CHAPTER 65 General Provisions Applicable to Counties, Cities, and Other Local Units

Miscellaneous General Provisions

65.003. Codes of ethics for city, county, charter county, urban-county government, and consolidated local government officials and employees — Codes of ethics for boards, officers, and employees of special purpose governmental entities — Interlocal agreements — Delegation of council’s subpoena power to investigate code of ethics violations.

    1. The governing body of each city, county, urban-county, consolidated local government, and charter county, shall adopt, by ordinance, a code of ethics which shall apply to all elected officials of the city, county, urban-county, consolidated local government, or charter county, and to appointed officials and employees of the city, county, urban-county, consolidated local government, or charter county government, or agencies created jointly, as specified in the code of ethics. The elected officials of a city, county, or consolidated local government to which a code of ethics shall apply include the mayor, county judge/executive, members of the governing body, county clerk, county attorney, sheriff, jailer, coroner, surveyor, and constable but do not include members of any school board. Agencies created jointly may include planning or administrative commissions or boards. Candidates for the local government elective offices specified in this subsection shall comply with the annual financial disclosure statement filing requirements contained in the code of ethics. (1) (a) The governing body of each city, county, urban-county, consolidated local government, and charter county, shall adopt, by ordinance, a code of ethics which shall apply to all elected officials of the city, county, urban-county, consolidated local government, or charter county, and to appointed officials and employees of the city, county, urban-county, consolidated local government, or charter county government, or agencies created jointly, as specified in the code of ethics. The elected officials of a city, county, or consolidated local government to which a code of ethics shall apply include the mayor, county judge/executive, members of the governing body, county clerk, county attorney, sheriff, jailer, coroner, surveyor, and constable but do not include members of any school board. Agencies created jointly may include planning or administrative commissions or boards. Candidates for the local government elective offices specified in this subsection shall comply with the annual financial disclosure statement filing requirements contained in the code of ethics.
    2. The boards, officers, and employees of special purpose governmental entities shall be subject to a code of ethics as provided in KRS 65A.070 . As used in this section, special purpose governmental entity has the same meaning as in KRS 65A.010 .
  1. Any city, county, or consolidated local government may enter into a memorandum of agreement or an interlocal agreement with one (1) or more other cities, counties, or consolidated local governments for joint adoption of a code of ethics which shall apply to all elected officials of the cities, counties, or consolidated local governments, and to appointed officials and employees as specified by each of the cities, counties, or consolidated local governments which enters into the agreement. Interlocal agreements shall be executed pursuant to the Interlocal Cooperation Act in KRS 65.210 to 65.300 . The interlocal agreement or memorandum of agreement may provide for but shall not be limited to:
    1. The provision of administrative services relating to the implementation of a code of ethics;
    2. The creation of a regional ethics board which serves independently to provide advice to member governments and their officials and provides for the enforcement of locally adopted codes of ethics; and
    3. Contracting by a memorandum of agreement with an area development district for the provision of administrative services relating to the implementation of a code of ethics. Candidates for the city, county, or consolidated local government elective offices specified in this subsection shall comply with the annual financial disclosure statement filing requirements contained in the code of ethics.
  2. Each code of ethics adopted as provided by subsection (1) or (2) of this section, or amended as provided by subsection (4) of this section, shall include but not be limited to provisions which set forth:
    1. Standards of conduct for elected and appointed officials and employees;
    2. Requirements for creation of financial disclosure statements, which shall be filed annually by all candidates for the city, county, or consolidated local government elective offices specified in subsection (1) of this section, elected officials of each city, county, or consolidated local government, and other officials or employees of the city, county, or consolidated local government, as specified in the code of ethics, and which shall be filed with the person or group responsible for enforcement of the code of ethics;
    3. A policy on the employment of members of the families of officials or employees of the city, county, or consolidated local government, as specified in the code of ethics;
    4. The designation of a person or group who shall be responsible for enforcement of the code of ethics, including maintenance of financial disclosure statements, all of which shall be available for public inspection, receipt of complaints alleging possible violations of the code of ethics, issuance of opinions in response to inquiries relating to the code of ethics, investigation of possible violations of the code of ethics, and imposition of penalties provided in the code of ethics.
  3. The code of ethics ordinance adopted by a city, county, or consolidated local government may be amended but shall not be repealed.
    1. Within twenty-one (21) days of the adoption of the code of ethics required by this section, each city, county, or consolidated local government shall deliver a copy of the ordinance by which the code was adopted and proof of publication in accordance with KRS Chapter 424 to the Department for Local Government. The Department for Local Government shall maintain the ordinances as public records and shall maintain a list of city, county, or consolidated local governments which have adopted a code of ethics and a list of those which have not adopted a code of ethics. (5) (a) Within twenty-one (21) days of the adoption of the code of ethics required by this section, each city, county, or consolidated local government shall deliver a copy of the ordinance by which the code was adopted and proof of publication in accordance with KRS Chapter 424 to the Department for Local Government. The Department for Local Government shall maintain the ordinances as public records and shall maintain a list of city, county, or consolidated local governments which have adopted a code of ethics and a list of those which have not adopted a code of ethics.
    2. Within twenty-one (21) days of the amendment of a code of ethics required by this section, each city, county, or consolidated local government shall:
      1. Deliver a copy of the ordinance by which the code was amended and proof of publication in accordance with KRS Chapter 424 to the Department for Local Government, which shall maintain the amendment with the ordinance by which the code was adopted; and
      2. Deliver a copy of the ordinance by which the code was amended to the governing body of each special purpose governmental entity that follows that establishing entity’s code of ethics pursuant to KRS 65A.070 .
    3. For ordinances adopting or amending a code of ethics under this section, cities of the first class and consolidated local governments shall comply with the publication requirements of KRS 83A.060(9), notwithstanding the exception contained in that statute.
  4. If a city, county, or consolidated local government fails to comply with the requirements of this section, the Department for Local Government shall notify all state agencies, including area development districts, which deliver services or payments of money from the Commonwealth to the city, county, or consolidated local government. Those agencies shall suspend delivery of all services or payments to the city, county, or consolidated local government which fails to comply with the requirements of this section. The Department for Local Government shall immediately notify those same agencies when the city, county, or consolidated local government is in compliance with the requirements of this section, and those agencies shall reinstate the delivery of services or payments to the city, county, or consolidated local government.
  5. Notwithstanding KRS 67C.103(14)(e), a simple majority of the legislative council of a consolidated local government may delegate its authority to issue administrative subpoenas for the attendance and testimony of witnesses and the production of documents relevant to possible violations of the code of ethics to the person or a majority of the group responsible for enforcement of a code of ethics. Subpoenas shall be served in the same manner as subpoenas for witnesses in civil cases. Compliance with the subpoenas shall be enforceable by the Circuit Court. Any failure to obey an order of the court may be punished by the court as contempt thereof.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1994, ch. 16, § 1, effective July 15, 1994; 1996, ch. 214, § 1, effective July 15, 1996; 1998, ch. 69, § 29, effective July 15, 1998; 2002, ch. 291, § 1, effective July 15, 2002; 2002, ch. 346, § 22, effective July 15, 2002; 2007, ch. 47, § 40, effective June 26, 2007; 2010, ch. 117, § 46, effective July 15, 2010; 2013, ch. 40, § 10, effective March 21, 2013; 2015 ch. 17, § 4, effective June 24, 2015; 2017 ch. 150, § 7, effective June 29, 2017.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(3/21/2013). Under the authority of KRS 7.136 , the Reviser of Statutes has corrected a manifest clerical or technical error in this statute. In subsection (1)(b), the word “have” has been changed to read “has.”

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Applicability.

As an independent municipal corporation, the metropolitan sewer district was not an agency of the county metro government within the meaning of KRS 65.003 . Therefore, the county metro ethics commission had no jurisdiction over the sewer district or its officials. Louisville/Jefferson County Metro Ethics Comm'n v. Schardein, 259 S.W.3d 510, 2008 Ky. App. LEXIS 225 (Ky. Ct. App. 2008).

2. Officials and Employees.

Under KRS 76.030(7) and 67C.139 , the metropolitan sewer district’s executive director and chief engineer, as appointees of the mayor, albeit appointed by the urban county government, were not “appointed officials and employees” of the urban county government within the meaning of KRS 65.003 . Therefore, the county metro ethics commission had no jurisdiction over the sewer district or its officials. Louisville/Jefferson County Metro Ethics Comm'n v. Schardein, 259 S.W.3d 510, 2008 Ky. App. LEXIS 225 (Ky. Ct. App. 2008).

Cited:

Ky. Exec. Branch Ethics Comm’n v. Atkinson, 339 S.W.3d 472, 2010 Ky. App. LEXIS 105 (Ky. Ct. App. 2010).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Department of Local Government has certain specific duties in relation to local ethics codes, such as to receive and hold as public records, copies of local ethics ordinances; it also has a “general” duty to determine compliance of a local ordinance with the “basic requirements” of this section. OAG 94-69 .

This section does not require local governments to adopt a code of ethics containing standards of conduct for every appointed official and employee. OAG 95-16 .

Joint city-county entities are not units of city or county governments for purposes of this section, and the members of the governing boards of such entities are not subject to the required ethics codes implemented by the governments which appointed them to those joint city-county boards and commissions. OAG 96-17 .

65.005. Notice to county clerk of establishment of political subdivision — Application of provisions only before July 1, 2014 — Transition to reporting requirements of KRS 65A.010 to 65A.090 — Duties of clerk — Fee — Notice by existing districts.

  1. The provisions of this section shall apply prior to July 1, 2014. On and after July 1, 2014, the provisions of this section shall no longer apply; instead the provisions of KRS 65A.010 to 65A.090 shall apply. Special districts shall cooperate with the Department for Local Government and the Auditor of Public Accounts to ensure an orderly transition from the reporting requirements of this section to the reporting requirements of KRS 65A.010 to 65A.090 . Notwithstanding the dates established by this subsection, the provisions of this section and KRS 65A.010 to 65A.090 shall be administered such that the registration required by KRS 65A.090(1) occurs as required by that subsection, and there is no gap in reporting by entities subject to this section and KRS 65A.010 to 65A.090 as the transition occurs.
    1. “Special district” means any agency, authority, or political subdivision of the state which exercises less than statewide jurisdiction and which is organized for the purpose of performing governmental or other prescribed functions within limited boundaries. It includes all political subdivisions of the state except a city, a county, or a school district. (2) (a) “Special district” means any agency, authority, or political subdivision of the state which exercises less than statewide jurisdiction and which is organized for the purpose of performing governmental or other prescribed functions within limited boundaries. It includes all political subdivisions of the state except a city, a county, or a school district.
    2. “Governing body” means the body possessing legislative authority in a city, county, or special district.
  2. No special district shall be legally created without sending notification of its existence in writing to the clerk of the county within the jurisdiction of which its principal office shall be located. This requirement for notification is in addition to all other provisions of existing law providing for the creation of special districts. The notification shall contain the names and addresses of the members of the governing body of the district, the name and address of its chief executive officer, a specific reference to the statute or statutes under which it was created, and a brief description of its service area and activities. The clerk shall record the original and forward a copy of the notification to the state local finance officer and the state local debt officer, Department for Local Government. The clerk shall be paid a fee of two dollars ($2) by the district for recording and mailing the notification.
  3. The governing body of any existing special district shall submit notification as required in subsection (3) of this section within thirty (30) days after June 16, 1966, and the governing body of a newly created special district shall submit the required notification at or before its first meeting.

History. Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 128; 1974, ch. 74, Art. II, § 9(1); 1978, ch. 384, § 134, effective June 17, 1978; 1994, ch. 508, § 20, effective July 15, 1994; 1998, ch. 69, § 30, effective July 15, 1998; 1998, ch. 85, § 3, effective July 15, 1998; 2007, ch. 47, § 41, effective June 26, 2007; 2010, ch. 117, § 47, effective July 15, 2010; 2013, ch. 40, § 11, effective March 21, 2013.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(7/15/98). This section was amended by 1998 Ky. Acts chs. 69 and 85. Where these Acts are not in conflict, they have been codified together. Where a conflict exists, Acts ch. 85, which was last enacted by the General Assembly, prevails under KRS 446.250 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

1. Water District.

Water district was entitled to governmental immunity in a case where flooding was caused after an employee failed to turn off water to a residence. The water district was a state agency engaged in a governmental function, pursuant to KRS 65.005(1)(a). South Woodford Water Dist. v. Byrd, 352 S.W.3d 340, 2011 Ky. App. LEXIS 153 (Ky. Ct. App. 2011), overruled, N. Ky. Water Dist. v. Carucci, 2019 Ky. LEXIS 276 (Ky. Aug. 29, 2019).

2. Development District.

Trial court erred in denying a development district's directed verdict motion as to its status under the Kentucky Whistleblower Act where although its statutory origin, Ky. Rev, Stat. Ann. § 65.005(2)(a), defined it as a political subdivision of the state, the employee had not presented sufficient evidence as to what state functions it performed. 2015 Ky. App. LEXIS 18 .

Cited:

Northern Kentucky Port Authority, Inc. v. Cornett, 700 S.W.2d 392, 1985 Ky. LEXIS 258 ( Ky. 1985 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

An urban renewal agency comes within the definition of “special district” set forth in this section. OAG 75-490 .

The failure of a water district to notify the clerk of the county court of its existence does not deprive the water district of its status as a legal entity. OAG 76-285 .

A community action corporation organized and functioning pursuant to the terms and provisions of KRS 273.410 to 273.455 (now 273.410 to 273.453 ) is a “district” for purposes of KRS 65.060 to 65.070 and can be a “special district” as defined in this section, since the definition includes an “agency,” if such community action corporation has been designated as an agency of a city or county government under KRS 273.435 . OAG 82-196 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Continuance of public ways, KRS 178.020 .

Conveyance of buildings by county building commission, KRS 67.465 .

Corporate powers of cities, KRS 82.081 .

Conveyance of real estate by cities, KRS 82.081 .

Conveyance of real estate by fiscal court, KRS 67.080 .

Dedication of public way or easement, procedure, KRS 82.400 .

Procedure for closing public ways, KRS 82.405 .

ALR

Power of municipal corporation to lease or sublet property owned or leased by it. 47 A.L.R.3d 19.

65.007. Removal of appointed member of special district governing body — Hearing — Appeal.

  1. Unless otherwise provided by state law, an appointed member of the governing body of a special district may be removed from office by the appointing authority after a hearing with notice as required by KRS Chapter 424 for inefficiency, neglect of duty, malfeasance or conflict of interest. The hearing shall be initiated and chaired by the appointing authority, who shall prepare a written statement setting forth the reasons for removal. The member to be removed shall be notified of his proposed removal and the reasons therefor by registered mail sent to his last known address at least ten (10) days prior to the hearing. The person to be removed may employ counsel to represent him. A record of the hearing shall be made by the appointing authority.
  2. Where the removal of an appointed member of a special district governing body is by the county judge/executive pursuant to subsection (1) of this section, the removal shall be subject to the approval of the fiscal court.
  3. A member removed pursuant to this section may appeal, within ten (10) days of the rendering of the decision or the approval of the fiscal court if required, to the Circuit Court of the county of the appointing authority. The scope of the appeal shall be limited to whether the appointing authority or the fiscal court abused their discretion in removing the member.

History. Enact. Acts 1980, ch. 18, § 1, effective July 15, 1980.

Opinions of Attorney General.

There is no conflict of interest where a commissioner of a water district is also president of the local bank which purchased the refinancing bonds of the district and in which the funds of the district are deposited in a checking account. OAG 80-654 .

65.008. Expiration of term of appointed member of governing body of authority.

  1. At least sixty (60) days before the expiration of the term of office of an appointed member of a district’s governing body, the district shall notify the appointing authority of the forthcoming expiration of the term of the appointed member of the district’s governing body.
  2. Unless otherwise provided by law, appointed members of district governing bodies shall serve until their successors are appointed and qualified. The failure of an appointing authority to appoint a successor or, if the appointing authority’s appointment is subject to the approval of a legislative body, to nominate a successor within sixty (60) days of the expiration of the term of office of a member of a district governing body shall constitute the reappointment of that member for another term of office.

History. Enact. Acts 1984, ch. 63, § 3, effective July 13, 1984.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

Lewis LP Gas, Inc. v. Lambert, 113 S.W.3d 171, 2003 Ky. LEXIS 166 ( Ky. 2003 ), overruled in part, Hoskins v. Maricle, 150 S.W.3d 1, 2004 Ky. LEXIS 196 ( Ky. 2004 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

This section is not applicable where there were vacancies on the Planning and Zoning Commission for more than sixty days, because the statute refers only to “districts.” OAG 91-17 .

65.009. Ex officio member of district governing body — Designation by fiscal court.

  1. Except where the law provides that fiscal court members may serve as members of a district’s governing body, the fiscal court of the county in which the greater portion of the district’s population lies may, by resolution, designate one of its members to serve as an ex officio member of a district’s governing body. Fiscal court members shall be eligible for ex officio membership on a district’s governing body regardless of residency, political affiliation or other restrictions on board membership.
  2. The fiscal court shall notify the district of the designation of an ex officio member of the governing body and the district shall provide the ex officio member with notice of all regular and special meetings of the district’s governing body.
  3. An ex officio member of a district’s governing body designated pursuant to this section shall not be counted in determining a quorum nor shall he vote on matters before the district’s governing body.
  4. An ex officio member of a district’s governing body designated pursuant to this section shall receive no compensation or reimbursement for expenses for attending meetings of the district’s governing body.
  5. An ex officio member of a district’s governing body designated pursuant to this section shall serve in such capacity at the pleasure of the fiscal court.
  6. The provisions of this section shall not apply to a district established by a city or cities.

History. Enact. Acts 1984, ch. 63, § 4, effective July 13, 1984; 2013, ch. 40, § 84, effective March 21, 2013.

65.010. Conveyance of real estate. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1958, ch. 21) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 82.081 .

65.012. Requirements for referendum petitions.

  1. All referendum petitions permitted by general law in KRS Chapters 65, 67, 67A, 67C, 68, 76, 81, 81A, 83A, 96, 96A, 97, 98, 99, 107, 108, 109, 132, 147, 157, 160, 162, 165, 173, 178, 183, 212, 230, 242, 243, 244, 262, 269, 424, and 436 and any referendum petitions permitted by other KRS chapters in accordance with Sections 60 and 171 of the Constitution of Kentucky shall include the:
    1. Printed name of the petitioner;
    2. Signature of the petitioner, or if the petitioner is a business or other organization, the signature of the legal representative of the business or organization;
    3. Year of birth of the petitioner if the petitioner is an individual other than a business or other organization;
    4. Residential address of the petitioner, or if the petitioner is a business or other organization, the address of the physical location of the business or organization that authorizes it to be a petitioner and, if different, the address of its headquarters; and
    5. Date that the petitioner signed the petition.
  2. Unless otherwise explicitly provided under the applicable law governing the petition, to be eligible to sign any referendum petition described in this section, a petitioner shall:
    1. Live in the district or jurisdiction that will be affected by the referendum or, if the petitioner is a business or other organization, have a physical address within the district or jurisdiction that will be affected by the referendum; and
    2. Be a registered voter if the petitioner is an individual other than a business or other organization.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 2012, ch. 54, § 1, effective July 12, 2012; 2018 ch. 155, § 3, effective July 14, 2018.

65.015. Legislative intention to occupy field regarding provisions of KRS 336.130.

The legislative body of any city, county, consolidated local government, urban-county government, charter county government, or unified local government shall not have the authority to adopt or enforce any ordinance, policy, or resolution that is in conflict with KRS 336.130 .

HISTORY: 2017 ch. 1, § 6, effective January 9, 2017.

65.016. Prohibition against requiring any employer to pay employee a certain wage or fringe benefit.

The legislative body of any city, county, consolidated local government, urban-county government, charter county government, or unified local government shall not have the authority to require any employer to pay to an employee a certain wage or fringe benefit other than as determined by the employer.

HISTORY: 2017 ch. 3, § 13, effective January 9, 2017.

65.020. City or county may become member of chamber of commerce. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 241, § 2) was repealed by Acts 1978, ch. 118, § 19, effective June 17, 1978.

65.025. Prohibitions relating to employment of entities providing architectural services and construction management services on capital construction projects — Effect of violation — Best value procurement criteria — Exception.

  1. As used in this section:
    1. “Employ” means to hire, retain, or otherwise contract with an individual or entity for goods or services;
    2. “Local government” means a city, county, charter county government, urban-county government, consolidated local government, or a special district;
    3. “Construction manager” means a person who coordinates and communicates the entire project process, clarifying cost and time consequences of design decisions as well as clarifying construction feasibility, and who manages the bidding, awarding, and construction phases of the project;
    4. “Design-build” means a system of contracting under which one (1) entity performs both architecture/engineering and construction under one (1) single contract;
    5. “Best value” means a procurement in which the decision is based on the primary objective of meeting the specific business requirements and best interests of the local government. These decisions shall be based on objective and quantifiable criteria that shall include price and that have been communicated to the offerors as set forth in the invitation for bids or request for proposals. Every invitation for bids or request for proposals shall provide that an item equal to that named or described in the specifications may be furnished. The specification may identify a sole brand in cases where, in the written opinion of the chief procurement officer, documented unique and valid conditions require compatibility, continuity, or conformity with established standards. An item shall be considered equal to the item named or described if, in the opinion of the owner and the design professional responsible for the specifications:
      1. It is at least equal in quality, durability, appearance, strength, design, and other criteria deemed appropriate;
      2. It will perform at least equally the function imposed by the general design for the public work being contracted for or the material being purchased; and
      3. It conforms substantially to the detailed requirements for the item in the specifications;
    6. “Capital project” means the construction, reconstruction, acquisition, installation, and improvement of public infrastructure that is owned by a local government and that serves a public purpose of the local government;
    7. “Private partner” means any entity that is a partner in a public-private partnership other than:
      1. The Commonwealth of Kentucky, or any agency or department thereof;
      2. The federal government;
      3. Any other local government;
      4. Any other state government; or
      5. Any agency of a state, federal, or local government; and
      1. “Public-private partnership” means a project delivery method for construction or financing of capital projects, or procurement of services, pursuant to a written public-private partnership agreement entered into pursuant to KRS 65.028 and administrative regulations promulgated thereunder, between: (h) 1. “Public-private partnership” means a project delivery method for construction or financing of capital projects, or procurement of services, pursuant to a written public-private partnership agreement entered into pursuant to KRS 65.028 and administrative regulations promulgated thereunder, between:
        1. At least one (1) private partner; and
        2. A local government.
      2. “Public-private partnership” does not include any traditional delivery method or method of procurement of goods or services entered into by a short-term contractual agreement between a local government and a private seller that terminates when the good or service is delivered, whether governed by the provisions of KRS 45A.343 to 45A.460 or 424.260 .
  2. A local government shall not employ the same entity to provide both architectural services and construction management services on the same capital construction project. No local government shall knowingly employ an officer, employee, or agent of, or an immediate family member of an officer, employee, or agent of:
    1. The architectural firm that provided the architectural services to also provide construction management services for the same capital construction project for which the architectural firm provided architectural services; or
    2. The construction management firm that provided the construction management services to also provide architectural services for the same capital construction project for which the construction management firm provided construction management services.
  3. A violation of subsection (2) of this section shall suspend the local government from receiving any financial assistance from the state, or any state agency, with respect to the project for which the architectural or construction management firm was employed until the matter is resolved.
  4. Local governments initiating a capital construction project shall incorporate, or shall require architects or construction managers in the employment of the local government to incorporate, best value procurement criteria in all invitations for bids or requests for proposals as provided for in subsection (1) of this section.
  5. Nothing in this section shall prohibit a local government from using:
    1. Design-build as a method of providing for capital construction services as long as best value contracting principles are followed as specified in subsection (1) of this section; or
    2. A public-private partnership as long as the provisions of KRS 65.028 are followed.

History. Enact. Acts 2001, ch. 154, § 1, effective June 21, 2001; 2008, ch. 47, § 4, effective July 15, 2008; 2016 ch. 67, § 4, effective April 8, 2016.

65.027. Reciprocal preference to be given to resident bidders by local governments.

  1. As used in this section, “local government” means city, county, urban-county, consolidated local government, charter county, unified local government, or special district.
  2. For all contracts awarded by a local government, the local government shall apply the reciprocal preference for resident bidders described in KRS 45A.494 .

History. Enact. Acts 2010, ch. 162, § 4, effective July 15, 2010.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(7/15/2010). The term “unified county” in subsection (1) of this section has been changed in codification to “unified local government” in order to use the correct, statutory term for a united city-county government and maintain consistency with the current text of the Kentucky Revised Statutes. This change was made by the Reviser of Statutes under the authority of KRS 7.136(1).

65.028. Public-private partnership delivery method of awarding contracts for capital construction projects — Kentucky Local Government Public-Private Partnership Board.

  1. As used in this section:
    1. “Best value” has the same meaning as in KRS 65.025 ;
    2. “Cabinet” means the Finance and Administration Cabinet;
    3. “Local government” means a city, county, charter county, urban-county government, consolidated local government, or unified local government of the Commonwealth;
    4. “Private partner” has the same meaning as in KRS 65.025 ; and
    5. “Public-private partnership” has the same meaning as in KRS 65.025.
  2. A public-private partnership delivery method may be utilized by a local government as provided in this section and administrative regulations promulgated thereunder. Contracts using this method shall be awarded by competitive negotiation on the basis of best value, and shall in all cases take effect only if executed by the legislative body of the local government. The provisions of KRS 65.025(2) to (4) shall not apply to public-private partnerships utilized by local governments.
  3. A local government utilizing a public-private partnership shall continue to be responsible for oversight of any function that is delegated to or otherwise performed by a private partner.
  4. A public-private partnership shall not be used to circumvent any requirements or restrictions placed upon any local government pursuant to any provision of the Kentucky Revised Statutes.
  5. All public-private partnership agreements executed by a local government or any of its agencies under this section shall be approved by the legislative body of the local government at a public meeting, and shall include at a minimum the following provisions:
      1. Property owned by a local government shall not be sold, conveyed, or disposed of in any way at any time; and (a) 1. Property owned by a local government shall not be sold, conveyed, or disposed of in any way at any time; and
      2. Leases issued by a local government to any party shall not be transferred in any way by that party; without the specific and express written consent of the legislative body of the local government;
    1. Require the private partner to provide or cause to be provided performance and payment bonds on the design and construction portion of the agreement as required under KRS 45A.435 and maintenance bonds, warranties, guarantees, and letters of credit in connection with the private partner’s other activities under the agreement, in the forms and amounts satisfactory to the local government and in amounts necessary to provide adequate protection to the local government;
    2. Review and approval of plans and specifications for the project by the local government;
    3. Inspection of the project by the local government to ensure that the private partner’s actions are acceptable to the local government in accordance with the agreement;
    4. Maintenance of public liability insurance or self-insurance, in form and amount satisfactory to the local government and reasonably sufficient to insure coverage of tort liability to the public and employees and to enable the continued operation of the project;
    5. Reimbursement to be paid to the local government for services provided by the local government;
    6. Filing of appropriate financial statements by the private partner on a periodic basis;
    7. Policies and procedures governing the rights and responsibilities of the local government and the private partner in the event the public-private partnership agreement is terminated or there is a material default by the private partner. These policies and procedures shall include conditions governing assumption of the duties and responsibilities of the private partner by the local government, and the transfer or purchase of property or other interests of the private partner by the local government;
    8. Any fees or payments as may be established by agreement of the private partner and the local government;
    9. A detailed description of all duties and requirements of the private partner;
    10. The ability of a private partner or partners to quickly respond to the needs presented in the request for proposal, and the importance of economic development opportunities represented by the qualifying project. In evaluating proposals, preference shall be given to a plan that includes the involvement of small businesses as subcontractors, to the extent that small businesses can provide services in a competitive manner, unless any preference interferes with the qualification for federal or other funds; and
    11. Any other information necessary to properly address the life cycle of the agreement, including the disposition of assets if or when the public-private partnership agreement is terminated or otherwise concludes.
    1. On or before December 31, 2016, the secretary of the Finance and Administration Cabinet shall promulgate administrative regulations setting forth criteria to be used by a local government employing a public-private partnership for a particular project, and establishing a process for public- private partnership procurement undertaken by local governments consistent with this section. Prior to submission of the proposed administrative regulations pursuant to the regulatory process required by KRS Chapter 13A, the proposed administrative regulations shall be approved by the Kentucky Local Government Public-Private Partnership Board established by subsection (11) of this section. (6) (a) On or before December 31, 2016, the secretary of the Finance and Administration Cabinet shall promulgate administrative regulations setting forth criteria to be used by a local government employing a public-private partnership for a particular project, and establishing a process for public- private partnership procurement undertaken by local governments consistent with this section. Prior to submission of the proposed administrative regulations pursuant to the regulatory process required by KRS Chapter 13A, the proposed administrative regulations shall be approved by the Kentucky Local Government Public-Private Partnership Board established by subsection (11) of this section.
    2. The secretary shall consult with design-builders, construction managers, contractors, design professionals including engineers and architects, and other appropriate professionals during the development of these administrative regulations.
    3. The secretary shall have the authority to contract with a consultant, pursuant to KRS 45A.695 , to assist the cabinet and the Kentucky Local Government Public-Private Partnership Board with the review process required in subsection (12) of this section. The secretary may, through administrative regulation, impose a reasonable fee on the private partner to defray the cost of the review required in subsection (12) of this section, including any expenses or fees incurred in contracting with a consultant.
    4. If the secretary fails to timely promulgate administrative regulations pursuant to this subsection, local governments may then act pursuant to this section including compliance with the process outlined in subsection (12) of this section, in the absence of administrative regulations.
  6. A request for proposal for a local government project utilizing a public-private partnership shall include at a minimum:
    1. The parameters of the proposed public-private partnership agreement;
    2. The duties and responsibilities to be performed by the private partner or partners;
    3. The methods of oversight to be employed by the local government;
    4. The duties and responsibilities that are to be performed by the local government and any other partners to the contract;
    5. The evaluation factors and the relative weight of each to be used in the scoring of awards; and
    6. Other information required by a local government to evaluate the proposals submitted by respondents and the overall proposed public-private partnership.
  7. A private entity desiring to be a private partner shall demonstrate to the satisfaction of the local government that it is capable of performing any duty, responsibility, or function it may be authorized or directed to perform as part of the public-private partnership agreement.
  8. When a request for proposal for a project utilizing a public-private partnership is issued, the local government shall transmit a copy of the request for proposal to the cabinet and to the Department for Local Government.
  9. A request for proposal or other solicitation may be canceled, or all proposals may be rejected, if it is determined in writing that the action is taken in the best interest of the local government and approved by the legislative body.
    1. There is established within the cabinet the Kentucky Local Government Public-Private Partnership Board, composed of eleven (11) members as follows: (11) (a) There is established within the cabinet the Kentucky Local Government Public-Private Partnership Board, composed of eleven (11) members as follows:
      1. The secretary of the cabinet, or the secretary’s designee;
      2. Two (2) individuals appointed by the Kentucky League of Cities, both of whom shall have experience in municipal financial operations;
      3. Two (2) individuals appointed by the Kentucky Association of Counties, both of whom shall have experience in county financial operations, one (1) to be recommended by the Kentucky County Judge/Executive Association and one (1) to be recommended by the Kentucky County Magistrates and Commissioners Association;
      4. The commissioner of the Department for Local Government, or the commissioner’s designee;
      5. The executive director of the Office of Financial Management within the cabinet, or the executive director’s designee;
      6. The Auditor of Public Accounts, or the Auditor’s designee;
      7. One (1) citizen member appointed by the Governor, who shall have experience and knowledge in local government debt and financial operations; and
      8. Two (2) members of the Kentucky General Assembly, one (1) appointed by the President of the Senate and one (1) appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, each of whom shall serve in a nonvoting ex officio capacity and shall not be considered for purposes of determining a quorum.
    2. Members of the board shall begin their terms on August 1, 2016, and shall serve for a term of four (4) years.
    3. Board members appointed under paragraph (a)2. and 3. of this subsection may send a designee with similar experience to meetings for which they are unavailable.
    4. Vacancies occurring in the term of any member shall be filled in the same manner as the original appointment.
    5. The members of the board shall receive no compensation for their services.
    6. The secretary of the cabinet, or the secretary’s designee, shall serve as chair of the board and the members shall elect a vice chair from among the membership of the board. The vice chair may preside over meetings of the board in the absence of the chair.
    7. The board shall meet at least once per year, and as needed for the timely consideration of proposed projects. A majority of the members of the board shall constitute a quorum.
    8. The secretary of the cabinet shall be responsible for providing staff support and maintaining complete records of the board’s actions and proceedings, as public records open to inspection.
    1. Upon the initial issuance of a public-private partnership agreement having a total contractual value that equals or exceeds thirty percent (30%) of the general fund revenues received by the local government in the immediately preceding fiscal year, the local government shall submit the agreement to the cabinet for the sole purpose of making an evaluation to the Kentucky Local Government Public-Private Partnership Board of the following: (12) (a) Upon the initial issuance of a public-private partnership agreement having a total contractual value that equals or exceeds thirty percent (30%) of the general fund revenues received by the local government in the immediately preceding fiscal year, the local government shall submit the agreement to the cabinet for the sole purpose of making an evaluation to the Kentucky Local Government Public-Private Partnership Board of the following:
      1. Whether the agreement meets the requirements of subsection (5) of this section;
      2. An analysis of the overall project’s economic and financial viability within the scope of available or proposed financing arrangements and expected revenues; and
      3. Whether the agreement adheres to the procurement process required by subsection (2) of this section.

        Public-private partnership agreements having a total contractual value that is less than thirty percent (30%) of the general fund revenues received by the local government in the immediately preceding fiscal year shall not be required to be submitted to the cabinet or the Kentucky Local Government Public-Private Partnership Board.

    2. The local government shall submit any information required by the cabinet, relating to the agreement and its procurement, to enable the cabinet to conduct this evaluation.
    3. The cabinet shall acknowledge receipt of the agreement within thirty (30) days, and after evaluation thereof shall, within ninety (90) days of its receipt, forward the results of its evaluation separately to each individual member of the Kentucky Local Government Public-Private Partnership Board. The full board shall meet within sixty (60) days of the issuance of the cabinet’s evaluation to consider the evaluation provided by the cabinet and approve or disapprove the proposed agreement. If the board disapproves the project, the board shall provide specific reasons for its disapproval. If the board approves the project, the cabinet shall return the agreement to the local government legislative body for final execution thereof. No public-private partnership agreement issued by a local government that is subject to evaluation by the cabinet and review and approval by the Kentucky Local Government Public-Private Partnership Board pursuant to paragraph (a) of this subsection shall take effect unless and until it is approved by the Kentucky Local Government Public-Private Partnership Board pursuant to this subsection and is found by the board to meet the requirements of this section and to be economically viable as provided in this subsection.
    4. If an agreement is not approved by the board, the local government submitting the agreement may modify the agreement and resubmit it for reconsideration in accordance with this section.
  10. The Commonwealth shall bear no liability for public-private partnership agreements approved pursuant to subsection (12) of this section.
  11. Upon approval and execution of a public-private partnership agreement, the local government shall transmit a copy of the agreement to the Department for Local Government.
  12. The Auditor of Public Accounts may periodically review public-private partnership agreements executed by a local government pursuant to this section, and any actions undertaken by private partners and local governments thereunder, to evaluate compliance with the agreement and this section.
  13. Multiple local governments, acting in accordance with KRS 65.210 to 65.300 , may jointly enter into a public-private partnership pursuant to this section. Public-private partnership agreements involving multiple local governments shall only be required to be submitted to the cabinet for evaluation and to the Kentucky Local Government Public-Private Partnership Board for review and approval, as provided by subsection (12) of this section, if the total contractual value equals or exceeds thirty percent (30%) of the combined general fund revenues received in the immediately preceding fiscal year by all local governments participating in the agreement.
    1. A person or business may submit an unsolicited proposal to a local government, which may receive the unsolicited proposal. (17) (a) A person or business may submit an unsolicited proposal to a local government, which may receive the unsolicited proposal.
    2. Within ninety (90) days of receiving an unsolicited proposal, a local government may elect to consider further action on the proposal, at which point the local government shall provide public notice of the proposal pursuant to KRS Chapter 424 or electronically on the Web site of the local government, and shall:
      1. Provide specific information regarding the proposed nature, timing, and scope of the unsolicited proposal, except that trade secrets, financial records, or other records of the person or business making the proposal shall not be posted unless otherwise agreed to by the local government and the person or business; and
      2. Provide for a notice period of at least thirty (30) days and no more than ninety (90) days for the submission of competing proposals.
    3. Upon the end of the notice period provided under paragraph (b)2. of this subsection, the local government may consider the unsolicited proposal and any competing proposals received. If the local government determines it is in the best interest of the local government to implement some or all of the concepts contained within the unsolicited proposal or competing proposals received by it, the local government may begin an open, competitive procurement process to do so pursuant to this section.
    4. An unsolicited proposal shall be deemed rejected if no written response is received from the local government within ninety (90) days after submission, during which time the governmental body has not taken any action on the proposal under paragraph (b) of this subsection.

HISTORY: 2016 ch. 67, § 5, effective April 8, 2016; 2017 ch. 132, § 6, effective March 27, 2017.

65.030. Record-keeping by computer or other rapid-access data collection system.

Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, any unit of state, county or municipal government, or any court, may maintain any records by computer or other rapid-access data collection system, provided that those records which are public records shall be kept in a manner which will allow the public unlimited and speedy access to them.

History. Enact. Acts 1970, ch. 122, § 1.

65.040. Special purpose districts may be formed by two or more counties. [Renumbered.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section was renumbered as KRS 65.160 by the Reviser under authority of KRS 7.136 .

65.041. Disposition of firearms or ammunition owned by unit of local government — Disposition of proceeds upon sale.

KRS 45A.343 and 45A.425 to the contrary notwithstanding:

  1. When a police department, sheriff’s department, or other agency of city, county, urban-county, or charter county government or other unit of local government disposes of firearms or ammunition owned by that unit of local government, the disposition shall be by:
    1. Public auction to persons eligible under federal law to purchase the type of firearm or ammunition being offered for sale;
    2. Trade to the federally licensed firearms dealer providing new firearms or ammunition to the agency;
    3. Transfer to another government agency or government-operated museum in Kentucky for official use or display; or
    4. Sale to the employee to whom the firearm was issued, if all of the following provisions are satisfied:
      1. The firearm was issued to the employee as his or her service weapon;
      2. The employee is retiring or an employee’s service weapon is being replaced;
      3. The employee is otherwise authorized by law to own or possess the firearm; and
      4. The sale price of the firearm is the fair market value of the firearm, not to exceed the actual cost of the firearm to the unit of government; and
  2. If the firearms or ammunition are sold, the proceeds of the sale shall be utilized solely for the purchase of body armor meeting or exceeding National Institute of Justice standards, firearms, ammunition, or range facilities, or a combination thereof, by the agency of government.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1998, ch. 606, § 128, effective July 15, 1998; 2014, ch. 29, § 1, effective July 15, 2014; 2015 ch. 20, § 3, effective June 24, 2015.

65.045. Civil action against firearms or ammunition manufacturer, trade association, or dealer.

  1. The authority to bring suit and right to recover against any firearms or ammunition manufacturer, trade association, or dealer by or on behalf or any city, county, urban-county, charter county, special district, or other local governmental unit created by or pursuant to an act of the General Assembly or Constitution of Kentucky, or any department, agency, or authority thereof, for damages, abatement, or injunctive relief resulting from or relating to the lawful design, manufacture, marketing, or sale of firearms or ammunition to the public shall be reserved exclusively to the Commonwealth.
  2. This section shall not prohibit a city, county, urban-county, charter county, special district, or other local governmental unit created by or pursuant to an act of the General Assembly or Constitution of Kentucky from bringing an action against a firearms or ammunition manufacturer or dealer for breach of contract or warranty as to firearms or ammunition purchased by that unit of local government.

History. Enact. Acts 2000, ch. 213, § 1, effective July 14, 2000.

Compiler’s Notes.

Section 2 of Acts 2000, ch. 213, effective July 14, 2000, read: “As of the effective date of this Act [July 14, 2000], the provision of Section 1 of this Act [this section] shall apply to any lawsuit by, or on behalf of, entities prohibited from filing a lawsuit pursuant to Section 1 of this Act that has been filed and not concluded prior to the effective date of this Act. Any lawsuit in progress which violates Section 1 of this Act shall, as of the effective date of this Act, be dismissed.”

65.050. Special purpose districts may be expanded to include additional counties. [Renumbered.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section was renumbered as KRS 65.162 by the Reviser under authority of KRS 7.136 .

65.055. Duty of county judge/executives and mayors to distribute information to local officials and board members — Electronic distribution permitted.

    1. County judge/executives and mayors, or their respective designees, shall distribute the written information provided by the Office of the Attorney General and the Department for Libraries and Archives under KRS 15.257 and 171.223 to each elected official and each member, whether elected or appointed, of every county and city legislative body, local government board, commission, authority, and committee, including boards of special districts, located within their respective jurisdictions. In the case of a board, commission, or authority created by joint action of a county or city, the county judge/executive and mayor, or their respective designees, shall distribute the written information to the members appointed by their respective jurisdictions. Distribution shall be accomplished within sixty (60) days of receiving the written information from the Office of the Attorney General and the Department for Libraries and Archives. The distribution may be by electronic means. (1) (a) County judge/executives and mayors, or their respective designees, shall distribute the written information provided by the Office of the Attorney General and the Department for Libraries and Archives under KRS 15.257 and 171.223 to each elected official and each member, whether elected or appointed, of every county and city legislative body, local government board, commission, authority, and committee, including boards of special districts, located within their respective jurisdictions. In the case of a board, commission, or authority created by joint action of a county or city, the county judge/executive and mayor, or their respective designees, shall distribute the written information to the members appointed by their respective jurisdictions. Distribution shall be accomplished within sixty (60) days of receiving the written information from the Office of the Attorney General and the Department for Libraries and Archives. The distribution may be by electronic means.
    2. The distribution of materials to members who have been elected or appointed after the most recent distribution of materials as required in paragraph (a) of this subsection has occurred shall be accomplished within sixty (60) days of the day their term of office begins. The distribution may be by electronic means.
  1. County judge/executives and mayors shall require signatory proof that each person identified in subsection (1) of this section has received the written information, shall maintain documentation of receipt on file, and shall certify to the Office of the Attorney General that the written information has been distributed as required.

History. Enact. Acts 2005, ch. 45, § 3, effective June 20, 2005; 2014, ch. 5, § 1, effective July 15, 2014.

65.060. Definition of district.

As used in KRS 65.008 , 65.009 , 65.065 and 65.070 , the term “district” shall mean and the provisions of KRS 65.008 , 65.009 , 65.065 and 65.070 shall apply to any board, commission, or special district created pursuant to the following statutes: KRS 39F.020 , 39F.160 ; KRS 65.160 , 65.162 , 65.210 to 65.300 , 65.510 to 65.650 ; KRS 74.010 to 74.415 ; KRS 75.010 to 75.260 ; KRS 76.005 to 76.210 , 76.241 to 76.273 , 76.274 to 76.279 , 76.295 to 76.420 , 76.600 to 76.640 ; KRS 77.005 to 77.305 ; KRS 80.262 to 80.610 ; KRS 91A.350 to 91A.390 ; KRS 96A.010 to 96A.230 ; KRS 104.450 to 104.680 ; KRS 107.310 to 107.500 ; KRS 108.010 to 108.070 , 108.080 to 108.180 ; KRS 109.056 , 109.059 , 109.115 to 109.190 ; KRS 147.610 to 147.705 ; KRS 147A.050 to 147A.120 ; KRS 154.50-301 to 154.50-346 ; KRS 164.605 to 164.675 ; KRS 173.450 to 173.650 , 173.710 to 173.800 ; KRS 179.700 to 179.735 ; KRS 183.132 to 183.160 ; KRS 184.010 to 184.300 ; KRS 210.460 to 210.480 ; KRS 212.720 to 212.755 ;KRS 216.310 to 216.360 ; KRS 220.010 to 220.613 ; KRS 262.100 to 262.660 , 262.700 to 262.990 ; KRS 266.010 to 266.990 ; KRS 267.010 to 267.990 ; KRS 268.010 to 268.990 ; or KRS 273.405 to 273.453 .

History. Enact. Acts 1980, ch. 30, § 1, effective July 15, 1980; 1982, ch. 253, § 12, effective July 15, 1982; 1982, ch. 453, § 22, effective July 15, 1982; 1984, ch. 63, § 1, effective July 13, 1984; 1984, ch. 308, § 16, effective July 13, 1984; 1984, ch. 4, § 1, effective July 15, 1986; 1992, ch. 383, § 3, effective July 14, 1992; 1998, ch. 226, § 112, effective July 15, 1998; 2008, ch. 6, § 1, effective July 15, 2008; 2020 ch. 21, § 13, effective March 17, 2020.

Opinions of Attorney General.

A community action corporation organized and functioning pursuant to the terms and provisions of KRS 273.410 to 273.455 (now KRS 273.410 to 273.453 ) is a “district” for purposes of KRS 65.060 to 65.070 and can be a “special district” as defined in KRS 65.005 , since the definition includes an “agency,” if such community action corporation has been designated as an agency of a city or county government under KRS 273.435 . OAG 82-196 .

A hospital district organized pursuant to KRS 216.310 to 216.360 is a “district” for purposes of KRS 65.070 requiring special districts to file annual statements. OAG 82-631 .

The definition of a district in this section does not extend to a city-county parks and recreation board created pursuant to KRS 97.035 . OAG 83-327 .

The community action agencies organized and functioning pursuant to KRS 273.405 to 273.453 are districts as that term is used in KRS 65.060 to 65.070 , and, as a district, these community action agencies may be considered local governmental units. OAG 86-7 .

65.065. Budgets — Application only to fiscal periods ending before July 1, 2014 — Transition to requirements of KRS 65A.010 to 65A.090 — Filing — Financial statements — Audits — Enforcement.

  1. The provisions of this section shall apply for fiscal periods ending prior to July 1, 2014. For fiscal periods beginning on or after July 1, 2014, the provisions of this section shall no longer apply; instead, the provisions of KRS 65A.010 to 65A.090 shall apply. Districts shall cooperate with the Department for Local Government and the Auditor of Public Accounts to ensure an orderly transition from the reporting requirements of this section to the reporting requirements of KRS 65A.010 to 65A.090 . Notwithstanding the dates established by this subsection, the provisions of this section and KRS 65A.010 to 65A.090 shall be administered such that the registration required by KRS 65A.090(1) occurs as required by that subsection, and there is no gap in reporting by entities subject to this section and KRS 65A.010 to 65A.090 as the transition occurs.
  2. The governing body of each district shall annually prepare a budget and, as appropriate, shall classify budget units in the same fashion as county budgets are classified in accordance with KRS 68.240(2) to (5). The state local finance officer shall prepare standard budget forms for district use and shall furnish them to county clerks for distribution to district officers. No moneys shall be expended from any funds or any sources, except in accordance with the budget which has been filed with the fiscal court to be available for public inspection. No budget of a district shall become effective until filed with the fiscal court of the county in which the district is located for submission to the Department for Local Government. For those districts with multicounty jurisdictions, the district shall file a copy with each of the fiscal courts within the jurisdiction of the district for their review. If the budget is not filed with the fiscal court at least thirty (30) days prior to the start of the district fiscal year, the fiscal court shall immediately notify the county attorney. The county attorney shall then notify the governing board of the special district of the noncompliance and then proceed with any steps necessary to prevent the expenditure of funds by the special district until the district is in compliance.
  3. The governing body of each district which for the year in question receives from all sources or expends for all purposes less than seven hundred fifty thousand dollars ($750,000) shall annually prepare a financial statement, except that once every four (4) years the district’s governing body shall provide for the performance of an audit as provided in subsection (5) of this section.
  4. The governing body of each district which for the year in question receives from all sources or expends for all purposes seven hundred fifty thousand dollars ($750,000) or more shall provide for the performance of an annual audit as provided in subsection (5) of this section.
  5. To provide for the performance of an audit, the governing body of a district shall employ an independent certified public accountant or contract with the Auditor of Public Accounts to perform an audit of the funds in the district budget. The audit shall conform to:
    1. Generally accepted governmental auditing standards, which means those standards for audits of governmental organizations, programs, activities, and functions issued by the Comptroller General of the United States; and
    2. Additional procedures and reporting requirements as may be required by the Auditor of Public Accounts. A unit of government furnishing funds directly to a district may require additional audits at its own expense. Upon request, the State Auditor of Public Accounts may review the final report and all related work papers and documents of the independent certified public accountant relating to the audit. If a district is required by law to audit its funds more often than is required by this section, it shall perform those audits and may submit them in lieu of the requirements of this section, if the audits meet the requirements of this subsection.
  6. The provisions of subsection (3) of this section shall not apply to any district that is required by law to annually submit a financial report to an agency of state government. The districts shall annually submit a copy of their financial report to the county judge/executive and to the state local finance officer and once every four (4) years provide for the performance of an audit as provided in subsection (5) of this section.
  7. Any resident of the district may bring an action in the Circuit Court to enforce the provisions of this section. The Circuit Court shall hear the action and, on a finding that the governing body of the district has violated the provisions of this section, shall order the district to comply with the provisions. The Circuit Court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the district, a reasonable attorney’s fee and court costs, to be paid from the district’s treasury.

History. Enact. Acts 1980, ch. 30, § 2, effective July 15, 1980; 1984, ch. 62, § 1, effective July 13, 1984; 1996, ch. 64, § 1, effective July 15, 1996; 1998, ch. 506, § 1, effective July 15, 1998; 2002, ch. 239, § 1, effective July 15, 2002; 2007, ch. 47, § 42, effective June 26, 2007; 2007, ch. 114, § 1, effective June 26, 2007; 2010, ch. 117, § 48, effective July 15, 2010; 2013, ch. 40, § 12, effective March 21, 2013.

Opinions of Attorney General.

The special district budget forms properly used by the district should be considered as the operational budget, not merely as an informational document. OAG 80-628 .

The state local finance officer may change any form or classification of district budgets, and may devise a budget form designed to accommodate federally approved budget forms where federal funding of the district is involved. OAG 80-628 .

65.067. Bond required of persons handling public funds — Compliance by elected officials and their employees.

  1. All officers, officials, and employees of cities, counties, urban-county governments, charter county governments, a regional wastewater commission, and special districts who handle public funds in the execution of their duties shall give a good and sufficient bond to the local governing body for the faithful and honest performance of his or her duties and as security for all money coming into that person’s hands or under that person’s control. The bond amount shall be based upon the maximum amount of public funds the officer, official, or employee handles at any given time during a fiscal year cycle. The local governing body shall pay the cost of the bond.
  2. Elected officials who post bond as required by statute, and employees of their offices covered by a blanket or umbrella bond, shall be deemed to have complied with subsection (1) of this section.

History. Enact. Acts 2000, ch. 332, § 1, effective July 14, 2000; 2011, ch. 98, § 17, effective June 8, 2011.

65.068. Fees for fingerprint impressions or photograph requested for professional, trade, or commercial purposes or personal use.

  1. Any city, county, charter county, urban-county government, consolidated local government, unified local government, or special district, or any agency or instrumentality thereof, may charge a fee of ten dollars ($10) per set of fingerprint impressions taken and five dollars ($5) per photograph taken or copied when those services are requested by a person for professional, trade, or commercial purposes or for personal use.
  2. If the Department of Kentucky State Police sets new fingerprinting and photograph fees under the provisions of KRS 16.068 , any city, county, charter county, urban-county government, consolidated local government, unified local government, or special district, or any agency or instrumentality thereof, may increase fingerprinting and photograph fees to equal those fees established by the Department of Kentucky State Police through administrative regulations.
  3. Nothing in this section shall change any other fee allocation allowed by statute.

History. Enact. Acts 2014, ch. 135, § 4, effective July 15, 2014.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(7/15/2014). In codification, the Reviser of Statutes has inserted “unified local government,” after “consolidated local government,” in subsection (2) of this statute to match the way the types of government are listed in subsection (1) of this statute. “Unified local government” was inadvertently omitted from subsection (2) in 2014 Ky. Acts ch. 135, sec. 4, and the Reviser of Statutes has corrected this manifest clerical or typographical error under the authority of KRS 7.136 (h).

65.070. Filing with county clerk and fiscal court — Application of provisions only to fiscal periods ending before July 1, 2014 — Transition to requirements of KRS 65A.010 to 65A.090 — Publication of descriptive information on the district — Submission of audit to fiscal court — Department for Local Government to furnish standard reporting forms to county clerks — Enforcement.

  1. The provisions of this section shall apply for fiscal periods ending prior to July 1, 2014. For fiscal periods beginning on and after July 1, 2014, the provisions of this section shall no longer apply; instead, the provisions of KRS 65A.010 to 65A.090 shall apply. Districts shall cooperate with the Department for Local Government and the Auditor of Public Accounts to ensure an orderly transition from the reporting requirements of this section to the reporting requirements of KRS 65A.010 to 65A.090 . Notwithstanding the dates established by this subsection, the provisions of this section and KRS 65A.010 to 65A.090 shall be administered such that the registration required by KRS 65A.090(1) occurs as required by that subsection, and there is no gap in reporting by entities subject to this section and KRS 65A.010 to 65A.090 as the transition occurs.
  2. Within sixty (60) days following the close of the fiscal year, the district shall:
    1. File with the county clerk of each county with territory in the district a certification showing any of the following information that has changed since the last filing by the district:
      1. The name of the district;
      2. A map or general description of its service area;
      3. The statutory authority under which it was created; and
      4. The names, addresses, and the date of expiration of the terms of office of the members of its governing body and chief executive officer;
    2. Submit for review a copy of the summary financial statement with the fiscal court of each county with territory in the district; and
    3. Publish, in lieu of the provisions of KRS 424.220 , but in compliance with other applicable provisions of KRS Chapter 424, the names and addresses of the members of its governing body and chief executive officer, and either a summary financial statement, which includes the location of supporting documents, or the location of district financial records which may be examined by the public.
  3. The district shall submit for review a copy of the audit with the fiscal court of each county with territory in the district. The submission shall be made within thirty (30) days of the district’s receipt of the completed audit.
  4. The Department for Local Government shall prepare and furnish to county clerks standard reporting forms which districts may use to comply with the provisions of this section.
  5. Any resident of the district may bring an action in the Circuit Court to enforce the provisions of this section. The Circuit Court shall hear the action and, on a finding that the governing body of the district has violated the provisions of this section, shall order the district to comply with its provisions. The Circuit Court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the district, a reasonable attorney’s fee and court costs, to be paid from the district’s treasury.

History. Enact. Acts 1980, ch. 30, § 3, effective July 15, 1980; 1982, ch. 393, § 41, effective July 15, 1982; 1984, ch. 62, § 2, effective July 13, 1984; 1984, ch. 63, § 2, effective July 13, 1984; 1994, ch. 508, § 21, effective July 15, 1994; 1996, ch. 321, § 1, effective July 15, 1996; 1998, ch. 69, § 31, effective July 15, 1998; 1998, ch. 506, § 2, effective July 15, 1998; 2002, ch. 239, § 2, effective July 15, 2002; 2007, ch. 47, § 43, effective June 26, 2007; 2010, ch. 117, § 49, effective July 15, 2010; 2013, ch. 40, § 13, effective March 21, 2013.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(7/15/98). This section was amended by 1998 Ky. Acts chs. 69 and 506. Where these Acts are not in conflict, they have been codified together. Where a conflict exists, Acts ch. 506, which was last enacted by the General Assembly, prevails under KRS 446.250 .

Opinions of Attorney General.

Where a local health department is co-extensive with a public health taxing district with all its income and disbursements recorded in the district’s financial records, subsection (1)(c) of this section demonstrates an intention to substitute publishing information as to the availability of financial records for publishing the previously-required detailed financial statement; therefore, as to these local health departments, there is to be an exception to the publishing requirements of KRS 424.220 , however, where the local health department is not co-extensive with a public health taxing district with the same financial records, it will have to publish in accordance with KRS 424.220 . OAG 80-325 .

A fire protection district now is required to publish an annual financial statement consistent with the requirements of subsection (1)(c) of this section in place of the annual financial statement formerly required by KRS 424.220 . OAG 80-627 .

The state local finance officer may change any form or classification of district budgets, and may devise a budget form designed to accommodate federally approved budget forms where federal funding of the district is involved. OAG 80-628 .

A hospital district organized pursuant to KRS 216.310 to 216.360 is a “district” for purposes of this section requiring special districts to file annual statements. OAG 82-631 .

A hospital district organized and functioning pursuant to the terms and provisions of KRS 216.310 to 216.360 is required to publish an annual statement consistent with the requirements of subdivision (1)(c) of this section in lieu of the annual financial statement required by KRS 424.220 . OAG 82-631 .

A riverport authority, created pursuant to KRS 65.510 to 65.650 , is required to publish an annual financial statement consistent with the requirements of subdivision (1)(c) of this section, in lieu of the provisions of KRS 424.220 . Such statement must also be in compliance with other applicable provisions (other than KRS 424.220 ) of KRS Chapter 424. OAG 83-428 , modifying OAG 83-392 .

A district health department established pursuant to KRS 212.810 to 212.930 has no taxing power, although funds arising out of public health taxing districts’ special health tax, provided for in KRS 212.720 to 212.755 , may be turned over to such district health department; accordingly, since the district health department is not a taxing district the summary financial statement of this section has no application. OAG 84-335 .

This section relating to publication of financial statements, has no application to a district health department; however, the financial statement provisions of KRS 424.220 do apply to a district health department. OAG 85-45 , modifying OAG 84-335 .

65.110. Public improvement assessment bills.

Any public improvement assessment bill issued by a city, county or urban-county government shall indicate clearly the amount of the payment which is not being used for reducing principal but rather for the payment of interest.

History. Enact. Acts 1976, ch. 44, § 1.

65.112. Compensation for sewage treatment utility property — Eminent domain — Surcharge to customers.

  1. The provisions of any other law, rule, or regulation notwithstanding, if any city, county, public body corporate or politic, or special district or subdistrict furnishes or proposes to furnish sewage treatment utility services to customers of another sewage treatment utility by means of all or any part of the installations owned or paid for by that other sewage treatment utility, then the city, county, public body, district, or subdistrict taking over or proposing to take over the customers shall pay just compensation for these installations prior to the time the customers are taken over. If an agreement for compensation is not reached, then just compensation for the installations shall be payable by the city, county, public body, district, or subdistrict after condemnation as provided for in the Eminent Domain Act of Kentucky.
  2. There is hereby granted to any city, county, public body corporate or politic, or special district or subdistrict the power of eminent domain with respect to sewage treatment plants, facilities, and installations owned by sewage treatment utilities. This power of eminent domain shall be exercisable in the manner prescribed by the Eminent Domain Act of Kentucky.
  3. Any city, county, public body corporate or politic, or special district or subdistrict shall be entitled to surcharge customers so as to recover the amount of compensation paid for installations acquired under this section by agreement or condemnation.

History. Enact. Acts 2004, ch. 53, § 1, effective July 13, 2004.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Attorney’s Fees.

Metropolitan sewer district acted in bad faith during condemnation negotiations by making an inadequate last offer to the condemnee of $4,000 when it had previously offered $60,000. However, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the district’s conduct was not so prejudicial as to justify award of counsel fees to the condemnee. Golden Foods, Inc. v. Louisville & Jefferson County Metro. Sewer Dist., 240 S.W.3d 679, 2007 Ky. App. LEXIS 459 (Ky. Ct. App. 2007).

65.115. Compensation for sewage treatment utility property — Eminent domain — Surcharge to customers. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 445, § 1, effective July 15, 1986) was repealed by Acts 2004, ch. 53, § 2, effective July 13, 2004. For present law, see KRS 65.112 .

65.117. Notice to state local debt officer required before any financial obligation entered into — Administrative regulations.

  1. No city, county, urban-county, consolidated local government, charter county, or special purpose governmental entity as defined in KRS 65A.010 shall enter into any financing obligation of any nature, whether evidenced by note pursuant to KRS 65.7701 to 65.7721 or otherwise, by lease pursuant to KRS 65.940 to 65.956 , under which the lease price exceeds two hundred thousand dollars ($200,000), by bond issuance pursuant to KRS Chapter 66, or any long-term debt obligation of any sort without first notifying the state local debt officer in writing. The Department for Local Government may promulgate administrative regulations to develop the forms for the notification that shall contain the relevant financial terms of the obligation, including the interest rates or method of determining rates, the date of issue, the maturity dates, term of obligation, renewal periods, and the trustee or paying agent, if any. No approval of the state local debt officer shall be required, unless otherwise required by law.
  2. Any financing obligation entered into prior to July 15, 2008, shall be considered in compliance if that notification is provided to the state local debt officer no later than one (1) year after July 15, 2008.

History. Enact. Acts 2008, ch. 35, § 1, effective July 15, 2008; 2010, ch. 117, § 50, effective July 15, 2010; 2013, ch. 40, § 14, effective March 21, 2013.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(7/15/2008). The phrase “prior to the passage of this section” in subsection (2) of this section as it appears in 2008 Ky. Acts ch. 35, sec. 1, has been codified to read “prior to July 15, 2008,” the date on which the Act became effective and the date of a corresponding reference in that same section.

65.120. Revenues from fees, fines and forfeitures related to parking.

All revenue generated from fees, fines, and forfeitures related to parking shall continue to be retained by those governmental entities receiving such fees, fines, and forfeitures on December 31, 1976, unless the fine is collected as a result of action taken in the Court of Justice.

History. Enact. Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 30, § 1.

65.125. Enactment and administration of special ad valorem tax.

  1. For the purposes of this section, “local government” means a city or county government.
  2. In order that a local government may provide funding for a specified project, program, or service, any local government may enact a special ad valorem tax for the purpose subject to the following:
    1. Any such tax shall be enacted by ordinance as provided in KRS 83A.060 for cities and KRS 67.076 to 67.078 for counties. The ordinance shall identify and generally describe the program, project, or service designated by the local government and provide for the levy of an annual tax sufficient to defray the cost;
    2. Upon first reading of the ordinance which will enact a special ad valorem tax, the chief executive authority shall direct that a copy of the ordinance be delivered to the county clerk;
    3. Upon receipt of the ordinance, the county clerk shall have prepared the question, which shall be “Are you in favor of the proposal entitled  . . . . . ? Yes  . . . . .  No  . . . . . .” The question shall be placed before the voters of the local government at the next regular election if the clerk receives the ordinance not later than the second Tuesday in August preceding the day of a general election. The county clerk shall cause to be published in accordance with KRS Chapter 424, at the same time as other voter information, the full text of the proposal. The county clerk shall cause to be posted in each polling place one (1) copy of the full text of the proposal;
    4. The provisions of the general election law shall apply to questions submitted to voters under this section. The certificate of the body authorized by law to canvass election returns shall be delivered to the chief executive authority of the local government proposing the special ad valorem tax. The certificate shall be entered upon the records of the local government at the next regular meeting of the legislative body;
    5. Upon passage of the question by a simple majority of those voting, the local government may proceed with the final adoption of the ordinance levying the special ad valorem tax at a rate not to exceed that approved by the voters.
  3. Any special ad valorem tax imposed under the authority of this section shall be based upon the assessed valuation of all taxable property within the jurisdictional boundaries of the local government.
  4. Any special ad valorem tax shall be collected in the same manner as are other ad valorem taxes. The revenues generated shall be in addition to other taxes and used solely for the specified project, program, or service as designated by the ordinance enacting the tax. The proceeds of the tax shall be accounted for in a separate fund and shall not be disbursed, expended, encumbered, or transferred for any use or purpose other than provided by the ordinance enacting the special ad valorem tax.
  5. Any special ad valorem tax shall be in addition to the tax rate levied and exclusive of the recall provisions in KRS 68.245 , 91.260 , 92.280 , 132.017 , and 132.027 .

History. Enact. Acts 1988, ch. 109, § 1, effective July 15, 1988; repealed, reenact., and amend. Acts 1990, ch. 92, § 1, effective July 13, 1990; 1996, ch. 195, § 27, effective July 15, 1996.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section was formerly compiled as KRS 91A.430 .

65.130. Local governments authorized to display historic religious and nonreligious artifacts, monuments, symbols, and texts in public buildings and on public property owned by the local governments.

Any city, county, charter county, urban-county government, consolidated local government, or special district, or any agency or instrumentality thereof, may display historic artifacts, monuments, symbols, and texts, including but not limited to religious materials, in public buildings and on public property owned by that unit of government if the display is consistent with the requirements of KRS 42.705 .

History. Enact. Acts 2006, ch. 34, § 3, effective March 24, 2006.

65.133. Responsibility for enforcement of sex offender registration laws.

  1. Each local law enforcement agency and the Department of Kentucky State Police shall each have the responsibility for enforcing the provisions of sex offender registration laws.
  2. Law enforcement agencies may enter into written agreements for joint investigation and enforcement of violations of sex offender registration laws. These agreements may include other local law enforcement agencies and may include the Department of Kentucky State Police.

History. Enact. Acts 2006, ch. 182, § 15, effective July 12, 2006; 2007, ch. 85, § 139, effective June 26, 2007.

65.135. Legislative intention to occupy field regarding violations of KRS 439.3401 and KRS 17.500.

  1. It is the intent of the General Assembly to occupy the entire field of legislation relating to:
    1. Any person who has committed or is charged with the commission of a violent offense as specified in KRS 439.3401 ; and
    2. Any person who has committed or is charged with commission of a sex crime as specified in KRS 17.500 .
  2. No city, county, urban-county, charter county, consolidated local government, or other unit or instrumentality of local government shall enact an ordinance or other rule or regulation relating to the control, management, registration, monitoring, or housing of, or other matter relating to, a person specified in subsection (1) of this section.
  3. The fact that the General Assembly has not regulated a particular subject relating to a person specified in subsection (1) of this section does not grant a city, county, urban-county, charter county, consolidated local government, or other unit or instrumentality of local government the authority to enact an ordinance, rule, or regulation relating to that subject.
  4. Cities, counties, urban-counties, charter counties, consolidated local governments, and units and instrumentalities of local government shall enforce the provisions of state law with regard to persons specified in subsection (1) of this section.
  5. On July 12, 2006, any local ordinance, resolution, or rule relating to any topic specified in this section shall be null, void, and unenforceable.

History. Enact. Acts 2006, ch. 182, § 16, effective July 12, 2006.

65.140. Local governments required to pay for purchases within 30 days — Interest penalty.

  1. As used in this section, unless the context otherwise requires, “purchaser” means any city, county, or urban-county government which receives goods or services from a vendor.
  2. Unless the purchaser and vendor otherwise contract, all bills for goods or services shall be paid within thirty (30) working days of receipt of a vendor’s invoice except when payment is delayed because the purchaser has made a written disapproval of improper performances or improper invoicing by the vendor or by the vendor’s subcontractor.
  3. An interest penalty of one percent (1%) of any amount approved and unpaid shall be added to the amount approved for each month or fraction thereof after the thirty (30) working days which followed receipt of vendor’s invoice by the purchaser.

History. Enact. Acts 1990, ch. 154, § 1, effective July 13, 1990.

Opinions of Attorney General.

Although this section does not define “vendor,” the Attorney General’s Office could see no reason why the Property Valuation Administrator (PVA) should not be considered a vendor for the purpose of billing a city for the city’s tax assessments, since the PVA is providing a service for which the city is obligated to make payment; therefore the city must make payment within 30 working days of receipt of the invoice from the PVA. OAG 92-69 .

65.150. Expenditure of funds for liability or property insurance.

  1. A county or city or urban-county government and any board, commission, agency or authority of a county, city or urban-county government may expend funds necessary to insure any of its employees, officials and property against any liability or property damage arising out of an act or omission committed in the scope and course of performing legal duties.
  2. A county fee officer and his deputies and assistants may be insured pursuant to subsection (1) of this section, or the officer may expend excess fees to insure himself and his deputies and assistants against any liability arising out of an act or omission committed in the scope and course of performing legal duties.
  3. Any parties eligible to expend funds for insurance pursuant to this section may associate, pursuant to KRS 65.210 to 65.300 , for the purpose of insuring themselves against any liability or property damage.
  4. An association of governmental units formed for the purpose of providing insurance to the participating members may act on behalf of and with the approval of the participating governmental units to borrow money and issue revenue bonds to fund the costs of providing the insurance. Revenue bonds issued pursuant to the authority granted in this subsection shall be issued in accordance with KRS 65.270 .

History. Enact. Acts 1979 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 22, § 3, effective May 12, 1979; 1988, ch. 225, § 5, effective July 15, 1988; 1988, ch. 309, § 1, effective July 15, 1988.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

This section was amended by two 1988 acts which were identical and which have been compiled together.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Negligence Action.

By permitting a county to purchase comprehensive liability insurance, this section effectively allows a negligence action to be filed against the county. Lee v. McCracken County Fiscal Court, 872 S.W.2d 88, 1993 Ky. App. LEXIS 103 (Ky. Ct. App. 1993).

2. Sovereign Immunity.

This section is not an express or implied waiver of the sovereign immunity of a county sued in tort. Franklin County v. Malone, 957 S.W.2d 195, 1997 Ky. LEXIS 105 ( Ky. 1997 ), overruled in part, Commonwealth Bd. of Claims v. Harris, 59 S.W.3d 896, 2001 Ky. LEXIS 198 ( Ky. 2001 ), overruled in part, Yanero v. Davis, 65 S.W.3d 510, 2001 Ky. LEXIS 203 ( Ky. 2001 ).

A county’s participation in a self-insurance fund does not waive its sovereign immunity from tort suits. Franklin County v. Malone, 957 S.W.2d 195, 1997 Ky. LEXIS 105 ( Ky. 1997 ), overruled in part, Commonwealth Bd. of Claims v. Harris, 59 S.W.3d 896, 2001 Ky. LEXIS 198 ( Ky. 2001 ), overruled in part, Yanero v. Davis, 65 S.W.3d 510, 2001 Ky. LEXIS 203 ( Ky. 2001 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

In enacting this section, the General Assembly has authorized fiscal courts to procure comprehensive general liability insurance for the county’s employees or officials to cover the specific areas of risk spelled out in this section. OAG 80-221 .

The compensation insurance is restricted to covering employees of the county receiving injuries arising out of and in the course of employment and this section does not authorize the county to purchase liability insurance on a comprehensive general basis. OAG 80-538 .

Insurance for liabilities “arising out of an act or omission committed in the scope and course of performing legal duties” may be purchased by county governments for officials and employees; but, such expense is entirely in the discretion of the county government and there is no provision requiring county governments to provide health or life insurance for coroners. OAG 81-407 .

A county jailer is not a fee officer; however, under subsection (1) of this section, the fiscal court of any county or urban county government may expend county funds, if available, to insure a county jailer against any liability arising out of an act or omission committed in the scope and course of performing legal duties. OAG 83-94 , modifying OAG 83-35 .

It is permissive, not mandatory, for a fiscal court to pay for the jailer’s liability insurance, and where the fiscal court decides not to pay for such liability insurance, the insurance would then have to be paid for by the jailer out of his own private pocket. OAG 83-94 , modifying OAG 83-35 .

A county may acquire comprehensive liability and casualty insurance. OAG 87-20 .

Pursuant to subsection (1) of KRS 65.240 and subsection (3) of this section, counties may associate to self-insure. OAG 87-20 .

This section did not authorize action of two counties executing interlocal cooperation agreement action in which they created a trust which issued tax-exempt bonds and used the proceeds to acquire all the stock of a corporation which sought to be licensed as an insurance company in order to provide reinsurance to various self-insured groups of the Kentucky Association of Counties since subsection (4) of this section contemplates the purchase of insurance not the purchase of an insurance company and states that the insurance obtained by revenue bonds must be for participating members and not as contemplated by the agreement to entities other than the two participating members. OAG 94-1 .

65.154. “Employer”, “employee” defined — Spouse to acknowledge action in writing if not named as beneficiary by employee.

  1. KRS 344.030 notwithstanding, for the purposes of this section, “employer” shall mean the sponsor of and “employee” shall mean a member of a pension plan governed by the federal “Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974,” and any member of a state pension plan or a pension plan of any unit of local government.
  2. For any employee who elects not to take a joint and survivor annuity or who selects a beneficiary other than the spouse if living, the employer shall provide forms which provide for the spouse of the employee to acknowledge by signature such action.

History. Enact. Acts 1984, ch. 239, § 1, effective July 13, 1984.

Compiler’s Notes.

The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 is located throughout titles 5 and 29 of USCS.

65.155. Pick up of employee contributions.

  1. Each local government or local government agency which has a pension plan which is qualified under Section 401(a) of the Internal Revenue Code shall, solely for the purpose of compliance with Section 414(h) of the United States Internal Revenue Code, pick up the employee contributions made to the respective retirement system pursuant to KRS 79.080 , 90.400 , 90.410 , 95.290 , 95.580 , 95.627 , 95.768 , 95.769 , 95.867 , or 96.180 for all compensation earned after August 1, 1982, or after qualification pursuant to Section 401(a) of the Internal Revenue Code, whichever is later, and all contributions so picked up shall be treated as employer contributions in determining tax treatment under the United States Internal Revenue Code and KRS 141.010 . However, each local government or local government agency shall continue to withhold federal and state income taxes based upon these contributions and hold them in a separate account until the Internal Revenue Service or the federal courts rule that, pursuant to Section 414(h) of the United States Internal Revenue Code, these contributions shall not be included as gross income of the employee until such time as the contributions are distributed or made available to the employee. The picked-up employee contribution shall satisfy all obligations to the retirement fund satisfied prior to August 1, 1982, or later date, as the case may be, by the employee contribution, and the picked-up employee contribution shall be in lieu of an employee contribution. The local governments or local government agencies shall pay these picked-up employee contributions from the same source of funds which is used to pay earnings to the employee. The employee shall have no option to receive the contributed amounts directly instead of having them paid by the local government or local government agency to the fund. Employee contributions picked up after August 1, 1982, shall be treated for all purposes of KRS 79.080 , 90.400 , 90.410 , 95.290 , 95.580 , 95.627 , 95.768 , 95.769 , 95.867 , or 96.180 in the same manner and to the same extent as employee contributions made prior to August 1, 1982, or later date of pick up, as the case may be.
  2. The pick up of employee contributions by the employer shall not be construed to reduce the final salary or the average salary upon which the employee retirement benefit may be based in any of the retirement systems covered by this section.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1982, ch. 166, § 44, effective July 15, 1982; 1984, ch. 177, § 13, effective July 13, 1984; 1990, ch. 476, Pt. VII D § 644, effective April 11, 1990; 2018 ch. 171, § 69, effective April 14, 2018; 2018 ch. 207, § 69, effective April 27, 2018.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(4/27/2018). This statute was amended by 2018 Ky. Acts chs. 171 and 207, which do not appear to be in conflict and have been codified together.

Compiler's Notes.

Section 649 of Acts 1990, ch. 476, Part VII D, provided that the provisions of Part VII D (§§ 630-648) of ch. 476 “shall apply to taxable years beginning after December 31, 1989.”

Sections 401(a) and 414(h) of the Internal Revenue Code, referred to in subsection (1) of this section, are compiled as 26 USCS § 401(a) and 26 USCS § 414(h), respectively.

65.156. Actuarial valuation requirement for local government pension systems — Exemptions — Copy to Legislative Research Commission — Contributions by cities, municipal agencies, urban-county governments, or consolidated local governments — Payment of lawful expenses — Prohibition against creation or maintenance of defined benefit retirement system susceptible of unfunded liability — Exceptions.

  1. The governing board of any local government retirement system created pursuant to KRS 67A.320 , 67A.340 , 67A.360 to 67A.690 , 79.080 , 90.400 , 90.410 , 95.290 , 95.520 to 95.620 , 95.621 to 95.629 , 95.767 to 95.784 , 95.851 to 95.884 , or KRS Chapter 96 shall submit the retirement system to an actuarial valuation, if the system provides a defined benefit, at least:
    1. Once every three (3) years if the system has six (6) or more active and retired members; or
    2. Once every five (5) years if the system has less than six (6) active and retired members. The valuation shall be prepared by an actuary who is a fellow of the Society of Actuaries, a member of the American Academy of Actuaries, or an enrolled actuary under the Employees’ Retirement Income Security Act of 1975. The board shall send a copy of the most recent valuation to the librarian of the Legislative Research Commission by September 1, 1982, and thereafter the board shall send a copy of each new valuation within ten (10) days of receipt. If all liabilities to all individuals entitled to benefits from the local government retirement system have been satisfied, no actuarial valuation shall be required.
  2. Actuaries performing valuations pursuant to this section shall use the entry age normal cost funding method. Their reports shall include a definition of each actuarial term and an explanation of each actuarial assumption used. Assumptions shall be reasonably related to the experience of the system and represent the actuary’s best estimate of anticipated experience.
  3. Any city or municipal agency with a retirement system created pursuant to KRS 79.080 , 90.400 , 90.410 , 95.520 to 95.620 , 95.621 to 95.629 , 95.767 to 95.784 , 95.851 to 95.884 , or KRS Chapter 96 which is closed to new members pursuant to KRS 78.530 , 95.520 , 95.621 , or 95.852 shall, if its local pension system provides a defined benefit, contribute annually to the pension system, for the benefit of the retirees of the system and the active participants who choose to remain in the system, and for the benefit of members who have completed at least twenty (20) years’ service and withdrawn from service pursuant to KRS 95.857 , an amount equal to that which would be required pursuant to the funding standards of KRS 95.868 , plus so much of the principal amount of any unfunded prior service liability as the actuary states is necessary to maintain cash flow adequate to pay retiree and beneficiary payments until financial obligations to all retirees and beneficiaries are fully satisfied.
  4. All lawful expenses for general administration, performance bonds, medical, actuarial, accounting, auditing, legal, and investment services of a retirement system listed in subsection (1) of this section shall be paid from the pension fund. Actuaries performing valuations pursuant to this section shall include estimates of the expenses in their recommendations for pension system funding, and local governments shall add payments for the expenses to their annual contributions to their respective retirement systems.
  5. A city or city agency, consolidated local government, or urban-county government may, pursuant to KRS 67A.340 , 79.080 , 90.410 , or KRS Chapter 96 as applicable, provide for the retirement security of its employees through the creation of a money purchase or defined contribution plan qualified under Section 401(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 as amended. City employee deferred compensation plans created pursuant to KRS 18A.270 , or money purchase or defined contribution plans, qualified under Section 401(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 as amended, which by their nature cannot have an unfunded liability, shall not be subject to the actuarial valuation requirements of this section, and shall not be subject to termination for purposes of employee entry into the County Employees Retirement System, as required by KRS 78.530 , 79.080 , 90.410 , and 96.180 .
  6. No city or county, except an urban-county, or special district, nor any agency or instrumentality of a city or county or special district shall create or maintain for its officers or employees a defined benefit retirement system, which by its nature can have an unfunded liability. The provisions of this subsection shall not preclude employer contributions for city managers or other appointed local government executives who participate, pursuant to KRS 78.540 , in a retirement system which operates in more than one (1) state, nor the continuation of a local government defined benefit retirement system which has been closed to new members but which must fulfill its obligations to current active members, retirees, and beneficiaries. Notwithstanding any provision to the contrary, the provisions of this subsection shall not apply to length of service awards programs established for the benefit of volunteer firefighters and volunteer life squad and volunteer rescue personnel.
  7. Notwithstanding any provision to the contrary, any city or county may establish awards programs that recognize the length of service to the community by volunteer firefighters, volunteer life squads, and volunteer rescue personnel.

History. Enact. Acts 1982, ch. 297, § 1, effective July 15, 1982; 1984, ch. 24, § 1, effective July 13, 1984; 1984, ch. 177, § 14, effective July 13, 1984; 1988, ch. 11, § 2, effective July 15, 1988; 1992, ch. 238, § 1, effective July 14, 1992; 1998, ch. 328, § 1, effective July 15, 1998; 2002, ch. 346, § 23, effective July 15, 2002; 2014, ch. 92, § 30, effective January 1, 2015.; 2016 ch. 31, § 1, effective July 15, 2016.

Compiler's Notes.

This section has been reprinted to correct errors appearing in the 2014 cumulative supplement.

65.157. County may appropriate funds to a city within a county or city may appropriate funds to county in which it is located — Specification of uses — Accounting on expenditures.

  1. The governing body of any county may, in accordance with the provisions of KRS Chapter 68, appropriate county funds to a city within the county to enable the city to perform proper and necessary governmental functions which the city is by statute authorized or required to undertake and which involves the public interest of the citizens of the county.
  2. The governing body of any city may, in accordance with the provisions of KRS Chapter 91A, appropriate city funds to the county in which the city is located to enable the county to perform proper and necessary governmental functions which the county is by statute authorized or required to undertake and which involves the public interest of the citizens of the city.
  3. The ordinance by which funds are appropriated to a county or a city under this section shall specify the permissible uses of such funds.
  4. A county or a city receiving funds under this section shall administer the funds and shall account at least biannually to the grantor on the expenditure of the funds.

History. Enact. Acts 1982, ch. 257, § 1, effective July 15, 1982.

65.1575. Charitable community foundations — Relationship with local governments.

  1. As used in this section:
    1. “Foundation” means a charitable community foundation established to accept gifts, bequests, devises, or other transfers for the purpose of meeting charitable objectives for the citizens of the community;
    2. “Local government” means every city, regardless of classification, every county, and every charter county and urban-county government;
    3. “Component fund” means an individual fund treated as part of a foundation and that meets the requirements established under regulations promulgated implementing 26 U.S.C. sec. 170 as amended from time to time; and
    4. “Nonprofit organization” means an organization incorporated under KRS Chapter 273 and exempt under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code.
    1. A local government may donate to a foundation the proceeds from the sale of any utility or facility or any grant, bequest, or devise received by it. (2) (a) A local government may donate to a foundation the proceeds from the sale of any utility or facility or any grant, bequest, or devise received by it.
    2. A local government may contribute to a nonprofit organization exempt under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code for the development and operation of a community center or recreational facilities.
  2. If the foundation receives a gift from a local government that is subject to conditions, limitations, or requirements by the donor, the gift shall be segregated in a component fund within the foundation, which shall be subject to conditions, limitations, or requirements that are substantially identical to those established by the donor.
  3. If the foundation receives a gift from a local government that is not subject to any specified conditions, limitations, or requirements by the donor, the gift amount shall be maintained in a component fund. The income from the fund shall be distributed to the local government for charitable purposes as directed by an ordinance of the governing body of the local government.
  4. If a nonprofit organization receives a gift from a local government, it shall maintain the financial records so as to be able to ascertain the use of the donated funds.
  5. The foundation or nonprofit organization exempt under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code shall return any donations to the general fund of a local government if:
    1. The foundation or nonprofit organization exempt under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code loses its status as a public charitable organization;
    2. The foundation or nonprofit organization exempt under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code is liquidated; or
    3. The foundation or nonprofit organization exempt under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code violates any condition, limitation, or requirement as established by the local government governing body.

History. Enact. Acts 1998, ch. 332, § 1, effective July 15, 1998; 2002, ch. 290, § 1, effective July 15, 2002.

Compiler’s Notes.

Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, referred to in this section, is codified as 26 USCS § 501(c)(3).

65.158. Procedure for city, consolidated local government, or urban-county employee nontax payroll deductions.

Any city, consolidated local government, or urban-county government which makes deductions from the pay of its employees for any cause other than taxes shall, upon the written request of at least thirty percent (30%) of all employees within a department or division, deduct the amount from the pay of an employee as he may note on a signed payroll notification card or voucher for the purposes of employee benefits, insurance, community projects, or union dues. No deduction shall be made pursuant to this section from the pay of any employee who does not sign a payroll notification card or voucher. Upon these deductions, the city, consolidated local government, or urban-county government shall, within thirty (30) days, pay to the elected representative or designated recipient for the employees of the department or division the total amount of the deductions minus the actual cost to the city, consolidated local government, or urban-county government of processing the deductions.

History. Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 276, § 1, effective July 15, 1986; 1998, ch. 501, § 1, effective July 15, 1998; 2002, ch. 346, § 24, effective July 15, 2002.

65.159. Incentive programs for emergency services personnel achieving health and fitness goals.

  1. As used in this section:
    1. “Emergency services personnel” means any nonelected persons employed by or volunteering for a:
      1. Fire department operating under KRS Chapter 67 or 95 or under the authority of an urban-county government, consolidated local government, charter-county government, or unified local government;
      2. Police department operating under KRS Chapter 67 or 95 or under the authority of an urban-county government, consolidated local government, charter-county government, or unified local government; or
      3. Sheriff’s department; and
    2. “Local government” means a city, county, urban-county government, charter county government, consolidated local government, or unified local government.
  2. Any local government or group of local governments may elect, through the adoption of an ordinance, or identical ordinances in the case of a group of local governments, to establish an incentive program for emergency services personnel to be rewarded for their leadership in achieving health and fitness goals that can be a model for others in the community.
  3. The ordinance or ordinances shall specify what measures shall be part of the incentive program, which may include the following health and fitness indicators:
    1. Fasting blood lipid levels that include total cholesterol, low density lipoproteins, high density lipoproteins, and triglycerides;
    2. Fasting glucose levels;
    3. Systolic and diastolic blood pressure levels, the measurement of which is encouraged to be recorded when the participant is in a more-relaxed state;
    4. Fitness levels, including activities such as distances walked, push-ups, sit-ups, pull-ups, and, in lieu of pull-ups for females, timed hangs;
    5. Body fat percentages;
    6. Body mass index; and
    7. Any other measure of fitness or health as determined by the local government, such as a reduction in the use of tobacco products or sodium.

      The ordinance or ordinances may provide considerations for differences in age and gender of the emergency services personnel. Local governments are encouraged, at a minimum, to include in their program the measures indicated in paragraphs (a) to (c) of this subsection.

    1. Local governments may reward participants who make the most positive gains in the health and fitness indicators measured by the local government. (4) (a) Local governments may reward participants who make the most positive gains in the health and fitness indicators measured by the local government.
    2. The ordinance or ordinances shall clearly set out what health and fitness standards will be rewarded within the selected measures.
  4. The ordinance or ordinances may include a step-based system of awards, in the instance if a certain standard is met consistently or consecutively for an established duration of time, the reward is to be incrementally increased.
  5. The ordinance or ordinances, in addition to or in lieu of rewarding individual emergency services personnel performance, may reward performance to a particular department or any combination of departments either in the local government or among different local governments.
  6. The reward may be monetary in nature, or any other consideration or reward not otherwise prohibited by state or federal law.
  7. A local government may, by ordinance, elect to repeal the program.
  8. Any monetary reward provided under this section shall not be included in the calculation for a retirement allowance for any emergency services personnel participating in the County Employees Retirement System set out in KRS 78.510 to 78.852 .
  9. A local government shall follow any applicable state and federal laws in the gathering of any health and fitness data from participants in the program, including the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191.
  10. Local governments are encouraged to acquire health and fitness baseline data for the participants by using previously collected health and fitness data or by collecting health and fitness data on the participants at the beginning of the program or when they begin participating in the program.
  11. Each local government adopting an ordinance pursuant to this section shall send a copy of its ordinance, and any amendments thereto, to the Kentucky Department for Local Government. The ordinance or amendment may be sent electronically or by any other method deemed suitable by the local government. The ordinances and amendments shall be deemed public records pursuant to KRS 61.870 to 61.884 .
  12. A local government may accept money by grant, gift, donation, bequest, legislative appropriation, or other conveyance to be used for the sole purpose of this section and shall be placed in a separate account apart from all other funds of the local government.
  13. Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit any local government from enacting or establishing alternative incentives or from participating in other incentive programs for the rewarding of health or fitness levels or goals.
  14. Participation in the program shall be voluntary on the part of emergency services personnel. The failure of any emergency services personnel to meet a standard set out in this program, or to participate in the program, shall not be used as a measure of his or her job-related performance.

HISTORY: 2016 ch. 140, § 1, effective July 15, 2016.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(7/15/2016). 2016 Ky. Acts ch. 140, sec. 1 directed that a new section of KRS Chapter 64 be created for the text of this statute, which authorizes a local government to establish an incentive program for emergency services personnel achieving certain health and fitness goals. The subject matter of KRS Chapter 64 relates to fees and compensation of public officers and employees. Since the incentive rewards authorized under this statute are not required to be monetary in nature, in codification the Reviser of Statutes created a new section of KRS Chapter 65, which contains general provisions applicable to counties, cities, and other units of local government, as a more appropriate statutory designation under the authority of KRS 7.136(1)(a).

Special Districts

65.160. Special districts may be formed by two or more counties.

  1. Upon approval of the fiscal courts of the counties involved, two (2) or more counties may join together to form a special district to fulfill any purpose which any individual county is presently authorized to fulfill or may be authorized to fulfill in the future.
  2. The membership of the governing body of such multi-county special districts shall be apportioned among the counties in ratio to their population, with each county having at least one (1) member.
  3. Members of the governing body of multi-county special districts may be removed from office as provided by KRS 65.007 .

History. Enact. Acts 1972, ch. 31, § 1; 1980, ch. 18, § 2, effective July 15, 1980; 1980, ch. 188, § 34, effective July 15, 1980.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section was formerly compiled as KRS 65.040 and was renumbered by the Reviser under authority of KRS 7.136 .

Legislative Research Commission Note.

This section was amended by two 1980 acts which do not appear to be in conflict and have been compiled together.

Opinions of Attorney General.

This section involves the formation of special purpose districts by two or more counties and, thus, membership on the governing board is limited to member counties because cities cannot be members of such special purpose districts. OAG 78-39 .

A community action corporation is not a special district for purposes of KRS 65.160 to 65.162 . OAG 82-196 .

65.162. Special districts may be expanded to include additional counties.

  1. Any special district may be expanded to include additional counties within its jurisdiction for performing the function for which it was organized.
  2. Before a county may participate in a multi-county special district, the fiscal court shall determine that participation is feasible and necessary. The determination shall be made only after a duly advertised public hearing has been held by the fiscal court.
  3. When a county is added to a multi-county special district, it shall be given representation on the governing body of the district in the same manner as the other counties within the district.
  4. Members of the governing body of multi-county special districts may be removed from office as provided by KRS 65.007 .

History. Enact. Acts 1972, ch. 31, § 2; 1980, ch. 18, § 3, effective July 15, 1980; 1980, ch. 188, § 35, effective July 15, 1980.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section was formerly compiled as KRS 65.050 and was renumbered by the Reviser under authority of KRS 7.136 .

Legislative Research Commission Note.

This section was amended by two 1980 acts which do not appear to be in conflict and have been compiled together.

65.164. “District.”

As used in KRS 65.166 to 65.176 , the word “district” shall mean any board, commission, or special district created pursuant to the following statutes: KRS 65.660 to 65.679 ; KRS 75.010 to 75.260 ; KRS 104.450 to 104.680 ; KRS 108.010 to 108.070 ; KRS 184.010 to 184.300 ; KRS 220.010 to 220.613 ; KRS 266.010 to 266.990 ; KRS 267.010 to 267.990 ; KRS 268.010 to 268.990 ; or KRS 269.100 to 269.270 .

History. Enact. Acts 1980, ch. 369, § 1, effective July 15, 1980; 1984, ch. 4, § 2, effective July 15, 1986; 2000, ch. 429, § 12, effective July 14, 2000.

Opinions of Attorney General.

A community action corporation is not a district for purposes of KRS 65.164 to 65.176 as it is not among the boards, commissions or special districts created pursuant to the statutory provisions set forth in this section. OAG 82-196 .

65.166. Fiscal court procedure for alteration or dissolution of district.

  1. Upon receipt of a petition and following a public hearing as provided in this section, the fiscal court may alter the boundaries of a district by reducing its area, or may dissolve a district if that district has for a period of two (2) consecutive years failed to provide the services for which it was established, or if all or a portion of such services have been provided by some other entity. If the district is located in more than one (1) county, the fiscal court of each county containing a portion of the district must vote to dissolve the district before such dissolution may take effect.
  2. Upon receipt of a petition signed by at least thirty percent (30%) of that class of citizens who may by law petition for the creation of the district, the fiscal court shall schedule a public hearing on the matter of alteration or dissolution and advertise such hearing as provided in KRS 424.130 .
  3. The petition shall be in substantially the following form: “The undersigned (registered voters, qualified voters, freeholders or landowners as determined by subsection (2) of this section) living within (name of special district and containing a metes and bounds description of the district) hereby request that the fiscal court consider the alteration or dissolution of (name of district) pursuant to this section.” The petition shall conspicuously state in layman’s terms that any legal obligations of the district must be satisfied before the district can be dissolved and that the citizens of the district shall be responsible for the satisfaction of any such obligations. Signatures on the petition shall be dated, the last no later than ninety (90) days after the first.
  4. At the hearing, the burden of proving that the district is providing or taking substantial steps toward providing the services for which it was created, or that no other entity is providing the service, shall be upon the district board of directors. In determining whether to alter, dissolve or to take no action in regard to the district, the fiscal court shall consider testimony offered at the hearing and any other relevant information including but not limited to the following:
    1. Present and projected need for the service provided by the district;
    2. Population density of the district;
    3. Existence of alternate providers of services;
    4. Revenue base of the district such as assessed valuation, bonding capacity and user fees; and
    5. Consequences of alteration of the district’s boundaries on the effectiveness and efficiency of the district.
  5. Within sixty (60) days following the hearing, the fiscal court shall set forth its written findings of fact in approving or disapproving the alteration or dissolution of the district.
    1. If the fiscal court determines to dissolve a district, it shall determine a method to satisfy any legal obligations of the district which might be affected thereby. Upon satisfaction of its legal obligations, the district shall be legally dissolved; any special ad valorem tax imposed by the district shall be removed from the tax rolls by the county clerk; and any assets of the district shall be assumed by the county.
    2. If the fiscal court determines to alter the boundaries of the district, it shall draw the new boundaries of the district and determine the proportional amount of existing legal obligations of the area which is to be excluded from the district. Upon the satisfaction of such obligations, the new boundaries of the district shall be legally effective and any affected taxpayers shall be removed from the tax rolls of the district.
  6. If the final decision of the fiscal court or the Circuit Court, in the case of an appeal as provided in KRS 65.168 , is against the alteration or dissolution of the district, no attempt to alter or dissolve the district pursuant to this section shall be made within three (3) years of the decision.

History. Enact. Acts 1980, ch. 369, § 2, effective July 15, 1980.

65.168. Appeal.

Any petitioner or member of the district board of directors may, within thirty (30) days of the fiscal court’s decision, appeal an adverse finding of the fiscal court to the Circuit Court in the county containing the greater part of the district. The Circuit Court shall review the decision of the fiscal court but shall reverse the decision only if such decision is found to be arbitrary or capricious. If the Circuit Court reverses the decision of the fiscal court by ordering the alteration or dissolution of the district, it shall direct the fiscal court to determine, as provided in subsection (5) of KRS 65.166 , a method for satisfying any legal obligations of the district which might be affected thereby.

History. Enact. Acts 1980, ch. 369, § 3, effective July 15, 1980.

65.170. Dissolution by referendum.

  1. A district may be dissolved by a referendum as provided in this section.
  2. Persons seeking dissolution of a district shall submit a petition to the county clerk signed by at least fifty percent (50%) of that class of citizens who may by law petition for the creation of the district.
  3. The petition shall be in substantially the following form: “The undersigned (registered voters, qualified voters, freeholders, or landowners as determined by subsection (2) of this section) living within (name of the district and containing a metes and bounds description of the district) hereby request that the question of the dissolution of the district be put to a referendum.” The petition shall conspicuously state in layman’s terms that any legal obligations of the district must be satisfied before the district can be dissolved and that the citizens of the district shall be responsible for the satisfaction of any such obligations. Signatures on the petition shall be dated, the last no later than ninety (90) days after the first.
  4. If the county clerk determines that the petition is in proper order, he shall certify the petition to the fiscal court or consolidated local government. The fiscal court or consolidated local government shall direct that the question be placed before the voters at the next regular election if the petition is certified not later than the second Tuesday in August preceding the day of the regular election. The fiscal court or consolidated local government shall bear the costs of advertising and placing the question before the voters.
  5. The county clerk shall advertise the question as provided in KRS Chapter 424 and shall prepare the following admonition to the voter: “The (name of district) may have existing legal obligations that must be satisfied before the district can be dissolved. The citizens of the district shall be responsible for the satisfaction of any such obligations.” The question of the dissolution of the district shall be placed before the voters in substantially the following form: “The (name of the district and containing a metes and bounds description of the district) should be dissolved.” The voter shall vote “yes” or “no.”
  6. Registered voters eligible to sign a petition for dissolution as provided by subsection (2) of this section shall be eligible to vote on the question of dissolution.
  7. In referendums under this section, provision shall be made for those opposing the dissolution of the district to have equal representation with the proponents of the measure in the determination of eligibility of voters, and in the observance of canvassing and certifying of the returns.

History. Enact. Acts 1980, ch. 369, § 4, effective July 15, 1980; 1982, ch. 360, § 14, effective July 15, 1982; 1996, ch. 195, § 28, effective July 15, 1996; 2002, ch. 346, § 25, effective July 15, 2002.

Opinions of Attorney General.

In order to be eligible to vote on the question of the dissolution of a sanitation district located in a particular county, the voter must be a person: (1) who is a registered voter in that county and in a precinct located within the sanitation district, and (2) who, as required by subsection (1) of KRS 220.040 is in possession of land claiming as a freeholder (i.e., a landowner) within the limits of the sanitation district located in the county sought to be dissolved. OAG 81-354 .

65.172. Dissolution on majority vote — When dissolution opposed, restriction on further attempt.

  1. If a majority of those voting in the referendum as provided in KRS 65.170 favor the dissolution of the district, the district shall, upon satisfaction of its legal obligations, be dissolved by order of the fiscal court, any special ad valorem tax imposed by the district shall be removed from the tax rolls by the county clerk and any assets of the district shall be assumed by the county.
  2. If a majority of those voting in the referendum oppose the dissolution of the district, no attempt to dissolve the district pursuant to KRS 65.170 shall be made within five (5) years of the election.

History. Enact. Acts 1980, ch. 369, § 5, effective July 15, 1980.

65.174. Dissolution of multicounty districts.

Multicounty districts may be dissolved when each member county follows procedures defined in KRS 65.170 .

History. Enact. Acts 1980, ch. 369, § 6, effective July 15, 1980.

65.176. Withdrawal of membership.

Any member county of the district may withdraw its membership after following the procedures defined in KRS 65.170 . The district shall continue to function after such withdrawals, with its boundaries consisting of the remaining county members. No county may withdraw from any district unless it satisfies its part of all contractual obligations assumed by the district prior to the passage of its resolution to the satisfaction of the board.

History. Enact. Acts 1980, ch. 369, § 7, effective July 15, 1980.

Taxing Districts

65.180. Definition of “taxing district.”

As used in KRS 65.182 to 65.190 , unless the context otherwise requires, the word “taxing district” shall mean, and the provisions of KRS 65.182 to 65.190 shall apply to, any special district authorized by statute to levy ad valorem taxes within the meaning of Section 157 of the Constitution of Kentucky or to levy ad valorem taxes under the provisions of KRS 68.602 and governed by the following statutes: KRS 65.182, 75.010 to 75.260 , 107.310 to 107.500 , 108.080 to 108.180 , 109.115 to 109.190 , 173.450 to 173.650 , 173.710 to 173.800 , 179.700 to 179.990 , 212.720 to 212.755 , 216.310 to 216.360 , 266.010 to 266.990 , and 268.010 to 268.990 .

History. Enact. Acts 1984, ch. 100, § 1, effective July 13, 1984; 2002, ch. 361, § 11, effective July 15, 2002; 2020 ch. 21, § 14, effective March 17, 2020.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

Kentucky River Auth. v. City of Danville, 932 S.W.2d 374, 1996 Ky. App. LEXIS 112 (Ky. Ct. App. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1186, 117 S. Ct. 1469, 137 L. Ed. 2d 682, 1997 U.S. LEXIS 2550, 65 U.S.L.W. 3711 (1997).

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Nontaxing special districts, KRS 65.805 to 65.830 .

65.181. Compliance with KRS 65A.010 to 65A.090.

The board of any taxing district established pursuant to KRS 65.180 to 65.192 shall comply with the provisions of KRS 65A.010 to 65A.090 .

History. Enact. Acts 2013, ch. 40, § 20, effective March 21, 2013.

65.182. Procedures for creating taxing district.

Except as otherwise provided by state law, the sole methods of creating a taxing district shall be in accordance with the following:

    1. Persons desiring to form a taxing district shall present a petition to the fiscal court clerk and to each member of the fiscal court, meeting the criteria of KRS 65.184 , and signed by a number of registered voters equal to or greater than twenty-five percent (25%) of an average of the voters living in the proposed taxing district and voting in the last four (4) general elections. At time of its submission to fiscal court, each petition shall be accompanied by a plan of service, showing such of the following as may be germane to the purposes for which the taxing district is being formed: (1) (a) Persons desiring to form a taxing district shall present a petition to the fiscal court clerk and to each member of the fiscal court, meeting the criteria of KRS 65.184 , and signed by a number of registered voters equal to or greater than twenty-five percent (25%) of an average of the voters living in the proposed taxing district and voting in the last four (4) general elections. At time of its submission to fiscal court, each petition shall be accompanied by a plan of service, showing such of the following as may be germane to the purposes for which the taxing district is being formed:
      1. The statutory authority under which the district is created and under which the taxing district will operate;
      2. Demographic characteristics of the area including but not limited to population, density, projected growth, and assessed valuation;
      3. A description of the service area including but not limited to the population to be served, a metes and bounds description of the area of the proposed taxing district, the anticipated date of beginning service, the nature and extent of the proposed service, the projected effect of providing service on the social and economic growth of the area, and projected growth in service demand or need;
      4. A three (3) year projection of cost versus revenue;
      5. Justification for formation of the taxing district including but not limited to the location of nearby governmental and nongovernmental providers of like services; and
      6. Any additional information, such as land use plans, existing land uses, drainage patterns, health problems, and other similar analyses which bear on the necessity and means of providing the proposed service.
    2. A majority of the members of a fiscal court may vote to form a taxing district set forth in a plan of service that shall contain those items set forth in paragraph (a)1. to 6. of this subsection as may be germane to the purposes for which the taxing district is being formed.
  1. The fiscal court clerk shall notify all planning commissions, cities, and area development districts within whose jurisdiction the proposed service area is located and any state agencies required by law to be notified of the proposal for the creation of the taxing district.
  2. The fiscal court clerk shall schedule a hearing on the proposal for no earlier than thirty (30) nor later than ninety (90) days following receipt of the petition, charter, and plan of service, and shall, in accordance with the provisions of KRS Chapter 424, publish notice of the time and place of the public hearing and an accurate map of the area or a description in layman’s terms reasonably identifying the area.
  3. At the public hearing, the fiscal court shall take testimony of interested parties and solicit the recommendations of any planning commission, city, area development district, or state agency meeting the criteria of subsection (2) of this section.
  4. The fiscal court may extend the hearing, from time-to-time, for ninety (90) days from the date of the initial hearing and shall render a decision within thirty (30) days of the final adjournment of the hearing.
  5. Following the hearing, the fiscal court shall set forth its written findings of fact and shall approve or disapprove the formation of the taxing district to provide service as described in the plan of service and to exercise the powers granted by the specific statutes that apply to the taxing district being formed.
  6. The creation of a taxing district shall be of legal effect only upon the adoption of an ordinance, in accordance with the provisions of KRS 67.075 and 67.077 , creating the taxing district, and compliance with the requirements of KRS 65.005 .
  7. A certified copy of the ordinance creating the taxing district shall be filed with the county clerk who shall add the levy to the tax bills of the county. For taxing purposes, the effective date of the tax levy shall be January 1 of the year following the certification of the creation of the taxing district.
  8. Nothing in this section shall be construed to enlarge upon or to restrict the powers granted a taxing district under the taxing district’s specific authorizing statutes.
  9. In a county which does not contain a city of the first class, the fiscal court may adopt the procedures of KRS 65.192 to create a fire protection district or a volunteer fire department district, but only those qualified voters who live within the boundaries of the proposed district shall vote on the question of whether it shall be established.

History. Enact. Acts 1984, ch. 100, § 2, effective July 13, 1984; 1994, ch. 155, § 1, effective July 15, 1994; 2002, ch. 361, § 12, effective July 15, 2002.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

Kennard v. Bracken County Library Bd. of Trustees, 887 S.W.2d 363, 1994 Ky. App. LEXIS 137 (Ky. Ct. App. 1994); Caneyville Volunteer Fire Dep’t v. Green’s Motorcycle Salvage, Inc., 286 S.W.3d 790, 2009 Ky. LEXIS 158 ( Ky. 2009 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

The establishment of an ambulance service district embracing the city is entirely in the hands of the city council for determination. There is no statutory authority for submitting the question to the voters. OAG 85-11 .

The tax rate requested in the petition cannot be decreased after the petition is submitted to the fiscal court. OAG 85-121 .

A “poll” or “straw vote” could not be placed on the ballot asking for voter opinion regarding the fiscal court’s action on a proposed taxing district, since any attempt to place such a question on the ballot would not only be unauthorized and therefore not binding but would also constitute an unauthorized expenditure of county funds. OAG 85-121 .

The procedure authorized by KRS 65.192 differs from the general procedure for creating special taxing districts, set forth in this section, by removing decision-making power from the local governmental units and placing it directly in the hands of the voters. OAG 91-188 .

65.184. Petition — Contents — Signatures.

  1. A valid petition for the creation of a taxing district shall be in substantially the following form:

    “The following registered voters of (insert name of county) hereby petition the fiscal court to form a (insert type of taxing district) which shall have the authority to impose a special ad valorem tax of (insert exact amount) on each one hundred dollars ($100) worth of property assessed for local taxation in the district for the following reasons: (A valid petition shall contain a brief list in layman’s terms of the reasons for the creation of the taxing district.)”

  2. The petition shall contain the name and address of each petitioner. Each signature shall be dated as of the day of its execution, the last signature no later than one hundred eighty (180) days from the first signature.

History. Enact. Acts 1984, ch. 100, § 3, effective July 13, 1984.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

Kennard v. Bracken County Library Bd. of Trustees, 887 S.W.2d 363, 1994 Ky. App. LEXIS 137 (Ky. Ct. App. 1994).

Opinions of Attorney General.

The verification of signatures on a petition to create a taxing district must be accomplished within the time frame set out in KRS 65.182(3). The petition must be verified in time for the hearing to be scheduled pursuant to appropriate notice required under KRS Chapter 424 within the referred to time frame. OAG 85-121 .

The signatures on a petition to create a taxing district must be verified as to voter registration. The court should direct the county clerk to check the signatures on the petition against the registration books to determine whether or not they are duly registered and also whether the number of signatures meets the statutory percentage requirement. OAG 85-121 .

Petitioners cannot continue to collect signatures once the petition and supporting documentation have been submitted to the fiscal court. Once the petition is filed and subject to review and verification, it cannot be amended thereafter so as to add additional signatures. OAG 85-121 .

65.186. Appeal from decision of fiscal court to form a taxing district.

  1. Any city containing all or any portion of the service area or any state agency with jurisdiction over the taxing district or any citizen living in the proposed area of the taxing district may, within thirty (30) days of the decision of the fiscal court, appeal the decision of the fiscal court on the formation of a district to the Circuit Court.
  2. The Circuit Court may affirm the action of the fiscal court, remand the matter to the fiscal court for additional findings or may reverse the action of the fiscal court and order approval or disapproval of the district. The Circuit Court may reverse the action of the fiscal court only if such decision is found to be arbitrary or capricious.
  3. No new or additional evidence may be introduced in the Circuit Court except as to fraud or misconduct affecting the decision of the fiscal court.
  4. Where appeals are brought from two (2) or more fiscal courts, the actions shall be merged and venue shall lie in the Circuit Court of the county where the greatest number of the taxing district’s residents are located.

History. Enact. Acts 1984, ch. 100, § 4, effective July 13, 1984.

65.188. Two or more counties included in one district.

The fiscal courts of two (2) or more counties may create a taxing district that includes the area of two (2) or more counties by following the procedures of KRS 65.182 to 65.190 .

History. Enact. Acts 1984, ch. 100, § 5, effective July 13, 1984.

65.190. Effect of amendment or repeal of section of KRS by 1984 Acts Chapter 100.

The amendment or repeal by 1984 Acts Chapter 100 of a section authorizing the creation of a taxing district shall not be construed as limiting or changing the power or organization of taxing districts created prior to July 13, 1984.

History. Enact. Acts 1984, ch. 100, § 6, effective July 13, 1984.

Opinions of Attorney General.

Since the 1984 act amending KRS 75.010 became effective on July 13, 1984, the new legislation is not retroactive as applied to a fire district created prior to July 13, 1984; however, such amendment of KRS 75.010 is retroactive as applied to an effort to establish a fire district under KRS 75.010 but which effort, prior to July 13, 1984, had not resulted in the complete creation of a fire district. OAG 84-313 .

65.192. Alternate method of creating a taxing district in counties containing a consolidated local government or a city of the first class.

In counties containing a consolidated local government or city of the first class, the following method of creating a taxing district shall be an alternative to KRS 65.182 to 65.190 :

  1. Persons desiring to form a taxing district shall present a petition to the fiscal court clerk or clerk of the legislative council of a consolidated local government and to each member of the fiscal court or consolidated local government council, requesting that the question of establishing the special district be placed upon the ballot for the next general election. The petition shall be signed by at least one hundred (100) registered voters from each senatorial district, contained wholly or partially within the proposed taxing district. If one hundred (100) registered voters do not reside within a senatorial district and within the boundaries of the proposed taxing district, then the petition shall be signed by twenty-five percent (25%) of the registered voters within said senatorial district. At the time of its submission to the fiscal court or consolidated local government council each petition shall be accompanied by a plan of service, showing such of the following as may be germane to the purposes for which the taxing district is being formed:
    1. The statutory authority under which the district is created and under which the taxing district will operate;
    2. The method of creating and appointing the governing body of such district if it is to be different from the general statutory authority under which it will operate;
    3. Demographic characteristics of the area, including but not limited to population, density, projected growth, and assessed valuation;
    4. A description of the service area, including but not limited to the population to be served, a metes and bounds description of the area of the proposed taxing district, the anticipated date of beginning service, the nature and extent of the proposed service, the projected effect of providing service on the social and economic growth of the area, and projected growth in service demand or need;
    5. A three (3) year projection of cost versus revenue and the method chosen for raising such revenues as authorized in this section;
    6. Justification for formation of the taxing district, including but not limited to the location of nearby governmental and nongovernmental providers of like services; and
    7. Any additional information such as land use plans, existing land uses, drainage patterns, health problems, and other similar analyses which bear on the necessity and means of providing the proposed service.
  2. The fiscal court clerk or the clerk of the legislative council of a consolidated local government shall notify all planning commissions, cities, and area development districts within whose jurisdiction the proposed service area is located and any state agencies required by law to be notified of the proposal for the creation of the taxing district.
  3. The fiscal court clerk or the clerk of the legislative council of a consolidated local government shall review the petition, and if the fiscal court or consolidated local government council determines that the signatures are valid, the fiscal court or consolidated local government council shall schedule a hearing on the proposal for no earlier than thirty (30) nor later than sixty (60) days following receipt of the petition, charter, and plan of service, and shall, in accordance with the provisions of KRS Chapter 424, publish notice which includes the time and place of the public hearing, alerts the public that the issue discussed at the hearing will be placed upon the ballot, and includes an accurate map of the area or a description in layman’s terms reasonably identifying the area.
  4. At the public hearing, the fiscal court or the legislative council of a consolidated local government shall take testimony of interested parties and solicit the recommendations of any planning commission, city, area development district, or state agency meeting the criteria of subsection (2) of this section.
  5. Following the public hearing, the fiscal court or the legislative council of a consolidated local government shall adopt a resolution submitting to the qualified voters of the county or the consolidated local government the question as to whether a taxing district should be established for the area and a special ad valorem tax or an occupational license fee imposed for the maintenance and operation of the district. A certified copy of the order of the fiscal court or the legislative council of a consolidated local government shall be filed with the county clerk not later than the second Tuesday in August prior to the next regular election and thereupon the clerk shall cause the question to be placed upon the ballot.
  6. The question shall be stated so that the service to be provided by the district, the type of governing body, and the method of financing as allowed by this section are clearly outlined.
  7. If a majority of those voting on the question favor the establishment of a special district with authorization to impose an ad valorem tax, then it shall be so established and shall constitute and be a taxing district within the meaning of Section 157 of the Constitution of Kentucky. If a majority of those voting on the question favor the establishment of a special district with an increase in the occupational license fee as authorized by this section, it shall be so established and shall operate as set forth in the question on the ballot.
  8. If an ad valorem tax is approved, the county clerk shall add the levy to the tax bills of the county or the consolidated local government. For taxing purposes, the effective date of the tax levy shall be January 1 of the year following the election. If an occupational license fee increase is approved, the appropriate legislative bodies shall add the levy to the occupational license fee as of January 1 of the year following the election. The tax or fee shall be collected in the same manner as are other county or consolidated local government ad valorem taxes or occupational license fees and shall be turned over to the governing body of the district. The special ad valorem tax or fee shall be in addition to all other ad valorem taxes or occupational license fees.
  9. Nothing in this section shall be construed to enlarge upon or to restrict the powers granted a taxing district under the taxing district’s specific authorizing statutes.
  10. A special district created pursuant to this section may be financed either by a special ad valorem tax imposed by the governing body of the district, as authorized by the voters in an election on the question, of an amount not to exceed ten cents ($0.10) per one hundred dollars ($100) of assessed value of the property subject to local taxation of the district; or by a levy of occupational license fees by the public body or bodies with jurisdiction over the area served by the special district, if the levy has been approved by the voters in an election on the question. The special district shall not levy both an ad valorem tax and an occupational license fee. The occupational license fee shall not exceed one percent (1%) of:
    1. Salaries, wages, commissions, and other compensation earned by persons for work done and services performed or rendered; and
    2. The net profits of businesses, trades, professions, or occupations from activities conducted in the district, except public service companies, banks, trust companies, combined banks and trust companies, combined trust, banking and title companies, any savings and loan association whether state or federally chartered, and in all other cases where a public body is prohibited by law from imposing a license fee.
  11. The budget of any taxing district created pursuant to this section shall be approved by the fiscal court or legislative council of a consolidated local government if financed by an ad valorem tax, or by the fiscal court or the legislative council of a consolidated local government and the legislative body levying the fee, if funded by an occupational license fee increase. The board of the district shall submit its estimate of revenue and proposed budget to the appropriate approving body or bodies by May 1 of each year, and such body or bodies shall approve or amend the budget by June 1.

History. Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 484, § 1, effective July 15, 1986; 1996, ch. 195, § 29, effective July 15, 1996; 2002, ch. 346, § 26, effective July 15, 2002.

Opinions of Attorney General.

Once a special taxing district is created pursuant to this section, and the district is financed by an occupational license tax, the tax rate established for the district cannot be changed under any circumstances. OAG 91-188 .

The procedure authorized by this section differs from the general procedure for creating special taxing districts, set forth in KRS 65.182 , by removing decision-making power from the local governmental units and placing it directly in the hands of the voters. OAG 91-188 .

The statute must be construed to insure a uniform rate of taxation throughout the district’s service area, and since there exists no procedure to assure a uniform change in the cities’ tax rate, the rate may not be changed at all. OAG 91-188 .

Claims Against Local Governments

65.200. Definitions for KRS 65.2001 to 65.2006.

As used in KRS 65.2001 to 65.2006 , unless the context otherwise requires:

  1. “Action in tort” means any claim for money damages based upon negligence, medical malpractice, intentional tort, nuisance, products liability and strict liability, and also includes any wrongful death or survival-type action.
  2. “Employee” means any elected or appointed officer of a local government, or any paid or unpaid employee or agent of a local government, provided that no independent contractor nor employee nor agent of an independent contractor shall be deemed to be an employee of a local government.
  3. “Local government” means any city incorporated under the law of this Commonwealth, the offices and agencies thereof, any county government or fiscal court, any special district or special taxing district created or controlled by a local government.

History. Enact. Acts 1988, ch. 224, § 15, effective July 15, 1988.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Sovereign Immunity.

Operating a golf course is not an “integral” function of state government; thus, a statutorily created agency so functioning as a non-profit, no capital stock corporation, formed to provide recreational facilities for the county, operated without the shield of sovereign immunity. Kenton County Pub. Parks Corp. v. Modlin, 901 S.W.2d 876, 1995 Ky. App. LEXIS 70 (Ky. Ct. App. 1995).

2. Local Government.

A water district was a “local government” within the meaning of this section as it was a special district created by the county fiscal court under KRS Chapter 74 in accordance with the procedures set forth in KRS 65.805 et seq. Siding Sales v. Warren County Water Dist., 984 S.W.2d 490, 1998 Ky. App. LEXIS 136 (Ky. Ct. App. 1998).

Trial court erred in allowing a punitive damages claim to go forward in a claim against a city housing authority; the housing authority was a non-profit entity created by the city to provide low cost housing, and nothing prohibited it from acting on the city’s behalf. Louisville Metro Hous. Auth. v. Burns, 198 S.W.3d 147, 2005 Ky. App. LEXIS 233 (Ky. Ct. App. 2005).

Cited:

Richardson v. Louisville/Jefferson County Metro Gov’t, 260 S.W.3d 777, 2008 Ky. LEXIS 152 ( Ky. 2008 ).

Research References and Practice Aids

Northern Kentucky Law Review.

Comment, A Survey of Kentucky Tort Reform, 17 N. Ky. L. Rev. 473 (1990).

65.2001. Application and construction of KRS 65.2002 to 65.2006.

  1. Every action in tort against any local government in this Commonwealth for death, personal injury or property damages proximately caused by:
    1. Any defect or hazardous condition in public lands, buildings or other public property, including personalty;
    2. Any act or omission of any employee, while acting within the scope of his employment or duties; or
    3. Any act or omission of a person other than an employee for which the local government is or may be liable shall be subject to the provisions of KRS 65.2002 to 65.2006 .
  2. Except as otherwise specifically provided in KRS 65.2002 to 65.2006 , all enacted and case-made law, substantive or procedural, concerning actions in tort against local governments shall continue in force. No provision of KRS 65.2002 to 65.2006 shall in any way be construed to expand the existing common law concerning municipal tort liability as of July 15, 1988, nor eliminate or abrogate the defense of governmental immunity for county governments.

History. Enact. Acts 1988, ch. 224, § 16, effective July 15, 1988.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Analysis

1. Local government.

The Louisville Water Company is an agency of the City of Louisville and, therefore, an action in tort against it is an action against a local government subject to the provisions of KRS 65.200 to 65.2006 . Louisville Water Co. v. Phelps, 2001 Ky. App. LEXIS 61 (Ky. Ct. App. May 18, 2001).

3. Damages

There was no merit to a former city employee’s argument that the Kentucky Claims Against Local Government Act, KRS 65.2001 et seq., unconstitutionally prohibited a plaintiff from recovering punitive damages from a municipality; it was the black-letter law in Kentucky that punitive damages under the Act were available only against entities that could not meet the criteria necessary to be categorized as an agency of a municipality, and such damages could not be awarded against the municipality or its agencies. Cherry v. City of Bowling Green, 2012 Ky. App. LEXIS 119 (Ky. Ct. App. July 20, 2012), review denied, ordered not published, 2013 Ky. LEXIS 64 (Ky. Mar. 13, 2013).

4. Scope of Employment.

Trial court erred in concluding that a police officer was acting within the scope of his employment at the time of ab accident because the officer stepped aside from his employment to accomplish some private purpose; immediately prior to the accident the officer was off-duty, he had run two personal errands, had his children in the vehicle with him, and was on his way home. Louisville/Jefferson Cnty. Metro Gov't v. Braden, 519 S.W.3d 386, 2017 Ky. App. LEXIS 19 (Ky. Ct. App. 2017).

In this provision, the General Assembly clearly acknowledges and expressly provides that there is a point at which an employee is not acting in furtherance of his or her municipal employer's interests. Louisville/Jefferson Cnty. Metro Gov't v. Braden, 519 S.W.3d 386, 2017 Ky. App. LEXIS 19 (Ky. Ct. App. 2017).

5. Respondeat Superior.

City's decision to provide a police officer a defense and simultaneously protect its interests under the Claims Against Local Governments Act was altogether proper and consistent with both the letter and the spirit of that statute because the allegations against the officer sufficiently invoked his duties as a public servant to cause the city to offer a defense until it was determined that he was not acting within the scope of his employment; that decision did not constitute an admission of fact or an assumption of liability. Louisville/Jefferson Cnty. Metro Gov't v. Braden, 519 S.W.3d 386, 2017 Ky. App. LEXIS 19 (Ky. Ct. App. 2017).

There is case law which compels the application of respondeat superior principles in cases involving a question of municipal liability; these principles lend themselves more naturally to the facts and circumstances arising from Claims Against Local Governments Act cases at the heart of which lies the question of whether an employee acted within the scope of his or her employment, thereby obligating his or her employer to answer, and indemnify him or her, for his or her actions. Louisville/Jefferson Cnty. Metro Gov't v. Braden, 519 S.W.3d 386, 2017 Ky. App. LEXIS 19 (Ky. Ct. App. 2017).

Trial court's reliance on a police officer's compliance with standard operating procedures (SOPs) was misplaced because that he was operating in compliance with the SOPs at the time of an accident could not, and did not, definitively compel the city to defend and indemnify him for his actions under the Claims Against Local Governments Act (CALGA); under no circumstances can a municipal police department's SOPs supersede CALGA or create a duty to indemnify where state statute says there is none. Louisville/Jefferson Cnty. Metro Gov't v. Braden, 519 S.W.3d 386, 2017 Ky. App. LEXIS 19 (Ky. Ct. App. 2017).

Cited:

Frankfort v. Byrns, 817 S.W.2d 462, 1991 Ky. App. LEXIS 124 (Ky. Ct. App. 1991); Richardson v. Louisville/Jefferson County Metro Gov’t, 260 S.W.3d 777, 2008 Ky. LEXIS 152 ( Ky. 2008 ).

Notes to Unpublished Decisions

1. Legislative intent.

Unpublished decision: It was not the intent of the drafters of the Kentucky Claims Against Local Governments Act, KRS 65.2001(2), to abrogate or expand the immunity afforded to local governments by either the Kentucky Constitution or the common law. Griffith v. Flinn, 2003 Ky. App. LEXIS 161 (Ky. Ct. App. June 27, 2003).

Research References and Practice Aids

Northern Kentucky Law Review.

Article: Government Tort Liability: A Survey Examination of Liability for Public Employers and Employees in Kentucky,36 N. Ky. L. Rev. 377 (2009).

65.2002. Amount of damages recoverable against local governments.

The amount of damages recoverable against a local government for death, personal injury or property damages arising out of a single accident or occurrence, or sequence of accidents or occurrences, shall not exceed the total damages suffered by plaintiff, reduced by the percentage of fault including contributory fault, attributed by the trier of fact to other parties, if any.

History. Enact. Acts 1988, ch. 224, § 17, effective July 15, 1988.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Punitive Damages.

This section does not authorize an award of punitive damages against a local government. Louisville Water Co. v. Phelps, 2001 Ky. App. LEXIS 61 (Ky. Ct. App. May 18, 2001).

Trial court erred in allowing a punitive damages claim to go forward in a claim against a city housing authority; the housing authority was a non-profit entity created by the city to provide low cost housing, and nothing prohibited it from acting on the city’s behalf. Louisville Metro Hous. Auth. v. Burns, 198 S.W.3d 147, 2005 Ky. App. LEXIS 233 (Ky. Ct. App. 2005).

Research References and Practice Aids

Northern Kentucky Law Review.

Comment, A Survey of Kentucky Tort Reform, 17 N. Ky. L. Rev. 473 (1990).

Treatises

Caldwell’s Kentucky Form Book, 5th Ed., Answer of City to Complaint of Battery Against Police Officer, Form 102.07.

65.2003. Claims disallowed.

Notwithstanding KRS 65.2001 , a local government shall not be liable for injuries or losses resulting from:

  1. Any claim by an employee of the local government which is covered by the Kentucky workers’ compensation law;
  2. Any claim in connection with the assessment or collection of taxes;
  3. Any claim arising from the exercise of judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or quasi-legislative authority or others, exercise of judgment or discretion vested in the local government, which shall include by example, but not be limited to:
    1. The adoption or failure to adopt any ordinance, resolution, order, regulation, or rule;
    2. The failure to enforce any law;
    3. The issuance, denial, suspension, revocation of, or failure or refusal to issue, deny, suspend or revoke any permit, license, certificate, approval, order or similar authorization;
    4. The exercise of discretion when in the face of competing demands, the local government determines whether and how to utilize or apply existing resources; or
    5. Failure to make an inspection.

Nothing contained in this subsection shall be construed to exempt a local government from liability for negligence arising out of acts or omissions of its employees in carrying out their ministerial duties.

History. Enact. Acts 1988, ch. 224, § 18, effective July 15, 1988.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Analysis

1. Ministerial Actions.

City was liable for negligence where the court found the actions of the city were ministerial in nature and, therefore, not clothed with immunity for the negligent design and construction of a drainage system which resulted in damage to the property of homeowners. Frankfort v. Byrns, 817 S.W.2d 462, 1991 Ky. App. LEXIS 124 (Ky. Ct. App. 1991).

Decision of when or if to extend sewer lines or to allow additional tap-ins is a legislative decision, and a city’s decision to service an area with a storm water drainage system is a discretionary legislative act; the design, building, and maintenance of such a system is ministerial, but until a hookup is approved, a city is exercising a legislative or discretionary function and has no liability for failure to provide service. Greenway Enters. v. City of Frankfort, 148 S.W.3d 298, 2004 Ky. App. LEXIS 292 (Ky. Ct. App. 2004).

City could be liable in a wrongful death action to the extent that the accident was caused by its police officer’s breach of his duty to operate a police cruiser in a safe manner. The operation of a police cruiser was considered conduct that was ministerial in nature. Pile v. City of Brandenburg, 215 S.W.3d 36, 2006 Ky. LEXIS 322 ( Ky. 2006 ).

2. Factual Question of Immunity.

The trial court erred by concluding that a city, and the individual employees, who were its agents and officers, were as a matter of law immune from liability in a tort action based on husband’s murder of wife where city’s police officers failed to arrest husband pursuant to an alleged mandatory arrest warrant despite several opportunities to do so. Ashby v. Louisville, 841 S.W.2d 184, 1992 Ky. App. LEXIS 233 (Ky. Ct. App. 1992), abrogated in part, Gaither v. Justice & Pub. Safety Cabinet, 447 S.W.3d 628, 2014 Ky. LEXIS 337 ( Ky. 2014 ).

Because subdivision ordinances were not unconstitutional, they were enforceable and the issue of whether officials were entitled to immunity pursuant to KRS 65.2003 did not have to be addressed. Campbell County Fiscal Court v. Nash, 2008 Ky. App. LEXIS 373 (Ky. Ct. App. Dec. 12, 2008), review granted, transferred, 2010 Ky. LEXIS 40 (Ky. Jan. 13, 2010), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 345 S.W.3d 811, 2011 Ky. LEXIS 57 ( Ky. 2011 ).

Defendant was entitled to state-law immunity under this section in plaintiff's suit arising out of the failure to pave a street since it exercised legislative authority when it decided which roads to pave. Bullock v. City of Covington, 698 Fed. Appx. 305, 2017 FED App. 0566N, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 19647 (6th Cir. Ky. 2017 ).

3. Failure to Enforce Any Law.

Where the plaintiffs essentially alleged that the defendant city failed to enforce local regulatory law establishing fire safety standards, the city was immune under subsection (3)(b) of this section. Siding Sales v. Warren County Water Dist., 984 S.W.2d 490, 1998 Ky. App. LEXIS 136 (Ky. Ct. App. 1998).

4. Permits, Licenses, Etc.

The defendant city’s refusal to issue an occupancy permit for a new building constructed to replace one destroyed by a fire, pending expansion of the water lines serving the property, constituted not only regulatory action on the city’s part, but also discretionary action, given its imposition of conditional occupancy dependent upon a sufficient water supply and, therefore, the city was exempt from liability for its alleged negligence under subsection (3)(c) of this section. Siding Sales v. Warren County Water Dist., 984 S.W.2d 490, 1998 Ky. App. LEXIS 136 (Ky. Ct. App. 1998).

Liability of a local government for its failure to enforce laws or regulations enacted for the public safety has been consistently denied by the courts and by the Kentucky Claims Against Local Governments Act, KRS 65.2003 , for three distinct reasons: (1) under the doctrine of immunity, the decision as to whether a structure meets the code standards is a discretionary function requiring the expertise and the decision-making authority of the government, its officers and employees; (2) there is recognition that, as a matter of public policy, governments should not be fearful of liability for the failure to govern, and through the enactment of safety laws, governments are not then insurers of compliance by private individuals; and (3) absent a special relationship between a government and a private individual, there is simply no duty to any specific citizen by virtue of building codes. The duty to protect is owed to the public and not to a particular individual or class of individuals. Griffith v. Flinn, 2003 Ky. App. LEXIS 161 (Ky. Ct. App. June 27, 2003).

5. Evidence of Bad Faith.

In response to a city’s motion for summary judgment relating to owners’ various tort claims against the city arising from a zoning dispute, the owners brought forth no evidence, beyond their mere allegations, that the city or its officials acted in bad faith; in the absence of any evidence which would overcome the city’s immunity, the trial court properly dismissed the owners’ claims. Godman v. City of Fort Wright, 234 S.W.3d 362, 2007 Ky. App. LEXIS 317 (Ky. Ct. App. 2007).

6. Jurisdiction.

In a negligence case against a water district, an appellate court had no jurisdiction to hear an argument under the Kentucky Claims Against Local Governments Act, KRS 65.200 - 65.2006 ; as a statutory defense to liability only, its denial could have only been vindicated following a final judgment as with any other liability defense. To the extent the trial court denied the water district’s motion to dismiss on this ground, the order remained interlocutory, and it was not made reviewable by the collateral order doctrine or other jurisprudence. South Woodford Water Dist. v. Byrd, 352 S.W.3d 340, 2011 Ky. App. LEXIS 153 (Ky. Ct. App. 2011), overruled, N. Ky. Water Dist. v. Carucci, 2019 Ky. LEXIS 276 (Ky. Aug. 29, 2019).

Cited in

Hicks v. Young, 2019 Ky. App. LEXIS 7 (Ky. Ct. App. Jan. 25, 2019).

Notes to Unpublished Decisions

Analysis

1. Failure to Enforce Any Law.

Unpublished decision: Failure to enforce government regulations or laws having quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative elements has consistently been held non-tortious. Griffith v. Flinn, 2003 Ky. App. LEXIS 161 (Ky. Ct. App. June 27, 2003).

2. Permits, Licenses, Etc.

Unpublished decision: KRS 65.2003(3)(c) is a codification of the common law regarding the failure of a local government to enforce safety and building codes. Griffith v. Flinn, 2003 Ky. App. LEXIS 161 (Ky. Ct. App. June 27, 2003).

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Note: A “Preposterous Anomaly”: Sovereign Immunity in Kentucky Following the Crash of Comair Flight 5191, 98 Ky. L.J. 889 (2009/2010).

Northern Kentucky Law Review.

Comment, A Survey of Kentucky Tort Reform, 17 N. Ky. L. Rev. 473 (1990).

65.2004. Periodic payment of damages.

  1. Upon motion of a local government against which final judgment has been rendered for a claim within the scope of KRS 65.200 to 65.2006 , the court, in accordance with subsection (2) of this section, may include in such judgment a requirement that the judgment be paid in whole or in part by periodic payments. Periodic payments may be ordered paid over a period of time not exceeding ten (10) years. Any periodic payment, upon becoming due under the terms of the judgment, shall constitute a separate judgment. Any judgment ordering any such payments shall specify the total amount awarded, the amount of each payment, the interval between payments and the number of payments to be paid under the judgment. Judgments paid pursuant to this section shall bear interest accruing from the date final judgment is entered, at the interest rate as specified in KRS 360.040. For good cause shown, the court may modify such judgment with respect to the amount of such payments and the number of payments, but the total amount of damages awarded by such judgment shall not be subject to modification in any event and periodic payments shall not be ordered paid over a period in excess of ten (10) years.
  2. A court may order periodic payment only upon finding that:
    1. Payment of the judgment is not totally covered by insurance; and
    2. Funds for the current budget year and other funds of the local government which lawfully may be utilized to pay judgments are insufficient to finance both the adopted budget of expenditures for the year and the payment of that portion of the judgment not covered by insurance.

History. Enact. Acts 1988, ch. 224, § 19, effective July 15, 1988.

Research References and Practice Aids

Northern Kentucky Law Review.

Comment, A Survey of Kentucky Tort Reform, 17 N. Ky. L. Rev. 473 (1990).

65.2005. Defense of employee by local government — Liability of employee.

  1. A local government shall provide for the defense of any employee by an attorney chosen by the local government in any action in tort arising out of an act or omission occurring within the scope of his employment of which it has been given notice pursuant to subsection (2) of this section. The local government shall pay any judgment based thereon or any compromise or settlement of the action except as provided in subsection (3) of this section and except that a local government’s responsibility under this section to indemnify an employee shall be subject to the limitations contained in KRS 65.2002 .
  2. Upon receiving service of a summons and complaint in any action in tort brought against him, an employee shall, within ten (10) days of receipt of service, give written notice of such action in tort to the executive authority of the local government.
  3. A local government may refuse to pay a judgment or settlement in any action against an employee, or if a local government pays any claim or judgment against any employee pursuant to subsection (1) of this section, it may recover from such employee the amount of such payment and the costs to defend if:
    1. The employee acted or failed to act because of fraud, malice, or corruption;
    2. The action was outside the actual or apparent scope of his employment;
    3. The employee willfully failed or refused to assist the defense of the cause of action, including the failure to give notice to the executive authority of the local government pursuant to subsection (2) of this section;
    4. The employee compromised or settled the claim without the approval of the governing body of the local government; or
    5. The employee obtained private counsel without the consent of the local government, in which case, the local government may also refuse to pay any legal fees incurred by the employee.

History. Enact. Acts 1988, ch. 224, § 20, effective July 15, 1988; 1994, ch. 233, § 1, effective July 15, 1994.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Former Employees

Local government was obligated to provide a former police officer for the locality with a defense in civil actions against the officer because the officer’s status as a former employee did not preclude the local government’s duty to defend since the civil claims arose from the officer’s job as a police officer. Richardson v. Louisville/Jefferson County Metro Gov't, 260 S.W.3d 777, 2008 Ky. LEXIS 152 ( Ky. 2008 ).

2. Scope of Employment.

Trial court erred in concluding that a police officer was acting within the scope of his employment at the time of ab accident because the officer stepped aside from his employment to accomplish some private purpose; immediately prior to the accident the officer was off-duty, he had run two personal errands, had his children in the vehicle with him, and was on his way home. Louisville/Jefferson Cnty. Metro Gov't v. Braden, 519 S.W.3d 386, 2017 Ky. App. LEXIS 19 (Ky. Ct. App. 2017).

3. Respondeat Superior.

City's decision to provide a police officer a defense and simultaneously protect its interests under the Claims Against Local Governments Act was altogether proper and consistent with both the letter and the spirit of that statute because the allegations against the officer sufficiently invoked his duties as a public servant to cause the city to offer a defense until it was determined that he was not acting within the scope of his employment; that decision did not constitute an admission of fact or an assumption of liability. Louisville/Jefferson Cnty. Metro Gov't v. Braden, 519 S.W.3d 386, 2017 Ky. App. LEXIS 19 (Ky. Ct. App. 2017).

There is case law which compels the application of respondeat superior principles in cases involving a question of municipal liability; these principles lend themselves more naturally to the facts and circumstances arising from Claims Against Local Governments Act cases at the heart of which lies the question of whether an employee acted within the scope of his or her employment, thereby obligating his or her employer to answer, and indemnify him or her, for his or her actions. Louisville/Jefferson Cnty. Metro Gov't v. Braden, 519 S.W.3d 386, 2017 Ky. App. LEXIS 19 (Ky. Ct. App. 2017).

In this provision, the General Assembly clearly acknowledges and expressly provides that there is a point at which an employee is not acting in furtherance of his or her municipal employer's interests. Louisville/Jefferson Cnty. Metro Gov't v. Braden, 519 S.W.3d 386, 2017 Ky. App. LEXIS 19 (Ky. Ct. App. 2017).

4. Duty to Indemnify.

Trial court's reliance on a police officer's compliance with standard operating procedures (SOPs) was misplaced because that he was operating in compliance with the SOPs at the time of an accident could not, and did not, definitively compel the city to defend and indemnify him for his actions under the Claims Against Local Governments Act (CALGA); under no circumstances can a municipal police department's SOPs supersede CALGA or create a duty to indemnify where state statute says there is none. Louisville/Jefferson Cnty. Metro Gov't v. Braden, 519 S.W.3d 386, 2017 Ky. App. LEXIS 19 (Ky. Ct. App. 2017).

Opinions of Attorney General.

A city was legally required to indemnify two (2) people for their legal defense costs in a litigation relating to the management of the city’s policemen’s retirement fund as they were both employees of the city for purposes of the statute. OAG 01-1 .

65.2006. Judgments affected.

KRS 65.200 to 65.2006 shall apply to all actions in tort in which money damages have not been adjudged as of July 15, 1988.

History. Enact. Acts 1988, ch. 224, § 21, effective July 15, 1988.

Energy Project Assessment District (EPAD) Act of 2015

65.205. Definitions for KRS 65.205 to 65.209.

As used in KRS 65.205 to 65.209 :

  1. “Energy improvement” means any permanent improvement fixed to real property and intended to increase the efficiency of energy use or decrease water or energy consumption or demand, generate electricity, provide thermal energy, or regulate temperature, including but not limited to a product, device, technology, or interacting group of products, devices, or technologies on the customer’s side of an electric, gas, water, or other energy meter;
  2. “Energy project” means the installation or modification of an energy improvement, including any associated project or financing costs;
  3. “Energy project assessment district” or “EPAD” means a geographic area designated by a local government pursuant to KRS 65.206 , within which energy projects may be undertaken and financed through the imposition of an assessment pursuant to KRS 65.205 to 65.209 ;
  4. “Local government” means any city, county, consolidated local government, urban-county government, charter county government, or unified local government of the Commonwealth;
  5. “Program” means an EPAD program established by a local government pursuant to KRS 65.206 ; and
  6. “Real property” excludes residential property consisting of fewer than five (5) units.

HISTORY: 2015 ch. 54, § 1, effective June 24, 2015.

65.206. Establishment of program to advance conservation and efficient use of energy and water resources.

  1. Pursuant to KRS 65.205 to 65.209 , the governing body of a local government may establish a program to advance the conservation and efficient use of energy and water resources within its jurisdiction, which program is hereby declared to be a valid exercise of the powers of local government and is in the best interest of the people of the Commonwealth, by allowing for energy projects to be financed by assessments imposed upon the real property being improved through the energy project. Nothing in KRS 65.205 to 65.209 shall be interpreted to:
    1. Expand the powers of eminent domain for a local government, state agency, or private entity or to allow a local government, state agency, or private entity to use the powers of eminent domain under this program; or
    2. Disregard or allow contravention of any net metering ordinance or policy, any generator interconnection ordinance or policy, or any rate ordinance duly adopted by the governing body.
    1. To establish a program, the governing body of a local government shall adopt a resolution or ordinance providing the terms and conditions of the program, including but not limited to: (2) (a) To establish a program, the governing body of a local government shall adopt a resolution or ordinance providing the terms and conditions of the program, including but not limited to:
      1. A statement that the local government intends to utilize assessments on relevant real property to support private sector energy projects;
      2. The designation of an EPAD, and a description of the boundaries thereof; and
      3. A procedure for the owners of record of real property located within an EPAD to petition the local government for participation in the program.
    2. Once a program is established, the governing body of a local government may amend the terms and conditions of the program by resolution or ordinance; except that no amendment shall be adopted to retroactively change the conditions under which an existing assessment was imposed, unless the owner of record of the affected real property consents to the amendment in writing.
    3. A local government may:
      1. Hire program staff, or contract with a third-party entity to administer a program;
      2. Impose fees on participating property owners to offset the costs of administering the program, including assessment and collection functions of various county offices; except that these fees shall not exceed the cost of services performed; and
      3. Engage financing for the purpose of administering the program from financial institutions with a physical presence in Kentucky whose deposits are insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.
    4. Any combination of local governments may agree to jointly implement or administer a program.
    1. The geographic area designated by the governing body of a local government as the EPAD: (3) (a) The geographic area designated by the governing body of a local government as the EPAD:
      1. May include the entire local government or any portion thereof; and
      2. Shall be wholly within the boundaries of the local government.
    2. A local government may designate more than one (1) separate EPAD within its boundaries.
  2. An authorized official of a local government that has established a program may approve a request from the owner of record of real property located within an EPAD to impose an assessment upon the property, which shall be used to repay the owner’s financing of an energy project on that property and the costs of any upgrades to the electrical or gas distribution system connected to that property necessary to accommodate the energy improvement. The upgrade costs shall be paid to the owner of the electrical distribution system. The financing may be provided by a third party or, if authorized by the local government, by any local government.
  3. Each energy project approved for participation in the program shall include a review of the property’s baseline energy or water usage conditions and the energy or water savings projected to be achieved as a result of the energy project.
  4. A program may authorize a participating property owner to:
    1. Directly purchase; or
    2. Acquire by contract, through a lease, power purchase agreement, or other service contract;

      the equipment and materials necessary for the installation or modification of an energy improvement.

  5. In addition to the authority provided in the Kentucky Revised Statutes for local governments to levy special assessments with the same lien status as a property tax, the governing body of a local government that establishes a program pursuant to this section may exercise powers granted under KRS 65.205 to 65.209 .

HISTORY: 2015 ch. 54, § 2, effective June 24, 2015.

65.207. Assessments on EPAD real property to repay energy project financing and associated costs — Conditions — Notice — Collection.

  1. An assessment may be imposed by a local government upon real property located in an EPAD and undergoing an approved energy project, pursuant to KRS 65.205 to 65.209 , to repay the financing and associated costs of the energy project.
    1. A local government may impose an assessment only after: (2) (a) A local government may impose an assessment only after:
      1. A petition to participate in the program and to be assessed is filed by the owner of record of the real property to be assessed; and
      2. A written contract is signed between the local government and the owner of record of the real property to be assessed accepting the energy project into the program and establishing the terms and conditions of the energy project and the assessment to be imposed.
    2. The petition filed by the owner of record shall include the written consent of the holder of each existing mortgage lien on the relevant property stating that the lien holder does not object to the imposition of the assessment.
  2. A local government that authorizes financing through assessments as part of a program established pursuant to KRS 65.205 to 65.209 shall file written notice of each assessment in the real property records of the county in which the property is located. This notice shall include:
    1. The amount of the assessment;
    2. The legal description of the real property;
    3. The name of each owner of record of the real property; and
    4. A reference to the statutory assessment lien provided under this section.
  3. Upon the imposition of an assessment, the assessment:
    1. Shall be added to the property tax bill for the relevant property;
    2. Shall be collected and distributed by the sheriff, or other designated local official or department, to the imposing local government in the same manner as the other taxes on the bill, and unpaid assessments shall bear the same penalty as general state and local ad valorem taxes; and
    3. Shall, together with any interest and penalties, constitute a first and prior lien against the real property on which the assessment is imposed from the date on which the notice of assessment is recorded pursuant to this section until paid. This lien shall have the same priority status as a lien for any other state or local ad valorem tax upon the property.

HISTORY: 2015 ch. 54, § 3, effective June 24, 2015.

65.208. Assessment imposed only at request of owner of EPAD real property to repay project financing.

The imposition of an assessment pursuant to KRS 65.205 to 65.209 is to be made solely at the request of the owner of record of real property within an EPAD. A local government shall not compel a person who owns real property in an EPAD to enter into a contract to repay the financing of an energy project through assessments under KRS 65.205 to 65.209 .

HISTORY: 2015 ch. 54, § 5, effective June 24, 2015.

65.209. Issuance of bonds or notes to finance energy projects — Security — Lien.

  1. A local government may issue bonds or notes to finance energy projects through assessments imposed pursuant to KRS 65.205 to 65.209 .
  2. Bonds or notes issued under this section shall not be general obligations of the local government. The bonds or notes shall be secured solely by one (1) or more of the following, as provided by the governing body of the local government in the resolution or ordinance approving the issuance of the bonds or notes:
    1. Payments of assessments on relevant real properties in one (1) or more specified energy project assessment districts;
    2. Reserves established by the local government from grants, bonds, or other available funds;
    3. Municipal bond insurance, lines of credit, public or private guaranties, standby bond purchase agreements, collateral assignments, mortgages, or other available means of providing credit support or liquidity; and
    4. Any other funds available for the purposes of KRS 65.205 to 65.209 .
  3. A local government pledge of assessments, funds, or contractual rights in connection with the issuance of bonds or notes by the local government under this section constitutes a first lien on the assessments, funds, or contractual rights pledged in favor of the person to whom the pledge is given, without further action by the local government. The lien is valid and binding against any other person, with or without notice.

HISTORY: 2015 ch. 54, § 4, effective June 24, 2015.

Interlocal Cooperation Act

65.210. Short title of KRS 65.210 to 65.300.

KRS 65.210 to 65.300 may be cited as the Interlocal Cooperation Act.

History. Enact. Acts 1962, ch. 216, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Housing Federal Prisoners.

Entering into an agreement to house federal prisoners pursuant to this act and KRS 441.025 , is a power, not a duty, imposed upon county government. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Detention Center v. Crockett, 786 S.W.2d 869, 1990 Ky. LEXIS 16 ( Ky. 1990 ).

2. Application.

A county’s participation in a self-insurance fund does not waive its sovereign immunity from tort suits. Franklin County v. Malone, 957 S.W.2d 195, 1997 Ky. LEXIS 105 ( Ky. 1997 ), overruled in part, Commonwealth Bd. of Claims v. Harris, 59 S.W.3d 896, 2001 Ky. LEXIS 198 ( Ky. 2001 ), overruled in part, Yanero v. Davis, 65 S.W.3d 510, 2001 Ky. LEXIS 203 ( Ky. 2001 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Any agreement made pursuant to this section through KRS 65.300 must be submitted to the Attorney General for examination and approval and failure to disapprove an agreement within two (2) days of its submission shall constitute approval thereof. OAG 72-465 .

This section through KRS 65.300 would allow a complete merger of a department of one governmental unit with a department of another so long as the merger is not used to avoid any existing and continuing legal functions and obligations. OAG 72-465 .

The city and county could enter into a contractual agreement to administer the building and housing codes under the Interlocal Cooperation Act, which agreement must contain the information referred to in KRS 65.250 and be approved by the office of the attorney general. OAG 73-570 .

When a county or counties make provision for a public defender, a county is a political subdivision but two (2) counties acting jointly do not make a single political subdivision and when the fiscal court acts legally for the county it means that the county, which is a political subdivision, is so acting and the fiscal court in such situation is an instrumentality of a political subdivision or county of a state. OAG 73-638 .

A fiscal court cannot contract, under authority of KRS 64.530 , with a fourth-class city located within their jurisdiction to detail a deputy sheriff to perform a majority of his duties within the city in return for the payment of his salary and expenses by the city; but, the city and county may enter into a contractual arrangement for police protection pursuant to the Interlocal Cooperation Act, KRS 65.210 to 65.300 . OAG 74-578 .

Under the Interlocal Cooperation Act cities within a county could enter into a contract to contribute funds, equipment and employees to the county for a county program to operate a landfill and collect and dispose of garbage throughout the county. OAG 74-706 .

Under this act a county and a city therein may enter into a joint city-county contract to establish a joint heritage commission. OAG 74-719 .

Where a city and county created, under the Kentucky Interlocal Cooperation Act, a new joint library with its board of trustees to conduct the affairs of the existing public library, they created, by virtue of KRS 65.250 , a “body corporate” and any additional creation by the board of trustees of a separate library corporation would be superfluous. OAG 75-288 .

If several cities execute an interlocal cooperation agreement to purchase materials and supplies, the agent for the cities, in advertising for bids, should identify the cities which are parties to the agreement as being the real contracting parties and buyers of materials and supplies. OAG 77-498 .

Where the Kentucky-Tennessee state line is a common boundary between two (2) cities, the cities could enter into a valid mutual aid contract relating to use of fire-fighting staff and equipment. OAG 77-632 .

An interlocal agreement is utilized where cooperative action in the utilization of peace officers and police department members is needed by which means governmental units can take advantage of the extraterritorial police power authorized in KRS 65.255 , and while in the performance of their duties, under an interlocal agreement, police officers outside their own city or county shall have the full power of arrest and all other powers they possess in their own city or county. OAG 78-364 .

Police officers are officers of the governmental entity in which they serve but under an interlocal agreement, for example, police officers involved in a cooperative undertaking between a city and a county or two (2) cities can avoid the prohibitions in KRS 61.080 and § 165 of the Kentucky Constitution against a person being, at the same time, a county officer and a city officer or an officer in two (2) different cities. OAG 78-364 .

The Interlocal Cooperation Act is a device whereby governmental units (including political subdivisions of the state and agencies of the state government) may jointly exercise their power on a basis of mutual advantage and thus provide services and facilities in a more efficient, economical and beneficial manner than they could individually, but only those powers which can be exercised individually can be exercised collectively. OAG 78-364 .

Where the several units of local government within the Bluegrass Area Development District sought to upgrade police services in the area of narcotics enforcement by forwarding to BGADD their proportionate share of matching funds for a Law Enforcement Assistance Administration grant, and then have BGADD contract on their behalf with the Kentucky State Police to provide those services, there was no cooperative and joint exercise of police powers requiring utilization of procedures of the Interlocal Cooperation Act. OAG 78-364 .

Since a city and a county, individually, may directly operate an ambulance service, they could utilize the provisions of KRS 79.110 to 79.180 or KRS 65.210 to 65.300 to agree to directly operate, jointly, an ambulance service even though KRS 65.730 has been repealed. OAG 79-104 .

The intent underlying the Interlocal Cooperation Act is that whatever a unit of government may do alone, it may do jointly with another governmental unit. OAG 79-208 .

Each of the local superintendents who comprise the Board of Directors of Eastern Kentucky Educational Development Corporation (EKEDC) may be held liable for the commission of an act or omission to take action regarding EKEDC matters which is a legal cause of injury to another. OAG 79-502 .

A county, or two (2) or more counties, acting under an agreement executed pursuant to the provisions of the Interlocal Cooperation Act may issue mortgage revenue bonds to finance the redevelopment of existing housing and to purchase existing housing units so long as the purchase is only a phase or part of the overall redevelopment plan under subsection (3)(j) of KRS 67.083 which will result in the ultimate transfer of title from county government to a private purchaser or to a governmental entity specifically authorized to administer a housing program. OAG 81-346 .

A sixth-class city may contract to furnish police protection to other sixth-class cities who are participating in agreements executed under the Interlocal Cooperation Act, KRS 65.210 to 65.300 , as long as the city is able to handle police services within its own boundaries and also has the capabilities to furnish police protection services to other cities. OAG 83-363 .

An agreement under the Interlocal Cooperation Act is a joint or cooperative undertaking between or among those governmental entities who have become parties to a formal agreement by satisfying the statutory requirements of KRS 65.210 to 65.300 ; the agreement is limited to public agencies and cannot be extended to include nonpublic agencies. OAG 84-200 .

While “public agencies” may enter into agreements executed under the Interlocal Cooperation Act, KRS 65.210 to 65.300 , assuming they can exercise unilaterally those functions they seek to exercise collectively, the agreements, including the benefits to be obtained therefrom, are limited to those units of government who have satisfied the statutory requirements of KRS 65.210 to 65.300 and are actually parties to the agreements. OAG 84-200 .

Cities and counties through the utilization of the Interlocal Cooperation Act, KRS 65.210 to 65.300 , may own and operate a hot mix bituminous asphalt plant for constructing and maintaining the roads and streets for which the member public agencies are responsible. OAG 84-200 .

An agreement pursuant to the Interlocal Cooperation Act, KRS 65.210 to 65.300 , is open to public inspection as it constitutes final action by the city; copies of such agreements must be filed with the county clerk of the county which is party to the agreement before the agreement becomes operative. OAG 84-217 .

With regard to fire protection services in rural areas, and a proposal concerning the merger of three fire departments, the cities and the county seeking such merger could possibly utilize the provisions of this act to more effectively and efficiently deliver fire protection services in the areas involved. OAG 90-134 .

Other than the requirements of KRS 304.1-120 (6) a self-insurance liability pool organized under the Interlocal Cooperation Act which provides coverage to local governments is not subject to the insurance code. OAG 92-124 .

The KACo Reinsurance Trust Program (KRT) is an interagency body of two (2) or more public agencies within the meaning of sudivision (1)(k) of KRS 61.870 and is therefore subject to the Open Records Act. OAG 93-65 .

Since the four subsections of KRS 224.40-315 are internally inconsistent, Senate Bill No. 2, Acts 1991 (Ex. Sess.) ch. 12, did not give a local solid waste management area’s governing body the authority to determine whether management facilities (which are not disposal facilities) are consistent with the local solid waste management plan. OAG 93-67 .

The Northern Kentucky Solid Waste Management Area is a cooperative arrangement between three units of government created under KRS 65.210 65.300 ; it can incorporate and enter into contracts as a separate entity, if permitted by the interlocal agreement itself. OAG 93-67 .

Three counties joining together pursuant to an interlocal agreement for the purpose of handling solid waste problems does not create a “special district” or a “waste management district” under KRS Chapter 109. OAG 93-67 .

Action of two (2) counties in executing an Interlocal Cooperation Act in which they created a trust which issued tax-exempt bonds and used the proceeds to acquire all the stock of a corporation was prohibited by Const., § 170 since the trust’s authority is no greater than that of either county, and since the counties cannot own stock in a corporation, neither can the trust. OAG 94-1 .

KRS 65.150 did not authorize action of two (2) counties executing interlocal cooperation agreement action in which they created a trust which issued tax-exempt bonds and used the proceeds to acquire all the stock of a corporation which sought to be licensed as an insurance company in order to provide reinsurance to various self-insured groups of the Kentucky Association of Counties since subsection (4) of KRS 65.150 contemplates the purchase of insurance not the purchase of an insurance company and states that the insurance obtained by revenue bonds must be for participating members and not as contemplated by the agreement to entities other than the two (2) participating members. OAG 94-1 .

A city may withdraw its participation from an existing tourism commission in accordance with its “home rule” powers under KRS § 82.082 . The legislature allows for a separate tax by allowing local governments to act separately in forming tourism commissions in KRS § 91A.350(1) and (2). OAG 2015-07

65.220. Purpose of KRS 65.210 to 65.300. [Effective until July 15, 2020]

It is the purpose of KRS 65.210 to 65.300 to permit local governmental units and the sheriff upon approval of the fiscal court to make the most efficient use of their powers by enabling them to cooperate with other localities on a basis of mutual advantage and thereby to provide services and facilities in a manner and pursuant to forms of governmental organization that will accord best with geographic, economic, population, and other factors influencing the needs and development of local communities.

History. Enact. Acts 1962, ch. 216, § 2; 2000, ch. 464, § 2, effective July 14, 2000.

Opinions of Attorney General.

A city and county may enter into an agreement to combine the city and county purchasing departments under the terms of the Interlocal Cooperation Act and by so doing relieve the county of its obligation and requirement under KRS 68.160 to appoint a purchasing agent. OAG 64-400 .

Jails of a second-class city and the county can be combined. OAG 67-64 .

Park and recreational facilities of a second-class city and the county may be merged. OAG 67-64 .

The fire departments of a second-class city and the county could be merged pursuant to the Interlocal Cooperation Act. OAG 67-64 .

The police departments of a city of the second class and the county could be merged under the Interlocal Cooperation Act. OAG 67-64 .

One or more cities of the fourth, fifth or sixth class would be authorized to join with the county under the Interlocal Cooperation Act to jointly establish a dog pound, appoint a dog warden and administer such a program if a written agreement was entered into by the parties and approved by the office of the attorney general. OAG 68-108 .

The police departments of a city and the county could be merged under the Interlocal Cooperation Act. OAG 68-443 .

Where a project was to be undertaken to relocate a highway, a railroad, and divert a river within the cut, the urban renewal and community development agency of the city could serve as the contracting agency, or project authority, to administer the project on behalf of the city, the railroad and the Department (now Bureau) of Highways. OAG 69-96 .

Agreements between volunteer fire departments to send men and equipment to assist each other can legally be entered into by virtue of the Interlocal Cooperation Act. OAG 69-213 .

Counties could combine in an agreement to construct, operate, or procure the operation of a juvenile detention facility, but such interlocal agreement would have to observe the provisions of KRS 208.130 (now repealed) and would be restricted to those counties of the same category as measured against KRS 208.130 . OAG 70-118 .

Where a combined project between counties for the construction of a juvenile detention home is entered into under KRS 65.210 to 65.300 , the cost may be allocated to each participating county on some agreed upon and equitable basis. OAG 70-118 .

A consolidation of the city and county health departments could be accomplished under the Interlocal Cooperation Act. OAG 70-212 .

Where a county wishes to allow city policemen to carry out police work anywhere in the county without having a member of the sheriff’s department with them, an agreement between the city and county can be entered into under the Interlocal Cooperation Act. OAG 71-62 .

Although a fifth-class city and a sixth-class city could not hire the same policemen, under the Interlocal Cooperation Act they could form a joint system of police protection. OAG 71-85 .

Although the fiscal court can establish a direct county disposal system or garbage collection in the unincorporated area of the county, a city could enter into a joint venture with the county in those areas. OAG 71-449 .

The police systems of the three (3) fifth-class cities in a county and a proposed county police system could be legally merged or consolidated. OAG 71-478 .

Both the city and county can enact measures to control flooding problems which, in turn, means that they can jointly participate in such a program under the Interlocal Cooperation Act. OAG 80-93 .

A sixth-class city may contract to furnish police protection to other sixth-class cities who are participating in agreements executed under the Interlocal Cooperation Act, KRS 65.210 to 65.300 , as long as the city is able to handle police services within its own boundaries and also has the capabilities to furnish police protection services to other cities. OAG 83-363 .

A city may withdraw its participation from an existing tourism commission in accordance with its “home rule” powers under KRS § 82.082 . The legislature allows for a separate tax by allowing local governments to act separately in forming tourism commissions in KRS § 91A.350(1) and (2). OAG 2015-07

65.220. Purpose of KRS 65.210 to 65.300. [Effective July 15, 2020]

It is the purpose of KRS 65.210 to 65.300 to permit public agencies to make the most efficient use of their powers by enabling them to cooperate with each other on a basis of mutual advantage and thereby to provide services and facilities in a manner and pursuant to forms of governmental organization that will accord best with geographic, economic, population, and other factors influencing the needs and development of local communities.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1962, ch. 216, § 2; 2000, ch. 464, § 2, effective July 14, 2000; 2020 ch. 98, § 1, effective July 15, 2020.

65.230. Definition of “public agency” for KRS 65.210 to 65.300. [Effective until July 15, 2020]

As used in KRS 65.210 to 65.300 , unless the context otherwise requires, “public agency” means any political subdivision of this state, any agency of the state government or of the United States, a sheriff, any county or independent school district, and any political subdivision of another state. It also means a state-supported or private institution of higher education and a county or independent public school district for the purposes of entering into a joint agreement to establish and operate a program or facility, including a center for child learning and study, designed to help one (1) or more schools meet any of the goals set forth in KRS 158.6451 , or for the investment of funds. If a private institution of higher education proposes to participate in an agreement pursuant to the Interlocal Cooperation Act, the Attorney General shall determine if the proposal is compatible with the United States Constitution, as part of the review of the agreement provided in KRS 65.260(2).

History. Enact. Acts 1962, ch. 216, § 3; 1964, ch. 114, § 1; 1982, ch. 87, § 1, effective July 15, 1982; 1988, ch. 393, § 1, effective July 15, 1988; 1994, ch. 356, § 1, effective July 15, 1994; 2000, ch. 464, § 3, effective July 14, 2000; 2003, ch. 80, § 1, effective June 24, 2003.

Opinions of Attorney General.

Under the Interlocal Cooperation Act Ashland and other cities in Kentucky have the authority to enter into an agreement with Huntington and other cities in West Virginia to establish and operate a metropolitan planning agency. OAG 67-193 .

Kentucky area development districts created under KRS 147A.050 to 147A.120 are political subdivisions of the state and at the same time are units of local government qualifying under the intergovernmental personnel act of 1970 for the receipt of funds under certain federal programs. This opinion also affirms OAG 73-318 . OAG 73-529 .

A Kentucky city, which is a “public agency” as defined by this section, may, pursuant to the authority set forth in KRS 82.082 , enter into a contract for sewerage services with another unit of government, including a unit located in another state, under the provisions of the Interlocal Cooperation Act, KRS 65.210 et seq., and the Kentucky city can utilize, pursuant to KRS 65.250 , the existing administrative machinery of the other “public agency” which is supplying the sewerage service for a designated fee, to serve as the administrative unit for the cooperative undertaking. OAG 81-220 .

An agreement under the Interlocal Cooperation Act is a joint or cooperative undertaking between or among those governmental entities who have become parties to a formal agreement by satisfying the statutory requirements of KRS 65.210 to 65.300 ; the agreement is limited to public agencies and cannot be extended to include nonpublic agencies. OAG 84-200 .

While “public agencies” may enter into agreements executed under the Interlocal Cooperation Act, KRS 65.210 to 65.300 , assuming they can exercise unilaterally those functions they seek to exercise collectively, the agreements, including the benefits to be obtained therefrom, are limited to those units of government who have satisfied the statutory requirements of KRS 65.210 to 65.300 and are actually parties to the agreements. OAG 84-200 .

Cities and counties through the utilization of the Interlocal Cooperation Act, KRS 65.210 to 65.300 , may own and operate a hot mix bituminous asphalt plant for constructing and maintaining the roads and streets for which the member public agencies are responsible. OAG 84-200 .

The Kentucky Association of Counties may not, on behalf of the counties, issue revenue bonds under the Interlocal Cooperation Act to partially finance the self-insurance fund since it is not a public agency. OAG 87-20 .

A city may withdraw its participation from an existing tourism commission in accordance with its “home rule” powers under KRS § 82.082 . The legislature allows for a separate tax by allowing local governments to act separately in forming tourism commissions in KRS § 91A.350(1) and (2). OAG 2015-07

65.230. Definitions for KRS 65.210 to 65.300. [Effective July 15, 2020]

As used in KRS 65.210 to 65.300 , unless the context otherwise requires:

  1. “Interlocal agency” means a separate legal or administrative entity with a governing board that is created in an agreement entered into by public agencies pursuant to the provisions of KRS 65.210 to 65.300 ;
  2. “Local government” means any:
    1. City;
    2. County;
    3. Consolidated local government;
    4. Urban-county government;
    5. Charter county government; or
    6. Unified local government;
  3. “Public agency” means:
    1. Any local government;
    2. Any political subdivision of this state or of another state;
    3. Any agency, board instrumentality, or commission created by a local government;
    4. Any taxing district as defined by KRS 65.180 ;
    5. Any special purpose government entity as defined in KRS 65A.010(9)(a) to (c), including those entities that are exempt from the definition of special purpose governmental entity under the provisions of KRS 65A.010(9)(d)7. to 9.;
    6. Any interlocal agency;
    7. The Commonwealth or any agency or instrumentality of the state government or of the United States, including but not limited to a state-supported institution of higher education;
    8. Any county school district or independent school district; and
    9. Any private institution of higher education entering into an agreement authorized by KRS 65.240(4) with another public agency.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1962, ch. 216, § 3; 1964, ch. 114, § 1; 1982, ch. 87, § 1, effective July 15, 1982; 1988, ch. 393, § 1, effective July 15, 1988; 1994, ch. 356, § 1, effective July 15, 1994; 2000, ch. 464, § 3, effective July 14, 2000; 2003, ch. 80, § 1, effective June 24, 2003; 2020 ch. 98, § 2, effective July 15, 2020.

65.240. Joint exercise of power by state agencies with other public agencies. [Effective until July 15, 2020]

  1. Any power or powers, privileges or authority exercised or capable of exercise by a public agency of this state may be exercised and enjoyed jointly with any other public agency of this state, and jointly with any public agency of any other state or of the United States to the extent that the laws of the United States permit such joint exercise or enjoyment. Any agency of the state government when acting jointly with any public agency may exercise and enjoy all of the powers, privileges and authority conferred by KRS 65.210 to 65.300 upon a public agency.
  2. Any two (2) or more public agencies may enter into agreements with one another for joint or cooperative action pursuant to the provisions of KRS 65.210 to 65.300 . Appropriate action by ordinance, resolution or otherwise pursuant to law, of the governing bodies of the participating public agencies shall be necessary before any such agreement may enter into force.
  3. Any public agency may enter into agreements with another public agency or agencies pursuant to KRS 65.210 to 65.300 to acquire by purchase or lease, any real or personal property, or any interest, right, easement, or privilege therein, outside of its municipal or jurisdictional boundaries, in connection with the acquisition, construction, operation, repair, or maintenance of any sewage, wastewater, or storm water facilities, notwithstanding any other provision of the Kentucky Revised Statutes restricting, qualifying, or limiting their authority to do so, except as set forth in KRS Chapter 278.
  4. A state-supported institution of higher education and one (1) or more county or independent public school districts may enter into agreements under KRS 65.210 to 65.300 for the purposes specified in KRS 65.230 , notwithstanding any other provision of the statutes restricting, qualifying or limiting their authority to do so.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1962, ch. 216, § 4(1), (2); 1964, ch. 114, § 2; 1982, ch. 97, § 2, effective July 15, 1982; 1988, ch. 393, § 2, effective July 15, 1988; 2018 ch. 196, § 4, effective July 14, 2018.

Opinions of Attorney General.

For the purpose of the indebtedness limitations of the constitution under Sections 157 and 158 of the Kentucky Constitution, the revenue sharing money actually made available to the city and county for the year in which the proposed new indebtedness for the buildings will be incurred, is a valid part of the two governmental units’ revenue for that particular year. OAG 73-263 .

In view of the explicit language of this section and KRS 65.270 , the Campbell County solid waste management authority can condemn land in its own name for its governmental and contractual purposes as the pre-existing rights of eminent domain vested in the participating governments may be collectively focused and utilized. OAG 73-787 .

A joint solid waste disposal authority may contract with a local garbage collector to provide garbage collection services to a city in the interlocal cooperation agreement since the agreement anticipates that the solid waste disposal program will be effectuated on a joint basis rather than a separate, city by city and unilateral basis. OAG 74-42 .

A city marshal of one city can be employed as a part-time deputy marshal, police officer, or patrolman of another city through an agreement between the two cities under an Interlocal Cooperation Act containing the information required in KRS 65.150 and approved by the Attorney General. OAG 74-537 .

As long as cities and counties comply with KRS 65.210 to 65.300 and meet the financial requirements of the Workmen’s Compensation Board and rules and regulations thereof, there is no impediment to cities joining with other cities and/or counties to provide workmen’s compensation self-insurance. OAG 78-115 .

This section would permit a city and county to grant jointly one cable television franchise, upon advertised bid solicitation, which would service the county and city. OAG 79-208 .

By reasonable implication the Interlocal Cooperation Act permits two major types of agreements: (1) the joint conduct by two or more governmental units of a particular function or joint operation of a particular governmental facility, and (2) the provision of governmental services on a contractual basis by one unit of government to one or more additional units. OAG 79-309 .

The Interlocal Cooperation Act envisions that governmental units may exercise certain powers jointly, provided each unit participating in the joint activity has the statutory authority to exercise such powers separately or unilaterally, and an interlocal agreement involving even one party which does not have the requisite statutory authority would render such contract null and void. OAG 79-309 .

Local school districts are public agencies which may take advantage of the benefits to be derived from entering into an interlocal agreement with each other. OAG 79-500 .

What a public agency can do by itself can usually be done jointly with other public agencies under an interlocal cooperation agreement, assuming no statutory bar exists to the contrary. OAG 79-500 .

An entity formed through the legal device of an interlocal cooperation agreement by public agencies which are sovereignly immune as a separate administrative entity, would be subject to the doctrine of sovereign immunity. OAG 79-502 .

Pursuant to this section, and Ky. Const., §§ 163 and 164, a city and county may engage in a joint cable television franchise, but where the city already has a franchise and is bound until May 31, 1984, unless the holder of the franchise and the city and county all agree to start over and the city and county advertise for a new and joint franchise, this is not possible before that date. OAG 79-566 .

A fourth-class city in Kentucky has the authority to operate various utility services and could, under the terms and provisions of the Interlocal Cooperation Act 65.210 et seq., execute a contract with another city to jointly operate such utility services. OAG 79-574 .

A interlocal agreement involving one party which does not have the requisite statutory authority would render the contract null and void. OAG 79-574 .

Concerning school and educational matters generally, a Kentucky city could not execute an interlocal agreement because cities do not have statutory authority to participate in school matters. OAG 79-574 .

A public housing agency operating under interlocal cooperation agreement may carry out a services project, in connection with a HUD section eight existing housing program, within the boundaries of all governmental units participating in the agreement; the Interlocal Cooperation Act provides authority for the public housing agency’s performing such function extraterritorially. OAG 79-617 .

Since a public housing agency operating under an interlocal cooperation agreement neither owns nor operates the actual buildings rented to persons assisted by the HUD section eight existing housing rent subsidy program, the extraterritoriality involved does not conflict with the concept of housing projects “acquired and operated” by a public housing authority envisioned by KRS Chapter 80. OAG 79-617 .

Although a sheriff normally has no authority to enforce city ordinances, pursuant to an interlocal cooperation agreement between a fourth-class city and a county the sheriff could be given complete jurisdiction to enforce city ordinances, as well as state law, within the municipal boundaries. OAG 80-42 .

A city housing agency may not operate a section 8 existing housing program (42 USCS § 1437f) within the boundaries of another city. OAG 80-55 .

Exclusive of the Interlocal Cooperation Act (KRS Chapter 147A), there is no statutory authority for the Kenton fiscal court to expend money on a railroad bridge located in Boone County a short distance from the Kenton County line which is part of a road which provides the only access to an industrial park, the commercial area of Boone County and I-75 for residents in the southern end of Kenton County; under this section, however, Boone County and Kenton County may execute an interlocal agreement wherein both counties may expend their general or road fund moneys in the reconstruction or repair of the bridge, subject, of course, to the availability of such funds in the county budgets and funds which were not previously committed to specific road and bridge projects. OAG 80-642 .

Since cities and counties have the authority under KRS 79.080(2) to establish and operate, individually, plans for the payment of hospitalization benefits, they may, under the authority of the Interlocal Cooperation Act, KRS 65.210 to 65.300 operate such plans jointly with other cities and counties. The agreement must ultimately be approved by the attorney general. OAG 82-294 .

Although local governments are responsible for the enforcement of the state building code within the boundaries of their jurisdictions, the department of local government may participate in the local enforcement program to the extent of providing funds for the research and planning of a program whereby various local governments will jointly conduct and operate an enforcement program. (Decision prior to 1982 enactment of KRS 147A.021 .) OAG 82-312 .

KRS 441.006 (now KRS 441.025 ) provides for jail agreements under the Interlocal Act, KRS 65.210 to 65.300 . OAG 82-334 .

Since a county cannot furnish county equipment and road employes to maintain or construct a city street unless such street is made a part of the county road system, the mere fact that an interlocal agreement is being entered into that does not encompass the city street’s being made a part of the county road system would not convert it into a lawful project. OAG 82-418 .

Not only may cities enact dog control ordinances but they may join together with other cities in joint or cooperative undertakings to handle such matters of common concern. OAG 82-447 .

The county has definite and prescribed obligations under KRS Chapter 258, but they do not include the duty to accept dogs at the county pound which were picked up by municipal dog control authorities, particularly where violations of municipal ordinances are involved. While the cities and the county have the authority to enter into a joint or cooperative agreement concerning dog control and the use of the county dog pound, which could include a boarding fee for dogs delivered to the pound by city dog control officers, the cities, in the absence of an agreement with the county, cannot require the county to accept dogs picked up for violations of municipal ordinances; absent an agreement between the cities and the county relative to dog control, the cities will enforce their ordinances only and the county and all peace officers will enforce the provisions of KRS Chapter 258. OAG 82-447 .

Where a city and county had not entered into an interlocal agreement relative to a joint cable television franchise, the unilateral solicitation of bids by the county, and the county’s acceptance of a bid which included the area of the city, resulted in an illegal award of franchise. OAG 83-321 .

While Ky. Const., §§ 163 and 164 dealing with franchises are self-operative in nature, the Interlocal Cooperation Act (KRS Chapter 147A), this section, would permit the city and county to grant jointly one cable television franchise (upon advertised bid solicitation) which would service the county and city and there is nothing in the joint action which would militate against the self-executing nature of Ky. Const., §§ 163 and 164 or against the exclusivity of separate governmental control over the streets and roads of the county and city respectively. OAG 83-321 .

Where bridge was entirely located in one county but was used by a few residents of adjacent county, the two (2) counties could enter into an interlocal agreement wherein both counties would contribute money to the repair or reconstruction of the bridge; however, for such an agreement to be valid, it must clearly appear that both counties had a definite public interest in such project and, in addition, the county in which the bridge was located would in no manner surrender its jurisdiction over the bridge. OAG 83-340 .

In addition to the express authorization of a contract between an airport authority and a city by which the authority undertakes emergency service involving UPS Aircraft either on UPS runways or on the UPS ramps by KRS 75.050 , this section expressly permits any two (2) or more public agencies of Kentucky to contract to do jointly what each can do alone. However, in view of the formalities of this and the following sections, KRS 75.050 , standing alone, is sufficient authority for the contract. OAG 85-97 .

Pursuant to subsection (1) of this section and subsection (3) of KRS 65.150 , counties may associate to self-insure. OAG 87-20 .

All peace officers in the Commonwealth of Kentucky are authorized, if not required, to cooperate with federal officials, i.e. the DEA, in enforcing appropriate federal laws against illegal drugs and drug trafficking. Also Kentucky peace officers may, to the extent permitted by federal law, enforce federal drug laws regarding crimes that have occurred in Kentucky in whole or in part, or that otherwise affect a business or person residing in Kentucky. OAG 92-104 .

A city may not unilaterally expend funds to maintain a waterway that is not within its boundaries. OAG 12-009 , 2012 Ky AG LEXIS 110.

A city may withdraw its participation from an existing tourism commission in accordance with its “home rule” powers under KRS § 82.082 . The legislature allows for a separate tax by allowing local governments to act separately in forming tourism commissions in KRS § 91A.350(1) and (2). OAG 2015-07

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Owsley, The Kentucky Interlocal Cooperation Act, 51 Ky. L.J. 22 (1962).

ALR

Joint project or enterprise, power of political subdivision to engage in. 123 A.L.R. 997.

Power of eminent domain as between state and subdivision or agency thereof, or as between different subdivisions or agencies themselves. 35 A.L.R.3d 1293.

65.240. Joint exercise of power by state agencies with other public agencies — Permissible agreements among private institutions of higher education, county school districts, and independent school districts. [Effective July 15, 2020]

  1. Any powers, privileges, or authorities exercised or capable of exercise by a public agency of this state may be exercised and enjoyed jointly with any other public agency of this state, and jointly with any public agency of any other state or of the United States to the extent that the laws of the United States permit such joint exercise or enjoyment. Any agency of the state government when acting jointly with any public agency may exercise and enjoy all of the powers, privileges and authority conferred by KRS 65.210 to 65.300 upon a public agency.
  2. Any two (2) or more public agencies may enter into agreements with one another for joint or cooperative action pursuant to the provisions of KRS 65.210 to 65.300 , including but not limited to for the sharing of revenues and physical assets. Appropriate action by ordinance, resolution or otherwise pursuant to law, of the governing bodies of the participating public agencies shall be necessary before any such agreement may enter into force.
  3. Any public agency may enter into agreements with another public agency or agencies pursuant to KRS 65.210 to 65.300 to acquire by purchase or lease, any real or personal property, or any interest, right, easement, or privilege therein, outside of its municipal or jurisdictional boundaries, in connection with the acquisition, construction, operation, repair, or maintenance of any water, sewage, wastewater, or storm water facilities, notwithstanding any other provision of the Kentucky Revised Statutes restricting, qualifying, or limiting their authority to do so, except as set forth in KRS Chapter 278.
  4. A private institution of higher education and one (1) or more county school districts or independent school districts may enter into agreements under KRS 65.210 to 65.300 for the purposes of establishing and operating a program or facility, including a center for child learning and study, designed to help one (1) or more schools meet the goals set out in KRS 158.6451 , or for the investment of funds if the Attorney General determines that the proposal is compatible with the United States Constitution as part of the review of the agreement provided in KRS 65.260(2), notwithstanding any other provision of the statutes restricting, qualifying or limiting their authority to do so.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1962, ch. 216, § 4(1), (2); 1964, ch. 114, § 2; 1982, ch. 97, § 2, effective July 15, 1982; 1988, ch. 393, § 2, effective July 15, 1988; 2020 ch. 98, § 4, effective July 15, 2020.

65.241. Public agency must notify establishing local governments of its intent to enter into interlocal agreement — Response or nonresponse of local governments. [Effective July 15, 2020]

  1. A public agency as defined in KRS 65.230(3)(c) to (f) shall provide written notification to the governing body of each of its establishing local governments of its intent to enter into an interlocal agreement pursuant to the provisions of KRS 65.210 to 65.300 that includes a:
    1. Written description and purpose of the proposed agreement;
    2. Copy of the proposed agreement; and
    3. Statement that the governing body of the establishing local government may either approve or disapprove the public agency’s entry into the proposed agreement by sending a written response of its approval or disapproval within thirty (30) days of the receipt of the notification from the public agency. The statement shall also note that if an establishing local government does not respond within that thirty (30) day period, the establishing local government shall be deemed to have approved the proposed entry into the agreement.
  2. In order for a public agency as defined in KRS 65.230(3)(c) to (f) to enter into an agreement pursuant to the provisions of KRS 65.210 to 65.300 , each governing body of the local government establishing that public agency, if more than one (1), shall:
    1. Notify the public agency of its approval in writing within thirty (30) days of receipt of the notification as set out in subsection (1) of this section; or
    2. Make no response. If the governing body of the local government makes no response within thirty (30) days of the notification as set out in subsection (1) of this section, the nonresponse shall be deemed to be approval of the proposal.

HISTORY: 2020 ch. 98, § 3, effective July 15, 2020.

65.242. Change in parties to interlocal agreement. [Effective until July 15, 2020]

  1. Provided that the terms of the agreement are not being substantively changed, whenever an existing agreement that complies with the requirements of KRS 65.210 to 65.300 is amended to join new parties or to remove existing parties, approval of the Attorney General or the Department for Local Government under KRS 65.260 and approval of the agency or officer with jurisdiction under KRS 65.300 shall not be required for the amendment to be effective.
  2. In lieu of the requirements of KRS 65.290 , when an agreement is amended pursuant to subsection (1) of this section, each public agency subject to the agreement, including any public agency withdrawing from the agreement, shall send the following to the county clerk of the county in which it is located, to the Secretary of State, and to either the Attorney General or the Department for Local Government, if either agency would have had the responsibility for review under KRS 65.260 :
    1. A copy of the full agreement, including any amendments;
    2. A statement containing the effective date and subject of the original agreement;
    3. A list of the parties being added to or removed from the agreement; and
    4. A certification signed by each party being added to the agreement that confirms that the party is:
      1. A public agency as defined in KRS 65.230 ; and
      2. Eligible under KRS 65.240 to join the interlocal agreement with the existing parties to the agreement.
  3. Public agencies may, by the terms of an agreement made pursuant to KRS 65.210 to 65.300 , specify the manner in which parties may be added to or removed from the agreement pursuant to this section. The language may authorize the addition of new parties or the removal of existing parties with or without the requirement of action by the legislative body of each public agency that is a party to the existing agreement or with a requirement of action by a minimum percentage of the legislative bodies of the public agencies that are parties to the agreement. In the absence of this language, action by the legislative body of each public agency that is a party to the existing agreement shall be required to amend the agreement to add new parties or remove existing parties.

HISTORY: 2016 ch. 92, § 1, effective July 15, 2016.

65.242. Change in parties to interlocal agreement. [Effective July 15, 2020]

  1. Provided that the terms of the agreement are not being substantively changed, whenever an existing agreement that complies with the requirements of KRS 65.210 to 65.300 is amended solely to join new parties or to remove existing parties, approval of the Attorney General or the Department for Local Government under KRS 65.260 and approval of the agency or officer with jurisdiction under KRS 65.300 shall not be required for the amendment to be effective.
  2. In lieu of the requirements of KRS 65.290 , when an agreement is amended pursuant to subsection (1) of this section, each public agency subject to the agreement or the interlocal agency created by the agreement shall file a copy of the amended agreement with the Secretary of State .
  3. Public agencies may, by the terms of an agreement made pursuant to KRS 65.210 to 65.300 , specify the manner in which parties may be added to or removed from the agreement pursuant to this section. The language may authorize the addition of new parties or the removal of existing parties with or without the requirement of action by each public agency that is a party to the existing agreement or with a requirement of action by a minimum percentage of the legislative bodies of the public agencies that are parties to the agreement.

HISTORY: 2020 ch. 98, § 5, effective July 15, 2020.

65.243. Status and authorities of interlocal agency created by interlocal agreement — Interlocal agreement controls if more restrictive than KRS 65.210 to 65.300 — Status and authorities are cumulative — No statutory power to tax granted to interlocal agency — Interlocal agency deemed a public agency. [Effective July 15, 2020]

  1. An interlocal agency created by the interlocal agreement shall constitute an agency and instrumentality of the public agencies party to the interlocal agreement for the purpose of performing the essential governmental functions and the public purposes authorized by the interlocal agreement.
  2. Unless restricted, limited, or otherwise conditioned under the terms of the interlocal agreement, an interlocal agency is authorized to exercise any powers not in conflict with local, state, or federal law or in conflict with the interlocal agreement that are necessary and convenient to accomplish the purposes for which the interlocal agency was created.
  3. To the extent that any of the provisions of the interlocal agreement are more restrictive, or limit the powers, privileges, or authority of the interlocal agency that are otherwise allowed by KRS 65.210 to 65.300 , the provisions of the interlocal agreement shall control.
  4. The status and authorities of an interlocal agency granted in this section, unless limited by the interlocal agreement, is cumulative and in addition to the powers and authority of an interlocal agency that may otherwise exist and that are granted or implied under any other laws of the Commonwealth to a specific type of public body that may also function as an interlocal agency under KRS 65.210 to 65.300 .
  5. Nothing in this section shall be construed to grant an interlocal agency the ability to levy a tax.
  6. An interlocal agency created by an interlocal agreement shall be deemed to be a public agency as defined in KRS 61.805 and 61.870 , and as such shall be subject to KRS 61.800 to 61.850 and 61.870 to 61.884 .

HISTORY: 2020 ch. 98, § 7, effective July 15, 2020.

65.245. Cooperative interlocal agreements for the sharing of revenues. [Repealed effective July 15, 2020]

  1. It is the purpose of this section to clarify the ability of cities, counties, urban-counties, charter counties, consolidated local governments, and sheriffs upon approval of the fiscal court or consolidated local government to share their revenues by entering into interlocal agreements.
  2. Any city, county, urban-county, consolidated local government, or charter county may by ordinance enter into cooperative interlocal agreements for the sharing of revenues. A sheriff, upon approval of the fiscal court or the consolidated local government, may enter into a memorandum of agreement with local governments for the purposes of sharing of revenues. The distribution of the revenues shall be as agreed upon by the local governments or the sheriff and contained in the interlocal agreement.

History. Enact. Acts 1992, ch. 87, § 1, effective July 14, 1992; 2000, ch. 464, § 4, effective July 14, 2000; 2002, ch. 346, § 27, effective July 15, 2002.

Notes to Opinions

Attorney General Opinions

A city may withdraw its participation from an existing tourism commission in accordance with its “home rule” powers under KRS § 82.082 . The legislature allows for a separate tax by allowing local governments to act separately in forming tourism commissions in KRS § 91A.350(1) and (2). OAG 2015-07

65.245. Cooperative interlocal agreements for the sharing of revenues. [Repealed effective July 15, 2020]

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1992, ch. 87, § 1, effective July 14, 1992; 2000, ch. 464, § 4, effective July 14, 2000; 2002, ch. 346, § 27, effective July 15, 2002; repealed by 2020 ch. 98, § 18, effective July 15, 2020.

65.250. Contents of agreements authorized by KRS 65.240 — Status of employees. [Effective until July 15, 2020]

  1. Any such agreement shall specify the following:
    1. The duration of the agreement;
    2. The precise organization, composition and nature of any separate legal or administrative entity created thereby together with a statement of the powers delegated thereto; provided such legal entity may be legally created;
    3. The purpose or purposes of such legal or administrative entity;
    4. The manner of financing the joint or cooperative undertaking and of establishing and maintaining a budget therefor; said agreement for financing the joint or cooperative undertaking shall include agreements relative to the respective responsibilities of the units of government involved for the payment of the employer’s share involved in any pertinent pension plan or plans, if any, provided for by KRS 65.280 ;
    5. The permissible method or methods to be employed in accomplishing the partial or complete termination of the agreement and for disposing of property upon such partial or complete termination;
    6. Any other necessary and proper matters.
  2. In the event that the agreement does not establish a separate legal or administrative entity to conduct the joint or cooperative undertaking, the agreement shall, in addition to paragraphs (a), (c), (d), (e) and (f) enumerated in subsection (1) of this section, contain the following:
    1. Provision for an administrator or joint board responsible for administering the joint or cooperative undertaking. In the event that a joint board is established, the public agencies party to the agreement shall be represented thereon;
    2. The manner of acquiring, holding and disposing of real and personal property used in the joint or cooperative undertaking.

History. Enact. Acts 1962, ch. 216, § 4(3), (4); 1964, ch. 114, § 4; 1966, ch. 255, § 78.

Opinions of Attorney General.

Where a city and a county acting under the Interlocal Cooperation Act and with intent to take advantage of the extraterritorial police power permitted by the act enter into an agreement authorizing all members of the city police force to exercise the power of arrest and other powers that they possess, in any territory of the county outside the city limits, this does not represent a cooperative and joint exercise of police power as required by KRS 64.240 (now repealed) nor does the failure to mention the matter of financing the joint or cooperative undertaking conform with subsec. (1)(d) of this section and the failure to create a separate legal or administrative entity does not conform to subsec. (2) of said section. The agreement therefore does not comply with either the intent or the terms of the Interlocal Cooperation Act and cannot be approved by the attorney general as required by this section. OAG 69-113 .

An interstate cooperative agreement could legally provide that the Tennessee watershed district would acquire such easements or flowage rights on Tennessee lands from Tennessee landowners whose lands might be flooded as a result of the construction and operation of two Kentucky dams, subject to the Tennessee district’s being reimbursed, by the Kentucky district, for its expenses in acquiring, recording and transferring such rights to the Kentucky district if such agreement complied with the requirements of this section, KRS 65.260 and 65.290 . OAG 69-204 .

Where a city and county created, under the Kentucky Interlocal Cooperation Act, a new joint library with its board of trustees to conduct the affairs of the existing public library, they created a “body corporate” and any additional creation by the board of trustees of a separate library corporation would be superfluous. OAG 75-288 .

An interlocal agreement and the steps taken to effectuate Ky. Const., §§ 163 and 164 may properly include joint advertising, joint consideration of bids, joint awarding of a cable television franchise covering city and county areas, a provision that the consideration payable to the city and county shall be a certain percentage of the gross receipts from city subscribers going to the city and a percentage of gross receipts of county subscribers going to the county respectively, and the joint control over the franchise. OAG 79-208 .

Where either a joint or cooperative agreement is involved, the agreement may provide for either a separate legal or administrative entity to conduct the undertaking or it may utilize the existing administrative machinery of one or more of the governmental units which are parties to the contract. OAG 79-309 .

Although the articles of incorporation of an entity purported to show that the apparent purpose of the corporation was to perform governmental activity, specifically to assist those political subdivisions of the state of Kentucky located in Campbell County in performing their municipal functions, the articles did not fully comply with this section and there was no indication that it had complied with KRS 65.260 , therefore, since the entity had no formal statutory authority that would make it an instrumentality of a political subdivision as defined in KRS 61.420(5) for social security purposes, social security should be paid by the entity directly to the social security administration as any other nonprofit corporation would do. OAG 80-348 .

A Kentucky city, which is a “public agency” as defined by KRS 65.230 , may, pursuant to the authority set forth in KRS 82.082 , enter into a contract for sewerage services with another unit of government, including a unit located in another state, under the provisions of the Interlocal Cooperation Act, KRS 65.210 et seq., and the Kentucky city can utilize, pursuant to this section, the existing administrative machinery of the other “public agency” which is supplying the sewerage service for a designated fee, to serve as the administrative unit for the cooperative undertaking. OAG 81-220 .

A city of the fifth class which entered into an interlocal agreement concerning fire protection could not pass the yearly charge on to its citizens in the absence of a statutory authorization for such special assessment. OAG 84-61 .

A city may withdraw its participation from an existing tourism commission in accordance with its “home rule” powers under KRS § 82.082 . The legislature allows for a separate tax by allowing local governments to act separately in forming tourism commissions in KRS § 91A.350(1) and (2). OAG 2015-07

65.250. Contents of agreements authorized by KRS 65.240. [Effective July 15, 2020]

  1. Any agreement entered into under KRS 65.210 to 65.300 shall specify the following:
    1. The purpose and duration of the agreement;
    2. If the agreement creates an interlocal agency:
      1. The organization, composition, authority, and nature of the interlocal agency, including the terms and qualifications of the members of the governing authority and their manner of appointment or selection;
      2. A statement of the powers delegated to the interlocal agency or any restrictions, limitations, or conditions the contracting parties wish to place on those powers; and
      3. A general statement of any responsibilities of the interlocal agency to the parties that established it;
    3. The manner of financing the joint or cooperative undertaking and of establishing and maintaining a budget therefor; said agreement for financing the joint or cooperative undertaking shall include agreements relative to the respective responsibilities of the public agencies involved for the payment of the employer’s share involved in any pertinent pension plan or plans, if any, provided for by KRS 65.280 ;
    4. The permissible method or methods to be employed in accomplishing the partial or complete termination of the agreement, including the method for disposing of property upon such partial or complete termination; and
    5. Any other necessary and proper matters.
  2. In the event that the agreement does not establish an interlocal agency to conduct the joint or cooperative undertaking, the agreement shall, in addition to paragraphs (a), (c), (d), and (e) enumerated in subsection (1) of this section, contain the following:
    1. Provision for an administrator responsible for the joint or cooperative undertaking; and
    2. The manner of acquiring, holding, and disposing of real and personal property used in the joint or cooperative undertaking.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1962, ch. 216, § 4(3), (4); 1964, ch. 114, § 4; 1966, ch. 255, § 78; 2020 ch. 98, § 6, effective July 15, 2020.

65.255. Powers of peace officers operating under cooperative agreement. [Effective until July 15, 2020]

If an agreement entered into under the authority of KRS 65.210 to 65.300 provides for cooperative action in the utilization of peace officers, police department members, while in the performance of their duties under such an agreement outside their own city or county, shall have the full power of arrest and all other powers they possess in their own city or county and shall have the same immunities and privileges as if the duties were performed in their own city or county.

History. Enact. Acts 1968, ch. 68.

Opinions of Attorney General.

Although a literal construction of KRS 95.510 (now repealed) would appear to empower police of cities of the third class to exercise their jurisdiction within an adjoining county providing it is within one (1) mile of the city limits, this construction is negated by this section and Const., § 101. OAG 75-68 .

Where a city and a county operate a joint metro police force under the Interlocal Cooperation Act and, under the authority of KRS 95.445 , the city establishes an auxiliary police force to perform special duties within the city, the members of the metro force have, under this section, county-wide jurisdiction but this extraterritorial jurisdiction would not extend to the members of the auxiliary force, whose power of arrest is limited to the city. OAG 75-381 .

Although a sheriff normally has no authority to enforce city ordinances, pursuant to an interlocal cooperation agreement between a fourth-class city and a county the sheriff could be given complete jurisdiction to enforce city ordinances, as well as state law, within the municipal boundaries. OAG 80-42 .

While police officers of a sixth class city have a statutory obligation to rigidly enforce the provisions of KRS 189.520 , dealing with driving under the influence, they can only enforce this statute or any other statute within their jurisdictional area of authority. Generally, the jurisdiction of such police officers to arrest for offenses against the state is limited to the city limits of their particular city. However, where sixth class cities are operating under an interlocal agreement, the jurisdiction is extended to include the city limits of all of the cities which are parties to the agreement. Also under the appropriate circumstances the jurisdiction of a sixth class city police officer could be expanded by the utilization of the concept of hot pursuit under KRS 431.045 . OAG 82-599 .

A city is generally liable for the negligent acts of its police officers who are operating in another city as authorized by an interlocal agreement, and liability will generally be incurred regardless of what the agreement says to the contrary. OAG 83-363 .

A city may withdraw its participation from an existing tourism commission in accordance with its “home rule” powers under KRS § 82.082 . The legislature allows for a separate tax by allowing local governments to act separately in forming tourism commissions in KRS § 91A.350(1) and (2). OAG 2015-07

65.255. Powers of peace officers operating under cooperative interlocal agreement. [Effective July 15, 2020]

If an agreement entered into under the authority of KRS 65.210 to 65.300 provides for cooperative action in the utilization of peace officers, those peace officers, while in the performance of their duties under the agreement outside their own city, county, or other jurisdiction, shall have the full power of arrest and all other powers they possess in their own city, county, or other jurisdiction, and shall have the same immunities and privileges as if the duties were performed in their own city, county, or other jurisdiction.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1968, ch. 68; 2020 ch. 98, § 8, effective July 15, 2020.

65.260. Limitations upon agreements — Approval by Attorney General or Department for Local Government — Exemptions. [Effective until July 15, 2020]

  1. No agreement made pursuant to KRS 65.210 to 65.300 shall relieve any public agency of any obligation or responsibility imposed upon it by law except that to the extent of actual and timely performance thereof by a joint board or other legal or administrative entity created by an agreement made pursuant to KRS 65.210 to 65.300 , that performance may be offered in satisfaction of the obligation or responsibility.
  2. Except as provided in subsections (3) and (4) of this section, every agreement made pursuant to KRS 65.210 to 65.300 shall, prior to and as a condition precedent to its entry into force, be submitted to the Attorney General who shall determine whether the agreement is in proper form and compatible with the laws of this state, except for interlocal agreements between cities, counties, charter counties, urban-county governments, and sheriffs upon approval of the fiscal court, which shall be submitted to the Department for Local Government. The Attorney General or the Department for Local Government shall approve any agreement submitted to them under this subsection unless they find that it does not meet the conditions set forth in KRS 65.210 to 65.300 . If the agreement does not meet these conditions, the Attorney General or the Department for Local Government shall detail in writing, addressed to the governing bodies of the public agencies concerned, the specific respects in which the proposed agreement fails to meet the requirements of law. Failure to disapprove an agreement submitted hereunder within sixty (60) days of its submission shall constitute approval thereof.
  3. The submission of an interlocal cooperative agreement to the Attorney General or the Department for Local Government as provided in subsection (2) of this section shall not be required for any cooperative agreement which involves only the construction, reconstruction, or maintenance of a municipal road or bridge, provided a written agreement is approved by each of the affected governing bodies.
  4. Interlocal cooperative agreements between school boards and counties shall be exempt from the provisions of subsection (2) of this section.

History. Enact. Acts 1962, ch. 216, § 4(5), (6); 1964, ch. 114, § 3; 1992, ch. 46, § 1, effective July 14, 1992; 2000, ch. 464, § 1, effective July 14, 2000; 2007, ch. 47, § 44, effective June 26, 2007; 2010, ch. 117, § 51, effective July 15, 2010.

Opinions of Attorney General.

Although two (2) cities have entered into an interlocal agreement, such agreement could be mutually dissolved by the cities at any time and no binding effect would result from a contract with a police authority and any contract between the Kentucky crime commission through the Kentucky law enforcement foundation fund would need to be entered into with the actual subdivisions involved. OAG 73-603 .

Although the articles of incorporation of an entity purported to show that the apparent purpose of the corporation was to perform governmental activity, specifically to assist those political subdivisions of the state of Kentucky located in Campbell County in performing their municipal functions, the articles did not fully comply with KRS 65.250 and there was no indication that it had complied with this section, therefore, since the entity had no formal statutory authority that would make it an instrumentality of a political subdivision as defined in KRS 61.420(5) for social security purposes, social security should be paid by the entity directly to the social security administration as any other nonprofit corporation would do. OAG 80-348 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Owsley, The Kentucky Interlocal Cooperation Act, 51 Ky. L.J. 22 (1962).

65.260. Limitations upon agreements — Approval by Attorney General or Department for Local Government — Exemptions. [Effective July 15, 2020]

  1. No agreement made pursuant to KRS 65.210 to 65.300 shall relieve any public agency of any obligation or responsibility imposed upon it by law, except that to the extent of actual and timely performance thereof by an interlocal agency, that performance may be offered in satisfaction of the obligation or responsibility.
  2. Except as provided in subsections (3) and (4) of this section, every agreement made pursuant to KRS 65.210 to 65.300 shall, prior to and as a condition precedent to its entry into force, be submitted to the Attorney General who shall determine whether the agreement is in proper form and compatible with the laws of this state. The Attorney General shall approve any agreement submitted to his or her office under this subsection unless he or she finds that it does not meet the requirements set forth in KRS 65.210 to 65.300 . If the agreement does not meet these requirements, the Attorney General shall detail in writing, addressed to the public agencies concerned, the specific respects in which the proposed agreement fails to meet the requirements of law. The failure of the Attorney General to disapprove an agreement submitted under this subsection within thirty (30) days of its submission shall constitute approval thereof.
    1. In lieu of the requirements of subsection (2) of this section, agreements involving only local governments, an agency, board, instrumentality, or commission created exclusively by one (1) or more local governments, or any combination thereof, shall prior to and as a condition precedent to its entry into force, be submitted to the Department for Local Government. The department shall determine whether the agreement is in proper form and shall approve any agreement submitted to it under this subsection unless it finds that the agreement does not meet the requirements set out in KRS 65.210 to 65.300 . If the agreement does not meet these requirements, the department shall detail, in writing, addressed to the public agencies concerned, the specific respects in which the proposed agreement fails to meet the requirements of KRS 65.210 to 65.300 . The failure of the department to disapprove an agreement submitted under this subsection within thirty (30) days of its submission shall constitute approval thereof. (3) (a) In lieu of the requirements of subsection (2) of this section, agreements involving only local governments, an agency, board, instrumentality, or commission created exclusively by one (1) or more local governments, or any combination thereof, shall prior to and as a condition precedent to its entry into force, be submitted to the Department for Local Government. The department shall determine whether the agreement is in proper form and shall approve any agreement submitted to it under this subsection unless it finds that the agreement does not meet the requirements set out in KRS 65.210 to 65.300. If the agreement does not meet these requirements, the department shall detail, in writing, addressed to the public agencies concerned, the specific respects in which the proposed agreement fails to meet the requirements of KRS 65.210 to 65.300. The failure of the department to disapprove an agreement submitted under this subsection within thirty (30) days of its submission shall constitute approval thereof.
    2. The approval of an agreement by the Department for Local Government under paragraph (a) of this subsection shall be deemed final and conclusive that the agreement meets the requirements of KRS 65.210 to 65.300, and the agreement shall not thereafter be subject to challenge as to the validity of its formation.
  3. The submission of an interlocal cooperative agreement to the Attorney General or the Department for Local Government as provided in subsections (2) and (3) of this section shall not be required for any cooperative agreement which involves:
    1. Only the construction, reconstruction, or maintenance of a municipal road or bridge, provided a written agreement is approved by each of the affected governing bodies of the public agencies, or the administrative head of a public agency if there is no governing body; or
    2. Interlocal cooperative agreements between school boards and local governments.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1962, ch. 216, § 4(5), (6); 1964, ch. 114, § 3; 1992, ch. 46, § 1, effective July 14, 1992; 2000, ch. 464, § 1, effective July 14, 2000; 2007, ch. 47, § 44, effective June 26, 2007; 2010, ch. 117, § 51, effective July 15, 2010; 2020 ch. 98, § 9, effective July 15, 2020.

65.270. Revenue bonds. [Effective until July 15, 2020]

  1. Whenever any two (2) or more public agencies, as defined in KRS 65.230 , enter into an agreement for joint or cooperative action pursuant to the provisions of KRS 65.210 to 65.300 , any public agency acting separately or jointly with one (1) or more of any other agencies, may acquire, construct, maintain, add to, and improve the necessary property, real and personal, which is required in order to perform the functions under the agreement, and for the purpose of defraying the costs incident to the performance of the agreement, may borrow money and issue negotiable revenue bonds.
  2. Any public agency or agencies may borrow money and issue bonds under this section pursuant to an order, resolution, or ordinance of its or their legislative or administrative body or bodies, which order, resolution, or ordinance shall set forth the terms of the agreement in full, the amount of the revenue bonds to be issued, and the maximum rate of interest. In every instance the order, resolution, or ordinance shall provide that the joint or cooperative action is being undertaken pursuant to the provisions of KRS 65.210 to 65.300 .
  3. The bonds may be issued to bear interest at a rate or rates or method of determining rates as the public agency or agencies determines, payable at least annually, and shall be executed in a manner and be payable at times not exceeding thirty (30) years from the date of issuance and at a place or places as the public agency or agencies determines.
  4. The bonds may provide that they or any of them may be called for redemption prior to maturity, on interest payment dates not earlier than one (1) year from the date of issuance of the bonds.
  5. Any public agency is empowered to accept donations or gifts to the joint or cooperative action from any source and to accept appropriations and grants to the joint or cooperative action from the federal government or its agencies and appropriations from the state or any county, city, or other political subdivision and, at the option of the public agency or agencies, to pledge any donations, gifts, or appropriations to the payment of revenue bonds issued to finance the cost of a joint or cooperative action.
  6. Bonds issued pursuant to this section shall be negotiable and shall not be subject to taxation. If any officer whose signature or countersignature appears on the bonds or coupons ceases to be an officer before delivery of the bonds, his signature or countersignature shall be valid and sufficient for all purposes the same as if he had remained in office until delivery. The bonds shall be sold in a manner and upon terms as the public agency or agencies deem best. The bonds shall be payable solely from the revenue derived from the joint or cooperative action and shall not constitute an indebtedness of the state, county, city, or political subdivision. It shall be plainly stated on the face of each bond that it has been issued under the provisions of KRS 65.210 to 65.300 .
  7. All money received from the bonds shall be applied solely for the acquisition, construction, maintenance, improvement, or operation of the joint or cooperative action, and the necessary expense of preparing, printing, and selling the bonds, or to advance the payment of interest on the bonds during the first three (3) years following the date of the issuance of the bonds.
  8. Before the issuance of the bonds the public agencies party to the agreement shall, by orders, resolutions, or ordinances of their respective legislative bodies, set aside and pledge the income and revenue of the joint or cooperative action including rents, royalties, fees, and proceeds of sales of property and from rates and charges for services derived or rendered by the joint or cooperative action into a separate and special fund to be used and applied in payment of the cost of the maintenance, operation, and depreciation incident to the joint or cooperative action. The orders, resolutions, or ordinances shall determine and fix the amount of revenue necessary to be set apart and applied to the payment of principal and interest of the bonds, and the proportion of the balance of the income and revenue to be set aside as a proper and adequate depreciation account. The remaining proportion of the balance shall be set aside for the reasonable and proper operation and maintenance of the joint or cooperative action.
  9. The rents, royalties, fees, rates, and charges for the service or sale of the joint or cooperative action shall be fixed and revised from time to time so as to be sufficient to provide for the payment of interest upon all bonds and to create a sinking fund to pay the principal of the bonds when due, and to provide for the operation and maintenance of the joint or cooperative action and an adequate depreciation account.

History. Enact. Acts 1962, ch. 216, § 5; 1996, ch. 274, § 4, effective July 15, 1996.

Opinions of Attorney General.

Given the explicit language of this section and KRS 65.240 , the Campbell County solid waste management authority can condemn land in its own name for its governmental and contractual purposes as the pre-existing rights of eminent domain vested in the participating governments may be collectively focused and utilized. OAG 73-787 .

The interlocal cooperative board may act as the fiscal agent for projects funded through the department of education. OAG 74-351 .

A county or group of counties operating under an interlocal agreement and issuing revenue bonds which are “public obligations” under subsection (1)(b) of KRS 58.410 would be subject to the interest rate provisions of KRS 58.430 which repealed the provisions of subsection (3) of this section upon its enactment. OAG 81-346 .

The Kentucky Association of Counties may not, on behalf of the counties, issue revenue bonds under the Interlocal Cooperation Act to partially finance the self-insurance fund since it is not a public agency. OAG 87-20 .

A city may withdraw its participation from an existing tourism commission in accordance with its “home rule” powers under KRS § 82.082 . The legislature allows for a separate tax by allowing local governments to act separately in forming tourism commissions in KRS § 91A.350(1) and (2). OAG 2015-07

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Acquisition and development of public projects by governmental units and agencies through revenue bonds, KRS ch. 58.

Facsimile signatures and seals on public securities and options as to negotiability, KRS 61.390 .

ALR

Recitals in bond as putting purchaser on notice of circumstances affecting validity of the bond. 86 A.L.R. 1099; 158 A.L.R. 938.

Revenue-producing enterprise owned by municipality, diversion of revenue from operation of, from payment of bonds issued for such enterprise. 103 A.L.R. 579; 165 A.L.R. 854.

Smaller political units, constitutionality of statutory plan for financing, or refinancing bonds of, by larger political unit. 106 A.L.R. 608.

Revenue bonds or other bonds not creating indebtedness as within constitutional or statutory requirement of prior approval by electors of issuance of bonds or incurring of indebtedness. 146 A.L.R. 604.

Validity of municipal bond issue as against owners of property, annexation of which to municipality became effective after date of election at which issue was approved by voters. 10 A.L.R.2d 559.

65.270. Revenue bonds. [Effective July 15, 2020]

  1. Whenever any two (2) or more public agencies, as defined in KRS 65.230 , enter into an agreement for joint or cooperative action pursuant to the provisions of KRS 65.210 to 65.300 , any public agency acting separately or jointly with one (1) or more of any other public agencies, may acquire, construct, maintain, add to, and improve the necessary property, real and personal, which is required in order to perform the functions under the agreement, and for the purpose of defraying the costs incident to the performance of the agreement, may borrow money and issue negotiable revenue bonds.
  2. Any public agency or agencies may borrow money and issue bonds under this section pursuant to an order, resolution, or ordinance of its or their legislative or administrative body or bodies, which order, resolution, or ordinance shall set forth the terms of the agreement in full, the amount of the revenue bonds to be issued, and the maximum rate of interest. In every instance the order, resolution, or ordinance shall provide that the joint or cooperative action is being undertaken pursuant to the provisions of KRS 65.210 to 65.300 .
  3. The bonds may be issued to bear interest at a rate or rates or method of determining rates as the public agency or agencies determines, payable at the times and at a place or places as the public agency or agencies determines.
  4. The bonds may provide that they or any of them may be called for redemption prior to maturity.
  5. Any public agency is empowered to accept donations or gifts to the joint or cooperative action from any source and to accept appropriations and grants to the joint or cooperative action from the federal government or its agencies and appropriations from the state or any county, city, or other political subdivision and, at the option of the public agency or agencies, to pledge any donations, gifts, or appropriations to the payment of revenue bonds issued to finance the cost of a joint or cooperative action.
  6. Bonds issued pursuant to this section shall be negotiable and shall not be subject to taxation. If any officer whose signature or countersignature appears on the bonds or coupons ceases to be an officer before delivery of the bonds, his signature or countersignature shall be valid and sufficient for all purposes the same as if he had remained in office until delivery. The bonds shall be sold in a manner and upon terms as the public agency or agencies deem best. The bonds shall be payable solely from the revenue derived from the joint or cooperative action and shall not constitute an indebtedness of the state, county, city, or political subdivision. It shall be plainly stated on the face of each bond that it has been issued under the provisions of KRS 65.210 to 65.300 .
  7. All money received from the bonds shall be applied solely for the acquisition, construction, maintenance, improvement, or operation of the joint or cooperative action, and the necessary expense of preparing, printing, and selling the bonds, or to advance the payment of interest on the bonds during the first three (3) years following the date of the issuance of the bonds.

The rents, royalties, fees, rates, and charges for the service or sale of the joint or cooperative action shall be fixed and revised from time to time so as to be sufficient to provide for the payment of interest upon all bonds and to create a sinking fund to pay the principal of the bonds when due, and to provide for the operation and maintenance of the joint or cooperative action and an adequate depreciation account.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1962, ch. 216, § 5; 1996, ch. 274, § 4, effective July 15, 1996; 2020 ch. 98, § 10, effective July 15, 2020.

65.280. Effect of civil service laws and regulations upon transferred employees. [Effective until July 15, 2020]

  1. In the event that a public agency or agencies determine to transfer any of its employees to the joint or cooperative action, which employees are subject to any civil service laws or regulations, such employees shall not lose any rights or benefits which have accrued prior to such transfer. Such employees, when transferred, to the joint or cooperative action from a public agency or agencies that are subject to any civil service laws or regulations, and who have completed probationary appointments with the public agency or agencies prior to the date of transfer, shall be considered as having satisfied all of the qualifications of the joint or cooperative action and shall be given full and regular appointments as defined in such laws or regulations as of the date they are transferred to the joint or cooperative action.
  2. In the event that the joint or cooperative action is such that its employees would be afforded civil service rights or benefits if they were employees of a county or city, such employees shall be afforded the protection of civil service laws or regulations; provided, however, that such protection is available under the laws of this state.
  3. In the event the joint or cooperative action employs a person employed immediately prior thereto by a component city or county, or by a special district, such employee shall be deemed to remain an employee of such city, county or special district for the purposes of any pension plan of such city, county, or special district, and shall continue to be entitled to all rights and benefits thereunder as if he had remained as an employee of the city, county, or special district, until the joint or cooperative action has provided a pension plan to which such employee is eligible and such employee has elected, in writing, to participate therein. Until such election, the joint or cooperative action shall deduct from the remuneration of such employee the amount which such employee is or may be required to pay in accordance with the provisions of the plan of such city, county, or special district and the joint or cooperative action shall pay to the city, county, or special district any amounts required to be paid under the provisions of such plan by employer and employee, unless an agreement, not adversely affecting the employee’s interest, or expectancy, has been made pursuant to KRS 65.250 (1)(d) for the payment of the employer’s pension obligation.

History. Enact. Acts 1962, ch. 216, §§ 6, 7; 1964, ch. 114, § 5; 1966, ch. 255, § 79; 1972, ch. 383, § 1.

Opinions of Attorney General.

Employees of the interlocal cooperative board who are employed for special project purposes are entitled to all of the civil service and fringe benefits enjoyed by employees of the member agency. OAG 74-351 .

A city may withdraw its participation from an existing tourism commission in accordance with its “home rule” powers under KRS § 82.082 . The legislature allows for a separate tax by allowing local governments to act separately in forming tourism commissions in KRS § 91A.350(1) and (2). OAG 2015-07

Research References and Practice Aids

ALR

Acquiescence or delay as affecting rights of public employee illegally discharged, suspended, or transferred. 145 A.L.R. 767.

65.280. Effect of civil service laws and regulations upon transferred employees. [Effective July 15, 2020]

  1. In the event that a public agency or agencies determine to transfer any of its employees to the joint or cooperative action, which employees are subject to any civil service laws or regulations, such employees shall not lose any rights or benefits which have accrued prior to such transfer. Such employees, when transferred, to the joint or cooperative action from a public agency or agencies that are subject to any civil service laws or regulations, and who have completed probationary appointments with the public agency or agencies prior to the date of transfer, shall be considered as having satisfied all of the qualifications of the joint or cooperative action and shall be given full and regular appointments as defined in such laws or regulations as of the date they are transferred to the joint or cooperative action.
  2. In the event that the joint or cooperative action is such that its employees would be afforded civil service rights or benefits if they were employees of a county or city, such employees shall be afforded the protection of civil service laws or regulations; provided, however, that such protection is available under the laws of this state.
  3. In the event the joint or cooperative action employs a person employed immediately prior thereto by a component city or county, or by a special district, such employee shall be deemed to remain an employee of such city, county or special district for the purposes of any pension plan of such city, county, or special district, and shall continue to be entitled to all rights and benefits thereunder as if he had remained as an employee of the city, county, or special district, until the joint or cooperative action has provided a pension plan to which such employee is eligible and such employee has elected, in writing, to participate therein. Until such election, the joint or cooperative action shall deduct from the remuneration of such employee the amount which such employee is or may be required to pay in accordance with the provisions of the plan of such city, county, or special district and the joint or cooperative action shall pay to the city, county, or special district any amounts required to be paid under the provisions of such plan by employer and employee, unless an agreement, not adversely affecting the employee’s interest, or expectancy, has been made pursuant to KRS 65.250 (1)(c) for the payment of the employer’s pension obligation.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1962, ch. 216, §§ 6, 7; 1964, ch. 114, § 5; 1966, ch. 255, § 79; 1972, ch. 383, § 1; 2020 ch. 98, § 16, effective July 15, 2020.

65.290. Copies of agreement must be filed — Status of agencies in controversy involving interstate agreement. [Effective until July 15, 2020]

Before any agreement made pursuant to KRS 65.210 to 65.300 shall become operative or have force and effect, a certified copy thereof shall be filed with the county clerk of the county which is party to the agreement, the county clerk of the county wherein any other political subdivision of the state is located which is party to such agreement, and with the Secretary of State. In the event that an agreement entered into pursuant to KRS 65.210 to 65.300 is between or among one or more public agencies of this state and one or more public agencies of another state or of the United States, said agreement shall have the status of an interstate compact, but in any case or controversy involving performance or interpretation thereof or liability thereunder, the public agencies party thereto shall be real parties in interest and the state may maintain an action to recoup or otherwise make itself whole for any damages or liability which it may incur by reason of being joined as a party therein. Such action shall be maintainable against any public agency or agencies whose default, failure of performance, or other conduct caused or contributed to the incurring of damage or liability by the state.

History. Enact. Acts 1962, ch. 216, § 8; 1964, ch. 114, § 6.

Notes to Opinions

Attorney General Opinions

A city may withdraw its participation from an existing tourism commission in accordance with its “home rule” powers under KRS § 82.082 . The legislature allows for a separate tax by allowing local governments to act separately in forming tourism commissions in KRS § 91A.350(1) and (2). OAG 2015-07

65.290. Copies of agreement must be filed — Status of public agencies in case or controversy involving agreement between or among agencies of other state or United States. [Effective July 15, 2020]

  1. Before any agreement made pursuant to KRS 65.210 to 65.300 shall become operative or have force and effect, a certified copy thereof shall be filed with the Secretary of State. After the original filing of an agreement as provided in this section, no additional filing is required for agreements amended solely for the addition or removal of parties as provided under KRS 65.242 .
  2. If an agreement entered into pursuant to KRS 65.210 to 65.300 is between or among one (1) or more public agencies of this state and one (1) or more public agencies of another state or of the United States, that agreement may have the status of an interstate compact, but in any case or controversy involving performance or interpretation thereof or liability thereunder, the public agencies party thereto shall be real parties in interest and the state may maintain an action to recoup or otherwise make itself whole for any damages or liability which it may incur by reason of being joined as a party therein. An action shall be maintainable against any public agency or agencies whose default, failure of performance, or other conduct caused or contributed to the incurring of damage or liability by the state.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1962, ch. 216, § 8; 1964, ch. 114, § 6; 2020 ch. 98, § 11, effective July 15, 2020.

65.300. Approval of agreement by officer or agency required. [Effective until July 15, 2020]

In the event that an agreement made pursuant to KRS 65.210 to 65.300 shall deal in whole or in part with the provisions of services or facilities with regard to which an officer or agency of the state government has constitutional or statutory powers of control, the agreement shall, as a condition precedent to its entry into force, be submitted to the state officer or agency having such power of control and shall be approved or disapproved by such officer or agency as to all matters within the jurisdiction of such officer or agency in the same manner and subject to the requirements governing the action of the Attorney General pursuant to subsection (2) of KRS 65.260 . The requirement of this section shall be in addition to and not in substitution for the requirement of submission to and approval by the Attorney General under subsection (2) of KRS 65.260 .

History. Enact. Acts 1962, ch. 216, § 9.

Notes to Opinions

Attorney General Opinions

A city may withdraw its participation from an existing tourism commission in accordance with its “home rule” powers under KRS § 82.082 . The legislature allows for a separate tax by allowing local governments to act separately in forming tourism commissions in KRS § 91A.350(1) and (2). OAG 2015-07

65.300. Approval of agreement by officer or agency required. [Effective July 15, 2020]

If an agreement made pursuant to KRS 65.210 to 65.300 deals in whole or in part with the provisions of services or facilities over which an officer or agency of the state government has constitutional or statutory powers of control, the agreement shall, as a condition precedent to its entry into force, be submitted to the state officer or agency having that power of control and shall be approved or disapproved by the officer or agency as to all matters within the jurisdiction of the officer or agency in the same manner and subject to the requirements governing the action of the Attorney General pursuant to subsection (2) of KRS 65.260 . The requirement of this section shall be in addition to and not in substitution for the requirement of submission to and approval by the Attorney General under subsection (2) of KRS 65.260 .

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1962, ch. 216, § 9; 2020 ch. 98, § 12, effective July 15, 2020.

65.310. Definitions for KRS 65.310 to 65.314.

As used in KRS 65.310 to 65.314 :

  1. “Public entity” means any organization that represents a statewide association of local governments where the majority of its governing body is composed of mayors, county judges/executive, or other local elected officials, and whose membership includes any or a combination of the following:
    1. Cities;
    2. Counties;
    3. Charter counties;
    4. Urban-counties;
    5. Consolidated local governments; and
    6. Unified local governments; and
  2. “Affiliated organization” means any incorporated or unincorporated organization staffed, managed, or administered by a public entity.

History. Enact. Acts 2010, ch. 76, § 2, effective July 15, 2010.

65.312. Applicability of Open Records Act and Open Meeting Act to governing bodies of public entity and affiliated organizations — Exceptions — Financial data to be posted on Web — Annual audit.

The governing body of a public entity and the governing body of an affiliated organization shall:

  1. Be subject to the provisions of KRS 61.870 to 61.884 , and all records of the public entity and its affiliated organizations shall be deemed open records and subject to public inspection, unless the record:
    1. Is excluded from inspection under KRS 61.878 ;
    2. Includes information that would provide an unfair competitive advantage to private sector competitors providing insurance coverage or financing services in the Commonwealth;
    3. Is generated by the public entity or an affiliated organization, is generally recognized as confidential or proprietary, and which, if openly disclosed, would permit an unfair commercial advantage to competitors of the public entity or an affiliated organization; or
    4. Relates to a fraudulent insurance claim investigation conducted by the public entity or an affiliated organization and does not become evidence in a criminal or civil action. This paragraph shall not be construed to affect the rights of parties in a civil or criminal action to obtain copies of the records pursuant to the rules of discovery applicable to that action;
  2. Be subject to the provisions of KRS 61.800 to 61.850 , with the following exceptions:
    1. Meetings may be closed in accordance with KRS 61.810 ; and
    2. Proceedings to discuss insurance rates, proposed rates, or anything that relates to rates if that discussion would jeopardize the competitiveness of the public entity or an affiliated organization may be closed, as well as proceedings which would provide an unfair competitive advantage to private sector competitors of the public entity or an affiliated organization providing insurance coverage or financing services in the Commonwealth;
  3. By January 15 of each year, establish a schedule of regular meetings consistent with KRS 61.820 , and conduct the regular meetings in accordance with the Open Meetings Act, KRS 61.805 to 61.850 . A public entity and its affiliated organizations may conduct special or emergency meetings, as set out in KRS 61.823 , over telephonic conference call, provided that the public entity or the affiliated organization otherwise adheres to the requirements of KRS 61.805 to 61.850 and provides a designated location or locations where members of the public may attend and hear the audio of each individual participating in the telephonic meeting;
  4. By January 1, 2011, provide a Web site that will allow citizens Internet access to substantial and substantive financial data about expenditures of the public entity and its affiliated organizations. Information on the Web site shall be updated at least on a monthly basis and shall provide the following information not considered confidential by state or federal law:
    1. The name of the recipient of the funds of the public entity and its affiliated organizations;
    2. The expenditure type by vendor;
    3. The amount of the expenditure;
    4. A description of the purpose of the expenditure, if available;
    5. The payment date of the expenditure;
    6. An electronic link to a database displaying the information contained in paragraphs (a) to (e) of this subsection, which information shall remain in the database for at least three (3) years after the payment date of the expenditure;
    7. The budget adopted by the governing body and its affiliated organizations; and
    8. The complete annual audit results on a continuing basis;
  5. Beginning August 1, 2010, undergo an annual audit performed by a certified public accountant or the Auditor of Public Accounts. The contract with the certified public accountant shall specify:
    1. That the certified public accountant shall forward a copy of the audit report and management letters to the Auditor of Public Accounts; and
    2. That the Auditor of Public Accounts shall have the right to review the certified public accountant’s work papers before and after the release of the audit; and
  6. Allow the Office of the Auditor of Public Accounts to conduct, at its discretion, an examination of the public entity and its affiliated organizations.

History. Enact. Acts 2010, ch. 76, § 3, effective July 15, 2010.

65.314. Adoption of procurement, personnel, and compensation policies and code of ethics.

By August 1, 2010, the governing body of a public entity and the governing body of any affiliated organization of the public entity shall each:

  1. Adopt a procurement policy consistent with KRS 45A.345 to 45A.460 that includes, notwithstanding KRS 45A.380(3) and (10), a transparent, competitive, selection process for licensed professional services, bond underwriting and bond counsel services, and financial and insurance products and services;
  2. Approve a detailed, equitable personnel and compensation policy;
  3. Approve contracts only in accordance with its bylaws and procurement policy;
  4. Establish an independent process to receive, analyze, investigate and resolve concerns relating to the public entity and its affiliated organizations, including alleged violations of the code of ethics required by subsection (6) of this section;
  5. Conduct training for its members relating to their legal and fiduciary responsibilities; and
  6. Adopt a code of ethics that shall include:
    1. Standards of conduct for its members and its officers and employees;
    2. Requirements for creation and annual filing of financial disclosure statements for its members and its officers and management personnel; and
    3. A policy on the employment of:
      1. Individuals related to its members; and
      2. Individuals related to its officers and employees.

History. Enact. Acts 2010, ch. 76, § 4, effective July 15, 2010.

Local Government Training

65.320. Local Government Training Advisory Council.

There shall be created a Local Government Training Advisory Council in Kentucky, to be composed of the presidents or their designees of the Kentucky Association of Counties, the County Judge/Executives Association, and the Kentucky League of Cities and the commissioner of the Department for Local Government.

History. Enact. Acts 1992, ch. 208, § 1, effective July 14, 1992; 1998, ch. 69, § 32, effective July 15, 1998; 2007, ch. 47, § 45, effective June 26, 2007; 2010, ch. 117, § 52, effective July 15, 2010.

65.323. Duties of council.

  1. The Local Government Training Advisory Council shall:
    1. Develop and update on a biennial basis a local government training plan that:
      1. Quantifies the training needs of local governments;
      2. Evaluates the abilities of existing training programs to meet the needs;
      3. Identifies areas of unmet need that justify expanding existing programs or the creation of new programs; and
      4. Formulates a strategy, giving consideration to the use of state-of-the-art communication techniques to enhance training efforts, that meets the needs of local governments;
    2. Submit a copy of the local government training plan to the Legislative Research Commission by November 1 of odd-numbered years;
    3. Ensure the proper coordination of training programs for city and county governments; and
    4. Elect a chairperson annually from its membership.
  2. The council shall adopt the plan provided for in subsection (1)(a) of this section by majority vote, at which time it shall become the policy document used by the Department for Local Government to determine priorities for the expenditure of training funds.

History. Enact. Acts 1992, ch. 208, § 2, effective July 14, 1992; 1998, ch. 69, § 33, effective July 15, 1998; 2007, ch. 47, § 46, effective June 26, 2007; 2010, ch. 117, § 53, effective July 15, 2010.

65.327. Use of existing training providers.

  1. The Local Government Training Advisory Council shall use the expertise of existing training providers in developing new or expanded programs. This includes but is not limited to:
    1. All institutions of higher education and affiliate organizations that provide training and technical assistance to local governments;
    2. State agencies that provide training related to statutory or regulatory oversight responsibilities;
    3. Area development districts;
    4. Public official professional associations;
    5. Private providers associated with established certification programs; and
    6. Any other provider suitable for developing effective training programs.
  2. The council shall be attached to the Department for Local Government for administrative purposes.

History. Enact. Acts 1992, ch. 208, § 3, effective July 14, 1992; 1998, ch. 69, § 34, effective July 15, 1998; 2007, ch. 47, § 47, effective June 26, 2007; 2010, ch. 117, § 54, effective July 15, 2010.

65.330. Members not to be compensated.

The members of the council shall not be compensated for their duties on the council.

History. Enact. Acts 1992, ch. 208, § 4, effective July 14, 1992.

65.333. Meetings.

  1. The council shall meet at least four (4) times each year at the times it determines by resolution. Special meetings may be called by the chairperson. Upon the request of three (3) members of the council, the chairperson shall call a special meeting.
  2. Notice of each meeting shall be given by the chairperson at least ten (10) days prior to the time of the meeting, unless all members of the council waive notice.

History. Enact. Acts 1992, ch. 208, § 5, effective July 14, 1992.

65.337. Quorum — Vote requirement.

A majority of the voting members of the council constitutes a quorum for the transaction of business, but no business shall be transacted and no proposition carried unless a majority of the members votes for it.

History. Enact. Acts 1992, ch. 208, § 6, effective July 14, 1992.

Land Bank Authorities

65.350. Definitions for KRS 65.350 to 65.375.

As used in KRS 65.350 to 65.375 :

  1. “Authority” means the land bank authority established pursuant to KRS 65.210 to 65.300 and KRS 65.350 to 65.375 ;
  2. “Agreement” means the interlocal cooperation agreement entered into by the parties pursuant to KRS 65.210 to 65.300 and KRS 65.350 to 65.375 ;
  3. “Local government” means every city, regardless of classification, every county, and every consolidated local government and urban-county government;
  4. “Party” or “parties” means one (1) or more parties to an agreement, which shall include any local government, the local school district, which may include county and independent school districts, within the county and the Commonwealth of Kentucky;
  5. “Property” means real property, including any improvements thereon;
  6. “Tax-delinquent property” means any property on which the taxes levied and assessed by any party remain in whole or in part unpaid on the date due and payable; and
  7. “Local government lien” means any lien established by or in favor of a local government under KRS Chapter 65, 82, 91, 91A, or 134.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1988, ch. 92, § 1, effective July 15, 1988; repealed, reenact., and amend. Acts 1990, ch. 341, § 1, effective July 13, 1990; 2003, ch. 171, § 1, effective June 24, 2003; 2017 ch. 86, § 4, effective June 29, 2017.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section was formerly compiled as KRS 91.800 .

65.352. Compliance with KRS 65A.010 to 65A.090.

Any board formed and operating under KRS 65.350 to 65.375 shall comply with the provisions of KRS 65A.010 to 65A.090 .

History. Enact. Acts 2013, ch. 40, § 21, effective March 21, 2013.

65.355. Creation of authority.

  1. Any local government, the county or independent school district within the county, and the Commonwealth of Kentucky may enter into an interlocal cooperation agreement pursuant to KRS 65.210 to 65.300 for the purpose of establishing a land bank authority pursuant to KRS 65.350 to 65.375 .
  2. The authority shall be a public body corporate and politic with the power to sue and be sued, issue deeds in its name, and any other powers necessary and convenient to carry out these powers or that may be granted to the authority by the parties.
  3. The authority shall be established to acquire the tax delinquent properties of the parties, properties that have become blighted or deteriorated as defined by KRS 99.705 and properties that have local government liens filed against them, to facilitate the public purpose of returning property that is in a non-revenue generating, non-tax producing status to effective utilization, including but not limited to providing housing, new industry, and jobs for the citizens of the county. The authority shall have the powers provided in KRS 65.370 and 65.375 and in the interlocal cooperation agreement.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1988, ch. 92, § 2, effective July 15, 1988; repealed, reenact., and amend. Acts 1990, ch. 341, § 2, effective July 13, 1990; 2003, ch. 171, § 2, effective June 24, 2003; 2017 ch. 86, § 5, effective June 29, 2017.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section was formerly compiled as KRS 91.805 .

65.360. Board of authority.

  1. The authority shall be governed by a board composed of one (1) member appointed by each unit of local government that is a party to the agreement, one (1) member appointed by the superintendent of schools of the county school district or of the independent school district, and one (1) member appointed by the Governor. Each member shall serve at the pleasure of the respective appointing authority for a term of four (4) years and shall serve without compensation. The members shall be residents of the county and may be employees of the parties and shall serve without additional compensation. Any vacancy shall be filled in the same manner as the original appointment.
  2. The board of the authority shall meet as required, and three (3) members shall constitute a quorum. Approval by a majority of the membership shall be necessary for any action to be taken by the authority. All meetings shall be open to the public, except as otherwise permitted by KRS 61.810 , and a written record shall be maintained of all meetings. A chairman shall be elected from among the members, and he shall execute all deeds, leases, and contracts of the authority when authorized by the board.
  3. The authority may employ its own staff or may utilize employees of the parties, as determined by the agreement.

History. Enact. Acts 1988, ch. 92, § 3, effective July 15, 1988; repealed, reenact., and amend. Acts 1990, ch. 341, § 3, effective July 13, 1990; 2003, ch. 171, § 3, effective June 24, 2003.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section was formerly compiled as KRS 91.810 .

65.365. List of electronic mail addresses of interested housing authorities.

Upon the creation of a land bank authority, the authority shall maintain a list of electronic mail addresses for all city, county, or regional housing authorities, and the Kentucky Housing Corporation, that have requested to be notified prior to any action by the authority to dispose of property in its inventory. It shall be the responsibility of an interested housing authority to provide the authority with the following information:

  1. The name of the organization;
  2. The electronic mailing address for the organization; and
  3. The name and title of a contact person for the organization.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1990, ch. 341, § 4, effective July 13, 1990; 2017 ch. 86, § 6, effective June 29, 2017.

65.370. Acquisition and disposal of property — Publication of information — Taxes extinguished — Proceeds of sale or disposal — Remittance of property taxes.

  1. The authority shall hold in its own name, for the benefit of the parties, all properties conveyed to it by the parties, all tax delinquent properties or properties having local government liens acquired by it pursuant to KRS 65.375 , and all properties otherwise acquired by other means.
  2. The authority shall administer the properties held by it, as follows:
    1. All property held by the authority shall be inventoried, and the inventory shall be maintained as a public record;
    2. The authority shall organize and classify the property on the basis of suitability for use;
    3. The authority shall maintain all property held by it in accordance with applicable laws and codes; and
    4. The authority shall have the power to manage, maintain, protect, rent, lease, repair, insure, alter, sell , trade, exchange, or otherwise dispose of any property on terms and conditions as determined by KRS 65.350 to 65.375 and by the authority. The authority may assemble tracts or parcels of property , and may exchange parcels, and may otherwise effectuate the purposes of the agreement and of KRS 65.350 to 65.375 .
  3. Before the authority may rent, lease, sell, trade, exchange, or otherwise dispose of any property it shall:
    1. Establish a price for rent or lease purposes;
    2. Establish a purchase price for sale purposes; or
    3. Establish the conditions for sale, rent, trade, exchange, or other disposal of the property.
  4. The authority shall publish pursuant to KRS Chapter 424, the information required pursuant to subsection (3) of this section, at least seven (7) days before any property may be disposed of from the inventory. Immediately following publication the authority shall notify by electronic mail all housing authorities on the mailing list required pursuant to KRS 65.365 of the authority’s intent to dispose of a specified property and the established price to rent, lease, or purchase the property, and conditions for disposal of the property.
  5. No property shall be acquired pursuant to KRS 65.350 to 65.375 by any entity for investment purposes only and with no intent to use the property other than to transfer the property at a future date for monetary gain.
  6. When a property is acquired by the authority, all state, county, city, and school district taxes shall be extinguished.
  7. When the authority sells or otherwise disposes of property, except property acquired and disposed of pursuant to KRS 65.375 , all proceeds shall be retained by the authority.
  8. For the first five (5) years following conveyance of the property by the authority to an owner that is subject to ad valorem property taxes, fifty percent (50%) of the ad valorem property taxes collected from the property by all parties to the agreement, except school districts, shall be remitted to the authority.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1988, ch. 92, § 4, effective July 15, 1988; repealed, reenact., and amend. Acts 1990, ch. 341, § 5, effective July 13, 1990; 2017 ch. 86, § 7, effective June 29, 2017.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section was formerly compiled as KRS 91.815 .

65.375. Conditions under which authority to take title to tax-delinquent properties.

  1. If any party obtains a judgment against a tax-delinquent property within the county for the taxes and, to satisfy the judgment, the property is ordered sold at a tax sale pursuant to KRS 91.504 or other provision of the Kentucky Revised Statutes, if no person bids an amount equal to the full amount of all tax bills, interest, and costs owing on the property at the sale, the authority shall be deemed to have bid the full amount of all tax bills, interest, and costs due to all parties of the authority regardless of whether or not they are all parties to the lawsuit. The authority shall not be required to make actual payment to the court for the amount deemed to have been bid. The court, notwithstanding any other provision of law, shall treat the amount deemed to have been bid as cash received. Upon proper motion by the authority, the court shall make a deed of the property to the “Land Bank Authority.” The title to the property shall be an absolute estate in fee simple, free and clear of all tax bills, interests, and costs owing to the parties of the authority but shall be subject to rights of way of public utilities on which tax has otherwise been paid and subject to any right of redemption of the United States of America, if any.
  2. At the time that the authority sells or otherwise disposes of property obtained pursuant to this section as part of its land bank program, the proceeds from the sale shall be distributed as follows:
    1. The party or parties bringing the action that resulted in the acquisition of the property by the land bank authority shall be reimbursed, to the extent proceeds are available, for all costs incurred; and
    2. Any remaining proceeds shall be distributed to the parties in proportion to their respective tax bills. Conveyance of a property to a party shall not constitute disposal.

History. Enact. Acts 1988, ch. 92, § 5, effective July 15, 1988; repealed, reenact., and amend. Acts 1990, ch. 341, § 6, effective July 13, 1990; 1992, ch. 314, § 7, effective July 14, 1992; 2009, ch. 10, § 57, effective January 1, 2010; 2017 ch. 86, § 8, effective June 29, 2017.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section was formerly compiled as KRS 91.820 .

Local Scenic Easement Law

65.410. Definitions.

  1. “Local legislative body” means the chief governing body of a city, county, consolidated local government, or urban-county which has legislative powers whether it is the board of aldermen, the general council, the common council, the legislative council, the city council, the board of commissioners, the fiscal court, or otherwise.
  2. “Open space land” means any land in an area which is provided or preserved for park or recreational purposes; conservation of land or other natural resources; historic or scenic purposes; or community development purposes.
  3. “Public body” means any state agency or local legislative body.
  4. A “scenic easement” is an interest in land transferred by the owner thereof to the public, either in perpetuity or for a term of years. A scenic easement may be created by sale, gift, lease, bequest, or otherwise. An instrument which creates a scenic easement shall contain a covenant whereby the owner of the land promises neither to undertake nor to permit the construction of any improvements upon the land, except as the instrument provides and except for public service facilities installed for the benefit of the land subject to such covenant or public service facilities installed pursuant to an authorization by the governing body of the city, county, urban-county, or the Public Service Commission. Any such reservation shall be consistent with the purposes of this chapter or with the findings of the county, city, or urban-county pursuant to KRS 65.466 and shall not permit any action which will materially impair the open-space character of the land.

History. Enact. Acts 1972, ch. 312, § 1; 1976, ch. 123, § 1; 2002, ch. 346, § 28, effective July 15, 2002.

Research References and Practice Aids

Journal of Mineral Law & Policy.

Comments, Preservation of Kentucky's Diminishing Farmland: A Statutory Analysis, 5 J.M.L. & P. 305 (1989-90).

Kentucky Law Journal.

Note, Historic Preservation — An Individual’s Perspective, 67 Ky. L.J. 1018 (1978-1979).

Comment, Conservation Easements: The Greening of America, 73 Ky. L.J. 255 (1984-85).

65.420. Acquisition of easements, purposes.

Local legislative bodies may obtain scenic and recreation easements in the Commonwealth for the purposes of providing necessary land for park development, restoration or preservation of scenic beauty, restoration or preservation of areas of historical interest, community development purposes and similar public purposes.

History. Enact. Acts 1972, ch. 312, § 2.

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Comment, Conservation Easements: The Greening of America, 73 Ky. L.J. 255 (1984-85).

65.430. Local legislative bodies may acquire interest in real property.

To carry out the purposes of KRS 65.410 to 65.460 , local legislative bodies may acquire by purchase, gift, lease, bequest or otherwise title to or any interests or rights in real property that will provide a means for the preservation or provision of permanent open space land.

History. Enact. Acts 1972, ch. 312, § 3.

65.440. Local legislative bodies, additional powers.

  1. Local legislative bodies shall have all the powers necessary to carry out the purposes and provisions of KRS 65.410 to 65.460 , including the following powers in addition to others granted by KRS 65.410 to 65.460 :
    1. To borrow funds and make expenditures necessary to carry out the purposes of KRS 65.410 to 65.460;
    2. To advance or accept advances of public funds;
    3. To apply for, accept and utilize grants and any other assistance from the federal government and any other public or private sources; to give such security as may be required and to enter and carry out contracts or agreements in connection with the assistance; and to include in any contract for assistance from the federal government such conditions imposed pursuant to federal laws as the local legislative body may deem reasonable and appropriate and which are not inconsistent with the purposes of KRS 65.410 to 65.460;
    4. To make and execute contracts and other instruments necessary to the exercise of its powers under KRS 65.410 to 65.460;
    5. In connection with the real property acquired for the purposes of KRS 65.410 to 65.460, to provide or to arrange or contract for the provision, construction, maintenance, operation or repair by any person or agency, public or private, of services, privileges, works, streets, roads, public utilities, or other facilities or structures that may be necessary to the provision, preservation, maintenance, and management of the property as open space land;
    6. To insure or provide for the insurance of any real or personal property or operations of the public body against any risks or hazards, including the power to pay premiums on the insurance;
    7. To demolish or dispose of any structures or facilities which may be detrimental to or inconsistent with the use of real property as open space land; and
    8. To exercise any or all of its functions and powers under KRS 65.410 to 65.460 jointly or cooperatively with one or more public bodies of this state, and to enter into agreements for joint or cooperative action.
  2. For the purposes of KRS 65.410 to 65.460 the local legislative bodies may:
    1. Appropriate funds;
    2. Issue and sell their revenue bonds and general obligation bonds in the manner and within the limitations prescribed by the applicable laws of the Commonwealth; and
    3. Exercise their powers under KRS 65.410 to 65.460 through a board or commission, or through such office or officers as the local legislative bodies by resolution determine.

History. Enact. Acts 1972, ch. 312, § 4.

65.450. Valuation and taxation of legislative body’s interest in real property.

Where an interest in real property less than the fee is held by the local legislative body for the purposes of KRS 65.410 to 65.460 , assessments made on the property for taxation shall reflect any change in the market value of the property which may result from the interest held by the local legislative body. The value of the interest held by the local legislative body shall be exempt from property taxation to the same extent as other property owned by the local legislative body.

History. Enact. Acts 1972, ch. 312, § 5.

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Note, Historic Preservation — An Individual’s Perspective, 67 Ky. L.J. 1018 (1978-1979).

Comment, Conservation Easements: The Greening of America, 73 Ky. L.J. 255 (1984-85).

65.460. Local legislative bodies denied power of eminent domain.

Local legislative bodies shall not exercise the power of eminent domain to acquire scenic easements. Nothing contained in this chapter shall prevent the use of eminent domain to acquire all other interests or rights in real property. A scenic easement will terminate when eminent domain is used to acquire property covered by the scenic easement agreement.

History. Enact. Acts 1972, ch. 312, § 6; 1976, ch. 123, § 11.

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Note, Historic Preservation — An Individual’s Perspective, 67 Ky. L.J. 1018 (1978-1979).

65.462. Acceptance of instrument constitutes dedication — Term of easement and covenant.

The execution and acceptance of an instrument described in KRS 65.410(4), shall constitute a dedication to the public of the scenic character of the lands for the term specified. Any such easement and covenant shall run for a term of not less than 30 years.

History. Enact. Acts 1976, ch. 123, § 2.

65.464. Covenant against cutting of trees.

An instrument described in KRS 65.410(4) shall contain a covenant against the cutting of timber, trees and other natural growth, except as may be required for fire prevention, thinning, elimination of diseased growth and similar protective measures, or for the harvest of trees in a manner compatible with scenic purposes.

History. Enact. Acts 1976, ch. 123, § 3.

65.466. Requirements for acceptance.

A scenic easement shall not be accepted by a city, county, urban-county, or consolidated local government, unless the governing body, by resolution finds:

  1. That the preservation of the character of the land is consistent with the plan of the city, county, consolidated local government, or urban-county, where such plan exists; and
  2. That the preservation of the character of the land is in the best interest of the state, county, city, consolidated local government, or urban-county, is important to the public for the enjoyment of scenic beauty, and will serve the public interest in a manner recited in the resolution and consistent with the purposes of KRS 65.462 to 65.480 .
  3. The local legislative body may consider these factors:
    1. It is likely that at some time the public may acquire the land for a park or other public use;
    2. The land is unimproved and has scenic value to the public as viewed from a public highway or from public or private buildings;
    3. The retention of the land as open space will add to the amenities of living in adjoining or neighboring urbanized areas;
    4. The land lies in an area which in the public interest should remain rural in character and the retention of the land as open space will help preserve the rural character of the area;
    5. It is in the public interest that the land remain in its natural state, including the trees and other natural growth, as a means of preventing floods or soil erosion or because of its value as watershed;
    6. The land lies within an established scenic highway corridor;
    7. The land is valuable to the public as a wildlife preserve or sanctuary and the instrument contains appropriate covenants to that end; or
    8. The land has historic significance or contains a building of either historic or architectural importance.

History. Enact. Acts 1976, ch. 123, § 4; 2002, ch. 346, § 29, effective July 15, 2002.

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Comment, Conservation Easements: The Greening of America, 73 Ky. L.J. 255 (1984-85).

65.468. Planning commission to issue advisory report on acquisition.

The local legislative body shall not acquire a scenic easement until the matter has been referred to its planning department or planning commission, where such planning body exists, and report thereon has been received from the planning commission. Within 30 days after receiving the proposal to acquire a scenic easement, the planning commission shall submit its report to the governing body. The governing body may extend the time for submitting such a report for an additional period not exceeding 30 days. The report shall contain a statement that the proposal is, or is not, consistent with the comprehensive plan of the jurisdiction where such plan exists. The report shall be considered advisory to the local legislative body and shall not be binding upon it or restrict its actions in the matter.

History. Enact. Acts 1976, ch. 123, § 5.

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Comment, Conservation Easements: The Greening of America, 73 Ky. L.J. 255 (1984-85).

65.470. Construction in violation of easement prohibited — Injunctive relief.

  1. From and after the time when a scenic easement has been acquired by the local legislative body and its acceptance endorsed thereon, no building permit shall be issued for any structure which would violate the easement and the local legislative body shall seek by appropriate proceedings an injunction against any threatened construction or other development or activity on the land which would violate the easement and shall seek a mandatory injunction requiring the removal of any structure erected in violation of the easement and the restoration of the land to its original character insofar as possible.
  2. In the event the local legislative body fails to seek an injunction against any threatened construction or other development or activity on the land which would violate the easement or to seek a mandatory injunction requiring the removal of any structure erected in violation of the easement or the restoration of the land to its original character insofar as possible, or if the local legislative body should construct any structure or development or conduct or permit any activity in violation of the easement, any resident of the jurisdiction which has acquired the easement may, by appropriate proceedings, seek such an injunction.

History. Enact. Acts 1976, ch. 123, § 6.

65.472. Recording of easement.

Upon acceptance of any instrument creating a scenic easement the clerk of the local legislative body shall record the same in the office of the county clerk and file copies with the property valuation administrator and the local planning commission if such commission exists. From and after the time of such recordation such contract shall import such notice thereof to all persons as is afforded by the recording laws of this state.

History. Enact. Acts 1976, ch. 123, § 7; 1978, ch. 384, § 135, effective June 17, 1978.

65.474. Extension of term of easement.

From time to time, the local legislative body may accept an instrument whereby the term of any scenic easement is extended in the same manner as is provided for the acceptance of an instrument originally creating a scenic easement. Upon the acceptance thereof the same shall be recorded in the office of the county clerk and copies filed with the property valuation administrator and the local planning commission.

History. Enact. Acts 1976, ch. 123, § 8; 1978, ch. 384, § 136, effective June 17, 1978.

65.476. Termination of easement.

If any land or a portion thereof as to which any local legislative body has accepted a scenic easement is thereafter sought to be condemned for public use and the local legislative body received the easement as a gift without the payment of any compensation therefor, the easement shall terminate as of the time of the filing of the complaint in condemnation as to the land or portion thereof sought to be taken for public use, and the owner shall be entitled to such compensation for the taking as he would have been entitled to had the land not been burdened by the easement.

History. Enact. Acts 1976, ch. 123, § 9.

65.478. Consent of owner of subsurface rights to easement.

A scenic easement shall not be transferred by the owners of property in which there are outstanding subsurface rights without the written consent of the owner of such subsurface rights.

History. Enact. Acts 1976, ch. 123, § 10.

65.480. Construction of certain improvements not prohibited.

Nothing contained in KRS 65.462 to 65.478 shall prohibit construction of improvements for agricultural purposes, flood control, control of soil erosion, or drainage of land.

History. Enact. Acts 1976, ch. 123, § 12.

Tax Increment Financing in Counties Containing a Consolidated Local Government or a City of the First Class

65.490. Definitions for KRS 65.490 to 65.499.

As used in KRS 65.490 to 65.499 , unless the context otherwise requires:

  1. “Agency” means an urban renewal and community development agency of a taxing district located within a county containing a consolidated local government or a city of the first class, established under KRS Chapter 99; a development authority located within a county containing a consolidated local government or a city of the first class established under KRS Chapter 99; a nonprofit corporation located within a county containing a consolidated local government or a city of the first class; or a designated department, division, or office of a county containing a consolidated local government or of a city of the first class;
  2. “Development area” means an area no less than one (1) square mile, nor more than six (6) square miles, designated in need of public improvements by a local or state government in a county containing a consolidated local government or a city of the first class, a project area as defined in KRS 99.615 , or a public project as defined in KRS 58.010 in a county containing a consolidated local government or a city of the first class. “Development area” includes an existing economic development asset;
  3. “Increment” means that amount of money received by any taxing district or the state that is determined by subtracting the amount of old revenues from the amount of new revenues in any year for which a taxing district or the state and an agency have agreed upon under the terms of a contract of release or a grant contract;
  4. “Local government” means a county containing a consolidated local government or a city of the first class;
  5. “New revenues” means the revenues received by any taxing district or the state from a development area in any year after the establishment of the development area;
  6. “Old revenues” means the amount of revenues received by any taxing district or the state from a development area in the last year prior to the establishment of the development area;
  7. “Project” means any urban renewal, redevelopment, or public project undertaken in accordance with the provisions of KRS 65.490 to 65.497 , any project undertaken in accordance with KRS 99.610 to 99.680 , any project undertaken in accordance with the provisions of KRS Chapter 58, or any “public project” as that term is defined in KRS 58.010 undertaken by a nonprofit corporation located within a county containing a consolidated local government or a city of the first class;
  8. “Release” or “contract of release” or “grant contract” means that agreement by which a taxing district or the state permits the payment to an agency of a portion of increments or an amount equal to a portion of increments received by it in return for the benefits accrued to the taxing district or the state by reason of a project undertaken by an agency in a development area;
  9. “Taxing district” means a consolidated local government, a county containing a city of the first class, a city of the first class that encompasses all or part of a development area, or the state, but does not mean a school district; and
  10. “Pilot program” means a tax increment financing program or a grant program created by an agency within a consolidated local government or a county containing a city of the first class which shall exist for a period of twenty (20) years, and may be extended for a period not to exceed an additional twenty-five (25) years as provided in KRS 65.4931 .

History. Enact. Acts 2000, ch. 326, § 1, effective July 14, 2000; 2002, ch. 346, § 30, effective July 15, 2002; 2006, ch. 252, Pt. XXX, § 1, effective April 25, 2006; 2017 ch. 189, § 1, effective April 11, 2017.

65.491. Legislative findings regarding tax increment financing.

  1. It is found and declared that public improvements, and publicly promoted private improvements, in any development area that result in the increase in the value of property located in the development area or result in increased employment within the development area serve a public purpose for each taxing district possessing the authority, directly or indirectly, to impose ad valorem taxes, sales taxes, income taxes, or occupational license fees in the development area, and for the state with regards to its revenues from ad valorem taxes, sales taxes, and income taxes. The increment in revenues derived by each taxing district and the state from the development area is found and declared to be one of the benefits derived by each taxing district and the state from any local development project or public project undertaken by the agency; and
  2. It is found that the use of tax increment financing or a grant program based upon the use of increment financing as tax revenues has proved to be successful and of great benefit to areas in need of revitalization and development in other parts of the country; therefore, the development of a pilot program within the Commonwealth to test the usefulness of increment financing to assist local governments in restoring and revitalizing their communities is declared to be a most worthy public purpose.

History. Enact. Acts 2000, ch. 326, § 2, effective July 14, 2000.

65.493. Development areas for tax increment financing — Qualifications.

  1. A county containing a city of the first class or a city of the first class may establish a development area for the purpose of creating a pilot program to utilize tax increment financing or a grant program based upon the increment in state tax revenues for the redevelopment and revitalization of these development areas within their communities.
  2. A development area in a county containing a city of the first class shall be located within ten (10) miles of the central business district of the largest city within the county and shall be within one (1) mile of one (1) or more economic development assets having employers, with at least one thousand (1,000) employees, who will leverage and promote investment in the zone.
  3. A development area in a county containing a city of the first class shall have adequate roads, sewers, water, rail service, and an interstate highway interchange directly available.
  4. At least fifty percent (50%) of a development area in a county containing a city of the first class, excluding roads, utility easements, and other infrastructure-related improvements, shall be composed of land that is a brownfield site or other land compatible for industrial or commercial uses to permit and facilitate redevelopment and reuse of land in the development area compatible with the adjacent economic development assets.

History. Enact. Acts 2000, ch. 326, § 3, effective July 14, 2000.

65.4931. Extension of pilot program period for not more than 25 years — Conditions — Reports.

  1. As used in this section:
    1. “Borrower” means the entity receiving the proceeds from a new bond issued because of an extended tax increment financing agreement allowed under KRS 65.490(10);
    2. “Excess revenues” means all moneys which exceed the costs associated with the borrower’s operating expenses, capital expenditures, and the regularly scheduled debt service on the bond; and
    3. “Term of the bond” shall begin on the date any current bonds are refinanced, reissued, or restructured and shall end upon the earlier of the stated maturity date of the bond or the payment in full of the bond.
  2. A pilot program may be extended for a period not to exceed an additional twenty-five (25) years in connection with the issuance of a new bond by the Kentucky Economic Development Finance Authority if the pilot program agreement contains provisions requiring that:
    1. The borrower use all excess revenues to redeem the bond prior to the stated maturity date;
      1. Once the bond is callable, the borrower apply all excess revenues to the redemption of the bond prior to the stated maturity date at least every thirty-six (36) months; and (b) 1. Once the bond is callable, the borrower apply all excess revenues to the redemption of the bond prior to the stated maturity date at least every thirty-six (36) months; and
      2. If it is the position of the borrower that the application of all excess revenues to the redemption of the bond prior to the stated maturity date jeopardizes the project, the borrower shall present an alternative payment plan for that thirty-six (36) month period to the Capital Projects and Bond Oversight Committee for approval; and
    2. No further revenues under the pilot program be remitted to the borrower following the end of the term of the bond.
  3. The borrower shall submit a report to the Governor and the Capital Projects and Bond Oversight Committee on or before November 1, 2018, and annually thereafter regarding the operations and financial condition of the borrower.

History. 2017 ch. 189, § 2, effective April 11, 2017.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(4/11/2017). During codification, the Reviser of Statutes has changed the internal numbering of paragraphs in subsection (2) of this statute from the way it appeared in 2017 Ky. Acts ch. 189, sec. 2 under the authority of KRS 7.136(1)(a).

65.494. KRS 65.490 to 65.499 limited to development areas established by county containing city of the first class or a city of the first class before March 23, 2007.

Effective on March 23, 2007, the provisions of KRS 65.490 to 65.499 shall apply only to development areas which were established by a county containing a city of the first class or a city of the first class prior to March 23, 2007, and that are subject to the provisions of a grant contract, Interlocal Cooperation Agreement or Master Agreement executed prior to March 23, 2007.

History. Enact. Acts 2007, ch. 95, § 23, effective March 23, 2007.

65.495. State and local development contracts for release of tax increments or grant awards — Limitations.

  1. In connection with the establishment of any development area, an agency may enter into contracts with one (1) or more taxing districts for the release to the agency of increments expected to be derived by a taxing district within a development area with an existing development asset as leveraged in part by the undertaking of a project.
  2. No contract shall require the release of less than fifty percent (50%) of the increments, or more than ninety-five percent (95%) of the increments where the revenue is derived solely from ad valorem taxation or solely from occupational license fees, or more than eighty percent (80%) of the increments where the revenue is derived from ad valorem taxes and occupational license fees.
  3. An agency may enter into a contract with the state, acting by and through the Governor, for an annual grant to the agency in an amount equal to not less than fifty percent (50%) nor more than eighty percent (80%) of the increment in ad valorem taxes, sales taxes, income taxes, and limited liability entity taxes derived by the state within the development area with an existing economic development asset as leveraged in part by the undertaking of a project.
  4. Any amount derived by the agency under the terms of a release shall be used solely for the purposes of the project and in the development area.

History. Enact. Acts 2000, ch. 326, § 4, effective July 14, 2000; 2006 (1st Extra. Sess.) ch. 2, § 69, effective June 28, 2006.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(6/28/2006). 2006 (1st Extra. Sess.) Ky. Acts ch. 2, sec. 73, provides that “unless a provision of this Act specifically applies to an earlier tax year, the provisions of this Act shall apply to taxable years beginning on or after January 1, 2007.”

65.497. State and local development contracts for benefits derived by taxing authority — Annual renewal.

  1. Each taxing district is authorized to execute a contract of release with any agency in acknowledgment of benefits to be derived by it within the development area with an existing economic development asset as leveraged in part by the undertaking of a project, and in order to promote the public purposes of the taxing district.
  2. Any contract signed for the release of increments shall be made on the basis of automatic year-to-year renewals, with the option to discontinue upon sixty (60) days’ notice before the end of any annual termination date of the contract.
  3. The state, acting by and through the Governor, is authorized to execute a grant contract with any agency in acknowledgment of benefits to be derived by it with the development area with an existing economic development asset as leveraged in part by the undertaking of a project, and in order to promote the public purpose of the state.
  4. Any grant contract signed for an amount equal to the increment derived from the development area shall be made on the basis of automatic year-to-year renewals, with the option to discontinue upon sixty (60) days’ notice before the end of any annual termination date of the contract.

History. Enact. Acts 2000, ch. 326, § 5, effective July 14, 2000.

65.499. Notice of contract of release to tax collector — Distribution of tax revenues.

Any agency, other than a county, consolidated local government, city, urban-county, or charter county government, that enters into a contract with any taxing district for the release of any increments that may arise during the period of a contract of release shall forthwith notify the official charged with the collecting of taxes for the property in the development area of the execution of a contract of release, and the official charged with the collection of taxes shall in each year a contract of release is in effect determine the amount of the increment that is the subject of the contract of release for division between the taxing district and the agency; and, upon the basis of the agreement made between the taxing district and the agency, the official shall divide and distribute the funds derived from the area between the taxing district and the agency. Any local government that has designated an agency as having oversight of a designated development area shall annually issue a release to the agency of those increments created from the taxes collected on properties within the development area. All increments released to an agency of a local government shall be used solely for the purposes of projects in the development area.

History. Enact. Acts 2000, ch. 326, § 6, effective July 14, 2000; 2002, ch. 346, § 31, effective July 15, 2002.

Riverport Authority

65.510. Definitions for KRS 65.510 to 65.650.

As used in KRS 65.510 to 65.650 , unless the context otherwise requires:

  1. “Riverport authority” or “authority” means an authority established as provided in KRS 65.510 to 65.650 ;
  2. “Riverport facilities” includes land, wharves, landings, buildings, equipment, and other improvements and appurtenances necessary or proper for the establishment, maintenance, operation, and expansion of riverports;
  3. “Governmental unit” means a city or a county;
  4. “Person” means any individual, firm, partnership, corporation, company, association, joint stock association, or body politic, and includes any trustee, receiver, assignee, or other similar representative thereof;
  5. “Industrial park” includes land which is held, owned, or optioned for present or future industrial or commercial development; and
  6. “Economic environs” means the political boundaries of the governmental units establishing a riverport authority.

History. Enact. Acts 1964, ch. 48, § 1; 1966, ch. 64, § 13; 1968, ch. 118, § 1; 1994, ch. 154, § 1, effective July 15, 1994.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Purpose.

The obvious intent of the Legislature in adopting the Riverport Authority Act, KRS 65.510 et seq., was to promote and develop port facilities by a governmental agency for the use and benefit of the general public. E.M. Bailey Distributing Co. v. Conagra, Inc., 676 S.W.2d 770, 1984 Ky. LEXIS 235 ( Ky. 1984 ).

2. Model Procurement Code.

The Kentucky Model Procurement Code, KRS 45A.010 et seq., was not applicable to a county riverport authority where neither the county, nor the authority, had adopted the provisions of the Code required by KRS 45A.343 . E.M. Bailey Distributing Co. v. Conagra, Inc., 676 S.W.2d 770, 1984 Ky. LEXIS 235 ( Ky. 1984 ).

3. Unlawful Franchise.

Operating agreement between riverport authority and private company, which entitled company to various benefits including the exclusive use of the land adjacent to the riverport facility and the use of grain-loading apparatus to the exclusion of all others upon a 24-hour prior notice on which use there was no limitation, and which agreement was for two years with an automatic renewal for three consecutive one-year periods, unlawfully granted to company a franchise or a privilege without complying with the requirements of advertisement and competitive bidding in Ky. Const., § 164 and thus was null and void. E.M. Bailey Distributing Co. v. Conagra, Inc., 676 S.W.2d 770, 1984 Ky. LEXIS 235 ( Ky. 1984 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

The provisions of KRS 65.510 to 65.650 indicate without any doubt that the riverport authority is a public or governmental agency or corporation with specifically assigned duties and powers relating to clearly defined public purposes and is not a private corporation but exists solely for public purposes; therefore, it is not necessary that it be formally incorporated or have or file articles of incorporation. OAG 77-16 .

Considering the purposes for which a riverport authority is created and remembering that it is a public, rather than a private, corporation existing for public purposes, the riverport authority cannot arbitrarily deny grain shippers access to its scales. OAG 78-676 .

Restrictions on purchasing grain would not be in keeping with the riverport’s purposes as a public corporation performing its statutorily created public functions or in the best interests of the authority or the public. OAG 78-676 .

Acting within the frame of its statutory powers the riverport authority as a public corporation is autonomous in nature. OAG 79-133 .

As of January 1, 1980, riverport authorities must look to the applicable provisions of the Kentucky Model Procurement Code in connection with their procurement programs. OAG 80-71 .

A riverport authority, created pursuant to KRS 65.510 through 65.650 , is required to publish an annual financial statement consistent with the requirements of KRS 65.070(1)(c), in lieu of the provisions of KRS 424.220 . Such statement must also be in compliance with other applicable provisions (other than KRS 424.220 ) of KRS Chapter 424. OAG 83-428 , modifying OAG 83-392 .

The bidding statute, KRS 424.260 , applies to a riverport authority created pursuant to KRS 65.510 et seq., unless the authority has specifically adopted the Model Procurement Code, KRS 45A.345 to 45A.460 , in which latter case the Model Procurement Code, with its bidding requirements, applies to the riverport authority. OAG 84-196 .

Even though a riverport authority is created jointly by a city and county, the created authority is still a body politic and corporate, it is still a special district and, thus, the district, i.e., the riverport authority, is subject to the bidding principle under KRS 424.260 , or the Model Procurement Code if adopted by the authority. OAG 84-196 .

65.520. Establishment — General powers — Cabinet’s oversight responsibilities.

  1. Any governmental unit by act of its legislative body, or any two (2) or more governmental units acting jointly by acts of their legislative bodies, and with the approval of the Transportation Cabinet, Office of the Secretary, may establish a developmental riverport authority to be composed of six (6) members.
  2. The authority shall be a body politic and corporate with the usual corporate attributes, and in its corporate name may sue and be sued, contract and be contracted with and do all things reasonable or necessary to effectively carry out the powers and duties prescribed by KRS 65.510 to 65.650 . The authority may exercise all powers granted to governmental agencies by KRS 58.010 to 58.140 . The authority may exercise all powers, consistent with its powers and duties stated in this chapter, granted by KRS 273.171 to corporations governed by KRS 273.161 to 273.390 .
  3. The responsibility for riverports shall be established within the Transportation Cabinet to provide oversight on development activities involving riverport authorities. The cabinet shall be responsible for managing a study that will develop a long-range capital improvements plan for Kentucky’s riverports that shall include, but not be limited to:
    1. Guidelines for ground transportation access to riverports;
    2. A model for determining the economic impact of riverports; and
    3. A blueprint for creating long-term funding mechanisms for riverports.

History. Enact. Acts 1964, ch. 48, § 2 (1), (2); 1966, ch. 64, § 14; 1968, ch. 118, § 2; 1994, ch. 499, § 10, effective July 15, 1994; 1998, ch. 583, § 1, effective July 15, 1998.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

This section originally referred to sections of KRS Ch. 273 that were repealed in the 1968 Session. Equivalent references have been substituted.

Opinions of Attorney General.

A riverport authority is not subject to the five-year limitation on holding of real estate set out in Ky. Const., § 192 since such bodies are not private corporations but are public agencies exercising powers conferred upon them by the legislature. OAG 68-78 .

Where a city, through its legislative body and with the approval of the Kentucky port and river development commission, establishes a developmental riverport authority, there is no constitutional or statutory provision authorizing a referendum by either the election or petition method and any attempt to refer it to the voters by either method would be a nullity and illegal. OAG 73-865 .

The provisions of KRS 65.510 to 65.650 indicate without any doubt that the Riverport Authority is a public or governmental agency or corporation with specifically assigned duties and powers relating to clearly defined public purposes and is not a private corporation but exists solely for public purposes; therefore, it is not necessary that it be formally incorporated or have or file articles of incorporation. OAG 77-16 .

A port authority is clearly a “public agency” as defined in KRS 61.805 . OAG 79-512 .

Acting within the frame of its statutory powers, the port authority as a public corporation is autonomous in nature, but the very nature and functions of a port authority mean that the members of a riverport authority are consequentially and necessarily “public officers” for the purpose of applying rules relating to tort liability. OAG 79-590 .

The port authority members would not be, generally, liable for the negligence of port authority employes, if the authority has employed persons of suitable skill. OAG 79-590 .

A city riverport authority has the right to locate its main port facility on land located outside the city limits since the riverport authority is a separate body politic from that of the city or county with no defined geographic boundaries. OAG 80-160 .

Once a riverport authority is established and thereby becomes a political entity, it has complete control over its own operation under the terms of KRS 65.510 to 65.650 . OAG 80-160 .

Considering the public function and public purpose of a riverport authority, a port authority has no authority to exclude on its own initiative the coal handling business as a standing policy; to attempt to exclude would mean a clear and direct violation of the mandate that the port’s contracts cannot “prevent, restrict or hamper the general use of the riverport by the public.” OAG 80-601 .

65.530. Purpose, duties, and powers of riverport authority.

  1. The purposes of the authority shall be to establish, maintain, operate, and expand necessary and proper riverport and river navigation facilities, and to acquire and develop property, or rights therein within the economic environs, the home county, or any county adjacent thereto, of the riverport or proposed riverport to attract directly or indirectly river-oriented industry. It shall have the duty and such powers as may be necessary or desirable to promote and develop navigation, river transportation, riverports, and riverport facilities, and to attract industrial or commercial operations to the property held as industrial parks.
  2. The authority shall establish and fix reasonable rates, charges, and fees for the use of the riverport facilities which shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the county in which the riverport is located. In fixing rates, charges, or fees the authority may take into consideration, among other factors, the total capital investment of the authority, the revenue needed properly to maintain such facilities, the revenue needed properly to expand the riverport and its facilities, the portion of the facilities utilized by the licensee or contracting party and its customers, and the volume and type of business conducted. Any party aggrieved by the rates, charges, or fees may appeal from the action of the authority to the Circuit Court of the county within which the authority operates, within ninety (90) days from the date that the authority finally publishes the rates, charges, or fees and gives notice of same to the contracting party or licensee. The Circuit Court may hear evidence and determine whether or not the rates, charges, or fees are, or are not, reasonable in amount. Appeal from the judgment of the Circuit Court may be prosecuted as any other civil appeal.
  3. The authority shall also have power, from time to time, to fix rates, charges, or fees by contract, or by publishing general rates, charges, or fees for commercial vendors, concessionaires, or other persons for the use or occupancy of riverport facilities under the terms and conditions it deems to be in the best interest of maintaining, operating, or expanding necessary riverport facilities, and the public use thereof.
  4. The authority may acquire by contract, lease, purchase, option, gift, condemnation, or otherwise any real or personal property, or rights therein, necessary or suitable for establishing, developing, operating, or expanding riverports, riverport facilities, water navigation facilities, including spoilage areas for the disposal of materials dredged from river bottoms in an effort to improve the navigability of rivers, reserve storage areas and reserves of bulk materials utilized by the authority or any person acting as the authority’s agent or licensee, and industrial parks or sites within the economic environs of the riverport or proposed riverport. The authority may erect, equip, operate, and maintain on the property buildings and equipment necessary and proper for riverport and water navigation facilities. The authority may dispose of any real or personal property, or rights therein, which in the opinion of the authority is not needed for use as riverport or water navigation facilities, or use as industrial parks or sites. The authority may lease, sell, convey, or assign its interest in land owned, optioned, or otherwise held by it to any person for the purpose of constructing and/or operating any industrial or commercial facility or for the purpose of acting as the authority’s agent or licensee in effectively carrying out any of its powers and duties.
  5. With the consent of the legislative body of the governmental unit in which the property to be condemned is located, the authority may by resolution, reciting that the property cannot be acquired by purchase or agreement and is needed for riverport, water navigation, or industrial purposes in accordance with the powers set forth in subsection (4) of this section, direct the condemnation of any property. The procedure for condemnation shall conform to the procedure set out in the Eminent Domain Act of Kentucky.
  6. The authority may apply for, receive authorization for, establish, and operate a foreign trade zone, as permitted by 19 U.S.C. sec. 81 , provided approval is obtained from the Cabinet for Economic Development.
  7. The authority shall comply with the provisions of KRS 65A.010 to 65A.090 .

History. Enact. Acts 1964, ch. 48, § 3; 1966, ch. 64, § 15; 1968, ch. 118, § 3; 1968, ch. 152, § 35; 1976, ch. 140, § 22; 1980, ch. 129, § 2, effective July 15, 1980; 1994, ch. 499, § 11, effective July 15, 1994; 1996, ch. 337, § 4, effective July 15, 1996; 2013, ch. 40, § 22, effective March 21, 2013.

Compiler’s Notes.

The Eminent Domain Act of Kentucky, referred to in subsection (5), is compiled as KRS 416.540 to 416.680 .

The federal law concerning foreign trade zones, referred to in subsection (6) of this section is now compiled as 19 USCS §§ 81(a) — 81(u).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Condemnation.

A riverport authority created pursuant to KRS Chapter 65 can condemn land which is needed for the construction of a riverport for public use prior to securing permission from the United States Corps of Engineers for the construction of the project, since it is not conceivable that all phases of the development of a riverport be completed simultaneously or completed within a reasonable time from each other before condemnation proceedings may be instituted. Northern Kentucky Port Authority, Inc. v. Cornett, 625 S.W.2d 104, 1981 Ky. LEXIS 298 ( Ky. 1981 ).

Cited:

Paducah Marine Ways, Inc. v. Revenue Cabinet Commonwealth, 730 S.W.2d 956, 1987 Ky. App. LEXIS 495 (Ky. Ct. App. 1987).

Opinions of Attorney General.

The riverport authority would not be required to make an offer to a landowner prior to condemning his land for purposes pointed out in KRS 65.530 . OAG 67-505 .

The riverport authority act gives the established authority the right to reasonably regulate the operation of privately owned boats along the adjoining property so as to prevent such boats from blocking or impeding the movement of coast guard boats. OAG 70-174 .

If it became necessary to develop and expand the riverport facility or to permit normal access to the coast guard facility, the authority could acquire the adjacent property either by purchase or condemnation. OAG 70-174 .

If the use of the riverport harbor facilities would, by virtue of granting fleet permits, inhibit the ingress and egress of the coast guard vessels or other boats utilizing the harbor facilities, or interfere in any way with the normal flow of traffic in and around the harbor, or create a docking space problem, the authority would have the legal right to deny the permits. OAG 78-440 .

Where the Greater Cincinnati Area Foreign Trade Zones Board (GCAFTZB) wished to enter into a contract with the Northern Kentucky Port Authority (NKPA) for the operation by GCAFTZB of a free trade zone on 400 acres owned by NKPA, and NKPA was also willing to enter such a contract, this section provides the NKPA with the authority to do so. OAG 78-548 .

There is nothing in subsection (2) of this section suggesting that the rates of the riverport authority are governed or influenced by the rates set by private firms for the same or similar services. OAG 78-676 .

Where Maysville and Mason County have created a riverport authority, which authority planned to acquire riverport facilities, a portion of which would be leased to a corporation engaged in coal transloading, the authority had the power to condemn the airspace, at a reasonable height above the tracks of the Chesapeake and Ohio Railroad Company, for erection of a conveyor belt system to take coal from rail hoppers or trucks to the port’s river area for loading onto barges. OAG 79-457 .

The members of the port authority are public officers and as public officers when acting in good faith within the scope of their authority are not personally liable for damages sustained by a member of the public as a result of their action, unless they have acted negligently, but they are liable for damages resulting from their negligence or deliberate wrongdoing, regardless of whether they were acting within the scope of their authority and are responsible for their misfeasance and negligence but are not responsible for the negligence of their employes if they have employed persons of suitable skill. OAG 79-590 .

A city riverport authority has the right to locate its main port facility on land located outside the city limits since the riverport authority is a separate body politic from that of the city or county with no defined geographic boundaries. OAG 80-160 .

Subsection (5) of this section clearly authorizes a city authority to condemn property located outside of the city and in the county. The authority must however first obtain the consent of the county fiscal court since the property to be condemned is located in the county and outside the city. OAG 80-160 .

Considering the public function and public purpose of a riverport authority, a port authority has no authority to exclude on its own initiative the coal handling business as a standing policy; to attempt to exclude would mean a clear and direct violation of the mandate that the port’s contracts cannot “prevent, restrict or hamper the general use of the riverport by the public.” OAG 80-601 .

Assuming that the riverport authority is an instrumentality or agency of the county, subsection (1) of KRS 416.560 and subsections (4) and (5) of this section are irreconcilable with respect to condemnation of property which the authority has been unable to purchase, since the first statute provides that the fiscal court would condemn the property and the second statute provides the riverport authority may, itself, condemn the property; however, since the legislature republished this section after the enactment of KRS 416.560 , it intended, as relates to the specific subject of riverport authorities, to impliedly repeal subsection (1) of KRS 416.560 to that extent, since, whenever there are apparent irreconcilable conflicts in statutes, the later statute controls; thus, the riverport authority may proceed, with the consent of the fiscal court, to condemn the land under its own name. OAG 81-244 .

A county riverport authority is not required to advertise to the general public its intent to sell parcels of an industrial park to industrial clients and request bids for the purchase of said property, where the riverport authority intends to convey the fee simple title to the industrial purchasers. OAG 84-277 .

65.540. Members of authority — Appointment, terms — Removal — Effect of compact.

  1. The members of the authority shall be appointed as follows:
    1. If the authority is established by a city, such members shall be appointed by the mayor of the city;
    2. If the authority is established by a county, such members shall be appointed by the county judge/executive with the approval of the fiscal court;
    3. If the authority is established as a joint city-county riverport authority, three (3) members shall be appointed by the mayor and three (3) members by the county judge/executive to the terms as provided in subsection (2) of this section, and in addition, the mayor may appoint himself or a member of the city legislative body as one (1) additional member of the authority and the county judge/executive may appoint himself or a member of the fiscal court as one (1) additional member of the authority for a term of two (2) years, provided that such persons may not serve on the authority after the expiration of their terms as an elected official;
    4. If a combination of cities and/or counties establishes a joint riverport authority, the mayors and/or county judges/executive involved shall jointly choose six (6) members to the terms as provided in subsection (2) of this section, and shall jointly choose successors and may upon agreement appoint a mayor or a member of a city legislative body and a county judge/executive or a member of a fiscal court as two (2) additional members of the authority for terms of two (2) years, provided that such persons may not serve on the authority after the expiration of their terms as an elected official.
  2. Except as provided in subsection (1)(c) and (d) of this section, members of the authority shall serve for a term of four (4) years each, and until their successors are appointed and qualified, provided, however, that initial appointments shall be made so that two (2) members are appointed for two (2) years, two (2) members for three (3) years, and two (2) members for four (4) years. Upon expiration of these staggered terms, successors shall be appointed for a term of four (4) years.
  3. A riverport authority member may be replaced by the appointing authority for inefficiency, neglect of duty, malfeasance, or conflict of interest. The appointing authority shall submit a written statement to the riverport authority setting forth the reasons for removal, and the statement shall be read at the next authority meeting, which shall be open to the general public. The member so removed shall have the right of appeal in the Circuit Court. Except as provided in subsection (1)(c) and (d) of this section no riverport authority member shall hold any official office with the appointing authority.
  4. Notwithstanding subsection (2) of this section, when a city of the first class and a county containing such city have in effect a compact under KRS 79.310 to 79.330 , the terms of the members of the authority shall be for three (3) years and until their successors are appointed and qualified. Upon the effective date of the compact, the county judge/executive with the approval of the fiscal court shall adjust the terms of the sitting members so that one-third (1/3) of the terms expire in one (1) year, one-third (1/3) expire in two (2) years, and one-third (1/3) expire in three (3) years. Upon expiration of these staggered terms, successors shall be appointed for a term of three (3) years. Upon the establishment of a consolidated local government in a county where a city of the first class and a county containing that city have had in effect a cooperative compact pursuant to KRS 79.310 to 79.330 , all members of the authority shall be appointed by the mayor of the consolidated local government for a term of three (3) years pursuant to the provisions of KRS 67C.139 . Incumbent members upon the establishment of the consolidated local government shall continue to serve as members of the authority for the time remaining on their current terms of appointment.

History. Enact. Acts 1964, ch. 48, § 2(3), (4), (10); 1968, ch. 118, § 4; 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 20, § 6, effective January 2, 1978; 1978, ch. 118, § 17, effective June 17, 1978; 1986, ch. 77, § 8, effective July 15, 1986; 2002, ch. 346, § 32, effective July 15, 2002.

Opinions of Attorney General.

The mayor could not serve as a member of the riverport authority. OAG 66-18 .

City and county officials, other than members of the city legislative body or members of the fiscal court, may be appointed to the joint riverport authority provided there exists no constitutional or statutory incompatiblity. OAG 70-432 .

There would be no incompatibility between serving as city councilman and as a member of the county riverport authority. OAG 71-462 .

If two (2) members of a riverport authority who are stockholders in a local grain company will not attend the meeting in which the question of leases to grain companies will be voted on, and the two (2) members will not attempt to influence the vote of the remaining four members on this issue, the two (2) members will not be subject to removal for conflict of interest. OAG 78-747 .

Proxies may not be used by members of either the Kentucky Port and River Development Commission or a local riverport authority. OAG 79-589 .

Where a city establishes a riverport authority and gives the mayor the appointment power, the mayor appoints the members thereof and has the power to replace any member under the terms of subsection (3) of this section; however, the power to remove a member of the authority can only be accomplished following a hearing from which the member so removed may appeal to the circuit court as provided in subsection (3) of this section; thus, the mayor cannot remove members of the authority except for cause and in the manner prescribed in subsection (3) of this section. OAG 80-160 .

Members of a joint city-county port authority need not be residents of the city or county which created the authority, except for the mayors and county judge/executive serving as additional members since they are officers designated under Ky. Const., § 234 as being required to live in their respective cities or counties, and this section is silent on the residency requirements. OAG 81-66 .

The county judge/executive cannot, under this section, be appointed to serve on the joint city-county port authority board on which he already serves in his capacity as county judge/executive, since he cannot be viewed as two (2) persons, the county judge/executive and a private person. OAG 81-66 .

Since a riverport authority is a governmental entity, a presiding officer who was also the president of a local bank would have a disqualifying conflict of interest, provided it could be shown that, in the authority’s dealing with the member’s bank, the member derived a pecuniary interest or profit in the relationship, though the personal financial benefit was small; however, such financial interest would not be disqualifying where it could not be reasonably calculated to affect the judgment of the member in conducting the affairs of the riverport authority. OAG 84-136 .

65.550. Withdrawal of city or county — Successors — Agreed dissolution.

  1. In the event that a joint riverport authority is created by cities and/or counties, and thereafter a city or cities or county or counties desire to withdraw from participation, then the remaining participants may jointly choose a successor member or members of the authority. No such withdrawing city or cities or county or counties shall be entitled to the return of any money or property advanced such authority.
  2. Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (1), any cities and/or counties which have established a joint riverport authority as provided for herein, may provide by a mutual written agreement between such cities and/or counties, and the joint riverport authority, that such joint riverport authority may be dissolved and may further provide that upon such complete termination, all funds, property and other assets held by the joint riverport authority shall be returned to such cities and/or counties in the same proportion as contributions of funds, property and other assets were made by such cities and/or counties. This section shall not apply and no dissolution shall be made until such time as all legal obligations of the joint riverport authority shall be satisfied and all existing commitments fulfilled.

History. Enact. Acts 1964, ch. 48, § 2(8); 1966, ch. 136.

65.560. Meetings of authority — Quorum — Effect of tie vote.

A quorum for the transacting of the business of the authority shall consist of four (4) members for a six (6) member authority and five (5) members for an eight (8) member authority. Meetings of the authority may be called by the chairman or by four (4) members for a six (6) member authority and five (5) members for an eight (8) member authority. In case of tie voting by the authority, the issue shall be deemed to have failed passage.

History. Enact. Acts 1964, ch. 48, § 2(9); 1978, ch. 118, § 18, effective June 17, 1978.

Opinions of Attorney General.

Where membership of a joint city-county port authority was expanded to eight members, but there were only five active members on the board and three vacancies, the quorum for the board is five under this section, regardless of the number of vacancies. OAG 81-66 .

65.570. Compensation of members — Employees — Duties of secretary-treasurer — Effect of compact.

  1. Members of the authority shall serve without compensation but shall be reimbursed for any actual and necessary expenses incurred by them in the conduct of the affairs of the authority. The authority shall, upon the appointment of its members, organize and elect officers. The authority shall choose a chairman and vice chairman who shall serve for terms of one (1) year. The authority may fix a salary for the secretary-treasurer, and the secretary-treasurer shall execute an official bond to be set and approved by the authority, and the cost thereof shall be paid by the authority.
  2. The authority may employ or retain necessary counsel, agents, employees, or other persons to carry out its purposes, work, and functions and may prescribe such rules and regulations as it deems necessary.
  3. The secretary-treasurer shall keep the minutes of all meetings of the authority and shall also keep a set of books showing the receipts and expenditures of the authority. He shall preserve on file duplicate vouchers for all expenditures and shall present to the authority, upon request, complete reports of all financial transactions and the financial condition of the authority. Such books and vouchers shall at all times be subject to examination by the legislative body or bodies by whom the authority was created. He shall transmit at least once annually a detailed report of all acts and doings of the authority to the legislative body or bodies by whom the authority was created.
  4. Notwithstanding subsection (1) of this section, when a city of the first class and a county containing such city have in effect a compact under KRS 79.310 to 79.330 , the secretary-treasurer or executive director, as the case may be, shall be appointed by and serve at the pleasure of the county judge/executive with the approval of the fiscal court as provided in KRS 67.040 ; fiscal court shall fix the salary. Upon the establishment of a consolidated local government in a county where a city of the first class and a county containing that city have had in effect a cooperative compact pursuant to KRS 79.310 to 79.330 , the secretary-treasurer or executive director, as the case may be, shall be appointed by and shall serve at the pleasure of the mayor.

History. Enact. Acts 1964, ch. 48, § 2(5) to (7); 1968, ch. 118, § 5; 1986, ch. 77, § 9, effective July 15, 1986; 2002, ch. 346, § 33, effective July 15, 2002.

Opinions of Attorney General.

A person can serve as trial commissioner and at the same time can be employed by a county riverport authority to act as legal counsel for the authority. OAG 77-101 .

Where a riverport authority advertised for a director, received 53 applications and selected and hired one man as director, and that man resigned after working for six (6) weeks, it was not necessary for the authority to review former applicants and advertise again to hire a replacement, if no regulations to that effect have been enacted pursuant to this section. OAG 81-187 .

65.580. City or county may appropriate funds or levy tax for use of riverport authority.

In order to provide money for the costs of administration, operation, maintenance, and development and for the purchase, lease, option, or holding of property, or rights therein, necessary or proper for the purposes contemplated in KRS 65.510 to 65.650 , the legislative body of any governmental unit creating the riverport authority under KRS 65.510 to 65.650 may annually appropriate funds to the authority; or such governmental unit may make an annual levy to collect a tax on taxable property situated in the governmental unit for such riverport development. Any appropriation shall be made by the legislative body in such amounts, in such proportion and upon such terms as the legislative body may determine. All funds derived from such appropriation or tax shall be turned over to the riverport authority for the purpose of carrying out the duties and powers of the authority.

History. Enact. Acts 1964, ch. 48, § 4; 1968, ch. 118, § 6.

65.590. Riverport authority may borrow money, how secured.

The authority may borrow money from any source on its own credit in anticipation of revenue to be derived from taxes, appropriations or other income, and for such purposes the authority may pledge the taxes, appropriations or income anticipated. The authority may pledge its assets, including, but not by way of limitation, real or personal property held for the purposes contemplated in KRS 65.510 to 65.650 , as security for moneys borrowed.

History. Enact. Acts 1964, ch. 48, § 5; 1968, ch. 118, § 7.

Opinions of Attorney General.

Since a riverport authority is a governmental entity, a presiding officer who was also the president of a local bank would have a disqualifying conflict of interest, provided it could be shown that, in the authority’s dealing with the member’s bank, the member derived a pecuniary interest or profit in the relationship, though the personal financial benefit was small; however, such financial interest would not be disqualifying where it could not be reasonably calculated to affect the judgment of the member in conducting the affairs of the riverport authority. OAG 84-136 .

65.600. Revenue bonds issued, when.

The authority is authorized to defray the cost of acquiring any real or personal property for the purposes contemplated in KRS 65.510 to 65.650 through the issuance of revenue bonds, and for that purpose the authority shall have all the powers and duties that are granted to or imposed upon governmental units by law.

History. Enact. Acts 1964, ch. 48, § 6; 1968, ch. 118, § 8.

65.610. Contracts for use of facilities — Maintenance costs, how paid.

  1. The authority may contract with any person or governmental agency for the use of the riverport and riverport facilities. Such contract shall not prevent, restrict or hamper the general use of the riverport by the public.
  2. All unpledged or surplus revenue derived from the use of the riverport and the riverport facilities shall be first applied to the maintenance of the riverport and the riverport facilities. A governmental unit may expend funds for this purpose out of its general funds or any other available funds.

History. Enact. Acts 1964, ch. 48, § 7.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Unlawful Franchise.

Operating agreement between riverport authority and private company, which entitled company to various benefits including the exclusive use of the land adjacent to the riverport facility and the use of grain-loading apparatus to the exclusion of all others upon a 24-hour prior notice on which use there was no limitation, and which agreement was for two years with an automatic renewal for three consecutive one-year periods, unlawfully granted to company a franchise or a privilege without complying with the requirements of advertisement and competitive bidding in Ky. Const., § 164 and thus was null and void. E.M. Bailey Distributing Co. v. Conagra, Inc., 676 S.W.2d 770, 1984 Ky. LEXIS 235 ( Ky. 1984 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Considering the public function and public purpose of a riverport authority, a port authority has no authority to exclude on its own initiative the coal handling business as a standing policy; to attempt to exclude would mean a clear and direct violation of the mandate that the port’s contracts cannot “prevent, restrict or hamper the general use of the riverport by the public.” OAG 80-601 .

65.620. Title to property — Tax exemptions.

The title to all property acquired by the authority shall vest in the authority and all such property shall be exempt from taxation to the same extent as other property used for public purposes. All revenue of the authority shall also be exempt from taxation.

History. Enact. Acts 1964, ch. 48, § 8; 1968, ch. 118, § 9.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

E.M. Bailey Distributing Co. v. Conagra, Inc., 676 S.W.2d 770, 1984 Ky. LEXIS 235 ( Ky. 1984 ).

65.630. Exercise of powers declared public function — Property held for public purpose.

The exercise of any power granted to a riverport authority in KRS 65.510 to 65.650 is hereby declared to be a public function, exercised for a public purpose, and as a matter of public necessity, and any real or personal property, or rights therein, acquired by a riverport authority and used in the manner and for the purposes enumerated in KRS 65.510 to 65.650 is hereby declared to be acquired and used for public purposes and as a matter of public necessity.

History. Enact. Acts 1964, ch. 48, § 9; 1968, ch. 118, § 10.

65.640. Authority may indemnify the United States for damages resulting from improvements.

Any riverport authority created pursuant to KRS 65.510 to 65.650 may indemnify the United States against any claims for damages, and any damage, that may result by overflow of the river from its being improved by the United States.

History. Enact. Acts 1964, ch. 48, § 10.

65.650. Commitments of authority to the United States to improve navigability.

  1. Any riverport authority created pursuant to KRS 65.510 to 65.650 may make commitments to the United States to provide certain specific minimum facilities and to provide spoilage areas when such commitments are necessary to obtain the assistance of the United States in improving the navigability of any river.
  2. Any such commitments made pursuant to this section shall be with the approval of the appointing authority.

History. Enact. Acts 1964, ch. 48, § 11.

Emergency Services Boards

65.660. Creation of single-county emergency services board — Replacement of existing fire, ambulance, and rescue squad boards — Boundaries — Taxing powers — Dissolution or alteration of boundaries.

  1. A fiscal court in a county with a county-wide fire protection district formed under KRS Chapter 75 that has entered into an interlocal agreement to provide fire service to the largest city in the county may, through the adoption of an ordinance in accordance with KRS 67.075 and 67.077 , merge the boards of the following special districts that are wholly contained within the county:
    1. Ambulance districts created under KRS 108.080 to 108.180 ;
    2. Fire protection districts created under KRS 75.010 to 75.260 ; and
    3. Local rescue squad districts created under KRS Chapter 39F.
  2. Once the fiscal court has merged any of the boards listed in paragraphs (a) to (c) of subsection (1) of this section, no additional special districts listed in paragraphs (a) to (c) of subsection (1) of this section shall be permitted to be created whose board of directors and taxing authority are not transferred to the emergency services board, and no boundary of a district shall exceed the boundary of the county that the emergency services district represents.
  3. An emergency services board’s jurisdiction shall encompass the boundaries of the special districts whose boards and taxing authority it is replacing.
  4. An emergency services board shall have the powers that constitute a taxing district within the meaning of Section 157 of the Constitution of Kentucky.
  5. If an emergency services board chooses to levy the tax allowed in KRS 65.670 , a certified copy of the ordinance levying the tax shall be filed with the county clerk who shall add the levy to the tax bills of the county. For taxing purposes, the effective date of the tax levy shall be January 1 of the year following the certification of the creation of the emergency services board.
  6. An emergency services board may be dissolved or the boundaries of the districts it represents may be altered if the procedures under KRS 65.164 to 65.176 are followed. If the emergency services board is dissolved, then the boards of the special districts of which it assumed the board duties shall be reappointed according to statute within thirty (30) days of the emergency services board’s dissolution, and the original taxing protocol applicable to the specific special district shall apply. Each special district shall assume that portion of the debt attributable to its service. Any unattributable debt shall be assumed by the fiscal court.

History. Enact. Acts 2000, ch. 429, § 2, effective July 14, 2000.

65.661. Compliance with KRS 65A.010 to 65A.090.

Any emergency services board established pursuant to KRS 65.660 to 65.679 shall comply with the provisions of KRS 65A.010 to 65A.090 .

History. Enact. Acts 2013, ch. 40, § 23, effective March 21, 2013.

65.662. Creation of multicounty emergency services board — Replacement of existing fire, ambulance, and rescue squad boards — Boundaries — Taxing powers — Dissolution or alteration of boundaries.

  1. Two (2) or more fiscal courts of which one (1) county shall have a county-wide fire protection district formed under KRS Chapter 75 that has entered into an interlocal agreement to provide fire service to the largest city in the county may, through the adoption of concurrent ordinances in accordance with KRS 67.075 and 67.077 , merge the boards of the following special districts that are wholly contained within their counties:
    1. Ambulance districts created under KRS 108.080 to 108.180 ;
    2. Fire protection districts created under KRS 75.010 to 75.260 ; and
    3. Local rescue squad districts created under KRS Chapter 39F.
  2. Once the fiscal courts have merged any of the boards listed in paragraphs (a) to (c) of subsection (1) of this section, no additional special districts listed in paragraphs (a) to (c) of subsection (1) of this section shall be permitted to be created in any of the member counties whose administration and taxing authority are not transferred to the emergency services board, and no boundary of a district shall exceed the boundaries of the counties that the multicounty emergency services district represents.
  3. A multicounty emergency services board’s jurisdiction shall encompass the boundaries of the special districts within the member counties whose boards and taxing authority it is replacing.
  4. A multicounty emergency services board shall have the powers that constitute a taxing district within the meaning of Section 157 of the Constitution of Kentucky.
  5. If a multicounty emergency services board chooses to levy the tax allowed in KRS 65.670 , a certified copy of the ordinance levying the tax shall be filed with the county clerk of each member county who shall add the levy to the tax bills of the county. For taxing purposes, the effective date of the tax levy shall be January 1 of the year following the certification of the creation of the emergency services board.
  6. A multicounty emergency services board may be dissolved or the boundaries altered if the procedures under KRS 65.164 to 65.176 are followed. If the emergency services board is dissolved, then the boards of the special districts of which it assumed the board duties shall be reappointed according to statute within thirty (30) days of the emergency services board’s dissolution, and the original taxing protocol applicable to the specific special district shall apply. Each special district shall assume that portion of the debt attributable to its service. Any unattributable debt shall be assumed equally by each fiscal court formerly participating in the multicounty emergency services board.

History. Enact. Acts 2000, ch. 429, § 3, effective July 14, 2000.

65.664. Powers of emergency services boards.

The emergency services board shall be a corporate public body and a political subdivision of the Commonwealth. It may prosecute and defend suits, hire necessary employees, and perform all acts necessary to carry on the work of providing fire fighting, emergency ambulance, and rescue squad services to the community.

History. Enact. Acts 2000, ch. 429, § 4, effective July 14, 2000.

65.666. Management of single-county emergency services board — Board appointments — Terms of board members — Residency requirement — Removal.

  1. The affairs of the emergency services board composed of one (1) county shall be controlled and managed by a board of directors appointed by the county judge/executive with the approval of the fiscal court.
  2. The county judge/executive shall appoint:
    1. One (1) member from each magisterial district of the county; and
    2. One (1) additional member from the county at large.
    1. If the board is composed of a number evenly divisible by four (4): (3) (a) If the board is composed of a number evenly divisible by four (4):
      1. One-fourth (1/4) of the board members’ initial terms shall be one (1) year;
      2. One-fourth (1/4) of the board members’ initial terms shall be two (2) years;
      3. One-fourth (1/4) of the board members’ initial terms shall be three (3) years; and
      4. One-fourth (1/4) of the board members’ initial terms shall be four (4) years.
    2. If the board is composed of a number unevenly divisible by four (4), then the county judge/executive shall appoint the remainder for a term of four (4) years.
  3. After the initial appointment, terms of the board members shall be for four (4) years.
  4. Board members may be reappointed, and they may succeed themselves.
  5. Each board member shall reside in the county.
  6. A majority of the membership of the board shall constitute a quorum.
  7. A member of the board of directors may be removed from office as provided in KRS 65.007 .
  8. The county judge/executive shall serve as an ex officio member of the board.
  9. No elected official shall serve as a member of the board.
  10. The board shall be appointed within thirty (30) days after the creation of the emergency services board.

History. Enact. Acts 2000, ch. 429, § 5, effective July 14, 2000.

65.668. Management of multicounty emergency services board — Board appointments — Terms of board members — Residency requirement — Removal — Vacancies.

  1. The affairs of the emergency services board composed of more than one (1) county shall be controlled and managed by a board of directors consisting of no more than eleven (11) members, with the number of members to be determined jointly by the county judges/executive of the member counties.
  2. The county judge/executive of each member county shall be entitled to appoint a proportionate share of the board relative to the population of the county according to the most recent federal census estimates of the year in which appointments are to be made with the approval of their respective fiscal courts. With the exception of the expiration of the initial appointment at the creation of the emergency services board, each year an appointment term expires the county judges/executive shall determine which county judge/executive, according to the adjusted population count, shall be allowed to make an additional appointment with the approval of his or her fiscal court. Each member county shall be allowed at least one (1) appointee. In no instance shall the emergency services board encompass more than eleven (11) counties.
    1. One-fourth (1/4) of the board members’ initial terms shall be one (1) year; (3) (a) One-fourth (1/4) of the board members’ initial terms shall be one (1) year;
    2. One-fourth (1/4) of the board members’ initial terms shall be two (2) years;
    3. One-fourth (1/4) of the board members’ initial terms shall be three (3) years; and
    4. One-fourth (1/4) of the board members’ initial terms shall be four (4) years.
  3. After the initial appointment, terms of the board members shall be for four (4) years.
  4. Board members may be reappointed, and they may succeed themselves.
  5. Each board member shall reside in the county he or she represents.
  6. A majority of the membership of the board shall constitute a quorum.
  7. A member of the board of directors may be removed from office as provided in KRS 65.007 .
  8. The county judge/executive of each county shall serve as an ex officio member of the board.
  9. No elected official shall serve as a member of the board.
  10. The board shall be appointed within thirty (30) days after the creation of the emergency services board.
  11. Vacancies in unexpired terms shall be filled by the appointing authority for the remainder of the unexpired term. No reapportionment, in accordance with the provisions of subsection (2) of this section, shall be executed in the instance of a vacancy in an unexpired term.

History. Enact. Acts 2000, ch. 429, § 6, effective July 14, 2000.

65.670. Levy of ad valorem tax — License fee — Purpose.

    1. In order to ensure the delivery of adequate services to the community or communities, the emergency services board may levy an ad valorem tax not to exceed ten cents ($0.10) per one hundred dollars ($100) of the assessed valuation of all property in the district. The emergency services board may levy this ad valorem tax on the property of each taxpayer served by each district whose board is merged into the emergency services board. The emergency services board ad valorem tax shall be collected by the sheriff of each member county in the same manner as county ad valorem taxes. The sheriff shall be entitled to a fee of four percent (4%) of the amount of the tax collected; and (1) (a) In order to ensure the delivery of adequate services to the community or communities, the emergency services board may levy an ad valorem tax not to exceed ten cents ($0.10) per one hundred dollars ($100) of the assessed valuation of all property in the district. The emergency services board may levy this ad valorem tax on the property of each taxpayer served by each district whose board is merged into the emergency services board. The emergency services board ad valorem tax shall be collected by the sheriff of each member county in the same manner as county ad valorem taxes. The sheriff shall be entitled to a fee of four percent (4%) of the amount of the tax collected; and
    2. The emergency services board may, in addition to the ad valorem tax in paragraph (a) of this subsection, charge fees necessary to further defray the costs of its operation.
  1. Tax and license fee revenues derived from this section shall be used only for the services described in KRS 65.660 or 65.662 .
  2. The assets and liabilities of the special districts under the jurisdiction of the emergency services board shall be maintained separately, but shall be managed by the emergency services board.

History. Enact. Acts 2000, ch. 429, § 7, effective July 14, 2000; 2004, ch. 152, § 1, effective July 13, 2004.

65.672. Contracts for fire, ambulance, and emergency squad services.

The emergency services board may contract with private and public entities to provide fire, ambulance, and emergency squad services.

History. Enact. Acts 2000, ch. 429, § 8, effective July 14, 2000.

65.674. Provision of emergency services through agency of county government — Dedicated county ad valorem tax — Exception to tax levy recall provisions.

  1. Once an emergency services board assumes control over fire, ambulance, or emergency squad districts, a fiscal court, or fiscal courts through an interlocal agreement, may opt to provide fire, ambulance, and emergency squad services directly or through an agency of county government. If that is the case, a dedicated ad valorem tax for the provision of fire, ambulance, and emergency squad services exclusive of all other taxes may be levied by the county or counties. The provisions of the ad valorem tax of KRS 65.670 shall apply.
  2. The initial levy of the ad valorem tax for the provision of funding to the emergency services board under this section shall not be subject to the recall provisions of KRS 68.245 or 132.023 , whichever is applicable. Subsequent changes to the amount shall be subject to the provisions of KRS 68.245 or 132.023 , whichever is applicable.

History. Enact. Acts 2000, ch. 429, § 9, effective July 14, 2000.

65.676. Emergency services tax supplemental to existing tax of fire, ambulance, and emergency squad districts — Aggregate tax limits.

In counties where ambulance districts created under the provisions of KRS 108.080 to 108.180 ; fire protection districts created under the provisions of KRS 75.010 to 75.260 ; or local rescue squad districts created under the provisions of KRS Chapter 39F exist and have enacted an ad valorem tax, the emergency services board may leave those ad valorem tax levies in place. The emergency services board may levy its permitted funding mechanisms in addition to these existing taxes, but the aggregate of the existing tax levied by the original district or districts, and the tax levied by the emergency services board shall not exceed the limits prescribed in KRS 65.670 .

History. Enact. Acts 2000, ch. 429, § 10, effective July 14, 2000.

65.679. KRS 65.660 to 65.679 supersede structure and taxing privileges of fire, ambulance, and emergency squad districts — Other provisions not affected.

If a fiscal court chooses to create an emergency services board, the provisions of KRS 65.660 to 65.679 shall supersede the structure of the boards of directors and the taxing privileges under KRS 108.080 to 108.180 , KRS 75.010 to 75.260 , and KRS Chapter 39F. The remaining provisions of KRS 108.080 to 108.180 , KRS 75.010 to 75.260 , and KRS Chapter 39F, applicable to the operation of the fire department, ambulance service, or emergency squad, shall remain in effect.

History. Enact. Acts 2000, ch. 429, § 11, effective July 14, 2000.

Incremental Financing for Economic Development

65.680. Definitions for KRS 65.680 to 65.699.

As used in KRS 65.680 to 65.699 :

  1. “Activation date” means the date established in the grant contract at any time in a two (2) year period after the date of approval of the grant contract by the economic development authority or the tourism development authority, as appropriate. The economic development authority or tourism development authority, as appropriate, may extend this two (2) year period to no more than four (4) years upon written application of the agency requesting the extension. To implement the activation date, the agency who is a party to the grant contract shall notify the economic development authority or the tourism development authority, as appropriate, the Department of Revenue, and other taxing districts that are parties to the grant contract when the implementation of the increment authorized in the grant contract shall occur;
  2. “Agency” means an urban renewal and community development agency established under KRS Chapter 99; a development authority established under KRS Chapter 99; a nonprofit corporation established under KRS Chapter 58; an air board established under KRS 183.132 to 183.160 ; a local industrial development authority established under KRS 154.50-301 to 154.50-346 ; a riverport authority established under KRS 65.510 to 65.650 ; or a designated department, division, or office of a city or county;
  3. “Assessment” means the job development assessment fee authorized by KRS 65.6851 , which the governing body may elect to impose throughout the development area;
  4. “Brownfield site” means real property, the expansion, redevelopment, or reuse of which may be complicated by the presence or potential presence of a hazardous substance, pollutant, or contaminant;
  5. “City” means any city, consolidated local government, or urban-county;
  6. “Commencement date” means the date a development area is established, as provided in the ordinance creating the development area;
  7. “Commonwealth” means the Commonwealth of Kentucky;
  8. “County” means any county, consolidated local government, or charter county;
  9. “CPI” means the nonseasonally adjusted Consumer Price Index for all urban consumers, all items (base year computed for 1982 to 1984 equals one hundred (100)), published by the United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics;
  10. “Debt charges” means the principal, including any mandatory sinking fund deposits, interest, and any redemption premium, payable on increment bonds as the payments come due and are payable and any charges related to the payment of the foregoing;
  11. “Development area” means a contiguous geographic area, which may be within one (1) or more cities or counties, defined and created for economic development purposes by an ordinance of a city or county in which one (1) or more projects are proposed to be located, except that for any development area for which increments are to include revenues from the Commonwealth, the contiguous geographic area shall satisfy the requirements of KRS 65.6971 or 65.6972 ;
  12. “Economic development authority” means the Kentucky Economic Development Finance Authority as created in KRS 154.20-010 ;
  13. “Enterprise Zone” means an area that had been designated by the Enterprise Zone Authority of Kentucky to be eligible for the benefits of Subchapter 45 of KRS Chapter 154 before January 1, 2005;
  14. “Governing body” means the body possessing legislative authority in a city or county;
  15. “Grant contract” means:
    1. That agreement with respect to a development area established under KRS 65.686 , by and among an agency and one (1) or more taxing districts other than the Commonwealth, by which a taxing district permits the payment to an agency of an amount equal to a portion of increments other than revenues from the Commonwealth received by it in return for the benefits accruing to the taxing district by reason of one (1) or more projects in a development area; or
    2. That agreement, including with respect to a development area satisfying the requirements of KRS 65.6971 or 65.6972 , a master agreement and addenda to the master agreement, by and among an agency, one (1) or more taxing districts, and the economic development authority or the tourism development authority, as appropriate, by which a taxing district permits the payment to an agency of an amount equal to a portion of increments received by it in return for the benefits accruing to the taxing district by reason of one (1) or more projects in a development area;
  16. “Increment bonds” means bonds and notes issued for the purpose of paying the costs of one (1) or more projects in a development area, the payment of which is secured solely by a pledge of increments or by a pledge of increments and other sources of payment that are otherwise permitted by law to be pledged or used as a source of payment of the bonds or notes;
  17. “Increments” means the amount of revenues received by any taxing district, determined by subtracting the amount of old revenues from the amount of new revenues in the calendar year with respect to a development area and for which the taxing district or districts and the agency have agreed upon under the terms of a grant contract;
  18. “Infrastructure development” means the acquisition of real estate within a development area meeting the requirements of KRS 65.6971 and the construction or improvement, within a development area meeting the requirements of KRS 65.6971 , of roads and facilities necessary or desirable for improvements of the real estate, including surveys; site tests and inspections; environmental remediation; subsurface site work; excavation; removal of structures, roadways, cemeteries, and other underground and surface obstructions; filling, grading, and provision of drainage, storm water retention, installation of utilities such as water, sewer, sewage treatment, gas, and electricity, communications, and similar facilities; and utility extensions to the boundaries of the development area meeting the requirements of KRS 65.6971;
  19. “Issuer” means a city, county, or an agency issuing increment bonds;
  20. “New revenues” means the amount of revenues received with respect to a development area in any calendar year after the activation date for a development area:
    1. Established under KRS 65.686 , the ad valorem taxes other than the school and fire district portions of the ad valorem taxes received from real property generated from the development area and properties sold within the development area, and occupational license fees not otherwise used as a credit against an assessment, and all or a portion of assessments as determined by the governing body; or
    2. Satisfying the requirements of KRS 65.6971 , the ad valorem taxes other than the school and fire district portions of the ad valorem taxes received from real property generated from the development area and properties sold within the development area; or
    3. Satisfying the requirements of KRS 65.6972 , the ad valorem taxes, other than the school and fire district portions of the ad valorem taxes, received from real property, Kentucky individual income tax, Kentucky sales and use taxes, local insurance premium taxes, occupational license fees, or other such state taxes as may be determined by the Department of Revenue to be applicable to the project and specified in the grant contract, generated from the primary project entity within the development area minus relocation revenue;
  21. “Old revenues” means the amount of revenues received with respect to a development area:
    1. Established under KRS 65.686 , in the last calendar year prior to the commencement date for the development area, revenues which constitute ad valorem taxes other than the school and fire district portions of ad valorem taxes received from real property in the development area and occupational license fees generated from the development area; or
    2. Satisfying the requirements of KRS 65.6971 , in the last calendar year prior to the commencement date for the development area, revenues which constitute ad valorem taxes other than the school and fire district portions of ad valorem taxes received from real property in the development area; or
    3. Satisfying the requirements of KRS 65.6972 , in the period of no longer than three (3) calendar years prior to the commencement date, the average as determined by the Department of Revenue to be a fair representation of revenues derived from ad valorem taxes, other than the school and fire district portions of ad valorem taxes, from real property in the development area, and Kentucky individual income tax, Kentucky sales and use taxes, local insurance premium taxes, occupational license fees, and other such state taxes as may be determined by the Department of Revenue as specified in the grant contract generated from the development area. With respect to this paragraph, if the development area was within an active enterprise zone for the period used by the Department of Revenue for measuring old revenues, then the calculation of old revenues shall include the amounts of ad valorem taxes, other than the school and fire district portions of ad valorem taxes, that would have been generated from real property, Kentucky individual income tax, Kentucky sales and use taxes, local insurance premium taxes, occupational license fees, and other such state taxes as may be determined by the Department of Revenue as specified in the grant contract, were the development area not within an active enterprise zone. With respect to this paragraph, if the primary project entity generated old revenue prior to the commencement date in the development area or revenues were derived from the development area prior to the commencement date of the development area, then revenues shall increase each calendar year by the percentage increase of the consumer price index, if any;
  22. “Outstanding” means increment bonds that have been issued, delivered, and paid for, except any of the following:
    1. Increment bonds canceled upon surrender, exchange, or transfer, or upon payment or redemption;
    2. Increment bonds in replacement of which or in exchange for which other bonds have been issued; or
    3. Increment bonds for the payment, or redemption or purchase for cancellation prior to maturity, of which sufficient moneys or investments, in accordance with the ordinance or other proceedings or any applicable law, by mandatory sinking fund redemption requirements, or otherwise, have been deposited, and credited in a sinking fund or with a trustee or paying or escrow agent, whether at or prior to their maturity or redemption, and, in the case of increment bonds to be redeemed prior to their stated maturity, notice of redemption has been given or satisfactory arrangements have been made for giving notice of that redemption, or waiver of that notice by or on behalf of the affected bond holders has been filed with the issuer or its agent;
  23. “Primary project entity” means the entity responsible for control, ownership, and operation of the project within a development area satisfying the requirements of KRS 65.6972 which generates the greatest amount of new revenues or, in the case of a proposed development area satisfying the requirements of KRS 65.6972 , is expected to generate the greatest amount of new revenues;
  24. “Project” means, for purposes of a development area:
    1. Established under KRS 65.686 , any property, asset, or improvement certified by the governing body, which certification is conclusive as:
      1. Being for a public purpose;
      2. Being for the development of facilities for residential, commercial, industrial, public, recreational, or other uses, or for open space, or any combination thereof, which is determined by the governing body establishing the development areas as contributing to economic development;
      3. Being in or related to a development area; and
      4. Having an estimated life or period of usefulness of one (1) year or more, including but not limited to real estate, buildings, personal property, equipment, furnishings, and site improvements and reconstruction, rehabilitation, renovation, installation, improvement, enlargement, and extension of property, assets, or improvements so certified as having an estimated life or period of usefulness of one (1) year or more;
    2. Satisfying the requirements of KRS 65.6971 ; an economic development project defined under KRS 154.22-010 , 154.24-010 , or 154.28-010 ; or a tourism attraction project defined under KRS 148.851 ; or
    3. Satisfying the requirements of KRS 65.6972 , the development of facilities for:
      1. The transportation of goods or persons by air, ground, water, or rail;
      2. The transmission or utilization of information through fiber-optic cable or other advanced means;
      3. Commercial, industrial, recreational, tourism attraction, or educational uses; or
      4. Any combination thereof;
  25. “Relocation revenue” means the ad valorem taxes, other than the school and fire district portions of ad valorem taxes, from real property, Kentucky individual income tax, Kentucky sales and use taxes, local insurance premium taxes, occupational license fees, and other such state taxes as specified in the grant contract, received by a taxing district attributable to that portion of the existing operations of the primary project entity located in the Commonwealth and relocating to the development area satisfying the requirements of KRS 65.6972 ;
  26. “Special fund” means a special fund created in accordance with KRS 65.688 into which increments are to be deposited;
  27. “Taxing district” means a city, county, or other taxing district that encompasses all or part of a development area, or the Commonwealth, but does not mean a school district or fire district;
  28. “Termination date” means the date on which a development area shall cease to exist, which for purposes of a development area:
    1. Established under KRS 65.686 , shall be:
      1. For a period of no longer than twenty (20) years from the commencement date and set forth in the grant contract; or
      2. For a period as determined under KRS 65.687 . Increment bonds shall not mature on a date beyond the termination date established by this paragraph; or
    2. Satisfying the requirements of KRS 65.6971 , shall be for a period of no longer than twenty (20) years from the commencement date and set forth in the grant contract constituting a master agreement, except that for an addendum added to the master agreement for each project in the development area, the termination date may be extended to no longer than twenty (20) years from the date of each addendum; or
    3. Satisfying the requirements of KRS 65.6972 , shall be for a period of no longer than twenty (20) years from the activation date of the grant contract. Increment bonds shall not mature on a date beyond the termination date established by this subsection;
  29. “Tourism development authority” means the Tourism Development Finance Authority as created in KRS 148.850 ; and
  30. “Project costs” mean the total private and public capital costs of a project.

History. Enact. Acts 2000, ch. 358, § 1, effective July 14, 2000; 2001, ch. 133, § 5, effective June 21, 2001; 2002, ch. 338, § 3, effective July 15, 2002; 2002, ch. 346, § 34, effective July 15, 2002; 2005, ch. 85, § 89, effective June 20, 2005; 2005, ch. 168, § 45, effective March 18, 2005; 2009 (1st. Ex. Sess.), ch. 1, § 60, effective June 26, 2009.

Legislative Research Commission Notes.

(3/18/2005). 2005 Ky. Acts. ch. 168, sec. 165, provides that this section shall apply to tax years beginning on or after January 1, 2005.

65.682. Legislative finding.

The General Assembly finds and declares that economic development created by the development of projects to support economic revitalization and improvement in a development area which results in the increase in the value of property located in a development area or results in increased employment opportunities within or around a development area serves a public purpose; and that the authority prescribed by KRS 65.680 to 65.699 and the purposes to be accomplished thereunder, are proper governmental and public purposes for which public moneys may be expended; and that the creation or expansion of development areas is of paramount importance mandating that the provisions of KRS 65.680 to 65.699 be liberally construed and applied in order to advance public purposes.

History. Enact. Acts 2000, ch. 358, § 2, effective July 14, 2000; 2002, ch. 338, § 4, effective July 15, 2002.

65.683. KRS 65.680 to 65.699 limited to development areas established under KRS 65.686 by a city or county before March 23, 2007.

Effective on March 23, 2007, the provisions of KRS 65.680 to 65.699 shall apply only to development areas which are:

  1. Established under KRS 65.686 by a city or county prior to March 23, 2007; and
  2. Subject to the provisions of a grant contract executed prior to March 23, 2007.

History. Enact. Acts 2007, ch. 95, § 24, effective March 23, 2007.

65.684. Powers of city or county for economic development.

For any development area for which increments do not include revenues from the Commonwealth, in addition to any other powers conferred by law, any city or county may exercise any powers necessary or convenient to carry out the purposes of KRS 65.680 to 65.699 , including the power to:

  1. Create development areas and to define their boundaries;
  2. Undertake projects;
  3. Issue increment bonds and pledge increments to the payment of debt charges on those increment bonds;
  4. Create a special fund established for the deposit of increments and other funds that may be used or pledged for the payment of increment bonds and to pay the costs of projects;
  5. Utilize increments to pay the costs of economic development projects and for the payment of amounts due on increment bonds; and
  6. Impose assessments.

History. Enact. Acts 2000, ch. 358, § 3, effective July 14, 2000; 2001, ch. 133, § 6, effective June 21, 2001; 2002, ch. 338, § 5, effective July 15, 2002.

65.6851. Option to impose assessment fee on certain newly created jobs — Limitation on amount — Tax credit for assessed employees — Restriction on multiple assessments — Termination — Requirements to exercise option — Transition provisions.

For any development area for which increments do not include revenues from the Commonwealth:

  1. Any governing body establishing a development area may impose an assessment on each person employed in the development area, as a condition of employment, whose job was newly created as a result of a project, and as determined by the policies and procedures established by the governing body, subject to the conditions in subsection (6) of this section, and who is subject to the state tax imposed by KRS 141.020 . A job shall not be deemed to be newly created under this section if it occurs due to the relocation of jobs from another location within the Commonwealth.
  2. Subject to KRS 65.6853 , the total assessment levied by any governing body within the development area shall not exceed an amount equal to two percent (2%) of the gross wages of the employee.
  3. Each person so assessed shall be entitled to credits against any local occupational license fee or payroll tax of the governing body that established the development area and the job development assessment fee, if an occupational license fee is then levied by that governing body and is not otherwise totally used as a credit against assessments imposed under Subchapter 23, 24, or 26 of KRS Chapter 154, and provided that the amount does not exceed the amount of the occupational licensing fee or payroll tax paid to that local government by the employee. If the governing body that created the job development assessment fee has no occupational license fee, the employee shall not be entitled to receive a credit against any other governmental agency’s occupational license fee.
  4. Subsequent to the establishment of a development area by one (1) governing body, no other governing body may levy an assessment in any portion of the development area that would cause the total assessment in any portion of the development area to exceed two percent (2%) of the gross wages of the employee, subject to KRS 65.6853 . If more than one (1) governing body jointly establishes a development area, the governing bodies that establish the development area shall agree upon the amount of the assessment and the manner by which the assessment is to be prorated among the governing bodies establishing the development area.
  5. Any assessment of employees in connection with their employment at a project levied under this section shall permanently lapse on the date:
    1. Any bonds issued in connection with acquiring or developing the infrastructure of a development area, in accordance with KRS 65.680 to 65.699 , are retired; or
    2. Any loans or other financing incurred in connection with the establishment of a development area mature or are prepaid in full.
  6. For the purposes of this section:
    1. The development area shall be a previously undeveloped tract of land;
    2. No more than five hundred (500) acres may be approved in any twelve (12) month period in any county; and
    3. Acceptable developments shall be limited to projects as defined in KRS 65.680 .
  7. Any agency that has established a development area under KRS 65.680 to 65.699 prior to July 15, 2002, unless otherwise approved by the agency, shall continue to operate under the provisions of KRS 65.680 to 65.699 as determined by the policies and procedures established by the agency prior to July 15, 2002.

History. Enact. Acts 2001, ch. 133, § 2, effective June 21, 2001; 2002, ch. 338, § 6, effective July 15, 2002; 2005, ch. 153, § 2, effective June 20, 2005.

65.6853. Relationship to other job development assessment fees — Maximum on total tax credits.

For any development area for which increments do not include revenues from the Commonwealth:

  1. If a company, against whose employees an assessment is levied under KRS 65.6851 , enters into an agreement with the economic development authority under Subchapter 23, 24, or 26 of KRS Chapter 154 allowing the company to impose a job development assessment fee as part of that agreement, the total assessment levied against the employee for state inducements and the development area shall not exceed six percent (6%), subject to subsection (2) of this section.
  2. If an eligible company under Subchapter 23, 24, or 26 of KRS Chapter 154 locates or expands within a development area, the assessment imposed under KRS 65.6851(1) shall not exceed the lesser of two percent (2%) or the difference between two percent (2%) and the local occupational license fee used as a credit against the assessments granted under Subchapter 23, 24, or 26 of KRS Chapter 154.

History. Enact. Acts 2001, ch. 133, § 3, effective June 21, 2001; 2002, ch. 338, § 7, effective July 15, 2002.

65.6855. Application of assessments — Employer’s duties.

For any development area for which increments do not include revenues from the Commonwealth:

  1. The employees of any company choosing to locate in a development area shall be subject to any assessments levied against them, and the company shall not have the authority to reject an assessment.
  2. Each employer in the development area shall:
    1. Collect the assessment from its employees by deducting the assessment from each paycheck of its employees;
    2. Promptly remit the assessment to the official charged with collecting revenues in the development area;
    3. Make its payroll books and records available to the official charged with collecting revenues in the development area at a reasonable time as specified by the governing body; and
    4. File with the official charged with collecting revenues in the development area any documentation with regard to the assessment as required by the governing body.

History. Enact. Acts 2001, ch. 133, § 4, effective June 21, 2001; 2002, ch. 338, § 8, effective July 15, 2002.

65.686. Establishment or modification of development area — Procedure — Termination.

  1. Any city or county may establish or modify a development area by:
    1. Holding a public hearing by its governing body or its designee at which interested parties are afforded a reasonable opportunity to express their views on the proposed creation or modification of a development area and its boundaries. Notice of the hearing shall:
      1. Include a declaration that the purpose of the hearing is to afford interested parties an opportunity to express their views regarding the proposed development area;
      2. Include a general description of the boundaries of the proposed development area;
      3. State the time and place of the hearing; and
      4. Be published in a local newspaper of general circulation at least seven (7) days but no more than twenty-one (21) days prior to the scheduled hearing date; and
    2. Adopting an ordinance which shall:
      1. Describe the boundaries of the proposed development area with sufficiency to allow ordinary and reasonable certainty of the territory included. However, no proposed development area shall include property located in any other development area;
      2. Create the development area on a date certain, which shall be referred to as the commencement date;
      3. Assign a name to the proposed development area for identification purposes;
      4. Contain findings that the designation of the proposed development area will result in the increase in the value of property located in the development area or result in increased employment within or around the development area, or both;
      5. Approve the grant contract, if any, relating to a development area;
      6. Establish, if applicable, a special fund for that development area;
      7. Contain any other findings, limitations, rules, or procedures regarding the proposed development area and its establishment or maintenance as deemed necessary by the governing body; and
      8. Permit, if applicable, the levying of an assessment; and
    3. Providing the official charged with collecting revenues in the development area, if the official is not an employee of the city or county designating the development area, with a description of the development area and any other information available which is needed to determine increments or new revenues.
    1. For any development area for which increments do not include revenues from the Commonwealth, increments generated in a development area shall be submitted by the official charged with collecting revenues in the development area, to the city or county establishing the special fund for that development area, deposited to that special fund and used to pay the costs of projects or to pay debt charges on increment bonds, except that increments payable to any city or county other than the city or county establishing the development area shall be submitted to that city or county as if no development area existed unless that city or county is a party to a grant contract that provides that some or all of the increments are to be submitted to a special fund. (2) (a) For any development area for which increments do not include revenues from the Commonwealth, increments generated in a development area shall be submitted by the official charged with collecting revenues in the development area, to the city or county establishing the special fund for that development area, deposited to that special fund and used to pay the costs of projects or to pay debt charges on increment bonds, except that increments payable to any city or county other than the city or county establishing the development area shall be submitted to that city or county as if no development area existed unless that city or county is a party to a grant contract that provides that some or all of the increments are to be submitted to a special fund.
    2. For any development area for which increments include revenues from the Commonwealth, increments paid by the city, county, or Commonwealth to the agency for which the development area is created shall be used to pay the costs of projects or to pay debt charges on increment bonds.
  2. The existence of a development area shall terminate on the termination date.

History. Enact. Acts 2000, ch. 358, § 4, effective July 14, 2000; 2001, ch. 133, § 7, effective June 21, 2001; 2002, ch. 338, § 9, effective July 15, 2002.

65.687. Extension of termination date for development area — Conditions.

  1. The termination date for a development area may be extended beyond twenty (20) years as provided in this section. To qualify for an extension of the termination date, the development area shall meet the following conditions:
    1. The initial development area shall have been established by the county under KRS 65.686 prior to July 1, 2003, and all subsequent development areas contiguous to the initial development area shall have been established prior to August 1, 2006;
    2. The development area, consisting of one (1) or more contiguous development areas, includes at least four hundred (400) acres in the aggregate; and
    3. The agency that issued the increment bonds for the development areas described in paragraphs (a) and (b) of this subsection shall, within two (2) years of June 26, 2009, refund the outstanding increment bonds with the issuance of new increment bonds for a term not to exceed twenty (20) years.
  2. The termination date for development areas meeting the requirements of subsection (1) of this section shall be the term of the new increment bonds issued in accordance with subsection (1)(c) of this section, not to exceed twenty (20) years from the date the new increment bonds described in subsection (1)(c) of this section are issued.

History. Enact. Acts 2009 (1st Ex. Sess.), ch. 1, § 61, effective June 26, 2009.

65.688. Special fund for outstanding increment bonds.

For any development area for which increments do not include revenues from the Commonwealth, while increment bonds are outstanding, the issuer shall maintain a special fund which shall be pledged for the retirement of those increment bonds. Officials charged with collecting revenues in the development area shall, for each year a grant contract is in effect or any increment bonds are outstanding with respect to a development area, determine the amount of increments from the development area which they are charged with collecting and submit those increments for deposit in the special fund established by the governing body for that development area. Funds deposited in a special fund for the payment of increment bonds shall be disbursed at the times and in the amounts required to pay debt charges on those increment bonds. Accrued interest from the sale of increment bonds shall be deposited in the special fund pledged to the payment of those bonds. Amounts in a special fund which exceed the amount required to pay debt charges on related increment bonds in any fiscal year may accumulate in the special fund for the payment of future debt charges or to pay the costs of additional projects in the development area, or may be transferred by the governing body from the special fund under the terms of a grant contract or used for any lawful purpose.

History. Enact. Acts 2000, ch. 358, § 5, effective July 14, 2000; 2002, ch. 338, § 10, effective July 15, 2002.

65.690. Ordinances governing increment bonds — Required provisions.

Increment bonds shall be issued, administered, and regulated only by ordinance adopted by the governing body which, in addition to any other provisions deemed appropriate by the governing body, shall:

  1. Declare the necessity of the increment bond issue;
  2. State the principal amount or maximum principal amount of the increment bonds to be issued;
  3. State the purpose of the increment bond issue;
  4. State or provide for the date of, and the dates and amounts or maximum amount of, maturities or principal payments on the increment bonds;
  5. State any provisions for a mandatory sinking fund, mandatory sinking fund redemption, or for redemption prior to maturity;
  6. Provide for the rate or rates of interest, or maximum rate or rates of interest, or the method for establishing or determining the rate or rates of interest to be paid on the increment bonds; and
  7. State any provision for a designated officer of the issuer to determine any of the specific terms required to be stated or provided for in this section, subject to any limitations stated in the proceedings.

History. Enact. Acts 2000, ch. 358, § 6, effective July 14, 2000.

65.692. Permitted purposes for bond issuance.

  1. Increment bonds may be issued to pay the costs of projects in the development area. The provisions of KRS 66.021 , 66.031 , 66.041 , 66.045 , 66.071 , 66.091 , 66.121 , 66.131 , 66.141 , 66.151 , 66.171 , 66.181 , and 66.191 shall apply to the issuance of increment bonds insofar as they do not conflict with KRS 65.680 to 65.699 ; if they do conflict, KRS 65.680 to 65.699 shall apply.
  2. Debt payments on increment bonds may be paid from increments, from any other funds of the issuer, or from funds identified in a grant contract, or any combination thereof. If increment bonds are payable solely from increments, the issuer shall, prior to the issuance of the increment bonds, make a determination that the increments are adequate to make the debt payments so long as the increment bonds are outstanding.
  3. Increment bonds may also be issued to fund or refund all or any portion of outstanding increment bonds. Any increment bonds issued under this subsection shall mature as determined by the governing body consistent with the definition of termination date as contained in KRS 65.680 and 66.091 .

History. Enact. Acts 2000, ch. 358, § 7, effective July 14, 2000; 2002, ch. 338, § 11, effective July 15, 2002.

65.694. Pledge of increments for bond payment — Precedence of pledges.

Any city or county may pledge increments to the payment of increment bonds by an ordinance adopted by the governing body or by a grant contract adopted by ordinance. Any pledge of increments adopted under this section shall, as to the increments, but not as to any other revenues, be superior to any other pledge of revenues for any other purpose and shall, from the effective date of the ordinance to the termination date, supersede any statute or ordinance regarding the application or use of increments. No ordinance in conflict with an ordinance pledging increments shall be adopted while any increment bonds secured by that pledge remain outstanding. Ordinances pledging increments on a subordinate basis to any existing pledges may be adopted.

History. Enact. Acts 2000, ch. 358, § 8, effective July 14, 2000; 2002, ch. 338, § 12, effective July 15, 2002.

65.696. Development area grant contract — Required provisions.

For any development area for which increments do not include revenues from the Commonwealth:

  1. Upon establishment of a development area, any city or county may release, by a grant contract with any other city or county, increments expected to be collected by that city or county in the related development area for a period that does not extend beyond the termination date.
  2. The grant contract shall include the following provisions:
    1. The identity of each city and county participating in the financing agreement;
    2. A detailed description of each project that is the subject of the grant contract, including an estimate of its costs of construction or acquisition and development;
    3. A detailed description of the development area;
    4. A detailed summary estimating old revenues collected and projected new revenues in the development area for each city and county that is a party to the grant contract, on an annual basis, for the term of the proposed grant contract;
    5. The maximum amount of increments to be released by the parties to the grant contract, if any, and the maximum number of years the release will be effective, including an agreement to deposit the increments in a special fund created for that purpose, which, if any increment bonds are to be issued, shall be held by the issuer of the increment bonds;
    6. The times and procedures for depositing increments and other funds, if any, in the special fund to be established for the development area and any provisions relating to the collection of the increments;
    7. Any covenants regarding additional funds or to pay the costs of the projects;
    8. Any covenants regarding completion of the project;
    9. Terms of default and remedies, except that no remedy shall permit the withholding by any party to the grant contract of any increments to be deposited in the special fund identified in the grant contract so long as any increment bonds are outstanding that are secured by a pledge of those increments;
    10. The commencement date;
    11. The termination date; and
    12. Any other provisions not inconsistent with KRS 65.680 to 65.699 that are deemed necessary or appropriate by the parties to the grant contract.

History. Enact. Acts 2000, ch. 358, § 9, effective July 14, 2000; 2002, ch. 338, § 13, effective July 15, 2002.

65.6971. Development area for infrastructure development — Application — Approval — Ordinance creating area — Increment amounts — Grant contracts — Portion of increment due from each taxing district — Financing account — Reports — Operating procedures — Obligation of Department of Revenue and agency.

  1. A city, county, or agency shall submit an application to the Cabinet for Economic Development for approval of a development area for infrastructure development which includes revenues from the Commonwealth, the standards for which the Cabinet for Economic Development and the Tourism, Arts and Heritage Cabinet shall establish through their operating procedures or by the promulgation of administrative regulations in accordance with KRS Chapter 13A. The Cabinet for Economic Development shall determine whether the development area described in the application constitutes a project of the type described in this section. The Cabinet for Economic Development, upon its determination, shall assign the application to the economic development authority or the tourism development authority, as appropriate, for further consideration and approval.
  2. A development area for purposes of infrastructure development shall:
      1. Consist of at least fifty (50) acres of undeveloped land, unless approved otherwise by the economic development authority or the tourism development authority in consideration of the geography of the area; or (a) 1. Consist of at least fifty (50) acres of undeveloped land, unless approved otherwise by the economic development authority or the tourism development authority in consideration of the geography of the area; or
      2. Consist of at least one (1) acre constituting a brownfield site; and
      1. In the case of an economic development project, be under the control of, owned by, and operated by an agency at the commencement date; or (b) 1. In the case of an economic development project, be under the control of, owned by, and operated by an agency at the commencement date; or
      2. In the case of a tourism attraction project, be under the control of, leased by, owned by, or operated by an agency at the commencement date.
  3. With respect to each city, county, or agency that applies to the economic development authority or the tourism development authority for approval of a development area for infrastructure development, the economic development authority or the tourism development authority shall request materials and make all inquiries concerning the application the economic development authority or the tourism development authority deems necessary. Upon review of the application and requested materials, and completion of inquiries, the economic development authority or the tourism development authority may grant approval for:
    1. The development area for infrastructure development;
    2. Each project for which an application has been submitted to be located in the development area for infrastructure development, provided that each project approved for location in the development area for infrastructure development meets the criteria necessary in order to qualify for inducements under subchapters 22, 24, or 28 of KRS Chapter 154, or satisfies the requirements of a tourism development attraction defined under KRS 148.851 ;
    3. The percentage of the Commonwealth’s portion of the increment that the Commonwealth agrees to distribute to the agency each year during the term of the grant contract;
    4. The maximum amount of costs for infrastructure development for which the increment may be distributed to the agency; and
    5. The master agreement constituting a grant contract and any addendum for each project approved for location in the development area for infrastructure development.
  4. Prior to any approval by the economic development authority or the tourism development authority, the economic development authority or the tourism development authority shall have received an ordinance adopted by the city or county creating the development area and establishing the percentage of increment that the city and county are distributing each year to the agency for use in the infrastructure development of the development area for which economic development authority or the tourism development authority approval is sought. The economic development authority or the tourism development authority shall not approve a percentage of the Commonwealth’s portion of the increment to be distributed to the agency each calendar year with respect to a development area for infrastructure development greater than the percentage approved by the city or county creating the development area.
  5. The maximum amount of increment available for development areas for infrastructure development is one hundred percent (100%).
  6. The terms and conditions of each grant contract, including the master agreement constituting a grant contract and any addenda, are subject to negotiations between the economic development authority or the tourism development authority and the other parties to the grant contract. The grant contract shall include but not be limited to the following provisions: the activation date, the taxes to be included in the calculation of the increment, the percentage increment to be contributed by each taxing district, the maximum amount of infrastructure development costs, a description of the development area, the termination date, subject to extension through each addendum, and the requirement of the agency to annually certify to the economic development authority or the tourism development authority as to the use of the increment for payment of infrastructure development costs.
    1. Any agency that enters into a grant contract for the release of any increments that may arise during the period of a grant contract shall, after each calendar year a grant contract is in effect, notify each taxing district obligated under the grant contract that an increment is due, and, in consultation with each taxing district, determine the respective portion of the total increment due from each taxing district. The agency shall then present the total increment due from the Commonwealth under the grant contract to the Department of Revenue for certification. (7) (a) Any agency that enters into a grant contract for the release of any increments that may arise during the period of a grant contract shall, after each calendar year a grant contract is in effect, notify each taxing district obligated under the grant contract that an increment is due, and, in consultation with each taxing district, determine the respective portion of the total increment due from each taxing district. The agency shall then present the total increment due from the Commonwealth under the grant contract to the Department of Revenue for certification.
      1. Upon notice from the agency, each taxing district obligated under the grant contract, other than the Commonwealth, shall release to the agency the respective portion of the total increment due under the grant contract. The agency shall certify to the Department of Revenue on a calendar year basis the amount of the increment collected.
      2. Upon certification of the total increment due from the Commonwealth by the Department of Revenue, the department is authorized and directed to transfer the increment to a tax increment financing account established and administered by the Finance and Administration Cabinet for payment of the Commonwealth’s portion of the increment. Prior to disbursement by the Finance and Administration Cabinet of the funds from the tax increment financing account, the economic development authority or the tourism development authority shall notify the Finance and Administration Cabinet that the agency is in compliance with the terms of the grant contract. Upon notification, the Finance and Administration Cabinet is authorized and directed to release to the agency the Commonwealth’s portion of the total increment due under the grant contract.
    2. The Department of Revenue shall report to the economic development authority or the tourism development authority on a calendar year basis the amount of the total increment released to an agency.
  7. The Department of Revenue shall have the authority to establish operating procedures for the administration and determination of the Commonwealth’s increment.
  8. The Department of Revenue or agency shall have no obligation to refund or otherwise return any of the increment to the taxpayer from whom the increment arose or is attributable. Further, no additional increment resulting from audit, amended returns or other activity for any period shall be transferred to the tax increment financing account after the initial release to the agency of the Commonwealth’s increment for that period.

History. Enact. Acts 2002, ch. 338, § 14, effective July 15, 2002; 2005, ch. 85, § 90, effective June 20, 2005; 2005, ch. 95, § 12, effective June 20, 2005; 2009, ch. 16, § 9, effective June 25, 2009.

65.6972. Development area and related project — Application — Approval — Requirements for project — Independent consultant — Approval by authority — Ordinance — Grant contracts — Portion of increment due from each taxing district — Financing account — Reports — Operating procedures — Obligation of Department of Revenue and agency.

  1. A city, county, or agency shall submit an application to the Cabinet for Economic Development for approval of a development area, which includes revenues from the Commonwealth, and the related project, the standards for which the Cabinet for Economic Development and the Tourism, Arts and Heritage Cabinet shall establish through their operating procedures or by the promulgation of administrative regulations in accordance with KRS Chapter 13A. The Cabinet for Economic Development shall determine whether the development area and related project described in the application constitutes a project of the type described in KRS Chapter 154 for which the economic development authority shall have the right to approve the development area and related project or KRS Chapter 148 for which the tourism development authority shall have the right to approve the development area and related project. The Cabinet for Economic Development, upon its determination, shall assign the application to the economic development authority or the tourism development authority, as appropriate, for further consideration and approval.
  2. A project otherwise satisfying the requirements of the project as defined in KRS 65.680 , in order to qualify the project and related development area, in addition shall satisfy all of the following requirements for a project:
    1. Represent new economic activity in the Commonwealth;
    2. Result in a minimum capital investment of ten million dollars ($10,000,000);
    3. Result in the creation of a minimum of twenty-five (25) new full-time jobs for Kentucky residents to be held by persons subject to the personal income tax of the Commonwealth within two (2) years of the date of the final resolution authorizing the development area and the project;
    4. Result in a net positive economic impact to the economy of the Commonwealth, taking into consideration any substantial adverse impact on existing Commonwealth businesses;
    5. Generate a minimum of twenty-five percent (25%) of the total revenues derived from the project attributable to sources outside of the Commonwealth during each year a grant contract is in effect;
    6. Result in a unique contribution to or preservation of the economic vitality and quality of life of a region of the Commonwealth; and
    7. Not be primarily devoted to the retail sale of goods.
  3. After assignment of the application for the project and related development area by the Cabinet for Economic Development:
    1. The economic development authority or the tourism development authority, as appropriate, shall engage the services of a qualified independent consultant to analyze data related to the project and the development area, who shall prepare a report for the economic development authority or the tourism development authority, as appropriate, with the following findings:
      1. The percentage of revenues derived from the development area which are generated from business not located in the Commonwealth;
      2. The estimated amount of increment the development area is expected to generate over a twenty (20) year period from the projected activation date;
      3. The estimated amount of ad valorem taxes, other than the school or fire district portion of ad valorem taxes, from real property, Kentucky individual income tax, Kentucky sales and use taxes, local insurance premium taxes, occupational license fees, or other such state taxes which would be displaced within the Commonwealth, to reflect economic activity which is being shifted over the twenty (20) year period;
      4. The estimated increment the development area is expected to generate over the twenty (20) year period, equal to the estimated amount set forth in paragraph (a)2. of this subsection minus the estimated amount set forth in paragraph (a)3. of this subsection; and
      5. The project or development area will not occur if not for the designation of the development area and granting of increments by the Commonwealth to the development area.
    2. The independent consultant shall consult with the economic development authority or the tourism development authority, as appropriate, the Office of State Budget Director and the Finance and Administration Cabinet in the development of the report. The Office of State Budget Director and the Finance and Administration Cabinet shall agree as to methodology to be used and assumptions to be made by the independent consultant in preparing its report. On the basis of the independent consultant’s report and prior to any approval of a project by the economic development authority or the tourism development authority, as appropriate, the Office of State Budget Director and the Finance and Administration Cabinet shall certify whether there is a projected net positive economic impact to the Commonwealth and the expected amount of incremental state revenues from the project to the economic development authority or tourism development authority, as appropriate. Approval shall not be granted if it is determined that there is no projected net positive economic impact to the Commonwealth.
    3. The primary project entity shall pay all costs associated with the independent consultant’s report.
  4. With respect to each city, county, or agency that applies for approval of a project and development area, the economic development authority or the tourism development authority, as appropriate, shall request materials and make all inquiries concerning the application the economic development authority or the tourism development authority, as appropriate, deems necessary. Upon review of the application and requested materials, and completion of inquiries, the economic development authority or the tourism development authority, as appropriate, may by resolution grant approval for:
    1. The development area and project for which an application has been submitted;
    2. The percentage of the Commonwealth’s portion of the increment that the Commonwealth agrees to have distributed to the agency each year during the term of the grant contract;
    3. The maximum amount of costs for the project for which the increment may be distributed to the agency; and
    4. The grant contract.
  5. Prior to any approval by the economic development authority or the tourism development authority, as appropriate, the economic development authority or the tourism development authority shall have received an ordinance adopted by the city or county creating the development area and approving the project and establishing the percentage of increment that the city and county are distributing each year to the agency to pay for the development area for which economic development authority or tourism development authority approval is sought. The economic development authority or the tourism development authority, as appropriate, shall not approve a percentage of the Commonwealth’s portion of the increment to be distributed to the agency each year with respect to a development area and project greater than the percentage approved by the city or county creating the development area.
  6. The amount of increment available for a development area shall be no more than eighty percent (80%) per year, but shall in no case exceed twenty-five percent (25%) of the project costs during the term of the grant agreement.
  7. The terms and conditions of each grant contract are subject to negotiations between the economic development authority or the tourism development authority, as appropriate, and the other parties to the grant contract. The grant contract shall include but not be limited to the following provisions: the activation date, the agreed taxes to be included in the calculation of the increment, the percentage increment to be contributed by the Commonwealth and other taxing districts, the maximum amount of project costs, a description of the development area and the project, the termination date, and the requirement that the agency annually certify to the economic development authority or tourism development authority, as appropriate, as to the use of the increment for payment of project costs in the development area.
  8. The agency responsible for the development area that enters into the grant contract shall, after each year the grant contract is in effect, certify to the economic development authority or the tourism development authority, as appropriate:
    1. The amount of the increment used during the previous calendar year for the project costs; and
    2. That more than twenty-five percent (25%) of the total revenues derived from the project during the previous calendar year were attributable to sources outside the Commonwealth.
    1. Any agency that enters into a grant contract for the release of any increments that may arise during the period of a grant contract shall, after each calendar year a grant contract is in effect, notify each taxing district obligated under the grant contract that an increment is due. In consultation with each taxing district, the agency shall determine the respective portion of the total increment due from each taxing district, and the determination of the agency shall be reviewed by an independent certified public accountant. The agency shall submit to the Department of Revenue for certification its determination with respect to the total increment due together with the review of the certified public accountant and detailed information concerning ad valorem taxes, Kentucky individual income tax, Kentucky sales and use taxes, local insurance premium taxes, occupational license fees, and other such state taxes as may be determined by the Department of Revenue, including withholding taxes of employees of each taxpayer located in the development area. (9) (a) Any agency that enters into a grant contract for the release of any increments that may arise during the period of a grant contract shall, after each calendar year a grant contract is in effect, notify each taxing district obligated under the grant contract that an increment is due. In consultation with each taxing district, the agency shall determine the respective portion of the total increment due from each taxing district, and the determination of the agency shall be reviewed by an independent certified public accountant. The agency shall submit to the Department of Revenue for certification its determination with respect to the total increment due together with the review of the certified public accountant and detailed information concerning ad valorem taxes, Kentucky individual income tax, Kentucky sales and use taxes, local insurance premium taxes, occupational license fees, and other such state taxes as may be determined by the Department of Revenue, including withholding taxes of employees of each taxpayer located in the development area.
      1. Upon notification to the agency of the total increment by the Department of Revenue and notice from the agency, each taxing district obligated under the grant contract, other than the Commonwealth, shall release to the agency the respective portion of the total increment due under the grant contract. The agency shall certify to the Department of Revenue on a calendar year basis the amount of the increments collected.
      2. Upon certification of the total increment due from the Commonwealth by the Department of Revenue, the department is authorized and directed to transfer the increment to a tax increment financing account established and administered by the Finance and Administration Cabinet for payment of the Commonwealth’s portion of the increment. Prior to disbursement by the Finance and Administration Cabinet of the funds from the tax increment financing account, the economic development authority or the tourism development authority, as appropriate, shall notify the Finance and Administration Cabinet that the agency is in compliance with the terms of the grant contract. Upon notification, the Finance and Administration Cabinet is authorized and directed to release to the agency the Commonwealth’s portion of the total increment due under the grant contract.
    2. The Department of Revenue shall report to the economic development authority or the tourism development authority, as appropriate, on a calendar year basis the amount of the total increment released to an agency.
  9. The Department of Revenue shall have the authority to establish operating procedures for the administration and determination of the Commonwealth’s increment.
  10. The Department of Revenue or agency shall have no obligation to refund or otherwise return any of the increment to the taxpayer from whom the increment arose or is attributable. Further, no additional increment resulting from audit, amended returns or other activity for any period shall be transferred to the trust account established under subsection (9)(a)2. of this section and administered by the Finance and Administration Cabinet after the initial release to the agency of the Commonwealth’s increment for that period.

History. Enact. Acts 2002, ch. 338, § 15, effective July 15, 2002; 2005, ch. 85, § 91, effective June 20, 2005; 2005, ch. 95, § 13, effective June 20, 2005; 2009, ch. 16, § 10, effective June 25, 2009.

65.698. Authority of KRS 65.680 to 65.699 supplemental to other legal authority.

The authority granted by KRS 65.680 to 65.699 is in addition to and not a limitation on any other authorizations granted by or pursuant to law for the same or similar purposes.

History. Enact. Acts 2000, ch. 358, § 10, effective July 14, 2000.

65.699. Short title for KRS 65.680 to 65.699.

KRS 65.680 to 65.699 may be cited as the Kentucky Increment Financing Act.

History. Enact. Acts 2000, ch. 358, § 11, effective July 14, 2000.

65.700. Definitions for KRS 65.700 and 65.703. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 2001, ch. 148, § 1, effective June 21, 2001) was repealed by Acts 2002, ch. 338, § 49, effective July 15, 2002. For present law, see KRS 65.680 .

65.703. Authorization for grant contracts with certain agencies for release of portion of tax increment — Procedures — Evaluation. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 2001, ch. 148, § 2, effective June 21, 2001) was repealed by Acts 2002, ch. 338, § 49, effective July 15, 2002.

Tax Increment Financing

65.7041. Findings of General Assembly relative to KRS 65.7041 to 65.7083.

  1. The General Assembly finds and declares that the establishment of development areas, local development areas, and projects which result in increased property values, increased employment opportunities, and increased economic activity in communities within the Commonwealth serves a public purpose.
  2. The General Assembly further finds and declares that the authority prescribed in KRS 65.7041 to 65.7083 , and the purposes to be accomplished thereunder, are proper.
  3. A city or county creating or expanding a development area or local development area, shall, to the greatest extent it determines to be reasonably feasible in carrying out the provisions of KRS 65.7041 to 65.7083 , afford maximum opportunity for the rehabilitation, development, renovation, or improvement of a development area or local development area by private enterprise.

History. Enact. Acts 2007, ch. 95, § 1, effective March 23, 2007.

65.7043. Purposes of KRS 65.7041 to 65.7083.

The purposes of KRS 65.7041 to 65.7083 are as follows:

  1. KRS 65.7047 provides authority for cities and counties to establish local development areas for the development of previously undeveloped land within their jurisdictional boundaries and to devote local resources to support the development of projects in those local development areas. Local development areas established under KRS 65.7047 and projects within local development areas shall not be eligible for participation by the Commonwealth; and
    1. KRS 65.7049 , 65.7051 , and 65.7053 provide a framework for cities and counties: (2) (a) KRS 65.7049 , 65.7051 , and 65.7053 provide a framework for cities and counties:
      1. To establish development areas for:
        1. The redevelopment of previously developed land within their jurisdictional boundaries; and
        2. The development of previously undeveloped land, if:
          1. The project proposed for the development area includes an arena as part of the proposed development;
          2. The project is a mixed-use development located in a university research park;
          3. The project is a mixed-use development located within three (3) miles of a military base that houses, deploys, or employs any combination of at least twenty-five thousand (25,000) military personnel, their families, military retirees, or civilian employees;
          4. The project is a mixed-use development which includes either or both significant public storm water and sanitary sewer facilities designed to comply with a community-wide court decree mandating corrective action by the local government or an agency thereof; or
          5. The project is a mixed-use development that includes a tract of previously undeveloped land that was owned by a liberal arts educational institution within four (4) years prior to the April 10, 2017, and the previously undeveloped land is bounded on one (1) side by a four (4) lane United States highway on April 10, 2017. No more than fifty percent (50%) of the previously undeveloped land shall be used for qualified mixed uses; and
      2. To devote local resources to providing redevelopment assistance and supporting projects in those development areas.
    2. Projects within development areas established pursuant to KRS 65.7049, 65.7051, and 65.7053 shall be eligible for participation by the Commonwealth if such projects meet the requirements for Commonwealth participation established by Subchapter 30 of KRS Chapter 154.

History. Enact. Acts 2007, ch. 95, § 2, effective March 23, 2007; 2008, ch. 178, § 1, effective July 15, 2008; 2009 (1st Ex. Sess.), ch. 1, § 56, effective June 26, 2009; 2011, ch. 62, § 1, effective June 8, 2011; 2013, ch. 99, § 1, effective June 25, 2013; 2017 ch. 174, § 1, effective April 10, 2017.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(4/10/2017). 2017 Ky. Acts ch. 174, sec. 5 provided that amendments made to subsection (2) of this statute in 2017 Ky. Acts ch. 174, sec. 1 shall apply to applications for which a Tax Incentive Agreement has not been approved prior to April 10, 2017 (the effective date of that section of that Act).

65.7044. Oversight and responsibility for Commonwealth’s participation in tax increment financing.

  1. Oversight and responsibility for the Commonwealth’s participation in tax increment financing shall be transferred from the Tax Increment Financing Commission to the Kentucky Economic Development Finance Authority, established by KRS 154.20-010 , on July 15, 2008.
  2. On and after July 15, 2008, the Tax Increment Financing Commission and the Division of Tax Increment Financing within the Office of the Commissioner in the Department of Revenue shall cease to exist.
  3. All documentation and records relating to state participation in all tax increment financing programs and all agreements authorized by all prior and existing statutes shall be transferred by the Tax Increment Financing Commission and the Division of Tax Increment Financing to the Kentucky Economic Development Finance Authority.
  4. The Division of Tax Increment Financing shall obtain authorization from all affected entities prior to the transfer of any confidential tax information to the Kentucky Economic Development Finance Authority.
  5. Members of the Tax Increment Financing Commission and staff of the Division of Tax Increment Financing shall cooperate fully with the Kentucky Economic Development Finance Authority in the transfer of all necessary records and information.
  6. Tax increment financing projects established under prior tax increment financing laws and agreements entered into under prior tax increment financing laws shall be administered and interpreted in accordance with the law in effect at the time the project was approved and the agreement entered into.

History. Enact. Acts 2008, ch. 178, § 12, effective July 15, 2008.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(7/15/2008). The Reviser of Statutes has corrected a manifest clerical or typographical error in subsection (1) of this statute from the way it appeared in 2008 Ky. Acts ch. 178, sec. 12. In that Act, a reference to “KRS 154.20-10” should have read “KRS 154.20-010 ,” which established the Kentucky Economic Development Finance Authority. This change has been made under the authority of KRS 7.136(1)(h).

65.7045. Definitions for KRS 65.7041 to 65.7083.

As used in KRS 65.7041 to 65.7083 :

  1. “Activation date” means the date established any time within a two (2) year period after the commencement date. The activation date is the date on which the time period for the pledge of incremental revenues shall commence. The governing body may extend the two (2) year period to no more than four (4) years upon written application by the agency requesting the extension. To implement the activation date, the agency that is a party to the local participation agreement or the local development area agreement shall notify the governing body that created the development area or local development area;
  2. “Agency” means:
    1. An urban renewal and community development agency established under KRS Chapter 99;
    2. A development authority established under KRS Chapter 99;
    3. A nonprofit corporation;
    4. A housing authority established under KRS Chapter 80;
    5. An air board established under KRS 183.132 to 183.160 ;
    6. A local industrial development authority established under KRS 154.50-301 to 154.50-346 ;
    7. A riverport authority established under KRS 65.510 to 65.650 ; or
    8. A designated department, division, or office of a city or county;
  3. “Arena” means a facility which serves primarily as a venue for athletic events, live entertainment, and other performances, and which has a permanent seating capacity of at least five thousand (5,000);
  4. “Authority” means the Kentucky Economic Development Finance Authority established by KRS 154.20-010 ;
  5. “Brownfield site” means real property, the expansion, redevelopment, or reuse of which may be complicated by the presence or potential presence of a hazardous substance, pollutant, or contaminant;
  6. “Capital investment” means:
    1. Obligations incurred for labor and to contractors, subcontractors, builders, and materialmen in connection with the acquisition, construction, installation, equipping, and rehabilitation of a project;
    2. The cost of acquiring land or rights in land within the development area on the footprint of the project, and any cost incident thereto, including recording fees;
    3. The cost of contract bonds and of insurance of all kinds that may be required or necessary during the course of acquisition, construction, installation, equipping, and rehabilitation of a project which is not paid by the contractor or contractors or otherwise provided;
    4. All costs of architectural and engineering services, including test borings, surveys, estimates, plans, specifications, preliminary investigations, supervision of construction, and the performance of all the duties required by or consequent upon the acquisition, construction, installation, equipping, and rehabilitation of a project;
    5. All costs that are required to be paid under the terms of any contract for the acquisition, construction, installation, equipping, and rehabilitation of a project; and
    6. All other costs of a nature comparable to those described in this subsection;
  7. “City” means any city, consolidated local government, or urban-county government;
  8. “Commencement date” means:
    1. The date on which a local development area agreement is executed; or
    2. The date on which a local participation agreement is executed;
  9. “Commonwealth” means the Commonwealth of Kentucky;
  10. “County” means any county, consolidated local government, charter county, unified local government, or urban-county government;
  11. “Debt charges” means the principal, including any mandatory sinking fund deposits, interest, and any redemption premium, payable on increment bonds as the payments come due and are payable and any charges related to the payment of the foregoing;
  12. “Development area” means an area established under KRS 65.7049 , 65.7051 , and 65.7053 ;
  13. “Economic development projects” means projects which are approved for tax credits under Subchapter 20, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 34, or 48 of KRS Chapter 154;
  14. “Establishment date” means the date on which a development area or a local development area is created. If the development area, local development area, development area plan, or local development area plan is modified or amended subsequent to the original establishment date, the modifications or amendments shall not extend the existence of the development area or local development area beyond what would be permitted under KRS 65.7041 to 65.7083 from the original establishment date;
  15. “Governing body” means the body possessing legislative authority in a city or county;
  16. “Increment bonds” means bonds and notes issued for the purpose of paying the costs of one (1) or more projects, or grant or loan programs as described in subsection (30)(c) of this section, in a development area or a local development area;
  17. “Incremental revenues” means the amount of revenues received by a taxing district, as determined by subtracting old revenues from new revenues in a calendar year with respect to a development area, a project within a development area, or a local development area;
  18. “Issuer” means a city, county, or agency issuing increment bonds;
  19. “Local development area” means a development area established under KRS 65.7047 ;
  20. “Local development area agreement” means an agreement entered into under KRS 65.7047 ;
  21. “Local participation agreement” means the agreement entered into under KRS 65.7063 ;
  22. “Local tax revenues” means:
    1. Revenues derived by a city or county from one (1) or more of the following sources:
      1. Real property ad valorem taxes;
      2. Occupational license taxes, excluding occupational license taxes that have already been pledged to support an economic development project within the development area; and
      3. The occupational license fee permitted by KRS 65.7056 ; and
    2. Revenues derived by any taxing district other than school districts or fire districts from real property ad valorem taxes;
  23. “Low-income household” means a household in which gross income is no more than two hundred percent (200%) of the poverty guidelines updated periodically in the Federal Register by the United States Department of Health and Human Services under the authority of 42 U.S.C. sec. 9902(2) ;
  24. “Mixed-use” has the same meaning as in KRS 154.30-060 ;
  25. “New revenues” means the amount of local tax revenues received by a taxing district with respect to a development area or a local development area in any calendar year beginning with the year in which the activation date occurred;
  26. “Old revenues” means the amount of local tax revenues received by a taxing district with respect to a development area or a local development area during the last calendar year prior to the commencement date. If the governing body determines that the amount of local tax revenues received during the last calendar year prior to the commencement date does not represent a true and accurate depiction of revenues, the governing body may consider revenues for a period of no longer than three (3) calendar years prior to the commencement date, so as to determine a fair representation of local tax revenues;
  27. “Outstanding” means increment bonds that have been issued, delivered, and paid for by the purchaser, except any of the following:
    1. Increment bonds canceled upon surrender, exchange, or transfer, or upon payment or redemption;
    2. Increment bonds in replacement of which or in exchange for which other increment bonds have been issued; or
    3. Increment bonds for the payment, redemption, or purchase for cancellation prior to maturity, of which sufficient moneys or investments, in accordance with the ordinance or other proceedings or any applicable law, by mandatory sinking fund redemption requirements, or otherwise, have been deposited, and credited in a sinking fund or with a trustee or paying or escrow agent, whether at or prior to their maturity or redemption, and, in the case of increment bonds to be redeemed prior to their stated maturity, notice of redemption has been given or satisfactory arrangements have been made for giving notice of that redemption, or waiver of that notice by or on behalf of the affected bond holders has been filed with the issuer or its agent;
  28. “Planning unit” means a planning commission established pursuant to KRS Chapter 100;
  29. “Project” means any property, asset, or improvement located in a development area or a local development area and certified by the governing body as:
    1. Being for a public purpose; and
    2. Being for the development of facilities for residential, commercial, industrial, public, recreational, or other uses, or for open space, including the development, rehabilitation, renovation, installation, improvement, enlargement, or extension of real estate and buildings; and
    3. Contributing to economic development or tourism;
  30. “Redevelopment assistance,” as utilized within a development area, includes the following:
    1. Technical assistance programs to provide information and guidance to existing, new, and potential businesses and residences;
    2. Programs to market and promote the development area and attract new businesses and residents;
    3. Grant and loan programs to encourage the construction or rehabilitation of residential, commercial, and industrial buildings; improve the appearance of building facades and signage; and stimulate business start-ups and expansions;
    4. Programs to obtain a reduced interest rate, down payment, or other improved terms for loans made by private, for-profit, or nonprofit lenders to encourage the construction or rehabilitation of residential, commercial, and industrial buildings; improve the appearance of building facades and signage; and stimulate business start-ups and expansions;
    5. Local capital improvements, including but not limited to the installation, construction, or reconstruction of streets, lighting, pedestrian amenities, public utilities, public transportation facilities, public parking, parks, playgrounds, recreational facilities, and public buildings and facilities;
    6. Improved or increased provision of public services, including but not limited to police or security patrols, solid waste management, and street cleaning;
    7. Provision of technical, financial, or other assistance in connection with:
      1. Applications to the Energy and Environment Cabinet for a brownfields assessment or a No Further Remediation Letter issued pursuant to KRS 224.1-450 ; or
      2. Site remediation by means of the Voluntary Environmental Remediation Program to remove environmental contamination in the development area, or lots or parcels within it, pursuant to KRS 224.1-510 to 224.1-532 ; and
    8. Direct development by a city, county, or agency of real property acquired by the city, county, or agency. Direct development may include one (1) or more of the following:
      1. Assembly and replatting of lots or parcels;
      2. Rehabilitation of existing structures and improvements;
      3. Demolition of structures and improvements and construction of new structures and improvements;
      4. Programs of temporary or permanent relocation assistance for businesses and residents;
      5. The sale, lease, donation, or other permanent or temporary transfer of real property to public agencies, persons, and entities both for profit and nonprofit; and
      6. The acquisition and construction of projects;
  31. “Service payment agreement” means an agreement between a city, county, or issuer of increment bonds or other obligations and any person, whereby the person agrees to guarantee the receipt of incremental revenues, or the payment of debt charges, or any portion thereof, on increment bonds or other obligations issued by the city, county, or issuer;
  32. “Special fund” means a special fund created under KRS 65.7061 in which all incremental revenues shall be deposited;
  33. “Taxing district” means any city, county, or special taxing district other than school districts and fire districts;
  34. “Tax incentive agreement” means an agreement entered into under KRS 154.30-070 ;
  35. “Termination date” means:
    1. For a development area, a date established by the ordinance creating the development area that is no more than twenty (20) years from the establishment date. If a tax incentive agreement for a project within a development area or a local participation agreement relating to the development area has a termination date that is later than the termination date established in the ordinance, the termination date for the development area shall be extended to the termination date of the tax incentive agreement, or local participation agreement. However, the termination date for the development area shall in no event be more than forty (40) years from the establishment date;
    2. For a local development area, a date established by the ordinance creating the local development area that is no more than twenty (20) years from the establishment date, provided that if a local development area agreement relating to the local development area has a termination date that is later than the termination date established in the ordinance, the termination date for the local development area shall be extended to the termination date of the local development area agreement;
    3. For a local participation agreement, a date that is no more than twenty (20) years from the activation date. However, the termination date for a local participation agreement shall in no event be more than forty (40) years from the establishment date of the development area to which the local participation agreement relates; and
    4. For a local development area agreement, a date that is no more than twenty (20) years from the activation date. However, the termination date for a local development area agreement shall in no event be more than forty (40) years from the establishment date of the local development area to which the development area agreement relates; and
  36. “University research park” means land owned by a public university that has been designated by the public university as being primarily for the development of projects and facilities to support high-tech, pharmaceutical, laboratory, and other research-based businesses, including projects and facilities to support and complement the development of high-tech, pharmaceutical, laboratory, and other research-based businesses.

History. Enact. Acts 2007, ch. 95, § 3, effective March 23, 2007; 2008, ch. 178, § 2, effective July 15, 2008; 2009 (1st. Ex. Sess.), ch. 1, § 57, effective June 26, 2009; 2010, ch. 24, § 58, effective March 25, 2010; 2011, ch. 62, § 2, effective June 8, 2011.

65.7047. Establishment of local development areas — Conditions for establishment — Steps for establishment or modification — Funding — Execution of agreement — Pledge of revenues.

  1. Any city or county may establish a local development area pursuant to this section, subject to the following conditions:
    1. A local development area shall be on previously undeveloped land;
    2. No more than one thousand (1,000) acres shall be approved for a local development area in any twelve (12) month period in any county;
    3. The establishment or expansion of the local development area shall not cause the assessed value of taxable real property within all local development areas and development areas of the city or county establishing the local development area to exceed twenty percent (20%) of the assessed value of all taxable real property within its jurisdiction. For the purpose of determining whether the twenty percent (20%) threshold has been met, the assessed value of taxable real property within all of the local development areas and development areas shall be valued as of the establishment date; and
    4. Unless the ordinance establishing a local development area requires an earlier termination date, a local development area shall cease to exist on the termination date.
  2. A city or county shall take the following steps to establish or modify a local development area:
    1. The city or county shall hold a public hearing to solicit input from the public regarding the local development area. The city or county shall advertise the hearing by causing to be published, in accordance with KRS 424.130 , notice of the time, place, and purpose of the hearing and a general description of the boundaries of the proposed local development area. The notice shall include a summary of the projects proposed for the local development area;
    2. After the public hearing, the city or county shall adopt an ordinance which shall include the following provisions:
      1. A description of the boundaries of the local development area;
      2. The establishment date and the termination date;
      3. A name for the local development area for identification purposes;
      4. Approval of any agreements relating to the local development area;
      5. A provision establishing a special fund for the local development area or any project within the local development area;
      6. A requirement that any entity other than the governing body that receives financial assistance under the local development area ordinance, whether in the form of a grant, loan, or loan guarantee, shall make periodic accounting to the governing body;
      7. A provision for periodic analysis and review by the governing body of the development activity in the local development area;
      8. Designation of the agency or agencies responsible for oversight, administration, and implementation of the local development ordinance; and
      9. Any other provisions, findings, limitations, rules, or procedures regarding the proposed local development area or a project within the local development area and its establishment or maintenance deemed necessary by the city or county; and
    3. If incremental revenues or other resources are to be pledged from taxing districts other than the city or county establishing the local development area, a local development area agreement shall be executed in accordance with the provisions of subsection (4) of this section.
  3. Funding for projects in a local development area shall be provided in accordance with KRS 65.7057 .
  4. A local development area agreement shall be executed among the agencies and taxing districts involved in administering, providing financing, or pledging incremental revenues within the local development area. The local development area agreement shall be adopted by a city or county by ordinance and by any other taxing district or agency by resolution, and shall include but not be limited to the following provisions:
    1. Identification of the parties to the local development area agreement and the duties and responsibilities of each entity under the agreement;
    2. Specific identification of the tax increments released or pledged by type of tax by each taxing district;
    3. The anticipated benefit to be received by each taxing district for the release or pledge, including:
      1. A detailed summary of old revenues collected and projected new revenues for each taxing district on an annual basis for the term of the local development area agreement; and
      2. The maximum amount of incremental revenue to be paid by each taxing district and the maximum number of years the payment will be effective;
    4. A detailed description of the local development area;
    5. A description of each proposed project, including an estimate of the costs of construction, acquisition, and development;
    6. A requirement that pledged incremental revenues will be deposited in a special fund pursuant to KRS 65.7061 , including the timing and procedure for depositing incremental revenues and other pledged amounts into the special fund;
    7. Terms of default and remedies, provided that no remedy shall permit the withholding by any party to the local development area agreement of any incremental revenues pledged to the special fund if increment bonds are outstanding that are secured by a pledge of those incremental revenues;
    8. The commencement date, activation date, and termination date; and
    9. Any other provisions not inconsistent with KRS 65.7041 to 65.7083 deemed necessary or appropriate by the parties to the agreement.
  5. Any pledge of incremental revenues in a local development area agreement shall be superior to any other pledge of revenues for any other purpose and shall, from the activation date to the termination date set forth in the local area development agreement, supersede any statute, ordinance, or resolution regarding the application or use of incremental revenues. No ordinance in conflict with a local development area agreement shall be adopted while any increment bonds secured by that pledge remain outstanding. Ordinances or resolutions pledging incremental revenues on a subordinate basis to any existing pledges may be adopted.

History. Enact. Acts 2007, ch. 95, § 4, effective March 23, 2007; 2008, ch. 178, § 3, effective July 15, 2008.

65.7049. Establishment of development area for investment, reinvestment, development, use, and reuse pursuant to this section and KRS 65.7051 and 65.7053 — Conditions for establishment — Findings required.

Any city or county may establish a development area pursuant to this section, KRS 65.7051 , and 65.7053 to encourage investment and reinvestment in and development, use, and reuse of areas of the city or county under the following conditions:

  1. The area shall be contiguous and shall be no more than three (3) square miles;
  2. The establishment or expansion of the development area shall not cause the assessed value of taxable real property within all development areas and local development areas of the city or county establishing the development area to exceed twenty percent (20%) of the assessed value of all taxable real property within its jurisdiction. For the purpose of determining whether the twenty percent (20%) threshold has been met, the assessed value of taxable real property within all of the development areas and local development areas shall be valued as of the establishment date;
  3. The governing body of the city or county shall determine that the development area either:
    1. Has two (2) or more of the following conditions:
      1. Substantial loss of residential, commercial, or industrial activity or use;
      2. Forty percent (40%) or more of the households are low-income households;
      3. More than fifty percent (50%) of residential, commercial, or industrial structures are deteriorating or deteriorated;
      4. Substantial abandonment of residential, commercial, or industrial structures;
      5. Substantial presence of environmentally contaminated land;
      6. Inadequate public improvements or substantial deterioration in public infrastructure; or
      7. Any combination of factors that substantially impairs or arrests the growth and economic development of the city or county; impedes the provision of adequate housing; impedes the development of commercial or industrial property; or adversely affects public health, safety, or general welfare due to the development area’s present condition and use; or
    2. The project meets the requirements of KRS 65.7043(2)(a)1.b.; and
  4. The governing body of the city or county shall find that all of the following are true for projects meeting the requirements of paragraph (a) of subsection (3) of this section:
    1. That the development area is not reasonably expected to be developed without public assistance. This finding shall be supported by specific reasons and supporting facts, including a clear demonstration of the financial need for public assistance; and
    2. That the public benefits of the development area justify the public costs proposed. This finding shall be supported by specific data and figures demonstrating that the projected benefits outweigh the anticipated costs and shall take into account the positive and negative effects of investment in the development on existing businesses and residents within the community as a whole; and
      1. That the area immediately surrounding the development area has not been subject to growth and development through investment by private enterprise; or (c) 1. That the area immediately surrounding the development area has not been subject to growth and development through investment by private enterprise; or
      2. If the area immediately surrounding the development area has been subject to growth and development through investment by private enterprise, the identification of special circumstances within the development area that would prevent its development without public assistance.

History. Enact. Acts 2007, ch. 95, § 5, effective March 23, 2007; 2009 (1st Ex. Sess.), ch. 1, § 58, effective June 26, 2009; 2011, ch. 62, § 3, effective June 8, 2011; 2013, ch. 99, § 2, effective June 25, 2013; 2017 ch. 174, § 3, effective April 10, 2017; 2018 ch. 199, § 3, effective July 14, 2018.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(4/10/2017). 2017 Ky. Acts ch. 174, sec. 5 provided that amendments made to subsection (3)(b) of this statute in 2017 Ky. Acts ch. 174, sec. 3 shall apply to applications for which a Tax Incentive Agreement has not been approved prior to April 10, 2017 (the effective date of that section of that Act).

65.7051. Establishment of development plan for a development area — Public hearing.

  1. Any city or county seeking to establish a development area shall adopt a development plan. The development plan may be developed by a city, a county, or a city and county jointly, or may be proposed by an agency or by a private entity. The plan shall include the following:
    1. Assurances that the proposed development area meets the requirements of KRS 65.7049(1) and (2), identification of the conditions in the proposed development area that meet the criteria set forth in KRS 65.7049(3), and, if applicable, confirmation that the requirements of KRS 65.7049(4) have been met;
    2. A detailed description of the existing uses and conditions of real property in the development area;
    3. A map showing the boundaries of the proposed development area, a legal description of the development area, and geographic reference points;
    4. A map showing proposed improvements and uses therein, including the identification of any proposed projects, along with a narrative description of the proposed improvements, projects, and uses within the development area;
    5. A description of the redevelopment assistance proposed to be employed in the development area, including the manner and location of such assistance;
    6. A detailed financial plan containing projections of the cost of the proposed redevelopment assistance to be provided, proposed projects to be funded, proposed sources of funding for these costs, projected incremental revenues, and the projected time frame during which financial obligations will be incurred;
    7. Proposed changes of any zoning ordinance, comprehensive plan, master plan, map, building code, or ordinance anticipated to be required to implement the development plan; and
    8. If the city or county is a member of a planning unit, certification of review by the planning commission for compliance with the comprehensive plan of the planning unit pursuant to KRS Chapter 100 after any necessary changes identified in paragraph (g) of this subsection are made.
  2. Prior to adoption of a development plan, the city or county shall hold a public hearing to solicit input from the public regarding the plan. The city or county shall advertise the hearing by causing to be published, in accordance with KRS 424.130 , notice of the time, place, and purpose of the hearing and a general description of the boundaries of the proposed development area. The notice shall include a summary of the redevelopment assistance proposed to be employed, identification of projects proposed for the development area, and a statement that a copy of the development plan is available for inspection at the business office of the city or county.
  3. Prior to publication of a hearing notice pursuant to subsection (2) of this section, a copy of the development plan shall be filed with the city clerk of each city having jurisdiction within the proposed development area, and with the county fiscal court.
  4. A city or county having jurisdiction within the proposed development area not initially participating in a proposed development plan shall have the opportunity to determine whether it will participate in the plan. The city or county shall determine and notify the entity proposing the development plan in writing within thirty (30) days after the public hearing whether it will participate in the plan.
  5. At the end of the time period established in subsection (4) of this section, the city or county may adopt an ordinance establishing a development area in accordance with KRS 65.7053 .

History. Enact. Acts 2007, ch. 95, § 6, effective March 23, 2007; 2008, ch. 178, § 4, effective July 15, 2008; 2011, ch. 62, § 5, effective June 8, 2011.

65.7053. Contents of ordinance establishing a development area — Agency to oversee and administer implementation of ordinance — Termination date.

  1. An ordinance establishing a development area shall include the following provisions:
    1. A legal description of the boundaries of the development area, and geographic reference points;
    2. The establishment date;
    3. The termination date, including a provision that allows the termination date to be extended as provided in KRS 65.7045(35);
    4. A name for the development area for identification purposes;
    5. A finding that the conditions in the development area meet the criteria described in KRS 65.7049 ;
    6. A finding supporting the need to employ redevelopment assistance in the development area;
    7. A provision adopting the development plan required by KRS 65.7051(1);
    8. Approval of any agreements relating to the development area, including any local participation agreements;
    9. A provision establishing a special fund for the development area or any project within the development area;
    10. A requirement that any entity other than the governing body that receives financial assistance under the development area ordinance, whether in the form of a grant, loan, or loan guarantee, shall make periodic accounting to the governing body;
    11. A provision for periodic analysis and review by the governing body of the development activity in the development area, a review of the progress in meeting the stated goals of the development area, and a requirement that the review and analysis be forwarded to the authority if the development activity includes projects subject to a tax incentive agreement;
    12. Designation of the agency or agencies responsible for oversight, administration, and implementation of the development ordinance; and
    13. Any other provisions, findings, limitations, rules, or procedures regarding the proposed development area or a project within the development area and its establishment or maintenance deemed necessary by the city or county.
  2. An ordinance establishing a development area may designate an existing agency to oversee and administer implementation of a development area ordinance or a portion thereof.
  3. Unless the ordinance establishing a development area requires an earlier date, a development area shall cease to exist on the termination date.

History. Enact. Acts 2007, ch. 95, § 7, effective March 23, 2007; 2008, ch. 178, § 5, effective July 15, 2008; 2009 (1st. Ex. Sess.), ch. 1, § 59, effective June 26, 2009; 2011, ch. 62, § 6, effective June 8, 2011.

65.7055. Amendment, change, or revision to development plan or development area — Adoption — Hearing and notice — Ordinance.

Any amendment, change, or revision to a development plan adopted as part of a development area established pursuant to KRS 65.7049 , 65.7051 , and 65.7053 , including the addition of a project, use of new or different redevelopment assistance within the development area, or amendment of the development area boundaries shall be made as follows, provided that any amendment adopted shall not extend the existence of development area beyond the termination date:

  1. An amendment to the development plan shall be adopted by the city or county. The proposed development plan amendment shall include the following:
    1. Identification of the development area to which the amendment applies;
    2. A copy of the development plan as revised by the amendment;
    3. A narrative description of the proposed changes to the original development area plan and how those changes will impact the original development plan;
    4. If the amendment changes the boundaries, or in any way amends maps filed with the original development plan, a revised map, a revised legal description of the development area, and revised geographic reference points, and identification of new improvements, or projects proposed in the amendment;
    5. A description of the redevelopment assistance proposed to be employed, including the manner and location of such assistance relating to the proposed amendment;
    6. A financial plan relating to the proposed amendment, including the proposed cost of providing any redevelopment assistance and proposed projects to be funded, the sources of funding to meet those costs, projected incremental revenues, and the projected time period during which financial obligations will be incurred;
    7. Proposed changes of any zoning ordinance, comprehensive plan, master plan, map, building code, or ordinance required to implement the proposed amendment; and
    8. If the city or county is a member of a planning unit, certification of review by the planning commission for compliance with the comprehensive plan of the planning unit pursuant to KRS Chapter 100 after any necessary changes identified in paragraph (g) of this subsection are made.
  2. Prior to the adoption of an amendment to a development plan, the city or county shall comply with the hearing and notice provisions set forth in KRS 65.7051(2) and (3). The notice provided in relation to an amendment to the development plan shall include a summary of how the amendment changes the development plan and shall identify new redevelopment assistance and projects proposed by the amendment.
  3. The city or county shall adopt any amendment to the development plan and any amendment to the development area by ordinance. The ordinance shall include the following provisions:
    1. A provision adopting the amendment to the development plan required by subsection (1) of this section;
    2. Approval of any local participation agreements or other agreements relating to the amendment;
    3. The identification of any new or different state or local tax revenues pledged by any taxing district to support the provision of redevelopment assistance or projects identified in the amendment;
    4. A finding that the amendment does not increase the aggregate value of taxable real property included in all the redevelopment areas and the local development areas within the jurisdiction of the city or county to more than twenty percent (20%) of the total value of taxable real property within its jurisdiction. For the purpose of determining whether the twenty percent (20%) threshold has been met, the assessed value of taxable real property within all of the local development areas and development areas shall be valued as of the establishment date; and
    5. Any other provisions, findings, limitations, rules, or procedures regarding the amendment deemed necessary by the city or county.

History. Enact. Acts 2007, ch. 95, § 8, effective March 23, 2007; 2008, ch. 178, § 6, effective July 15, 2008.

65.7056. Occupational license fee — Assessment — Credit against other license fee — Collection and remittance — Job development assessment fee — Fee maximums.

  1. Any city, county, or combination of cities and counties establishing a development area or local development area may, as a condition of employment, impose an occupational license fee against each person employed in the development area or local development area through the adoption of an ordinance imposing such fee. The imposition of the fee shall be subject to the following:
    1. The occupational license fee shall be imposed only against persons whose jobs are newly created as a result of a project within the development area or local development area. A job is not newly created if it occurs due to the relocation of a job from another location within the Commonwealth;
    2. The person against whom the assessment is imposed shall be subject to the state tax imposed by KRS 141.020 ;
    3. The assessment or any combination of assessments imposed by a city, a county, or a combination of cities and counties within the development area or local development area shall not exceed two percent (2%) of gross wages of the person; and
    4. The imposition of a fee shall be reported to the Kentucky Economic Development Finance Authority established by KRS 154.20-010 .
    1. Each person against whom an assessment is imposed shall be entitled to a credit against any jurisdictionwide local occupational license fee levied by the city, county, or combination of cities and counties that established the development area or local development area if the jurisdictionwide levy has not previously been made available as a credit against assessments imposed under Subchapter 23, 24, 25, 26, or 27 of KRS Chapter 154. (2) (a) Each person against whom an assessment is imposed shall be entitled to a credit against any jurisdictionwide local occupational license fee levied by the city, county, or combination of cities and counties that established the development area or local development area if the jurisdictionwide levy has not previously been made available as a credit against assessments imposed under Subchapter 23, 24, 25, 26, or 27 of KRS Chapter 154.
    2. The amount of the credit shall not exceed the amount of the jurisdictionwide occupational license fee paid to that city, county, or combination of cities and counties by the person subject to the assessment.
    3. If the city, county, or combination of cities and counties imposing the occupational license fee within the development area or local development area does not levy a jurisdictionwide occupational license fee, the employee shall not be entitled to a credit against any other city’s or county’s occupational license fee or any income tax levied by the Commonwealth.
  2. Each employer in the development area or local development area shall, for each employee subject to an occupational license fee levied pursuant to this section:
    1. Collect the occupational license fee by deducting the occupational license fee from each paycheck of its employees;
    2. Promptly remit the occupational license fee to the official charged with collecting revenues in the development area or local development area;
    3. Make its payroll books and records available to the official charged with collecting revenues in the development area or local development area at a reasonable time as specified by the city, county, or cities and counties establishing the development area or local development area; and
    4. File with the official charged with collecting revenues in the development area or local development area any documentation with regard to the occupational license fee as required by the city, county, or cities and counties establishing the development area or local development area.
  3. Any assessment of a person under this section shall permanently lapse on the earlier of:
    1. The termination date;
    2. The date on which any bonds issued in connection with the project are retired; or
    3. The date on which any loans or other financing incurred in connection with the establishment of the development area or local development area mature or are paid in full.
  4. If a company, against whose employees an assessment is levied under this section, enters into an agreement with the economic development authority under Subchapter 23, 24, 25, 26, or 27 of KRS Chapter 154 allowing the company to impose a job development assessment fee as part of that agreement, the total assessment levied against the employee for state inducements and the development area or local development area shall not exceed six percent (6%), subject to subsection (6) of this section.
  5. If an eligible company under Subchapter 23, 24, 25, 26, or 27 of KRS Chapter 154 locates or expands within a development area or local development area, the assessment imposed under this section shall not exceed the lesser of two percent (2%) or the difference between two percent (2%) and the local occupational license fee used as a credit against the assessments granted under Subchapter 23, 24, 25, 26, or 27 of KRS Chapter 154.

History. Enact. Acts 2008, ch. 178, § 8, effective July 15, 2008.

65.7057. Permitted sources for local funding for redevelopment assistance or projects — Special assessments — Local participation agreement required.

  1. To provide funding for redevelopment assistance or projects in a development area or projects in a local development area:
    1. Any taxing authority may, in addition to any other pledge permitted by law to secure its obligations, pledge up to one hundred percent (100%) of the incremental local tax revenues generated in the development area or local development area or from a project within the development area or local development area for up to thirty (30) years from the activation date;
    2. The amount of incremental revenues shall be determined for each type of tax separately; and
    3. Local tax revenues from a development area that have not been pledged to support redevelopment assistance or projects within the development area, or from a local development area that have not been pledged to support projects within the local development area, may be used to support other economic development projects, provided that local tax revenues shall not be pledged more than once. Thus, local tax revenues pledged to support increment bonds issued for the development area or local development area shall not also be pledged to support a specific project within the development area or local development area, and those revenues shall not be pledged to support any other program, development, or undertaking.
  2. Any city may pledge revenues collected under a special assessment imposed under KRS 91A.200 to 91A.290 to support projects or the provision of redevelopment assistance within a development area, or to support projects within a local development area, and may pledge revenues collected from the assessment to support increment bonds.
  3. Any county may levy a special assessment under the terms and conditions established for cities under KRS 91A.200 to 91A.290 to support projects or the provision of redevelopment assistance within a development area, or to support projects within a local development area, and may pledge revenues collected from the assessment to support increment bonds.
  4. Any city, county, or combination of cities and counties establishing a development area or a local development area may pledge revenues collected pursuant to the occupational license fee permitted by KRS 65.7056 .
  5. Any pledge of incremental revenues or other revenues related to a development area by a taxing district shall be accomplished through the execution of a local participation agreement in accordance with KRS 65.7063 .
  6. Any pledge of incremental revenues or other revenues related to a local development area by a taxing district shall be accomplished through the execution of a local development area agreement in accordance with KRS 65.7047 .

History. Enact. Acts 2007, ch. 95, § 9, effective March 23, 2007; 2008, ch. 178, § 7, effective July 15, 2008.

65.7059. Issuance of increment bonds by local governments.

Any city, county, or agency with bonding authority may issue increment bonds and may pledge incremental revenues to the payment of the increment bonds.

  1. Increment bonds shall be issued, administered, and regulated by ordinance adopted by the governing body which shall:
    1. Declare the necessity of the incremental bond issue;
    2. State the principal amount or maximum principal amount of the increment bonds to be issued;
    3. State the purpose of the increment bond issue;
    4. State or provide for the date of, and the dates and amounts or maximum amount of, maturities or principal payments on the increment bonds;
    5. State any provisions for a special fund, mandatory sinking fund, mandatory sinking fund redemption, or for redemption prior to maturity;
    6. Provide for the rate or rates of interest, or maximum rate or rates of interest, or the method for establishing the rate or rates of interest to be paid on the increment bonds;
    7. State any provision for a designated officer of the issuer to determine any of the specific terms required to be stated or provided for in this subsection, subject to any limitations stated in the proceedings;
    8. If the increment bonds are payable solely from incremental revenues, include a determination that the incremental revenues are adequate to make the debt charges so long as the increment bonds are outstanding; and
    9. Include any other provisions deemed appropriate by the governing body.
  2. Increment bonds issued pursuant to this section shall not mature on a date beyond the termination date of the development area or local development area.
  3. Increment bonds may also be issued to fund or refund all or any portion of outstanding increment bonds. Any increment bonds issued under this section shall mature as determined by the governing body consistent with the termination date.
  4. The provisions of KRS 66.021 , 66.031 , 66.041 , 66.045 , 66.071 , 66.091 , 66.121 , 66.131 , 66.141 , 66.151 , 66.171 , 66.181 , and 66.191 shall apply to the issuance of increment bonds insofar as they do not conflict with the provisions of KRS 65.7041 to 65.7083 . If they do conflict, the provisions of KRS 65.7041 to 65.7083 shall apply.

History. Enact. Acts 2007, ch. 95, § 10, effective March 23, 2007.

65.7061. Special fund to be pledged for retirement of increment bonds — Requirements governing disbursal of funds.

During any time when incremental revenues have been pledged pursuant to a local participation agreement or local development area agreement, or that increment bonds are outstanding, the city, county, or issuer, as the case may be, shall maintain a special fund, which shall be pledged for the retirement of increment bonds, if such bonds are outstanding, and the payment of costs related to a project in a development area or local development area, or providing redevelopment assistance in a development area.

  1. Officials charged with collecting revenues for any taxing district that has pledged incremental revenues under a local participation agreement or a local development area agreement shall, for each year a local participation agreement or local development area agreement is in effect or any increment bonds are outstanding with respect to a development area or local development area, submit those incremental revenues for deposit in the special fund. The amount of incremental revenues shall be determined under KRS 65.7083 .
  2. Funds deposited in a special fund shall be disbursed at the times and in the amounts required to pay the costs of any debt charges on incremental bonds, approved costs, and redevelopment assistance. However, there shall be no disbursements for other redevelopment assistance or approved costs in a development area or local development area, if the funds are required to pay debt charges on increment bonds.
  3. Amounts in a special fund which exceed the amount required to pay debt charges and, in a development area, and costs of redevelopment assistance in any fiscal year shall be used to provide for the retirement or defeasance of all or a portion of the remaining debt charges secured by the incremental revenues. Amounts beyond this may be used to pay the costs of additional projects or redevelopment assistance.

History. Enact. Acts 2007, ch. 95, § 11, effective March 23, 2007; 2008, ch. 178, § 9, effective July 15, 2008.

65.7063. Requirements for local participation agreements — Pledge of incremental revenues superior to other pledges of revenues.

  1. A local participation agreement shall be executed among the agencies and taxing districts involved in administering or providing financing or pledging incremental revenues to support the implementation of a development plan in a development area. The local participation agreement shall be adopted by a city or county by ordinance and by any other taxing authority or agency by resolution, and shall include but not be limited to the following provisions:
    1. Identification of the parties to the local participation agreement and the duties and responsibilities of each entity under the agreement;
    2. Specific identification of the incremental revenues released or pledged, or wage assessments pledged by type of tax by each taxing district;
    3. The anticipated benefit to be received by each taxing district for the release or pledge, including:
      1. A detailed summary of old revenues collected and projected new revenues for each taxing district on an annual basis for the term of the local participation agreement; and
      2. The maximum amount of incremental revenue to be paid by each taxing district and the maximum number of years the payment will be effective;
    4. A detailed description of the development area, including a legal description of the parcels included in the development area;
    5. A description of each proposed project that is the subject of a local participation agreement, including an estimate of the costs of construction, acquisition, and development;
    6. A requirement that pledged incremental revenues will be deposited in a special fund established pursuant to KRS 65.7061 , including the timing and procedure for depositing incremental revenues and other pledged amounts into the special fund;
    7. Terms of default and remedies, provided that no remedy shall permit the withholding by any party to the local participation agreement of any incremental revenues pledged to the special fund if increment bonds are outstanding that are secured by a pledge of those incremental revenues;
    8. The commencement date, activation date, and termination date; and
    9. Any other provisions not inconsistent with KRS 65.7041 to 65.7083 deemed necessary or appropriate by the parties to the agreement.
  2. Any pledge of incremental revenues in a local participation agreement shall be superior to any other pledge of revenues for any other purpose and shall, from the activation date to the termination date set forth in the local participation agreement, supersede any statute, ordinance, or resolution regarding the application or use of incremental revenues. An ordinance in conflict with a local participation agreement shall not be adopted while any increment bonds secured by that pledge remain outstanding. Ordinances or resolutions pledging incremental revenues on a subordinate basis to any existing pledges may be adopted.

History. Enact. Acts 2007, ch. 95, § 12, effective March 23, 2007; 2008, ch. 178, § 10, effective July 15, 2008.

65.7065. Service payment agreement — Power of city, county, or issuer to enter into agreement — Liens, priority, validity, enforceability, and termination.

  1. A city, county, or issuer may enter into a service payment agreement.
  2. The service payment agreement may provide that the city, county, or issuer shall have a lien on property described in the service payment agreement equal to the amount of periodic payments due under the service payment agreement. The service payment agreement may further provide that any lien created pursuant to this section shall be governed by the provisions set forth in KRS 91A.280 , provided that a lien created pursuant to this section shall not have the priority established in KRS 91A.280 in relation to an existing lien on the property covered by the agreement unless, prior to recording the service payment agreement, the lien holder under the service payment agreement provides notice of the lien created by the service payment agreement to the holder of the existing lien, and the holder of the existing lien consents to the priority in writing. If written consent is not obtained, the priority of the lien created under this subsection in relation to the prior lien shall be determined in the same manner as a mortgage lien under KRS 382.280 .
  3. A lien authorized by this section shall not be valid and enforceable until evidence of the lien has been recorded in the office of the county clerk. The lien shall commence upon the issuance of increment bonds or other obligations and shall continue until other funding sources pledged to and derived from the project that is the subject of the service payment agreement are sufficient to make, when due, all payments on the increment bonds or other obligations identified in the service payment agreement. Upon termination of a lien authorized by this section, a release shall be filed by the city, county, or issuer with the county clerk.

History. Enact. Acts 2007, ch. 95, § 13, effective March 23, 2007.

65.7067. Real property in development areas not eligible for assessment moratoriums under KRS 99.600.

Real property located within a development area shall not be eligible for participation in a program granting property assessment or reassessment moratoriums pursuant to KRS 99.600 .

History. Enact. Acts 2007, ch. 95, § 14, effective March 23, 2007.

65.7069. State Tax Increment Financing Commission — Members — Powers and duties — Annual report.

  1. The State Tax Increment Financing Commission is hereby created as an independent agency of the state within the meaning of KRS Chapter 12. The commission shall be composed of the following members:
    1. The secretary of the Finance and Administration Cabinet, who shall be the chair thereof;
    2. The state budget director;
    3. The secretary of the Cabinet for Economic Development;
    4. The secretary of the Tourism, Arts and Heritage Cabinet;
    5. The chair of the Kentucky Economic Development Finance Authority;
    6. The dean of the University of Kentucky Gatton College of Business and Economics; and
    7. The dean of the University of Louisville College of Business and Public Administration.
  2. The commission shall review all applications for state participation in tax increment financing projects and shall approve those proposals it determines meet the requirements established by KRS 65.7071 , 65.7073 , 65.7075 , 65.7077 , 65.7079 , and 65.7081 .
  3. Members of the commission shall serve without compensation, but may receive reimbursement for their actual and necessary expenses incurred in the performance of their duties.
  4. Any four (4) members of the commission shall constitute a quorum and shall by majority vote be authorized to transact any and all business of the commission.
  5. The commission shall meet at least two (2) times each year, but may meet more frequently upon the call of the chair or a request made by any four (4) members of the commission.
  6. The commission shall be attached to the Finance and Administration Cabinet for administrative purposes and staff services. All cabinets, departments, divisions, agencies, and officers of the Commonwealth shall furnish the commission with necessary assistance, resources, information, records, or advice as it may require to fulfill its duties.
  7. The commission shall prepare bylaws and shall establish procedures applicable to the operations of the commission.
  8. The commission shall have the authority to promulgate any regulations necessary for the administration of KRS 65.7069 , 65.7071 , 65.7073 , 65.7075 , 65.7077 , 65.7079 , and 65.7081 in accordance with KRS Chapter 13A.
  9. On or before February 15, 2008, and each year thereafter, the commission shall provide the Governor and the Legislative Research Commission with an annual report, which shall include but shall not be limited to the following for the prior calendar year:
    1. A list of applications considered by the commission during the prior calendar year, including the name of the applicant, a description of the project, the local tax revenues or other revenues pledged, the level of participation requested from the Commonwealth, and whether the application was approved; and
    2. For each approved application, the report shall include:
      1. The total commitment made by the Commonwealth, detailed by type of tax and estimated incremental revenues pledged for each tax;
      2. The length of the commitment; and
      3. The portion of the development area included in the project.

History. Enact. Acts 2007, ch. 95, § 15, effective March 23, 2007; 2009, ch. 16, § 11, effective June 25, 2009.

65.7071. State tax increment financing participation programs — Application requirements for a local government to request state participation — Commission review requirements — Pledge limitations — Projects grant agreements required — Independent consultant’s report. [Repealed, reenacted and amended.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 2007, ch. 95, § 16, effective March 23, 2007) was repealed, reenacted and amended as KRS 154.30-030 , effective July 15, 2008.

65.7073. Commonwealth Participation Program for State Real Property Ad Valorem Tax Revenues — Criteria for state participation — Qualifying expenditures — Pledge limitations — Commission review — Required determinations by the commission — Project grant agreement required. [Repealed, reenacted and amended.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 2007, ch. 95, § 16, effective March 23, 2007) was repealed, reenacted and amended as KRS 154.30-040 , effective July 15, 2008.

65.7075. Signature Project Program — Purpose — Two programs — Criteria for state participation — Qualifying expenditures — Commission review — Required determinations by the commission — Pledge limitations — Project grant agreement required. [Repealed, reenacted and amended.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 2007, ch. 95, § 18, effective March 23, 2007) was repealed, reenacted and amended as KRS 154.30-050 , effective July 15, 2008.

65.7077. Commonwealth Participation Program for Mixed-Use Redevelopment in Blighted Urban Areas — Definitions — Criteria for state participation — Qualifying expenditures — Commission review — Required determinations by the commission — Pledge limitations — Project grant agreement required. [Repealed, reenacted and amended.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 2007, ch. 95, § 19, effective March 23, 2007) was repealed, reenacted and amended as KRS 154.30-060 , effective July 15, 2008.

65.7079. Term and conditions of project grant agreements to be negotiated between commission and agency — Provisions of agreement — Pledge of incremental revenues superior to other pledges of revenues — Renewal and discontinuance of agreement. [Repealed, reenacted and amended.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 2007, ch. 95, § 20, effective March 23, 2007) was repealed, reenacted and amended as KRS 154.30-070 , effective July 15, 2008.

65.7081. Requirement that minimal capital investment be made prior to the release of incremental revenues — Escrow account — Duties of office to monitor agreements, track revenues, and prepare reports for commission. [Repealed, reenacted and amended.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 2007, ch. 95, § 21, effective March 23, 2007) was repealed, reenacted and amended as KRS 154.30-080 , effective July 15, 2008.

65.7083. Payment and release of incremental revenues — Duties of local taxing districts and Department of Revenue.

  1. Any agency that enters into a local participation agreement or local development area agreement for the release of incremental revenues during the period of a local participation agreement or local development area agreement shall, after each calendar year, in which a local participation agreement or local development area agreement is in effect, notify each taxing district obligated under the local participation agreement or local development area agreement that incremental revenues are due and, in consultation with each taxing district, the agency shall determine the amount of incremental revenues due from each taxing district.
  2. Upon notice from the agency, each taxing district obligated under a local participation agreement or local development area agreement shall release to the agency the incremental revenues due under the local participation agreement or local development area agreement. The agency shall certify to the authority on a calendar year basis the amount of incremental revenues and occupational license fees collected where applicable.
  3. The local taxing district shall have no obligation to refund or otherwise return any of the incremental revenues to the taxpayer from whom the incremental revenues arose or are attributable. Further, no additional incremental revenues resulting from audit, amended returns, or other activity for any period shall be transferred after the initial release to the agency of the taxing district’s increment for that period.

History. Enact. Acts 2007, ch. 95, § 22, effective March 23, 2007; 2008, ch. 178, § 11, effective July 15, 2008.

Ambulance Service Contracts

65.710. Contract requirements.

In order to enable cities and counties to fulfill their obligations regarding the public health, safety, and welfare, the General Assembly does hereby allow cities and counties to contract with private persons, partnerships, or corporations for providing ambulance service to the residents of such cities and counties subject to the following conditions:

  1. These contracts must be in writing and must be approved by the legislative body of the city if a city is party thereto, or by the fiscal court in case a county is party thereto.
  2. No contract shall be made with an ambulance service or other organization or person unless the contract shall stipulate that at least one (1) person on each ambulance run shall possess currently valid emergency medical technician certification.
  3. All contracts made with any ambulance service or other organization or person shall stipulate that all vehicles used for operation of the service comply with vehicle and equipment administrative regulations issued by the Cabinet for Health and Family Services.
  4. All contracts shall include the stipulation that at least two (2) trained persons, one (1) driver and one (1) attendant, shall be carried on each ambulance for each ambulance call which is covered by the contract.
  5. No contract shall be made for a period of time greater than four (4) years.
  6. The vehicle, equipment, training, and personnel requirements of subsections (2), (3), and (4) of this section shall also apply to the operation of an ambulance service by a city or a county or by a city and a county jointly.
  7. No provisions of this section shall be construed as to limit the power of any city or county to contract for or operate ambulance services under requirements which are stricter than those of this section, or to require insurance, or bonding of contractors, provided these provisions are not in conflict with the requirements of this section.

History. Enact. Acts 1970, ch. 192, § 1; 1980, ch. 119, § 7, effective July 15, 1980; 1998, ch. 426, § 91, effective July 15, 1998; 2005, ch. 99, § 109, effective June 20, 2005; 2019 ch. 44, § 4, effective June 27, 2019; 2020 ch. 91, § 49, effective April 15, 2020.

Opinions of Attorney General.

The county could not contribute county funds to the operation of funeral home ambulance services not covered by contracts pursuant to this section and KRS 65.730 (now repealed). OAG 72-202 .

The provision allowing cities and counties to contract for ambulance service is permissive only, and furnishing of service is not mandatory. OAG 72-202 .

Since KRS 65.730 (now repealed) requires that the standards set out in this section must be met by the county in the operation of county ambulance service, a county could not operate an ambulance service even with the best equipment available if it did not meet the standards; moreover, there is a possibility that the members of the fiscal court might be individually liable if they are negligent in failing to meet a public duty to use equipment of sufficient standards. OAG 73-160 .

A county can either contract for or operate an ambulance service for its citizens and, since section 103(a)(1)(D) of Title I of the revenue sharing act (31 USCS § 1222(a)(1)(D)) authorizes expenditures for health purposes, revenue sharing funds may be used for this purpose. OAG 73-162 .

If the fiscal court believes that the health and welfare of the counties and citizens demand, it can engage in an ambulance service contract without submitting it to the vote of the people subject to its levying the franchise on bid pursuant to section 164 of the Kentucky Constitution. OAG 73-246 .

In a county ambulance program a small fee or service charge could be made for each call under the broad legislative authority and police powers given under KRS 67.083 . OAG 73-246 .

In view of the fact that a county can only levy ad valorem taxes and license taxes the proposed special tax by the county to fund the county ambulance program could not be levied. OAG 73-246 .

County establishment of an ambulance service with some private organization or person could not be legally placed on the ballot since there is no constitutional or statutory authority for such placing and it would conflict with this section. OAG 73-246 .

Since the growing ambulance problem and the premise that the counties’ exercise of their police power to provide ambulance service shouldn’t be impaired by the Bureau of Highways toll collections, it is believed that the county and bureau interests can be balanced to provide both toll revenue and public health. OAG 73-349 .

A city of the fourth class may make a grant to a corporation which provides ambulance service provided it is done on a contractual basis to insure that the inhabitants of the city are furnished ambulance service. OAG 74-301 .

Where an ambulance does not conform to the statutory standards set forth in this section, county cannot subsidize such ambulance service operating on nonconforming licenses, in the county. OAG 75-158 .

Providing of ambulance services, under any of the options, is permissive only. OAG 75-190 .

Where a city merely contracts for services from a private ambulance firm, it would not be liable for negligence by such firm. OAG 75-284 .

A county as a political subdivision and arm of state government is protected by its sovereign immunity from liability for negligence by an ambulance service which it subsidizes. OAG 75-284 .

There is no statutory requirement that firms operating an ambulance service for hire by a city or county government carry malpractice insurance against civil liability for negligence. OAG 75-284 .

Under the express wording of this section and KRS 65.730 (now repealed) the county, through the fiscal court, may contract directly with a private person, partnership or corporation to provide ambulance service for the county’s inhabitants, however, this is subject to the fiscal court’s letting the franchise contract on bids pursuant to Ky. Const., § 164; moreover, the fiscal court may authorize the county judge (now county judge/executive), in connection with an ambulance franchise ordinance, to sign the awarded contract on behalf of the county. OAG 76-571 .

Where private persons conducting an ambulance service receive a county subsidy, the fiscal court could stipulate in the contract with the providers of the service that the charges to be collected from users are to be considered debts owing unto the county. OAG 76-673 .

Where constitutional requirements regarding debt restrictions and voter approval are observed, a county or city could grant an ambulance service franchise for longer than one year. OAG 77-483 .

Revenue sharing funds of counties may be used to subsidize both private and nonprofit agencies providing emergency ambulance services to counties under contract agreements pursuant to this section and KRS 65.730 (now repealed). OAG 77-501 .

Coal severance tax funds of counties may not be used to subsidize either private or nonprofit agencies providing emergency ambulance services to counties under contract agreements pursuant to this section and KRS 65.730 (now repealed). OAG 77-501 .

A franchise contract relating to ambulance service can be and should be limited to emergency ambulance service. OAG 78-360 .

KRS 65.730 (repealed) required that the standards mentioned in this section must be met by a county, whether it operated the ambulance service itself directly or whether it contracted for such service. OAG 78-506 .

There is nothing in this section that suggests that the fiscal courts enacting an ordinance relating to ambulance service is mandatory. OAG 78-557 .

Where a county emergency ambulance service franchise would be up for bids September 1, 1979, but would be only for a term of three months, but where it had been determined that no one would bid for a franchise for only 90 days, the county could negotiate a contract with the current franchisee, since there would be no contract for a term of years, and this section provides for contracting for less than a term of years. OAG 79-428 .

A county cannot grant a franchise to a private ambulance service for a term of a year or years with the original bid winner being given an option to negotiate exclusively to provide the next year’s service without the necessity to rebid in each succeeding year because if a fiscal court grants a franchise, the literal terms of Section 164 of the Kentucky Constitution must be followed and the bidding requirement is mandatory for each new term. OAG 80-258 .

A county cannot incorporate under KRS Chapter 273 and grant that corporation a long-term franchise to negotiate with private firms on a yearly basis to provide ambulance service to the county, because the fiscal court, by a KRS Chapter 273 creation, cannot circumvent the express language of Ky. Const., § 164. OAG 80-258 .

While there is no statutory authority for the fiscal court to enter into a contract to operate a county ambulance service with the office of the sheriff, there is nothing to prevent such a contract with the sheriff as an individual person, apart from his sheriff’s office and staff, provided he can carry on both functions in the manner required by law and the contract; however, while there is no express statutory requirement that a sheriff devote all of his time to the sheriff’s office, it could be implicit that in the broad range of statutory duties of the sheriff is the requirement that he devote full time to his duties but only the courts can resolve such question; moreover, the money received by the sheriff for this county ambulance service would have had to be added to his regular county sheriff’s office fee income to apply the rubber dollar maximum and employes working for the sheriff in connection with the ambulance service must be private individuals. OAG 80-574 .

A fiscal court may reasonably restrict its ambulance services to emergency situations only. OAG 82-239 .

In general, any county may, in the discretion of the fiscal court, establish a county emergency ambulance service by contracting for it and granting a franchise under Ky. Const., § 164, or may establish an emergency ambulance service district pursuant to KRS 108.100 et seq., or may establish a county emergency ambulance service directly operated by the county, but the fiscal court is not mandatorily required to provide emergency ambulance service under present statutes. OAG 82-239 .

While a city cannot legally donate or contribute public funds to a private corporation over which it has no control, with certain exceptions where the state legislature has specifically authorized such donations, the city could contract with a nonprofit organization to render paramedic services to its citizens the same as it is specifically authorized to do with respect to contracting for emergency ambulance service pursuant to KRS 65.710 to 65.730 (KRS 65.730 is now repealed). The city could also provide for paramedic service in conjunction with the operation of its own emergency ambulance service on behalf of the citizens of the city. OAG 82-366 .

An ambulance service may be carried on in the county under one of three methods: (1) ambulance service under a county franchise to private persons or a corporation under this section, provided such franchise is let under competitive bidding pursuant to Ky. Const., § 164; (2) ambulance service as a direct county operation under its police power as found in KRS 67.083(3)(t); and (3) ambulance service provided by an ambulance district as established under KRS 108.080 et seq. OAG 82-601 .

Since the county’s granting a franchise for ambulance service and the city’s granting a franchise are two different exercises of power, the city’s letting of an ambulance service within that city (ambulances traveling over city streets) will in no way conflict with the fiscal court’s authority to grant an ambulance franchise relating to ambulance service within the unincorporated boundaries of the county, and involving ambulances traveling over roads in that area. OAG 82-601 .

The one-year maximum contract period of subdivision (5) of this section governing ambulance service contracts is inoperative in light of Ky. Const., § 164 which establishes a 20-year maximum period for franchises. OAG 82-601 ; OAG 83-349 .

This section provides for only cities and counties contracting for ambulance services; this section, because of its express and literal language, cannot apply to an ambulance service district created under KRS Chapter 108. Clearly the statutes dealing with the ambulance service district envision the district’s furnishing ambulance services directly, or, as an option under KRS 108.140(9), the district’s contracting with private persons, partnerships or corporations for providing ambulance service to residents of the district. OAG 83-172 .

The fiscal court had the authority under Ky. Const., §§ 163 and 164 to issue a franchise for the furnishing of ambulance service to a private person or corporation after the bidding procedure required by Ky. Const., § 164. OAG 83-222 .

Where the person operating an ambulance service in a county had received no franchise, and the fiscal court did not make use of Ky. Const., §§ 163 and 164, so that no bidding procedure was used by fiscal court, the ambulance service was not operating constitutionally; consequently, the person operating the ambulance service was subject to a mandamus suit in the local Circuit Court, in which the fiscal court could seek to compel him to cease his operation of an ambulance service on county roads. OAG 83-222 .

Where a county is funding its ambulance contract from the county’s ad valorem taxes, it would have to include all of the county, including corporate areas within the county, as a service area, since the ambulance purpose is common to the entire county. OAG 84-323 .

An ambulance service contract can be let under this section, provided such franchise is let out under competitive bidding, pursuant to Ky. Const., § 164; such a franchise may be granted for up to 20 years. If the subject contract was not let under competitive bidding, it would be void. OAG 84-323 .

Where a county entered into a contract for the furnishing of ambulance service, pursuant to this section, the ambulance service involved a purpose common to the entire county; thus, unless such contract embraced all citizens within the county, including those who lived in cities within the county, Ky. Const., §§ 2 and 171 would be violated. OAG 84-323 .

65.720. Construction of contract provisions.

No provisions of KRS 65.710 shall be construed as to limit the power of any city or county to contract for services under requirements which are stricter than those listed in KRS 65.710 and 65.720 , or to require insurance or bonding of contractors, provided such provisions are not in conflict with the requirements of KRS 65.710 and 65.720 .

History. Enact. Acts 1970, ch. 192, § 2; 1980, ch. 188, § 36, effective July 15, 1980.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Kentucky Mandatory Requirement.

Kentucky Constitution, § 103, KRS 62.050 and 67.720 are mandatory in nature and substantial compliance with these provisions is not sufficient. Commonwealth ex rel. Stidham v. Henson, 887 S.W.2d 353, 1994 Ky. LEXIS 111 ( Ky. 1994 ).

65.730. Additional county powers. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1970, ch. 192, § 3) was repealed by Acts 1978, ch. 118, § 19, effective June 17, 1978.

Emergency Telephone Service

65.750. Definitions for KRS 65.750 to 65.760.

As used in KRS 65.750 to 65.760 :

  1. “911 emergency service” means a system that provides the end user of a service connection with emergency services by using the digits 9-1-1, directs emergency calls to the appropriate public safety answering points based on the geographic location from which the call originated, and provides the capability for automatic number identification and automatic location identification features in accordance with the FCC order. As used in KRS 65.760 , the term “911 emergency service” includes the terms “next generation 911” as defined in KRS 65.7621 , “wireless enhanced 911 system,” “wireless enhanced 911 service,” and “wireless E911 service” as used in KRS 65.7621 to 65.7643 ;
  2. “Automatic call distribution” or “ACD” means a system that automatically distributes incoming calls to PSAP attendants in the order the calls are received;
  3. “Automatic number identification” or “ANI” means a feature that allows for the automatic display of the 911 caller’s ten (10) digit number, or equivalent, in accordance with applicable FCC rules and regulations;
  4. “Automatic location identification” or “ALI” means a feature by which the location or estimated location of the calling party is made available to a PSAP in accordance with applicable FCC rules and regulations;
  5. “Automatic location identification data management system” or “ALI/DBS” means a system of manual procedures and computer programs used to create, store, and update the data required for ALI in support of enhanced 911;
  6. “Automatic vehicle location” or “AVL” means a system used to track emergency responder vehicles;
  7. “Dispersed private telephone system” or “DPTS” means a multiline, shared tenant system or PBX used for the purpose of reselling telephone service to residential customers and whose connection to a telephone network is capable of carrying emergency calls from more than one (1) specific location within a structure or structures but does not mean a multiline, shared tenant system or PBX owned and operated by a state agency or used in providing service within a hotel or motel;
  8. “FCC order” means the Order of the Federal Communications Commission, FCC Docket No. 94-102, adopted effective October 1, 1996, including any subsequent amendments or modifications thereof;
  9. “Fully enhanced 911 emergency telephone service” means a telephone network feature that selectively routes calls placed to the national 911 emergency number to the proper public service answering points (PSAPs) and provides the PSAP with a voice connection and ANI and ALI information;
  10. “Geographic information systems” or “GIS” means a system for capturing, storing, displaying, analyzing, and managing data, and associated attributes which are spatially referenced;
  11. “Law Enforcement Information Network of Kentucky and the National Crime Information Center” or “LINK/NCIC” means two (2) systems used by law enforcement and emergency communications personnel for short messaging between agencies and to request vehicle, driver, and criminal history checks;
  12. “Local government” means any city, county, urban-county government, consolidated local government, unified local government, or charter county government;
  13. “Master street address guide” or “MSAG” means a database of street names and house number ranges within their associated communities defining emergency services zones and their associated emergency service numbers used by PSAPs to enable proper routing of 911 calls;
  14. “Private branch exchange” or “PBX” means a privately owned switch system that connects calls to a telephone company;
  15. “Public safety answering point” or “PSAP” means a communications facility that is assigned the responsibility to receive 911 calls originating in a given area and, as appropriate, to dispatch public safety services or to extend, transfer, or relay 911 calls to appropriate public safety agencies;
  16. “Service connection” means the transmission, conveyance, or routing of voice, data, video, text, or any other information signal of the purchaser’s choosing by any medium or method now in existence or later devised with the ability to directly connect the user to 911 emergency services;
  17. “Service supplier” means a person or entity that administers, maintains, and operates the ALI/DBS and may include telephone companies that provide local exchange telephone service to a telephone subscriber;
  18. “Station identification number” or “SIN” means a number that a DPTS uses to identify a specific station on the switch; and
  19. “Interconnected Voice over Internet Protocol” or “VoIP” means a service that:
    1. Enables real-time, two-way voice communications;
    2. Requires a broadband connection from the user’s location;
    3. Requires Internet protocol-compatible customer premises equipment; and
    4. Permits users generally to receive calls that originate on the public switched telephone network and terminate calls to the public switched telephone network.

History. Enact. Acts 1984, ch. 154, § 1, effective July 13, 1984; 1998, ch. 521, § 1, effective July 15, 1998; 1998, ch. 535, § 13, effective July 15, 1998; 2016 ch. 111, § 2, effective July 15, 2016; 2019 ch. 108, § 1, effective June 27, 2019.

Opinions of Attorney General.

The funds received as a result of the implementation of KRS 65.750 through 65.760 may only be utilized in connection with the establishment and maintenance of a 911 emergency telephone system. OAG 91-182 .

The term “911 emergency services,” as used in subsection (3) of KRS 65.760 , means, in the context of its use, “911 emergency telephone services,” as such service is the subject of KRS 65.750 to 65.760 and such “911 emergency telephone service” includes the personnel necessary to receive a call to 911, and to refer (or dispatch) the call to a responding agency, and the dispatch personnel necessary to provide 911 telephone service on a twenty-four (24) hour basis may properly be funded from funds collected to provide such service in accordance with KRS 65.760. OAG 96-33 .

65.751. Legislative findings and declarations regarding all emergency services.

The General Assembly hereby finds and declares that:

  1. The general welfare and safety of the citizens of the Commonwealth of Kentucky in emergency situations depend in large measure upon a fully functional 911 emergency services system;
  2. It is in the best interests of the Commonwealth to provide adequate resources to local governments for the effective delivery of life-saving 911 emergency services;
  3. The authority granted and the purposes to be accomplished by KRS 65.750 to 65.760 and 65.7621 to 65.7643 are proper governmental and public purposes necessary for the provision of 911 emergency services to the citizens of the Commonwealth; and
  4. The CMRS service charges, as defined in KRS 65.7621(10), are vital to the provision of 911 emergency services to the citizens of the Commonwealth and are intended to apply to each CMRS connection regardless of whether that connection is prepaid, postpaid, or uses free minutes.

HISTORY: 2016 ch. 111, § 1, effective July 15, 2016.

65.752. Requirements for enhanced 911 emergency service — Privacy of information.

  1. Any DPTS located in an area that has adopted enhanced 911 emergency service shall within three (3) years of the date of its adoption, or if already adopted within three (3) years after July 15, 1998, be able to:
    1. Operate effectively within an enhanced 911 system;
    2. Transmit a SIN for the station that directly dials the emergency number 911 to the service supplier; and
    3. Provide the service supplier with the following system information that shall be updated within five (5) business days if changes occur within the system:
      1. Number of incoming trunk connections to the enhanced 911 system; and
      2. SIN, sublocation, such as floor or apartment number, if applicable, and street address of each station that may originate an emergency call.
  2. In areas where fully enhanced 911 service has been implemented, the service supplier shall, at a minimum, make the verified ANI and ALI provided by the DPTS available to a PSAP for a fully enhanced 911 call.
  3. In areas where fully enhanced 911 service has been implemented, the service supplier shall maintain the confidentiality and privacy of all information contained in the ALI/DBS, including any information that identifies telephone calls made from extensions on DPTS, except when the release of the information is ordered by a court of competent jurisdiction.
  4. In areas where enhanced 911 service has been implemented, an employee of a PSAP shall not retrieve or disclose ALI information except in response to a 911 call or for the purpose of maintaining the ALI database, unless ordered by a court of competent jurisdiction.

History. Enact. Acts 1998, ch. 521, § 2, effective July 15, 1998.

Opinions of Attorney General.

The Division of Public Safety, operating as a Public Safety Answering Point for the purpose of receiving 911 calls and dispatching public safety services as appropriate, is not foreclosed from releasing recordings of 911 calls under the narrow prohibition on disclosure of Automatic Location Identification information codified at KRS 65.752(4). Further, KRS 61.878(1)(a) may only be properly invoked where the facts of a specific case warrant invocation, and not as a matter of policy; the facts in this case do not support the denial of the request. OAG 04-ORD-161.

65.754. Penalties for violations of KRS 65.752.

  1. Any owner, employee, or agent of a DPTS that knowingly or wantonly violates the provisions of KRS 65.752(2) shall be fined not less than twenty-five dollars ($25) nor more than two hundred dollars ($200) or imprisoned in the county jail for not more than ninety (90) days, or both. Each day the violation continues shall be considered a separate offense.
  2. Any owner, employee, or agent of a DPTS or a service supplier that violates the provisions of KRS 65.752(3) shall be subject to the following penalties:
    1. For a first offense, a Class A misdemeanor; and
    2. For a second and subsequent offense, a Class D felony.

History. Enact. Acts 1998, ch. 521, § 3, effective July 15, 1998.

65.755. Digits reserved for emergency telephone number.

Every telephone company within the Commonwealth shall reserve the initial digits 9-1-1 for use as an emergency telephone number. The company shall assign this number within an exchange only to a public body or other applicant for the establishment of 911 emergency service.

History. Enact. Acts 1984, ch. 154, § 2, effective July 13, 1984; 2016 ch. 111, § 25, effective July 15, 2016.

65.760. Establishment of 911 emergency telephone service by local government — Sources and disposition of revenues — Funding.

  1. Any local government may establish 911 emergency service upon approval of the governing body of the city, county, or urban-county government and may adopt regulations concerning the provision of this service by ordinance.
  2. Any local government, or any combination thereof, may with the approval of their governing bodies enter into an interlocal cooperation agreement creating a joint 911 emergency service.
    1. The funds required by a local government to establish and operate 911 emergency service, or to participate in joint service with other local governments, may be obtained through the levy of any special tax, license, or fee not in conflict with the Constitution and statutes of this state. The special tax, license, or fee may include a subscriber charge for 911 emergency service that shall be levied on an individual exchange-line basis, limited to a maximum of twenty-five (25) exchange lines per account per government entity. (3) (a) The funds required by a local government to establish and operate 911 emergency service, or to participate in joint service with other local governments, may be obtained through the levy of any special tax, license, or fee not in conflict with the Constitution and statutes of this state. The special tax, license, or fee may include a subscriber charge for 911 emergency service that shall be levied on an individual exchange-line basis, limited to a maximum of twenty-five (25) exchange lines per account per government entity.
    2. Any private commercial telephone service or owner of a dispersed private telephone system (DPTS) that provides local and 911 emergency service to subscribers for compensation shall collect and remit the subscriber charge to the local government on the same basis as the primary local exchange carrier, except that this requirement shall not apply to a state agency that currently maintains an independent 911 system with its own public safety answering point.
    3. Any provider of interconnected VoIP local and 911 emergency services to subscribers for compensation shall collect and remit any special tax, license, or fee levied under paragraph (a) of this subsection to the local government, except that the special tax, license, or fee levied under paragraph (a) of this subsection shall not apply to a commercial mobile radio service subject to a fee imposed under KRS 65.7629 or 65.7634 .
  3. All revenues raised from any special tax, license, or fee levied under subsection (3) of this section shall be expended only as provided in this subsection and only to the extent that the expenditure is directly attributable to the establishment, operation, or maintenance of a PSAP, the delivery of 911 emergency services, or the provision of wireless enhanced 911 services, as follows:
    1. The hiring of personnel;
    2. The following costs for employees:
      1. Salaries;
      2. Fringe benefits;
      3. MSAG coordination;
      4. Uniforms; and
      5. Addressing and database development and management;
    3. Facility costs for the following expenses:
      1. Capital improvements for construction, remodeling, or expansion;
      2. Lease or rental payments;
      3. Utilities;
      4. Heating and air conditioning;
      5. Fire suppression systems;
      6. Security systems;
      7. Cleaning and maintenance;
      8. Emergency power and uninterruptable power equipment;
      9. Insurance;
      10. Office supplies;
      11. Printing and copying services; and
      12. Furniture;
    4. Training and memberships in professional associations, including:
      1. Vendor-provided training;
      2. Conferences;
      3. Necessary travel and lodging;
      4. On-the-job training; and
      5. Memberships in 911-related associations;
    5. Costs for the following equipment shall be allowed to the extent its function is directly attributable to the provision of 911 emergency services, whether on the premises or remotely located:
      1. 911 controllers, equipment, or software;
      2. 911 trunks or administrative lines for the 911 center;
      3. Remote 911 hardware or modems;
      4. ACD systems or other call management facilities and software;
      5. Call-time stamping or other clock functions;
      6. Computer workstations;
      7. Telephone and related services to support the receipt of 911 contact from the deaf and hard of hearing community;
      8. Voice and data recording systems;
      9. Radio systems, including consoles and any fixed radio asset that is not mobile or portable and that is used for 911 and emergency response;
      10. CAD, GIS mapping, paging, mobile data, LINK/NCIC, or AVL systems and associated databases;
      11. Network connectivity;
      12. Software licenses; and
      13. Maintenance or service agreements for equipment or software listed in this subsection;
    6. Vehicle costs for the following, either as reimbursement to an employee for the use of a private vehicle or direct costs for a vehicle assigned to the agency:
      1. MSAG development and maintenance;
      2. GIS data development, verification, and testing; and
      3. Public education;
    7. Costs for the following professional services:
      1. Legal;
      2. Architectural;
      3. Auditing; and
      4. Consultation; and
    8. Costs for public education regarding the proper use of 911 emergency services.
  4. A local government shall not use revenues from any special tax, license, or fee levied under subsection (3) of this section for personnel costs, facility costs, training and membership costs, equipment costs, vehicle costs, professional services costs, public education costs, nor any of the following costs, unless the expense is directly attributable to the delivery of 911 emergency services:
    1. Personnel costs for the following personnel, unless directly functioning as PSAP staff:
      1. Law enforcement;
      2. Emergency medical services personnel;
      3. Fire protection personnel;
      4. Emergency management staff; and
      5. Shared support or technical staff;
    2. Facility costs for the following purposes and facilities, except for that portion used for the delivery of 911 emergency services:
      1. Capital and furnishing costs for facilities whose primary purpose is not the delivery of 911 emergency services;
      2. Facilities primarily intended for use by police, fire, emergency medical services, or other emergency management personnel; and
      3. Facilities providing general offices for local government operations;
    3. Training and membership costs for the following purposes:
      1. Costs for training for staff not directly involved in the delivery of 911 emergency services or courses whose content is not intended to increase the knowledge, skills, and abilities of 911 personnel with regard to delivery of 911 emergency services; and
      2. Costs for memberships in organizations or associations whose primary purpose is not public safety communications or the delivery of 911 emergency services;
    4. The following hardware, software, or peripheral costs:
      1. Law enforcement, fire protection, emergency medical services, or jail record management systems;
      2. Word processing and other general computer applications;
      3. GIS applications providing data layers not needed for the location of emergency calls or other general mapping and locations services for government operations;
      4. Court information systems;
      5. Field equipment used outside of the PSAP by emergency responders or other government personnel for radio, paging, mobile data, LINK/NCIC, ACD, or AVL systems;
      6. Internet connectivity for an application listed in this subsection;
      7. A maintenance or service agreement for an application listed in this subsection; and
      8. A software license for an application listed in this subsection;
    5. The cost of an emergency response or other government vehicle;
    6. Costs for professional services; and
    7. Costs for public education.
  5. The governing body may apply for and accept federal moneys and may accept contributions and donations from any source for the purpose of funding 911 emergency service.
  6. Nothing in this section shall preclude other means of establishing or funding a 911 emergency service within any local area or exchange, nor require the operation of such service by any local government.

History. Enact. Acts 1984, ch. 154, § 3, effective July 13, 1984; 1986, ch. 114, § 1, effective July 15, 1986; 1998, ch. 521, § 4, effective July 15, 1998; 2016 ch. 111, § 3, effective July 15, 2016.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Reasonable relationship.

Fees authorized by Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 65.760 had to bear some reasonable relationship to the benefit received. Greater Cincinnati/Northern Ky. Apt. Ass'n v. Campbell County Fiscal Court, 479 S.W.3d 603, 2015 Ky. LEXIS 1946 ( Ky. 2015 ).

Fee imposed by a county to fund its 911 service, which replaced a land line subscriber charge with an annual service fee levied upon each occupied individual residential and commercial unit, was a constitutional and statutorily valid exercise of its authority. Greater Cincinnati/Northern Ky. Apt. Ass'n v. Campbell County Fiscal Court, 479 S.W.3d 603, 2015 Ky. LEXIS 1946 ( Ky. 2015 ).

2. 911 fee valid.

Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 65.760(3) is a specific provision that expressly authorizes the use of fees to fund 911 emergency telephone services, demonstrates the General Assembly's specific intent to permit local governments to fund 911 telephone services through the imposition of fees, and does not require that the fee be based on use. Greater Cincinnati/Northern Ky. Apt. Ass'n v. Campbell County Fiscal Court, 479 S.W.3d 603, 2015 Ky. LEXIS 1946 ( Ky. 2015 ).

NOTES TO UNPUBLISHED DECISIONS

1. Invalid User Fee.

It was error to grant summary judgment holding a fee imposed on water meters to fund a 911 service was a valid user fee because there was no direct relationship between the fee and the service provided, so the fee was not a valid user fee. City of Lancaster v. Garrard County, 2014 Ky. App. LEXIS 120 (Ky. Ct. App.), sub. op., 2014 Ky. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1054 (Ky. Ct. App. July 3, 2014).

Opinions of Attorney General.

The funds received as a result of the implementation of KRS 65.750 through 65.760 may only be utilized in connection with the establishment and maintenance of a 911 emergency telephone system. OAG 91-182 .

The term “911 emergency services,” as used in subsection (3) of this section, means, in the context of its use, “911 emergency telephone services,” as such service is the subject of KRS 65.750 to 65.760 and such “911 emergency telephone service” includes the personnel necessary to receive a call to 911, and to refer (or dispatch) the call to a responding agency, and the dispatch personnel necessary to provide 911 telephone service on a twenty-four (24) hour basis may properly be funded from funds collected to provide such service in accordance with this section. OAG 96-33 .

Wireless Enhanced Emergency 911 Systems

65.7621. Definitions for KRS 65.7621 to 65.7643. [Effective until July 15, 2020]

As used in KRS 65.7621 to 65.7643 , unless the context requires otherwise:

  1. “Administrator” means the person who serves as the state 911 coordinator, the executive director of the Kentucky 911 Services Board, and the state administrator of CMRS emergency telecommunications under KRS 65.7625 ;
  2. “Automatic location identification”, or “ALI” means a feature by which the location or estimated location of the calling party is made available to a PSAP in accordance with applicable FCC rules and regulations;
  3. “Automatic number identification”, or “ANI” means a feature that allows for the automatic display of the 911 caller’s ten-digit number, or equivalent, in accordance with applicable FCC rules and regulations;
  4. “CMRS” means commercial mobile radio service under Sections 3(27) and 332(d) of the Federal Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. secs. 151 et seq., and the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, as it existed on August 10, 1993. The term includes the term “wireless” and service provided by any wireless real time two-way voice communication device, including radio-telephone communications used in cellular telephone service, personal communications service, and the functional or competitive equivalent of a radio-telephone communications line used in cellular telephone service, a personal communications service, or a network radio access line;
  5. Board” means the Kentucky 911 Services Board;
  6. “CMRS connection” means a mobile handset telephone number assigned to a CMRS customer;
  7. “CMRS customer” means an end user to whom a mobile handset telephone number is assigned and to whom CMRS is provided in return for compensation;
  8. “CMRS Fund” means the commercial mobile radio service emergency telecommunications fund;
  9. “CMRS provider” means a person or entity who provides CMRS to an end user. The term includes both facilities-based resellers and nonfacilities-based resellers;
  10. “CMRS service charges” means the CMRS postpaid service charge, the CMRS prepaid service charge, and the CMRS service charge fee levied under KRS 65.7636 ;
  11. CMRS postpaid service charge” means the CMRS emergency telephone service charge fee levied under KRS 65.7629(3) and collected under KRS 65.7635 ;
  12. “CMRS prepaid service charge” means the fee imposed on prepaid wireless telecommunications service under KRS 65.7634 and collected under KRS 142.100 to 142.135 ;
  13. “FCC order” means the Order of the Federal Communications Commission, FCC Docket No. 94-102, adopted effective October 1, 1996, including any subsequent amendments or modifications thereof;
  14. “Local exchange carrier” or “LEC” means any person or entity who is authorized to provide telephone exchange service or exchange access in the Commonwealth;
  15. “Local government” means any city, county, charter county, or urban-county government of the Commonwealth, or any other governmental entity maintaining a PSAP;
  16. “Mobile telephone handset telephone number” means the ten (10) digit number assigned to a CMRS connection;
  17. “Next generation 911” means a 911 system where any device capable of making a 911 emergency request uses digital technology through managed emergency services Internet protocol networks composed of functional elements and databases that replicate enhanced 911 features and functions while providing additional multimedia capabilities for the PSAP. “Next generation 911” includes any technology, functions, capabilities, best practices, or processes, either currently existing or later developed, that will be used during and after the transition of the delivery of 911 services from analog to digital technology;
  18. “Prepaid wireless telecommunications service” means a wireless telecommunications service that:
    1. If purchased, must be paid for in advance;
    2. Is sold or provided in predetermined units of time or dollars that decline in a known amount of use or time; and
    3. Provides the user with access to 911 emergency service;

      “Prepaid wireless telecommunications service” includes service provided by prepaid wireless providers approved as eligible telecommunications companies by the Kentucky Public Service Commission to participate in the wireless low-income Lifeline program;

  19. “Prepaid wireless telecommunications service provider” means a person or entity that provides prepaid wireless telecommunications service as authorized by a license issued by the FCC;
  20. “Proprietary information” means information, including customer lists and other related information, technology descriptions, technical information, or trade secrets;
  21. “Pseudo-automatic number identification” means a wireless enhanced 911 service capability that enables the automatic display of the number of the cell site or cell face;
  22. “Public safety answering point” or “PSAP” means a communications facility that is assigned the responsibility to receive 911 calls originating in a given area and, as appropriate, to dispatch public safety services or to extend, transfer, or relay 911 calls to appropriate public safety agencies;
  23. “Purchaser” means a person who purchases prepaid wireless telecommunications service in a retail transaction;
  24. “Retail transaction” means the purchase of prepaid wireless telecommunications service from a retailer for any purpose other than resale;
  25. “Retailer” means a person who sells prepaid wireless telecommunications service to any person for a purpose other than resale;
  26. “Service connection” means the transmission, conveyance, or routing of voice, data, video, text, or any other information signal of the purchaser’s choosing by any medium or method now in existence or later devised with the ability to directly connect the user to 911 emergency services;
  27. “Service supplier” means a person or entity who provides local exchange telephone service to a telephone subscriber;
  28. “Wireless enhanced 911 system,” “wireless E911 system,” “wireless enhanced 911 service,” or “wireless E911 service” means an emergency telephone system that provides the end user of the CMRS connection with wireless 911 service and, in addition, directs 911 calls to appropriate public safety answering points based on the geographical location from which the call originated and provides the capability for automatic number identification and automatic location identification features in accordance with the requirements of the FCC order; and
  29. “Tier III CMRS provider” means a non-nationwide Commercial Mobile Radio Service provider with no more than five hundred thousand (500,000) subscribers as of December 31, 2001.

History. Enact. Acts 1998, ch. 535, § 1, effective July 15, 1998; 2005, ch. 85, § 92, effective June 20, 2005; 2006, ch. 219, § 1, effective July 12, 2006; 2009, ch. 12, § 33, effective June 25, 2009; 2016 ch. 111, § 4, effective July 15, 2016.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(6/25/2009). This statute, as amended by 2009 Ky. Acts ch. 12, sec. 33, contained a reference in subsection (1) to “Section 4 of this Act,” a statute codified at KRS 42.724 . After consultation with the drafter and examination of the materials in the bill folder, the reference has been replaced with “KRS 65.7625 ” (Section 34 of that Act) by the Reviser of Statutes during codification to correct a manifest clerical or typographical error. This correction has been made under the authority of KRS 7.136(1).

(7/12/2006). 2006 Ky. Acts ch. 193, sec. 14, instructs the Reviser of Statutes to correct statutory references to agencies and officers whose names have been changed in the Act, as it confirms reorganization within the executive branch and establishes the Kentucky Office of Homeland Security. Such a correction has been made in this section.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Provider.

Prepaid provider met the definition of a commercial mobile radio service provider in KRS 65.7621(9) and was required under KRS 65.7635(1) to collect the service fees imposed by KRS 65.7629(3). Exempting prepaid providers would contravene the uniformity requirement of KRS 65.7627 . Virgin Mobile USA, L.P. v. Commonwealth, 2012 Ky. App. LEXIS 104 (Ky. Ct. App. June 29, 2012), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 2014 Ky. LEXIS 334 (Ky. Aug. 21, 2014).

65.7621. Definitions for KRS 65.7621 to 65.7643. [Effective July 15, 2020]

As used in KRS 65.7621 to 65.7643 , unless the context requires otherwise:

  1. “Administrator” means the person who serves as the state 911 coordinator, the executive director of the Kentucky 911 Services Board, and the state administrator of CMRS emergency telecommunications under KRS 65.7625 ;
  2. “Automatic location identification”, or “ALI” means a feature by which the location or estimated location of the calling party is made available to a PSAP in accordance with applicable FCC rules and regulations;
  3. “Automatic number identification”, or “ANI” means a feature that allows for the automatic display of the 911 caller’s ten-digit number, or equivalent, in accordance with applicable FCC rules and regulations;
  4. “CMRS” means commercial mobile radio service under Sections 3(27) and 332(d) of the Federal Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. secs. 151 et seq., and the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, as it existed on August 10, 1993. The term includes the term “wireless” and service provided by any wireless real time two-way voice communication device, including radio-telephone communications used in cellular telephone service, personal communications service, and the functional or competitive equivalent of a radio-telephone communications line used in cellular telephone service, a personal communications service, or a network radio access line;
  5. “Board” means the Kentucky 911 Services Board;
  6. “CMRS connection” means a mobile handset telephone number assigned to a CMRS customer;
  7. “CMRS customer” means an end user to whom a mobile handset telephone number is assigned and to whom CMRS is provided in return for compensation;
  8. “CMRS Fund” means the commercial mobile radio service emergency telecommunications fund;
  9. “CMRS provider” means a person or entity who provides CMRS to an end user. The term includes both facilities-based resellers and nonfacilities-based resellers;
  10. “CMRS service charges” means the CMRS postpaid service charge, the CMRS prepaid service charge, and the CMRS service charge fee levied under KRS 65.7636 ;
  11. “CMRS postpaid service charge” means the CMRS emergency telephone service charge fee levied under KRS 65.7629(3) and collected under KRS 65.7635 ;
  12. “CMRS prepaid service charge” means the fee imposed on prepaid wireless telecommunications service under KRS 65.7634 and collected under KRS 142.100 to 142.135 ;
  13. “FCC order” means the Order of the Federal Communications Commission, FCC Docket No. 94-102, adopted effective October 1, 1996, including any subsequent amendments or modifications thereof;
  14. “Local exchange carrier” or “LEC” means any person or entity who is authorized to provide telephone exchange service or exchange access in the Commonwealth;
  15. “Local government” means any city, county, charter county, or urban-county government of the Commonwealth, or any other governmental entity maintaining a PSAP;
  16. “Mobile telephone handset telephone number” means the ten (10) digit number assigned to a CMRS connection;
  17. “Next generation 911” means a 911 system where any device capable of making a 911 emergency request uses digital technology through managed emergency services Internet protocol networks composed of functional elements and databases that replicate enhanced 911 features and functions while providing additional multimedia capabilities for the PSAP. “Next generation 911” includes any technology, functions, capabilities, best practices, or processes, either currently existing or later developed, that will be used during and after the transition of the delivery of 911 services from analog to digital technology;
  18. “Prepaid wireless telecommunications service” means a wireless telecommunications service that, if purchased, is required to be paid for in advance and is either sold in predetermined units, dollars, or time which decline with use in a known amount, or is sold for unlimited use during a predetermined period of time;“Prepaid wireless telecommunications service” includes service provided by prepaid wireless providers approved as eligible telecommunications companies by the Kentucky Public Service Commission to participate in the wireless low-income Lifeline program;
  19. “Prepaid wireless telecommunications service provider” means a person or entity that provides prepaid wireless telecommunications service as authorized by a license issued by the FCC;
  20. “Proprietary information” means information, including customer lists and other related information, technology descriptions, technical information, or trade secrets;
  21. “Pseudo-automatic number identification” means a wireless enhanced 911 service capability that enables the automatic display of the number of the cell site or cell face;
  22. “Public safety answering point” or “PSAP” means a communications facility that is assigned the responsibility to receive 911 calls originating in a given area and, as appropriate, to dispatch public safety services or to extend, transfer, or relay 911 calls to appropriate public safety agencies;
  23. “Purchaser” means a person who purchases prepaid wireless telecommunications service in a retail transaction;
  24. “Retail transaction” means the purchase of prepaid wireless telecommunications service from a retailer for any purpose other than resale;
  25. “Retailer” means a person who sells prepaid wireless telecommunications service to any person for a purpose other than resale;
  26. “Service connection” means the transmission, conveyance, or routing of voice, data, video, text, or any other information signal of the purchaser’s choosing by any medium or method now in existence or later devised with the ability to directly connect the user to 911 emergency services;
  27. “Service supplier” means a person or entity who provides local exchange telephone service to a telephone subscriber;
  28. “Wireless enhanced 911 system,” “wireless E911 system,” “wireless enhanced 911 service,” or “wireless E911 service” means an emergency telephone system that provides the end user of the CMRS connection with wireless 911 service and, in addition, directs 911 calls to appropriate public safety answering points based on the geographical location from which the call originated and provides the capability for automatic number identification and automatic location identification features in accordance with the requirements of the FCC order; and
  29. “Tier III CMRS provider” means a non-nationwide Commercial Mobile Radio Service provider with no more than five hundred thousand (500,000) subscribers as of December 31, 2001.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1998, ch. 535, § 1, effective July 15, 1998; 2005, ch. 85, § 92, effective June 20, 2005; 2006, ch. 219, § 1, effective July 12, 2006; 2009, ch. 12, § 33, effective June 25, 2009; 2016 ch. 111, § 4, effective July 15, 2016; 2020 ch. 40, § 2, effective July 15, 2020.

65.7623. Kentucky 911 Services Board — Members — Expenses — Budget — Advisory Council.

  1. There is hereby created the Kentucky 911 Services Board, the “board,” consisting of seven (7) members as follows:
    1. The executive director of the Office of Homeland Security;
    2. The secretary of the Public Protection Cabinet;
    3. One (1) elected city official of a city government appointed by the Kentucky League of Cities;
    4. One (1) elected county official of a county government appointed by the Kentucky Association of Counties;
    5. One (1) director of a certified PSAP operated by a local government entity or a consolidated group of local government entities who previously served on the 911 Services Advisory Council and is not an elected official, to be appointed jointly by the Kentucky Association of Public-Safety Communications Officials and the Kentucky Emergency Number Association;
    6. One (1) member representative of a county or city government appointed by the Governor from a list of three (3) names submitted by the Kentucky League of Cities or Kentucky Association of Counties. The Kentucky League of Cities and the Kentucky Association of Counties shall alternate in providing a list of names to the Governor every two (2) years, and the selected member representative shall serve for a two (2) year term and may be an elected city or county official; and
    7. One (1) member appointed by the Governor who shall be employed by or representative of the interest of CMRS providers. The member representing the interests of CMRS providers shall serve for a two (2) year term, and shall alternate between representing a Tier I provider and a Tier III provider.
  2. The executive director of the Office of Homeland Security and secretary of the Public Protection Cabinet shall serve by virtue of their offices. The members appointed under subsection (1)(c) to (e) of this section shall be appointed for a term of four (4) years and until their successors are appointed and qualified. Members appointed under subsection (1)(f) and (g) of this section shall serve for a term of two (2) years. Members appointed under subsection (1)(c) to (g) of this section may only serve as long as the appointee holds the office or position he or she held at the time of his or her appointment. Any vacancy on the board shall be filled in the same manner as the original appointment and shall be for the remainder of the unexpired term.
  3. No member of the board shall be held to be a public officer by reason of membership on the board. The elected city and county officials appointed under subsection (1) of this section shall each serve on the board in an ex officio voting capacity by virtue of their respective elected offices as long as they continue to occupy their local elected positions during their term as a board member. Their duties as members of the board shall be an extension of their duties as local elected officials and their service on the board shall not constitute the holding of a separate and distinct public office apart from their respective local elected positions.
  4. The executive director of the Office of Homeland Security shall serve as chair and preside over meetings of the board, which shall be conducted at least four (4) times each year. In the absence of the executive director of the Office of Homeland Security, the board may be chaired by any other member of the board selected by the remaining members. The board shall be subject to the provisions of the Kentucky Open Meetings Act, KRS 61.805 to 61.850 . The board shall establish a regular meeting schedule for each calendar year. The board shall hold at least two (2) meetings per calendar year in congressional districts other than the one in which Frankfort is located, and shall rotate its traveling meeting locations among the congressional districts before holding another traveling meeting in the same congressional district. A majority of the members appointed to the board shall constitute a quorum.
  5. In addition to the administrator appointed by the executive director of the Office of Homeland Security under KRS 65.7625 , the Office of Homeland Security shall provide staff services, office space, and other resources necessary to conduct its affairs. The board shall be attached to the Office of Homeland Security for administrative purposes but shall operate as an independent entity within state government.
  6. The board members shall serve without compensation but shall be reimbursed in accordance with KRS 45.101 for expenses incurred in connection with their official duties as members of the board.
  7. All administrative costs and expenses incurred in the operation of the board, including payments under subsections (5) and (6) of this section and KRS 65.7625 , shall be paid as reimbursement to the Office of Homeland Security from that portion of the CMRS fund that is authorized under KRS 65.7631(2) to be used by the board for administrative purposes. Expenses for personnel, equipment, or facilities that serve multiple functions or purposes shall be prorated. Only those costs for services directly involved in the coordination and administration of duties related to the CMRS emergency telecommunications function shall be eligible for payment using the funds provided in KRS 65.7631(2).
  8. Prior to June 1 of each year, the Office of Homeland Security shall submit a budget detailing all projected administrative and operational expenses for the subsequent fiscal year to be used by the board in establishing the board’s budget for the upcoming fiscal year.
  9. The board shall be advised by a permanent advisory council with members appointed by the executive director of the Office of Homeland Security. The members of the advisory council shall represent the interests of the 911 community and shall, at a minimum, include a representative from each of the following organizations:
      1. The Department of Kentucky State Police; (a) 1. The Department of Kentucky State Police;
      2. The Kentucky Sheriffs’ Association;
      3. The Kentucky Association of Chiefs of Police;
      4. The Kentucky Fire Chiefs Association;
      5. The Kentucky Ambulance Providers Association;
      6. The Kentucky League of Cities;
      7. The Kentucky Association of Counties;
      8. The Department of Criminal Justice Training; and
      9. The Kentucky Board of Emergency Medical Services;
    1. The Kentucky Association of Public-Safety Communications Officials and the Kentucky Emergency Number Association, each appointed by the executive director of the Office of Homeland Security from a list of three (3) names submitted by both organizations; and
    2. Any other members selected by the executive director who are familiar with PSAPs, public finances, shared governmental services, emergency management, community crisis response preparation, or the interests of 911 service stakeholders.

HISTORY: 2016 ch. 111, § 5, effective July 15, 2016; 2018 ch. 138, § 1, effective July 14, 2018.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(7/12/2006). 2006 Ky. Acts ch. 193, sec. 14, instructs the Reviser of Statutes to correct statutory references to agencies, subagencies, and officers whose names have been changed in 2006 legislation confirming the reorganization of the executive branch. Such a correction has been made in this section.

65.7625. Appointment and duties of state administrator of commercial mobile radio service emergency telecommunications.

  1. The executive director of the Office of Homeland Security shall appoint a state administrator of commercial mobile radio service emergency telecommunications. The executive director of the Office of Homeland Security shall set the administrator’s compensation, the cost of which may be shared by the Office of Homeland Security and the Kentucky 911 Services Board. The board shall be responsible for any portion of the administrator’s salary that is not to be paid by the Office of Homeland Security, with the board’s portion of the salary to be paid from that portion of the CMRS fund that is authorized under KRS 65.7631(2) to be used by the board for administrative purposes.
  2. The administrator of CMRS emergency telecommunications shall serve as the coordinator and administrator on behalf of the board, and shall conduct the day-to-day operations of the board.
  3. The administrator shall, with the advice of the board, coordinate and direct a statewide effort to expand and improve enhanced emergency telecommunications capabilities and responses throughout the state, including but not limited to the implementation of wireless E911 service requirements of the FCC order and rules and regulations adopted in carrying out that order. In this regard, the administrator shall:
    1. Obtain, maintain, and disseminate information relating to emergency telecommunications technology, advances, capabilities, and techniques;
    2. Coordinate and assist in the implementation of advancements and new technology in the operation of emergency telecommunications in the state, including the development and implementation of next generation 911 service;
    3. Implement compliance throughout the state with the wireless E911 service requirements established by the FCC order and any rules or regulations which are or may be adopted by the Federal Communications Commission in carrying out the FCC order; and
    4. Perform all functions and duties assigned by the board in carrying out the purposes of KRS 65.7621 to 65.7643 , including but not limited to making a full report to the board at each meeting of the activities in which the administrator has engaged in the discharge of his or her duties since the previous meeting.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1998, ch. 535, § 3, effective July 15, 1998; 2005, ch. 85, § 94, effective June 20, 2005; 2006, ch. 219, § 3, effective July 12, 2006; 2009, ch. 12, § 34, effective June 25, 2009; 2016 ch. 111, § 6, effective July 15, 2016; 2018 ch. 138, § 2, effective July 14, 2018.

65.7627. Commercial mobile radio service emergency telecommunications fund.

There is established the commercial mobile radio service emergency telecommunications fund, the “CMRS fund,” an insured, interest-bearing account to be administered and maintained by the Kentucky 911 Services Board. The CMRS service charges levied under KRS 65.7629 , 65.7634 , and 65.7636 shall generate revenue equitably from prepaid and postpaid CMRS connections within the boundaries of the Commonwealth. No charges other than the CMRS service charges levied under KRS 65.7629 , 65.7634 , and 65.7636 are authorized to be levied by any person or entity for providing wireless service. All revenues collected under KRS 65.7635 and KRS 65.7634, 65.7636, and 142.100 to 142.135 shall be deposited directly into the fund, and the board shall direct disbursements from the fund according to the provisions of KRS 65.7631 . Moneys in the CMRS fund shall not be the property of the Commonwealth and shall not be subject to appropriation by the General Assembly. Moneys deposited or to be deposited into the CMRS fund shall not:

  1. Be loaned to the Commonwealth or to any instrumentality or agency thereof;
  2. Be subject to transfer to the Commonwealth or any agency or instrumentality thereof, except for purposes specifically authorized by KRS 65.7621 to 65.7643 ; or
  3. Be expended for any purpose other than a purpose authorized by KRS 65.7621 to 65.7643 .

History. Enact. Acts 1998, ch. 535, § 4, effective July 15, 1998; 2016 ch. 111, § 7, effective July 15, 2016.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Applicability.

Prepaid provider met the definition of a commercial mobile radio service provider in KRS 65.7621(9) and was required under KRS 65.7635(1) to collect the service fees imposed by KRS 65.7629(3). Exempting prepaid providers would contravene the uniformity requirement of KRS 65.7627 . Virgin Mobile USA, L.P. v. Commonwealth, 2012 Ky. App. LEXIS 104 (Ky. Ct. App. June 29, 2012), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 2014 Ky. LEXIS 334 (Ky. Aug. 21, 2014).

65.7629. Powers and duties of board.

The board shall administer the provisions of KRS 65.7621 to 65.7643 , and shall have the following powers and duties:

  1. To review, evaluate, and approve or disapprove the plans or plan modifications that are submitted to the board for complying with the wireless E911 service requirements established by the FCC order and by any rules or regulations which are or may be adopted by the Federal Communications Commission in carrying out the FCC order;
  2. To develop standards to be followed by the board in reviewing, evaluating, approving, or disapproving the plans or plan modifications that are submitted to the board;
    1. To collect the CMRS service charge from each CMRS connection: (3) (a) To collect the CMRS service charge from each CMRS connection:
      1. With a place of primary use, as defined in 4 U.S.C. sec. 124 , within the Commonwealth; or
      2. For prepaid CMRS connections, until January 1, 2017, at which time the CMRS prepaid service charge imposed under KRS 65.7634 and collected under KRS 142.100 to 142.135 shall take effect and this subparagraph shall no longer be in force:
        1. With a place of primary use, as defined in 4 U.S.C. sec. 124 , within the Commonwealth; or
        2. With a geographical location associated with the first six (6) digits, or NPA/NXX, of the mobile telephone number is inside the geographic boundaries of the Commonwealth.
    2. The CMRS postpaid service charge, and until January 1, 2017, the CMRS prepaid service charge, shall be seventy cents ($0.70) per month per CMRS connection, to be calculated, collected, and remitted in accordance with KRS 65.7635 . The amount of the CMRS service charge shall not be increased except by act of the General Assembly;
  3. To deposit the proceeds of the CMRS prepaid service charge levied under KRS 65.7634 that are collected by the Department of Revenue into the CMRS fund established by KRS 65.7627 and to distribute those revenues in accordance with KRS 65.7631 . The CMRS prepaid service charge shall be calculated, collected, and remitted in accordance with KRS 65.7634 and 142.100 to 142.135 ;
  4. To administer and maintain the CMRS fund according to the provisions of KRS 65.7627 , and promptly to deposit all revenues from the CMRS service charges into the CMRS fund;
  5. To make disbursements from the CMRS fund, according to the allocations and requirements established in KRS 65.7631 ;
  6. To establish procedures and guidelines to be followed by the board in reviewing, evaluating, and approving or disapproving disbursements from the CMRS fund and requests for disbursements made in accordance with KRS 65.7631 ;
  7. To resolve conflicts regarding reimbursable costs and expenses under KRS 65.7631 (4);
  8. To submit annual reports to the Auditor of Public Accounts no later than sixty (60) days after the close of each fiscal year, which shall provide an accounting for all CMRS service charges deposited into the CMRS fund during the preceding fiscal year and all disbursements to CMRS providers and PSAPs during the preceding fiscal year;
  9. To employ consultants, engineers, and other persons and employees as may be, in the judgment of the board, essential to the board’s operations, functions, and responsibilities, and to fix and pay their compensation from funds available to the board;
  10. To acquire, by gift, purchase, installment purchase, or lease, any equipment necessary to carry out the board’s purposes and duties;
  11. To retain any and all information, including all proprietary information, that is submitted to the board by CMRS providers and PSAPs, for the purposes of maintaining it and verifying its accuracy;
  12. To retain, with approval by the Auditor of Public Accounts, an independent certified public accountant who shall audit, once every twenty-four (24) months, the books of the board, CMRS providers, and PSAPs eligible to request or receive disbursements from the CMRS fund under KRS 65.7631 for the following purposes:
    1. To verify the accuracy of collection, receipts, and disbursements of all revenues derived from the CMRS service charges and the number of wireless E911 calls received by each PSAP eligible to request or receive disbursements from the CMRS fund;
    2. To determine whether the revenues generated by the CMRS service charges equal, exceed, or are less than the costs incurred in order to comply with the FCC order;
    3. To determine the sufficiency of the funds currently being withheld for administrative purposes under KRS 65.7631 (2); and
    4. To verify the accuracy of CMRS customer count information reported to the board by CMRS providers. The independent certified public accountant shall make a report of the audits to the board and to the appropriate chief executive officer or officers of the CMRS providers and PSAPs, and to the local governments responsible for the formation of the PSAP. The independent certified public accountant shall also forward a copy of the audits conducted pursuant to this subsection to the Legislative Research Commission for referral to the appropriate committee or committees and to the Auditor of Public Accounts. Upon request, the independent certified accountant shall send any work papers related to the audits to the Auditor of Public Accounts. All information with respect to the audits shall be released to the public or published only in aggregate amounts which do not identify or allow identification of numbers of subscribers or revenues attributable to individual CMRS providers;
  13. To ensure that all carriers have an equal opportunity to participate in the wireless E911 system;
  14. To ensure that wireless E911 systems are compatible with wireline E911 systems;
  15. To determine the appropriate method for disbursing funds to PSAP’s based on wireless workload under KRS 65.7631(5)(b);
  16. To develop standards and protocols for the improvement and increased efficiency of 911 services in Kentucky;
  17. To provide direct grants or state matches for federal, state, or private grants for the establishment or improvement of the 911 emergency telecommunications system in the Commonwealth; and
  18. To develop and implement standards for advancements and new technology in the operation of emergency telecommunications in the state, including the development and implementation of next generation 911 service.

History. Enact. Acts 1998, ch. 535, § 5, effective July 15, 1998; 2001, ch. 42, § 1, effective June 21, 2001; 2002, ch. 69, § 3, effective July 15, 2002; 2006, ch. 219, § 4, effective July 12, 2006; 2016 ch. 111, § 8, effective July 15, 2016.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(7/15/2002). The amendments made to subsection (3) of this statute in 2002 Ky. Acts ch. 69, sec. 3, “take effect for customer service bills issued after August 1, 2002.” 2002 Ky. Acts ch. 69, sec. 6.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Collection.

Prepaid provider met the definition of a commercial mobile radio service provider in KRS 65.7621(9) and was required under KRS 65.7635(1) to collect the service fees imposed by KRS 65.7629(3). Exempting prepaid providers would contravene the uniformity requirement of KRS 65.7627 . Virgin Mobile USA, L.P. v. Commonwealth, 2012 Ky. App. LEXIS 104 (Ky. Ct. App. June 29, 2012), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 2014 Ky. LEXIS 334 (Ky. Aug. 21, 2014).

Under former Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 65.7635(1) and 65.7629(3) (amended 2006), a commercial mobile radio service (CMRS) provider is not required to pay the CMRS service charge, but was obligated to collect. Virgin Mobile U.S.A., L.P. v. Commonwealth ex rel. Commerc. Mobile Radio Serv. Telecomms. Bd., 448 S.W.3d 241, 2014 Ky. LEXIS 632 ( Ky. 2014 ).

65.7630. Gathering and reporting information regarding 911 emergency communications funding and costs — Annual report to board by agencies and providers — Administrative regulations — Information subject to disclosure under Open Records Act and information subject to confidentiality — Report to Legislative Research Commission.

  1. The board shall gather and report data and information regarding 911 emergency communications funding procedures and costs on or before November 1 of each year.
  2. The board shall determine the information it needs to evaluate 911 funding, collection of the CMRS service charges, and expenditures, and each local government, state governmental agency, wireless or wireline provider of technology capable of transmitting voice or text traffic for an emergency 911 request to a PSAP, and/or private citizen in possession of that information shall provide the information to the board within the time frames established by the board. The board may hire a consultant to gather and analyze the information required by this section.
  3. Each local governmental agency and state governmental agency having jurisdiction over one (1) or more public safety answering points (PSAPs) shall provide at least the following information to the board each fiscal year:
    1. The amount of revenue available or budgeted for 911 services from the following sources:
      1. The state general fund;
      2. CMRS funds received through the distribution formula under KRS 65.7631 ;
      3. City and county general funds
      4. CMRS grant funds
      5. Other grant funds and their sources; and
      6. Any other funds received for 911 service and their sources; and
    2. How the revenue described in this paragraph was spent by the PSAPs.
  4. Each CMRS provider shall submit at least the following to the board:
    1. One (1) annual report each calendar year of the total number of active CMRS connections in each zip code within Kentucky served by the provider for each month during the year. The report shall be in the form and manner prescribed by the board and shall be submitted no later than thirty (30) days after the end of each year. Each CMRS provider shall include in its report separate counts of the numbers of active CMRS connections attributable to prepaid customers, postpaid customers, and wireless low-income Lifeline customers served by the CMRS provider for each month. For the purposes of this subsection, “active CMRS connection” means all CMRS connections that have an account balance of units of time or dollars greater than zero on any day of the month and includes every Lifeline end user for whom the CMRS provider received reimbursement from the universal service fund during the month under the wireless low-income Lifeline program; and
    2. Upon request of the board, any other information needed to evaluate CMRS service charge remittances to the board.
  5. Each local governmental agency, state governmental agency, or wireless or wireline provider of technology capable of transmitting voice traffic for an emergency 911 request to a PSAP that fails to provide the information required by this section shall not be eligible to receive distributions of state funds from the CMRS Board.
  6. The CMRS Board shall promulgate administrative regulations in accordance with KRS Chapter 13A to establish annual reporting requirements so that the board has the information needed to monitor the use of 911 funds and the rate of the 911 service charge.
  7. All information received by the CMRS Board pursuant to this section shall be subject to disclosure under KRS 61.870 to 61.884 . Proprietary information given to the board by any wireless or wireline provider of technology capable of transmitting voice or text traffic for an emergency 911 request to a PSAP pursuant to this section shall be subject to the same confidentiality as provided for proprietary information under KRS 65.7639 and shall only be released or published in aggregate amounts which do not identify or allow identification of numbers of CMRS customers or revenues attributable to an individual CMRS provider.
  8. The CMRS Board shall ensure that the Legislative Research Commission has access to all data collected under this section and shall report this information to the Legislative Research Commission’s Interim Joint Committee on Veterans, Military Affairs, and Public Protection by November 1 of each year. Upon request, the board shall also report this information to any public entity as defined in KRS 65.310 .

History. Enact. Acts 2011, ch. 106, § 1, effective June 8, 2011; 2016 ch. 111, § 9, effective July 15, 2016.

65.7631. Apportionment of money in CMRS fund. [Effective until July 15, 2020]

  1. The moneys in the CMRS fund shall be apportioned among the approved uses of the fund as specified in this section. The board shall make individual disbursements from the fund upon such terms and conditions necessary in view of the amount of revenues on deposit at the time each request for disbursement is reviewed and approved.
  2. Not more than two and one-half percent (2.5%) of the total monthly revenues deposited into the CMRS fund shall be disbursed or reserved for disbursement by the board to pay the administrative costs and expenses incurred in the operation of the board in carrying out the functions and duties set forth in KRS 65.7621 to 65.7643 .
    1. Two and one-half percent (2.5%) of the total monthly revenues deposited into the CMRS fund shall be used solely for the purpose of reimbursing the actual expenses incurred by tier III CMRS providers from June 30, 2011, to January 1, 2016, for complying with requirements established by the FCC order. Reimbursement under this subsection is only available to tier III CMRS providers that: (3) (a) Two and one-half percent (2.5%) of the total monthly revenues deposited into the CMRS fund shall be used solely for the purpose of reimbursing the actual expenses incurred by tier III CMRS providers from June 30, 2011, to January 1, 2016, for complying with requirements established by the FCC order. Reimbursement under this subsection is only available to tier III CMRS providers that:
      1. Have a cost recovery plan that was approved by the CMRS Board, predecessor in name to the Kentucky 911 Services Board, prior to June 30, 2011; and
      2. Had received approval for reimbursement from the CMRS Board, predecessor in name to the Kentucky 911 Services Board, prior to the effective date of this section.
    2. When all reimbursements approved under this subsection have been paid, the two and one-half percent (2.5%) apportioned under this subsection shall be used solely for the purposes specified in subsection (5) of this section.
  3. Ten percent (10%) of the total monthly revenues deposited into the CMRS fund shall be disbursed or reserved for disbursement to provide direct grants, matching money, or funds to PSAPs as determined by the Kentucky 911 Services Board:
    1. For the establishment and improvement of 911 services in the Commonwealth, including the implementation of next generation 911 capacity;
    2. For incentives to create more efficient delivery of 911 services by local governments receiving funding under subsection (5) of this section;
    3. For improvement of 911 infrastructure by Tier III wireless providers receiving funding under this section; and
    4. For consolidation reimbursement of two hundred thousand dollars ($200,000) per PSAP, not to exceed four hundred thousand dollars ($400,000) per county, to any PSAP that consolidates with a CMRS-certified PSAP, or creates a newly consolidated Phase II compliant PSAP. Funds shall be applied toward the cost of consolidating. If a PSAP consolidates and receives reimbursement, the Kentucky 911 Services Board shall not certify a new PSAP within the same county for a period of ten (10) years.

      When the balance of money collected under this subsection and not yet obligated for permitted uses exceeds three million dollars ($3,000,000) in any fiscal year, the excess amount shall be allocated under subsection (5) of this section.

  4. The balance of the total monthly revenues deposited into the CMRS fund after the amounts disbursed or reserved for disbursement under subsections (2), (3), and (4) of this section have been subtracted shall be distributed to PSAPs eligible to receive disbursement from the CMRS fund under subsection (6) of this section who actually request disbursement, as follows:
    1. Fifty percent (50%) of the remaining balance to be allocated under this subsection shall be distributed according to the “PSAP pro rata formula,” whereby each receives a percentage determined by dividing one (1) by the total number of PSAPs eligible to request and actually requesting disbursements under subsection (6) of this section. Any PSAPs certified before January 1, 2004, or for more than three (3) years, that choose to consolidate their operations shall continue to receive pro-rata shares as if they remained separate and distinct entities. The consolidated entity must be certified to receive funds under subsection (6) of this section; and
    2. Fifty percent (50%) of the remaining balance to be allocated under this subsection shall be distributed according to a method chosen by the board and based on the wireless workload of the PSAP. Methods to be considered may be based on the number of wireless 911 calls answered by each PSAP, the number of wireless phone users served by each PSAP, or any other method deemed by the board to be reasonable and equitable. The method chosen by the board shall be promulgated as a regulation under KRS 65.7633 . All amounts distributed to PSAPs under this subsection shall be used by the PSAPs solely for the purposes of answering, routing, and properly disposing of CMRS 911 calls, training PSAP staff, and public education concerning appropriate use of 911, in accordance with KRS 65.760(4) and (5). Additionally, amounts distributed to PSAPs under this subsection may be used for the purposes of complying with the wireless E911 service requirements established by the FCC order and any rules and regulations which are or may be adopted by the Federal Communications Commission pursuant to the FCC order, including the payment of costs and expenses incurred in designing, upgrading, purchasing, leasing, programming, testing, installing, or maintaining all necessary data, hardware, and software required in order to provide wireless E911 service.
    1. Notwithstanding any other provision of the law, no PSAP shall be eligible to request or receive a disbursement from the CMRS fund under subsection (4)(a) or (b) or (5) of this section unless and until the PSAP: (6) (a) Notwithstanding any other provision of the law, no PSAP shall be eligible to request or receive a disbursement from the CMRS fund under subsection (4)(a) or (b) or (5) of this section unless and until the PSAP:
      1. Is expressly certified as a PSAP by the Kentucky 911 Services Board, upon written application to the board;
      2. Demonstrates that the PSAP is providing E911 services to a local government that has adopted an ordinance either imposing a special tax, license, or fee as authorized by KRS 65.760(3) or has established other means of funding wireline 911 emergency service;
      3. Demonstrates that the administrator of the PSAP sent a request for wireless, E911 service to a CMRS provider, and that the infrastructure of the local exchange carrier will support wireless E911 service;
      4. Provides an accounting of the number of wireless E911 calls received by the PSAP during the prior calendar year if requested by the board; and
      5. Demonstrates that the PSAP has made the investment which is necessary to allow the PSAP to receive and utilize the data elements associated with wireless E911 service.
    2. In addition to the requirements of paragraph (a) of this subsection and in order to encourage the additional consolidation of PSAPs by local governments and state government agencies, after January 1, 2017, a PSAP shall receive priority consideration for distributions of funds from subsection (4)(a) and (b) of this section as follows:
      1. A PSAP that is not a state police dispatch center and that covers all local governments within two (2) or more counties shall receive first priority in the distribution of the funds by the board;
      2. A PSAP, including any state police dispatch center, that covers all the local governments within a single county shall receive second priority in the distribution of the funds by the board; and
      3. A PSAP that does not cover all of the local governments within a single county shall receive the last priority for the distribution of the funds listed in this subsection by the board.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1998, ch. 535, § 6, effective July 15, 1998; 2001, ch. 42, § 2, effective June 21, 2001; 2006, ch. 219, § 5, effective July 12, 2006; 2009, ch. 12, § 35, effective June 25, 2009; 2016 ch. 111, § 10, effective July 15, 2016; 2018 ch. 138, § 3, effective July 14, 2018.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(7/15/2016). Under the authority of KRS 7.136(1) (c), during codification of 2016 Ky. Acts ch. 111, sec. 10 (this statute), the Reviser of Statutes has corrected a reference in subsection (4) to read “this subsection” instead of “this paragraph.”

Research References and Practice Aids

2020-2022 Budget Reference.

See State/Executive Branch Budget, 2020 Ky. Acts ch. 92, Pt. I, H, 4, (2) at 888.

2018-2020 Budget Reference.

See State/Executive Branch Budget, 2018 Ky. Acts ch. 169, Pt. I, H, 4, (3) at 1327.

65.7631. Apportionment of money in CMRS fund. [Effective July 15, 2020]

  1. The moneys in the CMRS fund shall be apportioned among the approved uses of the fund as specified in this section. The board shall make individual disbursements from the fund upon such terms and conditions necessary in view of the amount of revenues on deposit at the time each request for disbursement is reviewed and approved.
  2. Not more than two and one-half percent (2.5%) of the total monthly revenues deposited into the CMRS fund shall be disbursed or reserved for disbursement by the board to pay the administrative costs and expenses incurred in the operation of the board in carrying out the functions and duties set forth in KRS 65.7621 to 65.7643 .
  3. Two and one-half percent (2.5%) of the total monthly revenues deposited into the CMRS fund shall be used solely for the purpose of establishing or maintaining statewide next generation 911 initiatives to assist with the adoption and operation of next generation 911 services and applications. Fund disbursements shall be limited to equipment, hardware, software, or contracted services used in the preparation for, or delivery of, next generation 911.
  4. Ten percent (10%) of the total monthly revenues deposited into the CMRS fund shall be disbursed or reserved for disbursement to provide direct grants, matching money, or funds to PSAPs as determined by the Kentucky 911 Services Board:
    1. For the establishment and improvement of 911 services in the Commonwealth, including the implementation of next generation 911 capacity;
    2. For incentives to create more efficient delivery of 911 services by local governments receiving funding under subsection (5) of this section;
    3. For improvement of 911 infrastructure by Tier III wireless providers receiving funding under this section; and
    4. For consolidation reimbursement of two hundred thousand dollars ($200,000) per PSAP, not to exceed four hundred thousand dollars ($400,000) per county, to any PSAP that consolidates with a CMRS-certified PSAP, or creates a newly consolidated Phase II compliant PSAP. Funds shall be applied toward the cost of consolidating. If a PSAP consolidates and receives reimbursement, the Kentucky 911 Services Board shall not certify a new PSAP within the same county for a period of ten (10) years.

      When the balance of money collected under this subsection and not yet obligated for permitted uses exceeds three million dollars ($3,000,000) in any fiscal year, the excess amount shall be allocated under subsection (5) of this section.

  5. The balance of the total monthly revenues deposited into the CMRS fund after the amounts disbursed or reserved for disbursement under subsections (2), (3), and (4) of this section have been subtracted shall be distributed to PSAPs eligible to receive disbursement from the CMRS fund under subsection (6) of this section who actually request disbursement, as follows:
    1. Fifty percent (50%) of the remaining balance to be allocated under this subsection shall be distributed according to the “PSAP pro rata formula,” whereby each receives a percentage determined by dividing one (1) by the total number of PSAPs eligible to request and actually requesting disbursements under subsection (6) of this section. Any PSAPs certified before January 1, 2004, or for more than three (3) years, that choose to consolidate their operations shall continue to receive pro-rata shares as if they remained separate and distinct entities. The consolidated entity must be certified to receive funds under subsection (6) of this section; and
    2. Fifty percent (50%) of the remaining balance to be allocated under this subsection shall be distributed according to a method chosen by the board and based on the wireless workload of the PSAP. Methods to be considered may be based on the number of wireless 911 calls answered by each PSAP, the number of wireless phone users served by each PSAP, or any other method deemed by the board to be reasonable and equitable. The method chosen by the board shall be promulgated as a regulation under KRS 65.7633 . All amounts distributed to PSAPs under this subsection shall be used by the PSAPs solely for the purposes of answering, routing, and properly disposing of 911 calls, training PSAP staff, and public education concerning appropriate use of 911, in accordance with KRS 65.760(4) and (5). Additionally, amounts distributed to PSAPs under this subsection may be used for the purposes of complying with the wireless E911 service requirements established by the FCC order and any rules and regulations which are or may be adopted by the Federal Communications Commission pursuant to the FCC order, including the payment of costs and expenses incurred in designing, upgrading, purchasing, leasing, programming, testing, installing, or maintaining all necessary data, hardware, and software required in order to provide wireless E911 service.
    1. Notwithstanding any other provision of the law, no PSAP shall be eligible to request or receive a disbursement from the CMRS fund under subsection (4)(a) or (b) or (5) of this section unless and until the PSAP: (6) (a) Notwithstanding any other provision of the law, no PSAP shall be eligible to request or receive a disbursement from the CMRS fund under subsection (4)(a) or (b) or (5) of this section unless and until the PSAP:
      1. Is expressly certified as a PSAP by the Kentucky 911 Services Board, upon written application to the board;
      2. Demonstrates that the PSAP is providing E911 services to a local government that has adopted an ordinance either imposing a special tax, license, or fee as authorized by KRS 65.760(3) or has established other means of funding wireline 911 emergency service;
      3. Demonstrates that the administrator of the PSAP sent a request for wireless, E911 service to a CMRS provider, and that the infrastructure of the local exchange carrier will support wireless E911 service;
      4. Provides an accounting of the number of wireless E911 calls received by the PSAP during the prior calendar year if requested by the board; and
      5. Demonstrates that the PSAP has made the investment which is necessary to allow the PSAP to receive and utilize the data elements associated with wireless E911 service.
    2. In addition to the requirements of paragraph (a) of this subsection and in order to encourage the additional consolidation of PSAPs by local governments and state government agencies, after January 1, 2017, a PSAP shall receive priority consideration for distributions of funds from subsection (4)(a) and (b) of this section as follows:
      1. A PSAP that is not a state police dispatch center and that covers all local governments within two (2) or more counties shall receive first priority in the distribution of the funds by the board;
      2. A PSAP, including any state police dispatch center, that covers all the local governments within a single county shall receive second priority in the distribution of the funds by the board; and
      3. A PSAP that does not cover all of the local governments within a single county shall receive the last priority for the distribution of the funds listed in this subsection by the board.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1998, ch. 535, § 6, effective July 15, 1998; 2001, ch. 42, § 2, effective June 21, 2001; 2006, ch. 219, § 5, effective July 12, 2006; 2009, ch. 12, § 35, effective June 25, 2009; 2016 ch. 111, § 10, effective July 15, 2016; 2020 ch. 40, § 1, effective July 15, 2020.

65.7633. Promulgation of administrative regulations by board.

  1. The Kentucky 911 Services Board shall implement the provisions of KRS 65.7621 to 65.7643 through the promulgation of administrative regulations in accordance with the provisions of KRS Chapter 13A.
  2. The board shall promulgate regulations:
    1. Establishing procedures for the submission of plans or modifications of plans to the board, for its review and approval or disapproval, for complying with the wireless E911 service requirements established by the FCC order and any rules and regulations which are or may be adopted by the Federal Communications Commission in carrying out the FCC order, including but not limited to projections of anticipated costs and expenses necessary for designing, upgrading, purchasing, leasing, programming, testing, installing, or maintaining on an ongoing basis all necessary data, hardware, and software required in order to provide this service;
    2. Establishing procedures and guidelines to be followed by the board in reviewing, evaluating, and approving or disapproving the plans or modifications of plans that are submitted to it in accordance with the procedures promulgated under paragraph (a) of this subsection;
    3. Establishing procedures and guidelines to be followed by the board in reviewing, evaluating, and approving or disapproving disbursements from the CMRS fund and requests for disbursements under KRS 65.7631(3), (4), and (5); and
    4. Establishing procedures and guidelines for resolving disputes regarding reimbursable costs and expenses under KRS 65.7631(3), (4), and (5).

History. Enact. Acts 1998, ch. 535, § 7, effective July 15, 1998; 2006, ch. 219, § 6, effective July 12, 2006; 2016 ch. 111, § 11, effective July 15, 2016.

65.7634. CMRS prepaid service charge. [Effective until July 15, 2020]

  1. Beginning January 1, 2017, a CMRS prepaid service charge shall be imposed at a flat rate of ninety-three cents ($0.93) on each retail transaction involving the purchase or sale of:
    1. Cellular phones preloaded with a set dollar amount for minutes or units of air time, or sold with rebates for air time;
    2. Calling cards for cellular phones preloaded with a set dollar amount for minutes of units or air time;
    3. The recharging of a reusable cellular phone calling card; and
    4. The recharging of a cellular phone itself with additional minutes or units of air time.
  2. The CMRS prepaid service charge imposed by subsection (1) of this section shall be collected by the retailer from the purchaser at the time of purchase for each purchase sourced to this state as provided in KRS 139.105 . The amount of the CMRS prepaid service charge shall be either separately stated on an invoice, receipt, or other similar document that is provided to the purchaser by the retailer, or otherwise disclosed to the purchaser.
  3. The CMRS prepaid service charge shall be paid by the purchaser, and shall not constitute a liability of the retailer or of any prepaid wireless telecommunications service provider.
  4. All amounts collected by the retailer shall be deemed to be held in trust by the retailer for and on account of the Commonwealth, shall constitute a debt of the retailer to the Commonwealth, and shall be remitted to the Department of Revenue as provided in KRS 142.100 to 142.135 .
  5. The CMRS prepaid service charge amount collected by a retailer from a purchaser shall not be included in the base for measuring any tax, fee, surcharge, or other charge that is imposed by the state, any political subdivision of the state, or any intergovernmental agency if the amount is separately stated on an invoice, receipt, or a similar document provided to the consumer by the retailer.

HISTORY: 2016 ch. 111, § 15, effective January 1, 2017.

65.7634. CMRS prepaid service charge. [Effective July 15, 2020]

  1. Beginning January 1, 2017, a CMRS prepaid service charge shall be imposed at a flat rate of ninety-three cents ($0.93) on each retail transaction involving the purchase or sale of:
    1. Cellular phones preloaded with a set dollar amount for minutes or units of air time, or sold with rebates for air time;
    2. Calling cards for cellular phones preloaded with a set dollar amount for minutes of units or air time;
    3. The recharging of a reusable cellular phone calling card;
    4. The recharging of a cellular phone itself with additional minutes or units of air time; and
    5. Any prepaid wireless telecommunications service.
  2. The CMRS prepaid service charge imposed by subsection (1) of this section shall be collected by the retailer from the purchaser at the time of purchase for each purchase sourced to this state as provided in KRS 139.105 . The amount of the CMRS prepaid service charge shall be either separately stated on an invoice, receipt, or other similar document that is provided to the purchaser by the retailer, or otherwise disclosed to the purchaser.
  3. The CMRS prepaid service charge shall be paid by the purchaser, and shall not constitute a liability of the retailer or of any prepaid wireless telecommunications service provider.
  4. All amounts collected by the retailer shall be deemed to be held in trust by the retailer for and on account of the Commonwealth, shall constitute a debt of the retailer to the Commonwealth, and shall be remitted to the Department of Revenue as provided in KRS 142.100 to 142.135 .
  5. The CMRS prepaid service charge amount collected by a retailer from a purchaser shall not be included in the base for measuring any tax, fee, surcharge, or other charge that is imposed by the state, any political subdivision of the state, or any intergovernmental agency if the amount is separately stated on an invoice, receipt, or a similar document provided to the consumer by the retailer.

HISTORY: 2020 ch. 40, § 3, effective July 15, 2020.

65.7635. Duty of commercial mobile radio service providers to act as collection agents for postpaid service charges for fund — Procedure for collection of service charges before and after January 1, 2017.

  1. Each CMRS provider shall act as a collection agent of the CMRS postpaid service charge for the CMRS fund. From its customers, the provider shall, as part of the provider’s billing process, collect the CMRS postpaid service charges levied upon CMRS connections under KRS 65.7629(3) from each CMRS connection to whom the billing provider provides CMRS. Each billing provider shall list the CMRS postpaid service charge as a separate entry on each bill which includes a CMRS postpaid service charge. If a CMRS provider receives a partial payment for a monthly bill from a CMRS customer, the provider shall first apply the payment against the amount the CMRS customer owes the CMRS provider. For CMRS customers who purchase CMRS services on a prepaid basis, the CMRS service charge shall be determined according to one (1) of the following methodologies as elected by the CMRS provider, until January 1, 2017, at which time the CMRS prepaid service charge imposed under KRS 65.7634 and collected under KRS 142.100 to 142.135 shall take effect and paragraphs (a) and (b) of this subsection shall no longer be in force:
    1. The CMRS provider shall collect, on a monthly basis, the CMRS service charge specified in KRS 65.7629(3) from each active customer whose account balance is equal to or greater than the amount of service charge; or
    2. The CMRS provider shall divide its total earned prepaid wireless telephone revenue received with respect to its prepaid customers in the Commonwealth within the monthly 911 emergency service reporting period by fifty dollars ($50), multiply the quotient by the service charge amount, and pay the resulting amount to the board.
  2. A CMRS provider has no obligation to take any legal action to enforce the collection of the CMRS postpaid service charges for which any CMRS customer is billed. Collection actions to enforce the collection of the CMRS postpaid service charge against any CMRS customer may, however, be initiated by the state, on behalf of the board, in the Circuit Court of the county where the bill for CMRS service is regularly delivered, and the reasonable costs and attorneys’ fees which are incurred in connection with any such collection action may be awarded by the court to the prevailing party in the action.
  3. State and local taxes shall not apply to a separately stated CMRS postpaid service charge.
  4. To reimburse itself for the cost of collecting and remitting the CMRS postpaid service charge, each CMRS provider may deduct and retain from the CMRS postpaid service charges it collects during each calendar month an amount not to exceed one and one-half percent (1.5%) of the gross aggregate amount of CMRS postpaid service charges it collected that month.
  5. All CMRS postpaid service charges imposed under KRS 65.7621 to 65.7643 collected by each CMRS provider, less the administrative fee described in subsection (4) of this section, are due and payable to the board monthly and shall be remitted on or before thirty (30) days after the end of the calendar month. Collection actions may be initiated by the state, on behalf of the board, in the Franklin Circuit Court or any other court of competent jurisdiction, and the reasonable costs and attorneys’ fees which are incurred in connection with any such collection action may be awarded by the court to the prevailing party in the action.

History. Enact. Acts 1998, ch. 535, § 8, effective July 15, 1998; 2006, ch. 219, § 7, effective July 12, 2006; 2016 ch. 111, § 12, effective July 15, 2016.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(7/12/2006). Although 2006 Ky. Acts ch. 219, sec. 7, subsec. (5), contains a reference to “subsection (3) of this section,” that reference has been codified as “subsection (4) of this section” because subsection (2), which was struck in the introduced version of the bill, was restored in the House Committee Substitute, but the necessary adjustment to this internal reference was not made. This manifest typographical or clerical error has been corrected in codification under KRS 7.136(1)(h).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Applicability.

KRS 65.7635(1), at its most basic level and in no uncertain terms, required a prepaid wireless service provider to collect the emergency 911 service fees from its Kentucky customers. Commonwealth Commer. Mobile Radio Serv. Emergency Telecomms. Bd. v. TracFone Wireless, Inc., 735 F. Supp. 2d 713, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87379 (W.D. Ky. 2010 ).

Each commercial mobile radio service provider, including prepaid providers, must collect the service fees from each customer to whom service is provided. Virgin Mobile USA, L.P. v. Commonwealth, 2012 Ky. App. LEXIS 104 (Ky. Ct. App. June 29, 2012), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 2014 Ky. LEXIS 334 (Ky. Aug. 21, 2014).

Prepaid provider met the definition of a commercial mobile radio service provider in KRS 65.7621(9) and was required under KRS 65.7635(1) to collect the service fees imposed by KRS 65.7629(3). Exempting prepaid providers would contravene the uniformity requirement of KRS 65.7627 . Virgin Mobile USA, L.P. v. Commonwealth, 2012 Ky. App. LEXIS 104 (Ky. Ct. App. June 29, 2012), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 2014 Ky. LEXIS 334 (Ky. Aug. 21, 2014).

Because a prepaid provider acted in good faith when it disputed whether it was required to collect and remit service charges, it should not have been ordered to pay the attorney’s fees of the agency, although it was incorrect in asserting that the statute did not apply where a provider collected no taxes from its customers. Virgin Mobile USA, L.P. v. Commonwealth, 2012 Ky. App. LEXIS 104 (Ky. Ct. App. June 29, 2012), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 2014 Ky. LEXIS 334 (Ky. Aug. 21, 2014).

1998 Commercial Mobile Radio Service (CMRS) Emergency Telecommunications Act, KRS 65.7621 -.7643, applied to a prepaid wireless phone service provider and other prepaid providers because the provider was a “CMRS provider” within the meaning of former KRS 65.7635 , and the plain language of the 1998 Act required that all CMRS providers pay the enhanced 911 fees. Commonwealth Commer. Mobile Radio Serv. Emergency Telcoms. Bd. v. Tracfone Wireless, Inc., 712 F.3d 905, 2013 FED App. 0095P, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 6873 (6th Cir. Ky. 2013 ).

Prepaid wireless phone service provider was obligated to pay fees following the 2006 Amendments to the Commercial Mobile Radio Service (CMRS) Emergency Telecommunications Act, KRS 65.7621 -.7643, and it was obligated to do so starting on the effective date of the amendments, because the CMRS Emergency Telecommunications Board did not act contrary to the requirements of KRS 65.7635 in opting not to issue Option C rules or regulations, and the provider was on notice that it had a duty to collect fees under the 2006 Amendments. Commonwealth Commer. Mobile Radio Serv. Emergency Telcoms. Bd. v. Tracfone Wireless, Inc., 712 F.3d 905, 2013 FED App. 0095P, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 6873 (6th Cir. Ky. 2013 ).

1.5 Construction.

Under former Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 65.7635(1) and 65.7629(3) (amended 2006), a commercial mobile radio service (CMRS) provider is not required to pay the CMRS service charge, but was obligated to collect. Virgin Mobile U.S.A., L.P. v. Commonwealth ex rel. Commerc. Mobile Radio Serv. Telecomms. Bd., 448 S.W.3d 241, 2014 Ky. LEXIS 632 ( Ky. 2014 ).

Primary responsibility for the collection of the commercial mobile radio service (CMRS) service charge was on the Commercial Mobile Radio Service Emergency Telecommunications Board, not the CMRS providers. Virgin Mobile U.S.A., L.P. v. Commonwealth ex rel. Commerc. Mobile Radio Serv. Telecomms. Bd., 448 S.W.3d 241, 2014 Ky. LEXIS 632 ( Ky. 2014 ).

2. Construction.

In the context of former KRS 65.7635(1), there is no ambiguity in understanding all commercial mobile radio service providers shall collect the fee. Commonwealth Commer. Mobile Radio Serv. Emergency Telcoms. Bd. v. Tracfone Wireless, Inc., 712 F.3d 905, 2013 FED App. 0095P, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 6873 (6th Cir. Ky. 2013 ).

In the context of KRS 65.7635 , the permissive language in Option C, that the fee may be determined by administrative regulations promulgated by the Commercial Mobile Radio Service Emergency Telecommunications Board, does not impose a requirement on the Board. Without the Board exercising its discretion to promulgate a regulation, there is no collection methodology contained in Option C as it is written; it is within the Board’s discretion to decide to issue or decline to issue a regulation upon a request. Commonwealth Commer. Mobile Radio Serv. Emergency Telcoms. Bd. v. Tracfone Wireless, Inc., 712 F.3d 905, 2013 FED App. 0095P, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 6873 (6th Cir. Ky. 2013 ).

Both versions of the Commercial Mobile Radio Service (CMRS) Emergency Telecommunications Act, KRS 65.7621 -.7643, the 1998 Act and the 2006 amendments, state that each CMRS provider shall act as a collection agent for the CMRS fund. Therefore, the general obligation of all CMRS providers to collect fees remains unchanged. Commonwealth Commer. Mobile Radio Serv. Emergency Telcoms. Bd. v. Tracfone Wireless, Inc., 712 F.3d 905, 2013 FED App. 0095P, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 6873 (6th Cir. Ky. 2013 ).

3. Due Process.

Prepaid wireless service provider’s due process defense to its not having collected emergency 911 service fees failed because KRS 65.7635(1) clearly states that all Commercial Mobile Radio Service (CMRS) providers, which included the prepaid wireless service provider, must collect the service fees. Furthermore, there was no evidence that compliance with that general mandate would have been genuinely impossible. Commonwealth Commer. Mobile Radio Serv. Emergency Telecomms. Bd. v. TracFone Wireless, Inc., 735 F. Supp. 2d 713, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87379 (W.D. Ky. 2010 ).

4. Equal Protection.

Trial court's attorney's fee award was improperly reversed given that the trial court had properly considered the lodestar factors. Virgin Mobile U.S.A., L.P. v. Commonwealth ex rel. Commerc. Mobile Radio Serv. Telecomms. Bd., 448 S.W.3d 241, 2014 Ky. LEXIS 632 ( Ky. 2014 ).

Prepaid wireless service provider’s argument that requiring it to pay emergency 911 service fees when it did not collect such fees from its customers under KRS 65.7635(1) would treat it differently than the postpaid providers who did collect from their customers was flawed because (1) the prepaid provider was not similarly situated to postpaid providers that billed for, and collected, the service fees from their customers (the prepaid provider freely admitted that it made no attempt to collect the service fees), and (2) requiring it to collect the fees actually treated all Commercial Mobile Radio Service (CMRS) providers the same; it did not prejudice prepaid providers or advantage postpaid providers. Commonwealth Commer. Mobile Radio Serv. Emergency Telecomms. Bd. v. TracFone Wireless, Inc., 735 F. Supp. 2d 713, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87379 (W.D. Ky. 2010 ).

4. Liability.

From the enactment of the 2006 Amendments until September of 2009, a prepaid wireless service provider did not collect any fees from customers who purchased phones or prepaid minutes; nor did it offers any explanation or excuse for its failure to do so. Because “Option C” was unavailable for those sales, the provider was clearly obligated to collect the fees under Option A or B and was liable for the past due fees for its direct customers. Commonwealth Commer. Mobile Radio Serv. Emergency Telecomms. Bd. v. TracFone Wireless, Inc., 735 F. Supp. 2d 713, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87379 (W.D. Ky. 2010 ).

Upon its initial election of Option C under KRS 65.7635(1)(c), a prepaid wireless service provider had no legal obligation under the 2006 Amendments to remit fees for its non-direct customers until the Commercial Mobile Radio Service Board advised it of the proper method of collection. Commonwealth Commer. Mobile Radio Serv. Emergency Telecomms. Bd. v. TracFone Wireless, Inc., 735 F. Supp. 2d 713, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87379 (W.D. Ky. 2010 ).

65.7636. Lifeline program provider to collect and remit monthly CMRS service charge to board — Enforcement of service charge collection — No impact on CMRS fees imposed prior to January 1, 2017 — Prohibited use of moneys received.

  1. As used in this section, “Lifeline provider” means a CMRS provider that the Kentucky Public Service Commission has deemed or deems eligible to participate in the wireless low-income Lifeline program and to receive reimbursement from the universal service fund managed by the Federal Communications Commission pursuant to the federal Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. secs. 151 et seq.
  2. A Lifeline provider shall be liable for a CMRS service charge equal to the amount of the CMRS postpaid service charge levied under KRS 65.7629 and shall remit a monthly payment to the Kentucky 911 Services Boardequal to the product of the following factors:
    1. The amount of the postpaid CMRS service charge levied under KRS 65.7629 ; and
    2. The number of unique end users with Kentucky addresses for which the Lifeline provider received reimbursement from the universal service fund during the immediately preceding month.
  3. All service charges levied by this section are due and payable to the board monthly and shall be remitted on or before thirty (30) days after the end of the calendar month. Collection actions may be initiated by the state, on behalf of the board, in the Franklin Circuit Court or any other court of competent jurisdiction, and the reasonable costs and attorney’s fees which are incurred in connection with any such collection action may be awarded by the court to the prevailing party in the action.
  4. Nothing in this section shall be interpreted or otherwise construed to impact litigation pending in the courts of the Commonwealth commencing on or before March 1, 2016, regarding the application of CMRS fees imposed prior to January 1, 2017, to CMRS providers receiving reimbursement from the universal service fund.
  5. A Lifeline provider shall not use any moneys received for participation in the wireless low-income Lifeline program from the universal service fund managed by the Federal Communications Commission pursuant to the federal Telecommunications Act of 1996, 41 U.S.C. secs. 151 et seq., to pay for any portion of the CMRS service charge levied on the Lifeline provider under this section.

HISTORY: 2020 ch. 37, § 1, effective March 27, 2020.

65.7637. Limitations of liability for CMRS providers, service suppliers, VoIP service providers, and 911 or next generation 911 system services or equipment providers.

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no CMRS provider, service supplier, provider of Interconnected Voice over Internet Protocol service as defined in KRS 65.750 , or entity that provides services or equipment used in a 911 or next generation 911 system, nor their employees, directors, officers, subcontractors, or agents, except in cases of negligence, or wanton or willful misconduct, or bad faith, shall be liable for any damages in a civil action or subject to criminal prosecution resulting from death or injury to any person or from damage to property incurred by any person in connection with developing, adopting, establishing, participating in, implementing, maintaining, or providing access to 911 emergency service as defined in KRS 65.750 ; in connection with the quality of the service; in connection with ensuring that any 911 call or communication goes through properly; or in connection with providing access to 911 emergency service in connection with providing wireless 911 service, E911 service, or next generation 911 service.

History. Enact. Acts 1998, ch. 535, § 9, effective July 15, 1998; 2019 ch. 108, § 2, effective June 27, 2019.

65.7639. Information to be given to board by CMRS providers — Confidentiality of information.

Each CMRS provider shall provide customer mobile handset telephone numbers and names to PSAPs when required by the board. Each CMRS provider may be required to provide a quarterly report to the board of the number of subscribers receiving bills in each zip code served by the provider during that quarter if needed. Funds from the CMRS fund may be used to pay for the costs associated with providing this information. Although customer mobile handset telephone numbers and names shall be available to PSAPs, and to the board, this information shall remain the property of the disclosing CMRS provider and shall be used only in providing emergency response services to 911 calls and in collecting the service charge from subscribers. Mobile handset telephone numbers and names which are required to be provided under this section constitute confidential proprietary information and shall not be released to any person for purposes other than for including the numbers and names in the emergency telephone system database, for purposes related to the collection of the service charge, and for providing the numbers and names to permit a response to police, fire, medical, or other emergency situations. Notwithstanding any other provision of the law, no information provided to PSAPs under this section shall be disclosed other than to the submitting CMRS provider, the administrator, the board, and the independent certified public accountant retained by the board under KRS 65.7629(13) without the express permission of the submitting CMRS provider unless ordered by a court of competent jurisdiction. General information collected by the independent certified public accountant shall only be released or published in aggregate amounts which do not identify or allow identification of numbers of subscribers or revenues attributable to an individual CMRS provider.

History. Enact. Acts 1998, ch. 535, § 10, effective July 15, 1998; 2001, ch. 42, § 3, effective June 21, 2001.

65.7640. Mobile telecommunications services — Adoption of federal provisions — Notification of service provider about errors — Correction and refund — Exhaustion of remedies.

As it relates, under KRS 65.7621 to 65.7643 , to mobile telecommunications services as defined in 4 U.S.C. sec. 124 :

  1. The provisions of 4 U.S.C. secs. 116 to 126 are hereby adopted and incorporated by reference.
  2. If a customer believes that a tax, charge, fee, or assignment of place of primary use or taxing jurisdiction on a bill is incorrect, the customer shall notify the service provider about the alleged error in writing. This notification shall include the street address for the customer’s place of primary use, the account name and number for which the customer seeks a correction, a description of the alleged error, and any other information that the service provider reasonably requires. Within sixty (60) days of receiving the customer’s notification, the service provider shall either correct the error and refund or credit all taxes, charges, and fees incorrectly charged to the customer within four (4) years of the customer’s notification, or explain to the customer in writing how the bill was correct and why a refund or credit will not be made.
  3. A customer shall not have a cause of action against a service provider for any erroneously collected taxes, charges, or fees until the customer has exhausted the procedure set forth in subsection (2) of this section.

History. Enact. Acts 2002, ch. 69, § 4, effective July 15, 2002.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(7/15/2002). The provisions of this statute created in 2002 Ky. Acts ch. 69, sec. 4, “take effect for customer service bills issued after August 1, 2002.“ 2002 Ky. Acts ch. 69, sec. 6.

65.7641. Illegal use of wireless emergency telephone service — Penalties.

Wireless emergency telephone service shall not be used for personal use but shall be used solely for the purpose of communications by the public in emergency situations. Any person who knowingly uses or attempts to use wireless emergency telephone service for a purpose other than obtaining public safety assistance or who knowingly uses or attempts to use wireless emergency telephone service in an effort to avoid any CMRS service charges shall be guilty of a Class A misdemeanor. If the value of the wireless emergency telephone service obtained in a manner prohibited by this section or the value of the CMRS service charges exceeds five hundred dollars ($500), the offense may be prosecuted as a Class D felony.

History. Enact. Acts 1998, ch. 535, § 11, effective July 15, 1998; 2016 ch. 111, § 13, effective July 15, 2016.

65.7643. Construction of KRS 65.7621 to 65.7643 with respect to Communications Act of 1934.

KRS 65.7621 to 65.7643 shall not be construed as enabling the Commonwealth of Kentucky, including the Public Service Commission of Kentucky, to regulate CMRS in contravention of Section 332(c)(3) of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. sec. 332(c)(3) .

History. Enact. Acts 1998, ch. 535, § 12, effective July 15, 1998.

Short-Term Borrowing Act

65.7701. Definitions for KRS 65.7703 to 65.7721.

As used in KRS 65.7703 to 65.7721 , unless the context otherwise requires:

  1. “Governmental agency” means any county, urban-county government, consolidated local government, city, taxing district, special district, school district, or other political subdivision of the Commonwealth or body corporate or politic or any instrumentality of the foregoing.
  2. “Governing body” means the board, council, commission, fiscal court, or other body or group that is authorized by law to act on behalf of a governmental agency.
  3. “Legislation” means an order, resolution, or ordinance of the governing body.
  4. “Notes” means notes authorized by KRS 65.7703 to 65.7721 which may be secured by taxes or revenue or taxes and revenue.
  5. “Revenue” means all funds received by a governmental agency which are not taxes, including but not limited to excises, transfers, service fees, assessments, and occupational license fees.
  6. “State local debt officer” means the officer so designated in KRS 66.045 .
  7. “Taxes” means taxes properly levied upon real or personal property.

History. Enact. Acts 1990, ch. 76, § 1, effective July 13, 1990; 1994, ch. 508, § 22, effective July 15, 1994; 2002, ch. 346, § 35, effective July 15, 2002.

65.7703. Authority to borrow money in anticipation of taxes or revenues — Notes to be payable only by appropriation.

A governmental agency shall have power and authority, by legislation duly adopted, to borrow moneys from time to time in any fiscal year in anticipation of the receipt of current taxes or revenues, or both, to evidence the obligation by notes, appropriately designated, and to authorize, issue, and sell notes in the manner, and subject to the limitations provided in KRS 65.7703 to 65.7721 . Notes shall be payable only from moneys appropriated by the governing body of the governmental agency. The power to borrow from time to time shall include, but not be limited to, the power to make a single authorization and issue and sell portions of the amount of authorized notes whenever desired during the fiscal year.

History. Enact. Acts 1990, ch. 76, § 2, effective July 13, 1990.

65.7705. Note maximums.

No governmental agency shall authorize or issue notes in any one (1) fiscal year which in the aggregate shall exceed seventy-five percent (75%) of:

  1. In the case of notes payable solely from and secured by a pledge of taxes, the amount of taxes levied and to be collected for the current fiscal year;
  2. In the case of notes payable solely from and secured by a pledge of revenues, the amount of revenues anticipated to be collected during the current fiscal year; and
  3. In the case of notes payable from and secured by a pledge of taxes and revenues, the sum of taxes and revenues anticipated to be collected during the current fiscal year.

History. Enact. Acts 1990, ch. 76, § 3, effective July 13, 1990.

65.7707. Maturity of notes — Payment of interest.

Notes payable shall mature on a date determined by the governing body which shall be no later than the last day of the fiscal year in which the notes are issued. Interest on notes from the date thereof shall be payable at their maturity or payable in installments at earlier dates. Interest on the notes may be at a rate, rates or method of determining rates the governing body of the governmental agency unit may determine.

History. Enact. Acts 1990, ch. 76, § 4, effective July 13, 1990.

65.7709. Time of issuance — Format.

Notes shall be dated as of a date not more than thirty (30) days after the effective date of the legislation authorizing the notes. Notes shall be issued in the denominations, shall be subject to the rights of prior redemption, shall have the privileges of exchange and registration, shall be dated, shall be in registered or bearer form, with or without coupons, and shall be payable at the place or places, all as the governing body of the governmental agency may determine.

History. Enact. Acts 1990, ch. 76, § 5, effective July 13, 1990.

65.7711. Notes to be secured by pledge, lien, and charge — Sinking fund or note retirement fund.

Notes issued in a single fiscal year, shall be equally and ratably secured by the pledge of, security interest in, and a lien and charge on, the taxes or revenues, or both, of the governmental agency specified in the authorizing legislation which are in the process of collection and are to be received during the period when the notes will be outstanding. The pledge, lien, and charge shall be fully perfected as against the governmental agency, all creditors, and all third parties in accordance with the terms of the legislation from and after the delivery of the notes until the notes are paid in full. The legislation may establish one (1) or more sinking funds or note retirement funds and provide for periodic or other deposits therein, and may contain such covenants or other provisions as the governmental agency shall determine. In every case, the taxes and revenues pledged shall be those taxes and revenues which are the subject of appropriation for the current fiscal year. The holders or owners of notes may be given the right to have the notes continually secured by the faith and credit of the governmental agency, and each note shall bear on its face a statement to that effect and to the effect that the right of payment on the note is limited to the taxes or revenues pledged under the legislation of the governmental agency authorizing the notes.

History. Enact. Acts 1990, ch. 76, § 6, effective July 13, 1990.

65.7713. Enforcement of pledge, lien, and charge — Payment of notes.

The holder of the notes may enforce a pledge of, security interest in, and lien and charge on, the taxes or revenues, or both, of the governmental agency against all state and local public officials in possession of any of the taxes or revenues at any time which may be collected directly from the official upon notice by the holder for application to the payment of a note as and when due or for deposit in the applicable sinking fund or note retirement fund at the times and in the amounts specified in the note. Any state or local public official in possession of any taxes or revenues which are pledged shall make payment, against receipt therefor, directly to the holder of the notes and shall be discharged from any further liability or responsibility for taxes or revenues. If the payment is a payment in full of the notes, it shall be made against surrender of the notes to the state or local public official for delivery to the governmental agency in the case of payment in full, otherwise it shall be made against production of the notes for notation thereon of the amount of the payment.

History. Enact. Acts 1990, ch. 76, § 7, effective July 13, 1990.

65.7715. Estimate of revenues available for securing notes.

Prior to each authorization of notes, authorized officers of the governmental agency shall make an estimate of the taxes or revenues, or both, whichever is to secure the payment of the notes, which are estimated to be received during the period when the notes will be outstanding. The estimate shall take due account of the past and anticipated collection experience of the governmental agency and of current economic conditions. The estimate shall be certified by the officer as of a date not more than thirty (30) days prior to the effective date of the legislation authorizing the notes.

History. Enact. Acts 1990, ch. 76, § 8, effective July 13, 1990.

65.7717. Sale — Award to be made by legislation.

Notes may be sold at public, private, or invited sale as the governing body of the governmental agency may determine. Any public sale shall be advertised and conducted in the manner and subject to the conditions provided for a public sale of bonds pursuant to KRS Chapter 424. The governing body of the governmental agency shall award the notes by legislation to specified purchasers at a specified price.

History. Enact. Acts 1990, ch. 76, § 9, effective July 13, 1990.

65.7719. Notification of prescribed note information to state local debt officer. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1990, ch. 76, § 10, effective July 13, 1990; 1994, ch. 508, § 23, effective July 15, 1994) was repealed by Acts 2008, ch. 35, § 4, effective July 15, 2008.

65.7721. Short title.

KRS 65.7701 to 65.7721 may be cited as the Short-term Borrowing Act.

History. Enact. Acts 1990, ch. 76, § 11, effective July 13, 1990.

Creation of Nontaxing Special Districts

65.805. Definition of “district” for KRS 65.810 to 65.830.

As used in KRS 65.810 to 65.830 , unless the context otherwise requires, the word “district” shall mean, and the provisions of KRS 65.810 to 65.830 shall apply to, any special district governed by the following statutes: KRS 74.010 to 74.415 , 108.010 to 108.070 , 184.010 to 184.300 , and 267.010 to 267.990 .

History. Enact. Acts 1984, ch. 64, § 1, effective July 13, 1984; 2008, ch. 6, § 2, effective July 15, 2008; 2019 ch. 44, § 5, effective June 27, 2019.

Compiler’s Notes.

KRS 66.610 to 66.650 , referred to in this section, were repealed.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Water District

Water district was entitled to governmental immunity in a case where flooding was caused after an employee failed to turn off water to a residence. The water district was a state agency engaged in a governmental function, pursuant to KRS 65.005(1)(a). South Woodford Water Dist. v. Byrd, 352 S.W.3d 340, 2011 Ky. App. LEXIS 153 (Ky. Ct. App. 2011), overruled, N. Ky. Water Dist. v. Carucci, 2019 Ky. LEXIS 276 (Ky. Aug. 29, 2019).

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Taxing districts, KRS 65.180 to 65.190 .

65.810. Sole method of creating a nontaxing special district.

Except as otherwise provided by state law, the sole method of creating a district shall be in accordance with the following:

  1. Persons desiring to form a district shall present a petition to the fiscal court clerk and to each member of the fiscal court, meeting the criteria of KRS 65.815 , and signed by a number of registered voters equal to or greater than twenty percent (20%) of an average of the voters living in the proposed service area and voting in the last four (4) general elections. At time of its submission to fiscal court each petition shall be accompanied by a plan of service, showing such of the following as may be germane to the purposes for which the district is being formed:
    1. The statutory authority under which the district is created and under which the district will operate;
    2. Demographic characteristics of the area including but not limited to population, density, projected growth, and assessed valuation;
    3. A description of the service area including but not limited to the population to be served, a metes and bounds description of the area of the proposed district, the anticipated date of beginning service, the nature and extent of the proposed service, the projected effect of providing service on the social and economic growth of the area, and projected growth in service demand or need;
    4. A three (3) year projection of cost versus revenue;
    5. Justification for formation of the district including but not limited to the location of nearby governmental and nongovernmental providers of like services; and
    6. Any additional information such as land use plans, existing land uses, drainage patterns, health problems, and other similar analyses which bear on the necessity and means of providing the proposed service.
  2. The fiscal court clerk shall notify all planning commissions, cities, and area development districts within whose jurisdiction the proposed service area is located and any state agencies required by law to be notified of the proposal for the creation of the district.
  3. The fiscal court clerk shall schedule a hearing on the proposal for no earlier than thirty (30) nor later than ninety (90) days following receipt of the petition, charter, and plan of service, and shall, in accordance with the procedures of KRS Chapter 424, publish notice of the time and place of the public hearing and an accurate map of the area or a description in layman’s terms reasonably identifying the area of the proposed district.
  4. At the public hearing, the fiscal court shall take testimony of interested parties and solicit the recommendations of any planning commission, city, area development district, or state agency meeting the criteria of subsection (2) of this section.
  5. The fiscal court may extend the hearing, from time-to-time, for ninety (90) days from the date of the initial hearing and shall render a decision within thirty (30) days of the final adjournment of the hearing.
  6. Following the hearing, the fiscal court shall set forth its written findings of fact and shall approve or disapprove the formation of the district to provide service as described in the plan of service, and to exercise the powers granted by the specific statutes that apply to the district being formed.
  7. The creation of a district shall be of legal effect only upon the adoption of an ordinance, in accordance with the provisions of KRS 67.075 and 67.077 , creating such district and compliance with the requirements of KRS 65.005 .
  8. Nothing in this section shall be construed to enlarge upon or to restrict the powers granted a district under the district’s specific authorizing statutes.

History. Enact. Acts 1984, ch. 64, § 2, effective July 13, 1984.

65.815. Petition for creation of nontaxing special district.

  1. A valid petition for the creation of a district shall be in substantially the following form:

    “The following registered voters of (insert name of county) hereby petition the fiscal court of each county concerned to form a (insert type of district) for the following reasons: (A valid petition shall contain a brief list in layman’s terms of the reasons for the creation of the district.)”

  2. The petition shall contain the name and address of each petitioner. Each signature shall be dated as of the day of its execution, the last signature no later than one hundred eighty (180) days from the first signature.

History. Enact. Acts 1984, ch. 64, § 3, effective July 13, 1984.

65.820. Appeal of decision of fiscal court on formation of nontaxing special district.

  1. Any city containing all or any portion of the service area or any state agency with jurisdiction over the district or any citizen living in the proposed area of the district may, within thirty (30) days of the decision of the fiscal court, appeal the decision of the fiscal court on the formation of a district to the Circuit Court.
  2. The Circuit Court may affirm the action of the fiscal court, remand the matter to the fiscal court for additional findings or may reverse the action of the fiscal court and order approval or disapproval of the district. The Circuit Court may reverse the action of the fiscal court only if such decision is found to be arbitrary or capricious.
  3. No new or additional evidence may be introduced in the Circuit Court except as to fraud or misconduct affecting the decision of the fiscal court.
  4. Where appeals are brought from two (2) or more fiscal courts, the actions shall be merged and venue shall lie in the Circuit Court of the county where the greatest number of the district’s residents are located.

History. Enact. Acts 1984, ch. 64, § 4, effective July 13, 1984.

65.825. Creation of joint nontaxing special district.

The fiscal courts of two (2) or more counties may create a district that includes the area of two (2) or more counties by following the procedures of KRS 65.810 to 65.830 .

History. Enact. Acts 1984, ch. 64, § 5, effective July 13, 1984.

65.830. Effect of KRS 65.805 to 65.830 on special districts created prior to July 13, 1984.

The amendment or repeal by 1984 Acts, Chapter 64 of a section authorizing the creation of a district shall not be construed as limiting or changing the power or organization of districts created prior to July 13, 1984.

History. Enact. Acts 1984, ch. 64, § 6, effective July 13, 1984.

Ordinances and Regulations

65.870. Local firearms control ordinances prohibited — Exemption from immunity — Declaratory and injunctive relief.

  1. No existing or future city, county, urban-county government, charter county, consolidated local government, unified local government, special district, local or regional public or quasi-public agency, board, commission, department, public corporation, or any person acting under the authority of any of these organizations may occupy any part of the field of regulation of the manufacture, sale, purchase, taxation, transfer, ownership, possession, carrying, storage, or transportation of firearms, ammunition, components of firearms, components of ammunition, firearms accessories, or combination thereof.
  2. Any existing or future ordinance, executive order, administrative regulation, policy, procedure, rule, or any other form of executive or legislative action in violation of this section or the spirit thereof is hereby declared null, void, and unenforceable.
  3. Any person or organization specified in subsection (1) of this section shall repeal, rescind, or amend to conform, any ordinance, administrative regulation, executive order, policy, procedure, rule, or other form of executive or legislative action in violation of this section or the spirit thereof within six (6) months after July 12, 2012.
  4. Pursuant to Section 231 of the Constitution of Kentucky, insofar as any person or organization specified in subsection (1) of this section is considered an agent of the Commonwealth, it is the intent of the General Assembly to exempt them from any immunity provided in Section 231 of the Constitution of Kentucky to the extent provided in this section. A person or an organization whose membership is adversely affected by any ordinance, administrative regulation, executive order, policy, procedure, rule, or any other form of executive or legislative action promulgated or caused to be enforced in violation of this section or the spirit thereof may file suit against any person or organization specified in subsection (1) of this section in any court of this state having jurisdiction over any defendant to the suit for declaratory and injunctive relief. A court shall award the prevailing party in any such suit:
    1. Reasonable attorney’s fees and costs in accordance with the laws of this state; and
    2. Expert witness fees and expenses.
  5. If any person or organization specified in subsection (1) of this section violates this section or the spirit thereof, the court shall declare the improper ordinance, administrative regulation, executive order, policy, procedure, rule, or other form of executive or legislative action specified in subsection (1) of this section null, void, and unenforceable, and issue a permanent injunction against the person or organization specified in subsection (1) of this section prohibiting the enforcement of such ordinance, administrative regulation, executive order, policy, procedure, rule, or any other form of executive or legislative action specified in subsection (1) of this section.
  6. A violation of this section by a public servant shall be a violation of either KRS 522.020 or 522.030 , depending on the circumstances of the violation.
  7. The provisions of this section shall not apply where a statute specifically authorizes or directs an agency or person specified in subsection (1) of this section to regulate a subject specified in subsection (1) of this section.

History. Enact. Acts 1984, ch. 42, § 1, effective July 13, 1984; 2012, ch. 117, § 1, effective July 12, 2012.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Zoning Ordinances.

KRS 65.870 did not prohibit zoning ordinances in two (2) cities from restricting the locations in which a gun shop could operate, as the ordinances did not represent regulations in the field of firearm regulation prohibited by KRS 65.870 , but rather represented regulations in the field of land use. Peter Garrett Gunsmith, Inc. v. City of Dayton, 98 S.W.3d 517, 2002 Ky. App. LEXIS 1561 (Ky. Ct. App. 2002).

Opinions of Attorney General.

A city of the first class is not authorized to enact a local ordinance regulating the registration of firearms and requiring notification to the local governing body of all firearms sales. OAG 93-71 .

A city ordinance regulating concealable firearms conflicted with this section and was therefore invalid under the Home Rule Statute, KRS 82.082 . OAG 99-10 .

65.871. Local restrictions on sales of metals and products containing metal permitted — Conditions.

A city, county, urban-county, charter county, unified county, or consolidated local government may adopt an ordinance relating to the purchase of metals and metal-containing products provided the ordinance:

  1. Contains at least the provisions specified in KRS 15.232 , 16.066 , 433.890 to 433.896 , 433.900 to 433.906 , and 512.090 , but which may contain additional provisions; and
  2. Does not specify a lesser penalty for a similar offense than specified in KRS 15.232 , 16.066 , 433.890 to 433.896 , and 512.090 or provides that the penalty specified in KRS 433.890 to 433.896 and 512.090 shall apply.

History. Enact. Acts 2008, ch. 83, § 7, effective July 15, 2008; 2012, ch. 91, § 7, effective July 12, 2012.

65.873. Local restrictions on use of mobile telephone in motor vehicle prohibited.

No city, county, urban-county, charter county, consolidated local government, or special district shall impose a restriction on the use of a mobile telephone in a motor vehicle.

History. Enact. Acts 2003, ch. 94, § 1, effective June 24, 2003.

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Note: Cell Phones Pose a Distraction to Drivers but Legislative Ban Is Not the Answer, 98 Ky. L.J. 177 (2009/2010).

65.875. Prohibition against local rent control on private property.

Notwithstanding the provisions of KRS 67.712 , 67.083 , 82.082 , and 83.420 , to insure uniformity and statewide application, only the General Assembly shall enact legislation which would control rents on private property. This section is not intended to impair the right of any city, county, or urban-county to manage and control any property in which it has an interest through a housing authority or similar agency which provides housing assistance, nor is this section intended to include those programs operated by any city, county, or urban-county pursuant to federal grant programs.

History. Enact. Acts 1992, ch. 242, § 1, effective July 14, 1992.

65.877. Local governments’ authority to regulate holding of inherently dangerous wildlife — List of inherently dangerous wildlife.

  1. A county, city, urban-county, or charter county government may regulate or prohibit the holding of wildlife that have been identified by the Department of Fish and Wildlife Resources as inherently dangerous to human health and safety.
  2. The department has declared the following species of wildlife to be inherently dangerous to human health and safety and shall establish procedures for denying or issuing a transportation permit for said wildlife:
    1. African buffalo (Syncerus caffer);
    2. Hippopotamus (Hippopotamus amphibius);
    3. Hyenas (family Hyaenidae), all species except aardwolves (Proteles cristatus);
    4. Old world badger (Meles meles);
    5. Lions, jaguars, leopards, or tigers (genus Panthera);
    6. Clouded leopard (Neofelis nebulosa);
    7. Cheetah (Acinonyx jubatus);
    8. Elephants (family Elephantidae);
    9. Rhinoceroses (family Rhinocerotidae);
    10. Gorillas (family Pongidae);
    11. Baboons, drills, or mandrills (genus Papio);
    12. Gelada baboon (Theropithecus gelada);
    13. Gavials (family Gavialidae);
    14. Crocodiles (family Crocodylidae);
    15. Alligators or caimans (family Alligatoridae);
    16. Sea snakes (family Hydrophidae);
    17. Cobras or coral snakes (family Elapidae);
    18. Adders or vipers (family Viperae);
    19. Venomous rear-fanged species (family Colubridae);
    20. Gila monsters or beaded lizards (family Helodermatidae);
    21. Komodo dragon (Varanus komodoensis);
    22. Wolverine (Gulo gulo);
    23. Bears (family Ursidae);
    24. Wolf or wolf hybrids of over twenty-five percent (25%) wolf; or
    25. Cougar or mountain lion (Felis concolor).

History. Enact. Acts 1998, ch. 512, § 3, effective July 15, 1998.

65.879. Prohibition against local ordinances specifically applicable to residential care facilities for persons with a disability — Information to be provided by Cabinet for Health and Family Services — Facilities not exempted from general application ordinances.

  1. As used in this section:
    1. “Cabinet” means the Cabinet for Health and Family Services;
    2. “Local government” means a city, county, charter county, urban-county government, consolidated local government, or unified local government;
    3. “Persons with a disability” has the same meaning as in KRS 100.982 ; and
    4. “Residential care facility” means a residence, including a group home or staffed residence, operated and maintained by:
      1. A private agency receiving state or federal funds; or
      2. A government agency; that provides services in a homelike setting for persons with a disability.
  2. A local government shall not adopt or enforce any licensing or other requirements specifically applicable to residential care facilities providing services for persons with a disability beyond those required by statutes or administrative regulations of the Commonwealth of Kentucky or the federal government.
    1. A local government may adopt a resolution by its legislative body requesting the cabinet to provide information on each residential care facility within the requesting local government’s boundaries. The cabinet shall provide information to the local government within thirty (30) days of the receipt of the resolution requesting this information. The information provided by the cabinet shall be limited to: (3) (a) A local government may adopt a resolution by its legislative body requesting the cabinet to provide information on each residential care facility within the requesting local government’s boundaries. The cabinet shall provide information to the local government within thirty (30) days of the receipt of the resolution requesting this information. The information provided by the cabinet shall be limited to:
      1. The physical location of the residential care facility or facilities; and
      2. The name and contact information for the individual or organization primarily responsible for the oversight of the facility or facilities.
    2. Once a resolution has been filed by a local government, the cabinet shall:
      1. Provide that local government updated information if:
        1. The number of residential care facilities within the jurisdiction changes;
        2. The physical location changes; or
        3. The name and contact information for the individual or organization primarily responsible for the oversight changes; or
      2. Provide an annual update of the information provided in this subsection, in the event that the provisions of subparagraph 1. of this paragraph do not occur.
    3. The information provided in this subsection shall only be for the use of the local government’s law enforcement agencies, fire protection services, or emergency service providers. The information provided by the cabinet shall not be subject to the provisions of KRS 61.872 to KRS 61.884 . This exemption applies solely to the local government receiving the information.
  3. This section shall not be construed to exempt residential care facilities from compliance with local government ordinances that apply generally within the jurisdiction, including but not limited to business licensing requirements, occupational license taxes, nuisance and property maintenance codes, public and fire safety ordinances, health and sanitation ordinances, zoning requirements as provided under KRS 100.984 , or any other type of local ordinance of general application.

History. Enact. Acts 2012, ch. 55, § 1, effective July 12, 2012.

Code Enforcement Boards

65.8801. Purpose of KRS 65.8801 to 65.8839.

It is the intent of KRS 65.8801 to 65.8839 to protect, promote, and improve the health, safety, and welfare of the citizens residing within the local governments of this state by authorizing the creation of administrative boards with the authority to issue remedial orders and impose civil fines in order to provide an equitable, expeditious, effective, and inexpensive method of ensuring compliance with the ordinances in force in local governments. KRS 65.8801 to 65.8839 is intended and shall be construed to provide an additional or supplemental means of obtaining compliance with local government ordinances, and nothing contained in KRS 65.8801 to 65.8839 shall prohibit the enforcement of local government ordinances by any other means authorized by law.

History. Enact. Acts 1996, ch. 177, § 1, effective July 15, 1996.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

Highview Manor Ass’n, LLC v. Louisville Metro Health Dep’t, — S.W.3d —, 2008 Ky. App. LEXIS 185 (Ky. Ct. App. 2008); Louisville Metro Health Dep’t v. Highview Manor Ass’n, LLC, 319 S.W.3d 380, 2010 Ky. LEXIS 216 ( Ky. 2010 ).

65.8805. Definitions for KRS 65.8801 to 65.8839.

As used in KRS 65.8801 to 65.8839 , unless the context otherwise requires:

  1. “Local government” means any county, consolidated local government, urban-county government, charter county government, unified local government, or city of any class;
  2. “Code enforcement board” means an administrative body created and acting under the authority of KRS 65.8801 to 65.8839 ;
  3. “Joint code enforcement board” means two (2) or more local governments that have entered into an interlocal agreement in accordance with KRS 65.210 to 65.300 to perform and enforce the duties of a code enforcement board as provided in KRS 65.8801 to 65.8839 ;
  4. “Code enforcement officer” means a city police officer, safety officer, citation officer, county police officer, sheriff, deputy sheriff, university police officer, airport police officer, or other public law enforcement officer with the authority to issue a citation;
  5. “Ordinance” means an official action of a local government body, which is a regulation of a general and permanent nature and enforceable as a local law and shall include any provision of a code of ordinances adopted by a local government which embodies all or part of an ordinance;
  6. “Imminent danger” means a condition which is likely to cause serious or life-threatening injury or death at any time;
  7. “Abatement costs” means a local government’s necessary and reasonable costs for and associated with clearing, preventing unauthorized entry to, or demolishing all or a portion of a structure or premises, or taking any other action with regard to a structure or premises necessary to remedy a violation and to maintain and preserve the public health, safety, and welfare in accordance with any local government ordinance;
  8. “Final order” means any order:
    1. Issued by the code enforcement board in accordance with KRS 65.8828(4) or (6);
    2. Issued by an assigned hearing officer in accordance with KRS 65.8829(7) and that is not appealed to the code enforcement board as provided in KRS 65.8828(6);
    3. Created because a violator neither paid nor contested the citation within seven (7) days as provided in KRS 65.8825(6);
    4. Created because of a failure of a violator to appear at a hearing the violator requested to contest the citation as provided in KRS 65.8828(1);
  9. “Owner” means a person, association, corporation, partnership, or other legal entity having a legal or equitable title in real property; and
  10. “Premises” means a lot, plot, or parcel of land, including any structures upon it.

History. Enact. Acts 1996, ch. 177, § 2, effective July 15, 1996; 2006, ch. 12, § 1, effective July 12, 2006; 2016 ch. 86, § 1, effective July 15, 2016.

65.8808. Code enforcement board creation — Joinder with additional cities or counties — Powers — Classification of violation of ordinance as civil offense.

  1. The legislative body of a local government may, by ordinance, create a code enforcement board which shall have the power to issue remedial orders and impose civil fines as a method of enforcing a local government ordinance when a violation of the ordinance has been classified as a civil offense in accordance with this section. Any local government may expand its code enforcement board to include additional cities or counties within its jurisdiction for performing the function for which the code enforcement board was organized.
  2. Subject to the limitations set forth in subsection (3) of this section, the legislative body of a local government may utilize a code enforcement board to enforce any ordinance of the local government, including but not limited to, any zoning or nuisance ordinance. Each ordinance to be enforced by a code enforcement board, by its express terms, shall provide that each violation of the ordinance shall constitute a civil offense.

    The ordinance shall provide either:

    1. A specific civil fine or fines that may be imposed for each violation of the ordinance; or
    2. Two (2) separate civil fines as follows:
      1. A maximum civil fine that may be imposed for each offense if the citation is contested under KRS 65.8825(6); and
      2. A specific civil fine of less than the maximum civil fine that will be imposed for each offense if the person who has committed the offense does not contest the citation.
  3. No legislative body of a local government shall classify the violation of an ordinance as a civil offense if the same conduct that is regulated by the ordinance would also, under any provision of the Kentucky Revised Statutes, constitute a criminal offense or a moving motor vehicle offense.

History. Enact. Acts 1996, ch. 177, § 3, effective July 15, 1996; 1998, ch. 364, § 1, effective July 15, 1998; 2006, ch. 12, § 2, effective July 12, 2006; 2016 ch. 86, § 2, effective July 15, 2016.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Civil Fines.

Because a local government’s authority to impose a fine on a person who commits a civil offense by violating a local ordinance comes from KRS 65.8808 , and not from the Kentucky Criminal Code, a city’s ordinance that imposed a civil fine for feeding deer was lawful. Kelly v. City of Fort Thomas, 610 F. Supp. 2d 759, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1146 (E.D. Ky. 2009 ), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 620 F.3d 596, 2010 FED App. 0285P, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 18437 (6th Cir. Ky. 2010 ).

Cited:

Highview Manor Ass’n, LLC v. Louisville Metro Health Dep’t, — S.W.3d —, 2008 Ky. App. LEXIS 185 (Ky. Ct. App. 2008).

65.8811. Membership of board — Term — Reappointment — Vacancy — Removal — Compensation.

    1. A code enforcement board shall consist of no fewer than three (3) members who shall be appointed by the executive authority of the local government, subject to the approval of the legislative body. (1) (a) A code enforcement board shall consist of no fewer than three (3) members who shall be appointed by the executive authority of the local government, subject to the approval of the legislative body.
    2. A joint code enforcement board shall be appointed as set out in the terms of an interlocal agreement and shall include representation on the board of all participating local governments. Two (2) or more participating local governments may share an appointment or appointments as set out in the terms of the interlocal agreement.
  1. The initial appointments to a code enforcement board shall be as follows:
    1. One-third (1/3) of the membership or one-third (1/3) of the membership and one (1) member of the board shall be appointed for a term of one (1) year;
    2. One-third (1/3) of the membership or one-third (1/3) of the membership and one (1) member of the board shall be appointed for a term of two (2) years; and
    3. One-third (1/3) of the membership or one-third (1/3) of the membership and one (1) member of the board shall be appointed for a term of three (3) years.

      All subsequent appointments shall be made for a term of three (3) years.

    1. Each member of a code enforcement board shall have resided within the boundaries of the local government unit for a period of at least one (1) year prior to the date of the member’s appointment and shall reside there throughout the term in office. (3) (a) Each member of a code enforcement board shall have resided within the boundaries of the local government unit for a period of at least one (1) year prior to the date of the member’s appointment and shall reside there throughout the term in office.
    2. Board members serving on joint code enforcement boards shall have resided within the boundaries of the local government they represent for a period of at least one (1) year prior to the date of the member’s appointment and shall reside there throughout the term in office.
  2. A member may be reappointed, subject to approval of the legislative body or, in the case of a joint appointment, approval of the legislative bodies.
  3. Any vacancy on a code enforcement board shall be filled within sixty (60) days by the executive authority, subject to the approval of the legislative body. Joint appointments shall require an agreement of the executive authorities and approval of the legislative bodies in filling the vacancy. If a vacancy is not filled within sixty (60) days, the remaining members of the code enforcement board shall fill the vacancy. All vacancies shall be filled for the remainder of the unexpired term.
  4. Any member of a code enforcement board may be removed by the appointing authority or authorities for misconduct, inefficiency, or willful neglect of duty. Any appointing authority or authorities exercising the power to remove a member of a code enforcement board shall submit a written statement to the member and to the legislative body of the local government or local governments, setting forth the reasons for removal. The member so removed shall have the right of appeal to the Circuit Court.
  5. All members of a code enforcement board shall, before entering upon their duties, take the oath of office prescribed by Section 228 of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Kentucky.
  6. The members of a code enforcement board may be reimbursed for expenses or compensated, or both, as specified in the ordinance creating the board.
  7. No member of a local government code enforcement board shall hold any elected or appointed office, whether paid or unpaid, or any position of employment with the unit of local government that is subject to the jurisdiction of the code enforcement board.
  8. Each legislative body that elects to establish a code enforcement board is encouraged to provide opportunities for education regarding pertinent topics for the members of the code enforcement board.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1996, ch. 177, § 4, effective July 15, 1996; 1998, ch. 364, § 2, effective July 15, 1998; 2006, ch. 12, § 3, effective July 12, 2006; 2007, ch. 106, § 2, effective June 26, 2007; 2016 ch. 86, § 3, effective July 15, 2016; 2017 ch. 86, § 1, effective June 29, 2017.

65.8815. Organization of board — Meetings — Quorum — Minutes — Administrative personnel.

  1. The board shall, upon the initial appointment of its members, and annually thereafter, elect a chair from among its members, who shall be the presiding officer and a full voting member of the board. In the absence of the chair, the remaining members of the board shall select one (1) of their number to preside in place of the chair and exercise the powers of the chair.
  2. Regular meetings of the code enforcement board shall be held as specified in the ordinance creating the board. A code enforcement board shall be authorized to conduct special or emergency meetings in accordance with KRS 61.805 to 61.850 .
  3. The presence of at least a majority of the board’s entire membership shall constitute a quorum. The affirmative vote of a majority of the members constituting a quorum shall be necessary for any official action to be taken. Any member of a code enforcement board who has any direct or indirect financial or personal interest in any matter to be decided shall disclose the nature of the interest and shall disqualify himself from voting on the matter and shall not be counted for purposes of establishing a quorum.
  4. Minutes shall be kept for all proceedings of the code enforcement board and the vote of each member on any issue decided by the board shall be recorded in the minutes.
  5. All meetings and hearings of the code enforcement board shall be open to the public.
  6. The local government legislative body shall provide clerical and administrative personnel for the proper conduct of the duties of the code enforcement board.

History. Enact. Acts 1996, ch. 177, § 5, effective July 15, 1996; 1998, ch. 364, § 3, effective July 15, 1998; 2011, ch. 95, § 4, effective June 8, 2011; 2016 ch. 86, § 4, effective July 15, 2016.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

Short v. City of Olive Hill, 414 S.W.3d 433, 2013 Ky. App. LEXIS 115 (Ky. Ct. App. 2013).

65.8818. Alternate board members.

The executive authority may appoint two (2) alternate members to serve on the code enforcement board in the absence of regular members. The appointment of alternate members shall be subject to the approval of the legislative body. Alternate members shall meet all of the qualifications and be subject to all of the requirements of KRS 65.8801 to 65.8839 that apply to regular members.

History. Enact. Acts 1996, ch. 177, § 6, effective July 15, 1996.

65.8821. Powers of board.

Each code enforcement board shall have the power to:

  1. Adopt rules and regulations to govern its operation and the conduct of its hearings that are consistent with the requirements of KRS 65.8801 to 65.8839 and ordinances of the local government or local governments creating the board;
  2. Conduct hearings, or assign a hearing officer to conduct a hearing, to determine whether there has been a violation of any local government ordinance that the board has jurisdiction to enforce;
  3. Subpoena alleged violators, witnesses, and evidence to its hearings. Subpoenas issued by the board, or an assigned hearing officer, may be served by any code enforcement officer;
  4. Take testimony under oath. The chairman of the board, or an assigned hearing officer, shall have the authority to administer oaths to witnesses prior to their testimony before the board on any matter;
  5. Make findings and issue orders that are necessary to remedy any violation of a local government ordinance that the board has jurisdiction to enforce; and
  6. Impose civil fines as authorized by ordinance on any person found to have violated any ordinance that the board has jurisdiction to enforce.

History. Enact. Acts 1996, ch. 177, § 7, effective July 15, 1996; 2011, ch. 95, § 1, effective June 8, 2011; 2016 ch. 86, § 6, effective July 15, 2016.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

Highview Manor Ass’n, LLC v. Louisville Metro Health Dep’t, — S.W.3d —, 2008 Ky. App. LEXIS 185 (Ky. Ct. App. 2008).

65.8823. Abatement and decontamination of methamphetamine contamination — Ordinance.

A local government may provide by ordinance for the abatement and decontamination of a property where a methamphetamine contamination notice has been posted as provided in KRS 224.1-410 .

HISTORY: 2019 ch. 52, § 1, effective June 27, 2019.

65.8825. Enforcement proceedings — Procedure.

  1. Enforcement proceedings before a code enforcement board or hearing officer shall be initiated by the issuance of a citation by a code enforcement officer.
  2. When a code enforcement officer, based upon personal observation or investigation, has reasonable cause to believe that a person has committed a violation of a local government ordinance, the officer is authorized to issue a citation by:
    1. Personal service to the alleged violator;
    2. Leaving a copy of the citation with any person eighteen (18) years of age or older who is on the premises, if the alleged violator is not on the premises at the time the citation is issued;
    3. Mailing a copy of the citation by regular first-class mail to the last known recorded mailing address of the alleged violator; or
    4. If, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, the issuance of a citation using the methods set out in paragraphs (a) to (c) of this subsection is not possible, then the citation is properly served by posting a copy of the citation in a conspicuous place on the premises.
  3. When authorized by ordinance, a code enforcement officer may, in lieu of immediately issuing a citation, give notice that a violation shall be remedied within a specified period of time. If the person to whom the notice is given fails or refuses to remedy the violation within the time specified, the code enforcement officer is authorized to issue a citation.
  4. The citation issued by the code enforcement officer shall be in a form prescribed by the local government and shall contain, in addition to any other information required by ordinance or rule of the board:
    1. The date and time of issuance;
    2. The name and address of the person to whom the citation is issued;
    3. The date and time the offense was committed;
    4. The facts constituting the offense;
    5. The section of the code or the number of the ordinance violated;
    6. The name of the code enforcement officer;
    7. The civil fine that will be imposed for the violation if the person does not contest the citation if the local government has elected to use the alternative authorized under KRS 65.8808(2)(b);
    8. The maximum civil fine that may be imposed if the person elects to contest the citation;
    9. The procedure for the person to follow in order to pay the civil fine or to contest the citation; and
    10. A statement that if the person fails to pay the civil fine set forth in the citation or contest the citation, within the time allowed, the person shall be deemed to have waived the right to a hearing before the code enforcement board or hearing officer to contest the citation and that the determination that a violation was committed shall be final, and the alleged violator shall be deemed to have waived the right to appeal the final order to District Court.
  5. After issuing a citation to an alleged violator, the code enforcement officer shall notify the code enforcement board by delivering the citation to the administrative official designated by ordinance or by the board. The code enforcement officer, hearing officer, or code enforcement board may also elect to provide notice of the issuance of the citation to any lienholder with an interest in the subject premises.
  6. When a citation is issued, the person to whom the citation is issued shall respond to the citation within seven (7) days of the date the citation is issued by either paying the civil fine set forth in the citation or requesting, in writing, a hearing to contest the citation. If the person fails to respond to the citation within seven (7) days, the person shall be deemed to have waived the right to a hearing to contest the citation and the determination that a violation was committed shall be considered final. In this event, the citation, as issued, shall be deemed a final order determining that the violation was committed and imposing the civil fine set forth in the citation, and the alleged violator shall be deemed to have waived the right to appeal the final order to District Court. Notice of the final order shall be provided to the cited violatorby:
    1. Regular first-class mail;
    2. Certified mail, return receipt requested;
    3. Personal delivery; or
    4. Leaving a copy of the order at that person’s usual place of residence with any individual residing therein who is eighteen (18) years of age or older and who is informed of the contents of the order.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1996, ch. 177, § 8, effective July 15, 1996; 2011, ch. 95, § 2, effective June 8, 2011; 2016 ch. 86, § 7, effective July 15, 2016; 2017 ch. 86, § 2, effective June 29, 2017.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

Short v. City of Olive Hill, 414 S.W.3d 433, 2013 Ky. App. LEXIS 115 (Ky. Ct. App. 2013).

65.8828. Hearing — Notice — Failure to appear — Procedure — Final order.

  1. When a hearing is requested, the code enforcement board, through its clerical and administrative staff, shall schedule a hearing. Not less than seven (7) days before the date set for the hearing, the code enforcement board shall notify the person who requested the hearing of the date, time, and place of the hearing. The notice may be given by regular first-class mail; certified mail, return receipt requested; by personal delivery; or by leaving the notice at the person’s usual place of residence with any individual residing therein who is eighteen (18) years of age or older and who is informed of the contents of the notice. The code enforcement board may also elect to provide notice of hearing to any lienholders with an interest in the subject premises. Any person requesting a hearing who fails to appear at the time and place set for the hearing shall be deemed to have waived the right to a hearing to contest the citation and the determination that a violation was committed shall be final. In this event, the citation, as issued, shall be deemed a final order determining that the violation was committed and imposing the civil fine set forth in the citation, and the alleged violator shall be deemed to have waived the right to appeal the final order to District Court. Notice of the final order shall be provided to the cited violator in the manner set forth in subsection (5) of this section.
  2. Each case that is the subject of a hearing may be presented by an attorney selected by the local government or by a member of the administrative staff of the local government. An attorney may either be counsel to the code enforcement board or may represent the local government by presenting cases at the hearing, but in no case shall an attorney serve in both capacities.
  3. All testimony shall be under oath and shall be recorded. The code enforcement board or assigned hearing officer shall take testimony from the code enforcement officer, the alleged offender, and any witnesses to the alleged violation offered by the code enforcement officer or the alleged offender. Formal rules of evidence shall not apply, but fundamental due process shall be observed and shall govern the proceedings.
  4. If a code enforcement board conducts the hearing, or upon the receipt of recommendations of a hearing officer pursuant to KRS 65.8829(6) , then the code enforcement board shall determine, based on the evidence presented, whether a violation was committed. When the board determines that no violation was committed, an order dismissing the citation shall be entered. When the board determines that a violation has been committed, the board may issue an order upholding the citation and may order the offender to do either or both of the following:
    1. Pay a civil fine in an amount up to the maximum authorized by ordinance; or
    2. Remedy a continuing violation within a specified time to avoid the imposition of a fine as authorized by ordinance.
  5. Every final order following a hearing of a code enforcement board shall be reduced to writing, which shall include the findings and conclusions of the board, and the date the order was issued. A copy of the order shall be furnished to the person named in the citation. If the person named in the citation is not present at the time a final order of the board is issued, the order shall be delivered to that person by regular first-class mail; certified mail, return receipt requested; by personal delivery; or by leaving a copy of the order at that person’s usual place of residence with any individual residing therein who is eighteen (18) years of age or older and who is informed of the contents of the order.
  6. If the code enforcement board is reviewing a final order entered by a hearing officer on appeal as authorized by KRS 65.8829(7), the code enforcement board shall review the record created before the hearing officer and determine whether there is substantial evidence on the record to support a finding by the hearing officer that a violation was committed. If the code enforcement board determines that there is not substantial evidence on the record, it shall issue an order dismissing the citation. If the code enforcement board determines that there is substantial evidence on the record that a violation was committed, it shall issue a final order upholding the order entered by the hearing officer. The provisions of subsections (1) and (4) of this section shall apply to any appeal hearing conducted pursuant to this subsection.

History. Enact. Acts 1996, ch. 177, § 9, effective July 15, 1996; 1998, ch. 364, § 4, effective July 15, 1998; 2011, ch. 95, § 3, effective June 8, 2011; 2016 ch. 86, § 8, effective July 15, 2016.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Service of Order.

Code enforcement board was required to send an order via certified mail or use another enhanced service method because the owners were not present when the written order was entered, regardless of whether one of the owners was present at the time of the oral pronouncement; however, an order sent by regular mail had to be upheld because the owners did not timely appeal to the district court after receiving the written order. Short v. City of Olive Hill, 414 S.W.3d 433, 2013 Ky. App. LEXIS 115 (Ky. Ct. App. 2013).

65.8829. Hearing officer — Duties — Procedures — Ordinance for alternative procedure.

  1. A code enforcement board may assign a hearing officer as provided by ordinance to conduct hearings in accordance with the procedures set forth in KRS 65.8828 .
    1. Any member of the code enforcement board, including the chair, may be assigned as a hearing officer. (2) (a) Any member of the code enforcement board, including the chair, may be assigned as a hearing officer.
    2. An individual that is not a member of the code enforcement board may be assigned by the code enforcement board as a hearing officer as long as the individual does not hold any elected or appointed office or position of employment with a unit of local government that created the code enforcement board.
  2. Any person assigned to be a hearing officer by a code enforcement board shall have experience or shall have received training in the code enforcement process and basic procedural due process, as specified in the ordinance creating the code enforcement board. The experience or training shall include, at a minimum, acquired knowledge regarding a party’s fundamental due process right to:
    1. Be accompanied and advised by counsel at the hearing;
    2. Present evidence and witnesses on his or her behalf at the hearing;
    3. Examine the evidence opposing the party; and
    4. Confront and cross-examine the witnesses opposing the party.
  3. An assigned hearing officer may administer oaths to witnesses prior to their testimony and subpoena alleged violators, witnesses, and evidence to the hearing to which the officer is assigned.
  4. Any hearing conducted by a hearing officer under this section shall conform to the procedural requirements of KRS 65.8828(1) to (5).
  5. The hearing officer shall make written findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a recommended order for consideration by the code enforcement board. The hearing officer shall, within twenty-four (24) hours of entry, forward these findings, conclusions, and recommended order to the alleged violator in the manner required by KRS 65.8828 (5) and to the code enforcement board for its action under KRS 65.8828 .
    1. In lieu of subsection (6) of this section, a local government may provide in the ordinance establishing the code enforcement board that a hearing officer shall make written findings of facts and conclusions of law, and enter final orders consistent with the authority granted to the code enforcement board under KRS 65.8828(4). (7) (a) In lieu of subsection (6) of this section, a local government may provide in the ordinance establishing the code enforcement board that a hearing officer shall make written findings of facts and conclusions of law, and enter final orders consistent with the authority granted to the code enforcement board under KRS 65.8828(4).
    2. The findings of fact, conclusions of law, and final order shall be forwarded within twenty-four (24) hours of entry to the alleged violator in the manner required by KRS 65.8828(5) and to the code enforcement board.
    3. For appeals of a final order of a hearing officer issued under this subsection, the local government shall designate in the ordinance governing the operation of the code enforcement board that either:
      1. A final order issued by a hearing officer under this subsection may be appealed by the alleged violator to the code enforcement board in accordance with terms specified in the ordinance governing the operation of the code enforcement board. If the local government provides appeals to the code enforcement board, the appeal shall be filed in writing to the code enforcement board within seven (7) days of the receipt of the final order. The failure to file an appeal within seven (7) days shall render the order entered by the hearing officer final for all purposes and an individual receiving a final order under this subparagraph shall be required to exhaust the administrative remedy of appeal to the code enforcement board before appealing to District Court as authorized under KRS 65.8831 ; or
      2. A final order issued by a hearing officer under this subsection may be appealed by the alleged violator directly to District Court, in accordance with the provisions of KRS 65.8831 .

HISTORY: 2016 ch. 86, § 5, effective July 15, 2016.

65.8831. Appeals — Final judgment.

  1. An appeal from any final order issued pursuant toKRS 65.8829(7)(c)2, or pursuant to KRS 65.8828(4) or (6) may be made to the District Court of the county in which the local government is located within thirty (30) days of the date the order is issued. The appeal shall be initiated by the filing of a complaint and a copy of the final order in the same manner as any civil action under the Rules of Civil Procedure. The District Court shall review the final order de novo.
  2. A judgment of the District Court may be appealed to the Circuit Court in accordance with the Rules of Civil Procedure.
  3. If no appeal from a final order is filed within the time period set forth in subsection (1) of this section, the order shall be deemed final for all purposes.

History. Enact. Acts 1996, ch. 177, § 10, effective July 15, 1996; 1998, ch. 364, § 5, effective July 15, 1998; 2016 ch. 86, § 9, effective July 15, 2016.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Standard of Review.

Because a District Court did not have appellate jurisdiction over a decision by a code enforcement board under KRS 65.8831 , the District Court was to conduct a de novo review of the record created before the code enforcement board and was not confined to a determination as to whether the board’s decision was arbitrary. Highview Manor Ass'n, LLC v. Louisville Metro Health Dep't, 2008 Ky. App. LEXIS 185 (Ky. Ct. App. June 13, 2008), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 319 S.W.3d 380, 2010 Ky. LEXIS 216 ( Ky. 2010 ).

2. Constitutionality.

That part of KRS 65.8831(1) limiting review of a code enforcement board’s decision to the record created before the board was an unconstitutional grant of appellate jurisdiction to a district court in violation of Ky. Const. § 113 and KRS 24A.010(3). Such decisions were subject to de novo trials in district court. Louisville Metro Health Dep't v. Highview Manor Ass'n, LLC, 319 S.W.3d 380, 2010 Ky. LEXIS 216 ( Ky. 2010 ).

3. Timeliness.

Code enforcement board was required to send an order via certified mail or use another enhanced service method because the owners were not present when the written order was entered, regardless of whether one of the owners was present at the time of the oral pronouncement; however, an order sent by regular mail had to be upheld because the owners did not timely appeal to the district court after receiving the written order. Short v. City of Olive Hill, 414 S.W.3d 433, 2013 Ky. App. LEXIS 115 (Ky. Ct. App. 2013).

4. Necessary Parties.

Code Enforcement Board was not an indispensable party to the action at its inception because a complaint brought pursuant to this section is not an appeal from a final action by the Board but was treated as an original action challenging the enforcement order issued under the city’s authority. Hengehold v. City of Florence, 596 S.W.3d 599, 2020 Ky. App. LEXIS 15 (Ky. Ct. App. 2020).

65.8835. Lien — Recording — Responsibility for fines, charges, and fees.

  1. The local government shall possess a lien on property owned by the person found by a nonappealable final order as defined by KRS 65.8805(8), or by a final judgment of the court, to have committed a violation of a local government ordinance. The lien shall be for all civil fines assessed for the violation and for all charges and fees incurred by the local government in connection with the enforcement of the ordinance, including abatement costs. An affidavit of the code enforcement officer shall constitute prima facie evidence of the amount of the lien and the regularity of the proceedings pursuant to KRS 65.8801 to 65.8839 . The lien:
    1. Shall be recorded in the office of the county clerk;
    2. Shall be notice to all persons from the time of its recording and shall bear interest until paid;
    3. Subject to KRS 65.8836 , shall take precedence over all other liens, except state, county, school board, and city taxes;
    4. Shall continue for ten (10) years following the date of the nonappealable final order, or final judgment of the court; and
    5. May be enforced by judicial proceedings, including an action to foreclose.
  2. In addition to the remedy prescribed in subsection (1) of this section, the person found to have committed the violation shall be personally responsible for the amount of the lien, including all civil fines assessed for the violation and for all charges, fees, and abatement costs incurred by the local government in connection with the enforcement of the ordinance. The local government may bring a civil action against the person and shall have the same remedies as provided for the recovery of a debt.
  3. Nothing in this section shall otherwise affect the rights or obligations between the owner of the property and those persons who claim a security interest in the property.

History. Enact. Acts 1996, ch. 177, § 11, effective July 15, 1996; 2016 ch. 86, § 10, effective July 15, 2016.

65.8836. System for notification of lienholder — Requirements — Correction of violation — Precedence of lien.

  1. A local government adopting the provisions of KRS 65.8801 to 65.8839 shall implement a system for notification to lienholders that meets the minimum requirements of subsection (2) of this section and shall comply with the procedures to permit remedial action by lienholders as provided in subsection (3) of this section in order to obtain and maintain the lien priority over previously filed liens granted in KRS 65.8835 .
  2. A local government shall create a notification system that provides lienholders and others that elect to do so with electronic notifications of all final orders entered pursuant to KRS 65.8801 to 65.8839 . The system shall meet the following minimum requirements:
    1. An individual or entity may register with the local government to receive information on each final order by providing a name, mailing address, phone number, and an electronic mailing address to the local government. The local government shall accept this information in any form submitted by a registrant. It shall be the responsibility of the registrant to maintain and update its contact information with the local government, except that a local government shall inform a registrant of any evidence the local government receives that the electronic mailing address is invalid or not functional in order to provide the registrant an opportunity to submit an updated electronic mailing address;
    2. No less than once a month but no more frequently than once per week, the local government shall send electronic mail notification of all final orders issued pursuant to the provisions of KRS 65.8801 to 65.8839 since the last date of notification to each party registered pursuant to paragraph (a) of this subsection. The notification shall, at a minimum, include or provide an electronic link to a document or database meeting the requirements of this paragraph that includes:
      1. The name of the person charged with a violation;
      2. The physical address of the premises where the violation occurred;
      3. The last known mailing address for the owner of the premises where the violation occurred if, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, it is ascertainable.
      4. A specific description of the citation leading to the final order, including the citation detail set forth in KRS 65.8825(4)(a) to (h), which may be satisfied by including a copy of the full citation;
      5. The findings of the final order, including the penalty or penalties imposed by the final order, which may be satisfied by providing a copy of the full final order; and
      6. The status of the final order in regards to its ability to be appealed pursuant to KRS 65.8831 , except that the local government shall provide an update to registrants if an appeal is filed on a final order pursuant to KRS 65.8831 ;
    3. At the same time the electronic notification required under paragraph (b) of this subsection is sent, a local government shall post this notification or provide a summary of the information regarding each final order required by paragraph (b) of this subsection in a conspicuous place on its public Web site, which shall be affiliated with the local government and contain other information about the local government.If the local government posts using summary form:
      1. The summary shall be calculated to reasonably allow identification of the specific properties which may be impacted by the lien; and
      2. Upon request, the local government shall provide the complete record of a final order created under paragraph (b) of this subsection without charge; and
    4. A local government shall maintain the records created under this subsection for a period of ten (10) years following their issuance.
    1. A lien holder of record may, within forty-five (45) days from the date of issuance of notification under subsection (2) of this section, correct the violation if it has not already been abated, or elect to pay all civil fines assessed for the violation and all charges and fees incurred by the local government in connection with the enforcement of the ordinance, including abatement costs. This subsection shall not prohibit the local government from taking immediate action if necessitated under KRS 65.8838 . (3) (a) A lien holder of record may, within forty-five (45) days from the date of issuance of notification under subsection (2) of this section, correct the violation if it has not already been abated, or elect to pay all civil fines assessed for the violation and all charges and fees incurred by the local government in connection with the enforcement of the ordinance, including abatement costs. This subsection shall not prohibit the local government from taking immediate action if necessitated under KRS 65.8838 .
    2. The lien provided by KRS 65.8835 shall not take precedence over previously recorded liens if:
      1. The local government failed to comply with the requirements of subsection (2) of this section for notification of the final order; or
      2. A prior lienholder corrected the violation or paid all civil fines assessed for the violation and all charges and fees incurred by the local government in connection with the enforcement of the ordinance, including abatement costs within forty-five (45) days as provided in paragraph (a) of this subsection.
    3. A lien that does not take precedence over previously recorded liens under the circumstances outlined in paragraph (b) of this subsection, shall, if the final order remains partially unsatisfied, take precedence over all other subsequent liens except liens for state, county, school board and city taxes.
    4. Nothing contained in this subsection shall prohibit a local government from recording a lien before the forty-five (45) day period established in paragraph (a) of this subsection expires. If the lien is fully satisfied prior to the expiration of the forty-five (45) day period established in paragraph (a) of this subsection, the local government shall release the lien in the county clerk’s office where the lien is recorded within fifteen (15) days of satisfaction.
  3. The local government may delegate responsibility for compliance with this section to the code enforcement board or its administrative staff as specified in the ordinance establishing and governing the operation of the code enforcement board.
  4. The failure of a local government to comply with this section or the failure of a lien to take precedence over previously filed liens as provided in subsection (3)(b) of this section, shall not limit or restrict any other remedies that the local government has against the property or the violator.
  5. The requirements of this section shall not apply to a local government when it enforces KRS 65.8840 .

HISTORY: 2016 ch. 86, § 11, effective July 15, 2016; 2017 ch. 86, § 3, effective June 29, 2017.

65.8838. Immediate action to remedy violation of ordinances.

Nothing contained in KRS 65.8801 to 65.8839 shall prohibit a local government from taking immediate action to remedy a violation of its ordinances when there is reason to believe that the existence of the violation presents imminent danger, a serious threat to the public health, safety, and welfare, or if in the absence of immediate action, the effects of the violation will be irreparable or irreversible.

History. Enact. Acts 1996, ch. 177, § 12, effective July 15, 1996; 2016 ch. 86, § 12, effective July 15, 2016.

65.8839. Short title for KRS 65.8801 to 65.8839.

The provisions of KRS 65.8801 to 65.8839 may be cited as the “Local Government Code Enforcement Board Act.”

History. Enact. Acts 1996, ch. 177, § 13, effective July 15, 1996.

65.8840. Abatement of nuisance — Exceptions — Enforcement ordinance — Lien — Personal liability of property owner — Right to farm exception.

  1. As used in this section:
    1. “Abatement costs” means a local government’s necessary and reasonable costs for and associated with clearing, preventing unauthorized entry to, or demolishing all or a portion of a structure or premises, or taking any other action with regard to a structure or premises necessary to remedy a violation and to maintain and preserve public health, safety, and welfare in accordance with any local government ordinance;
    2. “Automobile collector” means a person who collects and restores motor vehicles;
    3. “Code enforcement board” means an administrative body created and acting under the authority of KRS 65.8801 to 65.8839 ;
    4. “Code enforcement officer” means a city police officer, safety officer, citation officer, county police officer, sheriff, deputy sheriff, university police officer, airport police officer, or other public law enforcement officer with the authority to issue a citation;
    5. “Imminent danger” means a condition which is likely to cause serious or life- threatening injury or death at any time;
    6. “Local government” means any county, consolidated local government, urban- county government, charter county government, unified local government, or city of any class;
    7. “Ordinance” means an official action of a local government body, which is a regulation of a general and permanent nature and enforceable as a local law and shall include any provision of a code of ordinances adopted by a local government which embodies all or part of an ordinance;
    8. “Ordinary public view” means a sight line within normal visual range by a person on a public street or sidewalk adjacent to real property;
    9. “Owner” means a person, association, corporation, partnership, or other legal entity having a legal or equitable title in real property;
    10. “Parts car” means an automobile that is not intended to be operated along streets and roads, but is used to provide parts for the restoration of other automobiles; and
    11. “Premises” means a lot, plot, or parcel of land, including any structures upon it.
    1. The provisions of this section may be enforced through a code enforcement board pursuant to KRS 65.8801 to 65.8839 , or by any other means authorized by law, including but not limited to direct enforcement through the enactment of an ordinance as provided in subsection (7) of this section. (2) (a) The provisions of this section may be enforced through a code enforcement board pursuant to KRS 65.8801 to 65.8839 , or by any other means authorized by law, including but not limited to direct enforcement through the enactment of an ordinance as provided in subsection (7) of this section.
    2. If the provisions of this section are enforced through a code enforcement board pursuant to KRS 65.8801 to 65.8839, the provisions of subsections (8), (9), and (10) of this section shall not apply, and KRS 65.8801 to 65.8839 shall supersede any conflicting provisions of this section.
  2. Except as provided in subsection (4) of this section, it shall be unlawful for the owner, occupant, or person having control or management of any premises within a local government to permit a public nuisance, health hazard, or source of filth to develop thereon through the accumulation of:
    1. Junked or wrecked automobiles, vehicles, machines, or other similar scrap or salvage materials, excluding inoperative farm equipment;
    2. One (1) or more mobile or manufactured homes as defined in KRS 227.550 that are junked, wrecked, or inoperative and which are not inhabited;
    3. Rubbish; or
    4. The excessive growth of weeds or grass.
  3. The provisions of subsection (3)(a) of this section shall not apply to:
    1. Junked, wrecked, or inoperative automobiles, vehicles, machines, or other similar scrap or salvage materials located on the business premises of a:
      1. Licensed automotive recycling dealer as described in KRS 190.010(8);
      2. Used motor vehicle dealer as defined in KRS 190.010(6): or
      3. Motor vehicle auction dealer as defined in KRS 190.010(11);
    2. Junked, wrecked, or inoperative motor vehicles, including parts cars, stored on private premises by automobile collectors, whether as a hobby or a profession, if these motor vehicles and parts cars are stored out of ordinary public view by means of suitable fencing, trees, shrubbery, or other means; and
    3. Any motor vehicle as defined in KRS 281.010 that is owned, controlled, operated, managed, or leased by a motor carrier.
  4. An owner shall not permit any structure upon his or her premises to become unfit and unsafe for human habitation, occupancy, or use or to permit conditions to exist on the structure or premises which are dangerous or injurious to the health or safety of the occupants of the structure, the occupants of neighboring structures, or other residents of the local government.
  5. A local government may provide by ordinance for the abatement and decontamination of a property where a methamphetamine contamination notice has been posted as provided in KRS 224.1-410 . Pursuant to subsections (7) and (8) of this section, notice and an opportunity to request a hearing shall be afforded to an owner prior to decontamination of the property. A lien for all fees, charges, and costs incurred by the local government in the enforcement of an ordinance related to decontaminating a property where a methamphetamine contamination notice has been posted pursuant to KRS 224.1-410 shall be placed on the property pursuant to subsection (9) of this section. Notwithstanding subsections (12) and (13) of this section, the costs of abatement and decontamination of a property where a methamphetamine contamination notice has been posted are recoverable throughout the county.
  6. Any local government may establish by ordinance reasonable standards and procedures for the enforcement of this section. The procedures shall comply with all applicable statutes, administrative regulations, or codes. Any ordinance establishing these procedures may be enforced by any means authorized by law. Proper notice shall be given to owners before any action is taken pursuant to this section, and, prior to the decontamination of a property where a methamphetamine contamination notice has been posted pursuant to KRS 224.1-410 or the demolition of any unfit or unsafe structure, the opportunity to request a hearing shall be afforded the owner.
  7. Unless imminent danger exists on the subject premises that necessitates immediate action, the local government shall send, within fourteen (14) days of a final determination after hearing or waiver of hearing by the owner, a copy of the determination to any lien holder of record of the subject premises by first-class mail with proof of mailing. The lien holder of record may, within forty-five (45) days from receipt of that notice, correct the violations cited or elect to pay all civil fines assessed for the violation and all charges and fees incurred by the local government in connection with the enforcement of the ordinance, including abatement costs, as permitted by subsection (9) of this section.
  8. A local government shall have a lien against the property for all civil fines assessed for the violation and for all charges and fees incurred by the local government in connection with the enforcement of the ordinance, including abatement costs. The affidavit of the code enforcement officer shall constitute prima facie evidence of the amount of the lien and the regularity of the proceedings pursuant to this section, and shall be recorded in the office of the county clerk. The lien shall be notice to all persons from the time of its recording and shall bear interest thereafter until paid. The lien created shall take precedence over all other liens, except state, county, school board, and city taxes, except as provided in subsection (10) of this section. The local government shall possess the lien for ten (10) years following the date of the final, nonappealable order of a code enforcement board or final judgment of the court. The lien may be enforced by judicial proceeding.
  9. The lien provided in subsection (9) of this section shall not take precedence or priority over a previously recorded lien if:
    1. The local government failed to provide the lien holder a copy of the determination in accordance with subsection (8) of this section; or
    2. The lien holder received a copy of the determination as required by subsection (8) of this section, and the lien holder corrected the violations or paid all civil fines assessed for the violation and all charges and fees incurred by the local government in connection with the enforcement of the ordinance, including abatement costs.
  10. In addition to the remedy prescribed in subsection (7) of this section or any other remedy authorized by law, the owner of a premises upon which a lien has been attached pursuant to this section shall be personally liable for the amount of the lien, including all civil fines assessed for the violation and all charges, fees, and abatement costs incurred by the local government in connection with the enforcement of the ordinance. The local government may bring a civil action against the owner and shall have the same remedies as provided for the recovery of a debt owed. The failure of a local government to comply with subsection (8) of this section, and the failure of a lien to take precedence over previously filed liens as provided in subsection (10) of this section, shall not limit or restrict any remedies that the local government has against the owner of the premises.
  11. The provisions of subsections (7), (9), and (11) of this section shall not apply to an owner, occupant, or person having control or management of any land located in an unincorporated area if the owner, occupant, or person is not the generator of the rubbish or is not dumping or knowingly allowing the dumping of the rubbish and has made reasonable efforts to prevent the dumping of rubbish by other persons onto the premises.
  12. The provisions of this section shall not be enforced by a county government upon any premises situated in an unincorporated portion of the county that is assessed as agricultural land for tax purposes by the property valuation administrator.
  13. The right to request a hearing pursuant to this section shall be limited to a period of thirty (30) days after notice has been placed on the property and has been sent by certified mail return receipt requested.

HISTORY: 2016 ch. 86, § 13, effective July 15, 2016; 2019 ch. 52, § 2, effective June 27, 2019.

Regional Wastewater Commissions

65.8901. Legislative findings — Statutory authority for regional wastewater commission.

  1. The General Assembly finds that regionalization of utility services can benefit Kentuckians by sharing the capital and operating costs of facilities among many users while protecting and enhancing the water quality of the Commonwealth’s watersheds, creeks, lakes, and rivers. The General Assembly additionally finds and declares that:
    1. Continued economic growth in the Commonwealth is dependent upon the expansion of infrastructure to promote industrial, commercial, and residential development;
    2. Industrial, commercial, institutional, and residential development must be undertaken in a manner consistent with applicable planning, and in a manner that safeguards the waters of the Commonwealth from pollution;
    3. The challenges of improving and safeguarding the quality of the Commonwealth’s watersheds, creeks, streams, lakes, and rivers through improvements in wastewater infrastructure and expanded wastewater treatment capacity favor a cooperative, regional approach;
    4. The Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Commission has realigned the mission at Fort Knox, a one hundred nine thousand (109,000) acre military reservation located in three (3) counties of the Commonwealth, resulting in significant economic expansion in the region encompassing the post;
    5. The ongoing regional economic expansion in the Fort Knox area of Hardin, Bullitt, and Meade counties resulting from BRAC, and the industrial, commercial and residential development throughout the Salt River Basin, including expansion in the adjacent counties of Oldham and Jefferson, provide a unique opportunity to illustrate the advisability of adopting a regionally integrated approach to wastewater management as a cost-effective and more affordable way to preserve Kentucky’s water resources; and
    6. It is, therefore, the intent of the General Assembly to authorize the creation of a regional wastewater commission in accordance with KRS 65.8901 to 65.8923 , within the counties of Bullitt, Hardin, Jefferson, Meade, and Oldham, or portions of those counties, for the purposes of preserving water quality and developing infrastructure in the Salt River Basin sufficient to promote and sustain industrial, commercial, and residential development.
  2. KRS 65.8901 to 65.8923 shall constitute full and complete authority for the creation of a regional wastewater commission and for carrying out the powers and duties of the commission.

History. Enact. Acts 2011, ch. 98, § 1, effective June 8, 2011.

65.8903. Definitions for KRS 65.8901 to 65.8923 and 69.8925.

As used in KRS 65.8901 to 65.8923 and 65.8925 , the following definitions shall apply:

  1. “Commission” means a regional wastewater commission established pursuant to KRS 65.8905 ;
  2. “Member entity” means any of the following entities located in the counties of Bullitt, Hardin, Jefferson, Meade, or Oldham, that are participating in or that are eligible to participate in a regional wastewater commission:
    1. A city that owns a wastewater system;
    2. An urban-county government that owns a wastewater system;
    3. A sanitation district created pursuant to KRS Chapters 67 and 220;
    4. A metropolitan sewer district or a joint sewer agency established under KRS Chapter 76;
    5. A water district that owns a wastewater system established under KRS Chapter 74; and
    6. An agency of the federal, state, or local government owning a wastewater system subject to regulation by the Kentucky Division of Water;
  3. “Organizing official” means the chief elected official of the unit of general purpose local government elected by a majority vote of the member entities. The organizing official may be a county judge/executive, a city mayor, or a mayor of an urban-county government or a consolidated local government; and
  4. “Wastewater” means raw, untreated, or partially treated sewage and other polluted waters collected by lateral and main lines from residential, commercial, and industrial customers of wastewater systems owned by or under contract with a member entity of a commission and properly conveyed to designated receiving points for further transportation or treatment. “Wastewater” includes stormwater.

History. Enact. Acts 2011, ch. 98, § 2, effective June 8, 2011.

65.8905. Procedure for forming regional wastewater commission.

  1. Any two (2) or more member entities owning wastewater systems may jointly:
    1. Acquire and construct wastewater collection, transportation, and treatment facilities;
    2. Operate and manage those facilities; and
    3. Improve and extend those facilities in any manner permitted under law.
  2. The governing body of a member entity owning a wastewater system that wants to form a regional wastewater commission shall adopt a resolution or ordinance electing to participate with other member entities to perform any of the functions authorized under subsection (1) of this section.
  3. Upon the adoption of an ordinance or resolution by the governing body of each member entity or a decision by a local, state, or federal agency owning a wastewater system to participate in a commission, a certified copy of each member entity’s action shall be filed with the organizing official.
  4. Prior to the adoption by the governing body of any member entity of a resolution or ordinance proposing participation in a commission, that governing body shall publish notice in accordance with KRS Chapter 424 and shall set a date for a public hearing regarding the creation of the commission and shall give at least thirty (30) days’ prior notice of the hearing. The notice shall include, at a minimum:
    1. An explanation of the scope of the geographic area proposed to be served by a commission; and
    2. A description of the anticipated benefits to the residents in the geographic area served by the member entity of membership by that entity in a commission.

      A resident, sewer customer, or citizen of the Commonwealth affected by a member entity proposing to establish a commission may submit written or oral comments and objections to the member entity, which shall provide a written statement of consideration of comments received.

  5. The member entity shall enter an order of decision along with specific findings for the decision. The organizing official among the member entities seeking to form a commission shall establish the commission, designating it as a “regional wastewater commission,” if, after the public hearing and consideration of all comments and objections received, those member entities have adopted a resolution or ordinance, as appropriate, finding that:
    1. The establishment of a commission is in the furtherance of the public health, convenience, and benefit to the customers of the member entities proposing the creation of the commission; and
    2. The establishment of a commission can reasonably be expected to result in the improvement of the environment over that which would occur in the absence of the formation of the commission.

History. Enact. Acts 2011, ch. 98, § 3, effective June 8, 2011.

65.8907. Appointment of commissioners — Terms.

  1. After establishment of a commission, the chief executive officer of each member entity shall appoint one (1) commissioner to represent that member entity. A commissioner shall be a customer, a resident, or an authorized representative of the member entity, and shall be a resident of the county where the member entity that the commissioner is appointed to represent is located. The appointment shall be subject to the approval of the governing body of that member entity.
  2. There shall be no fewer than three (3) commissioners appointed by member entities to a commission, and the commission shall always have an odd number of commissioners. If the total number of commissioners is less than three (3) or is an even number, then the legislative bodies for the geographic areas served by the two (2) member entities shall jointly appoint one (1) additional member. The additional member shall be a resident of either of the service areas of the two (2) member entities.
  3. Commissioners shall serve terms of four (4) years and may be reappointed. Terms shall commence from the first day of the month when the order establishing the commission was entered. Upon the expiration of a commissioner’s term, a successor shall be appointed in the manner of the commissioner’s original appointment. Each commissioner shall serve until a qualified successor is appointed, and any vacancy shall be filled for the balance of the unexpired term.
  4. Initial commissioners shall serve the following terms:
    1. One-third (1/3) of the commissioners shall serve for terms of two (2) years;
    2. One-third (1/3) of the commissioners shall serve for terms of three (3) years; and
    3. The remaining commissioners shall serve for terms of four (4) years.

History. Enact. Acts 2011, ch. 98, § 4, effective June 8, 2011.

65.8909. Procedure for inclusion of entity in existing regional wastewater commission.

  1. Any entity listed in KRS 65.8903(2) that did not participate in the initial creation of the commission may elect to participate in the operation and appoint a commissioner to an existing commission. To elect participation, the governing body of the prospective member entity shall follow the process set forth in KRS 65.8905(2) to (5).
  2. After the process set forth in KRS 65.8905(2) to (5) is complete, inclusion of the prospective member entity in the existing commission shall be granted if the organizing official finds that such inclusion:
    1. Satisfies the criteria set forth in KRS 65.8905(5)(a) and (b); and
    2. Will assist in achievement of the purposes of KRS 65.8901 to 65.8923 and will be advantageous both for the customers of the prospective member entity and for the customers of the existing member entities of the commission.
  3. If inclusion is granted, the organizing official shall enter an order authorizing the inclusion of the member entity. The chief executive officer of the member entity shall appoint a commissioner to the commission in accordance with the process and restrictions set forth in KRS 65.8907 .
  4. The term of the newly appointed commissioner shall be determined in accordance with KRS 65.8907(4), but may be adjusted by the commission so that no more than one-third (1/3) of the terms of the commissioners expire each year.

History. Enact. Acts 2011, ch. 98, § 5, effective June 8, 2011.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(6/8/2011). 2011 Ky. Acts ch. 98, sec. 5 (this statute) contained a reference in subsection (2)(b) to “the purposes of this Act.” In codification, the Reviser of Statutes has determined that the reference should have been to “the purposes of Sections 1 to 12 of this Act,” which was created as a new statutory range in KRS Chapter 65 and codified as KRS 65.8901 to 65.8923 . The correction has been made under the authority of KRS 7.136 .

65.8911. Organization of commission — Compensation — Bond — Applicability of Open Meetings Act and Open Records Act.

  1. The commission shall organize by appointing a chair from among its members and a secretary and a treasurer, who need not be commissioners. The secretary shall keep a record of all proceedings of the commission. The treasurer shall be the lawful custodian of all funds of the commission and shall make expenditures as authorized by the commission. The secretary and treasurer shall perform other duties pertaining to the affairs of the commission and may receive salaries prescribed by the commission.
  2. The commission shall:
    1. Adopt bylaws and rules of procedure;
    2. Establish a regular meeting time, date, and location; and
    3. Decide upon other matters for conduct of its business.
  3. The commission may employ and fix reasonable compensation for a qualified general manager and other personnel comparable to the salary and benefits of the personnel for similarly sized wastewater entities based on regional or national standards. The commission may contract with and fix reasonable compensation for the services of officers, agents, operators, and consultants, including engineers, attorneys, accountants, fiscal agents, and other professional persons.
  4. Each commissioner shall receive the same compensation fixed by agreement among the member entities and paid out of the commission’s funds. Reasonable expenses incurred by a commissioner in the course of commission business shall be authorized and verified by the commission and shall be paid with commission funds.
  5. Each commissioner shall have one (1) vote on matters requiring a vote. Each commissioner, secretary, treasurer, and general manager shall be bonded for faithful performance of his or her official duties pursuant to KRS 65.8917 , 65.8919 , 65.8921 , and 65.8923 . Bond shall be in an amount prescribed by the commission, shall be comparable to bonds required of individuals among the member entities, and the cost of bonding shall be borne by the commission.
  6. Commission meetings and records shall be subject to KRS 61.805 to 61.850 and 61.870 to 61.884 , respectively.

History. Enact. Acts 2011, ch. 98, § 6, effective June 8, 2011.

65.8913. Removal of commissioner for cause — Notice — Hearing.

  1. A commissioner may be removed for cause by the chief executive officer of the member entity he or she represents. The chief executive officer shall give the commissioner thirty (30) days’ written notice of the hearing. The notice shall identify the charges brought against that commissioner, and the hearing shall be conducted by an impartial hearing officer appointed by the governing body of the member entity. The commissioner may elect to be represented by private legal counsel and shall bear any cost associated with private legal counsel.
  2. After a formal evidentiary hearing under subsection (1) of this section, the hearing officer shall submit written findings to the governing body of the member entity for approval or disapproval. If the governing body approves the charges brought against the commissioner, then the position shall be declared vacant.

History. Enact. Acts 2011, ch. 98, § 7, effective June 8, 2011.

65.8915. Withdrawal of member entity from regional wastewater commission — Payment of obligations — Vacancies.

  1. Any member entity of the commission may withdraw its participation by submitting an ordinance or resolution, as appropriate, of its governing body to all member entities at least ninety (90) days prior to the effective date of the withdrawal, conditioned solely upon that member having made prior payment in full or making other financial arrangements agreeable to the member entities to meet contract obligations, retire any cost, or pay any portion of any debt or other obligations incurred on its behalf by the commission.
  2. Vacancies on the commission that result from a withdrawal of a member entity shall be filled in the manner prescribed in KRS 65.8907 .

History. Enact. Acts 2011, ch. 98, § 8, effective June 8, 2011.

65.8917. Managing board — Powers and duties of regional wastewater commission — Property and income exempt from tax.

  1. The commissioners shall constitute the managing board of the commission. The commission shall be a public corporation, and a public body corporate and politic, and a local public agency with the powers and duties in its corporate name to:
    1. Execute contracts or be contracted with;
    2. Sue and be sued;
    3. Adopt and alter its corporate seal, at its own pleasure;
    4. Make loans and issue and repay revenue bonds, or other instruments of indebtedness;
    5. Receive proceeds from loans and grants;
    6. Purchase, acquire, own, hold, and dispose of all real and personal property necessary for carrying out its corporate purposes; and
    7. Exercise any powers, duties, and requirements for carrying out its corporate purposes in the manner prescribed in KRS 58.010 to 58.190 and KRS Chapter 224A.
  2. The commission shall have full and complete supervision, management, and control over all of its facilities. The commission shall prescribe standards for the quality and characteristics of the wastewater it accepts into its facilities, including standards as are required under state and federal law. All matters relating to the following shall be clearly set forth in commission policy and procedures and promulgated to the governing bodies of all the member entities of the commission:
    1. Procurement of professional services;
    2. Construction of facilities;
    3. Accepting, metering, conveying, and treating influent from all waste streams; and
    4. Handling of treatment process solids and effluent.
  3. It shall be the role and duty of the commission to:
    1. Plan for and provide site and technology appropriate facilities and services relating to any type or aspect of wastewater collection, transportation, or treatment to achieve the best benefit for the customers of its member entities;
    2. Protect and enhance the environmental quality of the watershed in which those facilities and services are located;
    3. Actively participate in the planning activities of the 2020 water management planning councils established pursuant to KRS Chapter 151, that serve the regions in which the commission has facilities;
    4. Use the configuration of available and proposed wastewater facilities that is the most cost-effective in safeguarding the waters of the Commonwealth from pollution, and providing wastewater infrastructure appropriate for the customers of the member entities; and
    5. Ensure that any construction or expansion of any wastewater facility proposed by a commission is consistent with the regional facilities plan adopted by the member entities of the commission and approved by either the Division of Water or the United States Environmental Protection Agency.
  4. For the purpose of ensuring proper collection, transportation, and treatment of wastewater and in the furtherance of its purpose, the commission may collect and treat or contract with others to collect and treat any portion of its overall waste load.
  5. The commission’s property and income, along with any bonds or financial instruments issued by the commission or income derived from those bonds or financial instruments, shall be exempt from taxation.
  6. The commission shall adopt and comply with KRS 45A.343 , 45A.345 to 45A.360 , 45A.735 , 45A.740 , 45A.745 , and 45A.750 of the Kentucky Model Procurement Code and conduct all its business and financial activities according to approved governmental fiscal procedure. The commission shall procure the services of a certified public accountant to conduct an audit of all funds and fiscal transactions annually, providing copies of the audit report to the governing bodies of its member entities.

History. Enact. Acts 2011, ch. 98, § 9, effective June 8, 2011.

65.8919. Commission to provide services to member entities and other parties on wholesale contract basis — Mandatory contract provisions — Rates and charges — Contract to manage existing wastewater facility.

  1. The commission shall provide all services on a wholesale contract basis and shall have no retail customers. The commission shall not be deemed a utility under KRS 278.010(3), but any contract between a commission and a utility that is regulated by the Public Service Commission regarding provision of services that would result in an increase in the rates paid by customers of that utility shall be subject to review and approval by the Public Service Commission in accordance with KRS Chapter 278. Contracts entered into between the commission and its member entities or other parties shall include covenants for the establishment of rates and charges as provided in subsection (5) of this section.
  2. In addition to providing services to its member entities by contract, the commission may contract with cities, city-owned utilities, urban-county governments, consolidated local governments, sanitation districts, metropolitan sewer districts, joint sewer agencies, water districts, and agencies of local, state, and federal government that are not members of the commission. The commission may contract to provide services to wastewater entities in neighboring states that are not members of the commission under terms mutually agreed upon by the respective parties.
  3. The commission shall not enter into a service contract with any entity that is obtaining the same wastewater collection, transportation, or treatment services by agreement with another wastewater service provider that has incurred debt obligations or any costs attributable to the agreement that are to be retired in whole or in part from revenue generated from providing the service to the entity, unless the wastewater service provider releases the entity from its wastewater service agreement.
  4. All services provided by the commission to member entities or other parties shall be set out in contracts that shall contain, at a minimum, the following elements:
    1. A comprehensive description of any type of services to be provided;
    2. A statement of term, with beginning and ending times, dates, and a specific delineation of automatic term extensions of the contract, if any;
    3. A provision that the commission shall be the exclusive service provider for all or a designated geographic portion of a member entity’s wastewater collection system;
    4. Statements that:
      1. All service shall be metered at each point of service and that the contractee shall be responsible for initial capital costs and construction of metering stations subject to the commission’s specifications;
      2. The commission shall take ownership and provide security for all metering stations for purposes of management;
      3. The commission shall arrange for testing of all meters according to manufacturer’s recommended schedule;
      4. Testing and metering station maintenance costs shall be shared equally between the commission and the contractee;
      5. Metering stations shall be accessible to both parties; and
      6. Meters shall be read at least monthly or more often according to a mutually agreed upon schedule;
    5. A statement setting out allowed minimum volumes, if any, and allowed maximum volumes expressed in gallons per minute for each meter;
    6. Identification of collected wastewater sources and allowed quality of influent to commission facilities at each meter;
    7. A statement of rates and charges for access to services, for allowed minimum volumes, if any, expressed in dollars per thousand gallons, and for allowed maximum volumes, expressed in dollars per thousand gallons;
    8. A statement that all rates or charges are subject to adjustment based on periodic cost-of-service analyses and an associated cost-allocation plan funded equitably between the commission and contractees, and a statement that any rates and charges adjustment that may occur in the interim between the times of full cost-of-service analyses with cost-allocation plans, if any, are subject to clauses citing time frames, volumes of influent, or other triggering elements tied to designated indexing method and proper notice;
    9. A requirement that either party provide immediate notification to the other party regarding changes in volume or the quality of influent, instances of mechanical failure, or other critical circumstance affecting operations when and as changes are known or can be reasonably anticipated;
    10. A statement regarding any modifications or restrictions in service by either the commission or the contractee during emergencies;
    11. A statement delineating any special condition binding one (1) or both parties, or citation of a particular action that, if taken by either party or if either party allows a third party to take, will constitute a breach of contract or invoke specifically identified penalties;
    12. A statement requiring both parties to provide current contact information of the respective parties’ agents for both administrative matters and for emergencies; and
    13. A statement that the commission and the governing body of the contractee agree to meet at least annually to review any contract issues, assess service delivery, and plan for future service needs.
  5. Any contract entered into by the commission to supply designated wastewater services to either a member entity or other party shall provide that charges assessed by the commission and payments made by the entity or party shall be fair, just, and reasonable and shall be sufficient to cover all costs associated with the service. The commission’s rates and charges may be modified to compensate for increased operating costs, pursuant to covenants set forth in contract. Contracts for services shall be fully binding on the parties, but shall not be construed to be a debt of the commission member entities within the meaning of any statutory or constitutional limitations.
  6. If a commission contracts for management of a wastewater facility owned by a member entity or other party, the commission shall become a signatory on any federal, state, or local wastewater-related permits issued to and held by that member entity or other party.

History. Enact. Acts 2011, ch. 98, § 10, effective June 8, 2011.

65.8921. Procedure for establishing or changing rates or charges for service.

  1. The rates and charges to be assessed by the commission to its member entities and other parties shall be the verified cost of providing the services as prescribed in this section, and shall be allocated based on usage and the cost of service. However, if continuity of consumer service or the preservation of water quality is threatened by special circumstances affecting a public wastewater utility, the commission may establish special rates for that entity for a period not to exceed one (1) year so long as benefits to member entities are not jeopardized and nonmembers are not adversely affected in any manner.
  2. The commission shall establish wholesale charges, rates, and terms for its services to its member entities and to any other party to which it provides service under contract that are fair, just, and reasonable and shall be sufficient at all times to:
    1. Pay the cost of operation and maintenance of any facility that it may own or lease to provide wastewater services contracted to its member entities or other parties;
    2. Pay the principal and interest on any bonds, loans, or other instruments or obligations secured in the name of the commission; and
    3. Provide an adequate fund for renewals, replacements, and reserves.
  3. The commission’s procedure for establishing or changing rates and charges levied on member entities and other parties that contract for service shall be as follows:
    1. Every five (5) years, or more often if circumstances warrant, the commission shall procure, pursuant to KRS 45A.343 , 45A.345 to 45A.460 , 45A.735 , 45A.740 , 45A.745 , and 45A.750 , the professional consulting services of an independent accounting firm or individual accountant qualified and experienced in conducting cost-of-service studies. The commission shall invite the governing body of each member entity to designate a special representative to participate in the consultant selection process;
    2. The firm or individual selected in consultation with the commission’s designated engineers, operators, and other knowledgeable individuals shall perform a cost-of-service study to:
      1. Determine the actual or probable cost of operating and maintaining the commission’s respective wastewater facilities;
      2. Determine the cost of servicing any associated debt obligations and administrative costs;
      3. Devise a comprehensive cost allocation plan and recommend that the commission establish and levy specific rates for treatment services and appropriate charges for other services to offset these costs; and
      4. Devise and recommend a standard method of formulary whereby the commission may conduct regular financial analyses internally, based on sound accounting policy, allowing for the application of inflation indices and other equitable methods of determining service rates;
    3. The commission shall determine and set final rates and charges based on and only after:
      1. The cost-of-service study and recommendations of the consultant are received;
      2. Consultation with the governing bodies of member entities during the cost-of-service study; and
      3. For a rate increase greater than five percent (5%), a vote approving the final rate by a majority of the legislative bodies of the member entities that comprise the wastewater commission or, in the case of a special district or government agency, by the fiscal court of the county that contains the district or agency, which shall take action thirty (30) days after notice of the proposed final rate. Each legislative body of a member entity, or fiscal court in the case of a special district or government agency, shall have equal weight. Absent a majority vote, rates shall remain provisional and must be reset by the wastewater commission;
    4. Initial rates and charges and any subsequent changes to rates and charges of five percent (5%) or less shall be approved by the commission, but not more than once in a twelve (12) month period. Increases above five percent (5%) shall remain provisional until action by the legislative bodies pursuant to paragraph (c) of this subsection; and
    5. The commission shall provide not less than sixty (60) days’ written notice to the governing bodies of the member entities prior to the effective date of any change in rates or charges for service, which shall remain provisional until action by the legislative bodies of the member entities pursuant to paragraph (c) of this subsection.

History. Enact. Acts 2011, ch. 98, § 11, effective June 8, 2011.

65.8923. Acquisition of appropriate sites, facilities, and funding.

  1. For the purpose of acquiring all or part of the facilities necessary to collect, transport, and treat wastewater, the commission may purchase facilities and equipment from member entities and others for mutually agreed upon terms not to exceed the actual value of the facilities and equipment. Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, a member entity of the commission or other entity may convey ownership of the facility or equipment to the commission without an election or voter approval.
  2. If a member entity has any outstanding debt obligation related to any facility or equipment proposed to be acquired by the commission, the commission may either make sufficient purchase payment to the owner to cover debt obligations or assume the debt obligations in its name pursuant to a sales agreement and any other instruments deemed appropriate by legal counsel. If the commission makes cash payment to the owner for the equipment or facility, it shall be a condition of sale that any outstanding debt obligation associated with the equipment or facility be retired by the owner at the time of sale.
  3. The commission may secure funding from state and federal grants and loan programs, nonprofit associations, and private lending institutions and may issue revenue bonds to acquire, construct, improve, or extend facilities for the collection, transportation, or treatment of wastewater. Loans and bonds shall be payable solely from the revenues derived pursuant to contracts for wastewater collection, transportation, and treatment services with member entities or other entities.
  4. For the purpose of securing appropriate sites, facilities, and required funding, the commission shall be vested with all the powers, duties, and responsibilities as delegated and granted to a governmental agency under the terms and provisions of KRS 58.010 to 58.190 and KRS Chapter 224A.
  5. A commission shall not assume responsibility for payment of any fines or penalties incurred by a member entity or other party and owed at the time of formation of a commission or contracting with that party, as a result of an agreed order, enforcement action, or other resolution of alleged violation of any provision of the Clean Water Act.

History. Enact. Acts 2011, ch. 98, § 12, effective June 8, 2011.

65.8925. Web site to provide public access to expenditure records of regional wastewater commission — Monthly updates — Registration with Department for Local Government — Application of KRS 65A.010 to 65A.090.

  1. By January 1, 2012, the commissioners of a regional wastewater commission established under the provisions of KRS 65.8901 to 65.8923 shall provide public access to records relating to expenditures of the commission through display of the records on a Web site.
  2. The Web site shall be in a searchable format and shall provide financial information about expenditures not exempt under the provisions of state or federal law, including:
    1. The payee name;
    2. The category or type of expenditure;
    3. A description of the reason for the expenditure, if available;
    4. The expenditure amount;
    5. An electronic link to documents relating to the expenditure, if the documents are available electronically;
    6. The budget adopted by the commission and subsequent amendments to that budget;
    7. The completed annual audit results; and
    8. Any other information deemed relevant by the commission.
  3. Information on the Web site shall be updated at least on a monthly basis and shall be maintained on the Web site for at least three (3) years.
    1. The regional wastewater commission shall register with the Department for Local Government as required by KRS 65A.090 . (4) (a) The regional wastewater commission shall register with the Department for Local Government as required by KRS 65A.090 .
    2. For fiscal periods beginning on and after July 1, 2014, the provisions of KRS 65A.010 to 65A.090 shall apply to regional wastewater commissions. Commissioners shall work with the Department for Local Government to provide the information required by this section through the registry established by KRS 65A.020 .

History. Enact. Acts 2011, ch. 98, § 14, effective June 8, 2011; 2013, ch. 40, § 24, effective March 21, 2013.

Uniform Financial Information Report

65.900. Definitions for KRS 65.905 to 65.925.

As used in KRS 65.905 to 65.925 , unless the context requires otherwise:

  1. “City” means every city organized and governed under the mayor-alderman form of government pursuant to KRS Chapter 83, every city organized and governed under the mayor-council form of government pursuant to KRS Chapter 83A, every city organized and governed under the commission form of government pursuant to KRS Chapter 83A, every city organized and governed under the city manager form of government pursuant to KRS Chapter 83A, every consolidated local government organized and governed under the consolidated local government form of government pursuant to KRS Chapter 67C, and every urban-county government organized and governed under the urban-county form of government pursuant to KRS Chapter 67A.
  2. “County” means any of Kentucky’s one hundred twenty (120) counties.
  3. “Special district” means any district with ad valorem taxing powers including, but not limited to, those specified in the following KRS statutes: KRS 75.010 to 75.260 , KRS 76.274 to 76.279 , KRS 104.450 to 104.680 , KRS 107.310 to 107.500 , KRS 108.080 to 108.180 , KRS 109.115 to 109.190 , KRS 147.610 to 147.710 , KRS 164.605 to 164.675 , KRS 173.450 to 173.650 , KRS 173.710 to 173.800 , KRS 179.700 to 179.990 , KRS 210.370 to 210.480 , KRS 212.720 to 212.755 , KRS 216.310 to 216.360 , KRS 220.010 to 220.613 , KRS 262.010 to 262.660 , KRS 262.700 to 262.990 , KRS 266.010 to 266.990 , KRS 268.010 to 268.990 , and KRS 269.100 to 269.270 .
  4. “Local government” includes:
    1. For fiscal periods ending prior to July 1, 2014, cities, counties, consolidated local governments, urban-county governments, and special districts; and
    2. For fiscal periods beginning on and after July 1, 2014, cities, counties, consolidated local governments, and urban-county governments.
  5. “Lease-purchase agreement” means an agreement to lease or to lease and purchase major items of property, equipment, or services estimated to cost fifty thousand dollars ($50,000) or more, and two hundred thousand dollars ($200,000) or more for the construction or installation of a building or a utility.

History. Enact. Acts 1990, ch. 47, § 1, effective July 13, 1990; 2007, ch. 20, § 1, effective June 26, 2007; 2007, ch. 47, § 50, effective June 26, 2007; 2013, ch. 40, § 15, effective March 21, 2013; 2020 ch. 21, § 15, effective March 17, 2020.

Compiler’s Notes.

KRS 147.710 , referred to in this section, was repealed.

65.905. Local governments required to file uniform financial information report — Application of provisions only to fiscal periods ending before July 1, 2014 — Transition to requirements of KRS 65A.010 to 65A.090 — Use of report by Department for Local Government.

  1. Except as otherwise provided in subsection (2) of this section, each local government shall annually, after the close of the fiscal year, complete a uniform financial information report. The report shall be submitted to the Department for Local Government by May 1 immediately following the close of the fiscal year. The Department for Local Government shall immediately send the compiled data from the uniform financial information report to the Legislative Research Commission in accordance with KRS 65.925 to be used for the purposes of KRS 6.955 to 6.975 .
  2. The final quarterly report filed by a county within fifteen (15) days after the end of the last quarter of the fiscal year, in accordance with KRS 68.360(2), shall be deemed the uniform financial information report for that county for purposes of compliance with KRS 65.900 to 65.925 .
      1. Each city may have the uniform financial information report completed by its selected auditor as part of the terms and conditions of the written agreement between the city and the auditor in accordance with KRS 91A.040 . (3) (a) 1. Each city may have the uniform financial information report completed by its selected auditor as part of the terms and conditions of the written agreement between the city and the auditor in accordance with KRS 91A.040 .
      2. Each county may have the uniform financial information report completed by its auditor selected in accordance with KRS 43.070 or 64.810 .
      3. For fiscal periods ending prior to July 1, 2014, each special district may have the uniform financial information report completed by its auditor selected in accordance with KRS 65.065 . For fiscal periods beginning on and after July 1, 2014, the provisions of this section shall no longer apply to special districts. Instead, the provisions of KRS 65A.010 to 65A.090 shall apply. Notwithstanding the dates established by this subparagraph, the provisions of this section and KRS 65A.010 to 65A.090 shall be administered such that the registration required by KRS 65A.090(1) occurs as required by that subsection, and there is no gap in reporting by entities subject to this section and KRS 65A.010 to 65A.090 as the transition occurs.
    1. If a city does not use the auditor to complete the uniform financial information report, it shall by order designate an elected or nonelected official to be responsible for annually completing the report and submitting it to the Department for Local Government.
    2. If a local government has any agency, board, or commission that receives any funding from the local government, but conducts its operations on an autonomous or semi-autonomous basis, the local government shall note on the uniform financial information report the name of the agency, board, or commission; the mailing address of the agency, board, or commission; and the dollar amount annually appropriated by the local government to the agency, board, or commission.
  3. The Department for Local Government shall by administrative regulation prescribe the format of the uniform financial information report, and shall attempt to coordinate and combine efforts with the United States Bureau of the Census in the development of the format of the uniform financial information report so that a single report will meet the needs of both agencies and fulfill the requirements of KRS 65.900 to 65.925 . Regardless of any agreement between the Department for Local Government and the United States Bureau of the Census, the Department for Local Government shall maintain responsibility for assuring that a uniform financial information report is distributed to each local government as soon as practicable after the close of each fiscal year, but in no event later than one hundred twenty (120) days prior to the required submission date of May 1.
  4. The Department for Local Government shall use the uniform financial information report to replace as many financial information forms as possible that local governments are currently required to complete and submit to that office for use by either the state or federal governments, by consolidating the required information into the uniform report.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1990, ch. 47, § 2, effective July 13, 1990; 1992, ch. 33, § 6, effective July 14, 1992; 1996, ch. 321, § 2, effective July 15, 1996; 1998, ch. 69, § 35, effective July 15, 1998; 1998, ch. 186, § 1, effective July 15, 1998; 2007, ch. 20, § 2, effective June 26, 2007; 2007, ch. 47, § 48, effective June 26, 2007; 2010, ch. 117, § 55, effective July 15, 2010; 2013, ch. 40, § 16, effective March 21, 2013; 2018 ch. 47, § 2, effective July 14, 2018.

65.910. Required contents of uniform financial information report.

  1. The uniform financial information report shall include but not be limited to information relating to demographics, debt service, lease-purchase agreements, tax rates and revenues, licenses, permits, fees, utilities, intergovernmental revenues, miscellaneous revenues and expenses, charges for services, and all expenditures.
  2. Information on expenditures shall be listed by total only and indicate the fund from which an appropriation was made. The Department for Local Government shall consult with the Kentucky League of Cities, the Kentucky Association of Counties, the Kentucky Municipal Finance Officers’ Association, the Kentucky Society of Certified Public Accountants, and other affected interest groups, as well as local officials in the development of information to be included in the expenditure section of the uniform financial information report.

History. Enact. Acts 1990, ch. 47, § 3, effective July 13, 1990; 1992, ch. 33, § 7, effective July 14, 1992; 1992, ch. 105, § 62, effective July 14, 1992; 1996, ch. 254, § 18, effective July 15, 1996; 1998, ch. 69, § 36, effective July 15, 1998; 2007, ch. 20, § 3, effective June 26, 2007; 2007, ch. 47, § 49, effective June 26, 2007; 2010, ch. 117, § 56, effective July 15, 2010.

65.915. Date of filing first report. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1990, ch. 47, § 4; 1998, ch. 69, § 37) was repealed by Acts 2007, ch. 20, § 6, effective June 26, 2007 and Acts 2007, ch. 47, § 95, effective June 26, 2007.

65.920. Effects of failure of local government to comply with certain specified statutory provisions.

  1. Any local government that fails to submit annually a uniform financial information report to the Department for Local Government shall be ineligible to receive county or municipal road aid moneys in accordance with KRS 177.360 or 177.366 . Any local government receiving road aid moneys in accordance with KRS 177.365 to 177.369 or KRS 177.320 and 177.360 that fails to comply with the provisions of KRS 65.900 to 65.925 shall immediately have all road aid payments suspended until the local government submits the uniform financial information report to the Department for Local Government.
  2. If a local government receives payments of money from the Commonwealth and fails to comply with the provisions of KRS 65.900 to 65.925 or KRS 92.280(1), the state local finance officer may notify those agencies making payments to the local government of noncompliance, and those agencies shall immediately suspend delivery of all payments to the local government except those payments made pursuant to KRS Chapter 154 or KRS 42.4588 , until the state local finance officer determines that the local government has complied with the requirements of KRS 65.900 to 65.925 or KRS 92.280(1).

History. Enact. Acts 1990, ch. 47, § 5, effective July 13, 1990; 1998, ch. 69, § 38, effective July 15, 1998; 1998, ch. 186, § 2, effective July 15, 1998; 2007, ch. 20, § 4, effective June 26, 2007; 2007, ch. 47, § 51, effective June 26, 2007; 2010, ch. 117, § 57, effective July 15, 2010.

65.925. Copies to be filed with Legislative Research Commission.

The Department for Local Government shall consult with the Legislative Research Commission to determine a format for electronic data which is acceptable to both. At the earliest date possible, but no later than September 30, 1992, and each year thereafter, the Department for Local Government shall provide a copy of all reliable data from the uniform financial information reports of all reporting governments to the Legislative Research Commission in the agreed upon electronic format.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1990, ch. 47, § 8, effective July 13, 1990; 1998, ch. 69, § 39, effective July 15, 1998; 2007, ch. 47, § 52, effective June 26, 2007; 2010, ch. 117, § 58, effective July 15, 2010; 2018 ch. 47, § 3, effective July 14, 2018.

Governmental Leasing Act

65.940. Definitions for KRS 65.942 to 65.956.

As used in KRS 65.942 to 65.956 , unless the context otherwise requires:

  1. “Acquire” means to purchase, install, equip, or improve personal property or real property pursuant to KRS 65.942 to 65.956 .
  2. “City” means any municipal corporation of any class incorporated in the Commonwealth.
  3. “Construct” means building reconstruction, replacement, extension, repairing, betterment, development, equipment, embellishment, or improvement.
  4. “County” means a political subdivision of the Commonwealth created and established by the laws of the Commonwealth.
  5. “Governmental agency” means any county, urban-county government, consolidated local government, city, taxing district, special district, school district, or other political subdivision of the Commonwealth or body corporate or politic or any instrumentality of the foregoing.
  6. “Governing body” means the board, council, commission, fiscal court, or other body or group that is authorized by law to acquire property for each respective governmental agency.
  7. “Lease” means a lease, lease-purchase, lease with option to purchase, installment sale agreement, or other similar agreement entered into pursuant to KRS 65.942 to 65.956 .
  8. “Lease price” means the total of amounts designated as payments of principal under a lease.
  9. “Net interest cost” means the total of all interest to accrue and fall due through the last payment due date on a lease, plus any discount or minus any premium included in the lease price.
  10. “Person” means any individual, corporation, organization, government or governmental subdivision, or agency, business trust, estate, trust, partnership, association, and any other legal entity.
  11. “Personal property” means personal property, appliances, equipment, or furnishings, or an interest therein, whether movable or fixed, deemed by the governing body of a governmental agency to be necessary, useful, or appropriate to one (1) or more purposes of the governmental agency, but shall not include real property.
  12. “Real property” means land, buildings, fixtures, and interests in real property, deemed by the governing body of the governmental agency to be necessary, useful, or appropriate to one (1) or more purposes of the governmental agency.
  13. “Revenue” means all funds received by a governmental agency which are not taxes, including but not limited to excises, transfers, service fees, assessments, and occupational license fees.
  14. “School district” means any county school district or independent school district organized and existing pursuant to the laws of the Commonwealth.
  15. “Special district” means any agency, authority, or political subdivision of the Commonwealth which exercises less than statewide jurisdiction and which is organized for the purpose of performing governmental or other prescribed functions within limited boundaries. It includes all political subdivisions of the Commonwealth except a city, county, or school district.
  16. “State local debt officer” means the officer so designated in KRS 66.045 .
  17. “Taxes” means taxes properly levied upon real or personal property.
  18. “Taxing district” means any taxing district created under KRS 65.180 to 65.190 .

History. Enact. Acts 1990, ch. 81, § 1, effective July 13, 1990; 1994, ch. 508, § 24, effective July 15, 1994; 2002, ch. 346, § 36, effective July 15, 2002.

65.942. Terms and conditions of leases — Leasing for financing property purchases — Sinking fund — Time period for challenging validity of ordinance or resolution.

    1. The governing body of a governmental agency may approve by ordinance, order, or resolution and may execute, perform, and make payments under a lease with any person, to acquire or construct personal property or real property for any public purpose. (1) (a) The governing body of a governmental agency may approve by ordinance, order, or resolution and may execute, perform, and make payments under a lease with any person, to acquire or construct personal property or real property for any public purpose.
    2. The lease may be on the terms and conditions that are deemed appropriate by the governing body.
    3. Leases may be payable in whole or in part from taxes and may be obligations of the governmental agency for the entire term of the lease or for a period that does not exceed one (1) year.
    4. Leases may contain an option or options to renew or extend the term and may be made payable from a pledge of all or any part of any revenues, funds, or taxes or any combination of any revenues, funds, or taxes, which are available to the governmental agency for its public purposes.
    1. A governmental agency may pledge any revenues or taxes as security for payment under leases, and the leases may provide that the governmental agency may terminate its obligations under the lease at the expiration of each year during the term of the lease. (2) (a) A governmental agency may pledge any revenues or taxes as security for payment under leases, and the leases may provide that the governmental agency may terminate its obligations under the lease at the expiration of each year during the term of the lease.
    2. A governmental agency may pledge any revenue or taxes as security for payment under a lease regardless of any right to terminate.
    3. The lease may provide for the payment of interest on the unpaid amount of the lease price at a rate, rates, or method of determining rates and may contain prepayment provisions, termination penalties, and other provisions determined by the governing body of the governmental agency.
    1. Prior to entering into a lease for the financing of the purchase of any personal property or real property, a governmental agency shall comply with other provisions of law regarding the purchase of property for public purposes. (3) (a) Prior to entering into a lease for the financing of the purchase of any personal property or real property, a governmental agency shall comply with other provisions of law regarding the purchase of property for public purposes.
    2. The lease shall be deemed an instrument for financing and provisions of law regarding purchases of property for public use shall not apply to the lease itself.
    3. Leases may be entered into on a publicly advertised competitive basis or on a private negotiated basis without advertisement.
  1. A sinking fund prescribed by KRS 66.081 shall be established for the payment of leases which are not annually renewable and which are payable in whole or in part from taxes and lease payments under those leases shall be made from the sinking fund.
    1. Any action challenging the validity or enforceability of any ordinance or resolution adopted by a governmental agency approving a lease shall be brought within thirty (30) days from the date on which notice of the adoption of the ordinance or resolution is published in accordance with KRS Chapter 424. (5) (a) Any action challenging the validity or enforceability of any ordinance or resolution adopted by a governmental agency approving a lease shall be brought within thirty (30) days from the date on which notice of the adoption of the ordinance or resolution is published in accordance with KRS Chapter 424.
    2. If the action challenging the validity or enforceability of the ordinance or resolution is not brought within the time provided by paragraph (a) of this subsection, the action shall be forever barred.

History. Enact. Acts 1990, ch. 81, § 2, effective July 13, 1990; 1996, ch. 280, § 29, effective July 15, 1996; 2019 ch. 35, § 2, effective June 27, 2019.

65.944. When approval by state local debt officer or chief state school officer is required — Technical and advisory assistance on leases.

    1. In addition to the notification required by KRS 65.117 , no county, except an urban-county, shall enter into a lease if the lease price exceeds five hundred thousand dollars ($500,000) without first receiving the approval of the lease from the state local debt officer. The state local debt officer may prescribe procedures and adopt regulations for granting approval of the leases. (1) (a) In addition to the notification required by KRS 65.117 , no county, except an urban-county, shall enter into a lease if the lease price exceeds five hundred thousand dollars ($500,000) without first receiving the approval of the lease from the state local debt officer. The state local debt officer may prescribe procedures and adopt regulations for granting approval of the leases.
    2. In addition to the notification required by KRS 65.117, no school district shall enter into a lease if the lease price exceeds one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000) without first receiving the approval of the lease from the chief state school officer. The chief state school officer shall recommend administrative regulations to the State Board of Education for implementation of KRS 65.940 to 65.956 .
  1. The state local debt officer may provide technical and advisory assistance regarding the entering into leases by a governmental agency whose governing body requests assistance.

History. Enact. Acts 1990, ch. 81, § 3, effective July 13, 1990; 1992, ch. 27, § 6, effective March 2, 1992; 1994, ch. 508, § 25, effective July 15, 1994; 2008, ch. 35, § 2, effective July 15, 2008.

65.946. Maximum term for leases.

A lease for real property may have any term, including renewals, not to exceed forty (40) years. A lease for personal property may have any term, including renewals, not to exceed the useful life of the personal property financed, determined in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles.

History. Enact. Acts 1990, ch. 81, § 4, effective July 13, 1990.

65.948. Leased property exempt from state and local taxation.

A governmental agency shall be considered the equitable owner of any personal or real property leased under KRS 65.940 to 65.956 where the property is used solely for public purposes, unless the governmental agency is vested with legal ownership pursuant to KRS 65.952 . Personal or real property which is equitably or legally owned by a governmental agency shall be exempt from all taxation by the Commonwealth and any of its political subdivisions. Leases and interests therein and payments received by lessors or their assigns which are identified as interest shall be exempt from taxation by the Commonwealth and any of its political subdivisions to the same extent as bonds or notes issued by the Commonwealth and any governmental agency.

History. Enact. Acts 1990, ch. 81, § 5, effective July 13, 1990.

65.950. Leases as a legal and authorized investment.

A lease or any interest therein entered into pursuant to KRS 65.940 to 65.956 shall be a legal and authorized investment for banks, savings banks, trust companies, building and loan associations, savings and loan associations, insurance companies, fiduciaries, and trustees.

History. Enact. Acts 1990, ch. 81, § 6, effective July 13, 1990.

65.952. Title to property subject to the lease.

A lease may provide that legal title to the real property or personal property subject to the lease may be vested in the governmental agency or in the person acting as lessor under the lease and may be transferred from one to the other under terms provided in the lease.

History. Enact. Acts 1990, ch. 81, § 7, effective July 13, 1990.

65.954. Construction of KRS 65.940 to 65.956.

KRS 65.940 to 65.956 shall be authority for entering into leases and the performance of the other acts and procedures authorized by KRS 65.940 to 65.956 , without reference to any other laws, or any restrictions or limitations contained therein, except as specifically provided in KRS 65.940 to 65.956. If leases are entered into under KRS 65.940 to 65.956, to the extent of any conflict or inconsistency between any provisions of KRS 65.940 to 65.956 and any provisions of any other law, the provisions of KRS 65.940 to 65.956 shall prevail and control, except that any governmental agency may use the provisions of any other law, not in conflict with the provisions of KRS 65.940 to 65.956, to the extent convenient or necessary to carry out any power or authority, express or implied, granted by KRS 65.940 to 65.956. KRS 65.940 to 65.956 shall be liberally construed to effectuate its purpose.

History. Enact. Acts 1990, ch. 81, § 8, effective July 13, 1990.

65.956. Short title.

KRS 65.940 to 65.956 may be cited as the Governmental Leasing Act.

History. Enact. Acts 1990, ch. 81, § 9, effective July 13, 1990.

CHAPTER 65A Special Purpose Governmental Entities

65A.010. Definitions for chapter.

As used in this chapter:

  1. “County” means any county, consolidated local government, urban-county government, unified local government, or charter county;
  2. “DLG” means the Department for Local Government established by KRS 147A.002 ;
  3. “Establishing entity” means the city or county, or any combination of cities and counties, that established a special purpose governmental entity and that has not subsequently withdrawn its affiliation with the special purpose governmental entity by ordinance or other official action;
  4. “Federally regulated municipal utility” means a municipal utility governed by the provisions of KRS 96.550 to 96.901 , that maintains a wholesale power contract with a federal agency that also serves as its regulatory authority;
    1. “Fee” means any user charge, levy, assessment, fee, schedule of rates, or tax, other than an ad valorem tax, imposed by a special purpose governmental entity. (5) (a) “Fee” means any user charge, levy, assessment, fee, schedule of rates, or tax, other than an ad valorem tax, imposed by a special purpose governmental entity.
    2. “Fee” shall not include the following charges imposed by special purpose governmental entities that provide utility services:
      1. Any fuel cost adjustment that is:
        1. Made pursuant to an agreement with a power supplier;
        2. Amended by the power supplier based on the variable cost of fuel; and
        3. Passed through to the consumer by the utility pursuant to the agreement between the utility and the power supplier;
      2. Any power or energy cost adjustment implemented pursuant to a duly adopted base rate that provides for the periodic adjustment of a component of the rate, including any fuel costs or transmission costs, in accordance with the formula or conditions set forth in the base rate; or
      3. Any environmental control cost adjustments or surcharges implemented pursuant to a duly adopted base rate that provides for the periodic adjustment of a component of the rate in accordance with a formula or conditions set forth in the base rate;
    1. “Private entity” means any entity whose sole source of public funds is from payments pursuant to a contract with a city, county, or special purpose governmental entity, including funds received as a grant or as a result of a competitively bid procurement process. (6) (a) “Private entity” means any entity whose sole source of public funds is from payments pursuant to a contract with a city, county, or special purpose governmental entity, including funds received as a grant or as a result of a competitively bid procurement process.
    2. “Private entity” does not include any entity:
      1. Created, wholly or in part, by a city, county, or combination of cities and counties to perform one (1) or more of the types of public services listed in subsection (9)(c) of this section; or
      2. Governed by a board, council, commission, committee, authority, or corporation with any member or members who are appointed by the chief executive or governing body of a city, county, or combination of cities and counties, or whose voting membership includes governmental officials who serve in an ex officio capacity;
  5. “Public funds” means any funds derived from the levy of a tax, fee, assessment, or charge, or the issuance of bonds by the state or a city, county, or special purpose governmental entity;
  6. “Registry” means the online central registry and reporting portal established pursuant to KRS 65A.020 ; and
    1. “Special purpose governmental entity” or “entity” means any agency, authority, or entity created or authorized by statute which: (9) (a) “Special purpose governmental entity” or “entity” means any agency, authority, or entity created or authorized by statute which:
      1. Exercises less than statewide jurisdiction;
      2. Exists for the purpose of providing one (1) or a limited number of services or functions;
      3. Is governed by a board, council, commission, committee, authority, or corporation with policy-making authority that is separate from the state and the governing body of the city, county, or cities and counties in which it operates; and
        1. Has the independent authority to generate public funds; or 4. a. Has the independent authority to generate public funds; or
        2. May receive and expend public funds, grants, awards, or appropriations from the state, from any agency, or authority of the state, from a city or county, or from any other special purpose governmental entity.
    2. “Special purpose governmental entity” shall include entities meeting the requirements established by paragraph (a) of this subsection, whether the entity is formed as a nonprofit corporation under KRS Chapter 273, pursuant to an interlocal cooperation agreement under KRS 65.210 to 65.300 , or pursuant to any other provision of the Kentucky Revised Statutes.
    3. Examples of the types of public services that may be provided by special purpose governmental entities include but are not limited to the following:
      1. Ambulance, emergency, and fire protection services;
      2. Flood control, drainage, levee, water, water conservation, watershed, and soil conservation services;
      3. Area planning, management, community improvement, and community development services;
      4. Library services;
      5. Public health, public mental health, and public hospital services;
      6. Riverport and airport services;
      7. Sanitation, sewer, waste management, and solid waste services;
      8. Industrial and economic development;
      9. Parks and recreation services;
      10. Construction, maintenance, or operation of roads and bridges;
      11. Mass transit services;
      12. Pollution control;
      13. Construction or provision of public housing, except as set out in paragraph (d)8. of this subsection;
      14. Tourism and convention services; and
      15. Agricultural extension services.
    4. “Special purpose governmental entity” shall not include:
      1. Cities;
      2. Counties;
      3. School districts;
      4. Private entities;
      5. Chambers of commerce;
      6. Any incorporated entity that:
        1. Provides utility services;
        2. Is member-owned; and
        3. Has a governing body whose voting members are all elected by the membership of the entity;
      7. Any entity whose budget, finances, and financial information are fully integrated with and included as a part of the budget, finances, and financial reporting of the city, county, or cities and counties in which it operates;
      8. Federally regulated public housing authorities established pursuant to KRS Chapter 80 that receive no more than twenty percent (20%) of theirtotal funding for any fiscal year from nonfederal fees, not including rental income; or
        1. Any fire protection district or volunteer fire department district operating under KRS Chapter 75 with the higher of annual receipts from all sources or annual expenditures of less than one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000); or 9. a. Any fire protection district or volunteer fire department district operating under KRS Chapter 75 with the higher of annual receipts from all sources or annual expenditures of less than one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000); or
        2. Any fire department incorporated under KRS Chapter 273.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 2013, ch. 40, § 1, effective March 21, 2013; 2013, ch. 124, § 8, effective June 25, 2013; 2014, ch. 7, § 1, effective March 19, 2014; 2015 ch. 17, § 1, effective June 24, 2015; 2016 ch. 91, § 1, effective July 15, 2016; 2018 ch. 90, § 1, effective July 14, 2018.

Legislative Research Commission Notes.

(3/19/2014). 2014 Ky. Acts ch. 7, sec. 11 provides that the amendments to this statute made in 2014 Ky. Acts ch. 7, sec. 1, shall apply retroactively beginning January 1, 2014.

(3/21/2013).In subsection (5)(b)1. of this statute, a reference to “subsection (7)(c)” has been changed to read “subsection (8)(c).” In the Senate Committee Substitute to the bill that created this statute ( 2013 Ky. Acts ch. 40, sec. 1), the former subsection (7) was renumbered as subsection (8), but an internal reference to subsection (7)(c) was not corrected. In codifying this section, the Reviser of Statutes has made this correction pursuant to KRS 7.136(1).

(3/21/2013). This statute was created in 2013 Ky. Acts ch. 40, sec. 1 (HB 1), and then amended in 2013 Ky. Acts ch. 124, sec. 8, after HB 1 had been enacted. That amendment has been incorporated into the text of this statute as created.

65A.020. Duties of Department for Local Government relating to forms, reporting, and online access — Information to be submitted by special purpose governmental entities — Failure to submit information — Administrative regulations — Registry — Registration fee — Annual report. [Effective until July 15, 2020]

  1. The DLG shall:
    1. On or before March 1, 2014, make the necessary reporting and certification forms, online reporting portal, and online central registry available for reporting by special purpose governmental entities. The portal and registry shall serve as a unified location for the reporting of and access to administrative and financial information by special purpose governmental entities; and
    2. On or before October 1, 2014, make available online public access to administrative and financial information reported by special purpose governmental entities.
    1. For each fiscal period beginning on or after July 1, 2014, all special purpose governmental entities shall annually submit to the DLG the information required by this section. The information shall be submitted in accordance with this section, at the time, and in the form and format required by the DLG. The information submitted shall include at a minimum the following: (2) (a) For each fiscal period beginning on or after July 1, 2014, all special purpose governmental entities shall annually submit to the DLG the information required by this section. The information shall be submitted in accordance with this section, at the time, and in the form and format required by the DLG. The information submitted shall include at a minimum the following:
      1. Administrative information:
        1. The name, address, and, if applicable, the term and appointing authority for each board member of the governing body of the entity;
        2. The fiscal year of the entity;
        3. The Kentucky Revised Statute and, if applicable, the local government ordinance and interlocal agreement under which the entity was established; the date of establishment; the establishing entity; and the statute or statutes, local government ordinance, or interlocal agreement under which the entity operates, if different from the statute or statutes, ordinance, or agreement under which it was established;
        4. The mailing address and telephone number and, if applicable, the Web site uniform resource locator (URL) of the entity;
        5. The operational boundaries and service area of the entity and the services provided by the entity;
          1. A listing of all the most significant taxes or fees imposed and collected by the entity, including the rates or amounts charged for the reporting period and the statutory or other source of authority for the levy of the tax or fee. f. i. A listing of all the most significant taxes or fees imposed and collected by the entity, including the rates or amounts charged for the reporting period and the statutory or other source of authority for the levy of the tax or fee.
          2. As used in this subdivision, “most significant taxes or fees” means the five (5) taxes or fees levied by the entity that produce the most tax and fee revenue for the entity, provided that if the top five (5) revenue-producing taxes and fees do not produce at least eighty-five percent (85%) of all tax and fee revenues received by the entity, additional taxes and fees shall be listed until the taxes and fees listed produce at least eighty-five percent (85%) of all tax and fee revenues of the entity. If an entity levies fewer than five (5) taxes and fees, the entity shall list all taxes and fees levied;
        6. The primary contact for the entity for purposes of communication from the DLG;
        7. The code of ethics that applies to the entity, and whether the entity has adopted additional ethics provisions;
        8. A listing of all federal, state, and local governmental entities that have oversight authority over the special purpose governmental entity or to which the special purpose governmental entity submits reports, data, or information; and
        9. Any other related administrative information required by the DLG; and
      2. Financial information:
          1. The most recent adopted budget of the entity for the upcoming fiscal year; a. i. The most recent adopted budget of the entity for the upcoming fiscal year;
          2. After the close of each fiscal year, a comparison of the budget to actual revenues and expenditures for each fiscal year, including any amendments made throughout the fiscal year to the budget originally submitted;
          3. Completed audits or attestation engagements as provided in KRS 65A.030 ; and
          4. Other financial oversight reports or information required by the DLG.
        1. In lieu of the submissions required by subdivision a.i., ii., and iv. of this subparagraph:
          1. A federally regulated municipal utility shall submit, after the close of each fiscal year, the monthly balance, revenue, and expense report required by the federal regulator, which constitutes year-end data; and
          2. A public utility established pursuant to KRS 96.740 that is not a federally regulated municipal utility shall submit after the close of each fiscal year a report that includes the same information, in the same format as is required for federally regulated municipal utilities under subpart i. of this subdivision.
    2. The provisions of KRS 65A.040 shall apply when a special purpose governmental entity fails to submit the information required by this section in a timely manner, or submits information that does not comply with the requirements and standards established by this section and the DLG. To facilitate the enforcement of these provisions, the DLG shall establish and maintain an online list of due dates for the filing of reports, audit certifications, and information for each special purpose governmental entity.
    3. The provisions of this subsection shall be in addition to, and shall not supplant or replace any reporting or filing requirements established by other provisions of the Kentucky Revised Statutes.
    1. The DLG shall, by administrative regulation adopted pursuant to KRS Chapter 13A, develop standard forms, protocols, timeframes, and due dates for the submission of information by special purpose governmental entities. All information shall be submitted electronically; however, the DLG may allow submission by alternative means, with the understanding that the DLG shall be responsible for converting the information to a format that will make it accessible through the registry. (3) (a) The DLG shall, by administrative regulation adopted pursuant to KRS Chapter 13A, develop standard forms, protocols, timeframes, and due dates for the submission of information by special purpose governmental entities. All information shall be submitted electronically; however, the DLG may allow submission by alternative means, with the understanding that the DLG shall be responsible for converting the information to a format that will make it accessible through the registry.
    2. In an effort to reduce duplicative submissions to different governmental entities and agencies, during the development of the forms, protocols, timeframes, and due dates, the DLG shall consult with other governmental entities and agencies that may use the information submitted by special purpose governmental entities, and may include the information those agencies and entities need to the extent possible.
    3. As an alternative to completing and submitting any standard form developed by the DLG for the reporting of financial information, federally regulated municipal utilities and public utilities established pursuant to KRS 96.740 that are not federally regulated municipal utilities may elect to satisfy the reporting requirements established by subsection (2)(a)2. of this section for the public power components of their operations by reporting the financial information related to their electric system accounts in accordance with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s Uniform System of Accounts.
    1. Beginning October 1, 2014, all information submitted by special purpose governmental entities under this section shall be publicly available through the registry. The registry shall be updated at least monthly, but may be updated more frequently at the discretion of the DLG. The registry shall include a notation indicating the date of the most recent update. (4) (a) Beginning October 1, 2014, all information submitted by special purpose governmental entities under this section shall be publicly available through the registry. The registry shall be updated at least monthly, but may be updated more frequently at the discretion of the DLG. The registry shall include a notation indicating the date of the most recent update.
    2. The registry shall be in a searchable format and shall, at a minimum, allow a search by county, by special purpose governmental entity name, and by type of entity.
    3. To the extent possible, the registry shall be linked to or accessed through the Web site established pursuant to KRS 42.032 to provide public access to expenditure records of the executive branch of state government.
    1. To offset the costs incurred by the DLG in maintaining and administering the registry, the costs incurred in providing education for the governing bodies and employees of special purpose governmental entities as required by KRS 65A.060 , and the costs incurred by the DLG and the Auditor of Public Accounts in responding to and acting upon noncompliant special purpose governmental entities under KRS 65A.040 , excluding costs associated with conducting audits or special examinations, each special purpose governmental entity shall pay a registration fee to the DLG on an annual basis at the time of registration under this section. (5) (a) To offset the costs incurred by the DLG in maintaining and administering the registry, the costs incurred in providing education for the governing bodies and employees of special purpose governmental entities as required by KRS 65A.060 , and the costs incurred by the DLG and the Auditor of Public Accounts in responding to and acting upon noncompliant special purpose governmental entities under KRS 65A.040 , excluding costs associated with conducting audits or special examinations, each special purpose governmental entity shall pay a registration fee to the DLG on an annual basis at the time of registration under this section.
    2. The initial annual fee shall be as follows:
      1. For special purpose governmental entities with annual revenue from all sources of less than one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000), twenty-five dollars ($25);
      2. For special purpose governmental entities with annual revenues from all sources of at least one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000) but less than five hundred thousand dollars ($500,000), two hundred fifty dollars ($250); and
      3. For special purpose governmental entities with annual revenues of five hundred thousand dollars ($500,000) or greater, five hundred dollars ($500).
    3. If the costs of administering and maintaining the registry, providing education, and enforcing compliance change over time, the fee and tiered structure established by paragraph (b) of this subsection may be adjusted one (1) time by the DLG through the promulgation of an administrative regulation under KRS Chapter 13A. The rate, if adjusted, shall be set at a level no greater than a level that is expected to generate sufficient revenue to offset the actual cost of maintaining and administering the registry, providing education for the governing bodies and employees of special purpose governmental entities, and enforcing compliance.
    4. The portion of the registration fee attributable to expenses incurred by the Auditor of Public Accounts for duties and services other than conducting audits or special examinations shall be collected by the DLG and transferred to the Auditor of Public Accounts on a quarterly basis. Prior to the transfer of funds, the Auditor of Public Accounts shall submit an invoice detailing the actual costs incurred, which shall be the amount transferred; however, the amount transferred to the Auditor of Public Accounts under the initial fee established by paragraph (b) of this section shall not exceed the annual amount agreed to between the DLG and the Auditor of Public Accounts.
      1. In determining the annual fee due from a special purpose governmental entity, the DLG may exclude revenues received by the special purpose governmental entity if: (e) 1. In determining the annual fee due from a special purpose governmental entity, the DLG may exclude revenues received by the special purpose governmental entity if:
        1. The revenues constitute nonrecurring, nonoperating grants for the purpose of capital asset acquisition, capital construction, disaster recovery efforts, or other one (1) time purposes as determined by the DLG; and
        2. The special purpose governmental entity requests, in writing to the DLG and for each fiscal year it receives the revenue in question, that the revenues in question not be included in determining its annual revenues.
      2. Any receipts excluded under this paragraph shall still be reported as required under subsection (2)(a)2. of this section.
  2. By October 1, 2014, and on or before each October 1 thereafter, the DLG shall file an annual report with the Legislative Research Commission detailing the compliance of special purpose governmental entities with the provisions of KRS 65A.010 to 65A.090 . The Legislative Research Commission shall refer the report to the Interim Joint Committee on Local Government for review.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 2013, ch. 40, § 2, effective March 21, 2013; 2014, ch. 7, § 2, effective March 19, 2014; 2015 ch. 17, § 2, effective June 24, 2015.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(3/19/2014). 2014 Ky. Acts ch. 7, sec. 11 provides that the amendments to this statute made in 2014 Ky. Acts ch. 7, sec. 2, shall apply retroactively beginning January 1, 2014.

Research References and Practice Aids

2020-2022 Budget Reference.

See State/Executive Branch Budget, 2020 Ky. Acts ch. 92, Pt. V, A, 2 at 939.

65A.020. Duties of Department for Local Government relating to forms, reporting, and online access — Information to be submitted by special purpose governmental entities — Failure to submit information — Administrative regulations — Registry — Registration fee — Annual report. [Effective July 15, 2020]

  1. The DLG shall:
    1. On or before March 1, 2014, make the necessary reporting and certification forms, online reporting portal, and online central registry available for reporting by special purpose governmental entities. The portal and registry shall serve as a unified location for the reporting of and access to administrative and financial information by special purpose governmental entities; and
    2. On or before October 1, 2014, make available online public access to administrative and financial information reported by special purpose governmental entities.
    1. For each fiscal period beginning on or after July 1, 2014, all special purpose governmental entities shall annually submit to the DLG the information required by this section. The information shall be submitted in accordance with this section, at the time, and in the form and format required by the DLG. The information submitted shall include at a minimum the following: (2) (a) For each fiscal period beginning on or after July 1, 2014, all special purpose governmental entities shall annually submit to the DLG the information required by this section. The information shall be submitted in accordance with this section, at the time, and in the form and format required by the DLG. The information submitted shall include at a minimum the following:
      1. Administrative information:
        1. The name, address, and, if applicable, the term and appointing authority for each board member of the governing body of the entity;
        2. The fiscal year of the entity;
        3. The Kentucky Revised Statute and, if applicable, the local government ordinance and interlocal agreement under which the entity was established; the date of establishment; the establishing entity; and the statute or statutes, local government ordinance, or interlocal agreement under which the entity operates, if different from the statute or statutes, ordinance, or agreement under which it was established;
        4. The mailing address and telephone number and, if applicable, the Web site uniform resource locator (URL) of the entity;
        5. The operational boundaries and service area of the entity and the services provided by the entity;
          1. A listing of all the most significant taxes or fees imposed and collected by the entity, including the rates or amounts charged for the reporting period and the statutory or other source of authority for the levy of the tax or fee. f. i. A listing of all the most significant taxes or fees imposed and collected by the entity, including the rates or amounts charged for the reporting period and the statutory or other source of authority for the levy of the tax or fee.
          2. As used in this subdivision, “most significant taxes or fees” means the five (5) taxes or fees levied by the entity that produce the most tax and fee revenue for the entity, provided that if the top five (5) revenue-producing taxes and fees do not produce at least eighty-five percent (85%) of all tax and fee revenues received by the entity, additional taxes and fees shall be listed until the taxes and fees listed produce at least eighty-five percent (85%) of all tax and fee revenues of the entity. If an entity levies fewer than five (5) taxes and fees, the entity shall list all taxes and fees levied;
        6. The primary contact for the entity for purposes of communication from the DLG;
        7. The code of ethics that applies to the entity, and whether the entity has adopted additional ethics provisions;
        8. A listing of all federal, state, and local governmental entities that have oversight authority over the special purpose governmental entity or to which the special purpose governmental entity submits reports, data, or information; and
        9. Any other related administrative information required by the DLG; and
      2. Financial information:
          1. The most recent adopted budget of the entity for the upcoming fiscal year; a. i. The most recent adopted budget of the entity for the upcoming fiscal year;
          2. After the close of each fiscal year, a comparison of the budget to actual revenues and expenditures for each fiscal year, including any amendments made throughout the fiscal year to the budget originally submitted;
          3. Completed audits or attestation engagements as provided in KRS 65A.030 ; and
          4. Other financial oversight reports or information required by the DLG.
        1. In lieu of the submissions required by subdivision a.i., ii., and iv. of this subparagraph:
          1. A federally regulated municipal utility shall submit, after the close of each fiscal year, the monthly balance, revenue, and expense report required by the federal regulator, which constitutes year-end data; and
          2. A public utility established pursuant to KRS 96.740 that is not a federally regulated municipal utility shall submit after the close of each fiscal year a report that includes the same information, in the same format as is required for federally regulated municipal utilities under subpart i. of this subdivision.
    2. The provisions of KRS 65A.040 shall apply when a special purpose governmental entity fails to submit the information required by this section in a timely manner, or submits information that does not comply with the requirements and standards established by this section and the DLG. To facilitate the enforcement of these provisions, the DLG shall establish and maintain an online list of due dates for the filing of reports, audit certifications, and information for each special purpose governmental entity.
    3. The provisions of this subsection shall be in addition to, and shall not supplant or replace any reporting or filing requirements established by other provisions of the Kentucky Revised Statutes.
    1. The DLG shall, by administrative regulation adopted pursuant to KRS Chapter 13A, develop standard forms, protocols, timeframes, and due dates for the submission of information by special purpose governmental entities. All information shall be submitted electronically; however, the DLG may allow submission by alternative means, with the understanding that the DLG shall be responsible for converting the information to a format that will make it accessible through the registry. (3) (a) The DLG shall, by administrative regulation adopted pursuant to KRS Chapter 13A, develop standard forms, protocols, timeframes, and due dates for the submission of information by special purpose governmental entities. All information shall be submitted electronically; however, the DLG may allow submission by alternative means, with the understanding that the DLG shall be responsible for converting the information to a format that will make it accessible through the registry.
    2. In an effort to reduce duplicative submissions to different governmental entities and agencies, during the development of the forms, protocols, timeframes, and due dates, the DLG shall consult with other governmental entities and agencies that may use the information submitted by special purpose governmental entities, and may include the information those agencies and entities need to the extent possible.
    3. As an alternative to completing and submitting any standard form developed by the DLG for the reporting of financial information, federally regulated municipal utilities and public utilities established pursuant to KRS 96.740 that are not federally regulated municipal utilities may elect to satisfy the reporting requirements established by subsection (2)(a)2. of this section for the public power components of their operations by reporting the financial information related to their electric system accounts in accordance with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s Uniform System of Accounts.
    1. Beginning October 1, 2014, all information submitted by special purpose governmental entities under this section shall be publicly available through the registry. The registry shall be updated at least monthly, but may be updated more frequently at the discretion of the DLG. The registry shall include a notation indicating the date of the most recent update. (4) (a) Beginning October 1, 2014, all information submitted by special purpose governmental entities under this section shall be publicly available through the registry. The registry shall be updated at least monthly, but may be updated more frequently at the discretion of the DLG. The registry shall include a notation indicating the date of the most recent update.
    2. The registry shall be in a searchable format and shall, at a minimum, allow a search by county, by special purpose governmental entity name, and by type of entity.
    3. To the extent possible, the registry shall be linked to or accessed through the Web site established pursuant to KRS 42.032 to provide public access to expenditure records of the executive branch of state government.
    1. To offset the costs incurred by the DLG in maintaining and administering the registry, the costs incurred in providing education for the governing bodies and employees of special purpose governmental entities as required by KRS 65A.060 , and the costs incurred by the DLG and the Auditor of Public Accounts in responding to and acting upon noncompliant special purpose governmental entities under KRS 65A.040 , excluding costs associated with conducting audits or special examinations, each special purpose governmental entity shall pay a registration fee to the DLG on an annual basis at the time of registration under this section. (5) (a) To offset the costs incurred by the DLG in maintaining and administering the registry, the costs incurred in providing education for the governing bodies and employees of special purpose governmental entities as required by KRS 65A.060 , and the costs incurred by the DLG and the Auditor of Public Accounts in responding to and acting upon noncompliant special purpose governmental entities under KRS 65A.040 , excluding costs associated with conducting audits or special examinations, each special purpose governmental entity shall pay a registration fee to the DLG on an annual basis at the time of registration under this section.
    2. The initial annual fee shall be as follows:
      1. For special purpose governmental entities with annual revenue from all sources of less than one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000), twenty- five dollars ($25);
      2. For special purpose governmental entities with annual revenues from all sources of at least one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000) but less than five hundred thousand dollars ($500,000), two hundred fifty dollars ($250); and
      3. For special purpose governmental entities with annual revenues of five hundred thousand dollars ($500,000) or greater, five hundred dollars ($500).
    3. If the costs of administering and maintaining the registry, providing education, and enforcing compliance change over time, the fee and tiered structure established by paragraph (b) of this subsection may be adjusted one (1) time by the DLG through the promulgation of an administrative regulation under KRS Chapter 13A. The rate, if adjusted, shall be set at a level no greater than a level that is expected to generate sufficient revenue to offset the actual cost of maintaining and administering the registry, providing education for the governing bodies and employees of special purpose governmental entities, and enforcing compliance.
    4. The portion of the registration fee attributable to expenses incurred by the Auditor of Public Accounts for duties and services other than conducting audits or special examinations shall be collected by the DLG and transferred to the Auditor of Public Accounts on a quarterly basis. Prior to the transfer of funds, the Auditor of Public Accounts shall submit an invoice detailing the actual costs incurred, which shall be the amount transferred; however, the amount transferred to the Auditor of Public Accounts under the initial fee established by paragraph (b) of this section shall not exceed the annual amount agreed to between the DLG and the Auditor of Public Accounts.
      1. In determining the annual fee due from a special purpose governmental entity, the DLG may exclude revenues received by the special purpose governmental entity if: (e) 1. In determining the annual fee due from a special purpose governmental entity, the DLG may exclude revenues received by the special purpose governmental entity if:
        1. The revenues constitute nonrecurring, nonoperating grants for the purpose of capital asset acquisition, capital construction, disaster recovery efforts, or other one (1) time purposes as determined by the DLG; and
        2. The special purpose governmental entity requests, in writing to the DLG and for each fiscal year it receives the revenue in question, that the revenues in question not be included in determining its annual revenues.
      2. In determining the annual fee due from a special purpose governmental entity that is a public use airport operating under KRS 183.132 to 183.160 , the DLG may exclude revenues received by that public use airport if the revenues constitute nonoperating or recurring grants for the purpose of capital asset acquisition, capital construction, disaster recovery efforts, or other one (1) time purposes as determined by the DLG.
      3. Any receipts excluded under this paragraph shall still be reported as required under subsection (2)(a)2. of this section.
  2. By October 1, 2014, and on or before each October 1 thereafter, the DLG shall file an annual report with the Legislative Research Commission detailing the compliance of special purpose governmental entities with the provisions of KRS 65A.010 to 65A.090 . The Legislative Research Commission shall refer the report to the Interim Joint Committee on Local Government for review.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 2013, ch. 40, § 2, effective March 21, 2013; 2014, ch. 7, § 2, effective March 19, 2014; 2020 ch. 27, § 1, effective July 15, 2020.

65A.030. Audits, financial statements, and attestation engagements for fiscal periods beginning on or after July 1, 2014 — Alternative financial review — Exclusion of some annual receipts. [Effective until July 15, 2020]

  1. For fiscal periods beginning on or after July 1, 2014, requirements relating to audits and financial statements of special purpose governmental entities are as follows:
    1. Every special purpose governmental entity with the higher of annual receipts from all sources or annual expenditures of less than one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000) shall:
      1. Annually prepare a financial statement; and
      2. Once every four (4) years, contract for the application of an attestation engagement as determined by the DLG, as provided in subsection (2) of this section;
    2. Every special purpose governmental entity with the higher of annual receipts from all sources or annual expenditures equal to or greater than one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000) but less than five hundred thousand dollars ($500,000) shall:
      1. Annually prepare a financial statement; and
      2. Once every four (4) years, contract for the provision of an independent audit as provided in subsection (2) of this section; and
    3. Every special purpose governmental entity with the higher of annual receipts from all sources or annual expenditures equal to or greater than five hundred thousand dollars ($500,000) shall:
      1. Annually prepare a financial statement; and
      2. Be audited annually as provided in subsection (2) of this section.
    1. To provide for the performance of an audit or attestation engagement as provided in subsection (1)(a) to (c) of this section, the governing body of a special purpose governmental entity shall employ an independent certified public accountant or contract with the Auditor of Public Accounts to conduct the audit or attestation engagement unless the provisions of subsection (3) of this section apply. (2) (a) To provide for the performance of an audit or attestation engagement as provided in subsection (1)(a) to (c) of this section, the governing body of a special purpose governmental entity shall employ an independent certified public accountant or contract with the Auditor of Public Accounts to conduct the audit or attestation engagement unless the provisions of subsection (3) of this section apply.
    2. The audit or attestation engagement shall be completed no later than twelve (12) months following the close of the fiscal year subject to the audit or the attestation engagement.
      1. The special purpose governmental entity shall submit for publication on the registry the audit or attestation engagement, in the form and format required by the DLG. (c) 1. The special purpose governmental entity shall submit for publication on the registry the audit or attestation engagement, in the form and format required by the DLG.
      2. A federally regulated municipal utility may comply with the requirements of this section for the public power component of its operations by submitting an audit that conforms to the requirements imposed by the federal agency with which it maintains a wholesale power contract.
      3. A public utility established pursuant to KRS 96.740 that is not a federally regulated municipal utility may comply with the requirements of this section for the public power component of its operations by submitting a copy of its annual audit performed under KRS 96.840 .
      1. The audit or attestation engagement shall conform to: (d) 1. The audit or attestation engagement shall conform to:
        1. Generally accepted governmental auditing or attestation standards, which means those standards for audits or attestations of governmental organizations, programs, activities, and functions issued by the Comptroller General of the United States;
        2. Generally accepted auditing or attestation standards, which means those standards for all audits or attestations promulgated by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants; and
        3. Additional procedures and reporting requirements as may be required by the Auditor of Public Accounts.
      2. Rather than meeting the standards established by subparagraph 1. of this paragraph, the audit submitted by a federally regulated municipal utility or a public utility established pursuant to KRS 96.740 that is not a federally regulated municipal utility with regard to the public power component of the utility’s operations shall conform to KRS 96.840 and the financial standards of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s Uniform System of Accounts.
    3. Upon request, the Auditor of Public Accounts may review the final report and all related work papers and documents of the independent certified public accountant relating to the audit or attestation engagement.
    4. If a special purpose governmental entity is required by another provision of law to audit its funds more frequently or more stringently than is required by this section, the special purpose governmental entity shall comply with the provisions of that law, and shall comply with the requirements of paragraph (c) of this subsection.
    5. Notwithstanding any provision of the Kentucky Revised Statutes to the contrary, a unit of government furnishing funds directly to a special purpose governmental entity may require additional audits at the expense of the unit of government furnishing the funds.
    6. All audit reports, attestation engagement reports, and financial statements of special purpose governmental entities shall be public records.
    1. Any board, commission, or agency established by statute with regulatory authority or oversight responsibilities for a category of special purpose governmental entities may apply to the Auditor of Public Accounts to be approved to provide an alternative financial review of the special purpose governmental entities it regulates or oversees that are required by subsection (1)(a) of this section to submit an attestation engagement. The application shall be in the form and format determined by the Auditor of Public Accounts. (3) (a) Any board, commission, or agency established by statute with regulatory authority or oversight responsibilities for a category of special purpose governmental entities may apply to the Auditor of Public Accounts to be approved to provide an alternative financial review of the special purpose governmental entities it regulates or oversees that are required by subsection (1)(a) of this section to submit an attestation engagement. The application shall be in the form and format determined by the Auditor of Public Accounts.
    2. The Auditor of Public Accounts shall review the application and if the auditor determines that the board, commission, or agency has the resources and capacity to conduct an acceptable alternative financial review, the auditor shall notify the DLG that the board, commission, or agency is approved to provide an alternative financial review of the special purpose governmental entities it regulates or oversees that are required by subsection (1)(a) of this section to submit an attestation engagement.
    3. The Auditor of Public Accounts shall advise the DLG and the board, commission, or agency regarding modifications to the proposed alternative financial review procedures necessary to obtain the Auditor of Public Accounts’ approval.
    4. Any board, commission, or agency approved to provide alternative financial reviews shall reapply to the Auditor of Public Accounts for approval to continue to provide alternative financial reviews at least every four (4) years. The Auditor of Public Accounts may require more frequent approvals.
    5. The Auditor of Public Accounts or the DLG may withdraw any approval granted under this subsection if the board, commission, or agency fails to conduct alternative financial reviews using the procedures and including the terms and components agreed to with the DLG.
    6. Any board, commission, or agency approved to provide alternative financial reviews shall notify the Auditor of Public Accounts and the DLG if an irregularity is found in the alternative financial review.
    7. Any special purpose governmental entity subject to regulation or oversight by a board, commission, or agency that obtains approval to provide an alternative financial review under this subsection shall have the option of having an alternative financial review performed by the board, commission, or agency, or may contract for the application of an attestation engagement as provided in subsection (1)(a) of this section.
  2. The DLG shall determine which procedures conducted under attestation standards will apply to special purpose governmental entities meeting the conditions established by subsection (1)(a) of this section. The DLG may determine that additional procedures be conducted under attestation standards for specific categories of special purpose governmental entities or for specific special purpose governmental entities, as needed, to obtain the oversight and information deemed necessary by the DLG.
  3. Based on the information submitted by special purpose governmental entities under KRS 65A.020 and 65A.090 , the DLG shall determine when each special purpose governmental entity was last audited, and shall notify the special purpose governmental entity of when each audit or attestation engagement is due under the new standards and requirements of this section.
    1. In determining the requirements relating to audits and financial statements of special purpose governmental entities under subsection (1) of this section, the DLG may exclude annual receipts received by the special purpose governmental entity if: (6) (a) In determining the requirements relating to audits and financial statements of special purpose governmental entities under subsection (1) of this section, the DLG may exclude annual receipts received by the special purpose governmental entity if:
      1. The receipts constitute nonrecurring, nonoperating grants for the purpose of capital asset acquisition, capital construction, disaster recovery efforts, or other one (1) time purposes as determined by the DLG; and
      2. The special purpose governmental entity requests, in writing to the DLG and for each fiscal year it receives the revenue in question, that the revenues in question not be included in determining its annual revenues.
    2. Any receipts excluded under paragraph (a) of this subsection shall still be reported as required under KRS 65A.020(2)(a)2.
  4. The DLG may promulgate administrative regulations pursuant to KRS Chapter 13A to implement the provisions of this section.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 2013, ch. 40, § 3, effective March 21, 2013; 2014, ch. 7, § 3, effective March 19, 2014; 2015 ch. 17, § 3, effective June 24, 2015.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(3/19/2014). 2014 Ky. Acts ch. 7, sec. 11 provides that the amendments to this statute made in 2014 Ky. Acts ch. 7, sec. 3, shall apply retroactively beginning January 1, 2014.

65A.030. Audits, financial statements, and attestation engagements for fiscal periods beginning on or after July 1, 2014 — Alternative financial review — Exclusion of some annual receipts. [Effective July 15, 2020]

  1. For fiscal periods beginning on or after July 1, 2014, requirements relating to audits and financial statements of special purpose governmental entities are as follows:
    1. Every special purpose governmental entity with the higher of annual receipts from all sources or annual expenditures of less than one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000) shall:
      1. Annually prepare a financial statement; and
      2. Once every four (4) years, contract for the application of an attestation engagement as determined by the DLG, as provided in subsection (2) of this section;
    2. Every special purpose governmental entity with the higher of annual receipts from all sources or annual expenditures equal to or greater than one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000) but less than five hundred thousand dollars ($500,000) shall:
      1. Annually prepare a financial statement; and
      2. Once every four (4) years, contract for the provision of an independent audit as provided in subsection (2) of this section; and
    3. Every special purpose governmental entity with the higher of annual receipts from all sources or annual expenditures equal to or greater than five hundred thousand dollars ($500,000) shall:
      1. Annually prepare a financial statement; and
      2. Be audited annually as provided in subsection (2) of this section.
    1. To provide for the performance of an audit or attestation engagement as provided in subsection (1)(a) to (c) of this section, the governing body of a special purpose governmental entity shall employ an independent certified public accountant or contract with the Auditor of Public Accounts to conduct the audit or attestation engagement unless the provisions of subsection (3) of this section apply. (2) (a) To provide for the performance of an audit or attestation engagement as provided in subsection (1)(a) to (c) of this section, the governing body of a special purpose governmental entity shall employ an independent certified public accountant or contract with the Auditor of Public Accounts to conduct the audit or attestation engagement unless the provisions of subsection (3) of this section apply.
    2. The audit or attestation engagement shall be completed no later than twelve (12) months following the close of the fiscal year subject to the audit or the attestation engagement.
      1. The special purpose governmental entity shall submit for publication on the registry the audit or attestation engagement, in the form and format required by the DLG. (c) 1. The special purpose governmental entity shall submit for publication on the registry the audit or attestation engagement, in the form and format required by the DLG.
      2. A federally regulated municipal utility may comply with the requirements of this section for the public power component of its operations by submitting an audit that conforms to the requirements imposed by the federal agency with which it maintains a wholesale power contract.
      3. A public utility established pursuant to KRS 96.740 that is not a federally regulated municipal utility may comply with the requirements of this section for the public power component of its operations by submitting a copy of its annual audit performed under KRS 96.840 .
      1. The audit or attestation engagement shall conform to: (d) 1. The audit or attestation engagement shall conform to:
        1. Generally accepted governmental auditing or attestation standards, which means those standards for audits or attestations of governmental organizations, programs, activities, and functions issued by the Comptroller General of the United States;
        2. Generally accepted auditing or attestation standards, which means those standards for all audits or attestations promulgated by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants; and
        3. Additional procedures and reporting requirements as may be required by the Auditor of Public Accounts.
      2. Rather than meeting the standards established by subparagraph 1. of this paragraph, the audit submitted by a federally regulated municipal utility or a public utility established pursuant to KRS 96.740 that is not a federally regulated municipal utility with regard to the public power component of the utility’s operations shall conform to KRS 96.840 and the financial standards of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s Uniform System of Accounts.
    3. Upon request, the Auditor of Public Accounts may review the final report and all related work papers and documents of the independent certified public accountant relating to the audit or attestation engagement.
    4. If a special purpose governmental entity is required by another provision of law to audit its funds more frequently or more stringently than is required by this section, the special purpose governmental entity shall comply with the provisions of that law, and shall comply with the requirements of paragraph (c) of this subsection.
    5. Notwithstanding any provision of the Kentucky Revised Statutes to the contrary, a unit of government furnishing funds directly to a special purpose governmental entity may require additional audits at the expense of the unit of government furnishing the funds.
    6. All audit reports, attestation engagement reports, and financial statements of special purpose governmental entities shall be public records.
    1. Any board, commission, or agency established by statute with regulatory authority or oversight responsibilities for a category of special purpose governmental entities may apply to the Auditor of Public Accounts to be approved to provide an alternative financial review of the special purpose governmental entities it regulates or oversees that are required by subsection (1)(a) of this section to submit an attestation engagement. The application shall be in the form and format determined by the Auditor of Public Accounts. (3) (a) Any board, commission, or agency established by statute with regulatory authority or oversight responsibilities for a category of special purpose governmental entities may apply to the Auditor of Public Accounts to be approved to provide an alternative financial review of the special purpose governmental entities it regulates or oversees that are required by subsection (1)(a) of this section to submit an attestation engagement. The application shall be in the form and format determined by the Auditor of Public Accounts.
    2. The Auditor of Public Accounts shall review the application and if the auditor determines that the board, commission, or agency has the resources and capacity to conduct an acceptable alternative financial review, the auditor shall notify the DLG that the board, commission, or agency is approved to provide an alternative financial review of the special purpose governmental entities it regulates or oversees that are required by subsection (1)(a) of this section to submit an attestation engagement.
    3. The Auditor of Public Accounts shall advise the DLG and the board, commission, or agency regarding modifications to the proposed alternative financial review procedures necessary to obtain the Auditor of Public Accounts’ approval.
    4. Any board, commission, or agency approved to provide alternative financial reviews shall reapply to the Auditor of Public Accounts for approval to continue to provide alternative financial reviews at least every four (4) years. The Auditor of Public Accounts may require more frequent approvals.
    5. The Auditor of Public Accounts or the DLG may withdraw any approval granted under this subsection if the board, commission, or agency fails to conduct alternative financial reviews using the procedures and including the terms and components agreed to with the DLG.
    6. Any board, commission, or agency approved to provide alternative financial reviews shall notify the Auditor of Public Accounts and the DLG if an irregularity is found in the alternative financial review.
    7. Any special purpose governmental entity subject to regulation or oversight by a board, commission, or agency that obtains approval to provide an alternative financial review under this subsection shall have the option of having an alternative financial review performed by the board, commission, or agency, or may contract for the application of an attestation engagement as provided in subsection (1)(a) of this section.
  2. The DLG shall determine which procedures conducted under attestation standards will apply to special purpose governmental entities meeting the conditions established by subsection (1)(a) of this section. The DLG may determine that additional procedures be conducted under attestation standards for specific categories of special purpose governmental entities or for specific special purpose governmental entities, as needed, to obtain the oversight and information deemed necessary by the DLG.
  3. Based on the information submitted by special purpose governmental entities under KRS 65A.020 and 65A.090 , the DLG shall determine when each special purpose governmental entity was last audited, and shall notify the special purpose governmental entity of when each audit or attestation engagement is due under the new standards and requirements of this section.
    1. In determining the requirements relating to audits and financial statements of special purpose governmental entities under subsection (1) of this section, the DLG may exclude annual receipts received by the special purpose governmental entity if: (6) (a) In determining the requirements relating to audits and financial statements of special purpose governmental entities under subsection (1) of this section, the DLG may exclude annual receipts received by the special purpose governmental entity if:
      1. The receipts constitute nonrecurring, nonoperating grants for the purpose of capital asset acquisition, capital construction, disaster recovery efforts, or other one (1) time purposes as determined by the DLG; and
      2. The special purpose governmental entity requests, in writing to the DLG and for each fiscal year it receives the revenue in question, that the revenues in question not be included in determining its annual revenues.
    2. In determining the requirements relating to audits and financial statements under subsection (1) of this section of special purpose governmental entities that are public use airports operating under KRS 183.132 to 183.160 , the DLG may exclude annual receipts received by those public use airports if the receipts constitute nonoperating or recurring grants for the purpose of capital asset acquisition, capital construction, disaster recovery efforts, or other one (1) time purposes as determined by the DLG.
    3. Any receipts excluded under paragraph (a) or (b) of this subsection shall still be reported as required under KRS 65A.020(2)(a)2.
  4. The DLG may promulgate administrative regulations pursuant to KRS Chapter 13A to implement the provisions of this section.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 2013, ch. 40, § 3, effective March 21, 2013; 2014, ch. 7, § 3, effective March 19, 2014; 2020 ch. 27, § 2, effective July 15, 2020.

65A.040. Failure to submit information or submitting noncompliant information — Notice — Withholding of funds — Audit or special examination — Distribution of funds upon compliance — Action to enforce reporting requirements.

  1. The provisions of this section shall apply when any special purpose governmental entity fails to submit information or submits noncompliant information under KRS 65A.020 .
  2. If a special purpose governmental entity fails to submit information in a timely manner or submits noncompliant information, the DLG shall, within thirty (30) days after the due date of the information, notify the special purpose governmental entity and the establishing entity in writing that:
    1. Either:
      1. The required information was not submitted in a timely manner; or
      2. The information submitted was noncompliant and the reason for noncompliance;
    2. The special purpose governmental entity shall have thirty (30) days from the date of the notice to submit the information; and
    3. Failure to submit compliant information:
      1. Will result in:
        1. Any funds due the entity and in the possession of any agency, entity, or branch of state government being withheld by the state government entity until the report or information is submitted; and
        2. Publication of a notice of noncompliance in a newspaper having general circulation in the area where the special purpose governmental entity operates; and
      2. May result in the Auditor of Public Accounts or the auditor’s designee performing an audit or special examination of the special purpose governmental entity at the expense of the entity.
  3. Upon the failure of a special purpose governmental entity to submit information in response to the notice sent under subsection (2) of this section, the DLG shall, within fifteen (15) days after the passage of the thirty (30) day period:
    1. Notify in writing the Auditor of Public Accounts, the establishing entity, and any entity having oversight or responsibility of the special purpose governmental entity at the state level. The notice shall include at a minimum the name, mailing address, and primary contact name for the special purpose governmental entity, as well as details about the information that is past due;
    2. Notify the Finance and Administration Cabinet that the special purpose governmental entity has failed to comply with the reporting requirements of KRS 65A.010 to 65A.090 , and that any funds in the possession of any agency, entity, or branch of state government shall be withheld until further notice; and
      1. Cause to be published in the newspaper having general circulation in the area where the special purpose governmental entity operates a notice of noncompliance. The notice shall meet the requirements of KRS Chapter 424 and shall include: (c) 1. Cause to be published in the newspaper having general circulation in the area where the special purpose governmental entity operates a notice of noncompliance. The notice shall meet the requirements of KRS Chapter 424 and shall include:
        1. Identification of the special purpose governmental entity;
        2. A statement that the special purpose governmental entity failed to comply with the reporting requirements established by KRS 65A.020 ;
        3. The names of the board members of the special purpose governmental entity;
        4. The name and contact information of the individual provided as the contact for the special purpose governmental entity; and
        5. Any other information the DLG may require.
      2. The cost of publication of the notice shall be borne by the special purpose governmental entity. If the notice includes more than one (1) special purpose governmental entity, the cost shall be divided equally among the entities included in the notice.
  4. Upon receipt of notification under subsection (3)(b) of this section, the secretary of the Finance and Administration Cabinet shall, within ten (10) days after receipt of the notice, notify all state agencies, entities, and branches of state government to withhold any funds due the noncompliant special purpose governmental entity.
    1. The Auditor of Public Accounts shall, within thirty (30) days after the receipt of information from the DLG under subsection (3)(a) of this subsection, notify in writing the special purpose governmental entity that the entity may be subject to an audit or special examination at the expense of the special purpose governmental entity. (5) (a) The Auditor of Public Accounts shall, within thirty (30) days after the receipt of information from the DLG under subsection (3)(a) of this subsection, notify in writing the special purpose governmental entity that the entity may be subject to an audit or special examination at the expense of the special purpose governmental entity.
    2. The Auditor of Public Accounts may initiate an audit or special examination of any special purpose governmental entity any time after sending the notice required by paragraph (a) of this subsection. Any audit or special examination initiated pursuant to this subsection shall be at the expense of the special purpose governmental entity.
    3. Once commenced, an audit or special examination may be completed regardless of whether the special purpose governmental entity subsequently submits the required information.
    4. The audit or special examination shall be prepared and submitted as required by KRS 65A.020 and 65A.030 .
  5. Upon receipt of all required information from a noncompliant special purpose governmental entity, the DLG shall notify in writing the Auditor of Public Accounts, the establishing entity, and the Finance and Administration Cabinet, and the secretary of the Finance and Administration Cabinet shall notify all state agencies, entities, and branches of state government that funds withheld may once again be distributed to the special purpose governmental entity.
  6. Any resident or property owner of the service area of a special purpose governmental entity may bring an action in the Circuit Court to enforce the provisions of KRS 65A.020 . The Circuit Court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the special purpose governmental entity, a reasonable attorney’s fee and court costs, to be paid from the special purpose governmental entity’s treasury.

History. Enact. Acts 2013, ch. 40, § 4, effective March 21, 2013.

65A.050. Administrative dissolution of special purpose governmental entity — Dissolution by governing body.

    1. As used in this subsection, “entity seeking dissolution” shall mean: (1) (a) As used in this subsection, “entity seeking dissolution” shall mean:
      1. The DLG;
      2. If the special purpose governmental entity was established by one (1) county, or by one (1) city, the governing body of the county or city that established the special purpose governmental entity;
      3. If the special purpose governmental entity was established by multiple counties and cities, the governing bodies of all establishing entities; or
      4. If the special purpose governmental entity was established other than by an establishing entity, the governing body or bodies of the county or counties in which the special purpose governmental entity provides or provided services, or operates or operated.
    2. Any special purpose governmental entity that meets at least one (1) of the following criteria may be administratively dissolved:
      1. The special purpose governmental entity has taken no action for two (2) or more consecutive years;
      2. Following a written inquiry from the entity seeking dissolution, the chair of the special purpose governmental entity either:
        1. Notifies the entity seeking dissolution in writing that the special purpose governmental entity has not had a governing board, or has not had a sufficient number of governing board members to constitute a quorum for two (2) or more consecutive years; or
        2. Fails to respond to the inquiry within thirty (30) days;
      3. The special purpose governmental entity fails to register with the DLG as required by KRS 65A.090 ;
      4. The special purpose governmental entity fails to file the information required by KRS 65A.020 for two (2) or more consecutive years; or
      5. The governing body of the special purpose governmental entity provides documentation to the DLG or the governing body or bodies of the establishing entity that it has unanimously adopted a resolution declaring the special purpose governmental entity inactive.
    3. To begin the process of administrative dissolution, the entity seeking dissolution shall provide notification of the proposed administrative dissolution as provided in this paragraph:
      1. The entity seeking dissolution shall:
        1. Post a notice of proposed administrative dissolution on the registry established by KRS 65A.020 ;
        2. For administrative dissolutions under subparagraphs 3., 4., and 5. of paragraph (b) of this subsection, publish, in accordance with the provisions of KRS Chapter 424, a notice of proposed administrative dissolution, with the cost of the publication billed to the special purpose governmental entity for which administrative dissolution is sought;
        3. Mail a copy of the notice to the registered contact for the special purpose governmental entity, if any; and
        4. Mail a copy of the notice as follows:
          1. If the dissolution is sought by the DLG, to the governing body of the establishing entity or county, and to all entities at the state level having oversight of or responsibility for the special purpose governmental entity; and
          2. If the dissolution is sought by an establishing entity or county, to the DLG and any other establishing entities or counties, and to all entities at the state level having oversight of or responsibility for the special purpose governmental entity; and
      2. The notice shall include:
        1. The name of the entity seeking dissolution, and contact information for the entity;
        2. The name of the special purpose governmental entity for which dissolution is sought;
        3. The statutes under which the special purpose governmental entity was organized and operating;
        4. A description of the services provided and the territory of the special purpose governmental entity;
        5. If there is a plan of dissolution as required by paragraph (e) of this subsection, identification of the place where the plan of dissolution may be reviewed;
        6. A statement that any objections to the administrative dissolution shall be filed in writing with the entity seeking to dissolve the special purpose governmental entity within thirty (30) days after the publication date, and the address and process for submitting such objections; and
        7. A statement that if no written objections are received within thirty (30) days of publication of the notice, the special purpose governmental entity shall be administratively dissolved.
      1. Any resident living in or owning property in the area served by the special purpose governmental entity for which dissolution is sought, who is not a member of the governing body of the special purpose governmental entity or an immediate family member of a member of the governing body of the special purpose governmental entity, may file a written objection to the dissolution with the entity seeking dissolution. The written objection shall state the specific reasons why the special purpose governmental entity shall not be dissolved, and shall be filed within thirty (30) days after the posting of the notice on the registry as required by paragraph (c) of this subsection. (d) 1. Any resident living in or owning property in the area served by the special purpose governmental entity for which dissolution is sought, who is not a member of the governing body of the special purpose governmental entity or an immediate family member of a member of the governing body of the special purpose governmental entity, may file a written objection to the dissolution with the entity seeking dissolution. The written objection shall state the specific reasons why the special purpose governmental entity shall not be dissolved, and shall be filed within thirty (30) days after the posting of the notice on the registry as required by paragraph (c) of this subsection.
        1. Upon the passage of thirty (30) days with no objections filed, and satisfaction of all outstanding obligations of the special purpose governmental entity, the special purpose governmental entity shall be deemed dissolved and, if a dissolution plan was required, the entity seeking dissolution shall proceed to implement the dissolution plan. 2. a. Upon the passage of thirty (30) days with no objections filed, and satisfaction of all outstanding obligations of the special purpose governmental entity, the special purpose governmental entity shall be deemed dissolved and, if a dissolution plan was required, the entity seeking dissolution shall proceed to implement the dissolution plan.
        2. Notification of dissolution shall be provided by the entity seeking dissolution to all other entities listed under paragraph (a) of this subsection. The DLG shall maintain a list of all dissolved special purpose governmental entities and the date of dissolution on the registry established by KRS 65A.020.
      2. If written objections are received within thirty (30) days of the publication on the registry required by paragraph (c) of this subsection, the dissolution process shall be aborted, and the process established by subsection (2) of this section shall be utilized if it is determined that dissolution should still be sought, notwithstanding any other dissolution process that may exist in the Kentucky Revised Statutes for the type of special purpose governmental entity for which dissolution is sought.
    4. If the special purpose governmental entity for which administrative dissolution is sought:
      1. Is providing services;
      2. Has outstanding liabilities; or
      3. Has assets; the entity seeking dissolution shall, as part of the dissolution process, develop a dissolution plan that includes, as relevant, provisions addressing the continuation of services, the satisfaction of all liabilities, and the distribution of assets of the special purpose governmental entity.
  1. Any special purpose governmental entity not meeting the requirements for dissolution under subsection (1) of this section, and for which no specific dissolution provisions apply in the Kentucky Revised Statutes, may be dissolved as provided in this subsection:
    1. The dissolution of a special purpose governmental entity may be initiated upon:
      1. The affirmative vote of two-thirds (2/3) of the governing body of the special purpose governmental entity and the adoption of an ordinance by the affirmative vote of two-thirds (2/3) of the governing body of each establishing entity;
      2. The adoption of an ordinance by an affirmative vote of two-thirds (2/3) of the governing body of each establishing entity; or
      3. If there is no establishing entity, by the adoption of an ordinance by an affirmative vote of two-thirds (2/3) of the governing body of each county in which the special purpose governmental entity provides services or operates;
    2. Upon initiation of a dissolution after an affirmative vote as provided in paragraph (a) of this subsection, the special purpose governmental entity for which dissolution is sought shall not assume any new obligations or duties, contract for any new debt, or levy any additional fees or taxes unless the new obligations, duties, debt, fees, or taxes are included in the dissolution plan required by paragraph (c) of this subsection. Any contract or agreement or plan for new obligations, duties, debt, fees, or taxes entered into or devised in violation of this paragraph shall be void;
    3. After voting to commence dissolution of a special purpose governmental entity, the governing body or bodies initiating the dissolution shall:
      1. Develop a dissolution plan which, if adopted by an establishing entity shall be by ordinance, which shall include but not be limited to:
        1. A description of how the necessary governmental services provided by the special purpose governmental entity will be provided upon dissolution of the entity or a statement that the services are no longer needed;
        2. A plan for the satisfaction of any outstanding obligations of the special purpose governmental entity, including the continuation of any tax levies or fee payments necessary to meet the outstanding obligations;
        3. Assurances from any organization or entity that will be assuming responsibility for services provided by the special purpose governmental entity, or that will assume the obligations of the special purpose governmental entity, that the organization or entity will, in fact, provide the services or assume the obligations;
        4. A plan for the orderly transfer of all assets of the special purpose governmental entity in a manner that will continue to benefit those to whom services were provided by the special purpose governmental entity;
        5. A date upon which final dissolution of the special purpose governmental entity shall occur; and
        6. Any other information the governing body wishes to include. The dissolution plan shall be available for public review at least thirty (30) days prior to the public hearing required by subparagraph 2. of this paragraph;
      2. Hold a public hearing in each county and city that is participating in the dissolution to present the proposed dissolution plan and receive feedback from the public. The time and location of the hearing, as well as the location where a copy of the dissolution plan may be reviewed by the public prior to the hearing, shall be advertised as provided in KRS 424.130 , and shall be posted on the registry established by KRS 65A.020 . The hearing shall be held not less than fifteen (15) days, nor more than thirty (30) days, after the publication of the notice in the newspaper;
      3. Send a copy of the notice required by subparagraph 2. of this paragraph to the DLG and to any state entity with oversight authority of the special purpose governmental entity;
      4. If the dissolution plan is amended after the public hearing, make the amended dissolution plan available for public inspection for at least fifteen (15) days prior to the final vote of the governing body under subparagraph 6. of this paragraph;
      5. If the special purpose governmental entity is a utility as defined in KRS 278.010(3), obtain approval from the Public Service Commission pursuant to KRS 278.020(6); and
      6. Within sixty (60) days after the date of the public hearing, finally approve or disapprove the dissolution of the special purpose governmental entity and the dissolution plan. Approval shall require:
        1. If initiated by the governing board of the special purpose governmental entity, the affirmative vote of two-thirds (2/3) of the members of the governing body of the special purpose governmental entity and the adoption of an ordinance by two-thirds (2/3) of the members of the governing body of each establishing entity;
        2. The adoption of an ordinance by two-thirds (2/3) of the members of the governing body of each establishing entity; or
        3. If there is no establishing entity, by the adoption of an ordinance by two-thirds (2/3) of the members of the governing body of each county in which the special purpose governmental entity provided services or operated;
    4. The governing body or bodies shall notify the DLG of the outcome of the vote or votes taken pursuant to subparagraph 6. of paragraph (c) of this subsection; and
    5. Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, the dissolution of a special purpose governmental entity shall not be final until all obligations of the special purpose governmental entity have been satisfied or have been assumed by another entity.

History. Enact. Acts 2013, ch. 40, § 5, effective March 21, 2013; 2016 ch. 50, § 4, effective April 8, 2016.

Legislative Research Commission Notes.

(3/21/2013). Under the authority of KRS 7.136 , the Reviser of Statutes has corrected manifest clerical or technical errors in this statute. In subsection (1)(c)1.d.i., the word “the” has been inserted before “special purpose governmental entity.” In subsection (2)(a)1., the words “vote or” have been changed to read “vote of.” In subsection (2)(c)5., the word “a” has been inserted before “utility,” and in subsection (2)(d), the word “of” has been inserted before “the vote or votes.”

(3/21/2013). In subsection (2)(c)4. of this statute, a reference to “subparagraph 5.” has been changed to read “subparagraph 6.” During the drafting of the bill that created this statute ( 2013 Ky. Acts ch. 40, sec. 5), the former subparagraph 5. was renumbered as subparagraph 6., but an internal reference to subparagraph 5. was not corrected. In codifying this section, the Reviser of Statutes has made this correction pursuant to KRS 7.136(1).

65A.060. Educational materials and programs for governing bodies and employees.

The DLG shall provide, or shall arrange for the provision of, educational materials and programs for the governing bodies and employees of special purpose governmental entities to inform them of their duties and responsibilities under the provisions of this chapter and issues related thereto. In developing the materials and programs, the DLG shall consult with public entities as defined in KRS 65.310 . The DLG may promulgate administrative regulations under KRS Chapter 13A to implement this section.

History. Enact. Acts 2013, ch. 40, § 6, effective March 21, 2013.

65A.070. Code of ethics.

    1. The board, officers, and employees of each special purpose governmental entity shall be subject to the code of ethics of the establishing entity in which the special purpose governmental entity’s principal business office is located. (1) (a) The board, officers, and employees of each special purpose governmental entity shall be subject to the code of ethics of the establishing entity in which the special purpose governmental entity’s principal business office is located.
    2. If the principal business office is located in more than one (1) establishing entity, the board of the special purpose governmental entity shall select one (1) of the applicable codes of ethics that will apply.
    3. If there is no establishing entity, the board, officers, and employees of the special purpose governmental entity shall be subject to the code of ethics of the county in which the special purpose governmental entity’s principal business office is located.
  1. The governing body of a special purpose governmental entity may adopt ethics provisions that are more stringent than those of the establishing entity in which its principal business office is located. If more stringent provisions are adopted, the governing body of the special purpose governmental entity shall, within twenty-one (21) days of the adoption of the provisions, deliver a copy of the provisions to the DLG and the establishing entity. Any subsequent amendments shall also be delivered to the DLG and the establishing entity within twenty-one (21) days of adoption. The DLG shall include any documents provided under this section as part of the public records and lists maintained under KRS 65.003(5)(a).

History. Enact. Acts 2013, ch. 40, § 7, effective March 21, 2013.

65A.080. Annual budget — Publication of information.

  1. The governing body of each special purpose governmental entity shall annually adopt a budget conforming with the requirements established under KRS 65A.020 prior to the start of the fiscal year to which the budget applies. The adopted budget may be amended by the governing body of the special purpose governmental entity throughout the fiscal year using the same process that was used for adoption of the original budget. No moneys shall be expended from any source except as provided in the originally adopted or subsequently amended budget.
  2. In lieu of the publication requirements of KRS 424.220 , but in compliance with other applicable provisions of KRS Chapter 424, each special purpose governmental entity shall, within sixty (60) days after the close of each fiscal year, publish the location where the adopted budget, financial statements, and most recent audit or attestation engagement reports may be examined by the public.

History. Enact. Acts 2013, ch. 40, § 8, effective March 21, 2013; 2014, ch. 7, § 4, effective March 19, 2014.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(3/19/2014). 2014 Ky. Acts ch. 7, sec. 11 provides that the amendments to this statute made in 2014 Ky. Acts ch. 7, sec. 4, shall apply retroactively beginning January 1, 2014.

65A.090. Registration with Department for Local Government — Notification — Failure to register — Action to enforce prohibition against taxes and fees.

    1. To establish a complete list of all special purpose governmental entities operating in Kentucky on March 21, 2013, so that the registry established pursuant to KRS 65A.020 will be comprehensive, every existing special purpose governmental entity shall register with the DLG as provided in this subsection. (1) (a) To establish a complete list of all special purpose governmental entities operating in Kentucky on March 21, 2013, so that the registry established pursuant to KRS 65A.020 will be comprehensive, every existing special purpose governmental entity shall register with the DLG as provided in this subsection.
    2. Registration shall occur prior to December 31, 2013, and shall be in the form and format required by the DLG, provided that in addition to the information required by the DLG, all special purpose governmental entities shall report to the DLG the date the last independent audit of the entity was conducted.
    3. Between March 21, 2013, and December 31, 2013, the DLG, with assistance from the area development districts created under KRS 147A.050 , public entities as defined in KRS 65.310 , and the Auditor of Public Accounts, shall notify all special purpose governmental entities of which it is aware of the registration requirement established by this subsection, and of the consequences of failing to register in a timely manner.
  1. The governing body of any special purpose governmental entity established on or after January 1, 2014, shall, within fifteen (15) days of the establishment of the entity, file with the DLG the information required by subsection (2)(a)1. of KRS 65A.020 and any other information required by the DLG.
  2. Notwithstanding any other provision of the Kentucky Revised Statutes, any special purpose governmental entity that fails to provide information to the DLG as required under this section shall be:
    1. Subject to administrative dissolution as provided in KRS 65A.050 ; and
    2. Prohibited from levying or collecting any tax, fee, assessment, or charge beginning January 1, 2014, through the date the entity registers with the DLG.

To enforce paragraph (b) of this subsection, any resident or property owner of the service area of a special purpose governmental entity may bring an action in the Circuit Court. The Circuit Court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the special purpose governmental entity, a reasonable attorney’s fee and court costs, to be paid from the special purpose governmental entity’s treasury.

History. Enact. Acts 2013, ch. 40, § 9, effective March 21, 2013.

65A.100. Fees and ad valorem taxes levied by special purpose governmental entities — Reporting to governing body of city or county — Reporting exceptions. [Repealed effective January 1, 2021]

  1. Beginning January 1, 2014, the provisions of this section shall apply to any fee or ad valorem tax levied by a special purpose governmental entity that is not otherwise required by statute or ordinance to be adopted or approved through an official act of an establishing entity.
  2. Except as provided in subsection (4) of this section, any special purpose governmental entity that:
      1. Adopts a new fee or ad valorem tax; (a) 1. Adopts a new fee or ad valorem tax;
      2. Increases the rate at which an existing fee or tax, other than an ad valorem tax, is imposed; or
      3. Adopts an ad valorem tax rate;

        shall report the fee or tax to the governing body of the establishing entity in which the largest number of citizens served by the special purpose governmental entity reside. If the special purpose governmental entity serves only the residents of a city, the notice shall be provided to the governing body of that city.

    1. The report required by paragraph (a) of this subsection shall be for informational purposes only, and the governing body shall not have the authority to adjust, amend, or veto the fee or tax, provided that any other provision of the Kentucky Revised Statutes that provides greater authority for the governing body of a city or county over taxes, fees, or rates imposed by a special purpose governmental entity shall continue to apply to those taxes, fees, or rates.
    1. The report required by subsection (2) of this section shall be made as provided in this subsection. (3) (a) The report required by subsection (2) of this section shall be made as provided in this subsection.
    2. Any fee or ad valorem tax that will be imposed on a compulsory basis by an entity other than an entity described in paragraph (c) of this subsection shall be reported by:
      1. Submission of written notification of the ad valorem tax or fee to the governing body at least thirty (30) days before the date the ad valorem tax or fee will be effective; and
      2. Presentation of testimony relating to the ad valorem tax or fee at an open, regularly scheduled meeting of the governing body at least ten (10) days prior to the date the ad valorem tax or fee will be effective.
    3. The annual financial report submitted by federally regulated municipal utilities or public utilities established pursuant to KRS 96.740 that are not federally regulated to their establishing entities pursuant to KRS 96.840 shall satisfy the reporting requirements of subsection (2) of this section.
  3. The reporting requirements established by subsection (2) of this section shall not apply to the following:
    1. Rental fees;
    2. Fees established by contractual arrangement;
    3. Admission fees;
    4. Charges to recover costs incurred by a special purpose governmental entity for the connection, restoration, relocation, or discontinuation of any service requested by any person;
    5. Any penalty, interest, sanction, or other charge imposed by a special purpose governmental entity for a failure to pay a charge or fee, or for the violation, breach, or failure to pay or perform as agreed pursuant to a contractual agreement;
    6. Amounts charged to customers or contractual partners for nonessential services provided on a voluntary basis;
    7. Fees or charges authorized under federal law that pursuant to federal law may not be regulated by the Commonwealth or local governments within the Commonwealth;
    8. Purchased water or sewage treatment adjustments, as authorized by KRS 278.015 , made by a special purpose governmental entity as a direct result of a rate increase by its wholesale water supplier or wholesale sewage treatment provider;
    9. Any new fee or fee increase for which a special purpose governmental entity must obtain prior approval from the Public Service Commission pursuant to KRS Chapter 278; or
    10. Other charges or fees imposed by a special purpose governmental entity for the provision of any service that is also available on the open market.
  4. The governing body shall include notification that the ad valorem tax or fee will be presented in all public notices provided for the meeting.
  5. An establishing entity may require a more stringent reporting process than that established by subsections (1) to (3) of this section by ordinance or interlocal agreement for any special purpose governmental entity or category of special purpose governmental entities, provided that the requirements do not conflict with reporting requirements established by other provisions of the Kentucky Revised Statutes.

History. Enact. Acts 2013, ch. 40, § 85, effective March 21, 2013; 2013, ch. 124, § 8, effective June 25, 2013; 2014, ch. 7, § 5, effective March 19, 2014.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(3/19/2014). 2014 Ky. Acts ch. 7, sec. 11 provides that the amendments to this statute made in 2014 Ky. Acts ch. 7, sec. 4, shall apply retroactively beginning January 1, 2014.

(3/19/2014). In codification, the Reviser of Statutes has altered the internal numbering of subsection (3) of this statute from the way it appeared in 2014 Ky. Acts ch. 7, sec. 5 under the authority of KRS 7.136(1)(a).

(3/21/2013). This statute was created in 2013 Ky. Acts ch. 40, sec. 85 (HB 1), and then amended in 2013 Ky. Acts ch. 124, sec. 8, after HB 1 had been enacted. That amendment has been incorporated into the text of this statute as created.

65A.100. Fees and ad valorem taxes levied by special purpose governmental entities — Reporting to governing body of city or county — Reporting exceptions. [Repealed effective January 1, 2021]

  1. Beginning January 1, 2014, the provisions of this section shall apply to any fee or ad valorem tax levied by a special purpose governmental entity that is not otherwise required by statute or ordinance to be adopted or approved through an official act of an establishing entity.
  2. Except as provided in subsection (4) of this section, any special purpose governmental entity that:
      1. Adopts a new fee or ad valorem tax; (a) 1. Adopts a new fee or ad valorem tax;
      2. Increases the rate at which an existing fee or tax, other than an ad valorem tax, is imposed; or
      3. Adopts an ad valorem tax rate;

        shall report the fee or tax to the governing body of the establishing entity in which the largest number of citizens served by the special purpose governmental entity reside. If the special purpose governmental entity serves only the residents of a city, the notice shall be provided to the governing body of that city.

    1. The report required by paragraph (a) of this subsection shall be for informational purposes only, and the governing body shall not have the authority to adjust, amend, or veto the fee or tax, provided that any other provision of the Kentucky Revised Statutes that provides greater authority for the governing body of a city or county over taxes, fees, or rates imposed by a special purpose governmental entity shall continue to apply to those taxes, fees, or rates.
    1. The report required by subsection (2) of this section shall be made as provided in this subsection. (3) (a) The report required by subsection (2) of this section shall be made as provided in this subsection.
    2. Any fee or ad valorem tax that will be imposed on a compulsory basis by an entity other than an entity described in paragraph (c) of this subsection shall be reported by:
      1. Submission of written notification of the ad valorem tax or fee to the governing body at least thirty (30) days before the date the ad valorem tax or fee will be effective; and
      2. Presentation of testimony relating to the ad valorem tax or fee at an open, regularly scheduled meeting of the governing body at least ten (10) days prior to the date the ad valorem tax or fee will be effective.
    3. The annual financial report submitted by federally regulated municipal utilities or public utilities established pursuant to KRS 96.740 that are not federally regulated to their establishing entities pursuant to KRS 96.840 shall satisfy the reporting requirements of subsection (2) of this section.
  3. The reporting requirements established by subsection (2) of this section shall not apply to the following:
    1. Rental fees;
    2. Fees established by contractual arrangement;
    3. Admission fees;
    4. Charges to recover costs incurred by a special purpose governmental entity for the connection, restoration, relocation, or discontinuation of any service requested by any person;
    5. Any penalty, interest, sanction, or other charge imposed by a special purpose governmental entity for a failure to pay a charge or fee, or for the violation, breach, or failure to pay or perform as agreed pursuant to a contractual agreement;
    6. Amounts charged to customers or contractual partners for nonessential services provided on a voluntary basis;
    7. Fees or charges authorized under federal law that pursuant to federal law may not be regulated by the Commonwealth or local governments within the Commonwealth;
    8. Purchased water or sewage treatment adjustments, as authorized by KRS 278.015 , made by a special purpose governmental entity as a direct result of a rate increase by its wholesale water supplier or wholesale sewage treatment provider;
    9. Any new fee or fee increase for which a special purpose governmental entity must obtain prior approval from the Public Service Commission pursuant to KRS Chapter 278; or
    10. Other charges or fees imposed by a special purpose governmental entity for the provision of any service that is also available on the open market.
  4. The governing body shall include notification that the ad valorem tax or fee will be presented in all public notices provided for the meeting.
  5. An establishing entity may require a more stringent reporting process than that established by subsections (1) to (3) of this section by ordinance or interlocal agreement for any special purpose governmental entity or category of special purpose governmental entities, provided that the requirements do not conflict with reporting requirements established by other provisions of the Kentucky Revised Statutes.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 2013, ch. 40, § 85, effective March 21, 2013; 2013, ch. 124, § 8, effective June 25, 2013; 2014, ch. 7, § 5, effective March 19, 2014; repealed by 2020 ch. 90, § 4, effective January 1, 2021.

65A.110. Fees and ad valorem taxes levied by special purpose governmental entities — Reporting to governing body of city or county — Reporting exceptions. [Effective January 1, 2021]

  1. This section applies to any ad valorem tax or fee levied by a special purpose governmental entity that is not otherwise required by statute or ordinance to be adopted or approved through an official act of an establishing entity.
  2. This section does not apply to:
    1. An air board established or operating under KRS 183.132 to 183.160 ;
    2. A fire protection district established or operating under KRS Chapter 75; or
    3. An ambulance taxing district established or operating under KRS 108.090 to 108.180 .
  3. As used in this section, “compensating tax rate” has the same meaning as in KRS 132.010 and applies to all special purpose governmental entities with the authority to levy ad valorem taxes, regardless of whether the special purpose governmental entity is subject to KRS 132.023 or any other provision of the Kentucky Revised Statutes that requires advertisement or allows for voter recall.
    1. Notwithstanding any other provision of the Kentucky Revised Statutes, any special purpose governmental entity, other than the special purpose governmental entities described in subsection (2) of this section, proposing to levy: (4) (a) Notwithstanding any other provision of the Kentucky Revised Statutes, any special purpose governmental entity, other than the special purpose governmental entities described in subsection (2) of this section, proposing to levy:
      1. An ad valorem tax rate for the upcoming year that is projected to generate more revenue than would be generated by the levy of the compensating tax rate; or
      2. An ad valorem tax for the first time;

        shall submit in writing the proposed rate to the establishing entity. If the establishing entity includes more than one (1) city or county, or if there is no establishing entity, the rate shall be submitted to the governing body of the city or county in which the largest number of citizens served by the special purpose governmental entity reside. If the special purpose governmental entity serves only the residents of a city, the notice shall be provided to the governing body of that city. The rate shall be submitted no later than seven (7) days after the adoption of the ordinance, order, resolution, or motion to levy a tax rate that exceeds the compensating tax rate, or to levy a new ad valorem tax.

    2. The governing body of the city or county to which the rate was submitted shall have thirty (30) days from the date of submission to:
      1. Approve or fail to act on the proposed rate, in which case the proposed rate may be implemented by the special purpose governmental entity after all other statutory requirements for levying the rate are met;
        1. Approve a rate that is less than the proposed rate but greater than the compensating tax rate when the special purpose governmental entity is proposing the levy of a rate that is projected to generate more revenue than would be generated by the levy of the compensating tax rate; or 2. a. Approve a rate that is less than the proposed rate but greater than the compensating tax rate when the special purpose governmental entity is proposing the levy of a rate that is projected to generate more revenue than would be generated by the levy of the compensating tax rate; or
        2. Approve a rate that is less than the proposed rate when the special purpose governmental entity is proposing the levy of an ad valorem tax for the first time.

          If the governing body approves a rate under subdivision a. or b. of this subparagraph, the approved amount of the rate may be implemented by the special purpose governmental entity after all other statutory requirements for levying the rate are met; or

      2. Disapprove the entire proposed rate by a majority vote of the governing body, in which case subdivisions a. and b. of this subparagraph shall apply:
        1. If the special purpose governmental entity levied an ad valorem tax during the current year, the special purpose governmental entity may levy a rate for the upcoming year that does not exceed the compensating tax rate; and
        2. If the special purpose governmental entity is proposing an initial levy, the levy shall not be imposed, and the special purpose governmental entity shall wait at least one (1) year before proposing another ad valorem tax levy.
    3. Upon request of a special purpose governmental entity, the DLG shall calculate rates on behalf of the special purpose governmental entity.
    1. Notwithstanding any other provision of the Kentucky Revised Statutes, any special purpose governmental entity, other than the special purpose governmental entities described in subsection (2) of this section, proposing the imposition of a new fee, or a fee which is expected to produce increased revenue as compared to revenue generated during the prior fiscal year, and that is not subject to an approval process for the proposed fee under another provision of the Kentucky Revised Statutes or administrative regulations promulgated pursuant thereto, shall submit the proposed fee to the establishing entity. If the establishing entity includes more than one (1) city or county, or if there is no establishing entity, the fee shall be submitted to the governing body of the city or county in which the largest number of citizens served by the special purpose governmental entity reside, except as provided in subsection (6) of this section. If the special purpose governmental entity serves only the residents of a city, the notice shall be provided to the governing body of that city. The proposed fee shall be submitted to the relevant city or county no later than forty-five (45) days prior to the scheduled implementation of the fee. (5) (a) Notwithstanding any other provision of the Kentucky Revised Statutes, any special purpose governmental entity, other than the special purpose governmental entities described in subsection (2) of this section, proposing the imposition of a new fee, or a fee which is expected to produce increased revenue as compared to revenue generated during the prior fiscal year, and that is not subject to an approval process for the proposed fee under another provision of the Kentucky Revised Statutes or administrative regulations promulgated pursuant thereto, shall submit the proposed fee to the establishing entity. If the establishing entity includes more than one (1) city or county, or if there is no establishing entity, the fee shall be submitted to the governing body of the city or county in which the largest number of citizens served by the special purpose governmental entity reside, except as provided in subsection (6) of this section. If the special purpose governmental entity serves only the residents of a city, the notice shall be provided to the governing body of that city. The proposed fee shall be submitted to the relevant city or county no later than forty-five (45) days prior to the scheduled implementation of the fee.
    2. The governing body of the city or county shall have thirty (30) days from the date of submission to:
      1. Approve or fail to act on the proposed fee, in which case the proposed fee may be implemented by the special purpose governmental entity after all other statutory requirements for levying the fee are met;
      2. Approve a fee in an amount less than the amount of the proposed fee, in which case the approved fee amount may be implemented by the special purpose governmental entity after all other statutory requirements for levying the fee are met; or
      3. Disapprove the entire proposed fee by a majority vote of the governing body, in which case subdivisions a. and b. of this subparagraph shall apply:
        1. If a proposed increase of an existing fee is disapproved, any fee then in existence shall remain unchanged, and the special purpose governmental entity shall not seek to increase the fee again for at least one (1) year from the date of the submission of the disapproved fee increase; and
        2. If a proposed initial fee is disapproved, the special purpose governmental entity shall not seek to impose the fee again for at least one (1) year from the date of the submission of the disapproved initial fee.
  4. The requirements established by subsection (5) of this section shall not apply to the following provisions of this subsection:
    1. Rental fees;
    2. Fees established by contractual arrangement;
    3. Admission fees;
    4. Fees or charges to recover costs incurred by a special purpose governmental entity for the connection, restoration, relocation, or discontinuation of any service requested by any person;
    5. Any penalty, interest, sanction, or other fee or charge imposed by a special purpose governmental entity for a failure to pay a charge or fee, or for the violation or breach of or failure to pay or perform as agreed pursuant to a contractual agreement or as reflected in a published schedule;
    6. Amounts charged to customers or contractual partners for nonessential services provided on a voluntary basis;
    7. Fees or charges authorized under federal law that pursuant to federal law may not be regulated by the Commonwealth or local governments within the Commonwealth;
    8. Purchased water or sewage treatment adjustments, as authorized by KRS 278.015 , made by a special purpose governmental entity as a direct result of a rate increase by its wholesale water supplier or wholesale sewage treatment provider;
    9. Any new fee or fee increase for which a special purpose governmental entity must obtain prior approval from the Public Service Commission pursuant to KRS Chapter 278;
    10. Other charges or fees imposed by a special purpose governmental entity for the provision of any service that is also available on the open market; or
    11. Fees or charges imposed by municipal utilities for the provision of power, water, wastewater, natural gas, or telecommunications services, unless submission is otherwise required by statute or an ordinance adopted by the establishing entity.
    1. Subsections (4) and (5) of this section shall not be interpreted as transferring any tax-levying or fee-levying authority granted to a special purpose governmental entity under any other provision of the Kentucky Revised Statutes to cities and counties charged with reviewing tax and fee increases under this section. (7) (a) Subsections (4) and (5) of this section shall not be interpreted as transferring any tax-levying or fee-levying authority granted to a special purpose governmental entity under any other provision of the Kentucky Revised Statutes to cities and counties charged with reviewing tax and fee increases under this section.
    2. This section shall not be interpreted to grant tax-levying or fee-levying authority on behalf of special purpose governmental entities to any city or county reviewing tax rates or fees proposed by a special purpose governmental entity and subject to review under this section.
  5. This section shall apply independently of and in addition to any other statutory requirements and provisions relating to the levy of ad valorem taxes or fees by special purpose governmental entities, other than the special purpose governmental entities described in subsection (2) of this section, including statutory rate limits, public hearing requirements, and recall provisions, and shall not be interpreted to circumvent, supplant, or otherwise replace those requirements and provisions.
  6. The provisions of this section shall not be interpreted as limiting the ability of any city, county, or other establishing entity to impose reporting or submission requirements that are more stringent than those established in this section.

HISTORY: 2020 ch. 90, § 1, effective January 1, 2021.

CHAPTER 66 Issuance of Bonds and Control of Funds

General Provisions on Bonded Indebtedness for Local Government

66.010. County bonds to build, repair, or remodel public buildings. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (1872, 1873: amend. Acts 1978, ch. 384, § 137, effective June 17, 1978) was repealed by Acts 1996, ch. 280, § 30, effective July 1, 1996.

66.011. Definitions for chapter.

As used in this chapter, unless otherwise expressly provided:

  1. “Bonds” means bonds, notes, commercial paper, and other instruments in writing, authorized by or issued pursuant to or in accordance with this chapter, to evidence an obligation to repay or guarantee the repayment of money borrowed, or to pay interest by, or to pay at any future time other money obligations.
  2. “Capitalized interest” means all or a portion of the interest payable on bonds from their date to a date stated or provided for in the proceedings, which interest is to be paid from the proceeds of the bonds.
  3. “Credit enhancement facilities” means letters of credit; lines of credit; stand-by, contingent, or firm bond purchase agreements; insurance, or surety arrangements; guarantees, and other arrangements that provide for direct or contingent payment of bonds; interest or redemption premium on bonds, for security or additional security in the event of nonpayment or default in respect of bonds, or for making payment of bonds; interest or redemption premium on bonds to and at the option and on demand of the holders of bonds or at the option of the issuer or upon certain conditions occurring under put or similar arrangements, or for otherwise supporting the credit or liquidity of bonds; and includes credit, reimbursement, marketing, remarketing, indexing, carrying, interest rate hedge, and subrogation agreements, and other agreements and arrangements for payment and reimbursement of the person providing the credit enhancement facilities and the security for that payment and reimbursement.
  4. “Debt charges” means the principal, including any mandatory sinking fund deposits, interest, and any redemption premium, payable on bonds as the payments come due and are payable and any charges related to credit enhancement facilities. The use of “debt charges” for this purpose does not imply that any particular obligations constitute debt within the meaning of the Kentucky Constitution or other laws.
  5. “Financing costs” means all costs and expenses relating to the issuance and carrying costs of bonds including charges related to credit enhancement facilities which are not debt charges.
  6. “Floating indebtedness” means the amount by which the total of all expenditures by an issuer in any fiscal year exceeds the total of all funds and receipts of the issuer for that fiscal year which are available to the issuer for the purpose of funding those expenditures, but only to the extent that the governing body of the issuer made good-faith estimates of expenditures and funds and receipts available to fund those expenditures and the short-fall in available funds and receipts was due to unforeseeable circumstances or events.
  7. “Fully-registered bonds” means bonds in certificated or uncertificated form, registered as to both principal and interest in the name of the owner.
  8. “Interest” or “interest equivalent” means those payments or portions of payments, however denominated, that constitute or represent consideration for forbearing the collection of money, or for deferring the receipt or payment of money to a future time.
  9. “Issuer” means a county, city, urban-county, charter county, or other taxing district, and for purposes of making any determinations required under this chapter, may include an authorized representative of the issuer.
  10. “Governing body” means the legislative authority of the issuer.
  11. “Legislation” means an ordinance or resolution passed by a governing body.
  12. “Mandatory sinking fund redemption requirements” means amounts required by proceedings to be deposited in a sinking fund for the purpose of paying, by mandatory redemption prior to stated maturity, the principal of bonds that is due and payable in a subsequent year or fiscal year.
  13. “Net indebtedness” means the principal amount of outstanding bonds of an issuer as determined in accordance with KRS 66.031 .
  14. “Notes” means bonds that mature no later than five (5) years from the date they are issued.
  15. “Obligation” means instruments in writing, which are not bonds within the meaning of this chapter, that evidence an obligation to repay money borrowed, or to pay interest by, or to pay at any future time other money obligations, including, without limitation, installment sale, lease, lease purchase, or similar agreements, which obligations bear interest or an interest equivalent.
  16. “Outstanding,” referring to bonds, means bonds that have been issued, delivered, and paid for, except any of the following:
    1. Bonds canceled upon surrender, exchange, or transfer, or upon payment or redemption;
    2. Bonds in replacement of which or in exchange for which other bonds have been issued; or
    3. Bonds for the payment, or redemption or purchase for cancellation prior to maturity, of which sufficient moneys or investments, in accordance with the applicable legislation or other proceedings or any applicable law, by mandatory sinking fund redemption requirements, or otherwise, have been deposited, and credited in a sinking fund or with a trustee or paying or escrow agent, whether at or prior to their maturity or redemption, and, in the case of bonds to be redeemed prior to their stated maturity, notice of redemption has been given or satisfactory arrangements have been made for giving notice of that redemption, or waiver of that notice by or on behalf of the affected bond holders has been filed with the issuer or its agent.
  17. “Public project” means any property, asset, or improvement certified by the governing body, which certification is conclusive, as being for a public purpose and having an estimated life or period of usefulness of one (1) year or more, and includes, but is not limited to, real estate, buildings, and personal property, equipment, furnishings, and site improvements, and reconstruction, rehabilitation, renovation, installation, improvement, enlargement, and extension of property, assets, or improvements so certified as having an estimated life or period of usefulness of one (1) year or more and is to be used for a public purpose.
  18. “Person” or “persons” means political and corporate entities, societies, communities, the public generally, individuals, partnerships, and joint stock companies.
  19. “Proceedings” means the legislation, certifications, notices, orders, sale proceedings, trust agreements or indentures, mortgages, leases, lease-purchase agreements, assignments, credit enhancement facility agreements, and other agreements, instruments, and documents, as amended and supplemented, providing for the terms and conditions applicable to, or providing for the security or sale or award of, bonds, and includes the provisions set forth or incorporated in those bonds and proceedings.
  20. “Refund” means to provide for the payment of debt charges and expenses related to that payment at or prior to retirement by purchase, call for redemption, payment at maturity, or otherwise, outstanding obligations of an issuer or its instrumentality, including, without limitation, bonds.
  21. “Register” means the books kept and maintained for registration, exchange, and transfer of registered bonds.
  22. “Self-supporting obligations” means obligations issued for the purpose of paying costs of public projects to the extent that receipts of the issuer, other than the proceeds of taxes levied by that issuer, derived from or with respect to that public project or the operation of the public project being financed, or the enterprise, system, or category of public project of which the public project being financed is part, are estimated by the governing body or a representative of the governing body to be sufficient to pay the current expenses of that operation or of that public project, enterprise, or system and the debt charges payable from those receipts on obligations issued for that public project.
  23. “Sinking fund” means a fund established for the management of moneys to be used for the retirement of outstanding bonds.
  24. “State local debt officer” as used in this chapter and other provisions of law, means the commissioner, Department for Local Government or the commissioner’s agent designated in writing.
  25. “Taxing district” means an issuer, other than a county, city, urban-county, or charter county authorized to levy ad valorem taxes within the meaning of Section 157 of the Constitution of Kentucky which is not a school district.
  26. “Tax-supported lease” means a lease entered into under KRS 65.942 to 65.956 in which the lessee has agreed to levy and collect taxes to make lease payments.

History. Enact. Acts 1996, ch. 280, § 1, effective July 15, 1996; 1998, ch. 85, § 4, effective July 15, 1998.

66.020. Sale of bonds — Commissioner. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (1873 to 1875) was repealed by Acts 1996, ch. 280, § 30, effective July 15, 1996.

66.021. Bonds as negotiable instruments — Presumption of validity.

  1. Bonds lawfully authorized and issued by an issuer, subject to applicable provisions for registration or of the proceedings of the issuance, are negotiable instruments.
  2. Unless a judicial action or proceeding challenging the validity of bonds is commenced by personal service on the chief executive officer of the issuer, prior to the initial delivery of the bonds, the bonds and the proceedings relating to them are incontestable and the bonds shall be conclusively considered to be and to have been issued, secured, entered into, payable, sold, executed, and delivered, and the proceedings relating to them taken, in conformity with all legal requirements, if all of the following apply:
    1. They state that they are issued or entered into under or pursuant to authorizing provisions of law and comply on their face with those provisions;
    2. They are issued or entered into for a public purpose, as stated in the bonds or the legislation authorizing their issuance, and within any limitations prescribed by law;
    3. Their purchase price, if any, has been paid in full; and
    4. The transcript of the proceedings contains a statement by the officer having charge of the applicable records, or by the chief executive officer of the issuer, that all the proceedings were held in compliance with law, which statement creates a conclusive presumption that the proceedings were held in compliance with all laws, including, as applicable, KRS 61.800 .

History. Enact. Acts 1996, ch. 280, § 2, effective July 15, 1996.

66.030. Tax to pay bonds and interest. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (1877) was repealed by Acts 1996, ch. 280, § 30, effective July 15, 1996.

66.031. Calculation of net indebtedness of issuer.

  1. For purposes of this chapter, the principal amount of outstanding bonds includes:
    1. The payment or reimbursement requirements of the issuer under credit enhancement facilities relating to the principal amount of outstanding bonds;
    2. The unpaid principal portion of all lease rental payments of tax-supported leases;
    3. The principal amount of obligations of any instrumentality of an issuer created for the purpose of financing projects which obligations are outstanding within the meaning of the mortgage, trust indenture, or legislation approving those obligations and which were issued prior to July 15, 1996, unless the obligations would constitute self-supporting obligations; and
    4. Leases under KRS 65.940 to 65.956 entered into prior to July 15, 1996, unless the lease would constitute self-supporting obligations.
  2. In calculating the net indebtedness of an issuer, none of the following obligations or bonds shall be considered:
    1. Obligations issued in anticipation of the levy or collection of special assessments which are payable solely from those assessments or are otherwise self-supporting obligations;
    2. Obligations issued in anticipation of the collection of current taxes or revenues for the fiscal year which are payable within that fiscal year;
    3. Obligations, which are not self-supporting obligations, issued after July 15, 1996, by any instrumentality of the issuer created for the purpose of financing public projects for which there has been no pledge to the payment of debt charges of any tax of the issuer or for which there is covenant by the issuer to collect or levy a tax to pay debt charges;
    4. Self-supporting obligations and other obligations for which there has been no pledge to the payment of debt charges of any tax of the issuer or for which there is no covenant by the issuer to collect or levy a tax to pay debt charges;
    5. Obligations issued to pay costs of public projects to the extent they are issued in anticipation of the receipt of, and are payable as to principal from, federal or state grants within that fiscal year;
    6. Leases entered into under KRS 65.940 to 65.956 which are not tax-supported leases;
    7. Bonds issued in the case of an emergency, when the public health or safety should so require; or
    8. Bonds issued to fund a floating indebtedness.

History. Enact. Acts 1996, ch. 280, § 3, effective July 15, 1996.

66.040. Election on bond issue. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (1880, 1881: amend. Acts 1966, ch. 239, § 4) was repealed by Acts 1996, ch. 280, § 30, effective July 15, 1996.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(7/15/96). Under KRS 446.260 , the repeal of this section in 1996 Ky. Acts ch. 280 prevails over its amendment in 1996 Ky. Acts ch. 195.

66.041. Maximum percentages of net indebtedness.

  1. A city, urban-county, consolidated local government, or charter county shall not incur net indebtedness to an amount exceeding the following maximum percentages on the value of taxable property within the city, urban-county, consolidated local government, or charter county, as estimated by the last certified assessment previous to the incurring of the indebtedness:
    1. Cities, urban-counties, consolidated local governments, and charter counties having a population of fifteen thousand (15,000) or more, ten percent (10%);
    2. Cities, urban-counties, and charter counties having a population of less than fifteen thousand (15,000) but not less than three thousand, five percent (5%); and
    3. Cities, urban-counties, and charter counties having a population of less than three thousand (3,000), three percent (3%).
  2. A county, which is not an urban-county, consolidated local government, or charter county, or a taxing district shall not incur net indebtedness for all purposes that exceeds an amount equal to two percent (2%) of the value of the taxable property within the county or district, as estimated by the last certified assessment previous to the incurring of the indebtedness.

History. Enact. Acts 1996, ch. 280, § 4, effective July 15, 1996; 2002, ch. 346, § 37, effective July 15, 2002.

66.045. State local debt officer may provide technical and advisory assistance on issuance of bonds.

  1. It is the intent of this section to facilitate, through state technical and advisory assistance, the marketing of local government bonds and other long-term obligations at the lowest possible net interest costs.
  2. The state local debt officer may provide technical and advisory assistance regarding the issuance of bonds and obligations to those issuers whose governing bodies request that assistance. The assistance shall include, but need not be limited to:
    1. Advice on the marketing of bonds and obligations by issuers;
    2. Conduct of training courses in debt management; and
    3. Promotion of the use by local governments of such tools for sound financial management as adequate systems of budgeting, accounting, auditing, and reporting.

History. Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 127; 1978, ch. 155, § 58, effective June 17, 1978; 1982, ch. 393, § 42, effective July 15, 1982; 1986, ch. 374, § 1, effective July 15, 1986; 1994, ch. 508, § 26, effective July 15, 1994; 1996, ch. 280, § 23, effective July 15, 1996; 2008, ch. 35, § 3, effective July 15, 2008.

Opinions of Attorney General.

Cities and counties would not come under KRS 42.420 since a similar approval procedure is provided in this section and KRS 66.310 , involving the state local finance officer and since KRS 42.420 was not intended to be duplicative. OAG 81-242 .

66.050. City of first or second class, incurring indebtedness beyond income for year — Issuance of bonds. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (186b-10, 3069: amend. Acts 1966, ch. 239, § 5) was repealed by Acts 1982, ch. 434, § 15, effective July 15, 1982.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

This section was amended by 1982 Acts, Chapter 360, § 15 and repealed by 1982 Acts, Chapter 434, § 15. Pursuant to KRS 446.260 , the repeal prevails.

66.051. Purposes for issuance of bonds — Principal amount maximum.

  1. An issuer may issue bonds for the purpose of providing funds with which:
    1. To fund floating indebtedness;
    2. To fund the cost of providing a public service if the governing body determines that an emergency exists and the public health or safety so requires;
    3. To fund unfunded liabilities;
    4. To establish a reserve for past or future liabilities or casualties; or
    5. To pay one (1) or more final judgments rendered against the issuer, including settlements of claims approved by a court.
  2. The principal amount of the bonds issued may not exceed the amount required for subsections (1)(a) to (e) of this section, plus financing costs, permitted by this chapter to be paid from the proceeds of bonds, plus, in the case of judgments, costs, and expenses assessed or taxed against the issue and defense costs of the issuer.

History. Enact. Acts 1996, ch. 280, § 5, effective July 15, 1996.

66.060. City of third class, issuance of bonds. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3284) was repealed by Acts 1982, ch. 434, § 15, effective July 15, 1982.

66.061. Bonds for public projects — Credit enhancement facilities agreements.

  1. An issuer may issue bonds for the purpose of paying all or any portion of the costs of any public project that the issuer is authorized, alone or in cooperation with other persons, to acquire, improve, or construct.
  2. Costs of public projects that may be financed with, and paid from the proceeds of bonds include, without limitation as to other costs properly allocable to the public project, the costs of acquiring, constructing, reconstructing, rehabilitating, installing, remodeling, renovating, enlarging, equipping, furnishing, or otherwise improving the public project; site clearance, site improvement, and site preparation; acquisition of real or personal property; indemnity and surety bonds; premiums on insurance, all related direct administrative expenses and allocable portions of direct costs of the issuer; engineering, architectural, legal, and other consulting and professional services; designs, plans, specifications, feasibility, or rate studies; appraisals, surveys, and estimates of cost; interest or interest equivalent on the bonds, whether capitalized or not; financing costs; title work and title commitment, insurance and guaranties; amounts necessary to establish any debt service reserve or other reserves as required by the proceedings for the bonds; audits; the reimbursement of moneys advanced or applied by or borrowed from any person, whether to or by the issuer or others, from whatever source provided, for the payment of any item or items of cost of the public project; and all other expenses necessary or incidental to planning or determining feasibility or practicability with respect to the public project; or necessary or incidental to the acquisition, construction, reconstruction, rehabilitation, installation, remodeling, or other improvement of the public project; the financing of the public project; and the placing of the public project in condition for use and operation; and all like or related costs; including any one, part, or combination of, or the issuer’s share of, those costs and expenses.
  3. If, after the public project for which bonds were issued is available for use, the issuer determines that proceeds of those bonds are not needed to pay costs relating to that public project, those proceeds may be used to pay debt service on those bonds or used to pay the costs of another public project.
  4. An issuer may enter into agreements obligating an issuer which relate to credit enhancement facilities.

History. Enact. Acts 1996, ch. 280, § 6, effective July 15, 1996.

66.070. City of fourth, fifth or sixth class, incurring indebtedness beyondincome for year. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3490-34, 3637-3, 3705: amend. Acts 1966, ch. 239, § 6) was repealed by Acts 1982, ch. 434, § 15, effective July 15, 1982.

66.071. Capitalized interest in bonds — Financing costs.

  1. Capitalized interest may be included in the principal amount of bonds to pay the interest that the issuer estimates will become due and payable on the bonds prior to the receipt of sufficient taxes, special assessments, or other revenues or receipts from which the interest is generally to be paid. Capitalized interest shall be deposited, as determined by the issuer, in the sinking fund or in a separate account in the special project or construction fund, and applied to interest on those bonds. The amount of capitalized interest may not exceed an amount estimated by the issuer to be interest that will accrue on the bonds prior to the date that is twelve (12) months after the date the public project is anticipated to be available for use.
  2. The amount of capitalized interest authorized by this section to be included in the principal amount of an issue of bonds shall be reduced by the amount of any capitalized interest included in any prior issue of bonds or obligations that is to be or was retired by the issuance of the bonds or prior bonds.
  3. Financing costs may be paid unless otherwise provided in the proceedings, from the proceeds of the bonds to which they relate and, as to future financing costs, from the same sources from which debt charges on the bonds are paid and as though debt charges.

History. Enact. Acts 1996, ch. 280, § 7, effective July 15, 1996.

66.080. County bonds to fund floating indebtedness. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (1857, 1858) was repealed by Acts 1996, ch. 280, § 30, effective July 15, 1996.

66.081. Maintenance of sinking funds.

  1. At any time while the bonds are outstanding, an issuer shall maintain a sinking fund which shall be pledged for the retirement of all of the issuer’s outstanding bonds, and tax-supported leases. The issuer shall deposit moneys in the sinking fund at times and in amounts so adequate moneys will be available in the sinking fund for the payment of debt charges on all outstanding bonds and tax-supported leases.
  2. Except in the case of bonds issued for the purpose of refunding, all proceeds from the sale of bonds, except accrued interest, shall be paid into a special fund for the public purpose related to the bonds, and any interest and other income earned on money in that special fund may be used for that purpose or may be credited to the general fund or other fund or account as the issuer authorizes and used for the purposes of that fund or account. The accrued interest received from the sale of bonds shall be paid into the sinking fund.
  3. If a public project that was financed by bonds is sold, the amount received from the sale shall be paid into the sinking fund or into a special fund for the construction or acquisition of public projects.
  4. The unexpended balance in a sinking fund remaining after bonds and tax-supported leases are no longer outstanding may be transferred to any other fund of the issuer.

History. Enact. Acts 1996, ch. 280, § 8, effective July 15, 1996.

66.090. County refunding bonds. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (1852) was repealed by Acts 1996, ch. 280, § 30, effective July 15, 1996.

66.091. Maturity period of bonds.

Bonds shall have a maximum maturity not exceeding forty (40) years, except as follows:

  1. Bonds issued to fund a floating indebtedness, five (5) years;
  2. Bonds issued to pay for the costs of a public project, the life or period of usefulness of the public project as estimated by the user and if the bond issue includes more than one (1) public project, the average number of years of life or period of usefulness of the public projects measured by the weighted average of the amounts expended or proposed to be expended for the public projects; and
  3. If, after bonds are issued, the public project or any part of the project is revised in a manner that would change the average number of years of life or the period of usefulness of the public project to a period that is shorter than the period by which the final maturity of the bonds was determined, the issuer shall nevertheless be in compliance with the requirements of this section so long as the original estimate of life or usefulness was made in good faith.

History. Enact. Acts 1996, ch. 280, § 9, effective July 15, 1996.

66.100. Advertisement and election to refund or pay county bonds issued for railroad purposes. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 239, § 7) was repealed by Acts 1996, ch. 280, § 30, effective July 15, 1996.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(7/15/96). Under KRS 446.260 , the repeal of this section in 1996 Ky. Acts ch. 280 prevails over its amendment in 1996 Ky. Acts ch. 195.

66.101. Contents of legislation authorizing issuance.

  1. A city or county by ordinance and a taxing district by resolution shall enact debt provisions which:
    1. Declare the necessity of the bond issue;
    2. State the principal amount or maximum principal amount of the bonds to be issued;
    3. State the purpose of the bond issue;
    4. State or provide for the date of, and the dates and amounts or maximum amounts of, maturities or principal payments on the bonds;
    5. State any provisions for a mandatory sinking fund, mandatory sinking fund redemption, or for redemption prior to maturity;
    6. Provide for the rate or rates of interest, or maximum rate or rates of interest, or the method from time to time for establishing or determining the rate or rates of interest to be paid on the bonds; and
    7. State any provision for a designated officer of the issuer to determine any of the specific terms required to be stated or provided for in this section, subject to any limitations stated in the proceedings.
  2. Legislation passed under this section shall identify the source or sources of payment of debt charges on the bonds, which may be any moneys of the issuer required by law to be used, or lawfully available. The legislation shall provide for the levying of a tax sufficient in amount to pay the debt charges on the bonds issued under the legislation, but the amount of that tax to be levied or collected in any year may be reduced by the amount lawfully available from existing taxes.

History. Enact. Acts 1996, ch. 280, § 10, effective July 15, 1996.

66.110. Bonds and coupons, how disposed of after payment or exchange. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (1856) was repealed by Acts 1996, ch. 280, § 30, effective July 15, 1996.

66.111. Tax levy and budget appropriation to pay bond debt charges.

  1. After the issuance of bonds, the issuer shall levy a tax in a sufficient amount and appropriate in its annual budget, together with any other moneys available to the issuer, an amount of funds sufficient to pay the debt charges on the bonds.
  2. If the issuer determines it to be necessary or appropriate, and if not prohibited by other law, proceedings relating to the bonds may contain or provide for any one (1) or more or combination of the following:
    1. The pledge to the payment of debt charges and related covenants to levy, charge, collect, deposit, and apply, receipts of the issuer, referred to in this subsection as pledged receipts, including, without limitation, ad valorem property taxes as permitted by law; occupational license fees; insurance premium taxes; excises, utility and service revenues; and any other receipts from taxes, excises, permits, licenses, fines, or other sources of revenue of, or of revenue distributions to, the issuer; and covenants for the establishment, investment, segregation, and maintenance of any funds or reserves in connection with the bonds. No pledge or covenant may be made that impairs the express contract rights of the holders of outstanding bonds of the issuer.
    2. Covenants of the issuer and other provisions to protect and safeguard the security and rights of the holders of the bonds and of the providers of any credit enhancement facilities and provisions for defeasance.
    3. Rights and remedies of the holders of bonds, in addition to any other rights and remedies under law, but subject to the terms of the proceedings and of any credit enhancement facility.
    4. The costs of or payments under credit enhancement facilities may be paid from any moneys of the issuer. The credit enhancement facility may be for the benefit of holders of the particular bonds and of any other bonds of the issuer.
  3. Moneys and investments held by the issuer or on behalf of the issuer, and all receipts of the issuer, needed and allocated to payment of debt charges or payments by the issuer under credit enhancement facilities, are property of the issuer devoted to essential governmental purposes, and, accordingly shall not be applied to any purpose other than as provided in this chapter and in the legislation authorizing the bonds, and shall not be subject to any order, judgment, lien, execution, attachment, set-off, or counterclaim by any creditor or judgment creditor, as a result of a tort judgment or otherwise, against the issuer other than the holders of the bonds or the provider of the credit enhancement facility who are entitled thereto pursuant to this chapter and the legislation or proceedings.

History. Enact. Acts 1996, ch. 280, § 11, effective July 15, 1996.

66.120. District refunding bonds. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (186b-1: amend. Acts 1966, ch. 239, § 8) was repealed by Acts 1996, ch. 280, § 30, effective July 15, 1996.

66.121. Interest rates — Issuance subject to call or redemption prior to maturity.

  1. Bonds issued by an issuer shall bear interest at a rate or rates as provided for in the legislation authorizing the bonds. Interest payable on the bonds may be determined at a variable rate or rates, which may change from time to time in accordance with a base, formula, or standard, including determination at whatever rate is required to sell or remarket the bonds on the open market, or other floating rate interest structure, identified or approved by the governing body.
  2. An issuer may issue bonds subject to call or redemption prior to maturity at a redemption price as determined by the governing body.

History. Enact. Acts 1996, ch. 280, § 12, effective July 15, 1996.

66.130. Tax to pay principal and interest of county or district funding or refunding bonds. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (186b-2, 1853, 1859) was repealed by Acts 1996, ch. 280, § 30, effective July 15, 1996.

66.131. Signature on behalf of issuer — Use of interest coupons.

  1. Bonds shall be signed on behalf of the issuer as follows:
    1. In the case of a city, urban-county, consolidated local government, or charter county, by the chief executive officer and attested by the clerk of the governmental body, or by the other officers as are designated to sign by the legislation authorizing the bonds;
    2. In the case of a county, by the judge/executive or other chief executive officer and attested by the fiscal court clerk, or by the officers of the county as are designated to sign by the legislation authorizing the bonds; or
    3. In the case of a taxing district, by the officer of the issuer designated by the legislation authorizing the bonds.
  2. If an officer designated to sign bonds or interest coupons pursuant to subsection (1) of this section is for any reason unable or unavailable to sign, another officer of the issuer, designated by legislation passed by the issuer, may sign instead of that officer.
  3. All signatures required by this section may be facsimile signatures.
  4. If an officer who has signed, manually or by facsimile signature, any bonds of an issuer ceases to be the officer before the bonds so have been actually delivered, the bonds may nevertheless be issued and delivered as though the person who has signed the bonds had not ceased to be the officer. Any bonds may be signed as provided in this section, on behalf of the issuer, by an officer who is the proper officer of the issuer on the actual date of signing of the bonds, notwithstanding the fact that at the date of the bonds or on the date of delivery of the bonds that person was or is not the officer of the issuer.
  5. Bonds, other than fully registered bonds, may, in the discretion of the issuer, have interest coupons attached or otherwise appertaining. The interest coupons shall be signed on behalf of the issuer by the manual or facsimile signature of at least one (1) of the officers described in subsection (1) of this section.

History. Enact. Acts 1996, ch. 280, § 13, effective July 15, 1996; 2002, ch. 346, § 38, effective July 15, 2002.

66.140. Refunding bonds of taxing districts, towns under special acts, and unclassified municipalities. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (186c-1, 186c-2, 186c-5) was repealed by Acts 1996, ch. 280, § 30, effective July 15, 1996.

66.141. Manner of sale of bonds or notes.

Except for bonds which are also notes, bonds shall be sold by advertised competitive bid. Notes may be sold by competitive bid or at private negotiated sale in a manner determined or authorized by the issuer. Bonds may be sold at a price equal to a percent of their principal amount, plus accrued interest, and at an interest rate or rates not exceeding that determined by the issuer in accordance with the method of sale prescribed in this chapter.

History. Enact. Acts 1996, ch. 280, § 14, effective July 15, 1996.

66.150. Tax to pay principal and interest of bonds — Collection. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (186c-3) was repealed by Acts 1996, ch. 280, § 30, effective July 15, 1996.

66.151. Deposit and crediting of proceeds.

Proceeds from the sale of bonds shall be deposited and credited as provided in the legislation authorizing the bonds, in the proceedings approved by that legislation, or in instructions given by an officer authorized to designate the allocation of proceeds.

History. Enact. Acts 1996, ch. 280, § 15, effective July 15, 1996.

66.160. Redemption and interest accounts. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (186c-4) was repealed by Acts 1996, ch. 280, § 30, effective July 15, 1996.

66.161. Issuing bonds or obligations to fund or refund outstanding bonds.

  1. Upon the determination of the governing body that the issuance will be in the issuer’s best interest, the issuer may:
    1. Issue bonds to fund or refund any outstanding bonds or obligations previously issued. Any bonds issued pursuant to this subsection shall mature as determined by the governing body consistent with KRS 66.091 , but their maturity shall not be later than the date that would have been permitted by KRS 66.091 , as if the original bonds or obligations had been issued under the provisions of this chapter; and
    2. Issue obligations, if authorized by other law, to fund or refund any outstanding bonds previously issued under this chapter.
  2. Bonds may be issued pursuant to this section to fund or refund all or any portion of the outstanding bonds, whether or not the bonds to be funded or refunded were issued subject to call or redemption prior to maturity, or are the original bonds, or are themselves refunding bonds.
  3. Moneys derived from the proceeds of bonds issued pursuant to this section to fund or refund bonds shall, to the extent required by the legislation or proceedings, be placed in an escrow fund, which may be in the sinking fund, and pledged for the purpose of funding or refunding the refunded bonds and shall be used, together with any other available funds as provided in this section, for that purpose. When the issuer has placed in escrow moneys derived from proceeds of refunding bonds or obligations or otherwise, or investments, or a combination of both, determined to be sufficient, with the interest or other investment income accruing on those investments, for the payment of debt charges on the refunded bonds, the refunded bonds shall no longer be considered to be outstanding, shall not be considered for purposes of determining any limitation, direct or indirect, on the net indebtedness of the issuer, and the levy of taxes or other charges for the payment of debt charges on the refunded bonds under this chapter.
  4. The authority granted by this section is in addition to and not a limitation on any other authorizations granted by or pursuant to law for the same or similar purposes.

History. Enact. Acts 1996, ch. 280, § 16, effective July 15, 1996.

66.170. City’s power to issue bonds to fund floating debt or to refund outstanding bonds. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3010-10, 3071, 3078 to 3080, 3195, 3284, 3646, 3679: amend. Acts 1994, ch. 244, § 2, effective April 5, 1994) was repealed by Acts 1996, ch. 280, § 30, effective July 15, 1996.

66.171. Register of fully-registered bonds — Payment of debt charges — Transfers or exchanges.

  1. An issuer shall keep or cause to be kept a register for the purpose of effecting the exchange, transfer, and payment of fully-registered bonds, which shall show the date, series, denomination, and owner of the fully-registered bonds and, if applicable, the number and series of the coupon bonds for which they were exchanged.
  2. An issuer shall pay or cause to be paid the debt charges on fully-registered bonds only to or on the order of the person appearing by the register to be the owner of the bonds, unless otherwise provided in an applicable credit enhancement facility.
  3. Subject to any applicable provisions of the proceedings, registered bonds may be transferred or exchanged on the register by the registered owner in person or by a person authorized by the registered owner to do so by a power of attorney.

History. Enact. Acts 1996, ch. 280, § 17, effective July 15, 1996.

66.180. City of first class, when refunding bonds to be issued by. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3010-10) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 234, § 11, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 91A.200 to 91A.290 .

66.181. Registration of coupon bonds — Transfers.

  1. An issuer may register any coupon bond registrable as to principal upon the request of the owner or holder. Thereafter, no transfer shall be valid unless the transfer is entered on the records of the issuer and similarly noted on the bond, and the bond may be discharged from registration by being in like manner transferred to bearer and thereupon the bond may be transferred by delivery.
  2. Registration of a coupon bond as to principal does not affect the negotiability of the appertaining coupons. A negotiable coupon is transferable by delivery whether or not the principal of the bond to which it appertains is registered.
  3. A reasonable fee may be charged as compensation for the expense of this registration.

History. Enact. Acts 1996, ch. 280, § 18, effective July 15, 1996.

66.190. City of second class, how refunding bonds to be issued — Sinking fund. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3079, 3080, 3195) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 234, § 11, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 91A.200 to 91A.290 .

66.191. Complaint for validation of bonds — Proceedings.

  1. As used in this section, supplementing the definitions of the terms contained in KRS 66.011 , “issuer” also includes any person issuing fractionalized interests in bonds and any instrumentality of an issuer and “bonds” also includes obligations.
    1. An issuer, at any time prior to its issuance or entering into of bonds, may file a complaint for validation and thereby commence an action for the purpose of obtaining an adjudication of its authority to issue or enter into and the validity of, and security for, and source of payment of, the bonds, and of the validity of all proceedings taken and proposed to be taken in connection therewith, including, but not limited to, any of the following: (2) (a) An issuer, at any time prior to its issuance or entering into of bonds, may file a complaint for validation and thereby commence an action for the purpose of obtaining an adjudication of its authority to issue or enter into and the validity of, and security for, and source of payment of, the bonds, and of the validity of all proceedings taken and proposed to be taken in connection therewith, including, but not limited to, any of the following:
      1. The levy of taxes or special assessments levied or to be levied;
      2. The lien of those taxes or special assessments;
      3. The levy or charge of rates, charges, rentals, lease payments, or tolls;
      4. Any underlying obligation; and
      5. The proceedings and remedies for the collection of the taxes, special assessments, rates, charges, rentals, lease payments, or tolls, or payments by an issuer.
    2. No such action shall be commenced except upon determination of its necessity by the governing body or other authority empowered to adopt the legislation for the issuance of the bonds.
    3. The action shall be commenced in the Circuit Court of the county in which the issuer is located in whole or in part or has its principal office.
  2. The complaint for validation shall contain that which is required by the Rules of Civil Procedure including, without limitation, in ordinary and precise language and by references or exhibits, statements or descriptions of all of the following:
    1. The issuer’s existence and authority for issuing the bonds;
    2. The holding and result of any required election relating to the bonds;
    3. If already passed or issued, the legislation, order, or proceeding authorizing the issuance of the bonds and evidence of its passage or issuance;
    4. All other essential proceedings taken and proposed to be taken in connection with the bonds;
    5. If not set forth in legislation, order, or proceeding already passed or issued, the approximate amount and general proposed terms of the bonds;
    6. The county or counties in which the proceeds of the bonds, or any part thereof, are to be expended; and
    7. Any other pertinent matters.
  3. Upon the filing of the complaint, the court shall issue an order in general terms in the form of a notice directed to the state and to “all property owners, taxpayers, citizens, and others having or claiming any right, title, or interest in any property or funds to be affected” by the issuance or entering into of the bonds or “affected in any way thereby,” requiring the state through the Attorney General and all such persons to appear and be heard before the court at a time to be designated in the order, and show cause why the complaint should not be granted and the proceedings and the bonds validated and confirmed as therein.
  4. At least twenty (20) days before the time fixed in the order for hearing, a copy of the complaint and order, unless waived in writing, shall be served upon the Attorney General. The Attorney General shall carefully examine the complaint and if it appears, or there is reason to believe, that the complaint is defective, insufficient, or untrue, or if in the opinion of the Attorney General the issuance of the bonds or any related action, is not lawful or has not been duly authorized, the Attorney General may enter an appearance for the state and assert any defense to the complaint that the Attorney General considers proper. The Attorney General may enter an appearance and assert any support for the complaint that the Attorney General considers proper. No other appearance by or service of the complaint on any other attorney or person other than the Attorney General or persons set forth in this section shall be required.
  5. The clerk of the court in which the action is commenced shall publish a copy of the order in a newspaper of general circulation in that county and in each other county in which at least ten percent (10%) of the proceeds of the bonds is proposed to be expended. The publication in each county shall be made not less than seven (7) nor more than twenty-one (21) days before the date set for hearing. Upon publication of the order, service upon all property owners, taxpayers, citizens, or others having or claiming any right, title, or interest in or against the plaintiff or property subject to taxation or special assessment for payment of debt charges on the bonds, or otherwise affected by or interested in the issuance or entering into of the bonds described in the complaint is complete, and the court has jurisdiction of them to the same extent as if these defendants were individually named in the complaint and personally served.
  6. The Attorney General, and any other person made a defendant, or his counsel shall, subject to laws restricting public access to certain records, have reasonable access to all records and proceedings of the issuer which pertain to the matters described in the complaint. Any officer, agent, or employee of the issuer who has charge, possession, custody, or control of any of those records and proceedings shall furnish such authenticated copies of them as the person requests, at that person’s expense.
  7. Upon motion of the issuer, whether before or after the date set for hearing as provided in subsection (4) of this section, the court may enjoin any person from commencing any other action or proceeding contesting the same or related matters as described in the complaint, as the complaint may from time to time be amended. The court may order a joint hearing or trial before it of all related issues then pending in any action or proceeding in any court in the state, and may order any such action or proceeding consolidated with the validation complaint pending before it, and may make any order as may be necessary or proper to effect that consolidation and as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delays or multiplicity of suits. That order is not appealable.
  8. Any property owner, taxpayer, citizen, or person affected by or interested in the issuance or entering into of the bonds may become a named party to the action by pleading to the complaint at or before the time set for the hearing provided in subsection (4) of this section, or thereafter by intervention upon leave of court.
  9. At the time designated in the order for hearing, the court shall proceed to hear and determine all questions of law and fact in the action and may make such interlocutory orders and adjournments as will enable it properly to try and determine the action and to render a final judgment with the least possible delay.
  10. Any party to the action may appeal from a final judgment of a Circuit Court under subsection (10) of this section to the Court of Appeals. The notice of appeal shall take priority over all other civil cases therein pending, except habeas corpus. No oral argument shall be permitted on appeal except at the request of the court on its own motion.
  11. All of the following apply to a final judgment of the Circuit Court, as finally affirmed or modified in any appeal, that determines that the issuer or obligor has authority to issue the bonds upon the general terms set forth in the complaint for validation and that adjudicates the legality of all proceedings taken and proposed to be taken in connection with the bonds:
    1. The final judgment is forever binding and conclusive, as to all matters adjudicated, against the issuer, any obligor, and all other parties to the action, and those in privity with them, whether named in the action or included in the description in the notice provided for in subsection (4) of this section.
    2. If all procedural steps required to be taken for the completion of the authorization, issuance, sale, and delivery of the bonds after the date of the final judgment, are properly taken in accordance with the applicable provisions of law and the terms of the final judgment, the final judgment constitutes a permanent injunction against any person’s contesting, by any action or proceeding, any of the following:
      1. The validity of the bonds described in the complaint;
      2. The validity of the taxes, special assessments, tolls, charges, rates, or other levies, or lease payments, or payments by an obligor, authorized, contracted, or covenanted to be imposed, made, or collected for the payment of the debt charges on the bonds; or
      3. The validity of any pledge of or lien on revenue or property to secure the payment of the debt charges or payment obligations on the bonds.
    3. A final judgment does not permanently enjoin any person not a named party to the action from raising a claim or defense seeking relief in whole or in part from any levy of taxes or special assessments, made or to be made, or collected or to be collected, against property owned by that person, authorized for the payment of any debt charges or payment obligations on the bonds described in the complaint if the claim or defense is based upon a right that such person may have only in his individual capacity as an owner of the property subject to the tax or special assessment.
  12. The costs of each action under this section shall be paid by the plaintiff and may be paid from the proceeds of the bonds, except that if a taxpayer, citizen, or other person has contested, intervened in, or appealed the action the court may tax the whole or such part of the costs against that person as is equitable and just.

History. Enact. Acts 1996, ch. 280, § 19, effective July 15, 1996.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

Chandler v. City of Winchester, 973 S.W.2d 78, 1998 Ky. App. LEXIS 63 (Ky. Ct. App. 1998).

66.200. City of second class, increase of preconstituional indebtedness. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3073) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 234, § 11, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 91A.200 to 91A.290 .

66.210. Bonds or obligations of county, city, or taxing district. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (186c-6, 983q-4: amend. Acts 1962, ch. 25, § 1; 1976 (Ex. Sess.) ch. 14, § 45, effective January 2, 1978; repealed and reenact. Acts 1990, ch. 476, Pt. V, § 296, effective July 13, 1990; 1994, ch. 244, § 1, effective April 5, 1994) was repealed by Acts 1996, ch. 280, § 30, effective July 15, 1996.

66.220. Proof required to obtain approval of county, city, or taxing district bonds or obligations. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (186c-7: repealed and reenact. Acts 1990, ch. 476, Pt. V, § 297, effective July 13, 1990) was repealed by Acts 1996, ch. 280, § 30, effective July 15, 1996.

66.230. Bonds to refund special assessment bonds issued under ten-year plan by cities other than in class. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2741L-46, 2741L-49) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 234, § 11, effective July 15, 1980. For present law, see KRS 91A.200 to 91A.290 .

66.240. Notice of intention to isue bonds — Objections. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2741L-47: amend. Acts 1966, ch. 239, § 9) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 234, § 11, effective July 15, 1980. For present law, see KRS 91A.200 to 91A.290 .

66.250. Instalments of original assessments to be respread — Enforcement. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2741L-48, 2741L-49) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 234, § 11, effective July 15, 1980. For present law, see KRS 91A.200 to 91A.290 .

66.260. Bonds of city of first class, election to permit sale at higher interest rate or below par. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (186b-5, 186b-7, 186b-8) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 234, § 11, effective July 15, 1980.

66.270. Tax to pay additional interest. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (186b-6) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 234, § 11, effective July 15, 1980.

County Debt Act

66.280. Definition for KRS 66.300 to 66.390 — Short title. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (938q-1, 938q-24: amend. Acts 1942, ch. 179, §§ 1, 6; 1960, ch. 68, Art. V, § 3; 1974, ch. 74, Art. II, § 9(2); 1978, ch. 155, § 41, effective June 17, 1978; 1978, ch. 384, § 138, effective June 17, 1978; 1980, ch. 188, § 37, effective July 15, 1980; 1986, ch. 374, § 2, effective July 15, 1986; 1994, ch. 508, § 27, effective July 15, 1994) was repealed by Acts 1996, ch. 280, § 30, effective July 15, 1996.

66.290. Administrative staff. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (938q-2; Acts 1958, ch. 126, § 3; 1962, ch. 25, § 2) was repealed by Acts 1978, ch. 155, § 165, effective June 17, 1978.

66.300. County Debt Commission — Appeal from rulings of state local debt officer. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (938q-3: amend. Acts 1962, ch. 210, § 15; 1974, ch. 74, Art. II, § 9(2); 1974, ch. 257, § 2; 1976, ch. 210, § 2; 1978, ch. 155, § 41, effective June 17, 1978; 1980, ch. 141, § 3, effective July 15, 1980; 1994, ch. 508, § 28, effective July 15, 1994) was repealed by Acts 2003, ch. 82, § 4, effective June 24, 2003. For present law, see KRS 66.310 .

66.310. Approval of county bonds.

  1. No county may issue bonds which, together with all other net indebtedness of the county plus the principal amount of any outstanding self-supporting obligations, is in excess of one-half of one percent (0.5%) of the value of the taxable property therein, as determined by the next preceding certified assessment, without having first secured the written approval of the state local debt officer. Any other bonds to be issued by any county may be submitted for approval as hereinafter provided. When the fiscal court of any county has petitioned the state local debt officer under KRS 66.320 for assistance in formulating a plan for reorganizing its debt structure, or has received the approval of any issue of county bonds voluntarily as provided in this section, all bonds thereafter issued by the county must be approved as provided in this section.
  2. Without the approval of the state local debt officer a county may not lease, as lessee, a building or public facility that has been or is to be financed at the county’s request or on its behalf through the issuance of bonds by another public body or by a nonprofit corporation serving as an agency and instrumentality of the county for that purpose, unless the bonds, if issued by the county itself as its own general obligations, would be exempt under the provisions of subsection (1). If his or her approval is required, the state local debt officer shall hold a hearing for the purpose of considering the terms of the lease upon the same basis as is provided under subsections (3) and (4) of this section, and interested parties shall have the same right of appeal as is therein provided. This subsection does not apply to leases entered into before July 1, 1964, nor to renewals thereafter of leases entered into before that date, nor to bonds referred to in this subsection if those bonds have been sold prior to that date, whether or not actually delivered to the purchaser or purchasers thereof before that date.
  3. The state local debt officer shall hold a hearing in accordance with KRS Chapter 13B for the purpose of determining whether any issue of bonds submitted to him or her for approval should be approved or disapproved. The state local debt officer shall provide notice of the hearing to the county judge/executive of the county proposing to issue bonds, and the county judge/executive shall cause a copy of that notice to be published in advance of the date set for the hearing as provided in KRS 424.130 . Any person having a material interest in the issuance of the bonds shall have an opportunity to be heard and to present evidence at the hearing held by a hearing officer appointed by the state local debt officer. A record of the proceedings of the hearing shall be made, and the state local debt officer shall review the record and prepare a written decision approving or disapproving the issuance of the proposed bonds. The decision shall set forth the findings of fact upon which the state local debt officer bases his or her decision. On the day that the state local debt officer issues a decision, he or she shall mail a copy to the county judge/executive of the county proposing to issue the bonds and to any person who attended the hearing and requested to receive a copy of the decision.
  4. The state local debt officer shall disapprove the issuance of the proposed bonds if he or she finds that one (1) or more of the following conditions exist:
    1. The financial condition and prospects of the county do not warrant a reasonable expectation that interest and principal maturities can be met when due without seriously restricting other expenditures of the county, including the debt service on the other outstanding obligations of the county;
    2. The issue of bonds will not serve the best interests of both the county issuing the bonds and a majority of its creditors; or
    3. The bonds or the issuance thereof will be invalid.
  5. If the state local debt officer is petitioned by any county to approve the issuance of bonds to refund outstanding county bonds, and if the state local debt officer is unable to find that the bonds sought to be refunded were in their entirety validly issued, he or she shall nevertheless find that bonds may be issued validly for the purpose of refunding the bonds, in equivalent or lesser par principal amount, provided that the interest rate to be borne by the refunding bonds shall be sufficient to make possible their liquidation within their life at no greater average annual cost to the county than would be required to liquidate, within the same number of years, the portion of the outstanding indebtedness found to be valid at the interest rate borne by it before refunding.
  6. Within thirty (30) days after the date of a decision by the state local debt officer approving a county’s proposal to issue bonds, any interested party or taxpayer of the county that presented evidence at the hearing required by subsection (3) of this section may appeal to the Circuit Court of the county proposing to issue the bonds. Appeal shall be taken by filing a complaint with the clerk of the court and serving a copy of the complaint upon the state local debt officer by certified mail, return receipt requested. The fiscal court and, in the case of funding or refunding bonds, the creditors whose claims or bonds are proposed to be funded or refunded, shall be made parties to the appeal. The state local debt officer shall not be named as a party to an appeal under this subsection, but shall be allowed to intervene in the appeal upon his or her motion. Summons shall be served and class representatives designated as provided in the Rules of Civil Procedure. Within thirty (30) days of receipt of the complaint, the state local debt officer shall certify and file a copy of the record of the proceedings and his or her decision with the Circuit Court.
  7. A county proposing to issue bonds may appeal a decision of the state local debt officer disapproving the issuance of the bonds by filing a complaint with the Franklin Circuit Court within thirty (30) days after the date of the decision. The state local debt officer shall be named as a defendant in an appeal under this subsection. Summons shall be issued and served as provided in the Rules of Civil Procedure. With his or her answer, the state local debt officer shall certify and file a copy of the record of the proceedings and his or her decision.
  8. Appeals to the Circuit Court shall be advanced on the docket and shall be heard and decided upon the record certified by the state local debt officer. The findings of fact of the state local debt officer shall be final if supported by any substantial evidence; however, if only the question of the validity of the bonds proposed to be funded or refunded is in issue, additional evidence relating to the validity of the bonds may be presented.
  9. An appeal may be taken from the Circuit Court to the Court of Appeals in the manner provided in the Rules of Civil Procedure.
  10. If no appeal is taken from the approval of a bond issue by the state local debt officer as provided in this section, the decision as to the legality of the bonds shall be res judicata in any subsequent case or cases raising the question of their legality.
  11. Record of the approval of bonds as provided in this section shall be made in the minutes of the next meeting of the fiscal court of the county issuing the bonds so approved, and copies of all decisions of the state local debt officer shall be filed with the Secretary of State.
  12. As used in this section, bonds means bonds and obligations.

History. 938q-4, 938q-5: amend. Acts 1942, ch. 179, §§ 2, 6; 1952, ch. 84, § 55; 1960, ch. 104, § 2; 1962, ch. 25, § 3; 1964, ch. 191, § 1; 1966, ch. 239, § 10; 1976, ch. 62, § 66; 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 20, § 6, effective January 2, 1978; 1994, ch. 508, § 29, effective July 15, 1994; 1996, ch. 280, § 20, effective July 15, 1996; 2003, ch. 82, § 2, effective June 24, 2003; 2019 ch. 35, § 8, effective June 27, 2019.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. In General.

Where county was in default on issue of road and bridge bonds, and plan was worked out to refund issue by exchanging a new issue bearing a lower rate of interest, county had authority to agree to pay, out of road and bridge sinking fund, reasonable compensation to agent who perfected plan, the cost of publishing call notices, and service charges to an agency for handling interest and principal payments. Governor v. Wolfe County, 291 Ky. 267 , 163 S.W.2d 485, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 213 ( Ky. 1942 ).

Bonds proposed to be issued by county to finance building of courthouse were void because they were not approved as required by this section. Cole v. McCracken County, 297 Ky. 797 , 181 S.W.2d 461, 1944 Ky. LEXIS 835 ( Ky. 1944 ).

2. Constitutionality.

The provision of this section (prior to 1942 amendment) that the decision of the state local finance officer or county debt commission as to the legality of a bond issue shall be res adjudicata in any subsequent case raising such question of legality is unconstitutional as to unrepresented bondholders as an invasion of the powers of the judicial department and as denying due process both under the state and federal constitutions. Morgan County v. Governor of Kentucky, 288 Ky. 532 , 156 S.W.2d 498, 1941 Ky. LEXIS 133 ( Ky. 1941 ).

The provision of this section (prior to 2003 amendment) that on trial in Circuit Court the findings of fact of the county debt commission shall be final if supported by any substantial evidence denies due process to parties not theretofore made parties. Hence such persons are entitled to submit additional evidence. The better procedure is to remand the case to the commission for that purpose. Morgan County v. Governor of Kentucky, 288 Ky. 532 , 156 S.W.2d 498, 1941 Ky. LEXIS 133 ( Ky. 1941 ).

The General Assembly has no power to reduce the 40-year maximum maturity provision of Ky. Const., § 159 on bonds issued under Ky. Const., § 157a, to a length of time lower than 40 years. Fiscal Court of Estill County v. Debt Com. of Kentucky, 286 Ky. 114 , 149 S.W.2d 735, 1941 Ky. LEXIS 209 ( Ky. 1941 ).

The power given by subsection (3) of this section to the state local finance officer, to withhold approval of bond issues under certain circumstances, is not an unconstitutional interference with the powers of the fiscal court, but the power may not be exercised arbitrarily. Lincoln Nat'l Bank, Inc. v. County Debt Com., 294 Ky. 642 , 172 S.W.2d 463, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 513 ( Ky. 1943 ).

3. Purpose.

The provision of this section prohibiting a county from contracting a debt in excess of one-half (1/2) of one percent (1%) of the value of its taxable property without approval of the state local finance officer is not an attempt to reduce the constitutional debt limit, but to require the statutory procedure to be followed before exceeding the statutory limit. Lincoln Nat'l Bank, Inc. v. County Debt Com., 294 Ky. 642 , 172 S.W.2d 463, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 513 ( Ky. 1943 ).

4. Construction.

The words “res adjudicata,” as used in this section, mean “final.” County Debt Com. v. Morgan County, 279 Ky. 476 , 130 S.W.2d 779, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 279 ( Ky. 1939 ), overruled, Fiscal Court of Estill County v. Debt Com. of Kentucky, 286 Ky. 114 , 149 S.W.2d 735, 1941 Ky. LEXIS 209 ( Ky. 1941 ).

It was competent for the Legislature to provide for approval by the state local finance officer, the county debt commission, and the courts, as a prerequisite to contracting a debt exceeding one-half (1/2) of one percent (1%) of the value of the taxable property. Fiscal Court of Estill County v. Debt Com. of Kentucky, 286 Ky. 114 , 149 S.W.2d 735, 1941 Ky. LEXIS 209 ( Ky. 1941 ).

5. Application.

This section and former KRS 66.210 (see now KRS 66.310 ) do not apply to revenue bonds issued for the purpose of providing equipment and buildings for an already acquired airport field where such bonds will be liquidated by and from proceeds arising from the operation of the airport and where no debt is created which must be met by taxation of the citizens or their properties. Droege v. Kenton County Fiscal Court, 300 Ky. 186 , 188 S.W.2d 320, 1945 Ky. LEXIS 518 ( Ky. 1945 ).

6. Valid Issue.

An issue of refunding bonds by county was valid, though payment as to some was deferred, where plan insured within limits of human foresight the ultimate payment in full to all bondholders. Epley v. Kentucky County Debt Com., 283 Ky. 600 , 142 S.W.2d 116, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 363 ( Ky. 1940 ).

An issue of refunding bonds is not invalid because the original bonds are not callable and the majority of them have not matured, where the refunding bonds are to be issued only in exchange for and upon the cancellation of bonds of the original issue and will bear interest only from the date of issue. Epley v. Kentucky County Debt Com., 283 Ky. 600 , 142 S.W.2d 116, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 363 ( Ky. 1940 ).

Where bonds sought to be refunded were issued prior to enactment of former KRS 66.210 (see now KRS 66.310 ) there is a presumption of their validity, and no proof is required to establish their validity in the proceedings for approval of the refunding bonds. Lincoln Nat'l Bank, Inc. v. County Debt Com., 294 Ky. 642 , 172 S.W.2d 463, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 513 ( Ky. 1943 ).

7. Administrative Proceedings.

Proceedings hereunder are administrative until they reach the Circuit Court. Morgan County v. Governor of Kentucky, 288 Ky. 532 , 156 S.W.2d 498, 1941 Ky. LEXIS 133 ( Ky. 1941 ).

8. Denial of Approval.

Where county had failed to pay bonded indebtedness and had incurred floating indebtedness as a result of improper fiscal management, excessive expenditures and low tax collections, and there was no convincing proof that county would be able to amortize a refunding bond issue, state local finance officer did not abuse discretion in withholding approval of proposed refunding bonds. Lincoln Nat'l Bank, Inc. v. County Debt Com., 294 Ky. 642 , 172 S.W.2d 463, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 513 ( Ky. 1943 ).

Proposal of county to refund bonded debt by new issue, but to leave floating indebtedness outstanding, was discriminatory of the rights of the holders of the warrants representing the floating indebtedness, and was properly denied approval as not being to best interests of county and its creditors. Lincoln Nat'l Bank, Inc. v. County Debt Com., 294 Ky. 642 , 172 S.W.2d 463, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 513 ( Ky. 1943 ).

9. — Subsequent Application.

Denial of approval of bond issue does not prevent county from making subsequent application for approval. Lincoln Nat'l Bank, Inc. v. County Debt Com., 294 Ky. 642 , 172 S.W.2d 463, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 513 ( Ky. 1943 ).

10. Hearing.
11. — Notice.

The two (2) weeks’ notice required by this section (prior to the 2003 amendment) to be given the county judge of the hearing is sufficient notice to the taxpayers of the county. County Debt Com. v. Morgan County, 279 Ky. 476 , 130 S.W.2d 779, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 279 ( Ky. 1939 ), overruled, Fiscal Court of Estill County v. Debt Com. of Kentucky, 286 Ky. 114 , 149 S.W.2d 735, 1941 Ky. LEXIS 209 ( Ky. 1941 ).

12. County Debt Commission.
13. — Judicial Power.

This section conferred no judicial power on the county debt commission in allowing it to pass upon the validity of bond issues and providing that its findings of fact shall be final if supported by substantial evidence. County Debt Com. v. Morgan County, 279 Ky. 476 , 130 S.W.2d 779, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 279 ( Ky. 1939 ), overruled, Fiscal Court of Estill County v. Debt Com. of Kentucky, 286 Ky. 114 , 149 S.W.2d 735, 1941 Ky. LEXIS 209 ( Ky. 1941 ).

14. Appeal.

Prior to the 2003 repeal of former KRS 66.300 , the county debt act does not state that the appeal from the decision of the county debt commission shall be deemed to be an action for the declaration of rights under it, but merely provides that the appeal shall be decided in the same manner or way. Morgan County v. Governor of Kentucky, 288 Ky. 532 , 156 S.W.2d 498, 1941 Ky. LEXIS 133 ( Ky. 1941 ).

Prior to the 2003 repeal of former KRS 66.300 , Circuit Court had power to pass on validity of bond issues sought to be refunded, although county debt commission had not passed on such point. Lincoln Nat'l Bank, Inc. v. County Debt Com., 294 Ky. 642 , 172 S.W.2d 463, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 513 ( Ky. 1943 ).

Prior to the 2003 repeal of former KRS 66.300 , on appeal to the Circuit Court from the county debt commission, the case is before the court in its entirety for a trial de novo, on the record made before the commission. The court may pass upon every question which legitimately arises on the record, whether or not such question was passed on by the commission, the only limitation being that the courts are bound by the findings of fact of the commission if supported by any substantial evidence. Lincoln Nat'l Bank, Inc. v. County Debt Com., 294 Ky. 642 , 172 S.W.2d 463, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 513 ( Ky. 1943 ).

15. — Parties.

There is no specific provision in the county debt act requiring that bondholders be made parties personally or by representation to the proceedings which, until they reach the court by appeal, are administrative and not judicial. Morgan County v. Governor of Kentucky, 288 Ky. 532 , 156 S.W.2d 498, 1941 Ky. LEXIS 133 ( Ky. 1941 ).

This section, by authorizing interested persons to be heard and to appeal, contemplates representation of bondholders, although it does not specify method of joinder until the judicial stage is reached. The judicial procedure being governed by KRS 418.040 to 418.085 , the court may join bondholders under KRS 418.075 and should not decide an appeal from the commission that would prejudice the bondholders. One or more substantial bondholders may represent the class. Morgan County v. Governor of Kentucky, 288 Ky. 532 , 156 S.W.2d 498, 1941 Ky. LEXIS 133 ( Ky. 1941 ).

16. — Evidence.

The provision that the courts are bound by the findings of fact of the county debt commission if supported by any substantial evidence does not deprive the courts of the power to determine the quality of evidence, that is, its competency and probative value. Lincoln Nat'l Bank, Inc. v. County Debt Com., 294 Ky. 642 , 172 S.W.2d 463, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 513 ( Ky. 1943 ).

17. Res Adjudicata.

Declaratory judgment to the effect that property exempted from county taxation by KRS 132.200 should be included in the computation of all taxable property in county for purpose of determining maximum debt limit of county under Ky. Const., § 158 was not res adjudicata and binding on state local finance officer and county budget commission where such action was but a ruse to deprive finance officer and commission of jurisdiction given them by former KRS 66.210 and this section in approving bond issues, where neither the finance officer nor the commission were a party to the action and where the judgment was not appealed. Monroe County v. County Debt Com., 247 S.W.2d 507, 1952 Ky. LEXIS 708 ( Ky. 1952 ).

Cited:

Fiscal Court of Magoffin County v. Gardner, 302 Ky. 826 , 196 S.W.2d 597, 1946 Ky. LEXIS 759 ( Ky. 1946 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Cities and counties would not come under KRS 42.420 since a similar approval procedure is provided in KRS 66.045 and this section, involving the state local finance officer and since KRS 42.420 was not intended to be duplicative. OAG 81-242 .

A county must obtain the approval of the local finance officer for any bond or obligation exceeding one-half of one percent (.5%) value of the taxable property; KRS 66.310 does not offer an alternative to the approval of the local finance officer for county bond issues. OAG 88-3 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Bonds for municipal electric plant need not be approved, KRS 96.880 .

Declaratory judgments, KRS 418.040 to 418.090 .

Refinancing at higher interest rate than that of original issue, KRS 58.440 .

Kentucky Law Journal.

Peak, Constitutionals Limitation on County Indebtedness in Kentucky, 28 Ky. L.J. 32 (1939).

Morrow, County Debt Difficulties in Kentucky, 31 Ky. L.J. 122, 242 (1942-43.)

Stevens, Property Tax Revenue Assessment Levels and Taxing Rate: The Kentucky Rollback Law, 60 Ky. L.J. 105 (1971).

66.320. Assistance to counties in reorganizing debt structure — Investigation of debt situation.

Any county, upon petition of its fiscal court, is entitled as a matter of right to the assistance of the state local debt officer in formulating a plan for reorganizing its debt structure. When any county is in default on the principal or interest of any indebtedness, or gives evidence of becoming unable to meet principal or interest maturities on any funded indebtedness within a reasonable time, or has an indebtedness which might, with advantage to the county, be funded or refunded, the state local debt officer may investigate the debt situation and credit standing of the county and negotiate with officials and creditors of the county for the purpose of formulating a plan for issuing or reissuing bonds.

History. 938q-5; 1994, ch. 508, § 30, effective July 15, 1994.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

Lincoln Nat’l Bank, Inc. v. County Debt Com., 294 Ky. 642 , 172 S.W.2d 463, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 513 ( Ky. 1943 ).

66.330. Sale of county bonds — Terms — Conditions — Advertisement — Expenses. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (938q-6: amend. Acts 1942, ch. 179, §§ 3, 6; 1966, ch. 239, § 11; 1994, ch. 508, § 31, effective July 15, 1994) was repealed by Acts 1996, ch. 280, § 30, effective July 15, 1996.

66.340. Place of payment of bonds. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (938q-10: amend. Acts 1994, ch. 508, § 32, effective July 15, 1994) was repealed by Acts 1996, ch. 280, § 30, effective July 15, 1996.

66.350. Registration of bonds. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (938q-11: amend. Acts 1994, ch. 508, § 33, effective July 15, 1994) was repealed by Acts 1996, ch. 280, § 30, effective July 15, 1996.

66.360. County road and bridge revolving fund. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (938q-7: amend. Acts 1994, ch. 508, § 34, effective July 15, 1994) was repealed by Acts 1996, ch. 280, § 30, effective July 15, 1996.

66.370. Surrender of sinking fund assets to county sinking fund — Administration of fund.

  1. A county may, by order of its fiscal court, surrender to the state local debt officer, Department for Local Government, all money in hand, notes, bonds, accounts, or other credits representing assets available, and any other sums which may hereafter become available from any and all sources, for paying the principal and interest of any bonded debt of the county; however, if a county surrenders the sinking fund for any bond issue payable either from the tax levy authorized by Section 157 or by Section 157a of the Constitution of Kentucky or from any special tax levy authorized by law, it shall also surrender the sinking funds for all other bonds payable from the same tax levy as herein defined. The surrender shall be irrevocable on the part of the county. Any county which has a bond issue approved under KRS 66.310 may comply with the provisions of this subsection with respect to the sinking funds for the bonds thus approved and for any other bonds payable from the same tax levy as herein defined.
  2. All cash received under this section by the state local debt officer, Department for Local Government, shall be deposited with the commissioner, Department for Local Government, to the credit of a fund designated the “county sinking fund.” All assets other than cash shall be deposited with the commissioner, Department for Local Government, and shall be liquidated, upon authorization of the commissioner, within a reasonable time.
  3. The county treasurer of any county complying with the provisions of this section shall remit monthly to the state local debt officer, Department for Local Government, all moneys received from any tax levy made for the exclusive purpose of paying principal and interest on any bonds. Any moneys appropriated in the county budget from any other source or any moneys required by law to be used for the same purpose shall be remitted as required for paying any principal or interest maturities, or both, or meeting sinking fund requirements. The state local debt officer, Department for Local Government, may institute actions in the Franklin Circuit Court to enforce the provisions of this subsection or to recover any funds that may have been misapplied.
  4. Accounts showing the county sinking fund receipts and disbursements shall be kept by the state local debt officer, Department for Local Government, for each bond issue of each county for which deposits are made in the fund. As of the close of the county fiscal year the state local debt officer, Department for Local Government, shall, within thirty (30) days thereafter, render to the county judge/executive of each county having deposits in the fund a statement thereof for each bond issue of that county. On or about the first day of May of each year, the state local debt officer, Department for Local Government, shall deliver to the county judge/executive an estimate of the principal and interest requirements of outstanding bonds issued by that county or of the proportionate annual amount which should be deposited in a sinking fund.
  5. Disbursements from the county sinking fund shall, when authorized by the state local debt officer, Department for Local Government, be made in the same manner as other claims on the Commonwealth are paid. Disbursements may be made only for:
    1. The payment of principal or interest, or both, of the bonds for which the deposit was made; and
    2. The investment of the funds as authorized by law.
  6. All coupons and bonds for the payment of which deposits are made in the county sinking fund shall be paid either directly by the state local debt officer, Department for Local Government, or by the bank designated as paying agent. That bank may be paid a reasonable fee for its services by the Department for Local Government out of its appropriation. All paid bonds and coupons shall be surrendered to the state local debt officer and canceled and shall be delivered to the judge/executive of each county along with the annual statement provided for in this section.

History. 938q-8: amend. Acts 1942, ch. 179, §§ 4, 6; 1962, ch. 25, § 4; 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 20, § 6, effective January 2, 1978; 1978, ch. 155, § 59, effective June 17, 1978; 1980, ch. 19, § 9, effective July 15, 1980; 1994, ch. 508, § 35, effective July 15, 1994; 1996, ch. 280, § 21, effective July 15, 1996; 1998, ch. 85, § 5, effective July 15, 1998; 2007, ch. 47, § 53, effective June 26, 2007; 2010, ch. 117, § 59, effective July 15, 2010.

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Sinking funds for county bonded indebtedness, budget to provide for, KRS 68.220 , 68.240 , 68.290 , 68.300 .

Kentucky Law Journal.

Ragan, State Supervision of County Finance in Kentucky, 55 Ky. L.J. 132 (1966).

ALR

Officer’s liability for loss of bonds in which sinking fund was invested through failure of bank. 25 A.L.R. 1358.

Failure of bank in which funds have been deposited for payment of coupons as affecting liability of party issuing them. 103 A.L.R. 1265.

Sinking fund as factor in determining whether indebtedness or proposed indebtedness of political subdivision exceeds constitutional or statutory limits. 125 A.L.R. 1393.

66.380. Investment of county sinking fund. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (938q-9: amend. Acts 1942, ch. 179, §§ 5, 6; 1960, ch. 68, Art. V, § 4; 1994, ch. 508, § 36, effective July 15, 1994) was repealed by Acts 1996, ch. 280, § 30, effective July 15, 1996.

66.390. State controller not to hold county bonds. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (938q-20: amend. Acts 1962, ch. 25, § 5; 1978, ch. 155, § 60, effective June 17, 1978; 1980, ch. 188, § 38, effective July 15, 1980; 1982, ch. 393, § 43, effective July 15, 1982; 1986, ch. 374, § 3, effective July 15, 1986; 1994, ch. 508, § 37, effective July 15, 1994) was repealed by Acts 1996, ch. 280, § 30, effective July 15, 1996.

Bankruptcy of Taxing Units

66.400. Taxing units may go into bankruptcy — Approval of state local debt officer and state local finance officer required for county — Liens on bonds or leases — Public property exempt from seizure — Judgments against local government — Exceptions. [Effective until April 1, 2021]

  1. As used in this section:
    1. “Bond” has the same meaning as in KRS 66.011 and is issued according to the provisions of KRS 66.011 to 66.191 ;
    2. “Lease” has the same meaning as in KRS 65.940 and is entered into under the provisions of KRS 65.940 to 65.956 ; and
    3. “Local government” has the same meaning as in KRS 44.001 .
  2. Any taxing agency or instrumentality as defined in Chapter IX of the Federal Bankruptcy Act as amended by the Acts of Congress of August 16, 1937, Chapter 657, June 22, 1938, Chapter 575, March 4, 1940, Chapter 41, June 28, 1940, Chapter 438 and acts amendatory and supplementary thereto or acts extending the date of expiration thereof, as the same may be amended or extended from time to time, may file a petition for the composition of its debts and to do all things necessary to comply with the provisions of the Federal Bankruptcy Act. No county shall file a petition as provided in the Federal Bankruptcy Act unless the proposed plan is first approved by the state local debt officer and the state local finance officer, as defined in KRS 68.001 . No changes or modifications shall be made in the plan of composition after the filing of the petition without the approval of the state local debt officer and the state local finance officer. The state local debt officer and the state local finance officer shall approve or disapprove the proposed plan of composition or any changes or modifications thereof under the same procedure and for the same reasons as bonds are approved or disapproved under KRS 66.280 to 66.390 .
    1. The revenues of a tax adopted: (3) (a) The revenues of a tax adopted:
      1. According to KRS 66.111(1) for the payment of bonds shall be deemed pledged for the payment of the principal of and the premium and interest on the bonds; and
      2. According to KRS 65.942(2) for the payment of a lease shall be deemed pledged for the payment of the principal and interest portions of a lease payment and any prepayment penalties on a lease;

        whether or not the pledge is stated in the bonds, the lease, or in the proceedings authorizing the bonds or the lease.

    2. The holders of all bonds issued and leases entered into shall have a first lien on those tax revenues.
    3. There shall be a statutory lien on the tax revenues pledged in favor of the holders of all bonds issued and leases entered into, effective by operation of law, that shall apply to all outstanding bonds payable from taxes adopted according to KRS 66.111(1) and leases payable from taxes adopted according to KRS 65.942(2), without priority of one (1) bond or lease over another bond or lease, regardless of when the bonds were issued or the lease was entered into.
    4. No filing need be made under the Uniform Commercial Code or otherwise to perfect the lien on the tax revenues.
    5. The pledge of the tax shall constitute a sufficient appropriation, and the tax revenues shall be applied as required by the pledge, without the requirement for further appropriation.
  3. Amounts appropriated for the payment of any obligation that is subject to annual renewal, including but not limited to leases entered into under the provisions of KRS 58.010 to 58.205 or KRS 65.940 to 65.956 , shall be deemed pledged for payment according to subsection (3)(a) of this section, and the holders of all bonds issued or leases entered into shall have a first lien on those appropriations commencing on the date of the appropriation.
    1. The public property of any local government, of every character and description, used for government or public purposes, is exempt from seizure by attachment, execution, or other legal process, except as provided in subsections (7) and (8) of this section. (5) (a) The public property of any local government, of every character and description, used for government or public purposes, is exempt from seizure by attachment, execution, or other legal process, except as provided in subsections (7) and (8) of this section.
    2. A local government’s funds in the hands of its treasurer or a depository shall not be subject to garnishment or other legal process, except as provided in subsections (6), (7), and (8) of this section.
    1. Except for judgments covered under KRS 65.2004 , any local government against which final judgment has been rendered for a claim that is not fully covered by insurance may make a motion to the Circuit Court to enter an order for the payment of money damages, in whole or in part, through a periodic payment schedule for a period of time not to exceed ten (10) years. (6) (a) Except for judgments covered under KRS 65.2004 , any local government against which final judgment has been rendered for a claim that is not fully covered by insurance may make a motion to the Circuit Court to enter an order for the payment of money damages, in whole or in part, through a periodic payment schedule for a period of time not to exceed ten (10) years.
    2. A court entering an order in response to a motion made by a local government under paragraph (a) of this subsection shall consider the ability of the local government to pay the judgment without a substantial disruption to the essential public services provided by the local government. The court shall consider the following factors in evaluating the motion and in setting a periodic payment schedule:
      1. The funds available in the local government’s current fiscal year and other funds available to the local government to pay the damages in the remainder of the local government’s fiscal year during which the final judgment was entered;
      2. The total revenues reasonably expected to be collected by the local government in subsequent fiscal years based upon the historical collections in previous fiscal years;
      3. The total expenses of the local government in subsequent years for the costs associated with the provision of essential public services, the payment of debt service for the existing obligations of the local government, and any other expenses reasonably necessary for the efficient administration of the local government, including personnel, operation, and maintenance costs associated with existing infrastructure, and new costs which may be reasonably anticipated for the local government; and
      4. If the award for damages is an amount that exceeds twenty-five percent (25%) of the total revenues collected by the local government in the immediately preceding fiscal year, the court may also consider any revenue or debt financing options that are reasonably available to the local government that could be employed to help satisfy the judgment.
    3. An order entered by the court establishing a periodic payment schedule shall specify the total amount awarded, the amount of each payment, the interval between payments, and the number of payments to be paid under the order.
    4. Any judgment paid pursuant to the periodic payment schedule established under this subsection shall bear interest accruing from the date final judgment is entered at one-half (1/2) the interest rate provided by KRS 360.040.
    5. Upon petition to the court, the court may modify a periodic payment schedule established in this subsection for good cause shown by the local government. The modification may include changes to the amount of payments, the number of payments, and the period of payments, but in no case shall an adjustment pursuant to this paragraph alter the total amount of damages to be paid, exclusive of interest, in the original order.
  4. Subject to the provisions of subsection (6) of this section, a court may enter an order providing for the attachment, execution, garnishment, or seizure by other legal process of public property, including moneys, of a local government only upon a finding that:
    1. The local government has failed to comply with an order, modified order, or judgment entered by the court as provided by subsection (6) of this section or KRS 65.2004 ;
    2. After a period of twenty-four (24) months, the local government did not petition the court to enter an order for the payment of money damages, in whole or in part, through a periodic payment schedule as provided by subsection (6) of this section or KRS 65.2004 and has not paid in full the total damages awarded under the judgment; or
    3. The judgment for damages was not of the type that permitted the court to enter an award of periodic damages, and the local government has failed to pay the damages due in full after the passage of twenty-four (24) months from the entry of a final judgment.
    1. Any order providing for the attachment, execution, garnishment, or seizure by other legal process of public property, including moneys, of a local government shall not impair the ability of the local government to continue to provide essential services to the public, including the payment of key personnel needed for the provision of those services and those employees necessary for the collection of revenues on behalf of the local government. (8) (a) Any order providing for the attachment, execution, garnishment, or seizure by other legal process of public property, including moneys, of a local government shall not impair the ability of the local government to continue to provide essential services to the public, including the payment of key personnel needed for the provision of those services and those employees necessary for the collection of revenues on behalf of the local government.
    2. In making a determination as to the appropriate extent of an order under this subsection, a court shall consider but shall not be limited to the factors provided in subsection (6)(b) of this section.
  5. Nothing in this section shall:
    1. Bar the pursuit of any other remedies that exist to enforce a judgment under state law; or
    2. Prohibit a local government and a judgment creditor from entering into an agreement for the payment of damages under terms and conditions that differ from the remedies and process established under this section.

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 146, § 1; 1994, ch. 508, § 38, effective July 15, 1994; 2019 ch. 35, § 9, effective June 27, 2019.

Compiler’s Notes.

The Federal Bankruptcy Act referred to in this section may be found in 11 USCS, § 1 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Sanitation district was not a local government.

Chapter 7 trustee was entitled to an order allowing him to garnish the accounts of a county sanitation district in order to satisfy a judgment because Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 66.400 , which provided that the public property of any local government used for government or public purposes was exempt from seizure by attachment, execution, or other legal process, did not apply to sanitation districts, as they did not fall within the statutory definition of a local government. Further, even if it did, it could not apply retroactively to the judgment, which was entered prior to the enactment of § 66.400 , which became effective on June 27, 2019. Keats v. Bullitt Cty. Sanitation Dist. (In re Bullitt Utils., Inc.), 2019 Bankr. LEXIS 3403 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. Oct. 29, 2019).

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Morrow, County Debt Difficulties in Kentucky, 31 Ky. L.J. 242 (1943).

ALR

Right of holder of bond to full or pro rata payment when fund out of which obligation is payable is insufficient to pay all obligations of equal dignity. 90 A.L.R. 717; 171 A.L.R. 1033.

66.400. Municipalities may go into bankruptcy — Approval of state local debt officer and state local finance officer required for county — Municipality may not file if delinquent in contributions to retirement system — Liens on bonds or leases — Public property exempt from seizure — Judgments against local government — Exceptions. [Effective April 1, 2021]

  1. As used in this section:
    1. “Bond” has the same meaning as in KRS 66.011 and is issued according to the provisions of KRS 66.011 to 66.191 ;
    2. “Lease” has the same meaning as in KRS 65.940 and is entered into under the provisions of KRS 65.940 to 65.956 ; and
    3. “Local government” has the same meaning as in KRS 44.001 .
    1. Except as otherwise provided by this section, any municipality as defined in the United States Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. secs. 101 et seq., and acts amendatory and supplementary thereto or acts extending the date of expiration thereof, as the same may be amended or extended from time to time, may file a petition for the composition of its debts and to do all things necessary to comply with the provisions of the United States Bankruptcy Code. (2) (a) Except as otherwise provided by this section, any municipality as defined in the United States Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. secs. 101 et seq., and acts amendatory and supplementary thereto or acts extending the date of expiration thereof, as the same may be amended or extended from time to time, may file a petition for the composition of its debts and to do all things necessary to comply with the provisions of the United States Bankruptcy Code.
    2. No county shall file a petition as provided in the United States Bankruptcy Code unless the proposed plan is first approved by the state local debt officer and the state local finance officer, as defined in KRS 68.001 . No changes or modifications shall be made in the plan of composition after the filing of the petition without the approval of the state local debt officer and the state local finance officer. The state local debt officer and the state local finance officer shall approve or disapprove the proposed plan of composition or any changes or modifications thereof under the same procedure and for the same reasons as bonds are approved or disapproved under KRS 66.280 to 66.390 .
    3. No municipality may file for bankruptcy protection under the United States Bankruptcy Code if it is in default or is delinquent in the payment of contributions due under KRS 78.510 to 78.852 .
    1. The revenues of a tax adopted: (3) (a) The revenues of a tax adopted:
      1. According to KRS 66.111(1) for the payment of bonds shall be deemed pledged for the payment of the principal of and the premium and interest on the bonds; and
      2. According to KRS 65.942(2) for the payment of a lease shall be deemed pledged for the payment of the principal and interest portions of a lease payment and any prepayment penalties on a lease; whether or not the pledge is stated in the bonds, the lease, or in the proceedings authorizing the bonds or the lease.
    2. The holders of all bonds issued and leases entered into shall have a first lien on those tax revenues.
    3. There shall be a statutory lien on the tax revenues pledged in favor of the holders of all bonds issued and leases entered into, effective by operation of law, that shall apply to all outstanding bonds payable from taxes adopted according to KRS 66.111(1) and leases payable from taxes adopted according to KRS 65.942(2), without priority of one (1) bond or lease over another bond or lease, regardless of when the bonds were issued or the lease was entered into.
    4. No filing need be made under the Uniform Commercial Code or otherwise to perfect the lien on the tax revenues.
    5. The pledge of the tax shall constitute a sufficient appropriation, and the tax revenues shall be applied as required by the pledge, without the requirement for further appropriation.
  2. Amounts appropriated for the payment of any obligation that is subject to annual renewal, including but not limited to leases entered into under the provisions of KRS 58.010 to 58.205 or KRS 65.940 to 65.956 , shall be deemed pledged for payment according to subsection (3)(a) of this section, and the holders of all bonds issued or leases entered into shall have a first lien on those appropriations commencing on the date of the appropriation.
    1. The public property of any local government, of every character and description, used for government or public purposes, is exempt from seizure by attachment, execution, or other legal process, except as provided in subsections (7) and (8) of this section. (5) (a) The public property of any local government, of every character and description, used for government or public purposes, is exempt from seizure by attachment, execution, or other legal process, except as provided in subsections (7) and (8) of this section.
    2. A local government’s funds in the hands of its treasurer or a depository shall not be subject to garnishment or other legal process, except as provided in subsections (6), (7), and (8) of this section.
    1. Except for judgments covered under KRS 65.2004 , any local government against which final judgment has been rendered for a claim that is not fully covered by insurance may make a motion to the Circuit Court to enter an order for the payment of money damages, in whole or in part, through a periodic payment schedule for a period of time not to exceed ten (10) years. (6) (a) Except for judgments covered under KRS 65.2004 , any local government against which final judgment has been rendered for a claim that is not fully covered by insurance may make a motion to the Circuit Court to enter an order for the payment of money damages, in whole or in part, through a periodic payment schedule for a period of time not to exceed ten (10) years.
    2. A court entering an order in response to a motion made by a local government under paragraph (a) of this subsection shall consider the ability of the local government to pay the judgment without a substantial disruption to the essential public services provided by the local government. The court shall consider the following factors in evaluating the motion and in setting a periodic payment schedule:
      1. The funds available in the local government’s current fiscal year and other funds available to the local government to pay the damages in the remainder of the local government’s fiscal year during which the final judgment was entered;
      2. The total revenues reasonably expected to be collected by the local government in subsequent fiscal years based upon the historical collections in previous fiscal years;
      3. The total expenses of the local government in subsequent years for the costs associated with the provision of essential public services, the payment of debt service for the existing obligations of the local government, and any other expenses reasonably necessary for the efficient administration of the local government, including personnel, operation, and maintenance costs associated with existing infrastructure, and new costs which may be reasonably anticipated for the local government; and
      4. If the award for damages is an amount that exceeds twenty-five percent (25%) of the total revenues collected by the local government in the immediately preceding fiscal year, the court may also consider any revenue or debt financing options that are reasonably available to the local government that could be employed to help satisfy the judgment.
    3. An order entered by the court establishing a periodic payment schedule shall specify the total amount awarded, the amount of each payment, the interval between payments, and the number of payments to be paid under the order.
    4. Any judgment paid pursuant to the periodic payment schedule established under this subsection shall bear interest accruing from the date final judgment is entered at one-half (1/2) the interest rate provided by KRS 360.040.
    5. Upon petition to the court, the court may modify a periodic payment schedule established in this subsection for good cause shown by the local government. The modification may include changes to the amount of payments, the number of payments, and the period of payments, but in no case shall an adjustment pursuant to this paragraph alter the total amount of damages to be paid, exclusive of interest, in the original order.
  3. Subject to the provisions of subsection (6) of this section, a court may enter an order providing for the attachment, execution, garnishment, or seizure by other legal process of public property, including moneys, of a local government only upon a finding that:
    1. The local government has failed to comply with an order, modified order, or judgment entered by the court as provided by subsection (6) of this section or KRS 65.2004 ;
    2. After a period of twenty-four (24) months, the local government did not petition the court to enter an order for the payment of money damages, in whole or in part, through a periodic payment schedule as provided by subsection (6) of this section or KRS 65.2004 and has not paid in full the total damages awarded under the judgment; or
    3. The judgment for damages was not of the type that permitted the court to enter an award of periodic damages, and the local government has failed to pay the damages due in full after the passage of twenty-four (24) months from the entry of a final judgment.
    1. Any order providing for the attachment, execution, garnishment, or seizure by other legal process of public property, including moneys, of a local government shall not impair the ability of the local government to continue to provide essential services to the public, including the payment of key personnel needed for the provision of those services and those employees necessary for the collection of revenues on behalf of the local government. (8) (a) Any order providing for the attachment, execution, garnishment, or seizure by other legal process of public property, including moneys, of a local government shall not impair the ability of the local government to continue to provide essential services to the public, including the payment of key personnel needed for the provision of those services and those employees necessary for the collection of revenues on behalf of the local government.
    2. In making a determination as to the appropriate extent of an order under this subsection, a court shall consider but shall not be limited to the factors provided in subsection (6)(b) of this section.
  4. Nothing in this section shall:
    1. Bar the pursuit of any other remedies that exist to enforce a judgment under state law; or
    2. Prohibit a local government and a judgment creditor from entering into an agreement for the payment of damages under terms and conditions that differ from the remedies and process established under this section.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 146, § 1; 1994, ch. 508, § 38, effective July 15, 1994; 2019 ch. 35, § 9, effective June 27, 2019; 2020 ch. 79, § 18, effective April 1, 2021.

Public Works Cumulative Reserve Fund

66.410. Establishment of public works cumulative reserve fund authorized. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1944, ch. 142, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

66.420. Levy of tax for fund. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1944, ch. 142, § 2) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

66.430. Uses to which fund may be devoted — Definition of “public works.” [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1944, ch. 142, § 3) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

66.440. Expenditures from fund. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1944, ch. 142, § 4) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

66.450. Accumulation of fund — No lapse. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1944, ch. 142, § 5) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

66.460. Investment of fund. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1944, ch. 142, § 6) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

Purchases

66.470. Purchases by political subdivisions from United States government.

Whenever authorized by ordinance or resolution by its legislative authority, any political subdivision of the state shall have power to purchase supplies, materials or equipment from or through the United States government without calling for bids, notwithstanding any law or charter provision to the contrary.

History. Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 81.

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

School district may purchase from federal government without taking bids, KRS 162.075 .

Investments

66.480. Investment of public funds — Limitations — Written investment policy — Duties of state local debt officer — Investment pool — Rating agency.

  1. The governing body of a city, county, urban-county, charter county, school district (provided that its general procedure for action is approved by the Kentucky Board of Education), or other local governmental unit or political subdivision, may invest and reinvest money subject to its control and jurisdiction in:
    1. Obligations of the United States and of its agencies and instrumentalities, including obligations subject to repurchase agreements, if delivery of these obligations subject to repurchase agreements is taken either directly or through an authorized custodian. These investments may be accomplished through repurchase agreements reached with sources including but not limited to national or state banks chartered in Kentucky;
    2. Obligations and contracts for future delivery or purchase of obligations backed by the full faith and credit of the United States or a United States government agency, including but not limited to:
      1. United States Treasury;
      2. Export-Import Bank of the United States;
      3. Farmers Home Administration;
      4. Government National Mortgage Corporation; and
      5. Merchant Marine bonds;
    3. Obligations of any corporation of the United States government, including but not limited to:
      1. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation;
      2. Federal Farm Credit Banks;
      3. Bank for Cooperatives;
      4. Federal Intermediate Credit Banks;
      5. Federal Land Banks;
      6. Federal Home Loan Banks;
      7. Federal National Mortgage Association; and
      8. Tennessee Valley Authority;
    4. Certificates of deposit issued by or other interest-bearing accounts of any bank or savings and loan institution having a physical presence in Kentucky which are insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation or similar entity or which are collateralized, to the extent uninsured, by any obligations, including surety bonds, permitted by KRS 41.240(4);
    5. Uncollateralized certificates of deposit issued by any bank or savings and loan institution having a physical presence in Kentucky rated in one (1) of the three (3) highest categories by a competent rating agency;
    6. Bankers’ acceptances for banks rated in one (1) of the three (3) highest categories by a competent rating agency;
    7. Commercial paper rated in the highest category by a competent rating agency;
    8. Bonds or certificates of indebtedness of this state and of its agencies and instrumentalities;
    9. Securities issued by a state or local government, or any instrumentality of agency thereof, in the United States, and rated in one (1) of the three (3) highest categories by a competent rating agency;
    10. Shares of mutual funds and exchange traded funds, each of which shall have the following characteristics:
      1. The mutual fund shall be an open-end diversified investment company registered under the Federal Investment Company Act of 1940, as amended;
      2. The management company of the investment company shall have been in operation for at least five (5) years; and
      3. All of the securities in the mutual fund shall be eligible investments pursuant to this section;
    11. Individual equity securities if the funds being invested are managed by a professional investment manager regulated by a federal regulatory agency. The individual equity securities shall be included within the Standard and Poor’s 500 Index, and a single sector shall not exceed twenty-five percent (25%) of the equity allocation; and
    12. Individual high-quality corporate bonds that are managed by a professional investment manager that:
      1. Are issued, assumed, or guaranteed by a solvent institution created and existing under the laws of the United States;
      2. Have a standard maturity of no more than ten (10) years; and
      3. Are rated in the three (3) highest rating categories by at least two (2) competent credit rating agencies.
  2. The investment authority provided by subsection (1) of this section shall be subject to the following limitations:
    1. The amount of money invested at any time by a local government or political subdivision in any one (1) of the categories of investments authorized by subsection (1)(e), (f), (g), (k), and (l) of this section shall not exceed twenty percent (20%) of the total amount of money invested by the local government;
    2. The amount of money invested at any one (1) time by a local government or a political subdivision in the categories of investments authorized in subsection (1)(j), (k), and (l) of this section shall not, aggregately, exceed forty percent (40%) of the total money invested;
    3. No local government or political subdivision shall purchase any investment authorized by subsection (1) of this section on a margin basis or through the use of any similar leveraging technique; and
    4. At the time the investment is made, no more than five percent (5%) of the total amount of money invested by the local governments or political subdivisions shall be invested in any one (1) issuer unless:
      1. The issuer is the United States government or an agency or instrumentality of the United States government, or an entity which has its obligations guaranteed by either the United States government or an entity, agency, or instrumentality of the United States government;
      2. The money is invested in a certificate of deposit or other interest- bearing accounts as authorized by subsection (1)(d) and (e) of this section;
      3. The money is invested in bonds or certificates of indebtedness of this state and its agencies and instrumentalities as authorized in subsection (1)(h) of this section; or
      4. The money is invested in securities issued by a state or local government, or any instrumentality or agency thereof, in the United States as authorized in subsection (1)(i) of this section.
  3. The governing body of every local government or political subdivision that invests or reinvests money subject to its control or jurisdiction according to the provisions of subsection (1) of this section shall by January 1, 1995, adopt a written investment policy that shall govern the investment of funds by the local government or political subdivision. The written investment policy shall include but shall not be limited to the following:
    1. A designation of the officer or officers of the local government or political subdivision who are authorized to invest and oversee the investment of funds;
    2. A list of the permitted types of investments;
    3. Procedures designed to secure the local government’s or political subdivision’s financial interest in the investments;
    4. Standards for written agreements pursuant to which investments are to be made;
    5. Procedures for monitoring, control, deposit, and retention of investments and collateral;
    6. Standards for the diversification of investments, including diversification with respect to the types of investments and firms with whom the local government or political subdivision transacts business;
    7. Standards for the qualification of investment agents which transact business with the local government, such as criteria covering creditworthiness, experience, capitalization, size, and any other factors that make a firm capable and qualified to transact business with the local government or political subdivision; and
    8. Requirements for periodic reporting to the governing body on the status of invested funds.
  4. Sheriffs, county clerks, and jailers, who for the purposes of this section shall be known as county officials, may invest and reinvest money subject to their control and jurisdiction, including tax dollars subject to the provisions of KRS Chapter 134 and 160.510 , as permitted by this section.
  5. The provisions of this section are not intended to impair the power of a county official, city, county, urban-county, charter county, school district, or other local governmental unit or political subdivision to hold funds in deposit accounts with banking institutions as otherwise authorized by law.
  6. The governing body or county official may delegate the investment authority provided by this section to the treasurer or other financial officer or officers charged with custody of the funds of the local government, and the officer or officers shall thereafter assume full responsibility for all investment transactions until the delegation of authority terminates or is revoked.
  7. All county officials shall report the earnings of any investments at the time of their annual reports and settlements with the fiscal courts for excess income of their offices.
  8. The state local debt officer is authorized and directed to assist county officials and local governments, except school districts, in investing funds that are temporarily in excess of operating needs by:
    1. Explaining investment opportunities to county officials and local governments through publication and other appropriate means; and
    2. Providing technical assistance in investment of idle funds to county officials and local governments that request that assistance.
    1. The state local debt officer may create an investment pool for local governments, except school districts, and county officials; and counties and county officials and cities may associate to create an investment pool. If counties and county officials and cities create a pool, each group may select a manager to administer their pool and invest the assets. Each county and each county official and each city may invest in a pool created pursuant to this subsection. Investments shall be limited to those investment instruments permitted by this section. The funds of each local government and county official shall be properly accounted for, and earnings and charges shall be assigned to each participant in a uniform manner according to the amount invested. Charges to any local government or county official shall not exceed one percent (1%) annually on the principal amount invested, and charges on investments of less than a year’s duration shall be prorated. Any investment pool created pursuant to this subsection shall be audited each year by an independent certified public accountant, or by the Auditor of Public Accounts. A copy of the audit report shall be provided to each local government or county official participating in the pool. In the case of an audit by an independent certified public accountant, a copy of the audit report shall be provided to the Auditor of Public Accounts, and to the state local debt officer. The Auditor of Public Accounts may review the report of the independent certified public accountant. After preliminary review, should discrepancies be found, the Auditor of Public Accounts may make his or her own investigative report or audit to verify the findings of the independent certified public accountant’s report. (9) (a) The state local debt officer may create an investment pool for local governments, except school districts, and county officials; and counties and county officials and cities may associate to create an investment pool. If counties and county officials and cities create a pool, each group may select a manager to administer their pool and invest the assets. Each county and each county official and each city may invest in a pool created pursuant to this subsection. Investments shall be limited to those investment instruments permitted by this section. The funds of each local government and county official shall be properly accounted for, and earnings and charges shall be assigned to each participant in a uniform manner according to the amount invested. Charges to any local government or county official shall not exceed one percent (1%) annually on the principal amount invested, and charges on investments of less than a year’s duration shall be prorated. Any investment pool created pursuant to this subsection shall be audited each year by an independent certified public accountant, or by the Auditor of Public Accounts. A copy of the audit report shall be provided to each local government or county official participating in the pool. In the case of an audit by an independent certified public accountant, a copy of the audit report shall be provided to the Auditor of Public Accounts, and to the state local debt officer. The Auditor of Public Accounts may review the report of the independent certified public accountant. After preliminary review, should discrepancies be found, the Auditor of Public Accounts may make his or her own investigative report or audit to verify the findings of the independent certified public accountant’s report.
    2. If the state local debt officer creates an investment pool, he or she shall establish an account in the Treasury for the pool. He or she shall also establish a separate trust and agency account for the purpose of covering management costs, and he or she shall deposit management charges in this account. The state local debt officer may promulgate administrative regulations, pursuant to KRS Chapter 13A, governing the operation of the investment pool, including but not limited to provisions on minimum allowable investments and investment periods, and method and timing of investments, withdrawals, payment of earnings, and assignment of charges.
    3. Before investing in an investment pool created pursuant to this subsection, a local government or county official shall allow any savings and loan association or bank in the county, as described in subsection (1)(d) of this section, to bid for the deposits, but the local government or county official shall not be required to seek bids more often than once in each six (6) month period.
    1. With the approval of the Kentucky Board of Education, local boards of education, or any of them that desire to do so, may associate to create an investment pool. Each local school board which associates itself with other local school boards for the purpose of creating the investment pool may invest its funds in the pool so created and so managed. Investments shall be limited to those investment instruments permitted by this section. The funds of each local school board shall be properly accounted for, and earnings and charges shall be assigned to each participant in a uniform manner according to the amount invested. Charges to any local school board shall not exceed one percent (1%) annually on the principal amount invested, and charges on investments of less than a year’s duration shall be prorated. Any investment pool created pursuant to this subsection shall be audited each year by an independent certified public accountant, or by the Auditor of Public Accounts. A copy of the audit report shall be provided to each local school board participating in the pool. In the case of an audit by an independent certified public accountant, a copy of the audit report shall be provided to the Auditor of Public Accounts, and to the Kentucky Board of Education. The Auditor of Public Accounts may review the report of the independent certified public accountant. After preliminary review, should discrepancies be found, the Auditor of Public Accounts may make his or her own investigative report or audit to verify the findings of the independent certified public accountant’s report. (10) (a) With the approval of the Kentucky Board of Education, local boards of education, or any of them that desire to do so, may associate to create an investment pool. Each local school board which associates itself with other local school boards for the purpose of creating the investment pool may invest its funds in the pool so created and so managed. Investments shall be limited to those investment instruments permitted by this section. The funds of each local school board shall be properly accounted for, and earnings and charges shall be assigned to each participant in a uniform manner according to the amount invested. Charges to any local school board shall not exceed one percent (1%) annually on the principal amount invested, and charges on investments of less than a year’s duration shall be prorated. Any investment pool created pursuant to this subsection shall be audited each year by an independent certified public accountant, or by the Auditor of Public Accounts. A copy of the audit report shall be provided to each local school board participating in the pool. In the case of an audit by an independent certified public accountant, a copy of the audit report shall be provided to the Auditor of Public Accounts, and to the Kentucky Board of Education. The Auditor of Public Accounts may review the report of the independent certified public accountant. After preliminary review, should discrepancies be found, the Auditor of Public Accounts may make his or her own investigative report or audit to verify the findings of the independent certified public accountant’s report.
    2. The Kentucky Board of Education may promulgate administrative regulations governing the operation of the investment pool including but not limited to provisions on minimum allowable investments and investment periods, and methods and timing of investments, withdrawals, payment of earnings, and assignment of charges.
  9. As used in this section, “competent rating agency” means a rating agency certified or approved by a national entity that engages in such a process. The certification or approval process shall include but not necessarily be limited to the following elements the subject rating agency must possess:
    1. A requirement for the rating agency to register and provide an annual updated filing;
    2. Record retention requirements;
    3. Financial reporting requirements;
    4. Policies for the prevention of misuse of material nonpublic information;
    5. Policies addressing management of conflicts of interest, including prohibited conflicts;
    6. Prohibited acts practices;
    7. Disclosure requirements;
    8. Any policies, practices, and internal controls required by the national entity; and
    9. Standards of training, experience, and competence for credit analysts.

History. Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 205; 1982, ch. 57, § 1, effective March 9, 1982; 1986, ch. 261, § 1, effective July 1, 1986; 1988, ch. 393, § 3, effective July 15, 1988; 1990, ch. 291, § 2, effective July 13, 1990; 1990, ch. 476, Pt. V, § 298, effective July 13, 1990; 1994, ch. 275, § 1, effective July 15, 1994; 1994, ch. 508, § 39, effective July 15, 1994; 1996, ch. 362, § 6, effective July 15, 1996; 1998, ch. 554, § 3, effective July 15, 1998; 2009, ch. 10, § 58, effective January 1, 2010; 2019 ch. 11, § 1, effective June 27, 2019.

Compiler’s Notes.

The Federal Investment Company Act of 1940 referred to in subdivision (1)(j)1. of this section is compiled as 15 USCS §§ 80a-1 — 80a-52.

The reference to State Board of Elementary and Secondary Education in this section has been changed to Kentucky Board of Education on authority of Acts 1996, ch. 362, § 6, effective July 15, 1996.

Legislative Research Commission Notes.

(7/15/94). This section was amended by 1994 Ky. Acts chs. 275 and 508. Where these Acts are not in conflict, they have been codified together. In cases where stylistic changes made in Acts ch. 508 conflict with substantive changes in Acts ch. 275, the provisions of Acts ch. 275 have prevailed. Cf. KRS 7.123(1).

(7/13/90). The Act amending this section prevails over the repeal and reenactment in House Bill 940, Acts ch. 476, pursuant to section 653(1) of Acts ch. 476.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

Marshall v. Commonwealth, 20 S.W.3d 478, 2000 Ky. App. LEXIS 62 (Ky. Ct. App. 2000).

Opinions of Attorney General.

The Greater Cincinnati Airport Authority, as a governmental unit, must abide by the mandates of this section and cannot accept as security for its deposits types of collateral which do not qualify under this section even though such collateral would be sufficient to secure State funds under KRS 41.240 . OAG 78-481 .

A county may invest in school revenue bonds, either city or county, pursuant to subsection (b) of this section which authorizes investments in bonds or certificates of indebtedness of this state and of its agencies and instrumentalities, for all county and municipal school boards are state agencies. OAG 79-317 .

A county may invest in the notes or certificates of indebtedness of the Kentucky state property and building commission board and the Kentucky Housing Corporation as these are statutorily designated state agencies. OAG. 79-317.

A county may invest its funds in those banks mentioned in the Farm Credit Act, 12 USCS § 2001 et seq., and in the Federal Home Loan Banks pursuant to the authority vested in it by this section. OAG 79-317 .

A county may not invest in the general bonds of other counties or municipalities. OAG 79-317 .

Investment by a county in Federal National Mortgage Association discount notes and debentures is not authorized by this section. OAG 79-317 .

Since cities and counties unilaterally have the authority to invest their temporarily idle funds pursuant to this section in those types of securities specifically listed in this section, cities and counties could enter into an agreement under the Interlocal Cooperation Act, KRS 65.210 to 65.300 , providing for a cooperative investment program; however, cities and counties cannot, either unilaterally or collectively, turn over their funds to an area development district to manage for investment purposes as such action is not permitted under this section. OAG 80-472 .

For guidelines as to investment of money receipts of office by sheriffs, see OAG 82-244 (modifying OAG 78-491 ).

Under the 1982 amendment of this section, the state local finance officer is required to assist the sheriff in the investing of funds coming into his hands which are temporarily in excess of “operating needs”; that obviously does not include tax moneys collected. OAG 82-244 .

Under subdivision (1)(d) of this section, governmental units mentioned in subsection (1) of this section may invest and reinvest their money in interest-bearing deposits in national banks. OAG 84-343 .

A public library created pursuant to KRS 173.300 to 173.410 is not a local governmental unit nor a political subdivision within the meaning of this section. OAG 84-343 .

A local government can invest in a mutual fund that itself invested solely in United States Government securities. OAG 88-52 .

Based on the reasoning contained in OAG 82-29 and 88-52, this section can be interpreted to allow a county to invest its funds in mutual funds that invest solely in federal securities, including such securities subject to repurchase agreements with state banks, national banks and brokerage firms. OAG 90-28 .

The second sentence of subdivision (1)(a) of this section should not be read as restrictive, but rather as permissive; by the use of the term “may” the provision would allow the method set forth therein but would also allow the use of other methods, such as purchase through brokerage firms. OAG 90-28 .

Subdivision (1)(d) of this section establishes a statutory requirement that deposits of local governmental monies in specified institutions, exceeding the amount insured by an agency of the government of the United States, must be “collateralized” by a pledge of obligations, as permitted by subsection (4) of KRS 41.240 , “having a current quoted market value at least equal to any uninsured deposits.” OAG 94-22 .

“Deposits,” as used in this section with regard to “uninsured deposits,” refers to the total value of such “deposits,” which includes items that have not yet been “collected” by the institution in which a deposit has been made given check processing or clearance time. OAG 94-22 .

Financing of Public Improvements from County License Taxes (Counties of 300,000)

66.510. County public improvements finance board (Counties of 300,000 imposing license fees).

A county which imposes license fees for revenue for purposes other than or in addition to common schools pursuant to KRS 68.180 may, by resolution of the fiscal court, have created in the county the body corporate and politic authorized by KRS 66.510 to 66.543 . That body shall be called the “ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . County Public Improvements Finance Board” (hereafter called board). The board shall have the powers and duties stated in KRS 66.510 to 66.543 and all consistent powers granted by KRS 273.171 to corporations governed by KRS 273.161 to 273.390 .

History. Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 232, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

The provisions of KRS 66.510 to 66.543 violate Ky. Const., § 157 to the extent that they authorize the improvement board to pledge to the payment of its debts appropriations required to be made to it by the fiscal court in future years from the proceeds of the general tax revenues. Sawyer v. Jefferson County Fiscal Court, 438 S.W.2d 531, 1969 Ky. LEXIS 411 ( Ky. 1969 ).

66.513. Members of board — Appointment — Terms — Bond.

  1. The board shall consist of five (5) residents of the county who are thirty-five (35) years old or older and have gained excellent repute in the financial community. The board’s members (hereafter called trustees) shall have four (4) year terms except as stated in subsection (2). Trustees may serve successive terms. Trustees shall be appointed by the county judge/executive with the consent of one-half (1/2) of the members (including the county judge/executive) of the fiscal court.
  2. One (1) of the initial terms shall be for one (1) year. Two (2) of the initial terms shall be for two (2) years. The two (2) remaining initial terms shall be for four (4) years. Thereafter, all terms shall be for four (4) years. Not more than three (3) of the initial trustees shall be affiliated with the same political party.
  3. The fiscal court may require bond of all trustees in such amounts as the court deems proper. The cost of bonds shall be an administrative expense within the meaning of KRS 66.537 .

History. Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 232, § 2.

66.517. Powers of board.

The board may exercise all the powers granted to governmental agencies by KRS 58.010 to 58.140 . The board may exercise all the powers granted to a county building commission by KRS 67.450 to 67.555 . Furthermore, the board may use the procedures and powers of each of those sets of sections of the Kentucky Revised Statutes to obtain facilities and improvements for the matters of statewide concern described in KRS 66.520 .

History. Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 232, § 3; 1980, ch. 188, § 39, effective July 15, 1980.

66.520. Facilities of state concern enumerated — Appropriation by county of more than 300,000 for.

  1. Jails, parks, office space for officers mentioned in the Constitution, roads, sanitation, and land reclamation, conservation, and drainage are matters of statewide concern. In any county with a population in excess of 300,000 inhabitants, eighty percent (80%) or more of whom reside in areas defined as urban by the latest federal decennial census, there is a special need for facilities and improvements with respect to those matters of statewide concern. The fiscal court of such a county shall make an annual appropriation for those facilities and improvements. If a board has been established, the annual appropriation shall be to the board and shall be the lesser of (a) the amount requested by the board under its plan or (b) twelve percent (12%) of the amount the county would have received in the preceding year from imposition at the full rate allowed by KRS 68.180 of the fee authorized by that section for nonschool purposes reduced by the amount of all credits described in KRS 68.190 actually allowed against such fees. If there is no board, the fiscal court shall annually appropriate for such facilities and improvements between five (5) and twelve percent (12%) of the amount described in clause (b) of the next preceding sentence.
  2. To the extent required by Sections 157, 158, 159, or 181 of the Constitution, subsection (1) is directory.

History. Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 232, § 4.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

Since the commitment by the county to make the appropriations to the public improvements finance board does not, in and of itself, create a debt, there is no violation of Ky. Const., § 157 in the mere statutory direction to the county to make the appropriations for public improvements, nor in the resolution of the fiscal court so doing. Sawyer v. Jefferson County Fiscal Court, 438 S.W.2d 531, 1969 Ky. LEXIS 411 ( Ky. 1969 ).

When the Public Improvements Finance Board borrows money and pledges in payment thereof the annual appropriations for future years which the county is committed to make out of its general revenues, a debt has been created within the meaning of Ky. Const., § 157 and if the obligation is deemed to be that of the county Ky. Const., § 157 is violated and if it is deemed to be that of the board Ky. Const., § 157 is still violated because the board is itself a municipality within Ky. Const., § 157. Sawyer v. Jefferson County Fiscal Court, 438 S.W.2d 531, 1969 Ky. LEXIS 411 ( Ky. 1969 ).

2. Construction.

The fact that the Public Improvements Finance Board itself has no power to levy taxes does not keep it from being classed as a municipality within the meaning of Ky. Const., § 157 so long as it can compel the tax-levying unit of government to pay over proceeds of taxes levied by the latter. Sawyer v. Jefferson County Fiscal Court, 438 S.W.2d 531, 1969 Ky. LEXIS 411 ( Ky. 1969 ).

This section does not call for the appropriation of proceeds of the occupational license tax but merely uses the amount of occupational license tax that would have been received in the preceding year from imposition of the tax at full rate as a measure of the maximum limit of the appropriation. Sawyer v. Jefferson County Fiscal Court, 438 S.W.2d 531, 1969 Ky. LEXIS 411 ( Ky. 1969 ).

This section requires a county to commit its general revenues to the payment of an annual appropriation for a future period the duration of which can be controlled by the terms of financing contracts entered into by the board with money lenders. Sawyer v. Jefferson County Fiscal Court, 438 S.W.2d 531, 1969 Ky. LEXIS 411 ( Ky. 1969 ).

66.523. Public improvements financing plan — Contents — Implementation — Annual report of board.

  1. The board shall prepare a public improvements financing plan which shall become the basis of all its operations including its requests to the fiscal court for appropriations for improvements and facilities described in KRS 66.520 . In preparing the plan the board may use the services of all governmental agencies having any duties in connection with the matters of statewide concern described in KRS 66.520 . The plan shall include in detail the sources of revenue to defray the costs of all projects. Revenue from appropriations made under KRS 66.520 and planned revenue from annual rental payments shall not be aggregated with each other or any other sources of revenue for any improvement contemplated.
  2. The board shall submit its plan to the fiscal court before incurring any obligation (aside from costs incident to preparation of the plan) with respect to any public improvement. If the fiscal court does not disapprove of the plan in part or as a whole within ninety (90) days from the time the board transmits the plan to the fiscal court, the board may implement the plan to the extent it was not disapproved. The failure of the fiscal court to disapprove the plan, or part of it, shall in no way be deemed to make any obligation incurred by the board under the plan an obligation of the fiscal court.
  3. Annually, at least ninety (90) days prior to the adoption of the proposed county budget pursuant to KRS 68.240 , the board shall submit to the fiscal court a report of its affairs. Any supplements or amendments to the board’s plan shall be included in the report. The fiscal court shall have ninety (90) days to disapprove of any supplements or amendments. Disapproval or the lack of it for all or any parts of the supplements or amendments shall have the same results as subsection (2) orders for the original plan.
  4. No amendment or supplement shall reduce or release any prior obligation of the board without consent of the obligees.

History. Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 232, § 5; 1980, ch. 19, § 10, effective July 15, 1980.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

Sawyer v. Jefferson County Fiscal Court, 438 S.W.2d 531, 1969 Ky. LEXIS 411 ( Ky. 1969 ).

66.527. Indebtedness of board, how secured — Refunding of obligations — Negotiability.

  1. The board may incur indebtedness, buy, lease, rent, sell, operate, manage, accept gifts and grants, and do anything else necessary or proper to obtain for the county in accordance with the board’s plan the public improvements described therein. To secure its obligations the board may pledge its assets subject to any prior pledges or charges against them. The board may incur indebtedness the security for the payment of which is a special fund rather than the unencumbered assets of the board. The board may pledge its expected receipts from one or more sources to secure payment of its various debts and obligations. The board may make such covenants and agreements with its creditors as may be necessary or proper to reduce the cost to the board of the indebtedness. Those covenants or agreements may include arrangements for the operation of public improvements by trustees for the benefit of creditors in the event of a default by the board in the timely payment of indebtedness.
  2. In addition to any method of refunding established by covenants in the board’s obligations, the board may for any indebtedness refund it in advance of its maturity by borrowing against the same security as pledged for the original indebtedness and substituting as security for the original indebtedness general obligations of the United States or its agencies if (a) the principal and interest of the obligations of the United States (or its agencies) are payable in time and sufficient in amount to defray seasonably and fully the board’s outstanding obligation on the original indebtedness, and (b) the net annual interest cost of the indebtedness to the board will be reduced.
  3. Obligations of the board may be made negotiable. Except as otherwise provided herein, the board’s obligations shall be in the form established by KRS 58.010 to 58.140 .

History. Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 232, § 7.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

When the Public Improvements Finance Board borrows money and pledges in payment thereof the annual appropriations for future years which the county is committed to make out of its general revenues, a debt has been created within the meaning of Ky. Const., § 157 and if the obligation is deemed to be that of either the county or the board Ky. Const., § 157 is violated. Sawyer v. Jefferson County Fiscal Court, 438 S.W.2d 531, 1969 Ky. LEXIS 411 ( Ky. 1969 ).

This section violates Ky. Const., § 157 to the extent that it authorizes the improvement board to pledge to the payment of its debts appropriations required to be made to it by the fiscal court in future years from the proceeds of general tax revenues. Sawyer v. Jefferson County Fiscal Court, 438 S.W.2d 531, 1969 Ky. LEXIS 411 ( Ky. 1969 ).

66.530. Pledge of proceeds of license tax by county for public improvement — Limitations — Effect of bonds.

Subject to the will of any General Assembly and Sections 176 and 177 of the Constitution, the fiscal court of a county levying the full percentage of the occupational license fee authorized for nonschool purposes by KRS 68.180 may pledge no more than twelve percent (12%) of the revenue annually to be derived therefrom as security for special obligations bonds of the fiscal court for any public improvement within the scope of KRS 66.510 to 66.543 . The bonds shall not be obligations of the county but merely of the special fund made up of the pledged fees. No election under Sections 157 and 159 of the Constitution shall be required for said bonds. In all other respects the bonds shall be deemed to have been authorized and issued pursuant to KRS Chapter 66.

History. Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 232, § 8; 1996, ch. 280, § 26, effective July 15, 1996.

66.533. KRS 66.310 not applicable to appropriations under KRS 66.520.

The provisions of KRS 66.310 shall apply neither to fiscal court appropriations made to the board under KRS 66.520 nor to the board’s budget or operations.

History. Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 232, § 9.

66.537. Employment of staff by board — Administrative expenses.

  1. The fiscal court of a county having a board may annually appropriate to the board funds for the board’s administrative expenses; such an appropriation shall be distinct from appropriations to the board in accordance with its plan.
  2. Subject to funds made available under subsection (1), the board may employ a staff. Board members may be paid not more than five hundred dollars ($500) per year as salary. In addition, they may be allowed expenses they incur incident to the board’s business.
  3. Any income received by the board from investments, any revenue received by the board from the operation of facilities or improvements, any appropriations for operations, any grants and subventions, and any other property or money received by the board from its operations under its plan shall be used strictly in furtherance of the plan rather than for the board’s administrative expense.

History. Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 232, § 10.

66.540. Agreement of board and sinking fund commissioners of city for common use of employees.

The board and the commissioners of any sinking fund of any city of the first class within the county may make an agreement under KRS 65.210 to 65.300 or KRS 79.110 to 79.180 for the main purpose of having the employees of that sinking fund perform functions relating to debt service, fiscal management, and investment of funds that would otherwise be performed by employees of the board. Any such agreement shall be construed and carried out in a manner which in no way impairs either the performance of the employees’ duties to the sinking fund or the assets of the sinking fund. Any such agreement shall be deemed to be a covenant or condition of any obligation made by the board during the existence of the agreement.

History. Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 232, § 6.

66.543. Investments by board.

Authorized investments for the board’s funds shall be general obligations of the United States and its agencies and obligations of the Commonwealth of Kentucky and its agencies and authorities exclusive of local units of government. Nevertheless, the board may invest in obligations of local units of government, districts, commissions, authorities, and municipalities within the county pursuant to specific parts of the plan when such investments, in the judgment of the board, offer the best method of obtaining a particular facility or improvement.

History. Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 232, § 11.

County Public Improvements Finance Commission

66.550. County Public Improvements Finance Commission (counties of 50,000 imposing license fees). [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 263, § 4) was repealed by Acts 1970, ch. 155, § 19. For present law see KRS 107.310 to 107.500 .

66.553. Members of commission; appointment; terms; bond. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 263, § 5) was repealed by Acts 1970, ch. 155, § 19. For present law see KRS 107.310 to 107.500 .

66.557. Powers of commission. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 263, § 6) was repealed by Acts 1970, ch. 155, § 19. For present law see KRS 107.310 to 107.500 .

66.560. Facilities of concern to commission; appropriation by county. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 263, § 7) was repealed by Acts 1970, ch. 155, § 19. For present law see KRS 107.310 to 107.500 .

66.563. Public improvements financing plan; contents; implementation; annual report. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 263, § 8) was repealed by Acts 1970, ch. 155, § 19. For present law see KRS 107.310 to 107.500 .

66.567. Indebtedness of commission; how secured; refunding of obligations; negotiability. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 263, § 9) was repealed by Acts 1970, ch. 155, § 19. For present law see KRS 107.310 to 107.500 .

66.570. Pledge of license tax proceeds for improvements; limitations; effect of bonds. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 263, § 10) was repealed by Acts 1970, ch. 155, § 19. For present law see KRS 107.310 to 107.500 .

66.573. KRS 66.310 not applicable to appropriations under KRS 66.560. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 263, § 11) was repealed by Acts 1970, ch. 155, § 19. For present law see KRS 107.310 to 107.500 .

66.577. Administrative expenses; employment of staff; compensation of commission members. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 263, § 12) was repealed by Acts 1970, ch. 155, § 19. For present law see KRS 107.310 to 107.500 .

66.580. Investments by commission. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 263, § 13) was repealed by Acts 1970, ch. 155, § 19. For present law see KRS 107.310 to 107.500 .

Neighborhood Improvements in Counties Containing City of First Class

66.610. Declaration of necessity for act. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1968, ch. 155, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1984, ch. 4, § 3, effective July 15, 1986.

66.613. Neighborhood improvement districts, establishment — Territory to be included. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1968, ch. 155, §§ 1, 2; 1984, ch. 64, § 7, effective July 13, 1984) was repealed by Acts 1984, ch. 4, § 3, effective July 15, 1986.

66.615. Improvement districts for establishment and maintenance of recreation areas. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1968, ch. 155, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1984, ch. 4, § 3, effective July 15, 1986.

66.617. Map of territory in proposed district to show roads — Notice of hearing on creation of district. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1968, ch. 155, §§ 1, 3) was repealed by Acts 1984, ch. 4, § 3, effective July 15, 1986.

66.620. Petition for change in road or improvement before hearing — Hearing — Final order creating district, effect. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1968, ch. 155, §§ 1, 4) was repealed by Acts 1984, ch. 4, § 3, effective July 15, 1986, and Acts 1984, ch. 4, § 3, effective July 15, 1986.

66.623. Cost of improvement, how paid — Apportionment of costs between benefitted properties. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1968, ch. 155, §§ 1, 7) was repealed by Acts 1984, ch. 4, § 3, effective July 15, 1986.

66.625. Apportionment of costs between benefitted properties, how made. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1968, ch. 155, § 10) was repealed by Acts 1984, ch. 4, § 3, effective July 15, 1986.

66.627. Work on improvement, how carried out. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1968, ch. 155, § 5; 1984, ch. 64, § 8, effective July 13, 1984) was repealed by Acts 1984, ch. 4, § 3, effective July 15, 1986.

66.630. Fire hydrants and street lights may be installed in public ways. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1968, ch. 155, § 12) was repealed by Acts 1984, ch. 4, § 3, effective July 15, 1986.

66.633. Water, gas, and sewer service pipes, installation before roadpaved, when. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1968, ch. 155, § 14; 1984, ch. 111, § 46, effective July 13, 1984) was repealed by Acts 1984, ch. 4, § 3, effective July 15, 1986.

66.635. Sidewalk cost included in improvements, when. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1968, ch. 155, § 15) was repealed by Acts 1984, ch. 4, § 3, effective July 15, 1986.

66.637. Public notice to be given before acceptance of work. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1968, ch. 155, § 6) was repealed by Acts 1984, ch. 4, § 3, effective July 15, 1986.

66.640. Classification or designation of roads not changed by this law. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1968, ch. 155, § 9; 1980, ch. 188, § 40, effective July 15, 1980) was repealed by Acts 1984, ch. 4, § 3, effective July 15, 1986.

66.643. Fiscal court to determine how assessments made. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1968, ch. 155, § 11) was repealed by Acts 1984, ch. 4, § 3, effective July 15, 1986.

66.645. Public or charitably owned property subject to assessment. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1968, ch. 155, §§ 1, 8) was repealed by Acts 1984, ch. 4, § 3, effective July 15, 1986.

66.647. Lien for cost of improvements — Special trustee may be appointed to administer improvements. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1968, ch. 155, § 16; 1980, ch. 188, § 41, effective July 15, 1980) was repealed by Acts 1984, ch. 4, § 3, effective July 15, 1986.

66.650. Appointment warrants or improvement bonds — Issuance — Special trustee, functions. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1968, ch. 155, § 17; 1980, ch. 188, § 42, effective July 15, 1980) was repealed by Acts 1984, ch. 4, § 3, effective July 15, 1986.

Modification of Curbs for the Disabled

66.660. Regulation of crosswalks, curbs and gutters — Wheelchair ramps.

  1. The legislative body of any city, county or urban-county government shall provide for and regulate crosswalks, curbs, and gutters; provided, that after June 17, 1978, all new curbs, and all existing curbs which are a part of any reconstruction, within any block which is contiguous to any highway and in which fifty percent (50%) of the territory is devoted to or zoned for business, commercial, residential or industrial use, shall comply with the provisions of subsection (2).
  2. In order to enable persons using wheelchairs to travel freely and without assistance, at each crosswalk a ramp with nonslip surface shall be built into the curb so that the sidewalk and street blend to a common level. Such ramp shall not be less than thirty-two (32) inches wide and shall not have a slope greater than one (1) inch rise per twelve (12) inches length, where practicable. In all ramps there shall be a gradual rounding at the bottom of the slope.

History. Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 16, § 1; 1978, ch. 308, § 1, effective June 17, 1978.

Opinions of Attorney General.

This statute requires affirmative action on the part of a city’s local legislative body in order to provide that the crosswalk ramping requirements are properly enforced and, therefore, that body is ultimately responsible for any violations of the minimum ramping guidelines and ultimately responsible for implementing regulations governing crosswalk construction to prevent future violations. OAG 75-727 .

Since the state Legislature intended to make the provisions of this section mandatory rather than permissive, this statute has been violated in every instance in which a crosswalk constructed in a city’s business, commercial, or industrial block after the effective date of this statute has failed to incorporate the minimum ramping requirements, even though plans or contracts for such construction may have been approved and budgeted before the effective date and without notice that ramping would be necessary. OAG 75-727 .

This section is in compliance with the intent of 23 USCS 402 (b)(1)(F) which requires only that the State provide an “adequate and reasonable” access for handicapped individuals to cross curbs. OAG 77-474 .

Penalties

66.990. Penalties.

  1. Any officer who willfully fails to perform his or her duty under this chapter shall be deemed guilty of misfeasance in office, and shall be fined not more than one hundred dollars ($100).
  2. Any county or state officer who knowingly violates any of the provisions of KRS 66.310 or 66.320 shall, in addition to the specific liabilities imposed for violating any of the provisions of those sections, be guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof, shall have his or her office declared vacant, and may also be fined not more than five hundred dollars ($500) or imprisoned for not more than ninety (90) days, or both so fined and imprisoned.

History. 938q-20, 938q-21, 1881: amend. Acts 1962, ch. 25, § 6; 1986, ch. 374, § 4, effective July 15, 1986; 1996, ch. 280, § 22, effective July 15, 1996; 2003, ch. 82, § 3, effective June 24, 2003.

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

County officers, penalty for misfeasance, malfeasance or neglect of duty, KRS 61.170 .

CHAPTER 67 County Government (Fiscal Courts and County Commissioners)

General Provisions

67.010. Boundary of counties on Ohio and Mississippi Rivers.

Each county whose boundary is described in part by the Mississippi and Ohio Rivers shall be considered as bounded in that particular by the state line, and the islands thereof shall be within the respective counties holding the main land in this state opposite thereto.

History. G.S., ch. 8, § 3.

Compiler’s Notes.

By Acts 1946, ch. 107, the General Assembly recognized and established a certain line as the boundary line between the counties of Barren, Hart and Edmonson and by Acts 1946, § 64, established a portion of the boundary line between the counties of Knox and Laurel.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

Fayette County Fiscal Court v. Fayette County, 314 Ky. 595 , 236 S.W.2d 455, 1950 Ky. LEXIS 1098 ( Ky. 1950 ); Shearer v. Hall, 399 S.W.2d 701, 1965 Ky. LEXIS 31 ( Ky. 1965 ); Ratliff v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government, 540 S.W.2d 8, 1976 Ky. LEXIS 31 ( Ky. 1976 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Floating restaurants on barges anchored to the Kentucky side of the Ohio River near the City of Louisville would be within the jurisdiction of Jefferson County for purposes of local occupational taxes. OAG 86-68 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Boundaries of cities on Ohio River, KRS 81.065 .

Criminal jurisdiction of courts in counties bordering on Ohio, Mississippi, Big Sandy and Tennessee Rivers, KRS 452.530 .

ALR

Challenging acts or proceedings by which its boundaries are affected, right of county as to. 86 A.L.R. 1373.

Capacity to attack the fixing or extension of municipal limits or boundary. 17 A.L.R.5th 195.

Proper remedy or procedure for attacking legality of proceedings annexing territory to municipal corporation. 18 A.L.R.2d 1255.

What land is contiguous or adjacent to municipality so as to be subject to annexation. 49 A.L.R.3d 589.

Right of one governmental subdivision to challenge annexation proceedings by another such subdivision. 17 A.L.R.5th 195.

Right of one governmental subdivision to challenge annexation proceedings by another such subdivision. 17 A.L.R.5th 195.

67.020. Removal of county seat.

  1. When a petition, signed in person by a number of legal voters of the county equal to twenty-five percent (25%) of the number of votes cast in the county at the last general election for county officers, is filed with the county judge/executive, asking for an election on the proposition of removing the county seat, the county judge/executive, by orders entered of record, shall call an election on that proposition to be held on the day of the next general election for county officers that does not occur within less than ninety (90) days from the filing of the petition. No order calling such an election shall be legal unless the place to which the county seat is proposed to be removed is specified in the petition and in the order calling the election.
  2. The county judge/executive, by order entered of record, shall direct the sheriff to advertise the election and its object by publication pursuant to KRS chapter 424.
  3. If two-thirds (2/3) of all legal voters who vote at the election vote for removal, the fiscal court shall provide for the removal of the county seat.
  4. Elections under this section shall not be held oftener than once every ten (10) years in the same county.

History. 915, 917: amend. Acts 1966, ch. 239, § 12; 1978, ch. 384, § 139, effective June 17, 1978.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Time of Election.

Election on removal of county seat can only be held on day of regular election. Walker v. Goode, 153 Ky. 795 , 156 S.W. 893, 1913 Ky. LEXIS 931 ( Ky. 1913 ).

2. Plurality Required.

Two-thirds vote of all those voting at the election at which the question is submitted is required. Cassidy v. Hilman, 31 S.W. 726, 17 Ky. L. Rptr. 461 (1895).

Cited:

Stieritz v. Kaufman, 314 Ky. 10 , 234 S.W.2d 145, 1950 Ky. LEXIS 1004 ( Ky. 1950 ), overruled, Coffey v. Anderson, 371 S.W.2d 624, 1963 Ky. LEXIS 103 ( Ky. 1963 ), overruled in part, Coffey v. Anderson, 371 S.W.2d 624, 1963 Ky. LEXIS 103 ( Ky. 1963 ).

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Conduct of regular elections, KRS Ch. 118.

Location of county seat, local or special act relating to forbidden, Ky. Const., § 59(26).

Removal of county seat, Ky. Const., § 64.

Selection of county seat on consolidation of counties, KRS 67.240 , 67.260 .

ALR

Legislative power to raise constitutional minimum of favorable votes imposed upon adoption of proposition to change county seat submitted to voters. 91 A.L.R. 1021.

Nonregistration as affecting one’s qualification as signer of petition for change of county seat. 100 A.L.R. 1308.

Prohibition to restrain action of administrative officers as to relocation of county seat. 115 A.L.R. 33; 159 A.L.R. 627.

Withdrawal of name from petition, for change of county seat, or revocation of withdrawal, and time therefor. 126 A.L.R. 1031; 27 A.L.R.2d 604.

67.030. Dividing county or striking off territory.

  1. When a petition, describing a particular territory of a county and signed in person by not less than a majority of the voters living in that territory, is filed with the county judge/executive, asking for an election on the proposition of dividing the county or striking the described territory from the county and attaching it to an adjoining county, the county judge/executive, by order entered of record, shall call an election on that proposition to be held on the day of any regular election held in the county for other than county officers if the order is filed with the county clerk not later than the second Tuesday in August preceding the day of the regular election. No order calling such an election shall be legal unless it contains a specific description of the territory proposed to be stricken or divided.
  2. The county judge/executive, by order entered of record, shall direct the sheriff to advertise the election and its object by publication pursuant to KRS Chapter 424, and by printed handbills posted at the courthouse door and at not less than four (4) places in each precinct.
  3. The proposition shall not be adopted unless a majority of all the legal voters of the county voting on the question vote in favor of it.
  4. Any portion stricken off and added to another county as a result of the election shall be bound for all costs expended.

History. 919, 921: amend. Acts 1966, ch. 239, § 13; 1978, ch. 384, § 140, effective June 17, 1978; 1996, ch. 195, § 32, effective July 15, 1996.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

Coffey v. Anderson, 371 S.W.2d 624, 1963 Ky. LEXIS 103 ( Ky. 1963 ); Howell v. Wilson, 371 S.W.2d 627, 1963 Ky. LEXIS 104 ( Ky. 1963 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

A proposition for striking territory from a county could be voted upon at the regular 1978 November election or any subsequent November election other than the one at which county officers are to be elected. OAG 77-268 .

Since counties and their boundaries are creatures of the legislature, they can only be changed by legislative action; therefore, a vote taken pursuant to this section can serve only as an indication to the legislature a county’s position on possibly dividing or striking a portion of a county’s territory and does not, in and of itself, result in a division or striking of the territory of a county and its attachment to an adjoining county. OAG 95-35 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Conduct of regular elections, KRS Ch. 118.

Consolidation of counties, KRS 67.190 to 67.310 .

Division of county, or striking off territory, Ky. Const., §§ 63 to 65.

New counties, to what districts attached:

Senatorial district, KRS 6.020 .

New county, election or appointment of officers until regular election, Ky. Const., § 102.

Portion of county stricken off is liable for its portion of debts of original county, Ky. Const., § 65.

Kentucky Law Journal.

Lewis, Kostas, and Carnes, Consolidation — Complete or Functional — of City and County Governments in Kentucky, 42 Ky. L.J. 295 (1954).

ALR

Right of political division to use corporate funds to avoid or induce change of boundaries. 86 A.L.R. 1369.

Capacity to attack the fixing or extension of municipal limits or boundary. 13 A.L.R.2d 1279.

What land is contiguous or adjacent to municipality so as to be subject to annexation. 49 A.L.R.3d 589.

Right of one governmental subdivision to challenge annexation proceedings by another such subdivision. 17 A.L.R.5th 195.

67.035. Branch offices — Deputies.

  1. In all counties with a land area of more than 750 square miles, the sheriff and county clerk, when authorized by resolution of the fiscal court, may each maintain a branch office in any incorporated or unincorporated city of the county other than the county seat.
  2. The sheriff and county clerk, when authorized by the fiscal court, may appoint one or more deputies for the branch office. The salaries to be paid said deputies together with the office rent and other expenses incidental to maintaining branch offices shall be considered as a part of the necessary expenses of the respective officers and shall be paid in the manner now provided by law for such expenses.
  3. Branch offices as authorized by the fiscal court may be used for the same purposes as those for which the offices at the county seat are used; Provided, however, That all records must be kept at the county seat. The period of time such branch offices shall be maintained, and the office hours, shall be fixed by the fiscal court. The compensation of the deputy in charge of the branch office shall be fixed in the same manner as the compensation of deputies serving at the county seat office. The sheriff and county clerk shall remain liable on their bonds for all funds collected by the branch offices.

History. Enact. Acts 1970, ch. 135, § 1; 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 46.

Opinions of Attorney General.

Registration or reregistration of voters could be conducted at a branch office of the county clerk established under subsection (1) of this section without the authorization or permission of the election commission since such office is authorized to carry on the same functions as that carried on at the clerk’s office located at the county seat, so long as such registration remains under the direction and supervision of the county election board. OAG 73-215 .

KRS 186.014 narrowly relates to only the issuance of motor vehicle license plates, as concerns the county clerk, while subsection (1) of this section is designed to accommodate any other function of the county clerk in the county; accordingly, assuming that Pike County has a land area of more than 750 square miles, the fiscal court of Pike County may authorize the county clerk to maintain a branch office in any incorporated (other than Pikeville) or unincorporated city of Pike County but only on a reasonable showing of the necessity for such branches. OAG 82-43 .

There is no statutory authority for a sheriff’s branch office in a county that does not have in excess of 750 square miles land area. OAG 82-528 .

Fiscal Courts

67.040. Fiscal court — Members — Presiding officer — Deadlock.

  1. The fiscal court of each county shall consist of the county judge/executive and the justices of the peace of the county; or of the county judge/executive and three (3) county commissioners elected under KRS 67.050 and 67.060 .
  2. The county judge/executive shall preside, if present. A majority of the justices of the peace or commissioners shall elect one (1) of their number to preside during the absence or inability of the county judge/executive to preside. If any person fails to comply with a lawful order of the fiscal court, the Circuit Court, on application by the county judge/executive, may compel obedience by proceedings for contempt.
  3. When there is a tie vote in the fiscal court in the selection of any officer or employee to be selected by the fiscal court, and a deadlock results and continues for fifteen (15) days or longer, the county judge/executive shall cause to be entered upon the minutes of the fiscal court an order reciting the facts as to the deadlock, and the question upon which it has occurred and exists, and thereupon, the county judge/executive shall make such appointment.

History. 1833, 1836, 1837: amend. Acts 1942, ch. 173, §§ 1, 2; 1952, ch. 224, § 1; 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 20, § 6, effective January 2, 1978; 1978, ch. 118, § 7, effective June 17, 1978; 1978, ch. 384, § 141, effective June 17, 1978.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

This section was amended by two 1978 acts which do not appear to be in conflict and are compiled together.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. In General.

The fiscal court can act only as a body, at regular or called meetings; the individual members as such have no control over fiscal affairs. McDonald's Adm'x v. Franklin County, 125 Ky. 205 , 100 S.W. 861, 30 Ky. L. Rptr. 1245 , 1907 Ky. LEXIS 271 ( Ky. 1907 ).

2. Court of Record.

The fiscal court is a court of record with definite statutory powers thus where there was no judicial process or adjudication of the matter in the fiscal court which could be used as a basis for the entry of order of contempt against clerk for failure to issue warrant for paying refunding bonds, county court was without jurisdiction to enter or enforce such order. Casteel v. Sparks, 312 Ky. 99 , 226 S.W.2d 533, 1950 Ky. LEXIS 593 ( Ky. 1950 ).

3. Civil Liability.

Justices of the peace, when acting in their capacity as members of the fiscal court, are performing legislative rather than judicial functions, and are not liable in damages for error or mistake in the performance of such legislative duties. Commonwealth v. Kenneday, 118 Ky. 618 , 82 S.W. 237, 26 Ky. L. Rptr. 504 , 1904 Ky. LEXIS 80 ( Ky. 1904 ).

4. Criminal Liability.

The fiscal court, as such, cannot be indicted for failure to keep the county roads in repair; any criminal proceeding must be against the members of the fiscal court individually. Commonwealth v. Boyle County Fiscal Court, 113 Ky. 325 , 68 S.W. 116, 24 Ky. L. Rptr. 234 , 1902 Ky. LEXIS 47 ( Ky. 1902 ).

5. County Judge/executive.

Where pleadings could not be read as revealing that defendant county judge (now county judge/executive), a judicial officer, was performing any judicial act during the meeting of county fiscal court or that he was entitled at that time to the defense of judicial immunity when plaintiff, another member of the county fiscal court, was forcibly removed from the meeting by the defendant, the judgment of the court for the defendant was vacated in absence of legal defense of judicial immunity relied on by the court. Lynch v. Johnson, 420 F.2d 818, 1970 U.S. App. LEXIS 11304 (6th Cir. Ky. 1970 ).

The conduct of the county judge (now county judge/executive) in presiding over the fiscal court is a judicial act, thus the doctrine of judicial immunity from civil liability applies and he is immune from liability for alleged acts unless there was no plausible basis for his jurisdiction. Lynch v. Johnson, 291 F. Supp. 906, 1968 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9306 (E.D. Ky. 1968 ), modified, 420 F.2d 818, 1970 U.S. App. LEXIS 11304 (6th Cir. Ky. 1970 ).

The conduct of the county judge (now county judge/executive) in presiding over the fiscal court is a judicial act to which the doctrine of judicial immunity from civil liability applies, and his action in imprisoning a member of the fiscal court for contempt is protected by that doctrine, which has not been abrogated by the civil rights act, 42 USCS § 1981. Lynch v. Johnson, 291 F. Supp. 906, 1968 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9306 (E.D. Ky. 1968 ), modified, 420 F.2d 818, 1970 U.S. App. LEXIS 11304 (6th Cir. Ky. 1970 ).

The county judge (now county judge/executive) has all the powers of any other member of the fiscal court, including the right to vote. Bath County ex rel. Brown v. Daugherty, 113 Ky. 518 , 68 S.W. 436, 24 Ky. L. Rptr. 350 , 1902 Ky. LEXIS 68 ( Ky. 1902 ). See Stephens v. Wilson, 115 Ky. 27 , 72 S.W. 336, 24 Ky. L. Rptr. 1832 , 1903 Ky. LEXIS 67 ( Ky. 1903 ); Hollis v. Weissenger, 143 Ky. 72 , 135 S.W. 410, 1911 Ky. LEXIS 326 ( Ky. 1911 ); Barnett v. Gilbert, 164 Ky. 564 , 175 S.W. 1029, 1915 Ky. LEXIS 412 ( Ky. 1915 ).

6. Pro Tem Judge.

Prior to enactment of 1942 amendment permitting a county judge pro tem to act for county judge (now county judge/executive) in his absence, a pro tem county judge (now county judge/executive) had no power to act as a member and presiding officer of the fiscal court. Jefferson County Fiscal Court v. Grauman, 281 Ky. 608 , 136 S.W.2d 1102, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 93 ( Ky. 1940 ). (Decision prior to 1978 amendment).

7. Representation of City.

Jefferson County is not a county where there is a city separated by law from the remainder of the county for county governmental purposes, within the meaning of Ky. Const., § 144. The city of Louisville is entitled to representation in the Jefferson County fiscal court. Joyes v. Jefferson County Fiscal Court, 106 Ky. 615 , 51 S.W. 435, 21 Ky. L. Rptr. 199 , 1899 Ky. LEXIS 94 ( Ky. 1899 ).

8. Quorum.

The county judge (now county judge/executive) must be counted in determining what number of members constitutes a quorum, and whether a majority has acted. Bath County ex rel. Brown v. Daugherty, 113 Ky. 518 , 68 S.W. 436, 24 Ky. L. Rptr. 350 , 1902 Ky. LEXIS 68 ( Ky. 1902 ). See Stephens v. Wilson, 115 Ky. 27 , 72 S.W. 336, 24 Ky. L. Rptr. 1832 , 1903 Ky. LEXIS 67 ( Ky. 1903 ); Hollis v. Weissenger, 143 Ky. 72 , 135 S.W. 410, 1911 Ky. LEXIS 326 ( Ky. 1911 ); Barnett v. Gilbert, 164 Ky. 564 , 175 S.W. 1029, 1915 Ky. LEXIS 412 ( Ky. 1915 ). (Decisions prior to 1978 amendment).

Members of fiscal court constituting less than a quorum may not compel the attendance of absent members by attachment. Stephens v. Wilson, 115 Ky. 27 , 72 S.W. 336, 24 Ky. L. Rptr. 1832 , 1903 Ky. LEXIS 67 ( Ky. 1903 ).

Provision of KRS 259.040 (now repealed) that decision on question of election to prohibit stock running at large shall be by “a majority of the members of the fiscal court” requires a majority of all those constituting the court, and not merely a majority of a quorum, which would be sufficient under this section. Brooks v. Johnson, 148 Ky. 470 , 146 S.W. 761, 1912 Ky. LEXIS 447 ( Ky. 1912 ). (Decision prior to 1978 amendment).

Where those members of the fiscal court who vote on a proposition before the court are sufficient to constitute a quorum, and a majority of those who do vote are in favor of the proposition, the vote is sufficient to carry the proposition, although other members of the court are present and do not vote. Lawrence County v. Lawrence Fiscal Court, 191 Ky. 45 , 229 S.W. 139, 1921 Ky. LEXIS 284 ( Ky. 1921 ). (Decision prior to 1978 amendment).

Cited:

Martin v. Stumbo, 282 Ky. 793 , 140 S.W.2d 405, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 262 ( Ky. 1940 ); Howard v. Saylor, 305 Ky. 504 , 204 S.W.2d 815, 1947 Ky. LEXIS 852 ( Ky. 1947 ); Paducah v. McCracken County, 305 Ky. 539 , 204 S.W.2d 942, 1947 Ky. LEXIS 857 ( Ky. 1947 ); Cook v. Fihe, 358 S.W.2d 350, 1962 Ky. LEXIS 166 ( Ky. 1962 ); Fiscal Court of Jefferson County v. Anchorage, 393 S.W.2d 608, 1965 Ky. LEXIS 243 ( Ky. 1965 ); Polston v. King, 965 S.W.2d 143, 1998 Ky. LEXIS 34 ( Ky. 1998 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

The power to break a tie vote does not extend to the county judge (now county judge/executive) in matters which do not relate to the appointment of officers or employees. OAG 61-1053 .

The county judge (now county judge/executive) may appoint an officer or employee to fill a vacancy in the event of a tie vote in the fiscal court, but the county judge (now county judge/executive) may not break a tie vote on a motion to discharge an officer or employee. OAG 63-556 .

Where in a vacancy in the position of county road supervisor only one candidate was qualified and the fiscal court had a tie in the vote for the nomination and the tie continued for 15 days, the county judge (now county judge/executive) could make an appointment to the position by appropriate order. OAG 64-722 .

The reapportionment procedure relates only to justices’ districts and thus does not apply to the commission form of government. OAG 65-236 .

The county judge (now county judge/executive) may not enter into a binding contract on behalf of the county to initiate the Kentucky work experience and training program in his county unless authorized to do so by proper order of the fiscal court. OAG 65-411 .

There is not constitutional or statutory incompatibility between membership on the county fiscal court and membership on the county board of health. OAG 66-87 .

Neither KRS 67.070 nor this section has application to deadlocks existing in the selection of members of the zoning commission by the county judge (now county judge/executive) under the terms of KRS 100.141 . OAG 66-510 .

The county judge (now county judge/executive) can vote on a planning program affecting a housing project area and involving KRS chapters 80 and 100 even though his vote might produce a tie, and subsection (4) (now subsection (3)) of this section would have no application. OAG 67-152 .

A petition for the adoption of a commission form of government must be filed 60 days before the general election at which such question is to be presented to the voters. OAG 67-309 .

Where the question involved before the fiscal court did not involve the selection of officers or employees, the county judge (now county judge/executive) had no authority to break the tie. OAG 68-355 .

To pass zoning regulation changes requires a majority vote of the entire fiscal court under KRS 100.207 and KRS 100.211 rather than a majority of a quorum under subsection (3) of this section. OAG 68-524 . (Opinion prior to 1978 amendment).

The county judge (now county judge/executive) and two (2) magistrates constitute a quorum, since the judge is a voting member. OAG 69-246 .

Where the county judge (now county judge/executive) with two (2) magistrates present out of four at a continued meeting of the regular term appointed a county treasurer for the next term and a proper order was entered in connection with the appointment, the action was legal. OAG 69-246 .

A person whose insurance agency handles a portion of the insurance on the courthouse and county jail would be disqualified for a conflict of interests from being appointed county judge pro tem since he might have to preside over the fiscal court. OAG 69-626 .

Where the county judge (now county judge/executive) resigned prior to the termination of his office, a majority of the original fiscal court at its next regular meeting could elect one of their number to preside over the fiscal court meeting. OAG 69-631 .

The deadlock provisions of this section apply to the appointment of the third member of the county budget commission and to the selection of a member of the county hospital board. OAG 70-105 .

The office of county judge (now county judge/executive) is probably the most important elected single county office since he is not only a member of the fiscal court but is also the presiding officer of the fiscal court. OAG 70-144 .

Where a tie resulted when a fiscal court voted on whether or not the county should give financial support to a children’s recreation program at a high school, the county judge (now county judge/executive) could not break the tie because it did not concern selection of an officer or employee. OAG 70-525 .

In Lawrence County v. Lawrence Fiscal Court (1921), 191 Ky. 45 , 229 S.W. 139, 1921 Ky. LEXIS 284 , on p. 141, the court held that when a quorum is present and votes on a proposition, those members who are present and do not vote will be considered as concurring with the majority and therefore, a county treasurer was duly elected at the meeting of the Monroe County fiscal court where the person who did not vote was counted with the majority, three (3) against two (2), thus raising the final calculation to four (4) for and two (2) against. OAG 73-350 .

Where there is a tie vote and it does not involve election of any employee or official of the county, then the issue is dead unless someone changes his mind and votes differently. OAG 73-394 .

A county commissioner who has a solicitor’s license with an insurance agency doing business with the county may avoid the problem of a disqualifying interest if his remuneration from the agency is solely limited to specific business he refers to the agency and none of this business involves the county. OAG 73-806 .

Although there is a tie-breaking procedure provided for the fiscal court in the selection of an employee, there is no such procedure provided when there is a tie vote in discharging an employee. OAG 74-50 .

The appointment of a county road supervisor is covered by KRS 179.020 and not by this section, the “tie vote” statute, which applies to selection of county officers and employees generally and not to county finance matters. OAG 74-99 .

Generally in the selection and hiring of county officers and employees the county judge and the members of the fiscal court each have a single, equal vote and, under this section, after 15 days the county judge may break a tie vote. OAG 75-280 . Modified by OAG 87-42 .

The punctual attendance of members of the fiscal court at its lawful meetings may not be coerced by the contempt of court powers of the county judge (now county judge/executive) but may be compelled by mandamus action filed in circuit court. OAG 75-384 .

Although a county judge (now county judge/executive is the presiding officer of the fiscal court, he would have the authority to second a motion before the court. OAG 76-185 .

Since abstentions to a vote on a motion before a county fiscal court have to be counted as voting in favor of the measure, a motion to purchase certain property would carry where a county judge (now county judge/executive and four magistrates constituted the entire fiscal court and where the voting was two (2) “yes” votes, one (1) “no” vote and two (2) abstentions. OAG 76-185 .

Unless a measure before the fiscal court deals with the appointment of county officers or employees, the county judge (now county judge/executive) has no authority to vote a second time on the measure to break a deadlock that has existed for 15 days or more. OAG 76-185 .

After the implementation of the new judicial system in 1978 the justices of the peace will no longer perform judicial duties, but in those counties having the magisterial system of government the duties of the justices of the peace will relate to their serving on the fiscal court. OAG 77-80 .

In subsection (4) (now (3)) this section presupposes that the county judge (now county judge/executive) has voted on an officer or employee, along with the other members of the fiscal court the vote resulting in a tie, and that later the judge breaks the tie by naming the person to be employed. OAG 78-52 .

The county judge/executive has the right and duty to vote on all matters or question coming before that body. OAG 78-52 .

The chairman of the fiscal court meeting, when a member or nonmember interferes with the orderly progression of the meeting, can ask him to leave the meeting room or hall; and, if the offending person does not leave, the chairman can get him removed by calling on the sheriff’s office or county or city police. OAG 78-242 .

The county judge/executive has no valid authority to the fine and imprison a person for contempt in connection with a fiscal court meeting. OAG 78-242 .

Under KRS 67.711 the deputy appointed by the county judge/executive may exercise “all administrative powers, duties, and responsibilities” of the office of county judge/executive for the fiscal court, while it performs certain acts legislative in character, performs duties that are quasi-judicial and administrative in nature and in using the term “administrative powers” in KRS 67.711 the legislature used the term in its broad constitutional sense, as envisioned in a tripartite government. OAG 78-277 .

Under this section as amended, effective June 17, 1978, if the county judge/executive is absent or unable to preside, a majority of the justices of the peace or commissioners (as the case may be) shall elect one of their number to preside over the fiscal court; however, under KRS 67.711 the county judge/executive may appoint a deputy, and such deputy can preside over fiscal court in his absence. OAG 78-277 .

In light of Kentucky Constitution, § 144, and subsection (1) of this section, a fiscal court during the period of transition from a commissioner to a magistrate form of government may be composed of a combination of county commissioners and justices of the peace. OAG 78-282 .

The county judge/executive does not have the power to break a tie vote of the fiscal court for the removal of either a county employee or a member of a board, commission or agency for the tie break procedure applies only to appointments, not to dismissals or firing. OAG 78-353 .

Where the fiscal court vote is tied on selection of personnel (officer or employe), either under the nomination and consent procedure or where fiscal court determines that appointment (under any preexisting statute), the county judge/executive may break the tie under KRS 67.070 (3). OAG 78-353 .

The county judge/executive breaks a tie where the selection of any officer or employee is involved; this section, however, does not limit the county judge/executive’s right to vote as a regular, full member of the fiscal court on all matters properly before the court. OAG 79-73 .

In the absence of a constitutional of statutory rule of procedure the proceedings of fiscal court are governed by general parliamentary law. OAG 79-281 .

Pursuant to KRS 67.710 the county judge/executive must nominate a person for the office of county treasurer, subject to the approval of the fiscal court as a body, and if the fiscal court in passing on the nomination comes to a tie vote, the tie vote provisions apply. OAG 80-175 .

If, as chairman of the fiscal court, the county judge/executive directs a member of the fiscal court or the county attorney to desist from disorderly conduct, and such person fails to comply with the county judge/executive’s order, then the county judge/executive can make application to the circuit court to compel obedience by proceedings in circuit court for contempt; the county judge/executive could also ask such disorderly person to either desist from such bad conduct or leave the meeting room, and if the offender does not desist from engaging in such disorder and does not leave the meeting room, the chairman can have him removed by calling the sheriff’s office or county or city police. OAG 80-191 .

The fiscal court does not presently have the authority, and it has never had the authority, to appoint the deputy county judge/executive to preside over the fiscal court in the absence of the county judge/executive. OAG 80-372 .

Where the county judge/executive is not available, a majority of the other fiscal court members (must have a quorum) should elect one of their number to preside over the fiscal court. OAG 80-372 .

The deputy county judge/executive cannot act for the county judge/executive as a member or presiding officer of the fiscal court, thus, should the county judge/executive be absent or unable to attend a fiscal court meeting, then under subsection (2) of this section a majority of the justices of the peace, or commissioners (as the case may be) on the fiscal court shall elect one of their number to preside during the absence or inability of the county judge/executive to preside, and the same selection process applies at each meeting that the county judge/executive is unable to preside over. OAG 80-417 .

County can only take official action through the fiscal court by majority vote, and hence no individual magistrate can require county attorney to do anything in connection with county government. OAG 82-228 .

The reapportionment commissioners to be selected by fiscal court under KRS 67.045(4) are not “officers or employees,” as the term is used in subsection (3) of this section. Moreover, KRS 67.045(4) is autonomous in connection with providing for appointment by the fiscal court of reapportionment commissioners and has no linkage with subsection (3) of this section. The specific statute, KRS 67.045(4), must prevail over the general statute, subsection (3) of this section. OAG 82-586 .

The county judge/executive can break a tie in the fiscal court over the hiring of a county road engineer or county road supervisor, pursuant to subsection (3) of this section. OAG 87-42 , modifying OAG 75-280 .

On the assumption that a magistrate is neither directly nor indirectly pecuniarily interested in the outcome of a proposed zoning change, he may vote on that matter, both as a lawfully appointed member of the city-county planning and zoning commission, and as a member of the fiscal court. OAG 91-36 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Claims allowed by fiscal court, certain county officers not to purchase or speculate in, KRS 61.240 .

County attorney to attend and advise fiscal court, KRS 69.210 .

County contracts, members of fiscal court not to be interested in, KRS 61.220 .

Fiscal court for consolidated county to be chosen under commission form of government law, KRS 67.250 .

Fiscal court, members, presiding officer, quorum, Ky. Const., § 144.

Kentucky Law Journal.

Comments, Freedom of Speech: The Case of the “Corrupt” Campaign Promise, 70 Ky. L.J. 203 (1982).

Treatises

Caldwell’s Kentucky Form Book, 5th Ed., Practice Context for Justices of the Peace, § 17.00.

67.042. Fiscal court districts in counties containing city of first class.

In counties containing a city of the first class where the fiscal court is composed of justices of the peace and the county judge/executive, the county shall be divided into eight (8) justices’ districts and the justice elected from each district shall be entitled a magistrate/representative.

History. Enact. Acts 1984, ch. 107, § 3, effective July 13, 1984.

Opinions of Attorney General.

On the ballot, the title of the office under this section may be “magistrate/representative”; although Ky. Const., § 99 refers to the office as that of “justice of the peace,” the terms “justice of the peace” and “magistrate” are synonymous and have been so construed by the courts. OAG 85-30 .

Candidates for the office of magistrate/representative are to run by district in both the primary and general elections; in the absence of any attempt on the part of the legislature to provide that magistrates are to be nominated from districts in the primary by countywide vote, they must be nominated by the residents of the districts as has been the case in all past elections for this office throughout the state. OAG 85-30 .

67.045. District boundaries — Reapportionment — Procedure.

  1. For the purposes of this section the word “district” shall mean:
    1. Justice’s of the peace district in counties having a fiscal court composed of the county judge/executive and the justices of the peace;
    2. County commissioner’s district in counties having a fiscal court composed of the county judge/executive and three (3) county commissioners; or
    3. Justice’s of the peace district in counties having a fiscal court composed of the county judge/executive and three (3) county commissioners established according to KRS 67.060 .
  2. In counties where the members of the county fiscal court are nominated or elected by districts, the boundaries of those districts shall be drawn so that the districts are compact, contiguous, and the population of each district shall be as nearly equal as is reasonably possible.
  3. In counties where the fiscal court consists of the county judge/executive and three (3) county commissioners established according to KRS 67.060 , the justice of the peace districts shall be coextensive with the three (3) county commissioner districts.
  4. The fiscal court shall initiate reapportionment proceedings in May of the first year following the decennial census of the United States. The fiscal court may, at other times, review the district boundaries and shall initiate reapportionment proceedings if the district boundaries are in violation of subsection (2) of this section.
  5. To initiate a reapportionment proceeding, the fiscal court shall publish notice of the planned reapportionment in accordance with KRS Chapter 424 and appoint three (3) competent citizens of the county over twenty-one (21) years of age, and residing in different districts, and the county clerk as a nonvoting member as commissioners to reapportion the county into not less than three (3) nor more than eight (8) justices’ districts in counties having a fiscal court composed of the county judge/executive and the justices of the peace or three (3) commissioner’s districts in counties having a fiscal court composed of the county judge/executive and county commissioners. The commissioners, before they proceed to act, shall be sworn to faithfully perform their duties. They shall receive out of the county treasury a reasonable compensation for their services, fixed by the fiscal court.
  6. The commissioners shall, within sixty (60) days after their appointment, lay off the boundary lines of the districts. They shall file in the office of the county clerk and with each member of the fiscal court a written report, showing the boundary of each district and the estimated population in each. Within sixty (60) days of the receipt of the report, the fiscal court shall consider the report of the commissioners and, in accordance with the provisions of KRS 67.075 to 67.077 , adopt or amend the report in establishing the districts. In no event shall districts be reapportioned during the period from thirty (30) days prior to the last date for filing for candidacy for county office as provided in KRS 118.165 and the regular election for candidates for county office.
  7. Precinct lines shall be redrawn when necessary in accordance with the provisions of KRS 117.055 . No precinct shall be in more than one (1) district.
  8. Within twenty (20) days of the establishment of the districts by the fiscal court, any registered voter of the county may bring an action in the Circuit Court to enforce the provisions of this section. The Circuit Court shall hear the action and, on a finding that the fiscal court has violated the provisions of this section, remand the matter to the fiscal court. The Circuit Court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the fiscal court, a reasonable attorney’s fee, to be paid from the county treasury, as part of the costs.

History. Enact. Acts 1978, ch. 201, § 1, effective March 30, 1978; 1982, ch. 29, § 1, effective July 15, 1982; 1998, ch. 390, § 1, effective July 15, 1998; 2000, ch. 354, § 5, effective July 14, 2000.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

Where this section delegated to district court judge the power to dispose of exceptions to proposed redistricting and establish the boundaries of voting districts, it was a void statute since Ky. Const., § 27, prohibits one branch of government from exercising the powers of another branch. Fawbush v. Bond, 613 S.W.2d 414, 1981 Ky. LEXIS 222 ( Ky. 1981 ).

Cited:

Robinson v. Ehrler, 691 S.W.2d 200, 1985 Ky. LEXIS 249 ( Ky. 1985 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

A petition asking for a referendum on the return to the magistrate form of government could not specify a number of magistrates on the fiscal court other than the number serving at the time of the petition and subsequent referendum since to have to vote at the same time on the question of changing the form of government and reapportioning the magistrial districts would be too confusing to the voters; also, there are two separate statutory referendum procedures (this section and 67.050 ) which would mean that there would be two separate questions on the ballot at the same time. OAG 78-282 .

Any reapportionment of magisterial districts must follow this section. OAG 78-282 .

Where a county’s magisterial districts are reapportioned pursuant to this section, and as a result of such reapportionment more districts are established than existed prior to reapportionment, vacancies are automatically created in the new districts at the time the reapportionment becomes effective and these vacancies must be filled by appointment of the governor until an election can be held for the unexpired term or terms, pursuant to § 152 of the Kentucky Constitution. OAG 78-282 .

Commissioners appointed to reapportion a county under repealed reapportionment law could not continue to act pursuant to this section; the entire reapportionment process must begin anew pursuant to the requirements of this section. OAG 78-304 .

Any inhabitant or citizen of the county who is least 18 years of age may file an application for reapportionment with the county judge/executive, and once an application for reapportionment has been filed with the county judge/executive, he shall publish notice of the filing of such application in accordance with KRS Chapter 424. OAG 78-389 .

Following notice of an application for reapportionment, the county judge/executive must, within 60 days, in fiscal court, appoint three (3) competent citizens of the county over 21 years of age, who reside in different justices’ districts, as commissioners to reapportion the county into not less than three (3) nor more than eight (8) justices’ districts, and such appointments should take the form of a county judge/executive order, which should be filed for record with the county clerk. OAG 78-389 .

The commissioners, before they can act, must be sworn to faithfully perform their duties before the county judge/executive and must be provided reasonable compensation for such services as commissioners, payable out of the county treasury. OAG 78-389 .

The commissioners must, within 60 days after their appointment, lay off the boundary lines of the districts, file in the office of the county clerk a written report, showing the boundary of each district and the estimated population in each, and file a copy of the report of reapportionment with the District Court of the county involved. OAG 78-389 .

Within 20 days after the filing of the report, any citizen of the county may file exceptions in the District Court, and the District Court must fix a day not later than 10 days after the filing of exceptions for trial thereof, at which the District Court shall dispose of exceptions and, by an order entered of record, establish the boundaries of the districts. OAG 78-389 .

Generally, the justices’ districts may be reapportioned at any time, except for the proviso in subsection (2) of this section; the provision relating to equal population in such districts is meaningless in those counties having the commissioner type government and may be disregarded; any citizen of the county may initiate a reapportionment proceeding, except that the county judge/executive must take the affirmative steps provided in subsection (3) of this section; the District Court must finally pass on the reapportionment; and the county judge/executive may, in his order of appointing reapportionment commissioners, designate the number of justices’ districts of not less than three (3) nor more than eight (8). OAG 78-803 .

Magisterial reapportionment may take place any time, provided that any final order of reapportionment of the District Court cannot take effect prior to the first Monday in January, 1982, when the new term of justices begins. OAG 79-190 .

Should there be multiple reapportionment prior to the first Monday in January, 1982, in connection with necessity to equalize the population in the magisterial districts, the later reapportionment would govern, even though both orders would operate in futuro. OAG 79-191 .

If a commissioner becomes so incapacitated that the commissioners cannot perform their duty under the time sequence set out in this section a county judge/executive has the authority to replace that commissioner with a person who, with the other two, can do the job required by this section. OAG 79-507 .

Since the commissioners have no basic term of office, any of the commissioners could be replaced for a valid reason. OAG 79-507 .

The general purpose of this section is to provide effective or educative notice of the reapportionment process. OAG 79-552 .

The publication, required by subsection (3) (now (4)) of this section, should be published once at the beginning of the reapportionment procedure pursuant to the provisions of KRS 424.140(4), contain a statement when the county judge/executive will appoint three (3) commissioners to reapportion, when the commissioners must file their report with the county clerk, when and where the people may file exceptions to the report, and when a trial on such exceptions may be had. OAG 79-614 , modifying OAG 79-552 .

Under the express wording of this section there is no provision for the “filing of a petition” or an “application for reapportionment.” OAG 79-614 , modifying OAG 79-552 .

After reapportionment involving changes from the prior reapportionment, it is the responsibility of the county board of elections to so draw or redraw precinct boundary lines so that no precinct line bisects or crosses a magisterial line, as last established under reapportionment, but the precinct lines are irrelevant as concerns reapportionment itself. OAG 80-69 .

At any time there is a substantial disparity in population of the magisterial districts, reapportionment is necessary under the one man, one vote Supreme Court cases; where the county judge fails or refuses to initiate reapportionment when required by law, a taxpayer’s class action mandamus suit can be brought in Circuit Court requiring the county judge/executive to act. OAG 80-69 .

Since the 1980 census data will not get to the county in time to redistrict for the 1981 primary, and since reapportionment may be done anytime but not within 120 days prior to any primary, where there was a great disparity in the population of the districts the county judge/executive should immediately have initiated a reapportionment of the county’s magisterial districts. OAG 80-195 .

Redistricting the magisterial districts may be accomplished under the terms of this section at any time as long as it is not within 120 days prior to any primary election for justice of the peace, and this was true irrespective of the freeze on precinct boundaries under former KRS 117.057 . OAG 80-378 .

The county judge/executive can employ an outside attorney to advise on the reapportionment of the county’s magisterial districts. OAG 80-620 .

In county where after reapportionment of the justices’ districts an additional district was added, candidates for election to the office of magistrate in the newly created district could file for and run in the May and November, 1981 elections, the winner to be so sworn in and to take office on the first Monday in January, 1982 provided that the District Court order of apportionment was specifically made effective as of the first Monday in January of 1982. OAG 80-647 .

Where 1980 federal census would not be released until June 1, 1981 and could be delayed longer because of litigation, since an effective reapportionment of magisterial districts must be done before the 1981 primary which is scheduled for May 26, 1981, a reapportionment must be made so that it accommodates the primary election and if no reapportionment was initiated until release of the 1980 census such reapportionment would not affect the winners at the May 26 election of the four-year term in the county. OAG 81-5 .

No fiscal court could take effective action under this section, as amended in 1982, until July 15, 1982. OAG 82-354 .

The publishing by fiscal court of the notice of planned reapportionment is mandatory. OAG 82-354 .

Where a fiscal court voted to appoint three (3) citizens to serve as commissioners to reapportion the county, but no notice of the planned reapportionment was published as required by this section, where the vote on these appointments was three (3) to two (2) with the county judge/executive and one magistrate voicing concern that this action was not legal, and where the county attorney was not present to advise the court, the reapportionment action taken by the fiscal court was a nullity. OAG 82-354 .

The appointment of the reapportionment commissioners under this section is by the fiscal court as a body only and KRS 67.710(8), relating to appointments by the county judge/executive with approval of fiscal court, does not apply. However, any member of fiscal court can make a motion relating to such appointments. OAG 82-404 .

Any portion of the Ft. Campbell Military Reservation located in Christian County, including, of course, the residents thereof, should be included in reapportioning magisterial districts pursuant to this section. OAG 82-441 .

Assuming that the fiscal court has properly established the magisterial districts under this section and no timely court action has been filed concerning the establishment, the establishment is considered effective when the order of fiscal court in the matter takes the form of an ordinance and becomes effective as an ordinance pursuant to KRS 67.075 through 67.077 . If a registered voter sues in Circuit Court to enforce the provisions of the statute, such suit could delay the effective date. OAG 82-451 .

Since a justice of the peace serving on fiscal court is a constitutional officer, the presently elected magistrates (justices of the peace) on the fiscal court of a reapportioned magisterial district were entitled to serve out the remainder of their terms. OAG 82-451 .

The establishment of magisterial districts is done by the work of the commissioners of reapportionment as finally treated by fiscal court ordinance. The coordination of precinct boundaries with magisterial districts is the separate burden of the County Board of Elections under KRS 117.055 . OAG 82-451 .

The reapportionment commissioners to be selected by fiscal court under subsection (4) of this section are not “officers or employees,” as the term is used in KRS 67.040(3). Moreover, subsection (4) of this section is autonomous in connection with providing for appointment by the fiscal court of reapportionment commissioners and has no linkage with KRS 67.040(3). The specific statute, subsection (4) of this section, must prevail over the general statute, KRS 67.040(3). OAG 82-586 .

Where pursuant to this section a reapportionment commission was appointed to reapportion county into eight (8) magisterial districts by November 15, 1982, but on November 2, 1982 voters of the county chose to adopt a commission form of government, the reapportionment of the magisterial districts pursuant to this section had to be completed as directed and the present magistrates’ terms will continue to run through 1985 at which time justices of the peace will be elected for a new four-year term; however, as elected justices they will not be on the new fiscal court, since under subsection (1) of KRS 67.060 prior to the next election in 1985 the county judge/executive is required to divide the county into three (3) commissioner districts, and at the 1985 election and each four (4) years thereafter the voters will elect three (3) commissioners, one from each district, who with the county judge/executive, will constitute the fiscal court. The reapportionment of commissioners districts under KRS 67.060 relates strictly to commissioners who will make up the fiscal court beginning in January, 1986 and the reapportionment of the justices of the peace districts under this section will be merely to meet the mandate of Ky. Const., § 99, since because of the implications of such section the reapportionment procedure of this section would apply by implication to a county having a commission form of government. OAG 82-598 .

Where a fiscal court adopts a plan for reapportionment of magisterial districts that meets the provisions of this section, yet divides one or more voting precincts, since both the reapportionment acts, KRS 117.055 and this section, prohibit a precinct line from bisecting or crossing a magisterial district line, following the reapportionment the county board of elections must alter any precinct that has been crossed by virtue of reapportionment in order to conform with the requirements of KRS 117.055 and this section. OAG 82-617 ; OAG 82-621 .

After the fiscal court has adopted the plan of reapportionment of magisterial and commission districts, any resident or taxpayer of the county may file a civil action in Circuit Court to void any reapportionment legislation adopted by the fiscal court under the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. OAG 82-621 .

Where as a result of the redistricting of magisterial districts required by this section a new magisterial district was created, any local option election called within the new district would be restricted to the voters residing therein. As a consequence, those voters living in portions of territory that had been a part of the old district could not paticipate in the election. OAG 83-170 .

A candidate could not have his district reapportioned out from under him because all reapportionment must cease well before the candidate files his nomination papers. OAG 91-156 .

A candidate to fill a vacancy could not be disqualified because of reapportionment; if he is a resident of the district as it existed at the time the vacancy occurred, he may seek and hold the office. OAG 91-156 .

If county commissioner is successful in his bid for state office, then his commissioner office will become vacant and a special election will determine a successor to complete the unexpired term; thus, there could be an electoral process underway during the time period established for mandatory reapportionment, but since it is not a regular election year for county office, apportionment should proceed as scheduled under subsection (3) of this section regardless of the outcome of the commissioner’s race for state office. OAG 91-156 .

Subsection (5) of this section refers to a regular election which is one that occurs at a regular interval and at which voters elect a candidate for a complete term. OAG 91-156 .

The federal census should be accorded a strong presumption of correctness in determining the population of county districts and the reapportionment commissioners should deviate from the census figures only upon clear and convincing evidence of an inaccuracy in those figures; voter registration records do not by themselves provide strong evidence because the residency standard for voting is based on intent rather than actual presence and before the commission may reject the census figures because they are inaccurate in one district, it must determine that the figures are accurate in the other districts. OAG 92-58 .

Under KRS 117.055 precinct lines are to be drawn by the county board of elections and the reapportionment commission has no authority to establish a precinct boundary. OAG 92-58 .

In counties with the commissioner form of government, the commissioner’s districts and the justice of the peace districts are the same; consequently, such counties have three (3) justices of the peace who are elected from the respective commissioner districts. Since constables’ districts are the same as the justice of the peace districts (Ky. Const., § 99), constables are likewise elected from each commissioner’s district. Thus there is no separate apportionment of justice of the peace/constable districts; their districts are the same as the commissioner’s districts. OAG 93-40 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Treatises

Caldwell’s Kentucky Form Book, 5th Ed., Practice Context for Justices of the Peace, § 17.00.

67.050. County commissioners — Election to ascertain having — Return to prior form of government.

  1. Any county may have a fiscal court consisting of the county judge/executive and three (3) commissioners elected from the county at large. To ascertain whether the county desires to have county commissioners, the county judge/executive, upon an application by written petition signed by registered voters of the county equal in number to at least fifteen percent (15%) of the total number of votes cast in the county in the preceding presidential election or one thousand two hundred (1,200) registered voters of the county, whichever is less, shall enter an order on his order book calling an election to submit to the legal voters of the county the following question: “Are you for or against having a fiscal court composed of three (3) commissioners and the county judge/executive?” The order shall be entered at the next regular term after the petition is filed, and shall direct the election to be held at the next regular election to be held in the county if the order is filed with the county clerk not later than the second Tuesday in August preceding the day of the regular election. The county clerk shall give to the sheriff or other officer appointed to hold the election a certified copy of the order within five (5) days after the order is made, and the sheriff or other officer shall have the order published pursuant to KRS Chapter 424 and in addition advertise it by printed handbills posted at one (1) or more conspicuous places in each precinct in the county for the length of time that publication is required, stating when the election will be held and the purpose thereof.
  2. All such elections shall be held under the general election laws. No such election shall be held in any county more often than once in four (4) years.
  3. Any county that has voted in favor of having county commissioners may return to its prior form of government by following the same procedures as provided in subsections (1) and (2) of this section, by which it chose to have county commissioners. A petition for an election on a return to a fiscal court composed of justices of the peace and the county judge/executive shall state a proposed number of justices of the peace. The question to be submitted to the voters shall be in the following form: “Are you in favor of a return to a fiscal court composed of the county judge/executive and (insert the proposed number of justices) justices of the peace who shall represent specific districts within the county?”
  4. If a majority of the votes cast at an election held under subsection (3) of this section are in favor of a return to a fiscal court composed of justices of the peace and the county judge/executive, the fiscal court shall, if necessary, initiate proceedings to reapportion the justices districts, and such reapportionment shall conform to the requirements of KRS 67.045 . The change in the composition of the fiscal court shall become effective upon the assumption of office of justices of the peace elected at the next regular election for that office.

History. 1847: amend. Acts 1966, ch. 239, § 14; 1968, ch. 80; 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 20, § 6, effective January 2, 1978; 1978, ch. 384, § 142, effective June 17, 1978; 1984, ch. 107, § 1, effective July 13, 1984; 1996, ch. 195, § 33, effective July 15, 1996; 1998, ch. 335, § 1, effective July 15, 1998.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Time of Election.

Prior to enactment of provision providing for holding of election at next regular election to be held in the county, election could be held only at regular election at which county officers were to be elected. Hutchinson v. Miller, 158 Ky. 363 , 164 S.W. 961, 1914 Ky. LEXIS 611 ( Ky. 1914 ).

Election under this section may be held at any regular election, including one at which only federal officers are elected. Tarvin v. Boltz, 175 Ky. 246 , 194 S.W. 108, 1917 Ky. LEXIS 301 ( Ky. 1917 ).

Election under this section may not be held on any day other than the day of a regular election at which public officers will be elected. Patterson v. Lawson, 255 Ky. 781 , 75 S.W.2d 507, 1934 Ky. LEXIS 330 ( Ky. 1934 ).

2. Void Election.

A referendum election on return to the magisterial form of government which did not comply with the requirements of this section was void. Robinson v. Ehrler, 691 S.W.2d 200, 1985 Ky. LEXIS 249 ( Ky. 1985 ).

The 30-day proviso for election contests under KRS 120.250 does not bar a claim that a referendum on the question of whether to return the fiscal court from the commissioner back to the magisterial form of government was void. Robinson v. Ehrler, 691 S.W.2d 200, 1985 Ky. LEXIS 249 ( Ky. 1985 ).

Cited:

Billiter v. Nelson, 300 S.W.2d 790, 1957 Ky. LEXIS 473 ( Ky. 1957 ), overruled, Lackey v. Garner, 367 S.W.2d 257, 1963 Ky. LEXIS 17 ( Ky. 1963 ), overruled in part, Lackey v. Garner, 367 S.W.2d 257, 1963 Ky. LEXIS 17 ( Ky. 1963 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

When a county votes to adopt the commission form of government the county judge (now county judge/executive) is required to divide the county into three (3) districts as nearly equal in population as practicable, before the next regular election for county officers, and at said election and every four (4) years thereafter, there is required to be elected by the voters of the entire county three (3) commissioners, one from each district who, with the county judge (now county judge/executive), shall constitute the fiscal court. OAG 60-439 .

Jefferson County could return to a justice of the peace type of fiscal court, provided that subsection (3) of this section is followed and a majority vote obtained. OAG 71-225 .

A petition asking for a referendum on the return to the magistrate form of government could not specify a number of magistrates on the fiscal court other than the number serving at the time of the petition and subsequent referendum for to have to vote at the same time on the question of changing the form of government and reapportioning the magisterial districts would be too confusing to the voters; also, there are two separate statutory referendum procedures (67.045 and this section) which would mean that there would be two separate questions on the ballot at the same time. OAG 78-282 .

If a county votes pursuant to subsection (3) of this section to return to a magistrate form of government the transition would take place immediately following the official certification of the vote by the county board of elections. OAG 78-282 .

If the voters of a county vote pursuant to subsection (3) of this section to return to a magistrate form of government the county commissioners then in office would be entitled to serve out the remainder of their term since they are named in Kentucky Constitution, § 144 and are therefore constitutional officers. OAG 78-282 .

In light of Kentucky Constitution, § 144 and subsection (1) of KRS 67.040 a fiscal court during the period of transition from a commissioner to a magistrate form of government may be composed of a combination of county commissioners and justices of the peace. OAG 78-282 .

Where a county, which had eight (8) magistrates serving as the fiscal court when it changed to the commission form of government, votes to return to the magisterial form of government, the county will be required to have eight magistrates represented on its fiscal court, since § 99 of the Kentucky Constitution requires the continual election of magistrates (justices of peace) even though a county changes to the commission form of government, and, pursuant to Ky. Const., § 144 the justices of peace compose the fiscal court if the county is operating under the magisterial form of government. OAG 80-137 .

A person may run to reelection as county commissioner from a district when a portion of the district within which he resides has been annexed by a city, the old boundaries of which are within another district. OAG 80-623 .

Once the eight (8) new magisterial districts have been set and approved, the three (3) county commissioner districts and the three (3) current magisterial districts will be eliminated. OAG 85-30 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Conduct of regular elections, KRS Ch. 118.

Kentucky Law Journal.

Terry, Reapportionment — “One Man One Vote” — Local Government, 58 Ky. L.J. 599 (1970).

67.060. County commissioners — Election, term, qualifications.

  1. If a majority of the votes cast at an election held under KRS 67.050 are in favor of the fiscal court being composed of the county judge/executive and three (3) commissioners, the county judge/executive shall, no later than the first Monday in January in the year of the regular election for county officers, divide the county into three (3) districts as nearly equal in population as practicable, and shall establish the boundary lines of each of the three (3) commissioner districts so that each district is an unbroken area and not split or divided by another commissioner district. At the next regular election for county officers, and every four (4) years thereafter, there shall be elected by the voters of the entire county three (3) commissioners, one (1) from each district who, with the county judge/executive, shall constitute the fiscal court.
    1. In any county containing a city of the first class, which county has heretofore voted in favor of a fiscal court composed of the county judge/executive and three (3) county commissioners, the county judge/executive shall divide the county into three (3) districts as provided in subsection (1) of this section, the districts to be designated for identification purposes by the letters A, B and C, respectively. (2) (a) In any county containing a city of the first class, which county has heretofore voted in favor of a fiscal court composed of the county judge/executive and three (3) county commissioners, the county judge/executive shall divide the county into three (3) districts as provided in subsection (1) of this section, the districts to be designated for identification purposes by the letters A, B and C, respectively.
    2. The three (3) commissioners shall be elected by the qualified voters of the county at large at regular elections held every four (4) years. One commissioner shall represent District A and shall be elected at the regular election in the year 1973, and two (2) commissioners who shall represent Districts B and C, respectively, shall be elected at the regular election in the year 1975.
  2. Persons seeking the nomination of a political party as candidate for the office of county commissioner shall, where a primary election is required for such political party, be voted upon exclusively by the eligible voters of the district in which the person resides and seeks to represent. Persons seeking the nomination of a minor political party persons who file as independent candidates or persons seeking the nomination in counties containing a city with a population equal to or greater than eight thousand (8,000) as determined by the most recent federal decennial census but not a city of the first class shall not be subject to the provisions of this paragraph. They shall be nominated by the voters of the entire county.
  3. To be eligible for election as a commissioner representing one of the three (3) districts, a person shall have been a bona fide resident of the district he proposes to represent for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the election, and, upon election, shall continue to reside within the district he was elected to represent for the duration of his term of office, under penalty of forfeiture of the office.
  4. Commissioners elected under this section shall take the oath of office and enter upon the discharge of their duties on the first Monday in January after their election, and shall serve for terms of four (4) years and until their successors are elected and qualify, or until the effective date of a return to a fiscal court composed of justices of the peace and the county judge/executive.
  5. No person is eligible to be a county commissioner unless he is at least twenty-four (24) years of age and has been for two (2) years next preceding his election a resident of the county and a citizen of Kentucky.

History. 1847 to 1849, 1851b-1, 1851b-5, 1851b-8: amend. Acts 1972, ch. 300, § 1; 1974, ch. 2, § 1; 1974, ch. 47, § 1; 1976, ch. 355, § 1; 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 20, § 6, effective January 2, 1978; 1984, ch. 107, § 2, effective July 13, 1984; 1984, ch. 189, § 1, effective July 13, 1984; 2005, ch. 69, § 1, effective June 20, 2005; 2014, ch. 92, § 32, effective January 1, 2015.

Compiler’s Notes.

For this section as effective until January 1, 2015, see the preceding section also numbered KRS 67.060 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

The provision that the commissioners are to be elected from districts is constitutional. Hazelrigg v. Hazelrigg, 169 Ky. 345 , 183 S.W. 933, 1916 Ky. LEXIS 700 ( Ky. 1916 ).

2. Election.

Where election to provide for county commissioners was void, justices of the peace could maintain action to enjoin persons elected as commissioners from attempting to exercise functions of fiscal court. Hutchinson v. Miller, 158 Ky. 363 , 164 S.W. 961, 1914 Ky. LEXIS 611 ( Ky. 1914 ); Patterson v. Lawson, 255 Ky. 781 , 75 S.W.2d 507, 1934 Ky. LEXIS 330 ( Ky. 1934 ).

Cited:

Jefferson County Fiscal Court v. Grauman, 281 Ky. 608 , 136 S.W.2d 1102, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 93 ( Ky. 1940 ); Billiter v. Nelson, 300 S.W.2d 790, 1957 Ky. LEXIS 473 ( Ky. 1957 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

The commissioners elected are required to take the oath of office and enter upon the discharge of their duties on the first Monday in January after their election, and shall serve for terms of four years and until their successors are elected and qualified. OAG 60-439 .

When a county votes to adopt the commission form of government the county judge (now county judge/executive) is required to divide the county into three (3) districts as nearly equal in population as practicable before the next regular election for county officers, and at said election and every four (4) years thereafter, there is required to be elected by the voters of the entire county three commissioners, one from each district who, with the county judge (now county judge/executive), shall constitute the fiscal court. OAG 60-439 .

A county commissioner elected from a particular district must reside within said district. OAG 62-425 .

If a county commissioner were to move from the district from which he was elected, he would disqualify himeself and be subject to removal. OAG 62-425 .

An independent candidate for the office of county commissioner is not required to be a registered voter in order to run for or hold the office. OAG 67-366 .

The area of each commissioner’s district must be composed of adjacent territory which eliminates the possibility of a district that is divided or split so that a portion thereof is not contiguous to the rest of the district. OAG 73-22 .

As the fiscal court meets on the first and third Wednesday of each month and the justices of the peace, county judge (now county judge/executive) and commissioners, as members of the fiscal court, should hold over their offices until the newly elected members take office on January 7, 1974, the incumbent fiscal court could have a meeting on January 2, 1974, the first Wednesday of the month, before the newly elected members of the court take office. OAG 73-866 .

A commissioner of the fiscal court appointed by the governor, to fill the unexpired term of a deceased commissioner, who was 23 years of age instead of the required 24 years is a de facto officer and is also a usurper of the office and, while the acts of a de facto officer are valid as to third persons, he cannot himself acquire rights based upon his defective title and is not entitled to compensation or to maintain a suit to recover compensation attached to the office. OAG 75-26 .

The persons appointed by the governor to fill a vacancy occurring on a county commission must meet the one-year residency requirement and the person must continue to reside within the district throughout the duration of the term of his office. OAG 77-701 .

Pursuant to subsection (3) of this section, any candidate who desires to seek a party nomination in the primary for the office of county commissioner in a county must be nominated exclusively by the eligible voters of the district in which he resides and seeks nomination; and in the November election, though he runs from his district, he is voted upon by the county at large. OAG 80-116 .

This section clearly requires a county commissioner to be not only a bona fide resident of the district at the time of his election but also to continue to reside within the district for the duration of his term. OAG 82-230 .

Where a district is expanded due to redistricting during a commissioner’s term of office, there is no legal objection to said commissioner moving into that part of his district that has been added by virtue of redistricting and thereby continuing to remain a legal resident of the district, even though he no longer resides within the particular area of the district as constituted at the time of his election. OAG 82-230 .

Where pursuant to KRS 67.045 a reapportionment commission was appointed to reapportion county into eight magisterial districts by November 15, 1982, but on November 2, 1982 voters of the county chose to adopt a commission form of government, the reapportionment of the magisterial districts pursuant to KRS 67.045 had to be completed as directed and the present magistrates’ terms will continue to run through 1985 at which time justices of the peace will be elected for a new four year term; however, as elected justices they will not be on the new fiscal court, since under subsection (1) of this section prior to the next election in 1985 the county judge/executive is required to divide the county into three commissioner districts, and at the 1985 election and each four years thereafter the voters will elect three commissioners, one from each district, who with the county judge/executive, will constitute the fiscal court. The reapportionment of commissioners districts under this section relates strictly to commissioners who will make up the fiscal court beginning in January, 1986 and the reapportionment of the justices of the peace districts under KRS 67.045 will be merely to meet the mandate of Ky. Const., § 99, since because of the implications of such section the reapportionment procedure of KRS 67.045 would apply by implication to a county having a commission form of government. OAG 82-598 .

Unless a county embraced or contained within its boundaries a city of the third class in its entirety, such county would not come within the requirement of subsection (3) of this section that its county commissioners be nominated in the party primary by the voters of the entire county. The City of Corbin lies in only portions of the counties of Whitley and Knox and thus is embraced in neither; accordingly, commissioners of these two counties would continue to be nominated in party primaries by the eligible voters of the district in which they seek nomination and not by a county-wide vote. OAG 84-168 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Compensation of commissioners, KRS 64.530 .

Offices incompatible with county commissioner, KRS 61.080 .

Vacancies in elective offices, how filled, Ky. Const., § 152.

67.063. Reapportionment of commissioners’ districts. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1972, ch. 300, § 2; 1974, ch. 2, § 2; 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 47, effective January 1, 1978; 1978, ch. 384, § 143, effective June 17, 1978; 1980, ch. 188, § 43, effective July 15, 1980) was repealed by Acts 1982, ch. 29, § 2, effective July 15, 1982.

67.065. Composition of fiscal courts in counties having a population of 75,000 or over; election of commissioners; oath; eligibility. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 118, §§ 1 to 4) which was held unconstitutional in Billiter v. Nelson, 300 S.W.2d 790 (Ky. App. 1957), was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 255, § 283, effective June 16, 1966.

67.070. Fiscal courts having county commissioners, law governing — Special sessions — Tie vote.

  1. Except as provided in subsections (2) and (3) of this section, and as otherwise provided by law, all laws governing fiscal courts composed of the county judge/executive and the justices of the peace shall be applicable to fiscal courts composed of the county judge/executive and the county commissioners.
  2. When the county judge/executive is unable to call a special session, or refuses to do so on request of two (2) commissioners, two (2) commissioners may call it if, in their opinion, the necessity exists.
  3. When there is a tie vote in the fiscal court in the selection of any officer or employee to be selected by the fiscal court, and a deadlock results and continues for fifteen (15) days or longer, the county judge/executive shall cause to be entered upon the minutes of the fiscal court an order reciting the facts as to the deadlock, and the question upon which it has occurred and exists, and thereupon, unless an election is immediately made by the fiscal court, the county judge/executive shall appoint the officer or employee.

History. 1850, 1851b-6.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

Provision of law providing that county judge (now county judge/executive) could make appointments in case of a tie vote, was constitutional. Kirchdorfer v. Tincher, 204 Ky. 366 , 264 S.W. 766, 1924 Ky. LEXIS 458 ( Ky. 1924 ).

Provision of law permitting two (2) of the three (3) commissioners to break a tie, caused by the county judge (now county judge/executive) and one (1) commissioner voting opposite to other two (2) commissioners, was unconstitutional except insofar as it related to a tie vote on the question of appointing an officer or employee of the county. Kirchdorfer v. Tincher, 204 Ky. 366 , 264 S.W. 766, 1924 Ky. LEXIS 458 ( Ky. 1924 ).

County budget act was unconstitutional because it exempted counties having a fiscal court composed of commissioners. As far as general management of county affairs was concerned, there was no basis for distinguishing between counties having commissioners and those having magistrates. Felts v. Linton, 217 Ky. 305 , 289 S.W. 312, 1926 Ky. LEXIS 90 ( Ky. 1926 ).

Provision giving the county judge (now county judge/executive) the power to appoint in the case of a tie vote, is constitutional. Hill v. Taylor, 264 Ky. 708 , 95 S.W.2d 566, 1936 Ky. LEXIS 388 ( Ky. 1936 ).

2. Construction.

This section must be considered as an implied part of every statute relating to the appointment of officers or employees by fiscal courts. Hill v. Taylor, 264 Ky. 708 , 95 S.W.2d 566, 1936 Ky. LEXIS 388 ( Ky. 1936 ).

3. Application.

This section is not restricted to positions specifically created by the legislature. Cook v. Fihe, 358 S.W.2d 350, 1962 Ky. LEXIS 166 ( Ky. 1962 ).

This statute is restricted to situations in which a position is unoccupied and the question before the fiscal court is the selection of a person to occupy it. Cook v. Fihe, 358 S.W.2d 350, 1962 Ky. LEXIS 166 ( Ky. 1962 ).

4. Appointments.

Under law giving majority of commissioners power to make appointments in case of a tie vote, a majority of the commissioners did not have power to appoint a commissioner of the poorhouse, where a proper majority of the fiscal court had never made provision for the establishment of the office of poorhouse commissioner or for the duties and compensation of such office, although a poorhouse commissioner had been employed for many years under an invalid appointment by the county judge (now county judge/executive). Farmer v. Marr, 238 Ky. 417 , 38 S.W.2d 209, 1931 Ky. LEXIS 248 ( Ky. 1931 ).

Provision of law giving two (2) commissioners the right to make appointments in the case of a tie vote, did not apply to appointments provided by law to be made by the county judge (now county judge/executive) with the approval of the fiscal court. In such case a tie vote would only result in a failure to give approval. Bristow v. Shrout, 264 Ky. 125 , 94 S.W.2d 352, 1936 Ky. LEXIS 294 ( Ky. 1936 ).

County judge (now county judge/executive) could lawfully appoint county treasurer in case of a tie vote, notwithstanding former provision of law that a majority of the members of the fiscal court shall be necessary to select the county treasurer. Muenninghoff v. Marret, 269 Ky. 826 , 108 S.W.2d 878, 1937 Ky. LEXIS 673 ( Ky. 1937 ).

5. — Validity.

An appointment made by retiring fiscal court to take effect after the termination of period of office of its members is void. Mason County v. Condon, 280 Ky. 371 , 133 S.W.2d 527, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 134 ( Ky. 1939 ).

In action where two (2) parties each sought a judgment declaring himself to be the treasurer of Kenton County where one party was appointed by county judge (now county judge/executive) just as his term as commissioner of the fiscal court was ending following eight-month deadlock of fiscal court in attempting to name a county treasurer, such appointment was void even though his term as fiscal court commissioner was about to expire and even though subsection (3) of this section gives the county judge (now county judge/executive) power to appoint treasurer where the fiscal court fails to do so, for such appointment was not good public policy especially since commissioner had helped to keep the office vacant for nearly eight months. Smith v. McDermott, 313 Ky. 184 , 230 S.W.2d 636, 1950 Ky. LEXIS 844 ( Ky. 1950 ).

6. Re-employment.

Where fiscal court showed intention to continue county infirmary by providing in budget for superintendent, payment of superintendent who failed reelection by court, for two months after expiration of his term, was equivalent to his re-employment until his successor was named, or until he was discharged. Mason County v. Condon, 280 Ky. 371 , 133 S.W.2d 527, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 134 ( Ky. 1939 ).

Cited:

Mason County v. Condon, 280 Ky. 371 , 133 S.W.2d 527, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 134 ( Ky. 1939 ); Jefferson County Fiscal Court v. Grauman, 281 Ky. 608 , 136 S.W.2d 1102, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 93 ( Ky. 1940 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

The legislature has simply remained silent as to the resolution of deadlocks except in the situation involving the selection of any officer or employee to be selected by the fiscal court. OAG 65-236 .

Neither this section nor KRS 67.040 has application to deadlocks existing in the selection of members of the planning commission by the county judge (now county judge/executive) under the terms of KRS 100.141 . OAG 66-510 .

Since KRS 25.650 (now repealed) required a bond of at least $5,000 for a justice of the peace which bond covered both his judicial duties and his serving on a fiscal court, under subsection (1) of this section, the bonding provision of KRS 25.650 (now repealed) were made applicable to commissioners serving on a fiscal court and, to the extent that they conflict with this opinion, OAG 39-918 and 70-670 are hereby overruled. OAG 73-131 .

The county judge/executive does not have the power to break a tie vote of the fiscal court for the removal of either a county employee or a member of a board, commission or agency for the tie break procedure applies only to appointments, not to dismissals or firing. OAG 78-353 .

Where the fiscal court vote is tied on selection of personnel (officer or employe), either under the nomination and consent procedure or where fiscal court determines that appointment (under any preexisting statute), the county judge/executive may break the tie under KRS 67.070 (3). OAG 78-353 .

The special district budget forms properly used by the district should be considered as the operational budget, not merely as an informational document. OAG 80-628 .

67.075. Definitions.

For the purposes of this chapter, the following words shall have the following meanings:

  1. “County ordinance” means (a) an official written act of a fiscal court, the effect of which is general and lasting in nature, which is enforceable within the jurisdiction of the county; or (b) a lawful appropriation of money.
  2. “Summary” means a concise written narrative covering the main points of any official statement, certified as to its accuracy by the fiscal court and written in a way calculated to inform the public clearly of its contents. Summaries may be written for but are not limited to resolutions and ordinances.

History. Enact. Acts 1978, ch. 118, § 1, effective June 17, 1978.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Statute Validly Enacted.

County occupational tax ordinance was valid as it was enacted in substantial compliance with KRS 67.077(2), despite the failure of the county to obtain court approval of the published summary as required by KRS 67.075(2), as: (1) the summary was published in the official county newspaper, (2) the summary stated the time and place of the special meeting and the location at which the complete ordinance could be read, (3) the summary sufficiently covered the main points of the ordinance and clearly informed the public of its nature, and (4) the only provisions of the ordinance that were not included in the summary concerned the method of collection and enforcement of the tax, which were not main points of the ordinance. Knox County v. Hammons, 129 S.W.3d 839, 2004 Ky. LEXIS 74 ( Ky. 2004 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Were it not for KRS 97.035 , the establishment of a park system would be by ordinance, because it is a subject matter lasting in nature and general in character as a function in general government for the general public benefit, but the options as to legal format in KRS 97.035 (ordinance, order or resolution) govern here, since the statute deals with a specific subject, i.e., creation of a park system. OAG 78-783 .

KRS Chapter 100 must be read together with KRS 67.075 et seq., and KRS 67.083(3)(k) and statutes on the same subject, in pari materia, should be integrated so as to give effect to the legislative intention. OAG 78-815 .

KRS 67.083(3)(k), which speaks in terms of ordinances for zoning purposes, is a zoning statute to that extent and thus a zoning regulation in the form of a resolution would be in conflict with KRS 67.083(3)(k) and 67.075 et seq. OAG 78-815 .

On and after June 17, 1978, any zoning regulation action taken by a fiscal court in the form of a resolution, where KRS 67.076 et seq., and 67.083(3)(k) are not followed, as an effective legislative action, is void. OAG 78-815 .

Where a fiscal court had passed zoning regulations as resolutions, it could ratify them as ordinances and make them retroactive to the dates of the original measures. OAG 78-815 .

Since a fiscal court action relative to alteration of an existing road relates only to a specific road segment and not to the general road system of the county, it is not general in nature and, hence, not an ordinance. OAG 79-410 .

Where after the fiscal court had adopted the county budget through a formal ordinance enactment, the fiscal court wished to transfer some of the budgeted moneys from one budgeted fund to another, a fiscal court resolution or order would suffice to effect such a transfer so long as the resolution or order showed the nature of the emergency and the reason for making such a transfer. OAG 80-461 .

While an ordinance is partly defined in subsection (1) of this section as “an official written act of a fiscal court, the effect of which is general and lasting in nature,” subsection (1) of KRS 103.210 explicitly and clearly provides that the fiscal court may issue industrial revenue bonds by “ordinance or resolution”; accordingly, approval of a bond issue for a shopping center need not be in the form of an ordinance rather than a resolution even though the bonds are general and lasting in nature. OAG 81-409 .

While KRS 67.083(6)(c) provides that a county government may adopt ordinances which incorporate by reference state statutes and administrative regulations in areas in which a county government is authorized to act, that provision, standing alone, does not appear to mandate the approval of an administrative code by way of an ordinance; however, “county ordinance” is defined in subdivision (1) of this section as an official written act of fiscal court which is general and lasting in nature and since that description fits precisely an administrative code, the administrative code should be adopted by ordinance. OAG 82-77 .

A fiscal court can ratify an existing administrative code by simply enacting it in the form of an ordinance and making it retroactive to the date of the original code, subject to subsequent changes made. OAG 82-77 .

To the extent it might be said to be part of the funding mechanism, the formation of a county police force, and the appropriation of money for its operation, with the attendant required approval of the fiscal court, is a matter that must be addressed through a county ordinance. OAG 94-13 .

67.076. Use of county ordinance and resolution — Form — Amendment.

  1. No action embraced in the term “county ordinance” may be taken except by passage of a county ordinance. Other official actions, including but not limited to approvals required by the fiscal court, may be taken by resolution, order, or motion;
  2. All ordinances shall be introduced in writing;
  3. No county ordinance shall relate to more than one (1) subject, and each ordinance shall be prefaced in the following manner by a title which expresses that subject: “AN ORDINANCE relating to (the subject of the ordinance):”;
  4. There shall be inserted between the title and the body of each county ordinance an enacting clause written in the following manner: “Be it ordained by the fiscal court of county of  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , Commonwealth of Kentucky:”;
  5. County ordinances shall be amended by ordinance and only by setting out in full each amended section;
  6. No action of a fiscal court shall be invalidated because of improper denomination of a county ordinance or other written document, if the procedures required for taking the action have otherwise been observed.

History. Enact. Acts 1978, ch. 118, § 4, effective June 17, 1978.

Opinions of Attorney General.

The approval of claims filed against the county can be effected by a simple resolution or order of fiscal court. OAG 78.595.

Based upon the express language of the definition of “county ordinance” as contained in KRS 67.075 and the express wording of subsection (5) of this section, there can be no valid amendment of a proposed ordinance that has not been fully enacted and made into law as covered in KRS 67.075 through 67.078 ; therefore, subsection (5) of this section refers only to the amendment of county ordinances that have been enacted under the subject statutes and have already become local law, and the current statutes do not permit the amendment of a “proposed ordinance” that has not become the law. OAG 78-714 .

If a majority of the fiscal court felt the urgency of the immediate amendment of a proposed ordinance, the majority could, at the appropriate time, simply vote against the enactment of the ordinance as drafted; then, at a later time the originally proposed ordinance could be redrafted and run through the legislative procedure outlined in KRS 67.075 through 67.078 . OAG 78-714 .

KRS 67.075 through 67.078 carefully detail the procedure to be followed by fiscal courts in enacting ordinances, and nowhere in these statutes are there any provisions dealing concisely and explicitly with the procedural matter of amending an ordinance which has not been finally voted on and enacted, or the matter of the fiscal court’s determining any additional procedural rules, and in this detailed context the failure to include such procedural treatment means exclusion under the legal maxim “inclusio unius est exclusio alterius,” meaning the inclusion of one thing is the exclusion of another. OAG 78-714 .

Although a county fiscal court resolution approving the issuance of bonds for a shopping center could only become effective after publication in the precise manner set out in KRS 103.210 , the formalities of a county ordinance do not, under subsection (1) of this section, apply to a resolution of the fiscal court; accordingly, the requirement of two (2) readings applied by subsection (1) of KRS 67.077 to a county ordinance does not apply to a resolution. OAG 81-409 .

A fiscal court can ratify an existing administrative code by simply enacting it in the form of an ordinance and making it retroactive to the date of the original code, subject to subsequent changes made. OAG 82-77 .

While KRS 67.083(6)(c) provides that a county government may adopt ordinances which incorporate by reference state statutes and administrative regulations in areas in which a county government is authorized to act, that provision, standing alone, does not appear to mandate the approval of an administrative code by way of an ordinance; however, “county ordinance” is defined in KRS 67.075(1), as an official written act of fiscal court which is general and lasting in nature and since that description fits precisely an administrative code, the administrative code should be adopted by ordinance. OAG 82-77 .

If the county clerk’s office does not generate sufficient fees to pay, along with other necessary official expenses of the office, the necessary official telephone bills of the office, the fiscal court could, and probably would have a duty to, pay such expenses of the county clerk’s office from the county treasury. OAG 93-4 .

Reasonable expenses of the county clerk’s office (which would include bills for official telephone costs) are to be paid from the fees of the office. The fiscal court must approve (or disapprove) payment of claims against the county, which must be presented to the fiscal court by the county judge/executive. OAG 93-4 .

To the extent it might be said to be part of the funding mechanism, the formation of a county police force, and the appropriation of money for its operation, with the attendant required approval of the fiscal court, is a matter that must be addressed through a county ordinance. OAG 94-13 .

67.077. Treatment of proposed ordinance — Incorporation of material into ordinance by reference — Section not applicable to charter county, urban-county government, or consolidated local government. [Effective July 14, 2020]

  1. No county ordinance shall be passed until it has been read on two (2) separate days, but ordinances may be read by title and a summary only. A proposed ordinance may be amended by the fiscal court after its first reading and prior to its adoption. All amendments shall be proposed in writing, and only by setting out in full each amended section.
  2. No county ordinance shall be passed until it has been published pursuant to KRS Chapter 424. Prior to passage, ordinances may be published by summary. Publication shall include the time, date, and place at which the county ordinance will be considered, and a place within the county where a copy of the full text of the proposed ordinance is available for public inspection. Publication of amendments to a proposed ordinance shall be required, pursuant to KRS Chapter 424, prior to its adoption, and amendments shall be filed with the full text of the proposed ordinance that is available for public inspection. If consideration for passage is continued from the initial meeting to a subsequent date, no further publication shall be necessary if at each meeting the time, date, and place of the next meeting are announced.
  3. All county ordinances and amendments shall be published after passage and may be published in full or in summary form at the discretion of the fiscal court. If applicable, a sketch, drawing, or map, together with a narrative description written in layman’s terms, may be used in lieu of metes and bounds descriptions. If published in summary form, publication shall contain notice of a place in the county where the full text of the ordinance or amendment is available for public inspection.
  4. Traffic, building, housing, plumbing, electrical, safety, and other self-contained codes may be adopted by reference if a copy of the code is kept with the adopting ordinance and is made a part of the permanent records of the county.
  5. The provisions of this section shall not be applicable in counties that have pursuant to KRS 67.830 adopted a charter county form of government or pursuant to KRS Chapter 67A adopted an urban-county form of government or pursuant to KRS Chapter 67C adopted a consolidated local government.

History. Enact. Acts 1978, ch. 118, § 5, effective June 17, 1978; 1980, ch. 11, § 1, effective July 15, 1980; 1990, ch. 401, § 12, effective July 13, 1990; 2002, ch. 346, § 39, effective July 15, 2002.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Legislative Intent.

Obvious intent of KRS 67.077(2) is to ensure that no county ordinance is passed in secret or without reasonable notice to the public, and to effectuate this goal, the statute requires that the public be accurately informed of the time, date, and place for consideration of a proposed ordinance; by choosing to publish by summary, a county is required to construct a summary that accurately and sufficiently covers the main points of the ordinance, and it can only be assumed that certification by fiscal court is required to ensure that the published summary is not misleading and provides sufficient detail as to put the public on notice of the nature of the ordinance. Knox County v. Hammons, 129 S.W.3d 839, 2004 Ky. LEXIS 74 ( Ky. 2004 ).

2. Directory Provision.

KRS 67.077(2) is a directory provision and is satisfied by substantial compliance. Knox County v. Hammons, 129 S.W.3d 839, 2004 Ky. LEXIS 74 ( Ky. 2004 ).

3. Substantial Compliance Found.

County occupational tax ordinance was valid as it was enacted in substantial compliance with KRS 67.077(2), despite the failure of the county to obtain court approval of the published summary as required by KRS 67.075(2), as: (1) the summary was published in the official county newspaper, (2) the summary stated the time and place of the special meeting and the location at which the complete ordinance could be read, (3) the summary sufficiently covered the main points of the ordinance and clearly informed the public of its nature, and (4) the only provisions of the ordinance that were not included in the summary concerned the method of collection and enforcement of the tax, which were not main points of the ordinance. Knox County v. Hammons, 129 S.W.3d 839, 2004 Ky. LEXIS 74 ( Ky. 2004 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

In the absence of a constitutional or statutory rule of procedure the proceedings of fiscal court are governed by general parliamentary law. OAG 79-281 .

Although a county fiscal court resolution approving the issuance of bonds for a shopping center could only become effective after publication in the precise manner set out in KRS 103.210 , the formalities of a county ordinance do not, under subsection (1) of KRS 67.076 , apply to a resolution of the fiscal court; accordingly, the requirement of two (2) readings applied by subsection (1) of this section to a county ordinance does not apply to a resolution. OAG 81-409 .

67.077. Treatment of proposed ordinance — Incorporation of material into ordinance by reference — Section not applicable to charter county, urban-county government, or consolidated local government. [Effective July 15, 2020]

  1. No county ordinance shall be passed until it has been read on two (2) separate days, but ordinances may be read by title and a summary only. A proposed ordinance may be amended by the fiscal court after its first reading and prior to its adoption. All amendments shall be proposed in writing, and only by setting out in full each amended section.
  2. All county ordinances and amendments shall be published pursuant to KRS Chapter 424 after passage and may be published in full or in summary form at the discretion of the fiscal court. If applicable, a sketch, drawing, or map, together with a narrative description written in layman’s terms, may be used in lieu of metes and bounds descriptions. If published in summary form, publication shall contain notice of a place in the county where the full text of the ordinance or amendment is available for public inspection.
  3. Traffic, building, housing, plumbing, electrical, safety, and other self- contained codes may be adopted by reference if a copy of the code is kept with the adopting ordinance and is made a part of the permanent records of the county.
  4. The provisions of this section shall not be applicable in counties that have pursuant to KRS 67.830 adopted a charter county form of government or pursuant to KRS Chapter 67A adopted an urban-county form of government or pursuant to KRS Chapter 67C adopted a consolidated local government.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1978, ch. 118, § 5, effective June 17, 1978; 1980, ch. 11, § 1, effective July 15, 1980; 1990, ch. 401, § 12, effective July 13, 1990; 2002, ch. 346, § 39, effective July 15, 2002; 2020 ch. 87, § 4, effective July 15, 2020.

67.078. Quorum — Majority of fiscal court required to pass ordinance — Emergency acts — Effective date.

  1. Unless otherwise provided by statute, a majority of a fiscal court shall constitute a quorum and a majority of a quorum shall be sufficient to take action, except that a majority of the fiscal court shall be required to pass an ordinance. No meeting shall be held by the fiscal court without notice to all members thereof.
  2. A majority of the fiscal court may declare an emergency to exist by naming and describing the emergency, and thereafter may adopt a county ordinance to address that emergency without regard to the requirements of KRS 67.077 .
  3. All county ordinances and other official actions shall state the effective date thereof.

History. Enact. Acts 1978, ch. 118, § 6, effective June 17, 1978.

Opinions of Attorney General.

Where at least a quorum is present and votes on a proposition, those members who are present and do not vote will be considered as voting with the majority, which means that there must be at least a majority of the quorum voting on the proposition before the vote of the abstaining member is considered, and the vote of the abstaining member is merely added to the majority vote of the quorum, but for the vote to be considered controlling in the passing of a resolution or motion, it is necessary that when you add the positive vote of the majority of the quorum to the constructive vote of the member abstaining, the total must constitute a majority of those members actually present. OAG 78-616 .

Although this chapter requires a vote of a majority of the fiscal court to pass a zoning ordinance, the provisions of KRS 100.211 , which require a majority of the fiscal court to override the recommendation of a planning commission, would apply where there is a deadlock of the fiscal court in voting on a zoning amendment recommended by the planning commission, since these sections are in pari materia, and, thus, where there is a tie vote on a proposed zoning amendment, such tie vote does not result in a silent or constructive approval or enactment of the amendment. OAG 81-199 .

County can only take official action through the fiscal court by majority vote, and hence no individual magistrate can require county attorney to do anything in connection with county government. OAG 82-228 .

Although the county judge/executive has the unilateral authority to fix the dates of commencement of the regular terms of the fiscal court, no statute expressly provides the unilateral authority to designate the beginning time of regular meetings of the fiscal court; however, if the fiscal court properly passes a resolution providing, for example, that the regular term meetings of the fiscal court shall begin at 7:30 p.m., there being no statute to the contrary, it would be the duty of the county judge/executive to ensure the execution of such resolution. OAG 95-26 .

67.080. Powers of fiscal court.

  1. The fiscal court may:
    1. Appropriate county funds according to the provisions of KRS 68.210 to 68.360 for lawful purposes;
    2. Sell and convey any real estate or personal property belonging to the county, and buy land for the use of the county, when necessary, for the lawful purposes of the county as provided for in this section and KRS 67.083 . The fiscal court may appoint one (1) or more commissioners to sell or buy real estate under this subsection, subject to the approval of the fiscal court, and convey it to the purchaser, under the direction of the court, or have it conveyed to the court, by deed properly executed and recorded.
      1. When real property is purchased, the county shall pay no more than the highest appraised value, as determined by a Kentucky certified real property appraiser as defined in KRS 324A.010 , or the price determined through exercising the power of eminent domain, if that power is used. A valuation of the real property shall not be required if the purchase price is forty thousand dollars ($40,000) or less;
      2. When real property is conveyed or sold, the county shall convey or sell it in accordance with KRS 67.0802 ; and
      3. When personal property is conveyed or sold, the county shall convey or sell it in accordance with KRS 67.0802 ;
    3. Regulate and control the fiscal affairs of the county;
    4. Cause correct accounts and records to be kept of all receipts and disbursements of the public funds of the county, employ a competent person to keep such accounts and records, pay such person a reasonable compensation for such services, and have the accounts of the county and all county officers audited, when necessary and in accordance with the provisions of KRS 43.070 and 64.810 ;
    5. Exercise all the corporate powers of the county unless otherwise provided by law;
    6. Establish all appointive offices, set the duties of those offices, and approve all appointments to those offices; and
    7. Investigate all activities of the county government.
  2. The fiscal court shall:
    1. Appropriate county funds, according to the provisions of KRS 68.210 to 68.360 , for purposes required by law;
    2. As needed, cause the construction, operation, and maintenance of all county buildings and other structures, grounds, roads and other property;
    3. Adopt an administrative code for the county; and
    4. Provide for the incarceration of prisoners according to the provisions of KRS Chapter 441.
  3. The fiscal court shall not exercise executive authority except as specifically assigned by statute.

History. 927, 1834, 1840: amend. Acts 1946, ch. 21; 1956, ch. 248; 1966, ch. 191; 1974, ch. 6, § 1; 1978, ch. 118, § 2, effective June 17, 1978; 1982, ch. 385, § 25, effective July 1, 1982; 1984, ch. 141, § 11, effective July 13, 1984; 1986, ch. 51, § 4, effective July 15, 1986; 1992, ch. 290, § 1, effective July 14, 1992; 2000, ch. 223, § 1, effective July 14, 2000.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(12/14/94). 1992 Ky. Acts ch. 247, sec. 1, deleted the definition of Kentucky certified real property appraiser formerly contained in KRS 324A.010 and referenced in subsection (1) of this statute. Section 4 of that same Act created KRS 324A.035 , which requires the Real Estate Appraisers Board to establish by administrative regulation classifications of appraisers.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. In General.

One who deals with the agents of a county must look to the orders of the fiscal court for the agents’ authority. McKechnie v. Canada, 198 Ky. 807 , 250 S.W. 111, 1923 Ky. LEXIS 567 ( Ky. 1923 ).

Under this section it must be presumed that the fiscal court knows the number of deputies employed by the county clerk, the salaries they receive, and all other expenditures of his office. Land v. Lewis, 291 Ky. 800 , 165 S.W.2d 553, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 316 ( Ky. 1942 ).

2. Construction.

This section did not impliedly repeal prior special acts providing for city of Covington to furnish courthouse, jail and offices for county officers in the city. Covington v. Kenton County, 82 S.W. 392, 26 Ky. L. Rptr. 677 , 1904 Ky. LEXIS 367 (Ky. Ct. App. 1904).

This section did not impliedly repeal prior special acts providing for a courthouse district to furnish court facilities in the city of Newport. Commissioners for Courthouse Dist. v. City of Newport, 94 S.W. 629, 29 Ky. L. Rptr. 649 , 1906 Ky. LEXIS 335 (Ky. Ct. App. 1906).

Statutes authorizing fiscal court to expend funds raised by taxation will be strictly construed. Jefferson County Fiscal Court v. Jefferson County, 278 Ky. 68 , 128 S.W.2d 230, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 388 ( Ky. 1939 ).

This section and KRS 67.130 should be construed together to vest superior control of appropriations necessary for performance of jailer’s duties in fiscal court. Ball v. Scott, 281 Ky. 449 , 136 S.W.2d 48, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 44 ( Ky. 1940 ).

By the use of the word “may” in this section the legislature clearly intended not only to empower the fiscal courts to repair and keep in good condition the roads and bridges, but by implication they are placed under the duty to exercise some degree of care and diligence in the performance of such duties. Shearer v. Hall, 399 S.W.2d 701, 1965 Ky. LEXIS 31 ( Ky. 1965 ).

3. Powers and Duties.

The powers delegated to the fiscal court by this section appear to be entirely legislative and administrative powers, and therefore a county fiscal court is not an ordinary judicial tribunal. Lynch v. Johnson, 420 F.2d 818, 1970 U.S. App. LEXIS 11304 (6th Cir. Ky. 1970 ).

The county judge (now county judge/executive) and justices of the peace, when assembled as a fiscal court, do not act as conservators of the peace or in any judicial capacity, but in a legislative capacity, and they and their sureties are not liable for error in the performance of such legislative duties. Commonwealth v. Kenneday, 118 Ky. 618 , 82 S.W. 237, 26 Ky. L. Rptr. 504 , 1904 Ky. LEXIS 80 ( Ky. 1904 ).

For purpose of determining whether or not fiscal court has exceeded its power in creating new offices not provided for by statute, the nature of services to be performed by and not the title given to new employees is controlling. Veith v. Dunlap, 308 Ky. 386 , 214 S.W.2d 608, 1948 Ky. LEXIS 949 ( Ky. 1948 ).

The fiscal court does not have the power to purchase a steamboat under any of the powers enumerated in this section. Boone v. Cook, 365 S.W.2d 100, 1963 Ky. LEXIS 214 ( Ky. 1963 ).

Because KRS 67.080 vested sole authority with the judge/executive, the fiscal court lacked the authority to hire plaintiff for the position of “power plant liaison”. As a result, plaintiff was never legally hired to the position of “power plant liaison” and his claim for wrongful termination based on retaliation failed. Combs v. Knott County Fiscal Court, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29008 (E.D. Ky. Nov. 21, 2005).

4. — Implied.

Whether in a particular case there is a necessarily implied authority depends upon the facts of that case and the language of the statute. The controlling consideration is whether the particular implied authority is one having a logical and reasonable tendency toward the accomplishment of the expressly conferred authority. Commonwealth v. Fayette County, 239 Ky. 485 , 39 S.W.2d 962, 1931 Ky. LEXIS 804 ( Ky. 1931 ).

The fiscal court has such implied powers as are reasonably incidental and indispensable to the proper exercise of its specific powers, and to accomplish the purpose for which the fiscal court was created. Edwards v. Logan County, 244 Ky. 296 , 50 S.W.2d 83, 1932 Ky. LEXIS 393 ( Ky. 1932 ).

5. — Limitations.

Every person who deals with the fiscal court must take notice of the law and must know the extent of authority of the fiscal court in contracting with it. Farmer v. Marr, 238 Ky. 417 , 38 S.W.2d 209, 1931 Ky. LEXIS 248 ( Ky. 1931 ). See Leslie County v. Keith, 227 Ky. 663 , 13 S.W.2d 1012, 1929 Ky. LEXIS 944 ( Ky. 1929 ); Calvert v. Allen County Fiscal Court, 252 Ky. 450 , 67 S.W.2d 701, 1934 Ky. LEXIS 809 ( Ky. 1934 ); Goodlett v. Anderson County, 267 Ky. 166 , 101 S.W.2d 421, 1936 Ky. LEXIS 761 ( Ky. 1936 ).

6. — Delegation.

Fiscal court could not delegate to a committee of its members the broad power to pass on the merits of a claim against the county and to execute a note of the county for such sum as the committee should find due on the claim. Ohio County, Ky. v. Baird, 181 F. 49, 1910 U.S. App. LEXIS 4818 (6th Cir. Ky. 1910 ).

While the fiscal court may appoint committees to discharge mere ministerial duties, it cannot delegate to an agent or committee any function involving the exercise of a discretion vested in the fiscal court. Calvert v. Allen County Fiscal Court, 252 Ky. 450 , 67 S.W.2d 701, 1934 Ky. LEXIS 809 ( Ky. 1934 ).

The fiscal court cannot delegate to others its power to acquire land for road and bridge purposes. Calvert v. Allen County Fiscal Court, 252 Ky. 450 , 67 S.W.2d 701, 1934 Ky. LEXIS 809 ( Ky. 1934 ).

This section does not authorize the fiscal court to appoint an officer to assume its powers and duties with respect to caring for the poor and thus relieve itself of the responsibility. Graves County v. Dowdy, 258 Ky. 544 , 80 S.W.2d 597, 1935 Ky. LEXIS 209 ( Ky. 1935 ).

7. — Employment of Counsel.

Where county attorney appeals from order of fiscal court, the fiscal court may employ counsel to represent it on the appeal. Jefferson County v. Jefferson County Fiscal Court, 161 Ky. 538 , 170 S.W. 1171, 1914 Ky. LEXIS 89 ( Ky. 1914 ).

County is authorized to employ counsel to represent its interest. Lawrence County v. Stewart, 287 Ky. 827 , 155 S.W.2d 446, 1941 Ky. LEXIS 651 ( Ky. 1941 ).

Notwithstanding county attorney has primary duty to represent county’s interests, fiscal court may employ counsel to assist him, where in its judgment county attorney is unable fully to look after its interests. Lawrence County v. Stewart, 287 Ky. 827 , 155 S.W.2d 446, 1941 Ky. LEXIS 651 ( Ky. 1941 ).

8. — Ratification of Contracts.

Fiscal court may ratify any contract which it could have made in the first instance. Lawrence County v. Stewart, 287 Ky. 827 , 155 S.W.2d 446, 1941 Ky. LEXIS 651 ( Ky. 1941 ).

Counsel who had been employed by county attorney to conduct certain suits on behalf of county was entitled to recover his fees, since the contract of employment was not ultra vires of the county and had been ratified by fiscal court by order to pay such fees. Lawrence County v. Stewart, 287 Ky. 827 , 155 S.W.2d 446, 1941 Ky. LEXIS 651 ( Ky. 1941 ).

9. — Successor to Old Court of Claims.

The fiscal court took the place of the old court of claims and levy, existing prior to the present constitution, and where a special act relating to one county was still in force after the enactment of the present constitution the fiscal court could exercise the powers conferred on the court of claims and levy by that act. Pearce v. Mason County, 99 Ky. 357 , 35 S.W. 1122, 18 Ky. L. Rptr. 266 , 1896 Ky. LEXIS 94 ( Ky. 1896 ).

The powers of the fiscal court are largely those of the old court of claims. Stephens v. Wilson, 115 Ky. 27 , 72 S.W. 336, 24 Ky. L. Rptr. 1832 , 1903 Ky. LEXIS 67 ( Ky. 1903 ); Silbersack v. Kraft, 194 Ky. 587 , 240 S.W. 392, 1922 Ky. LEXIS 233 ( Ky. 1922 ).

10. — Review of Acts of Other Officers.

The county clerk and the county election commission are public agencies, and so long as they act within the limits of the authority conferred upon them by KRS 118.350 to 118.420 (repealed) their acts are the acts of the county and cannot be repudiated by the fiscal court. Ewing v. Hays, 257 Ky. 259 , 77 S.W.2d 946, 1934 Ky. LEXIS 553 ( Ky. 1934 ).

The fiscal court may review the actions of the county clerk and county election commissioners. Ewing v. Hays, 257 Ky. 259 , 77 S.W.2d 946, 1934 Ky. LEXIS 553 ( Ky. 1934 ).

11. — Void Election.

County commissioners elected following void election at which vote was in favor of having fiscal court composed of commissioners could be enjoined from attempting to exercise powers of fiscal court. Hutchinson v. Miller, 158 Ky. 363 , 164 S.W. 961, 1914 Ky. LEXIS 611 ( Ky. 1914 ).

12. — Liability.

The fiscal court, as such, cannot be indicted for failure to keep the county roads in repair; any criminal proceeding must be against the members of the fiscal court individually. Commonwealth v. Boyle County Fiscal Court, 113 Ky. 325 , 68 S.W. 116, 24 Ky. L. Rptr. 234 , 1902 Ky. LEXIS 47 ( Ky. 1902 ).

The fiscal court and its members are not liable to a person injured from defects in the county highways, bridges or other structures which the county is by law required to maintain. Simons v. Gregory, 120 Ky. 116 , 85 S.W. 751, 27 Ky. L. Rptr. 509 , 1905 Ky. LEXIS 85 ( Ky. 1905 ).

Where courthouse consisted of several stories, the fiscal court had the right to provide an elevator, and in so doing was performing a governmental function, so that fiscal court and its members were not liable for personal injuries resulting from defective condition of elevator. Simons v. Gregory, 120 Ky. 116 , 85 S.W. 751, 27 Ky. L. Rptr. 509 , 1905 Ky. LEXIS 85 ( Ky. 1905 ).

Acts of justice of the peace in certifying for payment the time sheets of road employees in his magisterial district were not in the performance of any duty imposed upon him as a member of the fiscal court; therefore the sureties on his official bond were not liable for sums fraudulently secured by justice in certifying false time sheets. Commonwealth use of Warren County v. Cox' Adm'r, 264 Ky. 327 , 94 S.W.2d 632, 1936 Ky. LEXIS 305 ( Ky. 1936 ).

Actions pursuant to subsection (2)(d) of this section against fiscal court members in their individual capacities are barred by sovereign immunity because, under KRS 441.045(1), the members’ function of adopting rules for the cleanliness and comfort of jails and the treatment of prisoners is a discretionary function. Franklin County v. Malone, 957 S.W.2d 195, 1997 Ky. LEXIS 105 ( Ky. 1997 ), overruled in part, Commonwealth Bd. of Claims v. Harris, 59 S.W.3d 896, 2001 Ky. LEXIS 198 ( Ky. 2001 ), overruled in part, Yanero v. Davis, 65 S.W.3d 510, 2001 Ky. LEXIS 203 ( Ky. 2001 ).

13. — Compensation of Illegal Appointees.

The fiscal court is without power to pay for the services of persons appointed to office when there was no express authority in law for their appointment. Woodruff v. Shea, 152 Ky. 657 , 153 S.W. 1005, 1913 Ky. LEXIS 722 ( Ky. 1913 ); Ray v. Woodruff, 168 Ky. 563 , 182 S.W. 662, 1906 Ky. LEXIS 277 ( Ky. 1906 ).

14. — Committees.

Committee of fiscal court had no power, in buying land for road purposes, to agree that county would make fills and levees within a certain time, and pay liquidated damages in case of default. Calvert v. Allen County Fiscal Court, 252 Ky. 450 , 67 S.W.2d 701, 1934 Ky. LEXIS 809 ( Ky. 1934 ).

Persons dealing with a committee of the fiscal court are charged with knowledge of all limitations upon the power of the committee. Calvert v. Allen County Fiscal Court, 252 Ky. 450 , 67 S.W.2d 701, 1934 Ky. LEXIS 809 ( Ky. 1934 ).

15. — Division of County.

A fiscal court had authority to adopt a resolution dividing a county into cable television districts. Akers v. Floyd County Fiscal Court, 556 S.W.2d 146, 1977 Ky. LEXIS 518 ( Ky. 1977 ).

16. Power to Bind Fiscal Court.

A judgment against the fiscal court, in a matter of general interest to the county, is binding on the taxpayers of the county. Stone v. Winn, 165 Ky. 9 , 176 S.W. 933, 1915 Ky. LEXIS 476 ( Ky. 1915 ).

The county election commission has the power to fix the compensation, within reasonable limits, of the clerical help employed by the county election commissioners to tabulate the vote, and the fiscal court must authorize payment of such compensation. Ewing v. Hays, 257 Ky. 259 , 77 S.W.2d 946, 1934 Ky. LEXIS 553 ( Ky. 1934 ).

17. Jurisdiction.

The fiscal court has no jurisdiction to try any litigated question, or to adjudge the rights to property. Bardstown & L. Turnpike Co. v. Nelson County, 117 Ky. 674 , 78 S.W. 851, 25 Ky. L. Rptr. 1900 , 1904 Ky. LEXIS 229 ( Ky. 1904 ).

The Constitution does not fix the jurisdiction of the fiscal court, but leaves it to the General Assembly to define the jurisdiction. Gross v. Fiscal Court of Jefferson County, 225 Ky. 641 , 9 S.W.2d 1006, 1928 Ky. LEXIS 849 ( Ky. 1928 ); Farmer v. Marr, 238 Ky. 417 , 38 S.W.2d 209, 1931 Ky. LEXIS 248 ( Ky. 1931 ); Rentz v. Campbell County, 260 Ky. 242 , 84 S.W.2d 44, 1935 Ky. LEXIS 440 ( Ky. 1935 ).

18. — Limitation.

The jurisdiction of the fiscal court is confined to the authority expressly conferred or necessarily implied by statute. City of Covington v. Kenton County, 82 S.W. 392, 26 Ky. L. Rptr. 677 , 1904 Ky. LEXIS 367 (Ky. Ct. App. 1904); Jefferson County v. Young, 120 Ky. 456 , 86 S.W. 985, 27 Ky. L. Rptr. 849 , 1905 Ky. LEXIS 116 ( Ky. 1905 ); American Car & Foundry Co. v. Johnson County, 147 Ky. 69 , 143 S.W. 773, 1912 Ky. LEXIS 190 ( Ky. 1912 ); Jefferson County v. Jefferson County Fiscal Court, 161 Ky. 538 , 170 S.W. 1171, 1914 Ky. LEXIS 89 ( Ky. 1914 ); Riddell v. Boone County, 183 Ky. 77 , 208 S.W. 323, 1919 Ky. LEXIS 440 ( Ky. 1919 ); Silbersack v. Kraft, 194 Ky. 587 , 240 S.W. 392, 1922 Ky. LEXIS 233 ( Ky. 1922 ); McKechnie v. Canada, 198 Ky. 807 , 250 S.W. 111, 1923 Ky. LEXIS 567 ( Ky. 1923 ); Commonwealth use of Scott County v. Nunnelley, 211 Ky. 409 , 277 S.W. 506, 1925 Ky. LEXIS 89 0 ( Ky. 1925 ); Bruner v. Jefferson County Fiscal Court, 239 Ky. 613 , 40 S.W.2d 271, 1931 Ky. LEXIS 831 ( Ky. 1931 ); Commonwealth v. Fayette County, 239 Ky. 485 , 39 S.W.2d 962, 1931 Ky. LEXIS 804 ( Ky. 1931 ); Commonwealth use of Daviess County v. Spurrier, 274 Ky. 464 , 118 S.W.2d 739, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 277 ( Ky. 1938 ); Bates v. Greenup County, 282 Ky. 268 , 138 S.W.2d 463, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 160 ( Ky. 1940 ); Asher v. Boatright, 294 Ky. 120 , 171 S.W.2d 27, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 398 ( Ky. 1943 ).

A fiscal court is a court of limited jurisdiction and may exercise only such power as the legislature had expressly or by necessary implication conferred upon it. Burns v. Moore, 307 Ky. 167 , 209 S.W.2d 735, 1948 Ky. LEXIS 680 ( Ky. 1948 ).

19. — Implied.

The implied power of the fiscal court is limited to the authority reasonably necessary to execute its express powers, or to discharge its express duties. Bruner v. Jefferson County Fiscal Court, 239 Ky. 613 , 40 S.W.2d 271, 1931 Ky. LEXIS 831 ( Ky. 1931 ).

20. — Revocation of Judicial and Executive Orders.

The fiscal court is an executive as well as a judicial body. When it acts judicially its judgments may not be set aside at a subsequent term, except upon the grounds on which judgments of other courts may be set aside. But when it acts in its executive capacity its orders stand just as the orders of any other executive body, and can be revoked by the fiscal court at any time. Sandy Hook Bank's Trustee v. Elliott County Fiscal Court, 248 Ky. 498 , 58 S.W.2d 637, 1933 Ky. LEXIS 247 ( Ky. 1933 ).

21. — Levy of Taxes.

The fact that in laying out magisterial districts a city in the county had not been given proper representation did not furnish grounds for attacking the jurisdiction of the fiscal court to levy a tax, in a collateral action, where the city had made no complaint as to the apportionment. McInerney v. Huelefeld, 116 Ky. 28 , 75 S.W. 237, 25 Ky. L. Rptr. 272 , 1903 Ky. LEXIS 173 ( Ky. 1903 ).

22. Appropriation.

An order of the fiscal court merely reciting that the funds received from the road tax should be apportioned among the magisterial districts on a pro rata basis was not a valid appropriation for road purposes, and did not authorize each magistrate to expend the money for road work in his district. McKechnie v. Canada, 198 Ky. 807 , 250 S.W. 111, 1923 Ky. LEXIS 567 ( Ky. 1923 ).

Good faith in the expenditure of county money is of no protection in the absence of a valid appropriation. McKechnie v. Canada, 198 Ky. 807 , 250 S.W. 111, 1923 Ky. LEXIS 567 ( Ky. 1923 ).

Neither the county judge (now county judge/executive) as such nor the county court have authority or power to appropriate public funds except in emergencies. McKechnie v. Canada, 198 Ky. 807 , 250 S.W. 111, 1923 Ky. LEXIS 567 ( Ky. 1923 ).

No valid appropriation can be made except by formal action of the fiscal court. No action taken by the individual members of the court can constitute a valid appropriation. McKechnie v. Canada, 198 Ky. 807 , 250 S.W. 111, 1923 Ky. LEXIS 567 ( Ky. 1923 ).

County judge (now county judge/executive) alone, without formal action of fiscal court, had no power to make arbitration agreement with property owner concerning damages for condemnation of land. Johnson County v. Castle, 229 Ky. 381 , 17 S.W.2d 260, 1929 Ky. LEXIS 769 ( Ky. 1929 ).

A county fiscal court had the authority to appropriate and expend county funds to purchase vehicles to be used by magistrates in performing their official duties. Concerned Citizens for Pike County v. County of Pike, 984 S.W.2d 102, 1998 Ky. App. LEXIS 125 (Ky. Ct. App. 1998).

23. — Purpose.

In making an appropriation, the order must specify not only the amount but also the purpose for which it is to be used. Flowers v. Logan County, 148 Ky. 822 , 147 S.W. 918, 1912 Ky. LEXIS 548 ( Ky. 1912 ).

Although order of fiscal court making appropriation must specify the purpose, language specifying the general purpose is sufficient, and parol evidence may be introduced to show the particular use within the general purpose for which the appropriation was made. Ray v. Woodruff, 168 Ky. 563 , 182 S.W. 662, 1906 Ky. LEXIS 277 ( Ky. 1906 ).

The fiscal court may not appropriate money for “incidentals,” without any indication of what kind of incidentals are contemplated. Ray v. Woodruff, 168 Ky. 563 , 182 S.W. 662, 1906 Ky. LEXIS 277 ( Ky. 1906 ).

The purpose of the rule requiring fiscal court appropriation orders to specifically state the purpose for which the appropriation is to be used is to permit the public, by examination of the record, to determine whether the appropriation was for a lawful purpose. If the order refers to a claim which may be inspected, the purpose of the rule is accomplished. Thompson v. Shipp, 298 Ky. 805 , 184 S.W.2d 245, 1944 Ky. LEXIS 1028 ( Ky. 1944 ).

Acquisition of an incinerator for garbage disposal of county, or a tract of land to be used as garbage disposal for county, was a “public project” and fiscal court could appropriate money for such project out of funds not required by law to be devoted to some other purpose, or could issue tax-free revenue bonds for such purpose. Fayette County Fiscal Court v. Fayette County, 314 Ky. 595 , 236 S.W.2d 455, 1950 Ky. LEXIS 1098 ( Ky. 1950 ).

Grants made by fiscal court from county tax revenues by direct payment to certain specified privately-owned schools designated as transportation subsidies violated Ky. Const., § 171, which provides that taxes shall be levied for public purposes only, and subsection (1) of KRS 61.080 , which provides that county funds may be appropriated only for lawful purposes. Fiscal Court v. Brady, 885 S.W.2d 681, 1994 Ky. LEXIS 88 ( Ky. 1994 ).

24. — Limitations.

The fiscal court has no power to appropriate county funds except for purposes expressly authorized by statute. Morgantown Deposit Bank v. Johnson, 108 Ky. 507 , 56 S.W. 825, 22 Ky. L. Rptr. 210 , 1900 Ky. LEXIS 6 8 ( Ky. 1900 ); Vaughn v. Hulett, 119 Ky. 380 , 84 S.W. 309, 27 Ky. L. Rptr. 35 , 1905 Ky. LEXIS 6 ( Ky. 1905 ); Mitchell v. Henry County, 124 Ky. 833 , 100 S.W. 220, 30 Ky. L. Rptr. 1051 , 1907 Ky. LEXIS 241 ( Ky. 1907 ); Jefferson County v. Peter, 127 Ky. 453 , 105 S.W. 887, 32 Ky. L. Rptr. 374 , 1907 Ky. LEXIS 143 ( Ky. 1907 ); Hollis v. Weissinger, 142 Ky. 129 , 134 S.W. 176, 1911 Ky. LEXIS 177 ( Ky. 1911 ); Woodruff v. Shea, 152 Ky. 657 , 153 S.W. 1005, 1913 Ky. LEXIS 722 ( Ky. 1913 ); Russell County v. Hill, 164 Ky. 360 , 175 S.W. 988, 1915 Ky. LEXIS 396 ( Ky. 1915 ); Ray v. Woodruff, 168 Ky. 563 , 182 S.W. 662, 1906 Ky. LEXIS 277 ( Ky. 1906 ); Mills v. Lantrip, 170 Ky. 81 , 185 S.W. 514, 1916 Ky. LEXIS 21 ( Ky. 1916 ); Allin v. Mercer County, 174 Ky. 566 , 192 S.W. 638, 1917 Ky. LEXIS 21 6 ( Ky. 1917 ); Commonwealth use of Scott County v. Nunnelley, 211 Ky. 409 , 277 S.W. 506, 1925 Ky. LEXIS 890 ( Ky. 1925 ); Jefferson County v. Jefferson County Fiscal Court, 220 Ky. 678 , 299 S.W. 209, 1927 Ky. LEXIS 642 ( Ky. 1927 ); Boyd County v. Boyd Fiscal Court, 247 Ky. 183 , 56 S.W.2d 959, 1933 Ky. LEXIS 368 ( Ky. 1933 ).

The fiscal court has no power to appropriate county funds except for purposes necessarily implied by imperative language. Fiscal Court of Jefferson County v. Pflanz, 127 Ky. 8 , 104 S.W. 1002, 31 Ky. L. Rptr. 1242 , 1907 Ky. LEXIS 112 ( Ky. 1907 ); Bath County v. United Disinfectant Co., 248 Ky. 111 , 58 S.W.2d 239, 1933 Ky. LEXIS 180 ( Ky. 1933 ); Jefferson County v. Jefferson County Fiscal Court, 269 Ky. 535 , 108 S.W.2d 181, 1937 Ky. LEXIS 635 ( Ky. 1937 ).

25. — Allocation.

Fiscal court had discretion in allocating appropriations, and could lawfully set aside certain portion of taxes for roads and bridges, another portion for current expenses, and the balance to meet indebtedness, with provision that small debts be paid in full first. Magoffin County v. Owens, 118 Ky. 783 , 82 S.W. 417, 26 Ky. L. Rptr. 715 , 1904 Ky. LEXIS 104 ( Ky. 1904 ).

26. — Collateral Attack.

Where the fiscal court acts within its discretion and within its authority in making an appropriation, and the order making the appropriation shows that it was one authorized by law, the order making the appropriation cannot be attacked collaterally. The money cannot be recovered from the person who received it in an action against him; the only remedy is by suit for injunction against the fiscal court. Ray v. Woodruff, 168 Ky. 563 , 182 S.W. 662, 1906 Ky. LEXIS 277 ( Ky. 1906 ).

Where fiscal court made appropriation to county clerk for services rendered by him as clerk of the fiscal court, the appropriation was one authorized by law, and it could not be attacked collaterally on the ground that the county clerk actually rendered no services. Ray v. Woodruff, 168 Ky. 563 , 182 S.W. 662, 1906 Ky. LEXIS 277 ( Ky. 1906 ).

If the fiscal court had authority to make an appropriation, the appropriation order can be questioned only on direct appeal, but if there was no authority of law for the appropriation, the order may be attacked collaterally and the money may be recovered in a suit against the person who received it. Mills v. Lantrip, 170 Ky. 81 , 185 S.W. 514, 1916 Ky. LEXIS 21 ( Ky. 1916 ).

Appropriations by fiscal court for payment of road improvement claims, authorized by law, cannot be collaterally attacked. Commonwealth use of Daviess County v. Spurrier, 274 Ky. 464 , 118 S.W.2d 739, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 277 ( Ky. 1938 ).

27. — Compelling by Mandamus.

The fiscal court has the duty to appropriate sufficient funds to maintain the county buildings, and if it fails to do so the jailer may maintain an action to compel the appropriation. Knott County Fiscal Court v. Duke, 157 Ky. 499 , 163 S.W. 459, 1914 Ky. LEXIS 309 ( Ky. 1914 ); Leslie County v. Hensley, 276 Ky. 679 , 125 S.W.2d 255, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 589 ( Ky. 1939 ).

A fiscal court may be compelled by mandatory order of the Circuit Court to appropriate a sufficient jailer’s allowance. Leslie County v. Hensley, 276 Ky. 679 , 125 S.W.2d 255, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 589 ( Ky. 1939 ).

Jailer has duty of superintending and supervising matters required under KRS 67.130 , and can compel the fiscal court to appropriate funds necessary for purposes therein specified, subject to the power of the fiscal court to pass upon the necessity. Ball v. Scott, 281 Ky. 449 , 136 S.W.2d 48, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 44 ( Ky. 1940 ).

28. Abuse of Discretion.

If the fiscal court had authority to make an appropriation, and the appropriation order is valid on its face, the question as to whether the fiscal court abused its discretion, or whether the person to whom the appropriation was made actually furnished the services or materials for which the appropriation was made, can be raised only by appeal from the order. Ray v. Woodruff, 168 Ky. 563 , 182 S.W. 662, 1906 Ky. LEXIS 277 ( Ky. 1906 ); Mills v. Lantrip, 170 Ky. 81 , 185 S.W. 514, 1916 Ky. LEXIS 21 ( Ky. 1916 ).

In making an appropriation for an infirmary the fiscal court has discretion as to the manner in which the appropriation shall be made effective, and the courts will not interfere with such discretion in the absence of corruptness or bad faith. Robinson v. Mercer Fiscal Court, 218 Ky. 452 , 291 S.W. 721, 1927 Ky. LEXIS 176 ( Ky. 1927 ).

29. — Appeal.

If county attorney considers appropriations by fiscal court to be illegal, he may appeal from the orders making the appropriations. Boyd County v. Boyd Fiscal Court, 247 Ky. 183 , 56 S.W.2d 959, 1933 Ky. LEXIS 368 ( Ky. 1933 ).

30. — Unlawful Appropriation and Refusal to Sue.

When the fiscal court makes an unlawful appropriation, and thereafter declines upon request to authorize the institution of an action to recover the money, the county court may direct the institution of an action in the name of the county by the county attorney. Hopkins County v. Givens, 96 S.W. 819, 29 Ky. L. Rptr. 993 (1906).

31. — Unauthorized.

Appropriation for special fee to county clerk was void as there was no provision for the payment of such fee. Morgantown Deposit Bank v. Johnson, 108 Ky. 507 , 56 S.W. 825, 22 Ky. L. Rptr. 210 , 1900 Ky. LEXIS 68 ( Ky. 1900 ).

Appropriation for salary to road overseers held invalid. Vaughn v. Hulett, 119 Ky. 380 , 84 S.W. 309, 27 Ky. L. Rptr. 35 , 1905 Ky. LEXIS 6 ( Ky. 1905 ).

Where a statute provides that certain duties shall be performed by a county officer, but fixes no compensation for such services, the fiscal court has no authority to appropriate money to pay a compensation. Young v. Jefferson County, 100 S.W. 335, 30 Ky. L. Rptr. 1209 (1907). See Morgantown Deposit Bank v. Johnson, 108 Ky. 507 , 56 S.W. 825, 22 Ky. L. Rptr. 210 , 1900 Ky. LEXIS 6 8 ( Ky. 1900 ); Vaughn v. Hulett, 119 Ky. 380 , 84 S.W. 309, 27 Ky. L. Rptr. 35 , 1905 Ky. LEXIS 6 ( Ky. 1905 ); Mills v. Lantrip, 170 Ky. 81 , 185 S.W. 514, 1916 Ky. LEXIS 21 ( Ky. 1916 ).

Appropriation for salary to county surveyor held invalid. Young v. Jefferson County, 100 S.W. 335, 30 Ky. L. Rptr. 1209 (1907).

Appropriation for postage for board of tax supervisors held invalid. Ray v. Woodruff, 168 Ky. 563 , 182 S.W. 662, 1906 Ky. LEXIS 277 ( Ky. 1906 ).

Appropriation of salary of extra deputy for juvenile court held invalid. Ray v. Woodruff, 168 Ky. 563 , 182 S.W. 662, 1906 Ky. LEXIS 277 ( Ky. 1906 ).

Appropriation for special allowance to clerk of fiscal court held invalid. Mills v. Lantrip, 170 Ky. 81 , 185 S.W. 514, 1916 Ky. LEXIS 21 ( Ky. 1916 ).

The fiscal court has power to purchase an adding machine for its use and for the use of the county clerk. Cain v. Burroughs Adding Mach. Co., 180 Ky. 567 , 203 S.W. 315, 1918 Ky. LEXIS 106 ( Ky. 1918 ).

Appropriations for allowances to sheriff for premium on official bond, expenses of deputies in making arrests, post office box rent, expenses of automobile and taking up and destroying dogs were invalid as such items were too indefinite to permit payment. Commonwealth use of Scott County v. Nunnelley, 211 Ky. 409 , 277 S.W. 506, 1925 Ky. LEXIS 890 ( Ky. 1925 ).

Fiscal court had no authority to appropriate county funds for expenses of county welfare director in attending National Conference of Social Workers. Jefferson County ex rel Grauman v. Jefferson County Fiscal Court, 269 Ky. 768 , 108 S.W.2d 810, 1937 Ky. LEXIS 668 ( Ky. 1937 ).

This section does not authorize a fiscal court to make appropriations for a floodwall, the sole method for protecting lives and property from floods being that provided by KRS Ch. 266. Jefferson County Fiscal Court v. Jefferson County, 278 Ky. 68 , 128 S.W.2d 230, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 388 ( Ky. 1939 ).

A fiscal court has no power to appropriate county funds for the purpose of contracting with a city to furnish fire protection for property that is publicly owned but not owned by the county. Jefferson County Fiscal Court v. Jefferson County, 278 Ky. 785 , 129 S.W.2d 554, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 497 ( Ky. 1939 ).

The fiscal court may not appropriate money to the State Board of Health, nor contract with the State Board of Health for medical aid to the citizens of the county, except pursuant to the provisions of KRS 212.040 to 212.270 . Estill County v. Noland, 292 Ky. 698 , 167 S.W.2d 707, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 146 ( Ky. 1942 ).

County was not authorized to contribute with city to cost of constructing proposed sewer to correct and eliminate unhealthful and unsanitary condition caused by series of pools in creek bend catching and holding water which had a tendency to become stagnant and emit obnoxious odors. Kenton County v. Covington, 302 Ky. 503 , 195 S.W.2d 93, 1946 Ky. LEXIS 714 ( Ky. 1946 ).

32. — Authorized.

Where statute specifically authorized counties to erect armories, the fiscal court had the power to provide heat, light and janitor service for the county armory, and to make appropriations for that purpose. Fiscal Court of Jefferson County v. Pflanz, 127 Ky. 8 , 104 S.W. 1002, 31 Ky. L. Rptr. 1242 , 1907 Ky. LEXIS 112 ( Ky. 1907 ).

The fiscal court has the power to purchase electric fans for the office of the county clerk in the courthouse. Hollis v. Weissinger, 142 Ky. 129 , 134 S.W. 176, 1911 Ky. LEXIS 177 ( Ky. 1911 ).

The power of the fiscal court to appropriate county funds for the benefit of infirmaries includes the power to appropriate county funds to assist a privately-owned hospital in the county; the fact that the money will be spent by the hospital officials without control by the fiscal court is no objection. Robinson v. Mercer Fiscal Court, 218 Ky. 452 , 291 S.W. 721, 1927 Ky. LEXIS 176 ( Ky. 1927 ).

A fiscal court may appropriate county funds to the Community Chest of a city located within the county. Jefferson County v. Jefferson County Fiscal Court, 220 Ky. 678 , 299 S.W. 209, 1927 Ky. LEXIS 642 ( Ky. 1927 ).

The authority of counties to appropriate funds for infirmaries authorizes appropriation to a private hospital to be used by its authorities rather than by public officials. But a county having adequate funds may acquire a hospital by purchase. Booth v. Owensboro, 274 Ky. 325 , 118 S.W.2d 684, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 258 ( Ky. 1938 ).

33. — Purchase of Land.

This section and KRS 70.540 to 70.570 (KRS 70.545 to 70.570 now repealed) do not give, either expressly or impliedly, to the fiscal court such authority that it can appropriate money for purchase of land to be conveyed, for consideration of $1.00, to commonwealth to be used as a site for district headquarters of state police. Hogge v. Rowan County Fiscal Court, 313 Ky. 387 , 231 S.W.2d 8, 1950 Ky. LEXIS 862 ( Ky. 1950 ).

34. — Holding Court.

Fiscal court under subsection (4) of this section had the right to appropriate necessary funds to purchase robes to be worn by circuit judges of the county during conduct of trials and hearings. Tierney v. Shamburger, 266 S.W.2d 339, 1954 Ky. LEXIS 814 ( Ky. 1954 ) (Decision prior to 1978 amendment).

35. Expenditures.
36. — Specified.

An officer to whom money appropriated by the fiscal court is entrusted for expenditure may spend the money only for the purpose specified in the appropriation order, and if he spends it for some other purpose he may not receive credit even though the county benefited thereby. Flowers v. Logan County, 148 Ky. 822 , 147 S.W. 918, 1912 Ky. LEXIS 548 ( Ky. 1912 ).

37. — Surplus Funds.

When the county has a surplus for any year, over and above its obligations for that year, it may expend such surplus for any valid purpose, and need not apply it to the extinguishment of debts carried over from previous years. Falls City Const. Co. v. Fiscal Court of Wolfe County, 160 Ky. 623 , 170 S.W. 26, 1914 Ky. LEXIS 524 ( Ky. 1914 ).

38. — Unauthorized.

It is improper to make county funds available to individual members of fiscal court as committees to spend as they see fit, although general purpose of expenditures is limited. Flowers v. Logan County, 138 Ky. 59 , 127 S.W. 512, 1910 Ky. LEXIS 41 ( Ky. 1910 ).

Where money lawfully appropriated by the fiscal court was spent for lawful purposes, but in an unlawful manner, and the manner of making such expenditures had been acquiesced in for a number of years, the county could not recover the money so spent from the person who expended it on behalf of the county. Flowers v. Logan County, 138 Ky. 59 , 127 S.W. 512, 1910 Ky. LEXIS 41 ( Ky. 1910 ).

Fiscal court could not allow sheriff credit for “advertising,” “stamps, stationery and books,” or “incidental expenses,” such items being too indefinite to indicate statutory authorization. Commonwealth use of Scott County v. Nunnelley, 211 Ky. 409 , 277 S.W. 506, 1925 Ky. LEXIS 890 ( Ky. 1925 ).

In settling sheriff’s accounts, the fiscal court has no authority to allow sheriff credit for expenditures not specifically authorized to be made for the county by the sheriff. Commonwealth use of Scott County v. Nunnelley, 211 Ky. 409 , 277 S.W. 506, 1925 Ky. LEXIS 890 ( Ky. 1925 ).

Claims for county poor farm are necessary and indispensable governmental expenses. First Nat'l Bank v. Hays, 288 Ky. 297 , 156 S.W.2d 121, 1941 Ky. LEXIS 95 ( Ky. 1941 ).

39. — Employment of Agents.

The fiscal court may employ an agent to perform the ministerial part of expending an appropriation made for an authorized purpose. Jefferson County v. Jefferson County Fiscal Court, 220 Ky. 678 , 299 S.W. 209, 1927 Ky. LEXIS 642 ( Ky. 1927 ).

40. — Refusal to Make.

County board of health has authority to impose liability on county for necessary expenses of controlling contagious disease, and fiscal court may refuse to pay only such expenses as are unreasonable. City of Bardstown v. Nelson County, 78 S.W. 169, 25 Ky. L. Rptr. 1478 (1904).

41. — Sheriff’s Expenses.

Fiscal court is liable for telephone rental and long distance calls of sheriff and for cost of books for records required to be kept by law. Barkley v. Gatewood, 285 Ky. 179 , 147 S.W.2d 373, 1941 Ky. LEXIS 356 ( Ky. 1941 ).

Fiscal court of county containing a city of the second class had no authority to pay premiums on sheriff’s official bond required by KRS 70.020 . Thompson v. Shipp, 298 Ky. 805 , 184 S.W.2d 245, 1944 Ky. LEXIS 1028 ( Ky. 1944 ).

42. Police Force.

A judicial court may not order a county fiscal court to appropriate “adequate” funding for the operation of a statutorily authorized county police force. Fiscal Court of Taylor County v. Taylor County Metro Police, 805 S.W.2d 113, 1991 Ky. LEXIS 21 ( Ky. 1991 ).

43. Claims.
44. — Purpose.

Where orders of fiscal court allowing certain claims of the sheriff referred to and incorporated by reference the “claim as recommended by the institutions committee,” and the claims so adopted stated the purpose for which the appropriation was requested, the orders were sufficiently specific. Thompson v. Shipp, 298 Ky. 805 , 184 S.W.2d 245, 1944 Ky. LEXIS 1028 ( Ky. 1944 ).

45. — Compelling Payment.

If the fiscal court incurs a valid obligation, the county treasurer may be compelled by mandamus to pay it. Cain v. Burroughs Adding Mach. Co., 180 Ky. 567 , 203 S.W. 315, 1918 Ky. LEXIS 106 ( Ky. 1918 ).

46. — Statute of Limitations.

Claim of county against county clerk who had never been required to make annual settlement for money allegedly received by him in excess of his salary was based upon implied contract and as five year statute of limitations of KRS 413.120 began to run from date clerk’s settlement with county was due, January 1, 1946, where county brought suit for surplus allegedly owing for 1945 on August 2, 1951, claim was barred. Greenup County v. Millis, 303 S.W.2d 898, 1957 Ky. LEXIS 272 ( Ky. 1957 ).

47. — Illegally Presented Claim.

When a claim allowed by the fiscal court is not legally presented, or is unjust, the county attorney may appeal to the Circuit Court on behalf of the county, without being ordered to do so by either the county court or the fiscal court. Perry County v. McIntosh, 280 Ky. 223 , 133 S.W.2d 90, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 124 ( Ky. 1939 ).

48. — Itemized.

Claims against fiscal court for fees must be itemized and the statutory provisions for payment must be pointed out. Goodlett v. Anderson County, 267 Ky. 166 , 101 S.W.2d 421, 1936 Ky. LEXIS 761 ( Ky. 1936 ).

49. — Refusal.

The fiscal court has discretion to refuse to allow claims of election commissioners for various employees other than the necessary clerks and tabulators authorized by statute to be employed. Ewing v. Hays, 257 Ky. 259 , 77 S.W.2d 946, 1934 Ky. LEXIS 553 ( Ky. 1934 ).

50. — Recovery.

Where fiscal court had no authority to allow a certain claim, it can later revoke its order allowing the claim and the county can recover the money from the person to whom it was paid. Morgantown Deposit Bank v. Johnson, 108 Ky. 507 , 56 S.W. 825, 22 Ky. L. Rptr. 210 , 1900 Ky. LEXIS 68 ( Ky. 1900 ); Pulaski County v. Richardson, 225 Ky. 556 , 9 S.W.2d 523, 1928 Ky. LEXIS 816 ( Ky. 1928 ).

If the fiscal court pays the claim of an officer without authority, or appropriates money without authority, the amount so paid may be recovered in a suit against the person or officer receiving it. Ray v. Woodruff, 168 Ky. 563 , 182 S.W. 662, 1906 Ky. LEXIS 277 ( Ky. 1906 ).

Where fiscal court pays the claim of an officer without authority, or appropriates money without authority the amount so paid may be recovered in a suit against the person or officer and such recovery may be in an independent action, without an appeal having been taken from the order of the fiscal court. Goodlett v. Anderson County, 267 Ky. 166 , 101 S.W.2d 421, 1936 Ky. LEXIS 761 ( Ky. 1936 ).

51. — Taxpayer’s Action.

Although taxpayer, under particular circumstances, had right to maintain action to recover sums due county, the fiscal court nevertheless retained the right to compromise the claims, and a compromise made in good faith pending the taxpayer’s action would be a good defense to the action. Shipp use of Fayette County v. Rodes, 219 Ky. 349 , 293 S.W. 543, 1927 Ky. LEXIS 348 ( Ky. 1927 ).

52. — Allowance.

In allowing claims against the county the fiscal court is an auditing body, acting ministerially. When a claim is presented to it, it passes on the fact whether its consideration has been received on the county’s behalf, and whether the amount claimed is that previously agreed upon or allowed by law. The allowance is not conclusive, but may be appealed from, and on appeal the fiscal court is not concluded by the allowance. Owen County v. Walker, 141 Ky. 516 , 133 S.W. 236, 1911 Ky. LEXIS 43 ( Ky. 1911 ); Knott County Fiscal Court v. Duke, 157 Ky. 499 , 163 S.W. 459, 1914 Ky. LEXIS 309 ( Ky. 1914 ).

The fiscal court, in allowing claims of the county election commissioners for clerical help, acts judicially, and has a discretion in passing on the reasonableness and necessity of the number of helpers employed and the amount of compensation fixed by the election commissioners. The fiscal court may not arbitrarily disallow such claims, but must allow such as are reasonable and proper. Ewing v. Hays, 257 Ky. 259 , 77 S.W.2d 946, 1934 Ky. LEXIS 553 ( Ky. 1934 ).

53. — Compromise.

Fiscal court has right to compromise claims due county, notwithstanding pending action by taxpayer to collect claims for county, but compromise must be made in good faith, and not fraudulently. Acceptance by fiscal court of less amount than that admitted to be due, or less than amount offered in compromise offer by debtor, or compromise made for purpose of concealing true liability, would not be good faith. Shipp use of Fayette County v. Rodes, 219 Ky. 349 , 293 S.W. 543, 1927 Ky. LEXIS 348 ( Ky. 1927 ).

Fiscal court may dismiss action brought to recover on claims due county, notwithstanding objection of taxpayers seeking to intervene, as long as the fiscal court acts in good faith. Commonwealth use of Fleming County v. Plummer, 235 Ky. 506 , 31 S.W.2d 897, 1930 Ky. LEXIS 404 ( Ky. 1930 ).

54. — Validity.

The fiscal court may not revoke an order once made for the payment of a valid claim. Pulaski County v. Richardson, 225 Ky. 556 , 9 S.W.2d 523, 1928 Ky. LEXIS 816 ( Ky. 1928 ).

When a claim has been allowed by the fiscal court and the allowance is attacked, the validity of the claim must be determined from the claim as stated, and it cannot be supported by evidence that the claim was actually for something else. Taylor v. Jones, 253 Ky. 285 , 69 S.W.2d 372, 1934 Ky. LEXIS 648 ( Ky. 1934 ).

55. — Invalid, Effect.

If the fiscal court allows an invalid claim, its action is absolutely void. Taylor v. Jones, 253 Ky. 285 , 69 S.W.2d 372, 1934 Ky. LEXIS 648 ( Ky. 1934 ); Goodlett v. Anderson County, 267 Ky. 166 , 101 S.W.2d 421, 1936 Ky. LEXIS 761 ( Ky. 1936 ).

56. — Liability of Court Members.

Individual members of fiscal court are not personally liable for unauthorized payments to person employed without statutory authority, unless in making the payments the court used money that had been appropriated for another purpose. Woodruff v. Shea, 152 Ky. 657 , 153 S.W. 1005, 1913 Ky. LEXIS 722 ( Ky. 1913 ).

57. Settlements.

In action by county against sheriff and sureties, to collect sums due on settlement of sheriff’s accounts, it was not necessary to allege that fiscal court had directed county attorney or some other attorney to bring action. Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Breathitt County, 276 Ky. 173 , 123 S.W.2d 250, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 538 ( Ky. 1938 ).

Payment of funds received by county clerk in excess of his salary and expenses to county after audit was not binding on county as final settlement where county showed no acceptance or approval of amount as final settlement, and clerk did not seriously contend that the amount was tendered by him as a final settlement. Greenup County v. Millis, 303 S.W.2d 898, 1957 Ky. LEXIS 272 ( Ky. 1957 ).

The fiscal court is fully vested with the power to have settlements audited. Madison County v. Arnett, 360 S.W.2d 208, 1962 Ky. LEXIS 216 ( Ky. 1962 ).

58. Real Estate.
59. — Conveyance.

County may convey land to corporation under plan pursuant to which corporation will issue bonds and erect courthouse, which county will rent from year to year and which county may eventually acquire by reason of application of rental payments to agreed purchase price. Sizemore v. Clay County, 268 Ky. 712 , 105 S.W.2d 841, 1937 Ky. LEXIS 521 ( Ky. 1937 ).

Where a conveyance of real property to a county contains no restrictions as to its use and county owns land in fee, former subsection (2) (now subsection (1)(b)) of this section gives the fiscal court complete power and authority to deal with the property, including the right to sell or lease to private persons and therefore, fiscal court could lease land to blind person for construction of building in which to conduct his business. Burns v. Moore, 307 Ky. 167 , 209 S.W.2d 735, 1948 Ky. LEXIS 680 ( Ky. 1948 ).

60. — Lease.

The power to sell includes the power to lease. Abernathy v. Irvine, 355 S.W.2d 159, 1961 Ky. LEXIS 16 ( Ky. 1961 ), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 831, 83 S. Ct. 49, 9 L. Ed. 2d 67, 1962 U.S. LEXIS 649 (U.S. 1962).

61. — Recovery of Possession.

Notwithstanding the provisions of KRS 67.130 , the fiscal court, under its power to control the property of the county, may bring such actions with reference to the county buildings as it deems necessary, including an action of forcible detainer to recover possession of a room in the courthouse. Owen County v. Greene, 129 Ky. 750 , 112 S.W. 854, 1908 Ky. LEXIS 212 ( Ky. 1908 ).

Where the fiscal court has leased county property to private persons, the fiscal court has sole authority to bring action to recover possession from the lessees, and the jailer has no authority, under KRS 67.130 , to maintain an action to recover possession without the advice or consent of the fiscal court. Bath County v. Denton, 162 Ky. 47 , 171 S.W. 1000, 1915 Ky. LEXIS 6 ( Ky. 1915 ).

62. Public Buildings.

“County buildings” means such buildings as the courthouse, clerk’s office and jail. Fiscal Court of Jefferson County v. Pflanz, 127 Ky. 8 , 104 S.W. 1002, 31 Ky. L. Rptr. 1242 , 1907 Ky. LEXIS 112 ( Ky. 1907 ).

A county armory is not a “county building” within the meaning of this section, and the jailer is not required to perform any duties with regard to the armory. Fiscal Court of Jefferson County v. Pflanz, 127 Ky. 8 , 104 S.W. 1002, 31 Ky. L. Rptr. 1242 , 1907 Ky. LEXIS 112 ( Ky. 1907 ).

The jailer may not expend any money to maintain the county buildings, under KRS 67.130 , unless the fiscal court has first appropriated the money for that purpose, and has authorized the particular expenditures. Knott County Fiscal Court v. Duke, 157 Ky. 499 , 163 S.W. 459, 1914 Ky. LEXIS 309 ( Ky. 1914 ).

There is no statutory or constitutional provision requiring fiscal court to furnish magistrates courtrooms or offices within county courthouse, therefore, order of fiscal court requiring magistrates to pay rent for office space in county courthouse and to vacate courthouse by certain date was valid. Fayette County v. Fayette County Fiscal Court, 317 S.W.2d 162, 1958 Ky. LEXIS 71 ( Ky. 1958 ).

63. — Courthouse.

The only power and obligation of the fiscal court is to provide a courthouse and jail at the county seat; it has no power or duty to furnish a place for holding court or a jail in another city in the county. City of Covington v. Kenton County, 82 S.W. 392, 26 Ky. L. Rptr. 677 , 1904 Ky. LEXIS 367 (Ky. Ct. App. 1904).

Fact that existing courthouse is in an unsafe condition is not such an emergency as to justify the fiscal court in incurring an indebtedness for a new courthouse in excess of the income for the current year, without a popular vote. Bradford v. Fiscal Court of Bracken County, 159 Ky. 544 , 167 S.W. 937, 1914 Ky. LEXIS 864 ( Ky. 1914 ).

Fiscal court may lawfully provide for the construction of a courthouse piecemeal, from year to year, out of the annual income as it is collected. Falls City Const. Co. v. Fiscal Court of Wolfe County, 160 Ky. 623 , 170 S.W. 26, 1914 Ky. LEXIS 524 ( Ky. 1914 ).

64. — Repair.

The fiscal court, and not the jailer, has the duty of keeping the public buildings in repair. (See KRS 67.130 ). Frizzell v. Holmes, 131 Ky. 373 , 115 S.W. 246, 1909 Ky. LEXIS 36 ( Ky. 1909 ).

The fiscal court had authority to purchase a fire truck, under its power to keep public buildings “in repair.” Commonwealth v. Fayette County, 239 Ky. 485 , 39 S.W.2d 962, 1931 Ky. LEXIS 804 ( Ky. 1931 ).

65. — Hospital.

Fiscal court has authority to purchase hospital building for county out of funds on hand, and is not required to follow the procedure of issuing bonds provided by former KRS 216.010 to 216.050 (now repealed). Combs v. Center, 234 Ky. 364 , 28 S.W.2d 37, 1930 Ky. LEXIS 186 ( Ky. 1930 ).

66. — Court Facilities for City.

Fiscal court of Campbell County has no duty to furnish court facilities in the city of Newport. Commissioners for Courthouse Dist. v. City of Newport, 94 S.W. 629, 29 Ky. L. Rptr. 649 , 1906 Ky. LEXIS 335 (Ky. Ct. App. 1906).

67. — Building Committee.

Building committee appointed by fiscal court to supervise erection of courthouse had no authority to make changes in contract, such power being solely in fiscal court. Allen County v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 122 Ky. 825 , 93 S.W. 44, 29 Ky. L. Rptr. 356 , 1906 Ky. LEXIS 105 ( Ky. 1906 ).

68. Jail.

Jailer has no authority to incur obligation for necessary supplies for jail without specific authorization from the fiscal court. If the fiscal court refuses, on his application, to authorize the expenditure, the jailer may either appeal or apply for a writ of mandamus. Bath County v. United Disinfectant Co., 248 Ky. 111 , 58 S.W.2d 239, 1933 Ky. LEXIS 180 ( Ky. 1933 ).

The fiscal court is not required to turn over to the jailer for his uncontrolled expenditure sums appropriated to enable him to perform the duties imposed by KRS 67.130 , and court may properly reserve supervision of major expenditures under budget plan requiring jailer to present accounts to court for approval and payment. Ball v. Scott, 281 Ky. 449 , 136 S.W.2d 48, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 44 ( Ky. 1940 ).

Order of fiscal court that curb be placed on orders for supplies for jail and courthouse and that in the future there must be approval of two (2) members of the court before supplies were ordered, did not limit or interfere with right or duties of county jailer. Tolson v. Wolfe County Fiscal Court, 243 S.W.2d 666, 1951 Ky. LEXIS 1153 ( Ky. 1951 ).

The fiscal court’s duty to secure a sufficient jail requires only that it exercise the care of an ordinarily prudent man, and thus, the court did not incur liability, where a prisoner was injured by a gas explosion, without a showing that the court or county judge (now county judge/executive) acted negligently. Hall v. Midwest Bottled Gas Distributors, Inc., 532 S.W.2d 449, 1975 Ky. LEXIS 30 ( Ky. 1975 ).

A county fiscal court has no mandatory duty to provide a jail facility within its boundaries; counties may confine their prisoners in facilities outside their territories. Commonwealth v. Carroll County Fiscal Court, 633 S.W.2d 720, 1982 Ky. App. LEXIS 216 (Ky. Ct. App. 1982).

While KRS 71.020 provides that the jailer “shall have the custody, rule and charge of the jail in his county and of all persons in the jail,” this provision does not establish the jailer as the final authority over the subject matter of medical care. Other provisions of the code suggest that it is the fiscal court of the county that establishes policy and the jailer who carries out these policies. Johnson v. Hardin County, 908 F.2d 1280, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 12163 (6th Cir. Ky. 1990 ).

69. — Jailer’s Residence.

Fayette County is not required to furnish heat, light, water, telephone or sanitary supplies for the jail or the jailer’s residence. Holland v. Fayette County, 240 Ky. 37 , 41 S.W.2d 651, 1931 Ky. LEXIS 344 ( Ky. 1931 ).

70. Bridges.

Fiscal court has power to erect a bridge across a stream constituting part of the county boundary, and to construct approaches to it in the adjoining county. Washer v. Bullitt County, 110 U.S. 558, 4 S. Ct. 249, 28 L. Ed. 249, 1884 U.S. LEXIS 1717 (U.S. 1884).

Where a bridge forming a part of a county road has been washed away, it is the duty of the fiscal court to replace it, and this duty may be enforced by mandamus. Leslie County v. Wooten, 115 Ky. 850 , 75 S.W. 208, 25 Ky. L. Rptr. 217 , 1903 Ky. LEXIS 163 ( Ky. 1903 ).

Where bridge located within city limits was essential part of city street which formed connecting link of important county highway, and was necessary for use of people of county in going to and from county buildings, the county was required to contribute part of cost of reconstructing the bridge. Flemingsburg v. Fleming County, 127 Ky. 120 , 105 S.W. 133, 32 Ky. L. Rptr. 11 , 1907 Ky. LEXIS 121 ( Ky. 1907 ).

The fiscal court is not controlled nor precluded by KRS 178.150 when exercising its jurisdiction in the building or repairing of bridges and maintaining roads as authorized by this section. Bailey v. Carter County, 247 Ky. 639 , 57 S.W.2d 667, 1933 Ky. LEXIS 446 ( Ky. 1933 ).

The fiscal court has discretion to determine whether a bridge shall be erected in the first instance, but it has the absolute duty to keep existing bridges in repair, devoid of discretionary power. Bailey v. Carter County, 247 Ky. 639 , 57 S.W.2d 667, 1933 Ky. LEXIS 446 ( Ky. 1933 ).

The power of the fiscal court to “erect, keep in repair and superintend bridges” does not include the power to employ a supervisor of bridges, since KRS 179.020 and KRS 179.070 provide that supervision of bridges shall be by the county road engineer or a person designated by the county court. Asher v. Boatright, 294 Ky. 120 , 171 S.W.2d 27, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 398 ( Ky. 1943 ).

71. — Toll.

The power of the fiscal court to “erect, keep in repair and superintend bridges” is not sufficient, of itself, to authorize the charging of toll on county bridges. Pineville v. Pineville Bridge Co., 179 Ky. 375 , 200 S.W. 659, 1918 Ky. LEXIS 234 ( Ky. 1918 ). (But see Irvine Toll Bridge Co. v. Estill County, 210 Ky. 170 , 275 S.W. 634, 1925 Ky. LEXIS 644 ( Ky. 1925 ). ).

Fiscal court has power to grant a franchise for the erection of a toll bridge over a stream within the county. Irvine Toll Bridge Co. v. Estill County, 210 Ky. 170 , 275 S.W. 634, 1925 Ky. LEXIS 644 ( Ky. 1925 ). (But see Pineville v. Pineville Bridge Co., 179 Ky. 375 , 200 S.W. 659, 1918 Ky. LEXIS 234 ( Ky. 1918 ). ).

72. Fiscal Affairs.

The entire control of the fiscal affairs of the county is vested in the fiscal court; the sheriff is merely a collecting officer, and is not the managing agent of the fiscal court to the extent that a judgment against him would bind the fiscal court. Henderson County v. Henderson Bridge Co., 116 Ky. 164 , 75 S.W. 239, 25 Ky. L. Rptr. 421 , 1903 Ky. LEXIS 174 ( Ky. 1903 ).

The power of the fiscal court to regulate and control the fiscal affairs and property of the county must be read in connection with the other provisions of this section. Jefferson County v. Young, 120 Ky. 456 , 86 S.W. 985, 27 Ky. L. Rptr. 849 , 1905 Ky. LEXIS 116 ( Ky. 1905 ).

The power of the fiscal court to control the fiscal affairs and property of the county does not authorize the fiscal court to make expenditures not specifically authorized by statute. Mills v. Lantrip, 170 Ky. 81 , 185 S.W. 514, 1916 Ky. LEXIS 21 ( Ky. 1916 ).

This section gives the fiscal court almost unlimited control of the fiscal affairs of county. Pulaski County v. Richardson, 225 Ky. 556 , 9 S.W.2d 523, 1928 Ky. LEXIS 816 ( Ky. 1928 ).

Fiscal court had no power to cancel interest on note and mortgage representing investment of sinking fund under KRS 178.200 , where there was no dispute as to amount due, maker was financially responsible, and mortgage security was ample. Ward v. Roberts, 281 Ky. 418 , 136 S.W.2d 549, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 50 ( Ky. 1940 ).

While fiscal court cannot go beyond limitation of power defined by legislature, such as to create an office not expressly provided, in the conduct and operation of the business of the county and the execution of granted power the scope of application of former subsection (6) (now subsection (1)(c)) of this section must expand or contract to meet the new and different conditions which are constantly coming within the field of its operations. Veith v. Tinnell, 307 Ky. 575 , 210 S.W.2d 930, 1948 Ky. LEXIS 722 ( Ky. 1948 ).

73. — Suits on Behalf of County.

Taxpayer may not sue on claim due county unless demand has first been made on fiscal court to bring suit and fiscal court has refused. Commonwealth use of Buckler v. Tilton, 48 S.W. 148, 20 Ky. L. Rptr. 1056 (1898); Williams v. Stallard, 185 Ky. 10 , 213 S.W. 197, 1919 Ky. LEXIS 229 ( Ky. 1919 ).

Where fiscal court, after demand by taxpayer that it bring suit to recover money due county, fails for several months to take any action, such failure may be treated as a refusal to bring suit, justifying institution of suit by taxpayer to recover money. Mills v. Lantrip, 170 Ky. 81 , 185 S.W. 514, 1916 Ky. LEXIS 21 ( Ky. 1916 ).

The fiscal court is the agency of the county to look after the collection and disbursement of county funds, and has the primary right to institute and conduct all actions looking to the preservation of the fiscal affairs of the county. Williams v. Stallard, 185 Ky. 10 , 213 S.W. 197, 1919 Ky. LEXIS 229 ( Ky. 1919 ); Ward v. Buckingham, 268 Ky. 297 , 104 S.W.2d 994, 1937 Ky. LEXIS 453 ( Ky. 1937 ).

The fact that the fiscal court had authorized excessive salary payments to the county judge (now county judge/executive) and to other officers did not dispense with the requirement that a demand be made upon the fiscal court to bring action to recover the illegal payments before such action could be brought by a taxpayer. Williams v. Stallard, 185 Ky. 10 , 213 S.W. 197, 1919 Ky. LEXIS 229 ( Ky. 1919 ).

Taxpayer may not sue on claim due county unless demand has first been made on fiscal court to bring suit and fiscal court has refused; unless circumstances are such as to indicate that a demand would be futile. Pike County v. Young, 266 Ky. 588 , 99 S.W.2d 749, 1936 Ky. LEXIS 713 ( Ky. 1936 ); Ward v. Buckingham, 268 Ky. 297 , 104 S.W.2d 994, 1937 Ky. LEXIS 453 ( Ky. 1937 ).

The fact that the fiscal court had revoked a previous order authorizing an audit and the employment of special counsel to bring suit against former jailer did not constitute such evidence that a demand on the fiscal court to bring suit would be futile so as to authorize a taxpayer to bring suit. Pike County v. Young, 266 Ky. 588 , 99 S.W.2d 749, 1936 Ky. LEXIS 713 ( Ky. 1936 ).

The county judge (now county judge/executive) has no authority to sue on behalf of the county unless he has made demand on the fiscal court and it has refused to bring suit, or the facts are such as to indicate that a demand would be futile. Pike County v. Young, 266 Ky. 588 , 99 S.W.2d 749, 1936 Ky. LEXIS 713 ( Ky. 1936 ).

Mere failure of the fiscal court to bring suit to recover on note and mortgage payable to county did not constitute such dereliction of duty as would indicate a demand to sue would have been futile. Ward v. Buckingham, 268 Ky. 297 , 104 S.W.2d 994, 1937 Ky. LEXIS 453 ( Ky. 1937 ).

Demand upon fiscal court that it take steps to recover from county clerk such income of his office as had been “wrongfully, improperly or illegally used, disbursed or withheld” was sufficient to inform fiscal court that desired action was with respect to number and salaries of clerk’s deputies, and other excessive office expenses. Land v. Lewis, 291 Ky. 800 , 165 S.W.2d 553, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 316 ( Ky. 1942 ).

In action by taxpayer to recover certain sums allegedly paid illegally to county attorney where no demand was made on fiscal court to bring suit and no circumstances were presented that would relieve the necessity of the taxpayer’s making such demand the taxpayer had no standing to sue on behalf of the county. Upton v. Whitley County, 310 Ky. 174 , 220 S.W.2d 375, 1949 Ky. LEXIS 871 ( Ky. 1949 ).

Mere inaction on part of fiscal court, whose primary duty it was to bring suit for county, could not relieve interested taxpayers from making demand upon it before seeking to bring suit on behalf of county. Upton v. Whitley County, 310 Ky. 174 , 220 S.W.2d 375, 1949 Ky. LEXIS 871 ( Ky. 1949 ).

The fiscal court is by law entrusted with the management of the county’s affairs, and it is vested with the primary right to bring all suits on behalf of the county and the general rule is that an individual has no standing to bring a suit on behalf of the county until there has been a demand upon and a refusal by those whose duty is it to bring the action, however, a demand will not be required where it would be futile. Upton v. Whitley County, 310 Ky. 174 , 220 S.W.2d 375, 1949 Ky. LEXIS 871 ( Ky. 1949 ).

The fiscal courts, not the taxpayers, are vested with the primary duty to institute all suits on behalf of the counties. Reeves v. Jefferson County, 245 S.W.2d 606, 1951 Ky. LEXIS 1263 ( Ky. 1951 ).

74. — Liability for Errors.

The acceptance of the benefit of services or materials does not make the county liable for the reasonable value thereof under an implied contract, in the absence of a previous valid order of the fiscal court for such materials or contract for such services. Owen County v. Walker, 141 Ky. 516 , 133 S.W. 236, 1911 Ky. LEXIS 43 ( Ky. 1911 ); Flowers v. Logan County, 148 Ky. 822 , 147 S.W. 918, 1912 Ky. LEXIS 548 ( Ky. 1912 ); Rowe v. Alexander, 156 Ky. 507 , 161 S.W. 508, 1913 Ky. LEXIS 460 ( Ky. 1913 ); Bath County v. United Disinfectant Co., 248 Ky. 111 , 58 S.W.2d 239, 1933 Ky. LEXIS 180 ( Ky. 1933 ).

Members of fiscal court are not individually liable for errors of judgment in the expenditure of county funds. Boyd County v. Boyd Fiscal Court, 247 Ky. 183 , 56 S.W.2d 959, 1933 Ky. LEXIS 368 ( Ky. 1933 ).

75. — Compensation of County Officers.

This section does not confer on fiscal court the right to fix compensation of the county clerk’s deputies. Farris v. Nichols, 286 Ky. 196 , 150 S.W.2d 484, 1941 Ky. LEXIS 229 ( Ky. 1941 ).

76. — Bonds.

Bond salesman employed by fiscal court could make no agreement as to future interest rate on bonds in the absence of an order of the fiscal court authorizing such an agreement. Riddell v. Boone County, 183 Ky. 77 , 208 S.W. 323, 1919 Ky. LEXIS 440 ( Ky. 1919 ).

Fiscal court had no authority to raise interest rate on outstanding bond issue by agreeing to replace four percent bonds with bonds bearing five percent interest. Riddell v. Boone County, 183 Ky. 77 , 208 S.W. 323, 1919 Ky. LEXIS 440 ( Ky. 1919 ).

The fiscal court may provide for the manner of retirement of bonds issued against rentals to be received by it from the operation of hospital leased to corporation. State Bank & Trust Co. v. Madison County, 275 Ky. 501 , 122 S.W.2d 99, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 455 ( Ky. 1938 ).

77. — Control of County Treasurer.

Order of fiscal court directing treasurer not to pay any warrant issued prior to current fiscal year without special order from fiscal court was notice to the treasurer that the fiscal court considered such prior warrants invalid, and treasurer had no right to pay such warrants. Pulaski County v. Richardson, 225 Ky. 556 , 9 S.W.2d 523, 1928 Ky. LEXIS 816 ( Ky. 1928 ).

The county treasurer must obey the orders of the fiscal court with regard to the payment of claims unless he knows it has exceeded its authority. Pulaski County v. Richardson, 225 Ky. 556 , 9 S.W.2d 523, 1928 Ky. LEXIS 816 ( Ky. 1928 ).

The county treasurer, in performing his duties, is subject to the discretionary control of the fiscal court. Edwards v. Logan County, 244 Ky. 296 , 50 S.W.2d 83, 1932 Ky. LEXIS 393 ( Ky. 1932 ).

Where fiscal court ordered loan of county money on improper security, it could not hold county treasurer liable for loss resulting from insolvency of borrower. Edwards v. Logan County, 244 Ky. 296 , 50 S.W.2d 83, 1932 Ky. LEXIS 393 ( Ky. 1932 ).

78. — — Appointment.

Refusal of fiscal court to reappoint plaintiff at the end of his term as county treasurer, an office which has the indicia of a policy making government position which vests its holder with discretionary power, considerable responsibility, and confidence and supervisory authority, and instead to make a patronage appointment of another person to the position was consistent with this section, KRS 67.083 and KRS. 68.010 and Ky. Const., §§ 23 and 107 and such action of the court did not violate the First or Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and was consistent with federal precedent. Garrard County Fiscal Court v. Layton, 840 S.W.2d 208, 1992 Ky. App. LEXIS 97 (Ky. Ct. App. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1032, 113 S. Ct. 1851, 123 L. Ed. 2d 474, 1993 U.S. LEXIS 2825 (U.S. 1993).

79. — Comptroller.

Fiscal court under subsection (6) (now subsection (1)(c)) of this section had power to employ a comptroller for the county, for even though employee was given the title comptroller such employment did not constitute the creation of an office not authorized by statute for this was not the creation of an office but merely a designation of the type of service to be performed and, moreover the employment was not for a fixed term and employment could be terminated on 15 days’ notice by either court or employee. Veith v. Tinnell, 307 Ky. 575 , 210 S.W.2d 930, 1948 Ky. LEXIS 722 ( Ky. 1948 ).

KRS 68.130 , KRS 68.140 and KRS 68.150 authorizing the employment of an auditor, assistant auditors and public accountants did not prohibit fiscal court from employing a comptroller whose services did not duplicate those of auditors or public accountants but were creative or recommendatory in nature. Veith v. Tinnell, 307 Ky. 575 , 210 S.W.2d 930, 1948 Ky. LEXIS 722 ( Ky. 1948 ).

80. — Purchasing Agent.

KRS 68.160 and KRS 68.170 do not deprive the fiscal court of its power to control the fiscal affairs of the county, but only authorize the purchasing agent to buy such things as the fiscal court has ordered bought. Gross v. Fiscal Court of Jefferson County, 225 Ky. 641 , 9 S.W.2d 1006, 1928 Ky. LEXIS 849 ( Ky. 1928 ).

81. — Mingling of Charges and Receipts.

Money received by county under KRS 47.020 should not be mingled with general funds charging all expenditures against a single fund but where disbursements on this account are larger than receipts the difference can be charged against the general revenues as a portion the regular tax rate is available for county road purposes. Fulton County Fiscal Court v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 285 Ky. 17 , 146 S.W.2d 15, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 591 ( Ky. 1940 ).

82. — Implied Contracts.

A county cannot become indebted under an implied contract. Rowe v. Alexander, 156 Ky. 507 , 161 S.W. 508, 1913 Ky. LEXIS 460 ( Ky. 1913 ); Cain v. Burroughs Adding Mach. Co., 180 Ky. 567 , 203 S.W. 315, 1918 Ky. LEXIS 106 ( Ky. 1918 ); Leslie County v. Keith, 227 Ky. 663 , 13 S.W.2d 1012, 1929 Ky. LEXIS 944 ( Ky. 1929 ); Bath County v. United Disinfectant Co., 248 Ky. 111 , 58 S.W.2d 239, 1933 Ky. LEXIS 180 ( Ky. 1933 ).

83. Audit.

Fiscal court may employ accountant to investigate books, accounts and records of county officers and employees. Taylor v. Riney, 156 Ky. 393 , 161 S.W. 203, 1913 Ky. LEXIS 440 ( Ky. 1913 ).

The power of the fiscal court to regulate and control the fiscal affairs and property of the county includes the power to employ an accountant to investigate the books, accounts and records of county officers and employees. Taylor v. Riney, 156 Ky. 393 , 161 S.W. 203, 1913 Ky. LEXIS 440 ( Ky. 1913 ).

The fact that the fiscal court had employed an auditor under this section did not deprive the county school board of authority to employ an auditor to examine sheriff’s books on school tax collections. Bell County Board of Education v. Lee, 239 Ky. 317 , 39 S.W.2d 492, 1931 Ky. LEXIS 775 ( Ky. 1931 ).

The fiscal court has discretion as to whether it will employ an auditor to audit the accounts of county officers, and in the absence of a showing of abuse of that discretion a court of equity will not compel the fiscal court to employ an auditor at the request to the county attorney to assist the latter in suits against county officers to recover excess compensation. Boyd County v. Boyd Fiscal Court, 247 Ky. 183 , 56 S.W.2d 959, 1933 Ky. LEXIS 368 ( Ky. 1933 ).

County auditor is an “officer” and not an “employee” of county, and thereby comes within provision of Ky. Const., § 150 barring unpardoned felon from office. Howard v. Saylor, 305 Ky. 504 , 204 S.W.2d 815, 1947 Ky. LEXIS 852 ( Ky. 1947 ).

In action by county to recover funds received by county clerk in excess of his salary and expenses, fact that fiscal court did not authorize audit did not disqualify auditor employed by county for any audit made by a competent person, verified by him as being correct, is admissible to prove facts embodied therein after opposite side has had a reasonable opportunity to examine it for errors. Greenup County v. Millis, 303 S.W.2d 898, 1957 Ky. LEXIS 272 ( Ky. 1957 ).

Where no serious complaint was made as to accuracy of audit with the exception of one item that involved the application of KRS 142.015 and this was corrected by the county, special master commissioner erred in not considering such audit in determining what amount county could recover from clerk as funds received by him in excess of his salary and expenses. Greenup County v. Millis, 303 S.W.2d 898, 1957 Ky. LEXIS 272 ( Ky. 1957 ).

84. Accounts.

Since county clerk had duty to keep proper records of his expenses he had the burden of showing that any amounts charged to him by auditors employed by county were incorrect in action by county to recover funds received by him in excess of his salary and expenses especially where he had refused to supply list of itemized expenses. Greenup County v. Millis, 303 S.W.2d 898, 1957 Ky. LEXIS 272 ( Ky. 1957 ).

Under this section and KRS 61.290 (now repealed) there are means by which proper accounts and records may be compelled to be kept. Funk v. Milliken, 317 S.W.2d 499, 1958 Ky. LEXIS 100 ( Ky. 1958 ).

85. — Reports.

Under former subsection (7) (now subsection (1)(d)) of this section, the jailer must make an annual report to the fiscal court including all money received by him from all sources, and all disbursements claimed by him. Holland v. Fayette County, 240 Ky. 37 , 41 S.W.2d 651, 1931 Ky. LEXIS 344 ( Ky. 1931 ).

The failure of a county officer to make an annual report to the fiscal court of his fees and disbursements does not preclude him from making a report covering his entire term and receiving as settlement thereon. Taylor v. Broughton, 254 Ky. 265 , 71 S.W.2d 635, 1934 Ky. LEXIS 75 ( Ky. 1934 ).

Fiscal court may require of the clerk a statement of revenues and clerical expenses; and, at the time of considering the budget, the fiscal court and county debt commission may require him to furnish a statement of anticipated revenues and contemplated expenses. Farris v. Nichols, 286 Ky. 196 , 150 S.W.2d 484, 1941 Ky. LEXIS 229 ( Ky. 1941 ).

86. Depository.

The fiscal court has the power to designate a depository for county funds, including those funds in the hands of the county treasurer. Edwards v. Logan County, 244 Ky. 296 , 50 S.W.2d 83, 1932 Ky. LEXIS 393 ( Ky. 1932 ).

Fiscal court has power to designate depository of county funds in hands of county officers, and where it has done so the officer is relieved of liability for failure of depository, except where officer does not withdraw funds and account for them at the time required by law, or where the officer has knowledge of facts which would reasonably lead him to question solvency of depository. Jordon v. Baker, 252 Ky. 40 , 66 S.W.2d 84, 1933 Ky. LEXIS 1007 ( Ky. 1933 ).

87. Maintenance of Poor.

The fiscal court has sole jurisdiction to provide for the care, maintenance and treatment of the poor, including the establishment of a poorhouse, farm or hospital, and the employment of the necessary officers and employees in connection therewith. Silbersack v. Kraft, 194 Ky. 587 , 240 S.W. 392, 1922 Ky. LEXIS 233 ( Ky. 1922 ).

Although fiscal court has duty to provide for paupers, person who is supporting pauper cannot recover from county for sums expended by him in the absence of an express contract with the fiscal court; refusal of fiscal court to make contract would not create implied obligation. Delph v. Clay County, 231 Ky. 589 , 21 S.W.2d 980, 1929 Ky. LEXIS 322 ( Ky. 1929 ).

In the exercise of its powers concerning the maintenance of the poor, including the employment and compensation of a commissioner of the poorhouse, the fiscal court is vested with a discretion, judicial in character, which can be exercised only by a majority of the members of the court. Farmer v. Marr, 238 Ky. 417 , 38 S.W.2d 209, 1931 Ky. LEXIS 248 ( Ky. 1931 ).

The fiscal court must provide for the sick and poor of the county without regard to the place of residence of the recipient within the county. Richmond v. Madison County Fiscal Court, 290 Ky. 293 , 161 S.W.2d 58, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 398 ( Ky. 1942 ).

The primary duty to care for the poor and sick rests on the county and this duty is not limited to those unfortunates who reside in the county outside the corporate limits of a city, however the city also has a duty in this respect since the county because of its limited taxing power is unable to make adequate provision for the care and maintenance of all poor persons and to hospitalize all the indigent such persons from the entire county. Paducah v. McCracken County, 305 Ky. 539 , 204 S.W.2d 942, 1947 Ky. LEXIS 857 ( Ky. 1947 ).

88. — Agreement with City.

Court, in declaratory judgment action by city against county, did not have authority to determine what portion of expense of caring for indigent living in the city should be borne by the county, the only remedy being by an agreement between the city and county under KRS 212.640 to 212.710 , or by enactment of new statutes fixing proportionate responsibility. Paducah v. McCracken County, 305 Ky. 539 , 204 S.W.2d 942, 1947 Ky. LEXIS 857 ( Ky. 1947 ).

89. — Hospital.

County could not disclaim all responsibility for the hospitalization of the indigent sick who are residents of city merely because of fortuitous circumstances that city has constructed and is operating a municipal hospital. Paducah v. McCracken County, 305 Ky. 539 , 204 S.W.2d 942, 1947 Ky. LEXIS 857 ( Ky. 1947 ).

A county containing a city of only the sixth class could under authority of former subsection (8) (deleted by 1978 amendment) of this section issue bonds for the purpose of constructing and furnishing a county public health clinic and hospital. Demunbrun v. Browning, 311 Ky. 71 , 223 S.W.2d 372, 1949 Ky. LEXIS 1058 ( Ky. 1949 ).

KRS 216.011 to 216.240 (KRS 216.011 to 216.090 , 216.230 , and 216.240 now repealed) merely prescribed a special procedure for acquiring a hospital by issuing bonds in a county containing a city of the second, third, fourth or fifth class, and it was not the purpose of the legislature to repeal this section insofar as it authorized counties not containing cities of the enumerated classes to acquire and maintain hospitals. Demunbrun v. Browning, 311 Ky. 71 , 223 S.W.2d 372, 1949 Ky. LEXIS 1058 ( Ky. 1949 ).

90. — Poorhouse Keeper.

Where poorhouse keeper had been appointed by county judge (now county judge/executive) without authority, but fiscal court accepted services and approved claims for compensation of person appointed, the fiscal court ratified the employment insofar as past services were concerned, but was not estopped from declining to accept future services or from exercising its power to appoint a new commissioner. Farmer v. Marr, 238 Ky. 417 , 38 S.W.2d 209, 1931 Ky. LEXIS 248 ( Ky. 1931 ).

Commissioner of poorhouse holds office during pleasure of the fiscal court. Mason County v. Condon, 280 Ky. 371 , 133 S.W.2d 527, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 134 ( Ky. 1939 ).

Poorhouse keeper appointed by fiscal court is an employee and not an officer, and his salary maybe changed at any time. Graves County v. Dowdy, 258 Ky. 544 , 80 S.W.2d 597, 1935 Ky. LEXIS 209 ( Ky. 1935 ).

91. — Physician.

Employment of a physician to render medical attention to the poor can be done only by formal action of the fiscal court; employment by individual members is not sufficient, although done according to custom and previously acquiesced in by fiscal court by paying for services under such employment. Leslie County v. Keith, 227 Ky. 663 , 13 S.W.2d 1012, 1929 Ky. LEXIS 944 ( Ky. 1929 ).

92. — Christmas Party.

Fiscal court had no authority to appropriate money for an annual Christmas party conducted by the juvenile court for children under its supervision, at which food and clothing were distributed, such appropriation not coming within the power of the fiscal court to provide for the poor. Bruner v. Jefferson County Fiscal Court, 239 Ky. 613 , 40 S.W.2d 271, 1931 Ky. LEXIS 831 ( Ky. 1931 ).

93. — Repair of Sewer.

The power of the fiscal court to provide for the poor is not sufficient to authorize the fiscal court to appropriate money to repair a sewer in a private subdivision, although the sewer constitutes a menace to the health of the residents and the property owners are not financially able to make the repairs themselves. Jefferson County v. Jefferson County Fiscal Court, 269 Ky. 535 , 108 S.W.2d 181, 1937 Ky. LEXIS 635 ( Ky. 1937 ).

94. Highways and Roads.

The court has discretion as to the manner of discharging the duty of maintaining roads, but not as to whether it will perform the duty. Commonwealth v. Boyle County Fiscal Court, 113 Ky. 325 , 68 S.W. 116, 24 Ky. L. Rptr. 234 , 1902 Ky. LEXIS 47 ( Ky. 1902 ).

The fiscal court has the duty of keeping the county roads in repair. Commonwealth v. Boyle County Fiscal Court, 113 Ky. 325 , 68 S.W. 116, 24 Ky. L. Rptr. 234 , 1902 Ky. LEXIS 47 ( Ky. 1902 ).

The power of the fiscal court to “provide for the good condition of the highways” does not include the power to purchase an automobile for the use of the members of the fiscal court in inspecting the county roads, or for the use of employees in charge of road work. Hollis v. Weissinger, 142 Ky. 129 , 134 S.W. 176, 1911 Ky. LEXIS 177 ( Ky. 1911 ).

The fiscal court has no authority to establish a road, that power being exclusively in the county court. Rowe v. Alexander, 156 Ky. 507 , 161 S.W. 508, 1913 Ky. LEXIS 460 ( Ky. 1913 ); Roberts v. Taylor, 226 Ky. 640 , 11 S.W.2d 710, 1928 Ky. LEXIS 152 ( Ky. 1928 ); Johnson v. Clark County, 258 Ky. 563 , 80 S.W.2d 571, 1935 Ky. LEXIS 197 ( Ky. 1935 ); Jefferson County v. Jefferson County Fiscal Court, 269 Ky. 535 , 108 S.W.2d 181, 1937 Ky. LEXIS 635 ( Ky. 1937 ). (See Harlan v. Cornett, 203 Ky. 41 , 261 S.W. 849, 1924 Ky. LEXIS 844 ( Ky. 1924 ).

The fiscal court is not controlled nor precluded by KRS 178.150 in exercising its jurisdiction in maintaining roads as authorized by this section. Bailey v. Carter County, 247 Ky. 639 , 57 S.W.2d 667, 1933 Ky. LEXIS 446 ( Ky. 1933 ).

Group of citizens were not entitled to mandatory injunction compelling fiscal court to improve surface of a particular road, the fiscal court having sole discretion to determine on which roads improvements shall be made, and what the nature of the improvements shall be. Madison Fiscal Court v. Edester, 301 Ky. 1 , 190 S.W.2d 695, 1945 Ky. LEXIS 685 ( Ky. 1 945).

95. — Improvements.

The planning and zoning commission has no control over improvement of county roads since that is the function of the fiscal court; thus the planning commission cannot compel the fiscal court to enlarge the width of the pavement and an attempt by the commission to attach, as a condition of plat approval, a requirement that the fiscal court accept the improvement of a county road was an unlawful exercise of power by the commission and the condition was invalid. Lampton v. Pinaire, 610 S.W.2d 915, 1980 Ky. App. LEXIS 408 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980).

96. — Streams.

The fiscal court has no control over the streams of the county, whether navigable or not, except insofar as they are involved in highway construction, and the court therefore has no power to grant a franchise for the construction of a boom. American Car & Foundry Co. v. Johnson County, 147 Ky. 69 , 143 S.W. 773, 1912 Ky. LEXIS 190 ( Ky. 1912 ).

97. — Relocation.

The fiscal court has the authority to extend public funds under its control for the relocation of roads. Pennyrile Rural Electric Cooperative Corp. v. Higgins, 379 S.W.2d 467, 1964 Ky. LEXIS 244 ( Ky. 1964 ).

98. — Railroad Crossings.

Although this section enjoins the fiscal court with the duty of providing for the “good condition of the highways in the county,” it is clear that a county has no statutory authority to prevent a railroad from crossing a county highway at grade level if the railroad company complies with the requirements of KRS 179.290 and KRS 277.060 . Jefferson County v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 245 S.W.2d 611, 1951 Ky. LEXIS 1264 ( Ky. 1951 ).

99. — Abandoned Roads.

Where law gave county right to take over abandoned toll roads, fiscal court had no jurisdiction to judicially determine that particular road had been abandoned. Bardstown & L. Turnpike Co. v. Nelson County, 117 Ky. 674 , 78 S.W. 851, 25 Ky. L. Rptr. 1900 , 1904 Ky. LEXIS 229 ( Ky. 1904 ).

100. — Construction and Maintenance.

Under its power to provide for the good condition of the highways in the county, the fiscal court has the power to reconstruct a hard surface road. Hanlon v. Cleary, 142 Ky. 46 , 133 S.W. 953, 1911 Ky. LEXIS 118 ( Ky. 1911 ).

In providing for the construction and maintenance of county roads, the fiscal court may make a general levy and appropriation for road purposes, and is not restricted by those statutes relating to hard surface roads (KRS 178.140 to 178.170 ). Russell County v. Hill, 164 Ky. 360 , 175 S.W. 988, 1915 Ky. LEXIS 396 ( Ky. 1915 ).

101. — Private Roads.

The fiscal court has no authority to purchase a private road for the purpose of making it a public road, in the absence of an order of the county court establishing the road as a public road. Rowe v. Alexander, 156 Ky. 507 , 161 S.W. 508, 1913 Ky. LEXIS 460 ( Ky. 1913 ). (See KRS 178.115 .).

The power of the fiscal court to provide for the good condition of the highways of the county applies only to roads that have been taken over by the county as a part of its road system, and fiscal court has no authority to spend county money in repairing road in a private subdivision. Jefferson County v. Jefferson County Fiscal Court, 269 Ky. 535 , 108 S.W.2d 181, 1937 Ky. LEXIS 635 ( Ky. 1937 ).

102. — Right of Way.

County was liable for damages to person who owned interest in right of way over which road was constructed, even in the absence of proof that the road was lawfully established. Harlan v. Cornett, 203 Ky. 41 , 261 S.W. 849, 1924 Ky. LEXIS 844 ( Ky. 1924 ).

Fiscal court had power to contract with landowner that county would purchase part of right of way for road if landowner would furnish balance of right of way and construct all of road. Harlan v. Cornett, 203 Ky. 41 , 261 S.W. 849, 1924 Ky. LEXIS 844 ( Ky. 1924 ).

The fiscal court may purchase a right of way for a state highway without the approval of the county attorney, since subsection (1) of KRS 177.070 applies only when the state highway department negotiates the purchase. Lee County v. Hieronymus, 240 Ky. 490 , 42 S.W.2d 730, 1931 Ky. LEXIS 444 ( Ky. 1931 ).

103. — Supervision by Committee.

Where county has system of free public roads, and does not employ a county road engineer, the fiscal court may employ its own members as committees to supervise construction and maintenance of roads, for which they may receive compensation under KRS 67.110 (now repealed). Knox Fiscal Court v. Davis, 267 Ky. 155 , 101 S.W.2d 409, 1936 Ky. LEXIS 758 ( Ky. 1936 ).

104. — Competitive Bidding.

Where there was no law requiring competitive bidding on road contracts, the fiscal court could revoke or ignore its own ruling for competitive bidding. Hanlon v. Cleary, 142 Ky. 46 , 133 S.W. 953, 1911 Ky. LEXIS 118 ( Ky. 1911 ).

105. — Landfill Project.

Under former subsection (9) (now subsection (2)(b)) of this section fiscal court had implied authority to make an appropriation for a landfill project, so as to provide a place for county residents to dispose of trash and garbage, and thus stop practice of throwing trash and garbage along sides of highways. Steinfeld v. Jefferson County Fiscal Court, 306 Ky. 621 , 208 S.W.2d 939, 1948 Ky. LEXIS 617 ( Ky. 1948 ).

106. Advertising Resources of County.

An appropriation to advertise the resources of the county must be for a use that will directly accomplish the purpose. The advertisement must be the primary purpose of the expenditure. Jefferson County v. Peter, 127 Ky. 453 , 105 S.W. 887, 32 Ky. L. Rptr. 374 , 1907 Ky. LEXIS 143 ( Ky. 1907 ).

Fiscal court had no authority to appropriate funds to secure selection of city in county as site for national political convention, such not being an appropriation “to advertise the resources of the county.” Jefferson County v. Peter, 127 Ky. 453 , 105 S.W. 887, 32 Ky. L. Rptr. 374 , 1907 Ky. LEXIS 143 ( Ky. 1907 ).

Fiscal court could not legally expend public funds to decorate county courthouse for the Kentucky Derby under subsection (10) (deleted by 1978 amendment) of this section. Shamburger v. Tierney, 257 S.W.2d 592, 1953 Ky. LEXIS 798 ( Ky. 1953 ).

107. Levy and Collection of Taxes.

Fiscal court may levy a tax to obtain funds with which to build a courthouse, under its general power to levy taxes for “necessary expenses” and for “county purposes,” and is not required to borrow money and issue bonds for that purpose. Combs v. Letcher County, 107 Ky. 379 , 54 S.W. 177, 21 Ky. L. Rptr. 1057 , 1899 Ky. LEXIS 182 ( Ky. 1899 ); Bonta v. Fiscal Court of Mercer County, 144 Ky. 241 , 137 S.W. 1084, 1911 Ky. LEXIS 597 ( Ky. 1911 ).

Default judgment in action against sheriff to enjoin him from collecting certain taxes alleged to be illegal was not binding on fiscal court, and did not bar subsequent action by fiscal court to collect taxes. Henderson County v. Henderson Bridge Co., 116 Ky. 164 , 75 S.W. 239, 25 Ky. L. Rptr. 421 , 1903 Ky. LEXIS 174 ( Ky. 1903 ).

108. — Liability of Court.

In levying taxes the fiscal court acts in a legislative capacity, and its members are not liable individually for taxes levied in excess of constitutional limits. Commonwealth v. Kenneday, 118 Ky. 618 , 82 S.W. 237, 26 Ky. L. Rptr. 504 , 1904 Ky. LEXIS 80 ( Ky. 1904 ).

109. — Assessment of Property.

The fiscal court has no authority to assess property, and has no authority over the county tax commissioner (now property valuation administrator) or over the assessment of property. Jefferson County v. Young, 120 Ky. 456 , 86 S.W. 985, 27 Ky. L. Rptr. 849 , 1905 Ky. LEXIS 116 ( Ky. 1905 ).

110. — Control of Action by Mandamus.

A federal court may issue a writ of mandamus to compel a fiscal court to levy sufficient taxes to pay a judgment rendered against the county in the federal court. Tucker v. Hubbert, 196 F. 849, 1912 U.S. App. LEXIS 1552 (6th Cir. Ky. 1912 ).

111. — Taxpayer’s Suit.

After taxes illegally levied and collected have been paid out by the disbursing officers of the county, a taxpayer may not maintain an action against the county to recover the taxes paid by him. Commonwealth use of Devoe v. Boske, 124 Ky. 468 , 99 S.W. 316, 30 Ky. L. Rptr. 400 , 1907 Ky. LEXIS 201 ( Ky. 1907 ).

112. Corporate Powers of County.

KRS 178.180 and KRS 178.190 , providing for commissioners to handle road and bridge bonds, do not unconstitutionally deprive the fiscal court of its right to exercise the corporate powers of the county, such sections being a case “otherwise provided by law” within the meaning of subsection (13) (now subsection (1)(e)) of this section. Rentz v. Campbell County, 260 Ky. 242 , 84 S.W.2d 44, 1935 Ky. LEXIS 440 ( Ky. 1935 ).

113. — Exception.

The provision of KRS 118.060 (now repealed) that the sheriff shall provide the voting booths is one of the matters “otherwise provided by law” within the meaning of former subsection (13) (now subsection (1)(e)) of this section, and the sheriff may therefore make a contract for the purchase of booths which will be binding on the county and which the fiscal court must pay. Fiscal Court v. Louisville Tent & Awning Co., 185 Ky. 466 , 215 S.W. 88, 1919 Ky. LEXIS 320 ( Ky. 1919 ).

Cited:

Jefferson County ex rel. Grauman v. Jefferson County Fiscal Court, 274 Ky. 91 , 118 S.W.2d 181, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 235 ( Ky. 1938 ); Fiscal Court of Fayette County v. Nichols, 287 Ky. 478 , 153 S.W.2d 986, 1941 Ky. LEXIS 570 ( Ky. 1941 ); Cole v. McCracken County, 297 Ky. 797 , 181 S.W.2d 461, 1944 Ky. LEXIS 835 ( Ky. 1944 ); Keck v. Manning, 313 Ky. 433 , 231 S.W.2d 604, 1950 Ky. LEXIS 897 ( Ky. 1950 ); Jefferson County v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 245 S.W.2d 611, 1951 Ky. LEXIS 1264 ( Ky. 1951 ); Burkholder v. Louisville, 276 S.W.2d 29, 1955 Ky. LEXIS 411 ( Ky. 1955 ); Pulaski Fiscal Court v. Floyd, 374 S.W.2d 863, 1964 Ky. LEXIS 399 ( Ky. 1964 ); Moores v. Fayette County, 418 S.W.2d 412, 1967 Ky. LEXIS 213 ( Ky. 1967 ); Home Indem. Co. v. Johnson County Fiscal Court, 682 F. Supp. 326, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13208 (E.D. Ky. 1987 ); Phipps v. Commonwealth, 933 S.W.2d 825, 1996 Ky. App. LEXIS 118 (Ky. Ct. App. 1996).

NOTES TO UNPUBLISHED DECISIONS

1. Powers and Duties.
2. — Liability.

It was proper to grant a county fiscal court summary judgment on the ground of official immunity in an estate’s action alleging they were negligent in not providing warning signs at a curve because the act of placing or not placing signs or a guardrail on county roads was a discretionary act on the part of the fiscal court, not a ministerial one; the fiscal court’s failure to act did not constitute objective bad faith because there were never any accidents or complaints about the road. Estate of Morris v. Smith, 2014 Ky. App. LEXIS 81 (Ky. Ct. App. May 16, 2014), review denied, ordered not published, 2015 Ky. LEXIS 59 (Ky. Feb. 11, 2015).

Opinions of Attorney General.

The word “employees” as used in KRS 67.180 and 67.185 does not cover elected county officers and thus the purchase by the county fiscal court of compensation insurance for such officers is not authorized thereby. OAG 60-989 .

The fiscal court of Boyd County, pursuant to KRS 28.030 (now repealed) and this section, may authorize the county court to rent space for a permanent branch office in Ashland. OAG 60-1202 .

County road equipment and personnel may not be used to render services to private roads or lands even though the landowner is willing to pay for these services. OAG 62-24 .

It is permissible for the county to enter into a lease arrangement with a holding corporation to lease the courthouse grounds and the building thereon provided such lease would not interfere in any respect with the public use to which the building would otherwise be put. The sublease of such a public building for private business use would be subject to question on the issues of public policy and statutory authorization, and contrary to the majority rule on such matters. The lease by the holding company to the county of space in the building would have to be renewable on a yearly basis in view of the construction accorded Ky. Const., § 157. OAG 62-481 .

“Necessary office expenses” as used in KRS 64.350 , of a jailer, or combined sheriff and jailer in Jefferson County, does not include construction in or additions to the existing county jail, and the department of finance could not pay for such construction out of the fees of the jailer. OAG 62-1084 .

A common law incompatibility would exist between the office of county treasurer and the office of county auditor. OAG 63-32 .

A fiscal court has no statutory authority to appropriate money out of its annual funds toward the purchase of land to be used as a county fairground. OAG 63-643 .

A fiscal court could not permit the use of county trucks or equipment to haul crushed rock to expand the parking area of a manufacturing company within the county. OAG 63-813 .

Counties are authorized to grant authority in the nature of a franchise for the use of the public ways of the county by a television antenna cable system subject to the provisions of Ky. Const., § 164. OAG 64-44 .

The general fund of one county cannot be expended to purchase right of way for county roads in another county. OAG 64-191 .

A fiscal court would not be authorized to make a contribution to the chamber of commerce for the purpose of promoting a folk festival in the county. OAG 64-252 .

It would be improper for a county judge (now county judge/executive) to set up a special account in a bank without consent of the fiscal court or to pay county bills by cash. OAG 64-476 .

The fiscal court has the general duty of equipping the county jail with the basic equipment such as a stove, refrigerator, cooking and kitchenware necessary in the preparation and storage of food for prisoners fed therein. OAG 64-758 .

The action of a magistrate of the fiscal court in procuring or contracting for road and bridge work, such as to exceed the budget or appropriations provided therefor, would be illegal, and the county would not be financially or otherwise bound by such acts. OAG 64-881 .

Where excess fees are insufficient to pay for long distance calls of county officials compensated by fees involving properly documented official business the tolls for such calls are properly payable from the county treasury or tax revenues. OAG 65-349 .

The necessary office supplies and record books, as required by the office of master commissioner, are properly payable from the county treasurer. OAG 65-445 .

A fiscal court would have no authority to appropriate county money to a joint city-county human rights commission. OAG 65-619 .

The fiscal court can provide an office in the courthouse for the county attorney, or if no space is available the county attorney should be allowed to claim as a credit against excess fees that percentage of the private office rent that is fairly allocable to the conducting of the county’s business. OAG 65-732 .

While the statute empowers the fiscal court to provide a courthouse and to regulate and control such property, there is nothing in the Kentucky Constitution or the statutes to require the elected county officials to have an office in the courthouse and the assignment of office space in the courthouse to such officers lies within the sound discretion of the fiscal court. OAG 65-750 .

Where the sheriff purchased office furniture and equipment from the fees of his office, that property became the property of the county and the fiscal court had control of the property. OAG 65-881 .

A city of the fifth class is required to pay for the cost of keeping or imprisoning a city prisoner and the primary responsibility for furnishing necessary medical attention and drugs for an indigent prisoner rests upon the county, but medical care and treatment of indigents is an area in which the city and county may agree between themselves upon an equitable sharing of responsibility. OAG 66-7 .

In a county where the position of road engineer or road supervisor had not been established, the magistrates could be reimbursed for mileage expenses out of the county treasury for actual mileage traveled in supervising the county road system. OAG 66-57 .

The fiscal court has no authority to delegate, to the county judge (now county judge/executive), the authority to hire or fire county employees. OAG 66-144 .

Although the fiscal court is not directly permitted to provide for office rent or courtroom space for magistrates by payments from the county treasury, such rent, which is attributed to the use of space as an office and courtroom for magistrates, may be taken as credit against the excess fees of that office. OAG 66-221 .

The county judge (now county judge/executive) may be reimbursed for his travel expenses relating to the supervision and development of the county road system provided the expenses are detailed and documented. OAG 66-431 .

The fiscal court can legally award a franchise for the county-wide collection of garbage to an individual or corporation under Ky. Const., § 164. OAG 66-468 .

A county could subsidize a private ambulance service only to the extent that ambulance services were provided for sick persons who were also poor or indigent. OAG 66-588 .

A county fiscal court had no legal authority to hire an auditor to audit the accounts of the county board of education. OAG 66-658 .

The fiscal court has the authority to effect the payment for postage stamps, envelopes, and all similar necessary expendable supplies for the operation of the office of the Circuit Court Clerk directly out of the county treasury. OAG 67-26 .

A county had the authority to sell and convey a lot to a bank directly, provided that the applicable requirements of this section and KRS 65.010 (now repealed) were met. OAG 67-43 .

The preparation of the payrolls of county road employees must be prepared by the county clerk as fiscal court clerk after the certification of the county road engineer as to the gross sum due the employees for each pay period. OAG 67-50 .

Jails of a second-class city and the county can be combined. OAG 67-64 .

The county attorney is required to institute such suits as may be necessary to attempt the collection of delinquent county hospital accounts when so directed by the fiscal court through proper orders and there is no statutory basis for extra compensation in performing such duties. OAG 67-319 .

Public officials may take proper emergency action to insure appropriate detention facilities in the event of lawlessness involving many persons. OAG 67-354 .

A fiscal court has the authority to purchase microfilming machines and supplies for the county clerk’s office. OAG 67-460 .

There is no authorization for a county to subsidize a private ambulance service. OAG 67-471 .

Where a person is admitted to a state mental hospital on the application of the health officer, if the patient is found to be indigent, the expenses of transportation to the hospital could be paid for directly out of the county treasury under subsection (8) (deleted by 1978 amendment) of this section. OAG 67-527 .

A county was authorized under KRS 104.170 (now repealed) to acquire property from a hospital and to enter into a contract with the U. S. Corps of Engineers to construct a flood wall for the protection of the hospital located in the county which was a nonprofit organization to which the citizens of the county looked for medical services. OAG 68-10 .

The county is primarily financially responsible, subject to its ability to pay and as a properly budgeted item, for furnishing medical aid to an indigent prisoner regardless of whether he is considered a city or county prisoner. OAG 68-180 .

A county hospital could acquire equipment on a lease purchase arrangement whereby a rental would be paid monthly over a period of months in excess of twelve (12) and upon the completion of the required rental payments the hospital would exercise its option to purchase. OAG 68-280 .

A county hospital could not legally purchase equipment on a monthly installment plan that would extend over a period in excess of twelve months. OAG 68-280 .

A county hospital could not legally purchase equipment which could not be paid for within the fiscal year in which it was purchased. OAG 68-280 .

Fiscal courts in counties of 75,000 or less may finance or furnish sheriff’s automobiles in such counties as necessary official expenses of that office. OAG 68-330 .

The city has no authority to inspect county buildings for possible repairs and condemnation under the city’s building inspection code. OAG 68-389 .

Where an area containing a county roadway segment is annexed by a city of the sixth class, the maintenance and upkeep of the road segment annexed must be borne by the city. OAG 68-506 .

Where the county had an easement for road purposes over a lane owned in fee simple by a coal mining company, the fiscal court could legally agree to the installation of a conveyor belt by the coal company over the easement provided such conveyor was safe and did not interfere with public use. OAG 69-4 .

The fiscal court, in a county containing a county hospital, has the authority to provide for the appointment and removal of a board or commission appointed to assist in the management or administration of the hospital, and the fiscal court may prescribe regulations dealing with such administrative operations. OAG 69-268 .

The fiscal court of Kenton County has the implicit statutory authority to provide, by a proper budgeted item, for the payment of the expense of moving the county court clerk’s office supplies, records, and equipment from the old building to the new county building. OAG 69-305 .

Although a city or county could not contribute public funds to a group of private citizens for a beautification project, the city and county could establish either separate committees or a joint committee pursuant to Ky. KRS ch. 65, composed of citizens and appropriate funds thereto, to be utilized for beautifying the metropolitan area. OAG 69-415 .

Where a prisoner awaiting trial is transferred to another county on a change of venue and becomes sick requiring treatment by a doctor and the furnishing of medicines, the cost of such treatment and medicines must be borne by the county where the prisoner was awaiting trial at the time the expense was incurred. OAG 69-464 .

The paper, chemicals, and other copying supplies used for the recording books of the county court should be paid for out of excess fees, but if this is not possible, payment should be made out of the county treasury. OAG 69-492 .

A fiscal court would have no authority to give or donate its county funds to the Falls Region Health Council, Inc. OAG 69-561 .

Where two (2) county officials and an employee were sued in federal court for action taken by them in good faith and in the proper discharge of their duties against a former county hospital administrator, the fiscal court had the power to authorize the payment of costs, attorneys’ fees and expenses incurred by the three (3) in defending the suit. OAG 69-585 .

The fiscal court of a county, in its sound discretion, has the authority to enter into a lease, and such lease is valid where the fiscal court took into consideration the public interest and exercised good business judgment. OAG 69-599 .

Where a county treasurer had elected to keep county funds in a certain bank, but the fiscal court designated another bank as the depository for county funds and ordered the treasurer to transfer the funds, the action of designation by the fiscal court was legal and the county treasurer was compelled to comply with the order. OAG 70-45 .

The fiscal court has authority to regulate and control the fiscal affairs of the county and can provide a depository for local funds at any lawful meeting and change its orders previously made on the subject. OAG 70-68 .

Although the jailer should have a key to the front door of the courthouse in order to carry out his duties, the custody of any other keys to that door is for the fiscal court to decide. OAG 70-82 .

A fiscal court can make expenditures for relief of the sick and indigent as properly budgeted items for that purpose, but the total amount budgeted must depend on the county’s financial ability. OAG 70-91 .

Where the fiscal court advertised a request for bids on the operation and lease of the county rest home and then accepted a bid of 18 percent of gross receipts, the bid was valid as the leasing of the rest home did not require the application of KRS 424.260 . OAG 70-96 .

Stamps and envelopes used in mailing out tax bills by the sheriff’s office can be authorized by the fiscal court to be paid for out of the county treasury or can be paid for out of the excess fees of the sheriff’s office. OAG 70-116 .

The fiscal court has the authority to effect payment for mailing stamps and envelopes used in mailing tax notices, provided the expenditures are properly documented and subject to any maximum level of expenses. OAG 70-170 .

A lease between a local bank and the county under which the county would lease a dump truck from the bank on a one-year lease, renewable until the truck was paid for, at which time the title would be transferred to the county, would be valid if the annual rental did not cause the county to exceed its debt limitation, if the county was only obligated for a one-year lease and if the lease-purchase arrangement was let out on competitive bids with the bank the assignee of the successful bidder. OAG 70-233 .

A cable television corporation generally, in order to install its cable system and related equipment on, over, or across the right of way of a county road system, must acquire a franchise from the fiscal court pursuant to Ky. Const., § 164, and according to the term and bidding procedure outlined therein. OAG 70-241 .

The medical costs for an indigent prisoner in the county jail must be borne by the county, including the costs of transportation and guards. OAG 70-304 .

The fiscal court, as well as the jailer, is entitled to have a key to the county jail. OAG 70-359 .

The fiscal court or county commission may by proper resolution authorize the county judge (now county judge/executive) on behalf of the county to execute a contract with the Kentucky crime commission to receive federal funds. OAG 70-394 .

The fiscal court has authority under KRS 68.010 , 68.020 (1) and subsection (6) (now subsection (1)(c)) of this section to designate a depository for the county funds and to change the depository within its discretion. OAG 70-519 .

A fiscal court, subject to available funds in the budget, may provide an appropriation from county funds for the purpose of providing textbooks and school supplies needed by the indigent school children of the district through proper budgetary action as prescribed in KRS Ch. 68. OAG 70-548 .

A county cannot operate an ambulance service to the exclusion of all others, unless the county issues a franchise and makes the franchise exclusive as a result of the public interests demanding such restraint or limitation of competition. OAG 70-565 .

If a county decides to grant an ambulance service franchise, the granting of such franchise could be exclusive, within the sound discretion of the fiscal court, depending upon what the public interest demands in the particular situation. OAG 70-565 .

In the absence of issuing an ambulance service franchise under Ky. Const., § 164 or KRS Ch. 58, a county has no authority to prohibit the operation of a competing ambulance service. OAG 70-565 .

Where the chief of the volunteer fire department was sued as an individual for malicious prosecution as the result of an arson warrant, the fiscal court, in its discretion, could authorize the payment of the fire chief’s court costs and attorney’s fees by means of a properly budgeted item. OAG 70-680 .

An individual magistrate alone, representing his district, cannot order work done in another magistrate’s district. OAG 70-742 .

The hiring and firing of county hospital personnel cannot be delegated to a board but must be determined by the fiscal court. OAG 70-813 , 71-1.

This section does not authorize the change from a cash basis based on the situation where county fee officers were paid part of their salaries for 1970 in 1971 due to assessment litigation. OAG 71-28 .

Where in 1970, due to tax assessment litigation, salaries and fees to some officials were delayed, salary amounts and fees earned by the clerk in 1970 and which should have normally been paid by the county in 1970 should have been considered as receipts for 1970, though actually received in 1971, for the purposes of settlement with the county. OAG 71-42 .

When the sheriff’s office needs certain office equipment to carry out its functions and there are insufficient fees for such purpose, the fiscal court should authorize the payment for such needed equipment out of the county treasury, subject to the availability of properly budgeted funds for such purpose. OAG 71-47 .

Where the sheriff’s office requires such equipment as an adding machine and a calculator to be adequately functional in rendering its legally required services, such equipment can be purchased out of the fees of the office, and a credit against excess fees should be allowed when such purchases are properly documented. OAG 71-47 .

Where, in the reasonable judgment of the fiscal court, the county attorney is unable for any reason, including the county attorney’s viewpoint toward the subject action of the fiscal court, to look after the interests of the county fully and completely, the fiscal court may employ counsel to assist in defending a suit against the fiscal court or it may employ independent counsel if the circumstances warrant. OAG 71-228 .

Where the fiscal court accepted a petition to dissolve a library district as valid after the county attorney advised them it was not valid and the fiscal court was subsequently sued by the library board, if the county attorney did not feel he could adequately defend the suit, the fiscal court could employ counsel to assist him. OAG 71-228 .

Before a fiscal court could authorize the expenditure of funds to hire outside counsel to assist in the defense of several suits against a sheriff, it would have to be determined that the requisite county interest was involved and that the sheriff had acted in good faith in the performance of his duties. OAG 71-355 .

A county could sell or lease land to a Kiwanis Club to be used in expanding the fairgrounds and, since the use would be for a public purpose that would be beneficial to the community in general, the land could be donated for a token consideration. OAG 71-374 .

If a county sold or leased land to a civic club to be used as a fairground, the county could insert a reverter clause in any deed of the land should it cease to be used for the purpose in question, particularly if it is donated. OAG 71-374 .

The fiscal court has the implied authority, under its express county road powers of this section, to cause the erection of appropriate speed limit signs on county roads, in conformity with this section. OAG 71-397 .

Although the fiscal court can establish a direct county disposal system or garbage collection in the unincorporated area of the county, a city could enter into a joint venture with the county in those areas. OAG 71-449 .

The basis for a direct county disposal system is well established under KRS 58.010 et seq. and this section. OAG 71-449 .

The statutory authority for direct county operation of a disposal system may properly extend over into the area of garbage collection. OAG 71-449 .

When this section is read together with KRS 58.010 et seq., the legal basis for a direct county garbage collection or disposal system, or both, clearly emerges. OAG 71-449 .

Where real property was devised to a county hospital, the county, through the fiscal court, had the authority to sell and convey the subject property to a third-party buyer provided that the statutory requirements of KRS 65.010 (now repealed) are met. OAG 71-544 .

County road equipment may not be used to work on private roads, with or without compensation, as the fiscal court is only authorized to provide for the good condition of highways and the responsibility for such illegal use would rest with the individual members of the fiscal court. OAG 68-86 , 73-290.

Subsection (2) of this section is broad enough to allow the fiscal court to authorize renovation of an existing building. OAG 72-32 .

Subsection (2) would not authorize the fiscal court to purchase commercial property with the intent to lease such property to the county 4-H Association with an option to purchase, when said association would in turn sublease the property to various local and federal agencies. OAG 72-53 .

Under subsection (6) (now subsection (1)(c)), the fiscal court is responsible for the receipt and expenditure of federal money that comes to the county. OAG 72-167 .

The county, through the fiscal court, is responsible for furnishing the office of the Circuit Court Clerk with necessary supplies and equipment which would include a desk and a typewriter. OAG 72-250 .

A fiscal court is monetarily responsible for official postage used in the office of the Circuit Court Clerk. OAG 72-293 .

Fiscal court cannot authorize payment of an award out of the county treasury for the apprehension and conviction of persons involved in burning a bridge located in the county. OAG 72-305 .

A firm employed by a county on an annual basis to audit the fee officers of that county on a calendar year basis, to audit the records of the county treasurer on a fiscal year basis and does not otherwise keep any county books or records or supervise those who keep such records is not a county auditor under the terms of this section. OAG 72-356 .

The fiscal court can authorize the shooting of pigeons from the top of the county courthouse. OAG 72-760 .

Revenue sharing funds allocated to a county are subject to the fiscal court’s control and the county treasurer has immediate custodial and accounting responsibility for all county funds, including revenue sharing funds, therefore, the treasurer must carefully hold such money subject to the orders of the fiscal court. OAG 73-171 .

A fiscal court can only act as a body, cannot act to fragment the county’s business on a magisterial district basis and all expenditures must be for the county as a unit of local government, the fiscal court being required to base all expenditures on what may be equitable for the whole county. OAG 73-423 .

Possessing limited powers, a fiscal court can expend its public funds only for purposes expressly authorized or necessarily implied by imperative language and cannot spend its funds for a city within the county unless the expenditure is a valid county expenditure permitted by law, and is equitable in view of the whole county’s needs. OAG 73-423 .

The fiscal court members may not agree to divide federal revenue sharing funds equally among themselves, each spending his “share” within his magisterial district as all such expenditures must be for the county as the unit of local government and must be measured by at least three (3) tests: (1) is it a valid county expenditure permitted by law? (2) is it equitable in view of the whole county’s needs? and (3) is the expenditure one that falls within both one (1) or more categories of priority expenditures as outlined in § 103 of Tit. 1 of the Revenue Sharing Act? OAG 73-423 .

A fiscal court can purchase a private law library and office equipment for the county attorney’s office from excess fees of the succeeding county attorney or from the county treasury where the fees of that office are insufficient for that purpose under KRS 64.530 and this section which has been broadly interpreted in Barkley v. Gatewood (1941), 285 Ky. 179 , 147 S.W.2d 373, 1941 Ky. LEXIS 356 , to establish the county’s authority to pay for necessary equipment of the office of a county official or the fiscal court may purchase such library as a purchase for the county law library under the authority of KRS 172.100 . OAG 73-433 .

Elections cannot be held without affirmative constitutional or statutory authority and there is no such authorization for placing upon the ballot in a statewide or county-wide general election such questions as the abolition of strip mining or the abrogation of broad form deeds which provide for no damages to surface owners where strip and auger mining is conducted except in cases of arbitrary, wanton or malicious acts. OAG 73-518 .

Assuming that the expenditures are made as a properly budgeted item in accordance with KRS Ch. 68, a fiscal court can legally pay the dues of each member or of the full fiscal court for membership in the Kentucky Magistrates and Commissioners Association and can reimburse the members, including the county judge (now county judge/executive) and the county attorney, for expenses incurred in travel to meetings of the association and expenses incidental thereto including food and lodging. These expenditures would be a proper credit against excess fees of the magistrates comprising the fiscal court or the magistrates could be reimbursed directly from the county treasury. OAG 73-552 .

When a fiscal court (or fiscal courts acting jointly) employ a public defender, the court is a political subdivision since it is acting legally for the county. OAG 73-638 .

The fiscal court has the authority to establish an accounting system wherein fee offices turn in all fees to the county treasury, and the county treasurer pays each officer his monthly salary out of the treasury. OAG 74-1 .

The fiscal court has the legal authority to remove the county hospital board of directors and to delegate the check writing power to the administrator together with a member of the fiscal court. OAG 74-364 .

If a jailer resides in the jail and a deputy jailer meets the requirements of KRS 71.020 by residing in the jail, the fiscal court may charge the jailer rent for his residential quarters which must be paid out of the private funds of the jailer and not out of excess fees as office expense. OAG 74-309 .

If, in the reasonable judgment of the fiscal court, the county attorney is unable for any reason to look after the interests of the county and fiscal court fully and completely, the fiscal court may employ outside counsel to assist the county attorney in defending a civil action against the fiscal court and pay for such additional services out of the county treasury. OAG 74-345 .

The fiscal courts have the power to appropriate dues, in connection with a proposed county officials association to pay for services to members, under this section and KRS 67.083 , 64.530 . OAG 74-434 .

The fiscal court has the authority under subsection (6) (now subsection (1)(c)) to impose an order that county claims will be paid during regular office hours of the county clerk and treasury. OAG 74-466 .

A mandamus action cannot be had against the fiscal court seeking an order requiring the fiscal court to build a new jail. OAG 74-488 .

The county has the primary responsibility in paying the costs of getting an indigent county resident presently in jail from the jail to the hospital, and the county court is the proper court to authorize the prisoner’s removal from jail. OAG 74-494 .

The fiscal court, so long as it acts in good faith, has the right to compromise and settle for less than the amount owed in excess fees which are not the subject of pending litigation since official expenses allowable as credits against excess fees may be unliquidated, uncertain, doubtful or disputed. OAG 74-511 .

If a fiscal court adopts an accounting system wherein fee officers turn in all fees to the county treasury and the county treasurer in turn pays each officer his monthly salary, all legal fees of the sheriff’s office, earned and collected by the sheriff and his lawful deputies, would have to be turned into the county treasury. OAG 74-604 .

The closing day under KRS 61.160 is left to the discretion of each public official maintaining an office and is not a matter within the discretion of the fiscal court under subsection (6) (now subsection (1) (c)) of this section; thus any fiscal court ordinance purporting to set the closing day for particular county offices would be wholly illegal and void. OAG 74-663 .

Even though a county may utilize the services of a county road supervisor to directly supervise county road work, the fiscal court as a body never loses its ultimate responsibility for the county road program; thus an individual magistrate, acting as himself, does not have the authority to override the decision of the fiscal court or to act in place of the fiscal court by telling a county supervisor not to work on a particular road. OAG 74-676 .

Neither this section nor KRS 67.083 permit a county to use its funds, employees or facilities to collect and dispose of garbage of cities within the county but, under the Interlocal Cooperation Act, KRS 65.210 to 65.300 , the county and the cities could enter into a contract for the cities to contribute funds, equipment and employees to a county program to operate a sanitary landfill and collect and dispose of garbage throughout the county. OAG 74-706 .

Although a fiscal court is prohibited by Ky. Const., § 179 from loaning county funds to deputy sheriffs to permit them to purchase cars for use in the performance of their official duties, it may, under the authority of this section and KRS 67.083 , purchase such automobiles, as a properly budgeted item, for the use of the sheriff and his deputies in carrying out their law enforcement duties, the county retaining title to the cars and leasing them to the sheriff at an equitable monthly rental payable from the fees of his office. OAG 74-735 .

Under this section, the county judge is merely one (1) member of the fiscal court and, while he does get to vote on all matters before that body, he has only one (1) vote and the power of the judge to determine from whom to purchase office supplies, and the county clerk’s purchase of paper and the county judge’s (now county judge/executive’s) control over it, are all matters under the control of the fiscal court and not the county judge. OAG 74-918 .

The sheriff is responsible for preparing and submitting his report of settlement to the fiscal court and the reasonable cost of preparing it may be considered an official expense of his office and paid out of his fees. OAG 75-33 .

The medical and drug bills of a city prisoner confined in the county jail should be paid by him if he is not indigent; if he is indigent the county of his residence is primarily responsible for such bills, although the city of his residence has joint responsibility therefor, and the city and county should agree on an equitable basis of shared payment. OAG 75-51 .

The fiscal court, in its discretion, may pay as a properly budgeted item the legal fees of a sheriff and county attorney in defending suits brought against them, providing the court makes a reasonable determination that: (1) the interests of the county were involved in the litigation and (2) the officers acted in good faith in connection with their actions which were the subject matters of the litigation and in connection with the discharge of their official duties. OAG 75-53 .

Under the authority of this section and KRS 67.083 the fiscal court has the authority to establish by proper order speed limits on county roads lower than those prescribed in KRS 189.390 and 189.391 (now repealed) where such lower limits are necessary to the public health, safety, welfare and convenience, except in the special situation involving trucks under KRS 189.230 where the county judge may set lower speed limits. OAG 75-74 .

Since a fiscal court has full authority to regulate and control the fiscal affairs and property of a county, the fiscal court may direct, by proper orders, the county court clerk to countersign all checks written on the county treasury. OAG 75-157 .

Pursuant to authority in KRS 67.083 , in addition to subsection (8) of this section, relating to the sick and indigent, the fiscal courts can subsidize private ambulance services as it relates to charity and noncharity cases. OAG 75-158 (Opinion prior to 1978 amendment).

Assuming that the requirements of Ky. Const., §§ 157 and 158 and the budgetary procedures mandated by KRS ch. 68 are complied with, a fiscal court under the authority of this section and KRS 67.083 can legally purchase land for the purpose of leasing it to a private corporation for use as a county fair site. OAG 75-279 .

A county is protected by its sovereign immunity from suit for tort liability arising from the operation of a county fair by a private corporation to which the county has leased the land used for the fair site, but, in order to remove any potential liability of individual members of the fiscal court, the lease should contain a disclaimer, specifying that the fair is not an operation of the county or the fiscal court and that all risks are assumed by the fair corporation. OAG 75-279 .

A county may not jointly with a private corporation purchase land to be used as a county fair site. OAG 75-279 .

Where the expense of an audit of a county office conducted under KRS 64.810 cannot be paid from the fees of the office, the fiscal court may, in its discretion, pay for the audit out of the county treasury. OAG 75-342 .

The punctual attendance of members of the fiscal court at its lawful meetings may not be coerced by the contempt of court powers of the county judge (now county judge/executive) but may be compelled by mandamus action filed in Circuit Court. OAG 75-384 .

As indicated in this section and KRS 67.083 , nothing in the general powers of the fiscal court indicate a ministerial duty to fix a ditch so the fiscal court cannot be legally compelled to repair a ditch although the fiscal court could, in its discretion, repair a ditch under its police powers as specifically relates to the health, safety and welfare of county citizens and as a public project under KRS 58.010 (now repealed). OAG 75-400 .

The fiscal court under this section has superior power over that of the jailer under KRS 67.130 concerning the regulation and control of county buildings. OAG 75-404 .

The fiscal court has the responsibility of hiring and firing county employees, even where such employment is federally funded, and such power cannot be delegated to the county judge. OAG 76-25 .

A sheriff can purchase a communications system for the department as a necessary office expense without formal approval of the fiscal court if the purchase money comes from excess fees rather than the county treasury. OAG 76-57 .

When the county auditor is employed on a day to day basis as a county employee and is not an independent contractor, he is a county officer. OAG 76-63 .

There is no statutory requirement concerning the location of a county jail in relation to the county courthouse. OAG 76-146 .

In fulfilling its obligation to provide for the good condition of the highways, a fiscal court cannot impose on individuals who use the roads the financial burden of repair and maintenance; thus the exaction of a fee based on the tonnage hauled by a coal company on county roads would not be permissible. OAG 76-170 .

The fiscal court is responsible for paying for such housekeeping items as dish detergent, toilet paper, soap, paper towels and mops used for the county jail and maintenance of the prisoners. OAG 76-229 .

The fiscal court has the power to purchase all property for the county out of the county treasury and this includes any equipment purchased for the use of the office of sheriff or for any other county constitutional office and where necessary official puchases are made out of excess fees of county constitutional officers for use of those offices, the fiscal court has the authority to require that such purchases be made by the central purchasing officer established by the fiscal court to effect county purchases after such purchases are authorized by fiscal court orders. OAG 76-390 .

Since under subsections (5) and (9) (now see subsection (2)(b)) of this section the legislature intended county road fund money to be spent on roads and bridges located within the county, one county cannot use its road and bridge money on repairing a bridge in a second county; however, under KRS 67.083 the fiscal court of the county can appropriate money from its county general fund for the purpose of repairing such bridge in another county since the bridge is vital to the health, education, welfare and convenience of families in the county who would otherwise be cut off from the county road and the service it entails. OAG 76-472 .

Where certain convicted criminal defendants brought civil rights suits against various county officials, where the fiscal court determines that the subject officials performed their statutory duties in a bona fide or good faith manner during the period in question in the civil rights litigation, the fiscal court, in its discretion, may authorize the county attorney to defend such actions; however, where, in the reasonable judgment of the fiscal court, the county attorney, considering his official workload, would be unable to look after the interest of the county fully and completely, the fiscal court may employ special counsel to assist the county attorney or to conduct, themselves, the defense of such officials. OAG 77-21 .

The fiscal court of the county of a prisoner’s residence, if the prisoner is indigent, has the primary responsibility for paying any necessary medical bills incurred while he was a prisoner in the county jail. OAG 77-690 .

Where county personal property is determined to be surplus, the property should be appraised by at least two (2) competent and independent appraisers and then the property should not be sold for less than the appraised value on a negotiated basis or by written bids, whichever is calculated to bring the best price. OAG 77-692 .

This section imposes the duty of providing necessary medical expenses for a sick prisoner upon the fiscal court of the county in which the indigent prisoner resides inasmuch as an indigent prisoner is a poor prisoner or a pauper prisoner, even though he does not reside in a poorhouse. OAG 78-7 ; 78-268; 78-272.

In view of the fact that the courts have held that relieving unemployment is a public purpose, the lease and use of county property for industrial purposes would be valid. OAG 78-67 .

A county may, in its sound discretion, lease land it owns to private persons for agricultural purposes pursuant to this section. OAG 78-108 .

A fiscal court has a continuing duty to maintain an adequate county jail and even if a county jail is closed down by the fiscal court or by a judicial court order for the reason of its being inadequate to house prisoners, the fiscal court within a reasonable time (as determined by the courts) must provide another and adequate county jail. OAG 78-129 .

If a fiscal court fails to furnish an adequate jail, its members are subject to a mandamus action in Circuit Court and the members of fiscal court are subject to an indictment for willful neglect in the discharge of official duties if they fail, after a reasonable period of time elapses within which they should have taken action, to secure a sufficient jail. OAG 78-129 .

This section is basically a delegation of specific powers, which specific powers are deemed by the court to be duties. OAG 78-129 .

The fiscal court’s franchise power exists by virtue of the fact that cable television (cable and wire) is constructed over county road systems, over which the fiscal court has jurisdiction and fiscal courts generally have the authority to establish in the contract of franchise such reasonable provisions for service and rates under Constitution § 164, as are calculated to effectuate the purposes for which it is granted. OAG 78-208 .

There is no specific statutory authority for the subsidizing of or giving of aid to a physician in connection with his private practice, even though the practical effect of such aid would promote the public health of the county. OAG 78-210 .

The fiscal court has authority to appropriate money for the construction or maintenance or improvement of any road segment lying within the boundaries of the county, and, in general, this permissibility would also apply to bridges. OAG 78-250 .

It is incumbent upon the fiscal court that the sheriff have a telephone and that the actual and necessary official calls be paid for out of the county treasury in order that the sheriff’s office can function properly as required by the statutes; of course, expenditures for such telephone are subject to proper budgeting as provided in KRS Chapter 68. OAG 78-270 .

Where the fiscal court authorized use of a grader in only four (4) of eight (8) county districts such act was valid and binding and inasmuch as this section is a discretionary statute giving the fiscal court the authority to see to the condition of county roads and there are no legal grounds compelling the fiscal court to make the machinery available for usage on a county-wide basis. OAG 78-290 .

It is within the power of the fiscal court to sell property belonging to the county, and that power is not affected by the fact that federal funding was obtained under the Hill-Burton Act for construction of a hospital; therefore, it was proper, in the sense of being within its authority, for the fiscal court to execute a deed conveying the land and appurtenances known as the hospital to CCWMH, Inc., and such land and appurtenances became the property of CCWMH, Inc., a private nonprofit corporation. OAG 78-302 .

Where the fiscal court deeded county hospital to Clinton County War Memorial Hospital, Inc., the hospital became a private corporation when title passed to CCWMH, Inc., and the fiscal court was divested of any and all rights to assume control of the operation and management by reason of that transaction and this is so even though federal funds were used to build the hospital and CCWMH, Inc., was formed for the purposes of obtaining a deed to the hospital and operating it as a public nonprofit hospital for the benefit of the residents of the county. OAG 78-302 .

The county judge/executive would be acting beyond the scope of his powers by appointing a library board which would in turn initiate a library program which would be supported by county funds where the fiscal court had not, by prior action, appropriated funds for such a purpose. OAG 78-332 .

The proper use and the allocation of the county road fund lies within the sound discretion of the fiscal court and the courts are not inclined to reverse their actions relating to appropriations and allocations unless the facts reveal that they have acted arbitrarily or unreasonably in making such appropriations and allocations. OAG 78-334 .

A county, through its fiscal court, may build a road leading to a subdivision if it will lie in the county, but not within city boundaries, and there is no requirement that the road be a throughway or that it give access to more than one (1) area. OAG 78-374 .

Concerning contracts that relate to the legislative or governmental powers of the fiscal court, no action taken by the fiscal court in that regard would be binding upon its successors; whereas, if the contract arises out of the business or proprietary powers of the fiscal court, such contract or agreement could be binding upon the successors of the fiscal court. OAG 78-432 .

The power conferred upon counties to exercise legislative or governmental functions is conferred to be exercised as often as may be found needful or politic, and an incumbent fiscal court presently holding such powers is vested with no discretion to circumscribe or limit or diminish their efficiency, but must transmit them unimpaired to their successors, but in the exercise of the business powers of a county, the county and its officers are controlled by no such rule, and they may lawfully exercise these powers in the same way, and in their exercise the county will be governed by the same rules which control a private individual or a business corporation under like circumstances. OAG 78-432 .

While the fiscal court is directed to adopt a county administrative code which will include procedures relating to the filing of claims against the county, and while the county judge/executive can be given a central role in the administrative handling of claims against the county, under this section the fiscal court has no authority to relinquish its overall control of fiscal matters by authorizing the payment of claims by the county judge/executive without the specific approval of the fiscal court. OAG 78-467 .

Outside of legal meetings of the fiscal court, in those counties having the commissioner type of government, the commissioners as individual officers have no administrative or executive functions, as relate to county government, as spelled out by statute. OAG 78-529 .

Implicit in this section, KRS 67.710 and 68.005 is the authority for the fiscal court to establish in the administrative code a reasonable provision for the county judge/executive’s vacation with pay. OAG 79-14 .

Individual members of the fiscal court may be held liable in tort in connection with the operation of county buildings, grounds, roads and bridges, depending upon the factual situation as determined by the courts. OAG 79-101 .

The fiscal court has the responsibility of causing the construction, operation and maintenance of all county buildings and other structures, grounds, roads and other property, implicit in which is overall responsibility of the fiscal court members to keep all such county buildings, grounds, roads and bridges in a proper and safe state of repair and maintenance. OAG 79-101 .

Fiscal courts can authorize the employing of a C.P.A. firm to audit the county treasury account. OAG 79-103 .

Under this section and Ky. Const., § 164, the fiscal court may divide a county into cable television districts and award a cable television franchise to the highest and best bidder in each district, where the fiscal court had determined, as a legislative matter, that such a method of operation will be for the best interest of the community. OAG 79-199 .

Where a volunteer fire department is a unit of county government operated pursuant to KRS 67.083(3)(u) rather than an independent unit disassociated from county government such as a nonprofit corporate entity or a volunteer fire district organized pursuant to KRS Chapter 75, in any situation where county money is involved, the fiscal court, not the county fire department, should act on behalf of the county and make the basic decisions of how to spend the money, how much to spend and arrangements pertaining to any particular expenditure. OAG 79-226 .

Reasonably implied in this section and KRS 67.083 is the premise that the fiscal court can expend county money where necessary to seek judicial guidance in the carrying out of its governmental function and the proper exercise of its basic powers. OAG 79-272 .

KRS 67.710 , 67.083 and this section are in pari materia and must be construed together such that effect may be given to all of the provisions of each, if fairly and reasonably such construction is possible. OAG 79-345 .

Subsection (2)(b) of this section and KRS 67.083(3)(t) explicitly and expressly suggest that a fiscal court, as a body, has the sole jurisdiction to determine, both by legislative and executive or administrative action, the county road programs. OAG 79-345 .

A county has authority to regulate by ordinance the use of public ways for the transmission of public utilities. OAG 79-346 .

In passing on claims against a county, it is only necessary that the county judge/executive indicate to the fiscal court the claimant, basic nature of the claim, and the amount. OAG 79-374 .

The fiscal court has exclusive authority over county roads, including the authority to construct, maintain and operate such roads in the public interest of the health, safety, welfare and convenience of the inhabitants of the county. OAG 79-393 .

This section and KRS 67.083(3)(u) impose upon the fiscal court the affirmative duty of taking such steps, by orders or ordinances, in providing, within the county’s financial ability and constitutional limitations, the necessary police protection. OAG 79-451 .

Assuming that department retirement ages are properly set, it would be possible that an employee who reaches the mandatory retirement age in one particular employment might be transferred to a county job involving another kind of employment, provided he meets the necessary occupational qualifications, and is under age 70. OAG 79-458 .

Mandatory retirement age can vary within county departments, provided the fiscal court can demonstrate that there is a bona fide occupational qualification based upon the realities and reasonable necessities of governmental business performed and its public implications require a lower retirement age than 70. OAG 79-458 .

The fiscal court may, under its authority to deal with county personnel matters, enact an ordinance providing a mandatory retirement age for county employees, but, because of the federal law (29 USCS § 631(a)), that retirement age generally cannot be less than age 70. OAG 79-458 .

Any revenue or money belonging to the county is necessarily considered to be county money, regardless of the source, taxes, license fees, donations, gifts, etc. OAG 79-480 .

KRS 216.310 to 216.360 relate to a hospital district, but not to a “county hospital” established under 67.083(3)(d) or this section. OAG 79-495 .

A fiscal court’s authority to let a cable television franchise is bottomed on the fiscal court’s power to control its roads and rights-of-way. OAG 79-566 .

Where a cable T.V. company is not occupying county roads or rights-of-way with its facilities in unincorporated territory, then it can operate without a county franchise. OAG 79-566 .

The county judge/executive alone has no authority to close down the county jail. OAG 79-587 .

The fiscal court could close down the county jail for repair, where extensive repair is necessary to make it adequate and humane, or it can close down the jail permanently where it is found unfit or inadequate as a jail and where repair will not be performed, but in both instances, the fiscal court must, within a reasonable time, provide another and adequate county jail. OAG 79-587 .

Considering the responsibility of each county, through its fiscal court, to provide for jail or detention facilities a fiscal court could, by ordinance, establish a reasonable charge per day for furnishing the jail facilities to out-of-county prisoners, not as a dieting fee but as a reasonable charge imposed upon the neighboring using counties under the theory of their sharing in the capital cost of constructing such facility and the cost of utilities. OAG 79-588 .

The fiscal court has no positive duty of procuring interest on its county deposits. OAG 80-98 .

The matter of choosing a county depository is left to the discretion of the fiscal court, as a body. OAG 80-98 .

The issuance of a garbage franchise by the fiscal court must necessarily involve a reasonable consideration to be paid to the county. OAG 80-57 .

A county judge/executive may not appoint magistrates to serve as road commissioners over their respective districts since the fiscal court as a body is required to establish the policies and expenditures relating to county roads; and the road program cannot be fragmented into a project in each magisterial district. OAG 80-102 .

A county fiscal court may enact a general license tax ordinance without a vote of the electorate, where the revenue from such a county tax is needed to complete the county’s judicial facilities building; the tax may be applied effectively to all persons working and businesses operating within the county boundaries, including persons working and businesses operating within the city boundaries of a city in that county, even though the city already has its own payroll tax in effect. OAG 80-121 .

A county hospital commission may adopt regulations pursuant to KRS 45A.360 , and establish small purchase procedures pursuant to KRS 45A.385 , but, since the fiscal court cannot delegate its overall fiscal control of the county hospital, such regulations and procedures would be subject to fiscal court approval. OAG 80-128 .

Since a county hospital commission is not an autonomous unit of government and is subject to the direct and overall fiscal and financial supervision of the fiscal court, proper regulations and small purchase procedures adopted by fiscal court for the general county operations could be made applicable to the county hospital, and in that way duplication of effort could be avoided and the county would be on a unified system. OAG 80-128 .

Since there is no minimum salary payable to jailers out of the county treasury, the amount of any salary paid to jailers out of the county treasury is in the sound discretion of the fiscal court; but as to fee officers, such as the county jailer, where the jailer receives sufficient fees to make the maximum rubber dollar amount for 1980, the jailer is entitled to such maximum compensation, and in such case the fiscal court can do nothing to prevent the fee officer’s getting the maximum rubber dollar compensation where the jailer’s fees are sufficient to give him or her, as the case may be, the maximum possible under the rubber dollar formula. OAG 80-164 .

A county fiscal court, which plans to renovate a building to be used as the county court facility, may not restrict and apply the invitations to bid only to general contractors with home offices in that county, since the Model Procurement Code applies to fiscal courts and there is nothing in the applicable sections of KRS Chapter 45A that would support such a restriction. OAG 80-215 .

Neither a county judge/executive nor the fiscal court has the authority to delegate executive or administrative duties to the magistrates on fiscal court since subsection (3) of this section expressly provides that the fiscal court shall not exercise executive authority except as specifically assigned by statute. OAG 80-236 .

A county fiscal court does not have the authority under KRS 67.080 and 67.083 to appropriate funds to youth sport programs by funding through a joint recreation board created under KRS 97.035 ; although the fiscal court may under KRS 67.083 (3)(f), appropriate money, properly budgeted for such purposes, directly to the youth sports organization concerned, a recreation board has no statutory authority to act as an arm of fiscal court to handle county appropriations which are to finally go to various youth sports program organizations. OAG 80-303 .

The fiscal court of a county that owns a county farm does not have the authority under KRS 67.080 and 67.083 to lease a part of the county farm to a joint recreation board for use by the fair board as a county fairground; however, under KRS 67.083 (3)(f) and (9) the fiscal court may lease the property to the county fair board for county fair purposes. OAG 80-303 .

The fiscal court has the duty to provide the county treasurer with any necessary items of office supplies and equipment, including bond requirement expense. OAG 80-309 .

The fiscal court has the authority to establish necessary county offices and positions, in proper implementation of express statutory county functions, and the fiscal court may employ an administrative assistant so long as he is to assist the fiscal court in its legislative function. OAG 80-334 .

The fiscal court may properly provide the commissioners of fiscal court with separate offices, with phone and secretaries, within its sound discretion, depending upon the actual need for such facilities and secretarial help and available money. OAG 80-334 .

The commissioners of fiscal court cannot screen and hire CETA workers without the county judge/executive’s knowledge since that would be in violation of KRS 67.710(7), such action constituting an usurpation of the county judge/executive’s function in nominating people for hiring. OAG 80-334 .

Where the fiscal court has authorized a raise in salary for the county judge/executive, it cannot later in the term turn down that raise since that would be a prohibited change in his compensation. OAG 80-334 .

Since the fiscal affairs of the county, including the final adoption of the budget, are squarely on the shoulders of the fiscal court as a body, the county judge/executive and his staff have the duty to employ all reasonable means of furnishing needed fiscal information to the other commissioners, and the county judge/executive should answer all reasonable requests for information by the commissioners prior to the May 24 deadline for submitting the budget to the fiscal court, because the fiscal court must act on the budget by July 1 and five weeks is not a sufficient period to review the proposed budget in detail. OAG 80-344 .

The fiscal court may approve of an administrative code provision whereby the county judge/executive could, under a properly defined emergency situation, take steps to effect repair of a county road or bridge, subject, however, to a ratification of such action by the fiscal court as a body at the first meeting opportunity. OAG 80-368 .

The responsibility for determining precisely just what specifically designated road segments and bridges will be constructed, reconstructed, maintained, or repaired, rests with the fiscal court as a body, not the county judge/executive, and the county judge/executive cannot order the road department to begin work on a particular bridge without fiscal court approval. OAG 80-368 .

The responsibility for providing security for a prisoner, who is receiving treatment at a hospital, rests with the fiscal court of the county of trial, including the payment of the guards for their services. OAG 80-434 .

The mere inclusion in the county budget of enough money to allow for a salary adjustment for the county judge/executive is not enough to effectuate the salary adjustment, because the budget is merely a document providing appropriation for potential expenditure; the actual allotment and final appropriation and expenditure of county treasury funds requires a specific and formal order or resolution of fiscal court. OAG 80-438 .

Where a fiscal court entered orders approving of a loan for the construction or renovation of a new county facility and courthouse, but the county judge/executive refused to sign the loan and renovation documents prior to their deadline date, the other members of the fiscal court could sign the documents on behalf of the county, because the fiscal court can exercise such an executive or administrative function as signing documents it has legislatively authorized where the county judge/executive fails or refuses to carry out his mere ministerial duty of signing; to hold otherwise would obviously give the county judge/executive veto power over the fiscal court, which he does not have, and would permit the blocking of the will of the majority of the fiscal court. OAG 80-458 .

Pursuant to subsection (2)(b) of this section, the fiscal court is responsible for maintaining a county jail facility which is adequate both in size and housing requirements for the needs of the county. OAG 80-482 .

The fiscal court has a continuing affirmative duty under KRS 67.080 and KRS 67.083 to provide a county jail; the duty is not limited merely to the provision of a physical facility, the jail, but also encompasses the duty to perform the service of keeping and housing prisoners and thus, though the county has no jail, the fiscal court will nonetheless continue to have an affirmative duty to provide for the housing and keeping of prisoners, to operate the jail, as it were, through some alternative means. OAG 80-535 .

Where the clerk of fiscal court or his deputy is not present for any reason at a special fiscal court meeting, the fiscal court has the authority to designate some other person, capable of preparing such minutes, to prepare the minutes of the fiscal court meeting. OAG 80-595 .

The fiscal court does not have the authority to maintain temporarily or occasionally a road which has not been accepted into the county road system, but which is a public road used by the school buses, mail service and general public. OAG 80-602 .

Where a jailer had to borrow money to run the jail, the interest paid on the loan may be deducted from the jailer’s excess fees as a credit since the jailer borrowed the money to run the jail while it was closed, thus directly benefiting the county, which under this section and KRS 67.083 has overall responsibility for maintaining the county jail. OAG 81-70 .

Where paving contractor paved .5 miles of road in a magisterial district in addition to the contracted .6 miles upon the approval of a single magistrate, but without consideration or approval by the full fiscal court, the county was not legally obligated to pay the additional $8,800 billed by the contractor since the extra work could only be properly authorized by the fiscal court acting as a body under this section and KRS 67.083 ; however, the full fiscal court could ratify the contract since it had the power to make it in the first place. OAG 81-104 .

The fiscal court of a county may lease a portion of the tobacco base owned by the county to individuals, since the power of the court under this section to sell real property includes the power to lease, and the lease of county property does not come under the competitive bidding requirements of KRS 424.260 and the Model Procurement Code, KRS 45A.010 , since the bidding principle applies only to governmental acquisitions, not to situations where the government is the lessor; however, the lease must contain the precise consideration given, since the fiscal court must make full public disclosure of its transactions. OAG 81-107 .

Where an urban county council or fiscal court has, under KRS 67A.060 , this section, and KRS 67.083 , enacted reasonable ordinances providing for accumulated leave payment upon leaving local service and taking leave with pay while still in local service, an employee of the county court clerk, jailer or sheriff who is terminated may be paid for accumulated leave out of the “75% fund” set up in Ky. Const., § 106. OAG 81-123 .

A county fiscal court has the authority to grant a cable television franchise pursuant to Ky. Const., §§ 163 and 164, and to the extent that the systems of cable and wire are constructed over county road systems over which the fiscal court has jurisdiction, the franchise power also exists pursuant to this section and KRS 67.083 ; moreover, the fiscal court has the authority, under Ky. Const., §§ 163 and 164 to establish in the franchise contract reasonable provisions for service and rates which are calculated to effectuate the purposes for which it is granted; thus, a franchise contract which required the cable operator to perform at a level which would meet applicable FCC guidelines would be reasonable and valid. OAG 81-166 .

It would not be legal for the magistrates to supervise road work or other county work, with or without pay, since they may only exercise the powers which this section and KRS 67.083 permit or direct them to do. OAG 81-186 .

The power given to the county fiscal court to adopt an administrative code for a county pursuant to subsection (2)(c) of this section properly encompasses provisions for vacation and sick leave for all county employees, including deputies of county constitutional officers, using state statutes and state administrative regulations as a background, so long as such treatment is not in conflict with constitutional or statutory sections. OAG 81-202 ( OAG 81-61 withdrawn).

The statutory definition of “may” defined as “permissive” under subsection (20) of KRS 446.010 does not apply to subsection (1)(c) of this section, when viewed in its total context, since the courts have held that the fiscal court has almost unlimited control of the fiscal affairs of a county and the exercise of that control by the fiscal court is mandatory. OAG 81-203 .

Although a county generally has responsibility only for those indigents who actually reside in that county, the medical care costs for indigent prisoners who are residents of another county or state would also have to be borne by that county as a necessary cost in the operation of the jail pursuant to this section, KRS 67.083 , and KRS 67.130 , subject to the payment of medical care for indigent prisoners with nonpostponable life or health threatening problems by the governmental unit (county, state or federal) whose law has been violated, as provided in KRS 441.010 (now KRS 441.045 ). OAG 81-213 .

A fiscal court in a county with less than 75,000 population can pass an ordinance or order providing that certain elected fee officers, such as the clerk and sheriff, turn over their statutory fees to the county treasury with the understanding that the salaries of such officers, their deputies, and necessary office expenses be paid out of the county treasury, and, since such revenues are public moneys, these fees must be put into a “public account” covering each fee officer, as a part of the county treasury’s accounting system. OAG 81-303 .

The reasonable construction of KRS 67.083 , 67.130 , 208.130 (now repealed) and this section means that the county is responsible for the costs of transporting juveniles from one county to another. OAG 81-357 .

There is nothing in this section which allows a fiscal court to enact an ordinance relating to the isolated recordation of oil shale leases. OAG 81-414 .

Neither this section nor KRS 67.083 contain any express delegation of authority to the fiscal courts to enact obscenity or pornography laws. OAG 81-417 .

There is no authority in either this section or KRS 67.083 which authorizes a fiscal court to expend public funds to pay the electrical inspection fees for individual county residents; in addition, Ky. Const., § 179 prohibits any county from appropriating money for any individual. OAG 82-30 .

Under subdivision (1)(c) of this section, the fiscal court may provide a small sum to the county clerk for petty cash for use only in making change in the operation of the clerk’s office; however, it should be understood that the county money remains county money at all times and is not to be expended for any operative cost of that office and, the clerk must account strictly for such money as a bailee and return it upon demand to the county. OAG 82-107 .

The choosing of a depository bank for county funds is the responsibility of the fiscal court. OAG 82-134 .

Any fiscal court in Kentucky has supervision and control over county finances and county personnel, and in the exercise of its broad county powers, any fiscal court can enter into a contract with county personnel which is deemed to be in the county’s and general public’s interest and involves such items as wages, hours, terms, and conditions of employment. It was definitely not the legislative intent that KRS 78.470 and 78.480 would negate such broad powers. OAG 82-141 .

In all counties in Kentucky, the county judge/executive may appoint a county police force, which will be funded by appropriate action and budgeting by the fiscal court. Members of a county police force are county employees and are subject to the administrative and legislative controls of the county judge/executive and the fiscal court as a body, pursuant to KRS 67.083(3)(u), 67.710(7) and subdivisions (1)(a), (1)(c), (1)(e), (2)(a) and (2)(c) of this section. OAG 82-141 .

There is ample authority in the case law and statutory law which authorize counties of less than 300,000 population to voluntarily engage in collective bargaining, leading to a finally executed written agreement which would be binding on the parties; accordingly, any such county may, through its fiscal court, voluntarily enter into a binding collective bargaining agreement with its county police force, as relates to hours, wages, and other conditions of employment. OAG 82-141 .

The superintendent of county buildings, under the administrative supervision of the county judge/executive, has a precise janitorial role to perform, the necessary expense of which must be borne by the county; the burden to keep the courthouse in a proper state of cleanliness and sanitation is clearly upon the fiscal court, the county judge/executive and the superintendent of buildings, in that order of hierarchy of governmental function. OAG 82-160 .

Pursuant to KRS 67A.060 , 67.083 , and this section, the Urban County Council, and the fiscal courts in other counties coming under the application of Ky. Const., § 106 and KRS 64.345 , may enact reasonable ordinances providing for leave time, i.e., for accumulated leave payment upon leaving the local service and taking leave with pay while still in local service. Such leave with pay would be payable out of the “75% account” of the affected office. Thus such leave payments would require: (1) a local ordinance and (2) a corresponding order of the court or fiscal court, as the case may be, relating to necessary office expenses (budget). OAG 82-221 .

The budget role of the court or fiscal court in KRS 64.345 was not designed to usurp the legislative role assigned to a county or urban county government. OAG 82-221 .

If the fiscal court has adopted an admininstrative code pursuant to subdivision (2)(c) of this section, and if the code purports to place additional responsibilities on the deputy county judge/executive which would be the equivalent of a secretary-bookkeeper position for assisting the county judge/executive, then the administrative code would govern; in the absence of giving the deputy the secretarial-bookkeeping additional role by way of the administrative code, the fiscal court cannot require the county judge/executive to combine those positions. OAG 82-224 .

County can only take official action through the fiscal court by majority vote, and hence no individual magistrate can require county attorney to do anything in connection with county government. OAG 82-228 .

A county has the duty of providing for the care, treatment and maintenance of the sick and poor of the county, although the county’s responsibility for providing for such sick, ailing and poor people is subject to its ability to pay. The fiscal court must set up an item in the county budget for the sick and poor, based upon available revenue. OAG 82-239 .

As to any damages created by the sending county’s prisoners held by holding county pursuant to contract, the fiscal courts of the holding and sending counties have the authority to specifically contract in order to remove the risk of liability for such damages on the part of the holding county. OAG 82-334 .

KRS 441.006 (now KRS 441.025 ) gives any county the option of providing a jail in the county or contracting with another county or a city for the incarceration of its prisoners. OAG 82-334 .

Where the county sheriff had no excess fees to pay into the county, the fiscal court should fund his documented and necessary office telephone expenses. OAG 82-402 .

City and county governments have the authority to dispose of real property they no longer need and the power to sell includes the power to lease. In deciding upon the various elements and aspects of a leasing arrangement, local governments must use their good business judgment and consider the governmental unit’s best interests. OAG 82-522 .

The fiscal court has no authority on its own initiative to amend or change an administrative code since it has been adopted. The county judge/executive has the sole power to offer a code and suggest revisions thereto, subject to the approval or disapproval of the fiscal court as a body in adopting a code or revisions thereof. OAG 82-569 .

The adoption of an administrative code is mandatory. Once it is adopted the fiscal court has no power to repeal it in toto. An adopted code may be amended, as suggested by the county judge/executive and approved by the fiscal court, but it cannot be repealed in toto. OAG 82-569 .

The fiscal court has authority to adopt a policy concerning permissive reimbursement of county officials’ legal expenses, provided that it meets the following guidelines: (1) it is found that the official was acting in good faith within the scope of his authority in the discharge of his official duties; i.e., he is found by the courts to not be guilty of crime, negligence, misconduct, or willful or malicious wrongdoing; (2) the litigation is of such nature as to affect the county governmental interest; and (3) there is money in an appropriate county budget item sufficient to pay such legal expenses. OAG 82-596 .

Where the fiscal court provides for four (4) county officials’ reimbursement for litigational expenses, such are legal if they meet the guidelines for reimbursement of expenses; however, where the fiscal court, as relates to the litigation involving four (4) county officials, decides to not reimburse a fifth county official involved in the same litigation, such action, where the case of the fifth defendant meets the guidelines, might be construed by the courts to be arbitrary under Ky. Const., § 2. Thus, where five county officials were involved and they are qualified under the guidelines for reimbursement of expenses, the reimbursement should be effected on a fair and equitable basis, if at all, for all five defendants. OAG 82-596 .

While it is true that all warrants for payments of funds from the county treasury must be cosigned by the county treasurer and county judge/executive under KRS 68.020(1), the authorization for using county funds to pay for necessary official supplies for the county clerk’s office can only come by a majority vote of the fiscal court at a properly called meeting. OAG 82-615 .

The fiscal court may reimburse or indemnify the jailer for his actual litigational costs suffered by him “while acting in good faith” in the discharge of his official duties; of course only after the litigation has become final can it be determined whether he so acted in good faith for the purposes of reimbursement of the jailer for actual litigational costs (money out of his own pocket). OAG 83-35 .

Kentucky law presently lays down no precise standard as to the consideration necessary for the sale of excess county real estate. OAG 83-37 .

A fiscal court could sell a hospital physical plant, which was not needed by the county, to a nonprofit corporation for at least its fair market value; a sale of surplus land for fair market value would satisfy Ky. Const., §§ 3, 171 and 179, as relates to prohibited gifts of county money. OAG 83-37 .

In paying the salaries of county road personnel the fiscal court may: (1) approve each set of payroll checks issued by a formal order or simple resolution by majority vote at a proper meeting of the fiscal court; or (2) establish, by way of an ordinance the rule that subject to named requirements, such as work time reports, etc., the county road department payroll checks will be issued at certain intervals, for work actually performed, under the supervision of the county judge/executive, without any other formal order or resolution of the fiscal court, and subject to the availability of budgeted funds. OAG 83-95 .

A fiscal court may engage in a grant of county money for ambulance purposes to a properly enfranchised person or corporation, provided it is done on a contractual basis to insure that the inhabitants of the unincorporated portion of the county are furnished ambulance service. OAG 83-222 .

The fiscal court, where the sheriff’s fees and receipts are not sufficient, should by an appropriate order, and subject to proper budget procedure under KRS Chapter 68, direct that payments be made out of the county treasury for the sheriff’s official postage, sheriff’s office supplies and utilities. OAG 83-293 .

The members of a joint city-county parks and recreation board are not county officers and, therefore, the provisions of subdivision (1)(d) of this section are not applicable to such a board. OAG 83-327 .

A fiscal court’s jurisdiction, including its powers relating to the county roads and bridges, extends only to territory within the particular county’s boundaries; accordingly, a county had no statutory authority to unilaterally spend county money on a bridge located in another county. OAG 83-340 .

The fiscal court, pursuant to KRS 67.083 and this section, can enact an ordinance providing for the management of the county hospital by a board to be established by fiscal court but, if the hospital is to remain a county hospital, the ultimate control and authority over the operation of the hospital by the fiscal court must be carefully and scrupulously retained; while the fiscal court can establish a board to conduct the day-to-day management of the county hospital, the fiscal court must retain for the county full ownership of the hospital property and final control and responsibility for the hospital. OAG 83-350 .

The county treasurer must keep an appropriation ledger, process claims, write the checks, and make financial reports to the fiscal court and while the county judge/executive has authority under subdivisions (1)(c) and (d) of this section and 67.083(3), with the approval of the fiscal court, to appoint personnel to assist him in his administrative and executive role, specifically as relates to administrative duties pertaining to county finances, such personnel cannot be hired to merely duplicate the precise work of the county treasurer, nor can such employment be used to interfere in any way with the statutory duties of the county treasurer. OAG 83-456 .

No conflict of interest or incompatibility of responsibilities exists, where the fiscal court chooses a bank at which the county judge/executive is on the board of directors to serve as the depository bank for county funds. OAG 84-9 .

There is no express statute authorizing fiscal courts to enact landlord-tenant legislation. OAG 84-62 .

Where the fiscal court budgets money for the sheriff’s office for a specific purpose (such as official radio equipment repair), only the fiscal court has the authority to finally authorize expenditure of those budgeted county funds for that specific purpose; the fiscal court has no authority to delegate its fiscal court or decisional role in authorizing expenditure of county money. OAG. 84-139.

The fiscal court has the responsibility of procuring the necessary automobiles for the sheriff’s statutory functions where it appears that the sheriff’s fees are not wholly sufficient for that purpose. Thus, to the extent that the expense allowance and sheriff’s fees are not wholly sufficient to fund the acquisition cost of automobiles and the cost of operation, the fiscal court has the responsibility of funding such costs out of the county treasury, under available budgeted county funds. OAG 84-140 .

The provision of KRS 26A.100 , that the county shall provide such reasonably available space to the court system indicates that the initial determination of whether reasonably available space exists in a particular county is addressed to the fiscal court; its decision is final, except where the courts determine, in appropriate litigation, that the fiscal court acted arbitrarily. OAG 84-159 .

In the event that the salary of the deputy sheriff is paid out of the county treasury, the fiscal court would not become the “employer” under KRS Chapter 337, but it would have the authority to approve or disapprove of overtime payment of such deputy, where the overtime is to come out of the county treasury; the fiscal court, under its powers given in this section, would have the authority, in passing on such expenditure from the county treasury, to use its sound judgment as to whether the overtime was lawfully authorized by the sheriff. The employer in this situation is the constitutional officer, i.e., the sheriff, who is the actual employer under KRS 337.010(1)(d); the actual employer, as such, hires, fires, and directs the deputy in his statutory duties. OAG 84-183 .

By reasonable implication, arising out of the fiscal court’s express powers under KRS 67.083 and this section, a fiscal court may accept property by gift or donation where there are no conditions attached except that the property be used for a public purpose. OAG 84-190 .

The fiscal court has the authority to acquire property for county purposes and the courts will not interfere with the broad exercise of discretion of the fiscal court in that regard, unless there is a clear showing of abuse amounting to fraud or action indicating arbitrariness or capriciousness. OAG 84-190 .

Fiscal court lawfully accepted donation of dirt by a private citizen, which was to be used for a county purpose, and the using of county equipment to go onto the private property of the donor to pick up the dirt was legal. OAG 84-190 .

It is the responsibility of the fiscal court to authorize a specific bidding project and approve the terms of the advertisement for bids, after that the fiscal court can authorize the county judge/executive to prepare the bid terms and advertise for bids for the county government; the fiscal court, of course, must make the award. OAG 84-194 .

The fiscal court’s range of responsibility, in seeing to it that all fiscal court personnel and fringe benefit policies be applied equally, extends only to those county employees subject to the direct control and authority of the fiscal court; it does not extend to those deputies of county constitutional officers. OAG 84-203 .

The fiscal court, under its express and implied powers granted in KRS 67.083 and this section, has the authority to establish personnel and fringe benefits programs encompassing its own employees and the employees of the constitutional officers in a uniform system; however, the deputies’ participation in the system is based upon the constitutional officer’s requesting the fiscal court to so act. OAG 84-203 .

The term “county employees” includes the county employees who serve directly under the authority of the fiscal court, and includes the deputies, assistants and various statutory support personnel of local or county constitutional officers. OAG 84-203 .

A fiscal court has no authority or responsibility to initiate county personnel programs applicable to deputies of county constitutional officers; there is simply no statutory authority for that approach. The establishing of such programs for the deputies can only come about where the constitutional officer requests the fiscal court to so establish such programs. OAG 84-203 .

Regardless of the constitutional officers’ financial tie-in with county government, there is no statutory authority for the fiscal court’s initial programming of personnel matters, relating to constitutional officer deputies; the initiating must take the form of a written request, for such programming applicable to the deputies, from their constitutional officer, the appointing authority. OAG 84-203 .

Considering that the adequate housing of the court and the jail systems are to be given a high priority, under KRS 26A.100 , 67.083 and this section, the fiscal court of any county has the authority to allocate space in the county courthouse or its county buildings for the court and jail systems; its exercise of such authority can only be reversed by the courts, in a proper law suit, where the courts deem that the fiscal court has acted arbitrarily in its allocation decisions. OAG 84-263 .

Although there is no longer a statutory provision requiring jails and courthouses to be located in the county seat, the location of such buildings addresses itself to the sound discretion of the fiscal court in terms of economics, political function and convenience for the court systems and the public generally. OAG 84-263 .

There is no statutory authority which would allow a county clerk to pay the health insurance premiums on himself and his deputies without fiscal court approval. OAG 84-324 .

There is no statutory authority for the county treasurer’s files and records being taken out of her office, nor can a county treasurer operate her daily office duties from a place other than the county treasurer’s office. OAG 85-10 .

If the county treasurer is physically unable to perform her statutory duties, the fiscal court may designate some county employee, or one hired temporarily for this purpose, to perform the treasurer’s duties, until such time as the fiscal court can conduct a hearing, pursuant to KRS 68.010(4), on the question as to whether there is any applicable ground for removal from office. OAG 85-10 .

A fiscal court, in its sound discretion, and on a case by case basis, may provide for reimbursing a county official for legal fees expended in litigation under these coexisting conditions: (1) It is found that the official was acting in good faith within the scope of his authority in the discharge of his official duties, i.e., he is found by the courts not to be guilty of crime, negligence, misconduct, or willful or malicious wrongdoing; (2) The litigation is of such a nature as to affect the county governmental interest; (3) There is money in an appropriate county budget item sufficient to pay such legal expenses. OAG 85-25 .

A county could not make a contribution to three (3) volunteer fire departments, each located in a different city of the county, even though they provided fire protection for the entire county; nor could the county purchase a specific piece of equipment or pay certain bills for them. OAG 85-99 .

A county may acquire comprehensive liability and casualty insurance. OAG 87-20 .

It is within the power of the fiscal court to require the county judge/executive to seek a personal service contract for a certain type of service and to bring to the fiscal court for approval a specific contractor. If the county judge/executive refuses to comply with the order of the fiscal court, a mandamus action may be instituted in the Circuit Court to require the judge to comply. OAG 88-83 .

County would be banned under Ky. Const., § 162 from paying any claim under an agreement or contract for a project involving the leasing of a detention facility (prison) used to house prisoners from outside as well as within the state, as there is no express authority of law for a county’s entry into such endeavor. OAG 90-115 .

Long-term housing of prisoners of the state of Kentucky is a function constitutionally mandated to the state, and the role sought to be assumed by a county in housing not only state prisoners, but prisoners of jurisdictions outside Kentucky, is not provided for by statute and is not a function necessary for operation of the county; accordingly, the county may not lawfully lease and operate a 336-bed detention center or prison for such purpose; such action is not necessary for operation of the county and handling the types of prisoners envisioned under this project is “otherwise provided for” by statute and the Kentucky Constitution. OAG 90-115 .

A dissenting vote of one (1) member of the court does not operate to exclude that member from the purview of a policy adopted by a majority vote of the court’s members. OAG 91-205 .

A policy, to the extent its application was limited to travel subject to reimbursement from county funds, appeared to be a reasonable effort to set policy concerning travel expenses to be paid from county funds; establishment of such policy is within the authority of the fiscal court to regulate and control the fiscal affairs of the county. OAG 91-205 .

Exercise by the fiscal court of its authority to assign office space is subject to specific provisions of the statutes, and the ban on arbitrariness expressed in Ky. Const., § 2, or stated another way, the reasonable exercise of discretion. OAG 91-207 .

The fiscal court has the authority to assign office space for the county judge/executive and other county employees. OAG 91-207 .

If a fee office opens after the death of the incumbent but before the appointment of the successor, responsibility for monetary assets, including public funds, could arguably fall within the scope of KRS 67.130 or could be a proper subject of the administrative code for the county, required by subsection (2)(c) of this section or a court might place responsibility for public funds on the deputy officers who continue to handle the funds during a vacancy. OAG 91-227 .

If the county clerk’s office does not generate sufficient fees to pay, along with other necessary official expenses of the office, the necessary official telephone bills of the office, the fiscal court could, and probably would have a duty to, pay such expenses of the county clerk’s office from the county treasury. OAG 93-4 .

Reasonable expenses of the county clerk’s office (which would include bills for official telephone costs) are to be paid from the fees of the office. The fiscal court must approve (or disapprove) payment of claims against the county, which must be presented to the fiscal court by the county judge/executive. OAG 93-4 .

The only viable funding mechanism that might fully support formation of a county police force is the general tax revenue of a county, via proper budgeting by the fiscal court. OAG 94-13 .

Responsibility for determining what sections of county roads shall be paved rests with the fiscal court; the county judge/executive has no authority to order work on a particular project without fiscal court approval. OAG 94-20 .

County administrative code provision purporting to authorize the county judge/executive to appoint temporary employees, without fiscal court approval, was invalid; therefore, payments to individuals whose appointment to county service has not been approved by the fiscal court would not be authorized under the law. OAG 94-27 .

Although the county judge/executive has the unilateral authority to fix the dates of commencement of the regular terms of the fiscal court, no statute expressly provides the unilateral authority to designate the beginning time of regular meetings of the fiscal court; however, if the fiscal court properly passes a resolution providing, for example, that the regular term meetings of the fiscal court shall begin at 7:30 p.m., there being no statute to the contrary, it would be the duty of the county judge/executive to ensure the execution of such resolution. OAG 95-26 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Air pollution control board, fiscal court members are ex officio members of, in counties not having first or second-class city, KRS 77.065 .

Air pollution control district, action by fiscal court necessary for activation of, KRS 77.015 to 77.030 , 77.040 , 77.045 .

Alcoholic beverages, hours of sale, when fiscal court to regulate, KRS 244.290 , 244.480 .

Appointments made or authorized by fiscal court:

Air pollution control board members in counties having first or second-class city, KRS 77.070 .

Dog warden, KRS 258.195 .

Housing authority, members, county or regional, KRS 80.420 , 80.430 .

Road commissioners to handle proceeds of road bonds, KRS 178.180 .

Welfare board, combined, for Louisville and Jefferson County, KRS 98.180 .

Auditor, Jefferson County may employ, KRS 68.130 to 68.150 .

County land and building fund, KRS 68.125 .

Drainage ditches and levees, power of fiscal court over, KRS 267.550 , 267.560 .

Employees of county, retirement, disability or hospitalization plans may be established for, KRS 79.080 .

Extension districts and boards, fiscal court may create, KRS 164.620 , 164.630 .

Forest fire protection system, county participation, KRS 149.520 , 149.540 to 149.600 .

Friend of the court, county containing city of first or second class may provide for, KRS 403.090 .

Housing authority, county or regional, fiscal court may establish, KRS 80.320 .

Institutions established or maintained by fiscal court:

County law library, KRS 172.100 to 172.170 .

Health departments, county or district, KRS 212.040 , 212.110 , 212.120 , 212.640 .

Playgrounds and recreation centers, KRS 97.010 , 97.020 .

Jails, operation, management, funding, and construction, KRS 441.025 to 441.135 , KRS 441.215 to 441.255 , KRS 441.420 to 441.450 , KRS 441.605 to 441.695 .

Kentucky Historical Society, fiscal court may authorize county officers to turn over books to, KRS 171.340 .

Law library in county containing second-class city, fiscal court to control, KRS 172.170 .

Metropolitan correctional services department, establishment and regulation, KRS 67B.010 to 67B.080 .

Office expenses of circuit clerk, county clerk, sheriff and jailer, in counties of 70,000 population, fiscal court may authorize allowance for, out of county funds, KRS 64.346 .

Office space or quarters, when fiscal court to provide:

Property valuation administrator, KRS 132.410 .

Sheriff, KRS 134.160 .

Prisoners in state prisons not to be used in any county without consent of fiscal court, KRS 197.130 .

Prisoners, transfer and transporting, KRS 441.500 to 441.550 .

Real estate records, in counties containing city of second class, fiscal court may have indexed, KRS 382.220 .

Road or bridge in two counties, fiscal courts may cooperate in building or repairing, KRS 178.250 , 178.260 .

Roads, duties of fiscal court as to, KRS Chs. 178, 179.

Roads, fiscal court may establish, KRS 178.115 .

Supplies and equipment for property valuation administrator, power to furnish, duty to maintain, KRS 132.605 .

Swamps, fiscal court may have reclaimed, KRS 269.070 .

Zoning and planning, KRS 100.111 to 100.311 , 100.317 , 100.324 to 100.328 , 100.331 to 100.337 .

Kentucky Bench & Bar.

Johnson, Reforming Kentucky’s Jails, Vol. 46, No. 3, July 1, 1982, Ky. Bench & Bar 14.

Kentucky Law Journal.

Goodlet, Construction of Statutes — “Ejusdem Generis,” 28 Ky. L.J. 355 (1940).

Morrow, County Debt Difficulties in Kentucky, 31 Ky. L.J. 242 (1943).

Muehlenkamp, Remedies for Disproportionate Tax Assessment in Kentucky, 36 Ky. L.J. 401 (1948).

Vanlandingham, The Fee System in Kentucky Counties, 40 Ky. L.J. 275 (1952).

Law Enforcement in Kentucky, 52 Ky. L.J. 1 (1963).

Notes, County Jail Reform In Kentucky — A Second Look, 68 Ky. L.J. 378 (1979-1980).

Northern Kentucky Law Review.

Notes, County Government — Home Rule —The General Assembly Must Grant Governmental Powers to Fiscal Courts “With the Precision of a Rifle Shot and Not with the Casualness of a Shotgun Blast” — Fiscal Court v. City of Louisville, 559 S.W.2d 478, 1977 Ky. LEXIS 554 ( Ky. 1977 ), 5 N. Ky. L. Rev. 107 (1978).

67.0802. Sale or other disposition of county property.

  1. As used in this section, “independent appraisal” means an appraisal made by:
    1. An individual or organization not affiliated with the county or its officers or employees, using a generally accepted national or professional standard; or
    2. A county’s officers or employees using a nationally published valuation of property based on the most recent edition of the publication.
  2. A county may sell or otherwise dispose of any of its real or personal property.
  3. Before selling or otherwise disposing of any real or personal property, the county shall make a written determination setting forth and fully describing:
    1. The real or personal property;
    2. Its intended use at the time of acquisition;
    3. The reasons why it is in the public interest to dispose of it; and
    4. The method of disposition to be used.
  4. Real or personal property may be:
    1. Transferred, with or without compensation, to another governmental agency;
    2. Sold at public auction following publication of the auction in accordance with KRS 424.130(1)(b);
    3. Sold by electronic auction following publication of the auction, including the uniform resource link (URL) for the site of the electronic auction, in accordance with KRS 424.130(1)(b);
    4. Sold by sealed bids in accordance with the procedure for sealed bids under KRS 45A.365(3) and (4);
    5. Transferred, with or without compensation, for economic development purposes, which shall include but not be limited to real property transfers for the elimination of blight;
    6. Traded towards the acquisition of the same or similar type of property if the value of the property the county is receiving in exchange equals or exceeds the actual fair market value of the property it traded as determined using an independent appraisal;
      1. Sold for its appraised fair market value or a greater amount if the property is valued at five thousand dollars ($5,000) or less in an independent appraisal without using the procedure set out in paragraph (d) of this subsection. (g) 1. Sold for its appraised fair market value or a greater amount if the property is valued at five thousand dollars ($5,000) or less in an independent appraisal without using the procedure set out in paragraph (d) of this subsection.
      2. Property sold under this paragraph shall not be sold to a county officer or employee;
    7. Sold for scrap or disposed of as garbage, of which road millings and dirt may be considered as such, in a manner consistent with the public interest if the property has no value, or is of a nominal value as determined by an independent appraisal; or
    8. Sold by the Finance and Administration Cabinet under an agreement with the county.
  5. If a county receives no bids for the real or personal property, either at public or electronic auction or by sealed bid, the property may be disposed of, consistent with the public interest, in any manner deemed appropriate by the county. In those instances, a written description of the property, the method of disposal, and the amount of compensation, if any, shall be made.
    1. Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this subsection, any compensation resulting from the disposal of this real or personal property shall be transferred to the general fund of the county. (6) (a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this subsection, any compensation resulting from the disposal of this real or personal property shall be transferred to the general fund of the county.
    2. Any compensation resulting from the disposal of real or personal property that was acquired by forfeiture under KRS Chapter 218A or purchased using funds restricted under KRS 218A.420(4)(a) shall be transferred to the account used for such forfeiture proceeds and upon transfer shall remain subject to the restrictions of KRS 218A.420(4)(a).

History. Enact. Acts 2000, ch. 223, § 2, effective July 14, 2000; 2004, ch. 153, § 2, effective July 13, 2004; 2019 ch. 69, § 1, effective March 25, 2019; 2019 ch. 12, § 1, effective June 27, 2019.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(6/27/2019). This statute was amended by 2019 Ky. Acts chs. 12 and 69, which do not appear to be in conflict and have been codified together.

Research References and Practice Aids

2020-2022 Budget Reference.

See State/Executive Branch Budget, 2020 Ky. Acts ch. 92, Pt. III, 33 at 937.

67.081. Fiscal courts authorized to appropriate and donate funds to nonprofit corporations or associations organized for recreation or conservation purposes — Conditions. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 85) was repealed by Acts 1978, ch. 118, § 19, effective June 17, 1978.

67.082. Declaration of epidemic area — Animal population reduction program — Liability of state personnel.

  1. Notwithstanding the provisions of KRS 150.370 , 525.130 , or any other statute that may be in conflict herewith, any county fiscal court may, whenever an epidemic or potential epidemic of a disease transmissible to man and domestic animals exists or is threatened in any species of wildlife, declare all or any portion of that county to be an epidemic area. Following a declaration, the fiscal court may, with approval of the Cabinet for Health and Family Services and the Department of Fish and Wildlife Resources, conduct control programs, including population reduction programs, against any species of wildlife including, but not limited to, red and gray foxes, skunks, and rodents which may be serving as reservoirs and/or vectors of any disease transmissible to human beings and/or domestic animals including but not limited to rabies, leptospirosis, salmonellosis, and Rocky Mountain spotted fever. These control programs may include but shall not be limited to hunting, trapping, vaccination, and use of poisons. Technical and operational assistance for the programs shall be made available by the Cabinet for Health and Family Services, the Department of Fish and Wildlife Resources, and the Department of Agriculture. A control program established under authority of this section may be conducted by the individual or joint action of the referred-to state agencies, the local health department, or individual property owners designated as agents of said cabinets and departments. In the event poisonous baits are used to control an outbreak of rabies in wildlife, those programs shall be under the direction of the Cabinet for Health and Family Services. All pet animals in the area shall be quarantined for the duration of the program by action of the local board of health. These programs shall be regulated to provide specific identification of bait station locations, daily check of each bait station, and positive pickup and destruction of all unconsumed baits at the end of the program.
  2. No liability shall be imposed upon any state agency or local agency or any employee or agent thereof for any injury occurring to domesticated animals, individuals, or property in carrying out programs in good faith authorized by this section, but all persons and agencies shall be liable to the extent otherwise provided by law for ordinary and gross negligence.

History. Enact. Acts 1972, ch. 98, § 1(1), (2); 1974, ch. 74, Art. VI, § 107(1); 1984, ch. 111, § 47, effective July 13, 1984; 1998, ch. 426, § 92, effective July 15, 1998; 2005, ch. 99, § 110, effective June 20, 2005.

67.083. Additional powers of fiscal courts.

  1. It is the purpose of this section to provide counties as units of general purpose local government with the necessary latitude and flexibility to provide and finance various governmental services within those functional areas specified in subsection (3) of this section, while the General Assembly retains full authority to prescribe and limit by statute local governmental activities when it deems such action necessary.
  2. The fiscal court of any county is hereby authorized to levy all taxes not in conflict with the Constitution and statutes of this state now or hereafter enacted.
  3. The fiscal court shall have the power to carry out governmental functions necessary for the operation of the county. Except as otherwise provided by statute or the Kentucky Constitution, the fiscal court of any county may enact ordinances, issue regulations, levy taxes, issue bonds, appropriate funds, and employ personnel in performance of the following public functions:
    1. Control of animals, and abatement of public nuisances;
    2. Regulation of public gatherings;
    3. Public sanitation and vector control;
    4. Provision of hospitals, ambulance service, programs for the health and welfare of the aging and juveniles, and other public health facilities and services;
    5. Provision of corrections facilities and services, and programs for the confinement, care, and rehabilitation of juvenile law offenders;
    6. Provision of parks, nature preserves, swimming pools, recreation areas, libraries, museums, and other recreational and cultural facilities and programs;
    7. Provision of cemeteries and memorials;
    8. Conservation, preservation and enhancement of natural resources including soils, water, air, vegetation, and wildlife;
    9. Control of floods;
    10. Facilitating the construction and purchase of new and existing housing; causing the repair or demolition of structures which present a hazard to public health, safety, or morals or are otherwise inimical to the welfare of residents of the county; causing the redevelopment of housing and related commercial, industrial, and service facilities in urban or rural areas; providing education and counseling services and technical assistance to present and future residents of publicly assisted housing;
    11. Planning, zoning, and subdivision control according to the provisions of KRS Chapter 100;
    12. Adoption, by reference or in full, of technical codes governing new construction, renovation, or maintenance of structures intended for human occupancy;
    13. Regulation of commerce for the protection and convenience of the public;
    14. Regulation of the sale of alcoholic beverages according to the provisions of KRS Chapters 241 to 244;
    15. Exclusive management of solid wastes by ordinance or contract or by both and disposition of abandoned vehicles;
    16. Provision of public buildings, including armories, necessary for the effective delivery of public services;
    17. Cooperation with other units of government and private agencies for the provision of public services, including, but not limited to, training, educational services, and cooperative extension service programs;
    18. Provision of water and sewage and garbage disposal service but not gas or electricity; including management of onsite sewage disposal systems;
    19. Licensing or franchising of cable television;
    20. Provision of streets and roads, bridges, tunnels and related facilities, elimination of grade crossings, provision of parking facilities, and enforcement of traffic and parking regulations;
    21. Provision of police and fire protection;
    22. Regulation of taxis, buses, and other passenger vehicles for hire;
    23. Provision and operation of air, rail and bus terminals, port facilities, and public transportation systems;
    24. Promotion of economic development of the county, directly or in cooperation with public or private agencies, including the provision of access roads, land and buildings, and promotion of tourism and conventions;
    25. Preservation of historic structures; and
    26. Regulation of establishments or commercial enterprises offering adult entertainment and adult entertainment activities.
  4. The county judge/executive is hereby authorized and empowered to exercise all of the executive powers pursuant to this section.
  5. A county acting under authority of this section may assume, own, possess and control assets, rights, and liabilities related to the functions and services of the county.
  6. If a county is authorized to regulate an area which the state also regulates, the county government may regulate the area only by enacting ordinances which are consistent with state law or administrative regulation:
    1. If the state statute or administrative regulation prescribes a single standard of conduct, a county ordinance is consistent if it is identical to the state statute or administrative regulation;
    2. If the state statute or administrative regulation prescribes a minimal standard of conduct, a county ordinance is consistent if it establishes a standard which is the same as or more stringent than the state standard;
    3. A county government may adopt ordinances which incorporate by reference state statutes and administrative regulations in areas in which a county government is authorized to act.
  7. County ordinances which prescribe penalties for their violation shall be enforced throughout the entire area of the county unless:
    1. Otherwise provided by statute; or
    2. The legislative body of any city within the county has adopted an ordinance pertaining to the same subject matter which is the same as or more stringent than the standards that are set forth in the county ordinance. The fiscal court shall forward a copy of each ordinance which is to be enforced throughout the entire area of the county to the mayor of each city in the county.
    1. The powers granted to counties by this section shall be in addition to all other powers granted to counties by other provisions of law. These powers, other than the power to tax, may be exercised cooperatively by two (2) or more counties, or by a county and a city, or by a county and a special district, or by a county and the state through, but not limited to, joint contracts, joint ownership of property, or the exchange of services, including personnel and equipment. When counties cooperate in the provision of public services, contracts shall be drawn to document the benefits and relative cost for each of the participating governments. One (1) government may pay one hundred percent (100%), or a lesser percentage, of all or any part of the cost of the joint undertaking, based upon the written contract required by this subsection. (8) (a) The powers granted to counties by this section shall be in addition to all other powers granted to counties by other provisions of law. These powers, other than the power to tax, may be exercised cooperatively by two (2) or more counties, or by a county and a city, or by a county and a special district, or by a county and the state through, but not limited to, joint contracts, joint ownership of property, or the exchange of services, including personnel and equipment. When counties cooperate in the provision of public services, contracts shall be drawn to document the benefits and relative cost for each of the participating governments. One (1) government may pay one hundred percent (100%), or a lesser percentage, of all or any part of the cost of the joint undertaking, based upon the written contract required by this subsection.
    2. A permissive procedure authorized by this section shall not be deemed to be exclusive or to prohibit the exercise of other existing laws and laws which may hereafter be enacted but shall be an alternative or supplement thereto.
  8. Any agency of county government exercising authority pursuant to subsection (3)(y) of this section shall, prior to exercising such authority, obtain the voluntary written consent of the owner of the structure. Consent may be obtained only after advising the owner in writing of any advantages and disadvantages to the owner which are likely to result from the exercise of such authority.

History. Enact. Acts 1972, ch. 384, § 1; 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 20, § 6, effective January 2, 1978; 1978, ch. 118, § 3, effective June 17, 1978; 1979 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 22, § 1, effective May 12, 1979; 1980, ch. 149, § 3, effective July 15, 1980; 1982, ch. 254, § 1, effective July 15, 1982; 1986, ch. 23, § 1, effective July 15, 1986; 1988, ch. 29, § 1, effective July 15, 1988; 1998, ch. 210, § 1, effective July 15, 1998; 2000, ch. 82, § 1, effective July 14, 2000.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

This section, to the extent that it grants powers to the fiscal court not enumerated in Ky. Const., § 181, is in a vacuum and is a nullity. Fiscal Court of Jefferson County v. Louisville, 559 S.W.2d 478, 1977 Ky. LEXIS 554 ( Ky. 1977 ), decision prior to 1978 amendment.

2. Construction.

The action of the 1979 Extraordinary Session of the General Assembly in amending subsection (3)(j) of this section by deleting the phrase “facilitating the construction of new housing” was beyond the subject matter of the proclamation for the session and was void. Jones v. County of Laurel, 600 S.W.2d 489, 1980 Ky. App. LEXIS 330 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980).

Trial court properly upheld an ordinance regulating poultry facilities, which was passed after the landowners purchased property for the purpose of constructing and operating a confined poultry production facility, as a proper exercise of the county’s police power, through KRS 67.083(3), in order to protect citizens from the certain health and environmental risks when said facilities were operated improperly and without regard to surrounding property owners. Upchurch v. Cumberland County Fiscal Court, 2003 Ky. App. LEXIS 22 (Ky. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 2003), op. withdrawn, 2004 Ky. LEXIS 32 (Ky. Feb. 11, 2004).

KRS 67.083(3)(k) affords a fiscal court only those planning, zoning and subdivision powers authorized in KRS Chapter 100. Campbell County Fiscal Court v. Nash, 2008 Ky. App. LEXIS 373 (Ky. Ct. App. Dec. 12, 2008), review granted, transferred, 2010 Ky. LEXIS 40 (Ky. Jan. 13, 2010), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 345 S.W.3d 811, 2011 Ky. LEXIS 57 ( Ky. 2011 ).

3. Excise Tax.

County tax levied upon the business of receiving and/or processing coal at a fixed place of business within the county for distribution outside the county was an excise tax which was invalid under Ky. Const., § 181. C. C. C. Coal Co. v. Pike County, 536 S.W.2d 467, 1976 Ky. LEXIS 80 ( Ky. 1976 ).

4. Garbage Collection.

A county does not have the right to exercise an exclusive garbage collection franchise within the incorporated areas of cities. Radcliff v. Hardin County, 607 S.W.2d 132, 1980 Ky. App. LEXIS 376 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980).

Contract between the county fiscal court and private company for disposal of solid waste in a privately-owned landfill was a grant of a privilege or franchise granted in violation of the advertisement and public bidding requirements of Ky. Const., § 164. KRS Chapters 67, 109 and 224 establish that the General Assembly has placed in the counties primary responsibility and authority for the exclusive management of solid waste. County fiscal court was exercising its governmental, rather than proprietary, function in contracting with a private company for the construction and operation of the proposed landfill. Solid waste disposal requires a franchise whether it is performed by private parties or on private property. Eastern Ky. Resources v. Arnett, 934 S.W.2d 270, 1996 Ky. LEXIS 118 ( Ky. 1996 ).

Fiscal court had the responsibility for the management and disposal of solid waste within its jurisdiction under KRS 67.083(3), 109.041(1), and 224.40-315 (1), so the argument that its contract granting a solid waste company the right to expand its landfill did not grant a franchise because a franchise could not be granted for the sale of a commercial product that was not the product of a government, but was a business which was open to all, was without merit. BFI Waste Sys. of N. Am., Inc. v. Huntington Woods Neighborhood Ass'n, 134 S.W.3d 624, 2003 Ky. App. LEXIS 295 (Ky. Ct. App. 2003).

Because a City did not continue to contract for the collection of solid waste after the effective date of KRS 224.43-315 , the County had the exclusive authority to regulate the collection under KRS 67.083(3)(o), (7)(b), and KRS 109.011 ; therefore, the trial court properly granted summary judgment to the County. City of Salyersville v. Magoffin County, 178 S.W.3d 539, 2005 Ky. App. LEXIS 242 (Ky. Ct. App. 2005).

County fiscal court and an executive judge for the fiscal court were entitled to summary judgment on a 42 USCS § 1983 claim asserted by a sanitation company alleging that the bidding process for a solid waste disposal contract was a sham to provide cover for political retaliation arising from the owner’s failure to support the judge during an election. KRS 67.083 committed the management of solid wastes to the exclusive authority of fiscal courts such that the judge’s alleged statements played no role in the awarding of the contract to another entity. There was no evidence to suggest that the fiscal court was driven by any unconstitutional motive, but instead all evidence suggested that the contract was awarded to the highest scoring bidder based on an evaluation scheme agreed to prior to the receipt of the bids. Sartaine v. Pennington, 410 F. Supp. 2d 584, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2494 (E.D. Ky. 2006 ), aff'd, 244 Fed. Appx. 718, 2007 FED App. 0564N, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 19110 (6th Cir. Ky. 2007 ).

5. Jails.

A county fiscal court has no mandatory duty to provide a jail facility within its boundaries; counties may confine their prisoners in facilities outside their territories. Commonwealth v. Carroll County Fiscal Court, 633 S.W.2d 720, 1982 Ky. App. LEXIS 216 (Ky. Ct. App. 1982).

While KRS 71.020 provides that the jailer “shall have the custody, rule and charge of the jail in his county and of all persons in the jail,” this provision does not establish the jailer as the final authority over the subject matter of medical care. Other provisions of the code suggest that it is the fiscal court of the county that establishes policy and the jailer who carries out these policies. Johnson v. Hardin County, 908 F.2d 1280, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 12163 (6th Cir. Ky. 1990 ).

This section provides a county with the necessary latitude and flexibility to provide and maintain a jail in the county as required by KRS 441.025 ; thus, read together, KRS 441.025 (2)(a), subsection (3)(e) of this section and KRS Chapter 67B allow a county to contract with a private corporation to provide and maintain a jail. Transfer of defendant to privately owned and operated facility did not constitute an unauthorized release. Phipps v. Commonwealth, 933 S.W.2d 825, 1996 Ky. App. LEXIS 118 (Ky. Ct. App. 1996).

6. Occupational License Tax.

A county of less than 30,000 population has the legal authority to levy occupational license taxes. Casey County Fiscal Court v. Burke, 743 S.W.2d 26, 1988 Ky. LEXIS 4 ( Ky. 1988 ).

A county ordinance, which levied an occupational license fee on the gross compensation of all persons employed or self-employed within the county, did not constitute an arbitrary exercise of power and, therefore, did not violate Section 2 of the Kentucky Constitution, or the equal protection clauses of the United States and Kentucky Constitutions, notwithstanding that a city within the county already imposed a similar occupational license fee and that the city license fee could not be offset against the county license fee. Preston v. Johnson County Fiscal Court, 27 S.W.3d 790, 2000 Ky. LEXIS 119 ( Ky. 2000 ).

A county ordinance, which levied an occupational license fee on the gross compensation of all persons employed or self-employed within the county, did not constitute local or special legislation in violation of the Kentucky Constitution as the occupational license fee applied to every employed or self-employed entity in that county. Preston v. Johnson County Fiscal Court, 27 S.W.3d 790, 2000 Ky. LEXIS 119 ( Ky. 2000 ).

7. Restaurant Tax.

Because the General Assembly has given fourth and fifth class cities authority to impose a 3% restaurant tax on its retail sales in KRS 91A.400 , the Circuit Court held that the Russell County Fiscal Court’s attempt to impose such a 3% tax would deprive the two (2) fifth class cities in Russell County of a statutory right, even though such right has not been exercised; further, KRS 137.115(1)(a) allows a county to impose an annual $10 restaurant license fee and where the General Assembly has given the power to impose a specific tax to one government entity, a fiscal court may not also impose such a tax without violating the expressed limitations on its taxing power contained in this section. Russell County Fiscal Court v. Kelley, 823 S.W.2d 941, 1991 Ky. App. LEXIS 133 (Ky. Ct. App. 1991).

8. County Officials.
9. — Appointment.

Refusal of fiscal court to reappoint plaintiff as county treasurer an office which has the indicia of a policy making government position which vests its holder with discretionary power, considerable responsibility, and confidence and supervisory authority, at the end of his term and instead to make a patronage appointment of another person to the position was consistent with this section, KRS 67.080 , and KRS 68.010 and Ky. Const., §§ 23 and 107 and such action of the court did not violate the first or fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution and was consistent with federal precedent. Garrard County Fiscal Court v. Layton, 840 S.W.2d 208, 1992 Ky. App. LEXIS 97 (Ky. Ct. App. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1032, 113 S. Ct. 1851, 123 L. Ed. 2d 474, 1993 U.S. LEXIS 2825 (U.S. 1993).

10. Expenditures.

A county fiscal court had the authority to appropriate and expend county funds to purchase vehicles to be used by magistrates in performing their official duties. Concerned Citizens for Pike County v. County of Pike, 984 S.W.2d 102, 1998 Ky. App. LEXIS 125 (Ky. Ct. App. 1998).

District court properly granted summary judgment in favor of a county in an action by a masonry company that unsuccessfully bid on two public construction contracts and alleged a violation of a U.S. Const. amend. XIV under 42 USCS § 1983; the unsuccessful bidder could not demonstrate a constitutionally protected property interest in the publicly bid contracts because KRS 67.083(3) granted the county broad discretion in the procurement process and, thus, the unsuccessful bidder could not demonstrate that the county abused its discretion in awarding the contracts to the successful bidder. Expert Masonry, Inc. v. Boone County, 440 F.3d 336, 2006 FED App. 0088P, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 5762 (6th Cir. Ky. 2006 ).

11. Adult Entertainment.

The powers set forth in this section encompass the power to regulate adult entertainment establishments. C&H Entertainment, Inc. v. Jefferson County Fiscal Court, 169 F.3d 1023, 1999 FED App. 0087P, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 3428 (6th Cir. Ky. 1999 ).

County ordinance that placed restrictions regarding the hours of operation and the conduct of employees of sexually oriented businesses, which ordinance was passed to prevent the negative secondary effects generally associated with such businesses, was clearly within the constitutional power of the county to enact. Commonwealth v. Jameson, 215 S.W.3d 9, 2006 Ky. LEXIS 290 ( Ky. 2006 ), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 825, 128 S. Ct. 190, 169 L. Ed. 2d 36, 2007 U.S. LEXIS 9107 (U.S. 2007).

12. Discrimination.

A county ordinance which prohibited employment discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity did not violate the statute as the Kentucky Civil Rights Act, KRS 344.010 et. seq., does not prohibit municipalities from expanding the scope of antidiscrimination statutes to protect those individuals not covered by the act itself. Hyman v. City of Louisville, 132 F. Supp. 2d 528, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4016 (W.D. Ky. 2001 ).

13. — Sexual Orientation.

A county ordinance prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity was enforceable in the incorporated portion of the county since neither of the exceptions contained in subsection (7) were applicable. Rogers v. Fiscal Court of Jefferson Louisville, 48 S.W.3d 28, 2001 Ky. App. LEXIS 66 (Ky. Ct. App. 2001).

14. Hospitals.

A city and a county may join in the operation and maintenance of a hospital, but neither the city nor the county may take a private corporation or individuals into partnership in conduction such public enterprise. Booth v. Owensboro, 274 Ky. 325 , 118 S.W.2d 684, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 258 ( Ky. 1938 ).

The fiscal court may provide for the manner of retirement of bonds issued against rentals to be received by it from the operation of hospital leased to corporation. State Bank & Trust Co. v. Madison County, 275 Ky. 501 , 122 S.W.2d 99, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 455 ( Ky. 1938 ).

An arrangement whereby corpiration deeded property to county which was to construct new hospital and lease it to corporation as operating agent, and county was vested with control of hospital and of fees to be charged, did not violate former law regarding control of hospitals. State Bank & Trust Co. v. Madison County, 275 Ky. 501 , 122 S.W.2d 99, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 455 ( Ky. 1938 ).

A city and a county may join in the operation and maintenance of a hospital, but neither the city nor the county may take a private corporation or individuals into partnership in conducting such public enterprise. Booth v. Owensboro, 274 Ky. 325 , 118 S.W.2d 684, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 258 ( Ky. 1938 ).

Since the fiscal court is the governing body directly responsible to the county electorate, a county hospital must remain under the control of that body, though the fiscal court may sell or lease property for the purpose of being operated as a hospital. Knox County Fiscal Court v. Knox County General Hospital, Inc., 528 S.W.2d 672, 1975 Ky. LEXIS 69 ( Ky. 1975 ).

Where the articles of incorporation of a nonprofit corporation organized by a fiscal court to assume management of a county hospital denied the fiscal court he power to choose as to whom it would appoint as directors, the power to remove or replace directors except upon expiration of the terms for which they were appointed, and a veto power over the actions of the directors, the articles of incorporation failed to leave ultimate control of the hospital in the governing body of the county as required by former law regarding control of hospitals. Knox County Fiscal Court v. Knox County General Hospital, Inc., 528 S.W.2d 672, 1975 Ky. LEXIS 69 ( Ky. 1975 ).

Where a nonprofit corporation was organized by the fiscal court to assume management of a county hospital, the articles of incorporation were not a grant of authority giving the hospital corporation any ownership interest or a contract right to retain possession or control of the county’s hospital facilities, and thus the fiscal court had the right to assume management of the county hospital and terminate its control by directors of the corporation. Knox County Fiscal Court v. Knox County General Hospital, Inc., 528 S.W.2d 672, 1975 Ky. LEXIS 69 ( Ky. 1975 ).

Cited:

Maupin v. Stansbury, 575 S.W.2d 695, 1978 Ky. App. LEXIS 663 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978); City of Barbourville v. Knox County Fiscal Court, 80 S.W.3d 765, 2001 Ky. App. LEXIS 75 (Ky. Ct. App. 2001); Stringer v. Realty Unlimited, Inc., 97 S.W.3d 446, 2002 Ky. LEXIS 181 ( Ky. 2002 ); Ky. Licensed Bev. Ass’n v. Louisville-Jefferson County Metro Gov’t, 127 S.W.3d 647, 2004 Ky. LEXIS 39 ( Ky. 2004 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

A proposed tax by a county government based upon the percentage of a county resident’s individual Kentucky income tax liability would be unconstitutional as being a kind of tax not authorized by Section 181 of the Kentucky Constitution. OAG 72-278 .

This section is broad enough to allow a county to levy an automobile license tax under the police power. OAG 72-318 .

This section should be read in pari materia with KRS 68.197 and 68.198 and the limitations on license or occupational tax as contained in those sections should be observed. OAG 72-318 .

This section would not allow a fiscal court to impose a motor vehicle license tax as a strictly revenue matter as such a tax would be in conflict with Section 181 of the Kentucky Constitution. OAG 72-318 .

Under this implementing statute the fiscal court may impose an occupational tax. OAG 72-318 .

A city-county car sticker tax could not be used in an expanded police role for law enforcement in general as such a tax would not be legal to the extent that the revenues therefrom would be used to fund law enforcement in general or police activities other than those involved in the police administration of the licensing system. OAG 72-466 .

A county may not enact a tax for the county government on the production of natural gas and coal in the county. OAG 72-478 .

This section would allow a county resolution or order providing for county payment of a portion of the premium for a Blue Cross-Blue Shield plan for county clerk deputies. OAG 72-540 .

It would appear that under this section a fiscal court could adopt an order establishing standards for burglar alarms. OAG 72-585 .

The requiring of a bond for the use of heavy vehicles over lightly constructed county roads is within the province of the fiscal court under this section so long as such an ordinance does not conflict with KRS 189.210 or 189.222 . OAG 72-592 .

Given the broad provisions of this section the fiscal court of a county would be permitted to place on a November ballot the question of whether or not the voters would like to see the construction of a reservoir lake as approved by the court. OAG 72-645 (Withdrawing OAG 72-453 ).

In view of the police powers granted by this section the fiscal court could enact an ordinance providing a license fee for those places of entertainment covered in KRS 231.010 subject to the rule that the revenues cannot exceed the reasonable policing cost. OAG 72-822 .

The police power under this section is broad enough to authorize a fiscal court’s appropriation of county money for school construction, if within its sound discretion and depending upon the particular and underlying facts of the situation. OAG 73-3 .

A fiscal court could by ordinance adopt a reasonable charge to be paid by a property owner who calls for a fire truck which was purchased by the city and manned by volunteers who are paid a certain amount for each run. OAG 73-40 .

County police power as it relates to education and welfare is sufficiently broad to authorize fiscal court’s appropriation of revenue sharing funds for county library construction and operation provided construction is an ordinary and necessary capital expenditure. OAG 73-116 .

Should county voters approve the sale of alcoholic beverages the county, under the home rule powers of this section, cannot prohibit the sale of alcoholic beverages to only those package stores owned by the county as the legislature clearly never intended to amend or repeal any section of KRS chapters 241, 242, 243 or 244 nor is this section an applicable or permissive legislative procedure involving alcoholic beverages. OAG 73-147 .

A city school system has proposed building a new school and auditorium and the city, rather than build a separate auditorium or civic center due to prohibitive cost, would like to contribute some of its revenue sharing funds and, although this is a permissible use and has been done with county revenue sharing funds as authorized by this section, there is no comparable implementing statute authorizing the city to make such a contribution of city money to school construction since city taxes are not involved. OAG 73-170 .

Although a county could levy an occupational tax such tax would not apply to bank examiners of the department of banking and securities, since the burden on the department of figuring out arithmetically the occupational tax liability of examiners based upon the amount of time spent in the county in the course of their examinations and their gross salaries would require express constitutional or statutory authority. OAG 73-216 .

The temporary presence in a county of banking examiners of the department of banking and securities did not bring them within the operative sweep of the county occupational license tax enacted under the authority of this section. OAG 73-216 .

This section authorizes counties to levy an occupational tax, as an implementation of Ky. Const., § 181. OAG 73-216 .

A county ambulance program could impose a small fee or service charge on each call under broad legislative authority and police powers given under this section. OAG 73-246 .

A fourth-class city does not possess statutory authority to contribute city revenue sharing money to school construction or other school purposes and, while this section is the specific source of authority of a county to spend its revenue sharing money for school construction, we can find no comparable authority for a fourth-class city. OAG 73-269 .

Fiscal court has no authority to place a question on the ballot concerning the merger of school districts as this section limits the powers of a county to those that do not conflict with the constitution or statutes and as the legislature, under KRS 160.040 , has provided the procedure for merging school districts, this field is preempted. Since the school districts are agencies of the state, not the county, all decisions affecting school questions are to be made by the district boards of education and the state department of education. OAG 73-272 .

A county library board can obtain the levy of a tax by the county fiscal court over the county’s general tax levy by either establishing a library district and thus a separate taxing district organized under KRS 173.470 or KRS 173.720 or requesting the county fiscal court, pursuant to their powers under this section to present to the county voters the question of an additional tax levy which if assented to by two-thirds (2/3) of those voting, would be an intended, authorized “voting levy” and therefore not subject to KRS 68.245(1) nor prohibited by Ky. Const., § 157. OAG 73-291 .

It is possible that the courts would uphold a county contribution to the capital construction of a building to house a public rescue squad under the county’s police powers, subject to its being properly budgeted, and provided Ky. Const., § 179 would not prohibit such a contribution. OAG 73-334 .

Since neither the Constitution of Kentucky nor statutes give the fiscal court any power either expressly or by implication to exempt property from taxes, but only the power to levy taxes, the Scott County fiscal court has no authority to exempt tangible personal property from ad valorem property taxes. OAG 73-397 .

The revenue sharing fund belonging to the city and county may be spent for the categories selected by the board, as necessity demands. OAG 73-400 .

Elections cannot be held without affirmative constitutional or statutory authority and there is no such authorization for placing upon the ballot in a statewide or county-wide general election such questions as the abolition of strip mining or the abrogation of broad form deeds. OAG 73-518 .

County ordinance requiring a motor vehicle sticker at $4.00 per vehicle per year imposed upon all persons or firms owning or operating motor vehicles upon county roads is not authorized as a tax or for revenue purposes by Section 181 of the Kentucky Constitution but this section authorizes a fiscal court in the reasonable exercise of the county’s police powers to enact such an ordinance in connection with the traffic regulation on county road systems where the revenue collected does not exceed the reasonable policing cost since if it does the measure must be considered a revenue measure. OAG 73-526 .

Where a fiscal court passes an ordinance requiring a $4.00 sticker licensing fee for all motor vehicles operated on county roads the fiscal court could in its discretion provide for a reasonable clerk’s fee for issuing such sticker, but in the absence of such provision KRS 64.010 (now repealed) probably would not apply since the $1.50 fee provided for in that section would appear to be inequitable in view of the amount of the sticker fee. OAG 73-526 .

Where the fiscal court of a county in the reasonable exercise of its police powers enacts an ordinance requiring that all vehicles operated on county road systems carry a sticker to be issued for a fee, the license fees collected under such ordinance may be expended for any legal county purpose so long as the revenues from the ordinance licensing does not exceed the reasonable policing costs. If such revenues do exceed the reasonable policing costs the ordinance would be invalid as a tax which the county is not permitted to levy under Ky. Const., § 181. OAG 73-526 .

Assuming the expenditures are made as a properly budgeted item in accordance with KRS Ch. 68, a fiscal court can legally pay the dues of each of its members or of the full fiscal court for membership in the Kentucky Magistrates and Commissioners Association and can reimburse the members of the fiscal court including the county judge (now county judge/executive) and the county attorney for expenses incurred in travel to meetings of the association and expenses incidental thereto including food and lodging. These expenditures would be a proper credit against excess fees of the magistrates comprising the fiscal court or the magistrates could be reimbursed directly from the county treasury. OAG 73-552 .

County funds could be utilized to pay for Blue Cross medical insurance covering not only county employees but also county officials, including justices of the peace. OAG 73-589 .

In levying a tax on insurance premiums to be placed in a special fund for the development or acquisition of facilities for county fire protection the county fiscal court has exercised its power to levy a tax in compliance with this section to accomplish its valid objective. OAG 73-601 .

As a county ordinance cannot conflict with an existing statute and a city ordinance must usually be based upon statutory authority, so the county ordinance must not conflict with a city ordinance to the extent that it is ultimately in conflict with an existing statute, although there appears to be no intent to set the county above the city generally. OAG 73-652 .

The proposed ordinance prohibiting any surface mining without the prior written and recorded consent of the surface and mineral owners could not be upheld as a valid exercise of the county’s police powers since, under the known fact surrounding the economics of coal, the courts would not hold the ordinance to be reasonable and in conformity with the necessity of the situation. OAG 73-666 .

Where a county is operating an ambulance service in unincorporated areas and the ambulance unit arrives on the scene of an accident where a state trooper, sheriff or other peace officer has not taken control of the situation, the ambulance squad leader has the authority to remove the victims from the wreckage and he may call upon the driver of a wrecker to assist in accomplishing that purpose as such authority exists as a reasonable exercise of the county’s police powers. OAG 73-744 .

A county fiscal court has ample authority to levy a county motor vehicle license fee on residents and nonresidents using the county roads on a regular basis to move to and from their places of employment and it is not discriminatory to exempt from the payment of such license fee those persons required to obtain a license tag for the operation of their motor vehicles in cities and towns located in the county. OAG 73-827 .

The fiscal court can, by appropriate ordinance, establish a merit system for county employees if the ordinance is not in conflict with the county police force merit system or the fire department merit system and providing that said ordinance is not in conflict with constitutional and statutory sections. OAG 73-829 .

The fiscal court has the power under the safety and welfare police powers of the state to allow the purchase of two (2) automobiles for use of the sheriff’s office. OAG 73-843 .

The fiscal court has the authority, under the safety and welfare police powers of this section, to provide for the purchase of automobiles for the sheriff’s office to carry out law enforcement duties if this is done as a properly budgeted item pursuant to KRS Ch. 68 but the fiscal court has no authority to turn over any such vehicles to the sheriff-elect prior to his taking office. OAG 73-843 .

The fiscal court has the authority to establish an accounting system wherein fee offices turn in all fees to the county treasury, and the county treasurer pays each officer his monthly salary out of the treasury. OAG 74-1 .

Since a county ordinance must not be in conflict with any existing or future constitutional or statutory section, jurors cannot be paid more, by way of a county ordinance, than the statutory amount for their services set by KRS 29.390(3) (repealed). OAG 74-2 .

The county clerk has no statutory or constitutional authority to impose the condition of showing a tax receipt to prove payment of property taxes before issuing a vehicle registration license plate since KRS 186.035 (repealed) was found to be unconstitutional as special legislation. OAG 74-3 , 74-34.

The fiscal court could by ordinance declare the use of a county vehicle by a senior citizens organization to be a public and county purpose under this section. OAG 74-107 .

The authority granted by this section is large enough to permit a county to use revenue sharing funds to help finance a factory being built by a nonprofit corporation which will be leased to a corporation organized for profit with an option to purchase. OAG 74-203 .

The selection of a detective by the county attorney with the approval of the fiscal court would be subject to proper budgeting procedure as required by KRS Chapter 68. OAG 74-303 .

The fiscal court may, under its police powers, approve by an ordinance the selection of a detective by the county attorney for use in carrying out his statutory functions but the ordinance must provide a specific term and must not provide a lump sum expense account in violation of KRS 64.710 nor state that he is a peace officer in conflict with KRS 446.010 . OAG 74-303 .

A prisoner who is taken from a jail to a hospital by the jailer for medical services reasonably necessary under the circumstances must pay the hospital expenses if he is a resident of the county and city and is not indigent; but, if he is indigent, the county has the primary responsibility of paying subject to the availability of funds budgeted for that purpose under KRS Ch. 68 unless it can persuade the city to contribute to payment. OAG 74-321 .

A fiscal court ordinance providing for a county solid waste collection system under the police powers of this section is not in conflict with KRS Ch. 109, since it provides an alternate method. OAG 74-327 .

The fiscal court may, by an appropriate ordinance, prescribe reasonable penalties necessary for the enforcement of a garbage collection and disposal system created under this section. OAG 74-327 .

A fiscal court may under the police powers of this section provide by ordinance for a county solid waste commission, created by ordinance setting forth its powers and membership, to establish solid waste collection districts and grant franchises to garbage collectors in the collection districts subject to the approval of the fiscal court; but all pertinent provisions of KRS 211.700 to 211.730 (repealed) and 211.992 (repealed) must be complied with. OAG 74-327 .

If, in the reasonable judgment of the fiscal court, the county attorney is unable for any reason to look after the interests of the county and fiscal court fully and completely, the fiscal court may employ outside counsel to assist the county attorney in defending a civil action against the fiscal court and pay for such additional services out of the county treasury. OAG 74-345 .

An ordinance of a fiscal court imposing, under this section, a car sticker tax on automobiles of residents of the unincorporated areas of a county solely as a revenue measure and not in any way connected with motor vehicle regulations or inspections would be unconstitutional as unauthorized by Ky. Const., § 181. OAG 74-346 .

Reimbursement of a county judge, by the county on order of the fiscal court, for life, health and accident insurance premiums paid by him for himself would be reimbursement of official expenses in the public interest and would not have to be calculated within the maximum authorized by KRS 64.535 as a permissible adjustment of the $7,200 year level provided in Ky. Const., § 246. OAG 74-347 .

A county fiscal court order under authority of this section, providing the county will reimburse the county judge for the added expenses of the extra duty involved in executing extra matters not to exceed $50.00 per week, is not a flat amount or lump sum prohibited by KRS 64.710 and, is legal, provided it does not duplicate state payments made under KRS 25.320(2) (repealed) to county judges to defray or partly defray the expenses of their office. OAG 74-347 .

The fiscal court does not have authority to levy a tax on each ton of stone removed from quarries or mines being operated in the county since Ky. Const., § 181 makes no provision for counties to levy a severance tax on stone. OAG 74-348 .

The punctual attendance of members of the fiscal court at its lawful meetings cannot be coerced by the contempt of court powers of the county judge but may be compelled by mandamus action filed in circuit court. OAG 75-384 .

If any of the proceeds of a county license tax passed under the authority of this section as implementing Ky. Const., § 181 are used for “public service programs” as defined in KRS 68.520 without first having been submitted to the electorate as that section requires, then the fiscal court ordinance enacting the tax would be invalidated. OAG 75-385 .

Under the authority of Ky. Const., § 181 as implemented by this section the fiscal court of a county with a population of less than 50,000 may legally enact by ordinance a license tax upon the receipts or profits of all persons engaged or employed in any trade, occupation or profession within the county, including within certain enumerated cities located therein, for the purpose, as stated in the ordinance, of defraying the general expenses of the county government and to constitute the base upon which the fiscal court contemplates issuing a revenue bond issue for the financing of courthouse renovations and improvements and to provide additional funds for the county general fund. OAG 75-385 .

Although there is no statutory authority permitting a city to appropriate money for a private nonprofit association giving emergency financial aid to the poor and the aged, the county fiscal court, under the broad police powers enumerated in this section, may by appropriate ordinance, subject to proper budgetary procedures, appropriate county money, including federal revenue sharing funds, to the support of such association. OAG 75-389 .

This section does not authorize the holding of a referendum on KRS 436.160 , 436.165 , as such would be a redelegation of power. OAG 74-403 .

This section does not authorize a county to levy a severance tax as such a tax is an excise tax and the legislature is prohibited by Ky. Const., §§ 171, 181, from delegating that type of levy to the counties. OAG 74-427 .

The fiscal courts have the power to appropriate dues, in connection with a proposed county officials association to pay for services to members, under this section and KRS 64.530 , 67.080 . OAG 74-434 .

An ordinance passed by a fiscal court under this section requiring electric companies to collect the garbage district charge from those persons who use both electricity and the garbage district services would be illegal as such an ordinance would conflict with KRS 109.180(3) (now 109.056(3)) providing for voluntary agreement. OAG 74-528 .

An ordinance adopted by the county fiscal court establishing a compulsory and continual solid waste collection and disposal system is a “public health law” as envisioned by KRS 211.025 and is enforceable by the county health department under KRS 212.240 . OAG 74-594 .

If a fiscal court adopts an accounting system wherein fee officers turn in all fees to the county treasury and the county treasurer in turn pays each officer his monthly salary, all legal fees of the sheriff’s office, earned and collected by the sheriff and his lawful deputies, would have to be turned into the county treasury. OAG 74-604 .

Any ordinance passed by the fiscal court under this section providing for solicitors’ licenses as a police measure would be in conflict with KRS 367.510 to 367.515, which are designed as state police measures to protect the public generally from fraudulent and deceptive practices which may emerge from solicitation of orders for magazines and books and certain other matter; but, the fiscal court can pass an ordinance under authority of Ky. Const., § 181 providing for solicitors’ licenses as a license or occupational tax measure if it is nondiscriminatory, nonconfiscatory and based upon reasonable classification. OAG 74-614 .

A county is prohibited from passing any ordinance which would provide for a tax based on the amount of coal mined in the county since the state has enacted a general severance tax on coal (KRS Ch. 143). OAG 74-648 .

The closing day under KRS 61.160 is left to the discretion of each public official maintaining an office and is not a matter within the discretion of the fiscal court under KRS 67.080(6) (now KRS 67.080(1)(c)) thus an ordinance based upon this section, would be invalid as being totally in conflict with KRS 61.160 . OAG 74-663 .

Neither this section nor KRS 67.080 permit a county to use its funds, employees or facilities to collect and dispose of garbage of cities within the county but, under the Interlocal Cooperation Act, KRS 65.210 to 65.300 , the county and the cities could enter into a contract for the cities to contribute funds, equipment and employees to a county program to operate a sanitary landfill and collect and dispose of garbage throughout the county. OAG 74-706 .

Under this section and the general police powers of cities, a county and cities within it may contract with a radio station for a dispatching service to their law enforcement agencies. OAG 74-713 .

A county, under the authority of this section, and a city, under its general power to appropriate money for a public municipal purpose, may jointly establish a city-county heritage commission by entering into a contract pursuant to the Interlocal Cooperation Act, KRS 65.210 to 65.300 . OAG 74-719 .

Reclamation of strip mined Kentucky land is a public purpose and a fiscal court may assist in funding the program of a private college to set up instruction and a degree in reclamation, providing the fiscal court determines that the program will result in a real and direct benefit to the county, by, for example, the direct involvement of persons taking the instruction in reclamation within the county. OAG 74-730 .

Under the authority of this section and under the federal revenue sharing act, subsection (a)(2) of 31 USCS § 1222(a) (now repealed) which authorizes expenditure of revenue sharing funds for “ordinary and necessary capital expenditures authorized by law” and 31 USCS § 1243(a)(3) (now repealed) mandating the expenditure of such funds only in accordance with the laws and procedure applicable to the expenditure of local revenues, a fiscal court, providing it follows the fiscal requirements in KRS Ch. 68, may with county revenue sharing funds purchase and provide on loan to the county board of education portable classroom units to be used in place of an elementary school vacated because it was unsafe. OAG 74-732 .

Although a fiscal court is prohibited by Ky. Const., § 179 from loaning county funds to deputy sheriffs to permit them to purchase cars for use in the performance of their official duties, it may, under the authority of this section and KRS 67.080 , purchase such automobiles, as a properly budgeted item, for the use of the sheriff and his deputies in carrying out their law enforcement duties, the county retaining title to the cars and leasing them to the sheriff at an equitable monthly rental payable from the fees of his office. OAG 74-735 .

The fiscal court may pay a consulting engineer’s bill to determine the feasibility of renovating a school, the structure of which is unsafe for students, out of the county treasury, subject to proper budget procedure as set forth in KRS ch. 68; also it may be paid with county revenue sharing money pursuant to 31 USCS § 1222 (now repealed) as “ordinary and necessary capital expenditures authorized by law.” OAG 74-795 .

The fiscal court, in its discretion, may pay as a properly budgeted item the legal fees of a sheriff and county attorney incurred in defending suits brought against them, providing the court makes a reasonable determination that: (1) the interests of the county were involved in the litigation and (2) the officers acted in good faith in connection with their actions which were the subject matters of the litigation and in connection with the discharge of their official duties. OAG 75-53 .

Under the authority of KRS 67.080 and this section the fiscal court has the authority to establish by proper order speed limits on county roads lower than those prescribed in KRS 189.390 and 189.391 (now repealed) where such lower limits are necessary to the public health, safety, welfare and convenience, except in the special situation involving trucks under KRS 189.230 where the county judge (now county judge/executive) may lower speed limits. OAG 75-74 .

Since a fiscal court has full authority to regulate and control the fiscal affairs and property of a county, the fiscal court may direct, by proper orders, the county court clerk to countersign all checks written on the county treasury. OAG 75-157 .

Pursuant to authority in this section and KRS 67.080 , the fiscal court can subsidize the private ambulance services as it relates to charity and noncharity cases. OAG 75-158 .

A fiscal court may pass an ordinance submitting the question as to the voting of an ad valorem tax, for the purpose of financing county ambulance service, at the general election, regardless of whether the county directly provides such services or contracts such services, without being in conflict with any constitutional or statutory provision. OAG 75-158 .

Since the General Assembly did not intend to confer general authority to require a bond for the privilege of operating vehicles within statutory limits, any attempt by a county to establish an escrow account to be used for repair of roads in the county owned system would be in conflict with KRS 189.222 and KRS 189.271 . OAG 75-182 .

Any procedure for requiring a bond under circumstances not contemplated by this section would be in conflict with and beyond the scope of this section. OAG 75-183 .

This section authorizes the fiscal court to establish a similar procedure for county roads, as provided under KRS 189.222 or KRS 189.271 , relating to the operation of trucks at a greater weight on designated highways. OAG 75-183 .

Assuming that the requirements of Ky. Const., §§ 157 and 158 and the budgetary procedures mandated by KRS Ch. 68 are complied with, a fiscal court under the authority of this section and KRS 67.080 can legally purchase land for the purpose of leasing it to a private corporation for use as a county fair site. OAG 75-279 .

A county is protected by its sovereign immunity from suit for tort liability arising from the operation of a county fair by a private corporation to which the county has leased the land used for the fair site, but, in order to remove any potential liability of individual members of the fiscal court, the lease should contain a disclaimer, specifying that the fair is not an operation of the county or the fiscal court and that all risks are assumed by the fair corporation. OAG 75-279 .

A county may not jointly with a private corporation purchase land to be used as a county fair site. OAG 75-279 .

As indicated in KRS 67.080 and this section, nothing in the general powers of the fiscal court indicates a ministerial duty to fix a ditch so the fiscal court cannot be legally compelled to repair a ditch although the fiscal court could, in its discretion, repair a ditch under the police powers as specifically relates to the health and welfare of county citizens and as a public project under KRS 58.010 . OAG 75-400 .

Where the fiscal court decides to get into a low-income housing program, KRS 80.310 to 80.610 (KRS 80.310 now repealed) preempts this field and a housing authority would have to be established and a fiscal court could not assume such a program directly under this section since such attempted direct action would be in direct conflict with the subject statutes, although the federal law would seem to permit the direct approach. OAG 75-406 .

A county ordinance requiring motor vehicles, trailers, and semi-trailers operating upon the public roads of the county to be covered effectively to prevent cargo from spilling upon the public highways is enforceable on county roads as it is not in conflict with KRS 189.150 and 189.231 and is also enforceable on state highways located in the county under the ordinance or under KRS 189.150 and the ordinance passed under the authority of this section does not constitute an abdication of the state’s rights to use its own police powers. OAG 75-468 .

The fiscal court may contract with volunteer fire departments for fire protection services in the county or establish its own fire protection program for the county with funds from the general fund or revenue sharing funds or, under the county’s police powers may, by an appropriate ordinance with adequate guidelines, appropriate county money to volunteer fire departments out of revenues generally available to the county for fire protection services in the county. OAG 75-536 .

The fiscal court may pay the Blue Cross-Blue Shield premiums for county officers under this section and that portion of OAG 75-538 in conflict with this opinion is withdrawn. OAG 75-582 .

This section empowers the fiscal court to contribute to the cost of erecting a stop light wherever the city controls the regulation of traffic, including state highways, as this involves the health, safety and welfare of inhabitants. OAG 75-654 .

The fiscal court’s powers under this section are not sufficient to allow for the calling of a special election to vote on an issue that does not involve the creation of a county obligation in terms of Ky. Const., § 157, and where the issue involved would create such an obligation, § 157 does authorize a general or November election, but there is no authority authorizing a special election in such a case. OAG 75-690 , 76-368.

Where a water system construction project is public in nature and necessary in the public interest, a fiscal court could legally grant general fund tax money from the county treasury to the water company as a contribution toward the cost of establishing the water system. OAG 75-714 .

Since people lobbying for legislation affecting state or local governments are not intended to come under the lobbying statutes (KRS 6.250 to KRS 6.320 (now repealed)), a fiscal court may properly designate one of its magistrates to lobby before the state Legislature where the lobbying will relate strictly to present county government or fiscal court legislation and the legislation will be necessary for the fiscal court to perform its governmental and statutory duties or to accomplish the purposes for which the county was created. OAG 75-724 .

Where funds have not been appropriated for funding the expenses of one of the fiscal court’s magistrates who is authorized to lobby before the state Legislature on legislation affecting county government and fiscal courts, the expenses could be paid by the fiscal court out of the county treasury subject to proper transfer procedure under KRS 68.290 . OAG 75-724 .

As KRS 67.080 controls over this section, the fiscal court has the responsibility of hiring and firing county employees, even where the employment is federally funded, and such power cannot be delegated to county judges. OAG 76-25 .

The fiscal court in coal producing counties has sufficient power under this section to make an expenditure out of county treasury to pay lobbying expenses of Kentucky Coal County Coalition which is attempting to get legislation to bring coal severance tax money to the county of origin. OAG 76-28 .

An occupational tax may be limited to specific classifications of businesses or occupations provided that the classifications are valid and all occupations or businesses within the classifications are subject to the tax. OAG 76-111 .

Independent occupational taxes may be levied by a county and by cities within the county without the levy being considered double taxation since the tax is not imposed on the same property by the same governing body during the same taxing period for the same taxing purpose. OAG 76-111 .

As long as a county will not use railroad property in such fashion as to materially impair its use by the railroad, there is nothing to prevent the condemnation of the property for the purpose of establishing a county park. OAG 76-203 .

Where a water district has already been established, the fiscal court under this section may expend county funds to finance the extension of water system lines. OAG 76-240 .

Under this section a fiscal court has the authority to contract with a city in the adjoining state for the furnishing of fire-fighting services to an area of the county along the state boundary in consideration of the fiscal court’s contributing county money to pay for such services, and the fiscal court could by ordinance adopt a reasonable charge to be paid to the county by the property owner who calls for the fire-fighting equipment. OAG 76-243 .

A fiscal court has authority to fund a waterline extension with the county’s coal severance tax allotment, and the court could make an assessment to be paid by the waterline users to recoup the capital expenditure. OAG 76-244 .

The county sheriff’s mileage allowance of 10¢ per mile for executing a notice, subpoena, or summons cannot legally be changed by the fiscal court. OAG 76-302 .

Where a fair board has asked the county fiscal court for financial assistance in the purchase of a site for conducting the county fair, the fiscal court may avoid the constitutional “debt” restrictions by establishing a grant from the county’s revenue sharing money to the recreation corporation, but the fiscal court must in no way become obligated contractually in connection with the purchase price. OAG 76-326 .

Since under KRS 67.080 (5) and (9) (see now subsection (2)(b)) the Legislature intended county road fund money to be spent on roads and bridges located within the county, one county cannot use its road and bridge money on repairing a bridge in a second county; however, under this section the fiscal court of the county can appropriate money from its county general fund for the purpose of repairing such bridge in another county since the bridge is vital to the health, education, welfare and convenience of families in the county who would otherwise be cut off from the county road and the service it entails. OAG 76-472 (decision prior to 1978 amendment of KRS 67.080 ).

Under this section a proposed resolution of a fiscal court authorizing the condemnation of private land for a private access road is unconstitutional and illegal. OAG 76-499 .

This section would authorize a fiscal court to enact an ordinance providing for the filing and recording in the county clerk’s office of topographical maps to be used to locate land boundaries. OAG 76-525 .

A $5,000 donation by the fiscal court to help finance the operation of a ferry was authorized under the broad police powers of this section since it relates to the health, education, safety, welfare and convenience of the inhabitants of the county for only the ferry makes the interstate travel through the county possible and the attendant economic benefits are obvious and significant since there is no interstate bridge in the area. OAG 76-557 .

A fiscal court could, under the authority of this section, Ky. Const., §§ 171 and 181, pass an ordinance imposing an occupational or license tax upon those persons engaged in writing fire insurance policies in the county and the tax could be measured in terms of the amount of such insurance written; however, such tax, to meet the constitutional test, would have to be based upon a reasonable classification, not be discriminatory and not be confiscatory and the revenue generated by such tax could be used for the financial support of a fire department established pursuant to KRS Chapter 75; there is no conflict between this section, such an ordinance, and KRS 75.040 for a fire protection district is a separate taxing district which does not involve the county ad valorem tax levy. OAG 76-575 .

Any attempt to utilize the home rule law for the purpose of placing the question of a county’s adoption of zoning on a referendum ballot would conflict with the terms of KRS Ch. 100 governing planning and zoning in all counties. OAG 76-736 .

A fiscal court under its police powers granted in this section may establish by an appropriate ordinance a reasonable system of licensing private security guards. OAG 76-760 .

Under an appropriate ordinance of the fiscal court pursuant to this section the fiscal court could provide a permissive basis for paying the premiums on personal liability insurance covering the sheriff, the county patrolman, and constable and such ordinance would not be in conflict with KRS 67.180 since that section does not cover insurance of the kind in question. OAG 77-20 .

Where certain convicted criminal defendants brought civil rights suits against various county officials, where the fiscal court determines that the subject officials performed their statutory duties in a bona fide or good faith manner during the period in question in the civil rights litigation, the fiscal court, in its discretion, may authorize the county attorney to defend such actions; however, where, in the reasonable judgment of the fiscal court, the county attorney, considering his official workload, would be unable to look after the interest of the county fully and completely, the fiscal court may employ special counsel to assist the county attorney or conduct, themselves, the defense of such officials. OAG 77-21 .

The fiscal court under an appropriate ordinance pursuant to this section can buy term life insurance on officials and employees and pay for it out of the county budget and it could also pay the full premium on hospitalization insurance for county employees if the fiscal court desired. OAG 77-38 .

This section does not permit a fiscal court to cross over into municipal territory with its cable television franchise, since the city’s exclusive authority over streets as provided by KRS Ch. 96, KRS 85.140 (now repealed), KRS 93.050 (now repealed), KRS 94.110 (now repealed), and KRS 94.360 (now repealed) would be in conflict with such attempted county action. OAG 77-111 .

A proposal by the fiscal court permitting a classification committee with the approval of the executive director to suspend service of a misdemeanant sentence should not be adopted by a fiscal court since it would permit the granting of parole by a committee when the granting of parole is an executive function and moreover since the legislature has already legislated on the question of parole for misdemeanants if the fiscal court were to pass such a plan it would be an attempt to change the statutory procedure of KRS 439.177 and KRS 439.179 contrary to this section. OAG 77-132 .

Inasmuch as law books used by the commonwealth’s attorney in the prosecution of crime would directly bear upon the public welfare and safety of county citizens, the fiscal court could reimburse the commonwealth’s attorney for expenditures incurred in purchasing the books. OAG 77-280 .

A fiscal court would have no authority to change or alter by ordinance the sheriff’s commission for collecting taxes for the levee board and the board of directors of a watershed conservancy district, for the fees are controlled by KRS 134.290 and 262.770 . OAG 77-289 .

A special tax to be used for a county’s ambulance service would be valid where the tax was a special ad valorem tax within the roll-back and constitutional limitations. OAG 77-316 .

This section does not give the fiscal court general supervisory control over the deputies of the county constitutional officers; thus the hiring or firing of the deputy clerks is a prerogative only of the county clerk. OAG 77-383 .

This section does not authorize a fiscal court to place a referendum on the November ballot as to whether the county should adopt a dog restraint or leash law. OAG 77-420 .

Inasmuch as there is presently no statutory authority for the county clerk’s errors and omission insurance premiums to be paid out of the earned fees of the county clerk, the clerk will simply have to pay the premiums out of his own personal assets. OAG 78-188 ; withdrawing OAG 77-63 .

Under Ky. Const., § 164 and this section as amended in 1978 a city can grant a cable television franchise, as it relates to territory within the municipal boundaries, and the fiscal court may grant a similar franchise, involving territory which is unincorporated within the county boundaries, provided that the explicit requirements of Ky. Const., § 164 are followed including the requirements that such local governments, before granting a franchise, duly advertise for and receive bids, and award the franchise to the highest and best bidder. OAG 78-316 .

A franchise contract relating to ambulance service can be and should be limited to emergency ambulance service. OAG 78-360 .

Marshall County would be free to enact an occupational license tax under the general provisions of this section. OAG 78-373 .

Concerning contracts that relate to the legislative or governmental powers of the fiscal court, no action taken by the fiscal court in that regard would be binding upon its successors; whereas, if the contract arises out of the business or proprietary powers of the fiscal court, such contract or agreement could be binding upon the successors of the fiscal court. OAG 78-432 .

The power conferred upon counties to exercise legislative or governmental functions is conferred to be exercised as often as may be found needful or politic, and an incumbent fiscal court presently holding such powers is vested with no discretion to circumscribe or limit or diminish their efficiency, but must transmit them unimpaired to their successors, but in the exercise of the business powers of a county, the county and its officers are controlled by no such rule, and they may lawfully exercise these powers in the same way, and in their exercise the county will be governed by the same rules which control a private individual or a business corporation under like circumstances. OAG 78-432 .

The Chaney House, as a program designed to provide for the welfare of predelinquent boys, would fall within the ambit of this section and since the Henderson County Fiscal Court is operating within the bounds of its express powers, the court would be protected from liability by sovereign immunity. OAG 78-460 .

A county may directly treat the subject of a solid waste management program by ordinance under this section, but where the county directly operates and maintains a solid waste management program under this section and KRS Chapter 58, the fiscal court’s program is subject to applicable rules and regulations of the Department for Natural Resources and Environmental Protection pursuant to KRS 224.10-100 (24) and 224.10-100 (1), as amended in 1978. OAG 78-480 .

Under this section, as amended in 1978, the fiscal court can enact reasonable regulations relating to public gatherings, whether on public or private lands. OAG 78-492 .

KRS 68.510 , authorizing the county to establish “public service programs,” would at the same time authorize the county (upon establishing such a program under the terms of KRS 68.510 et seq.), through its fiscal court, to contract with a third party, such as the Mental Health Retardation Regional Board which is presently professionally versed in the field, to perform the operational service of such a program as long as the county maintains overall control, and, the county can enter into contracts for service in those fields in which it is authorized by law to act. OAG 78-502 .

A city of the fourth class and a county can jointly acquire, own, operate and maintain a cemetery. OAG 78-544 .

A mandatory vehicle emission inspection ordinance can be adopted by the fiscal court of Jefferson County under this section. OAG 78-550 .

There is nothing in this section that suggests that the fiscal courts enacting an ordinance relating to ambulance service is mandatory. OAG 78-557 .

A county, through its fiscal court, has the authority under Ky. Const., § 181, and this section, to levy an occupational or license tax, and even if the occupational tax covered all persons working or carrying on a business in the county (including those in cities in the county), double taxation would not be involved, since to constitute double taxation the two taxes must be imposed on the same property by the same governing body during the same taxing period for the same taxing purpose. OAG 78-624 .

Nothing in this section or elsewhere in the code authorizes a fiscal court to spend county funds to pay for building materials for a volunteer, nonprofit organization handling emergencies. OAG 78-652 .

Subsection (3)(u) of this section is a specific enough delegation of authority to authorize the fiscal court of Jefferson County or any other county without an urban county government to enact an ordinance providing for safety officers, with the duties similar to those outlined in KRS 67A.075 . OAG 78-683 .

KRS Chapter 100 must be read together with KRS 67.075 et seq., and subsection (3)(k) of this section and statutes on the same subject, in pari materia, should be integrated so as to give effect to the legislative intention. OAG 78-815 .

On and after June 17, 1978, any zoning regulation action taken by a fiscal court in the form of a resolution, where KRS 67.075 et seq., and subsection (3)(k) of this section, are not followed, as an effective legislative action, is void. OAG 78-815 .

Subsection (3)(k) of this section, which speaks in terms of ordinances for zoning purposes, is a zoning statute to that extent and a zoning regulation in the form of a resolution would be in conflict with subsection (3)(k) of this section and KRS 67.075 et seq. OAG 78-815 .

Where a fiscal court had passed zoning regulations as resolutions, it could ratify them as ordinances and make them retroactive to the dates of the original measures. OAG 78-815 .

This section, as amended in 1978, is sufficient, as an expressly delegated power, to authorize any fiscal court in Kentucky to enact a motor vehicle sticker tax, provided that it is not designed as a revenue measure and meets the test of just providing the policing costs of roads traffic supervision. OAG 78-834 .

Individual members of the fiscal court may be held liable in tort in connection with the operation of county buildings, grounds, roads and bridges, depending upon the factual situation as determined by the courts. OAG 79-101 .

The fiscal court has the responsibility of causing the construction, operation and maintenance of all county buildings and other structures, grounds, roads and other property, implicit in which is overall responsibility of the fiscal court members to keep all such county buildings, grounds, roads and bridges in a proper and safe state of repair and maintenance. OAG 79-101 .

The county home rule bill specifically authorizes counties to engage in planning, zoning and subdivision control only according to the provisions of KRS Chapter 100. OAG 79-105 .

Where the provisions of KRS Chapter 100 have not been followed in connection with planning and zoning and there is no planning unit, no planning commission and no comprehensive plan, subdivision regulations cannot be adopted by county government. OAG 79-105 .

KRS 97.050 involves expenditures for equipping, maintaining and operating a park, playground or recreation center, but neither it nor this section authorizes an expenditure for school band trips. OAG 79-129 .

Assuming that sewer lines would be constructed along or through county road rights-of-way, a fiscal court has the authority to grant a franchise to a corporation in connection with the sewer lines operation pursuant to Ky. Const., §§ 163 and 164, assuming it is the highest and best bidder. OAG 79-156 .

Prior to May 12, 1979, Ky. Const., § 179 would have prevented subsection (3)(j) of this section from being applied by county governments to the making of mortgage loans to private citizens; since that date the deletion of the power of counties to engage in the “construction of new housing” has become effective ending any statutory authority for it whatsoever. OAG 79-166 .

Subsection (3)(j) of this section, in terms of revenue bond financing, simply would not pass the constitutional test of sufficiently described powers; the legislature simply does not describe revenue bond financing, only governmental obligation bond financing. OAG 79-166 .

KRS 15.750 , 32.011 and this section, when read together, authorize a fiscal court to contribute county money to the payment of the salary of an assistant commonwealth’s attorney. OAG 79-190 .

A fiscal court may not legally appropriate county funds to repair a privately owned building leased to a volunteer fire department, an independent organization disassociated from the county government. OAG 79-198 .

Where a volunteer fire department is a unit of county government operated pursuant to subsection (3)(u) of this section rather than an independent unit disassociated from county government such as a nonprofit corporate entity or a volunteer fire district organized pursuant to KRS Chapter 75, in any situation where county money is involved, the fiscal court, not the county fire department, should act on behalf of the county and make the basic decisions of how to spend the money, how much to spend and arrangements pertaining to any particular expenditure. OAG 79-226 .

Flexibility and sound judgment are vested in the fiscal courts by subsection (1) of this section, subject to their conforming to the dictates of the statutes and Constitution. OAG 79-229 .

If a county were to employ its general obligation bond to finance construction of new housing, such would constitute an unconstitutional use or application of this section since the county would be diverting its tax revenues to private individuals; and such appropriation of money and extending of credit to individuals is expressly prohibited by Ky. Const., § 179, but revenue bond financing would involve a constitutional use of this section. OAG 79-229 .

It can be seen from the long list of expressly mentioned areas of county government functions under subsection (3) of this section that such subjects may be properly and constitutionally financed through general obligation bonds of the county and through revenue bonds of the county. OAG 79-229 .

The legislature, in using the words “issue bonds” in subsection (3) of this section, intended to establish a phrase necessarily embracing any constitutional method of financing by way of the appropriate kind of bonds, i.e., general obligation bonds and revenue type bonds of the county, depending upon the expressly authorized governmental function involved. OAG 79-229 .

A county may enact an ordinance pertaining to junkyards which is more restrictive than the state statute and may enact an ordinance requiring the licensing of junkyards. OAG 79-258 .

The field of consumer protection is a permissible area for regulation by a fiscal court, provided such regulation is consistent with state law or administrative regulation. OAG 79-268 .

Reasonably implied in KRS 67.080 and this section is the premise that the fiscal court can expend county money where necessary to seek judicial guidance in the carrying out of its governmental function and the proper exercise of its basic powers. OAG 79-272 .

A county, through its fiscal court, has the authority to levy an occupational or license tax. OAG 79-301 .

A fiscal court would qualify as a “public housing agency” under the broad definition of 42 USCS § 1437a(6), since the fiscal court is authorized under subsections (3)(j) and (3)(q) of this section to “assist in the development of low-income housing,” and not actual operation of low-income housing. OAG 79-332 .

KRS 67.080(2)(b) and subsection (3)(t) of this section explicitly and expressly suggest that a fiscal court, as a body, has the sole jurisdiction to determine, both by legislative and executive or administrative action, the county road programs. OAG 79-345 .

KRS 67.710 , 67.080 and this section are in pari materia and must be construed together such that effect may be given to all of the provisions of each, if fairly and reasonably such construction is possible. OAG 79-345 .

A county has authority to regulate by ordinance the use of public ways for the transmission of public utilities. OAG 79-346 .

County occupational taxes are privilege taxes covering the privilege of doing work or engaging in a business within the geographical confines of the county government; therefore, the occupational tax could not apply to income earned outside of Kentucky. OAG 79-374 .

If a fiscal court of a county with a population less than 30,000 were to pass an occupational tax, the citizens of that county have no remedy to stop the enactment of the tax since there are no provisions in this section for submission to the voters. OAG 79-374 .

In passing on claims against a county, it is only necessary that the county judge/executive indicate to the fiscal court the claimant, basic nature of the claim, and the amount. OAG 79-374 .

The express power to levy the occupation tax under this section carries with it at least the implied power to require the filing of a return, showing net profit or gross salary as the case may be, and the enforcement of that requirement by means of a penalty as a necessary incident to the exercise of the express power. OAG 79-374 .

An agreement for the professional management of a county hospital, to be performed by a private corporation, would be valid, provided that such county hospital operation is expressly subject to the overall control and supervisory management of the fiscal court. OAG 79-377 .

A county ordinance which levies a license or occupational tax on coal producers engaged in the extraactive business enterprise of coal production would be constitutional, provided that the license or occupational tax as applied to coal producers is fairly and equitably integrated with a general county occupational or license tax applying to an overall occupational or license tax. OAG 79-385 .

All fiscal courts in Kentucky can levy a license or occupational tax for general revenue purposes or for any specific county governmental purpose authorized pursuant to subsection (2) of this section. OAG 79-385 .

The fiscal court has exclusive authority over county roads, including the authority to construct, maintain and operate such roads in the public interest of the health, safety, welfare and convenience of the inhabitants of the county. OAG 79-393 .

Subsection (3)(r) of this section expressly prohibits enacting ordinances involving gas. OAG 79-397 .

KRS 67.080 and subsection (3)(u) of this section impose upon the fiscal court the affirmative duty of taking such steps, by orders or ordinances, in providing, within the county’s financial ability and constitutional limitations, the necessary police protection. OAG 79-451 .

A county hospital established under KRS 216.010 (now repealed) continues as a county hospital, the source authority having been switched from KRS 216.010 (now repealed) to the present subsection (3)(d) of this section. OAG 79-495 .

Any fiscal court in Kentucky can establish a county hospital. OAG 79-495 .

KRS 216.310 to 216.360 relate to a hospital district, but not to a “county hospital” established under 67.080 or subsection (3)(d) of this section. OAG 79-495 .

A fiscal court’s authority to let a cable television franchise is bottomed on the fiscal court’s power to control its roads and rights-of-way. OAG 79-566 .

Where a cable television company is not occupying county roads or rights-of-way with its facilities in unincorporated territory, then it can operate without a county franchise. OAG 79-566 .

There is no authority for the county judge/executive or fiscal court to prohibit or limit a volunteer fire department operating in the unincorporated part of a county, except that the fiscal court may enact ordinances pertaining to the reasonable regulation of such volunteer fire departments, pursuant to subsection (3)(u) of this section. OAG 79-569 .

There is no authority of the county judge/executive or fiscal court to prohibit or limit rescue squads operating in the unincorporated portion of a county, except that the fiscal court, under subsection (3)(d) of this section, has express authority to enact ordinances regarding the reasonable regulation of ambulance service in the unincorporated part of the county. OAG 79-569 .

The county judge/executive alone has no authority to close down the county jail. OAG 79-587 .

The fiscal court could close down the county jail for repair, where extensive repair is necessary to make it adequate and humane, or it can close down the jail permanently where it is found unfit or inadequate as a jail and where repair will not be performed, but in both instances, the fiscal court must, within a reasonable time, provide another and adequate county jail. OAG 79-587 .

Considering the responsibility of each county, through its fiscal court, to provide for jail or detention facilities a fiscal court could, by ordinance, establish a reasonable charge per day for furnishing the jail facilities to out-of-county prisoners, not as a dieting fee but as a reasonable charge imposed upon the neighboring using counties under the theory of their sharing in the capital cost of constructing such facility and the cost of utilities. OAG 79-588 .

The authority to regulate noise pollution found in KRS Chapter 224 is sufficient, even though it is not found in the county home rule statute. OAG 79-599 .

Subsection (3)(u) of this section is explicit enough to authorize a fiscal court to establish by ordinance an auxiliary police force. OAG 80-13 .

Although subsection (3)(u) of this section provides authority for fiscal courts to now establish county auxiliary police forces formerly authorized by KRS 70.545 (repealed), where a county had established such a force pursuant to that section, repeal of that section would automatically vitiate the original fiscal court order establishing the force and require a new ordinance be passed based on the authority of subsection (3)(u) of this section, if the auxiliary force is to continue. OAG 80-36 .

Since the county is responsible for the general operational costs of the county jail (exclusive of dieting fees), the cost of guarding a county prisoner while he was hospitalized must be borne by the county. OAG 80-94 .

The fiscal court has no positive duty of procuring interest on its county deposits. OAG 80-98 .

The matter of choosing a county depository is left to the discretion of the fiscal court, as a body. OAG 80-98 .

A county judge/executive may not appoint magistrates to serve as road commissioners over their respective districts since the fiscal court as a body is required to establish the policies and expenditures relating to county roads; and the road program cannot be fragmented into a project in each magisterial district. OAG 80-102 .

Under present law, a county fiscal court has no authority to grant city policemen countywide jurisdiction since the fiscal court has no jurisdiction over city policemen, which are under the exclusive jurisdiction of the city legislative body. OAG 80-109 .

A fiscal court may not enact a county ordinance which would add a $10.00 fee to the regular court costs for the purpose of operating and maintaining the county jail, since court costs are purely statutory and there is no statute authorizing the fiscal court to legislate on court costs. OAG 80-114 .

A county fiscal court may enact a general license tax ordinance without a vote of the electorate, where the revenue from such a county tax is needed to complete the county’s judicial facilities building; the tax may be applied effectively to all persons working and businesses operating within the county boundaries, including persons working and businesses operating within the city boundaries of a city in that county, even though the city already has its own payroll tax in effect. OAG 80-121 .

A county ordinance which purports to comprehensively regulate armed security officers for nongovernmental entities of private enterprise is invalid as applied to railroad policemen, under subsection (3) of this section, in view of the direct and specific conflict between the ordinance and KRS 277.270 et seq., and because KRS 277.270 et seq. preempt the field of railroad policemen. OAG 80-157 .

Since there is no minimum salary payable to jailers out of the county treasury, the amount of any salary paid to jailers out of the county treasury is in the sound discretion of the fiscal court; but as to fee officers, such as the county jailer, where the jailer receives sufficient fees to make the maximum rubber dollar amount for 1980, the jailer is entitled to such maximum compensation, and in such case the fiscal court can do nothing to prevent the fee officer’s getting the maximum rubber dollar compensation where the jailer’s fees are sufficient to give him or her, as the case may be, the maximum possible under the rubber dollar formula. OAG 80-164 .

Where county has less than 30,000 population, the fiscal court can enact a general license tax without a vote of the people. OAG 80-302 .

A county fiscal court does not have the authority under KRS 67.080 and this section to appropriate funds to youth sport programs by funding through a joint recreation board created under KRS 97.035 ; although the fiscal court may appropriate money, properly budgeted for such purposes, directly to the youth sports organization concerned, a recreation board has no statutory authority to act as an arm of fiscal court to handle county appropriations which are to finally go to various youth sports program organizations. OAG 80-303 .

The fiscal court of a county that owns a county farm does not have the authority under KRS 67.080 and this section to lease a part of the county farm to a joint recreation board for use by the fair board as a county fairground; however, under this section the fiscal court may lease the property to the county fair board for county fair purposes. OAG 80-303 .

The fiscal court has the authority to establish necessary county offices and positions, in proper implementation of express statutory county functions, and the fiscal court may employ an administrative assistant so long as he is to assist the fiscal court in its legislative function. OAG 80-334 .

The fiscal court may approve of an administrative code provision whereby the county judge/executive could, under a properly defined emergency situation, take steps to effect repair of a county road or bridge, subject, however, to a ratification of such action by the fiscal court as a body at the first meeting opportunity. OAG 80-368 .

The responsibility for determining precisely just what specifically designated road segments and bridges will be constructed, reconstructed, maintained, or repaired, rests with the fiscal court as a body, not the county judge/executive, and the county judge/executive cannot order the road department to begin work on a particular bridge without fiscal court approval. OAG 80-368 .

A fiscal court and a franchise ordinance can set forth an amendment procedure whereby a future fiscal court cannot amend the franchise ordinance without all franchise holders approving said amendment. OAG 80-413 .

If the term of a franchise as granted by a fiscal court is for 15 years, and that term of years is included in the original ordinance granting the franchise, the current fiscal court cannot in any way amend the ordinance as far as it affects the rights and obligations of the franchise holders since the county and the franchise holder are bound by the original term of years under Ky. Const., § 164. OAG 80-413 .

The responsibility for providing security for a prisoner, who is receiving treatment at a hospital, rests with the fiscal court of the county of trial, including the payment of the guards for their services. OAG 80-434 .

Where a fiscal court entered orders approving of a loan for the construction or renovation of a new county facility and courthouse, but the county judge/executive refused to sign the loan and renovation documents prior to their deadline date, the other members of the fiscal court could sign the documents on behalf of the county, because the fiscal court can exercise such an executive or administrative function as signing documents it has legislatively authorized where the county judge/executive fails or refuses to carry out his mere ministerial duty of signing; to hold otherwise would obviously give the county judge/executive veto power over the fiscal court, which he does not have, and would permit the blocking of the will of the majority of the fiscal court. OAG 80-458 .

Where the 1979 amendment (ch. 22, § 1) to this section, which deleted the words “facilitating the construction of new housing” from subsection (3)(j), was declared unconstitutional in Jones v. County of Laurel, 600 S.W.2d 489, 1980 Ky. App. LEXIS 330 (Ky. App. 1980), the mere republication of all of this section in 1980 when the general assembly amended subsection (3)(r) by adding the words “including management of onsite sewage disposal systems,” merely carried forward the effect of the 1979 deletion which was later declared unconstitutional in Jones and the 1980 amendment to subsection (3)(r) was not intended to have any effect on the construction of subsection (3)(j); therefore, since the law is well established in Kentucky that where a law amending a prior law is held to be void, the prior law remains in full force and effect as originally passed, the words “facilitating the construction of new housing” must be construed as being legally contained in the current subsection (3)(j) of this section. OAG 80-473 .

The authority of an urban-county government to reduce and control litter by container legislation, under the powers given to counties, is derived from this section. OAG 80-502 .

Where a county license tax is laid upon persons engaged in independent trades, occupations and professions, the tax is a valid occupational or license tax and such tax may be measured in terms of net income or market value of the goods produced; the measuring of the tax in terms of market value does not convert the license tax into an excise tax. OAG 80-516 .

Where a fiscal court enacted a general occupational tax in the amount of one percent of market value of all products or one percent of net profits from nonmanufacturing businesses, the intent of the fiscal court was to levy the tax on all independent trades, occupations and professions and thus it qualified as an occupational or license tax and was not an excise tax, as defined by the courts; the fact that the tax applied to certain producing businesses was measured in terms of one percent of the market value of the goods produced did not convert the license tax into an excise tax. OAG 80-516 .

The fiscal court has a continuing affirmative duty under KRS 67.080 and this section to provide a county jail; the duty is not limited merely to the provision of a physical facility, the jail, but also encompasses the duty to perform the service of keeping and housing prisoners and thus, though the county has no jail, the fiscal court will nonetheless continue to have an affirmative duty to provide for the housing and keeping of prisoners, to operate the jail, as it were, through some alternative means. OAG 80-535 .

Where the clerk of fiscal court or his deputy is not present for any reason at a special fiscal court meeting, the fiscal court has the authority to designate some other person, capable of preparing such minutes, to prepare the minutes of the fiscal court meeting. OAG 80-595 .

The fiscal court does not have the authority to maintain temporarily or occasionally a road which has not been accepted into the county road system, but which is a public road used by the school buses, mail service and general public. OAG 80-602 .

Since a county, individually, has the authority, pursuant to subsection (3)(j) of this section, to facilitate the construction of new housing and to cause the redevelopment of existing housing, it may join together with other counties, under the authority of the Interlocal Cooperation Act (KRS 65.210 to 65.300 ) to collectively engage in the adoption of a homeowners mortgage finance plan to facilitate the construction of new housing and the acquisition of existing housing to enable persons meeting maximum income limitations to finance the purchase of housing at less than the prevailing market interest rate. OAG 80-651 .

Where a jailer had to borrow money to run the jail, the interest paid on the loan may be deducted from the jailer’s excess fees as a credit since the jailer borrowed the money to run the jail while it was closed, thus directly benefiting the county, which under KRS 67.080 and this section has overall responsibility of maintaining the county jail. OAG 81-70 .

Where a paving contractor paved .5 miles of road in a magisterial district in addition to the contracted .6 miles upon the approval of a single magistrate but without consideration or approval by the full fiscal court, the county was not legally obligated to pay the additional $8,800 billed by the contractor since the extra work could only be properly authorized by the fiscal court acting as a body under KRS 67.080 and this section; however the full fiscal court could ratify the contract since it had the power to make it in the first place. OAG 81-104 .

Where an urban county council or fiscal court has, under KRS 67A.060 , KRS 67.080 , and this section, enacted reasonable ordinances providing for accumulated leave payment upon leaving local service and taking leave with pay while still in local service, an employee of the county court clerk, jailer or sheriff who is terminated may be paid for accumulated leave out of the “75% fund” set up in Ky. Const., § 106. OAG 81-123 .

Where a proposed street will run from a county recreational park to a city street, city commission approval of the proposed street means that the street will become a part of the city street system, and the city will have exclusive municipal jurisdiction or control over it under KRS 82.082 ; however, the fiscal court of the county may maintain the proposed street as a part of the county road system under the authority of KRS 178.010 and this section, assuming that the city approves of the dedication, subject to the approval of the city commission. OAG 81-142 .

A county fiscal court has the authority to grant a cable television franchise pursuant to Ky. Const., §§ 163 and 164, and to the extent that the systems of cable and wire are constructed over county road systems which the fiscal court has jurisdiction over, the franchise power also exists pursuant to KRS 67.080 and this section; moreover, the fiscal court has the authority, under Ky. Const., §§ 163 and 164 to establish in the franchise contract reasonable provisions for service and rates which are calculated to effectuate the purposes for which it is granted, thus, a franchise contract which required the cable operator to perform at a level which would meet applicable FCC guidelines would be reasonable and valid. OAG 81-166 .

It would not be legal for magistrates to supervise road work or other county work, with or without pay since they may only exercise the powers which KRS 67.080 and this section permit or direct them to do. OAG 81-186 .

Although a county generally has responsibility only for those indigents who actually reside in that county, the medical care costs for indigent prisoners who are residents of another county or state would also have to be borne by that county as a necessary cost in the operation of the jail pursuant to KRS 67.080 , this section, and KRS 67.130 , subject to the payment of medical care for indigent prisoners with nonpostponable life or health threatening problems by the governmental unit (county, state or federal) whose law has been violated, as provided in KRS 441.010 (now KRS 441.045 ). OAG 81-213 .

A county cannot, in order to raise money to distribute to various volunteer fire departments, utilize the provisions of KRS 92.285 (now repealed) to levy and collect a license fee or tax against insurance companies based upon a percentage of the premiums received by the company, since when a county levies a license or occupational tax pursuant to subsection (2) of this section, such license or tax on insurance companies must be fairly and equitably integrated with a county occupational or license tax applying to occupations, trades and professions generally. OAG 81-247 .

A city or county government, by a proper ordinance enacted pursuant to subsections (3)(c), (3)(o) and (3)(r) of this section, may require that residential and commercial inhabitants within its jurisdiction utilize its garbage pickup and disposal services and require them to pay reasonable fees for such services. OAG 81-278 .

A fiscal court in a county with less than 75,000 population can pass an ordinance or order providing that certain elected fee officers, such as the clerk and sheriff, turn over their statutory fees to the county treasury with the understanding that the salaries of such officers, their deputies, and necessary office expenses be paid out of the county treasury, and, since such revenues are public moneys, these fees must be put into a “public account” covering each fee officer, as a part of the county treasury’s accounting system. OAG 81-303 .

A county fiscal court is empowered by Ky. Const., § 181 to impose an occupational license tax upon an insurance company operating in the county as long as the tax is fairly and equitably integrated with the general county occupational license tax, is based upon reasonable classifications and is not discriminatory, arbitrary or confiscatory, since subsection (2) of this section allows the fiscal court to levy all taxes not in conflict with the state Constitution and statutes. OAG 81-332 .

If an ambulance service is directly operated by a county, the county fiscal court has the authority to levy a special tax for the service pursuant to subsection (3)(d) of this section, and, if necessary, it can levy an additional ad valorem tax pursuant to subsection (1) of KRS 68.090 , since an ambulance service involves a county purpose. OAG 81-344 .

A county, or two (2) or more counties, acting under an agreement executed pursuant to the provisions of the Interlocal Cooperation Act may issue mortgage revenue bonds to finance the redevelopment of existing housing and to purchase existing housing units, so long as the purchase is only a phase or part of the overall redevelopment plan under subsection (3)(j) of this section which will result in the ultimate transfer of title from county government to a private purchaser or to a governmental entity specifically authorized to administer a housing program. OAG 81-346 .

The reasonable construction of KRS 67.080 , 67.130 and 208.130 (now repealed) and this section means that the county is responsible for the costs of transporting juveniles from one county to another. OAG 81-357 .

Subsections (3)(j) and (3)(q) of this section authorize a fiscal court to assist the Department of Housing and Urban Development in making subsidized rental payments to certain individuals and do not prevent the fiscal court from assisting such payments in unincorporated areas of the county, provided that there is no statute preempting that function in favor of a city within the county, and provided that there is no duplicating function being presently exercised by a city or cities within the county pursuant to subsection (1) of KRS 80.010 and KRS 80.020 . OAG 81-364 .

Although a county receiving moneys from the Economic Assistance Fund established under KRS 42.450 would appear to have statutory authorization to make expenditures from the fund to such nonprofit organizations as little league baseball pursuant to the language of subsection (2) of KRS 42.455 and subdivision (3)(f) of this section which allow expenditures for “recreation,” such an appropriation would violate the prohibition of Ky. Const., § 179 against appropriations for corporations since the baseball program is not a county operation or function and is not under the basic operative control or management of the fiscal court. OAG 81-381 .

A county fiscal court cannot enact an ordinance providing for mandatory recordation by lessees of all conveyances of less than fee simple title in oil shale since the recordation provisions have no basic causal connection with the statutory purpose of conservation and preservation of natural resources and flood control set forth in subdivisions (3)(h) and (3)(i) of this section, and since the subject matter of land title instrument recordation is preempted by KRS Chapter 382. OAG 81-414 .

Neither KRS 67.080 nor this section contain any express delegation of authority to the fiscal courts to enact obscenity or pornography laws. OAG 81-417 .

There is no authority in either KRS 67.080 or this section which authorizes a fiscal court to expend public funds to pay the electrical inspection fees for individual county residents; in addition, Ky. Const., § 179 prohibits any county from appropriating money for any individual. OAG 82-30 .

It is improper for a county fiscal court to create a county honest election committee which would regulate the conduct of candidates in local elections, because the county lacks the statutory authority to legislate in the field of election regulation. OAG 82-31 .

The legislature, pursuant to constitutional directives, has preempted the field of election law regulation and control, and no county or city can enact legislation in this area regardless of the fact that such legislation might in some respects serve a valuable purpose. OAG 82-31 .

While subdivision (3)(u) of this section provides that the fiscal court may pass ordinances relating to “provision of police and fire protection,” the subject matter of an ordinance authorizing constables to use blue lights and sirens on their official vehicles has been preempted by the General Assembly in the enactment of KRS 189.910 and 189.920 . OAG 82-47 .

While subdivision (6)(c) of this section provides that a county government may adopt ordinances which incorporate by reference state statutes and administrative regulations in areas in which a county government is authorized to act, that provision, standing alone, does not appear to mandate the approval of an administrative code by way of an ordinance; however, “county ordinance” is defined in KRS 67.075(1), as an official written act of fiscal court which is general and lasting in nature and since that description fits precisely an administrative code, the administrative code should be adopted by ordinance. OAG 82-77 .

The power granted by subdivision (3)(u) of this section is not limited to that power expressly conferred thereby, but it includes such powers as are necessarily or fairly implied in, or incident to, the accomplishment of the things which are expressly authorized to be done. OAG 82-95 .

The repeal of former KRS 70.545 was with the intent that the specific power to create auxiliary police forces would be replaced by the general authority given in the Home Rule statute, KRS 67.083(3)(u). OAG 82-95 .

Any fiscal court may enact an ordinance providing for the creation of a county auxiliary police force and has the necessarily implied power, in enacting such ordinance, to treat such matters as the duties to be performed in the county, upon such terms and conditions as the fiscal court deems proper; further, the ordinance shall prescribe the number of officers and men of such force, the manner of their appointment, and the rules and regulations that shall govern the powers and duties of the members of such force, including the power of arrest. OAG 82-95 .

A fiscal court, assuming funds have been properly budgeted for the purpose, may lawfully approve reimbursement, subject to proper documentation being submitted, of the reasonable expenses for travel, meals, and lodging, actually paid by one elected to a county office, who has not yet assumed such office, where such expenses are immediately incident to attending statutorily provided training for such office. OAG 93-72 .

County road equipment or other county equipment may be used on public graveyards and cemetery roads where such use promotes the proper upkeep and maintenance of such public cemeteries and cemetery roadways; the fiscal court’s authority to so use its equipment is amply reflected in the case law and is expressly provided for in subdivision (3)(g) of this section. OAG 82-101 .

The fiscal court has authority, under KRS 75.050 and subdivision (3)(u) of this section, to contract with volunteer fire departments for fire protection purposes. OAG 82-103 .

A fiscal court may, pursuant to subdivision (3)(x) of this section, grant or donate properly budgeted county money to a county fair board for the purpose of rebuilding grandstands which were destroyed by fire, since the grandstands would be directly used, in the context of a traditional county fair, for the larger purpose of promoting the economic development of the county through the advertising of the economic resources of the county. OAG 82-104 .

Any fiscal court in Kentucky has supervision and control over county finances and county personnel, and in the exercise of its broad county powers, any fiscal court can enter into a contract with county personnel which is deemed to be in the county’s and general public’s interest and involves such items as wages, hours, terms, and conditions of employment. It was definitely not the legislative intent that KRS 78.470 and 78.480 would negate such broad powers. OAG 82-141 .

In all counties in Kentucky, the county judge/executive may appoint a county police force, which will be funded by appropriate action and budgeting by the fiscal court. Members of a county police force are county employees and are subject to the administrative and legislative controls of the county judge/executive and the fiscal court as a body, pursuant to KRS 67.080(1)(a), (c), (e) and (2)(a), (c), KRS 67.710(7) and subdivision (3)(u) of this section. OAG 82-141 .

There is ample authority in the case law and statutory law which authorize counties of less than 300,000 population to voluntarily engage in collective bargaining, leading to a finally executed written agreement which would be binding on the parties; accordingly, any such county may, through its fiscal court, voluntarily enter into a binding collective bargaining agreement with its county police force, as relates to hours, wages, and other conditions of employment. OAG 82-141 .

Pursuant to KRS 67A.060 , 67.080 and this section, the Urban County Council, and the fiscal courts in other counties coming under the application of Ky. Const., § 106 and KRS 64.345 , may enact reasonable ordinances providing for leave time, i.e., for accumulated leave payment upon leaving the local service and taking leave with pay while still in local service. Such leave would be payable out of the “75% account” of the affected office. Thus such leave payments would require: (1) a local ordinance and (2) a corresponding order of the court or fiscal court, as the case may be, relating to necessary office expenses (budget). OAG 82-221 .

The budget role of the county or fiscal court in KRS 64.345 was not designed to usurp the legislative role assigned to a county or urban county government. OAG 82-221 .

County can only take official action through the fiscal court by majority vote, and hence no individual magistrate can require county attorney to do anything in connection with county government. OAG 82-228 .

A fiscal court has the authority to enact reasonable ordinances designed to provide a garbage collection and disposal service system for the health and convenience of its county citizens. OAG 82-236 .

In view of the increased load effected by the garbage of areas outside a county, and the attendant implications for the public health of citizens of the county by way of increasing health problems or hazards, an ordinance prohibiting citizens from other counties from dumping their trash and garbage into county trash containers was a valid, not arbitrary, exercise of the fiscal court’s police powers, particularly as the outside citizens paid nothing toward the maintenance of the garbage, while the citizens of the county directly supported the garbage operation through the county’s general fund. OAG 82-236 .

Ordinance provision prohibiting anyone to place garbage other than household or business bagged garbage into county trash containers was legal under the broad police powers of fiscal court, and the fiscal court in such an ordinance could prescribe reasonable penalties for violation thereof. OAG 82-236 .

Where a community action corporation is organized and functioning pursuant to KRS 273.410 to 273.455 (now KRS 273.410 to 273.453 ), and has been designated, pursuant to an ordinance or resolution of the fiscal court, as an agent of the county under KRS 273.435 for the implementation of various statutorily authorized public welfare projects, the fiscal court may appropriate public funds to such a community action corporation in connection with the carrying out of such projects. OAG 82-238 .

A county has the duty of providing for the care, treatment and maintenance of the sick and poor of the county, although the county’s responsibility for providing for such sick, ailing and poor people is subject to its ability to pay. The fiscal court must set up an item in the county budget for the sick and poor, based upon available revenue. OAG 82-239 .

A fiscal court may reasonably restrict its ambulance services to emergency situations only. OAG 82-239 .

A fiscal court may, under subsection (3)(u) of this section, establish by ordinance an auxiliary police force, but such force would have no connection with the sheriff’s office. An auxiliary county police force is not to be confused with a regular county police force established under KRS 70.540 . OAG 82-254 .

Any county may, in the discretion of the fiscal court, establish a county emergency ambulance service by contracting for it and granting a franchise under Ky. Const., § 164, or may establish an emergency ambulance service district pursuant to KRS 108.100 et seq., or may establish a county emergency ambulance service directly operated by the county, but the fiscal court is not mandatorily required to provide emergency ambulance service under present statutes. OAG 82-239 .

A county police officer is considered to be a county officer. OAG 82-304 .

Where the county sheriff had no excess fees to pay into the county, the fiscal court should fund his documented and necessary office telephone expenses. OAG 82-402 .

Under the statutory powers given counties in subdivision (3)(d) of this section and KRS 68.240(2)(e), a fiscal court has the authority to contract in connection with the maintenance of hospital operations, provided that no constitutional nor statutory section is violated, and such authority exists even though the hospital function, when assumed by the county, is not governmental, but is a function which may or may not be exercised by fiscal court. Once a county decided to establish a county hospital, it became a county function for general purposes. OAG 82-446 .

Where a county, in order to fund an operating deficit of the county hospital, proposed to enter into an obligation in the form of notes payable solely and only out of a “special fund,” i.e., the revenues of the county hospital and, although the notes would probably be set up in terms of one year obligations, it would be the intention of the county and the hospital, on the one hand, and the owners of the notes on the other hand, to renegotiate the contract each year for a period of seven (7) years with a continually decreasing total such that the entire obligation would be paid in seven (7) years time, and where the notes would declare on their face that payment would be made solely and only from the revenues of the hospital and that the county would have no obligation, directly or indirectly, to pay the notes from the county treasury or budgeted funds of the county, such proposed loan would not violate Ky. Const., § 157 and would be legal. OAG 82-446 .

Counties may enact ordinances relative to dog control but whether they do or not, they must fulfull their statutory obligations as set forth in KRS Chapter 258. While cities have the authority to enact dog control measures they cannot impose obligations upon a county to which the county does not agree and which are in excess of the county’s duties and obligations under the provision of KRS Chapter 258. OAG 82-447 .

The county has definite and prescribed obligations under KRS Chapter 258, but they do not include the duty to accept dogs at the county pound which were picked up by municipal dog control authorities, particularly where violations of municipal ordinances are involved. While the cities and the county have the authority to enter into a joint or cooperative agreement concerning dog control and the use of the county dog pound, which could include a boarding fee for dogs delivered to the pound by city dog control officers, the cities, in the absence of an agreement with the county, cannot require the county to accept dogs picked up for violations of municipal ordinances; absent an agreement between the cities and the county relative to dog control, the cities will enforce their ordinances only and the county and all peace officers will enforce the provisions of KRS Chapter 258. OAG 82-447 .

Proposed fee on garages and parking lots whereby the operators of such business would pay a fee to the county and be issued a permit for parking activity was a license tax and was constitutionally impermissible since the county already had an occupational license tax. OAG 82-573 .

The fiscal court has authority to adopt a policy concerning permissive reimbursement of county officials’ legal expenses, provided that it meets the following guidelines: (1) it is found that the official was acting in good faith within the scope of his authority in the discharge of his official duties; i.e., he is found by the courts to not be guilty of crime, negligence, misconduct, or willful or malicious wrongdoing; (2) the litigation is of such nature as to affect the county governmental interest; and (3) there is money in an appropriate county budget item sufficient to pay such legal expenses. OAG 82-596 .

Where the fiscal court provides for four county officials’ reimbursement for litigational expenses, such are legal if they meet the guidelines for reimbursement of expenses; however, where the fiscal court, as relates to the litigation involving four county officials, decides to not reimburse a fifth county official involved in the same litigation, such action, where the case of the fifth defendant meets the guidelines, might be construed by the courts to be arbitrary under Ky. Const., § 2. Thus, where five county officials were involved, and they are qualified under the guidelines for reimbursement of expenses, the reimbursement should be effected on a fair and equitable basis, if at all, for all five defendants. OAG 82-596 .

The fiscal court of a county may impose an automobile sticker tax under its police power, as found in subdivision (3)(t) of this section. The proceeds of such tax, while falling under the restrictive doctrine requiring such tax revenues as are reasonably necessary to fund the administrative cost of the exercised regulatory power, may be used to subsidize an ambulance service. OAG 82-600 .

An ambulance service may be carried on in the county under one of three methods: (1) ambulance service under a county franchise to private persons or a corporation under KRS 65.710 , provided such franchise is let under competitive bidding pursuant to Ky. Const., § 164; (2) ambulance service as a direct county operation under its police power as found in subdivision (3)(t) of this section; and (3) ambulance service provided by an ambulance district as established under KRS 108.080 et seq. OAG 82-601 .

The fiscal court may impose an auto sticker tax under its police power as found in subdivisions (3)(t) of this section to fund an ambulance service, and such tax would not violate Ky. Const., §§ 170 and 181. However, the proceeds cannot exceed the amount of revenue necessary to fund the administrative cost of the regulatory power. OAG 82-601 .

A vehicle sticker tax for the purpose of funding a county ambulance service could constitutionally be imposed by a fiscal court to apply to those automobiles of citizens residing in the county and using roads under the fiscal court’s jurisdiction, and also to citizens from other counties who run their vehicles over county roads on a consistent or regular basis. OAG 82-601 .

The criterion for determining whether an ordinance levying a license tax upon vehicles is properly within the exercise of the police power under subdivision (3)(t) of this section is that the tax must only be sufficient to compensate the county for the issuance of the license, the necessary keeping of the records of such transactions, and the supervisory regulation over the subjects of the license; further, the tax must not be unreasonable in amount for the county’s police supervision provided for by it, nor more than was necessary for the purpose, considering the size of the county and the necessity for the police supervision. OAG 83-25 .

If the tax revenue from an automobile sticker tax actually exceeds the reasonable cost of administration, the tax ordinance is invalid, since the excess over and above the reasonable cost of administration would cause the tax to be unconstitutional; thus the excess could not be legally spent for any county purpose. OAG 83-25 .

There is no legitimate or constitutional way to use an automobile sticker tax, imposed pursuant to subdivision (3)(t) of this section, for general revenue purposes. OAG 83-25 .

The fiscal court cannot impose an automobile vehicle sticker tax under its police power solely for the purpose of funding a county-wide police department, although such tax can be imposed for the purposes of classifying, licensing, tagging and supervising vehicles and their drivers in connection with the sticker tax ordinance, which purposes would involve the use of a county police force. OAG 83-25 .

The fiscal court may reimburse or indemnify the jailer for his actual litigational costs suffered by him “while acting in good faith” in the discharge of his official duties; of course only after the litigation has become final can it be determined whether he so acted in good faith for the purposes of reimbursement of the jailer for actual litigational costs (money out of his own pocket). OAG 83-35 .

There is no basis in subdivision (3)(d) of this section, nor in any other statute, for the fiscal court’s subsidizing a private corporate hospital by selling the county’s hospital physical plant to the hospital for no consideration; thus, where a county had purchased physical plant of hospital from nonprofit corporation and leased plant back to corporation which continued to operate the hospital, the fiscal court could not legally transfer the title to the hospital physical plant back to the corporation without consideration. OAG 83-37 .

In paying the salaries of county road personnel the fiscal court may: (1) approve each set of payroll checks issued by a formal order or simple resolution by majority vote at a proper meeting of the fiscal court; or (2) establish, by way of an ordinance the rule that subject to named requirements, such as work time reports, etc., the county road department payroll checks will be issued at certain intervals, for work actually performed, under the supervision of the county judge/executive, without any other formal order or resolution of the fiscal court, and subject to the availability of budgeted funds. OAG 83-95 .

Since the statutory powers of a county fiscal court do not include carrying on or promoting the work of the church or churches, a fiscal court cannot legally expend county tax money in putting rock and gravel upon church parking lots, meritorious as it might otherwise be in relation to spiritual and moral training. OAG 83-175 .

The fiscal court, pursuant to subdivision (3)(a) of this section, may enact ordinances dealing with animal control so long as they do not conflict with the provisions of KRS Chapter 258. OAG 83-209 .

A fiscal court may engage in a grant of county money for ambulance purposes to a properly enfranchised person or corporation, provided it is done on a contractual basis to insure that the inhabitants of the unincorporated portion of the county are furnished ambulance service. OAG 83-222 .

Where board of levee commissioners entered agreement for excavation of drainage ditch, under terms of which board was required to acquire the necessary easements and rights-of-way, and board had insufficient funds to acquire such easements, the fiscal court could not levy a special assessment in order to raise funds to enable the board of levee commissioners to purchase the needed land or rights-of-way, nor was there any authority for the circuit court to force the fiscal court to levy such a tax; in the absence of sufficient funds, the board could not instigate the condemnation proceedings. OAG 83-234 .

Subdivision (3)(i) of this section contemplates a project by the fiscal court, not the expenditure of county funds in connection with an undertaking of a board of levee commissioners, a separate and independent taxing district organized and functioning pursuant to KRS Chapter 266. OAG 83-234 .

Although the city has exclusive jurisdiction and control over its city streets, a fiscal court, with the consent of the city, may, pursuant to KRS 178.010 and this section, take city streets into the county road system by fiscal court order for the purpose of expending county money on the construction or improvement of such streets. OAG 83-321 .

The fiscal court’s jurisdiction, including its powers relating to the county roads and bridges, extends only to territory within the particular county’s boundaries; accordingly, a county had no statutory authority to unilaterally spend county money on a bridge located in another county. OAG 83-340 .

The fiscal court, pursuant to KRS 67.080 and this section, can enact an ordinance providing for the management of the county hospital by a board to be established by fiscal court but, if the hospital is to remain a county hospital, the ultimate control and authority over the operation of the hospital by the fiscal court must be carefully and scrupulously retained; while the fiscal court can establish a board to conduct the day-to-day management of the county hospital, the fiscal court must retain for the county full ownership of the hospital property and final control and responsibility for the hospital. OAG 83-350 .

Once a fiscal court takes action in the establishing of a county road program, the county judge/executive, as the county’s chief executive, is immediately responsible for implementing or carrying out such program, assisted by the county road engineer or supervisor, county road employees and other county employees necessary to such implementation. OAG 83-382 .

Assuming that the coroner’s bills submitted to and approved by the fiscal court are valid claims against the county treasury and are accurately stated, the county judge/executive has no authority to alter such claims. OAG 83-434 .

A fiscal court can contribute $200 of county funds to the Kentucky Association of County Judge Executives for legal expenses of a lawsuit filed against the Kentucky Local Facilities Construction Authority, where the purpose of the lawsuit is to seek a clarification and interpretation of the new jail legislation in KRS Chapter 441, since this jail legislation is of immediate and pressing concern to fiscal courts. OAG 83-447 .

The county treasurer must keep an appropriation ledger, process claims, write the checks, and make financial reports to the fiscal court and while the county judge/executive has authority under KRS 67.080(1)(c) and (d) and subsection (3) of this section, with the approval of the fiscal court, to appoint personnel to assist him in his administrative and executive role, specifically as relates to administrative duties pertaining to county finances, such personnel cannot be hired to merely duplicate the precise work of the county treasurer, nor can such employment be used to interfere in any way with the statutory duties of the county treasurer. OAG 83-456 .

Powers of fiscal court and the county judge/executive depend wholly upon express powers delegated to them by the General Assembly or powers which are strongly and necessarily implied. OAG 84-36 .

The fiscal court has no authority to legislate on the subject of vacation time for constitutional officers’ deputies nor does the county judge/executive, as an individual officer, have any such legislative authority. OAG 84-36 .

There is no express statute authorizing fiscal courts to enact landlord-tenant legislation. OAG 84-62 .

One of the powers of a fiscal court is the making of provisions for roads and enforcement of traffic regulations; however, a fiscal court must scrupulously avoid devising any traffic regulation in conflict with existing statutory law. OAG 84-68 .

A fiscal court has no authority to establish a system of permits whereby trucks would be permitted to haul commodities in excess of statutory weight limits over county roads upon the posting of a bond for any damages which they might cause to such roads. Such a permit system would be in direct conflict with the legislative program envisioned in KRS 189.221 and 189.230 . OAG 84-68 .

Since county revenue bonds issued in conformity with applicable statutory sections involve no county governmental debt obligation, no lending of credit, and no use of tax revenues, Ky. Const., § 179 (prohibiting a county’s lending of credit) is not violated. OAG 84-92 .

The fiscal court can issue county revenue bonds for the purpose of constructing and acquiring new and existing housing, and rehabilitating, remodeling, renovating or redeveloping existing housing. OAG 84-92 .

Revenue bond financing is left to the sound discretion of fiscal courts, who must rely upon fiscal agents and the expertise of bond counsel in such details and in the formulation of the appropriate bond documents. OAG 84-92 .

Where the fiscal court budgets money for the sheriff’s office for a specific purpose (such as official radio equipment repair), only the fiscal court has the authority to finally authorize the expenditure of those budgeted county funds for that specific purpose; the fiscal court has no authority to delegate its fiscal court or decisional role in authorizing expenditure of county money. OAG 84-139 .

The fiscal court has the responsibility of procuring the necessary automobiles for the sheriff’s statutory functions where it appears that the sheriff’s fees are not wholly sufficient for that purpose; thus, to the extent that the expense allowance and sheriff’s fees are not wholly sufficient to fund the acquisition cost of automobiles and the cost of operation, the fiscal court has the responsibility of funding such costs out of the county treasury, under available budgeted county funds. OAG 84-140 .

Since there is no statute authorizing the county clerk to perform the duty of collecting a county auto sticker tax, the fiscal court cannot impose such duty on the clerk. OAG 84-188 .

The fiscal court has the authority to acquire property for county purposes and the courts will not interfere with the broad exercise of discretion of the fiscal court in that regard, unless there is a clear showing of abuse amounting to fraud or action indicating arbitrariness or capriciousness. OAG 84-190 .

By reasonable implication, arising out of the fiscal court’s express powers under KRS 67.080 and this section, a fiscal court may accept property by gift or donation where there are no conditions attached except that the property be used for a public purpose. OAG 84-190 .

Fiscal court lawfully accepted donation of dirt by a private citizen, which was to be used for a county purpose, and the using of county equipment to go onto the private property of the donor to pick up the dirt was legal. OAG 84-190 .

The fiscal court, under its express and implied powers granted in KRS 67.080 and this section, has the authority to establish personnel and fringe benefits programs encompassing its own employees and the employees of the constitutional officers in a uniform system; however, the deputies’ participation in the system is based upon the constitutional officer’s requesting the fiscal court to so act. OAG 84-203 .

The fiscal court’s range of responsibility, in seeing to it that all fiscal court personnel and fringe benefit policies be applied equally, extends only to those county employees subject to the direct control and authority of the fiscal court; it does not extend to those deputies of county constitutional officers. OAG 84-203 .

The term “county employees” includes the county employees who serve directly under the authority of the fiscal court, and includes the deputies, assistants and various statutory support personnel of local or county constitutional officers. OAG 84-203 .

Regardless of the constitutional officers’ financial tie-in with county government, there is no statutory authority for the fiscal court’s initial programming of personnel matters, relating to constitutional officer deputies; the initiating must take the form of a written request, for such programming applicable to the deputies, from their constitutional officer, the appointing authority. OAG 84-203 .

Considering that the adequate housing of the court and the jail systems are to be given a high priority, under KRS 26A.100 , 67.080 and this section, the fiscal court of any county has the authority to allocate space in the county courthouse or its county buildings for the court and jail systems; its exercise of such authority can only be reversed by the courts, in a proper law suit, where the courts deem that the fiscal court has acted arbitrarily in its allocation decisions. OAG 84-263 .

Although there is no longer a statutory provision requiring jails and courthouses to be located in the county seat, the location of such buildings addresses itself to the sound discretion of the fiscal court in terms of economics, political function and convenience for the court systems and the public generally. OAG 84-263 .

Where a county was operating under a contract with a private company for solid waste disposal, and the contract contained no reference to the county’s participation in sharing certain engineering costs attendant upon the operation of the landfill by the private entrepreneurs, the county’s sharing in such extra costs would be of a gratuitous nature, which would apparently be prohibited by Ky. Const., §§ 3 and 171. OAG 84-276 .

Allowance by fiscal court of an amendment to an existing cable television franchise, which would require a $20.00 security deposit from renters, but not from owners, was a reasonable classification and did not violate Ky. Const., § 2; when considering the actual experience of the company with renters, and the fact that the company suffered a monetary loss in extending service to renters without requiring a security deposit for the converter boxes, such requirement was reasonable and not discriminatory, it being applied to all within that class. OAG 85-8 .

Where original franchise ordinance provided for security deposits for converter boxes, not to exceed $25.00, the fiscal court’s resolution recognizing cable television company’s right to require a security deposit was an amendment of an existing franchise and did not violate Ky. Const., § 164. OAG 85-8 .

If the county treasurer is physically unable to perform her statutory duties, the fiscal court may designate some county employee, or one hired temporarily for this purpose, to perform the treasurer’s duties, until such time as the fiscal court can conduct a hearing, pursuant to KRS 68.010(4), on the question as to whether there is any applicable ground for removal from office. OAG 85-10 .

A fiscal court, in its sound discretion, and on a case by case basis, may provide for reimbursing a county official for legal fees expended in litigation under these coexisting conditions: (1) It is found that the official was acting in good faith within the scope of his authority in the discharge of his official duties, i.e., he is found by the courts to not be guilty of crime, negligence, misconduct, or willful or malicious wrongdoing; (2) The litigation is of such nature as to affect the county governmental interest; (3) There is money in an appropriate county budget item sufficient to pay such legal expenses. OAG 85-25 .

A county could not make a contribution to three volunteer fire departments, each located in a different city of the county, even though they provided fire protection for the entire county; nor could the county purchase a specific piece of equipment or pay certain bills for them. OAG 85-99 .

There is no statutory authority for a fiscal court to contribute to a city park program. OAG 85-99 .

Pursuant to KRS 273.441 and KRS 273.410(2), any of the counties which have in legal effect designated a corporation as a community action agency may, subject to available funds and proper budgeting procedure under KRS Chapter 68, contribute, through the corporation, county funds for any of the purposes described specifically in KRS 273.441 and KRS 273.410(2), with the assumption that such county grants are made by way of an agreement between the county and the corporation that such county money will be spent for a designated purpose or purposes, as expressly provided in KRS 273.441 and 273.410(2), the corporation subsequently reporting to the county government the precise nature and amount of the final expenditure. Basically, the powers of a fiscal court expressed in subsection (3) of this section relate to public expenditures and programs under the direct control of fiscal court. OAG 85-117 .

Subdivision (3)(g) of this section states that counties may provide memorials; since this is a public purpose which the county may engage in, the fiscal court may donate money to a private institution for this purpose if it so chooses. OAG 86-23 .

The fiscal court may turn over a water line it owns to a county water district without receiving compensation for it if it believes this to be in the best interest of the county. OAG 86-30 .

A county may acquire comprehensive liability and casualty insurance. OAG 87-20 .

Assumption of the prison function by a county is not consistent with the mandate of Kentucky Constitution vis-a-vis prisoners who have been sentenced to the penitentiary; such responsibility rests with the state. OAG 90-115 .

County would be banned under Ky. Const., § 162 from paying any claim under an agreement or contract for a project involving the leasing of a detention facility (prison) used to house prisoners from outside as well as within the state, as there is no express authority of law for a county’s entry into such endeavor. OAG 90-115 .

Long-term housing of prisoners of the state of Kentucky is a function constitutionally mandated to the state, and the role sought to be assumed by a county in housing not only state prisoners, but prisoners of jurisdictions outside Kentucky, is not provided for by statute and is not a function necessary for operation of the county; accordingly, the county may not lawfully lease and operate a 336-bed detention center or prison for such purpose; such action is not necessary for operation of the county and handling the types of prisoners envisioned under this project is “otherwise provided for” by statute and the Kentucky Constitution. OAG 90-115 .

This section, coupled with the pronouncements of the Supreme Court in Casey County Fiscal Court v. Burke, Ky., 743 S.W.2d 26, 1988 Ky. LEXIS 4 (1988), do not give counties unlimited authority to act in connection with “functional areas” listed in subsection (3) of this section. OAG 90-115 .

When a county of over 30,000 population levies an occupational tax, the county must credit tax payments made to a city; but a county of under 30,000 population levying an identical tax need not extend such a credit. OAG 91-157 .

A donation of water district funds, by a water district created pursuant to KRS Chapter 74, “to civic organizations such as the chamber of commerce or an independent non-profit organization formed for the purpose of attracting business and industry to the county in which the water district operates,” would involve an expenditure inconsistent with the statutory purpose of a water district, and thus cannot be lawfully made. OAG 92-43 .

A fiscal court, pursuant to subdivision (3)(x) of this section, has the authority to appropriate funds to promote economic development in the county, either directly or in cooperation with public or private agencies. A mere “donation” to an entity, such as a chamber of commerce or a non-profit organization formed for the purpose of attracting business and industry to the county directly, without terms or conditions as to its application to promote economic development, is not a proper expenditure pursuant to subdivision (3)(x) of this section. OAG 92-43 .

If the roads or streets of a specific subdivision, although privately owned, are subject to public access, so as to be “public roads” within the meaning of KRS 189.010 (3), applicable speed limit provisions of KRS 189.390 would apply to them, and could be enforced upon them by law enforcement officers; additionally, Fiscal Court could, in the exercise of its police power, and in view of specific provisions of KRS 189.390 and 189.010 provide, by proper ordinance, for speed limits on privately owned subdivision streets generally which are used by the public. OAG 92-67 .

While the county Fiscal Court cannot lawfully enact a license fee uniquely applicable to the operator of a specific incinerator operation, it may enact a license fee pursuant to KRS 68.178(1), generally applicable to off-site waste management facilities in the county. OAG 92-76 .

In order to guard against a claim of arbitrariness, a county ordinance imposing a license fee pursuant to KRS 68.178(1) must be drawn so as to address all off-site waste management facilities in the county, as distinguished from being expressly directed toward a single entity. OAG 92-76 .

The fiscal court may ratify submission of an application for a grant where a grant application (apparently related to ambulance service) was submitted to the Cabinet for Human Resources over the signature of the county judge/executive and the fiscal court, at the time of submission of the application, had not approved such submission, although it later did so since the fiscal courts are authorized to make provision for ambulance service and the county, through its fiscal court, may ratify a contract which it had the power, in the first instance, to make. OAG 92-118 .

Since state statutes and regulations have preempted the field of musseling in Kentucky, county and city local musseling ordinances were invalid. OAG 93-1 .

The county judge/executive, in exercising authority pursuant to KRS 67.090(2), may effectively override an ordinance fixing the dates of the regular term meetings of the fiscal court. OAG 93-22 .

A county road department is prohibited from providing, at public expense, labor necessary to install a culvert to enhance access to private property from a county road. OAG 93-24 .

A fiscal court, assuming funds have been properly budgeted for the purpose, may lawfully approve reimbursement, subject to proper documentation being submitted, of the reasonable expenses for travel, meals, and lodging, actually paid by one elected to a county office, who has not yet assumed such office, where such expenses are immediately incident to attending statutorily provided training for such office. OAG 93-72 .

The specific delegation of authority in subdivisions (3)(a) — (y) of this section constitutionally establishes the broad powers of the counties to deal with solid waste, as well as the conservation, preservation and enhancement of the natural resources of the county. OAG 94-43 .

The General Assembly has delegated to the counties, and through them, to such special districts as are created, broad authority to regulate all aspects of solid waste management and disposal and this authority may be exercised cooperatively by both a county and a special district. However, any regulation or ordinance must not be arbitrary and must also be consistent with state statutes and regulations upon the subject. OAG 94-43 .

Definitions of solid waste contained in KRS 109.012(9) and in regulations adopted by the board of directors of solid waste district which include “any garbage, refuse, sludge and other discarded material,” are broad enough to cover both those parts of solid waste which can be treated or recycled and those which cannot; therefore, the petroleum contaminated soils which were treated by corporation were solid wastes within the meaning of both the definition in KRS Chapter 109 and in the solid waste district regulations. OAG 94-43 .

Where county ordinance provision regulating solid waste was legal under the broad police powers of fiscal court, the fiscal court in such ordinance may prescribe reasonable penalties for a violation of ordinance provisions. OAG 94-43 .

A county fiscal court may act as the non-federal sponser for a federally supported flood control project, a portion of which will be carried out within the incorporated area of a sixth class within the county. OAG 96-30 .

Fiscal courts may generally regulate water, sewer, and cable television services in the county, but are restricted from governing the use of gas or electricity. OAG 02-1 .

Since ordinances banning pain clinics are not the subject of an express power granted to local governmental units by the General Assembly, and infringe upon the legislative policy embodied in statutes regulating the practice of medicine and distribution of controlled substances, such ordinances are beyond the legitimate authority of a unit of local government. OAG 11-003 , 2011 Ky. AG LEXIS 54.

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Jails, operation, management, funding, and construction, KRS 441.025 to 441.135 , KRS 441.215 to 441.255 , KRS 441.420 to 441.450 , KRS 441.605 to 441.695 .

Journal of Natural Resources & Environmental Law.

Articles, Historic Districts: A Look at the Mechanics in Kentucky and a Comparative Study of State Enabling Legislation, 11 J. Nat. Resources & Envtl. L. 229 (1995-96).

Kentucky Bench & Bar.

Johnson, Reforming Kentucky’s Jails, Vol. 46, No. 3, July, 1982, Ky. Bench & Bar 14.

Kentucky Law Journal.

Kentucky Law Survey, Morris, Municipal Law, 70 Ky. L.J. 287 (1981-82).

Snell, A Plea for a Comprehensive Liability Statute, 74 Ky. L.J. 521 (1985-86).

Cox, What May States Do About Out-of-State Waste in Light of Recent Supreme Court Decisions Applying the Dormant Commerce Clause? Kentucky As Case Study in the Waste Wars, 83 Ky. L.J. 551 (1994-95).

Northern Kentucky Law Review.

Notes, County Government — Home Rule —The General Assembly Must Grant Governmental Powers to Fiscal Courts “With the Precision of a Rifle Shot and Not with the Casualness of a Shotgun Blast” — Fiscal Court v. City of Louisville, 559 S.W.2d 478, 1977 Ky. LEXIS 554 ( Ky. 1977 ), 5 N. Ky. L. Rev. 107 (1978).

67.0831. Fiscal courts to provide facilities to hold children. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 423, § 181, effective July 1, 1987; 1988, ch. 350, § 137, effective April 10, 1988) was repealed by Acts 2014, ch. 132, § 56, effective July 14, 2014.

67.084. Authorization for ordinance enabling county to qualify for flood insurance.

The fiscal court of any county may promulgate, pass and implement ordinances to satisfy state and federal regulations so as to qualify said county for flood insurance subsidized by the United States of America.

History. Enact. Acts 1978, ch. 14, § 1, effective June 17, 1978.

Opinions of Attorney General.

A county fiscal court may act as the non-federal sponser for a federally supported flood control project, a portion of which will be carried out within the incorporated area of a sixth class within the county. OAG 96-30 .

67.0841. Effect of repeal of statute granting permissive power to counties.

The repeal of any statute granting permissive power or authority to counties shall not be construed to limit any power or authority which may be exercised by a fiscal court pursuant to KRS 67.083 .

History. Enact. Acts 1978, ch. 118, § 14, effective June 17, 1978.

67.085. Condemnation for county purposes.

Whenever the fiscal court of any county deems it to be in the best interest of the county to acquire the fee simple title to any real property within such county for any administrative or governmental purpose in addition to those now provided for by law and the fiscal court is unable to contract with the owner of the land, required for such purpose, for its purchase or to acquire the same by gift, the land may be condemned under the procedure set forth in the Eminent Domain Act of Kentucky, and said fiscal court may appropriate funds to pay for said real property.

History. Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 94; 1976, ch. 140, § 23.

Compiler’s Notes.

The Eminent Domain Act of Kentucky is compiled as KRS 416.540 416.680 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

Citizens Fidelity Bank & Trust Co. v. Jefferson County, 283 S.W.2d 1, 1955 Ky. LEXIS 280 ( Ky. 1955 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

This section was intended to embrace the acquisition of land only and not airspace easements. OAG 67-53 .

As long as a county will not use railroad property in such fashion as to materially impair its use by the railroad, there is nothing to prevent the condemnation of the property for the purpose of establishing a county park. OAG 76-203 .

A fiscal court may condemn land to establish and operate a county cemetery. OAG 79-18 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Condemnation for any public project, KRS 58.140 .

67.090. Place of holding fiscal court — Terms.

  1. The fiscal court of each county shall hold its sessions at the county seat or at other county government centers within the county as authorized by the fiscal court. On the seventh day prior to any meeting of the fiscal court at a site other than the county seat, the clerk of the fiscal court shall, for one (1) day, publish notice of the meeting in a newspaper as provided by KRS Chapter 424.
  2. The fiscal court shall hold a regular term each month, which shall continue until the business of the court is completed. The county judge/executive may, by an order of record, fix the dates for the commencement of the regular terms.
  3. The county judge/executive may call a special term of the fiscal court for the transaction of any business of which that court has jurisdiction. If a special term is necessary and the county judge/executive is unable, or refuses to act, a majority of the members of the fiscal court may call the special term.

History. 1838, 1839: amend. Acts 1954, ch. 37; 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 20, § 6, effective January 2, 1978; 1978, ch. 390, § 1, effective June 17, 1978; 1988, ch. 328, § 1, effective July 15, 1988.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. In General.

The fiscal court can only act at stated or called public meetings. McDonald's Adm'x v. Franklin County, 125 Ky. 205 , 100 S.W. 861, 30 Ky. L. Rptr. 1245 , 1907 Ky. LEXIS 271 ( Ky. 1907 ).

2. Notice

Challenge to a fiscal court’s adoption of ordinances establishing regular meetings was rejected because appellants failed to present any evidence that the ordinances were not properly drafted or that the county did not comply with the notice requirements of KRS 67.090(1). Moreover, because it was determined that Campbell County, Kentucky, had two county seats, publication was not required. Nolan v. Campbell County Fiscal Court, 2010 Ky. App. LEXIS 217 (Ky. Ct. App. Nov. 24, 2010).

3. Compensation of Clerk.

There is no provision for paying county clerk for making orders calling terms of fiscal court. Mills v. Lantrip, 170 Ky. 81 , 185 S.W. 514, 1916 Ky. LEXIS 21 ( Ky. 1916 ).

4. Special Term.

Where fiscal court had six (6) members, including county judge (now county judge/executive), three (3) members had no authority to call a special term, and could not issue warrants of arrest to compel the attendance of absent members. Stephens v. Wilson, 115 Ky. 27 , 72 S.W. 336, 24 Ky. L. Rptr. 1832 , 1903 Ky. LEXIS 67 ( Ky. 1903 ).

Where majority of members of fiscal court called special term, but did not give notice to other members, actions at such special term were void. Morgan v. Champion, 150 Ky. 396 , 150 S.W. 517, 1912 Ky. LEXIS 911 ( Ky. 1912 ).

Where record of meeting recited that it was a special term, and the day of the meeting was not the first Tuesday of the month, it would be assumed that the meeting was a special term, although the record showed no order calling the special term. Meadors v. Williams, 163 Ky. 398 , 173 S.W. 1114, 1915 Ky. LEXIS 240 ( Ky. 1915 ).

5. — Notice.

In order to give validity to the action of a fiscal court at a special term, each member of the fiscal court must have personal notice of the time when the term is to be held, if it is practicable to give such notice. But if all members are present at the term, the failure to give notice is remedied. Meadors v. Williams, 163 Ky. 398 , 173 S.W. 1114, 1915 Ky. LEXIS 240 ( Ky. 1915 ).

Each member of fiscal court must be notified of time and place of special term. Combs v. Center, 234 Ky. 364 , 28 S.W.2d 37, 1930 Ky. LEXIS 186 ( Ky. 1930 ).

Testimony of county judge that he placed in mail notices of special term, addressed to members of fiscal court, raised presumption that notices were received, but presumption was rebutted by testimony of members that they did not receive notices. Harlan County v. Howard, 246 Ky. 791 , 56 S.W.2d 365, 1932 Ky. LEXIS 828 ( Ky. 1932 ).

Where two (2) members of fiscal court were not given notice of special term, proceedings at that term were void. Harlan County v. Howard, 246 Ky. 791 , 56 S.W.2d 365, 1932 Ky. LEXIS 828 ( Ky. 1932 ).

6. — Power to Call.

It is the county judge (now county judge/executive), and not the county court, who has the power to call a special term of the fiscal court. Combs v. Center, 234 Ky. 364 , 28 S.W.2d 37, 1930 Ky. LEXIS 186 ( Ky. 1930 ).

7. — Order Calling.

The order of the county judge (now county judge/executive) calling a special term need not be entered of record or signed by the judge. Combs v. Center, 234 Ky. 364 , 28 S.W.2d 37, 1930 Ky. LEXIS 186 ( Ky. 1930 ).

8. — Request.

Failure of county board of education to file budget and request for tax levy with fiscal court before regular April term of court, as directed by statute, did not operate to forfeit right of board to file same at a later date and request that a special term of the fiscal court be called to make the tax levy. Fiscal Court of Cumberland County v. Board of Education, 191 Ky. 263 , 230 S.W. 57, 1921 Ky. LEXIS 311 ( Ky. 1921 ).

9. — Mandamus to Compel.

County board of education was entitled to writ of mandamus to compel fiscal court and county judge to call special term of fiscal court to accept school budget and make necessary tax levy. Fiscal Court of Cumberland County v. Board of Education, 191 Ky. 263 , 230 S.W. 57, 1921 Ky. LEXIS 311 ( Ky. 1921 ).

10. — Levy of Taxes.

Fiscal court is not required to make county tax levy at a regular term of the court, but may do so at a special term. Pulaski County v. Watson, 106 Ky. 500 , 50 S.W. 861, 21 Ky. L. Rptr. 61 , 1899 Ky. LEXIS 69 ( Ky. 1899 ).

11. — Establishment of Health Department Void.

A county health department can be established only by a resolution adopted at a regular term of the fiscal court. Where such a resolution was adopted at a special term, the fact that subsequent orders making appropriations for the health department were made at regular terms did not operate to validate the attempted resolution of establishment. Estill County v. Noland, 292 Ky. 698 , 167 S.W.2d 707, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 146 ( Ky. 1942 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

The court itself, composed of the magistrates and the county judge (now county judge/executive), has the sole authority to designate by proper order or resolution the place for holding the sessions of the court. OAG 65-872 .

Where the county judge (now county judge/executive) with two (2) magistrates present out of four (4) at a continued meeting of the regular term appointed a county treasurer for the next term and a proper order was entered in connection with the appointment, the action was legal. OAG 69-246 .

An out-going county judge (now county judge/executive) could legally call a session of the fiscal court for the last day of the year for the purpose of paying certain bills outstanding against the county. OAG 69-675 .

It is within the discretion of the majority of the fiscal court to call a meeting once a week to conduct actual and necessary county business, but these meetings cannot be legally used merely to increase the compensation of the magistrates for attending meetings. OAG 71-149 .

Under this section the county judge (now county judge/executive), or a majority of the fiscal court in the applicable instance, may call special sessions for the transaction of any business of which that court has jurisdiction. However, this section contemplates actual and necessary county business. The calling of special meetings cannot legally be used merely to increase the compensation of the magistrates for attending the meeting and, if no necessary business is transacted at such meetings, consideration should be given to taking appropriate action to contest the compensation payments to the members of the fiscal court for their attending such meetings. OAG 71-149 .

In a real and actual emergency situation where there is an obstruction on or damage to a road, an emergency meeting of the fiscal court could be called and would be valid if every member received actual notice of the meeting and attended the meeting with a signed waiver of the reasonable notice requirement. OAG 71-451 .

As the fiscal court meets on the first and third Wednesday of each month and the justices of the peace, county judge (now county judge/executive) and commissioners, as members of the fiscal court, should hold over their office until the newly elected members take office on January 7, 1974, the incumbent fiscal court could have a meeting on January 2, 1974, the first Monday of the month, before the newly elected members of the court take office. OAG 73-866 .

In a special session the fiscal court can transact any business of which that body has jurisdiction, regardless of whether the special session was called by the county judge or a majority of the members of the court. OAG 74-70 .

The county judge (now county judge/executive) may enter an order in the fiscal court order book establishing the beginning and ending dates and months of the two (2) general terms, and he may also direct that sessions of the general terms be held on a certain day for each of the calendar year months. OAG 75-44 .

The fiscal court may meet at night if, after considering all the circumstances involved including the convenience or inconvenience to the fiscal court members, the time selected is reasonable. OAG 75-280 .

If a majority of the fiscal court feels that a special term is necessary and they call up the county judge/executive to call a special term, and he either is unable to call the special term or he refuses to call the special term, then under the statute a majority of the members of the fiscal court may call the special term; however, in order to give validity to the actions of the fiscal court in such special term, each member of the fiscal court, including the county judge/executive, must have personal notice of the time and place when and where the meeting is to be held, if it is practical to give such notice, but if all members are present at such special term, the failure to give notice is remedied. OAG 78-252 .

The fiscal court may meet at night if, after considering all the circumstances involved, the time selected is reasonable. OAG 78-252 .

The fiscal court can hold its meetings in the courthouse in the county seat or it may hold its meetings in some other building located in the county seat, or it may hold its meetings outside of the county seat upon notice as prescribed by this section. OAG 78-587 .

Any part of a county administrative code requiring the preparation of an agenda for notice to the fiscal court, news media and the public in general is in conflict with this section and is inoperative. OAG 79-121 .

Except where the fiscal court meets at a site other than the county seat, no newspaper publication by way of newspaper advertisement or other formal newspaper notice is required in the holding of such meetings. OAG 79-121 .

There is no statute requiring the publication of the agenda of a proposed meeting of fiscal court in the local or other newspapers as a paid item of advertising of the kind envisioned in KRS Chapter 424, nor is the fiscal court limited at the meeting to any precisely formulated agenda. OAG 79-121 .

There is no suggestion that the county judge/executive, in his notice of special sessions, describe with particularity and specificity the precise subjects to be dealt with in the meeting. OAG 79-121 .

The county judge/executive cannot recess rather than adjourn a fiscal court meeting in order to avoid a special meeting being called in the interim because the fiscal court can only act as a body, and the county judge/executive, alone, has no authority to recess the fiscal court. OAG 80-412 .

The language of KRS 68.010 providing for the appointment of a treasurer at the “regular June term” of fiscal court does not mesh with this section, dealing with terms of the fiscal court, which requires a fiscal court to hold two (2) regular terms per year, one of which must be in October and, further, that where the county judge/executive does not fix the terms, the first regular term must commence on the first Tuesday in April and the second regular term on the first Tuesday of October. However, the making of the appointment on June 3, as a special term, is substantial compliance with KRS 68.010 . OAG 83-475 .

The county judge/executive, in exercising authority pursuant to subsection (2) of this section, may effectively override an ordinance fixing the dates of the regular term meetings of the fiscal court. OAG 93-22 .

Although the county judge/executive has the unilateral authority to fix the dates of commencement of the regular terms of the fiscal court, no statute expressly provides the unilateral authority to designate the beginning time of regular meetings of the fiscal court; however, if the fiscal court properly passes a resolution providing, for example, that the regular term meetings of the fiscal court shall begin at 7:30 p.m., there being no statute to the contrary, it would be the duty of the county judge/executive to ensure the execution of such resolution. OAG 95-26 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Fiscal court composed of county judge and commissioners, how special session called, KRS 67.070 .

ALR

Place of holding sessions of trial court as affecting validity of its proceedings. 18 A.L.R.2d 572.

67.100. Records of fiscal court.

  1. The fiscal court is a court of record. Minutes of the proceedings of each meeting shall be prepared and submitted for approval at the next succeeding meeting.
  2. Every official action of the fiscal court shall be made a part of the permanent records of the county.
  3. The county budget ordinance shall be indexed so that each index list covers one (1) fiscal year and shall be listed in such index no later than thirty (30) days after passage and any required approval.
  4. County ordinances other than the county budget ordinance shall be indexed in a composite index of all county ordinances in force, and shall be listed in the index no later than thirty (30) days after passage and any required approval.
  5. A copy of all records required by this section shall be kept in the office of the county clerk.

History. 1838, 1842, 1843: amend. Acts 1978, ch. 118, § 8, effective January 1, 1979.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Construction.

This section is mandatory. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Bullitt County, 247 Ky. 489 , 57 S.W.2d 506, 1933 Ky. LEXIS 430 ( Ky. 1933 ).

2. Record.

The fiscal court can speak only by its records. Danville, Dix River & L. Turnpike Road Co. v. Lincoln County Fiscal Court, 77 S.W. 379, 25 Ky. L. Rptr. 1162 (1903); Morgan v. Champion, 150 Ky. 396 , 150 S.W. 517, 1912 Ky. LEXIS 911 ( Ky. 1912 ); Fox v. Lantrip, 162 Ky. 178 , 172 S.W. 133, 1915 Ky. LEXIS 38 ( Ky. 1915 ); Meadors v. Williams, 163 Ky. 398 , 173 S.W. 1114, 1915 Ky. LEXIS 240 ( Ky. 1915 ); Duff v. Knott County, 238 Ky. 71 , 36 S.W.2d 870, 1931 Ky. LEXIS 194 ( Ky. 1931 ); Farmer v. Marr, 238 Ky. 417 , 38 S.W.2d 209, 1931 Ky. LEXIS 248 ( Ky. 1931 ); Baker v. Tedders, 244 Ky. 736 , 52 S.W.2d 715, 1932 Ky. LEXIS 511 ( Ky. 1932 ); Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Bullitt County, 247 Ky. 489 , 57 S.W.2d 506, 1933 Ky. LEXIS 430 ( Ky. 1933 ).

Where there was no record of the fiscal court of employment of deceased there was no employment as there was no action of the fiscal court and fact that order directing payment had been signed by judge and other magistrates was of no effect for it was not signed by them acting as the fiscal court. McDonald's Adm'x v. Franklin County, 125 Ky. 205 , 100 S.W. 861, 30 Ky. L. Rptr. 1245 , 1907 Ky. LEXIS 271 ( Ky. 1907 ).

Where record of meeting of fiscal court recites that it was a “special, called term,” it will be assumed that the record is correct. Meadors v. Williams, 163 Ky. 398 , 173 S.W. 1114, 1915 Ky. LEXIS 240 ( Ky. 1915 ).

A person dealing with the fiscal court must look to its orders as the source of his authority or right. Farmer v. Marr, 238 Ky. 417 , 38 S.W.2d 209, 1931 Ky. LEXIS 248 ( Ky. 1931 ).

Unlike the law applicable to ordinary commercial transactions between individuals, a fiscal court cannot become liable under an implied contract; rather than basing an agreement on past actions, a fiscal court can be legally bound only through its records. Boyd Fiscal Court v. Ashland Public Library Bd. of Trustees, 634 S.W.2d 417, 1982 Ky. LEXIS 261 ( Ky. 1982 ).

The mere act of budgeting funds for a specific purpose does not create a contractual obligation on the county, nor does acceptance of benefits by the fiscal court create a contract unless the acceptance is accompanied by an effective ratification in the form of an official order. Boyd Fiscal Court v. Ashland Public Library Bd. of Trustees, 634 S.W.2d 417, 1982 Ky. LEXIS 261 ( Ky. 1982 ).

Where fiscal court unilaterally budgeted $55,000 for fiscal year 1978-1979 to be used for library bookmobile services, without renewing an expired contract covering same, and made five monthly payments to the library, but thereafter decided to discontinue bookmobile service due to a shortage of funds and more compelling needs, and where the library knew of such decision but continued to operate the bookmobile until the end of the fiscal year, the fiscal court’s five payments did not create a contract by ratification for the remaining seven months of the fiscal year in the absence of an official order to that effect. Boyd Fiscal Court v. Ashland Public Library Bd. of Trustees, 634 S.W.2d 417, 1982 Ky. LEXIS 261 ( Ky. 1982 ).

3. — Failure to Appear on Record.

Where there was no record of fiscal court employing person as agent of county to handle bonds, attempted employment was wholly void. McDonald's Adm'x v. Franklin County, 125 Ky. 205 , 100 S.W. 861, 30 Ky. L. Rptr. 1245 , 1907 Ky. LEXIS 271 ( Ky. 1907 ).

Where order of fiscal court recited that two (2) members of fiscal court voted in favor of certain proposition, and that remaining four members did not vote, those who did not vote could not be treated as impliedly voting in favor of the proposition in the absence of a showing in the record that they were offered an opportunity to vote in the negative. Morgan v. Champion, 150 Ky. 396 , 150 S.W. 517, 1912 Ky. LEXIS 911 ( Ky. 1912 ).

Where approval of contractor’s bond was required to be by fiscal court, such approval must appear on records of court, and court could not delegate power of approval to another; but ineffectual attempt to delegate power was rendered valid by later order of fiscal court approving bond. O'Kelly v. Lockwood, 154 Ky. 544 , 157 S.W. 1096, 1913 Ky. LEXIS 117 ( Ky. 1913 ).

4. — Alteration or Correction.

Affidavits of members of fiscal court as to what happened when proposition was submitted to a vote could not be admitted to contradict to records of the court, or to supply a deficiency in the records. Morgan v. Champion, 150 Ky. 396 , 150 S.W. 517, 1912 Ky. LEXIS 911 ( Ky. 1912 ).

5. — Use.

Where records of fiscal court indicated that named person was purchaser of county bond issue, such person could not maintain that he was in fact agent employed by county to sell bonds. Duff v. Knott County, 238 Ky. 71 , 36 S.W.2d 870, 1931 Ky. LEXIS 194 ( Ky. 1931 ).

6. — Parol Evidence.

Where person contracting with fiscal court was present when order setting forth contract was read and approved by the fiscal court, and signed by the judge, he could not later claim that verbal agreement with fiscal court prior to signing of order contained conditions not set forth in order. Danville, Dix River & L. Turnpike Road Co. v. Lincoln County Fiscal Court, 77 S.W. 379, 25 Ky. L. Rptr. 1162 (1903).

Parol evidence is not competent to show that the court did something not shown by its records, or that it did not do something which is shown by its records. Morgan v. Champion, 150 Ky. 396 , 150 S.W. 517, 1912 Ky. LEXIS 911 ( Ky. 1912 ).

7. Minutes.

Where minutes recite that county judge was present, it is not necessary that his name be set forth. Fox v. Lantrip, 169 Ky. 759 , 185 S.W. 136, 1916 Ky. LEXIS 773 ( Ky. 1916 ).

Although minutes did not recite formally that certain members of court were present, entry in minutes that certain motion was made by one member and seconded by another, naming each, was sufficient to show that they were present. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Bullitt County, 247 Ky. 489 , 57 S.W.2d 506, 1933 Ky. LEXIS 430 ( Ky. 1933 ).

Minute to effect that it was “moved and seconded” that certain contract “be and is approved and ordered to be recorded,” followed by copy of contract, was sufficient to evidence that motion was passed. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Bullitt County, 247 Ky. 489 , 57 S.W.2d 506, 1933 Ky. LEXIS 430 ( Ky. 1933 ).

8. Reading and Signing of Minutes or Orders.

Where county attorney questioned validity of orders of fiscal court allowing certain claims, on ground that fraud had been practiced in that they were not read out before their allowance or as part of the minutes of the court, proper procedure was to apply to fiscal court to vacate orders upon grounds allowed by former civil rule, and in case of refusal by fiscal court to vacate orders, to appeal to the Circuit Court. Kenton County by Hanlon v. Jameson, 150 Ky. 440 , 150 S.W. 528, 1912 Ky. LEXIS 916 ( Ky. 1912 ).

The fiscal court may ratify a contract that it might lawfully have made in the first instance, but the ratification can be only by order duly entered and signed. Duff v. Knott County, 238 Ky. 71 , 36 S.W.2d 870, 1931 Ky. LEXIS 194 ( Ky. 1931 ).

The records of the fiscal court do not become binding until they are signed by the judge. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Bullitt County, 247 Ky. 489 , 57 S.W.2d 506, 1933 Ky. LEXIS 430 ( Ky. 1933 ).

An order of appointment by a fiscal court is not valid until signed. Madison County Fiscal Court v. Cotton, 273 Ky. 508 , 117 S.W.2d 201, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 673 ( Ky. 1938 ).

Order of fiscal court calling election on proposed bond issue for hospital, which was duly entered in order book and signed as required by this section was a valid “order” and not a resolution notwithstanding that it used the word “resolved” rather than “ordered.” Schumer v. Kenton County, 306 Ky. 667 , 208 S.W.2d 960, 1948 Ky. LEXIS 625 ( Ky. 1948 ).

9. — Time and Manner.

This section does not require that the proceedings of each calendar day be separately read and signed; the court may treat the entire time it is in session during any term as one day, and make one order of adjournment at the conclusion, preceding which the minutes of the preceding calendar days are read and signed. Commonwealth use of Clay County v. Howard, 99 Ky. 542 , 36 S.W. 556, 18 Ky. L. Rptr. 412 , 1896 Ky. LEXIS 116 ( Ky. 1896 ); Walker v. Fox, 216 Ky. 33 , 287 S.W. 228, 1926 Ky. LEXIS 841 ( Ky. 1926 ); Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Bullitt County, 247 Ky. 489 , 57 S.W.2d 506, 1933 Ky. LEXIS 430 ( Ky. 1933 ).

Where several meetings of fiscal court are held on different days, but with no intervening adjournment, a signing of the minutes on the last day will be sufficient, but in approving the signing of the minutes with respect to any one of the preceding days only those members of the court who were present on that day may participate. A member who was not present on the day a proposition was voted upon may not move for reconsideration of the vote on the proposition. Walker v. Fox, 216 Ky. 33 , 287 S.W. 228, 1926 Ky. LEXIS 841 ( Ky. 1926 ).

The orders of the fiscal court, in order to be valid, must be read and signed as required by this section. Mere reading and signing minute book containing notation that various orders were entered is not sufficient. Vansant v. Watson, 230 Ky. 316 , 19 S.W.2d 994, 1929 Ky. LEXIS 89 ( Ky. 1929 ).

Where order was noted in minutes of day on which order was made, but minutes were not signed on that day, and order was written out by clerk and signed by judge on following day, none of the other members of the fiscal court being then present, the order was not valid. Harlan County v. Howard, 246 Ky. 791 , 56 S.W.2d 365, 1932 Ky. LEXIS 828 ( Ky. 1932 ).

There is no requirement that each separate order by signed at the end. It is sufficient if the orders of one session are signed before adjournment by one signature at the bottom of the order book. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Bullitt County, 247 Ky. 489 , 57 S.W.2d 506, 1933 Ky. LEXIS 430 ( Ky. 1933 ).

It is within the contemplation of this section that individual orders may be separately signed, and it is not necessary that the record of all proceedings of a session be cumulated and signed as a single unit. Cummings v. Pendleton County Board of Education, 305 S.W.2d 314, 1957 Ky. LEXIS 306 ( Ky. 1957 ).

Where the order of the county fiscal court dissolving a county public library district was adopted in full compliance with the requirements of this statute except for the failure of the record to recite the names of the persons by whom the court was held and the county judge (now county judge/executive) subsequently signed the order book, not in the presence of the other members, in which the names of the persons by whom the court was held were set forth, there was no failure to comply with his statute and the effective date of the resolution was the date the book was signed. Graves County Public Library Dist. Board v. Graves County Fiscal Court, 479 S.W.2d 27, 1972 Ky. LEXIS 290 ( Ky. 1972 ).

Where a resolution dissolving a library district was adopted by a county fiscal court on May 18, 1971, but the resolution was not entered in the order book or signed by the county judge (now county judge/executive) until May 21, 1971, the appeal time started running from the date the resolution was signed and entered. Graves County Public Library Dist. Board v. Graves County Fiscal Court, 479 S.W.2d 27, 1972 Ky. LEXIS 290 ( Ky. 1972 ).

For appeal-time purposes the effective date of fiscal court orders or resolutions was the date on which the requirements of this section were completed. Graves County Public Library Dist. Board v. Graves County Fiscal Court, 479 S.W.2d 27, 1972 Ky. LEXIS 290 ( Ky. 1972 ).

10. — Improper Signing.

Where order was made at meeting of fiscal court, but was not entered in records or signed on that day, signing of order by county judge (now county judge/executive) at an adjourned meeting, out of the presence of the members who were present when the order was made, did not validate the order. Howard v. Howard, 236 Ky. 557 , 33 S.W.2d 635, 1930 Ky. LEXIS 803 ( Ky. 1930 ).

11. — Nunc Pro Tunc Orders.

The fiscal court may, by proper action, enter an order nunc pro tunc, but where order of fiscal court is not read and signed at meeting at which it was made, subsequent signing by county judge (now county judge/executive) will not make it effective as a nunc pro tunc order. Vansant v. Watson, 230 Ky. 316 , 19 S.W.2d 994, 1929 Ky. LEXIS 89 ( Ky. 1929 ).

12. — Presumption.

Where minutes of meeting of fiscal court were signed by presiding judge, the fact that the minutes of a later meeting recited that the minutes of the previous meeting were read and approved would not rebut the presumption that the minutes of the first meeting were properly read and approved at the first meeting. Fox v. Lantrip, 169 Ky. 759 , 185 S.W. 136, 1916 Ky. LEXIS 773 ( Ky. 1916 ).

If the minutes show by whom the court was held, and are signed by the presiding judge, it will be presumed that the minutes were publicly read and that the judge signed them with the approval of those who were present when the court was held. Fox v. Lantrip, 169 Ky. 759 , 185 S.W. 136, 1916 Ky. LEXIS 773 ( Ky. 1916 ); Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Bullitt County, 247 Ky. 489 , 57 S.W.2d 506, 1933 Ky. LEXIS 430 ( Ky. 1933 ).

The presumption that minutes were publicly read and approved cannot be rebutted by parol evidence. Fox v. Lantrip, 169 Ky. 759 , 185 S.W. 136, 1916 Ky. LEXIS 773 ( Ky. 1916 ); Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Bullitt County, 247 Ky. 489 , 57 S.W.2d 506, 1933 Ky. LEXIS 430 ( Ky. 1933 ).

If the minutes and the record of the proceedings of a number of separate meetings held on different days without a sine die adjournment are legally approved and signed by the presiding officer at the last meeting, it will be conclusively presumed that the minutes were properly read, and such procedure is a sufficient compliance with this section. Walker v. Fox, 216 Ky. 33 , 287 S.W. 228, 1926 Ky. LEXIS 841 ( Ky. 1926 ).

Where exhibits in suit did not show whether unsigned order was entire record of session of fiscal court at which it was made, it would be assumed that it was not, and that the county judge (now county judge/executive) properly signed the order book before the adjournment of the session. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Bullitt County, 247 Ky. 489 , 57 S.W.2d 506, 1933 Ky. LEXIS 430 ( Ky. 1933 ).

13. — Failure, Effect.

Order of fiscal court electing appellant treasurer of county was null and void because it was not signed by county judge (now county judge/executive) as chairman of the court as required by this section and thus appellant was only a de facto officer for the period he served and such order could not be validated by a nunc pro tunc signing after term at which it was made. Saylor v. Robins, 304 Ky. 34 , 199 S.W.2d 725, 1947 Ky. LEXIS 574 ( Ky. 1947 ).

Where no order or minute of any order of the fiscal court was signed by the county judge (now county judge/executive) as chairman of fiscal court as required by this section, order of court electing appellant treasurer of county was illegal and void. Saylor v. Robins, 304 Ky. 34 , 199 S.W.2d 725, 1947 Ky. LEXIS 574 ( Ky. 1947 ).

14. — Sufficiency.

If minutes recite the names of the justices who were present at the session, and the fact that the county judge (now county judge/executive) was present, it is not necessary that the minutes state that those present “held” the court. Fox v. Lantrip, 169 Ky. 759 , 185 S.W. 136, 1916 Ky. LEXIS 773 ( Ky. 1916 ).

Where memorandum was entered in minute book to effect that order was made for bond election, with notation that order would be later written out, signing of minutes was not sufficient to validate order, since memorandum did not give sufficient information to indicate what order contained. Vansant v. Watson, 230 Ky. 316 , 19 S.W.2d 994, 1929 Ky. LEXIS 89 ( Ky. 1929 ).

Until the record required by the statute was made, the resolution was an incompleted act and not appealable. Graves County Public Library Dist. Board v. Graves County Fiscal Court, 479 S.W.2d 27, 1972 Ky. LEXIS 290 ( Ky. 1972 ).

15. — Adjournment Without, Effect.

If fiscal court adjourns at end of day’s session, without reading and signing minutes, orders purported to be made at such session cannot be validated by reading and signing at later session in same term. Fox v. Lantrip, 162 Ky. 178 , 172 S.W. 133, 1915 Ky. LEXIS 38 ( Ky. 1915 ).

16. — Notation by County Clerk.

Where minutes of proceedings of session of fiscal court were not read or signed, and did not show who was present, mere notation by county clerk in minutes that fiscal court had ordered that salary of school superintendent be fixed was of no effect. Subsequent entry of order in full in minutes of later session in same term was also of no effect, where such minutes were not read or signed. Fox v. Lantrip, 162 Ky. 178 , 172 S.W. 133, 1915 Ky. LEXIS 38 ( Ky. 1915 ).

17. — Fraud.

If fiscal court suppressed reading of minutes showing allowance of certain claims, such conduct would be fraud justifying setting aside orders of allowance at a subsequent term. Kenton County by Hanlon v. Jameson, 150 Ky. 440 , 150 S.W. 528, 1912 Ky. LEXIS 916 ( Ky. 1912 ).

18. — Memorandum of Order.

Where fiscal court made order calling election on bond issue, but minutes of meeting at which order was made contained only a memorandum as to order, and order was not entered in order book until a later date, signing of order book on such later date did not validate order nunc pro tunc. Vansant v. Watson, 230 Ky. 316 , 19 S.W.2d 994, 1929 Ky. LEXIS 89 ( Ky. 1929 ).

19. — Order Book not Required.

This section does not require the keeping of an order book, but only requires that orders be read and signed in the presence of the members of the court; thus individual orders may be separately signed for it is not necessary that the record of all proceedings of a session be cumulated and signed as a single unit. Cummings v. Pendleton County Board of Education, 305 S.W.2d 314, 1957 Ky. LEXIS 306 ( Ky. 1957 ).

Where order calling for election on special school building fund tax was approved, read and signed in the presence of the members of the fiscal court on May 10 and was entered in order book but order book was not signed by the judge in the presence of the fiscal court until August 11, some three months after the election, such order was valid, for this section requires only that the orders be read and signed in the presence of the members of the fiscal court and does not require the keeping of an order book. Cummings v. Pendleton County Board of Education, 305 S.W.2d 314, 1957 Ky. LEXIS 306 ( Ky. 1957 ).

20. — Direct Attack.

Action to annul order of fiscal court calling election on bond issue and all subsequent proceedings under such order was a direct attack upon the validity of the order, in which parol evidence was admissible to show that order was not signed at meeting at which it was entered. Vansant v. Watson, 230 Ky. 316 , 19 S.W.2d 994, 1929 Ky. LEXIS 89 ( Ky. 1929 ).

21. — Collateral Attack.

An alleged error in an order of the fiscal court cannot be shown by parol evidence in a collateral action. Grayson County v. Rogers, 122 S.W. 866 ( Ky. 1909 ).

Fiscal court records cannot be impeached, contradicted or varied by parol evidence in a collateral proceeding, if the records are fair and regular on their face. Kenton County by Hanlon v. Jameson, 150 Ky. 440 , 150 S.W. 528, 1912 Ky. LEXIS 916 ( Ky. 1912 ); Fox v. Lantrip, 169 Ky. 759 , 185 S.W. 136, 1916 Ky. LEXIS 773 ( Ky. 1916 ); Vansant v. Watson, 230 Ky. 316 , 19 S.W.2d 994, 1929 Ky. LEXIS 89 ( Ky. 1929 ).

An order of a fiscal court allowing claims of several persons, even though invalid because not read or signed by the county judge (now county judge/executive), could not be collaterally attacked in an action to enjoin a particular claimant from attempting to enforce his claim. Hoskins v. Asher, 274 Ky. 107 , 118 S.W.2d 128, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 222 ( Ky. 1938 ).

22. Act of Court.

A mere meeting together of the persons composing the membership of the fiscal court, and determining in parol what they are to do and not to do, is not an act of the court. Fox v. Lantrip, 162 Ky. 178 , 172 S.W. 133, 1915 Ky. LEXIS 38 ( Ky. 1915 ).

23. Alteration or Correction of Minutes or Orders.

Unless some valid grounds or reasons exist to the contrary, the fiscal court has jurisdiction over its orders and can alter and correct them, not only to conform to the facts, but also to conform to the law measuring the rights, powers and procedure of such courts. Howard v. Howard, 236 Ky. 557 , 33 S.W.2d 635, 1930 Ky. LEXIS 803 ( Ky. 1930 ).

Where order that authorized election on a special school building fund tax was read and signed in the presence of the fiscal court on May 11 but did not recite names of the persons by whom court was held, subsequent signing of order on August 11 some three months after election setting forth names of persons by whom court was held on that day had the effect of supplying omission and made the order valid as of the date it was approved. Cummings v. Pendleton County Board of Education, 305 S.W.2d 314, 1957 Ky. LEXIS 306 ( Ky. 1957 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

The fiscal court cannot validly pass orders or resolutions by secret vote of the members. OAG 65-517 .

Where the minutes of the fiscal court meeting showed the county judge (now county judge/executive) voted “no,” and the record did not indicate that his vote was recorded outside of the meeting, the “no” vote was valid. OAG 68-122 .

Where the fiscal court meets on a regular monthly day, unless there are intervening days of meetings, the adjournment is final and the minutes must be read, signed, and approved prior to such final adjournment. OAG 70-69 .

If the provisions of this section were not complied with, an attempted “meeting” of the fiscal court was not a valid one. OAG 70-689 .

The per diem compensation of magistrates of the fiscal court under this section contemplates a valid meeting. OAG 70-689 .

Where a meeting of the fiscal court did not comply with the provisions of this section, the magistrates were not entitled to per diem under KRS 64.530 . OAG 70-689 .

This section requires the presence of either the county clerk or an authorized deputy clerk at the official meetings of the fiscal court. OAG 71-77 .

Meetings of the fiscal court, during which county business may be transacted, must be public and open for all to attend. OAG 71-278 .

There is no authority that would allow the fiscal court to pass on any question by secret ballot. OAG 71-278 .

The county judge (now county judge/executive) has no authority to withhold funds relating to the upkeep and maintenance of county roads as the fiscal court must speak through its records and not through the mere verbal assertions or unilateral actions of one or more of its membership and, although the county judge (now county judge/executive) is the presiding officer of the fiscal court, he has no authority to act individually or unilaterally in connection with the subject affairs of the county. OAG 73-132 .

Since this section implicitly requires the indentification of each member of the fiscal court who votes and whether he votes yes or no, a measure passed by secret ballot would be invalid. OAG 74-135 .

An order book, when kept, is not a substitute for compliance with this section, in that signing the order book after adjournment will not validate an order or resolution that was not read and signed before adjournment in conformance with this section. OAG 78-152 .

Minutes of the fiscal court may be written out in longhand; such longhand minutes should be filed, as the official record, to support the typed version. OAG 78-152 , OAG 78-363 .

It is clear that the 1978 amendment to this section requires minutes which accurately depict who, of the fiscal court membership, participated in the meeting, who voted for what, and an accurate statement of what was actually voted on. OAG 78-363 .

This section does not require the keeping of an order book but only that such orders be read and signed in the presence of the members of the court holding such meeting and the original minutes composed and written at the meeting really constitute the official minutes since the so-called orders appearing in the order book are merely reference material which conveniently documents the record for the public’s convenience. OAG 78-363 (opinion prior to 1978 amendment).

This section is mandatory, and requires the specific indentity of the members of the court holding the meeting. OAG 78-363 (opinion prior to 1978 amendment).

While the provisions of this section are mandatory, it has been held that where the records do not show that the minutes of the court were publicly read by the clerk or signed by the county or presiding judge with the approval of the justices, and the record is regular on its face, it will be presumed that the minutes were read by the clerk and signed by the judge, with the approval of the justices. OAG 78-363 (opinion prior to 1978 amendment).

If the county clerk is the clerk of the fiscal court, the fiscal court, if it wishes, can require the clerk to physically bring the current fiscal court order book over to the meeting. OAG 78-587 .

In reading this section and KRS 67.120 together, and under the circumstances peculiar to Jefferson County under these sections, the fiscal court clerk’s copy of the minutes will constitute substantial compliance with this section and KRS 76.120 and the county clerk is not required to maintain a copy of the fiscal court minutes in his office. OAG 79-62 .

Where the clerk of fiscal court or his deputy is not present for any reason at a special fiscal court meeting, the fiscal court has the authority to designate some other person, capable of preparing such minutes, to prepare the minutes of the fiscal court meeting. OAG 80-595 .

The General Assembly, by its 1978 amendment of this section, desired to put the taking of the minutes of a fiscal court meeting on a flexible basis, since, under the statute prior to the amendment, the presence of the clerk or deputy was mandatory and such presence could conceivably affect the timetable of holding meetings, depending upon the availability of the clerk or deputy. OAG 81-337 .

The 1978 amendment to this section is silent as to the presence at fiscal court meetings and as to who should prepare the minutes of the meeting, so that under the express language of this section, the minutes of a fiscal court meeting may be taken by the county attorney, where suggested by the county clerk and found acceptable by the fiscal court; thus, where the fiscal court approves the minutes as read, the record cannot later be nullified or modified by extrinsic testimony. OAG 81-337 .

As a basic rule, where the fiscal court has not by formal action accepted a particular road segment into the county road system, it has no authority to spend county money on it or to maintain or improve it in any way. The only exceptions to this basic rule relate to sidewalks and bus turn-arounds for school children, as treated under KRS 178.290 . OAG 82-136 .

67.110. Compensation of county commissioners serving on fiscal court, when fixed. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (1845, 1847, 1851b-7: amend. Acts 1944, ch. 84; 1946, ch. 62; 1950, ch. 123, § 29; 1952, ch. 14; 1956, ch. 53; 1966, ch. 258, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1972, ch. 358, § 2.

67.120. Clerk, deputy clerk, and stenographer of fiscal court and of the legislative council of a consolidated local government.

  1. Except in counties containing a city of the first class or a consolidated local government, the county clerk, at his option, shall be clerk of the fiscal court. He shall attend its sessions and keep a full and complete record of all its proceedings, with a proper index. For his services as clerk of the fiscal court, he shall receive an annual salary fixed at a reasonable amount by the fiscal court and paid in monthly installments out of the county treasury. The salary must be fixed not later than the first Monday in May in the year in which county clerks are elected. If the county clerk chooses not to be the clerk of the fiscal court, the fiscal court may select a clerk according to the provisions of subsection (2) of this section.
  2. Except in a consolidated local government, the fiscal court of each county in this Commonwealth in which there is located a city of the first class shall have a clerk, and may have a deputy clerk and may employ a stenographer, all of whom shall attend its sessions and keep a full and correct record of all the proceedings of the court, together with a complete index, and who in addition shall perform such duties as may be required of them by the court. The fiscal court shall appoint a clerk who shall serve at the pleasure of the fiscal court. The clerk shall execute bond to be approved by the fiscal court. He shall receive an annual salary which shall be fixed by the court and paid in monthly installments out of the county levy. The court may appoint a deputy clerk and a stenographer who shall qualify by taking the constitutional oath and who shall serve at the will of the court. The salary of the deputy clerk and the stenographer shall be fixed by the court and paid in monthly installments out of the county levy.
  3. The legislative council of a consolidated local government shall have a clerk, and may have a deputy clerk and may employ a stenographer, all of whom shall attend its sessions and keep a full and correct record of all the proceedings of the council, together with a complete index, and who in addition shall perform such duties as may be required of them by the council. The legislative council shall appoint a clerk who shall serve at the pleasure of the council. The clerk shall execute bond to be approved by the council. He or she shall receive an annual salary which shall be fixed by the council. The council may appoint a deputy clerk and a stenographer, to assist in the official duties of the clerk, who shall qualify by taking the constitutional oath and who shall serve at the will of the council. The salaries of the deputy clerk and the stenographer shall be fixed by the council.

History. 1072, 1835, 1851b-3: amend. Acts 1942, ch. 180, §§ 4, 7; 1978, ch. 118, § 9, effective January 1, 1979; 1978, ch. 384, § 144, effective June 17, 1978; 2002, ch. 346, § 40, effective July 15, 2002.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Compensation of Clerk.

The compensation fixed for the county clerk under this section for his services as clerk of the fiscal court is the only compensation the clerk may receive in such capacity, and he may not charge the fees allowed by KRS 64.010 (repealed, now see KRS 64.012 ) for any service performed by him as clerk of the fiscal court. Nuetzel v. Barr, 180 Ky. 196 , 202 S.W. 499, 1918 Ky. LEXIS 42 ( Ky. 1918 ); Goodlett v. Anderson County, 267 Ky. 166 , 101 S.W.2d 421, 1936 Ky. LEXIS 761 ( Ky. 1936 ).

2. — Time for Fixing.

The compensation of the county clerk for serving as clerk of the fiscal court must be fixed before the election at which county clerks are elected, and cannot be changed during the term of the clerk. Fiscal Court of Mercer County v. Gibbs, 166 Ky. 434 , 179 S.W. 409, 1915 Ky. LEXIS 707 ( Ky. 1915 ); Pursifull v. Taxpayers' League of Bell County, 257 Ky. 202 , 77 S.W.2d 783, 1934 Ky. LEXIS 544 ( Ky. 1934 ).

The clerk’s salary must be fixed not later than the first Monday in May in the year in which county clerks are elected. Scott v. Montgomery County, 300 Ky. 300 , 188 S.W.2d 455, 1945 Ky. LEXIS 537 ( Ky. 1945 ).

3. — Reasonableness of Compensation.

Reasonableness of compensation allowed county clerk as clerk of fiscal court can be questioned only by appeal from the order of allowance, and not in a collateral action. Elliott v. Commonwealth, 144 Ky. 335 , 138 S.W. 300, 1911 Ky. LEXIS 626 ( Ky. 1911 ).

Where there was evidence that county clerk and deputies did render some services to fiscal court, allowance of $200 per year for such services was not unreasonable. Ray v. Woodruff, 168 Ky. 563 , 182 S.W. 662, 1906 Ky. LEXIS 277 ( Ky. 1906 ).

4. — Extra Compensation.

Allowance of per diem to county clerk for his services as clerk of the fiscal court must be treated as covering all of his services for the fiscal court, and such allowance cannot be supplemented by additional fees for special services. Mills v. Lantrip, 170 Ky. 81 , 185 S.W. 514, 1916 Ky. LEXIS 21 ( Ky. 1916 ).

Clerk could not receive extra compensation for services in connection with county bond issue. Taylor v. Jones, 253 Ky. 285 , 69 S.W.2d 372, 1934 Ky. LEXIS 648 ( Ky. 1934 ).

Only power of fiscal court is to fix compensation of clerk prior to time clerk takes office; any additional payment during term is void and may be recovered in a collateral action. Goodlett v. Anderson County, 267 Ky. 166 , 101 S.W.2d 421, 1936 Ky. LEXIS 761 ( Ky. 1936 ).

5. Order Fixing Compensation.
6. — Collateral Attack.

Order for payment of compensation to county clerk for services rendered as clerk of fiscal court would not be attacked collaterally on ground that clerk did not render any services, but could only be attacked by appeal or action to enjoin payment. Ray v. Woodruff, 168 Ky. 563 , 182 S.W. 662, 1906 Ky. LEXIS 277 ( Ky. 1906 ).

7. Employment of Clerk Other than County Clerk.

In the absence of express authority, the fiscal court could not employ or pay a clerk of the fiscal court other than the county clerk. Woodruff v. Shea, 152 Ky. 657 , 153 S.W. 1005, 1913 Ky. LEXIS 722 ( Ky. 1913 ).

8. County with First-Class City.

Prior to enactment of this section, the fiscal court of Jefferson County had no authority to employ a clerk and auditor of the fiscal court, other than the county clerk. Woodruff v. Shea, 152 Ky. 657 , 153 S.W. 1005, 1913 Ky. LEXIS 722 ( Ky. 1913 ).

9. Liability of Sureties.

Sureties on bond of county clerk were not liable for excess fees allowed him by fiscal court. Elliott v. Commonwealth, 144 Ky. 335 , 138 S.W. 300, 1911 Ky. LEXIS 626 ( Ky. 1911 ).

Cited:

Land v. Lewis, 291 Ky. 800 , 165 S.W.2d 553, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 316 ( Ky. 1942 ); McKenna v. Nichols, 295 Ky. 778 , 175 S.W.2d 121, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 311 ( Ky. 1943 ); Casteel v. Sparks, 312 Ky. 99 , 226 S.W.2d 533, 1950 Ky. LEXIS 593 ( Ky. 1950 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

A fiscal court may enter into a contract with a corporation whose president is the county court clerk and also the clerk of the fiscal court. OAG 60-774 .

The clerk of the fiscal court of Jefferson County is not a constitutional officer and is not subject to the constitutional prohibition against change of compensation during his term. OAG 62-1121 .

Where the same person was county clerk and clerk of the fiscal court, he was not entitled to the fee listed under KRS 64.010 (repealed, now see KRS 64.012 ) involving orders allowing claims against the county treasurer or state treasurer. OAG 65-768 .

Although the fiscal court would have no authority to require the county court clerk to do the bookkeeping and withhold insurance premiums on private policies from the salaries of county employees, the clerk could agree to do so if the compensation for such service was paid to the clerk by the affected employees. OAG 66-691 .

The preparation of the payrolls of county road employees must be prepared by the county clerk as fiscal court clerk after the certification of the county road engineer as to the gross sum due the employees for each pay period. OAG 67-50 .

The duty of preparing claim vouchers necessary for payment of claims is that of the county court clerk. OAG 70-21 .

Under this section, a change or adjustment in the salary or compensation of the county clerk during his current term of office would not be valid. OAG 72-40 .

Subsection (1) provides that the county court clerk is the clerk of the fiscal court ex officio but the county clerk has the authority to designate one of his lawful deputies to perform that function in his stead when such clerk is unable to attend, in accordance with KRS 61.035 . OAG 73-271 .

Where meetings of the fiscal court are held on Saturday either the county clerk or his deputy is required to attend the fiscal court sessions and keep a full and complete record of the proceedings despite the fact that the office of the county clerk is open only Monday through Friday. OAG 73-560 .

Federal revenue sharing funds are to be handled in the same way as county money generally, subject to the restrictions set out in the revenue sharing act (31 USCS § 1221 et seq.), thus a fiscal court should issue an order that the county clerk prepare all warrants, countersign checks and certify the warrants to the treasurer where the claims have been properly filed with the clerk and approved by the fiscal court. OAG 74-100 .

Under the authority of KRS 61.035 a county court clerk may designate, in writing, one of his deputies to countersign the checks where the county clerk is required to countersign all checks written on the county treasury. OAG 75-157 .

The county judge/executive could be appointed as clerk of the fiscal court if the county clerk opts to not continue as fiscal court clerk, but he should not be present and participate in the fiscal court meeting when he is so selected as clerk of fiscal court, nor should he be present and participate in the fiscal court meeting at which regulations affecting his duties as clerk of fiscal court are enacted, since to so participate would constitute a common-law incompatibility. OAG 78-414 .

In reading KRS 67.100 and this section together, and under the circumstances peculiar to Jefferson County under these sections, the fiscal court clerk’s copy of the minutes will constitute substantial compliance with KRS 67.100 and this section and the county clerk is not required to maintain a copy of the fiscal court minutes in his office. OAG 79-62 .

Where the clerk of fiscal court or his deputy is not present for any reason at a special fiscal court meeting, the fiscal court has the authority to designate some other person, capable of preparing such minutes, to prepare the minutes of the fiscal court meeting. OAG 80-595 .

Where the county clerk in any county, except one containing a first-class city, fails to exercise his option to automatically become clerk of the fiscal court, the fiscal court must appoint the clerk of the fiscal court pursuant to this section, despite the provisions of subsection (8) of KRS 67.710 , which provides that the county judge/executive appoints the clerk with the approval of the fiscal court, since the 1978 amendment to this section, which was the later amendment of the conflicting statutes and thereby implicitly repeals the earlier statute, controls. OAG 81-184 .

For duties of the fiscal court clerk and county clerk in relation to fiscal court proceedings when county clerk decides not to be the fiscal court clerk and another person is appointed to fill that position, see OAG 84-303 .

County clerk cannot lawfully impose upon the fiscal court a separate charge for certified copies of minutes of fiscal court meetings furnished to the fiscal court for its use. OAG 94-38 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Bonds of public officers, what to contain, KRS 62.060 .

Jefferson County to pay premiums on bonds of officers, KRS 62.150 .

Oath to be taken before entering on duties of office, Ky. Const., § 228.

ALR

Liability of clerk of court, or his bond, for defaults and misfeasances of his assistants or deputies. 1 A.L.R. 222; 102 A.L.R. 174; 116 A.L.R. 1064; 71 A.L.R.2d 1140.

Liability of clerk or his bond for money paid to clerk of court by virtue of his office. 59 A.L.R. 60.

County Buildings

67.125. County jail building fund — Purposes — Tax on convictions — Use of funds. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1964, ch. 125, § 1) was declared unconstitutional in Driver v. Sawyer, 392 S.W.2d 52 (Ky. App. 1965) and was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 255, § 283.

67.127. Designation of county multiple services buildings as regional governmental centers. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 295, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1978, ch. 118, § 19, effective June 17, 1978.

67.130. County buildings — Jailer may be employed as superintendent — Maintenance and operation of jailer’s residence.

The fiscal court of each county shall be responsible for the maintenance and operation of all county buildings, grounds, and other properties. The county judge/executive shall execute the policies of the fiscal court relating to buildings, grounds, and other properties. The fiscal court may employ the jailer as superintendent of those county buildings, grounds, and other county properties agreed upon by the jailer and the fiscal court. Compensation for these additional services shall be in addition to the regular salary paid the jailer for performing the duties of the jailer. The total compensation of the jailer for his duties as superintendent and for his duties as jailer shall not exceed the limit set in KRS 64.527 . The fiscal court of each county shall annually appropriate a sum sufficient to purchase the labor and materials necessary to maintain and operate county property, including the jailer’s residence if owned by the county, and to keep the jailer’s residence in repair and in clean, comfortable, and presentable condition. Any sum appropriated for maintenance and operation of the jailer’s residence shall be expended by the jailer. The county attorney shall bring civil action in the name of the county to recover possession of or for injury to or intrusion or trespass upon any such county property, and the net proceeds of any such recovery shall be paid into the county treasury.

History. 3948: amend. Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 48, effective January 2, 1978; 1978, ch. 118, § 10, effective June 17, 1978; 1992, ch. 89, § 1, effective July 14, 1992.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

The amendment to this section that provided that the county should appropriate money to heat and light the public buildings, and to keep them in a clean and comfortable condition, was unconstitutional insofar as it applied to jailers then in office, because prior to the amendment the jailers were required to pay for the performances of such services out of their fees. Frizzell v. Holmes, 131 Ky. 373 , 115 S.W. 246, 1909 Ky. LEXIS 36 ( Ky. 1909 ).

2. Construction.

This section does not deprive the fiscal court of the right to bring an action of unlawful detainer to recover possession of a room in the courthouse from a person wrongfully in possession. Owen County v. Greene, 129 Ky. 750 , 112 S.W. 854, 1908 Ky. LEXIS 212 ( Ky. 1908 ).

KRS 67.080 and this section should be construed together to vest superior control of appropriations necessary for performance of jailer’s duties in fiscal court. Ball v. Scott, 281 Ky. 449 , 136 S.W.2d 48, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 44 ( Ky. 1940 ).

This section was not intended to deprive the fiscal court of its superior power to regulate and control the county’s buildings. Pulaski Fiscal Court v. Floyd, 374 S.W.2d 863, 1964 Ky. LEXIS 399 ( Ky. 1964 ).

3. Application.

This section does not apply to Fayette County. In that county the jailer must furnish heat, light, water, telephones and sanitary supplies for the jail and the jailer’s residence, but in settling his accounts he may be allowed credit for so much as was spent for the jail. Holland v. Fayette County, 240 Ky. 37 , 41 S.W.2d 651, 1931 Ky. LEXIS 344 ( Ky. 1931 ).

4. — Exception.

This section requires the fiscal court to appropriate the money necessary to keep all of the public buildings in a clean, comfortable and presentable condition, and to heat and light the same, including the halls and the offices of the various county officers, but not including the courtrooms for which the jailer receives compensation under KRS 64.150 (now repealed). Adair Fiscal Court v. Conover, 141 Ky. 743 , 133 S.W. 761, 1911 Ky. LEXIS 78 ( Ky. 1911 ). But see Talbott v. Caudill, 248 Ky. 146 , 58 S.W.2d 385, 1933 Ky. LEXIS 206 ( Ky. 1933 ).

5. Appropriations.

Jailer can compel the fiscal court to appropriate funds necessary for purposes herein specified, subject to the power of the fiscal court to pass upon the necessity. Ball v. Scott, 281 Ky. 449 , 136 S.W.2d 48, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 44 ( Ky. 1940 ).

The jailer can compel the fiscal court, by mandamus, to appropriate sufficient funds to keep the public buildings and offices in a clean and comfortable condition, and to heat and light them. Adair Fiscal Court v. Conover, 141 Ky. 743 , 133 S.W. 761, 1911 Ky. LEXIS 78 ( Ky. 1911 ); Vanhoose v. Wheeler, 141 Ky. 746 , 133 S.W. 779, 1911 Ky. LEXIS 90 ( Ky. 1911 ); Knott County Fiscal Court v. Duke, 157 Ky. 499 , 163 S.W. 459, 1914 Ky. LEXIS 309 ( Ky. 1914 ); Bath County v. United Disinfectant Co., 248 Ky. 111 , 58 S.W.2d 239, 1933 Ky. LEXIS 180 ( Ky. 1933 ).

Such sums as are necessary to provide for the proper upkeep of county buildings, over and above the jailer’s compensation for his janitor services, should be appropriated annually by the fiscal court. Perkins v. Cumberland County, 294 Ky. 737 , 172 S.W.2d 651, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 546 ( Ky. 1943 ).

6. — Repayment of Money Unlawfully Received.

The law implies a contract on the part of the jailer to repay money unlawfully received in excess of the amount appropriated for him by the fiscal court. Wolfe County v. Tolson, 283 Ky. 11 , 140 S.W.2d 671, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 287 ( Ky. 1940 ).

7. Expenditures by Jailer.
8. — Limitation.

The jailer may not expend money for purposes contemplated by this section unless the fiscal court has previously appropriated the money for that purpose, and if the jailer does so he may not recover the money from the county. Knott County Fiscal Court v. Duke, 157 Ky. 499 , 163 S.W. 459, 1914 Ky. LEXIS 309 ( Ky. 1914 ).

Jailer cannot obligate county to pay for supplies and materials for upkeep of county buildings in absence of appropriation for that purpose, even though county accepts and receives benefit of items purchased. Bath County v. United Disinfectant Co., 248 Ky. 111 , 58 S.W.2d 239, 1933 Ky. LEXIS 180 ( Ky. 1933 ).

9. — Control.

The fiscal court is not required to turn over to the jailer for his uncontrolled expenditure sums appropriated to enable him to perform the duties imposed by this section, and may properly reserve supervision of major expenditures under budget plan requiring jailer to present accounts to court for approval and payment. Ball v. Scott, 281 Ky. 449 , 136 S.W.2d 48, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 44 ( Ky. 1940 ).

Order of fiscal court that curb be placed on orders for supplies for jail and courthouse and that there must be in the future approval of two (2) members of the court before supplies were ordered, did not limit or interfere with right or duties of county jailer. Tolson v. Wolfe County Fiscal Court, 243 S.W.2d 666, 1951 Ky. LEXIS 1153 ( Ky. 1951 ).

The jailer cannot bind the fiscal court by a contract made without the court’s specific direction to do so. Fulton County v. Spartan Chemicals, Inc., 343 S.W.2d 125, 1960 Ky. LEXIS 101 ( Ky. 1960 ).

10. Compensation for Care of Buildings.

The fiscal court may pay the jailer a reasonable sum for his services in keeping the public buildings in a clean, comfortable condition. Brummal v. Jackson, 145 Ky. 630 , 140 S.W. 1016, 1911 Ky. LEXIS 902 ( Ky. 1911 ); Cross v. Clinton County, 186 Ky. 505 , 217 S.W. 362, 1920 Ky. LEXIS 52 ( Ky. 1920 ).

Under this section the county must pay for the materials and equipment for furnishing fuel, light and water for the courtrooms, but the jailer is nevertheless entitled to the fee provided by KRS 64.150 (now repealed) if he does anything to make the heat, light and water available for use, such as turning on and off the heat and lights and making drinking water conveniently available. Talbott v. Caudill, 248 Ky. 146 , 58 S.W.2d 385, 1933 Ky. LEXIS 206 ( Ky. 1933 ).

Any sum paid by the county to the jailer for services rendered under this section constitutes compensation he receives by virtue of his office, and must be counted in determining whether total compensation received by jailer exceeds constitutional limit. Bell Fiscal Court v. Helton, 258 Ky. 219 , 79 S.W.2d 683, 1935 Ky. LEXIS 806 ( Ky. 1935 ).

The amount payable for services in caring for the county buildings is compensation to the jailer which must be fixed by the fiscal court for the jailer’s term just as the compensation of other county officers is fixed. Perkins v. Cumberland County, 294 Ky. 737 , 172 S.W.2d 651, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 546 ( Ky. 1943 ).

It was incumbent upon the fiscal court to fix the jailer’s annual salary at the same time the yearly income of other officials was established. Fannin v. Davis, 385 S.W.2d 321, 1964 Ky. LEXIS 158 ( Ky. 1964 ), overruled in part, Scalise v. Sewell-Scheuermann, 566 S.W.3d 539, 2018 Ky. LEXIS 451 ( Ky. 2018 ).

11. — Change.

It is proper for fiscal court to fix compensation of jailer, for services in caring for county buildings, before commencement of term of jailer, and having once been fixed it cannot be changed during the term. Perkins v. Cumberland County, 294 Ky. 737 , 172 S.W.2d 651, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 546 ( Ky. 1943 ).

12. — Appeal from Order Fixing.

County judge (now county judge/executive) may not question collaterally whether jailer has properly performed duties for which fiscal court has allowed a monthly compensation, but can only appeal from order allowing compensation or bring action to enjoin payments. Brummal v. Jackson, 145 Ky. 630 , 140 S.W. 1016, 1911 Ky. LEXIS 902 ( Ky. 1911 ).

In fixing the salary or compensation of public officers, as prescribed by this section, the fiscal court exercises an exclusive judicial discretion and the only relief from its judgment is by a timely appeal to the circuit court. Wolfe County v. Tolson, 283 Ky. 11 , 140 S.W.2d 671, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 287 ( Ky. 1940 ).

Jailer’s only remedy in case of dissatisfaction with amount of compensation fixed by fiscal court for his services in caring for county buildings is by appeal from order, and if order was made before jailer’s election he cannot complain that he had no opportunity to appeal. Perkins v. Cumberland County, 294 Ky. 737 , 172 S.W.2d 651, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 546 ( Ky. 1943 ).

13. Duties of Jailer.

The jailer does not have the duty of heating or lighting the offices in the county buildings other than the courtrooms. Frizzell v. Holmes, 131 Ky. 373 , 115 S.W. 246, 1909 Ky. LEXIS 36 ( Ky. 1909 ). But see Adair Fiscal Court v. Conover, 141 Ky. 743 , 133 S.W. 761, 1911 Ky. LEXIS 78 ( Ky. 1911 ).

14. — Exception.

The jailer is not required to keep the public buildings “in repair.” The fiscal court has that duty and the jailer cannot compel the fiscal court to make an appropriation to him to enable him to keep the buildings in repair. Frizzell v. Holmes, 131 Ky. 373 , 115 S.W. 246, 1909 Ky. LEXIS 36 ( Ky. 1909 ).

15. Jailer’s Residence.

Where the jailer’s residence was not owned by the county, and in the absence of any express contract to pay rent and for heat, light and water, the county was not liable. Laurel County Fiscal Court v. Steele, 285 Ky. 407 , 148 S.W.2d 283, 1941 Ky. LEXIS 399 ( Ky. 1941 ).

16. Actions to Recover Possession of County Property.

Jailer’s power to bring actions to recover possession of county property is subject to superior power of fiscal court, and where fiscal court leases county property to a private person the jailer cannot, without consent of the fiscal court, bring an action to dispossess the lessee. Bath County v. Denton, 162 Ky. 47 , 171 S.W. 1000, 1915 Ky. LEXIS 6 ( Ky. 1915 ).

17. Duty to Provide Jail.

A county fiscal court has no mandatory duty to provide a jail facility within its boundaries; counties may confine their prisoners in facilities outside their territories. Commonwealth v. Carroll County Fiscal Court, 633 S.W.2d 720, 1982 Ky. App. LEXIS 216 (Ky. Ct. App. 1982).

Cited:

Manning v. Sims, 308 Ky. 587 , 213 S.W.2d 577, 1948 Ky. LEXIS 864 , 5 A.L.R.2d 1154 ( Ky. 1948 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

In counties not coming under the terms of this section, the jailer must furnish the utilities to be credited as an item of expense. OAG 62-616 .

The fiscal court has the general duty of equipping the county jail with the basic equipment such as a stove, refrigerator, cooking and kitchenware necessary in the preparation and storage of food for prisoners fed therein. OAG 64-758 .

The annual appropriation for janitorial services is compensation to the jailer and cannot be changed during the term of the jailer. OAG 65-741 .

In a county coming under this section the jailer has the right to hire the janitors to keep the courthouse clean. OAG 65-741 .

Although the jailer should have a key to the front door of the courthouse in order to carry out his duties, the custody of any other keys to that door is for the fiscal court to decide. OAG 70-82 .

For the purpose of determining the maximum compensation of $12,600 as prescribed in KRS 64.535 , all fees earned by the jailer and any and all salaries paid to the county jailer, including the janitorial salary as prescribed in this section, must be considered. OAG 71-436 .

While the fiscal court has budgetary control and accounting supervision over the expenditure for janitorial services under this section, the fiscal court has no authority to hire or fire a janitor for the courthouse other than the county jailer, so that the jailer retains the authority to designate the person or persons to be employed for such janitorial work. OAG 72-7 .

While the fiscal court has budgetary control and accounting supervision over the expenditure for janitorial services, the county jailer is the superintendent of county buildings and it is up to him to either do the janitorial work himself or to hire someone to do that work. OAG 73-571 .

A janitorial appropriation of $200 a month for a jailor made in accordance with this section is not a salary. OAG 74-102 .

The county jailer must pay for janitorial services out of the money annually appropriated by the fiscal court under this section and cannot pay for such services out of excess fees. OAG 74-389 .

The fiscal court under KRS 67.080 has superior power over that of the jailer under KRS 67.130 concerning the regulation and control of county buildings. OAG 75-404 .

The fiscal court is responsible for paying for such housekeeping items as dish detergent, toilet paper, soap, paper towels and mops used for the county jail and maintenance of the prisoners. OAG 76-229 .

Inasmuch as the jailer as superintendent of county buildings is directly responsible for janitorial services, the fiscal court has no authority to hire a janitor for the courthouse. OAG 76-339 .

Where a county jail has been closed because it has been condemned and the county jailer performs no duties in relation to keeping prisoners because the prisoners are housed in jail facilities in surrounding counties and such jailer performs only janitorial services at the courthouse, that portion of his salary which represents the annual appropriation for janitorial expenses under this section would be legal, provided it reflects janitorial work actually performed. OAG 77-523 .

The removal of garbage from the courthouse is within the responsibility of the county jailer and thus he is entitled to reimbursement for the travel expenses necessary for the disposition of the garbage. OAG 78-80 .

In connection with the 1978 amendment of this section, while fiscal court is responsible for county building maintenance, if the county judge/executive, with approval of fiscal court, employs the jailer as county building superintendent and is thus given the janitorial duty, this janitorial appropriation is still compensation to the jailer for purposes of determining excess fees. OAG 79-50 .

The county judge/executive, with approval of fiscal court, may employ someone other than the jailer as superintendent of county buildings. OAG 79-272 .

This section relates strictly to the jailer’s janitorial function in connection with county buildings, including the courthouse. OAG 79-272 .

The county jail is a county building. OAG 79-288 .

The fiscal court has the responsibility for maintaining a county jail, including a new one and repairing or reconstructing an existing one, when necessary. OAG 79-288 .

The fiscal court must pay a salary out of the county treasury to the county jailer and deputies when the jailer’s fees are insufficient to provide them with equitable and reasonable salaries and has the responsibility for appropriating money for the necessary and official expenses in operating the jail when the fees of the jailer are insufficient for that purpose. OAG 79-288 .

The jailer may at the same time be the janitor of county buildings, provided that the county judge/executive, with approval of the fiscal court, employs the jailer as superintendent of county buildings, grounds and other properties, pursuant to this section, thus, the jailer is not automatically the janitor of county buildings as he was under this section prior to the 1978 amendment (Ch. 118, § 10). OAG 80-161 .

To the extent that the annual janitorial appropriation mentioned in this section would represent money paid to a jailer for janitorial services rendered by him personally, that would be net compensation; any of that janitorial money paid out by the jailer for supplies or equipment used in the janitorial function or paid out by the jailer to others to assist in the janitorial function should be deducted from the gross appropriation to determine the jailer’s net compensation. OAG 80-161 .

Under the rubber dollar principle any salary paid to the jailer plus any net janitorial compensation plus earned fees of the jailer as aggregated cannot exceed the sum of $23,184 for 1980, and any excess of the jailer’s receipts over and above the amount allowable for his personal compensation, the compensation of his deputies and assistants, and authorized official expenses, must be turned over to the county treasury. OAG 80-161 .

Any compensation paid to a jailer for janitorial work performed personally by him would be construed as personal compensation and subject to the personal compensation maximum for jailers. OAG 80-650 .

Although a county generally has responsibility only for those indigents who actually reside in that county, the medical care costs for indigent prisoners who are residents of another county or state would also have to be borne by that county as a necessary cost in the operation of the jail pursuant to subsection (2)(b) of KRS 67.080 , subsection (3)(p) of KRS 67.083 , and this section, subject to the payment of medical care for indigent prisoners with nonpostponable life or health threatening problems by the governmental unit (county, state or federal) whose law has been violated, as provided in KRS 441.010 (now KRS 441.045 ). OAG 81-213 .

The reasonable construction of KRS 67.080 , 67.083 , 208.130 (now repealed) and this section means that the county is responsible for the costs of transporting juveniles from one county to another. OAG 81-357 .

If the superintendant of buildings is to properly carry out his janitorial function, he must have access to all of the rooms in the courthouse either by key or in some other manner which is reasonable under the circumstances. OAG 82-160 .

The superintendent of county buildings, under the administrative supervision of the county judge/executive, has a precise janitorial role to perform, the necessary expense of which must be borne by the county; the burden to keep the courthouse in a proper state of cleanliness and sanitation is clearly upon the fiscal court, the county judge/executive and the superintendent of buildings, in that order of hierarchy of governmental function. OAG 82-160 .

Any “salary” paid to a jailer under this section in 1979 and 1980 must be considered in the total “statutory” compensation permitted the jailer for those years under the rubber dollar compensation. OAG 82-333 .

Under this section, the jailer, along with the fiscal court, has the burden of properly isolating the “statutory salary” part from the supplies and equipment part of funds received by the jailer. OAG 82-333 .

Where a jailer was paid a salary for janitorial work in the courthouse, the “salary” would be an unconstitutional addition to his regular jailer’s compensation, provided that regular jailer compensation was at the maximum rubber dollar amount permitted by KRS 64.527 and Ky. Const., § 246. OAG 82-333 .

Where the jailer gets someone to assist him in his managerial role under this section, funds received by the jailer as “salary” and paid to assistant to perform his role as superintendent would still count against him as “salary” to be considered in determining total permissible compensation. OAG 82-333 .

Where the jailer is given the role of superintendent of county buildings, this section requires the fiscal court to: (1) establish a salary for the jailer for his management services, and (2) establish a separate account for the necessary purchase of any supplies, materials or equipment required to be used by the jailer in carrying out his janitorial duties. This involves the establishment of two entirely separate accounts. OAG 82-333 .

If the jailer is employed as the superintendent of county buildings and grounds pursuant to this section, he would be required, among other things, to see to it that the courthouse yard is mowed. OAG 82-460 .

Where county jail was not open in 1981 or 1982 but county had a jailer who lived in the jailer’s residence and was paid a salary as custodian of county property under the formula laid out in KRS 441.009(2) (now KRS 441.245 ), the jailer’s earnings in 1982 from being buildings custodian could not be used for such compensation formulation for the calendar year 1982, but the jailer could keep his custodial earnings, provided that his total compensation did not exceed the rubber dollar maximum for 1982. Moreover, his earnings as buildings custodian for the calendar year of 1981 would be his compensation for calendar year 1982, unless the $12,000 figure was greater, in which case the $12,000 would be his minimal salary for 1982. OAG 82-497 .

If the fiscal court did not designate county jailer as transportation officer, the jailer would be required, under KRS 441.510 , to serve as bailiff to the circuit and district courts of the county, as provided in KRS 71.050 ; in addition, the fiscal court, under this section, could require the jailer to serve as custodian of county buildings and grounds, provided that such property custodian duties did not conflict with his role as court bailiff since, under the statutory provisions, the bailiff function has priority. OAG 84-231 .

Where a county has no regular jail, but only a holdover jail, and the jailer does not transport prisoners, the jailer must serve as a bailiff to the circuit and district courts, as provided for in KRS 71.050 ; the fiscal court may also require the jailer to serve as custodian of county buildings and grounds, as provided for in this section. It is up to the fiscal court to designate some suitable person to be in charge of the county holdover. OAG 85-6 .

Where a county has a holdover jail, the fiscal court should establish a reasonable salary for the jailer, based upon his range of functions, as described in KRS 441.510(4), KRS 71.050 , and this section, and his actual performance thereof. However, such salary shall be in accordance with KRS 441.245 . OAG 85-6 .

If a fee office opens after the death of the incumbent but before the appointment of the successor, responsibility for monetary assets, including public funds, could arguably fall within the scope of this section or could be a proper subject of the administrative code for the county, required by KRS 67.080(2)(c) or a court might place responsibility for public funds on the deputy officers who continue to handle the funds during a vacancy. OAG 91-227 .

When an elected fee official dies in office, operations normally cease and the office is closed until a replacement is appointed; but during this transition period the ultimate responsibility for physical assets such as office equipment lies with the fiscal court and county judge/executive. OAG 91-227 .

HB 408 (Acts 1992, ch. 89, § 1) amended this section and KRS 441.510(4) to provide that the fiscal court may no longer require the jailer to act both as bailiff to the circuit and district courts, and as custodian of county buildings and grounds. OAG 92-128 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Jail facilities, KRS 441.420 to 441.450 , 441.605 to 441.695 .

Jails, operation, management and funding, KRS 441.025 to 441.255 .

ALR

Court’s power to remove jailer from office. 118 A.L.R. 174.

Failure of jailers to perform their duties as a punishable offense. 134 A.L.R. 1256.

Civil liability of sheriff or other officer charged with keeping jail or prison for death or injury of prisoner. 14 A.L.R.2d 353.

Liability of prison authorities for injury to prisoner directly caused by assault by other prisoner. 41 A.L.R.3d 1021.

Civil liability of prison or jail authorities for self-inflicted injury or death of prisoner. 79 A.L.R.3d 1210.

67.140. Care and custody of courthouse and grounds.

The fiscal court shall have authority and jurisdiction to levy and collect property taxes necessary for the purpose of keeping and maintaining the courthouse and grounds in proper condition and repair, to prevent injury thereto, to keep them in a proper state of cleanliness and sanitation, to provide heat and lights for them, and to provide sufficient water for the courts and offices therein.

History. 1938f-1: amend. Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 49, effective January 2, 1978; 1978, ch. 118, § 11, effective June 17, 1978.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Purpose.

The purpose of this section is to give taxing authority to the fiscal court to raise money to protect and prevent injury to the property of the county and to make adequate provision for the maintenance of appropriate offices and court facilities and it does not contemplate that the members shall personally superintend the manner in which the work is done. Moores v. Fayette County, 418 S.W.2d 412, 1967 Ky. LEXIS 213 ( Ky. 1967 ).

2. Personal Liability of Court.

This section does not render the members of the fiscal court personally liable for injuries suffered by a person in a fall on the courthouse sidewalk because of an alleged accumulation of ice and snow since it is the rule that public officers are responsible only for their own misfeasance and negligence and are not responsible for the negligence of persons employed by them if they have employed persons of suitable skill. Moores v. Fayette County, 418 S.W.2d 412, 1967 Ky. LEXIS 213 ( Ky. 1967 ).

3. Facilities for Magistrates.

There is no statutory or constitutional provision requiring fiscal court to furnish magistrates courtrooms or offices with county courthouse, therefore, order of fiscal court requiring magistrates to pay rent for office space in county courthouse and to vacate courthouse by certain date was valid. Fayette County v. Fayette County Fiscal Court, 317 S.W.2d 162, 1958 Ky. LEXIS 71 ( Ky. 1958 ).

4. Location Not County Seat.

There is no authority for the fiscal court to secure a sufficient jail and comfortable place for holding court at any place other than at the county seat. Covington v. Kenton County, 82 S.W. 392, 26 Ky. L. Rptr. 677 , 1904 Ky. LEXIS 367 (Ky. Ct. App. 1904); Commissioners for Courthouse Dist. v. City of Newport, 94 S.W. 629, 29 Ky. L. Rptr. 649 , 1906 Ky. LEXIS 335 (Ky. Ct. App. 1906).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Although the fiscal court is not directly permitted to provide for office rent or courtroom space for magistrates by payments from the county treasury, such rent, which is attributed to the use of space as an office and courtroom for magistrates, may be taken as credit against the excess fees of that office. OAG 66-221 .

If the superintendent of buildings is to properly carry out his janitorial function, he must have access to all of the rooms in the courthouse either by key or in some other manner which is reasonable under the circumstances. OAG 82-160 .

The superintendent of county buildings, under the administrative supervision of the county judge/executive, has a precise janitorial role to perform, the necessary expense of which must be borne by the county; the burden to keep the courthouse in a proper state of cleanliness and sanitation is clearly upon the fiscal court, the county judge/executive and the superintendent of buildings, in that order of hierarchy of governmental function. OAG 82-160 .

67.150. Jailer relieved of duties as to courts in certain counties having cities of second class. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (938f-2: amend. Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 50; 1978, ch. 384, § 145) was repealed by Acts 1978, ch. 228, § 19, effective June 17, 1978.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

KRS 67.150 , 70.550 , 70.570 , 70.570 , 97.791 , 179.190 , 182.030 , 182.040 , 204.050 , were amended in revisor’s bill, Acts 1978, ch. 384, HB 607, §§ 145, 165, 166, 167, 226, 318, 322, 323 and 341; however, Acts 1978, ch. 118, HB 152, § 19 repealed them and prevails. See KRS 7.136(3).

67.160. Temporary courthouse, clerk’s office or jail.

The county judge/executive may rent, for the period that a courthouse is being built or repaired, or cannot be used, a house not more than a mile and one quarter from the public square or courthouse site, as a temporary courthouse. He may also rent, for the period that the clerk’s office or jail is being built or repaired, a house within the same distance of the public square or courthouse site, as a temporary clerk’s office or jail. The rent for such temporary courthouse, clerk’s office or jail shall be paid out of the county treasury.

History. 3950: amend. Acts 1960, ch. 20.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Location.

This section does not authorize county to rent buildings for a courthouse in a city not the county seat. City of Covington v. Kenton County, 82 S.W. 392, 26 Ky. L. Rptr. 677 , 1904 Ky. LEXIS 367 (Ky. Ct. App. 1904).

2. Duty to Provide Jail.

A county fiscal court has no mandatory duty to provide a jail facility within its boundaries; counties may confine their prisoners in facilities outside their territories. Commonwealth v. Carroll County Fiscal Court, 633 S.W.2d 720, 1982 Ky. App. LEXIS 216 (Ky. Ct. App. 1982).

67.170. Jailer to have custody of personal property belonging to jail and any other county property for which he is superintendent.

The jailer of each county shall take charge of and carefully preserve all furniture, bedding and similar property belonging to the jail and any other county property at the county seat for which he may act as superintendent. The jailer shall be liable to the county upon his official bond for the value of any such property lost or destroyed by reason of his negligence or fault, and the county may enforce this liability by notice and motion in the District Court.

History. 3949: amend. Acts 1978, ch. 118, § 12, effective June 17, 1978; 1978, ch. 384, § 146, effective June 17, 1978.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

This section was amended by two 1978 acts which do not appear to conflict and are compiled together.

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Jails, operation, management, funding, and construction, KRS 441.025 to 441.135 , KRS 441.215 to 441.255 , KRS 441.420 to 441.450 , KRS 441.605 to 441.695 .

Summary proceedings, KRS 418.005 to 418.015 .

Insurance

67.180. Motor vehicle and compensation insurance — Purchase by county except county containing city of first class.

  1. The fiscal court of each county, except a county containing a city of the first class may, in its discretion, for the protection of the public and its employees, appropriate county funds to purchase policies of insurance of all kinds deemed advisable, covering vehicles operated by the county, and compensation insurance covering employees of the county receiving injuries arising out of and in the course of employment.
  2. Suits instituted on such policies may be maintained against the county only for the purpose of obtaining a judgment which when final shall measure the liability of the insurance carrier to the injured party for whose benefit the insurance policy was issued, but not to be enforced or collectible against the county or fiscal court or the members thereof.

History. 1840a-1: amend. Acts 1944, ch. 49, § 1; 2014, ch. 92, § 33, effective January 1, 2015.

Compiler’s Notes.

For this section as effective until January 1, 2015, see the preceding section also numbered KRS 67.180 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Purpose.

The object and purpose of this section was to permit the governing authorities of a county to purchase insurance and thereby waive its legal immunity from liability for the torts of its agents and employees. Monroe County v. Rouse, 274 S.W.2d 477, 1954 Ky. LEXIS 1230 ( Ky. 1954 ).

This section was designed to make available to county officials a way to ameliorate the severity of the common-law doctrine of governmental immunity. Monroe County v. Rouse, 274 S.W.2d 477, 1954 Ky. LEXIS 1230 ( Ky. 1954 ).

2. Construction.

This section permits the county to be sued and a judgment obtained against it to measure the liability of the insurance carrier to the injured party. Fayette County v. Hill, 304 Ky. 621 , 201 S.W.2d 886, 1947 Ky. LEXIS 688 ( Ky. 1947 ).

A county can be sued for the negligent acts of its employee when county carries public liability insurance that does not contain a waiver of governmental immunity for the provisions of this section, when a county has purchased an insurance policy for the protection of the public, are mandatory and constitute a part of the policy as fully and as effectually as if written therein and provisions of policy designed to restrict liability within narrower limits are in conflict with the broad and wholesome purposes of the section and are void. Monroe County v. Rouse, 274 S.W.2d 477, 1954 Ky. LEXIS 1230 ( Ky. 1954 ).

This section permits a fiscal court of a county to purchase insurance policies of all kinds as those policies relate to county operated vehicles as well as compensation insurance. Lee v. McCracken County Fiscal Court, 872 S.W.2d 88, 1993 Ky. App. LEXIS 103 (Ky. Ct. App. 1993).

3. Governmental Immunity.

This section does not indicate legislative intention to depart from the doctrine of governmental immunity for tort because it clearly recognizes the immunity doctrine in providing that a suit on workmen’s compensation insurance policy is maintainable against the county only for the purpose of obtaining a judgment which shall measure the liability of the insurance carrier, and shall not be enforced or collectible against the county or the fiscal court. Ginter v. Montgomery County, 327 S.W.2d 98, 1959 Ky. LEXIS 71 ( Ky. 1959 ).

Driver’s case against the Knott County Fiscal Court was not about injuries related to an automobile accident involving vehicles owned by the county but, instead, was one concerning the alleged negligence for failure to remove mud and debris from the roadway and failure to warn of the hazardous condition; therefore, the trial court erred in not granting summary judgment because KRS 67.180 did not expressly waive sovereign immunity based on these facts. Knott County Fiscal Court v. Amburgey, 439 S.W.3d 754, 2013 Ky. App. LEXIS 17 (Ky. Ct. App. 2013).

circuit court properly dismissed an urban county government (the UCG), its police division, its fleet service, and a police officer, in his official capacity (the defendants) and denied a bicyclist’s motion to vacate his personal injury action based on sovereign immunity because the UCG’s creation of a self-insured retention fund did not waive sovereign immunity, the comprehensive automobile liability policy at issue was limited to indemnification, specifically excluding any duty to defend, and did not constitute an express waiver of the defendants’ sovereign immunity defense. Noel v. Welch, 2019 Ky. App. LEXIS 33 (Ky. Ct. App. Mar. 15, 2019).

4. Indemnity Insurance.

Where contract between county and insurance company was one of indemnity whereby the company was only bound to indemnify the county against loss, no action could be maintained against company by plaintiff where county was not liable to plaintiff. Brooks v. Clark County, 297 Ky. 549 , 180 S.W.2d 300, 1944 Ky. LEXIS 746 ( Ky. 1944 ) (decision prior to 1944 amendment permitting suits against county on such policies to obtain judgment).

5. Workers’ Compensation Insurance.

This section merely gives permissive authority and imposes no obligation or duty on any fiscal court to purchase workers’ compensation insurance. Ginter v. Montgomery County, 327 S.W.2d 98, 1959 Ky. LEXIS 71 ( Ky. 1959 ).

Cited:

Carr v. Jefferson County, 275 Ky. 685 , 122 S.W.2d 482, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 475 ( Ky. 1938 ); Roland v. Catholic Archdiocese of Louisville, 301 S.W.2d 574, 1957 Ky. LEXIS 482 ( Ky. 1957 ); Kenton County Pub. Parks Corp. v. Modlin, 901 S.W.2d 876, 1995 Ky. App. LEXIS 70 (Ky. Ct. App. 1995).

Opinions of Attorney General.

The word “employees” as used in this section and KRS 67.185 does not cover elected county officers and thus the purchase by the county fiscal court of compensation insurance for such officers is not authorized thereby. OAG 60-989 .

A person injured by the negligence of a state employee has an option whether to proceed through the board of claims or against the individual employee, but the remedy, once elected, is exclusive. OAG 61-994 .

Although the immunity of a county from tort and breach of contract liability still exists, if an insurance policy is procured under the statute, there is a waiver of immunity to that extent. OAG 64-465 .

Where the fiscal court procures liability insurance under the statute there is a waiver of immunity to that extent. OAG 65-286 .

The fiscal court of a county of 75,000 or more population could not require the sheriff, jailer and county clerk to purchase compensation insurance out of their excess fees, since it would not constitute “a necessary office expense” of such offices. OAG 70-577 .

Neither the fiscal court nor the county board of health can legally procure in its name insurance on a truck purchased by the county health department with its funds when such truck is to be used solely for county health department purposes. OAG 71-331 .

Where a county operates an ambulance service, the county would have sovereign immunity unless it procured liability insurance covering such county ambulances as such insurance, to the extent of coverage, would constitute an exception to sovereign immunity. OAG 73-160 .

Fact that application of workmen’s compensation to county employees has been made mandatory does not make the purchase of policy providing such compensation “a necessary office expense” payable from fees of the particular office head since there is still no statute so permitting. OAG 73-618 .

Although the state is liable for negligent acts only to the limits of any insurance carried by it, an employee, if negligent, may be liable personally beyond any policy limits. OAG 74-450 .

A fiscal court of the second, fourth, fifth or sixth-class may, in its discretion, for protection of the public, appropriate county funds for insurance on county vehicles and employees even though the county is protected under sovereign immunity. OAG 76-21 .

Under an appropriate ordinance of the fiscal court pursuant to KRS 67.083 the fiscal court could provide a permissive basis for paying the premiums on personal liability insurance covering the sheriff, the county patrolman, and constable and such ordinance would not be in conflict with this section since that section does not cover insurance of the kind in question. OAG 77-20 .

Although a fiscal court had no authority to purchase liability on a comprehensive general basis, the fact that it purchased such general liability insurance in the past would in no way constitute a waiver of the county’s sovereign immunity. OAG 77-609 .

The fiscal court is not obligated to purchase liability insurance but it has permissive authority under this section to purchase liability insurance covering vehicles operated by the county; the amount of such coverage is left to the sound discretion of the fiscal court and such insurance, to the extent of coverage, constitutes a legislative exception to sovereign immunity. OAG 78-234 .

The insurance company from whom liability insurance is purchased cannot assert the defense of sovereign immunity, and any suit brought on such a policy is subject to the limitations set forth in subsection (2) of this section. OAG 78-234 .

The fiscal court of a county containing a city of the fifth-class can purchase liability insurance coverage on all county owned and operated motor vehicles, including county owned road graders or other nonlicensed vehicles owned by the county and which are used on county roads for the term “vehicles operated by the county” is broad enough to include any county motor vehicles used by the county for any governmental purpose, whether licensed or not. OAG 78-455 .

A fiscal court may take out liability insurance covering the operation of county motor vehicles; this section and KRS 67.185 are permissive only. OAG 79-101 .

Where the fiscal court procures liability insurance, the doctrine of sovereign immunity is still preserved, since this section clearly recognizes that doctrine in providing that a suit on such policy is maintainable against the county (within the policy coverage) only for the purpose of obtaining a judgment which shall measure the liability of the insurance carrier, and shall not be enforced or collectible against the county or fiscal court as the governing body of the county. OAG 80-538 .

For the purpose of obtaining employee fringe benefits, the county is responsible for paying, on behalf of jail personnel as county employees, social security payments (KRS Ch. 61), workmen’s compensation premiums (KRS Ch. 342), unemployment insurance premiums (KRS Ch. 341) and medical insurance coverage (KRS Ch. 67). OAG 82-346 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Comments, The Employee Defense Act: Wearing Down Sovereign Immunity, 66 Ky. L.J. 150 (1977-78).

ALR

Insurance on public property, right or duty to carry. 100 A.L.R. 600.

Liability or indemnity insurance carried by governmental unit as affecting immunity from tort liability. 68 A.L.R.2d 1437.

Governmental vehicles or their operators. 87 A.L.R.2d 1224.

Coverage and exclusions under liability policy issued to municipal corporation of similar governmental body. 23 A.L.R.3d 1282.

Validity and construction of statute authorizing or requiring governmental unit to procure liability insurance covering public officers or employees for liability arising out of performance of public duties. 71 A.L.R.3d 6.

67.185. Motor vehicle and compensation insurance — Purchase by county containing city of first class.

The fiscal court in each county having therein a city of the first class may, in its discretion, for the protection of the public and its employees appropriate county funds to purchase policies of insurance of all kinds deemed advisable covering motor vehicles and other vehicles operated by the county, and compensation insurance covering employees of the county receiving injuries arising out of and in the course of employment; provided, the insurance carrier, by its policy of insurance, waives therein the right to contest or deny liability, by denying the liability of the county because of its governmental capacity and immunity on that account, and, provided, said policy of insurance shall bind the company to pay any final judgment rendered against the county for loss, or damage to property of any person or death or injury of any person.

History. Enact. Acts 1944, ch. 81; 2014, ch. 92, § 34, effective January 1, 2015.

Compiler’s Notes.

For this section as effective until January 1, 2015, see the preceding section also numbered 67.185 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. In General.

Since the county may insure against losses through the exercise of governmental functions, where during consideration of the case by the jury, the jury came out of the jury room and told the court that the question of insurance had been injected into the discussion of the case in the jury room and the court sent jury back to jury room admonishing it to consider only the evidence testified to during the trial, trial judge’s action in not setting aside the jury was correct. Jefferson County Fiscal Court v. Ross, 273 S.W.2d 554, 1954 Ky. LEXIS 1174 ( Ky. 1954 ).

Cited:

Roland v. Catholic Archdiocese of Louisville, 301 S.W.2d 574, 1957 Ky. LEXIS 482 ( Ky. 1957 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

The word “employees” as used in KRS 67.180 and this section does not cover elected county officers and thus the purchase by the county fiscal court of compensation insurance for such officers is not authorized thereby. OAG 60-989 .

A person injured by the negligence of a state employee has an option whether to proceed through the board of claims or against the individual employee, but the remedy, once elected, is exclusive. OAG 61-994 .

A fiscal court may take out liability insurance covering the operation of county motor vehicles; KRS 67.180 and this section are permissive only. OAG 79-101 .

For the purpose of obtaining employee fringe benefits, the county is responsible for paying, on behalf of jail personnel as county employees, social security payments (KRS Ch. 61), workers’ compensation premiums (KRS Ch. 342), unemployment insurance premiums (KRS Ch. 341) and medical insurance coverage (KRS Ch. 67). OAG 82-346 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Comments, The Employee Defense Act: Wearing Down Sovereign Immunity, 66 Ky. L.J. 150 (1977-78).

67.186. Fiscal court may provide for liability and indemnity insurance for benefit of patients of county operated hospitals — Conditions.

  1. The fiscal court of any county in which there is a county operated hospital may provide for liability and indemnity insurance for the benefit of the hospital against the negligence of the employees of such hospital.
  2. The insurance policies so purchased by the fiscal court shall be purchased only from insurance companies authorized to transact business in this state, and any such policy shall bind the insurer to pay, subject to the terms and conditions of the policy, any final judgment, not in excess of the policy limits, rendered against the insured hospital or hospital employees for the death or injury of any patient, or damage to the property of any patient, resulting from the negligence of the hospital, its agents or employees.
  3. This section shall not be construed as waiving the immunity of the county or county operated hospital from suit only to the extent of the policy limits, and no judgment may be enforced or collected against the county, fiscal court, the members thereof, or such hospital, but shall only measure the liability of the insurance carrier. No attempt shall be made in the trial of any suit to suggest the existence of any insurance which covers in whole or in part any judgment or award which has been rendered in favor of the claimant, but if the verdict rendered by the jury exceeds the limits of applicable insurance, the court shall reduce the amount of said judgment to a sum equal to the applicable limit stated in the policy.

History. Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 156, §§ 1, 2; 1960, ch. 192.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Pleading Exception to Immunity.

Although a county which carries liability insurance for its hospital operation may have a limited liability under the statute, it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to plead that she came within the exception to the immunity established by Ky. Const., § 231 after the county had asserted its immunity as a ground for dismissal of the complaint. Rather v. Allen County War Memorial Hospital, 429 S.W.2d 860, 1968 Ky. LEXIS 764 ( Ky. 1968 ).

2. Limited Waiver of Immunity.

KRS 67.186(3) permits a suit to be brought against a county hospital for the sole purpose of measuring a negligence claimant’s entitlement to proceeds from the hospital’s policy of liability insurance. Reyes v. Hardin County, 55 S.W.3d 337, 2001 Ky. LEXIS 138 ( Ky. 2001 ).

3. Jurisdiction.

Suits against county hospitals for the purpose of measuring the liability of the hospital’s insurance carrier are to be brought in either the Circuit Court or the District Court, depending upon the amount in controversy, and are not to be brought in the Kentucky Board of Claims. Reyes v. Hardin County, 55 S.W.3d 337, 2001 Ky. LEXIS 138 ( Ky. 2001 ).

Cited:

Roland v. Catholic Archdiocese of Louisville, 301 S.W.2d 574, 1957 Ky. LEXIS 482 ( Ky. 1957 ); Stephenson v. Louisville & Jefferson County Board of Health, 389 S.W.2d 637, 1965 Ky. LEXIS 391 ( Ky. 1965 ); Casey v. Grayson County Bd. of Educ., — S.W.3d —, 2003 Ky. App. LEXIS 36 (Ky. Ct. App. 2003).

Opinions of Attorney General.

The statute permits suits to be brought where counties have taken out insurance authorized under the statute, but in the event that no such insurance has been taken out the statute confers a governmental immunity from suit for negligence of county hospital employees. OAG 62-1019 .

A hospital operated jointly by the city and county would not be considered a county hospital with the authority to provide liability and indemnity insurance pursuant to this section. OAG 70-735 .

Neither the fiscal court nor the county board of health can legally procure in its name insurance on a truck purchased by the county health department with its funds when such truck is to be used solely for county health department purposes. OAG 71-331 .

A county hospital as such is not suable in tort action and the county maintaining the county hospital is immune from tort liability under Ky. Const., § 231 as a political subdivision of the state except to the extent of insurance coverage where this section is involved. OAG 75-19 .

Where the liability insurance premium for a county hospital increased from $7,000 one year to $35,000 the next year, the fiscal court’s failure to procure such insurance would not be construed as negligence so as to subject them to individual liability as the matter of insurance is really for the fiscal court to determine, within its discretion, under this section. OAG 75-50 (see also 75-19).

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Comments, The Employe Defense Act: Wearing Down Sovereign Immunity, 66 Ky. L.J. 150 (1977-78).

Snell, A Plea for a Comprehensive Liability Statute, 74 Ky. L.J. 521 (1985-86).

ALR

Immunity of county from liability for damages in tort in operating hospital. 25 A.L.R.2d 221.

Consolidation of Counties

67.190. Petition for consolidation of counties — Notice.

When a petition signed by not less than five percent (5%) of the registered legal voters of any county, and no petition shall be signed by less than two hundred (200) legal voters of any county, shall be filed with the county judge/executive, asking that said county be consolidated with a named adjoining county, it shall be the duty of the county judge/executive to notify the county judge/executive of the adjoining county. If within six (6) months from the time of said notice of the first county to the second county a petition, similarly signed by not less than five percent (5%) of the registered legal voters of any county, and no petition shall be signed by less than two hundred (200) legal voters of any county, has been filed, for the consolidation of the two (2) counties, the county judge/executive of the second county shall notify the county judge/executive of the first county of such action.

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 48, § 1; 1978, ch. 384, § 147, effective June 17, 1978.

Research References and Practice Aids

ALR

Nonregistration as affecting one’s qualification as signer of petition for change of county seat. 100 A.L.R. 1308.

67.200. New petition when petition not filed in time.

If such a petition is filed with the county judge/executive of the second county more than six (6) months from the time of the filing of the petition in the first county, the petition filed in the first county shall be of no effect, but a new petition, signed as provided in KRS 67.190 , may be filed in the first county, and, if it is filed within six (6) months of the filing of the petition in the second county, it shall be effective for the purpose of authorizing the calling of an election in each county as provided in KRS 67.210 .

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 48, § 2; 1978, ch. 384, § 148, effective June 17, 1978.

67.210. Order for election on question of consolidation.

If such a petition is filed in the second county within six (6) months of the filing of the petition in the first county, or if a new petition is filed in the first county within six (6) months of the filing of the petition in the second county, it shall be the duty of each of the county judges/executive of the two (2) counties, by orders entered of record, to call an election to be held, and direct a poll to be taken in the various precincts in each county on the day of the election to be held in said counties on the first Tuesday after the first Monday in November following the filing of the petition as provided herein, if the filing of an effective petition in the county in which one (1) is last filed occurs not later than the second Tuesday in August preceding the day of the regular election, at which election the proposition for the consolidation of the two (2) named counties shall be submitted to the legal voters of each of the two (2) counties for their approval or rejection.

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 48, § 3; 1978, ch. 384, § 149, effective June 17, 1978; 1996, ch. 195, § 34, effective July 15, 1996.

67.220. Advertisement of election.

The county judge/executive of each county, by order of record, shall direct the sheriff of that county to advertise the election, and the object thereof by publication pursuant to KRS Chapter 424.

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 48, § 4; 1966, ch. 239, § 15; 1978, ch. 384, § 150, effective June 17, 1978.

67.230. General election laws to apply.

It shall be the duty of the officers of said election in each voting precinct to hold said election the same hours they are by law required to hold election for county officers and said election shall be held and conducted in all respects under the general election laws obtaining in this Commonwealth at the time of the election.

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 48, § 5.

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Elections, KRS Chapter 116 to Chapter 121A.

67.240. Certification of results of election — Appointment of commissions to lay off justices’ districts and select choice of names and county seats.

  1. The result of the election in each county shall be certified by the county election commissioners to the county judge/executive in each county. If a majority of the voters of each county, voting on the proposition, approve the consolidation, the county judge/executive of each county shall, within thirty (30) days after the election, appoint a commission to be composed of three (3) voters of the county for the purpose of dividing the area of the new county into districts for the election of members of the fiscal court for the new county. The said commissions representing the two (2) counties shall meet together within fifteen (15) days after their appointment and proceed to divide the area of the new county into three (3) districts, each to be as nearly equal in area and population as possible. The commissions also shall select not less than two (2) and not more than three (3) names for the new county, and shall select not less than two (2) nor more than three (3) sites for the county seat of the new county. The report of the commissions, which shall act jointly, shall be filed with the county judge/executive of each county not less than ninety (90) days after the appointment of the commissions.
  2. If, at the expiration of ninety (90) days after the six (6) commissioners have been appointed as provided for herein, a majority of said commissioners have failed to agree upon the selection of three (3) names for the proposed county or three (3) places for the county seat to be submitted to the voters of the county as provided for in KRS 67.260 , the Governor of the Commonwealth of Kentucky shall appoint a seventh person to act as chairman of said board of commissioners and said chairman shall not have a vote on any question except in case of a tie vote. The report of the commissions, when a chairman is appointed, shall be filed with the county judge/executive of each county not less than thirty (30) days after appointment of the chairman.

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 48, § 6; 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 20, § 6, effective January 2, 1978; 1978, ch. 384, § 151, effective June 17, 1978.

Research References and Practice Aids

ALR

Withdrawal of name from petition, for change of county seat, or revocation of withdrawal, and time therefor. 126 A.L.R. 1031; 27 A.L.R.2d 604.

67.250. Report of commissions — Election of officers for new county.

The report of the commissions shall be entered on the records of each county judge/executive. At the next general election to be held in the counties for the election of county officers, officers for the new county shall be chosen. Said election shall be held and conducted in all respects under the general election laws obtaining in this Commonwealth at the time of the election. Members of the fiscal court for the new county shall be elected, one (1) from each of the three (3) districts created by the commissions, under the provisions of the law providing for the election of county commissioners under the commission form of government for counties, or any amendments thereto.

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 48, § 7; 1978, ch. 384, § 152, effective June 17, 1978.

67.260. Election to choose name and county seat of new county — Period between elections on consolidation.

  1. At the general election for the election of new officers for the new county, the voters of the combined area to be embraced within the new county shall select a name for the new county and a site for the county seat from among the names and sites recommended by the commissions as provided in KRS 67.240 . The question of the selection of a name and county seat for the new county shall be filed with the county clerk not later than the second Tuesday in August preceding the day of the general election and shall be submitted to the voters at the election in the following form:
  2. The new county shall bear the name approved by the majority of the voters of the combined area of the new county, voting on the proposition, and the county seat of the new county shall be located at the site approved by the majority of the voters of the combined area of the new county voting on the proposition. The name of the county shall not be changed thereafter, and the county seat shall not be changed thereafter, except as authorized by KRS 67.020 .
  3. Whenever an election is held in any county on the question of consolidation of such county with any other county, no election affecting the consolidation of said county shall be held within four (4) years thereafter, except the election as provided for in KRS 67.250 and this section.

“I am in favor of (These spaces shall be filled in with the names for the new county recommended by the commissions) as the name for the new county to be formed by the consolidation of and counties. (Fill in these spaces with the names of the two (2) counties to be consolidated.) The voter shall be instructed to indicate his choice of one (1) of the names presented. “I am in favor of (These spaces shall be filled in with the names of the sites for the county seat of the new county recommended by the commissions) as the site for the county seat of the new county formed by the consolidation of and counties. (Fill in these spaces with the names of the two (2) counties to be consolidated.) The voter shall be instructed to indicate his choice of one (1) of the names presented.

Click to view

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 48, § 8; 1982, ch. 360, § 16, effective July 15, 1982; 1996, ch. 195, § 35, effective July 15, 1996.

67.270. Debts of old counties — Separate taxes to pay.

The territory formerly embraced within each of the old counties is hereby made into a separate special taxing district with power to levy and collect taxes, and the separate debt of each county shall be a first lien on the territory formerly embraced within that county. The fiscal court of the new county shall fix the rate of tax levy for each of the two (2) special taxing districts, and the property within each shall be assessed and the taxes collected by the same county officers of the new county, and in the same manner that the law provides for the assessment of property and the collection of taxes by counties. The money collected as taxes for each of the special taxing districts shall be kept separate and shall be used only in payment of the debts of the old county that formerly embraced the territory of that specific taxing district.

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 48, § 9.

67.280. Assignment of new county to various election districts.

Where the two (2) old counties were in the same representative, senatorial, judicial circuit, congressional, or railroad commissioner district or districts, the new county shall remain in the same district or districts. Where the two (2) old counties were not in the same district or districts, the new county shall be placed in the following district or districts: In the representative, senatorial, judicial circuit, congressional, or railroad commissioner district or districts, respectively, in which the old county, having the largest population, was located; provided, that if each of the two (2) old counties was a separate district the new county shall be divided into two (2) such districts, each district to be coterminous with the boundary lines of the old counties; provided further, that if any of the election districts formed under the provisions of KRS 67.190 to 67.270 as a result of county consolidation are in violation of the requirements of the Constitution, such consolidation shall not be effective unless the General Assembly, at its first session after the consolidation, shall redistrict the state in compliance with the provisions of the Constitution.

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 48, § 10; 1976, ch. 62, § 67.

67.290. Records and property of old counties.

All records, supplies and equipment of the old counties shall be turned over to the proper officials of the new county.

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 48, § 11.

67.300. Disposition of school districts upon consolidation. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 48, § 12) was repealed by Acts 1978, ch. 32, § 1, effective June 17, 1978.

67.310. Disposition of county administrative agencies.

In case either, or both, of the counties that have consolidated under the provisions of KRS 67.190 to 67.290 has a county health department, county library board, water district board, and other similar county agencies, the members thereof shall serve out the terms for which they were respectively elected. In case both counties have a board of the same type the consolidated county shall constitute a consolidated territory for the purpose of exercising all the functions of such boards, and such boards shall operate together as one (1) board until the expiration of the terms of all members. Provision shall be made for the election of a new board for the consolidated county as the expiration of the terms of the old members requires. In case only one (1) of the counties has a board of the type contemplated by this section the authority of such board shall be restricted to the confines of the territory that composed the original territory.

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 48, § 13.

County Fire Departments

67.320. Counties may maintain fire protection program. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 22, §§ 1, 2; 1966, ch. 146, § 2; 1968, ch. 152, § 36) was repealed by Acts 1978, ch. 118, § 19, effective June 17, 1978.

67.323. Fire department merit system — Creation — Scope — Board — Definitions — Applicability.

  1. Any county that has not established a county police merit system, as provided by KRS 78.400 to 78.460 and 78.990 may, by order of its fiscal court, duly made and entered of record, create a county fire department merit system, and for that purpose establish a county fire department merit board, whose duties it shall be to classify and examine applicants seeking employment as firefighters or employees of the fire department of the said county, and, in addition, to promulgate rules and regulations governing the classification, qualification, examination, appointment, promotion, demotion, fine, suspension and other disciplinary action within the said county fire department of all personnel of the county fire department or departments affected as provided in this section and KRS 67.325 and 78.425 , and, in addition thereto, to hold such hearings, public and executive, and impose such penalties upon the personnel affected as provided in this section, KRS 67.325 and 78.425 .
  2. Fiscal courts affected hereby shall make appropriations of money for the reasonable and necessary expenses of the said board.
  3. KRS 78.410 to 78.460 and 78.990 shall be followed in the establishing of a county fire department merit system as provided in this section. All terms referring to the county police force, by context or definition, shall be taken to mean county fire department. Other terms mean:
    1. “Board” means the county fire department merit board created by subsection (1).
    2. “Chief” means the chief of the county fire department affected by this section, KRS 67.325 and 78.425 .
    3. “Assistant chief” means the next in command to the chief of the county fire department affected by this section, KRS 67.325 and 78.425 .
    4. “Secretary” means the executive secretary and examiner employed by the county fire department merit board created by this section, KRS 67.325 and 78.425.
    5. “Officer” means any member of the county fire department affected by this section, KRS 67.325 and 78.425.
    6. “Employee” means all other employees of the county fire department affected by this section, KRS 67.325 and 78.425.

History. Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 148, § 1; 1978, ch. 164, § 5, effective June 17, 1978; 2014, ch. 92, § 35, effective January 1, 2015.

Compiler’s Notes.

For this section as effective until January 1, 2015, see the preceding section also numbered 67.323 .

Research References and Practice Aids

ALR

Acquiescence or delay as affecting rights of member of fire department illegally discharged, suspended, or transferred. 145 A.L.R. 767.

Governmental control of actions of speech of public officers or employees in respect of matters outside the actual performance of their duties. 163 A.L.R. 1358.

67.325. Police and firefighters’ merit system may be established — Law governing.

Any county may, by order of its fiscal court, duly made and entered of record, create a merit system for both the county police force and the county fire department, and for that purpose establish a single merit board for both. The board shall concurrently exercise the powers granted by KRS 67.323 , 78.400 to 78.460 and 78.990 .

History. Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 148, § 2.

67.327. Fire department membership charges and subscriber fees may be added to property tax bills — Collection and distribution.

  1. If a county fire department is authorized by law to collect membership charges or subscriber fees for combatting fires or serving in other emergencies, the fiscal court may adopt an ordinance to require those annual membership charges or subscriber fees to be added to property tax bills. In any county where the fiscal court has adopted such an ordinance, the county clerk shall add the annual membership charges or subscriber fees to the tax bills of the affected property owners.
  2. The membership charges or subscriber fees shall be collected and distributed by the sheriff to the appropriate fire departments in the same manner as the other taxes on the bill and unpaid fees or charges shall bear the same penalty as general state and county taxes. This shall be a lien on the property against which it is levied from the time of the levy.

History. Enact. Acts 2002, ch. 163, § 2, effective July 15, 2002.

City-County Governmental Building

67.330. Definitions for KRS 67.340 to 67.370. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 199, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

67.340. Power of city of first class and county containing such city to acquire and use joint city-county governmental building. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 199, §§ 2, 3) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

67.350. Contracts and agreements for joint acquisition, ownership, use and operation of city-county building. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 199, § 4) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

67.360. Financing of city-county building. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 199, § 5) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

67.370. Authority for city-county building is optional — Liberal construction. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 199, § 6, 7) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

67.372. County administration of global positioning monitoring system program — Conditions — Agreements between counties — Administrative fee.

Any county or combination of counties may operate a global positioning monitoring system program subject to the following conditions:

  1. The program shall be assigned by ordinance to a county department or county agency that agrees to operate or supervise the program continuously, twenty-four (24) hours per day, seven (7) days per week;
  2. Each county shall identify a law enforcement agency or agencies with jurisdiction in the county to assist a petitioner, victim, or witness when a person ordered to wear a monitoring device violates the provisions of the court’s order and is in need of assistance;
  3. A county or counties electing to contract with an entity providing a global positioning monitoring system and devices shall meet not less than all of the requirements of this section and KRS 403.761 and 456.100 ;
  4. Each county shall monitor the performance of the entity providing the global positioning system and devices and shall have a provision in the contract with the monitoring entity agreeing to the termination of the contract in the event of serious or continued violations of the contract;
  5. Any system chosen shall use the most appropriate global positioning technology to track the person ordered to wear the monitoring device and shall include technology that:
    1. In a domestic violence case under KRS 403.715 to 403.785 or any case under KRS Chapter 456:
      1. Notifies law enforcement or other monitors of any breach of the court-ordered boundaries;
      2. Notifies the petitioner in a timely manner of any breach; and
      3. Allows monitors to communicate directly with the person ordered to wear the monitoring device; and
    2. In other situations in which monitoring is authorized by KRS 67.374 , 431.517 , 431.518 , 431.520 , 456.100 , 533.030 , and 533.250 the contracting county or combination of counties shall, in the contract, specify the type and level of global positioning monitoring system services desired;
  6. The monitoring entity shall agree to a price for monitoring during the duration of the contract which shall not be increased but may be reduced during the duration of the contract. The contract shall provide that reduced payments shall be accepted by the vendor as a full payment for all purposes from persons determined to be indigent by a court or other authority ordering the use of monitoring. In bidding for the contract the vendor may take into account that some monitored persons will not be able to pay the full cost of the monitoring or may not be able to pay any cost for the monitoring. The contract shall specify that no unit of state or local government and no public officer or employee shall be liable for the costs of monitoring under the contract. Notwithstanding the provisions of this subsection, a county or counties may agree to pay all or a part of the monitoring fee to the monitoring entity if the county would have otherwise been required by a court to place a person in jail at county expense and the cost of the monitoring is less than the cost of placing the person in jail;
  7. Agreements between counties for monitoring services may, with the approval of their governing bodies, be consummated by a contract signed by all counties party thereto or by an interlocal cooperation agreement;
  8. A county utilizing a global positioning monitoring system program may charge an administrative fee to a person ordered to participate in a global positioning monitoring program to provide for the county’s cost in administering the monitoring program. The fee shall be set by ordinance and shall be in addition to the fee charged by the entity contracted to provide the monitoring; and
  9. KRS Chapter 456 and KRS 403.715 to 403.785 shall not apply to a person ordered to participate in a global positioning monitoring system under KRS 431.517 , 431.518 , 431.520 , 533.030 , and 533.250 . The provisions of a court order that relate to a person ordered to participate in a global positioning monitoring system pursuant to KRS 431.517 , 431.518 , 431.520 , 533.030 , and 533.250 shall govern that person’s conduct and any reporting or other requirements ordered by the court.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 2010, ch. 170, § 9, effective July 15, 2010; 2015 ch. 102, § 39, effective January 1, 2016.

67.374. County global positioning monitoring system program — Request for and acceptance of public bids — Monitoring of successful bidder — Other uses of program permitted — Confidentiality of system information.

  1. “Global positioning monitoring system” has the same meaning as in KRS 403.720 .
  2. A county or combination of counties electing to participate in a global positioning monitoring system program shall, by ordinance, set other requirements for global positioning monitoring system devices and for the operation of the global positioning monitoring system which shall include, at a minimum, the requirements contained in KRS 403.715 to 403.785 , KRS 456.100 , the provisions of this section, and KRS 67.372 .
  3. A county or combination of counties electing to participate in a global positioning monitoring system program shall, through a public bid process, select an entity or entities to provide the best available technology with regard to global positioning monitoring system devices that meet the requirements of this section and KRS 67.372 , 403.761 , and 456.100 and a system that meets those same requirements, including but not limited to the acceptance of reduced fees for petitioners and indigent persons ordered to wear a monitoring device.
  4. A person, county, or combination of counties electing to participate in a global positioning monitoring system program shall continuously monitor the performance of successful bidders, receive complaints regarding service, and conduct hearings pursuant to KRS Chapter 13B which may result in penalties as set out in the contract against an entity providing global positioning monitoring system services or which may result in cancellation of the contract with the provider of the service, or both. The provisions of this subsection shall be part of any bid offering and any contract entered into between the county or combination of counties and an entity providing global positioning monitoring system services.
  5. A county or combination of counties electing to operate a global positioning monitoring system program may utilize that program for:
    1. Monitoring a respondent and petitioner pursuant to KRS 403.715 to 403.785 or 456.100 ;
    2. Monitoring the pretrial release of a person charged with a crime pursuant to KRS 431.515 to 431.550 ;
    3. Monitoring a person assigned to a pretrial diversion program pursuant to KRS 533.250 to 533.262 ; and
    4. Monitoring a person granted probation or conditional discharge pursuant to KRS Chapter 533.
  6. Information obtained by a global positioning monitoring system shall not be a public record.
  7. Information obtained by a global positioning monitoring system shall be used only for the purpose of verifying the location of the monitored person. Global positioning monitoring system information obtained from persons subject to monitoring pursuant to KRS 403.715 to 403.785 or 456.100 shall not be utilized for any criminal investigation, prosecution, or other criminal justice related purpose without a valid search warrant or order issued by a court of competent jurisdiction. Information obtained in violation of this subsection or without a valid search warrant or court order shall be inadmissible in court for any purpose.
  8. Any person or organization who knowingly or wantonly divulges global positioning monitoring system information about any person in violation of subsection (6) or (7) of this section shall be guilty of a Class A misdemeanor.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 2010, ch. 170, § 10, effective July 15, 2010; 2015 ch. 102, § 40, effective January 1, 2016.

Building Standards

67.380. Authority of fiscal court to regulate construction of buildings.

The fiscal court of any county shall have authority, by order or resolution, to adopt, and to enforce, regulations governing construction as defined by KRS 198B.010 pursuant to the provisions of KRS 198B.060 .

History. Enact. Acts 1950, ch. 70; 1978, ch. 117, § 57, effective August 31, 1979; 1980, ch. 188, § 44, effective July 15, 1980; 1982, ch. 308, § 8, effective July 15, 1982; 1998, ch. 9, § 3, effective July 15, 1998.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Construction.

This section in authorizing the regulation of building construction gave fiscal court power to regulate from the standpoint of health as well as from the standpoint of safety and thus fiscal court by extending original interim zoning resolution after this section became effective could validly put in force such portions of the resolution as were within the scope of the powers granted by this section. Daugherty v. Lexington, 249 S.W.2d 755, 1952 Ky. LEXIS 857 ( Ky. 1952 ), limited, American Sign Corp. v. Fowler, 276 S.W.2d 651, 1955 Ky. LEXIS 432 ( Ky. 1955 ).

This section authorizes the regulation of building construction from the standpoint of public safety and health in a limited or narrow sense, and not in the broad sense of the public good generally. American Sign Corp. v. Fowler, 276 S.W.2d 651, 1955 Ky. LEXIS 432 ( Ky. 1955 ).

2. County-wide Zoning.

It is customary for zoning statutes to contain express provisions for the regulation of the use of property, and the absence of any such provision from this section is very persuasive that this section was not intended to be a zoning statute. American Sign Corp. v. Fowler, 276 S.W.2d 651, 1955 Ky. LEXIS 432 ( Ky. 1955 ).

This section does not authorize county-wide zoning. American Sign Corp. v. Fowler, 276 S.W.2d 651, 1955 Ky. LEXIS 432 ( Ky. 1955 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

A building which was once used for human occupancy but for several years had been solely used as a storage shed and barn in connection with a livestock and farming operation was exempt from fiscal court regulation. OAG 78-120 .

This section is aimed at establishing a building code law designed to relate to specific health hazards and is not a zoning statute since it stresses the structural aspect of buildings rather than the use of the buildings. OAG 78-120 .

There is no statutory impediment to the county road foreman also being appointed as county building inspector; however, the fiscal court would have to determine factually whether or not the road supervisor could perform both jobs with care and ability, if he could not, then a common-law incompatibility would exist. OAG 84-253 .

67.390. Authority of fiscal court of county containing first-class city to regulate erection, construction, reconstruction, relocation, remodeling, alteration, repair and maintenance of buildings. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1954, ch. 25, § 1; 1966, ch. 239, § 16) was repealed by Acts 1978, ch. 117, § 66, effective August 31, 1979.

67.400. County may adopt standards in effect in first-class city. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1954, ch. 25, § 2; 1966, ch. 239, § 17) was repealed by Acts 1978, ch. 117, § 66, effective August 31, 1979.

67.410. County building inspectors — Building permits — Fees — Appeals.

  1. The fiscal court of any county may appoint a qualified and competent person to administer such regulations. His official title shall be “Building Inspector of  . . . . .  County, Kentucky.” His salary shall be fixed by the fiscal court, and paid out of the county levy. He shall have such deputies and assistants as the fiscal court deems necessary, and their salaries shall likewise be fixed by the fiscal court and paid out of the county levy. The fiscal court shall also pay out of county funds the necessary expenses of his office. The fiscal court may contract with individuals or corporations for the performance of technical or scientific services required for the proper enforcement and administration of its building regulations.
  2. No person shall build, erect, construct, reconstruct, remodel, relocate, alter or repair any building within the county without first obtaining a building permit from the building inspector.
  3. The fiscal court shall establish a system of reasonable fees to be charged every applicant for such permit, but such fees shall not exceed the cost of the service provided.
  4. Any person aggrieved by any ruling, order, or decision of such building inspector may appeal using the procedures provided in KRS 198B.070 .

History. Enact. Acts 1954, ch. 25; 1956, ch. 54; 1962, ch. 246; 1978, ch. 117, § 58, effective August 31, 1979.

Opinions of Attorney General.

A county does not possess the authority to require building permits or fees of the Commonwealth or school system, directly or indirectly, in connection with school building projects. OAG 72-608 .

A county does not have the authority, pursuant to this section, to require a building permit and a fee of the county riverport authority in connection with a building the riverport authority proposes to construct under its statutory authority to establish and operate a foreign trade zone, since this section is not specific enough to authorize the permit and fee against a public corporate governmental agency exercising specific powers for clearly defined public purposes. OAG 79-195 .

There is no statutory impediment to the county road foreman also being appointed as county building inspector; however, the fiscal court would have to determine factually whether or not the road supervisor could perform both jobs with care and ability, if he could not, then a common-law incompatibility would exist. OAG 84-253 .

67.420. Civil action to enforce building standards.

In case any building or structure is or is proposed to be erected, constructed, reconstructed, relocated, remodeled, altered, repaired, maintained or used in violation of any reasonable regulations adopted pursuant to this chapter, the county attorney of such county, or any property owner or occupant who would be damaged by such violation, may in addition to other remedies provided by law, institute injunction, mandamus, abatement, or other appropriate action to prevent, enjoin, abate or remove such unlawful erection, construction, reconstruction, relocation, remodeling, alteration, repair, maintenance, or use.

History. Enact. Acts 1954, ch. 25, § 5; 1986, ch. 331, § 17, effective July 15, 1986.

County Buildings Commission

67.450. County buildings commission — Membership, terms, bond, vacancies, officers.

  1. Upon the fiscal court adopting an order reciting the necessity of financing the acquisition, construction, remodeling or improvement of a county building or buildings of any type which a county has the legal right to acquire, construct, remodel or improve and requesting the county judge/executive to appoint a county buildings commission, the county judge/executive of such county shall thereupon appoint a county buildings commission composed of three (3) members. One (1) of such members shall have his term of office designated as three (3) years, one (1) of such members shall have his term of office designated as two (2) years and the remaining member shall have his term of office designated as one (1) year. Upon the expiration of the term of office of each of these commissioners, the county judge/executive shall appoint a commissioner to succeed him to serve for a term of three (3) years. Each commissioner shall execute a bond to be approved by the county judge/executive and shall be sworn to faithfully perform the duties of his position. Vacancies shall be filled by the county judge/executive.
  2. The commissioners shall elect a chairman, secretary and treasurer.

History. Enact. Acts 1962, ch. 224, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

Driver v. Sawyer, 392 S.W.2d 52, 1965 Ky. LEXIS 260 ( Ky. 1965 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

There is no constitutional nor statutory prohibition against persons holding the office of county attorney and county treasurer and at the same time serving as a member of the county building commission. OAG 62-1169 .

Even though partially funded with money from the federal government, a county building commission would be required to follow the bidding provisions of KRS 424.260 . OAG 65-746 .

A fiscal court had no statutory authority to submit for a vote of the people the question of whether or not to increase the tax levy for the construction of a new jail. OAG 68-405 .

Under the terms of this section a county may organize a holding company for the purpose of acquiring title to the courthouse property in order to contract for the renovation of the courthouse by borrowing money without the inhibition of the constitutional debt limitations of Ky. Const., §§ 157 and 158. OAG 72-32 .

A county may organize a county buildings commission holding company to construct a new county garage; the county garage may be funded by revenue bonds payable solely from revenue derived from the building, as provided in KRS 67.520 , and would not constitute an indebtedness of the county buildings commission within the meaning of Ky. Const., §§ 157 and 158; or a county may issue its general obligation bonds to fund the construction of county buildings, but the requirements of Ky. Const., §§ 157 and 158 and KRS 66.280 et seq. must then be observed, including a two-thirds vote of the people where the debt cannot be funded out of current revenues. OAG 80-477 .

A county may organize a holding company to secure movable road construction and maintenance equipment which could be mortgaged as security for bondholders, and which could be leased by the holding corporation to the county on an annual lease-option basis. OAG 80-477 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Development of public projects by governmental units and agencies, KRS Ch. 58.

Form of bonds of officers, KRS 62.060 .

67.455. Disbursement of funds.

The treasurer of the commission shall pay out the funds of the commission only upon presentation of warrants signed by the chairman and countersigned by the secretary of the commission. The treasurer shall execute bond to the commission in an amount fixed by the commission.

History. Enact. Acts 1962, ch. 224, § 2.

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Form of bonds of public officers, KRS 62.060 .

67.460. Status of commission.

Such commission shall be a public corporation and commission and shall be considered as a public agency and instrumentality of the county whose county judge/executive appoints same, in order to finance projects under the provisions hereof.

History. Enact. Acts 1962, ch. 224, § 3.

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Interlocal cooperation act, KRS 65.210 to 65.300 .

67.465. Authority to convey to commission fee simple title.

For the purpose of providing county buildings for county purposes or to remodel or improve same, the county of which the members of such commission are residents may convey to the county buildings commission a fee simple title, with covenant of general warranty, to a site now held or hereafter acquired by such county.

History. Enact. Acts 1962, ch. 224, § 4.

67.470. Construction contract — Approval of plans.

Every county buildings commission to which a site for a building has been conveyed, on which a building is to be constructed, remodeled or improved, as provided in KRS 67.465 , shall enter into a contract or contracts with some person for the erection, remodeling or improvements on the site of a building with the necessary appurtenances according to the plans and specifications adopted by the county buildings commission and approved by the county.

History. Enact. Acts 1962, ch. 224, § 5.

Research References and Practice Aids

ALR

Erection of prison or jail in park or square. 18 A.L.R. 1254; 63 A.L.R. 484; 144 A.L.R. 486.

Operation of garage for maintenance and repair of municipal vehicles as governmental function. 26 A.L.R.2d 944.

Maintenance of auditorium, community recreational center building, or the like, as governmental or proprietary function for purposes of tort liability. 47 A.L.R.2d 544.

67.475. Amortization of cost under lease terms.

Immediately upon the approval of the plans and specifications, as provided in KRS 67.470 , the county shall offer to lease the building for a term of one (1) year from the time the building is completed and ready for occupancy. The lease by its terms shall give the lessee the option to extend the lease from year to year for periods of one (1) year until the original term of the lease has been extended for the total number of years acceptable to the county buildings commission, not exceeding thirty (30) years at a rental which, if paid for the original term and for each of the full number of years for which the term is extended, will amortize the total cost of the erection, remodeling or improvement of the building and appurtenances, provide an adequate maintenance fund and, in addition thereto, a sum sufficient to pay the cost of insuring the building against loss or damage by fire and windstorm or other calamity in such sum as may be agreed upon by the parties thereto.

History. Enact. Acts 1962, ch. 224, § 6.

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

County land and building fund, KRS 68.125 .

67.480. Authority to construct county buildings.

Any county buildings commission may establish and erect, remodel or improve county buildings and necessary appurtenances within the county, under the provisions of KRS 67.450 to 67.550 , for the purpose of supplying the county with adequate buildings necessary to carry out its rights, duties and powers.

History. Enact. Acts 1962, ch. 224, § 7.

67.485. Plans and specifications, approval — Bids.

When any county buildings commission desires to construct, remodel or improve a building under the provisions of KRS 67.480 , the county buildings commission shall by resolution cause plans and specifications for the building to be duly made and filed in the office of the county clerk. The plans and specifications shall give a full description of the building to be constructed, remodeled or improved, the details thereof and the manner of construction. The plans and specifications shall be prepared by an architect selected by the county buildings commission and approved by the county. If the plans and specifications are approved and if the county offers to lease the building under a lease of the kind provided in KRS 67.475 , the county buildings commission shall cause its secretary to advertise for bids, and thereafter the county buildings commission through its chairman may contract for the construction, remodeling or improvement of the building.

History. Enact. Acts 1962, ch. 224, § 8.

Research References and Practice Aids

ALR

Revocation, prior to execution of formal written contract, of vote for decision of public body awarding contract to bidder. 3 A.L.R.3d 864.

Right of contractor with federal, state, or local public body to latter’s immunity from tort liability. 9 A.L.R.3d 382.

Contract for personal services as within requirement of submission of bids as condition of public contract. 15 A.L.R.3d 733.

Right of municipal corporation to recover back from contractor payments made under contract violating competitive bidding statute. 33 A.L.R.3d 397.

Liability of municipality on quasi contract for value of property or work furnished without compliance with bidding requirements. 33 A.L.R.3d 1164.

67.490. Authority to borrow money and to issue bonds — Conditions on issuing bonds.

For the purpose of defraying the cost of acquiring, constructing, remodeling, or improvement of any building and its appurtenances under the provisions of KRS 67.480 , any county buildings commission may borrow money and issue negotiable bonds. No bonds shall be issued until the conditions of KRS 67.450 to 67.550 , including the provisions of KRS 67.475 as to a lease, have been complied with and until authorized by a resolution specifying the proposed undertaking, the amount of bonds to be issued, and the maximum rate of interest the bonds are to bear. The resolution shall provide that the building or buildings and appurtenances are to be constructed, remodeled, improved, or acquired under the provisions of KRS 67.450 to 67.550 .

History. Enact. Acts 1962, ch. 224, § 9; 1996, ch. 274, § 5, effective July 15, 1996.

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Bonds, when and how counties may issue, KRS Ch. 66.

67.495. Terms of bonds.

All bonds issued under the provisions of KRS 67.450 to 67.550 may bear interest at a rate or rates or method of determining rates, payable at least annually, and shall be executed in a manner and be payable at times, not exceeding thirty (30) years from the date of issue, and at a place as the county buildings commission determines. The bonds shall be sold in a manner and upon the terms as the county buildings commission deems for its best interests.

History. Enact. Acts 1962, ch. 224, § 10; 1996, ch. 274, § 6, effective July 15, 1996.

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Removal of interest rate limits. KRS 58.430 .

67.500. Bonds, negotiable, nontaxable, payment.

All bonds issued under the provisions of KRS 67.450 to 67.550 shall have all of the qualities of negotiable instruments and shall not be subject to taxation. If any of the officers whose signatures appear on the bonds or coupons cease to be such officers before delivery of the bonds, the signatures shall nevertheless be valid for all purposes, the same as if the officers had remained in office until delivery. The bonds shall be payable solely from revenue derived from the building, as provided in KRS 67.520 , and shall not constitute an indebtedness of the county buildings commission within the meaning of the constitutional provisions or limitations. It shall be plainly stated on the face of each bond that it was issued under the provisions of KRS 67.450 to 67.550 and does not constitute an indebtedness of the county buildings commission.

History. Enact. Acts 1962, ch. 224, § 11.

67.505. Use of bond revenue — Lien created.

All money received from any bonds issued pursuant to the provisions of KRS 67.450 to 67.550 shall be used solely for the establishment, remodeling, erection or improvement of the building and necessary appurtenances, except that the money may be used also to advance the payment of the interest on bonds during the first three (3) years following the date of the bonds. There shall be a statutory mortgage lien upon the buildings and appurtenances in favor of the holder of the bonds and coupons.

History. Enact. Acts 1962, ch. 224, § 12.

67.510. Enforcement of lien.

The building and appurtenances shall remain subject to the statutory mortgage lien provided by KRS 67.505 , until the payment in full of the principal and interest on the bonds. Any holder of the bonds or of any of the coupons may, either at law or in equity, protect and enforce the lien and may by action enforce and compel performance of all duties required in KRS 67.450 to 67.550 , including the making and collecting of sufficient rents, the segregation of income and revenue and the application thereof.

History. Enact. Acts 1962, ch. 224, § 13.

67.515. Receiver authorized.

If there is any default in the payment of principal or interest on any of the bonds, any court having jurisdiction of the action may appoint a receiver to administer the building on behalf of the county buildings commission, with power to charge and collect rentals sufficient to provide for the payment of any bonds or obligations outstanding against the building and for the payment of operating expenses and to apply the income and revenues in conformity with the provisions of KRS 67.450 to 67.550 and of the resolution authorizing such bonds.

History. Enact. Acts 1962, ch. 224, § 14.

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Appointment of receiver to administer project on behalf of governmental agency, KRS 58.060 .

67.520. Special fund created — Bond payment — Building maintenance.

At or before the issuance of the bonds, the county buildings commission by resolution shall set aside and pledge the income of the building into a special fund to be used and applied in payment of the cost and maintenance of the building. The resolution shall definitely fix the amount of revenues necessary to be set aside and applied for the payment of principal and interest on the bonds. The balance of the income shall be set aside for the reasonable and proper maintenance of the building, including a sufficient sum to pay the cost of insurance. The county buildings commission may provide by resolution any provision and stipulation it deems necessary for the administration of the income for the security of the bond holders.

History. Enact. Acts 1962, ch. 224, § 15.

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Fund for maintenance, operation and depreciation of public projects, KRS 58.070 .

67.525. Sinking fund management.

The sinking fund shall be deposited in a depositary selected by the county buildings commission. The deposit, where practicable, shall be continuously secured by a pledge to the county buildings commission of direct obligations of the United States, exclusive of accrued interest, at all times at least equal to the balance on deposit in the account or in some other manner acceptable to the purchasers or holders of the bonds. The securities shall be deposited with the county buildings commission or held by a trustee or agent satisfactory to such commission. The sinking fund may be invested in direct obligations of the United States.

History. Enact. Acts 1962, ch. 224, § 16.

67.530. Surplus in maintenance fund, disposition.

If a surplus is accumulated in the maintenance fund equal to the cost of maintaining the building during the remainder of the calendar or fiscal year, as may be provided by the resolution required by KRS 67.520 , and the cost of maintaining and operating the building for the succeeding like calendar or fiscal year, the excess over such amount shall be transferred to the sinking fund.

History. Enact. Acts 1962, ch. 224, § 17.

67.535. Refunding bonds authorized — Manner of issuance.

The county buildings commission may issue refunding bonds for the purpose of providing funds for the payment of any outstanding bonds, in accordance with the proceedings prescribed for the issuance of the original bonds. The refunding bonds shall be secured to the same extent and shall have the same source of payment as the bonds which are refunded.

History. Enact. Acts 1962, ch. 224, § 18.

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Refinancing at higher interest rate than that of original issue, KRS 58.440 .

67.540. Additional bonds authorized.

If the county buildings commission finds that the bonds authorized will be insufficient to accomplish the purpose desired, additional bonds may be authorized and issued subject to the same procedure.

History. Enact. Acts 1962, ch. 224, § 19.

67.545. Amortization — County ownership.

When the county has paid rent sufficient to amortize the cost of erecting, acquiring, remodeling or improvement of the building and appurtenances and to maintain the building and pay the cost of insurance, the county buildings commission shall thereupon convey the premises to the county and shall transfer any balance remaining in the funds provided for in KRS 67.520 , 67.525 and 67.530 to the account of the county.

History. Enact. Acts 1962, ch. 224, § 20.

67.550. General obligation bonds, deed of trust authorized — Effect — Intent.

  1. Notwithstanding any of the other provisions of KRS 67.450 to 67.550 , the county buildings commission may, by declaring its desire to do so, provide, in addition to all of the other provisions authorized in KRS 67.450 to 67.550 in connection with the issuance of its bonds, that such bonds shall be its general obligations and may, in connection with the issuance of its bonds, execute a mortgage deed of trust in favor of a trustee, providing that in the event of default by the commission in the payment of interest or principal of its bonds or in the event of default of any other covenant contained in such mortgage deed of trust the trustee, upon behalf of the bondholders, may institute and carry through foreclosure proceedings, with the property secured by the mortgage deed of trust put up for sale on foreclosure proceedings, the proceeds of such sale to be used for the benefit of the bondholders. In connection with such plan of financing, such provisions may be inserted in the bonds themselves and in the mortgage deed of trust as may be necessary to protect the bondholders and in order to make such bonds salable with the lowest net interest cost to the commission. If the county buildings commission declares its intent by resolution to follow the provisions of this section, and in order to do so it is necessarily inconsistent that the provisions of any other section of KRS 67.450 to 67.550 be complied with, such other provisions of KRS 67.450 to 67.550 which are necessarily inconsistent with the provisions of this section shall not be complied with to the extent but only to the extent of such necessary inconsistency. If general obligations of the county buildings commission are issued pursuant to the provisions of this section, such obligations shall be general obligations only of the county buildings commission as a public corporation and shall not be general obligations of the individual members of such county buildings commission to any extent.
  2. It is the intent of this section to permit the county buildings commission, if it desires to do so, to issue obligations under this section which may also be secured in the same way that obligations issued under the provisions of other sections of KRS 67.450 to 67.550 are secured, to the full extent that this may be done consistent with the provisions of this section.

History. Enact. Acts 1962, ch. 224, § 21.

67.555. Purpose of KRS 67.450 to 67.550.

The provisions of KRS 67.450 to 67.550 are additional and alternate methods for the acquisition, construction, remodeling and improvement of buildings by counties and do not include, alter, amend or repeal any other statute. No proceedings shall be required for the issuance of any bonds under the provisions of KRS 67.450 to 67.550 , except such as are prescribed therein.

History. Enact. Acts 1962, ch. 224, § 22.

Seized and Forfeited Property

67.590. Designation of custodian of property of indeterminate ownership — Procedure for handling property. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1970, ch. 106, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 193, § 6, effective July 15, 1980.

67.592. Seized and forfeited property — Duties of property clerk — Exclusions.

  1. The county judge/executive shall designate the sheriff of the county, or, if there is a county police department, may designate the chief of the county police, as custodian of all property:
    1. Alleged to be or suspected of being the proceeds of crime;
    2. Alleged to be or suspected of having been used to facilitate the commission of a crime;
    3. Which is subject to confiscation or forfeiture, excluding property subject to forfeiture pursuant to KRS Chapter 218A, or both, under any provision of the Kentucky Revised Statutes;
    4. Which is taken from the person of a prisoner, except for any personal property that may be in the custody of a prisoner upon his or her admission to jail, in which case all property which he or she is not permitted to retain upon admission to jail shall be placed in the custody of the jailer;
    5. Which is lost or abandoned and taken into custody by any peace officer, or the courts; or
    6. Which is taken from persons supposed to be insane, intoxicated, or otherwise incapable of taking care of themselves.
  2. Any peace officer, except for the Department of Kentucky State Police, or court having custody of the property shall, as soon as practicable, deliver it into the custody of the property clerk.
  3. The sheriff or chief of county police designated as custodian of property shall appoint from persons on his or her staff, or may employ, a person to serve as property clerk and other persons necessary as deputy property clerks.
  4. All the property shall be particularly described and registered by the property clerk, or his or her deputy, in a book kept for that purpose, containing the name of the owner, if ascertained, the place where found, the name of the person from whom it was taken, with the general circumstances of its receipt, the name of the officer recovering the property, the names of all claimants to the property, and any final disposition of the property. The property clerk shall advertise the property, if it is not the subject of a forfeiture proceeding, as to the amount and disposition of the property.
  5. The fiscal court of the county may prescribe regulations in regard to the duties of the property clerk and his or her deputies, and require security for the faithful performance of the duties imposed by this section.
  6. All animals stolen, strayed, lost, or confiscated that come into the possession of the property clerk shall be sent to an animal shelter located within the county, if there is one, or if there is none to an animal shelter in another county.
  7. No property shall be delivered to the property clerk or his or her deputy except as provided in this section.
  8. No property shall be disposed of by the property clerk or his or her deputy except in the manner prescribed by law.
  9. The provisions of this section shall apply in all unincorporated areas of a county and in all cities which do not appoint a property custodian pursuant to KRS 95.845 .

History. Enact. Acts 1980, ch. 193, § 1, effective July 15, 1980; 1990, ch. 445, § 4, effective July 13, 1990; 2004, ch. 189, § 25, effective July 13, 2004; 2007, ch. 85, § 141, effective June 26, 2007.

67.594. Use of property as evidence — Disposition.

  1. If any property in the custody of the property custodian is desired as evidence in any court, such property shall be delivered to any officer who presents an order to that effect from the court. Such property shall not be retained by the court, but shall be returned to the property clerk.
  2. All property which has been seized and is forfeited pursuant to law shall be disposed of as provided in the court order of forfeiture.
  3. All property that remains in the custody of the property clerk without any lawful claimant thereto, and which is contraband or which is subject to forfeiture and on which there will be no court action shall be ordered forfeited by the Circuit Court of the county not less than ninety (90) days after it comes into the possession of the property clerk. The order of forfeiture shall specify the manner of disposition of the property and shall be consistent with applicable provisions of the Kentucky Revised Statutes and federal law. If the property is ordered and sold the proceeds shall go to:
    1. The state if the property was seized by an agency of the state or peace officer thereof;
    2. The county, if the property was seized by the sheriff or an agency or peace officer of the county;
    3. The Department of Fish and Wildlife Resources, if the property was seized by a peace officer of the Department of Fish and Wildlife or was seized by any other officer for violation of KRS Chapter 150;
    4. The city, if the property was seized by the city or by an agency or peace officer thereof and the property was delivered to the city property clerk;
    5. The city (ninety percent (90%) of the proceeds) and the sheriff (ten percent (10%) of the proceeds) if the property was seized by the city or by an agency or peace officer thereof and the property was delivered to the sheriff or the county police; or
    6. The state, if the property was seized by any combination of agencies listed above.
  4. All property that remains in the custody of the property custodian without any lawful claimant thereto and which is not subject to the provisions of subsections (2) or (3) of this section may be sold at public auction in a suitable room designated for such purpose, after being advertised pursuant to KRS Chapter 424. The proceeds of such sale shall be paid into the fiscal court to the credit of the agency which has custody of the property. No property shall be sold pursuant to this section unless:
    1. The property has been in custody for not less than ninety (90) days; and
    2. Reasonable efforts have been made by the property clerk or his deputy to ascertain the name of the true owner or lawful claimant of the property and to effect its return to him; and
    3. The sale of the property is in conformity with applicable state and federal laws and regulations.

History. Enact. Acts 1980, ch. 193, § 2, effective July 15, 1980.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

United States v. Hatfield, 815 F.2d 1068, 1987 U.S. App. LEXIS 4273 (6th Cir. 1987).

Opinions of Attorney General.

In order to minimize potential liability to lien holders, a county police agency, or other agency, should, as a minimum, send notice, allowing a sufficient opportunity to respond, by certified mail, return receipt requested, of possible sale of a vehicle unclaimed following impoundment. Such notice should be sent to both the registered owner of such vehicle, and any lien holders of record regarding such vehicle. Such notice must be given with respect to both in-state and out-of-state vehicles. Agencies should retain documentation of their efforts in such regard. OAG 91-96 .

67.600. Use of property in custody as evidence — Auction of unclaimed property. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1970, ch. 106, § 2) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 193, § 6, effective July 15, 1980.

Service Districts

67.650. Establishment of service districts — Requirements for expansion of boundaries.

The territory of a county may, as permitted by Section 172A of the Constitution, be divided into service districts by the fiscal court. Each service district shall constitute a separate tax district within which the county government may, upon receipt of a petition signed by a majority of the registered voters in the district as of the last general election, levy and collect taxes in accordance with the kind, type, level, and character of the services provided by the county government in each of these service districts. The governing body of the county government may abolish or alter service districts, but any expansion of the boundaries of a service district shall require a petition signed by a majority of the registered voters, as of the last general election, in the new territory to be incorporated.

History. Enact. Acts 1978, ch. 195, § 1, effective June 17, 1978.

Opinions of Attorney General.

It would appear, from an examination of the constitutional provisions (Ky. Const., § 172A) and the implementing statute (this section), that where the voters in the district created are not receiving the services provided by the county government they may petition the fiscal court to reduce such rate, but there is no provision for the fiscal court to act in accordance with such petition and it could very well ignore the petition and continue to levy the rate in effect. OAG 78-580 .

County Cemetery Board

67.680. County cemetery board.

  1. A county acting under authority of this section may by ordinance create a county cemetery board that may apply to the Department for Local Government for grants to restore and maintain nonprofit cemeteries that do not receive perpetual care funds pursuant to KRS 367.952.
  2. The county cemetery boards shall meet three (3) times annually in space provided by the fiscal court and shall have five (5) volunteer members with no more than three (3) representing the same political party. Members shall be appointed by the county judge/executive with approval of the fiscal court, shall have lived in the county for at least one (1) year prior to appointment, and shall have demonstrated an interest in cemetery preservation, genealogy, local history, or a related area.

History. Enact. Acts 2002, ch. 276, § 3, effective July 15, 2002; 2007, ch. 47, § 54, effective June 26, 2007; 2010, ch. 117, § 60, effective July 15, 2010.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(7/15/2002). Under the authority of KRS 7.136 , the Reviser of Statutes has corrected a clearly erroneous statutory reference in subsection (1) of this section as enacted in 2002 Ky. Acts ch. 276, sec. 3, by changing “KRS 367.962” to “KRS 367.952.”

67.682. County cemetery fund — Administrative regulations relating to county cemetery board.

  1. The Department for Local Government shall establish a county cemetery fund to receive appropriations, gifts, grants, federal funds, revolving funds, and any other funds from public and private sources.
    1. Moneys deposited in the fund shall be disbursed by the State Treasurer and any unallocated or unencumbered balances in the fund shall be invested as provided in KRS 42.500(9).
    2. Income earned from investment, including unallotted or unencumbered balances in the fund, shall not lapse, shall be returned to the Department for Local Government, and may be redistributed to other counties.
  2. The Department for Local Government shall promulgate administrative regulations related to responsibilities of the boards, grant appropriation amounts and eligible expenditures, application and reporting procedures, accountability criteria for grant recipients, and other issues of importance to the board’s operation.

History. Enact. Acts 2002, ch. 276, § 4, effective July 15, 2002; 2007, ch. 47, § 55, effective June 26, 2007; 2010, ch. 117, § 61, effective July 15, 2010.

County Judge/Executive

67.700. County judge/executive — Election — Term.

There shall be elected in nineteen hundred and seventy-seven (1977) and every four (4) years thereafter, in each county a county judge/executive who shall enter upon the discharge of the duties of his office on the first Monday in January after his election, and continue in office four (4) years, and until the election and qualification of his successor.

History. Enact. Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 20, § 1.

Opinions of Attorney General.

Where the county judge has served on a committee which functions in an administrative capacity under the express terms of a trust instrument, the county judge/executive can continue to serve on the committee. OAG 77-742 .

67.705. Qualifications — Vacancy — Salary — Minimum annual compensation — Exception — Duties and salaries of judge/executive and magistrates or commissioners in county containing a consolidated local government.

  1. Each county shall have a chief executive officer known as the county judge/executive. Only a resident of the county shall be eligible for election as county judge/executive. He shall be nominated and elected by the qualified voters of the county in the manner provided by law for the election of county officers. In case the office of county judge/executive becomes vacant by reason of death, resignation, or removal, it shall be filled with a person appointed by the Governor, in accordance with Section 152 of the Constitution, for the unexpired term. The Governor shall appoint a person to fill a vacancy in the office of county judge/executive not later than thirty (30) days after the date on which the vacancy occurs. If a vacancy occurs in the office of county judge/executive, the remaining members of fiscal court shall elect one (1) of their members to serve as temporary county judge/executive until the Governor fills the vacancy in the office, notwithstanding the provisions of KRS 61.080(2) to the contrary.
  2. The county judge/executive shall receive an annual salary pursuant to the salary schedule in KRS 64.5275 , except in counties that contain an urban-county form of government or a consolidated local government, where the county judge/executive shall receive the salary set by the legislative body.
  3. Except in counties containing a consolidated local government, in no event shall the county judge/executive, justice of the peace, magistrate, or commissioners who serve on the fiscal court holding office on January 2, 1978, receive less than the total annual compensation received by that official during calendar year 1976.
  4. In a county containing a consolidated local government, the county judge/executive and magistrates or commissioners may have those duties as determined by ordinance of the consolidated local government and shall receive a salary as set by the legislative council of the consolidated local government for those duties.

History. Enact. Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 20, § 2, effective January 2, 1978; 1982, ch. 384, § 1, effective July 15, 1982; 1998, ch. 592, § 1, effective July 15, 1998; 1998, ch. 610, § 6, effective July 15, 1998; 2002, ch. 346, § 41, effective July 15, 2002.

Compiler’s Notes.

Section 10 of Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 20, as amended by § 4 of Acts 1982, ch. 384 provided that “Sections 2 through 7 of this Act shall not apply in counties having an urban county form of government. In such counties, the duties of the county judge/executive shall be as prescribed by the comprehensive plan of such government and his salary shall be fixed by the legislative body of such government.”

Legislative Research Commission Note.

Section 10 of Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 20, as amended by § 4 of Acts 1982, ch. 384 provided that: “This section and KRS 67.710 to 67.720 shall not apply in counties having an urban county form of government. In such counties, the duties of the county judge/executive shall be as prescribed by the comprehensive plan of such government and his salary shall be fixed by the legislative body of such government.”

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. That Official.

The term “that official” in subsection (4) of this section applies to the office or the salary paid to the one holding the office of county judge/executive in 1976 and this section does not limit the minimum payment only if “that official” is the same person in 1978 as in 1976. Wood v. Shelby County, 581 S.W.2d 31, 1979 Ky. App. LEXIS 406 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).

2. Salary Limits Mandatory.

Where the Shelby County Fiscal Court was required by subsection (4) of this section to set the county judge/executive’s salary at a minimum of $16,768.80, but had set it at a lower figure, there was no conflict with either Ky. Const., § 161, or KRS 64.530(4) since the increase would merely correct the situation to do what should have been done, and mandamus would be the proper remedy. Wood v. Shelby County, 581 S.W.2d 31, 1979 Ky. App. LEXIS 406 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).

Even though the effective date of subsections (2), (3) and (4) of this section was January 2, 1978, which would put the burden for fixing the salary on the new fiscal court, in conflict with Ky. Const., § 161 and KRS 64.530(4), the old fiscal court was free to fix the salary anywhere within the limits, and any salary set above or below the limits would be illegal and void. Wood v. Shelby County, 581 S.W.2d 31, 1979 Ky. App. LEXIS 406 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Although a fiscal court is mandatorily held to the applicable minimal basis, the court may use its discretion in going above that level until it reaches the maximum compensation permitted under KRS 64.527 for the county judge/executive. OAG 77-720 .

The county judge/executive is entitled to the higher minimum under this section; and thus the fiscal court may adjust his compensation from the lower to the higher minimum. OAG 78-55 .

A county judge/executive is not automatically entitled to the annual maximum rubber dollar compensation; the fiscal court must set his salary, subject to the applicable minimum and the rubber dollar maximum, and the fiscal court has a discretion as to his salary in the range from the minimum level to the maximum level. OAG 80-208 .

County judge/executive is entitled to get retroactive pay in order to make minimum annual salary provided by this section as amended in 1982. OAG 82-253 .

While the 1982 amendment to this section became effective on July 15, 1982, under the express language “annual compensation” used in the amendment, such amendment will apply retroactively back to January 1, 1982, as relates to the 1982 calendar year. OAG 82-253 .

The 1982 amendment to this section with regard to the county judge/executive’s salary is strictly in the context of the rubber dollar-consumer price index formulation. Thus the fixing of the county judge/executive’s salary in 1982 is not a change in compensation, in the constitutional sense, but is a fixation in terms of affording those officers with the application of the consumer price index theory previously adopted by Kentucky’s then highest court. OAG 82-317 .

The purpose of the six percent (6%) limitation of subsection (3) of this section was to place a maximum in terms of six percent (6%) of the county’s total receipts, excluding federal revenue sharing moneys, special federal grants and Local Government Economic Assistance. OAG 84-95 .

There is no statutory definition of the term “annual general fund receipts,” as used in subsection (3) of this section; consequently, it can only refer to all revenues coming into the county treasury, each year, including road funds, with the exceptions of revenue sharing moneys, special federal grants and Local Government Economic Assistance moneys. OAG 84-95 .

A county judge/executive cannot refuse to accept the full mandatory salary provided by this section and KRS 64.527 and he must be paid back pay for any year in which he was not paid the amount required by statute. OAG 84-381 .

Given this section, it is not likely that the county judge/executive could be paid less in annual compensation than the salary drawn by the county clerk and county sheriff. A motion by the fiscal court denying a cost of living increase to all elected officials of the county, thereby seeking to prevent payment from the county treasury to the county judge/executive of the amount to which he or she would be entitled pursuant to this section, would be in violation of this section. OAG 94-44 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Compensation adjustment, annual computation of consumer price index, KRS 64.527 .

67.710. Powers and duties.

The county judge/executive shall be the chief executive of the county and shall have all the powers and perform all the duties of an executive and administrative nature vested in, or imposed upon, the county or its fiscal court by law, or by agreement with any municipality or other subdivision of government, and such additional powers as are granted by the fiscal court. The county judge/executive shall be responsible for the proper administration of the affairs of the county placed in his charge. His responsibilities shall include, but are not limited to, the following:

  1. Provide for the execution of all ordinances and resolutions of the fiscal court, execute all contracts entered into by the fiscal court, and provide for the execution of all laws by the state subject to enforcement by him or by officers who are under his direction and supervision;
  2. Prepare and submit to the fiscal court for approval an administrative code incorporating the details of administrative procedure for the operation of the county and review such code and suggest revisions periodically or at the request of the fiscal court;
  3. Furnish the fiscal court with information concerning the operations of the county departments, boards, or commissions, necessary for the fiscal court to exercise its powers or as requested by the fiscal court;
  4. Require all officials, elected or appointed, whose offices utilize county funds, and all boards, special districts, and commissions exclusive of city governments and their agencies located within the county to make a detailed annual financial report to the fiscal court concerning the business and condition of their office, department, board, commission, or special districts;
  5. Consistent with procedures set forth in KRS Chapter 68, prepare and submit to the fiscal court an annual budget and administer the provisions of the budget when adopted by the fiscal court;
  6. Keep the fiscal court fully advised as to the financial condition and needs of the county and make such other reports from time to time as required by the fiscal court or as he deems necessary;
  7. Exercise with the approval of the fiscal court the authority to appoint, supervise, suspend, and remove county personnel (unless otherwise provided by state law);
  8. With the approval of the fiscal court, make appointments to or remove members from such boards, commissions, and designated administrative positions as the fiscal court, charter, law or ordinance may create. The requirement of fiscal court approval must be designated as such in the county administrative code or the county charter. In counties containing a city of the first class, the county judge/executive shall appoint to those seats which are not subject to prior qualification on a board or commission an equal number of members from each district, as defined in KRS 67.045 , into which the authority of the board or commission extends. If there are more districts than members of a particular board or commission, he shall not appoint more than one (1) member from any district. If there are more members of a particular board or commission than there are districts, he shall equalize appointments to the extent possible. The county judge/executive shall not be required, but shall use his best efforts, to balance appointments on a board or commission if the appointments are to be made from nominees submitted by other groups or individuals or if nominees must have a professional or technical background, expertise or membership. He shall attempt to balance appointments among all such boards and commissions in order to equalize representation of all districts over the entire range of such boards and commissions; and
  9. When directed by statute or an ordinance of that county to make an appointment and fill a vacancy, nominate a person to fill the vacancy within sixty (60) days of the date of the vacancy. The fiscal court shall approve or disapprove the nomination within forty-five (45) days of the receipt of the nomination. If the county judge/executive fails to nominate a person within sixty (60) days of the date of the vacancy, the fiscal court may fill the vacancy. If the fiscal court fails to approve or disapprove a nomination within forty-five (45) days of the nomination, the county judge/executive’s nominee is deemed to have been approved. If the fiscal court disapproves a nomination, the county judge/executive shall nominate another person to fill the vacancy within forty-five (45) days of the disapproval. If the county/judge executive fails to nominate another person within forty-five (45) days, a majority of the fiscal court may fill the vacancy.

History. Enact. Acts 1976, ch. 20, § 3, effective January 2, 1978; 1986, ch. 101, § 1, effective July 15, 1986; 1988, ch. 338, § 1, effective July 15, 1988; 2019 ch. 19, § 1, effective June 27, 2019.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

See Legislative Research Commission Note following KRS 67.705 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Analysis

1. Legislative Intent.

The Legislature chose to enact one comprehensive statute setting forth the nature and extent of the powers and duties county judges/executive were to retain when their judicial powers terminated on January 2, 1978, and thus this section was intended by the legislature to amend by implication all pre-existing statutes which vested the county judge/executive with an unrestricted power to appoint the members of boards and commissions and to definitively set forth the precise nature, extent, and scope of that power for the future. Fiscal Court Comm'rs v. Jefferson County Judge/Executive, 614 S.W.2d 954, 1981 Ky. App. LEXIS 234 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981).

2. Approval of Appointments Designated in County Code.

The portion of subsection (8) of this section which reads “the requirement of fiscal court approval must be designated as such in the county administrative code or the county charter” was added merely for the purpose of insuring that a given county’s administrative code will spell out that fiscal courts have a right to approve appointments made by county judges/executive to boards and commissions, rather than making the existence of an administrative code a condition precedent to the fiscal court’s right to exercise its power of approval. Fiscal Court Comm'rs v. Jefferson County Judge/Executive, 614 S.W.2d 954, 1981 Ky. App. LEXIS 234 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981).

There is nothing in the language of subsection (8) of this section to indicate that the requirement of fiscal court approval of county judge/executive appointments was not intended by the legislature to be effective until such time as the requirement is designated in a given county’s administrative code or charter, since to so find would require court to find that legislature intended to permit the county judge/executive to defeat the right of approval conferred upon the fiscal court by failing to comply with his responsibility under subsection (2) of this section to prepare and submit a proposed county administrative code for fiscal court approval, and such result would be ludicrous. Fiscal Court Comm'rs v. Jefferson County Judge/Executive, 614 S.W.2d 954, 1981 Ky. App. LEXIS 234 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981).

4. Code Proposal.

Although the county executive procrastinated in performing his duty to propose a county code, the county’s fiscal court violated KRS 67.710(2) when it proposed and adopted its own code; only a county executive was permitted to propose a code. A trial court’s order recognizing the fiscal court’s code as binding was improper. Knight v. Spurlin, 226 S.W.3d 844, 2007 Ky. App. LEXIS 116 (Ky. Ct. App. 2007).

5. Personnel Matters.

Where a county planner claimed that he was hired and thus could only be fired by the fiscal court, but no mention was made of his hiring in the fiscal court’s meeting minutes as required by KRS 61.800 to 61.884 , the absence of any such approval or ratification rendered his employment improper ab initio, so the fiscal court did not have to approve the termination of his employment. Kelley v. Miller, 2007 Ky. App. Unpub. LEXIS 106 (Ky. Ct. App. Oct. 12, 2007), review denied, ordered not published, 2008 Ky. LEXIS 219 (Ky. Sept. 10, 2008).

Cited:

Christian v. Belcher, 888 F.2d 410, 1989 U.S. App. LEXIS 15908 (6th Cir. 1989).

Notes to Unpublished Decisions

Analysis

1. Liability.

Unpublished decision: Federal claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983 against a county judge executive for his participation in the hiring and supervision of a custodian who raped the plaintiff, while she was doing community service at the court house, were summarily dismissed because the plaintiff failed to show that the county judge executive was deliberately indifferent to her constitutional rights when he hired the custodian as it was not plainly obvious that the custodian would have sexually assaulted someone and there was no evidence that the county judge executive had any information that the custodian was likely to abuse another sexually or that the county judge executive encouraged or was directly involved in the rape. Doe v. Magoffin County Fiscal Court, 174 Fed. Appx. 962, 2006 FED App. 0259N, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 9482 (6th Cir. Ky. 2006 ).

2. Immunity from Liability.

Unpublished decision: State law tort claims against a county judge executive for his participation in the hiring and supervision of a custodian who raped the plaintiff, while she was doing community service at the court house, were summarily dismissed because sovereign immunity protected the executive from the claims against him in his official capacity, and qualified official immunity protected him from liability for the state law claims of negligent hiring and negligent supervision. The decision to hire and not to perform a background check were discretionary functions, and there was no evidence that the executive had acted in bad faith; the duty to supervise was not ministerial as the plaintiff pointed to no regulation, statute, or administrative framework in this case that required the executive’s obedience and therefore he was protected by qualified official immunity under Kentucky law. Doe v. Magoffin County Fiscal Court, 174 Fed. Appx. 962, 2006 FED App. 0259N, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 9482 (6th Cir. Ky. 2006 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Where the term of an officer appointed to a board or commission by the county judge (now county judge/executive) extends beyond January 2, 1978, the appointment is not nullified because of the fact that the appointing authority went out of office or because the office of the appointing authority was abolished, for the validity of such appointment rests purely on the matter of whether the county judge (now county judge/executive) prior to January 2, 1978 made the appointment in conformity with the statutes. OAG 77-149 .

The county judge/executive continues to perform nonjudicial statutory functions previously performed by the county judge. OAG 77-288 .

An alien would be legally qualified to be a secretary to the county judge/executive, but the alien could not be a notary public. OAG 77-297 .

Under this section, the county judge/executive has the authority to hire or fire CETA personnel, with the approval of fiscal court. OAG 77-426 .

After the position is created by ordinance of the fiscal court, the county judge/executive appoints the pro tem with the approval of the fiscal court to serve as county judge/executive when the latter is ill, out of the country or State or is otherwise incapacitated to carry out his statutory duties. OAG 78-71 ; 78-197.

If the fiscal court creates the position of administrative assistant by ordinance, then the county judge/executive, with the approval of the fiscal court, may appoint someone to such position. OAG 78-118 .

In hiring county road personnel, the county judge/executive can only nominate such employes and the fiscal court can accept or reject such nominations. OAG 78-164 .

While the other fiscal court members can suggest a nominee for hiring, the county judge/executive does not have to accept such nomination. OAG 78-164 .

Under the terms of subsection (1) of KRS 67.705 following a vacancy of the office of county judge/executive, the Governor fills said vacancy, subject to an election for the unexpired term as required by Ky. Const., § 152. OAG 78-197 .

The county judge/executive does not have authority to remove a water commissioner from office, but such power of removal is lodged in the Public Service Commission. OAG 78-215 .

If the county judge/executive sends his secretary to attend district meetings to represent him as to availability of funds to the county, the secretary’s report should be made available to the fiscal court since this section requires the county judge/executive to furnish fiscal court with all pertinent information concerning county operations necessary for the proper exercise of fiscal court powers and to keep the fiscal court fully advised as to any financial matters affecting the county operations. OAG 78-223 .

In connection with county policemen, the county judge/executive has the authority to hire and fire such personnel without the consent of fiscal court but the fiscal court must set a salary for county policemen. OAG 78-223 .

The fiscal court may, under subsection (8) of this section, pass an ordinance establishing the administrative office of county judge/executive pro tem to serve in the absence of the county judge/executive or when he is ill or otherwise unable to carry out the functions of that office. OAG 78-277 .

The county judge/executive has authority to require the library boards to submit to him such information concerning its operations as from time to time the fiscal court may require. OAG 78-331 .

The county judge/executive is given no authority to appropriate or spend county funds. OAG 78-332 .

The county judge/executive would be acting beyond the scope of his powers by appointing a library board which would in turn initiate a library program which would be supported by county funds where the fiscal court had not, by prior action, appropriated funds for such a purpose. OAG 78-332 .

Since the provisions of KRS 97.035(2) and subsection (8) of this section regarding removal of members of the park board are irreconcilable such that effect cannot reasonably be given to both, subsection (8) of this section amends by implication the provisions of KRS 97.035(2). OAG 78-353 .

The county judge/executive does not have the authority to appoint a member of a board, commission or designated administrative position without the majority approval of fiscal court; the consent of the fiscal court as a body is mandatory. OAG 78-353 .

The county judge/executive does not have the authority to remove a member of a board, commission or designated administrative position prior to the expiration of their term, or if there is no term, without the majority approval of the fiscal court. OAG 78-353 .

The county judge/executive is the sole nominating authority for positions of membership on a board, commission and in an agency, and the other members of fiscal court can suggest a nomination, but the county judge/executive does not have to agree to the nomination. OAG 78-353 .

The county judge/executive need not exhaust the complete list of applicants for a position on a board, commission or agency before asking for new applicants for such position. OAG 78-353 .

Where the fiscal court vote is tied on selection of personnel (officer or employee), either under the nomination and consent procedure or where fiscal court determines that appointment (under any preexisting statute), the county judge/executive may break the tie under KRS 67.070(3). OAG 78-353 .

Because the county judge/executive’s power is purely executive and administrative, he may not appoint the members of the hospital board, even where such appointments would be subject to the approval of the fiscal court since that power is vested only in the fiscal court. OAG 78-375 (modified by OAG 78-466 to the extent of conflict).

The tenure of county employees generally, in the absence of a civil service system, cannot extend beyond the tenure of the members of the fiscal court which appoints them. OAG 78-432 .

Appointees of the county judge/executive should be documented by an executive order of the county judge/executive and filed in the county judge/executive’s executive order book in the county clerk’s office. OAG 78-454 .

The general procedure of appointing and removing members of boards created by statute is governed by subsection (8) of this section, whereby only the county judge/executive can nominate for appointment and removal a particular individual member of the board, subject to the acceptance or rejection by the fiscal court as a body, since the appointing function is generally considered to be executive in nature, and not essentially a legislative one and since subsection (8) of this section amends by implication KRS 216.323 , since the former statute is the later expression of the legislative will. OAG 78-466 (modifying 78-375 to the extent of conflict).

The executive director of the Jefferson County Metropolitan Correctional Services Department has authority to hire and fire employees under KRS 67B.050(4) which is within the exception of subsection (7) of this section. OAG 78-551 .

The fiscal court, if necessary, can appoint a person to assist the county judge/executive in the administration of purchases. OAG 78-621 .

The procedure envisioned in KRS 31.170 would govern over the general procedure established in subsection (7) of this section. OAG 78-700 .

Subsection (8) of this section and KRS 183.132 (3)(b) (now KRS 183.132 (4)(b)) are in irreconcilable conflict, and in this situation the later statute should control and while KRS 183.132 was last amended in 1964, subsection (8) of this section was passed during the extraordinary session of 1976; therefore subsection (8) of this section controls. OAG 78-746 .

Implicit in KRS 67.080 , 68.005 and this section is the authority for the fiscal court to establish in the administrative code a reasonable provision for the county judge/executive’s vacation with pay. OAG 79-14 .

There is no statutory authority for the county judge/executive to delegate the hiring and firing of county personnel. OAG 79-35 .

Subsection (8) of this section simply means the county judge/executive nominates a person to a commission and then the fiscal court either rejects or accepts the nomination. OAG 79-118 .

When subsection (8) of this section and KRS 68.230 (now repealed) are read together, the county judge/executive nominates a person for the appointive membership on the budget commission, subject to the approval or disapproval of the nomination by the fiscal court and where the fiscal court approves the nomination, the appointment is entered in the county judge/executive order book. OAG 79-118 .

The administrative code of a county can in no way be worded such as to supersede any statutory authority to act in the areas of fiscal affairs, personnel and purchasing. OAG 79-153 .

The fiscal court has no authority on its own initiative to amend or change the county administrative code; rather, the county judge/executive has the sole power to offer a code and suggest revisions thereto, subject to the approval or disapproval of fiscal court as a body in adopting a code or revisions thereof since the word “adopt,” as used in KRS 68.005 , clearly suggests the approval of something already formulated, and subsection (2) of this section vests in the county judge/executive the sole authority to “prepare and submit” for fiscal court “approval” an administrative code. OAG 79-153 .

The initiating of or proposing the administrative code rests only with the county judge/executive. OAG 79-176 .

Only the county judge/executive has the burden of and authority to submit such a code and suggested revisions thereof to the fiscal court for its approval or rejection. OAG 79-179 .

The fiscal court in all counties must adopt an administrative code. OAG 79-179 .

There is no penalty provision for the failure to provide an administrative code. OAG 79-179 .

Only the county judge/executive can propose an administrative code and suggest revisions or amendments to it, and once he proposes the code or amendments, then the fiscal court as a body either adopts it, or rejects the proposal and starts over again. OAG 79-238 .

The specific language of KRS 178.080 must govern, with the viewers being appointed by the fiscal court, acting as a body, and the general procedure of this section not applying. OAG 79-290 .

There is nothing in this section to suggest that a county judge/executive can take over all executive authority in connection with county roads. OAG 79-345 .

This section, KRS 67.080 and KRS 67.083 are in pari materia and must be construed together such that effect may be given to all of the provisions of each, if fairly and reasonably such construction is possible. OAG 79-345 .

Subsection (8) of this section generally amends by implication earlier statutes dealing with the same subject matter and which are irreconcilable with the later statute. OAG 79-352 .

Pursuant to this section the county judge/executive must nominate a person for the office of county treasurer, subject to the approval of the fiscal court as a body, and if the fiscal court in passing on the nomination comes to a tie vote, the tie vote provisions of KRS 67.040(3) apply. OAG 80-175 ; OAG 81-11 ; OAG 81-151 .

The county officer selection system of subsection (8) of this section has no application where a county fiscal court leases hospital facilities and equipment to a nonprofit corporation and the hospital will be operated as a hospital of that corporation, and not as a county hospital, even though under the terms of the lease agreement the board of directors of the lessee corporation will be selected by the county fiscal court. OAG 80-268 .

The commissioners of fiscal court cannot screen and hire CETA workers without the county judge/executive’s knowledge since that would be in violation of this section, such action constituting an usurpation of the county judge/executive’s function in nominating people for hiring. OAG 80-334 .

Since the fiscal affairs of the county, including the final adoption of the budget, are squarely on the shoulders of the fiscal court as a body, the county judge/executive and his staff have the duty to employ all reasonable means of furnishing needed fiscal information to the other commissioners, and the county judge/executive should answer all reasonable requests for information by the commissioners prior to the May 24 deadline for submitting the budget to the fiscal court, because the fiscal court must act on the budget by July 1 and five weeks is not a sufficient period to review the proposed budget in detail. OAG 80-344 .

The fiscal court may approve of an administrative code provision whereby the county judge/executive could, under a properly defined emergency situation, take steps to effect repair of a county road or bridge, subject, however, to a ratification of such action by the fiscal court as a body at the first meeting opportunity. OAG 80-368 .

The responsibility for determining precisely just what specifically designated road segments and bridges will be constructed, reconstructed, maintained or repaired, rests with the fiscal court as a body, not the county judge/executive, and the county judge/executive cannot order the road department to begin work on a particular bridge without fiscal court approval. OAG 80-368 .

The county judge/executive can give the nominating or appointing power to the deputy in writing when the county judge/executive is ill, and this would include the power of appointment held by the county judge/executive pursuant to special statutes such as KRS 63.220 . OAG 80-372 .

Since KRS 183.132(10) and subdivision (8) of this section are in conflict as to who removes a member of a county air board, this section, as the later enactment, prevails and a member of a county air board is removed by the county judge/executive with the approval of the fiscal court; the statutes are not in conflict as to the reasons for removal, however, and a member of a county air board can only be removed by the county judge/executive and the fiscal court for those specific reasons set forth in KRS 183.132(10). OAG 80-403 .

Since the overall supervision of the county road program is the responsibility of the county judge/executive, the road supervisor or engineer is required to carry out his technical road duties, but under the supervision of the county judge/executive; this means that when the fiscal court wants an engineer report on the program, the fiscal court should request the county judge/executive to have himself and the road supervisor present at the fiscal court meeting or meetings for purposes of the report and any discussion which may ensue. OAG 80-412 .

Where an air board is established by a county, the air board members are nominated by the county judge/executive, subject to the approval of fiscal court as a body, and since the fiscal court is therefor the appointing authority, a justice of the peace serving on the fiscal court is prohibited by KRS 183.132(10) from becoming an air board member. OAG 80-436 .

Because of the peculiar nature of the removal of a county treasurer, under KRS 68.010(3) (now subsection (4)), the special provisions of that section govern over the general system of discharge as contained in subsection (8) of this section; thus the discharge of a county treasurer is strictly up to the fiscal court, as a body, after a due process hearing. OAG 80-453 .

Where a fiscal court entered orders approving of a loan for the construction or renovation of a new county facility and courthouse, but the county judge/executive refused to sign the loan and renovation documents prior to their deadline date, the other members of the fiscal court could sign the documents on behalf of the county, because the fiscal court can exercise such an executive or administrative function as signing documents it has legislatively authorized where the county judge/executive fails or refuses to carry out his mere ministerial duty of signing; to hold otherwise would obviously give the county judge/executive veto power over the fiscal court, which he does not have, and would permit the blocking of the will of the majority of the fiscal court. OAG 80-458 .

When a multi-county road engineer is not working in a particular contracting county, the county judge/executive must supervise the road program without him since the county judge/executive is the overall executive head over the county road program, but the executive role of the county judge/executive was not intended to take the place of a road engineer or supervisor. OAG 80-542 .

Since the reporting of the road supervisor at a fiscal court meeting is mandatory, and since the county judge/executive should be present when the report is given, it is mandatory that the county judge/executive be present with the road supervisor on such report occasions. OAG 80-610 .

Until the 1980 amendment to KRS 68.010 becomes effective on April 1, 1982, the county judge/executive must nominate a person for the office of county treasurer under this section, subject to the approval or disapproval of the fiscal court as a body, and on and after April 1, 1982 the fiscal court shall appoint the county treasurer, since KRS 68.010 , as amended in 1980, would govern over this section since the amended KRS 68.010 would be the later expression of legislative intent. OAG 81-11 ; OAG 81-151 .

A county administrative code regulation which grants the county judge/executive the right to appoint a person to the district hospital board on a temporary basis not to exceed one year without approval of the fiscal court, where the fiscal court has rejected all of the nominations submitted by the county judge/executive, is invalid and in conflict with KRS 216.323 and subsection (8) of this section, since these statutes do not authorize the county judge/executive under any circumstances to appoint any person to fill the position, temporarily or otherwise, without the formal approval of the fiscal court. OAG 81-29 .

An earlier opinion, OAG 80-175 , which held that the current version of KRS 68.010 (effective until April 1, 1982), which provides that the fiscal court shall appoint the county treasurer, and subsection (8) of this section are irreconcilable and that this section, governs, will not be modified, since the two different methods of appointment cannot be reconciled; the execution of one would defeat the operation of the other, the specific nature of KRS 68.010 and the general nature of this section do not render them reconcilable. OAG 81-151 .

There is no danger that the county judge/executive could, through his power to appoint and remove the county treasurer, jeopardize the checks and balances system of KRS 68.020 to the extent the county judge/executive and treasurer must cosign checks since this section does not leave the appointment in the hands of the county judge/executive, because he can only make the appointment with the approval of the fiscal court. OAG 81-151 .

While the statutes make provision for the fiscal court enacting an administrative code, the county can still operate effectively without such a code since the provision in subsection (8) of this section relating to a code simply means that if a code is enacted, it must contain appointment provisions which are not in conflict with this section. OAG 81-151 .

Where the county clerk in any county, except one containing a first-class city, fails to exercise his option to automatically become clerk of the fiscal court, the fiscal court must appoint the clerk of the fiscal court pursuant to KRS 67.120 , despite the provisions of subsection (8) of this section which provides that the county/executive appoints the clerk with the approval of the fiscal court, since the 1978 amendment to KRS 67.120 , which was the later amendment of the conflicting statutes and thereby implicitly repeals the earlier statute, controls. OAG 81-184 .

Where a county fiscal court inadvertently failed to appoint a county treasurer at the April term, the fiscal court could, pursuant to subsection (8) of this section, appoint a county treasurer retroactively to May 1, 1981, and for a term which would expire on June 30, 1982, since, although the present version of KRS 68.010 (effective until April, 1982) requires appointment to a four-year term, the new version of KRS 68.010 , (effective April 1, 1982) will require the fiscal court to appoint a county treasurer to take office on July 1, 1982, for a two-year term. OAG 81-320 .

KRS 70.540 , under which the county judge/executive can make the county police appointments without fiscal court concurrence, controls over this section, under which the county judge/executive may hire county employes with the consent of the fiscal court, since KRS 70.540 is the later and more specific statute. OAG 81-431 .

The fiscal court has no authority to nominate a county employee; they can suggest a nominee to the county judge/executive, but if he does not nominate that person, the machinery of subsection (7) of this section does not begin to operate. OAG 81-431 .

Where a nomination of a county employee is made pursuant to subsection (7) of this section, and the majority of fiscal court does not consent to the appointment, the nomination is a nullity. OAG 81-431 .

Where the county judge/executive attempted to terminate the employment of four county employees in November 1981, but the fiscal court did not consent to the firings until January 1982, the terminations by the county judge/executive were void for failure to comply with subsection (7) of this section, and the fiscal court was required to give back pay to the illegally dismissed employees for the period from November through January. OAG 82-57 .

If a county judge/executive fails to nominate persons for county employment for a substantial period, a mandamus suit may be filed by the other members of fiscal court in circuit court against him whereby the members ask for judgment requiring the county judge/executive to make such nominations which would, in effect, compel the county judge/executive to perform a ministerial act, i.e., the appointment by nomination of county employees. OAG 82-63 .

Absent a merit system, the county employees under the previous administration automatically lost their jobs at the beginning of the new administration, unless they were rehired pursuant to the general procedure of subsection (7) of this section. OAG 82-63 .

A properly drawn county administrative code remains effective and binding on successive county administrations, subject to periodic revisions as permitted by subsection (2) of this section. OAG 82-77 .

Subsections (7) and (8) of this section control to the extent that they conflict with the provisions of a county administrative code governing appointment, suspension and removal of county personnel. OAG 82-77 .

The decision in OAG 81-431 applies to counties with populations exceeding 75,000, subject to any statute making an exception to the general procedure described therein. OAG 82-77 .

In all counties in Kentucky, the county judge/executive may appoint a county police force, which will be funded by appropriate action and budgeting by the fiscal court. Members of a county police force are county employes and are subject to the administrative and legislative controls of the county judge/executive and the fiscal court as a body, pursuant to KRS 67.080(1)(a), (c), (e) and (2)(a), (c), KRS 67.083(3)(u), and subsection (7) of this section. OAG 82-141 .

The appointment of a county road engineer or county road supervisor is mandatory. OAG 82-142 .

The county judge/executive does not have a “rubber stamp” power, and the relative powers of the county judge/executive and the other members of the fiscal court, as relate to subsections (7) and (8) of this section, are to be used with thoughtfulness, care and reason until they can actually agree on persons to be employed. OAG 82-142 .

The fiscal court can withhold its consent to a particular appointee made by the county judge/executive under subsections (7) or (8) of this section when such withholding is based upon sound discretion and is not arbitrary nor whimsical. OAG 82-142 .

Where the county judge/executive makes his appointment of a county road supervisor, or other county personnel, the fiscal court as a body cannot arbitrarily withhold its consent. OAG 82-142 .

Subsection (8) of this section directs the county judge/executive to appoint people to various boards, with the consent of the fiscal court, and no exception is mentioned concerning urban county government; thus, the appointment power in subsection (8) is indeed a “power of government” and must be observed, unless and until the general assembly provides otherwise. Accordingly, the county judge/executive of an urban county must appoint the water commissioners for the urban county. OAG 82-144 .

As the later and specific statute, KRS 74.020 governing water district commissioner appointments controls over Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), Ch. 20, § 10, which would exempt urban county governments from subsection (8) of this section; thus the conclusion in OAG 82-144 that the county judge/executive in an urban county must make the water district appointments involving the urban county territory is correct. OAG 82-174 .

When considering subsection (8) of this section and KRS 67.712(1) in connection with general statute powers of the county judge/executive, it would appear that, in an urban county government, the mayor takes the place of the county judge/executive as to such general statute powers; however, KRS 74.020 , and the appointment of water district board commissioners thereunder, does not involve a general statute but involves a specific statute, relating only to appointments to water district boards. OAG 82-174 .

If the fiscal court acts arbitrarily in withholding its approval of an appointment to the water district board, the county judge/executive can seek approval through a mandamus action in the circuit court. OAG 82-176 .

Once the county judge/executive appoints water commissioners, the fiscal court is required to either approve or disapprove of the appointments; however, the fiscal court cannot disapprove of such appointment on whimsical, unreasonable, or arbitrary grounds and, if they disapprove, there must be some rational or sound reason for the disapproval since Ky. Const., § 2 prohibits the exercise of absolute and arbitrary power. OAG 82-176 .

The appointment procedure of KRS 74.020(1)(a) is the same as that of subsection (8) of this section, in that the appointments to the water district board of commissioners are made by the county judge/executive, with the approval of the fiscal court. OAG 82-176 .

Under KRS 67.711 , county judge/executive has the authority to employ a deputy county judge/executive, without the consent of the fiscal court. The fiscal court is required to provide the deputy with a reasonable salary, viewed in terms of the functions assigned to that post. OAG 82-224 .

The appointment of the reapportionment commissioners under KRS 67.045 is by the fiscal court as a body only and subsection (8) of this section, relating to appointments by the county judge/executive with approval of fiscal court, does not apply. However, any member of fiscal court can make a motion relating to such appointments. OAG 82-404 .

Jail employees are, for general purposes, county employees and such employees are subject generally to various statutes relating to “county employees” as such; however, the liability for unlawful acts of deputies rests with the jailer and his bond while nondeputy jail personnel would be subject to dismissal under the procedure of subsection (7) of this section. OAG 82-423 .

As to any liability for jail employes’ illegal actions, the county is immune under the doctrine of sovereign immunity. However, the fiscal court members could have liability for tortious conduct of nondeputy jail employes who are appointed with consent of fiscal court. OAG 83-463 .

The adoption of an administrative code is mandatory. Once it is adopted the fiscal court has no power to repeal it in toto. An adopted code may be amended, as suggested by the county judge/executive and approved by the fiscal court, but it cannot be repealed in toto. OAG 82-569 .

The fiscal court has no authority on its own initiative to amend or change an administrative code since it has been adopted. The county judge/executive has the sole power to offer a code and suggest revisions thereto, subject to the approval or disapproval of the fiscal court as a body in adopting a code or revisions thereof. OAG 82-569 .

There is no statute prohibiting the county judge/executive from engaging in extra work such as operating county-owned machinery, provided that it is not in conflict with some positive duty under this section or any other statute that requires his attention at the time in question. OAG 83-50 .

Neither the general nor specific powers of the county judge/executive set forth in this section include the authority to regulate traffic in alcoholic beverages; such “additional power” must be granted by the fiscal court by resolution pursuant to KRS 241.110(1). OAG 83-63 .

A fiscal court may engage in a grant of county money for ambulance purposes to a properly enfranchised person or corporation, provided it is done on a contractual basis to insure that the inhabitants of the unincorporated portion of the county are furnished ambulance service. OAG 83-222 .

Since there is no law to the contrary, the county police, who are under the merit system, are appointed by the county/judge executive, with consent of the fiscal court, pursuant to subsection (7) of this section. OAG 83-351 .

Once a fiscal court takes action in the establishing of a county road program, the county judge/executive, as the county’s chief executive, is immediately responsible for implementing or carrying out such program, assisted by the county road engineer or supervisor, county road employes and other county employes necessary to such implementation. OAG 83-382 .

The county judge/executive may be reimbursed out of the county treasury (subject to an appropriate budget fund under KRS Chapter 68) for his reasonably necessary and documented expenses arising out of his attending county judge seminars, conventions, and legislative conferences directly involving official county business or functions; to the extent that such meetings would involve the county road program, such expenses would fall under the allowance granted in KRS 67.722 . OAG 83-409 .

Assuming that the coroner’s bills submitted to and approved by the fiscal court are valid claims against the county treasury and are accurately stated, the county judge/executive has no authority to alter such claims. OAG 83-434 .

The operation of the county jail is a joint responsibility of the jailer and fiscal court, and the county judge/executive, when fiscal court is not in session, is required to implement the policy and formal actions of the fiscal court relating to the fiscal court’s joint operative jail responsibility. OAG 83-442 .

The jailer and fiscal court are jointly responsible for the operation of the jail, and the county judge/executive has an implementing function relating to that joint responsibility. Unless the courts would arrive at a different conclusion in a case in which the issue is clearly and plainly presented, the joint responsibility can be modified only by new legislation pinpointing and delineating with sharpness the relative management responsibilities of the jailer, fiscal court and county judge/executive. OAG 83-442 .

The county treasurer must keep an appropriation ledger, process claims, write the checks, and make financial reports to the fiscal court and while the county judge/executive has authority under KRS 67.080(1)(c) and (d) and 67.083(3), with the approval of the fiscal court, to appoint personnel to assist him in his administrative and executive role, specifically as relates to administrative duties pertaining to county finances, such personnel cannot be hired to merely duplicate the precise work of the county treasurer, nor can such employment be used to interfere in any way with the statutory duties of the county treasurer. OAG 83-456 .

The salary or salaries of personnel hired to assist the county judge/executive in his financial role should be paid out of the county treasury, subject to proper budgeting procedure as outlined in KRS Chapter 68; the specific salary or salaries would be determined by the fiscal court. OAG 83-456 .

The county judge/executive’s nominating appointment power pursuant to subsection (8) of this section has no application to the appointment of a county treasurer since the 1982 amendment of KRS 68.010 , providing for the “fiscal court’s appointment” of a treasurer, governs as the later legislative enactment. OAG 83-475 .

The fiscal court has no authority to legislate on the subject of vacation time for constitutional officers’ deputies nor does the county judge/executive, as an individual officer, have any such legislative authority. OAG 84-36 .

Any existing statute which gives the county judge/executive the sole authority to appoint members of boards or commissions, but which does not mention the approval of fiscal court, is deemed to be amended by implication by subsection (8) of this section, and the appointments by the county judge/executive require the approval of the fiscal court, pursuant to the literal terms of subsection (8) of this section. OAG 84-198 .

Although KRS 133.020(1) vests the county judge/executive with an unrestricted power to appoint the regular board of assessment appeals, the Court of Appeals in Fiscal Court v. Jefferson, 614 S.W.2d 954, 1981 Ky. App. LEXIS 234 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981) held that subsection (8) of this section amended KRS 133.020(1) by implication and thus governs such appointments; thus, the county judge/executive’s appointments to such board are subject to the approval of the fiscal court. OAG 84-198 .

KRS 179.060 provides, in effect, pursuant to KRS 179.020(2), that the county judge/executive can remove a county road supervisor, without the consent of the fiscal court. However, it can be said that subsection (7) of this section amended KRS 179.060 by implication, and subsection (7) of this section requires the county judge/executive to exercise his authority to remove county personnel with the approval of the fiscal court. OAG 84-205 .

Although KRS 133.020 provides that the county judge/executive may appoint the members of the county board of assessment appeals (there is no mention of fiscal court consent), subsection (7) of this section, which requires the fiscal court’s consent to appointments to boards by the county judge/executive, controls such appointments. OAG 84-206 .

Water district commissioners are appointed by the county judge/executive with the approval of fiscal court, pursuant to KRS 74.020 ; however, the initial appointment or nomination must be made by the county judge/executive, with the approval of the fiscal court. Clearly the fiscal court has no authority to nominate or initially appoint such commissioners. OAG 84-206 .

In the absence of a statute, the county judge/executive cannot be considered an employe for fringe benefits generally afforded county employes; if the county judge/executive, as a member of fiscal court, is to establish a fringe benefit for himself, the General Assembly would have to authorize it in a clear and unambiguous statute. OAG 84-332 .

It is within the power of the fiscal court to require the county judge/executive to seek a personal service contract for a certain type of service and to bring to the fiscal court for approval a specific contractor. If the county judge/executive refuses to comply with the order of the fiscal court, a mandamus action may be instituted in the circuit court to require the judge to comply. OAG 88-83 .

There is a difference between a personal service contract and an employer-employe relationship; consequently, subdivision (7) of this section does not apply to personal service contracts. OAG 88-83 .

Since subsection (8) of this section and KRS 68.010(1) are irreconcilable because they provide for two different methods of appointment of the county treasurer, and since where two statutes on any subject are apparently in conflict and cannot be reconciled, the later statute controls, the 1988 amendment and republishing of this section, which included subsection (8), was the later expression of the legislative will and makes subsection (8) of this section a later statute than KRS 68.010(1); therefore, subsection (8) of this section is the appropriate statutory provision to apply to the question of how a county treasurer should be appointed, and accordingly the county judge/executive is responsible for making the appointment to the position of county treasurer, with the approval of the fiscal court. OAG 90-46 .

The fiscal court, in determining whether to make an appropriation for purchase of scales to weight trucks for use by the sheriff’s office, could weigh such need against funds available, reasonable enforcement priorities, availability of outside resources, and other considerations; a fiscal court is under a strict duty to ensure that essential obligations are provided for before making appropriations for those things that, while allowable, are not compulsory or indispensable. OAG 92-61 .

The county judge/executive is not a sworn law enforcement officer in the sense of having police authority to enforce the traffic laws and further, the county judge/executive has no duty to purchase scales for use by the sheriff’s office in enforcing truck weight provisions; therefore, a writ of mandamus probably will not lie against a county judge/executive to require him to purchase scales for a sheriff’s office use, as such is not his duty. OAG 92-61 .

Since public hospital corporation was not created by the county fiscal court, by charter, by law, or by ordinance but was created by its incorporators and since subsection (8) of this section by its express terms, applies to appointments or removals from boards, commissions or designated administrative positions created by the fiscal court, charter, law, or ordinance, the provisions of subsection (8) of this section is not applicable to appointments or removals from the corporation’s board; appointments to the hospital board are governed by the by-laws of the corporation. OAG 92-154 .

Although the county judge/executive has the unilateral authority to fix the dates of commencement of the regular terms of the fiscal court, no statute expressly provides the unilateral authority to designate the beginning time of regular meetings of the fiscal court; however, if the fiscal court properly passes a resolution providing, for example, that the regular term meetings of the fiscal court shall begin at 7:30 p.m., there being no statute to the contrary, it would be the duty of the county judge/executive to ensure the execution of such resolution. OAG 95-26 .

67.711. Deputy county judge/executive and office personnel — Appointment — Compensation — Powers and duties.

  1. Notwithstanding the provisions of KRS 67.710(7), the county judge/executive of any county may appoint a deputy county judge/executive, and a reasonable number of other assistants, secretaries, and clerical workers within the office of the county judge/executive as determined by the fiscal court, who shall serve at his pleasure. The fiscal court, pursuant to KRS 64.530(4), shall fix reasonable compensation for the deputy county judge/executive and such other employees.
  2. The deputy county judge/executive may exercise all administrative powers, duties, and responsibilities of that office, and may assume such other responsibilities as shall be prescribed in the administrative code of the county, except that the deputy county judge/executive shall not act for the county judge/executive as a member or presiding officer of the fiscal court.

History. Enact. Acts 1978, ch. 118, § 15, effective June 17, 1978; 1980, ch. 52, § 1, effective July 15, 1980; 1986, ch. 74, § 1, effective March 5, 1986.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

See Legislative Research Commission Note following KRS 67.705 .

Opinions of Attorney General.

Under KRS 67.040 as amended, effective June 17, 1978, if the county judge/executive is absent or unable to preside, a majority of the justices of the peace or commissioners (as the case may be) shall elect one of their number to preside over the fiscal court; however, under this section the county judge/executive may appoint a deputy, and such deputy can preside over fiscal court in his absence. OAG 78-277 .

Under the express language of this section in the absence of the county judge/executive the deputy appointed under this section can serve as chairman of the fiscal court meetings, with the authority to preside over the meeting, rule on parliamentary questions, vote on questions and break tie votes as described in KRS 67.040 . OAG 78-277 .

Under this section the deputy appointed by the county judge/executive may exercise “all administrative powers, duties, and responsibilities” of the office of county judge/executive for the fiscal court, while it performs certain acts legislative in character, performs duties that are quasi-judicial and administrative in nature and in using the term “administrative powers” in this section the legislature used the term in its broad constitutional sense, as envisioned in a tripartite government. OAG 78-277 .

No consent to the appointment of a deputy county judge/executive by fiscal court is required, and the appointment can be made in a county judge/executive executive order, which will be lodged for record with the county court clerk’s office, but the deputy’s salary would have to be set by the fiscal court. OAG 78-321 .

The underlying purpose of this section is to provide for a deputy who can perform all duties of that office when the county judge/executive is absent from the county or is ill or otherwise is unable to perform his statutory duties. OAG 78-321 .

“A” deputy simply means one deputy. OAG 78-453 .

It can be seen that the deputy may exercise all statutory powers and duties of the office of county judge/executive and while the administrative code of the county may prescribe additional duties for the deputy, the administrative code can rise no higher than the statutes. OAG 78-453 .

Since the county judge/executive is no longer a judicial officer and is now an executive and administrative officer, it is the opinion that the county judge/executive can direct his appointed deputy to assist him in carrying out his executive and administrative statutory functions, even though the county judge/executive is not absent from his office and his work and is not ill. OAG 78-453 .

Whenever the county judge/executive is absent from his office or is unable to act as county judge/executive for any good reason, he can instruct his deputy to act for him and where the county judge/executive is ill or incapacitated such that he cannot request his deputy to act, the deputy can act in his stead where the circumstances would demand; it is not necessary that the county judge/executive be physically out of the county in order for his deputy to act in his stead. OAG 78-453 .

The county judge/executive deputy may legally preside over fiscal court in the absence of the county judge/executive. OAG 78-607 .

A deputy county judge/executive would have to live in some county in Kentucky, since a Kentucky public officer must live in Kentucky. OAG 79-366 .

Regardless of whether a deputy’s job is a full or part-time operation, there is nothing in the Constitution or statutes requiring the deputy county judge/executive to actually live or have his legal residence in the county of his appointment. OAG 79-366 .

This section does not envision that a deputy county judge/executive must necessarily be a full-time office. OAG 79-366 .

Public policy dictates that the deputy county judge/executive must avoid participating, directly or indirectly, in any proceeding involving a county contract with her spouse. OAG 80-296 .

The county judge/executive can give the nominating or appointing power to the deputy in writing when the county judge/executive is ill, and this would include the power of appointment held by the county judge/executive pursuant to special statutes such as KRS 63.220 . OAG 80-372 .

The deputy county judge/executive cannot act for the county judge/executive as a member or presiding officer of the fiscal court, even though the county judge/executive is ill and won’t return for some time. OAG 80-372 .

The fiscal court does not presently have the authority, and it has never had the authority, to appoint the deputy county judge/executive to preside over the fiscal court in the absence of the county judge/executive. OAG 80-372 .

Upon the appointment of a deputy by the county judge/executive, the fiscal court has the duty to provide a reasonable salary for the deputy, payable out of the county treasury as a properly budgeted item under KRS Chapter 68, based upon his actual work schedule. OAG 82-61 .

The intent of this section was to give the deputy, if called upon by county judge/executive, the power to exercise all duties and powers which he can exercise as county judge/executive, but only as relates to county government. The inclusion of the county judge/executive in KRS 402.050 , as one of those who can solemnize marriages in Kentucky, has no relation to county government. OAG 82-145 .

If the fiscal court has adopted an administrative code pursuant to KRS 67.080(2)(c), and if the code purports to place additional responsibilities on the deputy county judge/executive which would be the equivalent of a secretary-bookkeeper position for assisting the county judge/executive, then the administrative code would govern; in the absence of giving the deputy the secretarial-bookkeeping additional role by way of the administrative code, the fiscal court cannot require the county judge/executive to combine those positions. OAG 82-224 .

Under this section, county judge/executive has the authority to employ a deputy county judge/executive, without the consent of the fiscal court. The fiscal court is required to provide the deputy with a reasonable salary, viewed in terms of the functions assigned to that post. OAG 82-224 .

There is no legal impediment in connection with the appointment of the secretary of a county judge/executive as deputy county judge/executive. OAG 82-438 .

A fiscal court cannot indirectly, by lowering the salary of the deputy county judge/executive to an unconscionable and unconstitutional level, bring about the departure of a particular deputy from office. OAG 82-515 .

Technically, the fiscal court may lower the salary of a deputy county judge/executive; however, the lowering of the deputy’s salary would have to be effected under the yardstick of a “reasonable salary” for services actually performed. Any salary lowering not based upon the “reasonable salary” concept would on its face appear to be arbitrary and would be unconstitutional in terms of Ky. Const., § 2, which prohibits arbitrary action. OAG 82-515 .

Upon the appointment of a deputy county judge/executive by the county judge/executive pursuant to this section, the fiscal court has the positive duty to provide a reasonable salary for the deputy, payable out of the county treasury, as a properly budgeted item under KRS Ch. 68, based upon his actual work schedule. OAG 82-515 .

The county judge/executive’s secretary may also hold positions as finance officer or, deputy county judge/executive as well as secretary without violating any statutes; however, the triple function would be subject to the common law rule which prohibits holding more than one office where the other office and the additional work will not permit the proper performance of all the jobs. OAG 84-253 .

67.712. Powers and immunities common to all county judges/executive and county governments, including urban-county governments and consolidated local governments.

  1. Whenever rights, powers, privileges, immunities, and responsibilities are granted to the county judge/executive in general statutes, the same shall be considered a grant in those counties in which a consolidated local government has been adopted pursuant to KRS Chapter 67C to the mayor of the consolidated local government, and shall be considered a grant in those counties in which an urban-county government has been adopted pursuant to KRS Chapter 67A to the officer in whom such functions are vested under the applicable provision of the comprehensive plan of an urban-county government, if any, and otherwise to the chief executive officer of an urban-county government.
  2. Whenever rights, powers, privileges, immunities, and responsibilities are granted to the fiscal court in general statutes, the same shall be considered a grant in those counties in which a consolidated local government has been adopted pursuant to KRS Chapter 67C to the officer or officers in whom such functions are vested pursuant to KRS 67C.103(1) and 67C.105(1), respectively, of the consolidated local government, and shall be considered a grant in those counties in which an urban-county government has been adopted pursuant to KRS Chapter 67A to the legislative body of the urban-county government.

History. Enact. Acts 1978, ch. 118, § 16, effective June 17, 1978; 2002, ch. 346, § 42, effective July 15, 2002.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

See Legislative Research Commission Note following KRS 67.705 .

Opinions of Attorney General.

When considering the general statute, KRS 67.710(8) and this section in connection with general statute powers of the county judge/executive, it would appear that the mayor in an urban county takes the place of the county judge/executive as to such general statute powers; however, KRS 74.020 , and the appointment of water district board commissioners thereunder, does not involve a general statute but involves a specific statute, relating only to appointments to water district boards. OAG 82-174 .

67.715. Reorganization powers.

  1. The county judge/executive may create, abolish, or combine any county department or agency or transfer a function from one department or agency to another, provided that he shall first submit plans for such reorganization to the fiscal court. If not disapproved within sixty (60) days, the plans shall become effective.
  2. The county judge/executive or county judges/executive of multicounty districts may, with approval of the fiscal court or fiscal courts, create any special district or abolish or combine any special district, provided the district was created solely by the county judge/executive or county judges/executive or solely by one or more such fiscal courts.
  3. The county judge/executive shall assure the representation of the county on all boards, commissions, special districts, and multicounty programs in which county participation is called for.

History. Enact. Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 20, §§ 4, 6, effective January 2, 1978; 1992, ch. 36, § 1, effective July 14, 1992.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

See Legislative Research Commission Note following KRS 67.705 .

Opinions of Attorney General.

The county judge/executive, with approval of fiscal court as a body, could dissolve an agricultural extension district, provided it meets certain minimal constitutional requirements: (1) the fiscal court would hold a public hearing on the matter of dissolution; (2) all liabilities and contractual obligations of the district would have to be settled completely prior to dissolution. OAG 80-67 .

Subsection (1) of this section does not authorize the abolishing of an air board created by the county. OAG 80-625 .

The effect of subsection (2) of this section, as relates to the creation of a special district, is simply that the General Assembly has provided a method of creation of special districts in addition to any other methods presently in statutory existence. Thus, there appears to be no conflict of subsection (2) with KRS 75.010 and 75.025 (now repealed) as applied to the creation of a fire protection district. OAG 83-292 .

Subsection (2) of this section literally gives the county judge/executive, with approval of fiscal court, the authority to create any special district, including a fire protection district, without the petition process. Once a fire protection district is created under subsection (2) of this section, the powers of such district enumerated in KRS Chapter 75 apply, including the taxing power. OAG 83-292 .

While, under KRS Chapter 74, a sewer district created under subsection (2) of this section would be a political subdivision of the county, it is not a special taxing district; it can only make charges for service and land assessments for capital improvements. Thus such a sewer district created under subsection (2) of this section, and applying the applicable language of KRS Chapter 74, is not subject to the indebtedness restrictions of Ky. Const., §§ 157 and 158. OAG 83-391 .

Where the county judge/executive and fiscal court desire to create a sewer district pursuant to subsection (2) of this section, the orders of the county judge/executive and fiscal court should be carefully worded to disclose the intended creation of a sewer district, as treated in KRS 220.030 to 220.540 , and 224.190 to 224.200 (now KRS 224.18-760 to 224.18-785 ), in the analogous manner expressed therein, and to the extent that those statutes can be practically applied to a sewer district operation. OAG 83-391 .

When a sewer district is created under subsection (2) of this section, the county judge/executive’s order and order of the fiscal court should be carefully worded to disclose the intended creation of a sewer district, as treated by KRS 74.020 to 74.390 in the analogous manner expressed in KRS 74.407 , and to the extent that those statutes in that group can be practically applied to a sewer district operation. OAG 83-391 .

67.720. Bond of county judge/executive — Minimum — Record.

The county judge/executive shall execute a bond for the faithful performance of the duties of his office. The bond shall be a minimum of ten thousand dollars ($10,000) with sureties approved by the fiscal court, which shall record the approval of sureties in its minutes. If the fiscal court does not approve sureties under this section within thirty (30) days after the county judge/executive has taken office, the Circuit Judge shall approve the sureties. Premiums on the bond of the county judge/executive shall be paid from county funds appropriated by the fiscal court. The fiscal court shall file a record of the bond with the county clerk.

History. Enact. Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 20, § 5, effective January 2, 1978; 1996, ch. 86, § 1, effective July 15, 1996.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(1976). See Legislative Research Commission Note following KRS 67.705 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Application.

Ky. Const., § 103, KRS 62.050 and this section, which state that a county clerk before taking office shall post bond, are mandatory in nature. Elective clerks must post required bond before assuming the duties of office. Substantial compliance with these provisions is not sufficient. Bowen v. Commonwealth ex rel. Stidham, 887 S.W.2d 350, 1994 Ky. LEXIS 110 ( Ky. 1994 ).

67.722. Expense allowance for county road department — Exception.

Except in a consolidated local government, the county judge/executive shall receive an annual expense allowance of three thousand six hundred dollars ($3,600) for performing his duties and fulfilling his responsibilities in the administration of the local county road program. Payment shall be made quarterly in the amount of nine hundred dollars ($900) per quarter, the first such payment to be made for the quarter ending March 31, 1978.

History. Enact. Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 20, § 7, effective January 2, 1978; 2002, ch. 346, § 43, effective July 15, 2002.

Opinions of Attorney General.

The allowance provided for in this section is compensation to the county judge/executive, and he is not required to make any formal accounting of his use of that money, except that it is a part of his compensation for purposes of applying the rubber dollar maximum of KRS 64.527 . OAG 78-183 .

The county judge/executive does not have to formally account for the expense allowance, since there is nothing in the statute suggesting such formal accountability. OAG 78-244 (modifying OAG 78-183 ).

This section is a “lump sum expense allowance” for the county judge/executive, as envisioned by KRS 64.710 , in connection with his performing his duties in the administration of the county road program. OAG 78-244 (modifying OAG 78-183 ).

The expense allowance provided the county judge/executive may be constitutionally funded from the county road fund, since such “administration of the local county road program” relates directly to the “cost of administration” of the county road program, as the terms “cost of administration” and “public highways” are used in Ky. Const., § 230 and as envisioned in KRS 68.100 , and Ky. Const., § 180; under the same reasoning, if it can be reasonably determined as to what percentage of his work schedule the county judge/executive is engaged in administrative work relating to the county road program of construction, maintenance, and repair, that percentage factor may be applied to his salary to determine that precise part of his salary which may be funded out of the county road fund. OAG 80-377 .

Since the reporting of the road supervisor at a fiscal court meeting is mandatory, and since the county judge/executive should be present when the report is given, it is mandatory that the county judge/executive be present with the road supervisor on such report occasions. OAG 80-610 .

The expense allowance is all that the county judge/executive can receive from the county, unless he can show in a particular situation that the road program annual expense allowance has been exhausted in paying his actual expenses and does not cover his particular claimed expense; consequently, if he is to recover any money in excess of the annual allowance for such expenses, he must necessarily be able to document all such expenses which were in fact reimbursed by way of the expense allowance. OAG 83-238 .

Once the fiscal court as a body establishes a county road project, the county judge/executive, as the county’s chief executive, is immediately responsible for implementing or carrying out such program, assisted by the county road engineer or supervisor, county road employees and other county employees necessary to such implementation. Thus, the expense account provided for in this section is for the county judge/executive’s expenses accruing from his executive and supervisory duties relating to the county road program. OAG 83-409 .

The county judge/executive may be reimbursed out of the county treasury (subject to an appropriate budget fund under KRS Chapter 68) for his reasonably necessary and documented expenses arising out of his attending county judge seminars, conventions, and legislative conferences directly involving official county business or functions; to the extent that such meetings would involve the county road program, such expenses would fall under the allowance granted in this section. OAG 83-409 .

Where statute directs that an expense allowance shall be received by the county judge/executive, paying agency cannot accede to the request of the county judge/executive that such payment be instead made to the county treasury. OAG 94-67 .

Research References and Practice Aids

2020-2022 Budget Reference.

See Transportation Cabinet Budget, 2020 Ky. Acts ch. 93, Pt. I, A, 7, (5) at 952.

2018–2020 Budget Reference.

See Transportation Cabinet Budget, 2018 Ky. Acts ch. 208, Pt. I, A, 7, (6) at 1937.

67.725. “Absent” and “disabled” defined for KRS 67.730 to 67.745.

For the purpose of KRS 67.730 to 67.745 , the regular county judge/executive, the deputy county judge/executive, or other persons designated to serve in the line of succession during an emergency shall be deemed “absent” when he is outside the county at the time of the occurrence or declaration of the emergency and is unable to return; and shall be deemed “disabled” when sick, injured or mentally incompetent to perform the duties.

History. Enact. Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 486, effective January 2, 1978; 1980, ch. 52, § 2, effective July 15, 1980.

67.730. Inability of county judge/executive to serve during emergency.

When the absence or disability of the duly-elected county judge/executive of any county shall prevent his serving in office during an emergency involving national and state defense, the duties of the county judge/executive shall be administered temporarily by the deputy county judge/executive, if one has been appointed by the county judge/executive and is actively serving as such.

History. Enact. Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 487, effective January 2, 1978; 1980, ch. 52, § 3, effective July 15, 1980.

67.735. Appointment of deputy county judge/executive to serve during emergency.

In any county where no deputy county judge/executive has been appointed by the county judge/executive upon June 18, 1970, then the county judge/executive of such county shall appoint a deputy county judge/executive for the purpose of preparing for such an emergency as is set forth in KRS 67.730 .

History. Enact. Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 488, effective January 2, 1978; 1980, ch. 52, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

67.740. Assumption of duties of county judge/executive by fiscal court member.

If neither the county judge/executive nor the deputy county judge/executive is able to serve in the office by reason of absence or disability, then the duties of the county judge/executive shall be assumed temporarily by a member of the fiscal court selected for this purpose by the fiscal court, provisions of subsection (2) of KRS 61.080 to the contrary notwithstanding.

History. Enact. Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 489, effective January 2, 1978; 1980, ch. 52, § 5, effective July 15, 1980.

67.745. Persons serving as county judge/executive during emergency — How long.

Any of the persons designated herein to serve in the line of succession to the county judge/executive during such state of emergency shall occupy and serve in the office of county judge/executive:

  1. Only until, if and when, the regular county judge/executive should return to the county from absence during the emergency or should recover from disability; or
  2. Until the Governor of the Commonwealth is able to make an appointment of a successor to the regular county judge/executive; or
  3. Until the termination of the state of emergency, whichever should occur soonest.

History. Enact. Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 490, effective January 2, 1978.

Taxation of Business

67.750. Definitions for KRS 67.750 to 67.790.

As used in KRS 67.750 to 67.790 , unless the context requires otherwise:

  1. “Business entity” means each separate corporation, limited liability company, business development corporation, partnership, limited partnership, sole proprietorship, association, joint stock company, receivership, trust, professional service organization, or other legal entity through which business is conducted;
  2. “Compensation” means wages, salaries, commissions, or any other form of remuneration paid or payable by an employer for services performed by an employee, which are required to be reported for federal income tax purposes and adjusted as follows:
    1. Include any amounts contributed by an employee to any retirement, profit sharing, or deferred compensation plan, which are deferred for federal income tax purposes under a salary reduction agreement or similar arrangement, including but not limited to salary reduction arrangements under Section 401(a), 401(k), 402(e), 403(a), 403(b), 408, 414(h), or 457 of the Internal Revenue Code; and
    2. Include any amounts contributed by an employee to any welfare benefit, fringe benefit, or other benefit plan made by salary reduction or other payment method which permits employees to elect to reduce federal taxable compensation under the Internal Revenue Code, including but not limited to Sections 125 and 132 of the Internal Revenue Code;
  3. “Fiscal year” means “fiscal year” as defined in Section 7701(a)(24) of the Internal Revenue Code;
  4. “Employee” means any person who renders services to another person or business entity for compensation, including an officer of a corporation and any officer, employee, or elected official of the United States, a state, or any political subdivision of a state, or any agency or instrumentality of any one (1) or more of the above. A person classified as an independent contractor under the Internal Revenue Code shall not be considered an employee;
  5. “Employer” means “employer” as defined in Section 3401(d) of the Internal Revenue Code;
  6. “Gross receipts” means all revenues or proceeds derived from the sale, lease, or rental of goods, services, or property by a business entity reduced by the following:
    1. Sales and excise taxes paid; and
    2. Returns and allowances;
  7. “Internal Revenue Code” means the Internal Revenue Code in effect on December 31, 2008, as amended;
  8. “Net profit” means gross income as defined in Section 61 of the Internal Revenue Code minus all the deductions from gross income allowed by Chapter 1 of the Internal Revenue Code, and adjusted as follows:
    1. Include any amount claimed as a deduction for state tax or local tax which is computed, in whole or in part, by reference to gross or net income and which is paid or accrued to any state of the United States, local taxing authority in a state, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, any territory or possession of the United States, or any foreign country or political subdivision thereof;
    2. Include any amount claimed as a deduction that directly or indirectly is allocable to income which is either exempt from taxation or otherwise not taxed;
    3. Include any amount claimed as a net operating loss carryback or carryforward allowed under Section 172 of the Internal Revenue Code;
    4. Include any amount of income and expenses passed through separately as required by the Internal Revenue Code to an owner of a business entity that is a pass-through entity for federal tax purposes; and
    5. Exclude any amount of income that is exempt from state taxation by the Kentucky Constitution or the Constitution and statutory laws of the United States;
  9. “Sales revenue” means receipts from the sale, lease, or rental of goods, services, or property;
  10. “Tax district” means a city, county, urban-county, charter county, consolidated local government, school district, special taxing district, or any other statutorily created entity with the authority to levy net profits, gross receipts, or occupational license taxes;
  11. “Taxable gross receipts,” in case of a business entity having payroll or sales revenues both within and without a tax district, means gross receipts as defined in subsection (6) of this section, as apportioned under KRS 67.753 ;
  12. “Taxable gross receipts,” in case of a business entity having payroll or sales revenue only in one (1) tax district, means gross receipts as defined in subsection (6) of this section;
  13. “Taxable net profit,” in case of a business entity having payroll or sales revenue only in one (1) tax district, means net profit as defined in subsection (8) of this section;
  14. “Taxable net profit,” in case of a business entity having payroll or sales revenue both within and without a tax district, means net profit as defined in subsection (8) of this section, as apportioned under KRS 67.753 ; and
  15. “Taxable year” means the calendar year or fiscal year ending during the calendar year, upon the basis of which net income or gross receipts is computed.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 2003, ch. 117, § 1, effective June 24, 2003; 2004, ch. 63, § 1, effective July 13, 2004; 2005, ch. 153, § 1, effective June 20, 2005; 2006, ch. 149, § 197, effective July 12, 2006; 2006, ch. 168, § 1, effective July 12, 2006; 2007, ch. 52, § 1, effective June 26, 2007; 2009, ch. 49, § 1, effective June 25, 2009; 2014, ch. 92, § 36, effective January 1, 2015; 2019 ch. 44, § 6, effective June 27, 2019.

Compiler’s Notes.

Internal Revenue Code (IRC) § 401(a) is 26 USCS § 401(a); IRC § 401(k) is 26 USCS 401(k); IRC § 402(e) is 26 USCS § 402(e); IRC § 403(a) is 26 USCS § 403(a); IRC § 403(b) is 26 USCS § 403(b); IRC § 408 is 26 USCS § 408; IRC § 414(h) is 26 USCS § 414(h); IRC § 457 is 26 USCS § 457; IRC § 125 is 26 USCS § 125; IRC § 132 is 26 USCS § 132; IRC § 7701(a)(24) is 26 USCS § 7701(a)(24); IRC § 172 is 26 USCS § 172.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(6/26/2007). 2007 Ky. Acts ch. 52, sec. 3, provides that the amendments to KRS 67.750 in 2007 Ky. Acts ch. 52, sec. 1, “shall apply to tax years beginning on or after January 1, 2007.”

67.753. Apportionment of net profit or gross receipts of business entity to local tax district.

  1. Except as provided in subsection (4) of this section, net profit or gross receipts shall be apportioned as follows:
    1. For business entities with both payroll and sales revenue in more than one (1) tax district, by multiplying the net profit or gross receipts by a fraction, the numerator of which is the payroll factor, described in subsection (2) of this section, plus the sales factor, described in subsection (3) of this section, and the denominator of which is two (2); and
    2. For business entities with sales revenue in more than one (1) tax district, by multiplying the net profits or gross receipts by the sales factor as set forth in subsection (3) of this section.
  2. The payroll factor is a fraction, the numerator of which is the total amount paid or payable in the tax district during the tax period by the business entity for compensation, and the denominator of which is the total compensation paid or payable by the business entity everywhere during the tax period. Compensation is paid or payable in the tax district based on the time the individual’s service is performed within the tax district.
  3. The sales factor is a fraction, the numerator of which is the total sales revenue of the business entity in the tax district during the tax period, and the denominator of which is the total sales revenue of the business entity everywhere during the tax period.
    1. The sale, lease, or rental of tangible personal property is in the tax district if:
      1. The property is delivered or shipped to a purchaser, other than the United States government, or to the designee of the purchaser within the tax district regardless of the f.o.b. point or other conditions of the sale; or
      2. The property is shipped from an office, store, warehouse, factory, or other place of storage in the tax district and the purchaser is the United States government.
    2. Sales revenues, other than revenue from the sale, lease, or rental of tangible personal property or the lease or rental of real property, are apportioned to the tax district based upon a fraction, the numerator of which is the time spent in performing such income-producing activity within the tax district and the denominator of which is the total time spent performing that income-producing activity.
    3. Sales revenue from the lease or rental of real property is allocated to the tax district where the property is located.
  4. If the apportionment provisions of this section do not fairly represent the extent of the business entity’s activity in the tax district, the business entity may petition the tax district or the tax district may require, in respect to all or any part of the business entity’s business activity, if reasonable:
    1. Separate accounting;
    2. The exclusion of any one (1) or more of the factors;
    3. The inclusion of one (1) or more additional factors which will fairly represent the business entity’s business activity in the tax district; or
    4. The employment of any other method to effectuate an equitable allocation and apportionment of net profit or gross receipts.

History. Enact. Acts 2003, ch. 117, § 2, effective June 24, 2003; 2004, ch. 63, § 2, effective July 13, 2004.

67.755. Quarterly estimated tax payments.

  1. Every business entity, other than a sole proprietorship, subject to a net profits, gross receipts, or occupational license tax levied by a tax district shall make quarterly estimated tax payments on or before the fifteenth day of the fourth, sixth, ninth, and twelfth month of each taxable year if the tax liability for the taxable year exceeds five thousand dollars ($5,000).
  2. The quarterly estimated tax payments required under subsection (1) of this section shall be based on the lesser of:
    1. Twenty-two and one-half percent (22.5%) of the current taxable year tax liability;
    2. Twenty-five percent (25%) of the preceding full year taxable year tax liability; or
    3. Twenty-five percent (25%) of the average tax liability for the three (3) preceding full year taxable years’ tax liabilities if the tax liability for any of the three (3) preceding full taxable years exceeded twenty thousand dollars ($20,000).
  3. Any business entity that fails to submit the minimum quarterly payment required under subsection (2) of this section by the due date for the quarterly payment shall pay an amount equal to twelve percent (12%) per annum simple interest on the amount of the quarterly payment required under subsection (2) of this section from the earlier of:
    1. The due date for the quarterly payment until the time when the aggregate quarterly payments submitted for the taxable year equal the minimum aggregate payments due under subsection (2) of this section; or
    2. The due date of the annual return.

      A fraction of a month is counted as an entire month.

  4. The provisions of this section shall not apply to any business entity’s first full or partial taxable year of doing business in the tax district or any first taxable year in which a business entity’s tax liability exceeds five thousand dollars ($5,000).
  5. The provisions of this section shall not apply unless adopted by the tax district.

History. Enact. Acts 2003, ch. 117, § 3, effective June 24, 2003; 2004, ch. 63, § 3, effective July 13, 2004.

67.758. Refund of estimated taxes.

  1. In the case where the tax computed under KRS 67.750 to 67.790 is less than the amount which has been declared and paid as estimated tax for the same taxable year, a refund shall be made upon the filing of a return.
    1. Overpayment resulting from the payment of estimated tax in excess of the amount determined to be due upon the filing of a return for the same taxable year may be credited against the amount of estimated tax determined to be due on any declaration filed for the next succeeding taxable year or for any deficiency or nonpayment of tax for any previous taxable year; (2) (a) Overpayment resulting from the payment of estimated tax in excess of the amount determined to be due upon the filing of a return for the same taxable year may be credited against the amount of estimated tax determined to be due on any declaration filed for the next succeeding taxable year or for any deficiency or nonpayment of tax for any previous taxable year;
    2. No refund shall be made of any estimated tax paid unless a complete return is filed as required by KRS 67.750 to 67.790 .
  2. At the election of the business entity, any installment of the estimated tax may be paid prior to the date prescribed for its payment.

History. Enact. Acts 2003, ch. 117, § 4, effective June 24, 2003.

67.760. Applicability of federal income tax law — Business entity to keep records.

  1. For purposes of KRS 67.750 to 67.790 , computations of gross income and deductions therefrom, gross receipts or sales, and deductions therefrom, accounting methods, and accounting procedures shall be as nearly as practicable identical with those required for federal income tax purposes.
  2. Every business entity subject to an occupational license tax governed by the provisions of KRS 67.750 to 67.790 shall keep records, render under oath statements, make returns, and comply with rules as the tax district from time to time may prescribe. Whenever the tax district deems it necessary, the tax district may require a business entity, by notice served to the business entity, to make a return, render statements under oath, or keep records, as the tax district deems sufficient to determine the tax liability of the business entity.
  3. The tax district may require, for the purpose of ascertaining the correctness of any return or for the purposes of making an estimate of the taxable income of any business entity, the attendance of a representative of the business entity or of any other person having knowledge in the premises.

History. Enact. Acts 2003, ch. 117, § 5, effective June 24, 2003; 2004, ch. 63, § 4, effective July 13, 2004.

67.763. Tax liability of business entity that ceases doing business in tax district.

If any business entity dissolves or withdraws from a tax district during any taxable year, or if any business entity in any manner surrenders or loses its charter during any taxable year, the dissolution, withdrawal, or loss or surrender of charter shall not defeat the filing of returns and the assessment and collection of net profit or gross receipts taxes or tax withheld for the period of that taxable year during which the business entity had net profit or gross receipts or tax withheld in the tax district.

History. Enact. Acts 2003, ch. 117, § 6, effective June 24, 2003.

67.765. Use of tax year and accounting methods required for federal income tax purposes.

If a business entity makes, or is required to make, a federal income tax return, the net profit or gross receipts shall be computed for the purposes of KRS 67.750 to 67.790 on the basis of the same calendar or fiscal year required by the federal government, and shall employ the same methods of accounting required for federal income tax purposes.

History. Enact. Acts 2003, ch. 117, § 7, effective June 24, 2003.

67.766. Tax district to submit occupational license tax forms, instructions, and ordinance to Secretary of State — Posting on one-stop business portal or other SOS Web site.

  1. Before November 1, 2012, each tax district that imposes an occupational license tax on net profits or gross receipts shall submit either an electronic or hard copy of its occupational license tax return form or forms; accompanying instructions; and a copy of its occupational license tax ordinance to the Secretary of State.
  2. A tax district that imposes a new occupational license tax on net profits or gross receipts or amends its ordinance after November 1, 2012, shall provide a copy of its ordinance to the Secretary of State within thirty (30) days of the adoption or amendment. The tax district may provide any additional information, interpretations, forms, or instructions it deems necessary to clarify or explain its compliance requirements for affected business entities.
  3. The Secretary of State shall include the form or forms, instructions, or the ordinances provided under this section on the one-stop business portal or another public Web site maintained by that office.

History. Enact. Acts 2012, ch. 70, § 1, effective July 12, 2012.

67.767. Development, adoption, use, and availability of standard form or forms for occupational license tax returns — Duties of Secretary of State and tax districts.

    1. The Secretary of State shall prescribe a standard form or forms, through promulgation of an administrative regulation, which shall be accepted by all tax districts and shall allow for returns of net profits and gross receipts occupational license taxes by all business entities unless the tax district opts out from acceptance in accordance with subsection (2) of this section or is exempted under subsection (3) of this section. The Secretary shall also develop and update as necessary instructions or a set of instructions for business entities on the completion of the standard form or forms so that business entities have the current information necessary to ensure the proper payment of the tax to each tax district. (1) (a) The Secretary of State shall prescribe a standard form or forms, through promulgation of an administrative regulation, which shall be accepted by all tax districts and shall allow for returns of net profits and gross receipts occupational license taxes by all business entities unless the tax district opts out from acceptance in accordance with subsection (2) of this section or is exempted under subsection (3) of this section. The Secretary shall also develop and update as necessary instructions or a set of instructions for business entities on the completion of the standard form or forms so that business entities have the current information necessary to ensure the proper payment of the tax to each tax district.
    2. The Secretary shall seek advice and comments on the development, amendment, and maintenance of the form or forms and instructions from an advisory committee chaired by the Secretary, or his or her designee, that is composed of a representative from the Kentucky Association of Counties, the Kentucky League of Cities, the Kentucky Occupational License Association, the Kentucky School Boards Association, the Kentucky Society of Certified Public Accountants, urban-county governments, and consolidated local governments, and a representative of business entities appointed by the Secretary.
    3. During the development of the proposed initial form or forms, the Secretary of State shall report in writing to the Interim Joint Committee on Local Government on the progress of the development process. When the proposed administrative regulation is filed with the Legislative Research Commission pursuant to KRS Chapter 13A, the Secretary of State shall also submit a copy thereof, via regular or electronic mail, to the members of the Interim Joint Committee on Local Government or, if during a session of the General Assembly, to the members of the House Standing Committee on Local Government and the Senate Standing Committee on State and Local Government. The submission to the members shall include a note from the Secretary of State stating that the members may submit any comments regarding the proposed administrative regulation in accordance with the deadline established in KRS 13A.270(1)(c).
    4. Notwithstanding KRS 13A.290(6)(a), after review by the Administrative Regulation Review Subcommittee, the Legislative Research Commission shall assign the administrative regulation to the Interim Joint Committee on Local Government for consideration or, if during a session of the General Assembly, to the House Standing Committee on Local Government and the Senate Standing Committee on State and Local Government.
    5. Once the standard form or forms are adopted or amended, the Secretary of State shall include the form or forms, instructions, and any updates on the one-stop business portal or another public Web site maintained by that office along with information submitted to the Secretary of State pursuant to subsection (2) or (3) of this section. The form or forms and instructions shall be updated and maintained by the Secretary of State at no cost to the tax districts. No fee shall be levied against the public or businesses for accessing and downloading forms, instructions, or other information maintained by the Secretary of State under this section.
  1. After the form or forms are adopted under subsection (1) of this section but prior to July 1, 2017, a tax district may adopt the standard form or forms as its exclusive return form or forms, may accept the standard form or forms in addition to the tax district’s own return form or forms, or may elect to opt out of accepting the standard form or forms through adoption of a written order by the tax district’s governing body. If a tax district elects not to accept the standard form or forms, it shall forward the following information to the Secretary of State for inclusion on the one-stop business portal or another public Web site maintained by that office:
    1. A copy of the written order specifying that the tax district will not accept the standard form or forms within thirty (30) days of its adoption; and
    2. A copy of occupational license tax forms that the tax district accepts, any accompanying instructions, and any future amendments to those forms and instructions within thirty (30) days of any change.
  2. After July 1, 2017, a tax district shall either adopt the standard form or forms as its exclusive return form or forms or accept the standard form or forms in addition to the tax district’s own return form or forms, unless:
    1. The tax district submits a written request approved by the tax district’s governing body to the Secretary of State for an exemption based on documented information that acceptance of the form will impose an undue financial hardship on the tax district; and
    2. The Secretary of State approves the request for an exemption and obtains the return form or forms that will be accepted by the tax district and any applicable instructions for inclusion on the one-stop business portal or another public Web site maintained by that office. In exercising his or her discretion to grant an exemption under this subsection, the Secretary of State may impose any reasonable terms and limitations upon the exemption.
  3. Upon receipt of an order pursuant to subsection (2) of this section or upon the issuance of an exemption under subsection (3) of this section, the Secretary of State shall provide notice to the Kentucky Society of Certified Public Accountants of the tax districts that have submitted a written order to opt out under subsection (2) of this section or that are granted an exemption under subsection (3) of this section.
  4. The Secretary of State shall, only upon the request of a tax district, include electronic links for the electronic filing of forms with the local tax district by no later than July 1, 2017.
  5. Nothing in this section or KRS 67.766 shall be interpreted to alter or preempt the requirements imposed by a tax district regarding deadlines, reporting, rates, or other legally imposed procedures regarding the imposition, administration, and collection of local occupational license taxes by a tax district. Nor shall the adoption or use of a standard form or forms developed under this section release the taxpayer from any liability or responsibility to the tax district for the correct payment of taxes, penalties, and any other obligations imposed by the tax district. This section and KRS 67.766 shall not be interpreted to authorize the collection of local tax revenues by the state government or any other agency of the state.

History. Enact. Acts 2012, ch. 70, § 2, effective July 12, 2012.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(7/12/2012). Under the authority of KRS 7.136(1), the Reviser of Statutes has altered the format of the text in subsection (1) of this statute during codification. The words in the text were not changed.

67.768. When returns to be made — Copy of federal income tax return to be submitted with return.

  1. All business entities’ returns for the preceding taxable year shall be made by April 15 in each year, except returns made on the basis of a fiscal year, which shall be made by the fifteenth day of the fourth month following the close of the fiscal year. Blank copies of local forms for returns shall be made available to business entities by the tax district.
  2. Every business entity shall submit a copy of its federal income tax return at the time of filing its return with the tax district. Whenever, in the opinion of the tax district, it is necessary to examine the federal income tax return of any business entity in order to audit the return, the tax district may compel the business entity to produce for inspection a copy of all statements and schedules in support thereof. The tax district may also require copies of reports of adjustments made by the federal government.

History. Enact. Acts 2003, ch. 117, § 8, effective June 24, 2003; 2012, ch. 70, § 3, effective July 12, 2012.

67.770. Extensions.

  1. A tax district may grant any business entity an extension of not more than six (6) months, unless a longer extension has been granted by the Internal Revenue Service or is agreed to by the tax district and the business entity, for filing its return, if the business entity, on or before the date prescribed for payment of the tax, requests the extension and pays the amount properly estimated as its tax.
  2. If the time for filing a return is extended, the business entity shall pay, as part of the tax, an amount equal to twelve percent (12%) per annum simple interest on the tax shown due on the return, but not previously paid, from the time the tax was due until the return is actually filed and the tax paid to the tax district. A fraction of a month is counted as an entire month.

History. Enact. Acts 2003, ch. 117, § 9, effective June 24, 2003; 2004, ch. 63, § 5, effective July 13, 2004.

67.773. Tax due when return filed — Minimum and maximum liability.

  1. The full amount of the unpaid tax payable by any business entity, as appears from the face of the return, shall be paid to the tax district at the time prescribed for filing the tax return, determined without regard to any extension of time for filing the return.
  2. A tax district may impose minimum and maximum tax liabilities for the tax on net profits or gross receipts.

History. Enact. Acts 2003, ch. 117, § 11, effective June 24, 2003.

67.775. Auditing of returns — Payment of additional tax — Federal audit.

  1. As used in this section and KRS 67.778 , unless the context requires otherwise:
    1. “Conclusion of the federal audit” means the date that the adjustments made by the Internal Revenue Service to net income or gross receipts as reported on the business entity’s federal income tax return become final and unappealable; and
    2. “Final determination of the federal audit” means the revenue agent’s report or other documents reflecting the final and unappealable adjustments made by the Internal Revenue Service.
  2. As soon as practicable after each return is received, the tax district may examine and audit it. If the amount of tax computed by the tax district is greater than the amount returned by the business entity, the additional tax shall be assessed and a notice of assessment mailed to the business entity by the tax district within five (5) years from the date the return was filed, except as otherwise provided in this subsection.
    1. In the case of a failure to file a return or of a fraudulent return the additional tax may be assessed at any time.
    2. In the case of a return where a business entity understates net profit or gross receipts, or omits an amount properly includable in net profit or gross receipts, or both, which understatement or omission or both is in excess of twenty-five percent (25%) of the amount of net profit or gross receipts stated in the return, the additional tax may be assessed at any time within six (6) years after the return was filed.
    3. In the case of an assessment of additional tax relating directly to adjustments resulting from a final determination of a federal audit, the additional tax may be assessed before the expiration of the times provided in this subsection, or six (6) months from the date the tax district receives the final determination of the federal audit from the business entity, whichever is later.

      The times provided in this subsection may be extended by agreement between the business entity and the tax district. For the purposes of this subsection, a return filed before the last day prescribed by law for filing the return shall be considered as filed on the last day. Any extension granted for filing the return shall also be considered as extending the last day prescribed by law for filing the return.

  3. Every business entity shall submit a copy of the final determination of the federal audit within thirty (30) days of the conclusion of the federal audit.
  4. A tax district may initiate a civil action for the collection of any additional tax within the times prescribed in subsection (2) of this section.

History. Enact. Acts 2003, ch. 117, § 10, effective June 24, 2003.

67.778. Payment of tax not delayed — Claims for refund or credit.

  1. No suit shall be maintained in any court to restrain or delay the collection or payment of any tax subject to the provisions of KRS 67.750 to 67.790 .
  2. Any tax collected pursuant to the provisions of KRS 67.750 to 67.790 may be refunded or credited within two (2) years of the date prescribed by law for the filing of a return or the date the money was paid to the tax district, whichever is the later, except that:
    1. In any case where the assessment period contained in KRS 67.775 has been extended by an agreement between the business entity and the tax district, the limitation contained in this subsection shall be extended accordingly.
    2. If the claim for refund or credit relates directly to adjustments resulting from a federal audit, the business entity shall file a claim for refund or credit within the time provided for in this subsection or six (6) months from the conclusion of the federal audit, whichever is later. For the purposes of this subsection and subsection (3) of this section, a return filed before the last day prescribed by law for filing the return shall be considered as filed on the last day.
  3. Exclusive authority to refund or credit overpayments of taxes collected by a tax district is vested in that tax district.

History. Enact. Acts 2003, ch. 117, § 12, effective June 24, 2003; 2004, ch. 63, § 6, effective July 13, 2004.

67.780. Employer to withhold taxes.

Every employer making payment of compensation to an employee shall deduct and withhold upon the payment of the compensation any tax imposed against the compensation by a tax district. Amounts withheld shall be paid to the levying tax district in accordance with KRS 67.783 . A tax district may impose minimum and maximum tax liabilities for the tax on compensation.

History. Enact. Acts 2003, ch. 117, § 13, effective June 24, 2003; 2004, ch. 63, § 7, effective July 13, 2004.

67.783. Employer to report tax withheld — Liability of employer for failure to withhold or pay tax.

  1. Every employer required to deduct and withhold tax under KRS 67.780 shall, for the quarter ending after January 1 and for each quarter ending thereafter, on or before the end of the month following the close of each quarter make a return and report to the tax district the tax required to be withheld under KRS 67.780 , unless the employer is permitted or required to report within a reasonable time after some other period as determined by the tax district.
  2. Every employer who fails to withhold or pay to the tax district any sums required by KRS 67.750 to 67.790 to be withheld and paid shall be personally and individually liable to the tax district for any sum or sums withheld or required to be withheld in accordance with the provisions of KRS 67.780 .
  3. The tax district shall have a lien upon all the property of any employer who fails to withhold or pay over to the tax district sums required to be withheld under KRS 67.780 . If the employer withholds but fails to pay the amounts withheld to the tax district, the lien shall commence as of the date the amounts withheld were required to be paid to the tax district. If the employer fails to withhold, the lien shall commence at the time the liability of the employer is assessed by the tax district.
  4. Every employer required to deduct and withhold tax under KRS 67.780 shall annually on or before February 28 of each year complete and file on a form furnished or approved by the tax district a reconciliation of the tax withheld in each tax district where compensation is paid or payable to employees. Either copies of federal forms W-2 and W-3, transmittal of wage and tax statements, or a detailed employee listing with the required equivalent information as determined by the tax district shall be submitted.
  5. Every employer shall furnish each employee a statement on or before January 31 of each year showing the amount of compensation and license tax deducted by the employer from the compensation paid to the employee for payment to a tax district during the preceding calendar year.

History. Enact. Acts 2003, ch. 117, § 14, effective June 24, 2003.

67.785. Personal liability of officers of business entity.

  1. An employer shall be liable for the payment of the tax required to be deducted and withheld under KRS 67.780 .
  2. The president, vice president, secretary, treasurer or any other person holding an equivalent corporate office of any business entity subject to KRS 67.780 shall be personally and individually liable, both jointly and severally, for any tax required to be withheld under KRS 67.750 to 67.790 from compensation paid to one or more employees of any business entity, and neither the corporate dissolution or withdrawal of the business entity from the tax district nor the cessation of holding any corporate office shall discharge that liability of any person; provided that the personal and individual liability shall apply to each or every person holding the corporate office at the time the tax becomes or became obligated. No person shall be personally and individually liable under this subsection who had no authority to collect, truthfully account for, or pay over any tax imposed by KRS 67.750 to 67.790 at the time that the taxes imposed by KRS 67.750 to 67.790 become or became due.
  3. Every employee receiving compensation in a tax district subject to the tax imposed under KRS 68.180 , 68.197 , 91.200 , or 92.281 shall be liable for the tax notwithstanding the provisions of subsections (1) and (2) of this section.

History. Enact. Acts 2003, ch. 117, § 15, effective June 24, 2003.

67.788. Application for refund or credit — When employee may file for refund.

  1. Where there has been an overpayment of tax under KRS 67.780 , refund or credit shall be made to the employer only to the extent that the amount of the overpayment was not deducted and withheld under KRS 67.780 by the employer.
  2. Unless written application for refund or credit is received by the tax district from the employer within two (2) years from the date the overpayment was made, no refund or credit shall be allowed.
  3. An employee who has compensation attributable to activities performed outside a tax district, based on time spent outside the tax district, whose employer has withheld and remitted the occupational license fee on the compensation attributable to activities performed outside the tax district to the tax district, may file for a refund within two (2) years of the date prescribed by law for the filing of a return. The employee shall provide a schedule and computation sufficient to verify the refund claim and the tax district may confirm with the employer the percentage of time spent outside the tax district and the amount of compensation attributable to activities performed outside the tax district prior to approval of the refund.

History. Enact. Acts 2003, ch. 117, § 16, effective June 24, 2003; 2004, ch. 63, § 8, effective July 13, 2004.

67.790. Penalties — Confidentiality of information filed with tax district — Suspension of services or payments if tax district fails to comply with KRS 67.766(1) or (2).

  1. A business entity subject to tax on gross receipts or net profits may be subject to a penalty equal to five percent (5%) of the tax due for each calendar month or fraction thereof if the business entity:
    1. Fails to file any return or report on or before the due date prescribed for filing or as extended by the tax district; or
    2. Fails to pay the tax computed on the return or report on or before the due date prescribed for payment.

      The total penalty levied pursuant to this subsection shall not exceed twenty-five percent (25%) of the total tax due; however, the penalty shall not be less than twenty-five dollars ($25).

  2. Every employer who fails to file a return or pay the tax on or before the date prescribed under KRS 67.783 may be subject to a penalty in an amount equal to five percent (5%) of the tax due for each calendar month or fraction thereof. The total penalty levied pursuant to this subsection shall not exceed twenty-five percent (25%) of the total tax due; however, the penalty shall not be less than twenty-five dollars ($25).
  3. In addition to the penalties prescribed in this section, any business entity or employer shall pay, as part of the tax, an amount equal to twelve percent (12%) per annum simple interest on the tax shown due, but not previously paid, from the time the tax was due until the tax is paid to the tax district. A fraction of a month is counted as an entire month.
  4. Every tax subject to the provisions of KRS 67.750 to 67.790 , and all increases, interest, and penalties thereon, shall become, from the time the tax is due and payable, a personal debt of the taxpayer to the tax district.
  5. In addition to the penalties prescribed in this section, any business entity or employer who willfully fails to make a return, willfully makes a false return, or willfully fails to pay taxes owing or collected, with the intent to evade payment of the tax or amount collected, or any part thereof, shall be guilty of a Class A misdemeanor.
  6. Any person who willfully aids or assists in, or procures, counsels, or advises the preparation or presentation under, or in connection with, any matter arising under KRS 67.750 to 67.790 of a return, affidavit, claim, or other document, which is fraudulent or is false as to any material matter, whether or not the falsity or fraud is with the knowledge or consent of the person authorized or required to present the return, affidavit, claim, or document, shall be guilty of a Class A misdemeanor.
  7. A return for the purpose of this section shall mean and include any return, declaration, or form prescribed by the tax district and required to be filed with the tax district by the provisions of KRS 67.750 to 67.790 , or by the rules of the tax district or by written request for information to the business entity by the tax district.
    1. No present or former employee of any tax district shall intentionally and without authorization inspect or divulge any information acquired by him or her of the affairs of any person, or information regarding the tax schedules, returns, or reports required to be filed with the tax district or other proper officer, or any information produced by a hearing or investigation, insofar as the information may have to do with the affairs of the person’s business. This prohibition does not extend to information required in prosecutions for making false reports or returns for taxation, or any other infraction of the tax laws, or in any way made a matter of public record, nor does it preclude furnishing any taxpayer or the taxpayer’s properly authorized agent with information respecting his or her own return. Further, this prohibition does not preclude any employee of the tax district from testifying in any court, or from introducing as evidence returns or reports filed with the tax district, in an action for violation of a tax district tax laws or in any action challenging a tax district tax laws. (8) (a) No present or former employee of any tax district shall intentionally and without authorization inspect or divulge any information acquired by him or her of the affairs of any person, or information regarding the tax schedules, returns, or reports required to be filed with the tax district or other proper officer, or any information produced by a hearing or investigation, insofar as the information may have to do with the affairs of the person’s business. This prohibition does not extend to information required in prosecutions for making false reports or returns for taxation, or any other infraction of the tax laws, or in any way made a matter of public record, nor does it preclude furnishing any taxpayer or the taxpayer’s properly authorized agent with information respecting his or her own return. Further, this prohibition does not preclude any employee of the tax district from testifying in any court, or from introducing as evidence returns or reports filed with the tax district, in an action for violation of a tax district tax laws or in any action challenging a tax district tax laws.
    2. Any person who violates the provisions of paragraph (a) of this subsection by intentionally inspecting confidential taxpayer information without authorization shall be fined not more than five hundred dollars ($500) or imprisoned for not longer than six (6) months, or both.
    3. Any person who violates the provisions of paragraph (a) of this subsection by divulging confidential taxpayer information shall be fined not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000) or imprisoned for not more than one (1) year, or both.
  8. If a tax district that imposes a net profits or gross receipts occupational license tax fails to comply with the requirements of KRS 67.766(1) or (2), the Secretary of State shall inform the tax district in writing of its noncompliance. If the tax district is not in compliance within thirty (30) days following the notice from the Secretary, the Secretary shall notify all state agencies which deliver services or payments of money from the Commonwealth to the tax district of the tax district’s noncompliance. Those agencies shall suspend delivery of all services or payments to a tax district which fails to comply with the requirements of KRS 67.766(1) or (2). The Secretary of State shall immediately notify those same agencies when the tax district is in compliance with the requirements of KRS 67.766(1) or (2), and those agencies shall reinstate the delivery of services or payments to the tax district.

History. Enact. Acts 2003, ch. 117, § 17, effective June 24, 2003; 2004, ch. 63, § 9, effective July 13, 2004; 2012, ch. 70, § 4, effective July 12, 2012.

67.793. Tax district may levy one-time tax rate.

Notwithstanding the maximum tax rates in KRS 68.180 , 68.197 , and 91.200 , a tax district which levies a tax on net profits may levy a tax rate that would generate approximately the same amount of revenues as the prior year plus normal revenue growth experienced by the tax district over the prior five (5) years. A tax district may invoke the provisions of this section only once.

History. Enact. Acts 2003, ch. 117, § 23, effective June 24, 2003.

67.795. When KRS 67.750 to 67.790 applies.

The provisions of KRS 67.750 to 67.790 shall apply on and after July 15, 2008, to all tax districts that levy an occupational license fee or a tax on net profits or gross receipts, except that the provisions of KRS 67.750 to 67.790 shall not apply to the utilities gross receipts tax levied by school districts pursuant to KRS 160.613 and 160.614 . A tax district may apply the provisions of KRS 67.750 to 67.790 to the levy of an occupational license fee or a tax on net profits or gross receipts, except the utilities gross receipts tax levied by school districts pursuant to KRS 160.613 and 160.614 , by adoption of an ordinance prior to July 15, 2008.

History. Enact. Acts 2003, ch. 117, § 24, effective June 24, 2003; 2004, ch. 63, § 10, effective July 13, 2004; 2005, ch. 153, § 3, effective June 20, 2005.

Counties without Incorporated Areas

67.800. Receipt by county of funds a city is eligible to receive.

Notwithstanding any statute to the contrary, the fiscal court of any county in which there are no incorporated areas shall receive any appropriate state funds a city is eligible to receive in addition to any state funds a county is eligible to receive. Funds received by a fiscal court pursuant to this section in any county in which there are no incorporated areas, shall be used to perform proper and necessary governmental functions statutorily authorized or required involving the public interests of the citizens of the county.

History. Enact. Acts 1988, ch. 327, § 1, effective July 15, 1988.

67.805. Receipt of certain tax funds by county.

The fiscal court of any county in which there are no incorporated areas shall receive any funds arising from the imposition of taxes provided by KRS 138.220 , 138.660(1) and (2) and 234.320 that are designated for allocation to any unincorporated urban place located within the county pursuant to KRS 177.366 and 177.369 , in addition to any funds the county receives pursuant to KRS 177.320 .

History. Enact. Acts 1988, ch. 327, § 2, effective July 15, 1988.

67.810. Receipt by county of urban library funds.

The fiscal court in any county in which there are no incorporated areas shall be eligible to receive urban libraries funds pursuant to KRS 173.860 and 173.870 .

History. Enact. Acts 1988, ch. 327, § 3, effective July 15, 1988.

Charter County Government and Consolidated City-County Services and Functions

67.825. Authorization for charter county government or consolidation of services or functions.

In order to facilitate the operation of local government, to prevent duplication of services, and to promote efficient and economical management of the affairs of local government, the citizens of any county, except in a county containing a consolidated local government, a city of the first class, an urban-county government, or a unified local government, may vote to merge all units of city and county government into a charter county form of government or to consolidate any agency, subdivision, department, or subdistrict providing any services or performing any functions for a city or county. The merger or consolidation shall take place only after compliance with the procedures set forth in KRS 67.830 .

History. Enact. Acts 1990, ch. 401, § 1, effective July 13, 1990; 1994, ch. 440, § 1, effective July 15, 1994; 2002, ch. 346, § 44, effective July 15, 2002; 2012, ch. 63, § 3, effective January 1, 2013.

Compiler’s Notes.

For this section as effective until January 1, 2013, see the preceding section, also numbered KRS 67.825 .

67.830. Procedure for adoption of charter county form of government or for consolidation of services or functions.

  1. The fiscal court in any county, except in a county containing a consolidated local government, a city of the first class, an urban-county government or a unified local government, and a majority of all cities within the county may adopt an ordinance to study the question of merging the county government with all other units of local government within the county to form a charter county form of government, or consolidating any agency, subdivision, department, or subdistrict providing any services or performing any functions for a city or county.
  2. In lieu of the adoption of an ordinance pursuant to subsection (1) of this section, a petition may be filed with the county clerk pursuant to KRS 67.832 requesting the appointment of a commission to study the question of the adoption of a charter county form of government or the consolidation of any agency, subdivision, department, or subdistrict providing any services or performing any functions for a city or county. The petition shall be signed by a number of registered voters equal to at least twenty percent (20%) of the residents in the unincorporated area of the county voting in the preceding regular election and twenty percent (20%) of the residents in incorporated areas of the county voting in the preceding regular election.
  3. Within sixty (60) days of the adoption of an ordinance pursuant to subsection (1) of this section, or within sixty (60) days of a petition being filed with the county clerk pursuant to subsection (2) of this section and certified as sufficient pursuant to  KRS 67.832 , the fiscal court and the city legislative body of each city within the county shall jointly appoint a commission to study the question of the adoption of a charter county form of government or the consolidation of any agency, subdivision, department, or subdistrict providing any services or performing any functions for a city or county. The fiscal court shall determine the size of the membership of the commission, which shall be composed of not less than twenty (20) or more than forty (40) citizen members, and which may include elected or appointed county and city officials. Any officials appointed under this section shall serve as voting members of the commission. The actual appointment of individual members to the commission shall be governed by the following provisions:
    1. The county judge/executive, with the approval of the fiscal court, shall make a number of appointments equal to fifty-five percent (55%) of the membership of the commission;
    2. Jointly, the cities shall make a number of appointments equal to forty-five percent (45%) of the membership of the commission. The mayor of each city shall, subject to the approval of the city legislative body, make a number of appointments based on the ratio that the percentage of the population residing in the mayor’s city bears to the total population of all cities in the county. Each city within the county shall have a minimum of one (1) representative on the commission; and
    3. The county judge/executive shall serve as a voting member of the commission and preside as its chairman.
  4. The commission shall be funded by the fiscal court and each city within the county in proportion to its ratio of membership on the commission and shall be responsible for developing a comprehensive plan for the consolidation of services and functions of cities and the county, or the formation of a charter county government that shall include but not be limited to the following provisions:
    1. A description of the form, structure, functions, powers, and name of the proposed charter county government;
    2. A description of the officers and their powers and duties of the proposed charter county government;
    3. The procedures by which the original comprehensive plan may be amended by the subsequently created charter county government;
    4. The procedures by which the comprehensive plan may be amended by county and participating city or cities as a result of contingencies arising from the failure of certain jurisdictions to vote in favor of joining the comprehensive plan. The contingency plan shall be adopted by the participating county and city or cities by joint ordinance. The contingency plan shall be adopted by the participating county and city or cities within sixty (60) days of the certification of the election result. The contingency plan shall only address:
      1. Issues of revenue;
      2. Issues of indebtedness;
      3. Issues of service provision, service areas, or service area boundaries;
      4. Personnel or administration, but may not infringe upon any pre-existing collective bargaining agreements in force in participating jurisdictions; and
      5. Any issues directly related to the cost of government or provision of services within the comprehensive plan.

        The contingency plan shall not address issues within the plan related to paragraph (a), (b), or (c) of this subsection; and

    5. The procedures whereby the charter county government may be dissolved. The procedures drafted shall include but are not limited to:
      1. Requirements for a public petition for the dissolution of the charter county government;
      2. The question to be presented to voters for the dissolution of the charter county government; and
      3. Any administrative measures necessary to settle tax and debt issues created by the dissolution of the charter county government.

        The proposed charter plan shall specify that no petition for the dissolution of the charter county government shall be valid until a period of five (5) years have passed from commencement of the first terms of the duly elected officers of the charter county government.

  5. The comprehensive plan shall be completed within four (4) years of the commission’s appointment. If a majority of the commission members are unable to agree on a single plan for the formation of a charter county government or the consolidation of services or functions within four (4) years of the appointment of the commission, the commission shall be disbanded unless two-thirds (2/3) of the commission agree to extend the commission for no longer than six (6) months.
  6. The comprehensive plan shall be consistent with the provisions of the Constitution of Kentucky and shall be advertised at least ninety (90) days before a regular election at which the voters will be asked to approve or disapprove the adoption of the comprehensive plan. The question of whether the comprehensive plan shall be adopted shall be filed with the county clerk not later than the second Tuesday in August preceding the day of the next regular election.
  7. The comprehensive plan proposed shall be presented to the voters at a regular election and:
    1. The votes shall be counted, returns made and canvassed in accordance with the provisions of KRS Chapters 116 to 121 governing elections;
    2. The results shall be certified by the county board of election commissioners to the county clerk; and
    3. If a majority of those voting on the issue within each area as required by subsections (8) and (9) of this section are in favor of adopting the comprehensive plan, the county board of election commissioners shall enter the fact of record, and the charter county commission shall organize the charter county government or the county and each participating city shall provide for the consolidation of services or functions as provided in the comprehensive plan.
  8. Subject to the restrictions in subsection (9) of this section, for the comprehensive plan to be adopted, it shall require both a majority of those residents voting within the unincorporated area of the county to vote in favor of its adoption, and:
    1. A majority of those residents voting within the city containing the largest population in the county, based on the most recent decennial census, to vote in favor of its adoption; or
    2. A majority of those residents voting, pursuant to subsection (9) of this section, within cities that together contain at least fifty percent (50%) of the population residing within the incorporated areas of the county, based on the most recent decennial census, to vote in favor of its adoption.
    1. The votes shall be counted within each city to determine whether the majority of voters within each city are in favor of the adoption of the comprehensive plan. (9) (a) The votes shall be counted within each city to determine whether the majority of voters within each city are in favor of the adoption of the comprehensive plan.
    2. Each city where the majority of those voting are in favor of adopting the comprehensive plan shall participate in the charter county government, subject to the requirements of subsection (8) of this section.
    3. Each city where the majority of those voting are not in favor of adopting the comprehensive plan:
      1. Shall not participate in the charter county government;
      2. Shall remain incorporated unless dissolved in accordance with KRS 81.094 and shall continue to exercise all powers and perform the functions permitted by the Constitution and general laws of the Commonwealth of Kentucky applicable to the cities of the class to which they have been assigned; and
      3. Shall allow eligible voters within the city to vote for the chief executive officer of the charter county government and the relevant legislative body member or members of the charter county government for the area including the nonparticipating city.
  9. If the comprehensive plan is not adopted, the same proposal shall not be submitted for voter consideration for a period of five (5) years from the date of the election wherein the comprehensive plan failed to receive the requisite votes.

History. Enact. Acts 1990, ch. 401, § 2, effective July 13, 1990; 1994, ch. 440, § 2, effective July 15, 1994; 1996, ch. 195, § 36, effective July 15, 1996; 2002, ch. 346, § 45, effective July 15, 2002; 2012, ch. 63, § 4, effective January 1, 2013.

Compiler’s Notes.

For this section as effective until January 1, 2013, see the preceding section, also numbered KRS 67.330

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. In General

Ordinance or petition authorizing the creation of a charter county government commission cannot limit the commission’s authority to consider options allowed under KRS 67.830 . Rather, the commission must be able to consider all options and draft a comprehensive plan for merger or consolidation of services as it sees fit. City of Taylorsville v. Spencer County Fiscal Court, 371 S.W.3d 790, 2012 Ky. App. LEXIS 85 (Ky. Ct. App. 2012).

2. Statutory requirements

Petition for a voter referendum on a charter county government did not comply with the requirements of KRS 67.830 , and the petition was therefore invalid. The petition’s wording did not precisely conform to the language of the statute and thus improperly limited the authority of the commission to be created pursuant to the statute. City of Taylorsville v. Spencer County Fiscal Court, 371 S.W.3d 790, 2012 Ky. App. LEXIS 85 (Ky. Ct. App. 2012).

Opinions of Attorney General.

The Legislature did not authorize a commission, appointed pursuant to subsection (3) of this section to study the question of adoption of a charter county form of government or consolidation of certain functions of government, to return a finding that no change should occur. Such commission is mandated by subsection (4) of this section to develop a comprehensive plan for submission to the voters in accordance with subsection (5) of this section. OAG 95-18 .

67.832. Petition to form commission to study adoption of charter county form of government or consolidation of agencies and services.

  1. A petition authorized pursuant to KRS 67.830(2) shall meet the requirements of this section. The petition shall be drafted in such a way that the effect of signing the petition is to support the formation of a commission to study the question of the adoption of a charter county form of government or the consolidation of any agency, subdivision, department, or subdistrict providing any services or performing any function for a city or a county.
  2. Any five (5) qualified voters within the unincorporated area of the county or five (5) qualified voters within the most populous city within the county may commence petition proceedings by filing with the county clerk an affidavit stating they constitute the petition committee and will be responsible for circulating the petition and filing it in proper form. The affidavit shall:
    1. State the names and addresses of the committee members;
    2. Specify the address to which all notices to the committee are to be sent; and
    3. Set out in full the proposal to be considered by the voters.
  3. No later than fourteen (14) business days after the affidavit of the petition committee is filed, the county clerk shall:
    1. Notify the petition committee of all statutory requirements for petitions under this section; and
    2. Deliver a copy of the affidavit to the fiscal court and the legislative body of each city within the county.
  4. In form, a petition to be filed under this section shall:
    1. Be uniform in size and style;
    2. Be assembled as one (1) instrument for filing;
    3. Contain signatures that are executed in ink or indelible pencil. The petition shall be signed by registered voters and the petition shall include:
      1. The signature of the registered voter;
      2. The printed name of the registered voter;
      3. The residential address of the registered voter;
      4. The date of birth of the registered voter; and
      5. The date of signature of the petition.
    4. Be signed by a number of voters:
      1. Equal to at least twenty percent (20%) of the county’s residents in the unincorporated areas of the county voting in the preceding regular election; and
      2. Equal to at least twenty percent (20%) of the residents of the incorporated areas of the county voting in the preceding regular election; and
    5. Contain or have attached throughout its circulation, the full text of the proposal.
  5. When it is filed, each sheet of a petition shall have an affidavit executed by the circulator stating:
    1. That he or she personally circulated the sheet;
    2. The number of signatures contained on the petition;
    3. That all signatures were affixed in his or her presence;
    4. That each signer had an opportunity before signing to read the full text of the proposal; and
    5. That he or she believes them to be genuine signatures of registered voters in the county.
    1. Within thirty (30) days after the petition is filed, the county clerk shall complete a certificate as to its sufficiency. (6) (a) Within thirty (30) days after the petition is filed, the county clerk shall complete a certificate as to its sufficiency.
    2. If the county clerk finds the petition sufficient, the clerk shall send a certificate of the petition’s sufficiency, by certified mail, to:
      1. The petition committee;
      2. The fiscal court of the county; and
      3. The legislative body of each city within the county.
    3. If the county clerk finds the petition is insufficient, the clerk shall:
      1. File a certificate of insufficiency specifying the particulars making it insufficient; and
      2. Send a copy of the certificate, by certified mail, to:
        1. The petition committee;
        2. The fiscal court of the county; and
        3. The legislative body of each city within the county.
    1. A petition certified insufficient for lack of the required number of valid signatures may be amended once if the petition committee files: (7) (a) A petition certified insufficient for lack of the required number of valid signatures may be amended once if the petition committee files:
      1. A notice of intention to amend it with the county clerk within five (5) days after receiving the certificate of insufficiency; and
      2. A supplemental petition upon additional sheets within thirty (30) days of receiving the certificate of insufficiency. The supplemental sheets shall comply with all requirements established by subsection (4) of this section.
    2. Within ten (10) days after the supplemental petition is filed, the county clerk shall determine if the amended petition is sufficient. If the county clerk finds the amended petition sufficient, the clerk shall complete a certificate of sufficiency and send a copy of certificate of the petition’s sufficiency, by certified mail, to:
      1. The petition committee;
      2. The fiscal court of the county; and
      3. The legislative body of each city within the county.
  6. A final determination as to the sufficiency of a petition shall be subject to review in the Circuit Court of the county. This review shall be limited to the validity of the county clerk’s determination. A final determination of insufficiency shall not prejudice the filing of a new petition for the same purpose in accordance with this section.

History. Enact. Acts 2012, ch. 63, § 1, effective January 1, 2013.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(1/1/2013). Under the authority of KRS 7.136(1), the Reviser of Statutes has altered the format of the text in subsection (6) of this statute during codification. The words in the text were not changed.

67.835. Redistricting of charter county government legislative districts.

Notwithstanding any contrary provision of the comprehensive plan of a charter county government, the legislative body of a charter county government may defer redistricting of the legislative districts of the body subsequent to each decennial census by the United States Bureau of Census, until after completion of the redistricting of General Assembly seats within the charter county subsequent to the census. The redistricting of charter county government legislative districts shall be effective for the first regular charter county government primary election scheduled more than one hundred eighty (180) days after completion of the redistricting. The redistricting shall become effective no later than two (2) years after the release of census data upon which the redistricting is based.

History. Enact. Acts 1990, ch. 401, § 3, effective July 13, 1990; 1994, ch. 440, § 3, effective July 15, 1994.

67.840. Election of officials.

Following the adoption and organization of a charter county government, or the consolidation of services or functions pursuant to KRS 67.830 , officials designated in the comprehensive plan shall be elected at the next regularly scheduled election at which county officers shall be elected. Upon the election and qualification of officials designated in the comprehensive plan, the charter county government shall immediately become the effective government. All the debts, property, franchises, and rights of the existing county government and of any municipality within the county shall be assumed by the charter county government as designated within the comprehensive plan.

History. Enact. Acts 1990, ch. 401, § 4, effective July 13, 1990; 1994, ch. 440, § 4, effective July 15, 1994.

67.845. Dissolution of participating incorporated cities and special districts — Effect.

The comprehensive plan for merging a participating city or cities and a county government into a charter county government under KRS 67.825 to 67.875 may provide for the corporate dissolution of incorporated cities and special districts within the county. If the participating incorporated cities and special districts within the county are dissolved, the following provisions shall apply:

  1. For purposes of all state and federal licensing and regulatory laws, statutory entitlement, gifts, grants-in-aid, governmental loan, or other governmental assistance under state or federal laws, rules, or regulations:
    1. The charter county may be deemed a county and, if so, the entire geographic area and population of the charter county shall be considered in calculating and determining the distribution basis for state or federal statutory entitlements, gifts, grants-in-aid, loans, or other forms of governmental assistance; and
    2. The charter county government may designate to the appropriate state or federal agency those geographic areas, portions of roads, or segments of population that shall be deemed to constitute rural or urban areas, roads, or population.
  2. The chief executive officer of the charter county government may determine and make the designations provided for in this section following a public hearing. The charter county government shall fix the time and place of the hearing and it shall be advertised pursuant to KRS Chapter 424.

History. Enact. Acts 1990, ch. 401, § 5, effective July 13, 1990; 1994, ch. 440, § 5, effective July 15, 1994; 2012, ch. 63, § 5, effective January 1, 2013.

Compiler’s Notes.

For this section as effective until January 1, 2013, see the preceding section, also numbered KRS 67.845 .

67.850. Rights, powers, privileges, and immunities of charter county governments.

  1. Charter county governments may exercise the constitutional and statutory rights, powers, privileges, immunities, and responsibilities of counties and cities of the home rule class within the county:
    1. In effect on the date the charter county government becomes effective;
    2. That may subsequently be authorized for or imposed upon counties and cities of that class; and
    3. That may be authorized for or imposed upon charter counties.
  2. Rights, powers, privileges and immunities exercised by charter county governments pursuant to subsection (1)(a) and (b) of this section shall continue to be authorized for charter county governments notwithstanding repeal or amendment of the statutes upon which they are based unless expressly repealed or amended for charter county governments.

History. Enact. Acts 1990, ch. 401, § 6, effective July 13, 1990; 2019 ch. 44, § 7, effective June 27, 2019.

67.852. Continued effect of existing contracts, bonds, franchises, and other obligations after adoption of charter county government.

  1. All contracts, bonds, franchises, and other obligations of a participating city and the county in existence on the effective date of a charter county government, including but not limited to collective bargaining agreements, shall continue in force and effect as obligations of the charter county government for the term of those contracts, bonds, franchises, and other obligations.
  2. The charter county government shall succeed to all rights and entitlements of these contracts, bonds, franchises, and other obligations.
  3. All conflicts in the provisions of the contracts, bonds, franchises, and other obligations shall be resolved in a manner that does not impair the rights of any of the parties.
  4. Nothing in KRS 67.825 to 67.875 shall be construed to nullify a participating city’s petition pursuant to KRS 345.010 to be included under KRS Chapter 345 for collective bargaining with firefighters. Nothing in KRS 67.825 to 67.875 shall be construed to nullify any other legal obligations requiring the continuance of collective bargaining with a county’s or participating city’s employees. To the extent required by KRS Chapter 345 or any other legal obligation requiring the continuance of collective bargaining, the charter county government shall continue to bargain collectively with those employees who were covered under a contract with the county or participating city at the time of the formation of the charter county government.

History. Enact. Acts 2012, ch. 63, § 2, effective January 1, 2013.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(1/1/2013). Although subsection (4) of this statute, as created by 2012 Ky. Acts ch. 63, sec. 2, refers to “a participating city’s petition pursuant to KRS 345.010 ,” that statute contains only definitions, and petitions are found in KRS 345.060 and 345.080 .

67.855. Ordinance powers — Conflicts.

  1. Charter county governments may enact and enforce within their territorial limits the tax, licensing, police, sanitary, and other ordinances not in conflict with the Constitution and general statutes of this state now or hereafter enacted, required for the health, education, safety, welfare, and convenience of the inhabitants of the county and for the effective administration of the charter county government. A charter county government shall not enact any ordinance that imposes any tax or license, franchise or other fee, or requires a license, franchise, or other permission, for or with respect to the construction or maintenance of any utility equipment, facility, or apparatus along, over, under, or across the streets, alleys, or public grounds of, or the operation of any utility business within, any portion of the area of the government outside of the larger of the area within the corporate boundaries of the participating city or cities at the time of creation of the charter county government, or that part of the area of the charter county government within which the government provides at least the level of services provided by any participating city that existed prior to the creation of the charter county government.
  2. Charter county government ordinances shall be deemed to conflict with general statutes of this state only:
    1. When the ordinance authorizes that which is expressly prohibited by a general statute; or
    2. When there is a comprehensive scheme of legislation on the same subject embodied in a general statute.
  3. No ordinance or resolution shall be considered by the charter county government legislative body until it has been read at two (2) separate meetings. A second reading may be suspended by a two-thirds (2/3) vote of the membership of the legislative body. Requirements for reading ordinances or resolutions may be satisfied by public reading of the title and summary.
  4. All ordinances and resolutions shall be effective upon passage, unless timely vetoed by the chief executive officer of the charter county government pursuant to the provisions of the comprehensive plan of the charter county government. Any ordinance or resolution imposing fines, forfeitures, imprisonment, taxes, or fees, other than a bond ordinance or resolution, shall be published in full in a newspaper qualified under KRS 424.120 . The publication requirements for all other ordinances or resolutions, including bond ordinances or resolutions, shall be satisfied by publication in full or by publication of the title and summary.
  5. The provisions of any local, statewide, or nationally recognized standard code and codifications of entire bodies of local legislation may be adopted by ordinance that identifies the subject matter by title, source, and date and incorporates the adopted provisions by reference without setting them out in full, if a copy accompanies the adopting ordinance and is made a part of the permanent records of the charter county government.

History. Enact. Acts 1990, ch. 401, § 7, effective July 13, 1990; 2012, ch. 63, § 6, effective January 1, 2013.

Compiler’s Notes.

For this section as effective until January 1, 2013, see the preceding section, also numbered KRS 67.855 .

67.860. Service districts.

The territory of a charter county government may be divided into service districts. Each service district shall constitute a separate tax district within which the charter county government shall levy and collect taxes in accordance with the kind, type, level, and character of the services provided by the charter county government in each of these districts. The legislative body of the charter county government may abolish or alter existing districts, or create new districts.

History. Enact. Acts 1990, ch. 401, § 8, effective July 13, 1990.

67.862. Applicability of KRS 68.245, 132.010, and 132.017 to charter county ad valorem tax rates.

The provisions of KRS 68.245 , 132.010 , and 132.017 shall apply to ad valorem tax rates levied by charter county governments.

History. Enact. Acts 2010, ch. 95, § 2, effective July 15, 2010.

67.865. Merit or civil service system for employees.

  1. If a comprehensive plan adopted pursuant to KRS 67.830 requires the implementation of a merit or civil service system for the employees of a charter county government, the system shall be implemented by the charter county government to guarantee the substantive and procedural rights possessed by any employee of a government in existence within the boundaries of the charter county prior to the effective date of merger.
  2. During the time a merit or civil service system is being implemented pursuant to the requirements of a comprehensive plan, all procedural and substantive rights possessed by any employee of a government in existence within the boundaries of the charter county prior to the effective date of merger shall be protected.
  3. If a comprehensive plan adopted pursuant to KRS 67.830 does not require the implementation of a merit or civil service system for the employees of a charter county government, the charter county government shall continue to guarantee the substantive and procedural rights possessed by those employees who had merit system or civil service protection through a local government in existence within the boundaries of the charter county prior to the effective date of merger.

History. Enact. Acts 1990, ch. 401, § 9, effective July 13, 1990.

67.870. Employment on basis of political activity prohibited.

  1. No person shall be appointed to any position in a charter county government because of political, partisan service rendered by him or his family, or because of political sentiment or affiliation nor shall any person be dismissed, suspended, or reduced in grade or pay because of any political opinion.
  2. The appointment and continuance of employment of all persons in a charter county government shall depend solely upon their ability and willingness to perform their duties, and shall not be a reward for political activity or contribution to campaign funds.
  3. No employee of a charter county government shall be forced to pay or collect any assessments made by political organizations, contribute to political campaign funds, or be active in politics.
  4. While on duty, no employee of a charter county government shall be active in politics or work for the election of candidates.

History. Enact. Acts 1990, ch. 401, § 10, effective July 13, 1990.

67.875. Retirement system for employees.

A charter county government may provide a retirement system for its employees only by participating in the County Employees Retirement System pursuant to KRS 78.510 to 78.852 .

History. Enact. Acts 1990, ch. 401, § 11, effective July 13, 1990.

Unified Local Government

67.900. Authorization to form unified local government.

In order to promote efficient and economical management of the affairs of local government and prevent the duplication of services, the voters of any county, except a county containing a consolidated local government, an urban-county government, or a charter county government, may vote to unite the county government with one (1) or more cities within the county to form a unified local government. The creation and implementation of a unified local government shall take place only after compliance with the procedures set forth in KRS 67.900 to 67.940 .

History. Enact. Acts 2006, ch. 246, § 1, effective July 12, 2006.

67.902. Definitions for KRS 67.900 to 67.940.

As used in KRS 67.900 to 67.940 :

  1. “Citizen member” means a person who is neither an elected nor an appointed official or employee of the county or a participating city;
  2. “Participating city” means a city that has filed an ordinance with the county clerk and has been named in the notification sent by the county clerk under KRS 67.904(3); and
  3. “Population” means the number of residents residing within the territorial limits of a city or county based upon the most recent official decennial census by the United States Bureau of Census.

History. Enact. Acts 2006, ch. 246, § 2, effective July 12, 2006.

67.904. Procedure for initiation of unification process — Appointment of unification review commission.

The unification process shall be initiated in the following manner:

  1. The legislative body of one (1) or more cities within the county and the county fiscal court may enact ordinances proposing that a commission be formed to study the question of unifying the county government with one (1) or more cities within the county to form a unified local government. The executive authority of each city enacting an ordinance shall cause a copy of the ordinance to be filed with the county clerk no later than ten (10) days after enactment.
  2. The county clerk shall be responsible for determining whether the required ordinances have been filed to initiate the unification process. The unification process shall be initiated when the county clerk determines that:
    1. An ordinance has been enacted by the county fiscal court under subsection (1) of this section; and
    2. An ordinance has been enacted and filed by one (1) or more cities within the county.
  3. If the county clerk makes the determination required by subsection (2) of this section, the clerk shall notify the county judge/executive, the mayor of each city within the county, and the chief executive officer of every special district within the county that the unification process has been initiated by the county and the city or cities named in the notification.
  4. Within sixty (60) days of notification by the county clerk that the unification process has been officially initiated, a unification review commission shall be appointed.

History. Enact. Acts 2006, ch. 246, § 3, effective July 12, 2006.

67.906. Unification review commission — Membership — Chairperson — Filling vacancies.

  1. The county judge/executive and the mayor of the participating city with the greatest population shall jointly determine the size of the unification review commission which shall be composed of not less than twenty (20) nor more than forty (40) members.
  2. The membership of the unification review commission shall be divided equally between the county and the participating cities. The mayor of each participating city shall, with the approval of the city legislative body, make a number of appointments based on the ratio that the percentage of the population residing in the mayor’s city bears to the population of all participating cities. Each participating city shall have a minimum of one (1) representative on the unification review commission. The county judge/executive shall, with the approval of the fiscal court, appoint a number of members to the unification review commission equal to the number of city members.
  3. The chairperson of the unification review commission shall be a citizen member elected by a majority vote of the membership of the unification review commission at its first meeting.
  4. Any vacancy on the commission shall be filled in the same manner as original appointments are made.

History. Enact. Acts 2006, ch. 246, § 4, effective July 12, 2006.

67.908. Funding of unification review commission.

Unless otherwise agreed upon by the county and the participating cities, the unification review commission shall be funded by the fiscal court and each participating city in proportion to their relative population. For purposes of this section, the population of the county shall be calculated excluding the population of any participating city.

History. Enact. Acts 2006, ch. 246, § 5, effective July 12, 2006.

67.910. Unification plan — Components — Deadline for completion — Dissolution of commission.

  1. The unification review commission shall study matters relating to the feasibility of forming a unified local government and, if unification is proposed, develop a unification plan consistent with the provisions of the Kentucky Constitution and KRS 67.900 to 67.940 . A unification plan shall include:
    1. The process for establishing the unified local government;
    2. A description of the form, structure, functions, and powers of the proposed unified local government;
    3. A description of the officers of the proposed unified local government and their powers and duties;
    4. A procedure for the orderly and timely transition of specified services, functions, and responsibilities from each affected city and the county to the unified local government;
    5. A procedure for the orderly transition to the unified local government of the services, functions, and responsibilities of any special district that will be eliminated;
    6. A procedure for the orderly transition to the unified local government of the services, functions, and responsibilities of any board, commission, or authority that will be eliminated;
    7. The procedures by which the unification plan may be amended by the subsequently created unified local government;
    8. The procedures by which the unification plan may be amended by the participating county and city or cities as a result of contingencies arising from the failure of certain jurisdictions to vote in favor of joining the unification plan. The contingency plan shall be adopted by the participating county and city or cities by joint ordinance. The contingency plan shall be adopted by the participating county and city or cities within sixty (60) days of the certification of the election result. The contingency plan shall only address:
      1. Issues of revenue;
      2. Issues of indebtedness;
      3. Issues of service provision, service areas, or service area boundaries;
      4. Personnel or administration, but may not infringe upon any pre-existing collective bargaining agreements in force in participating jurisdictions; and
      5. Any issues directly related to the cost of government or provision of services within the unification plan. The contingency plan shall not address issues within the plan related to paragraph (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), or (g) of this subsection; and
    9. The procedures by which the unified local government may be dissolved. The procedures drafted shall include but are not limited to:
      1. Requirements for a public petition for the dissolution of the unified local government;
      2. The question to be presented to voters for the dissolution of the unified local government; and
      3. Any administrative measures necessary to settle tax and debt issues created by the dissolution of the unified local government. The proposed unification plan shall specify that no petition for the dissolution of the unified local government shall be valid until a period of five (5) years has passed from commencement of the first terms of the duly elected officers of the unified local government; and
    10. Such other provisions as the commission shall determine.
  2. The unification review commission may propose a unification plan under which the county and one (1) or more participating cities unite to form a single unit of local government.
  3. The unification plan shall be completed within two (2) years of the commission’s appointment. If a majority of the commission members are unable to agree on a plan for unification within the two (2) year period, the unification review commission shall be dissolved by operation of law.

History. Enact. Acts 2006, ch. 246, § 6, effective July 12, 2006; 2012, ch. 63, § 7, effective January 1, 2013.

67.912. Legislative council — Chief executive and administrative officers — Powers, duties, and salary of CEO.

  1. The legislative authority of a unified local government shall be vested in a legislative council elected in the manner provided by the unification plan.
  2. The executive authority of a unified local government shall be vested in a chief executive officer elected in the manner provided by the unification plan. The chief executive officer shall have the powers and duties of a county judge/executive under KRS 67.710 and a mayor under KRS 83A.130 .
  3. A chief administrative officer may be employed to serve on the staff of the chief executive officer. A chief administrative officer shall be appointed by the chief executive officer, subject to confirmation by a vote of three-fifths (3/5) of the legislative council, and possess education or professional experience, or both, in the area of public administration. A chief administrative officer may be removed by executive order of the chief executive officer or by a vote of three-fifths (3/5) of the entire legislative body.
  4. The chief executive officer shall appoint all members of boards, commissions, authorities, or other entities formed by the unified local government after the effective date of the unification plan and shall fill all vacancies as they occur on boards, commissions, authorities, or other entities created by the county or a participating city prior to the effective date of the unification plan, which continue to exist after unification. All appointments by the chief executive officer shall be made subject to confirmation by a majority of the legislative council.
  5. The salary of the chief executive officer of a unified local government shall be no less than the salary of a county judge/executive pursuant to KRS 64.535 based upon the population of the county in the year prior to election of the chief executive officer.

History. Enact. Acts 2006, ch. 246, § 7, effective July 12, 2006.

67.914. Public hearings on unification plan.

The unification review commission shall hold at least one (1) public hearing prior to finalizing its plan to combine county government with one (1) or more cities within the county into a unified local government. The commission may hold additional public hearings as determined by the commission. Notice setting forth the time, date, location, and purpose of the public hearing shall be published as required by KRS Chapter 424.

History. Enact. Acts 2006, ch. 246, § 8, effective July 12, 2006.

67.916. Approval of unification plan by commission.

Following its final public hearing, the unification review commission shall vote on the proposed unification plan as presented or as modified by the commission. A unification plan approved by a majority vote of the commission members shall be submitted to the registered voters in the county for a vote at the next regular election.

History. Enact. Acts 2006, ch. 246, § 9, effective July 12, 2006.

67.918. Question of unification to be submitted to voters — Adoption of unification plan after approval — Prohibition against placing rejected plan on ballot for five years.

  1. The question whether the unification plan shall be adopted shall be filed with the county clerk not later than the second Tuesday in August preceding the day of the next regular election. The plan shall be advertised at least once not later than ninety (90) days before the regular election at which the voters will be asked to approve or disapprove the adoption of the unification plan.
  2. The question to be submitted to the voters shall read as follows:

    “Are you in favor of unifying the city (or cities) of _____________________________________ and _____________________________________ County into a single government according to the unification plan adopted by the Unification Review Commission?”

    1. Subject to the restrictions in paragraph (b) of this subsection, for the unification plan to be adopted, it shall require both a majority of those residents voting within the unincorporated area of the county to vote in favor of its adoption, and: (3) (a) Subject to the restrictions in paragraph (b) of this subsection, for the unification plan to be adopted, it shall require both a majority of those residents voting within the unincorporated area of the county to vote in favor of its adoption, and:
      1. A majority of those residents voting within the city containing the largest population in the county, based on the most recent decennial census, to vote in favor of its adoption; or
      2. A majority of those residents voting, pursuant to paragraph (b) of this subsection, within cities that together contain at least fifty percent (50%) of the population residing within the incorporated areas of the county, based on the most recent decennial census, to vote in favor of its adoption.
      1. The votes shall be counted within each city to determine whether the majority of voters within each city are in favor of the adoption of the unification plan. (b) 1. The votes shall be counted within each city to determine whether the majority of voters within each city are in favor of the adoption of the unification plan.
      2. Each city where the majority of those voting are in favor of adopting the unification plan shall participate in the unified local government, subject to the requirements of paragraph (a) of this subsection.
      3. Each city where the majority of those voting are not in favor of adopting the unification plan:
        1. Shall not participate in the unified local government;
        2. Shall remain incorporated unless dissolved in accordance with KRS 81.094 and shall continue to exercise all powers and perform the functions permitted by the Constitution and general laws of the Commonwealth of Kentucky applicable to the cities of the class to which they have been assigned; and
        3. Shall allow eligible voters within the city to vote for the chief executive officer of the unified local government and the relevant legislative body member or members of the unified local government for the area including the nonparticipating city.
  3. The votes shall be counted, returns made, and canvassed in accordance with the provisions of KRS Chapters 116 to 121 governing elections, and the results shall be certified by the county board of election commissioners to the county clerk. If a majority of those voting on the issue are in favor of forming a unified local government, the county board of election commissioners shall enter the fact of record and the unified local government shall be organized as provided in the unification plan.
  4. An adopted unification plan shall take effect January 1 following the election of officers to fill elective offices created by the unification plan. Officers shall be elected in the regular election in the next even-numbered year following adoption of the unification plan.
  5. If the question whether the unification plan shall be adopted is rejected by a majority of the electorate, the question is defeated and cannot be voted on again for five (5) years from the date of certification of the election results.

History. Enact. Acts 2006, ch. 246, § 10, effective July 12, 2006; 2012, ch. 63, § 8, effective January 1, 2013.

67.920. Redistricting of unified local government legislative districts.

  1. If the unification plan of a unified local government provides for election of legislative council members by legislative district, the legislative council may defer redistricting of legislative districts, subsequent to each decennial census by the United States Bureau of Census, until after completion of the redistricting of General Assembly seats within the unified local government after that census.
  2. The redistricting of unified local government legislative districts under this section shall be effective for the first regular unified local government primary election scheduled more than one hundred eighty (180) days after completion of the redistricting, but, in no event shall the redistricting become effective later than two (2) years after release of the census data upon which the redistricting is based.

History. Enact. Acts 2006, ch. 246, § 11, effective July 12, 2006.

67.922. Rights, powers, privileges, immunities, and responsibilities of unified local government — Continuance of county and city laws — Enactment and enforcement of ordinances.

  1. A unified local government may exercise the constitutional and statutory rights, powers, privileges, immunities, and responsibilities of counties and of cities of the first class or home rule class within the unified local government:
    1. In effect on the date the unified local government becomes effective;
    2. Which may subsequently be authorized for or imposed upon counties and cities of that class; and
    3. Which may be authorized for or imposed upon unified local governments.
  2. If a city of the first class exists within the county on the date that the unified local government becomes effective and that city is part of the unified local government, the unified local government may also exercise the constitutional and statutory rights, powers, privileges, immunities, and responsibilities of a city of the first class in addition to its authority to exercise the rights, powers, privileges, immunities, and responsibilities granted under subsection (1) of this section.
  3. A unified local government shall be accorded the same sovereign immunity granted counties, their agencies, officers, and employees.
  4. All ordinances of a unified local government shall be enacted and enforced pursuant to KRS 83A.060 and 83A.065 .

History. Enact. Acts 2006, ch. 246, § 12, effective July 12, 2006; 2019 ch. 44, § 8, effective June 27, 2019.

67.924. Retention of laws in force at time of unification — Superceding existing laws — Resolution of conflicts between county and city ordinances.

Unless otherwise specifically set forth in the unification plan that is approved by the unification commission and submitted to the voters, ordinances, orders, resolutions, and other effects of law in force within a county and participating city at the time of unification that do not conflict with the unification plan remain in effect until superseded by specific action of the new governing body of the unified local government.

  1. If a participating city ordinance conflicts with a county ordinance, the county ordinance shall prevail and shall become effective countywide.
  2. If a participating city ordinance addresses a subject not addressed by a county ordinance, the city ordinance shall remain effective only within the territory of the participating city until changed by the unified local government.
  3. If a participating city ordinance addresses a subject not addressed by a county ordinance but conflicts with an ordinance of another participating city, the ordinances shall remain effective in each participating city until changed by the unified local government.
  4. If a county ordinance addresses a subject matter not addressed by a participating city ordinance, the county ordinance shall become effective countywide.

History. Enact. Acts 2006, ch. 246, § 13, effective July 12, 2006.

67.926. Contracts and obligations of counties and cities to be honored after unification.

All contracts, bonds, franchises, and other obligations of a participating city and the county in existence on the effective date of a unified local government shall continue in force and effect as obligations of the unified local government, and the unified local government shall succeed to all rights and entitlements thereunder. All conflicts in the provisions of the contracts, bonds, franchises, or other obligations shall be resolved in a manner that does not impair the rights of any of the parties.

History. Enact. Acts 2006, ch. 246, § 14, effective July 12, 2006.

67.928. Powers and duties of Sections 99 and 144 constitutional offices within unified territory — Funding responsibilities and oversight duties unaffected by unification.

  1. Except as provided in subsection (2) of this section, all offices provided for in Sections 99 and 144 of the Constitution of Kentucky shall remain in existence upon the unification of a county and a participating city or cities pursuant to KRS 67.900 to 67.940 . However, all existing powers and duties of the offices shall be assigned to the unified local government.
  2. Nothing in KRS 67.900 to 67.940 shall alter or affect the election or term of any county court clerk, county attorney, coroner, jailer, sheriff, surveyor, or assessor. Nor shall any provision of KRS 67.900 to 67.940 be construed to alter or affect the powers, duties, or responsibilities of these officers as prescribed by the Constitution and laws of the Commonwealth of Kentucky. Any funding responsibilities or oversight of any constitutional officers or their employees previously exercised by the county, which shall include the approval of the annual budget of the sheriff’s and the county clerk’s offices, shall be transferred to the unified local government.

History. Enact. Acts 2006, ch. 246, § 15, effective July 12, 2006.

67.930. Employees of county and cities to become employees of unified local government — Rights, privileges, and protections of employees and their beneficiaries remain in effect.

  1. Upon the effective date of an adopted unification plan, all regular employees of the county and participating city or cities shall become employees of the unified local government.
  2. All rights, privileges, and protections attributed to a regular employee by a civil service system established by a county or participating city prior to the effective date of the unification plan shall continue in effect until changed by statute or ordinance.
  3. Upon the establishment of a unified local government, all rights, privileges, and protections of beneficiaries of a retirement fund or pension fund established by a participating city or county shall continue in effect until all benefits due each beneficiary have been paid.

History. Enact. Acts 2006, ch. 246, § 16, effective July 12, 2006.

67.932. Division of unified local government’s territory into service districts by legislative council — Tax districts to correspond — Partial-service districts.

The territory of a unified local government may be divided into service districts. Each service district shall constitute a separate tax district within which the unified local government shall levy and collect taxes in accordance with the kind, type, level, and character of the services provided by the unified local government in each district. The legislative council of a unified local government may abolish or alter existing districts or create new districts and may establish partial-service districts into which one (1) or more services provided within a full-service district may be expanded or extended, and may establish service districts into which all of the services provided within a full-service district shall be expanded or extended, along with one (1) or more other services not provided within the full-service district.

History. Enact. Acts 2006, ch. 246, § 17, effective July 12, 2006.

67.934. Taxing, fire protection, sanitation, water, and special districts to continue unless eliminated in plan or later dissolved — Rate of levy.

Unless eliminated under the unification plan, all taxing districts, fire protection districts, sanitation districts, water districts, and any special taxing or service districts of any kind existing upon the successful passage of the question set out in KRS 67.918 shall continue in existence unless dissolved in the manner prescribed by law and shall continue to exercise all the powers and functions permitted by the Constitution and the general laws of the Commonwealth of Kentucky. If a special taxing district in existence upon the successful passage of the question is eliminated under the unification plan or is later dissolved, the unified government may include any rate levied by the special district as part of its levied rate in the area served by the special district without having to comply with the provisions of KRS 132.027 .

History. Enact. Acts 2006, ch. 246, § 18, effective July 12, 2006.

67.936. Ordinances creating boards, commissions, authorities, and interlocal agreements deemed reenacted unless eliminated in plan — Restructuring powers of council.

  1. Unless eliminated under the unification plan, all ordinances of a county and participating city creating boards, commissions, and authorities and interlocal agreements shall survive and be deemed reenacted by the new legislative council. All members of boards, commissions, and authorities may serve the balance of the terms to which they were appointed and until their successors are appointed and duly qualified according to law. The legislative council shall have the power, by ordinance, to take such action as it deems necessary to abolish, restructure, consolidate, or otherwise alter any board, commission, or authority if the action is consistent with the Kentucky Revised Statutes.
  2. All planning commissions established pursuant to KRS Chapter 100 in existence within a county upon the adoption of a unified local government shall continue to exercise all of the powers and functions permitted by the Constitution of Kentucky and the Kentucky Revised Statutes until dissolved in the same manner prescribed by law.

History. Enact. Acts 2006, ch. 246, § 19, effective July 12, 2006.

67.938. Continuation of tax structures and rates and service levels after unification — Imposition of different tax rates within territory — Certificates of delinquency.

  1. The tax structure, tax rates, and level of services in effect in the county and in each of the participating cities upon the adoption of a unified local government shall remain in effect after the adoption of the unified local government and shall remain the same until changed by the newly elected unified local government legislative council.
  2. In order to maintain the tax structure, tax rates, or level of services in the areas of the unified local government formerly comprising incorporated cities, the unified local government council may provide, in a manner described in this section, for taxes and services within the formerly incorporated cities that are different from the taxes and services which are applicable in the remainder of the unified local government. If a unified local government is formed that contains a participating city with a restaurant tax imposed pursuant to KRS 91A.400 , the restaurant tax may be retained by the unified local government in the area of the participating city.
  3. Any difference in the ad valorem tax rate on the class of property which includes the surface of the land in the portion of the county formerly comprising the incorporated cities, and the surface of the land in the portion of the county other than that formerly comprising the incorporated cities, may be imposed directly by the unified local government legislative council. Any change in these ad valorem tax rates shall comply with KRS 68.245 , 132.010 , 132.017 , and 132.027 and shall be used for services as provided by KRS 82.085 .
  4. All delinquent taxes of a participating city in a unified local government shall be filed with the county clerk and shall be known as certificates of delinquency or personal property certificates of delinquency and shall be governed by the procedures set out in KRS Chapter 134, except that certificates of delinquency and personal property certificates of delinquency on former city tax bills may be paid or purchased directly from the clerk under KRS 134.126 and 134.127 .

History. Enact. Acts 2006, ch. 246, § 20, effective July 12, 2006; 2009, ch. 10, § 60, effective January 1, 2010.

67.940. Nonparticipating cities within territory to remain incorporated and exercise existing powers — Incorporations after unification prohibited — Council approval required for annexation.

  1. Any nonparticipating city located within the territory of a unified local government following adoption of a unification plan shall remain incorporated unless dissolved in accordance with KRS 81.094 and shall continue to exercise all powers and perform all functions permitted by the Constitution of Kentucky and the Kentucky Revised Statutes applicable to cities of the class to which it has been assigned.
  2. After the adoption of a unified local government, there shall be no further incorporation of cities within the county.
  3. After the adoption of a unified local government, any proposed annexation by a city in the county shall first receive the approval of the legislative council of the unified local government prior to the city proceeding under the provisions of KRS Chapter 81A. The city shall request the approval of the unified local government by ordinance. The unified local government shall respond by ordinance within sixty (60) days of receipt of the request. If an ordinance has not been enacted by the unified local government legislative council within sixty (60) days, the request by a city to proceed with an annexation proposal shall be deemed to be approved by the unified local government.

History. Enact. Acts 2006, ch. 246, § 21, effective July 12, 2006.

Penalties

67.990. Penalties.

  1. Any officer who willfully violates any of the provisions of KRS 67.020 is guilty of misfeasance in office, and shall be fined not more than one hundred dollars ($100).
  2. Any officer who willfully violates any of the provisions of KRS 67.090(2) shall be fined not less than fifty dollars ($50) nor more than two hundred dollars ($200) for each offense.

History. 918, 938h-58: amend. Acts 1954, ch. 25, § 4; 1968, ch. 152, § 37; 1980, ch. 188, § 45, effective July 15, 1980.

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Misfeasance, malfeasance or wilful neglect of duty by certain county officers, penalty for, KRS 61.170 .

67.992. Penalty.

Any person who violates any provision of KRS 67.082 relating to the use of poisons shall be fined not less than fifty dollars ($50), nor more than five hundred dollars ($500), or imprisoned for not less than ten (10) days, nor more than three (3) months, or both.

History. Enact. Acts 1972, ch. 98, § 1(3).

CHAPTER 67A Urban-County Government

67A.010. Urban-county form of government authorized.

In order to facilitate the operation of local government, to prevent duplication of services, and to promote efficient and economical management of the affairs of local government, the voters in any county except a county containing a city of the first class may merge all units of city and county government into an urban-county form of government. Such merger shall take place only after compliance with the procedures set forth in KRS 67A.020 .

History. Enact. Acts 1970, ch. 268, § 1; 1972, ch. 28, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

Absent any all-inclusive, straight-out prohibition in the constitution against the grant to local voters of any power of self-government in regard to the structure of local government, this section is not unconstitutional. Pinchback v. Stephens, 484 S.W.2d 327, 1972 Ky. LEXIS 148 ( Ky. 1972 ).

This statute, classifying counties or cities on the basis of size alone, did not violate Ky. Const., § 59 in confining its application to counties other than ones containing a city of the first class since its subject was the organization or government of the classified governmental units and the exclusion had a rational and reasonable basis. Pinchback v. Stephens, 484 S.W.2d 327, 1972 Ky. LEXIS 148 ( Ky. 1972 ).

The establishment of urban-county government in Fayette County led to the creation of new offices, different terms and methods of elections, and many structural changes, and was not an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority because this chapter established the powers that an urban-county government can possess and only delegated the authority to provide the structure. Holsclaw v. Stephens, 507 S.W.2d 462, 1973 Ky. LEXIS 3 ( Ky. 1973 ).

2. Abolition of Urban-county Government.

Since KRS 67A.010 et seq. contains no procedure for abolishing an urban-county government and Ky. Const., § 156 provides that the General Assembly alone may provide how towns may be organized, proposed amendment to county government charter that would abolish the urban-county government and replace it with former city and county governments was not constitutionally permissible. Goodloe v. Baesler, 539 S.W.2d 298, 1976 Ky. LEXIS 55 ( Ky. 1976 ).

3. Immunity from Suit.

The airport board was established by either the city or the county, and pursuant to this section, became a county agency prior to the time of the tort involved; therefore, the immunity of the state and the county was extended to the air board. Inco, Ltd. v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Airport Bd., 705 S.W.2d 933, 1985 Ky. App. LEXIS 679 (Ky. Ct. App. 1985).

Cited:

Thomas v. Lyons, 586 S.W.2d 711, 1979 Ky. LEXIS 284 ( Ky. 1979 ); Hempel v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government, 641 S.W.2d 51, 1982 Ky. App. LEXIS 261 (Ky. Ct. App. 1982); Cox v. Norton, 797 F.2d 329, 1986 U.S. App. LEXIS 27624 (6th Cir. 1986).

Opinions of Attorney General.

This section through KRS 67A.040 (repealed) provides the exclusive method for a complete merger of city and county governments. OAG 72-465 .

Under this section through KRS 67A.040 (repealed) it is clear that the urban-county government completely supersedes the former city and county governments. OAG 72-465 .

The statutory approval of county budgets by the state local finance officer does not apply to urban county government unless the urban county government elects to invoke pertinent budget statutes of KRS Ch. 68, including KRS 68.250 . OAG 74-360 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Comments, The Urban County: Kentucky’s New Structure for Local Government, 62 Ky. L.J. 568 (1973-1974).

67A.020. Election on urban-county form of government — Formation of plan.

Upon a petition filed with the county clerk and signed by a number of registered voters equal to five percent (5%) of voters of the county voting in the immediate past general election, and, upon additional petitions equal to the number of municipal corporations within the county, filed with the county clerk and signed by a number of registered voters equal to five percent (5%) of the number of voters of each municipal corporation, voting in the immediate past general election, requesting a referendum be held on the question of adopting the urban-county form of government, the fiscal court and the council of the largest city within the county shall appoint a representative commission composed of not less than twenty (20) citizens which shall devise a comprehensive plan of urban-county government. The plan shall include a description of the form, structure, functions, powers and officers and their duties of the proposed urban-county government; the procedures by which the original plan may be amended; and such other provisions as the commission shall determine; and shall be consistent with the provisions of the Constitution of Kentucky. This plan shall be advertised at least ninety (90) days before a general election at which the voters will be asked to approve or disapprove the adoption of the plan. The question of whether the plan shall be adopted shall be filed with the county clerk not later than the second Tuesday in August preceding the day of the next general election. The votes shall be counted, returns made and canvassed as in other elections, and the results shall be certified by the county board of election commissioners to the county clerk. If it appears that a majority of those voting are in favor of adopting the plan, the commissioners shall enter such fact of record and shall organize the urban-county government.

History. Enact. Acts 1970, ch. 268, § 2; 1972, ch. 257, § 1; 1982, ch. 360, § 17, effective July 15, 1982; 1996, ch. 195, § 37, effective July 15, 1996.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

Absent any all-inclusive, straight-out prohibition in the constitution against the grant to local voters of any power of self-government in regard to the structure of local government, this section is not unconstitutional. Pinchback v. Stephens, 484 S.W.2d 327, 1972 Ky. LEXIS 148 ( Ky. 1972 ).

This statute did not violate Ky. Const., § 60 forbidding the enactment of laws to take effect upon the approval of any other authority than the General Assembly, since Ky. Const., § 60 also expressly exempted laws for the regulation by counties, cities, towns or other municipalities of their local affairs. Pinchback v. Stephens, 484 S.W.2d 327, 1972 Ky. LEXIS 148 ( Ky. 1972 ).

This statute did not violate Ky. Const., §§ 97 to 108, designating various constitutional county offices, or Ky. Const., § 144, providing for a fiscal court, since it was possible that a particular plan proposed under this statute would not inevitably violate those sections. Pinchback v. Stephens, 484 S.W.2d 327, 1972 Ky. LEXIS 148 ( Ky. 1972 ).

This statute did not inevitably violate Ky. Const., § 156, dealing with cities, which provided that “the organization and powers of each class shall be defined and provided for by general laws, so that all municipal corporations of the same class shall possess the same powers and be subject to the same restrictions.” Pinchback v. Stephens, 484 S.W.2d 327, 1972 Ky. LEXIS 148 ( Ky. 1972 ).

Cited:

Hacker v. Baesler, 812 S.W.2d 706, 1991 Ky. LEXIS 45 ( Ky. 1991 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

A citizens’ advocate created via charter does not have the right to sit in on executive sessions of the urban-county council where the charter does not include such authority. OAG 77-778 .

67A.023. Redistricting of urban-county legislative districts.

Notwithstanding any contrary provision of the comprehensive plan of an urban-county government, the legislative body of an urban-county government may defer redistricting of the legislative districts of such body subsequent to each decennial census by the United States Bureau of Census until after completion of the redistricting of General Assembly seats within the urban-county subsequent to such census. The redistricting of urban-county government legislative districts hereunder shall be effective for the first regular urban-county government primary election scheduled more than one hundred eighty (180) days after completion of such redistricting; provided that in no event will the redistricting become effective later than two (2) years after release of the census data upon which the redistricting is based.

History. Enact. Acts 1980, ch. 203, § 1, effective July 15, 1980.

67A.025. Chief administrative officer — Appointment — Duties — Compensation — Removal.

  1. In order to provide professional assistance in the administration of urban-county governments, a chief administrative officer may be employed to serve on the staff of the chief executive officer. The chief administrative officer shall possess demonstrable education and/or professional experience in the art and science of governmental management. The chief administrative officer may be a nonresident of Kentucky and/or the urban-county, but must become a resident of the urban-county within six (6) months of appointment and shall maintain such residence during the tenure of his or her office.
  2. The chief administrative officer shall be appointed by the chief executive officer subject to confirmation by a vote of three-fifths (3/5) of the legislative body.
  3. The chief administrative officer of any urban-county government created before December 31, 1987, may be removed, with or without cause, by: (a) executive order of the chief executive officer; or (b) three-fifths (3/5) vote of the entire legislative body.

Upon removal, the chief administrative officer shall not be entitled to severance pay or notice of intention to remove him or her. The chief administrative officer of any urban-county government created after December 31, 1987, may be removed by three-fifths (3/5) vote of the entire legislative body.

History. Enact. Acts 1978, ch. 166, § 3, effective June 17, 1978; 1988, ch. 379, § 1, effective July 15, 1988.

Opinions of Attorney General.

In view of the principles under which acts are judged in relation to Ky. Const., § 51, this section is a valid statutory provision. OAG 78-762 .

67A.028. Legislative finding of fact — Correctional services division permitted — Duties of sheriff and jailer.

  1. The General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Kentucky determines as a legislative finding of fact that the needs of large urban areas in the field of detention, institutionalization, and rehabilitation of offenders and public wards are more specialized, acute, and distinct than the needs of smaller communities, and require programs peculiarly suited to the needs of large, urban areas, and that in order to protect, enhance, and maintain the public safety, health, and general welfare, it is necessary that legislative bodies of counties containing an urban-county government, where the constitutional offices of sheriff and jailer have been consolidated, be empowered to create correctional services divisions which shall be divisions of urban-county government, and which will be vested with the duty, responsibility, and power to maintain and operate all of the correctional, detention, and rehabilitative facilities of these counties in a professional and competent manner.
  2. A correctional services division may be established by ordinance of the legislative body of any county containing an urban-county government in which the constitutional offices of sheriff and jailer have been consolidated as provided in Section 105 of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Kentucky. A division shall, upon its creation, have all of the duties, responsibilities, and liabilities of the sheriff and jailer as set forth and contained in the Kentucky Revised Statutes, with reference to the operation and maintenance of the county jail and all county correctional facilities. The sheriff and jailer shall, notwithstanding any other statutory provision to the contrary, have no further responsibility, duty, and liability for the performance of statutory duties on a personal basis. The sheriff shall be required to annually inspect all county correctional facilities and render a written report to the urban-county government legislative body and to the commissioner of the Department of Corrections regarding the general operation of all correctional facilities. The report shall furnish, in detail, information regarding the number of prisoners, detainees, and public wards who are inmates of each correctional facility; the offenses or causes for their incarceration; the length of stay; and further reports regarding rehabilitative programs instituted and being carried on by the division as may be required for a complete accounting and report.
  3. The correctional services division shall, subject to the approval and authorization of the legislative body of the urban-county government, generally administer, operate, and maintain all county correctional facilities, and formulate and implement necessary correctional and rehabilitative programs. All employees of the division, including the director, shall be members of the classified civil service system established pursuant to KRS 67A.210 et seq.

History. Enact. Acts 1990, ch. 138, § 1, effective January 3, 1994; 1992, ch. 211, § 14, effective July 14, 1992.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(7/14/92). The amendment of this section by 1992 Ky. Acts ch. 211, sec. 14, did not operate to accelerate the effective date of this section. See KRS 446.320 .

67A.030. Effective date of urban-county form of government — Assumption of all governmental functions by county.

Upon the election and qualification of county officers and such other elected officials as provided in the comprehensive plan at the next regularly scheduled election at which county officers shall be elected, as provided in Section 99 of the Constitution, the urban-county government shall immediately become the effective government. All the debts, property, franchises and rights of the existing county government and of any municipality within the county shall be assumed by the urban-county government.

History. Enact. Acts 1970, ch. 268, § 3; 1972, ch. 257, § 2.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

Absent any all-inclusive, straight-out prohibition in the constitution against the grant to local voters of any power of self-government in regard to the structure of local government, this section is not unconstitutional. Pinchback v. Stephens, 484 S.W.2d 327, 1972 Ky. LEXIS 148 ( Ky. 1972 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

The urban-county government council has the authority to use the jailer’s house as it may determine in Fayette County, and the jailer has no authority to determine the use. OAG 74-495 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Comments, The Urban County: Kentucky’s New Structure for Local Government, 62 Ky. L.J. 568 (1973-1974).

67A.035. Classification of cities of no impact on urban-county government.

Any comprehensive system of classification of cities enacted pursuant to the authority granted in Kentucky Constitution Section 156a shall not in and of itself be construed to impact the constitutional and statutory rights, powers, privileges, immunities, and responsibilities provided to urban-county governments pursuant to KRS 67A.060 .

History. Enact. Acts 2014, ch. 92, § 8, effective January 1, 2015.

67A.040. General powers of urban-county. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1970, ch. 268, § 4; 1972, ch. 257, § 3) was repealed by Acts 1974, ch. 244, § 2.

67A.050. Designation for purposes of state or federal laws or administrative regulations.

The comprehensive plan for merging city and county governments into an urban-county government under this chapter may provide for the corporate dissolution of incorporated municipalities and special districts within the county whereupon:

  1. For purposes of all state and federal licensing and regulatory laws, statutory entitlement, gifts, grants-in-aid, governmental loan, or other governmental assistance under state or federal laws or administrative regulations;
    1. The urban-county shall be deemed a county and shall also be deemed to contain incorporated municipalities of the number and classes which existed in the county on the day prior to the date the urban-county government became effective; and the entire geographic area and population of the urban-county shall be considered in calculating and determining the distribution basis for state or federal statutory entitlements, gifts, grants-in-aid, loans, or other forms of governmental assistance;
    2. The urban-county government is empowered to designate to the appropriate state or federal agency those geographic areas, portions of roads, segments of population, or combinations thereof which shall be deemed to constitute rural or urban areas, roads or population, notwithstanding whether such areas, roads or population are within incorporated municipalities.
  2. The chief executive officer of the urban-county government shall determine and make the designations herein following a public hearing thereon. The urban-county government shall fix the time and place of the hearing which shall be advertised pursuant to KRS Chapter 424.

History. Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 127, § 1; 1988, ch. 379, § 3, effective July 15, 1988.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(1988). A technical correction has been made in this section by the Reviser of Statutes pursuant to KRS 7.136 .

Opinions of Attorney General.

Local option elections are within state licensing and regulatory laws for which an included city is deemed to exist even after the adoption of an urban-county form of government; therefore, the county unit rule still applies to all of a county outside of that city, which would remain an independent unit for purposes of local option elections, but the urban-county government charter may provide that future local option elections will not be bound by the county unit rule. OAG 88-40 .

67A.060. Exercise of constitutional and statutory powers of counties and cities of highest class within urban-county — Withdrawal of power.

  1. Urban-county governments may exercise the constitutional and statutory rights, powers, privileges, immunities and responsibilities of counties and cities of the highest class within the county:
    1. In effect on the date the urban-county government becomes effective;
    2. Which may subsequently be authorized for or imposed upon counties and cities of that class; and
    3. Which may be authorized for or imposed upon urban-counties.
  2. Rights, powers, privileges and immunities exercised by urban-county governments pursuant to subsection (1)(a) and (b) of this section shall continue to be authorized for urban-county governments notwithstanding repeal or amendment of the statutes upon which they are based unless expressly repealed or amended for urban-county governments.

History. Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 244, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Elections.

Statutes drafted for cities with different forms of government from the urban-county government are nevertheless applicable to the election laws applicable to cities of the second class operating under the city manager form of government. Thomas v. Lyons, 586 S.W.2d 711, 1979 Ky. LEXIS 284 ( Ky. 1979 ).

2. Sovereign Immunity.

The county is a political subdivision of the state and is clothed with immunity from tort liability and, pursuant to subsection (1), urban-county government retains the immunities of county government; it is, like a county government, an arm of the state entitled to the protective cloak of sovereign immunity. Hempel v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government, 641 S.W.2d 51, 1982 Ky. App. LEXIS 261 (Ky. Ct. App. 1982).

Urban county governments constitute a new classification of county government that are entitled to sovereign immunity under KRS 67A.060(1); thus, three pedestrians were precluded from seeking damages action against the Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government for injuries they sustained while attempting to cross a highway. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Gov't v. Smolcic, 142 S.W.3d 128, 2004 Ky. LEXIS 182 ( Ky. 2004 ).

KRS 67A.060 retention of sovereign immunity in urban county governments is not unconstitutional; sovereign immunity “trumps” jural rights because sovereign immunity predates the adoption of Kentucky’s first constitution. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Gov't v. Smolcic, 142 S.W.3d 128, 2004 Ky. LEXIS 182 ( Ky. 2004 ).

Circuit court properly granted a county’s motion for summary judgment based on sovereign immunity, as employing a claims service to investigate claims under a self-insurance fund did not constitute an explicit waiver of sovereign immunity. Phillips v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Gov't, 331 S.W.3d 629, 2010 Ky. App. LEXIS 242 (Ky. Ct. App. 2010).

Opinions of Attorney General.

In view of this section and Ky. Const., §§ 184 and 186, a board of education may not be compelled to, nor may it voluntarily, pay an assessment imposed under KRS 67A.780 for a sanitary sewer benefitting school property. OAG 75-613 .

Cities and counties, and by extension, urban-county governments, are limited to the levying of ad valorem taxes and occupational or licensing taxes. OAG 80-502 .

KRS 82.082 applies to urban-county governments because they have the powers of the city of the highest class within the county. OAG 80-502 .

The authority of an urban-county government to reduce and control litter by container legislation, under the powers given to counties, is derived from KRS 67.083 . OAG 80-502 .

There are no constitutional or legal reasons why an urban-county government or a county in Kentucky would not have the authority to enact local anti-litter ordinances based on proposed “bottle bill” which required a $.05 refund on all beverage containers. OAG 80-502 .

Where employee of nonprofit corporation formed to develop a civic and convention center desired to run for urban-county council while retaining his corporate position, the provisions of KRS 61.280 (now repealed) which prohibit officers of second class cities from direct or indirect interest in city contracts would apply to the urban-county government under this section; however, since the contract between the council and the corporation to operate the civic and convention center was executed prior to the employee securing a seat on council and was renewed automatically every three years until canceled, there would be no violation of KRS 61.260 (now repealed); but as a member of the council such employee should refrain from participating in any discussion or voting with respect to altering the terms of the contract, if such becomes necessary. OAG 81-6 .

Where an urban-county council or fiscal court has, under this section, KRS 67.080 , and KRS 67.083 , enacted reasonable ordinances providing for accumulated leave payment upon leaving local service and taking leave with pay while still in local service, an employee of the county court clerk, jailer or sheriff who is terminated may be paid for accumulated leave out of the “75% fund” set up in Ky. Const., § 106. OAG 81-123 .

Where a county encompassing a major city has merged with that city to form an urban-county government, the allotment of county road aid pursuant to subsections (1)(b) to (1)(d) of KRS 177.360 , can be accomplished through the designation by the urban-county government, pursuant to this section, of rural-urban areas and roads in rural and urban areas of the urban-county government, thus allocation can be made based upon such an “urbanized boundary.” OAG 81-176 .

The only legal deputy sheriffs are those appointed by the sheriff to fill deputy positions authorized by the urban-county council pursuant to KRS 64.530 , 67A.060 , 67A.300 , and unsalaried deputy sheriffs, called “courtesy special deputies,” are illegal; such illegal deputies are merely private persons and have the power of arrest given to private persons under KRS 431.005(2), but they are not peace officers and they cannot carry concealed deadly weapons for any reason. OAG 82-105 .

The budget role of the court or fiscal court in KRS 64.345 , governing compensation of clerks, sheriffs and jailers in counties with a population of 75,000 or more, was not designed to usurp the legislative role assigned to a county or urban-county government. OAG 82-221 .

Pursuant to this section and KRS 67.080 and 67.083 , the urban-county council, and the fiscal courts in other counties coming under the application of Ky. Const., § 106 and KRS 64.345 , may enact reasonable ordinances providing for leave time, i.e., for accumulated leave payment upon leaving the local service and taking leave with pay while still in local service. Such leave would be payable out of the “75% account” of the affected office. Thus such leave payments would require: (1) a local ordinance and (2) a corresponding order of the court or fiscal court, as the case may be, relating to necessary office expenses (budget). OAG 82-221 .

A local government, including urban-county government, may by ordinance treat any facet of the “certificate of need” concept which may be practically applied to ambulance service, and which treatment is authorized by statute. OAG 82-576 .

Because this section authorizes urban-county governments to exercise the constitutional and statutory powers of cities of the highest class within the county, an urban-county, in imposing an occupational tax, is not bound by the 1% limit set forth in KRS 68.197 . OAG 94-6 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Snell, A Plea for a Comprehensive Liability Statute, 74 Ky. L.J. 521 (1985-86).

67A.070. Ordinance powers — Conflicts — Readings — Effective date — Publication requirements — Adoption by reference to recognized codes.

  1. Urban-county governments may enact and enforce within their territorial limits such tax, licensing, police, sanitary and other ordinances not in conflict with the Constitution and general statutes of this state now or hereafter enacted, as they shall deem requisite for the health, education, safety, welfare and convenience of the inhabitants of the county and for the effective administration of the urban-county government.
  2. Urban-county government ordinances shall be deemed to conflict with general statutes of this state only:
    1. When the ordinance authorizes that which is expressly prohibited by a general statute; or
    2. When there is a comprehensive scheme of legislation on the same subject embodied in a general statute.
  3. No ordinance or resolution shall be considered by the urban-county government legislative body until it has been read at two (2) separate meetings; provided, however, that the requirement for a second reading may be suspended by a two-thirds (2/3) vote of the membership of the legislative body. Requirements for reading ordinances or resolutions may be satisfied by public reading of the title and of a certified synopsis of the contents prepared by an attorney licensed to practice law in the Commonwealth of Kentucky.
  4. All ordinances and resolutions shall be effective upon passage, unless timely vetoed by the chief executive officer of the urban-county government pursuant to the provisions of the comprehensive plan of the urban-county government. All ordinances of the urban-county government shall be published in full or by publication of the title and a certified synopsis prepared by an attorney licensed to practice law in the Commonwealth of Kentucky. A certified synopsis shall include a brief narrative setting out the main points of the ordinance in a way reasonably calculated to inform the public in a clear and understandable manner of the meaning of the ordinance and shall contain the full text of any section that imposes taxes or fees. The publication shall occur in the daily newspaper which has the largest bona fide circulation in the county and is published in the publication area.
  5. The provisions of any local, statewide or nationally recognized standard code and codifications of entire bodies of local legislation may be adopted by ordinance which identifies the subject matter by title, source and date and incorporates the adopted provisions by reference without setting them out in full, provided a copy accompanies the adopting ordinance and is made a part of the permanent records of the urban-county government.

History. Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 402, § 1; 1976, ch. 184, § 3; 1984, ch. 135, § 1, effective July 13, 1984; 2011, ch. 46, § 3, effective June 8, 2011.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Veto.

Subsection (4) of this section does not validate a veto exercised pursuant to an unconstitutional provision of a county charter. Hacker v. Baesler, 812 S.W.2d 706, 1991 Ky. LEXIS 45 ( Ky. 1991 ), modified, 1991 Ky. LEXIS 130 (Ky. Aug. 29, 1991).

2. Absence of Conflict.

True test under KRS 67A.070(2)(a) of the concurrent authority of the state and local government to regulate a particular area is the absence of conflict, and the simple fact that the state has made certain regulations does not prohibit local government from establishing additional requirements so long as there is no conflict between them. Thus, a local ordinance, which banned smoking in public buildings was neither expressly nor impliedly preempted by state statutes that also touched on the issue of smoking such as KRS 438.300 ; the Kentucky Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, KRS 217.005 et seq.; or the Retail Food Code, 902 KAR 45:005. Lexington Fayette County Food & Bev. Ass'n v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Gov't, 131 S.W.3d 745, 2004 Ky. LEXIS 94 ( Ky. 2004 ).

3. Sovereign Immunity.

Where county employees alleged that the county violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 USCS § 201 et seq., and the Kentucky Wages and Hours Act, KRS ch. 37, their state law claims were barred by sovereign immunity, which had been preserved by the state Legislature to counties which adopted an urban form of government pursuant to KRS 67A.070(1), and which the county did not waive when it removed the action to federal court. Crawford v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Gov't, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2567 (E.D. Ky. Jan. 9, 2007).

Opinions of Attorney General.

An urban-county ordinance requiring a $.05 refund on all beverage containers would not be preempted by statutes or regulations of the department of alcoholic beverage control since there is nothing in the language of KRS 241.060 to indicate that restrictions of some sort cannot be applied to beverage containers, especially where the regulation has nothing to do with the alcoholic nature of the beverage and since the alcoholic beverage control board has jurisdiction over only a segment of the types of beverages, i.e., alcoholic beverages, included in such a proposed bottle bill. OAG 80-502 .

The authority of an urban-county government to reduce and control litter by container legislation, under the powers given to counties, is derived from KRS 67.083 . OAG 80-502 .

There are no constitutional or legal reasons why an urban-county government or a county in Kentucky would not have the authority to enact local anti-litter ordinances based on proposed “bottle bill” which required a $.05 refund on all beverage containers. OAG 80-502 .

A proposed ordinance containing a provision allowing a landlord the right to immediately terminate a lease based on a tenant’s dangerous conduct is in conflict with the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act, KRS 383.505 to 383.715 , and the forcible entry and detainer provisions of KRS 383.200 et seq., and would, therefore, be invalid if enacted. OAG 83-251 .

The adoption of a proposed loitering ordinance which would prohibit loitering for the purpose of engaging in “an unlawful drug transaction” is prohibited by this section, because such an enactment would be in conflict with existing state legislation by attempting to redefine statutory crimes. OAG 91-27 .

KRS 217B.270 bans a locality from enacting, or continuing in force, an ordinance regarding the sale or use of pesticides on agricultural or silvicultural lands, but does not prevent a local ordinance regarding the sale or use of pesticides on “lawns.” However, an ordinance on such subject is outside the ordinance power of an urban-county government, since a comprehensive legislative scheme concerning lawn pesticide applications is already embodied in 217B.300 . OAG 92-142 .

If there is a comprehensive scheme of legislation embodied in a general statute on the same subject as would be addressed by a local ordinance, the local ordinance will be deemed to be in conflict with the general statutes of this state, and thus outside the ordinance making power of an urban-county government. OAG 93-45 .

The phrase “occupy the field” is not synonymous with the phrase “comprehensive scheme of legislation” used in subdivision (2)(b) of this section. OAG 93-45 .

Broad, detailed, patterned legislation regarding a given subject, which addresses all or most of the key matters of significance regarding a given subject, must reasonably be viewed as a “comprehensive scheme of legislation” concerning that subject; the fact that legislation does not address some aspect of a subject will not render a legislative scheme other than comprehensive. OAG 93-45 .

Since the statute that authorizes urban-county government to impose the occupational tax, KRS 92.280 , contains no language authorizing a referendum, and where there is no other authority, statutory or constitutional, authorizing such a referendum, urban-county government had no authority to amend its charter to provide for a referendum on occupational license taxes and the county clerk had no duty to place the proposed amendment on the general election ballot. OAG 94-54 .

67A.075. Safety officers — Appointment — Duties — Compensation.

  1. The legislative body of urban-county governments may appoint as needed safety officers. Safety officers shall have duties as prescribed by ordinance, which may include but not be limited to:
    1. Issuance of citations for violation of motor vehicle offenses as provided for in KRS Chapters 186 and 189, provided that safety officers shall not have the authority to issue citations for moving violations.
    2. Issuance of citations for violation of any motor vehicle or traffic safety ordinance of the urban-county government.
    3. Control and direction of traffic on public thoroughfares.
    4. Removal of vehicles in violation of state or local law consistent with those laws.
  2. The ordinance prescribing the duties of safety officers shall set out the urban-county ordinances and the sections of KRS Chapters 186 and 189 for which citation authority will exist.
  3. A safety officer may issue a citation for a misdemeanor or a violation committed in his presence as provided in this section. The procedures for citations shall be the same as provided in KRS 431.015 .
  4. Safety officers appointed by authority of this section shall have only the limited powers as provided by this section and shall not have the powers of peace officers to make arrests or carry deadly weapons.
  5. Safety officers shall successfully complete one hundred twenty (120) hours of appropriate training certified by the Kentucky Law Enforcement Council prior to being appointed as a safety officer.
  6. Safety officers shall be compensated and receive employment benefits as provided by urban-county ordinance.
  7. While in the process of securing information to complete accident reports and notwithstanding any statute to the contrary, safety officers may issue citations for violations of KRS 186.430 , 186.450 , 186.510 , and 186.540 .

History. Enact. Acts 1978, ch. 166, § 2, effective June 17, 1978; 1978, ch. 173, § 1, effective June 17, 1978; 1980, ch. 188, § 46, effective July 15, 1980; 1994, ch. 110, § 1, effective July 15, 1994.

Opinions of Attorney General.

Under common usage of language the term “moving violation” as mentioned in subsection (1)(a) of this section refers specifically to motor vehicle violations contained in KRS Chapters 186 and 189 which involve a motor vehicle that is moving or is in motion since there is nothing indicating a contrary sense. OAG 78-434 .

67A.076. Citation officers — Appointment — Duties — Compensation.

  1. Urban-county governments may appoint citation officers who shall have qualifications as prescribed by ordinance and who shall not have powers of peace officers to arrest or carry weapons but may issue citations as authorized by ordinance upon observation of:
    1. Nonmoving motor vehicle offenses.
    2. Violations of ordinances except for moving motor vehicle offenses and except for offenses which constitute a violation of the Kentucky Penal Code.
  2. The procedure for citations issued by a citation officer shall be as provided in KRS 431.015 .
  3. This section is not a limitation on the power of a citation officer to make an arrest as a private person as provided in KRS 431.005 .

History. Enact. Acts 1978, ch. 166, § 1, effective June 17, 1978.

67A.080. Fines, forfeitures and costs from ordinance violations retained by urban-county government. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 245, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491, effective January 2, 1978.

67A.150. Service districts.

The territory of an urban-county government may be divided into service districts. Each service district shall constitute a separate tax district within which the urban-county government shall levy and collect taxes in accordance with the kind, type, level and character of the services provided by the urban-county government in each of these districts. The legislative body of the urban-county government may abolish or alter existing districts, or create new districts and, notwithstanding any contrary provision of the comprehensive plan of an urban-county government, may establish partial urban services districts into which one (1) or more services not provided within the full urban services district shall be expanded or extended, and may establish urban services districts into which all of the services provided within the full urban services district shall be expanded or extended along with one (1) or more other services not provided within the full urban services district.

History. Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 242, § 1; 1988, ch. 320, § 1, effective July 15, 1988.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

Insofar as this section mandates that service districts are separate taxing districts it contravenes Ky. Const., § 171 and differentials in tax rates between service districts are unconstitutional as applied to personal property and severed mineral interests, although such differentials were valid respecting real estate by reason of Ky. Const., § 172A. Jacobs v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government, 560 S.W.2d 10, 1977 Ky. LEXIS 564 ( Ky. 1977 ).

67A.160. Procedure for referendum authorized by KRS 97.590 — Combined proposal with purchase of development rights program.

The procedure for a referendum authorized by KRS 97.590 shall be as follows:

  1. A public parks purchase and maintenance program proposal authorized by KRS 97.590 may be submitted to the voters of an urban-county by either a resolution of the legislative body or a petition meeting the requirements of this section. The resolution or petition shall set out the matters specified in KRS 97.590 (1). The proposal shall be drafted in such a way that a vote in favor of adoption shall be a vote in favor of the effect or impact of the proposal.
  2. Petitions shall be signed by registered voters of the urban-county government equal in number to at least ten percent (10%) of the total number of votes cast in the urban-county in the last regular mayoral election of the urban-county government.
  3. If, not later than ninety (90) days preceding the day established for a regular election, the county clerk receives a resolution adopted by a three-fifths (3/5) vote of the legislative body of the urban-county government requesting that the question be submitted to the voters or determines that a petition submitted in accordance with this section is sufficient, the legal department of the urban-county government shall prepare to place before the voters of the urban-county government at the next regular election the question, which shall appear on the ballot in the following form:

    “( ) FOR RATIFICATION OF (summary of proposed program)

    ( ) AGAINST RATIFICATION OF (summary of proposed program)”

    The county clerk shall cause to be published not fewer than three (3) times within thirty (30) days of the election, in a newspaper having a general circulation in the territory of the urban-county government, notice of the referendum, the exact language of the proposal, and a map prepared by the urban-county government showing the general location of the properties that may be purchased and the public parks that may be maintained under the program.

  4. The provisions of general election law shall apply to a referendum conducted under this section. The certificate of the body authorized by law to canvass election returns shall be delivered to the mayor of the urban-county government and the certificate shall be entered upon the records of the urban-county government during the next regular meeting of the urban-county government legislative body. If a proposed program is approved, it shall become effective at the time specified in the proposal, but the effective date shall not be before the first day of January following the election.
  5. After complying with the provisions of this section and KRS 67A.847 , a purchase of development rights program authorized by KRS 67A.843 and 67A.845 may include a public parks and maintenance program proposal authorized by KRS 97.590 . In the case of a combined proposal, the urban-county government shall place before the voters a single ballot proposal that combines the purchase of development rights proposal and the public parks purchase and maintenance proposal. In that event, the proposal shall specify which tax levy or portion thereof shall provide funding for the purchase of development rights program proposal and which shall provide funding for the purchase of parks and maintenance program.

History. Enact. Acts 1998, ch. 597, § 5, effective July 15, 1998; 2000, ch. 355, § 1, effective July 14, 2000.

67A.200. Merit or civil service system — Protection of employees’ prior rights — Exemption.

  1. Whenever the comprehensive plan adopted pursuant to KRS Chapter 67A requires the implementation of a merit or civil service system for the employees of an urban-county government, such system shall be implemented by the urban-county government so as to guarantee the substantive and procedural rights possessed by any employee of a government in existence within the boundaries of the urban-county prior to the effective date of merger.
  2. During the time a merit or civil service system is being implemented, pursuant to the requirements of a comprehensive plan, all procedural and substantive rights possessed by any employee of a government in existence within the boundaries of the urban-county prior to the effective date of merger shall be protected.
  3. Any urban-county government created after December 31, 1987, shall be exempt from the provisions of KRS 67A.210 to 67A.350 .

History. Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 199, § 1; 1988, ch. 379, § 2, effective July 15, 1988.

Merit and Pension Systems

67A.210. Definitions.

  1. In KRS 67A.210 to 67A.350 , unless the context requires otherwise:
    1. “Administrative or directorial position” means the head of a department or other executive unit other than those excluded under KRS 67A.220 .
    2. “Appointing authority” means the officer, commission, board or body having the power of appointment or removal in any office, department, commission, board or institution, under law, ordinance or comprehensive plan, and does not include any ratifying authority entitled to approve or disapprove an appointment.
    3. “Civil service” means the offices and positions of trust or employment in the service of the urban-county government not specifically excluded by KRS 67A.220 to 67A.340 .
    4. “Commission” means the civil service commission as established under KRS 67A.230 .
    5. “Comprehensive plan” means the plan for merger of local governments provided in this chapter.
    6. “Competitive examination” means the examination or evaluation described in KRS 67A.230 and 67A.240 .
    7. “Dismissal” means the discharge of an employee.
    8. “Employee” means any person employed in the conduct of municipal affairs including an administrative or directorial position, but the term shall not include:
      1. Officers elected by the voters, and persons appointed to fill vacancies in elective offices;
      2. Members of all boards, commission and authorities established under the provisions of the comprehensive plan or by ordinance pursuant thereto;
      3. The chief administrative officer as denominated in the comprehensive plan;
      4. Department commissioners of all executive departments created by the comprehensive plan or by ordinance pursuant thereto;
      5. All administrative assistants appointed by the mayor or highest elective executive officer under the provisions of the comprehensive plan and all secretaries excluded by the provisions of the comprehensive plan;
      6. Temporary or part-time employees and all persons employed to conduct special inquiries, investigations or studies for the urban-county government;
      7. Constitutional officers and their appointees.
    9. “Pension fund” means the moneys derived from the employees or the levy of a special tax, or any other sum derived from any other source, to be used for the retirement of employees after the prescribed years of service and for the benefit of disabled employees, and widows and dependent children in the case of death of an employee within the scope of his employment according to the terms of KRS 67A.320 through 67A.340 , the comprehensive plan, or the ordinances of the urban-county government, including retirement systems adopted pursuant to law.
    10. “Seniority” for purposes of KRS 67A.240 , 67A.250 , and 67A.270 refers to length of service as defined in the comprehensive plan or ordinance, but shall in each case include such service under cities, counties or other municipalities which have been merged into the urban-county government. Seniority and length of service for purposes of KRS 67A.320 and 67A.330 shall be in accordance with rules established by the comprehensive plan or ordinance, but shall in each case include service or seniority obtained under pension plans described in such sections existing in municipalities prior to the adoption of urban-county government, and shall in no case give credit to any service or seniority except in respect to such prior service in municipalities having such pension plans, or under urban-county governments, except that the urban-county government may purchase credits in lieu of seniority, the cost thereof being determined by the trustees of the pension fund, in accordance with sound actuarial principles, for employees whose seniority or length of service was under municipalities other than those described herein.
  2. The provisions of KRS 67A.230 to 67A.340 are independent of and do not affect the laws governing the police and fire departments, nor their pension funds.

History. Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 246, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

Barrow v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Civ. Serv. Comm’n, 222 S.W.3d 237, 2006 Ky. App. LEXIS 203 (Ky. Ct. App. 2006).

67A.220. Executive unit established — Personnel duties — Control by civil service commission.

An urban-county government may by comprehensive plan or ordinance establish an executive unit charged with personnel matters. In the event such a unit is established, the urban-county government shall by comprehensive plan or ordinance delegate to such unit, in addition to its regular functions not related to this statute, the initial performance of all or a part of the functions described as functions of the commission in KRS 67A.230 to 67A.250 and 67A.270 , but no other sections hereof, except that in any event the decisions of the said unit shall be subject to review, amendment or change by the commission. In the case of the certification of lists of eligible applicants for employment, such lists may be prepared by the executive unit, but shall be submitted to the appointing authority only after approval of the commission; and in respect of all other matters delegated, periodic reports shall be made by the unit to the commission, not less than monthly, and any directions of the commission, or any proposed alterations or changes in the action of the unit shall be promptly complied with by the unit. The legislative body of the urban-county government, subject to its comprehensive plan, may from time to time, revoke such delegation of authority to the executive unit, and may establish reasonable procedures for review of the actions of the executive unit, not in conflict with the provisions hereof, and not in conflict with the principle that personnel policy should in the first instance be determined by professional and trained personnel experts, but subject to the control of the civil service commission. All other provisions of this section notwithstanding, in the event that the commission amends, alters or changes any action of the unit, or in the event that the commission gives any directions to the unit as provided herein, or in any way acts to control the unit as provided herein, such amendment, change, alteration, direction or control shall be in writing and shall be supported by findings, which findings shall be supported by substantial evidence of the error of the unit.

History. Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 246, § 2.

67A.230. Civil service commission — Membership — Terms — Rule-making and enforcement powers.

  1. Any urban-county government shall operate under KRS 67A.230 to 67A.350 , and, by comprehensive plan or ordinance, create a civil service commission, which shall hold culture-fair, open examinations or evaluations to determine the relative fitness of applicants for municipal employment within the urban-county government that are designated by comprehensive plan or ordinance. The urban-county government shall, by ordinance, create civil service classifications for all employees consistent with the actual work to be performed by such employees.
  2. The mayor, or other appointing authority, as determined by the comprehensive plan, subject to the approval of the urban-county government legislative body, shall appoint five (5) persons who shall constitute the civil service commission of that urban-county government. No appointee shall be related by either blood or marriage to the mayor or any member of the urban-county legislative body. The appointees shall originally be appointed, two (2) for a term of two (2) years and three (3) for a term of four (4) years, and the successors to these appointees shall be appointed in like manner, each for a period of four (4) years and until his successor is appointed and qualified. A vacancy shall be filled for the unexpired term in the same manner as original appointments. There shall be chosen by the commission a secretary of the commission. The secretary shall be an employee of the urban-county government who is covered by the provisions of KRS 67A.220 to 67A.310 . Each appointee shall qualify by taking an oath of office as required by law. The salaries, if any, of the members of the commission may be fixed by the urban-county government legislative body in accordance with its comprehensive plan.
  3. If the appointing authority of any urban-county government fails to appoint a civil service commission within ninety (90) days after he has the power to so appoint or after a vacancy exists, the vice mayor, or the second ranking elected executive officer of the urban-county government, however designated, shall make the appointment and the appointee shall hold office until the expiration of the term and until his successor is appointed and qualified.
  4. The civil service commission shall make and enforce culture-fair rules, not inconsistent with the provisions of KRS 67A.220 to 67A.310 , or the comprehensive plan or the ordinance of the urban-county government, for examinations and registrations therefor.

History. Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 246, § 3.

67A.240. Examinations — Rating — Eligible list — Administrative regulations.

  1. The civil service commission shall prescribe and propound such said examinations as are proper, commensurate with vacant positions within the various departments of the urban-county government, according to classification prescribed by ordinance, shall set such times and places for holding examinations as may be proper and shall give public notice of vacancies by publication pursuant to KRS Chapter 424, and shall give actual notice to all eligible applicants of time and place of examinations. Provided, however, that the civil service commission may prescribe and propound job descriptions which reasonably establish minimum qualifications and standards for eligibility to take such examinations, but in no event shall such job descriptions be a subterfuge for the evasion of the requirement that employment be determined on the basis of the principles set out herein.
  2. The civil service commission shall, as soon after examinations as is practicable, certify to the appointing authority, a list of the applicants so examined, with the one having the highest average ranked first, and all others ranked numerically according to the result of the examination. After the compilation of such a list the commission may provide for further, substantially identical examinations, given on the same basis as the original examination, to supplement the list so compiled, and the results of each such subsequent examination shall be consolidated with the results of the prior examinations to provide an eligible list from among all of those who have taken such several examinations.
  3. Every soldier, sailor, marine, members of the air forces, Army Nurses Corps and members of other branches of the military services and Red Cross nurses who served during a period of hostilities between the United States and another power in World War II, the Korean or Vietnam conflict, the Persian Gulf War, Operation Iraqi Freedom, or Operation Enduring Freedom, who has not been dishonorably discharged, and who is an applicant for any position of civil service of the urban-county government shall be entitled to five percent (5%) increase on his examination mark on entrance into civil service employment.
  4. The civil service commission of urban-county governments shall maintain an eligible list of all individuals who, based on the outcome of examinations, are qualified for each position to be filled.
  5. The legislative body may designate certain civil service positions and prescribe that for such positions the examinations shall first be given exclusively to current employees; provided, however, that if no employee with a minimum of six (6) months’ seniority achieves a passing grade, an examination shall be held in accordance with subsection (1) of this section, and shall be held, if less than five (5) such persons achieve a passing grade if the appointing authority so determines.
  6. Upon the approval of the civil service commission, the appointing authority may promulgate administrative regulations to carry out the provisions of this section.

History. Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 246, § 4; 1996, ch. 273, § 1, effective July 15, 1996; 2013, ch. 128, § 1, effective June 25, 2013.

67A.250. Qualifications of applicants.

The civil service commission shall examine all eligible applicants as to their physical and mental qualification for the particular classification wherein they seek employment. To be eligible for examination a person must satisfy the minimum standards established under KRS 67A.240 .

History. Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 246, § 5.

67A.260. Present employees.

Employees, who at the time the provisions of KRS 67A.230 to 67A.350 become effective have been in the employ of the urban-county government, or any city or county or other municipality merged into such urban-county government, (a) for six (6) months last past or (b) having been employed after taking a merit system examination, shall not be required to stand an original examination, unless the comprehensive plan otherwise provides, and shall be eligible for all the benefits provided by KRS 67A.230 to 67A.310 , unless the comprehensive plan otherwise provides.

History. Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 246, § 6.

67A.270. Appointments — Promotions — Reinstatements.

  1. The appointing authority shall make all civil service appointments, and the appointments shall be made only from the list of applicants certified by the civil service commission after examination. Appointments shall be made only by the selection of one (1) applicant from the list, except as provided in subsections (6) and (7) of this section.
  2. Whenever it is imperative to fill a vacancy in classified civil service before the commission can certify a list of persons eligible for appointment after competitive examination, the appointing authority shall nominate a competent person from the same class or next lower rank to the commission and if certified by the commission as qualified he may be appointed temporarily to fill the vacancy until an appointment can be made after competitive examination. Temporary appointments hereunder and under subsection (3) of this section hereof shall continue only until a regular appointment can be made from the eligible list prepared by the commission.
  3. In the circumstances described in subsection (2) of this section, when no one upon the eligible list, or by promotion from the same class or the next lower rank is available, competent and qualified, a temporary appointment may be made by the appointing authority without examination. In no case shall appointment hereunder or under subsection (2) of this section continue longer than ninety (90) days; and in no case shall successive appointments be made of the same person or other persons, to such vacancies, except hereunder or under subsection (2) of this section.
  4. Where the service to be rendered by an appointee in the classified service is for a temporary period as provided herein, the appointing authority shall select for that temporary service a person on the list of those eligible for permanent appointment, if such person accepts such appointment. Successive temporary appointments to the same position shall not be made under this provision. The acceptance or refusal by an eligible applicant of a temporary appointment shall not affect his standing on the register for permanent employment, nor shall temporary service be counted as part of the probationary service in case of subsequent appointment to a permanent position.
  5. Temporary appointments made by reason of these provisions, made necessary by reason of illness or disability of regular employees, may continue during such period of disability, but shall continue only during such period of disability and in no case longer than nine (9) months. No other temporary appointments other than those provided for herein may be made, except that seasonal appointments may be made for periods not in excess of six (6) months.
  6. Seniority, in the executive unit in which the vacancy occurs, and seniority in the level or rank of employment nearest the level or rank in which the vacancy occurs, shall each be given material consideration in filling such vacancies as shall occur in the classified civil service. Within six (6) months after June 21, 1974, or within six (6) months after the effective date of the urban-county government, there shall be established by comprehensive plan or ordinance (which function may be delegated to the commission, or to the executive unit charged with personnel matters subject to the control of the commission), a plan which in definite terms complies with this subsection. The said plan may be amended from time to time in accordance with the comprehensive plan or ordinance, but the effective date of any alteration therein shall be no sooner than 180 days after its adoption. Such plan shall provide for and describe in reasonable detail the circumstances, if any, under which the seniority described therein shall be the sole criteria for promotion, and the circumstances in which it will not, and in the latter case, shall provide a reasonably definite method by which applicants shall be entitled to an increase on their examination or evaluation scores by reason of such seniority, the relative importance of each such type of seniority in such determination, and the percentage increase in such scores for such seniority. The Circuit Court of the county in which the urban-county government is located shall have jurisdiction to determine the reasonableness of such plan and alterations thereto, and its compliance with the principles set out in this subsection.
  7. In case of vacancy in the classified service, where peculiar and exceptional qualifications of a particular professional or educational character are required, upon satisfactory evidence that for reasons stated in writing by the appointing authority the commission may suspend the provisions requiring competitive examination under civil service.
  8. The legislative body may by ordinance provide that any person who successfully completed his probationary period and subsequently ceased working in a position in the classified civil service, for reasons other than dismissal, may be restored to the office or position he formerly held if he so requests in writing to the appointing authority. Such person shall be eligible for reinstatement for a period of one (1) year following separation from the service and shall be reinstated only with the approval of the appointing authority.

History. Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 246, § 7; 1978, ch. 177, § 1, effective June 17, 1978; 1996, ch. 273, § 2, effective July 15, 1996; 2013, ch. 128, § 2, effective June 25, 2013.

67A.280. Dismissal, suspension, or reduction.

  1. No employee in the classified service of urban-county government, after serving a probationary period provided by comprehensive plan or ordinance for his class, which shall not be in excess of six (6) months, shall be dismissed, suspended, or reduced in grade or pay for any reason except inefficiency, misconduct, insubordination, or violation of law involving moral turpitude.
  2. Any person may prefer charges in writing against any employee by filing them with the appointing authority who shall communicate the charges without delay to the head of the executive unit in charge of personnel matters, and to the civil service commission. The charges must be signed by the person making them and must set out clearly each charge. The appointing authority shall, whenever probable cause appears, prefer charges against any employee whom he believes guilty of conduct justifying his removal or disciplinary action. Upon the filing of charges, the secretary of the civil service commission shall notify its members and serve a copy of the charges upon the accused employee with a statement of the date, place, and hour at which the hearing of charges will begin, this hearing not to be held within three (3) days of the date of the service of charges upon the accused employee. The day on which the charges are served on the accused employee shall count as one of the days of notice. The person accused may in writing waive the service of charges and demand trial within three (3) days after they have been filed with the secretary of the civil service commission.
  3. Upon the hearing, the charges shall be considered traversed and put in issue, and the trial shall be limited to the issues presented by the written charges, provided, however, that the charges may be amended prior to trial, in which event the notice procedures hereinabove described shall be again complied with, and reasonable opportunity given for the preparation for trial on the amended charges.
  4. The civil service commission shall have the power to summon and compel attendance of witnesses at all hearings by subpoena issued by the secretary of that body and served upon the witnesses by members of the police department of the urban-county government or any officer authorized to serve subpoenas. If any witness fails to appear in response to a summons or refuses to testify concerning any matter on which he may lawfully be interrogated, any District Judge, on application of the commission, may compel obedience by proceedings for contempt as in the case of disobedience of a subpoena issued from the District Court. The accused employee shall have the right to have subpoenaed any witnesses he may desire, upon furnishing their names to the secretary. Subpoenas may be served on the request of the accused employee without charge. They shall be issued by the secretary and served by the police department. The action and decision of the civil service commission on the charges shall be reduced to writing and kept in a book for that purpose and the written charge shall be attached to the book containing the body’s decision.
  5. In cases where the head of the department or executive unit or the appointing authority has probable cause to believe an employee has been guilty of conduct justifying his removal or punishment, he shall immediately suspend that employee from duty or from both pay and duty pending trial and the employee shall not be placed on duty or allowed pay thereafter until the charges are heard by the civil service commission.
  6. The civil service commission shall punish any employee found guilty by reprimand or a suspension for any length of time not to exceed six (6) months, or by reducing the grade, if the employee’s classification warrants, or by combining any two (2) or more of these punishments, or by dismissal. No employee shall be reprimanded, removed, suspended, or dismissed except as provided in this section.
  7. Irrespective of the other provisions of KRS 67A.230 to 67A.310 , an employee may be suspended by the head of the executive unit in which he is employed, or by the appointing authority, but only as provided by comprehensive plan or ordinance, for a period not exceeding 30 days in any twelve (12) month period, and may be reprimanded by such head or authority not more than twice in any twelve (12) month period. In such event, the actions of such head or appointing authority shall be subject to appeal to the commission. Such appeal shall be filed with the secretary of the commission within ten (10) days of the action of the unit head or appointing authority, and may be reviewed, reduced, or revoked by the commission after a hearing in which the unit head or appointing authority shall have reasonable opportunity under rules established by the commission, to support his charges. The grounds of suspension or reprimand under this subsection shall be only those set out by comprehensive plan or ordinance. The commission shall further have the power, in the event it finds that the unit head or appointing officer acted in error, to take such action as shall be necessary to compensate the appealing employee for such error. An appeal by an employee shall not suspend the operation of the action of the unit head or appointing authority pending action of the commission.
  8. Nothing herein shall prevent the comprehensive plan or ordinance from providing additional remedies and rights to employees.

History. Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 246, § 8; 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 51, effective January 2, 1978.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Due Process.

Although KRS 67A.280 vested a former urban-county employee with a property interest in his continued employment with a county, he failed to show that his due process rights were violated or that he was constructively discharged when he resigned following a failed random drug test at work; although the county’s initial reasonable cause drug testing notice was defective, the employee suffered no injury from that notice because he had refused to comply with it. He had sufficient notice that the county sought to terminate him for his drug activity, he was given the opportunity to appear before the local civil service commission to defend himself, but he had voluntarily chosen to resign rather than pursuing the administrative remedies available to him. Relford v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Gov't, 390 F.3d 452, 2004 FED App. 0409P, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 24464 (6th Cir. Ky. 2004 ), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 1049, 125 S. Ct. 2300, 161 L. Ed. 2d 1089, 2005 U.S. LEXIS 4205 (U.S. 2005).

Cited:

Brady v. Pettit, 586 S.W.2d 29, 1979 Ky. LEXIS 280 ( Ky. 1979 ); Barrow v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Civ. Serv. Comm’n, 222 S.W.3d 237, 2006 Ky. App. LEXIS 203 (Ky. Ct. App. 2006).

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Kentucky Law Survey, Rogers and Sims, Administrative Law, 69 Ky. L.J. 489 (1980-81).

Treatises

Caldwell’s Kentucky Form Book, 5th Ed., Order Setting Trial (AOC 030), Form 4.07.

67A.290. Appeal to Circuit Court and Court of Appeals.

  1. Any employee of the urban-county government found guilty by the civil service commission of any charge as provided by KRS 67A.280 or any action upheld under subsection (7) of the said section, or any amendment thereto, may appeal to the Circuit Court of the county in which the urban-county government is located within thirty (30) days after such action becomes final, but the enforcement of the judgment of the civil service commission shall not be suspended pending appeal.
  2. Upon request in writing by the accused and the payment of costs therefor, the secretary of the civil service commission shall file a certified copy of the charges and the judgment of that body in the Circuit Court. Upon the transcript being filed the case shall be docketed in the Circuit Court and tried de novo.
  3. If the secretary fails to certify the transcript to the Circuit Court within five (5) days after the request is made, then the aggrieved person may file an affidavit in that court setting out as fully as possible the charges made at the time of trial and judgment, together with a statement that demand for the transcript had been made of the secretary more than five (5) days prior to the filing of the affidavit. Upon filing of this affidavit in the Circuit Court, the case shall be docketed in that court and the court may compel the filing of the transcript by the secretary by entering proper mandatory order, and upon failure of the secretary so to do, he shall be liable to fine and imprisonment for contempt. Such appeal shall have precedence over other business and be determined speedily.
  4. An appeal will lie from the judgment of the Circuit Court to the Court of Appeals as in other cases, if the original punishment fixed by the civil service commission was dismissal of the accused. An appeal will also lie from the judgment of a Circuit Court in any controversy arising under this section or any other section of the statutes relating to civil service for urban-county governments.

History. Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 246, § 9.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Trial De Novo.
2. — Procedure.

In cases of public employee discharge, where there is a trial de novo statute, the employee has the burden of proof, must produce the transcript of evidence before the administrative board, and has the right to call additional witnesses; the Circuit Court’s review is limited to a determination of whether the administrative body acted arbitrarily, and may not substitute punishment. Brady v. Pettit, 586 S.W.2d 29, 1979 Ky. LEXIS 280 ( Ky. 1979 ).

3. — Evidence.

It is incumbent upon the Circuit Court, sitting as an appellate court for a county police merit board, to base its decision upon the transcript of the proceedings below, and any other evidence which is relevant to the issue of arbitrariness. No other evidence is to be admitted on appeal. Crouch v. Jefferson County, 773 S.W.2d 461, 1988 Ky. LEXIS 53 ( Ky. 1988 ), modified, 1989 Ky. LEXIS 41 (Ky. June 8, 1989).

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Kentucky Law Survey, Rogers and Sims, Administrative Law, 69 Ky. L.J. 489 (1980-81).

Northern Kentucky Law Review.

Burns & Fischesser, A Survey of Kentucky Employment Law., 31 N. Ky. L. Rev. 85 (2004).

Treatises

Caldwell’s Kentucky Form Book, 5th Ed., Order Setting Trial (AOC 030), Form 4.07.

67A.300. Number of employees — Salaries — Protection from dismissal, suspension, or reduction — Abolishment of office or position — Reinstatement.

  1. The urban-county legislative body shall fix by ordinance the number and classification of urban-county employees, and the salaries for each classification. When the number of employees and their classification has been fixed by comprehensive plan or ordinance, including any ordinance of a city or other municipality existing prior to the adoption of the urban-county form of government, which prior ordinance is adopted for any period of time by the urban-county government under its comprehensive plan or ordinance, no employee shall be dismissed, suspended or reduced in grade or pay for any reason except that set out in KRS 67A.280 .
  2. Provided, further, that: whenever in the exercise of a reasonable discretion, it shall be the judgment of the legislative body of the urban-county government that economic necessity requires it, or that there is no longer a need for a particular office or position to exist, the legislative body may abolish said office or position and any officer or employee occupying said office or position may be laid-off or suspended until and if such office or position is re-created or reestablished. The abolition of any office or position must not be a subterfuge to effect another purpose, but must be actual and bona fide and must not amount to the mere alteration, modification or abolition of title only.
  3. Should any officer or employee conceive that he has been aggrieved by the abolition or the proposed abolition of said office or position, he may, at any time within ninety (90) days, file a petition in the Circuit Court of the county wherein the urban-county government is located, stating his reason why it should not be abolished, and upon issue joined thereon by the urban-county government, the burden shall be on the latter to establish the necessity for and the good faith of the urban-county government in abolishing said office or position. The right to abolish and the right to have the office or position re-created shall be determined as other equitable actions are determined.
  4. If the office or position is re-created or reestablished within one (1) year, then any person who was deprived of his office or position shall be restored to the office or position he formerly held or occupied in the order of his seniority if he shall elect to do so, and the urban-county government shall advise said officer or employee at his last known address and advertise pursuant to KRS Chapter 424, that the office or position has been re-created or reestablished.

History. Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 246, § 10.

Opinions of Attorney General.

A civil service employee who has voluntarily resigned cannot be reinstated to his former position. OAG 77-719 .

The only legal deputy sheriffs are those appointed by the sheriff to fill deputy positions authorized by the urban-county council pursuant to KRS 64.530 , 67A.060 , 67A.300 , and unsalaried deputy sheriffs, called “courtesy special deputies,” are illegal; such illegal deputies are merely private persons and have the power of arrest given to private persons under KRS 431.005(2), but they are not peace officers and they cannot carry concealed deadly weapons for any reason. OAG 82-105 .

67A.310. Prohibition of political activities.

  1. No person shall be appointed to any position because of political, partisan service rendered by him or his family, or because of political sentiment or affiliation nor shall any person be dismissed, suspended or reduced in grade or pay because of any political opinion.
  2. The appointment and continuance of employment of all persons shall depend solely upon their ability and willingness to perform their duties, and shall not be a reward for political activity or contribution to campaign funds.
  3. No employee shall be forced to pay or collect any assessments made by political organizations, contribute to political campaign funds, or be active in politics.
  4. No employee shall be active in politics or work for the election of candidates while on duty.

History. Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 246, § 11; 1984, ch. 120, § 1, effective July 13, 1984.

67A.315. Pension programs in urban-counties created after July 15, 1988 — Participation in County Employees Retirement System.

Urban-county governments created after July 15, 1988, shall not be governed by the provisions of KRS 67A.320 to 67A.340 and 67A.360 to 67A.690 . They shall continue any pension system which was in effect in the county or any city comprising the urban-county, but may close such system to new members in favor of participation in the County Employees Retirement System. If the urban-county adopts the provisions of KRS 78.510 to 78.852 , employees in service on the date of participation shall be given the option to join the County Employees Retirement System, as provided for in KRS 78.530 and 78.531 .

History. Enact. Acts 1988, ch. 96, § 1, effective July 15, 1988.

67A.320. Pension fund — Picked-up employee contributions — Repeal of ordinances established for creation or maintenance of pension fund — Liquidation and distribution of residual assets — Report.

  1. Any urban-county government in which there existed a municipality which had in effect an employees’ pension fund prior to its merger into the urban-county form of government shall provide by comprehensive plan or ordinance for the maintenance of the pension fund for those employees covered by the pension fund, and shall in each case provide for the payment to the pension fund in each month of the sum necessary to maintain the fund in accordance with the actuarial principles established by the actuarial studies described in this section, and may assess monthly the amount or percent of the salary of the employees as determined on a fair actuarial basis, and in any case not in excess of nine percent (9%) of the monthly salary of each employee unless a higher rate was charged prior to the merger of governments, in which case the higher rate may be charged, the assessment to be deducted from the employees’ salaries or picked up pursuant to subsection (2) of this section and paid in cash into the pension fund. Within six (6) months after the effective date of the urban-county form of government, or within six (6) months after June 21, 1974, whichever shall be later, the trustees of the board shall, at the expense of the pension fund, provide for the performance of an actuarial valuation, which shall be completed within six (6) months thereafter, and shall describe the amounts necessary to be contributed by the urban-county government or other sources to fund on an actuarially sound basis the benefits promised or described in the fund, including any payments required to bring the fund to an actuarially sound position if it was not so at the time of the performance of the valuation. The legislative body shall determine a reasonable period over which additional funding, if any, shall be made, which period shall not exceed thirty (30) years. A similar valuation shall be arranged by the board at the cost of the urban-county government at least once in every three (3) year to five (5) year period thereafter as prescribed by KRS 65.156 . If the fund created by this section is extended to cover employees not described in the first sentence of this section, the actuarial valuation shall determine the required payments necessary to keep the expanded fund on an actuarially sound basis, and the urban-county government shall maintain the fund, and shall assess against the additional covered employees the same monthly contribution as required for other government employees.
  2. The urban-county government shall, solely for the purpose of compliance with Section 414(h) of the United States Internal Revenue Code, pick up the employee contributions required by this section for all compensation earned after August 1, 1982, and the contributions picked up shall be treated as employer contributions in determining tax treatment under the United States Internal Revenue Code and KRS 141.010 . However, the urban-county government shall continue to withhold federal and state income taxes based upon these contributions and hold them in a separate account until the Internal Revenue Service or the federal courts rule that, pursuant to Section 414(h) of the United States Internal Revenue Code, these contributions shall not be included as gross income of the employee until such time as the contributions are distributed or made available to the employee. The picked-up employee contribution shall satisfy all obligations to the retirement fund satisfied prior to August 1, 1982, by the employee contribution, and the picked-up employee contribution shall be in lieu of an employee contribution. The urban-county government shall pay these picked-up employee contributions from the same source of funds which is used to pay earnings to the employee. The employee shall have no option to receive the contributed amounts directly instead of having them paid by the urban-county government to the fund. Employee contributions picked up after August 1, 1982, shall be treated for all purposes of this section in the same manner and to the same extent as employee contributions made prior to August 1, 1982.
  3. The pick up of employee contributions by the employer shall not be construed to reduce the final salary or the average salary upon which the employee retirement benefit is based.
  4. There is hereby created a board for the existing employees’ pension fund and trustees of that board. Trustees from the pension fund board shall consist of the mayor, four (4) members of the legislative body of the urban-county government selected by the legislative body, the secretary of the Finance and Administration Cabinet, the director of the Division of Personnel, and three (3) civil service employees or retirees to be elected to the board by those employees and retirees covered by the employees’ pension fund. In the event that there is no position in the urban-county government denominated secretary of the Finance and Administration Cabinet and/or director of the Division of Personnel, the appointed office of the urban-county government exercising the functions most closely resembling such office shall serve as trustee.
  5. Temporary employees appointed without examination shall not be compelled to contribute to any pension fund and shall not be eligible to benefits.
  6. In no year shall the contribution by the urban-county government to the pension fund, in the manner provided in this section, be less than the total amount assessed upon and deducted from the salary of the employees.
  7. The trustees of the pension fund shall, at least once every three (3) months, report in writing to the mayor the receipts, expenditures, and financial status of the pension fund, stating the places of deposit of funds, or the character of investments made, and the mayor shall cause copies of the report to be posted in at least three (3) places where urban-county employees frequent and report.
  8. If the urban-county government issues the appropriate order allowing participation in the County Employees Retirement System alternate participation plan pursuant to KRS 78.530(3) and 78.531(2), the urban-county government shall have the right to use assets in the local pension fund, other than assets necessary to pay benefits to the remaining active members of the local pension fund and to retirees and their survivors as determined by actuarial valuation and other than assets payable to the County Employees Retirement System pursuant to KRS 78.531(2), to assist in the payment of both the employee’s and employer’s costs of alternate participation pursuant to KRS 78.530(3)(d).
  9. If all liabilities to all individuals entitled to benefits from the employees’ pension fund have been satisfied, any ordinances established for creation or maintenance of the fund may be repealed by the majority vote of the duly elected members of the entire legislative body of the urban-county government. If repealed, the fund’s board of trustees shall, within sixty (60) days of repeal, proceed with the liquidation of any residual assets of the fund. All residual assets liquidated pursuant to this subsection shall be distributed by the board of trustees to the urban-county government’s general fund which shall then contribute the entire distribution received into the policemen’s and firefighters’ retirement fund as a supplemental contribution, so long as the return of assets complies with federal and state law governing the distribution of assets. The supplemental contribution provided to the policemen’s and firefighters’ retirement fund under this subsection shall be in addition to the contributions required by KRS 67A.360 to 67A.690 and shall not be used to offset any other contributions required to be paid to the fund under the provisions of KRS 67A.360 to 67A.690 . Within thirty (30) days following the distribution of residual assets, the board of trustees of the fund shall as its last act file a complete report with the legislative body of the urban-county government of the actions taken to terminate the fund and liquidate residual assets of the fund. Upon completion of the provisions specified by this subsection, the provisions of KRS 67A.320 to 67A.330 as it relates to the employees’ pension fund shall be void.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 246, § 12; 1980, ch. 287, § 1, effective July 15, 1980; 1982, ch. 166, § 36, effective July 15, 1982; 1982, ch. 297, § 2, effective July 15, 1982; 1984, ch. 24, § 3, effective July 13, 1984; 1984, ch. 192, § 7, effective July 13, 1984; 1990, ch. 476, Pt. VII D, § 645, effective April 11, 1990; 1992, ch. 69, § 1, effective March 19, 1992; 2016 ch. 31, § 2, effective July 15, 2016; 2018 ch. 171, § 70, effective April 14, 2018; 2018 ch. 207, § 70, effective April 27, 2018.

Compiler's Notes.

Section 414(h) of the United States Internal Revenue Code, referred to in subsection (2) of this section, is compiled as 26 USCS § 414(h).

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(4/27/2018). This statute was amended by 2018 Ky. Acts chs. 171 and 207, which do not appear to be in conflict and have been codified together.

67A.330. Preservation of employees’ rights.

From and after the effective date of the urban-county form of government there shall be, with respect to each employee, an inviolable contract between the urban-county government as employer and such employee; and the urban-county government and its employees shall continue to operate under KRS 67A.230 to 67A.330 and all substantial matters contained in the ordinance first adopted hereunder. A repeal or modification of substantial provisions of that ordinance by the urban-county government shall in no wise affect such contract, unless by the mutual consent of the urban-county government and the affected employee. Such contract and right shall not be affected, either directly or indirectly, by an action of the urban-county government, its legislative body, executive officers, citizens or voters, whether under the guise of altering its form of government, adopting a new form of government or classification, abolishing any governmental or municipal entity, and substituting same with another governmental or municipal entity, or any other means whatsoever. The first ordinance referred to in this paragraph shall include, if applicable, any ordinance of a city, county or other municipality existing prior to the adoption of the urban-county form of government which is adopted by the urban-county government for any period of time by its comprehensive plan or ordinance. The said contract shall include, and such actions shall not affect any substantial matter, including procedures and structures, for both pension and merit systems.

History. Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 246, § 13.

67A.340. Authorization of other retirement programs.

The legislative body of the urban-county government is hereby authorized and empowered to establish and provide such other pension funds, systems, social security programs or other retirement benefits allowable as may be deemed necessary or desirable for those employees not covered by the pension provisions of KRS 67A.320 and 67A.330 , or for the benefit of the employees covered by the provisions of KRS 67A.320 and 67A.330 .

History. Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 246, § 14.

67A.345. Continued health insurance eligibility for retirees — Benefits — Payments made to provider — Group rates for spouses, dependents, and disabled children.

  1. All members of the policemen’s and firefighters’ retirement fund of the urban-county government, operated pursuant to KRS 67A.360 to 67A.690 , and all members of the urban-county government city employees pension fund who retired prior to July 1, 1999, and who did not terminate their participation in the group health insurance plan provided by the urban-county government before that date, and all members who retire on or after July 1, 1999, or who withdrew from service on a certificate prior to September 18, 2002, or who withdraw on a certificate as provided by KRS 67A.410(3)(a) or (b), shall continue to be eligible to participate, at the member’s cost, in a group health insurance plan approved by the urban-county council for such retirees.
  2. The urban-county government shall provide, on behalf of all eligible members of the policemen’s and firefighters’ retirement fund and city employees pension, the following benefits:
    1. A sum equal to the single premium for the plan coverage selected by the retiree, but not more than one hundred percent (100%) of the urban-county government’s contribution to the health insurance component of the benefit pool for current urban-county government employees; and
    2. Upon the death of a member of the policemen’s and firefighters’ retirement fund due to occupational causes, the urban-county government shall pay to the approved provider of the group health insurance plan one hundred percent (100%) of the cost of the family medical coverage for the member’s surviving spouse and dependent children as long as they remain eligible for a monthly retirement allowance from the retirement fund.
  3. No benefits shall be available under this section to retired members who were not, immediately prior to July 1, 1999, participants in the group health insurance plan coverage provided to urban-county government employees and retirees or who retire on or after July 1, 1999, and, at the time of their retirement, do not elect to participate in the group health insurance plan coverage provided pursuant to subsection (1) of this section.
  4. Benefits shall be available under this section to members of the policemen’s and firefighters’ retirement fund who:
    1. Prior to September 18, 2002, withdrew from service on a certificate when they attain the age of forty-six (46) years if, at the time they withdrew from service, they elected to participate in the group health insurance plan coverage provided pursuant to subsection (1) of this section upon attaining age forty-six (46);
    2. Withdraw on a certificate entitling them to a pension benefit at the age of forty-one (41) as provided by KRS 67A.410(3)(a) if, at the time they withdraw from service, they elect to participate in the group health insurance plan coverage provided pursuant to subsection (1) of this section upon attaining age forty-one (41); or
    3. Withdraw on a certificate entitling them to a pension benefit at the age of fifty (50) as provided by KRS 67A.410(3)(b) if, at the time they withdraw from service, they elect to participate in the group health insurance plan coverage provided pursuant to subsection (1) of this section upon attaining age fifty (50).
  5. All payments shall be made to the approved provider of the group health insurance plan, not to the retiree, and the retiree shall not be entitled to receive any portion of the government contribution remaining after payment is made to the approved provider.
  6. Group rates under the group health insurance plan approved by the urban-county council under subsection (1) of this section shall be made available to the spouse, dependents, and disabled children, regardless of the disabled child’s age, of a qualified and participating retiree, if the premium for the spouse, dependent, or disabled child is paid by the retired member, spouse, dependent, or disabled child, by payroll deduction or similar method.

History. Enact. Acts 2002, ch. 274, § 8, effective July 15, 2002; 2006, ch. 144, § 1, effective April 4, 2006; 2013, ch. 7, § 1, effective March 14, 2013.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Generally.

KRS 67A.345(2)(A) limited health insurance premium coverage to the level of contributions for current employees; therefore, the retired policed officers could not claim that their receipt of 100 percent health insurance coverage constituted a vested right when it was explicitly subject to limitation per the statute and ordinances creating it. Puckett v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Gov't, 566 Fed. Appx. 462, 2014 FED App. 0383N, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 9665 (6th Cir. Ky. 2014 ).

67A.350. Exemption of retirement allowances — Taxability after December 31, 1997.

All retirement allowances and other benefits accrued or accruing to any person under the provisions of KRS 67A.220 to 67A.340 and accumulated contributions and cash securities in the fund created under KRS 67A.220 to 67A.340 are hereby exempted from any state tax, and shall not be subject to execution, attachment, garnishment, or any other process whatsoever, nor shall any assignment thereof be enforceable in any court. Except retirement benefits accrued or accruing to any person under the provisions of KRS 67A.220 to 67A.340 on or after January 1, 1998, shall be subject to the tax imposed by KRS 141.020 , to the extent provided in KRS 141.010 and 141.0215 .

History. Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 246, § 15; 1995 (2nd Ex. Sess.), ch. 1, § 5, effective April 28, 1995.

Police and Firefighters’ Retirement and Benefit Fund

67A.360. Definitions for KRS 67A.360 to 67A.690.

Words and phrases, wherever used in KRS 67A.360 to 67A.690 , unless a different meaning is clearly indicated by the context, shall have the following meanings:

  1. “Fund” shall mean the “Policemen’s and Firefighter’s Retirement Fund of the  . . . . .  Urban-County Government”;
  2. “Government” shall mean the governmental unit of any urban-county government in the Commonwealth of Kentucky, including the governmental unit of any former urban-county government which changes its form of government, class or other status;
  3. “Department” shall mean the police department or the fire department of a government;
  4. “Board” shall mean the board of trustees provided in KRS 67A.360 to 67A.690 as the agency responsible for the direction and operation of the affairs and business of the fund. The board shall hold title to all assets of the fund;
  5. “Member” shall mean any member of the police or fire department who is included in the membership of the fund;
  6. “Service” shall mean actual employment in a department of a government, or a city existing within the boundaries of the government immediately prior to the establishment of an urban-county government, for salary or compensation, or service otherwise creditable as herein provided;
  7. “Prior service” shall mean service rendered prior to the date of establishment of the fund or the fund of a city existing within the boundaries of the government immediately prior to the establishment of an urban-county government;
  8. “Membership service” shall mean service rendered on or after the date of establishment of the fund or the fund of a city existing within the boundaries of the government immediately prior to the establishment of an urban-county government;
  9. “Total service” shall mean prior service, membership service, and service credit purchased by a member as provided in KRS 67A.402 ;
  10. “Regular interest” shall mean such rate of interest as shall be fixed by the board, provided that for the first five (5) years of operation of the fund the rate shall be not less than three percent (3%) per annum, compounded annually;
  11. “Occupational disability” shall mean disability due to occupational causes, including but not limited to injury or disease. The presumption of contracting disease “while on active duty as a result of strain or the inhalation of noxious fumes, poisons or gases” created by KRS 79.080 shall be a presumption of “occupational disability” hereunder;
  12. “Occupational death” shall mean death due to occupational causes, including but not limited to injury or disease;
  13. “Average salary” shall mean the highest average annual salary of the member for any three (3) consecutive years of service within the total service of the member, including employee contributions picked up after August 1, 1982 pursuant to KRS 67A.510(2);
  14. The masculine pronoun, wherever used, shall include the feminine pronoun; and widow shall include widower;
  15. The fiscal year of the fund shall date from July 1 of any year to June 30 of the next year following;
  16. “Total disability” shall mean a disability which substantially precludes a person from performing with reasonable regularity the substantial and material parts of any gainful work or occupation in the service of the department that he would be competent to perform were it not for the fact that the impairment is founded upon conditions which render it reasonably certain that it will continue indefinitely;
  17. “Minor child” includes, as applicable, a child under the age of twenty-three (23) still engaged in full-time education;
  18. “Mayor,” “commissioner of finance,” “commissioner of public safety,” and “director of human resources” shall mean the persons holding the office or job most closely resembling the ordinary meaning of such terms, in the event that a government does not have an office so described;
  19. “Salary” means the member’s actual base rate of pay and any other compensation that the government chooses to include. “Salary” shall include longevity pay, training incentive pay, and hazardous duty and special duty pay but shall exclude uniform and equipment allowances, uniform maintenance allowances, education incentive pay, annual payments for excess accumulated sick leave credit, compensation for overtime work, except for scheduled overtime of fire department members, and any other compensation excluded by the government;
  20. “Participation date” means the date the member was hired by the government in a position eligible to participate in the fund; and
  21. “Actuarial funding level” means the actuarial value of assets divided by the actuarially accrued liability expressed as a percentage that is determined and reported by the actuary in the annual actuarial valuation of the fund.

History. Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 106, § 1, effective July 1, 1974; 1978, ch. 164, § 6, effective June 17, 1978; 1982, ch. 166, § 38, effective July 15, 1982; 1990, ch. 189, § 1, effective July 13, 1990; 2000, ch. 484, § 1, effective July 14, 2000; 2002, ch. 274, § 1, effective July 15, 2002; 2013, ch. 7, § 2, effective March 14, 2013.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Occupational Disability.

If it is proven, that the nature and duration of the work effort aggravated or aroused a dormant, degenerative condition to a disabling condition sooner than it would have been aroused without the work effort, the condition itself is an injury which is due to an “occupational cause” as contemplated by subdivision (11) of this section. Board of Trustees v. Brown, 665 S.W.2d 924, 1983 Ky. App. LEXIS 377 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983).

The Legislature intended that one who becomes disabled because of his work is entitled to an occupational disability pension, and where it was established by the claimant that his disabling back condition was aggravated and aroused by the repeated trauma occurring during the course of his employment because of long hours spent riding in a patrol car, the trial court correctly found this to be an “occupational disability” for the purposes of determining the amount of pension benefits the claimant was entitled to receive. Board of Trustees v. Brown, 665 S.W.2d 924, 1983 Ky. App. LEXIS 377 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983).

2. Health Care Coverage.

Retirees were ineligible to opt back into health coverage under former Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government, Ky., Ordinance No. 217-99(c) because that subsection included the retirees, and excluded them from coverage; benefits were payable only to individuals who retired before July 1, 1999, and were participants in the health plan. No patent ambiguity appeared in the ordinance and, in the absence of ambiguity, the ordinance spoke for itself. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Gov't v. Johnson, 280 S.W.3d 31, 2009 Ky. LEXIS 76 ( Ky. 2009 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Disability which does not satisfy the Kentucky statutory requirement of total disability does not justify a disability pension. OAG 77-120 .

67A.370. Retirement and benefit fund established — Name.

There is hereby established in urban-county governments, a retirement and benefit fund for members of the police and fire departments, their dependents and beneficiaries. The fund shall be known as the “Policemen’s and Firefighters’ Retirement Fund of the . . . . . Urban-County Government.” In such name all of its business shall be transacted, all of its moneys invested and all of its accumulated reserves consisting of cash, securities, and other property shall be held.

History. Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 106, § 2, effective July 1, 1974; 1978, ch. 164, § 7, effective June 17, 1978.

67A.380. Purpose of fund.

The purpose of the fund is to provide retirement annuities and disability benefits for the members of the police and fire departments who become aged or otherwise incapacitated, and widows’ annuities and other benefits to the dependents of such members to the end that such members may accumulate reserves for themselves and their dependents to meet, without prejudice or hardship, the hazards of old age, disability, death, and termination of service, thereby encouraging qualified personnel to enter and remain in the service of such departments.

History. Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 106, § 3, effective July 1, 1974.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

Board of Trustees v. Brown, 665 S.W.2d 924, 1983 Ky. App. LEXIS 377 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Based upon the principle that a child support obligation is not to be considered as an ordinary contractual debt, but a moral obligation imposed by the state, and that the policy of KRS Chapter 67A is to provide benefits for the fund’s member as well as his or her dependents, such benefits may be subject to attachment, assignment, or garnishment for purposes of enforcing a child support order. OAG 91-158 .

67A.390. Membership.

The following persons shall become members of the fund:

  1. All active full-time members of a department in service on the day prior to the date of establishment;
  2. All persons who become full-time members on or after the date of establishment who shall become members as a condition of employment, except that, effective July 1, 2013, any member who retires and receives a retirement annuity from the fund shall not be eligible to participate in the fund following retirement and earn a second retirement annuity from the fund; and
  3. All members of a department who on the date of establishment are working in a civilian or appointive capacity for the government, the Commonwealth of Kentucky, or the United States of America, while on an approved leave of absence from a department.

History. Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 106, § 4, effective July 1, 1974; 2013, ch. 7, § 3, effective March 14, 2013.

67A.400. Service credit — Computation.

  1. Each person becoming a member on the date of establishment shall be entitled to full credit for all service rendered prior to such date. Each person becoming a member after the date of establishment shall be entitled to credit after such date, provided contributions are made or, after August 1, 1982, picked up pursuant to KRS 67A.510(2) for all such subsequent service. Total service shall include prior service and membership service.
  2. The following types of service shall be eligible for service credit:
    1. Service as a full-time member of a department of the government;
    2. Service in a civilian or other capacity in the service of the government, Commonwealth of Kentucky, or the federal government, while on approved leave of absence from a department, subject to maximum credit for such service of one (1) year;
    3. Service in any branch of the armed forces of the United States during a period of national emergency while on leave of absence from a department, provided that such leave-of-absence-service shall not exceed five (5) years, and that such member shall reenter the service of a department of the government within a period of six (6) months following the date of separation other than by dishonorable discharge from such service; and
    4. All service rendered in a civilian capacity as provided in subsection (3) of KRS 67A.390 .
  3. In the computation of service credit, nine (9) months or more of service during a year shall entitle a member for one (1) year of service; six (6) to nine (9) months of service shall constitute three-quarters (3/4) of a year; three (3) to six (6) months, one-half (1/2) year; less than three (3) months, one-quarter (1/4) of a year.

History. Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 106, § 5, effective July 1, 1974; 1982, ch. 166, § 39, effective July 15, 1982.

67A.402. Employee purchase of service credit — Payment procedures.

    1. Except as otherwise provided in paragraph (d) of this subsection, any member whose participation date in the fund is prior to March 14, 2013, who has at least five (5) years of total service credit as a member of the fund may purchase service credit, that is not otherwise purchasable, for up to a maximum of four (4) years of service. (1) (a) Except as otherwise provided in paragraph (d) of this subsection, any member whose participation date in the fund is prior to March 14, 2013, who has at least five (5) years of total service credit as a member of the fund may purchase service credit, that is not otherwise purchasable, for up to a maximum of four (4) years of service.
    2. Except as otherwise provided in paragraph (d) of this subsection, any member whose participation date in the fund is on or after March 14, 2013, who has at least five (5) but no more than ten (10) years of membership service may, subject to the limitations provided by this section, purchase periods of active military duty service in the Armed Forces of the United States, not to exceed four (4) years, that are not otherwise credited under KRS 67A.400(2)(c). The member shall provide verification of the period of active military duty as prescribed by the board.
    3. The member shall not be entitled to purchase any service credit under this section for which he or she has been given credit in another defined benefit retirement fund; however, the member may purchase government service credit by transferring funds directly from another public defined benefit retirement plan if the member provides proof that he or she is not eligible for a retirement benefit from the other public defined benefit retirement fund.
    4. Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding:
      1. No service credit purchase under this subsection shall be counted toward the accrual of a health or other medical insurance retirement benefit in this fund;
      2. No service purchased under this section by a member whose participation date in the fund is on or after March 14, 2013, shall be used to determine the member’s eligibility to retire or to withdraw on a certificate under KRS 67A.410(2) or (3)(b); and
      3. The amount of service a member can purchase under this section shall not exceed the amounts specified by paragraphs (a) and (b) of this subsection.
  1. A member who purchases service credit shall file an application with the board no later than sixty (60) days prior to the anticipated service purchase payment date. The member shall pay to the fund an amount which shall be determined by actuarial method consistent with the methods prescribed for determining the purchase of prior service credit which shall be the principal.
  2. Payment of the principal shall be made in a lump sum or payment of the principal and interest may be made by installments. Interest, at the annual rate of return on investments of the fund for the preceding year, shall be established by the commissioner of finance on or before August 31 of each year and shall be based on financial statements of the fund for the year ending June 30, except that the interest shall not be less than three percent (3%). Interest shall be added to the principal for the time period for which installments are to be made.
  3. If payments are made by installment, the cost of purchasing the service credit shall be recalculated annually based upon the member’s current salary, the interest rate established by the commissioner of finance, and other factors required by the actuarial method. The member’s payments shall be adjusted annually to reflect the annual recalculation of the cost of purchasing service credit. Installment payments shall be consecutive and the total number of monthly installments shall not be less than twelve (12) or more than two hundred forty (240). The member shall pay the installments by payroll deduction.
  4. Payments shall not be picked up by the urban-county government. No employer contribution shall be paid on the installments. The board shall determine how much of the total cost represents payment for one (1) quarter of the service to be purchased and the member shall receive service credit for one (1) quarter of the service each time this amount is paid.
  5. If the member dies, retires, or ceases to be a member of the fund before he or she has made all installment payments for the purchase of service credit, the fund shall refund to the member, his or her qualified surviving spouse, or his or her estate, the portion of any payment that does not represent a full quarter of service.
  6. A member whose participation date in the fund is prior to March 14, 2013, who does not repay a refund of contributions, as provided in KRS 67A.500(3), shall be entitled to purchase service credit for prior membership service.
  7. The member may cancel a purchase obligation at any time, but once canceled, a member shall have forever forfeited, waived, and relinquished the right to purchase service credit.

History. Enact. Acts 1990, ch. 189, § 13, effective July 13, 1990; 2000, ch. 484, § 2, effective July 14, 2000; 2006, ch. 144, § 2, effective April 4, 2006; 2013, ch. 7, § 4, effective March 14, 2013.

67A.404. Purchase of retirement credit for accumulated unused sick leave.

  1. Any member who retires based on age and service on or after January 1, 1990, or based on service on or after September 18, 2002, may purchase service credit for unused sick leave accrued while contributing to the retirement fund from which the retirement benefit is to be paid in accordance with this section.
  2. A member retiring based on age and service, or based on service only, on or after September 18, 2002, who chooses to purchase service credit for unused, accumulated sick leave as provided in this section shall notify the board of his or her intention upon submitting his or her retirement application to the board. The urban-county government shall certify the retiring member’s unused, accumulated sick leave balance, up to a maximum of seven hundred and twenty (720) hours for members employed by the division of police and one thousand and eight (1,008) hours for members employed by the division of fire. The member’s sick leave balance, expressed in days, shall be divided by the average number of working days per month and rounded to the nearest number of whole months. This number of months shall be added to the member’s service credit for the purpose of determining his or her rate of retirement annuity pursuant to KRS 67A.430 and his or her total service credit pursuant to KRS 67A.400 . The value of the unused, accumulated sick leave shall be based on the daily salary rate calculated from the member’s last annual salary. Payment for unused sick leave, up to a maximum of seven hundred and twenty (720) hours for members employed by the division of police and one thousand and eight (1,008) hours for members employed by the division of fire, shall be incorporated into the annual salary of the final year of service, provided that the member contributes to the retirement fund the amount set forth in KRS 67A.510 and the urban-county government matches such contribution by the amount set forth in KRS 67A.520(1) on the unused, accumulated sick leave.

History. Enact. Acts 1990, ch. 189, § 14, effective July 13, 1990; 2006, ch. 144, § 3, effective April 4, 2006.

67A.406. Confidentiality of member’s account records — Exceptions — Response to subpoena of records.

  1. Each current, former, or retired member’s account shall be administered in a confidential manner, and specific data regarding a current, former, or retired member shall not be released for publication unless authorized by the member. However, the board may release account information to the urban-county government or to any other governmental agency as it deems necessary or in response to a lawful subpoena or order issued by a court of law.
  2. A subpoena served upon the board that requires the production of any specific data regarding a current, former, or retired member is sufficient if the secretary of the board delivers within five (5) working days, by certified mail or by personal delivery, legible and durable copies of records, certified by the secretary, or an affidavit stating the information required by the subpoena. The production of documents or an affidavit shall be in lieu of any personal testimony of the secretary unless, after the production of documents or affidavit, a separate subpoena is served upon the board specifically directing the testimony of the secretary.
  3. The certification shall be signed before a notary public by the secretary and shall include the name of the member, the member’s Social Security number, and a legend substantially to the following effect: “The records are true and complete reproductions of the original records which are housed in the board’s office. This certification is given by the undersigned in lieu of his or her personal appearance.”
  4. When an affidavit or copies of records are personally delivered, a receipt shall be presented to the person receiving the records for his or her signature and shall be immediately signed and returned to the person delivering the records. When an affidavit or copies of records are sent via certified mail, the receipt used by the postal authorities shall be sufficient to prove delivery and receipt of the affidavit or copies of records.
  5. When the affidavit or copies of records are delivered to a party for use in a deposition, they shall, after termination of the deposition, be delivered personally or by certified mail to the clerk of the court or other body before which the action or proceeding is pending. It shall be the responsibility of the party or attorney to transmit the receipt obtained to the secretary of the board. Upon issuance of a final order terminating the case and after the normal retention period for court records expires, the affidavit or copies of records shall be permanently disposed of by the clerk in a manner that protects the confidentiality of the information contained therein.
  6. Records of the board that are susceptible to photostatic reproduction may be proved as to foundation, identity, and authenticity without any preliminary testimony by use of legible and durable copies, certified in accordance with this section.

History. Enact. Acts 2006, ch. 144, § 12, effective April 4, 2006.

67A.410. Voluntary retirement.

  1. For members whose participation date in the fund is prior to March 14, 2013:
    1. The member may, at his or her option, retire on a service retirement annuity if he or she has completed at least twenty (20) years of total service, provided the member retires and begins receiving a service retirement annuity prior to July 1, 2013; or
    2. The member may, at his or her option, retire on a service retirement annuity if he or she is at least forty-one (41) years of age and has completed at least twenty (20) years of total service if the member retires on or after July 1, 2013.
  2. For members whose participation date in the fund is on or after March 14, 2013, the member may, at his or her option, retire on a service retirement annuity if he or she is at least fifty (50) years of age and has at least twenty-five (25) years of membership service.
    1. Any member whose participation date in the fund is prior to March 14, 2013, who does not retire by July 1, 2013, who withdraws from service prior to age forty-one (41) after having completed at least twenty (20) years of total service, and who has not accepted a refund of contributions, shall receive upon application to the fund, a certificate entitling the member to a service retirement annuity upon his or her attainment of age forty-one (41). (3) (a) Any member whose participation date in the fund is prior to March 14, 2013, who does not retire by July 1, 2013, who withdraws from service prior to age forty-one (41) after having completed at least twenty (20) years of total service, and who has not accepted a refund of contributions, shall receive upon application to the fund, a certificate entitling the member to a service retirement annuity upon his or her attainment of age forty-one (41).
    2. Any member whose participation date in the fund is on or after March 14, 2013, who withdraws from service prior to age fifty (50) after having completed at least twenty-five (25) years of membership service, and who has not accepted a refund of contributions, shall receive upon application to the fund, a certificate entitling the member to a service retirement annuity upon his or her attainment of age fifty (50).
    3. Upon the death of a member prior to age forty-one (41) who is holding a certificate issued by the fund pursuant to paragraph (a) of this subsection or upon the death of a member prior to age fifty (50) who is holding a certificate issued by the fund pursuant to paragraph (b) of this subsection, the surviving spouse shall receive an annuity in accordance with KRS 67A.492 based upon the survivorship payment option selected by the member.
    4. The certificates provided by this subsection shall be issued by the fund and shall specify the amount of the annuity earned and accrued at the date of withdrawal from service, except that the amount of annuity earned and accrued at the date of withdrawal shall be actuarially adjusted to reflect the survivorship payment option selected by the member upon application for a certificate.
  3. Provided the member has met the terms required by this section to receive a service retirement annuity, the board shall grant the retirement annuity upon receipt of the application of the member.

History. Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 106, § 6, effective July 1, 1974; 1992, ch. 181, § 1, effective July 14, 1992; 1994, ch. 380, § 1, effective July 15, 1994; 2002, ch. 274, § 2, effective July 15, 2002; 2006, ch. 144, § 4, effective April 4, 2006; 2013, ch. 7, § 5, effective March 14, 2013.

67A.420. Compulsory retirement.

Each member shall be subject to compulsory retirement according to the rules of the government in which he is employed, except that any member able to perform his assigned duties shall not be precluded from serving:

  1. At least twenty (20) years if the member’s participation date in the fund is prior to March 14, 2013; or
  2. At least twenty-five (25) years if the member’s participation date in the fund is on or after March 14, 2013.

History. Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 106, § 7, effective July 1, 1974; 2013, ch. 7, § 6, effective March 14, 2013.

67A.430. Rate of retirement annuity — Retroactive increase of monthly annuity to $1,250 — Annual adjustment.

    1. For a member whose participation date in the fund is prior to March 14, 2013, the rate of retirement annuity shall be two and one-half percent (2.5%) of average salary, as defined in KRS 67A.360(13), for each year of total service. (1) (a) For a member whose participation date in the fund is prior to March 14, 2013, the rate of retirement annuity shall be two and one-half percent (2.5%) of average salary, as defined in KRS 67A.360(13), for each year of total service.
    2. For a member whose participation date in the fund is on or after March 14, 2013, the rate of retirement annuity shall be two and one-quarter percent (2.25%) of average salary, as defined in KRS 67A.360(13), for each year of total service.
    3. Fractional periods of service shall be considered in the calculation of such annuities according to the rate provided by paragraph (a) or (b) of this subsection, based upon the participation date of the member.
  1. Any retiree or surviving spouse who, as of July 1, 2005, was receiving a monthly annuity of less than one thousand two hundred fifty dollars ($1,250) shall have the pension increased to one thousand two hundred fifty dollars ($1,250). Such increase shall be retroactive to July 1, 2005, and the retiree or surviving spouse shall receive a lump-sum payment equal to the difference between the amount of the monthly annuities received between July 1, 2005, and July 15, 2006, and the amount that would have been received had the monthly annuity been increased on July 1, 2005. The board shall increase this annuity at the same rate as annually provided by KRS 67A.690(1), and such increase shall be determined and granted annually thereafter by the board.

History. Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 106, § 8, effective July 1, 1974; 1996, ch. 311, § 1, effective July 15, 1996; 2000, ch. 484, § 3, effective July 14, 2000; 2001, ch. 131, § 1, effective June 21, 2001; 2002, ch. 274, § 3, effective July 15, 2002; 2006, ch. 144, § 5, effective April 4, 2006; 2013, ch. 7, § 7, effective March 14, 2013.

67A.440. Death of member due to occupational causes — Benefits to surviving widow, minor children, and parents. [Effective until July 15, 2020]

    1. Upon death of a member due to occupational causes, regardless of length of service, his surviving widow shall be entitled immediately upon cessation of salary to an annuity equal to seventy-five percent (75%) of the member’s last rate of salary. This annuity shall be payable until she dies. In addition, if any minor children of the member, under age eighteen (18), survive the member, the widow or parent or legal guardian shall receive on account of each child, ten percent (10%) of the member’s last rate of salary until each child attains age eighteen (18). In the case of a child regularly engaged in full-time educational activities, payments shall continue until age twenty-three (23), but payments shall be made directly to a child between the ages of eighteen (18) and twenty-three (23). The combined payments to a widow and minor children shall not exceed one hundred percent (100%) of his final rate of salary. When more than one (1) child survives the member, the amount payable by reason of such children shall be divided equally among them. (1) (a) Upon death of a member due to occupational causes, regardless of length of service, his surviving widow shall be entitled immediately upon cessation of salary to an annuity equal to seventy-five percent (75%) of the member’s last rate of salary. This annuity shall be payable until she dies. In addition, if any minor children of the member, under age eighteen (18), survive the member, the widow or parent or legal guardian shall receive on account of each child, ten percent (10%) of the member’s last rate of salary until each child attains age eighteen (18). In the case of a child regularly engaged in full-time educational activities, payments shall continue until age twenty-three (23), but payments shall be made directly to a child between the ages of eighteen (18) and twenty-three (23). The combined payments to a widow and minor children shall not exceed one hundred percent (100%) of his final rate of salary. When more than one (1) child survives the member, the amount payable by reason of such children shall be divided equally among them.
    2. Any surviving widow who is drawing a benefit pursuant to paragraph (a) of this subsection on July 1, 2013, that is less than the amount computed under paragraph (a) of this subsection, shall have her retirement annuity increased to the amount determined under paragraph (a) of this subsection.
  1. If the member is not survived by a widow, or, if she remarries, and there are minor children of the member, the following benefits shall be paid:
    1. One (1) minor child, fifty percent (50%) of the final rate of salary;
    2. Two (2) minor children, an additional fifteen percent (15%) of final salary;
    3. Three (3) or more minor children, an additional ten percent (10%) of final salary, subject to a maximum combined payment of seventy-five percent (75%) of the member’s final rate of salary.

      These benefits shall be divided in equal amounts for each child and paid to the parent or legal guardian of each child under eighteen (18). In the case of a child regularly engaged in full-time educational activities, payments shall continue until age twenty-three (23), but payments shall be made directly to the child between the ages of eighteen (18) and twenty-three (23). As eligibility of children expires, the total annuity payment shall be reduced by percentage amount in reverse order.

  2. If neither a widow nor minor children eligible for benefits survive the member, each dependent parent shall be entitled to an annuity equal to twenty-five percent (25%) of the member’s last rate of salary, or fifty percent (50%) to both parents.

History. Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 106, § 9, effective July 1, 1974; 1980, ch. 81, § 1, effective July 15, 1980; 2002, ch. 274, § 4, effective July 15, 2002; 2013, ch. 7, § 8, effective March 14, 2013.

Opinions of Attorney General.

Based upon the principle that a child support obligation is not to be considered as an ordinary contractual debt, but a moral obligation imposed by the state, and that the policy of KRS Chapter 67A is to provide benefits for the fund’s member as well as his or her dependents, such benefits may be subject to attachment, assignment, or garnishment for purposes of enforcing a child support order. OAG 91-158 .

67A.440. Death of member due to occupational causes — Benefits to surviving spouse, minor children, and parents. [Effective July 15, 2020]

    1. Upon death of a member due to occupational causes, regardless of length of service, the surviving spouse shall be entitled immediately upon cessation of salary to an annuity equal to seventy-five percent (75%) of the member’s last rate of salary. This annuity shall be payable until the surviving spouse dies. In addition, if any minor children of the member, under age eighteen (18), survive the member, the surviving spouse or parent or legal guardian shall receive on account of each child, ten percent (10%) of the member’s last rate of salary until each child attains age eighteen (18). In the case of a child regularly engaged in full-time educational activities, payments shall continue until age twenty-three (23), but payments shall be made directly to a child between the ages of eighteen (18) and twenty-three (23). The combined payments to a surviving spouse and minor children shall not exceed one hundred percent (100%) of the final rate of salary. When more than one (1) child survives the member, the amount payable by reason of such children shall be divided equally among them. (1) (a) Upon death of a member due to occupational causes, regardless of length of service, the surviving spouse shall be entitled immediately upon cessation of salary to an annuity equal to seventy-five percent (75%) of the member’s last rate of salary. This annuity shall be payable until the surviving spouse dies. In addition, if any minor children of the member, under age eighteen (18), survive the member, the surviving spouse or parent or legal guardian shall receive on account of each child, ten percent (10%) of the member’s last rate of salary until each child attains age eighteen (18). In the case of a child regularly engaged in full-time educational activities, payments shall continue until age twenty-three (23), but payments shall be made directly to a child between the ages of eighteen (18) and twenty-three (23). The combined payments to a surviving spouse and minor children shall not exceed one hundred percent (100%) of the final rate of salary. When more than one (1) child survives the member, the amount payable by reason of such children shall be divided equally among them.
    2. Any surviving spouse who is drawing a benefit pursuant to paragraph (a) of this subsection on July 1, 2013, that is less than the amount computed under paragraph (a) of this subsection, shall have the retirement annuity increased to the amount determined under paragraph (a) of this subsection.
  1. If the member is not survived by a spouse, and there are minor children of the member, the following benefits shall be paid:
    1. One (1) minor child, fifty percent (50%) of the final rate of salary;
    2. Two (2) minor children, an additional fifteen percent (15%) of final salary;
    3. Three (3) or more minor children, an additional ten percent (10%) of final salary, subject to a maximum combined payment of seventy-five percent (75%) of the member’s final rate of salary.

      These benefits shall be divided in equal amounts for each child and paid to the parent or legal guardian of each child under eighteen (18). In the case of a child regularly engaged in full-time educational activities, payments shall continue until age twenty-three (23), but payments shall be made directly to the child between the ages of eighteen (18) and twenty-three (23). As eligibility of children expires, the total annuity payment shall be reduced by percentage amount in reverse order.

  2. If neither a surviving spouse nor minor children eligible for benefits survive the member, each dependent parent shall be entitled to an annuity equal to twenty-five percent (25%) of the member’s last rate of salary, or fifty percent (50%) to both parents.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 106, § 9, effective July 1, 1974; 1980, ch. 81, § 1, effective July 15, 1980; 2002, ch. 274, § 4, effective July 15, 2002; 2013, ch. 7, § 8, effective March 14, 2013; 2020 ch. 103, § 1, effective July 15, 2020.

67A.450. Death of member not occasioned by performance of duty — Benefits to surviving spouse and minor children. [Effective until July 15, 2020]

  1. Upon death of a member occurring while in service, arising from any cause other than in the performance of duty, provided the member has had at least five (5) years of total service, his or her surviving spouse shall receive an annuity equal to one and one-half percent (1-1/2%) of average salary for each year of total service, credited to the member, but not less than fifteen percent (15%) of average salary, subject to the following conditions:
    1. The surviving spouse had been married to the member at least six (6) months prior to his or her death;
    2. The surviving spouse’s annuity will terminate in any event when the surviving spouse dies. The annuity of each child or children shall continue until each child attains age eighteen (18), or, in the case of a child regularly engaged in full-time educational activities the age of twenty-three (23).
  2. If, in addition to a surviving spouse, minor children survive the member, an additional annuity shall be payable for such children equal to fifty percent (50%) of the amount of the surviving spouse’s annuity for the first child, and twenty-five percent (25%) of the amount of the surviving spouse’s annuity for each additional child, subject to a maximum combined payment for the surviving spouse and children of seventy-five percent (75%) of the member’s average salary. The annuity payable for minor children shall be divided and paid in equal amounts for each child to the parent or guardian of each child under eighteen (18), and directly to each child between the ages of eighteen (18) and twenty-three (23) who is regularly engaged in full-time educational activities. As eligibility of children expires, the total annuity payable for such children shall be reduced by percentage amount in reverse order.
  3. If the member is not survived by a surviving spouse who qualifies under KRS 67A.450(1)(a) and there are minor children, the following benefits shall be paid: (a) one (1) minor child, fifty percent (50%), (b) two (2) minor children, fifteen percent (15%) additional, (c) three (3) or more minor children ten percent (10%) additional, subject to a maximum combined payment of seventy-five percent (75%) of the average salary as defined in KRS 67A.360(13). The benefits payable for minor children shall be divided and paid in equal amounts for each child to the parent or legal guardian of each child under the age of eighteen (18), and directly to each child between the ages of eighteen (18) and twenty-three (23) who is regularly engaged in full-time educational activities. The annuity of each child or children shall continue until each child attains age eighteen (18), or, in the case of a child regularly engaged in full-time educational activities the age of twenty-three (23). The annuity payments shall be reduced in reverse order, as provided in subsection (2) of this section.

History. Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 106, § 10; 1976, ch. 175, § 2; 1980, ch. 81, § 2, effective July 15, 1980; 1990, ch. 189, § 2, effective July 13, 1990; 2006, ch. 144, § 6, effective April 4, 2006.

Opinions of Attorney General.

Neither the provisions of subsection (2) of this section or any other of the subsections refer to the surviving children other than those of the widow of the deceased, which could not include children by a previous marriage; if the legislature had intended to include the surviving children of a former marriage, it would have done so in clear and specific terms. OAG 79-224 .

67A.450. Death not in the line of duty of member ineligible or eligible for voluntary service retirement — Benefits to surviving spouse and minor children. [Effective July 15, 2020]

  1. For a member who on the date of death is not eligible for a voluntary service retirement under KRS 67A.410 , whose death occurs while in service, arising from any cause other than in the performance of duty, provided the member has had at least five (5) years of total service, his or her surviving spouse shall receive an annuity equal to one and one-half percent (1-1/2%) of average salary for each year of total service, credited to the member, but not less than fifteen percent (15%) of average salary, subject to the following conditions:
    1. The surviving spouse had been married to the member at least six (6) months prior to his or her death;
    2. The surviving spouse’s annuity will terminate in any event when the surviving spouse dies. The annuity of each child or children shall continue until each child attains age eighteen (18), or, in the case of a child regularly engaged in full-time educational activities the age of twenty-three (23).
  2. If, in addition to a surviving spouse, minor children survive the member, an additional annuity shall be payable for such children equal to fifty percent (50%) of the amount of the surviving spouse’s annuity for the first child, and twenty-five percent (25%) of the amount of the surviving spouse’s annuity for each additional child, subject to a maximum combined payment for the surviving spouse and children of seventy-five percent (75%) of the member’s average salary. The annuity payable for minor children shall be divided and paid in equal amounts for each child to the parent or guardian of each child under eighteen (18), and directly to each child between the ages of eighteen (18) and twenty-three (23) who is regularly engaged in full-time educational activities. As eligibility of children expires, the total annuity payable for such children shall be reduced by percentage amount in reverse order.
  3. If the member is not survived by a surviving spouse who qualifies under KRS 67A.450(1)(a) and there are minor children, the following benefits shall be paid: (a) one (1) minor child, fifty percent (50%), (b) two (2) minor children, fifteen percent (15%) additional, (c) three (3) or more minor children ten percent (10%) additional, subject to a maximum combined payment of seventy-five percent (75%) of the average salary as defined in KRS 67A.360(13). The benefits payable for minor children shall be divided and paid in equal amounts for each child to the parent or legal guardian of each child under the age of eighteen (18), and directly to each child between the ages of eighteen (18) and twenty-three (23) who is regularly engaged in full-time educational activities. The annuity of each child or children shall continue until each child attains age eighteen (18), or, in the case of a child regularly engaged in full-time educational activities the age of twenty-three (23). The annuity payments shall be reduced in reverse order, as provided in subsection (2) of this section.
  4. Any active member who, on the date of death would otherwise be eligible for a service retirement under KRS 67A.410 , shall be deemed to have service until the date of the member’s death calculated with credit for accumulated sick leave under KRS 67A.404 . The deceased member shall be deemed to have elected the survivorship one hundred percent (100%) allowance option under KRS 67A.492(2)(b).

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 106, § 10; 1976, ch. 175, § 2; 1980, ch. 81, § 2, effective July 15, 1980; 1990, ch. 189, § 2, effective July 13, 1990; 2006, ch. 144, § 6, effective April 4, 2006; 2020 ch. 103, § 2, effective July 15, 2020.

67A.460. Permanent occupational disability — Annuity rate — Disability retirement benefits.

  1. If a total and permanent occupational disability occurs, the member shall receive an annuity calculated pursuant to subsection (2) of this section. This benefit shall begin at the time the member’s salary ceases, and shall be paid during his or her entire lifetime. At the member’s death, his or her eligible surviving spouse, if any, shall receive the benefits as provided under KRS 67A.492 , and his or her minor children, if any, shall receive benefits as provided under KRS 67A.440 .
  2. The minimum annuity rate for a total and permanent occupational disability shall be:
    1. Fifty percent (50%) of the member’s last rate of salary if the member’s rate of disability is less than twenty percent (20%) and the disablement is the direct result of documented occupational injuries for service to the department that occurred on or after July 1, 2013;
    2. Sixty percent (60%) of the member’s last rate of salary if the member’s rate of disability is less than twenty percent (20%) and the disablement is the direct result of documented occupational injuries for service to the department that occurred prior to July 1, 2013; or
    3. Sixty percent (60%) of the member’s last rate of salary if the member’s rate of disability is equal to twenty percent (20%) or more. The minimum annuity rate provided by this paragraph shall be increased by one half (1/2) of the amount by which the member’s percentage of disability exceeds twenty percent (20%), but this increase shall be not more than fifteen percent (15%) of the member’s last rate of salary and the member’s total annuity shall not be greater than seventy-five percent (75%) of his or her last rate of salary.
  3. The member’s percentage of disability shall be the average of the impairment rating determined by two (2) physicians selected by the board under KRS 67A.480 , using the “Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment”.
  4. If a member is eligible for a service retirement annuity under KRS 67A.410 and the amount of the member’s service retirement annuity would exceed the amount of his or her total and permanent occupational disability annuity, as determined by the board under this section, then the member may elect to receive an additional service retirement annuity payment equal to the amount by which the member’s service retirement annuity would have exceeded the amount of his or her total and permanent occupational disability annuity, in addition to the member’s disability annuity, by filing with the board the application required by KRS 67A.410 .

History. Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 106, § 11, effective July 1, 1974; 1990, ch. 189, § 16, effective July 13, 1990; 1994, ch. 380, § 2, effective July 15, 1994; 2000, ch. 484, § 4, effective July 14, 2000; 2006, ch. 144, § 7, effective April 4, 2006; 2010, ch. 90, § 7, effective July 15, 2010; 2013, ch. 7, § 9, effective March 14, 2013.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Proof of Disability.

The Legislature intended that one who becomes disabled because of his work is entitled to an occupational disability pension, and where it was established by the claimant that his disabling back condition was aggravated and aroused by the repeated trauma occurring during the course of his employment because of long hours spent riding in a patrol car, the trial court correctly found this to be an “occupational disability” for the purposes of determining the amount of pension benefits the claimant was entitled to receive. Board of Trustees v. Brown, 665 S.W.2d 924, 1983 Ky. App. LEXIS 377 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983).

2. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction.

Court of Appeals erred in granting a petition for a writ of prohibition to the board of trustees of an urban county government policemen's and firefighter's retirement fund to prohibit the circuit court from considering a police officer's petition for review of the denial of his claim for disability benefits because the circuit court was clearly vested by statute with subject-matter jurisdiction to review of the board's decision notwithstanding the flaws of the initial pleading, there was no claim that the board would suffer great injustice and irreparable injury if the writ were not granted, the orderly administration of justice would not suffer, and no substantial miscarriage of justice would occur. Spears v. Goodwine, 490 S.W.3d 347, 2016 Ky. LEXIS 253 ( Ky. 2016 ).

Cited in:

Spears v. Bd. of Trs. of the Lexington-Fayette Urban Cty. Gov't Policemen's & Firefighters' Ret. Fund, 2018 Ky. App. LEXIS 330 (Ky. Ct. App. Sept. 28, 2018).

67A.462. Review of disability retirements — Suspension or termination of disability benefits. [Effective until July 16, 2020]

  1. Once each year following the retirement of a member on a disability retirement allowance, the board may require the person, prior to his normal retirement date, to undergo a medical examination. Should he refuse to submit to any such medical examination, his retirement allowance shall be discontinued until his withdrawal of his refusal, and should his refusal continue for one (1) year, all his rights to any further disability allowance shall cease. Any member whose medical examination reveals that he is no longer totally and permanently disabled within the meaning of KRS 67A.360(16) shall be disqualified from further receipt of disability benefits.
    1. Once each year following the retirement of a member on a disability retirement allowance the board shall require the person, prior to his normal retirement date, to complete and return to the board a statement indicating whether he is employed, the name of his employer, if any, and a description of his job duties. The board shall discontinue the disability benefits of any member for the duration of his refusal to provide the board with employment information. Any member who fails to provide the information to the board within one (1) year after the initial request shall lose his right to any further disability benefits. (2) (a) Once each year following the retirement of a member on a disability retirement allowance the board shall require the person, prior to his normal retirement date, to complete and return to the board a statement indicating whether he is employed, the name of his employer, if any, and a description of his job duties. The board shall discontinue the disability benefits of any member for the duration of his refusal to provide the board with employment information. Any member who fails to provide the information to the board within one (1) year after the initial request shall lose his right to any further disability benefits.
    2. The board shall have the right to terminate the disability retirement benefits of any member who is employed in an occupation which is essentially similar to that of his former employment, either in job classification, similarity of duties, or which otherwise demonstrates that the member is performing activities for which he earlier claimed he was disabled from performing. For the purpose of this section, members who were sworn police officers may not hold a sworn position as peace officer and continue to receive disability benefits.

History. Enact. Acts 1990, ch. 189, § 12, effective July 13, 1990.

67A.462. Review of disability retirements — Suspension or termination of disability benefits — Investigations, hearings, and appeals. [Effective July 15, 2020]

  1. Once each year following the retirement of a member on a disability retirement allowance, the board may require the person, prior to his or her normal retirement date, to undergo a medical examination. Should he or she refuse to submit to any such medical examination, his or her retirement allowance shall be discontinued until his or her withdrawal of his or her refusal, and should his or her refusal continue for one (1) year, all his or her rights to any further disability allowance shall cease. Any member whose medical examination reveals that he or she is no longer totally and permanently disabled within the meaning of KRS 67A.360(16) shall be disqualified from further receipt of disability benefits.
    1. Once each year following the retirement of a member on a disability retirement allowance, the board shall require the person, prior to his or her normal retirement date, to complete and return to the board a statement indicating whether he or she is employed, the name of his or her employer, if any, and a description of his or her job duties. The board shall discontinue the disability benefits of any member for the duration of his or her refusal to provide the board with employment information. Any member who fails to provide the information to the board within one (1) year after the initial request shall lose his or her right to any further disability benefits. (2) (a) Once each year following the retirement of a member on a disability retirement allowance, the board shall require the person, prior to his or her normal retirement date, to complete and return to the board a statement indicating whether he or she is employed, the name of his or her employer, if any, and a description of his or her job duties. The board shall discontinue the disability benefits of any member for the duration of his or her refusal to provide the board with employment information. Any member who fails to provide the information to the board within one (1) year after the initial request shall lose his or her right to any further disability benefits.
    2. The board shall have the right to terminate the disability retirement benefits of any member who is employed in an occupation which is essentially similar to that of his or her former employment, either in job classification, similarity of duties, or which otherwise demonstrates that the member is performing activities for which he or she earlier claimed he or she was disabled from performing. For the purpose of this section, members may not hold a sworn position as an elected, paid, or volunteer peace officer, firefighter, paramedic, or any other position generally considered to be a public safety position that otherwise qualifies for hazardous duty salary, retirement, or death benefits under the laws of the Commonwealth or the laws applicable to such employment within the state or federal jurisdiction governing the position, and continue to receive disability benefits.
  2. The board is authorized to make reasonable investigative inquiries, conduct a hearing, and request the appearance of witnesses, including the member receiving disability benefits, to ensure compliance with this section. Any member whose disability benefits are terminated may request a rehearing before the board under KRS 67A.660 . A member may seek judicial review of any final order of the board revoking disability benefits in accordance with KRS 67A.670 .

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1990, ch. 189, § 12, effective July 13, 1990; 2020 ch. 103, § 3, effective July 15, 2020.

67A.470. Total and permanent disability not occasioned by duties of member — Benefits.

    1. Upon total and permanent disability of a member as the result of any cause other than occupational disability, if a member shall have rendered at least five (5) years of total service, he shall be entitled to a disability retirement annuity determined under this section. (1) (a) Upon total and permanent disability of a member as the result of any cause other than occupational disability, if a member shall have rendered at least five (5) years of total service, he shall be entitled to a disability retirement annuity determined under this section.
    2. For a member whose participation date in the fund is prior to March 14, 2013, the amount of the disability retirement annuity shall be equal to two and one-half percent (2.5%) of the average salary, as defined in KRS 67A.360(13), for each full year of total service, subject to a minimum payment of twenty-five percent (25%) of such average salary and a maximum payment of seventy-five percent (75%) of average salary.
    3. For a member whose participation date in the fund is on or after March 14, 2013, the amount of the disability retirement annuity shall be equal to two and one-quarter percent (2.25%) of the average salary, as defined in KRS 67A.360(13), for each full year of total service, subject to a minimum payment of twenty-two and one-half percent (22.5%) of such average salary and a maximum payment of sixty-seven and one-half percent (67.5%) of average salary.
    4. Payment of the disability annuity as provided by this section shall be made during disability of the member. After the member’s death, his eligible widow, if any, shall receive the benefits as provided in KRS 67A.492 , and his minor children, if any, shall receive benefits as provided under KRS 67A.450 .
  1. Any annuity for nonoccupational disability shall begin to accrue upon the expiration of ninety (90) days following the commencement of disability provided that if the member is receiving salary for sick leave for a period of more than ninety (90) days, payment shall accrue from the date such salary ceases. If written application for such annuity shall not have been filed with the board prior to the expiration of ninety (90) days from date of disability, the annuity shall begin to accrue from the date the application shall be filed but not prior to the expiration of ninety (90) days from the date of disability, nor in any event prior to the time when salary payments to the employee shall have ceased.

History. Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 106, § 12, effective July 1, 1974; 1980, ch. 81, § 3, effective July 15, 1980; 1990, ch. 189, § 17, effective July 13, 1990; 2013, ch. 7, § 10, effective March 14, 2013.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Proof of Disability.

The Legislature intended that one who becomes disabled because of his work is entitled to an occupational disability pension, and where it was established by the claimant that his disabling back condition was aggravated and aroused by the repeated trauma occurring during the course of his employment because of long hours spent riding in a patrol car, the trial court correctly found this to be an “occupational disability” for the purposes of determining the amount of pension benefits the claimant was entitled to receive. Board of Trustees v. Brown, 665 S.W.2d 924, 1983 Ky. App. LEXIS 377 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983).

Opinions of Attorney General.

If a person renders at least five years of total service and then develops a total and permanent disability from nonoccupational causes, and satisfies, to the board’s satisfaction, the legal requirement of total disability, he would be entitled to a disability pension pursuant to this section regardless of how much of his prior medical history was known to the department. OAG 77-120 .

67A.480. Medical examination to determine disability — Certification of examining physicians.

For the purpose of KRS 67A.360 to 67A.690 , a member shall be considered totally and permanently disabled after the board has received written certification by at least two (2) licensed and practicing physicians selected by the board that the member is totally and likely to be permanently disabled for the further performance of the duties of any assigned position in the service of the department. If upon consideration of the report of such physicians and such other evidence as shall have been presented to it by the member or others interested therein, the board finds the member to be totally and permanently disabled, it shall grant him a disability retirement annuity upon written certification that the member has been separated from the service of the government because of total disability of such nature as to reasonably prevent further service for the employer, and as a consequence is not entitled to compensation from the government.

History. Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 106, § 13, effective July 1, 1974.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited in:

Spears v. Bd. of Trs. of the Lexington-Fayette Urban Cty. Gov't Policemen's & Firefighters' Ret. Fund, 2018 Ky. App. LEXIS 330 (Ky. Ct. App. Sept. 28, 2018).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Where a fireman sustains a service-connected injury and applies for a disability pension the city can transfer such person from his primary duty, firefighting, to one of their own choosing, such as the alarm room or fire prevention. OAG 77-120 .

67A.490. Death of member — Benefit to designated beneficiary when no surviving spouse’s, children’s, or dependent parent annuities payable.

  1. Upon death of a member, occurring while in active service, if no surviving spouse’s annuity, children’s annuities, or dependent parent annuities are payable, the designated beneficiary of the member or his or her estate shall be entitled to a death benefit equal to the total contributions made by the member, including the amount of any employee contributions picked up by the urban-county government pursuant to KRS 67A.510(2), without interest, or one thousand five hundred dollars ($1,500), whichever is greater.
  2. Upon death of a retired member, if no surviving spouse’s annuity, children’s annuities, or dependent parent annuities shall be due and payable, a death benefit shall be paid to the designated beneficiary or estate of the member, equal to the excess, if any, of the total contributions made by the member, including those picked up pursuant to KRS 67A.510(2), to this fund to the date of retirement, without interest, over the total annuity payments received by the member. The minimum payment in such case shall be one thousand five hundred dollars ($1,500). If a surviving spouse’s annuity, children’s annuities, or dependent parent annuities are payable after the death of the retired member, the amount of such death benefit, if any, shall be determined upon termination of annuity payments to all survivors of the member, whether such termination occurs by death or other cause.

History. Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 106, § 14, effective July 1, 1974; 1980, ch. 81, § 4, effective July 15, 1980; 1982, ch. 166, § 40, effective July 15, 1982; 2006, ch. 144, § 8, effective April 4, 2006.

67A.492. Survivor benefit of sixty percent (60%) of member’s final annuity, final rate of pay, or service retirement annuity — Eligibility — Purchase of optional survivorship allowance. [Effective until July 15, 2020]

    1. Upon the death of a retired member, his or her surviving spouse shall receive an annuity equal to sixty percent (60%) of the member’s final annuity, or of the member’s final rate of pay, whichever is greater. (1) (a) Upon the death of a retired member, his or her surviving spouse shall receive an annuity equal to sixty percent (60%) of the member’s final annuity, or of the member’s final rate of pay, whichever is greater.
    2. Upon the death of a member who withdraws on a certificate as provided by KRS 67A.410(3)(a) or (b), his or her surviving spouse shall receive an annuity equal to sixty percent (60%) of the member’s service retirement annuity.
    3. The surviving spouse must have been married to the member for at least three (3) years prior to the member’s death or six (6) months prior to the member’s retirement or withdrawal on a certificate as provided by KRS 67A.410(3)(a) or (b), in order to be eligible for the benefits provided in this section. Effective April 4, 2006, the benefits provided by this section shall be made eligible to surviving spouses of any retired member who died on July 14, 2000, or thereafter.
  1. Any member who retires on July 15, 1990, or thereafter, and any member who withdraws on a certificate as provided by KRS 67A.410(3)(a) or (b), shall have the option at retirement or upon application for a certificate to purchase an increased annuity allowance for his or her surviving spouse. The amount of any such optional survivorship allowance shall be actuarially equivalent to the amount of retirement allowance otherwise payable to the member. The member may elect either of two (2) options:
    1. Survivorship seventy-five percent (75%). The member may elect to receive a decreased retirement allowance during his or her lifetime and have seventy-five percent (75%) of such retirement allowance continue after the member’s death to his or her eligible surviving spouse until the surviving spouse’s death.
    2. Survivorship one hundred percent (100%). The member may elect to receive a decreased retirement allowance during his or her lifetime and have such retirement allowance continued at the same rate after the member’s death to his or her eligible surviving spouse until the surviving spouse’s death.

History. Enact. Acts 1990, ch. 189, § 15, effective July 13, 1990; 2000, ch. 484, § 5, effective July 14, 2000; 2006, ch. 144, § 9, effective April 4, 2006; 2013, ch. 7, § 11, effective March 14, 2013.

67A.492. Surviving spouse benefit of sixty percent of member’s final annuity, final rate of pay, or service retirement annuity — Eligibility — Purchase of optional survivorship allowance — Survivng children benefit of fifty percent to secenty-five percent. [Effective July 15, 2020]

    1. Upon the death of a retired member, his or her surviving spouse shall receive an annuity equal to sixty percent (60%) of the member’s final annuity, or of the member’s final rate of pay, whichever is greater. (1) (a) Upon the death of a retired member, his or her surviving spouse shall receive an annuity equal to sixty percent (60%) of the member’s final annuity, or of the member’s final rate of pay, whichever is greater.
    2. Upon the death of a member who withdraws on a certificate as provided by KRS 67A.410(3)(a) or (b), his or her surviving spouse shall receive an annuity equal to sixty percent (60%) of the member’s service retirement annuity.
    3. The surviving spouse must have been married to the member for at least three (3) years prior to the member’s death or six (6) months prior to the member’s retirement or withdrawal on a certificate as provided by KRS 67A.410(3)(a) or (b), in order to be eligible for the benefits provided in this section. Effective April 4, 2006, the benefits provided by this section shall be made eligible to surviving spouses of any retired member who died on July 14, 2000, or thereafter.
  1. Any member who retires on July 15, 1990, or thereafter, and any member who withdraws on a certificate as provided by KRS 67A.410(3)(a) or (b), shall have the option at retirement or upon application for a certificate to purchase an increased annuity allowance for his or her surviving spouse. The amount of any such optional survivorship allowance shall be actuarially equivalent to the amount of retirement allowance otherwise payable to the member. No surviving minor children annuity shall be payable under subsection (3) of this section if a surviving spouse annuity is payable under this subsection. The member may elect either of two (2) options:
    1. Survivorship seventy-five percent (75%). The member may elect to receive a decreased retirement allowance during his or her lifetime and have seventy-five percent (75%) of such retirement allowance continue after the member’s death to his or her eligible surviving spouse until the surviving spouse’s death; or
    2. Survivorship one hundred percent (100%).The member may elect to receive a decreased retirement allowance during his or her lifetime and have such retirement allowance continued at the same rate after the member’s death to his or her eligible surviving spouse until the surviving spouse’s death.
  2. If, in addition to a surviving spouse who is entitled to an annuity under subsection (1) of this section, a minor child or children survive the member, an additional annuity shall be provided for such child or children equal to:
    1. For the first child, fifty percent (50%) of the amount of the surviving spouse’s annuity; and
    2. For each additional child, twenty-five percent (25%) of the amount of the surviving spouse’s annuity;

      subject to a maximum combined annuity for the surviving spouse and minor children not to exceed seventy-five percent (75%) of the member’s final annuity, final rate of pay, or service retirement annuity, calculated, as applicable, under subsection (1) of this section.

      The annuity provided for the minor children shall be divided and paid in equal amounts for each child to the surviving parent or guardian of each child under the age of eighteen (18), and paid directly to each child between the ages of eighteen (18) and twenty-three (23) who is regularly engaged in full-time educational activities. The annuity of each child or children shall continue until each child attains the age of eighteen (18), or in the case of a child regularly engaged in full-time educational activities, the age of twenty-three (23). As the eligibility of children expire, the total annuity for such children shall be reduced by percentage amount in reverse order.

  3. If the member is not survived by a spouse who qualifies under subsection (1) or (2) of this section, and a minor child or children survive the member, an annuity shall be provided for such child or children equal to the following share of the member’s final annuity, final rate of pay, or service retirement, whichever is greater:
    1. For the first child, fifty percent (50%); and
      1. For two (2) children, an additional fifteen percent (15%); or (b) 1. For two (2) children, an additional fifteen percent (15%); or
      2. For three (3) or more children, an additional ten percent (10%) each;

        subject to a maximum combined annuity for all minor children not to exceed seventy-five percent (75%) of the member’s final annuity, final rate of pay, or service retirement, whichever is greater.

The annuity provided for the minor children shall be divided and paid in equal amounts for each child to the surviving parent or guardian of each child under the age of eighteen (18), and paid directly to each child between the ages of eighteen (18) and twenty-three (23) who is regularly engaged in full-time educational activities. The annuity of each child or children shall continue until each child attains the age of eighteen (18), or in the case of a child regularly engaged in full-time educational activities, the age of twenty-three (23). As the eligibility of children expire, the total annuity for such children shall be reduced by percentage amount in reverse order.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1990, ch. 189, § 15, effective July 13, 1990; 2000, ch. 484, § 5, effective July 14, 2000; 2006, ch. 144, § 9, effective April 4, 2006; 2013, ch. 7, § 11, effective March 14, 2013; 2020 ch. 103, § 4, effective July 15, 2020.

67A.500. Withdrawal from service prior to retirement — Refunds — Forfeitures — Repayment upon reemployment.

  1. Upon withdrawal from service prior to retirement, a member shall be entitled to receive a refund of the amount of contributions made by the member or picked up by the urban-county government pursuant to KRS 67A.510(2) after the date of establishment, without interest. Payments of picked up employee contributions shall be subject to state and federal tax as appropriate.
  2. Any member receiving a refund of contributions shall thereby ipso facto forfeit, waive, and relinquish all accrued rights and benefits in the system, including all credited and creditable service. The board may, in its discretion, regardless of cause, withhold payment of a refund for a period not to exceed six (6) months after receipt of an application from a member.
  3. Any member who has received a refund shall be considered a new member upon subsequent reemployment if such person qualifies for membership under KRS 67A.360 to 67A.690 . Any member who is reemployed after withdrawing from service and who received a refund of contributions shall, within ninety (90) days of his reemployment or prior to retirement, whichever occurs first, make a repayment to the system of the amount or amounts previously received as a refund, including interest at the rate determined by the board to be the actual rate of return on investments made by the board, but not less than three percent (3%) per annum, from the dates of the refund to the date of repayment, compounded annually. Upon the restoration of such refunds, such member shall have reinstated to his account all credited service represented by the refunds of which repayment has been made. Repayment of refunds by any member shall include all refunds received by a member prior to the date of his last withdrawal from service, with interest, and shall be made in a single lump sum payment. Repayments shall not be picked up by the urban-county government. If repayment is not made within the specified time period, the member shall have forever forfeited, waived, and relinquished the right to have reinstated to his account the credited service represented by the refunds for which repayment was not made, but shall not be precluded from purchasing service credit as provided in KRS 67A.402 if the member began participating in the fund prior to March 14, 2013.
  4. Any member who has received, or who is entitled to receive, a refund, but who within six (6) months of becoming entitled to receive such refund, qualifies for membership under the provisions of a fund in effect in another government adopted pursuant to law, shall have the option of paying his refund into such other fund, in which event he shall be deemed a member of such other fund and his account therein shall be credited with all contributions, including those picked up pursuant to KRS 67A.510(2), and service under his original fund.

History. Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 106, § 15, effective July 1, 1974; 1982, ch. 166, § 41, effective July 15, 1982; 2000, ch. 484, § 6, effective July 14, 2000; 2013, ch. 7, § 12, effective March 14, 2013; 2014, ch. 92, § 37, effective January 1, 2015.

Compiler’s Notes.

For this section as effective until January 1, 2015, see preceding section also numbered KRS 67A.500 .

67A.510. Members’ contributions — Picked-up employee contributions.

    1. Each active member shall contribute a sum equal to not less than ten and one-half percent (10.5%) nor more than eleven percent (11%) of current salary, to be determined by the legislative body of the urban-county government, except that: (1) (a) Each active member shall contribute a sum equal to not less than ten and one-half percent (10.5%) nor more than eleven percent (11%) of current salary, to be determined by the legislative body of the urban-county government, except that:
      1. For members whose participation date in the fund is prior to March 14, 2013, the members shall, effective July 1, 2013, contribute a sum equal to twelve percent (12%) of current salary to the fund; and
      2. For members whose participation date in the fund is on or after March 14, 2013, the member shall contribute a sum equal to twelve percent (12%) of current salary to the fund.
    2. The commissioner of finance of the government is hereby authorized to deduct such amount provided by this subsection from the salary paid to each active member during any pay period. This contribution shall be made as a deduction from salary, notwithstanding that the salary paid in cash to such member may be reduced thereby below the established statutory rate. Every member of the fund shall be deemed to consent and agree to the deduction from salary as herein provided, and shall receipt for his full salary, and payment to such member of salary less such deduction shall constitute a full and complete discharge and acquittance of all claims and demand whatsoever for the services rendered by such member during the period covered by such payment, except as to the benefits herein provided. After August 1, 1982, employee contributions shall be picked up by the urban-county government pursuant to subsection (2) of this section.
  1. The urban-county government shall, solely for the purpose of compliance with Section 414(h) of the United States Internal Revenue Code, pick up the employee contributions required by this section for all compensation earned after August 1, 1982, and the contributions so picked up shall be treated as employer contributions in determining tax treatment under the United States Internal Revenue Code and KRS 141.010 . However, the urban-county government shall continue to withhold federal and state income taxes based upon these contributions and hold them in a separate account until the Internal Revenue Service or the federal courts rule that, pursuant to Section 414(h) of the United States Internal Revenue Code, these contributions shall not be included as gross income of the employee until such time as the contributions are distributed or made available to the employee. The picked-up employee contribution shall satisfy all obligations to the retirement fund satisfied prior to August 1, 1982, by the employee contribution, and the picked-up employee contribution shall be in lieu of an employee contribution. The urban-county government shall pay these picked-up employee contributions from the same source of funds which is used to pay earnings to the employee. The employee shall have no option to receive the contributed amounts directly instead of having them paid by the urban-county government to the fund. Employee contributions picked up after August 1, 1982, shall be treated for all purposes of KRS 67A.360 to 67A.690 in the same manner and to the same extent as employee contributions made prior to August 1, 1982.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 106, § 16, effective July 1, 1974; 1980, ch. 329, § 1, effective July 15, 1980; 1982, ch. 166, § 37, effective July 15, 1982; 1990, ch. 189, § 3, effective July 13, 1990; 1990, ch. 476, Pt. VII D, § 646, effective April 11, 1990; 2013, ch. 7, § 13, effective March 14, 2013; 2018 ch. 171, § 71, effective April 14, 2018; 2018 ch. 207, § 71, effective April 27, 2018.

Compiler's Notes.

Section 414(h) of the United States Internal Revenue Code is compiled as 26 USCS § 414(h).

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(4/27/2018). This statute was amended by 2018 Ky. Acts chs. 171 and 207, which do not appear to be in conflict and have been codified together.

Opinions of Attorney General.

Employee contributions to the Policemen’s and Firefighter’s Retirement Fund, which were picked up by the employer pursuant to the provisions of subsection (2) of this section, are required to be tax deferred for Kentucky income tax purposes; members of the fund do not have the option of having their contributions taxed now so that they can have a nontaxable income when they retire. OAG 84-26 .

67A.520. Contributions by government — Injunction or mandamus requiring compliance.

The government shall make annual contributions to the fund toward the annuities and benefits provided by KRS 67A.360 to 67A.690 based upon the results of the annual actuarial valuation of the fund required by KRS 67A.560(6)(c). These contributions by the government shall be equal to the sum of the normal contribution amount and an additional amount to be known as the actuarially accrued liability contribution amount.

  1. For purposes of this section, the normal contribution amount shall be an annual amount that, when combined with all active member contributions to the fund, is sufficient to fund the benefits earned during the year.
  2. For purposes of this section, the actuarially accrued liability contribution amount shall be an annual amount that is sufficient to amortize the total unfunded actuarially accrued liability of the fund over a period of thirty (30) years, using the level-dollar amortization method, for a period beginning July 1, 2013, and ending June 30, 2043. The level-dollar amortization method shall be used to determine the government’s contribution payable on or after July 1, 2013.
  3. The government contribution to the fund computed under this section shall:
    1. Be determined using the entry age normal cost method;
    2. Effective July 1, 2013, and for each fiscal year thereafter, not be less than twenty million dollars ($20,000,000) annually for the thirty (30) year period occurring on or after July 1, 2013, unless the pension fund has an actuarial funding level equal to or greater than one hundred percent (100%) as determined by the actuarial valuation of the fund, in which case, the contribution payable by the government shall be equal to the normal contribution amount specified by this section; and
    3. Be fixed by the board annually, in accordance with this section and based upon the results of the annual actuarial valuation required by KRS 67A.560(6)(c), and shall be in effect for a period of one (1) fiscal year. The board shall notify the government of the rates payable under this section following the board’s acceptance of the actuarial valuation.
  4. In addition to other remedies provided by law, any member of the fund or any annuitant may obtain in the Circuit Court of any county in which the government is located an injunction or mandamus requiring the government to comply with this section.

History. Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 106, § 17, effective July 1, 1974; 1980, ch. 329, § 2, effective July 15, 1980; 1982, ch. 297, § 3, effective July 15, 1982; 1990, ch. 189, § 4, effective July 13, 1990; 2002, ch. 274, § 5, effective July 15, 2002; 2013, ch. 7, § 14, effective March 14, 2013.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. In General.

There is a grammatical flaw in this section, in that it provides that the urban-county government shall make a contribution to the retirement fund which is “equal to the sum” of its four (4) subsections, yet it is readily apparent that the four (4) subsections are not capable of being added together. Gurnee v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Gov't, 6 S.W.3d 852, 1999 Ky. App. LEXIS 26 (Ky. Ct. App. 1999).

2. Application.

In the absence of any other rate set by the Board of Trustees, LFUCG complied with this section by paying the minimum rate provided for in subsection (c). Gurnee v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Gov't, 6 S.W.3d 852, 1999 Ky. App. LEXIS 26 (Ky. Ct. App. 1999).

Circuit court erred in holding that members of a county policemen's and firefighter's retirement fund could not compel the county government to pay any amount it failed to contribute to the fund because the unfunded liability did not double as a running tab for unpaid contributions; any missed contribution on the part of government did not become a part of the unfunded liability that must be paid in 30 years, but rather, if the government did not make such a contribution, it had to do so. Puckett v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Gov't, 524 S.W.3d 467, 2016 Ky. App. LEXIS 196 (Ky. Ct. App. 2016).

Unfunded liability does not double as a running tab for unpaid contributions because the amortization payments addressed a shortfall in the fund's assets that existed by reason of legislative design, namely, a funding scheme that permitted the urban-county government to make minimal contributions and interest-only payments; the payments were not intended to address a shortfall in the fund's assets that existed by reason of noncompliance with its statutory duty to make annual contributions. Puckett v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Gov't, 524 S.W.3d 467, 2016 Ky. App. LEXIS 196 (Ky. Ct. App. 2016).

3. Legislative Intent.

It is apparent that the drafters intended for the government to pay an amount which equals the sum of subsections (1) and (2), or at the least, the minimum contribution contained in subsection (3). Gurnee v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Gov't, 6 S.W.3d 852, 1999 Ky. App. LEXIS 26 (Ky. Ct. App. 1999).

67A.530. Board of trustees to operate fund and direct policies — Membership — How chosen. [Effective until July 15, 2020]

  1. The responsibility for the proper operation of the fund and the direction of its policies shall be vested in a board of trustees of twelve (12) members, consisting of the mayor, the commissioner of public safety, the commissioner of finance, the director of human resources, two (2) retired members of the fund, the chiefs of the police and fire department, and two (2) active members of each department, who shall be elected by ballot by the active members of the respective departments and shall serve for alternating terms of two (2) years under rules adopted by the board. One of the active members representing each department shall be elected on even-numbered years; and the other active member representing the department shall be elected on odd-numbered years. In the event of a vacancy of an elected member, the pension board shall fill the vacancy by appointment until the next regular election.
  2. The retired fund members shall be selected by retired fund members by ballot to serve two (2) year terms. One (1) retired fund member shall be a retired fire department member, and the other shall be a retired police department member. Retired fund members of a department shall submit the names of at least three (3) nominees from their department to the pension board not less than three (3) months before the term of office is due to expire. The retired members of both departments shall have the right to vote for nominees from either department. For the term beginning October 15, 2000, names of nominees from each department shall be submitted to the pension board by no later than August 15, 2000. The pension board shall cause to be prepared an official ballot which shall be distributed to all retired fund members by mail to their last known address. The ballot shall contain the name, address, and former department of each of the candidates. The candidates shall be grouped together by departments for voting purposes and retired fund members shall be instructed to vote for one (1) member from each department. Any ballot marked with more than one (1) vote per department shall be disqualified and not counted. The retiree from either department receiving the most votes shall serve a two (2) year term. The retiree from the other department receiving the most votes shall serve an initial term of one (1) year. Subsequently, retirees elected in alternate years from each department shall serve two (2) years. In the event of vacancy of an elected retired fund member of the board, the retiree receiving the next largest number of votes from the department for which the vacancy exists shall fill the vacancy until the next election for a representative of that retiree’s department. Retired fund members shall vote for one (1) candidate from each department by marking a square opposite the name of the candidate of his choice and returning the marked ballot to the secretary of the pension board. Votes shall be tabulated by a committee of three (3) pension board members appointed by the chairman for that purpose. The tabulating committee shall report in writing to the pension board the results of the election and the name of the retired fund member who shall serve on the board.

History. Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 106, § 18, effective July 1, 1974; 1990, ch. 189, § 5, effective July 13, 1990; 2000, ch. 333, § 1, effective July 14, 2000; 2000, ch. 484, § 7, effective July 14, 2000.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(7/14/2000). This section was amended by 2000 Ky. Acts chs. 333 and 484. Where these Acts are not in conflict, they have been codified together. Where a conflict exists between a change in Acts ch. 484 that is a revisory amendment to delete superseded text and a change in ch. 333 that is nonrevisory and substantive in nature, Acts ch. 333 has been allowed to prevail. Cf. KRS 7.136(3).

Opinions of Attorney General.

This section gives the member of city’s retirement fund board representing the retired members the right to participate in and vote on matters before the board affecting retirees; he is authorized to represent his constituents, the retirees, and his interests are in common with that group; the fact that the retired board member also serves as an officer of a private group representing retirees does not automatically disqualify him from membership on the board of the pension and retirement fund. OAG 91-104 .

67A.530. Board of trustees to operate fund and direct policies — Membership — How chosen. [Effective July 15, 2020]

  1. The responsibility for the proper operation of the fund and the direction of its policies shall be vested in a board of trustees of twelve (12) members, consisting of the mayor, the commissioner of public safety, the commissioner of finance, the director of human resources, two (2) retired members of the fund, the chiefs of the police and fire department, and two (2) active members of each department, who shall be elected by ballot by the active members of the respective departments and shall serve for alternating terms of two (2) years under rules adopted by the board. One of the active members representing each department shall be elected on even-numbered years; and the other active member representing the department shall be elected on odd-numbered years. In the event of a vacancy of an elected member, the pension board shall fill the vacancy by appointment until the next regular election.
  2. The retired fund members shall be selected by retired fund members by ballot to serve two (2) year terms. One (1) retired fund member shall be a retired fire department member, and the other shall be a retired police department member. Retired fund members of a department shall submit the names of at least three (3) nominees from their department to the pension board not less than three (3) months before the term of office is due to expire. The retired members of each department shall have the right to vote for nominees of the department from which the member retired. For the term beginning October 15, 2000, names of nominees from each department shall be submitted to the pension board by no later than August 15, 2000, and August 15 of each subsequent election year. The pension board shall cause to be prepared an official ballot of the retired nominees for each respective department, which shall be distributed to all retired fund members from each respective department from which the member retired by mail to their last known address. The ballot shall contain the name and address of each of the candidates. Retired fund members shall be instructed to vote for one (1) nominee. Any ballot marked with more than one (1) vote per ballot shall be disqualified and not counted. In the event of vacancy of an elected retired fund member of the board, the retiree receiving the next largest number of votes from the department for which the vacancy exists shall fill the vacancy until the next election for a representative of that retiree’s department. Retired fund members shall vote for one (1) candidate from the department from which the member retired by marking a square opposite the name of the candidate of his or her choice and returning the marked ballot to the secretary of the pension board. Votes shall be tabulated by a committee of three (3) pension board members appointed by the chairman for that purpose. The tabulating committee shall report in writing to the pension board the results of the election and the name of the retired fund member who shall serve on the board.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 106, § 18, effective July 1, 1974; 1990, ch. 189, § 5, effective July 13, 1990; 2000, ch. 333, § 1, effective July 14, 2000; 2000, ch. 484, § 7, effective July 14, 2000; 2020 ch. 103, § 5, effective July 15, 2020.

67A.540. Election among active members — Certification of vote.

  1. Subject to the foregoing provisions, there shall be held on the first Wednesday after the first Tuesday of September of each year an election among the active members for trustee of the fund.
  2. On or before August 10 preceding, nominations for candidates in the election shall be filed with the chief of the police department and the chief of the fire department. The nominations shall be in writing and shall be signed by not less than twenty-five percent (25%) of the members. Within five (5) days after the close of nominations, the chiefs of the respective departments shall certify in writing to all districts and bureaus of the departments the names of those placed in nomination.
  3. On the first Wednesday after the first Tuesday in September beginning at the hour of 12 noon on Wednesday and continuing thereafter for a forty-eight (48) hour period, an election shall be held under the supervision of the commanding officers of the districts and bureaus. Each member shall vote at the district or bureau of which he is a member, except those members who are not assigned to a specific district or bureau, who shall vote at the office of the chief of police or chief of the fire department, as the case may be. At the close of voting, the commanding officer of each district or bureau, shall in the presence of the nominees or their duly authorized agents, open the ballot box and count the votes. He shall then make a certificate of the count and send the certificate with the ballots in a sealed envelope to the mayor, who shall, on the following Wednesday, open all the certificates so received and after counting all the returns, certify the result to the board. On the third Wednesday after the first Tuesday in September the candidate or candidates receiving the most votes shall assume office.

History. Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 106, § 19, effective July 1, 1974.

67A.550. Duties of board.

In addition to other duties provided in KRS 67A.360 to 67A.690 , the board shall:

  1. Establish and maintain an office in the facilities provided by the government for the meetings of the board and the keeping of the books, accounts, and records of the fund; hold regular meetings monthly, and such special meetings as may be deemed necessary; and keep a full record of all of its proceedings, which shall be open to inspection by the public;
  2. Provide for the installation of a system of accounts and records that will give full effect to the requirements of KRS 67A.360 to 67A.690 ; adopt all necessary actuarial tables to be used in the operation of the fund; and provide for the compilation of such statistical and financial data as may be required for actuarial valuations, periodic surveys, and calculations;
  3. Obtain such information from the participating members and the government as shall be necessary for the proper operation of the fund;
  4. Consider and pass upon all applications for annuities, benefits, refunds and other payments, and authorize the expenditure for such purposes, in accordance with the provisions hereof. The board shall have authority to promulgate such rules and regulations, not inconsistent with the provisions of KRS 67A.360 to 67A.690 , necessary for the proper determination of all claims before it;
  5. Accept any gift, grant, or bequest of any money or property of any kind, for the purposes designated by the grantor if such purposes are specified as providing cash benefits to some or all of the members or annuitants of the fund; if no such purposes are designated, the same shall be credited to the account representing income from investments; and
  6. Have the accounts of the fund audited in accordance with Government Auditing Standards, issued by the Comptroller General of the United States, as of the end of each fiscal year, by a competent accountant, and submit the audit report to the government with other financial or statistical data as are necessary for a proper interpretation of the condition of the fund and the results of its operations. The board shall also cause to be published for distribution among the members a synopsis of such report.

History. Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 106, § 20, effective July 1, 1974; 1996, ch. 311, § 2, effective July 15, 1996.

67A.560. Board officers — Treasurer — Legal adviser — Actuarial assistance — Rules and regulations. [Effective until July 15, 2020]

  1. The officers of the board shall consist of a president, vice president, and a secretary. The president shall be the chief executive officer of the board, shall preside at all meetings and shall appoint all necessary committees. The vice president shall serve as president in the absence of the president.
  2. The board shall designate a secretary who may be a member of the board and shall fix the secretary’s compensation. The secretary shall keep a full account of all proceedings of the board and shall give notice of all meetings and give effect to all resolutions, orders, and directives of the board. The secretary shall be in charge of the detailed affairs of administration of the fund; shall keep the record of proceedings of all meetings; shall keep all books, files, records, and accounts of the fund; shall receive all applications for annuities, benefits, and refunds; shall prepare periodic reports relative to the financial operations of the fund for the information of the board and its membership; shall compile all statistics pertinent to the operations of the fund; and shall answer all correspondence received by the board.
  3. The commissioner of finance shall be ex officio treasurer of the board and custodian of the fund. The commissioner shall have custody of all cash and securities of the fund, subject to the authority and directives of the board, and shall keep such accounts and records as may be prescribed by the board. These accounts and records shall be subject to inspection of the board or any member thereof.
  4. The commissioner of finance shall, within ten (10) days after his or her selection, execute a bond to the board, with good surety, in such penal sum as the board directs, to be approved by the board, conditioned upon the faithful performance of the duties of the office, and that the commissioner shall safely keep and shall truthfully account for all money and properties that come into his or her hands as treasurer of the fund, and that upon the expiration of his or her term of office, he or she shall deliver to his or her successor all securities, unexpended moneys, and other properties that come into his or her hands as treasurer of the fund. The bond shall be filed with the secretary of the board, and suit thereon may be filed in the name of the board for use of the board or any person injured by its breach. The premium on said bond may be paid out of the fund.
  5. The commissioner of law of the government shall serve as legal adviser to the board, except that the board shall have the power to hire independent counsel, the cost of such independent counsel to be borne by the pension fund.
    1. The board shall employ actuarial assistance from time to time to advise it in matters relating to the technical aspects of operations of the fund, to assist in the preparation of the periodic financial reports, to conduct the annual actuarial valuation of the fund, to determine the government’s contribution as provided by KRS 67A.520 , and to make periodic analyses of the operation of the fund. (6) (a) The board shall employ actuarial assistance from time to time to advise it in matters relating to the technical aspects of operations of the fund, to assist in the preparation of the periodic financial reports, to conduct the annual actuarial valuation of the fund, to determine the government’s contribution as provided by KRS 67A.520 , and to make periodic analyses of the operation of the fund.
    2. Within six (6) months after the establishment of an urban-county form of government, an actuarial study shall be made for the purpose of recommending rates, mortality, disability, retirement, separations from service, and other essential factors.
    3. Beginning with the fiscal year ending June 30, 2013, and each fiscal year thereafter, an actuarial valuation of the fund shall be completed by the actuary employed by the fund. The valuation shall include a description of the actuarial assumptions used and descriptive statistics on the actuarial health of the fund, and shall determine the government’s contribution in accordance with KRS 67A.520. Actuarial assumptions used in the fund’s valuation shall be reasonably related to the experience of the fund and represent the actuary’s best estimate of anticipated experience.
    4. At least once every five (5) years, the board shall cause an actuarial experience study of the fund to be completed by the actuary employed by the board. The actuarial experience study shall include a review of actuarial assumptions, actuarial tables, and actuarial funding methods used in the actuarial valuation. Based upon the results of the experience study, the actuary employed by the fund shall recommend the actuarial assumptions, actuarial tables, and actuarial funding methods to be adopted by the board.
    5. In the event the actuarial valuation or actuarial experience study is not undertaken as provided by this subsection, any member of the fund or any annuitant may obtain an injunction or mandamus requiring the actuarial valuation or actuarial experience study be completed, or may obtain the appointment of a person or persons to complete the actuarial valuation or actuarial experience study, from the Circuit Court of any county in which the government is located.
  6. The board shall establish rules and regulations to implement the provisions of KRS 67A.360 to 67A.690 which shall not be inconsistent therewith.

History. Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 106, § 21, effective July 1, 1974; 1982, ch. 297, § 4, effective July 15, 1982; 1984, ch. 24, § 4, effective July 13, 1984; 1990, ch. 189, § 6, effective July 13, 1990; 2000, ch. 484, § 8, effective July 14, 2000; 2006, ch. 144, § 10, effective April 4, 2006; 2013, ch. 7, § 15, effective March 14, 2013.

67A.560. Board officers — Treasurer — Legal adviser — Actuarial assistance — Rules and regulations — Legislative intent to conform with applicable federal statutes, regulations , and published guidance. [Effective July 15, 2020]

  1. The officers of the board shall consist of a president, vice president, and a secretary. The president shall be the chief executive officer of the board, shall preside at all meetings and shall appoint all necessary committees. The vice president shall serve as president in the absence of the president.
  2. The board shall designate a secretary who may be a member of the board and shall fix the secretary’s compensation. The secretary shall keep a full account of all proceedings of the board and shall give notice of all meetings and give effect to all resolutions, orders, and directives of the board. The secretary shall be in charge of the detailed affairs of administration of the fund; shall keep the record of proceedings of all meetings; shall keep all books, files, records, and accounts of the fund; shall receive all applications for annuities, benefits, and refunds; shall prepare periodic reports relative to the financial operations of the fund for the information of the board and its membership; shall compile all statistics pertinent to the operations of the fund; and shall answer all correspondence received by the board.
  3. The commissioner of finance shall be ex officio treasurer of the board and custodian of the fund. The commissioner shall have custody of all cash and securities of the fund, subject to the authority and directives of the board, and shall keep such accounts and records as may be prescribed by the board. These accounts and records shall be subject to inspection of the board or any member thereof.
  4. The commissioner of finance shall, within ten (10) days after his or her selection, execute a bond to the board, with good surety, in such penal sum as the board directs, to be approved by the board, conditioned upon the faithful performance of the duties of the office, and that the commissioner shall safely keep and shall truthfully account for all money and properties that come into his or her hands as treasurer of the fund, and that upon the expiration of his or her term of office, he or she shall deliver to his or her successor all securities, unexpended moneys, and other properties that come into his or her hands as treasurer of the fund. The bond shall be filed with the secretary of the board, and suit thereon may be filed in the name of the board for use of the board or any person injured by its breach. The premium on said bond may be paid out of the fund.
  5. The commissioner of law of the government shall serve as legal adviser to the board, except that the board shall have the power to hire independent counsel, the cost of such independent counsel to be borne by the pension fund.
    1. The board shall employ actuarial assistance from time to time to advise it in matters relating to the technical aspects of operations of the fund, to assist in the preparation of the periodic financial reports, to conduct the annual actuarial valuation of the fund, to determine the government’s contribution as provided by KRS 67A.520 , and to make periodic analyses of the operation of the fund. (6) (a) The board shall employ actuarial assistance from time to time to advise it in matters relating to the technical aspects of operations of the fund, to assist in the preparation of the periodic financial reports, to conduct the annual actuarial valuation of the fund, to determine the government’s contribution as provided by KRS 67A.520 , and to make periodic analyses of the operation of the fund.
    2. Within six (6) months after the establishment of an urban-county form of government, an actuarial study shall be made for the purpose of recommending rates, mortality, disability, retirement, separations from service, and other essential factors.
    3. Beginning with the fiscal year ending June 30, 2013, and each fiscal year thereafter, an actuarial valuation of the fund shall be completed by the actuary employed by the fund. The valuation shall include a description of the actuarial assumptions used and descriptive statistics on the actuarial health of the fund, and shall determine the government’s contribution in accordance with KRS 67A.520. Actuarial assumptions used in the fund’s valuation shall be reasonably related to the experience of the fund and represent the actuary’s best estimate of anticipated experience.
    4. At least once every five (5) years, the board shall cause an actuarial experience study of the fund to be completed by the actuary employed by the board. The actuarial experience study shall include a review of actuarial assumptions, actuarial tables, and actuarial funding methods used in the actuarial valuation. Based upon the results of the experience study, the actuary employed by the fund shall recommend the actuarial assumptions, actuarial tables, and actuarial funding methods to be adopted by the board.
    5. In the event the actuarial valuation or actuarial experience study is not undertaken as provided by this subsection, any member of the fund or any annuitant may obtain an injunction or mandamus requiring the actuarial valuation or actuarial experience study be completed, or may obtain the appointment of a person or persons to complete the actuarial valuation or actuarial experience study, from the Circuit Court of any county in which the government is located.
  6. The board shall establish rules and regulations to implement the provisions of KRS 67A.360 to 67A.690 which shall not be inconsistent therewith. Notwithstanding any other evidence of legislative intent, it is hereby declared to be the controlling legislative intent that the provisions of KRS 67A.360 to 67A.690 conform with federal statutes or regulations and meet the qualification requirements under 26 U.S.C. sec. 401(a) , applicable federal regulations, and other published guidance. Provisions of KRS 67A.360 to 67A.690 which conflict with federal statutes or regulations or qualification under 26 U.S.C. sec. 401(a) , applicable federal regulations, and other published guidance shall not be available. The board shall have the authority to promulgate regulations to conform with federal statutes and regulations and to meet the qualification requirements under 26 U.S.C. sec 401(a).

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 106, § 21, effective July 1, 1974; 1982, ch. 297, § 4, effective July 15, 1982; 1984, ch. 24, § 4, effective July 13, 1984; 1990, ch. 189, § 6, effective July 13, 1990; 2000, ch. 484, § 8, effective July 14, 2000; 2006, ch. 144, § 10, effective April 4, 2006; 2013, ch. 7, § 15, effective March 14, 2013; 2020 ch. 103, § 6, effective July 15, 2020.

67A.570. Investments.

The board may invest the moneys accruing to the fund, in interest-bearing bonds of any county, urban-county government or city in this Commonwealth, or in any securities in which trustees are permitted to invest trust funds under the laws of this Commonwealth, or in international or other securities as permitted under federal law. Such bonds shall be registered in the name of the board to the extent possible. The securities acquired by the board shall be deposited with the commissioner of finance and shall be subject to the order of the board. The board may at the cost of the pension fund employ or engage consultants to provide investment advice to aid the board in its determinations.

History. Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 106, § 22, effective July 1, 1974; 1984, ch. 24, § 5, effective July 13, 1984; 1990, ch. 189, § 7, effective July 13, 1990; 2006, ch. 144, § 11, effective April 4, 2006; 2014, ch. 92, § 38, effective January 1, 2015.

Compiler’s Notes.

For this section as effective until January 1, 2015, see preceding section also numbered KRS 67A.570 .

67A.580. Accounts and records — Reserve accounts.

  1. An adequate system of accounts and records shall be established and maintained for the fund that will reflect fully the requirements of the provisions of KRS 67A.360 to 67A.690 . This system shall be integrated, to the extent possible with the accounts, records, and procedures of the government to the end that the same shall operate most effectively and at minimum expense, and that duplication of records and accounts may be avoided.
  2. All assets of the fund shall be credited according to the purposes for which they are held in the following designated reserve accounts:
    1. Members’ Contribution Reserve. The amounts contributed by the members, including those picked up pursuant to KRS 67A.510(2), shall be credited to this reserve, together with regular interest thereon as herein provided. An individual account shall be maintained for each member, to which shall be credited the amounts of his contributions or amounts picked up by the urban-county government. Upon the granting of a service retirement annuity, disability annuity, or survivor’s annuity or benefit, the accumulated contributions to the credit of the member concerned shall be transferred from this reserve to the retirement reserve. Refunds and death payments representing member’s contributions shall be charged to this reserve.
    2. Employer’s Contribution Reserve. The amounts contributed by the government under the provisions hereof, for service retirement annuity, disability retirement annuity, and benefits to survivors covering membership service and prior service, shall be credited to this reserve. Upon the granting of a service retirement annuity, disability retirement annuity, or survivor’s benefit, an amount representing the excess of the actuarial value of the annuity, or benefit over the accumulated contributions of the member, shall be transferred from this reserve to the retirement reserve.
    3. Retirement Reserve. Upon the granting of a service retirement annuity, disability retirement annuity, or survivor’s benefit, the accumulated contributions of the member, including those picked up pursuant to KRS 67A.510(2), and an amount representing the excess of the actuarial value of the annuity or benefit over such accumulated contributions, shall be transferred to this reserve from the member’s contribution reserve and employer’s contribution reserve, respectively. All income from investments, including gains on investment transactions, shall be credited to this reserve. All losses on investments shall be charged to this reserve. All payments on account of any annuity made by the fund shall be charged to this reserve. Any deficiency in this reserve shall be removed by an increase in the amount of government’s contributions for future membership service.

History. Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 106, § 23, effective July 1, 1974; 1982, ch. 166, § 42, effective July 15, 1982; 2002, ch. 274, § 6, effective July 15, 2002; 2013, ch. 7, § 16, effective March 14, 2013.

67A.590. Payment of moneys from fund.

  1. The officers of the government designated by law to draw warrants on the government treasury, shall on request in writing by the board, draw warrants on the commissioner of finance, payable to the treasurer of the board, against moneys of the fund.
  2. Moneys ordered paid from the fund to any person shall be paid by the treasurer only, upon warrant signed by the president of the board and countersigned by the secretary. No warrant shall be drawn except by order of the board duly entered on the record of proceedings of the board.

History. Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 106, § 24, effective July 1, 1974; 1990, ch. 189, § 8, effective July 13, 1990.

67A.600. Fund to supersede prior pension funds — Increase in retirement annuity.

  1. It is the intention of KRS 67A.360 to 67A.690 that the fund herein created shall supersede and take the place of the pension fund established under KRS 95.851 to 95.884 inclusive, for cities becoming urban-county governments, which sections shall be without force and effect, insofar as applicable to such urban-county governments.
  2. The fund created by KRS 67A.360 to 67A.690 shall succeed to and assume as of July 1, 1974, all assets of such pension funds, and shall continue to make payment of all annuities, pensions, and benefits granted by superseded pension funds at the rates previously fixed and under the conditions previously in effect, except as provided in subsection (3) of this section.
    1. Persons who retired under the provisions of KRS 95.520 to 95.620 , or 95.851 to 95.884 in a city which subsequently was merged into an urban-county government, or their surviving spouses or eligible children, shall receive an upward adjustment in their retirement or survivor’s annuity by calculation of a two percent (2%) annual increase compounded, from July 1, 1974, until July 15, 1980, and annual increases compounded, from July 15, 1980, until July 15, 1990, in the same percentage amount by which the pension board increased other pensions pursuant to KRS 67A.690(1) for those same years. The survivor’s annuity shall be determined as if the retired member’s annuity had been increased annually by two percent (2%) compounded from July 1, 1974, until July 15, 1980, and annual increases compounded, from July 15, 1980, until July 15, 1990, in the same percentage amount by which the pension board increased other pensions pursuant to KRS 67A.690(1) for those same years. For purposes of calculation, the member’s or survivor’s first increase shall occur July 1, 1974, but only after the member was retired for one (1) year or attained age fifty-one (51), whichever was later, or would have been retired one (1) year or reached the age of fifty-one (51), whichever was later, in the event the member died before being retired one (1) year or reaching the age of fifty-one (51), unless retirement was under disability, in which case age and length of retirement criteria shall not apply. (3) (a) Persons who retired under the provisions of KRS 95.520 to 95.620 , or 95.851 to 95.884 in a city which subsequently was merged into an urban-county government, or their surviving spouses or eligible children, shall receive an upward adjustment in their retirement or survivor’s annuity by calculation of a two percent (2%) annual increase compounded, from July 1, 1974, until July 15, 1980, and annual increases compounded, from July 15, 1980, until July 15, 1990, in the same percentage amount by which the pension board increased other pensions pursuant to KRS 67A.690(1) for those same years. The survivor’s annuity shall be determined as if the retired member’s annuity had been increased annually by two percent (2%) compounded from July 1, 1974, until July 15, 1980, and annual increases compounded, from July 15, 1980, until July 15, 1990, in the same percentage amount by which the pension board increased other pensions pursuant to KRS 67A.690(1) for those same years. For purposes of calculation, the member’s or survivor’s first increase shall occur July 1, 1974, but only after the member was retired for one (1) year or attained age fifty-one (51), whichever was later, or would have been retired one (1) year or reached the age of fifty-one (51), whichever was later, in the event the member died before being retired one (1) year or reaching the age of fifty-one (51), unless retirement was under disability, in which case age and length of retirement criteria shall not apply.
    2. After calculation of the new annuity level, persons affected by this section shall be granted the same annual increase granted to retirees pursuant to KRS 67A.690(1), and the annuity on which this cost-of-living increment is based shall be the annuity level reached through the addition of annual compounded increases calculated pursuant to paragraph (a) of this subsection. If the member has not attained the age of fifty-one (51) or would not have attained the age of fifty-one (51) in the event the member is deceased, then the member or survivor shall receive increases of two percent (2%) compounded annually until the member attains or would have attained age fifty-one (51), at which time the same annual increase granted to retirees who retired pursuant to KRS 67A.690(1) shall apply. In addition, each annuitant or surviving spouse or eligible child shall receive a one-time lump-sum payment of five hundred dollars ($500).
  3. The provisions of subsection (3) of this section shall not apply to any retiree or surviving spouse who receives a minimum retirement annuity, annually adjusted, pursuant to 1972 Acts Chapter 185, Section 1, but each such retiree or surviving spouse shall receive a one-time lump-sum payment of five hundred dollars ($500). If, in the future, any retiree or spouse annuity granted pursuant to this section falls below the adjusted minimum annuity, the affected retiree or spouse shall be granted, from that time forward, the adjusted minimum annuity calculated pursuant to 1972 Acts Chapter 185, Section 1.

History. Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 106, § 25, effective July 1, 1974; 1980, ch. 188, § 47, effective July 15, 1980; 1988, ch. 353, § 1, effective July 15, 1988; 1990, ch. 189, § 10, effective July 13, 1990; 2014, ch. 92, § 39, effective January 1, 2015.

Compiler’s Notes.

For this section as effective until January 1, 2015, see preceding section also numbered KRS 67A.600 .

67A.610. Member deemed to authorize deductions for contributions — Picked-up employee contributions.

Each member shall, by virtue of the payment of contributions to the fund, receive a vested interest in such contributions, and in consideration of such vested interest, shall be conclusively deemed to undertake and agree to pay the same and to have the amounts deducted from his salary as herein provided. After August 1, 1982, employee contributions shall be picked up by the urban-county government pursuant to KRS 67A.510(2).

History. Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 106, § 26, effective July 1, 1974; 1982, ch. 166, § 43, effective July 15, 1982.

67A.620. Benefits nonassignable — Not to be attached except for child support.

The right to a retirement annuity, disability annuity, survivor’s annuity or benefit, death benefit, or any other benefit under the provision hereof, by whatever name called, or refund, is personal with the recipient thereof, and the assignment, garnishment, execution, or transfer of such benefit or any part thereof shall be void, except as herein provided. Any such annuity, benefit, or refund shall not answer for debts contracted by the person receiving the same, and it is the intention of this section that they shall not be attached or affected by any judicial proceeding, except for court or administratively ordered current child support, or owed child support, or to-be-owed child support.

History. Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 106, § 27, effective July 1, 1974; 1990, ch. 189, § 9, effective July 13, 1990; 1998, ch. 255, § 33, effective July 15, 1998.

Opinions of Attorney General.

Based upon the principle that a child support obligation is not to be considered as an ordinary contractual debt, but a moral obligation imposed by the state, and that the policy of KRS Chapter 67A is to provide benefits for the fund’s member as well as his or her dependents, such benefits may be subject to attachment, assignment, or garnishment for purposes of enforcing a child support order. OAG 91-158 .

67A.630. Payment of annuities.

Any service retirement annuity, disability retirement annuity, or any other annuity provided herein shall be payable in equal monthly installments as life annuities, and shall not be increased, decreased, revoked, or repealed, except for error, or except where specifically otherwise provided. The cost of providing death benefits for members in receipt of retirement annuities shall not be construed as a reduction in the life annuity payable to the member. The first payment of an annuity shall be made for the fraction of a month elapsing until the end of the first month; and the last payment shall be made as of the end of the month in which death occurs.

History. Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 106, § 28, effective July 1, 1974.

67A.640. Obligations of government.

It is the intention of KRS 67A.360 to 67A.690 that the payment of the required contributions by the government shall include all allowances, annuities, benefits, and administration expenses and shall be the obligation of the government.

History. Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 106, § 29, effective July 1, 1974.

Opinions of Attorney General.

Expenses incurred by a board of trustees with respect to administering the retirement fund should be paid out of the urban-county government’s required contribution to the fund. OAG 77-441 .

67A.650. Change in form of government, class, or other status not to affect coverage.

Any government covered by KRS 67A.360 to 67A.690 , which may subsequently change its form of government or its class or other status, shall continue to be covered by KRS 67A.360 to 67A.690 .

History. Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 106, § 30, effective July 1, 1974.

67A.655. Transition to County Employees Retirement System.

The legislative body in an urban-county government may issue the appropriate order, pursuant to KRS 78.530(1), directing participation for policemen and firefighters in the County Employees Retirement System. All new employees who would have been granted membership in the policemen’s and firefighter’s retirement fund of the urban-county government shall be members of the County Employees Retirement System. All active members of the policemen’s and firefighter’s retirement fund of the urban-county government at the time of transition to the County Employees Retirement System may choose membership in the County Employees Retirement System or may retain membership in the local retirement fund, but the legislative body may withdraw its order prior to the effective date if the number of active members choosing to transfer is not sufficient to fully fund the balance of the cost of transition after available local pension assets are included. The urban-county government shall elect the alternate participation plan, pursuant to KRS 78.530(3), for active members who transfer to the County Employees Retirement System. Notwithstanding the provisions of KRS 78.530(3)(b), the urban-county government may, at its option, extend the payment period for the cost of alternate participation to a maximum of thirty (30) years with the interest at the rate actuarially assumed by the County Employees Retirement System board. The urban-county government shall have the right to use assets in the local pension fund, other than those assets, as determined by actuarial valuation, necessary to pay benefits to the remaining active members of the local retirement fund and retirees and their survivors, to assist in the payment of the annual installment cost of alternate participation. The County Employees Retirement System employee contribution shall be made as a deduction from salary, and payment to the member of salary less this deduction shall constitute a full and complete discharge and acquittance of all claims and demands whatsoever for the services rendered by the member during the period covered by the payment. All policemen and firefighters who become members of the County Employees Retirement System pursuant to this section shall be granted hazardous duty coverage.

History. Enact. Acts 1994, ch. 371, § 1, effective July 15, 1994; 2016 ch. 31, § 3, effective July 15, 2016.

67A.660. Rehearing by board. [Effective until July 15, 2020]

After a determination has been made on any application by the board, any interested person may, within twenty (20) days after notice of the determination or finding of the board, apply for a rehearing with respect to any of the matters determined by the board. The application shall specify the matter of which a rehearing is sought. The board shall fix the time for the rehearing within twenty (20) days after the same is filed with the secretary of the board, in no event to be less than sixty (60) days from the date the application is filed unless otherwise agreed by the parties. Upon the rehearing a complete transcript shall be made of all evidence presented. The cost of such transcript shall be borne equally by the applicant for the rehearing and the board. Upon rehearing, the board may change, modify, vacate or affirm its previous order upon said application and enter such an order as it deems necessary.

History. Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 106, § 31, effective July 1, 1974.

67A.660. Rehearing by board. [Effective July 15, 2020]

After a determination has been made on any application by the board, any interested person may, within twenty (20) days after notice of the determination or finding of the board, apply for a rehearing with respect to any of the matters determined by the board. The application shall specify the matter of which a rehearing is sought. The board shall fix the time for the rehearing at the board’s next scheduled regular meeting held after the same is filed with the secretary of the board, in no event to be less than sixty (60) days from the date the application is filed unless otherwise agreed by the parties. Upon the rehearing a complete transcript shall be made of all evidence presented. The cost of such transcript shall be borne equally by the applicant for the rehearing and the board. Upon rehearing, the board may change, modify, vacate or affirm its previous order upon said application and enter such an order as it deems necessary.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 106, § 31, effective July 1, 1974; 2020 ch. 103, § 7, effective July 15, 2020.

67A.670. Appeal to circuit court.

  1. The order or determination of the board upon the rehearing shall be conclusive and binding, but any interested party may, within twenty (20) days after the rendition of the order of the board, by petition appeal to the Circuit Court of the county in which the urban-county government is located for a review of the order of the board.
  2. The petition shall state fully the grounds upon which a review is sought, assign all errors relied on and be verified by the petitioner who shall furnish a copy to the board at the time of the filing of the same. Summons shall be issued directing the board to answer within twenty (20) days and directing the board to send the original record to the circuit clerk certifying that such record is the entire original record of the rehearing which shall be filed by the clerk of the Circuit Court and such record shall then become and be considered by the Circuit Court on the review. The appeal provided for herein shall not be considered effective unless the person making the appeal has paid to the board one-half (1/2) of the cost of the transcript of the record of the rehearing within the period provided for making the appeal.
  3. No new nor additional evidence may be introduced in the Circuit Court except as to fraud or misconduct of some person engaged in the administration of KRS 67A.360 to 67A.690 , and affecting the order, decision or determination appealed from, but the court shall otherwise hear the cause upon the record as certified by the board and shall dispose of the cause in summary manner, its review being limited to determining whether or not:
    1. The board acted without or in excess of its powers;
    2. The order, decision or determination was procured by fraud;
    3. The order, decision or determination of the board is not in conformity with the provisions of KRS 67A.360 to 67A.690 ;
    4. If findings of fact are in issue the party seeking to set aside any order, decision or determination of the board shall have the burden of proof to show by clear and satisfactory evidence that the order, decision or determination is unreasonable or unlawful. If upon appeal as herein provided, the order, decision or determination of the board is reversed the party perfecting the appeal shall be refunded by the board his portion of the costs paid for the transcript of the record made on the rehearing.
  4. The board and each interested party may appear before the Circuit Court. The court shall enter judgment affirming, modifying or setting aside the order, decision or determination appealed from, or in its discretion remand the cause to the board for further proceedings in conformity with the direction of the court. The court may, before judgment and upon a sufficient showing of fact, remand the cause to the board.

History. Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 106, § 32, effective July 1, 1974.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Circuit Court's Subject-Matter Jurisdiction.

Court of Appeals erred in granting a petition for a writ of prohibition to the board of trustees of an urban county government policemen's and firefighter's retirement fund to prohibit the circuit court from considering a police officer's petition for review of the denial of his claim for disability benefits because the circuit court was clearly vested by statute with subject-matter jurisdiction to review of the board's decision notwithstanding the flaws of the initial pleading, there was no claim that the board would suffer great injustice and irreparable injury if the writ were not granted, the orderly administration of justice would not suffer, and no substantial miscarriage of justice would occur. Spears v. Goodwine, 490 S.W.3d 347, 2016 Ky. LEXIS 253 ( Ky. 2016 ).

Cited in:

Spears v. Bd. of Trs. of the Lexington-Fayette Urban Cty. Gov't Policemen's & Firefighters' Ret. Fund, 2018 Ky. App. LEXIS 330 (Ky. Ct. App. Sept. 28, 2018).

Opinions of Attorney General.

A person whose initial disability pension request was denied may file another application at any time if subsequent facts and circumstances result in his becoming totally disabled at some point in the future. OAG 77-120 .

This section provides that an appeal of the board’s determination may be made within 20 days to the Circuit Court; however, if no timely appeal is made the specific claim on the basis of that particular fact situation is concluded, but if a person is reassigned to another job within the department and subsequently develops an additional disability which prohibits him from performing his job at that time or if he simply cannot perform his new job at that time because of the original disability, a new claim could be presented to the board; before a disability pension could be granted, however, the applicant would have to satisfy at that time the legal definition of total disability on the basis of new medical examinations and evidence and such other new evidence as he might elect to present and the key is the person’s condition at that time and whether he is totally disabled at that time. OAG 77-120 .

67A.680. Appeal to Court of Appeals.

  1. The judgment of the Circuit Court shall be subject to appeal to the Court of Appeals. The scope of review by the Court of Appeals shall include all matters subject to review by the Circuit Court and also errors of law arising in the Circuit Court and upon appeal made reviewable by the Rules of Procedure.
  2. The procedure as to appeal to the Court of Appeals shall be the same as in civil actions so far as it is applicable to and shall not conflict with the provisions of KRS 67A.360 to 67A.690 .

History. Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 106, § 33, effective July 1, 1974.

67A.690. Increase in retirement annuity.

    1. The increase in retirement annuities provided and authorized by paragraphs (b) and (c) of this subsection shall be provided when: (1) (a) The increase in retirement annuities provided and authorized by paragraphs (b) and (c) of this subsection shall be provided when:
      1. A member who retired prior to July 1, 2013, has been retired for one (1) year or attained forty-seven (47) years of age, whichever is later;
      2. The member would have been retired for one (1) year or attained forty-seven (47) years of age, whichever is later, in the event the member died prior to July 1, 2013;
      3. A member who retires on or after July 1, 2013, has been retired five (5) years or attained fifty (50) years of age, whichever is sooner; or
      4. The member would have been retired for five (5) years or attained fifty (50) years of age, whichever is sooner, in the event the member dies on or after July 1, 2013.
    2. Except as provided by paragraph (c) of this subsection, for each member, widow, or dependent child who is eligible for an increase in retirement annuities as provided by paragraph (a) of this subsection, the board shall increase his or her retirement annuity by:
      1. Two percent (2%) per year, compounded annually, if the member, widow, or dependent child is receiving an annualized retirement annuity of less than forty thousand dollars ($40,000);
      2. One and one-half percent (1.5%) per year, compounded annually, if the member, widow, or dependent child is receiving an annualized retirement annuity of at least forty thousand dollars ($40,000) but less than seventy-five thousand dollars ($75,000); or
      3. One percent (1%) per year, compounded annually, if the member, widow, or dependent child is receiving an annualized retirement annuity equal to or greater than seventy-five thousand dollars ($75,000), except that no member, widow, or dependent child receiving an annualized retirement annuity equal to or greater than one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000) shall receive an increase in his or her retirement annuity until January 1, 2016.
    3. If the fund has an actuarial funding level greater than eighty-five percent (85%), as determined by the most recently completed actuarial valuation of the fund, the board shall, in lieu of the increase provided by paragraph (b) of this subsection, increase retirement annuities for members, widows, and dependent children as follows, provided the increase meets the requirements of paragraph (d) of this subsection:
      1. For members whose participation date in the fund is prior to March 14, 2013, who are eligible for an increase in retirement annuities as provided by paragraph (a) of this subsection, the board may increase retirement annuities by an amount not less than two percent (2%) nor more than five percent (5%) per year, compounded annually;
      2. For members whose participation date in the fund is on or after March 14, 2013, who are eligible for an increase in retirement annuities as provided by paragraph (a) of this subsection, the board may increase retirement annuities by an amount not more than three percent (3%) per year, compounded annually; and
      3. Increases provided under this paragraph shall be in lieu of the increases provided under paragraph (b) of this subsection.
    4. The board shall determine annually whether an increase in retirement annuities can be provided under paragraph (c) of this subsection. No increase in retirement annuities shall be provided under paragraph (c) of this subsection, if the increase in retirement annuities will reduce the actuarial funding level of the fund below eighty-five percent (85%).
  1. Beginning July 1, 2001, notwithstanding any other provision to the contrary, any member, retired prior to July 1, 2013, under occupational disability, as provided in KRS 67A.460 , or nonoccupational disability shall be entitled to an increase in his or her annuity, or in the event of death the annuity paid to his or her spouse or dependent, after he or she has been retired one (1) year regardless of age or date of retirement. A member retiring under occupational disability, as provided in KRS 67A.460 , or nonoccupational disability, on or after July 1, 2013, shall be entitled to an increase in his or her annuity as provided by subsection (1) of this section. The amount of the annual increase shall be the same as described in subsection (1) of this section, compounded annually, and the increase shall be determined and granted annually thereafter by the board. For a member retired on occupational disability for a length of time in excess of one (1) year prior to June 21, 2001, the board shall increase the member’s annuity as described in this paragraph, on July 1, 2001, and each July 1 thereafter.
    1. A member who retired pursuant to the provisions of KRS 67A.360 to 67A.690 prior to July 15, 1980, or pursuant to KRS 67A.690 (2) after July 15, 1980, or his surviving spouse or eligible surviving children, shall receive an upward adjustment in their retirement or survivor’s annuity by calculation of a two percent (2%) annual increase compounded from July 1, 1974, until July 15, 1980, and annual increases compounded, from July 15, 1980, until July 15, 1990, in the same percentage amount by which the pension board increased other pensions pursuant to subsection (1) of this section for those same years. For purposes of calculation, unless the member retired under disability, the member’s or survivor’s first increase shall occur after the member was retired for one (1) year or attained the age of forty-seven (47), whichever was later, or would have been retired one (1) year or reached the age of forty-seven (47), whichever was later, in the event the member died before being retired one (1) year or reaching the age of forty-seven (47). In the case of retirement under disability, no age or length of retirement criteria shall apply. (3) (a) A member who retired pursuant to the provisions of KRS 67A.360 to 67A.690 prior to July 15, 1980, or pursuant to KRS 67A.690(2) after July 15, 1980, or his surviving spouse or eligible surviving children, shall receive an upward adjustment in their retirement or survivor’s annuity by calculation of a two percent (2%) annual increase compounded from July 1, 1974, until July 15, 1980, and annual increases compounded, from July 15, 1980, until July 15, 1990, in the same percentage amount by which the pension board increased other pensions pursuant to subsection (1) of this section for those same years. For purposes of calculation, unless the member retired under disability, the member’s or survivor’s first increase shall occur after the member was retired for one (1) year or attained the age of forty-seven (47), whichever was later, or would have been retired one (1) year or reached the age of forty-seven (47), whichever was later, in the event the member died before being retired one (1) year or reaching the age of forty-seven (47). In the case of retirement under disability, no age or length of retirement criteria shall apply.
    2. After calculation of the new annuity level, members of age forty-seven (47) or more affected by this subsection, or survivors of a member who would have been forty-seven (47) or more in the event the member is deceased, shall be granted the same annual increase granted to retirees who retired July 15, 1980, or thereafter, pursuant to subsection (1) of this section, and the annuity on which this cost-of-living increment is based shall be the annuity level reached through the addition of annual compounded increases calculated pursuant to paragraph (a) of this subsection, but not less than the annuity level in effect prior to July 15, 1990. If the member has not attained the age of forty-seven (47) or would not have attained the age of forty-seven (47) in the event the member is deceased, then the member or survivor shall receive increases of two percent (2%) compounded annually until the member attains or would have attained age forty-seven (47), at which time the same annual increase granted to retirees who retired July 15, 1980, or thereafter shall apply.
  2. The provisions of subsection (3) of this section shall not apply to any retiree or surviving spouse who receives a minimum retirement annuity, annually adjusted, pursuant to KRS 67A.430 . If, in the future, any retiree or spouse annuity granted pursuant to this section falls below the adjusted minimum annuity, the affected retiree or spouse shall be granted, from that time forward, the adjusted minimum annuity calculated pursuant to KRS 67A.430 .

History. Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 106, § 36, effective July 1, 1974; 1980, ch. 329, § 3, effective July 15, 1980; 1988, ch. 353, § 2, effective July 15, 1988; 1990, ch. 189, § 11, effective July 13, 1990; 2001, ch. 131, § 2, effective June 21, 2001; 2002, ch. 274, § 7, effective July 15, 2002; 2013, ch. 7, § 17, effective March 14, 2013.

Collective Bargaining for Police Officers and Firefighters in Urban-County Government

67A.6901. Definitions for KRS 67A.6901 to 67A.6911.

As used in KRS 67A.6901 to 67A.6911 :

  1. “Secretary” means the secretary of the cabinet;
  2. “Corrections personnel” means an employee of an urban-county government permanently assigned to a detention facility and working in any capacity in that detention facility;
  3. “Cabinet” means the Kentucky Labor Cabinet;
  4. “Exclusive representative” means the labor organization which has been designated by the cabinet as the representative of the majority of police officers, firefighter personnel, firefighters, or corrections personnel in appropriate units or has been so recognized by the urban-county government;
  5. “Firefighter” means an employee of an urban-county government engaged in serving the public by providing fire protection, including those covered by KRS Chapter 95;
  6. “Firefighter personnel” means dispatch communications officers;
  7. “Labor organization” means any chartered labor organization of any kind in which police officers, firefighter personnel, firefighters, or corrections personnel participate and which exists for the primary purpose of dealing with urban-county governments concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rate of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of employment;
  8. “Person” includes one (1) or more individuals, labor organizations, associations, corporations, legal representatives, trustees, trustees in bankruptcy, or receivers; and
  9. “Police officer” means an employee, sworn or certified, of an urban-county government who participates in the Law Enforcement Foundation Program Fund provided in KRS 15.410 to 15.510 .

History. Enact. Acts 2004, ch. 100, § 1, effective July 13, 2004; 2006, ch. 177, § 1, effective July 12, 2006; 2010, ch. 24, § 59, effective July 15, 2010.

67A.6902. Employees’ right to organize for the purpose of collective bargaining.

  1. Police officers, firefighter personnel, firefighters, and corrections personnel of an urban-county government shall have, and shall be protected in the exercise of, the right of self-organization, to form, join, or assist any labor organization, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing on questions of wages, hours, and other conditions of employment free from interference, restraint, or coercion.
  2. Labor organizations designated by the cabinet as the representative of the majority of police officers, firefighter personnel, firefighters, or corrections personnel in an appropriate unit or recognized by an urban-county government as the representative of the majority of employees in an appropriate unit shall be the exclusive representative for the employees of that unit for the purpose of collective bargaining with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours, and other conditions of employment.
  3. Labor organizations recognized by an urban-county government as the exclusive representative or so designated in accordance with the provisions of this section shall be responsible for representing the interests of all police officers, firefighter personnel, firefighters, or corrections personnel in the unit without discrimination.

History. Enact. Acts 2004, ch. 100, § 2, effective July 13, 2004; 2006, ch. 177, § 2, effective July 12, 2006; 2010, ch. 24, § 60, effective July 15, 2010.

67A.6903. Duty to bargain collectively.

The urban-county government and the labor organization that has been designated as the exclusive representative of police officers, firefighter personnel, firefighters, or corrections personnel in an appropriate unit, through appropriate officials or their representatives, shall have the authority and the duty to bargain collectively.

History. Enact. Acts 2004, ch. 100, § 3, effective July 13, 2004; 2006, ch. 177, § 3, effective July 12, 2006.

67A.6904. Activities prohibited and duty to bargain in good faith.

  1. Except as provided in KRS 336.130 , urban-county governments and their representatives and agents are prohibited from:
    1. Interfering, restraining, or coercing police officers, firefighter personnel, firefighters, or corrections personnel in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in KRS 67A.6902 ;
    2. Dominating or interfering with the formation, existence, or administration of any labor organization;
    3. Discriminating in regard to hiring or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization;
    4. Discharging or otherwise discriminating against an employee because he or she has signed or filed any affidavit, petition, or complaint or given any information or testimony under this section; or
    5. Refusing to bargain collectively in good faith with a labor organization which is the exclusive representative of employees in an appropriate unit, including but not limited to the discussing of grievances with the exclusive representative.
  2. Labor organizations and their agents are prohibited from:
    1. Restraining or coercing:
      1. Police officers, firefighter personnel, firefighters, or corrections personnel in the exercise of the right guaranteed in KRS 67A.6902 ; and
      2. An urban-county government in the selection of a representative for the purposes of collective bargaining or the adjustment of grievances; or
    2. Refusing to bargain collectively in good faith with an urban-county government, if they have been designated in accordance with the provisions of this section as the exclusive representative of police officers, firefighter personnel, firefighters, or corrections personnel in an appropriate unit.
  3. For the purposes of this section, to bargain collectively is to carry out in good faith the mutual obligation of the parties, or their representatives; to meet together at reasonable times, including meetings in advance of the budget-making process; to negotiate in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other conditions of employment; to negotiate an agreement; to negotiate any question arising under any agreement; and to execute a written contract incorporating any agreement reached, if requested by either party. The obligation shall not be interpreted to compel either party to agree to a proposal, or require either party to make a concession.

History. Enact. Acts 2004, ch. 100, § 4, effective July 13, 2004; 2006, ch. 177, § 4, effective July 12, 2006; 2017 ch. 1, § 7, effective January 9, 2017.

67A.6905. Election of exclusive representative.

  1. Whenever, in accordance with administrative regulations that may be promulgated by the cabinet, a petition has been filed:
    1. By a police officer, group of police officers, firefighter personnel, a firefighter, group of firefighters, a corrections officer, group of corrections personnel, or any labor organization acting on behalf of thirty percent (30%) of the employees who have signed labor organization affiliation cards and the labor organization showing proof of representation:
      1. Alleging that they wish to be represented for collective bargaining by a labor organization as exclusive representative; or
      2. Asserting that the labor organization which has been certified or is currently being recognized by the urban-county government as bargaining representative is no longer the representative of the majority of employees in the unit; or
    2. By an urban-county government alleging that one (1) or more labor organizations has presented to it a claim to be recognized as the representative of the majority of police officers, firefighter personnel, firefighters, or corrections personnel in an appropriate unit;

      the cabinet shall investigate the petition, and if it has reasonable cause to believe that a question of representation exists, shall provide for an appropriate hearing upon due notice. If the cabinet finds that there is a question of representation, it shall direct an election by secret ballot to determine whether or by which labor organization the police officers, firefighter personnel, firefighters, or corrections personnel desire to be represented, and shall certify the result thereof to the legislative council of the urban-county government.

  2. The cabinet shall decide in each case, in order to assure police officers, firefighter personnel, firefighters, and corrections personnel the fullest freedom in exercising the rights guaranteed by this section, the unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining, based on such factors as community of interest, wages, hours, and other working conditions of the police officers, firefighter personnel, firefighters, or corrections personnel involved; the history of collective bargaining; and the desires of the police officers, firefighter personnel, firefighters, or corrections personnel.
  3. An election shall not be directed in any bargaining unit or in any subdivision thereof within which in the preceding twelve (12) month period a valid election has been held. The cabinet shall determine who is eligible to vote in the election and shall promulgate administrative regulations governing the election. In any election where none of the choices on the ballot receives a majority, a runoff shall be conducted and the ballot shall provide for the selection between the two (2) choices receiving the largest and the second largest number of valid votes cast in the election. A labor organization which receives the majority of the votes cast in an election shall be certified by the cabinet as exclusive representative of all the police officers, firefighter personnel, firefighters, or corrections personnel in the unit.
  4. Nothing in this or any other law shall be construed to prohibit recognition of a labor organization as the exclusive representative by an urban-county government by mutual consent.
  5. No election shall be directed by the cabinet in any bargaining unit where there is in force and effect a valid collective bargaining agreement; provided, however, no collective bargaining agreement shall bar an election upon the petition of persons not parties thereto where more than four (4) years have elapsed since the execution of the agreement or the last timely renewal, whichever was later.

History. Enact. Acts 2004, ch. 100, § 5, effective July 13, 2004; 2006, ch. 177, § 5, effective July 12, 2006; 2010, ch. 24, § 61, effective July 15, 2010.

67A.6906. Unfair labor practices and remedies therefor — Hearing — Findings — Expenses.

Violations of the provisions of KRS 67A.6904 shall be deemed to be unfair labor practices remedial by the cabinet in the following manner.

  1. Whenever it is charged by an urban-county government or a labor organization that any person has engaged in or is engaging in any unfair labor practices, the cabinet or any hearing officer designated by the cabinet shall conduct an administrative hearing in accordance with KRS Chapter 13B.
  2. If, upon the preponderance of the evidence presented, the cabinet is of the opinion that any person named in the charge has engaged in or is engaging in an unfair labor practice, then it shall issue a final order requiring the person to cease and desist from the unfair labor practice, and to take any affirmative action including reinstatement of police officers, firefighter personnel, firefighters, or corrections personnel with or without back pay, as will effectuate the policies of this section. The final order may further require the person to make reports from time to time showing the extent to which he or she has complied with the order. If, upon the preponderance of the evidence presented, the cabinet is not of the opinion that the person named in the charge has engaged in or is engaging in the unfair labor practice, then the cabinet shall issue a final order dismissing the complaint. No final order shall issue based upon any unfair labor practice occurring more than six (6) months prior to the filing of the charge with the cabinet, unless the person aggrieved thereby was prevented from filing the charge by reason of service in the Armed Forces, in which event, the six (6) month period shall be computed from the day of his or her discharge. No final order of the cabinet shall require the reinstatement of any individual as a police officer, firefighter personnel, firefighter, or corrections personnel who has been suspended or discharged, or the payment to the individual of any back pay, if the individual was suspended or discharged for cause.
  3. Until a final order has been appealed, the cabinet at any time, upon reasonable notice and in the manner that it deems proper, may modify or set aside, in whole or in part, any final order made or issued by it.
  4. The cabinet or the charging party may petition for the enforcement of the final order and for appropriate temporary relief or restraining order in the Circuit Court for the county in which the violation occurred.
  5. Any person aggrieved by a final order of the cabinet may obtain a review of the final order by filing a petition in the Circuit Court assigned jurisdiction under subsection (4) of this section in accordance with KRS Chapter 13B.

History. Enact. Acts 2004, ch. 100, § 6, effective July 13, 2004; 2006, ch. 177, § 6, effective July 12, 2006; 2010, ch. 24, § 62, effective July 15, 2010.

67A.6907. Petition for fact-finding panel upon deadlock — Hearings — Findings — Expenses.

  1. If, after a reasonable period, but in no event less than thirty (30) days, of negotiations over the terms of a new collective bargaining agreement or modifications to an existing agreement, the parties to the negotiations are deadlocked, either party or the parties jointly may petition the cabinet, by certified mail, return receipt requested, or by registered mail, to initiate fact-finding.
  2. Upon receipt of a petition to initiate fact-finding, the cabinet shall cause an investigation to determine whether or not the parties are deadlocked in their negotiations. During the course of this investigation, the secretary is empowered to utilize his or her office in an effort to effectuate a settlement between the parties through mediation and conciliation.
  3. Upon completion of the cabinet’s investigation, and if a settlement between the parties has still not been reached, the secretary shall within ten (10) days appoint a qualified and disinterested person as the impartial chairman of a three (3) member panel to function as the fact-finders. In addition to the impartial chairman, the other two (2) members of the panel shall be one (1) member named by the labor organization and one (1) member named by the urban-county government, parties to the deadlocked negotiations.
  4. Upon consultation with the other members of the panel, the impartial chairman shall establish dates and places for public hearings. Whenever feasible, public hearings shall be held within the jurisdiction in which the urban-county government is located. The panel may subpoena witnesses, and a written transcript of the hearing shall be made. Upon completion of the hearings, the panel shall, by majority decision, make written findings of fact, recommendations, and opinions to be served on the urban-county government and labor organization parties and released to the public. Expenses incurred by the three (3) member panel in this section shall be paid by the parties involved in the labor dispute.

History. Enact. Acts 2004, ch. 100, § 7, effective July 13, 2004; 2010, ch. 24, § 63, effective July 15, 2010.

67A.6908. Requirements for an agreement — Enforcement in Circuit Court.

  1. Any agreement reached by the negotiators shall be reduced to writing and shall be executed by both parties.
  2. An agreement between the urban-county government and a labor organization shall be valid and enforced under its terms when entered into in accordance with the provisions of this section and signed by the mayor of the urban-county government or his or her representative. No publication thereof shall be required to make it effective. The procedure for the making of an agreement between an urban-county government and a labor organization provided by this section shall be the exclusive method of making a valid agreement for police officers, firefighter personnel, firefighters, or corrections personnel represented by a labor organization.
  3. Suits for violation of agreements between an urban-county government and a labor organization representing police officers, firefighter personnel, firefighters, or corrections personnel may be brought by the parties to the agreement in the Circuit Court of the urban-county government.

History. Enact. Acts 2004, ch. 100, § 8, effective July 13, 2004; 2006, ch. 177, § 7, effective July 12, 2006.

67A.6909. Urban-county government to withhold dues and deliver to bargaining unit.

Subject to the requirements set forth in KRS 336.135 , upon the written authorization of any police officers, firefighter personnel, firefighters, or corrections personnel within a bargaining unit, the urban-county government shall deduct from the payroll of the police officer, firefighter personnel, firefighter, or corrections personnel the monthly amount of dues as certified by the secretary of the exclusive bargaining representative, and shall deliver the same to the treasurer of the exclusive bargaining representative.

History. Enact. Acts 2004, ch. 100, § 9, effective July 13, 2004; 2006, ch. 177, § 8, effective July 12, 2006; 2017 ch. 6, § 5, effective January 9, 2017.

67A.6910. Police officers, firefighter personnel, firefighters, corrections personnel, and labor organizations not to participate in strike.

No police officer, firefighter personnel, firefighter, or corrections officer of an urban-county government shall engage in, and no police officer labor organization, firefighter personnel labor organization, firefighter labor organization, or corrections officer labor organization shall sponsor or condone, any strike.

History. Enact. Acts 2004, ch. 100, § 10, effective July 13, 2004; 2006, ch. 177, § 9, effective July 12, 2006.

67A.6911. Volunteer firefighters exempted from provisions of KRS 67A.6901 to 67A.6911.

Notwithstanding any provision of the Kentucky Revised Statutes to the contrary, the provisions of KRS 67A.6901 to 67A.6911 shall not be construed or interpreted to apply to volunteer firefighters.

History. Enact. Acts 2004, ch. 100, § 11, effective July 13, 2004.

Public Improvements

67A.710. Definitions.

  1. The term “assessed value basis” as used in KRS 67A.715 to 67A.825 means the plan for levying of improvement benefit assessments on the basis of the assessed land values of the benefited properties, as authorized by KRS 67A.715 to 67A.825 .
  2. The term “costs” as applied to any project undertaken under KRS 67A.715 to 67A.825 includes the cost of labor, materials, and equipment necessary to complete the project in a satisfactory manner, cost of land acquired, and every expense connected with the project, including preliminary and other surveys, inspections of the work, engineers’ fees and costs, attorneys’ fees, preparation of plans and specifications, publication of ordinances and notices, interest which will accrue on the bonds until the due date of the first annual improvement assessment levied in connection therewith, a sum equal to any discount in the sale of the bonds (if discount bids are authorized and permitted by the governing body), a reasonable allowance for unforeseen contingencies, the printing of bonds, and other costs of financing which may include the payment of a fee to a fiscal agent for advice and assistance in the preparation and marketing of the bonds.

History. Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 394, § 1.

67A.715. Purpose.

It is the purpose of KRS 67A.710 to 67A.825 to extend permissive authority of urban-county governments for assessment financing of public improvements.

History. Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 394, § 2.

67A.720. Maturity of bonds.

Bonds for improvements authorized by the provisions of KRS 67A.710 to 67A.825 may be caused to mature as to principal in term or serial maturities not to exceed twenty (20) years from date of issue.

History. Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 394, § 3.

67A.725. Basis of assessment.

The assessment for any public improvement authorized by the provisions of KRS 67A.710 to 67A.825 shall be on an assessed land value basis.

History. Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 394, § 4.

67A.730. First Ordinance — Contents — Hearing.

If an urban-county government desires to authorize, construct, and finance an improvement pursuant to the provisions of KRS 67A.710 to 67A.825 , its governing body shall initiate the proceedings by adopting an ordinance, herein called the “First Ordinance,” in which announcement shall be made of the proposed improvement in such manner as to identify the benefited properties which properties may be identified by naming the public way or ways upon which they abut, if any, or by geographical location, or both. In either case the ordinance shall recite the nature and scope of the improvement, a preliminary estimate of the costs thereof, as submitted in writing by an engineer, or firm of engineers, holding a license from the Commonwealth of Kentucky, and the amount, if any, which the urban-county government proposes to appropriate from available funds toward the estimated cost. In all succeeding proceedings, the urban-county government shall be bound and limited by the preliminary report of the engineer, or engineers, with regard to the nature, scope, and extent of the proposed improvement project (unless the First Ordinance be amended); but shall not be bound by, or limited to, the preliminary estimate of costs. The costs shall be determined upon the basis of construction bids publicly solicited as hereinafter provided, and shall be binding upon the urban-county government, and upon the owners of property to be benefited by the proposed improvement project, whether the same turn out to be equal to, below, or above such preliminary estimate. Architects, engineers, and fiscal agents may be employed without advertising or competition. The First Ordinance shall provide for a public hearing at a time and place specified therein (not less than one (1) week after publication) and shall give notice that at the hearing any owner of property to be benefited may appear and be heard as to:

  1. Whether the proposed project should be undertaken or abandoned, and
  2. Whether the nature and scope of the project shall be altered. The First Ordinance shall be published pursuant to KRS Chapter 424. The First Ordinance may designate a person, who may be the mayor, a member of the governing body, or any official of the urban-county government, to preside at and conduct such public hearing. In the absence of a designation in the ordinance, the mayor, or a person designated by the mayor shall preside. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the public hearing shall not be deemed irregular or improper if it is in fact presided over and conducted at the designated time, and place by any elected officer or member of the governing body. Any owner of property intended to be benefited by the proposed improvement project may be heard at such public hearing, in person or by a representative.

History. Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 394, § 5.

Opinions of Attorney General.

Although a board of education may not be compelled to and may not voluntarily expend school funds to repair or replace a sidewalk abutting one of its schools, it may not compel the municipal authorities to do so. OAG 75-613 .

67A.735. Second Ordinance — Procedure following public hearing.

If at a subsequent meeting, the governing body of the urban-county government determines that the owners of more than fifty percent (50%) both in number of lots or parcels and in aggregate assessed value of the properties to be benefited by the project, object to the project, it shall not be undertaken unless the project is that of constructing sanitary sewers, in which case the governing body may approve the project with less than fifty percent (50%) property owner approval if the project will eliminate a public health hazard. If fifty percent (50%) or more do not object, the governing body shall enact a Second Ordinance, which shall be published as provided in KRS 67A.730 with respect to publication of the First Ordinance.

History. Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 394, § 6.

67A.740. Construction contracts — Bids — Performance bonds.

Proposals for the construction of the project shall be solicited upon the basis of the submission of sealed competitive bids after advertisement, by publication pursuant to KRS Chapter 424. Upon or after the acceptance by the governing body of a bid, or combination of bids, the governing body may determine the total cost for the proposed project, taking into account the amount of the accepted bids, and all other costs of the project, as herein defined. Each contract shall be supported by a performance bond for the full amount thereof, with good surety to be approved by the governing body.

History. Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 394, § 7.

67A.745. Notification of property owners as to amount due — Issuance of bonds.

  1. When the total cost of the project has been established, the amount to be assessed against each parcel of property shall be determined. Property owners shall be notified by certified mail of the exact amount due for their portion of the project. They shall be given thirty (30) days in which to pay in full.
  2. At the end of the thirty (30) days, the governing body shall total the amount of properties for which no payment was received and authorize sale of bonds of the urban-county government to provide the amount necessary to complete financing of the project. The governing body shall establish the denominations and maturity dates thereof which may be term or serial maturities, not to exceed twenty (20) years.

History. Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 394, § 8.

67A.750. Action of aggrieved property owner — Limitation.

  1. Within thirty (30) days after notice provided in KRS 67A.745(1) any owner of property to be benefited by the proposed project, may file an action in circuit court, seeking relief by declaratory judgment, injunction, or otherwise. The owner may file in the office of the clerk of the urban-county government a written, notarized statement of intent to file such an action, indorsed by a licensed attorney at law to the effect, that in his opinion, his client has a reasonable and legitimate probable cause for such proposed litigation, in which event the time for filing such action shall be extended for fifteen (15) days after the date such statement is filed.
  2. If such action is filed or a statement of intent is filed as provided in subsection (1) of this section, all proceedings of the urban-county government with respect to the above project shall be abated until final judicial determination of the controversies presented thereby. After the lapse of the thirty (30) day period, all actions by owners of properties to be benefited shall be forever barred.

History. Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 394, § 9.

67A.755. Annual assessment — Advance levy and payment — Assessment for debt service reserve.

An annual assessment on each parcel of property for which bonds are issued shall be levied according to the assessed value basis. The first such levy and each succeeding levy shall be made in advance and shall be sufficient to pay the principal and interest on the bonds. As a precaution against default and to provide a debt service reserve, the governing body shall also assess and collect annually an amount equal to one-half of one percent (0.5%) of the total amount of the principal and interest of the bonds. The advance payment and debt service reserve shall be deposited in an interest bearing account. The payments, reserve, and earnings shall be used to pay the last installment on the bonds.

History. Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 394, § 10.

67A.760. Third Ordinance — Purposes — Adoption.

The governing body shall adopt a Third Ordinance authorizing the sale of the bonds and covenanting with the holders of the bonds and coupons, that until the payment in full thereof the urban-county government will levy annually an improvement assessment upon the affected properties only. The ordinance shall also covenant with the holders of said bonds and coupons, until payment in full thereof, the governing body will pursue and exhaust, at the urban-county government’s expense, all remedies available to the urban-county government and for the benefit and protection of the bondholders, including enforcement to judgment and decretal sale of the liens upon affected properties, as provided in KRS 67A.710 to 67A.825 . The ordinance shall designate one (1) or more places of payment of principal and interest, within or without the Commonwealth and provide for the payment by the urban-county government of any and all reasonable and customary charges for the services of paying agents, to the end that the holders of the bonds and coupons will receive the sums therein stipulated, without deductions for such charges. The ordinance may contain any other provisions not contrary to law.

History. Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 394, § 11.

67A.765. Sale of bonds — Bids — Advertisement.

After the Third Ordinance has been adopted (and without regard for its date of publication), the urban-county government may solicit the submission of bids or proposals for the purchasing of the bonds authorized by the Third Ordinance, the same to be received upon a sealed competitive basis after advertisement by publication pursuant to KRS Chapter 424. Such bids or proposals may be solicited on the basis of competition as to price or interest coupon rates, as may be specified in the published notice, and bids offering less than the par or face value of the bonds may be considered and accepted if so stated in the published notice of the sale. If no bids are received upon terms acceptable to the governing body and conforming to the published notice, bids may again be solicited by similar published notice, until a purchase bid is received upon terms acceptable to the governing body, but the bonds, or a portion thereof, may be awarded to a contractor, according to the provisions of KRS 67A.710 to 67A.825 .

History. Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 394, § 12.

67A.770. Deposit of prepayments and bond sale proceeds — Security — Disbursements.

As prepayments are received and when the bonds are delivered and the proceeds are received by the urban-county government, the same shall be deposited in an interest-bearing account in a bank or trust company, or combined bank and trust company, and to the extent such deposit may exceed insurance provided by federal deposit insurance corporation (if the depository be a member thereof, otherwise the full amount), the same shall be secured by a valid pledge of bonds or notes of the United States government, or fully guaranteed thereby, having at all times a market value equal to the undisbursed balance of such deposit; or shall be secured in such other manner as the governing body may prescribe or approve. Costs of the project which may then be earned and payable, may be paid forthwith. There shall be set aside into the sinking fund, hereinafter created, a sum from bond proceeds equal to all interest which will accrue on said bonds until the date when the first improvement assessment levied in connection therewith will become due and payable. The remainder may be disbursed from time to time in payment of costs of the project, as herein defined, except that payments on account of the construction contracts shall not exceed ninety percent (90%) of the amount shown by a written certificate of the engineer to have been earned for materials furnished and/or labor performed by any contractor, the retained ten percent (10%) to be disbursed only upon final acceptance of the finished work of such contractor. If, after completion, acceptance and payment of the work of all contractors, and the payment of all costs of the improvement project, as herein defined, there shall remain an unexpended balance of bond proceeds, such balance shall be transferred to the sinking fund created and maintained in connection with the project, as provided in KRS 67A.800 . The advanced installment and the one-half of one percent (0.5%) collected pursuant to KRS 67A.755 shall be part of the sinking fund.

History. Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 394, § 13.

67A.775. Bonds not to constitute debt of urban-county government — Tax exemption — Liquidation — Extent of liability to bondholders.

Each of said bonds shall bear on its face the statement that it has been issued under KRS 67A.710 to 67A.825 , and that it does not constitute an indebtedness of the urban-county government within the meaning of the Constitution. The bonds, and the receipt of interest thereon, shall not be subject to taxation. The bonds shall have all the qualities and incidents of negotiable instruments. The bonds, and the interest thereon, shall be payable exclusively from the proceeds of the annual improvement assessments levied upon the properties benefited by the project identified in the bonds; but the urban-county government shall become directly and personally liable to the bondholders for any deficiencies which may arise from its failure to pursue to exhaustion, and in timely fashion, all remedies lawfully available in the collection of such improvement assessments.

History. Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 394, § 14.

67A.780. Assessment ratio — Special assessment.

The sum necessary to be raised annually for the sinking fund shall be assessed against the property benefited in the proportion that the assessed value of each lot or parcel for urban-county government taxation shall bear to the whole assessed value of the benefited properties, as shown by the records upon which urban-county government taxation is based at the time of the adoption of the Third Ordinance. Where there is no such record, as in the case of public property, or property owned by religious, charitable, or educational institutions, the same (except that owned by the United States government) shall be specially assessed by the proper assessing officers, and for such special assessment reasonable compensation may be made. Any such special assessment shall be subject to all procedures for equalization and judicial review as may be provided by law in connection with ordinary assessments.

History. Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 394, § 15.

Opinions of Attorney General.

In view of Ky. Const. Sections 184 and 186 and KRS 67A.060 , a board of education may not be compelled to, nor may it voluntarily, pay an assessment imposed under this section for a sanitary sewer benefitting school property. OAG 75-613 .

67A.785. Accounting method for payments.

The department for finance and administration of an urban-county government shall provide a method of accounting for payments for less than a year in order to have the first and each succeeding installment in advance.

History. Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 394, § 16.

67A.790. When levy to be made — When due — Penalties for nonpayment.

The annual improvement assessment for each project shall be levied by the governing body when the levy for general urban-county taxes is made; and such improvement assessment levy shall be due at the same time, or times, when the general urban-county government taxes are due, and shall be subject to the same penalties and accrual of interest in the event of nonpayment as in the case of such general taxes unless the bond interest rate is greater, in which case, it shall apply.

History. Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 394, § 17.

67A.795. Assessment to constitute lien on benefited property — Precedence.

Each annual improvement assessment, with any penalty or interest incident to the nonpayment thereof, shall constitute a lien upon the lot or parcel of benefited property against which it is assessed. The lien shall attach to each lot or parcel of benefited property as the same is described by the owner’s deed of record in the county clerk’s office at the time of the publication of the Third Ordinance, as provided in KRS 67A.760 , and thereupon shall take precedence over all other liens, whether created prior to or subsequent to the publication of said ordinance, except state and county taxes, general municipal taxes, and prior improvement taxes and shall not be defeated or postponed by any private or judicial sale, by any mortgage, or by any error or mistake in the description of the property or in the names of the owners. No error in the proceedings of the governing body shall exempt any benefited property from its share of the improvement assessment, or from the payment thereof, or from the penalties or interest thereon, as herein provided. No error in the proceedings of the governing body shall exempt any property from liability for payment of any annual improvement assessment, or for any interest or penalty incident to nonpayment thereof. The urban-county’s governing body, or any court of competent jurisdiction, shall have power to make such rules and orders as may be required to do justice to all parties.

History. Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 394, § 18; 1978, ch. 384, § 153, effective June 17, 1978.

67A.800. Segregation of proceeds from assessment — Sinking fund.

The proceeds received by the urban-county government from each and every annual improvement assessment levy made in connection with each separate improvement project, as authorized by KRS 67A.710 to 67A.825 , shall be segregated from and kept always separate and apart from all other receipts of the urban-county government from any and all other sources, and shall be deposited in a separate and special account in a financial institution in an account so specially designated by number or other designation as to identify the same in such manner as to distinguish the receipts and deposits from each such project from the receipts and deposits from every other such project, and from any and every other account or fund of the urban-county government. The same shall constitute the “sinking fund” referred to in KRS 67A.710 to 67A.825 . The funds shall be deposited in an interest-bearing account, at the rate of interest prevailing at the time of such deposit. When the bonds become due, funds shall be transferred to the account from which the bonds shall be paid.

History. Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 394, § 19.

67A.805. Restriction on payments from sinking fund — Debt service reserve.

All sums received and deposited in the sinking fund shall be held inviolate and applied by the urban-county government solely for the payment of the principal of, and interest on, the bonds issued for the financing of the identified improvement project. The amount collected, and deposited in the sinking fund from the first improvement assessment levied in connection with any project, in excess of maturing principal and interest of the bonds, and for the purpose of creating a “debt service reserve,” shall be held in the sinking fund for that purpose.

History. Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 394, § 20.

67A.810. Procedure where no bids received on offered bonds.

If the urban-county government shall adopt the Third Ordinance, herein referred to, and shall publicly solicit the submission of bids or proposals for the purchasing of its “improvement assessment bonds” for the project identified therein, and shall fail to receive a bid upon terms of price and/or interest coupon rate, or rates, conforming to the published notice and acceptable to the governing body, the bonds, or a portion thereof, may be awarded to the contractor, or contractors, at a price of not less than the minimum price permitted by the said published notice, and bearing one (1) or more interest coupon rates not exceeding the rate, or rates, permitted in the said published notice but only upon the following conditions:

  1. The entire bond issue authorized by the Third Ordinance may be awarded to the contractor, or contractors, if it or they shall submit to, and obtain formal approval by, the governing body of the urban-county government, of a written undertaking (approval as to form and substance by the government’s duly designated legal counsel):
    1. Agreeing to accept in full an agreed payment of the amount, or the aggregate of the amounts, of their respective contracts, bonds as authorized by the Third Ordinance equal in principal amount (or as near thereto as may be practicable) to the amount, or the aggregate of the amounts of their contracts (in which event such bonds shall be the latest maturing and highest numbered of the bonds authorized by the Third Ordinance), and
    2. Agreeing to pay to the urban-county government, in cash, the purchase price of the bonds to the extent that the same exceeds the aggregate amount of the contracts of the contractor, or contractors, who are signatories of such written instrument; or
  2. Bonds equal to the amount, or amounts, of the contracts of the contractor, or contractors, who are signatories of a written instrument agreeing to accept the same in payment thereof, approved as to form and substance by the urban-county government’s properly designated legal counsel, may be awarded to such contractor, or contractors, in the event the urban-county government is able to, and does, (within constitutional restrictions) appropriate from available funds a sum in cash sufficient to defray all costs of the project, as defined in KRS 67A.710 to 67A.825 , in excess of the amount of such construction contract, or the aggregate of the several contracts. In such event, the sum so appropriated by the governing body of the urban-county government shall be applied to the payment of such costs;
  3. In the event of procedure as set forth in either subsection (1) or (2) of this section, the bonds awarded to the contractor, or contractors (other than those paid for in cash as set forth in the foregoing subsection (1)), shall be placed by the urban-county government, in escrow, with a responsible financial institution, with written instructions that the same may be released to the contractor, or contractors, from time to time, but in principal amount not exceeding seventy-five percent (75%) of the amount certified in writing by the engineer, or engineers, to the said escrow agent, and the urban-county government, to have been theretofore earned by and payable to the identified contractor, or contractors, under the terms and conditions of their respective contracts. Upon final approval and acceptance of the project by the governing body, the reserved twenty-five percent (25%) of such bonds may be released and delivered to such contractor, or contractors.

History. Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 394, § 21.

67A.815. Procedure where proceeds of bonds authorized by Third Ordinance insufficient.

If, by reason of miscalculation or the happening of unforeseen events or conditions, the proceeds of the bonds authorized by the Third Ordinance should prove to be insufficient to provide for the completion of the project and the payment in full of all costs thereof, the governing body shall be authorized to reassess all properties and collect in cash or to issue and sell additional bonds sufficient to make up the deficiency, and such additional bonds shall rank on a parity as to security and source of payment with the bonds originally authorized.

History. Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 394, § 22.

67A.820. When assessments to cease — Refund of surplus.

The amount of the annual assessment collected and the debt service reserve and any interest earned therefrom shall remain in the sinking fund. When the amount in the sinking fund is sufficient to retire bonds at maturity, assessments shall cease. In the event of a surplus after all bonds have been retired, the surplus shall be returned on a pro rata basis to the property owners if in excess of one dollar ($1) per property. If less than one dollar ($1), the surplus shall be transferred to the general fund of the urban-county government.

History. Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 394, § 23.

67A.825. Procedure when project cannot be completed according to KRS 67A.710 to 67A.820.

If an urban-county government has taken any steps under KRS 67A.710 to 67A.820 to provide for, construct or finance any improvements allowed to be undertaken by the provisions of KRS 67A.710 to 67A.820 , and for any reason the project cannot be completed according to the provisions of KRS 67A.710 to 67A.820, the governing body may:

  1. Abandon the project, in which case all prepayments shall be returned. Any interest earned on prepayments may also be returned or retained and applied to any cost resulting from the effort to complete the project.
  2. The governing body may proceed in any manner authorized by law, to complete the project. In this case all prepayments and any interest earned shall be returned on a pro rata basis.

History. Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 394, § 24.

Purchase of Development Rights

67A.840. Legislative findings and declarations.

  1. The General Assembly hereby finds and declares that it is a policy of the Commonwealth to retain agriculture and rural landscapes in urban counties.
  2. The General Assembly further finds and declares that the preservation of agriculture and rural landscapes contributes to the development of tourism and recreation.
  3. The General Assembly further finds and declares that the urban-county form of government promotes industrialization and commercialization, attended by rapid residential development, which threatens the preservation of agriculture and rural landscapes.
  4. The General Assembly further finds and declares that in urban counties a single government embraces the entire county and, by nature, has within its jurisdiction both substantial urban areas and substantial rural areas thereby creating the ability to distribute both the benefits and the financial obligations of a purchase of development rights program fairly among the constituents of a single government.
  5. The General Assembly further finds and declares that conferring responsibility upon the electorate in urban-county governments to make decisions regarding the establishment and funding of programs to retain and enhance agriculture and rural landscapes and to promote tourism and recreation is consistent with the broad home rule concepts embodied in this chapter.

History. Enact. Acts 1998, ch. 372, § 1, effective July 15, 1998.

67A.841. Definitions for KRS 67A.840 to 67A.850 and KRS 91A.390.

As used in KRS 67A.840 to 67A.850 and KRS 91A.390 , unless the context clearly indicates otherwise:

  1. “Conservation easement” means an interest in land, less than fee simple, which restricts or prevents the development or improvement of the land in the fashion provided in the instrument of conveyance by which the easement is created;
  2. “Development right” means an interest in real property established under a purchase of development rights program which is made severable from the parcel to which the interest is appurtenant and which may be purchased as provided for in the program; and
  3. “Purchase of development rights program” or “PDR program” or “program” means a comprehensive program providing for the establishment and purchase of development rights in accordance with the requirements of KRS 67A.840 to 67A.850 and KRS 91A.390 .

History. Enact. Acts 1998, ch. 372, § 2, effective July 15, 1998.

67A.843. Referendum by voters in urban-county on question or question of levying taxes for purchase of development rights — Contents of proposal to be voted upon.

  1. An urban-county government is authorized to place before the public, via referendum according to the procedure established in KRS 67A.847 , the question of whether to fund a purchase of development rights program by means of one (1) or more of the following special tax levies which shall be in addition to all taxes otherwise permitted by law in the urban-county:
    1. An ad valorem tax not to exceed five cents ($0.05) per one hundred dollars ($100) of assessed value upon all taxable property in the urban-county, subject only to the aggregate limits on property taxes set forth in the Kentucky Constitution, but not subject to the recall provisions of KRS 132.017 ;
    2. A license fee not to exceed one-eighth of one percent (0.125%) on franchises, trades, occupations and professions in accordance with KRS 92.280(2), except that no fee shall be collected from any individual who is not a resident of the urban-county; and
    3. A transient room tax as defined in KRS 91A.390 not to exceed one percent (1%) of rents.
  2. The proposal put before the voters shall set forth the following information:
    1. General descriptions of the types and locations of the properties from which development rights may be purchased under the program; and in describing the types of property, general descriptions such as “agricultural,” “agriculturally zoned,” or “farm” shall be sufficient, and in indicating the locations, general descriptions such as “northern section” and “eastern quadrant” shall be sufficient; and
    2. The type, rate, and effective date, including the ending date if the levy is for a specific duration, of the special tax levy, or levies, from among those authorized in subsection (1) of this section, which is proposed to fund the program.

History. Enact. Acts 1998, ch. 372, § 3, effective July 15, 1998.

67A.845. Purchase of development rights program.

  1. Within one hundred eighty (180) days following the passage of a purchase of development rights proposal by referendum as provided for in KRS 67A.843 , 67A.847 , and 67A.849 , an urban-county government shall establish a purchase of development rights program which, in addition to the matters approved by referendum, shall include:
    1. A statement of the purpose of the program;
    2. A detailed map showing the locations of the properties from which development rights may be purchased;
    3. The restrictions upon the use and development of the properties from which development rights have been purchased, and the duration of those restrictions which may be perpetual as the equivalent of covenants running with the land;
    4. The mechanism, if any, for removing the restrictions;
    5. The procedure for valuation and transfer of the development rights. The instrument of transfer shall be an instrument drawn, executed, and recorded in accordance with KRS Chapter 382, which shall set forth the terms of the restrictions with specificity;
    6. The entity authorized by the urban-county government to operate the program; and
    7. Any other provisions the urban-county government deems necessary or appropriate.
  2. The program may provide for the purchase of conservation easements or other comparable interests in real estate in addition to or in lieu of the purchase of development rights.
  3. The provisions of the program, except those elements adopted by referendum, may be amended from time to time by the urban-county government.

History. Enact. Acts 1998, ch. 372, § 4, effective July 15, 1998.

67A.847. Procedure for referendum — Application of general election law — Combined proposal with public parks purchase and maintenance program.

The procedure for a referendum authorized by KRS 67A.843 shall be as follows:

  1. A purchase of development rights program proposal authorized by KRS 67A.843 and 67A.845 may be submitted to the voters of an urban-county by either a resolution of the legislative body or a petition meeting the requirements of this section. The resolution or petition shall set out the matters specified in KRS 67A.843 (1). The proposal shall be drafted in such a way that a vote in favor of adoption shall be a vote in favor of the proposal.
  2. Petitions shall be signed by registered voters of the urban-county government equal in number to at least ten percent (10%) of the total number of votes cast in the urban-county in the last regular mayoral election of the urban-county government.
  3. If, not later than ninety (90) days preceding the day established for a regular election, the county clerk receives a resolution adopted by a three-fifths (3/5) vote of the legislative body of the urban-county government requesting that the question be submitted to the voters or determines that a petition submitted in accordance with this section is sufficient, the legal department of the urban-county government shall prepare to place before the voters of the urban-county government at the next regular election the question, which shall appear on the ballot in the following form:

    “( ) FOR RATIFICATION OF (summary of proposed program)

    ( ) AGAINST RATIFICATION OF (summary of proposed program)”.

    The county clerk shall cause to be published, not fewer than three (3) times within the thirty (30) day period immediately preceding the election in a newspaper having a general circulation in the territory of the urban-county government, notice of the referendum, the exact language of the proposal, and a map prepared by the urban-county government showing the general location of the properties from which development rights may be purchased under the program.

  4. The provisions of general election law shall apply to a referendum conducted under this section. The certificate of the body authorized by law to canvass election returns shall be delivered to the mayor of the urban-county government and the certificate shall be entered upon the records of the urban-county government during the next regular meeting of the urban-county government legislative body. If a proposed program is approved, it shall become effective at the time specified in the proposal, but the effective date shall not be before the first day of January following the election.
  5. After compliance with the provisions of this section and KRS 67A.160 , a purchase of development rights program authorized by KRS 67A.843 and 67A.845 may be combined with a public parks purchase and maintenance program proposal authorized by KRS 97.590 . In the case of a combined proposal, the urban-county government shall place before the voters a single ballot proposal that combines the purchase of development rights program proposal and the parks purchase and maintenance program proposal. In that event, the proposal shall specify which tax levy or portion thereof shall provide funding for the purchase of development rights program proposal and which will provide funding for the parks purchase and maintenance program proposal.

History. Enact. Acts 1998, ch. 372, § 5, effective July 15, 1998; 2000, ch. 355, § 2, effective July 14, 2000.

67A.849. Subsequent referendum to increase, decrease, or eliminate funding sources.

  1. At any time not earlier than five (5) years following the passage of a purchase of development rights proposal in a referendum authorized by KRS 67A.843 and 67A.847 , a referendum may be held on the question of whether to increase, decrease, or eliminate the funding sources of the program, either upon the adoption of a resolution by the legislative body of the urban-county government or upon the filing of a duly certified petition, according to the same procedures set forth in KRS 67A.847 .
  2. The passage of a referendum to decrease or eliminate the funding sources for a purchase of development rights program will not be legally effective prior to the satisfaction of all contractual obligations that have been assumed by pertinent contracting authorities in connection with the program.

History. Enact. Acts 1998, ch. 372, § 6, effective July 15, 1998.

Ad Valorem Taxes

67A.850. Taxing power.

Urban-county government may exercise ad valorem property taxing powers pursuant to the Kentucky Constitution, Section 157, to the limits authorized therein for the class of city to which the largest city in the county belonged on the day prior to the date the urban-county government became effective. The taxing powers must be exercised by the urban-county government consistent with the Kentucky Constitution, Section 172A, and KRS 132.010 , 132.023 , and 132.027 . Provided, in no way will this section and KRS 67A.860 allow an urban-county government to increase the taxes of any district without the urban-county government having first performed its obligations to provide services for such increases. Within the privileges and limitations of this section, an urban-county government may impose an additional ad valorem tax, not to exceed five cents ($0.05) per one hundred dollars ($100), for the purpose of funding the purchase of development rights program provided for under KRS 67A.845 .

History. Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 243, § 1; 1990, ch. 343, § 9, effective July 13, 1990; 1998, ch. 372, § 7, effective July 15, 1998.

Compiler’s Notes.

Section 11 of Acts 1990, ch. 343 provided “The provisions of this Act shall be effective for tax years with assessment dates on or after January 1, 1991.”

67A.860. Extension of urban services — Notice to property owner.

  1. The chief executive officer of the urban-county government shall notify each property owner by certified mail, of the urban-county government intention to extend urban services which may result in a tax increase to the property owner.
  2. The notice by the chief executive officer shall fix the time and place of a public hearing on the extension of urban services for the affected property.
  3. The notice shall be postmarked no less than ten (10) days prior to the date of the public hearing and thirty (30) days prior to the extension of urban services.
  4. The notice provision shall not apply to extension of urban services, when less than ten (10) contiguous individual parcels of property are to be affected by the extension of urban services.

History. Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 243, § 2.

Sanitary Sewers

67A.871. Definitions for KRS 67A.872 to 67A.894.

As used in KRS 67A.872 to 67A.894 , the following words or terms shall have the respective meanings indicated, unless a different meaning is clearly indicated by the context:

  1. “Assessed value basis” means the plan for the levying of improvement benefit assessments upon benefited property for benefits conferred by construction of projects on the basis of the assessed values (land only) of the benefited property, whether such levies are paid in full by benefited property owners or levied annually to amortize bonds. Such plan shall also include the levying of identical improvement benefit assessments upon classified zones of benefited property where determination is made by ordinance of an urban-county government, as provided in KRS 67A.872 to 67A.894 , that benefits conferred by construction of a project are substantially equal and that the assessed value (land only) of all benefited property or designated zones thereof shall therefore be deemed equal in respect of a given wastewater collection project.
  2. “Benefited property, and property to be benefited” mean the property (land only) proposed to be benefited by construction of a wastewater collection project instituted by an urban-county government for the payment of the costs of which improvement benefit assessments are to be levied against and collected from such benefited property.
  3. “Bonds” mean improvement lien bonds authorized and issued by urban-county governments pursuant to authority of KRS 67A.872 to 67A.894 for the purpose of providing costs for the construction of wastewater collection projects.
  4. “Construction” means and includes, the following services and facilities provided by an urban-county government:
    1. Preliminary planning to determine the economic and engineering feasibility of construction of wastewater collection projects, any engineering, architectural, legal, fiscal and economic investigations and studies necessary thereto, and all necessary surveys, designs, plans, working drawings, specifications, procedures and other required actions incident to the construction of wastewater collection projects;
    2. The building, acquisition, installation, erection, alteration, remodeling, improvements, expansion or extension of wastewater collection projects, and any other physical devices or appurtenances in connection with, or reasonably attendant to, such projects;
    3. The provision or making available sewer collection services to benefited property by providing sewer facilities to such benefited property although not directly financed by the issuance of bonds; and
    4. Inspection and supervision incident to the acquisition, construction and installation of wastewater collection projects.
  5. “Costs” as such term shall be applied to any wastewater collection project undertaken under KRS 67A.872 to 67A.894 includes the cost of labor, materials and equipment necessary to acquire, install and complete the project in a satisfactory manner, cost of land acquired, and every expense connected with the project, including construction costs, preliminary and other surveys, financial planning, inspections of the work as construction progresses, engineers’ fees and costs, preparation of plans and specifications, publication of ordinances and notices, interest which will accrue on the bonds until the due date of the first annual improvement assessment levied in connection therewith, capitalized interest on the bonds for a period not to exceed three (3) years, a sum equal to any discount in the sale of the bonds (if discount bids are authorized and permitted by the issuing government), all or any portion of the debt service reserve requirement, if determination is made to finance them from bond proceeds, a reasonable allowance for unforeseen contingencies, the printing of bonds and other costs of financing, including payment of attorneys’ fees, underwriting and fiscal agency fees, trustees’ fees, rating service fees and costs of issuance of bonds.
  6. “Debt service reserve requirement” means, with respect to any particular issue of bonds, the maximum annual requirements for payment of principal of and interest on the bond issue, which debt service reserve requirement shall be either funded in whole or in part by application of bond proceeds, or accrued in due course by the levying of improvement benefit assessments as provided in KRS 67A.872 to 67A.894 .
  7. “Government or urban-county government” means an urban-county government which has been duly created and established pursuant to the provisions of this chapter.
  8. “Ordinance” means a formal and binding enactment of the urban-county council of an urban-county government entered in connection with the financing by such government of a wastewater collection project.
  9. “Public ways” shall include streets, boulevards, avenues, roads, lanes, alleys, parkways, courts, terraces and other courses of travel open to the general public by whatsoever name designated.
  10. “Wastewater” means any water or liquid substance containing sewage, industrial waste or other pollutants or contaminants derived from the prior use of such water or liquid substance.
  11. “Wastewater collection project or projects” means all or any part of any facilities, devices, objects and systems used and useful in the collection, holding or transmission of wastewater from a benefited property to wastewater treatment plants or other similar facilities for final disposition thereof. Such terms shall include, without limiting the generality of the foregoing, sanitary sewage collection lines, intercepting sewers, outfall sewers, sewer laterals, power stations and pumping stations, and other equipment and their appurtenances necessary to enable the project to fulfill its function, including land acquisition, whether such project facilities are provided by funds derived from issuance of bonds or otherwise provided by a government in any manner.

History. Enact. Acts 1976, ch. 371, § 1, effective March 30, 1976.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(1988). A technical correction has been made in this section by the Reviser of Statutes pursuant to KRS 7.136 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

The Urban County Sewer Act, KRS 67A.871 et seq., is not special legislation and does not violate Ky. Const., §§ 59, 60 or 156, and the fact that there is presently only one urban-county government does not mean that the law is unconstitutional; the act is an appropriate classification and bears a reasonable relation to the purpose of the act, which is to create a reasonable method of extending sewers to older neighborhoods in former county areas and fairly assessing the costs of construction. Conrad v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government, 659 S.W.2d 190, 1983 Ky. LEXIS 274 ( Ky. 1983 ).

The General Assembly in enacting KRS 67A.871 et seq. was within its constitutional authority to provide authorization for urban county governments to construct and maintain wastewater collection projects; such authority is merely a logical extension of the legitimate power of any municipal government. Conrad v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government, 659 S.W.2d 190, 1983 Ky. LEXIS 274 ( Ky. 1983 ).

Cited:

Cox v. Norton, 797 F.2d 329, 1986 U.S. App. LEXIS 27624 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1089, 107 S. Ct. 1298, 94 L. Ed. 2d 154, 1987 U.S. LEXIS 721 (1987).

67A.872. Authorization to construct and maintain wastewater collection projects.

The General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Kentucky finds and determines as a fact that in urbanized areas of the Commonwealth, where industrialization and commercialization have progressed at a high rate, attended by rapid residential development, there is a particular public need for acquisition of major wastewater collection projects in the interests of the health, safety and welfare of the general public residing in such areas and in order to enable metropolitan population centers to plan and develop major community-wide sewer facilities; that it is therefore essential that urban-county governments be vested with alternative authority for the construction and installation of facilities for the collection of flowable liquid wastes generated by residential, commercial and industrial uses for ultimate disposition in a proper manner at the cost of benefited properties; and that such urban-county governments be authorized and empowered to directly plan, develop, initiate, finance and carry out wastewater collection projects.

History. Enact. Acts 1976, ch. 371, § 2, effective March 30, 1976.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

The Urban County Sewer Act, KRS 67A.871 et seq., is not special legislation and does not violate Ky. Const., §§ 59, 60 or 156, and the fact that there is presently only one urban-county government does not mean that the law is unconstitutional; the act is an appropriate classification and bears a reasonable relation to the purpose of the act, which is to create a reasonable method of extending sewers to older neighborhoods in former county areas and fairly assessing the costs of construction. Conrad v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government, 659 S.W.2d 190, 1983 Ky. LEXIS 274 ( Ky. 1983 ).

67A.873. Alternative or additional authority.

Urban-county governments created pursuant to this chapter are authorized to provide for, construct and finance wastewater collection projects according to the financing plan set forth in KRS 67A.871 to 67A.894 . The authority hereby conferred upon urban-county governments is not intended, nor shall it be construed, to be in derogation or substitution of any authority otherwise conferred upon any urban-county government, but is alternative and in addition thereto. If any urban-county government has undertaken any proceedings under any other law to acquire a project, it may abandon such proceedings and proceed under the provisions of KRS 67A.871 to 67A.894 . It is the purpose of KRS 67A.871 to 67A.894 to extend permissive authority to urban-county government to finance wastewater collection projects according to the assessed value basis, whereby benefited properties shall be assessed the cost of such projects according to benefits conferred upon the properties.

History. Enact. Acts 1976, ch. 371, § 3, effective March 30, 1976.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Assessment of Benefited Properties.

It is well settled that a special assessment for public sewer improvements is not a “tax” but is an assessment which is to be made in an amount with reference to the benefit which the property derives from the cost of the project. Conrad v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government, 659 S.W.2d 190, 1983 Ky. LEXIS 274 ( Ky. 1983 ).

67A.874. Authority is exclusive.

In undertaking the planning, design, institution, authorization and financing of wastewater collection projects under KRS 67A.871 to 67A.894 , urban-county governments shall be vested with exclusive authority to plan, design, initiate, finance and carry out construction of such projects solely according to the requirements and procedures of KRS 67A.871 to 67A.894 , without the necessity of securing approvals, ratifications or other consents from any other municipal corporation or the county encompassing any such government or in which any such government is situated.

History. Enact. Acts 1976, ch. 371, § 4, effective March 30, 1976.

67A.875. Determination of need by ordinance — Preliminary planning procedures — Ordinance of initiation.

  1. Any urban-county government which determines that the public health, safety, and general welfare requires construction of a wastewater collection project and which proposes to undertake, authorize, construct, and finance a wastewater collection project pursuant to KRS 67A.871 to 67A.894 shall, by appropriate ordinance of its urban-county council make such determinations and cause preliminary plans, designs, specifications, and financial planning for such project to be prepared by one (1) or more engineers, or one (1) or more firms of engineers, licensed to do business in the Commonwealth of Kentucky. Alternatively, such preliminary procedures may be accomplished directly by duly-qualified government personnel. A preliminary engineering and financing report shall be prepared in writing by such engineers for submission to the government.
  2. The preliminary engineering and financing report shall, designate a geographical area in which a wastewater collection project is recommended for construction, contain a reasonable description of the project facilities proposed to be constructed, contain a statement as to benefits to be conferred by the proposed project and the distribution of such benefits and contain an estimate of the costs of the proposed project. The urban-county council of such government shall receive such preliminary engineering and financing report at a regular meeting, shall thereafter study and evaluate the same, and by duly-enacted ordinance either approve the preliminary engineering and financing report as submitted, disapprove such report, or amend and approve same in its sound discretion.
  3. Upon approval of the preliminary engineering and financing report, or amendment thereof and approval thereof as amended, by the urban-county council of such urban-county government, such council shall formally initiate proceedings for the acquisition and financing of the proposed wastewater collection project by the enactment of an ordinance to be designated as the ordinance of initiation, in which public announcement shall be made of the wastewater collection project proposed to be acquired, constructed, and financed, the identification of properties proposed to be benefited by such project, which benefited properties may be identified by naming the public way upon which the benefited properties abut, if any, or by geographical location, or by metes and bounds or other appropriate description. The ordinance of initiation shall recite the nature and scope of the wastewater collection project being initiated by the government, shall give a preliminary estimate of the costs thereof, shall determine that each lot, parcel and tract of land named and identified in the ordinance of initiation as benefited property shall be afforded benefits by the project unless specifically excluded by such ordinance and shall order that a public hearing be held in respect of the proposed wastewater collection project.
  4. In all succeeding proceedings, the government shall be bound and limited by the ordinance of initiation with regard to the nature, scope and extent of the proposed wastewater collection project, but shall not be bound by or limited to the preliminary estimate of the costs of the proposed project. The costs of such project shall be determined upon the basis of construction bids publicly solicited by such urban-county government as required by KRS 67A.871 to 67A.894 , and shall be binding upon the government and upon the owners of benefited properties, whether they turn out to be equal to, below, or above, such preliminary estimate of costs.
  5. In the ordinance of initiation, the urban-county council shall make findings of fact regarding the degree and nature of benefit which will accrue to benefited properties by the installation of the project. In the event the urban-county council determines as a fact that groups of benefited properties, or all benefited properties, will be affected and benefited in substantially the same manner and to substantially the same degree, such urban-county council may determine that it is appropriate to classify benefited properties into one or more assessment zones based upon the similarity of benefits to be derived by benefited properties from installation of the project, and in such case, the urban-county council may deem all benefited properties within a particular assessment zone to be equally benefited and therefore equally treated for purposes of levying improvement benefit assessments to provide funds to pay the costs of the project. It is the intent of KRS 67A.871 to 67A.894 to vest in the urban-county council of any urban-county government undertaking a project, authority to make findings of fact in order to classify properties according to benefits conferred from the construction of projects, and such urban-county council may, as aforesaid, by appropriate ordinance, determine that identified groups of benefited properties will be benefited similarly by a project and shall therefore be treated equally for purposes of levying improvement benefit assessments upon such benefited properties. The urban-county council may accept and rely upon any pertinent data in making such findings of fact, including, the size and diameter of sanitary sewer service connections to be made available. In the event the urban-county council of the government shall determine that all properties situated within a particularly described classification or zone shall not receive substantially equal benefits from the project, the urban-county council shall determine in the ordinance of initiation that such properties shall be assessed for benefits conferred based upon the relative assessed land valuation of each benefited property as it relates to the aggregate assessed land valuation of all benefited properties within such particularly described classification or zone initially, when property owners shall be afforded the opportunity to pay improvement benefit assessments on a lump sum basis, and subsequently, during each annual period when bonds issued to provide for payment of costs of the project not paid by lump sum payments shall be outstanding. Findings of fact made by any urban-county council in accordance with the provisions of this section shall be entitled to a presumption of regularity and accuracy when based upon receipt of, and consideration of, factual data and information described in this section.
  6. The ordinance of initiation shall provide that a public hearing shall be held in respect of the proposed project at a time and place which shall be specified in the ordinance of initiation, and shall give notice that at the public hearing any owner of benefited property may appear and be heard as to whether the proposed project should be undertaken, whether the nature and scope of the project should be altered, and whether the project shall be financed through the assessment of benefited properties and issuance of bonds in respect of assessments not paid on a lump sum basis, all as proposed by the ordinance of initiation and as authorized by KRS 67A.871 to 67A.894 .
  7. The ordinance of initiation shall be published pursuant to KRS Chapter 424, and shall designate an individual, who shall be a member of the urban-county council or any government officer, to preside at the public hearing. In the absence of a designation in the ordinance of initiation, the mayor of the government shall preside at the public hearing. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the public hearing shall not be deemed irregular or improper if it is in fact presided over and conducted at the designated time and place by any official of the urban-county government.

History. Enact. Acts 1976, ch. 371, § 5, effective March 30, 1976.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Contracting for Preliminary Plans and Specifications.

There is no mandatory requirement in this section that the engineering contracts be authorized after the ordinance is passed; any language requiring the engineering work to be done after the passage of the ordinance is directory and not mandatory. The substance of the law is that in conjunction with initiating a wastewater collection project, the government is authorized to contract for preliminary plans, specifications and financial planning; the statute contains no mandatory language that consultants shall be retained only after the ordinance determining the need is passed. Conrad v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government, 659 S.W.2d 190, 1983 Ky. LEXIS 274 ( Ky. 1983 ).

Cited:

Cox v. Norton, 797 F.2d 329, 1986 U.S. App. LEXIS 27624 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1089, 107 S. Ct. 1298, 94 L. Ed. 2d 154, 1987 U.S. LEXIS 721 (1987).

67A.876. Notice of public hearing.

The urban-county government shall cause notice of the public hearing ordered to be held by the ordinance of initiation to be afforded to all owners of property proposed to be benefited by the project and to be assessed for the costs thereof. The notice shall be published pursuant to KRS Chapter 424, and in addition, such reasonable actual notice as is best suited to advise affected benefited property owners shall be given to owners of the benefited property using such methods as shall be determined by ordinance of the urban-county government to be the most practicable in the circumstances. The notice shall advise owners of benefited property that a public hearing shall be held in respect of the project and its financing, and that assessments to pay the costs of the project are proposed to be levied against all benefited properties.

History. Enact. Acts 1976, ch. 371, § 6, effective March 30, 1976.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Substantial Compliance.

An urban-county government’s failure to strictly comply with the legal publication requirements of KRS 424.120(1)(b), by publishing their ordinance concerning a sewer project in a newspaper that did not have the largest bona fide circulation in the area, was not reversible error where substantial compliance with the notification requirements had been achieved, in that the notice was published in the newspaper with the second largest circulation, individual notices were mailed to the affected property owners, and there was considerable publicity about the initiation of the sewer project by means of radio, television and newspaper coverage. Conrad v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government, 659 S.W.2d 190, 1983 Ky. LEXIS 274 ( Ky. 1983 ).

Cited:

Cox v. Norton, 797 F.2d 329, 1986 U.S. App. LEXIS 27624 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1089, 107 S. Ct. 1298, 94 L. Ed. 2d 154, 1987 U.S. LEXIS 721 (1987).

67A.877. Benefited properties — Later-connecting properties.

  1. The properties to be benefited by construction of a wastewater collection project shall consist of all real properties which are thereby afforded a means of draining wastewater from such properties, whether such real properties consist of unimproved land or contain improvements. Benefited properties shall include all real properties which are directly contiguous and abutting to any proposed sewer, lateral, main, outfall line, transmission line, interceptor, sewer easement to contain a project facility, or other project facility into which sanitary discharge and drainage of wastewater may be accomplished, whether the project sewer facility be constructed by application of the proceeds of the bonds or from funds otherwise made available by the government. Provided, however, the urban-county council of the government undertaking a project may adopt reasonable rules and regulations in respect of benefited property, and may exclude real properties which the urban-county council deems appropriate for exclusion because of location, size or other special circumstances.
  2. The urban-county council of the government may determine, either in the ordinance of initiation or in subsequent proceedings, the necessity and desirability in the interests of the public health, safety and general welfare, that properties other than the benefited properties be permitted to connect to a wastewater collection project in the future, and may make equitable provisions which may be adjustable from year to year as bonds are retired, whereby the owners of such later-connecting properties may, by paying charges for the privilege of connecting and by assuming assessment obligations, be placed as nearly as practicable on a basis of financial equity with the owners of property initially provided to be benefited and assessed.
  3. Benefited property owned by any city, county, or urban-county government (or owned by the United States of America or any of its agencies, if such property is subject to assessment by Act of Congress), shall be assessed annually the same as private property, and the amount of the annual assessment shall be paid by the city, county, urban-county government or United States government, as the case may be.
  4. Benefited property owned by the Commonwealth of Kentucky, except property the title to which is vested in the Commonwealth for the benefit of a district board of education pursuant to KRS 162.010 , shall be assessed as follows: Before assessing the Commonwealth, the urban-county council shall serve written notice on the secretary of the Finance and Administration Cabinet of the Commonwealth, setting forth specific details, including the estimated aggregate total amount of any improvement benefit assessment proposed to be levied against any property of the Commonwealth relative to the project. Said written notice shall be served prior to the next even-numbered-year regular session of the General Assembly of Kentucky so that the amount of any specific improvement assessment may be included in the biennial executive branch budget recommendation to be submitted to the General Assembly. Payment of any assessment shall be made only from funds specifically appropriated for that assessment. If an amount sufficient to pay the total amount of an assessment has been appropriated, then the total amount shall be paid, as and when due. If an amount sufficient only to pay annual assessment has been appropriated, then only the amount of the annual assessment shall be paid. The amount of the assessment shall be certified by the commissioner of finance of the urban-county government to the Finance and Administration Cabinet, which shall thereupon draw a warrant upon the State Treasurer payable to the government and the State Treasurer shall pay the same.
  5. In the case of property the title to which is vested in the Commonwealth for the benefit of a district board of education, the amount of the annual assessment shall be paid by the city, county, urban-county government or other local governmental agency or authority which represents the taxing authority of such board of education.
  6. No benefited property shall be exempt from assessment, except as herein provided.

History. Enact. Acts 1976, ch. 371, § 7, effective March 30, 1976; 1978, ch. 155, § 41, effective June 17, 1978; 1982, ch. 450, § 63, effective July 1, 1983; 2001, ch. 58, § 13, effective June 21, 2001.

67A.878. Public hearing.

A public hearing shall be held at the time and place designated in the ordinance of initiation. Any person qualifying under the provisions of KRS 67A.875(7) shall preside and conduct the hearing. The presiding officer shall cause reasonable notes or minutes of the proceedings to be made, and they shall be submitted in writing to a subsequent regularly scheduled meeting of the urban-county council of the government. Any owner of property proposed to be benefited by the proposed wastewater collection project may appear and be heard at the public hearing, either in person or by a duly authorized representative. Any such owner of benefited property may submit to the presiding officer or to the designated clerk a written instrument in which such owner of benefited property is identified by name, address and designation of benefited property, and containing a statement of any reason for advocating or objecting to any of the aspects of the proposed project, and such written instruments shall be attached to and included in the written report of the hearing. Whether or not any such written instruments are submitted, the presiding officer at the public hearing may require those in attendance to execute an attendance roster, to properly identify themselves as owners of benefited property or representatives of the owners, and may impose reasonable rules upon the conduct of the public hearing. The estimated costs of the project shall be disclosed at the public hearing, or, if construction bids for construction of the project have been received, the results of the bidding shall be disclosed. A report of local health agencies may be made a part of the public hearing, and the government may cause distribution of informative materials and summarizations of engineering and health reports to be carried out at the public hearing. The public hearing may be adjourned to convene again, and from time to time either at a time and place announced at the public hearing or upon public notice of the time and place to be given in any manner the government may determine.

History. Enact. Acts 1976, ch. 371, § 8, effective March 30, 1976.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Due Process.

Due process does not require a perfect hearing, but rather that there be provided an orderly process whereby property owners can object to the project, the estimated cost of the project, the method of financing the project, and the general amount of such assessments. Cox v. Norton, 797 F.2d 329, 1986 U.S. App. LEXIS 27624 (6th Cir. Ky. 1986 ), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1089, 107 S. Ct. 1298, 94 L. Ed. 2d 154, 1987 U.S. LEXIS 721 (U.S. 1987).

67A.879. Consideration of written report of public hearing — Ordinance of determination.

At a subsequent regular meeting of the urban-county council of the government, the written report of the public hearing shall be publicly received and considered by the urban-county council. At the meeting, or any subsequent, properly convened, regular, adjourned or special meeting of the urban-county council, prior to enactment of the ordinance of determination, owners of benefited properties may again be heard in person or by representatives. At any subsequent regular meeting, the urban-county council, following receipt of facts and data determined by it to be sufficient in the premises regarding the wastewater collection project, including the report of public hearing, data submitted by local health authorities, if any, engineering information and data, statements by owners of benefited properties, and any other data deemed relevant, may adopt an ordinance, designated as the ordinance of determination, with respect to the project which may provide for either: (1) the undertaking of the project with provision for the financing thereof as previously set forth in the ordinance of initiation; (2) the abandonment of the project; or (3) the alteration of the nature and scope of the project, in which event the procedure for ordinance of initiation and public hearing shall be repeated pursuant to the provisions of KRS 67A.871 to 67A.894 . The ordinance of determination shall be published as provided by KRS Chapter 424.

History. Enact. Acts 1976, ch. 371, § 9, effective March 30, 1976.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

Cox v. Norton, 797 F.2d 329, 1986 U.S. App. LEXIS 27624 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1089, 107 S. Ct. 1298, 94 L. Ed. 2d 154, 1987 U.S. LEXIS 721 (1987).

67A.880. Action by property owner for relief from ordinance of determination.

  1. Any owner of property to be benefited by the wastewater collection project may, within thirty (30) days after passage and publication of the ordinance of determination:
    1. File an action in the Circuit Court of the county in which the urban-county government is situated seeking relief by declaratory judgment, injunction or otherwise; or
    2. File in the office of the clerk of the urban-county government a written statement of intent to file such an action endorsed by a licensed attorney-at-law to the effect that in his opinion his client has a reasonable and legitimate probable cause for such proposed litigation, in which event the time for filing the action shall be extended for fifteen (15) days after the date the statement is filed.
  2. In the event of the occurrence of either (a) or (b) above, all proceedings of the government with respect to the proposed wastewater collection project shall be abated until final judicial determination of the controversies presented thereby. In the absence of action by any owner of property proposed to be benefited as herein provided, the provisions of the ordinance of determination shall be final and binding. After the lapse of time as herein provided, all actions by owners of properties to be benefited shall be forever barred.

History. Enact. Acts 1976, ch. 371, § 10, effective March 30, 1976.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality of Limitation.

The 30-day statute of limitations is constitutional and was within the power of the General Assembly to enact. Conrad v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government, 659 S.W.2d 190, 1983 Ky. LEXIS 274 ( Ky. 1983 ).

2. Purpose.

The primary purpose of such a short statute of limitations as provided for in this section is to be able to determine if there is going to be litigation and if so, to resolve it expeditiously since pending litigation is usually fatal to the issuance or marketing of bonds. Cox v. Norton, 797 F.2d 329, 1986 U.S. App. LEXIS 27624 (6th Cir. Ky. 1986 ), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1089, 107 S. Ct. 1298, 94 L. Ed. 2d 154, 1987 U.S. LEXIS 721 (U.S. 1987).

67A.881. Action by council when ordinance of determination upheld.

If the ordinance of determination authorizes the undertaking of the project and the financing thereof according to the plan of financing enacted by the ordinance of initiation, and if owners of benefited properties do not institute action as permitted by KRS 67A.880 , or if such action be taken and shall result in final judgment permitting the government to proceed according to the ordinance of initiation and the ordinance of determination, the urban-county council of the government may proceed to implement and finance the costs of construction of the project as authorized by KRS 67A.871 to 67A.894 .

History. Enact. Acts 1976, ch. 371, § 11, effective March 30, 1976.

67A.882. Bids — Apportionment of costs — Alternative payment methods and funding — Refunds by urban-county government.

  1. Proposals for the construction of the project shall be solicited upon the basis of submission of sealed, competitive bids after advertisement by publication pursuant to KRS Chapter 424, following adoption of the ordinance of determination and expiration of the permissive litigation period, or alternatively, the conclusion of litigation in a manner favorable to the project.
  2. After all costs of the project have been determined upon the basis of the construction bidding, the costs shall be apportioned among the owners of benefited property pursuant to the method of assessment previously determined in the ordinance of initiation and the ordinance of determination. However, in determining the apportionment of individual costs for purposes of affording to the owners of benefited property the privilege of paying the assessment levies in full on a lump-sum basis, the urban-county government shall exclude amounts required for the creation of the debt service reserve fund, capitalized interest costs, and any bond discount which the government may allow in connection with the sale of bonds to provide funds for the costs of construction not paid initially by the owners of benefited properties on a lump-sum basis.
  3. The owners of benefited property shall be notified in writing of the exact amount levied against their individual properties, which amount may, at the option of each owner, be paid in full on a lump-sum basis within thirty (30) days. Such owners shall be notified that in the event they exercise the option to pay in full on a lump-sum basis and in the event any refund of lump-sum payments or of interest earned on lump-sum payments is subsequently made, it shall be paid to the owners of the benefited properties for which lump-sum payments have been made as determined at the date the appropriate ordinance under either KRS 67A.894 or subsection (5) of this section is adopted. The statement submitted to such owners of benefited property shall additionally advise such owners that in the event such owners do not elect to pay the special improvement benefit assessment in full within the period of thirty (30) days from receipt, the urban-county government shall issue bonds pursuant to KRS 67A.871 to 67A.894 for the purpose of providing the cost of construction of the project, including the debt service reserve fund, if paid from bond proceeds, capitalized interest costs, any bond discount, together with all other costs, as the term is defined in KRS 67A.871 (5). The owners of the benefited property shall further be advised that bonds and the interest thereon shall be amortized by annual improvement benefit assessment levies against all benefited properties which have not made lump-sum payments in accordance with the method of apportionment provided by the ordinance of initiation and the ordinance of determination.
  4. At the conclusion of the thirty (30) day permissive lump-sum payment period, the urban-county council shall determine the aggregate principal amount of improvement benefit assessments paid in full by owners of benefited property; shall order the deposit of the moneys in a trust account the principal of which shall be used solely to pay the costs of construction of the project; shall aggregate all unpaid improvement benefit assessments for purposes of determining the principal amount of bonds to be issued by the government to provide the costs of the project; shall compute the debt service reserve fund in respect to the bonds, if the fund is to be capitalized from bond proceeds; shall determine the bond discount and capitalized interest which shall be applicable to the issue of bonds; and shall proceed to complete the financing of the costs of construction of the project through the adoption of the ordinance of bond authorization as provided in KRS 67A.883 and the sale of bonds authorized pursuant thereto.
  5. If an urban-county government has taken steps under KRS 67A.871 to 67A.893 to provide for, construct and finance any project, and finally determines, by appropriate ordinance, that the project is essentially completed, the legislative body of the urban-county government may, in its discretion, refund any part, or all, of the interest earned on lump-sum payments, pro rata, to the current owners of the benefited properties which paid on a lump-sum basis, as determined at the date the ordinance determining the project is essentially completed is adopted.

History. Enact. Acts 1976, ch. 371, § 12, effective March 30, 1976; 1982, ch. 334, § 1, effective July 15, 1982; 2005, ch. 85, § 95, effective June 20, 2005.

67A.883. Ordinance of bond authorization — Trust indenture.

  1. Following compliance with the foregoing provisions of KRS 67A.871 to 67A.882 , the urban-county council of the government may adopt an ordinance known as the ordinance of bond authorization. The ordinance of bond authorization shall make provision, for the following:
    1. Determining and confirming the nature and scope of the project, the real properties to be benefited thereby (which shall be all benefited properties identified in the ordinance of initiation and the ordinance of determination, excepting properties as to which lump sum payment of improvement benefit assessment levies has been made within the statutory period), the exact method of assessment of benefited properties and the costs of the projects;
    2. Authorizing the issuance of bonds of the government from time to time which shall be designated “improvement lien bonds” and which shall additionally identify the project by reference to its name or title;
    3. Determining the principal amount of the bond issue, subject to the provisions of KRS 67A.891 ;
    4. Establishing the denomination and maturity dates of the bonds, which may be term or serial maturities not to exceed thirty (30) years from date of issue, and providing for the issuance of the bonds in series, if so ordered, each such series to be equally secured on a pari passus basis by improvement benefit assessments levied on all benefited properties and by liens in respect thereto;
    5. Levying an annual improvement benefit assessment effective upon the benefited properties, except such properties for which lump sum payment of the improvement benefit assessment has been made pursuant to KRS 67A.882 (3), pursuant to the assessed value basis according to either their respective assessed land values as determined for purposes of general ad valorem taxation, or upon a basis of equality by zones, pursuant to findings of fact by the urban-county council that benefited properties in particular zone classifications are to be treated equally for assessment purposes because of substantial equality of benefits conferred, such assessments to be made without regard to any constitutional or other limits otherwise applicable to taxation for general ad valorem purposes, the annual rate of such improvement assessment to be fixed when regular county ad valorem taxes are levied and to be sufficient in each year to provide for the payment of the bonds and interest coupons as they mature; and, in each year until accrual of the debt service reserve requirement, to be sufficient to provide in addition a sum equal to twenty percent (20%) of maximum annual principal and interest requirements, the same to constitute a debt service reserve fund as a precaution against possible default by reason of failures in the collection of the annual levies as hereinafter provided; provided, however, that in the event the government shall have provided that the debt service reserve requirement be financed from bond proceeds as one of the costs of the project, such additional levies to accrue, the debt service reserve requirement shall be omitted, but it shall be promptly instituted at any time in order to maintain the debt service reserve requirement at its prescribed level;
    6. Covenanting with the holders of the bonds and coupons that until the payment in full thereof the government will levy annually an improvement benefit assessment upon each benefited property, as provided in the foregoing subsection (e) hereof; provided, that the government may provide by ordinance that certain benefited properties shall be omitted from assessment during initial periods not to exceed three (3) years because of construction scheduling;
    7. Covenanting with the holders of the bonds and coupons that until payment in full thereof, the government will pursue and exhaust at the expense of the government all remedies available to the government for the benefit and protection of the bondholders, including both termination of water service to delinquent real properties and enforcement of judgment and decretal sale of the liens upon benefited properties which are granted by KRS 67A.871 to 67A.894 ;
    8. Designating one or more places of payment of principal and interest within or without the Commonwealth;
    9. Specifying or omitting provisions for redemption and payment prior to stated maturities and the terms thereof;
    10. Providing for the payment by the government of any and all reasonable and customary charges for the services of trustees and paying agents to the end that the holders of the bonds and coupons will receive the sums therein stipulated without deduction for such charges; and
    11. Any other provisions not contrary to law. The government is expressly authorized and empowered to finance any particular project by an issue of bonds which may be sold and delivered in one or more series, each of which series is equally and indistinguishably secured, as provided in KRS 67A.871 to 67A.894 , by improvement benefit assessments levied upon all benefited properties, except such properties for which lump sum payment of the improvement benefit assessment has been made pursuant to KRS 67A.882(3) and liens granted for the security of bondholders by KRS 67A.871 to 67A.894 on benefited properties shall apply to each such benefited property and in favor of every bond of each such series, whenever issued.
  2. In the discretion of the urban-county council of the government, any improvement lien bonds or bond anticipation notes issued under the provisions of KRS 67A.871 to 67A.894 may be secured by a trust indenture by and between the government and a corporate trustee, which may be any trust company or bank having the powers of a trust company within or without the Commonwealth of Kentucky. The trust indenture of the government providing for the issuance of improvement lien bonds or notes may pledge or assign for the security of improvement lien bonds or notes all or any part of the totality of improvement benefit assessments levied, collected, enforced and received by the government. The trust indenture shall contain provisions for protecting and enforcing the rights and remedies of the bondholders as may be reasonable, proper and not in violation of law, including covenants and provisions setting forth the duties of the government in relation to the purposes to which improvement lien bond proceeds may be applied; the disposition and pledging of receipts of improvement benefit assessments; and the custody, safeguarding and application of all improvement benefit assessment revenues. It shall be lawful for any bank or trust company incorporated under the laws of the Commonwealth which may act as depository of the proceeds of bonds, notes or of government revenues, to furnish indemnity bonds or to pledge securities as may be required by the trust indenture of the government. Any trust indenture may set forth the rights and remedies of the bondholders and of the indenture trustee and may restrict the individual right of action by bondholders. In addition to the foregoing, any trust indenture may contain any other provisions as the government may determine to be reasonable and proper for the further security of the holders of the bonds. All expenses incurred in carrying out the provisions of the trust indenture shall be treated as a part of the costs of the project and shall be paid from either the proceeds of the bonds or, during the life of the bond issue, from the proceeds of improvement benefit assessments levied against and collected from, benefited properties.
  3. All bonds issued under the provisions of KRS 67A.871 to 67A.894 shall have and are hereby declared to possess all of the qualities and incidences of negotiable instruments under the laws of Kentucky. The bonds may be issued in coupon or in registered form or in both, as the government may determine, and provision may be made for the registration of any coupon bonds as to principal only and also as to both principal and interest and for the reconversion into coupon bonds of any bonds registered as to both principal and interest. The government may sell the bonds in any manner either at public or private sale, and for any price as it may determine will best effect the purposes of KRS 67A.871 to 67A.894 .
  4. Any government initiating a project pursuant to KRS 67A.871 to 67A.894 shall have and possess all powers and the authority set forth in KRS 58.150 .

History. Enact. Acts 1976, ch. 371, § 13, effective March 30, 1976; 1982, ch. 334, § 2, effective July 15, 1982.

67A.884. Assistance agreement with Kentucky Pollution Abatement Authority. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1976, ch. 371, § 14, effective March 30, 1976) was repealed by Acts 2005, ch. 85, § 700, effective June 20, 2005.

67A.885. Deposit of funds — Security — Interest.

When any bonds are delivered and the proceeds are received by the government, they shall be deposited in a bank or trust company or combined bank and trust company, and to the extent the deposit may exceed insurance provided by federal deposit insurance corporation, the same shall be secured by a valid pledge of direct bonds or notes of the United States government or bonds or notes fully guaranteed thereby having at all times a market value equal to the undisbursed balance of such deposit; or shall be secured in any other manner as the urban-county council may approve. Costs of the project shall be paid from the proceeds of the bonds pursuant to such regulations and requirements as shall be determined by the government and incorporated into the ordinance of bond authorization. There shall be set aside into the sinking fund hereinafter created a sum from bond proceeds equal to all interest which will accrue on the bonds until the date when the first improvement benefit assessment levied in connection therewith will become due and payable, together with such further sum as may be provided in the ordinance of bond authorization, not to exceed interest on the bonds for a period of three (3) years. If provided in the ordinance of bond authorization, all or any portion of the debt service reserve requirement shall be set aside into the debt service reserve fund. If after completion, acceptance and payment of the work of all contractors and the payment of all costs of the project there shall remain an unexpended balance of bond proceeds, the balance shall be transferred to the sinking fund created and maintained in connection with the project as provided by KRS 67A.871 to 67A.894 .

History. Enact. Acts 1976, ch. 371, § 15, effective March 30, 1976.

67A.886. Bonds not indebtedness of government.

Each of the bonds shall bear on its face the statement that it has been issued under the provisions of KRS 67A.871 to 67A.894 and that it does not constitute an indebtedness of the government within the meaning of the Constitution of Kentucky. The bonds and the receipt of interest thereon shall not be subject to taxation. The bonds and the interest thereon shall be payable solely and only from the proceeds of the annual improvement benefit assessments levied by the government from time to time upon the properties benefited by the project identified in the bonds and from the debt service reserve fund; the government shall become directly and personally liable to the bondholders for any deficiencies which may arise as a direct result of failure by the government to pursue to exhaustion and in timely fashion all remedies lawfully available in the collection of such improvement assessments.

History. Enact. Acts 1976, ch. 371, § 16, effective March 30, 1976.

67A.887. Annual levy of assessment against benefited property.

The sum necessary to be raised annually for the sinking fund and consequent amortization of the outstanding bonds, whether all authorized bonds have been issued or not (together with the sum of any amounts required annually to pay trustees’ fees, paying agents’ fees, cost of administration of the project, and the cost of billing, collecting and enforcing improvement benefit assessments, including fees of proper governmental bodies incident to placing assessment bills on tax statements, and collecting, enforcing and remitting same), shall be levied and assessed from time to time against the benefited properties pursuant to the prior determinations made by the government in respect of benefits received. If the urban-county council of the government has determined that all benefited properties within classified zones are substantially equally benefited and that all therein shall be assessed equally, the same assessment levy shall be made against each benefited property within a classified zone. In other cases, if any, the sum necessary to be raised annually for amortization of the bonds shall be levied and assessed against the benefited properties in the proportion that the assessed value of each individual lot, parcel or tract for urban-county government ad valorem taxation shall bear to the whole assessed value of all the benefited properties as shown by the records upon which urban-county government ad valorem taxation may from time to time be based. Where there is no such record, as in the case of public property or property owned by religious, charitable or educational institutions, the same (except that owned by the United States government) shall be specially assessed by the proper assessing officers and for such special assessment reasonable compensation shall be paid. Any such special assessment shall be subject to all procedures for equalization and judicial review as may be provided by law in connection with ordinary assessments.

History. Enact. Acts 1976, ch. 371, § 17, effective March 30, 1976.

Opinions of Attorney General.

A county board of education can constitutionally pay a privilege fee for connecting to a public sewer system. A privilege fee to fund construction of a sewer system is a “public school purpose” if it bears a rational relationship to the value of the services provided to the public schools. A fee based on usage and acreage meets this standard because it is proportional to the services provided. OAG 2009-01 .

67A.888. Time of levy — Date taxes due — Collection of improvement benefit assessments.

The annual improvement benefit assessment for the project shall be levied by the government against benefited properties, except such properties for which lump-sum payment of the improvement benefit assessment has been made pursuant to KRS 67A.882(3), when the levy for general urban-county government taxes is made; and such improvement benefit assessment levy shall be due at the same time when general urban-county government taxes are due and shall be subject to the same penalties and accrual of interest in the event of nonpayment as in the case of the general urban-county government taxes. Improvement benefit assessments shall be collected by the urban-county government officers charged with responsibility for the collection of ad valorem taxes and shall be enforced in like manner.

History. Enact. Acts 1976, ch. 371, § 18, effective March 30, 1976; 1982, ch. 334, § 3, effective July 15, 1982.

67A.889. Lien for annual improvement assessment.

Each annual improvement assessment, with any penalty or interest incident to the nonpayment thereof, shall constitute a lien upon the lot or parcel of benefited property against which it is assessed. The lien shall attach to each lot or parcel of benefited property as the same is described by the owner’s deed of record in the county clerk’s office at the time of the publication of the ordinance of initiation, as provided, and thereupon shall take precedence over all other liens, whether created prior to or subsequent to the publication of the ordinance, except state and county taxes, general municipal taxes, and prior improvement assessments and shall not be defeated or postponed by any private or judicial sales, by any mortgage, or by any error or mistake in the description of the property or in the names of the owners. No error in the proceedings of the urban-county council shall exempt any benefited property from the lien for the improvement assessment, or from the payment thereof, or from the penalties or interest thereon, as herein provided. No error in the proceedings of the urban-county council shall exempt any property from liability for payment of any annual improvement assessment, or for any interest or penalty incident to nonpayment thereof. The urban-county council of the government shall have power to make such rules and orders as may be required to properly administer the project.

History. Enact. Acts 1976, ch. 371, § 19, effective March 30, 1976; 1978, ch. 384, § 154, effective June 17, 1978.

67A.890. Proceeds to be kept in separate account — Sinking fund.

The proceeds received by the government from each annual improvement assessment levy made in connection with the project, as authorized by KRS 67A.871 to 67A.894 , shall be segregated from and kept always separate and apart from all other receipts of the government from all other sources, and shall be deposited in a separate and special account in a financial institution in an account so specially designated by number or other designation as to identify it in such manner as to distinguish the receipts and deposits from the project from the receipts and deposits from every other project, and from any other account or fund of the government. It shall constitute the “sinking fund” referred to in KRS 67A.871 to 67A.894 .

History. Enact. Acts 1976, ch. 371, § 20, effective March 30, 1976.

67A.891. Uses of sinking fund.

All sums received and deposited in the sinking fund shall be held inviolate and applied by the government, or the trustee in respect of the bonds solely for the payment of the principal of, and interest on, the bonds issued for the financing of the identified project. The amount levied, collected and deposited in the sinking fund from initial improvement assessment levies in connection with the project, in excess of maturing principal and interest of the bonds and equal to twenty percent (20%) of maximum annual principal and interest requirements, for the purpose of creating the debt service reserve fund shall be held in the sinking fund as a special reserve for that purpose. Such excess levies shall continue annually until the debt service reserve requirement has been accrued in the debt service reserve fund in respect of all outstanding bonds; provided that the debt service reserve requirement may be funded from the proceeds of the bonds. If, at the time of any annual levy of the improvement assessment, the sum held in the sinking fund as debt service reserve fund shall exceed the debt service reserve requirement, such excess may be taken into account in fixing the rate of the improvement benefit assessment for the ensuing year; and if the amount so held in the debt service reserve fund is below the specified level, the next annual improvement assessment levy shall be increased in a corresponding manner so as to accrue the debt service reserve requirement. In making the improvement assessment levy for the year preceding the final maturity of bonds for any project, the urban-county council may take into account, and make allowance for the amount held in the sinking fund of the project as the debt service reserve fund; and if in making the levy the urban-county council shall miscalculate and provide funds insufficient to pay the final maturing principal and interest, the governing body shall be authorized, and shall be required, to make a subsequent improvement assessment levy upon the benefited properties sufficient to make up the deficiency, with interest to date of payment. If the procedures required by KRS 67A.871 to 67A.894 shall result in a surplus after payment and discharge of the bonds, and all interest thereon to date of payment, such surplus shall be refunded, pro rata, to the owners of benefited properties, as determined at the date the surplus is ascertained by the governing body to exist.

History. Enact. Acts 1976, ch. 371, § 21, effective March 30, 1976.

67A.892. Insufficiency of lump-sum payments and bonds.

If, by reason of miscalculation or the happening of unforeseen events or conditions, the total proceeds of the lump-sum payments and bonds authorized by the ordinance of bond authorization should prove to be insufficient to provide for the completion of the project and the payment in full of all costs thereof, the urban-county government shall be responsible for any such deficiency.

History. Enact. Acts 1976, ch. 371, § 22, effective March 30, 1976; 1982, ch. 334, § 4, effective July 15, 1982.

67A.893. Sewer connection mandatory.

In the interests of the health, safety, and welfare of the general public and for the protection of the public health, the government is authorized and empowered, by ordinance, to mandatorily require the owners of all benefited properties to cause any improvements capable of the generation of wastewater situated on such benefited properties to be connected to the facilities of the wastewater collection project. Urban-county governments are authorized and empowered to covenant with the holders of bonds to order mandatory connection of all improved premises situated upon benefited properties to the facilities of a project financed pursuant to KRS 67A.871 to 67A.894 .

History. Enact. Acts 1976, ch. 371, § 23, effective March 30, 1976.

67A.894. Return of funds if project not completed.

If an urban-county government has taken any steps under KRS 67A.871 to 67A.893 to provide for, construct or finance any project, and for any reason the project cannot be completed according to the provisions of KRS 67A.871 to 67A.893 , the government shall return all improvement benefit assessments paid in full by owners of benefited property on a lump-sum basis to the owners of such benefited properties, as determined at the date the ordinance determining the project cannot be completed is adopted. Any interest earned on such prepayments shall be applied by the government to the payment of any costs resulting from effort to carry out the project, and any remainder shall be returned, pro rata, to such owners of benefited property. Thereafter, such urban-county government may proceed to finance and construct the project in any other manner authorized by law.

History. Enact. Acts 1976, ch. 371, § 26, effective March 30, 1976; 1982, ch. 334, § 5, effective July 15, 1982.

Motor Vehicle Parking Authorities

67A.910. Declaration of public need and legislative policy.

  1. It is hereby found and declared that there now exists in urban counties in this Commonwealth a lack of parking space for automobiles in main business and professional areas including but not limited to those areas commonly referred to as “downtown”. It is further found that persons commonly referred to as “shoppers”, are induced to transact business in areas providing free parking facilities for reasonable lengths of time. It is further found that many “downtown” or main business areas have deteriorated as a consequence of inadequate or too costly parking facilities and that the tax base has often decreased while the need for governmental services, such as police, fire, and accident protection and street maintenance has often increased all to the detriment of the entire community.
  2. It is hereby declared that it is the policy of this Commonwealth to protect and promote the safety, comfort, convenience, and welfare of the people of the Commonwealth and particularly of the communities in which there exists inadequate or too costly parking in “downtown” or main business areas and in which the tax base is decreasing or is threatened. It is further declared that adequate and reasonably priced parking facilities promote the safety, comfort, convenience and welfare of the people living and working in all sections of any community but that the greatest benefit falls upon property owners, businesses, and professional persons owning property or offering their goods and services in close proximity to such parking facilities.

History. Enact. Acts 1976, ch. 287, § 9.

67A.912. Definitions.

As used in this chapter unless the context requires otherwise:

  1. “Authority” means a local parking authority as created by KRS 67A.914 .
  2. “Commissioner” means a person appointed to serve on the governing body of a local parking authority.
  3. “District” means an area designated by the ordinance creating, under the supervision of the local parking authority, a local parking district that is deemed to be specially benefited.
  4. “Subdistrict” means a part of a district having a different degree of benefit from the remainder of the district.
  5. “Local legislative body” means the governing body of any urban-county government whether it be designated as a city commission, city council or any other similar designation.
  6. “Project” means any undertaking within or near a local parking district.

History. Enact. Acts 1976, ch. 287, § 10.

67A.914. Creation of parking authority.

The local legislative body of any county governed under urban-county statutes may, by resolution, create and establish an agency to be known by the name of the largest city in such county and the name of the county itself, separated by the word “and” and the words “parking authority”. That agency shall exist for each urban-county government with the powers, duties, and functions as hereinafter provided.

History. Enact. Acts 1976, ch. 287, § 11.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Sovereign immunity.

Parking Authority of River City, Inc., was not entitled to sovereign immunity from a slip and fall claim where its authority and actions under Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 67A.914 and 67A.920 were corporate, rather than governmental. Parking Auth. of River City, Inc. v. Bridgefield Cas. Ins. Co., 477 S.W.3d 598, 2015 Ky. App. LEXIS 152 (Ky. Ct. App. 2015).

67A.916. Commissioners — Term — Bylaws.

  1. Upon adoption of the resolution creating a parking authority as set out in KRS 67A.914 , the mayor shall within three (3) days appoint, with the approval of a majority of the legislative body, five (5) residents of the urban-county area as commissioners of the local parking authority.
  2. Three (3) of the commissioners who are first appointed shall be designated to serve for terms of one (1), two (2), and three (3) years, respectively, and the remaining two (2) of such commissioners shall be designated to serve for four (4) years each, from the date of their appointment. A commissioner shall hold office until his successor has been appointed and qualified. Thereafter all commissioners shall serve four (4) year terms.
  3. The commissioners shall collectively be known as the board of commissioners of the local parking authority and shall constitute its governing body. The local parking authority shall elect a chairman and vice chairman from among the members of its board of commissioners. The term of office for each of those officers, unless otherwise prescribed by the authority, shall be for the calendar year or that portion thereof remaining after each such officer is designated or elected.
  4. The board of commissioners may adopt bylaws not inconsistent with this chapter, to implement the powers and duties granted by KRS 67A.910 to 67A.928 .

History. Enact. Acts 1976, ch. 287, § 12.

67A.918. Duties of commissioners.

The board of commissioners shall:

  1. Study the need for new parking facilities within the urban-county and report the results of such study to the legislative body.
  2. Study the need for parking space to be provided without charge to certain classes of users within one or more districts of the urban-county and report the results of such study to the legislative body.
  3. If the authority finds a need for one or more parking districts it may make a report which shall:
    1. Describe the outside boundaries of the proposed local parking district giving due consideration to benefit rendered to each parcel or tract of real estate so included.
    2. Describe the boundaries within the proposed parking district or such subdistricts as may be required to properly adjust for various degrees of benefit to each subdistrict within the local parking district.
    3. Propose parking facilities or structures to be acquired or constructed and give the expected cost of such facilities.
    4. Propose a plan of assessment or taxation or both to be imposed on businesses, professions, and real estate located within the proposed parking district consistent with the fiscal needs of the district.
  4. The authority shall report the results of its study to the legislative body, describing the outside boundaries of the area to be benefited, the nature and extent of benefit, the nature and cost of the facilities proposed, and the details of the plan of assessment or taxation, or both, proposed to be imposed on businesses, professions, and real estate located within the proposed parking district. If the legislative body finds that the general plan is in the public interest, the legislative body shall set by resolution a time and place for a first public hearing on the proposal. A notice of the time and place of the hearing, including the complete text of the report of the authority to the legislative body, shall be published pursuant to KRS Chapter 424. The hearing shall be held before the legislative body, with the mayor presiding.
  5. After the public hearing the legislative body may:
    1. By resolution determine that no local parking district is in the best interests of the urban-county government.
    2. Resubmit the original study and report to the authority with directions to make specific changes.
    3. Make such changes to the proposed boundaries of the district and subdistricts (if any) as may be deemed necessary and make such changes to the proposed ad valorem tax rates or occupational taxes as may be found necessary in keeping with the revenue needs of the district and the benefit expected to be derived to the various recipients. Once such changes are made, the legislative body may create by ordinance the existence of a local parking district incorporating into the ordinance any amendments.

History. Enact. Acts 1976, ch. 287, § 13.

67A.920. Powers of parking authority.

  1. Each parking authority created under the authority of KRS 67A.914 shall constitute a public body, corporate and politic, and shall have the following powers in addition to the others granted:
    1. To sue and be sued; to have a seal; to make and execute contracts and other instruments necessary or convenient to the exercise of its powers;
    2. To make, and from time to time amend and repeal bylaws, rules and regulations in order to effect the purpose of this chapter;
    3. To hire and maintain such staff personnel as may be required;
    4. To purchase, lease, obtain option upon, acquire by gift, grant, bequest, devise or otherwise, any real or personal property, including air space, or any interest therein, together with any improvements thereon; to demolish buildings and clear improvements from any of its real property and dispose of any personal property resulting therefrom; to dispose of any real or personal property at its fair value; to rent, lease, construct, maintain, manage, operate, repair parking facilities and structures and other real property located within or within reasonable proximity to the parking districts;
    5. To borrow from and to accept loans and grants from the federal, state, urban-county governments or any agency thereof, or from any sources, public or private, and to pledge such security as may be required;
    6. To invest any funds held in reserves or sinking funds or any funds not required for immediate disbursements, in property or securities in which savings banks may legally invest funds subject to their control; to purchase its bonds at a price not more than the principal amount thereof and accrued interest, all bonds so purchased to be cancelled;
    7. To plan, design and locate parking facilities and structures at, below, or above the surface of the earth;
    8. To contract with any suitable and qualified person, firm or corporation for construction or for operation of any parking facility or structure as is found to be in the public interest;
    9. To covenant as to the use of any or all of its real or personal property; and to covenant as to the maintenance of its real and personal property the replacement thereof, the insurance to be carried thereon and the use and disposition of insurance moneys;
    10. To covenant as to the rights, liabilities, powers and duties arising upon the breach of any covenant, condition, or obligation; and to covenant and prescribe as to events of default and terms and conditions upon which any or all of its bonds or obligations shall become or may be declared due before maturity, and as to the terms and conditions upon which such declaration and its consequences may be waived;
    11. To vest in a trustee or trustees or the holders of bonds or any proportion of them the right to enforce the payment of the bonds or trustees the right in the event of a default by said agency, to take possession of any project or part thereof, and to collect the rents and revenues arising therefrom, or due the agency in connection therewith, and to dispose of such moneys in accordance with the agreement of the agency with said trustee; to provide for the powers and duties of a trustee or trustees and to limit the liabilities thereof; and to provide the terms and conditions upon which the trustee or trustees of the holders of bonds or any proportion of them may enforce any covenant or rights securing or relating to the bonds;
    12. To exercise all or any part or combination of the powers herein granted; to make covenants other than and in addition to the covenants herein expressly authorized of like or different character; to make such covenants and to do any and all such acts and things as may be necessary or convenient or desirable in order to secure its bonds, or, in the discretion of said agency, except as otherwise provided in this chapter, as will tend to make the bonds more marketable notwithstanding that such covenants, acts, or things may not be enumerated herein.
  2. The bonds, notes and other obligations of an authority are declared to be issued for an essential public and government purpose, and together with interest thereon and income therefrom shall be exempt from all taxes.

History. Enact. Acts 1976, ch. 287, § 14.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Sovereign immunity.

Parking Authority of River City, Inc., was not entitled to sovereign immunity from a slip and fall claim where its authority and actions under Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 67A.914 and 67A.920 were corporate, rather than governmental. Parking Auth. of River City, Inc. v. Bridgefield Cas. Ins. Co., 477 S.W.3d 598, 2015 Ky. App. LEXIS 152 (Ky. Ct. App. 2015).

67A.922. Power to issue bonds.

  1. A parking authority shall have power to issue bonds from time to time under this chapter. An authority shall also have power to issue refunding bonds for the purpose of paying or retiring bonds previously issued by it. An authority may issue bonds on which the principal and interest are payable:
    1. Exclusively from the income and revenues of the project or projects financed from the proceeds of such bonds; or
    2. Exclusively from such income and revenues together with grants and contributions from the federal, state, or urban-county government, or other sources. Any such bonds may be additionally secured by a mortgage, deed of trust, or other lien or encumbrance on the property, including pledges of tax increments as allowed by law in the project or projects financed from the proceeds of such bonds.
  2. Neither the members of the board of commissioners of an authority nor any person executing the bonds shall be liable personally on the bonds by reason of the issuance thereof. The bonds and other obligations of an authority shall so state on their face that such bonds and obligations issued under this section shall not be a debt of the urban-county government, state or any political subdivision thereof, within the meaning of any constitutional or statutory debt limitation or restriction and neither the urban-county government, state nor any political subdivision thereof shall be liable thereon, nor, in any event, shall such bonds or obligations be payable out of any funds or properties other than those of said authority, except as provided by contract.
  3. Bonds of an authority shall be authorized by resolution of its board of commissioners. Such bonds may be issued in one or more series, each of which may be separately secured, and shall bear such date or dates, mature at such time or times, bear interest at such rate or rates, be in such denomination or denominations, be in such form either coupon or registered, carry such conversion or registration privileges, have such rank or priority, be executed in such manner, be payable in such medium of payment, at such place or places, and be subject to such terms of redemption, with or without premium, as such resolution, its trust indenture or mortgage may provide.
  4. The bonds may be sold at less than par, and shall be sold at public sale held after notice has been given by publication pursuant to KRS Chapter 424, except that payment for any portion of a project may be made in bonds, provided, however, that: (a) any such transaction shall be approved by the price advisory council before its consummation; (b) such exchange is valid and legal pursuant to regulations of the Internal Revenue Service.
  5. The bonds may be sold with provision that they bear no interest, or only nominal interest, for a period of years, after which they may bear greater interest; and provision may be made for the capitalization of interest for periods not in excess of five (5) years. More than one (1) project may be established within the same project area, and each such project may be financed with a different issue or bonds with differing security. Each of said bond issues may be designed to meet standards required under federal statutes or regulations pertaining to the issuance of tax-exempt bonds; provided, however, that nothing herein shall be deemed to prohibit the issuance of any series of bonds, the interest on which may not be exempt from federal income tax.
  6. In case any of the members or officers of the authority whose signatures appear on any bonds, coupons, notes or other obligations shall cease to be such members or officers before the delivery of such bonds, coupons, notes or other obligations, such signatures shall, nevertheless, be valid and sufficient for all purposes, the same as if they had remained in office until such delivery. Any provision of any law to the contrary notwithstanding, any bonds, coupons, notes or other obligations issued pursuant to this chapter shall be fully negotiable except as limited by their terms.
  7. In any suit, action or proceedings involving the validity or enforceability of any bonds of an authority or the security therefor, any such bonds reciting in substance that they have been issued by the agency to aid in financing a project shall be conclusively deemed to have been issued for a project and said project shall be conclusively deemed to have been planned, approved, located, and carried out in accordance with the purposes and provisions of KRS 67A.910 to 67A.928 .
  8. In connection with the issuance of bonds, an authority in addition to its other powers, shall have the power:
    1. To pledge all or any part of its gross or net revenue to which its right then exists or may thereafter come into existence;
    2. To encumber, by mortgage, deed of trust, or otherwise, all or any part of its real or personal property;
    3. To covenant against pledging all or any part of its revenues, or against encumbering all or any part of its real or personal property to which its right or title then exists or may thereafter come into existence or against permitting or suffering any lien on such revenues or property; to covenant with respect to its sale, leasing, or other disposition of any project or any part thereof; and to covenant as to what other, or additional debts or obligations may be incurred by it;
    4. To covenant as to the bonds to be issued and as to the issuance of such bonds in escrow or otherwise, and as to the use and disposition of the proceeds thereof; to provide for the replacement of lost, destroyed or mutilated bonds, to covenant against extending the time for the payment of its bonds or interest thereon; and to redeem the bonds, and to covenant for their redemption and to provide the terms and conditions thereof;
    5. To covenant as to the amounts to be charged in the sale or lease of properties in a project or projects the amount to be raised from revenue each year or other period of time and as to the use and disposition to be thereof; to create or to authorize the creation of special funds for moneys held for development or other costs, debt service, reserves, or other purposes, and to covenant as to the use and disposition of the money held in such funds;
    6. To prescribe the procedure, if any, by which the terms of any contract with bondholders may be amended or abrogated, the amount of bonds the holders of which must consent thereto and the manner in which such consent may be given.

History. Enact. Acts 1976, ch. 287, § 15.

67A.924. Ad valorem tax levy to retire bonds.

In order to accomplish its purposes the authority, through its board, may request the legislative body of the urban-county government in which it is located to levy an ad valorem tax on all property within the parking district which is assessed for local taxation, at a rate, which, when calculated in connection with other revenues of the authority, shall not exceed the amount necessary to amortize any bonds issued or proposed to be issued to finance the project or projects proposed by the authority, plus operating expenses of the authority. All ad valorem taxes authorized by this chapter shall be collected in the same manner as are all other ad valorem taxes and shall be turned over to the board of commissioners as the governing body of the authority. Such taxes shall be solely for the benefit and purposes of the authority and shall be in addition to all other taxes. The legislative body may levy the ad valorem tax so requested initially and from year to year thereafter if required in conjunction with other revenues, to amortize any bonds issued or proposed for a project not disapproved under the authority of this chapter.

History. Enact. Acts 1976, ch. 287, § 16.

67A.926. Occupational license tax levy to retire bonds.

In order to accomplish its purposes the authority, through its board, may request the legislative body of the urban-county government in which it is located to levy an occupational license tax on all businesses, commercial establishments, and professional offices within the local parking district at a rate, which, when calculated in connection with other revenues of the authority, shall not exceed the amount necessary to amortize any bonds issued or proposed to be issued to finance the project or projects proposed by the authority, plus operating expenses of the authority. All occupational license taxes authorized by this chapter shall be collected in the same manner as are all other occupational license taxes and shall be turned over to the board of commissioners as the governing body of the authority. Such taxes shall be solely for the benefit and purposes of the authority and shall be in addition to all other taxes. The local legislative body may levy the occupational license tax so requested initially and from year to year thereafter if required in conjunction with other revenues, to amortize any bonds issued or proposed for a project not disapproved under the authority of this chapter.

History. Enact. Acts 1976, ch. 287, § 17.

67A.928. Exemption from tax.

If the authority determines upon application of a business, individual, or property owner doing business, having offices, or owning property within the local parking district, that such business or individual does not benefit from the operation of the authority then an exemption or partial exemption may be ordered by the board of commissioners so as to relieve such business or individual from the same tax as would be imposed on others who are benefited to a greater extent by the operation of the authority.

History. Enact. Acts 1976, ch. 287, § 18.

67A.990. Penalties.

Any person who knowingly makes any false statement, or falsifies, or permits to be falsified, any record or records of the fund established pursuant to KRS 67A.370 , in any attempt to defraud the fund, shall be fined not less than $500 or imprisoned in the county jail for not more than twelve (12) months, or both, and the fund shall have the right to recover any payments made under false representations.

History. Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 106, § 34, effective July 1, 1974.

CHAPTER 67B Metropolitan Correctional Services Department

67B.010. Authority to create metropolitan correctional services departments.

The General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Kentucky determines as a legislative finding of fact that the needs of large urban areas in the field of detention, institutionalization, and rehabilitation of offenders and public wards are more specialized, acute, and distinct than the needs of smaller communities, and require programs peculiarly suited to the needs of large, urban areas, and that in order to protect, enhance, and maintain the public safety, health, and general welfare, it is necessary that consolidated local governments or fiscal courts of counties containing a city of the first class where the constitutional offices of sheriff and jailer have been consolidated, be empowered to create metropolitan correctional services departments which shall be divisions of the consolidated local or county government, and which will be vested with the duty, responsibility, and power to maintain and operate all of the correctional, detention, and rehabilitative facilities of such counties in a professional and competent manner.

History. Enact. Acts 1972, ch. 100, § 1; 2002, ch. 346, § 46, effective July 15, 2002.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Suits Against Department.
2. — Counsel Fees.

Where action was brought against various county officers and employees of the metropolitan correctional services department (MCSD), the suit was for all practical purposes against the MCSD which would bear the burden of counsel fees award. Fluhr v. Roberts, 463 F. Supp. 745, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15024 (W.D. Ky. 1979 ).

3. Liability Insurance Exclusion.

The county jail, being used for incarceration of convicted persons for penal purposes, as well as detention or correctional purposes, was determined to be a penal institution within the sense in which the term is used in the exclusion provisions of the county’s liability policy. Home Indem. Co. v. Johnson County Fiscal Court, 682 F. Supp. 326, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13208 (E.D. Ky. 1987 ).

4. Jails.
5. — Provision and Maintenance by Private Corporation.

KRS 67.083 provides a county with the necessary latitude and flexibility to provide and maintain a jail in the county as required by KRS 441.025 ; thus, read together, KRS 441.025 (2)(a), KRS 67.083 (3)(e) and this chapter allow a county to contract with a private corporation to provide and maintain a jail. Transfer of defendant to privately owned and operated facility did not constitute an unauthorized release. Phipps v. Commonwealth, 933 S.W.2d 825, 1996 Ky. App. LEXIS 118 (Ky. Ct. App. 1996).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Section 105 of the Kentucky Constitution, providing for the retention of the office of sheriff, where Legislature effects consolidation of offices of sheriff and jailer and this chapter abolishing the jailer function in the sheriff-jailer consolidation situation, thus implying repeal of KRS 71.110 which provided for consolidation and retention of such offices, cast a serious doubt as to the constitutionality of this chapter. OAG 75-187 .

67B.020. Definitions.

As used in this chapter, the following words or terms shall have the respective meanings indicated, unless a different meaning is clearly indicated by the context:

  1. “Department” means a metropolitan correctional services department created or maintained by a consolidated local government or the fiscal court of a county containing a city of the first class, where the constitutional offices of sheriff and jailer have been consolidated, pursuant to this chapter.
  2. “Fiscal court” means the county judge/executive and justices of the peace of a county, or the county judge/executive and three (3) county commissioners elected pursuant to KRS 67.050 and 67.060 , which exercises the legislative functions of a county as provided by the provisions of the Kentucky Revised Statutes.
  3. “Correctional facility” means the county jail and all other detention and penal facilities of a county or consolidated local government, whether for juvenile or adult offenders and public wards, together with all rehabilitative facilities of such a county or consolidated local government for juvenile or adult offenders and for public wards, including facilities operated by private agencies under contract with the consolidated local government or fiscal court, as such facilities may be designated from time to time by the consolidated local government or fiscal court.
  4. “Sheriff” means the sheriff of a county or the sheriff in a county containing a consolidated local government who has been duly elected by the qualified voters as provided in Section 99 of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Kentucky.
  5. “Jailer” means the jailer of a county or the jailer in a county containing a consolidated local government who has been duly elected by the qualified voters of a county as provided in Section 99 of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Kentucky.
  6. “Governmental agency” means any incorporated city, division of a city, or consolidated local government, including the United States of America, and its agencies and instrumentalities, situated within, or conducting public operations within, a county in which a metropolitan correctional services department has been duly established.
  7. “Consolidated local government” means a local government established pursuant to KRS Chapter 67C.

History. Enact. Acts 1972, ch. 100, § 2; 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 20, § 6, effective January 2, 1978; 1980, ch. 52, § 6, effective July 15, 1980; 1996, ch. 27, § 1, effective February 29, 1996; 2002, ch. 346, § 47, effective July 15, 2002.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Liability Insurance Exclusion.

The county jail, being used for incarceration of convicted persons for penal purposes, as well as detention or correctional purposes, was determined to be a penal institution within the sense in which the term is used in the exclusion provisions of the county’s liability policy. Home Indem. Co. v. Johnson County Fiscal Court, 682 F. Supp. 326, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13208 (E.D. Ky. 1987 ).

2. Provision and Maintenance by Private Corporation.

KRS 67.083 provides a county with the necessary latitude and flexibility to provide and maintain a jail in the county as required by KRS 441.025 ; thus, read together, KRS 441.025 (2)(a), KRS 67.083 (3)(e) and this chapter allow a county to contract with a private corporation to provide and maintain a jail. Transfer of defendant to privately owned and operated facility did not constitute an unauthorized release. Phipps v. Commonwealth, 933 S.W.2d 825, 1996 Ky. App. LEXIS 118 (Ky. Ct. App. 1996).

67B.030. Establishment and nature of department — Duties of jailer and limited duties of sheriff vested in department.

  1. A metropolitan correctional services department may be established or maintained by ordinance of a consolidated local government or by order of the fiscal court of any county containing a city of the first class, in which the constitutional offices of sheriff and jailer have been consolidated as provided in Section 105 of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Kentucky. Said department shall, upon its creation or maintenance, constitute a de jure department and division of the consolidated local or county government, having and possessing all of the enumerated powers, responsibilities, and duties hereinafter specifically set forth.
  2. Upon the creation or maintenance of a metropolitan correctional services department by the consolidated local government or fiscal court of a county containing a city of the first class, in which the constitutional offices of sheriff and jailer have been consolidated pursuant to Section 105 of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, all of the duties, responsibilities, and liabilities of the sheriff and jailer as set forth and contained in the Kentucky Revised Statutes, with reference to the operation and maintenance of the county jail and all county correctional facilities shall immediately be vested in the department and thereupon the sheriff and jailer shall have no further responsibility, duty, and liability for the performance of said statutory duties on a personal basis; provided, however, that said sheriff shall be required to annually inspect all county correctional facilities and render reports as hereinafter provided.

History. Enact. Acts 1972, ch. 100, § 3; 1982, ch. 385, § 26, effective July 1, 1982; 2002, ch. 346, § 48, effective July 15, 2002.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Liability.

Circuit court did not err in dismissing an administratrix’s action against the Louisville Metro Department of Corrections (LMDOC) and its director because it properly concluded that the director, in his individual capacity, was not subject to liability; the merger of Jefferson County and the City of Louisville, created a consolidated government that vested the powers of the county jailer in the LMDOC, not its employees, and the director was never the jailer. A.H. v. Louisville Metro Gov't, 2018 Ky. App. LEXIS 183 (Ky. Ct. App. June 8, 2018).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Where a considerable amount of prisoners’ clothing and money was abandoned at the Jefferson County jail operated by the metropolitan correctional services department, it was escheatable to the state under KRS 393.020 and 393.066 . OAG 79-646 .

County correctional employees are not peace officers, since nowhere in KRS Chapter 67B are the employees of the department designated as such, nor can such peace officer powers be implied from the general language found in this section dealing with the nature of the department, or under KRS 67B.050 detailing the powers and duties of the department. OAG 83-291 .

67B.040. Executive director — Qualifications and appointment.

The mayor of a consolidated local government or a fiscal court shall, at or subsequent to the creation or maintenance of a metropolitan correctional services department, appoint and employ an executive director of the metropolitan correctional services department who shall be well-educated, trained, and experienced in the administration of correctional and rehabilitative public facilities, and who, together with assistant directors, to be appointed and employed by the mayor or fiscal court, shall have full and complete management of the department and all of its operations. The executive director of the department, together with all assistant directors, shall be directly appointed by, and shall serve at the pleasure of, the mayor or fiscal court, and may be removed and replaced upon order of the mayor or fiscal court.

History. Enact. Acts 1972, ch. 100, § 4; 2002, ch. 346, § 49, effective July 15, 2002.

67B.050. Powers and duties of department.

The department shall, subject to the approval and authorization of the consolidated local government or fiscal court, generally administer, operate, and maintain all county correctional facilities, including facilities operated by private agencies under contract with the consolidated local government or fiscal court, and formulate and implement necessary correctional and rehabilitative programs. In carrying out its duties, the department shall have and possess, subject to the approval and authorization of the consolidated local government or fiscal court, all powers necessary to effectuate its purposes, including, but not by way of limitation the following:

  1. To prepare an annual budget with reference to the operations of the department for submission to the consolidated local government or fiscal court.
  2. To authorize all expenditures of the department in conformity with the annual budget, as approved by the consolidated local government or fiscal court, all such expenditures to be submitted for consolidated local government or fiscal court approval as in the case of all other county or consolidated local government agencies and departments.
  3. To prepare and submit not less than annually a report of all the activities, programs, and expenditures of the department to the consolidated local government or fiscal court.
  4. To employ and dismiss employees as may be necessary for the proper management and operation of the department and of the correctional facilities which are governed by the department, subject to the department merit system.
  5. To promulgate comprehensive rules, regulations, and bylaws for the regulation, administration, maintenance, and operation of the department, which rules, regulations, and bylaws shall be subject to approval by the consolidated local government or fiscal court.
  6. To formulate and implement penal, correctional, and rehabilitative programs, including the power to enter into contracts with private agencies for the operation of correctional or detention facilities, all of such facilities and programs to be subject to approval by the consolidated local government or fiscal court.
  7. To comply with all statutory requirements contained in the Kentucky Revised Statutes with reference to the operation, maintenance, and upkeep of all correctional facilities.
  8. To provide for the humane care, treatment, and feeding of all inmates of all correctional facilities of the county.
  9. To enter into contracts with private or governmental agencies regarding matters of correctional and rehabilitative import, including the operation, maintenance, and upkeep of correctional or detention facilities.
  10. To apply for, and accept, grants-in-aid from any public or private agency.

History. Enact. Acts 1972, ch. 100, § 5; 1996, ch. 27, § 2, effective February 29, 1996; 2002, ch. 346, § 50, effective July 15, 2002.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Provision and Maintenance by Private Corporation.

KRS 67.083 provides a county with the necessary latitude and flexibility to provide and maintain a jail in the county as required by KRS 441.025 ; thus, read together, KRS 441.025 (2)(a), KRS 67.083 (3)(e) and this chapter allow a county to contract with a private corporation to provide and maintain a jail. Transfer of defendant to privately owned and operated facility did not constitute an unauthorized release. Phipps v. Commonwealth, 933 S.W.2d 825, 1996 Ky. App. LEXIS 118 (Ky. Ct. App. 1996).

Opinions of Attorney General.

The executive director of the Jefferson County Metropolitan Correctional Services Department has authority to hire and fire employees under subsection (4) of this section which is within the exception of subsection (7) of KRS 67.710 . OAG 78-551 .

Nowhere in either Acts 1978, ch. 118, or this section is there any provision for a county to dispose of abandoned personnel property and use the proceeds for county purposes, and in the absence of any specific authority, KRS Chapter 393 controls the disposition of abandoned tangible personal property such as that in the Metropolitan Correctional Services Property Room. OAG 78-559 .

County correctional employees are not peace officers, since nowhere in KRS Chapter 67B are the employees of the department designated as such, nor can such peace officer powers be implied from the general language found in KRS 67B.030 dealing with the nature of the department, or under this section detailing the powers and duties of the department. OAG 83-291 .

67B.060. Merit system for department employees.

Upon the creation or maintenance of a metropolitan correctional services department by a consolidated local government or county fiscal court, the consolidated local government or fiscal court may create or maintain a departmental merit system, and for that purpose, establish, maintain, or designate an appropriate board, commission, or committee, whose duties it shall be to classify and examine applicants seeking employment as officers or employees of the department, and in addition, to promulgate rules and regulations governing the classification, qualification, examination, appointment, promotion, demotion, suspension, and other disciplinary action within the department, with reference to all personnel of the department; and in addition thereto, to hold such hearings, public and executive, as may be reasonably required in the operation of a viable employment protection and career development merit system. All employees of the department below the rank of assistant director shall be covered by the merit system.

History. Enact. Acts 1972, ch. 100, § 6; 2002, ch. 346, § 51, effective July 15, 2002.

67B.070. Sheriff to inspect department’s facilities.

The sheriff of any county in which a department has been established or maintained shall, not less than annually, inspect all correctional facilities administered by the department, and shall make a written report to the consolidated local government or fiscal court and to the secretary of corrections regarding the general operation of all such correctional facilities, which report shall furnish in detail information regarding the number of prisoners, detainees, and public wards who are inmates of each correctional facility; the offenses or causes for their incarceration; the length of stay with reference to same; and such further reports regarding rehabilitative programs instituted and being carried on by the department as may be required for a complete accounting and report.

History. Enact. Acts 1972, ch. 100, § 7; 1986, ch. 331, § 18, effective July 15, 1986; 2002, ch. 346, § 52, effective July 15, 2002.

67B.080. Department may contract to share staff and facilities.

A metropolitan correctional services department created in accordance with this chapter may enter into contracts and agreements with any other governmental agencies operating, or having authority to operate, correctional facilities, whereby the department may make the professional services of its staff, or the correctional facilities operated by said department, available to such other governmental agencies. All other governmental agencies are, in addition to all other powers granted by law, specifically authorized and empowered to enter into such contracts with metropolitan correctional services departments.

History. Enact. Acts 1972, ch. 100, § 8.

CHAPTER 67C Restructure of Local Government in County Containing City of First Class

67C.010. Study of local government — Report — Proposals for change in functions — Consolidation plan. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1982, ch. 49, § 1, effective July 15, 1982) was repealed by Acts 1984, ch. 57, § 1, effective July 13, 1984.

67C.020. Initiation of process for development of new form of local government — Drafting commission — Comprehensive plan — Approval ordisapproval. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1982, ch. 49, § 2, effective July 15, 1982) was repealed by Acts 1984, ch. 57, § 1, effective July 13, 1984.

67C.030. Funding of drafting commission. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1982, ch. 49, § 3, effective July 15, 1982) was repealed by Acts 1986, ch. 331, § 63, effective July 15, 1986.

67C.040. Public hearings. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1982, ch. 49, § 4, effective July 15, 1982) was repealed by Acts 1986, ch. 331, § 83, effective July 15, 1986.

67C.050. Funding of drafting commission. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1982, ch. 49, § 5, effective July 15, 1982) was repealed by Acts 1986, ch. 331, § 63, effective July 15, 1986.

Consolidation of Local Governments in Counties Containing Cities of the First Class

67C.101. Election to approve consolidation of county and city of the first class — Powers, privileges, and jurisdiction of consolidated local government.

  1. The governmental and corporate functions vested in any city of the first class shall, upon approval by the voters of the county at a regular or special election, be consolidated with the governmental and corporate functions of the county containing the city. This single government replaces and supersedes the governments of the pre-existing city of the first class and its county.
    1. A consolidated local government shall have all powers and privileges that cities of the first class and their counties are, or may hereafter be, authorized to exercise under the Constitution and the general laws of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, including but not limited to those powers granted to cities of the first class and their counties under their respective home rule powers. (2) (a) A consolidated local government shall have all powers and privileges that cities of the first class and their counties are, or may hereafter be, authorized to exercise under the Constitution and the general laws of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, including but not limited to those powers granted to cities of the first class and their counties under their respective home rule powers.
    2. A consolidated local government shall continue to exercise these powers and privileges notwithstanding repeal or amendment of any of the laws upon which the powers and privileges are based unless expressly repealed or amended for consolidated local governments.
    3. In addition, a consolidated local government shall have other powers and privileges as the government may be authorized to exercise under the Constitution and general laws of the Commonwealth of Kentucky.
    4. A consolidated local government is neither a city government nor a county government as those forms of government exist on July 15, 2002, but it is a separate classification of government which possess the greater powers conferred upon, and is subject to the lesser restrictions applicable to, county government and cities of the first class under the Constitution and general laws of the Commonwealth of Kentucky.
    5. A consolidated local government shall be accorded the same sovereign immunity granted counties, their agencies, officers, and employees.
  2. A consolidated local government shall have power and authority to:
    1. Levy and collect taxes upon all property taxable for state purposes within the territorial limits of the consolidated local government not exempt by law from taxation;
    2. License, tax, and regulate privileges, occupations, trades, and professions authorized by law, to be uniform throughout the jurisdiction;
    3. Make appropriations for the support of the consolidated local government and provide for the payment of all debts and expenses of the consolidated local government and the debts and expenses of the county and city of which it is the successor;
    4. Issue or cause to be issued bonds and other debt instruments that counties containing a city of the first class are authorized to issue or enter into all other financial transactions as may be permitted by law;
    5. Purchase, lease, construct, maintain, or otherwise acquire, hold, use, and operate any property, real or personal, for any public purpose, and sell, lease, or otherwise dispose of any property, real or personal, belonging to a consolidated local government;
    6. Exercise the power of eminent domain for any public purpose subject to the limitations and exceptions prescribed by the Constitution and the general laws of the Commonwealth of Kentucky;
    7. Accept federal or state funds and other sources of revenue that are applicable to counties and cities of the first class;
    8. Establish, erect, maintain, and operate facilities for the confinement, detention, and rehabilitation of persons convicted of the violation of the ordinances and laws of a consolidated local government or the Commonwealth of Kentucky;
    9. Pass and enforce by fines and penalties, if necessary, all ordinances, not inconsistent with law, as are expedient in maintaining the peace, good government, health, and welfare of the inhabitants of the county and prevent, abate, and remove nuisances;
    10. Collect and dispose of garbage, junk, and other refuse, and regulate the collection and disposal of garbage, junk, and other refuse by others;
    11. Provide for the redevelopment, renewal, or rehabilitation of blighted, deteriorated, or dilapidated areas;
    12. Enforce zoning regulations;
    13. Enter into contracts and agreements with other governmental entities and with private persons, firms, and corporations;
    14. Adopt procedures for collective bargaining with its employees and for the certification of exclusive bargaining agents for groups of employees in accordance with the Constitution and general laws of the Commonwealth of Kentucky and its ordinances; and
    15. Exercise all other powers and authorities granted to counties and cities of the first class by the general laws of the Commonwealth of Kentucky.
  3. The powers of the consolidated local government shall be construed broadly in favor of the consolidated local government. The specific mention, or failure to mention, of particular powers in this section shall not be construed as limiting in any way the general or specific powers of a consolidated local government.
  4. A consolidated local government shall have power and jurisdiction throughout the total area embraced by the official jurisdictional boundaries of the county.
  5. A consolidated local government shall be known as  . . . . . / . . . . .  County Metro Government, which shall be the combination of the names of the largest city in existence on the date of the adoption of the consolidated local government and the county.

History. Enact. Acts 2000, ch. 189, § 1, effective July 14, 2000; 2002, ch. 346, § 53, effective July 15, 2002.

Compiler’s Notes.

Section 20 of Acts 2000, ch. 189, effective July 14, 2000, read: “If any provision of this Act or the application thereof to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the invalidity shall not affect other provisions or applications of the Act that can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of the Act are severable.”

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Sovereign immunity.

Transit Authority of River City did not enjoy sovereign immunity from the underlying negligence action filed by a pedestrian to recover injuries he sustained after being struck by a TARC bus because KRS 96A.020 clearly stated that a transit authority was a public body corporate with the power to sue and be sued and to have and exercise, generally, all of the powers of private corporations. Transit Auth. of River City v. Bibelhauser, 432 S.W.3d 171, 2013 Ky. App. LEXIS 142 (Ky. Ct. App. 2013).

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Bench & Bar.

Snyder, A Temporary Guide to Sovereign Immunity Law in Kentucky, Vol. 67, No. 4, July 2003, Ky. Bench & Bar 29.

67C.103. Consolidated local government council — Council districts — Redistricting following decennial census — Terms, qualifications, and election of members and president — Regular and special meetings — Notice requirements — Ordinances — Vacancies — Legislative powers — Government Oversight and Audit Committee — Name of council.

  1. The legislative authority of a consolidated local government, except as otherwise specified in KRS 67C.101 to 67C.137 , shall be vested in a consolidated local government council. The members of the council shall be nominated and elected by district. There shall be only one (1) council member elected from each council district.
  2. There shall be twenty-six (26) council districts. The initial boundaries, population, and numerical designation of the council districts shall be as specified by KRS 67C.135 . The population of the council districts shall be as nearly equal as is reasonably possible. For any newly consolidated local governments whose officials take office in 2003, upon taking office, the legislative council may take action to adjust the boundaries and population of the districts in order to equalize the population of the districts which may have changed as a result of recent census information. Any changes made to alter the boundaries of council districts shall be based on the population of the county as determined by the most recent United States Census or official census estimates as provided by the United States Bureau of the Census.
  3. Following the official publication of each decennial census by the United States Bureau of the Census for the area embraced by a consolidated local government, the council shall adopt an ordinance, if necessary, to redistrict the council districts. A redistricting ordinance shall provide for the distribution of population among the council districts as nearly equal as is reasonably possible. Every council district shall be compact and contiguous and shall respect existing neighborhood, community, and city boundaries whenever possible.
  4. The consolidated local government council members shall serve for a term of four (4) years beginning on the first Monday in January following their election except that the initial election of council members shall be in a manner as to provide for staggered terms for council members. At the initial election of the members of a consolidated local government council, those representing even-numbered districts shall be elected for a two (2) year term. Those representing odd-numbered districts shall be elected for a four (4) year term. Thereafter, all council members shall be elected for four (4) year terms.
  5. The members of a consolidated local government council shall be nominated and elected from the district in which they reside in partisan elections. After the initial terms of office of the first elected council members, council members shall be elected in the same election years as other local government officials as regulated by the regular election laws of the Commonwealth and as provided in subsection (4) of this section.
  6. No person shall be eligible to serve as a member of a consolidated local government council unless he or she is at least eighteen (18) years old, a qualified voter, and a resident within the territory of the consolidated local government and the district that he or she seeks to represent for at least one (1) year immediately prior to the person’s election. A council member shall continue to reside within the district from which he or she was elected throughout the term of office.
  7. The presiding officer of a consolidated local government council shall be a president who shall be chosen annually by a majority vote of the entire council from among its members at the first meeting of the council in January. The council president has the right to introduce any resolution or recommend any ordinance and shall be entitled to vote on all matters.
  8. The consolidated local government council shall upon notice meet within seven (7) days after its members have taken office, and shall thereafter hold at least one (1) regular meetings per month. No newspaper notice shall be required for regular or special meetings of the consolidated local government council. However, notice of all meetings of the council and all meetings of committees of the council shall be held pursuant to KRS 61.805 to 61.850 .
  9. A majority of the members of the consolidated local government council shall constitute a quorum, but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day. The consolidated local government council may enforce the attendance of members by rules or ordinances with appropriate fines. The mayor or two-thirds (2/3) of the entire membership of the council may call a special meeting at any time. Meetings shall be held in such places in the county as are provided by ordinance, and the place of meetings shall not be changed except by an ordinance for which two-thirds (2/3) of the members of the consolidated local government council have voted.
  10. The council shall determine its own rules and order of business, and keep and provide a public record of its proceedings. The council shall provide for the publication of all ordinances in a composite code of ordinances.
  11. Council ordinances that prescribe penalties for their violation shall be enforced through the entire area of the consolidated local government unless:
    1. Otherwise provided by statute; or
    2. The legislative body of any city within the consolidated local government area has adopted an ordinance pertaining to the same subject matter that is the same as or more stringent than the standards set forth in the consolidated local government’s ordinance.
  12. In the case of a vacancy on the consolidated local government council by reason of death, resignation, or removal, the council by majority vote of the membership of the council shall elect a qualified resident of the council district not later than thirty (30) days after the date the vacancy occurs. Should the council fail to elect, by majority vote of the membership of the council, a qualified person to fill the vacancy within thirty (30) days, the mayor of the consolidated local government shall fill the vacancy by appointment of a qualified person for the unexpired term.
  13. All legislative powers of a consolidated local government are vested in the consolidated local government council. The term “legislative power” is to be construed broadly and shall include the power to:
    1. Enact ordinances, orders, and resolutions, and override a veto of the mayor by a two-thirds (2/3) majority of the membership of the legislative council;
    2. Review the budgets of and appropriate money to the consolidated local government;
    3. Adopt a budget ordinance;
    4. Levy taxes, subject to the limitations of the Constitution and the laws of the Commonwealth of Kentucky;
    5. Establish standing and temporary committees; and
    6. Make independent audits and investigations concerning the affairs of the consolidated local government and any board or commission that:.
      1. Is composed of members who are appointed by the mayor and approved by the legislative council; or
      2. Has a budget that is equal to or greater than one million dollars ($1,000,000.00), except that this subparagraph shall not apply to any fee officer elected within the consolidated local government.
    1. The consolidated local government council shall establish a Government Oversight and Audit Committee. This committee shall be: (14) (a) The consolidated local government council shall establish a Government Oversight and Audit Committee. This committee shall be:
      1. Composed of members from each of the two (2) largest political caucuses in the legislative council;
      2. Appointed by the chairs of their respective caucuses; and
      3. Composed on the basis of the proportion of each of the two (2) caucuses’ total membership as compared to the total membership of the legislative council. Any fractional proportions shall be rounded in the favor of the smallest caucus” membership on the committee.
    2. The committee shall have the power to:
      1. Compel testimony and the submission of work papers or documents;
      2. Issue subpoenas to compel any officer of or appointee to a board or commission described in subsection (13)(f) of this section or any department or division of the consolidated local government to appear before the committee and to compel the submission to the committee of any work papers or documents pertinent to an independent audit or investigation. Any subpoenas issued or testimony compelled shall be subject to any relevant statutes concerning privacy. Testimony subject to KRS 61.810 shall only be taken in executive session. The right to privacy or the requirement that testimony be taken in executive session may be waived by the person or entity being subpoenaed or compelled to testify;
      3. Petition the appropriate Circuit Court to compel obedience by proceedings for contempt as in the case of disobedience of a subpoena issued from the Circuit Court or a refusal to testify therein, if any officer or appointee fails or refuses to testify or furnish the work papers or documents subpoenaed;
      4. Administer oaths to witnesses appearing before the committee when the committee deems the administration of an oath necessary and advisable as provided by law. This decision to administer oaths shall be taken by a majority vote of the committee of the legislative council; and
      5. Recommend the removal of any appointee to a board or commission described in subsection (13)(f) of this section.
    3. The legislative council of the consolidated local government shall adopt by resolution any process or procedures deemed necessary for the administration of subpoenas and oaths.
    4. The legislative council of the consolidated local government may only act to remove an appointee to a board or commission described in subsection (13)(f) of this section upon the recommendation of the Government Oversight and Audit Committee.
    5. The Government Oversight and Audit Committee shall have the power to issue subpoenas or administer oaths. Except as provided in KRS 65.003(7), the legislative council of the consolidated local government shall not delegate those powers to any other entity or entities not a part of the legislative council of the consolidated local government.
  14. The consolidated local government council shall be known as the legislative council of.... /.... County Metro Government, which shall be a combination of the names of the largest city in existence in the county on the date of the adoption of the consolidated local government and the county.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 2000, ch. 189, § 2, effective July 14, 2000; 2002, ch. 346, § 54, effective July 15, 2002; 2012, ch. 49, § 1, effective July 12, 2012; 2017 ch. 150, § 1, effective June 29, 2017.

67C.105. Qualifications, election, title, and powers of mayor — Deputy Mayor — Procedure for filling vacancy in office of mayor.

  1. All executive and administrative power of the government shall be vested in the office of the mayor. The term “executive and administrative power” shall be construed broadly. The mayor shall be the chief executive of a consolidated local government formed under the provisions of KRS 67C.101 to 67C.137 .
    1. The mayor shall be nominated and elected in partisan elections for a term of four (4) years in the same election years as other local government officials as regulated by the regular election laws of the Commonwealth. (2) (a) The mayor shall be nominated and elected in partisan elections for a term of four (4) years in the same election years as other local government officials as regulated by the regular election laws of the Commonwealth.
    2. The mayor shall assume office on the first Monday in January following his or her election. He or she shall serve until a successor qualifies.
    3. The mayor may serve for no more than three (3) consecutive terms, after which time he or she shall be prohibited from running for election or being appointed as mayor for a period of at least four (4) years.
  2. The mayor shall be at least twenty-one (21) years old, a qualified voter, a member of his or her political party, and a resident of the territory encompassing the consolidated local government for a period of at least one (1) year prior to his or her election as mayor. The mayor shall continue to reside within the geographic boundary of the consolidated local government throughout his or her term of office.
  3. Except as otherwise provided in KRS 67C.101 to 67C.137 , the mayor shall have all the power and authority that the mayor of the city of the first class and the county judge/executive exercised under the Constitution and the general laws of the Commonwealth of Kentucky prior to the consolidation.
  4. The mayor is authorized to supervise, administer, and control all departments and agencies as may be created by KRS 67C.101 to 67C.137 or created by ordinance. The mayor shall appoint all department and agency directors. The appointees shall serve at the pleasure of the mayor. Specifically, the mayor shall:
    1. Prepare and submit an annual report coinciding with the fiscal year, on the state of the consolidated local government, to be presented at a public meeting of the council;
    2. Submit an annual budget no fewer than sixty (60) days prior to the end of the fiscal year;
    3. Oversee the administration and implementation of the adopted budget ordinance;
    4. Enforce the ordinances of the consolidated local government;
    5. Supervise all officers, agents, employees, cabinets, departments, offices, agencies, functions, and duties of the consolidated local government;
    6. Call special meetings of the consolidated local government council;
    7. Appoint and remove his or her own staff at his or her own pleasure;
    8. Execute written contracts, subscriptions, agreements,or obligations of the consolidated local government;
    9. Approve or veto ordinances and resolutions adopted by the consolidated local government council;.
    10. Submit any written contracts, subscriptions, agreements, or obligations exceeding the small purchase amount established pursuant to KRS 45A.385 in a resolution to the legislative council for its approval or its disapproval. Those written contracts, subscriptions, agreements, or obligations awarded to the lowest evaluated bid or proposal pursuant to KRS 45A.343 to 45A.460 shall be excluded, unless the legislative council changes the threshold for submission of a resolution. The legislative council may, by ordinance, set threshold amounts other than those established by KRS 45A.385 for the small purchases for submission of a resolution for its approval or disapproval; and
    11. Appoint a deputy mayor within seven (7) days of the mayor taking the oath of office and keep the office of deputy mayor filled throughout the mayor’s term. The deputy mayor shall:
      1. Meet all the qualifications for mayor established pursuant to subsection (3) of this section;
      2. Serve at the mayor’s pleasure and may be replaced by the mayor for any cause; and
      3. Have only the duties assigned to him or her by the mayor.
    1. If the office of mayor becomes vacant by reason of death, resignation, or removal: (6) (a) If the office of mayor becomes vacant by reason of death, resignation, or removal:
      1. The deputy mayor shall become the temporary mayor, inheriting all powers and duties of the mayor;
      2. The deputy mayor shall serve as temporary mayor for no more than thirty (30) days until the council, by a majority vote of the members of the council, shall elect a resident of the consolidated local government who meets the qualifications for mayor established pursuant to subsection (3) of this section to serve as mayor. The council may select the temporary mayor for this position. If the legislative council fails to elect a person to fill the vacancy within thirty (30) days after the vacancy occurs, the Governor shall fill the vacancy in the office by appointment of a qualified person who is a resident of the consolidated local government and meets the qualifications for mayor established pursuant to subsection (3) of this section; and
      3. The tenure of the gubernatorial appointment shall be governed by Section 152 of the Kentucky Constitution.
    2. If the offices of both the mayor and deputy mayor become vacant by reason of death, resignation, or removal:
      1. The presiding officer of the consolidated local government council shall become the temporary mayor, inheriting all powers and duties of the mayor;
      2. The presiding officer shall serve as temporary mayor for no more than thirty (30) days until the council shall, by a majority vote of the members of the council, elect a resident of the consolidated local government who meets the qualifications for mayor established pursuant to subsection (3) of this section. The council may select the temporary mayor for this position. If the legislative council fails to elect a person to fill the vacancy within thirty (30) days after the vacancy occurs, the Governor shall fill the vacancy in the office by appointment of a qualified person who is a resident of the consolidated local government and meets the qualifications for mayor established pursuant to subsection (3) of this section; and
      3. The tenure of the gubernatorial appointment shall be governed by Section 152 of the Kentucky Constitution
  5. The mayor of a consolidated local government shall be known as the mayor of  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . / . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  County Metro Government, which shall be a combination of the names of the largest city in existence in the county on the date of the adoption of the consolidated local government and the county.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 2000, ch. 189, § 3, effective July 14, 2000; 2002, ch. 346, § 55, effective July 15, 2002; 2012, ch. 49, § 2, effective July 12, 2012; 2017 ch. 150, § 2, effective June 29, 2017.

Opinions of Attorney General.

A mayor had the authority under KRS 67C.105(5)(h) to enter into a contract that required the appropriation of city funds on the city’s behalf without first presenting it to the council. There is no restriction on the Mayor entering into a contract which contains provisions requiring the expenditure of funds, before those funds have been appropriated by the Metro Council. However, despite containing the signature of the Mayor, those provisions of the Agreement which require appropriations are not effective until such time as the Council affirmatively approves them. There is no authority providing that council approval precede the mayor’s signing of such a contract. OAG 09-007 .

Section 164 of the Kentucky Constitution does not prohibit a Mayor from entering into a lease for a term of 99 years. Furthermore, KRS 91A.180 does not restrict the Mayor’s authority to enter into leases on behalf of the city under his executive powers set forth in KRS 67C.105 . OAG 09-007 .

67C.107. Employees of city and county to become employees of consolidated local government — Rights, privileges, and protections of employees — Bargaining units and labor contracts — Continuation of benefits of police and firefighters’ pension funds.

  1. Upon public approval at a regular or special election of a consolidation of a city of the first class and its county, all regular employees of the city of the first class and the county shall become employees of the consolidated local government.
  2. All rights, privileges, and protections attributed to all regular employees by a civil service or classified service system established by a city of the first class or a county containing a city of the first class shall continue in effect until changed by statute or ordinance when applicable.
  3. A consolidated local government shall recognize and shall continue to bargain with any bargaining unit consisting of public employees recognized by either the previously existing city or county government.
  4. All labor contracts under renegotiation or in existence in a city of the first class or a county containing a city of the first class on the effective date of a local government consolidation shall, if being renegotiated, continue to be renegotiated by the consolidated local government, and if in existence, continue in effect until the expiration of the terms of the contracts at which time new contracts shall be renegotiated between the consolidated local government and affected labor representatives.
  5. Upon the establishment of a consolidated local government, all rights, privileges, and protections of beneficiaries of a policemen’s retirement fund and a firefighter’s pension fund in a city of the first class shall continue in effect until all benefits due each beneficiary have been paid.

History. Enact. Acts 2000, ch. 189, § 4, effective July 14, 2000; 2002, ch. 346, § 56, effective July 15, 2002.

67C.109. Consolidated local government to have status of county and of city of the first class for the purpose of receiving government aid and grants.

For the purpose of applying for or receiving any aid or grant-in-aid from the Commonwealth of Kentucky or the government of the United States, a consolidated local government shall be deemed a county and shall be deemed an incorporated city of the first class under the Constitution and general laws of the Commonwealth of Kentucky.

History. Enact. Acts 2000, ch. 189, § 5, effective July 14, 2000; 2002, ch. 346, § 57, effective July 15, 2002.

67C.111. Status of cities other than those of the first class located within the territory of the consolidated local government.

  1. All cities other than those of the first class located within the territory of the consolidated local government, upon the successful passage of the question to consolidate a city of the first class and its county, shall remain incorporated unless dissolved in accordance with KRS 81.094 and shall continue to exercise all powers and perform the functions permitted by the Constitution and general laws of the Commonwealth of Kentucky applicable to the cities of the class to which they have been assigned.
  2. Upon the adoption of a consolidated local government in a county containing a city of the first class, there shall be no further incorporations of cities within the county.
  3. Upon the adoption of a consolidated local government in a county containing a city of the first class, there shall be no annexations for a period of twelve (12) years by any city remaining in the county. After that time, any proposed annexation by a city in that county shall first receive the approval of the legislative council of the consolidated local government prior to the city proceeding under the provisions of KRS Chapter 81A. The city shall request the approval of the consolidated legislative council by ordinance. The consolidated legislative council’s decision shall be made by ordinance and within sixty (60) days of the receipt of the request by the affected city. If an ordinance has not been enacted by the consolidated legislative council within sixty (60) days, the request for a city to proceed with an annexation proposal shall be deemed to be approved by the consolidated legislative council.
  4. The adoption of a consolidated local government in a county containing a city of the first class shall not prevent the merger or dissolution of any existing cities as provided by law or the merger of any remaining cities with the newly consolidated local government.

History. Enact. Acts 2000, ch. 189, § 6, effective July 14, 2000.

67C.113. Continued existence of taxing and service districts located within territory of the consolidated local government.

All taxing districts, fire protection districts, sanitation districts, water districts, and any other special taxing or service districts of any kind existing upon the successful passage of the question to consolidate a city of the first class and its county shall continue in existence unless dissolved in the manner prescribed by law and shall continue to exercise all the powers and functions permitted by the Constitution and the general laws of the Commonwealth of Kentucky.

History. Enact. Acts 2000, ch. 189, § 7, effective July 14, 2000.

67C.115. Continued existence of laws of county and of city of the first class after consolidation — Resolution of conflicts between existing laws — Enactment of new laws for consolidated local government — County attorney to serve as legal adviser — Exception — Meaning given to titles in ordinances.

  1. Upon the successful passage of the question to consolidate a city of the first class and its county, all ordinances and resolutions of the previously existing city of the first class and all ordinances and resolutions of the county shall become effective ordinances and resolutions of the consolidated local government until repealed, modified, or amended in accordance with the following order of precedence:
    1. If a city ordinance conflicts with a county ordinance, the county ordinance shall prevail and shall become effective countywide; and
    2. If a city ordinance addresses a subject matter not addressed by a county ordinance, the city ordinance shall become effective countywide; and
    3. If a county ordinance addresses a subject matter not addressed by a city ordinance, the county ordinance shall become effective countywide.

      Notwithstanding paragraph (a) of this subsection and in the event a uniform land development code has not been jointly adopted by the city and county prior to the effective date of a consolidated local government, the historic preservation and landmarks ordinances, and the zoning regulations of the city adopted pursuant to KRS Chapter 100, shall prevail and become effective countywide.

  2. Ordinances and resolutions of either the city of the first class or its county in existence on the effective date of a local government consolidation which conflict with other provisions of this chapter shall be void. Except as provided in KRS 67C.123(3), any ordinance, resolution, or order in effect in a city of the first class or its county on the date a consolidated local government takes effect shall expire five (5) years from that date unless amended or reenacted by the consolidated local government.
  3. All ordinances of the city and county creating agencies and boards and interlocal agreements shall survive and be deemed reenacted by the council. All members may serve the balance of the terms to which they were appointed and until their successors are appointed and duly qualified according to law.
  4. For purposes of this section, a conflict shall be deemed to exist between ordinances or resolutions, or the provisions of this chapter, where any rights, remedies, entitlements, or the enforcement thereof cannot reasonably be reconciled.
  5. The county attorney shall serve as the legal advisor and representative to the consolidated local government and except for those duties pertaining to fiscal court set forth in KRS 69.210 , the county attorney shall retain and exercise all other duties, powers, and rights delegated to that office by law. This subsection does not prevent the consolidated local government council from retaining its own legal counsel solely for advice and consultation should they choose to do so.
  6. Wherever the words “county judge” or “county judge/executive” appear in any resolution or ordinance in existence in a city of the first class or in a county containing a city of the first class as of the effective date of the establishment of a consolidated local government, they shall be deemed to mean the mayor of the consolidated local government.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 2000, ch. 189, § 8, effective July 14, 2000; 2002, ch. 346, § 58, effective July 15, 2002; 2004, ch. 104, § 2, effective July 13, 2004; 2017 ch. 150, § 3, effective June 29, 2017.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Application.

Jefferson County, Ky., Ordinance § 111.20 imposing certain restrictions on where adult entertainment establishments may be located applied to the area that was formerly the City of Louisville when on January 16, 2003, Jefferson County merged with the City of Louisville. Cam I, Inc. v. Louisville/Jefferson County Metro Gov't, 252 F. Supp. 2d 406, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4444 (W.D. Ky. 2003 ), amended, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13025 (W.D. Ky. July 18, 2003).

67C.117. Policy of equal opportunity for all citizens — Policy of fair representation in all aspects of governance for minority citizens and businesses — Consolidated local government to ensure achievement of policies.

    1. It shall be the policy of the consolidated local government to ensure that opportunities generated directly or indirectly by the consolidated local government are equally available to all citizens without regard to race, color, religion, national origin, marital status, physical handicap, sex, or age. (1) (a) It shall be the policy of the consolidated local government to ensure that opportunities generated directly or indirectly by the consolidated local government are equally available to all citizens without regard to race, color, religion, national origin, marital status, physical handicap, sex, or age.
    2. It shall also be the policy of the consolidated local government to include the minority community in all aspects of governance in the consolidated local government. Minority citizens and business shall be represented in all actions of the consolidated government, including but not limited to government employment, appointments to boards or commissions, contracting, and purchasing.
  1. The percentage of minority citizens who shall be employed by the consolidated local government shall be no less than the percentage of minority citizens available in the consolidated local government’s Metropolitan Statistical Area defined by the United States Office of Management and Budget as used by the United States Census Bureau survey. The percentage of minority citizens who shall be appointed to each of its boards and commissions shall be no less than the percentage of minority citizens in the community, or the percentage of minority representatives on the consolidated local government’s legislative body, whichever is greater.
  2. The consolidated local government shall adopt ordinances and develop policies to achieve the mandate set forth in this section.

History. Enact. Acts 2000, ch. 189, § 9, effective July 14, 2000; 2013, ch. 95, § 1, effective June 25, 2013.

67C.119. Requirements for affirmative action plan for consolidated local government — Responsibilities of Affirmative Action Office — Employment opportunities to be equally available to all citizens — Procedures governing awarding of contracts, leases, and other agreements with consolidated local government — Hearing to ensure compliance and enforcement — Affirmative action appeals.

  1. The consolidated local government shall have an affirmative action plan that complies with all current federal guidelines and requirements relevant to local governments.
  2. The mayor shall prepare and implement an affirmative action plan.
  3. There shall be established under the direction of the mayor an office that shall be called the “Affirmative Action Office.”
  4. The Affirmative Action Office shall aid the mayor in preparing the plan, and shall be responsible for the day-to-day operation and implementation of the affirmative action plan.
  5. An affirmative action plan, in addition to following all federal requirements, shall include good faith efforts to:
    1. Determine the extent to which minorities and women are underutilized in major categories;
    2. Identify and eliminate the specific causes of the underutilization;
    3. Identify and eliminate all employment practices that have an adverse impact on minorities, women, and others protected by applicable law and the relationship of which to job performance has not been clearly established;
    4. Rely exclusively on practices that are based on merits and other valid job related criteria;
    5. Develop substantial applicant pools of validly qualified minorities and women, special recruitment efforts, and other measures to insure that sufficient numbers of these groups are included to help reduce their underutilization;
    6. Develop, through special recruitment efforts and other measures, applicant pools in which handicapped persons are represented equitably;
    7. Project goals and timetables to include estimates of the representation of minorities and women likely to result from the operation of this affirmative action plan; and
    8. Establish organizational structures and monitoring systems that will ensure effective operation of its goals, and means for modification of the plan as needed.
  6. All contracts, leases, or other agreements for materials, supplies, equipment, or, contractual services other than professional that, in the aggregate, exceed the amount for small purchases in KRS 45A.385 in any fiscal year shall be awarded in compliance with KRS 424.260 or with KRS 45A.343 to 45A.460 , if applicable.
  7. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this section, the provisions of this section shall apply to every person, firm, corporation, and association that has been awarded contracts, leases, or other agreements as provided by KRS 424.260 or with KRS 45A.343 to 45A.460 , if applicable, that, in the aggregate, exceed the amount for small purchases in KRS 45A.385 in any fiscal year.
  8. Employment opportunities generated directly or indirectly by the government of the consolidated local government shall be equally available to all citizens without regard to race, color, religion, national origin, marital status, physical handicap, sex, or age. In order to ensure that employment opportunities generated directly or indirectly by the consolidated local government are equally available, contractors and vendors shall be approved as provided by this section prior to the awarding of any contract, lease, or other agreement that requires an expenditure in excess of the amount for small purchases in KRS 45A.385 with the consolidated local government.
  9. No person, firm, corporation, or association shall be awarded a contract, lease, or other agreement that requires an expenditure in excess of the amount for small purchases in KRS 45A.385 until and unless that person, firm, corporation, or association has been prequalified as determined by procedures and requirements enacted by ordinance by the consolidated local government.
  10. No officer, employee, or agent of the consolidated local government shall accept a contract, lease, or other agreement that requires an expenditure in excess of the amount for small purchases in KRS 45A.385 with the consolidated local government until and unless that person, firm, corporation, or association has been prequalified as determined by procedures and requirements enacted by ordinance by the consolidated local government.
  11. All persons, firms, corporations, or associations seeking to bid on contracts, leases, or other agreements that require an expenditure exceeding the amount for small purchases in KRS 45A.385 with the consolidated local government shall submit a request for prequalification as an eligible contractor, pursuant to the procedures and requirements enacted by ordinance by the consolidated local government.
  12. The consolidated local government shall make available a list of all bidders who have been prequalified and shall distribute the list to the appropriate purchasing officers, employees, or agents of the consolidated local government.
  13. Any person, firm, corporation, or association that submits an otherwise qualified bid for a contract, lease, or other agreement pursuant to the provisions of KRS 424.260 , but that has not prequalified pursuant to this section, may be approved by the consolidated local government as provided by this section. Any person, firm, or corporation that is approved by the consolidated local government shall thereafter be qualified and considered eligible for award for a contract, lease, or other agreement.
  14. The consolidated local government shall prequalify persons, firms, corporations, and associations seeking a contract, lease, or other agreement that requires an expenditure exceeding the amount for small purchases in KRS 45A.385 with the consolidated local government if, on an analysis of the workforce of that entity, the consolidated local government determines that:
    1. The entity is not deficient in the utilization of minority groups or women;
    2. The entity has an acceptable, bona fide affirmative action plan;
    3. The entity is a small business that employs ten (10) or fewer individuals;
    4. The entity has a federally approved affirmative action program; or
    5. The consolidated local government has made a finding based on other reasonable criteria, and after consideration of the provisions of 41 C.F.R. 60-2, determines the entity does not require an affirmative action plan.
  15. An acceptable affirmative action plan for an entity seeking a contract, lease, or other agreement with a consolidated local government shall include:
    1. An analysis of the areas of the entity’s workforce within which it is deficient in the utilization of minority groups and women; and
    2. Timetables to which the entity’s good faith efforts shall be directed to correct the deficiencies and to achieve prompt and full utilization of minorities and women at all levels and in all segments of its workforce where deficiencies exist.
  16. A bona fide affirmative action plan for an entity seeking a contract, lease, or other agreement with a consolidated local government shall include a set of specific and result-oriented procedures, goals, and timetables to which an entity commits itself to apply every good faith effort in order to achieve equal employment opportunity. Procedures without effort to make them work are meaningless and effort undirected by specific and meaningful procedures is inadequate.
  17. In reviewing an affirmative action plan for an entity seeking a contract, lease, or other agreement with a consolidated local government, the consolidated local government shall be guided by the relevant provisions of 41 C.F.R. 60-2 which outlines the requirements of affirmative action plans for federal contractors and vendors.
  18. The consolidated local government shall use its best efforts, directly and through contracting agencies, other interested federal, state, and local agencies, contractors, and all other available instrumentalities to cause any labor union engaged in work pursuant to contracts, leases, and agreements that are the subject matter of this section or any agency referring workers or providing or supervising apprenticeship or training for or in the course of this work to cooperate in the implementation of the purposes of this section.
  19. The consolidated local government on its own motion or on motion of any interested party shall cause hearings as it deems necessary for compliance or enforcement of this section.
  20. The consolidated local government shall hold a hearing prior to imposing or recommending the imposition of penalties and sanctions for violation of this section. No penalty that would prohibit any contractor from obtaining future contracts under this section shall be made without affording the contractor an opportunity for a hearing.
  21. Notice of any final decision or determination of the consolidated local government that affects the running of time for taking an appeal shall be mailed to all parties in the matter, including the proposed contractor, lessor or other party, and the affected local government offices.
  22. The consolidated local government shall establish an affirmative action appeals board for purposes of hearing appeals from any final decision relating to matters pertaining to this section. The board shall be composed of the county attorney, or his or her designee, the council president of the consolidated local government, or his or her designee, and a representative of the financial department of the consolidated local government, or his or her designee.
  23. Any appeal from a decision of the consolidated local government shall be hand-delivered or mailed by certified mail to the affirmative action appeals board not later than thirty (30) days from the date of the local government’s decision. The appeal shall set forth the grounds for the appeal. The appeals board shall notify all parties in writing of the time and place of a hearing. The hearing committee may issue subpoenas for any witnesses requested by either of the parties or in the appeals board’s opinion necessary to the proper disposition of the matter to be heard. All parties shall be allowed legal representation, witnesses may be cross-examined, and the proceeding shall be recorded. The local government shall transmit, within ten (10) days after receipt of notice of appeal, all the original papers in action to the appeals board.
  24. The appeals board shall have the power to require the contractor to furnish all necessary records and give testimony as to enable the board to render a fair and competent decision. The duty of the board shall be to review all records, hear all testimonies of witnesses, and determine whether the decision of the local government was correct. The decision of the appeals board shall be final. The decision of the appeals board shall be transmitted in writing to the appropriate offices of the local government for implementation and shall set forth specifically its findings of fact and conclusions relative to its determination. The administration of sanctions and penalties in accordance with that determination shall be the duty of the appropriate department or contracting agency of the consolidated local government.
    1. On request of the adversely affected party the appeals board may, on terms as are just, relieve a party from its final order of determination on the following grounds: (25) (a) On request of the adversely affected party the appeals board may, on terms as are just, relieve a party from its final order of determination on the following grounds:
      1. Mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;
      2. Newly discovered evidence that by due diligence could not have been discovered in time for the hearing;
      3. Perjury or falsified evidence; or
      4. Fraud affecting the proceedings other than perjury or falsified evidence.
    2. The request shall be made within thirty (30) days after notification of the appeals board’s final determination. A request under this subsection does not affect the finality of the order or determination or suspend its operation.
  25. In accordance with the enforcement provisions of this section, the consolidated local government may cancel, terminate, suspend, or cause to be canceled, terminated, or suspended, any contract, lease, or agreement that is the subject matter of this section for failure of the contractor or vendor to comply. Contracts, leases, and agreements may be canceled, terminated, or suspended absolutely or continuance of contracts, leases, and agreements may be conditioned on a program for future compliance as approved by the consolidated local government.
  26. Any contracting agency shall refrain from entering into further contracts or extensions or other modifications of existing contracts, with any noncomplying contractor, until the contractor has established and will carry out personnel and employment policies in compliance with the provisions of this section.
  27. Whenever the consolidated local government makes a determination regarding noncompliance by a contractor pursuant to this section, it shall promptly notify the appropriate contracting agency and other affected local government agencies and offices of the action recommended. The contracting agency shall take the action recommended and shall report the results of that action to the consolidated local government.
  28. If the appeals board shall so direct, contracting agencies shall not enter into contracts with any bidder or prospective contractor unless the bidder or prospective contractor has satisfactorily complied with the provisions of this order or submits a program for compliance acceptable to the consolidated local government.

History. Enact. Acts 2000, ch. 189, § 10, effective July 14, 2000; 2013, ch. 95, § 2, effective June 25, 2013.

67C.121. Powers and duties of Sections 99 and 144 constitutional officers within territory of consolidated local government — Terms, elections, powers, duties, and responsibilities of county clerk, county attorney, sheriff, jailer, coroner, surveyor, and assessor.

  1. All offices provided for in Sections 99 and 144 of the Constitution of Kentucky shall remain in existence upon the consolidation of a city of the first class with its county. However, all existing powers and duties of these offices shall be assigned to the consolidated local government.
  2. Nothing in KRS 67C.101 to 67C.137 shall alter or affect the election or term of any county court clerk, county attorney, sheriff, jailer, coroner, surveyor, or assessor. Nor shall any provision of KRS 67C.101 to 67C.137 be construed to alter or affect the powers, duties, or responsibilities of these officers as prescribed by the Constitution and laws of the Commonwealth of Kentucky. Any funding responsibilities or oversight of any constitutional officers or their employees previously exercised by the county, which shall include the approval of the annual budget of the sheriff’s and the county clerk’s offices, shall be transferred to the consolidated local government.

History. Enact. Acts 2000, ch. 189, § 11, effective July 14, 2000; 2002, ch. 346, § 59, effective July 15, 2002.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Salary.

Kentucky Legislature's failure to include any mention of the statutory salary provision for constables in the consolidation legislation is fatal to enactment of an ordinance relating to the salary of constables. Therefore, a constable's salary should not have been determined based on an ordinance. Whitlock v. Rowland, 453 S.W.3d 740, 2015 Ky. App. LEXIS 1 (Ky. Ct. App. 2015).

67C.123. Continued existence of tax structure, tax rates, and level of services — Certificate of delinquency on taxes owed city of the first class — Continued effect of existing contracts, bonds, franchises, and other obligations — Resolution of conflicts.

  1. The tax structure, tax rates, and level of services in effect in the city of the first class and its county upon the adoption of a consolidated local government shall remain in effect after the adoption of the consolidated local government and shall remain the same until changed by the newly elected consolidated local government council.
  2. All delinquent taxes of the former city of a first class in a consolidated local government shall be filed with the county clerk and shall be known as certificates of delinquency or personal property certificates of delinquency and shall be governed by the procedures set out in KRS Chapter 134, except that the certificates of delinquency and personal property certificates of delinquency on tax bills of the former city of the first class may be paid or purchased directly from the clerk under KRS 134.126 and 134.127 .
  3. Notwithstanding the provisions of KRS 67C.115(2), all contracts, bonds, franchises, and other obligations of the city of the first class and of the county in existence on the effective date of a consolidated local government shall continue in force and effect as obligations of the consolidated local government and the consolidated local government shall succeed to all rights and entitlements thereunder. All conflicts in the provisions of the contracts, bonds, franchises, or other obligations shall be resolved in a manner that does not impair the rights of any parties thereto.

History. Enact. Acts 2000, ch. 189, § 12, effective July 14, 2000; 2002, ch. 346, § 60, effective July 15, 2002; 2004, ch. 104, § 1, effective July 13, 2004; 2009, ch. 10, § 61, effective January 1, 2010.

67C.125. Limitation upon consolidated local government’s power to levy property tax.

Notwithstanding any other provision of KRS 67C.101 to 67C.137 or any subsequent enactment of a general nature of the General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, a consolidated local government shall not levy any tax on real property at a rate or rates in excess of that allowed by KRS 68.245 and KRS 132.027 . The limitations in those statutes shall apply to the consolidated local government in the same manner as applied to all other counties and cities.

History. Enact. Acts 2000, ch. 189, § 13, effective July 14, 2000.

67C.127. Continued existence of county’s cooperative compacts prior to adoption of consolidated local government.

Any cooperative compact in existence in a county containing a city of the first class on July 14, 2000, shall remain in effect unless a consolidated local government is adopted as provided in KRS 67C.101 to 67C.137 . The terms and agreements within a cooperative compact shall remain the same and in effect until the installation of the officers of the newly consolidated local government. If the voters in a county containing a city of the first class fail to approve a proposal for a consolidated local government then the cooperative compact shall remain in effect for the duration of the terms of the compact agreement.

History. Enact. Acts 2000, ch. 189, § 14, effective July 14, 2000.

67C.129. Salary of mayor.

The salary of the mayor of a newly consolidated local government created by the provisions of KRS 67C.101 to 67C.137 shall be the same as that allowed for a mayor of a city of the first class as provided by Section 246 of the Kentucky Constitution.

History. Enact. Acts 2000, ch. 189, § 15, effective July 14, 2000.

67C.131. Salaries for members of legislative council — Authorization to hire staff persons.

  1. The salary of the members of the legislative council of a newly consolidated local government created by the provisions of KRS 67C.101 to 67C.137 shall be eighty percent (80%) of that amount that is permitted for county commissioners on July 14, 2000, as provided by Section 246 of the Kentucky Constitution. In order to equate the compensation of legislative council members with the purchasing power of the dollar, the Department for Local Government shall compute by the second Friday in February of every year the annual increase or decrease in the consumer price index of the preceding year. The Department for Local Government shall notify the appropriate governing bodies charged by law to fix the compensation of the above elected officials of the annual rate of compensation to which the elected officials are entitled in accordance with the increase or decrease in the consumer price index. Upon notification from the Department for Local Government, the appropriate governing body may set the annual compensation of the above elected officials at a rate no greater than that stipulated by the Department for Local Government.
  2. Each legislative council member may hire one (1) full-time staff person. In addition to that full-time staff person, the two (2) largest political caucuses within the legislative council may hire staff persons to meet the staffing needs of those caucuses.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 2000, ch. 189, § 16, effective July 14, 2000; 2007, ch. 47, § 56, effective June 26, 2007; 2010, ch. 117, § 62, effective July 15, 2010; 2017 ch. 150, § 4, effective June 29, 2017.

67C.133. State Auditor to annually conduct audit of consolidated local government’s funds.

The Auditor of Public Accounts, in order to insure the authorized, legal, regular, and safe handling, administration, or expenditure of public funds, shall annually audit the funds budgeted by any consolidated local government in a county containing a city of the first class. Actions taken by the Auditor and the local government for compliance with this section shall be the same as those required by KRS Chapters 43 and 424 and by KRS 43.070 , 64.810 , 64.820 , 64.830 , 64.840 , and 64.850 relating to financial administration and the responsibilities of the handling of public funds.

History. Enact. Acts 2000, ch. 189, § 17, effective July 14, 2000.

67C.135. Division of county into legislative council districts after election approving consolidation — Requirements for district plan — Right of registered voter to bring action in Circuit Court.

  1. After certification of the election at which the voters of a county containing a city of the first class have approved the consolidation of a city of the first class and the county and after receipt of the 2000 census data, a plan to divide the county into twenty-six (26) legislative council districts shall be submitted to the fiscal court in order to establish the initial boundaries of the legislative council districts for the newly consolidated government.
  2. The district plan for the legislative council shall be prepared and submitted by representatives of a department of geography from the largest public university that exists within the county.
  3. Upon submission of the plan that lays out the initial boundaries of the legislative council districts, the fiscal court shall approve the plan within thirty (30) days as submitted and without amendment.
  4. The boundaries of the districts shall be drawn so that the districts are compact and contiguous, and the population of each district shall be as nearly equal as is reasonably possible.
  5. Thereafter, and not less than every ten (10) years, the legislative council shall initiate reapportionment proceedings in May of the first year following the decennial census of the United States to review the districts and reapportion them if necessary.
  6. To initiate a reapportionment proceeding, the legislative council shall publish notice of the planned reapportionment in accordance with KRS Chapter 424.
  7. In no event shall districts be reapportioned during the period from thirty (30) days prior to the last date for filing for candidacy for local government office as provided in KRS 118.165 and the regular election for candidates for local government office.
  8. Precinct lines shall be drawn when necessary in accordance with the provisions of law. No precinct shall be in more than one (1) district.
  9. Within twenty (20) days of the establishment of the districts by the legislative council, any registered voter of the county may bring an action in the Circuit Court to enforce the provisions of this section. The Circuit Court shall hear the action and, on a finding that the legislative council has violated the provisions of this section, remand the matter to the legislative council. The Circuit Court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the legislative council, a reasonable attorney’s fee, to be paid from the treasury of the local government, as part of the costs.

History. Enact. Acts 2000, ch. 189, § 18, effective July 14, 2000.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

Where KRS 67C.135(3) contained sufficient criteria for drawing new legislative districts and the fiscal court had no power or discretion as to the creation of the initial districts, the statute did not violate the prohibition against arbitrary power or the doctrine of separation of powers in Ky. Const. §§ 2, 27, 28, 29 when it required fiscal court approval of the plan without permitting it to make further refinements after-the-fact. Owens v. Jefferson County Fiscal Court, 128 S.W.3d 834, 2004 Ky. App. LEXIS 37 (Ky. Ct. App. 2004).

67C.137. Question of consolidation to be submitted to voters.

  1. In every county containing a city of the first class in existence on July 14, 2000, a question regarding the consolidation of the city of the first class and their county as provided by KRS 67C.101 to 67C.137 shall be submitted to the voters of the county at the regular election to be held in November of 2000. The election shall be governed by the general election laws of the Commonwealth. Approval of the proposal shall require a simple majority of those voting on the question.
  2. The question to be submitted to the voters shall read as follows:

“Are you in favor of combining the City of . . . . . and . . . . . County into a single government with a mayor and legislative council, keeping all other cities, fire protection districts and special districts in existence?”

History. Enact. Acts 2000, ch. 189, § 19, effective July 14, 2000.

67C.139. Authority over appointments upon establishment of consolidated local government.

If a cooperative compact exists between a city of the first class and its county prior to the creation of a consolidated local government, upon the establishment of the consolidated local government:

    1. The mayor of the consolidated local government shall assume all appointment authority previously held by the county judge/executive and the mayor of the consolidating governments. Appointments made by the mayor should reflect the political, geographic, gender, age, and racial diversity of the population within the jurisdiction of the consolidated local government. Upon the expiration of a term of appointment, the mayor shall make an appointment or reappointment within ninety (90) days of the term’s expiration. (1) (a) The mayor of the consolidated local government shall assume all appointment authority previously held by the county judge/executive and the mayor of the consolidating governments. Appointments made by the mayor should reflect the political, geographic, gender, age, and racial diversity of the population within the jurisdiction of the consolidated local government. Upon the expiration of a term of appointment, the mayor shall make an appointment or reappointment within ninety (90) days of the term’s expiration.
    2. If the mayor fails to make an appointment within ninety (90) days, the legislative council of the consolidated local government shall make the appointment within thirty (30) days after the expiration of the ninety (90) day period. The legislative council’s appointment shall take into account the political, geographic, gender, age, and racial diversity of the population. The legislative council shall adopt a resolution specifying how these appointments shall be made; and
    1. When authorized by statute, the mayor shall, subject to legislative council approval, determine which statutorily created agencies, boards, and commissions require legislative council approval for the appointment of members. (2) (a) When authorized by statute, the mayor shall, subject to legislative council approval, determine which statutorily created agencies, boards, and commissions require legislative council approval for the appointment of members.
      1. Subject to legislative council approval, the mayor shall determine the agencies, boards, and commissions to which legislative council members shall be appointed. The mayor’s determination under this subparagraph shall be made in consultation with the Office of the Attorney General and shall not violate the incompatible offices prohibitions in KRS 61.080(3). (b) 1. Subject to legislative council approval, the mayor shall determine the agencies, boards, and commissions to which legislative council members shall be appointed. The mayor’s determination under this subparagraph shall be made in consultation with the Office of the Attorney General and shall not violate the incompatible offices prohibitions in KRS 61.080(3).
      2. The presiding officer of the legislative council shall make all legislative council appointments to agencies, boards, and commissions from the membership of the legislative council, subject to subparagraph 1. of this paragraph.
    2. The legislative council shall enact an ordinance setting out the role of the legislative council, if any, in the appointment process for each individual agency, board, and commission created by statute. Only one (1) agency, board, or commission shall be addressed per ordinance. Such ordinance shall require a vote of the majority of the entire membership of the legislative council for approval and shall be subject to mayoral veto and legislative override pursuant to KRS 67C.103(13)(a) and 67C.105(5)(i); and
  1. The appointment of members to all agencies, boards, and commissions created by ordinance shall be determined by the ordinance creating the agency, board, or commission.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 2002, ch. 346, § 1, effective July 15, 2002; 2017 ch. 150, § 5, effective June 29, 2017.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Appointments.

Under KRS 76.030(7) and 67C.139 , the metropolitan sewer district’s executive director and chief engineer, as appointees of the mayor, albeit appointed by the urban county government, were not “appointed officials and employees” of the urban county government within the meaning of KRS 65.003 . Therefore, the county metro ethics commission had no jurisdiction over the sewer district or its officials. Louisville/Jefferson County Metro Ethics Comm'n v. Schardein, 259 S.W.3d 510, 2008 Ky. App. LEXIS 225 (Ky. Ct. App. 2008).

67C.141. Powers and responsibilities of mayor and other officers of consolidated local government.

  1. Notwithstanding any provision to the contrary, any statute which confers any rights, powers, privileges, immunities, or responsibilities upon the county judge/executive in a county formerly containing a city of the first class and presently having a consolidated local government, is hereby deemed to confer such rights, powers, privileges, immunities, and responsibilities upon the mayor of the consolidated local government.
  2. Any statute which confers any rights, powers, privileges, immunities, or responsibilities upon a fiscal court in a county formerly containing a city of the first class and now having a consolidated local government, is hereby deemed to confer such rights, powers, privileges, immunities, and responsibilities upon the officer or officers in whom such functions are vested in the consolidated local government by KRS 67C.103(1) and 67C.105(1), respectively. This provision applies to the general statutes applicable to counties, as well as applying to statutes applicable only within a county formerly containing a city of the first class.

History. Enact. Acts 2002, ch. 346, § 2, effective July 15, 2002.

67C.143. Removal of elected officers of consolidated local government — Hearing — Vote of council — Appeal — Restrictions on eligibility for office or appointment following removal.

  1. Unless otherwise provided by law, any elected officer of a consolidated local government in case of misconduct, incapacity, or willful neglect in the performance of the duties of his or her office may be removed from office by the legislative council, sitting as a court, under oath, upon charges preferred by the mayor or by any five (5) members of the legislative council, or, in case of charges against the mayor, upon charges preferred by not less than ten (10) members of the legislative council. No legislative council member preferring a charge shall sit as a member of the legislative council when it tries that charge.
  2. No elected officer shall be removed without having been given the right to a full public hearing.
  3. A decision to remove a mayor, legislative council member, or appointee to a board or commission shall require a vote of two-thirds (2/3) of the total number of legislative council members.
  4. Any elected officer removed from office under the provisions of this section may appeal to the Circuit Court and from there to the Court of Appeals. The appeal to the Circuit Court shall be taken and tried in the same manner as civil cases are tried.
    1. No elected officer removed from office under this section shall be eligible to fill the office vacated before the expiration of the term to which the elected member was originally elected. (5) (a) No elected officer removed from office under this section shall be eligible to fill the office vacated before the expiration of the term to which the elected member was originally elected.
    2. Any appointee to a board or commission removed under this section shall not be eligible for:
      1. The office from which he or she was removed before five (5) years following the date of his or her removal from that office; or
      2. Appointment to a board or commission described in KRS 67C.103(13)(f) before five (5) years following the date of his or her removal from that office.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 2002, ch. 346, § 3, effective July 15, 2002; 2017 ch. 150, § 6, effective June 29, 2017.

67C.145. Service districts — Taxes — Alteration of service districts and change of boundaries.

The territory of a consolidated local government may, as permitted by Section 172A of the Constitution of Kentucky, be divided into service districts. Each service district shall constitute a separate tax district within which the consolidated local government may, upon receipt of a petition signed by a majority of the registered voters in the district as of the last general election, levy and collect taxes in accordance with the kind, type, and character of the services provided by the consolidated local government in each of these service districts. A consolidated local government may abolish or alter service districts, but any expansion of the boundaries of a service district shall require a petition signed by a majority of the registered voters, as of the last election, in the new territory to be included in the service district. Notwithstanding the foregoing provision, a consolidated local government may not create or change the boundaries of a service district if that change would adversely affect the powers or functions of any city, existing taxing district, fire protection district, water district, or any other special taxing or service district of any kind which was in existence on the date the consolidated local government became effective unless such entity consents by resolution adopted by its governing body.

History. Enact. Acts 2002, ch. 346, § 4, effective July 15, 2002.

67C.147. Taxes and services in area of former city of the first class — Imposition of different tax rates — Urban service tax district — Modification of boundaries.

  1. In order to maintain the tax structure, tax rates, or level of services in the area of the consolidated local government formerly comprising the city of the first class, the legislative council of a consolidated local government may provide in the manner described in this chapter for taxes and services within the area comprising the former city of the first class which are different from the taxes and services which are applicable in the remainder of the county. These differences may include differences in tax rates upon the class of property which includes the surface of the land, differences in ad valorem tax rates upon personal property, and differences in tax rates upon insurance premiums.
  2. Any difference in the ad valorem tax rate on the class of property which includes the surface of the land in the portion of the county formerly comprising the city of the first class and in the portion of the county other than that formerly comprising the city of the first class may be imposed directly by the consolidated local government council. Any change in these ad valorem tax rates shall comply with KRS 68.245 , 132.010 , 132.017 , and 132.027 and shall be used for services as provided by KRS 82.085 .
  3. If the consolidated local government council determines to provide for tax rates applicable to health insurance premiums and personal property which are different in the area formerly comprising the city of the first class than the rates applicable in the remainder of the county, it shall do so in the following manner. The consolidated local government council shall by ordinance create a tax district to be known as the “urban service tax district” bounded by the former boundaries of the former city of the first class. The ordinance shall designate the number of members of the board of this taxing district and the manner in which they shall be appointed. The ordinance shall provide that the board of the taxing district shall receive the income derived from the differential in tax rate applicable in the area formerly comprising the city of the first class with respect to personal property, health insurance premiums, or both, and shall contract with the consolidated local government to pay all sums collected to the consolidated local government, in return for the provision of services performed by the consolidated local government within the area formerly comprising the city of the first class which services are in addition to services performed by the consolidated local government in the remainder of the county.
  4. After the initial formation of an urban service taxing district in a consolidated local government, the boundaries of the district may be modified in the following manner. The proposal to alter the boundaries of the urban service taxing district within a consolidated local government may be initiated by:
    1. A resolution enacted by the consolidated local government describing the boundaries of the area to be added to or deleted from the taxing district and duly passed and signed by the mayor not less than one hundred twenty (120) days before the next regularly scheduled election day within the county; or
    2. A petition signed by a number of qualified voters living within precincts within the area to be added to or deleted from the taxing district equal to ten percent (10%) of the votes cast within each precinct in the last general election for President of the United States and delivered to the clerk of the legislative council more than one hundred twenty (120) days next preceding the next regularly scheduled election day within the county.

The boundaries so described in either case shall not cross precinct lines. The question of whether the area bounded as described should be added to or deleted from, as the case may be, the urban services taxing district shall then be placed upon the ballot in the precincts in the area to be added or deleted at the next regular election and the question stated on the ballot shall be so phrased that a “Yes” vote shall be cast in favor of making the proposed change and a “No” vote shall be cast to oppose the proposed change. If a majority of those voting in those precincts support the change, then the change in the boundaries of the urban service district shall be implemented.

History. Enact. Acts 2002, ch. 346, § 5, effective July 15, 2002.

Police Force Merit System in Consolidated Local Government

67C.301. Definitions for KRS 67C.301 to 67C.327.

As used in KRS 67C.301 to 67C.327 , unless the context otherwise requires:

  1. “Board” means the consolidated local government police force merit board or boards hereinafter created.
  2. “Chief” means a chief of a consolidated local government police force affected by KRS 67C.301 to 67C.327 .
  3. “Assistant chief” means the next in command to the chiefs of the consolidated local government police force or forces affected by KRS 67C.301 to 67C.327 .
  4. “Secretary” means the executive secretary employed by the consolidated local government police force merit board or boards created as provided by KRS 67C.301 to 67C.327 .
  5. “Officer” means any member of the consolidated local government police forces affected by KRS 67C.301 to 67C.327 , including police officers, corporals, sergeants, lieutenants, and captains.

History. Enact. Acts 2002, ch. 339, § 1, effective July 15, 2002; 2003, ch. 118, § 1, effective March 18, 2003.

67C.303. Ordinance creating merit system and merit board — Duties of board — Appropriation of funds for expenses of board.

  1. A consolidated local government shall, by ordinance, create a consolidated local government police force merit system and in the same ordinance shall establish a consolidated local government police force merit board. A board shall classify and examine applicants seeking employment as officers of the police force of the consolidated local government, excluding applicants for the positions of chief, assistant chief, and officers above the rank of captain. The board, except when prohibited, shall promulgate rules and regulations not inconsistent with KRS 67C.301 to 67C.327 governing the classification, qualification, examination, appointment, probation, promotion, demotion, suspension, and other disciplinary action within the consolidated local government police force of all officers affected and covered by the provisions of KRS 67C.301 to 67C.327 , and shall hold hearings and impose, if necessary, penalties upon the personnel affected by KRS 67C.301 to 67C.327.
  2. The legislative council of the consolidated local government shall annually appropriate funds for the reasonable and necessary expenses of the board.

History. Enact. Acts 2002, ch. 339, § 2, effective July 15, 2002.

67C.305. Membership of merit board — Appointment — Removal — Oath — Election of police officers.

  1. The mayor, subject to the approval of the legislative council of the consolidated local government, shall appoint five (5) persons, who shall constitute the consolidated local government police force merit board of the consolidated local government. The members of the board shall serve without compensation. Each board appointee shall be at least thirty (30) years of age, a resident of the consolidated local government, and not related by either blood or marriage to either the mayor or any member of the legislative council of the consolidated local government. The first members of the board shall be appointed within thirty (30) days of the effective date of the ordinance creating a consolidated local government police force merit system and merit board. One (1) member of the board shall be appointed for a term of one (1) year, one (1) for a term of two (2) years, two (2) for a term of three (3) years, and one (1) for a term of four (4) years. Thereafter, all appointments shall be for four (4) years except that an appointment to fill a vacancy on the board shall be made only for the unexpired term of the vacated position. Any board member may be removed by resolution of the legislative council of the consolidated local government for neglect, incapacity, misfeasance, or malfeasance on the part of a board member. No appointed board member shall hold any other public office, elective or appointive, during his or her term as a member of the board, and shall not receive any money, gift, or consideration of any type from any person, directly or indirectly, for or on account of any recommendation, proposal, or suggestion bearing upon the business of the board or the consolidated local government police force. Not more than three (3) members shall be members of the same political party.
  2. Each appointee, before entering upon the discharge of his or her duties, shall qualify by subscribing, taking, and filling an oath of office as required by law.
  3. The officers of the consolidated local government police forces shall elect, for a two (2) year term, two (2) police officers of the consolidated police forces with a minimum of five (5) or more years’ service who shall serve as members of the board for the purpose of deciding discipline cases only, and who may vote in these cases. In case of a vacancy in a position held by a police officer, a new election shall be held within sixty (60) days of the date the vacancy occurs and the person elected shall fill the remainder of the original unexpired term.

History. Enact. Acts 2002, ch. 339, § 3, effective July 15, 2002; 2003, ch. 118, § 2, effective March 18, 2003.

67C.307. First meeting of board — Officers — Rules — Voting.

  1. The board shall meet within thirty (30) days of the creation of the board and the members shall select from among themselves a chairman and vice chairman and adopt such rules, regulations, and bylaws not inconsistent with KRS 67C.301 to 67C.327 for the necessary operation of the board. In all nondisciplinary matters requiring a vote, a majority of the board members present and voting shall determine any questions, provided that at least three (3) board members are present to constitute a quorum.
  2. In cases of discipline, four (4) members of the board shall be present to constitute a quorum, one (1) of which shall be a police officer as defined in KRS 67C.305(3).

History. Enact. Acts 2002, ch. 339, § 4, effective July 15, 2002; 2003, ch. 118, § 3, effective March 18, 2003.

67C.309. Meetings of board — Secretary — Minutes — Records.

  1. The board shall meet at least once every two (2) calendar months and minutes of each meeting shall be kept.
  2. The board, with the approval of the mayor, shall employ a secretary who shall also conduct examinations, prepare eligible lists, keep all records of the board’s business, keep and maintain all minutes of all board meetings, and perform such other duties in connection with the business of the board as may be required. The secretary may be employed on either a part-time or full-time basis, and the secretary shall receive compensation as may be recommended by the board and approved by the legislative council. All orders and minutes of the board shall be signed by the chairman who shall be elected by the board members, and the minutes shall be countersigned by the secretary.
  3. All records and meetings of the board shall comply with KRS 61.805 to 61.884 .

History. Enact. Acts 2002, ch. 339, § 5, effective July 15, 2002; 2003, ch. 118, § 4, effective March 18, 2003.

67C.311. Mayor’s certification of information on police officers.

Within thirty (30) days after the creation of a merit board under KRS 67C.301 to 67C.327 , the mayor shall certify to the board the names, rank, rate of pay, and the seniority of every officer on the police force as of the effective date of the ordinance creating the board.

History. Enact. Acts 2002, ch. 339, § 6, effective July 15, 2002.

67C.313. Police officers deemed qualified to continue duties and to be permanent employees — Probationary officers.

  1. All police officers of whatever rank and title of a consolidated local government police force shall be covered by the provisions of this section, except probationary officers. All officers of a consolidated local government police force on active duty or service as of the effective date of an ordinance creating a consolidated local government police merit system and board, shall be deemed fit and qualified to continue their respective duties of employment on or for the consolidated local government police force without examination or further qualification.
  2. All personnel covered by the provisions of this section, except probationary officers, shall be deemed to be permanent employees subject to their ability to satisfactorily perform their respective duties and further subject to their good behavior.
  3. A probationary officer shall not be included in the merit system until that officer has satisfactorily completed his or her initial probationary period which shall be one (1) year from his or her sworn date. The one (1) year probationary period may be extended for up to six (6) months upon showing of just cause by the chief and approved by the board.
  4. Officers covered by the provisions of KRS 67C.303 and serving promotional probationary periods shall not be deemed excluded from the merit system during the promotional probationary periods.

History. Enact. Acts 2002, ch. 339, § 7, effective July 15, 2002; 2003, ch. 118, § 5, effective March 18, 2003.

67C.315. Application to chief, assistant chief, and officers above the rank of captain.

  1. The provisions of KRS 67C.303 , 67C.305 , 67C.307 , 67C.309 , and 67C.319 shall not apply to the chief of police, assistant chief, and any officers above the rank of captain of the consolidated local government police force. These officers shall be appointed by the mayor and shall not be considered covered under the employment protections of the merit board, except as provided in subsection (2) of this section.
  2. Any officer originally covered by the provisions of KRS 67C.303 , 67C.305 , 67C.307 , and 67C.309 who shall accept an appointment and qualify as chief of police, assistant chief of police, or officer above the rank of captain shall be deemed to have received a leave of absence from the classified service for and during his or her service in either of these respective positions. Should any chief of police, assistant chief of police, or officer above the rank of captain cease to serve in that capacity, he or she shall be restored to the same classification and rank which he or she held prior to the appointment without loss of seniority in grade. Any person not covered by the provisions of KRS 67C.303 , 67C.305 , 67C.307 , and 67C.309 when appointed to the position of chief of police, assistant chief of police, or officer above the rank of captain shall not be deemed to be part of the classified service and shall not be placed in any classification or rank in the classified service when he or she ceases to serve in that position unless he or she goes through the normal qualification and classification procedures required by the board.

History. Enact. Acts 2002, ch. 339, § 8, effective July 15, 2002; 2003, ch. 118, § 6, effective March 18, 2003.

67C.317. Soliciting and receiving political contributions — Appointment or promotion for political service — Discipline for failure to make political contribution — Opinions and beliefs — Political or religious controversies — Political activity prohibited.

  1. No officer while on duty or in uniform covered by the provisions of KRS 67C.301 to 67C.327 shall directly or indirectly solicit or receive or be in any manner concerned in receiving, soliciting, or publicizing any assessment, gift, subscription, or contribution to or for any political party or candidate for public office.
  2. No person shall use or promise to use his or her personal influence or official authority to secure any appointment or promotion to any position of employment covered by the provisions of KRS 67C.301 to 67C.327 , as a reward or return for personal or partisan political service. No candidate applying for original appointment or promotion to any position of employment covered by KRS 67C.301 to 67C.327 shall sign or execute or promise to sign or execute a resignation dated or undated in advance of his or her appointment or promotion. No officer covered by the provisions of KRS 67C.301 to 67C.327 shall be suspended, laid-off, demoted, promoted, disciplined, or threatened, or in any way changed in rank, duty, or compensation for withholding or neglecting to pay or make any contribution of any sort, either in money, goods, services, or anything of value for any political purpose whatsoever.
  3. No examination question on any examination given by the board shall relate to any political or religious opinion, belief, affiliation, or service and no appointment, promotion, demotion, suspension, or removal shall be brought about, affected, or influenced by these opinions, beliefs, affiliations, or services.
  4. No officer covered by the provisions of KRS 67C.301 to 67C.327 shall foster, promote, or be concerned with any actions involving political or religious controversies or prejudices while in uniform.
  5. No officer covered by KRS 67C.301 to 67C.327 and no probationary officer shall, while on duty, in uniform, or using public resources, propose or oppose the placement of a question or advocate for the adoption or defeat of a question to be voted upon by the voters of the government under which the officer is employed.
  6. Nothing contained in KRS 67C.301 to 67C.327 shall be so construed as to abridge the rights of any officer with respect to his or her personal opinions, beliefs, and right to vote.

History. Enact. Acts 2002, ch. 339, § 9, effective July 15, 2002; 2003, ch. 118, § 7, effective March 18, 2003; 2008, ch. 135, § 2, effective July 15, 2008.

67C.319. Rules for qualification, appointment, and discipline of officers — Chief examiner — Promotional examinations — Review of results — Filling promotional vacancies.

  1. Every consolidated local government police force merit system board created shall make, promulgate, and when necessary, amend rules for the qualifications, original appointment, probation, promotion, demotion, transfer, lay-off, reinstatement, suspension, and removal of the officers covered by KRS 67C.303 , 67C.305 , 67C.307 , and 67C.309 . No rule or regulation made, promulgated, or amended by any consolidated local government police force merit system board shall be inconsistent with the express provisions of this chapter. The board shall publish its rules and any amendments and shall supply certified copies to the mayor, legislative council, and the police chief and shall post a copy conspicuously in the office or place where the headquarters of the consolidated local government police is maintained. The copies of the rules and amendments shall be distributed and posted in the manner prescribed within three (3) days after adoption.
  2. The rules in addition to other matters shall specifically provide for and cover the following:
    1. Physical, mental, educational, citizenship, and age requirements for new officers;
    2. Physical, mental, educational, citizenship, age, and length of service requirements for promotion from lower to higher rank or classification;
    3. A requirement that police officers, since their most recent date of entry into that rank, have at least:
      1. Five (5) years of continuous service as police officers before being eligible for promotion to the rank of sergeant; and
      2. One (1) year of continuous service as police sergeants before being eligible for promotion to the rank of lieutenant;
    4. Provision for open, competitive, written, oral, and other mental and physical examinations to determine the relative fitness of all candidates for original appointment and for promotion;
    5. A requirement of public notice of all examinations to be given by the merit board;
    6. Organization and meetings of the board; and
    7. Procedure and conduct of public hearings.
  3. The board, with the approval of the mayor, shall employ a chief examiner who shall be professionally qualified and experienced in the field of testing and who shall formulate, give, grade, and administer all written or other examinations as required by the board.
  4. Physical fitness for promotion shall be presumed unless certified to the contrary by the chief of police who shall supply the board with medical records of the disability.
  5. At least ninety (90) days’ notice shall be given before a promotional examination is conducted.
  6. Promotional tests shall be graded, as determined by the board, to include scores on the written, oral, or other examination components. In addition, seniority shall be awarded for each year of full-time continuous service since being hired as a police recruit or police officer. If the candidate has been rehired after a period of separation, seniority for promotional tests shall be calculated from the most recent hire date. The results of the written, oral, or other examination components shall be combined with the seniority component to determine the applicant’s final earned rating. The board shall determine the weight for each component of the final earned rating, including seniority. The weight assigned to seniority as a component shall not exceed ten percent (10%) of the maximum number of points attainable for all examination components combined. If the number of candidates exceeds the number of positions in the rank for which the candidates are being tested, the chief examiner may set a cut-off score on any of the tests, excluding seniority, that candidates must meet or exceed in order for them to progress in the selection process. The cut-off score shall be set such that the number of candidates equals one-half (1/2) the number of positions in the rank for which the candidates are being tested, that number to be rounded up, at the time of the posting. If ties exist at the cut-off score, individuals having tied scores shall progress in the selection process.
  7. Promotional eligibility lists shall contain the names of successful candidates in the order of their standing through examination. An individual’s results and ratings are subject to review by the individual candidate but are otherwise confidential.
  8. The chief examiner shall compile the results of all examinations. Upon completion of grading of examinations, candidates shall be informed by mail of the final evaluated rating attained and their individual ranking on the eligibility list. An applicant may, by appointment, discuss his or her examination results within the offices of the chief examiner during business hours at any time when such review will not interfere with the work of the board. Such review must be requested within ten (10) calendar days following the establishment of the eligibility list. The board shall make examination questions and answers available for inspection by the applicant upon the filing of a written challenge.
  9. In filling promotional vacancies, the chief of police shall select from not more than five (5) candidates graded highest on the appropriate eligibility list. The board shall determine the justification for not promoting a candidate with the higher evaluated rating who has been certified for promotion four (4) times. If the board determines that the candidate’s nonpromotion is unjustified or unsupported by the evidence, the candidate shall be promoted. The certified rank list for promotions shall be valid for two (2) years and shall not be extended. All promotional vacancies shall be filled within sixty (60) days of the vacancy.
  10. For the purposes of this section:
    1. “Continuous service” means the period of time in which a police officer has been employed full-time in that position with the consolidated local government police department without separation. Continuous service shall not be broken if an employee, who has been involuntarily terminated, is reinstated by legal process; and
    2. “Separation” means removal from employment as a police officer but shall not include lawful leaves of absence from duty such as military leave, medical leave, or other lawful absences where return to duty is ordinarily expected.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 2002, ch. 339, § 10, effective July 15, 2002; 2003, ch. 118, § 8, effective March 18, 2003; 2007, ch. 131, § 1, effective June 26, 2007; 2018 ch. 83, § 2, effective July 14, 2018.

67C.321. Actions taken by chief against officers — Written statement — Answer — Citizen charges of misconduct.

  1. Any officer may be removed, suspended for a period not to exceed thirty (30) days, laid-off, or reduced in grade by the chief for any cause which promotes the efficiency of the services, but before any such action is taken by the chief against any officer, the chief shall furnish the officer concerned with a written statement of the reasons why the described action is being taken. The officer may be reduced, removed, suspended for a period not to exceed thirty (30) days, or laid-off from the date the written statement of reasons is served upon her or him. Each officer removed, suspended for a period not to exceed thirty (30) days, laid-off, or reduced in grade shall be allowed a period of ten (10) days within which the officer may file a written answer to the charges and the reasons which caused her or his suspension, removal, or reduction. This answer shall be made a part of the official records of the police department. No trial or examination of witnesses shall be required in any such case except at the discretion of the chief. The chief shall likewise furnish a copy of the written charges and reasons for her or his action to the board.
  2. Any citizen who makes written, sworn charges of misconduct concerning the actions of any police officer shall present the charges to the chief of police who shall investigate the charges. The chief of police shall determine what action, if any, shall be taken against the officer, subject to the limitations set out in this chapter. The citizen may appeal the determination of the chief of police to the board.

History. Enact. Acts 2002, ch. 339, § 11, effective July 15, 2002; 2003, ch. 118, § 9, effective March 18, 2003.

67C.323. Review of disciplinary actions — Hearings — Appeal.

In all cases provided for in KRS 67C.321 , the action of the chief shall be final except in the following cases:

  1. Every action in the nature of a dismissal, suspension, or demotion of a nonprobationary officer made by the chief shall be subject to review by the board at the request of any officer affected by KRS 67C.301 to 67C.327 . An appeal to the board of a dismissal, demotion, or forty (40) hour or more suspension of a nonprobationary officer shall be heard by the full board. The board shall give notice and hold a public hearing. After the hearing, the board shall retire in executive session to discuss the evidence introduced at the hearing and to make its determination and conclusion. While in executive session, the board shall not receive any further evidence or communication from any source prior to reaching its determination and conclusion. The board, while in executive session, may request and receive legal advice from board counsel on specific legal issues which may arise during deliberations. If a majority of the members of the board are of the opinion that the action of the chief is unjustified or unsupported by proper evidence, the order of the chief may be set aside and revoked by the board, and the board may impose the penalty or punishment it deems necessary and appropriate, if any; provided however, the board shall not impose a penalty or punishment in excess of the action of the chief. No officer shall be removed or dismissed except as provided for in this section.
  2. An appeal to the board of a suspension of a nonprobationary officer of less than forty (40) hours may be heard by the full board or any hearing officer secured by the board. If the appeal is heard by a hearing officer, all rules established by the board relating to appeals of disciplinary actions shall be applicable. After the hearing, the hearing officer shall complete and submit to the board, no later than thirty (30) days after the hearing, a written recommended order which shall include his findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommended disposition of the appeal, which may include recommended penalties. The recommended order shall also include a statement advising the appealing officer and chief fully of their exception and appeal rights. A copy of the hearing officer’s recommended order shall be sent to the appealing officer and chief. Each party shall have fifteen (15) days from the date the recommended order is mailed within which to file exceptions to the recommendations with the board. The board shall consider the record including the recommended order in any exceptions duly filed to a recommended order, and accept and adopt or reject or modify, in whole or in part, the recommended order, or remand the appeal of the matter, in whole or in part, to the hearing officer for further proceedings as appropriate. The final order of the board shall be in writing. If the final order differs from the recommended order, it shall include separate statements of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The board shall render a final order in an administrative hearing within thirty (30) days after receipt of the hearing officer’s recommended order.
    1. Every action of a dismissal, suspension, or demotion made by the board shall be final, except that any person aggrieved may, within thirty (30) days after the action, appeal to the Circuit Court of the county in which the board meets. The board shall be named respondent as the consolidated local government police force merit board, and service shall be had on the chairman of the board. Notice of the appeal shall be given to the chief or the officer if not already a party to the appeal as real parties in interest. The appeal taken to the Circuit Court shall be docketed by the clerk as a civil action with appropriate judicial review of an administrative action or decision. (3) (a) Every action of a dismissal, suspension, or demotion made by the board shall be final, except that any person aggrieved may, within thirty (30) days after the action, appeal to the Circuit Court of the county in which the board meets. The board shall be named respondent as the consolidated local government police force merit board, and service shall be had on the chairman of the board. Notice of the appeal shall be given to the chief or the officer if not already a party to the appeal as real parties in interest. The appeal taken to the Circuit Court shall be docketed by the clerk as a civil action with appropriate judicial review of an administrative action or decision.
    2. The judgment of the Circuit Court shall be subject to appeal to the Court of Appeals. The procedure as to the appeal to the Court of Appeals shall be the same as in any civil action.

History. Enact. Acts 2002, ch. 339, § 12, effective July 15, 2002; 2003, ch. 118, § 10, effective March 18, 2003; 2013, ch. 95, § 3, effective June 25, 2013.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited in

River City FOP Lodge 614, Inc. v. Louisville/Jefferson Cty. Metro. Gov't, 2019 Ky. App. LEXIS 15 (Ky. Ct. App. Feb. 1, 2019); River City FOP Lodge 614, Inc. v. Louisville/Jefferson Cty. Metro. Gov't, 585 S.W.3d 258, 2019 Ky. App. LEXIS 93 (Ky. Ct. App. 2019).

67C.325. Rights of officer brought before board — Subpoenas.

Procedural due process shall be afforded to any police officer brought before the board. The officer shall be given a prompt hearing by the board, have an opportunity to confront his or her accusers, and have the privilege of presenting the board with evidence. The board shall have the power to issue subpoenas attested in the name of its chairman, to compel the attendance of witnesses, to compel the production of documents and other documentary evidence, and so far as practicable, conduct the hearing within the Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure. Upon a showing of proper need, the board shall issue subpoenas to compel the attendance of witnesses, or to compel the production of documents and other documentary evidence for the benefits of the officer or the chief at the request of the officer or the chief.

History. Enact. Acts 2002, ch. 339, § 13, effective July 15, 2002; 2003, ch. 118, § 11, effective March 18, 2003.

67C.326. Review of citizen complaints against police officers.

  1. In order to establish a minimum system of professional conduct of the police officers of consolidated local governments of this Commonwealth, the following standards of conduct are stated as the intention of the General Assembly to deal fairly and set administrative due process rights for police officers of the consolidated local government and at the same time providing a means for redress by the citizens of the Commonwealth for wrongs allegedly done to them by police officers covered by this section:
    1. Any complaint taken from any individual alleging misconduct on the part of any police officer, as defined herein, shall be taken as follows:
      1. If the complaint alleges criminal activity on behalf of a police officer, the allegations may be investigated without a signed, sworn complaint of the individual;
      2. If the complaint alleges abuse of official authority or a violation of rules and regulations of the department, an affidavit, signed and sworn to by the complainant, shall be obtained;
      3. If a complaint is required to be obtained and the individual, upon request, refuses to make allegations under oath in the form of an affidavit, signed and sworn to, the department may investigate the allegations, but shall bring charges against the police officer only if the department can independently substantiate the allegations absent the sworn statement of the complainant;
      4. Nothing in this section shall preclude a department from investigating and charging an officer both criminally and administratively;
    2. No threats, promises, or coercions shall be used at any time against any police officer while he or she is a suspect in a criminal or departmental matter. Suspension from duty with or without pay, or reassignment to other than an officer’s regular duties during the period, shall not be deemed coercion. Prior to or within twenty-four (24) hours after suspending the officer pending investigation or disposition of a complaint, the officer shall be advised in writing of the reasons for the suspension;
    3. No police officer shall be subjected to interrogation in a departmental matter involving alleged misconduct on his or her part, until forty-eight (48) hours have expired from the time the request for interrogation is made to the accused officer, in writing. The interrogation shall be conducted while the officer is on duty. The police officer may be required to submit a written report of the alleged incident if the request is made by the department no later than the end of the subject officer’s next tour of duty after the tour of duty during which the department initially was made aware of the charges;
    4. If a police officer is under arrest, or likely to be arrested, or a suspect in any criminal investigation, he shall be afforded the same constitutional due process rights that are accorded to any civilian, including but not limited to the right to remain silent and the right to counsel, and shall be notified of those ights before any questioning commences. Nothing in this section shall prevent the suspension with or without pay or reassignment of the police officer pending disposition of the charges;
    5. Any charge involving violation of any consolidated local government rule or regulation shall be made in writing with sufficient specificity so as to fully inform the police officer of the nature and circumstances of the alleged violation in order that he may be able to properly defend himself. The charge shall be served on the police officer in writing;
    6. When a police officer has been charged with a violation of departmental rules or regulations, no public statements shall be made concerning the alleged violation by any person or persons of the consolidated local government or the police officer so charged, until final disposition of the charges;
    7. No police officer as a condition of continued employment by the consolidated local government shall be compelled to speak or testify or be questioned by any person or body of a nongovernmental nature; and
    8. When a hearing is to be conducted by any appointing authority, legislative body, or other body as designated by the Kentucky Revised Statutes, the following administrative due process rights shall be recognized and these shall be the minimum rights afforded any police officer charged:
      1. The accused police officer shall have been given at least seventy-two (72) hours’ notice of any hearing;
      2. Copies of any sworn statements or affidavits to be considered by the hearing authority and any exculpatory statements or affidavits shall be furnished to the police officer no less than seventy-two (72) hours prior to the time of any hearing;
      3. If any hearing is based upon a complaint of an individual, the individual shall be notified to appear at the time and place of the hearing by certified mail, return receipt requested;
      4. If the return receipt has been returned unsigned, or the individual does not appear, except where due to circumstances beyond his control he cannot appear, at the time and place of the hearing, any charge made by that individual shall not be considered by the hearing authority and shall be dismissed with prejudice;
      5. The accused police officer shall have the right and opportunity to obtain and have counsel present, and to be represented by the counsel;
      6. The appointing authority, legislative body, or other body as designated by the Kentucky Revised Statutes shall subpoena and require the attendance of witnesses and the production by them of books, papers, records, and other documentary evidence at the request of the accused police officer or the charging party. If any person fails or refuses to appear under the subpoena, or to testify, or to attend, or produce the books, papers, records, or other documentary evidence lawfully required, the appointing authority, legislative body, or other body as designated by the Kentucky Revised Statutes may report to the Circuit Court or any judge thereof the failure or refusal, and apply for a rule. The Circuit Court, or any judge thereof, may on the application compel obedience by proceedings for contempt as in the case of disobedience of the requirements of a subpoena issued from the court;
      7. The accused police officer shall be allowed to have presented, witnesses and any documentary evidence the police officer wishes to provide to the hearing authority, and may cross-examine all witnesses called by the charging party;
      8. For any police officer suspended with or without pay who is not given a hearing as provided by this section within sixty (60) days of any charge being filed, the charge then shall be dismissed with prejudice and not be considered by any hearing authority and the officer shall be reinstated with full back pay and benefits; and
      9. The failure to provide any of the rights or to follow the provisions of this section may be raised by the officer with the hearing authority. The hearing authority shall not exclude proffered evidence based on failure to follow the requirements of this section but shall consider whether, because of the failure, the proffered evidence lacks weight or credibility and whether the officer has been materially prejudiced.
  2. Any police officer who shall be found guilty by any hearing authority of any charge may bring an action in the Circuit Court in the county in which the consolidated local government is located to contest the action of that hearing authority, and the action shall be tried as an original action by the court.
  3. The judgment of the Circuit Court shall be subject to appeal to the Court of Appeals. The procedure as to appeal to the Court of Appeals shall be the same as in any civil action. As the provisions of this section relate to a minimum system of professional conduct, nothing in this section shall be construed as limiting or in any way affecting any rights previously afforded to police officers of the consolidated local government by statute, ordinance, or working agreement.

HISTORY: 2015 ch. 119, § 2, effective June 24, 2015.

67C.327. Promotional lists in existence upon establishment of consolidated local government — Merit board.

Upon the establishment of a consolidated local government merit board, the existing or currently promulgated promotional lists of the merit and civil service boards of the previously existing county and city of the first class governments shall remain in effect until their normal expiration date, or no longer than two (2) years after the effective date of the ordinance required to be enacted by KRS 67C.303 .

History. Enact. Acts 2002, ch. 339, § 14, effective July 15, 2002; 2003, ch. 118, § 12, effective March 18, 2003.

Collective Bargaining for Police Officers in Consolidated Local Government

67C.400. Definitions for KRS 67C.400 to 67C.418.

As used in KRS 67C.400 to 67C.418 :

  1. “Cabinet” means the Kentucky Labor Cabinet;
  2. “Labor organization” means any chartered labor organization of any kind in which police officers participate and which exists for the primary purpose of dealing with consolidated local governments concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rate of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of employment;
  3. “Exclusive representative” means the labor organization which has been designated by the cabinet as the representative of the majority of police officers in appropriate units or has been so recognized by the consolidated local government;
  4. “Person” includes one (1) or more individuals, labor organizations, associations, corporations, legal representatives, trustees, trustees in bankruptcy, or receivers; and
  5. “Secretary” means the secretary of the Labor Cabinet of the Commonwealth of Kentucky.

History. Enact. Acts 2004, ch. 101, § 1, effective July 13, 2004; 2010, ch. 24, § 64, effective July 15, 2010.

67C.402. Employees’ right to organize for the purpose of collective bargaining — Mayor to represent consolidated local government.

  1. Police officers of a consolidated local government shall have, and shall be protected in the exercise of, the right of self-organization, to form, join, or assist any labor organization, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing on questions of wages, hours, and other conditions of employment free from interference, restraint, or coercion.
  2. Labor organizations designated by the cabinet as the representative of the majority of police officers in an appropriate unit or recognized by a consolidated local government as the representative of the majority of employees in an appropriate unit shall be the exclusive representative for the employees of that unit for the purpose of collective bargaining with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours, and other conditions of employment.
  3. Labor organizations recognized by a consolidated local government as the exclusive representative or so designated in accordance with the provisions of this section shall be responsible for representing the interest of all police officers in the unit without discrimination.
  4. When a labor organization has been designated in accordance with the provisions of this section as the exclusive representative of police officers in an appropriate unit, the mayor of a consolidated local government or his designated authorized representative shall represent the consolidated local government in collective bargaining with the labor organization.

History. Enact. Acts 2004, ch. 101, § 2, effective July 13, 2004; 2010, ch. 24, § 65, effective July 15, 2010.

67C.404. Duty to bargain collectively.

The consolidated local government and the labor organization that has been designated as the exclusive representative of police officers in an appropriate unit, through appropriate officials or their representatives, shall have the authority and the duty to bargain collectively.

History. Enact. Acts 2004, ch. 101, § 3, effective July 13, 2004.

67C.406. Activities prohibited and duty to bargain in good faith.

  1. Except as provided in KRS 336.130(3), consolidated local governments, their representatives, or their agents are prohibited from:
    1. Interfering, restraining, or coercing police officers in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in KRS 67C.402 ;
    2. Dominating or interfering with the formation, existence, or administration of any labor organization;
    3. Discriminating in regard to hiring or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization;
    4. Discharging or otherwise discriminating against an employee because he or she has signed or filed any affidavit, petition, or complaint or given any information or testimony under this section; or
    5. Refusing to bargain collectively in good faith with a labor organization which is the exclusive representative of employees in an appropriate unit, including but not limited to the discussing of grievances with the exclusive representative.
  2. Labor organizations or their agents are prohibited from:
    1. Restraining or coercing:
      1. Police officers in the exercise of the right guaranteed in KRS 67C.402 ; and
      2. A consolidated local government in the selection of a representative for the purposes of collective bargaining or the adjustment of grievances; or
    2. Refusing to bargain collectively in good faith with a consolidated local government, if they have been designated in accordance with the provisions of this section as the exclusive representative of police officers in an appropriate unit.
  3. For the purposes of this section, to bargain collectively is to carry out in good faith the mutual obligation of the parties, or their representatives; to meet together at reasonable times, including meetings in advance of the budget-making process; to negotiate in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other conditions of employment; to negotiate an agreement; to negotiate any question arising under any agreement; and to execute a written contract incorporating any agreement reached, if requested by either party. The obligation shall not be interpreted to compel either party to agree to a proposal, or require either party to make a concession.

History. Enact. Acts 2004, ch. 101, § 4, effective July 13, 2004; 2017 ch. 1, § 8, effective January 9, 2017.

67C.408. Election of exclusive representative.

  1. Whenever, in accordance with administrative regulations that may be promulgated by the cabinet, a petition has been filed:
    1. By a police officer or group of police officers or any labor organization acting in behalf of thirty percent (30%) of the employees who have signed labor organization affiliation cards and the labor organization showing proof of representation:
      1. Alleging that they wish to be represented for collective bargaining by a labor organization as exclusive representative; or
      2. Asserting that the labor organization which has been certified or is currently being recognized by the consolidated local government as bargaining representative is no longer the representative of the majority of employees in the unit; or
    2. By a consolidated local government alleging that one (1) or more labor organizations has presented to it a claim to be recognized as the representative of the majority of police officers in an appropriate unit;

      The cabinet shall investigate the petition, and if it has reasonable cause to believe that a question of representation exists, shall provide for an appropriate hearing upon due notice. If the cabinet finds that there is a question of representation, it shall direct an election by secret ballot to determine whether or by which labor organization the police officers desire to be represented and shall certify the result thereof to the legislative council of the consolidated local government.

  2. The cabinet shall decide in each case, in order to assure police officers the fullest freedom in exercising the rights guaranteed by this section, the unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining, based on such factors as community of interest, wages, hours, and other working conditions of the police officers involved; the history of collective bargaining; and the desires of the police officers.
  3. An election shall not be directed in any bargaining unit or in any subdivision thereof within which in the preceding twelve (12) month period a valid election has been held. The cabinet shall determine who is eligible to vote in the election and shall promulgate administrative regulations governing the election. In any election where none of the choices on the ballot receives a majority, a runoff shall be conducted, the ballot providing for the selection between the two (2) choices receiving the largest and the second largest number of valid votes cast in the election. A labor organization which receives the majority of the votes cast in an election shall be certified by the cabinet as exclusive representative of all the police officers in the unit.
  4. Nothing in this or any other law shall be construed to prohibit recognition of a labor organization as the exclusive representative by a consolidated local government by mutual consent.
  5. No election shall be directed by the cabinet in any bargaining unit where there is in force and effect a valid collective bargaining agreement; provided, however, that no collective bargaining agreement shall bar an election upon the petition of persons not parties thereto where more than four (4) years have elapsed since the execution of the agreement or the last timely renewal, whichever was later.

History. Enact. Acts 2004, ch. 101, § 5, effective July 13, 2004; 2010, ch. 24, § 66, effective July 15, 2010.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(7/13/2004). Under the authority of KRS 7.136(1)(h), during codification a manifest clerical or typographical error occurring in Ky. Acts ch. 101, sec. 5(5), has been corrected. The second clause of Ky. Acts ch. 101, sec. 5(5), reads, “provided, however, that collective bargaining agreement shall bar an election upon the petition of persons not parties thereto where more than four (4) years have elapsed . . . . . ” It is clear from the context and legislative history of the Act that the word “no” was erroneously omitted before the word “collective” in the provision, and the omitted word has been restored during codification.

67C.410. Unfair labor practices and remedies therefor — Hearing — Final order — Appeal to Circuit Court.

Violations of the provisions of KRS 67C.406 shall be deemed to be unfair labor practices remedial by the cabinet in the following manner.

  1. Whenever it is charged by a consolidated local government or a labor organization that any person has engaged in or is engaging in any unfair labor practices, the cabinet or any hearing officer designated by the cabinet shall conduct an administrative hearing in accordance with KRS Chapter 13B.
  2. If, upon the preponderance of the evidence presented, the cabinet is of the opinion that any person named in the charge has engaged in or is engaging in an unfair labor practice, then it shall issue a final order requiring the person to cease and desist from the unfair labor practice, and to take any affirmative action including reinstatement of police officers with or without back pay, as will effectuate the policies of this section. The final order may further require the person to make reports from time to time showing the extent to which he or she has complied with the order. If, upon the preponderance of the evidence presented, the cabinet is not of the opinion that the person named in the charge has engaged in or is engaging in the unfair labor practice, then the cabinet shall issue a final order dismissing the complaint. No final order shall issue based upon any unfair labor practice occurring more than six (6) months prior to the filing of the charge with the cabinet, unless the person aggrieved thereby was prevented from filing the charge by reason of service in the Armed Forces, in which event the six (6) month period shall be computed from the day of his or her discharge. No final order of the cabinet shall require the reinstatement of any individual as a police officer who has been suspended or discharged, or the payment to the individual of any back pay, if the individual was suspended or discharged for cause.
  3. Until a final order has been appealed, the cabinet at any time, upon reasonable notice and in the manner that it deems proper, may modify or set aside, in whole or in part, any final order made or issued by it.
  4. The cabinet or the charging party may petition for the enforcement of the final order and for appropriate temporary relief or restraining order in the Circuit Court for the county in which the violation occurred.
  5. Any person aggrieved by a final order of the cabinet may obtain a review of the final order by filing a petition in the Circuit Court assigned jurisdiction under subsection (4) of this section in accordance with KRS Chapter 13B.

History. Enact. Acts 2004, ch. 101, § 6, effective July 13, 2004; 2010, ch. 24, § 67, effective July 15, 2010.

67C.412. Petition for fact-finding panel upon deadlock — Hearings — Findings — Expenses.

  1. If, after a reasonable period, but in no event less than thirty (30) days, of negotiations over the terms of a new collective bargaining agreement or modifications in an existing agreement, the parties to the negotiations are deadlocked, either party or the parties jointly may petition the cabinet, by certified mail, return receipt requested, or by registered mail, to initiate fact-finding.
  2. Upon receipt of a petition to initiate fact-finding, the cabinet shall cause an investigation to determine whether or not the parties are deadlocked in their negotiations. During the course of this investigation, the secretary is empowered to utilize his or her office in an effort to effectuate a settlement between the parties through mediation and conciliation.
  3. Upon completion of the cabinet’s investigation, and if a settlement between the parties has still not been reached, the secretary shall within ten (10) days appoint a qualified and disinterested person as the impartial chairman of a three (3) member panel to function as the fact-finders. In addition to the impartial chairman, the other two (2) members of the panel shall be one (1) member named by the labor organization and one (1) member named by the consolidated local government, parties to the deadlocked negotiations.
  4. Upon consultation with the other members of the panel, the impartial chairman shall establish dates and places for public hearings. Whenever feasible, public hearings shall be held within the jurisdiction in which the consolidated local government is located. The panel may subpoena witnesses, and a written transcript of the hearing shall be made. Upon completion of the hearings the panel shall, by majority decision, make written findings of fact, recommendations, and opinions to be served on the consolidated local government and labor organization (parties) and these shall be released to the public. Expenses incurred by the three (3) member panel in this section shall be paid by the parties involved in the labor dispute.

History. Enact. Acts 2004, ch. 101, § 7, effective July 13, 2004; 2010, ch. 24, § 68, effective July 15, 2010.

67C.414. Requirements for an agreement — Enforcement in Circuit Court.

  1. Any agreement reached by the negotiators shall be reduced to writing and shall be executed by both parties.
  2. An agreement between the consolidated local government and a labor organization shall be valid and enforced under its terms when entered into in accordance with the provisions of this section and signed by the mayor of the consolidated local government or the mayor’s representative. No publication thereof shall be required to make it effective. The procedure for the making of an agreement between a consolidated local government and a labor organization provided by this section shall be the exclusive method of making a valid agreement for police officers represented by a labor organization.
  3. Suits for violation of agreements between a consolidated local government and a labor organization representing police officers may be brought by the parties to the agreement in the Circuit Court of the consolidated local government.

History. Enact. Acts 2004, ch. 101, § 8, effective July 13, 2004.

67C.416. Consolidated local government to withhold dues and deliver to bargaining unit.

Subject to the requirements set forth in KRS 336.135 , upon the written authorization of any police officers within a bargaining unit, the consolidated local government shall deduct from the payroll of the police officer the monthly amount of dues as certified by the secretary of the exclusive bargaining representative and shall deliver the same to the treasurer of the exclusive bargaining representative.

History. Enact. Acts 2004, ch. 101, § 9, effective July 13, 2004; 2017 ch. 6, § 6, effective January 9, 2017.

67C.418. Police officer or labor organization not to participate in strike.

No police officer of a consolidated local government shall engage in, and no police officer labor organization shall sponsor or condone, any strike.

History. Enact. Acts 2004, ch. 101, § 10, effective July 13, 2004.

CHAPTER 68 County Finance and County Treasurer

68.001. Definition of state local finance officer.

As used in this chapter and other provisions of law, “state local finance officer” shall mean the commissioner of the Department for Local Government, or his agent designated in writing with the approval of the Governor.

History. Enact. Acts 1994, ch. 508, § 2, effective July 15, 1994; 1998, ch. 69, § 40, effective July 15, 1998; 2007, ch. 47, § 57, effective June 26, 2007; 2010, ch. 117, § 63, effective July 15, 2010.

68.002. “County,” “fiscal court,” and “county judge/executive” defined to apply to charter county governments.

As used in this chapter unless the context requires otherwise:

  1. “County” shall also mean a charter county government;
  2. “Fiscal court” shall also mean the legislative body of a charter county government; and
  3. “County judge/executive” shall also mean the chief executive officer of a charter county government.

History. Enact. Acts 2010, ch. 95, § 3, effective July 15, 2010.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(7/15/2010). Under the authority of KRS 7.136 , the Reviser of Statutes has corrected manifest clerical or typographical errors by inserting “a” before the first occurrence of “charter county government” and “the” before “legislative body” and “chief executive officer” in this section.

County Financial Officers, Taxation, and Fiscal Management

68.005. County administrative code.

  1. The fiscal court shall adopt a county administrative code which includes, but is not limited to, procedures and designation of responsibility for:
    1. General administration of the office of county judge/executive, county administrative agencies, and public authorities;
    2. Administration of county fiscal affairs, including budget formulation, receipt and disbursement of county funds and preparation of records required for the county audit, and the filing of claims against the county;
    3. Personnel administration, including description and classification of nonelected positions, selection, assignment, supervision and discipline of employees, employee complaints and the county affirmative action program;
    4. County purchasing and award of contracts;
    5. Delivery of county services.
  2. The fiscal court shall review the county administrative code annually during the month of June and may by a two-thirds (2/3) majority of the entire fiscal court amend the county administrative code at that time. The county judge/executive may at other times prepare and submit amendments to the code for the approval of a majority of the fiscal court.

History. Enact. Acts 1978, ch. 197, § 1, effective January 1, 1979; 1986, ch. 429, § 1, effective July 15, 1986.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Authority to Propose Code.

Although the county executive procrastinated in performing his duty to propose a county code, the county’s fiscal court violated KRS 67.710(2) when it proposed and adopted its own code; only a county executive was permitted to propose a code. A trial court’s order recognizing the fiscal court’s code as binding was improper. Knight v. Spurlin, 226 S.W.3d 844, 2007 Ky. App. LEXIS 116 (Ky. Ct. App. 2007).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Implicit in KRS 67.080 , 67.710 and this section is the authority for the fiscal court to establish in the administrative code a reasonable provision for the county judge/executive’s vacation with pay. OAG 79-14 .

An administrative code must be simply viewed as a device to promote sound and efficient administrative management of county government, but not at the expense of impinging upon the statutory law of county government powers. OAG 79-153 .

An administrative code should not be conceived as a “catalog” designed to cover everything which the human imagination can conjure up. OAG 79-153 .

An administrative code, under this section, should merely provide administrative procedures: (1) which would facilitate the carrying out of the statutory administrative functions of county officers and fiscal court purely within the framework of the pertinent power statutes; (2) which would not be in conflict with existing or future constitutional statutory law. OAG 79-153 .

The administrative code of a county can in no way be worded such as to supersede any statutory authority to act in the areas of fiscal affairs, personnel and purchasing. OAG 79-153 .

The fiscal court has no authority on its own initiative to amend or change the county administrative code; rather, the county judge/executive has the sole power to offer a code and suggest revisions thereto, subject to the approval or disapproval of fiscal court as a body in adopting a code or revisions thereof since the word “adopt,” as used in this section, clearly suggests the approval of something already formulated, and KRS 67.710(2) vests in the county judge/executive the sole authority to “prepare and submit” for fiscal court “approval” an administrative code. OAG 79-153 .

The initiating of or proposing the administrative code rests only with the county judge/executive. OAG 79-176 .

Nothing prevents the delegation of authority to make purchases, up to a certain level less than $5,000, to the county judge/executive, subject to final fiscal court approval, being placed in the administrative code. OAG 79-179 .

The fiscal court in all counties must adopt an administrative code. OAG 79-179 .

There is no penalty provision for the failure to provide an administrative code. OAG 79-179 .

Where the population of the magisterial districts is substantially unequal, a county administrative code could not require an equal amount of road work be done in each district, unless supported by other relevant factors, such as traffic volume, importance to the county of given road segments in each district, and road mileage, since such a result could be considered arbitrary without such supporting data. OAG 79-179 .

Nothing in the budget statutes authorizes the fiscal court to place a provision in the administrative code requiring the budget commission to divide the road maintenance money equally into six (6) magisterial districts. OAG 79-238 .

Only the county judge/executive can propose an administrative code and suggest revisions or amendments to it, and once he proposes the code or amendments, then the fiscal court as a body either adopts it, or rejects the proposal and starts over again. OAG 79-238 .

There is nothing to prevent a county from purchasing a three-year insurance policy, if it can be funded from current revenues, as a properly budgeted item under this section. OAG 81-109 .

The adoption of an administrative code is mandatory. Once it is adopted the fiscal court has no power to repeal it in toto. An adopted code may be amended, as suggested by the county judge/executive and approved by the fiscal court, but it cannot be repealed in toto. OAG 82-569 .

The fiscal court has no authority on its own initiative to amend or change an administrative code since it has been adopted. The county judge/executive has the sole power to offer a code and suggest revisions thereto, subject to the approval or disapproval of the fiscal court as a body in adopting a code or revisions thereof. OAG 82-569 .

A county treasurer would fall under a personnel policy that spells out sick time, days off, vacations, hours of work, holidays, etc. OAG 83-254 .

68.010. County treasurer — Appointment, term, oath, bond — Appointment of acting county treasurer under specified circumstances.

Notwithstanding the provisions of KRS 67.710 , or any other statute:

    1. The fiscal court of each county, by June 30 every four (4) years, beginning with June, 1999, shall appoint a county treasurer for a term of four (4) years. (1) (a) The fiscal court of each county, by June 30 every four (4) years, beginning with June, 1999, shall appoint a county treasurer for a term of four (4) years.
    2. In 1998, the fiscal court of each county, by June 30, shall appoint a county treasurer for a term of one (1) year. In 1999 and every four (4) years thereafter, the fiscal court of each county shall appoint a county treasurer for a term of four (4) years pursuant to paragraph (a) of this subsection.
    3. If for any reason the county treasurer is not appointed at the regular June meeting, the county judge/executive shall call the fiscal court to meet on a day fixed by order entered on the order book of the court, and the meeting shall be held before the end of June.
  1. The county treasurer shall take office on the July 1st immediately following his appointment.
  2. No person is eligible to be county treasurer unless at the time of his appointment he is a citizen of Kentucky, is at least twenty-five (25) years old or has obtained a baccalaureate level degree from a regionally accredited institution of higher education. The county treasurer shall take the constitutional oath of office before the fiscal court, and shall execute bond with at least two (2) reputable sureties, to be approved by the fiscal court. The fiscal court may pay the premium on the bond from county funds.
  3. If, at any time, the county treasurer is unable to perform the duties of this office because of illness, physical or mental incapacity, or other cause beyond his control for more than thirty (30) days, or if there is a vacancy created in the office by the resignation or death of the current county treasurer, then the fiscal court shall appoint, at either a regular term or a special term called by the county judge/executive, an acting county treasurer to serve until the current county treasurer is able to resume the performance of his duties, or in the case of the resignation or death of the treasurer, until the end of the current county treasurer’s term of office. Should the fiscal court be in doubt as to the treasurer’s ability to resume his duties, it shall consult with a licensed physician acceptable to both the fiscal court and the treasurer. If the physician advises that the treasurer is able to perform his duties, the treasurer shall be reinstated within ten (10) days. As soon as the treasurer is reinstated, the acting county treasurer shall cease to act as county treasurer and shall turn over to the county judge/executive all records and accounts and shall make a final settlement with the fiscal court within thirty (30) days. The fiscal court may remove the county treasurer or acting county treasurer at any time for neglect of duty, incompetency, or dishonesty.

History. 928 to 930: amend. Acts 1968, ch. 22; 1980, ch. 90, § 1, effective April 1, 1982; 1982, ch. 296, §§ 1, 2, effective April 2, 1982; 1986, ch. 188, § 1, effective July 15, 1986; 1996, ch. 160, § 1, effective July 15, 1996; 2003, ch. 105, § 1, effective June 24, 2003.

Compiler’s Notes.

Section 4 of Acts 1980, ch. 90 read, “This Act shall become effective April 1, 1982. The county treasurer in office at that time shall retain his office until his successor is chosen and qualified pursuant to Section 1 of this Act (KRS 68.010 ).”

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Appointment.

In electing a county treasurer the fiscal court is performing a ministerial function, not a judicial function. Barnett v. Gilbert, 164 Ky. 564 , 175 S.W. 1029, 1915 Ky. LEXIS 412 ( Ky. 1915 ).

Order of fiscal court electing appellant treasurer of county was null and void because it was not signed by county judge as chairman of the court as required by KRS 67.100 (prior to its 1978 amendment) and thus appellant was only a de facto officer for period he served and such order could not be validated by a nunc pro tunc signing after term at which it was made. Saylor v. Robins, 304 Ky. 34 , 199 S.W.2d 725, 1947 Ky. LEXIS 574 ( Ky. 1947 ).

In action where two parties each sought a judgment declaring himself to be the treasurer of Kenton County where one party was appointed by county judge just as his term as commissioner of the fiscal court was ending following an eight (8) month deadlock of fiscal court in attempting to name a county treasurer, such appointment was void even though his term as fiscal court commissioner was about to expire and even though subsec. (3) of KRS 67.070 gives the county judge power to appoint treasurer where fiscal court fails to do so, for such appointment was not good public policy especially since commissioner had helped to keep the office vacant for nearly eight (8) months. Smith v. McDermott, 313 Ky. 184 , 230 S.W.2d 636, 1950 Ky. LEXIS 844 ( Ky. 1950 ).

2. — Vote.

A majority of all the members of the fiscal court is required to elect a county treasurer. Barnett v. Gilbert, 164 Ky. 564 , 175 S.W. 1029, 1915 Ky. LEXIS 412 ( Ky. 1915 ).

In case of a tie vote on the question of appointing a treasurer, in a court having commissioners, the county judge may make the appointment under KRS 67.070 . Muenninghoff v. Marret, 269 Ky. 826 , 108 S.W.2d 878, 1937 Ky. LEXIS 673 ( Ky. 1937 ).

3. — Action to Compel.

In action for writ of mandamus to compel fiscal court to elect a county treasurer, on ground that treasurer in office had not been legally elected, treasurer in office was a necessary party even though his election was void. Fiscal Court of Carter County v. Strother, 199 Ky. 824 , 251 S.W. 1003, 1923 Ky. LEXIS 932 ( Ky. 1923 ).

4. Reappointment.

Refusal of fiscal court to reappoint plaintiff at the end of his term as county treasurer, an office which has the indicia of a policy making government position which vests its holder with discretionary power, considerable responsibility, and confidence and supervisory authority, at the end of his term and instead to make a patronage appointment of another person to the position was consistent with KRS 67.080 , KRS 67.083 and this section and Ky. Const., §§ 23 and 107 and such action of the court did not violate the first or fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution and was consistent with federal precedent. Garrard County Fiscal Court v. Layton, 840 S.W.2d 208, 1992 Ky. App. LEXIS 97 (Ky. Ct. App. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1032, 113 S. Ct. 1851, 123 L. Ed. 2d 474, 1993 U.S. LEXIS 2825 (U.S. 1993).

5. Term.

County treasurer may not hold over until successor is appointed and qualifies, but is limited to four-year term. Miller v. Rockcastle County, 248 Ky. 290 , 58 S.W.2d 598, 1933 Ky. LEXIS 230 ( Ky. 1933 ).

6. Bond.

Bond of treasurer was valid although penal sum was not fixed by fiscal court as required by KRS 62.060 . Where county judge, in preparing bond, wrote in penal sum without prior authority from fiscal court, and bond was then executed, bond was valid to extent of such penal sum. Miller v. Rockcastle County, 248 Ky. 290 , 58 S.W.2d 598, 1933 Ky. LEXIS 230 ( Ky. 1933 ).

7. — Approval.

Where treasurer executes bond and takes office on faith of bond, failure of fiscal court to enter order approving bond does not render bond invalid. Miller v. Rockcastle County, 248 Ky. 290 , 58 S.W.2d 598, 1933 Ky. LEXIS 230 ( Ky. 1933 ).

Where bond was filed with county court clerk, and order appointing treasurer recited that treasurer had appeared and executed bond, there was in effect an approval of the bond. Miller v. Rockcastle County, 248 Ky. 290 , 58 S.W.2d 598, 1933 Ky. LEXIS 230 ( Ky. 1933 ).

Approval of treasurer’s bond can be shown only by records of fiscal court. Parol evidence is not admissible to show that bond was filed and accepted. Reynolds v. Floyd County Fiscal Court, 262 Ky. 445 , 90 S.W.2d 694, 1935 Ky. LEXIS 792 ( Ky. 1935 ).

8. — Failure to Give.

Oral statement by members of fiscal court to treasurer that bond given for previous term would be sufficient, did not excuse failure of treasurer to execute bond, in absence of record. Reynolds v. Floyd County Fiscal Court, 262 Ky. 445 , 90 S.W.2d 694, 1935 Ky. LEXIS 792 ( Ky. 1935 ).

Where treasurer fails to give bond within 30 days of appointment, as required by KRS 62.050 , he forfeits the office and it becomes vacant. Reynolds v. Floyd County Fiscal Court, 262 Ky. 445 , 90 S.W.2d 694, 1935 Ky. LEXIS 792 ( Ky. 1935 ).

9. — Liability of Sureties.

Treasurer is liable on his bond for loss of funds of drainage district, of which he is ex officio treasurer by virtue of KRS 267.440 , resulting from insolvency of depository, notwithstanding that depository was designated by drainage board. Taylor v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 246 Ky. 598 , 55 S.W.2d 410, 1932 Ky. LEXIS 811 ( Ky. 1932 ).

Sureties on treasurer’s bond were not liable for defalcations occurring during period treasurer held over after expiration of four-year term. Miller v. Rockcastle County, 248 Ky. 290 , 58 S.W.2d 598, 1933 Ky. LEXIS 230 ( Ky. 1933 ).

Where county had issued bonds to fund outstanding warrants, and treasurer diverted proceeds of bonds to payment of other county obligations, treasurer and his sureties were liable to warrant holder whose warrant was not paid because of such diversion, but treasurer and sureties could recover from county to extent that valid obligations of county had been reduced. Hargis v. Commonwealth, 249 Ky. 799 , 61 S.W.2d 648, 1933 Ky. LEXIS 608 ( Ky. 1933 ). (But see Bernard v. McFarland, 267 Ky. 210 , 101 S.W.2d 913, 1937 Ky. LEXIS 292 ( Ky. 1937 ). ).

10. Removal.

Order of fiscal court directing sheriff not to pay county funds to county treasurer did not have the effect of removing the treasurer from office. Barnett v. Gilbert, 164 Ky. 564 , 175 S.W. 1029, 1915 Ky. LEXIS 412 ( Ky. 1915 ).

In proceedings to enjoin the removal of a county treasurer, the question is not whether the trial court would remove the treasurer if it were the fiscal court, or whether the fiscal court was influenced by political or personal bias, but whether there was substantial evidence of the treasurer’s guilt, and fair notice and a hearing given, and whether the cause was legally sufficient. Lyon v. Bell, 275 Ky. 69 , 120 S.W.2d 752, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 366 ( Ky. 1938 ).

11. — Sufficient Cause.

Failure of treasurer to comply with provision of law requiring a detailed written report to the county judge showing all receipts was sufficient cause for removal of treasurer, notwithstanding that treasurer had made proper and complete settlements, and it had been the custom not to require such reports, and the county judge had advised the treasurer that the reports would not be required. Stanley v. Fiscal Court, Hopkins County, 190 Ky. 495 , 227 S.W. 813, 1921 Ky. LEXIS 471 ( Ky. 1921 ).

Sufficiency of cause for which treasurer is removed is a question of law for the courts, but the courts will not review the discretion of the fiscal court where the cause of removal was failure of the treasurer to comply with a mandatory statutory duty. Stanley v. Fiscal Court, Hopkins County, 190 Ky. 495 , 227 S.W. 813, 1921 Ky. LEXIS 471 ( Ky. 1921 ).

Where duty is imposed on treasurer by statute, and a penalty is provided for failure to perform that duty, failure to perform the duty is sufficient cause for removal of the treasurer, notwithstanding his good faith. Stanley v. Fiscal Court, Hopkins County, 190 Ky. 495 , 227 S.W. 813, 1921 Ky. LEXIS 471 ( Ky. 1921 ).

Violation of any mandatory statute defining the duties of the county treasurer is sufficient ground for his removal by the fiscal court, though the previous fiscal court permitted the violation. Lyon v. Bell, 275 Ky. 69 , 120 S.W.2d 752, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 366 ( Ky. 1938 ).

12. — Hearing.

Treasurer is entitled to a hearing on the question of his removal. Barnett v. Gilbert, 164 Ky. 564 , 175 S.W. 1029, 1915 Ky. LEXIS 412 ( Ky. 1915 ).

13. — Appeal.

Treasurer has no right of appeal from order of fiscal court removing him from office, but may protect his rights by an appropriate proceeding if the fiscal court has acted corruptly or arbitrarily. Stanley v. Fiscal Court of Hopkins County, 189 Ky. 390 , 224 S.W. 1081, 1920 Ky. LEXIS 438 ( Ky. 1920 ).

14. — Restoration to Office.

Action against fiscal court to enjoin it and its members from interfering with treasurer in performance of his duties, and to compel court to restore him to office, would be an appropriate proceeding. Stanley v. Fiscal Court of Hopkins County, 189 Ky. 390 , 224 S.W. 1081, 1920 Ky. LEXIS 438 ( Ky. 1920 ).

15. Vacancy.

Where vacancy occurs during regular four-year term of treasurer, appointment to fill vacancy can be made only for unexpired term. Reynolds v. Floyd County Fiscal Court, 262 Ky. 445 , 90 S.W.2d 694, 1935 Ky. LEXIS 792 ( Ky. 1935 ).

Cited:

Rockcastle County v. Bowman, 274 Ky. 787 , 120 S.W.2d 385, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 336 ( Ky. 1938 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

The outgoing county treasurer is entitled to be compensated for performing the duties of his office until the newly appointed treasurer has qualified and his bond has been approved. OAG 61-309 .

When the fiscal court failed to appoint a county treasurer at its April term, a vacancy existed even though the former treasurer purported to hold over until July 1. OAG 62-30 .

A common-law incompatibility would exist between the office of county treasurer and the office of county auditor. OAG 63-32 .

Where the county judge with two magistrates present out of four at a continued meeting of the regular term appointed a county treasurer for the next term and a proper order was entered in connection with the appointment, the action was legal. OAG 69-246 .

The fiscal court at its regular April term every four years, beginning with 1913, must appoint a county treasurer for a term of four years. OAG 69-403 .

The fiscal court has authority under this section, subsection (1) of KRS 68.020 and subsection (6) (now subsection (1)(c)) of KRS 67.080 to designate a depository for the county funds and to change the depository within its discretion. OAG 70-519 .

The fiscal court may, in its reasonable discretion, increase the salary of the county treasurer during the term of office. OAG 71-540 .

In Lawrence County v. Lawrence Fiscal Court, 191 Ky. 45 , 229 S.W. 139, 1921 Ky. LEXIS 284 (1921), on p. 141, the court held that when a quorum is present and votes on a proposition, those members who are present and do not vote will be considered as concurring with the majority and their silence construed as voting with the majority and therefore, a county treasurer was duly elected at the meeting of a fiscal court where the person who did not vote was counted with the majority, three against two, thus raising the final calculation to four for and two against. OAG 73-350 .

Subsection (2) (now subsection (3)) of this section, in light of modern corporate surety capabilities and the fact that the county now pays the surety premium, should not be read as requiring two corporate sureties as such would be an interpretation resulting in an unreasonable and useless result unless the court believes the proffered corporate surety is financially unsound. OAG 76-8 .

The wife of the county judge (now county judge/executive) could be appointed by the fiscal court as county treasurer, but the county judge (now county judge/executive) should refrain from nominating his wife and should refrain from voting on his wife’s employment. OAG 77-343 .

Where a county treasurer’s term of office expired in April of 1977, but where the fiscal court failed to appoint a new treasurer until May of 1977, the former treasurer was not subject to the protection of removal only for cause after the expiration of her term. OAG 77-475 .

In the exercise of its authority to regulate and control the fiscal affairs of the county, a fiscal court may choose a depository bank located in another county. OAG 77-709 .

A thorough knowledge of the specific factual situation involved would be absolutely critical in applying the general definitions of this section. OAG 78-87 .

A county treasurer can only serve for a period not exceeding the four year term. OAG 79-409 .

Pursuant to KRS 67.710 the county judge/executive must nominate a person for the office of county treasurer, subject to the approval of the fiscal court as a body, and if the fiscal court in passing on the nomination comes to a tie vote, the tie vote provisions of KRS 67.040(3) apply. OAG 80-175 ; OAG 81-11 ; OAG 81-151 .

The appointment of a county treasurer by the fiscal court is mandatory. OAG 80-309 .

The general assembly may, by the application of its legislation, cut short the four year term of the county treasurer, as provided in this section, such that under the 1980 amendment to this section, effective April 1, 1982, the fiscal court in all counties in Kentucky must appoint a county treasurer at its regular June term of 1982 for a two year term; therefore, the county treasurer in office as of April 1, 1982, will retain his office only until his successor is chosen and qualified. OAG 80-313 .

Where a county treasurer’s term of office expires on April 30, 1981, the next appointment under this section, as it is presently drawn, will be at the regular April term of fiscal court in 1981 since the new term sequence of two years for county treasurers will not go into effect until April 1, 1982. OAG 80-313 .

Because of the peculiar nature of the removal of a county treasurer, the special provisions of this section govern over the general system of discharge as contained in KRS 67.710(8); thus the discharge of a county treasurer is strictly up to the fiscal court, as a body, after a due process hearing. OAG 80-453 .

Until the 1980 amendment to this section becomes effective on April 1, 1982, the county judge/executive must nominate a person for the office of county treasurer under KRS 67.710 , subject to the approval or disapproval of the fiscal court as a body, and on and after April 1, 1982 the fiscal court shall appoint the county treasurer, since this section as amended in 1980 would govern over KRS 67.710 since the amended section would be the later expression of legislative intent. OAG 81-11 ; OAG 81-151 .

An earlier opinion, OAG 80-175 , which held that the version of this section (effective until April 1, 1982), which provides that the fiscal court shall appoint the county treasurer, and subsection (8) of KRS 67.710 , which provides that the county judge/executive must nominate persons for appointment to the various county boards and administrative positions are irreconcilable and that KRS 67.710 governs, will not be modified, since the two different methods of appointment cannot be reconciled; the execution of one would defeat the operation of the other, and the specific nature of this section and the general nature of KRS 67.710 do not render them reconcilable. OAG 81-151 .

Where a county fiscal court inadvertently failed to appoint a county treasurer at the April term, the fiscal court could, pursuant to subsection (8) of KRS 67.710 , appoint a county treasurer retroactively to May 1, 1981, and for a term which would expire on June 30, 1982, since, although the present version of this section (effective until April, 1982) requires appointment to a four-year term, the new version of KRS 68.010 (effective April 1, 1982) will require the fiscal court to appoint a county treasurer to take office on July 1, 1982, for a two-year term. OAG 81-320 .

In light of the 1982 amendment to this section, the term of office of the county treasurer is four years. OAG 83-475 .

The county judge/executive’s nominating appointment power pursuant to KRS 67.710(8) has no application to the appointment of a county treasurer since the 1982 amendment of this section, providing for the “fiscal court’s appointment” of a treasurer, governs as the later legislative enactment. OAG 83-475 .

Any member of the fiscal court may suggest a person for the office of county treasurer, and then the fiscal court votes on the nominee; where the county judge/executive suggests a person for that office, and the fiscal court by majority vote rejects his suggestion, some other person may be suggested by the county judge/executive or some other member for a vote by the fiscal court. OAG 83-475 .

The language of this section providing for the appointment of a treasurer at the “regular June term” of fiscal court does not mesh with KRS 67.090 , dealing with terms of the fiscal court, which requires a fiscal court to hold two regular terms per year, one of which must be in October and, further, that where the county judge/executive does not fix the terms, the first regular term must commence on the first Tuesday in April and the second regular term on the first Tuesday of October. However, the making of the appointment on June 3, as a special term, is substantial compliance with this section. OAG 83-475 .

There are no statutory provisions for a temporary appointment of a county treasurer; the fiscal court, in view of the duties of the county treasurer, and considering the importance of county finances, is mandated to appoint a county treasurer at the time stated in the statute and, if the fiscal court delays on coming to a majority vote on such appointment, they are subject to a mandamus suit in circuit court seeking a court order requiring them to appoint some person as county treasurer. OAG 83-475 .

If the county treasurer is physically unable to perform her statutory duties, the fiscal court may designate some county employee, or one hired temporarily for this purpose, to perform the treasurer’s duties, until such time as the fiscal court can conduct a hearing, pursuant to subsection (4) of this section, on the question as to whether there is any applicable ground for removal from office. OAG 85-10 .

Pursuant to KRS 273.441 and KRS 273.410(2), any of the counties which have in legal effect designated a corporation as a community action agency may, subject to available funds and proper budgeting procedure under this chapter, contribute, through the corporation, county funds for any of the purposes described specifically in KRS 273.441 and KRS 273.410(2), with the assumption that such county grants are made by way of an agreement between the county and the corporation that such county money will be spent for a designated purpose or purposes, as expressly provided in KRS 273.441 and KRS 273.410(2), the corporation subsequently reporting to the county government the precise nature and amount of the final expenditure. OAG 85-117 .

Since KRS 67.710 (8) and subsection (1) of this section are irreconcilable because they provide for two different methods of appointment of the county treasurer, and since where two statutes on any subject are apparently in conflict and cannot be reconciled, the later statute controls, the 1988 amendment and republishing of KRS 67.710 , which included subsection (8), was the later expression of the legislative will and makes KRS 67.710(8) a later statute than subsection (1) of this section; therefore, KRS 67.710(8) is the appropriate statutory provision to apply to the question of how a county treasurer should be appointed, and accordingly the county judge/executive is responsible for making the appointment to the position of county treasurer, with the approval of the fiscal court. OAG 90-46 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Alcoholic beverage licenses, part of license fee may be recovered from county if local option goes into effect before license expires, KRS 242.190 , 242.220 .

Alcoholic beverages, fiscal court may grant local licenses to traffic in, and impose license fees and taxes, KRS 243.060 , 243.600 .

Appropriations of county funds, purposes for which authorized:

Agricultural and home economics extension work, KRS 247.080 .

Air pollution control district, KRS 77.125 .

Drainage district, to aid, KRS 267.550 , 267.560 , 268.630 .

Electric plant, preliminary expenses of, KRS 96.730 .

Farm bureaus, county, KRS 247.300 .

Forest fire control, for, KRS 149.160 to 149.180 .

Friend of the court in certain counties, for salary and expenses of, KRS 403.090 .

Health departments, county and district, KRS 212.040 , 212.190 , 212.650 .

Law library, county, to replace certain law books, KRS 172.130 .

Library, county or regional, KRS 173.310 , 173.360 .

Office expenses of circuit clerk, county clerk, sheriff and jailer, in counties of 75,000 population, KRS 64.346 .

Playgrounds and recreation centers, county, KRS 97.050 .

Private corporation, association or individual, funds not to be appropriated for, exceptions, Ky. Const., § 179.

Real estate records, indexes of, in counties containing cities of second class, KRS 382.220 .

School children, transportation of, KRS 158.115 .

Soil conservation, KRS 262.260 .

Supplies and equipment for property valuation administrator, KRS 132.605 .

Water system or line, KRS 74.350 .

Bankruptcy, county may go into, KRS 66.400 .

Bonds of county officers and depositories, what to contain, KRS 62.060 to 62.080 .

Borrowing of money by county, law to state purpose, and money to be used only for that purpose, Ky. Const., § 178.

Claim created by unauthorized contract, county may not pay, Ky. Const., § 162.

Commonwealth’s attorney in Jefferson County, automobile to be furnished by county, KRS 69.130 .

Commonwealth detectives, KRS 69.110 .

Constables and deputies, allowance for automobile expense in certain counties, KRS 64.210 .

Constables, Jefferson County, money collected by to be paid into county treasury, KRS 64.200 .

Conveyances, general index of in certain counties, courthouse district to pay for work, KRS 382.210 .

County attorneys, assistants, KRS 64.530 .

County buildings commission, KRS 67.450 .

County buildings, county to pay for maintenance of, KRS 67.130 .

County debt act, KRS 66.280 to 66.390 .

County debt, state not to assume, exceptions, Ky. Const., § 176.

County road engineer:

Compensation and expenses of, county to pay, KRS 179.020 to 179.050 .

Obstructions in road, removal of, how paid for, KRS 179.210 , 179.230 , 179.280 .

Repair of roads neglected by contractor, how paid for, KRS 179.150 .

Road machinery, purchase or lease, and maintenance of, KRS 179.180 .

Courthouse, jail or clerk’s office, county may rent temporary quarters for, KRS 67.160 .

Credit of county not to be lent to corporation, association or individual; exceptions, Ky. Const., § 179.

River improvements, certain counties may indemnify United States against damage claims arising from, KRS 182.130 .

Deadlock or tie vote in fiscal court composed of county judge and commissioners, KRS 67.070 .

Drainage ditch across county road, when county to be assessed for, KRS 267.180 .

Elections, expenses of paid by county:

County election commissioners, compensation of, KRS 117.035 .

Local option elections, county to pay expense of, KRS 242.060 .

Fees, when paid or received by county:

Clerks of courts, KRS 64.012 .

Motor vehicle registration, KRS 47.020 , 186.060 .

Prisoner, for conveying to another county, KRS 64.070 .

Return of 25% of fees paid into state treasury by county officers, KRS 64.350 .

Sheriffs, KRS 64.090 .

Revenue cabinet, powers over county finance, KRS 131.030 , 131.140 .

Fines and forfeitures, disposition of:

Highway laws, fines for violating, KRS 178.990 , 179.990 , 189.990 .

Jury fund, fines and forfeitures formerly paid into:

Record of, KRS 46.030 .

Oil, gas or salt water well, failure to plug, KRS 353.990 .

Road duty, for failure to perform, KRS 179.990 .

Fiscal court:

Generally, Ky. Const., § 144.

Jurisdiction and powers, KRS 67.080 .

Forest reserve appropriation, distribution to counties for schools and roads, KRS 149.130 .

Houseboat license fee, KRS 182.140 , 182.990 .

Housing authority bonds, counties may invest in, KRS 386.050 .

Housing authority, county, power to raise and manage funds, KRS 80.290 , 80.300 .

Indebtedness of counties, limits on, Ky. Const., §§ 157, 157a, 158.

Issuance of bonds and control of funds, KRS Ch. 66.

Jail, bedclothing for prisoners in, county to pay for, KRS 71.030 .

Jail, budget and funding, KRS 441.206 to 441.225 .

Jail, construction, KRS 441.605 to 441.695 .

Jails, operation and management, KRS 441.045 to 441.135 .

Jail, person dying in, county to pay for burial, KRS 71.040 .

Jefferson County Children’s Home, county to manage properties of, KRS 201.160 , 201.170 , 201.200 .

Jefferson County to pay premiums on bonds of officers, KRS 62.150 .

Justices of the peace, Jefferson County, money collected by to be paid into county treasury, KRS 64.250 .

License fees, counties may impose, KRS 137.115 .

License fees, general assembly may authorize counties to impose, Ky. Const., § 181.

Lien of laborers and materialmen on funds due contractor for county work, KRS 376.210 .

Local option election, county to pay expense of, KRS 242.060 .

Mob violence or lawlessness, removal of accused to protect from, county to pay cost of, KRS 441.060 , 441.540 , 441.550 , 452.230 .

Oath and bond required before taking office, Ky. Const., §§ 103, 228; KRS 62.010 , 62.050 .

Playgrounds and recreation centers, county, gifts for, KRS 97.040 .

Premiums on bonds of county officers, Jefferson County to pay, KRS 62.150 .

Public officers, oath, Ky. Const., § 228.

Purchasing of county supplies under compact with city or another county, KRS 79.010 to 79.070 .

Real estate records in certain counties, county to pay for establishment and maintenance of, KRS 382.220 .

Recorders of justices’ courts, Jefferson County, duties as to county funds, KRS 64.200 , 64.250 .

Revenue, cabinet of powers over county taxation, KRS 131.030 , 131.130 , 131.140 .

Review of equalized property assessment, fiscal court may obtain in circuit court, KRS 133.170 .

Roads and bridges:

County bonds for, KRS 178.010 , 178.170 to 178.190 , 178.210 .

Drainage of road, county to pay for damage to adjacent land, KRS 179.310 .

Fiscal court, authority to provide, KRS 67.080 .

Land taken or damaged, tax to pay for, KRS 178.110 .

Maintenance of roads built with state aid, county to pay for, KRS 179.400 .

Maintenance of subdivision roads in counties containing a third-class city, KRS 179.470 .

Right of way for state highway, when county to pay for, KRS 177.060 , 177.070 .

Roads, state may lend to counties for, Ky. Const., § 157a.

Signposts and index boards for roads, KRS 179.320 .

State aid KRS 179.010 , 179.410 to 179.440 .

Tax levy, KRS 178.210 .

Salaries or compensation, when to be paid by county:

Clerk of fiscal court, KRS 67.120 .

Clerk of fiscal court and deputy, Jefferson County, KRS 67.120 .

Commissioner to supply lost, destroyed or mutilated record, KRS 422.240 .

Commonwealth’s attorneys’ salaries, counties may supplement, Ky. Const., § 98.

Constables, Jefferson County, KRS 64.200 , 70.320 .

County clerk:

Certifying list of conveyances to property valuation administrator, KRS 132.480 .

Correcting tax books after equalization, KRS 133.181 .

Tax bills and stubs, for making out, KRS 133.240 .

Taxes, for calculating and making list of, KRS 132.550 .

County health officer, KRS 212.170 to 212.190 .

County judge/executive, KRS 64.535 .

County law librarian, in county containing second-class city, KRS 172.170 .

County officers, deduction from salary for failure to perform duty, KRS 61.120 .

County road engineer, KRS 179.020 , 179.040 , 179.050 .

Property valuation administrator, KRS 133.030 .

Drainage commissioner in counties having 75 or more separate drainage districts, KRS 267.010 , 267.090 , 267.490 .

Friend of the court in certain counties, KRS 403.090 .

Justices of the peace, Jefferson County, KRS 64.250 .

Property valuation administrator, KRS 132.590 .

Stenographers to various county officers, oaths, KRS 67.120 , 69.100 , 69.105 .

Schools:

Lands of dissolved charitable organization to inure to benefit of, KRS 273.130 .

Needy school children, county to pay for books and school supplies, KRS 160.330 .

School board elections, county to pay expense of, KRS 160.240 .

Tax levy for, KRS 160.460 to 160.530 .

Sheriff or collector of county taxes, settlement with fiscal court, KRS 134.310 .

Sheriff’s county levy bond, county to pay premium on, KRS 62.156 .

Sinking funds may be invested in United States bonds, KRS 386.050 .

Statute of limitations on action against county on bonded debt, KRS 413.110 .

Stock in company, association or corporation, county not to hold, Ky. Const., § 179.

Surveyor, lost records of to be supplied, county to pay for, KRS 73.160 .

Swamps, bonds to pay for drainage of, KRS 269.070 to 269.100 .

Taxes, county:

Agricultural products, when counties may tax, KRS 132.200 .

Bank deposits, counties may not tax, KRS 132.030 .

Bank stock, to what extent county may tax, KRS 91.620 .

Board of health for Louisville and Jefferson County, tax for, KRS 212.470 .

Bonds of state, counties, cities and districts exempt from taxation, Ky. Const., § 171.

Building and loan associations or production credit associations, counties may not tax capital stock, surplus, undivided profits, notes, mortgages or credits of, KRS 136.300 .

Collection of county taxes, KRS ch. 134.

Consolidated county to levy separate taxes for debts of old counties, KRS 67.270 .

Courthouses and premises, counties containing city of second class, tax levy for maintenance, KRS 67.140 .

Distilled spirits in warehouse, taxation of by county, KRS 132.150 , 132.160 .

District bonds, county court may levy tax to pay, KRS 76.150 .

Exemptions of property from taxation, Ky. Const., § 170.

Health departments, county and district, tax levies for, KRS 212.040 , 212.650 .

Horse races, county may not tax, KRS 137.190 .

Hospitals, county, tax levy for, KRS 67.083 .

Indebtedness of county, tax must be provided to pay within 40 years, Ky. Const., § 159.

Jefferson County Children’s Home, tax levy for, KRS 201.160 , 201.170 .

Levees, tax for building or repair of, KRS 266.190 .

Levy of tax by county, order must state purpose and money may be used only for that purpose, Ky. Const., § 180.

Library, tax for, KRS 173.360 .

Lien for county taxes, KRS 132.290 , 134.420 .

Life insurance companies, domestic, to what extent county may tax capital stock of, KRS 136.320 .

Livestock and domestic fowls, counties may not tax, KRS 132.200 .

Margin transactions, indebtedness of customers to brokers on, county not to tax, KRS 132.050 .

Needy school children, tax levy to provide books and supplies for, KRS 160.330 .

Oil, crude, taxation of production of, KRS 137.120 .

Operating property of public service corporations, taxation of by county, KRS 136.160 , 136.170 .

Poll tax:

County may levy, limit on, Ky. Const., § 180.

Property subject to county taxation, KRS 132.200 .

Railroads, taxation of real estate by county, KRS 136.200 .

Rate of taxation by counties, limits on, Ky. Const., §§ 157, 157a.

Roads and bridges, tax for, KRS 178.110 , 178.210 .

School miscellaneous taxes, levy, KRS 160.593 to 160.597 .

Sheriff as tax collector, KRS 134.140 .

State warrants, county may not tax, KRS 41.200 .

Swamps, drainage of, tax levy for, KRS 269.070 .

Tax, general assembly may authorize counties to levy, limits on, Ky. Const., § 181.

Trust companies, to what extent county may tax stock, KRS 91.620 .

Territory stricken off county, liability for share of debts and for costs of striking off, Ky. Const., § 65; KRS 67.030 .

T.V.A., Prorated distribution to counties of payments to department of revenue, made by, KRS 96.895 .

Kentucky Law Journal Law Enforcement in Kentucky. 52 Ky. L.J. 1 (1963).

68.020. County treasurer — Duties and powers.

  1. The county treasurer shall receive and receipt for all money due the county from its collecting officers or from any other person whose duty it is to pay money into the county treasury, and shall disburse such money in such manner and for such purpose as may be authorized by appropriate authority of the fiscal court. He shall not disburse any money received by him for any purpose other than that for which it was collected and paid over to him, and when he pays out money he shall take a receipt therefor. All warrants for the payment of funds from the county treasury shall be co-signed by the county treasurer and the county judge/executive.
  2. He may, and when directed by the fiscal court shall, invest the funds of the county pursuant to KRS 66.480 .
  3. He may, and when directed by the fiscal court shall, institute actions in the name of the county against all delinquent sheriffs or collectors of the county, and against anyone having money belonging to the county who fails or refuses to pay it over on demand when due. He shall keep a record of all actions he is directed to institute on behalf of the county, showing their condition and the money collected thereunder.
  4. He shall keep an accurate detailed account of all money received and disbursed by him for the county, and shall keep books of accounts of the financial transactions of the county in the manner required by the uniform system of accounting prescribed by the state local finance officer.
  5. The county treasurer shall, when required by the fiscal court, settle his accounts as county treasurer, and within thirty (30) days after the close of each fiscal year, he shall, unless his immediate predecessor has done so, make a full and complete settlement for the preceding fiscal year with the fiscal court or with a person or persons whom the fiscal court, by order of record, appoints to make settlement with him. In case of a vacancy, the county judge/executive shall call a special meeting which shall proceed in the manner it deems proper to settle the accounts of the county treasurer.

History. 931, 935, 4114h-2: amend. Acts 1960, ch. 93; 1962, ch. 25, § 7; 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 20, § 6, effective January 2, 1978; 1978, ch. 197, § 2, effective June 17, 1978; 1980, ch. 90, § 2, effective April 1, 1982; 1980, ch. 188, § 48, effective July 15, 1980; 1980, ch. 289, § 1, effective July 1, 1980; 1982, ch. 57, § 5, effective March 9, 1982; 1982, ch. 393, § 44, effective July 15, 1982; 1984, ch. 14, § 1, effective July 13, 1984.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. General Control by Fiscal Court.

The treasurer is purely a ministerial officer, and as custodian of the county funds must pay them out under the orders of the fiscal court. Harrison v. Logan County, 129 Ky. 48 , 110 S.W. 377, 33 Ky. L. Rptr. 465 , 1908 Ky. LEXIS 141 ( Ky. 1908 ); Cain v. Burroughs Adding Mach. Co., 180 Ky. 567 , 203 S.W. 315, 1918 Ky. LEXIS 106 ( Ky. 1918 ).

The treasurer is never required to assume judicial functions, or to undertake to say what orders of the fiscal court are valid and what are invalid. If fiscal court orders him not to pay certain warrants, he should obey, and if he is sued by the warrant-holder it will be the duty of the county attorney to defend him. Pulaski County v. Richardson, 225 Ky. 556 , 9 S.W.2d 523, 1928 Ky. LEXIS 816 ( Ky. 1928 ).

The county treasurer is a ministerial officer or agent with his powers and duties delineated by this section. If the statute contains no prescription as to a particular function, the treasurer is subject to the control of the fiscal court with regard thereto. Whatever discretion the treasurer may have is subordinate to the discretion of the fiscal court. Edwards v. Logan County, 244 Ky. 296 , 50 S.W.2d 83, 1932 Ky. LEXIS 393 ( Ky. 1932 ).

2. Orders of Court.
3. — Liability.

Where fiscal court set aside portion of funds in hands of county treasurer as road and bridge fund, and entered orders directing treasurer to make payments out of that fund on vouchers of road overseers approved by county judge, such orders authorized treasurer to make payments on such vouchers, and the fact that some of the vouchers did not bear the word “overseer” after the overseer’s signature would not render the treasurer liable. Harrison v. Logan County, 129 Ky. 48 , 110 S.W. 377, 33 Ky. L. Rptr. 465 , 1908 Ky. LEXIS 141 ( Ky. 1908 ).

Where treasurer, in good faith, paid several small claims against county which were proper and just claims, treasurer would not be held personally liable to county merely because orders under which payments were made were irregular. Harrison v. Logan County, 129 Ky. 48 , 110 S.W. 377, 33 Ky. L. Rptr. 465 , 1908 Ky. LEXIS 141 ( Ky. 1908 ).

Where fiscal court entered order directing treasurer not to pay any warrants issued during prior years without a specific order from the fiscal court, treasurer who ignored the order was liable to the county for the sums paid out by him on such warrants. Pulaski County v. Richardson, 225 Ky. 556 , 9 S.W.2d 523, 1928 Ky. LEXIS 816 ( Ky. 1928 ).

Where fiscal court loaned sinking fund money without taking security required by statute, county treasurer was not liable for making such loan as directed by fiscal court. Edwards v. Logan County, 244 Ky. 296 , 50 S.W.2d 83, 1932 Ky. LEXIS 393 ( Ky. 1932 ).

4. Payment of Warrants.

Treasurer had the right to honor warrants issued by clerk of fiscal court, although such warrants were not full and complete copies of orders of fiscal court. Harrison v. Logan County, 129 Ky. 48 , 110 S.W. 377, 33 Ky. L. Rptr. 465 , 1908 Ky. LEXIS 141 ( Ky. 1908 ).

When a warrant drawn on the treasurer is presented to him for payment, he must pay it, if there is money available, unless he has notice or knowledge that the warrant is invalid. The fiscal court may not revoke a valid warrant, but may revoke one issued upon an illegal claim. Pulaski County v. Richardson, 225 Ky. 556 , 9 S.W.2d 523, 1928 Ky. LEXIS 816 ( Ky. 1928 ).

Treasurer must pay warrants issued for necessary governmental expenses in the order in which they are presented, in preference to other claims. Breathitt County v. Cockrell, 250 Ky. 743 , 63 S.W.2d 920, 1933 Ky. LEXIS 764 ( Ky. 1933 ).

5. — Refusal to Pay.

Where order of fiscal court merely authorized county judge to purchase a machine for a price not exceeding a named sum, treasurer had right to refuse to pay warrant issued by clerk of fiscal court on such order until proof was presented that purchase had actually been made. Cain v. Burroughs Adding Mach. Co., 180 Ky. 567 , 203 S.W. 315, 1918 Ky. LEXIS 106 ( Ky. 1918 ).

In action by jailer to compel county treasurer to pay warrants issued to jailer, treasurer had no right to interpose defense that the payment of the warrants would cause the jailer’s total compensation to exceed the constitutional limit. Breathitt County v. Cockrell, 250 Ky. 743 , 63 S.W.2d 920, 1933 Ky. LEXIS 764 ( Ky. 1933 ).

The treasurer is a mere disbursing officer without power to question the act of the fiscal court when ordering a warrant drawn on him, except when the warrant is illegal on its face, or the warrant or the treasurer’s records show that the funds appropriated for the purpose for which the warrant was issued will be exceeded, or that the payment of the warrant will cause the income provided for the year to be exceeded. In any of such cases, the treasurer may decline to pay the warrant and will be personally liable if he does pay it, except that he may pay warrants for necessary governmental expenses even though the payment will cause the funds provided for that purpose to be exceeded. Breathitt County v. Cockrell, 250 Ky. 743 , 63 S.W.2d 920, 1933 Ky. LEXIS 764 ( Ky. 1933 ).

6. — Mandamus to Compel.

Treasurer may be compelled by mandamus to pay a warrant issued by the fiscal court. Cain v. Burroughs Adding Mach. Co., 180 Ky. 567 , 203 S.W. 315, 1918 Ky. LEXIS 106 ( Ky. 1918 ).

Mandamus was proper remedy to compel county treasurer to pay county warrants for governmental expenses in preference to other warrants. Breathitt County v. Cockrell, 250 Ky. 743 , 63 S.W.2d 920, 1933 Ky. LEXIS 764 ( Ky. 1933 ).

7. — Liability.

Where treasurer, in good faith, pays out money pursuant to orders and warrants of the fiscal court, he and his sureties are not liable to the county for such money, even though the fiscal court had no authority to allow the claims for which the warrants were issued. Harrison v. Logan County, 129 Ky. 48 , 110 S.W. 377, 33 Ky. L. Rptr. 465 , 1908 Ky. LEXIS 141 ( Ky. 1908 ).

8. Diversion of Funds.

Where county had issued bonds to fund outstanding warrants, and treasurer diverted proceeds of bonds to payment of other county obligations, treasurer and his sureties were liable to warrant holder whose warrant was not paid because of such diversion, but treasurer and sureties could recover from county to extent that valid obligations of county had been reduced. Hargis v. Commonwealth, 249 Ky. 799 , 61 S.W.2d 648, 1933 Ky. LEXIS 608 ( Ky. 1933 ). (But see Bernard v. McFarland, 267 Ky. 210 , 101 S.W.2d 913, 1937 Ky. LEXIS 292 ( Ky. 1937 ).

9. Reports.

Failure of treasurer to make written report to county judge showing all receipts, as required by KRS 68.360 , was sufficient cause for removal of treasurer, notwithstanding that he had made full settlements, custom had been not to make reports, and county judge had advised that reports were not necessary. Stanley v. Fiscal Court, Hopkins County, 190 Ky. 495 , 227 S.W. 813, 1921 Ky. LEXIS 471 ( Ky. 1921 ).

10. Office.

Subsection (4) of this section clearly placed a duty on fiscal court to furnish the county treasurer with a suitable office, whether it be in the courthouse or at some other location in the county seat, moreover, it was fiscal court’s duty to furnish such office with necessary equipment for the proper discharge of the treasurer’s duties. Todd County Fiscal Court v. Frey, 285 S.W.2d 499, 1955 Ky. LEXIS 82 ( Ky. 1955 ) (Decision prior to 1978 amendment).

While subsection (4) of this section places on the fiscal court the duty to furnish county treasurer with a suitable office and the equipment necessary to properly discharge the duties of county treasurer, it does not confer upon any county treasurer the right to enter into a contract on behalf of county unless clothed with express authority by the fiscal court; therefore, treasurer who rented office and purchased supplies without authority of the fiscal court for five (5) years could not later recover amounts so expended from county. Todd County Fiscal Court v. Frey, 285 S.W.2d 499, 1955 Ky. LEXIS 82 ( Ky. 1955 ) (Decision prior to 1978 amendment).

11. Depository Selection.

Fact that treasurer in contract of employment by fiscal court agreed to cause interest to be paid on money coming into his hands did not deprive fiscal court of power to designate depository for funds. Edwards v. Logan County, 244 Ky. 296 , 50 S.W.2d 83, 1932 Ky. LEXIS 393 ( Ky. 1932 ).

Fiscal court has power to designate a depository in which the treasurer shall keep the county funds. If the court does not designate a depository the treasurer may select one, but if the court does designate a depository the treasurer must deposit the county funds therein, and is thereby relieved of any responsibility for loss resulting from the insolvency of the depository. However, if the court designates two depositories, the treasurer has discretion as to which he will use, and if facts come to his knowledge which would lead him to question the financial condition of the one selected by him, he may be liable for negligence in not transferring the funds to the other one. Edwards v. Logan County, 244 Ky. 296 , 50 S.W.2d 83, 1932 Ky. LEXIS 393 ( Ky. 1932 ).

12. Liability in Ex Officio Capacity.

Treasurer is liable on his bond for loss of funds of drainage district, of which he is ex officio treasurer by virtue of KRS 267.440 , resulting from insolvency of depository, notwithstanding that depository was designated by drainage board. Taylor v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 246 Ky. 598 , 55 S.W.2d 410, 1932 Ky. LEXIS 811 ( Ky. 1932 ).

13. Records.

In action against treasurer and sureties, bank books kept by treasurer were admissible in evidence without proof that they were regularly and accurately kept. Miller v. Rockcastle County, 248 Ky. 290 , 58 S.W.2d 598, 1933 Ky. LEXIS 230 ( Ky. 1933 ).

Cited:

Lyon v. Bell, 275 Ky. 69 , 120 S.W.2d 752, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 366 ( Ky. 1938 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

The fiscal court should issue a standing order for the payment of the total amounts on the regular payroll for a certain period of time which would give the clerk proper authorization to prepare the warrants as the payrolls become due. OAG 62-614 .

There is no authorization for additional compensation to the county treasurer for preparing and causing to be published the annual financial statement. OAG 65-100 .

In essence, a five-day work week is required for public offices generally including that of county treasurer. OAG 69-32 .

Where a county treasurer had elected to keep county funds in a certain bank, but the fiscal court designated another bank as the depository for county funds and ordered the treasurer to transfer the funds, the action of designation by the fiscal court was legal and the county treasurer was compelled to comply with the order. OAG 70-45 .

A county treasurer must hold funds subject to orders of the fiscal court. OAG 70-68 .

The fiscal court has authority under KRS 68.010 , subsection (1) of this section and subsection (6) (now subsection (1)(c)) of KRS 67.080 to designate a depository for the county funds and to change the depository within its discretion. OAG 70-519 .

Although any revenue sharing funds allocated to a county are subject to the control of the fiscal court which has the overall fiscal and financial responsibility for the revenues coming into the county, the county treasurer has the immediate custodial and accounting responsibility for all county funds including revenue sharing funds, so it is incumbent upon the county treasurer to carefully hold such money subject to the orders of the fiscal court. OAG 73-171 .

This section was not intended to negate the provisions in KRS 68.120 . OAG 74-406 .

Although the statutes do not set out the specific number of hours each week the county treasurer’s office should remain open, under KRS 61.160 and this section the office should be open five days a week and keep reasonable business hours during those days. OAG 75-280 .

Even though this section, as amended in 1978, requires the county judge/executive and county treasurer to co-sign the warrants and checks for the payment of funds from the county treasury, such co-signing in no way constitutes an approval of the claims filed against the county, and is not a substitute for the final written approval of claims by the fiscal court as a body. OAG 78-493 .

A fiscal court order allowing the two commissioners to perform an administrative role and sign C.E.T.A. checks, etc., was illegal, and an executive order changing this was not necessary and had no legal effect. OAG 79-61 .

The accounting system described in the department of local government’s “Uniform System of Accounts for Kentucky Counties” is a valid implementation of the county accounting laws. OAG 79-339 .

The county judge/executive’s secretary can also serve at the same time as county treasurer. OAG 79-409 .

The county treasurer is purely a ministerial officer who holds money deposited in the county treasury subject to orders of the fiscal court. OAG 79-409 .

Any revenue or money belonging to the county is necessarily considered to be county money, regardless of the source, taxes, license fees, donations, gifts, etc. OAG 79-480 .

Where the county attorney advised the county treasurer that three county officials were not delivering basic services for which they were hired, the treasurer had the right to believe that on the face of it, the checks were not drawn for county governmental purposes and could decline to sign the checks in following the county attorney’s advice; if the treasurer were to sign them he would do so at his personal risk and it was possible that the courts would find that he did not act in good faith in going against the written advice of the county attorney. OAG 80-95 .

The county treasurer and county judge/executive, individually, have no authority to select the depository since the fiscal court as a body is primarily responsible for the bank accounts and such officers cannot be held liable permitting the county’s bank accounts to draw no interest. OAG 80-98 .

Neither the county judge/executive under his reorganization powers, KRS 67.715 , nor the fiscal court, KRS 67.080 and 67.083 , has the authority to interfere with in any way or render less effective the county treasurer’s performing of his mandated statutory duties. OAG 80-309 .

The fiscal court of Jefferson County does not possess the power to delete office personnel from the county treasurer’s office and place that personnel under a separate department, known as the department of finance, thus leaving the county treasurer with no employees to directly answer to his authority, since transferring the treasurer’s duties and immediate supporting staff would constitute an unlawful interference with the treasurer’s mandated statutory duties under this section. OAG 80-309 .

The county treasurer is responsible for his own files, although they are public records, and there is no authority for such files being taken out of the office by any elected official, except under a judicial order. OAG 80-334 .

No conflict of interest exists if the county treasurer (appointed official) is a stockholder in the agency providing insurance coverage to the county. OAG 80-612 .

There is no danger that the county judge/executive could, through his power to appoint and remove the county treasurer, jeopardize the checks and balances system of this section to the extent the county judge/executive and treasurer must cosign checks since KRS 67.710 does not leave the appointment in the hands of the county judge/executive, because he can only make the appointment with the approval of the fiscal court. OAG 81-151 .

If a county volunteer fire department is a unit of the county government, rather than an independent unit disassociated from county government, then the funds received by the fire department in connection with fire services it has rendered should be deposited with the county treasurer pursuant to this section and expended in the discretion of the fiscal court pursuant to the budgetary provisions of KRS 68.210 et seq. OAG 81-218 .

Since, under KRS 441.008 (now KRS 441.235 ), where the jailer’s expenditures are within authorized budget categories the county treasurer must prepare the checks, sign them and see to it that the payees receive the checks. Subsection (1) of this section, which requires the county treasurer to disburse county funds as authorized by fiscal court and to cosign county checks with the county judge/executive, does not apply. OAG 82-424 .

The fiscal court is not responsible for any overspending of the jail funds since it has no supervising or approving role; however, the county treasurer would be directly held responsible for any such overspending and the jailer has a direct responsibility in seeing to it that he stays within his budgeted funds. OAG 82-424 .

While it is true that all warrants for payments of funds from the county treasury must be cosigned by the county treasurer and county judge/executive under subsection (1) of this section, the authorization for using county funds to pay for necessary official supplies for the county clerk’s office can only come by a majority vote of the fiscal court at a properly called meeting. OAG 83-615 .

The county treasurer is primarily accountable to the fiscal court, since that body is in charge of county finances and the treasurer must cooperate with the county judge/executive in connection with administering receipts and payment of county money. OAG 83-254 .

The county treasurer must keep an appropriation ledger, process claims, write the checks, and make financial reports to the fiscal court and while the county judge/executive has authority under KRS 67.080(1)(c) and (d) and 67.083(3), with the approval of the fiscal court, to appoint personnel to assist him in his administrative and executive role, specifically as relates to administrative duties pertaining to county finances, such personnel cannot be hired to merely duplicate the precise work of the county treasurer, nor can such employment be used to interfere in any way with the statutory duties of the county treasurer. OAG 83-456 .

The salary or salaries of personnel hired to assist the county judge/executive in his financial role should be paid out of the county treasury, subject to proper budgeting procedure as outlined in KRS Chapter 68; the specific salary or salaries would be determined by the fiscal court. OAG 83-456 .

The county judge/executive cannot arbitrarily refuse to sign checks but would generally have to cosign checks for expenditures specifically authorized by statute and fiscal court order, and subject to proper budgeting procedure and available balances. OAG 83-456 .

The county treasurer must make financial reports to the fiscal court relating to receipts and disbursements of county money. OAG 83-456 .

As to the proper procedure for setting the salaries of the deputies of the county clerk under KRS 64.530 in a county operating under the fee-pooling system, see OAG 85-76 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Collection of public claims by action, KRS Ch. 135.

County or regional library, duties of treasurer as to, KRS 173.320 .

County treasurer is ex officio treasurer of drainage district, KRS 267.440 .

Payment, collection and refund of taxes, KRS ch. 134.

Sheriff to pay county money to and settle with county treasurer, KRS 134.300 , 134.310 .

68.030. Approval and recording of settlements.

Each settlement made by the county treasurer shall be approved by the fiscal court in open court, and shall, by order of the fiscal court, be recorded by the county clerk in a book kept for that purpose. The original shall be filed in the county clerk’s office, and preserved as a record of the court. All statements, vouchers and other papers relating to the annual settlement shall be filed in the office of the county clerk, to be disposed of as the fiscal court directs.

History. 933, 936.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Effect of Settlement.

When settlement has been made and approved, it is prima facie correct, and in suit to surcharge settlement burden is on plaintiff to show that treasurer did not make payments for which he was given credit. Harrison v. Logan County, 129 Ky. 48 , 110 S.W. 377, 33 Ky. L. Rptr. 465 , 1908 Ky. LEXIS 141 ( Ky. 1908 ).

2. Compensation of County Clerk.

Compensation of county clerk for services under this section is one cent for each ten words recorded. Mills v. Lantrip, 170 Ky. 81 , 185 S.W. 514, 1916 Ky. LEXIS 21 ( Ky. 1916 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Requests for disposal or destruction of the records of the office of county treasurer must be submitted to the state archives and records commission for determination and the request must be initially channeled through the director of state archives and records service. OAG 65-207 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Fees of county clerks, KRS 64.012 .

68.040. Compensation of county treasurer. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Acts 1942, ch. 180, § 7; 1944, ch. 45) was repealed by Acts 1950, ch. 123, § 29. For present law see KRS 64.530 .

68.050. Duties of outgoing county treasurer.

When a new county treasurer has qualified and his bond has been approved, the outgoing county treasurer shall vacate the office by July 1, deliver to his successor all books, papers and records held by him by virtue of his office, and make a full and complete settlement of his accounts with the fiscal court.

History. 937: amend. Acts 1980, ch. 90, § 3, effective April 1, 1982.

Opinions of Attorney General.

The outgoing county treasurer is entitled to be compensated for performing the duties of his office until the newly appointed treasurer has qualified and his bond has been approved. OAG 61-309 .

68.060. Fiscal year for counties.

The fiscal year of each county shall begin on July 1, and end on June 30 next following. All county reports, budgets, appropriations and tax levies shall be made with reference to specific fiscal years or fractions thereof.

History. 907a.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Change of Fiscal Year.

For the method of meeting hiatus caused by change from calendar year to fiscal year in 1934, see Jefferson County Fiscal Court v. Jefferson County, 257 Ky. 507 , 78 S.W.2d 324, 1934 Ky. LEXIS 565 ( Ky. 1934 ); Hewlett v. Hopkins County, 265 Ky. 41 , 95 S.W.2d 1118, 1936 Ky. LEXIS 444 ( Ky. 1936 ); Rose v. Owen County, 266 Ky. 422 , 99 S.W.2d 177, 1936 Ky. LEXIS 672 ( Ky. 1936 ).

Where an area planning commission changed its accounting basis from a calendar year to a fiscal year running from July 1 to June 30, in order to coordinate its fiscal year with that of the counties within its jurisdiction, the commission, in effectuating this change in accounting, had no authority to levy an additional ad valorem tax to finance a special fiscal year from January 1 to June 30, since that would have allowed the commission to receive one and one-half times its annual tax revenues. Kling v. Northern Kentucky Area Planning Com., 654 S.W.2d 606, 1983 Ky. LEXIS 261 ( Ky. 1983 ).

2. Levy of Taxes.

Levy of taxes for any fiscal year must be based on assessment as of July 1 of preceding calendar year. Jefferson County Fiscal Court v. Jefferson County, 257 Ky. 507 , 78 S.W.2d 324, 1934 Ky. LEXIS 565 ( Ky. 1934 ).

Cited:

St. Matthews v. Trueheart, 274 S.W.2d 52, 1954 Ky. LEXIS 1221 ( Ky. 1954 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Where, due to litigation, tax bills were not sent out until June 1 and the books were to be closed as of June 30, the county treasurer could, for the purpose of making properly budgeted expenditures authorized by the fiscal court and involving unpaid claims incurred in that fiscal year to be paid from the tax revenue collected from the June 1 tax bills, keep his accounting books open for the 75-day period required for the collection of the taxes. OAG 71-264 .

The county officer compensated from fees must, within a reasonable period after the end of each calendar year of his term, make a financial report and settlement of the county based on the calendar year and on a cash basis so that his excess fees reflect receipts and expenditures occurring within the calendar year and not the fiscal year. OAG 73-372 .

A specific sum may be budgeted for a fiscal year and ordered by the fiscal court to be paid for extra or emergency help for the county clerk’s office, such as typing or clerical help and help other than deputies and assistants as contemplated by KRS 64.530 (4); but, the application of the funds involved must be on a fiscal year basis. OAG 74-636 .

Under the doctrine of pari materia, the legislature intended that special districts should have the same fiscal year as counties, i.e., from July 1 to June 30. OAG 80-628 .

The creation of a special fiscal year by an area planning commission to bring its fiscal procedures into agreement with the fiscal procedures of the counties located within its jurisdiction and the levy of an ad valorem tax to finance the special fiscal year would be valid since subsection (1) of KRS 147.660 provides that the collection of its tax be done in conformity with the collection of county taxes, which, under this section can be done with reference to specific years or fractions thereof. OAG 81-355 .

This section specifically adopts Ky. Const., § 169, by providing that the fiscal year of each county shall begin on July 1, and end on June 30 next following. OAG 85-65 .

68.070. Annual financial statement of certain counties; publication. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (1846) was repealed by Acts 1944, ch. 155, § 2. For present law see KRS 424.220 .

68.080. Publication of annual financial statement of counties containing city of first class.

The fiscal court of each county that contains a city of the first class shall cause to be published pursuant to KRS Chapter 424, at the end of each fiscal year, a financial statement of the county which shall include a list of the claims and amounts thereof allowed against the county during the preceding fiscal year, and to whom allowed, with such other information as the fiscal court deems proper to have published.

History. 1851b-4: amend. Acts 1966, ch. 239, § 18; 1988, ch. 32, § 4, effective July 15, 1988.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

Nichols v. Rogers, 292 Ky. 428 , 166 S.W.2d 867, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 103 ( Ky. 1942 ).

68.090. County ad valorem taxes — Limitation — Special tax for tubercular institution.

  1. For county purposes the fiscal court of each county shall levy an ad valorem tax on all property subject to county taxation. This section does not authorize the fiscal court to levy a tax to pay any railroad bonded indebtedness or any interest thereon. The ad valorem tax shall not exceed fifty cents ($0.50) on each one hundred dollars’ ($100) worth of property taxed.
  2. In any county which has under the law established itself as a tubercular district the fiscal court shall levy a tax sufficient to maintain a tubercular institution and provide for the salaries of the medical staff thereof and any other necessary expenses incident thereto taking into consideration any federal, state, or private financial assistance which may be given to the institution or which by law the institution is entitled to receive. The levy shall be an ad valorem tax on all property subject to county taxation and shall not exceed ten cents ($0.10) on each one hundred dollars’ ($100) worth of property so taxed and the ten cents ($0.10) shall be an additional tax to the fifty cents ($0.50) ad valorem tax limitation hereinbefore provided for.

History. 1839, 1882, 4281u-1: amend. Acts 1944, ch. 66; 1968, ch. 100, § 2; 1968, ch. 152, § 38; 1974, ch. 316, § 1; 1974, ch. 386, § 10.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

This section was amended by two 1974 acts which do not appear to be in conflict and have been compiled together.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Construction.

This section did not repeal law creating a courthouse district in Campbell County and authorizing the levy of a tax to maintain a courthouse. Mauget v. Plummer, 107 Ky. 41 , 52 S.W. 844, 21 Ky. L. Rptr. 641 , 1899 Ky. LEXIS 125 ( Ky. 1899 ).

The maintenance and repair of county roads is a “county purpose” within the meaning of this section for which taxes may be levied. KRS 178.140 to 178.170 do not preclude the fiscal court from constructing or maintaining the county roads in a manner other than that specified in those sections. Russell County v. Hill, 164 Ky. 360 , 175 S.W. 988, 1915 Ky. LEXIS 396 ( Ky. 1915 ).

2. Application.

This section does not apply to taxation of corporate franchises. Henderson Bridge Co. v. Commonwealth, 120 Ky. 690 , 87 S.W. 1088, 27 Ky. L. Rptr. 1104 , 27 Ky. L. Rptr. 1177 , 1905 Ky. LEXIS 154 ( Ky. 1905 ).

3. Poll Tax.

A person subject to poll tax is a “taxpayer” within the meaning of statutes conferring certain rights on taxpayers. De Haven v. Hardinsburg Graded Common School Dist., 164 Ky. 511 , 175 S.W. 994, 1915 Ky. LEXIS 398 ( Ky. 1915 ).

Fiscal court has discretion whether to levy poll tax, but cannot levy tax upon some male residents of county and exempt others who are not exempted by statute. Shelton v. Smith, 284 Ky. 236 , 144 S.W.2d 500, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 480 ( Ky. 1940 ).

4. Jurisdiction to Tax.

Where boats and barges used in carrying out business of company distributed annually approximately 500,000 tons of coal along a 162 mile route, 94.6% of which was within Kentucky, the tugs and barges were an indispensable part of the whole business, and were as necessarily present in Kentucky, as the loading and unloading facilities having their situs in Ohio and West Virginia respectively, this continuity and consistency of presence in Kentucky attached such permanency as to take it out of the zone of mere transiency or a sporadic and temporary presence and as parts of the whole business received protection in Kentucky, they acquired a tax situs in Kentucky. Reeves v. Island Creek Fuel & Transp. Co., 313 Ky. 400 , 230 S.W.2d 924, 1950 Ky. LEXIS 859 (Ky.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 853, 71 S. Ct. 82, 95 L. Ed. 625, 1950 U.S. LEXIS 1535 (U.S. 1950).

5. Property Subject to Tax.

The city of Covington is not separated from Kenton County for county governmental purposes, and the fiscal court of Kenton County may levy taxes on property in the city of Covington. McInerney v. Huelefeld, 116 Ky. 28 , 75 S.W. 237, 25 Ky. L. Rptr. 272 , 1903 Ky. LEXIS 173 ( Ky. 1903 ).

All property located in the county is liable for its ratable proportion of the taxes levied for a purpose common to the entire county. Richmond v. Madison County Fiscal Court, 290 Ky. 293 , 161 S.W.2d 58, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 398 ( Ky. 1942 ).

6. Apportionment of Taxes.

Where company conducted its operations throughout the year with relatively few interruptions and its tugs and barges moved along a route of 162 miles 94.6% of which was in Kentucky and thus had a taxable situs in Kentucky to apportion the taxes against the company’s boats and barges in proportion to the length of the line operated and location in each state, county and other taxing jurisdictions was logical and fair. Reeves v. Island Creek Fuel & Transp. Co., 313 Ky. 400 , 230 S.W.2d 924, 1950 Ky. LEXIS 859 (Ky.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 853, 71 S. Ct. 82, 95 L. Ed. 625, 1950 U.S. LEXIS 1535 (U.S. 1950).

7. Levy.

In levying county taxes the fiscal court acts in a legislative capacity, and its individual members are not liable on their official bonds for levying a tax in excess of the constitutional limit. Commonwealth v. Kenneday, 118 Ky. 618 , 82 S.W. 237, 26 Ky. L. Rptr. 504 , 1904 Ky. LEXIS 80 ( Ky. 1904 ).

The fiscal court has sole and exclusive jurisdiction to levy county taxes. Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Logan County, 119 Ky. 428 , 84 S.W. 341, 27 Ky. L. Rptr. 66 , 1905 Ky. LEXIS 15 ( Ky. 1905 ).

The power of the fiscal court to levy taxes does not embrace any authority to assess property, or to purchase plats for the use of the assessor. Jefferson County v. Young, 120 Ky. 456 , 86 S.W. 985, 27 Ky. L. Rptr. 849 , 1905 Ky. LEXIS 116 ( Ky. 1905 ).

The fiscal court may not levy any tax not authorized by law, and its power to tax will be strictly construed. Russell County v. Hill, 164 Ky. 360 , 175 S.W. 988, 1915 Ky. LEXIS 396 ( Ky. 1915 ).

8. — Purpose.

The fiscal court could not levy an ad valorem tax for the support of the poor. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Pendleton County, 96 Ky. 491 , 29 S.W. 324, 16 Ky. L. Rptr. 584 , 1895 Ky. LEXIS 111 ( Ky. 1895 ).

The fiscal court had the power to include in its levy a tax for the purpose of erecting a workhouse. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Christian County, 70 S.W. 180, 24 Ky. L. Rptr. 894 (1902).

This section authorizing a levy for “county purposes,” did not affect the requirement of Ky. Const., § 180 that the purpose of each tax levy must be specified, and a levy of an ad valorem tax “for county purposes” was not a sufficient specification of the purpose of the tax. Chesapeake, O & S.W. Ry. v. Commonwealth, 111 S.W. 334, 33 Ky. L. Rptr. 882 (Ky. Ct. App. 1908).

Where existing courthouse was in dangerous condition, the fiscal court had the power to levy a tax, within constitutional limits, to create fund with which to build new courthouse, and was not required to issue bonds for such purpose. Bonta v. Fiscal Court of Mercer County, 144 Ky. 241 , 137 S.W. 1084, 1911 Ky. LEXIS 597 ( Ky. 1911 ). See Combs v. Letcher County, 107 Ky. 379 , 54 S.W. 177, 21 Ky. L. Rptr. 1057 , 1899 Ky. LEXIS 182 ( Ky. 1899 ).

The fiscal court has the power under this section to include in its levy a tax for the maintenance and repair of roads, and is not limited by KRS 178.160 (now repealed) and KRS 178.170 to a special tax or the issuance of bonds. The tax levy may also include a levy for the reconstruction of roads in cooperation with the state. Russell County v. Hill, 164 Ky. 360 , 175 S.W. 988, 1915 Ky. LEXIS 396 ( Ky. 1915 ).

9. — Basis.

County taxes are to be based upon assessment for state taxes, and any action taken by board of supervisors applies to county levy as well as state levy. Royer Wheel Co. v. Taylor County, 104 Ky. 741 , 47 S.W. 876, 20 Ky. L. Rptr. 904 , 1898 Ky. LEXIS 215 ( Ky. 1898 ).

10. — Method.

Definite and specific legislation is not necessary in order to permit counties to levy ad valorem tax on personalty, for counties, under their general taxing power to assess personalty for taxation, could apportion or allocate to themselves a part or share of the value of an item or unit of personalty and thus they could levy such tax on towboats and barges of company where boats and barges had acquired tax situs in Kentucky and in the several counties. Reeves v. Island Creek Fuel & Transp. Co., 313 Ky. 400 , 230 S.W.2d 924, 1950 Ky. LEXIS 859 (Ky.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 853, 71 S. Ct. 82, 95 L. Ed. 625, 1950 U.S. LEXIS 1535 (U.S. 1950).

If the statutes imposing the tax provided a method of apportionment that method would be exclusive, but where the statutes did not prescribe any scheme for assessment, in taxing company’s towboats and barges court must look to see if the mileage basis was a fair and just method of calculating the aliquot part of company’s boats and barges which had acquired a tax situs in Kentucky and several taxing districts. Reeves v. Island Creek Fuel & Transp. Co., 313 Ky. 400 , 230 S.W.2d 924, 1950 Ky. LEXIS 859 (Ky.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 853, 71 S. Ct. 82, 95 L. Ed. 625, 1950 U.S. LEXIS 1535 (U.S. 1950).

11. — Necessity.

So long as the tax levy is within the constitutional and statutory limits, a court of equity will not inquire into the necessity of the levy in a suit by an individual taxpayer to enjoin the collection of the taxes assessed against his property. McInerney v. Huelefeld, 116 Ky. 28 , 75 S.W. 237, 25 Ky. L. Rptr. 272 , 1903 Ky. LEXIS 173 ( Ky. 1903 ).

12. — Time of Making.

Fiscal court is not required to make county tax levy at a regular term of the court, but may do so at a special term. Pulaski County v. Watson, 106 Ky. 500 , 50 S.W. 861, 21 Ky. L. Rptr. 61 , 1899 Ky. LEXIS 69 ( Ky. 1899 ).

Fiscal court was not required to wait until after board of supervisors had adjourned before making county tax levy. Pulaski County v. Watson, 106 Ky. 500 , 50 S.W. 861, 21 Ky. L. Rptr. 61 , 1899 Ky. LEXIS 69 ( Ky. 1899 ).

13. — Constitutional Limitation.

A levy in excess of the constitutional fifty cent rate is void, and where sheriff collects taxes under excess levy he and his sureties cannot be compelled to account to the county for the same. Boone v. Powell County, 108 S.W. 251, 32 Ky. L. Rptr. 1172 (1908).

Fiscal court has no authority to levy a tax exceeding the limit fixed by this section and by Ky. Const., § 157, for the purpose of paying the interest and principal of funding bonds issued to fund floating indebtedness of the county, unless such indebtedness was incurred prior to the adoption of the present constitution or was authorized by popular vote. Parsons v. Arnold, 235 Ky. 600 , 31 S.W.2d 928, 1930 Ky. LEXIS 416 ( Ky. 1930 ).

14. — Void, Effect.

If attempted levy of taxes for any year is void for any reason, the defect may be corrected by a subsequent valid levy, although the subsequent levy is not made until the following year. Morton v. Fullerton, 229 Ky. 76 , 16 S.W.2d 797, 1929 Ky. LEXIS 707 ( Ky. 1929 ).

15. — Mandamus to Compel.

Federal court in which judgment has been entered against county may compel fiscal court by mandamus to levy tax to pay judgment. Tucker v. Hubbert, 196 F. 849, 1912 U.S. App. LEXIS 1552 (6th Cir. Ky. 1912 ).

16. — Injunction Against.

The fact that representation on the fiscal court was unequal because justices’ districts were not fairly laid out did not furnish grounds for enjoining collection of tax levied by fiscal court. McInerney v. Huelefeld, 116 Ky. 28 , 75 S.W. 237, 25 Ky. L. Rptr. 272 , 1903 Ky. LEXIS 173 ( Ky. 1903 ).

Where a taxpayer sues to enjoin collection of tax under alleged void levy, on behalf of himself and all other taxpayers, judgment is binding on other taxpayers, although they were not made parties by name. Parsons v. Arnold, 235 Ky. 600 , 31 S.W.2d 928, 1930 Ky. LEXIS 416 ( Ky. 1930 ).

17. — Petition Attacking.

A petition attacking a tax levy must allege facts, not conclusions. Allegation that tax levy was “illegal,” without alleging that ground of illegality was fact that levy exceeded constitutional limit because indebtedness which tax was levied to retire was not authorized by popular vote, was insufficient. Parsons v. Arnold, 235 Ky. 600 , 31 S.W.2d 928, 1930 Ky. LEXIS 416 ( Ky. 1930 ).

Cited:

Ward v. Buckingham, 268 Ky. 297 , 104 S.W.2d 994, 1937 Ky. LEXIS 453 ( Ky. 1937 ); Rea v. Gallatin County Fiscal Court, 422 S.W.2d 134, 1967 Ky. LEXIS 38 ( Ky. 1967 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

The poll tax is not a prerequisite to the right to vote and is nothing more than another revenue measure for the taxing jurisdiction in question. OAG 72-816 .

The 1974 amendment to this section eliminated the poll tax as a tax which can be levied by counties, school districts and cities. OAG 74-289 .

Cities or counties may not levy a poll tax since it has been eliminated by amendment of this section, 92.280 and 160.475 . OAG 74-631 .

A proposed licensure change of a TB District Hospital to permit the hospital to accept and treat nontuberculosis patients should not result in a change in the hospital’s eligibility to receive mandatory tax support payments under this statute. OAG 75-320 .

If an ambulance service is directly operated by a county, the county fiscal court has the authority to levy a special tax for the service pursuant to subsection (3)(d) of KRS 67.083 , and, if necessary, it can levy an additional ad valorem tax pursuant to subsection (1) of this section, since an ambulance service involves a county purpose. OAG 81-344 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Alcoholic beverage license fees, county may impose, KRS 243.060 , 243.600 .

Assessment and collection of county ad valorem taxes, KRS Chs. 132, 134.

Basis of county tax levy, KRS 132.280 .

Board of health for Louisville and Jefferson County, appropriations required for, KRS 212.470 .

Consolidated county to levy separate taxes for debts of old counties, KRS 67.270 .

Library, tax for, KRS 173.360 .

License fees, general assembly may authorize county to impose, Ky. Const., § 181.

Municipal electric plant to pay sum equivalent to tax based on book value, KRS 96.820 .

Poll tax, limit on, Ky. Const., § 180.

Property subject to county taxation, KRS 132.200 , 136.030 , 136.280 .

School tax, KRS 160.460 to 160.530 .

Special road tax, election for levy of, KRS 178.210 .

Tax bills, how made out, KRS 133.220 .

Tax rate for counties, limits on, Ky. Const., §§ 157, 157a.

Tax rate not to be fixed until assessment is certified by department of revenue to county clerk, KRS 133.185 .

Kentucky Law Journal.

Lewis, Kostas, and Carnes, Consolidation — Complete or Functional — Of City and County Governments, 42 Ky. L.J. 295 (1954).

Stephenson, Property Assessment Remedies for the Kentucky Taxpayer, 60 Ky. L.J. 84 (1971).

ALR

Authority of county to employ tax ferret. 11 A.L.R. 913; 32 A.L.R. 88.

Constitutional provision prohibiting legislature from imposing taxes for county and corporate purposes or providing that legislature may invest power to levy such taxes in the local authorities. 46 A.L.R. 609; 106 A.L.R. 906.

Other taxing unit of same state, lien for county tax as affected by lien or sale for tax imposed by. 135 A.L.R. 1472.

Power of county as to exemption from taxation of private enterprises conducted for recreational, exhibition, or entertainment purposes, power of county as to. 116 A.L.R. 889.

Voting, constitutionality of statute making payment of poll tax condition of right of. 139 A.L.R. 561.

68.100. Purpose of tax to be specified — Funds not to be diverted — Remedies.

  1. All county taxes shall be levied by order or resolution of the fiscal court. The purpose for which each tax is levied shall be specified in the order or resolution, and the revenue therefrom shall be expended for no other purpose than that for which the tax was levied. Failure to specify the purpose of the tax shall render the order or resolution invalid.
  2. If any county tax revenue is expended for another purpose than that for which the tax was levied, each officer, agent or employee who, by refusal to act, could have prevented the expenditure, and each member of the fiscal court who voted for the expenditure, shall be jointly and severally liable to the county for the amount of county tax revenue so expended. The county attorney shall prosecute to recovery all such actions, and if he fails to do so for six (6) months after the money is expended any taxpayer may prosecute such action for the use and benefit of the county.
  3. A recovery under this section does not bar a criminal prosecution under subsection (3) of KRS 68.990 .
  4. Any indebtedness contracted in violation of this section or of KRS 68.110 shall be void, and the contract shall not be enforceable by the person with whom made; nor shall such county ever be authorized to assume the same, and money paid under any such contract may be recovered by the county.

History. 4281u-2.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Application.

Subsection (2) of this section applies to cases where taxes have been levied for one purpose and are diverted to another purpose by the fiscal court and has no application to allegedly unauthorized or excessive payments; thus its provisions did not dispense with requirement of demand on fiscal court to bring action to collect amounts allegedly illegally paid to three county officials. Cooley v. Sturgill, 293 S.W.2d 634, 1956 Ky. LEXIS 80 ( Ky. 1956 ).

2. Order or Resolution.
3. — Purpose.

Ordinance merely providing that tax levy be fixed at a certain sum, without specifying the purpose of the tax, did not comply with this section. Nickens v. Commonwealth, 228 Ky. 477 , 15 S.W.2d 261, 1929 Ky. LEXIS 561 ( Ky. 1929 ).

Ordinance imposing license tax on motor vehicles for “the general fund” sufficiently specified the purpose of the tax. Daily v. Owensboro, 257 Ky. 281 , 77 S.W.2d 939, 1934 Ky. LEXIS 550 ( Ky. 1934 ).

When fiscal court accepts proposed budget and levies a tax for general fund purposes in accordance with the budget, the requirement of Ky. Const., § 180, that resolution passed by any county levying a tax must specify distinctly the purpose for which the tax is levied, is satisfied. Nichols v. Henry, 301 Ky. 434 , 191 S.W.2d 930, 1945 Ky. LEXIS 746 ( Ky. 1945 ).

4. Diversion of Funds.

The expenditure for other things of a substantial part of those funds reserved for current governmental expenses and other special purposes was a misappropriation by officials and an unlawful receipt by recipients. Fulton County Fiscal Court v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 285 Ky. 17 , 146 S.W.2d 15, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 591 ( Ky. 1940 ).

5. — Purpose Impossible of Attainment.

Bond proceeds, when the purpose of the issue has become impossible of attainment, may be used to retire the issue. Fiscal Court of Estill County v. Debt Com. of Kentucky, 286 Ky. 114 , 149 S.W.2d 735, 1941 Ky. LEXIS 209 ( Ky. 1941 ).

6. — Funding of Debt Resulting From.

Indebtedness of municipality to its sinking fund, resulting from diversion of sinking fund money to general municipal purposes, was a valid indebtedness of the municipality which could be funded by the issuance of bonds, since diversion did not increase obligations of municipality. Hopkinsville v. Wheeler, 269 Ky. 291 , 269 Ky. 292 , 106 S.W.2d 1017, 1937 Ky. LEXIS 595 , 1937 Ky. App. LEXIS 595 ( Ky. 1937 ).

7. — Liability.

This section does not impose liability on the members of the fiscal court for spending money for a purpose not authorized by law, but only for spending money for a purpose other than that for which it was collected. Woodruff v. Shea, 152 Ky. 657 , 153 S.W. 1005, 1913 Ky. LEXIS 722 ( Ky. 1913 ).

Members of fiscal court who use or appropriate any portion of road tax levied under Ky. Const., § 157a for any purpose other than the retirement of indebtedness for road purposes will be civilly and criminally liable. Bird v. Asher, 170 Ky. 726 , 186 S.W. 663, 1916 Ky. LEXIS 129 ( Ky. 1916 ); Collier v. Bourbon Fiscal Court, 188 Ky. 491 , 223 S.W. 149, 1920 Ky. LEXIS 307 ( Ky. 1920 ).

County treasurer who pays out tax money for a purpose other than that for which the tax was levied is liable to the county, but is not liable to a person holding a claim against the county where claim has not been paid because of the diversion of funds. Bernard v. McFarland, 267 Ky. 210 , 101 S.W.2d 913, 1937 Ky. LEXIS 292 ( Ky. 1937 ).

Where money was diverted from sinking fund to general fund, the fact that the money was used to pay valid claims would not relieve the officers responsible for the diversion from liability for interest on the diverted funds, or from criminal liability. Hopkinsville v. Wheeler, 269 Ky. 291 , 269 Ky. 292 , 106 S.W.2d 1017, 1937 Ky. LEXIS 595 , 1937 Ky. App. LEXIS 595 ( Ky. 1937 ).

Use of proceeds of bond issue, voted for “building roads and bridges,” to buy right of way for state highway, was not an unlawful diversion of funds. Rice v. Marcum, 294 Ky. 486 , 172 S.W.2d 75, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 483 ( Ky. 1943 ).

8. — — Errors of Judgment.

Members of fiscal court are not liable under this section for errors of judgment in the expenditure of county funds. Boyd County v. Boyd Fiscal Court, 247 Ky. 183 , 56 S.W.2d 959, 1933 Ky. LEXIS 368 ( Ky. 1933 ).

9. — Evidence.

The county attorney may institute action against members of fiscal court under this section, but cannot compel fiscal court to employ an auditor to assist in discovering facts upon which to base such action, in the absence of a showing of concealment or unusual state of accounts. Boyd County v. Boyd Fiscal Court, 247 Ky. 183 , 56 S.W.2d 959, 1933 Ky. LEXIS 368 ( Ky. 1933 ).

10. Criminal Liability.

The fact that the ordinance pursuant to which certain taxes were levied and collected did not specify the purpose of the levy as required by this section would not relieve the tax collector of criminal liability for embezzling the tax money. Nickens v. Commonwealth, 228 Ky. 477 , 15 S.W.2d 261, 1929 Ky. LEXIS 561 ( Ky. 1929 ).

11. Authority to Order Tax.

The trial court had authority to order the county court clerk to place a four-cent health tax rate on the tax bills, even though the magistrates had not approved the rate. Trimble County Fiscal Court v. Trimble County Bd. of Health, 587 S.W.2d 276, 1979 Ky. App. LEXIS 469 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).

Cited:

Rose v. Knox County Fiscal Court, 279 Ky. 611 , 131 S.W.2d 498, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 319 ( Ky. 1939 ); George v. Bernheim Distilling Co., 300 Ky. 179 , 188 S.W.2d 321, 1945 Ky. LEXIS 519 ( Ky. 1945 ); Fannin v. Davis, 385 S.W.2d 321, 1964 Ky. LEXIS 158 ( Ky. 1964 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

A county fiscal court ordinance enacting a license tax for the stated purpose of defraying the general expenses of the county government, although somewhat generalized, is technically in compliance with this section and Ky. Const., § 180. OAG 75-385 .

The expense allowance provided the county judge/executive in KRS 67.722 may be constitutionally funded from the county road fund, since such “administration of the local county road program” relates directly to the “cost of administration” of the county road program, as the terms “cost of administration” and “public highways” are used in Ky. Const., § 230 and as envisioned in this section, and Ky. Const., § 180; under the same reasoning, if it can be reasonably determined as to what percentage of his work schedule the county judge/executive is engaged in administrative work relating to the county road program of construction, maintenance, and repair, that percentage factor may be applied to his salary to determine that precise part of his salary which may be funded out of the county road fund. OAG 80-377 .

To the extent that a particular county tax ordinance or resolution spells out with particularity that all or a certain portion of the tax must go for county road purposes, any expenditure of that tax money, “earmarked” for county road purposes, to pay for the expense allowance provided for in KRS 64.530 , would be in violation of Ky. Const., § 180, and this section. OAG 82-466 .

The fiscal court, to the extent that the county clerk’s office runs short in the procurement and payment of necessary official expenses (certain necessary supplies, etc.), when considering the clerk’s fees and any county appropriation, has the responsibility of procuring and paying for such needed office supplies under proper budget procedure. OAG 82-615 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Taxes levied for one purpose may not be used for another, Ky. Const., § 180.

Use of public funds for public projects, KRS 58.130 .

68.110. Expenditure in excess of revenue or diversion of funds forbidden.

  1. The fiscal court shall not in any year expend any money in excess of the amount annually levied and collected for that year or levied, collected or appropriated for any special purpose.
  2. The fiscal court shall not expend, or permit or authorize to be expended, any county revenue raised by taxes levied for one (1) purpose, for any other purpose than that specified in the order or resolution levying the tax.
  3. No member of the fiscal court shall knowingly vote for any appropriation or contract in violation of this section or KRS 68.100 , and no county officer shall knowingly do any act to impose upon the county any pecuniary liability in excess of the limitations of this section, KRS 68.090 and 68.100 .

History. 4281u-4.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Purpose.

This section was enacted to enable better enforcement of Ky. Const., §§ 157 and 180. Southern Bitulithic Co. v. Detreville, 156 Ky. 513 , 161 S.W. 560, 1913 Ky. LEXIS 483 ( Ky. 1913 ).

2. Construction.

This section indicates a clear legislative intent to limit expenditures to the amount that will be raised by the tax rate actually levied. However, such intent could not prevail over construction of Ky. Const., § 157 that indebtedness may be incurred up to amount that would be raised if maximum constitutional tax rate had been levied. Hill v. Covington, 264 Ky. 618 , 95 S.W.2d 278, 1936 Ky. LEXIS 380 ( Ky. 1936 ).

3. Application.

This section applies only to money raised by taxation, and officers are not liable under this section for diverting proceeds of bond issue to a purpose other than that for which the bonds were voted. Commonwealth v. Silcox, 209 Ky. 32 , 272 S.W. 40, 1925 Ky. LEXIS 418 ( Ky. 1925 ).

4. Tax Levy.
5. — Collection.

The fiscal court could pledge tax funds which had already accrued but had not been collected. Caywood v. Stivers, 430 S.W.2d 327, 1968 Ky. LEXIS 398 ( Ky. 1968 ).

6. Expenditures.
7. — Priority.

The fiscal authorities should first provide for the necessary governmental expenses, and expenditures for nonessential governmental purposes should then be limited to the amount of actual revenue remaining. Hockley v. Carter County, 267 Ky. 250 , 101 S.W.2d 928, 1937 Ky. LEXIS 298 ( Ky. 1937 ).

8. — Exceeding Revenue.

In determining whether expenditure will exceed revenues, floating indebtedness carried over from preceding years must be considered. Southern Bitulithic Co. v. Detreville, 156 Ky. 513 , 161 S.W. 560, 1913 Ky. LEXIS 483 ( Ky. 1913 ); Russell County Fiscal Court v. Russell County, 246 Ky. 529 , 55 S.W.2d 337, 1932 Ky. LEXIS 779 ( Ky. 1932 ).

This section expressly prescribes that no county, municipality, or other taxing district in the commonwealth “shall expend any money in excess of the amount annually levied and collected for that year.” Hill v. Covington, 264 Ky. 618 , 95 S.W.2d 278, 1936 Ky. LEXIS 380 ( Ky. 1936 ).

9. — Diversion of Funds.

A municipality may not defeat a valid debt by diverting to other purposes the proceeds of the tax levied to pay such debt. Southern Bitulithic Co. v. Detreville, 156 Ky. 513 , 161 S.W. 560, 1913 Ky. LEXIS 483 ( Ky. 1913 ).

The expenditure for other things of a substantial part of those funds reserved for current governmental expenses and other special purposes was a misappropriation by the officials and an unlawful receipt by the recipients. Fulton County Fiscal Court v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 285 Ky. 17 , 146 S.W.2d 15, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 591 ( Ky. 1940 ).

Since the purpose of KRS 178.210 is to improve and construct rather than to repair and maintain, the diversion or expenditure of the funds realized from the collection of the special tax levy for repair or maintenance of county roads or bridges was improper and illegal and as such expenditures were not within the purview of the specified purpose of that section they were in violation of Ky. Const., § 180 and this section. Thompson v. Bracken County, 294 S.W.2d 943, 1956 Ky. LEXIS 153 ( Ky. 1956 ).

10. — — Injunction to Prevent.

Where fiscal court used funds from special tax levy levied for purpose of improving and constructing county roads and bridges for the purposes of repairing and maintaining roads and bridges, such funds were being improperly used and court erred in failing to grant a permanent injunction to prevent them from expending such proceeds in such improper manner. Thompson v. Bracken County, 294 S.W.2d 943, 1956 Ky. LEXIS 153 ( Ky. 1956 ).

11. Liability for Diversion.

Members of fiscal court who use or appropriate any portion of road tax levied under Ky. Const., § 157a for any purpose other than the retirement of indebtedness for road purposes will be civilly and criminally liable. Bird v. Asher, 170 Ky. 726 , 186 S.W. 663, 1916 Ky. LEXIS 129 ( Ky. 1916 ); Collier v. Bourbon Fiscal Court, 188 Ky. 491 , 223 S.W. 149, 1920 Ky. LEXIS 307 ( Ky. 1920 ).

Where money was diverted from sinking fund to general fund, the fact that the money was used to pay valid claims would not relieve the officers responsible for the diversion from liability for interest on the diverted funds, or from criminal liability. Hopkinsville v. Wheeler, 269 Ky. 291 , 269 Ky. 292 , 106 S.W.2d 1017, 1937 Ky. LEXIS 595 , 1937 Ky. App. LEXIS 595 ( Ky. 1937 ).

If any part of county tax revenue, however small, is used or appropriated by the fiscal court for any purpose other than that for which it was levied, then the members of the fiscal court and its officers may become subject to civil as well as criminal liability. Thompson v. Bracken County, 294 S.W.2d 943, 1956 Ky. LEXIS 153 ( Ky. 1956 ).

12. Floating Indebtedness.
13. — Validity.

This section does not invalidate a floating indebtedness, or prevent a funding of such indebtedness. Bond v. Corbin, 241 Ky. 663 , 44 S.W.2d 576, 1931 Ky. LEXIS 133 ( Ky. 1931 ). But see Payne v. Covington, 276 Ky. 380 , 123 S.W.2d 1045, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 549 ( Ky. 1938 ).

This section does not render invalid a floating indebtedness consisting of claims for essential governmental expenses left unpaid because of overexpenditures for nonessential governmental functions. Russell County Fiscal Court v. Russell County, 246 Ky. 529 , 55 S.W.2d 337, 1932 Ky. LEXIS 779 ( Ky. 1932 ).

14. Funding of Indebtedness Due to Diversion.

Indebtedness of municipality to its sinking fund, resulting from diversion of sinking fund money to general municipal purposes, was a valid indebtedness which could be funded by the issuance of bonds, since diversion did not increase obligations of municipality. Hopkinsville v. Wheeler, 269 Ky. 291 , 269 Ky. 292 , 106 S.W.2d 1017, 1937 Ky. LEXIS 595 , 1937 Ky. App. LEXIS 595 ( Ky. 1937 ).

Cited:

Ballard v. Adair County, 268 Ky. 347 , 104 S.W.2d 1100, 1937 Ky. LEXIS 465 ( Ky. 1937 ); Fannin v. Davis, 385 S.W.2d 321, 1964 Ky. LEXIS 158 ( Ky. 1964 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

A contract entered into by the fiscal court for delivery of a piece of equipment during the current fiscal year but for which the first payment would be deferred until the next fiscal year would be void where the budget for the year in which payment would be made had not been approved when the contract was made. OAG 61-408 .

If a fiscal court operates on a properly classified budget, such as to include a reasonable fund for prior year claims, and if the payment, out of a current budget, for prior year claims does not exceed such proper budget fund, then such payment of claims would be valid, provided the gross expenditures conform to the requirements of this section and KRS 68.310 but any substantial departure from this procedure would constitute illegal payment of claims. OAG 64-599 .

This section does not negate KRS 68.120 where that section’s criteria have been met. OAG 74-406 .

The fiscal court, in its discretion, may pay as a properly budgeted item the legal fees of a sheriff and county attorney incurred in defending suits brought against them providing the court makes a reasonable determination that: (1) the interests of the county were involved in the litigation and (2) the officers acted in good faith in connection with their actions which were the subject matters of the legislation and in connection with the discharge of their official duties. OAG 75-53 .

The expense allowance provided the county judge/executive in KRS 67.722 may be constitutionally funded from the county road fund, since such “administration of the local county road program” relates directly to the “cost of administration” of the county road program, as the terms “cost of administration” and “public highways” are used in Ky. Const., § 230 and as envisioned in KRS 68.100 , and Ky. Const., § 180; under the same reasoning, if it can be reasonably determined as to what percentage of his work schedule the county judge/executive is engaged in administrative work relating to the county road program of construction, maintenance, and repair, that percentage factor may be applied to his salary to determine that precise part of his salary which may be funded out of the county road fund. OAG 80-377 .

Since the leasing of road equipment does not involve an essential and compulsory governmental service or function, if a lease contract involves an assumption by the county of a total debt of lease payments which exceeds the income and revenue available to the county for the particular year in which the lease is executed, the contract would violate Ky. Const., § 157 in the absence of a requisite vote of the people; in the event that such lease would involve a lease for only one year, which could at the option of fiscal court be renewed from year to year (the county only being obligated for one year at a time), and assuming that the county has currently available revenue to cover the first year’s rental (and has available the current revenue to cover any subsequent one-year renewal), and assuming the limit of Ky. Const., § 158 is met, then Ky. Const., § 157 would not be violated. OAG 83-323 .

It is the responsibility of the fiscal court to authorize a specific bidding project and approve the terms of the advertisement for bids, after which the fiscal court can authorize the county judge/executive to prepare the bid terms and advertise for bids for the county government; the fiscal court, of course, must make the award. OAG 84-194 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Board of health for Louisville and Jefferson County not to incur debt beyond annual income, KRS 212.450 .

Expenditures in excess of budget fund, KRS 68.300 .

Tax, order levying to specify purpose; funds not to be diverted, Ky. Const., § 180.

Kentucky Law Journal.

Morrow, County Debt Difficulties in Kentucky, 31 Ky. L.J. 122 (1942).

ALR

Indebtedness, limitation of power to tax as limitation of power to incur, or vice versa. 97 A.L.R. 1103.

Presumptions and burden of proof as to violation of or compliance with public debt limitation. 16 A.L.R.2d 515.

Parking meters, permissible use of funds from. 83 A.L.R.2d 625.

68.120. Surplus in special fund to revert to general fund — Return to special reserve fund for similar purpose.

Where the special object or purpose for which a tax was levied has been accomplished, any amount remaining in the special fund shall become a part of the general revenue fund of the county. In any county where all or any part of a special fund so transferred to the general fund remains unexpended and has not been commingled with other funds in such a way as to lose its identification, the county may return the same to a special reserve fund for an object or purpose similar to that for which the fund was originally accumulated and may invest the same in investments in which other funds of the county may lawfully be invested until such time as it is necessary to expend the fund for such purpose.

History. 4281u-5: amend. Acts 1942, ch. 188, § 2.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

Fannin v. Davis, 385 S.W.2d 321, 1964 Ky. LEXIS 158 ( Ky. 1964 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

When properly used, this section does not conflict with KRS 68.020 , 68.110 or Ky. Const., § 180. OAG 74-406 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Funds from tax levied for one purpose not to be diverted to another, Ky. Const., § 180.

Use of public funds for public projects, KRS 58.130 .

68.125. County land and building fund.

  1. The fiscal court of any county is hereby authorized and empowered to establish a fund to be designated and known as a land and building fund and to set aside in said fund and acquire therein from year to year funds for the purpose of acquiring lands and improving same, and for the erection, maintaining, improving and reconstruction of necessary buildings and other improvements for the use of such county; such fund to be a permanent fund as herein provided.
  2. The fiscal court of such county whenever it shall so determine may use the moneys in such fund to acquire and purchase such lands as it may see fit, and in such manner and at such places in said county as it may see fit, title thereto being taken in the name of such county, and may erect such improvements on said or other lands as said court may deem necessary and proper for the use of such county.
  3. The fiscal court at the time of fixing the rate of the tax levies for said county may fix a tax levy to be part of and included in the general fund levy, the amount realized from such levy to be set aside for and become part of such building fund, but in no event shall said fund become a part of the general revenue fund of the county under the provisions of KRS 68.120 .
  4. All moneys in said fund shall be kept as other county funds, but shall be invested under the supervision of said fiscal court only in obligations of the United States government.
  5. Such fiscal court shall have the power upon the approval of the majority of the members thereof to receive any funds by gift or devise to be placed in and become part of such building fund upon such terms and conditions as such members shall deem proper.
  6. Nothing contained in this section shall be construed as affecting or limiting the right of any county to acquire lands or to improve lands, erect or maintain, or reconstruct buildings as is otherwise authorized by law.

History. Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 101.

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

County buildings commission, KRS 67.450 .

Issuance of revenue bonds for public projects, KRS 58.010 to 58.120 .

68.127. Emergency floodwall operation fund, fiscal court of county containing city of the first class may establish — Additions to fund — Investment of funds — Gifts.

  1. The fiscal court of any county containing a city of the first class is hereby authorized and empowered to establish a fund to be designated and known as an emergency floodwall operation fund and to set aside in said fund and acquire therein from year to year funds for the purpose of operating floodwalls when such operation shall become necessary because of flood or other emergency. The fund herein provided shall be a permanent fund and the sums accumulated shall not be used for any other purpose.
  2. The fiscal court of such county may add to the fund from year to year such moneys out of its general revenue as it deems advisable or necessary.
  3. All moneys in said fund shall be kept as other county funds, but shall be invested under the supervision of said fiscal court only in obligations of the United States government.
  4. Such fiscal court shall have the power, upon the approval of the majority of the members thereof, to receive any funds by gift or devise to be placed in or become a part of such emergency floodwall operation fund upon such terms and conditions as the fiscal court shall deem proper.

History. Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 21, effective May 18, 1956.

68.130. Auditor and assistant auditor for consolidated local government or county having city of first class — Salary — Bond.

A consolidated local government or the fiscal court of each county containing a city of the first class may appoint an auditor and an assistant auditor, to hold office at the pleasure of the consolidated local government or fiscal court. The auditor and assistant auditor shall each receive an annual salary to be fixed by the consolidated local government or fiscal court and paid out of the consolidated local government or county levy. They shall each execute bond with an incorporated surety company authorized and qualified to become surety on bonds in this state, or with at least two (2) solvent and responsible individuals as surety, the bonds and sureties to be approved by the consolidated local government or fiscal court.

History. 1851b-11, 1851b-12: amend. Acts 1942, ch. 180, §§ 4, 7; 2002, ch. 346, § 61, effective July 15, 2002.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Employment of Comptroller.

Fiscal court had power to employ a “comptroller,” whose duties, among other things, were to make a survey of the county government, analyze costs, recommend changes, and advise department heads, such duties not being so similar as to be a duplication of those performed by auditors and public accountants. Veith v. Tinnell, 307 Ky. 575 , 210 S.W.2d 930, 1948 Ky. LEXIS 722 ( Ky. 1948 ).

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Audit of accounts of county officers, KRS 43.070 .

Fiscal court may have audits made and employ auditors, KRS 67.080 .

Counties of 200,000 to pay premiums on bonds of officers, KRS 62.150 .

68.140. Duties of auditor and assistant auditor.

The auditor and assistant auditor shall make regular audits of all accounts and records of the consolidated local government or fiscal court and of all other agencies whose revenue is provided in whole or in part from taxes levied or funds appropriated by the consolidated local government or fiscal court, and shall cause correct accounts and records to be kept of all receipts and disbursements of county funds, make periodical reports as required by the consolidated local government or fiscal court, and perform any other related duties imposed upon them by the consolidated local government or fiscal court.

History. 1851b-11: amend. Acts 2002, ch. 346, § 62, effective July 15, 2002.

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Access to books of air pollution control district and audit of accounts, KRS 77.140 .

Access to records of city-county board of health, KRS 212.550 .

See note to KRS 68.130 . Veith v. Tinnell, 307 Ky. 575 , 210 S.W.2d 930, 1948 Ky. LEXIS 722 (1948).

68.150. Additional audit by independent firm.

The fiscal court of counties containing a city of the first class may, in addition to the audits made by the auditor and assistant auditor, employ an independent firm of certified public accountants to audit accounts of all county officers not oftener than once in any fiscal year.

History. 1851b-13.

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

See note to § 68.130 . Veith v. Tinnell, 307 Ky. 575 , 210 S.W.2d 930, 1948 Ky. LEXIS 722 (1948).

68.160. Purchasing agent for consolidated local government or county having city of first class.

Upon the establishment of a consolidated local government in a county which contained a city of the first class, the mayor may, every four (4) years, appoint a purchasing agent for a term of four (4) years. The fiscal court of each county containing a city of the first class shall, every four (4) years, beginning in 1928, appoint a purchasing agent for a term of four (4) years, the term of the first purchasing agent to begin May 1, 1928.

History. 907b-1, 907b-2: amend. Acts 2002, ch. 346, § 63, effective July 15, 2002.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

This section in authorizing fiscal court to appoint a purchasing agent did not violate Ky. Const., § 144. Gross v. Fiscal Court of Jefferson County, 225 Ky. 641 , 9 S.W.2d 1006, 1928 Ky. LEXIS 849 ( Ky. 1928 ).

2. Appointment.

KRS 67.070 applies in the case of a deadlock in the fiscal court on the question of appointing a purchasing agent. Hill v. Taylor, 264 Ky. 708 , 95 S.W.2d 566, 1936 Ky. LEXIS 388 ( Ky. 1936 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

A city and county may enter into an agreement to combine the city and county purchasing departments under the terms of the interlocal cooperation act and by so doing relieve the county of its obligation and requirement under this section to appoint a purchasing agent. OAG 64-400 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Deadlock or tie vote in selection of employee by fiscal court, KRS 67.070 .

Purchasing unit for county and city may be set up by compact, KRS 79.010 to 79.070 .

68.170. Duties and salary of purchasing agent.

  1. The purchasing agent shall make all purchases of supplies, goods, wares and merchandise ordered by the fiscal court to be purchased for county purposes.
  2. Said purchasing agent shall be paid for his services a salary to be fixed by the fiscal court of the county and to be paid in equal monthly installments out of the county levy.

History. 907b-3, 907b-4: amend. Acts 1942, ch. 180, §§ 4, 7; 1978, ch. 110, § 101, effective January 1, 1980.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Application.

Subsection (1) of this section was intended to require competitive bids only on articles which are sold and consumed generally and does not apply to a type of property that is rare and unique, such as a steamboat; therefore this section cannot be used to invalidate such a purchase. Boone v. Cook, 365 S.W.2d 100, 1963 Ky. LEXIS 214 ( Ky. 1963 ) (Decision prior to 1978 amendment).

2. Authority of Agent.

The purchasing agent has the authority to purchase only such things as the fiscal court has ordered to be purchased. Gross v. Fiscal Court of Jefferson County, 225 Ky. 641 , 9 S.W.2d 1006, 1928 Ky. LEXIS 849 ( Ky. 1928 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

KRS 424.260 was intended to supersede any similar bidding provisions for local governmental units. OAG 76-496 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Political subdivision may purchase from federal government without taking bids, KRS 66.470 .

Purchases by city-county board of health, how made, KRS 212.460 .

68.175. Purchasing agent for county having city of second class. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 33; 1968, ch. 152, § 39; 1978, ch. 110, § 102) was repealed by Acts 1978, ch. 118, § 19, effective June 17, 1978.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

This section was also amended by Acts 1978, ch. 110, § 102. The later repeal by Acts 1978, ch. 118, § 19 prevails.

License Taxes

68.178. County license fee for off-site waste management facilities — Use of proceeds.

  1. The fiscal court of any county may license off-site waste management facilities located within the county with the imposition of a license fee at a percentage rate not to exceed two percent (2%) per annum of the gross receipts of such a waste management facility owned or operated by self-employed individuals, partnerships, or corporations. The proceeds from the license fee shall be used to defray the general revenue requirements of the county where the facility is located. For purposes of assessing the licensing fee provided for in this section, off-site waste management shall consist of establishing and operating a facility whose principal purpose is treatment, storage, disposal, or a combination of these activities but shall not include those treatment, storage, or disposal activities which occur incidental to or which are not otherwise distinguishable from a broader manufacturing operation at the site of said operation.
    1. The fiscal court of a county or the urban-county council of an urban-county government may license a solid waste landfill located within the county or urban-county area. The license fee may be set at not less than one cent ($0.01) but no more than fifty cents ($0.50) per ton of waste received by the landfill or set at up to five percent (5%) of gross receipts of the landfill. (2) (a) The fiscal court of a county or the urban-county council of an urban-county government may license a solid waste landfill located within the county or urban-county area. The license fee may be set at not less than one cent ($0.01) but no more than fifty cents ($0.50) per ton of waste received by the landfill or set at up to five percent (5%) of gross receipts of the landfill.
    2. The license fee as set may be increased by an amount up to one-quarter (1/4) of the base fee per ton or on gross receipts of waste received at the landfill which originates from outside of the planning area. For purposes of this section, planning area shall mean those areas within Kentucky as indicated in solid waste management plans filed with the cabinet by a county, multicounty area, or waste management district. However, before a fee differential may be imposed the county or urban-county government shall demonstrate that the differential is reasonably related to additional government services which must be undertaken because of the landfilling of nonplanning area waste. This demonstration may be made by showing an unplanned for reduction in waste disposal capacity and a need to provide for future disposal capacity or impacts on roads, litter control or emergency services.
    3. The proceeds from the license fee shall be used to defray the government services provided to the landfill, necessary clean-up operations or emergency responses related to operation of the landfill or transporting waste to the landfill, necessary maintenance, improvement or construction of roads, and for the general revenue requirements of the county or urban-county government where the landfill is located.
    4. Ten percent (10%) of the license fee shall be remitted annually in equal shares to all counties and urban-county governments in the planning area served by the landfill from where the fees originated which shall be used for local solid waste planning and plan implementation. Counties or urban-county governments desiring to impose the fee provided for herein are authorized to accept payments in lieu of the fee under duly-executed contracts between the county and the permitted site or facility. The fee provided for in this subsection shall be in lieu of the provisions of subsection (1). Special waste, as defined in KRS 224.50-760 , except for waste from sanitary wastewater treatment facilities, shall be exempt from this subsection.
  2. In the case of hazardous waste facilities involving land disposal, including a regional integrated waste treatment and disposal demonstration facility as defined in KRS Chapter 224, the rate levied under this section shall be not more than five percent (5%) per annum of the gross receipts and shall be calculated so as to produce sufficient revenue to compensate the county for any additional costs incurred by it from having a hazardous waste facility located in its jurisdiction, including, but not limited to, the loss of ad valorem property tax revenues from the property on which the facility is located, the loss of ad valorem property tax revenues from abutting properties or other affected properties, the cost of providing any additional emergency services, the cost of monitoring air, surface water, ground water to the extent that other monitoring data is not available, and other costs established as being associated with the facility and for which the county is not otherwise compensated.

History. Enact. Acts 1980, ch. 197, § 4, effective July 15, 1980; 1982, ch. 279, § 11, effective July 15, 1982; 1988, ch. 45, § 1, effective July 15, 1988; 2005, ch. 123, § 13, effective June 20, 2005.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Commerce Clause.

Since county’s increased license fee for out-of-area waste was directly in proportion to the amount of out-of-area waste the appellant imported, as mandated by this section, the Commerce Clause requirement of fair relation to benefits was satisfied. Carpenter v. Commonwealth, 831 S.W.2d 188, 1992 Ky. App. LEXIS 88 (Ky. Ct. App. 1992).

Where defendant did not allege any facts to support his claim that this section discriminated against interstate commerce on its face or in its effect, apart from the fact that he did not do business with any out-of-area waste generators who were located in Kentucky, clearly, this business practice was one of defendant’s own choosing and thus did not negate the applicability of his county out-of-area fee to any waste from Kentucky he might choose to import. Private parties cannot engineer Commerce Clause violations by voluntarily “gerrymandering” their business activities; if such were possible, a complainant could force a violation under a license fee scheme that was not higher for out-of-area waste, by simply choosing to do all his business with out-of-state generators and claiming that the five percent license fee discriminated against out-of-state waste. Carpenter v. Commonwealth, 831 S.W.2d 188, 1992 Ky. App. LEXIS 88 (Ky. Ct. App. 1992).

2. Compatibility with Subchapter 43 of KRS Chapter 224.

Since counties may regulate solid waste facilities, it follows that this section, which allows counties to assess license fees for solid waste landfills, is not inconsistent with Subchapter 43 of KRS Chapter 224. This conclusion is bolstered by a recent amendment to KRS 224.43-310 , which directs each governing body, beginning January 1, 1993, to report annually to the cabinet regarding, among other concerns, the fees assessed and collected for solid waste management. Carpenter v. Commonwealth, 831 S.W.2d 188, 1992 Ky. App. LEXIS 88 (Ky. Ct. App. 1992).

3. Double Taxation.

Assessment of local franchise tax under KRS 136.120 did not constitute double taxation when considered with the license fee authorized by this section; the former is a tax on tangible property, the latter a fee based on gross receipts. Cooksey Bros. Disposal Co. v. Boyd County, 973 S.W.2d 64, 1997 Ky. App. LEXIS 132 (Ky. Ct. App. 1997), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 930, 119 S. Ct. 338, 142 L. Ed. 2d 279, 1998 U.S. LEXIS 6495 (U.S. 1998).

Opinions of Attorney General.

While the county Fiscal Court cannot lawfully enact a license fee uniquely applicable to the operator of a specific incinerator operation, it may enact a license fee pursuant to subsection (1) of this section, generally applicable to off-site waste management facilities in the county. OAG 92-76 .

In order to guard against a claim of arbitrariness, a county ordinance imposing a license fee pursuant to subsection (1) of this section, must be drawn so as to address all off-site waste management facilities in the county, as distinguished from being expressly directed toward a single entity. OAG 92-76 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Stephens, Commencing the Decade With Environmental Reform: The 1980 Kentucky General Assembly Implements the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 69 Ky. L.J. 227 (1980-81).

Cox, What May States Do About Out-of-State Waste in Light of Recent Supreme Court Decisions Applying the Dormant Commerce Clause? Kentucky As Case Study in the Waste Wars, 83 Ky. L.J. 551 (1994-95).

68.180. Occupational license tax in counties containing 300,000 population — Exemptions from local fees and taxes — Regulation of ministers.

  1. The fiscal court of each county having a population of three hundred thousand (300,000) or more may by order or resolution impose license fees on franchises, provide for licensing any business, trade, occupation, or profession, and the using, holding, or exhibiting of any animal, article, or other thing.
  2. License fees on such business, trade, occupation, or profession for revenue purposes, except those of the common schools, shall be imposed at a percentage rate not to exceed one and one-fourth percent (1.25%) of:
    1. Salaries, wages, commissions, and other compensation earned by persons within the county for work done and services performed or rendered in the county; and
    2. The net profits of businesses, trades, professions, or occupations from activities conducted in the county.
    1. No public service company that pays an ad valorem tax shall be required to pay a license tax. (3) (a) No public service company that pays an ad valorem tax shall be required to pay a license tax.
      1. It is the intent of the General Assembly to continue the exemption from local license fees and occupational taxes that existed on the effective date of this section for providers of multichannel video programming services or communications services as defined in KRS 136.602 that were taxed under KRS 136.120 prior to January 1, 2006. (b) 1. It is the intent of the General Assembly to continue the exemption from local license fees and occupational taxes that existed on the effective date of this section for providers of multichannel video programming services or communications services as defined in KRS 136.602 that were taxed under KRS 136.120 prior to January 1, 2006.
      2. To further this intent, no company providing multichannel video programming services or communications services as defined in KRS 136.602 shall be required to pay a license tax. If only a portion of an entity’s business is providing multichannel video programming services or communications services, including products or services that are related to and provided in support of the multichannel video programming services or communications services, this exclusion applies only to that portion of the business that provides multichannel video programming services or communications services, including products or services that are related to and provided in support of the multichannel video programming services or communications services or communications services.
    2. No license tax shall be imposed upon or collected from any bank, trust company, combined bank and trust company, combined trust, banking and title business in this state, any savings and loan association, whether state or federally chartered.
    3. No license tax shall be imposed upon income received by members of the Kentucky National Guard for active duty training, unit training assemblies, and annual field training.
    4. No license tax shall be imposed upon income received by precinct workers for election training or work at election booths in state, county, and local primary, regular, or special elections.
    5. No license tax shall be imposed upon any profits, earnings, or distributions of an investment fund which would qualify under KRS 154.20-250 to 154.20-284 to the extent any profits, earnings, or distributions would not be taxable to an individual investor, or in other cases where the county is prohibited by law from imposing a license tax.
  3. The provisions and limitations of subsection (2) of this section shall not apply to license fees imposed for regulatory purposes as to form and amount, or to the license fees authorized by KRS 160.482 to 160.488 .
  4. Pursuant to this section, no fiscal court shall regulate any aspect of the manner in which any duly ordained, commissioned, or denominationally licensed minister of religion may perform his or her duties and activities as a minister of religion. Duly ordained, commissioned, or denominationally licensed ministers of religion shall be subject to the same license fees imposed on others in the county on salaries, wages, commissions, and other compensation earned for work done and services performed or rendered.

History. Enact. Acts 1960, ch. 80, § 1; 1965 (1st Ex. Sess.), ch. 2, § 23; 1976, ch. 104, § 1; 1976, ch. 301, § 2; 1990, ch. 476, Pt. IV, § 120, effective July 13, 1990; 1998, ch. 509, § 1, effective July 15, 1998; 2002, ch. 230, § 1, effective July 15, 2002; 2003, ch. 117, § 18, effective June 24, 2003; 2005, ch. 167, § 1, effective July 1, 2005; 2005, ch. 168, § 121, effective January 1, 2006.

Compiler’s Notes.

Section 10 of Acts 1998, ch. 509, provided that the 1998 amendments to this section “apply to tax years beginning after December 31, 1997.”

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(1/1/2006). This section was amended by 2005 Ky. Acts chs. 167 and 168, which do not appear to be in conflict and have been codified together.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

KRS 68.180 to 68.195 was not special legislation prohibited by Ky. Const., §§ 59 and 60 and did not violate the uniformity provisions of Ky. Const., §§ 171 and 181. Kupper v. Fiscal Court of Jefferson County, 346 S.W.2d 766, 1961 Ky. LEXIS 337 ( Ky. 1961 ).

Cited:

Commissioners of Sinking Fund v. Estate of Doyle, 573 S.W.2d 932, 1978 Ky. App. LEXIS 615 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Where, prior to January 1, 1965, the Kentucky department of agriculture did not withhold city and county occupational license taxes from employees employed in the city and county, neither the department nor Commonwealth was liable for taxes, interest or penalty for any prior period, and the city and county would have to look to the employees for any unpaid taxes. OAG 65-845 .

This section is a prohibition against a county fiscal court levying certain license fees, but there is no reference to a prohibition against the levying of a license tax against savings and loans by municipalities. OAG 76-708 .

In a county with a population of less than thirty thousand, a fiscal court can produce new or additional revenue other than that derived from the ordinary ad valorem tax rate by levying a license or occupational tax without a vote of the people if the county does not already have a general license or occupational tax. OAG 85-84 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

License taxes, KRS Ch. 137.

ALR

Dining room: application of occupation or license tax to one operating dining room, cafeteria, or beverage room incidental to other business. 13 A.L.R.2d 1362.

Interest on license tax refund or credit in absence of specific controlling statute. 88 A.L.R.2d 825-835, 840.

Payment of license taxes to prevent closing of, or interference with business as involuntary so as to permit recovery. 80 A.L.R.2d 1040.

Renting or leasing out real estate, validity and construction of license tax or fee, or business privilege or occupational tax on persons engaged in. 93 A.L.R.2d 1136.

Right to attack validity of statute, ordinance, or regulation relating to occupational or professional license as affected by applying for or securing, license. 65 A.L.R.2d 660.

Single or isolated transaction as falling within provisions of commercial or occupational licensing requirements. 93 A.L.R.2d 90.

Tort action, failure to obtain occupational or business license or permit as defense to. 13 A.L.R.2d 157.

Application of city ordinance requiring license for a laundry, to supplier of coin-operated laundry machines intended for use in apartment building. 65 A.L.R.3d 1296.

Failure of building and construction artisan or contractor to procure business or occupational license as affecting enforceability of contract or right of recovery for work done—modern cases. 44 A.L.R.4th 271.

68.185. Fiscal court’s function in collection and appropriation of tax.

  1. The fiscal court of each county having a population of three hundred thousand (300,000) or more may provide for the levy, assessment, and collection of the license fees authorized by KRS 68.180 and 160.482 to 160.488 , provide for the issuance and enforcement of licenses, and specify the county governmental purposes to which the revenue derived from license fees authorized by KRS 68.180 shall be applied.
  2. In making the provisions described in subsection (1), and without limiting them, the fiscal court may, by resolution or order, adopt reasonable rules or regulations requiring the preparation and filing of timely, accurate, and truthful returns, accounts, and license applications which will aid in the determination of the amount of the fee.

History. Enact. Acts 1960, ch. 80, § 2; 1964, ch. 111, § 1; 1965 (1st Ex. Sess.), ch. 2, § 24; 1990, ch. 476, Pt. IV, § 121, effective July 13, 1990.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

KRS 68.180 to 68.195 was not special legislation prohibited by Ky. Const., §§ 59 and 60 and did not violate the uniformity provisions of Ky. Const., §§ 171 and 181. Kupper v. Fiscal Court of Jefferson County, 346 S.W.2d 766, 1961 Ky. LEXIS 337 ( Ky. 1961 ).

2. Delegation of Authority.

The fiscal court could provide for the assessment and collection of the license fees by delegating that authority to the Sinking Fund of the City of Louisville. Commissioners of Sinking Fund v. Estate of Doyle, 573 S.W.2d 932, 1978 Ky. App. LEXIS 615 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).

68.190. Credit for payment of similar city tax.

Any amount paid to any city of the first class within such county as a license fee, for the same privilege and for the same period, shall be credited against the county license fee payable under subsections (1) and 2 of KRS 68.180 . Any amount paid to any other city within such county as a license fee, for the same privilege and for the same period, shall be credited against the county license fee payable under subsections (1) and 2 of KRS 68.180 , provided that such city, at least thirty (30) days prior to the beginning of any county fiscal year, has contracted with the fiscal court to contribute annually to the support of joint agencies of such county and one or more cities in the county, an amount which bears the same ratio to the annual appropriation made for such joint agencies by a city of the first class in the county, as the assessed valuations for county tax purposes, as determined by the property valuation administrator, of the real and tangible personal property, excluding franchises, located within the corporate limits of such other cities, respectively, bears to the same assessed valuations within a city of the first class in said county.

History. Enact. Acts 1960, ch. 80, § 3; 1965 (1st Ex. Sess.), ch. 2, § 2; repealed and reenact., Acts 1990, ch. 476, Pt. V, § 299, effective July 13, 1990; 2003, ch. 117, § 21, effective June 24, 2003.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1960, ch. 80, § 3; 1965 (1st Ex. Sess.), ch. 2, § 25) was repealed and reenacted by Acts 1990, ch. 476, Part V, § 299, effective July 13, 1990.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

KRS 68.180 to 68.195 was not special legislation prohibited by Ky. Const., §§ 59 and 60 and did not violate the uniformity provisions of Ky. Const., §§ 171 and 181. Kupper v. Fiscal Court of Jefferson County, 346 S.W.2d 766, 1961 Ky. LEXIS 337 ( Ky. 1961 ).

68.195. Construction of KRS 68.180 to 68.195.

  1. Nothing in KRS 68.180 to 68.195 shall be construed to repeal, amend, or affect in any way the provisions of KRS 243.060 .
  2. KRS 68.180 to 68.195 shall not in any wise repeal, amend, affect or apply to any existing statute exempting property from local taxation or fixing a special rate on proper classification or imposing a state tax which is declared to be in lieu of all local taxation, nor shall it be construed to authorize a county to require any company that pays both an ad valorem tax and a franchise tax to pay a license tax.
  3. KRS 68.180 to 68.195 shall not be construed as repealing KRS 91.200 , or 92.281 or any of the laws of the Commonwealth relating to the levy of license taxes, but shall be held and construed as ancillary and supplemental thereto.

History. Enact. Acts 1960, ch. 80, §§ 4 to 6, effective June 16, 1960.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

KRS 68.180 to 68.195 was not special legislation prohibited by Ky. Const., §§ 59 and 60 and did not violate the uniformity provisions of Ky. Const., §§ 171 and 181. Kupper v. Fiscal Court of Jefferson County, 346 S.W.2d 766, 1961 Ky. LEXIS 337 ( Ky. 1961 ).

68.197. License fees in counties of 30,000 or more — Exemptions from local fees and taxes — Regulation of ministers.

  1. The fiscal court of each county having a population of thirty thousand (30,000) or more may by ordinance impose license fees on franchises, provide for licensing any business, trade, occupation, or profession, and the using, holding, or exhibiting of any animal, article, or other thing.
  2. License fees on business, trade, occupation, or profession for revenue purposes, except those of the common schools, may be imposed at a percentage rate not to exceed one percent (1%) of:
    1. Salaries, wages, commissions, and other compensation earned by persons within the county for work done and services performed or rendered in the county;
    2. The net profits of self-employed individuals, partnerships, professional associations, or joint ventures resulting from trades, professions, occupations, businesses, or activities conducted in the county; and
    3. The net profits of corporations resulting from trades, professions, occupations, businesses, or activities conducted in the county.
  3. In order to reduce administrative costs and minimize paperwork for employers, employees, and businesses, the fiscal court may provide:
    1. For an annual fixed amount license fee which a person may elect to pay in lieu of reporting and paying the percentage rate as provided in this subsection on salaries, wages, commissions, and other compensation earned within the county for work done and services performed or rendered in the county; and
    2. For an annual fixed amount license fee which an individual, partnership, professional association, joint venture, or corporation may elect to pay in lieu of reporting and paying the percentage rate as provided in this subsection on net profits of businesses, trades, professions, or occupations from activities conducted in the county.
    1. Licenses imposed for regulatory purposes are not subject to limitations as to form and amount. (4) (a) Licenses imposed for regulatory purposes are not subject to limitations as to form and amount.
    2. No public service company that pays an ad valorem tax is required to pay a license tax.
      1. It is the intent of the General Assembly to continue the exemption from local license fees and occupational taxes that existed on January 1, 2006, for providers of multichannel video programming services or communications services as defined in KRS 136.602 that were taxed under KRS 136.120 prior to the effective date of this section. (c) 1. It is the intent of the General Assembly to continue the exemption from local license fees and occupational taxes that existed on January 1, 2006, for providers of multichannel video programming services or communications services as defined in KRS 136.602 that were taxed under KRS 136.120 prior to the effective date of this section.
      2. To further this intent, no company providing multichannel video programming services or communications services as defined in KRS 136.602 shall be required to pay a license tax. If only a portion of an entity’s business is providing multichannel video programming services including products or services that are related to and provided in support of the multichannel video programming services or communications services, this exclusion applies only to that portion of the business that provides multichannel video programming services or communications services, including products or services that are related to and provided in support of the multichannel video programming services or communications services.
    3. No license tax shall be imposed upon or collected from any insurance company except as provided in KRS 91A.080 , bank, trust company, combined bank and trust company, combined trust, banking, and title business in this state, or any savings and loan association whether state or federally chartered, or in other cases where the county is prohibited by law from imposing a license fee.
  4. No license fee shall be imposed or collected on income received by members of the Kentucky National Guard for active duty training, unit training assemblies, and annual field training, or on income received by precinct workers for election training or work at election booths in state, county, and local primary, regular, or special elections, or upon any profits, earnings, or distributions of an investment fund which would qualify under KRS 154.20-250 to 154.20-284 to the extent any profits, earnings, or distributions would not be taxable to an individual investor.
  5. Persons who pay a county license fee pursuant to this section and who also pay a license fee to a city contained in the county may, upon agreement between the county and the city, credit their city license fee against their county license fee. As used in this subsection, “city contained in the county” shall include a city that is in more than one (1) county.
  6. The provisions of subsection (6) of this section notwithstanding, effective with license fees imposed under the provisions of subsection (1) of this section on or after July 15, 1986, persons who pay a county license fee and a license fee to a city contained in the county shall be allowed to credit their city license fee against their county license fee. As used in this subsection, “city contained in the county” shall include a city that is in more than one (1) county.
  7. Notwithstanding any statute to the contrary, the provisions of subsection (7) of this section shall apply as follows from March 14, 2012, through July 15, 2014:
    1. Any set-off or credit of city license fees against county license fees that exists between a city and county as of March 15, 2012, shall remain in effect as it is on March 15, 2012; and
    2. The provisions of subsection (7) of this section shall not apply to a city and county unless both the city and the county have both levied and are collecting license fees on March 15, 2012.
  8. A county that enacted an occupational license fee under the authority of KRS 67.083 shall not be required to reduce its occupational tax rate when it is determined that the population of the county exceeds thirty thousand (30,000).
  9. Notwithstanding any statute to the contrary:
    1. In those counties where a license fee has been authorized by a public question approved by the voters, there shall be no credit of a city license fee against a county license fee except by agreement between the county and the city in accordance with subsection (6) of this section;
    2. Notwithstanding any provision of the KRS to the contrary, no taxpayer shall be refunded or credited for any overpayment of a license tax paid to any county to the extent the overpayment is attributable to or derives from this section as it existed at any time subsequent to July 15, 1986, and the taxpayer seeks a credit for a license tax paid to a city located within such county, if such refund claim or amended tax return claim was filed or perfected after November 18, 2004, except by agreement between the city and county in accordance with subsection (6) of this section;
    3. In those counties where a license fee has been authorized by a public question approved by the voters, the percentage rate of the license fee in effect on January 1, 2005, and any maximum salary limit upon which the license fee is calculated shall remained unchanged for subsequent fiscal years. A percentage rate higher than the percentage rate in effect on January 1, 2005, or any change in the maximum salary limit upon which a license fee is calculated shall be prohibited unless approved by the voters at a public referendum. The percentage rate of a license fee in such counties shall at no time exceed one percent (1%). Any question to be placed before the voters as a result of this paragraph shall be placed on the ballot at a regular election or nominating primary.
    4. This subsection shall have retroactive application; and
    5. If any provision of this subsection or the application thereof to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the invalidity shall not affect other provisions or application of this section that can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this subsection are severable.
  10. Pursuant to this section, no fiscal court shall regulate any aspect of the manner in which any duly ordained, commissioned, or denominationally licensed minister of religion may perform his or her duties and activities as a minister of religion. Duly ordained, commissioned, or denominationally licensed ministers of religion shall be subject to the same license fees imposed on others in the county on salaries, wages, commissions, and other compensation earned for work done and services performed or rendered.

History. Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 263, §§ 1, 2; 1968, ch. 152, § 40; 1974, ch. 113, § 1; 1976, ch. 301, § 3; 1978, ch. 268, § 1, effective June 17, 1978; 1986, ch. 131, § 1, effective July 15, 1986; 1990, ch. 481, § 2, effective July 13, 1990; 1998, ch. 509, § 2, effective July 15, 1998; 2000, ch. 425, § 1, effective July 14, 2000; 2002, ch. 230, § 2, effective July 15, 2002; 2003, ch. 117, § 19, effective June 24, 2003; 2005, ch. 79, § 1, effective March 16, 2005; 2005, ch. 167, § 2, effective July 1, 2005; 2005, ch. 168 § 122, effective January 1, 2006; 2006, ch. 168, § 2, effective July 12, 2006; 2012, ch. 110, § 18, effective April 11, 2012.

Compiler’s Notes.

Section 10 of Acts 1998, ch. 509, provided that the 1998 amendments to this section “apply to tax years beginning after December 31, 1997.”

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(7/12/2006). 2006 Ky. Acts ch. 168, sec. 3, provides that the amendments to KRS 68.197 in 2006 Ky. Acts ch. 168, sec. 2, shall apply retroactively to August 1, 2005.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Analysis

1. Occupational License Tax.

A county of less than 30,000 population has the legal authority to levy occupational license taxes (pursuant to 2003 amendment, now “fee”). Casey County Fiscal Court v. Burke, 743 S.W.2d 26, 1988 Ky. LEXIS 4 ( Ky. 1988 ).

County ordinance enacted in 2000 that increased occupational license fees from the level set in 1978 clearly “imposed” a fee “on or after July 15, 1986”; therefore, pursuant to KRS 68.197(4), city residents could credit their municipal fees against their county fees. However, this tax credit did not apply to the fee imposed in 1978, but only to the amount in which the tax was increased in 2000. City of Covington v. Kenton County, 149 S.W.3d 358, 2004 Ky. LEXIS 279 ( Ky. 2004 ).

For purposes of triggering the right, granted to city taxpayers by KRS 68.197(4), to credit their city occupational license fees against license fees imposed under the provisions of KRS 68.197(1) on or after July 15, 1986, a tax is “imposed” whenever the fiscal court enacts an ordinance requiring taxpayers to pay the tax, regardless of whether it is a new tax or an increase of an existing tax. City of Covington v. Kenton County, 149 S.W.3d 358, 2004 Ky. LEXIS 279 ( Ky. 2004 ).

County occupational license fee was properly approved by public question pursuant to KRS 68.197 because the ballot question met the requirements of KRS 83A.120 and 120.250 . Further, a taxpayer’s challenge was untimely under KRS 120.250 in that it was not brought within 30 days after the election. King v. Campbell County, 217 S.W.3d 862, 2006 Ky. App. LEXIS 331 (Ky. Ct. App. 2006).

County fiscal court’s ordinance that provided for disparate treatment of license fee payers based on whether they paid the license fee based on their net profit or wages earned was invalid to the extent of that disparate treatment; the authorizing statute, KRS 68.197(3), stated that employers, employees, and businesses should be treated alike and, thus, the county fiscal court could not enact an ordinance providing for such disparate treatment. Hardwick v. Boyd County Fiscal Court, 219 S.W.3d 198, 2007 Ky. App. LEXIS 85 (Ky. Ct. App. 2007).

2. — Retroactive Application of Amendments.

County’s occupational license fee ordinance and KRS 68.197 were constitutionally valid because when the fee was first imposed under a public question ballot, the county was not required to give taxpayers credit for city fees and retroactive restoration of that provision had legitimate purpose and did not violate due process under the Kentucky Constitution or KRS 446.080 . King v. Campbell County, 217 S.W.3d 862, 2006 Ky. App. LEXIS 331 (Ky. Ct. App. 2006).

Amendments to KRS 68.197 retroactively restoring a provision that two (2) counties were not required to give taxpayers credit for city occupational license fees paid did not violate Ky. Const. § 59 as a local or special act because there were distinctive and natural reasons setting those two (2) counties apart from other counties such that a legitimate legislative purpose to relieve threatened fiscal hardship was served by requiring the latter counties to credit the fees but relieving the former counties from the requirement. The fees were authorized for the two (2) counties pursuant to a public question ballot approved by the voters and thus was a legitimate and unique classification. King v. Campbell County, 217 S.W.3d 862, 2006 Ky. App. LEXIS 331 (Ky. Ct. App. 2006).

Retroactive application of an amendment to KRS 68.197 did not amount to a legislative encroachment upon judicial power in violation of the separation of powers of Ky. Const. §§ 27 and 28. A taxpayer’s right to a tax refund under an occupational license fee ordinance had not vested through a final judgment, and thus the General Assembly’s retroactive amendment of a law applicable to his pending case did not encroach upon judicial power in violation of the separation of powers provision. King v. Campbell County, 217 S.W.3d 862, 2006 Ky. App. LEXIS 331 (Ky. Ct. App. 2006).

3. Unremitted Tax.

Based on the enactment of Ky. H.B. 524, it is clear that the Kentucky Legislature intended for the remedy in KRS 91A.080 (7) to be the exclusive remedy for all disputes after July 15, 2008. KRS 68.197(4)(d) is strongly indicative of the fact that the Legislature intended for the remedy in KRS 91A.080 to be the exclusive remedy for the county to collect unremitted tax revenue from an insurance company. Franklin County v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100150 (E.D. Ky. Dec. 11, 2008).

Even prior to the enactment of H.B. 524, the exclusive remedy available to local governments seeking to collect unremitted tax revenue was through KRS 91A.080 because H.B. 524 both amended KRS 91A.080 and enacted KRS 91A.0804 and, if the County was allowed to collect taxes against insurers through an action in federal court, the admonition in KRS 68.197(4)(d) would have been meaningless. Franklin County v. Am. Int'l S. Ins. Co., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101383 (E.D. Ky. Dec. 16, 2008).

Cited:

Russell County Fiscal Court v. Kelley, 823 S.W.2d 941, 1991 Ky. App. LEXIS 133 (Ky. Ct. App. 1991); City of Barbourville v. Knox County Fiscal Court, 80 S.W.3d 765, 2001 Ky. App. LEXIS 75 (Ky. Ct. App. 2001); Franklin County v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., — F. Supp. 2d —, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104974 (E.D. Ky. 2008 ).

Notes to Unpublished Decisions

Analysis

1. Unremitted Tax.

Unpublished decision: Plaintiff county’s action to recover taxes it claimed were owed by defendant insurance companies was properly dismissed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) because the county’s exclusive remedy for the alleged underpayment was an administrative proceeding before the Kentucky Office of Insurance; the administrative-examination procedures of former KRS § 91A.080(7)(c), which were applicable to the county’s action, afforded a civil remedy sufficient to overcome the default presumption that a private cause of action would lie under KRS 446.070 . Franklin County v. Travelers Prop. Cas. Ins. Co. of Am., 368 Fed. Appx. 669, 2010 FED App. 0149N, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 5242 (6th Cir. Ky. 2010 ).

Unpublished decision: Plaintiff county’s action to recover taxes it claimed were owed by defendant insurance companies was properly dismissed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) because the county’s exclusive remedy for the alleged underpayment was an administrative proceeding before the Kentucky Office of Insurance; the administrative-examination procedures of former KRS § 91A.080(7)(c), which were applicable to the county’s action, afforded a civil remedy sufficient to overcome the default presumption that a private cause of action would lie under KRS 446.070 . Franklin County v. Travelers Prop. Cas. Ins. Co. of Am., 368 Fed. Appx. 669, 2010 FED App. 0149N, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 5242 (6th Cir. Ky. 2010 ).

2. Licensing Requirements.

Unpublished decision: Where plaintiff, after pleading guilty to violating a county government’s anti-peddling ordinance for his conduct in attempting to sell university basketball tickets to two undercover officers outside of the university’s sporting arena, sued the government under 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983, alleging that his right to free speech was violated, his reliance upon KRS 68.197 for the proposition that a city could only impose a license fee upon businesses, trade, occupations, and professions was misplaced. The statute actually defined the power of the fiscal court of a county with more than 30,000 persons to provide for licensing any business, trade, occupation, or profession; it did not, therefore, indicate any limitation on local regulation of peddling. Wilson v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Gov't, 201 Fed. Appx. 317, 2006 FED App. 0752N, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 25617 (6th Cir. Ky. 2006 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

The general rule is that where the statute fails to prescribe the form in which the question shall be submitted, it is sufficient to identify the subject matter and show its purpose. OAG 78-570 .

If the fiscal court desires to impose an occupational or license tax, and the tax question receives a majority vote of acceptance at election, then under KRS 68.198 the fiscal court may appropriately specify the county governmental purposes to which the revenue derived from the tax shall be applied. OAG 78-664 (Opinion prior to 1986 amendment).

A county cannot impose an occupational license tax (pursuant to 2003 amendment, now “fee”) only on fire and casualty insurance companies; such a tax must be uniform on all such insurance businesses in the county and must be fairly and equitably intergrated with a county occupational or license tax applying to occupations, trades and professions generally. OAG 79-301 .

A county ordinance which levies a license or occupational tax (pursuant to 2003 amendment, now “fee”) on coal producers engaged in the extractive business enterprise of coal production would be constitutional, provided that the license or occupational tax as applied to coal producers is fairly and equitably integrated with a general county occupational or license tax applying to an over-all occupational or license tax. OAG 79-385 .

A fiscal court may, in lieu of the percentage rate applied against wages and profits, provide for an annual fixed amount license fee. OAG 79-385 .

Where county has less than 30,000 population, the fiscal court can enact a general license tax (pursuant to 2003 amendment, now “fee”) without a vote of the people. OAG 80-302 .

The fiscal court may, under this section, impose an occupational license tax (pursuant to 2003 amendment, now “fee”) on itinerant businesses, provided they are regularly engaged in such retail business activity within county boundaries, and provided that such tax is integrated with a general county occupational license tax applying to occupations, trades, and professions generally, throughout all of the county, and which may include municipal territory. OAG 82-543 .

In a county with a population of less than thirty thousand, a fiscal court can produce new or additional revenue other than that derived from the ordinary ad valorem tax rate by levying a license or occupational tax (pursuant to 2003 amendment, now “fee”) without a vote of the people if the county does not already have a general license or occupational tax. OAG 85-84 .

When a county of over 30,000 population levies an occupational tax (pursuant to 2003 amendment, now “fee”), the county must credit tax payments made to a city; but a county of under 30,000 population levying an identical tax need not extend such a credit. OAG 91-157 .

Because KRS 67A.060 authorizes urban county governments to exercise the constitutional and statutory powers of cities of the highest class within the county, an urban county, in imposing an occupational tax (pursuant to 2003 amendment, now “fee”), is not bound by the 1% limit set forth in this section. OAG 94-6 .

68.198. Fiscal court powers as to imposition of license tax (counties of 30,000).

  1. The fiscal court of said counties may provide for the levy, the assessment and the collection of the license fees authorized by KRS 68.197 , provide for the issuance and enforcement of licenses, and specify the county governmental purposes to which the revenue derived from license fees authorized by KRS 68.197 shall be applied.
  2. In making the provisions described in subsection (1), and without limiting them, the fiscal court may, by resolution or order adopt reasonable rules or regulations requiring the preparation and filing of timely, accurate, and truthful returns, accounts, and license applications which will aid in the determination of the amount of the fee.

History. Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 263, § 3.

Opinions of Attorney General.

If fiscal court desires to impose an occupational or license tax, and the tax question receives a majority vote of acceptance at the election held pursuant to subsection (3) of KRS 68.197 , then under this section the fiscal court may appropriately specify the county governmental purposes to which the revenue derived from the tax shall be applied. OAG 78-664 (Opinion prior to 1986 amendment of KRS 68.197 ).

68.199. County that attains population of 30,000 — Credit against occupational license fee — Voluntary credit — New fee or increase in fee.

  1. Notwithstanding the provisions of KRS 68.197(7), a county that enacts an occupational license fee under the authority of KRS 67.083 prior to attaining a population of thirty thousand (30,000) shall not be required to allow a credit against the county occupational license fee for an occupational license fee paid to a city within the county when it is determined that the population of the county exceeds thirty thousand (30,000).
  2. If prior to July 15, 2002, a county voluntarily granted a credit against the county occupational license fee under the terms of an ordinance, interlocal agreement, or other agreement with a city, the county shall not eliminate the credit after it is determined that the population of the county exceeds thirty thousand (30,000).
  3. After July 15, 2002, a county that enacts a new county occupational license fee or increases a county occupational license fee, after it is determined that the county population exceeds thirty thousand (30,000), shall be required to allow the credit against the city fee required by KRS 68.197(7) to the extent of the increase or new fee.
  4. For purposes of this section, the county population shall be determined based only on the official decennial census by the United States Bureau of the Census.

History. Enact. Acts 2002, ch. 161, § 1, effective July 15, 2002; 2003, ch. 117, § 22, effective June 24, 2003.

68.200. License fee on retailers who rent out motor vehicles in counties containing a designated city, consolidated local government, or urban-county government — Use of proceeds. [Effective until July 15, 2020]

  1. As used in this section, unless the context clearly indicates otherwise:
    1. Motor vehicle means “vehicle” as defined in KRS 186.010(8)(a);
    2. Retailer means “retailer” as defined in KRS 139.010 ; and
    3. Gross rental charge means “gross rental charge” as defined in KRS 138.462(4).
  2. A county containing a designated city, consolidated local government, or urban-county government may levy a license fee on the rental of motor vehicles which shall not exceed three percent (3%) of the gross rental charges from rental agreements for periods of thirty (30) days or less. The license fee shall apply to retailers who receive more than seventy-five percent (75%) of their gross revenues generated in the county from gross rental charges. Any license fee levied pursuant to this subsection shall be collected by the retailer from the renters of the motor vehicles.
  3. Revenues from rental of motor vehicles shall not be included in the gross rental charges on which the license fee is based if:
    1. The declared gross weight of the motor vehicle exceeds eleven thousand (11,000) pounds; or
    2. The rental is part of the services provided by a funeral director for a funeral; or
    3. The rental is exempted from the state sales and use tax pursuant to KRS 139.470 .
  4. A fiscal court or the legislative body of an urban-county government shall provide for collection of the license fee in the ordinance by which the license fee is levied. The revenues shall be deposited in an account to be known as the motor vehicle license fee account. The revenues may be shared among local governments pursuant to KRS 65.245 .
  5. The county shall use the proceeds of the license fee for economic development activities. It shall distribute semiannually, by June 30 and December 31, all revenues not shared pursuant to KRS 65.245 , to one (1) or more of the following entities if it has established, or contracted with, the entity for the purposes of economic development and is satisfied that the entity is promoting satisfactorily the county’s economic development activities:
    1. A riverport authority established by the county pursuant to KRS 65.520 ; or
    2. An industrial development authority established by the county pursuant to KRS 154.50-316 ; or
    3. A nonprofit corporation as defined in KRS 273.161(4) which has been organized for the purpose of promoting economic development. The entity shall make a written request for funds from the motor vehicle license fee account by May 31 and November 30, respectively.
    1. As used in this section, “designated city” means a city on the registry maintained by the Department for Local Government under this subsection. (6) (a) As used in this section, “designated city” means a city on the registry maintained by the Department for Local Government under this subsection.
    2. On or before January 1, 2015, the Department for Local Government shall create and maintain a registry of cities that, as of August 1, 2014, were classified as cities of the first, second, and third class. The Department for Local Government shall make the information included on the registry available to the public by publishing it on its Web site.

History. Enact. Acts 1994, ch. 426, § 1, effective July 15, 1994; 2008, ch. 95, § 17, effective August 1, 2008; 2013, ch. 113, § 3, effective June 25, 2013; 2014, ch. 92, § 40, effective January 1, 2015.

Compiler’s Notes.

For this section as effective until January 1, 2015, see the preceding section also numbered KRS 68.200 .

68.200. License fee on retailers who rent out motor vehicles in counties containing a designated city, consolidated local government, or urban-county government — Use of proceeds. [Effective July 15, 2020]

  1. As used in this section, unless the context clearly indicates otherwise:
    1. Motor vehicle means “vehicle” as defined in KRS 186.010(8)(a);
    2. Retailer means “retailer” as defined in KRS 139.010 ; and
    3. Gross rental charge means “gross rental charge” as defined in KRS 138.462 .
  2. A county containing a designated city, consolidated local government, or urban-county government may levy a license fee on the rental of motor vehicles which shall not exceed three percent (3%) of the gross rental charges from rental agreements for periods of thirty (30) days or less. The license fee shall apply to retailers who receive more than seventy-five percent (75%) of their gross revenues generated in the county from gross rental charges. Any license fee levied pursuant to this subsection shall be collected by the retailer from the renters of the motor vehicles.
  3. Revenues from rental of motor vehicles shall not be included in the gross rental charges on which the license fee is based if:
    1. The declared gross weight of the motor vehicle exceeds eleven thousand (11,000) pounds; or
    2. The rental is part of the services provided by a funeral director for a funeral; or
    3. The rental is exempted from the state sales and use tax pursuant to KRS 139.470 .
  4. A fiscal court or the legislative body of an urban-county government shall provide for collection of the license fee in the ordinance by which the license fee is levied. The revenues shall be deposited in an account to be known as the motor vehicle license fee account. The revenues may be shared among local governments pursuant to KRS 65.210 to 65.300 .
  5. The county shall use the proceeds of the license fee for economic development activities. It shall distribute semiannually, by June 30 and December 31, all revenues not shared pursuant to KRS 65.210 to 65.300 , to one (1) or more of the following entities if it has established, or contracted with, the entity for the purposes of economic development and is satisfied that the entity is promoting satisfactorily the county’s economic development activities:
    1. A riverport authority established by the county pursuant to KRS 65.520 ; or
    2. An industrial development authority established by the county pursuant to KRS 154.50-316 ; or
    3. A nonprofit corporation as defined in KRS 273.161(4) which has been organized for the purpose of promoting economic development. The entity shall make a written request for funds from the motor vehicle license fee account by May 31 and November 30, respectively.
    1. As used in this section, “designated city” means a city on the registry maintained by the Department for Local Government under this subsection. (6) (a) As used in this section, “designated city” means a city on the registry maintained by the Department for Local Government under this subsection.
    2. On or before January 1, 2015, the Department for Local Government shall create and maintain a registry of cities that, as of August 1, 2014, were classified as cities of the first, second, and third class. The Department for Local Government shall make the information included on the registry available to the public by publishing it on its Web site.

HISTORY: 2020 ch. 98, § 13, effective July 15, 2020.

68.202. License fee on cable television systems in counties containing a designated city — Use of proceeds.

  1. A county containing a designated city may levy a license fee not to exceed two percent (2%) on the gross receipts of all cable television systems within its boundaries, including systems franchised by cities within the county.
  2. The fiscal court shall provide for collection of the license fee in the ordinance by which the license fee is levied. The revenues shall be deposited in an account to be known as the cable television license fee account.
  3. The county shall use the proceeds of the license fee only to provide teleconferencing facilities and equipment and television production services, equipment, and facilities pursuant to an arrangement with the Kentucky Authority for Educational Television, as specifically authorized by the General Assembly.
  4. A county which has adopted the license fee authorized by subsection (1) of this section, and any cities within the county, shall not levy a franchise fee exceeding three percent (3%) of the gross receipts of its franchised cable television system.
    1. As used in this section, “designated city” means a city on the registry maintained by the Department for Local Government pursuant to this subsection. (5) (a) As used in this section, “designated city” means a city on the registry maintained by the Department for Local Government pursuant to this subsection.
    2. On or before January 1, 2015, the Department for Local Government shall create and maintain a registry of cities that, as of August 1, 2014, were classified as cities of the second class. The Department for Local Government shall make the information included on the registry available to the public by publishing it on its Web site.

History. Enact. Acts 1994, ch. 426, § 2, effective July 15, 1994; 2014, ch. 92, § 41, effective January 1, 2015.

Compiler’s Notes.

For this section as effective until January 1, 2015, see the preceding section also numbered KRS 68.202 .

County Budget

68.210. Administration of county uniform budget system — Review — Revision.

The administration of the county uniform budget system shall be under the supervision of the state local finance officer who may inspect and shall supervise the administration of accounts and financial operations and shall prescribe and shall install, by July 1, 1985, a system of uniform accounts for all counties and county officials. Subsequent to every regular and extraordinary session of the General Assembly he shall review the county uniform budget system to determine if it is consistent with state law and generally accepted accounting practices. If he finds the system to be inconsistent with state law or to contain obsolete accounting practices, he shall revise it accordingly. He may require all officials of all local governments and local taxing districts to submit such financial reports as he may deem proper. He may investigate, examine, and supervise the accounts and operations of all local governments and local government officers. This section does not impose upon or transfer to the state local finance officer any post audit functions.

History. 938q-1, 1851c-7, 4114h-2: amend. Acts 1960, ch. 68, Art. V, § 5; 1974, ch. 74, Art. II, § 9(1); 1974, ch. 254, § 12; 1978, ch. 155, § 61, effective June 17, 1978; 1984, ch. 14, § 2, effective July 13, 1984.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Construction.

KRS 68.210 to 68.370 (KRS 68.370 now repealed) mandatorily provide a uniform county budget system, under which each county must submit its proposed annual budget to the state local finance officer for approval. State Property & Bldg. Com. v. Hays, 346 S.W.2d 3, 1961 Ky. LEXIS 277 ( Ky. 1961 ).

Cited:

Lyon v. Bell, 275 Ky. 69 , 120 S.W.2d 752, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 366 ( Ky. 1938 ); Marcum v. Robinson, 279 Ky. 445 , 130 S.W.2d 826, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 295 ( Ky. 1939 ); Fulton County Fiscal Court v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 285 Ky. 17 , 146 S.W.2d 15, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 591 ( Ky. 1940 ); Nichols v. Henry, 301 Ky. 434 , 191 S.W.2d 930, 1945 Ky. LEXIS 746 , 168 A.L.R. 1385 ( Ky. 1945 ); Griffin v. Clay County, 304 Ky. 592 , 201 S.W.2d 733, 1947 Ky. LEXIS 684 ( Ky. 1947 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

A contract entered into by the fiscal court for delivery of a piece of equipment during the current fiscal year but for which the first payment would be deferred until the next fiscal year would be void where the budget for the year in which payment would be made had not been approved when the contract was made. OAG 61-408 .

County may use revenue sharing funds for the purpose of renting or purchasing automobiles to be used by the sheriff’s office for law enforcement if the item is properly budgeted. OAG 74-189 .

Since the new system of uniform accounting and standard bookkeeping procedures for all counties and county officials was to be established by January, 1975, the installation of the new system of auditing of county officials called for by KRS 64.810 and 43.070 was mandatorily required as of January, 1975, and not before. OAG 76-51 .

If the department for local government’s investigation and supervision of a county’s fiscal affairs discloses the possible commission of crime on the part of those local officials responsible for carrying on the fiscal affairs of the county, the department should disclose it to the local prosecutorial officers, for any action they deem proper, including possible prosecutions under KRS 61.170 or KRS Chapter 522. OAG 80-139 .

If a county volunteer fire department is a unit of the county government, rather than an independent unit disassociated from county government, then the funds received by the fire department in connection with fire services it has rendered should be deposited with the county treasurer pursuant to KRS 68.020 and expended in the discretion of the fiscal court pursuant to the budgetary provisions of KRS 68.210 to 68.360 . OAG 81-218 .

The state local finance officer has no authority to “cut” or reduce any validly fixed salaries, as a county debt, but he does have the authority to monitor and arrange the payment schedules of such obligations until the budget is on a sound and going basis. OAG 82-159 .

Where tie vote of the fiscal court defeated the final adoption of the budget, the county would be without a budget until one is finally adopted. OAG 88-45 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Revenue Cabinet, powers as to county finance, KRS 131.030 , 131.130 , 131.140 .

Kentucky Law Journal.

Ragan, State Supervision of County Finance in Kentucky, 55 Ky. L.J. 132 (1966).

68.220. Uniform county budget system.

The fiscal affairs of each county, except those pertaining to education, shall be administered by the fiscal court under a uniform budget system. The county budget shall provide for all the funds to be expended by the county from current revenue for each fiscal year. The state local finance officer shall classify the counties for budget purposes upon the basis of their populations and expenditures, or upon some other proper basis, and may classify them in the same manner for the purpose of prescribing accounts.

History. 938q-18, 1851c-1, 1851c-6: amend. Acts 1962, ch. 25, § 8; 1978, ch. 155, § 62, effective June 17, 1978.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Excess Claims.

Any appropriation or claim allowed by the fiscal court in excess of any budget fund is null and void. Noble v. Combs, 273 Ky. 578 , 117 S.W.2d 579, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 684 ( Ky. 1938 ).

2. Amendment of Budget.

Fiscal court could amend budget to meet hiatus caused by change from calendar year to fiscal year. Jefferson County Fiscal Court v. Jefferson County, 257 Ky. 507 , 78 S.W.2d 324, 1934 Ky. LEXIS 565 ( Ky. 1934 ).

3. Supervision of Expenditures.

The fiscal court is not required to turn over to the jailer for his uncontrolled expenditure sums appropriated to enable him to perform the duties imposed by KRS 67.130 , and may properly reserve supervision of major expenditures under budget plan requiring jailer to present accounts to court for approval and payment. Ball v. Scott, 281 Ky. 449 , 136 S.W.2d 48, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 44 ( Ky. 1940 ).

4. Defense to Claims Against Budget.

In action to compel fiscal court to pay plaintiff’s claim for services rendered as circuit court reporter, answer alleging that the amount budgeted for reporting services for the year in which plaintiff’s services were rendered had been expended, that plaintiff’s claim was in excess of the amount budgeted, and that there was not sufficient present or anticipated revenue to pay all debts and also meet current expenses, stated a good defense, on which defendants were entitled to a hearing. Marcum v. Robinson, 279 Ky. 445 , 130 S.W.2d 826, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 295 ( Ky. 1939 ).

Cited:

Lyon v. Bell, 275 Ky. 69 , 120 S.W.2d 752, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 366 ( Ky. 1938 ); Fulton County Fiscal Court v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 285 Ky. 17 , 146 S.W.2d 15, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 591 ( Ky. 1940 ).

68.230. County budget commission. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (1851c-2, 1851c-4: amend. Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 20, § 6; 1978, ch. 384, § 155) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 19, § 11, effective July 15, 1980.

68.240. Proposed budget — Contents — Duties of fiscal court.

  1. The county judge/executive shall annually prepare a proposed budget for the expenditure of all funds, including those from state and federal sources, which are to be expended by the fiscal court in the next fiscal year. The proposed budget shall be classified into budget units as outlined in subsection (2) of this section. In addition to preparing a reasonable estimate of the funds actually needed for both general and special purposes, the county judge/executive shall prepare an estimated statement of receipts to be anticipated from local, state and federal sources. The county judge/executive shall submit the proposed budget and estimate of receipts to the fiscal court by May 1 of each year.
  2. The fiscal court, at a meeting or meetings held not later than June 1 of each year, shall make a detailed investigation of each separate activity of the county for which the county judge/executive proposes that county funds are to be expended by the fiscal court. All expenditures shall be classified into budget units as prescribed by the state local finance officer, including but not limited to:
    1. General expenses of county government.
    2. Protection to persons and property.
    3. General health and sanitation.
    4. Social services.
    5. Recreation and culture.
    6. Transportation facilities and services.
    7. Debt service.
    8. Administration and miscellaneous.
    9. Jail operations.
  3. The county budget shall have a fund known as the “sinking fund principal account” and a fund known as the “sinking fund interest account.” There shall be allocated annually to the sinking fund principal account a sum equal to the proportional yearly amount necessary to retire each bond issue of the county at maturity, and to the sinking fund interest account a sum equal to the interest on bonded indebtedness payable during the current budget year.
  4. The county budget shall include such budget units as may be required by the activities of the county. When necessary, the county budget may be subdivided into separate budget funds so that the cost of each class of expenditures can be ascertained at any time and regulated according to the financial condition and needs of the county.
  5. The funds set apart in the county budget for a budget unit, or any subdivision thereof, shall constitute a separate budget fund and shall be appropriated and accounted for separately.
  6. The fiscal court shall comment upon the proposed budget, and may amend it according to its desires prior to the date when it is sent to the state local finance officer according to the procedures of KRS 68.250 .

History. 1951c-3, 1951c-6: amend. Acts 1965 (1st Ex. Sess.), ch. 2, § 8, subsecs. (1) to (5); 1978, ch. 197, § 3, effective January 1, 1979; 1979 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 22, § 2, effective May 12, 1979; 1980, ch. 19, § 1, effective July 15, 1980; 1984, ch. 14, § 3, effective July 13, 1984; 1984, ch. 141, § 5, effective July 13, 1984; 1988, ch. 328, § 5, effective April 9, 1988.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Bonds.

The imperative law of the Constitution and the statutes requiring that local legislative bodies issuing bonds provide by taxation to be collected annually throughout the life of a bonded indebtedness a sum sufficient to amortize the debt and pay it as it becomes due applies alike to bonds issued by authority of a special referendum vote and to bonds issued by resolution order or ordinance of a local legislative body to fund a valid floating debt. Fulton County Fiscal Court v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 285 Ky. 17 , 146 S.W.2d 15, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 591 ( Ky. 1940 ).

2. Expenditures.
3. — Obligatory.

No fiscal court may emasculate a positive requirement of law to appropriate for a specific purpose by making such encumbrances of a noncompulsory but permissive variety as to exclude or squeeze out an expenditure that it is under an obligation to meet. Clinton County Farm Bureau v. Clinton County Fiscal Court, 339 S.W.2d 930, 1960 Ky. LEXIS 491 ( Ky. 1960 ).

4. — Priority.

Fiscal court is under strict duty to see that all obligations that are essential are adequately provided for and it is only after such matters are taken care of that expenditures of a type that are legally allowable but not compulsory or indispensable may in the fiscal court’s discretion be included in the budget. Clinton County Farm Bureau v. Clinton County Fiscal Court, 339 S.W.2d 930, 1960 Ky. LEXIS 491 ( Ky. 1960 ).

5. Salary Reductions.

The plain meaning of KRS 441.245(4) (now (3)) mandates that a jailer’s salary remain the same from year to year, with adjustments permitted solely for changes in the consumer price index; in light of this section, a county fiscal court did not have the authority to reduce a jailer’s salary. Wallace v. King, 973 S.W.2d 485, 1998 Ky. App. LEXIS 59 (Ky. Ct. App. 1998).

Cited:

Kenton County v. Covington, 302 Ky. 503 , 195 S.W.2d 93, 1946 Ky. LEXIS 714 ( Ky. 1946 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Claims of the jailer for dieting prisoners and for supplies for use in keeping the jail and county building are in the category of governmental expense and are entitled to priority in payment from current funds over the payment of permissive claims from the annual budget fund, and they are preferred and until paid the fiscal court cannot validly pay any debts or other claims. OAG 63-734 .

If a fiscal court operates on a properly classified budget, such as to include a reasonable fund for prior year claims, and if the payment, out of a current budget, for prior year claims does not exceed such proper budget fund, then such payment of claims would be valid, provided the gross expenditures conform to the requirements of KRS 68.110 and 68.310 , but any substantial departure from this procedure would constitute illegal payment of claims. OAG 64-599 .

The action of a magistrate of the fiscal court in procuring or contracting for road and bridge work, such as to exceed the budget or appropriations provided therefor, would be illegal, and the county would not be financially or otherwise bound by such acts. OAG 64-881 .

The only way a city may obtain additional revenue is to increase the tax rate by not more than ten percent after proper notice and hearing in conformity with this section. OAG 65-722 .

Where in settling with the fiscal court the sheriff only withheld $8400 for 1964 instead of $9600, the 1964 settlement with the county should be reopened and the county should pay the $1200 to the sheriff out of an appropriate budgeted fund. OAG 65-75 .

Since summoning of jurors to serve for county and quarterly courts constitutes a necessary governmental expense, the fiscal court and the county budget commission have the responsibility for providing a budget fund to cover such expenses. OAG 66-99 .

A fiscal court can make expenditures for relief of the sick and indigent as properly budgeted items for that purpose, but the total amount budgeted must depend on the county’s financial ability. OAG 70-91 .

Expenditures for roads and bridges are part of the county budget which must be proposed by the budget commission as a body and acted upon by the fiscal court and there is nothing that authorizes the county judge (now county judge/executive) to act by himself or unilaterally in budgeting the county road fund and if such procedure is not followed, such action is illegal. OAG 73-373 .

The $100 monthly expenses paid to magistrates pursuant to KRS 64.258 (now repealed) is not compensation under KRS 64.530 and such payment is permissible where it is properly budgeted under KRS ch. 68, the amounts paid to each justice are equal and the county has sufficient funds in the county treasury after governmental necessities have been provided for. OAG 74-113 .

County may use revenue sharing funds for the purpose of renting or purchasing automobiles to be used by the sheriff’s office for law enforcement if the item is properly budgeted. OAG 74-189 .

An administrative code provision suggesting six different magisterial districts for purposes of accounting and budgeting violates subsection (2)(d) of this section, requiring a budget unit of highways and bridges which suggests a highways and bridges account, i.e., one account. OAG 79-238 (Opinion prior to 1984 amendment).

Subsection (2)(d) of this section is in harmony with case holdings that repair and maintenance of county roads is within the sound discretion of the fiscal court as a body. OAG 79-238 (Opinion prior to 1984 amendment).

Nothing in the budget statutes authorizes the fiscal court to place a provision in the administrative code requiring the budget commission to divide the road maintenance money equally into six (6) magisterial districts. OAG 79-238 .

When the budget commission approves a proposed budget, a copy is forwarded to the fiscal court for comment after which the commission is required to amend the proposed budget, according to the desires of fiscal court and then forward it to the state local finance officer for approval as to form and classification. OAG 79-238 .

The use of county funds, personnel or equipment to improve or maintain private drives or lanes is illegal and unconstitutional. OAG 79-343 .

The revenue from an occupational license tax may be spent on any statutorily authorized county purpose. OAG 79-374 .

Since the fiscal affairs of the county, including the final adoption of the budget, are squarely on the shoulders of the fiscal court as a body, the county judge/executive and his staff have the duty to employ all reasonable means of furnishing needed fiscal information to the other commissioners, and the county judge/executive should answer all reasonable requests for information by the commissioners prior to the May 24 deadline for submitting the budget to the fiscal court, because the fiscal court must act on the budget by July 1 and five weeks is not a sufficient period to review the proposed budget in detail. OAG 80-344 .

The mere inclusion in the county budget of enough money to allow for a salary adjustment for the county judge/executive is not enough to effectuate the salary adjustment, because the budget is merely a document providing appropriation for potential expenditure; the actual allotment and final appropriation and expenditure of county treasury funds requires a specific and formal order or resolution of fiscal court. OAG 80-438 .

Adoption of a proposed budget by the fiscal court need not be preceded by a line item discussion of the proposed budget. OAG 82-91 .

Under the statutory powers given counties in KRS 67.083(3)(d) and subdivision (2)(e) of this section, a fiscal court has the authority to contract in connection with the maintenance of hospital operations, provided that no constitutional nor statutory section is violated, and such authority exists even though the hospital function, when assumed by the county, is not governmental, but is a function which may or may not be exercised by fiscal court. Once a county decided to establish a county hospital, it became a county function for general purposes. OAG 82-446 (Opinion prior to 1984 amendment).

Where a county, in order to fund an operating deficit of the county hospital, proposed to enter into an obligation in the form of notes payable solely and only out of a “special fund,” i.e., the revenues of the county hospital and, although the notes would probably be set up in terms of one year obligations, it would be the intention of the county and the hospital, on the one hand, and the owners of the notes on the other hand, to renegotiate the contract each year for a period of seven (7) years with a continually decreasing total such that the entire obligation would be paid in seven (7) years time, and where the notes would declare on their face that payment would be made solely and only from the revenues of the hospital and that the county would have no obligation, directly or indirectly, to pay the notes from the county treasury or budgeted funds of the county, such proposed loan would not violate Ky. Const., § 157 and would be legal. OAG 82-446 .

Any county budget not reflecting the essentials required in this section is not a legal budget and the publication of a county budget not reflecting all of the requirements of this section is not a legal publication; the taxpayers have a right to be fully informed about the proposed county revenues and expenditures, including information as to the bonded indebtedness of the county, and this means full publication of the budget. OAG 83-322 .

Any promotions or pay increases for members of the police force which may come about under the rules promulgated by the merit board must be taken into account by the fiscal court in the formulation of the county budget. OAG 83-351 .

The fiscal court has no responsibility for paying the sheriff’s statutorily authorized expenses out of the county treasury where the sheriff’s fees are adequate for such purpose. Where the fees of the sheriff are not adequate to fund such expenses, and where an audit of the sheriff’s office indicates that his office financial operations and expenditures disclose no infraction of law or mismanagement or negligence on his part, the responsibility of the fiscal court would come into play; however, there must be money available in a properly budgeted item sufficiently descriptive to embrace the specific sheriff’s expenses involved. OAG 84-104 .

The fiscal court could adopt the jailer’s budget proposal into the overall county budget through its amendment authority pursuant to subsection (6) of this section, and thereby eliminate or modify the jail budget proposed by the county judge/executive. OAG 91-183 .

A county fiscal court may act as the non-federal sponser for a federally supported flood control project, a portion of which will be carried out within the incorporated area of a sixth class within the county. OAG 96-30 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Jefferson County Children’s Home, appropriations for purchase of property, KRS 201.160 .

Library, mandatory appropriation for, KRS 173.360 .

Louisville and Jefferson County board of health, appropriations and budget requirements for, KRS 212.470 , 212.520 , 212.540 .

Surrender of sinking funds to county sinking fund when bonds approved under county debt act, KRS 66.370 .

68.243. Inclusion of poll tax revenue in county budget. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 316, § 4; 1980, ch. 19, § 2, effective July 15, 1980) was repealed by Acts 1990, ch. 343, § 10, effective July 13, 1990.

Section 11 of Acts 1990, ch. 343, provided: “The provisions of this Act shall be effective for tax years with assessment dates on or after January 1, 1991.”

68.245. Estimate of assessment — Levy in excess of compensatory tax rate subject to recall vote or reconsideration.

  1. The property valuation administrator shall submit an official estimate of real and personal property and new property assessment as defined in KRS 132.010 , to the county judge/executive by April 1 of each year.
  2. No county fiscal court shall levy a tax rate, excluding any special tax rate which may be levied at the request of a county community improvement district pursuant to KRS 107.350 and 107.360 , following a favorable vote upon such tax by the voters of that county, which exceeds the compensating tax rate defined in KRS 132.010 , until the taxing district has complied with the provisions of subsection (5) of this section.
  3. The state local finance officer shall certify to each county judge/executive, by June 30 of each year, the following:
    1. The compensating tax rate, as defined in KRS 132.010 , and the amount of revenue expected to be produced by it;
    2. The tax rate which will produce no more revenue from real property, exclusive of revenue from new property, than four percent (4%) over the amount of revenue produced by the compensating tax rate defined in KRS 132.010 and the amount of revenue expected to be produced by it.
  4. Real and personal property assessment and new property determined in accordance with KRS 132.010 shall be certified to the state local finance officer by the Department of Revenue upon completion of action on property assessment data.
    1. A county fiscal court, proposing to levy a tax rate, excluding any special tax rate which may be levied at the request of a county community improvement district pursuant to KRS 107.350 and 107.360 , following a favorable vote upon the tax by the voters of that county, which exceeds the compensating tax rate defined in KRS 132.010 , shall hold a public hearing to hear comments from the public regarding the proposed tax rate. The hearing shall be held in the principal office of the taxing district, or, in the event the taxing district has no office, or the office is not suitable for a hearing, the hearing shall be held in a suitable facility as near as possible to the geographic center of the district. (5) (a) A county fiscal court, proposing to levy a tax rate, excluding any special tax rate which may be levied at the request of a county community improvement district pursuant to KRS 107.350 and 107.360 , following a favorable vote upon the tax by the voters of that county, which exceeds the compensating tax rate defined in KRS 132.010 , shall hold a public hearing to hear comments from the public regarding the proposed tax rate. The hearing shall be held in the principal office of the taxing district, or, in the event the taxing district has no office, or the office is not suitable for a hearing, the hearing shall be held in a suitable facility as near as possible to the geographic center of the district.
    2. County fiscal courts of counties containing a city of the first class proposing to levy a tax rate, excluding any special tax rate which may be levied at the request of a county community improvement district pursuant to KRS 107.350 and 107.360, following a favorable vote upon the tax by the voters of that county, which exceeds the compensating tax rate defined in KRS 132.010, shall hold three (3) public hearings to hear comments from the public regarding the proposed tax rate. The hearings shall be held in three (3) separate locations; each location shall be determined by dividing the county into three (3) approximately equal geographic areas, and identifying a suitable facility as near as possible to the geographic center of each area.
    3. The county fiscal court shall advertise the hearing by causing to be published at least twice in two (2) consecutive weeks, in the newspaper of largest circulation in the county, a display type advertisement of not less than twelve (12) column inches, the following:
      1. The tax rate levied in the preceding year, and the revenue produced by that rate;
      2. The tax rate proposed for the current year and the revenue expected to be produced by that rate;
      3. The compensating tax rate and the revenue expected from it;
      4. The revenue expected from new property and personal property;
      5. The general areas to which revenue in excess of the revenue produced in the preceding year is to be allocated;
      6. A time and place for the public hearings which shall be held not less than seven (7) days nor more than ten (10) days, after the day that the second advertisement is published;
      7. The purpose of the hearing; and
      8. A statement to the effect that the General Assembly has required publication of the advertisement and the information contained therein.
    4. In lieu of the two (2) published notices, a single notice containing the required information may be sent by first-class mail to each person owning real property, addressed to the property owner at his residence or principal place of business as shown on the current year property tax roll.
    5. The hearing shall be open to the public. All persons desiring to be heard shall be given an opportunity to present oral testimony. The county fiscal court may set reasonable time limits for testimony.
    1. That portion of a tax rate, excluding any special tax rate which may be levied at the request of a county community improvement district pursuant to KRS 107.350 and 107.360 , following a favorable vote upon a tax by the voters of that county, levied by an action of a county fiscal court which will produce revenue from real property, exclusive of revenue from new property, more than four percent (4%) over the amount of revenue produced by the compensating tax rate defined in KRS 132.010 shall be subject to a recall vote or reconsideration by the taxing district, as provided for in KRS 132.017 , and shall be advertised as provided for in paragraph (b) of this subsection. (6) (a) That portion of a tax rate, excluding any special tax rate which may be levied at the request of a county community improvement district pursuant to KRS 107.350 and 107.360 , following a favorable vote upon a tax by the voters of that county, levied by an action of a county fiscal court which will produce revenue from real property, exclusive of revenue from new property, more than four percent (4%) over the amount of revenue produced by the compensating tax rate defined in KRS 132.010 shall be subject to a recall vote or reconsideration by the taxing district, as provided for in KRS 132.017 , and shall be advertised as provided for in paragraph (b) of this subsection.
    2. The county fiscal court shall, within seven (7) days following adoption of an ordinance to levy a tax rate, excluding any special tax rate which may be levied at the request of a county community improvement district pursuant to KRS 107.350 and 107.360, following a favorable vote upon a tax by the voters of that county, which will produce revenue from real property, exclusive of revenue from new property as defined in KRS 132.010, more than four percent (4%) over the amount of revenue produced by the compensating tax rate defined in KRS 132.010, cause to be published, in the newspaper of largest circulation in the county, a display type advertisement of not less than twelve (12) column inches the following:
      1. The fact that the county fiscal court has adopted a rate;
      2. The fact that the part of the rate which will produce revenue from real property, exclusive of new property as defined in KRS 132.010, in excess of four percent (4%) over the amount of revenue produced by the compensating tax rate defined in KRS 132.010 is subject to recall; and
      3. The name, address, and telephone number of the county clerk, with a notation to the effect that that official can provide the necessary information about the petition required to initiate recall of the tax rate.

History. Enact. Acts 1965 (1st Ex. Sess.), ch. 2, Part III, § 8, subsecs. (6) to (8); 1978, ch. 197, § 4, effective January 1, 1979; 1980, ch. 19, § 3, effective July 15, 1980; 1980, ch. 317, § 8, effective July 15, 1980; 1980, ch. 319, § 10, effective July 1, 1980; 1990, ch. 343, § 1, effective July 13, 1990; 2005, ch. 85, § 96, effective June 20, 2005.

Compiler’s Notes.

Section 11 of Acts 1990, ch. 343 provided: “The provisions of this Act shall be effective for tax years with assessment dates on or after January 1, 1991.”

Legislative Research Commission Note.

KRS 68.245 was enacted as an amendment to KRS 68.240 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

This section, in setting a tax rate below the maximum provided in Ky. Const., § 157 does not violate that section when construed together with Ky. Const., § 181 as it must be. Rea v. Gallatin County Fiscal Court, 422 S.W.2d 134, 1967 Ky. LEXIS 38 ( Ky. 1967 ).

2. Construction.

This section limits the power to tax. Rea v. Gallatin County Fiscal Court, 422 S.W.2d 134, 1967 Ky. LEXIS 38 ( Ky. 1967 ).

3. Determination of Tax Rate.

The language of KRS 132.487(3), governing a centralized ad valorem tax system for motor vehicles, clearly and unequivocally removes all valuations of and tax revenues from motor vehicles from the base amount used in determining the compensating tax rate and maximum possible tax rate envisioned under the provisions of KRS 132.023 , 132.027 , 160.470 and this section. Kling v. Geary, 667 S.W.2d 379, 1984 Ky. LEXIS 216 ( Ky. 1984 ).

Cited:

Lowery v. Jefferson, 458 S.W.2d 168, 1970 Ky. LEXIS 167 ( Ky. 1970 ); Ashland v. Webb, 470 S.W.2d 604, 1971 Ky. LEXIS 279 ( Ky. 1971 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

If a fiscal court imposed the ten (10%) percent increase in fiscal year 1967-68 and at a later time reduced said rate, it could not later impose an increase up to the ten percent level. OAG 66-789 .

A fiscal court could impose the ten percent increase in fiscal year 1967-68 and at a later time reduce said rate. OAG 66-789 .

If the county budget commission and fiscal court did not take advantage of the ten percent increase in fiscal year 1967-68, such increase would be forever waived and could not be taken in the future. OAG 66-789 .

Since there is no authorization for a public referendum on the question of increasing property tax revenues under this section or KRS 160.470 , questions regarding property taxes set out in petition cannot be placed upon the ballot in general election. OAG 67-287 .

The people to be affected by any increase in taxes must be given an opportunity to express their views on the matter whenever the city seeks an increase in its tax rate under KRS 132.027 . Therefore, adoption of a second increase by the city must be preceded by notice and public hearing even though a hearing was conducted on the first increase. OAG 67-291 .

Under the assumption that a county library is still a library organized and existing under KRS 173.310 , and since it follows that it is not a separate library taxing district, the library appropriation must necessarily come out of the general county levy, that is, the 50 cents levy rolled back under this section. Therefore, the library five cent tax rate cannot be levied as an addition to the general county levy. OAG 68-84 .

Where after the roll-back a library district did not have sufficient funds to operate, under KRS 173.610 a petition could be filed putting the question of an increased tax levy to a vote of the people, and if the vote was affirmative the tax could be raised to exceed the roll-back rate. OAG 68-606 .

Since this section specifically excludes voted levies from the revenue limits, library tax levy which was in effect a voted levy could be made in addition to the regular county general tax levy. OAG 70-327 .

Where the voters of a county established a library service and concomitant tax levy in 1954, prior to the “100 percent holding” of Russman v. Luckett, 391 S.W.2d 694, 1965 Ky. LEXIS 322 (Ky. App. 1965), the roll-back provisions of this section apply to the library tax levy. OAG 70-327 .

The levying of a special road tax, after the accumulation of sufficient revenue to liquidate the bonds and interest, would be in violation of this section. OAG 70-671 .

Once a library district has been established under KRS 173.310 , the fiscal court is required to appropriate money annually to furnish such library service, and the amount shall be not less than five cents nor more than fifteen cents on each $100 worth of property assessed for local taxation, subject to the limitations of this section. OAG 70-706 .

Under this section the county’s general tax rate is required to be rolled back or adjusted to 100% assessment so that the revenue produced from the local ad valorem county rate would be approximately equal to the 1965 level of revenue. OAG 72-124 .

A county library board can obtain the levy of a tax by a county fiscal court over the county’s general tax levy by either establishing a library district and thus a separate taxing district organized under KRS 173.470 or KRS 173.720 or it may request the fiscal court to present to the voters the question of an additional tax levy which if assented to by two thirds of those voting, would be an intended, authorized “voting levy” and therefore not subject to subsection (1) of this section nor prohibited by Ky. Const., § 157. OAG 73-291 (Opinion prior to 1980 amendment).

The fiscal court has a sound discretion under KRS 68.260 as to whether the revenue to be produced for the current budget reaches the maximum permissible level or a level less than the maximum. OAG 74-314 .

The county budget commission should include the revenue received from the poll tax in 1973 in the current budget and in county budgets in subsequent years; then the state local finance officer must include such revenue when computing the maximum permissible local ad valorem tax in accordance with subdivisions (2)(a), (b) and (c) (now (3)(a) and (b)) of this section. OAG 74-314 (Opinion prior to 1990 amendment).

The county ad valorem tax revenue is limited to the application of the preceding year’s tax rate to the preceding year’s assessment, exclusive of voting levies, plus the revenue determined from applying the effective tax rate to the net assessment growth base. OAG 74-393 .

Although a county is in a position to reduce its tax rate in 1975, the rate actually levied must be used in computing the 1976-77 rate and not the rate that could be levied for 1975-76 in computing such rate. OAG 75-478 .

Once a county reduces the local ad valorem tax rate, such rate is the one that must be used for subsequent determination of the amount of revenue which can be raised in the county and such a reduction will also reduce the county’s share of the federal revenue sharing money over what was received the previous year. OAG 75-487 .

Community cannot lower its property tax rate and then several years later raise it again so as to generate the tax revenues which had previously been permissible. OAG 76-457 .

If the fiscal court is unable to provide any budget funds for a cooperative extension service district, it may levy a tax, and any tax so levied must be included in the computation of the county tax levy. OAG 76-546 .

Under KRS 262.200 , as amended in 1980, once the district board’s budget has been submitted to and finally approved by the fiscal court, it is mandatory that the fiscal court fund the budget either from the county’s general fund or by levying the millage ad valorem tax, not to exceed $25,000 for a fiscal year, because subsection (4) of KRS 262.200 says that the funds “shall be supplied;” since the millage ad valorem tax is not a voted levy, and since the tax is characterized by subsection (4) of KRS 262.200 as a “county tax,” the roll-back restrictions of this section apply. OAG 80-260 (Overruled by OAG 92-113 to the extent of conflict).

Because the clear and unambiguous intent of the general assembly was to place a ceiling upon real property tax rates while specifically exempting personal property tax rates, the unavoidable conclusion is that the county fiscal court may establish two separate tax rates — one for real property and one for personal property. OAG 80-545 .

An emergency ambulance service district created either by referendum under KRS 108.100 or by action of the fiscal court under KRS 108.105 would be a special taxing district under Ky. Const., § 157, since KRS 108.100 and KRS 108.105 must be read together under the doctrine of in pari materia and as an autonomous special taxing district would not be included in the county’s ad valorem tax levy under this section. OAG 81-99 .

If the proposed county tax rate used to fund emergency ambulance service is more than four percent (4%) over the amount of revenue produced by the compensating tax rate as defined in KRS 132.010 , a recall vote or reconsideration by the county voters, as provided in KRS 132.017 , shall be advertised as directed in subsection (6)(b) of this section; however, upon a recall petition being filed, the fiscal court may cancel an election on the question of exceeding four percent over the compensating tax rate by simply reducing the tax rate so as not to exceed the four percent. OAG 81-344 .

The tax authorized by KRS 262.200 is not subject to the rate rollback provisions of this section. Since the KRS 262.200 tax already contains its own rollback provision, there is no need to subject it to the additional rollback mechanism in this section.To do so would render the expressed $25,000 ceiling in KRS 262.200 meaningless. OAG 92-113 (overruling OAG 80-260 to the extent of conflict).

Funds derived from a soil conservation tax imposed under KRS 262.200 are not included in the computation of the 4% increase in revenue permitted under this section. Since the soil and water conservation tax is not subject to this section, it necessarily follows that the revenue it produces should not be included in the calculations of permissible rates for other taxes that are subject to this section. OAG 92.113.

The recall provisions of KRS 68.245(6) are only triggered when a real property tax rate exceeds, by more than four percent, the compensating tax rate as defined in KRS 132.010(6). In calculating the compensating tax rate, personal property must be included when applying a rate to “all classes of taxable property” to determine whether use of a substitute rate is required by KRS 132.010(6). OAG 10-005 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Kentucky Law Survey, Vasek and Bradley, Kentucky Taxation, 68 Ky. L.J. 777 (1979-1980).

Kentucky Law Survey, Whiteside, Taxation, 71 Ky. L.J. 479 (1982-83).

68.246. Rate on business inventories levied by fiscal court.

Subject to the provisions of KRS 68.245 , a county fiscal court may levy a rate on business inventories equal to or less than the prevailing rate of taxation on other tangible personal property in the respective county.

History. Enact. Acts 1980, ch. 319, § 12, effective July 15, 1980.

Opinions of Attorney General.

A fiscal court may levy an inventory tax on alcoholic beverage inventories. OAG 80-599 .

68.247. Tax on motor vehicles and trailers to be used in determining maximum permissible county revenue. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1978, ch. 371, § 3, effective January 1, 1981) was repealed by Acts 1990, ch. 343, § 10, effective July 13, 1990.

Section 11 of Acts 1990, ch. 343, provided: “The provisions of this Act shall be effective for tax years with assessment dates on or after January 1, 1991.”

68.248. County revenue limits on tax rate applicable to personal property.

  1. In the event that the tax rate applicable to real property levied by a county fiscal court will produce a percentage increase in revenue from personal property less than the percentage increase in revenue from real property, the county fiscal court may levy a tax rate applicable to personal property which will produce the same percentage increase in revenue from personal property as the percentage increase in revenue from real property.
  2. The tax rate applicable to personal property levied by a county fiscal court under the provisions of subsection (1) of this section shall not be subject to the public hearing provisions of KRS 68.245(5) and to the recall provisions of KRS 68.245(6).

History. Enact. Acts 1982, ch. 397, § 1, effective July 15, 1982; 1990, ch. 343, § 2, effective July 13, 1990.

Compiler’s Notes.

Section 11 of Acts 1990, ch. 343 provided: “The provisions of this Act shall be effective for tax years with assessment dates on or after January 1, 1991.”

Opinions of Attorney General.

Subsection (2) of KRS 68.249 , limiting the increase in the county tax rate on personal property, means that the tax rate levied under this section on such property for 1982-83 cannot exceed the tax rate levied in 1981-82; additionally, the tax rate levied under subsection (1) of KRS 68.249 cannot exceed the tax rate levied in 1981-82; however, the two rates collectively may exceed such rate. This determination is extended to all similar provisions of Acts 1982, ch. 397, i.e., KRS 132.024 , 132.025 , 132.029 , 132.029 1, 160.473 , 160.474 (now repealed). OAG 83-221 .

68.249. Cumulative percentage increase in revenue from personal property tax by county for 1982-83 only — Limit — Tax rate not subject to public hearing and recall. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1982, ch. 397, § 2, effective July 15, 1982) was repealed by Acts 1990, ch. 343, § 10, effective July 13, 1990.

Section 11 of Acts 1990, ch. 343, provided: “The provisions of this Act shall be effective for tax years with assessment dates on or after January 1, 1991.”

68.250. Form of budget — State local finance officer to regulate — Approval of budget.

  1. The state local finance officer shall have full power and authority to supervise and direct the form and classifications of all county budgets. He shall approve all budget forms and classifications and may change any form or classification submitted to him before making such approval. The county judge/executive shall use the form furnished or approved by the state local finance officer and shall not make any changes therein or use any other form, unless authorized by the state local finance officer.
  2. Not less than twenty (20) days before the time for adoption of the county budget the county judge/executive shall transmit two (2) copies of the proposed budget including statements of both anticipated receipts and expenditures by budget funds, to the state local finance officer for approval as to form and classification.
  3. If the state local finance officer finds that the proposed budget is uniform with the budgets of other counties of the same class in classification of units and conforms to the budget laws, he shall approve the classification, return the original copy to the county judge/executive and retain the duplicate copy as part of his records. If the proposed budget is not uniform with the budgets of other counties in classification of units he shall make such changes as he deems necessary for the purpose of establishing uniformity.
  4. If the proposed budget fails to comply with any requirements of law, the state local finance officer shall so notify the county judge/executive, and may refuse to approve the budget until the county judge/executive authorizes him to make such changes as he deems to be required by law.

History. 938q-13, 1851c-4: amend. Acts 1980, ch. 19, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

Estill County v. Noland, 295 Ky. 753 , 175 S.W.2d 341, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 324 ( Ky. 1943 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Expenditures for roads and bridges are part of the county budget which must be proposed by the budget commission and there is nothing that authorizes the county judge/executive to act by himself or unilaterally in budgeting the county road fund and if such procedure is not followed, such action is illegal. OAG 73-373 .

The statutory approval of county budgets by the state local finance officer does not apply to urban county government unless the urban county government by proper ordinance elects to invoke pertinent budget statutes of KRS ch. 68, including this section. OAG 74-360 .

The fiscal court may make changes in the budget in the nature and amount of funds expended, within the form or classification of the budget units previously established. OAG 79-73 .

When the budget commission approves a proposed budget, a copy is forwarded to the fiscal court for comment after which the commission is required to amend the proposed budget, according to the desires of fiscal court and then forward it to the state local finance officer for approval as to form and classification. OAG 79-238 .

The state local finance officer may change any form or classification of district budgets, and may devise a budget form designed to accommodate federally approved budget forms where federal funding of the district is involved. OAG 80-628 .

68.260. Adoption of budget by fiscal court.

  1. The proposed county budget, tentatively approved by the fiscal court and approved by the state local finance officer as to form and classification, shall be submitted to the fiscal court for adoption not later than July 1 of each year. The budget as presented and amended shall be adopted as of July 1. The county judge/executive shall cause a copy of the proposed budget to be posted in a conspicuous place in the courthouse near the front door, and be published pursuant to KRS Chapter 424, at least seven (7) days before final adoption by the fiscal court.
  2. Any taxpayer or group of taxpayers may petition the fiscal court in respect to the budget or any part thereof before final adoption.
  3. If the fiscal court rejects any part of the proposed budget, it shall make the changes in the nature and amount of funds a majority of the court considers desirable, but it has no power to make any change in the form or classification of the budget units or subdivisions of units.
  4. The fiscal court may amend the budget on the basis of the assessment from the Department of Revenue. The fiscal court shall finalize the budget within thirty (30) days of the receipt of the certified assessment.

History. 1815c-5: amend. Acts 1944, ch. 173, § 6; 1968, ch. 152, § 41; 1970, ch. 65, § 1; 1978, ch. 197, § 5, effective January 1, 1979; 1980, ch. 19, § 5, effective July 15, 1980; 1988, ch. 328, § 4, effective April 9, 1988; 1998, ch. 340, § 1, effective July 15, 1998; 2000, ch. 248, § 1, effective July 14, 2000; 2005, ch. 85, § 97, effective June 20, 2005.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Publication.

Where the proposed budget was posted in the courthouse and a summary of the budget with a statement of estimated receipts and general sources and estimated expenditures was published in the newspaper the publication was sufficient as this section was not intended to require that the entire detailed budget be published in a newspaper. Estill County v. Noland, 295 Ky. 753 , 175 S.W.2d 341, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 324 ( Ky. 1943 ).

2. Nature of Process.

A permissive statute such as this section strengthens the view that the budget making process of a fiscal court is a political one. Fiscal Court of Taylor County v. Taylor County Metro Police, 805 S.W.2d 113, 1991 Ky. LEXIS 21 ( Ky. 1991 ).

Cited:

Hall v. Noplis, 367 S.W.2d 456, 1963 Ky. LEXIS 27 ( Ky. 1963 ); Rea v. Gallatin County Fiscal Court, 422 S.W.2d 134, 1967 Ky. LEXIS 38 ( Ky. 1967 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

The county budget must be published in full and a synopsis would not be sufficient. OAG 65-131 .

Expenditures for roads and bridges are part of the county budget which must be proposed by the budget commission and there is nothing that authorizes the county judge/executive to act by himself or unilaterally in budgeting the county road fund and if such procedure is not followed, such action is illegal. OAG 73-373 .

To accomplish a proper balancing of the private right to question and the public’s necessity for the orderly work of the fiscal court, the court can reasonably require petitioning citizens to furnish, prior to the meeting, the fiscal court with data as to the names of petitioners, organization represented if any, and the parts of the budget to be discussed. OAG 77-423 .

While the adoption of the county budget, pursuant to this section, as amended, is a legislative act, the creation of county administrative positions should be effected by a specific order or ordinance of the fiscal court. OAG 78-490 .

The fiscal court may make changes in the budget in the nature and amount of funds expended, within the form or classification of the budget units previously established. OAG 79-73 .

A fiscal court cannot lower the salaries of constitutional officers during their terms once the fiscal court has actually, and with finality, fixed their particular salary levels in the budget, and has adopted such budget. OAG 80-323 .

Since the fiscal affairs of the county, including the final adoption of the budget, are squarely on the shoulders of the fiscal court as a body, the county judge/executive and his staff have the duty to employ all reasonable means of furnishing needed fiscal information to the other commissioners, and the county judge/executive should answer all reasonable requests for information by the commissioners prior to the May 24 deadline for submitting the budget to the fiscal court, because the fiscal court must act on the budget by July 1 and five weeks is not a sufficient period to review the proposed budget in detail. OAG 80-344 .

Adoption of a proposed budget by the fiscal court need not be preceded by a line item discussion of the proposed budget. OAG 82-91 .

Any county budget not reflecting the essentials required in KRS 68.240 is not a legal budget and the publication of a county budget not reflecting all of the requirements of KRS 68.240 is not a legal publication; the taxpayers have a right to be fully informed about the proposed county revenues and expenditures, including information as to the bonded indebtedness of the county, and this means full publication of the budget. OAG 83-322 .

Under the literal and explicit provisions of this section, the publication of the budget means publication in full, since there is no language in the statute imposing any limitation on the word “published.” OAG 83-322 .

Because public participation and attendance is explicitly encouraged prior to final adoption of a county budget, the presiding officer, at a fiscal court meeting called for the final reading of the budget, erred when he ruled that a spectator and a member of the court were out of order when they tried to comment on the budget at the meeting; the fact that the fiscal court held more than one hearing had no significance in this narrow particular. OAG 84-265 .

A fiscal court that fails to comply with the mandatory direction of this section, whether by inaction or a tie vote, must be compelled to act by appropriate litigation. OAG 88-45 .

KRS 68.990 provides for possible sanctions against members of a fiscal court for failure to comply with the mandatory language of this section. OAG 88-45 .

There are no statutory provisions that would allow the county judge/executive to declare an emergency and put into effect a budget that was defeated by the fiscal court. OAG 88-45 .

Where a vote for a motion for adoption of a county budget ended in a tie, the result was a defeat of the motion, and thus the county was without a budget; a mandamus action could be brought against the fiscal court members who voted against the budget to ask the circuit court to require the adoption of a budget, and the state local finance officer could also sue the county pursuant to KRS 68.350 . OAG 88-45 .

Where tie vote of the fiscal court defeated the final adoption of the budget, the county was without a budget until one was finally adopted. OAG 88-45 .

A fiscal court, assuming funds have been properly budgeted for the purpose, may lawfully approve reimbursement, subject to proper documentation being submitted, of the reasonable expenses for travel, meals, and lodging, actually paid by one elected to a county office, who has not yet assumed such office, where such expenses are immediately incident to attending statutorily provided training for such office. OAG 93-72 .

It is obvious that a county judge/executive cannot unilaterally impose a county police force on a county. OAG 94-13 .

A county fiscal court may act as the non-federal sponser for a federally supported flood control project, a portion of which will be carried out within the incorporated area of a sixth class within the county. OAG 96-30 .

68.270. Certification of approved budget to state local finance officer.

Within fifteen (15) days after the budget is adopted by the fiscal court, the county judge/executive shall certify to the state local finance officer a copy of the original budget as approved by the state local finance officer, indicating clearly all changes made by the fiscal court.

History. 938q-14.

68.275. Payment of claims against the county — Use of standing orders for payment of certain recurrent expenses — Use of electronic funds transfers.

  1. Claims against the county that are within the amount of line items of the county budget and arise pursuant to contracts duly authorized by the fiscal court shall be paid by the county judge/executive by a warrant drawn on the county and co-signed by the county treasurer.
  2. The county judge/executive shall present all claims to the fiscal court for review prior to payment and the court, for good cause shown, may order that a claim not be paid.
  3. The fiscal court may adopt an order, called a standing order, to preapprove the payment of recurrent monthly payroll and utility expenses. No other expenses shall be preapproved pursuant to this subsection without the written consent of the state local finance officer. Notwithstanding KRS 68.020(1), payment of preapproved expenses may be made by means of electronic funds transfers from an authorized account of the county without the cosignatures of the county judge/executive and the county treasurer if approved by the fiscal court in a standing order, and if the fiscal court has received the payee’s prior written consent for the payment of funds by electronic funds transfer due the payee. All standing orders adopted by the fiscal court shall be renewed annually and submitted to the state local finance officer by July 1 of each fiscal year with the submission of the county budget if the fiscal court wishes to continue the standing order. Otherwise, after July 1, the standing order shall expire, and no more payments designated in the standing order shall be preapproved unless a new order is adopted by the fiscal court according to the provisions of this subsection.

History. Enact. Acts 1988, ch. 328, § 3, effective July 15, 1988; 1998, ch. 299, § 1, effective July 15, 1998; 2005, ch. 72, § 1, effective June 20, 2005.

Opinions of Attorney General.

Reasonable expenses of the county clerk’s office (which would include bills for official telephone costs) are to be paid from the fees of the office. The fiscal court must approve (or disapprove) payment of claims against the county, which must be presented to the fiscal court by the county judge/executive. OAG 93-4 .

If the county clerk’s office does not generate sufficient fees to pay, along with other necessary official expenses of the office, the necessary official telephone bills of the office, the fiscal court could, and probably would have a duty to, pay such expenses of the county clerk’s office from the county treasury. OAG 93-4 .

A fiscal court, assuming funds have been properly budgeted for the purpose, may lawfully approve reimbursement, subject to proper documentation being submitted, of the reasonable expenses for travel, meals, and lodging, actually paid by one elected to a county office, who has not yet assumed such office, where such expenses are immediately incident to attending statutorily provided training for such office. OAG 93-72 .

68.280. Amendment of budget to provide for expenditure of unanticipated income.

The fiscal court may make provision for the expenditure of receipts unanticipated in the original budget by preparing an amendment to the budget, showing the source and amount of the unanticipated receipts and specifying the budget funds that are to be increased thereby. The amendment shall be submitted to the state local finance officer subject to the same provisions as the original budget.

History. 938q-15: amend. Acts 1978, ch. 197, § 6, effective January 1, 1979.

Opinions of Attorney General.

The salaries of the county welfare director and the county road foreman may be increased by the fiscal court, which may make provision for expenditure of receipts unanticipated in the original budget by preparing an amendment under certain conditions named therein. In the event of the existence of surplus funds in the appropriate budget unit, such funds could be used for the purpose of increasing these salaries without affecting the approved budget. OAG 67-425 .

Direct reimbursements are not authorized under KRS 178.010 , 178.080 , 178.115 or 179.470 for county road department to agree to provide maintenance to subdivision streets in return for payments by the residents of the subdivision through the road committee; however, the reimbursement of maintenance expenses of subdivision roads through special assessments under KRS 179.470 would be allowed and would accrue to that part of the county road fund allocated for the maintenance of subdivision streets rather than the general road fund; thus, where the fiscal court adopts the road project under KRS 179.470 before the fiscal court finally adopts the budget, the cost of the road project can be set up under special road account and where the road project is approved by the fiscal court after the budget is approved, the budget would have to be amended under this section to set up the special road project and unanticipated revenue by way of special assessments. OAG 81-19 .

Where the actual county receipts will appreciably exceed the amounts originally budgeted in the county budget, the state local finance officer can only approve an amendment to the budget up to the amount of unanticipated revenue actually received by the county, not merely expected to be received, because until the money is actually received, it is academic to amend the budget. OAG 82-5 .

The fiscal court, in preparing a budget amendment to provide for the expenditure of unanticipated revenue, should consult with the jailer, as strongly implied in KRS 441.008 (now KRS 441.235 ); it would be illogical to say that the jailer must be consulted in formulating the original budget, but not on an amendment. OAG 83-36 .

Unanticipated revenues received by the county could displace (free up) county tax revenue orginally budgeted for jail purposes, provided that the adequate and efficient operation of the jail would in no way be lessened or impaired. OAG 83-36 .

68.290. Transfer of money between budget funds.

The fiscal court may transfer money from one (1) budget fund to another to provide for emergencies or increases or decreases in county employment pursuant to KRS 64.530(4). The order of the fiscal court making the transfer shall show the nature of the emergency or personnel increase or decrease and the reason for making the transfer. The fiscal court shall not have any power to transfer money from any sinking fund or special fund raised for a specific purpose until the obligation or purpose for which the fund was raised has been satisfied.

History. 1851c: amend. Acts 1978, ch. 197, § 7, effective January 1, 1979; 1984, ch. 22, § 2, effective February 23, 1984.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

Fannin v. Davis, 385 S.W.2d 321, 1964 Ky. LEXIS 158 ( Ky. 1964 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

If a present budget contains any surplus funds, such funds could be used under the “extra help” theory. OAG 67-374 .

Where the amount budgeted by the county fiscal court for autopsies was exhausted, the fiscal court was prevented by KRS 68.300 from allowing further claims for fees of physicians in performing autopsies unless surplus money was transferred pursuant to this section. OAG 68-88 .

If the county budget commission refuses to approve a transfer of funds from one budget fund to another, where the transfer is a condition precedent to the fiscal court’s effective action in implementing the salary concept under KRS 64.530 which establishes guidelines and limits for fixing the compensation of county officers and employees, then the budget commission has no discretion in the approval of the transfer and a mandamus suit could be appropriate to require the commission to perform its duty. OAG 75-701 .

Where funds have not been appropriated for funding the expenses of one of the fiscal court’s magistrates who is authorized to lobby before the state Legislature on legislation affecting county government and fiscal courts, the expenses could be paid by the fiscal court out of the county treasury subject to proper transfer procedure. OAG 75-724 .

The excess of fees from the operations of a former sheriff should be transferred to the incumbent sheriff to fund operations of that office and if the excess is placed into the county general fund rather than transferred to the incumbent sheriff, a transfer of this money should be made to the appropriate account. OAG 76-106 .

Where after the fiscal court had adopted the county budget through a formal ordinance enactment, the fiscal court wished to transfer some of the budgeted moneys from one budgeted fund to another, a fiscal court resolution or order would suffice to effect such a transfer so long as the resolution or order showed the nature of the emergency and the reason for making such a transfer. OAG 80-461 .

Where a county emergency ambulance service was created as a nonprofit, nonstock corporation, for the purpose of providing ambulance service for emergency and general purposes a motion could be made and passed at a fiscal court meeting providing that any general fund surplus of the county be used solely to fund ambulance service. OAG 80-561 .

In view of the provision in KRS 441.008 (now KRS 441.235 ) that the jail budget be formulated by fiscal court in consultation with the jailer, the fiscal court, in transferring money between jail funds under this section, should consult with the jailer on such transfers. OAG 83-36 .

The fiscal court could transfer money from a jail budget item to a county nonjail budget item to provide for an emergency; however, such transfer would be subject to these conditions: (1) the transfer must not create an emergency for the jail; and (2) the restrictions of KRS 441.007(3) (now KRS 441.206 ) must be carefully observed. OAG 83-36 .

Salary adjustment for the jailer’s deputies requires a distinct and separate action of the fiscal court; the mere transfer of funds to the salary line item of the jail budget by the fiscal court, under this section, would not be tantamount to salary adjustment. OAG 83-49 .

The county judge/executive, alone, cannot transfer money between budget funds; only the fiscal court can do that, under the restrictions of this section. Thus, the county judge/executive must keep the fiscal court informed as to any need for a transfer of funds. OAG 83-99 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Tax and sinking fund to be provided for when indebtedness is authorized, Const., § 159.

Tax not to be diverted to another purpose, Const., § 180.

68.300. Expenditures in excess of budget fund void and illegal.

Any appropriation made or claim allowed by the fiscal court in excess of any budget fund, and any warrant or contract not within the budget appropriation, shall be void. No member of the fiscal court shall vote for any such illegal appropriation or claim. The county treasurer shall be liable on his official bond for the amount of any county warrant willfully or negligently signed or countersigned by him in excess of the budget fund out of which the warrant is payable.

History. 1851c-6, 1851c-10, 1851c-11.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Treasurer.
2. — Removal.

Violation of this section was sufficient ground for removal of a county treasurer. Lyon v. Bell, 275 Ky. 69 , 120 S.W.2d 752, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 366 ( Ky. 1938 ).

3. — Liability.

Treasurer was liable on bond for the amount of any county warrants wilfully or negligently signed or countersigned by her in excess of the budgetary fund from which the warrant was payable. Fannin v. Davis, 385 S.W.2d 321, 1964 Ky. LEXIS 158 ( Ky. 1964 ), overruled in part, Scalise v. Sewell-Scheuermann, 566 S.W.3d 539, 2018 Ky. LEXIS 451 ( Ky. 2018 ).

4. Excess Claims.

Any appropriation or claim allowed by the fiscal court in excess of any budget fund is void. Noble v. Combs, 273 Ky. 578 , 117 S.W.2d 579, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 684 ( Ky. 1938 ).

5. Payment from Federal Funds.

Where an architect’s fee was to be paid out of federal funds which were not obtained and the fee was not a regularly budgeted item, the fiscal court was not prevented from paying the claim because it was not a budgeted item. Carroll Fiscal Court v. McClorey, 455 S.W.2d 547, 1970 Ky. LEXIS 255 ( Ky. 1970 ).

6. Prior Claim.

Where, as a proper budget item, there was a fund for the building of a courthouse annex which was not built, a claim for the architect’s fee for the initial plans could be paid as a prior claim out of the fund. Carroll Fiscal Court v. McClorey, 455 S.W.2d 547, 1970 Ky. LEXIS 255 ( Ky. 1970 ).

Cited:

Ballard v. Adair County, 268 Ky. 347 , 104 S.W.2d 1100, 1937 Ky. LEXIS 465 ( Ky. 1937 ); Estill County v. Noland, 295 Ky. 753 , 175 S.W.2d 341, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 324 ( Ky. 1943 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

A contract entered into by the fiscal court for delivery of a piece of equipment during the current fiscal year but for which the first payment would be deferred until the next fiscal year would be void where the budget for the year in which payment would be made had not been approved when the contract was made. OAG 61-408 .

Claims of the jailer for dieting prisoners and for supplies for use in keeping the jail and county building are in the category of governmental expense and are entitled to priority in payment from current funds over the payment of permissive claims from the annual budget fund, and they are preferred and until paid the fiscal court cannot validly pay any debts or other claims. OAG 63-734 .

If a fiscal court operates on a properly classified budget, such as to include a reasonable fund for prior year claims, and if the payment, out of a current budget, for prior year claims does not exceed such proper budget fund, then such payment of claims would be valid, provided the gross expenditures conform to the requirements of KRS 68.110 and 68.310 but any substantial departure from this procedure would constitute illegal payment of claims. OAG 64-599 .

The action of a magistrate of the fiscal court in procuring or contracting for road and bridge work, such as to exceed the budget or appropriations provided therefor, would be illegal, and the county would not be financially or otherwise bound by such acts. OAG 64-881 .

Where in settling with the fiscal court the sheriff only withheld $8400 for 1964 instead of $9600, the 1964 settlement with the county should be reopened and the county should pay the $1200 to the sheriff out of an appropriate budgeted fund. OAG 65-755 .

The fiscal court, in its discretion, may pay as a properly budgeted item the legal fees of a sheriff and county attorney incurred in defending suits brought against them, providing the court makes a reasonable determination that: (1) the interests of the county were involved in the litigation and (2) the officers acted in good faith in connection with their actions which were the subject matters of the litigation and in connection with the discharge of their official duties. OAG 75-53 .

Where a fair board has asked the county fiscal court for financial assistance in the purchase of a site for conducting the county fair, the fiscal court may avoid the consitutional “debt” restrictions by establishing a grant from the county’s revenue sharing money to the recreation corporation, but the fiscal court must in no way become obligated contractually in connection with the purchase price. OAG 76-326 .

The fiscal court of a county cannot accept a bid in an amount that exceeds the amount appropriated in the budget for that fiscal year. OAG 78-609 .

The use of county funds, personnel or equipment to improve or maintain private drives or lanes is illegal and unconstitutional. OAG 79-343 .

In order to pay a county attorney’s civil salary, the fiscal court must scrupulously observe the dictates of KRS Ch. 68 and the salary must be authorized as a proper budgeted item for which current county revenues are sufficient to pay; thus the payment of the attorney’s salary can only legally and actually be paid as a properly budgeted item, even though the fiscal court observes its proper area of power (salary fixation for county civil attorney) and observes the rubber dollar concept. OAG 82-159 .

It is up to the fiscal court as a body to carefully consider contracts and claims against the county treasury such that the stern requirements of this section are met; the entire fiscal court has the responsibility not to engage in expenditures in excess of budget funds. OAG 82-309 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Claim created by unauthorized contract, county not to pay, Ky. Const., § 162.

County tax, order levying to specify purpose; funds not to be diverted, Ky. Const., § 180.

68.310. Limit of expenditures for first half of each fourth year.

Except in case of an emergency concerning which the county judge/executive, the fiscal court and the state local finance officer unanimously agree in writing, and, except for encumbrances or expenditures from the county’s road fund, no county shall, during the first half of any fourth fiscal year, beginning with the fiscal year 1998-1999, encumber or expend more than sixty-five percent (65%) in any fund budgeted for that fiscal year, not counting as current funds any budgetary allotments for or payments of principal and interest of bonded indebtedness. Prior to encumbering or expending any funds from the road fund during the first half of any fourth fiscal year which exceed sixty-five percent (65%) of the amount budgeted, the fiscal court shall assure that there are sufficient funds remaining in the general fund to provide for the excess encumbrance or expenditure from the road fund on a dollar for dollar basis. Those excess funds shall remain in the general fund until on or after January 1 of that fiscal year.

History. 938q-17: amend. Acts 1980, ch. 19, § 6, effective July 15, 1980; 1998, ch. 291, § 1, effective July 15, 1998.

Opinions of Attorney General.

The first half of the fourth fiscal year ends at midnight on December 31. OAG 65-870 .

The outgoing fiscal court must retain 35 percent of the total amount of current funds budgeted for that fiscal year, exclusive of budgetary allotments for or payments of bonded indebtedness, which will be available for expenditure during the second half of the fourth fiscal year which is the first six months of the new administration. OAG 69-403 .

The outgoing fiscal court must retain 35% of the total amount of current funds budgeted for the fourth fiscal year which will be available for expenditure during the second half of the fourth fiscal year in order to insure that the new administration will normally have enough money to at least pay for essential governmental services during the first six months of the new administration. OAG 73-802 .

Once revenue sharing money of the county is budgeted, it becomes subject to the limitations of this section. OAG 77-490 .

Where the current budget funds of a county total over $1,375,000, which includes $685,000 in insurance proceeds paid to the county upon the loss of its courthouse due to fire, the proceeds are included under this section in determining the unit used to compute the 65 percent limit on expenditures for the first half of the fiscal year, except for $43,000 already expended from the proceeds for architect’s fees to replace the building burned. OAG 82-5 .

It is up to the fiscal court as a body to carefully consider contracts and claims against the county treasury such that the stern requirements of KRS 68.300 are met; the entire fiscal court has the responsibility not to engage in expenditures in excess of budget funds. OAG 82-309 .

County’s violation of this section will not necessarily render claims against the county unenforceable. OAG 94-20 .

68.320. Borrowing in anticipation of current receipts.

The fiscal court may borrow money in anticipation of revenue receipts to meet the current expenses of the county as they accrue, and to pay interest and principal on bonded debts. Such current borrowing shall not exceed seventy-five percent (75%) of the unrealized and unencumbered revenue estimated in the budget to be derived from a tax levy for the then current fiscal year from which the principal of the borrowed money and the interest thereon may be paid. Bonded debt duly authorized and incurred is not subject to the limit imposed by this section.

History. 938q-16.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Change of Fiscal Year.

During fiscal year, fiscal court could borrow in anticipation of tax levied on basis of previous assessment, to meet hiatus caused by change of fiscal year. Jefferson County Fiscal Court v. Jefferson County, 257 Ky. 507 , 78 S.W.2d 324, 1934 Ky. LEXIS 565 ( Ky. 1934 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

If the sheriff was required to borrow money to run his office, the interest was his own personal responsibility and not an official expense. OAG 71-330 .

Without a vote of the people, any loan made to the city must not exceed, when considering the total financial obligations of the city for the particular fiscal year, the anticipated current revenue of the city for that fiscal year. OAG 78-572 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Morrow, County Debt Difficulties in Kentucky, 31 Ky. L.J. 242 (1943).

68.325. Claims against county, filing of — Duties of clerk and fiscal court — Exemptions. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 152) was repealed by Acts 1978, ch. 197, § 13, effective June 17, 1978.

68.330. Budget fund to be designated when claim allowed or warrant issued. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (1851c-9) was repealed by Acts 1978, ch. 197, § 13, effective June 17, 1978.

68.340. Budget records. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (935, 1851c-7: amend. Acts 1962, ch. 25, § 9; 1978, ch. 155, § 63) was repealed by Acts 1978, ch. 197, § 13, effective June 17, 1978.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

This section was also amended by Acts 1978, ch. 155, § 63. The later repeal by Acts 1978, ch. 197, § 13 prevails.

68.350. Investigation and examination by state local finance officer — Action to compel compliance with budget law.

The state local finance officer shall prescribe the books, blanks and forms to be used by county officials in the administration of the fiscal affairs of the county under the budget laws. He shall examine the budget records and make such investigations as may be necessary to determine the condition of the financial affairs of each county. If the state local finance officer finds that any county officer is willfully violating or neglecting the duties imposed by KRS 68.210 through 68.360 , he may institute legal proceedings in the Circuit Court of that county to compel compliance with the law.

History. 1851c-7: amend. Acts 1962, ch. 25, § 10; 1978, ch. 155, § 64, effective June 17, 1978; 1978, ch. 197, § 8, effective January 1, 1979; 1980, ch. 19, § 7, effective July 15, 1980.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

Howard v. Magoffin County, 734 S.W.2d 499, 1987 Ky. App. LEXIS 532 (Ky. Ct. App. 1987), overruled, Capital Holding Corp. v. Bailey, 873 S.W.2d 187, 1994 Ky. LEXIS 35 ( Ky. 1994 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

The state local finance officer has no authority to “cut” or reduce any validly fixed salaries, as a county debt, but he does have the authority to monitor and arrange the payment schedules of such obligations until the budget is on a sound and going basis. OAG 82-159 .

Where a vote for a motion for adoption of a county budget ended in a tie, the result was a defeat of the motion and thus the county was without a budget; a mandamus action could be brought against the fiscal court members who voted against the budget to ask the circuit court to require the adoption of a budget, and the state local finance officer could also sue the county pursuant to this section. OAG 88-45 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Audit of accounts of county officials, KRS 43.070 .

68.360. Monthly statement of county treasurer — Quarterly statement of county judge/executive.

  1. The county treasurer shall balance his books on the first day of each month, so as to show the correct amount on hand belonging to each fund on the day the balance is made, and shall within ten (10) days file with the county judge/executive and members of the fiscal court a monthly statement containing a list of warrants paid by him during the month, showing all cash receipts and the cash balance at the beginning and at the end of the month, and certifying that each warrant or contract is within the budget appropriation.
  2. The county judge/executive shall, within fifteen (15) days after the end of each quarter of each fiscal year, prepare a statement showing for the current fiscal year to date actual receipts from each county revenue source, the totals of all encumbrances and expenditures charged against each budget fund, the unencumbered balance of the fund, and any transfers made to or from the fund. The county judge/executive shall post the statement in a conspicuous place in the courthouse near the front door for at least ten (10) consecutive days, and transmit a copy to the fiscal court and to the state-local finance officer. The statement shall be read at the next meeting of the fiscal court.

History. 931, 1851c-10: amend. Acts 1978, ch. 197, § 9, effective June 17, 1978.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Removal of Treasurer.

Failure of treasurer to make written report to county judge/executive showing all receipts, as required by this section, was sufficient cause for removal of treasurer notwithstanding that he had made full settlements, custom had been not to make reports, and county judge/executive had advised that reports were unnecessary. Stanley v. Fiscal Court, Hopkins County, 190 Ky. 495 , 227 S.W. 813, 1921 Ky. LEXIS 471 ( Ky. 1921 ).

Violation of this section was sufficient ground for removal of a county treasurer. Lyon v. Bell, 275 Ky. 69 , 120 S.W.2d 752, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 366 ( Ky. 1938 ).

Cited:

Fannin v. Davis, 385 S.W.2d 321, 1964 Ky. LEXIS 158 ( Ky. 1964 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

The accounting system described in the department of local government’s “Uniform System of Accounts for Kentucky Counties” is a valid implementation of the county accounting laws. OAG 79-339 .

This section provides for a monthly statement of the county treasurer to be filed with the county judge/executive and the fiscal court, showing the balance of county funds available for governmental expenditure, and for the county judge/executive’s filing similar quarterly reports as to status of county funds, showing receipts and expenditures of county funds, which records are public records, as defined in KRS 61.870 , and are subject to inspection by any person under the conditions of KRS 61.872 . OAG 79-374 .

68.370. Quarterly statement of county receipts and expenditures. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (938g-19) was repealed by Acts 1978, ch. 197, § 13, effective June 17, 1978.

Courthouse Tax

68.480. Courthouse tax, counties containing a city of the second class. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 32, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1986, ch. 331, § 63, effective July 15, 1986.

Public Service Programs

68.510. Legislative intent.

It is the intent of KRS 68.520 to 68.550 to provide to counties within the Commonwealth of Kentucky, subject to the provisions for election set forth in KRS 68.520 to 68.550 , additional revenues for public service programs through voted levies of ad valorem taxes and license taxes.

History. Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 347, § 1; 1990, ch. 343, § 3, effective July 13, 1990.

Compiler’s Notes.

Section 11 of Acts 1990, ch. 343 provided: “The provisions of this Act shall be effective for tax years with assessment dates on or after January 1, 1991.”

Opinions of Attorney General.

The renovation or expansion of a county hospital building constitutes a capital improvement and therefore, the revenue for the performance of these jobs may not be obtained through the provisions of KRS 68.510 to 68.550 relating to the financing of public service programs. OAG 75-143 .

An occupational license tax must be uniformly imposed on all income earners working in a county, residents as well as nonresidents, for a distinction based upon sheer fact of nonresidency would not be valid. OAG 77-194 .

Since this section envisions a county-wide tax, a proposed public service program must be submitted to the voters in the unincorporated and incorporated areas of the county. OAG 77-194 .

Since KRS Chapter 173 specifically deals with the establishing, equipping, maintaining and administering of public libraries, that chapter is exclusively controlling for the purpose of providing revenues for public libraries. OAG 77-362 .

The requirement that the recommended financing of a county’s public service programs be approved by the electorate has no application to the appropriation under KRS 173.360 to provide library services. OAG 77-703 .

The fiscal court has no authority in acting on behalf of the taxing district to place the question of levying a mental health tax to a vote of the people, since no such authority exists in this section and since it is the duty of the fiscal court to make up its own mind as to whether or not the tax be imposed. OAG 78-422 .

This section refers solely to public service programs to be performed by the county and not such programs to be performed by any other political subdivision of the state. OAG 78-422 .

Though the fiscal court cannot order the tax question to be placed on the ballot on behalf of the Mental Health Retardation Board and the district created under KRS 68.510 et seq., not only by reason of the lack of statutory authority under the act but also by reason of the language expressed in this section to the effect that public service programs authorized thereby are those programs to be performed solely by the county; nevertheless the county can on its own initiative possibly place a similar question on the ballot as long as the general subject relates to human services and health services, provided the county itself operates the program on its own under KRS 68.520 and not pursuant to KRS 210.480 on behalf of the Mental Health-Mental Retardation Regional Board. OAG 78-422 .

68.520. “Public service program” defined — Provisions for submission of proposals to electorate — Limitation on ad valorem or occupational license taxes.

  1. As used in KRS 68.510 to 68.550 unless the context requires otherwise, “public service program” shall mean any newly-instituted or expanded service program to be performed by any county for the benefit of its citizens, which is approved by the electorate of such county as provided in KRS 68.510 to 68.550 , as distinguished from the acquisition by any such county of facilities of a capital nature, including, but not limited to, the provision or expansion of human services, provision for new health services or expansion of existing services, and the provision or expansion of police and fire protection services.
  2. For the purpose of providing one (1) or more public service programs to the citizens and inhabitants of any county, any county may submit to the electorate of such county one (1) or more proposals for the approval of one (1) or more public service programs to be financed by additional voted levies of ad valorem taxes upon all taxable property in such county. Such additional voted levies of ad valorem taxes upon all taxable property in any such county shall not exceed in the aggregate for all public service programs approved by the electorate, the limits prescribed by the Constitution of Kentucky for any such county.
  3. For the purpose of providing public service programs to the citizens and inhabitants of any county, any county may submit to the electorate of such county one (1) or more proposals for the approval of one (1) or more public service programs, to be financed by voted levies of occupational license fees. Such voted levies of occupational license fees in any county shall not exceed in the case of each individual public service program approved by the electorate, one-half of one percent (0.5%) of salaries, wages, commissions, and other compensation earned by persons within the county for work done and services performed or rendered in the county, and the net profits of businesses, trades, professions, or occupations from activities conducted in the county except public service companies, banks, trust companies, combined banks and trust companies, combined trust, banking and title companies, and all other cases where a county is prohibited by law from imposing a license tax.

History. Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 347, § 2.

Opinions of Attorney General.

If any of the proceeds of a county license tax passed under the authority of Ky. Const., § 181 as implemented by KRS 67.083 are used for “public service programs” as defined in this section without first having been submitted to the electorate as this section requires, then the fiscal court ordinance enacting the tax would be invalidated. OAG 75-385 .

This section, authorizing the county to establish “public service programs,” would at the same time authorize the county (upon establishing such a program under the terms referred to in KRS 68.510 et seq.), through its fiscal court, to contract with a third party, such as the Mental Health-Mental Retardation Regional Board which is presently professionally versed in the field, to perform the operational service of such a program as long as the county maintains overall control and, of course, the county can enter into contracts for service in those fields in which it is authorized by law to act. OAG 78-502 .

A county fiscal court may enact a general license tax ordinance without a vote of the electorate, where the revenue from such a county tax is needed to complete the county’s judicial facilities building; the tax may be applied effectively to all persons working and businesses operating within the county boundaries, including persons working and businesses operating within the city boundaries of a city in that county, even though the city already has its own payroll tax in effect. OAG 80-121 .

68.530. Fiscal court resolution and order designating submission of proposals to voters — Election — Framing of questions.

  1. In the event the fiscal court of any county determines that the public interest requires the establishment of one or more public service programs and that existing county revenues are inadequate to reasonably provide for such programs, the fiscal court may by resolution and order determine that one or more questions for the establishment of any such public service program shall be submitted to the electorate of such county. Such resolution and order shall designate with specificity each public service program to be submitted, together with the proposed source of funding therefor, which shall be either an ad valorem tax levy of a certain maximum number of cents per each one hundred dollars ($100) of assessed valuation subject to constitutional limits, or an occupational license tax subject to the limitations of KRS 68.520 to 68.550 .
  2. The fiscal court shall, following adoption of the resolution and order identified in subsection (1) of this section, cause to be prepared a question for submission to the voters of the county at an election held pursuant to notice as prescribed in KRS 424.130 . Said election shall be held in conjunction with a regularly scheduled November election, as provided by law. The question as it will appear on the ballot shall be filed with the county clerk not later than the second Tuesday in August preceding the regular election. The question shall be so framed that any voter who wishes to vote for the public service program or any individual public service program if there be more than one, may signify his approval by voting “Yes,” and any voter who wishes to vote against the public service program or any individual public service program so submitted may do so by voting “No.”

History. Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 347, § 3; 1996, ch. 195, § 38, effective July 15, 1996.

68.540. Approval by voters — Levy.

  1. If a majority of those voting on the question of any public service program approve such particular public service program, such particular public service program shall be adopted. The county clerk shall cause the question to appear before the voters, and the election results shall be canvassed and certified by the county board of election commissioners.
  2. If any public service program is approved by the electorate as herein provided, the specific tax so approved by the qualified voters in respect to such specific public service program shall be levied by the fiscal court in the manner provided by law, and such tax revenues shall be devoted solely to the public service program for which such specific taxes are levied. All such voted taxes shall be in addition to all other taxes otherwise authorized and provided by law.

History. Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 347, § 4; 1978, ch. 384, § 156, effective June 17, 1978; 1982, ch. 360, § 18, effective July 15, 1982; 1990, ch. 343, § 4, effective July 13, 1990.

Compiler’s Notes.

Section 11 of Acts 1990, ch. 343 provided: “The provisions of this Act shall be effective for the tax years with assessment dates on or after January 1, 1991.”

Opinions of Attorney General.

Without a vote of the people, any loan made to the city must not exceed, when considering the total financial obligations of the city for the particular fiscal year, the anticipated current revenue of the city for that fiscal year. OAG 78-572 .

68.550. Applicability to urban-county governments.

In an urban-county government, all rights, powers, privileges and responsibilities conferred by KRS 68.520 to 68.550 upon the fiscal court shall be exercised by the governing body of the urban-county government.

History. Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 347, § 5.

Industrial Taxing Districts

68.600. Definitions for KRS 68.600 to 68.606.

As used in KRS 68.600 to 68.606 , unless context otherwise requires:

  1. “Board” means the board of trustees of an industrial taxing district;
  2. “District” means an industrial taxing district; and
  3. “Governmental services” means services to include fire protection, solid waste management, water, electric, sewer, telecommunications, and other services as may be specified by the fiscal court of the county in which the district is located.

History. Enact. Acts 2002, ch. 361, § 7, effective July 15, 2002.

68.601. Compliance with KRS 65A.010 to 65A.090.

The board of trustees shall comply with the provisions of KRS 65A.010 to 65A.090 .

History. Enact. Acts 2013, ch. 40, § 25, effective March 21, 2013.

68.602. Portion of county in economic development project may organize district to levy taxes for higher level of services.

A portion of territory in a county that includes property that will be used in an economic development project that will result in the creation of at least five hundred (500) new jobs may be organized into a district for the purpose of levying taxes to pay for the establishment, operation, and maintenance of the level of governmental services provided to the district that exceeds the level of services provided to the other territory of the county.

History. Enact. Acts 2002, ch. 361, § 8, effective July 15, 2002.

68.604. Organization of taxing district under KRS 68.602 — Ad valorem tax and occupational license tax.

  1. Districts shall be organized under the procedures of KRS 68.602 .
  2. A district created under KRS 68.602 shall constitute a taxing district within the meaning of Section 157 of the Constitution of Kentucky.
  3. A special ad valorem tax and an occupational license tax may be imposed for the establishment, maintenance, and operation of the governmental services provided to the district.
    1. The ad valorem tax levied shall not exceed ten cents ($0.10) per one hundred dollars ($100) of the assessed valuation of all property in the district.
    2. The occupational license tax may be assessed after the approval of the fiscal court of the county in which the district is located under the provisions of KRS 68.178 , 68.180 , 68.185 , 68.190 , 68.195 , 68.197 , 68.198 , 68.200 , and 68.202 , as may be amended from time to time.
  4. All special ad valorem taxes and occupational license taxes authorized by KRS 65.180 , 65.182 , and 68.600 to 68.606 shall be collected in the same manner as are other county ad valorem taxes and occupational license taxes in each county affected and shall be turned over to the board, or to the fiscal court if there is no board. The special ad valorem tax shall be in addition to all other ad valorem taxes.

History. Enact. Acts 2002, ch. 361, § 9, effective July 15, 2002.

68.606. Administration of district — Board of trustees.

  1. A district shall be administered by the fiscal court of the county creating it, which shall control and manage the affairs of the district. The fiscal court may, by a majority vote of its members, establish a board of trustees to control and manage the affairs of the district.
  2. The board of trustees created under subsection (1) of this section shall operate in accordance with the following:
    1. The term of office of each trustee shall be four (4) years except as specified. The board shall consist of four (4) members who shall be appointed by the county judge/executive, with the approval of the fiscal court. Initial appointments shall be for terms of one (1), two (2), three (3), and four (4) years, as designated by the county judge/executive. Thereafter, each successor shall be appointed for a term of four (4) years. No more than three (3) members of the board shall be members of the same political party.
    2. The board shall elect its chairman from among its members. The board may appoint a secretary, an executive director, and other officials and employees who need not be members of the board. Members of the board shall not receive compensation for their services, but shall be reimbursed for their actual expenses incurred in the performance of their duties. A quorum for the transacting of the business of the board shall consist of three (3) members.
    3. A member of the board may be removed from office as provided by KRS 65.007 .

History. Enact. Acts 2002, ch. 361, § 10, effective July 15, 2002.

Penalties

68.990. Penalties.

  1. Any outgoing county treasurer who fails for ten (10) days to comply with any of the provisions of KRS 68.050 shall be fined not less than fifty (50) nor more than five hundred dollars ($500).
  2. The fiscal court and each of its members who fails or refuses to comply with any of the provisions of KRS 68.080 shall be fined fifty dollars ($50) for each offense.
  3. Any county officer or member of a fiscal court who violates any of the provisions of KRS 68.110(3) shall be fined not less than one hundred ($100) nor more than five hundred dollars ($500), or imprisoned in the county jail for not less than one (1) month nor more than twelve (12) months, or both.
  4. The fiscal court and each of its members who fails or refuses to implement a system of uniform accounts as prescribed by the state local finance officer pursuant to KRS 68.210 shall be fined one hundred dollars ($100) for each offense.
  5. Any local government official who fails to submit a financial report requested by the state local finance officer pursuant to KRS 68.210 shall, fifteen (15) days after written notice of noncompliance by the state local finance officer, be fined two hundred fifty dollars ($250) per day until compliance.
  6. Any county or state officer who knowingly violates any of the provisions of KRS 68.250(4), 68.270 , 68.280 , 68.310 , or 68.320 shall, in addition to the specific liabilities imposed for violating any of the provisions of those sections, be guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof, shall have his office declared vacant, and may also be fined not more than five hundred dollars ($500) or imprisoned for not more than ninety (90) days, or both.
  7. Any county officer who willfully violates any of the provisions of KRS 68.010 , 68.020(4), 68.220 to 68.260 , 68.290 , 68.300 , or 68.360 shall be fined not less than fifty (50) nor more than two hundred dollars ($200).
  8. Any person, including a corporation, who willfully fails to prepare or file a timely return, account, or license application described in KRS 68.185 , or who willfully prepares or files a false or inaccurate return, account, or license application shall be fined not more than one hundred dollars ($100).

History. 937, 938h-58, 938q-21, 1846, 1851b-4, 1851c-11, 4281a-4: amend. Acts 1962, ch. 210, § 16; 1964, ch. 111, § 2; 1978, ch. 197, § 10, effective June 17, 1978; 1980, ch. 19, § 8, effective July 15, 1980; 1984, ch. 14, § 4, effective July 13, 1984; 1984, ch. 111, § 48, effective July 13, 1984; 1990, ch. 476, Pt. IV, § 122, effective July 13, 1990.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Defense to Criminal Prosecution.

The fact that diverted funds were used to pay valid claims would be no defense to a criminal prosecution for violating subsec. (3) of KRS 68.110 . Hopkinsville v. Wheeler, 269 Ky. 291 , 269 Ky. 292 , 106 S.W.2d 1017, 1937 Ky. LEXIS 595 , 1937 Ky. App. LEXIS 595 ( Ky. 1937 ).

Cited:

Ballard v. Adair County, 268 Ky. 347 , 104 S.W.2d 1100, 1937 Ky. LEXIS 465 ( Ky. 1937 ); Lyon v. Bell, 275 Ky. 69 , 120 S.W.2d 752, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 366 ( Ky. 1938 ); Fulton County Fiscal Court v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 285 Ky. 17 , 146 S.W.2d 15, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 591 ( Ky. 1940 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

This section provides for possible sanctions against members of a fiscal court for failure to comply with the mandatory language of KRS 68.260 . OAG 88-45 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

County officers, penalty for misfeasance, malfeasance or nelgect of duty, KRS 61.170 .

Diversion of funds, liability, KRS 68.100 .

Warrant in excess of budget fund, liability of treasurer countersigning, KRS 68.300 .

CHAPTER 69 Commonwealth’s and County Attorneys

69.005. Annual salaries of certain county officers. [Renumbered as KRS 64.535.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1964, ch. 109, § 1; 1966, ch. 15, § 1) is recompiled as KRS 64.535 .

Commonwealth’s Attorneys

69.008. Commonwealth’s and county attorneys prohibited from requesting or requiring victim of alleged sexual offense to submit to polygraph or other examination — Other prohibitions.

No Commonwealth’s or county attorney shall:

  1. As a condition of proceeding with an investigation or prosecution of a case, request or require a victim of an alleged sexual offense to submit to a polygraph examination or any other device designed for the purpose of determining whether a person is telling the truth; or
  2. Charge or threaten to charge the victim of an alleged sexual offense with prosecution for a criminal offense for refusing to submit to a polygraph examination or other device designed for the purpose of determining whether a person is telling the truth.

History. Enact. Acts 2008, ch. 112, § 2, effective July 15, 2008.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(7/15/2008). 2008 Ky. Acts ch. 112, sec. 2, provided that this statute be created as a new section of KRS Chapter 65. However, in codification the Reviser of Statutes has created it as a new section of KRS Chapter 69, relating to Commonwealth’s and county attorneys, under the authority of KRS 7.136 (a).

69.010. Duty of Commonwealth’s attorney to attend to civil cases in Circuit Court — Exceptions.

  1. Except as provided in subsection (2) of this section, the Commonwealth’s attorney shall, except in Franklin County, attend to all civil cases and proceedings in which the Commonwealth is interested in the Circuit Courts of his judicial circuit. In civil cases the Governor may employ counsel to assist the Commonwealth’s attorney. The fees of the counsel employed by the Governor shall be paid out of the State Treasury upon a voucher signed by the Governor.
  2. In each judicial circuit containing a city of the first class, an urban-county government, or any city with a population of twenty-five thousand (25,000) or more, the Commonwealth’s attorney shall not be required to represent the Commonwealth in any civil proceedings.

History. 118: amend. Acts 1974, ch. 318, § 1; 1976, ch. 62, § 68; 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 17, § 22, effective January 1, 1978; 2014, ch. 92, § 42, effective January 1, 2015.

Compiler’s Notes.

For this section as effective until January 1, 2015, see the preceding section also numbered KRS 69.010

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. In General.

Under this section the Commonwealth’s Attorney is the proper party to invoke the penalty provisions set forth in KRS 271.990 (now repealed). Commonwealth ex rel. Breckinridge v. Monroe Co., 378 S.W.2d 809, 1964 Ky. LEXIS 213 ( Ky. 1964 ).

It could be an undue burden on the county attorney or Commonwealth attorney to represent the Commonwealth in actions described in KRS 15.715(4). The General Assembly has previously adopted this section, in which relief was given to the local Commonwealth’s Attorney in civil actions. Both legislative decisions are legitimate and logical classifications. Graham v. Mills, 694 S.W.2d 698, 1985 Ky. LEXIS 236 ( Ky. 1985 ).

2. Limit on Authority.

The Commonwealth’s Attorney has no authority to act as such outside his district, and cannot be compelled to do so. Thompson v. Carr, 76 Ky. 215 , 1877 Ky. LEXIS 32 ( Ky. 1877 ).

3. Special Counsel.

The Governor may employ special counsel in civil cases in the Circuit Court to assist the attorney representing the Commonwealth in such cases, whether it be the Commonwealth’s or county attorney. James v. Helm, 129 Ky. 323 , 111 S.W. 335, 33 Ky. L. Rptr. 871 , 1908 Ky. LEXIS 157 ( Ky. 1908 ).

When duty of prosecution of an action by the state rests on the county attorney, and the case requires duties outside of his county, grounds exist for the Governor to employ special counsel. Commonwealth v. Cundiff, 149 Ky. 37 , 147 S.W. 767, 1912 Ky. LEXIS 564 ( Ky. 1912 ); Commonwealth v. Hughes, 153 Ky. 34 , 154 S.W. 399, 1913 Ky. LEXIS 775 ( Ky. 1913 ).

Special counsel employed hereunder cannot be discharged without being secured in the payment of the amount due for their services. Gordon v. Morrow, 186 Ky. 713 , 218 S.W. 258, 1920 Ky. LEXIS 35 ( Ky. 1920 ).

4. Dismissal of Indictment.

This section vests the Commonwealth’s Attorney with practical control of all criminal prosecutions. Only he, or the county attorney when acting for him, may dismiss a good indictment. Commonwealth v. Cundiff, 149 Ky. 37 , 147 S.W. 767, 1912 Ky. LEXIS 564 ( Ky. 1912 ); Commonwealth v. Hughes, 153 Ky. 34 , 154 S.W. 399, 1913 Ky. LEXIS 775 ( Ky. 1913 ).

5. Penal Action.

A penal action must be brought by the Commonwealth’s Attorney for the county having jurisdiction and be brought in that county. Commonwealth v. Grand Central Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 97 Ky. 325 , 30 S.W. 626, 17 Ky. L. Rptr. 215 , 1895 Ky. LEXIS 178 ( Ky. 1895 ).

The Commonwealth’s Attorney is the chief prosecutor in the Circuit Court, and the institution and prosecution of penal actions therein rests in his discretion. Commonwealth v. Euster, 237 Ky. 162 , 35 S.W.2d 1, 1931 Ky. LEXIS 560 ( Ky. 1931 ).

6. Counsel Employed by Individuals.

Counsel for Commonwealth employed by individuals may make closing argument to the jury. Benningfield v. Commonwealth, 17 S.W. 271, 13 Ky. L. Rptr. 446 (1891); Roberts v. Commonwealth, 94 Ky. 499 , 22 S.W. 845, 15 Ky. L. Rptr. 341 , 1893 Ky. LEXIS 80 ( Ky. 1893 ); Adams v. Commonwealth, 129 Ky. 255 , 111 S.W. 348, 33 Ky. L. Rptr. 779 , 1908 Ky. LEXIS 159 ( Ky. 1908 ); Catron v. Commonwealth, 140 Ky. 61 , 130 S.W. 951, 1910 Ky. LEXIS 173 ( Ky. 1910 ).

7. Sex Offender Registration.

Trial court did not err by allowing the Commonwealth’s Attorney to appear on behalf of the Commonwealth at appellant’s sex offender risk assessment hearing; the Commonwealth had a serious and vital interest in protecting its citizens from harm by classifying and registering sex offenders, which outweighed any inconvenience that appellant might have suffered because of the notification and registration provisions. Bray v. Commonwealth, 203 S.W.3d 160, 2006 Ky. App. LEXIS 174 (Ky. Ct. App. 2006).

Cited:

Goose v. Commonwealth, 305 Ky. 644 , 205 S.W.2d 326, 1947 Ky. LEXIS 893 ( Ky. 1947 ); Davenport v. Commonwealth, 368 S.W.2d 327, 1963 Ky. LEXIS 46 ( Ky. 1963 ); Hancock v. Schroering, 481 S.W.2d 57, 1972 Ky. LEXIS 221 ( Ky. 1972 ); Commonwealth ex rel. Commonwealth ex rel. Hancock v. Davis, 521 S.W.2d 823, 1975 Ky. LEXIS 162 ( Ky. 1975 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

The Commonwealth’s Attorney cannot represent a private client in a criminal action. OAG 61-921 .

Although the Attorney General may be authorized to represent state employees in civil actions where the negligence of an individual operating a state-owned vehicle furnished for his regular use while on official business is brought into issue, he does not have a duty to do so, particularly where the defense of the interest of the Commonwealth is not a definite element of the action. OAG 62-883 .

While a justice of the peace, in a county of less than 250,000 population, who, in disregard of KRS 64.255 (now repealed), tries criminal cases, although he is not on salary from the county, is subject to civil suits brought by private individuals to recover fines and forfeitures illegally paid, nevertheless the county and Commonwealth’s Attorneys might consider filing suit on behalf of the county and Commonwealth in the Circuit Court of the county involved, since the remedies of individual convicted defendants would not necessarily take care of the public interest. OAG 70-48 .

A county attorney and his law partner, who is the Commonwealth’s Attorney of that district, may pursue cases pending against the Department (now Bureau) of Highways which are not in that county or judicial district, since there is no conflict of interest. OAG 70-307 .

This section would prevent the law partner of the Commonwealth’s Attorney from representing private clients in a condemnation suit in which a county in the Commonwealth’s Attorney’s district would be defendant. OAG 71-362 .

It is the duty of the Attorney General to represent state officers or departments in litigation in which the Commonwealth has an interest but a state officer or employee has no enforceable right to representation when sued individually unless the Attorney General or the legal counsel of the department believes the state has an interest in the litigation. OAG 73-874 .

Since a city-county airport board is an independent corporate entity, not a city or county agency, membership on such board is not an office contemplated by Ky. Const., § 165 or KRS 61.080 and is not incompatible with the office of Commonwealth’s Attorney. OAG 75-72 .

Since the practice of law does not include law book editing or writing, a Commonwealth’s Attorney would not be precluded from doing annotative work for a law publishing company, provided that the annotative work does not conflict with the duties of the office. OAG 76-298 .

When a lunacy inquest has been filed under KRS Chapter 202A or Chapter 203 (now renumbered and/or repealed), the Commonwealth’s Attorney may intervene on behalf of any party if he determines that it is in the best interest of the Commonwealth to do so. OAG 77-350 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Abolishment of office of Commonwealth’s Attorney, Ky. Const., § 108.

Agricultural seed law, Attorney General may act through Commonwealth’s attorney to prosecute violations of, KRS 250.160 .

Arrests, RCr 2.02 to 2.14.

Bawdy house, Commonwealth’s and county attorney to enjoin, KRS 233.030 to 233.050 .

Books to which Commonwealth’s and county attorneys are entitled, care and use thereof, KRS 57.300 , 57.330 , 57.360 .

Bureau of vehicle regulation to be represented by Commonwealth’s and county attorneys, KRS 281.800 .

Commission, Governor to issue to Commonwealth’s Attorney, KRS 61.020 .

Compensation of Commonwealth’s Attorney, Ky. Const., § 98.

Contempt proceedings, Commonwealth’s Attorney to institute proceedings for violation of appearance bond given in, KRS 432.250 .

Corporation, Commonwealth’s Attorney to institute proceedings to forfeit charter for violation of KRS 365.210 to 365.230, KRS 365.990.

Department for Human Resources, Commonwealth’s and county attorney to represent, KRS 212.270 .

Department of Natural Resources and Environmental Protection, Commonwealth’s and county attorneys to represent under the supervision of the Attorney General, KRS 149.070 .

Election and term of Commonwealth’s Attorney, Ky. Const., § 97.

Fines, disposition of, KRS 431.100 .

Fires, commissioner, Bureau of State Police to furnish data of evidentiary nature to Commonwealth’s Attorney or county attorney, KRS 227.290 .

Forest fire, Commonwealth’s Attorney to bring action to collect cost of fire fighting from person responsible for, KRS 149.180 .

Game and fish code, Commonwealth’s and county attorneys to enforce, KRS 150.130 .

Grand jury, Commonwealth’s Attorney to advise and interrogate witnesses when requested, RCr 5.14.

Indictment, dismissal of by Commonwealth’s Attorney, RCr 9.64.

Local option law, Commonwealth’s and county attorneys to bring suit for forfeiture of property for violation of, KRS 242.320 , 242.340 .

Military leave, annual, KRS 61.396 .

Mine, Commonwealth’s and county attorney to defend closing of, KRS 352.430 .

Office, person filing petition for reinstatement in, to notify Commonwealth’s and county attorney, KRS 63.160 .

Prisoner released from penitentiary, Commonwealth’s and county attorney to be notified when, KRS 197.170 .

Qualifications of Commonwealth’s Attorney, Ky. Const., § 100.

Removal of officers, duty of Commonwealth’s and county attorneys in regard to, KRS 63.170 , 63.180 .

Revenue, department of, Commonwealth’s and county attorney may be required to prosecute actions for, KRS 131.130 .

Stolen property, notice of motion for return of served on Commonwealth’s Attorney, KRS 431.210 .

Usurpers of county offices and franchises, Commonwealth’s Attorney to prosecute, KRS 415.040 .

Workers’ Compensation Board, Commonwealth’s and county attorney to represent upon the request of the board and the Attorney General, KRS 342.425 .

Kentucky Bench & Bar.

Advisory Opinions, Vol. 46, No. 3, July, 1982, Ky. Bench & Bar 44.

Kentucky Law Journal.

Montague, The Office of Attorney General in Kentucky, 49 Ky. L.J. 194 (1960).

Underwood, Part-Time Prosecutors and Conflicts of Interest: A Survey and Some Proposals, 81 Ky. L.J. 1 (1993).

ALR

Amount of compensation of private counsel employed to assist state’s attorney. 143 A.L.R. 846.

Status and functions of prosecuting attorney. 50 A.L.R.2d 771.

Change of venue, power or duty of prosecuting attorney to proceed with prosecution after. 60 A.L.R.2d 864.

Power of assistant or deputy prosecuting or district attorney to file information, or to sign or prosecute it in his own name. 80 A.L.R.2d 1067.

Constitutionality and construction of statute prohibiting a prosecuting attorney from engaging in the private practice of law. 6 A.L.R.3d 562.

Disqualification of prosecuting attorney on account of relationship with accused. 31 A.L.R.3d 953.

Immunity of prosecuting attorney or similar officer from action for false arrest or imprisonment. 79 A.L.R.3d 882.

Validity, under state law, of creation of office of independent special prosecutor. 84 A.L.R.3d 29.

Right of defendant in criminal proceeding to have immunity from prosecution granted to defense witness. 4 A.L.R.4th 617; 4 A.L.R.4th 1221.

Prosecutor’s power to grant prosecution witness immunity from prosecution. 4 A.L.R.4th 1221.

69.013. Duties as special prosecutor — Services outside of judicial circuit.

Each regular Commonwealth’s attorney shall be, ex officio, a special prosecutor of the Commonwealth, and as such shall perform such duties and render such services, at such time and places, coextensive with the Commonwealth as may be required by the Attorney General. The duties and services may include, but are not limited to, prosecution of or participation in action outside of his judicial circuit when directed by the Attorney General and assisting the Attorney General in preparation and presentation of the Commonwealth’s position in the appeal of criminal cases.

History. Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 26, § 1; 1976, ch. 62, § 69; 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 52.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

This section was repealed by act of the 1976 Extraordinary Session of the General Assembly (Acts Ex. Sess. 1976, ch. 17, § 52). It was also amended (Acts Ex. Sess. 1976, ch. 14, § 52). Since Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14 was signed by the Governor later than Acts ch. 17, it prevails.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Compensation.

Since under this section Commonwealth’s attorneys in Circuit Court districts containing cities of first or second class or urban-county governments do have duties coextensive with the state, the $12,000 salary limit for an officer, whose jurisdiction or duties are coextensive with Commonwealth and not the $7,200 salary limit for other public officers, pursuant to Ky. Const., § 246, applied to all Commonwealth’s Attorneys from the effective date of this section and the provisions for maximum annual compensation of $26,000 from July 1, 1976, for full-time district Commonwealth’s Attorneys pursuant to subsection (2) of KRS 64.510 (now repealed) did not exceed the $12,000 limit of 1949 as the change reflected purchasing power of money. Commonwealth ex rel. Hancock v. Davis, 521 S.W.2d 823, 1975 Ky. LEXIS 162 ( Ky. 1975 ).

69.015. Disqualification, assignment of another commonwealth’s attorney in action. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 26, § 2; 1976, ch. 62, § 70) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 17, § 52, effective January 1, 1978.

69.020. Commonwealth’s attorney shall not represent person accused of crime. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (121) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 17, § 52, effective January 1, 1978.

69.030. Duty to advise collector for Commonwealth.

Each Commonwealth’s attorney shall advise the collector of money due the Commonwealth in each county of his district in regard to motions against delinquent collecting officers for failing to return executions, and shall prosecute the motions.

History. 122: amend. Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 17, § 23, effective January 1, 1978.

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Law Enforcement in Kentucky, 52 Ky. L.J. 1 (1963).

69.040. Duty to collect judgments in favor of Commonwealth.

Each Commonwealth’s Attorney shall investigate and inquire into the condition of all unsatisfied judgments in his district in favor of the Commonwealth. He shall take all necessary steps by motion, action or otherwise to collect the unsatisfied judgments and cause them to be paid into the State Treasury.

History. 130.

Opinions of Attorney General.

A county attorney was entitled to a percentage of the fines and forfeitures collected by the judge of a quarterly court where said judge failed to make a timely report of the fine to the state and the omission was discovered by official audit. OAG 60-912 .

When a replevin bond is unsatisfied, the judge should require the county attorney and the Commonwealth’s attorney to proceed against the surety since all three (3) are jointly responsible for collecting the debt. OAG 68-526 .

69.050. Compensation of Commonwealth’s attorneys. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (124, 125, 133a-1, 1020a-1: amend. Acts 1944, ch. 16; 1966, ch. 26, § 7) was repealed by Acts 1968, ch. 152, § 168. For present law see KRS 15.755 .

69.053. Disqualified, not to receive moneys from fines or forfeitures. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 26, § 4) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 17, § 52, effective January 1, 1978.

69.055. Assistant commonwealth’s attorney in counties of 40,000 — Term — Salary. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1964, ch. 187, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 17, § 52, effective January 1, 1978.

69.057. Expenses of Commonwealth’s attorney or county attorney when acting as special prosecutor.

Any Commonwealth’s attorney or county attorney acting as a special prosecutor shall be reimbursed for his actual expenses incurred for lodging, meals and necessary travel. Such claims upon being approved by the Attorney General, shall be submitted to the Finance and Administration Cabinet for preparation of warrants and payments from the State Treasury.

History. Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 26, § 5; 1974, ch. 74, Art. II, § 9(1); 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 17, § 24, effective January 1, 1978.

Opinions of Attorney General.

Actual expenses for necessary travel in connection with a special prosecutor’s duties should be paid from the Commonwealth’s Attorneys’ expense account. OAG 69-655 .

69.060. Pro tem Commonwealth’s or county attorney — Appointment — Compensation.

Whenever the Commonwealth’s or county attorney is absent, the Chief Judge of the appropriate court may appoint a suitable attorney to act as Commonwealth’s or county attorney during his absence to prosecute criminal cases in the respective court. Such pro tem Commonwealth’s or county attorney shall receive for his services the same compensation which the regular Commonwealth’s or county attorney would receive for such criminal prosecutorial duties, on a proportional basis, to be paid out of the State Treasury on certificate of the Circuit Court clerk. The judge shall not appoint an attorney to act in the place of the Commonwealth’s attorney unless he and the county attorney are both absent, or are related to or counsel for the accused, except that in cases of felony the judge may appoint a pro tem Commonwealth’s attorney even though the county attorney is present and not disqualified.

History. 120, 352: amend. Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 53, effective January 2, 1978; 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 17, § 25, effective January 1, 1978.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

This section was amended by two acts of the 1976 Extraordinary Session of the General Assembly which do not appear to be in conflict. Although the two amendments were worded differently, since the substance is the same, they have been compiled together.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. “Absent.”

Mere absence from court is sufficient to warrant appointment of pro tem attorney. Shelton v. Commonwealth, 224 Ky. 671 , 6 S.W.2d 1094, 1928 Ky. LEXIS 661 ( Ky. 1928 ).

The Commonwealth’s Attorney is “absent,” in legal effect, when he is either disqualified, or for some reason disabled, to perform the duties of his office. Northcutt v. Howard, 279 Ky. 219 , 130 S.W.2d 70, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 261 ( Ky. 1939 ).

Unless the Commonwealth’s Attorney is physically absent from court or absent in legal effect by virtue of proceedings pending against him, no right or authority exists in the Circuit Court or any other official to appoint a substitute for him. Commonwealth ex rel. Breckinridge v. Wise, 351 S.W.2d 491, 1961 Ky. LEXIS 163 ( Ky. 1961 ).

2. Compensation.

Order of Circuit Judge, appointing pro tem Commonwealth’s Attorney and purporting to fix his compensation at a per diem plus one half the per centum of fines and forfeitures allowed the regular Commonwealth’s Attorney, was void insofar as it attempted to allow a per centum of fines in misdemeanor cases where the county attorney was present and not disqualified, and the order could be attacked collaterally in mandamus proceeding to compel commissioner of finance and state treasurer to pay such per centum. Wells v. Miller, 300 Ky. 680 , 190 S.W.2d 41, 1945 Ky. LEXIS 633 ( Ky. 1945 ).

Commonwealth’s Attorney pro tem is not entitled to any part of the fines and forfeitures collected in misdemeanor cases except in cases where the county attorney is absent or disqualified. Wells v. Miller, 300 Ky. 680 , 190 S.W.2d 41, 1945 Ky. LEXIS 633 ( Ky. 1945 ).

3. Discretion of Court.

In felony cases, when Commonwealth’s Attorney is absent or disqualified, and county attorney is present, appointment of a pro tem Commonwealth’s Attorney is in the discretion of the Circuit Judge. In all criminal cases in Circuit Court, in absence of or on disqualification of both Commonwealth’s Attorney and county attorney, appointment of pro tem attorney is mandatory. Adams v. Commonwealth, 129 Ky. 255 , 111 S.W. 348, 33 Ky. L. Rptr. 779 , 1908 Ky. LEXIS 159 ( Ky. 1908 ).

4. Service in Armed Forces.

This section provides the procedure to be followed in a situation where a Commonwealth’s Attorney is involuntarily inducted into the military service of the United States for such service does not make such attorney ineligible to continue in his position. Baker v. Dixon, 295 Ky. 279 , 174 S.W.2d 410, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 222 ( Ky. 1943 ).

This section supplies ample means whereby the interests of the Commonwealth in criminal trials might be fully protected and enforced while the regularly elected Commonwealth’s Attorney is serving in the military service of the United States. Caudel v. Prewitt, 296 Ky. 848 , 178 S.W.2d 22, 1944 Ky. LEXIS 595 ( Ky. 1944 ).

Circuit judge’s order approving affidavit of Commonwealth’s Attorney, which stated that he was unable to perform duties of office due to absence in the army, and that such duties were performed by a substitute selected by him, was equivalent to appointment of the substitute as Commonwealth’s Attorney pro tem, so as to entitle him to the remuneration provided by this section. Whitworth v. Miller, 302 Ky. 24 , 193 S.W.2d 470, 1946 Ky. LEXIS 592 ( Ky. 1946 ).

Although Commonwealth’s Attorney was entitled under theory of subrogation to claim against Commonwealth for amount which substitute, employed by him during time he was in the army, would have been entitled to receive as a pro tem Commonwealth’s Attorney, he could not recover such sum from the treasury, but was only entitled to have it credited against the amount being withheld by the Commonwealth out of future compensation due Commonwealth’s Attorney, to reimburse it for compensation erroneously paid to him while he was in the army. Whitworth v. Miller, 302 Ky. 24 , 193 S.W.2d 470, 1946 Ky. LEXIS 592 ( Ky. 1946 ).

5. De Facto Officer.

Where, due to erroneous belief that Commonwealth’s Attorney had abandoned office by entering armed forces, a successor was appointed to fill supposed vacancy, and full compensation was paid to him until regular attorney returned, the successor was a de facto officer, and the regular attorney could not recover from the state the amount paid to the successor under law that provided that any Commonwealth’s Attorney who has served in the armed forces of the United States should have deducted from his compensation any sum paid under this section to the attorney pro tem during the temporary absence of the regular attorney. Miller v. Robertson, 306 Ky. 653 , 208 S.W.2d 977, 1948 Ky. LEXIS 631 ( Ky. 1948 ).

6. Special Prosecutor.

Objection to special prosecutor may not be raised for the first time on appeal. Williams v. Commonwealth, 210 Ky. 518 , 276 S.W. 497, 1925 Ky. LEXIS 719 ( Ky. 1925 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

A Commonwealth’s Attorney pro tem is to be appointed to prosecute both felony and misdemeanor cases where both the Commonwealth’s Attorney and the county attorney are absent or disqualified, the latter being legally the same thing as being absent. OAG 64-176 .

The Commonwealth’s Attorney pro tem is entitled to 30 percent of the fines collected in those cases he prosecutes subject to the statutory maximum on compensation. OAG 64-176 .

Where the Commonwealth’s Attorney and the county attorney were both disqualified and it was so stated in the order appointing the Commonwealth’s Attorney pro tem, he was entitled to be compensated for prosecuting misdemeanor indictment cases as well as felonies. OAG 64-176 .

The pro tem appointment under this section is temporary, covering the absence of the county attorney from district court, and narrowly and exclusively relates to criminal prosecutions; there would be no official assistant to perform the county attorney’s civil duties under KRS 69.210 in his absence. OAG 82-418 .

This section applies to the absence of a Commonwealth Attorney, either physical or legal, but does not encompass a vacancy in office. OAG 92-101 .

The individual designated by the Attorney General as a temporary or interim Commonwealth’s Attorney pursuant to KRS 15.715(4) is not a de facto officer. Such person holds the position pursuant to statutory authorization, and therefore would not be a de jure officer. The law regarding de jure officers is that they are entitled to compensation at the same rate as the officer in whose place they act during the period that they had the responsibilities of that office. OAG 92-101 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

The Office of Attorney General in Kentucky. III. Relationship of the Office of Attorney General to Local Authorities, 51 Ky. L.J. 54-S (1963).

69.065. Compensation of Commonwealth’s attorney during period of service in Armed Forces. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 123) was repealed by Acts 1950, ch. 123, § 29.

69.070. Assistant commonwealth’s attorneys in counties of 200,000 — Terms. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (125a-1, 125a-2: amend. Acts 1948, ch. 109, § 1; 1952, ch. 37, § 1; 1962, ch. 157, § 1; 1966, ch. 255, § 80; 1972, ch. 124, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 17, § 52, effective January 1, 1978.

69.080. Qualifications and duties of assistant commonwealth’s attorneys. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (125a-3) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 17, § 52, effective January 1, 1978.

69.090. When assistants shall act as Commonwealth’s attorney.

In the absence of the Commonwealth’s attorney, the first assistant Commonwealth’s attorney shall act as Commonwealth’s attorney, without additional compensation. In the absence of both the Commonwealth’s attorney and the first assistant Commonwealth’s attorney, the second assistant Commonwealth’s attorney shall act as Commonwealth’s attorney, without additional compensation.

History. 125a-4.

69.095. Assistant commonwealth’s attorney — County of less than 200,000 and containing second-class city. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1964, ch. 106, §§ 1, 2; 1976, ch. 62, § 71) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 17, § 52, effective January 1, 1978.

69.097. Assistant Commonwealth’s attorney and district detective in a district with more than one judge. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1972, ch. 250, § 1; 1976, ch. 62, § 72) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 17, § 52, effective January 1, 1978.

69.100. Power of stenographers for Commonwealth’s attorney in county of 200,000 or more to administer oath.

In counties having a population of 200,000 or over, the stenographers for the Commonwealth’s attorney shall have the same power of administering an oath as a notary public.

History. 125c-1; amend. Acts 1952, ch. 37, § 2; 1962, ch. 44; 1966, ch. 255, § 81; 1972, ch. 124, § 2; 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 17, § 26, effective January 1, 1978.

Opinions of Attorney General.

The fiscal court of a county having no first or second-class cities and having a population of less than 200,000 does not have the authority to hire and pay a stenographer to work in the office of the Commonwealth’s Attorney. OAG 76-50 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Compensation, KRS 15.755 .

Notaries public, KRS 423.010 et seq.

ALR

Presence of stenographer in grand jury room as affecting indictment. 4 A.L.R.2d 392.

69.105. Power of stenographer for Commonwealth’s attorney to administer oath.

The stenographer for the Commonwealth’s attorney shall have the same power of administering an oath as a notary public.

History. Enact. Acts 1944, ch. 51; 1946, ch. 89; 1948, ch. 59; 1954, ch. 236, § 2; 1976, ch. 62, § 73; 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 17, § 27, effective January 1, 1978; 2014, ch. 92, § 43, effective January 1, 2015.

Compiler’s Notes.

For this section as effective until January 1, 2015, see the preceding section also numbered KRS 69.105 .

Opinions of Attorney General.

The fiscal court of a county having no first or second-class cities and having a population of less than 200,000 does not have the authority to hire and pay a stenographer to work in the office of the Commonwealth’s Attorney. OAG 76-50 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Notaries public, KRS 423.010 et seq.

69.110. Commonwealth detectives — Powers and duties.

Commonwealth detectives shall have the power of arrest in the counties comprising their districts and the right to execute process statewide. They shall assist the Commonwealth’s attorney in all matters pertaining to his office in the manner he designates and shall assist him in the preparation of all criminal cases in Circuit Court by investigating the evidence and facts connected with such cases.

History. 125b-1 to 125b-4, 125m-1 to 125m-4, 1851b-14: amend. Acts 1942, ch. 87, §§ 1, 2; 1944, ch. 108, § 1; 1948, ch. 192; 1950, ch. 107; 1952, ch. 37, § 3; 1952, ch. 109; 1962, ch. 66; 1966, ch. 138, § 1; 1966, ch. 255, § 82; 1972, ch. 45, § 1; 1972, ch. 124, § 3; 1972, ch. 276, § 1; 1976, ch. 62, § 74; 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 17, § 28, effective January 1, 1978; 1980, ch. 59, § 1, effective July 15, 1980.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

Wilbur v. Howard, 70 F. Supp. 930, 1947 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2877 (D. Ky. 1947 ), rev’d, 166 F.2d 884, 1948 U.S. App. LEXIS 2386 (6th Cir. Ky. 1948 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

A Commonwealth’s Attorney may not appoint assistant detectives to serve under the detective for the district. OAG 70-282 .

Under this section and subsection (2) of KRS 435.230 (repealed), a district detective has the same power of arrest as sheriffs have and may carry a concealed weapon when necessary for his protection in the discharge of his official duties. OAG 71-360 .

Commonwealth detective would be considered a state officer, and such office is not compatible with position of auxiliary or reserve policeman of a city. OAG 73-468 .

District Court judges are not authorized to appoint Commonwealth detectives. OAG 78-73 .

While this section grants a circuit detective those powers of execution of process and arrest held by a sheriff, there is no statutory provision which would permit the extension of those powers beyond the boundaries of a detective’s own judicial district. OAG 78-520 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Arrests, by whom and how made, KRS 70.078 , 431.005 , 431.025 , 431.055 .

69.115. Provisions of KRS 64.520 inapplicable to certain salaries. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1952, ch. 37, § 4) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 255, § 283.

69.120. Counties having a population of more than 150,000 to pay expenses of Commonwealth’s attorney.

The necessary expenses of the Commonwealth’s attorney in the discharge of his official duties in counties containing a population of more than 150,000 shall be paid out of the county levy. The fiscal court shall order payment of the expenses upon presentation of a bill by the Commonwealth’s attorney.

History. 125b-5.

69.130. Counties containing a consolidated local government or a city of the first class to provide automobile for Commonwealth’s attorney.

In any county containing a consolidated local government or city of the first class, the consolidated local government or fiscal court shall provide an automobile for the use of the Commonwealth’s attorney to assist him or her in his or her official duties, to be paid for out of the levy of the consolidated local government or county. The necessary expenses incurred in running, keeping, and repairing the automobile for official work shall be paid out of the levy of the consolidated local government or county upon requisition for such expenses by the Commonwealth’s attorney.

History. 125d-1: amend. Acts 2002, ch. 346, § 64, effective July 15, 2002.

Research References and Practice Aids

ALR

Mileage incidental to duty of office but which represented no actual expense or outlay by officer, officer’s rights and duties in respect of. 81 A.L.R. 493.

Mileage or traveling expenses, allowance for, to officer as affected by use of his own vehicle for transportation. 112 A.L.R. 172.

County Attorneys

69.210. Duties of county attorney.

  1. The county attorney shall attend the fiscal court or consolidated local government and conduct all business touching the rights or interests of the county or consolidated local government, and when so directed by the fiscal court or consolidated local government, he or she shall institute, defend, and conduct all civil actions in which the county or consolidated local government is interested before any of the courts of the Commonwealth.
  2. The county attorney shall attend to the prosecution in the juvenile session of the District Court of all proceedings held pursuant to petitions filed under KRS Chapter 610 and over which the juvenile session of the District Court has jurisdiction pursuant to KRS Chapter 610.
  3. The county attorney shall give legal advice to the fiscal court or consolidated local government and the several county or consolidated local government officers in all matters concerning any county or consolidated local government business within their jurisdiction. He or she shall oppose all unjust or illegally presented claims.
  4. A county attorney serving in a county, consolidated local government, or urban-county which is part of a judicial circuit described by KRS 69.010(2), in addition to the duties in subsections (1) and (2) of this section, shall have the following duties:
    1. He or she shall attend all civil cases and proceedings in his or her county in which the Commonwealth is interested; and
    2. He or she shall advise the collector of money due the Commonwealth in the county or consolidated local government in regard to motions against delinquent collecting officers for failing to return executions, and shall prosecute the motions. In no case shall the county attorney take a fee or act as counsel in any case in opposition to the interest of the county or consolidated local government.

History. 126, 127, 136: amend. Acts 1974, ch. 318, § 3; 1976, ch. 102, § 1; 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 17, § 29, effective January 1, 1978; 1980, ch. 215, § 1, effective July 15, 1980; 1986, ch. 423, § 185, effective July 1, 1987; 2002, ch. 346, § 65, effective July 15, 2002.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Litigation.

It is the duty of the county attorney to sue for the forfeiture of textbook bonds upon violation of their terms. D.C. Heath & Co. v. Commonwealth, 129 Ky. 835 , 113 S.W. 69, 1908 Ky. LEXIS 228 ( Ky. 1908 ); Money v. Beard & Marshall, 136 Ky. 219 , 124 S.W. 282, 1909 Ky. LEXIS 468 ( Ky. 1909 ).

County attorney cannot institute penal action in circuit court against will of Commonwealth's Attorney. Commonwealth v. Euster, 237 Ky. 162 , 35 S.W.2d 1, 1931 Ky. LEXIS 560 ( Ky. 1931 ).

County attorney had authority to institute action against county judge (now county judge/executive) to recover sums paid to county judge (now county judge/executive) under void order of fiscal court purporting to allow judge monthly sum for travel expenses, without county attorney first making demand on fiscal court that it bring suit, particularly where conduct of fiscal court members in voting for and approving the void order was such as to indicate that a demand would be futile. Estill County v. Noland, 301 Ky. 204 , 191 S.W.2d 223, 1945 Ky. LEXIS 715 ( Ky. 1945 ).

2. — Control.

When this section and KRS 69.220 (now repealed) are read together it is evident that the legislature intended that when the regular Commonwealth’s Attorney is present, he shall have full charge of all prosecutions, and the county attorney may not dismiss any of them without his consent; but when the Commonwealth’s Attorney is absent, the county attorney is in charge of all prosecutions except felonies, which are under the control of the commonwealth’s Attorney pro tem. Wells v. Miller, 300 Ky. 680 , 190 S.W.2d 41, 1945 Ky. LEXIS 633 ( Ky. 1945 ).

3. — Attendance.

The county attorney is required to attend to litigation in his county only. Shannon v. Ray, 280 Ky. 31 , 132 S.W.2d 545, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 70 ( Ky. 1939 ).

4. Legal Business of Fiscal Court.

This section and those following provided that the county attorney shall attend to the legal business of the fiscal court affecting the interests of the county. Commonwealth use of Clay County v. Sizemore, 269 Ky. 722 , 108 S.W.2d 733, 1937 Ky. LEXIS 666 ( Ky. 1937 ).

A county attorney, acting lawfully and within the scope of his duty, is protected by sovereign immunity from an action pursuant to this section because his duty to give legal advice to the fiscal court and county officers is a discretionary function. Franklin County v. Malone, 957 S.W.2d 195, 1997 Ky. LEXIS 105 ( Ky. 1997 ), overruled in part, Commonwealth Bd. of Claims v. Harris, 59 S.W.3d 896, 2001 Ky. LEXIS 198 ( Ky. 2001 ), overruled in part, Yanero v. Davis, 65 S.W.3d 510, 2001 Ky. LEXIS 203 ( Ky. 2001 ).

5. Conflict of Interest.

Where the interests or duty of the county attorney are in conflict with the interest and responsibilities of the county, the fiscal court has power to engage independent counsel to represent it and protect its interests. Commonwealth use of Clay County v. Sizemore, 269 Ky. 722 , 108 S.W.2d 733, 1937 Ky. LEXIS 666 ( Ky. 1937 ).

Where county attorney represented defendant in rape case, but there were no allegations of any derelictions on the attorney’s part, the court affirmed stating that the denial of a constitutional guaranty, such as the right of representation by counsel, will not render a judgment of conviction void, if the court had jurisdiction of the person and of the subject matter. Berry v. Gray, 299 S.W.2d 124, 1957 Ky. LEXIS 399 (Ky.), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 986, 77 S. Ct. 1288, 1 L. Ed. 2d 1145, 1957 U.S. LEXIS 824 (U.S. 1957).

Where the majority of the fiscal court voted to adopt its own administrative code and the county executive refused to complete the necessary steps to enact the code, and the fiscal court directed the county attorney to petition the trial court for relief, the county attorney was bound to follow the fiscal court’s directive, so he acted appropriately when he filed suit on behalf of the fiscal court; there was no conflict of interest, and the trial court did not err when it denied the executive’s motion to disqualify the county attorney. Knight v. Spurlin, 226 S.W.3d 844, 2007 Ky. App. LEXIS 116 (Ky. Ct. App. 2007).

6. Assistant.

The Governor may employ special counsel to assist county attorney in civil cases. James v. Helm, 129 Ky. 323 , 111 S.W. 335, 33 Ky. L. Rptr. 871 , 1908 Ky. LEXIS 157 ( Ky. 1908 ).

The county attorney is the official assistant of the Commonwealth’s Attorney in felony prosecutions, and in his absence acts in his stead. Catron v. Commonwealth, 140 Ky. 61 , 130 S.W. 951, 1910 Ky. LEXIS 173 ( Ky. 1910 ).

Notwithstanding county attorney has primary duty to represent county’s interests, fiscal court may employ counsel to assist him, where in its judgment county attorney is unable fully to look after its interests. Lawrence County v. Stewart, 287 Ky. 827 , 155 S.W.2d 446, 1941 Ky. LEXIS 651 ( Ky. 1941 ).

7. Appeal of Order of Fiscal Court.

County attorney may appeal to the Circuit Court from any order of the fiscal court making an unlawful appropriation of public money, or, after it has been appropriated, may institute an action to recover it, when so directed by the county or fiscal court. Hopkins County v. Givens, 96 S.W. 819, 29 Ky. L. Rptr. 993 (1906).

8. Appeals from Fiscal and County Court.

County attorney has authority to take appeals from county and fiscal courts, even though not directed to do so. Breckinridge County v. Rhodes, 127 Ky. 444 , 105 S.W. 903, 32 Ky. L. Rptr. 352 , 1907 Ky. LEXIS 147 ( Ky. 1907 ); Knott County v. Michael, 264 Ky. 36 , 94 S.W.2d 44, 1936 Ky. LEXIS 271 ( Ky. 1936 ); Johnson County v. High Test Oil & Gas Co., 267 Ky. 760 , 103 S.W.2d 272, 1937 Ky. LEXIS 385 ( Ky. 1937 ).

Where fiscal court appeals to Court of Appeals and then orders county attorney to discontinue the appeal, the attorney may make himself a party to the proceeding and appeal in his official capacity. Jordon v. Baker, 252 Ky. 40 , 66 S.W.2d 84, 1933 Ky. LEXIS 1007 ( Ky. 1933 ).

When a claim allowed by the fiscal court is not legally presented, or is unjust, the county attorney may appeal to the Circuit Court on behalf of the county, without being ordered to do so by either the county court or the fiscal court. Perry County v. McIntosh, 280 Ky. 223 , 133 S.W.2d 90, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 124 ( Ky. 1939 ).

The county attorney has authority to prosecute an appeal from an order of the fiscal court allowing unjust or illegally presented claims. Hoskins v. Leslie County Fiscal Court, 242 S.W.2d 874, 1951 Ky. LEXIS 1086 ( Ky. 1951 ).

9. — Bond.

County attorney may appeal to the Circuit Court, orders of the fiscal court allowing claims, and in so doing is not required to execute an appeal bond. Clay County v. Roach, 174 Ky. 436 , 192 S.W. 489, 1917 Ky. LEXIS 194 ( Ky. 1917 ).

10. — Dismissal.

Appeal from fiscal court by county attorney cannot be dismissed by the fiscal court over the county attorney’s objection. Jefferson County v. Waters, 111 Ky. 286 , 63 S.W. 613, 23 Ky. L. Rptr. 669 , 1901 Ky. LEXIS 201 ( Ky. 1901 ).

11. — County Judge.

County judge (now county judge/executive) is entitled to appeal from order of fiscal court when county attorney refuses to do so. Boyd County v. Arthur, 118 Ky. 932 , 82 S.W. 613, 26 Ky. L. Rptr. 906 , 1904 Ky. LEXIS 121 ( Ky. 1904 ).

12. Representation of Master Commissioner.

While master commissioner is a public officer he is not a state officer nor county officer, and neither the Attorney General nor county attorney is required to represent him. Shannon v. Ray, 280 Ky. 31 , 132 S.W.2d 545, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 70 ( Ky. 1939 ).

13. Commonwealth’s Attorney Pro Tem.

Commonwealth’s Attorney pro tem is not entitled to any part of the fines and forfeitures collected in misdemeanor cases except in cases where the county attorney is absent or disqualified. Wells v. Miller, 300 Ky. 680 , 190 S.W.2d 41, 1945 Ky. LEXIS 633 ( Ky. 1945 ).

14. — Compensation.

The county attorney is entitled to reimbursement for expenses for services which it is his duty to perform. Spalding v. Thornbury, 128 Ky. 533 , 31 Ky. L. Rptr. 738 , 33 Ky. L. Rptr. 362 , 103 S.W. 291, 108 S.W. 906, 1907 Ky. LEXIS 344 ( Ky. 1907 ); reh. den., Spalding v. Thornbury, 128 Ky. 533 , 103 S.W. 291, 108 S.W. 906, 31 Ky. L. Rptr. 738 , 33 Ky. L. Rptr. 362 , 1907 Ky. LEXIS 344 ( Ky. 1907 ), modified, 128 Ky. 539 , 108 S.W. 906 ( Ky. 1908 ).

County attorney is properly employable and compensable for making settlements for the fiscal court with the sheriff. Slayton v. Rogers, 128 Ky. 106 , 107 S.W. 696, 32 Ky. L. Rptr. 897 , 1908 Ky. LEXIS 36 ( Ky. 1908 ).

The county attorney is entitled to no contractual compensation for services which it is his duty to perform. Terrell v. Trimble County, 128 Ky. 51969 , 33 Ky. L. Rptr. 364 , 108 S.W. 848, 1908 Ky. LEXIS ( Ky. 1908 ); Money v. Beard & Marshall, 136 Ky. 219 , 124 S.W. 282, 1909 Ky. LEXIS 468 ( Ky. 1909 ).

Fiscal court may employ and compensate county attorney for services rendered outside the state or in a federal court. Slayton v. Rogers, 128 Ky. 106 , 107 S.W. 696, 32 Ky. L. Rptr. 897 , 1908 Ky. LEXIS 36 ( Ky. 1908 ).

County attorney may be compensated for services rendered after the expiration of his term in proceedings instituted by him while in office. Money v. Beard & Marshall, 136 Ky. 219 , 124 S.W. 282, 1909 Ky. LEXIS 468 ( Ky. 1909 ).

Order of Circuit Judge appointing pro tem Commonwealth’s Attorney and purporting to fix his compensation at a per diem plus one half the per centum of fines and forfeitures allowed the regular Commonwealth’s Attorney, was void insofar as it attempted to allow a per centum of fines in misdemeanor cases where the county attorney was present and not disqualified, and the order could be attacked collaterally in mandamus proceeding to compel commissioner of finance and State Treasurer to pay such per centum. Wells v. Miller, 300 Ky. 680 , 190 S.W.2d 41, 1945 Ky. LEXIS 633 ( Ky. 1945 ).

15. Arrest Warrant.

There is no authority for a county prosecutor to issue an arrest warrant or summons, or to sign the name of a district judge or trial commissioner thereto, even if the district judge authorizes the prosecutor to do so. Dugger v. Off 2nd, Inc., 612 S.W.2d 756, 1980 Ky. App. LEXIS 425 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980).

Cited:

Berry v. Gray, 155 F. Supp. 494, 1957 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2964 (D. Ky. 1957 ); Funk v. Milliken, 317 S.W.2d 499, 1958 Ky. LEXIS 100 ( Ky. 1958 ); Franklin County Fiscal Court v. Stewart, 757 S.W.2d 194, 1988 Ky. App. LEXIS 27 (Ky. Ct. App. 1988); Lococo v. Barger, 958 F. Supp. 290, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4262 (E.D. Ky. 1997 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

The power of the fiscal court to act is not contingent upon the presence of the county attorney. OAG 61-309 .

Where zoning ordinances have been adopted jointly by the county and a city of the second class, the county attorney has the duty of handling any violations of the zoning ordinance occurring outside the city limits and within the county. OAG 61-505 .

A county attorney should not have a financial interest in the sale of insurance policies to the fiscal court. OAG 62-24 .

Although the Attorney General may be authorized to represent state employees in civil actions where the negligence of an individual operating a state owned vehicle furnished for his regular use while on official business is brought into issue, he does not have a duty to do so, particularly where the defense of the interest of the Commonwealth is not a definite element of the action. OAG 62-883 .

A Commonwealth’s Attorney pro tem is to be appointed to prosecute both felony and misdemeanor cases where both the Commonwealth’s Attorney and the county attorney are absent or disqualified, the latter being legally the same thing as being absent. OAG 64-176 .

Where the Commonwealth’s Attorney and the county attorney were both disqualified and it was so stated in the order appointing the Commonwealth’s Attorney pro tem, he was entitled to be compensated for prosecuting misdemeanor indictment cases as well as felonies. OAG 64-176 .

A county attorney may be employed as private counsel by a joint city-county air board and the Compensation paid him would not be considered as part of the income derived as county attorney. OAG 65-837 .

In a county where no assistant county attorney was appointed, the county attorney could not validly delegate criminal prosecutions to one of his lawyer associates. OAG 66-382 .

Where the county attorney does not personally participate in the prosecution but has another attorney, not an assistant county attorney, acting in his behalf, the county attorney could not collect the statutory fees. OAG 66-382 .

A county attorney would have no official duty to represent the sheriff in a law suit filed by the school board against the sheriff for fees reimbursable to the school board. OAG 67-144 .

The county attorney is required to institute such suits as may be necessary to attempt the collection of delinquent county hospital accounts when so directed by the fiscal court through proper orders and there is no statutory basis for extra compensation in performing such duties. OAG 67-319 .

A county attorney may assist a private attorney in representing the Commonwealth of Kentucky in another county, since this would not constitute a case “in opposition to the interest of the county.” OAG 68-114 .

A county attorney has no duty to represent the commissioners of the courthouse district, since this section relates to advising county officers common to all of the counties of Kentucky. OAG 68-512 .

When a replevin bond is unsatisfied, the judge should require the county attorney and the Commonwealth’s Attorney to proceed against the surety since all three are jointly responsible for collecting the debt. OAG 68-526 .

The county attorney or one of his assistants must be present in cases where a person, who has had his driving privileges suspended, has appealed to the quarterly court of the county. OAG 68-584 .

Where the county or quarterly court requires the drafting of orders and where a short form type of order will not suffice, the judge may call upon the county attorney to draft such necessary orders. OAG 68-597 .

The city corporate counsel and the county attorney could be required to furnish legal representation for a joint city and county planning commission. OAG 69-200 .

A county attorney must discontinue his representation of persons accused of crime once he assumes the office of county attorney. OAG 69-667 .

The county attorney must attend the circuit courts held in his county in which mental competency inquests are conducted and must aid the Commonwealth’s Attorney in the prosecution of such inquests. OAG 70-7 .

In the absence of the Commonwealth’s Attorney, the county attorney is required to prosecute mental competency inquests. OAG 70-7 .

While a justice of the peace, in a county of less than 250,000 population, who, in disregard of KRS 64.255 (now repealed), tries criminal cases, although he is not on salary from the county, renders himself subject to civil suits brought by private individuals to recover fines and forfeitures illegally paid, nevertheless the city and Commonwealth’s Attorneys might consider filing suit on behalf of the county and Commonwealth in the Circuit Court of the county involved, since the remedies of individual convicted defendants would not necessarily take care of the public interest. OAG 70-48 .

The county attorney may defend in criminal actions originating and tried in counties other than his own and he may defend in criminal actions in the circuit court of his county and the Court of Appeals provided that he did not participate in a proceeding in his county’s inferior courts involving his duty as county attorney related to the subject charge or charges involved in the criminal action or actions. OAG 70-109 .

A county attorney and his law partner, who is the Commonwealth’s Attorney of that district, may pursue cases pending against the department (now Bureau) of Highways which are not in that county or judicial district, since there is no conflict of interest. OAG 70-307 .

If defending the processioners or the county surveyor in a suit to establish a county boundary would be of no interest or benefit to the county, then the county attorney would have no obligation to defend the processioners or county surveyor. OAG 70-623 .

The representation of a labor union by the law firm of a county attorney is not a conflict of interest unless the representation of the union may in some way involve the county’s interest. OAG 71-176 .

Where, in the reasonable judgment of the fiscal court, the county attorney is unable for any reason, including the county attorney’s viewpoint toward the subject action of the fiscal court, to look after the interests of the county fully and completely, the fiscal court may employ counsel to assist in defending a suit against the fiscal court or it may employ independent counsel if the circumstances warrant. OAG 71-228 .

Where the fiscal court accepted a petition to dissolve a library district as valid after the county attorney advised them it was not valid and the fiscal court was subsequently sued by the library board, if the county attorney did not feel he could adequately defend the suit, the fiscal court could employ counsel to assist him. OAG 71-228 .

Where a suit was filed against the county clerk to require him to place an individual’s name on the election ballot, since the county had an interest in the proper conducting of elections, the county attorney was required to represent the county clerk in the trial court. OAG 71-506 .

Unless the fiscal court determines that the county attorney is unable for any reason to look after the interests of the county during litigation of a particular matter, the county attorney has the responsibility to represent the county in a law suit without additional compensation, but where the fiscal court determines that the county attorney is not able for some substantial reason to look after the interest of the county then the court has the authority to employ counsel to assist the county attorney in the case. OAG 72-787 .

A county attorney should not engage in negotiations relating to state highway rights-of-way located in his county nor condemnation cases arising in his county even though he was retained prior to assuming office, but he may represent private parties involved in condemnation proceedings in other counties since his statutory obligations as county attorney do not extend to other counties. OAG 74-111 .

If, in the reasonable judgment of the fiscal court, the county attorney is unable for any reason to look after the interests of the county and fiscal court fully and completely, the fiscal court may employ outside counsel to assist the county attorney in defending a civil action against the fiscal court and pay for such additional services out of the county treasury. OAG 74-345 .

There is no criminal rule or statute authorizing a county attorney to issue a warrant of arrest. OAG 74-526 .

Only magistrates or other officers authorized to issue a warrant of arrest may actually issue such warrants under RCr 2.04 and the issuance of warrants of arrest is not included in the general duties of a county attorney under this section. OAG 74-526 .

If both the Commonwealth’s Attorney and his assistant are absent, the county attorney is the chief prosecutor before the circuit court. OAG 75-109 .

The Commonwealth’s Attorney has the authority to assign the county attorney whatever duties he desires in all criminal prosecutions before the Circuit Court, which assigned tasks the county attorney is bound by statute to perform. OAG 75-109 .

The appointment of a part-time assistant Commonwealth’s Attorney does not in any way modify the duties of the county attorney as the assistant stands in the stead of the Commonwealth’s Attorney and, in his absence, becomes chief prosecutor. OAG 75-109 .

Where the school board had requested the fiscal court to levy a gross receipts utility tax for school purposes after compliance with KRS 160.593 and 160.603 and the fiscal court refused to levy such tax, the county attorney could not represent the school board if a suit against the fiscal court became necessary because of conflict of interest as county attorney pursuant to this section. OAG 75-152 .

The members of the hospital district board are not included among “the several county officers” and thus the county attorney is not required to provide legal services to either the hospital district or the board. OAG 75-207 .

Under this section and KRS 69.560 (now repealed) the county and city attorneys must furnish legal advice to a joint city-county planning commission formed between a fourth-class city and the county in which it is located, although the commission may, pursuant to KRS 100.173 , employ independent counsel. OAG 75-256 .

In advising a joint city-county planning commission as required by this section and KRS 69.560 (now repealed) the county and city attorneys should each advise the commission within the area of their jurisdiction and the advice of neither is secondary to that of the other. OAG 75-256 .

Under subsection (2) the county attorney’s duty to prosecute all cases in city police court in which the county or Commonwealth is interested, where the city does not have a prosecuting attorney, is mandatory and the performance of this duty does not depend on the consent of the city involved as it is a statutory duty. OAG 75-683 .

The fiscal court must furnish the county attorney with office space, either in the courthouse or in some other location. OAG 76-380 .

The fiscal court should not charge the county attorney for county building space used by him as county attorney; however, if the county attorney uses a portion of his time for private practice, then the fiscal court should charge him rent on a pro rata basis; the fiscal court can determine the amount of time the county attorney spends on county business by requiring him to submit an affidavit as to the approximate percentage. OAG 76-380 .

Where certain convicted criminal defendants brought civil rights suits against various county officials and the fiscal court determines that the subject officials performed their statutory duties in a bona fide manner during the period in question in the civil rights litigation, the fiscal court, in its discretion, may authorize the county attorney to defend such actions; however, where, in the reasonable judgment of the fiscal court, the county attorney, considering his official workload, would be unable to look after the interest of the county fully and completely, the fiscal court may employ special counsel to assist the county attorney or conduct themselves, the defense of such officials. OAG 77-21 .

The county attorney has no obligation to defend members of the fiscal court on criminal charges, nor has he any duty to defend civilly the members if he deems their conduct outside the law. OAG 77-465 .

The nonjudicial and civil law functions retained by the county attorneys after the 1976 amendment of this section, and which may be treated by future legislation, are not, and would not be, in conflict with the letter and spirit of the Judicial Article (Acts 1974, ch. 84). OAG 76-497 . (Opinion prior to 1976 (Ex. Sess.) amendment.)

Ky. Const., § 165 and KRS 61.080 which prohibit a person’s being a county and state officer at the same time do not apply to the county attorney since the county attorney is one constitutional office, although the Legislature may prescribe duties for that office pertaining to county functions as well as to state court functions. OAG 76-497 .

A county attorney should not enter into a contract with the fiscal court as to the scope of his duties and compensation inasmuch as his civil duties are prescribed by statute and his compensation is strictly up to the fiscal court. OAG 78-13 .

The county attorney would handle civil appeals to Circuit Court in which the county is a party. OAG 78-190 .

Where county attorney had been suspended from the practice of law he no longer possessed the constitutional qualifications of a county attorney and thus since he can no longer serve as county attorney and as a prosecutor in the court of justice his prosecutorial salary from the State Treasury and his expense allowance should be stopped. OAG 78-279 .

The county attorney’s obligations to the county are of a civil nature, the main thrust of this section being that he must at all times represent the interest of the county. OAG 78-324 .

Under this section the primary responsibility for drafting fiscal court ordinances rests with the county attorney, but if in any particular situation the county attorney for any good reason is unable to draft the particular ordinance, or if it is desirable to bring in some person with legal expertise in a particular area of government, the fiscal court has the authority to employ special counsel for such drafting or to assist the county attorney in drafting the ordinance or ordinances. OAG 78-521 .

A district court judge has no authority over the county attorney to direct him to file a civil action. OAG 80-163 .

A county attorney is a county constitutional officer, pursuant to Ky. Const., § 99, and therefore, an assistant county attorney is a statutory county officer for the purpose of considering the general question of incompatibility of offices; since the office of assistant county attorney involves only one office, a county constitutional office, no incompatibility exists even though the county attorney has been given state duties as a prosecutor (KRS 15.725(2)) and county duties as an adviser to fiscal court. OAG 80-341 .

If a fiscal court votes to establish a road as a county road but the evidence indicates that the proposed road would be of private benefit only, the county attorney could file an injunctive civil suit in circuit court, seeking the enjoining of any action implementing the decision to establish the road. OAG 80-382 .

The county attorney has a duty, under this section, to represent the commissioners’ report on reapportionment in the District Court, since the commissioners are merely special agents for the county government; accordingly, he cannot represent the magistrates who individually oppose the report. OAG 80-524 .

The county attorney is required to advise the county judge/executive concerning initiation of reapportionment proceedings and if for any valid reason he is unable to do so, the fiscal court may procure and pay for the services of another attorney for such advice. OAG 80-524 .

The county judge/executive can employ an outside attorney to advise on the reapportionment of the county’s magisterial districts. OAG 80-620 .

The county attorney, who has the duty concerning the proper preparation of orders, resolutions and ordinances of fiscal court, pursuant to this section, may properly take the minutes of a fiscal court meeting, since this section requires the county attorney to attend fiscal court and “conduct all business in that court touching the rights or interests of the county . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ” and that language is broad enough to encompass the taking of the minutes. OAG 81-337 .

Neither this section nor KRS 15.725 specifically require the county attorney to advise a joint city-county planning commission, but this section is sufficiently broad to justify an interpretation that the county attorney should advise a city-county planning commission concerning the interests of the county. However, a county attorney would not be expected to render such advice if doing so would create a conflict of interest situation. OAG 82-377 .

The pro tem appointment under KRS 69.060 is temporary, covering the absence of the county attorney from district court, and narrowly and exclusively relates to criminal prosecutions; there would be no official assistant to perform the county attorney’s civil duties under this section in his absence. OAG 82-418 .

The county attorney has no responsibility concerning the advising or representing of the jailer, where such jailer is sued by a prisoner for a specific wrongful act, unless a county interest is involved; where the county interest is present, the fiscal court may (permissive only) direct the county attorney to defend such civil action. OAG 83-35 .

Where the jailer is sued in his official capacity, and where the county attorney and fiscal court have reason to believe the jailer acted in good faith in connection with his statutory duties, a county interest is involved since the county has a direct interest in the manner in which the county jailer’s statutory duties are performed in connection with a county institution, the county jail, and the concomitant impact upon the affected public. OAG 83-35 .

Where the county attorney would have a conflict of interest as between the jailer and county, the fiscal court may employ other counsel to defend the jailer, assuming that the county attorney and fiscal court have reason to believe the jailer acted in good faith in the matter being litigated. OAG 83-35 .

The county attorney, although a county constitutional officer under Ky. Const., § 99 and this section, has been given a state-wide function in his prosecutorial role and KRS 15.765(3) establishes the indexing of the original $12,000 maximum in Ky. Const., § 246 as the maximum compensation possible for the county attorney, regardless of what he receives from the fiscal court as county attorney, as the county’s civil advisor, and from the state as a state prosecutor. OAG 83-38 .

Under this section, the county attorney’s primary role concerns the fiscal court, as relates to the rights or interests of the county, including litigation for or against the county; where there is any conflict between advising a particular county officer and advising the county in its collective governmental sense, the county attorney must advise the county. OAG 83-380 .

Under subsection (3) of this section, the county attorney is required to give legal advice to the fiscal court members and “the several county officers,” which latter group would include the jailer, in all matters concerning any county business within their jurisdiction. However, the county attorney is not automatically the attorney for the jailer in a strict and legal sense; in a particular civil case brought against the jailer, the county attorney should defend the jailer, when so directed by the fiscal court, provided the county has a substantial interest in the litigation. OAG 83-380 .

The fiscal court lacks the authority to direct a county attorney to conduct a suit for the clerk for the collection of the state motor vehicle usage taxes, since no county interest is present. OAG 85-35 .

The county attorney was not required to represent the county sheriff in a lawsuit against delinquent taxpayers, since there is no requirement in the statutes relating to the sheriff’s responsibilities in regard to the collection of delinquent taxes that mandates the actual collection of a certain percentage of taxes, there is no authority for the sheriff to file suit for the collection of delinquent taxes, other than distraint of personal property, and even if the sheriff does not distrain personal property, there is no authority in the statutes for the Revenue Cabinet to withhold the sheriff’s quietus for failure to collect a certain percentage of delinquent taxes. OAG 86-61 .

Neither KRS 132.350 nor KRS 133.120(7) requires the county attorney to defend the property valuation administrator in a legal action brought against him. OAG 91-231 .

The county attorney may represent the property valuation administrator if the fiscal court determines that the county has a definite interest in defending the action and directs the county attorney to undertake representation; but without such direction from the fiscal court, the county attorney has no duty to represent the property valuation administrator. OAG 91-231 .

The county attorney, although a county constitutional officer under § 99 of the Kentucky Constitution, and having county responsibilities under this section, also has state duties pursuant to KRS 15.725(2); in relation to the state prosecutorial duties of the County Attorney, such officer is to be compensated as provided in KRS 15.765 , under a CPI Formula using 1949 as the base year, in accordance with § 246 of the Constitution of Kentucky, which provides for compensation of not more than $12,000 per annum. OAG 92-27 .

An attorney functioning as an independent contractor for a planning and zoning board could not at the same time serve as an assistant county attorney. OAG 93-38 .

For the adjustments to salaries of constitutional officers in relation to changes in the Consumer Price Index salary adjustment computations and therefore, the maximum annual compensation allowable by law for such positions in 1994 see OAG 94-7 . OAG 94-7 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Bank failing to report deposits, county attorney to institute suit to recover for, KRS 132.040 .

Confederate pension hearing, county attorney to act for Commonwealth in, KRS 206.040 .

Drainage commission, when county attorney to represent, KRS 267.410 .

Election of county attorney, Ky. Const., § 99.

Escheat, county attorney’s duties in regard to, KRS 393.180 to 393.250 .

Highways, bureau of, legal affairs, county attorney to assist attorney general in, KRS 176.280 .

Highways, bureau of, to be represented by county attorney in condemnation proceedings, KRS 177.082 .

Housing authority, county attorney to represent county or regional, KRS 80.450 .

Indexes of county records prepared by federal agency, county attorney to examine for approval, KRS 382.205 .

Misfeasance, malfeasance, neglect of duty by county attorney, generally, Ky. Const., § 227, KRS 61.170 .

Property valuation administrator, county attorney to give notice of examination of candidates for, KRS 132.380 .

Qualifications of county attorney, Ky. Const., § 100.

Revenue, county attorney’s duties in regard to, KRS 68.100 , 132.350 , 133.120 , 134.310 , 134.340 , 134.490 , 134.500 , 134.540 , 135.040 .

Road contract of county, county attorney not to have interest in, KRS 61.210 .

Roadhouse licenses, duties of county attorney in regard to, KRS 231.070 , 231.090 .

Roads, county attorney’s duties in regard to, KRS 180.030 , 189.190 , 416.110 .

Road sinking fund surplus, county attorney to approve titles before loan of is made, KRS 178.200 .

Sanitary district, creation of to be defended by the county attorney in circuit court, KRS 220.100 .

Unemployment compensation act, county attorney to prosecute criminal violations of upon request of attorney general, KRS 341.570 .

Vacancy in county attorney’s office, how filled, KRS 63.220 .

Water commission, county attorney to be counsel for, KRS 74.030 .

Kentucky Bench & Bar.

Advisory Opinions, Vol. 46, No. 3, July, 1982, Ky. Bench & Bar 44.

Kentucky Law Journal.

Vanlandingham, The Fee System in Kentucky Counties, 40 Ky. L.J. 275 (1952).

The Office of Attorney General in Kentucky. IV. Relationship of the Office of Attorney General to Local Authorities, 52 Ky. L.J. 54-S (1963).

Ragan, State Supervision of County Finance in Kentucky, 55 Ky. L.J. 132 (1966).

Underwood, Part-Time Prosecutors and Conflicts of Interest: A Survey and Some Proposals, 81 Ky. L.J. 1 (1993).

69.220. Control of prosecutions in circuit court by county attorney. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (135) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 17, § 52, effective January 1, 1978.

69.230. Improper opening, alteration or discontinuance of road — County attorney to oppose.

The county attorney shall oppose the wrongful opening, alteration or discontinuance of any public road.

History. 129.

Opinions of Attorney General.

Where one person objected to a road closing but the closing was not wrongful within the meaning of this section, the person aggrieved could appeal the closing but the county attorney would not be obligated to do so. OAG 62-778 .

Where a dead-end county road was closed by the fiscal court on a landowner’s misrepresentation that he was the sole owner of the adjoining land, another adjoining landowner or the county attorney could not appeal the decision four years later even if the fiscal court did not give proper notice of the intent to close the road. OAG 71-339 .

Where a road was closed without notice to an adjoining landowner because the fiscal court failed to give the proper notice, the county attorney was not required to take any affirmative action because there was no general public interest involved. OAG 71-339 .

In light of the provisions of Ky. Const., § 171, the duty imposed upon the county attorney by this section is operative only where a public purpose is involved. OAG 93-60 .

While in circumstances involving a public purpose, a county attorney would have a duty, pursuant to this section, to oppose the wrongful opening, alteration, or discontinuance of a public road, that duty is not present where the purpose is to advance private interests such as the recreational use of unimproved public roads across private lands. OAG 93-60 .

A county attorney does not have a duty to pursue the opening of a public road, which has not been accepted as a county road, in order to enable use of such road for personal recreational purposes of some members of the public, as such task does not involve a public purpose justifying the application of public resources. OAG 93-60 .

69.240. Judgments in favor of the Commonwealth — County attorney to collect.

The county attorney shall investigate and inquire into the condition of all unsatisfied judgments in his county in favor of the Commonwealth. He shall take all necessary steps, by motion, action or otherwise to collect unsatisfied judgments and cause them to be paid into the State Treasury.

History. 130.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Employment of Assisting Counsel.

County attorneys have no authority to employ counsel to assist in litigation. Allin v. County Board of Education, 148 Ky. 746 , 147 S.W. 920, 1912 Ky. LEXIS 549 ( Ky. 1912 ).

2. Commission for Collecting Tax Judgments.

Fiscal court cannot allow county attorney commission for collecting tax judgments due county, it being already his duty to do so. Spalding v. Thornbury, 128 Ky. 533 , 31 Ky. L. Rptr. 738 , 33 Ky. L. Rptr. 362 , 103 S.W. 291, 108 S.W. 906, 1907 Ky. LEXIS 344 ( Ky. 1907 ); reh. den., Spalding v. Thornbury, 128 Ky. 533 , 103 S.W. 291, 108 S.W. 906, 31 Ky. L. Rptr. 738 , 33 Ky. L. Rptr. 362 , 1907 Ky. LEXIS 344 ( Ky. 1907 ), modified, 128 Ky. 539 , 108 S.W. 906 ( Ky. 1908 ).

3. Enforcement of Judgments of School Districts.

County attorneys are authorized hereunder to enforce unpaid judgments and claims in favor of county school districts. D.C. Heath & Co. v. Commonwealth, 129 Ky. 835 , 113 S.W. 69, 1908 Ky. LEXIS 228 ( Ky. 1908 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

A county attorney was entitled to a percentage of the fines and forfeitures collected by the judge of a quarterly court where said judge failed to make a timely report of the fine to the state and the omission was discovered by official audit. OAG 60-912 .

When a replevin bond is unsatisfied, the judge should require the county attorney and the Commonwealth’s Attorney to proceed against the surety since all three are jointly responsible for collecting the debt. OAG 68-526 .

69.250. Salary of county attorney. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (1072) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 17, § 52, effective January 1, 1978.

69.260. Percentage of fines and forfeitures allowed county attorney. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (133, 133a-1, 134) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 17, § 52, effective January 1, 1978.

69.265. County attorneys, expenses. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1962, ch. 282, § 1; 1972, ch. 324, § 1; 1974, ch. 74, Art. II, § 9(2), effective July 1, 1974; 1974, ch. 134, § 1, effective July 1, 1974)) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 17, § 52, effective January 1, 1978.

69.270. Pro tem county attorney; when appointed; compensation. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (131) was repealed by Acts 1942, ch. 62, § 5.

69.275. Assistant county attorneys in counties containing less than 150,000 population and not containing city of the second class. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 62, §§ 1 to 3; 1946, ch. 45, § 2; 1962, ch. 243, § 1; 1974, ch. 26, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 17, § 52, effective January 1, 1978.

69.276. Assistant county attorneys in counties containing city of second, third or fourth class. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 45, § 1; 1962, ch. 243, § 2; 1974, ch. 26, § 2) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 17, § 52, effective January 1, 1978.

69.280. Assistant county attorneys in counties containing 250,000 or more population — Appointment — Term. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (136a-1, 136a-2, 136a-5, 136a-6: amend. Acts 1968, ch. 152, § 42) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 17, § 52, effective January 1, 1978.

69.290. Salaries of assistant county attorneys. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (136a-2, 136a-6: amend. Acts 1942, ch. 180, §§ 4, 7) was repealed by Acts 1950, ch. 123, § 29. See now KRS 64.530 for compensation of assistant county attorneys.

69.300. Duties and qualifications of assistant county attorneys.

The assistant county attorneys shall reside in the county in which the county attorney is elected, or within thirty (30) miles of the county line, or in a contiguous county and shall be attorneys licensed to practice in the Commonwealth, and shall have the same powers and perform the same duties that county attorneys have and perform, except that they shall be under the direction and control of the county attorney.

History. 136a-3, 136a-7: amend. Acts 1974, ch. 26, § 3; 1994, ch. 457, § 1, effective July 15, 1994.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

In re Kentucky Bar Asso. Amended Advisory Opinion E-291, 710 S.W.2d 852, 1986 Ky. LEXIS 271 ( Ky. 1986 ); Lococo v. Barger, 958 F. Supp. 290, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4262 (E.D. Ky. 1997 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

As a result of the 1974 amendment to this section, no particular length of time as a practicing attorney is required in order for an attorney to be an assistant county attorney. OAG 76-319 .

The fiscal court should furnish the assistant county attorney with office space in the courthouse or in some other location; he should occupy a space in the county attorney’s office unless the facts indicate that the space would not reasonably accommodate both attorneys. OAG 76-380 .

Attorneys employed by a county attorney to collect child support must reside in the county in which they are employed. OAG 92-9 .

The requirement in KRS 69.300 that assistant county attorneys reside within 30 miles of the county line should be interpreted as 30 miles in a straight line “as the crow flies” rather than according to the mileage that would have to be traveled along existing roads to reach the county line OAG 2006-04 .

KRS 69.300 ’s requirement that assistant county attorneys reside within 30 miles of the county line should be interpreted as 30 miles in a straight line. OAG 06-004 .

69.310. Duties when county attorney is absent.

In the absence of the county attorney, the first assistant shall act as county attorney, and in the absence of the county attorney and the first assistant, the second assistant shall act as county attorney. The assistants shall not receive additional compensation for acting as county attorney.

History. 136a-4, 136a-8.

69.320. Power of stenographer for county attorney in county containing a consolidated local government or a city of the first class in administering oaths.

In counties containing a consolidated local government or city of the first class, the stenographer for the county attorney shall have the same power of administering an oath as a notary public.

History. 136b-1 to 136b-3: amend. Acts 1942, ch. 180, §§ 4, 7; 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 17, § 30, effective January 1, 1978; 2002, ch. 346, § 66, effective July 15, 2002.

69.330. Stenographer in counties containing a city of the second class. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (136c-1, 136c-2: amend. Acts 1946, ch. 78, § 1; 1966, ch. 255, § 83) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 17, § 52, effective January 1, 1978.

69.340. Stenographer in counties containing a city of the third, fourth, or fifth class or 50,000 or more population. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (136d-1, 136d-2: amend. Acts 1942, ch. 193, §§ 1, 2; 1966, ch. 255, § 84) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 17, § 52, effective January 1, 1978.

69.350. Employment of victim advocate.

  1. Each county attorney may employ individually or jointly with one (1) or more other county attorneys at least one (1) victim advocate to counsel and assist crime victims as defined in KRS 421.500 .
  2. An individual employed as a victim advocate shall be a person who by a combination of education, professional qualification, training, and experience is qualified to perform the duties of this position. The victim advocate shall be an individual at least eighteen (18) years of age, of good moral character, with at least two (2) years of experience working in the human services field or court system in a position requiring professional contact with children or adults, who has:
    1. Received a baccalaureate degree in social work, sociology, psychology, guidance and counseling, education, religion, criminal justice, or other human service field; or
    2. Received a high school diploma or equivalency certificate, and, in addition to the experience required in this subsection, has at least four (4) years’ experience working in the human services field or court system.
  3. Each county attorney who employs an individual to serve as a victim advocate shall develop a written job description which describes the duties of the position and shall ensure the victim advocate completes training relating to the appropriate intervention with crime victims, including victims of domestic violence and elder abuse, neglect, and exploitation and other crimes against the elderly. Each victim advocate shall perform those duties necessary to insure compliance with the crime victim’s bill of rights contained in KRS 421.500 to 421.530 . No victim advocate shall engage in political activities while in the course of performing duties as victim advocate or the practice of law as defined in KRS 524.130 . The creation and funding of any new personnel position shall be reviewed and approved by the Prosecutors Advisory Council.

History. Enact. Acts 1996, ch. 189, § 2, effective July 15, 1996; 2005, ch. 132, § 16, effective June 20, 2005.

69.360. Employment of county detectives — Certification of county detectives appointed after July 1, 2019.

  1. A county attorney may employ one (1) or more county detectives. County detectives shall have the power of arrest in the county and the right to execute process statewide. They shall assist the county attorney in all matters pertaining to his office in the manner he designates and shall assist him in the preparation of all criminal cases in District Court by investigating the evidence and facts connected with such cases.
  2. A county detective appointed after July 1, 2019, shall be certified in accordance with KRS 15.380 to 15.404 .

History. Enact. Acts 2002, ch. 174, § 1, effective July 15, 2002; 2004, ch. 172, § 1, effective July 13, 2004; 2006, ch. 222, § 1, effective June 12, 2006; 2019 ch. 149, § 1, effective June 27, 2019.

Opinions of Attorney General.

A county detective employed by a county that does not contain a consolidated local government does not have arrest powers; may, but is not required to be, sworn in and wear a badge; and, if an off-duty police officer, retains arrest powers consistent with the law. OAG 13-008 , 2013 Ky. AG LEXIS 126.

City Attorneys

69.410. City attorney is director of department of law in cities of the first class; duties; salary. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2909-2) was repealed by Acts 1962, ch. 300.

69.420. Assistant city attorneys in cities of the first class; other employes; salaries. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2910) was repealed by Acts 1952, ch. 56, § 1.

69.430. Prosecuting attorney of police court in cities of first class — Assistance by comonwealth’s attorney. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2935, 2936, 2939: amend. Acts 1948, ch. 214, § 1; 1950, ch. 123, § 29; 1974, ch. 318, § 4) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 17, § 52, effective January 1, 1978.

69.440. Prosecuting attorney pro tem in cities of the first class — Vacation of prosecuting attorney. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2938: amend. Acts 1948, ch. 214, § 1; 1950, ch. 112, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 17, § 52, effective January 1, 1978.

69.450. City attorneys in cities of the second class — Election — Duties. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3165, 3167: amend. Acts 1974, ch. 318, § 5; 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 17, § 31) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

69.460. City solicitor in cities of the second class — Appointment — Duties — Powers. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3166: amend. Acts 1976, ch. 62, § 75) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

69.470. City solicitor in second-class cities to represent trustees of police and firemen’s pension fund. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3142b-19: amend. Acts 1978, ch. 164, § 8) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

69.480. City attorney in cities of the third class — Election — Qualifications. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3311, 3312: amend. Acts 1976, ch. 375, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

69.490. Duties of city attorney in cities of the thrid class. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3313: amend. Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 17, § 32) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

69.500. Salary of city attorney in cities of the third class. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3314) was repealed by Acts 1950, ch. 123, § 29.

69.510. Prosecuting attorney in cities of the third class — Election — Qualifications. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3369 to 3371) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 17, § 52, effective January 1, 1978.

69.520. Duties of prosecuting attorney in cities of the third class. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3372: amend. Acts 1974, ch. 318, § 6, effective July 1, 1976) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 17, § 52, effective January 1, 1978.

69.530. Compensation of prosecuting attorney in cities of the third class. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3373: amend. Acts 1964, ch. 110, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 17, § 52, effective January 1, 1978.

69.540. City attorney in cities of the third class to represent trustees of police and firemen’s pension fund. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3351a-19: amend. Acts 1978, ch. 164, § 9) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

69.550. Percentage of fines and forfeitures may be allowed city attorneys in cities of the fourth, fifth and sixth classes. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2741t) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 188, § 310, effective July 15, 1980 and by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

69.560. City attorneys in cities of the fourth class — Manner of selection — Qualifications — Duties — Salary. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3509: amend. Acts 1958, ch. 37; 1974, ch. 188, § 1; 1974, ch. 318, § 7; 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 17, § 33) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

69.570. City attorney of fourth-class city to represent Commonwealth on appeals from judgments of police court. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3517; Acts 1974, ch. 318, § 8) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 17, § 52, effective January 1, 1978.

69.575. City attorney in cities of fourth class to represent trustees of police and firemen’s pension fund. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 9, § 24; 1978, ch. 164, § 10) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

69.580. City attorney in cities of the fifth class — Duties — Employment of special counsel. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3628, 3649: amend. Acts 1974, ch. 318, § 9, effective July 1, 1976) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

69.590. City attorneys in cities of the sixth class — Appointment — Duties — Employment of special counsel. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3685, 3686: amend. Acts 1974, ch. 318, § 10, effective July 1, 1976; 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 17, § 35) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

Penalties

69.990. Penalties.

If any Commonwealth’s or county attorney fails to take the steps required by KRS 69.040 or 69.240 within sixty (60) days after they could have been taken, he shall forfeit all right to any percent of the judgment whenever collected and paid into the State Treasury.

History. 130.

Opinions of Attorney General.

A county attorney was entitled to a percentage of the fines and forfeitures collected by the judge of a quarterly court where said judge failed to make a timely report of the fine to the state and the omission was discovered by official audit. OAG 60-912 .

When a replevin bond is unsatisfied, the judge should require the county attorney and the Commonwealth’s Attorney to proceed against the surety since all three are jointly responsible for collecting the debt. OAG 68-526 .

CHAPTER 70 Sheriffs, Constables, and County Police Force

Sheriffs

70.010. Special oath of sheriff.

  1. In addition to the oath prescribed in the Constitution, every sheriff shall take the following oath: “I, A B, do swear that I will do right, as well to the poor as to the rich, in all things belonging to my office as sheriff; that I will do no wrong to any one for any gift, reward or promise, nor for favor or hatred, and in all things I will faithfully and impartially execute the duties of my office according to the best of my skill and judgment, so help me God.”
  2. The oath specified in subsection (1) of this section may be administered by any person who may administer an oath pursuant to KRS 62.020 . A person shall not administer the oath specified in subsection (1) of this section to himself or herself.

History. 4555: amend. Acts 1978, ch. 384, § 157, effective June 17, 1978; 2007, ch. 132, § 2, effective June 26, 2007.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Collateral Attack.

Third persons may not question acts of a de facto sheriff collaterally. Stokes v. Kirkpatrick, 58 Ky. 138 , 1858 Ky. LEXIS 28 ( Ky. 1858 ); Patterson v. Miller, 59 Ky. 493 , 1859 Ky. LEXIS 150 ( Ky. 1859 ).

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Abatement of houses of prostitution, sheriff’s fees, KRS 233.100 .

Active militia, powers of sheriff as to, KRS 37.240 .

Administration of estates, duties of sheriff, KRS 395.390 , 395.400 .

Arrest, how and by whom made, RCr 2.02 to 2.14.

Cities, counties and their agencies may establish retirement, disability or hospitalization plans for employees; form of plans, KRS 79.080 .

City civil service, KRS Ch. 90.

Claim against county, sheriff not to speculate in, KRS 61.230 .

Claims on treasury by peace officers, Ky. Const., § 106, KRS 64.060 , 64.070 , 64.090 .

Compensation of peace officers, KRS 61.310 .

Constitutional oath of officers, Ky. Const., § 228.

Conviction against officer for offense, KRS 61.170 .

Criminal identification activities of department of public safety, cooperation, KRS 17.115 .

Depository for fees, KRS 64.365 .

Dog law, sheriff to enforce, KRS Ch. 258.

Drainage tax roll, sheriff’s duties concerning, KRS 267.010 , 267.310 , 267.330 , 268.010 , 268.180 , 268.420 , 268.470 .

Election of sheriff, Ky. Const., § 99.

Escape of prisoner or allowing a prisoner to be forcibly taken, KRS 63.140 , 440.010 , 440.030 to 440.050 .

Execution of supersedeas bond, delivered to sheriff, RCr 12.02, 12.76.

Executions and judicial sales, KRS Ch. 426.

Fugitives to be apprehended and returned by peace officers, KRS 201.150 , 440.060 .

Intercity, intercounty and city-county compacts for purchasing and merit systems; retirement and disability plans for employees of counties and cities, KRS Ch. 79.

Jailer, office of, consolidated with that of sheriff in Jefferson County, KRS 71.110 .

Jurisdiction over highways and watercourses between counties, KRS 452.520 .

Liquor laws, sheriff’s duties concerning, KRS 242.040 , 242.330 , 242.360 , 243.530 , 244.190 , 244.200 .

Military leave, annual, KRS 61.396 .

Money deposited, peace officer to be responsible for, KRS 41.300 .

Neglect, malfeasance or misfeasance by peace officer, Ky. Const., § 227, KRS 61.170 .

Peace officers to enforce laws, KRS 62.040 , 150.090 , 189.520 , 281.765 .

Personal property taken by peace officer, suit to recover, KRS 426.615 .

Private employment, peace officers prohibited from, KRS 61.310 .

Qualifications of nonelective peace officers, KRS 61.300 .

Qualifications of sheriff, Ky. Const., § 100.

Release of prisoners, sheriff to be notified, KRS 197.170 .

Removal of peace officers, KRS 63.090 to 63.180 .

Report as to abandoned property, duty of sheriff to post and publish, KRS 393.110 .

Retirement system for county employees, KRS Ch. 78.

Riots and unlawful assemblies, vagrants, peace officers to disperse, KRS 432.510 .

Session acts, sheriff entitled to copy of, KRS 57.300 , 57.360 .

State fair, policing of, KRS 247.150 .

“Sweating,” confessions obtained by, KRS 422.110 .

Tax assessments, notice and collection by sheriff, compensation, KRS 133.215 , 134.140 , 134.290 , 178.230 , 178.240 .

Unclaimed logs and drifts, peace officers to sell, KRS 364.020.

Vacancies, how filled, KRS 63.150 , 63.160 , 63.220 .

Warrants and executions, who may issue, RCr 2.04.

Treatises

Caldwell’s Kentucky Form Book, 5th Ed., Practice Context for Sheriffs and Deputy Sheriffs, § 18.00.

ALR

Judicial and execution sales, failure to take statutory oath as ground of collateral attack on. 1 A.L.R. 1439.

Telephone, taking oath over. 12 A.L.R. 538; 58 A.L.R. 604.

Liability of sheriff for arrest under warrant by deputy where action is based on mistake as to identity of person arrested. 10 A.L.R.2d 752.

Validity of governmental requirement of oath of allegiance or loyalty. 18 A.L.R.2d 268.

Civil liability or prison or jail authorities for self-inflicted injury or death of prisoner. 79 A.L.R.3d 1210.

70.020. General bond of sheriff — Minimum — Record.

  1. The sheriff shall execute a bond for the faithful performance of the duties of his or her office. This bond shall be in addition to the bond required of him or her by KRS 134.230 and shall be a minimum of ten thousand dollars ($10,000), with sureties approved by the fiscal court, which shall enter the approval in its minutes and shall record the bond with the county clerk. The fiscal court shall require the sheriff to renew this bond annually, and more often if it deems proper.
  2. No jailer, coroner, judge, county clerk, clerk of a Circuit Court, or attorney shall be surety for a sheriff on his official bond.

History. 4556 to 4559: amend. Acts 1978, ch. 384, § 158, effective June 17, 1978; 1980, ch. 188, § 49, effective July 15, 1980; 1996, ch. 86, § 3, effective July 15, 1996; 2009, ch. 10, § 59, effective January 1, 2010.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. In General.

Failure of surety named in bond to sign same releases other sureties. Chamberlain & Tapp v. Brewer, 66 Ky. 561 , 1868 Ky. LEXIS 29 ( Ky. 1868 ); Fletcher v. Leight, Barrett & Co., 67 Ky. 303 , 1868 Ky. LEXIS 123 ( Ky. 1868 ).

2. Construction.

The sureties on the sheriff’s official bond, given pursuant to this section, are not liable for revenue collections of the sheriff where he has executed the statutory revenue bonds. Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Breathitt County, 276 Ky. 173 , 123 S.W.2d 250, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 538 ( Ky. 1938 ).

This section merely provides in general terms that the sheriff shall execute bond for the faithful performance of the duties of his office. Maryland Casualty Co. v. Magoffin County Bd. of Education, 358 S.W.2d 353, 1961 Ky. LEXIS 450 ( Ky. 1961 ).

3. Increase in Amount.

Where a county judge/executive rejected a proffered performance bond of $50,000 from the county sheriff on the grounds that the revenue bonds posted were inadequate to secure the aggregate tax receipts of the county and that a recent federal case had held that the county sheriff’s department was not protected by sovereign immunity in a civil rights suit against the police department, and where the county judge/executive instead set the performance bond at $300,000 and issued an order limiting the power of the sheriff to act within her capacity until the bond was posted, the county judge/executive acted within his statutory authority under KRS 62.060 which makes it mandatory for the officer whose duty it is to fix the amount of the bond, to approve it also, and to increase it when it appears to be in the interest of the obligee to do so. Muncy v. Keen, 619 S.W.2d 712, 1981 Ky. App. LEXIS 270 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981).

4. Liability.
5. — Levy of Execution.

Sheriff’s bond is liable for wrongful levy of execution. Rudy v. Johnson, 74 Ky. 543 , 1875 Ky. LEXIS 47 ( Ky. 1875 ).

6. — Shortage in School Tax Collection.

Sheriff’s bond is liable for shortages in collection of school taxes. Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Board of Trustees, 247 Ky. 535 , 57 S.W.2d 457, 1933 Ky. LEXIS 411 ( Ky. 1933 ).

7. — Failure to Pay Over Official Fees.

Sheriff’s bond is liable for failure to collect or pay over official fees listed with him for collection. Middleton v. Caldwell, 67 Ky. 392 , 1868 Ky. LEXIS 143 ( Ky. 1868 ).

8. — Arrest.

Sheriff’s bond is liable for negligent failure to execute a warrant of arrest or a wilful taking of insufficient bond. Commonwealth v. Reed, 65 Ky. 618 , 1866 Ky. LEXIS 216 ( Ky. 1866 ).

Sheriff’s bond is liable for negligent failure to execute a civil writ of arrest. Phillips v. Ronald, 66 Ky. 244 , 1867 Ky. LEXIS 177 ( Ky. 1867 ).

9. — Acts of Deputies.

Sheriff’s bond is liable for acts of his deputies done by virtue of their office in an attempt to execute a writ or process, as a means to that end or under a statute giving them the right to arrest without warrant; otherwise, they act as individuals. Jones v. Van Bever, 164 Ky. 80 , 174 S.W. 795, 1915 Ky. LEXIS 332 , L.R.A. (n.s.) 1915E172 ( Ky. 1915 ), overruled, Maryland Casualty Co. v. McCormack, 488 S.W.2d 347, 1972 Ky. LEXIS 42 ( Ky. 1972 ).

A person injured by the careless or malicious acts of a deputy sheriff cannot maintain an action against the sheriff or his bondsmen unless they were present and aided and abetted in the offense. Casey v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 278 Ky. 426 , 128 S.W.2d 939, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 449 ( Ky. 1939 ).

KRS 134.200 does not make the deputy sheriff the agent of the sheriff except in respect to collection of revenue, and does not make the sheriff or his bondsmen liable for a malicious injury to another by the deputy. Casey v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 278 Ky. 426 , 128 S.W.2d 939, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 449 ( Ky. 1939 ).

A sheriff and the sureties on his bond are only liable for the acts of a deputy sheriff when the latter acts officially, and a deputy is not acting within his official capacity when he makes an arrest not authorized by law. Commonwealth use of Commbs v. Vincent, 282 Ky. 95 , 137 S.W.2d 1091, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 131 ( Ky. 1940 ).

Sheriff and sureties on his bond were not liable for acts of deputy in killing person while attempting to arrest him without a warrant for being drunk in a private dwelling, since drunkenness in a private dwelling is not a public offense for which an arrest can be made and deputy was therefore acting without authority. Commonwealth use of Commbs v. Vincent, 282 Ky. 95 , 137 S.W.2d 1091, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 131 ( Ky. 1940 ).

10. Nonliability.

Sheriff’s bond is not liable for failure to collect delinquent taxes due his predecessor. Middleton v. Caldwell, 67 Ky. 392 , 1868 Ky. LEXIS 143 ( Ky. 1868 ).

Sheriff’s bond is not liable for collections as court receiver. Heeter v. Jewell, 69 Ky. 510 , 1869 Ky. LEXIS 198 ( Ky. 1869 ).

Sheriff’s bond is not liable for default in collection of revenue. Anderson v. Thompson, 73 Ky. 132 , 1873 Ky. LEXIS 63 ( Ky. 1873 ); Elliott County v. Kitchen, 77 Ky. 289 , 1878 Ky. LEXIS 7 3 ( Ky. 1878 ); Kenton County v. Lowe, 91 Ky. 367 , 16 S.W. 82, 13 Ky. L. Rptr. 97 , 1891 Ky. LEXIS 66 ( Ky. 1891 ); Commonwealth use of Nicholas County v. Stone, 114 Ky. 511 , 71 S.W. 428, 24 Ky. L. Rptr. 1297 , 1903 Ky. LEXIS 7 ( Ky. 1903 ).

11. Renewal of Bond.
12. — Fees for Recording.

The county is not liable for fees of county clerk for recording or noting of record this bond. It is a personal expense of the official. Owen County v. Walker, 141 Ky. 516 , 133 S.W. 236, 1911 Ky. LEXIS 43 ( Ky. 1911 ).

13. — Failure.

It is the duty of the county court to cause the sheriff to renew his bond annually, and upon his failure to renew it or furnish additional surety when required by the court, his office is subject to forfeiture. Bartly v. Fraine, 67 Ky. 375 , 1868 Ky. LEXIS 138 ( Ky. 1868 ); Leslie County v. Eversole, 222 Ky. 793 , 2 S.W.2d 644, 1928 Ky. LEXIS 250 ( Ky. 1928 ).

The sheriff, not being absolutely required to renew his bond annually, does not forfeit office by mere failure to renew. Brown v. Grover, 69 Ky. 1 , 1869 Ky. LEXIS 85 ( Ky. 1 869).

Upon the sheriff’s failure to execute his official bond on the statutory date, the county judge (now county judge/executive) may (1) suspend him until valid bond is given, or (2) vacate his office without notice. Renshaw v. Cook, 129 Ky. 347 , 111 S.W. 377, 33 Ky. L. Rptr. 860 , 33 Ky. L. Rptr. 895 , 1908 Ky. LEXIS 165 (Ky. Ct. App. 1908).

Unless the county court requires renewal of the sheriff’s bond, the failure to renew works no forfeiture in the office of sheriff. Cornett v. Duff, 283 Ky. 466 , 141 S.W.2d 870, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 356 ( Ky. 1940 ).

14. Premiums.

Fiscal court of county containing a city of the second class had no authority to pay premiums on sheriff’s official bond. Thompson v. Shipp, 298 Ky. 805 , 184 S.W.2d 245, 1944 Ky. LEXIS 1028 ( Ky. 1944 ).

15. — Recovery.

In action against sheriff and surety on his bond to recover amount of premiums on sheriff’s official bond paid by fiscal court without authority, judgment of lower court allowing recovery against sheriff was affirmed by divided court, as against contention that there was a variance between pleading and proof in that pleading sought recovery against sheriff in official capacity while proof showed liability in individual capacity; but judgment against surety was reversed on ground that surety’s liability was on implied contract and no recovery could be had in action based solely on contract of suretyship. Thompson v. Shipp, 298 Ky. 805 , 184 S.W.2d 245, 1944 Ky. LEXIS 1028 ( Ky. 1944 ).

16. Deputy Sheriff’s Bond to Sheriff.

There is no provision in the statutes making it mandatory for a deputy sheriff to execute a bond to the sheriff. Casey v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 278 Ky. 426 , 128 S.W.2d 939, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 449 ( Ky. 1939 ).

17. Sovereign Immunity.

Fire protection district’s suit against tax collection officials, including a county court clerk, a sheriff, and a county assessor or property valuation administrator, based on the officials’ failure to collect personal property tax pursuant to KRS 75.015 , was properly dismissed because sovereign immunity shielded the officials from liability; contrary to the district’s claim, the fact that the officials posted performance bonds did not amount to a waiver of sovereign immunity. Such waiver was found only where it was established by express language or by overwhelming implications. St. Matthews Fire Prot. Dist. v. Aubrey, 304 S.W.3d 56, 2009 Ky. App. LEXIS 47 (Ky. Ct. App. 2009).

Cited:

Clark v. Anderson, 300 Ky. 727 , 190 S.W.2d 342, 1945 Ky. LEXIS 643 ( Ky. 1945 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

When it appears to be to the interest of the commonwealth the county judge (now county judge/executive) may, at any time, increase the penal sum of the bond of a deputy sheriff or require a renewal thereof with other or additional sureties. The judge has no authority to cancel a deputy sheriff’s bond. OAG 67-324 .

A bond instrument, or copy thereof, in the hands of the clerk, and any entries or recordations in such regard, e.g. in an “order book,” or “miscellaneous bonds,” book, are recognized as being subject to public inspection. No exception set forth in Open Records provisions would support a denial of inspection of records of this type. No court order for inspection is required. OAG 89-47 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Treatises

Caldwell’s Kentucky Form Book, 5th Ed., Practice Context for Sheriffs and Deputy Sheriffs, § 18.00.

ALR

Personal liability of policeman, sheriff, or similar peace officer or his bond, for injury suffered as a result of failure to enforce law or arrest lawbreaker. 41 A.L.R.3d 700.

70.030. Deputy sheriffs — Certified court security officers — Nonsworn personnel — Participation in Law Enforcement Foundation Program.

  1. The sheriff may appoint his or her own deputies and may revoke the appointment at his or her pleasure, except where that revocation is prohibited by the provisions of KRS 70.260 to 70.273 . Any law to the contrary notwithstanding, a sheriff may appoint a deputy who resides outside the Commonwealth. In a county containing a consolidated local government or city of the first class with a deputy sheriff merit board, the term of office of a deputy shall continue from sheriff to sheriff unless a deputy is removed according to the provisions of KRS 70.260 to 70.273 . Before any deputy executes the duties of his or her office, he or she shall take the oath required to be taken by the sheriff.
  2. The sheriff may appoint his or her own certified court security officers and may revoke the appointment at his or her pleasure. A certified court security officer shall take an oath to faithfully perform the duties of his or her office and that he or she possesses the minimum qualifications under KRS 15.3971 .
  3. The sheriff may appoint nonsworn clerical, technical, professional, and support personnel to assist him or her in the performance of the duties of his or her office. All nonsworn personnel shall serve at the pleasure of the sheriff.
  4. No sheriff whose county has adopted a deputy sheriff merit board under KRS 70.260 shall appoint a deputy who is a member of the immediate family of the sheriff. The term “member of the immediate family” has the meaning given in KRS 70.260 .
  5. Except for certified court security officers, a sheriff’s office may, upon the written request of the sheriff, participate in the Kentucky Law Enforcement Foundation Program Fund authorized by KRS 15.410 to 15.510 without the county establishing a deputy sheriff merit board. This subsection shall not prohibit the sheriff from requesting the consolidated local government or the fiscal court to establish a deputy sheriff merit board.

History. 1762, 1763, 1763-1, 1763-2, 1779a-1, 4560: amend. Acts 1942, ch. 205, § 2; 1944, ch. 164; 1948, ch. 9; 1948, ch. 84; 1950, ch. 123, § 29; 1950, ch. 196, § 2; 1968, ch. 152, § 43; 1978, ch. 63, § 1, effective June 17, 1978; 1992, ch. 438, § 6, effective July 14, 1992; 1996, ch. 104, § 1, effective July 15, 1996; 1998, ch. 606, § 57, effective July 15, 1998; 2002, ch. 346, § 67, effective July 15, 2002; 2007, ch. 54, § 11, effective June 26, 2007; 2019 ch. 110, § 1, effective June 27, 2019.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

This section was also amended by Acts 1978, ch. 384, § 159 (the reviser’s bill) but Acts 1978, ch. 63, § 1 prevails.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. In General.

A deputy sheriff is an officer recognized by both constitution and statute. Keating v. Covington, 35 S.W. 1026, 18 Ky. L. Rptr. 245 (1896).

An officer elected or appointed for a term and whose salary or fees are fixed by law cannot be required to accept a less amount, even by contract or agreement. However, this rule is not applicable to deputy officers or one who holds office at the pleasure of the appointing power and who may be removed at any time. Hodges v. Daviess County, 285 Ky. 508 , 148 S.W.2d 697, 1941 Ky. LEXIS 423 ( Ky. 1941 ).

2. Purpose.

The purpose of this section is to permit the sheriff at all times to have full control of his office and deputies and to prevent enforcement of contracts in which the sheriff before election, in his own zeal to win the office, might tie his own hands in such a manner as to be unable to properly perform his duties to the public. Daniel v. Standard Acci. Ins. Co., 301 Ky. 536 , 192 S.W.2d 483, 1946 Ky. LEXIS 516 ( Ky. 1946 ).

3. Construction.

This section does not comprise “special” or “local” legislation. Herold v. Talbott, 261 Ky. 634 , 88 S.W.2d 303, 1935 Ky. LEXIS 703 ( Ky. 1935 ).

4. Appointment.
5. — Approval by Court.

If, without good cause, the court refuses approval, mandamus will lie. Dassey v. Sanders, 33 S.W. 193, 17 Ky. L. Rptr. 972 (1895).

An appointment to be valid must be approved by the court and by an order of record. Buckles v. Commonwealth, 113 Ky. 795 , 68 S.W. 1084, 24 Ky. L. Rptr. 571 , 1902 Ky. LEXIS 99 ( Ky. 1902 ); Wells v. Commonwealth, 195 Ky. 754 , 243 S.W. 1032, 1922 Ky. LEXIS 419 ( Ky. 1922 ).

Where defense attorneys agreed that the sheriff’s wife be sworn to accompany a lady juror and the only irregularity was that the county judge (now county judge/executive) had not approved the appointment, the sheriff’s wife was a de facto officer and defendant, therefore, was not denied a fair trial. Call v. Commonwealth, 482 S.W.2d 770, 1972 Ky. LEXIS 206 ( Ky. 1972 ), modified, 492 S.W.2d 195, 1973 Ky. LEXIS 507 ( Ky. 1973 ).

6. — Discretion of Court.

The discretion of the court is limited to the nominee’s qualifications. Fox v. Petty, 235 Ky. 240 , 30 S.W.2d 945, 1930 Ky. LEXIS 330 ( Ky. 1930 ).

7. Contracts of Employment.

Contract entered into between sheriff and deputy prior to sheriff’s election that provided that deputy was to be appointed deputy of a certain district and to have right to perform certain duties set out in the contract was in contravention of this section and claim asserted under such contract cannot be enforced. Daniel v. Standard Acci. Ins. Co., 301 Ky. 536 , 192 S.W.2d 483, 1946 Ky. LEXIS 516 ( Ky. 1946 ).

8. Termination.

A sheriff may remove his deputies at will. Poague v. Culver, 15 Ky. 132 , 1824 Ky. LEXIS 43 ( Ky. 1824 ); Buechele v. Petty, 265 Ky. 321 , 96 S.W.2d 1010, 1936 Ky. LEXIS 484 ( Ky. 1936 ).

Under this section at any time during the term of office the sheriff may terminate the service of his deputies. Mulberry v. Kitchen, 247 S.W.2d 380, 1952 Ky. LEXIS 695 ( Ky. 1952 ).

9. Powers.

A deputy is empowered to discharge all of the official duties imposed on the sheriff unless prohibited by statute. Ellison v. Stevenson, 22 Ky. 271 , 1827 Ky. LEXIS 276 ( Ky. 1827 ). See Lofland v. Ewing, 15 Ky. 42 , 1824 Ky. LEXIS 23 ( Ky. 1824 ); Humphrey's Ex'r v. Wade, 84 Ky. 391 , 1 S.W. 648, 8 Ky. L. Rptr. 384 , 1886 Ky. LEXIS 79 ( Ky. 1886 ).

A deputy is empowered to make service of process. Young v. Smith, 49 Ky. 293 , 1850 Ky. LEXIS 93 ( Ky. 1850 ).

A deputy sheriff is empowered to hold school election. Fishback v. Trustees Graded School Dist., 152 Ky. 519 , 153 S.W. 748, 1913 Ky. LEXIS 684 ( Ky. 1913 ).

Ky. Const. § 99 merely created the office of sheriff; it was silent as to the power to employ or remove deputies. That power was created by the General Assembly in KRS 70.030 , which took common-law powers away from executive officers and assigned them to different executive officers or agencies without violating the Constitution. McClure v. Augustus, 85 S.W.3d 584, 2002 Ky. LEXIS 185 ( Ky. 2002 ).

10. Number of Deputies.

Proof that the city of Lexington maintained a police force of seventy members, that there were four constables and four deputy constables in the county, that there were ten county patrolmen in the county, and that the state highway patrol had officers in the county, did not establish that nine or ten deputies was an unreasonable number for the sheriff of Fayette County to employ, there being no showing by complaining taxpayers as to the quantity of work the sheriff’s office was required to perform. Thompson v. Shipp, 298 Ky. 805 , 184 S.W.2d 245, 1944 Ky. LEXIS 1028 ( Ky. 1944 ).

11. Deputy Special Tax Collectors.

The appointment and compensation of deputy special tax collectors are subject to the approval of the fiscal court. Nichols v. Land, 288 Ky. 693 , 157 S.W.2d 303, 1941 Ky. LEXIS 192 ( Ky. 1941 ).

12. Dog Catcher.

A sheriff may employ a “dog catcher” deputy and pay him such compensation as may be agreed upon between them. Hodges v. Daviess County, 285 Ky. 508 , 148 S.W.2d 697, 1941 Ky. LEXIS 423 ( Ky. 1941 ).

13. Bond to Sheriff.

There is no provision in the statutes making it mandatory for a deputy sheriff to execute a bond to the sheriff. Casey v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 278 Ky. 426 , 128 S.W.2d 939, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 449 ( Ky. 1939 ).

Cited:

Burton v. Mayer, 274 Ky. 245 , 118 S.W.2d 161, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 233 ( Ky. 1938 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

A special deputy sheriff who has the arresting authority of a peace officer but who is not on the county payroll and who works only for a night club does not hold a valid appointment as a deputy sheriff since he is not a working county-paid member of the sheriff’s staff. Special local police officers to preserve the peace and protect the property of private persons are covered by KRS 61.360 . OAG 71-170 .

The appointment of a special deputy sheriff who is not on the county payroll and only works for places of business and is paid by the management of that place of business is not a legal appointment. OAG 71-170 .

If a deputy is discharged from his position, he has no legal basis for recovering any salary, except that salary actually earned by him prior to his discharge. OAG 71-319 .

While the sheriff may appoint his deputies with the approval of the county judge, the number of the deputies and their compensation will depend upon the sound discretion of the fiscal court which includes consideration of the fees of the office and the state of the county budget. OAG 73-637 .

An individual could not simultaneously serve as town marshal, a city office, and deputy sheriff, a county office, as positions are incompatible. OAG 73-795 .

The requirement in KRS 70.030 that the county court approve a sheriff’s appointment of his deputies has been amended by implication since KRS 64.530(4) controls where the county population is less than 75,000 and the fiscal court determines the number and compensation of deputies; KRS 64.345 controls in Jefferson and Fayette Counties and an order of a panel of circuit judges and county judge, signed by a majority, makes the determination and KRS 64.345 controls in all other counties having 75,000 population or more and the determination is made by the fiscal court. OAG 74-697 .

A deputy sheriff is not an officer named and designated in the text of the Constitution and is not required by Ky. Const. § 234 to reside in the county where he serves. OAG 75-52 .

The sheriff can discharge or dismiss his deputy at any time without any reason at all so that if a deputy sheriff was discharged without reason, such discharge would be legal and no civil rights would be violated. OAG 75-465 .

A sheriff could not legally employ two or three additional persons as part-time deputy sheriffs where the fiscal court had only authorized two deputy sheriff positions and the persons filling those two (2) positions were the only legal deputy sheriffs in the county during the term of office of such sheriff. OAG 78-112 .

Pursuant to this section the sheriff may, with the approval of the fiscal court, appoint his own deputies; however, the only legal deputy sheriffs are those appointed by the sheriff to fill deputy positions authorized by the fiscal court pursuant to KRS 64.530 . OAG 78-112 .

The sheriff appoints his own deputies, and the consent of fiscal court is not required nor authorized, but the determination of the number of deputies and their salaries is a responsibility of fiscal court pursuant to KRS 64.530 . OAG 80-1 .

A county ordinance requiring deputy sheriffs to complete a two-week peace officer course at the Kentucky Bureau of Training within six months of appointment, qualify on a pistol range and purchase a minimum of $100,000 professional liability insurance as minimum qualifications for deputy sheriffs is invalid since it conflicts with the various requirements of this section, KRS 61.300 , and KRS 15.335 which preempt the field of deputy qualifications. OAG 81-35 .

A deputy sheriff’s service ends with the term of the incumbent sheriff regardless of the source of funding for the deputies. OAG 81-430 .

An incumbent sheriff may not, after leaving office, be eligible to be either a sheriff’s deputy or sheriff’s assistant, unless he was originally elected or appointed to fill the unexpired term of another sheriff. OAG 82-25 .

Under KRS 70.040 , the sheriff is liable for the acts or omissions of his deputies. Thus the sheriff may require his deputies to execute bonds, in connection with the sheriff’s tax collection function, to cover their responsibility for indemnifying the sheriff or the sheriff’s office. OAG 82-460 .

The sheriff is required to pay his deputies a salary, as set by the fiscal court. OAG 83-19 .

A deputy sheriff under KRS 61.300(2) must be, to qualify under that statute, a continuous resident of the county of his appointment for two years next preceding his appointment as deputy sheriff. OAG 83-269 .

The sheriff’s staff must consist of “deputies,” regardless of the function of the sheriff which they perform, clerical or otherwise. OAG 83-301 .

County constitutional officers, such as the sheriff, jailer and clerk, have no inherent authority to devise personnel policies for their deputies; the constitutional officers must look to the statutes for any application of personnel rules. OAG 84-22 .

A fiscal court cannot adopt personnel policies by ordinance for the county employes, and then apply such policies to deputies of constitutional officers, such as the sheriff, jailer and county clerk, because the fiscal court has no general statutory authority to deal with the deputies of county constitutional officers, other than to set the number and salaries of such deputies as permitted in KRS 64.530 . OAG 84-22 .

Deputy sheriffs serve only at the pleasure of the sheriff who appoints them, and their serving can only continue during that appointing sheriff’s term; thus, when a sheriff dies, his appointed deputies have to be reappointed by the new sheriff in order to continue to serve. OAG 84-31 .

Neither a county fiscal court nor a sheriff has the statutory authority to engage in a contract with a water district, which contract would provide that the water district pay the fiscal court or sheriff for a regular sheriff deputy’s providing law-enforcement services on the water district’s property and surrounding area. OAG 84-242 .

The deputy sheriff merit board legislation placed a limitation on the authority of a sheriff to revoke the appointment of a deputy sheriff, but did not remove or modify the authority of a sheriff, pursuant to subsection (1) of this section, to “appoint his own deputies,” accordingly, the rule still applies, that the term of office of a deputy sheriff expires with the cessation of service of the appointing sheriff. OAG 95-6 .

Two (2) basic issues are addressed by the deputy sheriff merit board statutory provisions (KRS 70.260(1), KRS 70.263 , KRS 70.267(5), KRS 70.270 , KRS 70.273 ); one (1) is disciplinary matters concerning deputy sheriffs and the other is required training. There is no language within such provisions expressly addressing the term of office, as such, of a deputy sheriff, and no language stating that the term of office of a deputy sheriff covered by deputy sheriff merit board provisions shall continue from sheriff to sheriff, unless the deputy is removed for cause. OAG 95-6 .

A deputy sheriff’s compliance with training requirements does not translate to an extended term of office, or restrict the appointive authority of the sheriff, as the deputy sheriff merit board provisions principally address the revocation, etc., of the appointment of a deputy sheriff in connection with disciplinary matters; they do not address, as such, the term of office of a deputy sheriff, and do not limit the authority of a sheriff to appoint his own deputies. OAG 95-6 .

Kentucky law provides for two (2) “basic” types of deputy sheriff, (1) a “regular deputy,” (this section) who must be paid, and (2) a “special deputy sheriff” (KRS 70.045 ), who may not be paid. In turn, there are two (2) categories of “special deputy sheriffs.” There are what might be termed “general law enforcement special deputies” (KRS 70.045 (1)), and there are “emergency circumstance” special deputies (KRS 70.045(2)). OAG 95-22 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Deputies in counties with population of 70,000 or more, number and compensation of, KRS 64.345 .

Treatises

Caldwell’s Kentucky Form Book, 5th Ed., Practice Context for Sheriffs and Deputy Sheriffs, § 18.00.

ALR

Additional deputies provided for during term of sheriff whose deputies were to be paid by the public, are they to be paid by officer or public. 26 A.L.R. 1309.

Validity, construction, and application of regulation regarding outside employment or occupation of a sheriff’s deputy or assistant. 88 A.L.R.2d 1235.

Validity, construction, and application of regulation regarding outside employment of governmental employees or officers. 94 A.L.R.3d 1230.

70.035. Deputies and clerical assistants in certain counties containing a population between 70,000 and 75,000. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 92, § 2) was repealed by Acts 1950, ch. 123, § 29.

70.036. Uniforms for sheriffs, deputies, and court security officers — Use — Expense, how paid.

  1. Sheriffs, bonded deputy sheriffs, and certified court security officers are authorized to wear approved uniforms while engaged in the performance of their duties. As used herein, “approved uniforms” means those uniforms the design and color of which are officially approved by the Kentucky Sheriffs’ Association.
  2. The expense of uniforms used by sheriffs, their deputies, and certified court security officers in accordance with this section may be paid by the fiscal court from the county general fund. All such uniforms shall be the property of the county.

History. Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 221, §§ 1, 2; 2007, ch. 54, § 12, effective June 26, 2007.

Opinions of Attorney General.

The paying for uniforms for the sheriff and his deputies by the fiscal court from county funds is discretionary with the court. OAG 66-458 .

If the Kentucky Sheriffs’ Association has officially adopted and reduced to writing “approved uniforms” as to design and color the sheriffs of Kentucky may use such uniform but since a sheriff’s badge is not a part of the uniform each sheriff can choose any appropriate and reasonable badge which need not be in the shape of a star nor approved by the Kentucky Sheriffs’ Association. OAG 74-112 .

70.040. Deputy’s acts and omissions — Liability for.

The sheriff shall be liable for the acts or omissions of his deputies; except that, the office of sheriff, and not the individual holder thereof, shall be liable under this section. When a deputy sheriff omits to act or acts in such a way as to render his principal responsible, and the latter discharges such responsibility, the deputy shall be liable to the principal for all damages and costs which are caused by the deputy’s act or omission.

History. 4558, 4561: amend. Acts 1972, ch. 363, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Liability.
2. — Deputy.

A deputy is liable to one with whom he has contracted against damage. Winterbower v. Haycraft, 70 Ky. 57 , 1869 Ky. LEXIS 258 ( Ky. 1869 ).

3. — Sheriff.

The sheriff is liable for acts of his deputies done by virtue of their office in an attempt to execute a writ or process, as a means to that end or under a statute giving them the right to arrest without warrant. Otherwise they act as individuals. Shields v. Pflanz, 101 Ky. 407 , 19 Ky. L. Rptr. 648 , 41 S.W. 267, 1897 Ky. LEXIS 202 ( Ky. 1897 ); Commonwealth v. Hurt, 64 S.W. 911, 1901 Ky. LEXIS 619 , 23 Ky. L. Rptr. 1171 (1901); Jones v. Van Bever, 164 Ky. 80 , 174 S.W. 795, 1915 Ky. LEXIS 332 , L.R.A. (n.s.) 1915E172 ( Ky. 1915 ), overruled, Maryland Casualty Co. v. McCormack, 488 S.W.2d 347, 1972 Ky. LEXIS 42 ( Ky. 1972 ).

Because there is no waiver of the official immunity of the sheriff for the sheriff's official actions, there is also no waiver of the official immunity of the coroner for the coroner's official actions. Harrod v. Caney, 547 S.W.3d 536, 2018 Ky. App. LEXIS 94 (Ky. Ct. App. 2018).

KRS 134.200 does not make the deputy sheriff the agent of the sheriff except in respect to collection of revenue, and does not make the sheriff or his bondsmen liable for a malicious injury to another by the deputy. Casey v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 278 Ky. 426 , 128 S.W.2d 939, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 449 ( Ky. 1939 ).

A sheriff will be liable under this section for the action of his deputies if they use excessive force while performing the official duty of serving a peace warrant. Lawson v. Burnett, 471 S.W.2d 726, 1971 Ky. LEXIS 259 ( Ky. 1971 ).

4. — — Official Acts of Deputy.

A sheriff and the sureties on his bond are only liable for the acts of a deputy sheriff when the latter acts officially, and a deputy is not acting within his official capacity when he makes an arrest not authorized by law. Commonwealth use of Commbs v. Vincent, 282 Ky. 95 , 137 S.W.2d 1091, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 131 ( Ky. 1940 ).

KRS 70.040 exposed the office of sheriff to civil suit for the acts and omissions of a deputy; a sheriff, in his official capacity, was not entitled to the shield of sovereign immunity by KRS 70.040 for a claim brought against him based on his deputy’s operation of a patrol car which struck and injured two (2) troopers. Cross v. Jones, 2005 Ky. App. LEXIS 172 (Ky. Ct. App. Aug. 5, 2005), aff'd, 260 S.W.3d 343, 2008 Ky. LEXIS 100 ( Ky. 2008 ).

Although a sheriff, in his official capacity, had official immunity at common law for the tortious acts committed by his deputies, KRS 70.040 waives that immunity and imposes liability on the sheriff for his deputies’ acts. Jones v. Cross, 260 S.W.3d 343, 2008 Ky. LEXIS 100 ( Ky. 2008 ).

5. — — Careless or Malicious Acts.

A person injured by the careless or malicious acts of a deputy sheriff cannot maintain an action against the sheriff or his bondsmen unless they were present and aided and abetted in the offense. Casey v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 278 Ky. 426 , 128 S.W.2d 939, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 449 ( Ky. 1939 ).

6. — — Killing of Man Fleeing Arrest.

A sheriff is liable for the act of his deputies in killing a man fleeing arrest believing him to be one for whom they held a warrant. Johnson v. Williams' Adm'r, 111 Ky. 289 , 63 S.W. 759, 23 Ky. L. Rptr. 658 , 1901 Ky. LEXIS 206 ( Ky. 1901 ).

Where a decedent was killed while riding a motorcycle during a police chase when a deputy sheriff struck the motorcycle, a vicarious liability claim against the sheriff survived summary judgment because the negligence claim against the deputy sheriff survived. Walker v. Davis, 643 F. Supp. 2d 921, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63626 (W.D. Ky. 2009 ), aff'd, 649 F.3d 502, 2011 FED App. 0229P, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 17456 (6th Cir. Ky. 2011 ).

7. — — Arrest Without Warrant or Legal Cause.

Sheriff and sureties on his bond were not liable for acts of deputy in killing person while attempting to arrest him without a warrant for being drunk in a private dwelling, since drunkenness in a private dwelling is not a public offense for which an arrest can be made and deputy was therefore acting without authority. Commonwealth use of Commbs v. Vincent, 282 Ky. 95 , 137 S.W.2d 1091, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 131 ( Ky. 1940 ).

8. — — Detention of Automobile.

Sheriff was liable in damages for unlawful taking and detention of automobile by deputy pursuant to search warrant obtained under local option law, where warrant was void because deputy had failed to sign and file affidavit for warrant. Campbell v. Blankenship, 308 Ky. 808 , 215 S.W.2d 960, 1948 Ky. LEXIS 1048 ( Ky. 1948 ).

9. — — Mistreatment of Prisoner.

The sheriff is liable for mistreatment of a prisoner by his deputy. Shields v. Pflanz, 101 Ky. 407 , 41 S.W. 267, 19 Ky. L. Rptr. 648 , 1897 Ky. LEXIS 202 ( Ky. 1897 ).

10. Bond of Deputy.

The bond of a deputy sheriff given pursuant to KRS 134.200 runs to the sheriff alone, and a person injured by the malicious acts of the deputy cannot maintain an action against the sureties on the bond. Casey v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 278 Ky. 426 , 128 S.W.2d 939, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 449 ( Ky. 1939 ).

11. Recovery by Sheriff.

The sheriff may recover his damages against his deputies after judgment against himself. Bottom v. Williamson, 66 Ky. 521 , 1868 Ky. LEXIS 17 ( Ky. 1868 ). See Colter v. Morgan's Adm'rs, 51 Ky. 278 , 1851 Ky. LEXIS 60 ( Ky. 1851 ).

Cited:

Overstreet v. Thomas, 239 S.W.2d 939, 1951 Ky. LEXIS 910 ( Ky. 1951 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Where a sheriff and two deputies were sued in a civil suit, if judgment was awarded against them the court costs would not be an official expense of the sheriff’s office. OAG 68-367 .

The purpose of the deputy’s bond is to indemnify the sheriff as an individual for any loss that may be occasioned due to the sheriff’s possible liability under this section. OAG 71-319 .

The sheriff could ask for a deputy’s bond forfeiture upon a showing of actual damages and costs which are caused by the deputy’s act or omission. OAG 71-319 .

Any damage claims against the “office of sheriff” must come out of excess fees, if there are excess fees, of the sheriff’s office; otherwise, there can be no monetary recovery. OAG 80-1 .

The members of fiscal court are not liable for the negligent or wrongful acts and omissions of the sheriff and his deputies. OAG 80-1 .

The sheriff may require his deputies to execute bond to cover their responsibility for indemnifying the office of the sheriff for any damages and cost occasioned by their wrongful act or omission. OAG 80-1 .

Under this section, the sheriff is liable for the acts or omissions of his deputies. Thus the sheriff may require his deputies to execute bonds, in connection with the sheriff’s tax collection function, to cover their responsibility for indemnifying the sheriff or the sheriff’s office. OAG 82-460 .

Research References and Practice Aids

ALR

Liability of officer or his bond for neglect of deputy or assistant to make return of process. 1 A.L.R. 222; 102 A.L.R. 174; 116 A.L.R. 1064; 71 A.L.R.2d 1140.

Liability of sheriff for arrest under warrant by deputy where action is based on mistake as to identity of person arrested. 10 A.L.R.2d 752.

70.045. Special deputies.

    1. The sheriff of a county with a population of ten thousand (10,000) or more may appoint and have sworn in and entered on the county clerk order book either: (1) (a) The sheriff of a county with a population of ten thousand (10,000) or more may appoint and have sworn in and entered on the county clerk order book either:
      1. One (1) special deputy for each two thousand five hundred (2,500) residents or part thereof in his county; or
      2. Up to a maximum of ten (10) special deputies, regardless of the population of the county;

        to assist him with general law enforcement and maintenance of public order.

    2. The sheriff of a county with a population of less than ten thousand (10,000) may appoint and have sworn in and entered on the county clerk order book one (1) special deputy for each one thousand (1,000) residents or part thereof in his county, to assist him with general law enforcement and maintenance of public order.

      The population of the county shall be determined by the most recent count or estimate by the Federal Bureau of Census.

  1. The sheriff in each county may appoint and have sworn in, and entered on the county clerk order book, as many special deputies as needed to assist him in the execution of his duties and office in preparation for or during an emergency situation, such as fire, flood, tornado, storm, or other such emergency situations. For purposes of this section only, an emergency situation is a condition which, in the judgment of the sheriff, requires a response immediately necessary for the preservation of public peace, health or safety, utilizing special deputies previously appointed in preparation for the contingency.
  2. The special deputy shall:
    1. Be appointed and dismissed on the authority of the sheriff;
    2. Not receive any monetary compensation for his time or services;
    3. Serve at the request of the sheriff, unless personal conditions rule otherwise;
    4. Be answerable to and under the supervision of the sheriff, who shall be responsible for the actions of the special deputy; and
    5. Be appointed regardless of race, color, creed, or position.
  3. The position of special deputy as created and defined in subsections (1), (2), and (3) is subject to the provisions of this section only.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1976, ch. 154, § 1; 1982, ch. 109, § 1, effective March 25, 1982; 1986, ch. 158, § 1, effective July 15, 1986; 1990, ch. 134, § 2, effective July 13, 1990; 2004, ch. 140, § 2, effective July 13, 2004; 2018 ch. 83, § 1, effective July 14, 2018.

Opinions of Attorney General.

Appointment of a special deputy under either KRS 70.045(1) or (2) is clearly an official function of the sheriff’s office and one in which the public has a legitimate interest. Accordingly, the Sheriff’s reliance on OAG 76-655 as the basis for denying access to records containing information relating to past and present special deputies is misplaced. Although the Sheriff may withhold certain personal information relating to the special deputies, including home addresses and social security numbers, records containing the information sought are public records within the meaning of KRS 61.870(2). OAG 02-ORD-175.

Other than the special deputies for great emergencies, there is no such thing as a special deputy in Kentucky. OAG 80-72 .

Although a sheriff may appoint special deputies to assist him in a fire emergency situation pursuant to this section, he cannot appoint so-called “courtesy special deputies,” who are unsalaried deputy sheriffs, to aid him in his daily statutory duties. OAG 82-105 .

Although this section, as amended in 1982, is couched in general and somewhat vague language, the office of special deputy apparently meets the minimal requirements of an “office,” as set forth in Love v. Duncan, 256 S.W.2d 498, 1953 Ky. LEXIS 741 (Ky. Ct. App. 1953), except for the requirement of legislative definition of duties and powers. Questions as to the defined duties in connection with periods not involving an emergency situation, will have to be decided by the courts. OAG 82-254 .

There is nothing in this section, as amended in 1982, mandatorily requiring a citizen to serve as special deputy. OAG 82-254 .

Under this section, as amended in 1982, the sheriff has the authority to appoint special deputies at any time during his term, in preparation for or during an emergency. Thus they may be appointed merely in preparation for an emergency, which means before any emergency arises. OAG 82-254 .

The county fiscal court is prohibited by this section from providing salaries for the special deputies appointed pursuant to this section. Also, the fiscal court has no authority to convert the special deputies into regular deputies. OAG 83-197 .

A special deputy appointed under this section is not a “peace officer” for purposes of KRS 431.005 regarding warrantless arrests, since the special deputy is not a full-time paid deputy sheriff. OAG 83-246 .

When a special deputy is properly on duty in connection with an actual emergency, as defined in this section, such special peace officer has the authority, pursuant to KRS 431.005(1), to make an arrest: (a) in obedience to a warrant; or (b) without a warrant when a felony is committed in his presence; or (c) without a warrant when he has reasonable grounds to believe that the person being arrested has committed a felony; or (d) without a warrant when a misdemeanor, as defined in KRS 431.060 , has been committed in his presence; or (e) without a warrant when a violation of KRS 189.290 , 189.393 , 189.520 , 189.580 , all being traffic regulations, 511.080 (criminal trespass), or 525.070 (harassment) has been committed in his presence. OAG 83-246 .

The sheriff does not need fiscal court approval when declaring an emergency, nor is he required to issue any formal declaration of the existence of an emergency. The fiscal court is not involved in the appointment of special deputies and their individual performances in an emergency and the sheriff is responsible for his own conduct and that of his deputies and special deputies. OAG 83-301 .

The number of special deputies appointed addresses itself to the sound discretion of the sheriff, depending largely on the emergency anticipated or which actually occurs. OAG 83-301 .

The employment of special sheriff’s deputies during emergencies is not “covered employment” under KRS 341.055(4)(e) and former (g) and the fiscal court is not, therefore, responsible for unemployment insurance for such deputies. OAG 83-301 .

Workers’ compensation applies to special deputy sheriffs appointed under this section during emergencies, pursuant to KRS 342.640(3), since they are in the service of a political subdivision, i.e., the county, although a special deputy could elect not to be covered. The fiscal court is responsible for providing workers’ compensation insurance coverage unless it elects to be a self-insurer, the premium being paid as properly budgeted under the procedure outlined in KRS Chapter 68. OAG 83-301 .

A special deputy cannot receive compensation for his work. OAG 83-448 .

There is no statutory or constitutional conflict of interest involved where an elected magistrate serves as a special deputy. OAG 83-448 .

The official oath of any special deputy appointed by the sheriff may be administered by a judge, county judge/executive, notary public, clerk of a court, or a justice of the peace, within his district or county. OAG 83-448 .

This section does not deal with the usual and lasting problem of law enforcement in the county generally and is not designed to augment the existing deputy staff arrangements for the ordinary, usual and lasting law-enforcement purposes. OAG 84-34 .

Only the sheriff can appoint special deputies; the county judge/executive and the fiscal court have no authority to declare a “continuing emergency situation” and, further, the nature of the emergencies listed in subsection (1) of this section do not contemplate an emergency of a continuing nature. OAG 84-34 .

The special deputies can only serve under the sheriff’s appointment in specific relation to one or more of the specially enumerated kinds of emergencies contained in subsection (1) of this section, or in relation to any other emergency of the same kind, class or nature. OAG 84-34 .

By virtue of subsection (4) of this section a special deputy appointed pursuant to subsection (1) of this section is not subject to the residential requirements imposed by KRS 61.300 . OAG 90-51 .

The duties of a special deputy sheriff appointed pursuant to subsection (1) of this section are not limited to an “emergency situation,” while the duties of a special deputy sheriff appointed pursuant to subsection (2) of this section are limited to “preparation for and during an emergency situation.” OAG 92-115 .

A special deputy sheriff, whether a “general law enforcement deputy” or an “emergency situation deputy,” as an unpaid deputy, cannot make a warrantless arrest pursuant to KRS 431.005(2). OAG 92-115 .

An unpaid special deputy sheriff appointed pursuant to KRS 70.045 can, except in the case of a domestic violence related arrest that would be made pursuant to KRS 431.005 (2), make an arrest either with or without a warrant, when authorized under other provisions of KRS 431.005 , the statute under which the deputy is appointed, and other provisions of the law. OAG 92-140 .

An unpaid special deputy sheriff is not a “peace officer” for purposes of making a warrantless arrest pursuant to KRS 431.005(2). OAG 92-140 .

The limited definition of “peace officer” set forth in KRS 431.005(3) as affecting a special deputy sheriff applies only in relation to an arrest that would be made without a warrant pursuant to KRS 431.005(2), in what might be termed the “domestic violence” circumstance. This limited definition does not restrict the authority of a special deputy sheriff, as a peace officer, to make an arrest without a warrant as required by KRS 403.760(2), for violation of a protective order issued under the provisions of KRS 403.740 or 403.750 pursuant to KRS 500.020 , 403.715 , and 403.740 . OAG 92-140 .

The courts of this state have for many years regarded a deputy sheriff as having substantially the same authority as the sheriff. Breaking and entering a house or enclosure to carry out an order of arrest would be a duty of the sheriff, and thus could be carried out by a deputy of the sheriff, or a special deputy of the sheriff. OAG 92-140 .

Since a state motor vehicle enforcement officer is a state officer and a special deputy sheriff is a county officer and since subsection (1) of KRS 61.080 bans one from serving at the same time as a state officer and as an officer of any county, selected motor vehicle enforcement officers may not be appointed as special deputy sheriffs. OAG 93-61 .

“Volunteer” deputy sheriffs are, from a legal perspective, “special deputy sheriffs”. A “volunteer” (special) deputy sheriff, appointed for “general law enforcement” pursuant to subsection (1) of this section has the same powers, except in the case of a warrantless arrest pursuant to KRS 431.005(2), as a “regular” or paid deputy sheriff. A special deputy appointed for “emergency circumstances” under subsection (2) of this section has the powers of a special deputy sheriff only during preparation for, or the occurrences of, emergencies such as fire, flood, storm, or other “such emergencies.” The sheriff must cause signification of the statutory provision under which a special deputy is appointed to appear on the county clerk order book together with the deputy’s name. OAG 95-22 .

Kentucky law provides for two (2) “basic” types of deputy sheriff, (1) a “regular deputy,” (this section) who must be paid, and (2) a “special deputy sheriff” (this section), who may not be paid. In turn, there are two (2) categories of “special deputy sheriffs.” There are what might be termed “general law enforcement special deputies” (subsection (1) of this section), and there are “emergency circumstance” special deputies (subsection (2) of this section). OAG 95-22 .

70.050. Person may be empowered to execute process.

  1. A sheriff may, by writing, empower any person to execute an original or mesne process. The person so empowered shall indorse his action on the instrument empowering him, and shall make affidavit to the truth of the indorsement, and attach the affidavit to the process and deliver the indorsement and affidavit to the sheriff or his deputy, to be returned to the proper office. The indorsement shall have the same validity as if made by the sheriff.
  2. The sheriff shall be responsible for the acts of the person so empowered.

History. 4562, 4563.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Special Bailiffs.
2. — Appointment.

A deputy sheriff is empowered to appoint a special bailiff. Norman v. Norman, 69 Ky. 495 , 1869 Ky. LEXIS 193 ( Ky. 1869 ).

3. — Area of Service.

A special bailiff may serve only in the county of his appointment and residence. York v. Commonwealth, 82 Ky. 360 , 6 Ky. L. Rptr. 334 , 1884 Ky. LEXIS 90 (Ky. Ct. App. 1884); Lillard v. Brannin, 91 Ky. 511 , 16 S.W. 349, 13 Ky. L. Rptr. 74 , 1891 Ky. LEXIS 85 ( Ky. 1891 ).

4. — Validity of Return.

The return of a special bailiff has the same validity as that of his principal. Gardner v. Lincoln Bank & Trust Co., 251 Ky. 109 , 64 S.W.2d 497, 1933 Ky. LEXIS 830 ( Ky. 1933 ).

5. — Sufficiency of Return.

Return by special bailiff is sufficient if it shows time and method of execution. Barbour v. Newkirk, 83 Ky. 529 , 7 Ky. L. Rptr. 555 , 1886 Ky. LEXIS 4 (Ky. Ct. App. 1886); Simms v. Simms, 88 Ky. 642 , 11 S.W. 665, 11 Ky. L. Rptr. 131 , 1889 Ky. LEXIS 81 (Ky. Ct. App. 1889).

6. — Weapons.

A special bailiff may carry a concealed deadly weapon only when actually engaged in a bona fide effort to execute process. Wells v. Commonwealth, 200 Ky. 241 , 254 S.W. 743, 1923 Ky. LEXIS 45 ( Ky. 1923 ).

7. Liability of Sheriff.
8. — Bailiff Appointed by Parol.

A sheriff is liable for acts done by a bailiff appointed by parol. Grayble v. Froman, 8 Ky. 191 , 1818 Ky. LEXIS 35 ( Ky. 1818 ); Mann v. Martin's Adm'r, 82 Ky. 242 , 6 Ky. L. Rptr. 346 , 1884 Ky. LEXIS 69 (Ky. Ct. App. 1884).

Opinions of Attorney General.

If the sheriff’s regular deputy staff is inadequate to meet the total statutory responsibilities of the sheriff, including the service of process and legal papers, he may, in writing, empower the elected constables, as peace officers, to assist him in the serving of process under his supervision and direction, with the fees resulting from the process-serving by such constables accruing to the sheriff’s office. OAG 78-66 .

Where the sheriff’s regular deputy staff is inadequate to meet the sheriff’s total statutory responsibilities, the sheriff, under this section, may in writing empower constables and other peace officers to execute criminal process, coming into the sheriff’s hands, under the sheriff’s supervision and direction. OAG 84-37 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Erroneous return, penalty for, KRS 70.085 .

Kentucky Law Journal.

Kentucky Law Survey, Garvey and Doutt, Civil Procedure, 68 Ky. L.J. 529 (1979-1980).

70.060. Sheriff may command power of county.

Any sheriff, deputy sheriff or other like officer may command and take with him the power of the county, or a part thereof, to aid him in the execution of the duties of his office, and may summon as many persons as he deems necessary to aid him in the performance thereof.

History. 4578: amend. Acts 1962, ch. 234, § 16.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Posse Comitatus.

A sheriff may summon a posse comitatus when necessary to the performance of his duties. Bell v. North, 14 Ky. 133 , 1823 Ky. LEXIS 140 ( Ky. 1823 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Where city police officers of a second-class city whose jurisdiction to arrest is confined to the city limits are summoned to assist the sheriff, those city police officers possess the same right of arrest as the sheriff. OAG 75-430 .

If the sheriff’s regular deputy staff is inadequate to meet the total statutory responsibilities of the sheriff, including the service of process and legal papers, he may in writing empower the elected constables, as peace officers, to assist him in the serving of process under his supervision and direction with the fees resulting from the process-serving by such constables accruing to the sheriff’s office. OAG 78-66 .

A police officer has the power and authority to order a citizen to transport a police officer in the citizen’s private vehicle for the purpose of performing a law enforcement function in a true emergency. OAG 79-262 .

If a police officer commandeers a vehicle of a private citizen, uses it as an emergency vehicle, and it is damaged during such use, assuming there was no negligence in the operation thereof, neither the officer nor the city is liable for such damage. OAG 79-262 .

In an emergency police officers may call for assistance by any person available and such person has a duty to provide any reasonable assistance including the use of his truck or car. OAG 79-262 .

A fiscal court cannot adopt personnel policies by ordinance for the county employees, and then apply such policies to deputies of constitutional officers, such as the sheriff, jailer and county clerk, because the fiscal court has no general statutory authority to deal with the deputies of county constitutional officers, other than to set the number and salaries of such deputies as permitted in KRS 64.530 . OAG 84-22 .

County constitutional officers, such as the sheriff, jailer and clerk, have no inherent authority to devise personnel policies for their deputies; the constitutional officers must look to the statutes for any application of personnel rules. OAG 84-22 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Militia, powers of sheriff as to, KRS 37.240 .

Kentucky Law Journal.

Law Enforcement in Kentucky, 52 Ky. L.J. 1 (1963).

70.062. School and student safety issues training encouraged — Collaboration between sheriffs and local school districts encouraged.

  1. The sheriff in each county is encouraged to receive training on issues pertaining to school and student safety, and shall be invited to meet annually with local school superintendents to discuss emergency response plans and emergency response concerns.
  2. The sheriff in each county is encouraged to collaborate with the local school district on policies and procedures for communicating to the school district any instances of trauma-exposed students.

History. Enact. Acts 2013, ch. 126, § 7, effective June 25, 2013 and Acts 2013, ch. 133, § 7, effective June 25, 2013; 2019 ch. 5, § 17, effective March 11, 2019; 2020 ch. 5, § 8, effective February 21, 2020.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(6/25/2013). This statute was created with identical text in 2013 Ky. Acts chs. 126 and 133, which were companion bills. These Acts have been codified together.

70.065. Sheriff, deputy sheriff, constable, and county police officer prohibited from requesting or requiring victim of alleged sexual offense to submit to polygraph or other examination — Other prohibitions.

No sheriff, deputy sheriff, constable, or county police officer shall:

  1. As a condition of proceeding with an investigation or prosecution of a case, request or require a victim of an alleged sexual offense to submit to a polygraph examination or any other device designed for the purpose of determining whether a person is telling the truth; or
  2. Charge or threaten to charge the victim of an alleged sexual offense with prosecution for a criminal offense for refusing to submit to a polygraph examination or other device designed for the purpose of determining whether a person is telling the truth.

History. Enact. Acts 2008, ch. 112, § 3, effective July 15, 2008.

70.070. Execution and return of process — Territorial jurisdiction.

Each sheriff shall execute and make due return of all notices and process which come to him and may be lawfully executed by him against any person or property in his county, or upon any river or creek adjoining his county. He shall return the time of service of each notice and process, and the time of the levy of each execution, what levied on, when he sold the property seized, whom to and what for, and all other matters touching his duty, and shall subscribe his own name to the return, and, if he is a deputy, the name also of his principal.

History. 4565.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Amendment of Return.

With the court’s permission, an officer may amend his return either during or after his term of office. Bolling v. Doneghy, 62 Ky. 220 , 1 Duv. 220, 1864 Ky. LEXIS 34 ( Ky. 1864 ). See Malone, Chiles & Co. v. Samuel, 10 Ky. 35 0 , 3 A.K. Marsh. 350, 1821 Ky. LEXIS 136 ( Ky. 1821 ); Armstrong v. Easton, 40 Ky. 66 , 1 B. Mon. 66, 1840 Ky. LEXIS 79 ( Ky. 1840 ); Thompson v. Moore, 91 Ky. 80 , 12 Ky. L. Rptr. 664 , 15 S.W. 6, 1891 Ky. LEXIS 4 ( Ky. 1891 ); reh. overruled, Thompson v. Moore, 15 S.W. 358, 12 Ky. L. Rptr. 665 ( Ky. 1891 ); Louisville, H. & S. L. R. Co. v. Commonwealth, 104 Ky. 35 , 46 S.W. 207, 20 Ky. L. Rptr. 371 , 1898 Ky. LEXIS 127 ( Ky. 1898 ).

2. Evidence.

Surplusage in a return is not evidence. Dupuy v. Johnson, 4 Ky. 562 , 1809 Ky. LEXIS 146 ( Ky. 1809 ); Walker v. McKnight, 54 Ky. 467 , 1854 Ky. LEXIS 89 ( Ky. 1854 ).

An executed return raises presumption that the officer has completely performed his duty, unless the return itself shows incomplete service. Stephens v. Frazier, 41 Ky. 250 , 1842 Ky. LEXIS 8 ( Ky. 1842 ); Case v. Colston, 58 Ky. 145 , 1858 Ky. LEXIS 29 ( Ky. 1858 ); Fleece v. Goodrum, 62 Ky. 306 , 1864 Ky. LEXIS 71 ( Ky. 1864 ); Jones v. Edwards, 78 Ky. 6 , 1879 Ky. LEXIS 48 ( Ky. 1879 ); Cheatham v. Whitman, 86 Ky. 6 14 , 6 S.W. 595, 9 Ky. L. Rptr. 761 , 1888 Ky. LEXIS 14 ( Ky. 1888 ).

An ambiguous return may be explained by secondary evidence. Chamberlain & Tapp v. Brewer, 66 Ky. 561 , 1868 Ky. LEXIS 29 ( Ky. 1868 ).

3. Signature of Deputy.

A deputy should sign the name of his principal by himself as deputy, but a signature in his own name as deputy is not void. Norman v. Norman, 69 Ky. 495 , 1869 Ky. LEXIS 193 ( Ky. 1869 ); Humphrey's Ex'r v. Wade, 84 Ky. 391 , 1 S.W. 648, 8 Ky. L. Rptr. 384 , 1886 Ky. LEXIS 79 ( Ky. 1886 ).

4. Impeachment.

Impeachment of a return must be by the clear and convincing evidence. Commonwealth v. Jackson, 73 Ky. 424 , 1874 Ky. LEXIS 69 ( Ky. 1874 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

An advance of $5.00 (plus tax) for fees for execution of process is required to be paid into court by one prosecuting a civil action under KRS 64.080 ; in the quarterly court the clerk is required to deliver the process to the designated officer pursuant to KRS 25.015 (now repealed), this section and subsection (1) of KRS 70.350 ; the designated officer shall serve it and make proper return before payment of his fee from the advance deposited with the clerk and KRS 64.090 fixes fees to be paid to the sheriff and KRS 64.190 fixes constable fees; and any other advances charged or demanded are not authorized by law. OAG 63-215 .

The office of the sheriff of Fayette County could lease a boat and motor for official duties on the Kentucky River. OAG 64-470 .

It is the duty of the court clerk and not of the sheriff of a county to forward process to a proper officer in another county of this state where it is to be served. OAG 66-62 .

The sheriff cannot refuse to serve warrants in misdemeanor cases until the $7.00 fee is paid. OAG 71-277 .

The sheriff must execute warrants issued under KRS 434.290 (repealed) when placed in his hands for execution, and he is not entitled to his $7.00 fee until the defendant is convicted and it is taxed to the defendant as costs. OAG 71-277 .

This section requires the sheriff or his deputies to execute criminal process issued by a justice of the peace court and delivered to him for service. OAG 71-365 .

This section requires in effect that the sheriff or deputy actually serving the process must sign the return. OAG 72-772 .

If the sheriff’s regular deputy staff is inadequate to meet the total statutory responsibilities of the sheriff, including the service of process and legal papers, he may in writing empower the elected constables, as peace officers, to assist him in the serving of process under his supervision and direction with the fees resulting from the process-serving by such constables accruing to the sheriff’s office. OAG 78-66 .

Neither a county sheriff nor his deputies may, under color of state law, accommodate landlords by serving notices to vacate which are not issued by the court. OAG 79-598 .

A county sheriff must execute and make due return on all criminal process lawfully issued by a county trial commissioner (process as authorized by SCR 5.030 ) and placed in the sheriff’s hands or with his lawful deputies. OAG 80-332 .

Except where the District Court or trial commissioner indicates a need for immediacy in serving a warrant, the sheriff must exercise reasonable diligence in executing the process, bearing in mind his other duties, work schedule and convenience. OAG 80-332 .

Where a defendant has willfully failed to comply with the conditions of a bail bond, resulting in a forfeiture ordered by the court, and a lien on real estate is involved so that notice of the forfeiture is sent to the county clerk pursuant to RCr 4.48, the proper officer to execute the lien would be the county sheriff of the county in which the real property is situated, or his deputy under this section. OAG 81-215 .

A sheriff and his deputies may serve criminal process anywhere within the boundaries of his county pursuant to this section which establishes the territorial limits of a sheriff in serving criminal as well as civil process. OAG 81-300 .

The courts are not mandated to place the summoning of jurors in the hands of the sheriff, although they may do so if they desire; the courts may require the court clerk to mail the summonses. OAG 83-100 .

The court issuing a warrant of arrest has the authority to place the warrant for service with any peace officer of the county it chooses, including the sheriff. OAG 83-343 .

A county sheriff can serve a warrant, issued by any court in his county and delivered to him for service, anywhere within his county boundaries, including city boundaries in his county, and even where the offense is committed in the city. OAG 83-343 .

A sheriff is not authorized to serve “notices” on behalf of a city when those “notices” do not constitute judicial process issued by a court of law in connection with legal proceedings undertaken by the city. OAG 83-403 .

KRS 24A.140(1) requires the sheriff to provide the “same services to the district court as are provided to the circuit court” which would include serving all necessary criminal process and allied papers; moreover, since the process is issued by the court, this section, governing execution of process by the sheriff, means that the sheriff is required to execute criminal process coming out of the circuit and district courts which process is placed in his hands by order or direction of the particular court. OAG 84-37 .

The placing of criminal process and papers with the sheriff or other peace officer is a matter of discretion with the issuing court; the judge of the issuing court may indicate to the clerk of the court the judge’s desires as to whom (the sheriff, constable, or other peace officer) the process will be delivered to for execution and return. OAG 84-37 .

Where the sheriff’s regular deputy staff is inadequate to meet the sheriff’s total statutory responsibilities, the sheriff, under KRS 70.050 , may in writing empower constables and other peace officers to execute criminal process, coming into the sheriff’s hands, under the sheriff’s supervision and direction. OAG 84-37 .

If a sheriff refuses to serve process on the ground that the requester owes him for an unrelated fee, the sheriff would be in violation of this section and would be liable on his official bond for such neglect of duty; he would also be subject to the court’s holding him in contempt, since the illegal failure to serve summons would constitute an interference with the proper exercise of the court’s judicial functions. OAG 84-114 .

A sheriff may not refuse to serve a properly issued process for the requester for the reason that the requester owes him a fee bill involving an unrelated matter. OAG 84-114 .

A sheriff can legally refuse to serve or attempt to serve a civil summons where he has not yet been paid to serve it. OAG 84-114 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Bond of sheriff as revenue collector, KRS 134.230 , 134.330 .

Bond to be executed by sheriff, Ky. Const., § 103.

Bonds of public officers, KRS Ch. 62.

Execution, time of receiving to be noted, KRS 426.120 .

Imprisonment, return of execution of, RCr 11.22.

Jurisdiction over roads and streams forming county boundaries, KRS 452.520 .

Liability for failure to return execution in time, KRS 426.350 .

Premium on bond, when claim against the state, KRS 62.140 , 62.155 .

“Prevented by force” not sufficient return, KRS 70.079 .

Process, to whom may be directed, 454.135 , 454.140 .

Sheriff to attend clerk’s office daily to receive process, KRS 70.075 .

Suits on bond of sheriff may be brought in Franklin Circuit Court, KRS 135.080 .

Sunday, process that may be executed on, KRS 431.095 .

Sureties’ liabilities for excess advancements to sheriffs, KRS 64.140 .

Sureties’ rights and liabilities when sheriff vacates office, KRS 70.110 .

Kentucky Law Journal.

Kentucky Law Survey, Garvey and Doutt, Civil Procedure, 68 Ky. L.J. 529 (1979-1980).

ALR

Amendment as permissible to cure omission of signature of issuing officer on civil process or summons. 37 A.L.R.2d 928.

Inclusion or exclusion of first and last days in computing time for service of process which must take place a certain number of days before a known future date. 98 A.L.R.2d 1398.

70.075. Duty of sheriff to attend clerk’s office.

It shall be the duty of the sheriff, or of one (1) of his deputies, to attend at the clerk’s office daily — Sundays excepted — to receive any process that may be issued, and the clerk shall deliver to him any process remaining in his office.

History. C. C. 46: trans. Acts 1952, ch. 84, § 1, effective July 1, 1953.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Good Faith Issuance.

When a party in good faith causes issuance of summons within time required by statute he has complied with the law and saved his right of action for it is the official duty of county clerk to see that process is delivered to sheriff for service and the duty of the sheriff or one of his deputies to attend clerk’s office daily to receive such process as has been issued. Blue Grass Mining Co. v. Stamper, 267 Ky. 643 , 103 S.W.2d 112, 1937 Ky. LEXIS 376 ( Ky. 1937 ).

Cited:

Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Little, 264 Ky. 579 , 95 S.W.2d 253, 1936 Ky. LEXIS 373 ( Ky. 1936 ); Blue Grass Mining Co. v. North, 265 Ky. 250 , 96 S.W.2d 757, 1936 Ky. LEXIS 470 ( Ky. 1936 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

This section is in reality a “duty” or “functional” statute embracing the interrelated work of the circuit clerk and the sheriff, although it is supportive of the procedural functions of the clerk and sheriff in the issuance and service of process. Thus, the clerk’s manual rule permitting the clerk’s delivering a process to the party to deliver to the sheriff is in conflict with and a circumvention of this section and must give way to the dictates of this section. OAG 85-110 .

70.076. Sheriff to indorse time of receiving process.

The sheriff shall indorse upon every summons, order of arrest or for the delivery of property, or of attachment, or injunction, in his hands, the day and hour of its reception by him.

History. C. C. 674: trans. Acts 1952, ch. 84, § 1, effective July 1, 1953.

70.077. Breaking and entering buildings to execute process.

A sheriff having an order of attachment, or for the delivery of property, may enter any building or inclosure containing the property, to take it; and, if necessary for this purpose, may break the building or inclosure, having first publicly demanded the property.

History. C. C. 675: trans. Acts 1952, ch. 84, § 1, effective July 1, 1953.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Entry in Absence of Holder.

Constable had the right to make forcible entry into appellant’s apartment in his absence and take possession of the articles of personal property named in writ directing sheriff or constable to take possession of articles, in execution of writ which was then in his hands. Schork v. Calloway, 205 Ky. 346 , 265 S.W. 807, 1924 Ky. LEXIS 108 ( Ky. 1924 ).

2. Refusal of Admission.

Under this section an officer having an order directing him to take specific property might forcibly enter any building containing it, after having demanded and been refused admission and he is not prohibited by KRS 70.180 which provides only against forcible entry to levy a fieri facias. Schork v. Calloway, 205 Ky. 346 , 265 S.W. 807, 1924 Ky. LEXIS 108 ( Ky. 1924 ).

3. Forcing Lock or Window.

A constable, having a distress warrant in his hands for execution, is not authorized to force a lock of an outer door, or window which is closed and fastened to enter the house to make a levy. Jewell v. Mills, 66 Ky. 62 , 1867 Ky. LEXIS 125 ( Ky. 1867 ).

Research References and Practice Aids

ALR

Validity, construction and application of statutes authorizing public officer to break into building to serve documents or process or to execute process in civil proceedings. 129 A.L.R. 247.

70.078. Breaking and entering buildings to execute order of arrest.

A sheriff having an order of arrest may enter any house or inclosure in which the party to be arrested may be, to arrest him; and, if necessary for this purpose, may break the house or inclosure, having informed any person therein of his object; or, if no person appear to whom such information can be given, after having publicly demanded the person to be arrested; and, in either case, after having given sufficient time for the house or inclosure to be opened.

History. C. C. 676: trans. Acts 1952, ch. 84, § 1, effective July 1, 1953.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Breaking into Inclosure.

A sheriff who had a writ of arrest for the purpose of executing it had the authority to break into any house or inclosure at any time, whether day or night, first having given proper notice. Phillips v. Ronald, 66 Ky. 244 , 1867 Ky. LEXIS 177 ( Ky. 1867 ).

2. Refusal to Make Reasonable Attempt to Execute.

By having failed and having refused to make a reasonable attempt to execute a writ of arrest the night that writ was placed in his hands about early gaslighting time, in the city of Louisville, and having been admonished that the absconding debtor was at one of the hotels in the city, and that next morning would be too late to execute it — the absconding debtor having crossed over to Indiana at three o’clock next morning and escaped — the sheriff was guilty of gross negligence and disregard of official duty. Phillips v. Ronald, 66 Ky. 244 , 1867 Ky. LEXIS 177 ( Ky. 1867 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

The sheriff should arrest a person against whom a contempt order has been issued by a judge of the circuit court and the sheriff or his deputy may enter the home of the person adjudged to be in contempt in order to do so. OAG 64-170 .

A peace officer may, after observing a person committing a public offense in his presence, pursue that person to his home and make the arrest there even though he may have temporarily lost sight of the misdemeanant. OAG 68-491 .

A county policeman has the same authority in effecting an arrest under a warrant as the sheriff, including the power of breaking and entering buildings to execute warrants of arrest. OAG 76-310 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Treatises

Caldwell’s Kentucky Form Book, 5th Ed., Search Warrant to Detect Gaming Tables, Form 351.05.

70.079. Process not to be returned “prevented by force.”

It shall not be a sufficient return of any process, that the officer was prevented by force from executing it.

History. C. C. 677: trans. Acts 1952, ch. 84, § 1, effective July 1, 1953.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Bona Fide Effort.

The officer is required only to make a reasonable bona fide effort to perform his duty. Commonwealth for Ashby v. Gill, 53 Ky. 20 ( Ky. 1853 ).

2. Procedure.

As part of their duties in executing warrants of arrest, sheriffs and their deputies must inform the person named in the warrant of their purpose and the offense for which the arrest is being made, and then either the subject must voluntarily place himself in the custody of the officer or the officer will place the subject in restraint if the subject offers force against the officer. Lawson v. Burnett, 471 S.W.2d 726, 1971 Ky. LEXIS 259 ( Ky. 1971 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Where an arrest warrant is to be executed the peace officer must actually and physically arrest defendant bringing him before the magistrate who issued the warrant and the officer’s return must describe the manner and time of arrest to constitute adequate service of process and for officer to telephone defendant telling him to contact judge is illegal and in direct disobedience of magistrate’s order in issuing the warrant. OAG 73-380 .

A public business may not prevent the constable and his legally sworn and bonded deputies from serving legal process, such as civil and criminal summonses and subpoenas, upon that business’ employees by refusing to permit said officers to enter the place of business as long as the officers in good faith use reasonable and necessary means to contact the named defendant employees in the place of business. OAG 83-493 .

70.080. Return of “not found.”

No officer shall return on any process that the defendant is not found within his county, unless he has actually been to the defendant’s residence. If the defendant is not found by the officer, or is not a resident of the county, the officer shall so return.

History. 4566.

70.085. Summons, return of — Amendment if erroneous — Penalty.

The return on a summons by an officer must state when and how the summons was served, and, if erroneous, may, with leave of the court, be amended according to the truth. An officer who makes an erroneous return may be fined by the court not exceeding ten dollars ($10), and is liable to the person aggrieved for any injury caused by the error.

History. C. C. 49: trans. Acts 1952, ch. 84, § 1; 1966, ch. 255, § 85.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Amendment.

An officer may amend his return upon the leave of the court even after judgment and after his term of office expires. Ramey v. Francis, Day & Co., 169 Ky. 469 , 184 S.W. 380, 1916 Ky. LEXIS 715 ( Ky. 1916 ).

2. Curing of Deficiencies.

Deficiencies of original return on summons could not be cured by amendment without the permission of the court. Jones v. Fuller, 280 Ky. 671 , 134 S.W.2d 240, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 192 ( Ky. 1939 ).

3. Correction by Court.

Court in election case could after the time for pleading had expired correct return on summons that showed August 26th as the date of service so as to show the true date August 22nd and even if the summons had not been served until August 26th answer filed on August 25th was not filed prematurely for petition was filed and summons issued, and the contestee was not required to wait until the summons was served on him before filing answer, for he could waive the service of summons and enter his appearance. Hudson v. Manning, 250 Ky. 760 , 63 S.W.2d 943, 1933 Ky. LEXIS 774 ( Ky. 1933 ).

In election contest court after the time for pleading has expired could correct return on summons so as to show the true date of service. Hudson v. Manning, 250 Ky. 760 , 63 S.W.2d 943, 1933 Ky. LEXIS 774 ( Ky. 1933 ).

Cited:

Miller v. National Bank of London, 273 Ky. 243 , 116 S.W.2d 320, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 618 ( Ky. 1938 ).

Research References and Practice Aids

ALR

Attack on return of service of process in action in personam showing personal or constructive service in state, by showing that defendant was a nonresident and was not served in the state. 107 A.L.R. 1342.

Omission of signature of issuing officer on civil process or summons as affecting jurisdiction of the person. 37 A.L.R.2d 928.

Failure to make return as affecting validity of service or court’s jurisdiction. 82 A.L.R.2d 668.

Mistake or error in middle initial or middle name of party as vitiating or invalidating civil process, summons, or the like. 6 A.L.R.3d 1179.

70.090. Fines, forfeitures and fees — Sheriff to collect.

The sheriff shall collect and account for all fines and forfeitures, and all officers’ fees listed with him, and payable in his county, during his term of office.

History. 4572.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Authorization by Execution.

The sheriff is not authorized to collect fines and forfeitures until an execution is put in his hands authorizing him to collect them. National Surety Co. v. Commonwealth, 253 Ky. 607 , 69 S.W.2d 1007, 1934 Ky. LEXIS 694 ( Ky. 1934 ).

2. Failure to Collect or Pay Over Fees.

The sheriff’s official bond is liable for his failure to collect or pay over official fees listed with him for collection. Middleton v. Caldwell, 67 Ky. 392 , 1868 Ky. LEXIS 143 ( Ky. 1868 ). See Griffith v. Com'wealth ex rel. Hughes, 73 Ky. 281 , 1874 Ky. LEXIS 47 (Ky. Ct. App. 1874).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Under KRS 64.340 a sheriff cannot collect fees for his services in connection with the county or quarterly court misdemeanor cases unless the fees are recovered and collected from the defendant and under KRS 453.020 a defendant is required to pay such costs only if he is convicted. OAG 74-603 .

70.095. Fees for fingerprint impressions or photograph requested for professional, trade, or commercial purposes or personal use.

  1. Sheriffs may charge a fee of ten dollars ($10) per set of fingerprint impressions taken and five dollars ($5) per photograph taken or copied when those services are requested by a person for professional, trade, or commercial purposes or for personal use.
  2. If the Department of Kentucky State Police sets new fingerprinting and photograph fees under the provisions of KRS 16.068 , sheriffs may increase fingerprinting and photograph fees to equal those fees established by the Department of Kentucky State Police through administrative regulations.
  3. Nothing in this section shall change any other fee allocation allowed by statute.

History. Enact. Acts 2014, ch. 135, § 3, effective July 15, 2014.

70.100. Distrainable fee-bills — Time allowed for collection.

Except as provided in subsection (1) of KRS 64.050 which is hereby made applicable to sheriffs, for two (2) years after the expiration of his term of office a sheriff and his deputies may collect his distrainable fee-bills, or those of any other officer, placed in his hands for collection during his term of office, and may make distress for the same within the time during which the fee retains its distrainable force, and, with his sureties, shall be liable to the person entitled to such fees.

History. 4564: amend. Acts 1962, ch. 210, § 17.

Opinions of Attorney General.

In view of KRS 64.340 , where a misdemeanor defendant is not convicted, or the case does not proceed to judgment, a sheriff has no statutory means for collecting his fees and, since such fees are uncollectible, he is not accountable for them. OAG 75-393 .

Where a misdemeanor defendant is convicted but never pays the costs, including the sheriff’s fees, the sheriff, as a fee officer, is accountable in his audit for such uncollected fees unless he shows to the auditor that he took all reasonable and practical means to collect such fees, although the statutes do not make the sheriff an insurer of the collection of fees legally due and payable. OAG 75-393 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Fee-bills, when due and distrainable, KRS 64.430 .

70.105. Money unpaid pending litigation.

Any money due an outgoing sheriff, other than compensation for the collection of taxes, remaining unpaid because of pending litigation shall be paid to the outgoing sheriff at the conclusion of the litigation.

History. Enact. Acts 1958, ch. 53, effective June 19, 1958.

70.110. Execution of process after leaving office — Rights of sureties.

  1. When a sheriff dies or otherwise vacates his office, his deputies shall complete the execution of any process in his or their hands. The sureties on the bond of the sheriff may require indemnity from the deputies in the manner prescribed for sureties in official or other bonds in KRS 62.090 to 62.120 . If the deputies fail to give the indemnity which the court requires, their powers to act as deputy shall be revoked by the court.
  2. When the term of a sheriff expires, he shall complete the execution of any process in his hands, and any act or omission in this respect shall be covered by his official bond.
  3. When a sheriff resigns, dies or vacates his office, the plaintiff in any process or execution, upon paying to the sheriff or his deputy the fees and lawful charges for services rendered up to the time of withdrawal, may withdraw such process or execution from the hands of the sheriff or his deputy, and place the same, at his election, in the hands of any other proper officer, who shall proceed to the execution thereof in the same manner that the sheriff or his deputy was required to do by law, and under the same penalties.

History. 4575: amend. Acts 1966, ch. 255, § 86.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Successive Sheriffs.

Under this section, a fieri facias may be levied by one sheriff, and a venditioni exponas placed in the hands of his successor, notwithstanding the original sheriff’s fees are unpaid. Davis v. Hudson, 195 Ky. 766 , 244 S.W. 68, 1922 Ky. LEXIS 434 ( Ky. 1922 ).

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Malfeasance or neglect of peace officers, penalty, KRS 61.170 .

Surety, proceedings for release and indemnity, KRS 62.090 , 62.100 .

70.120. Money collected by sheriff — Demand for.

A person entitled to money collected by a sheriff may demand it from the sheriff, by himself, his attorney, or any other person having his written authority.

History. 4576.

Opinions of Attorney General.

Sheriff who has collected money under an execution must pay it to the execution creditor or his attorney or to any other person having creditor’s written authority on due demand and sheriff has no right to delay such payment of money to the person entitled to it when demand is made prior to the return date as the purpose of the return date is merely to give the officer sufficient time to find property which will satisfy the execution and make his return to the court. OAG 73-313 .

If a sheriff needs additional deputies in connection with court appearances under KRS 64.090 and KRS 70.140 he can move the courts for them under KRS 64.345 and the circuit and county courts in their discretion can increase the number of sheriff deputies whose salaries would be fixed by the judges payable out of “75 per cent” account, but the fees received by the sheriff for court appearances from the state treasury and the county treasury must be turned in to the state treasury monthly pursuant to KRS 64.345 . OAG 74-112 .

70.130. Sheriff to execute sentences of court and convey prisoners — Coroner or jailer may act.

The sheriff shall, by himself or deputy, convey all persons to the penitentiary or juvenile facility condemned to confinement therein, and execute the sentence of the court in other criminal and penal cases. But the court may order the coroner or jailer to act in the place of the sheriff in the discharge of those duties.

History. 4577: amend. Acts 1998, ch. 272, § 2, effective July 15, 1998.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

Georgetown v. Morrison, 362 S.W.2d 289, 1962 Ky. LEXIS 256 ( Ky. 1962 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

A sheriff is required to transport prisoners placed in his custody as far as is necessary to execute the orders of the courts as to the prisoners’ place of confinement. OAG 80-482 .

The sheriff has a duty to obey all orders of the courts of justice, and to execute the sentence of the court and this duty is absolute; if the sheriff is charged to take custody of a prisoner by a judge he must do so, even when both he and the judge are aware that no facilities are available for housing the prisoner. OAG 80-482 .

Nothing in KRS Chapter 70 requires the sheriff to be a security guard for jail prisoners taken to the hospital. The responsibility for taking such prisoners to the hospital or to the doctor and guarding them is placed upon the jailer and his staff. OAG 82-403 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Executions in criminal cases, RCr 11.22.

Fee for conveying prisoners, KRS 64.070 .

Jailer, when sheriff to act as, Ky. Const., § 105; KRS 71.090 .

Orders of general assembly, sheriff may be directed to execute, KRS 6.071 , 6.131 .

Process may be directed to person other than sheriff, KRS 454.135 , 454.140 .

Sheriff to deliver condemned persons to penitentiary, RCr 11.22; KRS 431.215 .

70.140. Sheriff to attend and keep order in fiscal and Court of Justice courts — Court security officers limited to Court of Justice courts.

The sheriff shall, by himself or deputy, attend and keep order in the fiscal court and any court of the Court of Justice and shall obey the orders of said courts, but a certified court security officer may only attend and keep order in any court of the Court of Justice and shall obey the orders of said court.

History. 4587: amend. Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 54; 2007, ch. 54, § 13, effective June 26, 2007.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

The effective date for this section as amended by Acts 1976, Ex. Sess., ch. 14, § 54 is set forth in Acts 1976, Ex. Sess., ch. 14, § 491 (1) as March 19, 1977 and in § 491 (3) as January 2, 1978. The Administrative Office of the Courts has advised that the section as amended was intended to become effective on January 2, 1978.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

Cornett v. Chandler, 307 S.W.2d 918, 1957 Ky. LEXIS 122 ( Ky. 1957 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

The necessary and actual expenses of the deputy sheriffs in staying overnight with sequestered juries under orders of the circuit court can be paid, when properly documented, from the sheriff’s 75 per cent account pursuant to KRS 64.345 as a legitimate and necessary office expense. OAG 71-495 .

This section includes the duty of watching over a sequestered jury. OAG 75-309 .

Under the special circumstances surrounding the operation of the criminal circuit courts in Jefferson County, the use of the word “deputy” in KRS 70.140 and 64.090 may be extended to the plural and requirement for payment by the state to the $7.00 fee for each deputy sheriff attending a particular criminal court upon the request of the particular circuit judge can mean more than one deputy per judge under KRS 446.020 . OAG 75-472 .

This section is mandatory in nature. OAG 75-667 .

The phrase “sheriff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . or deputy” does not include county police. OAG 75-667 .

A sheriff has the duty to transport prisoners from the jail to the circuit or the district court upon a proper showing of need by the jailer. OAG 78-653 .

Assuming that a disorder or disturbance of fiscal court arises, and the county judge/executive requests the sheriff or deputy to intervene and remove the offending person, and the sheriff fails or refuses to intervene, there is no remedy that would suffice for that particular event. OAG 80-451 .

The presiding officer of the fiscal court may call on the sheriff or deputy to remove from the proceedings any person, including any member of the fiscal court, who is actually engaged in a disturbance of the fiscal court as defined in Webster’s Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary and the case of Lowery v. Adams, 344 F. Supp. 446, 1972 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13929 (W.D. Ky. 1972 ); however, the chair must be very careful that there is actually a “disturbance” in the strictest sense, and not merely parliamentary or fiscal court debate and discussion. OAG 80-451 .

While it is mandatory under this section for the sheriff to attend fiscal court meetings and keep order, the sheriff must make a sound judgment as to whether or not he is viewing a disturbance or not; if he has reason to believe that there is no disorder and that the fiscal court is merely engaged in parliamentary debate and discussion, there is no basis for his intervention. OAG 80-451 .

The sheriff has a duty to obey all orders of the courts of justice, and to execute the sentence of the court and this duty is absolute; if the sheriff is charged to take custody of a prisoner by a judge he must do so, even when both he and the judge are aware that no facilities are available for housing the prisoner. OAG 80-482 .

Where a county has an arrangement to use a second county’s juvenile detention center to house certain juveniles, it is the responsibility of the sheriff of the first county, or his deputies, under KRS 24A.140 and this section, to transport juveniles who have been arrested by city police in the first county to the detention facility in the second county; it is not the responsibility of the city police who effected the arrest. OAG 81-357 .

A sheriff is under a statutory duty to obey a court order directing a prisoner to be transported in accordance to a bench warrant issued in regard to a civil action, despite the absence of statutory authorization for payment from the state treasury for transporting the prisoner. OAG 95-27 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Circuit court, security services provided by sheriff, KRS 23A.090 .

District court, duties of sheriff, KRS 24A.140 .

Jurors, sequestered, responsibility for needs, transportation, security, equipment and services, KRS 29A.180 .

70.150. Sheriff to patrol roads — Record of accidents.

  1. The sheriff of each county and his deputies shall patrol all public roads in his county, and direct, regulate and control the traffic on such roads so as to maintain a maximum degree of safety.
  2. He shall, as soon as possible, after receiving information of their occurrence, investigate all accidents and wrecks occurring upon the roads. When possible, he shall determine the position of each of the vehicles connected therewith immediately before and after each accident or wreck. Where accidents or wrecks appear to have been made by the vehicles or by the parties owning, operating or occupying the vehicles at the time of the accident or wreck, he shall make a record of the measurement, direction and location of all tracks and visible impressions made on and about the road that have a tendency to disclose the cause of the accident. He shall make a record in his office of his observations and findings. He shall ascertain, if possible, the license number of each of the vehicles connected therewith, the number of each engine and the make of each vehicle, the name of the state, territory, district, department and county issuing the license, the name and address of the owner or operator of the vehicle, the name and address of each occupant of the vehicles, the name and address of each witness, and the name and address of each person who immediately thereafter came upon the ground or who saw evidence of the position of the vehicles immediately before or after the accident or wreck, or who heard a statement made by the parties owning or occupying either vehicle as to how or who caused the accident or wreck.
  3. When any person is wounded or killed, or there is reason to believe that criminal negligence or carelessness was the cause of the accident or wreck, the officer making the inspection, shall take affidavits or statements from all witnesses who have information of incriminating facts connected therewith. For the purpose of securing affidavits or statements, each sheriff and deputy may upon his own initiative, issue and serve a subpoena upon witnesses requiring them to testify, and may administer an oath to each witness before testifying, and may reduce the testimony to writing. The sheriff shall return the affidavits and statements, together with a report in writing of all information required, to the county attorney and a duplicate of the report and statements or affidavits to the circuit clerk for submission to the grand jury next to be convened in his county.

History. 3786-2.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

The part of this section empowering the sheriff or deputy to administer an oath is not unconstitutional. Milliken v. Harrod, 275 Ky. 597 , 122 S.W.2d 148, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 471 ( Ky. 1938 ).

If the part of this section authorizing the sheriff or his deputies to issue subpoenas for witnesses violated Ky. Const., §§ 27 and 28 it would not render the whole section void. Milliken v. Harrod, 275 Ky. 597 , 122 S.W.2d 148, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 471 ( Ky. 1938 ).

2. Purpose.

The purpose of this section is for the public welfare and protection of the public generally, and the sheriff when acting as county patrolman performs a service for the state. Therefore this section does not violate Ky. Const., § 181. Milliken v. Harrod, 275 Ky. 597 , 122 S.W.2d 148, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 471 ( Ky. 1938 ).

Cited:

Georgetown v. Morrison, 362 S.W.2d 289, 1962 Ky. LEXIS 256 ( Ky. 1962 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

A sheriff should be allowed credit for excess fees for expenses incurred by deputies in performing duties under this section and KRS 70.160 and reimbursed to the deputies so long as the expenses are properly documented. OAG 70-485 .

Any written reports of a motor vehicle accident made pursuant to this section are required to be placed on record in the sheriff’s office, and they may be inspected as public records by a person showing the interest required by the common-law rule (that person has an interest therein which is such as would enable him to defend or maintain an action for which the document or record sought can furnish evidence or necessary information) except that such interest is presumed. OAG 70-570 .

Under KRS 95.800 (now repealed) and this section, a marshal of a sixth-class city and a county sheriff have jurisdiction throughout the county so that local peace officers have concurrent jurisdiction with the state police to enforce all the laws of the Commonwealth on the turnpike. OAG 75-210 .

The $300 monthly allowance provided by KRS 70.170 should be used by the sheriff to reimburse the deputies for their documented mileage in patrolling roads and inspecting dance halls and roadhouses under this section and KRS 70.160 . If that does not reimburse the deputies in full for such expenses, then they can, by properly documenting such expenses, be paid their actual and necessary expenses out of the fees of the sheriff’s office or the county treasury, where the fiscal court has so provided by appropriate budgeting procedure. OAG 82-118 .

The fiscal court has the responsibility of procuring the necessary automobiles for the sheriff’s statutory functions where it appears that the sheriff’s fees are not wholly sufficient for that purpose; thus, to the extent that the expense allowance and sheriff’s fees are not wholly sufficient to fund the acquisition cost of automobiles and the cost of operation, the fiscal court has the responsibility of funding such costs out of the county treasury, under available budgeted county funds. OAG 84-140 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Enforcement of motor vehicle laws; arrests; bail bonds, KRS 281.765 .

70.155. Motor vehicle impoundment — Handling and storage fees — Challenge to validity of impoundment — Hearing — Appeal.

  1. As used in this section, “hearing board” or “board” means a body:
    1. Established by ordinance;
    2. Empowered to conduct hearings pursuant to this section; and
    3. Composed of one (1) or more persons appointed pursuant to ordinance and any hearing officers appointed by the board.

      Any actions of a hearing officer shall be deemed to be the action of the board.

  2. A sheriff may impound a motor vehicle parked, stopped, or standing upon a street or public way within its jurisdiction that is in violation of an ordinance or statute prohibiting parking, stopping, or standing in the location, manner, or at the time the vehicle is cited or for any other lawful reason.
  3. A sheriff may condition the release of an impounded motor vehicle upon the payment of the handling and storage fees imposed thereon, unless the owner or other person entitled to possession challenges the validity of the impoundment pursuant to subsection (4) of this section. A vehicle may be released to the owner or other person entitled to possession only upon proof of ownership or right to possession. The sheriff may require reasonable security, bond, or other assurances of indemnification from a person who is not the registered owner of the vehicle prior to releasing the vehicle to that person.
  4. The owner of a motor vehicle which has been impounded pursuant to this section or other person entitled to possession may challenge the validity of the impoundment and request in writing a hearing before the hearing board. The hearing shall be conducted within ten (10) business days of the date of the request, unless the owner or other person entitled to possession waives the right to the hearing or the sheriff shows good cause for the delay. The sheriff shall retain possession of the vehicle pending the hearing, unless the owner or other person claiming right of possession posts a bond in an amount equal to the fees accrued as of the date of the hearing request, or seventy-five dollars ($75), whichever is less. If the owner or person claiming possession of the vehicle is unable to pay the amount of the bond, the hearing shall be held within seventy-two (72) hours of the date the request for the hearing is received, unless that person requests or agrees to a continuance.
    1. At least five (5) days prior to the date set for the hearing, the sheriff shall notify the person requesting the hearing of the date, time, and place of the hearing. In the case of a hearing required to be held within seventy-two (72) hours of the date of the request as provided in subsection (4) of this section, the person requesting the hearing shall be informed at the time of his or her request, or as soon thereafter as is practicable, of the date, time, and place of the hearing. (5) (a) At least five (5) days prior to the date set for the hearing, the sheriff shall notify the person requesting the hearing of the date, time, and place of the hearing. In the case of a hearing required to be held within seventy-two (72) hours of the date of the request as provided in subsection (4) of this section, the person requesting the hearing shall be informed at the time of his or her request, or as soon thereafter as is practicable, of the date, time, and place of the hearing.
    2. Any person who refuses or, except for good cause, fails to appear at the date, time, and place set for the hearing shall be deemed to have conceded on that person’s and owner’s behalf that the impoundment was valid and reasonable.
    3. At the hearing, after consideration of the evidence, the board shall determine whether the impoundment was valid and reasonable. If the board determines the impoundment was:
      1. Valid and reasonable, the board shall uphold the impoundment and condition the release of the vehicle upon payment of all fees accruing thereto. If a bond was posted as security for release of the vehicle, the bond shall be forfeited to the sheriff. Any fees in excess of the amount of the bond posted shall be ordered to be paid by the owner of the vehicle to the sheriff; or
      2. Not valid and reasonable, an order releasing the vehicle shall be entered. All fees paid or amounts posted as bond because of the impoundment of the vehicle shall be returned.

        The board shall furnish the owner or person appearing on the owner’s behalf with a copy of its order.

    4. The board may consider a parking citation and any other written report made under oath by the issuing officer in lieu of the officer’s personal appearance at the hearing.
    5. An appeal from the hearing board’s determination may be made to the District Court of the county in which the sheriff is located within seven (7) days of the board’s determination. The appeal shall be initiated by the filing of a complaint and a copy of the board’s order in the same manner as any civil action. The action shall be tried de novo and the burden shall be on the sheriff to establish that the impoundment was valid and reasonable. If the court finds that the impoundment was:
      1. Valid and reasonable, the owner shall be ordered to pay all fees accruing thereto as of the date of judgment; or
      2. Not valid and reasonable, the sheriff shall be ordered to release the vehicle, if applicable, and to return all fees paid as a result of the impoundment and the plaintiff shall be authorized to recover his or her costs.
    6. The judgment of the District Court may be appealed to the Circuit Court in accordance with the Rules of Civil Procedure.

HISTORY: 2019 ch. 46, § 2, effective March 22, 2019.

70.160. Sheriff to visit and inspect dance halls and roadhouses. [Repealed]

History. Recodified Acts 1942, ch. 208, § 1, effective October 1, 1942, § 3786-3; Repealed Acts 2017, ch. 18, § 4, effective June 28, 2017.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Recodified Acts 1942, ch. 208, § 1, effective October 1, 1942, § 3786-3) was repealed by Acts 2017, ch. 80, § 58, effective June 29, 2017.

70.170. Salary for services under KRS 70.150.

  1. Each sheriff performing the duties required under the provisions of KRS 70.150 shall be allowed the amount of thirty-six hundred dollars ($3,600) annually payable out of the State Treasury at the rate of three hundred dollars ($300) per month for such services. The first such monthly payment shall be for the month of July, 1966, and the check therefor shall be forwarded to the sheriff concerned on or about the last working day of that month and each month thereafter.
  2. The allowance authorized in subsection (1) of this section shall be considered as operating expenses of the sheriff’s office and shall not be considered as part of his compensation. Sheriffs shall not be required to keep records verifying the expenditures from the allowance provided by the state.

HISTORY: 3786-4, 3786-5: amend. Acts 1952, ch. 73, § 1; 1966, ch. 224; 1970, ch. 92, § 17; 1974, ch. 252, § 1, effective July 1, 1974; 1980, ch. 1, § 1, effective July 15, 1980; 2017 ch. 18, § 1, effective June 29, 2017.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Construction.

This section merely increased sheriff’s duties as such, and under Ky. Const., §§ 161 and 235, a sheriff in office at time statute took effect could not recover the additional compensation provided for. Shannon v. Combs, 273 Ky. 514 , 117 S.W.2d 219, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 680 ( Ky. 1938 ).

This section is not invalid because of the difficulty and expense in ascertaining the additional compensation to which the sheriff is entitled for his services as county patrolman. Milliken v. Harrod, 275 Ky. 597 , 122 S.W.2d 148, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 471 ( Ky. 1938 ).

This section being enacted subsequent to KRS 45.020 to 45.160 (now repealed), prevailed over the earlier law, the auditor could draw his warrant for the amount fixed for sheriff’s services, notwithstanding that no specific appropriation was made. Shannon v. Dean, 279 Ky. 279 , 130 S.W.2d 812, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 290 ( Ky. 1939 ).

2. Purpose.

The compensation provided in this section is to compensate sheriff for his extra duties as highway patrolman. It is not connected with KRS 134.210 (now repealed). Milliken v. Harrod, 275 Ky. 597 , 122 S.W.2d 148, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 471 ( Ky. 1938 ).

3. Presentation of Claim for Services.

The sheriff must support his claim for services by substantial evidence and must satisfy the department of finance as to what the highest net receipts in any one year of his or his predecessor’s tenure was, and his net receipts for the year as sheriff, and the department must then allow difference between these two sums provided it does not exceed $1500 and entire compensation does not exceed $5000. Shannon v. Dean, 279 Ky. 279 , 130 S.W.2d 812, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 290 ( Ky. 1939 ). (decision prior to 1952 amendment).

4. Additional Mileage Allowance.

Sheriff may be allowed credit for necessary mileage in performing official services other than those for which he received compensation under this section or under KRS 64.095 (now repealed). Funk v. Milliken, 317 S.W.2d 499, 1958 Ky. LEXIS 100 ( Ky. 1958 ).

Cited:

Georgetown v. Morrison, 362 S.W.2d 289, 1962 Ky. LEXIS 256 ( Ky. 1962 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Sheriffs cannot purchase automobiles for the purpose of carrying out duties of their office that are not set out and required by KRS 64.095 (now repealed), 70.150 and 70.160 pursuant to the authority of KRS 44.050 and regulations thereunder. OAG 62-432 .

Upon presentation of a properly itemized and documented claim, the sheriff should be allowed credit, against excess fees of his office, for necessary mileage in performing official services other than those for which he receives reimbursement under KRS 64.095 (now repealed) or this section and credit for his office expenses which are reasonable in amount, beneficial to the public and not personal in nature. OAG 69-541 .

To the extent the $175 per month does not cover reimbursement for vehicle expense in patrolling roads and inspecting dance halls and roadhouses as paid by the county, the $175 should be retained as an expense allowance for reimbursement of those expenses. OAG 73-823 .

If the present salary authorized for the sheriff plus the probable fees of the office will not total $12,600 per year, the fiscal court may increase the salary of the sheriff and said increase may be funded from available revenue sharing funds of the county as an expenditure for law enforcement but the monthly expense allowance of $175 is considered as operating expenses of the sheriff’s office and should not be considered as part of his compensation. OAG 73-828 .

Official vehicular expenses of the county sheriff may be credited against excess fees up to the amount fixed in advance by the fiscal court providing the claimed expenses are not those for which the sheriff has been reimbursed under this section or KRS 64.095 (now repealed). OAG 74-177 .

The fiscal court could establish a mileage factor that would reasonably reimburse an officer for the vehicular expenses. OAG 74-243 .

Claimed expenses against the county by county officers must be formally made and documented under KRS 68.325 (now repealed) as if the state expense allowances did not exist. OAG 74-371 , modifying OAG 74-347 to the extent it is in conflict.

An elected sheriff who is removed from office may submit claims to the fiscal court for reimbursement of necessary office expenses provided by the statute or recognized by the courts payable out of the county treasury or excess fees, provided they are properly documented. OAG 74-680 .

In view of the provision that sheriffs are not required to keep records verifying the expenditures from the state expense allowance, the fiscal court can authorize reimbursement out of the county treasury for the sheriff’s expenses in patrolling public roads and in inspecting dance halls and roadhouses. OAG 76-349 .

The fiscal court may authorize the payment out of the county treasury for the monthly maintenance of automobiles used by the county sheriff in connection with his statutory duties and, in addition, it can authorize the payment out of the county treasury for gasoline used by the sheriff’s vehicles in the carrying out of his statutory functions, of course these payments for automobile maintenance and gasoline should not be in duplication of reimbursements involved in this section and KRS 64.095 (now repealed); it is legal to budget a sum for such expenditures which is an estimate of what may be expended for that category; however, the actual expenditure of such money must be based upon actual maintenance cost accrued as documented and presented by the sheriff to the fiscal court for payment on an item by item basis. OAG 78-271 .

The $300 monthly allowance provided by this section should be used by the sheriff to reimburse the deputies for their documented mileage in patrolling roads and inspecting dance halls and roadhouses under KRS 70.150 and 70.160 . If that does not reimburse the deputies in full for such expenses, then they can, by properly documenting such expenses, be paid their actual and necessary expenses out of the fees of the sheriff’s office or the county treasury, where the fiscal court has so provided by appropriate budgeting procedure. OAG 82-118 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Constitutional limit on salaries, Ky. Const., § 246.

Fees of sheriffs, KRS 64.090 .

Record of sheriff’s fees to be kept, KRS 64.100 .

Prisoners, payment for conveying, KRS 64.070 .

Salary of sheriff in counties of 70,000 population, KRS 64.345 .

2020-2022 Budget Reference.

See State/Executive Branch Budget, 2020 Ky. Acts ch. 92, Pt. I, F, 6, (3) at 878.

2018-2020 Budget Reference.

See State/Executive Branch Budget, 2018 Ky. Acts ch. 169, Pt. I, G, 6, (3) at 1316.

Kentucky Law Journal.

Vanlandingham, The Fee System in Kentucky Counties, 40 Ky. L.J. 275 (1952).

ALR

Constitutional inhibition of change of officer’s compensation as applicable to allowance for expenses or disbursements. 106 A.L.R. 779.

70.180. Breaking and entering for purpose of executing writs.

  1. A sheriff or other officer may, in the execution of a writ of habere facias possessionem, or writ of seizin, break open either the outer or inner door of a dwelling or any other house on the premises, during the daytime.
  2. If the outer door of the dwelling house in which the defendant’s property is located is fastened, the sheriff or other officer levying a fieri facias shall not break open the outer door to seize the property. But if the outer door is open, the officer may enter and may break open any inner door to enable him to reach the property. He may break open the outer door of any building other than the dwelling house of the defendant in the execution, to enable him to seize the defendant’s property during the daytime.
  3. The sheriff or other officer may break open the outer or any other door of the dwelling or any other house of a third person in which the property of the defendant in the execution is fraudulently concealed or kept.
  4. In executing any other civil process, the sheriff or other officer has the same power to break and enter the dwelling or other house of any person, as he has to seize property under execution.
  5. In executing a writ of habeas corpus or any criminal or penal process requiring an actual arrest, the sheriff or other officer may break open any door of the dwelling or other house of the defendant, or any other person, if it is necessary to enable him to make the arrest.
  6. But if the process does not require an arrest, then the officer has only the powers given him in the execution of civil process.

History. 4579 to 4584.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. In General.

A peace officer, in executing criminal process, has all the authority of the law. Collins v. Commonwealth, 218 Ky. 189 , 291 S.W. 1, 1926 Ky. LEXIS 113 ( Ky. 1926 ).

2. Outer Door.

An apartment door is an “outer door,” though inside the building. Schork v. Calloway, 205 Ky. 346 , 265 S.W. 807, 1924 Ky. LEXIS 108 ( Ky. 1924 ).

3. — Break Open.

The term “break open” is not restricted to breaking a lock or catch, but includes any method of forcing open outer door or window. Jewell v. Mills, 66 Ky. 62 , 1867 Ky. LEXIS 125 ( Ky. 1867 ). See Calvert v. Stone, 49 Ky. 152 , 1849 Ky. LEXIS 46 ( Ky. 1849 ).

A writ directing seizure of property adjudged subject to lien may be executed by breaking open the defendant’s outer door. Schork v. Calloway, 205 Ky. 346 , 265 S.W. 807, 1924 Ky. LEXIS 108 ( Ky. 1924 ).

4. “Other Officer.”

The term “other officer” includes a United States marshal. American Cent. Ins. Co. v. Stearns Lumber Co., 145 Ky. 255 , 140 S.W. 148, 1911 Ky. LEXIS 805 ( Ky. 1911 ).

5. Demand for Entrance.

This section does not require a demand for entrance or explanation of purpose by the arresting officer. United States v. Chambers, 382 F.2d 910, 1967 U.S. App. LEXIS 5001 (6th Cir. Ohio 1967).

6. Use of Firearms.

Unnecessary shooting into the dwelling of the criminal where he had taken refuge was an unlawful exercise of authority. Rhode Island Ins. Co. v. Fallis, 203 Ky. 112 , 261 S.W. 892, 1924 Ky. LEXIS 859 ( Ky. 1924 ).

7. Burning of House.

The powers conferred by subsection (5) do not authorize the burning of a house in which a fugitive has taken refuge. American Cent. Ins. Co. v. Stearns Lumber Co., 145 Ky. 255 , 140 S.W. 148, 1911 Ky. LEXIS 805 ( Ky. 1911 ).

8. Force Necessary.

Under KRS 70.077 an officer having an order directing him to take specific property might forcibly enter any building containing it, after having demanded and been refused admission and he is not prohibited by this section which provides only against forcible entry to levy a fieri facias. Schork v. Calloway, 205 Ky. 346 , 265 S.W. 807, 1924 Ky. LEXIS 108 ( Ky. 1924 ).

Where police officers who went to restaurant to execute warrant of arrest on appellant were admitted to the restaurant by someone on the inside and with the use of some force they entered basement club through door in back of restaurant after person who had admitted them attempted to bar basement door, they clearly did not violate subsection (5) of this section. Strader v. Commonwealth, 302 Ky. 330 , 194 S.W.2d 368, 1946 Ky. LEXIS 633 ( Ky. 1946 ).

9. Illegal Search.

Evidence of possession of stolen property obtained in illegal search, even though erroneously admitted in evidence over defendant’s objection, was not ground for reversal where defendant later took the stand and admitted facts authorizing a conviction. Clark v. Commonwealth, 288 Ky. 845 , 157 S.W.2d 485, 1941 Ky. LEXIS 201 ( Ky. 1941 ).

10. Jurisdiction.

This section does not authorize officers to act outside their jurisdiction. Brittain v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 219 Ky. 465 , 293 S.W. 956, 1927 Ky. LEXIS 357 ( Ky. 1927 ).

11. Criminal Process.

A warrant of arrest authorizes a breaking into the house of a third party only when (1) the criminal resides there, or (2) when he is there at the time of breaking. Hawkins v. Commonwealth, 53 Ky. 395 ( Ky. 1854 ).

Officers are not authorized to enter dwelling for purpose of making arrest when the criminal is not therein, and there are no reasonable grounds for believing that he is therein. Miller v. Commonwealth, 235 Ky. 825 , 32 S.W.2d 416, 1930 Ky. LEXIS 482 ( Ky. 1930 ).

12. Writ of Possession.

Writs of possession confer no authority as against one not a party to the action, or otherwise bound by proceedings therein. Wagner v. Hatcher, 137 Ky. 406 , 125 S.W. 1063, 1910 Ky. LEXIS 584 ( Ky. 1910 ); Perkins v. Ogilvie, 140 Ky. 412 , 131 S.W. 200, 1910 Ky. LEXIS 286 ( Ky. 1910 ).

13. Evidence Against Third Party.

Officers entering a house to execute a warrant of arrest against the owner found a third party operating an illicit still. The evidence of the officers was competent against the third party. Short v. Commonwealth, 215 Ky. 763 , 286 S.W. 1041, 1926 Ky. LEXIS 780 ( Ky. 1926 ).

Cited:

Commonwealth v. Gross, 758 S.W.2d 436, 1988 Ky. LEXIS 62 ( Ky. 1988 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

A person appointed pursuant to KRS 454.145 , having the same power as a sheriff in connection with the execution of a given process under this section, is in the status of an “other nonelective peace officer” within the meaning of KRS 61.300(1). OAG 95-4 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Arrest, door may be broken to make, KRS 70.078 ; unnecessary force not to be used in making, KRS 431.025 .

Habeas corpus, service of writ of, KRS 419.060 .

Summons, manner of serving, RCr 2.10.

Unreasonable search and seizure prohibited, Ky. Const., § 10.

ALR

Breaking into building to levy execution, right of officer as to. 57 A.L.R. 210.

Validity of attachment of chattels within store or building other than private dwelling, made without removing goods or without making an entry. 22 A.L.R.2d 1276.

70.190. Obligations taken by officers.

Every obligation taken by any officer, by color of his office, from a person in his custody, in any manner or form other than that especially provided by law, shall be void, but unnecessary conditions in the obligations shall not vitiate it.

History. 4569.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Void Bond.

A bond failing to impose the obligations required by law is void. Cole v. Regan, 107 S.W. 756, 32 Ky. L. Rptr. 1059 (1908).

70.200. Elisor — How appointed — Term of office — Powers — Compensation.

  1. If the office of sheriff is vacant in any county, the Circuit Judge may appoint a citizen of the county to act as elisor. The elisor shall hold his office for one (1) year or until a sheriff is qualified, unless removed by the Circuit Judge.
  2. The person appointed shall give bond, to be approved by the county judge/executive, to cover all claims that may come to his hands. The elisor shall take the oath prescribed by law for sheriffs.
  3. The elisor may levy and collect executions, convey and sell land, and perform all acts and duties which are by law, devolved upon sheriffs, except that he shall not collect any kind of taxes or any judgment rendered upon any bonds or the coupons thereof issued or executed for any subscription to the capital stock of any railroad company or in aid of the construction of any railroad.
  4. He shall receive the same fees and compensation as the sheriff and be paid in the same manner.

History. 1597 to 1599: amend. Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 55, effective January 2, 1978; ch. 20, § 6, effective January 2, 1978.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Service of Process.

An elisor may serve process. Brumleve v. Cronan, 176 Ky. 818 , 197 S.W. 498, 1917 Ky. LEXIS 134 ( Ky. 1917 ).

2. Jury — Summons.

A person appointed to summon a petit jury is not an elisor. Benson v. Commonwealth, 249 Ky. 328 , 60 S.W.2d 941, 1933 Ky. LEXIS 522 ( Ky. 1933 ).

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Bond, KRS 62.050 .

Oath of office, KRS 62.010 .

Vacancy in office of sheriff to be filled by county judge, KRS 63.220 .

70.210. Mobile radio communication equipment for sheriffs and deputies.

The fiscal court of any county may purchase mobile radio communication equipment for the use of the sheriff and deputies of that county if it deems the purchase of such equipment to be to the best interest of the county, considering the county finances and other permissible expenditures.

History. Enact. Acts 1954, ch. 59, effective June 17, 1954.

Opinions of Attorney General.

Sheriffs and their deputies may use mobile radio communication equipment in their privately owned vehicles in connection with their law enforcement and official duties, which equipment has been purchased by a fiscal court pursuant to this section, without violating subsection (1) of KRS 432.570 . OAG 71-494 .

Deputy Sheriff Merit Boards

70.260. Option for county to create deputy sheriff merit board — Expenses — Membership — Meetings — Exclusion of certain deputy sheriffs who serve in policy-making positions.

  1. The primary legislative body of each county may enact an ordinance creating a deputy sheriff merit board, which shall be charged with the duty of holding hearings, public and executive, in disciplinary matters concerning deputy sheriffs. For the purpose of KRS 70.260 to 70.273 , the primary legislative body of each county that does not have an urban-county, consolidated local government, or charter county government shall be the fiscal court.
  2. The reasonable and necessary expenses of the board, including the funds necessary to retain an attorney to advise the board on legal matters, shall be paid out of the fees and commissions collected by the sheriff. If the fees and commissions are not sufficient to pay the expenses of the board and the other expenses authorized by statute to be paid from these fees and commissions, the sheriff may negotiate with the primary legislative body to determine a method of paying all or part of the expenses of the board.
  3. The board shall consist of five (5) members, two (2) members appointed by the county judge/executive or the chief executive officer of an urban-county government or the chief executive officer of a consolidated local government pursuant to the provisions of KRS 67C.139 with approval by the primary legislative body, two (2) members appointed by the county sheriff, and one (1) member elected by the deputy sheriffs of the county. Each board appointee shall be at least thirty (30) years of age and a resident of the county. No person shall serve on the board who is a deputy sheriff or who holds any elected public office. No person shall be appointed to the board who is a member of the immediate family of the sheriff of the county served by the board. The members of the board shall not receive a salary but shall receive reimbursement for necessary expenses.
  4. All appointments shall be for two (2) years, and any vacancies shall be filled by the sheriff or county judge/executive, or the chief executive officer of an urban-county government or consolidated local government responsible for the appointment of the departing board member.
  5. The board shall elect a chairman from its membership and keep an accurate record of its proceedings.
  6. The board shall meet when a disciplinary matter concerning a deputy sheriff is brought to its attention or at other times at the discretion of the board, upon notification of its members.
  7. Three (3) members shall constitute a quorum in all matters which may come before the board.
  8. For the purpose of this section, “member of the immediate family” means a person’s father, mother, brother, sister, spouse, son, daughter, aunt, uncle, son-in-law, or daughter-in-law.
  9. An ordinance, adopted under subsection (1) of this section by a county or consolidated local government, may exclude deputy sheriffs who serve in policy-making or confidential positions from coverage by the merit system. If the ordinance makes this exclusion, a deputy sheriff who is covered by the merit system and who accepts an appointment in a policy-making or confidential position shall be deemed to have received a leave of absence from the merit system during the incumbency of that position. If he ceases to serve in a policy-making or confidential position but continues to serve as a deputy, he shall be restored to coverage at the same classification and rank that he held prior to his policy-making position under the merit system. A deputy who is not covered by the merit system at the time he is appointed to a policy-making or confidential position shall be deemed not to be part of the merit system and shall not be included in the merit system when he ceases to serve in that position.

History. Enact. Acts 1992, ch. 438, § 1, effective July 14, 1992; 1996, ch. 104, § 2, effective July 15, 1996; 2000, ch. 334, § 1, effective July 14, 2000; 2002, ch. 346, § 68, effective July 15, 2002.

Opinions of Attorney General.

An ordinance creating a deputy sheriff merit board pursuant to this section cannot lawfully exclude “top ranking or policy making deputy sheriffs” from the purview of such board, as the statute in question speaks in terms of “deputy sheriffs,” a phrase encompassing all deputy sheriffs and no provision is made for exclusion of “top ranking or policy making deputies” from such category. OAG 95-6 .

Two (2) basic issues are addressed by the deputy sheriff merit board statutory provisions (subsection (1) of this section, KRS 70.263 , KRS 70.267(5), KRS 70.270 , KRS 70.273 ); one (1) is disciplinary matters concerning deputy sheriffs and the other is required training. There is no language within such provisions expressly addressing the term of office, as such, of a deputy sheriff, and no language stating that the term of office of a deputy sheriff covered by deputy sheriff merit board provisions shall continue from sheriff to sheriff, unless the deputy is removed for cause. OAG 95-6 .

70.261. Adoption of rules — Certified copies — Subjects addressed — Issuance of additional rules — Repeal or amendment of existing rules.

  1. When a county creates a deputy sheriff merit board, the board shall issue, and publish within forty-eight (48) hours after their adoption, rules that are not inconsistent with the provisions of KRS 70.260 to 70.273 . The board shall provide a certified copy of the rules to:
    1. The sheriff of the county who shall additionally post a copy in a conspicuous place in the main office and in any branch offices where deputies are regularly assigned to work from;
    2. The county judge/executive of the county; and
    3. The legislative body of the county.
  2. The board shall, at a minimum, adopt a body of rules that addresses the following subjects:
    1. For deputy sheriffs:
      1. Qualifications for initial and continued employment, which shall at a minimum include: citizenship, age, physical, mental, and educational requirements;
      2. Grounds for temporary appointments;
      3. Advancement requirements. Deputy sheriffs shall be employed for at least three (3) full years before being eligible for the rank of sergeant;
      4. Factors that shall, or may, result in demotion, the procedures for determining whether or not to demote a deputy, and the procedures for executing a demotion;
      5. Factors that shall, or may, result in fining, probation, suspension, or removal; and
      6. Administrative procedures for the deputies in the office such as transfer, lay-off, and reinstatement.
    2. For the general administration of the board itself:
      1. Organizational structure and conduct of meetings;
      2. Procedure and conduct of public hearings as a result of the board’s actions; and
      3. Implementation and execution of written and oral examinations, and physical tests of fitness for appointment and promotion of deputies.
  3. The subsequent issuance of additional rules, or of the repeal or amendment of existing rules shall follow the provisions indicated in subsection (1) of this section.

History. Enact. Acts 1998, ch. 244, § 10 and ch. 510, § 10, effective July 15, 1998.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(7/15/98). This section was created by 1998 Ky. Acts ch. 244, sec. 10, and ch. 510, sec. 10, which are identical and have been codified together.

70.262. Collective bargaining for deputy sheriffs in merit system in county containing a consolidated local government or a city of first class — Prohibition against strikes — Employment contract with sheriff.

  1. Except as provided in KRS 336.130 , in any county containing a consolidated local government or city of the first class that has adopted a merit system under KRS 70.260 to 70.273 , deputies subject to the merit system may organize, form, join, or participate in organizations in order to engage in lawful concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid and protection, and to bargain collectively through a representative of their own free choice. Deputies shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of these activities but shall be subject to the lawful provisions of any collective bargaining agreement entered into under this section. Strikes by deputies of any collective bargaining unit shall be prohibited at any time.
  2. Except as provided in KRS 336.130 , in any county containing a consolidated local government or city of the first class that has adopted a merit system under KRS 70.260 to 70.273 , the sheriff shall contract with a representative of the deputies described in subsection (1) of this section employed by the sheriff where the representative has established representation of a majority of the deputies, with respect to wages, hours, and terms and conditions of employment, including execution of a written contract incorporating any agreement reached between the sheriff and the representative. The sheriff shall not be required to bargain over matters of inherent managerial policy.

History. Enact. Acts 2000, ch. 340, § 1, effective July 14, 2000; 2002, ch. 346, § 69, effective July 15, 2002; 2017 ch. 1, § 9, effective January 9, 2017.

70.263. Training requirements for counties having deputy sheriff merit board — Training for deputy sheriff providing security service to the courts.

  1. Each person serving as a covered deputy sheriff on the effective date of an ordinance that creates a deputy sheriff merit board for the county in which he serves shall have successfully completed, within one (1) year following the effective date of that ordinance, a basic training course as established by KRS 15.440 at a school certified or recognized by the Kentucky Law Enforcement Council. Training approved by the Kentucky Law Enforcement Council received before the effective date of the ordinance may be used to satisfy all or part of this requirement.
  2. Each person appointed as a covered deputy sheriff in a county that has adopted a deputy sheriff merit board before the date of his appointment shall have successfully completed, within one (1) year following the appointment, a basic training course as established by KRS 15.440 at a school certified or recognized by the Kentucky Law Enforcement Council. Training approved by the Kentucky Law Enforcement Council received before the effective date of the ordinance may be used to satisfy all or part of this requirement.
  3. A deputy sheriff whose official duty is to provide security service to the courts, and who is compensated pursuant to KRS 64.092 , shall, the provisions of subsections (1) and (2) of this section notwithstanding, satisfy the training requirements for employment if he completes law enforcement training which the Administrative Office of the Courts certifies to the sheriff as acceptable. If the training was not received prior to the effective date of the ordinance creating the deputy sheriff merit board, in the case of a deputy sheriff serving when the ordinance was passed, or prior to appointment in the case of a deputy sheriff appointed after the effective date of the ordinance, then it shall be received within one (1) year following the effective date of the ordinance or the date of appointment, as the case may be.
  4. A person failing to meet the requirements of this section shall forfeit his position as deputy sheriff immediately upon the expiration of the applicable one (1) year time limit.

History. Enact. Acts 1992, ch. 438, § 2, effective July 14, 1992; 1994, ch. 402, § 1, effective July 15, 1994; 1996, ch. 104, § 3, effective July 15, 1996; 2000, ch. 480, § 12, effective July 14, 2000; 2016 ch. 112, § 3, effective July 15, 2016.

Opinions of Attorney General.

Deputies who, in prior employment, received 400 hours of training, may not be “grandfathered” so as not to be required to obtain additional training as called for by this section. OAG 93-9 .

While a deputy sheriff, who was serving in that capacity on the effective date of a local ordinance establishing a deputy sheriff merit board, is required to obtain certain training within one year of that effective date, or forfeit the position of deputy sheriff, a deputy’s employment status is not rendered “probationary” by virtue of that training requirement, or by virtue of any other statutory language related to deputy sheriff merit boards. OAG 93-51 .

Two basic issues are addressed by the deputy sheriff merit board statutory provisions (this section, KRS 70.260(1), KRS 70.267(5), KRS 70.270 , and KRS 70.273 ); one is disciplinary matters concerning deputy sheriffs and the other is required training. There is no language within such provisions expressly addressing the term of office, as such, of a deputy sheriff, and no language stating that the term of office of a deputy sheriff covered by deputy sheriff merit board provisions shall continue from sheriff to sheriff, unless the deputy is removed for cause. OAG 95-6 .

70.265. Deputy sheriff merit boards to employ chief examiner — Duties.

  1. Deputy sheriff merit boards shall employ a chief examiner who shall operate under the board’s sole supervision.
  2. The board shall only employ a person for this position who is qualified and experienced in the field of testing.
  3. The examiner shall design, administer, and evaluate all written tests the board requires applicants for promotion to take for consideration for promotion. Each applicant for promotion shall be given an oral and written examination to determine the applicant’s qualification for promotion.
  4. The examiner shall select a panel of three (3) persons to conduct the oral portion of the exam battery. The panel shall be selected from an agency other than the local sheriff’s office, and the panel members shall be of at least the same rank to which the applicant aspires and of the same field.
  5. Unless the sheriff certifies that the applicant is not physically fit for promotion, physical fitness shall be presumed.
    1. The composite score of the examination battery shall be calculated as follows: (6) (a) The composite score of the examination battery shall be calculated as follows:
      1. Sixty-five percent (65%) for the written examination; and
      2. Thirty-five percent (35%) for the oral examination.
    2. An applicant shall receive one (1) seniority point to be added to the composite score for each full year over three (3) full years of service. No applicant shall receive more than ten (10) seniority points. No applicant shall receive a seniority point for serving less than a full year.
  6. Testing and scoring methods shall not depart from, or be inconsistent with, those set out in this section.
  7. The chief examiner shall deliver the final scores of the applicants for promotion, in a manner that will ensure complete privacy and confidentiality of the applicants and their scores, directly to the chair of the board. The chief examiner shall not release this information to anyone but the chair of the board.
  8. Notice of the date, time, and place of examinations shall be given no later than ninety (90) days before the examination date.
  9. Promotions shall be filled by the sheriff from a list of no more than three (3) of the candidates who obtained the highest combined scores on the written and oral examination, including any seniority points, and are physically fit to serve in the new capacity.

History. Enact. Acts 1998, ch. 244, § 11 and ch. 510, § 11, effective July 15, 1998.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(7/15/98). This section was created by 1998 Ky. Acts ch. 244, sec. 11, and ch. 510, sec. 11, which are identical and have been codified together.

70.267. Prohibited conduct — Construction of section — Probationary period.

  1. No deputy sheriff covered by the provisions of KRS 70.260 to 70.273 shall directly or indirectly solicit, receive, or be in any manner concerned in receiving, soliciting, or publicizing any assessment, gift, subscription, or contribution to or for any political party or candidate for public office.
  2. No deputy sheriff covered by the provisions of KRS 70.260 to 70.273 shall be suspended, laid-off, demoted, promoted, disciplined, threatened, or in any way changed in duty or compensation for withholding or neglecting to pay or make contributions of any sort, either in money, goods, services, or anything of value for any political purpose. Nothing in this subsection shall limit the power of a sheriff to revoke the appointment of a deputy during the probationary period described in subsection (5) of this section.
  3. No deputy sheriff covered by the provisions of KRS 70.260 to 70.273 shall be a candidate for any public office. Any person who violates this subsection shall forfeit his position as deputy sheriff.
  4. Nothing contained in this section shall be construed to abridge the rights of any deputy sheriff with respect to his personal opinions, beliefs, or right to vote.
  5. A deputy sheriff’s employment shall be probationary during the first year of service following an initial appointment or a promotional appointment. A sheriff may, at his pleasure, revoke the appointment of a deputy who works for him at any time within one (1) year following the appointment.

History. Enact. Acts 1992, ch. 438, § 3, effective July 14, 1992; 2000, ch. 334, § 2, effective July 14, 2000.

Opinions of Attorney General.

A deputy sheriff may not engage in campaign activities for or against a given candidate or political party while on duty, as such would involve direction of public resources toward a private purpose, which is violative of § 171 of the Constitution of Kentucky; however, a deputy, while off duty, and assuming private resources were involved, could for example stuff envelopes in connection with a political campaign if the mailings do not involve solicitation of contributions or gifts for a political party or candidate for public office. OAG 93-9 .

Two basic issues are addressed by the deputy sheriff merit board statutory provisions (subsection (5) of this section, KRS 70.260(1), KRS 70.263 , KRS 70.270 , and KRS 70.273 ); one is disciplinary matters concerning deputy sheriffs and the other is required training. There is no language within such provisions expressly addressing the term of office, as such, of a deputy sheriff, and no language stating that the term of office of a deputy sheriff covered by deputy sheriff merit board provisions shall continue from sheriff to sheriff, unless the deputy is removed for cause. OAG 95-6 .

70.270. Disciplinary and removal procedures by sheriff — Charges by citizen.

  1. Any deputy sheriff may be removed, suspended, or laid-off by the sheriff for any cause which will promote the efficiency of the department. Except when an appointment is revoked during the probationary period described in KRS 70.267(5), the sheriff shall furnish a covered deputy with a written statement of the reason why the action was taken.
  2. Except for the revocation of an appointment pursuant to KRS 70.267(5), every action in the nature of a dismissal, suspension, or reduction made by the sheriff shall be subject to review by the board at the request of any deputy sheriff affected by the provisions of KRS 70.260 to 70.273 .
  3. Any citizen who makes written charges of misconduct, under oath, concerning the actions of any deputy sheriff covered by the provisions of KRS 70.260 to 70.273 shall present the charges to the sheriff, who shall investigate the charges. The sheriff shall determine what action, if any, shall be taken against the deputy, subject to the limitations set out in KRS 70.260 to 70.273 . The citizen may appeal the determination of the sheriff to the board.

History. Enact. Acts 1992, ch. 438, § 4, effective July 14, 1992; 1996, ch. 104, § 4, effective July 15, 1996.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Due Process.

Defendants were entitled to summary judgment on civil rights claims asserted by deputy sheriff who was discharged after he was convicted of hindering prosecution and official misconduct; KRS 70.270 afforded the deputy a post-deprivation remedy, and due process did not require a pre-deprivation remedy, and by failing to seek administrative review of his termination under KRS 70.270 (2), the deputy waived his procedural due process claims. Humphrey v. Scott County Fiscal Court, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32362 (E.D. Ky. Dec. 9, 2005), aff'd, 211 Fed. Appx. 390, 2006 FED App. 0861N, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 29193 (6th Cir. Ky. 2006 ).

Notes to Unpublished Decisions

1. Due Process.

Unpublished decision: Sheriff’s failure to notify a deputy in writing of his termination, as required by KRS 70.270 , did not violate the deputy’s Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process rights because the deputy received sufficient oral notice of his termination when he met with the sheriff and the deputy’s arrest and prosecution sufficiently apprised him of the reasons for his termination. The meeting provided the deputy with the informal opportunity for discussion required by due process. Humphrey v. Scott County Fiscal Court, 211 Fed. Appx. 390, 2006 FED App. 0861N, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 29193 (6th Cir. Ky. 2006 ).

Unpublished decision: In a former county deputy sheriff’s 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983 action against a county sheriff’s department for alleged violations of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause arising from the deputy’s termination, the deputy waived his claim that he was terminated in violation of his procedural due process rights because he failed to request review of his termination by a county deputy sheriff merit board, as he was permitted to do by KRS 70.270(2), and he failed to provide a plausible explanation for his failure to do so. The failure to pursue the administrative remedies provided by Kentucky law prevented him from pursuing his procedural due process claim in federal court. Humphrey v. Scott County Fiscal Court, 211 Fed. Appx. 390, 2006 FED App. 0861N, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 29193 (6th Cir. Ky. 2006 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Two basic issues are addressed by the deputy sheriff merit board statutory provisions (this section, KRS 70.260(1), KRS 70.263 , KRS 70.267(5), and KRS 70.273 ); one is disciplinary matters concerning deputy sheriffs and the other is required training. There is no language within such provisions expressly addressing the term of office, as such, of a deputy sheriff, and no language stating that the term of office of a deputy sheriff covered by deputy sheriff merit board provisions shall continue from sheriff to sheriff, unless the deputy is removed for cause. OAG 95-6 .

70.273. Disciplinary and removal procedures by board — Hearing — Appeals.

  1. The board may remove, suspend, lay off or discipline any deputy sheriff covered by the provisions of KRS 70.260 to 70.273 on written charges of misconduct preferred on its own initiative or the initiative of any citizen, but only after reasonable notice to the accused and after a complete public hearing at which the deputy accused shall have the right to be present, represented by counsel, and confronted by all of the witnesses preferring charges against him.
  2. Procedural due process shall be afforded to all deputy sheriffs by the board. The board shall notify the deputy promptly and in writing of any charges brought against him by the board or by a citizen. The board shall have the power to issue subpoenas and to compel the attendance of witnesses, and shall conduct the hearing, as far as possible, within the Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure. Any deputy who is not given a hearing within sixty (60) days of any charge being preferred shall be reinstated in full.
  3. After a full public hearing by the board, the board shall retire into executive session to discuss the evidence introduced at the hearing and to make its determination and conclusion. The board in executive session shall not receive any further evidence or communication from any source, except for legal advice from the board’s counsel, prior to reaching its determination and conclusion.
  4. When an appointment is revoked during the probationary period described in KRS 70.267(5), the action of the sheriff shall be final. In all other disciplinary matters, the action of the sheriff or the board shall be final, except that any aggrieved person may, within thirty (30) days after the decision is rendered, appeal to the Circuit Court of the county in which the board meets. The board shall be named as respondent, and the county attorney shall represent the board before the court. The appeal taken to the Circuit Court shall be a review of record by the court.
  5. The provisions of KRS 70.260 to 70.273 shall not apply to any nonsworn employee appointed by the sheriff pursuant to KRS 70.030 , to any special deputy appointed by the sheriff pursuant to KRS 70.045 , or to a deputy in a policy-making or confidential position excluded from coverage by the ordinance creating the deputy sheriff merit board.

History. Enact. Acts 1992, ch. 438, § 5, effective July 14, 1992; 1996, ch. 104, § 5, effective July 15, 1996.

Opinions of Attorney General.

Two basic issues are addressed by the deputy sheriff merit board statutory provisions (this section, KRS 70.260(1), KRS 70.263 , KRS 70.267 , and KRS 70.270 ); one is disciplinary matters concerning deputy sheriffs and the other is required training. There is no language within such provisions expressly addressing the term of office, as such, of a deputy sheriff, and no language stating that the term of office of a deputy sheriff covered by deputy sheriff merit board provisions shall continue from sheriff to sheriff, unless the deputy is removed for cause. OAG 95-6 .

70.280. Court security officers — Duties — Prohibited conduct.

  1. A certified court security officer shall be charged with the following duties:
    1. Attending sessions of any court of the Court of Justice in the county in which he or she is sworn;
    2. Keeping order in the courts;
    3. Providing security services to the courts within the court facility or immediate area of the court facility;
    4. Guarding prisoners during court appearances;
    5. Serving warrants and other court papers on individuals physically present in the courtroom;
    6. Transporting prisoners;
    7. Arresting and taking individuals into custody who are in the court facility or immediate area of the court facility, or while transporting prisoners; and
    8. Service of process and other papers relating to civil matters on individuals physically present in the courtroom.
  2. A certified court security officer shall not:
    1. Go outside the immediate area of the court facility in which he or she is providing security services to make an arrest or take an individual into custody, except when transporting prisoners;
    2. Patrol the roads, streets, or highways;
    3. Issue traffic citations, except to enforce parking regulations around the court facility; or
    4. Perform general law enforcement duties outside that of providing court security.

History. Enact. Acts 2007, ch. 54, § 10, effective June 26, 2007.

70.282. Provision of security services for Court of Justice, courthouses, and courtrooms limited to sheriff and Department Kentucky State Police — Exceptions.

  1. No agency of a unit of local government, other than the sheriff, shall provide security services for the Court of Justice, a courthouse, or a courtroom unless the provision of the service is specifically authorized by the Kentucky Revised Statutes.
  2. No agency of state government, other than the Department of Kentucky State Police or the Administrative Office of the Courts, shall provide security services for the Court of Justice, a courthouse, or a courtroom unless the provision of the services is specifically authorized by the Kentucky Revised Statutes.
  3. This section shall not preclude any peace officer, upon request of a court security officer or justice or judge of the Court of Justice, from providing security or law enforcement service for a specific incident or series of specific incidents.
  4. This section shall not preclude any peace officer from taking law enforcement action in a courthouse or courtroom upon viewing the commission of an offense, or upon service of a warrant or civil or criminal process.

History. Enact. Acts 2007, ch. 54, § 16, effective June 26, 2007.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(6/26/2007). 2007 Ky. Acts ch. 85, relating to the creation and organization of the Justice and Public Safety Cabinet, instructs the Reviser of Statutes to correct statutory references to agencies and officers whose names have been changed in that Act. Such a correction has been made in this section.

70.284. Failure or refusal of sheriff to provide court security services — Contracts with units of local government.

  1. In any county, if the sheriff fails or refuses to provide certified peace officers or certified security officers for the provision of security services to any court of the Court of Justice, then the Administrative Office of the Courts shall contract with a county, urban-county, charter county, consolidated local government, combined local government agency, or an agency of a city government to provide security services to any court of the Court of Justice in the county where the sheriff has failed or refused to provide such services.
  2. Security personnel provided by a local government under contract to the Administrative Office of the Courts shall be certified peace officers, certified court security officers, or a combination thereof.
  3. A court security officer provided by a unit of local government shall:
    1. Meet all of the qualifications and training specified in KRS 15.380 to 15.404 ; and
    2. Have the same power, duties, restrictions, and authority as a certified court security officer pursuant to KRS Chapter 70 and KRS 15.442 and 527.020 .

History. Enact. Acts 2007, ch. 54, § 17, effective June 26, 2007.

Employment Contracts

70.290. Employment contract for deputy sheriff or peace officer — Reimbursement of law enforcement agency when deputy or peace officer accepts employment with another agency.

    1. City and county law enforcement agencies, including sheriff’s offices, may, as a condition of employment, require a newly appointed deputy sheriff or peace officer who will participate in the Kentucky Law Enforcement Foundation Fund Program, authorized by KRS 15.410 to 15.510 , to enter into an employment contract for a period of no longer than three (3) years from the date of graduation from the Department of Criminal Justice Training, or other training approved by the Kentucky Law Enforcement Council. (1) (a) City and county law enforcement agencies, including sheriff’s offices, may, as a condition of employment, require a newly appointed deputy sheriff or peace officer who will participate in the Kentucky Law Enforcement Foundation Fund Program, authorized by KRS 15.410 to 15.510 , to enter into an employment contract for a period of no longer than three (3) years from the date of graduation from the Department of Criminal Justice Training, or other training approved by the Kentucky Law Enforcement Council.
    2. If a deputy sheriff or peace officer who has entered into a contract authorized under this subsection accepts employment as a peace officer with another law enforcement agency, that law enforcement agency shall reimburse the law enforcement agency that initially hired the deputy sheriff or peace officer for the actual costs incurred and expended by the law enforcement agency that initially hired the deputy sheriff or peace officer which are associated with the initial hiring of that officer, including but not limited to the application process, training costs, equipment costs, salary and fringe benefits. The law enforcement agency that initially hired the deputy sheriff or peace officer shall be reimbursed for the costs from the time of the deputy sheriff or peace officer’s initial application until graduation from the Department of Criminal Justice Training.
      1. For contracts entered into before the June 29, 2017, the amount of reimbursement authorized by this subsection shall be prorated based upon the percentage of time that the deputy sheriff or peace officer completed of his or her employment contract. The amount of reimbursement authorized by this subsection after the pro rata amount is calculated shall be reduced by the cost of the training provided by the Department of Criminal Justice Training for the subject officer. (c) 1. For contracts entered into before the June 29, 2017, the amount of reimbursement authorized by this subsection shall be prorated based upon the percentage of time that the deputy sheriff or peace officer completed of his or her employment contract. The amount of reimbursement authorized by this subsection after the pro rata amount is calculated shall be reduced by the cost of the training provided by the Department of Criminal Justice Training for the subject officer.
      2. For contracts entered into on or after June 29, 2017, the amount of reimbursement authorized by this subsection shall not be prorated, and shall be for the full amount as calculated in paragraph (b) of this subsection.
  1. If a peace officer who has been employed by a state law enforcement agency for three (3) years or less accepts employment as a peace officer with a city or local law enforcement agency, that city or local law enforcement agency shall reimburse the state law enforcement agency that initially hired the peace officer for the costs expended with the initial hiring of that officer, including but not limited to the application process, training costs, equipment costs, salary and fringe benefits. The state law enforcement agency that initially hired the peace officer shall be reimbursed for the costs incurred and expended from the time of the peace officer’s initial application until graduation from a Kentucky Law Enforcement Council approved training academy. The amount of reimbursement authorized by this subsection shall be prorated based upon the percentage of time that the peace officer has been employed.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 2002, ch. 305, § 1, effective July 15, 2002; 2017 ch. 88, § 1, effective June 29, 2017.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Repayment.

KRS 70.290 did not prohibit the city from seeking repayment of the amounts owed under the contract by the employee, a police officer; the intent was to aid law enforcement agencies in retraining trained officers and helping agencies save on training costs, and the employee was contractually required under employment agreement to pay costs. Waters v. City of Pioneer Village, 299 S.W.3d 278, 2009 Ky. App. LEXIS 231 (Ky. Ct. App. 2009).

70.291. Definition of “police officer” for KRS 70.291 to 70.293.

As used in KRS 70.291 to 70.293 , “police officer” shall have the same meaning as “police officer” in KRS 15.420 and as “officer” in KRS 16.010 .

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 2014, ch. 96, § 1, effective July 15, 2014; 2015 ch. 71, § 1, effective June 24, 2015.

70.292. Sheriff may employ retired police officer — Qualifications.

  1. A county police department or county sheriff’s office in the Commonwealth of Kentucky may employ police officers who have retired under the State Police Retirement System, Kentucky Employees Retirement System, or the County Employees Retirement System as provided by KRS 70.291 to 70.293 .
  2. An individual employed under KRS 70.291 to 70.293 shall have:
      1. Participated in the Law Enforcement Foundation Program fund under KRS 15.410 to 15.515 ; or (a) 1. Participated in the Law Enforcement Foundation Program fund under KRS 15.410 to 15.515 ; or
      2. Retired as a commissioned officer pursuant to KRS Chapter 16;
    1. Retired with at least twenty (20) years of service credit;
    2. Been separated from service for the period required by KRS 61.637 so that the member’s retirement is not voided;
    3. Retired with no administrative charges pending; and
    4. Retired with no pre-existing agreement between the individual and the county police department or the sheriff’s office prior to the individual’s retirement for the individual to return to work for the county police department or the sheriff’s office.

History. Enact. Acts 2014, ch. 96, § 2, effective July 15, 2014; 2015 ch. 71, § 2, effective June 24, 2015; 2018 ch. 171, § 21, effective April 14, 2018; 2018 ch. 207, § 21, effective April 27, 2018.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(4/27/2018). This statute was amended by 2018 Ky. Acts chs. 171 and 207, which do not appear to be in conflict and have been codified together.

70.293. Terms of employment retired police officer. [Effective until April 1, 2021]

  1. Individuals employed under KRS 70.291 to 70.293 shall:
    1. Serve for a term not to exceed one (1) year. The one (1) year employment term may be renewed annually at the discretion of  the employing county police department or sheriff’s office;
    2. Receive compensation according to the standard procedures applicable to the employing county police department or sheriff’s office; and
    3. Be employed based upon need as determined by the county police department or the employing sheriff’s office.
  2. Notwithstanding any provisions of KRS 16.505 to 16.652 , 18A.225 to 18A.2287 , 61.510 to 61.705 , or 78.510 to 78.852 to the contrary:
    1. Individuals employed under KRS 70.291 to 70.293 shall continue to receive all retirement and health insurance benefits to which they were entitled upon retiring in the applicable system administered by Kentucky Retirement Systems;
    2. Individuals employed under KRS 70.291 to 70.293 shall not be eligible to receive health insurance coverage through the county police department, the sheriff’s office, or the fiscal court of the county police department or sheriff’s office;
    3. The county police department, sheriff’s office, or fiscal court of the county police department or sheriff’s office shall not pay any employer contributions or retiree health expense reimbursements to the Kentucky Retirement Systems required by KRS 61.637(17) for individuals employed under KRS 70.291 to 70.293; and
    4. The county police department, sheriff’s office, or fiscal court of the county police department or sheriff’s office shall not pay any insurance contributions to the state health insurance plan, as provided by KRS 18A.225 to 18A.2287 , for individuals employed under KRS 70.291 to 70.293.
  3. Individuals employed under KRS 70.291 to 70.293 shall be subject to any merit system, civil service, or other legislative due process provisions applicable to the county police department or sheriff’s office. A decision not to renew a one (1) year appointment term under this section shall not be considered a disciplinary action or deprivation subject to due process.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 2014, ch. 96, § 3, effective July 15, 2014; 2015 ch. 71, § 3, effective June 24, 2015; 2018 ch. 171, § 22, effective April 13, 2018; 2018 ch. 207, § 22, effective April 27, 2018.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(4/27/2018). This statute was amended by 2018 Ky. Acts chs. 171 and 207, which do not appear to be in conflict and have been codified together.

70.293. Terms of employment retired police officer. [Effective April 1, 2021]

  1. Individuals employed under KRS 70.291 to 70.293 shall:
    1. Serve for a term not to exceed one (1) year. The one (1) year employment term may be renewed annually at the discretion of the employing county police department or sheriff’s office;
    2. Receive compensation according to the standard procedures applicable to the employing county police department or sheriff’s office; and
    3. Be employed based upon need as determined by the county police department or the employing sheriff’s office.
  2. Notwithstanding any provisions of KRS 16.505 to 16.652 , 18A.225 to 18A.2287 , 61.510 to 61.705 , or 78.510 to 78.852 to the contrary:
    1. Individuals employed under KRS 70.291 to 70.293 shall continue to receive all retirement and health insurance benefits to which they were entitled upon retiring in the applicable system administered by Kentucky Retirement Systems or the County Employees Retirement System;
    2. Individuals employed under KRS 70.291 to 70.293 shall not be eligible to receive health insurance coverage through the county police department, the sheriff’s office, or the fiscal court of the county police department or sheriff’s office;
    3. The county police department, sheriff’s office, or fiscal court of the county police department or sheriff’s office shall not pay any employer contributions or retiree health expense reimbursements to the Kentucky Retirement Systems required by KRS 61.637(17) for individuals employed under KRS 70.291 to 70.293; and
    4. The county police department, sheriff’s office, or fiscal court of the county police department or sheriff’s office shall not pay any insurance contributions to the state health insurance plan, as provided by KRS 18A.225 to 18A.2287 , for individuals employed under KRS 70.291 to 70.293.
  3. Individuals employed under KRS 70.291 to 70.293 shall be subject to any merit system, civil service, or other legislative due process provisions applicable to the county police department or sheriff’s office. A decision not to renew a one (1) year appointment term under this section shall not be considered a disciplinary action or deprivation subject to due process.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 2014, ch. 96, § 3, effective July 15, 2014; 2015 ch. 71, § 3, effective June 24, 2015; 2018 ch. 171, § 22, effective April 13, 2018; 2018 ch. 207, § 22, effective April 27, 2018; 2020 ch. 79, § 31, effective April 1, 2021.

70.294. Employment contract for law enforcement telecommunicator.

  1. As used in this section, “law enforcement agency” means a city, county, consolidated local government, urban-county government, charter county government, unified local government, or state law enforcement agency, and includes a sheriff’s office.
    1. Law enforcement agencies may, as a condition of employment, require a newly appointed law enforcement telecommunicator to enter into an employment contract for a period of no longer than three (3) years from the date of graduation from the Department of Criminal Justice Training, or other training approved by the Kentucky Law Enforcement Council. (2) (a) Law enforcement agencies may, as a condition of employment, require a newly appointed law enforcement telecommunicator to enter into an employment contract for a period of no longer than three (3) years from the date of graduation from the Department of Criminal Justice Training, or other training approved by the Kentucky Law Enforcement Council.
    2. If a law enforcement telecommunicator who has entered into a contract authorized under this section begins employment as a law enforcement telecommunicator with another law enforcement agency during the contractual period, that law enforcement agency or the law enforcement telecommunicator shall reimburse the law enforcement agency that initially hired the law enforcement telecommunicator for the actual costs incurred and expended which are associated with the initial hiring of that telecommunicator, including but not limited to the application process, training costs, equipment costs, and salary. The law enforcement agency that initially hired the law enforcement telecommunicator shall be reimbursed for the costs from the time of the law enforcement telecommunicator’s initial application until graduation from the Department of Criminal Justice Training, or other training approved by the Kentucky Law Enforcement Council.
    3. The amount of reimbursement authorized by paragraph (b) of this subsection shall be prorated based upon the percentage of time that the law enforcement telecommunicator completed his or her employment contract.

History. Enact. Acts 2014, ch. 99, § 1, effective July 15, 2014.

Constables

70.310. Bond and oath of constable — Minimum — Record.

  1. Every constable shall execute bond in the minimum amount of ten thousand dollars ($10,000), with good sureties approved by the fiscal court.
  2. The bond shall be recorded by the fiscal court with the county clerk, and the approval of the sureties shall be entered on the records of the fiscal court.
  3. The bond shall be renewed biennially, and more often if required by the fiscal court. When additional security is required of the constable, he shall be given ten (10) days’ notice.

History. 424, 426, 427: amend. Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 20, § 6, effective January 2, 1978; 1978, ch. 384, § 160, effective June 17, 1978; 1996, ch. 86, § 8, effective July 15, 1996.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Liability.

Constable’s sureties are liable for his official torts, but not for violence done in a personal capacity. Jewell v. Mills, 66 Ky. 62 , 1867 Ky. LEXIS 125 ( Ky. 1867 ).

Constable’s sureties are also liable for collectible claims placed in his hands. Commonwealth for Arnold v. Sommers, 66 Ky. 555 , 1868 Ky. LEXIS 27 ( Ky. 1868 ).

Constable’s sureties are not liable for claims not collectible by him in his official capacity. Commonwealth for Arnold v. Sommers, 66 Ky. 555 , 1868 Ky. LEXIS 27 ( Ky. 1868 ).

Constable’s sureties are not liable for collections on claims placed in his hands before execution of his bond. Boswell & Lemmon v. Sheriff, 71 Ky. 97 , 1871 Ky. LEXIS 19 ( Ky. 1871 ).

2. Care of Property.

Constable should use ordinary diligence in care of property in his legal custody. Tudor v. Lewis, 60 Ky. 378 , 1860 Ky. LEXIS 97 ( Ky. 1860 ).

3. Common Law Bond.

The bond of a constable appointed in a district in which he did not reside is good as a common law bond. Commonwealth for Harris v. Teal, 53 Ky. 29 ( Ky. 1853 ).

4. Action on Bond.

Action on constable’s bond is properly brought in the name of the Commonwealth, for the use and benefit of the interested party. Commonwealth for Harris v. Teal, 53 Ky. 29 ( Ky. 1853 ).

5. Process Unlawfully Issued.

Service of process unlawfully issued to him does not render the constable a trespasser. Epperson v. Graves, 11 Ky. Op. 423, 3 Ky. L. Rptr. 527 , 1882 Ky. LEXIS 122 (Ky. Ct. App. Jan. 21, 1882).

Opinions of Attorney General.

In any county that does not have a population of 200,000 or more, where KRS 62.150 does not apply, the fiscal court is not required to pay for the official bond of constables under this section, as the county does for other officials. OAG 95-11 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Bond to be given by constable, Ky. Const., § 103.

Bond of public officers, KRS Ch. 64.

Constables to enforce motor vehicle laws, arrests, KRS 281.765 .

Election of constable, Ky. Const., § 99.

Fees and compensation of constable, KRS 64.190 to 64.210 .

Jefferson County to pay premiums on bonds of officers, KRS 62.150 .

Qualifications and jurisdiction of constables, Ky. Const., §§ 100, 101.

ALR

Liability of constable or his bond for defaults and misfeasances of his assistants and deputies. 1 A.L.R. 222; 102 A.L.R. 174; 116 A.L.R. 1064; 71 A.L.R.2d 1140.

Personal liability of constable, or his bond, for negligently causing personal injury or death. 60 A.L.R.2d 873.

Personal liability of policeman, sheriff, or similar peace officer or his bond, for injury suffered as a result of failure to enforce law or arrest lawbreaker. 41 A.L.R.3d 700.

70.320. Deputy constables in authorized counties.

  1. As used in this section:
    1. “Authorized county” means a county containing either an eligible city or a consolidated local government; and
    2. “Eligible city” means a city on the registry maintained by the Department for Local Government under subsection (5) of this section.
  2. The appointment of deputy constables shall be allowed only in authorized counties. In authorized counties, each constable may appoint one (1) or more deputies with the consent of the county judge/executive or the mayor, in a consolidated local government, as the case may be. The constable and his or her surety are liable on his or her bond for all the acts and omissions of his or her deputies.
  3. Deputy constables may be removed at any time for any cause deemed sufficient by the constable by order of the county judge/executive or the mayor in a consolidated local government, as the case may be, entered after filing of a written direction by the constable.
  4. Each deputy constable in counties containing a consolidated local government or city of the first class shall be compensated for his or her services by salary fixed by the consolidated local government or fiscal court, and paid out of the levy of the consolidated local government or county.
  5. On or before January 1, 2015, the Department for Local Government shall create and maintain a registry of cities that, as of August 1, 2014, were classified as cities of the first or second classes. The Department for Local Government shall make the information included on the registry available to the public by publishing it on its Web site.

History. 425, 1083a-9: amend. Acts 1942, ch. 180, §§ 8, 9; 1946, ch. 165; 1952, ch. 6, § 1; 1954, ch. 105, § 1; 1960, ch. 241; 1968, ch. 152, § 44; 1978, ch. 384, § 161, effective June 17, 1978; 2002, ch. 346, § 70, effective July 15, 2002; 2014, ch. 92, § 44, effective January 1, 2015.

Compiler’s Notes.

For this section as effective until January 1, 2015, see the preceding section also numbered 70.320 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Appointment.

This section does not authorize a county judge (now county judge/executive) to appoint deputy constables. Milliken v. Harrod, 275 Ky. 597 , 122 S.W.2d 148, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 471 ( Ky. 1938 ).

2. Salary.

Legislature may require county to pay an outright salary of $200 per month to a constable, notwithstanding fees collected by him do not amount to that much. Jefferson County Fiscal Court v. Thomas, 279 Ky. 458 , 130 S.W.2d 60, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 258 ( Ky. 1939 ).

3. Allocation of Fees.

The Legislature may allocate fees earned by office of constable, through deputy constables, to payment of salary of deputy constables alone. Jefferson County Fiscal Court v. Thomas, 279 Ky. 458 , 130 S.W.2d 60, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 258 ( Ky. 1939 ).

4. Liability.

A constable is liable for the official misdoings of his deputies. Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Hall, 215 Ky. 36 , 284 S.W. 426, 1926 Ky. LEXIS 662 ( Ky. 1926 ).

5. — Bonds.

A constable may require indemnity bonds from his deputies. Commonwealth v. Bartholomew, 265 Ky. 703 , 97 S.W.2d 591, 1936 Ky. LEXIS 563 ( Ky. 1936 ).

Cited:

Koehler v. Commonwealth, 222 Ky. 670 , 1 S.W.2d 1072, 1928 Ky. LEXIS 220 ( Ky. 1928 ); Muenninghoff v. Bartholomew, 269 Ky. 36 , 106 S.W.2d 97, 1937 Ky. LEXIS 554 ( Ky. 1937 ); Sparks v. Adkins, 304 Ky. 212 , 200 S.W.2d 307, 1947 Ky. LEXIS 615 ( Ky. 1947 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

It is not permissible for a deputy constable to be appointed or to serve in a county that does not contain a first or second-class city, even without a salary. OAG 67-89 .

A deputy constable is not disqualified from serving in that capacity because of his residing in a district other than that in which the constable resides. OAG 70-187 .

Where an individual was legally appointed deputy constable, such individual remained a deputy constable until the county constable’s term of office expired, even though the constable orally told the deputy that he was dismissed as a deputy, since this section requires a written direction of the constable and an order of the county court to dismiss a deputy constable. OAG 72-146 .

A constable in a county that does not contain a first or second-class city has no authority to appoint a deputy constable. OAG 73-834 .

A county, or fiscal court, is not required to “establish a budget for the constable’s office,” to make a budgetary allocation or appropriation to such office, except where express requirements of the statutes mandate an appropriation or payment to, or on behalf of, constables. OAG 95-11 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Deputy constables to receive allowance for automobile expense in certain counties, KRS 64.210 .

70.330. Vacancy in constable’s office in district containing city of sixth class — Marshal may act as.. [Repealed effective January 1, 2015.]

In any magisterial district in which there is no qualified constable, and in which there is situated a city of the sixth class, the marshal of the city may perform all the duties pertaining to the office of constable coextensive with the magisterial district so long as the office of constable is vacant, but no longer.

History. 425a-1.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (425a-1) was repealed by Acts 2014, ch. 92, § 314, effective January 1, 2015.

70.340. Powers after leaving office.

  1. A constable who vacates or is removed from office shall return and account for all claims, processes and papers in his hands, in the same manner as if he had continued in office, or he may be required by the county judge/executive to deliver them to his successor or to the county judge/executive.
  2. The constable shall, after the expiration of his term of office, execute and return all processes or precepts in his hands at the termination of his office, and may replevy or collect all executions and fee-bills then in his hands.

History. 428, 444: amend. Acts 1978, ch. 384, § 162, effective June 17, 1978.

70.350. Execution of process — Jurisdiction.

  1. Constables may execute warrants, summons, subpoenas, attachments, notices, rules and orders of court in all criminal, penal and civil cases, and shall return all process placed in his hands to the courts or persons issuing them, on or before the return day, noting the time of execution on them.
  2. A constable may exercise the duties of his office in any part of the county, but shall not execute any process in which he is personally interested except fee-bills for his own service. He shall not levy on or sell land, or any interest therein.
  3. The constable shall not be compelled to receive a precept, fee-bill or order for witness attendance, or other claim against any person who is known to be and to reside out of his district, unless the precept is in behalf of the Commonwealth or is a precept against property in his district. But if a constable voluntarily receives such precept, fee-bill, order for witness attendance or other claim, he and his sureties shall be accountable for the same as if the person it is against resided or was in his district, or had property therein.

History. 436, 438 to 440.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Forcible Entry.

A constable may not make a forcible entry in order to execute a fieri facias or distress warrant. Jewell v. Mills, 66 Ky. 62 , 1867 Ky. LEXIS 125 ( Ky. 1867 ).

2. Office.

Under Ky. Const., § 234, a constable may be enjoined from maintaining his office in another constable’s district. Ellis v. Wright, 237 Ky. 98 , 34 S.W.2d 966, 1931 Ky. LEXIS 554 ( Ky. 1931 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

A constable’s jurisdiction to perform his duties includes not only his district, but any part of the county. OAG 60-624 .

An advance of $5.00 (plus tax) for fees for execution of process is required to be paid into court under KRS 64.080 by one prosecuting a civil action; in the quarterly court the clerk is required to deliver the process to the designated officer pursuant to KRS 25.015 (now repealed), 70.070 and subsection (1) of 70.350 ; the designated officer shall serve it and make proper return before payment of his fee from the advance deposited with the clerk and KRS 64.090 fixes fees to be paid to the sheriff and KRS 64.190 fixes constable fees; and any other advances charged or demanded are not authorized by law. OAG 63-215 .

A city council cannot ban or limit the services of the constable within the city limits. OAG 70-216 .

A person who is a constable only on weekends and who works in private employment five days a week cannot properly perform the duties of his office as constable and there is a strong possibility that a common-law incompatibility would exist. OAG 70-263 .

A county constable may cite law violators into a city police court of a city within his county for offenses occurring within the corporate limits of the city. OAG 70-488 .

A constable may, if he desires, serve process outside of his district, which process he is not otherwise required to serve. OAG 70-614 .

Pursuant to subsection (3) of this section, a constable cannot be compelled to serve process outside of his district unless the process is in behalf of the commonwealth or is against property in his district. OAG 70-614 .

A constable can make an arrest in a city within his district and bring the defendant before the police court of that city if it has jurisdiction. OAG 70-620 .

A constable has the duty of serving process, where it is directed or delivered to him, involving parties residing in his district, although the suit has been filed in another district. OAG 70-664 .

Where old judgments were granted in one district but the defendants now live in another district, the responsibility for serving process in connection with the enforcement of the old judgment is upon the constable of the district in which the defendant lives. OAG 70-664 .

A constable can issue citations in traffic violation cases outside of his district, citing such cases either to the county or justice’s court or to the police judge. OAG 70-792 .

A constable or deputy constable has authority to serve execution issued from the circuit court on personal property. OAG 71-234 .

This section and KRS 70.360 require an officer serving process to make a return indicating positively in writing that the person has been served or that he was not found, if the defendant is a resident of the county. OAG 72-437 .

As a constable may exercise the duties of his office in any part of the county, the city council of a city in that county cannot prevent him from performing such duties within the corporation limits of the city. OAG 74-48 .

A constable may enforce municipal ordinances if the offenses were committed within the boundaries of the municipality and in the presence of the constable. OAG 74-54 .

An elective constable cannot be barred from working in the city limits by the mayor, chief of police or the city council but he must keep his office in the district for which he was elected. OAG 74-554 .

No special person may be appointed to serve summons and attachment in connection with circuit and quarterly court cases except the judges of circuit court may appoint one bailiff pursuant to KRS 24.265 (repealed) who would be classified as a deputy sheriff. OAG 74-657 .

Generally, a constable may exercise the duties of his office in any part of the county. OAG 77-720 .

The constable can serve process for the district court involving parking violations if it is put in his hands by the district court. OAG 78-189 .

Since a constable’s jurisdiction is coextensive with the county in which he resides and is elected he may, generally, exercise the duties of his office in any part of the county. OAG 78-207 .

A constable has no vested right in being given a warrant of arrest for delivery. OAG 82-487 .

The district judge, in any county, as the issuing official, has the discretion as to whom (the peace officer) the warrant of arrest shall be delivered for execution. The court does not withhold a warrant from any peace officer; he merely decides the peace officer to whom the warrant will be delivered for execution, and there is no law or rule requiring the issuing judge to deliver the warrant to a particular or specific peace officer. OAG 82-487 .

Where a business operator refuses to permit the constable or deputy to serve process peaceably upon one or more of his employees at his place of business, he could be in violation of KRS 421.080 , where the process is designed to compel the attendance of the witness before the grand jury or legislative committee. OAG 83-493 .

A public business may not prevent the constable and his legally sworn and bonded deputies from serving legal process, such as civil and criminal summonses and subpoenas, upon that business’ employees by refusing to permit said officers to enter the place of business as long as the officers in good faith use reasonable and necessary means to contact the named defendant employees in the place of business. OAG 83-493 .

Constables can only execute criminal process where the process is placed in their hands by the judge of the court, the court clerk as directed by the judge, or the sheriff under an emergency. OAG 84-37 .

The placing of criminal process and papers with the sheriff or other peace officer is a matter of discretion with the issuing court; the judge of the issuing court may indicate to the clerk of the court the judge’s desires as to whom (the sheriff, constable, or other peace officer) the process will be delivered to for execution and return. OAG 84-37 .

Where the sheriff’s regular deputy staff is inadequate to meet the sheriff’s total statutory responsibilities, the sheriff, under KRS 70.050 , may in writing empower constables and other peace officers to execute criminal process, coming into the sheriff’s hands, under the sheriff’s supervision and direction. OAG 84-37 .

Constables have no authority to serve process outside their own counties. OAG 96-29 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Fees, constable may distrain for, KRS 64.400 .

Process, officers to whom it may be directed, KRS 454.135 .

ALR

Liability of constable for damage to person or goods during execution of eviction process. 56 A.L.R. 1039.

70.360. Return of “not found.”

No constable shall return on any process that the defendant is not found, unless he has actually been to the defendant’s residence and has not found him, if the defendant is a resident of the county.

History. 437.

Opinions of Attorney General.

A public business may not prevent the constable and his legally sworn and bonded deputies from serving legal process, such as civil and criminal summonses and subpoenas, upon that business’ employees by refusing to permit said officers to enter the place of business as long as the officers in good faith use reasonable and necessary means to contact the named defendant employees in the place of business. OAG 83-493 .

70.370. Precedence of levying and satisfying writs.

Executions, fee-bills, orders of witnesses’ attendance, distress warrants and attachments, shall be levied and satisfied by the constable according to the priority of time in which they are placed in his hands. The constable shall, in every case, indorse the time of reception.

History. 442.

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Proceedings upon executions, KRS 426.640 to 426.665 , 426.675 , 426.680 .

70.380. Staying or delay of process — When constable excused by.

It shall be no defense to any action or motion against a constable or his sureties that the process or other authority under which he acted, or it was his duty to act, was stayed or in any manner delayed, unless it was done in writing signed by the plaintiff, his agent or attorney.

History. 445.

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Written direction by plaintiff or his attorney necessary to excuse officer, KRS 426.340 .

70.390. To collect, return and receipt for claim.

  1. The constable shall collect all claims placed in his hands for collection, when by proper diligence they may be collected.
  2. When a constable fails to collect a claim placed in his hands for collection, he shall upon demand return the claim, properly indorsed, to the person entitled thereto within six (6) months from the time it is placed in his hands for collection.
  3. The constable shall give a receipt, stating the amount paid, for each claim or demand he collects.

History. 435.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Liability.

Constable is not liable for failure to make return until six months has expired, demand has been made of him, and he has refused delivery. Walters v. Chinn, 58 Ky. 499 , 1859 Ky. LEXIS 4 ( Ky. 1859 ).

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Failure of officer to pay money collected, penalty, KRS 426.360 .

Knowingly making illegal charge, penalty, KRS 64.990 .

70.400. Claims placed in hands — Not to become interested in.

No constable shall buy, or become interested by contract in, any claim against another put into his hands for collection. Any such purchase or contract may be relied on by a defendant in bar of a suit on such claim, or as a ground for vacating a judgment or quashing an execution thereon.

History. 443.

70.410. Motion against constable — Notice.

Recovery on the constable’s bond may be had by motion. Ten (10) days’ notice, specifying the grounds of the motion, shall be given. If not executed on all persons liable on the bond, the motion may proceed against those notified.

History. 429, 431.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Demand and Refusal.

Demand and refusal to account must precede suit against constable for moneys collected. Harris v. Perry, 65 Ky. 101 , 1867 Ky. LEXIS 24 ( Ky. 1867 ). See Huston v. Hagar, 62 Ky. 24 , 1863 Ky. LEXIS 10 ( Ky. 1863 ).

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Action and recovery on bond, KRS 62.070 .

Notice of motion in summary proceedings, KRS 418.010 .

Treatises

Caldwell’s Kentucky Form Book, 5th Ed., Notice of Motion Against a Constable and his Sureties for his Failure to Execute a Distress — Warrant, and his Failure to Collect Claims or Pay Money Collected, Form 18.11.

70.420. Recovery for failure to pay over money collected.

  1. For constable’s failure, upon proper demand, to pay over money collected by him, the plaintiff shall recover the amount collected by the officer, and interest from the time of demand, and ten percent (10%) damages thereon, and the costs of his motion or action.
  2. In such action or motion a receipt given by the constable to the person placing the claim or demand in his hands shall be presumptive evidence, after one hundred and twenty (120) days from its date, that such demand has been collected.

History. 429, 432, 434.

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Liability of officer for failure to pay over money collected, KRS 426.360 .

Treatises

Caldwell’s Kentucky Form Book, 5th Ed., Notice of Motion Against a Constable and his Sureties for his Failure to Execute a Distress — Warrant, and his Failure to Collect Claims or Pay Money Collected, Form 18.11.

70.430. Constables in counties of 250,000 population — Duties — Monthly report.

  1. Constables in counties containing a population of over 250,000 on or before the tenth day of each calendar month shall make a report to the county clerk concerning the performance of the duties of office by himself and his deputies during the next preceding calendar month.
    1. Under the heading of civil matters, the report shall contain a statement showing the total number of each kind of civil processes and orders received, the total number of each returned executed, returned unexecuted, and not returned and not executed.
    2. Under the heading of criminal matters, the report shall contain a list of the names and addresses of all persons for whom warrants of arrest have been obtained by the constable and his deputies, noting the name of the officer obtaining each warrant, the name of the officer executing each warrant, and indicating the warrants returned executed, returned unexecuted, and not returned and not executed; a list of the names and addresses of all persons for whom warrants of arrest have been obtained by others and delivered to the constable and his deputies for execution, noting the name and address of the person obtaining each warrant; the name of the officer executing it, and indicating the warrants returned executed, returned unexecuted, and not returned and not executed; a list of the names and addresses of all persons arrested by the constable and his deputies without warrant, noting the name of the officer making the arrest and the cause of the arrest; a list of all the places for which search warrants have been obtained by the constable and his deputies, noting the name of the officer obtaining each search warrant, the name of the officer executing it, and indicating the search warrants returned executed, returned and unexecuted, and not returned, and not executed.
    3. Under the heading of other matters, the report shall contain a brief but adequate report upon all other acts of the constable and his deputies performed under authority, or under color of authority, of office.
  2. Each monthly report shall be subscribed and sworn to by the constable and such parts thereof as pertain to the acts of his deputies beyond his presence shall be deemed to be sworn to upon information and belief. The clerk shall cause attested copies thereof to be promptly delivered to the county judge/executive, the county attorney, and the attorney for the Commonwealth.

History. 1083a-9: amend. Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 56, effective January 2, 1978; ch. 20, § 6, effective January 2, 1978; 1978, ch. 384, § 163, effective June 17, 1978.

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Compensation of constables and deputies in counties of over 250,000 population; duties concerning, KRS 64.200 .

Constables and deputies to receive allowance for automobile expense, KRS 64.210 .

70.440. False entries in books and reports.

No constable or deputy constable in any county containing a population of over 250,000 shall make, participate in making, or knowingly permit another to make a false entry, or omit, or participate in or permit the omission of, any proper entry, in his official books or records, or knowingly make or participate in the making of any false statement or report, with intent to cheat or defraud the state, the county or any person.

History. 1083a-14.

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Recorder to receive and report money for justice and constable, KRS 64.200 , 64.250 .

County Police Force and Auxiliary

70.510. Patrols in counties containing cities of first or second class; appointment; jurisdiction. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3780, 3783) was repealed by Acts 1942, ch. 115, § 2.

70.520. Duties; hours of duty. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3781, 3782) was repealed by Acts 1942, ch. 115, § 2.

70.530. Compensation; motor patrolmen; powers. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3783) was repealed by Acts 1942, ch. 115, § 2.

70.540. County police force authorized — Jurisdiction — Appointment — Qualifications — Term — Oath — Officers.

The county judges/executive of the respective counties shall have and are hereby given the power, jurisdiction and authority to establish, appoint and maintain a county police force within their respective counties, all of the members and officers of which shall have and are hereby given jurisdiction coextensive with the whole county for which they are appointed. Such police force may consist of a chief and such member, rank and grade subordinate to the chief, and such clerical and skilled employees as the county judge/executive shall deem proper. All of the members and employees of the county police force shall be appointed by the county judge/executive and shall serve for a term of one (1) year from the date of their respective appointments, unless sooner removed by the county judge/executive for neglect of duty or improper conduct. All members of the force shall be citizens of the United States not less than twenty-one (21) years of age and residents of the Commonwealth of Kentucky. None but discreet and sober persons shall be appointed to any position on said county police force. Each of the members of the said county police force shall take an oath, before the county judge/executive of their county, to faithfully, impartially and diligently perform the duties of their respective offices. Provided, however, that the chief officer of the county police force of any county may be designated, in the discretion of the county judge/executive of said county, as captain or any other appropriate title, and such county police force in any county may consist of one (1) or more commanding officers, as the county judge/executive of such county may deem proper or adequate.

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 115, § 1; 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 20, § 6, effective January 2, 1978; 1978, ch. 384, § 164, effective June 17, 1978; 1980, ch. 188, § 50, effective July 15, 1980; 1982, ch. 88, § 1, effective July 15, 1982.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

Former law, that fixed maximum compensation of county police officers at $25.00 per year in counties of less than 25,000, and $2,400 and up per year in counties over 70,000, was not unconstitutional as special or discriminatory legislation against the less populated counties which in effect would have prevented the establishment of police forces in these counties, since the legislature obviously believed that in small counties such a police force would only be needed in emergencies to supplement sheriff’s force, and there being no requirement that such officers devote full time to their office. Metcalf v. Howard, 304 Ky. 498 , 201 S.W.2d 197, 1947 Ky. LEXIS 666 ( Ky. 1947 ) (decided under prior law).

Since the statutes providing for county patrols authorize every county court to establish a patrol, make rules and regulations, and appoint members of the force, the statutes do not violate Ky. Const., § 141 (now repealed), requiring uniformity of jurisdiction of county courts. The fact that jurisdiction of fiscal courts to fix salaries of patrolmen is not uniform does not constitute a violation of Ky. Const., § 141 (now repealed). Metcalf v. Howard, 304 Ky. 498 , 201 S.W.2d 197, 1947 Ky. LEXIS 666 ( Ky. 1947 ).

2. Construction.

This section, KRS 67.080 and 70.545 to 70.570 (KRS 70.545 to 70.570 now repealed) do not give, either expressly or impliedly, to the fiscal court such authority that it can appropriate money for purchase of land to be conveyed, for consideration of $1.00, to commonwealth to be used as a site for district headquarters of state police. Hogge v. Rowan County Fiscal Court, 313 Ky. 387 , 231 S.W.2d 8, 1950 Ky. LEXIS 862 ( Ky. 1950 ).

3. Salaries.

KRS 78.400 to 78.460 and 78.990 authorizing the creation of a county police force merit system superseded this section when accepted by the fiscal court and appellees were no longer term officers for the offices they held had been thereby abolished and their terms terminated and they now held their positions for indefinite terms, and thus their salaries could be increased without regard to Ky. Const., § 161. Tierney v. Pendleton, 253 S.W.2d 376, 1952 Ky. LEXIS 1084 ( Ky. 1952 ) (decided under prior law).

4. Uniforms.

The fiscal court had the right to appropriate money to the county police department for the purchase of uniforms which at all times remained the property of the department but were worn by the members of the police force at the times that they were on active duty. Steinfeld v. Jefferson County Fiscal Court, 312 Ky. 614 , 229 S.W.2d 319, 1950 Ky. LEXIS 722 ( Ky. 1950 ) (decided under prior law).

Where county policemen, ordered to wear uniforms furnished by county while on duty, obtained no property rights in the uniforms and were to return them to the department on termination of employment therewith, appropriation of the fiscal court to pay for the uniforms was valid and proper as against the contention that the furnishing of uniforms increased the compensation of the policemen in contravention of Ky. Const., § 161. Steinfeld v. Jefferson County Fiscal Court, 312 Ky. 614 , 229 S.W.2d 319, 1950 Ky. LEXIS 722 ( Ky. 1950 ) (decided under prior law).

5. Jurisdiction.

Attorney who also served as captain of and legal advisor to the county police department cannot practice in motor vehicle cases arising anywhere within the territorial jurisdiction of the county police department, even though the larger cities within the county maintained their own police departments. Tucker v. Kentucky Bar Asso., 550 S.W.2d 467, 1976 Ky. LEXIS 154 ( Ky. 1976 ).

6. Funding.

A judicial court may not order a county fiscal court to appropriate “adequate” funding for the operation of a statutorily authorized county police force. Fiscal Court of Taylor County v. Taylor County Metro Police, 805 S.W.2d 113, 1991 Ky. LEXIS 21 ( Ky. 1991 ).

Under this section, approval by the fiscal court is not necessary, nor is there any provision for the funding of the operation of a police force. Fiscal Court of Taylor County v. Taylor County Metro Police, 805 S.W.2d 113, 1991 Ky. LEXIS 21 ( Ky. 1991 ).

7. Arrest.

Because the definition of “peace officer” in KRS 431.005(3) is specifically limited to “domestic violence” situations, it had no application to defendant’s arrest for trafficking and possession of controlled substance; part-time county police officer was duly appointed under this section and was a peace officer empowered to make arrest under KRS 431.005(1). Adams v. Commonwealth, 931 S.W.2d 465, 1996 Ky. App. LEXIS 157 (Ky. Ct. App. 1996), overruled in part, Mills v. Dep't of Corr. Offender Info. Servs., 438 S.W.3d 328, 2014 Ky. LEXIS 328 ( Ky. 2014 ).

8. Compensation.

Since the statutes providing for county patrols authorize every county court to establish a patrol, make rules and regulations, and appoint members of the force, the statutes did not violate Ky. Const., § 141 (repealed), requiring uniformity of jurisdiction of county courts. The fact that jurisdiction of fiscal courts to fix salaries of patrolmen was not uniform did not constitute a violation of Ky. Const., § 141 (repealed). Metcalf v. Howard, 304 Ky. 498 , 201 S.W.2d 197, 1947 Ky. LEXIS 666 ( Ky. 1947 ) (decided under prior law).

Cited:

Stuart v. Combs, 360 S.W.2d 144, 1962 Ky. LEXIS 213 ( Ky. 1962 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

If a county police force is appointed under this section, the fiscal court must set some salary for such police force, even though it be negligible such as $1.00 per year for each officer. OAG 65-626 .

The police departments of a city of the second class and the county could be merged under the interlocal cooperation act. OAG 67-64 .

The police departments of a city and the county could be merged under the interlocal cooperation act. OAG 68-443 .

Persons employed as “school crossing guards,” but not employed under either this section or KRS 70.545 (now repealed) authorizing auxiliary and regular county police forces, lack the necessary delegation of authority to exercise the powers of a police officer. OAG 71-117 .

The police systems of the three fifth-class cities in a county and a proposed county police system could be legally merged or consolidated. OAG 71-478 .

County policemen who are paid with federal funds from the federal emergency work program can be paid for their past services as county ambulance drivers from the county’s revenue sharing money that was appropriated for ambulance service for a past period of time as county revenue sharing money is not matching money and health is one of the priority expenditures authorized by the revenue sharing act. OAG 73-146 .

County policemen who are paid with federal funds under the federal emergency work program may have their car expenses paid from the county’s general fund, provided the car expenses are properly documented and the appropriate budget procedure is observed. OAG 73-146 .

Where a county judge (now county judge/executive) desires to establish a county police system he must act in substantial compliance with the statutes and he must coordinate the budget and cooperate fully with the fiscal court since the fiscal court has the duty and authority to fund the operation by establishing a reasonable salary and by providing necessary supplies and equipment to appropriate budgetary actions. OAG 73-344 .

When a county judge (now county judge/executive) and the fiscal court desire to establish a county police force they must comply with this section through KRS 70.570 (now repealed) and if they do not, the members allegedly serving on such force are not in fact legally members of such organization. OAG 73-775 .

Sheriff is a county officer under the constitution and members of a county police department would be considered county officers and, while there would be no incompatibility under KRS 61.080 , it is doubtful that the sheriff could serve as chief of the county police department and perform the duties of both offices with care and ability. OAG 73-783 .

Where the county judge (now county judge/executive) establishes a county police force under this section, the fiscal court, using its sound discretion, has the duty to fix the salary of each county policeman appointed by the judge, keeping in mind that such police force system is on a regular basis and that the county cannot expect persons to devote their full time to such work for a meaningless or nominal sum. OAG 73-873 .

Where the county judge (now county judge/executive) permits a county policeman to hold over past a one-year appointment period, the officer is a de facto, if not a de jure, county policeman. OAG 74-581 .

A hold over of a member of the county police force past a one-year term does not constitute an automatic reappointment. OAG 74-581 .

The appointment of members of the county police force to be legally effective should be expressly made and documented in writing for each one-year term. OAG 74-581 .

A county police officer is not a constitutional officer for the purpose of residency under the Constitution; thus, pursuant to KRS 15.335 , limiting residency and voting qualifications to constitutional officers, the residency requirements of KRS 61.300 and this section do not apply. OAG 74-581 .

The fiscal court order books need only reflect salary provisions for a county police chief and not that he was duly appointed, since the appointment may be made by the county judge (now county judge/executive) without consent of the fiscal court and the records of the county court must reflect the appointment. OAG 74-581 .

Neither the sheriff nor one of his deputies may serve as the nonsalaried county police chief as the police chief should only be answerable to the county court and while KRS 61.080 and Const. § 165 do not prohibit such appointments, a practical incompatibility could arise in the serving in two capacities. OAG 74-581 .

The county police department whose force is established, appointed and operated by the county court pursuant to this section and KRS 70.550 (now repealed) cannot be placed under the jurisdiction of the sheriff’s department as it has no organizational connection with the sheriff’s department whose staff consists of deputy sheriffs authorized by the fiscal court under KRS 64.530 . OAG 74-581 .

Any valid appointee of the county police system must be a regular day-by-day employee and must receive a fair salary for his labors. OAG 74-581 .

A school guard made a member of a county police force would be a county officer and in view of KRS 61.080 could not be made a member of a city police force. OAG 74-738 .

Where a county has no county police force and the county fiscal court has employed a detective and fixed his salary, payable from revenue sharing funds, such appointment and salary payments were illegal and void. OAG 75-192 .

A proposal to appoint a county police force consisting of one officer, who would serve without compensation and whose sole duty would be to patrol the county roads and detect truck violations, is illegal since the statutes envision a regular, full time and systematic county police force involving reasonable compensation set by the fiscal court. OAG 75-334 .

A county police force can be created under this section on and after January 2, 1978, even though the “judge of the county court” will not be in existence in Kentucky on and after January 2, 1978, since the original duties of a county judge in creating and appointing a county police force did not and do not involve a judicial function and, according to Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 20, § 6, on and after January 2, 1978, the words “county judge” in this section shall be read as “county judge/executive.” OAG 77-14 .

The county judge/executive has the authority to appoint a county police force with appointments on a one-year-at-a-time basis. OAG 78-59 .

The county judge/executive appoints the county police force. OAG 78-73 .

The county police force established under this section and KRS 70.550 (now repealed) cannot be placed under the jurisdiction of the sheriff’s department, since it has no orgnizational connection with the sheriff’s department. OAG 78-228 .

Any valid appointee of the county police system must be a regular day-by-day employee, with a fair salary for his work. OAG 79-411 .

It is not mandatory that fiscal court fund a county police force, except where to disband the present county police force would result in an impairment of an obligation of contract. OAG 79-411 .

KRS 67.080 and KRS 67.083(3)(u) impose upon the fiscal court the affirmative duty of taking such steps, by orders or ordinances, in providing, within the county’s financial ability and constitutional limitations, the necessary police protection. OAG 79-451 .

A county police chief has no power to fire a patrolman on his own authority. OAG 79-605 .

Pursuant to this section, it is the county judge/executive which must make regulations for the police force, not the county police chief. OAG 79-605 .

When a county policeman has been charged with neglect of duty or other improper conduct, the county judge/executive should hold a hearing on the charges, which should first have been reduced to writing and presented to the officer, at which hearing the county attorney and policeman’s attorney should be present and due process afforded. OAG 79-605 .

There is nothing in this section suggesting authority for creating an auxiliary police force. OAG 80-13 .

From the unambiguous language of this section, the county judge/executive is in charge of the overall daily supervision of the county police force; however it is contemplated that the county judge/executive will delegate the responsibility of the day-to-day supervision to a professional chief of police. OAG 81-420 .

The fiscal court has a positive responsibility to properly fund an existing county police force under KRS 64.530 and once the county judge/executive establishes a county police force, he may obtain court relief to enforce the proper funding of such police force; the fiscal court cannot arbitrarily withhold proper funding. OAG 81-420 .

The repeal of KRS 70.545 to 70.570 (relating to county police force, rules, etc.) in no way derogates the power given to the county judge/executive in this section. OAG 81-420 .

This section provides for a county police force under the appointment and management authority of the county judge/executive and it does not allow for the integration of the county police force with the county sheriff’s office. OAG 81-420 .

This section, under which the county judge/executive can make the county police appointments without fiscal court concurrence, controls over KRS 67.710 , under which the county judge/executive may hire county employees with the consent of the fiscal court, since this section is the later and more specific statute. OAG 81-431 .

Any county of less than 300,000 population may, through its fiscal court, voluntarily enter into a binding collective bargaining agreement with its county police force, as relates to hours, wages, and other conditions of employment. OAG 82-141 .

In all counties in Kentucky, the county judge/executive may appoint a county police force, which will be funded by appropriate action and budgeting by the fiscal court. Members of a county police force are county employees and are subject to the administrative and legislative controls of the county judge/executive and the fiscal court as a body, pursuant to KRS 67.080(1)(a), (c), (e) and (2)(a), (c), KRS 67.083(3)(u), and KRS 67.710(7). OAG 82-141 .

A fiscal court may, under KRS 67.083(3)(u), establish by ordinance an auxiliary police force, but such force would have no connection with the sheriff’s office. An auxiliary county police force is not to be confused with a regular county police force established under this section. OAG 82-254 .

A county police officer is considered to be a county officer. OAG 82-304 .

As relates to a one-man county police force, the serious legislative policy expressed in this section eliminates the possibility of creating a sham or nominal police force for mere political purposes. OAG 82-347 .

The county judge/executive, under this section, has the authority to establish a county police force of a “reasonable number,” especially in terms of the necessity for county law enforcement personnel and the availability of money in the county budget for that purpose. OAG 82-347 .

The fiscal court has a positive responsibility to fund properly an existing county police force, and cannot arbitrarily withhold proper funding. Once the county judge/executive establishes a reasonable county police force, he may obtain court relief to enforce the proper funding of such police force. OAG 82-347 .

Under KRS 61.360(3), off-duty county police officers cannot wear county police uniforms while employed (actually on duty) as private security guards; however, should the occasion arise, while he is working as a private security guard, during which the off-duty county policeman believes that he should utilize his powers of arrest as a county policeman (a peace officer), he may do so, provided he fully informs the person arrested that he is also a county policeman as well as a private security guard since, in that way, no deception will be practiced. KRS 61.360(3) merely prohibits actual deception, and especially where the security guard is not a public peace officer. OAG 83-90 .

The only viable funding mechanism that might fully support formation of a county police force is the general tax revenue of a county, via proper budgeting by the fiscal court. OAG 94-13 .

It is obvious that a county judge/executive cannot unilaterally impose a county police force on a county. OAG 94-13 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Issuance of retail package and drink licenses for liquor, dependent on maintenance of police force, KRS 243.230 .

Merit system for county police, KRS 78.400 to 78.460 .

Police protection, fiscal court’s power to provide, KRS 67.082 .

Kentucky Law Journal.

Lewis, Kostas, and Carnes, Consolidation — Complete or Functional — of City and County Governments in Kentucky, 42 Ky. L.J. 295 (1954).

70.542. Auxiliary county police force.

  1. Except in counties containing a consolidated local government or city of the first class, or counties containing an urban-county government, the fiscal court of any county in which there is an established county police force pursuant to KRS 70.540 , may provide for the establishment or abolishment of an auxiliary county police force to perform duties within the county upon such terms and conditions as the fiscal court deems necessary and proper. The fiscal court shall prescribe the number of members comprising such auxiliary county police force, and prescribe rules and regulations that shall govern the powers and duties of the members of such auxiliary county police force, unless otherwise provided in subsection (2) of this section.
  2. A member of an auxiliary county police force shall:
    1. Be appointed by the county judge/executive and serve at his or her pleasure;
    2. Be answerable and under the direction of the county judge/executive, except when the county judge/executive delegates such authority to the chief officer of the county police force;
    3. Not receive any compensation or benefits for his or her time or service, except that the fiscal court may provide for the payment of any reasonable and necessary expenses incurred by a member of the auxiliary county police force in the conduct of his or her official duties; and
    4. Be appointed regardless of race, color, creed, or position.
  3. Before any person is appointed as a member of an auxiliary county police force, he or she shall give bond to the county judge/executive in an amount as prescribed by the fiscal court. The fiscal court may authorize the premium therefor to be paid out of the general funds of the county.

History. Enact. Acts 1982, ch. 383, § 2, effective July 15, 1982; 1984, ch. 177, § 15, effective July 13, 1984; 2002, ch. 346, § 71, effective July 15, 2002.

Opinions of Attorney General.

The fiscal court, in an ordinance creating an auxiliary county police force, has the authority to extend to such auxiliary county policemen the full powers of arrest of a statutory peace officer, including the right to carry a weapon; under these county legislative conditions, and once the auxiliary county policemen have been duly appointed and have taken oath, they become policemen and peace officers as long as they remain on the force. OAG 83-58 .

70.545. County auxiliary police force authorized. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1962, ch. 65, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1978, ch. 118, § 19, effective June 17, 1978.

70.550. Rules and regulations as to personnel. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 115, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1978, ch. 118, § 19, effective June 17, 1978.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

KRS 67.150 , 70.550 , 70.560 , 70.570 , 97.791 , 179.190 , 182.030 , 182.040 , 204.050 , were amended in revisor’s bill, Acts 1978, ch. 384, HB 607, §§ 145, 165, 166, 167, 226, 318, 322, 323 and 341; however, Acts 1978, ch. 118, HB 152, § 19 repealed them and prevails. See KRS 7.136(3).

70.560. Compensation of members — Equipment, bonds. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 115, § 1; 1946, ch. 18, § 1; 1966, ch. 255, § 87) was repealed by Acts 1978, ch. 118, § 19, effective June 17, 1978.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

KRS 67.150 , 70.550 , 70.560 , 70.570 , 97.791 , 179.190 , 182.030 , 182.040 , 204.050 , were amended in revisor’s bill, Acts 1978, ch. 384, HB 607, §§ 145, 165, 166, 167, 226, 318, 322, 323 and 341; however, Acts 1978, ch. 118, HB 152, § 19 repealed them and prevails. See KRS 7.136(3).

70.561. Compensation of chief and assistant chief in county containing population of 200,000 or more. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 142, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1950, ch. 123, § 29.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

KRS 67.150 , 70.550 , 70.560 , 70.570 , 97.791 , 179.190 , 182.030 , 182.040 , 204.050 , were amended in revisor’s bill, Acts 1978, ch. 384, HB 607, §§ 145, 165, 166, 167, 226, 318, 322, 323 and 341; however, Acts 1978, ch. 118, HB 152, § 19 repealed them and prevails. See KRS 7.136(3).

70.570. Powers and duties of police force. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 115, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1978, ch. 118, § 19, effective June 17, 1978.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

KRS 67.150 , 70.550 , 70.560 , 70.570 , 97.791 , 179.190 , 182.030 , 182.040 , 204.050 , were amended in revisor’s bill, Acts 1978, ch. 384, HB 607, §§ 145, 165, 166, 167, 226, 318, 322, 323 and 341; however, Acts 1978, ch. 118, HB 152, § 19 repealed them and prevails. See KRS 7.136(3).

Retirement System for County Police

70.580. Definitions for KRS 70.580 to 70.598. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 212, § 1, effective May 18, 1956; 1974, ch. 386, § 11; 1978, ch. 384, § 168, effective June 17, 1978) was repealed by Acts 1984, ch. 177, § 17, effective July 13, 1984.

70.582. Creation of pension system — Appropriation, contributions. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 212, § 2, effective May 18, 1956) was repealed by Acts 1984, ch. 177, § 17, effective July 13, 1984.

70.583. Pension fund — Purpose — Expenditures. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 212, § 3, effective May 18, 1956) was repealed by Acts 1984, ch. 177, § 17, effective July 13, 1984.

70.586. Board to manage fund — Selection of members — Term — Compensation. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 212, § 4, effective May 18, 1956) was repealed by Acts 1984, ch. 177, § 17, effective July 13, 1984.

70.588. System funded by investment trust — Disbursement of funds. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 212, § 5, effective May 18, 1956) was repealed by Acts 1984, ch. 177, § 17, effective July 13, 1984.

70.590. Board to promulgate rules and regulations — Pass on applications — Report to fiscal court. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 212, § 6, effective May 18, 1956) was repealed by Acts 1984, ch. 177, § 17, effective July 13, 1984.

70.592. Investments. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 212, § 7, effective May 18, 1956) was repealed by Acts 1984, ch. 177, § 17, effective July 13, 1984.

70.594. Refund. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 212, § 8, effective May 18, 1956; 1982, ch. 166, § 45, effective July 15, 1982) was repealed by Acts 1984, ch. 177, § 17, effective July 13, 1984.

70.596. County attorney to advise board — Board may employ attorney. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 212, § 9, effective May 18, 1956) was repealed by Acts 1984, ch. 177, § 17, effective July 13, 1984.

70.598. Pension in addition to social security benefits. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 212, § 10, effective May 18, 1956) was repealed by Acts 1984, ch. 177, § 17, effective July 13, 1984.

Guards

70.610. Guards for safekeeping prisoner.

When the circuit judge believes that the safekeeping of a prisoner confined in his county under a charge of felony requires that a guard be kept over him, he shall make the order of record to that effect, and direct the number of guards to be summoned, by whom, and under whose control they shall be placed. Each guard so summoned and performing duty shall be allowed one dollar ($1) per day, to be paid out of the county treasury.

History. 2044: amend. Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 57, effective January 2, 1978.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Compensation.

Allowance of claims by Circuit Court does not preclude county from rejecting or varying the allowance when guards have performed their duty negligently. Judge & Justices of Hickman County Court v. Moore, 65 Ky. 108 , 1867 Ky. LEXIS 26 ( Ky. 1867 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

The medical costs for an indigent prisoner in the county jail must be borne by the county, including the costs of transportation and guards. OAG 70-304 .

An order by a county judge (now county judge/executive) directing the sheriff to summon and maintain a guard over a prisoner, in connection with his hospitalization at the county hospital was valid. OAG 70-339 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Compensation and mileage of guards conveying prisoners, KRS 64.070 .

Conveyance to hospital, expenses of guard, KRS 202A.101 .

Removal of prisoners from insecure jail, KRS 441.040 , 441.520 .

Penalties

70.990. Penalties.

  1. If the sheriff fails to renew the bond required of him by KRS 70.020 when ordered to do so by the county judge/executive, the county judge/executive shall suspend him from acting until he conforms with the order, or may vacate his office.
  2. If the sheriff violates any of the provisions of KRS 70.140 , he shall be guilty of a violation.
  3. Any sheriff who knowingly makes a false or illegal return on any process or fee-bill, by color of his office, shall be guilty of a Class A misdemeanor and liable to the person injured for treble the damage caused thereby.
  4. If the constable fails to give additional security or to renew his bond when ordered to do so by the county judge/executive, the county judge/executive shall enter an order declaring his office vacant.
  5. Any constable who executes any process, other than a fee-bill for his own service, in which he is personally interested shall be guilty of a violation.
  6. Any constable who violates any of the provisions of KRS 70.390 shall be guilty of a violation. If he violates subsections (1) or (2) of KRS 70.390 , he shall be liable for the amount of the claim.
  7. Any constable or deputy constable in any county containing a population of over 250,000 who violates any of the provisions of KRS 70.440 shall be guilty of a Class D felony.
  8. If the constable fails to return any process, placed in his hands, by the return day, the plaintiff may recover five dollars ($5) from him upon motion before the court from which the process issued.
  9. If a constable fails without reasonable excuse to return process placed in his hands for collection within twenty (20) days after the return day, he shall be liable for the amount of the process plus ten percent (10%).

History. 427, 433, 435, 439, 440, 1083a-14, 4557, 4574, 4587: amend. Acts 1978, ch. 384, § 169, effective June 17, 1978; 1992, ch. 463, § 10, effective July 14, 1992.

Opinions of Attorney General.

Where a constable moved out of state and his whereabouts were unknown and his bond was canceled, the county court could require him to renew his bond and upon his failure to do so declare the office vacant, whereupon an appointment could be made to the office until an election could be held. OAG 60-371 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Illegal fee-bills, penalties for, KRS 64.990 .

Liability for failure to return executions, KRS 426.340 , 426.350 , 426.990 .

CHAPTER 71 Jailer

71.010. Bond and oath of jailer — Minimum — Record.

The jailer shall take the oath prescribed by the Constitution and execute bond to the Commonwealth in the minimum amount of ten thousand dollars ($10,000), with sureties approved by the fiscal court, which shall record the approval in its minutes and shall file the bond with the county clerk. No coroner, sheriff, sheriff’s deputy, county judge/executive or Circuit Judge, county or circuit clerk, or attorney shall be surety for the jailer on his official bond.

History. 2224, 4559: amend. Acts 1978, ch. 384, § 170, effective June 17, 1978; 1980, ch. 188, § 51, effective July 18, 1980; 1996, ch. 86, § 5, effective July 15, 1996.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Bond.

Sureties on jailer’s bond were not liable for money received by him in excess of the amount appropriated for him by the fiscal court, where bond provided that he would faithfully discharge the duties of his office and pay over to all parties entitled thereto any funds that may come into his hands by virtue of his office, as sums paid the jailer illegally were not within the contemplation of the bond. Wolfe County v. Tolson, 283 Ky. 11 , 140 S.W.2d 671, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 287 ( Ky. 1940 ).

2. — Liability.

Fact that prisoner in jail was guilty of insanitary conduct, was noisy and used abusive language did not justify an assault by other prisoners or furnish grounds for denying liability on part of jailer and his deputy for failing to prevent or stop assault. Lamb v. Clark, 282 Ky. 167 , 138 S.W.2d 350, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 152 ( Ky. 1940 ).

Jailer and deputy are liable for injuries to prisoner sustained through assault by other prisoners in “kangaroo court,” if jailer and deputy negligently failed to stop assault or could have reasonably anticipated it and took no steps to prevent it. Lamb v. Clark, 282 Ky. 167 , 138 S.W.2d 350, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 152 ( Ky. 1940 ).

Cited:

Fulton v. Shanklin, 275 Ky. 772 , 122 S.W.2d 733, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 490 ( Ky. 1938 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Although the county judge/executive is required, by KRS 134.250 and this section, to review and approve, if properly executed, a sheriff’s bond and a jailer’s bond, he is not required to join in the execution of the bond himself. OAG 82-58 .

The fiscal court is not responsible for any overspending of the jail funds, since it has no supervising or approving role; however, the county treasurer would be directly held responsible for any such overspending and the jailer has a direct responsibility in seeing to it that he stays within his budgeted funds. OAG 82-424 .

Where it is shown that a jailer is guilty of mismanagement in creating an “overtime” situation, he will be liable on his bond under this section; such jailer, where he illegally creates an overtime situation, would finally be personally responsible to the employee for the overtime. OAG 83-625 .

Where the jailer is sued in his official capacity, and where the county attorney and fiscal court have reason to believe the jailer acted in good faith in connection with his statutory duties, a county interest is involved since the county has a direct interest in the manner in which the county jailer’s statutory duties are performed in connection with a county institution, the county jail, and the concomitant impact upon the affected public. OAG 83-35 .

Where the county attorney would have a conflict of interest as between the jailer and county, the fiscal court may employ other counsel to defend the jailer, assuming that the county attorney and fiscal court have reason to believe the jailer acted in good faith in the matter being litigated. OAG 83-35 .

The fiscal court may reimburse or indemnify the jailer for his actual litigational costs suffered by him “while acting in good faith” in the discharge of his official duties; of course only after the litigation has become final can it be determined whether he so acted in good faith for the purposes of reimbursement of the jailer for actual litigational costs (money out of his own pocket). OAG 83-35 .

The jailer’s official bond only extends to his financial responsibility in disbursing county or public money; it in no way is designed to cover the jailer’s potential tort liability. OAG 83-35 .

The jailer’s official bond mentioned in KRS 71.060(1) is a bond covering his financial responsibility in disbursing county money; in fixing and approving such bond, the county judge/executive should set the bond for not less than an amount reflecting the estimated aggregate amount of public money coming into his hands each year during the effective period of the bond. OAG 83-35 .

The failure of the county jailer to execute bond before entering upon the duties of his office created a vacancy in that office. See Campbell v. Dotson, 111 Ky. 125 , 63 S.W. 480, 1901 Ky. LEXIS 193 (1901). KRS 62.050(2) requires the elected official who must make bond to give bond on or before the day the term of office to which he has been elected begins; the statutory deadline for executing bond is mandatory and failure to give bond by the deadline vacates the office. OAG 83-483 .

Once the county jailer passed the statutory deadline of KRS 62.050(2) without making bond, the office became vacant; there is simply no provision of statutory law permitting the making of effective bond after the deadline. OAG 83-483 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Bond required, when to be executed, Ky. Const., § 103, KRS 62.050 .

Jefferson County to pay premiums on bonds of officers, KRS 62.150 .

Oath required, when and before whom taken, Ky. Const., § 228, KRS 62.010 , 62.020 .

Premium on bond to be paid by the state, KRS 62.140 .

Provisions of bond, recovery on, KRS 62.020 to 62.080 .

ALR

Civil liability of sheriff or other officer charged with keeping jail or prison for death or injury of prisoner. 14 A.L.R.2d 353; 41 A.L.R.3d 1021.

Civil liability of prison or jail authorities for self-inflicted injury or death of prisoner. 79 A.L.R.3d 1210.

71.020. Custody of jail.

Each jailer shall have the custody, rule and charge of the jail in his county and of all persons in the jail and shall keep the same himself or by his deputy or deputies. Where the jail admits the residence of the same therein he or one (1) of his deputies may reside in the jail.

History. 2229: amend. Acts 1942, ch. 147, §§ 1, 2; 1982, ch. 385, § 27, effective July 1, 1982.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Duty of Jailer.

Jailer must procure heat, light, water, telephones and sanitary supplies for jail, and is entitled to credit therefor in his settlement. Holland v. Fayette County, 240 Ky. 37 , 41 S.W.2d 651, 1931 Ky. LEXIS 344 ( Ky. 1931 ).

The jailer owes a duty to any prisoner to keep him safe from unnecessary harm which could be reasonably anticipated. Hall v. Midwest Bottled Gas Distributors, Inc., 532 S.W.2d 449, 1975 Ky. LEXIS 30 ( Ky. 1975 ).

A jailer who left duty prior to the arrest of a prisoner, who committed suicide in the jail rest room two (2) hours later, could not be held liable under this section since he did not have the requisite knowledge that the prisoner might harm himself. Neither could he be held liable under KRS 71.060(1), which applies only to disbursement of money, not to vicarious liability for personal injury. Franklin County v. Malone, 957 S.W.2d 195, 1997 Ky. LEXIS 105 ( Ky. 1997 ), overruled in part, Commonwealth Bd. of Claims v. Harris, 59 S.W.3d 896, 2001 Ky. LEXIS 198 ( Ky. 2001 ), overruled in part, Yanero v. Davis, 65 S.W.3d 510, 2001 Ky. LEXIS 203 ( Ky. 2001 ).

2. — Medical Care.

While this section, provides that the jailer “shall have the custody, rule and charge of the jail in his county and of all persons in the jail,” this provision does not establish the jailer as the final authority over the subject matter of medical care. Other provisions of the code suggest that it is the fiscal court of the county that establishes policy and the jailer who carries out these policies. Johnson v. Hardin County, 908 F.2d 1280, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 12163 (6th Cir. Ky. 1990 ).

Summary judgment was properly granted on a failure to provide medical care claim where the officials responded immediately, sought direction from the prison physician and followed those orders, and although they did not move the prisoner for 13 hours, they did so because the prisoner refused to be moved. McCallister v. Riley, 2016 Ky. App. LEXIS 91 (Ky. Ct. App.), sub. op., 2016 Ky. App. Unpub. LEXIS 879 (Ky. Ct. App. June 3, 2016).

3. Supplies for Jailer’s Residence.

Fayette County is not responsible for heat, light, water, telephones, beds, bedding or sanitary supplies for the jailer’s residence. Holland v. Fayette County, 240 Ky. 37 , 41 S.W.2d 651, 1931 Ky. LEXIS 344 ( Ky. 1931 ).

4. False Imprisonment.

A jailer has custody of the prisoners in the jail and unless he has legal authority in the form of a written mittimus or an order of a court he is liable for false imprisonment in holding person in jail beyond a reasonable time for procuring such authority. Garvin v. Muir, 306 S.W.2d 256, 1957 Ky. LEXIS 22 ( Ky. 1957 ).

Where appellant after serving sentence for drunkenness was held in jail 25 days without a mittimus or any other valid order for his detention being issued, fact that jailer had no personal knowledge of such unlawful imprisonment was not a complete defense to action for false imprisonment but did tend to show a lack of malice on jailer’s part and was competent for purpose of minimizing the damages that might be awarded. Garvin v. Muir, 306 S.W.2d 256, 1957 Ky. LEXIS 22 ( Ky. 1957 ).

5. Fiscal Court.

KRS 441.025 states that a county may provide for the incarceration of prisoners by: “(a) providing and maintaining a jail in the county.” It does not provide that a fiscal court may operate a jail because that is a responsibility granted to the jailer by this section. Regional Jail Authority v. Tackett, 770 S.W.2d 225, 1989 Ky. LEXIS 25 ( Ky. 1989 ).

6. Regional Jail.

This section, which grants to the jailer the right to operate a county jail, does not conflict with KRS 441.800 which grants to the regional jail authority the power to operate a regional jail. Regional Jail Authority v. Tackett, 770 S.W.2d 225, 1989 Ky. LEXIS 25 ( Ky. 1989 ).

7. — Definition.

KRS 441.005 provides for a separate definition of the terms “jail” and “regional jail.” A jail is defined as a county jail or correctional and detention facility while a regional jail is defined as a jail “owned and operated by two or more counties through a regional jail authority as provided in KRS 441.800 .” Regional Jail Authority v. Tackett, 770 S.W.2d 225, 1989 Ky. LEXIS 25 ( Ky. 1989 ).

8. — Power.

The power vested in the regional jail authority to “provide for the operation and maintenance” of the regional jail necessarily carries with it the power to employ an administrator and other personnel to operate the regional jail free of any direct participation by the jailers and fiscal courts of the counties involved. Regional Jail Authority v. Tackett, 770 S.W.2d 225, 1989 Ky. LEXIS 25 ( Ky. 1989 ).

9. Immunity.

Where an inmate working as part of a work program was injured and sued the county and the jailers, since the record established that the acts of the defendants complained of were performed within the scope of their discretionary authority, and there being no evidence offered from which reasonable jurors could conclude that any of the acts complained of were performed in “bad faith,” the defendants are entitled to the protection of qualified official immunity. Rowan County v. Sloas, 201 S.W.3d 469, 2006 Ky. LEXIS 237 ( Ky. 2006 ).

Cited:

Vaughn v. Asbury, 726 S.W.2d 315, 1987 Ky. App. LEXIS 437 (Ky. Ct. App. 1987); County of Harlan v. Appalachian Reg’l Healthcare, Inc., 85 S.W.3d 607, 2002 Ky. LEXIS 188 ( Ky. 2002 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

If residential facilities are furnished in the jail either the jailer or his deputy must reside therein rent free, but it is a matter of discretion for the county fiscal court to decide if other jail employees should be charged rent if they reside within the jail. OAG 60-1279 .

In the interest of the health of the prisoners and keeping order in the jail the jailer may supervise the taking of medications to the point of insuring that the medications are taken as prescribed by the physician. OAG 68-344 .

The fiscal court, as well as the jailer, is entitled to have a key to the county jail. OAG 70-359 .

The jailer is the person to determine in what manner the prisoners can make phone calls for legal and financial help. OAG 70-484 .

Where a city uses the county jail, the police court could recommend in a document separate from the judgment that a particular city prisoner not be allowed to be a trusty, but the ultimate decision must be made by the county court. OAG 71-481 .

Where a city uses the county jail, the ultimate authority in prescribing rules governing the designation of prisoners in the county jail as trusties is vested in the county court. OAG 71-481 .

County jailer is responsible for prisoners’ custody and has the overall responsibility for their security while they are in a work program, subject to the county court’s rules as to working hours and security measures. OAG 72-17 .

Where a prisoner has previously escaped from jail, failed to appear for an extradition hearing and is being held under warrants in several counties, the jailer did not act improperly in refusing to allow relatives to visit the prisoner in jail. OAG 72-296 .

The responsibilities of the county jailer described in this section and KRS 71.040 apply to city jailers. OAG 72-392 .

The jailer, within his reasonable discretion, may establish visitation hours and may determine who may or may not visit certain prisoners based upon considerations of humanity, safety and security of the prisoners. OAG 72-534 .

Where a prisoner is incarcerated without a mittimus or court order, a jailer must use his good judgment in determining what is a reasonable period for awaiting a court order in order to preclude liability for false imprisonment. OAG 72-780 .

If a jailer resides in the jail and a deputy jailer meets the requirements of this section by residing in the jail, the fiscal court may charge the jailer rent for his residential quarters which must be paid out of the private funds of the jailer and not out of excess fees as office expense. OAG 74-389 .

Since the jailer’s use of the residential area in the jail is expressly authorized and is designed for the public purpose of rendering the jailer’s office and jail more effective, and in view of the mandatory nature of this requirement, he should not be charged rental for such quarters. OAG 74-490 .

In the Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government it is the responsibility of the county jailer to deliver prisoners to the quarterly court, to guard such prisoners while there and to return such prisoners to the respective detention facilities. OAG 75-572 .

Where the jailer elects to authorize his deputy to live in the jailer’s quarters in the jail the fiscal court has no authority to prohibit such arrangement because of the potential for overtime problems or otherwise. OAG 76-385 .

A county jailer could operate a closed circuit television system in the county jail for security purposes and privacy considerations would have to give way to the reasonable exercise of the police power. OAG 77-197 .

In view of the statutory duties imposed on the county jailer, it can be reasonably inferred that the office is a full-time job. OAG 77-446 .

Where the county jail has been condemned and closed, the fiscal court may not pay for the jailer’s living quarters located outside an operating jail. OAG 77-523 ; 78-80.

The county jailer is a constitutional officer and thus he has the supervision and control over the deputy jailers, and the immediate employer is the county jailer himself; therefore he is responsible for the supervision of the jail and its prisoners and the deputy staff, and with that responsibility goes the duty of establishing the work schedule for the deputies. OAG 78-565 .

While the county governing body can adopt rules concerning the “inside” management of the jail, the jail is not to be operated jointly by the county jailer and the county governing body; the county governing body must remain within the intended boundaries of its authority so the jailer can exercise his responsibilities and authority. OAG 79-73 .

The county jailer is authorized to receive only such prisoners as are authorized by a written order of a court having jurisdiction. OAG 79-588 .

A jailer should have gone to the fiscal court in the first instance to secure the hiring of guards to watch over a hospitalized prisoner. OAG 80-94 .

It is the opinion that the rental value of the residential quarters of a county jail does not constitute personal compensation for the county jailer and should not be included in the jailer’s receipts in determining excess fees, which the county jailer is required to pay over to the county after each calendar year of his term. OAG 80-130 .

The county attorney has no authority over the administrative operation of the county jail, but where the county judge/executive or other members of fiscal court come to him with a complaint involving alleged violations of the jail rules, then he as prosecutor must handle the complaint as he is required to do with other alleged violations of the criminal law coming to him as the prosecutor before the district court. OAG 80-154 .

The jailer of an urban-county government cannot lawfully run a jail commissary on the basis of a profit to himself, although he could run a commissary for the sole benefit of the prisoners as a means of promoting better prisoner behavior. OAG 80-525 .

Where jailer is carrying on a commissary operation in the jail, he should maintain commissary records in order to provide an adequate basis for determining whether he is operating at a profit to himself or not; such records, take on the nature of public records, since there is no logical way to disassociate the commissary activity of this public officer from his functions as jailer, and would be a part of the total official records as concerns any auditing of the books. OAG 80-525 .

Inasmuch as the county jailer has the custody of the prisoners, the jailer must treat the prisoners humanely, which includes the direct and immediate responsibility for seeing to it that the prisoners get proper medical attention; thus the county jailer has the immediate responsibility for transporting sick prisoners to the hospital and back. OAG 80-607 .

An ordinance which provides that where a county jail prisoner must be taken to the hospital and guards must be provided for that purpose, the sheriff must provide the guards from among his deputies is invalid, since the immediate responsibility for the hospital guards attaches to the jailer under this section and KRS 71.040 and where the jailer is unable to furnish guards from his staff he must call upon the fiscal court to provide them rather than the sheriff, whose responsibility for transporting prisoners under KRS 441.500 (now KRS 441.510 ) relates only to transporting them to and from detention facilities. OAG 81-35 .

Since the county jailer has the custody of the jail and all prisoners in the jail, under this section and KRS 71.030 and 71.040 , he has the responsibility for the transporting of such prisoners from the jail to a physician’s office or to a medical facility and for their return to the jail; the county jailer’s custodial responsibilities include keeping the prisoners safe and protecting them from unnecessary harm, keeping them comfortable and treating them humanely and the latter includes affording them the opportunity of medical help where needed. OAG 82-166 .

The county jailer is only responsible for operating the county jail. He is not required to worry about the illegal maintenance of a city jail, prior to the time that the legislature removes any reference to city jails from the statutes, nor is there anything in the law making an illegal city jail a branch or agency of the county jail. OAG 82-217 .

This section contains no provision that the jailer (or deputy), if permitted to live in the jail, pay rent. The jailer’s or deputy’s living in the jail would simply be a special benefit arising out of the jail function. OAG 82-344 .

While KRS 441.006 (now KRS 441.025 ) contains no guidelines as to the per diem contract rate to be paid by a county sending prisoners to be incarcerated in another county, the rate must be reasonable, and should at least include these factors: (a) the cost of feeding, supervising and caring for prisoners; and (b) the reasonable alloction of capital construction cost or value of building as a reasonable rental factor. OAG 82-334 .

It is not mandatory for the jailer or deputy to live in the jail. OAG 82-344 .

Under this section and KRS 71.040 , the county jailer is required to receive an arrested person in the county jail where such person is lawfully committed to him, i.e., where the arresting officer requests such receiving of the prisoner when no magistrate is immediately available. OAG 82-364 .

Where an arresting officer has compiled with the requirements of RCr 3.02 in taking an arrested person to the county jail, once the jailer, or his deputy, assumes the custody of such an arrested person, the responsibility of the arresting officer comes to an end. The “assumption of custody” can occur either by the express declaration of the jailer or of an authorized deputy to that effect, or by the obvious implications of the total actions of the jailer or authorized deputy in actually dealing personally with the arrested person; the sharply definitive assumption to custody could be a form signed by the jailer or deputy indicating the acceptance of custody. OAG 82-364 .

Since a county jailer has custody of the prisoners in his jail and is an officer of the court for the district and circuit courts in his county, he or his deputies are responsible for transporting such prisoners to and from the courts and remaining with such prisoners while they are before the courts. OAG 82-421 .

Since the local jailer has the custody of prisoners, he must transport such prisoners to the doctors, dentists, etc., as necessary. OAG 82-437 .

Being a jailer and a school bus driver at the same time involves no statutory incompatibility. However, it is possible that such dual roles will, in a particular county, present a common law incompatibility in that the jailer may not be able to execute both functions in the manner required by law. OAG 82-452 .

Since the jailer’s use of the jail as a residence would be designed to render his office more effective, it is implied in KRS 71.040 and this section that the jailer and family living in the jail could eat food brought in for jail prisoner consumption; however, where the jailer and family do not live in the jail, there is no supportable reason for the jailer and family being fed with jail food. OAG 83-218 .

The jailer is required to operate the community center which has been designated as the place for prisoners to perform community service work by the county judge/executive; if he refuses to operate the center, he could be subjected to an action of claimed malfeasance in office or wilful neglect in the discharge of official duties, pursuant to KRS 61.170 . OAG 83-245 .

The legislative policy merely permits the jailer or a deputy to live in the jail and thus conduct a close surveillance of the jail operation; however, at most, the jailer’s or deputy’s living in the jail is permissive only, and the jailer and family are not required to live in or near the jail. OAG 83-250 .

Implicit in his custodial responsibility is the jailer’s responsibility for maintaining a 24-hour alert or “awake” supervision of the jail and its inmates; central in this concept of surveillance is the necessity for keeping the prisoners within prison walls until properly released, and the duty the jailer owes to the prisoners to keep them safe and to protect them from unnecessary harm. OAG 83-250 .

The jailer must be personally responsible for purchasing, out of his personal funds, the food requirements for him and his family. OAG 83-250 .

Where a county jail had been closed and the fiscal court permitted the jailer to remain in the living quarters of the jail for the remainder of his term without paying rent, the fiscal court could legally discontinue paying his utility bills, since failing to pay the jailer’s utility bill had nothing to do with reducing the jailer’s compensation. OAG 83-280 .

A jailer may require his prisoners to wear some reasonable type of prisoner uniform calculated to subserve the necessary disciplinary system of the jail; such appropriate prisoner uniforms would constitute a legitimate item of expense, which may be provided for in the jail budget. OAG 84-44 .

There is no statute which prohibits a jailer from making “trustees” out of parole violators, who are lodged in county jails with detainers awaiting hearings or a warrant from the Parole Board. OAG 84-287 .

The jailer has the authority to photograph prisoners, without their consent, legally entrusted to his custody for the purpose of identification and in order to promote the safe-keeping and security of the jail. OAG 84-306 .

Judges of the judicial system would have to observe any existing jail policy and procedure, issued by the Corrections Cabinet or the county jailer, relating to visitation of county jail inmates; however, where a judge of a court, in exercising the court’s sound judicial discretion, believes that justice in a particular case would require the court’s imposing some special rule as to visitation of a particular prisoner whose case is pending before that court, the court may so impose the special rule. OAG 84-331 .

Where a jailer is no longer a regular jailer, this section, relating to the residence of the jailer in a regular jail, has no application; therefore, the fiscal court has the authority to direct the jailer to vacate the old jailer’s quarters, which are owned by the county. The statutes do not authorize any county-furnished residence for a jailer of a holdover jail. OAG 85-6 .

KRS 441.510 , where there is no county jail, permits the fiscal court to appoint a transportation officer, who may be the jailer or the sheriff or someone else; however, regardless of the person appointed under those three choices, there is no statutory provision requiring the transportation officer to live at the closed jail, or any particular place. Under this section, where there is a jail in operation, and where the jail is suitable for living purposes, the jailer, or one of his deputies, may reside in the jail; however, even if the jailer is the transportation officer, this section does not apply, since it applies only to an operational jail. OAG 85-44 .

It is up to the fiscal court to adopt a transportation plan for transportation of prisoners as necessary; however, if the fiscal court does not adopt a transportation plan then transportation of prisoners will be provided for as provided for in subsection (1) of KRS 441.505 . OAG 94-10 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Arming prisoners, jailer may, KRS 432.510 .

Condemned person, conveying to penitentiary, KRS 431.215 .

Consolidation of jailer’s and sheriff’s office permissible, Ky. Const., § 105.

County buildings, when jailer superintendent of, KRS 67.130 .

Criminal identification activities of department of public safety, cooperation, KRS 17.115 .

Depository for fees, KRS 64.365 .

Election of jailer, Ky. Const., § 99.

Furniture and bedding of jail and courthouse, jailer is custodian of, KRS 67.170 .

Income and expenses; monthly report to be made by jailers in certain counties, KRS 64.345 .

Incompatible offices, KRS 61.080 .

Jail, fiscal court shall provide, KRS 67.080 .

Jails and county prisoners, KRS ch. 441.

Loss of prisoner, office vacated in case of, KRS 63.140 .

Process to be directed to jailer, KRS 454.140 , RCr 6.56.

Qualifications of jailer, Ky. Const., § 100.

Removal of jailer, Ky. Const., § 227; KRS 63.090 to 63.130 .

Salary of jailer in certain counties, Ky. Const., § 106; KRS 64.345 .

Vacancy in office of jailer, how filled, KRS 63.220 .

Kentucky Law Journal.

Notes, An Analysis of the Question of County Jail Reform in Kentucky, 65 Ky. L.J. 130 (1976-77).

Vanlandingham, The Fee System in Kentucky Counties, 40 Ky. L.J. 275 (1952).

ALR

Failure of jailer to perform his duties. 134 A.L.R. 1256.

Ministerial or judicial nature of duty of officer charged with keeping jail or prison. 14 A.L.R.2d 353; 41 A.L.R.3d 1021.

71.030. Jailer to keep jail clean and warm.

The jailer shall keep the jail comfortably warm, and clean and free from nauseous odors, and shall provide prisoners confined in the jail with a sufficiency of bedclothing to make them comfortable. The bedclothing shall be paid for out of the county levy.

History. 2236.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Jailer’s Residence.

Fayette County is not required to furnish beds or bedding for the jailer’s residence. Holland v. Fayette County, 240 Ky. 37 , 41 S.W.2d 651, 1931 Ky. LEXIS 344 ( Ky. 1931 ).

Cited:

County of Harlan v. Appalachian Reg’l Healthcare, Inc., 85 S.W.3d 607, 2002 Ky. LEXIS 188 ( Ky. 2002 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

The county jailer must pay for janitorial services out of the money annually appropriated by the fiscal court under KRS 67.130 and cannot pay for such services out of excess fees. OAG 74-389 .

Since the county jailer has the custody of the jail and all prisoners in the jail, uner KRS 71.020 , 71.040 , and this section he has the responsibility for the transporting of such prisoners from the jail to a physician’s office or to a medical facility and for their return to the jail; the county jailer’s custodial responsibilities include keeping the prisoners safe and protecting them from unnecessary harm, keeping them comfortable and treating them humanely and the latter includes affording them the opportunity of medical help where needed. OAG 82-166 .

Being a jailer and a school bus driver at the same time involves no statutory incompatibility. However, it is possible that such dual roles will, in a particular county, present a common law incompatibility in that the jailer may not be able to execute both functions in the manner required by law. OAG 82-452 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

County court to make rules for jail, KRS 441.045 .

71.040. Treatment of prisoners — Disposition of deceased prisoners.

At the time of booking, the jailer shall receive and keep in the jail all persons who are lawfully committed thereto, until they are lawfully discharged, unless the person is in need of emergency medical attention, in which case the arresting officer shall obtain medical attention for the person prior to delivery to the jail. The jailer shall treat them humanely and furnish them with proper food and lodging during their confinement. He shall deliver those who die in jail to their friends, if requested, or have them decently buried at the expense of the county.

History. 2226: amend. Acts 1984, ch. 141, § 7, effective July 13, 1984.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. In General.

The law imposes the duty on the jailer to exercise reasonable and ordinary care and diligence to prevent unlawful injury to a prisoner placed in his custody but he cannot be charged with negligence in failing to prevent what he cannot reasonably anticipate. Lamb v. Clark, 282 Ky. 167 , 138 S.W.2d 350, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 152 ( Ky. 1940 ).

Circuit court did not err in dismissing an administratrix’s action against the Louisville Metro Department of Corrections (LMDOC) and its director because it properly concluded that the director, in his individual capacity, was not subject to liability; the merger of Jefferson County and the City of Louisville, created a consolidated government that vested the powers of the county jailer in the LMDOC, not its employees, and the director was never the jailer. A.H. v. Louisville Metro Gov't, 2018 Ky. App. LEXIS 183 (Ky. Ct. App. June 8, 2018).

Circuit court did not err in dismissing an administratrix’s action seeking compensatory and punitive damages for violations of the statute because the Louisville Metro Government and the director of the Louisville Metro Department of Corrections were entitled to governmental immunity. A.H. v. Louisville Metro Gov't, 2018 Ky. App. LEXIS 183 (Ky. Ct. App. June 8, 2018).

2. Assault by Other Prisoners.

Where prisoner was lawfully incarcerated and jailer was acting in his official capacity in keeping him in custody, jailer and the sureties on his bond would be liable for jailer’s failure to exercise ordinary care to prevent assault on prisoner by other prisoners. Ratliff v. Stanley, 224 Ky. 819 , 7 S.W.2d 230, 1928 Ky. LEXIS 680 ( Ky. 1928 ).

Fact that the prisoner in jail was guilty of insanitary conduct, was noisy and used abusive language did not justify an assault by other prisoners or furnish grounds for denying liability on part of jailer and his deputy for failing to prevent or stop assault. Lamb v. Clark, 282 Ky. 167 , 138 S.W.2d 350, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 152 ( Ky. 1940 ).

3. — Kangaroo Court.

Jailer and deputy are liable for injuries to prisoner sustained through assault by other prisoners in “kangaroo court,” if jailer and deputy negligently failed to stop assault or could have reasonably anticipated it and took no steps to prevent it. Lamb v. Clark, 282 Ky. 167 , 138 S.W.2d 350, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 152 ( Ky. 1940 ).

4. Acceptance of Prisoners.

Jailer cannot refuse to accept prisoners committed to his custody by a judgment of a police court, where the court had jurisdiction to try the offense and of the person charged therewith. Lexington v. Gentry, 116 Ky. 528 , 76 S.W. 404, 25 Ky. L. Rptr. 738 , 1903 Ky. LEXIS 226 ( Ky. 1903 ).

5. Allowance.

Fiscal court’s action in allowing items for food for prisoners in jailer’s account could not be disturbed in absence of mistake, fraud or abuse of discretion. Taylor v. Todd, 241 Ky. 605 , 44 S.W.2d 606, 1931 Ky. LEXIS 148 ( Ky. 1931 ).

The fiscal court may be compelled by mandatory order of the Circuit Court to appropriate a sufficient jailer’s allowance. Leslie County v. Hensley, 276 Ky. 679 , 125 S.W.2d 255, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 589 ( Ky. 1939 ).

The fiscal court’s monthly allowance to the jailer is intended to cover his necessary expenses other than caring for and dieting prisoners, and not to compensate him for his services, for which he is to receive only the statutory fees. Leslie County v. Hensley, 276 Ky. 679 , 125 S.W.2d 255, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 589 ( Ky. 1939 ).

6. Credit for Time in Custody.

A prisoner is entitled to credit only for the days he actually spends in jail. Commonwealth v. Reece, 294 Ky. 251 , 171 S.W.2d 452, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 437 ( Ky. 1943 ).

Prisoner was entitled to credit for days on which he spent nights in jail, although he was permitted to work out of jail in private employment during daytime hours. Commonwealth v. Reece, 294 Ky. 251 , 171 S.W.2d 452, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 437 ( Ky. 1943 ).

Prisoner was not entitled to credit for days he spent at jailer’s home, although he was in jailer’s custody and did work around the home. Commonwealth v. Reece, 294 Ky. 251 , 171 S.W.2d 452, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 437 ( Ky. 1943 ).

7. Duty to Administer Medications.

Administratrix’s 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983 action alleging wrongful death, negligence, gross negligence, and the tort of outrage against a county jailer based on the death of a pretrial detainee failed as a matter of law for lack of verifying medical evidence establishing that failure or delay in medicating the detainee for schizophrenia caused a fatal pulmonary embolism. Although KRS 71.040 imposed a duty of ordinary care on the jailer to prevent unlawful injury to a prisoner placed in his custody, the administratrix produced no evidence showing that he breached that duty. Weatherstrand v. Christian County Fiscal Court, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105500 (W.D. Ky. Nov. 10, 2009).

There was no waiver of government immunity under the provision of KRS 71.040 in a pretrial detainee’s suit alleging constitutionally deliberate indifference to serious medical needs from the delay in obtaining medical care for the detainee when she experienced labor symptoms. Webb v. Jessamine County Fiscal Court, 802 F. Supp. 2d 870, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87105 (E.D. Ky. 2011 ).

8. Duty to Prevent Self-harm.

Where there was evidence that a jailer knew that a prisoner was suicidal, that he was aware that the prisoner had previously cut his wrists and that he knew the prisoner was in poor physical condition because paramedics had examined him and transported him to the hospital for treatment, it was reasonable for the jury to infer that the jailer breached his duty to exercise reasonable care to prevent the prisoner from harming himself by failing to remove his belt from his person, which resulted in the prisoner hanging himself. Sudderth v. White, 621 S.W.2d 33, 1981 Ky. App. LEXIS 285 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981).

Cited:

Briskman v. Central State Hospital, 264 S.W.2d 270, 1954 Ky. LEXIS 665 ( Ky. 1954 ); County of Harlan v. Appalachian Reg’l Healthcare, Inc., 85 S.W.3d 607, 2002 Ky. LEXIS 188 ( Ky. 2002 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

The county fiscal court had no authority to require that a city of the fourth class pay for half of the utilities in order to house city prisoners in the county jail. OAG 62-616 .

The county jailer cannot refuse to accept prisoners committed to him by a judgment of the police court of the city while such court has jurisdiction to try the offense and the persons charged therewith. OAG 62-616 .

The fiscal court has the general duty of equipping the county jail with the basic equipment such as a stove, refrigerator, cooking and kitchenware necessary in the preparation and storage of food for prisoners fed therein. OAG 64-758 .

Unless the county court prohibits it, the county jailer may censor incoming mail to inmates and divulge information contained therein to appropriate officials if there is a mutual legitimate interest to be served by divulging the contents. OAG 65-475 .

A city of the fifth class is required to pay for the cost of keeping or imprisoning a city prisoner and the primary responsibility for furnishing necessary medical attention and drugs for an indigent prisoner rests upon the county, but medical care and treatment of indigents is an area in which the city and county may agree between themselves upon an equitable sharing of responsibility. OAG 66-7 .

When a prisoner’s sentence has been served, including his term of imprisonment and satisfaction of any fine and cost at the appropriate rate, it is the jailer’s duty to release him without any further order of the court. OAG 66-479 .

A jailer has no authority to disregard a properly entered order of the county judge releasing a prisoner on bail or recognizance. OAG 67-196 .

A jailer subjects himself to civil liability for damages if he refuses to release a prisoner lawfully discharged. OAG 67-196 .

Humane treatment requires the jailer to procure the filling of necessary prescriptions and to effect delivery thereof, with any expense to be borne by the prisoner unless he is indigent whereupon the cost should be borne by the county subject to its ability to pay. OAG 68-344 .

Where the county jailer employs his wife to cook for jail prisoners at a fixed monthly rate but filed no claim with the fiscal court for employing a jail cook and the fiscal court never fixed or paid any compensation for her as such cook, she was not the employe of the county but of the jailer for the purpose of social security tax or contribution imposed on employers under 42 USCS, § 401. OAG 69-350 .

The jailer has the duty to exercise reasonable and ordinary care and diligence in seeing that the prisoners are properly cared for, but he cannot be charged with negligence in failing to prevent what he cannot anticipate. OAG 70-555 .

The jailer has custody and charge of the jail and of prisoners lawfully committed thereto, but he has no authority in the field of criminal procedure. OAG 71-127 .

The jailer has no authority to book, direct or take a prisoner to any particular court. OAG 71-127 .

A jailer cannot refuse to receive persons lawfully committed to him just because they are sick or injured. OAG 71-273 .

A jailer has the responsibility to receive an arrested person in the county jail where such person is lawfully committed to him, and if such person is sick, the jailer has the responsibility, as a matter of humane treatment, to see that he gets proper medical attention. OAG 71-273 .

Once a prisoner is lawfully placed in the custody of the jailer, he cannot be released until “lawfully discharged” by a signed written order of the court having jurisdiction of the case. OAG 74-66 .

The jailer has the duty of seeing to it that prisoners are treated humanely, and this includes getting necessary medical attention and hospitalization. OAG 74-495 .

The jailer may in his reasonable discretion permit or not permit visitation hours, depending upon the attendant circumstances relating to humaneness, safety and security of prisoners. OAG 74-529 ; 74-562.

Under this section and RC 3.02, the county jailer has no authority to deliver the prisoners arrested and jailed without a warrant to any court. OAG 74-881 .

In the Lexington-Fayette Urban-County Government it is the responsibility of the county jailer to deliver prisoners to the quarterly court, to guard such prisoners while there and to return such prisoners to the respective detention facilities. OAG 75-572 .

KRS 219.021 requires a county jailer to secure a permit to operate a food establishment. OAG 75-636 .

Once a prisoner is lawfully placed in the custody of the county jailer he should not release him except upon a signed written order of the court having jurisdiction of the case, except that where the defendant is sentenced to a jail term and he serves out the term in full, the jailer can then release the prisoner if the jailer is certain that he has complied with the commitment papers signed by the court when the prisoner was placed in his custody. OAG 79-209 .

Should any question arise in the mind of the jailer about the duration of the prisoner’s incarceration, he should consult the court of jurisdiction and procure a discharge authority from the court in writing. OAG 79-209 .

Where the defendant has been properly placed in the custody of the jailer, the jailer has a responsibility to seek adequate medical attention in case of illness of the prisoner. OAG 79-455 .

The county jailer is authorized to receive only such prisoners as are authorized by a written order of a court having jurisdiction. OAG 79-588 .

Once a convict has been committed to the jailer’s care, he may be released only upon a lawful discharge, which occurs only where the term of the sentence has expired or where the judgment or court order states that the period of confinement is not to be consecutive and continuous by stating when the jailer is authorized to release the prisoner. OAG 80-23 ; OAG 82-250 .

Although the mere housing of juvenile prisoners with adult prisoners does not violate the Eighth Amendment per se, jail administrators, including the county jailer and fiscal court, have a responsibility to avoid a constitutional deprivation of rights under the Eighth Amendment. OAG 80-242 .

The jailer of an urban-county government cannot lawfully run a jail commissary on the basis of a profit to himself, although he could run a commissary for the sole benefit of the prisoners as a means of promoting better prisoner behavior. OAG 80-525 .

Where jailer is carrying on a commissary operation in the jail, he should maintain commissary records in order to provide an adequate basis for determining whether he is operating at a profit to himself or not; such records, take on the nature of public records, since there is no logical way to disassociate the commissary activity of this public officer from his functions as jailer, and would be a part of the total official records as concerns any auditing of the books. OAG 80-525 .

Inasmuch as the county jailer has the custody of the prisoners, the jailer must treat the prisoners humanely, which includes the direct and immediate responsibility for seeing to it that the prisoners get proper medical attention; thus the county jailer has the immediate responsibility for transporting sick prisoners to the hospital and back. OAG 80-607 .

An ordinance which provides that where a county jail prisoner must be taken to the hospital and guards must be provided for that purpose, the sheriff must provide the guards from among his deputies is invalid, since the immediate responsibility for the hospital guards attaches to the jailer under KRS 71.020 and this section and where the jailer is unable to furnish guards from his staff he must call upon the fiscal court to provide them rather than the sheriff, whose responsibility for transporting prisoners under KRS 441.500 (now KRS 441.510 ) relates only to transporting them to and from detention facilities. OAG 81-35 .

A jailer cannot refuse to receive persons lawfully committed to him just because they are sick or injured. OAG 81-148 .

Where a person is directed by a court of jurisdiction to be confined in the county jail awaiting trial on a criminal charge or where the person is sentenced to confinement in the county jail by a court of jurisdiction, even though he may be mentally ill, the jailer must keep and receive in the county jail all persons who are lawfully committed thereto, until they are lawfully discharged. OAG 81-148 .

If no hospital is available for a mentally ill prisoner, a county jailer must accept him pursuant to this section and the jailer’s search for an available hospital in his own county would be the limit of his required actions, although there is nothing to prevent him from making a search by telephone for an available hospital in another county. OAG 81-164 .

Regardless of the prisoner’s physical and mental condition, the county jailer, or deputy, is required by this section to accept him, if ordered by the court, or if the arresting officer brings him to the jailer under the conditions outlined in KRS 202A.040 (repealed), including the unavailability of a hospital requirement. OAG 81-164 .

Where a peace officer detains a mentally ill person pursuant to KRS 202A.040 (repealed) and there is no hospital in the county that will accept the mentally ill person pending a hearing, then the local county jailer, or his deputy, has a duty, under this section, to accept the mentally ill person, provided there is available space in the jail for him; however, the determination of whether the jail space is available and adequate should be left to the local court of jurisdiction and if the jailer believes the space is not available and adequate, he should receive the prisoner lawfully committed, and then take the space problem to the court for final resolution pursuant to KRS 441.030 (now KRS 441.520 ). OAG 81-164 .

A county jailer has the responsibility to receive an arrested person in the county jail where such person is lawfully committed to the jailer (either by order of the court or by request of the arresting officer where no magistrate is immediately available) and if such arrested person is ill or needs medical attention, as a matter of humane treatment the county jailer must see to it that the prisoner gets proper medical attention; the county jailer has no statutory basis for refusing to receive a prisoner on the ground that he is ill or needs medical attention. OAG 82-166 .

Since the county jailer has the custody of the jail and all prisoners in the jail, under KRS 71.020 and 71.030 , and this section, he has the responsibility for the transporting of such prisoners from the jail to a physician’s office or to a medical facility and for their return to the jail; the county jailer’s custodial responsibilities include keeping the prisoners safe and protecting them from unnecessary harm, keeping them comfortable and treating them humanely and the latter includes affording them the opportunity of medical help where needed. OAG 82-166 .

The county jailer is responsible for guarding prisoners who have been admitted to a hospital by a physician’s order or a court order and if his deputy staff is insufficient for this purpose, the jailer will have to call on the fiscal court for help in providing security guards. OAG 82-166 .

While KRS 441.006 (now KRS 441.025 ) contains no guidelines as to the per diem contract rate to be paid by a county sending prisoners to be incarcerated in another county, the rate must be reasonable, and should at least include these factors: (a) the cost of feeding, supervising and caring for prisoners; and (b) the reasonable allocation of capital construction cost or value of building as a reasonable rental factor. OAG 82-334 .

A jailer is prohibited from operating any business in connection with the jail for profit. OAG 82-335 .

Where county did not provide a cook or cooking equipment for its jail, the fiscal court and the jailer could get together and establish a “no profit” figure for the food prepared for jail prisoners in the restaurant operated by the jailer, so that, in essence, the situation would be essentially equivalent to the jailer’s preparing the food in the jail at no profit. OAG 82-335 .

Under KRS 71.020 and this section, the county jailer is required to receive an arrested person in the county jail where such person is lawfully committed to him, i.e., where the arresting officer requests such receiving of the prisoner when no magistrate is immediately available. OAG 82-364 .

Where an arresting officer has complied with the requirements of RCr 3.02 in taking an arrested person to the county jail, once the jailer, or his deputy, assumes the custody of such an arrested person, the responsibility of the arresting officer comes to an end. The “assumption of custody” can occur either by the express declaration of the jailer or of an authorized deputy to that effect, or by the obvious implications of the total actions of the jailer or authorized deputy in actually dealing personally with the arrested person; the sharply definitive assumption to custody could be a form signed by the jailer or deputy indicating the acceptance of custody. OAG 82-364 .

The transportation of female prisoners may be accomplished by using male or female deputies or guards, provided the prisoners are treated humanely and within the bounds of human decency and good sense. OAG 82-399 .

Since a county jailer has custody of the prisoners in his jail and is an officer of the court for the District and Circuit Courts in his county, he or his deputies are responsible for transporting such prisoners to and from the courts and remaining with such prisoners while they are before the courts. OAG 82-421 .

Where the prisoner is arrested and brought to the jailer, and where the courts are not open or available for the defendant’s appearance, the jailer may detain the defendant in jail during a reasonable time for procuring such court authority for detention. OAG 82-476 .

Under KRS 441.500(1)(c) (now KRS 441.510 ), the sheriff has the responsibility to transport prisoners needing medical attention to a physician, or surgeon, or hospital for necessary attention and treatment. However, it is the jailer’s responsibility to contact the sheriff’s office and acquaint that office with precisely known facts concerning a particular prisoner requiring medical attention. OAG 82-578 .

Refusal of jailer to conduct the transport of county jail prisoner who was in need of medical attention was valid, since it is the duty of the sheriff to furnish transportation in such cases after being informed of the need by the jailer. OAG 82-578 .

Notwithstanding the fact that a county jail prisoner needs medical attention, the county judge/executive or the fiscal court have no authority to enforce KRS 441.500 (now KRS 441.510 ) and this section relating to the relative responsibilities of the jailer and the sheriff in obtaining such attention for the prisoner. OAG 82-578 .

Since the jailer’s use of the jail as a residence would be designed to render his office more effective, it is implied in KRS 71.020 and this section that the jailer and family living in the jail could eat food brought in for jail prisoner consumption; however, where the jailer and family do not live in the jail, there is no supportable reason for the jailer and family being fed with jail food. OAG 83-218 .

The diet furnished to the prisoners must consist of proper foods, from a nutritional standpoint, and an adequate amount thereof for ordinary health needs. OAG 83-218 .

The fiscal court and county judge/executive have no authority to approve the jailer’s actions with respect to feeding of prisoners; however, where substantial evidence exists that the jailer is wasting county money in providing a gourmet kind of prisoner diet, the fiscal court could seek resolution by way of mandamus or injunctive relief in Circuit Court. OAG 83-218 .

The mere fact that the defendant needs medical attention upon arrival at the jail in no way militates against the lawfulness of the commitment to the jailer; ultimate liability of the jailer for failure to exercise proper and reasonable care of prisoners depends upon the particular circumstances of each case. OAG 83-324 .

In the absence of statute, the jailer cannot require the arresting officer to first take a defendant to obtain medical help as a condition precedent to the jailer’s admitting the defendant to the jail. OAG 83-324 .

Where the defendant was properly brought to the jailer late at night, and no magistrate was available, the jailer had the responsibility to seek medical care for the defendant regardless of the arresting officer’s failure to first take the defendant to obtain medical help. OAG 83-324 .

Any prisoner data or paperwork that is necessary to get for the prisoners the attention and possibly medical care by a licensed physician is a responsibility of the jailer, or his staff, having proper custody of such prisoners; the same is true where the court, under KRS 31.120 , requires certain paperwork relating to indigency. This section explicitly requires the jailer to treat the prisoners humanely; that humane treatment would include any necessary paperwork or assistance in paperwork in connection with their medical treatment and court determination of indigency. OAG 83-381 .

A jailer may require his prisoners to wear some reasonable type of prisoner uniform calculated to subserve the necessary disciplinary system of the jail; such appropriate prisoner uniforms would constitute a legitimate item of expense, which may be provided for in the jail budget. OAG 84-44 .

The jailer has the authority to photograph prisoners, without their consent, legally entrusted to his custody for the purpose of identification and in order to promote the safe-keeping and security of the jail. OAG 84-306 .

Only after a prisoner becomes lodged in a county jail does the county potentially become liable for the costs of emergency medical treatment for the prisoner. OAG 85-54 , withdrawing OAG 81-122 , and modifying OAG 84-256 .

A jailer is not required to accept for booking an arrestee in need of emergency medical attention, unless the jailer is provided with either: (1) a medical professional’s statement that emergency medical attention has been given the arrestee named on such statement, and necessary treatment provided to, or declined by, the arrestee, or (2) information, verbally or in writing, from an officer attempting to book a prisoner, indicating, at a minimum, where, and that within a reasonable time prior to attempted booking, a prisoner was offered emergency medical attention, and that the prisoner refused such attention, or alternatively, that such attention was provided and treatment, if recommended, was either accepted or refused; the responsibility of an officer for obtaining emergency medical attention for an arrestee in need of such attention, does not end when an arrestee is merely placed “within the premises of the jail.” OAG 92-84 .

“Emergency medical attention,” as used in this section, refers to a condition that, if not treated on an emergency basis, might result in loss of an arrestee’s life, or in grievous bodily harm, such as loss of sight or a limb. OAG 92-84 .

Although an arrestee might need “medical attention” at the time he or she is offered for booking, it is only a need for “emergency” medical attention that will trigger the duty of an arresting officer to obtain “emergency medical attention” for an arrestee in need of such attention, prior to delivering an arrestee to the jail. OAG 92-84 .

An arresting officer, as required by this section, must obtain “emergency medical attention” for one in need of such attention, prior to delivery of one in such need to jail; upon obtaining such “attention,” an officer ideally should obtain a legible statement signed and dated by a physician, or other medical professional, identifying the arrestee, and indicating that emergency medical attention has been given the arrestee, and that necessary treatment was also given, or, alternatively, was declined by the arrestee; in the event an arresting officer is unable to obtain a written statement from a medical professional as indicated above, he or she should note, preferably in writing, the date, time, where, and by whom, emergency medical attention was provided to an arrestee in need of such attention, as well as other pertinent facts. OAG 92-84 .

As a practical matter, during the booking process, custody should be viewed as a joint or shared responsibility of both the jailer and an arresting officer, as for example, while the intake form is being filled out; merely “putting an arrestee within the premises of the jail” does not transfer responsibility from an arresting officer to the jailer. OAG 92-84 .

It is up to the fiscal court to adopt a transportation plan for transportation of prisoners as necessary; however, if the fiscal court does not adopt a transportation plan then transportation of prisoners will be provided for as provided for in subsection (1) of KRS 441.505 . OAG 94-10 .

Given the absence of a statute authorizing a fiscal court to impose an administrative fee for booking upon a municipality or arrestee, and the statutory duty imposed upon the jailer to receive and keep in jail all persons lawfully committed to the jail until they are lawfully discharged, a fiscal court cannot lawfully impose a general administrative fee on a municipality or arrestee for booking in a county jail. OAG 94-56 .

A jailer may not refuse to accept a prisoner who has been charged with a crime on the ground that the jailer knows the charge is a ruse to hold the prisoner while a mental petition is pursued. OAG 94-62 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

“Sweating” prisoners forbidden, KRS 422.110 .

Transferring prisoners to another jail, KRS 441.530 .

ALR

Expense of keeping prisoner, validity and application of statutory provision for reimbursement for, to state or subdivision thereof. 139 A.L.R. 1028.

Provision of religious facilities for prisoners. 12 A.L.R.3d 1276.

Censorship of convicted prisoners’ “legal” mail. 47 A.L.R.3d 1150.

Censorship of convicted prisoners’ “nonlegal” mail. 47 A.L.R.3d 1192.

Prison conditions as amounting to cruel and unusual punishment. 51 A.L.R.3d 111.

71.050. Officer of Circuit and District Courts — Bailiff.

The jailer is an officer of the Circuit and District Courts for his county. In any county where there is no jail and the jailer does not transport prisoners, the jailer shall serve as a bailiff to the Circuit and District Courts of the county.

History. 2225: amend. Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 58, effective January 2, 1978; 1978, ch. 384, § 171, effective June 17, 1978; 1984, ch. 141, § 12, effective July 13, 1984.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

Commonwealth v. Carroll County Fiscal Court, 633 S.W.2d 720, 1982 Ky. App. LEXIS 216 (Ky. Ct. App. 1982); Vaughn v. Asbury, 726 S.W.2d 315, 1987 Ky. App. LEXIS 437 (Ky. Ct. App. 1987).

Opinions of Attorney General.

The jailer does not have to appear in court with a prisoner for a hearing unless the jailer is so directed by the court. OAG 70-484 .

A county jailer has no authority to assess and collect fines. OAG 70-690 .

In the Lexington-Fayette Urban-County Government it is the responsibility of the county jailer to deliver prisoners to the quarterly court, to guard such prisoners while there and to return such prisoners to the respective detention facilities. OAG 75-572 .

A city and a county cannot agree to house prisoners in the city’s jail unless there is a round-the-clock jailer present. OAG 78-380 .

The jailer, as an officer of the court subject to the court’s command, shall transport prisoners to the court when ordered to do so by the court. OAG 80-23 ; OAG 82-550 .

The jailer has no automatic duty to attend court except when ordered to do so by the court. OAG 80-23 ; OAG 82-550 .

Since the county jailer and his deputies are peace officers within the provisions of KRS 446.010 , they may issue traffic citations pursuant to and in accordance with the provisions of KRS 431.015 for misdemeanors or violations committed in their presence. OAG 80-231 .

The county jailer and his deputies have no authority to issue city parking tickets as this involves a matter over which the city has complete control. OAG 80-231 .

Although KRS 441.500 (now KRS 441.510 ) is rather generally worded, the primary duty of transporting prisoners to the courts rests upon the sheriff, unless the circumstances fall within one of the exceptions established by subsections (1)(a) and (b) and (2)(a) and (b) of said section. However, under this section, the jailer, as an officer of the court subject to the court’s command, shall perform such duty when ordered to do so by the court. OAG 82-550 , affirming OAG 80-23 and modifying OAG 82-421 .

Since the jailer is an officer of the circuit and district courts he can be ordered by those courts to wait upon court with prisoners; basically he has immediate custody of the prisoners and is a security guard although he get no fee. OAG 82-425 .

Since a county jailer has custody of the prisoners in his jail and is an officer of the court for the District and Circuit Courts in his county, he or his deputies are responsible for transporting such prisoners to and from the courts and remaining with such prisoners while they are before the courts. OAG 82-421 , modified by OAG 82-550 .

If the fiscal court did not designate the county jailer as transportation officer, the jailer would be required, under KRS 441.510 , to serve as bailiff to the Circuit and District Courts of the county, as provided in this section; in addition, the fiscal court, under KRS 67.130 , could require the jailer to serve as custodian of county buildings and grounds, provided that such property custodian duties did not conflict with his role as court bailiff since, under the statutory provisions, the bailiff function has priority. OAG 84-231 .

Where a county has no regular jail, but only a holdover jail, and the jailer does not transport prisoners, the jailer must serve as a bailiff to the Circuit and District Courts, as provided for in this section; the fiscal court may also require the jailer to serve as custodian of county buildings and grounds, as provided for in KRS 67.130 . It is up to the fiscal court to designate some suitable person to be in charge of the county holdover. OAG 85-6 .

Where a county has a holdover jail, the fiscal court should establish a reasonable salary for the jailer, based upon his range of functions, as described in this section and KRS 441.510(4) and 67.130 , and his actual performance thereof. However, such salary should not exceed the $12,000.00 described in KRS 441.245(5). OAG 85-6 .

71.060. Jail personnel. [Effective until July 15, 2020]

  1. The jailer shall be liable on his official bond for the conduct of his deputies. The deputies shall have all the powers and be subject to the same penalties as the jailer.
  2. The jailer shall be responsible for the appointment and removal of jail personnel, and the jailer may dismiss his deputies at any time with cause. The number of jail personnel shall be set by the fiscal court in the jail budget. The fiscal court shall establish education and training requirements as permitted by regulations adopted pursuant to KRS 441.055 .

History. 2237: amend. Acts 1956, ch. 95, § 1, effective May 18, 1956; 1978, ch. 384, § 172, effective June 17, 1978; 1982, ch. 385, § 28, effective July 1, 1982; 1984, ch. 114, § 1, effective July 13, 1984; 1986, ch. 331, § 19, effective July 15, 1986; 1992, ch. 95, § 1, effective July 14, 1992; 1992, ch. 262, § 4, effective July 14, 1992.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(7/14/92) This section was amended by 1992 Acts chs. 95 and 262 which are in conflict. Pursuant to KRS 446.250 , Acts ch. 262 which was last enacted by the General Assembly prevails.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. In General.

The law makes no provision for the employment of a bookkeeper or matron, except in Jefferson County, and therefore no allowance can be made for them in other counties. Taylor v. Todd, 241 Ky. 605 , 44 S.W.2d 606, 1931 Ky. LEXIS 148 ( Ky. 1931 ).

A jailer who left duty prior to the arrest of a prisoner, who committed suicide in the jail rest room two (2) hours later, could not be held liable under KRS 71.020 since he did not have the requisite knowledge that the prisoner might harm himself. Neither could he be held liable under subsection (1) of this section, which applies only to disbursement of money, not to vicarious liability for personal injury. Franklin County v. Malone, 957 S.W.2d 195, 1997 Ky. LEXIS 105 ( Ky. 1997 ), overruled in part, Commonwealth Bd. of Claims v. Harris, 59 S.W.3d 896, 2001 Ky. LEXIS 198 ( Ky. 2001 ), overruled in part, Yanero v. Davis, 65 S.W.3d 510, 2001 Ky. LEXIS 203 ( Ky. 2001 ).

2. Construction.

This section guarantees a jailer one deputy, but does not deny him the right to employ other help to discharge the proper functions of his office. Wilson v. Ball, 323 S.W.2d 840, 1959 Ky. LEXIS 336 ( Ky. 1959 ) (decision prior to 1956 amendment).

3. Compensation.

A deputy jailer is not protected by the provisions of Ky. Const., §§ 161 and 235 that the compensation of public officers shall not be changed during their term of office, since the deputy serves at the pleasure of the jailer and has no fixed term. Moody v. Duerson, 280 Ky. 527 , 133 S.W.2d 712, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 148 ( Ky. 1939 ).

Since power to appoint deputy jailer and to determine terms of employment are vested in the jailer by this section, subject to approval of appointment by county court, fact that orders of county court recited that deputy was appointed by it, and that budgets of fiscal court and jailer’s reports recited that deputy received $1500 per year, did not operate to fix his salary at that amount, where actual salary was fixed and paid at a smaller amount under deputy’s contract of employment with jailer, and acceptance of smaller salary estopped deputy to claim more. Moody v. Duerson, 280 Ky. 527 , 133 S.W.2d 712, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 148 ( Ky. 1939 ).

4. — Source.

County fiscal court was not liable for overtime pay due deputy jailers appointed by county jailor because the county is not liable for any claims unless there has first been an appropriate order of the county fiscal court. Yocom v. Franklin County Fiscal Court, 551 S.W.2d 833, 1977 Ky. App. LEXIS 711 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).

5. Approval of Appointment.

Jailer is not entitled to allowance for a deputy unless the appointment is approved by the county court. Taylor v. Todd, 241 Ky. 605 , 44 S.W.2d 606, 1931 Ky. LEXIS 148 ( Ky. 1931 ).

6. Removal of Jail Personnel.

This section, as it currently reads, has eliminated the jailer’s power to discharge a deputy at will. Said v. Lackey, 731 S.W.2d 7, 1987 Ky. App. LEXIS 485 (Ky. Ct. App. 1987).

County jailer provided substantial reasons for terminating an employee pursuant to KRS 71.060(2), including not only the allegations of sexual misconduct with inmates, but also the employee’s own admissions of ethical misconduct, where the employee admitted that on multiple occasions he was alone in unsupervised situations with female inmates, and that he committed numerous violations of standard operating procedures while with those inmates. Martin v. Osborne, 239 S.W.3d 90, 2007 Ky. App. LEXIS 409 (Ky. Ct. App. 2007).

Cited:

Funk v. Milliken, 317 S.W.2d 499, 1958 Ky. LEXIS 100 ( Ky. 1958 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Where a county had had no deputy jailers in the past and the fiscal court failed to make provision for their number and compensation prior to the deadline of KRS 64.530 , the jailer could appoint two (2) deputies and a matron without the necessity for fiscal court approval, but the fiscal court would have the authority to determine their compensation. OAG 66-105 .

The number and compensation of deputy jailers must be fixed by not later than the first Monday in May of the election year, and, if not so fixed, the number and compensation will be limited to that of the preceding term. OAG 66-105 .

Where the wife of a jailer has never been appointed as a deputy or a matron under this statute and the county has never fixed any compensation for her as a jailer deputy, as matron, or county employe, the social security contributions must be paid by the jailer, the actual employer, and not by the county. OAG 69-7 .

Where a person performed services as a deputy jailer during his vacation but was not appointed a deputy pursuant to this section, he must look to the deputy jailer or jailer personally for compensation. OAG 72-227 .

Where there is an emergency a jailer can appoint two (2) additional deputies for an indefinite period, provided that the county judge approves. OAG 72-671 .

Jailer in county which previously had no deputy jailers could appoint a woman as matron, with the salary for such matron being left to the discretion of the fiscal court. OAG 73-469 .

There is nothing in the statutes providing that a county jailer’s wife must be the jail matron; but, a jailer may, under the authority of KRS 71.070 (repealed), appoint a respectable woman, who may be his wife, as matron and the fiscal court must set her salary and make provisions to pay her out of excess fees or the county treasury. OAG 74-389 .

The sheriff has no authority to set the salary for a deputy jailer since the fiscal court is required by KRS 64.530 to set the salary which can then be paid by the jailer out of excess fees. OAG 74-389 .

Under this section a jailer may on his own authority appoint not more than two (2) deputies but he may not pay their salaries out of the salary and fees of his office and the salaries would have to be fixed by order of the fiscal court unless a salary had been previously set for a deputy in which case, in the absence of a fiscal court order, it would carry over as the salary of the new deputy under KRS 64.730 . OAG 75-69 .

Since the office of deputy jailer is a county office under this section, although appointive rather than an elective office, it is incompatible with the office of member of the common council of a city of the third class in view of KRS 61.080 . OAG 75-292 .

The county jailer can, in view of this section, appoint up to two (2) deputies without the approval of the county judge, county court or fiscal court and, where there has been no previous fixed compensation for such deputies, the fiscal court may, subject to proper budgetary procedures, fix their compensation during their current terms. OAG 75-293 .

A county jailer may appoint as a deputy county jailer a person who resides outside of the county in which he will serve. OAG 75-301 .

The appointing of the first two (2) deputies is strictly up to the jailer, but if they are to be properly salaried, the action of the fiscal court is required. OAG 78-565 .

The fiscal court can designate up to two (2) deputies for the jailer before the term begins, but additional deputies (after the first two(2)) may be appointed by the jailer during term, if approved by the county judge/executive, since the specific statute (this section) should govern over the general (KRS 64.530 ). OAG 79-51 .

The fiscal court must pay a salary out of the county treasury to the county jailer and deputies when the jailer’s fees are insufficient to provide them with equitable and reasonable salaries and has the responsibility for appropriating money for the necessary and official expenses in operating the jail when the fees of the jailer are insufficient for that purpose. OAG 79-288 .

A deputy jailer is subject to being discharged by the jailer at any time, as an administrative matter, but he cannot be removed by the fiscal court. OAG 80-154 .

A grand jury can indict or not indict a deputy jailer, as the case may be, but a grand jury has no authority to give administrative recommendations or advice as to what to do with the deputy administratively. OAG 80-154 .

Since the county jailer and his deputies are peace officers within the provisions of KRS 446.010 , they may issue traffic citations pursuant to and in accordance with the provisions of KRS 431.015 for misdemeanors or violations committed in their presence. OAG 80-231 .

Where a fiscal court order of May, 1977, fixed the number of deputy jailers at three and one matron, the fiscal court could not legally change the number of those positions by either adding or subtracting since the number of deputies cannot during the term be changed. OAG 80-319 .

This section can in no way be construed to negate the authority of the fiscal court to treat the subject of vacation and sick leave in the administrative code ordinance so as to embrace the jailer’s deputies along with county employees generally. OAG 81-202 ( OAG 81-61 withdrawn).

A deputy jailer’s nonsupport of the jailer for reelection is a proper reason for dismissal of the deputy jailer since this section does not require that “cause” or “legal cause” exist. OAG 81-206 .

In removing a deputy, a jailer is not required to have a reason for so doing under this section, so that removal for legal cause is not involved, since the power to remove is an incident of the power to appoint where the duration or term of the office is not prescribed by law. OAG 81-206 .

The expressed discontent with the jailer’s operational policy by a deputy jailer is a proper reason for dismissal of the deputy jailer since under this section no “cause” or “legal cause” is required for dismissal. OAG 81-206 .

The public criticism of operational policies, philosophies and personal criticism of a jailer by a deputy jailer is a proper reason for dismissal of the deputy jailer since this section does not require “cause” or “legal cause” for dismissal. OAG 81-206 .

Where a county jailer is in the hospital, has not resigned and apparently has no intention of doing so, his office is not vacant, thus, he or his deputies must operate the jail at all times since under this section the deputies have all the powers of the jailer. OAG 81-334 .

KRS 64.530 (3) and this section are in conflict regarding the appointment of deputies for a jailer, and KRS 64.530 , as the later statute, governs; the two sections could be harmonized only by ruling that the fiscal court must recognize that the jailer is automatically entitled to two (2) deputies and that, under KRS 64.530(3), the fiscal court could authorize additional deputies within the time frame required by that section. OAG 82-61 .

Where a fiscal court passed a resolution authorizing five deputies for the jailer, the jailer could not employ a cook, in addition to the five deputies. OAG 82-61 .

Where the employment of one person as a full time matron is not possible or feasible, subsection (2) of this section implicitly authorizes the jailer to employ two (2) part-time persons as matron whose salaries and time would be equivalent to one full-time matron and would clearly be separated to reflect their part-time status; the statute was clearly enacted to provide all jails, outside of Jefferson County, with at least one matron, or the practical equivalent thereof. OAG 82-108 .

Deputies and matrons appointed under this section must be salaried and funded by the county in its jail budget. OAG 82-315 .

Deputy jailers must be at least 21 years of age. OAG 82-383 ; OAG 82-463 .

The transportation of female prisoners may be accomplished by using male or female deputies or guards, provided the prisoners are treated humanely and within the bounds of human decency and good sense. OAG 82-399 .

A validly appointed deputy jailer can effect an arrest in the county if he follows the dictates of KRS 431.005 and, thus a deputy jailer can make an arrest in his county for a misdemeanor in obedience to a warrant or without a warrant when a misdemeanor, as defined in KRS 431.060 , has been committed in his presence; however, an arrest under the special circumstances related in KRS 431.005 (2) do not apply to a deputy jailer. A regular deputy jailer is required to be on duty in connection with the jail operations under a full and regular schedule but, even if a deputy jailer is remiss in his jail duties, such would not invalidate his arrest actions if properly effected. OAG 82-422 .

Since the jailer is liable on his official bond for the conduct of his deputies, the jailer has the duty of seeing to it that his deputy performs the usual and normal jail duties required of him under the law. OAG 82-422 .

Jail employees are for general purposes county employees and such employees are subject generally to various statutes relating to “county employees” as such; however, the liability for unlawful acts of deputies rests with the jailer and his bond while nondeputy jail personnel would be subject to dismissal under the procedure of KRS 67.710(7). OAG 82-423 .

There is nothing in KRS 441.005 prohibiting a person from being a deputy jailer or matron and a jail cook at the same time. However, any deputy jailer or matron who puts in more than 40 hours per week would be subject to overtime pay under KRS Chapter 337. OAG 82-463 .

As to any liability for jail employees’ illegal actions, the county is immune under the doctrine of sovereign immunity. However, the fiscal court members could have liability for tortious conduct of nondeputy jail employees who are appointed with consent of fiscal court. OAG 82-463 .

A jail is not required to have a matron if the jail does not handle women prisoners. OAG 82-549 .

The county jailer and his deputies, including the matron, are “peace officers” under KRS 446.010 . OAG 82-625 .

The jailer is the “employer” of the jail matron under KRS 337.010(1)(d), since he employs the “employees,” who are the jail deputies, including the matron; county deputies to constitutional officers, including the jailer’s deputies, are not listed in the exceptions to the definition of “employee,” for purpose of the wages and hours law, provided under KRS 337.010(2)(a). OAG 82-625 .

KRS 337.285 , providing for time and a half for employment in excess of 40 hours, applies to the jailer as employer and the jail matron as an employe of the jailer; however, if the jail matron is the wife of the jailer, then under KRS 337.010(2)(a)(6), such a spouse of the employer would be exempt from the operation of KRS Chapter 337. OAG 82-625 .

If a county jailer employs a matron who is of no relation to the jailer, he must carefully determine whether the time in excess of a 40-hour week is “actually necessary”; where the overtime is not shown to be actually necessary in the exercise of the deputy’s or matron’s public function, such overtime would not be valid against the “jail” budget or the general county budget. Where overtime is not shown to be in the “public good,” this is equivalent to saying that the extra time is not necessary. OAG 82-625 .

Where KRS 337.285 (time and a half) is properly applied (extra time is necessary), then if the “jail budget” part of the county budget does not contain the money to pay for such overtime, the fiscal court is responsible for paying it, since the fiscal court has the overall duty of maintaining a county jail operation regardless of whether it admits an employer-employee relationship or not. In such situation the “employer” is still the jailer under KRS Chapter 337. OAG 82-625 .

Even prior to the effective date of Acts 1982, Ch. 385, the jailer was the “employer” and the deputy jailer was the “employee” under KRS 337.010(1)(d) and (e); the deputy jailer is not exempt from KRS Chapter 337, unless the deputy jailer (matron) was the wife, child or other member of the jailer’s immediate family. OAG 82-626 .

Prior to the enactment of Acts 1982, Ch. 385, where the time in excess of 40 hours was authorized by the jailer, the time and one-half payment was a claim against the jailer’s fees; where he had no fees available, the county treasurer, where a properly budgeted sum was available, was answerable to such payment for overtime, under the concept that the county jail was a county institution, even though the jailer was immediately in charge of the jail, and the fiscal court was ultimately or derivatively responsible for the effective operation of that county institution. OAG 82-626 .

The state minimum wage statute, KRS 337.275 , as amended in 1982, applies to the jailer deputy and matron. OAG 82-626 .

KRS 337.285 (overtime pay) applied to jail deputies and matrons prior to the enactment of Acts 1982, Ch. 385, except where the deputy or matron was the parent, spouse, child or other member of the jailer’s immediate family. OAG 82-626 .

On and after July 1, 1982, the effective date of Acts 1982, Ch. 385, the county treasurer at the discretion of the jailer is responsible for payment of overtime to the deputy jailer and matron out of the jail budget part of the county budget, assuming that the overtime is necessary and that such an expenditure is within an authorized budget category, as covered in KRS 441.008(2) (now KRS 441.235 ); if not, then the fiscal court will have to pay it out where such funds are available. OAG 82-626 .

The jailer should authorize work in excess of 40 hours (per week) only where necessary; where it is shown that a jailer is guilty of mismanagement in authorizing an “overtime situation,” he would be personally liable, and liable on his bond for the payment of the overtime to the deputy or matron and the claim would not be payable from the jail fund or county treasury. Where the overtime is necessary, the claim for overtime must now be paid from the jail fund, or from the county treasury generally, where there are no jail budget funds to pay it. OAG 82-626 .

The jailer cannot convert a “matron” position into a third or other regular deputy position; in terms of subsection (2) of this section, a person appointed as a matron remains a matron until removed by the jailer. However, where the matron qualifies as a deputy jailer under KRS 61.300 , the fiscal court could approve the jailer’s appointment of the former matron as a third regular deputy under subsection (1) of this section. OAG 83-34 .

While the matron is considered a deputy, she is really a deputy jailer as relates to her supervision over female prisoners in the jail; when she ceases to be a matron, she cannot be changed into a third regular or general deputy since to do so would be to change the intent of this section. OAG 83-34 .

Before a jailer can decide to vest the functions of both matron and cook in a matron, he must carefully consider whether this division of functions in the matron could be effected such that the jailer’s overall prisoner-related functions may be adequately performed. OAG 83-34 .

The positions of deputy and matron are envisioned as being primarily full-time positions; however, where the employment of one person as a full-time deputy (including a matron) is not possible or feasible, the jailer may employ two (2) part-time persons to perform functionally what a full-time deputy would normally be expected to accomplish. OAG 83-34 .

The jailer’s official bond only extends to his financial responsibility in disbursing county or public money; it in no way is designed to cover the jailer’s potential tort liability. OAG 83-35 .

The jailer’s official bond mentioned in subsection (1) of this section is a bond covering his financial responsibility in disbursing county money; in fixing and approving such bond, the county judge/executive should set the bond for not less than an amount reflecting the estimated aggregate amount of public money coming into his hands each year during the effective period of the bond. OAG 83-35 .

Under KRS 441.009(5) (now KRS 441.245 ), where a county jailer’s local jail is closed for any reason, the jailer must serve as a transportation officer and shall be responsible for transporting prisoners, as provided in KRS 441.500 (now KRS 441.510 ); thus under those two (2) statutes, the jailer as transportation officer would have to transport prisoners, located in the out-of-county jail, to and from the county where the prisoners are incarcerated. Under subsection (1) of this section, the jailer could appoint up to two (2) deputies and a matron, where the deputies and matron are needed to aid the jailer in his role of transportation officer. OAG 83-185 .

Under subsection (1) of this section, any jailer, regardless of whether or not his jail is closed, is entitled to appoint not more than two (2) deputies; accordingly the jailer of a county whose jail was being closed could appoint up to two (2) deputies, unless the courts found that two (2) deputies were not needed, a determination which would depend upon the particular facts of the situation such as a number of prisoners to be transported during the remainder of his term. OAG 83-214 .

There is nothing in subsection (2) of this section suggesting that there must be female prisoners in the jail at the time of the original appointment of the matron. The jailer is required to use his sound judgment in making such appointment, based upon a reasonable expectancy of having female prisoners. OAG 83-280 .

There is no statute establishing a mandatory retirement age for jail deputies; a deputy jailer may be removed at any time by the jailer, provided that such removal is not done arbitrarily or discriminatorily. OAG 83-368 .

Where a jailer appoints two (2) deputies, who had previously been working 30 hours a week, to each work 40 hours a week, and the appointments are reasonable, the fiscal court must establish their compensation for not less than 40 hours per week. OAG 83-414 .

Until July 13, 1984, where the jailer’s deputy assists the jailer as transportation officer, the county treasurer should disburse the compensation earned and payable to this deputy from the available budgeted “jail budget” funds; on and after July 13, 1984, the jailer’s deputy can no longer pursue that role and it is then up to the fiscal court to provide any necessary vehicles, drivers and guards for whoever is transportation officer. OAG 84-179 .

In a county having no jail, the fiscal court, not the jailer as transportation officer, would have the authority to hire, under the jail budget, any necessary personnel for transporting prisoners. OAG 84-289 .

A county jail guard (deputy jailer), absent a proper local rule, is not banned from candidacy for office of constable while holding the office of deputy jailer, and a deputy jailer (county jail guard) may also serve as a constable while holding the office of deputy jailer. OAG 93-66 .

Since KRS 61.080 makes two (2) specific deputy positions, but not that of deputy jailer, incompatible with the office of constable, the offices of constable and county jail guard are not incompatable and one could serve as a constable and a county jail guard; however, a constable must not be, on one hand the arresting officer as constable, and on the other, the booking deputy jailer, of one he has arrested, as conflicting concerns would be present. OAG 93-66 .

While the office of constable and deputy jailer (county jail guard) are not incompatible, a county jail guard could not lawfully use time for which he or she is being paid as a jail guard, or the resources of the jail, to conduct his or her political campaign as such would involve direction of public resources for other than public purposes in violation of Ky. Const., § 171, and would presumably involve official misconduct. OAG 93-66 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Deputies in counties with population of 70,000 or more, number and compensation of, KRS 64.345 .

ALR

Civil liability of officer charged with keeping jail or prison for deputies or subordinates. 14 A.L.R.2d 353; 41 A.L.R.3d 1021.

71.060. Jail personnel — Conditions for appointment of a deputy who resides out of state. [Effective July 15, 2020]

  1. The jailer shall be liable on his official bond for the conduct of his deputies. The deputies shall have all the powers and be subject to the same penalties as the jailer.
  2. The jailer shall be responsible for the appointment and removal of jail personnel, and the jailer may dismiss his deputies at any time with cause. Any law to the contrary notwithstanding, a jailer may appoint a deputy who resides outside the Commonwealth. The number of jail personnel shall be set by the fiscal court in the jail budget. The fiscal court shall establish education and training requirements as permitted by regulations adopted pursuant to KRS 441.055 .
    1. Before a jailer appoints a deputy jailer who resides outside of the Commonwealth, the jailer shall, in writing, certify that no qualified resident of Kentucky was available for the position of deputy jailer at the time the position was sought to be filled which justified the seeking of qualified applicants from outside of the Commonwealth. (3) (a) Before a jailer appoints a deputy jailer who resides outside of the Commonwealth, the jailer shall, in writing, certify that no qualified resident of Kentucky was available for the position of deputy jailer at the time the position was sought to be filled which justified the seeking of qualified applicants from outside of the Commonwealth.
    2. The jailer shall file a copy of the certification with the fiscal court of the county in which the jailer serves prior to appointing a deputy jailer who resides outside the Commonwealth.

HISTORY: 2237: amend. Acts 1956, ch. 95, § 1, effective May 18, 1956; 1978, ch. 384, § 172, effective June 17, 1978; 1982, ch. 385, § 28, effective July 1, 1982; 1984, ch. 114, § 1, effective July 13, 1984; 1986, ch. 331, § 19, effective July 15, 1986; 1992, ch. 95, § 1, effective July 14, 1992; 1992, ch. 262, § 4, effective July 14, 1992; 2020 ch. 106, § 1, effective July 15, 2020.

71.065. Appointment of jail personnel and transportation officers in county without jail.

  1. If in any county there is no jail and the jailer does not serve as a transportation officer under KRS 441.510 , KRS 71.060 shall not be applicable and the jailer shall not be entitled to nor shall he appoint any jail personnel.
  2. If in any county there is no jail and the jailer serves as a transportation officer under KRS 441.510 , the county judge/executive, with the approval of the fiscal court, may employ one (1) or more persons to act as additional transportation officers to assist the jailer in his or her duties. These additional transportation officers shall perform their duties under the supervision of the jailer, and the jailer shall be liable on his or her official bond for the conduct of these officers. Persons other than the jailer employed as transportation officers under this section or KRS 441.510 shall have all the authority and power of peace officers only while transporting prisoners and acting in capacities entailing the maintenance of custody of prisoners.

History. Enact. Acts 1984, ch. 114, § 2, effective July 13, 1984; 2013, ch. 19, § 1, effective June 25, 2013.

Opinions of Attorney General.

In a county having no jail, the fiscal court, not the jailer as transportation officer, would have the authority to hire, under the jail budget, any necessary personnel for transporting prisoners. OAG 84-289 .

71.070. Deputies in counties having a population of 75,000 or more. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (1772) was repealed by Acts 1950, ch. 196, § 2.

71.080. Deputies in counties having a population of less than 70,000 and containing a city of the second class. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2240b-1) was repealed by Acts 1950, ch. 123, § 29.

71.090. Sheriff to act as jailer.

Except as provided in KRS 63.150 , if the jailer is legally committed to jail, or if for any cause the office of jailer becomes vacant, the sheriff of the county shall perform all the duties of jailer until the jailer is legally discharged from jail, or until a successor to the jailer is elected or appointed and qualified. If the sheriff cannot or should not act the county judge/executive may so certify, and shall, in writing, designate a responsible person to act for the occasion.

History. 2231, 2232.

Research References and Practice Aids

ALR

Court’s power to remove jailer from office. 118 A.L.R. 174.

Civil liability of sheriff or other officer charged with keeping jail or prison for death of prisoner. 14 A.L.R.2d 353; 41 A.L.R.3d 1021.

71.100. Jailer’s duties on going out of office.

When any jailer goes out of office, he shall deliver to his successor the custody of the jail, its keys, furniture and appurtenances, and the persons confined therein, with all official papers by which prisoners were committed to his custody or by which they were liberated therefrom.

History. 2230.

Research References and Practice Aids

ALR

Court’s power to remove jailer from office. 118 A.L.R. 174.

71.110. Office of jailer consolidated with office of sheriff in county containing a consolidated local government, city of the first class, or an urban-county government.

The offices of sheriff and jailer in counties containing a consolidated local government, a city of the first class, or an urban-county government shall be consolidated, but the office of sheriff shall be retained; and the sheriff hereafter in such counties shall perform the duties of jailer.

History. Enact. Acts 1948, ch. 231, § 1; 1990, ch. 138, § 2, effective January 3, 1994; 2002, ch. 346, § 72, effective July 15, 2002.

Opinions of Attorney General.

“Necessary office expense” as used in KRS 64.350 , of a jailer, or combined sheriff and jailer in Jefferson County, does not include construction in or additions to the existing county jail, and the department of finance could not pay for such construction out of the fees of the jailer. OAG 62-1084 .

Ky. Const., § 99 prohibits the present sheriff of Jefferson County from accepting a position under the next succeeding sheriff as a tax collector or as superintendent of the jail. OAG 65-723 .

Under Ky. Const., § 105 the Legislature may, at any time it is in lawful session, consolidate the offices of jailer and sheriff in any county. Under the present constitution however, such consolidation could only be effective on a county basis, not a regional basis. OAG 69-615 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Metropolitan correctional services department, maintenance and operation of county jail, duties and responsibilities vested in on creation, KRS 67B.030 .

Offices of sheriff and jailer may be consolidated, Ky. Const., § 105.

71.130. Procedure for testing inmate for infectious diseases to be established — Confidentiality of results.

  1. Each county and each municipal detention facility shall have a written procedure developed, in consultation with the facility medical provider, establishing conditions under which an inmate will be tested for infectious disease. The procedure shall be consistent with guidelines of the Centers for Disease Control and recommendations of the Correctional Medical Authority. The person receiving the test results may divulge the test results to the jailer or chief correctional officer. However, all other provisions of the Kentucky Sexually Transmitted Disease Control Confidentiality Act in KRS 214.400 to 214.420 shall remain in effect.
  2. Serologic blood test results obtained pursuant to subsection (1) of this section shall be confidential except they may be shared with employees or officers of the jailer or chief correctional officer who are responsible for the custody and care of the affected inmate and have a need to know the information. No person to whom the results of a test have been disclosed under this section may disclose the test results to another person not authorized under this section.
  3. The results of any serologic blood test on an inmate shall become a part of that inmate’s permanent medical file. Upon transfer of the inmate to any other correctional facility, the file shall be transferred in an envelope marked confidential.

History. Enact. Acts 1990, ch. 443, § 37, effective July 13, 1990.

Research References and Practice Aids

Northern Kentucky Law Review.

Braden, Aids: Dealing With the Plague, 19 N. Ky. L. Rev. 277 (1992).

71.990. Penalties.

A violation of KRS 71.020 shall constitute a misfeasance in office and the District Court may fine the jailer or he may be indicted therefor.

History. 2229: amend. Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 59, effective January 2, 1978.

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Failure to file report of receipts and disbursements, penalty for, KRS 64.990 .

Penalties for misfeasance, malfeasance or neglect of duty of officers generally, Ky. Const., § 227; KRS 61.170 .

ALR

Failure of jailers to perform their duties as a punishable offense. 134 A.L.R. 1256.

CHAPTER 72 Coroners, Inquests, and Medical Examinations

72.010. Oath and bond of coroner — Minimum — Record — Payment of bond premiums from county funds — Appointment of deputy coroners.

Every coroner shall execute bond in the minimum amount of ten thousand dollars ($10,000) with sureties approved by the fiscal court. The bond shall be recorded by the fiscal court in the office of the county clerk. The fact that the constitutional oath has been taken and the approval of the bond shall be entered upon the records of the fiscal court. Premiums on the bond of the coroner may be paid from county funds when appropriated by the fiscal court. No jailer, sheriff or sheriff’s deputy, county judge/executive, clerk, or attorney shall be surety for the coroner on his official bond. Every coroner shall have the authority to appoint deputy coroners. Deputy coroners shall execute a bond with sureties in accordance with the provisions of this section.

History. 527, 4559: amend. Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 20, § 6, effective January 2, 1978; 1978, ch. 93, § 6, effective June 17, 1978; 1984, ch. 103, § 1, effective July 13, 1984; 1996, ch. 86, § 7, effective July 15, 1996.

Opinions of Attorney General.

The county coroner may appoint any reasonable number of deputies necessary for him to carry out his statutory duties. OAG 80-609 .

The fiscal court is required to set a salary for deputy coroners, payable out of the county treasury as a properly budgeted item. OAG 83-211 .

Deputy coroners are not subject to Ky. Const., §§ 161 or 235, which prohibit a change in salary during a term. OAG 83-211 .

Where the salaries for deputy coroners were not fixed for the preceding term, the fiscal court may fix such salaries even after the coroner has assumed his office; where the deputies’ salaries were fixed for the preceding term, that salary will govern, until changed during the present term. OAG 83-211 .

While the fiscal court has the authority to designate the number of deputies for the coroner’s office as provided in KRS 64.530 , the coroner must point out to and document for the fiscal court the actual need for deputies, based upon the normal case load (coroner’s cases), county population, and related factors; there is no special formula. OAG 84-246 .

The specific compensation of the coroner’s deputies will be set by fiscal court, subject to in-term adjustment requested in writing by the coroner, based upon his presentation of data supporting particular salary ranges; the salary fixation may include the factors of the deputy’s ability and state of training, case load, and quality of performance. OAG 84-246 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Births and deaths, KRS Ch. 213.

Bond required, when to be executed, Ky. Const., § 103; KRS 62.050 .

Coroner’s claims on treasury, KRS 64.060 .

Coroner to temporarily fill office of sheriff removed under, KRS 63.150 , 63.160 .

Criminal identification activities of department of public safety, cooperation, KRS 17.115 .

Election of coroner, Ky. Const., § 99.

Embalmers and funeral directors, KRS Ch. 316.

Fees of coroner, KRS 64.185 .

General provisions as to offices and officers; social security for public employees, employees retirement system, KRS Ch. 61.

Incompatible offices, KRS 61.080 .

Jefferson County to pay premiums on bonds of officers, KRS 62.150 .

Oath required, when and before whom taken, Ky. Const., § 228; KRS 62.010 , 62.040 .

Oaths and bonds, KRS Ch. 62.

Process to be directed to coroner, KRS 454.140 .

Provisions of bond, recovery on, KRS 62.060 to 62.080 .

Qualifications of coroner, Ky. Const., § 100.

Removal of coroner from office, Ky. Const., § 227; KRS 63.090 to 63.130 .

Vacancy in coroner’s office, how filled, KRS 63.220 .

72.020. Duty of person, hospital, or institution finding or possessing dead body — Duties of coroner, law enforcement officer, embalmer, funeral director, or ambulance service.

  1. Any person, hospital, or institution, finding or having possession of the body of any person whose death occurred under any of the circumstances defined in subsections (1) through (12) of KRS 72.025 , shall immediately notify the coroner, or his deputy, and a law enforcement agency, which shall report to the scene within a reasonable time. No person shall remove the body or remove anything from the body until directed to do so by the coroner or his deputy, after the law enforcement agency is present or has failed, within a reasonable period of time, to respond.
  2. The coroner shall take possession of any objects, medical specimens, or articles which, in his opinion, may be helpful in establishing the cause of death, and he can make or cause to be made such tests and examinations of said objects as may be necessary or useful in determining the cause of death. In the event that a criminal prosecution arises, all such objects and articles together with reports of any examinations made upon them, shall be retained by the coroner until their production in evidence is required by the prosecuting authority, unless otherwise directed by written order of the court in which such prosecution is pending.
  3. Upon final disposition of each criminal prosecution under this section, the court shall by appropriate written order dispose of all objects retained under the provisions of this section.
  4. If the law enforcement officer at the scene has probable cause to believe that one of the conditions in subsection (1) of this section exists and the coroner refuses to require a post-mortem examination, the officer shall immediately notify the county or Commonwealth attorney who may proceed pursuant to KRS 72.445 .
  5. In all cases listed under KRS 72.025 in which a licensed embalmer, funeral director, or ambulance service is notified and is the first person at the scene of death other than private citizens, he shall notify the coroner and if the death appears to fall within the categories established in subsections (1) through (12) of KRS 72.025 , he shall notify a local law enforcement agency.

History. 528: amend. Acts 1964, ch. 127; 1978, ch. 93, § 7, effective June 17, 1978; 1982, ch. 195, § 2, effective July 15, 1982.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Notification of Coroner.

It is the duty of a person to notify the coroner of a death only where the dead person was “slain, drowned or otherwise suddenly killed,” or the death resulted from unnatural cause without the attendance of a physician. Ashland v. Miller, 283 S.W.2d 195, 1955 Ky. LEXIS 291 ( Ky. 1955 ).

2. Violations of Coroner’s Duties Do Not Require Exclusion of Evidence.

To the extent that KRS 72.020(2) imposes duties on the coroner, any violation of those duties does not affect the admission of relevant, competent, and properly identified evidence at a homicide trial. Saylor v. Commonwealth, 144 S.W.3d 812, 2004 Ky. LEXIS 220 ( Ky. 2004 ).

Where crime scene evidence was presented by witnesses other than the coroner, and proof of cause of death came from a witness other than the coroner, even assuming that KRS 72.020(2) was thereby violated, this did not make the evidence inadmissible at defendant’s homicide trial. Even if the evidence was obtained by the police in violation of KRS 72.020(2), this would not require its exclusion since no constitutional violation was involved. Saylor v. Commonwealth, 144 S.W.3d 812, 2004 Ky. LEXIS 220 ( Ky. 2004 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Under this section it is the duty of hospital authorities to notify the coroner in case of any death occurring in the operating room or post-operative room of hospital where the operation was necessitated by virtue of the fact that the patient had been the victim of some form of violence. OAG 62-964 .

Where a patient died in the hospital from gunshot wounds, even though the attending physician at the hospital made out the medical certificate for the death certificate, it was incumbent upon the hospital authorities under this section to notify the coroner of this death in order that such official could investigate and conduct an inquest as required by KRS 72.030 (now repealed). OAG 63-794 .

Even though the coroner was not notified of a violent death until after burial, if the coroner could reach a conclusion as to the cause of death from his investigation, he should sign the death certificate. OAG 66-504 .

The coroner should be called in only where the circumstances indicate that the death might be from other than natural causes. OAG 71-318 .

The prohibition against removing dead bodies also applies to peace officers investigating accidents. OAG 71-318 .

Even though representatives of the sheriff’s office may arrive first at the scene of an unnatural death or killing the coroner must take over and assume the responsibilities detailed in this section. OAG 72-131 .

Although the coroner has performed all his duties in connection with a death coming within this section and KRS 72.030 (now repealed), including his certification of death as required by KRS 213.090 (now repealed), before burial a police officer or a physician who believes that an autopsy should be conducted to learn the cause of death could procure an autopsy by a competent surgeon or physician, provided that the written consent of the party who could bring a damage action for an unauthorized or illegal autopsy, is obtained. OAG 72-151 .

A coroner who has asserted jurisdiction under this section or under KRS 72.030 (now repealed) is authorized to order a blood sample of the deceased to determine alcoholic level in an automobile accident case even though he has ordered no autopsy. OAG 73-196 .

Chapter 72 is strangely silent as to who conducts an inquest if the coroner or his deputy are not available. OAG 73-402 .

Where after a reasonable time it appears that the county coroner or his deputy are not available to take over the body of a person killed, the state trooper of that area may investigate the case and, after investigation, may direct the body be taken to a particular hospital until the coroner can be located. OAG 73-402 .

This section does not prohibit prison employees from cutting down the body of a prisoner found hanging where they reasonably decide under the circumstances that the hanged person might be still alive but the body should not be removed from the cell except where it is reasonably decided under the circumstances that it must be done to preserve life. OAG 74-688 .

Where the coroner has jurisdiction over the body in an inquest situation he has authority to take possession of money or other valuables found upon the deceased’s person, though not helpful in determining the cause of death, and hold the same until the property can be turned over to the person legally entitled to the body. OAG 77-315 .

Although the coroner has priority over the police department in certain death situations, the coroner should cooperate with the police department by allowing the police to examine evidence in the coroner’s custody. OAG 77-324 .

The county coroner has no jurisdiction over a civilian who lived and died on a federal enclave; thus the coroner cannot engage in an inquest nor order an autopsy on the body of such person regardless of consent of next of kin. OAG 77-581 .

Where the city police, responding to a call, arrived to find the victim of an apparent suicide still living, summoned an ambulance, and confiscated a gun believed to have been used to inflict the wound and where the coroner, following the victim’s death, sought to secure the gun and refused to sign a receipt for it for the investigating officers’ records, the coroner would be unjustified for doing so since a receipt would be required in order to document the chain of possession. OAG 79-119 .

Where a man who had a car accident was taken by ambulance to a hospital then transferred to another hospital at which he had earlier undergone both surgery and treatment for drinking, died the next day and was listed as having died from cardio pulmonary arrest due to chronic liver disease from alcohol abuse, with no mention of the injuries, it was up to the coroner to determine whether conditions existed authorizing the holding of an inquest and the question of whether or not the coroner abused his discretion in refusing to conduct an inquest is for the courts to determine. OAG 79-392 .

A deputy coroner, where authorized by the coroner or in the coroner’s absence, may collect medical specimens or articles which may, in his opinion, be helpful in establishing the cause of death, since, although the phrase “or his deputy” was deleted from the first sentence of subsection (2) by the 1982 amendment, KRS 72.405(3), under the 1982 amendment, remains intact as it read before the amendment, and provides that an “inquest” is an examination ordered by the coroner, or in his absence, ordered by a deputy coroner, into the causes and circumstances of any death which is a coroner’s case. It would seem absurd that a deputy, filling in for a coroner, can order an inquest, but could not collect medical specimens relating to the death case. OAG 82-376 .

The Legislature intended, as a means of properly enforcing the clear implications of this section relating to the 12 (now 19) grounds for a post-mortem, to enlarge the jurisdiction of the court in KRS 72.445 to offer a court the alternatives of either ordering a post-mortem exam, to be conducted by a medical examiner or by a certified coroner or deputy, or of ordering an autopsy to be conducted by a pathologist. OAG 82-376 .

Under subsection (4) of this section, where the law enforcement officer at the scene has probable cause to believe that one of the 12 (now 19) conditions mentioned in KRS 72.025 exists and the coroner refuses to require a post-mortem, the officer should notify the county or commonwealth’s attorney who can petition the district or circuit court of jurisdiction to order a post-mortem examination of the body (to be conducted by a medical examiner or by a certified coroner or deputy coroner) or the court may order an autopsy to be conducted by a pathologist. OAG 82-376 .

Under this section, as amended in 1982, a designee of the coroner is no longer authorized to receive notice of the finding of a body, etc. The use of a “designee” for any of the purposes previously described in this section is, as of July 15, 1982, no longer permitted. OAG 82-376 .

While a coroner’s verdict filed with the circuit court clerk is open to public inspection, objects and reports, such as autopsy reports, are to be retained by the coroner and the prosecuting authority and are not required to be made open for public inspection until prosecution is completed or a decision not to prosecute has been made. OAG 82-458 .

In those death cases requiring a postmortem examination under subdivisions (1) through (12) (now (1) through (19)) of KRS 72.025 , the coroner or his deputy, if either reports to the death scene as required upon notification, has at that time and place the sole authority to collect and store the death scene evidence; implicit, however, in subsection (2) of this section, is the concept that the coroner, if he is to really aid in the administration of criminal justice, must cooperate with the local prosecutor in displaying to and discussing with the prosecutor the death scene evidence in the custody of the coroner. OAG 83-52 .

If neither the coroner nor his deputy appear at the death scene, as required by subsection (1) of this section, any local peace officer (see KRS 446.010(24)) who is called and is present at the death scene may collect and store the death scene evidence; such peace officer must cooperate with the local prosecutor. OAG 83-52 .

Where the coroner or deputy was present at the death scene and collected and stored the death scene evidence, the coroner or deputy, as the case might have been, is the logical party to retain the evidence until called upon to give testimony about the evidence in a prosecutorial proceeding, unless otherwise directed by written order of the court in which such prosecution is pending. OAG 83-52 .

Since the principal function of the coroner in conducting a postmortem or inquest is to aid criminal justice by inquiring into circumstances of violent or suspicious deaths, the object being to obtain information as to whether death was caused by some criminal act, the coroner should exercise his sound judgment in passing on to the news media any information gleaned from the coroner’s work; where it appears to the coroner that the cause of death is an accident, or where no criminal prosecution is pending, the coroner can have less restraint in his decision to release information he has gathered to the news media. OAG 83-223 ; OAG 83-229 .

There is no statute giving the coroner the authority to control the giving out of information relating to human deaths generally; the occasion for the coroner’s exercise of discretion as to the giving out of information relating to such deaths would only arise in connection with information obtained through the coroner’s exercise of jurisdiction by way of a coroner ordered autopsy, a coroner’s case, or inquest. OAG 83-223 .

When a coroner’s inquest finds that a death resulted from a crime being committed and a criminal prosecution arises, all evidentiary material should be turned over by the coroner to the prosecuting authority as provided by subsection (2) of this section and such material may be withheld from public inspection pending the completion of the prosecution under KRS 61.878(1)(f); but where the cause of death is an accident or where no criminal prosecution is pending or being considered, blood and urine test results are not exempt from public inspection. OAG 83-223 .

The coroner has the authority to control press releases, and use his good judgment, in the public interest and for good law enforcement, relating to matters under his investigational jurisdiction; however, this does not preclude other law enforcement agencies from issuing press releases regarding matters they are also investigating. OAG 83-229 .

Where a coroner begins to investigate a death defined by KRS 72.405 as a “coroner’s case,” his work and jurisdiction should not be interfered with by other peace officers; however, the coroner’s investigation of possible crime does not rule out criminal investigation by other peace officers, provided the work and jurisdiction of the coroner in a coroner’s case is not interfered with or inhibited in any substantial way. OAG 83-229 .

In the event a law enforcement agency officer reaches a death scene prior to the coroner, he must permit the coroner, upon the coroner’s arrival, to go onto the death scene at once in order that the coroner can first make the determination as to whether it is a coroner’s case, and if the coroner thinks it is a coroner’s case, he can proceed to carry out his investigative powers; thus, a procedural rule of a city police department which stated that no one be allowed to enter the scene of a crime was in conflict with the statutory responsibilities of coroners in coroner cases. OAG 84-172 .

In response to a coroner’s subpoena or other written demand regarding a deceased person, whose death would come under the jurisdiction of the coroner, a hospital must produce medical and psychiatric records of deceased; to the extent a privilege is present as between patient and psychiatrist, or the patient’s authorized representative, as provided by KRS 421.215 (now repealed, see KRE, Rules 501 to 511), that privilege is abrogated regarding a deceased person, by the specific statutory authority of a coroner to require production of medical records in a death case. OAG 89-62 .

No liability would be incurred by a hospital or other custodian of psychiatrist-patient records, vis-a-vis the representative or estate of a deceased person, for release of records regarding a deceased person’s psychiatrist-patient communications, to a coroner, in response to his written demand pursuant to KRS 72.415 . OAG 89-62 .

The compelling state and public interest in having cause of death correctly ascertained overwhelms any privilege held by an authorized representative of a deceased; accordingly, a coroner may, in connection with an official investigation of a person’s death, compel production of that person’s psychiatric records, and the coroner’s authority in such regard is not contingent upon notice to or approval by a deceased’s personal representative or family. OAG 89-62 .

Research References and Practice Aids

ALR

Immunity from liability for unlawful treatment of dead body in operation of hospital by state or governmental unit or agency. 25 A.L.R.2d 244.

72.021. Care of remains of first responder, coroner, or deputy coroner killed in the line of duty. [Effective July 15, 2020]

  1. The coroner shall ensure that the remains of a police officer, firefighter, or emergency medical services personnel, as defined in KRS 61.315 , or a coroner or deputy coroner, killed in the line of duty are returned to the care and custody of that person’s family or other party responsible for the person’s final arrangements in a professional manner so as to obscure the contour of the decedent’s remains. Upon the wishes of the family or other responsible party, the coroner shall ensure that the decedent is covered by an American flag in honor of his or her service.
  2. The coroner may make arrangements with the family or other responsible party of a decedent described in subsection (1) of this section to have the individual returned to the care and custody of that person’s family or other party responsible for the person’s final arrangement by a funeral home or a designated transport service. In that case, the decedent shall be transported in the manner set out in subsection (1) of this section.

HISTORY: 2020 ch. 124, § 1, effective July 15, 2020.

72.022. Outgoing coroner to transfer office records.

  1. An outgoing coroner shall turn over all of his or her records relating to the office of coroner to the clerk of the fiscal court within ten (10) days of the end of his or her term or the date of removal or vacancy. The clerk of the fiscal court shall deliver these records to the new coroner within ten (10) days of the office being filled.
  2. Any coroner who fails to comply with subsection (1) of this section shall be fined one hundred dollars ($100) for each day the coroner fails to turn over the records of his or her office to the fiscal court clerk. The fine shall be remitted to the clerk of the fiscal court and placed in the county general fund. An outgoing coroner may appeal this fine to the Circuit Court of competent jurisdiction.

HISTORY: 2016 ch. 26, § 1, effective July 15, 2016.

72.025. Circumstances requiring post-mortem examination to be performed by coroner.

Coroners shall require a post-mortem examination to be performed in the following circumstances:

  1. When the death of a human being appears to be caused by homicide or violence;
  2. When the death of a human being appears to be the result of suicide;
  3. When the death of a human being appears to be the result of the presence of drugs or poisons in the body;
  4. When the death of a human being appears to be the result of a motor vehicle accident and the operator of the motor vehicle left the scene of the accident or the body was found in or near a roadway or railroad;
  5. When the death of a human being occurs while the person is in a state mental institution or mental hospital when there is no previous medical history to explain the death, or while the person is in police custody, a jail or penal institution;
  6. When the death of a human being occurs in a motor vehicle accident and when an external examination of the body does not reveal a lethal traumatic injury;
  7. When the death of a human being appears to be the result of a fire or explosion;
  8. When the death of a child appears to indicate child abuse prior to the death;
  9. When the manner of death appears to be other than natural;
  10. When human skeletonized remains are found;
  11. When post-mortem decomposition of a human corpse exists to the extent that external examination of the corpse cannot rule out injury or where the circumstances of death cannot rule out the commission of a crime;
  12. When the death of a human being appears to be the result of drowning;
  13. When the death of an infant appears to be caused by sudden infant death syndrome in that the infant has no previous medical history to explain the death;
  14. When the death of a human being occurs as a result of an accident;
  15. When the death of a human being occurs under the age of forty (40) and there is no past medical history to explain the death;
  16. When the death of a human being occurs at the work site and there is no apparent cause of death such as an injury or when industrial toxics may have contributed to the cause of death;
  17. When the body is to be cremated and there is no past medical history to explain the death;
  18. When the death of a human being is sudden and unexplained; and
  19. When the death of a human being occurs and the decedent is not receiving treatment by a licensed physician and there is no ascertainable medical history to indicate the cause of death.

History. Enact. Acts 1982, ch. 195, § 1, effective July 15, 1982; 1986, ch. 316, § 1, effective July 15, 1986; 1998, ch. 406, § 1, effective July 15, 1998.

Opinions of Attorney General.

The Legislature intended, as a means of properly enforcing the clear implications of KRS 72.020 relating to the 12 (now 19) grounds for a post-mortem, to enlarge the jurisdiction of the court in KRS 72.445 to offer a court the alternatives of either ordering a post-mortem exam, to be conducted by a medical examiner or by a certified coroner or deputy, or of ordering an autopsy to be conducted by a pathologist. OAG 82-376 .

Under KRS 72.020(4), where the law enforcement officer at the scene has probable cause to believe that one of the 12 (now 19) conditions mentioned in this section exists and the coroner refuses to require a post-mortem, the officer should notify the county or Commonwealth’s attorney who can petition the District or Circuit Court of jurisdiction to order a post-mortem examination of the body (to be conducted by a medical examiner or by a certified coroner or deputy coroner) or the court may order an autopsy to be conducted by a pathologist. OAG 82-376 .

Subdivision (9) of this section means an unnatural death. An unnatural death is an abnormal death resulting from an external agency or violence, as distinguished from a natural death. OAG 82-542 .

Historically, the coroner was not intended to exercise his function except where the circumstances indicated death might be from other than natural causes; recent amendments of the coroner law indicate no fundamental departure from the coroner’s historic role. OAG 83-52 .

In those death cases requiring a post-mortem examination under subdivisions (1) through (12) (now subdivisions (1) through (19)) of this section, the coroner or his deputy, if either reports to the death scene as required upon notification, has at that time and place the sole authority to collect and store the death scene evidence; implicit, however, in KRS 72.020(2), is the concept that the coroner, if he is to really aid in the administration of criminal justice, must cooperate with the local prosecutor in displaying to and discussing with the prosecutor the death scene evidence in the custody of the coroner. OAG 83-52 .

In the event a law enforcement agency officer reaches a death scene prior to the coroner, he must permit the coroner, upon the coroner’s arrival, to go onto the death scene at once in order that the coroner can first make the determination as to whether it is a coroner’s case, and if the coroner thinks it is a coroner’s case, he can proceed to carry out his investigative powers; thus, a procedural rule of a city police department which stated that no one be allowed to enter the scene of a crime was in conflict with the statutory responsibilities of coroners in coroner cases. OAG 84-172 .

The “post-mortem examination” mentioned in this section means a physical examination of the body by a medical examiner or by a coroner or deputy coroner who has been certified by the Department of Justice and may include an autopsy performed by a pathologist or other appropriate scientific tests administered to determine cause of death; under this definition the coroner must use his sound discretion, and considering his certification or noncertification, as to who will conduct the postmortem, autopsy, or other scientific tests as the case may justify. OAG 84-326 .

Where a body is discovered in a motor vehicle accident, and regardless of whether or not a deadly blow or wound on the body is revealed, the situation is properly one for a postmortem. There is nothing in subdivision (6) of this section which suggests a departure from the basic theme of this section, i.e., there must be a postmortem where circumstances indicate death might be from other than natural causes. OAG 84-326 .

Subdivision (6) of this section means that, even though an external examination of the body reveals no lethal traumatic injury (an external blow to the body calculated to produce death), where it reasonably appears that the death occurred in a motor vehicle accident, it is a circumstance that is subject to a postmortem examination. OAG 84-326 .

A natural death is one occurring by the unassisted operation of natural causes, as distinguished from a violent death, one caused or accelerated by the interference of human agency; thus subdivision (9) of this section means an unnatural death, i.e., an abnormal death resulting from an external agency or violence, as distinguished from a natural death. Therefore, the phrase “other than natural,” as it appears in subdivision (9), is rather broad, since it explicitly excludes a natural death. OAG 84-326 .

Since the central role of the coroner has always been to aid in the administration of criminal justice by inquiring into the circumstances of violent, suspicious deaths, and the object of an inquest has been to obtain information as to whether death was caused by some criminal act, the conducting of a postmortem examination is mandatory where the circumstances fall into one of the 17 (now 19) categories of circumstances enumerated in this section. OAG 84-355 .

Since the subjects contained in the basic training course for coroners and their deputies are designed to enable coroners and deputy coroners to better carry out their function of conducting postmortem examinations, under the clear language of KRS 72.405(4) and (5), no coroner can personally conduct a postmortem, as required by this section, where such coroner has not been certified by the Department of Justice. OAG 84-355 .

In response to a coroner’s subpoena or other written demand regarding a deceased person whose death would come under the jurisdiction of the coroner, a hospital must produce medical and psychiatric records of a deceased; to the extent a privilege is present as between patient and psychiatrist, or the patient’s authorized representative, as provided by KRS 421.215 (now repealed, see KRE, Rules 501 to 511), that privilege is abrogated regarding a deceased person, by the specific statutory authority of a coroner to require production of medical records in a death case. OAG 89-62 .

No liability would be incurred by a hospital or other custodian of psychiatrist-patient records, vis-a-vis the representative or estate of a deceased person, for release of records regarding a deceased person’s psychiatrist-patient communications to a coroner, in response to his written demand pursuant to KRS 72.415 . OAG 89-62 .

The compelling state and public interest in having cause of death correctly ascertained overwhelms any privilege held by an authorized representative of a deceased; accordingly, a coroner may, in connection with an official investigation of a person’s death, compel production of that person’s psychiatric records, and a coroner’s authority in such regard is not contingent upon notice to or approval by a deceased’s personal representative or family. OAG 89-62 .

72.026. Testing for presence of controlled substances in post-mortem examination — When required — Reporting of drug overdose — Administrative regulations.

  1. In cases requiring a post-mortem examination under KRS 72.025 , the coroner or medical examiner shall take a biological sample and have it tested for the presence of any controlled substances which were in the body at the time of death and which at the scene may have contributed to the cause of death.
  2. If a coroner or medical examiner determines that a drug overdose is the cause of death of a person, he or she shall provide notice of the death to:
    1. The state registrar of vital statistics and the Department of Kentucky State Police. The notice shall include any information relating to the drug that resulted in the overdose. The state registrar of vital statistics shall not enter the information on the deceased person’s death certificate unless the information is already on the death certificate;
    2. The licensing board for the individual who prescribed or dispensed the medication, if known. The notice shall include any information relating to the drug that resulted in the overdose, including the individual authorized by law to prescribe or dispense drugs who dispensed or prescribed the drug to the decedent; and
    3. For coroners only, the Commonwealth’s attorney and a local law enforcement agency in the circuit where the death occurred, if the death resulted from the use of a Schedule I controlled substance. The notice shall include all information as to the types and concentrations of Schedule I drugs detected.

      This subsection shall not apply to reporting the name of a pharmacist who dispensed a drug based on a prescription.

  3. The state registrar of vital statistics shall report, within five (5) business days of the receipt of a certified death certificate or amended death certificate, to the Division of Kentucky State Medical Examiners Office, any death which has resulted from the use of drugs or a drug overdose.
  4. The Justice and Public Safety Cabinet in consultation with the Kentucky State Medical Examiners Office shall promulgate administrative regulations necessary to administer this section.

History. Enact. Acts 2012 (1st Ex. Sess.), ch. 1, § 7, effective July 20, 2012; 2015 ch. 66, § 1, effective March 25, 2015.

72.029. Monthly report by coroner on child fatalities.

Every coroner or other official performing a coroner’s functions shall, on or before the tenth day of each month, report to the Department for Public Health the death of any child under the age of eighteen (18) years occurring within the county during the preceding month, and the circumstances of the death. The report shall be made on the form required pursuant to administrative regulations promulgated pursuant to KRS Chapter 13A by the department. The form shall be developed in consultation with the Kentucky Coroners’ Association.

History. Enact. Acts 1996, ch. 347, § 5, effective July 15, 1996; 1998, ch. 426, § 93, effective July 15, 1998.

72.030. Inquest — When to be held. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (528: amend. Acts 1956, ch. 143, § 2, effective May 18, 1956) was repealed by Acts 1978, ch. 93, § 21, effective June 17, 1978. For present law, see KRS 72.400 to 72.992 .

72.031. Prohibited uses of autopsy photographs, other visual images, and video and audio recordings.

  1. No autopsy photograph, other visual image in whatever form, video recording, or audio recording shall be open to the public unless the spouse or personal representative of the decedent provides an express waiver to the state medical examiner, coroner, or other public official in lawful possession of those materials to make those materials public. However, the office of the state medical examiner, a coroner, or other public official in lawful possession of an autopsy photograph, other visual image in whatever form, video recording, or audio recording shall make an autopsy photograph, other visual image in whatever form, video recording, or audio recording available to:
    1. The spouse, children, and surviving parents, and the personal representative of the decedent;
    2. A law enforcement agency, any agency or panel required by statute to conduct fatality reviews, county attorney, Commonwealth’s attorney, public health officer, or coroner having a bona fide interest in the case;
      1. A beneficiary under an insurance policy, for the purpose of processing a claim related to the decedent’s death; or (c) 1. A beneficiary under an insurance policy, for the purpose of processing a claim related to the decedent’s death; or
      2. An insurance company, with the written permission of the decedent’s spouse or personal representative, for the purpose of processing a claim related to the decedent’s death;
    3. An attorney or an attorney’s agents in a matter arising out of the decedent’s death;
    4. A defendant in any criminal case arising out of the decedent’s death if the defendant is proceeding pro se in the case;
    5. A physician or other medical professional licensed by the Commonwealth or another state or territory under the jurisdiction of the United States for the purposes of teaching or for publication in a scientific journal or textbook;
    6. A certified law enforcement instructor for the purpose of using the autopsy photograph, other visual image in whatever form, video recording, or audio recording in bona fide law enforcement training;
    7. A county attorney, Commonwealth’s attorney, public health officer, or coroner for the purpose of using the autopsy photograph, other visual image in whatever form, video recording, or audio recording in bona fide training;
    8. A licensed attorney for the purpose of using the autopsy photograph, other visual image in whatever form, video recording, or audio recording in a Kentucky continuing legal education program; and
    9. A person disseminating the image as part of an informative, expressive, or artistic work, whether analog or digital, that is:
      1. Part of a play, book, magazine, newspaper, audiovisual work, or cable, broadcast, or satellite television program; or
      2. Part of a work of art, including but not limited to news or commentary; after a court with jurisdiction as provided in subsection (8)(a) of this section, in a proceeding including parties entitled to notice under subsection (8)(b) of this section, has determined that the autopsy photograph, other visual image in whatever form, video recording, or audio recording is newsworthy or pertains to a matter of public concern or public interest.
    1. Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this subsection, no medical examiner, coroner, or other public official in lawful possession of an autopsy photograph, other visual image in whatever form, video recording, or audio recording shall knowingly release those materials to any person not specifically authorized in subsection (1) of this section. (2) (a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this subsection, no medical examiner, coroner, or other public official in lawful possession of an autopsy photograph, other visual image in whatever form, video recording, or audio recording shall knowingly release those materials to any person not specifically authorized in subsection (1) of this section.
    2. A medical examiner, coroner, or other public official in lawful possession of an autopsy photograph, other visual image in whatever form, video recording, or audio recording may publish such material in a scientific journal or textbook, or use such material for bona fide teaching or training after:
      1. Redacting the decedent’s name, address, and Social Security number; and
      2. Obscuring any distinguishing physical features which would allow a viewer to identify the decedent, including but not limited to the decedent’s face or any tattoos.
  2. No autopsy photograph, other visual image in whatever form, video recording, or audio recording supplied by the state medical examiner, coroner, or other public official in lawful possession of those materials pursuant to subsection (1)(b) to (j) of this section shall be used for any purpose not specifically described therein.
  3. When the purpose for the use of an autopsy photograph, other visual image in whatever form, video recording, or audio recording has been achieved, the material shall be destroyed by the person to whom it was made available under this section.
  4. When the state medical examiner, coroner, or other public official in lawful possession of an autopsy photograph, other visual image in whatever form, video recording, or audio recording makes the materials available under subsection (1)(f) to (j) of this section:
    1. The name, address, and Social Security number of the decedent shall be redacted; and
    2. Any distinguishing physical features which would allow a viewer to identify the decedent, including but not limited to the decedent’s face or any tattoos, shall be obscured.
  5. Any person seeking any autopsy photograph, other visual image in whatever form, video recording, or audio recording pursuant to this section shall pay any fee allowed under KRS 72.260 for the requested items.
  6. The provisions of this section shall not be construed to contravene or limit the production of records pursuant to the Rules of Civil Procedure or the Rules of Criminal Procedure.
    1. The Circuit Court of the county where the decedent resided or, if the decedent was not a resident of the Commonwealth, in which an autopsy photograph, other visual image in whatever form, video recording, or audio recording is located may, upon a showing of good cause, issue an order authorizing any person to view or copy a photograph, other visual image in whatever form, video recording, or audio recording of an autopsy or to listen to or copy an audio recording of an autopsy, and may prescribe any restrictions or stipulations that the court deems appropriate. In determining good cause, the court shall consider whether this disclosure is necessary for the public evaluation of governmental performance, whether the disclosure is the least intrusive means available, and the availability of similar information in other public records, regardless of form. In all cases, the viewing, copying, listening to, or other handling of a photograph, other visual image in whatever form, video recording, or audio recording of an autopsy shall be under the direct supervision of the custodian of the record or of the custodian’s designee. (8) (a) The Circuit Court of the county where the decedent resided or, if the decedent was not a resident of the Commonwealth, in which an autopsy photograph, other visual image in whatever form, video recording, or audio recording is located may, upon a showing of good cause, issue an order authorizing any person to view or copy a photograph, other visual image in whatever form, video recording, or audio recording of an autopsy or to listen to or copy an audio recording of an autopsy, and may prescribe any restrictions or stipulations that the court deems appropriate. In determining good cause, the court shall consider whether this disclosure is necessary for the public evaluation of governmental performance, whether the disclosure is the least intrusive means available, and the availability of similar information in other public records, regardless of form. In all cases, the viewing, copying, listening to, or other handling of a photograph, other visual image in whatever form, video recording, or audio recording of an autopsy shall be under the direct supervision of the custodian of the record or of the custodian’s designee.
      1. The spouse or personal representative of the decedent shall be given: (b) 1. The spouse or personal representative of the decedent shall be given:
        1. Reasonable notice of a petition filed with the court to view or copy a photograph, other visual image in whatever form, video recording, or audio recording of an autopsy or a petition to listen to or copy an audio recording;
        2. A copy of the petition; and
        3. Reasonable notice of the opportunity to be present and heard at any hearing on the matter.
      2. If there is no surviving spouse or personal representative, then the notice shall be given to the deceased’s adult children or, if the deceased has no adult children, to the surviving parents of the deceased, and, if there is no individual to represent the estate of the decedent, then the court shall proceed to schedule a hearing without giving such notice.

HISTORY: 2017 ch. 78, § 1, effective June 29, 2017.

72.032. Short title for KRS 72.031 and 72.992(4).

KRS 72.031 and 72.992(4) may be cited as Jack’s Law.

HISTORY: 2017 ch. 78, § 3, effective June 29, 2017.

72.040. Deputy coroner may hold inquest — Bond of deputy. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (535: amend. Acts 1954, ch. 121, § 1, effective June 17, 1954) was repealed by Acts 1978, ch. 93, § 21, effective June 17, 1978. For present law, see KRS 72.400 to 72.992 .

72.045. Liability of office — Deputies.

The office of coroner, rather than the individual holder of the office, shall be liable for the acts or omissions of deputy coroners. When a deputy coroner omits to act or acts in such a way as to render the coroner responsible, and the coroner discharges such responsibility, the deputy shall be liable to the coroner for all damages and costs caused by the deputy’s act or omission.

History. Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 387, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. No waiver of immunity.

Because there is no waiver of the official immunity of the sheriff for the sheriff's official actions, there is also no waiver of the official immunity of the coroner for the coroner's official actions. Harrod v. Caney, 547 S.W.3d 536, 2018 Ky. App. LEXIS 94 (Ky. Ct. App. 2018).

Circuit court was correct to deny the coroner's assertion of official immunity because under the statutory waiver of absolute immunity for actions of deputy coroners, the office of the coroner can be liable for the deputy coroner's actions. Harrod v. Caney, 547 S.W.3d 536, 2018 Ky. App. LEXIS 94 (Ky. Ct. App. 2018).

72.050. Jury, when and how summoned — Pay. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (533) was repealed by Acts 1978, ch. 93, § 21, effective June 17, 1978. For present law, see KRS 72.400 to 72.475 , 72.992 .

72.060. Witnesses and testimony at inquest. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (530) was repealed by Acts 1978, ch. 93, § 21, effective June 17, 1978. For present law, see KRS 72.400 to 72.475 , 72.992 .

72.070. Post-mortem examination of unburied bodies. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (532: amend. Acts 1958, ch. 100, § 2, effective June 19, 1958; 1976, ch. 146, § 2) was repealed by Acts 1978, ch. 93, § 21, effective June 17, 1978. For present law, see KRS 72.400 to 72.475 , 72.992 .

72.072. County or city judge in cities of the first or second class may order autopsy. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Actts 1972, ch. 354, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1978, ch. 93, § 21, effective June 17, 1978. For present law, see KRS 72.400 to 72.475 , 72.992 .

72.075. Restrictions on post-mortem examinations. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1958, ch. 100, § 1, effective June 19, 1958) was repealed by Acts 1978, ch. 93, § 21, effective June 17, 1978. For present law, see KRS 72.400 to 72.475 , 72.992 .

72.080. Exhumed body — Post-mortem and investigation — Report to be filed. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (537a: amend. Acts 1968, ch. 114, § 15; 1972, ch. 354, § 2) was repealed by Acts 1978, ch. 93, § 21, effective June 17, 1978. For present law, see KRS 72.400 to 72.475 , 72.992 .

72.090. Cost of inquest, post-mortem — Payment. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (532, 537a: amend. Acts 1958, ch. 100, § 3, effective June 19, 1958; 1972, ch. 354, § 3; 1974, ch. 74, Art. VI, § 107(1)) was repealed by Acts 1978, ch. 93, § 21, effective June 17, 1978. For present law, see KRS 72.400 to 72.475 , 72.992 .

72.100. Disposal of body and valuables found thereon. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (531) was repealed by Acts 1978, ch. 93, § 21, effective June 17, 1978. For present law, see KRS 72.400 to 72.475 , 72.992 .

72.110. Cost of search of sink or vault — How paid. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (534) was repealed by Acts 1978, ch. 93, § 21, effective June 17, 1978. For present law, see KRS 72.400 to 72.475 , 72.992 .

72.120. Person found guilty by inquest — Arrest of. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (529) was repealed by Acts 1978, ch. 93, § 21, effective June 17, 1978. For present law, see KRS 72.400 to 72.475 , 72.992 .

72.130. Deputy coroners in county with population of 200,000. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (537b-2, 537b-3, 537b-4, 537b-5: amend. Acts 1948,ch. 210, § 1; 1968, ch. 152, § 45) was repealed by Acts 1978, ch. 93, § 21, effective June 17, 1978. For present law, see KRS 72.400 to 72.475 , 72.992 .

72.140. Stenographer in county with population of 200,000. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (537b-6: amend. Acts 1948, ch. 210, § 2; 1968, ch. 152, § 46) was repealed by Acts 1978, ch. 93, § 21, effective June 17, 1978. For present law, see KRS 72.400 to 72.475 , 72.992 .

72.150. Removing body from stream — Reward for. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (4286) was repealed by Acts 1978, ch. 93, § 21, effective June 17, 1978. For present law, see KRS 72.400 to 72.475 , 72.992 .

Medical Examiners

72.210. Purpose of Office of the Kentucky State Medical Examiner.

In enacting legislation establishing an Office of the Kentucky State Medical Examiner for the Commonwealth of Kentucky, it is not the intention of the General Assembly to abolish or interfere with the coroner in his role as a constitutionally elected peace officer. It is the intention of the General Assembly for the office to aid, assist, and complement the coroner in the performance of his duties by providing medical assistance to him in determining causes of death.

History. Enact. Acts 1968, ch. 114, § 1; 1998, ch. 65, § 4, effective July 15, 1998; 2007, ch. 85, § 142, effective June 26, 2007.

72.215. Definitions for KRS 72.210 to 72.275. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1968, ch. 114, § 2) was repealed by Acts 1974, ch. 74, Art. VI, § 108.

72.220. Justice and Public Safety Cabinet to provide medical assistance to coroner investigating deaths.

The Justice and Public Safety Cabinet shall, within budgetary limitation, provide medical assistance to coroners in investigating deaths; provide or contract for laboratory facilities for performing autopsies and investigations pursuant to KRS 72.210 to 72.275 ; provide for the keeping of reports of all investigations and examinations; and provide such other functions and duties as may be specified in KRS 72.210 to 72.275 or in the administrative regulations of the secretary of justice and public safety.

History. Enact. Acts 1968, ch. 114, § 3; 1974, ch. 74, Art. VI, § 37; 1982, ch. 195, § 3, effective July 15, 1982; 1982, ch. 343, § 14, effective July 15, 1982; 2007, ch. 85, § 143, effective June 26, 2007.

72.225. Advisory commission for medical examination.

An advisory commission is hereby established to act in a general advisory capacity to the medical examiner services. The commissioner of the Department of Kentucky State Police, the commissioner of criminal justice training, the secretary of justice and public safety, and the secretary for health and family services shall be ex officio members of the advisory commission. The secretary of justice and public safety shall appoint five (5) additional members for terms of four (4) years each or until their successors are appointed and qualify. Members of the advisory commission shall receive no compensation for their services but shall be repaid their actual expenses incurred in attending meetings.

History. Enact. Acts 1968, ch. 114, § 4; 1974, ch. 74, Art. VI, § 38; 1982, ch. 195, § 4, effective July 15, 1982; 1982, ch. 343, § 15, effective July 15, 1982; 1998, ch. 426, § 94, effective July 15, 1998; 2005, ch. 99, § 111, effective June 20, 2005; 2007, ch. 85, § 144, effective June 26, 2007.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

This section was amended by 1982 Acts, Chapter 195, Section 4, and 1982 Acts, Chapter 343, Section 15, which are in conflict in regard to the appointing authority for members of the advisory commission to medical examiner services. Pursuant to KRS 446.250 , the amendment in Chapter 343, Section 15, prevails as the later enactment.

72.230. Director of medical examiner section, personnel. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1968, ch. 114, § 5) was repealed by Acts 1974, ch. 74, Art. VI, § 108.

72.235. Justice and Public Safety Cabinet may provide facilities and professional personnel for studies and examinations.

The Justice and Public Safety Cabinet may establish or contract for physical facilities for the conduct of post-mortem and other necessary examinations. The cabinet may employ, by contract or otherwise, pathologists, toxicologists and other ancillary, technical and administrative personnel to perform autopsies and such other pathological, chemical and other studies and examinations as may be deemed necessary. Such studies and examinations may be performed in another state if deemed to be in the best interest of the Commonwealth by the chief medical examiner or the certified coroner or deputy coroner and the reports thereof shall have the same validity and admissibility in evidence as those performed within this state when duly certified by the chief medical examiner of the cabinet or by a certified coroner or deputy coroner.

History. Enact. Acts 1968, ch. 114, § 6; 1982, ch. 195, § 5, effective July 15, 1982; 1982, ch. 343, § 16, effective July 15, 1982; 2007, ch. 85, § 145, effective June 26, 2007.

72.240. Justice and Public Safety Cabinet may employ state chief medical examiner and associate — Employment of county and district medical examiners.

  1. The Justice and Public Safety Cabinet may employ a board-certified forensic pathologist as the chief medical examiner who shall administer the Office of the Kentucky State Medical Examiner and one (1) associate chief medical examiner for the Commonwealth.
  2. The Justice and Public Safety Cabinet may employ physicians licensed to practice medicine in Kentucky as county or district medical examiners to carry out the provisions of KRS 72.210 to 72.275 within the counties or district to which they are assigned by the medical examiner section. The cabinet may designate county or district health officers as county or district medical examiners and may authorize additional compensation therefor.

History. Enact. Acts 1968, ch. 114, § 7; 1982, ch. 195, § 6, effective July 15, 1982; 1998, ch. 65, § 5, effective July 15, 1998; 2007, ch. 85, § 146, effective June 26, 2007.

72.245. County or district examiner to assist coroner.

At the request of the coroner the county or district medical examiner shall assist in the investigation of deaths.

History. Enact. Acts 1968, ch. 114, § 8.

72.250. Costs of examinations and autopsies, how paid. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1968, ch. 114, § 9; 1980, ch. 188, § 52, effective July 15, 1980) was repealed by Acts 1982, ch. 195, § 14, effective July 15, 1982.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

This section was amended by 1982 Acts, Chapter 343, Section 17 and repealed by 1982 Acts, Chapter 195, Section 14. Pursuant to KRS 446.260 , the repeal prevails.

72.255. Administrative regulations.

The secretary of justice and public safety shall adopt administrative regulations to carry out the provisions of KRS Chapter 72, including but not limited to the adoption of forms, fees for examinations, certification requirements, reports of medical examiners and certified coroners, and other costs incidental to the administration of this chapter. The advisory commission provided for in KRS 72.225 shall review and may recommend new regulations or changes in the regulations provided for in this section.

History. Enact. Acts 1968, ch. 114, § 10; 1982, ch. 195, § 7, effective July 15, 1982; 1982, ch. 343, § 18, effective July 15, 1982; 2007, ch. 85, § 147, effective June 26, 2007.

72.260. Charge for copies.

The secretary of justice and public safety is authorized to establish a schedule of fees for issuing duplicate records of investigations, examinations, autopsies, and other records; provided, however, that one (1) copy shall be provided free of charge to the coroner and either the county or Commonwealth’s attorney concerned.

History. Enact Acts 1968, ch. 114, § 11; 1982, ch. 195, § 8, effective July 15, 1982; 1982, ch. 343, § 19, effective July 15, 1982; 1990, ch. 88, § 87; 2007, ch. 85, § 148, effective June 26, 2007.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section was amended by § 87 of Acts 1990, ch. 88 to contingently become effective as provided by § 93 of Acts 1990, ch. 88. However, § 93 of Acts 1990, ch. 88 was repealed by § 30 of Acts 1992, ch. 324, effective July 1, 1992. Therefore the amendment of this section by § 87 of Acts 1990, ch. 88 became effective July 1, 1992.

72.265. Coroner may act as county or district medical examiner.

Where a duly elected coroner is a physician licensed to practice medicine in Kentucky, he may be authorized by the department to perform the duties of a county or district medical examiner and may be compensated by the department therefor.

History. Enact. Acts 1968, ch. 114, § 12.

72.270. Trust and agency fund for fees.

Fees collected pursuant to KRS 72.210 to 72.275 shall be deposited in the State Treasury and credited to a trust and agency fund to help defray the cost of carrying out the provisions of KRS 72.210 to 72.275 .

History. Enact. Acts 1968, ch. 114, § 13.

72.275. Persons enforcing law immune from liability.

Anyone participating in good faith pursuant to KRS 72.210 to 72.275 or the administrative regulations of the secretary of justice and public safety shall have immunity from any civil liability that might otherwise be incurred or imposed.

History. Enact. Acts 1968, ch. 114, § 14; 1982, ch. 343, § 20, effective July 15, 1982; 2007, ch. 85, § 149, effective June 26, 2007.

72.280. Annual report to Justice and Public Safety Cabinet on drug-related deaths.

The Office of Drug Control Policy, in cooperation with the Division of Kentucky State Medical Examiners Office and its laboratory services, shall prepare and publish on its Web site an annual public report to the secretary of the Justice and Public Safety Cabinet which includes:

  1. The number of drug-related deaths;
  2. The decedent’s age, race, and gender but not his or her name or address;
  3. The counties in which those deaths occurred;
  4. The scientific, trade, or generic names of the drugs involved; and
  5. The method by which the drugs were obtained, when available.

History. Enact. Acts 2006, ch. 116, § 1, effective July 12, 2006; 2012 (1st Ex. Sess.), ch. 1, § 8, effective July 20, 2012.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(7/20/2012). 2007 Ky. Acts ch. 85, sec. 335, instructs the Reviser of Statutes to correct statutory references to agencies and officers whose names have been changed in the Act, as it confirms the reorganization of the Justice and Public Safety Cabinet. Such a correction has been made in this statute.

(7/20/2012). 2012 (1st Extra. Sess.) Ky. Acts ch. 1, sec. 12, Article XI, B., states that the compact contained in this statute “shall become effective and binding upon legislative enactment of the compact into law by no less than six states.” At the time of the codification of this statute, that threshold had not been met.

Kentucky Coroner’s Act of 1978

72.400. Legislative intent.

In enacting legislation relating to coroners, the General Assembly recognizes that the coroner is an elected constitutional peace officer. The General Assembly also recognizes that the ascertainment of the cause and manner of death in cases in which the coroner has jurisdiction is an essential governmental service. It is the intent of KRS 72.410 to 72.470 to encourage the coroner to participate in approved training sessions to improve his skills for the Commonwealth and to cooperate with the Office of the Kentucky State Medical Examiner administered by the Justice and Public Safety Cabinet.

History. Enact. Acts 1978, ch. 93, § 2, effective June 17, 1978; 1982, ch. 195, § 9, effective July 15, 1982; 1998, ch. 65, § 6, effective July 15, 1998; 2007, ch. 85, § 150, effective June 26, 2007.

72.405. Definitions. [Effective until July 15, 2020]

As used in KRS 72.410 to 72.470 , unless the context clearly indicates otherwise:

  1. “Coroner ordered autopsy” means an autopsy ordered by the coroner having jurisdiction and performed by a pathologist pursuant to such authorization in order to ascertain the cause and manner of death in a coroner’s case. In the event the pathologist deems it necessary, he may submit the appropriate specimen to a qualified chemist or toxicologist for analysis to assist him in ascertaining the cause of death in a coroner’s case;
  2. “Coroner’s case” means a case in which the coroner has reasonable cause for believing that the death of a human being within his county was caused by any of the conditions set forth in KRS 72.025 ;
  3. “Inquest” means an examination ordered by the coroner, or in his absence, ordered by a deputy coroner, into the causes and circumstances of any death which is a coroner’s case by a jury of six (6) residents of the county impaneled and selected by the coroner to assist him in ascertaining the cause and manner of death;
  4. “Post-mortem examination” means a physical examination of the body by a medical examiner or by a coroner or deputy coroner who has been certified by the Justice and Public Safety Cabinet and may include an autopsy performed by a pathologist or other appropriate scientific tests administered to determine cause of death; and
  5. “Certified coroner” or “certified deputy coroner” means a coroner or deputy coroner who has been certified by the Justice and Public Safety Cabinet to have successfully completed both the basic training course and annual inservice training course required by KRS 72.415 , except that a deputy coroner shall be certified without completion of training courses required by KRS 72.415 if he is a licensed physician. The secretary of justice and public safety may waive the requirement for basic training and certify a coroner during the eighteen (18) month period after July 15, 1982, if the advisory commission set forth in KRS 72.225 certifies to the secretary after a thorough review that the experience and knowledge of the specific coroner is such that he is qualified to be a certified coroner without taking the basic training.

History. Enact. Acts 1978, ch. 93, § 3, effective June 17, 1978; 1982, ch. 195, § 10, effective July 15, 1982; 2007, ch. 85, § 151, effective June 26, 2007.

Opinions of Attorney General.

Even though a body is not positively identified, the coroner must sign the certificate of death, inasmuch as absolute accuracy, while certainly attained; furthermore the death certificate will represent honest opinions and conclusions based upon the best available evidence from the various sources at the coroner’s disposal. OAG 79-74 .

Kentucky follows the English rule requiring the coroner in whose jurisdiction the corpse is found to hold the inquest, rather than the common law which placed the duty upon the coroner in the county in which the injury causing death occurred. OAG 79-392 .

The coroner is required to sign the death certificate in coroner’s cases. OAG 79-392 .

Where a man who had a car accident was taken by ambulance to a hospital then transferred to another hospital at which he had earlier undergone both surgery and treatment for drinking, died the next day and was listed as having died from cardio pulmonary arrest due to chronic liver disease from alcohol abuse, with no mention of the injuries, it was up to the coroner to determine whether conditions existed authorizing the holding of an inquest and the question of whether or not the coroner abused his discretion in refusing to conduct an inquest is for the courts to determine. OAG 79-392 .

Where a corpse was found floating in the Ohio River adjacent to Greenup County, the question whether the Greenup County coroner or an Ohio coroner would have jurisdiction would hinge on whether there was reason to believe that the death occurred in Greenup County, and the state line is, for this purpose, also the county line; but, although that line is the “low water mark” on the northerly side of the Ohio River, there is presently a dispute over whether that is the low water line as of 1792, or the low water line as it exists from time to time, which point is unsettled. OAG 79-430 .

Under the broad term “reasonable cause,” the coroner may hold an inquest upon the request of any responsible citizen, provided that such citizen furnishes the coroner with sufficient information to place the case under the “reasonable - cause - for - believing - in - unnatural - death” concept; however, the mere request of a responsible citizen, standing alone, would not be sufficient to make a coroner’s case under subsection (2) of this section. Thus, if a responsible citizen, who furnishes some indication of belief that death was other than a natural one, and that it occurred in the subject coroner’s county, requests and inquest, the request involves a “coroner’s case” and should be honored. OAG 82-120 .

A deputy coroner, where authorized by the coroner or in the coroner’s absence, may collect medical specimens or articles which may, in his opinion, be helpful in establishing the cause of death, since although the phrase “or his deputy” was deleted from KRS 72.020(2) by the 1982 amendment, subsection (3) of this section as amended in 1982, remains intact as it read before the amendment, and provides that an “inquest” is an examination ordered by the coroner, or in his absence, ordered by a deputy coroner, into the causes and circumstances of any death which is a coroner’s case. It would seem absurd that a deputy, filling in for a coroner, can order an inquest, but could not collect medical specimens relating to the death case. OAG 82-376 .

The legislature intended, as a means of properly enforcing the clear implications of KRS 72.020 relating to the 12 grounds for a post-mortem, to enlarge the jurisdiction of the court in KRS 72.445 to offer a court the alternatives of either ordering a post-mortem exam, to be conducted by a medical examiner or by a certified coroner or deputy, or of ordering an autopsy to be conducted by a pathologist. OAG 82-376 .

Under KRS 72.020(4), where the law enforcement officer at the scene has probable cause to believe that one of the 12 (now 19) conditions mentioned in KRS 72.025 exists and the coroner refuses to require a post-mortem, the officer should notify the county or commonwealth’s attorney who can petition the district or circuit court of jurisdiction to order a post-mortem examination of the body (to be conducted by a medical examiner or by a certified coroner or deputy coroner) or the court may order an autopsy to be conducted by a pathologist. OAG 82-376 .

There is no statute giving the coroner the authority to control the giving out of information relating to human deaths generally; the occasion for the coroner’s exercise of discretion as to the giving out of information relating to such deaths would only arise in connection with information obtained through the coroner’s exercise of jurisdiction by way of a coroner ordered autopsy, a coroner’s case, or inquest. OAG 83-223 .

Where a coroner begins to investigate a death defined by this section as a “coroner’s case,” his work and jurisdiction should not be interfered with by other peace officers; however, the coroner’s investigation of possible crime does not rule out criminal investigation by other peace officers, provided the work and jurisdiction of the coroner in a coroner’s case is not interfered with or inhibited in any substantial way. OAG 83-229 .

A coroner cannot order the county ambulance service to transport the remains to a facility for the purpose of having an autopsy performed. OAG 83-434 .

Section 100 of the Kentucky Constitution provides certain qualifications for coroners, and the rule is well established that the legislature cannot impose additional qualifications where the Constitution enumerates certain qualifications for a constitutional office; thus, where a coroner meets the qualifications stated in Ky. Const., § 100, he is eligible to serve in that office. In view of the fact, however, that the certification requirements of subsection (5) of this section and KRS 72.415 narrowly relate to the coroner’s personally conducting a postmortem examination and do not extend to the coroner’s eligibility to hold his office, the certification requirements for coroners are constitutional. OAG 84-355 .

Since the subjects contained in the basic training course for coroners and their deputies are designed to enable coroners and deputy coroners to better carry out their function of conducting post-mortem examinations, under the clear language of subsections (4) and (5) of this section, no coroner can personally conduct a postmortem, as required by KRS 72.025 , where such coroner has not been certified by the Department of Justice. OAG 84-355 .

72.405. Definitions. [Effective July 15, 2020]

As used in KRS 72.410 to 72.470 , unless the context clearly indicates otherwise:

  1. “Coroner ordered autopsy” means an autopsy ordered by the coroner having jurisdiction and performed by a pathologist pursuant to such authorization in order to ascertain the cause and manner of death in a coroner’s case. In the event the pathologist deems it necessary, he or she may submit the appropriate specimen to a qualified chemist or toxicologist for analysis to assist him or her in ascertaining the cause of death in a coroner’s case;
  2. “Coroner’s case” means a case in which the coroner has reasonable cause for believing that the death of a human being within his or her county was caused by any of the conditions set forth in KRS 72.025 ;
  3. “Inquest” means an examination ordered by the coroner, or in his or her absence, ordered by a deputy coroner, into the causes and circumstances of any death which is a coroner’s case by a jury of six (6) residents of the county impaneled and selected by the coroner to assist him or her in ascertaining the cause and manner of death;
  4. “Post-mortem examination” means a physical examination of the body by a medical examiner or by a coroner or deputy coroner who has been certified by the Justice and Public Safety Cabinet and may include an autopsy performed by a pathologist, other appropriate scientific tests administered to determine cause of death, or collection of tissue samples collected pursuant to KRS 213.161(3); and
  5. “Certified coroner” or “certified deputy coroner” means a coroner or deputy coroner who has been certified by the Justice and Public Safety Cabinet to have successfully completed both the basic training course and annual inservice training course required by KRS 72.415 , except that a deputy coroner shall be certified without completion of training courses required by KRS 72.415 if he or she is a licensed physician. The secretary of justice and public safety may waive the requirement for basic training and certify a coroner during the eighteen (18) month period after July 15, 1982, if the advisory commission set forth in KRS 72.225 certifies to the secretary after a thorough review that the experience and knowledge of the specific coroner is such that he or she is qualified to be a certified coroner without taking the basic training.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1978, ch. 93, § 3, effective June 17, 1978; 1982, ch. 195, § 10, effective July 15, 1982; 2007, ch. 85, § 151, effective June 26, 2007; 2020 ch. 126, § 2, effective July 15, 2020.

72.410. Investigation of deaths defined as a coroner’s case.

  1. The coroner of each county shall investigate the cause and manner of all deaths that are defined by KRS 72.405 as a coroner’s case.
  2. The coroner may, in his sound discretion, when investigating a coroner’s case, request the assistance of the district medical examiner and the Office of the Kentucky State Medical Examiner, order an autopsy, and hold an inquest.
    1. Upon notification of the death of a child under the age of eighteen (18) years which meets the criteria for a coroner’s case as defined in KRS 72.405 and 72.025 , the coroner shall as soon as practicable contact the local office of the Department for Community Based Services, law enforcement agencies with local jurisdiction, and the local health department to determine the existence of relevant information concerning the case. (3) (a) Upon notification of the death of a child under the age of eighteen (18) years which meets the criteria for a coroner’s case as defined in KRS 72.405 and 72.025 , the coroner shall as soon as practicable contact the local office of the Department for Community Based Services, law enforcement agencies with local jurisdiction, and the local health department to determine the existence of relevant information concerning the case.
    2. Any agency of the state or any other agency, institution, or facility providing services to the child or the child’s family, shall provide to the coroner upon his or her request the cooperation, assistance, and information to enable the coroner to comply with the provisions of this chapter. This section shall not be deemed to abrogate the attorney-client nor the clergy-penitent privilege or the confidentiality of records provided by KRS 311.377(2). If other privileged or confidential records are disclosed to the coroner pursuant to this section, the records shall remain confidential or privileged and shall not be disclosed except as authorized by this section, to the state or local child fatality response team, or as otherwise required by law.

History. Enact. Acts 1978, ch. 93, § 4, effective June 17, 1978; 1996, ch. 347, § 6, effective July 15, 1996; 1998, ch. 65, § 7, effective July 15, 1998; 2000, ch. 14, § 8, effective July 14, 2000; 2007, ch. 85, § 152, effective June 26, 2007.

Opinions of Attorney General.

Even though a body is not positively identified, the coroner must sign the certificate of death, inasmuch as absolute accuracy, while certainly attained; furthermore the death certificate will represent honest opinions and conclusions based upon the best available evidence from the various sources at the coroner’s disposal. OAG 79-74 .

The coroner is required to sign the death certificate in coroner’s cases. OAG 79-392 .

Where a man who had a car accident was taken by ambulance to a hospital then transferred to another hospital at which he had earlier undergone both surgery and treatment for drinking, died the next day and was listed as having died from cardio pulmonary arrest due to chronic liver disease from alcohol abuse, with no mention of the injuries, it was up to the coroner to determine whether conditions existed authorizing the holding of an inquest and the question of whether or not the coroner abused his discretion in refusing to conduct an inquest is for the courts to determine. OAG 79-392 .

The privileges codified at KRS 421.215 (now repealed, see KRE, Rules 501 to 511) and 319.111 (now repealed, see KRE, Rule 507) are incorporated into the Open Records Act by operation of this provision, and those privileges do not expire after death; records generated in the course of psychiatric treatment, and protected by these privileges, are exempt from inspection, though they come into the hands of the coroner for the purpose of enforcing KRS 72.410 , et seq. and his use of the records must be confined to those purposes, and their distribution prohibited accordingly. OAG 92-24 .

The protections afforded by the psychiatrist-patient privilege continue after the death of the patient; although the coroner may require the release of records of psychiatric treatment, for the purpose of enforcing the provisions of KRS 72.410 to 72.470 , he may not violate the rules of confidentiality pertaining to the psychiatrist-patient relationship by generally disclosing the records of treatment generated in the course of that relationship. OAG 92-24 .

72.415. Power and authority of coroners and their deputies — Training course for deputy coroners — Effects of failure to complete required training.

  1. For the purpose of enforcing the provisions of KRS 72.410 to 72.470 , coroners and deputy coroners shall have the full power and authority of peace officers in this state, including the power of arrest and the authority to bear arms, and shall have the power and authority to:
    1. Administer oaths;
    2. Enter upon public or private premises for the purpose of making investigations;
    3. Seize evidence;
    4. Interrogate persons;
    5. Require the production of medical records, books, papers, documents, or other evidence;
    6. Impound vehicles involved in vehicular deaths;
    7. Employ special investigators and photographers; and
    8. Expend funds for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of KRS 72.410 to 72.470 . The fiscal court or urban-county government shall pay all reasonable expenses incurred by the coroner and his deputy in carrying out his responsibilities under the provisions of KRS 72.410 to 72.470.
    1. No person shall be eligible to hold the office of deputy coroner unless he holds a high school diploma or its recognized equivalent. Every deputy coroner, other than a licensed physician, shall be required as a condition of office to take during every calendar year he or she is in office the training course of at least eighteen (18) hours provided by the Department of Criminal Justice Training or other courses approved by the Justice and Public Safety Cabinet after having completed the basic training course the first year of employment. The training course shall include material developed by the cabinet and approved by the Cabinet for Health and Family Services on the human immunodeficiency virus infection and acquired immunodeficiency syndrome. The material shall include information on known modes of transmission and methods of controlling and preventing these diseases with an emphasis on appropriate behavior and attitude change. (2) (a) No person shall be eligible to hold the office of deputy coroner unless he holds a high school diploma or its recognized equivalent. Every deputy coroner, other than a licensed physician, shall be required as a condition of office to take during every calendar year he or she is in office the training course of at least eighteen (18) hours provided by the Department of Criminal Justice Training or other courses approved by the Justice and Public Safety Cabinet after having completed the basic training course the first year of employment. The training course shall include material developed by the cabinet and approved by the Cabinet for Health and Family Services on the human immunodeficiency virus infection and acquired immunodeficiency syndrome. The material shall include information on known modes of transmission and methods of controlling and preventing these diseases with an emphasis on appropriate behavior and attitude change.
      1. Any deputy coroner subject to the training requirements of paragraph (a) of this subsection who fails to complete the mandated training shall be ineligible to perform the duties of deputy coroner, and may be terminated by the coroner. The coroner shall make written notification of the deputy coroner’s ineligibility to perform his or her duties to the deputy coroner and to the fiscal court or the legislative body of the consolidated local government, charter county government, urban-county government, or unified local government. (b) 1. Any deputy coroner subject to the training requirements of paragraph (a) of this subsection who fails to complete the mandated training shall be ineligible to perform the duties of deputy coroner, and may be terminated by the coroner. The coroner shall make written notification of the deputy coroner’s ineligibility to perform his or her duties to the deputy coroner and to the fiscal court or the legislative body of the consolidated local government, charter county government, urban-county government, or unified local government.
      2. The deputy coroner shall regain his or her eligibility upon successful recompletion of the initial basic training course referenced in KRS 64.185(4), which shall be evidenced by written certification provided by the Department of Criminal Justice Training to the coroner. Upon receipt of the certification, the coroner shall make written notification of the reinstatement of eligibility to the deputy coroner and to the fiscal court or the legislative body of the consolidated local government, charter county government, urban-county government, or unified local government.
      3. The compensation of a deputy coroner who becomes ineligible to perform his or her duties under subparagraph 1. of this paragraph shall be modified as follows:
        1. From the coroner’s written notification of ineligibility until the deputy coroner begins the basic training course mandated by subparagraph 2. of this paragraph, the deputy coroner shall receive no compensation;
        2. From the first day that the deputy coroner begins the basic training course mandated by subparagraph 2. of this paragraph until written notification of course outcome is received by the coroner, the deputy coroner shall be compensated at his or her previously established rate of compensation;
        3. If the deputy coroner fails the basic training course mandated by subparagraph 2. of this paragraph, the deputy coroner shall receive no compensation from the date of receipt of notification of failure from Department of Criminal Justice Training to the coroner until the deputy coroner begins anew the basic training course mandated by subparagraph 2. of this paragraph, at which time the deputy coroner shall be compensated at his or her previously established rate of compensation; and
        4. If the deputy coroner successfully completes the basic training course mandated by subparagraph 2. of this paragraph as evidenced by written certification provided by the Department of Criminal Justice Training to the coroner, the deputy coroner shall receive compensation as is normally determined for deputy coroners pursuant to statute.

History. Enact. Acts 1978, ch. 93, § 5, effective June 17, 1978; 1982, ch. 195, § 11, effective July 15, 1982; 1986, ch. 64, § 6, effective July 15, 1986; 1988, ch. 248, § 2, effective July 15, 1988; 1990, ch. 443, § 35, effective July 13, 1990; 1998, ch. 426, § 95, effective July 15, 1998; 2005, ch. 99, § 112, effective June 20, 2005; 2007, ch. 85, § 153, effective June 26, 2007; 2016 ch. 26, § 2, effective July 15, 2016.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(6/26/2007). The numbering of subsection (1) of this section has been altered by the Reviser of Statutes from the numbering in 2007 Ky. Acts ch. 85, sec. 153, under the authority of KRS 7.136 .

Opinions of Attorney General.

A county fiscal court is required to pay the expenses of transporting a murder victim’s body to a town for an autopsy and the expenses of towing the accused’s car to the Kentucky State Police laboratory in Frankfort since under this section, where the coroner carries out his duties under KRS Chapter 72, the fiscal court must pay all reasonable expenses incurred in carrying out his responsibilities. OAG 81-64 .

Subsection (1) of this section imposes upon each fiscal court and urban county government the responsibility of paying “all reasonable expenses” incurred by the coroner in carrying out his responsibilities under the provisions of KRS 72.410 to 72.470 . “All reasonable expenses” refers to all those expenses actually incurred by the coroner in carrying out his statutory duties which expenses are reasonable in amount and which are reasonably necessary in the performance of such duties. OAG 82-474 .

The fiscal court must pay the county coroner’s reasonable expenses in carrying out his duties. OAG 82-474 .

Where a coroner begins to investigate a death defined by KRS 72.405 as a “coroner’s case,” his work and jurisdiction should not be interfered with by other peace officers; however, the coroner’s investigation of possible crime does not rule out criminal investigation by other peace officers, provided the work and jurisdiction of the coroner in a coroner’s case is not interfered with or inhibited in any substantial way. OAG 83-229 .

The coroner has the authority to control press releases, and use his good judgment, in the public interest and for good law enforcement, relating to matters under his investigational jurisdiction; however, this does not preclude other law enforcement agencies from issuing press releases regarding matters they are also investigating. OAG 83-229 .

Assuming that the coroner’s expenses for mileage, film and developing, urine kits, office space and equipment, blood syringes, telephone service, various forms, letterheads and envelopes, and training school expenses were necessary in carrying out his duties as coroner, and assuming that they were reasonable expenses, the fiscal court was required to pay such expenses from a properly budgeted fund. OAG 83-232 .

The office of deputy coroner and that of city councilman are incompatible under the terms of KRS 61.080 , because a deputy coroner is a county officer with the same powers as those possessed by the coroner which includes peace officer powers. OAG 84-23 .

“All reasonable expenses” as used in subsection (1) of this section refers to those expenses, including the cost of office space, actually incurred by the coroner in carrying out his statutory duties, which expenses are reasonable in amount and which are reasonably necessary in the performance of such statutory duties. OAG 83-434 .

In regards to the criteria and standards as to the coroner’s expenses, the concept “reasonable expenses” expressed in subsection (1) of this section should embrace the specific nature of the coroner’s work (to aid law enforcement), the difficulties encountered and the results obtained. OAG 84-246 .

The fiscal court should provide sufficient space to store case reports, evidence from death scenes, photographs and autopsy reports for the period of usefulness to the coroner in carrying out his work. Since there is no statute expressly dealing with the retention time or final disposal, in the absence of a court order, or the applicable storage of such records by State Archives, the coroner should use his good judgment in disposing of items no longer needed. OAG 84-246 .

Regarding supplies such as steel tape measures, cameras, film, tape recorders, batteries, body bags, death scene preservation tape, gloves, cardiac needles, disinfectant, etc., the statutes lay down no precise standards or guidelines as to the necessity for procuring such supplies; it is up to each coroner to demonstrate and document, where possible, the actual need for such supplies, such that they would logically constitute “reasonable expenses,” as mentioned in subsection (1) of this section. OAG 84-246 .

Two way radios for the coroner and his deputies would seem to be a “reasonable expense,” as envisioned in this section, especially since the equipment would be calculated to promote the personal safety and job performance of the coroner. OAG 84-246 .

Necessary travel and training expenses of the coroner and his deputies directly pertaining to the coroner’s statutory functions would meet the term “reasonable expenses” referred to in subsection (1) of this section, and since the statutes spell out no specific rate for travel, 18 cents per mile would be a fair rate. OAG 84-246 .

The coroner’s records are public records, as defined in KRS 61.870(1) and (2). OAG 84-246 .

Since the subjects contained in the basic training course for coroners and their deputies are designed to enable coroners and deputy coroners to better carry out their function of conducting postmortem examinations, under the clear language of KRS 72.405(4) and (5), no coroner can personally conduct a postmortem, as required by KRS 72.025 , where such coroner has not been certified by the Department of Justice. OAG 84-355 .

In response to a coroner’s subpoena or other written demand regarding a deceased person whose death would come under the jurisdiction of the coroner, a hospital must produce medical and psychiatric records of a deceased; to the extent a privilege is present as between patient and psychiatrist, or the patient’s authorized representative, as provided by KRS 421.215 (now repealed, see KRE, Rules 501 to 507), that privilege is abrogated regarding a deceased person, by the specific statutory authority of a coroner to require production of medical records in a death case. OAG 89-62 .

No liability would be incurred by a hospital or other custodian of psychiatrist-patient records, vis-a-vis the representative or estate of a deceased person, for release of records regarding a deceased person’s psychiatrist-patient communications, to a coroner, in response to his written demand pursuant to KRS 72.415 . OAG 89-62 .

The compelling state and public interest in having cause of death correctly ascertained overwhelms any privilege held by an authorized representative of a deceased; accordingly, a coroner may, in connection with an official investigation of a person’s death, compel production of that person’s psychiatric records, and a coroner’s authority in such regard is not contingent upon notice to or approval by a deceased’s personal representative or family. OAG 89-62 .

The protections afforded by the psychiatrist-patient privilege continue after the death of the patient; although the coroner may require the release of records of psychiatric treatment, for the purpose of enforcing the provisions of KRS 72.410 to 72.470 , he may not violate the rules of confidentiality pertaining to the psychiatrist-patient relationship by generally disclosing the records of treatment generated in the course of that relationship. OAG 92-24 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Northern Kentucky Law Review.

Braden, Aids: Dealing With the Plague, 19 N. Ky. L. Rev. 277 (1992).

72.420. Coroner’s inquest — Subpoenas — Stenographic services — Verdict.

  1. A coroner may, in his sound discretion, order an inquest in any coroner’s case. The inquest shall be conducted by a coroner’s jury consisting of six (6) reputable citizens of the county selected and sworn by the coroner. The coroner may issue subpoenas and subpoenas duces tecum. No subpoenaed witness shall fail to appear as ordered. Application may be made by the coroner to the Circuit Court for punishment by contempt for failure to obey a coroner’s subpoena.
  2. The coroner may employ stenographic services to record the proceeding. Payment for stenographic services shall be made by the fiscal court or urban-county government, whichever is appropriate, upon certification by the coroner that the services were rendered.
  3. In the event the jury returns a verdict of murder, manslaughter, or other criminal act, the coroner shall arrest the named individual or notify the appropriate law enforcement authority to arrest such individual to be dealt with according to law. A copy of the verdict shall be filed with the appropriate Circuit Court clerk.

History. Enact. Acts 1978, ch. 93, § 8, effective June 17, 1978.

Opinions of Attorney General.

The coroner’s jury’s verdict is merely an advisory conclusion as to the causes and circumstances of any death, thus, there is simply nothing to appeal from, and there is no legal procedure whereby the verdict can be reviewed, or reconsidered. OAG 80-206 .

There is no statutory or consitutional provision for an appeal from a coroner’s jury’s verdict since the verdict is not binding on anyone and has no legal effect, as such, except where arrest is authorized for the named criminal suspect under subsection (3) of this section. OAG 80-206 .

This section does not require that the verdict document or other inquest records be actually turned over to a grand jury or commonwealth’s attorneys. OAG 82-120 .

This section requires a coroner’s jury, if it returns a verdict of murder, manslaughter, or other criminal act, to fix the responsibility for the death in the coroner’s case by designating the crime involved and naming the person or persons the jury believes committed the alleged crime. OAG 82-120 .

Where a coroner’s jury verdict spells out a crime, the coroner should notify the appropriate prosecutor in the county of the holding of the inquest and the filing of the verdict in the Circuit Court Clerk’s office; the finding of the coroner’s jury is merely advisory to the officials charged with the administration of the criminal law. OAG 82-120 .

When the coroner files a copy of the verdict with the Circuit Court Clerk as provided by subsection (3) of this section, the verdict is a record required to be open for public inspection. OAG 82-458 .

72.425. Consent to autopsy when death not a coroner’s case.

In the event the death of a person is not a coroner’s case, consent to an autopsy shall be obtained from the decedent, by written consent, signed and acknowledged prior to his death; or his or her spouse; or in the absence of a spouse, the next of kin of the decedent; or in the absence of any of the above, the person who assumes the responsibility to dispose of the body.

History. Enact. Acts 1978, ch. 93, § 9, effective June 17, 1978.

Opinions of Attorney General.

The phrase “next of kin,” as it appears in this section, refers to one or more persons in the nearest degree of blood relationship to the decedent and embraces all of the applicable class of nearest blood kin; thus, where decedent left children behind, the written consent of all of the children of decedent would have to be obtained if a noncoroner’s case autopsy is to be conducted. OAG 79-561 .

72.430. Pathologist, toxicologist, chemist — Immunity from civil liability.

No pathologist, toxicologist, chemist, or other authorized person shall be required to inquire into the authority of the coroner to order an autopsy to be performed. Any authorized pathologist, toxicologist, chemist, or other authorized person who participates in an autopsy or post-mortem examination, upon request of the coroner, shall have immunity from any civil liability that might otherwise be incurred or imposed.

History. Enact. Acts 1978, ch. 93, § 10, effective June 17, 1978.

Opinions of Attorney General.

The coroner’s or his jury’s verdict is not binding on anyone since it is merely for the information of the law enforcement people, including the local prosecutors. OAG 80-433 .

72.435. Cost of transporting or exhuming a body.

In the event it is necessary for the coroner to order a body to be transported or exhumed, payment shall be made by the fiscal court, consolidated local government, or urban-county government, whichever is appropriate, upon certification by the coroner that the services were rendered.

History. Enact. Acts 1978, ch. 93, § 11, effective June 17, 1978; 2002, ch. 346, § 73, effective July 15, 2002.

Opinions of Attorney General.

A coroner cannot order the county ambulance service to transport the remains to a facility for the purpose of having an autopsy performed. OAG 83-434 .

72.440. Circumstances under which coroner may order body exhumed.

A coroner may, upon receipt of an affidavit from any person stating that he believes or has reasonable grounds to believe that a person who is dead and buried died from poisoning or other illegal cause, order the body exhumed and a post-mortem examination or autopsy conducted.

History. Enact. Acts 1978, ch. 93, § 12, effective June 17, 1978.

72.445. County or Commonwealth’s attorney may petition court to order autopsy.

In the event a coroner declines to order an autopsy or body exhumed for an autopsy, the county or Commonwealth’s attorney may petition the District or Circuit Court having jurisdiction to order an autopsy. In granting or denying such request, the court shall determine whether or not reasonable grounds exist for believing that the decedent may have died as a result of a criminal act.

History. Enact. Acts 1978, ch. 93, § 13, effective June 17, 1978.

Opinions of Attorney General.

The legislature intended, as a means of properly enforcing the clear implications of KRS 72.020 relating to the 12 (now 19) grounds for a post-mortem, to enlarge the jurisdiction of the court under this section to offer a court the alternatives of either ordering a post-mortem exam, to be conducted by a medical examiner or by a certified coroner or deputy, or of ordering an autopsy to be conducted by a pathologist. OAG 82-376 .

Under KRS 72.020(4), where the law enforcement officer at the scene has probable cause to believe that one of the 12 (now 19) conditions mentioned in KRS 72.025 exists and the coroner refuses to require a post-mortem, the officer should notify the county or Commonwealth’s Attorney who can petition the District or Circuit Court of jurisdiction to order a post-mortem examination of the body (to be conducted by a medical examiner or by a certified coroner or deputy coroner) or the court may order an autopsy to be conducted by a pathologist. OAG 82-376 .

72.450. Disposal of body and valuables found thereon.

  1. A coroner who has possession of a dead body or a part thereof shall make a bona fide attempt to notify the spouse, if any, or next of kin of the decedent’s death. In the event the coroner is unable to locate the spouse, if any, or next of kin, he or she may cause the body to be buried at the expense of the fiscal court, consolidated local government, or urban-county government, whichever is appropriate.
  2. In the event the body is buried at public expense, the coroner shall take possession of all money or other property found on or belonging to the decedent and shall deliver same to the fiscal court, consolidated local government, or urban-county government, whichever is appropriate. Any money or other property found on the body of the decedent or belonging to him or her shall be delivered by the coroner to the fiscal court, consolidated local government, or urban-county government, whichever is appropriate, to help defray burial expenses. Any excess funds shall escheat to such governmental agency one (1) year thereafter.
  3. In lieu of having an unclaimed body buried at public expense, the coroner may deliver such body or part thereof to a state medical school in accordance with the provisions of KRS 311.300 to 311.350 .

History. Enact. Acts 1978, ch. 93, § 14, effective June 17, 1978; 2002, ch. 346, § 74, effective July 15, 2002.

Opinions of Attorney General.

Cremation is not an option for the coroner pursuant to subsection 1 of this section in the case of an unclaimed body. OAG 93-69 .

72.455. Expense of search for body.

The fiscal court, consolidated local government, or urban-county government, whichever is appropriate, shall pay the expense of conducting a search for a body where such search has been ordered by the coroner.

History. Enact. Acts 1978, ch. 93, § 15, effective June 17, 1978; 2002, ch. 346, § 75, effective July 15, 2002.

72.460. Cost of autopsies.

The cost of autopsies shall be paid for by the fiscal court; provided, however, that the Justice and Public Safety Cabinet, Office of the Kentucky State Medical Examiner, may contract with pathologists and toxicologists and chemists and pay for such autopsies within the budgetary limitations of funds appropriated by the General Assembly for this purpose.

History. Enact. Acts 1978, ch. 93, § 16, effective June 17, 1978; 1998, ch. 65, § 8, effective July 15, 1998; 2007, ch. 85, § 154, effective June 26, 2007.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. In General.

Where a coroner had received the maximum compensation allowed by the Kentucky Constitution he could not recover fees from a city for holding inquests therein, for the use of his county. Louisville v. Keaney, 267 Ky. 557 , 102 S.W.2d 996, 1937 Ky. LEXIS 346 ( Ky. 1937 ) (decided under prior law).

2. Constitutionality.

Provision that costs of inquest on unburied bodies held in cities having more than 30,000 inhabitants shall be paid by city was constitutional. Whittenberg v. Louisville, 238 Ky. 117 , 36 S.W.2d 853, 1931 Ky. LEXIS 187 ( Ky. 1931 ); Louisville v. Keaney, 267 Ky. 557 , 102 S.W.2d 996, 1937 Ky. LEXIS 346 ( Ky. 1937 ) (decided under prior law).

3. Liability for Fees.

The expense of making post-mortem examinations of either buried or unburied bodies as well as inquests on buried bodies was payable by the county, but the expense of inquests on unburied bodies in cities of more than 30,000 inhabitants was payable by the city. Grinstead v. Carter, 181 Ky. 331 , 204 S.W. 87, 1918 Ky. LEXIS 515 ( Ky. 1918 ) (decided under prior law).

Payment of fees for post-mortem examinations made during inquests held by a coroner within a city of more than 30,000 inhabitants was the liability of the county. Louisville v. Keaney, 267 Ky. 557 , 102 S.W.2d 996, 1937 Ky. LEXIS 346 ( Ky. 1937 ) (decided under prior law).

72.465. Inquiry into death under natural circumstances — Death certificate — Change in original certificate.

  1. The coroner shall in his sound discretion determine the extent of inquiry to be made into any death occurring under natural circumstances and falling within the provisions of KRS 72.410 to 72.470 , and if inquiry reveals that the physician or advanced practice registered nurse of record has sufficient knowledge to reasonably state the cause of a death occurring under natural circumstances, the coroner may authorize that physician or advanced practice registered nurse to sign the certificate of death. In all other instances, the coroner shall sign the death certificate in coroner’s cases.
  2. In the event an autopsy is performed under the provisions of KRS 72.410 to 72.470 subsequent to the time that a death certificate has been filed with the Cabinet for Health and Family Services, Vital Statistics Branch, the coroner shall notify the Vital Statistics Branch of any change that may be necessary in the original certificate.

History. Enact. Acts 1978, ch. 93, § 17, effective June 17, 1978; 1990, ch. 88, § 88, effective July 1, 1992; 1998, ch. 426, § 96, effective July 15, 1998; 2005, ch. 99, § 113, effective June 20, 2005; 2016 ch. 87, § 2, effective July 15, 2016.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section was amended by § 88 of Acts 1990, ch. 88 to contingently become effective as provided by § 93 of Acts 1990, ch. 88. However, § 93 of Acts 1990, ch. 88 was repealed by § 30 of Acts 1992, ch. 324, effective July 1, 1992. Therefore the amendment of this section by § 88 of Acts 1990, ch. 88 became effective July 1, 1992.

Opinions of Attorney General.

The statutory treatment of the issuance of death certificates indicates that the general assembly had in mind the issuance by the physician last in attendance upon the deceased where no coroner’s case is involved, and it seems logical that the physician who is qualified under the statutes to issue the death certificate is the physician who could make the pronouncement of death prior to such issuance of the death certificate; however, there is no specific statutory or judicial authority as to who pronounces death in a hospital. OAG 83-309 .

A physician, if authorized by the coroner, may sign a certificate of death only in a case in which a coroner’s inquiry reveals that the physician of record has sufficient knowledge to reasonably state the cause of a death occurring under natural circumstances. OAG 91-166 .

Only a coroner may lawfully sign a certificate of death concerning a death occurring under unnatural circumstances. OAG 91-166 .

72.470. Coroner or deputy — Immunity from civil liability.

Any coroner, deputy coroner or designee thereof, acting in good faith within the scope of his official duties, shall have immunity from any civil liability that might otherwise be incurred or imposed.

History. Enact. Acts 1978, ch. 93, § 18, effective June 17, 1978.

72.475. Short title.

KRS 72.400 to 72.470 may be cited as “The Kentucky Coroner’s Act of 1978.”

History. Enact. Acts 1978, ch. 93, § 1, effective June 17, 1978.

Penalties

72.990. Penalties. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (528, 537a, 3748) was repealed by Acts 1978, ch. 93, § 21, effective June 17, 1978.

72.991. Penalties. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. 1958, ch. 100, § 4, effective June 19, 1958) was repealed by Acts 1978, ch. 93, § 21, effective June 17, 1978.

72.992. Penalties.

  1. Any person who violates KRS 72.020(1) or who interferes with the coroner in the lawful performance of his duties shall be fined not less than two hundred fifty dollars ($250), or be confined in jail for not more than ninety (90) days, or both.
  2. Any coroner or deputy coroner who violates KRS 72.025 or 72.020 shall be guilty of willful neglect of official duties and shall be fined no more than one thousand dollars ($1,000) or forfeiture of office or both.
  3. Any law enforcement officer who violates KRS 72.020 shall be guilty of willful neglect of official duties and shall be fined no more than one thousand dollars ($1,000) or forfeiture of office or both.
      1. Except as provided in subparagraph 2. of this paragraph, any violation of KRS 72.031 by an individual other than the surviving spouse, children, parents, or personal representative of the decedent shall result in a fine of not more than five hundred dollars ($500) for the first violation and not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000) for each subsequent violation. (4) (a) 1. Except as provided in subparagraph 2. of this paragraph, any violation of KRS 72.031 by an individual other than the surviving spouse, children, parents, or personal representative of the decedent shall result in a fine of not more than five hundred dollars ($500) for the first violation and not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000) for each subsequent violation.
      2. Any violation of KRS 72.031(3) shall result in a fine which equals the greater of the appropriate fine provided for in subparagraph 1. of this paragraph or three (3) times any profits derived from violating KRS 72.031(3).
    1. Any fine collected under paragraph (a) of this subsection shall be paid into the crime victims’ compensation fund created under KRS 49.480 .

History. Enact. Acts 1978, ch. 93, § 20, effective June 17, 1978; 1982, ch. 195, § 12, effective July 15, 1982; 2017 ch. 78, § 2, effective June 29, 2017.

Legislative Research Commission Notes.

(6/29/2017). 2017 Ky. Acts ch. 78, sec. 4, states, “This Act [which creates KRS 72.031 and 72.032 and subsection (4) of this statute] is not meant to alter or change in any way the current law in the Commonwealth relating to the availability of autopsy records that are not otherwise specifically provided for in this Act.”

(6/29/2017). Subsection (4) of this statute, as created under 2017 Ky. Acts ch. 78, sec. 2, contained a reference to “the crime victims’ compensation fund created under KRS 346.185 .” In codification, this reference has been changed to read “the crime victims’ compensation fund created under KRS 49.480 .” KRS 346.185 was repealed, reenacted as KRS 49.480 , and amended by 2017 Ky. Acts ch. 74, sec. 48. The Reviser of Statutes has made this change under the authority of KRS 7.136(1)(e).

Research References and Practice Aids

Treatises

Caldwell’s Kentucky Form Book, 5th Ed., Indictment for Willful Neglect in Discharge of Official Duty, Form 10.07.

CHAPTER 73 Surveyor and Processioners

73.010. Bond of county surveyor — Minimum — Record.

The county surveyor, before he enters on the duties of his office, shall give a bond in the minimum amount of ten thousand dollars ($10,000) with sureties approved by the fiscal court, which shall record the approval in its minutes and shall file the bond with the county clerk.

History. 4672: amend. Acts 1978, ch. 384, § 173, effective June 17, 1978; 1996, ch. 86, § 6, effective July 15, 1996.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Failure to Give Bond.

One appointed county surveyor who failed to give the required bond was not legally in possession of office, and had no right to make entries in the county surveyor’s book. Wheeler v. Collins, 222 Ky. 801 , 2 S.W.2d 646, 1928 Ky. LEXIS 251 ( Ky. 1928 ).

Where person appointed as surveyor does not give bond within 30 days after his appointment, the office becomes vacant, and the county court may appoint another person to the office. Wheeler v. Collins, 222 Ky. 801 , 2 S.W.2d 646, 1928 Ky. LEXIS 251 ( Ky. 1928 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

The fiscal court, in its discretion, may pay the county surveyor a salary based upon work to be actually performed. OAG 70-178 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Bond to be executed, Ky. Const., § 103.

Conditions of and recovery on bonds, KRS 62.050 to 62.080 .

County road engineer or supervisor, employment of surveyor as, KRS 179.020 .

Election, term of office, Ky. Const., § 99.

Fees of clerk for taking bond, KRS 64.012 .

Fees of surveyor, KRS 64.320 .

Jefferson County to pay premiums on bonds of officers, KRS 62.150 .

Office to be vacant when bond not executed, KRS 62.990 .

Qualifications, Ky. Const., § 100.

Survey required for appropriation of vacant lands, KRS 56.190 to 56.250 .

Vacancy in office of surveyor, how filled, KRS 63.220 .

73.020. County surveyor — Requirements for eligibility.

No person shall be eligible to file for the office of county surveyor unless he or she produces to the county clerk at the time of filing for office evidence he or she holds a Kentucky license as a professional land surveyor in accordance with the requirements of KRS 322.020 and 322.045 .

History. 4672a-1: amend. Acts 1976, ch. 62, § 76; 2012, ch. 141, § 1, effective July 12, 2012.

Opinions of Attorney General.

County surveyor, a constitutionally created office, need not be a licensed land surveyor under KRS, Chapter 322 as the licensing requirements for other land surveyors cannot be imposed by the legislature in the absence of a constitutional provision to that effect. OAG 73-763 .

73.030. Deputies.

On the recommendation of the county surveyor, the county judge/executive may appoint one (1) or more deputy surveyors, if the county judge/executive is satisfied that they are competent. The surveyor shall be answerable for the conduct of his deputies, and may remove any deputy at his discretion. The removal of a deputy must be entered on the records of the county judge/executive.

History. 4673: amend. Acts 1978, ch. 384, § 174, effective June 17, 1978.

73.040. Duties of surveyor — Assistants.

  1. The county surveyor shall perform any business in the civil engineering profession that he is lawfully ordered to do by any court in his county.
  2. The county surveyor may select chainmen and other necessary assistants to aid him in carrying out the orders of court. The fees of his assistants shall be taxed as costs.

History. 4672a-2.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Purpose.

The purpose of this section is to permit the court, when in its judgment the county surveyor is not suitable, available or competent to do any specific work, to employ some other competent person, regardless of whether he is a surveyor or civil engineer. Gaines v. Weissinger, 144 Ky. 582 , 139 S.W. 787, 1911 Ky. LEXIS 669 ( Ky. 1911 ).

2. Employment of Another Surveyor or Engineer.

Under this section the right to perform services in the civil engineering profession belongs to the county surveyor, but the fiscal court has the discretion to employ another surveyor or civil engineer to perform these services. Gaines v. Weissinger, 144 Ky. 582 , 139 S.W. 787, 1911 Ky. LEXIS 669 ( Ky. 1911 ). See Kennedy v. Kenton County, 90 S.W. 969, 28 Ky. L. Rptr. 927 (1906).

3. Compensation.

The fiscal court has no authority to allow the county surveyor a salary in lieu of fees provided by statute. Young v. Jefferson County, 100 S.W. 335, 30 Ky. L. Rptr. 1209 (1907).

Cited:

In re Smith, 58 B.R. 448, 1986 Bankr. LEXIS 6552 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1986 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

A county surveyor could survey in his private capacity only if he is a licensed surveyor under KRS Chapter 322, and if the private work would not interfere with any statutory duties. OAG 74-284 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Fees as chainmen, KRS 64.330 .

Liability for misfeasance, malfeasance, or wilful neglect, Ky. Const., § 227; KRS 61.170 .

73.050. Order of survey, county surveyor given preference.

The court may direct an order of survey to any person; but in considering an application for the appointment of another surveyor for a special work, the court must give preference to the county surveyor.

History. 4672a-7, 4678.

73.060. Execution of orders of survey.

Every surveyor shall promptly and faithfully execute every order of survey made by any court of lands lying in his county, and make out and return a true plat and certificate of his survey, accompanied by explanatory notes.

History. 4674.

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Liability for misfeasance, malfeasance, or wilful neglect, Const., § 227; KRS 61.170 .

73.070. Survey, how made.

  1. Every survey shall be made by horizontal measurement.
  2. In resurveying lands, the surveyor must execute the survey by the magnetic meridian, but he shall certify and show in his plat the degree of variation in the magnetic needle from the true meridian at the periods of the original survey and of the resurvey, if it can be done.

History. 4675.

Opinions of Attorney General.

A land surveyor can legally prepare a map showing contours and elevations for planning and facilities. OAG 67-385 .

73.080. Field notes.

The county surveyor shall append to the field notes of every survey the date of the survey and the variations of the needle from the true meridian at the time of making the survey.

History. 4676.

73.090. Appointment to committee or as commissioner.

The county surveyor shall be made a member of committees or commissions appointed by the courts to locate, inspect, care for and report on bridges and other public improvements, and may, without taking additional oath, be made a commissioner to divide land, lay off dower or homestead, or open, alter or close a public road or open or close a private passway.

History. 4672a-3, 4679.

73.100. Surveyor may administer oath.

County surveyors and their deputies may administer oaths to commissioners appointed to divide land, to lay off dower or homestead, to open, alter or close a public road, or to open or close a private passway.

History. 4679.

73.110. Office of surveyor — Record books.

The county may provide the county surveyor with an office at the county seat, and with record books. The records shall be county property and shall be kept in the office of the surveyor or the county clerk.

History. 4672a-5: amend. Acts 1988, ch. 249, § 2, effective July 15, 1988.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Construction.

This section means that the county must furnish the surveyor with an office furnished with necessary furniture and equipment. Jefferson County Fiscal Court v. Gregg, 265 Ky. 61 , 95 S.W.2d 1130, 1936 Ky. LEXIS 449 ( Ky. 1936 ).

Cited:

Todd County Fiscal Court v. Frey, 285 S.W.2d 499, 1955 Ky. LEXIS 82 ( Ky. 1955 ); Gannon v. Pearl, 311 S.W.2d 184, 1958 Ky. LEXIS 176 ( Ky. 1958 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

If no space is available in the courthouse for the county surveyor and it is necessary to lease space elsewhere in the county seat, the county would be responsible for paying only that percentage of the rent that is fairly allocable to the conducting of his official business, furthermore the county is required to furnish only that office equipment that is necessary for the official business of the office. OAG 67-264 .

73.120. Records to be kept — Use as evidence — Requirements for survey.

The county surveyor shall keep a record of plats, and explanatory notes of all surveys made by him or his deputies, and copies of the record, certified to by the county surveyor, shall be legal evidence in any court. No survey or resurvey of real estate made by any person except the county surveyor or his deputy, shall be considered as legal evidence in any court, unless such survey is made by mutual consent in writing, signed by the parties, and recorded in the county clerk’s or county surveyor’s office, or made by order of court. Any survey or resurvey filed with the county clerk shall meet the requirements of KRS 64.012 and shall have required fees attached.

History. 4672a-4: amend. Acts 1988, ch. 249, § 3, effective July 15, 1988.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Purpose.

Apparent purpose of provision of this section that no survey or resurvey of real estate made by any person, except the county surveyor or his deputy, shall be considered as legal evidence in any court, unless such survey is made by mutual consent of the parties, is to make it clear that only official surveys or copies thereof may be admitted in evidence merely upon authentication as to a public record, presumptively regular and accurate, and unofficial surveys unless made by order of court, require preliminary proof of accuracy by surveyor or engineer who made proffered documents. Gannon v. Pearl, 311 S.W.2d 184, 1958 Ky. LEXIS 176 ( Ky. 1958 ).

This section merely eliminates the necessity of authenticating official surveys prior to their being introduced in evidence. Hofgesang v. Kasey, 382 S.W.2d 571, 1964 Ky. LEXIS 353 ( Ky. 1964 ).

2. Unofficial Survey.

Testimony of witness who made survey was admissible to prove that land in controversy was embraced in appellee’s deed since under this section unofficial survey could be admitted if there was preliminary proof of its accuracy by surveyor or engineer who made it. Gannon v. Pearl, 311 S.W.2d 184, 1958 Ky. LEXIS 176 ( Ky. 1958 ).

73.130. Recording of plats — Requirements for survey.

  1. In counties where there have been no record plat books kept by the county surveyors, the fiscal court, by contract with the county surveyor, may order him to record by plat and explanatory notes all or any part of the surveys he has made and preserved while in office, and any other surveys made and certified to by his predecessors in office. Surveys made in the past by a person other than the county surveyor shall not be platted in the record books except to explain some work done on the ground by the county surveyor.
  2. Anyone having a certified copy of a survey made by a county surveyor may have the survey platted and recorded at his expense in the county clerk’s or surveyor’s office. Any such survey filed with the county clerk shall meet the requirements of KRS 64.012 .

History. 4672a-6: amend. Acts 1988, ch. 249, § 4, effective July 15, 1988.

73.140. Vacancies — Preservation of papers.

When the office of county surveyor is vacant, the county judge/executive shall order the county clerk to take charge of the books and papers of the office, and the clerk shall give certified copies of the records when demanded, and the requirements of KRS 64.012 have been satisfied.

History. 4677: amend. Acts 1978, ch. 384, § 175, effective June 17, 1978; 1988, ch. 249, § 5, effective July 15, 1988; Enact. Acts 1990, ch. 88, § 81.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section was amended by § 81 of Acts 1990, ch. 88 to contingently become effective as provided by § 93 of Acts 1990, ch. 88. However, § 93 of Acts 1990, ch. 88 was repealed by § 30 of Acts 1992, ch. 324, effective July 1, 1992. Therefore the amendment of this section by § 81 of Acts 1990, ch. 88 became effective July 1, 1992.

73.150. Lost records.

When the records of the county surveyor have been lost, mutilated or destroyed, they shall be supplied upon request of the county surveyor and county judge/executive from the records of the land office.

History. 4679a-1: amend. Acts 1988, ch. 249, § 6, effective July 15, 1988.

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Land office, functions of secretary of state in relation to, KRS 56.230 , 56.260 to 56.280 , 56.300 to 56.320 .

73.160. Payment for books — Fee.

The county for which lost, mutilated or destroyed records are supplied shall furnish or pay for the necessary books in which to make the records and for the necessary clerk hire to transcribe the records, but no fees shall be due or payable to the state or any officer for such records.

History. 4679a-2.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Purpose.

The purpose of this section is to make it clear that the county has the authority, and that it is its duty, to resupply the surveyor’s office with records when the original records have been lost, mutilated or destroyed. Jefferson County Fiscal Court v. Gregg, 265 Ky. 61 , 95 S.W.2d 1130, 1936 Ky. LEXIS 449 ( Ky. 1936 ).

73.170. Certification of records — Use in evidence.

The Secretary of State shall certify to each book and at the end of each record, when supplied as directed in KRS 73.150 and 73.160 . Such records when compiled and certified by the Secretary of State shall be prima facie evidence in court of all matters therein contained.

History. 4679a-3.

73.180. Processioners — Appointment — Oath — Removal — Vacancies.

The county judge/executive shall appoint three (3) competent persons in the county to serve as processioners for a term of four (4) years. Before proceeding to act, each processioner shall take an oath to discharge the duties of his office to the best of his skill and judgment. Any two (2) processioners shall constitute a quorum to do business. The county judge/executive may fill vacancies and remove any of the processioners and appoint others.

History. 2367: amend. Acts 1978, ch. 384, § 176, effective June 17, 1978.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Purpose.

The purpose of the law regarding processioners is to perpetuate the testimony of living witnesses, and to perpetuate the true location of original monuments and lines. Crouch v. Wainscott, 122 Ky. 107 , 91 S.W. 289, 28 Ky. L. Rptr. 1026 , 1906 Ky. LEXIS 35 ( Ky. 1906 ).

Cited:

Buchanan v. Sledge, 272 Ky. 15 , 113 S.W.2d 859, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 82 ( Ky. 1938 ).

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Fees of processioners, KRS 64.330 .

73.190. Processioning of land on application.

The processioners shall, on the application of any person producing his title papers, go around his land, or the part he may desire, and re-mark it, taking care that the new marks are on the old lines. When they find any corner tree, post or stone removed, defaced or rotted down, the processioners shall mark a new corner tree, or place a stone or post, properly marked, where the old corner stood. The processioners shall report to the county judge/executive the land they have processioned, the lands it adjoins, and what alterations of corner trees, posts or stones have been made.

History. 2368: amend. Acts 1978, ch. 384, § 177, effective June 17, 1978.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Effect of Processioning.

Acts of processioners in locating and marking boundaries of city property are not binding on the property owners of a city whose rights are involved, unless such property owners consented to the proceeding. Whitesburg v. Baker, 196 Ky. 272 , 244 S.W. 686, 1922 Ky. LEXIS 494 ( Ky. 1922 ).

2. Report.

Only so much of the processioners’ report as is confined to the duties required of processioners as outlined in this section is prima facie evidence as to the boundary line processioned, and the report is not evidence of facts which it was not the duty of processioners to determine and report. Harrod v. Armstrong, 177 Ky. 317 , 197 S.W. 816, 1917 Ky. LEXIS 591 ( Ky. 1917 ).

The report of the processioners made under this section, after notice to the adjoining owners, is prima facie evidence of the time location of the line of the patent. Foster v. Roberts, 179 Ky. 752 , 201 S.W. 334, 1918 Ky. LEXIS 294 ( Ky. 1918 ).

73.200. Establishment of dividing lines.

The processioners or any two (2) or more persons selected by the parties and appointed by the county judge/executive may, on the application of persons whose lands adjoin, go on their dividing lines, and, by their consent, mark new corner trees, set up new stones or posts, ascertain the length of the lines, and make a report to the county judge/executive, in which the names of the parties, the new corner trees marked or stones or posts set up, and the length of the lines, shall be stated. The consent of the parties to the acts of the processioners, or persons selected, shall be indorsed on the report, and the report shall be signed by the parties and attested by one (1) or more of the processioners or persons selected, or the parties shall not be bound. In all contests as to boundary, such report shall be conclusive evidence between the parties and all persons claiming through or under them.

History. 2369: amend. Acts 1978, ch. 384, § 178, effective June 17, 1978.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Application.

This section applies where two or more owners of adjoining lands agree and join in the request to have their division line marked. Proceedings under this section must not only be joined in by all the parties concerned, but their assent must be indorsed in writing on the report and signed by the parties. Crouch v. Wainscott, 122 Ky. 107 , 91 S.W. 289, 28 Ky. L. Rptr. 1026 , 1906 Ky. LEXIS 35 ( Ky. 1906 ).

2. Evidence.

If processioners’ proceedings are regular, they are prima facie evidence of the correct location of the line, but are not conclusive unless the parties indorse their consent upon the report of the commissioners before it is returned to the county court. Carter v. Roberts, 203 Ky. 224 , 262 S.W. 10, 1924 Ky. LEXIS 883 ( Ky. 1924 ).

73.210. Surveyor to accompany processioners.

The county surveyor, or some person appointed by the court to survey, shall in all cases attend the processioners or the persons selected by the parties. He shall make out a plat and certificate of the land of the applicants, noting what is done, and his plat and certificate shall be returned with, and be considered a part of, the processioners’ report. The processioners and surveyor, in establishing lines and corners, may make proper allowance for the variation of the needle.

History. 2370.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Testimony of Surveyor.

In a processioning proceeding which was never perfected, and in which one of the corners was established by old people of the community, the court permitted the surveyor to testify concerning the facts of the processioning after the old people were dead. Phillips v. Stewart, 133 Ky. 134 , 97 S.W. 6, 29 Ky. L. Rptr. 1199 , 1906 Ky. LEXIS 275 ( Ky. 1906 ).

73.220. Depositions — Administering oath.

The processioners may, at the request of any party interested, take depositions as to the proper position of any corner or line, and the depositions shall be returned with the processioners’ report. The opposite party may, in like manner, take testimony at the same or another time. Any processioner or person selected by the parties who has taken a legal oath of qualification may administer an oath to any other processioner or person selected who has not taken an oath, or administer an oath touching any matter within the scope of their duties.

History. 2371.

73.230. Notice of processioning land and taking depositions.

Any person desiring to have his land processioned, or desiring to take depositions as allowed by KRS 73.220 , may give ten (10) days’ notice to any person interested, or his agent or attorney, or, if an infant, or person adjudged mentally disabled, to his guardian or conservator, of the time and place when and where the processioners will convene. If the party interested does not reside in the state, and has no known agent therein, notice shall be published pursuant to KRS Chapter 424 and shall also be posted for the same period that publication is required on the courthouse door. The printer of the paper in which the notice is published shall make an affidavit of the fact of publication, which, with the notice, shall be filed with the processioners before they act, and returned with their proceedings. An affidavit of a disinterested person of the service of a notice on persons interested, or their agents, or the fact of such agency, shall, in like manner, be made and filed with the processioners, and returned with their report.

History. 2372: amend. Acts 1966, ch. 239, § 19; 1978, ch. 92, § 6, effective June 17, 1978; 1982, ch. 141, § 48, effective July 1, 1982.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Parol Notice.

The notice required by this section means written notice, but a parol notice to one interested is sufficient to render the proceedings binding on him where he is present and participates in the processioning. Crouch v. Wainscott, 122 Ky. 107 , 91 S.W. 289, 28 Ky. L. Rptr. 1026 , 1906 Ky. LEXIS 35 ( Ky. 1906 ).

2. Evidence.

The purpose of processioning is to perpetuate evidence; but such evidence which is only prima facie may be rebutted in a subsequent proceeding. Shireman v. Null, 307 Ky. 743 , 212 S.W.2d 277, 1948 Ky. LEXIS 821 ( Ky. 1948 ).

73.240. Land in different counties, processioning.

If any person owns a tract of land that lies in two (2) or more adjoining counties, the processioners of that county in which the greater part lies may procession the whole tract.

History. 2373.

73.250. Reports, plats and depositions to be filed — Evidence.

The reports of processioners, the plats and certificates of the surveyor, notices and affidavits, and depositions taken by the processioners, shall be filed and kept by the county clerk. The report, notice and plat shall be recorded, and shall be prima facie evidence against the parties interested and others claiming through or under them.

History. 2374.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Failure to Sign Report, Effect.

An agreement upon which the report of processioners was based is not binding on the parties where the wife of one of the parties did not sign. Since the recorded report of the county processioners is only prima facie evidence against the parties, evidence is admissible to contradict such report. Lee v. Wheat, 111 S.W. 307, 33 Ky. L. Rptr. 724 (1908).

Where a report of processioners is filed and recorded in the county clerk’s office, but is not signed or attested by either of the parties, it is not binding against any of the parties, and is of no effect. Cumberland Coal Co. v. Croley, 172 Ky. 222 , 189 S.W. 198, 1916 Ky. LEXIS 187 ( Ky. 1916 ).

2. Prima Facie Evidence.

Report of processioners made under KRS 73.190 is prima facie evidence of the location of boundary lines set out in the report. Foster v. Roberts, 179 Ky. 752 , 201 S.W. 334, 1918 Ky. LEXIS 294 ( Ky. 1918 ).

3. — Limitation.

Only so much of the processioners’ report as is confined to the duties required of processioners is prima facie evidence of the boundary line processioned, and the report is not evidence of facts which it was not the duty of processioners to determine and report. Harrod v. Armstrong, 177 Ky. 317 , 197 S.W. 816, 1917 Ky. LEXIS 591 ( Ky. 1917 ).

4. Weight of Report.

In case involving the location of a property line between two (2) tracts of land where processioners’ report was based on a small amount of evidence and where the point which they accepted as the beginning point of the property line was rebutted by appellant’s own witnesses, the report was entitled to little, if any weight. Shireman v. Null, 307 Ky. 743 , 212 S.W.2d 277, 1948 Ky. LEXIS 821 ( Ky. 1948 ).

5. Burden of Proof.

This section places the burden in any subsequent proceeding upon the parties claiming against the report of the processioners. Crouch v. Wainscott, 122 Ky. 107 , 91 S.W. 289, 28 Ky. L. Rptr. 1026 , 1906 Ky. LEXIS 35 ( Ky. 1906 ). See Howard v. Clover Fork Coal Co., 207 Ky. 674 , 269 S.W. 1017, 1925 Ky. LEXIS 164 ( Ky. 1925 ).

73.990. Penalties.

  1. Any surveyor who violates any of the provisions of KRS 73.060 shall forfeit twenty dollars ($20) to the person injured, and shall be jointly and severally liable, with his sureties, to an action on his bond for damages.
  2. Any surveyor who violates any of the provisions of KRS 73.070 shall forfeit to the person injured fifteen dollars ($15), and shall be liable, with his sureties, to the injured party for damages and costs.
  3. Deputy surveyors shall be subject to the same penalties as the surveyor.

History. 4673 to 4675.

CHAPTER 74 Water Districts

Water Districts

74.010. Creation of a water district.

Subject to the provisions of KRS 74.012 a fiscal court may create a water district in accordance with the procedures of KRS 65.810 .

History. 938g-1: amend. Acts 1966, ch. 70, § 2; 1966, ch. 239, § 20; 1968, ch. 200, § 1; 1978, ch. 384, § 179, effective June 17, 1978; 1984, ch. 64, § 10, effective July 13, 1984.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

Prior law providing for the establishment of water districts for the purpose of promoting the public health, convenience and welfare and for the purpose of providing fire protection for citizens of any county in the state was constitutional as the legislature had the right to enact such law for such purposes involving the public health, convenience and welfare. Ryan v. Commissioners of Water Dist., 220 Ky. 822 , 295 S.W. 1023, 1927 Ky. LEXIS 612 ( Ky. 1927 ) (decided under prior law).

2. Notice.

Notice by publication is not a violation of due process. Any landowner of the district who has notice by publication of the proceedings, but fails to appear in county court and object, or to appeal from the county court, waives his right to question the validity of the assessments. Ryan v. Commissioners of Water Dist., 220 Ky. 822 , 295 S.W. 1023, 1927 Ky. LEXIS 612 ( Ky. 1927 ) (decided under prior law).

3. Petitioners.

The insufficiency in the number of qualified petitioners is not a jurisdictional or fatal defect so that a judgment of the county court establishing a water district which included a finding that an adequate number of persons had signed the petition was held conclusive. Grubb v. Wurtland Water Dist., 384 S.W.2d 321, 1964 Ky. LEXIS 94 ( Ky. 1964 ).

4. Fire Protection.

Although this section refers to provision for fire protection, the chapter does not provide that fire fighting equipment may be paid for either from taxes or from bond proceeds. A water district is not prohibited, however, from installing fire hydrants or other similar facilities for making water available for fire fighting purposes. Theobald v. Board of Comm'rs, 288 Ky. 720 , 157 S.W.2d 285, 1941 Ky. LEXIS 184 ( Ky. 1941 ).

Regulation of water district permitting service connections only with houses facing a street or road with a water main therein was reasonable because of the necessity for providing adequate fire protection for the customers of the district for this is one of the purposes for which such districts may be organized. Middletown Water Dist. v. Tucker, 284 S.W.2d 666, 1955 Ky. LEXIS 33 ( Ky. 1955 ).

5. Bonds.

Nothing in this chapter would prevent the pledge of the operative revenues as security for the payment of the bonds or their use for that purpose. Olson v. Preston St. Road Water Dist., 286 Ky. 66 , 149 S.W.2d 766, 1941 Ky. LEXIS 214 ( Ky. 1941 ).

There is nothing in this chapter which would prevent the sale of bonds for less than par plus accrued interest. Olson v. Preston St. Road Water Dist., 286 Ky. 66 , 149 S.W.2d 766, 1941 Ky. LEXIS 214 ( Ky. 1941 ).

6. Public Service Commission Jurisdiction.

The statutory exemption of KRS 278.010 (3) that exempts cities from Public Service Commission’s regulations for facilities owned, controlled, operated or managed by a city extends to all operations of a municipally owned water utility whether within or without the territorial boundaries of the city. McClellan v. Louisville Water Co., 351 S.W.2d 197, 1961 Ky. LEXIS 160 ( Ky. 1961 ).

Since a city-owned water supply system was not a utility within the definition of KRS 278.010 (3), the system was not subject to the jurisdiction of the public service commission, and therefore, the commission was without jurisdiction to resolve a territorial dispute between a city and a private water company where the city undertook to extend its water supply system beyond city limits into a contiguous territory served by the private company. Georgetown v. Public Service Com., 516 S.W.2d 842, 1974 Ky. LEXIS 173 ( Ky. 1974 ).

The Public Service Commission (PSC) has exclusive jurisdiction over the regulation of utility rates and service which extends to a city contracting for the sale and supply of water to a PSC-regulated county water district. Simpson County Water Dist. v. City of Franklin, 872 S.W.2d 460, 1994 Ky. LEXIS 13 ( Ky. 1994 ).

7. Concurrent Service.

Since KRS 74.040 to 74.416 do not grant exclusive authority to water district to operate in territory comprising district and as KRS 96.150 does authorize city to furnish water service in territory contiguous to city that lies within five miles of its corporate limits both have legal right and authority to furnish service in this area. Cold Spring v. Campbell County Water Dist., 334 S.W.2d 269, 1960 Ky. LEXIS 223 ( Ky. 1960 ), overruled, Georgetown v. Public Service Com., 516 S.W.2d 842, 1974 Ky. LEXIS 173 ( Ky. 1974 ), overruled in part, Georgetown v. Public Service Com., 516 S.W.2d 842, 1974 Ky. LEXIS 173 ( Ky. 1974 ); overruled on other grounds, Georgetown v. Public Service Com., 516 S.W.2d 842, 1974 Ky. LEXIS 173 (Ky. 1974).

Cited:

Olson v. Preston St. Water Dist., 291 Ky. 155 , 163 S.W.2d 307, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 195 ( Ky. 1942 ); Public Service Com. v. Southgate, Highland Heights, 268 S.W.2d 19, 1954 Ky. LEXIS 888 ( Ky. 1954 ); Covington v. Sohio Petroleum Co., 279 S.W.2d 746, 1955 Ky. LEXIS 528 ( Ky. 1955 ); Commonwealth v. Howard, 379 S.W.2d 475, 1964 Ky. LEXIS 247 ( Ky. 1964 ); Valla v. Preston Street Road Water Dist., 395 S.W.2d 772, 1965 Ky. LEXIS 164 ( Ky. 1965 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Commissioners of a water district organized pursuant to this chapter are prohibited from entering into contracts with the district as a conflict of interest would exist which would be against public policy. OAG 66-788 .

A county water district is a political subdivision of the Commonwealth of Kentucky and is entitled to an exemption from the motor vehicle usage tax when its vehicles are presented for registration with the county clerk. OAG 71-376 .

Construing this section and KRS 74.012 together, it is apparent that KRS 74.012 does not contemplate the establishment of a water association by court order so that no court order or prior court hearing would be required for the “incorporation or formation” of any water association and the nature of issues which could have been raised before a county court should be raised before the public service commission prior to their reaching a decision and no engineer or engineering services shall be employed before the hearing and finding by the public service commission that the formation of the water association is in the “best interest of the general public.” OAG 73-611 .

Although this section and KRS 74.020 provide that the water district commissioners shall be appointed by the county judge, the county judge would be acting prematurely and without legal authority if the appointments were made before the appropriate persons have been granted authority by the public service commission to petition the appropriate county court and before they have in fact petitioned the county court to have a water district established. OAG 74-185 .

Since a water district is under an obligation to serve all inhabitants within its geographical area of service as fixed under this section and as defined by the certificate of convenience and necessity (KRS 278.020 ), the water district cannot refuse water service to individuals who request it for houses constructed within the district and who tender the usual rates and comply with the usual contractual terms. OAG 75-719 .

The funds of the water district cannot be utilized for the purpose of purchasing liability insurance for the individual commissioners of the district. OAG 78-774 .

Water district organized pursuant to KRS Chapter 74 can, pursuant to KRS 96.940 , contract for the collection of charges of separate and distinct sewage district by water district if the sewer system is a sewer body as defined by subdivision (c) of KRS 96.931 . OAG 82-592 .

Since a water district organized and functioning under the provisions of KRS Chapter 74 is a public utility subject to the jurisdiction of the Public Service Commission, KRS 278.170 is applicable; while a utility may grant free or reduced rates to charitable and eleemosynary institutions, a fire district organized under KRS Chapter 75 is not such an institution. Thus, there is no authority for requiring the water district to furnish water free of charge to a fire protection district. OAG 84-147 .

A water district organized pursuant to the provisions of KRS Chapter 74 could probably require property owners within its service area to hook up to its water distribution system in the interest of public health, safety and welfare. OAG 84-148 .

A donation of water district funds, by a water district created pursuant to this chapter “to civic organizations such as the chamber of commerce or an independent non-profit organization formed for the purpose of attracting business and industry to the county in which the water district operates,” would involve an expenditure inconsistent with the statutory purpose of a water district, and thus cannot be lawfully made. OAG 92-43 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

City-county metropolitan sewer districts and sewer construction districts, KRS 76.010 to 76.420 .

Drainage districts, KRS Chapters 267, 268.

Fire protection districts, KRS Chapter 75.

Interlocal cooperation act, KRS 65.210 to 65.300 .

Public service commission, water district subject to jurisdiction of, KRS 278.015 .

Sanitation districts, KRS Chapter 220.

Urban renewal and redevelopment, KRS Chapter 99.

Water pollution control, KRS Chapter 220.70.

Kentucky Law Journal.

Ausness, Water Use Permits in a Riparian State: Problems, 66 Ky. L.J. 191 (1977-1978).

Lewis, Kostas, and Carnes, Consolidation — Complete or Functional of City and County Governments in Kentucky, 42 Ky. L.J. 295 (1954).

74.012. Water district — Creation — Application to Public Service Commission — Hearing — Conditions.

  1. Prior to the establishment of any water district as provided by KRS 74.010 , and prior to the incorporation or formation of any nonprofit corporation, association or cooperative corporation having as its purpose the furnishing of a public water supply (herein referred to as a “water association”), a committee of not less than five (5) resident freeholders of the geographical area sought to be served with water facilities by the proposed district or the proposed water association shall formally make application to the Public Service Commission of Kentucky in such manner and following such procedures as the Public Service Commission may by regulation prescribe, seeking from the commission the authority to petition the appropriate county judge/executive for establishment of a water district, or to proceed to incorporate or otherwise create a water association. The commission shall thereupon set the application for formal public hearing, and shall give notice to all other water suppliers, whether publicly owned or privately owned, and whether or not regulated by the commission, rendering services in the general area proposed to be served by said water district or water association, and to any planning and zoning or other regulatory agency or agencies with authority in the general area having concern with the application. The commission may subpoena and summon for hearing purposes any persons deemed necessary by the commission in order to enable the commission to evaluate the application of the proponents of said proposed water district or water association, and reach a decision in the best interests of the general public. Intervention by any interested parties, water suppliers, municipal corporations, and governmental agencies shall be freely permitted at such hearing.
  2. The public hearing shall be conducted by the commission pursuant to the provisions of KRS 278.020 . At the time of the hearing, no employment of counsel or of engineering services shall have been made to be paid from water district funds, water association funds, or made a charge in futuro against water district or water association funds, if formation of such water district or water association is permitted by the commission.
  3. Before the Public Service Commission shall approve any application for creation of a water district or water association, the commission must make a finding and determination of fact that the geographical area sought to be served by such proposed water district or water association cannot be feasibly served by any existing water supplier, whether publicly or privately owned, and whether or not subject to the regulatory jurisdiction of the commission. If it shall be determined that the geographical area sought to be served by the proposed water district or water association can be served more feasibly by any other water supplier, the commission shall deny the application and shall hold such further hearings and make such further determinations as may in the circumstances be appropriate in the interests of the public health, safety and general welfare.
  4. Any order entered by the commission in connection with an application for creation of a water district or water association shall be appealable to the Franklin Circuit Court as provided by KRS 278.410 .

History. Enact. Acts 1972, ch. 310, § 2; 1978, ch. 384, §§ 19, 180, effective June 17, 1978.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

This section was amended by two sections of a 1978 act which do not appear to be in conflict and have been compiled together.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Governmental immunity.

Water district did not offer any basis to conclude the providing of clean water for personal consumption, recreation, agriculture and commercial use was less proprietary than the sewage disposal and storm drainage services provided by sanitation districts; the water district’s own enabling statutes recognized that its services were provided by the private sector, plus the services the water district provided involved the private consumption and use of water. Governmental immunity did not protect the water district. Carucci v. N. Ky. Water Dist., 2019 Ky. App. LEXIS 3 (Ky. Ct. App. Jan. 18, 2019), aff'd, 2019 Ky. LEXIS 276 (Ky. Aug. 29, 2019).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Construing this section and KRS 74.010 together, it is apparent that this section does not contemplate the establishment of a water association by court order so that no court order or prior court hearing would be required for the “incorporation or formation” of any water association and the nature of issues which could have been raised before a county court should be raised before the Public Service Commission prior to their reaching a decision and no engineer or engineering services shall be employed before the hearing and finding by the Public Service Commission that the formation of the water association is in the “best interest of the general public.” OAG 73-611 .

Until the appropriate persons have applied to the Public Service Commission and have had their application approved by that body, giving them the authority to then petition the appropriate county court for the establishment of a water district and until they have actually petitioned the county court, the county judge would not have the legal authority to appoint water commissioners. OAG 74-185 .

Since this section and KRS 278.012 when read together simply reflect the legislative intent to bring private corporations furnishing water to the general public within the regulatory power of the Public Service Commission, regulation as applied to a private water utility does not convert the utility into a governmental agency as envisioned by KRS 42.330 (11) (now repealed) and therefore a water system organized under KRS Chapter 278 could not qualify under KRS 42.330 (now repealed) to use the Coal Severance Economic Aid Fund since it is not one of the beneficiary agencies listed in KRS 42.330 (now repealed). OAG 77-524 .

The Harrison County Water Association, Inc., is a nonprofit, nonstock private corporation and as such it would not be subject to the Open Meetings Law, KRS 61.805 to 61.850 ; however, a water district organized under the provisions of KRS Chapter 74 is subject to the provisions of both the Open Meetings and Open Records laws since a water district organized under this section is not a private nonprofit corporation and is therefore a public agency. OAG 78-395 .

74.015. Determination by Public Service Commission of necessity for water district prior to organization — Appeal. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 70, § 3) was repealed by Acts 1972, ch. 310, § 5.

74.020. Appointment of commissioners — Number — Terms — Removal — Vacancies — Organization — Bond — Compensation — Mandatory training — Notice of vacancy.

  1. A water district shall be administered by a board of commissioners which shall control and manage the affairs of the district. The term of each commissioner is four (4) years, except as provided in this section:
    1. If a district lies wholly within a single county, or operates as a single-county district, as provided in paragraph (c) of this subsection, the board of commissioners shall be composed of either three (3) or five (5) members as the county judge/executive shall determine. Members of the board shall be residents of the district, or of any incorporated or unincorporated area served by the district in the county in which the district was originally established, who shall be appointed by the county judge/executive with the approval of the fiscal court. Initial appointments shall be for terms of two (2), three (3), and four (4) years, as designated by the court.
    2. Except as provided in paragraph (c) of this subsection, if a district formed in a single county extends its area to include territory in one (1) or more adjacent counties, as provided by KRS 74.115 , the board of commissioners shall be appointed by the appropriate county judges/executive, with the approval of the respective fiscal courts of the concerned counties as follows: in two (2) county districts, three (3) members from the original district and two (2) members from the extended portion of the district; for extensions into three (3) or more counties, the respective county judges/executive, with the approval of the respective fiscal courts, shall appoint, in addition to the existing membership of the commission, two (2) members from the original one-county district and two (2) members from the newly extended portion of the district. Orders establishing the extension shall provide for the staggering of initial terms in an equitable manner.
    3. If a district acquires an existing water or gas distribution system serving an area which extends beyond the boundaries of the district into one (1) or more additional counties, or if a district extends its area to include territory in one (1) or more adjacent counties as provided by KRS 74.115 , it may operate the distribution system so acquired, or extended, without adding additional board members, if the new area to be served shall be deemed to be a minor portion of the total area served by the district, and if the fiscal court of the county containing the minor portion of the total area shall have agreed to the acquisition or to the extension of the distribution system. If less than twenty-five percent (25%) of the total assets of the distribution system are located within any particular county included in the territorial boundaries of the district, it shall be conclusively presumed, with respect to that particular county, that the district comes within the terms of this subsection.
  2. A commissioner may be removed from office as provided by KRS 65.007 or 74.025.
  3. A commissioner who participates in any official action by the water district board of commissioners which results in a direct financial benefit to him may be removed from office as provided by KRS 65.007 or 74.025.
  4. Vacancies shall be filled by the same appointing authority which is empowered to make the original appointment. Vacancies resulting from cause other than expiration of the term shall be filled for the unexpired term only. Notwithstanding KRS 67.710 , a vacancy resulting from the expiration of a term or the death, resignation, or removal of the incumbent shall be filled by the Public Service Commission if, within ninety (90) days following the vacancy, the vacancy has not been filled by the appropriate county judge/executive with approval of the fiscal court.
  5. The commission shall elect a chairman, vice chairman, secretary, treasurer, and any other officers and assistant officers as the commission may deem necessary, each of whom shall be members of the commission. Any two (2) or more offices may be held by the same person, except that the chairman may not hold any other office. Each commissioner shall execute a bond for the faithful performance of the duties of his position.
  6. Each commissioner shall receive an annual salary of not more than thirty-six hundred dollars ($3,600), which shall be paid out of the water district fund, except that beginning January 1, 1999, each commissioner who completes during an educational year a minimum of six (6) instructional hours of water district management training approved by the Public Service Commission may receive an annual salary of not more than six thousand dollars ($6,000) to be paid out of the water district fund. An educational year shall begin on January 1 and end on the following December 31. In the case of single-county districts, which shall be deemed to include districts described in paragraph (c) of subsection (1) of this section, the salary shall be fixed by the county judges/executive with the approval of the fiscal court; in multicounty districts, it shall be fixed by the agreement between the county judges/executive with the approval of their fiscal courts. In fixing and approving the salary of the commissioners, the county judge/executive and the fiscal court shall take into consideration the financial condition of the district and its ability to meet its obligations as they mature.
    1. In order to receive an increase in salary as specified in subsection (6) of this section, commissioners shall successfully complete six (6) instructional hours of water district management training annually. The training shall be approved and paid for by the water district of the county the commissioner represents. Those commissioners not required to complete the six (6) instructional hours shall be reimbursed for the cost of instruction if they choose to complete the water district training. (7) (a) In order to receive an increase in salary as specified in subsection (6) of this section, commissioners shall successfully complete six (6) instructional hours of water district management training annually. The training shall be approved and paid for by the water district of the county the commissioner represents. Those commissioners not required to complete the six (6) instructional hours shall be reimbursed for the cost of instruction if they choose to complete the water district training.
    2. The Public Service Commission shall be responsible for the regulation of all water district management training programs for commissioners of water districts, combined water, gas, or sewer districts, or water commissions.
    3. The Public Service Commission shall encourage and promote the offering of high quality water district management training programs that enhance a water district commissioner’s understanding of his or her responsibilities and duties. The commission shall, no later than January 1, 1999, establish standards and procedures to evaluate, accredit, and approve water district management training programs.
    1. At least once annually, the Public Service Commission shall provide or cause to be conducted a program of instruction, consisting of at least twelve (12) hours of instruction, that is intended to train newly appointed commissioners in the laws governing the management and operation of water districts and other subjects that the Public Service Commission deems appropriate. The commission may charge a reasonable registration fee to recover the cost of the programs and may accredit programs of instruction that are conducted by other persons or entities and that the commission deems equivalent to its program of instruction. (8) (a) At least once annually, the Public Service Commission shall provide or cause to be conducted a program of instruction, consisting of at least twelve (12) hours of instruction, that is intended to train newly appointed commissioners in the laws governing the management and operation of water districts and other subjects that the Public Service Commission deems appropriate. The commission may charge a reasonable registration fee to recover the cost of the programs and may accredit programs of instruction that are conducted by other persons or entities and that the commission deems equivalent to its program of instruction.
    2. Within twelve (12) months of his or her initial appointment, each commissioner shall complete the program of instruction described in paragraph (a) of this subsection. Any commissioner who fails to complete the program within twelve (12) months of his or her initial appointment shall forfeit his or her office and all right to act in discharge of the duties of the office. A commissioner required to attend a program under this subsection shall be reimbursed for the cost of instruction by his or her water district.
    1. Within thirty (30) days of the occurrence of a vacancy on its board of commissioners resulting from the expiration of a term or the death, resignation, or removal of the incumbent, a water district shall notify in writing the Public Service Commission of the existence of the vacancy. The notice shall include the name of the commissioner who last held the position and the date on which the unexpired term will end. (9) (a) Within thirty (30) days of the occurrence of a vacancy on its board of commissioners resulting from the expiration of a term or the death, resignation, or removal of the incumbent, a water district shall notify in writing the Public Service Commission of the existence of the vacancy. The notice shall include the name of the commissioner who last held the position and the date on which the unexpired term will end.
    2. Within thirty (30) days of the appointment of a commissioner and the appropriate fiscal court’s approval of that appointment, a water district shall notify the Public Service Commission of the appointment. The notice shall include the appointed person’s name and the date of the expiration of his or her term.
  7. The Public Service Commission may promulgate administrative regulations in accordance with KRS Chapter 13A to implement the requirements of this section.

History. 928g-2, 928g-4: amend. Acts 1952, ch. 12; 1958, ch. 174, § 1; 1962, ch. 218, § 1; 1966, ch. 170, § 1; 1966, ch. 255, § 88; 1970, ch. 218, § 1; 1974, ch. 309, § 1; 1976, ch. 257, § 1; 1978, ch. 384, § 181, effective June 17, 1978; 1980, ch. 18, § 4, effective July 15, 1980; 1982, ch. 330, § 9, effective July 15, 1982; 1984, ch. 307, § 1, effective July 13, 1984; 1992, ch. 310, § 1, effective July 14, 1992; 1992, ch. 388, § 3, effective July 14, 1992; 1994, ch. 298, § 1, effective July 15, 1994; 1996, ch. 236, § 1, effective April 4, 1996; 1998, ch. 76, § 1, effective July 15, 1998; 2008, ch. 6, § 3, effective July 15, 2008; 2010, ch. 18, § 1, effective July 15, 2010.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(6/5/2014). The Reviser of Statutes renumbered KRS 74.455 and KRS 74.025 on this date to provide a more appropriate location for that statute within KRS Chapter 74. Two references to KRS 74.455 in this statute were also changed to KRS 74.025 to conform.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

Louisville Extension Water Dist. v. Diehl Pump & Supply Co., 246 S.W.2d 585, 1952 Ky. LEXIS 640 ( Ky. 1952 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

In the absence of any statutory provision authorizing a water district to dissolve and prescribing the procedure for dissolution, dissolution may not be accomplished. OAG 63-666 .

Where a water district was formed entirely within one county and embraced a fourth-class city that contracted for water from the district the board of commissioners of the water district was limited to three members. OAG 64-488 .

A person who lives outside a water district cannot be a commissioner of the district. OAG 67-323 .

Where the water board consisted of three members, two members of the water commission could execute a contract employing a water district superintendent. OAG 69-311 .

The members of a water board could not, by executing a contract employing a water district superintendent, bind their successors. OAG 69-311 .

The statute contemplates in the filling of a vacancy an actual and existing vacancy. OAG 70-422 .

The appointment of a commissioner of a water district to a second term prior to the conclusion of his first term was not valid where the appointing judge died prior to the commencement of the second judge and a successor judge was appointed in his place. OAG 70-422 .

Although KRS 74.010 and this section provide that the water district commissioners shall be appointed by the county judge, the county judge would be acting prematurely and without legal authority if the appointments were made before the appropriate persons have been granted authority by the public service commission to petition the appropriate county court and before they have in fact petitioned the county court to have a water district established. OAG 74-185 .

An individual who lives in a community within the county but is not a part of the county water district because the community has a private water system would not be eligible to serve as a member of the board of commissioners of the water district. OAG 74-185 .

If a commissioner of a water district moves his residence outside the jurisdictional limits of the water district he has disqualified himself and would be subject to removal; he would not, however, automatically vacate his office by moving outside the district and, until such disqualified person resigned or was removed, he would be a de facto officer whose acts are considered legal. OAG 76-381 .

Where, beginning with 1974, the commissioners of a water district have voted themselves a salary for each year, the county judge and fiscal court could, by an appropriate order, ratify the action taken by the board of commissioners. OAG 77-425 .

The county judge/executive does not have authority to remove a water commissioner from office, but such power of removal is lodged in the Public Service Commission. OAG 78-215 .

This section states that a water district commissioner shall be appointed by the county judge/executive with the approval of the fiscal court and there is no statutory authority for such an appointment to be made by a magistrate, acting unilaterally, or by the superintendent of the water district. OAG 78-341 .

A county judge/executive cannot legally serve at the same time as a water board commissioner, since that would involve a common-law incompatibility and would be against public policy and none of the other members of fiscal court (that is, the magistrates or commissioners on the fiscal court) can legally serve as commissioners of a water board for the same year for the same reasons. OAG 78-651 .

Where a water district customer no longer lived in the district because the district expanded into another county and deleted that part of the original district in which the customer resided, that individual would not be eligible to be a water district commissioner since the term “original” as used in subsection (1)(b) of this section appears to mean the originating district as distinguished from the district as it was originally formed, and the legislative intent of that subsection is that the three members from the original district must reside within the district. OAG 80-201 .

Constitution § 237 would prohibit the postmaster of a first class post office in a city from being on the water board, since the postmaster position of a first class post office would be an “office of trust”; and a water board member is an office of trust under Kentucky law. OAG 80-234 .

There is no constitutional nor statutory incompatibility where a person is a school teacher and a member of the water board at the same time. OAG 80-234 .

There is no conflict of interest where a commissioner of a water district is also president of the local bank which purchased the refinancing bonds of the district and in which the funds of the district are deposited in a checking account. OAG 80-654 .

Where a water district was created in one county and, after being expanded into a second county, all of the first county area was deleted from the district, except for a small slice of land serving two customers, a vacancy on the board of commissioners, which left two commissioners from the original district and two from the extended district sitting, must be filled by a commissioner from the original district, pursuant to the literal language of subsection (1)(b) of this section, even though only two customers remain in that district. OAG 81-394 .

Where two existing commissioners of a bi-county water district lived outside the originally created district, which has been reduced to a strip of land serving two people, they could not serve their unexpired terms because the literal language of this section requires that they reside in the original district portion of the water district. OAG 81-394 .

There is nothing in this section that suggests any variation for urban county government with respect to appointments of water district commissioners. Thus, the county judge/executive of an urban county must appoint the water district commissioners for that county. OAG 82-144 .

As the later and more specific statute, this section controls over Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 20, § 10, which would exempt urban county governments from KRS 67.710(8); thus the conclusion in OAG 82-144 that the county judge/executive in an urban county must make the water district appointments involving the urban county territory is correct. OAG 82-174 .

When considering KRS 67.710(8) and KRS 67.712(1) in connection with general statute powers of the county judge/executive, it would appear that the mayor in an urban county takes the place of the county judge/executive as to such general statute powers; however, this section, and the appointment of water district board commissioners hereunder, does not involve a general statute but involves a specific statute, relating only to appointments to water district boards. OAG 82-174 .

A member of the water district board can hold over after the expiration of his term only where there is no regularly elected and qualified successor; where such officers hold over, their official acts are valid until their successors are appointed and qualified and they may be considered de facto officers. OAG 82-176 .

If the fiscal court acts arbitrarily in withholding its approval of an appointment to the water district board, the county judge/executive can seek approval through a mandamus action in the Circuit Court. OAG 82-176 .

Once the county judge/executive appoints water commissioners, the fiscal court is required to either approve or disapprove of the appointments; however, the fiscal court cannot disapprove of such appointment on whimsical, unreasonable, or arbitrary grounds and if it disapproves, there must be some rational or sound reason for the disapproval since Ky. Const., § 2 prohibits the exercise of absolute and arbitrary power. OAG 82-176 .

The appointment procedure of subsection (1)(a) of this section is the same as that of KRS 67.710(8), in that the appointments to the water district board of commissioners are made by the county judge/executive, with the approval of the fiscal court. OAG 82-176 .

Since members of the water district commission are not state, county or city officers, no incompatibility would exist where a person serves as a member of the commission and at the same time serves on the city council; of course where any business develops between the water district and the city, concerning which a vote must be taken, the councilman in question should refrain from participating or voting on the matter as this would be against public policy. OAG 82-635 .

Water district commissioners are appointed by the county judge/executive with the approval of fiscal court, pursuant to this section; clearly the fiscal court has no authority to nominate or initially appoint such commissioners. OAG 84-206 .

As relates to the proper number of commissioners on the board of commissioners of a two-county water district, and assuming that the extension of the original water district did not involve acquiring an existing water or gas distribution system as described in subdivision (1)(c) of this section, the proper number of board members is controlled by subdivision (1)(b) of this section; it provides in part that where a district is formed in a single county and extends its area to include territory in an adjacent county under KRS 74.115 , the board of commissioners shall be appointed by the county judge/executive with the approval of the fiscal courts of the concerned counties as follows: in two-county districts, three members from the original district and two members from the extended portion of the district. OAG 84-210 .

Under subdivision (1)(b) of this section, only residency in the water district is significant and board members need not be customers of the water district; the by-laws of a water district must be in harmony with the statutes and thus where by-laws required that water district board members be customers of the water district they were in conflict with this section. OAG 84-228 .

A member of a county water district can also serve as mayor of a newly established city of the sixth class which is located within the boundaries of the district. OAG 84-279 .

This section clearly requires commissioners appointed by the county judge/executive to be legal residents of the district. OAG 84-279 .

The word “resident”, as it appears in subsection (1)(a) of this section, logically refers to legal residence, which consists of actual residence at a place, coupled with the intent to remain at such place; the word “reside” or “resident,” as a qualification for holding some public office, is considered to be equivalent to legal domicile, as distinguished from the place of actual abode. Thus, where one has an actual domicile, and departs from it temporarily intending to return, it will remain his legal domicile for all purposes. OAG 85-41 .

Fiscal court’s motion limiting to two the number of consecutive terms that members of the Airport Board, Library Board, Water Commission, District Board of Health, Planning Commission and Parks and Recreation Board might serve was illegal, since there is no statutory authority for such action. While KRS 173.340 and 212.855 impose a limit on consecutive terms, as relate to a library board and a district board of health, the General Assembly has established no policy limiting the number of consecutive terms for members of the other boards and commissions, and there is no statutory authority for the fiscal court’s enacting such a policy as to the four bodies not covered by a General Assembly statute. OAG 85-116 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Conditions of bond, KRS 62.060 .

2008-2010 Budget Reference.

See 2009 (1st Extra. Sess.) Ky. Acts ch. 2, sec. 9, at p. 120, amending Part I, Operating Budget, F. Environmental and Public Protection Cabinet, 20. Public Service Commission, of 2008-2010 State/Executive Branch Budget, 2008 Ky. Acts ch. 127.

74.030. Legal services — Payment.

The commission may employ legal counsel whose compensation shall be paid from water district funds.

History. 938g-18: amend. Acts 1946, ch. 16; 1958, ch. 174, § 2; 2008, ch. 6, § 4, effective July 15, 2008.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

A technical correction has been made to this section by the Reviser of Statutes under authority of KRS 7.136 .

Opinions of Attorney General.

A water district could not employ and compensate the county attorney for performing legal duties for it since the county attorney is required by statute to act as counsel for the district. OAG 66-315 .

This section impliedly prohibits a member of a county attorney’s law firm from serving as special counsel for a water district and sharing the fees with the county attorney. OAG 76-172 .

If the legal fees accruing for work performed by the county attorney’s partners in his law firm for the water district and hospital are divided only among his partners, excluding himself, the legislative policy of no extra compensation to the county attorney would not be violated. OAG 78-13 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Underwood, Part-Time Prosecutors and Conflicts of Interest: A Survey and Some Proposals, 81 Ky. L.J. 1 (1993).

74.040. Chief executive officer — Employees — Expenses — Salary.

The commission may employ a person to serve as the chief executive officer of the water district. This person shall not be one (1) of the water district’s commissioners. The person may be designated the general manager, superintendent, or chief executive officer of the district or by any other similar title. The chief executive officer shall perform such additional duties as the commission may require of him or her and shall be subject to the orders of the commission. The chief executive officer shall employ all necessary labor and assistance in the performance of his or her duties, and he or she shall report to the commission all expenses incurred. The salary of the chief executive officer shall be fixed by the commission.

History. 938g-21: amend. Acts 2008, ch. 6, § 5, effective July 15, 2008.

Opinions of Attorney General.

The members of a water board could not, by executing a contract employing a water district superintendent, bind their successors. OAG 69-311 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Public works must be under supervision of registered professional engineer or architect, KRS 322.360 .

74.050. Treasurer — Duties — Compensation — Bond.

The treasurer of the commission shall be the lawful custodian of the funds of the water district and shall cause the funds to be disbursed according to procedures adopted by the commission. The procedures shall include a requirement for approval of disbursements by a commissioner in addition to the treasurer. The treasurer shall cause to be maintained a proper record of the receipts and disbursements of the water district in accordance with the Uniform System of Accounts for utilities. In addition to the compensation for commissioners as set out in KRS 74.020 , as compensation for his or her services the treasurer shall receive an amount fixed by the commission, not to exceed two hundred dollars ($200) per year. The treasurer shall execute bond to the commission in an amount and with such surety as determined by the commission.

History. 938g-15, 938g-19: amend. Acts 1966, ch. 255, § 89; 2008, ch. 6, § 6, effective July 15, 2008.

74.060. Power of appointment to include power of removal. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (938g-16) was repealed by Acts 1958, ch. 174, § 3.

74.070. Duties and powers of commission — Corporate powers of water district exercised by or under authority of commission.

  1. The commission shall be a body corporate for all purposes, and may make contracts for the water district with municipalities and other persons.
  2. All corporate powers of the water district shall be exercised by, or under the authority of, its commission. The business and affairs of the water district shall be managed under the direction and oversight of its commission.
  3. The commission may prosecute and defend suits, hire the chief executive officer and do all acts necessary to carry on the work of the water district.
  4. The commission may adopt bylaws not inconsistent with the provisions of this chapter.
  5. The commission shall comply with the provisions of KRS 65A.010 to 65A.090 .

History. 938g-4, 938g-5: amend. Acts 2008, ch. 6, § 7, effective July 15, 2008; 2013, ch. 40, § 26, effective March 21, 2013.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Contracts.

Where supply company furnished material and labor to district at phone request of one commissioner there was no enforceable contract under which company could recover as contract was not made according to statutes, and neither could company recover because district received benefits from material and labor furnished for the law does not raise any promises to pay under contract which district had no power to make. Louisville Extension Water Dist. v. Diehl Pump & Supply Co., 246 S.W.2d 585, 1952 Ky. LEXIS 640 ( Ky. 1952 ).

One contracting with a political subdivision such as a water district does so at his peril, unless the contract is executed in the manner provided by statute and where supply company furnished labor and material to district at phone request of one commissioner there was no enforceable contract upon which the company could recover. Louisville Extension Water Dist. v. Diehl Pump & Supply Co., 246 S.W.2d 585, 1952 Ky. LEXIS 640 ( Ky. 1952 ).

Contract under which all assets of water district were transferred to the city and the city assumed all liabilities of water district was authorized under this section. Valla v. Preston Street Road Water Dist., 395 S.W.2d 772, 1965 Ky. LEXIS 164 ( Ky. 1965 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

In the absence of any statutory provisions authorizing a water district to dissolve and prescribing the procedure for dissolution, dissolution may not be accomplished. OAG 63-666 .

The retirement system authorized for political subdivisions under KRS Chapter 78 provides the only existing statutory authority applicable to a water district and the board of commissioners must follow the dictates of KRS Chapter 78 in establishing a system. OAG 67-85 .

A water district had legal authority to sell particular water lines to a city if the water district followed the steps outlined in its bond ordinance pertaining to a sale. OAG 67-544 .

A water district’s regulations, concerning water and sewage, can extend only to its own water and sewage facilities. OAG 69-562 .

A county water district may borrow money from local banks (without a revenue bond issue) to extend water lines in the county; the borrowing of the money is conditioned upon two elements: (1) any restrictions contained in KRS Chapter 74; and (2) the sound business judgment of the water district commissioners. The statutes in KRS Chapter 74 strongly suggest that the water commission, in engaging in a loan, must consider the total available revenues from assessments and service charges which are uncommitted; further, the commission must carefully weigh the repayment of the loan in terms of uncommitted revenues which are reasonably anticipated to become available during the life of the loan. It is a pay-as-you-go concept, though not dictated by the Constitution. OAG 83-129 .

A water district organized pursuant to the provisions of KRS Chapter 74 could probably require property owners within its service area to hook up to its water distribution system in the interest of public health, safety and welfare. OAG 84-148 .

74.075. Establishment of fire protection district by water district.

The board of commissioners of any legally existing water district created under the authority of KRS Chapter 74 may have the power to create a fire protection district where no fire protection district exists by following the procedures of KRS 65.810 and 75.010 .

History. Enact. Acts 1972, ch. 56, § 1; 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 64, effective January 2, 1978; 1984, ch. 64, § 11, effective July 13, 1984.

74.076. Limits — Commissioners.

The newly created fire protection district shall be coextensive with the original water district and the board of commissioners shall be the same for the fire protection district as for the original water district. A fire protection district created under KRS 74.075 to 74.077 shall conform to all the provisions of KRS Chapter 75 except those that are in conflict with KRS 74.075 to 74.077 .

History. Enact. Acts 1972, ch. 56, § 2.

74.077. Postponement of organization pending decision on prior action.

Nothing in KRS 74.075 to 74.077 shall be construed to deny the right to the citizens of a water district to organize a fire protection district as provided under KRS Chapter 75 except that if action has already been taken under KRS 74.075 to 74.077 and remains pending, action for organization of a fire protection district shall be postponed until a final decision has been reached.

History. Enact. Acts 1972, ch. 56, § 3.

74.080. Rates and regulations.

The commission may establish water rates and make reasonable regulations for the disposition and consumption of water.

History. 938g-5.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Regulations.

Enforcement of regulation of water district permitting service connections only with houses facing a street or road with a water main therein against appellee was not discriminatory in view of the stipulation that all other noncomplying users, with two possible exceptions, had connected prior to the adoption of the regulation. Middletown Water Dist. v. Tucker, 284 S.W.2d 666, 1955 Ky. LEXIS 33 ( Ky. 1955 ).

2. — Reasonableness.

Regulation of water district permitting service connections only with houses facing a street or road with a water main therein the object of which was to control the water system expansion and to provide fire protection was not an unreasonable and unenforceable attempt to try to tell appellee which way his house must face in order to receive water service. Middletown Water Dist. v. Tucker, 284 S.W.2d 666, 1955 Ky. LEXIS 33 ( Ky. 1955 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

A water district’s regulations, concerning water and sewage, can extend only to its own water and sewage facilities. OAG 69-562 .

Under this section the owner of rental property may be required to pay for water furnished to his premises and used by a former tenant before water service is furnished to a subsequent tenant. OAG 73-520 .

74.085. Interest rate to be paid by water district. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1990, ch. 357, § 1, effective July 13, 1990) was repealed by Acts 1994, ch. 221, § 2, effective July 15, 1994. For present law, see KRS 278.460 .

74.090. Condemnation.

If it becomes necessary to acquire a right of way or land, and it cannot be acquired by purchase, the commission may condemn the needed property in the manner provided in the Eminent Domain Act of Kentucky. The owners of land sought to be condemned shall be made parties to the proceeding. Any damage awarded shall be paid by the commission out of the first funds available.

History. 938g-7: amend. Acts 1976, ch. 140, § 24.

Compiler’s Notes.

The Eminent Domain Act of Kentucky is compiled as KRS 416.540 to 416.680 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Treatises

Caldwell’s Kentucky Form Book, 5th Ed., Practice Context for Condemnation (Eminent Domain), § 307.00.

74.100. Acquisition of existing systems — Extension of mains and laterals — How paid for.

  1. Whenever a water supply line or system is in operation in any water district, and is supplying water to the citizens and landowners, and the commission deems it expedient to acquire the existing system, they may examine it, and if they find it properly designed and constructed they may purchase it, and pay for it in the same manner as provided for the original construction and improvement; or may pay for it in whole or in part out of any surplus funds in possession, receipt or anticipation of receipt by the commission.
  2. The commission may order any work or improvement it deems necessary to extend the necessary water mains and water laterals in the district to supply water to the residents of the district, and pay for such work by assessment against the land benefited according to benefits, as provided in this chapter, or may pay for the work in whole or in part out of the general fund of the water district realized from all other resources in the district.

History. 938g-6.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Right of Acquisition.

This section explicitly authorizes the commissioners to purchase the properties and franchises of an existing water company, and to pay for it by assessment according to benefits as provided for the original construction. Ryan v. Commissioners of Water Dist., 220 Ky. 822 , 295 S.W. 1023, 1927 Ky. LEXIS 612 ( Ky. 1927 ). See Middendorf v. Jameson, 265 Ky. 111 , 95 S.W.2d 1057, 1936 Ky. LEXIS 417 ( Ky. 1936 ).

A water district has no authority to acquire any part of an existing water system that lies outside the boundaries of the district. To do so would otherwise constitute an attempt to extend the boundaries of the district in a way not authorized by KRS 74.110 . Olson v. Preston St. Water Dist., 291 Ky. 155 , 163 S.W.2d 307, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 195 ( Ky. 1942 ).

Subsection (1) of this section anticipates that two or more water systems may operate side by side and moreover the legislature intended, by subsec. (1) to give water district power to purchase another water system within its district, but not to coerce other water system to sell to it. Hamrick v. Ashland, 321 S.W.2d 401, 1959 Ky. LEXIS 281 ( Ky. 1959 ).

Where owner of private water distribution system entered into contract with city whereby city was to furnish water for system on request of owner and city had first option to purchase water system if owner decided to sell it, since subsection (1) of this section does not give water district exclusive right to purchase water supply line or system that is within its territorial boundaries city could exercise its option when district offered to buy system. Hamrick v. Ashland, 321 S.W.2d 401, 1959 Ky. LEXIS 281 ( Ky. 1959 ).

2. Right to Furnish Water.

Where city and owner of private water distribution system had entered into contract wherein one provision gave city first option to purchase system should owner desire to sell it and later water district was formed and district offered to purchase system, district had right to raise question concerning whether it had exclusive rights to furnish water within territorial limits of district under this section. Hamrick v. Ashland, 321 S.W.2d 401, 1959 Ky. LEXIS 281 ( Ky. 1959 ).

3. Conflicting Water Suppliers.

Where water company was a municipally owned company within the meaning of KRS 96.230 company had the right to furnish water outside corporate limits of city and incorporation of water district did not deprive company of right to serve consumers being served at time of incorporation of district and those consumers being served at that time which company was in a position to serve and which district could not serve within immediate future, for although this section authorizes purchase of existing water facilities by a district within its territory there is nothing in KRS 74.010 to 74.990 which would give district authority to prevent sale of water to consumers by company. Board of Comm'rs v. Yunker, 239 S.W.2d 984, 1951 Ky. LEXIS 928 ( Ky. 1951 ), overruled, Louisville Water Co. v. Public Service Com., 318 S.W.2d 537, 1958 Ky. LEXIS 141 ( Ky. 1958 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

In the absence of fraud, corruption, or arbitrary action, the judgment of the board of commissioners of a water district as to extensions of the system to an entirely new section within its certificated area is beyond judicial control, since the commissioners of the district exercise a discretionary function in deciding whether to extend its system. OAG 75-719 .

The reasonableness of action by the board of commissioners of a water district in deciding whether to extend its system to an entirely new section within its certificated area can be measured in terms of the certificated area, the new area to be served, the need and cost of such extension, the financial impact of the extension upon the public service company, and the impact upon the total service available to the general public of the certificated area. OAG 75-719 .

Where a water district has already been established, the fiscal court under the Home Rule Act (KRS 67.083 ) may expend county funds to finance the extension of water system lines. OAG 76-240 .

74.110. Change of districts — Procedure — Deficit.

The territorial limits of an established water district may be enlarged or diminished in the following way:

  1. The commission shall file a petition with the county judge/executive, describing the territory to be annexed or stricken off, and setting out the reasons therefor.
  2. Notice of the petition shall be given in the manner provided by KRS Chapter 424. Within thirty (30) days after the notice, any resident of the water district or the territory proposed to be annexed may file objections and exceptions.
  3. The county judge/executive shall set the matter for hearing, and if the county judge/executive finds that it is reasonably necessary, he shall enter an order annexing or striking off the proposed territory. If the county judge/executive finds that the proposed change is unnecessary, he shall dismiss the petition. Either party may appeal the order to the Circuit Court.
  4. If any of the territory stricken off has been assessed to pay the costs of any improvements, the commission shall strike the assessments from the assessment roll and refund to the respective owners any assessments collected on the land which have been stricken off.
  5. If a deficit is incurred by striking off part of a water district, or by striking assessments from the assessment roll, so that the assessment roll is insufficient to pay the bonded indebtedness of the district, the deficit shall be paid out of the general fund of the district, realized from all other resources in the district.

History. 938g-3: amend. Acts 1978, ch. 384, § 182, effective June 17, 1978; 2008, ch. 6, § 8, effective July 15, 2008.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Acquisition of Water System Outside Boundaries.

A water district has no authority to acquire any part of an existing water system that lies outside the boundaries of the district. To do so would constitute an attempt to extend the boundaries of the district in a way not authorized by this section. Olson v. Preston St. Water Dist., 291 Ky. 155 , 163 S.W.2d 307, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 195 ( Ky. 1942 ).

2. Dissolution of District.

Under this section a water district can be diminished to the point of extinction and so dissolved. Valla v. Preston Street Road Water Dist., 395 S.W.2d 772, 1965 Ky. LEXIS 164 ( Ky. 1965 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

The general authority to annex additional territory set out in the statute cannot be construed to extend and apply to the territory of another water district. OAG 63-666 .

Although a water district could obtain a city water supply simply by constructing a connecting water line, the water district would have to extend its boundaries in order to serve customers presently located outside of its boundaries. OAG 76-234 .

Where an order of a county court has authorized a water district to annex territory of another water district which has transacted no business since the organizing procedures were completed but which has not been dissolved according to statutory provisions, the acquiring water district would have to satisfy the requirements of KRS 278.020 to obtain a certificate of convenience and necessity before beginning the construction of any plant or facility for furnishing water to the public. OAG 76-285 .

After January 1, 1978, petitions for extension or reduction of territorial limits of a water district must be filed with the county judge/executive. OAG 77-760 .

This section is a governmental power vested in the county judge/executive. OAG 82-144 .

County water district which previously constructed a gas system pursuant to KRS 74.401 could sell the gas system under the procedure of this section. The implications of KRS 74.367 and 74.361 suggested that final approval of the Public Service Commission should be sought before such sale took place. OAG 82-229 .

A county which was improperly designated a part of a multi-county water district, and which had appointed two commissioners to serve on the board of commissioners would have no recourse against the originating county or the water district after procedures were commenced to reduce the district to the proper area (when the district would no longer include the county which was improperly made a part of the multi-county district). OAG 84-210 .

74.115. Extension of district into adjoining county.

  1. Upon written request of two (2) or more freeholders in a county or counties adjacent to a county containing a water district, the board of commissioners of the district may petition the county judge/executive of the adjoining county or counties for addition of proposed territory. The procedure for such extension shall be the same as prescribed in KRS 74.110 and the county judge/executive of the adjoining county may make such order as is therein provided.
  2. Water districts may be established and extended regardless of whether the entire territory of the district is continuous, provided that such territory lies in a county or counties in which the district has been authorized to serve.

History. Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 70, § 6; 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 20, § 6, effective January 2, 1978; 1978, ch. 384, § 183, effective June 17, 1978.

Opinions of Attorney General.

After January 1, 1978, petitions for extension or reduction of territorial limits of a water district must be filed with the county judge/executive OAG 77-760 .

A county which was improperly designated a part of a multi-county water district, and which had appointed two commissioners to serve on the board of commissioners would have no recourse against the originating county or the water district after procedures were commenced to reduce the district to the proper area (when the district would no longer include the county which was improperly made a part of the multi-county district). OAG 84-210 .

This section was not designed to embrace, by way of addition, any part of an existing water system lying outside the boundaries of the district. OAG 84-210 .

As relates to the proper number of commissioners on the board of commissioners of a two-county water district, and assuming that the extension of the original water district did not involve acquiring an existing water or gas distribution system as described in KRS 74.020(1)(c), the proper number of board members is controlled by KRS 74.020(1)(b); it provides in part that where a district is formed in a single county and extends its area to include territory in an adjacent county under this section, the board of commissioners shall be appointed by the county judge/executive with the approval of the fiscal courts of the concerned counties as follows: in two-county districts, three members from the original district and two members from the extended portion of the district. OAG 84-210 .

74.120. Incorporated city may be included in district — Consent — Contract with city.

  1. All or any part of an incorporated city may be included in the boundaries of any existing water district or water district being newly organized, provided the governing body of such city by resolution or ordinance gives, or has given, its consent. Said consent may be limited to water, gas or sewage service, and the authority of the water district to serve the area of the incorporated city shall be limited by the exclusion of any type of service from the consent given. Any city which has been included in the boundaries of a water district for ten (10) or more years shall be deemed to have given its consent to the service, whether water, gas, or sewage, which has been provided for such period. The acquisition by a water district of an existing franchise for a water, gas, or sewage distribution system within such a city, whether by purchase, assignment or otherwise, shall be deemed to constitute the consent of the city which granted the franchise in the first instance, but only for the purpose of operating the type of distribution system for which the franchise was granted.
  2. The commission may contract with any city which is not included within the boundaries of the district for the purpose of furnishing water, gas or sewage services to the residents of such city and may contract with any city for the purpose of obtaining water, gas or sewage services for the use of the district.
  3. When the commission shall contract with any city of the first five (5) classes in the manner prescribed in this section, such city shall be deemed a part of the district during the life of the contract, but only for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of the contract. Nothing herein shall impair the ownership by the contracting city of its own system, or empower the district to take any action not authorized by the contract.

History. 938g-24: amend. Acts 1952, ch. 133, § 6; 1952, ch. 175; 1954, ch. 106, § 1; 1962, ch. 218, § 2; 1966, ch. 170, § 2; 1988, ch. 104, § 1, effective July 15, 1988.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Annexation of Area by City.

Where subdivision was annexed by city over a month after previously formed water district received a certificate of public convenience and necessity authorizing it to provide the subdivision with water, the city had a right to provide water in the subdivision and water district was excluded. Flemingsburg v. Public Service Com., 411 S.W.2d 920, 1966 Ky. LEXIS 28 ( Ky. 1966 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Where a city within a water district had not functioned as a governmental agency for more than 30 years but the city had never been dissolved, a board of trustees would have to be appointed in order to pass the ordinance to include the city in the water district. OAG 65-32 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Gas and sewage sytems, procedure for a water district to acquire and operate, KRS 74.400 to 74.410 .

74.120. Incorporated city may be included in district — Consent — Contract with city.

  1. All or any part of an incorporated city may be included in the boundaries of any existing water district or water district being newly organized, provided the governing body of such city by resolution or ordinance gives, or has given, its consent. Said consent may be limited to water, gas or sewage service, and the authority of the water district to serve the area of the incorporated city shall be limited by the exclusion of any type of service from the consent given. Any city which has been included in the boundaries of a water district for ten (10) or more years shall be deemed to have given its consent to the service, whether water, gas, or sewage, which has been provided for such period. The acquisition by a water district of an existing franchise for a water, gas, or sewage distribution system within such a city, whether by purchase, assignment or otherwise, shall be deemed to constitute the consent of the city which granted the franchise in the first instance, but only for the purpose of operating the type of distribution system for which the franchise was granted.
  2. The commission may contract with any city which is not included within the boundaries of the district for the purpose of furnishing water, gas or sewage services to the residents of such city and may contract with any city for the purpose of obtaining water, gas or sewage services for the use of the district.
  3. When the commission shall contract with any city in the manner prescribed in this section, such city shall be deemed a part of the district during the life of the contract, but only for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of the contract. Nothing herein shall impair the ownership by the contracting city of its own system, or empower the district to take any action not authorized by the contract.

History. 938g-24: amend. Acts 1952, ch. 133, § 6; 1952, ch. 175; 1954, ch. 106, § 1; 1962, ch. 218, § 2; 1966, ch. 170, § 2; 1988, ch. 104, § 1, effective July 15, 1988; 2014, ch. 92, § 45, effective January 1, 2015.

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Gas and sewage systems, procedure for a water district to acquire and operate, KRS 74.400 to 74.410 .

74.130. Classification of lands for assessments — Report.

  1. The commission shall examine the real estate in the district that may be affected by the proposed water system, and classify it into five (5) classes according to the benefit it will receive from the construction and operation of the water system. The real estate receiving the most benefit shall be marked “class A,” and the other classes shall be marked “class B,” “class C,” “class D” and “class E,” respectively, the real estate receiving the smallest benefit being marked “class E.” All real estate actually receiving water shall be placed in the highest classification. The amount of real estate owned by any person in each class, and the extent benefited shall be determined. The scale of assessment to be made by the commission upon the several classes shall be in the ratio of five (5), four (4), three (3), two (2) and one (1). The classification shall form the basis of the assessment of benefits to the real estate for all purposes.
  2. If the commission believes that substantial injustice will be done any landowner by strict conformity to the five (5) class rule above, the classification may be changed by diminishing or increasing the number of classes so as to conform to existing conditions.
  3. The commission shall make a report containing a statement of the estimated cost of the work and improvement to be made in the district, a description of all real estate in the district, showing the amount of real estate in each class, in tabulated form, and the names of the owners, and a statement of the estimated benefits that will accrue to each class of real estate by reason of the construction of the proposed improvements.

History. 938g-8.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Assessment.
2. — Method.

The use of two classifications based on primary and secondary benefits “to conform to existing conditions” is proper under this section. Barnes v. Jacobsen, 417 S.W.2d 224, 1967 Ky. LEXIS 247 ( Ky. 1967 ).

This section does not require that the assessment be made in proportion to the front footage of the property abutting the water line or according to the areas of the properties. Barnes v. Jacobsen, 417 S.W.2d 224, 1967 Ky. LEXIS 247 ( Ky. 1967 ).

3. — Postponement.

Water district may issue bonds payable out of revenues or, if necessary, by assessment, and postpone imposition of assessment to a future undetermined time. Postponement of assessment in this manner does not constitute a lien, but only a potential lien. Theobald v. Board of Comm'rs, 288 Ky. 720 , 157 S.W.2d 285, 1941 Ky. LEXIS 184 ( Ky. 1941 ).

4. — Insufficient Bond Revenues.

A water district may authorize revenue bonds for the construction of a waterworks system with a provision that if revenues are insufficient to meet minimum requirements under the bond ordinance, the district will make an assessment, in proportion to the assessed values of such property for ad valorem taxation purposes, against all property owners who have not paid a tap-in connection charge to the district prior to the filing of the assessment roll. Barnes v. Jacobsen, 417 S.W.2d 224, 1967 Ky. LEXIS 247 ( Ky. 1967 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Although a water district may issue revenue bonds and make assessments against benefited properties, the district does not have authority to levy an ad valorem tax. OAG 77-329 .

74.140. Acceptance of report — Notice — Final hearing.

When the final report is completed and filed, it shall be examined by the county judge/executive, and if it is found to be sufficient it shall be accepted. If it is not sufficient, it may be referred back to the commission with instructions to secure further information, to be reported at a subsequent date fixed by the county judge/executive. When the report is fully completed and accepted by the county judge/executive, a date not less than twenty (20) days thereafter shall be fixed by the county judge/executive for the final hearing upon the report, and notice of the hearing shall be given by publication pursuant to KRS Chapter 424. During that time, a copy of the report shall be on file in the office of the county clerk, and shall be open to the inspection of any landowner or person interested within the district. Any landowner assessed therein may file exception to the report. The county judge/executive upon final hearing shall confirm or reject the report.

History. 938g-9: amend. Acts 1966, ch. 239, § 21; 1978, ch. 384, § 184, effective June 17, 1978.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

Barnes v. Jacobsen, 417 S.W.2d 224, 1967 Ky. LEXIS 247 ( Ky. 1967 ).

74.150. Assessment roll — Statement of costs — Hearing — Final order — Appeal.

  1. After the classification of the land and the ratio of assessment of the different classes to be made has been confirmed by the county judge/executive, the commission shall prepare an assessment roll in duplicate, signed by the chairman and secretary of the commission, giving a description of all the land in the water district, the name of the owner, and the amount of assessment against each of the several tracts of land. In preparing this assessment roll the commission shall ascertain the total cost of the improvement, the cost of the proceedings and all wages paid or to be paid, and the total shall be the amount to be paid by the lands benefited. Attached to this water-assessment roll and filed with it, shall be a statement of all the costs of the work to be done, and five percent (5%) in addition to meet any unforeseen contingencies. This statement of costs shall also be made in duplicate and signed by the chairman and secretary of the commission. One (1) copy of the assessment roll and statement of costs shall be filed with the county clerk in which the proceeding is pending, and he shall then give at least ten (10) days’ notice of the time of the hearing on the assessment roll and statement of costs.
  2. At the time fixed for the hearing, the county judge/executive shall hear in a summary way all objections to the cost of the improvement, as set out in the statement made by the commission and filed with the assessment roll, and all objections to the assessments of lands therein set forth, and shall enter an order confirming the assessment roll, or directing the commission to change the assessments in accordance with the finding of the county judge/executive. The order of the county judge/executive confirming or modifying the assessment roll and statement of costs shall be final for all purposes if not appealed within thirty (30) days after the entry of the order. The county judge/executive shall also direct the clerk to certify to the treasurer of the commission a copy of the assessment roll as filed by the commission or changed by the county judge/executive. One (1) copy of the assessment roll shall be retained by the clerk and recorded as part of the record.

History. 938g-10: amend. Acts 1978, ch. 384, § 185, effective June 17, 1978; 1988, ch. 104, § 3, effective July 15, 1988.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Lien.

When the assessment roll shall become final it constitutes first and paramount lien against the land assessed, subject only to the lien for state and county taxes. Theobald v. Board of Comm'rs, 288 Ky. 720 , 157 S.W.2d 285, 1941 Ky. LEXIS 184 ( Ky. 1941 ).

Cited:

Barnes v. Jacobsen, 417 S.W.2d 224, 1967 Ky. LEXIS 247 ( Ky. 1967 ).

74.160. Striking assessments from roll — Procedure.

After the assessment roll has been confirmed or modified by the county judge/executive, if the commission is unable to furnish water to the owner of any land in the district, or if the land in any part of the district is so sparsely populated that in the opinion of the commission water could not be furnished to the owners thereof without incurring an unreasonable burden of additional assessment against the lands or an unreasonable burden of indebtedness against the water district without receiving any corresponding return in the profits realized from the sale of water in the territory, the commission may strike the assessments on land not receiving water from the assessment roll, or may reduce the assessments to conform with the benefits received, and refund to the respective owners any assessments collected that have been stricken off or reduced. After striking or reducing such assessments, the commission shall file a petition with the county judge/executive setting out the reasons why the assessments should be stricken off or reduced, with a certified copy of the assessments so stricken off or reduced. The county judge/executive shall then set the proceeding for a hearing, and after giving at least ten (10) days’ notice of the time of the hearing, the county judge/executive shall hear all objections to the order of the commission striking or reducing the assessment, and shall enter an order confirming the action of the commission or directing them to change the assessment roll in accordance with the finding of the county judge/executive. The order of the county judge/executive confirming or modifying the order of the commission striking off or reducing the assessment may be appealed from. If a deficit is incurred by striking or reducing any assessment so as to make the assessments insufficient to pay any bonded indebtedness of the water district, the deficit shall be paid out of the general fund of the district realized from all other revenues collected or to be collected in the district.

History. 938g-10: amend. Acts 1978, ch. 384, § 186, effective June 17, 1978.

74.170. Payment of assessments in thirty days — Constructive consent to bond issue or loan.

Any landowner whose land is assessed for any improvement under the provisions of this chapter may pay his assessment in full at any time within thirty (30) days after notice of assessment has been given. Every person who fails to pay the full amount of his assessment to the treasurer of the commission within thirty (30) days shall be deemed as consenting to the issuing of water district bonds or the taking of a loan by the district, to be repaid out of assessment revenues.

History. 938g-11, 938g-12: amend. Acts 1988, ch. 104, § 4, effective July 15, 1988.

74.175. Deferred assessments — Limitation on actions.

  1. When the water district desires to construct a water main which shall be primarily a transmission line and secondarily a line to serve customers along the water main, the commission may recommend to the court that the assessments be on a deferred basis. If the court determines that the water main is primarily a transmission main, and secondarily benefits the property owners abutting the water main, the court may provide that the assessments shall be on a deferred basis.
  2. In the event the assessments are on a deferred basis, they shall not be immediately due and payable until the benefit to the abutting property owners is realized either by a sale of the property or when the abutting property owner desires to tap into the water main, and at that time the deferred assessment shall be paid in full without interest. For a deferred assessment on which the district has not initiated collection action in the courts by July 14, 1992, limitations on an action to collect shall not begin to run until the assessment is immediately due and payable as provided for in this subsection.
  3. In the event a property owner who has a deferred assessment against his property sells only a portion of the property or desires water service for only a portion of the property, the deferred assessment shall be prorated and paid only for the portion being sold or for the reasonable area of property being served by the water main. The property owner shall be required to furnish to the commission a plat of the property being sold or the area which will be served with water, and no other area may be served from that service unless an additional portion of the deferred assessment is paid. For an additional portion of a deferred assessment on which the district has not initiated collection action in the courts by July 14, 1992, limitations on an action to collect shall not begin to run until the additional portion is immediately due and payable because of further sale of the property or further extension of water service.
  4. All remaining provisions of the assessment statutes shall apply to deferred assessments, except as same may be inconsistent with this deferred assessment provision.

History. Enact. Acts 1988, ch. 104, § 2, effective July 15, 1988; 1992, ch. 388, § 1, effective July 14, 1992.

74.177. Extension of water service to agricultural district land — Deferral of assessment — Payment of service connection costs.

  1. When a water district extends its water lines within its district or extends its water lines under KRS 74.110 beyond the district’s territorial limits, and the extension would benefit land within an agricultural district created under KRS 262.850 , the assessment against the land within the agricultural district for the cost of the extension shall be deferred. The assessment shall become payable when the land is removed, in part or in its entirety, from the agricultural district and developed for nonagricultural use. If only part of the land is removed from the agricultural district, the deferred assessment shall be prorated and paid only on the portion of the land removed. The land remaining in the district shall continue to benefit from the deferred assessment.
  2. The owner of land for which the assessment of costs for a water line extension has been deferred shall pay for any connection to provide water service from the water line extension to the land benefited by the deferred assessment.

History. Enact. Acts 2000, ch. 115, § 2, effective July 14, 2000.

74.180. Issuance of bonds or temporary financing of unpaid assessments.

  1. If all assessments are not paid in full by thirty (30) days after notice of assessment, the commission may issue bonds for the amount of the unpaid assessments, or may finance improvements on a temporary basis from district revenues or a loan to be repaid when assessments are collected. If the commission decides to issue bonds, it shall give notice that it proposes to issue bonds, giving the amount of bonds to be issued, the rate of interest they are to bear, and the time they will become payable.
  2. At the expiration of thirty (30) days after the publication, the commission may divide the unpaid assessments into not less than ten (10) annual installments, which shall draw interest at the rate or rates or method of determining rates as the commission deems best and be payable annually, from thirty (30) days after the date of publication. The bonds shall mature in series to correspond with the installments into which the unpaid assessments are divided, and shall draw interest at the rate or rates or method of determining rates as the commission determines, be payable at least annually, and be payable at some place to be designated by the commission. The bonds shall be for the exclusive use and benefit of the water district and shall designate on the face the name of the district and the purpose for which they were issued.
  3. The commission, in dividing the unpaid assessments into installments, shall fix the time for payment, and each landowner shall pay the installments due on his land, with interest due on that installment and deferred installments, to the treasurer of the commission on or before the time fixed by the commission for the maturity of the installment.

History. 938g-11, 938g-13: amend. Acts 1988, ch. 104, § 5, effective July 15, 1988; 1996, ch. 274, § 7, effective July 15, 1996.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

The legislature had the power to enact in a prior law providing for the establishment of water districts a provision that the commissioners at the end of thirty days after making of assessments could issue bonds to pay any balance due. Ryan v. Commissioners of Water Dist., 220 Ky. 822 , 295 S.W. 1023, 1927 Ky. LEXIS 612 ( Ky. 1927 ) (decided under prior law).

2. Bonds.
3. — Security.

Revenues may be pledged as security for the payment of bonds issued by a water district as well as the proceeds of the required assessments. Olson v. Preston St. Road Water Dist., 286 Ky. 66 , 149 S.W.2d 766, 1941 Ky. LEXIS 214 ( Ky. 1941 ).

When secured by the assessments only the bonds are not negotiable. When secured in addition by the revenues, they are negotiable. All doubt as to the right of the district to issue negotiable bonds should be resolved in favor of the existence of the power. Olson v. Preston St. Road Water Dist., 286 Ky. 66 , 149 S.W.2d 766, 1941 Ky. LEXIS 214 ( Ky. 1941 ).

4. — Payment.

When bonds are payable from revenues, and, if necessary, by assessment, such assessments are not payable in installments, this section contemplating only those instances where the entire cost is payable from assessments. Theobald v. Board of Comm'rs, 288 Ky. 720 , 157 S.W.2d 285, 1941 Ky. LEXIS 184 ( Ky. 1941 ).

5. — Sale.

Water district bonds may be sold for less than par plus accrued interest if the amount be accepted by the commissioners as the best price obtainable and adequate under the circumstances. Olson v. Preston St. Road Water Dist., 286 Ky. 66 , 149 S.W.2d 766, 1941 Ky. LEXIS 214 ( Ky. 1941 ).

74.190. Collection of unpaid installments — Sale of land — Redemption — Settlement with collecting officers — Fees.

  1. Upon the first Monday after an installment is due, the commission shall meet and ascertain the parties whose installments are in default and shall within sixty (60) days issue warrants directing the sheriff or other collecting officer to collect the installments that are in default. The collecting officer shall collect the installments, with interest due on them and deferred installments, together with a penalty of six percent (6%), in the same way state and county taxes are collected, and the collecting officer shall settle with the commission within sixty (60) days from the time the installments were certified to him.
  2. All lands upon which the installments have not been collected at the end of sixty (60) days shall be advertised and sold by the collecting officer in the same manner as in the case of state and county taxes. The sale so made shall be subject to the future installments of the assessments, and at the expiration of ninety (90) days from the date of the original certification of the installments to the collecting officer, the collecting officer shall make final settlement with the commission and pay to them all the moneys in his hands. If the collecting officer fails to make a settlement, the commission may compel him to make the settlement by order against him issued by the district court, after giving him five (5) days’ notice in writing. In case any land is not purchased at the sale, the collecting officer shall bid in the land for the district and in his final settlement with the commission shall take credit therefor. The collecting officer shall certify each of the sales to the county clerk as required in the sale of lands for state and county taxes, and the clerk shall record each sale in a book kept by him. For collecting the assessments certified to him the collecting officer shall be paid by the water commission the same fees allowed him for collecting state and county taxes and in the same manner. For recording the certificate of sale the clerk shall be allowed and paid the same fees allowed him by law for similar work in reference to state and county taxes.
  3. The owner of such real estate, or his representatives, heirs or assigns, shall have the right to redeem the land from the sale as is provided for the redemption of lands sold for state and county taxes, but only upon the same terms and conditions and within the same time as allowed in such case.

History. 938g-13: amend. Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 65, effective January 2, 1978; 1978, ch. 384, § 187, effective June 17, 1978.

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Clerk’s fees, KRS 64.012 .

Payment, collection and refund of taxes, KRS Chapter 134.

74.200. Modification of assessment — Relevy.

When the county judge/executive has confirmed an assessment for the construction of a water system and the assessment has been modified by a court, or for some unforeseen cause it cannot be collected, the commission may modify the assessment as originally confirmed to conform to the judgment of the court and to cover any deficit caused by the order of the county judge/executive or unforeseen occurrence. The relevy shall be made for the additional sum required, in the same ratio as in the original assessment. In any other case where it is ascertained that the amount assessed against the property in the water district is not sufficient to complete the improvements provided for, such deficit may be paid out of current reserve, or the county judge/executive may order a relevy upon the petition of the commission, or any three (3) or more petitioners. The petition must set forth the amount of the deficit, the causes thereof, and the amount necessary to be raised in order to complete the work. The county judge/executive shall give notice of the filing and purpose of the petition and fix a time, not less than ten (10) nor more than twenty (20) days from the giving of the notice, when the petition shall be acted upon. If upon hearing the county judge/executive finds that the relevy asked for in the petition is necessary in order to complete the work, the county judge/executive shall direct such relevy to be made by the commission. The relevy shall be made in the same ratio as the original assessment was made and shall be collected in the same way.

History. 938g-14: amend. Acts 1978, ch. 384, § 188, effective June 17, 1978.

74.210. Lien of assessments.

The assessment roll and each installment shall be a first lien on the land assessed, subject only to the lien for state and county taxes.

History. 938g-10, 938g-13.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Attachment.

Lien attaches when assessment roll becomes final. Prior to that time there is only a potential lien. Theobald v. Board of Comm'rs, 288 Ky. 720 , 157 S.W.2d 285, 1941 Ky. LEXIS 184 ( Ky. 1941 ).

74.220. Assessment roll as evidence — Enforcement of liens — Proceedings — Costs.

The assessment roll as made up by the commission shall be prima facie evidence in all courts that all steps necessary to be taken have been properly taken, and that all proceedings are regular and valid. The commission may enforce liens under this chapter by an action against the land in the Circuit Court at any time after January 1 of the year for which the assessments were levied. The right to institute such an action shall not prevent sales by the collecting officer as in cases of delinquent state and county taxes. The proceeds of sales in actions under this section shall be paid into the treasury of the district.

History. 938g-18.

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Collection of public claims by action, KRS Chapter 135.

74.230. Effect of irregularity — Exclusive remedies — Effect of release.

The collection of an assessment shall not be defeated, where the parties are properly before the court, on account of any irregularity in the proceedings that does not affect the substantial right of the party complaining. The remedies provided for in this chapter are exclusive of all other remedies. If any person or property is released, or any assessment raised or lowered, it shall not affect the rights or liabilities of any other property or person.

History. 938g-20.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

Olson v. Preston St. Water Dist., 291 Ky. 155 , 163 S.W.2d 307, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 195 ( Ky. 1942 ).

74.240. Record of expenses to be kept — Apportionment of expenses — Financial report to consumers — Books to be open for inspection.

  1. The commission shall keep an account of the time spent by all employees, and each item of expense incurred in connection with any water district, and shall charge such account to the district for which the expense was incurred. Where the time or work is upon more than one (1) district at the same time, it shall be apportioned between the districts. In the event any compensation fixed by the commission for any employee is on a salary basis, such salary shall be equitably apportioned between the districts by the commission.
  2. The commission shall be required to prepare and make available, to the consumers of the water supplied by any water district, an annual statement of receipts and disbursements; and any floating or bonded indebtedness. This report shall show the cost of water, material, labor, other salaries and any other expenses incidental to the operation and maintenance.
  3. All books of the commission shall be open for public inspection during normal business hours.

History. 938g-17: amend. Acts 1946, ch. 70.

74.250. Fees — Costs. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (938g-15) was repealed by Acts 2008, ch. 6, § 18, effective July 15, 2008.

74.260. Letting of work — Notice — Procedure — Bond of bidder. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (938g-22: amend. Acts 1952, ch. 92; 1966, ch. 239, § 22; 2005, ch. 108, § 1, effective June 20, 2005) was repealed by Acts 2006, ch. 158, § 2, effective July 12, 2006.

74.270. Monthly estimates — Payment. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (938g-23) was repealed by Acts 2002, ch. 193, § 1.

74.280. Additions may be acquired.

  1. Any water district may construct or acquire, and operate, within or without the district, additions, extensions, and all necessary appurtenances to the water system, the cost of which may not be assessed as a local benefit, for the purpose of supplying the water district with water.
  2. One (1) or more of such additions, extensions, or appurtenances owned by one (1) or more persons may be acquired as a single enterprise, and the commission may agree with the owner as to the value thereof and purchase the same at that value.

History. 938g-28 (1933 Supp.

Opinions of Attorney General.

Where a water district has already been established, the fiscal court under the Home Rule Act (KRS 67.083 ) may expend county funds to finance the extension of water system lines. OAG 76-240 .

74.290. Issuance of bonds for additions.

  1. For the purpose of defraying the cost of constructing or acquiring any additions, extensions, and necessary appurtenances under KRS 74.280 , the water district may borrow money and issue negotiable bonds. Before any bonds are issued an ordinance shall be enacted by the commission specifying the amount of the bonds and the rate of interest they are to bear, and reciting that the proposed additions, extensions, or necessary appurtenances that are to be constructed or acquired are to be made pursuant to the provisions of KRS 74.280 to 74.310 .
  2. All bonds issued under this section shall bear interest at a rate or rates or method of determining rates payable at least annually, and shall be executed in a manner, and be payable at times not exceeding fifty (50) years from the date of issue, and at a place, as the commission shall determine.
  3. All bonds shall be negotiable and shall not be subject to taxation. If any officer whose signature or countersignature appears on the bonds or coupons ceases to be an officer before delivery of the bonds, his signature or countersignature shall nevertheless be valid the same as if he had remained in office until delivery. The bonds shall be sold in a manner as the commission shall deem for the best interest of the water district, or the contract for the acquisition of any additions, extensions, and appurtenances to the waterworks may provide that payment shall be made in bonds. The bonds shall be payable solely from the revenues of the waterworks and shall not constitute an indebtedness of the water district within the meaning of the Constitution. It shall be plainly stated on the face of each bond that it has been issued under the provisions of KRS 74.280 to 74.310 and that it does not constitute an indebtedness of the water district within the meaning of the Constitution.
  4. If the commission finds that the bonds authorized will be insufficient to accomplish the purpose desired, additional bonds may be authorized and issued subject to the limitations prescribed for the original bonds.

History. 938g-28 (1933 Supp.): amend. Acts 1966, ch. 70, § 7; 1968, ch. 110, § 6; 1996, ch. 274, § 8, effective July 15, 1996.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Application.

The part of subsection (3) of this section which reads “The bonds shall not be negotiated on a basis to yield more than six per cent” applies only to the cost that the issuing district is permitted to pay for the use of the borrowed money. Valla v. Preston Street Road Water Dist., 395 S.W.2d 772, 1965 Ky. LEXIS 164 ( Ky. 1965 ) (decision prior to 1966 amendment).

Opinions of Attorney General.

A county water district may borrow money from local banks (without a revenue bond issue) to extend water lines in the county; the borrowing of the money is conditioned upon two elements: (1) any restrictions contained in KRS Chapter 74; and (2) the sound business judgment of the water district commissioners. The statutes in KRS Chapter 74 strongly suggest that the water commission, in engaging in a loan, must consider the total available revenues from assessments and service charges which are uncommitted; further, the commission must carefully weigh the repayment of the loan in terms of uncommitted revenues which are reasonably anticipated to become available during the life of the loan. It is a pay-as-you-go concept, though not dictated by the Constitution. OAG 83-129 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Removal of interest rate limits, KRS 58.430 .

74.300. Payment of bonds for additions — Operating and depreciation funds.

  1. All money derived from any bonds issued under KRS 74.280 to 74.310 shall be applied solely for the construction or acquisition of the additions, extensions and appurtenances, or to advance the payment of interest on bonds during the first three (3) years following the date of issue of the bonds.
  2. At or before the issuance of such bonds the commission shall by ordinance set aside and pledge the income and revenue of the waterworks into a separate and special fund to be used and applied in the payment of the cost of the additions, extensions or appurtenances and the maintenance, operation and depreciation thereof. The ordinance shall definitely fix and determine the amount of revenue that is necessary to be set apart and applied to the payment of the principal and interest of the bonds, and the proportion of the balance of such income and revenue that is to be set aside as a proper and adequate depreciation account. The balance shall be set aside for the operation and maintenance of the waterworks. The rates to be charged for the service from the waterworks shall be sufficient to provide for the payment of interest upon all bonds and to create a sinking fund to pay the principal when due, and to provide for the operation and maintenance thereof and an adequate depreciation account.
  3. If there is a surplus in the operating and maintenance fund equal to the cost of maintaining and operating the waterworks during the remainder of the current calendar or fiscal year, and during the next calendar or fiscal year, the commission may at any time transfer any excess over that amount to the depreciation account.
  4. The funds in the depreciation account shall be expended in balancing depreciation in the waterworks or in making new constructions, extensions or additions thereto. The funds may be invested as the commission designates and the income from investments shall be credited to the depreciation account.

History. 938g-28 (1933 Supp.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

Public Service Com. v. Dewitt Water Dist., 720 S.W.2d 725, 1986 Ky. LEXIS 314 ( Ky. 1986 ).

74.310. Receiver on default.

If there is any default in the payment of the principal or interest of any bonds issued under KRS 74.280 to 74.300 , any court having jurisdiction of the action may appoint a receiver to administer the waterworks on behalf of the water district. The receiver shall charge and collect rates sufficient to provide for the payment of any bonds or obligations outstanding against the waterworks and for the payment of the operating expenses and shall apply the income and revenue in conformity with KRS 74.300 .

History. 938g-28 (1933 Supp.

74.320. Refunding bonds authorized.

Water districts organized and operating under this chapter, or under Chapter 139 of the Acts of 1926, may issue refunding bonds for the purpose of refunding any bonded debt.

History. 938g-28.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

Refunding bonds issued by water districts and payable solely out of revenue raised by assessments of property in the district, are not within the inhibitions of Ky. Const., §§ 157 and 158. Middendorf v. Jameson, 265 Ky. 111 , 95 S.W.2d 1057, 1936 Ky. LEXIS 417 ( Ky. 1936 ).

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Issuance of bonds and control of funds, KRS Chapter 66.

74.330. Issuance — Form of bonds — Signatures.

Refunding bonds shall be issued under the signature of the chairman of the commission, the countersignature of the treasurer of the commission, and the seal of the district. The bonds shall be serially numbered. The commission shall prescribe the form and denominations of the bonds, and the time, not exceeding forty (40) years, at which they will mature and be redeemable. The bonds shall bear interest at a rate or rates or method of determining rates as the commission directs, be payable at least annually, and shall have interest coupons attached. The proceeds of the bonds shall be used exclusively for the refunding of bonded debts. In case any officer whose signature or countersignature appears on the bonds or coupons ceases to be an officer before delivery of the bonds, his signature or countersignature shall nevertheless be valid the same as if he had been in office until delivery.

History. 938g-29: amend. Acts 1968, ch. 110, § 7; 1996, ch. 274, § 9, effective July 15, 1996; 2008, ch. 6, § 9, effective July 15, 2008.

74.340. Interest payments and repurchase of bonds out of sinking fund — Bonds negotiable and nontaxable.

Upon the issuance of refunding bonds, the water district shall annually, from delinquent assessment collection and other revenues, carry to the sinking fund of the water district an amount sufficient to pay the annual interest on the bonds and create a fund for their purchase. Whenever there is a sufficient sum in the sinking fund over the amount required for the payment of interest, it shall be used in the purchasing of as many bonds as is practicable. All such bonds shall be negotiable and shall not be subject to taxation.

History. 938g-30.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

Pulaski County v. Ben Hur Life Ass’n, 286 Ky. 119 , 149 S.W.2d 738, 1941 Ky. LEXIS 210 ( Ky. 1941 ).

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Morrow, County Debt Difficulties in Kentucky, 31 Ky. L.J. 242 (1943).

74.350. County may pay part costs.

Any county may, by resolution of the fiscal court, pay any part of the costs of establishing or purchasing a water line or water system.

History. 938g-25.

Opinions of Attorney General.

A county fiscal court had no authority to appropriate funds to assist in the funding of revenue bonds issued by a water district. OAG 68-121 .

Where, from a construction standpoint, a water district was not completely established, the fiscal court could provide for county contributions to the water system calculated to assist in stablizing and making secure such system. OAG 68-266 .

Once a county water district is operating successfully and meeting its obligations and the original construction has been completed, the water system is “established” within the meaning of this section and would not be entitled to receive funds from the fiscal court. OAG 73-772 .

Where a water district has already been established, the fiscal court under the Home Rule Act (KRS 67.083 ) may expend county funds to finance the extension of water system lines. OAG 76-240 .

74.360. Manner of giving notices required by this chapter.

The notices required by KRS 74.110 , 74.150 , 74.160 , 74.170 , 74.180 and 74.200 shall be given by publication pursuant to KRS Chapter 424.

History. 938g-3, 938g-9 to 938g-11, 938g-14: amend. Acts 1966, ch. 239, § 23.

74.361. Merger of water districts — Hearing — Orders.

  1. The General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Kentucky determines as a legislative finding of fact that reduction of the number of operating water districts in the Commonwealth will be in the public interest, in that mergers of such districts will tend to eliminate wasteful duplication of costs and efforts, result in a sounder and more businesslike degree of management, and ultimately result in greater economies, less cost, and a higher degree of service to the general public; and that the public policy favors the merger of water districts wherever feasible.
  2. The Public Service Commission of Kentucky is authorized and empowered to initiate, carry out, and complete such investigations, inquiries, and studies as may be reasonably necessary to determine the advisability as to the merger of water districts. Prior to ordering a hearing with reference to the merger of any water district into one (1) or more additional water districts, the Public Service Commission shall cause to be prepared in writing a feasibility report and study regarding the proposed merger, containing such studies, investigations, facts, historical data, and projections as in the circumstances may be required in order to enable the commission to formulate a proper decision regarding such merger.
  3. Based upon the written report and study required to be made incident to any water district merger, the Public Service Commission may propose by order that a merger of water districts be accomplished, and, upon the issuance of such order, shall give actual notice to all water districts proposed to be merged. Said order shall provide for a formal public hearing to be held before the Public Service Commission on the subject of such proposed merger. Actual notice of such merger hearing shall also be furnished to the county judges/executive of each county containing a water district proposed to be merged, and each water commissioner of a water district proposed to be merged, and notice of such public hearing shall be afforded to the public served by the respective water districts sought to be merged, by newspaper notice in accordance with the provisions of KRS Chapter 424.
  4. A formal hearing before the Public Service Commission shall be held with reference to such merger proposal, and, upon such occasion, all water districts which are sought to be merged into a single entity shall be afforded the right to appear, to present evidence, to examine all exhibits and testimony, to cross-examine all witnesses, and to submit such memoranda, written evidence, and briefs as may be desired. Such public hearing may be adjourned from time to time by the Public Service Commission, and notice of such adjournments may, but need not, be afforded as with reference to the initial public hearing. At the conclusion of such proceedings, the Public Service Commission shall enter its order, either merging the water districts which are the subject of the merger proceedings into a single water district, or abandoning the merger proposal.
  5. Outstanding obligations of any water district merged in accordance with the provisions of this section which are secured by the right to levy an assessment as provided by KRS 74.130 to 74.230 , inclusive, or secured by a pledge of the income and revenues of the systems operated by any such merged water district, shall continue to be retired from such moneys and funds as shall be collected from the users of facilities operated by such merged water districts in the original water district area in accordance with the terms and provisions of the enabling laws and the authorizing resolutions or indentures under which the outstanding obligations were issued, until all such obligations have been retired.
  6. In any order ordering the merger of water districts, the Public Service Commission shall make such additional orders as may be required in connection with the schedule of rates, rentals and charges for services rendered to be levied by the water district which remains in existence following such merger, having due regard to contractual commitments made and entered into by the constituent merged water districts in connection with the issuance of obligations by such districts.
  7. Upon the effective date of any merger of water districts, the water commissioners of the merged water districts shall continue to serve as water commissioners of the resulting district, regardless of their normal term expiration, until one (1) year after approval of the merger by the Public Service Commission. Thereafter, the board shall be composed as set forth in KRS 74.363 . The appropriate county judge/executive or county judges/executive shall appoint and reappoint water commissioners to manage the business and affairs of the resultant water district, in the manner provided by KRS 74.363 .
  8. Any order of merger entered by the Public Service Commission in accordance with this section shall be subject to all of the provisions of KRS Chapter 278, with reference to petitions for rehearing, and appeal.
  9. Using the authority of this section the Public Service Commission can also cause mergers of water associations into water associations or mergers of water associations into water districts.
  10. Nothing contained herein shall be construed to prohibit or limit in any respect the acquisition by water utilities subject to the jurisdiction of the commission or by municipally owned water utilities of the assets of water districts or water associations or the merger of water districts or water associations and water utilities subject to the jurisdiction of the commission or municipally owned water utilities.

History. Enact. Acts 1972, ch. 310, § 4; 1978, ch. 384, § 189, effective June 17, 1978; 2008, ch. 6, § 10, effective July 15, 2008.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Cost of Study.

The Public Service Commission has no authority, under KRS 278.255 , to impose the cost for a merger feasibility study on utilities who are the subject of the study, undertaken pursuant to this section. Public Serv. Comm'n v. Attorney Gen. of Commonwealth, 860 S.W.2d 296, 1993 Ky. App. LEXIS 111 (Ky. Ct. App. 1993).

Opinions of Attorney General.

The implications of KRS 74.367 and this section suggested that final approval of the Public Service Commission should be sought before a county water district which previously constructed a gas system pursuant to KRS 74.401 sold same under KRS 74.110 . OAG 82-229 .

This section and KRS 74.363 are in conformity with the spirit of Ky. Const., § 19, which prohibits any law impairing the obligation of contracts. OAG 82-259 .

This section permits mergers of water districts into water associations, as well as mergers of water associations into water districts, which are all subject to the regulatory authority of the Public Service Commission. OAG 82-259 .

74.363. Merger of water districts — Board of resulting district — Transfer of assets — Payment of obligations.

  1. Boards of commissioners of any two (2) or more water districts may by concurrent action and by approval of a majority of the membership of the board of each merge their districts into one (1).
  2. The members of the boards of commissioners of the merged water districts shall serve as members of the board of commissioners of the resulting district, regardless of their normal term expiration, until one (1) year after approval of the merger by the Public Service Commission. Thereafter, the board shall be composed as follows:
    1. If the boundaries of the resulting district lie wholly within a single county, the board of commissioners shall be composed of between three (3) and seven (7) members as agreed upon by the merged water districts in their merger documents.
    2. If the boundaries of the resulting district lie within two (2) or more counties, the board of commissioners shall be composed of six (6) or more members as agreed upon by the merged water districts in their merger documents.
  3. Each appointment to the board of commissioners of the resulting district shall be made by the appropriate county judge/executive with the approval of the fiscal court. Each member of the board shall be a resident of the county from which he or she is appointed. The initial terms of the board of commissioners after the merger shall be as follows: approximately one-third (1/3) of the commissioners shall be appointed for a term of two (2) years; approximately one-third (1/3) of the commissioners shall be appointed for a term of three (3) years; and the remaining commissioners shall be appointed for a term of four (4) years. Thereafter, all commissioners shall be appointed for a term of four (4) years. KRS 74.020(2) to (10) shall apply to all commissioners and vacancies on the board of commissioners.
  4. The resulting district shall have all the assets and legal liabilities of the water districts joining in the merger. The separate existences of the water districts joining in the merger, except the resulting district, shall cease, and the title to all real estate and other property owned by the water districts joining in the merger shall be vested in the resulting district without reversion or impairment. Bonded obligations of any district secured by the right to levy an assessment as provided by KRS 74.130 through 74.230 or secured by the revenue of the systems operated by the district shall continue to be retired or a sinking fund for such purpose created from the tax assessments or revenue from the system operated by the district from funds collected over the same area by the new board of commissioners in accordance with the laws under which the bonds were issued until all bonded obligations of the old district have been retired.

History. Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 70, § 4; 1994, ch. 298, § 2, effective July 15, 1994; 1996, ch. 236, § 2, effective April 4, 1996; 1998, ch. 76, § 2, effective July 15, 1998; 2008, ch. 6, § 11, effective July 15, 2008; 2010, ch. 18, § 2, effective July 15, 2010.

Opinions of Attorney General.

KRS 74.361 and this section are in conformity with the spirit of Ky. Const., § 19, which prohibits any law impairing the obligation of contracts. OAG 82-259 .

74.367. Discontinuance of water district — Procedure.

  1. At any time after the organization of a water district, and after approval by the Public Service Commission in a proceeding similar to that provided by KRS 74.012 , more than fifty percent (50%) of the freeholders within the district may file a petition with the county judge/executive who had jurisdiction over the organization of the district requesting discontinuance of the water district. The petition shall state the reasons for discontinuance and that all obligations of the district have been met and that approval of the Public Service Commission has been obtained.
  2. After giving notice as provided in KRS Chapter 424 the county judge/executive may conduct such hearings on the petition as may be necessary to assist in making a determination.
  3. If, after hearings on the petition for discontinuance of the district the county judge/executive determines that a discontinuance is in the best interest of the residents of the district, the water district shall be dissolved by order of the county judge/executive and a copy of the order shall be forwarded to the Public Service Commission.

History. Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 70, § 5; 1980, ch. 188, § 53, effective July 15, 1980; 1980, ch. 369, § 8, effective July 15, 1980.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

This section was amended by two 1980 acts which do not appear to be in conflict and have been compiled together.

Opinions of Attorney General.

Where an order of a county court has authorized a water district to annex territory of another water district which has transacted no business since the organizing procedures were completed but which has not been dissolved according to statutory provisions, the acquiring water district would have to satisfy the requirements of KRS 278.020 to obtain a certificate of convenience and necessity before beginning the construction of any plant or facility for furnishing water to the public. OAG 76-285 .

The elimination of a territory from a water district can be effected through KRS 74.110 . OAG 82-144 .

The implications of this section and KRS 74.361 suggested that final approval of the Public Service Commission should be sought before a county water district which previously constructed a gas system pursuant to KRS 74.401 sold same under KRS 74.110 . OAG 82-229 .

74.370. Construction, acquisition or enlargement of system by issuance of revenue bonds or by a combination of bonds and assessments.

  1. Any water district, created in the manner provided in KRS 74.010 to 74.070 , both inclusive, may if the commissioners of such water district deem it feasible, build, or acquire or enlarge a water system without resort to, or in combination with, the right to levy assessments for the cost of such water system, as is provided in KRS 74.130 to 74.240 , both inclusive, and may obtain the funds with which to build, acquire or enlarge such system by the issuance of revenue bonds, payable solely from the revenue to be derived from the operation of such system, or payable partially from revenues and partially from assessments.
  2. In the event the commissioners shall decide to finance the cost of such construction, acquisition or enlargement by the issuance of revenue bonds, secured solely by the revenue of the system or partially by the revenue of the system and partially by assessments, the commission shall note such decision by appropriate resolution, and shall thereafter proceed under the provisions of KRS 96.350 to 96.510 , both inclusive, and the water district and the commission shall have the same powers and duties as a city of the second to sixth class inclusive under the provisions of KRS 96.350 to 96.510 , both inclusive. However, the water district and the commission shall not be limited solely to the revenue of the system in securing revenue bonds so issued.

History. Enact. Acts 1944, ch. 141, § 1; 1988, ch. 104, § 6, effective July 15, 1988; 2008, ch. 6, § 12, effective July 15, 2008.

Opinions of Attorney General.

A water district organized under KRS Chapter 74 may, pursuant to this section, finance enlargements of the water system by issuing revenue bonds payable solely from the revenue to be derived from the operation of such system, but when revenue bonds are utilized there can be no assessments against the landowners. OAG 63-23 .

A water district which has financed a water system through issuance of revenue bonds payable solely from the revenues of the water district may not assess the property of those benefiting from the system in order to make up the deficiencies needed to retire the bonds. OAG 67-378 .

74.370. Construction, acquisition or enlargement of system by issuance of revenue bonds or by a combination of bonds and assessments.

  1. Any water district, created in the manner provided in KRS 74.010 to 74.070 , both inclusive, may if the commissioners of such water district deem it feasible, build, or acquire or enlarge a water system without resort to, or in combination with, the right to levy assessments for the cost of such water system, as is provided in KRS 74.130 to 74.240 , both inclusive, and may obtain the funds with which to build, acquire or enlarge such system by the issuance of revenue bonds, payable solely from the revenue to be derived from the operation of such system, or payable partially from revenues and partially from assessments.
  2. In the event the commissioners shall decide to finance the cost of such construction, acquisition or enlargement by the issuance of revenue bonds, secured solely by the revenue of the system or partially by the revenue of the system and partially by assessments, the commission shall note such decision by appropriate resolution, and shall thereafter proceed under the provisions of KRS 96.350 to 96.510 , both inclusive, and the water district and the commission shall have the same powers and duties as a city inclusive under the provisions of KRS 96.350 to 96.510 , both inclusive. However, the water district and the commission shall not be limited solely to the revenue of the system in securing revenue bonds so issued.

History. Enact. Acts 1944, ch. 141, § 1; 1988, ch. 104, § 6, effective July 15, 1988; 2008, ch. 6, § 12, effective July 15, 2008; 2014, ch. 92, § 46, effective January 1, 2015.

74.380. Refunding assessment bonds with revenue bonds.

If any district has previously issued bonds secured entirely or partially by the right to levy an assessment as provided by KRS 74.130 to 74.230 , both inclusive, and such bonds are redeemed prior to maturity, bonds to refund same may be issued secured solely by the revenue of said system in the manner provided in KRS 74.370 .

History. Enact. Acts 1944, ch. 141, § 2.

74.390. Revenue bond plan is alternative.

KRS 74.370 and 74.380 shall not repeal nor reduce any existing rights or duties of a water district, and the commissioners thereof, but shall constitute an additional and alternate method of financing.

History. Enact. Acts 1944, ch. 141, § 3.

74.395. Financing of an expansion of water district system — Plan for expansion project — Applicability.

  1. A water district organized under this chapter may elect to finance all or part of an expansion of its system by adding a temporary surcharge to the rates charged for service. All funds so collected shall be set apart in a reserve trust account, shall be invested in securities issued or guaranteed by the United States government until they are needed, and shall be expended, together with any interest or other earnings, solely for the expansions or extensions specified in the plan described under subsection (2) of this section. If construction has not begun five (5) years after the surcharge is implemented, all funds so collected shall be returned to the water district customers, together with interest and earnings. This section shall constitute an additional or alternate method of financing expanded facilities, and shall not repeal or reduce any existing rights or duties of a water district.
  2. A water district which elects to establish a reserve trust account under this section shall develop a plan for the expansion project or projects to be financed from the reserve, which shall include the design and estimated cost of each element of the expansion, a time schedule for each step in the project, the proposed financing, and the amount of surcharge to water district rates needed to collect the amounts to be financed out of district reserves. After approval by the board of commissioners, the plan and proposed rates shall be submitted to the Public Service Commission. The commission, after a public hearing, shall issue an order approving, modifying or rejecting the plan. If a plan is approved, the commission shall establish a reasonable surcharge to implement the plan to be collected for a period no longer than five (5) years. The commission shall require the district to maintain its records in such a manner as will enable it, or the commission or its customers, to determine the amounts to be refunded and to whom they are due in the event that surcharge amounts shall be refunded.
  3. The water district may, with the approval of the commission, amend its plan to reflect subsequent developments or new information, but the changes shall not violate the intent of the initial plan.
  4. The provisions of this section also shall apply to water associations organized under KRS Chapter 273.

History. Enact. Acts 1988, ch. 323, § 1, effective July 15, 1988.

74.400. District may acquire, develop, maintain and operate gas system — Procedure.

  1. Any county judge/executive, except in counties containing a city of the first class, upon petition of seventy-five (75) resident freeholders of a water district organized under the provisions of KRS 74.010 , may authorize said water district to acquire, develop, maintain, and operate a system for the distribution of gas to the citizens of the county. The petition shall describe the territory intended to be included in the area to be served and shall set out the reasons a gas distribution system is needed.
  2. When the petition is filed, the county judge/executive shall give notice of the filing by publication as provided in KRS Chapter 424. Within thirty (30) days after the publication, any resident of the district may file objections, and the county judge/executive shall set the matter for hearing within ten (10) days. If the county judge/executive finds the establishment of a gas distribution system by such district reasonably necessary for the public health, convenience, and comfort of the residents, he shall make an order authorizing the establishment or acquisition of the gas distribution system.
  3. The county judge/executive may in his order strike off any part of the territory that the testimony shows will not be benefited by the creation of the distribution system. If the county judge/executive does not find that the gas distribution system is necessary he shall dismiss the petition. Either party may appeal the order to the Circuit Court.

History. Enact. Acts 1952, ch. 133, §§ 1 to 3; 1966, ch. 170, § 3; 1966, ch. 239, § 24; 1978, ch. 384, § 191, effective June 17, 1978.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

This section, KRS 74.405 and 74.410 establishing the procedure by which a water district is given the power to acquire and operate a gas system is constitutional. Fraley v. Beaver-Elkhorn Water Dist., 257 S.W.2d 536, 1953 Ky. LEXIS 781 ( Ky. 1953 ), overruled, McClellan v. Louisville Water Co., 351 S.W.2d 197, 1961 Ky. LEXIS 160 ( Ky. 1961 ).

74.401. Gas system established only if primary supply in district or county.

All other provisions of this chapter to the contrary notwithstanding, no water district created under this chapter shall establish a gas distribution system unless the primary source of the gas to be distributed is natural gas produced from within the territorial limits of the district or of a county in which the district is located. A gas distribution system so established may contract with a seller of gas for supplementing supplies of gas. Nothing in KRS 74.020 , 74.120 , 74.400 , 74.401 and 74.408 shall be construed to enlarge any requirement under existing law relating to the furnishing of gas to a water district by any other supplier. However, nothing in this section shall prohibit the continued operation of a gas distribution system in operation pursuant to the provisions of this chapter prior to June 16, 1966.

History. Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 170, § 5.

Opinions of Attorney General.

A water district is not authorized to establish a gas transmission system where the “source” of the gas supply is a gas transmission line which crosses the territory of the district. OAG 68-194 .

County water district which previously constructed a gas system pursuant to this section could sell the gas system under the procedure of KRS 74.110 . The implications of KRS 74.367 and 74.361 suggested that final approval of the Public Service Commission should be sought before such sale took place. OAG 82-229 .

74.405. Gas distribution system to be administered by water commissioners.

If the water district is authorized to establish the gas distribution system, such system shall be established, maintained, and operated by the water commissioners of the district authorized to establish said system and said commissioners shall have all of the powers and authority, as regards the gas distributing system, that are conferred upon them for the purpose of furnishing a water supply under KRS 74.010 to 74.390 .

History. Enact. Acts 1952, ch. 133, § 4, effective June 19, 1952.

Opinions of Attorney General.

County water district which previously constructed a gas system pursuant to this section could sell the gas system under the procedure of KRS 74.110 . OAG 82-229 .

74.407. Operation of sewage disposal systems — Water district’s powers to enforce collection of lawful rates and charges — Agreement to acquire property outside boundaries.

    1. In addition to the other authority which water districts presently have under this chapter, water districts are hereby authorized to acquire, develop, maintain, and operate sewage disposal systems within the confines of their respective districts or as authorized in paragraph (b) of this subsection, except that such sewer systems shall not include territory within the boundaries of existing municipal corporations having the authority to provide such sewer services without the consent of such municipal corporations. (1) (a) In addition to the other authority which water districts presently have under this chapter, water districts are hereby authorized to acquire, develop, maintain, and operate sewage disposal systems within the confines of their respective districts or as authorized in paragraph (b) of this subsection, except that such sewer systems shall not include territory within the boundaries of existing municipal corporations having the authority to provide such sewer services without the consent of such municipal corporations.
    2. Water districts may enter into agreements with another entity or entities to acquire by purchase or lease, any real or personal property, or any interest, right, easement, or privilege therein, outside of the district’s jurisdictional boundaries, in connection with the acquisition, construction, operation, repair, or maintenance of any sewage, wastewater, or storm water facilities, notwithstanding any other provision of the Kentucky Revised Statutes restricting, qualifying, or limiting their authority to do so, except as set forth in KRS Chapter 278.
  1. In the event of annexation of territory within a water district by another municipal corporation authorized to provide sewer systems and services, the water district may continue to provide and charge for sewer services within such newly annexed areas until such annexing municipal corporation makes adequate payment, by negotiation or condemnation, for such sewage disposal facilities owned and operated by the water district. The water district commissioners shall have all of the powers and authority, as regards sewer systems, that are conferred upon them for the purpose of furnishing a water supply under KRS 74.010 to 74.415 .
  2. If a water district that provides sewer services is also the water supplier, the water district may provide that rates for water service and sewer service be billed simultaneously and may enforce collection of lawful rates and charges for sewer services by discontinuing water service until payment of the delinquent charges, including penalties, interest, and reasonable fees for disconnection and reconnection, is made or some payment arrangement satisfactory to the water district is reached.
  3. If a water district that provides sewer services is not the water supplier, the water district may enforce collection of delinquent sewer service charges in the manner provided in KRS 96.930 to 96.943 .

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1962, ch. 152, § 1; 2008, ch. 6, § 13, effective July 15, 2008; 2012, ch. 30, § 1, effective July 12, 2012; 2018 ch. 196, § 5, effective July 14, 2018.

Opinions of Attorney General.

A water district’s regulations, concerning water and sewage, can extend only to its own water and sewage facilities. OAG 69-562 .

Water districts may require a property owner to connect to the system under the same authority given a municipal corporation. OAG 70-683 .

When a sewer district is created under KRS 67.715(2), the county judge/executive’s order and order of the fiscal court should be carefully worded to disclose the intended creation of a sewer district, as treated by KRS 74.020 to 74.390 in the analogous manner expressed in this section, and to the extent that those statutes in that group can be practically applied to a sewer district operation. OAG 83-391 .

A water district is, pursuant to this section, authorized to operate a sewage disposal system, and the water district could require a property owner to connect to its sewage disposal system under the same authority available to a municipal corporation. OAG 84-148 .

74.408. Board to determine order in which water, gas or sewage service is to be commenced.

The authority of a water district to establish water and gas distribution systems, and sewage treatment and disposal systems, having been recognized and established, it shall be the function of the board of commissioners of the water district to determine when, and in what order, each of these functions shall be commenced, and the operation of one (1) type of system shall not be a prerequisite for the operation of another type of system.

History. Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 170, § 4.

74.410. Revenue bonds may be issued as provided in KRS 58.010 to 58.140.

Water districts may, in addition to all other methods provided by law, acquire and develop water systems, systems for the distribution of natural, artificial, or mixed gas and sewage disposal systems through the issuance of revenue bonds under the terms and provisions of KRS 58.010 to 58.140 .

History. Enact. Acts 1952, ch. 133, § 5; 1962, ch. 152, § 2.

74.412. Extending lines through territory of other political subdivision.

Where operation of a sewer system requires, because of watershed factors or other reasons, water districts are authorized to extend lines through the territory of any municipal corporation or county with prior consent of such municipal corporation or county.

History. Enact. Acts 1962, ch. 152, § 3.

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Interlocal cooperation act, KRS 65.210 to 65.300 .

74.414. Contract with other municipality or district for services.

The commissioners of a water district, in order to abate possible health menaces in their area and to increase the consumption of water in the area, or whenever such commissioners deem it to be for the general benefit of the water district, shall have the authority to contract with any city, water district or sewer construction district, or other incorporated municipality or district, to provide for the operation of a water system, or a sanitary sewer system, or both, regardless of whether or not such water district operated by said board of commissioners has or will acquire any ownership rights in such systems to be so operated, upon such terms and conditions as such board of commissioners may deem appropriate, with or without any consideration being paid to or received by such water districts, other than the general benefit which may accrue to the water district from having more water or sewer customers and consequent increased use of water or sewer services.

History. Enact. Acts 1962, ch. 152, § 4; 1966, ch. 146, § 1 (1).

74.415. Commissioners may consider installation of fire hydrants on new or extended water lines.

  1. The commissioners of a water district, or the governing body of a water association referred to in KRS 74.012(1), in order to provide adequate means of fire protection, may consider the installation of fire hydrants on new or extended water lines within their area. They may investigate the availability of supplementary funding to pay the incremental costs of line sizing and hydrant installation. The commissioners or governing body shall not eliminate fire hydrants from new or extended water lines unless they determine that hydrants are not feasible. Their analysis shall include consideration of the incremental costs of adequately sized pipe and associated pumps and towers, and the benefits of real estate development, water sales, the availability of fire protection insurance, and the reduced fire insurance premiums which may result from the installation of hydrants at specified intervals.
  2. If a private real estate subdivision developer has not included adequately sized pipe and fire hydrants in his development plan, the commissioners of a water district or the governing body of a water association which has the capacity to supply adequate water for fire hydrants shall require, at the time the developer applies for permission to hook into the district’s water lines, an analysis by the developer of the incremental cost of hydrants and piping adequately sized for hydrants, the effect of hydrants on the cost and availability of fire protection insurance, and conclusions as to why the installation of hydrants is not feasible.

History. Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 146, § 1 (2); 1992, ch. 122, § 2, effective July 14, 1992.

74.416. Approval of sanitary sewer system project in Jefferson County. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1962, ch. 152, § 5) was repealed by Acts 2008, ch. 6, § 18, effective July 15, 2008.

Joint Operation of Water Sources

74.420. Definitions for KRS 74.420 to 74.520.

As used in KRS 74.420 to 74.520 , unless the context requires otherwise:

  1. “Sources of supply of water” means and includes any or all of the following: wells, impounding reservoirs, standpipes, storage tanks, pumps, machinery, purification plants, softening apparatus, trunk mains, and all other appurtenances useful in connection with developing and furnishing a supply of water under pressure into the water distribution systems of the cities, water districts, water associations or federal agencies which are represented by a commission created pursuant to the provisions of KRS 74.420 to 74.520 .
  2. “Water association” means a nonprofit corporation formed for the purpose of furnishing water services to the general public pursuant to KRS Chapter 273.

History. Enact. Acts 1960, ch. 207, § 1, effective June 16, 1960; 1996, ch. 122, § 1, effective July 15, 1996; 2003, ch. 167, § 1, effective June 24, 2003.

Opinions of Attorney General.

A water commission organized pursuant to KRS 74.420 to 74.520 does not possess the power of eminent domain. OAG 71-432 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

City-owned water system may pay tax equivalent to school tax, KRS 96.536 .

Furnishing water to another city, KRS 96.120 to 96.140 .

Extension of city-owned water system outside city limits, KRS 96.150 .

74.430. Authority for joint operation of water sources.

In the interest of the public health and for the purpose of providing an adequate supply of water to cities, water associations, water districts, and facilities owned or operated by federal agencies, any two (2) or more cities, or any two (2) or more water districts organized under this chapter, or any combination of cities, water districts, water associations, and federal agencies may jointly acquire, either by purchase or construction, sources of supply of water and may operate jointly the sources of supply of water and improve and extend them in the manner provided in KRS 74.420 to 74.520 . The governing body of any city, water association, water district, or federal agency desiring to avail themselves of the provisions of KRS 74.420 to 74.520 shall adopt a resolution or ordinance determining and electing to acquire and operate jointly sources of supply of water.

History. Enact. Acts 1960, ch. 207, § 2, effective June 16, 1960; 1996, ch. 122, § 2, effective July 15, 1996; 2003, ch. 167, § 2, effective June 24, 2003.

Opinions of Attorney General.

Since a proposed merger of city and county water systems under this section would involve a conveyance to a different legal entity, a vote of the people of a city would be required by KRS 96.540 and in addition such merger would be conditioned upon there being no impairment of the obligations of any bond contracts of either the city or the county. OAG 73-553 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Interlocal cooperation act, KRS 65.210 to 65.300 .

74.440. Procedure for creation of water commission.

  1. Upon the adoption of an ordinance or resolution by the governing body of each city, water association, or water district, or upon a decision by a federal agency, a certified copy of it shall be filed with the county judge/executive of the county in which the cities, water associations, water districts, or federal agencies proposing the creation of the commission having the greatest aggregate population are situated; and upon the filing, the county judge/executive shall by appropriate order set a date for a public hearing on the creation of the commission and shall give reasonable notice of the public hearing, which notice may be given in the manner as provided by KRS Chapter 424. Any customer of the water systems or resident of the cities proposing the creation of the commission may file objections; and at the public hearing if the county judge/executive finds that the establishment of the commission is reasonably necessary or advantageous for the public health, convenience, and comfort of the customers of all the water systems which proposed the creation of the commission, he shall make an order establishing the commission and designating it by name which name shall include the words “water commission.”
  2. If the county judge/executive does not find that the creation of a commission is reasonably necessary or advantageous, he shall make an appropriate order in this regard. Any party in interest may appeal the order to the Circuit Court or the cities, water associations, and water districts may revise and readopt the ordinances or resolutions, or the federal agency may revise its decision.

History. Enact. Acts 1960, ch. 207, § 3, effective June 16, 1960; 1978, ch. 384, § 192, effective June 17, 1978; 1996, ch. 122, § 3, effective July 15, 1996; 2003, ch. 167, § 3, effective June 24, 2003.

74.450. Membership of water commission — Term — Compensation — Removal — Status.

  1. After the county judge/executive has made an order creating a water commission, the presiding officer of each of the cities, water associations, or water districts which proposed the creation of the commission with the approval of its governing body, and each federal agency which joined in a proposal shall appoint one (1) commissioner. If the number of commissioners so appointed by the presiding officers of the cities, water associations, or water districts and by the federal agency or agencies shall equal or exceed five (5), no further commissioners shall be appointed and the commissioners shall be and constitute the water commission.
  2. If the number of commissioners appointed by the presiding officers of the cities, water associations, water districts, or federal agencies shall be less than five (5), the county judge/executive who entered the order creating the commission shall appoint additional commissioners to the commission as necessary to make the number of commissioners equal five (5). The commissioners shall constitute the commission, which shall be a public corporation and a public body corporate and politic with the powers and duties specified in KRS 74.420 to 74.520 . The commission may in its corporate name contract and be contracted with, sue and be sued, adopt and alter at its pleasure a corporate seal, and purchase, own, hold, and dispose of all real and personal property necessary for carrying out its corporate purpose under KRS 74.420 to 74.520 .
  3. The commissioners originally appointed shall meet and select by lot their respective terms of office so that approximately one-third (1/3) of the commissioners shall serve for a term of two (2) years, a like number for a term of three (3) years and the remaining commissioner or commissioners for a term of four (4) years. The terms shall be deemed to commence from the first day of the month during which the order of the county judge/executive creating the commission was entered.
  4. Upon the expiration of the term of office of each of the commissioners, a successor shall be appointed to succeed him for a term of four (4) years and the appointment shall be made in the same manner as the original appointment.
  5. Each commissioner shall serve until his successor has been appointed and has been qualified. Each commissioner shall be a resident of the service area of the water systems or an employee of the federal agency which is represented by the commission. A commissioner shall be eligible for reappointment upon the expiration of his term. A vacancy shall be filled for the balance of the unexpired term in the same manner as that prescribed for the appointment of the person who has ceased to hold office. Each commissioner shall receive the same compensation, which shall not be more than five hundred dollars ($500) per year, to be fixed by the commission and to be paid out of commission funds, except that a commissioner representing a federal agency shall serve without compensation. Each commissioner shall furnish a bond for faithful performance of his official duties. This bond shall not be less than five thousand dollars ($5,000); the amount shall be fixed by the commission; and its cost shall be paid by the commission.
  6. Each commissioner may be removed by the official by whom he was appointed, for cause, after hearing by the appointing official and after at least ten (10) days’ notice in writing has been given to the commissioner, which notice shall embrace the charges preferred against him. At the hearing he may be represented by counsel. The finding of the appointing official shall be final and removal results in vacancy in the office. A federal agency shall determine its own appointment and removal procedures for its representative.

History. Enact. Acts 1960, ch. 207, § 4, effective June 16, 1960; 1978, ch. 384, § 193, effective June 17, 1978; 1996, ch. 122, § 4, effective July 15, 1996; 2003, ch. 167, § 4, effective June 24, 2003.

Opinions of Attorney General.

Subsection (5) of this section would in effect prohibit an employee of the county from serving on a joint water commission. OAG 84-282 .

Someone who is employed by the school board is not eligible to serve on a joint water commission. OAG 84-282 .

74.455. Removal of district water commissioner — Causes.

  1. From and after the creation and establishment of a water district and the appointment of water commissioners to manage the affairs of the district, and following the acquisition or construction by any duly created and established water district of a public water system, and the consequent establishment of regulatory jurisdiction over such water district by the Public Service Commission of Kentucky, the Public Service Commission may remove any water commissioner from his office for good cause, including, inter alia, incompetency, neglect of duty, gross immorality, or nonfeasance, misfeasance, or malfeasance in office, including without limiting the generality of the foregoing, failure to comply with rules, regulations, and orders issued by the Public Service Commission.
  2. No such order of removal with respect to any water commissioner shall be entered by the Public Service Commission until a public hearing on the merits with reference to such matter has been held by the commission, at which hearing the water commissioner proposed to be removed from office shall be afforded the opportunity to appear, either pro se, or by counsel and file briefs, memoranda and motions, cross-examine witnesses, examine exhibits, and present evidence, both orally and in writing. All such orders of removal entered by the Public Service Commission shall be final and shall not be subject to appeal. Any water commissioner may waive such public hearing, in which case an order on removal may be forthwith entered by the commission.
  3. Using procedures of this section the Public Service Commission may also request the removal of directors, trustees or other governing persons of water associations in like manner.

History. Enact. Acts 1972, ch. 310, § 3.

Opinions of Attorney General.

The county judge/executive does not have authority to remove a water commissioner from office, but such power of removal is lodged in the Public Service Commission. OAG 78-215 .

74.460. Organization of commission — Powers and duties — Authority to acquire water supply — Obligations.

The commission shall organize by appointing a chairman from its own members and a secretary and a treasurer, who need not be commissioners. The secretary shall keep a record of all proceedings of the commission which shall be available for inspection as other public records. The treasurer shall be the lawful custodian of all funds of the commission and shall pay same out on orders authorized or approved by the commission. The secretary and treasurer shall perform other duties appertaining to the affairs of the commission and shall receive the salaries prescribed by the commission, and either or both may be required to furnish bonds in sums to be fixed by the commission for the use and benefit of the commission. The commission shall adopt its own rules of procedure and provide for its meetings. The commission shall have full and complete supervision, management, and control of the sources of supply of water as provided in the ordinances or resolutions for acquiring and operating them, and in their maintenance, operation, and extension. The commission may contract with cities, water associations, water districts, or federal agencies which are represented by the commission for furnishing a supply of water to the parties for a period not exceeding fifty (50) years and the governing bodies of the cities, water associations, water districts, or federal agencies may enter into the contracts with the commission. For the purpose of acquiring all or any part of its sources of supply of water, the commission may purchase from cities, water associations, water districts, or federal agencies which are represented by the commission for mutually agreed terms without regard to actual value any sources of supply of water separate and apart from the water distribution systems of the parties; and the cities, water associations, water districts, or federal agencies may convey the sources of supply of water to the commission without any election or voter approval notwithstanding any provision of any other law to the contrary. If any city, water association, or water district has outstanding any obligations which by their terms are in any manner payable from the revenues of their waterworks distribution system, the proceeds received from any conveyance shall be sufficient to retire all of the outstanding obligations, including all interest accrued and to accrue thereon to the date of retirement thereof; and the proceeds when received shall be set aside in a special fund and used for that purpose. The commission may appoint or contract for the services of officers, agents, and employees, including engineers, attorneys, accountants, fiscal agents, and other professional persons, prescribe their duties, and fix their compensation.

History. Enact. Acts 1960, ch. 207, § 5, effective June 16, 1960; 1996, ch. 122, § 5, effective July 15, 1996; 2003, ch. 167, § 5, effective June 24, 2003.

Opinions of Attorney General.

Since a proposed merger of city and county water systems under this section would involve a conveyance to a different legal entity, a vote of the people of a city would be required by KRS 96.540 and in addition such merger would be conditioned upon there being no impairment of the obligations of any bond contracts of either the city or the county. OAG 73-553 .

74.470. Authority to issue revenue bonds.

For the purpose of acquiring, either by purchase or construction, sources of supply of water or for making improvements and extensions to sources of supply of water, a commission may issue revenue bonds payable solely from the revenues to be derived pursuant to water supply contracts with the cities, water districts, water associations, federal agencies, political subdivisions, or other public bodies as provided in KRS 74.420 to 74.520 . For that purpose the commission may issue revenue bonds and be vested with all of the powers, duties, and responsibilities, including the power of condemnation, delegated and granted to a “governmental agency” under the terms and provisions of KRS Chapter 58, as the law now exists or as it may hereafter be amended. Under the law, the term “governmental agency” means the “commission” and the term “public project” means “sources of supply of water.”

History. Enact. Acts 1960, ch. 207, § 6, effective June 16, 1960; 1996, ch. 122, § 6, effective July 15, 1996; 2003, ch. 167, § 6, effective June 24, 2003.

74.480. Exclusive water supply — Basis for establishing rate, charges.

  1. When a commission has been created, the cities, water associations, water districts, or federal agencies represented by the commission shall contract with the commission for water and the contracts may provide that the sources of supply of water of the commission shall be the exclusive water supply for the respective water distribution systems. These cities, water associations, or water districts shall establish charges and rates for water supplied by them to consumers sufficient at all times:
    1. To pay the principal of and interest on all outstanding obligations of the cities, water associations, or water districts which by their terms are payable in any manner from the revenues of their respective waterworks distribution systems; and
    2. To pay the cost of operation and maintenance of their respective waterworks distribution systems, including the payments to be made to the commission pursuant to contracts for the purchase of water by those cities, water associations, or water districts.
  2. The commission shall establish charges and rates for water supplied to those cities, water associations, water districts, or federal agencies represented by the commission sufficient at all times:
    1. To pay the principal of and interest on the revenue bonds issued by the commission under the provisions of KRS 74.420 to 74.520 ;
    2. To pay the cost of operation and maintenance of the sources of supply of water; and
    3. To provide an adequate fund for renewals, replacements, and reserves.

Contracts entered into between the commission and the cities, water associations, or water districts shall include covenants for the establishment of rates and charges as provided in this section.

History. Enact. Acts 1960, ch. 207, § 7, effective June 16, 1960; 1996, ch. 122, § 7, effective July 15, 1996; 2003, ch. 167, § 7, effective June 24, 2003.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Depreciation Expense.

Depreciation expense on publicly-owned water district plant that has been purchased by federal grants and contributions and/or customer tap-on fees should be allowed in the revenue requirement because the water district has no private investor capital and its rates do not generate a return on rate base. Public Service Com. v. Dewitt Water Dist., 720 S.W.2d 725, 1986 Ky. LEXIS 314 ( Ky. 1986 ).

The proper rate-making treatment for depreciation expense of contributed property of publicly-held water districts is to allow depreciation on the contributed plant as an operating expense; the fact that the utility did not make an investment in the plant is of no consequence in the context of publicly-owned facilities. Public Service Com. v. Dewitt Water Dist., 720 S.W.2d 725, 1986 Ky. LEXIS 314 ( Ky. 1986 ).

The Public Service Commission’s disallowance of the rate of recovery for depreciation expense on contributed property of the publicly-held water district was arbitrary, capricious and confiscatory. Public Service Com. v. Dewitt Water Dist., 720 S.W.2d 725, 1986 Ky. LEXIS 314 ( Ky. 1986 ).

The purpose of depreciation expense as applied to nonprofit water districts does not relate to a recoupment of investment; the overriding statutory concept is renewal and replacement. Public Service Com. v. Dewitt Water Dist., 720 S.W.2d 725, 1986 Ky. LEXIS 314 ( Ky. 1986 ).

74.490. Commission may contract to supply other public bodies.

The commission shall also have the right to supply water to any city, water association, water district, political subdivision, federal agency or other public body, or any water distribution system regulated by the Public Service Commission, in addition to the cities, water associations, water districts, or federal agencies which are represented by the commission, upon the payments, terms, and conditions mutually agreed upon. No capital expenditures shall be made by the commission for the purpose of furnishing water to the other party or parties. Any contract entered into to supply water to a city, water association, water district, federal agency, political subdivision, or other public body shall provide that payments to be made thereunder shall be solely from the revenues to be derived by the city, water association, water district, political subdivision, or other public body from the operation of the water works distribution system thereof; and the contract shall be a continuing, valid, and binding obligation of the city, water association, federal agency, water district, political subdivision, or other public body, payable from the revenues for a period of years, not to exceed fifty (50), as provided in the contract. Any contract shall not be a debt of any city, water association, water district, federal agency, political subdivision, or other public body within the meaning of any statutory or constitutional limitations.

History. Enact. Acts 1960, ch. 207, § 8, effective June 16, 1960; 1996, ch. 122, § 8, effective July 15, 1996; 2003, ch. 167, § 8, effective June 24, 2003.

74.500. Procedure for participation by other city or water districts.

After the creation of a water commission provided for by KRS 74.420 to 74.520 , a city or water district which did not participate in the creation of said commission may participate in its operation and appoint a commissioner to serve on said commission in the following manner:

  1. The governing body of such city or water district shall adopt and file with the county judge/executive who entered the order creating said commission an ordinance or resolution electing and requesting that it be permitted to be included in and represented by said commission in the same manner and to the same extent as if said city or water district had originally participated in the creation of said commission.
  2. Upon such filing the county judge/executive shall by appropriate order set a date for a public hearing on the inclusion of such a city or water district in said commission, and shall give notice of such public hearing in the manner as provided by KRS 74.440 . Any resident of the city or water district at the time represented by said commission, and any resident of the city or water district requesting to be included in and represented by said commission and to participate in its operation, may file objections, and at the public hearing if the county judge/executive finds that the inclusion of such city or water district in said commission is reasonably necessary or advantageous for the public health, convenience and comfort of the residents of all cities and water districts represented by said commission, including the city or water district requesting to be included in said commission, and provided further that there shall be on file with the county judge/executive a resolution adopted by said commission evidencing its willingness to have such city or water district included in and represented by said commission the county judge/executive shall make an order authorizing the inclusion of such city or water district in the commission. If the county judge/executive does not find that the inclusion of such city or water district is reasonably necessary or advantageous he shall make an appropriate order in this regard. Any party in interest may thereupon appeal to the Circuit Court.
  3. Upon the entering of the order by the county judge/executive authorizing the inclusion of such city or water district in said commission the number of commissioners, if any, to be appointed to said commission by the county judge/executive shall be reduced by one (1) and the presiding officer, with the approval of the governing body of the city or water district which shall by virtue of said proceedings be included in and represented by said commission, shall appoint a commissioner whose term shall begin at the expiration of the term of the commissioner appointed by the county judge/executive whose term shall first expire. In the event there is no commissioner on said commission appointed by the county judge/executive the term of the commissioner appointed by the presiding officer of such city or water district shall be fixed so that the terms of approximately one-third (1/3) of the commissioners will expire in each year.

History. Enact. Acts 1960, ch. 207, § 9, effective June 16, 1960; 1978, ch. 384, § 194, effective June 17, 1978.

74.510. Commission declared not to constitute a utility.

Since the activities of a commission created pursuant to KRS 74.420 to 74.520 are limited to the supply of water under contract to cities, federal agencies, or to water distribution systems which are regulated by the Public Service Commission, including water districts and water associations, as provided in KRS 74.420 to 74.520 , and such a commission has no authority to supply water to individual private consumers, such a commission shall not be deemed to constitute a “utility” or “person” within the meaning and application of KRS Chapter 278 and a commission shall not be subject to the jurisdiction of the Public Service Commission.

History. Enact. Acts 1960, ch. 207, § 10, effective June 16, 1960; 1996, ch. 122, § 9, effective July 15, 1996; 2003, ch. 167, § 9, effective June 24, 2003.

74.520. Construction of KRS 74.420 to 74.520.

KRS 74.420 to 74.520 shall constitute full and complete authority for the creation of water commissions and for carrying out the powers and duties of same as provided in KRS 74.420 to 74.520 . The provisions of KRS 74.420 to 74.520 shall be liberally construed to accomplish its purpose and no procedure or proceedings, notices, consents or approvals, shall be required in connection therewith except as may be prescribed by KRS 74.420 to 74.520. Every water commission organized under KRS 74.420 to 74.520 is declared to be a public body created and functioning in the interest and for the benefit of the public, and its property and income and any bonds issued by it and income therefrom shall be exempt from taxation.

History. Enact. Acts 1960, ch. 207, § 11, effective June 16, 1960.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

Commonwealth v. Howard, 379 S.W.2d 475, 1964 Ky. LEXIS 247 ( Ky. 1964 ).

Penalties

74.990. Penalties.

Any collecting officer who fails to settle and pay any installment of assessments with interest, as and when provided by KRS 74.190 , shall be liable to the commission for the full amount certified to him, with interest. Such amount may be collected from such collecting officer by order issued against him by the District Court, on five (5) days’ notice in writing. The collecting officer shall be liable on his official bond for acts done under KRS 74.190 , and for the faithful performance of his duties prescribed therein.

History. 938g-13: amend. Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 66, effective January 2, 1978.

Opinions of Attorney General.

The penalties contained in this section are not applicable to withholding tax provisions of either the United States or the Commonwealth. OAG 83-314 .

CHAPTER 75 Fire Protection Districts

75.010. Creation of fire protection or volunteer fire department district — Territorial limits on proposed service area.

  1. A fire protection district or a volunteer fire department district may be created in accordance with the procedures of KRS 65.182 .
  2. A fire protection district or volunteer fire department district shall not include any territory within its proposed service area that lies within:
    1. The corporate limits of a city;
    2. The boundaries of an existing fire protection district or volunteer fire department district established pursuant to KRS 75.010 to 75.080 ;
    3. The service area boundaries of a fire department created under KRS Chapter 273 that is certified under KRS 75.400 to 75.460 ; or
    4. An area that is not contained within the boundaries of a city, but has fire protection services provided by a city government, unless an agreement is in place for the newly formed district to assume services in the territory as authorized in KRS 75.020(1)(b).

History. Enact. Acts 1944, ch. 133, § 1; 1960, ch. 104, § 3; 1964, ch. 184, § 1; 1966, ch. 239, § 25; 1968, ch. 152, § 47; 1976, ch. 62, § 77; 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 67, effective January 2, 1978; 1978, ch. 384, § 195, effective June 17, 1978; 1984, ch. 100, § 7, effective July 13, 1984; 2013, ch. 27, § 2, effective June 25, 2013; 2016 ch. 117, § 1, effective July 15, 2016.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Remonstrance.

Since a fire protection district is a type of a municipal corporation and as all matters relating to annexation of territory are within the province of the legislature, an annexation statute need not, in order to be valid, allow for any remonstrance at all; therefore when all the statutory prerequisites of a proposed annexation of territory by a fire protection district are met there can be no defense against such annexation except on constitutional grounds. Kelley v. Dailey, 366 S.W.2d 181, 1963 Ky. LEXIS 9 ( Ky. 1963 ).

Cited:

Effinger v. Fern Creek Volunteer Fire Dept., Inc., 564 S.W.2d 847, 1978 Ky. App. LEXIS 502 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978); Caneyville Volunteer Fire Dep’t v. Green’s Motorcycle Salvage, Inc., 286 S.W.3d 790, 2009 Ky. LEXIS 158 ( Ky. 2009 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Where a fire protection district came into existence after the 1965 amendment of KRS 132.010 , the tax rate could be imposed on the current assessed value. OAG 68-244 .

Where two cities in a county had fire departments that did not qualify as “regular fire departments” under subsection (3)(b) of KRS 95.010 , the county fire protection district could properly annex the territory and levy a fire tax on property within the two cities. OAG 69-373 .

As long as a fifth-class city maintains a “regular fire department,” it cannot become part of a larger fire district. OAG 70-399 .

A county could not establish a fire protection district without using the petition method covered by this section and KRS 75.025 (now repealed). OAG 72-480 .

A county-wide fire department embracing corporate as well as unincorporated areas would be in conflict with this section. OAG 72-480 .

A fire protection district could, under the authority of this section and KRS 75.020 , annex additional territory in another county contiguous to the present territory of the district. OAG 72-842 .

Where an incorporated city of the fifth class annexes an area previously within the territory of a fire district, the fire district can no longer levy a tax for fire protection on the residents of the territory if the city has a regular fire department. OAG 73-662 .

This section would not permit a volunteer fire department district to be created within the same jurisdictional area of an existing fire protection district. OAG 77-488 .

This section and KRS 75.025 (now repealed) are not in conflict but are two different methods whereby a fire protection district may be established. OAG 73-509 , 78-588.

There is no express statutory provision dealing with the dissolution of a fire protection district created under KRS Chapter 75. OAG 78-390 .

If the volunteer fire department of a city or county was organized and exists pursuant to KRS Chapter 75 (in some type of fire protection district) then they would generally be considered to be political subdivisions, and as political subdivisions of the State the districts would appear to have the same sovereign immunity as the State has, but the trustees of the district as well as the firemen may be held personally liable for any wrongdoing or negligent act since the doctrine of sovereign immunity does not extend to the trustees and firemen on an individual basis. OAG 78-494 , 80-660.

A “nontaxing” volunteer fire department is impossible under this section which does not permit it, and KRS 75.040 which specifically provides that upon the creation of a volunteer fire department district the trustees of the district are authorized to levy a tax on the property in such district although the authority to levy such tax is permissive and not mandatory. OAG 78-588 .

This chapter would not preempt volunteer fire departments operating in the unincorporated part of the county. OAG 79-569 .

A fire protection district is a special district, and thus KRS 45A.345 to 45A.460 , the Kentucky Model Procurement Code, apply to fire protection districts. OAG 79-647 .

A volunteer fire department district created under KRS 75.010 to 75.080 is a type of municipal corporation and a political subdivision of the state. OAG 80-12 .

All purchases of a volunteer fire protection district come under applicable provisions in the Kentucky Model Procurement Code (KRS 45A.345 to 45A.460 ), regardless of the source of the funding and the donations of the district. OAG 80-12 .

In answering fire calls from nonmembers of a volunteer fire department district, three approaches are possible in connection with establishing a basis for billing such nonmembers for the response to a fire call: (1) An oral contract between an authorized member of the fire department and the nonmember property owner; (2) making use of the “contract implied in law” concept; and (3) requiring the nonmember to sign a simple contract at the scene of the fire. OAG 80-162 .

A volunteer fire protection district, established under KRS Chapter 75, is a “local public agency,” as defined in KRS 45A.345 (9) (now 45A.345 (11)) since it is a “special district” and a “political subdivision,” thus the volunteer fire department district would come under the Model Procurement Code (KRS 45A.345 to 45A.460 ), provided that the district so chooses to come under the code. OAG 80-301 .

Chiefs of fire protection districts organized pursuant to KRS Chapter 75 have, in their own right under that chapter, limited inspection powers and no enforcement powers in connection with examining buildings for fire hazards; therefore, any effective program of inspection and enforcement must be coordinated with the state fire marshal’s office which, pursuant to the applicable provisions of KRS Chapter 227, can give chiefs of fire protection districts the authority to act on its behalf to carry out a program of fire safety relying upon inspections and enforcement of violations. OAG 80-316 .

Where a city had a 20-year contract, duly approved by a favorable vote of the citizens of the city, with a nonprofit corporation which was to provide fire protection to the city, the city could not legally rescind that contract in order to establish its own fire protection district because a city has no right to revoke an otherwise binding contract unless that power has been granted by the Constitution or by the legislature, which is not the case here. OAG 80-411 .

This section authorizes the county judge/executive to enter an order in the county judge/executive’s order book establishing a fire protection district, provided the conditions mentioned in the statute are met, but the statute gives him no authority to declare that such district shall be responsible for levying and collecting its own tax. OAG 80-560 .

A fire protection district organized pursuant to this chapter is an autonomous political subdivision and would be responsible for providing its own workers’ compensation insurance coverage. OAG 80-635 .

All fire fighters, whether they are city, county, fire district, paid or volunteer fire personnel, are subject to the provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act (KRS Chapter 342). OAG 80-635 .

Where the firemen are volunteer and receive no regular salary or hourly rate, but do receive an expense allowance of $11.00 per run, the receiving of an expense allowance does not preclude the volunteer firemen from being covered by the state workers’ compensation insurance program for volunteer firemen; however, the program does not cover the chief and assistant chief, who are regularly paid members of the fire district. OAG 80-635 .

A fire protection district organized pursuant to this chapter is a political subdivision of the Commonwealth and as such would appear to have the same sovereign immunity as is possessed by the state; however, the trustees of the district as well as the district’s firemen may be held personally liable for any intentional wrongdoing or acts of negligence since the doctrine of sovereign immunity does not extend to the trustees and firemen on an individual basis. OAG 80-660 .

Although there is no specific statute authorizing the board of trustees of a fire protection district to expend district funds to train personnel in emergency medical technician techniques and to furnish equipment for such personnel to utilize, the board may undertake such expenditures as protecting and saving lives and the rendering of emergency first aid which are generally recognized functions of firemen; however, those personnel rendering emergency first aid may be held personally liable for intentional wrongdoing or acts of negligence in connection therewith and, they probably cannot claim immunity under the provisions of the so-called “good samaritan law,” KRS 411.148 . OAG 80-660 .

If a fire district’s firemen are only involved in the rendering of emergency first aid treatment and care, and not in the providing of an ambulance service, then the fire district is not subject to the provisions and requirements of KRS 216B.015 et seq. OAG 80-660 .

All of the statutory requirements of the petition, described in this section, must be satisfied when the petition is presented for the necessary signatures or the signers (even if they are sufficient in number) will not be signing a valid and properly prepared petition. OAG 82-232 .

Since this section requires that the petition set out the metes and bounds of the proposed fire protection district, the use of a map merely showing where the proposed district will be is not sufficient; the petition will not be a legal petition for purposes of subsection (1) of this section unless it includes the metes and bounds of the proposed fire protection district when it is signed by the petitioners. OAG 82-232 .

While KRS 75.040 was not intended to constitute an exclusive mode of funding a volunteer fire protection district, the authority for the district to impose a fire call service charge or fee would be legal only if expressly authorized by statute; a review of KRS Chapter 75 reveals no statutory authority for the trustees of such a volunteer fire department district to impose a fee or charge for responding to fire calls within the district or within any other districts under contract. OAG 83-133 .

This section and KRS 75.025 (now repealed) point out two different methods whereby a fire protection district may be established; the fundamental difference lies in the method of establishment. Under this section, the procedure is more detailed and provides for such establishment through the order of the county judge/executive while, under KRS 75.025 (now repealed), the establishment is effected through the fiscal court. OAG 83-292 .

If the petition for a fire protection district has the proper number of signatures, if it contains the material required by the statute, if proper notice has been given and publication made and if no written objection to the petition has been made, this section requires that the county judge/executive enter an order establishing the fire protection district requested by the petitioners. The county judge/executive has no authority to reject a petition meeting the statute requirements or to, in effect, combine several valid petitions and issue an order establishing one fire district or some number of districts less than has been requested. OAG 83-297 .

A county judge/executive in considering several petitions for the establishment of fire districts pursuant to this section cannot enter an order establishing one combined fire protection district from all of the valid and proper petitions for individual fire protection districts nor can he order the establishment of one fire protection district from petitions involving separate but adjoining proposed districts. OAG 83-297 .

Since a water district organized and functioning under the provisions of KRS Chapter 74 is a public utility subject to the jurisdiction of the Public Service Commission, KRS 278.170 is applicable; while a utility may grant free or reduced rates to charitable and eleemosynary institutions, a fire district organized under KRS Chapter 75 is not such an institution. Thus, there is no authority for requiring the water district to furnish water free of charge to a fire protection district. OAG 84-147 .

Since the 1984 act amending this section became effective on July 13, 1984, the new legislation was not retroactive as applied to a fire district created prior to July 13, 1984; however, such amendment of this section was retroactive as applied to an effort to establish a fire district under this section but which effort, prior to July 13, 1984, had not resulted in the complete creation of a fire district. OAG 84-313 .

A fire protection district is a special and separate taxing district under Ky. Const., §§ 157 and 158. OAG 85-65 .

The fiscal year provisions of Ky. Const., § 169, apply to fire protection districts created and organized under KRS Chapter 75, unless otherwise provided by statutory law. OAG 85-65 .

A fire protection district is a local public agency under KRS 45A.345(9) (now 45A.345(11)). OAG 85-65 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Fire prevention and protection, KRS Chapter 227.

Kentucky Law Journal.

Lewis, Kostas and Carnes, Consolidation — Complete or Functional — of City and County Governments, 42 Ky. L.J. 295 (1954).

75.015. Formation of fire protection subdistrict — Tax levy — Expenditure of tax revenues — Separation of subdistrict amounts in tax billing and in accounting.

  1. A fire protection subdistrict may be formed according to the provisions of this section. A fire protection subdistrict shall:
    1. Be located within the territorial limits of a fire protection district or volunteer fire department district;
    2. Have a continuous boundary; and
    3. Be managed by the board of trustees of the district, which shall:
      1. Impose an ad valorem tax on property in the subdistrict in addition to the ad valorem tax the board imposes on property in the district as a whole; and
      2. Expend the revenue from that additional tax on improved fire protection facilities and services for the subdistrict.
  2. Persons desiring to form a fire protection subdistrict shall present a petition to the fiscal court clerk and to each member of the fiscal court. The petition shall be accompanied by a map and a metes and bounds description or other description which specifically identifies the boundaries of the proposed subdistrict. The petition shall be signed by more than sixty percent (60%) of the persons who both:
    1. Live within the proposed subdistrict; and
    2. Own property that is located within the proposed subdistrict and is subject to taxation by the district under KRS 75.040 .
  3. The petition shall contain the name and address of each petitioner and the address of each petitioner’s property that is located within the proposed subdistrict. It shall be in substantially the following form: “The following owners of property located within (insert the name of the fire protection district or volunteer fire department district) hereby petition the fiscal court to form a fire protection subdistrict located at (insert a brief description of the location of the proposed subdistrict). The board of trustees of (insert the name of the fire protection district or volunteer fire department district) shall have the authority to impose a special ad valorem tax of (insert amount, not to exceed the maximum allowed under subsection (6) of this section) on each one hundred dollars ($100) worth of property assessed for local taxation in the subdistrict, in order to provide enhanced fire protection for the subdistrict. This tax shall be in addition to the ad valorem tax imposed by the trustees on the district as a whole.”
  4. Upon receipt of the petition, the fiscal court shall hold a hearing and provide notification in the manner required for creation of a taxing district under KRS 65.182(2) to (5). Following the hearing, the fiscal court shall set forth its written findings of fact and shall approve or disapprove the formation of the subdistrict. The creation of the subdistrict shall be of legal effect only upon the adoption of an ordinance in accordance with the provisions of KRS 67.075 to 67.077 . A certified copy of the ordinance creating the subdistrict shall be filed with the county clerk.
  5. Upon the creation of a fire protection subdistrict, the trustees shall levy a tax, not to exceed the amount stated in the petition, on the property in the subdistrict, for the purpose of improving fire protection facilities and services in the subdistrict.
  6. The tax levied under this section, combined with the tax for fire and emergency services levied on the entire district under KRS 75.040 , shall not exceed:
    1. Ten cents ($0.10) per one hundred dollars ($100) of valuation as assessed for county taxes if neither the fire district nor the fire subdistrict operates an emergency ambulance service under KRS 75.040 ; or
    2. Twenty cents ($0.20) per one hundred dollars ($100) of valuation as assessed for county taxes if either the fire district or fire subdistrict operates an emergency ambulance service under KRS 75.040. At no time shall the trustees increase either of these taxes so that the combined total exceeds this limit.
  7. The county clerk shall add the levy to the tax bills of the affected property owners. For taxing purposes, the effective date of the tax levy shall be January 1 of the year following the certification and creation of the subdistrict. The tax shall be administered in the same manner as the tax on the entire district under KRS 75.040(2) and (3).
  8. The board of trustees shall not reduce the tax rate imposed on property in the district as a whole as a result of receiving extra revenue from the additional tax on property in the subdistrict. The trustees shall expend the extra revenue solely on improving fire protection facilities and services in the subdistrict and shall not expend the extra revenue on facilities or services that are shared by the entire district.
  9. Fire subdistrict taxes shall be placed on the tax bill in a place separate from the bill of the fire district tax so that ratepayers can ascertain the amount of each tax and its rate.
  10. The sheriff shall separately account to the fire district for the funds collected for each subdistrict within the fire district.
  11. Fire districts shall maintain a separate accounting of all subdistrict funds, and if there is more than one (1) subdistrict, a separate accounting for each subdistrict.

History. Enact. Acts 1994, ch. 414, § 1, effective July 15, 1994; 1996, ch. 90, § 1, effective July 15, 1996; 2004, ch. 151, § 2, effective July 13, 2004.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. In General.

Fire protection district’s suit against tax collection officials, including a county court clerk, a sheriff, and a county assessor or property valuation administrator, based on the officials’ failure to collect personal property tax pursuant to KRS 75.015 , was properly dismissed because sovereign immunity shielded the officials from liability; Ky. Const. § 99 provided for the election of a County Court Clerk, a County Sheriff, and a County Assessor (or Property Valuation Administrator), and, thus, the officials, having been sued only in their official capacities, were afforded the same immunity as that to which the county was itself entitled. St. Matthews Fire Prot. Dist. v. Aubrey, 304 S.W.3d 56, 2009 Ky. App. LEXIS 47 (Ky. Ct. App. 2009).

Summary judgment was properly awarded to a county fiscal court in an action by taxpayers challenging the imposition of a special ad valorem tax on their property because the court did not levy the disputed tax; the power to levy the tax was exclusively the duty and prerogative of the trustees of a fire protection subdistrict under KRS 75.015(5). Herman v. Jessamine County Fiscal Court, 2013 Ky. App. LEXIS 117 (Ky. Ct. App. Aug. 2, 2013), review denied, ordered not published, 2014 Ky. LEXIS 369 (Ky. Aug. 13, 2014).

75.020. Annexation or reduction of territory — Expansion into territory served by fire department — Assumption by city of debt — Merger of districts — Service area boundary maps to be updated and filed.

    1. The territorial limits of an established fire protection district, or a volunteer fire department district, as established under KRS 75.010 to 75.080 , may be enlarged or diminished in the following way: The trustees of the fire protection district or of the volunteer fire department district shall file a petition in the county clerk’s office of the county in which that district and the territory to be annexed or stricken off, or the greater part thereof, is located, describing the territory to be annexed or stricken and setting out the reasons therefor. Notice of the filing of such petition shall be given by publication as provided for in KRS Chapter 424. On the day fixed in the notice, the county judge/executive shall, if the proper notice has been given, and the publication made, and no written objection or remonstrance is interposed enter an order annexing or striking off the territory described in the petition. Fifty-one percent (51%) or more of the freeholders of the territory sought to be annexed or stricken off may, at any time before the date fixed in the notice, remonstrate in writing, filed in the clerk’s office, to the action proposed. If such written remonstrance is filed, the clerk shall promptly give notice to the trustees of the fire protection district, or of the volunteer fire department district, and the county judge/executive shall hear and determine the same. If upon such hearing, the county judge/executive finds from the evidence that a failure to annex or strike off such territory will materially retard the functioning of the fire protection district or the volunteer fire department district and materially affect adversely the owners and the inhabitants of the territory sought to be annexed or stricken off, he or she shall enter an order, granting the annexation or striking off the territory. In the latter event, no new petition to annex or strike off all or any part of the same territory shall be entertained for a period of two (2) years. Any aggrieved person may bring an action in Circuit Court to contest the decision of the county judge/executive. (1) (a) The territorial limits of an established fire protection district, or a volunteer fire department district, as established under KRS 75.010 to 75.080 , may be enlarged or diminished in the following way: The trustees of the fire protection district or of the volunteer fire department district shall file a petition in the county clerk’s office of the county in which that district and the territory to be annexed or stricken off, or the greater part thereof, is located, describing the territory to be annexed or stricken and setting out the reasons therefor. Notice of the filing of such petition shall be given by publication as provided for in KRS Chapter 424. On the day fixed in the notice, the county judge/executive shall, if the proper notice has been given, and the publication made, and no written objection or remonstrance is interposed enter an order annexing or striking off the territory described in the petition. Fifty-one percent (51%) or more of the freeholders of the territory sought to be annexed or stricken off may, at any time before the date fixed in the notice, remonstrate in writing, filed in the clerk’s office, to the action proposed. If such written remonstrance is filed, the clerk shall promptly give notice to the trustees of the fire protection district, or of the volunteer fire department district, and the county judge/executive shall hear and determine the same. If upon such hearing, the county judge/executive finds from the evidence that a failure to annex or strike off such territory will materially retard the functioning of the fire protection district or the volunteer fire department district and materially affect adversely the owners and the inhabitants of the territory sought to be annexed or stricken off, he or she shall enter an order, granting the annexation or striking off the territory. In the latter event, no new petition to annex or strike off all or any part of the same territory shall be entertained for a period of two (2) years. Any aggrieved person may bring an action in Circuit Court to contest the decision of the county judge/executive.
    2. In addition to the provisions of paragraph (a) of this subsection, if the trustees of a fire protection district or a volunteer fire department district, as established under KRS 75.010 to 75.080, are seeking to expand territory into an area served by a fire department created under KRS Chapter 273 and certified under KRS 75.400 to 75.460 or an area that is not contained within the boundaries of the city, but is being served by a city government, then the trustees shall, prior to executing the provisions of paragraph (a) of this subsection, enter into a written agreement with the fire chief and the board of the fire department created under KRS Chapter 273 or with the city government providing fire protection services to the area proposed to be annexed. The agreement shall establish the proposed new boundary as it applies to the fire department created under KRS Chapter 273 or to the area being served by the city fire department. On the day the agreement is finalized, the trustees of the district shall send by certified mail, return receipt requested, or have personally delivered a copy of the agreement to the county judge/executive of the county containing the territory subject to the expansion. The notice required in paragraph (a) of this subsection shall, in lieu of the applicable publication requirements set out in KRS Chapter 424, be published at least once a week, for a minimum of two (2) weeks. The last publication shall occur no less than seven (7) days before the date fixed in the notice.
    3. If the trustees approach the fire chief and board of the fire department created under KRS Chapter 273 or the city government in the manner authorized in paragraph (b) of this subsection and are unable to reach an agreement within thirty (30) days, the trustees, or any real property holder of the territory subject to the annexation, may directly seek permission from the real property holders of that territory to continue with the annexation procedure set out in paragraphs (a) and (b) of this subsection by circulating a petition and securing the signatures of at least fifty-one percent (51%) of the real property holders within that territory. The petition shall include the residential address of the signer and the date of the signature. The petition shall be certified by the county clerk if the clerk finds the petition sufficient in form and requisite amount of signatures.
  1. The property in any territory annexed to a fire protection district or to a volunteer fire department district shall not be liable to taxation for the purpose of paying any indebtedness incurred by the fire protection district or the volunteer fire department district prior to the date of the annexation of such territory, except such indebtedness as represents the balance owing on the purchase price of firefighting equipment. The property in any territory stricken off from a fire protection district or a volunteer fire department district by the incorporation of or annexation by a city of this Commonwealth shall not be relieved of liability of such taxes as may be necessary to pay its proportionate share of the indebtedness incurred while such territory was a part of that district. Territories stricken by action of the county judge/executive under the provisions of subsection (1) shall be relieved of liability for all indebtedness incurred by the fire protection district or the volunteer fire department district.
  2. Any city that maintains a “regular fire department,” and has either by incorporation or annexation caused property to be stricken from a fire protection district or a volunteer fire department district, shall comply with KRS 75.022(3).
  3. A fire protection district or volunteer fire department district established pursuant to KRS 75.010 to 75.080 shall not expand its service boundaries or annex territory contained in another fire protection district or volunteer fire department district established pursuant to KRS 75.010 to 75.080 . However, the territorial limits of two (2) or more fire protection districts, or volunteer fire department districts, as established by KRS 75.010 to 75.080, may be merged into one (1) fire protection district or volunteer fire department district as follows:
    1. The trustees of each fire protection district or volunteer fire department district shall file a joint petition in the county clerk’s office of the county in which all of the districts and the territory to be merged into one (1) district, or the greater part of the district, is located, describing the territory to be merged into the district and setting out the reasons for the merger;
    2. Notice of the filing of the petition shall be given by publication as provided in KRS Chapter 424 for public notices;
    3. On the day fixed in the notice, the county judge/executive shall, if proper notice by publication has been given, and no written objection or remonstrance has been made, enter an order merging the fire protection districts or volunteer fire department districts described in the petition;
    4. Fifty-one percent (51%) or more of the property owners of the territory sought to be merged into one (1) district may, at any time before the date fixed in the notice, remonstrate by written petition to the county clerk regarding their objection to the merger of the districts. If a petition is filed, the county clerk shall give prompt notice to the trustees of the fire protection districts or the volunteer fire protection districts and the county judge/executive;
    5. The county judge/executive shall schedule a hearing regarding the petition and shall give public notice as to the date, time, and place of the hearing. If after the hearing, the county judge/executive finds from the evidence that a failure to merge the territory will materially retard the functioning of the fire protection districts or volunteer fire department districts and materially affect adversely the owners and the inhabitants of the territory sought to be merged, he or she shall enter an order granting the merger of the districts into one (1) fire protection district or volunteer fire department district; and
    6. Any aggrieved person may bring an action in Circuit Court to contest the decision of the county judge/executive regarding the merger fire protection districts or volunteer fire department districts.
  4. The property in any fire protection district or volunteer fire department district which is merged with another fire protection district or volunteer fire department district shall not be liable to taxation for the purpose of paying any indebtedness incurred by the other fire protection district or volunteer fire department district prior to the date of the merger into one (1) fire protection district, except indebtedness which represents a balance owed on the purchase price of firefighting equipment from the other fire protection district or volunteer fire department district.
  5. Fire protection districts or volunteer fire department districts that modify service area boundaries by taking any action authorized under this section shall update their service area boundary maps and file them in the manner required by KRS 75.420 .

History. Enact. Acts 1944, ch. 133, § 2; 1960, ch. 104, § 4; 1964, ch. 184, § 2; 1966, ch. 146, § 8; 1976, ch. 62, § 78; 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 68, effective January 2, 1978; 1978, ch. 384, § 196, effective June 17, 1978; 1984, ch. 100, § 8, effective July 13, 1984; 1996, ch. 127, § 1, effective July 15, 1996; 2004, ch. 19, § 1, effective July 13, 2004; 2008, ch. 166, § 1, effective July 15, 2008; 2013, ch. 27, § 3, effective June 25, 2013; 2016 ch. 117, § 2, effective July 15, 2016.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Remonstrance.

Since a fire protection district is a type of municipal corporation and as all matters relating to annexation of territory are within the province of the legislature, an annexation statute need not, in order to be valid, allow for any remonstrance at all; therefore when all the statutory prerequisites of a proposed annexation of territory by a fire protection district are met there can be no defense against such annexation except on constitutional grounds. Kelley v. Dailey, 366 S.W.2d 181, 1963 Ky. LEXIS 9 ( Ky. 1963 ).

The court need not hear the remonstrance and shall order the annexation if less than fifty-one percent of the freeholders object, unless the objection raises a constitutional question or challenges the statute. Pewee Valley Fire Protection Dist. v. South Oldham Fire Protection Dist., 570 S.W.2d 290, 1978 Ky. App. LEXIS 574 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).

2. Procedure.

Where a petition was filed 23 days before the next term of a court which was not one of continuous jurisdiction, a judgment allowing the annexation was improper. Pottinger v. Magnolia Fire Protection Dist., 481 S.W.2d 273, 1972 Ky. LEXIS 242 ( Ky. 1972 ).

3. Annexation by Another District.

This section makes no specific provisions for the annexation of territory by one fire protection district of the territory of another fire protection district and the legislature did not contemplate or intend to permit such an acquisition; accordingly, a petition for such annexation was properly dismissed. Pewee Valley Fire Protection Dist. v. South Oldham Fire Protection Dist., 570 S.W.2d 290, 1978 Ky. App. LEXIS 574 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).

4. Freeholders.

A fire protection district is not a “freeholder” under subsection (1) of this section, but did have standing to object and enter a written defense. Pewee Valley Fire Protection Dist. v. South Oldham Fire Protection Dist., 570 S.W.2d 290, 1978 Ky. App. LEXIS 574 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).

Cited:

Caneyville Volunteer Fire Dep’t v. Green’s Motorcycle Salvage, Inc., 286 S.W.3d 790, 2009 Ky. LEXIS 158 ( Ky. 2009 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

In annexing additional land, the territory of the existing district must first be added to the territory to be annexed and then the petition must be filed in the clerk’s office in which the greater portion of the aggregate territory is located. OAG 72-842 .

Property owners in a fire district annexed to a city would still be liable for their share of a debt for the purchase of fire fighting equipment as evidenced by the tax rate applicable in the fire district until the equipment has been paid for. OAG 73-91 .

A fire protection district created under this chapter would be considered to be a “political subdivision” of the Commonwealth. OAG 77-321 .

This section provides for the enlarging or diminishing of the territory of a fire protection district and there is no limitation to the degree of diminution so that a fire protection district could be diminished to the point of nothingness with the result that the trustees would have no territory over which to exercise supervision. OAG 78-390 .

Where a fire protection district is diminished to the point of substantial nothingness under this section, a corporate dissolution would be no more than a normal, reasonable and necessary concomitant of such authority. OAG 78-390 .

While territory in a fire protection district which is annexed by a city is stricken from the district, such action does not relieve property owners in the annexed area of liability for such taxes as are necessary to pay for the proportionate share of the indebtedness incurred while such territory was part of the fire protection district. OAG 82-121 .

75.022. Definitions — Respective rights of city and fire district to provide certain fire protection services within city boundaries — Fire protection services for newly annexed city territory — Financing of fire protection services — Written agreements between fire district and city — Provision of fire service to territory annexed by city that does not maintain a regular fire department.

    1. As used in subsections (2) to (4) of this section, “city” means any city government that maintains a regular fire department as defined in KRS 95.010(3)(b). (1) (a) As used in subsections (2) to (4) of this section, “city” means any city government that maintains a regular fire department as defined in KRS 95.010(3)(b).
    2. As used in subsections (2) to (5) of this section, “fire district” means a fire protection district or a volunteer fire department district created in accordance with the procedures of KRS 65.182 , county volunteer fire department established under the authority of KRS 67.083 , and volunteer fire departments created as nonprofit corporations under KRS Chapter 273.
  1. Except as provided in subsection (4) of this section, a fire district shall not contain or later include within its boundaries any territory that is located within the corporate limits of a city. Subject to the limitations of subsections (3) and (4) of this section, a city shall have the primary right to provide fire service to all territories located within its corporate limits.
    1. In order for a city to assume the provision of fire service to annexed or newly incorporated territory that is being served by a fire district, the city shall pay the fire district for the proportionate share of the fire district’s indebtedness that was incurred while the annexed or newly incorporated territory was included within the fire district. (3) (a) In order for a city to assume the provision of fire service to annexed or newly incorporated territory that is being served by a fire district, the city shall pay the fire district for the proportionate share of the fire district’s indebtedness that was incurred while the annexed or newly incorporated territory was included within the fire district.
    2. Unless otherwise agreed to in writing by the city and the fire district, the proportionate share of the fire district’s debt attributable to annexed or newly incorporated territory shall be calculated based upon the ratio of the total value of taxable real property included within the annexed or newly incorporated territory to the total value of all taxable real property located within the entire fire district as it existed prior to the annexation or incorporation by the city. The resulting quotient shall be multiplied by the fire district’s total indebtedness to determine the amount of liability that the city is responsible for paying to the fire district.
    3. Unless otherwise agreed to in writing by the city and the fire district, the city shall pay the entire amount of the proportionate share of the indebtedness to the fire district prior to assuming service in the annexed or newly incorporated territory or shall pay the total amount in equal yearly installments over no more than three (3) consecutive years. The first installment shall be due to the fire district prior to the city assuming the provision of fire services.
    4. If a city meets the requirements of this subsection, the annexed or newly incorporated territory shall be stricken from the boundaries of the fire district, and the fire district shall no longer be authorized to collect any taxes from property owners within the stricken territory.
  2. A city shall cede its primary right to provide fire services to annexed or newly incorporated territory located within a fire district if:
    1. The city does not comply with the requirements of subsection (3) of this section to pay the fire district for the proportionate share of the indebtedness attributable to the annexed or newly incorporated territory;
    2. The fire district has no indebtedness at the time of the annexation or incorporation, and the fire district and city agree in writing that it is in the best interests of the citizens and property owners within the annexed or incorporated territory to continue to have fire service provided by the fire district. The agreement entered into by the fire district and the city may contain any agreed-upon term, conditions, and limitations; or
    3. Any circumstance exists where the fire district and city agree in writing that it is more appropriate and beneficial to the citizens and property owners within the territory for the fire district to continue the provision of fire services within the annexed or newly incorporated territory. The agreement entered into by the fire district and the city may contain any agreed-upon term, conditions, and limitations.
    1. As used in this subsection, “regular fire department” has the same meaning as in KRS 95.010(3)(b). (5) (a) As used in this subsection, “regular fire department” has the same meaning as in KRS 95.010(3)(b).
    2. A city that does not maintain a regular fire department, but maintains its own volunteer fire department:
      1. Shall have the right to assume the provision of fire service to territory annexed by the city that, at the time of the annexation, is being served by a fire district that does not maintain a regular fire department. A city that elects to assume the provision of fire service pursuant to this subsection shall follow the procedures established in subsections (3) and (4) of this section; and
      2. Shall not have the primary right to provide fire services to any territory that is being served by a fire district that maintains a regular fire department, unless the fire district strikes the territory from the district boundaries as authorized in KRS 75.020 .

History. Enact. Acts 2013, ch. 27, § 1, effective June 25, 2013; 2016 ch. 117, § 3, effective July 15, 2016.

75.025. County fire protection district — How organized — Powers. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1964, ch. 56, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1984, ch. 100, § 30, effective July 13, 1984.

75.030. Trustees — Appointment, term, vacancies — Officers. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1944, ch. 133, § 3; 1956, ch. 207, § 19; 1964, ch. 77, § 1; 1964, ch. 184, § 3; 1966, ch. 255, §§ 90, 283) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 97, § 1.

75.031. Trustees, elections, appointments, terms — Continued service upon establishment of consolidated local government — Vacancies — Removal — Elections for part of trustees — Officers.

    1. Upon creation of a fire protection district or a volunteer fire department district as provided in KRS 75.010 , the affairs of the district shall be conducted by the board of trustees consisting of seven (7) members, four (4) to be elected by the members of the district as hereinafter set out and three (3) to be appointed by the county judge/executive or mayor in a consolidated local government pursuant to the provisions of KRS 67C.139 . Two (2) members of the board of trustees shall be elected by the members of the firefighters of the district and shall be members of the district. Two (2) members of the board of trustees shall be property owners who own real or personal property which is subject to the fire protection tax pursuant to KRS 75.040 , who personally reside in the district, and who are not active firefighters and shall be elected by the property owners of the district. Property owners voting to select representatives to the board of trustees shall have attained the age of eighteen (18). The county judge/executive of the county in which the greater part of the district is located shall, with the approval of the fiscal court, appoint three (3) members of the board of trustees. In counties containing a city of the first class, trustees appointed by the county judge/executive to serve in volunteer fire prevention districts shall reside within the boundaries of that county. In counties governed by a consolidated local government, trustees appointed by the mayor to serve in volunteer fire prevention districts shall reside within the boundaries of the consolidated local government. At the first election held after the district is formed, one (1) firefighter shall be elected to serve on the board of trustees for a period of one (1) year and one (1) for a period of three (3) years, and one (1) nonfirefighter property owner shall be elected to serve on the board of trustees for a period of two (2) years and one (1) for a period of four (4) years. On the expiration of the respective terms, the successor to each shall have the same qualifications as his or her predecessor and shall be elected for a term of four (4) years. The original appointed members of the board of trustees shall be appointed for terms of one (1), two (2), and three (3) years respectively. On the expiration of the respective terms, the successors to each shall be appointed for a term of three (3) years. Upon the establishment of a consolidated local government, incumbent members shall continue to serve until the expiration of their current term of office. In the event of a vacancy in the term of an appointed or elected trustee, the county judge/executive shall appoint with the approval of the fiscal court a trustee for the remainder of the term, except in a county containing a consolidated local government. In a county containing a consolidated local government, the mayor pursuant to the provisions of KRS 67C.139 shall appoint a trustee for the remainder of the term. (1) (a) Upon creation of a fire protection district or a volunteer fire department district as provided in KRS 75.010 , the affairs of the district shall be conducted by the board of trustees consisting of seven (7) members, four (4) to be elected by the members of the district as hereinafter set out and three (3) to be appointed by the county judge/executive or mayor in a consolidated local government pursuant to the provisions of KRS 67C.139. Two (2) members of the board of trustees shall be elected by the members of the firefighters of the district and shall be members of the district. Two (2) members of the board of trustees shall be property owners who own real or personal property which is subject to the fire protection tax pursuant to KRS 75.040 , who personally reside in the district, and who are not active firefighters and shall be elected by the property owners of the district. Property owners voting to select representatives to the board of trustees shall have attained the age of eighteen (18). The county judge/executive of the county in which the greater part of the district is located shall, with the approval of the fiscal court, appoint three (3) members of the board of trustees. In counties containing a city of the first class, trustees appointed by the county judge/executive to serve in volunteer fire prevention districts shall reside within the boundaries of that county. In counties governed by a consolidated local government, trustees appointed by the mayor to serve in volunteer fire prevention districts shall reside within the boundaries of the consolidated local government. At the first election held after the district is formed, one (1) firefighter shall be elected to serve on the board of trustees for a period of one (1) year and one (1) for a period of three (3) years, and one (1) nonfirefighter property owner shall be elected to serve on the board of trustees for a period of two (2) years and one (1) for a period of four (4) years. On the expiration of the respective terms, the successor to each shall have the same qualifications as his or her predecessor and shall be elected for a term of four (4) years. The original appointed members of the board of trustees shall be appointed for terms of one (1), two (2), and three (3) years respectively. On the expiration of the respective terms, the successors to each shall be appointed for a term of three (3) years. Upon the establishment of a consolidated local government, incumbent members shall continue to serve until the expiration of their current term of office. In the event of a vacancy in the term of an appointed or elected trustee, the county judge/executive shall appoint with the approval of the fiscal court a trustee for the remainder of the term, except in a county containing a consolidated local government. In a county containing a consolidated local government, the mayor pursuant to the provisions of KRS 67C.139 shall appoint a trustee for the remainder of the term.
    2. An appointed trustee may be removed from office as provided by KRS 65.007 .
    3. No person shall be an elected trustee who, at the time of his or her election, is not a citizen of Kentucky and has not attained the age of twenty-one (21).
    4. Unless otherwise provided by law, an elected firefighter trustee may be removed from office by the mayor of a consolidated local government, or in a county not containing a consolidated local government, by the county judge/executive of the county in which the greater part of the district is located. An elected firefighter trustee may be removed after a hearing with notice as required by KRS Chapter 424, for inefficiency, neglect of duty, malfeasance, or conflict of interest. The hearing shall be initiated and chaired by the county judge/executive of a county or the mayor of a consolidated local government, who shall prepare a written statement setting forth the reasons for removal. The trustee to be removed shall be notified of his or her proposed removal and the reasons for the proposed removal by registered mail sent to his or her last known address at least ten (10) days prior to the hearing. The person proposed to be removed may employ counsel to represent him or her. A record of the hearing shall be made by the county judge/executive or mayor respectively.
    5. The removal of an elected firefighter trustee of a fire protection district shall be subject to the approval of the fiscal court of the county in which the greater part of the district is located in those counties not containing a consolidated local government or the legislative council in a county containing a consolidated local government.
    6. An elected firefighter trustee removed pursuant to paragraphs (d) and (e) of this subsection may appeal, within ten (10) days of the rendering of the decision of the fiscal court or legislative council, respectively, to the Circuit Court of the county in which the greater part of the district is located. The scope of the appeal shall be limited to whether the county judge/executive, mayor, legislative council, or the fiscal court respectively, abused their discretion in removing the trustee.
  1. The elective offices of members of the board of trustees shall be filled by an election to be held once each year on the fourth Saturday of June between the hours of 11:00 a.m. and 2:00 p.m. The polls shall be located at the principal fire house in the district. The date, time, and place of the election shall be advertised in accordance with KRS 424.120 . This notice shall be advertised at least thirty (30) days prior to the election date and shall include the names and addresses of the candidates to be voted on for each position of trustee. In lieu of the published notice for the election of the firefighter trustees, written notice containing the information required to be advertised may be sent by first-class mail to each member of the firefighters of the fire protection district or volunteer fire department district, addressed to the firefighter at his or her residence, at least thirty (30) days prior to the election date. The nominations for candidates for trustees both representing the firefighters and the property owners residing in the district shall be made in accordance with the bylaws of the department. The terms of the three (3) trustees appointed by the county judge/executive or mayor shall start at the same time as the terms of the elected trustees. On or before the beginning of the second fiscal or calendar year, depending on which basis the fire protection or volunteer fire department district is being operated, after June 16, 1966, all departments organized prior to June 16, 1966, shall increase their boards of trustees from three (3) to seven (7) members and elect the elective members in the manner set forth herein.
  2. The trustees shall elect from their number a chairman, a secretary, and a treasurer, the latter of whom shall give bond in an amount as shall be determined by the county judge/executive of the county in which the greater part of the fire protection district is located or the mayor in a consolidated local government, conditioned upon the faithful discharge of the duties of his or her office, and the faithful accounting for all funds which may come into his or her possession as treasurer. The premiums on the bonds shall be paid out of the funds of the district.

History. Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 97, § 2; 1976, ch. 336, § 1; 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 20, § 6, effective January 2, 1978; 1978, ch. 175, § 1, effective June 17, 1978; 1978, ch. 384, § 20, effective June 17, 1978; 1980, ch. 18, § 5, effective July 15, 1980; 1996, ch. 127, § 2, effective July 15, 1996; 1996, ch. 136, § 2, effective July 15, 1996; 2000, ch. 348, § 1, effective July 14, 2000; 2002, ch. 346, § 76, effective July 15, 2002; 2004, ch. 92, § 1, effective July 13, 2004; 2014, ch. 71, § 4, effective July 15, 2014.

Opinions of Attorney General.

As the election of two members of the board of trustees of a fire protection district is purely local in character and regular or general election laws are inapplicable, secret paper ballots can be used. OAG 73-635 .

There is no constitutional prohibition against the requirement that nonfirefighter nominees are to be elected by property owners of the district and members of the volunteer firefighters are ineligible to vote for such nominees as the selection of trustees and their qualifications are matters to be determined by the legislature. OAG 73-635 .

Action taken by three members of the seven-member board of trustees of the fire protection district with respect to the tax levy and appropriation would be void as it did not constitute the action of a majority and any money given for this purpose could be recovered by a taxpayer suit if necessary. OAG 74-245 .

A justice of the peace who is a member of the fiscal court may be elected or appointed trustee of a county fire protection district since it is a separate taxing district. OAG 74-341 .

Elections required by this section do not come under the regular or general election laws but are the responsibility of the board of trustees of the fire protection district and the costs in conducting the elections are covered by KRS 75.040 and not KRS 125.260 (repealed). OAG 74-520 .

On the basis of the fact that both real and personal property is subject to fire protection, any person owning real or personal property subject to the tax would be qualified to vote for the two members of the board of trustees of the fire protection district who are elected by property owners. OAG 74-782 .

The provision added to this section by the 1976 amendment that in counties containing a city of the first class trustees appointed by the county judge (now county judge/executive) to serve in volunteer fire protection districts shall reside within the boundaries of that fire district applies only to trustees appointed on or after the effective date of the amendment, June 19, 1976. OAG 76-454 .

If a trustee who has been elected by the property owners sells his property in the district and moves out of the fire protection district, he is subject to removal but until he either resigns or is removed from his position as a member of the board of trustees he serves as a de facto officer and his acts would be considered valid. OAG 77-575 .

A member of the fire department who resides in the district and owns property in the district may be appointed to a trustee position by the county judge, provided that appointment does not disturb the balance of viewpoints intended by this section. OAG 77-706 .

Inasmuch as both real and personal property are subject to the fire protection district tax, any person owning real or personal property subject to the tax would be qualified to vote for the property owner trustees. OAG 77-707 .

A property-owning firefighter cannot vote in the election for the trustees representing the property owners. OAG 78-409 .

If, in a particular household, all the property is recorded in the father’s name only, then the wife and children would probably be precluded from voting since they would have an extremely difficult time establishing that they legally own property in the district subject to the fire district tax. OAG 78-409 .

There is no reference to “voters” or registered voters or that those persons possessing the requirements of property ownership and residency must be registered voters. OAG 78-409 .

While this section does not deal with the required age of persons voting in the elections set forth herein and while no reported case deals with the subject, a person should be at least 18 years old to be eligible to vote in fire district elections. OAG 78-409 .

The owners of personal property subject to the tax and who reside within the district are “property owners” and entitled to vote regardless of whether the district has actually levied a tax on personal property. OAG 78-409 , 78-782.

The board of trustees of the volunteer fire department district can require each regular fireman of that district to carry an identification card issued by the board. OAG 79-622 .

In answering fire calls from nonmembers of a volunteer fire department district, three approaches are possible in connection with establishing a basis for billing such nonmembers for the response to a fire call: (1) An oral contract between an authorized member of the fire department and the nonmember property owner; (2) making use of the “contract implied in law” concept; and (3) requiring the nonmember to sign a simple contract at the scene of the fire. OAG 80-162 .

The board of trustees of a fire protection district has the implied power to borrow money for district purposes in 1980, in anticipation of revenues that the district has actually provided for, through its tax rate, in reasonable and good faith anticipation of collecting in connection with its 1980 budget. OAG 80-167 .

Constitution, § 165 and KRS 61.080 do not prohibit a county judge/executive from appointing a firefighter from one fire department to serve on the board of trustees of a fire protection district which does not include that department, since city and county firefighters are considered employees of their employing entity rather than governmental officers, and trustees of a fire protection district are district officers rather than state, county or city officers. OAG 81-427 .

This section does not prevent the chief or assistant chief from being considered as members of the fire fighting force or department but it also does not specifically include them as members of the fire fighting force or fire department. OAG 82-182 .

A member of the Board of Trustees of a fire protection district established pursuant to KRS Chapter 75 would not, for purposes of KRS 61.080 and Ky. Const., § 165, be considered a state, city or county officer. OAG 82-304 .

There is no statutory or constitutional prohibition against a person serving at the same time as a county police officer and as a member of the Board of Trustees of a fire protection district organized under KRS Chapter 75. OAG 82-304 .

Since this section does not define “members” or “department,” it does not prevent the chief from being considered as a member of the firefighting force or department but it also does not specifically include him in as a member of the that force or department. OAG 82-409 .

The fire chief of a fire protection district organized pursuant to KRS Chapter 75 is not prevented by statutory or constitutional provisions from serving at the same time as one of the two required members of the fire department on the fire district’s board of trustees. On those particular occasions where a conflict does occur, the fire chief should remove himself from the proceedings rather than merely abstaining or passing on the matter. OAG 82-409 .

Fire protection district trustees and officers are not state, city or county officers for purposes of KRS 61.080 and Ky. Const., § 165, but would be considered district officers; not only are there no statutory or constitutional prohibitions against a fire district fire chief serving at the same time as a member of the fire district’s board of trustees, but, subdivision (1)(a) of this section requires that two members of the board be elected by the members of the volunteer firefighters of the district and be members thereof. The General Assembly obviously intended that the interests of the firefighters be represented on the board since two board members must be members of the district’s fire department. OAG 82-409 .

By enactment of KRS 75.255 in 1974, the General Assembly abandoned the statutory alternative of a calendar year for fire protection districts, while leaving intact the prior provision of subsection (2) of this section relating to a “fiscal year basis”. Thus, by this legislation a fire protection district is permitted to use only a fiscal year basis. And since KRS Chapter 75 does not specify some beginning date other than July 1, of each year, the July 1 beginning date mentioned specifically in Ky. Const., § 169 governs such fire protection districts. OAG 85-65 .

75.040. Power to operate fire department and emergency ambulance service — Activities of district — Levy, assessment, and collection of tax to defray expenses — Supplemental emergency medical services.

    1. Upon the creation of a fire protection district or a volunteer fire department district as provided in KRS 75.010 to 75.031 , the trustees of a district are authorized to establish and operate a fire department and emergency ambulance service as provided in subsection (6) of this section and to levy a tax upon the property in the district. Property that may be taxed includes property within cities in a fire protection district or a volunteer fire department district: (1) (a) Upon the creation of a fire protection district or a volunteer fire department district as provided in KRS 75.010 to 75.031 , the trustees of a district are authorized to establish and operate a fire department and emergency ambulance service as provided in subsection (6) of this section and to levy a tax upon the property in the district. Property that may be taxed includes property within cities in a fire protection district or a volunteer fire department district:
      1. As provided by KRS 75.022 ; or
      2. Within the metes and bounds of a city that does not maintain a regular fire department as defined by KRS 95.010(3)(b). The property taxed shall be subject to county tax, and the tax levied by the district shall not exceed ten cents ($0.10) per one hundred dollars ($100) of valuation as assessed for county taxes, for the purpose of defraying the expenses of the establishment, maintenance, and operation of the fire department or to make contracts for fire protection for the districts as provided in KRS 75.050 . The rate set in this subsection shall apply, notwithstanding the provisions of KRS 132.023 .
    2. A fire protection district or a volunteer fire department district that establishes and operates an emergency ambulance service and is the primary service provider in the district may levy a tax upon the property in the district not to exceed twenty cents ($0.20) per one hundred dollars ($100) of valuation as assessed for county taxes, for the purpose of defraying the expenses of the establishment, maintenance, and operation of the fire department and emergency ambulance service or to make contracts for fire protection for the districts as provided in KRS 75.050 . The rate set in this subsection shall apply, notwithstanding the provisions of KRS 132.023 .
  1. The establishment, maintenance, and operation of a fire protection district or volunteer fire department district shall include, but not be limited to, the following activities:
    1. Acquisition and maintenance of adequate fire protection facilities;
    2. Acquisition and maintenance of adequate firefighting equipment;
    3. Recruitment, training, and supervision of firefighters;
    4. Control and extinguishment of fires;
    5. Prevention of fires;
    6. Conducting fire safety activities;
    7. Payment of compensation to firefighters and providing the necessary support and supervisory personnel;
    8. Payment for reasonable benefits or a nominal fee to volunteer firefighters when benefits and fees do not constitute wages or salaries under KRS Chapter 337 and are not taxable as income to the volunteer firefighters under Kentucky or federal income tax laws; and
    9. The use of fire protection district equipment for activities which are for a public purpose and which do not materially diminish the value of the equipment.
  2. The property valuation administrator of the county or counties involved, with the cooperation of the board of trustees, shall note on the tax rolls the taxpayers and valuation of the property subject to such assessment. The county clerk shall compute the tax on the regular state and county tax bills in such manner as may be directed by regulation of the Department of Revenue.
  3. Such taxes shall be subject to the same delinquency date, discounts, penalties, and interest as are applied to the collection of ad valorem taxes and shall be collected by the sheriff of the county or counties involved and accounted for to the treasurer of the district. The sheriff shall be entitled to a fee of one percent (1%) of the amount collected by him.
  4. Nothing contained in this subsection shall be construed to prevent the trustees of a fire protection district located in a city or county which provides emergency ambulance service from using funds derived from taxes for the purpose of providing supplemental emergency medical services so long as the mayor of the city or the county judge/executive of the county, as appropriate, certifies to the trustees in writing that supplemental emergency medical services are reasonably required in the public interest. For the purposes of this subsection, “supplemental emergency medical services” may include EMT, EMT-D, and paramedic services rendered at the scene of an emergent accident or illness until an emergency ambulance can arrive at the scene.
  5. The trustees of those fire protection districts or volunteer fire department districts whose districts or portions thereof do not receive emergency ambulance services from an emergency ambulance service district or, whose districts are not being served by an emergency ambulance service operated or contracted by a city or county government, may develop, maintain, and operate or contract for an emergency ambulance service as part of any fire department created pursuant to this chapter. No taxes levied pursuant to subsection (1) of this section shall be used to develop, maintain, operate, or contract for an emergency ambulance service until the tax year following the year the trustees of the district authorize the establishment of the emergency ambulance service.

History. Enact. Acts 1944, ch. 133, § 4; 1954, ch. 212, § 1; 1956, ch. 207, § 20; 1964, ch. 184, § 4; 1972, ch. 127, § 1; 1978, ch. 384, § 21, effective June 17, 1978; 1986, ch. 195, § 1, effective July 15, 1986; 1996, ch. 127, § 3, effective July 15, 1996; 2004, ch. 151, § 1, effective July 13, 2004; 2005, ch. 85, § 98, effective June 20, 2005; 2013, ch. 27, § 4, effective June 25, 2013.

Compiler’s Notes.

KRS 75.025 and 75.030 , contained in the reference to KRS 75.010 to 75.031 in subsection (1), have been repealed.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Delegation of Control by Contract.

A contract by which a fire district delegated more or less complete control of the operation to the local fire department was compatible with the district’s statutory authority. Effinger v. Fern Creek Volunteer Fire Dept., Inc., 564 S.W.2d 847, 1978 Ky. App. LEXIS 502 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).

Having contracted with a fire department for fire protection, it is common sense that the district would want the department to submit a budget for its approval and it cannot be said that the taxing power of the district was delegated by such contract. Effinger v. Fern Creek Volunteer Fire Dept., Inc., 564 S.W.2d 847, 1978 Ky. App. LEXIS 502 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).

2. Purpose of Contracts.

There is no language in this section that limits fire service contracts to departments or units outside the district’s territory, or for services in areas within the territory which can be more readily served by neighboring departments, or for reciprocal fire protection agreements among several departments, although it appears that a district might legally contract with a neighboring district or department for any of the foregoing reasons. Effinger v. Fern Creek Volunteer Fire Dept., Inc., 564 S.W.2d 847, 1978 Ky. App. LEXIS 502 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).

Cited:

Caneyville Volunteer Fire Dep’t v. Green’s Motorcycle Salvage, Inc., 286 S.W.3d 790, 2009 Ky. LEXIS 158 ( Ky. 2009 ); St. Matthews Fire Prot. Dist. v. Aubrey, 304 S.W.3d 56, 2009 Ky. App. LEXIS 47 (Ky. Ct. App. 2009).

Opinions of Attorney General.

The trustees of a fire protection district could not lease a service station in their official capacity and apply the profits to buying fire fighting equipment. OAG 61-367 .

A tax for a fire protection district levied by the fiscal court must be included in the computation of the 50 cent county tax limit. OAG 63-1079 .

A fire protection district cannot levy any tax on unmanufactured tobacco. OAG 64-232 .

Where a fire protection district was established in 1967, since the fire protection district came into existence after the roll back provisions on tax rates and budgets, the county clerk should compute the tax at the rate fixed by the district trustees, but such rate should not exceed 10¢ per $100 of the 1968 assessed value of property in the district. OAG 68-245 .

The tax provided for in subsection (1) of this section for the fire protection district applies to all property, both real and personal, in the district. OAG 69-340 .

A fire protection district established pursuant to KRS Chapter 75, could not legally establish a pension fund system for its volunteer workers under the statute. OAG 70-4 .

A city could lease space in a municipally owned fire house for a reasonable sum to any private organization to be used for a purpose that is basically private. OAG 71-488 .

The city legislative body could authorize the use of the municipally owned fire house by civic organizations involved in community projects. OAG 71-488 .

A fire protection district is a special and separate taxing authority and may levy its own tax exclusive of the county levy. OAG 72-480 .

As the 1972 amendment to this section was passed by the legislature after the 1972 amendment to KRS 132.023 , the provisions as to tax rates in this section prevail over the provisions of KRS 132.023 . OAG 72-646 .

While both Ky. Const., § 165 and KRS 61.080 prohibit a person from holding two municipal offices at the same time, there would be no incompatibility if a town council member served as a trustee of a fire prevention district since the fire prevention district is not equivalent to a municipality but is merely a separate taxing district under this section. OAG 73-711 .

This section and not KRS 125.260 (repealed) covers the costs of elections conducted pursuant to KRS 75.031 . OAG 74-520 .

This section authorizes the board of trustees of fire protection districts to levy taxes and as a separate taxing district under Ky. Const., §§ 157 and 158, it may borrow money in anticipation of but not in excess of its annual revenue so a fire protection district could borrow funds from a savings and loan association to purchase land and to erect a building to house its fire-fighting facilities. OAG 75-511 .

A fire protection district tax applies to the total acreage of real estate owned by a particular taxpayer and not just the acreage on which there are buildings. OAG 76-38 .

Although it is common for fire departments to operate an emergency ambulance service, there is no specific authority for general life squad and rescue services conducted by a fire protection district to be funded under this section. OAG 76-321 .

Fiscal court could, under the authority of KRS 67.083 , Ky. Const., §§ 171 and 181, pass an ordinance imposing an occupational or license tax upon those persons engaged in writing fire insurance policies in the county and the tax could be measured in terms of the amount of such insurance written; however, such tax, to meet the constitutional test, would have to be based upon a reasonable classification, not be discriminatory and not be confiscatory and the revenue generated by such tax could be used for the financial support of a fire department established pursuant to KRS Chapter 75; there is no conflict between KRS 67.083 , such an ordinance, and this section inasmuch as a fire protection district is a separate taxing district which does not involve the county ad valorem tax levy. OAG 76-575 .

This section does not provide the exclusive mode of funding a volunteer fire protection district. OAG 76-575 .

The McCreary County Fire Protection District can place tax funds in savings for the purchase of new equipment for use by the McCreary County Central Fire District. OAG 78-556 .

This section specifically requires a sheriff to collect the tax and account for the money to the treasurer of the fire district whether or not the tax was legal, valid, or properly collected; it is not for him to question the validity of the tax after he has collected it, and if there is any loss, he would be liable to the fire district. OAG 79-227 .

A fire protection district is a special and separate taxing district under Ky. Const., §§ 157 and 158. OAG 79-647 .

The board of trustees of a fire protection district has the implied power to borrow money for district purposes in 1980, in anticipation of revenues that the district has actually provided for, through its tax rate, in reasonable and good faith anticipation of collecting in connection with its 1980 budget. OAG 80-167 .

The trustees of a fire protection district are required to levy the district tax, then the county clerk is required to compute the district tax on the regular state and county tax bills in such manner as may be directed by regulation of the department of revenue, and finally the sheriff of the affected county is required to collect such district tax and account for same to the treasurer of the district. OAG 80-560 .

Although a fire protection district under this section has the authority through its board of trustees to levy a tax upon the property in its district in connection with the establishment, maintenance and operation of its fire department, there is no authority permitting a fiscal court to simply donate funds to a fire protection district, and such a donation would probably violate Ky. Const., § 179, since that section prohibits the General Assembly from authorizing a county to lend its credit or appropriate money to any corporation, association or individual. OAG 81-247 .

The authorized tax levy by the fire protection district is for the maintenance and operation of the fire department for the purpose of protecting the property owners within the district from fires or fire-related conditions. This protection includes not only the fighting of fires in progress but also includes the duty to prevent a dangerous and inflammatory condition from developing into a possible explosion and subsequent fire. OAG 82-310 .

The fire department of the district should, as part of its purpose and obligation in fighting fires and fire-related conditions, alleviate when possible any hazardous situation involving explosive material such as gasoline which is, without question, a fire hazard affecting the safety and welfare of the property owners who are paying taxes for such protection; as a consequence, the district cannot legally levy an extra charge or fee for the man-hours and equipment-hours deemed necessary to alleviate the hazardous condition in question. OAG 82-310 .

The fire department owes a duty to the property owners who must pay the tax, not only to fight fires in progress, but also to diffuse highly hazardous conditions involving inflammatory leaks, such as gasoline. OAG 82-310 .

If there is any conflict between subsection (1) of this section and KRS 132.023 , it relates to what tax rate may be set initially. There is no inconsistency and KRS 132.023 applies whenever an already established rate is increased. OAG 82-323 .

While this section was not intended to constitute an exclusive mode of funding a volunteer fire protection district, the authority for the district to impose a fire call service charge or fee would be legal only if expressly authorized by statute; a review of KRS Chapter 75 reveals no statutory authority for the trustees of such a volunteer fire department district to impose a fee or charge for responding to fire calls within the district or within any other districts under contract. OAG 83-133 .

KRS 67.715(2) literally gives the county judge/executive, with approval of fiscal court, the authority to create any special district, including a fire protection district, without the petition process; once a fire protection district is created under KRS 67.715(2), the powers of such district enumerated in KRS Chapter 75 apply, including the taxing power. OAG 83-292 .

The property valuation administrator (PVA) is responsible for assessing motor vehicles subject to a fire district tax, and part of the responsibility for assessing the property includes listing the property on the tax roll. OAG 84-132 .

There appears to be no authority in KRS Chapter 75 or anywhere else for the board of trustees of a fire protection district to enact an ordinance or regulation prohibiting certain kinds of hazardous burning in the county. However, there are some existing statutory provisions, such as KRS 149.370 , 149.375 , 149.380 , 149.400 and 227.300 , which may be of some help in alleviating the problems associated with widespread trash burning by the general public. OAG 84-213 .

Absent any grant of power to a fire protection district other than that contained in this chapter, a fire protection district is authorized to spend its tax funds for two purposes only: (1) to defray the expenses of the establishment, maintenance, and operation of the fire protection district; or (2) to make contracts for fire protection for the district. OAG 90-145 .

An expenditure of fire protection district tax funds for fire station recreational rooms is part of adequate fire protection facilities because such rooms are used by on-call firefighters who are waiting at the facilities between calls; in addition, expenditures for feeding volunteer firefighters after fire runs and after training sessions is part of the cost of extinguishing fires and training firefighters, while an expenditure for recognition awards and awards dinners is part of supervising firefighters. OAG 90-145 .

Expenditures of fire protection district tax funds on activities such as picnics, parties, bowling league memberships, softball and basketball league memberships, dances, and miscellaneous banquets and dinners do not appear to fit within the categories for which the expenditure of such funds is authorized or to be indispensable to carrying out the objects included in these categories. OAG 90-145 .

The purpose of a fire protection district is to prevent the loss of lives and property by fire; expenditures that fit within the following categories, or that are indispensable to carrying out the objects included in these categories, are expenditures for the establishment, maintenance, and operation of a fire protection district: 1. Acquisition and maintenance of adequate fire protection facilities; 2. Acquisition and maintenance of adequate fire fighting equipment; 3. Recruitment, training, and supervision of firefighters; 4. Control and extinguishment of fires; 5. Prevention of fires; 6. Conducting fire safety activities; 7. Payment of compensation to firefighters and necessary support and supervisory personnel. OAG 90-145 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Levy and assessment of property taxes, KRS Chapter 132.

75.042. Expenditure of unrefunded ad valorem taxes by fire district board of trustees permitted.

If ad valorem taxes have been collected under the provisions of KRS 75.015 or 75.040 when no taxes were due for the tax year beginning on January 1, 2005, moneys not refunded after the two (2) year period set out under the provisions of KRS 134.590 shall not be considered unclaimed property of the state and may be expended by the fire district board of trustees.

History. Enact. Acts 2007, ch. 37, § 3, effective June 26, 2007.

75.050. Contracts by fire units or districts, cities and counties, for fire protection.

Any fire protection district created as provided in KRS 75.010 , and any fire protection district or fire prevention district hereafter created pursuant to present or future law, and any municipal corporation, volunteer fire department, volunteer fire prevention unit, or volunteer fire protection unit, may, through its governing body, make and enter into contracts with any other fire protection district, fire prevention district, municipal corporation, volunteer fire department, volunteer fire prevention unit, or volunteer fire protection unit, either within the same county or within an adjoining county in an area adjacent to the boundary line between the counties, for the furnishing or receiving of fire protection services for all property within the confines of the area included in and covered by the contract or contracts, where such fire protection is not otherwise provided by some division of government or governmental agency. Similar contracts may be made and entered into between any county and an adjoining county, or between any county and any one (1) or more municipalities or districts, departments or units of the character above mentioned, located either within the county or within an adjoining county in an area adjacent to the boundary line between the counties. The personnel and equipment of a contracting party, in going to and returning from a fire, or in answering and responding to a false fire alarm or call, and while endeavoring to extinguish fires within the area covered by the contract, shall be deemed and hereby is declared to be engaged in the exercise of a governmental function.

History. Enact. Acts 1944, ch. 133, § 5; 1950, ch. 154, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Limitations on Contracts.

There is no language in this section that limits fire service contracts to departments or units outside the district’s territory, or for services in areas within the territory which can be more readily served by neighboring departments, or for reciprocal fire protection agreements among several departments, although it appears that a district might legally contract with a neighboring district or department for any of the foregoing reasons. Effinger v. Fern Creek Volunteer Fire Dept., Inc., 564 S.W.2d 847, 1978 Ky. App. LEXIS 502 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).

2. Delegation of Control.

A contract by which a fire district delegated more or less complete control of the operation to the local fire department was compatible with the district’s statutory authority. Effinger v. Fern Creek Volunteer Fire Dept., Inc., 564 S.W.2d 847, 1978 Ky. App. LEXIS 502 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).

Cited:

Barber v. Commissioner of Revenue, 674 S.W.2d 18, 1984 Ky. App. LEXIS 467 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984); Caneyville Volunteer Fire Dep’t v. Green’s Motorcycle Salvage, Inc., 286 S.W.3d 790, 2009 Ky. LEXIS 158 ( Ky. 2009 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

The city council of a fourth-class city could contract to sell a city-owned vehicle to the volunteer fire department for a consideration of $1.00. OAG 64-241 .

A city of the fourth class may either establish and operate a fire department or enter into a contract with an existing fire department and may obtain the money by either system through taxes imposed by city ordinance. OAG 64-247 .

A fiscal court could validly enter into contracts with two rural volunteer fire departments to pay stated sums to each of them, appropriated from the county’s general fund, for the performance of the fire-protection service in specified areas of the county, if such service is not presently being furnished by the county or an agency of the county. OAG 65-753 .

A city is authorized to contract with a volunteer fire department for fire protection within and without the city and compensate its members for services rendered, both within and without the city limits. OAG 67-42 .

The provisions of KRS 95.710 would not be applicable to a volunteer fire department of a city of the fourth class or restrict the employment by the department of persons under the age of 21 unless the city has elected to operate a fire department. OAG 68-131 .

A volunteer fire department is an independent organization dissociated with the city. It is sometimes established pursuant to the creation of a volunteer fire department district under this section or it may be established as a separate corporate entity. It is not under the jurisdiction of the city except so far as contractual agreements are concerned. This section authorizes a city to contract with a volunteer fire department for fire protection and such a contract could involve the use of city-owned equipment. OAG 71-8 .

This section does not authorize a city to levy a special tax for the purpose of raising revenue for a donation to a volunteer fire department. OAG 72-599 .

A conflict of interest exists where a voluntary fire department chief also serves as a member of the city council and the volunteer fire district is under contract with the city for fire protection. OAG 74-376 .

Volunteer firemen do not possess the powers of peace officers. OAG 75-567 .

Since a volunteer fire department is an independent organization not under the jurisdiction of the city government the city would probably not be liable in tort under a contractual arrangement between it and the volunteer fire department for an accident involving the personnel of the volunteer fire department; the volunteer fire department personnel, however, can be held personally liable for damages resulting from their negligent acts. OAG 76-582 .

A subdivision development which seeks a contractual arrangement for fire protection services with a fire protection district in an adjoining county would qualify under this section even though the subdivision is not adjacent to the common boundary county line. OAG 77-616 .

While the fiscal court of any county is authorized to contract with a volunteer fire department for fire prevention services pursuant to this section there is no authority for the county to simply donate public funds to a private corporation and, accordingly, a proposed donation by a fiscal court to a volunteer fire department would be invalid. OAG 78-122 .

Under a contract with a governmental unit or agency under this section a volunteer fire department, if it is nongovernmental, could be required to issue identification cards. OAG 79-622 .

The fiscal court has authority, under this section and KRS 67.083(3)(u), to contract with the volunteer fire departments for fire protection purposes. OAG 82-103 .

A municipality, in contracting for fire protection services for the city, may not exclude from the coverage of such fire protection services any churches, schools, charitable organizations and other buildings located within the city limits. OAG 83-271 .

Absent any grant of power to a fire protection district other than that contained in this chapter, a fire protection district is authorized to spend its tax funds for two purposes only: (1) to defray the expenses of the establishment, maintenance, and operation of the fire protection district; or (2) to make contracts for fire protection for the district. OAG 90-145 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Lewis, Kostas and Carnes, Consolidation — Complete or Functional — of City and County Governments in Kentucky, 42 Ky. L.J. 295 (1954).

75.060. Status and compensation of firefighters serving outside limits of district or municipality.

All municipal firefighters, fire protection district firefighters, and volunteer fire department firemen, full-paid or volunteer, attending and serving at fires or doing fire prevention work outside the corporate limits of a municipality, fire protection district, or volunteer fire department district as provided in KRS 75.050 , or area normally served by a volunteer fire department, shall be considered as serving in their regular line of duty as fully as if they were serving within the corporate limits of their own municipality, fire protection district, or area normally served by a volunteer fire department, but full-paid firefighters shall receive no additional compensation and volunteer firemen shall receive only such compensation as may be provided for by ordinance or resolution in such cases, and all such full-paid firefighters and volunteer firemen shall be entitled to all benefits of any pension fund, in the same manner as if the firefighting or fire prevention work had been within the corporate limits of the municipality, or area normally served by a volunteer fire department.

History. Enact. Acts 1944, ch. 133, § 6; 1964, ch. 184, § 5; 1978, ch. 164, § 11, effective June 17, 1978.

Opinions of Attorney General.

If the fire chief is a member of the city volunteer fire department and is under contract along with the other members, his residence outside of the city is of no legal consequence. OAG 67-42 .

A city is authorized to contract with a volunteer fire department for fire protection within and without the city and compensate its members for services rendered, both within and without the city limits. OAG 67-42 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Fire apparatus, use outside city limits, cities of all classes, KRS 95.830 .

75.070. No liability for damages when serving outside limits of district or municipality — Fire departments as agents of Commonwealth.

  1. A municipal fire department, fire protection district fire department, and volunteer fire department and the personnel of each, answering any fire alarms, performing fire prevention services, or other duly authorized emergency services inside and outside of the corporate limits of its municipality, fire protection district, or area normally served by a volunteer fire department, shall be considered an agent of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, and acting solely and alone in a governmental capacity, and such municipality, fire protection district, or area normally served by a volunteer fire department, shall not be liable in damages for any omission or act of commission or negligence while answering an alarm, performing fire prevention services, or other duly authorized emergency services.
  2. No municipal fire department, fire protection district fire department or volunteer fire department answering any fire alarms, performing fire prevention services or volunteer fire department services inside the corporate limits of the district shall be liable in damages for any omission or act of commission or negligence while answering or returning from any fire or reported fire, or doing or performing any fire prevention work under and by virtue of this chapter and said fire departments shall be considered agents of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, and acting solely and alone in a governmental capacity.

History. Enact. Acts 1944, ch. 133, § 7; 1956, ch. 207, § 21; 1964, ch. 184, § 6.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

KRS 75.070 and 95.830(2) are constitutional under Ky. Const. § 230 and 231 and do not violate the jural rights doctrine under Ky. Const. §§ 14, 54 and 241. Fire departments and volunteer fire departments are government agents who engage in a governmental, not proprietary function, and thus qualify for sovereign immunity. KRS 75.070 is constitutional and confers governmental immunity upon municipal fire departments, fire protection district fire departments and volunteer fire departments. Caneyville Volunteer Fire Dep't v. Green's Motorcycle Salvage, Inc., 286 S.W.3d 790, 2009 Ky. LEXIS 158 ( Ky. 2009 ).

2. Qualified Immunity.

KRS 75.070 granted official immunity to firefighters sued in their representative capacity; and, consequently, qualified official immunity to firefighters sued in their personal capacity but engaged in good faith discretionary functions. Caneyville Volunteer Fire Dep't v. Green's Motorcycle Salvage, Inc., 286 S.W.3d 790, 2009 Ky. LEXIS 158 ( Ky. 2009 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Where a contractual arrangement was in effect between the city and a volunteer fire department, the city would incur no tort liability for an accident involving property owned by the volunteer fire department where the vehicles were licensed in the name of the city and bore “official” license plates and labels. OAG 68-37 .

A volunteer fire department shall not be liable for the negligent acts of its individual volunteer firemen whether these acts of negligence occur within or without the area served by the volunteer fire department. OAG 69-213 .

Since the individual fireman could have been held liable for his negligent actions when the Kentucky Constitution was adopted in 1891, that remedy may not now be abolished by statute and any provision of this section that purports to provide this individual immunity is unconstitutional. OAG 69-213 .

A volunteer fire department, operating an emergency vehicle and administering first aid to victims, and the members or employees as individuals, may be liable in “ordinary tort” for negligence in performing its operations and as they may affect various individuals. OAG 71-82 .

This section is unconstitutional as being in violation of Ky. Const., §§ 14, 54, and 241. OAG 71-82 .

Volunteer firemen are not exempt from personal liability. OAG 71-300 .

Even though a fire protection district under KRS 75.010 has been held to be a municipal corporation this section exempts such districts from liability and, therefore, a district would not be liable for the tortious acts of its firemen at the time they are driving their private motor vehicles to and from the fire station pursuant to a fire call. OAG 72-630 .

A volunteer fire department is exempt from liability for damages under the terms of this section. OAG 73-21 .

Individual members of a volunteer fire department do not have sovereign immunity and could be personally responsible for their own personal acts. OAG 74-106 .

Whether or not a volunteer fire department is incorporated does not affect its sovereign immunity since it is a governmental agency of the Commonwealth immune by statute from damages for an omission or act of commission or negligence while answering an alarm, performing fire prevention services or other duly authorized emergency services. OAG 74-106 .

This section, in attempting to render a volunteer fire department and its personnel immune from tort liability due to negligence in performing firefighting or other emergency services inside and outside of a city, is unconstitutional and in violation of Ky. Const., §§ 14, 54 and 241. OAG 71-82 ; 76-582.

A fire protection district would not have immunity from liability where a burn victim’s condition is worsened by a fireman’s use of a burn sheet to wrap the injured party prior to the arrival of an ambulance or medical facilities. OAG 77-551 .

This section as it applies to limiting recovery against fire protection district firemen is unconstitutional. OAG 78-494 .

75.080. Erection of fire hydrants.

The trustees of any fire protection district wherein water pipes have been constructed and are maintained in the public ways thereof may by resolution duly adopted cause the erection of fire hydrants and attachments to the water pipes in the public ways, after the trustees have made a written contract for water to be furnished for use in the hydrants. The cost of such erection and attachments shall be apportioned by the trustees against the owners of the property fronting the public ways in which the fire hydrants are erected, by any equitable mode of apportionment which the board of trustees prescribes in the resolution ordering the erection of the fire hydrants and a lien shall exist against the property against which the apportionment runs for the cost of such improvement in the amount of such apportionment and interest thereon at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum. The lien is enforceable by proceedings in court. The erection and installation of fire hydrants may be under contract let to the lowest and best bidder after advertisement by publication pursuant to KRS Chapter 424.

History. Enact. Acts 1944, ch. 133, § 8; 1964, ch. 184, § 7; 1966, ch. 239, § 26.

75.100. Definitions for KRS 75.100 to 75.260.

As used in KRS 75.100 to 75.260 , unless the context requires otherwise:

  1. “Chairman” means the chairman of the board of trustees of a fire protection district organized under the provisions of KRS 75.010 to 75.080 , or the chairman of the governing board of a volunteer fire department.
  2. “Fire protection district” means fire districts organized under KRS 75.010 to 75.080 .
  3. “Board” means the board of trustees of a fire protection district organized under KRS 75.010 to 75.080 and the governing board of a volunteer fire department.
  4. “Fire department” means the officers, firefighters, and clerical or maintenance employees, including the chief and assistant chief of the department.
  5. “Chief” means the chief of the fire department of a fire protection department organized under KRS 75.010 to 75.080 and of a volunteer fire department.
  6. “Employees” means all persons employed, and paid wages, salary, or other compensation for services performed, by the board of trustees of a fire protection district organized under KRS 75.010 to 75.080 and of a volunteer fire department. The term “employees” does not include any individual who is a volunteer as defined in subsection (14) of this section.
  7. “Member” shall include the chief and all officers; all firefighters, including volunteer, paid, regular, and special firefighters; and all employees of a fire department, a fire protection district, or of a volunteer fire department.
  8. “Salary” and “wages” mean any compensation received by an employee by reason of his employment for services performed for a fire protection district or volunteer fire department.
  9. “Suspension” means the separation of an employee from the service for a temporary or fixed period of time, by his appointing authority, as a disciplinary measure.
  10. “Dismissal” means the discharge of an employee by lawful authority.
  11. “Trustees” means the board of trustees of a fire protection district and of a volunteer fire department.
  12. “Regular firefighters” means all firefighters who are members of a fire protection district, except for special firefighters appointed by the chairman of the board of trustees pursuant to KRS 75.110 .
  13. “Paid firefighters” means all firefighters who are employees of the fire protection district or volunteer fire department district.
  14. “Volunteer” means any person who is a member of a fire protection district or volunteer fire department who volunteers to provide services for the fire protection district or volunteer fire department, if the individual receives no salary, wages, or other compensation for services performed, or if the individual is paid expenses, reasonable benefits, or a nominal fee to perform the services for which the individual volunteered, and the services are not the same type of services which the individual is employed to perform for the fire protection district or volunteer fire department.

History. Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 207, § 1; 1964, ch. 184, § 8; 1978, ch. 164, § 12, effective June 17, 1978; 1994, ch. 43, § 10, effective July 15, 1994; 1996, ch. 127, § 4, effective July 15, 1996.

75.110. Appointment of special firefighters — Rules — Powers.

  1. The chairman may, if in his discretion there is a case of need, appoint special firefighters to do special duties at any place within the limits of the fire protection district, on terms he deems proper.
  2. These special firefighters shall be governed by such rules as the board may provide, and be given the powers the board may provide, including the powers enumerated in KRS 75.160 in the discretion of the board; if rules are not provided they shall be deemed to have the powers and duties of regular firefighters.

History. Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 207, § 2; 1964, ch. 184, § 9; 1978, ch. 164, § 13, effective June 17, 1978.

75.120. Board to control fire department and property — Appointment of fire chief and members of fire department — Compensation — Volunteer firemen — Reduction of personnel.

  1. The board shall control the fire department or departments within their district and the property and equipment in these departments.
  2. The board may appoint a chief of the fire department or departments and all subordinates and the number of members in the fire departments shall be determined by the board in their sole discretion. The board shall, by resolution, fix the salaries of all employees of the fire department, provide for their payment and for the payment of other expenses of the fire protection district. The board may, in their sole discretion, appoint volunteer firemen and fix, by resolution, their compensation, if any, and provide for payment of this compensation. The board may likewise reduce the number of employees of their district so long as their action is not capricious or arbitrary.

History. Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 207, § 3, effective February 28, 1956.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Selection of Fire Chief.

The only reasonable meaning that can be given to this section is that the district may (i.e., is permitted to) select a fire chief, but it need not retain or exercise this power, and it may legally delegate such power or right to any volunteer fire unit with which it contracts for its fire protection. Effinger v. Fern Creek Volunteer Fire Dept., Inc., 564 S.W.2d 847, 1978 Ky. App. LEXIS 502 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).

Opinions of Attorney General.

If a volunteer fire department is an independent organization established pursuant to this chapter, there would be no constitutional or statutory conflict between the offices of the fire chief and member of the city council. OAG 71-488 .

The board of trustees of a county fire protection district has authority, in its discretion, to fix the compensation of volunteer firemen and to increase or decrease such compensation whenever it deems appropriate. OAG 73-844 .

There appears to be no authority in KRS Chapter 75 or anywhere else for the board of trustees of a fire protection district to enact an ordinance or regulation prohibiting certain kinds of hazardous burning in the county. However, there are some existing statutory provisions, such as KRS 149.370 , 149.375 , 149.380 , 149.400 and 227.300 , which may be of some help in alleviating the problems associated with widespread trash burning by the general public. OAG 84-213 .

Since the City of Louisville’s fire station is not fully equipped to deal with the fire-crash emergency or spill of highly flammable liquids on UPS ramps or airfield runways, this section expressly permits the city to enter into a contract with the Airport Authority by which the Authority will undertake emergency service involving UPS aircraft either on the airfield runways or on the UPS ramps. OAG 85-97 .

In addition to the express authorization of a contract between an airport authority and city by which the authority undertakes emergency service involving UPS aircraft either on UPS runways or on the UPS ramps by this section, KRS 65.240 expressly permits any two or more public agencies of Kentucky to contract to do jointly what each can do alone. However, in view of the formalities of KRS 65.240 et seq., this section, standing alone, is sufficient authority for the contract. OAG 85-97 .

Naked grants of the county to three volunteer fire department districts located in three different cities of the county, and extended outside of this section, would not be authorized. OAG 85-99 .

An expenditure of fire protection district tax funds for fire station recreational rooms is part of adequate fire protection facilities because such rooms are used by on-call firefighters who are waiting at the facilities between calls; in addition, expenditures for feeding volunteer firefighters after fire runs and after training sessions is part of the cost of extinguishing fires and training firefighters, while an expenditure for recognition awards and awards dinners is part of supervising firefighters. OAG 90-145 .

Expenditures of fire protection district tax funds on activities such as picnics, parties, bowling league memberships, softball and basketball league memberships, dances, and miscellaneous banquets and dinners do not appear to fit within the categories for which the expenditure of such funds is authorized or to be indispensable to carrying out the objects included in these categories. OAG 90-145 .

The purpose of a fire protection district is to prevent the loss of lives and property by fire; expenditures that fit within the following categories, or that are indispensable to carrying out the objects included in these categories, are expenditures for the establishment, maintenance, and operation of a fire protection district: 1. Acquisition and maintenance of adequate fire protection facilities; 2. Acquisition and maintenance of adequate fire fighting equipment; 3. Recruitment, training, and supervision of firefighters; 4. Control and extinguishment of fires; 5. Prevention of fires; 6. Conducting fire safety activities; 7. Payment of compensation to firefighters and necessary support and supervisory personnel. OAG 90-145 .

The use of fire protection district equipment for activities other than fire protection activities is allowable under certain limited circumstances; first, such use must be for a public purpose, second, such use must be de minimum, i.e., it must not materially diminish the value of the equipment, third, such use must not interfere with the duty of the fire protection district to prevent the loss of lives and property by fire. OAG 90-145 .

The word “compensation” in subsection (2) of this section is limited to the payment of money to volunteer firefighters and does not extend to the provision of activities such as picnics, parties, bowling league memberships, dances and banquets. OAG 90-145 .

75.130. Discipline of members and employees.

  1. Except as provided in subsection (5) of this section no member or employee of a fire protection district shall be reprimanded, dismissed, suspended, or reduced in grade or pay for any reason except inefficiency, misconduct, insubordination, or violation of law or of the rules adopted by the board of trustees of the fire protection district, and only after charges are preferred and a hearing conducted as provided in this section.
  2. Any person may file charges against a member or employee of a fire protection district by filing them with the secretary of the board of trustees and by delivering or mailing the charges to the principal fire house in the fire protection district. The secretary shall immediately communicate the charges to the board of trustees by mailing or delivering a copy of the charges to each member of the board of trustees within seven (7) days of receipt of the charges at the principal fire house. The chairman of the board of trustees shall, after conducting or having conducted any inquiry or investigation which may be necessary, determine if probable cause appears. The chairman shall prefer charges to the board of trustees against any member or employee against whom probable cause exists, of conduct justifying the dismissal or punishment of the member or employee. If probable cause does not exist, the chairman shall dismiss the charges. All charges shall be written and shall set out clearly the charges made. The person filing the charges may withdraw them at any time prior to the conclusion of the hearing. The charges may then be dismissed.
  3. Charges preferred by the chairman of the board of trustees shall be heard by either the full board or a committee consisting of at least three (3) members of the board of trustees appointed by the chairman. At the hearing all charges shall be considered traversed and put in issue, and the trial shall be confined to matters related to the issues presented. Within forty-five (45) days after the charges have been preferred by the chairman to the board of trustees, that body, or a committee consisting of at least three (3) members of the board of trustees appointed by the chairman, shall proceed to hear the charges. At least ten (10)) days before the hearing the member or employee accused shall be served personally or by registered mail with a copy of the charges and a statement of the day, place, and hour at which the hearing of the charges will begin. The person accused may, in writing, waive the service of charges and demand trial within thirty (30) days after the charges are preferred to the board of trustees.
  4. The board of trustees of the fire protection district may summon and compel attendance of witnesses at hearings by subpoena issued by the secretary of that body and served upon the witnesses by any officer authorized to serve court subpoenas. If any witness fails to appear in response to a summons, or refuses to testify concerning any matter on which he may lawfully be interrogated, any District Judge, on application of the board of trustees, may compel obedience by proceedings for contempt as in the case of disobedience of a subpoena issued from the District Court. The member or employee accused may have subpoenaed any witnesses he may desire, upon furnishing their names to the secretary of the board of trustees. The written records of the charges, the hearing, if held, and any other actions or decisions of the board of trustees on the charges shall be kept as an open public record and maintained as required by KRS Chapter 61.
  5. When the board of trustees or the chief of the fire protection district has probable cause to believe a member or employee of a fire protection district has been guilty of conduct justifying dismissal or punishment, the board or the chief may suspend the member or employee from duty or from both pay and duty, pending trial, and the member or employee shall not be placed on duty, or allowed pay, until the charges are heard. If the member is suspended, there shall be no continuances granted without the consent of the member or employee accused. If the member suspended is a paid firefighter or an employee, the hearing on the charges shall be conducted within fourteen (14) days after the charges have been preferred by the chairman of the board of trustees.
  6. The board of trustees of the fire protection district shall fix the punishment of a member or employee of a fire protection district found guilty, by a reprimand, suspension for any length of time not to exceed six (6) months, by reducing the grade if the accused is an officer, or by combining any two (2) or more of those punishments, or by dismissal as a member or employee of the fire protection district.

History. Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 207, § 4, effective February 28, 1956; 1996, ch. 127, § 5, effective July 15, 1996.

Opinions of Attorney General.

The only disciplinary action that the board of trustees of a fire protection district can take against the fire fighters of that district is that set forth in KRS 95.450 and it must be done pursuant to the terms and provisions of that particular statute which requires the bringing of charges, informing the person of the charges against him and the holding of a hearing in connection with those charges. OAG 80-240 .

Assuming that there are no provisions for the evaluation of a fire district’s probationary fire fighters and thus no differentiation between probationary firefighters and regular firefighters, a fire protection district organized pursuant to KRS Chapter 75 probably could not discipline any of its firefighters without following the provisions of KRS 95.450 . OAG 82-577 .

Since a fire protection district that was not part of and was not located within the boundaries of a city of the second or third class was organized pursuant to KRS Chapter 75, its board of trustees must therefore follow the provisions of KRS 95.540 in connection with disciplinary matters. The organization of a fire protection district pursuant to KRS Chapter 75, rather than whether it encompasses or is located in portions of second and third class cities, governs as to the application of KRS 95.540 to disciplinary matters. OAG 82-577 .

75.140. Appeals of disciplinary actions.

  1. Any member or employee of a fire protection district found guilty by the board of trustees of the fire protection district of any charge, as provided by KRS 75.130 , may appeal to the Circuit Court of the county in which the fire protection district is located, but the enforcement of the judgment of the fire protection district shall not be suspended pending appeal. The notice of the appeal shall be filed not later than thirty (30) days after the date the board of trustees of the fire protection district makes its determination on the charge.
  2. Upon request of the accused, the secretary of the board of trustees of the fire protection district shall file a certified copy of the charges and the judgment of the board of trustees in the Circuit Court. Upon the transcript being filed, the case shall be docketed in the Circuit Court and tried as an original action.
  3. If the secretary of the board of trustees fails to certify the transcript to the Circuit Court within thirty (30) days after the request is made, the party aggrieved may file an affidavit in the Circuit Court setting out as fully as possible the charges made, the time of the hearing, and the judgment of the board of trustees of the fire protection district, together with a statement that demand for transcript was made upon the secretary of the board of trustees more than thirty (30) days before the filing of the affidavit. Upon the filing of the affidavit in the Circuit Court, the case shall be docketed and the Circuit Court may compel the filing of the transcript by the secretary of the board of trustees by entering the proper mandatory order, and by fine and imprisonment for contempt. The appeal shall have precedence over other business, and be determined speedily.
  4. An appeal will lie from the judgment of the Circuit Court to the Court of Appeals as in other cases.

History. Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 207, § 5, effective February 28, 1956; 1996, ch. 127, § 6, effective July 15, 1996.

75.150. Political activities of members.

  1. No person shall be appointed a member of the fire department in fire protection districts on account of any political service, contribution, sentiment, or affiliation. No member shall be dismissed, suspended, or reduced in grade or pay for any political opinion.
  2. Members and employees of any fire protection district, while off duty and out of uniform, shall be entitled to:
    1. Place political bumper stickers on their privately owned vehicles;
    2. Wear political buttons;
    3. Contribute money to political parties, political candidates and political groups of their choice;
    4. Work at the polls on election days;
    5. Aid in the registration or purgation of voters;
    6. Become members of political groups; and
    7. Hold office in political groups and carry out the mandates of that group.

History. Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 207, § 6, effective February 28, 1956; 1996, ch. 127, § 7, effective July 15, 1996.

75.160. Attendance of chief at board meetings — Definition of chief — Members as peace officers.

  1. The chief of the fire department in fire protection districts shall attend all sessions of the board, except executive sessions, and he shall execute all the orders of the board. Whenever “chief” is used in KRS 75.100 to 75.260 , it shall include the assistant chief when the chief is not on duty.
  2. The regular members of the fire department in fire protection districts, except volunteer firemen, shall have the same powers of arrest as now given by law to sheriffs of this Commonwealth and they are hereby expressly declared conservators of the public peace whose duties, in addition to their other prescribed duties, are to conserve the peace, enforce all laws and preserve order, and they shall have and are hereby expressly given the same right and the same power to arrest, search and seize as is now given by law to sheriffs of this Commonwealth, and they shall be at all times subject to the orders of the county judge/executive in which the fire district lies while enforcing the provisions of this section. Provided, however, that members of said fire departments shall not have the power to serve subpoenas, summonses and notices in civil cases and they shall receive no fees for performing any of the duties prescribed in this section as pertains to powers of law enforcement. The members shall constitute a law enforcement agency in addition to the patrol and investigation functions of the sheriff and his deputies under KRS 75.150 to 75.170 .

History. Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 207, § 7, effective February 28, 1956.

Opinions of Attorney General.

An assistant chief of a fire protection district may be armed while making arrests. OAG 72-339 .

An assistant chief of a fire protection district may enforce all laws generally as a peace officer pursuant to KRS 431.005 within the fire district. OAG 72-339 .

Regular officers of a fire department in a fire protection district are peace officers. OAG 72-339 .

Neither this section nor any other provision of KRS Chapter 75 prevents a chief or an assistance fire chief of a department or district organized pursuant to KRS Chapter 75 from serving as a member of the Board of Trustees of such a department or district or attending regular or closed meetings of that Board of Trustees. OAG 82-182 .

This section pertains to the chief when he is functioning solely as the chief of the department; there is no indication here or anywhere else in KRS Chapter 75 that this statute covers those situations where the chief is a member of the board, or that the chief, as a board member, has lesser or reduced powers than those possessed by other members of the board of trustees. OAG 82-182 .

75.170. Oath and bond of members.

  1. Each member of the fire department in fire protection districts shall, before entering upon the discharge of his various duties, take an oath before the county judge/executive of the county in which the greater part of the fire protection district is located or a notary public, to faithfully discharge his duties, and the oath shall be subscribed by the person taking it and filed in the minute book kept by the secretary of the board.
  2. Each member of the fire department in fire protection districts shall give such bond as the board may designate and with a surety as required by the board conditioned upon faithful performance of the member’s duties.

History. Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 207, § 8, effective February 28, 1956; 1996, ch. 127, § 8, effective July 15, 1996.

Opinions of Attorney General.

Volunteer firemen who are regular members of a fire department in a volunteer fire department district should be required to take the constitutional oath, and the oath contained in this section. OAG 79-622 .

75.180. Duties and powers of chief and members — Reimbursement of private owners for water used.

  1. The chief, assistant chief, or highest officer present at the fires answered by his department shall investigate their causes. He may examine witnesses, compel the testimony of witnesses, administer oaths, compel production of evidence and make arrests as provided in KRS 75.160 . He may enter any building at all reasonable times for the purpose of examining the building if, in his opinion the building is in danger of fire. He shall report his findings, when requested, to the board, Kentucky Inspection Bureau, and state fire marshal.
  2. The chief of the fire department shall direct and control the operation of the fire department and the control of the members in the discharge of their duties. He, and members of the fire department, shall have access to and the use of all cisterns, fireplugs, the waters of the waterworks of private persons and cisterns of private persons for the purpose of extinguishing fires and shall have the power to examine these water supplies at all reasonable times to see that they are in condition for use in case of fire. The chief shall have control of all hose, buildings, engines and other equipment provided for the fire department under direction of the board, or those authorized by the board to exercise this direction, and shall perform such other duties prescribed by the board not inconsistent with law. Upon application within ten (10) days to the board, any owner of property where water is used for firefighting shall be reimbursed in a reasonable amount by the board for water used.

History. Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 207, § 9; 1964, ch. 184, § 10; 2010, ch. 24, § 69, effective July 15, 2010.

Opinions of Attorney General.

Chiefs of fire protection districts organized pursuant to KRS Chapter 75 have, in their own right under that chapter, limited inspection powers and no enforcement powers in connection with examining buildings for fire hazards; therefore, any effective program of inspection and enforcement must be coordinated with the state fire marshal’s office which, pursuant to the applicable provisions of KRS Chapter 227, can give chiefs of fire protection districts the authority to act on its behalf to carry out a program of fire safety relying upon inspections and enforcement of violations. OAG 80-316 .

75.190. Right of way to fire apparatus and vehicles — Penalty for failure to yield. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 207, § 10; 1964, ch. 184, § 11) was repealed by Acts 1970, ch. 93, § 12.

75.200. Crossing fire hose or other equipment — Penalty. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 207, § 11) was repealed by Acts 1970, ch. 93, § 12.

75.210. Following fire apparatus or vehicles, parking private vehicles or blocking highway unlawful — Penalties. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 207, § 12; 1968, ch. 152, (§ 48) was repealed by Acts 1970, ch. 93, § 12.

75.220. Private vehicles to stop on approach of fire apparatus and participating vehicles — Penalty for violation. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 207, § 13; 1964, ch. 184, § 13; 1968, ch. 152, § 49) was repealed by Acts 1970, ch. 93, § 12.

75.230. Permits for use of warning lights and sirens — Penalty for improper use. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 207, § 14; 1964, ch. 184, § 14) was repealed by Acts 1970, ch. 93, § 12.

75.240. Board minute book — Contents — Where kept — Inspection.

The secretary of the board shall keep a minute book, appropriately bound and marked, in which the minutes of each meeting of the board shall be kept, together with all resolutions, tax levies, and other important material the board may designate. A copy of all material required to be kept by the secretary, shall be kept on file in the office of the clerk of the county in which the greater part of the fire protection district or volunteer fire department district lies. The public shall have the right to inspect the book and its contents at all times.

History. Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 207, § 15; 1964, ch. 184, § 15.

75.250. Board may employ counsel — Duties — Compensation — Duties of county attorney.

  1. The board may, in its discretion, employ or retain a regularly licensed attorney to advise them on all matters pertaining to their duties and shall have the discretion to delegate such authority to said attorney not forbidden by law. Said attorney shall attend all meetings of the board, except executive sessions when the board does not desire his presence, whenever the board shall request him to attend and shall advise the board on all legal matters on which he is requested to give advice.
  2. In addition to the attorney provided for in subsection (1) of this section, the county attorney in the county in which the fire protection district lies shall advise and represent the board in all matters and on the occasions chosen by the board whenever the board so requests.
  3. The board may fix the salary or compensation of the attorney provided for in subsection (1) of this section, in their discretion.

History. Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 207, § 16, effective February 28, 1956.

Opinions of Attorney General.

The board of trustees of a fire protection district may employ a private attorney to represent it in litigation under subsection (1) of this section since the word “advise” in that subsection is to be used in a broader sense than merely the giving of advice by the attorney to the board. OAG 81-53 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Underwood, Part-Time Prosecutors and Conflicts of Interest: A Survey and Some Proposals, 81 Ky. L.J. 1 (1993).

75.255. Audits and financial reports.

With respect to audits and financial reports, the board of trustees of fire protection districts and volunteer fire department districts shall follow the procedures of KRS 65.065 .

History. Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 298, § 1; 1978, ch. 384, § 197, effective June 17, 1978; 1986 ch. 195, § 2, effective July 15, 1986.

Opinions of Attorney General.

A certified public accountant, whose father was a member of the board of trustees of fire protection district, would not be disqualified from accepting employment to audit the district’s books, provided he was not a district employee during any of the period involved auditing, and he has no contractual relationship with members of the board or with the rural district officers or employees which relates to personal interest and financial affairs. OAG 75-193 .

KRS 424.220 applies to fire protection districts organized pursuant to KRS Chapter 75. OAG 80-240 .

The public officer required to prepare and publish the financial statement for a fire protection district involved in KRS 424.220 cannot escape his statutory duty by publishing a copy of the certified public accountant’s audit. OAG 80-240 .

There is provision in KRS Chapter 75 or in KRS 424.990 providing penalties for those who do not comply with the auditing requirements of this section. OAG 80-240 .

By enactment of this section in 1974, the General Assembly abandoned the statutory alternative of a calendar year for fire protection districts, while leaving intact the prior provision of KRS 75.031(2) relating to a “fiscal year basis”. Thus, by this legislation a fire protection district is permitted to use only a fiscal year basis. And since KRS Chapter 75 does not specify some beginning date other than July 1, of each year, the July 1 beginning date mentioned specifically in Ky. Const., § 169 governs such fire protection districts. OAG 85-65 .

75.260. Compensation of board members — Time and place of board meetings.

  1. The board may fix the respective salaries of its members on a per meeting basis not to exceed twenty-five dollars ($25) per meeting and not to exceed one (1) meeting per month.
  2. The board shall meet at least once a month at a time and place designated by the board and all meetings, except executive meetings, shall be open to the public.

History. Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 207, § 17, effective February 28, 1956; 1978, ch. 261, § 1, effective June 17, 1978.

Opinions of Attorney General.

Although this section provides for only a salary or per diem, board members could recover actual and necessary expenses in carrying out their statutory duties, including a gas and oil reimbursement and the cost of meals. OAG 76-506 .

A fire protection district is a “public agency” within the meaning of KRS 61.805(2) and the meetings of the board of trustees of a fire protection district organized under KRS Chapter 75 are public meetings, open to the public at all times, unless the particular meeting comes within one of the exceptions to the open meetings provisions as set forth in KRS 61.810 . OAG 80-240 .

75.270. Right of way over telephone to report fire — Penalty for refusal of right. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 207, § 18) was repealed by Acts 1962, ch. 235, § 5. For present law see KRS 438.160 to 438.190 .

Certified Volunteer Fire Departments

75.400. Definitions for KRS 75.400 to 75.460.

As used in KRS 75.400 to 75.460 , unless the context requires otherwise:

  1. “Commission” means the Commission on Fire Protection Personnel Standards and Education, attached to the Kentucky Community and Technical College System.
  2. “Fire department” includes all of the officers, firefighters, and clerical and maintenance employees, whether paid or volunteer.
  3. “Full-time paid firefighter” means an individual who receives a minimum salary of eight thousand dollars ($8,000) annually, and who works a minimum of two thousand and eighty (2,080) hours per year as an employee of a fire department recognized by the fire commission.
  4. “Paid fire department” means a fire department recognized by the commission, of which at least fifty percent (50%) of its firefighters are full-time paid firefighters.
  5. “Volunteer fire department” means a fire department with a minimum of twelve (12) members and a chief, at least one (1) operational fire apparatus or one (1) on order, with fewer than fifty percent (50%) of its firefighters being full-time paid firefighters.

History. Enact. Acts 1994, ch. 43, § 1, effective July 15, 1994; 2000, ch. 270, § 9, effective July 14, 2000.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

Caneyville Volunteer Fire Dep’t v. Green’s Motorcycle Salvage, Inc., 286 S.W.3d 790, 2009 Ky. LEXIS 158 ( Ky. 2009 ).

75.400. Definitions for KRS 75.400 to 75.460.

As used in KRS 75.400 to 75.460 , unless the context requires otherwise:

  1. “Commission” means the Kentucky Fire Commission, attached to the Kentucky Community and Technical College System.
  2. “Fire department” includes all of the officers, firefighters, and clerical and maintenance employees, whether paid or volunteer.
  3. “Full-time paid firefighter” means an individual who receives a minimum salary of eight thousand dollars ($8,000) annually, and who works a minimum of two thousand and eighty (2,080) hours per year as an employee of a fire department recognized by the commission.
  4. “Paid fire department” means a fire department recognized by the commission, of which at least fifty percent (50%) of its firefighters are full-time paid firefighters.
  5. “Volunteer fire department” means a fire department with a minimum of twelve (12) members and a chief, at least one (1) operational fire apparatus or one (1) on order, with fewer than fifty percent (50%) of its firefighters being full-time paid firefighters.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1994, ch. 43, § 1, effective July 15, 1994; 2000, ch. 270, § 9, effective July 14, 2000; 2020 ch. 67, § 5.

75.410. Program for recognition and certification of volunteer fire department — Authority for administrative regulations.

  1. The commission shall promulgate administrative regulations in accordance with KRS Chapter 13A to create a program for recognition and annual certification of volunteer fire departments. The criteria for recognition and certification shall be consistent with the provisions of KRS 95A.262 .
  2. In order to be recognized and certified, a volunteer fire department shall be organized pursuant to KRS 75.010 , KRS 67.083 , KRS Chapter 95, or KRS Chapter 273.
  3. Volunteer fire departments existing on July 15, 1994, which are receiving volunteer fire department aid pursuant to KRS 95A.262(2) shall have until July 1, 1995, to comply with regulations promulgated pursuant to subsection (1) of this section in order for their aid to continue. Volunteer fire departments created after July 15, 1994, shall comply with the criteria of these regulations in a manner consistent with the time requirements specified in KRS 95A.262(2).

History. Enact. Acts 1994, ch. 43, § 2, effective July 15, 1994.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

Caneyville Volunteer Fire Dep’t v. Green’s Motorcycle Salvage, Inc., 286 S.W.3d 790, 2009 Ky. LEXIS 158 ( Ky. 2009 ).

75.420. Application for recognition of fire department — Boundaries.

  1. The commission shall recognize all fire departments which comply with the provisions of KRS 75.410 and regulations promulgated in compliance therewith. Applications for recognition shall be made on forms provided by the commission. The department shall attach to the application an accurate map and a written description which delineates the boundaries of the area served by the department. The map and description shall also be filed with the county clerk of the county in which the department is located. If the boundaries extend into two (2) or more counties, the map and description shall be filed with the county clerk in each county in which a part of the department’s service area is located.
  2. The boundaries between two (2) or more departments created pursuant to KRS Chapter 273 may be altered if the departments enter into a written agreement establishing the boundaries, and if a majority of the property owners in the affected area approve the new boundaries. A new map and written description of the altered boundaries shall be filed with the commission and with the county clerks in the affected counties.

History. Enact. Acts 1994, ch. 43, § 3, effective July 15, 1994.

75.430. Fire Protection districts, volunteer fire department districts, and volunteer fire departments — Submission of financial information.

The governing body of each recognized and certified fire protection district or volunteer fire department district operating under KRS Chapter 75 which, for the year in question, receives from all sources or expends for all purposes less than one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000), or the governing body of each recognized and certified volunteer fire department created pursuant to KRS Chapter 273 shall submit financial information to the commission as provided in KRS 95A.055 .

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1994, ch. 43, § 4, effective July 15, 1994; 2010, ch. 151, § 124, effective January 1, 2011; 2013, ch. 40, § 27, effective March 21, 2013; 2016 ch. 91, § 2, effective July 15, 2016; 2018 ch. 90, § 2, effective July 14, 2018.

75.440. Funds available to recognized and certified fire department — Rights and responsibilities of department — Fire chief.

  1. Only fire departments recognized and certified by the commission shall be eligible to receive volunteer fire department aid pursuant to KRS 95A.262(2), to receive low interest loans pursuant to KRS 95A.262(14), or to participate in the Professional Firefighters Foundation Program, pursuant to KRS 95A.200 to 95A.290 .
  2. A fire department created pursuant to KRS Chapter 273 which has been recognized and certified by the commission shall have the following rights and responsibilities:
    1. Designation as the only fire department authorized to protect property within its geographic area as filed with the commission and the county clerk, but the department may seek the assistance of other departments, and may make reciprocal aid contracts pursuant to KRS 75.050 ;
    2. Authority to secure water immediately for purposes of fighting a fire from any source, public or private. Upon request, the department shall compensate the owner in a reasonable amount for water used within six (6) months of use; and
    3. All rights identified in the Kentucky Revised Statutes for fire departments.
  3. The officers and firefighters, whether paid or unpaid, of each fire department created pursuant to KRS Chapter 273 and recognized and certified by the commission shall select a chief. The appointment of the chief shall be subject to the approval of the governing board of the department. The chief shall establish a chain of command within the department. The chief, or the highest person available in the chain of command if the chief cannot be present, shall, subject to all state statutes as applicable, have the following rights and responsibilities:
    1. Authority to order the immediate evacuation of areas endangered by fire, a hazardous materials incident, or other impending disaster that constitutes a threat to life or property;
    2. Authority to be in charge of all fire ground operations at the scene of a fire or other emergency;
    3. Control of all department personnel while on duty; and
    4. Control of all equipment of the department.
  4. The chief of each fire department created pursuant to KRS Chapter 273 and recognized and certified by the commission shall perform necessary actions to maintain recognition and certification of the department by the commission.

History. Enact. Acts 1994, ch. 43, § 5, effective July 15, 1994.

75.450. Fees for services — Exemptions — Response to all fires in jurisdiction required — Mission statement — Inclusion of fees on property tax bills — Collection and distribution — Collection fee for sheriff.

  1. A fire department which collects membership charges or subscriber fees for combatting fires or serving in other emergencies shall base its annual fee or charge on the level of protection offered.
  2. A fire department that responds to a fire or other emergency on the property of a nonmember or nonsubscriber may charge the following fees for services rendered:
    1. Up to five hundred dollars ($500) for single family residential units; utility occupancies of two thousand (2,000) or fewer square feet; assembly and business occupancies having a capacity which does not exceed one hundred (100) persons; equipment; vehicles; and grass or woods fires; and
    2. Up to one thousand dollars ($1,000) for multifamily residential units; assembly and business occupancies having a capacity exceeding one hundred (100) persons; storage occupancies; utility occupancies of more than two thousand (2,000) square feet; and all industrial, educational, or institutional occupancies; and
    3. Up to five hundred dollars ($500) for responding to emergencies not covered in paragraphs (a) and (b) of this subsection, including response to high hazard occupancies as defined in KRS 198B.010 . The department may be entitled to recover necessary and reasonable costs in excess of the five hundred dollar ($500) limit based upon submission of a written itemized claim for the total costs incurred. Disputes involving fees in excess of the five hundred dollar ($500) limit shall be submitted to arbitration by the commission.
  3. For the purposes of subsection (2)(a) and (b) of this section, the meaning of assembly, business, industrial, educational, and institutional occupancies shall be as defined in KRS 198B.010 . The meaning of storage and utility occupancies shall be as defined in the Kentucky Building Code, Sections 311.1 and 312.1 respectively, promulgated pursuant to KRS 198B.050 .
  4. Property owned by the Commonwealth of Kentucky and the federal government shall be exempt from charges.
  5. If more than one (1) department responds to a fire or other emergency, the fee shall be paid only to the department which is authorized to protect the property pursuant to KRS 75.440(2)(a).
  6. A fire department shall respond within its jurisdiction to all fires and to other emergencies for which it is responsible as set forth in its mission statement. A copy of each fire department mission statement shall be filed with the commission. A new department shall file its statement when it is incorporated. A department in existence on July 15, 1994, shall file its mission statement by July 1, 1995. A copy of the mission statement shall be posted in a conspicuous location in each station of the department, and shall be filed with the county clerk of each county in which the department has jurisdiction pursuant to KRS 75.440(2)(a). The mission statement shall remain in effect until amended, and filed and posted by the fire department in the locations as required by this subsection.
  7. If a fire department collects membership charges or subscriber fees, the fiscal court may adopt an ordinance to require the annual membership charges or subscriber fees to be added to property tax bills. In any county where the fiscal court has adopted such an ordinance, the county clerk shall add the annual membership charges or subscriber fees to the tax bills of the affected property owners in a place separate from the bill of the fire district tax or fire subdistrict tax so that ratepayers can ascertain the amount of the membership charges or subscriber fees apart from the fire district tax.
  8. The membership charges or subscriber fees shall be collected and distributed by the sheriff to the appropriate fire departments in the same manner as the other taxes on the bill and unpaid fees or charges shall bear the same penalty as general state and county taxes. This shall be a lien on the property against which it is levied from the time of the levy. The fiscal court shall, in the ordinance set forth in subsection (7) of this section and in consultation with the sheriff and the fire department, set a collection fee for the sheriff to retain an amount not to exceed four and one-fourth percent (4.25%) of the membership charges or subscriber fees collected.

History. Enact. Acts 1994, ch. 43, § 6, effective July 15, 1994; 2002, ch. 163, § 1, effective July 15, 2002; 2012, ch. 51, § 1, effective July 12, 2012.

75.460. Payment by insurance company of property owner’s bill from fire department — Property owner’s responsibility.

  1. If a property owner who is not a member or subscriber of the fire department which charges membership or subscriber fees experiences a fire, incident, or emergency that the department responds to, he may provide his insurance company with the billing statement from the fire department.
  2. All insurance companies paying a claim pursuant to subsection one (1) of this section shall make payment of the stated charge for service in the following manner:
    1. The insurance company may make the check or draft payable to both the affected property owner and the affected fire department; or
    2. The insurance company may make the check or draft payable solely to the affected fire department.
  3. If an insurance company makes a claim check or draft payable both to the property owner and the fire department, the property owner shall make payment to the fire department within thirty (30) days of receipt of the check or draft. If the claim check or draft is not sufficient to cover the charge levied by the fire department, the property owner shall be responsible for payment of the balance to the fire department.
  4. A property owner who is not a member or subscriber of the fire department who does not have fire insurance coverage shall be fully responsible for payment of all charges levied by a fire department for services rendered in response to a fire, incident, or emergency within thirty (30) days of the date of the response by the department, or within thirty (30) days of the date of an arbitration award rendered pursuant to KRS 75.450(2)(c). Payment to the fire department shall be in full, unless a written agreement has been reached between the fire department and the property owner to establish a payment schedule to satisfy all charges to the property owner.
  5. If payment for services rendered has not been received within sixty (60) days from the date of response, or within thirty (30) days of the date of an arbitration award rendered pursuant to KRS 75.450(2)(c), and if a payment schedule has not been established, a fire department may proceed in small claims court or in other appropriate court action to recover from the property owner all fees associated with the response, including attorney fees and court costs.

History. Enact. Acts 1994, ch. 43, § 7, effective July 15, 1994.

75.470. KRS 75.400 to 75.460 not to be construed to conflict with authority of other named agencies.

Nothing in KRS 75.400 to 75.460 shall be construed to conflict with or supersede the authority of the Natural Resources and the Environmental Protection Cabinet, pursuant to the provisions of KRS Chapter 149, over management of forestry areas, and KRS Chapter 224, over management of hazardous wastes, nor the authority of the Division of Emergency Management, pursuant to KRS Chapter 39, over response to disasters and emergencies.

History. Enact. Acts 1994, ch. 43, § 8, effective July 15, 1994; 2000, ch. 102, § 4, effective July 14, 2000.

CHAPTER 76 City-County Metropolitan Sewer, Sewer Construction, and Sanitation Districts

Metropolitan Sewer Districts

76.005. Definitions.

As used in KRS 76.010 to 76.295 unless the context otherwise requires:

  1. “District” means a metropolitan sewer district authorized by KRS 76.010 to 76.210 .
  2. “Board” means the board described in KRS 76.030 .
  3. “District area,” “within the district,” “corporate limits of the district” and similar terms mean that area of a county containing a city of the first class which area was on April 1, 1964, either inside the city of the first class or served by sanitary or combined sanitary and storm water sewers which were under the immediate control and custody of the district, that area of such a county which is added to the district pursuant to KRS 76.170 , and that area of such a county which may be annexed to the city of the first class except that no construction subdistrict shall be construed to be within the district area.
  4. “Construction subdistrict bonds and obligations” and like phrases mean any obligation whatsoever that has been incurred by the district because of some function or activity of a construction subdistrict. Such debts are not obligations of the district, and such debts may be paid only from moneys received by the district on account of the construction subdistrict, or from the funds, if any, in the construction subdistrict reserve fund.
  5. “Construction subdistrict facilities” are all sewerage facilities within a construction subdistrict, and all sewerage facilities in a county containing a district outside the district area which:
    1. Are not a part of a sewer construction district organized pursuant to KRS 76.300 to 76.420 or a sanitation district organized pursuant to KRS 220.010 to 220.540 or a sewer system of a municipal corporation or a sewer system of a water district organized pursuant to KRS 74.010 to 74.415 ;
    2. Join together two (2) or more construction subdistricts or lead from a construction subdistrict to the district area or lead from a construction subdistrict to a disposal plant or a treatment plant outside the construction subdistrict and outside the district area.
  6. “District facilities” are all facilities of the district within the district area.

History. Enact. Acts 1964, ch. 33, § 1; 1980, ch. 188, § 54, effective July 15, 1980; 2008, ch. 6, § 14, effective July 15, 2008.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Acquisition of Private Facilities.

Should a metropolitan sewer district elect to purchase a privately-operated collection system, the abutting lot owners would own no more and no less than previously, which is an easement, or easements, for the free use of the system; they acquired those rights when they purchased their lots, and they cannot be made to pay for them again. Louisville & Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer Dist. v. Douglass Hills Sanitation Facility, 592 S.W.2d 142, 1979 Ky. LEXIS 317 ( Ky. 1979 ).

So long as a private company’s disposal plant is operated in conformity with applicable orders and regulations of the various governmental agencies, including the board of health, having regulatory authority in the premises, and in a manner that is not inconsistent with public health and safety, a metropolitan sewer district cannot force the collection system to be diverted to its system without payment of the value of the disposal plant to its owner; furthermore in the event the district should acquire the company’s rights by purchase or condemnation no charge may be assessed against the lot owners for any portion of the cost representing the value of the collection system. Louisville & Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer Dist. v. Douglass Hills Sanitation Facility, 592 S.W.2d 142, 1979 Ky. LEXIS 317 ( Ky. 1979 ).

The statutes contain no provision authorizing a metropolitan sewer district unilaterally to discontinue the operation of a privately-operated sewage disposal facility or to force its patrons to cease using it: to the contrary, the terms under which property owners may be brought into the system must be reached by written agreement with them or, in the case of incorporated areas, with the respective municipalities in which the property is located, and only where the area has been annexed and does not yet have an adequate system may the owners be required to connect to the district’s system as it becomes available to them. Louisville & Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer Dist. v. Douglass Hills Sanitation Facility, 592 S.W.2d 142, 1979 Ky. LEXIS 317 ( Ky. 1979 ).

2. Disposition of Obsolete Systems.

When an existing facility begins to wear out or become obsolete or otherwise inadequate a metropolitan sewer district has the right to determine whether that facility is to be phased out of existence or be permitted to perpetuate its viability through necessary improvement or rehabilitation; such a decision in a given instance cannot be arbitrary, but neither must it be dictated by what is best for the financial interests of individual investors or speculators. Louisville & Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer Dist. v. Douglass Hills Sanitation Facility, 592 S.W.2d 142, 1979 Ky. LEXIS 317 ( Ky. 1979 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

The Louisville and Jefferson County metropolitan sewer district has no statutory authority, express or implied, to extend its sewer system operations, by contracting with residents or developers or by condemnation, to collect sewer rates or service charges, or to establish a construction subdistrict, beyond the Jefferson County boundaries. OAG 73-752 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Fire protection districts, KRS Chapter 75.

Interlocal cooperation act, KRS 65.210 to 65.300 .

Issuance of bonds and control of funds, KRS Chapter 66.

Projects inducing location of governmental projects, powers of city as to utility facilities, KRS 82.110 , 82.115 .

Sanitation districts and water pollution control, KRS Chapter 220.

Water districts, KRS Chapter 74.

Treatises

Caldwell’s Kentucky Form Book, 5th Ed., Complaint in U.S. District Court for Polluting Sewer, Form 350.03.

76.007. Compliance with KRS 65A.010 to 65A.090.

The board of the district shall comply with the provisions of KRS 65A.010 to 65A.090 for both the district and any subdistrict established pursuant to KRS 76.241 to 76.273 .

History. Enact. Acts 2013, ch. 40, § 28, effective March 21, 2013.

76.010. Joint metropolitan sewer district authorized in cities with population of 20,000 or more and counties containing such cities — Corporate powers.

In the interest of the public health and for the purpose of providing adequate sewer and drainage facilities in and around each city with a population equal to or greater than twenty thousand (20,000) based upon the most recent federal decennial census and in each county containing a city with a population equal to or greater than twenty thousand (20,000) based upon the most recent federal decennial census, there may be created and established a joint metropolitan sewer district under the provisions of KRS 76.010 to 76.210 , having the powers, duties and functions as herein prescribed, to be known by and under the name of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (Name of city) and . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (Name of county) metropolitan sewer district, which district under that name shall be a public body corporate, and political subdivision, with power to adopt, use, and alter at its pleasure a corporate seal, sue and be sued, contract and be contracted with, and in other ways to act as a natural person, within the purview of KRS 76.010 to 76.210 .

History. Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 104, § 1; 1968, ch. 152, § 50; 2014, ch. 92, § 47, effective January 1, 2015.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(1/1/2015). The Reviser of Statutes has altered the numbering of this statute from the way it appears in 2014 Ky. Acts ch. 92, sec. 47, under the authority of KRS 7.136(1)(c).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

KRS 76.010 to 76.210 do not violate Ky. Const., §§ 27 to 29, 59, 60, 157 to 159 or 242, nor do they violate the due process and impairment of obligations of contract clauses of the federal Constitution. Veail v. Louisville & Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer Dist., 303 Ky. 248 , 197 S.W.2d 413, 1946 Ky. LEXIS 830 ( Ky. 1946 ).

2. Purpose.

The whole tenor of KRS 76.010 to 76.210 is to relieve the city of responsibility for the cost of constructing, extending or maintaining its sewerage system and to place the entire duty upon the metropolitan district as a political entity. Sanitation Dist. of Jefferson County v. Louisville & Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer Dist., 307 Ky. 422 , 208 S.W.2d 751, 1948 Ky. LEXIS 616 ( Ky. 1948 ).

3. Application.

Court of Appeals took judicial notice that Jefferson County was the only county containing a city of the first class, to which KRS 76.010 to 76.230 applied. Rash v. Louisville & Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer Dist., 309 Ky. 442 , 217 S.W.2d 232, 1949 Ky. LEXIS 670 ( Ky. 1949 ).

As an independent municipal corporation, the metropolitan sewer district was not an agency of the county metro government within the meaning of KRS 65.003 . Therefore, the county metro ethics commission had no jurisdiction over the sewer district or its officials. Louisville/Jefferson County Metro Ethics Comm'n v. Schardein, 259 S.W.3d 510, 2008 Ky. App. LEXIS 225 (Ky. Ct. App. 2008).

4. Entity.

A metropolitan sewer district is a separate entity acting for its own purposes and possessing defined, though limited, powers of a municipal community and it meets the conventional descriptions or definitions of a municipality. Rash v. Louisville & Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer Dist., 309 Ky. 442 , 217 S.W.2d 232, 1949 Ky. LEXIS 670 ( Ky. 1949 ).

5. Pre-existing Contract.

A metropolitan sewer district, created to take over and operate the sewer system of a city of the first class, was bound by the terms of an existing sewer-service contract between the city and a contiguous area, and adherence to the contract rates was not the granting of an exclusive privilege within the meaning of Ky. Const., § 3. Louisville & Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer Dist. v. Strathmoor Village, 307 Ky. 343 , 211 S.W.2d 127, 1948 Ky. LEXIS 739 ( Ky. 1948 ).

6. Annexation.
7. — Assumption of Indebtedness.

In the event that a part of the territory comprising a sanitation district under KRS 220.010 to 220.540 is annexed by a city of the first class which has created a city-county sewer district pursuant to KRS 76.010 to 76.220 (KRS 76.220 now repealed), neither the city nor the sewer district will assume the indebtedness of the sanitation district, but rather the indebtedness will continue to be a prior and extra charge on the sanitation district sewers and the property using them according to the terms of the bonds. Sanitation Dist. of Jefferson County v. Louisville & Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer Dist., 307 Ky. 422 , 208 S.W.2d 751, 1948 Ky. LEXIS 616 ( Ky. 1948 ).

8. Governmental Immunity.

Even though this section is entitled “tax exemptions” its application is not restricted to sewer district’s exemption from taxation for KRS 446.140 provides that section heads do not constitute any part of the law; therefore since the object of KRS 76.010 to 76.220 (KRS 76.220 now repealed) is for the preservation and promotion of the public health, where plaintiff was injured by act of employee of district, he cannot maintain action against the district, for his injury occurred as a result of act done by an agency of the state in the performance of a duty which it owes to the public, the execution of which was but the exercise of a power purely governmental. Fawbush v. Louisville & Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer Dist., 240 S.W.2d 622, 1951 Ky. LEXIS 1002 ( Ky. 1951 ).

Cited:

Louisville & Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer Dist. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 307 Ky. 413 , 211 S.W.2d 122, 1948 Ky. LEXIS 738 , 4 A.L.R.2d 588 ( Ky. 1948 ); Louisville & Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer Dist. v. Barker, 307 Ky. 655 , 212 S.W.2d 122, 1948 Ky. LEXIS 813 ( Ky. 1948 ); Sanitation Dist. of Jefferson County v. Louisville, 308 Ky. 368 , 213 S.W.2d 995, 1948 Ky. LEXIS 879 (Ky. 1948); Stierle v. Sanitation Dist. of Jefferson County, 243 S.W.2d 678, 1951 Ky. LEXIS 1161 ( Ky. 1951 ); Johnson v. Louisville, 261 S.W.2d 429, 1953 Ky. LEXIS 1014 ( Ky. 1953 ); Krumpelman v. Louisville & Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer Dist., 314 S.W.2d 557, 1958 Ky. LEXIS 310 , 75 A.L.R.2d 1110 ( Ky. 1958 ); Gnau v. Louisville & Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer Dist., 346 S.W.2d 754, 1961 Ky. LEXIS 333 ( Ky. 1961 ); Louisville & Jefferson County Metropolitan Dist. v. Kirk, 390 S.W.2d 182, 1965 Ky. LEXIS 346 ( Ky. 1965 ); Louisville & Jefferson County Metro. Sewer Dist. v. Simpson, 730 S.W.2d 939, 1987 Ky. LEXIS 211 ( Ky. 1987 ), cert. denied, Simpson v. Louisville & Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer Dist., 484 U.S. 964, 108 S. Ct. 453, 98 L. Ed. 2d 393, 1987 U.S. LEXIS 4865, 56 U.S.L.W. 3383 (1987), overruled, Calvert Invest., Inc. v. Louisville & Jefferson County Metro. Sewer Dist., 805 S.W.2d 133, 1991 Ky. LEXIS 17 ( Ky. 1991 ), overruled in part, Calvert Invest., Inc. v. Louisville & Jefferson County Metro. Sewer Dist., 805 S.W.2d 133, 1991 Ky. LEXIS 17 ( Ky. 1991 ), overruled in part as stated, Louisville/Jefferson County Metro Ethics Comm’n v. Schardein, 259 S.W.3d 510, 2008 Ky. App. LEXIS 225 (Ky. Ct. App. 2008); Calvert Invest., Inc. v. Louisville & Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer Dist., 847 F.2d 304, 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 6864 (6th Cir. 1988).

Opinions of Attorney General.

The Louisville and Jefferson County metropolitan sewer district has no statutory authority, express or implied, to extend its sewer system operations, by contracting with residents or developers or by condemnation, to collect sewer rates or service charges, or to establish a construction subdistrict, beyond the Jefferson County boundaries. OAG 73-752 .

Daviess County, if it enters into a joint creation of a metropolitan sewer district under KRS Chapter 76, may not create through the joint action with the City of Owensboro a district subject to more restrictive control by the local legislative bodies than that provided in KRS Chapter 76. OAG 83-124 .

The City of Owensboro (a second class city) and Daviess County, even though having only one state senatorial district, may validly form a metropolitan sewer district, notwithstanding the language contained in KRS 76.030(1) that states “members shall be so selected and appointed so that no more than one member resides in any one state senatorial district,” because the one-member-per-senatorial-district provision is basically meaningless, in view of the fact that of the eight second class cities in Kentucky, only two of them are located in counties involving more than one senatorial district. OAG 83-124 .

This section expressly adds second class cities, and the counties in which they are located, in authorizing the joint creation of a metropolitan sewer district “under the provisions of KRS 76.010 to 76.210 . . . . . ” Thus, the various statutes within that cited group apply equally to second class cities, regardless of whether or not second class cities are mentioned specifically in statutes other than this section. OAG 83-124 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Lewis, Kostas and Carnes, Consolidation — Complete or Functional — of City and County Governments in Kentucky, 42 Ky. L.J. 295 (1954).

Treatises

Caldwell’s Kentucky Form Book, 5th Ed., Petition to County Judge/Executive for Establishment of Sewer Construction District, Form 338.05.

76.020. Ordinance for creation of district.

Whenever by ordinance passed by the legislative body of any such city and approved by the mayor thereof, it is declared for the best interests of such city and the inhabitants thereof, that such district be created under the provisions of KRS 76.010 to 76.210 , the clerk of the legislative body of such city shall file a certified copy of such ordinance with the county judge/executive of the county wherein such city is located.

History. Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 104, § 2.

Research References and Practice Aids

Treatises

Caldwell’s Kentucky Form Book, 5th Ed., Petition to County Judge/Executive for Establishment of Sewer Construction, District (KRS Ch. 76), Form 338.05.

76.030. Board of district — Membership, appointment, qualifications, term, vacancies, removal, compensation — Effect of compact — Membership of board upon establishment of consolidated local government.

  1. Except in counties containing a consolidated local government, the business, activities, and affairs of such district shall be managed, controlled, and conducted by a board composed of seven (7) members, four (4) of whom shall be appointed by the mayor of such city subject to the approval of the city legislative body, and three (3) of whom shall be appointed by the county judge/executive of such county subject to the approval of the fiscal court, and which seven (7) members thus appointed shall constitute the board of such district. Not more than four (4) members of a seven (7) member board nor more than five (5) members of an eight (8) member board shall be affiliated with the same political party. After March 19, 1977, members shall be so selected and appointed so that no more than one (1) member resides in any one (1) state senatorial district. In a county containing a city of the first class, the county judge/executive, with approval of the fiscal court, shall appoint one (1) additional member to the board of such district who may be a resident of any state senatorial district in the county.
  2. Each such member shall be at least twenty-five (25) years of age; each appointed by the mayor shall be a resident of such city and wherein he shall have actually resided continuously for at least three (3) years next prior to appointment; each appointed by the county judge/executive shall be a resident of such county and wherein he shall have actually resided continuously for at least three (3) years next prior to appointment. No officer or employee of such city or county, whether holding a paid or unpaid position, shall be eligible for appointment as a member of such board.
  3. The term of each of such members shall be four (4) years, ending on July first. A member is eligible to succeed himself and shall continue in office until his successor has been appointed and qualified. Vacancies in the membership shall be filled for the unexpired portion of the term by the mayor or the county judge/executive as the case may be, subject to the same approval.
  4. Any member of the board appointed by the mayor may be removed by the mayor, for cause, after hearing by the mayor, and after at least ten (10) days’ notice in writing shall have been given to the member, which notice shall embrace the charges preferred against him. At the hearing he may be represented by counsel. The finding of the mayor shall be final and removal results in vacancy in such office. Any member of the board appointed by the county judge/executive may be removed by the county judge/executive, for cause, after hearing by the county judge/executive, and after at least ten (10) days’ notice in writing shall have been given to the member, which notice shall embrace the charges preferred against him. At the hearing he may be represented by counsel. The finding of the county judge/executive shall be final and removal results in vacancy in such office.
  5. The members of the board shall be paid seventy-five dollars ($75) for each meeting of the board attended by such member, and fifty dollars ($50) for attendance at any meeting of a committee which has been authorized or duly appointed by the board. But in no instance shall any member of said board be paid for more than one (1) meeting per day, nor more than one thousand eight hundred dollars ($1,800) during any fiscal year of the board, nor for more than twenty-four (24) board meetings and twenty-eight (28) committee meetings held during any fiscal year of said board.
  6. Notwithstanding subsection (3) of this section, when a city of the first class and a county containing such city have in effect a compact under KRS 79.310 to 79.330 , the terms of the members of the board shall be for three (3) years and until their successors are appointed and qualified. Upon the effective date of the compact, the mayor shall adjust the terms of the sitting members appointed by the mayor so that the terms of two (2) members expire in one (1) year, the term of one (1) member expires in two (2) years, and the term of one (1) member expires in three (3) years; the county judge/executive with the approval of the fiscal court shall adjust the terms of the sitting members appointed by the county judge/executive so that the term of one (1) member expires in one (1) year, the term of one (1) member expires in two (2) years, and the term of one (1) member expires in three (3) years. Upon expiration of these staggered terms, successors shall be appointed for a term of three (3) years.
  7. Upon the establishment of a consolidated local government in a county where a city of the first class and a county containing that city have had in effect a cooperative compact pursuant to KRS 79.310 to 79.330 , all members of the board shall be appointed by the mayor of the consolidated local government pursuant to the provisions of KRS 67C.139 for a term of three (3) years. Incumbent members upon the establishment of the consolidated local government shall continue to serve as members of the board for the time remaining on their current term of appointment.

History. Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 104, § 3; 1948, ch. 108, § 5; 1952, ch. 70, § 1; 1962, ch. 286, § 19; 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 13, § 27; 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 20, § 6; effective January 2, 1978; 1982, ch. 417, § 1, effective July 15, 1982; 1984, ch. 193, § 1, effective July 13, 1984; 1986, ch. 77, § 10, effective July 15, 1986; 1986, ch. 380, § 1, effective July 15, 1986; 2002, ch. 346, § 77, effective July 15, 2002.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

The 1948 amendment to subsection (5) of this section was held constitutional even though other 1948 amendments to other sections of this chapter were held unconstitutional because of specific separability provision of the amending act. Rash v. Louisville & Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer Dist., 309 Ky. 442 , 217 S.W.2d 232, 1949 Ky. LEXIS 670 ( Ky. 1949 ).

2 Appointments.

Under KRS 76.030(7) and 67C.139 , the metropolitan sewer district’s executive director and chief engineer, as appointees of the mayor, albeit appointed by the urban county government, were not “appointed officials and employees” of the urban county government within the meaning of KRS 65.003 . Therefore, the county metro ethics commission had no jurisdiction over the sewer district or its officials. Louisville/Jefferson County Metro Ethics Comm'n v. Schardein, 259 S.W.3d 510, 2008 Ky. App. LEXIS 225 (Ky. Ct. App. 2008).

Opinions of Attorney General.

There is no statutory or constitutional prohibition against a member of the General Assembly serving, at the same time, as a commissioner of a sewer construction district and if the person involved can perform in both capacities with care and ability and with impartiality and honesty, no common-law incompatibility would be involved in either. OAG 77-249 .

Since the property valuation administrator (PVA) is a state officer, the disqualification of subsection (2) of this section does not apply to prevent a PVA from serving on a metropolitan sewer district board. OAG 82-81 .

Where ordinance of fourth class city provided that the operation, maintenance, modification, repair and replacement of the city sanitary sewer system should be assumed by the Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer District pursuant to a previously executed agreement and, pursuant to that agreement, that all future sanitary sewer service in the city should be furnished by the district under its rules and regulations, that the district should assume all future responsibility for the maintenance and operation of the system, that the municipal sewer board should continue to exist until all indebtedness against the sewer system had been paid in full, that in compliance with the outstanding bond indebtedness the city should continue to collect sewer service charges and such billing and collection should be carried out by the Louisville Water Company in accordance with its existing contract with the district and that the total revenue from the sewer service charges should be remitted to the district from the Louisville Water Company, the terms of such ordinance clearly indicated that the city had turned the operation of its sewer system, which apparently was inadequate to furnish city services, over to the Metropolitan Sewer District and thus the city effectively used the district’s sewer facilities and was entitled to representation as a fourth class city under the terms of . . . . . subsection (1) of this section. OAG 82-552 .

KRS 76.010 expressly adds second class cities, and the counties in which they are located, in authorizing the joint creation of a metropolitan sewer district “under the provisions of KRS 76.010 to 76.210 . . . . . ” Thus, the various statutes within that cited group apply equally to second class cities, regardless of whether or not second class cities are mentioned specifically in statutes other than KRS 76.010. OAG 83-124 .

The City of Owensboro (a second class city) and Daviess County, even though having only one state senatorial district, may validly form a metropolitan sewer district, notwithstanding the language contained in subsection (1) of this section that states “members shall be so selected and appointed so that no more than one member resides in any one state senatorial district,” because the one-member-per-senatorial-district provision is basically meaningless, in view of the fact that of the eight second class cities in Kentucky, only two of them are located in counties involving more than one senatorial district. OAG 83-124 .

The provision in subsection (2) of this section concerning membership on the board and the prohibited conflicts and incompatibilities refers to officers and employees of the city and county establishing the joint metropolitan sewer district; it does not apply to an officer of a city not involved in the creation and establishment of the metropolitan sewer district. OAG 93-43 .

A mayor of a city of the third class is not prohibited by this section, KRS 61.080 or Ky. Const., § 165 from serving on the board of the Louisville and Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer District. OAG 93-43 .

76.040. Fiscal year.

The fiscal year of the district shall begin on July 1 of each year and end on June 30 next following.

History. Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 104, § 4.

76.050. Meetings of board — Quorum.

  1. Regular meetings of the board shall be held at least once in each calendar month, the time and place of which shall be fixed by the board.
  2. A majority of the members of the board shall constitute a quorum, and the affirmative vote of at least three (3) members of the board shall be necessary for the adoption of any motion, measure, or resolution.

History. Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 104, § 3; 1982, ch. 417, § 2, effective July 15, 1982.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

Although KRS 76.050 was included in 1982 Acts ch. 417, § 2, as having been amended, the change in wording was deleted by a Senate Committee amendment.

OPINIONS OF ATTORNEY GENERAL.

A Metropolitan Sewer District Board may assent to a contract term requiring a “supermajority” vote for certain matters, provided that the matter is not one delegated to the Board specifically by statute. OAG 2015-01

76.060. Officers and employees — Legal services — Effect of compact.

  1. The board shall, in July of each year, elect from its members a chairman and a vice chairman, who shall be of different political party affiliation. It shall employ a secretary-treasurer and a chief engineer, neither of whom is a member of the board. The secretary-treasurer and the chief engineer may be removed by the board for cause, after hearing by it and after at least ten (10) days’ notice in writing has been given to the secretary-treasurer or chief engineer, as the case may be, which notice shall embrace the charges preferred against him or her. At the hearing he or she may be represented by counsel. The finding of the board is final. The secretary-treasurer and the chief engineer shall each devote his or her entire time and attention exclusively to the services of the board. The board may employ, and remove at pleasure, professional and technical advisers, experts, and other employees, skilled or unskilled, as it deems requisite for the performance of its duties.
  2. The board shall require the secretary-treasurer and the chief engineer each to execute a bond and may exact from such of its other officers and employees bonds as it deems expedient. All bonds shall be payable to the district in the sums as the board may fix, with approved corporate surety, and premiums therefor shall be paid by the district. The bonds shall obligate the makers thereof to faithfully perform the duties of their respective offices and positions and to fully account for and pay over all money, property, or other thing of value of the district, which may come to their hands, respectively. The board shall fix the salaries and compensation of the officers and employees it engages, which salaries and compensation, however, shall be in line with that paid by the city and county for similar services.
  3. Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, when a city of the first class and a county containing such city have in effect a compact under KRS 79.310 to 79.330 , the executive director, secretary-treasurer, and chief engineer shall be appointed by and serve at the joint pleasure of the mayor, and the county judge/executive with the approval of the fiscal court pursuant to KRS 67.040 . Upon the establishment of a consolidated local government in a county where a city of the first class and a county containing such city have had in effect a cooperative compact pursuant to KRS 79.310 to 79.330 , the executive director, secretary-treasurer, and chief engineer shall be appointed by and serve at the pleasure of the mayor.

History. Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 104, § 4; 1968, ch. 152, § 51; 1986, ch. 77, § 11, effective July 15, 1986; 2002, ch. 346, § 78, effective July 15, 2002.

Compiler’s Notes.

Acts 1948, ch. 180, § 1, which also amended this section, was held unconstitutional in Rash v. Louisville & Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer Dist., 309 Ky. 442 , 217 S.W.2d 232 (1949) and therefore said amendment was never compiled herein.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

The 1948 amendment to this section charging the city attorney of a first-class city with the duty of handling all legal matters pertaining to the metropolitan sewer district, if established, of his particular county was unconstitutional because it was in contravention of Ky. Const., § 165 which prohibits same person from holding two or more incompatible public offices. Rash v. Louisville & Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer Dist., 309 Ky. 442 , 217 S.W.2d 232, 1949 Ky. LEXIS 670 ( Ky. 1949 ).

Cited:

Louisville/Jefferson County Metro Ethics Comm’n v. Schardein, 259 S.W.3d 510, 2008 Ky. App. LEXIS 225 (Ky. Ct. App. 2008).

76.070. District to take over existing sewer facilities — Duration of control and functions.

  1. When the district created under KRS 76.010 to 76.210 has organized, thereupon and by virtue of KRS 76.010 to 76.210 , the existing sewer and drainage system and facilities of the city forming a district pursuant to KRS 76.010, together with all contracts, books, maps, plans, papers and records, of whatever description pertaining to or relating to the design, construction, maintenance, operation, and affairs of the existing sewer and drainage system, shall be assigned, transferred, and dedicated to the use of and be in possession, and under the jurisdiction, control, and supervision, of the district under KRS 76.010 to 76.210 created, and the district is empowered to take possession thereof for its use and purposes. The district created under KRS 76.010 to 76.210 shall thereafter have complete jurisdiction, control, possession, and supervision, of the existing sewer and drainage system, and of all of the facilities of the city for the disposal of sewage and storm water, and shall continue to exercise such power so long thereafter as any bonds or liabilities of the district remain unpaid or have not been otherwise discharged. When all of the bonds issued by the district and all its obligations have been paid in full or have been otherwise discharged, the district shall nevertheless continue to function as contemplated by KRS 76.010 to 76.210 until dissolved and disposition of its property and assets provided for.
  2. The rights and powers given in this section shall apply in the whole of the district area.
  3. The board shall make and spread upon its records adequate descriptions, by map or otherwise, of the district area.

History. Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 104, § 5; 1964, ch. 33, § 2; 1968, ch. 152, § 52; 2014, ch. 92, § 48, effective January 1, 2015.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

The provisions of this section and KRS 76.090 authorizing sewer district to take over control of existing city sewer system and to impose charges for use of sewers, do not violate Ky. Const., § 242, prohibiting taking of private property without compensation, on ground that taxpayers of city had right to free use of city sewers, by virtue of fact that city had issued bonds to pay for sewers, which right would be taken away under these sections; city taxpayers did not have right to free use of city sewers, and transfer of city system to the district was merely a transfer of custodianship. Veail v. Louisville & Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer Dist., 303 Ky. 248 , 197 S.W.2d 413, 1946 Ky. LEXIS 830 ( Ky. 1946 ).

The provisions of this section and KRS 76.090 authorizing sewer district to take over control of existing city sewer system, and to impose charges for use of sewers, do not violate United States Const., Art. 1, § 10 forbidding impairment of obligation of contracts, on ground that city taxpayers’ contract with holders of sewer bonds issued by city entitled taxpayers to free use of sewers; taxpayers did not have any such contract right to free use of city sewers. Veail v. Louisville & Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer Dist., 303 Ky. 248 , 197 S.W.2d 413, 1946 Ky. LEXIS 830 ( Ky. 1946 ).

2. Contracts.

City taxpayer, who had no contract with city sewerage commission for sewer construction, could not attack the metropolitan sewer district law on the ground that the provisions of that law for the district taking over existing contracts with city commission would impair the obligation of such contracts. Veail v. Louisville & Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer Dist., 303 Ky. 248 , 197 S.W.2d 413, 1946 Ky. LEXIS 830 ( Ky. 1946 ).

Transfer by city sewerage commission to metropolitan sewer district, in connection with transfer of city sewer system to the district pursuant to this section, of contracts by which various industrial concerns were paying rental for use of city sewers, did not impair the obligation of such contracts to the detriment of the city taxpayers for moneys collected must be used by the district for the purpose of providing the service contracted for, the city merely assigning its benefits of these contracts and being relieved of their obligations. Veail v. Louisville & Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer Dist., 303 Ky. 248 , 197 S.W.2d 413, 1946 Ky. LEXIS 830 ( Ky. 1946 ).

Where there was a valid contract in force between city and contiguous incorporated town for sewer connections with the city system, subsequently created metropolitan sewer district which took over city sewer system was bound by the contract and could not impose higher rates than those fixed in the contract. Louisville & Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer Dist. v. Strathmoor Village, 307 Ky. 343 , 211 S.W.2d 127, 1948 Ky. LEXIS 739 ( Ky. 1948 ).

3. Liability for Defects.

Where the city created the hazardous condition prior to the time the operation of the sewer was transferred to metropolitan sewer district and maintained such condition for 29 years before the accident, the city was charged with notice of such a hazardous condition in its sidewalks, which are constantly used by the public. Louisville & Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer Dist. v. Louisville, 451 S.W.2d 172, 1970 Ky. LEXIS 380 ( Ky. 1970 ).

Where the metropolitan sewer district had no actual notice of a pipe protruding from sidewalk and the purpose of the pipe was unknown, the district was not charged with knowledge of the condition. Louisville & Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer Dist. v. Louisville, 451 S.W.2d 172, 1970 Ky. LEXIS 380 ( Ky. 1970 ).

Cited:

Louisville & Jefferson County Metropolitan Dist. v. Kirk, 390 S.W.2d 182, 1965 Ky. LEXIS 346 ( Ky. 1965 ).

76.080. General powers of district.

The district created under the provisions of KRS 76.010 to 76.210 is empowered:

  1. To have jurisdiction, control, possession, and supervision of the existing sewer and drainage system of the city forming a district pursuant to KRS 76.010 ; to maintain, operate, reconstruct, and improve the same as a comprehensive sewer and drainage system; to make additions, betterments, and extensions thereto within the district area; and to have all the rights, privileges, and jurisdiction necessary or proper for carrying such powers into execution. No enumeration of powers in KRS 76.010 to 76.210 shall operate to restrict the meaning of this general grant of power or to exclude other powers comprehended within this general grant.
  2. To prepare or cause to be prepared and to be thereafter revised and adopted, plans, designs, and estimates of costs, of a system of trunk, intercepting, connecting, lateral, and outlet sewers, storm water drains, pumping and ventilating stations, disposal and treatment plants and works, and all other appliances and structures which in the judgment of the board will provide an effective and advantageous means for relieving the district area from inadequate sanitary and storm water drainage and from inadequate sanitary disposal and treatment of the sewage thereof, or such sections or parts of such system of the district area as the board may from time to time deem proper or convenient to construct, consistent with the plans and purposes of KRS 76.010 to 76.210 , and may take all steps the board deems proper and necessary to effect the purposes of KRS 76.010 to 76.210 .
  3. To construct any additions, betterments and extensions to the facilities of the district, within or without the district area, and to construct any construction subdistrict facilities or additions, betterments and extensions thereto, within or without the district area, by contract or under, through, or by means of its own officers, agents and employees. No construction or extensions shall be started within the city forming a district pursuant to KRS 76.010 until, firstly, the city’s director of works, and secondly, its board of aldermen have approved the plans. No construction or extensions shall be started in any city with a population greater than three thousand (3,000) but less than one hundred thousand (100,000) based upon the most recent federal decennial census until the governing authorities of such city or cities have approved the plans. No construction or extensions shall be started in any other part of the county until the plans have been approved, firstly, by the county engineer and, secondly, by the fiscal court.
  4. To establish, construct, operate, and maintain, as a part of the sewer and drainage system of the district, sewage treatment and disposal plants and systems and all the appurtenances and appliances thereunto belonging. The sewage treatment and disposal plants may be located in the city, or beyond the limits of the city in the county in which the city is located, as the board deems expedient.
  5. To acquire and hold the personal property the board deems necessary and proper for carrying out the corporate purposes of the district and to dispose of personal property when the district has no further need therefor.
  6. To acquire by purchase, gift, lease, or by condemnation, real property or any interest, right, easement, or privilege therein, as the board determines necessary, proper and convenient for the corporate purposes of the district, and to use the same so long as its corporate existence continues, and same is necessary or useful for the corporate purposes of the district. Condemnation proceedings may be instituted in the name of the district pursuant to a resolution of the board declaring the necessity for the taking, and the method of condemnation shall be the same as provided in the Eminent Domain Act of Kentucky. When the board by resolution declares that any real property which it has acquired, or any interest therein, is no longer necessary or useful for the corporate purposes of the district, the real property and interest therein may be disposed of.
  7. To make bylaws and agreements for the management and regulation of its affairs and for the regulation of the use of property under its control and for the establishment and collection of sewer rates, rentals and charges, which sewer rates, rentals and charges, applicable within the limits of a city forming a district pursuant to KRS 76.010 , shall be subject to the approval, supervision and control of the legislative body of the city as hereinafter provided.
  8. To make contracts and execute all instruments necessary or convenient in the premises.
  9. To borrow money and to issue negotiable bonds and to provide for the rights of the holders thereof.
  10. To fix and collect sewer rates, rentals, and other charges, for services rendered by the facilities of the district, which sewer rates, rentals, and other charges, applicable within the limits of a city forming a district pursuant to KRS 76.010 , shall be subject to the approval, supervision and control of the legislative body of such city as hereinafter provided.
  11. To enter on any lands, waters and premises for the purpose of making surveys, and soundings and examinations.
  12. To approve or revise the plans and designs of all trunk, intercepting, connecting, lateral and outlet sewers, storm water drains, pumping and ventilating stations, disposal and treatment plants and works proposed to be constructed, altered or reconstructed by any other person or corporation, private or public, in the whole county, in order to insure that such proposed construction, alteration or reconstruction shall conform to and be a part of a comprehensive sewer and drainage system for the said county. No sewers, drains, pumping and ventilating stations, or disposal and treatment plants or works shall be constructed, altered or reconstructed without approval by the board of the district. Any such work shall be subject to inspection and supervision of the district.
  13. To enter into agreements with another entity or entities to acquire by purchase or lease, any real or personal property, or any interest, right, easement, or privilege therein, outside of the district’s jurisdictional boundaries, in connection with the acquisition, construction, operation, repair, or maintenance of any sewage, wastewater, or storm water facilities, notwithstanding any other provision of the Kentucky Revised Statutes restricting, qualifying, or limiting their authority to do so, except as set forth in KRS Chapter 278.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 104, § 6; 1948, ch. 180, §§ 2, 3; 1952, ch. 70, § 2; 1962, ch. 286, § 20; 1964, ch. 33, § 3; 1968, ch. 152, § 53; 1968, ch. 156, § 1; 1976, ch. 140, § 25; 2014, ch. 92, § 49, effective January 1, 2015; 2018 ch. 196, § 6, effective July 14, 2018.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

The powers granted to the sewer district by this section are purely administrative, and not legislative, so it does not violate Ky. Const., §§ 27, 28 or 29. Veail v. Louisville & Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer Dist., 303 Ky. 248 , 197 S.W.2d 413, 1946 Ky. LEXIS 830 ( Ky. 1946 ).

The references in this section to “Louisville” and “Jefferson County” do not render metropolitan sewer district law unconstitutional as local or special legislation, since it is apparent that such references were inadvertently used in place of “city of the first class and county containing such city.” Veail v. Louisville & Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer Dist., 303 Ky. 248 , 197 S.W.2d 413, 1946 Ky. LEXIS 830 ( Ky. 1946 ).

The 1948 amendment to subsections (7) and (10) of this section was held unconstitutional as not enacted in compliance with Ky. Const., § 51. Rash v. Louisville & Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer Dist., 309 Ky. 442 , 217 S.W.2d 232, 1949 Ky. LEXIS 670 ( Ky. 1949 ).

2. Condemnation.

Taxpayer could not question validity of the provision of subsection (6) of this section authorizing disposition of real estate acquired by condemnation, in advance of an attempt by the district to dispose of such real estate. Veail v. Louisville & Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer Dist., 303 Ky. 248 , 197 S.W.2d 413, 1946 Ky. LEXIS 830 ( Ky. 1946 ).

Where a city and corporation entered into an agreed judgment following a condemnation suit, whereby the corporation deeded to the city, for construction of sewers, certain land including a stream which was being used by the corporation for sewerage purposes, and, in part consideration thereof, the city agreed to allow the corporation, its successors and assigns, free use of the sewers, a subsequently created metropolitan sewer district which took over city sewer system could not, by exercise of the police power of the city, abrogate the agreement and force successors of the corporation to pay for use of the sewers. Bond Bros. v. Louisville & Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer Dist., 307 Ky. 689 , 211 S.W.2d 867, 1948 Ky. LEXIS 805 ( Ky. 1948 ), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 943, 70 S. Ct. 796, 94 L. Ed. 1358, 1950 U.S. LEXIS 2086 (U.S. 1950).

3. Environmental Impact.

A condemnor, who has public purpose, does not need to give consideration to the environmental impact of a proposed project in order to avoid acting in an arbitrary and capricious manner. Proffitt v. Louisville & Jefferson County Metro. Sewer Dist., 850 S.W.2d 852, 1993 Ky. LEXIS 66 ( Ky. 1993 ).

4. Capital Investment.

City could by the issuance of general obligation bonds, if the voters approved, lawfully make an additional capital investment in sewer system for the purpose of the protection of the public health of its citizens using proceeds for construction of a plant and facilities for treatment and disposal of sewerage before its discharge into the Ohio River necessary not only for pressing local need but to meet demand of state water pollution control board, since legal title to the sewer system had remained in the city and its power to finance its improvement had been left unimpaired and though the disposal plant would serve property beyond city’s boundaries, the entire system served the health of its citizens. Johnson v. Louisville, 261 S.W.2d 429, 1953 Ky. LEXIS 1014 ( Ky. 1953 ).

5. Improvements.

When an existing facility begins to wear out or become obsolete or otherwise inadequate a metropolitan sewer district has the right to determine whether that facility is to be phased out of existence or be permitted to perpetuate its viability through necessary improvement or rehabilitation; such a decision in a given instance cannot be arbitrary, but neither must it be dictated by what is best for the financial interests of individual investors or speculators. Louisville & Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer Dist. v. Douglass Hills Sanitation Facility, 592 S.W.2d 142, 1979 Ky. LEXIS 317 ( Ky. 1979 ).

6. Charges for Services Rendered.

A metropolitan sewer district, as custodian of certain drainage facilities, can establish and impose charges for services rendered; however, it has no power to levy taxes, as taxation is a legislative function which if delegated to such a sewer district would violate Ky. Const., §§ 27 and 28. Long Run Baptist Asso. v. Louisville & Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer Dist., 775 S.W.2d 520, 1989 Ky. App. LEXIS 106 (Ky. Ct. App. 1989).

7. Action to Reduce Pollution.

Since to allow sewage treatment works discharging pollutants into tributory of creek to continue treating sewage until metropolitan sewer district chose to begin eminent domain proceedings would be to agree to sewage treatment works’ continuing violation of federal law in derogation of the purposes of the Clean Water Act, a motion for injunctive relief ordering works to cease operation and sewer district to treat the sewage flow from residences in works’ sewage service area and to construct an intercepting line for this purpose would be granted. United States v. Confederate Acres Sanitary Sewer & Drainage System, Inc., 767 F. Supp. 834, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18943 (W.D. Ky. 1990 ).

8. Prescriptive Right to Use of Sewers.

County acquired no prescriptive right to the free use of the city sewers simply because it has been using them without charge for more than a century. Louisville & Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer Dist. v. Barker, 307 Ky. 655 , 212 S.W.2d 122, 1948 Ky. LEXIS 813 ( Ky. 1948 ).

9. Authority of City Government.

As an independent municipal corporation, the metropolitan sewer district was not an agency of the county metro government within the meaning of KRS 65.003 . Therefore, the county metro ethics commission had no jurisdiction over the sewer district or its officials. Louisville/Jefferson County Metro Ethics Comm'n v. Schardein, 259 S.W.3d 510, 2008 Ky. App. LEXIS 225 (Ky. Ct. App. 2008).

Cited:

Louisville & Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer Dist. v. Strathmoor Village, 307 Ky. 343 , 211 S.W.2d 127, 1948 Ky. LEXIS 739 ( Ky. 1948 ); Sanitation Dist. of Jefferson County v. Louisville, 308 Ky. 368 , 213 S.W.2d 995, 1948 Ky. LEXIS 879 ( Ky. 1948 ); Calvert Invest., Inc. v. Louisville & Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer Dist., 847 F.2d 304, 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 6864 (6th Cir. 1988).

Opinions of Attorney General.

The Metropolitan Sewer District Building Corporation, a nonprofit, no-stock, public corporation, organized pursuant to KRS Chapter 273, is the lawful agency and instrumentality of Louisville and Jefferson County metropolitan sewer district in the implementation and carrying out of the lawful corporate purposes of the joint district, and particularly in the implementation of the power granted MSD by subsection (6) of this section, and the interest on the bonds issued by it is exempt from both federal and state income taxation and from Kentucky state ad valorem taxation. OAG 67-197 .

A school board could not grant an easement across school property to the metropolitan sewer district since the easement would not constitute an educational purpose. OAG 69-127 .

The Louisville and Jefferson County metropolitan sewer district has no statutory authority, express or implied, to extend its sewer system operations, by contracting with residents or developers or by condemnation, to collect sewer rates or service charges, or to establish a construction subdistrict, beyond the Jefferson County boundaries. OAG 73-752 .

Since a metropolitan sewer district is a political subdivision and a separate entity acting for its own purposes and is not a department or agency of city, county or state government, the district retains its power of eminent domain for its statutory purposes and the power to condemn in its own name. OAG 76-307 .

A Metropolitan Sewer District Board may assent to a contract term requiring a “supermajority” vote for certain matters, provided that the matter is not one delegated to the Board specifically by statute. OAG 2015-01

Research References and Practice Aids

Treatises

Caldwell’s Kentucky Form Book, 5th Ed., Interlocutory Order and Judgment, Easement, Form 307.05.

Caldwell’s Kentucky Form Book, 5th Ed., Order Appointing Commissioners, Form 307.07.

Caldwell’s Kentucky Form Book, 5th Ed., Petition for Condemnation (Temporary and Permanent Easement), Form 307.01.

76.085. Privately constructed sewers to be approved — Investigation, charges.

  1. Any person or corporation, public or private, in the county in which such district is located submitting for approval plans and designs of sanitary sewers or storm water drainage facilities, or both, to be constructed by such person or corporation, private or public, pursuant to KRS 76.080 shall file with the district a written application for such approval or other action upon the plans and designs submitted by such person or corporation.
  2. When the district receives an application for approval of plans or designs of sanitary sewers and/or storm water drainage facilities to be constructed by some individual or corporation, the metropolitan sewer district is authorized and empowered to examine, inspect and investigate, as seems to be advisable, the sufficiency of the facilities which the application seeks to construct, to serve the purposes intended, and to establish and make reasonable charges for such services on the basis of a schedule adjusted according to the services required to make such investigation or on any other reasonable method.
  3. When it appears to the district that the construction of any sanitary sewer and/or storm water drainage facility being made by any other individual or corporation, requires inspection and supervision in order to assure the protection of public health and the proper subsequent completion of such facility for the purposes intended, the metropolitan sewer district shall include such finding in its order approving, modifying or disapproving the particular plans and projects, and shall charge such person or corporation for such inspection and supervision on the basis of the actual cost of inspection plus a reasonable additional cost of supervision.

History. Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 134; 1962, ch. 286, § 21; 1964, ch. 33, § 4.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Acquisition of Private Facilities.

Should a metropolitan sewer district elect to purchase a privately-operated collection system, the abutting lot owners would own no more and no less than previously, which is an easement, or easements, for the free use of the system; they acquired those rights when they purchased their lots, and they cannot be made to pay for them again. Louisville & Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer Dist. v. Douglass Hills Sanitation Facility, 592 S.W.2d 142, 1979 Ky. LEXIS 317 ( Ky. 1979 ).

2. Disposition of Obsolete Facilities.

When an existing facility begins to wear out or become obsolete or otherwise inadequate a metropolitan sewer district has the right to determine whether that facility is to be phased out of existence or be permitted to perpetuate its viability through necessary improvement or rehabilitation; such a decision in a given instance cannot be arbitrary, but neither must it be dictated by what is best for the financial interests of individual investors or speculators. Louisville & Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer Dist. v. Douglass Hills Sanitation Facility, 592 S.W.2d 142, 1979 Ky. LEXIS 317 ( Ky. 1979 ).

Cited:

Calvert Invest., Inc. v. Louisville & Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer Dist., 847 F.2d 304, 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 6864 (6th Cir. 1988).

76.090. Rates, rentals, and charges — Use of funds of district — Cutting off sewer and water service to delinquents.

  1. The district may establish a schedule of rates, rentals, and charges, to be collected from all the real property within the district area served by the facilities of the district, and prescribe the manner in which and the time at which the rates, rentals, and charges are to be paid, and may change the schedule from time to time as the district deems necessary, advisable or expedient. The schedule may be based upon either:
    1. The consumption of water on premises connected with the facilities, taking into consideration commercial and industrial use of water; or
    2. The number and kind of plumbing fixtures connected with the facilities; or
    3. The number of persons served by the facilities; or
    4. May be determined by the district on any other basis or classification which the district determines to be fair and reasonable, whether similar or dissimilar to those enumerated, except that the schedule shall be uniform for all residential property; or
    5. Any combination thereof.

      This schedule may include additional charges for treatment of sewage, with a surcharge where the sewage contains industrial wastes or other wastes in excess of limitations established by regulations of the district.

  2. Prior to the final adoption or modification of the schedule for the district area, the district shall adopt a proposed schedule and publish notice thereof pursuant to KRS Chapter 424. The notice so published shall be dated as of the date of first publication thereof and shall state that the proposed or revised schedule of rates, rentals, and charges will remain open for inspection in the office of the district for thirty (30) days from the date of the notice, and that objections thereto in writing may be filed during that period with the district by any person aggrieved thereby. The district shall examine and hear any and all complaints, may modify the proposed schedule, and shall adopt and establish a final schedule within sixty (60) days after the date of the notice; the schedule, however, shall not become final within a county outside a city of the first class until it has been approved by the fiscal court of the county, or shall not become final within a city of the first class, unless and until it has received the approval of the legislative body of the city of the first class by ordinance approved by the mayor; provided, however, the schedule finally adopted shall be sufficient and adequate to cover the purposes of this chapter. The schedules shall be uniform for all property falling within the same classification, which classification may be based upon the length of time the property has been in the district area, the drainage area within which the property lies, or any similar or dissimilar reasonable classification, except that the schedule shall be uniform for all residential property. The schedule so adopted and established shall thereafter be the rates, rentals, and charges for the use of the facilities of the district by users within the district area, until changed in the manner herein provided. The schedule of rates, rentals, and charges shall be established and revised from time to time so as to produce aggregate revenues to the district sufficient:
    1. For the payment of the interest on and principal of all revenue bonds and other obligations of the district except construction subdistrict obligations and bonds;
    2. For the payment of all cost and expenses of operating and maintaining the sewer and drainage system of the district within the district area, including but not limited to that portion of the salaries, wages, and fees of all officers and employees of the district equitably allocable to operations within or for the district area; and
    3. For the payment of all cost of renewals and replacement of such system within the district area; provided, however, that all expenses, salaries, wages, and fees necessary or incident to improvements for the account of which bonds are issued, may be included as a part of the cost of the improvements and paid from the proceeds of the bonds. The district may collect the sewer rates, rentals, and charges, or cause them to be collected and paid to it by agencies it designates, and with whom it may make such contracts or arrangements as the district deems proper. No moneys received on account of the existence or operation of construction subdistricts shall be used for the payment of district obligations, and no other moneys received by the district shall be used for the payment of construction subdistrict bonds or obligations. Except as provided in the preceding sentence, the use of all moneys of the district received from any and all sources is hereby limited exclusively and shall be devoted solely to the payment of all obligations of the district and board created by KRS 76.010 to 76.210 , and no funds from any sources authorized by KRS 76.010 to 76.210 , shall be diverted to any other purposes than those in KRS 76.010 to 76.210 set forth, except that the district shall pay from district area revenues an equitably allocable share of the cost of constructing and operating any nondistrict area facilities to which sewage from the district area is diverted in order to relieve facilities from excessive sewage and costs described in KRS 76.248 but otherwise paid for.
  3. Whenever an area located within the district is served initially by a construction subdistrict facility, the schedule of rates, rentals, and charges applicable to the particular construction subdistrict shall, at the discretion of the board, be applied to the area.
  4. Whenever any such sewer rates, rentals, or charges for services rendered remains unpaid for a period of thirty (30) days after the same becomes due and payable, the district shall declare the property, the owner thereof, and the user of the service, delinquent until such time as all service rates, rentals, and charges are fully paid and may cut off the sewer connection and service. It is unlawful for any delinquent to use water from any public water service or system and discharge same into a public sewer. No public water service or system shall furnish the delinquent with water to be discharged into a public sewer. The district may enter into agreements with any public water company or public water service providing for the discontinuance of water service to delinquents.

History. Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 104, § 7; 1956, ch. 109; 1960, ch. 200, § 1; 1964, ch. 33, § 5; 1966, ch. 255, § 91; 1968, ch. 156, § 2; 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 13, § 25.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

Charges for sewer service do not constitute taxes and therefore the metropolitan sewer district law is not unconstitutional as authorizing double taxation. Veail v. Louisville & Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer Dist., 303 Ky. 248 , 197 S.W.2d 413, 1946 Ky. LEXIS 830 ( Ky. 1946 ).

The provisions of this section and KRS 76.070 authorizing sewer district to take over control of existing city sewer system and to impose charges for use of sewers, do not violate Ky. Const., § 242, prohibiting taking of private property without compensation, on ground that taxpayers of city had right to free use of city sewers, by virtue of fact that city had issued bonds to pay for sewers, which right would be taken away under these sections; city taxpayers did not have right to free use of city sewers, and transfer of city system to the district was merely a transfer of custodianship. Veail v. Louisville & Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer Dist., 303 Ky. 248 , 197 S.W.2d 413, 1946 Ky. LEXIS 830 ( Ky. 1946 ).

The provisions of this section and KRS 76.070 authorizing sewer district to take over control of existing city sewer system, and to impose charges for use of sewers, do not violate United States Const., Art. 1, § 10 forbidding impairment of obligation of contracts, on ground that city taxpayers’ contract with holders of sewer bonds issued by city entitled taxpayers to free use of sewers; taxpayers did not have any such contract right to free use of city sewers. Veail v. Louisville & Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer Dist., 303 Ky. 248 , 197 S.W.2d 413, 1946 Ky. LEXIS 830 ( Ky. 1946 ).

2. Classification of Property.

A system of classification founded upon a natural and reasonable basis with a logical relation to the purposes and objectives of the authority granted does not offend the principle of equal rights under the law. Louisville & Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer Dist. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 307 Ky. 413 , 211 S.W.2d 122, 1948 Ky. LEXIS 738 ( Ky. 1948 ).

The district board had the power to make the classification between property within and property without city boundaries whereby owners of property without the city boundaries were charged higher rates for use of the sewer system than those within city boundaries, where citizens of city had built the system at great cost and city was obliged to liquidate bonds issued to finance it and pay annual interest thereon in large sums the money being raised entirely by taxation of city property. Louisville & Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer Dist. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 307 Ky. 413 , 211 S.W.2d 122, 1948 Ky. LEXIS 738 ( Ky. 1948 ).

Where metropolitan sewer district utilized a rate structure based upon the equivalent service unit approach, this was a reasonable and rational classification and was uniform for all residential property. Long Run Baptist Asso. v. Louisville & Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer Dist., 775 S.W.2d 520, 1989 Ky. App. LEXIS 106 (Ky. Ct. App. 1989).

3. Rates.

Where board of aldermen refused to approve rate schedule unless property owners outside the city were charged more than those in the city and sewer district promulgated a new schedule whereby it raised rates for property owners outside the city instead of reducing the rates for those inside the city, it cannot be said that the action of the sewer district was not its own. Louisville & Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer Dist. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 307 Ky. 413 , 211 S.W.2d 122, 1948 Ky. LEXIS 738 ( Ky. 1948 ).

It was not a violation of the uniform rates provision of this section when a newly created metropolitan sewer district was forced to continue service at rates set out in an existing contract entered into by the city and a contiguous town. Louisville & Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer Dist. v. Strathmoor Village, 307 Ky. 343 , 211 S.W.2d 127, 1948 Ky. LEXIS 739 ( Ky. 1948 ).

Where there was a valid contract in force between city and contiguous incorporated town for sewer connections with the city system, subsequently created metropolitan sewer district which took over city sewer system was bound by the contract and could not impose higher rates than those fixed in the contract. Louisville & Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer Dist. v. Strathmoor Village, 307 Ky. 343 , 211 S.W.2d 127, 1948 Ky. LEXIS 739 ( Ky. 1948 ).

4. — Disapproval.

Board of aldermen could disapprove sewer rate schedule by mere nonaction, passage of an ordinance to that effect not being necessary. Louisville & Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer Dist. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 307 Ky. 413 , 211 S.W.2d 122, 1948 Ky. LEXIS 738 ( Ky. 1948 ).

5. Free Use of Sewers.

Where a city and corporation entered into an agreed judgment following a condemnation suit, whereby the corporation deeded to the city, for construction of sewers, certain land including a stream which was being used by the corporation for sewerage purposes, and, in part consideration thereof, the city agreed to allow the corporation, its successors and assigns, free use of the sewers, a subsequently created metropolitan sewer district which took over city sewer system could not, by exercise of the police power of the city, abrogate the agreement and force successors of the corporation to pay for use of the sewers. Bond Bros. v. Louisville & Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer Dist., 307 Ky. 689 , 211 S.W.2d 867, 1948 Ky. LEXIS 805 ( Ky. 1948 ), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 943, 70 S. Ct. 796, 94 L. Ed. 1358, 1950 U.S. LEXIS 2086 (U.S. 1950).

6. Rental Charges.

Sewer service charges are not taxes, but are rentals for use of sewers or in some instances a method of paying for their construction, and thus classification of users of property does not fall within the strictness of constitutional provisions requiring uniformity of taxation. Louisville & Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer Dist. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 307 Ky. 413 , 211 S.W.2d 122, 1948 Ky. LEXIS 738 ( Ky. 1948 ).

Since there are no exclusions under this section and as sewer rental charges are not taxes or special assessments but possess commercial characteristics Jefferson County is obligated to pay sewer rentals for all its facilities using the services of the metropolitan sewer district. Louisville & Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer Dist. v. Barker, 307 Ky. 655 , 212 S.W.2d 122, 1948 Ky. LEXIS 813 ( Ky. 1948 ).

A metropolitan sewer district, as custodian of certain drainage facilities, can establish and impose charges for services rendered; however, it has no power to levy taxes, as taxation is a legislative function which if delegated to such a sewer district would violate Ky. Const., §§ 27 and 28. Long Run Baptist Asso. v. Louisville & Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer Dist., 775 S.W.2d 520, 1989 Ky. App. LEXIS 106 (Ky. Ct. App. 1989).

Since this chapter clearly gives a metropolitan sewer district express authority to impose a service charge to fund its comprehensive county-wide drainage system, and since this chapter has been held, by the Supreme Court, to be constitutional in all respects, a service charge imposed to fund a storm water drainage program was not considered to be a tax. Long Run Baptist Asso. v. Louisville & Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer Dist., 775 S.W.2d 520, 1989 Ky. App. LEXIS 106 (Ky. Ct. App. 1989).

7. Prescriptive Right to Use of Sewers.

County acquired no prescriptive right to the free use of the city sewers simply because it had been using them without charge for more than a century. Louisville & Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer Dist. v. Barker, 307 Ky. 655 , 212 S.W.2d 122, 1948 Ky. LEXIS 813 ( Ky. 1948 ).

8. Capital Investment.

City could by the issuance of general obligation bonds, if the voters approved, lawfully make an additional capital investment in sewer system for the purpose of the protection of the public health of its citizens using proceeds for construction of a plant and facilities for treatment and disposal of sewerage before its discharge into the Ohio River necessary not only for pressing local need but to meet demand of state water pollution control board, since legal title to the sewer system had remained in the city and its power to finance its improvement had been left unimpaired and though the disposal plant would serve property beyond city’s boundaries, the entire system served the health of its citizens. Johnson v. Louisville, 261 S.W.2d 429, 1953 Ky. LEXIS 1014 ( Ky. 1953 ).

9. Discontinuance of Water Service to Delinquent Users.

The Louisville Water Company is a “public water company or service” within the meaning of subsection (3) (now (4)) of this section and was thus authorized to enter into a contract with a sewer district providing for discontinuance of water service to delinquent sewer users. Rash v. Louisville & Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer Dist., 309 Ky. 442 , 217 S.W.2d 232, 1949 Ky. LEXIS 670 ( Ky. 1949 ).

Cited:

Louisville & Jefferson County Metro. Sewer Dist. v. Simpson, 730 S.W.2d 939, 1987 Ky. LEXIS 211 ( Ky. 1987 ), cert. denied, Simpson v. Louisville & Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer Dist., 484 U.S. 964, 108 S. Ct. 453, 98 L. Ed. 2d 393, 1987 U.S. LEXIS 4865, 56 U.S.L.W. 3383 (1987), overruled, Calvert Invest., Inc. v. Louisville & Jefferson County Metro. Sewer Dist., 805 S.W.2d 133, 1991 Ky. LEXIS 17 ( Ky. 1991 ), overruled in part, Calvert Invest., Inc. v. Louisville & Jefferson County Metro. Sewer Dist., 805 S.W.2d 133, 1991 Ky. LEXIS 17 ( Ky. 1991 ), overruled in part as stated, Louisville/Jefferson County Metro Ethics Comm’n v. Schardein, 259 S.W.3d 510, 2008 Ky. App. LEXIS 225 (Ky. Ct. App. 2008).

Opinions of Attorney General.

A water district can legally shut off water service to a customer because that customer does not pay a bill owing to a separate sanitation district, which is also a public corporation. OAG 68-510 .

This section permits the establishing of recurring rates and charges for use of the sewer system but does not authorize a one-time charge called a connection fee which is in addition to the contractual costs of the service connection, especially when such connection fee is charged only when the property in question has not been previously assessed for the cost of the sewer and therefore a $7,000 “connection fee” charge in lieu of an assessment charge for the cost of the sewer should not be paid by the county board of education, in keeping with the proscriptions of Ky. Const., §§ 184 and 186. OAG 77-128 .

76.091. Powers of legislative body of city of first class over affairs of district, and over rates, rentals and charges. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1948, ch. 180, § 4) was repealed by Acts 1962, ch. 286, § 25.

76.100. Construction, improvement or extension of sewer and drainage system — Contracts — Contractors’ bonds.

It shall be the duty of the district as promptly as possible, to rehabilitate, construct, improve, and extend, any sewer and drainage system taken over and controlled by it, which shall include, but is not limited to, disconnection of storm water drains and constructing outlets therefor, where such work is necessary to relieve existing sanitary sewers of storm water loads, in order to permit the efficient operation of such sanitary sewers. The district may make rules and regulations for the submission of bids and the construction of such additions, betterments, and extensions, or any part thereof. No contract shall be entered into for construction work or for the purchase of materials, unless the contractor shall give an undertaking with corporate surety in an amount approved by the board for the faithful performance of the contract. As to contracts entered into for construction, such undertaking shall provide, among other things, that the person or corporation entering into such contract with the district will pay for all materials furnished and services rendered in the performance of the contract, and that any person or corporation furnishing such materials or rendering such services, may maintain an action thereon to recover for the same against the obligor in the undertaking and the surety, as though such person or corporation was named therein.

History. Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 104, § 8.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Contracts.

The construction of sewers and drains is a public governmental function, but in making contracts therefor the city acts in a proprietary and not a governmental capacity and such contracts are governed by the same rules as control individuals. Davis v. Commissioners of Sewerage, 13 F. Supp. 672, 1936 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1515 (D. Ky. 1936 ), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 88 F.2d 797, 1937 U.S. App. LEXIS 3249 (6th Cir. Ky. 1937 ) (decided under prior law).

Contract that provided for a premium for the contractor if he completed the construction ahead of time and for the deduction of a like amount from the payment due the contractor for each additional day required to complete the project subsequent to the completion date of the contract, could be entered into by the sewerage commission, where the form of the contract was submitted to all bidders and each knew when he made his bid that such provisions would be part of the contract. Henry Bickel Co. v. Commissioners of Sewerage, 207 Ky. 234 , 268 S.W. 1096, 1925 Ky. LEXIS 62 ( Ky. 1925 ) (decided under prior law).

76.110. Power to acquire land — Procedure in cases requiring condemnation.

  1. The district shall have the power to acquire by purchase, gift or eminent domain proceedings, the fee or such right, title, interest or easement, in such lands as may be deemed by the district necessary for any of the purposes mentioned in KRS 76.010 to 76.295 , whether within or without the district area or within or without a construction subdistrict and any personal property necessary for the purpose of the district. Such lands or interest therein, or personal property may be so acquired whether or not the same are owned or held for public use by corporations, associations, or other persons having the power of eminent domain, or otherwise held or used for public purposes. Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to confer upon or recognize in the district any power to acquire by agreement, purchase or gift, or by eminent domain proceedings, any fee, right, title, interest or easement in property under the jurisdiction of the department of highways or included within the boundaries of any sanitation district organized under KRS Chapter 220, except necessary rights of way for trunk sewers through such sanitation districts. Forthwith upon the acquisition of any such fee, right, title, interest or easement, or personal property, the same shall become dedicated to the uses and purposes of the district.
  2. The method of condemnation of such property shall be pursuant to the Eminent Domain Act of Kentucky.
  3. When a district has filed a proceeding to condemn land or any interest therein or personal property, pursuant to the provisions of the Eminent Domain Act of Kentucky, and the board of such district shall determine that the necessity for procuring possession of the property is urgent, it may pass a resolution, at the time that said condemnation is authorized or at any time thereafter for a declaration of taking, declaring that said lands are to be taken for the use of a metropolitan sewer district. Said declaration of taking shall contain, or have annexed thereto, the following:
    1. A statement of the authority under which and, the public use for which, said lands are taken;
    2. A description of the lands taken sufficient for identification thereof;
    3. A statement of the estate or interest in said lands taken for said public use;
    4. A plat showing the lands taken.
  4. At any time after the report of the commissioners has been made, the district may file said declaration of taking and make a deposit with the clerk of the court of the sum of money stated in the award of the commissioners appointed. Title to said lands in fee simple or such lesser estate as is specified in said declaration or to said personal property shall then vest in such metropolitan sewer district, and the right to just compensation for said land or interest therein or personal property shall vest in the persons entitled thereto. Said compensation shall be ascertained and awarded in said proceeding as otherwise provided in the Eminent Domain Act of Kentucky.

History. Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 104, § 9; 1960, ch. 212; 1964, ch. 33, § 6; 1976, ch. 140, § 26; 1980, ch. 188, § 55, effective July 15, 1980.

Compiler’s Notes.

The Eminent Domain Act of Kentucky is compiled as KRS 416.540 to 416.680 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Annexed Territory.

Where area that had been a part of a sanitation district upon annexation became a part of the city, it became a part of the metropolitan sewer district subject only to the necessities of continued operation by the sanitation district of its system within the area to the extent and for the period necessary to retire its bonds chargeable against the property in the annexed area. Louisville & Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer Dist. v. Sanitation Dist., 353 S.W.2d 196, 1961 Ky. LEXIS 1 ( Ky. 1961 ).

2. Contracts to Service Outside Area.

Where realty company contracted with metropolitan sewer district to provide sewer service to homes company had built which where within sanitation district and sewer district entered into supplementary contract with sanitation district providing that sanitation district be permitted to charge regular service fees even though home owners would also be charged sewer district’s fees, such contract was ultra vires for this section and KRS 76.170 expressly prohibit sewer district from making such contract and KRS 220.510 denies to sanitation district the power to make such contract since property owners were not using its sanitary works, and thus sanitation district could not collect sewer service fee from property owners. Stierle v. Sanitation Dist. of Jefferson County, 243 S.W.2d 678, 1951 Ky. LEXIS 1161 ( Ky. 1951 ).

3. Environmental Impact.

A condemnor, who has public purpose, does not need to give consideration to the environmental impact of a proposed project in order to avoid acting in an arbitrary and capricious manner. Proffitt v. Louisville & Jefferson County Metro. Sewer Dist., 850 S.W.2d 852, 1993 Ky. LEXIS 66 ( Ky. 1993 ).

Cited:

Sanitation Dist. of Jefferson County v. Louisville & Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer Dist., 307 Ky. 422 , 208 S.W.2d 751, 1948 Ky. LEXIS 616 ( Ky. 1948 ); Jefferson County v. South Cent. Bell Tel. Co., 555 S.W.2d 629, 1977 Ky. App. LEXIS 799 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Since a metropolitan sewer district is a political subdivision and a separate entity acting for its own purposes and is not a department or agency of city, county or state government, the district retains its power of eminent domain for its statutory purposes and the power to condemn in its own name. OAG 76-307 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Treatises

Caldwell’s Kentucky Form Book, 5th Ed., Interlocutory Order and Judgment, Easement, Form 307.05.

Caldwell’s Kentucky Form Book, 5th Ed., Order Appointing Commissioners, Form 307.07.

Caldwell’s Kentucky Form Book, 5th Ed., Petition for Condemnation (Temporary and Permanent Easement), Form 307.01.

Caldwell’s Kentucky Form Book, 5th Ed., Practice Context for Condemnation (Eminent Domain), § 307.00.

76.120. Facilities of public service corporations, expense of reconstructing or replacing — Entering upon or damaging public way or place.

Where railroad tracks, street railroad tracks, gas or water pipes, telephone wires, telegraph wires, electric light or power lines, or conduits, for carrying telephone or telegraph or electric wires, or poles, or other structures of any public service corporation, extend in, along or across any part of the work authorized by KRS 76.010 to 76.210 , it shall be and become the duty of the person or corporation owning or using such tracks, pipes, wires, conduits, poles, or other structures, to make such changes in the same at the expense of the district as may be required during the construction of any improvement provided for in KRS 76.010 to 76.210 , and to construct or rebuild at the expense of the district its tracks, pipes, wires, conduits, poles, or other structures, over or along the work by KRS 76.010 to 76.210 authorized and constructed, and at its own expense to maintain the same after such work has been completed; provided, however, such changes of that part of such tracks, pipes, wires, conduits, poles or other structures as may be or extend in a public way, shall be made at the expense of the public service corporation owning or using the same only if necessary to afford the district reasonable use of such public way. Reasonable notice in writing of such necessary changes shall be given by the district to the parties concerned. The district may, after obtaining the written approval of the agency owning the right-of-way thereof, enter upon streets, highways, bridges, or public places, for the purpose of constructing any additions, betterments, or extensions of the facilities of the district. Whenever the district has entered upon and damaged any street, highway, bridge, or other public place, same shall be restored to its former condition at the expense of the district.

History. Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 104, § 10; 1962, ch. 156; 1964 ch. 33, § 49.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Public Way.

A drainage easement is not a “public way” within the meaning of this section since a public way is designed for the passage of people, not the flow of water or sewage. Jefferson County v. South Cent. Bell Tel. Co., 555 S.W.2d 629, 1977 Ky. App. LEXIS 799 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).

2. Expense of Relocation.

The portion of this section relieving the sewer district from the burden of relocation expenses if the facilities of a public service corporation are located within “a public way” is an extension of the rule which requires a public utility to relocate facilities in public streets at its own expense when changes are required by public necessity or convenience. Jefferson County v. South Cent. Bell Tel. Co., 555 S.W.2d 629, 1977 Ky. App. LEXIS 799 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).

This section was intended to amplify the rights and duties of a sewer district undertaking to exercise the power of eminent domain over the property rights of a public service corporation, but was not intended to apply to a situation in which the sewer district was not required to rely upon the power of eminent domain and, accordingly, where a sewer district had a prior drainage easement and did not exercise the power of eminent domain in order to expand a drainage facility, this section had no application and the district could not be held liable for costs incurred by a telephone company in relocating equipment which had been located on the easement. Jefferson County v. South Cent. Bell Tel. Co., 555 S.W.2d 629, 1977 Ky. App. LEXIS 799 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).

76.130. Deposit and paying out of moneys of district.

All moneys of the district, from whatever source derived, shall be paid to the secretary-treasurer. Such moneys shall be deposited in the name of the district by the secretary-treasurer, in one or more banks or trust companies, situated in the county in which said city is located, having a capital and surplus of not less than $500,000. The district may require that any or all such deposits be continuously secured by the pledge of direct obligations of the United States of America, having such value as may be satisfactory to the district. Such securities shall either be deposited with the secretary-treasurer or be held by a trustee or agent satisfactory to the district. In lieu of any such pledge of such securities, such funds may be secured by corporate surety bond or bonds, which shall be in form, sufficiency, and substance satisfactory to the district. All banks and trust companies are authorized to give such security for such deposits. The moneys in such accounts shall be paid out by the secretary-treasurer on warrants signed by the secretary-treasurer and countersigned by the chairman or vice chairman of the board, or signed and countersigned by such other person or persons as the board may from time to time designate by resolution.

History. Enact. Acts 1952, ch. 70, § 3.

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Conditions of bond of depository of public funds, KRS 62.060 .

76.140. No power to levy taxes.

The district shall not have power to levy ad valorem taxes upon any property for any purpose whatsoever.

History. Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 104, § 12.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

Charges for sewer service as provided for in KRS 76.090 do not constitute taxes and therefore the metropolitan sewer district law is not unconstitutional as authorizing double taxation. Veail v. Louisville & Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer Dist., 303 Ky. 248 , 197 S.W.2d 413, 1946 Ky. LEXIS 830 ( Ky. 1946 ).

2. Taxation as Legislative Function.

A metropolitan sewer district, as custodian of certain drainage facilities, can establish and impose charges for services rendered; however, it has no power to levy taxes, as taxation is a legislative function which if delegated to such a sewer district would violate Ky. Const., §§ 27 and 28. Long Run Baptist Asso. v. Louisville & Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer Dist., 775 S.W.2d 520, 1989 Ky. App. LEXIS 106 (Ky. Ct. App. 1989).

3. — Tax and Fee Distinguished.

A tax is universally defined as an enforced contribution to provide for the support of government, whereas a fee is a charge for a particular service. Long Run Baptist Asso. v. Louisville & Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer Dist., 775 S.W.2d 520, 1989 Ky. App. LEXIS 106 (Ky. Ct. App. 1989).

Since this chapter clearly gives a metropolitan sewer district express authority to impose a service charge to fund its comprehensive county-wide drainage system, and since this chapter has been held, by the Supreme Court, to be constitutional in all respects, a service charge imposed to fund a storm water drainage program was not considered to be a tax. Long Run Baptist Asso. v. Louisville & Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer Dist., 775 S.W.2d 520, 1989 Ky. App. LEXIS 106 (Ky. Ct. App. 1989).

76.150. District revenue bonds.

  1. Subsections (2) through (4) have no application to construction subdistrict bonds or obligations. All references to revenues, rates, rentals, charges, or collections in subsections (2) and (3) exclude those derived from or made on account of construction subdistricts. District facilities referred to in subsections (2) and (3) exclude construction subdistrict facilities.
  2. The district may, from time to time, issue its negotiable interest-bearing revenue bonds for any of its corporate purposes, and it may also, from time to time, issue its negotiable interest-bearing revenue bonds to refund any of its bonds at maturity or pursuant to redemption provisions, or at any time before maturity with the consent of the holders. All the bonds, including interest, are payable solely from and secured only by revenues of the district realized through the collection of rates, rentals, or other charges, imposed for use of the facilities of the district. The bonds shall be authorized by resolution of the board and shall bear the dates, mature at the times not exceeding forty (40) years from their respective dates, bear interest at the rate or rates or method of determining rates, payable at least annually, be in the denominations and form, either coupon or registered, carry the registration privileges, be executed in the manner, be payable in the medium of payment at the place, and be subject to the terms of redemption, with or without premium, as the resolutions provide; except that before the issuance of bonds for any project within the corporate limits of any city forming a district pursuant to KRS 76.010 , the issuance of bonds shall first be authorized by ordinance passed by the legislative body of the city and approved by the mayor of the city. The bonds shall be sold at public sale for the price as the board determines.
  3. Any resolution authorizing any bonds may contain provisions, which shall be a part of the contract with the holders of the bonds, as to:
    1. Pledging all or any part of the gross or net revenues of the district to secure the payment of the bonds and interest on the bonds;
    2. The amounts to be raised in each year by rates, rentals, and charges, and their use and disposition, and of any other revenues of the district;
    3. The setting aside of reserves or sinking funds and their regulation and disposition;
    4. Limitations on the right of the district to restrict and regulate the use of its facilities;
    5. Limitations on the purposes to which the proceeds of sale of any issue of bonds to be issued may be applied;
    6. Limitations on the issuance of additional bonds; and
    7. The procedure, if any, by which the term of any contract with bondholders may be amended or abrogated, the amount of bonds the holders of which must consent, and the manner in which the consent may be given.
  4. The bonds or other obligations of the district shall not constitute an obligation or indebtedness of the city or of the county and it shall be plainly stated on the face of each bond of the district that it has been issued under the provisions of KRS 76.010 to 76.210 , and that it does not constitute an indebtedness of the city or of the county. All bonds authorized may be issued without a vote of the voters and without any other proceedings or happenings of any other conditions or things than those proceedings, conditions and things which are specified and required by KRS 76.010 to 76.210 . The bonds shall be signed in the name of the district by the chairman or vice chairman of the board, attested by the signature of the secretary-treasurer, with corporate seal of the district attached.

History. Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 104, § 13; 1964, ch. 33, § 7; 1968, ch. 152, § 54; 1996, ch. 274, § 10, effective July 15, 1996; 2014, ch. 92, § 50, effective January 1, 2015.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

Metropolitan sewer district is a separate municipality, and any debt which it incurs must be paid solely out of the revenues of the district and its obligations do not constitute obligations of the city or county, therefore, the sewer district law does not violate Ky. Const., §§ 157, 158 or 159 by causing the debt limit of the city or county to be exceeded. Veail v. Louisville & Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer Dist., 303 Ky. 248 , 197 S.W.2d 413, 1946 Ky. LEXIS 830 ( Ky. 1946 ).

76.160. Enforcement of rights of bondholders — Trustee — Receiver.

  1. Subsections (2) and (3) have no application to construction subdistrict bonds or obligations. All references to revenues, rates, rentals, charges, or collections in subsections (2) and (3) exclude those derived from or made on account of construction subdistricts. District facilities referred to in subsections (2) and (3) exclude construction subdistrict facilities.
  2. In the event that the district shall default in the payment of principal of, or interest on, any of the bonds issued pursuant to KRS 76.010 to 76.210 after the said principal or interest shall become due, whether at maturity or upon call for redemption, and such default shall continue for a period of thirty (30) days, or in the event that the district shall fail or refuse to comply with the provisions of KRS 76.010 to 76.210 , or shall default in any agreement made with the holders of the bonds, the holders of twenty percent (20%) in aggregate principal amount of the bonds then outstanding, by instrument or instruments filed in the office of the county clerk of the county embracing the district and proved or acknowledged in the same manner as a deed to be recorded, may apply to a judge of the Circuit Court of the county, to appoint a trustee to represent all of the bondholders for the purposes herein provided. Upon such application such judge shall appoint a trustee and such trustee may, and upon written request of the holders of twenty percent (20%) in principal amount of the bonds of the district then outstanding shall, in his or its own name, (a) by mandamus or other suit, action or proceeding at law or in equity, enforce all rights of the bondholders, including but not limited to the right to require the district to collect rates, rentals, and other charges, adequate to carry out any agreement as to, or pledge of, the revenues of the district, and to require the district and its officers to carry out any other agreement with the bondholders and to perform its and their duties under KRS 76.010 to 76.210; (b) bring suit upon the bonds; (c) by action or suit in equity, require the district to account as if it were the trustee of an express trust for the bondholders; (d) by action or suit in equity, enjoin any acts or things which may be unlawful or in violation of the rights of bondholders; (e) declare all bonds due and payable, and if all defaults shall be made good then to annul such declarations and its consequences.
  3. Any such trustee, whether or not all bonds have been declared due and payable, shall be entitled as of right, upon application to the judge in the chancery branch, to the appointment of a receiver, who may enter upon and take possession of the facilities of the district, or any part or parts thereof, and operate and maintain the same, and collect and receive all rentals, rates, and other charges, and other revenues, of the district, thereafter arising therefrom, in the same manner as the district and its officers might do, and shall deposit all such moneys in a separate account and apply the same in such manner as such court shall direct. In any suit, action, or proceeding, by the trustee, the fees, counsel fees, and expenses of the trustee and of the receiver, if any, shall constitute disbursements taxable as costs. All costs and disbursements allowed by the court shall be a first charge on any revenue derived from the facilities of the district. Such trustee shall, in addition to the foregoing, have and possess all of the powers necessary or appropriate for the exercise of any functions specifically set forth herein or incident to the general representation of the bondholders in the enforcement and protection of their rights.

History. Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 104, § 14; 1964, ch. 33, § 8; 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 69.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

Power to appoint a receiver or trustee on behalf of bondholders in case of default of bonds by sewer district provided for in this section did not constitute an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the courts since courts have inherent power to appoint trustees and receivers in all cases of mismanagement, but in any event taxpayer could not question validity of such provision in advance of an attempt by a court to exercise the power. Veail v. Louisville & Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer Dist., 303 Ky. 248 , 197 S.W.2d 413, 1946 Ky. LEXIS 830 ( Ky. 1946 ).

76.170. Area included in district — Construction subdistrict excluded — Extension of boundaries.

  1. The initial unit of the district embraces the area that is coterminous with the boundaries of the city forming a district pursuant to KRS 76.010 . The district also embraces the district area as defined in KRS 76.005 . When territory which is part of a construction subdistrict is annexed to the city, that territory shall not become part of the district area during the existence of the construction subdistrict. When the existence of the construction subdistrict is wound up under KRS 76.271 , the territory therein shall become a part of the district area if it is then a part of the city or whenever it is annexed by the city. When a construction subdistrict consisting of territory outside the city is wound up, the board of the district shall incorporate the territory into the district area under conditions of KRS 76.271 . The district may also expand the district area by constructing and extending its initial sewer and drainage system and facilities beyond the corporate limits of the city and within the county in which the city is located whenever the district and the owners of real property to be served and located outside the limits of the city, by appropriate written instrument, agree as to apportionment of any and all costs of construction work, subsequent maintenance and operation appertaining thereto, and as to payments by the owners of the real property, of rates, rentals and charges for the services and facilities to be thus afforded and for that portion of the district’s capital costs, equitably allocable to the real property. Thereupon the real property served becomes a part of the district area. In a like manner and upon the same conditions, the district may construct and extend its sewer and drainage system and facilities so as to serve all or any part of any other city or other incorporated area located in the same county, pursuant to a written agreement between the district and the other city or incorporated area approved by their respective governing boards or bodies; provided, however, nothing in this subsection shall be construed as requiring the district to obtain the consent of any city with a population of less than three thousand (3,000) based upon the most recent federal decennial census located within a county containing a consolidated local government prior to constructing any sanitary or storm sewerage facilities within the limits of such a city, regardless of whether said facilities will serve the said city or not. All agreements referred to in this section shall be in appropriate form for recording and shall be filed of record with the county clerk as other instruments relating to transfer or creating a lien upon real estate. Any agreements entered into by the district pursuant to this section may provide that the district area shall include the real estate in such city or incorporated area, or part thereof, to be served pursuant to such agreement, and in such case when such instrument has been filed of record with the county clerk as aforesaid, the district area shall be thereby officially enlarged and extended to include same; except that the district area shall not be enlarged to include a construction subdistrict by agreement or otherwise.
  2. The district may also expand the district area by constructing and extending its initial sewer and drainage system, or by constructing or extending new sewerage and drainage systems and facilities, into areas of the county outside of the city of the first class and annexing the areas to be served by such new or expanded systems or facilities to the district area, as provided in KRS 76.171 .
  3. The words “incorporated area” as used in this section do not mean or apply to any sanitation district organized under KRS Chapter 220.
  4. The provisions of this section shall not apply in cases involving annexation by a city of the first class pursuant to KRS 81.300 to 81.360 .

History. Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 104, § 15; 1952, ch. 70, § 4; 1962, ch. 286, § 22; 1964, ch. 33, § 9; 1968, ch. 152, § 55; 1968, ch. 156, § 3; 2014, ch. 92, § 51, effective January 1, 2015.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Application.

Insofar as it concerns annexation by cities of the first class where a city-county sewer district has been created pursuant to KRS 76.010 to 76.220 (KRS 76.220 now repealed), KRS 220.010 to 220.540 must yield where there is a conflict. Sanitation Dist. of Jefferson County v. Louisville & Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer Dist., 307 Ky. 422 , 208 S.W.2d 751, 1948 Ky. LEXIS 616 ( Ky. 1948 ).

2. Contracts to Service Outside Area.

Where realty company contracted with metropolitan sewer district to provide sewer service to homes company had built which were within sanitation district and sewer district entered into supplementary contract with sanitation district providing that sanitation district be permitted to charge regular service fees even though home owners would also be charged sewer district’s fees, such contract was ultra vires for KRS 76.110 and this section expressly prohibits sewer district from making such contract and KRS 220.510 denies to sanitation district the power to make such contract since property owners were not using its sanitary works, and thus sanitation district could not collect sewer service fee from property owners. Stierle v. Sanitation Dist. of Jefferson County, 243 S.W.2d 678, 1951 Ky. LEXIS 1161 ( Ky. 1951 ).

3. Annexation.

In the event that a part of the territory comprising a sanitation district under KRS 220.010 to 220.540 is annexed by a city of the first class, which has created a city-county sewer district pursuant to KRS 76.010 to 76.220 (KRS 76.220 now repealed), neither the city nor the sewer district will assume the indebtedness of the sanitation district, but rather the indebtedness will continue to be a prior and extra charge on the sanitation district sewers and the property using them according to the terms of the bonds. Sanitation Dist. of Jefferson County v. Louisville & Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer Dist., 307 Ky. 422 , 208 S.W.2d 751, 1948 Ky. LEXIS 616 ( Ky. 1948 ).

Where area that had been a part of a sanitation district upon annexation became a part of the city, it became a part of the metropolitan sewer district subject only to the necessities of continued operation by the sanitation district of its system within the area to the extent and for the period necessary to retire its bonds chargeable against the property in the annexed area. Louisville & Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer Dist. v. Sanitation Dist., 353 S.W.2d 196, 1961 Ky. LEXIS 1 ( Ky. 1961 ).

4. Acquisition of Private Facilities.

Should a metropolitan sewer district elect to purchase a privately-operated collection system, the abutting lot owners would own no more and no less than previously, which is an easement, or easements, for the free use of the system; they acquired those rights when they purchased their lots, and they cannot be made to pay for them again. Louisville & Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer Dist. v. Douglass Hills Sanitation Facility, 592 S.W.2d 142, 1979 Ky. LEXIS 317 ( Ky. 1979 ).

So long as a private company’s disposal plant is operated in conformity with applicable orders and regulations of the various governmental agencies, including the board of health, having regulatory authority in the premises, and in a manner that is not inconsistent with public health and safety, a metropolitan sewer district cannot force the collection system to be diverted to its system without payment of the value of the disposal plant to its owner; furthermore in the event the district should acquire the company’s rights by purchase or condemnation no charge may be assessed against the lot owners for any portion of the cost representing the value of the collection system. Louisville & Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer Dist. v. Douglass Hills Sanitation Facility, 592 S.W.2d 142, 1979 Ky. LEXIS 317 ( Ky. 1979 ).

The statutes contain no provision authorizing a metropolitan sewer district unilaterally to discontinue the operation of a privately-operated sewage disposal facility or to force its patrons to cease using it; to the contrary, the terms under which property owners may be brought into the system must be reached by written agreement with them or, in the case of incorporated areas, with the respective municipalities in which the property is located, and only where the area has been annexed and does not yet have an adequate system may the owners be required to connect to the district’s system as it becomes available to them. Louisville & Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer Dist. v. Douglass Hills Sanitation Facility, 592 S.W.2d 142, 1979 Ky. LEXIS 317 ( Ky. 1979 ).

5. Use of Private Facilities.

The act of intercepting the sewage by the metropolitan sewer district by tapping into the main owned by a private sewer company did not constitute an unconstitutional taking of its property because this section prescribes metropolitan sewer district’s method of expansion. Calvert Invest., Inc. v. Louisville & Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer Dist., 847 F.2d 304, 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 6864 (6th Cir. Ky. 1988 ).

Cited:

Sanitation Dist. of Jefferson County v. Louisville, 308 Ky. 368 , 213 S.W.2d 995, 1948 Ky. LEXIS 879 ( Ky. 1948 ); Louisville & Jefferson County Metro. Sewer Dist. v. Simpson, 730 S.W.2d 939, 1987 Ky. LEXIS 211 ( Ky. 1987 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

The Louisville and Jefferson County metropolitan sewer district has no statutory authority, express or implied, to extend its sewer system operations, by contracting with residents or developers or by condemnation, to collect sewer rates or service charges, or to establish a construction subdistrict, beyond the Jefferson County boundaries. OAG 73-752 .

76.171. Construction of branch or lateral sewer lines in territory annexed to first-class city.

Where adequate sanitary sewers, combined sewers, drains, appurtenances, or property service connections have not been constructed in any territory annexed to a city of the first class since July 1, 1946, the city legislative body may, by ordinance, on recommendation of the board of the metropolitan sewer district, which includes such city, construct sanitary sewers, combined sewers, drains, appurtenances or property service connections within such territory, to connect with the city sewerage or drainage system, at the cost of the area benefited.

History. Enact. Acts 1952, ch. 69, § 1; 1960, ch. 200, § 2.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Scope of District’s Authority.

The statutes contain no provision authorizing a metropolitan sewer district unilaterally to discontinue the operation of a privately-operated sewage disposal facility or to force its patrons to cease using it; to the contrary, the terms under which property owners may be brought into the system must be reached by written agreement with them or, in the case of incorporated areas, with the respective municipalities in which the property is located, and only where the area has been annexed and does not yet have an adequate system may the owners be required to connect to the district’s system as it becomes available to them. Louisville & Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer Dist. v. Douglass Hills Sanitation Facility, 592 S.W.2d 142, 1979 Ky. LEXIS 317 ( Ky. 1979 ).

2. Delegation of Powers.

Ordinance enacted pursuant to this section and KRS 76.172 providing for installation of branch and lateral sewers was not invalid in respect to delegating right to sewer district to make contracts for construction and to issue apportionment warrants to property owners for payment therefor as both these acts were purely ministerial in their nature under the ordinance and it was permissible to authorize a proper agency to perform them. Krumpelman v. Louisville & Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer Dist., 314 S.W.2d 557, 1958 Ky. LEXIS 310 ( Ky. 1958 ).

3. Assessments.

Assessments for sewer construction are not taxes in the ordinary or strict sense of the term, but are burdens laid on property made for a public purpose in a fixed amount once and for all time with reference to the special benefit which such property derives from the cost of the project, however, broadly speaking they are a part of the system of taxation. Krumpelman v. Louisville & Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer Dist., 314 S.W.2d 557, 1958 Ky. LEXIS 310 ( Ky. 1958 ).

Ordinance providing for installation of branch and lateral sewers whereby property owners were required to pay cost for connection of sewer with their lots was not unconstitutional under Ky. Const., § 171 since it had no application to assessments for public improvements which confer local benefits. Krumpelman v. Louisville & Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer Dist., 314 S.W.2d 557, 1958 Ky. LEXIS 310 ( Ky. 1958 ).

Where branch and lateral sewers were constructed according to ordinance enacted pursuant to this section and KRS 76.172 , property that could not be served directly, although it was within the quarter block where sewer laterals were to be laid, was not subject to assessment to any extent in apportionment of the cost of such sewer construction. Krumpelman v. Louisville & Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer Dist., 314 S.W.2d 557, 1958 Ky. LEXIS 310 ( Ky. 1958 ).

4. — Installment Payments.

Ordinance enacted pursuant to this section and KRS 76.172 for the construction of branch and lateral sewers was valid in providing that cost of such construction be assessed against property owner without any provision therein for payment in annual installments. Krumpelman v. Louisville & Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer Dist., 314 S.W.2d 557, 1958 Ky. LEXIS 310 ( Ky. 1958 ).

The omission from this section and KRS 76.172 of a recital granting the right to pay the assessment in instalments did not invalidate them. Krumpelman v. Louisville & Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer Dist., 314 S.W.2d 557, 1958 Ky. LEXIS 310 ( Ky. 1958 ).

5. Priority of Liens.

Lien created by ordinance that provided for installation of branch and lateral sewers subsequent to execution of mortgages took priority over such mortgages even though both mortgages were executed and recorded prior to issuance and registering of apportionment warrants as required by this section as issuance of warrants is purely a ministerial act and does not have any effect on lien’s priority and requirement of registering applies only to good faith purchaser who has bought subsequent to enactment of ordinance, completion of work and issuance of warrants. Krumpelman v. Louisville & Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer Dist., 314 S.W.2d 557, 1958 Ky. LEXIS 310 ( Ky. 1958 ).

Lien provided for in this section to sewer district for the construction of lateral sewers and service connections were superior to and took priority over mortgages against two parcels of improved land situated in area where sewers were to be constructed even though mortgage on one parcel was executed and recorded May 2, 1952 and section did not go into effect until June 19, 1952. Krumpelman v. Louisville & Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer Dist., 314 S.W.2d 557, 1958 Ky. LEXIS 310 ( Ky. 1958 ).

76.172. Apportionment of construction costs — Liens — Apportionment warrants — Notice.

  1. The ordinance providing for the construction of sewerage or drainage facilities and appurtenances shall describe the nature and kind of facilities to be furnished and shall describe the particular area benefited by said sewerage or drainage facilities.
  2. The costs of the sanitary sewers, combined sewers, drains, and appurtenances shall be assessed against the land in said benefited area according to the number of square feet in any lot or tract within the area described in the ordinance, or according to any other equitable basis. If the square foot method of assessment is used, the rate of apportionment shall be the same for each square foot of land in said benefited area, and shall be determined by dividing the cost of the assessable sanitary sewers, combined sewers, drains and appurtenances by the total area of all land benefited in the area. No property which has been assessed for collector lines shall be reassessed for the installation or reinstallation of collector lines.
  3. The costs of property service connections from the sewer to the property line or easement line as required shall be assessed against the individual lots or tracts to which such property service connections are furnished. The costs to be assessed for the property service connections shall be fixed by regulation of the metropolitan sewer district based on its experience of costs for such work.
  4. All land included in said described territory shall be assessed, except such property dedicated to use for public roadways and property owned by cities forming a district pursuant to KRS 76.010 , counties containing cities forming a district pursuant to KRS 76.010 , and any joint agencies of such cities and counties.
  5. When the board of a metropolitan sewer district determines that such construction of sanitary sewers, combined sewers, drains, appurtenances or property service connections at the cost of the property owners shall be recommended to the board of aldermen of a city of the first class, the metropolitan sewer district shall cause its engineering department to prepare complete drawings and specifications for the work and to keep same available for inspection in its offices.
    1. The actual construction work of the sanitary sewers, combined sewers, drains, appurtenances or property service connections constructed pursuant to such ordinance shall be done by, or under the control of, the metropolitan sewer district. (6) (a) The actual construction work of the sanitary sewers, combined sewers, drains, appurtenances or property service connections constructed pursuant to such ordinance shall be done by, or under the control of, the metropolitan sewer district.
    2. The cost of the sanitary sewers, combined sewers, drains, appurtenances or property service connections shall include not only the actual construction costs and the costs of any easements required for the sewers, but also costs of surveys, designs, plans, specifications, advertising, inspection and administration; however, these costs other than actual construction costs and costs of easements shall not exceed fifteen percent (15%) of the actual construction cost of the project. The costs of surveys, designs, plans, specifications, advertising, inspection and administration, but not exceeding a total of fifteen percent (15%) of the actual construction costs and the cost of any easements shall be paid by the contractor to the metropolitan sewer district at the completion of the work so that such costs may be included in the apportionment warrants.
  6. A lien superior to all liens except the liens for state, county, city, school and road taxes and liens prior in time for other public improvements shall exist against the respective lots or tracts of land for the cost of the sanitary sewers, combined sewers, drains, appurtenances or property service connections for apportionment as hereinafter provided for, and interest thereon at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum.
  7. No error in the proceedings of the city legislative body shall exempt such property from payment after the work has been done as required by either the ordinance or contract, but the city legislative body, or the courts in which suits shall be proceeding, shall make all corrections, rules and orders to do justice to all parties concerned. In no event, if the sanitary sewers, combined sewers, drains, appurtenances or property service connections are constructed as provided, by ordinance or contract, shall the city or the metropolitan sewer district be liable for the costs of the sanitary sewers, combined sewers, drains, appurtenances or property service connections without the right to enforce such costs against the property receiving the benefit.
  8. Upon completion and acceptance of the sewer facility constructed, the metropolitan sewer district shall make out all apportionment warrants for which liens are given for improvements of sewer facilities and shall immediately enter them in alphabetical order upon a register kept for that purpose. When the holder of the warrant has obtained payment, he shall notify the metropolitan sewer district and it shall mark upon the register the fact of payment.
  9. The lien shall exist from the date of the apportionment warrant, but a lien shall not be valid against a purchaser for a valuable consideration without notice, unless the apportionment warrant is entered and registered within ten (10) days of its issuance.
  10. After any sewer facilities have been constructed in conformity with this section the metropolitan sewer district shall give notice by publication pursuant to KRS Chapter 424 of the costs apportioned, and the amounts assessed and levied on the various tracts of land liable for the payment.
  11. When property is annexed to a city forming a district pursuant to KRS 76.010 and subsequently is connected to a sewer owned or operated by the metropolitan sewer district, payment shall be made to the district of a proportionate part of the construction costs of the sewer on the basis that would apply if the sewer were being built within the corporate limits of the city by apportionment of costs against the benefited area as provided in this section.
  12. The district may construct sewerage or drainage facilities in areas of the district located outside of the city of the first class by assessment, using the procedures set forth in this section, with the word “ordinance” being read as “resolution,” the words “board of aldermen” being read as “fiscal court,” the words “city legislative body” being read as “fiscal court,” and the word “city” being read as “county.”

History. Enact. Acts 1952, ch. 69, § 2; 1956, ch. 61; 1960, ch. 200, § 3; 1962, ch. 286, § 23; 1966, ch. 239, § 27; 1968, ch. 156, § 4; 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 13, § 26; 2014, ch. 92, § 52, effective January 1, 2015.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Delegation of Powers.

Ordinance enacted pursuant to KRS 76.171 and this section providing for installation of branch and lateral sewers was not invalid in respect to delegating right to sewer district to make contracts for construction and to issue apportionment warrants to property owners for payment therefor as both these acts were purely ministerial in their nature under the ordinance and it was permissible to authorize a proper agency to perform them. Krumpelman v. Louisville & Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer Dist., 314 S.W.2d 557, 1958 Ky. LEXIS 310 ( Ky. 1958 ).

2. Assessments.

Ordinance providing for installation of branch and lateral sewers whereby property owners were required to pay cost for connection of sewer with their lots was not unconstitutional under Ky. Const., § 171 since it had no application to assessments for public improvements which confer local benefits. Krumpelman v. Louisville & Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer Dist., 314 S.W.2d 557, 1958 Ky. LEXIS 310 ( Ky. 1958 ).

Assessments for sewer construction are not taxes in the ordinary or strict sense of the term, but are burdens laid on property made for a public purpose in a fixed amount once and for all time with reference to the special benefit which such property derives from the cost of the project, however, broadly speaking they are a part of the system of taxation. Krumpelman v. Louisville & Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer Dist., 314 S.W.2d 557, 1958 Ky. LEXIS 310 ( Ky. 1958 ).

Where branch and lateral sewers were constructed according to ordinance enacted pursuant to KRS 76.171 and this section, property that could not be served directly, although it was within the quarter block where sewer laterals were to be laid, was not subject to assessment to any extent in apportionment of the cost of such sewer construction. Krumpelman v. Louisville & Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer Dist., 314 S.W.2d 557, 1958 Ky. LEXIS 310 ( Ky. 1958 ).

3. — Installment Payments.

Ordinance enacted pursuant to KRS 76.171 and this section for the construction of branch and lateral sewers was valid in providing that cost of such construction be assessed against property owner without any provision therein for payment in annual installments. Krumpelman v. Louisville & Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer Dist., 314 S.W.2d 557, 1958 Ky. LEXIS 310 ( Ky. 1958 ).

The omission from KRS 76.171 and this section of a recital granting the right to pay the assessment in installments did not invalidate them. Krumpelman v. Louisville & Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer Dist., 314 S.W.2d 557, 1958 Ky. LEXIS 310 ( Ky. 1958 ).

4. Priority of Liens.

Lien created by ordinance that provided for installation of branch and lateral sewers subsequent to execution of mortgages took priority over such mortgages even though both mortgages were executed and recorded prior to issuance and registering of apportionment warrants as required by this section as issuance of warrants is purely a ministerial act and does not have any effect on lien’s priority and requirement of registering applies only to good faith purchaser who has bought subsequent to enactment of ordinance, completion of work and issuance of warrants. Krumpelman v. Louisville & Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer Dist., 314 S.W.2d 557, 1958 Ky. LEXIS 310 ( Ky. 1958 ).

Lien provided for in this section to sewer district for the construction of lateral sewers and service connections were superior to and took priority over mortgages against two parcels of improved land situated in area where sewers were to be constructed even though mortgage on one parcel was executed and recorded May 2, 1952 and section did not go into effect until June 19, 1952. Krumpelman v. Louisville & Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer Dist., 314 S.W.2d 557, 1958 Ky. LEXIS 310 ( Ky. 1958 ).

76.173. Completed sewers and drains to become part of city’s system.

When completed any sewers or drains described in KRS 76.171 or 76.172 shall become a part of the district area’s sewer and drainage system, subject to charges for service the same as from other parts of the system within the district area.

History. Enact. Acts 1952, ch. 69, § 3; 1964, ch. 33, § 10.

76.175. Annexation by district of unincorporated area or city with population of less than 3,000 located in county containing consolidated local government — Procedure — Appeals.

The board of the district may annex any unincorporated area in the county, or any area of the county containing all or any part of a city with a population of less than three thousand (3,000) based upon the most recent federal decennial census located within a county containing a consolidated local government, whether contiguous or noncontiguous, to the district by making a preliminary order describing the area to be annexed and causing said order to be published pursuant to KRS Chapter 424. The notice so published shall state that objections in writing to the proposed annexation may be filed with the district within thirty (30) days of the date of said notice. The district shall examine and hear all such complaints. It may modify or amend the areas proposed to be annexed; and it shall make a final order, within sixty (60) days of the date of publication of said notice, describing the area or areas to be annexed and shall cause the same to be published pursuant to KRS Chapter 424. Within sixty (60) days after final publication of an order made pursuant to this section, any freeholder of land within the area or areas proposed to be annexed may appeal such final order to the Circuit Court for the county in which the district is located. All matters appealed shall be tried as an equitable action. Decisions of the Circuit Court may be appealed to the Court of Appeals.

History. Enact. Acts 1968, ch. 156, § 5; 1976, ch. 62, § 79; 2014, ch. 92, § 53, effective January 1, 2015.

76.180. Rules and regulations — Sewers regulated — Citizens’ complaints — Appeals.

  1. The district shall have power to make and promulgate all rules and regulations proper or necessary to regulate the use, operation, and maintenance of property and facilities under its control, and to carry into effect the powers granted the district by KRS 76.010 to 76.295 . The jurisdiction of the district shall extend outside of the district area and outside of construction subdistricts for regulation of any sewers, drains, or watercourses, which by natural flow, or otherwise, empty into or flow through any part of the district area, a construction subdistrict, or the district facilities, or are used by the district or flow through or are constructed in the county in which the district exists.
  2. The board shall develop a procedure and designate an independent hearing officer for the hearing, review, and resolution of citizens’ complaints and grievances that concern:
    1. Prioritization of sewer and drainage service requests conducted by the district’s maintenance or operations departments;
    2. Billing grievances involving the accuracy of individual or residential bimonthly sewer and drainage bills, sewer assessments, and the district’s billing policies and procedures;
    3. Reimbursement for plumber’s bills;
    4. Inadequate property restoration by district’s crews or contractors; and
    5. Rude or inappropriate behavior by district employees.
  3. Any person or corporation, public or private, affected by the exercise of powers granted the district may appeal a decision of the district to the hearing officer provided for in subsection (2) of this section. Appeals shall be limited to the complaints and grievances outlined in subsection (2) of this section. The appeals shall be in writing and shall state:
    1. The circumstances of the district’s action;
    2. The reason the appellant is aggrieved;
    3. Any citations of regulations or statutes the appellant believes to be pertinent to the appeal; and
    4. Recommendations of convenient times to hold a hearing on the matter.
  4. The hearing officer shall conduct a hearing within ninety (90) days of receipt of an appeal, and shall inform each appellant in writing of the date, time, and location his appeal will be heard. The site for each hearing shall be chosen by the hearing officer to meet the needs of the aggrieved party or parties. Citizens shall be given the greatest possible latitude regarding the introduction of evidence at all hearings.
  5. The hearing officer shall make a decision on each appeal that is consistent with applicable law and the policy of the district. The decision shall be forwarded to the board in the form of a recommendation within thirty (30) days of the hearing. The board shall review the findings of the hearing officer and accept or reject the recommendation within thirty (30) days of receiving it.
  6. Copies of the board’s decision and the hearing officer’s recommendation shall be sent to the appellant and the members of the General Assembly who represent any area within the district’s jurisdiction within fifteen (15) days of the board’s decision.

History. Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 104, § 16; 1952, ch. 70, § 5; 1962, ch. 286, § 24; 1964, ch. 33, § 11; 1980, ch. 188, § 56, effective July 15, 1980; 1992, ch. 114, § 1, effective July 14, 1992.

76.190. Agreements with other cities or districts.

In order to promote and protect its activities and facilities, and in furtherance of the public health, the district may enter into contracts with, and thereunder it may permit other cities, towns, municipalities, sewer and drainage districts, located in the same county as the city forming a district pursuant to KRS 76.010 , to connect with and use the facilities of the district. The rates for service and connections shall be as agreed upon between the contracting parties.

History. Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 104, § 17; 1968, ch. 152, § 56; 2014, ch. 92, § 54, effective January 1, 2015.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Prior Contract.

Where there was a valid contract in force between city and contiguous incorporated town for sewer connections with the city system, subsequently created metropolitan sewer district which took over city sewer system was bound by the contract and could not impose higher rates than those fixed in the contract. Louisville & Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer Dist. v. Strathmoor Village, 307 Ky. 343 , 211 S.W.2d 127, 1948 Ky. LEXIS 739 ( Ky. 1948 ).

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Interlocal cooperation act, KRS 65.210 to 65.300 .

76.200. Federal or state aid.

The district is authorized to enter into negotiations with the federal government and the Commonwealth of Kentucky, or either of them, or the agencies of both or either, and apply and obtain from them or either or both of them, any and all grants-in-aid that may be available.

History. Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 104, § 18.

76.210. Tax exemptions.

It is hereby found and declared that the creation of the district and the carrying out of its corporate purposes is in all respects in the interest of the public health and is a public purpose; that the district is performing a governmental function in the exercise of the powers conferred upon it by KRS 76.010 to 76.210 and it shall be required to pay no taxes or assessments upon any property owned or acquired by it, under its jurisdiction, control, possession, or supervision, or upon its activities in the operation and maintenance of its facilities. Bonds issued by the district and income therefrom are exempt from taxation.

History. Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 104, § 19.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

Bonds issued by metropolitan sewer district and the income therefrom are free from ad valorem and income taxation since these bonds are like other revenue bonds issued by municipalities or the state agencies for construction of bridges and other public improvements and the exemption declared by this section is a constitutionally valid exemption. Rash v. Louisville & Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer Dist., 309 Ky. 442 , 217 S.W.2d 232, 1949 Ky. LEXIS 670 ( Ky. 1949 ).

2. Governmental Immunity.

Even though this section is entitled “tax exemptions” its application is not restricted to sewer district’s exemption from taxation for KRS 446.140 provides that section heads do not constitute any part of the law; therefore since the object of KRS 76.010 to 76.220 (KRS 76.220 now repealed) is for the preservation and promotion of the public health, where plaintiff was injured by act of employee of district, he cannot maintain action against the district, for his injury occurred as a result of act done by an agency of the state in the performance of a duty which it owes to the public, the execution of which was but the exercise of a power purely governmental. Fawbush v. Louisville & Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer Dist., 240 S.W.2d 622, 1951 Ky. LEXIS 1002 ( Ky. 1951 ).

76.220. When operation to begin under KRS 76.010 to 76.220. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 104, § 22) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 255, § 283.

76.230. Metropolitan sewer districts in counties containing second-class cities. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1952, ch. 38, § 1; 1964, ch. 33, § 44) was repealed by Acts 1968, ch. 152, § 168. For present law see KRS 76.010 .

Joint Sewer Agencies

76.231. Joint sewer agency established — Powers — Administration — Dissolution.

  1. As an alternative to establishing a metropolitan sewer district pursuant to KRS 76.010 , any city with a population equal to or greater than twenty thousand (20,000) but less than one hundred thousand (100,000) based upon the most recent federal decennial census, together with the county in which it is located, may jointly establish a sewer agency for the purpose of providing sewer and drainage facilities within the city and the county.
  2. A joint sewer agency shall be established upon the enactment of identical ordinances establishing and setting out the powers of the agency by both the legislative body of the city and the fiscal court of the county.
  3. All the powers granted a metropolitan sewer district in cities of the first class by KRS 76.010 to 76.279 may be granted by ordinance to the sewer agency except that these powers may be restricted or qualified in order to conform to the local needs of the county and the city.
  4. The legislative body of the city and the fiscal court of the county shall establish a schedule of rates, rentals and charges to be collected from all real property served by the facilities of the sewer agency in the manner provided by KRS 76.090 . If the city, county, and sewer agency find that local needs warrant, uniformity of rates for all residential property shall not be required for a period of no more than ten (10) years from the date the sewer agency is established under subsection (2) of this section. If for whatever reason the city and county cannot agree to amendments to a rate schedule, the current schedule shall remain in effect until such time as an agreement can be reached.
  5. For purposes of establishing a schedule of rates, rentals, and charges to be collected, the legislative body of the city and the fiscal court of the county may prescribe by joint ordinance for the creation of a rate adjustment board that shall be comprised of the members of both legislative bodies, sitting as a single body. Upon the creation of a rate adjustment board, a simple majority of the combined membership of the rate adjustment board shall be required to establish rates, rentals, and charges to be collected.
  6. The joint sewer agency shall be administered as a separate legal entity or by a jointly appointed administrator or joint board as set out in the establishing ordinances.
  7. The joint sewer agency may be dissolved only by a joint action of the legislative body of the city and the fiscal court of the county. The establishing ordinance may be amended in the same manner as originally enacted.
  8. The legislative body of any city with a population of less than twenty thousand (20,000) based upon the most recent federal decennial census may by ordinance elect to be within the jurisdiction of a joint sewer agency established pursuant to this section.
  9. The joint sewer agency may enter into agreements with another entity or entities to acquire by purchase or lease, any real or personal property, or any interest, right, easement, or privilege therein, outside of the agency’s jurisdictional boundaries, in connection with the acquisition, construction, operation, repair, or maintenance of any sewage, wastewater, or storm water facilities, notwithstanding any other provision of the Kentucky Revised Statutes restricting, qualifying, or limiting their authority to do so, except as set forth in KRS Chapter 278.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1984, ch. 30, § 1, effective July 13, 1984; 1998, ch. 195, § 1, effective July 15, 1998; 2002, ch. 319, § 1, effective April 11, 2002; 2014, ch. 92, § 55, effective January 1, 2015; 2018 ch. 196, § 7, effective July 14, 2018.

76.232. Establishment of joint sewer agency by city with population of less than 20,000 to less than 100,000 with county or sanitation district — Powers — Administration.

  1. A city with a population less than twenty thousand (20,000) based upon the most recent federal decennial census together with the county in which it is located or together with the sanitation district, or any city with a population equal to or greater than twenty thousand (20,000) but less than one hundred thousand (100,000) based upon the most recent federal decennial census together with the county in which it is located or together with the sanitation district, as an alternative to establishing a metropolitan sewer district under KRS 76.010 , may jointly establish a sewer agency for the purpose of providing sewer and drainage facilities within the city and the county or within the city and the sanitation district.
  2. In order to establish a joint sewer agency under this section, the legislative body of the city, the fiscal court of the county, or the governing body of the sanitation district may vote to merge any existing agency or sanitation district or any portion thereof into the jointly established sewer agency or into an existing city or county sewer agency. If the legislative body of the city, fiscal court of the county, or governing body of the sanitation district determines to merge an existing agency or sanitation district into the joint sewer agency, it shall determine a method to satisfy any legal obligations of the existing agency or sanitation district which might be affected.
  3. A joint sewer agency shall be established upon the enactment of identical agreements establishing and setting out the powers of the sewer agency by all parties establishing the joint sewer agency. Any agreement enacted by a city or county shall be by ordinance. Any agreement enacted by a sanitation district shall be done in the same manner as any other official actions taken by the sanitation district.
  4. All the powers granted a metropolitan sewer district and cities of the first class by KRS 76.010 to 76.279 may be granted by ordinance to the joint sewer agency except that such powers may be restricted or qualified in order to conform to the local needs of the county, city, and sanitation district.
  5. The joint sewer agency shall be administered as a separate legal entity or by a jointly appointed administrator, joint board, or one of the merging entities, as set out in the ordinance creating the joint sewer agency.
  6. The joint sewer agency may be dissolved only by adoption of an ordinance of the legislative body of the city and the fiscal court of the county. The ordinance creating the joint sewer agency shall be amended in the same manner as originally enacted.
  7. The legislative body of any city with a population of less than twenty thousand (20,000) based upon the most recent federal decennial census may by ordinance elect to be within the jurisdiction of a joint sewer agency established pursuant to this section.
  8. The joint sewer agency may enter into agreements with another entity or entities to acquire by purchase or lease, any real or personal property, or any interest, right, easement, or privilege therein, outside of the agency’s jurisdictional boundaries, in connection with the acquisition, construction, operation, repair, or maintenance of any sewage, wastewater, or storm water facilities, notwithstanding any other provision of the Kentucky Revised Statutes restricting, qualifying, or limiting their authority to do so, except as set forth in KRS Chapter 278.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1998, ch. 36, § 1, effective July 15, 1998; 2014, ch. 92, § 56, effective January 1, 2015; 2018 ch. 196, § 8, effective July 14, 2018.

76.233. Agency revenue bonds.

Any city with a population of less than one hundred thousand (100,000) based upon the most recent federal decennial census and the county in which it is located which have established a joint sewer agency pursuant to KRS 76.231 may authorize the issuance of revenue bonds pursuant to the procedure set out in KRS 76.150 and 76.160 .

History. Enact. Acts 1984, ch. 30, § 2, effective July 13, 1984; 1996, ch. 274, § 11, effective July 15, 1996; 1998, ch. 36, § 2, effective July 15, 1998; 2014, ch. 92, § 57, effective January 1, 2015.

76.234. Compliance with KRS 65A.010 to 65A.090.

The board shall comply with the provisions of KRS 65A.010 to 65A.090 .

History. Enact. Acts 2013, ch. 40, § 29, effective March 21, 2013.

Metropolitan Sewer Districts

76.240. Board of organized metropolitan sewer district may determine that surface drains are necessary — When — Designation of area. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 60, subsections (1), (2)) was repealed by Acts 1962, ch. 14.

Construction Subdistricts

76.241. Construction subdistrict established — Petition, procedure, judicial review — Waiver of notice and hearing.

  1. The district may establish a construction subdistrict when twenty-five percent (25%) or more of the freeholders of land sought to be included in the construction subdistrict file their petition with the district. The petition shall describe the territory intended to be included in the construction subdistrict and the sewer and drainage conditions and facilities existing in this territory. The territory of the construction subdistrict may be noncontiguous to other territory of the district. Tenants in common, joint tenants with or without right of survivorship, and tenants by the entireties shall be deemed one (1) freeholder or property owner.
  2. When the petition is filed with the district, said district shall give notice of the filing by publication pursuant to KRS Chapter 424. Within thirty (30) days after the publication, any resident or freeholder of the proposed construction subdistrict may file objections and the district shall set the case for hearing within thirty (30) days. If the district finds that the establishment of the construction subdistrict is reasonably necessary for the public health, convenience and comfort of the residents of the subdistrict, it shall make an order establishing the construction subdistrict and designating it by name and number.
  3. If the district finds that the construction subdistrict is not necessary, it may dismiss the petition. If the district finds that any part of the proposed territory will not be benefited, it may strike such part. If the district strikes a certain portion of the area, the signature of the freeholders of that portion shall not be counted in determining whether the necessary twenty-five percent (25%) have petitioned for the creation of the subdistrict. A copy of the order of the board establishing a construction subdistrict shall be published in accordance with KRS Chapter 424.
  4. An order of the district rejecting or dismissing the petition shall be deemed a final order of the district appealable to the Circuit Court under the procedure set forth in KRS 76.247 within sixty (60) days. Appeals to the Circuit Court from the order establishing a construction subdistrict or striking or refusing to strike any territory from a construction subdistrict shall be made only as provided in KRS 76.247 and only after following the procedures required in KRS 76.247.
  5. In the event the owner or owners of all property or properties proposed to be included within the territorial boundaries of a construction subdistrict shall tender to the district their written request or requests that the district proceed immediately with the creation of a construction subdistrict, and the construction and installation therein of sewer facilities as provided in KRS 76.241 to 76.273 , inclusive, and shall unqualifiedly waive all formalities and substantive rights contained in:
    1. KRS 76.241 , concerning the affording of notice as to creation of a construction subdistrict, the time for filing objections to the creation thereof, and the time for appealing from an order establishing a construction subdistrict;
    2. KRS 76.243 , concerning the affording of notice as to proposed assessments; and
    3. KRS 76.246 , concerning the holding of a public hearing, and permitting litigation following the making and publication of an order concerning the construction plan in general.
  6. The district may thereupon make and publish an order creating such construction subdistrict, and its order as provided in KRS 76.246(2), without further action being required, and may thereupon proceed to carry out said plan for improvements without further recourse to said identified statutory provisions and formalities; but in all such instances the written request or requests of the owner or owners of all properties proposed to be included within the territorial boundaries of such construction subdistrict shall be in recordable form and shall be recorded in the office of the county clerk of the county wherein the properties are situated, and said clerk is authorized to record such instruments as in the case of mortgages and may charge and receive fees therefor as in the case of mortgages. Each resolution of the district, by which an improvement is undertaken according to this section, shall contain a recitation of the receiving of written requests and waivers from the owners of all properties included within the territorial boundaries of the construction subdistrict. In the event the district proceeds pursuant to KRS Chapter 107, as authorized by KRS 76.251 , the lien for which provision is made in KRS 107.160 shall attach upon publication of the resolution (equivalent to the “third ordinance”) which authorizes issuance of improvement assessment bonds.

History. Enact. Acts 1964, ch. 33, § 12; 1966, ch. 75, § 1; 1978, ch. 384, § 198, effective June 17, 1978.

Research References and Practice Aids

Treatises

Caldwell’s Kentucky Form Book, 5th Ed., Petition to County Judge/Executive for Establishment of Sewer Construction District, Form 338.05.

76.242. Construction subdistrict not to include nonconsenting cities or districts.

The construction subdistrict shall not include the whole or any part of any incorporated city with a population equal to or greater than three thousand (3,000) based upon the most recent federal decennial census, or any sanitation district or sewer construction district, or that part of a water district in which the water district has exercised its power to establish sanitary sewerage facilities pursuant to KRS 74.407 to 74.415 , except with the consent of the legislative or managing board of such city or district. With such consent, the property owners of such city or district will be considered as freeholders of the construction subdistrict.

History. Enact. Acts 1964, ch. 33, § 13; 1968, ch. 156, § 6; 2008, ch. 6, § 15, effective July 15, 2008; 2014, ch. 92, § 58, effective January 1, 2015.

76.243. Engineering survey of construction subdistrict — Assessment of benefits — Notice.

  1. The board shall, before entering upon any construction work in any construction subdistrict or any contracts therefor, have an engineering survey made of the territory within the construction subdistrict and report to the district board as to plans for sewer or drainage construction or both and as to the estimated cost thereof, with recommendations as to whether or not such construction is technically and economically feasible.
  2. The district shall add to the engineering report a classification of benefit to property to permit assessment of real estate pursuant to KRS 76.251 , 76.253 , 76.257 and 76.258 if the district seeks to finance construction under one (1) of those sections. The district shall cause notice of the proposed assessment to be mailed by first class mail to every affected freeholder at his last known address prior to publication under subsection (1) of KRS 76.246 .

History. Enact. Acts 1964, ch. 33, § 14.

76.244. Engineering report, when filed — Construction subdistrict may be abolished, when.

  1. The report described in KRS 76.243 shall be made and filed within one (1) year of an order made under KRS 76.241 which establishes the construction subdistrict or the order made under KRS 76.241 shall be deemed to have been one dismissing the petition and it shall be deemed to have been dismissed at the end of the one (1) year period.
  2. If, based on the report described in KRS 76.243 , the board decides the proposed sewer or drainage construction, or both, is not technically and economically feasible, the board may make an order abolishing the construction subdistrict, which shall be published pursuant to KRS Chapter 424 and which may be appealed in the manner described in KRS 76.247 . If the board finds that such construction may be made feasible by deleting portions of the subdistrict area, it may delete such area or areas by amending the order made under KRS 76.241 (2); provided, however, that at least twenty-five percent (25%) of the freeholders of land included in the remaining area must have petitioned for the creation of the subdistrict.
  3. If the board should determine that a proposed construction subdistrict sewer or drainage construction project, once found to be feasible, should no longer appear to be feasible, or should a change in circumstances make it appear that some alternative to a construction subdistrict represents a more desirable and feasible way of undertaking such sewer or drainage construction, then the board, in its sole discretion, may make an order abolishing the construction subdistrict, which order shall be published pursuant to KRS Chapter 424 and which may be appealed in the manner described in KRS 76.247 . In referring to KRS 76.247 , this section is not intended to provide for de novo trial.

History. Enact. Acts 1964, ch. 33, § 15; 1968, ch. 156, § 7.

76.245. Action taken by board on proposed improvement to be submitted to city legislative body or fiscal court for approval, disapproval or reference back. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 60, subsections (3) to (5)) was repealed by Acts 1962, ch. 14.

76.246. Notice of hearing, publication — Order of construction and assessment.

  1. When the report described in KRS 76.243 is prepared, a copy shall be filed with the secretary-treasurer of the district who shall, within forty (40) days, cause notice of the filing of same and a notice of where the report is available for public inspection to be published pursuant to KRS Chapter 424. The notices shall state the time, date and place for a public hearing on the report. Any affected property owner may appear at the hearing. The district may appoint a hearing officer to conduct hearings, take testimony, and report the hearing to the district board.
  2. Following the hearing the district shall make and publish an order describing the construction plan in general, setting forth the assessment method adopted, if any, the parcels assessed, provisions if any for application of KRS 107.140 (d), which relates to doing equity with respect to persons paying immediately and those who may be assessed later for extensions, and any other matters the district may see fit to include in the order.

History. Enact. Acts 1964, ch. 33, § 16.

76.247. Appeal from order of establishment or assessment — Procedure.

Within sixty (60) days after the final publication of an order made under KRS 76.241 which dismisses a petition for creation of a construction subdistrict or within sixty (60) days after final publication of an order made under KRS 76.246 any person who would have been qualified to sign a petition described in KRS 76.241 may appeal such order of the district to the Circuit Court for the county in which the district is located. All matters appealed from shall be tried de novo and as an equitable action. Decisions of the Circuit Court may be appealed to the Court of Appeals.

History. Enact. Acts 1964, ch. 33, § 17; 1976, ch. 62, § 80.

76.248. District may construct or contract for construction — No debts incurred until assessment final.

The district may carry out the plan itself or contract with others for construction of the sewerage facilities. The district shall incur no debts or obligations, aside from engineering study and administrative costs, on account of the construction subdistrict until an order made under KRS 76.246 is final and no longer appealable.

History. Enact. Acts 1964, ch. 33, § 18.

76.249. Combined methods of financing.

The district may adopt any combination of the financing methods for construction subdistricts authorized by KRS 76.251 , 76.253 , 76.254 , 76.257 , 76.258 and 76.259 which are fair and equitable to the residents and freeholders of the construction subdistrict and which protect and preserve the rights of holders of subdistrict bonds and obligations already issued or to be issued with respect to the construction subdistrict. The method or methods adopted need not be uniform for all portions of the construction subdistrict, but may be based upon reasonable classification of the realty in the various portions.

History. Enact. Acts 1964, ch. 33, § 19.

76.250. Cost of improvement — What to include. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 60, subsection (6)) was repealed by Acts 1962, ch. 14.

76.251. Assessment of costs — Lien — Payment — Effect of nonpayment.

For facilities designed to serve the construction subdistrict the district may, pursuant to KRS 76.243 , adopt a method of assessment of benefited property on the basis of acreage or any other equitable basis set forth in the order and notify property owner affected in accordance with subsection (11) of KRS 76.172 . From that date the assessment shall constitute a lien against the property. The landowner may pay the assessment in full at any time within thirty (30) days after notice of assessment; provided, however, that if assessments are levied in accordance with KRS 107.010 to 107.220 the assessment cannot be paid in full within thirty (30) days. Every property owner not paying the full amount of his assessment within thirty (30) days shall be presumed to have consented to the issuing of sewer or drainage construction bonds. Liens may be recorded in any manner that any other statutory lien can be recorded.

History. Enact. Acts 1964, ch. 33, § 20.

76.252. Priority of construction subdistrict assessment liens — Enforcement.

  1. Assessment liens imposed by KRS 76.005 to 76.295 are prior to all other liens except liens for taxes and other assessment liens already attached.
  2. Assessment liens may be enforced pursuant to KRS 426.005 and 426.006 .

History. Enact. Acts 1964, ch. 33, § 47; 1980, ch. 188, § 57, effective July 15, 1980.

76.253. Bonds if assessments not paid — Terms — Payment of assessments in installments.

  1. If all construction subdistrict assessments are not paid in full by thirty (30) days after notice of assessments, the district may issue bonds for the amount of the unpaid assessment, and shall give notice that it proposes to issue bonds, giving the amount of bonds to be issued, and the time they will become payable.
  2. At the expiration of thirty (30) days after the publication, the district may divide the unpaid assessments into not more than forty (40) annual installments, which shall draw interest at the rate or rates or method of determining rates as the district determines, and be payable at least annually, from thirty (30) days after the date of publication. The bonds shall mature in series to correspond with the installments into which the unpaid assessments are divided, and shall draw interest at the rate or rates or method of determining rates determined by the district, be payable at least annually, and be payable at some place to be designated by the district. The bonds shall be for the exclusive use and benefit of the construction and shall designate on the face the name of the construction subdistrict and the purpose for which they were issued.
  3. The district, in dividing the unpaid assessments into installments, shall fix the time of payment, and each landowner shall pay the installments due on his land, with interest due on that installment and deferred installments, to the district on or before the time fixed by the district for the maturity of the installment.
  4. For purposes of KRS 76.263 , assessments described in this section shall be deemed rates, rentals, or charges. Assessments may also be enforced by civil action.
  5. Bonds issued pursuant to this section are construction subdistrict bonds and obligations and are not obligations of the district.

History. Enact. Acts 1964, ch. 33, § 21; 1996, ch. 274, § 12, effective July 15, 1996.

76.254. Revenue bonds of construction subdistrict — Procedure — Contents.

  1. The district is authorized and empowered to issue negotiable, interest-bearing, construction subdistrict bonds which shall not be an obligation of the district; construction subdistrict revenue bonds shall be secured solely by the revenue pledged by KRS 76.262 and by moneys, if any, in the construction subdistrict reserve fund authorized by KRS 76.262 . Construction subdistrict bonds can be issued to obtain funds for the building, installation, or acquisition of construction subdistrict facilities or for refunding construction subdistrict bonds of the same construction subdistrict. Notwithstanding the foregoing two sentences, construction subdistrict bonds can be served by assessments.
  2. Construction subdistrict bonds shall be authorized by resolution of the board, shall bear a date or dates, shall mature at a time or times, not exceeding forty (40) years from their respective dates, bear interest at a rate or rates or method of determining rates, payable at least annually, be in a form, wholly registered, registered as to principal with bearer coupon, or bearer with coupon, carry registration privileges, be executed in a manner, be payable in a manner, be payable in a medium of payment at a place or places, and be subject to the terms of redemption, with or without premium, as the resolution or resolutions may require. Construction subdistrict bonds shall be sold at public sale for the price or prices as the board determines.
  3. Any resolution or resolutions authorizing any bonds pursuant to this section may contain provisions, which shall be a part of the contract with the holders of the bonds, concerning
    1. A pledge of or a security interest in the revenue derived from the construction subdistrict;
    2. The amounts to be raised in each year by rates, rentals, and charges, and their use and disposition;
    3. The setting aside of reserves or sinking funds and their regulation and disposition;
    4. Limitations on the right of the district to restrict and regulate the use of the subdistrict facilities;
    5. Limitations on the purposes to which the proceeds of sale of any issue of bonds to be issued with respect to the same construction subdistrict may be applied;
    6. Limitations on the issuance of additional bonds for the same construction subdistrict; and
    7. The procedure, if any, by which the term of any contract with bondholders may be amended or be abrogated, the amount of the bonds the holders of which must give consent, and the manner in which the consent may be given.
  4. Construction subdistrict bonds shall not constitute an obligation or indebtedness of the district or of any city or county, and it shall be stated plainly on the face of each construction subdistrict bond that it has been issued under the provisions of KRS 76.005 to 76.295 and that it does not constitute an obligation or indebtedness of the district or any city or county. All construction subdistrict bonds issued may be issued without any other proceedings or happenings of any other condition or things than those proceedings, conditions, and things which are specified and required by KRS 76.005 to 76.295 . Construction subdistrict bonds shall be signed in the name of the district by the chairman or vice chairman of the board, attested by the signature of the secretary-treasurer, with corporate seal of the district attached. The bonds may also be executed pursuant to KRS 61.390 .

History. Enact. Acts 1964, ch. 33, § 22; 1970, ch. 92, § 18; 1980, ch. 188, § 58, effective July 15, 1980; 1996, ch. 274, § 13, effective July 15, 1996.

76.255. Notice of proposed improvement to be given — Time for filing objections — Hearings — Notice of final decision — Appeal. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 60, subsections (7), (8)) was repealed by Acts 1962, ch. 14.

76.256. Refunding of bonds secured by assessments.

If bonds have been issued for any construction subdistrict secured entirely or partially by the right to levy an assessment as provided by KRS 76.251 to 76.257 , 76.261 to 76.267 and 76.271 to 76.273 and such bonds are redeemed prior to maturity, bonds to refund same may be issued secured solely by the revenue of said system in the manner provided in KRS 76.254 .

History. Enact. Acts 1964, ch. 33, § 23.

76.257. Financing may be arranged as in cities, terms in KRS Chapter 107 defined.

  1. In the financing of a construction subdistrict the district may use the authority and procedures granted to incorporated municipalities by KRS 107.010 to 107.220 . When applied to construction subdistricts, terms used in KRS 107.010 to 107.220 shall be construed to mean the following: “city” means “metropolitan sewer district”; “ordinance” means “resolution”; “clerk” means “secretary-treasurer of district”; “governing body” means “metropolitan sewer district board”; and “mayor or chairman of board of directors” means “chairman of metropolitan sewer district board.” Bonds issued pursuant to this section are construction subdistrict bonds and obligations secured by assessments.
  2. The provisions of subsection (1), permitting financing subdistrict construction under the provisions of KRS 107.010 to 107.220 , shall not repeal or reduce any existing rights or duties of the district, but shall constitute an additional method of financing.

History. Enact. Acts 1964, ch. 33, §§ 31, 32.

76.258. Financing by apportionment warrants.

After the creation of a construction district under the provisions of KRS 76.241 to 76.246 , the board may, if the board deem it feasible, instead of issuing bonds as provided in KRS 76.253 , issue apportionment warrants, using the procedures after assessment set out in KRS 184.150 to 184.250 , “road district” being read as “metropolitan sewer district,” “board of directors” being read as “metropolitan sewer district board” and the reference to roads being read as reference to sewers and drains including treatment plants.

History. Enact. Acts 1964, ch. 33, § 36.

76.259. Financing methods temporarily inadequate, procedure — Contracts.

  1. If the district finds as a fact that the methods of financing sewer facilities within a construction subdistrict provided for in KRS 76.005 to 76.295 will be inadequate, uneconomic, or unduly burdensome to the residents to be initially served, the district may contract with one or more persons to construct or cause to be constructed a sewer system within the construction subdistrict or to advance or loan money to the district for the construction of a sewer system within the construction subdistrict. The sewer system constructed must either be conveyed to the district, acting for the construction subdistrict, and be a subdistrict facility, or provisions for the eventual conveyance of the system to the district, acting for the subdistrict, must be included in the contract. When the district finds that one or more financing methods for construction subdistricts established by KRS 76.005 to 76.295 , excluding this section, have become feasible, the district may adopt such method or methods to raise the money to pay for the construction of sewer facilities within the construction subdistrict or to pay the loan.
  2. The contract may be made prior to the making of an order establishing the construction subdistrict. The contract may require that one (1) or more persons agree to buy construction subdistrict bonds to be issued pursuant to KRS 76.254 in an amount specified, which shall be sufficient to finance the construction of the sewer system. The maximum price and yield of the bonds shall be stated in the contract. Such contract shall not prevent the district from selling the bonds to a lower bidder.
  3. All contracts made pursuant to this section shall be in writing and shall contain a covenant that this section shall prevail over any contrary feature of the contract.
  4. The General Assembly declares that the public policy of the Commonwealth will not be offended merely because a contract or loan made pursuant to this section is privately negotiated or because it is made without competitive bidding.
  5. Bonds sold to one (1) or more contracting parties pursuant to subsection (2) shall be indorsed to disclose the nature of the sale. Such bonds, no matter who the holder or owner, shall never be eligible to have any payment made on their account pursuant to subsection (6) of KRS 76.262 .

History. Enact. Acts 1964, ch. 33, § 37; 1968, ch. 156, § 8; 1980, ch. 188, § 59, effective July 15, 1980.

76.260. Classification of land in designated area — Benefit rolls — Notice to be published — Objections — Hearings. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 60, subsections (9), (10)) was repealed by Acts 1962, ch. 14.

76.261. Default on revenue bonds — Trustee appointed — Actions by trustee, receiver, powers.

  1. The holders in aggregate principal amount of twenty percent (20%) of any class of construction subdistrict bonds authorized by KRS 76.254 may ex parte move a judge of the Circuit Court of the county containing the construction subdistrict to appoint a trustee to represent all of the holders of the same class of bonds when the facts described in paragraph (b) of subsection (2) have occurred.
  2. The judge shall appoint a trustee (which may be corporate) upon a showing that:
    1. Movants in fact are holders of twenty percent (20%) or more of the aggregate principal amount of the affected class of the bonds;
    2. Movants claim that there has been a default exceeding thirty (30) days in the payment of interest or principal on the bonds, that the district has failed to comply with the provisions of KRS 76.005 to 76.295 relating to construction subdistrict bonds, or that the district has breached a contract with the holders of the bonds; and
    3. Movants have filed in the office of the county clerk of the county containing the district an instrument in the nature of a notice of action against the district which instrument states that movants have applied to have a trustee appointed pursuant to this section and which names the affected construction subdistrict.
  3. The trustee may, or upon written request of any twenty percent (20%) in aggregate principal amount of his bondholder beneficiaries shall, file an action in his name against the district; the action shall seek all remedies, including but not limited to mandamus, prohibition, judgment against a special fund or funds, injunction, and declaratory judgment, needed to preserve and enforce the rights of the bondholders. The action shall be filed in the Circuit Court of the county containing the district.
  4. The rights of bondholders include, but are not limited to, the right to:
    1. Require the district to collect from the construction subdistrict rates, rentals, and charges adequate to pay principal and interest on the bonds;
    2. Require the district to perform all lawful agreements with the bondholders;
    3. Require the district to account to the bondholders as if it were trustee of an express trust for their benefit;
    4. Have the district enjoined from doing any acts or things which may be unlawful or in violation of the rights of the bondholders;
    5. Have all bonds of the affected class declared due and payable.
  5. Any trustee, whether or not all bonds have been declared due and payable, shall be entitled as of right, upon application to the Circuit Court, to the appointment of a receiver, who may enter upon and take possession of the construction subdistrict facilities, or any part thereof, and operate and maintain the same, and collect and receive all rentals, rates, other charges, and revenues of the construction subdistrict payable after commencement of the receivership. The receiver shall deposit such moneys in a separate account and apply them as the court directs. In any suit, action, or proceeding, by the trustee, the fees, counsel fees, and expenses of the trustee and of the receiver, if any, shall constitute disbursements taxable as costs. All costs and disbursements allowed by the court shall be a first charge on any revenue derived from the construction subdistrict facilities. Such trustee shall, in addition to the foregoing, have and possess all the powers necessary or appropriate for the exercise of any functions specifically set forth herein or incident to the general representation of the bondholders in the enforcement and protection of their rights.

History. Enact. Acts 1964, ch. 33, § 25; 1978, ch. 384, § 199, effective June 17, 1978; 1980, ch. 188, § 60, effective July 15, 1980.

76.262. Rate schedule for construction subdistrict — Notice — Objections — Purposes — Subdistrict fund, uses.

  1. The district is authorized to establish a schedule of rates, rentals, and charges to be collected from all real property within a construction subdistrict served by construction subdistrict facilities. This schedule shall be in addition to the charge authorized by KRS 76.090 . This schedule shall be determined for each construction subdistrict on the basis of one (1) or more of the factors stated in subsection (1) of KRS 76.090 .
  2. Before final adoption of such a schedule the district shall give notice of it pursuant to KRS Chapter 424. The first notice shall be dated as of the date of the first publication; that notice shall state that the proposed or revised schedule of rates, rentals, and charges will remain open for inspection in the office of the district for thirty (30) days from the date in the notice, and that any person claiming to be aggrieved by the proposed schedule may file written objections to it with the district. The district shall examine and hear any and all such objections, may modify the proposed schedule, and shall adopt and establish a final schedule within sixty (60) days after the date of the first notice.
  3. Such schedule shall be established and revised from time to time so as to produce revenues for the construction subdistrict sufficient:
    1. For the payment of all construction subdistrict bonds and obligations except those payable from assessments;
    2. For the payment of all costs and expenses of operating and maintaining the construction subdistrict which expenses shall include, but not be limited to, an equitable portion of the wages, salaries, and fees of officers and employees of the district;
    3. For the payment to the district of an amount which represents an equitable allocation of the cost of district facilities used, directly or indirectly, by the construction subdistrict if there is such a use;
    4. To meet all or part of reasonably foreseeable future need for trunk, main, connecting sewers and any other facilities necessary to link the construction subdistrict facilities to the district facilities or, where such linkage is not feasible, to link the construction subdistrict facilities to and dispose of the sewage in a treatment plant serving at least one (1) other construction subdistrict;
    5. For the payment of an equitable portion, not to exceed twice the amount required by paragraph (b), of any amount necessary to establish and maintain a fund created by subsection (6) and
    6. For the payment of all cost of renewals and replacements of construction subdistrict facilities.
  4. Any and all portions of expenses, salaries, wages and fees necessary or incident to improvements for which bonds are issued may be paid from bond proceeds.
  5. The rates, rentals, and charges authorized by this section need not be the same for all real property within the construction subdistrict but may be based upon any reasonable classification.
  6. The district may create a fund for construction subdistrict purposes generally, which fund may be used from time to time at the discretion of the district’s board for the purpose of financing sewerage and drainage studies, paying engineering costs, and defraying, in whole or in part, the cost of the construction or acquisition of sewerage and drainage facilities for any existing or proposed construction subdistricts.

History. Enact. Acts 1964, ch. 33, § 24; 1966, ch. 75, § 2.

76.263. Cut-off of water supply of user in construction subdistrict.

The district is granted the same authority relative to the cutting off of the water supply of its delinquent users within a construction subdistrict as is contained in KRS 76.090 relative to other territory under the jurisdiction of the district. Delinquents include persons or users who have failed to make timely payment of any assessment authorized by KRS 76.005 to 76.295 or any payment required by KRS 76.262 .

History. Enact. Acts 1964, ch. 33, § 27; 1980, ch. 188, § 61, effective July 15, 1980.

76.264. Operating and maintenance costs of subdistrict system, how paid.

Sewer and drainage systems or both constructed by construction subdistricts shall be operated and maintained by the district and payment for the actual cost, including overhead and administrative costs, shall be paid by the districts from funds of the construction subdistricts. Where sewer system constructed by construction subdistricts are connected to the district facilities an equitable proportionate charge for treatment of sewage at the district sewage treatment plant or plants shall also be transferred from the accounts of the construction subdistrict to the district.

History. Enact. Acts 1964, ch. 33, § 38.

76.265. Notice of action taken adverse to objections made by parties — Appeals — Filing of classification rolls in office of county clerk. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 60, subsections (11), (12)) was repealed by Acts 1962, ch. 14.

76.266. Notice of cost — Objection — Hearing — Appeal. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1960, ch. 255, § 2) was repealed by Acts 1962, ch. 14.

76.267. Property of district, bonds and income therefrom exempt from tax.

The establishment, financing and operation of a construction subdistrict by the district are in all respects in the interest of public health and for a public purpose. In so doing the district performs a governmental function in the exercise of the powers conferred upon it, and it shall be required to pay no taxes or assessments upon any property owned or acquired by it, or upon its activities in the operation and maintenance of its subdistrict facilities. Construction subdistrict bonds and the income therefrom are exempt from taxation.

History. Enact. Acts 1964, ch. 33, § 30.

76.268. Annexation to subdistricts, procedure — Effect.

Annexation to subdistricts may be accomplished by any of the following procedures, as the board may elect:

    1. After the creation of a construction subdistrict under the provisions of KRS 76.241 to 76.246 , the board may, if it deems it advisable, use the authority and procedures granted to sanitation districts by KRS 220.535 to 220.537 to annex territory to a subdistrict, the words “board of directors” being read as “metropolitan sewer district board.” (1) (a) After the creation of a construction subdistrict under the provisions of KRS 76.241 to 76.246 , the board may, if it deems it advisable, use the authority and procedures granted to sanitation districts by KRS 220.535 to 220.537 to annex territory to a subdistrict, the words “board of directors” being read as “metropolitan sewer district board.”
    2. Language in KRS 220.535 limiting the powers of annexation to a sanitation district in a county not containing a city of the first class shall not be applicable to a metropolitan sewer district which might use this method of annexation to a construction subdistrict even if it is located in a county containing a city of the first class, and the secretary of the Energy and Environment Cabinet shall function in regard to annexation by it in the same manner and under the same procedures, as set out in KRS 220.535 to 220.537, as he would in his capacity as commissioner of sanitation districts for any sanitation district.
  1. After the creation of a construction subdistrict under the provisions of KRS 76.241 to 76.246 , the board may annex any area, contiguous or noncontiguous, subject to the limitations of KRS 76.242 , to the construction subdistrict by making a preliminary order describing the area to be annexed and causing said order to be published pursuant to KRS Chapter 424. The notice so published shall state that objections in writing to the proposed annexation may be filed with the district within thirty (30) days of the date of said notice. The district shall examine and hear all such complaints. It may modify or amend the areas proposed to be annexed; and it shall make a final order, within sixty (60) days of the date of publication of said notice, describing the areas to be annexed and shall cause the same to be published, pursuant to KRS Chapter 424. A freeholder of land within the area proposed to be annexed may appeal such final order in the manner described in KRS 76.247 . In referring to KRS 76.247 , this section is not intended to provide for de novo trial.
  2. In the event the owner or owners of all the property or properties proposed to be annexed to a construction subdistrict shall tender to the district their written request or requests that the district proceed immediately with the annexation of said property or properties, and shall unqualifiedly waive all formalities and substantive rights contained in subsection (2) of this section, the district may thereupon make and publish a final order annexing said property or properties to the construction subdistrict. Said order shall contain a recitation of the receiving of waivers from the owners of all properties to be annexed thereunder. Provided, however, that in all such instances the written request or requests of the owner or owners of all properties proposed to be annexed to a construction subdistrict shall be in recordable form and shall be recorded in the office of the county clerk of the county wherein the property is located; and said clerk is authorized to record such instruments as in the case of mortgages and may charge and receive fees therefor as in the case of mortgages.
  3. The provisions of subsections (1), (2), and (3) of this section shall not repeal or reduce any existing rights or duties of metropolitan sewer districts, but shall constitute merely a procedure for annexation to construction subdistricts by a metropolitan sewer district.

History. Enact. Acts 1964, ch. 33, §§ 33 to 35; 1968, ch. 156, § 9; 1974, ch. 74, Art. VI, § 107(1); 1978, ch. 384, § 200, effective June 17, 1978; 2010, ch. 24, § 70, effective July 15, 2010.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(9/19/95). The reference to “the Director of Sanitary Engineering of the Department of Health” in subsection (1)(b) of the original text of this statute (1964 Ky. Acts ch. 33, sec. 34) was mistakenly changed to “the director of sanitary engineering of the Department [now Cabinet] for Human Resources” on the basis of 1974 Ky. Acts ch. 74, Art. VI, sec. 107(11). However, the functions of this officer as they related to KRS 220.535 to 220.537 , cited in subsection (1)(b) of this statute, were transferred to the commissioner of environmental protection in the amendment of KRS 220.020 by 1972 (1st Extra. Sess.), Ky. Acts ch. 3, sec. 30; these functions now are held by the secretary of the Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Cabinet (1974 Ky. Acts, ch. 74, Art. III, sec. 13(2) & (9); 1982 Ky. Acts ch. 393, sec. 50(3)). Because of this, and pursuant to KRS 7.136(2), “the secretary of the Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Cabinet” has been substituted in subsection (1)(b) of this statute where “the Director of Sanitary Engineering of the Department of Health” originally appeared.

76.269. Other districts to become construction subdistricts when — Incorporated in district when.

A sanitation district organized under KRS 220.010 to 220.540 , a sewer construction district organized under KRS 76.300 to 76.420 , and a sewage system owned by any municipality, political subdivision, or any other entity, public or private, may be made a construction subdistrict or incorporated into the district area by the board under the conditions of this section.

  1. Any such district or system may be made a construction subdistrict only when:
    1. Express, written consent of all bondholders and secured creditors has been obtained;
    2. The governing body or owner of such district or system has consented in writing; and
    3. The board has determined that the policy of KRS 76.010 to 76.295 will best be served by making such district or system a construction subdistrict.
  2. When such district or system has been made a construction subdistrict under subsection (1), KRS 76.241 to 76.253 and KRS 76.257 to 76.259 shall not apply to it.
  3. Any such district or system may be incorporated by the board into the district area only when:
    1. All debts of the district or system have been paid or an amount of either money or securities lawful as investments under KRS 386.020 has been laid aside to pay them by the governing body or owner of such district or system;
    2. The governing body or owner of such district or system has consented in writing;
    3. Such district or system is not within a sanitation tax district organized under KRS 76.274 ; and
    4. The board has determined that the policy of KRS 76.010 to 76.210 will best be served by incorporating such district or system into the district area.

History. Enact. Acts 1964, ch. 33, § 46; 1980, ch. 188, § 62, effective July 15, 1980.

76.270. Apportionment of cost of assessment — Notice to property owners — Payment of assessment. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 60, subsections (13), (14)) was repealed by Acts 1962, ch. 14.

76.271. Winding up of construction subdistrict affairs, when, effect.

The district shall wind up the affairs of a construction subdistrict and incorporate it into the district area only when:

  1. The board finds that such action would best serve the policy of KRS 76.010 to 76.295 .
  2. There are not outstanding any bonds issued pursuant to subsection (2) of KRS 76.272 if the proceeds of such bond issue have been used, are being used, or will be used to construct trunk, main, or intercepting sewers which, directly or indirectly, connect the construction subdistrict to either the district facilities or to a treatment plant, disposal plant, or outlet sewer also serving, directly or indirectly, another construction subdistrict.
  3. The construction subdistrict is not within a sanitation tax district organized under KRS 76.274 .
  4. The construction subdistrict has no outstanding obligations.
  5. The construction subdistrict has paid for its equitably allocable share of the capital costs of, and is connected to, directly or indirectly either
    1. The district facilities, or
    2. A treatment plant, disposal plant, or outfall sewer and any trunk, main, or intercepting sewers built to connect at least two (2) construction subdistricts to such treatment or disposal plant, or outfall sewer.
  6. The provisions of this section shall not apply in cases involving annexation by a city of the first class pursuant to KRS 81.300 to 81.360 .

History. Enact. Acts 1964, ch. 33, § 29; 1980, ch. 188, § 63, effective July 15, 1980.

76.272. Bonds of several construction subdistricts — Purposes, effect.

  1. The district may issue for one or more construction subdistricts bonds to finance construction of trunk, main, connecting sewers and any other facilities necessary to which, directly or indirectly, connect one or more of such construction subdistricts to either the district facilities or to a treatment plant, disposal plant, or outfall sewer which also serves, directly or indirectly, at least one (1) other construction subdistrict. Such bonds may also be used to finance construction of a treatment plant, disposal plant, or outfall sewer of the type described in the preceding sentence.
  2. Bonds issued pursuant to subsection (1) shall be construction subdistrict obligations for all construction subdistricts for which they are issued.
  3. Except as provided in this section, bonds authorized by subsection (1) shall be governed by KRS 76.254 and 76.261 . Such bonds shall be construction subdistrict bonds within the meaning of paragraph (a) of subsection (3) of KRS 76.262 . They shall not be considered construction subdistrict bonds within the meaning of subsection (6) of KRS 76.262 .

History. Enact. Acts 1964, ch. 33, § 26.

76.273. Revenue bonds alternate method of financing.

The provisions of KRS 76.254 , 76.256 and 76.272 , providing for financing with revenue bonds, shall not repeal nor reduce any existing rights or duties of the district, but shall constitute an additional and alternate method of financing.

History. Enact. Acts 1964, ch. 33, § 28.

Sanitation Tax Districts

76.274. Sanitation tax district — Creation, powers — Area included.

In the interest of the public health and for the purpose of providing adequate sanitation and drainage facilities in each county containing a city of the first class, there may be created and established therein one or more sanitation tax districts, under the provisions of KRS 76.005 to 76.295 , having the powers, duties and functions prescribed in KRS 76.005 to 76.295 , and to be known by and under the name of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (name) sanitation tax district. Such a district under its name shall be a public body corporate and political subdivision, with power to adopt, use and alter at its pleasure a corporate seal, sue and be sued, contract and be contracted with, and in other ways to act as a natural person, within the purview of KRS 76.005 to 76.295. Such district may encompass any territory within the county except:

  1. Territory in the district area of a metropolitan sewer district,
  2. Sewered areas which are connected to the district facilities of a metropolitan sewer district, and
  3. Sewered areas which have paid a capital investment recovery fee, or are paying the same, to a metropolitan sewer district to reimburse the metropolitan sewer district for that portion of its capital expenditures equitably allocable to the sewered area.

History. Enact. Acts 1964, ch. 33, § 39; 1980, ch. 188, § 64, effective July 15, 1980.

76.275. Apportionment warrants — Delivery — Interest-bearing — Payment. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 60, subsection (15)) was repealed by Acts 1962, ch. 14.

76.276. Resolution filed with county clerk, contents.

Whenever by resolution of the fiscal court acting upon its own initiative or upon petition from the metropolitan sewer district, it is declared for the best interests of such county and the inhabitants thereof that such sanitation tax district or districts be created under the provisions of KRS 76.005 to 76.295 , the fiscal court of such county shall file a certified copy of such resolution with the county clerk. The resolution shall describe the territory included within the sanitation tax district.

History. Enact. Acts 1964, ch. 33, § 40; 1978, ch. 384, § 201, effective June 17, 1978; 1980, ch. 188, § 65, effective July 15, 1980.

76.277. Board of sanitation tax district — Members, appointment, tenure, removal, compensation — Officers, employees.

  1. The affairs of each sanitation tax district shall be conducted by a board composed of five (5) members, all of whom shall be appointed by the county judge/executive of the county subject to the approval of the fiscal court. Not more than three (3) members of the board shall be affiliated with the same political party.
  2. Each member shall be at least twenty-five (25) years of age and a resident of the county. No officer or employee of a city or county, whether holding a paid or unpaid position, shall be eligible for appointment as a member of the board.
  3. On the first day of the first month which starts more than thirty (30) days after the creation of a sanitation tax district, or as soon thereafter as may be practical, the county judge/executive, subject to the approval of the fiscal court, shall appoint one (1) member for a term of two (2) years, two (2) members for a term of three (3) years, and two (2) members for a term of four (4) years. The first year of each term shall end on the first day of July which occurs at least six (6) months after the creation of the sanitation tax district. Upon the expiration of each of the terms and thereafter, the term of each member shall be four (4) years, ending on July first. A member is eligible to succeed himself, and shall continue in office until his successor has been appointed and qualified. Vacancies in the membership shall be filled for the unexpired portion of the term by the county judge/executive, subject to the approval of the fiscal court.
  4. Any member of the board may be removed for cause, after hearing by the county judge/executive, and after at least ten (10) days’ notice in writing has been given to the member. The notice shall embrace the charges preferred against him. At the hearing he may be represented by counsel. The finding of the county judge/executive shall be final and removal results in vacancy in the office.
  5. Each member of the board shall be paid ten dollars ($10) for each meeting of the board attended by the member.
  6. The board in accordance with its bylaws shall elect from its members a chairman and a vice chairman. It may employ a secretary-treasurer and other officers and employees as it deems requisite for the performance of its duties. The board may require those officers and employees as it determines to execute faithful performance bonds, in sums as fixed by the board. The premiums for the bonds shall be paid by the district.

History. Enact. Acts 1964, ch. 33, § 41; 1996, ch. 136, § 2, effective July 15, 1996.

76.2775. Compliance with KRS 65A.010 to 65A.090.

The board shall comply with the provisions of KRS 65A.010 to 65A.090 .

History. Enact. Acts 2013, ch. 40, § 30, effective March 21, 2013.

76.278. Ad valorem tax levy — Notice — Protesting petition — Referendum — Collection.

  1. In order to establish a comprehensive sewage and sewage treatment system, or storm water and surface drainage system, or both, within the sanitation tax district, the sanitation tax district through its board may levy an ad valorem tax upon the real property in the district, not exceeding limits designated by the Constitution of the Commonwealth. Provided, however, that notice stating the amount of the proposed tax and the area to be affected be published in a newspaper of bona fide circulation as provided in KRS 424.130 . Provided, further, that no resolution of the board imposing an ad valorem tax shall go into effect until the expiration of thirty (30) days after the first publication of the notice. If during the thirty (30) days next following the first notice of said resolution, a petition signed by a number of constitutionally qualified voters equal to fifteen percent (15%) of the votes cast within the area affected at the last preceding general election, stating the residence of each signer, and verified as to signatures and residence by the affidavits of one (1) or more persons is presented to the county judge/executive protesting against passage of such resolution or if the fiscal court passes a resolution suspending the tax, the resolution shall be suspended from going into effect. The county judge/executive shall notify the board of the sanitation tax district of the receipt of the petition or of the suspension of the resolution or both. If the resolution is not repealed by the board, the board shall submit to the voters of the area to be taxed, at the next regularly-scheduled November election, the question as to whether the tax shall be levied. The question as it will appear on the ballot shall be filed with the county clerk not later than the second Tuesday in August preceding the regular election. The question shall be so framed that the voter may by his vote answer “for” or “against.” If a majority of the votes cast upon the question oppose its passage, the resolution shall not go into effect. If a majority of the votes cast upon the question favor its passage, the resolution shall go into effect as of January 1 of the year succeeding the year in which the election is held.
  2. When such tax levy has been fully approved, the property valuation administrator, with the cooperation of the board shall note on the tax rolls the taxpayers and valuation of the property subject to such tax. The county clerk shall compute the tax on the regular state and county tax bills in such manner as may be directed by regulation of the Department of Revenue.
  3. Such ad valorem taxes shall be collected by the sheriff in accordance with the general law and accounted for to the board. The sheriff shall be entitled to a fee of one percent (1%) of the amount collected.

History. Enact. Acts 1964, ch. 33, § 42; 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 20, § 6, effective January 2, 1978; 1978, ch. 384, § 202, effective June 17, 1978; 1996, ch. 195, § 39, effective July 15, 1996; 2005, ch. 85, § 99, effective June 20, 2005.

76.279. Lease of system constructed by metropolitan sewer district — Renewals — Revenue bonds of metropolitan district.

  1. In order to provide for the construction of a comprehensive sewage and sewage treatment system, or storm water and surface drainage system, or both, the sanitation tax district and a metropolitan sewer district may agree in writing that the latter shall construct the system and operate it in consideration that the sanitation tax district lease the system for a term of one (1) year, which term may be renewed. No such system shall include lateral sewers. It may include any other appliance or structure reasonably incident to such a system.
  2. The sanitation tax district shall have an exclusive option to renew for each year succeeding the original term, but the option shall not grant exclusive renewal options for more than forty (40) years. The method of exercising the exclusive option to renew the lease shall be any method permissible under law which does not have the effect of authorizing or permitting the sanitation tax district to become indebted to an amount exceeding, in any year, the income and revenue provided for such year within the meaning of Section 157 of the Constitution of Kentucky.
  3. A metropolitan sewer district is authorized to issue bonds secured solely by rentals payable under such a lease to finance construction of the system. Except as provided in the preceding sentence, all matters pertaining to such bonds shall be governed by KRS 76.254 and 76.261 .

History. Enact. Acts 1964, ch. 33, § 43.

76.280. District to maintain improvements — Assessments — Collection — Lien. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 60, subsections (16), (17)) was repealed by Acts 1962, ch. 14.

76.281. Certificate of noninterference by metropolitan sewer district required before petition for sewer construction district. [Renumbered as KRS 76.295.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1964, ch. 33, § 45) was renumbered by the reviser in 1978 as KRS 76.295 .

76.290. Additional improvements. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1960, ch. 255, § 6) was repealed by Acts 1962, ch. 14.

Sewer Construction Districts

76.295. Certificate of noninterference by metropolitan sewer district required before petition for sewer construction district.

In counties containing a metropolitan sewer district, the county judge/executive shall not accept for filing a petition tendered to it pursuant to KRS 76.300 to 76.305 unless the metropolitan sewer district has certified in a written instrument that the proposed sewer construction district will not interfere with the orderly operation and expansion of the metropolitan sewer district. The Circuit Court of any county containing a metropolitan sewer district shall have jurisdiction to compel by injunction the issuing of such a certificate if its issuance has been denied arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably.

History. Enact. Acts 1964, ch. 33, § 45; 1978, ch. 384, § 203, effective June 17, 1978.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section was formerly compiled as KRS 76.281 .

76.300. Petition for establishment of sewer construction district.

The county judge/executive of any county in which a metropolitan sewer district has been established, upon petition of twenty-five percent (25%) of the resident freeholders therein may establish a sewer construction district for the purpose of providing sewers and/or drainage facilities to serve the district. The petition shall describe the territory intended to be included in the district, and the sewer and drainage conditions and facilities existing in this territory.

History. Enact. Acts 1952, ch. 68, § 1, effective June 19, 1952; 1978, ch. 384, § 204, effective June 17, 1978.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

Mahon v. Buechel Sewer Constr. Dist. #1, 355 S.W.2d 683 ( Ky. 1962 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

In the absence of a specific statute authorizing sewer construction districts to establish rates to be charged, the establishment of such rates is within the jurisdiction of the Public Service Commission, provided that such districts are not subject to regulation by a metropolitan sewer district. OAG 75-327 .

The procedure for establishing sewer construction districts pursuant to KRS 76.300 and 76.305 is constitutional. OAG 75-476 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Treatises

Caldwell’s Kentucky Form Book, 5th Ed., Petition to County Judge/Executive for Establishment of Sewer Construction, District (KRS Ch. 76), Form 338.05.

Caldwell’s Kentucky Form Book, 5th Ed., Petition for Establishment of a Sewer Construction District (Long Form), Form 338.07.

76.305. Notice and proceedings for establishment of sewer construction district — Appeal.

  1. When the petition is filed the county clerk shall give notice of the filing by publication pursuant to KRS Chapter 424 and by posting notices in three (3) public places within the proposed district. Within thirty (30) days after the publication, any freeholder of the proposed district may file objections, and the county judge/executive shall set the case for hearing at the first rule day after expiration of said thirty (30) days. If the county judge/executive finds that the establishment of such district is reasonably necessary for the public health, convenience and comfort of the residents of the district, he shall make an order establishing the district and designating it by name and number.
  2. If the county judge/executive finds that the district is not necessary, he may dismiss the petition. If the county judge/executive finds that any part of the territory will not be benefited, he may strike such part.
  3. Any party may appeal to the Circuit Court from the order establishing a district or dismissing the petition or striking or refusing to strike any territory from the district. From a decision of the Circuit Court any party may appeal to the Court of Appeals.

History. Enact. Acts 1952, ch. 68, §§ 2, 4; 1966, ch. 239, § 28; 1980, ch. 188, § 66, effective July 15, 1980.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Public Place.

Where copies of the notice were posted at a United States post office and on two telephone poles located on private property and which were subject to removal at any time the requirement of this section, KRS 76.335 and 76.345 that notice be posted in three public places was met. Mahon v. Buechel Sewer Constr. Dist., 355 S.W.2d 683, 1962 Ky. LEXIS 82 ( Ky. 1962 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

The procedure for establishing sewer construction districts pursuant to KRS 76.300 and 76.305 is constitutional. OAG 75-476 .

76.310. City or metropolitan sewer district not included in sewer construction district without consent.

The district shall not include the whole or any part of any incorporated city or any metropolitan sewer district except with the consent of the legislative or managing board of the city or district. With such consent, the resident property owners of the city or district will be considered as individual freeholders within the sewer construction district.

History. Enact. Acts 1952, ch. 68, § 5; 1966, ch. 255, § 92.

Research References and Practice Aids

Treatises

Caldwell’s Kentucky Form Book, 5th Ed., Interlocutory Order and Judgment, Easement, Form 307.05.

76.315. Sewer construction district commissioners — Appointment, terms, removal — Officers.

  1. If the county judge/executive orders such district established, the county judge/executive shall, with the approval of the fiscal court, appoint three (3) commissioners, from among the residents of the sewer construction district. One (1) of the commissioners shall be appointed for a term of two (2) years, one (1) for a term of three (3) years and one (1) for a term of four (4) years from the date of first appointment. Upon expiration of the term of office of each of these commissioners, the county judge/executive shall, with the approval of the fiscal court, appoint a commissioner to succeed him, to serve for a term of four (4) years. The commissioners shall elect a chairman, a secretary and a treasurer.
  2. A commissioner may be removed from office as provided by KRS 65.007 .

History. Enact. Acts 1952, ch. 69, § 6, effective June 19, 1952; 1978, ch. 384, § 205, effective June 17, 1978; 1980, ch. 18, § 6, effective July 15, 1980.

76.320. Corporate powers of commission.

The commission thereby created shall be the governing body of the sewer construction district and shall be a body corporate, with power to contract and be contracted with, to sue and be sued and to adopt a corporate seal.

History. Enact. Acts 1952, ch. 69, § 7, effective June 19, 1952.

76.325. Powers of commission.

The powers of the commission shall be:

  1. To construct, operate and maintain a sewerage and/or drainage system and sewers and drains within the boundaries of the sewer construction district, or to contract with a metropolitan sewer district for such construction, operation and/or maintenance;
  2. To provide for disposition of the sewage and/or drainage, and for treatment of sewage, either through its own facilities or by contract with the metropolitan sewer district;
  3. To clean out, straighten, alter, deepen, fill up or otherwise improve any stream, watercourse receiving sewage, liquid wastes or drainage, located in or out of the district;
  4. To construct, operate and maintain trunk sewers, intercepting sewers, laterals, siphons, pumping stations, sewage treatment and disposal works necessary for the purposes of the district, through its own facilities or by contract with the metropolitan sewer district;
  5. To hold, control, acquire by purchase, donation or condemnation any real or personal property necessary for location, construction, operation or maintenance of its works and improvements and easements for rights of way;
  6. Upon completion of construction of any integral part of the sewer or drainage system, to contract for the operation and maintenance of its works and improvements or easements for rights of way;
  7. Upon completion of construction of any integral part of the sewer or drainage system, to contract for the operation and maintenance of, and extensions to, such part of the system, with the metropolitan sewer district on a service basis for the users, or, with the approval of the court, to have the territory in such part of the sewer construction district incorporated into the metropolitan sewer district for service as provided to other property within said metropolitan sewer district; and
  8. To enter into agreements with another entity or entities to acquire by purchase or lease, any real or personal property, or any interest, right, easement, or privilege therein, outside of the district’s jurisdictional boundaries, in connection with the acquisition, construction, operation, repair, or maintenance of any sewage, wastewater, or storm water facilities, notwithstanding any other provision of the Kentucky Revised Statutes restricting, qualifying, or limiting their authority to do so, except as set forth in KRS Chapter 278.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1952, ch. 69, § 8, effective June 19, 1952; 2018 ch. 196, § 9, effective July 14, 2018.

76.326. Compliance with KRS 65A.010 to 65A.090.

The board shall comply with the provisions of KRS 65A.010 to 65A.090 .

History. Enact. Acts 2013, ch. 40, § 31, effective March 21, 2013.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(3/21/2013). This statute refers to “the board,” although under KRS 76.315 the governing body of a sewer construction district is a commission. The context in which this statute was enacted suggests that a reference to such a commission, rather than to a board, was intended. The statute was created as part of a series of sections in a bill (Sections 29 to 31 of 2013 Ky. Acts ch. 40), each of which read, “The board shall comply with the provisions of Sections 1 to 9 of this Act.” In the other sections in this series, the phrase “the board” refers to the governing body of a special purpose governmental entity. It appears that a similar reference was intended to appear in this statute.

76.330. Commission to make survey and report to county judge/executive of economic feasibility of construction — Certification by metropolitan district.

The commission shall, before entering upon any construction work or any contracts therefor, make a survey of the territory within the district, and report to the county judge/executive as to plans for sewer and/or drainage construction and as to the estimated cost thereof, with recommendations as to whether or not such construction is economically feasible. With such report shall be submitted a report and certification from the metropolitan sewer district as to whether or not the project is feasible from a technical and economic standpoint.

History. Enact. Acts 1952, ch. 69, § 9, effective June 19, 1952; 1980, ch. 188, § 67, effective July 15, 1980.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

Epperson v. Briscoe Manor Sewer Constr. Dist., 420 S.W.2d 390, 1966 Ky. LEXIS 3 ( Ky. 1966 ).

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Annexation of territory, KRS 76.405 .

Eminent domain, KRS Chapter 416.

76.335. Notice and hearing of exceptions.

When the report is filed, the clerk shall, within five (5) days, cause notice of the filing of the report to be given by publication pursuant to KRS Chapter 424 and by notices posted in three (3) public places within the sewer construction district. The hearing shall be held not more than twenty (20) days from the first published notice. Property owners may file exceptions to said report at any time up to the day the proceeding is docketed. The county judge/executive may hear the proceeding on that day, unless further time be required.

History. Enact. Acts 1952, ch. 68, § 10; 1966, ch. 239, § 29; 1978, ch. 384, § 206, effective June 17, 1978.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Public Place.

Where copies of the notice were posted at a United States Post Office and on two telephone poles located on private property and which were subject to removal at any time the requirement of this section, KRS 76.305 and KRS 76.345 that notice be posted in three public places was met. Mahon v. Buechel Sewer Constr. Dist., 355 S.W.2d 683, 1962 Ky. LEXIS 82 ( Ky. 1962 ).

76.340. Classification and report of land affected or benefited by sewer construction and operation.

If a plan for construction of sewers and/or drains is approved by the county judge/executive, the commissioners shall then examine the real estate in the sewer construction district that may be affected or benefited by construction and operation of such sewers or drains included in such approved plans, and shall classify the land into such number of classes as the commission deems advisable, and shall report its classification and the ratio of benefits for each class, from such sewers or drains to be constructed. This report as to classification shall include a general description of the land in each class with the names of the owners.

History. Enact. Acts 1952, ch. 69, § 11, effective June 19, 1952; 1980, ch. 188, § 68, effective July 15, 1980.

76.345. Notice and hearing of exceptions to classification report.

When this report of classification of benefits is filed, the clerk shall, within five (5) days, cause notice of the filing of same to be given by publication pursuant to KRS Chapter 424, and by notices posted in three (3) public places within the sewer construction district. The hearing shall be held not more than twenty (20) days from the first published notice. Property owners may file exceptions to said report at any time up to the day the proceeding is docketed. The county judge/executive may hear the proceeding on that day, unless further time be required.

History. Enact. Acts 1952, ch. 68, § 12; 1966, ch. 239, § 30; 1978, ch. 384, § 207, effective June 17, 1978.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Public Place.

Where copies of the notice were posted at a United States Post Office and on two telephone poles located on private property and which were subject to removal at any time the requirement of this section, KRS 76.305 and KRS 76.335 that notice be posted in three public places was met. Mahon v. Buechel Sewer Constr. Dist., 355 S.W.2d 683, 1962 Ky. LEXIS 82 ( Ky. 1962 ).

76.350. Appeals.

An order of the county judge/executive confirming, modifying or disapproving a report of commissioners of sewer construction district as to a plan of construction or as to classification of property or ratio of benefits may be appealed to the Circuit Court by the commission or any property holder. In the Circuit Court the appeal shall be docketed on the equity docket and the trial shall be de novo. Decisions of the Circuit Court may be appealed to the Court of Appeals.

History. Enact. Acts 1952, ch. 69, § 13, effective June 19, 1952; 1980, ch. 188, § 69, effective July 15, 1980.

76.355. Performance under plan.

When the classification and ratio between classes on any specific plan, has been finally determined, the commission may carry out the plan itself, or contract for construction of said sewers and/or drains included in the plan by the metropolitan sewer district or otherwise.

History. Enact. Acts 1952, ch. 69, § 14, effective June 19, 1952.

76.360. Assessment of benefited property — Lien of assessment — Payment.

When the cost of construction of the planned sewers and/or drains has been ascertained, the commission shall assess the property benefited in accordance with the classification and area or other basis previously determined. From that date the assessment shall constitute a lien against the property. The landowner may pay the assessment in full at any time within thirty (30) days after notice of assessment. Every property owner not paying the full amount of his assessment within thirty (30) days shall be presumed to have consented to the issuing of sewer construction bonds.

History. Enact. Acts 1952, ch. 69, § 14, effective June 19, 1952.

76.365. Issuance of sewer construction bonds for amount of unpaid assessments — Interest, maturity, payment.

  1. If all assessments are not paid in full by thirty (30) days after notice of assessment, the commission may issue bonds for the amount of the unpaid assessments, and shall give notice that it proposes to issue bonds, giving the amount of bonds to be issued, and the time they will become payable.
  2. At the expiration of thirty (30) days after the publication, the commission may divide the unpaid assessments into not less than ten (10) annual installments, which shall draw interest at the rate or rates or method of determining rates as the commission deems best and be payable at least annually, from thirty (30) days after the date of publication. The bonds shall mature in series to correspond with the installments into which the unpaid assessments are divided, and shall draw interest at the rate or rates or method of determining rates as the commission determines, be payable at least annually, and be payable at some place to be designated by the commission. The bonds shall be for the exclusive use and benefit of the sewer construction and shall designate on the face the name of the district and the purpose for which they were issued.
  3. The commission, in dividing the unpaid assessments into installments, shall fix the time for payment, and each landowner shall pay the installments due on his land, with interest due on that installment and deferred installments, to the treasurer of the commission on or before the time fixed by the commission for the maturity of the installment.
  4. Enforcement of payment of assessment and interest shall be by suit.

History. Enact. Acts 1952, ch. 69, § 16, effective June 19, 1952; 1996, ch. 274, § 14, effective July 15, 1996.

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Apportionment warrants, KRS 76.420 .

Issuance of bonds, general provisions concerning, KRS Chapter 66.

Removal of interest rate limits, KRS 58.430 .

76.366. Financing by revenue bonds.

  1. Any sewer construction district created in the manner provided in KRS 76.300 to 76.325 , both inclusive, may if the commissioners of such sewer construction district deem it feasible, build, or acquire or enlarge sewer or drainage facilities, including treatment plants, without resort to the right to levy assessments for the cost of such sewer or drainage facilities, including treatment plants, as is provided in KRS 76.340 to 76.365 , both inclusive, and may obtain the funds with which to build, acquire or enlarge such system by the issuance of revenue bonds, payable solely from the revenue to be derived from the operation of such system.
  2. In the event the commissioners shall decide to finance the cost of such construction, acquisition or enlargement by the issuance of revenue bonds, secured solely by the revenue of the system, the commission shall note such decision by appropriate resolution, and shall thereafter proceed under the provisions of KRS 96.350 to 96.510 , both inclusive, and the sewer construction district and the commission shall have the same powers and duties as a city with a population less than one hundred thousand (100,000) based upon the most recent federal decennial census inclusive under the provisions of KRS 96.350 to 96.510 , both inclusive, the language referring to waterworks and water systems in KRS 96.350 to 96.510 to be read as sewers and drains including treatment plants.
  3. In the event such procedure is followed the commission shall not observe the provisions of KRS 76.340 to 76.365 both inclusive.

History. Enact. Acts 1958, ch. 162, effective June 19, 1958; 2014, ch. 92, § 59, effective January 1, 2015.

76.367. Refunding with revenue bonds.

If any district has previously issued bonds secured entirely or partially by the right to levy an assessment as provided by KRS 76.340 to 76.365 , both inclusive, and such bonds are redeemed prior to maturity, bonds to refund same may be issued secured solely by the revenue of said systems in the manner provided in KRS 76.366 .

History. Enact. Acts 1958, ch. 162, effective June 19, 1958.

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Refinancing at higher interest rate than that of original issue, KRS 58.440 .

76.368. Power to discontinue water service.

In the event a sewer construction district elects to proceed under KRS 76.366 and 76.367 it is granted the same authority relative to the cutting off of the water supply of its delinquent users as is a sanitation district under KRS 220.510 , when written request for such cutting off is made by the commission to the water supplier. In the event this power is used the plans of the sewer district shall only require prior approval by the metropolitan sewer district as already provided in KRS 76.330 , and in such event the water supplier may require the sewer commission to supply an agent with full authority to receive payments or accept arrangements to pay the delinquent charges, together with interest and penalties thereon, to be present when the water is cut off and the water supplier may bill the sewer commission its actual expenses involved.

History. Enact. Acts 1958, ch. 162, effective June 19, 1958.

76.369. Effect of provisions for financing with revenue bonds.

KRS 76.366 and 76.367 shall not repeal nor reduce any existing rights or duties of a sewer construction district, and the commissioners thereof, but shall constitute an additional and alternate method of financing.

History. Enact. Acts 1958, ch. 162, effective June 19, 1958.

76.370. Dissolution of district.

On completion of collection of assessments, distribution of funds and retirement of all bonds, a sewer construction district may be dissolved by order of the county judge/executive.

History. Enact. Acts 1952, ch. 69, § 17, effective June 19, 1952; 1978, ch. 384, § 208, effective June 17, 1978.

76.375. Bond of commissioners and treasurer.

The commissioners shall give bond in such amount as the county judge/executive may require. The treasurer shall give bond in such amount as the commission may require.

History. Enact. Acts 1952, ch. 69, § 18, effective June 19, 1952; 1980, ch. 188, § 70, effective July 15, 1980.

76.380. Governmental nature of commission’s function.

The creation of a sewer construction district, and the carrying out of its corporate purposes are in all respects in the interest of public health and for a public purpose. A sewer construction district performs a governmental function in the exercise of the powers conferred upon it, and it shall be required to pay no taxes or assessments upon any property owned or acquired by it, or upon its activities in the operation and maintenance of its facilities. Bonds issued by a sewer construction district and income therefrom are exempt from taxation.

History. Enact. Acts 1952, ch. 69, § 19, effective June 19, 1952.

76.385. County attorney to represent commission — Additional counsel.

The county attorney shall represent the commission, but the commission may employ additional counsel when the amount of its legal work requires this.

History. Enact. Acts 1952, ch. 69, § 18, effective June 19, 1952.

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Underwood, Part-Time Prosecutors and Conflicts of Interest: A Survey and Some Proposals, 81 Ky. L.J. 1 (1993).

Treatises

Caldwell’s Kentucky Form Book, 5th Ed., Petition for Establishment of a Sewer Construction District (Long Form), Form 338.07.

76.390. Additional or alternate method of financing construction.

Any sewer construction district created in the manner provided in KRS 76.300 to 76.325 may, if the commissioners of such district deem it advisable, use the authority and procedures granted to incorporated municipalities by KRS 107.010 to 107.220 . When applied to sewer construction districts, terms used in KRS 107.010 to 107.220 shall be construed to mean the following: “city” means “district”; “ordinance” means “resolution”; “clerk” means “secretary of district”; “governing body” means “district commissioners”; “mayor or chairman of board of directors” means “chairman of the district.”

History. Enact. Acts 1960, ch. 198, § 1, effective June 16, 1960.

76.395. Construction of KRS 76.390.

The provisions of KRS 76.390 shall not repeal or reduce any existing rights or duties of sewer construction districts or the commissioners thereof, but shall constitute an additional method of financing which may be used in conjunction with KRS 76.300 to 76.385 , or may be an alternate method.

History. Enact. Acts 1960, ch. 198, § 2, effective June 16, 1960.

76.400. Exemption from KRS 76.085 — Exception.

Any sewer construction district created in the manner provided in KRS 76.300 to 76.325 is exempt from the provisions of KRS 76.085 , subsections (2) and (3), except when said sewer construction district empties its effluent into mains or plants operated by metropolitan sewer district.

History. Enact. Acts 1960, ch. 249, effective June 16, 1960.

76.405. Alternate method of annexation.

Any sewer construction district created in the manner provided in KRS 76.300 to 76.325 may, if the commissioners of such district deem it advisable, use the authority and procedures granted to sanitation districts by KRS 220.535 to 220.537 to annex territory to the district, “board of directors” being read as “commission.”

History. Enact. Acts 1962, ch. 263, § 1.

76.410. Exception to limitation of KRS 220.535.

Language in KRS 220.535 , limiting the powers of annexation to a sanitation district in a county not containing a city of the first class, shall not be applicable to sewer construction districts which may use this method of annexation, even if they are located in a county containing a city of the first class, and the secretary of the Energy and Environment Cabinet shall function in regard to annexations by them in the same manner and under the same procedures as set out in KRS 220.535 to 220.537 as he would in his capacity as commissioner of sanitation districts for any sanitation district.

History. Enact. Acts 1962, ch. 263, § 2; 2010, ch. 24, § 71, effective July 15, 2010.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(9/19/95). The reference to “the Director of Sanitary Engineering of the Department of Health” in the original text of this statute (1962 Ky. Acts ch. 263, sec. 2) was mistakenly changed to “the director of sanitary engineering of the Department [now Cabinet] for Human Resources” on the basis of 1974 Ky. Acts ch. 74, Art. VI, sec. 107(11). However, the functions of this officer as they related to KRS 220.535 to 220.537 , cited in this statute, were transferred to the commissioner of environmental protection in the amendment of KRS 220.020 by 1972 (1st Extra. Sess.), Ky. Acts ch. 3, sec. 30; these functions now are held by the secretary of the Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Cabinet (1974 Ky. Acts, ch. 74, Art. III, sec. 13(2) & (9); 1982 Ky. Acts ch. 393, sec. 50(3)). Because of this, and pursuant to KRS 7.136(2), “the secretary of the Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Cabinet” has been substituted in this statute where “the Director of Sanitary Engineering of the Department of Health” originally appeared.

76.415. Effect of KRS 76.405 and 76.410.

The provisions of KRS 76.405 and 76.410 shall not repeal or reduce any existing rights or duties of sewer construction districts or commissioners thereof, but shall constitute merely a procedure for annexation by sewer construction districts.

History. Enact. Acts 1962, ch. 263, § 3.

76.420. Apportionment warrants — Effect of section.

  1. Any sewer construction district created in the manner provided in KRS 76.300 to 76.400 may, if the commissioners of such district deem it feasible, instead of issuing bonds as provided in KRS 76.365 , issue apportionment warrants, using the procedures after assessment set out in KRS 184.150 to 184.250 , “board of directors” being read as “commission” and the references to roads being read as references to sewers and drains, including treatment plants.
  2. In the event a sewer construction district uses the financing procedures of this section or those set forth in KRS 76.365 and 76.390 , it shall have the same power to discontinue water service as is set out in KRS 76.368 for districts proceeding under KRS 76.366 and 76.367 .
  3. The provisions of subsections (1) and (2) of this section shall not repeal or reduce any existing rights or duties of sewer construction districts or the commissioners thereof, but shall constitute an additional method of financing which may be used in conjunction with KRS 76.300 to 76.385 , or may be an alternate method.

History. Enact. Acts 1962, ch. 151, §§ 1 to 3.

County Sanitation Districts

76.505. Sanitation districts authorized — Status — Extent. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1962, ch. 286, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1964, ch. 33, § 48.

76.510. Resolution of fiscal court. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1962, ch. 286, § 2) was repealed by Acts 1964, ch. 33, § 48.

76.515. Board — Membership — Qualifications — Appointment — Terms — Removal — Officers — Contracting power. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1962, ch. 286, § 3) was repealed by Acts 1964, ch. 33, § 48.

76.520. Authority of district. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1962, ch. 286, § 4) was repealed by Acts 1964, ch. 33, § 48.

76.525. Application for approval of plans — Authority of district. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1962, ch. 286, § 5) was repealed by Acts 1964, ch. 33, § 48.

76.530. Schedule of rates — Basis — Procedure — Collection — Use of monies — Delinquent user, services. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1962, ch. 286, § 6) was repealed by Acts 1964, ch. 33, § 48.

76.535. Duty of district — Bids — Contract, conditions. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1962, ch. 286, § 7) was repealed by Acts 1964, ch. 33, § 48.

76.540. Acquisition of lands — Dedication — Eminent domain — Condemnation proceedings. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1962, ch. 286, § 8) was repealed by Acts 1964, ch. 33, § 48.

76.545. Public service corporation facilities charges, costs, procedure. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1962, ch. 286, § 9) was repealed by Acts 1964, ch. 33, § 48.

76.550. Ad volarem tax authorized — Conditions. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1962, ch. 286, § 10) was repealed by Acts 1964, ch. 33, § 48.

76.555. Bond issue — Amount — Election. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1962, ch. 286, § 11) was repealed by Acts 1964, ch. 33, § 48.

76.560. Bonds — Preparation — Sinking fund — Sale — Contract with bond holder, contents — Status. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1962, ch. 286, § 12) was repealed by Acts 1964, ch. 33, § 48.

76.565. Revenue bonds authorized — Procedure — Sale — Contract, provisions. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1962, ch. 286, § 13) was repealed by Acts 1964, ch. 33, § 48.

76.570. Bond payment default — Procedure — Trustee, duties, rights. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1962, ch. 286, § 14) was repealed by Acts 1964, ch. 33, § 48.

76.575. Contractual rights with other districts. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1962, ch. 286, § 15) was repealed by Acts 1964, ch. 33, § 48.

76.580. Authority to negotiate. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1962, ch. 286, § 16) was repealed by Acts 1964, ch. 33, § 48.

76.585. Exemption from taxation. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1962, ch. 286, § 17) was repealed by Acts 1964, ch. 33, § 48.

Wastewater Collection Projects

76.600. Authority to provide for, construct and finance wastewater collection projects.

Existing metropolitan sewer districts created pursuant to the provisions of KRS 76.010 to 76.210 may provide for, construct, and finance wastewater collection projects according to the financing plan set forth in KRS Chapters 76 and 107. This authority is in addition to any authority otherwise conferred upon any metropolitan sewer district. If any metropolitan sewer district has undertaken any proceedings under any other law to construct a project, it may abandon such proceedings and proceed under the provisions of KRS Chapters 76 and 107. It is the purpose of KRS Chapters 76 and 107 to extend permissive authority to metropolitan sewer districts to finance wastewater collection projects according to the assessed value basis, whereby benefited properties shall be assessed the cost of such projects according to benefits conferred upon such properties.

History. Enact. Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 13, § 1.

76.610. Use of authority and procedures granted municipalities — Terms in KRS Chapter 107 defined.

Any metropolitan sewer district created in the manner provided in this chapter may, if the board of such district deems it advisable, use the authority and procedures granted to incorporated municipalities by KRS 107.010 to 107.220 . When applied to metropolitan sewer districts, terms used in KRS 107.010 to 107.220 shall be construed to mean the following: “city” or “municipality” means “metropolitan sewer district” (except that in KRS 107.090(1)(d), 107.130 , 107.140(2)(a) and (c), and 107.150 referring to city taxes the term “city” shall continue to mean “city”); “ordinance” means “resolution”; “clerk” means “secretary of the metropolitan sewer district”; and “mayor or chairman of the board of directors” means “chairman of board of the metropolitan sewer district.”

History. Enact. Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 13, § 2; 1986, ch. 331, § 20, effective July 15, 1986.

76.620. Approval required.

In undertaking wastewater collection projects under KRS Chapters 76 and 107, metropolitan sewer districts are vested with exclusive authority to plan, design, initiate, finance, and carry out construction of the projects solely according to the requirements and procedures of KRS Chapters 76 and 107. However, no project may be financed, no bonds may be issued, nor benefited property assessed for benefits conferred until the project has been approved by the fiscal court of the county of the affected district. In the event any benefited property is situated within a city of the first class encompassed by the district, the project shall also be approved by ordinance enacted by the governing body of that city.

History. Enact. Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 13, § 3.

76.630. Removal or relocation of municipal, municipally-owned utility or water district service equipment or appliances.

The provisions of KRS 76.120 notwithstanding, whenever any district shall determine that it is necessary that any fire plugs, water pipes, mains, and conduits, and other water service related equipment and appliances, belonging to any municipality or a municipally-owned utility, or any water district established pursuant to KRS Chapter 74, must be removed or relocated on, over or under a highway, city street, county road, or other public way, in order to construct, reconstruct, relocate or improve a drainage ditch, storm sewer, sanitary sewer, or any drainage or sewage facility connected therewith, the municipality or municipally-owned utility or the water district shall relocate or remove same in accordance with the reasonable needs of the metropolitan sewer district; and the costs and expenses of such relocation or removal, including the costs of installing such facilities in a new location and the costs of any land, or any rights or interests in lands, and any other rights, acquired to accomplish such relocation or removal, shall be ascertained and paid by the district as a part of the cost of improving, constructing or reconstructing such drainage or sewage facilities, provided such additional costs to the district do not result in an increase in the assessment against the benefited properties.

History. Enact. Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 13, § 4.

76.640. Enforcement powers.

  1. Any metropolitan sewer district which has initiated a wastewater collection project under the provisions of KRS Chapters 76 and 107 may enforce payment of annual improvement benefit assessments levied in respect of such project and may enforce rules and regulations relative to this project by directing the company or governmental unit providing water services to any benefited property to discontinue water services until: (a) the improvement benefits and penalties are duly paid and (b) the regulations and rules shall have been duly complied with and any defaults have been cured. However, a metropolitan sewer district shall indemnify the company or governmental unit providing water services from any liability for damages for terminating water services upon the direction of a district.
  2. Water suppliers shall be entitled to collect from owners of benefited properties a reasonable fee for termination and reinstatement of water services.
  3. It shall be lawful for metropolitan sewer districts initiating wastewater collection projects to covenant with holders of bonds that the district shall enforce the provisions of this section.
  4. Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions of this section, metropolitan sewer districts initiating projects pursuant to KRS Chapters 76 and 107 shall have all powers and rights granted to cities and sewer bodies by KRS 96.930 through 96.943 .

History. Enact. Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 13, § 5.

CHAPTER 77 Air Pollution Control

77.005. Definitions for chapter.

As used in this chapter, unless the context requires otherwise:

  1. “Legislative body” means the chief legislative body of the city, whether it is the board of aldermen, general council, board of commissioners, or otherwise;
  2. “Air contaminant” or “air contaminants” includes smoke, charred paper, dust, soot, grime, carbon, noxious acids, fumes, gases, odors, or particulate matter, or any combination thereof;
  3. “District” means an air pollution control district;
  4. “Largest city” means the city with the greatest population within the county based upon the most recent federal decennial census conducted by the United States Census Bureau;
  5. “Person” means any individual, firm, copartnership, joint adventure, association, corporation, social club, fraternal organization, estate, trust, receiver, syndicate, any county, city, municipality, district (for air pollution control or otherwise), or other political subdivision, or any group or combination acting as a unit, and the plural as well as the singular unit; and
  6. “Ringelmann Chart” means that standard published by the United States Bureau of Mines to determine the density of smoke.

History. Enact. Acts 1952, ch. 53, § 1, effective March 14, 1952; 2014, ch. 92, § 60, effective January 1, 2015.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

This chapter, construed as a whole, is sufficiently broad to confer upon an Air Pollution Control District (APCD) the power to create and implement a vehicle exhaust testing program, and when measured in light of the relevant factors governing reasonability, it is clearly constitutional and enforceable. Frederick v. Air Pollution Control Dist., 783 S.W.2d 391, 1990 Ky. LEXIS 10 ( Ky. 1990 ).

2. Legislative Intent.

This chapter is clearly intended to address and regulate problems associated with air pollution, including those related to vehicle emissions. Frederick v. Air Pollution Control Dist., 783 S.W.2d 391, 1990 Ky. LEXIS 10 ( Ky. 1990 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

The Jefferson County board of education must pay the license fee for each of its contaminant sources because it is both a “district” and a “municipality” and thus falls within the statute. OAG 74-57 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Interlocal cooperation act, KRS 65.210 to 65.300 .

Kentucky Law Journal.

Kentucky Law Survey, Bratt and Brown, Environmental Law, 70 Ky. L.J. 455 (1981-82).

77.010. Creation and boundaries of districts.

  1. In each county of the Commonwealth there is hereby created an air pollution control district.
  2. The boundaries of every air pollution control district shall be coextensive with the boundaries of the county within which it is situated.

History. Enact. Acts 1952, ch. 53, §§ 2, 3, effective March 14, 1952.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

Frederick v. Air Pollution Control Dist., 783 S.W.2d 391, 1990 Ky. LEXIS 10 ( Ky. 1990 ).

77.015. Action of fiscal court and city legislative body necessary to activate district.

  1. An air pollution control district shall not transact any business or exercise any of its powers under this chapter until or unless the fiscal court of the county within which such district is situated, by proper resolution, declares at any time hereafter that there is need for an air pollution control district to function in such county, provided:
  2. For the creation of any air pollution control district after January 1, 2015, it shall also be necessary, before the district of such county is qualified to transact any business or exercise any of its powers under this chapter, that the legislative body of the largest city within the county, by proper ordinance, declare, at any time after the aforementioned resolution has been made by the fiscal court of such county, that there is need for an air pollution control district to function in such city.

History. Enact. Acts 1952, ch. 53, § 3, effective March 14, 1952; 2014, ch. 92, § 61, effective January 1, 2015.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

Frederick v. Air Pollution Control Dist., 783 S.W.2d 391, 1990 Ky. LEXIS 10 ( Ky. 1990 ).

77.020. Public hearings for determination of whether district shall function.

The fiscal court of any county desiring to place its air pollution control district in operation and the legislative body of the largest city in such county must hold separate public hearings prior to and for the purpose of determining whether or not there is need for an air pollution control district to function.

History. Enact. Acts 1952, ch. 53, § 5, effective March 14, 1952; 2014, ch. 92, § 62, effective January 1, 2015.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

Frederick v. Air Pollution Control Dist., 783 S.W.2d 391, 1990 Ky. LEXIS 10 ( Ky. 1990 ).

77.025. Notice of hearings.

Notice of the public hearing shall be given by the county conducting the hearing by publication pursuant to KRS Chapter 424.

History. Enact. Acts 1952, ch. 53, § 6; 1966, ch. 239, § 31.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

Frederick v. Air Pollution Control Dist., 783 S.W.2d 391, 1990 Ky. LEXIS 10 ( Ky. 1990 ).

77.030. Resolution of fiscal court to be based upon findings of fact.

The fiscal court may adopt a resolution declaring that there is need for an air pollution control district to function if from the evidence received at such public hearing it finds:

  1. That the air within such county is so polluted with air contaminants as to be injurious to health, or an obstruction to the free use of property, or offensive to the senses of a considerable number of persons, so as to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property;
  2. And further that for any reason it is not practical to rely upon the enactment or enforcement of local ordinances to prevent or control the emission of smoke, fumes, or other substances which cause or contribute to such pollution.

History. Enact. Acts 1952, ch. 53, § 7, effective March 14, 1952.

77.035. Ordinance of city legislative body to be based upon findings of fact.

The legislative body of the largest city in the county may adopt an ordinance declaring that there is need for an air pollution control district to function if from the evidence received at such public hearing it finds:

  1. That the air within such city is so polluted with air contaminants as to be injurious to health, or an obstruction to the free use of property, or offensive to the senses of a considerable number of persons, so as to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property;
  2. And further that for any reason it is not practical to rely upon the enactment or enforcement of local ordinances to prevent or control the emission of smoke, fumes, or other substances which cause or contribute to such pollution.

History. Enact. Acts 1952, ch. 53, § 8, effective March 14, 1952; 2014, ch. 92, § 63, effective January 1, 2015.

77.040. Form and sufficiency of resolution and ordinance.

  1. A resolution of the fiscal court declaring that there is need for an air pollution control district to function is sufficient if it finds that there is need for an air pollution control district to function, and finds in substantially the wording of KRS 77.030 that both the conditions enumerated therein exist. No further detail is necessary.
  2. An ordinance of the legislative body of the largest city within the county declaring that there is need for an air pollution control district to function is sufficient if it finds that there is need for an air pollution control district to function, and finds in substantially the wording of KRS 77.035 that both the conditions enumerated therein exist. No further detail is necessary.

History. Enact. Acts 1952, ch. 53, § 9, effective March 14, 1952; 2014, ch. 92, § 64, effective January 1, 2015.

77.045. Certified copies of resolution and ordinance admissible in evidence.

  1. A copy of a resolution of the fiscal court declaring that there is need for an air pollution control district, duly certified by the county clerk, is admissible in evidence in any suit, action or proceeding.
  2. A copy of an ordinance of the legislative body of the largest city within the county declaring that there is need for an air pollution control district, duly certified by the clerk of such legislative body, is admissible in evidence in any suit, action or proceeding.

History. Enact. Acts 1952, ch. 53, §§ 10, 11, effective March 14, 1952; 2014, ch. 92, § 65, effective January 1, 2015.

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Admissibility of copies of domestic records or documents, KRE 902.

Fiscal courts are courts of record, KRS 67.100 .

Judicial notice of ordinances of cities, KRS 83A.060 .

77.050. Name and corporate powers of district.

The district shall be known by and under the name of Air Pollution Control District of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . County, and under such name shall be a public body corporate and a political subdivision of the Commonwealth.

History. Enact. Acts 1952, ch. 53, § 12, effective March 14, 1952.

Opinions of Attorney General.

Neither KRS 61.080 nor Ky. Const., § 165 prevent a person from, at the same time, being a member of the board of an air pollution control district and a member of the board of a sewer construction district, neither of which is a state, city or county agency, and if the person involved is able to perform the functions of both positions with care and ability and with impartiality and honesty, no common-law incompatibility would exist. OAG 77-247 .

Since the air pollution control district is a political subdivision of the State, it would appear that the district itself is clothed with the same sovereign immunity as the State has. OAG 78-429 .

The board members could be held personally liable for wrongdoing or negligent acts of the employees of the district only if the board members failed to exercise ordinary care in selecting such employees or subordinates. OAG 78-429 .

The members of the air pollution control board may be held personally liable for any wrongdoing or negligent act as members of that board, since the doctrine of sovereign immunity does not extend to the members on an individual basis. OAG 78-429 .

77.055. District to function immediately following activation — Conclusiveness of activation and organization.

  1. Upon the adoption of the resolution by the fiscal court of the county in which the district is to function, and, where necessary pursuant to KRS 77.015 , the passage of the ordinance by the legislative body of the largest city within such county, the district shall immediately begin to function.
  2. After the adoption of the resolution of the fiscal court of the county in which the district is to function, and the passage of the ordinance by the legislative body of the largest city within such county, the regular activation and organization of the district shall be finally and conclusively established against all persons except the Commonwealth of Kentucky upon suit commenced by the Attorney General. The activation and organization of said district shall not be directly or collaterally questioned in any suit, action or proceeding instituted by any other person.

History. Enact. Acts 1952, ch. 53, § 13, effective March 14, 1952; 2014, ch. 92, § 66, effective January 1, 2015.

77.060. General powers of district.

  1. The district shall have power to sue and be sued, contract and be contracted with, make rules and regulations and do all other things necessary to carry out the provisions of this chapter.
  2. The district shall have the power to take by grant, purchase, gift, devise, or lease, hold, use, enjoy, and to lease or dispose of real or personal property of every kind within or without the district necessary to the full exercise of its powers. It shall also have the power to lease, sell or dispose of any property or any interest therein whenever in the judgment of the air pollution control board such property, or any interest therein, or part thereof, is no longer required for the purposes of the district, or may be leased for any purpose without interfering with the use of the same for the purposes of the district, and to pay any compensation received therefor into the general fund of the district.

History. Enact. Acts 1952, ch. 53, § 14, effective March 14, 1952.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

This chapter, construed as a whole, is sufficiently broad enough to confer upon an Air Pollution Control District (APCD) the power to create and implement a vehicle exhaust testing program, and when measured in light of the relevant factors governing reasonability, it is clearly constitutional and enforceable. Frederick v. Air Pollution Control Dist., 783 S.W.2d 391, 1990 Ky. LEXIS 10 ( Ky. 1990 ).

2. Allowable Fees.

Given the fact that an Air Pollution Control District (APCD) is authorized to employ a private contractor to perform tests, the actual fee charged the APCD by that contractor is obviously part of the “cost” contemplated by KRS 77.205 , and the fact that the fee charged may include a profit to the contractor is of no significance. Frederick v. Air Pollution Control Dist., 783 S.W.2d 391, 1990 Ky. LEXIS 10 ( Ky. 1990 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

The legislature in enacting KRS 77.205 only intended to allow the district to charge a fee covering the initial cost of issuing a permit, while the federal Clean Air Act requires the permitting agency to charge permit fees covering the cost of implementing and enforcing the terms of permits (not including the cost of enforcement actions) as well as the cost of issuance, and this disparity in the district’s authority cannot be remedied by the more general grant to the district in subsection (1) of this section to make such rules and regulations as are necessary to carry out the provisions of KRS Chapter 77. OAG 78-757 .

77.065. County officers are ex officio officers and other personnel of district — Exception for county containing city of first class or consolidated local government or county where largest city has population of 20,000 or more — Effect of compact — Employees of district upon establishment of consolidated local government.

  1. The members of the fiscal court of a county shall be, and they are hereby designated as, and empowered to act as, ex officio the air pollution control board of the air pollution control district in such county.
  2. All county officers, their assistants, clerks, deputies, and employees, and all other county employees shall be ex officio officers, assistants, deputies, clerks, and employees respectively of the air pollution control district in the county in which they are employed. Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, they shall perform respectively the same various duties for the air pollution control district as for the county without additional compensation, in order to carry out the provisions of this chapter.
  3. The provisions of subsections (1) and (2) of this section shall not be applicable to any county containing a city of the first class, or a consolidated local government, or to a county where the largest city in that county contains a population equal to or greater than twenty thousand (20,000) based upon the most recent federal decennial census.
  4. Notwithstanding any provision of this chapter to the contrary, whenever a city of the first class and a county containing such city have in effect a compact under KRS 79.310 to 79.330 , the county shall provide all staff support, including a secretary-treasurer and an air pollution control officer, to the air pollution control board through county officers, assistants, clerks, deputies and employees. In such case, the staff of the air pollution control board, including the secretary-treasurer and the air pollution control officer, shall be deemed county employees and shall be subject to the control of fiscal court. At the time the compact takes effect, the employees of the air pollution control district shall be transferred to the service of the county government; provided that all such employees who are in the classified service at such time shall be continued in the classified service administered by county government. Upon the establishment of a consolidated local government in a county where a city of the first class and a county containing that city have had in effect a cooperative compact pursuant to KRS 79.310 to 79.330 , the employees of an air pollution control district shall be deemed to be employees of the consolidated local government and the provisions of this subsection shall be applied to the consolidated local government.

History. Enact. Acts 1952, ch. 53, § 15, effective March 14, 1952; 1986, ch. 77, § 12, effective July 15, 1986; 2002, ch. 346, § 79, effective July 15, 2002; 2014, ch. 92, § 67, effective January 1, 2015.

77.070. Air pollution control board, membership — Qualifications — Vacancies — Removal — Effect of compact — Membership of board upon establishment of consolidated local government.

  1. In a county containing a consolidated local government or a city with a population equal to or greater than twenty thousand (20,000) based upon the most recent federal decennial census, the air pollution control board of the air pollution control district shall consist of seven (7) members, three (3) of whom shall be appointed by the county judge/executive, subject to the approval of the fiscal court, and four (4) of whom shall be appointed by the mayor. The mayoral appointments shall be subject to the approval of the legislative body of the city.
  2. The mayor shall appoint, subject to the approval of the legislative body of the city, one (1) member for a term of one (1) year, one (1) member for a term of two (2) years, one (1) member for a term of three (3) years, and one (1) member for a term of four (4) years, and the county judge/executive, subject to the approval of the fiscal court, shall appoint one (1) member for a term of two (2) years, one (1) member for a term of three (3) years, and one (1) member for a term of four (4) years, and upon the expiration of each of said terms respectively, and thereafter, the term of each of such members shall be four (4) years, and until their successors are appointed and qualified.
  3. All air pollution control board members appointed pursuant to this section must be freeholders within the district; those appointed by the county judge/executive must be residents of such county, and those appointed by a mayor must be residents of their respective city or consolidated local government.
  4. Not more than four (4) of the seven (7) board members appointed pursuant to this section shall be of the same political party affiliation, nor shall an officer or employee of such city, consolidated local government, or county, whether holding a paid or unpaid position, be eligible for appointment to the board.
  5. A member of the air pollution control board is eligible to succeed himself or herself. A vacancy in the membership shall be filled by an appointee of the mayor or of the county judge/executive as the case may be, for the unexpired portion of the term. An appointee to a vacancy shall have the same qualifications as any regularly appointed member.
  6. Any member of the board appointed by a mayor may be removed, for cause, after a hearing, by the legislative body of such city or consolidated local government, and after ten (10) days’ notice in writing shall have been given to the member, which notice shall embrace the charges preferred against him. At the hearing he may be represented by counsel. The finding of the legislative body shall be final and removal results in vacancy in such office.
  7. Any member of the board appointed by a county judge/executive may be removed, for cause, after a hearing, by the fiscal court of such county, and after ten (10) days’ notice in writing shall have been given to the member, which notice shall embrace the charges preferred against him. At the hearing he may be represented by counsel. The finding of the fiscal court shall be final and removal results in vacancy in such office.
  8. As used in this section “mayor” means the chief executive of the city or consolidated local government whether the official designation of his office is mayor, city manager, or otherwise.
  9. Notwithstanding subsections (1) and (2) of this section, when a city of the first class and a county containing such city have in effect a compact under KRS 79.310 to 79.330 , the air pollution control board shall consist of seven (7) members, four (4) of whom shall be appointed by the county judge/executive with the approval of the fiscal court and three (3) of whom shall be appointed by the mayor, with the approval of the legislative body, of the first-class city within such county. The terms of such members shall be three (3) years, and until their successors are appointed and qualified. Upon the effective date of the compact, the mayor, and county judge/executive with the approval of the fiscal court, shall adjust the terms of the sitting members so that the term of one (1) of each of their appointments expires in one (1) year, the term of one (1) of each of their appointments expires in two (2) years, and the term of one (1) of each of their appointments expires in three (3) years. The term of the then remaining member who was previously appointed by the mayor shall terminate immediately and the county judge/executive with approval of the fiscal court shall appoint a member for a one (1) year term. Upon the expiration of these staggered terms, successors shall be appointed for a term of three (3) years. Upon the establishment of a consolidated local government in a county where a city of the first class and a county containing that city have had in effect a cooperative compact pursuant to KRS 79.310 to 79.330 , all members of the board shall be appointed by the mayor of the consolidated local government pursuant to the provisions of KRS 67C.139 for a term of three (3) years. Incumbent members upon the establishment of the consolidated local government shall continue to serve as members of the board for the time remaining of their current term of appointment.

History. Enact. Acts 1952, ch. 53, § 16, effective March 14, 1952; 1986, ch. 77, § 13, effective July 15, 1986; 2002, ch. 346, § 80, effective July 15, 2002; 2014, ch. 92, § 68, effective January 1, 2015.

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

General provisions as to offices and officers, KRS 61.010 to 61.396 .

Resignations, removals and vacancies, KRS Chapter 63.

77.075. Air pollution control board members to serve without compensation.

All air pollution control board members shall serve without compensation other than recovery of actual expenses from the district funds.

History. Enact. Acts 1952, ch. 53, § 17, effective March 14, 1952.

77.080. Meetings of board.

  1. Regular meetings of each air pollution control board shall be held at least once in each calendar month. The time and place of the meetings shall be fixed by the board.
  2. A majority of the members of the board shall constitute a quorum for the purpose of conducting business and exercising powers and for all other purposes. The affirmative vote of at least a majority of the membership of the board shall be necessary for the adoption of any motion, measure, or resolution, unless in any case the bylaws of the board require a larger number.

History. Enact. Acts 1952, ch. 53, § 18, effective March 14, 1952.

Opinions of Attorney General.

Any motion, measure, or resolution to be adopted by the Air Pollution Control Board of Jefferson County must be adopted by the affirmative vote of at least four of the seven members of the board. OAG 72-723 .

77.085. Election of chairman and vice chairman — Secretary-treasurer and air pollution control officer — Deputies, assistants, and other employees.

  1. An air pollution control board operating under KRS 77.070 shall, in July of each year, elect from its members a chairman and a vice chairman who shall be of different political party affiliation. The board shall employ a competent secretary-treasurer and an air pollution control officer, neither of whom shall be a member of the board. The secretary-treasurer and the air pollution control officer shall devote their entire time and attention exclusively to the services of the board.
  2. The air pollution control officer shall be an engineer by profession and shall be a graduate of a recognized university or college, shall be thoroughly familiar with the theory and practice of the prevention and control of air pollution, and shall meet the qualifications for a nonelective peace officer stated in KRS 61.300 .
  3. The secretary-treasurer and the air pollution control officer may be removed by the board, for cause, after hearing by it and after at least ten (10) days notice in writing shall have been given to the secretary-treasurer or the air pollution control officer, as the case may be, which notice shall embrace the charges preferred against the person. At the hearing the person may be represented by counsel. The finding of the board shall be final.
  4. The board may provide for assistants, deputies, clerks, attaches, and other persons to be employed by the secretary-treasurer and the air pollution control officer, and the times at which they shall be appointed.

History. Enact. Acts 1952, ch. 53, § 19, effective March 14, 1952; 1994, ch. 420, § 1, effective July 15, 1994; 2014, ch. 92, § 69, effective January 1, 2015.

77.090. Air pollution control officer, assistants, deputies and other employees in counties not containing a consolidated local government or a city with a population of 20,000 or more.

  1. In all counties other than those provided for in KRS 77.070 or 77.085 , the air pollution control board of the air pollution control district may appoint an air pollution control officer, and may provide for assistants, deputies, clerks, attaches and other persons to be employed by the air pollution control officer, and the times at which they shall be appointed.
  2. An air pollution control officer appointed pursuant to this section shall have the qualifications set forth in KRS 77.085 .
  3. Such air pollution control officer may be removed by the board, for cause, in the manner provided for the removal of air pollution control officers in subsection (3) of KRS 77.085 .

History. Enact. Acts 1952, ch. 53, § 20, effective March 14, 1952; 2014, ch. 92, § 70, effective January 1, 2015.

77.095. Employment of professional, technical or other advisers, experts and employees.

The air pollution control board of any air pollution control district in the Commonwealth may employ and remove at pleasure professional and technical advisers, experts, and other employees, skilled or unskilled, as it deems requisite for the performance of its duties.

History. Enact. Acts 1952, ch. 53, § 21, effective March 14, 1952.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Allowable Fees.

Given the fact that an Air Pollution Control District (APCD) is authorized to employ a private contractor to perform tests, the actual fee charged the APCD by that contractor is obviously part of the “cost” contemplated by KRS 77.205 , and the fact that the fee charged may include a profit to the contractor is of no significance. Frederick v. Air Pollution Control Dist., 783 S.W.2d 391, 1990 Ky. LEXIS 10 ( Ky. 1990 ).

77.100. Bond of secretary-treasurer, air pollution control officer and other officers and employees.

An air pollution control board shall require the secretary-treasurer and the air pollution control officer each to execute bond, and may exact from such of its other officers and employees bonds as it may deem expedient. All such bonds shall be payable to the district in such sums as the board may fix with approved corporate surety, and premiums therefor shall be paid by the district. Such bonds shall obligate the makers thereof to faithfully perform the duties of their respective offices and positions and to fully account for and pay over all money, property or other thing of value of the district, which may come to their hands, respectively.

History. Enact. Acts 1952, ch. 53, § 22, effective March 14, 1952.

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Bonds of officers, KRS 62.050 to 62.200 .

77.105. Hearing board — Membership, qualifications, term, removal.

  1. The air pollution control board of an air pollution control district shall appoint a hearing board to consist of three (3) members, none of whom is a member of the air pollution control board, and only two (2) of whom may be of the same political party affiliation. Two (2) members of the hearing board shall have been admitted to practice law in this Commonwealth. Both shall be residents and freeholders of the district. Neither shall be otherwise employed by the air pollution control district or by any other municipal corporation or political subdivision of the Commonwealth. The third member of the hearing board shall be an engineer by profession, and shall be a graduate of a recognized university or college and shall be thoroughly familiar with the theory and practice of the construction and operation of furnaces and combustion devices, or in the theory of the prevention and control of air pollution. The latter member shall not be otherwise employed by the air pollution control district or the air pollution control board appointing the hearing board, but may be an employee of some other political subdivision or municipal corporation of the Commonwealth. He need not reside nor own property within the district.
  2. The air pollution control board shall appoint one (1) member of the hearing board for a term of one (1) year, one (1) member for a term of two (2) years, and one (1) member for a term of three (3) years. Thereafter the terms of members of the hearing board shall be three (3) years. A member of the hearing board shall be eligible to succeed himself. A vacancy in the membership shall be filled by an appointee of the air pollution control board for the unexpired portion of the term. Such an appointee shall have the same qualifications as a regularly appointed member.
  3. Any member of the hearing board may be removed by the air pollution control board, for cause, after a hearing by the air pollution control board, and after at least ten (10) days notice in writing shall have been given to the member, which notice shall embrace the charges preferred against him. At the hearing he may be represented by counsel. The finding of the air pollution control board shall be final, and removal results in vacancy in such office.

History. Enact. Acts 1952, ch. 53, § 23, effective March 14, 1952.

77.110. Persons ineligible to membership on boards or employment by district.

Any person having any interest in the sale or control of any air pollution prevention equipment or apparatus which might be used effectively to reduce the emission of air contaminants shall not be eligible to be a member of an air pollution control board or of a hearing board, or to be the secretary-treasurer of an air pollution control board, or an air pollution control officer, or any assistant, deputy, clerk, attache, or employee of an air pollution control officer or secretary-treasurer, or to be any other employee of an air pollution control board or district.

History. Enact. Acts 1952, ch. 53, § 24, effective March 14, 1952.

77.115. Air pollution control board is governing body of district — Duties, responsibilities, and regulatory authority of board — Vehicle exhaust testing program — Limitations — Exemptions.

  1. The air pollution control board is hereby declared to be the governing body of an air pollution control district, and shall manage and control all the affairs and property of such district, and shall exercise all the powers of such district not otherwise delegated by this chapter. In a county where a city-county compact under KRS 79.310 to 79.330 is in effect or in a county where a consolidated local government has been established, the air pollution control board shall assume all of the duties and responsibilities of the hearing board appointed under KRS 77.105 , and the hearing board shall be abolished.
  2. Notwithstanding any provision of this chapter to the contrary, in a county where a city-county compact under KRS 79.310 to 79.330 is in effect or in a county where a consolidated local government has been established, the air pollution control board shall have regulatory authority for the district, and the city, consolidated local government, or county, as appropriate, shall exercise funding and administrative control of the district.
  3. If an air pollution control board finds the need for and requires the implementation of a vehicle exhaust testing program, the program shall prohibit emissions of, regulate, or control only mobile sources of air pollutants regulated under the state program established in accordance with KRS 224.20-710 to 224.20-765 .
  4. In a county where the air pollution control board makes a finding of a need for and requires the implementation of a vehicle exhaust testing program, the board shall exempt from the program vehicles registered to military personnel on active duty whose duty station is outside of the county.

History. Enact. Acts 1952, ch. 53, § 25, effective March 14, 1952; 1994, ch. 420, § 2, effective July 15, 1994; 2000, ch. 136, § 1, effective July 14, 2000; 2000, ch. 226, § 6, effective July 14, 2000; 2002, ch. 346, § 81, effective July 15, 2002.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

This chapter, construed as a whole, is sufficiently broad to confer upon an Air Pollution Control District (APCD) the power to create and implement a vehicle exhaust testing program, and when measured in light of the relevant factors governing reasonability, it is clearly constitutional and enforceable. Frederick v. Air Pollution Control Dist., 783 S.W.2d 391, 1990 Ky. LEXIS 10 ( Ky. 1990 ).

2. Legislative Intent.

This chapter is clearly intended to address and regulate problems associated with air pollution, including those related to vehicle emissions. Frederick v. Air Pollution Control Dist., 783 S.W.2d 391, 1990 Ky. LEXIS 10 ( Ky. 1990 ).

77.120. Compensation of officers and employees.

The air pollution control board shall determine the compensation of, and pay from district funds, the secretary-treasurer of the air pollution control board, his assistants, deputies, clerks, attaches, and other employees, the air pollution control officer, his assistants, deputies, clerks, attaches, and other employees, the members of the hearing board, and all other employees of the air pollution control board. The salaries and compensation paid shall be in line with that paid by the county, or the largest city within the county, for similar services.

History. Enact. Acts 1952, ch. 53, § 26, effective March 14, 1952; 2014, ch. 92, § 71, effective January 1, 2015.

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Limitations on compensation of officers and employees of city-county boards and commissions, KRS 64.610 .

77.125. Appropriations by city and county.

In order to provide money for carrying out the purposes of this chapter, the fiscal court of a county within which the air pollution control district has been activated and the legislative body of a city qualified to appoint members of the board pursuant to KRS 77.070 within such county, if there be any such city, may annually appropriate funds to such district. If there be such city within the county, the appropriation shall be in such proportion as may be agreed upon between the city legislative body and the fiscal court. Such funds shall be deposited in the treasury of the air pollution control district.

History. Enact. Acts 1952, ch. 53, § 27, effective March 14, 1952; 2014, ch. 92, § 72, effective January 1, 2015.

77.127. Air quality trust fund.

  1. In a county containing a consolidated local government or a city of the first class or a city having a population equal to or greater than twenty thousand (20,000) based upon the most recent federal decennial census, there is established within the air pollution control district a special trust fund to be known as the “air quality trust fund” to be used for conducting and funding air quality research and development projects, special nonrecurring air quality projects, and air quality education programs approved by the air pollution control board to assist in implementing the policies and purposes of this chapter.
  2. All money collected for the fund shall be deposited by the district into an interest-bearing capital project account maintained by the fiscal court or consolidated local government of the county in which the district is located. Money shall be distributed from the account by the finance director of the county or consolidated local government based upon written authorization from the air pollution control board. Money unexpended at the close of a fiscal year shall not lapse but shall be carried forward for future use.
  3. The fund shall not be used to support or finance the routine day-to-day activities and responsibilities of the district.
  4. The air pollution control board shall, by regulation, set policies and establish procedures for the receipt and disbursement of any money collected under this section and for the full disclosure of the source and use of the money.
  5. The air pollution control board shall control and manage the fund. It shall publish in writing at its June meeting each year an accounting of the income and disbursements of the fund.
  6. Four (4) members of the air pollution control board shall constitute a quorum for conducting business relating to the air quality trust fund. When votes are taken on matters relating to the fund, each member shall have one (1) vote, and the affirmative vote of at least a majority of the votes cast shall be necessary for the adoption of any motion, measure, or resolution.
  7. Members of the air pollution control board shall not solicit, but may accept, money by grant, gift, donation, bequest, civil or criminal penalty, or other conveyance to be credited to the air quality trust fund, but they may not accept penalties collected under KRS 77.990 for the air quality trust fund.

History. Enact. Acts 1994, ch. 420, § 8, effective July 15, 1994; 2002, ch. 346, § 82, effective July 15, 2002; 2014, ch. 92, § 73, effective January 1, 2015.

77.130. Fiscal year.

The fiscal year of an air pollution control board district shall begin on the first day of July of each year and end with June 30 next following.

History. Enact. Acts 1952, ch. 53, § 28, effective March 14, 1952.

77.135. Budget — Contingent fund — Compliance with KRS 65A.010 to 65A.090.

  1. It shall be the duty of the secretary-treasurer of an air pollution control board formed pursuant to KRS 77.070 , during or before the month of May of each year, to prepare and certify to the consolidated local government or fiscal court of the county and to the legislative body of the city, for their joint consideration, a preliminary budget showing the total funds which, in the judgment of the air pollution control board, will be needed for the various departments of the district, together with a statement showing the estimated balances, if any, which will be available on July 1 for expenditure during the next fiscal year following the certification of said statement, and also indicating, as nearly as may be possible, what additional funds or assets (other than appropriations) will be or will become available for expenditure during that year. The board shall also furnish to the consolidated local government or the fiscal court and the city legislative body any other information or data available to it which the consolidated local government, the fiscal court, or the city legislative body may request.
  2. Prior to the first day of each fiscal year, every air pollution control board shall prepare, for its own use and guidance, a financial budget setting forth the total amounts of funds available from all sources for expenditures during the said fiscal year, and also setting forth in detail the estimated expenditures of the board and the district during said fiscal year.
  3. A contingent fund for unanticipated expenditures may be established in order to provide for such contingent and unanticipated needs as may arise during the district’s said fiscal year.
  4. All air pollution control boards shall comply with the provisions of KRS 65A.010 to 65A.090 .

History. Enact. Acts 1952, ch. 53, §§ 29, 30, effective March 14, 1952; 2002, ch. 346, § 83, effective July 15, 2002; 2013, ch. 40, § 32, effective March 21, 2013; 2014, ch. 92, § 74, effective January 1, 2015.

77.140. Accounting — Audits and attestation procedures.

  1. The air pollution control board created pursuant to KRS 77.070 shall install and maintain a modern and efficient system of accounting and keep financial records. The board, however, may select and use the finance department of the consolidated local government or city to do its financial accounting and make its disbursements in a manner as may be agreed upon by and between the board and the director of finance of the consolidated local government or city, which work shall be done by the finance department without compensation from the board.
  2. The Auditor of Public Accounts of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, the comptroller and inspector of the consolidated local government or the city, and the county auditor of such county, respectively, shall have access to the books and records of the board.
  3. All air pollution control boards shall be subject to audit or attestation engagement procedures as provided in KRS 65A.030 . In addition, at any other time upon the direction of the legislative body of a consolidated local government, or upon the direction of the fiscal court of the county, the county auditor shall make an audit of the board’s accounts and report back thereon.

History. Enact. Acts 1952, ch. 53, § 31, effective March 14, 1952; 2002, ch. 346, § 84, effective July 15, 2002; 2013, ch. 40, § 33, effective March 21, 2013; 2014, ch. 92, § 75, effective January 1, 2015.

77.145. Duties of air pollution control officer — Powers as peace officer.

  1. The air pollution control officer shall observe and enforce, within his air pollution control district:
    1. The provisions of this chapter;
    2. All orders, regulations, and rules prescribed by the air pollution control board of the air pollution control district pursuant to this chapter;
    3. All variances and standards which the hearing board has prescribed pursuant to this chapter.
  2. In enforcing the provisions of this chapter and the orders, regulations, rules, variances, and standards of the air pollution control board and the hearing board, the air pollution control officer, his deputies and his assistants are peace officers.

History. Enact. Acts 1952, ch. 53, §§ 32, 33, effective March 14, 1952.

77.150. Prohibitions inapplicable unless district activated.

The provisions of KRS 77.150 to 77.175 do not apply within any air pollution control district unless and until, pursuant to resolution and ordinance as provided in KRS 77.010 to 77.060 , such air pollution control district may function and exercise its powers.

History. Enact. Acts 1952, ch. 53, § 34, effective March 14, 1952; 1994, ch. 420, § 12, effective July 15, 1994.

77.155. Prohibited emission of air contaminants.

  1. A person shall not, nor shall an agent or employee of a person, nor shall a person as agent or employee of another, discharge into the atmosphere from any single source of emission whatsoever, any air contaminant in quantities and for a period or periods in excess of applicable emission standards established by regulation by the air pollution control board. Exceeding these standards shall constitute a rebuttable presumption of violation of this section.
  2. A person shall not, nor shall an agent or employee of a person, nor shall a person as agent or employee of another, discharge from any source whatsoever such quantities of air contaminants or other material which cause injury, detriment, nuisance, or annoyance to any considerable number of persons or to the public or which endanger the comfort, repose, health, or safety of any such persons or the public or which cause or have a natural tendency to cause injury or damage to business or property. The board shall have power, by regulation, to fix reasonable limits, by weight or otherwise, for particular air contaminants or other material which in the opinion of said board may cause or have tendency to cause injury, detriment, nuisance, or annoyance to any considerable number of persons or to the public. Exceeding such limits shall be a rebuttable presumption of violation of this section.

History. Enact. Acts 1952, ch. 53, §§ 35, 36; 1954, ch. 173, § 1; 1994, ch. 420, § 3, effective July 15, 1994.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

This chapter, construed as a whole, is sufficiently broad to confer upon an Air Pollution Control District (APCD) the power to create and implement a vehicle exhaust testing program, and when measured in light of the relevant factors governing reasonability, it is clearly constitutional and enforceable. Frederick v. Air Pollution Control Dist., 783 S.W.2d 391, 1990 Ky. LEXIS 10 ( Ky. 1990 ).

2. Legislative Intent.

This chapter is clearly intended to address and regulate problems associated with air pollution, including those related to vehicle emissions. Frederick v. Air Pollution Control Dist., 783 S.W.2d 391, 1990 Ky. LEXIS 10 ( Ky. 1990 ).

Negligence per se claim of a regional airport authority, based on a previous property owner’s violation of a clean air statute, sought to recover costs incurred in cleaning up environmental contamination, which was not the harm that the statute intended to prevent. Because the complaint did not establish that the regional airport authority suffered the type of harm that the statute intended to prevent or that the regional airport authority was within the class of people the statute intended to protect, the regional airport authority was not entitled to relief for negligence per se. Reg'l Airport Auth. v. LFG, LLC., 255 F. Supp. 2d 688, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5272 (W.D. Ky. 2003 ).

Where a regional airport authority (RAA) acquired real property as part of an airport project, then sued the prior landowner to recover the cost of cleaning up environmental contamination based on the theory of negligence per se, and the RAA cited violations of KRS 77.155 , Kentucky environmental regulations, and Environmental Protection Agency regulations, the harm for which the RAA sought to recover — the costs incurred in cleaning up contamination — was not the type of harm that the cited statutes and regulations intended to prevent but rather, to avoid air pollution and contamination. Reg'l Airport Auth. v. LFG, LLC, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11904 (W.D. Ky. June 19, 2003).

Opinions of Attorney General.

An air pollution control district which has been established pursuant to this chapter may adopt more stringent standards and regulations than those of the Kentucky air pollution control commission. OAG 70.610 .

The ambient air standards adopted by the Louisville-Jefferson County air pollution control district were adopted pursuant to ceded jurisdiction under KRS 224.450 (renumbered as KRS 224.20-130 ), and the 1970 amendment to said section in no way invalidated those actions properly taken by them in adopting these standards. OAG 70-610 .

The provisions of this section would be applicable to emissions from trucks assuming that a local air pollution control district has been activated pursuant to KRS, Chapter 77 and its standards and procedures have been approved pursuant to KRS 224.450 (renumbered as KRS 224.20-130 ). OAG 72-239 .

Motor vehicles which violate duly-established emission standards are prohibited from operating in the jurisdiction for which such standards are in effect and violation of this prohibition is punishable according to KRS 77.990 . OAG 73-719 .

The air pollution control board of Jefferson County has the power and authority to establish emission limitations, other than prohibited by federal law, for particular air contaminants which are or may be emitted by motor vehicles operated within the jurisdictional boundaries of the board. OAG 73-719 .

77.160. Operations exempted from provisions of KRS 77.155.

The provisions of KRS 77.155 shall not be applicable:

  1. To buildings used exclusively for single owner-occupied private residences. However, the provisions of KRS 77.155 shall be fully effective and applicable if a renovation, demolition, or cleanup of a building may cause a disturbance of asbestos material and:
    1. The building is one (1) of a group of buildings consisting of more than one (1) building under common control; or
    2. At the time of the renovation, demolition, or cleanup, the use of the building or the property is commercial or is not known. To all larger residential buildings of whatever type, KRS 77.155 shall be effective and applicable;
  2. When a firebox, furnace, boiler, locomotive, or other fuel-consuming device is being cleaned out and a new fire is being built therein, in which event a smoke of a density as great or greater than that established by regulation by the air pollution control board shall be permitted for a period not to exceed six (6) minutes in any single period of sixty (60) minutes;
  3. To equipment used for agricultural operations in the growing of crops, or raising of fowl or animals;
  4. To smoke from fires set by or permitted by any public officer if such fire is set or permission given in the performance of the official duty of such officer for the purpose of weed abatement, the prevention of a fire or health hazard, or the instruction of public employees in the methods of fighting fire, which is, in the opinion of such officer, necessary.

History. Enact. Acts 1952, ch. 53, § 37, effective March 14, 1952; 1994, ch. 420, § 4, effective July 15, 1994.

77.165. Right of entry and inspection powers of air pollution control officer, assistants and deputies.

The air pollution control officer, his deputies and assistants, during reasonable hours, for the purpose of enforcing or administering this chapter or of any order, regulation or rule prescribed pursuant thereto, may enter every building, premises, or other place, except a building designed for and used exclusively as a private residence and may stop, detain and inspect any vehicles whether designed for and used on a public highway, rails, or in any other manner. No person shall in any way deny, obstruct, or hamper such entrance, or such stopping, detaining or inspection of such vehicle, or refuse to stop such a vehicle upon the lawful order of the air pollution control officer, his deputy or assistant.

History. Enact. Acts 1952, ch. 53, § 38, effective March 14, 1952.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

This chapter, construed as a whole, is sufficiently broad to confer upon an Air Pollution Control District (APCD) the power to create and implement a vehicle exhaust testing program, and when measured in light of the relevant factors governing reasonability, it is clearly constitutional and enforceable. Frederick v. Air Pollution Control Dist., 783 S.W.2d 391, 1990 Ky. LEXIS 10 ( Ky. 1990 ).

2. Legislative Intent.

This chapter is clearly intended to address and regulate problems associated with air pollution, including those related to vehicle emissions. Frederick v. Air Pollution Control Dist., 783 S.W.2d 391, 1990 Ky. LEXIS 10 ( Ky. 1990 ).

77.170. Stricter local regulation not preempted — Local ordinances not superseded — Exceptions.

  1. Except for subsection (3) of this section, the General Assembly does not, by the provisions of this chapter, intend to occupy the field except for requiring a county air pollution control board to exempt from the requirements of a vehicle exhaust testing program vehicles registered to military personnel on active duty whose duty station is outside of a county. Except for subsection (3) of this section, the provisions of this chapter do not prohibit the enactment or enforcement of any local ordinance stricter than the provisions of KRS 77.150 to 77.180 and stricter than the rules and regulations adopted pursuant to KRS 77.180 to 77.240 , which local ordinance prohibits, regulates, or controls air pollution.
  2. Except for subsection (3) of this section, and except for requiring a county air pollution control board to exempt from the requirements of a vehicle exhaust testing program vehicles registered to military personnel on active duty whose duty station is outside of a county, the provisions of this chapter do not supersede any such local ordinance. If it should be held that the provisions of this chapter supersede the provisions of any local ordinance, such suspension shall not bar the prosecution or punishment of any violation of such ordinance which violation was committed when such ordinance, was in full force and effect.
  3. Local ordinances prohibiting, regulating, or controlling emissions from mobile sources of air pollutants shall prohibit emissions of, regulate, or control only mobile sources of air pollutants regulated under the state program established in accordance with KRS 224.20-710 to 224.20-765 .

History. Enact. Acts 1952, ch. 53, §§ 39, 40, effective March 14, 1952; 1994, ch. 420, § 13, effective July 15, 1994; 2000, ch. 136, § 2, effective July 14, 2000; 2000, ch. 226, § 7, effective July 14, 2000.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(7/14/2000). This section was amended by 2000 Ky. Acts chs. 136 and 226, which do not appear to be in conflict and have been codified together.

77.175. Violations may be enjoined.

Any violation of any provision of KRS 77.150 to 77.175 may be enjoined in a civil action brought by the air pollution control board, the air pollution control officer, or any person aggrieved by such violation. Such abatement may be in addition to the fine hereinafter provided.

History. Enact. Acts 1952, ch. 53, § 42, effective March 14, 1952.

77.180. Orders, rules and regulations.

  1. The air pollution control board of an air pollution control district may make and enforce all needful orders, rules, and regulations necessary or proper to accomplish the purposes of this chapter for the administration of such district, and may perform all other acts necessary or proper to accomplish the purposes of this chapter.
  2. Nothing in KRS 77.150 to 77.175 limits in any way the power of the air pollution control board to make needful orders, rules, and regulations pursuant to KRS 77.180 to 77.240 . Nothing in KRS 77.150 to 77.175 permits any action contrary to any such order, rule, or regulation.

History. Enact. Acts 1952, ch. 53, §§ 41, 44, effective March 14, 1952.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

This chapter, construed as a whole, is sufficiently broad to confer upon an Air Pollution Control District (APCD) the power to create and implement a vehicle exhaust testing program, and when measured in light of the relevant factors governing reasonability, it is clearly constitutional and enforceable. Frederick v. Air Pollution Control Dist., 783 S.W.2d 391, 1990 Ky. LEXIS 10 ( Ky. 1990 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

An air pollution control district which has been established pursuant to this chapter may adopt more stringent standards and regulations than those of the Kentucky air pollution control commission. OAG 70-610 .

The ambient air standards adopted by the Louisville-Jefferson County air pollution control district were adopted pursuant to ceded jurisdiction under KRS 224.450 (renumbered as KRS 224.20-130 ), and the 1970 amendment to said section in no way invalidated those actions properly taken by them in adopting these standards. OAG 70-610 .

The Jefferson County air pollution control board has the power and authority to adopt a regulation prohibiting any person from removing, dismantling, or otherwise rendering inoperative, any air pollution control system or mechanism which is used solely to control air pollution from a motor vehicle. OAG 73-719 .

77.185. Public hearing to be held before enactment of orders, rules, or regulations — Adoption of procedural rules for the promulgation of regulations.

  1. The air pollution control board shall not enact any order, rule, or regulation until it first holds a public hearing thereon. It shall give notice of the public hearing by publication pursuant to KRS Chapter 424.
  2. The air pollution control board shall, by regulation, adopt procedural rules for the promulgation of regulations. These rules shall provide the public with a fair and reasonable opportunity for review of and comment on all proposed actions on regulations and shall ensure that the board provides full consideration to all written and oral comments prior to promulgating final regulations. The rules shall, at a minimum, provide the public with:
    1. At least thirty (30) days’ notice prior to a public hearing on proposed actions on regulations;
    2. Copies of the proposed actions at the time of the notice;
    3. A written response to all comments submitted on the proposed actions;
    4. A written statement explaining the basis for any substantive amendments made to a proposed action on regulations after its initial proposal; and
    5. An assessment of the regulatory impact on the regulated community and the public of each proposed action on regulations. The regulatory impact assessment shall include the estimated costs and savings associated with the action, the feasibility of all alternatives considered, and a comparison with any minimum or uniform standards under the Clean Air Act of 1963 as amended by the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 or any other federal requirement. The board may rely on reasonably available information in assessing the regulatory impact of its regulatory actions. The regulatory impact assessment required by this subsection need not be developed when the proposed regulatory action is substantively identical to federal standards or requirements.

History. Enact. Acts 1952, ch. 53, § 45; 1966, ch. 239, § 32; 1994, ch. 420, § 5, effective July 15, 1994.

77.190. Authority to enact orders, rules and regulations for reduction of air pollution.

Whenever the air pollution control board finds that the air in the air pollution control district is so polluted as to cause any discomfort or property damage at intervals to a substantial number of inhabitants of the district, the air pollution control board may make and enforce such orders, rules, and regulations as will reduce the amount of air contaminants released within the district.

History. Enact. Acts 1952, ch. 53, § 46, effective March 14, 1952.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

This chapter, construed as a whole, is sufficiently broad to confer upon an Air Pollution Control District (APCD) the power to create and implement a vehicle exhaust testing program, and when measured in light of the relevant factors governing reasonability, it is clearly constitutional and enforceable. Frederick v. Air Pollution Control Dist., 783 S.W.2d 391, 1990 Ky. LEXIS 10 ( Ky. 1990 ).

77.192. Board to promulgate administrative regulations to implement federal statute relating to alternative emission limitations.

The air pollution control board, in conjunction with the Energy and Environment Cabinet, shall promulgate administrative regulations, rules, and orders, to implement Section 7412(i)(5) of Title 42, United States Code, relating to alternative emission limitations allowed for early reduction of emissions.

History. Enact. Acts 1992, ch. 131, § 1, effective July 14, 1992; 2010, ch. 24, § 72, effective July 15, 2010.

77.195. Regulation of installations which may cause emission of air contaminants — Issuance of permits — Changes — Submission of plans and specifications — Exempted installations.

  1. The air pollution control board may require by regulation that before any person builds, erects, alters, replaces, operates, or uses any article, machine, equipment, or other contrivance specified by the regulation the use of which may cause the issuance of air contaminants, such person shall obtain a permit to do so from the air pollution control officer. The regulation may include the requirements of Title V of the Clean Air Act of 1963 as amended by the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 and 40 C.F.R. Part 70 State Operating Permit Programs.
  2. The air pollution control board may require by regulation that it shall be unlawful for any person to violate any requirement of a permit issued by the district.
  3. Insofar as the regulations do not grant an automatic permit for the operation of any source required to be permitted under the Federal Clean Air Act of 1963, as amended by the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, or under district regulations which are in existence upon the effective date of the regulations, a permit shall not be required without first affording the owner, operator, or user thereof a reasonable time within which to apply for such permit, and to furnish the air pollution control officer the information required pursuant to KRS 77.215 .
  4. This subsection shall not apply to sources required to have a permit before construction or modification under the applicable requirements of district regulations. In all other cases, if an applicant has submitted a timely and complete application for a permit, including renewals, but final action has not been taken on the application, the source’s failure to have a permit shall not be a violation concerning the activities to be covered by the permit unless the delay in final action was due to the failure of the applicant to timely submit information required or requested to process the application. No source required to have a permit shall be in violation of district permit regulations before the date on which the source may be required to submit an application.
  5. Compliance with a permit issued in accordance with district regulations shall be deemed compliance with any applicable requirements of this chapter and with district regulations as of the date of permit issuance if:
    1. The applicable requirements are included and are specifically identified in the permit; or
    2. The district, in acting on the permit application or revision, determines in writing that other requirements specifically identified are not applicable to the source, and the permit includes the determination or a concise summary thereof.
  6. The air pollution control district shall, by regulation, allow changes within a permitted source or one operating pursuant to a timely application under subsection (3) of this section, without requiring a permit revision, if the changes are not modifications under any provision of Title I of the Federal Clean Air Act of 1963 as amended by the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, and if the changes do not exceed the emissions allowable under the permit, whether expressed as a rate of emissions or in terms of total emission. The district may allow these changes without a permit revision only if the facility provides the United States Environmental Protection Agency and the district with written notification as required by district regulations at least seven (7) days in advance of the proposed changes, unless the district establishes, by regulation, a different schedule for emergencies.
  7. The air pollution control board may require that before the air pollution control officer issues a permit to operate a source required to be permitted by district regulations or by the Federal Clean Air Act of 1963 as amended by the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, or issues a permit to build, erect, alter, or replace any equipment, that the plans, specifications, and compliance plan show, and that the permit issued by the air pollution control officer require, that the building, erection, alteration, or replacement will be done in such a manner, and that such approved equipment be used, as the air pollution control board finds will eliminate or reduce the discharge of any air contaminants.
  8. A permit shall not be required for:
    1. Any mobile equipment;
    2. Any structure designed for and used exclusively as a single owner-occupied private residence. However, if a renovation, demolition, or cleanup of a structure may cause a disturbance of asbestos material, and:
      1. The structure is one (1) of a group of structures consisting of more than one (1) structure under common control; or
      2. At the time of the renovation, demolition, or cleanup, the use of the structure or the property is commercial or is not known,

        then notice to the air pollution control officer shall be required and a permit may be required depending on the amount of asbestos material involved;

    3. Equipment used for agriculture operations in the growing of crops, or raising of fowl or animals; or
    4. Repairs or maintenance not involving structural changes to any equipment for which a permit has been granted. As used in this section, maintenance does not include operation.
  9. The air pollution control board shall not, by regulation, order, or other legally enforceable means, require reductions in the emissions of oxides of nitrogen beyond those that are necessary to meet the provisions of the Federal Clean Air Act of 1963, as amended by the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, or regulations or other requirements of the United States Environmental Protection Agency, including, but not limited to, the requirements of Title I and Title IV of the federal act, the requirements for reasonably available control technology, and reductions that are submitted for inclusion in the Kentucky state implementation plan for attainment of maintenance of a national ambient air quality standard. This subsection shall not prohibit the air pollution control board from requiring, by regulation, order, or other enforceable means, a reduction in the emission of any other air contaminant that might have the incidental effect of reducing emissions of oxides of nitrogen.

History. Enact. Acts 1952, ch. 53, §§ 47, 48, 49, effective March 14, 1952; 1994, ch. 420, § 6, effective July 15, 1994.

Compiler’s Notes.

The Federal Clean Air Act of 1963, as amended by the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, as referred to in this section is compiled as 42 USCS § 7401 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

This chapter, construed as a whole, is sufficiently broad to confer upon an Air Pollution Control District (APCD) the power to create and implement a vehicle exhaust testing program, and when measured in light of the relevant factors governing reasonability, it is clearly constitutional and enforceable. Frederick v. Air Pollution Control Dist., 783 S.W.2d 391, 1990 Ky. LEXIS 10 ( Ky. 1990 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Although subsection (1) provides that the air pollution control board may require that one obtain a permit before operating any machine, etc. which may cause air contamination, subsection (4) provides that no permit may be required for mobile equipment which would appear to include automobiles and trucks so that the air pollution control board of Jefferson County would not have the power and authority to require each resident of Jefferson County to have his motor vehicle inspected on a regularly scheduled basis. OAG 73-719 .

77.200. Authority to contract with city or county for assistance in regulation of installations.

  1. The air pollution control board may contract with the county in which the air pollution control district is located, and may contract with any city within the district, and the county and any such city may contract with the air pollution control district, for the performance of such work in the name of, and subject to the approval of, the air pollution control officer by the building department or other officer, department, or agency of the county or such city charged with the enforcement of regulations pertaining to the erection, construction, reconstruction, movement, conversion, alteration, or enlargement of buildings or structures, as will accomplish all or part of the purposes of KRS 77.195 .
  2. In a county with a board formed pursuant to KRS 77.070 , the contracts may provide for the consideration, if any, which the air pollution control district shall pay to the county or city.
  3. In all other counties such contracts may provide for the consideration, if any, which shall be paid to the city. In no event shall any consideration be paid by the district to such counties for such services.

History. Enact. Acts 1952, ch. 53, § 50, effective March 14, 1952; 1994, ch. 420, § 14, effective July 15, 1994; 2014, ch. 92, § 76, effective January 1, 2015.

77.205. Annual emission fees — Permit fees.

  1. The air pollution control board may provide by regulation a schedule of annual emission fees to cover all reasonable direct and indirect costs required to maintain authorization to develop and administer the district’s permit program requirements under Title V of the Federal Clean Air Act of 1963 as amended by the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990. Every person subject to a Title V permit shall pay the fee required by that schedule. Except as otherwise required under this section, the district’s per-ton emission fee shall be computed as follows: the approved budget for the district’s Title V permit program plus any deficit or minus any surplus from the previous fiscal year divided by the actual emissions of regulated pollutants in the previous year. The district shall exclude from the emission fee calculation the amount of a source’s actual emissions of each regulated pollutant that the source emits in excess of four thousand (4,000) tons per year. Carbon monoxide shall not be considered a regulated pollutant for purposes of assessing fees pursuant to this subsection. All emission fees assessed by the district shall be expended to develop and implement the Title V permit program. Emission fees shall be deposited in an interest-bearing account with earned interest to be deposited in the account.
  2. The air pollution control board may provide by regulation a schedule of permit fees to cover all reasonable direct and indirect costs required to develop and administer the district’s non-Title V program.
  3. Funds unexpended at the end of the fiscal year shall not lapse but shall be carried forward for future use as provided for in this section.

History. Enact. Acts 1952, ch. 53, § 51, effective March 14, 1952; 1994, ch. 420, § 7, effective July 15, 1994.

Compiler’s Notes.

Title V of the Federal Clean Air Act of 1963, as amended by the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, as referenced herein is compiled as 42 USCS § 7661 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Permissible Costs.

Given the fact that an Air Pollution Control District (APCD) is authorized to employ a private contractor to perform tests, the actual fee charged the APCD by that contractor is obviously part of the “cost” contemplated by this section, and the fact that the fee charged may include a profit to the contractor is of no significance. Frederick v. Air Pollution Control Dist., 783 S.W.2d 391, 1990 Ky. LEXIS 10 ( Ky. 1990 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Permit fees enacted pursuant to KRS Chapter 77 would have to be limited to the criteria enumerated in this section, and the maxim of expressio unius est exclusio alterius would also dictate that elements not specified in this section could not be included in a permit fee. OAG 78-757 .

The legislature in enacting this section only intended to allow the district to charge a fee covering the initial cost of issuing a permit, while the federal Clean Air Act requires the permitting agency to charge permit fees covering the cost of implementing and enforcing the terms of permits (not including the cost of enforcement actions) as well as the cost of issuance, and this disparity in the district’s authority cannot be remedied by the more general grant to the district in KRS 77.060 (1) to make such rules and regulations as are necessary to carry out the provisions of KRS Chapter 77. OAG 78-757 .

77.210. Payment of permit fees to city or county assisting in regulation of installations.

A contract entered into pursuant to KRS 77.200 may provide that fees for permits shall be paid to the county or city, the officer, department, or agency of which county or city issues the permit, and may be retained by such county or city in whole or in part as the consideration, or part thereof, for issuing such permits. Otherwise, all fees paid for the issuance of permits shall be paid into the district treasury.

History. Enact. Acts 1952, ch. 53, § 52, effective March 14, 1952.

77.215. Information concerning installations to be furnished air pollution control officer.

The air pollution control officer may, at any time, require from any person who operates any plant or uses any article, machine, equipment, or other contrivance specified by the regulations of the air pollution control board or this chapter, the use or operation of which may cause the issuance of an air contaminant, or may require from an applicant for, or holder of any permit provided for by the regulations of the air pollution control board, such information, analyses, plans or specifications as will disclose the nature, extent, quantity, or degree of air contaminants which are or may be discharged by such source.

History. Enact. Acts 1952, ch. 53, § 53; 1954, ch. 173, § 2, effective June 17, 1954.

77.220. Suspension of permit for failure or refusal to furnish information concerning installation — Notice — Reinstatement.

  1. If the holder of any permit provided for by the regulations of the air pollution control board within a reasonable time willfully fails and refuses to furnish to the air pollution control officer information, analyses, plans, or specifications requested by such air pollution control officer, the air pollution control officer may suspend the permit. He shall serve notice in writing of such suspension and the reasons therefor on the permittee.
  2. Within ten (10) days after receipt of notice of suspension the permittee may file with the hearing board a demand for a public hearing as to whether or not the permit was properly suspended.
  3. The air pollution control officer shall reinstate a suspended permit when all information, analyses, plans, and specifications are furnished.
  4. The air pollution control officer may reinstate a suspended permit where, in his opinion, good reasons exist therefor.

History. Enact. Acts 1952, ch. 53, §§ 54, 55, 56, 57, effective March 14, 1952.

77.225. Public hearing on revocation or suspension of permit.

  1. The air pollution control officer may request the hearing board to hold a public hearing to determine whether a permit should be revoked, or a suspended permit should be reinstated.
  2. Within thirty (30) days after either the air pollution control officer or the permittee has requested a public hearing the hearing board shall hold such hearing and give notice of the time and place of such a hearing to the permittee, to the air pollution control officer and to such other persons as the hearing board deems should be notified, not less than ten (10) days before the date of the public hearing.

History. Enact. Acts 1952, ch. 53, §§ 58, 59, effective March 14, 1952.

77.230. Powers of hearing board after public hearing.

After a public hearing, the hearing board may:

  1. Continue the suspension of a permit suspended by the air pollution control officer; or
  2. Remove the suspension of an existing permit invoked by the air pollution control officer pending the furnishing by the permittee of the information, analyses, plans, and specifications required; or
  3. Find that no violation exists and reinstate an existing permit; or
  4. Revoke an existing permit, if it finds:
    1. The permittee has failed to correct any conditions required by the air pollution control officer; or
    2. A refusal of a permit would be justified; or
    3. Fraud or deceit was employed in the obtaining of the permit; or
    4. Any violation of this chapter or of any rule or regulation of the air pollution control board.

History. Enact. Acts 1952, ch. 53, § 60, effective March 14, 1952.

77.235. Violations.

It shall be considered a violation of this chapter for any person to:

  1. Knowingly make any false statement in any application for a permit or in any information, analyses, plans, or specifications submitted either in conjunction therewith, or at the request of the air pollution control officer; or
  2. Build, erect, alter, replace, use, or operate any source capable of emitting air contaminants for which a permit is required by the regulations of the air pollution control district when his permit so to do has been either suspended or revoked; or
  3. Build, erect, alter, replace, use, or operate any source capable of emitting air contaminants without first obtaining a permit so to do, where such permit is required by the regulations of the air pollution control board; or
  4. Build, erect, alter, or replace, operate or use any such article, machine, equipment, or other contrivance contrary to the provisions of any permits issued under regulations adopted pursuant to KRS 77.180 to 77.240 ; or
  5. Violate any order, rule, or regulation of an air pollution control district. Every day or portion thereof during which such violation occurs or continues is a separate offense; or
  6. Fail or neglect to furnish information, analyses, plans, or specifications required by the air pollution control officer.

History. Enact. Acts 1952, ch. 53, § 61 (subsec. 1), effective March 14, 1952.

Opinions of Attorney General.

The inclusion of subsection (5) in the provisions of KRS 77.240 gives the air pollution control board of Jefferson County the power and authority to bring a civil action for the purpose of obtaining an injunction against violation of emission standards or any other order, rule, or regulation of the board. OAG 73-719 .

77.240. Injunctive relief for certain violations.

Any violation of any provision of subsections (2), (3), (4), and (5) of KRS 77.235 may be enjoined in a civil action brought by the air pollution control board, the air pollution control officer, or any person aggrieved by such violation.

History. Enact. Acts 1952, ch. 53, § 62, effective March 14, 1952; 1994, ch. 420, § 15, effective July 15, 1994.

77.245. Variances may be permitted.

The provisions of this chapter do not prohibit the discharge of air contaminants to a greater extent or for a longer time, or both, than permitted by KRS 77.150 to 77.175 or by rules, regulations, or orders of the air pollution control board, if not of a greater extent or longer time than the hearing board or a court after a hearing before the hearing board finds necessary pursuant to the provisions of KRS 77.245 to 77.275 .

History. Enact. Acts 1952, ch. 53, § 63, effective March 14, 1952.

77.250. Hearings on variances — Notice.

  1. The hearing board on its own motion or at the request of any person may hold a hearing to determine under what conditions and to what extent a variance from the requirements established by KRS 77.150 to 77.175 or by rules, regulations, or orders of the air pollution control board is necessary and will be permitted.
  2. The hearing board shall serve a notice of the time and place of a hearing to grant a variance upon the air pollution control officer and upon the applicant, if any, not less than ten (10) days prior to such hearing.

History. Enact. Acts 1952, ch. 53, § 64, effective March 14, 1952.

77.255. Fees for variances.

The air pollution control board may provide, by regulation, a schedule of fees which will yield a sum not exceeding the estimated cost of the administration of KRS 77.245 to 77.275 , for the filing of applications for variances or to revoke or modify variances. All applicants shall pay the fees required by such regulations. All such fees shall be paid into the district treasury.

History. Enact. Acts 1952, ch. 53, § 65, effective March 14, 1952.

77.260. Standards prescribed for granting variances.

  1. If the hearing board finds that because of conditions beyond control compliance with KRS 77.150 to 77.175 or with any rule, regulation, or order of the air pollution control board will result in an arbitrary and unreasonable taking of property or in the practical closing and elimination of any lawful business, occupation or activity, in either case without a sufficient corresponding benefit or advantage to the people in the reduction of air contamination, it shall prescribe other and different requirements not more onerous applicable to plants and equipment operated either by named classes of industries or persons, or to the operation of separate persons; provided, however, that no variance may permit or authorize the maintenance of a nuisance.
  2. In determining under what conditions and to what extent a variance from said requirements is necessary and will be permitted, the hearing board shall exercise a wide discretion in weighing the equities involved and the advantages and disadvantages to the residents of the district and to any lawful business, occupation or activity involved, resulting from requiring compliance with said requirements or resulting from granting a variance.

History. Enact. Acts 1952, ch. 53, §§ 66, 67, effective March 14, 1952.

77.265. Hearing on revocation or modification of variance — Notice.

  1. The hearing board may revoke or modify by written order, after a public hearing held upon not less than ten (10) days’ notice, any order permitting a variance.
  2. The hearing board shall serve, by personal service or by certified mail, return receipt requested, notice of the time and place of a hearing to revoke or modify any order permitting a variance not less than ten (10) days prior to such hearing upon the air pollution control officer, upon all persons who will be subjected to greater restrictions if such order is revoked or modified as proposed and upon all other persons interested or likely to be affected who have filed with the hearing board or air pollution control officer a written request for such notification.
  3. If either the identity or address of any person entitled to such notice is unknown, the hearing board shall serve such person by publication of notice once in a newspaper of general circulation published within the district if such newspaper is published therein, otherwise by posting at a public place at the county seat within the district.

History. Enact. Acts 1952, ch. 53, § 68, effective March 14, 1952; 1974, ch. 315, § 6; 1980, ch. 114, § 10, effective July 15, 1980.

77.270. Time limit may be specified in order permitting variance.

The hearing board in making any order permitting a variance may specify the time during which such order will be effective, in no event to exceed one (1) year, but such variance may be continued from year to year without another hearing on the approval of the air pollution control officer.

History. Enact. Acts 1952, ch. 53, § 69, effective March 14, 1952.

77.275. Continuation of variances granted by prior ordinance.

If any local ordinance has provided regulations similar to those in KRS 77.150 to 77.175 or to any order, regulation, or rule prescribed by the air pollution control board, and has provided for the granting of variances, and pursuant to the local ordinance a variance has been granted prior to the adoption of a resolution by the fiscal court and the passage of an ordinance by the legislative body, pursuant to KRS 77.010 to 77.060 , or the passage of an ordinance by the consolidated local government, the variance shall be continued as a variance of the hearing board for the time specified therein or one (1) year, whichever is shorter, or until and unless prior to the expiration of such time the hearing board modifies or revokes such variance as provided in KRS 77.245 to 77.275 .

History. Enact. Acts 1952, ch. 53, § 70, effective March 14, 1952; 2002, ch. 346, § 85, effective July 15, 2002; 2014, ch. 92, § 77, effective January 1, 2015.

77.280. Application of KRS 77.280 to 77.305 to certain hearings.

KRS 77.280 to 77.305 applies to all hearings which KRS 77.180 to 77.275 provide shall be held by the hearing board.

History. Enact. Acts 1952, ch. 53, § 71, effective March 14, 1952.

77.285. Hearing board, chairman — Rehearing.

  1. The hearing board shall select from its number a chairman.
  2. The hearing board may hold a hearing en banc or may designate two (2) or one (1) of their number to hold a hearing.
  3. If two (2) or three (3) members of the hearing board conduct a hearing the concurrence of two (2) shall be necessary to a decision.
  4. The hearing board, not less than two (2) being present, may, in its discretion, within thirty (30) days rehear any matter which was decided by a single member.

History. Enact. Acts 1952, ch. 53, §§ 72, 73, effective March 14, 1952.

77.290. Subpoenas.

  1. Whenever the members of the hearing board conducting any hearing deem it necessary to examine any person as a witness at such hearing, the chairman of the hearing board shall issue a subpoena, in proper form, commanding such person to appear before it at a time and place specified to be examined as a witness. The subpoena may require such person to produce all books, papers, and documents in his possession or under his control material to such hearing.
  2. A subpoena to appear before the hearing board shall be served in the same manner as a subpoena in a civil action.

History. Enact. Acts 1952, ch. 53, § 74, effective March 14, 1952.

77.295. Enforcement of subpoenas by contempt proceedings — Personal attachment.

  1. Whenever any person duly subpoenaed to appear and give evidence or to produce any books and papers before the hearing board neglects or refuses to appear, or to produce any books and papers, as required by the subpoena, or refuses to testify or to answer any question which the hearing board decides is proper and pertinent, he shall be deemed in contempt, and the hearing board shall report the fact to the judge of the Circuit Court of the county.
  2. Upon receipt of the report, the judge of the Circuit Court shall issue an attachment directed to the sheriff of the county where the witness was required to appear and testify, commanding the sheriff to attach such person and forthwith bring him before the judge who ordered the attachment issued.
  3. On the return of the attachment and the production of the body of the defendant, the Circuit Judge has jurisdiction of the matter. The person charged may purge himself of the contempt in the same way, and the same proceeding shall be had, and the same penalties may be imposed, and the same punishment inflicted as in the case of a witness subpoenaed to appear and give evidence on the trial of a civil cause before a Circuit Court.

History. Enact. Acts 1952, ch. 53, § 75, effective March 14, 1952.

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Contempt of court by a witness, KRS 432.230 .

77.300. Members of hearing board may administer oaths to witnesses.

At any hearing the hearing board may require all or any witnesses to be sworn before testifying. Every member of the hearing board may administer oaths in every hearing in which he participates.

History. Enact. Acts 1952, ch. 53, § 76, effective March 14, 1952.

77.305. Appeals.

  1. Any person, being a party of record at such hearing, deeming himself aggrieved, including the air pollution control district, may maintain a special proceeding in equity in the Circuit Court of the county in which the district is located, to determine the reasonableness and legality of any action of the hearing board. Such special proceeding shall be entitled to priority on the docket of said equity court.
  2. Any person filing such a special proceeding after any decision of the hearing board shall be entitled to a trial de novo and an independent determination of the reasonableness and legality of such action in such court on all issues of law, facts, and mixed questions of law and facts and opinions therein involved. Jurisdiction is hereby given such Circuit Court to determine all questions and issues properly brought before it on such appeal.
  3. Appeals may be taken from the judgment of said Circuit Court to the Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

History. Enact. Acts 1952, ch. 53, § 77; 1976, ch. 62, § 81.

77.310. Proceedings for alleged violations of chapter or regulations and for petitions for a hearing on board orders or determinations — Hearing officers.

  1. If there is reason to believe that a violation of this chapter or of a regulation promulgated under this chapter has occurred within an air pollution control district, the district shall issue and mail to or serve upon the person complained against a written notice of the provision of this chapter or the regulation allegedly violated. The district may schedule a settlement conference before the air pollution control officer or a designee at which the person complained against may appear to answer the charges set out in the notice. The conference shall be scheduled at a time not less than thirty (30) days after the date of notice unless the person complained against waives in writing the thirty (30) day period. Alleged violations that remain unresolved may be scheduled for a hearing under subsection (3) of this section at a time not less than thirty (30) days after a determination that the violation is unresolved unless the person complained against waives in writing the thirty (30) day period. The scheduling of a settlement conference or hearing shall not prevent the negotiation of a settlement of a violation prior to the conference or hearing. At any time, the air pollution control board may determine that a violation shall be resolved as a civil or criminal action in an appropriate court or referred for action to either the United States Environmental Protection Agency or the Energy and Environment Cabinet instead of being resolved as a district action.
  2. When permittees or persons not previously heard in connection with the issuance of an order or the making of a determination including, but not limited to, the issuance, denial, modification, or revocation of a permit, consider themselves aggrieved, they may file with the district a petition for a hearing. The petition shall allege that the order or determination is contrary to law or fact and is injurious to the petitioner, stating the grounds and reasons, and demanding a hearing. Unless the board considers the petition frivolous, the air pollution control officer shall serve written notice of the petition on each person named therein and shall schedule a hearing not less than sixty (60) days after the date of the petition unless the person complained against waives in writing the sixty (60) day period. The right to demand a hearing under this section shall be limited to a period of thirty (30) days after the petitioner has had actual notice, or could reasonably have had notice, of the order or determination complained of. Prior to the hearing, the air pollution control officer may require the parties to meet for settlement purposes.
  3. Hearings of unresolved violations or petitions for a hearing on orders or determinations shall be held before a qualified hearing officer who, in the discretion of the district, may serve by contract, be paid on a per diem basis, or be a full-time employee of the county not assigned to the district. The district shall provide written notice of the hearing to the person alleged to be in violation or to the petitioner. After the conclusion of the hearing, the hearing officer shall, within thirty (30) days, make a report and recommended order, which shall contain findings of fact and conclusions of law, to the secretary-treasurer. If the secretary-treasurer finds upon written request of the hearing officer that additional time is needed, the secretary-treasurer may grant an extension. The hearing officer shall serve a copy of the report and recommended order upon all parties of record to the proceedings, and the parties shall be granted the right to file exceptions within fourteen (14) days of receipt. The secretary-treasurer shall schedule a time for the air pollution control board to consider the report, exceptions, and recommended order and to decide the case. The decision shall be served by mail upon all parties and shall be a final order of the board. No order of the board on a Title V permit shall become final for appeal purposes until it is approved by the United States Environmental Protection Agency under the Federal Clean Air Act of 1963 as amended by the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990.
  4. The hearing officer shall preside at the hearing, shall keep order, and shall conduct the hearing in accordance with reasonable administrative practices. A party to a hearing under this section may be represented by counsel, make oral or written argument, offer testimony, cross-examine witnesses, or take any combination of these actions. The record of the hearing shall be open to public inspection, and copies thereof shall be made available to a person upon payment of the actual cost of reproducing the original, except as otherwise provided in district regulations.

History. Enact. Acts 1994, ch. 420, § 9, effective July 15, 1994; 2010, ch. 24, § 73, effective July 15, 2010.

Compiler’s Notes.

The Federal Clean Air Act of 1963, as amended by the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, referenced herein is compiled as 42 USCS § 7401 et seq.

77.315. Appeals from final orders of board — Appeals from Circuit Court orders.

  1. Appeals may be taken from a final order of the board rendered after a hearing. An appeal shall be taken within thirty (30) days from the rendition of an order to the Circuit Court of the county in which the district is located. A person affected by the order shall file in the Circuit Court a petition which states fully the grounds upon which a review is sought and assigns all errors relied upon. The district shall be named respondent. Notice shall be given by the appellant to all parties of record to the prior proceedings. Service on the district shall be had on the secretary-treasurer. Summons shall issue upon the petition directing the district to send its entire record, properly bound, to the clerk of the Circuit Court after certifying that the record is its entire original record or a true copy thereof, which shall be filed by the clerk of the Circuit Court and shall then become official and be considered by the Circuit Court on the review. After the case has been properly docketed in the Circuit Court, a person directly affected by the issues on appeal may, upon notice to the parties, upon proper showing, and in the discretion of the court, be permitted to intervene. Upon hearing of the appeal, the findings of the district shall constitute a rebuttable presumption of the facts found therein. The court shall review the entire record and the findings and order of the district.
  2. Appeals from orders of the Circuit Court shall be taken in the manner provided in the Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure and the Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.

History. Enact. Acts 1994, ch. 420, § 10, effective July 15, 1994.

77.320. Elimination of vehicle emissions testing program in county containing consolidated local government — Determination of need for program.

  1. If by December 1 following the approval of a consolidated local government, the county containing the adopted consolidated local government has been notified by federal authorities of the attainment of the county of the air quality standards established by the Federal Environmental Protection Agency for ozone, carbon monoxide, and nitrogen dioxide, the air pollution control district board in that county shall upon July 15, 2002, begin the necessary actions to eliminate any vehicle emissions testing program operated in the county by November 1, 2003. The air pollution control district board shall not enter into or renew any contracts with any vendors for the operation of a vehicle emissions testing program which would extend beyond this date.
  2. If a consolidated local government should be notified at a date beyond November 1, 2003, of the county’s nonattainment of the air quality standards established by the Federal Environmental Protection Agency for ozone, carbon monoxide, and nitrogen dioxide, notwithstanding the provisions of KRS 77.115 , 224.20-130 , or 224.20-760 to the contrary, the consolidated local government shall determine the need for the reestablishment, administration, operation, and the role, if any, of an air pollution control district if a vehicle emissions testing program is re-created by the consolidated local government in accordance with KRS 224.20-710 to 224.20-765 . Nothing in KRS Chapters 77 and 224 shall preclude a consolidated local government from utilizing other methods and procedures for reaching attainment of the air quality standards established by the Federal Environmental Protection Agency for ozone, carbon monoxide, and nitrogen dioxide.

History. Enact. Acts 2002, ch. 229, § 1, effective July 15, 2002; 2002, ch. 346, § 235, effective July 15, 2002.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(7/15/2002). This section was created by 2002 Ky. Acts chs. 229 and 346. Where these Acts are not in conflict, they have been codified together. Where a conflict exists, Acts ch. 346, which was last enacted by the General Assembly, prevails under KRS 446.250 . Section 240 of 2002 Ky. Acts ch. 346 states, “In case of a conflict between Section 235 of this Act and Section 1 of House Bill 618 of this 2002 Regular Session of the General Assembly, it is the intention of the General Assembly that the provisions of Section 235 of this Act shall prevail.”

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Federal Preemption.

State Legislature’s attempt to weaken the effect of the Clean Air Act, 42 USCS § 7401 et seq., by adopting a less stringent state standard was preempted under the Supremacy Clause and a permanent injunction mandating enforcement of the federal law was entered by a District Court. Defendants failed to present any evidence that Kentucky’s SIP is not “less stringent” without the VET program and, consequently, the Court concluded that the Act, both procedurally and substantively, preempts KRS 77.320 . Ky. Res. Council, Inc. v. United States EPA, 304 F. Supp. 2d 920, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1241 (W.D. Ky. 2004 ).

77.990. Penalties.

  1. A person who violates any provision of this chapter shall be liable for the assessment by the district of a civil penalty not to exceed ten thousand dollars ($10,000). Every day or any portion thereof during which the violation occurs or continues shall constitute a separate offense. If the violation is not settled by the payment of an assessment to the district, the district may proceed by a civil or criminal action with the penalties provided in subsections (2), (3), and (4) of this section. After a civil or criminal action reaches final adjudication in court, the district shall not assess a further civil penalty for the violation.
  2. In a civil action, a person who violates any of the provisions of this chapter shall be liable for a civil penalty not to exceed ten thousand dollars ($10,000). Every day or any portion thereof during which the violation occurs or continues shall constitute a separate offense.
  3. In a criminal action, any person who violates any provision of this chapter shall be punished by a fine not to exceed ten thousand dollars ($10,000) or by imprisonment for a term of less than ninety (90) days. Every day or any portion thereof during which the violation occurs or continues shall constitute a separate offense.
  4. Any person who knowingly violates any provision of this chapter, or who knowingly provides false information in any document filed or required to be maintained under this chapter, or who knowingly renders inaccurate any monitoring device or method shall upon conviction be punished by a fine not to exceed ten thousand dollars ($10,000), or by imprisonment for a term of not less than one (1) year and not more than five (5) years, or by both fine and imprisonment, for each separate violation. Every day or any portion thereof during which the violation occurs or continues shall constitute a separate offense.

History. Enact. Acts 1952, ch. 53, §§ 43, 61 (subsec. 2); 1954, ch. 173, § 3; 1972, ch. 362, § 1; 1994, ch. 420, § 11, effective July 15, 1994.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

Frederick v. Air Pollution Control Dist., 783 S.W.2d 391, 1990 Ky. LEXIS 10 ( Ky. 1990 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Motor vehicles which violate duly-established emission standards are prohibited from operating in the jurisdiction for which such standards are in effect pursuant to KRS 77.155 (2) and violation of this prohibition is punishable according to the dictates of this section. OAG 73-719 .

CHAPTER 78 County Employees’ Civil Service and Retirement

78.010. Definitions. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1944, ch. 131, § 1; 1944, ch. 132, § 1) was declared unconstitutional in Wehrman v. Steltenkamp, 304 Ky. 409 , 200 S.W.2d 949 (1947) and was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 255, § 283.

78.020. Civil service commission — Established — Membership. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1944, ch. 131, § 2) was declared unconstitutional in Wehrman v. Steltenkamp, 304 Ky. 409 , 200 S.W.2d 949 (1947) and was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 255, § 283.

78.030. Rules. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1944, ch. 131, § 3) was declared unconstitutional in Wehrman v. Steltenkamp, 304 Ky. 409 , 200 S.W.2d 949 (1947) and was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 255, § 283.

78.040. Number, classifications and salaries of employees. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1944, ch. 131, § 4) was declared unconstitutional in Wehrman v. Steltenkamp, 304 Ky. 409 , 200 S.W.2d 949 (1947) and was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 255, § 283.

78.050. Eligibility for employment. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1944, ch. 131, § 5) was declared unconstitutional in Wehrman v. Steltenkamp, 304 Ky. 409 , 200 S.W.2d 949 (1947) and was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 255, § 283.

78.060. Examination of applicants — Eligible. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1944, ch. 131, § 6) was declared unconstitutional in Wehrman v. Steltenkamp, 304 Ky. 409 , 200 S.W.2d 949 (1947) and was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 255, § 283.

78.070. Appointments — Regular, provisional. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1944, ch. 131, § 7) was declared unconstitutional in Wehrman v. Steltenkamp, 304 Ky. 409 , 200 S.W.2d 949 (1947) and was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 255, § 283.

78.080. Present employees. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1944, ch. 131, § 8) was declared unconstitutional in Wehrman v. Steltenkamp, 304 Ky. 409 , 200 S.W.2d 949 (1947) and was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 255, § 283.

78.090. Political activity forbidden. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1944, ch. 131, § 9) was declared unconstitutional in Wehrman v. Steltenkamp, 304 Ky. 409 , 200 S.W.2d 949 (1947) and was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 255, § 283.

78.100. Removal suspension or reducation — Grounds. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1944, ch. 131, § 10) was declared unconstitutional in Wehrman v. Steltenkamp, 304 Ky. 409 , 200 S.W.2d 949 (1947) and was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 255, § 283.

78.110. Hearing of charges — Notice, witnesses. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1944, ch. 131, § 11) was declared unconstitutional in Wehrman v. Steltenkamp, 304 Ky. 409 , 200 S.W.2d 949 (1947) and was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 255, § 283.

78.120. Recording of charges and decision. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1944, ch. 131, § 12) was declared unconstitutional in Wehrman v. Steltenkamp, 304 Ky. 409 , 200 S.W.2d 949 (1947) and was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 255, § 283.

78.130. Appeal. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1944, ch. 131, § 13) was declared unconstitutional in Wehrman v. Steltenkamp, 304 Ky. 409 , 200 S.W.2d 949 (1947) and was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 255, § 283.

78.140. Pensions. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1944, ch. 131, § 14) was declared unconstitutional in Wehrman v. Steltenkamp, 304 Ky. 409 , 200 S.W.2d 949 (1947) and was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 255, § 283.

78.150. Civil service commission; appointment, qualifications, term, vacancies, oath, salary; inviolate contract on establishment of pension fund. [Omitted.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1944, ch. 132, § 2) was considered unconstitutional and was omitted from the 1948 edition of the KRS and subsequent editions. See Wehrman v. Steltenkamp, 304 Ky. 409 , 200 S.W.2d 949 (1947).

78.160. Organization of commission. [Omitted.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1944, ch. 132, § 3) was considered unconstitutional and was omitted from the 1948 edition of the KRS and subsequent editions. See Wehrman v. Steltenkamp, 304 Ky. 409 , 200 S.W.2d 949 (1947).

78.170. Examination of applicants; eligible lists. [Omitted.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1944, ch. 132, § 4) was considered unconstitutional and was omitted from the 1948 edition of the KRS and subsequent editions. See Wehrman v. Steltenkamp, 304 Ky. 409 , 200 S.W.2d 949 (1947).

78.180. Appointments. [Omitted.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1944, ch. 132, § 5) was considered unconstitutional and was omitted from the 1948 edition of the KRS and subsequent editions. See Wehrman v. Steltenkamp, 304 Ky. 409 , 200 S.W.2d 949 (1947).

78.190. Status of present patrolmen. [Omitted.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1944, ch. 132, § 6) was considered unconstitutional and was omitted from the 1948 edition of the KRS and subsequent editions. See Wehrman v. Steltenkamp, 304 Ky. 409 , 200 S.W.2d 949 (1947).

78.200. Qualifications of applicants; political activity. [Omitted.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1944, ch. 132, § 7) was considered unconstitutional and was omitted from the 1948 edition of the KRS and subsequent editions. See Wehrman v. Steltenkamp, 304 Ky. 409 , 200 S.W.2d 949 (1947).

78.210. Removal, suspension or reduction; charges; hearing. [Omitted.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1944, ch. 132, § 8) was considered unconstitutional and was omitted from the 1948 edition of the KRS and subsequent editions. See Wehrman v. Steltenkamp, 304 Ky. 409 , 200 S.W.2d 949 (1947).

78.220. Appeal. [Omitted.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1944, ch. 132, § 9) was considered unconstitutional and was omitted from the 1948 edition of the KRS and subsequent editions. See Wehrman v. Steltenkamp, 304 Ky. 409 , 200 S.W.2d 949 (1947).

78.230. Number, classification and salaries of patrolmen. [Omitted.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1944, ch. 132, § 10) was considered unconstitutional and was omitted from the 1948 edition of the KRS and subsequent editions. See Wehrman v. Steltenkamp, 304 Ky. 409 , 200 S.W.2d 949 (1947).

78.240. Board of trustees of pension fund; membership, officers, treasurer. [Omitted.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1944, ch. 132, § 11) was considered unconstitutional and was omitted from the 1948 edition of the KRS and subsequent editions. See Wehrman v. Steltenkamp, 304 Ky. 409 , 200 S.W.2d 949 (1947).

78.250. Pension fund; establishment, purposes, sources, investment. [Omitted.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1944, ch. 132, § 12) was considered unconstitutional and was omitted from the 1948 edition of the KRS and subsequent editions. See Wehrman v. Steltenkamp, 304 Ky. 409 , 200 S.W.2d 949 (1947).

78.260. Control and management of pension fund; assessments on salaries of patrolmen. [Omitted.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1944, ch. 132, § 13) was considered unconstitutional and was omitted from the 1948 edition of the KRS and subsequent editions. See Wehrman v. Steltenkamp, 304 Ky. 409 , 200 S.W.2d 949 (1947).

78.270. Rules for administration of fund; decisions on applications; records. [Omitted.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1944, ch. 132, § 14) was considered unconstitutional and was omitted from the 1948 edition of the KRS and subsequent editions. See Wehrman v. Steltenkamp, 304 Ky. 409 , 200 S.W.2d 949 (1947).

78.280. Investment of pension fund. [Omitted.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1944, ch. 132, § 15) was considered unconstitutional and was omitted from the 1948 edition of the KRS and subsequent editions. See Wehrman v. Steltenkamp, 304 Ky. 409 , 200 S.W.2d 949 (1947).

78.290. Interest on investments. [Omitted.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1944, ch. 132, § 16) was considered unconstitutional and was omitted from the 1948 edition of the KRS and subsequent editions. See Wehrman v. Steltenkamp, 304 Ky. 409 , 200 S.W.2d 949 (1947).

78.300. Pension benefits for disability or death. [Omitted.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1944, ch. 132, § 17) was considered unconstitutional and was omitted from the 1948 edition of the KRS and subsequent editions. See Wehrman v. Steltenkamp, 304 Ky. 409 , 200 S.W.2d 949 (1947).

78.310. Apportionment of benefits when fund insufficient. [Omitted.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1944, ch. 132, § 18) was considered unconstitutional and was omitted from the 1948 edition of the KRS and subsequent editions. See Wehrman v. Steltenkamp, 304 Ky. 409 , 200 S.W.2d 949 (1947).

78.320. Pension after twenty years’ service. [Omitted.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1944, ch. 132, § 19) was considered unconstitutional and was omitted from the 1948 edition of the KRS and subsequent editions. See Wehrman v. Steltenkamp, 304 Ky. 409 , 200 S.W.2d 949 (1947).

78.330. Funeral benefit. [Omitted.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1944, ch. 132, § 20) was considered unconstitutional and was omitted from the 1948 edition of the KRS and subsequent editions. See Wehrman v. Steltenkamp, 304 Ky. 409 , 200 S.W.2d 949 (1947).

78.340. Recipients of pension restricted. [Omitted.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1944, ch. 132, § 21) was considered unconstitutional and was omitted from the 1948 edition of the KRS and subsequent editions. See Wehrman v. Steltenkamp, 304 Ky. 409 , 200 S.W.2d 949 (1947).

78.350. Duties of treasurer of pension fund; bond. [Omitted.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1944, ch. 132, § 22) was considered unconstitutional and was omitted from the 1948 edition of the KRS and subsequent editions. See Wehrman v. Steltenkamp, 304 Ky. 409 , 200 S.W.2d 949 (1947).

78.360. Drawing of warrants on fund. [Omitted.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1944, ch. 132, § 23) was considered unconstitutional and was omitted from the 1948 edition of the KRS and subsequent editions. See Wehrman v. Steltenkamp, 304 Ky. 409 , 200 S.W.2d 949 (1947).

78.370. Payment of warrants. [Omitted.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1944, ch. 132, § 24) was considered unconstitutional and was omitted from the 1948 edition of the KRS and subsequent editions. See Wehrman v. Steltenkamp, 304 Ky. 409 , 200 S.W.2d 949 (1947).

78.380. Report of condition of fund. [Omitted.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1944, ch. 132, § 25) was considered unconstitutional and was omitted from the 1948 edition of the KRS and subsequent editions. See Wehrman v. Steltenkamp, 304 Ky. 409 , 200 S.W.2d 949 (1947).

78.390. Advice and representation by county attorney. [Omitted.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1944, ch. 132, § 27) was considered unconstitutional and was omitted from the 1948 edition of the KRS and subsequent editions. See Wehrman v. Steltenkamp, 304 Ky. 409 , 200 S.W.2d 949 (1947).

County Police

78.400. Definitions for KRS 78.400 to 78.480 and KRS 78.990.

As used in KRS 78.400 to 78.480 and KRS 78.990 , unless the context otherwise requires the following words and terms shall have the following meaning:

  1. “Board” means the county police force merit board or boards hereinafter created.
  2. “Chief” means the chiefs of the county police forces affected by KRS 78.400 to 78.480 and KRS 78.990 .
  3. “Assistant chief” means the next in command to the chiefs of the county police forces affected by KRS 78.400 to 78.480 and KRS 78.990 .
  4. “Secretary” means the executive secretary and examiner employed by the county police force merit board or boards hereinafter created.
  5. “Officer” means any member of the county police forces affected by KRS 78.400 to 78.480 and KRS 78.990 including chiefs and assistant chiefs and all commissioned or noncommissioned patrolmen, corporals, sergeants, lieutenants and captains.
  6. “Employee” means all other employees of the county police forces affected by KRS 78.400 to 78.480 and KRS 78.990 .

History. Enact. Acts 1952, ch. 141, § 1; 1962, ch. 280, § 1; 1972, ch. 297, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Construction.

KRS 78.400 to 78.460 and 78.990 authorizing the creation of a county police force merit system superseded KRS 70.540 when accepted by the fiscal court and appellees were no longer term officers for the offices they held had been thereby abolished and their terms terminated and they now held their positions for indefinite terms, and thus their salaries could be increased without regard to Ky. Const., § 161. Tierney v. Pendleton, 253 S.W.2d 376, 1952 Ky. LEXIS 1084 ( Ky. 1952 ).

2. Probationary Appointments.

The County Police Merit Board regulation which established probationary appointments as a separate class and permitted their summary removal was void because it conflicted with the statutory scheme authorizing and providing for a county police force merit system; regardless of her designation as a probationary appointment, the police officer was a member of the county police force, a covered employee included in the merit system, and entitled to the statutory protections attending the disciplinary and removal process described in KRS 78.445 to 78.460 . Brown v. Jefferson County Police Merit Bd., 751 S.W.2d 23, 1988 Ky. LEXIS 34 ( Ky. 1988 ).

Cited:

Jefferson County Police Merit Bd. v. Bilyeu, 634 S.W.2d 414, 1982 Ky. LEXIS 260 ( Ky. 1982 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

The police departments of a city and the county could be merged under the interlocal cooperation act. OAG 67-64 ; 68-443.

A county police officer covered under a county police merit system can be a candidate for public office (assuming there is no proper local merit system rule or regulation, or as noted a statute, which would ban such activity). Such an officer cannot, however, directly campaign for public office while in uniform. Further, a county police officer covered under a county police merit system, whether on or off duty, cannot participate in political fund raising activities as described in KRS 78.435(1). Such an officer thus cannot solicit or receive directly or indirectly, campaign contributions for his or her own campaign. OAG 93-27 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

City civil service, KRS Chapter 90.

County police force authorized, KRS 70.540 .

Intercity, intercounty and city-county compacts for purchasing and merit systems; retirement and disability plans for employees of counties and cities, KRS Chapter 79.

Military leave, annual, KRS 61.396 .

78.405. Powers of counties to create police force merit system — Appropriations.

  1. Any county of the Commonwealth of Kentucky may, by order of its fiscal court, duly made and entered of record, create a county police force merit system, and for that purpose, establish a county police force merit board, whose duties it shall be to classify and examine applicants seeking employment as officers or employees of the police force of the said county, and in addition thereto to promulgate rules and regulations not inconsistent with KRS 78.400 to 78.480 and 78.990 governing the classification, qualification, examination, appointment, probation, promotion, demotion, fine, suspension and other disciplinary action within the said county police force of all personnel of the county police force or forces affected and covered by KRS 78.400 to 78.460 and 78.990 , and in addition thereto, to hold such hearings, public and executive, and impose such penalties upon the personnel affected by KRS 78.400 to 78.460 and 78.990.
  2. Fiscal courts affected hereby shall make appropriations of money for the reasonable and necessary expenses of the said board.

History. Enact. Acts 1952, ch. 141, § 2 subsecs. (1), (7); 1962, ch. 280, § 2; 1988, ch. 319, § 1, effective July 15, 1988.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

Brown v. Jefferson County Police Merit Bd., 751 S.W.2d 23, 1988 Ky. LEXIS 34 ( Ky. 1988 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

A county police officer covered under a county police merit system can be a candidate for public office (assuming there is no proper local merit system rule or regulation, or as noted a statute, which would ban such activity). Such an officer cannot, however, directly campaign for public office while in uniform. Further, a county police officer covered under a county police merit system, whether on or off duty, cannot participate in political fund raising activities as described in KRS 78.435(1). Such an officer thus cannot solicit or receive directly or indirectly, campaign contributions for his or her own campaign. OAG 93-27 .

A regulation requiring a county police officer covered by KRS 78.400 to 78.460 to resign before running for public office is within the scope of regulatory authority of a county police merit system board created pursuant to this section, as provided by subsection (1) of KRS 78.440 . OAG 94-33 .

78.410. County police force merit boards.

  1. The county judge/executive, subject to the approval of the fiscal court of the county, shall appoint four (4) persons, who shall constitute the county police force merit board of such county, who shall serve without compensation, and the county judge/executive shall be a member ex officio of the said board, but shall only vote in case of a tie vote on any matter before the board for determination. Each board appointee shall be at least thirty (30) years of age, a resident of the county affected, and not related by either blood or marriage to either the county judge/executive or any member of the fiscal court of the said county. The first members of any said board shall be appointed within the thirty (30) day period following the effective date of an order duly made and entered by a fiscal court creating a county police force merit system and merit board, and one (1) member of the board shall be appointed for a term of one (1) year, one (1) for a term of two (2) years, one (1) for a term of three (3) years, and one (1) for a term of four (4) years. Thereafter, all appointments shall be for four (4) years except that appointments to fill vacancies within the respective terms shall be made only for the unexpired period of the respective terms. Any board member may be removed by resolution of the fiscal court of the county for neglect, incapacity, misfeasance or malfeasance on the part of said board members. No appointed board member shall hold any other public office elective or appointive during his term as a member of the board, and shall not receive any money, gift or consideration of any type from any person directly or indirectly for or on account of any recommendation, proposal or suggestion bearing upon the business of the board or the county police force. Not more than two (2) members shall be adherents of the same political party.
  2. Each appointee, before entering upon the discharge of his duties, shall qualify by subscribing, taking and filing an oath of office as required by law.
  3. The members of the county police department shall elect for a two (2) year term two (2) patrolmen of the county police department with a minimum of five (5) years service or more who shall serve as members of the county police force merit board for the purpose of deciding discipline cases only and who may vote in such cases. These members shall be elected during the month of July, 1978. In case of a vacancy, a new election shall be held within sixty (60) days of the date when the vacancy occurs and the person elected shall fill the remainder of the unexpired term.

History. Enact. Acts 1952, ch. 141, § 2 (subsecs. (2), (6)); 1970, ch. 198, § 1; 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 20, § 6, effective January 2, 1978; 1978, ch. 129, § 1, effective June 17, 1978.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Quorum for Hearings.

In order to conduct a disciplinary hearing four members of the police merit board constitute a quorum, but one of those four must be a patrolman member. Jefferson County Police Merit Board v. Arnold, 593 S.W.2d 103, 1980 Ky. App. LEXIS 293 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980).

Opinions of Attorney General.

If a patrolman elected to the county police force merit board is involved in a disciplinary proceeding which is before that board, he would be disqualified from sitting as a member of the board during the consideration of his case, but he would not necessarily permanently vacate his position, requiring the election of another patrolman to the board, as that would be determined by the outcome of the disciplinary proceeding. OAG 78-671 .

Subsection (3) of this section, by using the word “patrolmen” as opposed to the more general word “officers,” which would encompass all county policemen regardless of rank, seems to be referring to only those officers holding the rank or position of patrolmen. OAG 78-671 .

The patrolmen members of the county police force merit board receive no compensation for serving on the board other than their regular salary for their position as patrolmen. OAG 82-565 .

78.415. Meetings — Minutes — Secretary.

  1. The board shall meet at least once every two (2) calendar months and minutes of the business of each meeting shall be kept.
  2. The board shall employ a secretary who shall also conduct all examinations, prepare eligible lists, and keep all records and minutes of the board’s business and perform such other duties in connection with the business of the board as may be required by the board. The secretary may be employed on either a part-time or full-time basis, and said secretary shall receive such compensation as may be recommended by the board and approved by the fiscal court. All orders and minutes of the board shall be signed by the chairman thereof, who shall be elected by the board members, and the minutes shall be countersigned by the secretary.
  3. All records and minutes of the board shall be considered public records.

History. Enact. Acts 1952, ch. 141, § 2 (subsecs. (3), (4)); 1970, ch. 198, § 2; 1996, ch. 140, § 1, effective July 15, 1996.

78.420. Chairman, vice chairman — Administrative regulations — Voting, quorum.

  1. Upon appointment and qualification of the members of the board, they shall meet within the thirty (30) days following the creation of the board and elect their chairman and vice chairman and adopt such rules and regulations and bylaws not inconsistent with KRS 78.400 to 78.480 and 78.990 for the proper conduct of their offices. In all matters requiring a vote, a majority of the board members present and voting shall determine any question, provided that at least three (3) board members be present to constitute a quorum.
  2. In cases of discipline, four (4) members of the board must be present to constitute a quorum, one (1) of which must be a police officer as defined in subsection (3) of KRS 78.410 .

History. Enact. Acts 1952, ch. 141, § 2 (subsec. (5)); 1970, ch. 198, § 3; 1988, ch. 319, § 2, effective July 15, 1988.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Quorum for Hearings.

In order to conduct a disciplinary hearing four members of the police merit board constitute a quorum, but one of those four must be a patrolman member. Jefferson County Police Merit Board v. Arnold, 593 S.W.2d 103, 1980 Ky. App. LEXIS 293 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980).

78.425. Personnel included in merit system.

  1. All police officers of whatever rank and title, and all employees, except civilian employees covered by a collective bargaining agreement, of every county police force affected by KRS 78.400 to 78.460 and 78.990 are covered by the provisions hereof, except probationary officers and employees. All covered officers and employees of every county police force on active duty or service as of the effective date of an order of the fiscal court of the county creating a county police merit system and board, shall be deemed fit and qualified to continue their respective duties of employment on or for their respective county police force without examination or further qualification, except and unless the chief of police of any county police force shall, within sixty (60) days after the establishment of the board, certify to the board that any officer or employee is physically unfit to continue his or her duties.
  2. If a merit system is established which covers a county fire department, the provisions of subsection (1) shall apply to the county fire department as they apply to the county police force.
  3. All personnel covered by the provisions (a) of KRS 78.400 to 78.460 , or (b) KRS 67.323 , 67.325 and this section, or both, except probationary officers and employees, shall be deemed to be permanent employees subject to their ability to satisfactorily perform their respective duties and further subject to their good behavior.
  4. Probationary officers and employees shall not be included in the merit system until they satisfactorily complete their initial probationary periods established by the governing merit board. Officers and employees serving promotional probationary periods, however, shall not be deemed excluded from the merit system during the promotional probationary periods.

History. Enact. Acts 1952, ch. 141, § 3 (subsecs. (1), (2)); 1962, ch. 280, § 3; 1966, ch. 148, § 3; 1988, ch. 319, § 3, effective July 15, 1988; 1994, ch. 171, § 1, effective July 15, 1994.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Probationary Appointments.

The County Police Merit Board regulation which established probationary appointments as a separate class and permitted their summary removal was void because it conflicted with the statutory scheme authorizing and providing for a county police force merit system; regardless of her designation as a probationary appointment, the police officer was a member of the county police force, a covered employee included in the merit system, and entitled to the statutory protections attending the disciplinary and removal process described in KRS 78.445 to 78.460 . Brown v. Jefferson County Police Merit Bd., 751 S.W.2d 23, 1988 Ky. LEXIS 34 ( Ky. 1988 ).

Cited:

Jefferson County Police Merit Bd. v. Bilyeu, 634 S.W.2d 414, 1982 Ky. LEXIS 260 ( Ky. 1982 ).

78.428. Police officers excluded from classified service.

  1. The provisions of KRS 78.400 , 78.405 , and 78.425 shall not apply to the chief of police, assistant chiefs, and any officers above the rank of captain of county police forces in counties having a population of 600,000 or more. Said officers shall be appointed by the county judge/executive and shall not be considered covered officers, except as provided in subsection (2) of this section.
  2. Any employee covered by the provisions of KRS 78.400 to 78.480 who shall accept an appointment and qualify as chief of police or assistant chief of police shall be deemed to have received a leave of absence from the classified service for and during the incumbency of any of said respective positions. Should any such chief or assistant chief of police cease to serve as such there shall be restored to him the same classification and rank which he held prior to said appointment. Any person not covered by the provisions of KRS 78.400 to 78.480 when appointed to the position of chief of police or assistant chief of police shall not be deemed to be part of the classified service and shall not be returned to any classification or rank in the classified service when he ceases to serve in such capacity.

History. Enact. Acts 1972, ch. 259, § 1; 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 20, § 6, effective January 2, 1978.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

The subject matter of this section, removing certain officers from the protection of a merit system in only one county, is governmental in nature and is constitutional under Ky. Const., §§ 59 and 60. Jefferson County Police Merit Bd. v. Bilyeu, 634 S.W.2d 414, 1982 Ky. LEXIS 260 ( Ky. 1982 ).

Cited:

Brown v. Jefferson County Police Merit Bd., 751 S.W.2d 23, 1988 Ky. LEXIS 34 ( Ky. 1988 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Since there is no law to the contrary, the county police, who are under the merit system, are appointed by the county judge/executive, with consent of the fiscal court, pursuant to KRS 67.710(7). OAG 83-351 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Bench & Bar.

Palmore, A Summary of Significant Decisions by the Supreme Court of Kentucky April 1982-April 1983, Vol. 47, No. 3, July 1983, Ky. Bench & Bar 14.

78.430. County judge/executive to certify information concerning personnel.

  1. Within ten (10) days after the creation of any board under KRS 78.400 to 78.460 , the county judge/executive shall certify to the board the names, rank, rate of pay, the seniority of every officer and employee on the police force as of the effective date of the fiscal court order creating the board.
  2. If there is a board in existence June 14, 1962, the county judge/executive shall within thirty (30) days certify the chief and assistant chief to the board.

History. Enact. Acts 1952, ch. 141, § 3; 1962, ch. 280, § 4.

78.435. Political activities forbidden.

  1. No officer or employee covered by the provisions of KRS 78.400 to 78.460 shall directly or indirectly solicit or receive or be in any manner whatever concerned in receiving, soliciting or publicizing any assessment, gift, subscription or contribution to or for any political party or candidate for public office.
  2. No person shall use or promise to use his personal influence or official authority to secure any appointment or promotion to any position of employment covered by the provisions of KRS 78.400 to 78.460 , as a reward or return for personal or partisan political service. No candidate applying for original appointment or promotion to any position of employment covered by KRS 78.400 to 78.460 shall sign or execute or promise to sign or execute a resignation dated or undated in advance of such appointment or promotion. No officer or employee covered by the provisions of KRS 78.400 to 78.460 shall be suspended, laid-off, demoted, promoted, fined, disciplined or threatened, or in any way changed in rank, duty or compensation for withholding or neglecting to pay or make any contribution of any sort, or character, either in money, goods or services or anything of value for any political purpose whatsoever.
  3. No examination question in any examination held by the board shall relate to any political or religious opinion, belief, affiliation or service and no appointment, promotion, demotion, suspension, fine or removal shall be brought about, effected, affected or influenced by such opinions, beliefs, affiliations or services.
  4. No officer or employee covered by KRS 78.400 to 78.460 shall foster, promote, or be concerned with any actions involving political or religious controversies or prejudices while in uniform.
  5. Nothing contained in KRS 78.400 to 78.460 shall be so construed as to abridge the rights of any officer or employee with respect to his or her personal opinions or beliefs or right to vote.

History. Enact. Acts 1952, ch. 141, § 3 (subsecs. (4), (5)), effective March 4, 1952; 1980, ch. 65, § 1, effective July 15, 1980.

Opinions of Attorney General.

A Jefferson County policeman would have to terminate his employment and tenure under the civil service system to become a candidate for political office, since there is no provision in the Jefferson County police system allowing a member a leave of absence to run for political office. OAG 73-241 .

Members of the county police force, employed under the county police merit system as prescribed in this section, are entitled to participate in those political activities enumerated in KRS 95.017 , while they are off duty and out of uniform. OAG 78-524 .

An employee of a county police department who works under the county police merit system may be a campaign manager or treasurer for a candidate seeking political office under KRS 95.017 so long as he does so only when off duty and out of uniform, and the 1980 amendment to this section was not designed to override the effect of KRS 95.017 in permitting certain political activity. OAG 81-97 .

A county police officer covered under a county police merit system can be a candidate for public office (assuming there is no proper local merit system rule or regulation, or as noted a statute, which would ban such activity). Such an officer cannot, however, directly campaign for public office while in uniform. Further, a county police officer covered under a county police merit system, whether on or off duty, cannot participate in political fund raising activities as described in subsection (1) of this section. Such an officer thus cannot solicit or receive directly or indirectly, campaign contributions for his or her own campaign. OAG 93-27 .

If an “officer or employee covered by the provisions of KRS 78.400 to 78.640 ” is the manager, secretary, or treasurer of a candidate’s campaign committee, and such person’s campaign “received, solicited or publicized any assessment, gift, subscription or contribution to or for any political party or candidate for public office,” such officer or employee would at least be “concerned” (as by having an interest) in a matter in which being concerned is banned by subsection (1) of this section. OAG 94-33 .

78.440. Board to promulgate rules governing certain subjects — Publications — Qualifications — Requirements for promotion.

  1. Every county police force merit system board created hereunder shall make, promulgate, and when necessary, amend rules for the qualifications, original appointment, probation, promotion, demotion, transfer, lay-off, reinstatement, suspension, fine, and removal of the officers and employees covered by KRS 78.400 to 78.460 . No rule or regulation made, promulgated, or amended by any county police force merit system board shall be inconsistent with the express provisions of this chapter. The board shall publish its rules and any amendments by supplying a certified copy to the county judge/executive, the fiscal court, and the chief, and by posting a copy conspicuously in the office or place where the headquarters of the county police is maintained. The rules and amendments shall be published in the manner prescribed within three (3) days after the adoption thereof.
  2. The rules in addition to other matters shall specifically provide for and cover the following:
      1. Physical, mental, educational, citizenship, and age requirements for new employees and officers. (a) 1. Physical, mental, educational, citizenship, and age requirements for new employees and officers.
      2. Physical, mental, educational, citizenship, and age requirements for new employees and officers and seniority requirements for promotion from lower to higher rank or classification.
      3. A grade A patrolman shall have three (3) years of service as a grade A patrolman before he may be eligible for the promotion to the rank of sergeant. If there are fewer than fifty (50) police officers on the police force, the merit board may waive this service requirement.
      1. Open competitive written, oral, and physical tests to determine the relative fitness of all candidates and examinations for original appointment and for promotion. (b) 1. Open competitive written, oral, and physical tests to determine the relative fitness of all candidates and examinations for original appointment and for promotion.
      2. Public notices of examinations provided in subparagraph 1 of paragraph (b) and subparagraph 2 of paragraph (a) of this subsection.
    1. Temporary appointments in case of emergency.
    2. Organization and meetings of the board.
    3. Procedure and conduct of public hearings.
  3. No county police force merit system board shall adopt a rule requiring the retirement of officers or employees prior to the first day of the month following the officer or employee’s fifty-eighth birthday. This subsection shall not prohibit retirement prior to age fifty-eight (58) on a voluntary basis.
  4. The board shall employ a chief examiner who shall be professionally qualified and experienced in the field of testing and who shall formulate, give, grade, and administer all written tests as required by the board. The chief examiner shall report to the board the results of all tests given by him and he shall be solely responsible to the board. The chief examiner shall select a panel of three (3) members to conduct an oral examination of the applicants for promotion. The panel shall consist of three (3) persons of a supervisory capacity from an outside agency or agencies in the same field and of the same rank to which the applicant is aspiring. The chief examiner shall compile the grades of all applicants in strict compliance with procedures and percentages as set out below and shall deliver, in a sealed envelope, the scores of all applicants for promotion to the chairman of the board. The chief examiner shall not reveal to anyone the results of said tests other than in the manner set forth herein. If there are fewer than fifty (50) applicants for testing, the merit board may waive the requirements of this subsection and substitute other appropriate testing methods as determined by the board, but no testing method or the grading shall depart from or be inconsistent with the procedures and percentages set out below which shall be strictly followed in determining an applicant’s eligibility for promotion.
  5. Physical fitness for promotion shall be presumed unless certified to the contrary by the chief of police who shall supply the board with medical records of the disability.
  6. At least ninety (90) days’ notice shall be given before the promotional examination is conducted.
  7. The grading of promotional tests shall be as follows: sixty percent (60%) for written examination; thirty percent (30%) for oral examination; one percent (1%) for each year in seniority in grade, not to exceed ten percent (10%). Seniority points shall be awarded for each year of service after five (5) full years of service. The results of the written and oral examinations shall be added to the seniority points available to each applicant in determining the applicant’s final evaluated rating.

History. Enact. Acts 1952, ch. 141, § 4 (subsec. (1)); 1970, ch. 198, § 4; 1980, ch. 25, § 1, effective July 15, 1980; 1980, ch. 101, § 1, effective July 15, 1980; 1988, ch. 319, § 4, effective July 15, 1988; 1990, ch. 311, § 1, effective July 13, 1990.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Promotion Factors.

Two white police sergeants could not recover for reverse discrimination after they were not recommended for available lieutenant positions, but two black police sergeants were recommended; the police department’s action in not using a state statute that relied heavily on seniority in making promotions, and instead, adopting a regulation that gave women and minorities a more equal chance at promotions by considering groups of people with relatively similar qualifying scores to be equally suited for promotions was permissible to remedy demonstrated past discrimination and the two white police sergeants did not show that the affirmative action plan represented by the regulation was used to implement an invalid plan. Jefferson County v. Zaring, 91 S.W.3d 583, 2002 Ky. LEXIS 248 ( Ky. 2002 ).

Cited:

Brown v. Jefferson County Police Merit Bd., 751 S.W.2d 23, 1988 Ky. LEXIS 34 ( Ky. 1988 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Since there is no provision in the Jefferson County police system allowing a member a leave of absence to run for political office, a Jefferson County policeman would have to terminate his employment and tenure under the civil service system in order to become a candidate. OAG 73-241 .

The filling of a vacant position in the merit system would be made by the appointing authority (county judge/executive, with consent of fiscal court) under the rules of the merit board, which rules would cover the matter of filling such position by appointing an officer already within the system or some qualified person outside of the system. OAG 83-351 .

Any promotions or pay increases for members of the police force which may come about under the rules promulgated by the merit board must be taken into account by the fiscal court in the formulation of the county budget. OAG 83-351 .

This section vests in the merit board the authority to establish rules relating inter alia to classification, promotion, and seniority and the board has the authority by the strongest implication to implement such personnel actions; there is no mention in the statutes of the fiscal court’s implementation of such rules. OAG 83-351 .

The promulgation by the board of various rules does not include such general employee matters as hours in a work week, sick leave, other leaves, compensatory time, fringe benefits, etc.; thus, the fiscal court may, by ordinance, adopt general county employee personnel policies embracing such nondisciplinarian matters as work week hours, sick and other leaves, and fringe benefits, as authorized generally by statute, which personnel policies would apply to all county employees, including policemen. OAG 83-351 .

The implementation of disciplinary rules formulated under this section takes the form of disciplinary action by the chief of police under KRS 78.445 and disciplinary action by the board under KRS 78.450 ; the implementation of the nondisciplinary rules would be by the merit board generally. OAG 83-351 .

A regulation requiring a county police officer covered by KRS 78.400 to 78.460 to resign before running for public office is within the scope of regulatory authority of a county police merit system board created pursuant to KRS 78.405 , as provided by subsection (1) of this section. OAG 94-33

78.445. Disciplinary action by chief.

  1. Any officer or employee may be removed, suspended, laid-off, reduced in grade, or fined by the chief for any cause which will promote the efficiency of the service, but before any such action is taken by the chief against any officer or employee, the chief shall furnish the officer or employee concerned with a written statement of the reasons why the described action is taken. The officer or employee may be reduced, removed, suspended, laid-off or fined from the date when such written statement of reasons is served upon him. Each officer or employee removed, suspended, laid-off, reduced in grade, or fined, shall be allowed a period of ten (10) days within which he may file written answer to the charges and reasons which caused his suspension, removal, reduction or fine, which shall be made a part of the official records of the police department. No trial or examination of witnesses shall be required in any such case except in the discretion of the chief. The chief shall likewise furnish a copy of the written charges and reasons for his action to the board.
  2. Any citizen who makes written charges of misconduct, under oath, concerning the actions of any police officer hereunder shall present the charges to the chief of police, who shall investigate said charges. The chief of police shall determine what action, if any, shall be taken against the officer, subject to the limitations set out in this chapter. The citizen may appeal the determination of the chief of police to the board.

History. Enact. Acts 1952, ch. 141, § 4 (subsec. (1)); 1970, ch. 198, § 5; 1978, ch. 126, § 1, effective June 17, 1978.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Application.

The County Police Merit Board regulation which established probationary appointments as a separate class and permitted their summary removal was void because it conflicted with the statutory scheme authorizing and providing for a county police force merit system; regardless of her designation as a probationary appointment, the police officer was a member of the county police force, a covered employee included in the merit system, and entitled to the statutory protections attending the disciplinary and removal process described in KRS 78.445 to 78.460 . Brown v. Jefferson County Police Merit Bd., 751 S.W.2d 23, 1988 Ky. LEXIS 34 ( Ky. 1988 ).

2. Suspension Without Pay.

Under this section an officer may be suspended without pay pending the hearing by the merit board. O'Bryant v. Theobald, 421 S.W.2d 571, 1967 Ky. LEXIS 65 ( Ky. 1967 ).

3. Voluntary Resignation.

The procedural safeguards given to a dismissed police officer do not apply if the officer’s resignation is voluntary and a threat by superiors to take any legally authorized action if a voluntary resignation is not received does not affect its voluntary character. Redmon v. McDaniel, 540 S.W.2d 870, 1976 Ky. LEXIS 38 ( Ky. 1976 ).

4. Appeal by Police Chief.

The chief of a county police department had standing under KRS 78.455 to appeal the action of the police merit board which reduced to one day the three-day suspension which the chief had imposed on a member of the department; the statute places the police chief in a representative/official capacity and, as such, he enjoys the same right as other parties to prosecute an appeal or review an order or decree of the board, insofar as it injuriously affects the acts of the office of the chief. Duvall v. Helm, 623 S.W.2d 234, 1981 Ky. App. LEXIS 298 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981).

5. Initiation of Disciplinary Action.

This section and KRS 15.520 do not require that disciplinary proceedings must necessarily emanate from a citizen’s sworn complaint. While disciplinary action may rest upon the sworn allegation of a complaining citizen, this does not preclude disciplinary action by the departmental authority based upon initiation from within and upon any source of information. McDaniel v. Walp, 747 S.W.2d 613, 1987 Ky. App. LEXIS 621 (Ky. Ct. App. 1987), abrogated in part, Pearce v. Univ. of Louisville, 2011 Ky. App. Unpub. LEXIS 998 (Ky. Ct. App. Nov. 18, 2011).

Opinions of Attorney General.

The implementation of disciplinary rules formulated under KRS 78.440 takes the form of disciplinary action by the chief of police under this section and disciplinary action by the board under KRS 78.450 ; the implementation of the nondisciplinary rules would be by the merit board generally. OAG 83-351 .

78.450. Disciplinary action by board.

  1. The board shall also have the right to remove, reduce, suspend, lay-off, fine or discipline any officer or employee covered by the provisions hereof on written charges of misconduct preferred on its own initiative or the initiative of any citizen, but only after reasonable notice to the accused and after a complete public hearing at which the officer or employee accused shall have the right to be present and represented by counsel and confronted by all of the witnesses preferring the charges against him. Every such employee or officer shall be given the right within ten (10) days after charges are initiated by the board or a private citizen and before the public hearing prescribed herein, to file written answer to the charges preferred against him.
  2. After full public hearing by the board, the board may retire in executive session to discuss the evidence introduced at the hearing and to make its determination and conclusion. In no case shall the board in executive session receive any further evidence or communication from any source whatsoever prior to reaching its determination and conclusion.
  3. Before the board shall remove, reduce, suspend, lay-off, fine or discipline any officer or employee covered by the provisions hereof, the charges against said officer must be presented to the officer in writing and shall be specific as to the nature of the charge or charges, giving specific, detailed information so as to allow said officer to be able to properly defend himself.

History. Enact. Acts 1952, ch. 141, § 4 (subsec. (2)); 1970, ch. 198, § 6.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Evidence.
2. — Executive Session.

The provision in this section that prohibits the merit board from receiving evidence in executive session is not violated when the board, after holding hearings on the appeal of a member of the county police force from his demotion by the chief of police pursuant to KRS 78.445 and prior to preferring its own charges against the officer under this section, interviewed and took statements from witnesses in closed session, when the information obtained did not relate to or bear upon the demotion appeal upon which the board held its hearings. O'Bryant v. Theobald, 421 S.W.2d 571, 1967 Ky. LEXIS 65 ( Ky. 1967 ).

3. Appeal by Police Chief.

The chief of a county police department had standing under KRS 78.455 to appeal the action of the police merit board which reduced to one day the three-day suspension which the chief had imposed on a member of the department; the statute places the police chief in a representative/official capacity and, as such, he enjoys the same right as other parties to prosecute an appeal or review an order or decree of the board, insofar as it injuriously affects the acts of the office of the chief. Duvall v. Helm, 623 S.W.2d 234, 1981 Ky. App. LEXIS 298 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Where a police officer was discharged by the chief of police and appealed such discharge to the police merit board and the board refused to hear his appeal because he had not alleged that his dismissal was politically, religiously or prejudicially motivated, and thereupon the dismissed officer brought a libel action against the police chief and others in the Circuit Court alleging that statements by the police chief were deliberately untrue and sometime later filed a formal complaint against the police chief, stating, among other things, that the police chief made false statements against him, since there is no information that the officer appealed the board’s decision pursuant to KRS 78.445 he is not in the position of a discharged police officer whose dismissal is pending a court appeal but his dismissal is final and he is no longer a police officer but a private citizen and has standing to bring such charges as permitted by this section; however, inasmuch as the officer’s libel suit seeks to adjudicate some of the same issues which he has brought in his citizen’s complaint, the board should administratively defer hearing the complaint until the civil court action is finally adjudicated. OAG 77-224 .

The implementation of disciplinary rules formulated under KRS 78.440 takes the form of disciplinary action by the chief of police under KRS 78.445 and disciplinary action by the board under this section; the implementation of the nondisciplinary rules would be by the merit board generally. OAG 83-351 .

78.455. Action of chief or board final — Exceptions — Appeals to courts.

In all cases provided for in KRS 78.445 and 78.450 , the action of the chief or of the board shall be final except in the following cases:

  1. Every action in the nature of a dismissal, suspension, reduction, or fine made by the chief, shall be subject to review by the board at the request of any officer or employee affected by KRS 78.400 to 78.460 , and the board shall give notice and hold a public hearing. After the public hearing, the board shall retire in executive session to discuss the evidence introduced at the hearing and make its determination and conclusion. While in executive session, the board shall not receive any further evidence or communication from any source prior to reaching its determination and conclusion. The board, while in executive session, may request and receive legal advice from board counsel on specific legal issues which may arise during deliberations. If a majority of the members of the board are of the opinion that the action of the chief is unjustified or unsupported by proper evidence, the order of the chief may be set aside and revoked by the board and the board may impose the penalty or punishment it may deem necessary and appropriate, if any.
    1. Every action in the nature of a dismissal, suspension, reduction, or fine made by the board shall be final, except that any person aggrieved thereby may, within twenty (20) days after the rendition of the action, appeal to the Circuit Court of the county in which the board meets. The board shall be named respondent as the county police force merit board, and service shall be had on the chairman thereof. The appeal taken to the Circuit Court shall be docketed by the clerk as a civil action and shall be tried anew, as if no action had been rendered by the board. (2) (a) Every action in the nature of a dismissal, suspension, reduction, or fine made by the board shall be final, except that any person aggrieved thereby may, within twenty (20) days after the rendition of the action, appeal to the Circuit Court of the county in which the board meets. The board shall be named respondent as the county police force merit board, and service shall be had on the chairman thereof. The appeal taken to the Circuit Court shall be docketed by the clerk as a civil action and shall be tried anew, as if no action had been rendered by the board.
    2. The judgment of the Circuit Court shall be subject to appeal to the Court of Appeals. The procedure as to appeal to the Court of Appeals shall be the same as in civil action.

History. Enact. Acts 1952, ch. 141, § 4 (subsec. (2)); 1966, ch. 25; 1970, ch. 198, § 7; 1978, ch. 126, § 2, effective June 17, 1978; 1990, ch. 312, § 1, effective July 13, 1990.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Sufficiency of Evidence.

Under this section, if the board finds that the action of the chief was not influenced by political activity, religious belief or prejudice, it is not required to pass on the sufficiency of the evidence. O'Bryant v. Theobald, 421 S.W.2d 571, 1967 Ky. LEXIS 65 ( Ky. 1967 ).

2. Appeal by Police Chief.

The chief of a county police department had standing under this section to appeal the action of the police merit board which reduced to one day the three-day suspension which the chief had imposed on a member of the department; this section places the police chief in a representative/official capacity and, as such, he enjoys the same right as other parties to prosecute an appeal or review an order or decree of the board, insofar as it injuriously affects the acts of the office of the chief. Duvall v. Helm, 623 S.W.2d 234, 1981 Ky. App. LEXIS 298 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981).

3. Relevant Evidence.

It is incumbent upon the Circuit Court, sitting as an appellate court for a county police merit board, to base its decision upon the transcript of the proceedings below, and any other evidence which is relevant to the issue of arbitrariness. No other evidence is to be admitted on appeal. Crouch v. Jefferson County, 773 S.W.2d 461, 1988 Ky. LEXIS 53 ( Ky. 1988 ), modified, 1989 Ky. LEXIS 41 (Ky. June 8, 1989).

Cited:

Young v. McDaniel, 664 F. Supp. 263, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17173 (W.D. Ky. 1986 ), aff’d, 826 F.2d 1066, 1987 U.S. App. LEXIS 11038 (6th Cir. Ky. 1987 ); Brown v. Jefferson County Police Merit Bd., 751 S.W.2d 23, 1988 Ky. LEXIS 34 ( Ky. 1988 ); Nelson v. Jefferson County, 863 F.2d 18, 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 16612 (6th Cir. 1988).

78.460. Board hearings to conform to due process of law — Board may issue subpoenas, compel attendance of witnesses, and compel production of documents.

Procedural due process shall be afforded to all police officers by the board. The board shall inform any officer, promptly and in writing, of any charges brought against the officer by the board. The officer shall be given a prompt hearing by the board, have an opportunity to confront his accusers, and have the privilege of presenting the board with evidence. The board shall have the power to issue subpoenas attested in the name of its chairman, to compel the attendance of witnesses, to compel the production of documents and other documentary evidence, and so far as practicable, conduct the hearing within the Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure. Upon a showing of proper need, the board shall issue subpoenas to compel the attendance of witnesses, or to compel the production of documents and other documentary evidence for the benefit of the officer or the chief at the request of the officer or the chief. Any officer who is not given a hearing within sixty (60) days of any charge placed shall be reinstated in full.

History. Enact. Acts 1952, ch. 141, § 4 (subsec. (3)); 1970, ch. 198, § 8; 1994, ch. 399, § 1, effective July 15, 1994.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Reinstatement.

Where the County Police Merit Board erroneously dismissed the police officer’s claim for a hearing without reaching the merits, she was entitled to a remand for a trial on the merits, but not to automatic reinstatement with full back pay under this section and KRS 15.520 . Brown v. Jefferson County Police Merit Bd., 751 S.W.2d 23, 1988 Ky. LEXIS 34 ( Ky. 1988 ).

78.470. Collective bargaining authorized — Strikes prohibited.

Except as provided in KRS 336.130 , in any county in the Commonwealth of Kentucky, which has a population of 300,000 or more and which has adopted the merit system, the county employees in the classified service as police may organize, form, join or participate in organizations in order to engage in lawful concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid and protection, and to bargain collectively through representatives of their own free choice. Such employees shall also have the right to refrain from any or all such activities. Strikes by said members of any such collective bargaining unit shall be prohibited at any time.

History. Enact. Acts 1972, ch. 297, § 2; 2017 ch. 1, § 10, effective January 9, 2017.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

Jefferson County Police Merit Bd. v. Bilyeu, 634 S.W.2d 414, 1982 Ky. LEXIS 260 ( Ky. 1982 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Since, except as to counties with a population of 300,000 or more that have adopted the merit system, there is no statutory requirement of collective bargaining between governmental units and police officers, agreements between a city of the fourth class and its police as to hours and wages are unenforceable and may unilaterally to modified by the city by ordinance. OAG 75-607 .

Only Jefferson County qualifies under this section as to population, and, except for Jefferson County, there is no statutory provision requiring collective bargaining between county governments and their police officers; accordingly, in those counties other than Jefferson, collective bargaining agreements, in the absence of the fiscal court’s voluntary permission or recognition, would not be enforcible or binding on the parties; however, if the fiscal court desires, in its discretion, to recognize collective bargaining, it may do so, and the agreements would then be enforcible and binding on the parties. OAG 82-79 .

Any fiscal court in Kentucky has supervision and control over county finances and county personnel, and in the exercise of its broad county powers, any fiscal court can enter into a contract with county personnel which is deemed to be in the county’s and general public’s interest and involves such items as wages, hours, terms, and conditions of employment. It was definitely not the legislative intent that this section and KRS 78.480 would negate such broad powers. OAG 82-141 .

There is ample authority in the case law and statutory law to authorize counties of less than 300,000 population to voluntarily engage in collective bargaining, leading to a finally executed written agreement which would be binding on the parties; accordingly, any such county may, through its fiscal court, voluntarily enter into a binding collective bargaining agreement with its county police force, as relates to hours, wages, and other conditions of employment. OAG 82-141 .

This section and KRS 78.480 , in a county having a population of 300,000 or more, which county has a merit system for its police force, permit such police to organize and engage in collective bargaining with fiscal court in respect to wages, hours terms and conditions of employment. OAG 82-141 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Northern Kentucky Law Review.

Zielke, Public Sector Labor Law in Kentucky, 6 N. Ky. L. Rev. 327 (1979).

78.480. Proper subjects for bargaining.

Except as provided in KRS 336.130 , in any county in the Commonwealth of Kentucky which has a population of 300,000 or more and which has adopted the merit system for its police force, the fiscal court may contract with representatives of the police employed by said county with respect to wages, hours, terms and conditions of employment, including execution of a written contract incorporating any agreement reached between the fiscal court and representatives of the police. The fiscal court shall not be required to bargain over matters of inherent managerial policy.

History. Enact. Acts 1972, ch. 297, § 3; 2017 ch. 1, § 11, effective January 9, 2017.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

Jefferson County Police Merit Bd. v. Bilyeu, 634 S.W.2d 414, 1982 Ky. LEXIS 260 ( Ky. 1982 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Only Jefferson County qualifies under KRS 78.470 as to population, and, except for Jefferson County, there is no statutory provision requiring collective bargaining between county governments and their police officers; accordingly, in those counties other than Jefferson, collective bargaining agreements, in the absence of the fiscal court’s voluntary permission or recognition, would not be enforcible or binding on the parties; however, if the fiscal court desires, in its discretion, to recognize collective bargaining, it may do so, and the agreements would then be enforcible and binding on the parties. OAG 82-79 .

Any fiscal court in Kentucky has supervision and control over county finances and county personnel, and in the exercise of its broad county powers, any fiscal court can enter into a contract with county personnel which is deemed to be in the county’s and general public’s interest and involves such items as wages, hours, terms, and conditions of employment. It was definitely not the legislative intent that KRS 78.470 and this section would negate such broad powers. OAG 82-141 .

There is ample authority in the case law and statutory law to authorize counties of less than 300,000 population to voluntarily engage in collective bargaining, leading to a finally executed written agreement would be binding on the parties; accordingly, any such county may, through its fiscal court, voluntarily enter into a binding collective bargaining agreement with its county police force, as relates to hours, wages, and other conditions of employment. OAG 82-141 .

KRS 78.470 and this section, in a county having a population of 300,000 or more, which county has a merit system for its police force, permit such police to organize and engage in collective bargaining with fiscal court in respect to wages, hours, terms and conditions of employment. OAG 82-141 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Northern Kentucky Law Review.

Zielke, Public Sector Labor Law in Kentucky, 6 N. Ky. L. Rev. 327 (1979).

County Employees Retirement System

78.510. Definitions for KRS 78.510 to 78.852. [Declared void — See LRC Note Below]

As used in KRS 78.510 to 78.852 , unless the context otherwise requires:

  1. “System” means the County Employees Retirement System;
  2. “Board” means the board of trustees of the system as provided in KRS 78.780 ;
  3. “County” means any county, or nonprofit organization created and governed by a county, counties, or elected county officers, sheriff and his employees, county clerk and his employees, circuit clerk and his deputies, former circuit clerks or former circuit clerk deputies, or political subdivision or instrumentality, including school boards, charter county government, or urban-county government participating in the system by order appropriate to its governmental structure, as provided in KRS 78.530 , and if the board is willing to accept the agency, organization, or corporation, the board being hereby granted the authority to determine the eligibility of the agency to participate;
  4. “School board” means any board of education participating in the system by order appropriate to its governmental structure, as provided in KRS 78.530 , and if the board is willing to accept the agency or corporation, the board being hereby granted the authority to determine the eligibility of the agency to participate;
  5. “Examiner” means the medical examiners as provided in KRS 61.665 ;
  6. “Employee” means every regular full-time appointed or elective officer or employee of a participating county and the coroner of a participating county, whether or not he qualifies as a regular full-time officer. The term shall not include persons engaged as independent contractors, seasonal, emergency, temporary, and part-time workers. In case of any doubt, the board shall determine if a person is an employee within the meaning of KRS 78.510 to 78.852 ;
  7. “Employer” means a county, as defined in subsection (3) of this section, the elected officials of a county, or any authority of the county having the power to appoint or elect an employee to office or employment in the county;
  8. “Member” means any employee who is included in the membership of the system or any former employee whose membership has not been terminated under KRS 61.535 ;
  9. “Service” means the total of current service and prior service as defined in this section;
  10. “Current service” means the number of years and months of employment as an employee, on and after July 1, 1958, for which creditable compensation is paid and employee contributions deducted, except as otherwise provided;
  11. “Prior service” means the number of years and completed months, expressed as a fraction of a year, of employment as an employee, prior to July 1, 1958, for which creditable compensation was paid. An employee shall be credited with one (1) month of prior service only in those months he received compensation for at least one hundred (100) hours of work. Twelve (12) months of current service in the system shall be required to validate prior service;
  12. “Accumulated contributions” means the sum of all amounts deducted from the compensation of a member and credited to his individual account in the members’ account, including employee contributions picked up after August 1, 1982, pursuant to KRS 78.610(4), together with interest credited, or investment returns earned as provided by KRS 61.5956 , on the amounts, and any other amounts the member shall have contributed thereto, including interest credited thereon or investment returns earned as provided by KRS 61.5956 . “Accumulated contributions” shall not include employee contributions that are deposited into accounts established pursuant to 26 U.S.C. sec. 401(h) within the funds established in KRS 16.510 , 61.515 , and 78.520 , as prescribed by KRS 61.702(2)(b);
  13. “Creditable compensation”:
    1. Except as provided by paragraph (b) or (c) of this subsection, means all salary, wages, and fees, including payments for compensatory time, paid to the employee as a result of services performed for the employer or for time during which the member is on paid leave, which are includable on the member’s federal form W-2 wage and tax statement under the heading “wages, tips, other compensation”, including employee contributions picked up after August 1, 1982, pursuant to KRS 78.610(4);
    2. Includes:
      1. Lump-sum bonuses, severance pay, or employer-provided payments for purchase of service credit, which shall be averaged over the employee’s service with the system in which it is recorded if it is equal to or greater than one thousand dollars ($1,000);
      2. Cases where compensation includes maintenance and other perquisites, but the board shall fix the value of that part of the compensation not paid in money;
      3. Lump-sum payments for creditable compensation paid as a result of an order of a court of competent jurisdiction, the Personnel Board, or the Commission on Human Rights, or for any creditable compensation paid in anticipation of settlement of an action before a court of competent jurisdiction, the Personnel Board, or the Commission on Human Rights, including notices of violations of state or federal wage and hour statutes or violations of state or federal discrimination statutes, which shall be credited to the fiscal year during which the wages were earned or should have been paid by the employer. This subparagraph shall also include lump-sum payments for reinstated wages pursuant to KRS 61.569 , which shall be credited to the period during which the wages were earned or should have been paid by the employer;
      4. Amounts which are not includable in the member’s gross income by virtue of the member having taken a voluntary salary reduction provided for under applicable provisions of the Internal Revenue Code; and
      5. Elective amounts for qualified transportation fringes paid or made available on or after January 1, 2001, for calendar years on or after January 1, 2001, that are not includable in the gross income of the employee by reason of 26 U.S.C. sec. 132(f)(4) ; and
    3. Excludes:
      1. Uniform, equipment, or any other expense allowances paid on or after January 1, 2019, living allowances, expense reimbursements, lump-sum payments for accrued vacation leave, sick leave except as provided in KRS 78.616(5), and other items determined by the board;
      2. For employees who begin participating on or after September 1, 2008, lump-sum payments for compensatory time;
      3. Training incentive payments for city officers paid as set out in KRS 64.5277 to 64.5279 ;
      4. For employees who begin participating on or after August 1, 2016, nominal fees paid for services as a volunteer;
      5. For employees who are employed in a nonhazardous position, who began participating prior to September 1, 2008, and who retire after July 1, 2023, lump-sum payments for compensatory time upon termination of employment; and
      6. Any salary or wages paid to an employee for services as a Kentucky State Police school resource officer as defined by KRS 158.441 ;
  14. “Final compensation” means:
    1. For a member who begins participating before September 1, 2008, who is employed in a nonhazardous position, the creditable compensation of the member during the five (5) fiscal years he was paid at the highest average monthly rate divided by the number of months of service credit during that five (5) year period multiplied by twelve (12). The five (5) years may be fractional and need not be consecutive, except that for members retiring on or after January 1, 2019, the five (5) fiscal years shall be complete fiscal years. If the number of months of service credit during the five (5) year period is less than forty-eight (48) for members retiring prior to January 1, 2019, one (1) or more additional fiscal years shall be used. If a member retiring on or after January 1, 2019, does not have five (5) complete fiscal years that each contain twelve (12) months of service credit, then one (1) or more additional fiscal years, which may contain less than twelve (12) months of service credit, shall be added until the number of months in the final compensation calculation is at least sixty (60) months;
    2. For a member who is employed in a nonhazardous position, whose effective retirement date is between August 1, 2001, and January 1, 2009, and whose total service credit is at least twenty-seven (27) years and whose age and years of service total at least seventy-five (75), final compensation means the creditable compensation of the member during the three (3) fiscal years the member was paid at the highest average monthly rate divided by the number of months of service credit during that three (3) year period multiplied by twelve (12). The three (3) years may be fractional and need not be consecutive. If the number of months of service credit during the three (3) year period is less than twenty-four (24), one (1) or more additional fiscal years shall be used. Notwithstanding the provision of KRS 61.565 , the funding for this paragraph shall be provided from existing funds of the retirement allowance;
    3. For a member who begins participating before September 1, 2008, who is employed in a hazardous position, as provided in KRS 61.592 , and who retired prior to January 1, 2019, the creditable compensation of the member during the three (3) fiscal years he was paid at the highest average monthly rate divided by the number of months of service credit during that three (3) year period multiplied by twelve (12). The three (3) years may be fractional and need not be consecutive. If the number of months of service credit during the three (3) year period is less than twenty-four (24), one (1) or more additional fiscal years, which may contain less than twelve (12) months of service credit, shall be used;
    4. For a member who begins participating on or after September 1, 2008, but prior to January 1, 2014, who is employed in a nonhazardous position, the creditable compensation of the member during the five (5) complete fiscal years immediately preceding retirement divided by five (5). Each fiscal year used to determine final compensation must contain twelve (12) months of service credit. If the member does not have five (5) complete fiscal years that each contain twelve (12) months of service credit, then one (1) or more additional fiscal years, which may contain less than twelve (12) months of service credit, shall be added until the number of months in the final compensation calculation is at least sixty (60) months; or
    5. For a member who begins participating on or after September 1, 2008, but prior to January 1, 2014, who is employed in a hazardous position as provided in KRS 61.592 , or for a member who begins participating prior to September 1, 2008, who is employed in a hazardous position as provided in KRS 61.592, who retires on or after January 1, 2019, the creditable compensation of the member during the three (3) complete fiscal years he was paid at the highest average monthly rate divided by three (3). Each fiscal year used to determine final compensation must contain twelve (12) months of service credit. If the member does not have three (3) complete fiscal years that each contain twelve (12) months of service credit, then one (1) or more additional fiscal years, which may contain less than twelve (12) months of service credit, shall be added until the number of months in the final compensation calculation is at least thirty-six (36) months;
  15. “Final rate of pay” means the actual rate upon which earnings of an employee were calculated during the twelve (12) month period immediately preceding the member’s effective retirement date, and shall include employee contributions picked up after August 1, 1982, pursuant to KRS 78.610(4). The rate shall be certified to the system by the employer and the following equivalents shall be used to convert the rate to an annual rate: two thousand eighty (2,080) hours for eight (8) hour workdays, one thousand nine hundred fifty (1,950) hours for seven and one-half (7.5) hour workdays, two hundred sixty (260) days, fifty-two (52) weeks, twelve (12) months, one (1) year;
  16. “Retirement allowance” means the retirement payments to which a member is entitled;
  17. “Actuarial equivalent” means a benefit of equal value when computed upon the basis of the actuarial tables adopted by the board. In cases of disability retirement, the options authorized by KRS 61.635 shall be computed by adding ten (10) years to the age of the member, unless the member has chosen the Social Security adjustment option as provided for in KRS 61.635 (8), in which case the member’s actual age shall be used. For members who begin participating in the system prior to January 1, 2014, no disability retirement option shall be less than the same option computed under early retirement;
  18. “Normal retirement date” means the sixty-fifth birthday of a member unless otherwise provided in KRS 78.510 to 78.852 ;
  19. “Fiscal year” of the system means the twelve (12) months from July 1 through the following June 30, which shall also be the plan year. The “fiscal year” shall be the limitation year used to determine contribution and benefits limits as set out in 26 U.S.C. sec. 415 ;
  20. “Agency reporting official” means the person designated by the participating agency who shall be responsible for forwarding all employer and employee contributions and a record of the contributions to the system and for performing other administrative duties pursuant to the provisions of KRS 78.510 to 78.852 ;
  21. “Regular full-time positions,” as used in subsection (6) of this section, shall mean all positions that average one hundred (100) or more hours per month, determined by using the number of hours actually worked in a calendar or fiscal year, or eighty (80) or more hours per month in the case of noncertified employees of school boards, determined by using the number of hours actually worked in a calendar or school year, unless otherwise specified, except:
    1. Seasonal positions, which although temporary in duration, are positions which coincide in duration with a particular season or seasons of the year and that may recur regularly from year to year, in which case the period of time shall not exceed nine (9) months, except for employees of school boards, in which case the period of time shall not exceed six (6) months;
    2. Emergency positions that are positions that do not exceed thirty (30) working days and are nonrenewable;
    3. Temporary positions that are positions of employment with a participating agency for a period of time not to exceed twelve (12) months and not renewable;
    4. Probationary positions which are positions of employment with a participating employer that do not exceed twelve (12) months and that are used uniformly by the participating agency on new employees who would otherwise be eligible for participation in the system. Probationary positions shall not be renewable by the participating employer for the same employee, unless the employee has not been employed with the participating employer for a period of at least twelve (12) months; or
    5. Part-time positions that are positions that may be permanent in duration, but that require less than a calendar or fiscal year average of one hundred (100) hours of work per month, determined by using the number of months actually worked within a calendar or fiscal year, in the performance of duty, except in case of noncertified employees of school boards, the school term average shall be eighty (80) hours of work per month, determined by using the number of months actually worked in a calendar or school year, in the performance of duty;
  22. “Alternate participation plan” means a method of participation in the system as provided for by KRS 78.530(3);
  23. “Retired member” means any former member receiving a retirement allowance or any former member who has on file at the retirement office the necessary documents for retirement benefits and is no longer contributing to the system;
  24. “Current rate of pay” means the member’s actual hourly, daily, weekly, biweekly, monthly, or yearly rate of pay converted to an annual rate as defined in final rate of pay. The rate shall be certified by the employer;
  25. “Beneficiary” means the person, persons, estate, trust, or trustee designated by the member in accordance with KRS 61.542 or 61.705 to receive any available benefits in the event of the member’s death. As used in KRS 61.702 , beneficiary shall not mean an estate, trust, or trustee;
  26. “Recipient” means the retired member, the person or persons designated as beneficiary by the member and drawing a retirement allowance as a result of the member’s death, or a dependent child drawing a retirement allowance. An alternate payee of a qualified domestic relations order shall not be considered a recipient, except for purposes of KRS 61.623 ;
  27. “Person” means a natural person;
  28. “School term or year” means the twelve (12) months from July 1 through the following June 30;
  29. “Retirement office” means the Kentucky Retirement Systems office building in Frankfort;
  30. “Delayed contribution payment” means an amount paid by an employee for current service obtained under KRS 61.552 . The amount shall be determined using the same formula in KRS 61.5525 , except the determination of the actuarial cost for classified employees of a school board shall be based on their final compensation, and the payment shall not be picked up by the employer. A delayed contribution payment shall be deposited to the member’s account and considered as accumulated contributions of the individual member. In determining payments under this subsection, the formula found in this subsection shall prevail over the one found in KRS 212.434 ;
  31. “Participating” means an employee is currently earning service credit in the system as provided in KRS 78.615 ;
  32. “Month” means a calendar month;
  33. “Membership date” means the date upon which the member began participating in the system as provided in KRS 78.615 ;
  34. “Participant” means a member, as defined by subsection (8) of this section, or a retired member, as defined by subsection (23) of this section;
  35. “Qualified domestic relations order” means any judgment, decree, or order, including approval of a property settlement agreement, that:
    1. Is issued by a court or administrative agency; and
    2. Relates to the provision of child support, alimony payments, or marital property rights to an alternate payee;
  36. “Alternate payee” means a spouse, former spouse, child, or other dependent of a participant, who is designated to be paid retirement benefits in a qualified domestic relations order;
  37. “Accumulated employer credit” means the employer pay credit deposited to the member’s account and interest credited on such amounts as provided by KRS 16.583 and 61.597 ;
  38. “Accumulated account balance” means:
    1. For members who began participating in the system prior to January 1, 2014, the member’s accumulated contributions;
    2. For members who began participating in the system on or after January 1, 2014, in the hybrid cash balance plan as provided by KRS 16.583 and 61.597 , the combined sum of the member’s accumulated contributions and the member’s accumulated employer credit; or
    3. For nonhazardous members who are participating in the 401(a) money purchase plan as provided by KRS 61.5956 , the combined sum of the member’s accumulated contributions and the member’s accumulated employer contributions in the 401(a) money purchase plan;
  39. “Volunteer” means an individual who:
    1. Freely and without pressure or coercion performs hours of service for an employer participating in one (1) of the systems administered by Kentucky Retirement Systems without receipt of compensation for services rendered, except for reimbursement of actual expenses, payment of a nominal fee to offset the costs of performing the voluntary services, or both; and
    2. If a retired member, does not become an employee, leased employee, or independent contractor of the employer for which he or she is performing volunteer services for a period of at least twenty-four (24) months following the retired member’s most recent retirement date;
  40. “Nominal fee” means compensation earned for services as a volunteer that does not exceed five hundred dollars ($500) per month. Compensation earned for services as a volunteer from more than one (1) participating employer during a month shall be aggregated to determine whether the compensation exceeds the five hundred dollars ($500) per month maximum provided by this subsection;
  41. “Nonhazardous position” means a position that does not meet the requirements of KRS 61.592 or has not been approved by the board as a hazardous position;
  42. “Accumulated employer contribution” means the employer contribution deposited to the member’s account and any investment returns on such amounts as provided by KRS 61.5956 ; and
  43. “Monthly average pay” means the higher of the member’s monthly final rate of pay or the average monthly creditable compensation earned by the deceased member during his or her last twelve (12) months of employment.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1958, ch. 167, § 1; 1960, ch. 165, part III, § 1; 1962, ch. 31, § 1; 1964, ch. 49, § 1; 1966, ch. 34, § 1; 1972, ch. 116, § 61; 1974, ch. 87, § 1; 1974, ch. 128, § 32; 1976, ch. 321, §§ 32, 40; 1978, ch. 311, § 20, effective June 17, 1978; 1982, ch. 166, § 28, effective July 15, 1982; 1982, ch. 423, § 15, effective July 15, 1982; 1984, ch. 111, § 49, effective July 13, 1984; 1984, ch. 198, § 1, effective July 13, 1984; 1986, ch. 176, § 1, effective July 15, 1986; 1986, ch. 90, § 22, effective July 15, 1986; 1988, ch. 349, § 31, effective July 15, 1988; 1988, ch. 364, § 3, effective July 15, 1988; 1990, ch. 117, § 1, effective July 13, 1990; 1990, ch. 401, § 13, effective July 13, 1990; 1992, ch. 240, § 51, effective July 14, 1992; 1994, ch. 485, § 25, effective July 15, 1994; 1996, ch. 31, § 2, effective July 15, 1996; 1996, ch. 167, § 24, effective July 15, 1996; 1998, ch. 105, § 21, effective July 15, 1998; 1998, ch. 300, § 2, effective July 15, 1998; 2000, ch. 210, § 4, effective July 14, 2000; 2000, ch. 385, § 33, effective July 14, 2000; 2001, ch. 7, § 8, effective June 21, 2001; 2002, ch. 52, § 18, effective July 15, 2002; 2003, ch. 169, § 13, effective March 31, 2003; 2004, ch. 36, § 31, effective July 13, 2004; 2008 (1st Ex. Sess.), ch. 1, § 25, effective June 27, 2008; 2009, ch. 71, § 1, effective June 25, 2009; 2009, ch. 77, § 24, effective June 25, 2009; 2010, ch. 148, § 7, effective July 15, 2010; 2011, ch. 44, § 4, effective June 8, 2011; 2011, ch. 52, § 4, effective June 8, 2011; 2013, ch. 120, § 72, effective July 1, 2013; 2016 ch. 25, § 2, effective July 15, 2016; 2017 ch. 32, § 17, effective June 29, 2017; 2017 ch. 126, § 3, effective June 29, 2017; 2018 ch. 151, § 7, effective April 13, 2018; 2018 ch. 107, § 15, effective July 14, 2018; 2019 ch. 197, § 5, effective April 9, 2019.

Legislative Research Commission Notes.

(4/1/2021). In codifying the amendments to this statute in 2020 Ky. Acts ch. 79, sec. 32, the Reviser of Statutes has restored two deleted statutory references. In subsection (26), the phrase “ KRS 61.623 ” was bracketed and struck through in the bill, and in subsection (37) the phrase “ KRS 16.583 and 61.597 ” was similarly bracketed and struck through. In both cases, these actions would have had the effect of deleting the language from the statute. It is clear from the context and from the history of this Act that both deletions were inadvertent errors. These corrections have been made under the authority of KRS 7.136(1).

(12/13/2018). On December 13, 2018, the Kentucky Supreme Court ruled that the passage of 2018 SB 151 (2018 Ky. Acts ch. 107), did not comply with the three-readings rule of Kentucky Constitution Section 46 and that the legislation is, therefore, constitutionally invalid and declared void. That ruling applies to changes made to this statute in that Act.

(7/14/2018). This statute was amended by 2018 Ky. Acts chs. 107 and 151, which do not appear to be in conflict and have been codified together.

Compiler's Notes.

Section 42 of Acts 1976, ch. 321 provides: “This Act shall not be construed as repealing any of the provisions of 1976 House Bill 142 [ch. 224 amending KRS 61.595 by adding provisions relating to members of General Assembly] but shall be held and construed as ancillary and supplementary thereto.”

Opinions of Attorney General.

The Attorney General’s office has no authority to determine an agency’s eligibility to participate in the county employees’ retirement system. OAG 70-730 .

For social security contributions, the employer-county’s rate should be applied to that portion of the sheriff’s fees that are received and retained by him as his personal compensation, subject to the maximum of $12,600. OAG 71-266 .

Where the jailer received part of his fees for dieting prisoners from the state, part from the city and part from the county, the jailer would be an employee of the county for retirement contribution purposes. OAG 71-269 .

Boards of education participating in the county employees retirement system must include school bus drivers who comply with the 80 hours per month work requirement of subdivision (d) of subsection (20) (now subsection (21)) of this section. OAG 74-305 .

Even though a city has not established a pension fund pursuant to KRS 90.410 and has elected to be covered under the county employees’ retirement system [KRS 78.510 (10) and 78.530 (1)] it nevertheless must continue to operate its civil service system (excluding retirement) pursuant to KRS Chapter 90. OAG 74-615 .

The board of aldermen of the City of Louisville, the Fiscal Court of Jefferson County, and the board of trustees of the Kentucky Retirement Systems have taken all those steps which are necessary for the Transit Authority of River City, to participate in the county employees’ retirement system. OAG 74-916 .

Persons hired by a county for a one-year period pursuant to a contract with the local manpower program to provide federally funded public service employment are temporary employees and, as such, they are excluded from participation in the county employees’ retirement system. OAG 75-726 .

Under the express language of subsection (13) of this section, the rental value of the residential quarters of a county jail is not creditable compensation in terms of the county employees’ retirement system. OAG 80-130 .

A county coroner who is a full-time county employee within the meaning of subsection (6) of this section can participate in the county employees’ retirement system if the county is a participating member of the system under KRS 78.530 . OAG 81-407 .

A county coroner who operates his office on a part-time basis, as defined in subsection (21)(d) of this section, or on an on-call basis can be exempted from coverage of a county employees’ retirement system since he would be a part-time worker within the meaning of subsection (21)(d) of this section. OAG 81-407 .

Bailiffs who were treated as deputy sheriffs and who worked more than 100 hours per month were covered under the county retirement system since this section expressly provides that those working in excess of 100 hours qualify as regular full-time employees. OAG 82-113 .

The failure on the part of the General Assembly to have included any reference of the county attorney and his employees operates so as to eliminate that group from being included in the definition of “county employees.” OAG 90-85 .

The individuals working in the Child Support Enforcement Division contained in the office of the county attorney are not to be considered as county employees for purposes of the county employee retirement system. OAG 90-85 .

Salaries of county attorney employees involved with the various law enforcement activities of the office and paid from fees generated by the county attorney’s collection of delinquent taxes, rather than county funds, are not subject to the requirements of the county employees retirement system; these individuals are not to be considered employees of a participating county, but rather, they are to be considered employees of the county attorney’s office. OAG 90-133 .

Circuit court clerk, as a part-time worker as ex officio county law librarian, was not eligible to have the salary for part-time work credited in relation to the County Employees Retirement System (CERS). OAG 94-45 .

Payment to the circuit court clerk for part-time work as ex officio county law librarian did not constitute “creditable compensation” within the meaning of applicable statutes; moreover, there is no provision authorizing purchase of credit for part-time service as ex officio county law librarian. OAG 94-45 .

78.510. Definitions for KRS 78.510 to 78.852. [Declared void — See LRC Note Below]

As used in KRS 78.510 to 78.852 , unless the context otherwise requires:

  1. “System” means the County Employees Retirement System;
  2. “Board” means the board of trustees of the system as provided in KRS 78.782 ;
  3. “County” means any county, or nonprofit organization created and governed by a county, counties, or elected county officers, sheriff and his or her employees, county clerk and his employees, circuit clerk and his or her deputies, former circuit clerks or former circuit clerk deputies, or political subdivision or instrumentality, including school boards, cities, charter county governments, urban-county governments, consolidated local governments, or unified local governments participating in the system by order appropriate to its governmental structure, as provided in KRS 78.530 , and if the board is willing to accept the agency, organization, or corporation, the board being hereby granted the authority to determine the eligibility of the agency to participate;
  4. “School board” means any board of education participating in the system by order appropriate to its governmental structure, as provided in KRS 78.530 , and if the board is willing to accept the agency or corporation, the board being hereby granted the authority to determine the eligibility of the agency to participate;
  5. “Examiner” means the medical examiners as provided in KRS 61.665 ;
  6. “Employee” means every regular full-time appointed or elective officer or employee of a participating county and the coroner of a participating county, whether or not he or she qualifies as a regular full-time officer. The term shall not include persons engaged as independent contractors, seasonal, emergency, temporary, and part-time workers. In case of any doubt, the board shall determine if a person is an employee within the meaning of KRS 78.510 to 78.852 ;
  7. “Employer” means a county, as defined in subsection (3) of this section, the elected officials of a county, or any authority of the county having the power to appoint or elect an employee to office or employment in the county;
  8. “Member” means any employee who is included in the membership of the system or any former employee whose membership has not ceased under KRS 78.535 ;
  9. “Service” means the total of current service and prior service as defined in this section;
  10. “Current service” means the number of years and months of employment as an employee, on and after July 1, 1958, for which creditable compensation is paid and employee contributions deducted, except as otherwise provided;
  11. “Prior service” means the number of years and completed months, expressed as a fraction of a year, of employment as an employee, prior to July 1, 1958, for which creditable compensation was paid. An employee shall be credited with one (1) month of prior service only in those months he received compensation for at least one hundred (100) hours of work. Twelve (12) months of current service in the system shall be required to validate prior service;
  12. “Accumulated contributions” means the sum of all amounts deducted from the compensation of a member and credited to his individual account in the members’ account, including employee contributions picked up after August 1, 1982, pursuant to KRS 78.610(4), together with interest credited, on the amounts, and any other amounts the member shall have contributed thereto, including interest credited thereon. “Accumulated contributions” shall not include employee contributions that are deposited into accounts established pursuant to 26 U.S.C. sec. 401(h) within the fund established in KRS 78.520 , as prescribed by KRS 61.702(2)(b);
  13. “Creditable compensation”:
    1. Except as limited by paragraph (c) of this subsection, means all salary, wages, and fees, including payments for compensatory time, paid to the employee as a result of services performed for the employer or for time during which the member is on paid leave, which are includable on the member’s federal form W-2 wage and tax statement under the heading “wages, tips, other compensation”, including employee contributions picked up after August 1, 1982, pursuant to KRS 78.610(4). The creditable compensation of fee officers who receive salary, fees, maintenance, or other perquisites as a result of their official duties is the gross amount received decreased by the cost of salary paid deputies and clerks and the cost of office supplies and other official expenses;
    2. Includes:
      1. Lump-sum bonuses, severance pay, or employer-provided payments for purchase of service credit, which shall be averaged over the employee’s service with the system in which it is recorded if it is equal to or greater than one thousand dollars ($1,000);
      2. Cases where compensation includes maintenance and other perquisites, but the board shall fix the value of that part of the compensation not paid in money;
      3. Lump-sum payments for creditable compensation paid as a result of an order of a court of competent jurisdiction, the Personnel Board, or the Commission on Human Rights, or for any creditable compensation paid in anticipation of settlement of an action before a court of competent jurisdiction, the Personnel Board, or the Commission on Human Rights, including notices of violations of state or federal wage and hour statutes or violations of state or federal discrimination statutes, which shall be credited to the fiscal year during which the wages were earned or should have been paid by the employer. This subparagraph shall also include lump-sum payments for reinstated wages pursuant to KRS 61.569 , which shall be credited to the period during which the wages were earned or should have been paid by the employer;
      4. Amounts which are not includable in the member’s gross income by virtue of the member having taken a voluntary salary reduction provided for under applicable provisions of the Internal Revenue Code; and
      5. Elective amounts for qualified transportation fringes paid or made available on or after January 1, 2001, for calendar years on or after January 1, 2001, that are not includable in the gross income of the employee by reason of 26 U.S.C. sec. 132(f)(4) ; and
    3. Excludes:
      1. Living allowances, expense reimbursements, lump- sum payments for accrued vacation leave, sick leave except as provided in KRS 78.616(5), and other items determined by the board;
      2. For employees who begin participating on or after September 1, 2008, lump-sum payments for compensatory time;
      3. Training incentive payments for city officers paid as set out in KRS 64.5277 to 64.5279 ;
      4. For employees who begin participating on or after August 1, 2016, nominal fees paid for services as a volunteer; and
      5. Any salary or wages paid to an employee for services as a Kentucky State Police school resource officer as defined by KRS 158.441 ;
  14. “Final compensation” means:
    1. For a member who begins participating before September 1, 2008, who is employed in a nonhazardous position, the creditable compensation of the member during the five (5) fiscal years he or she was paid at the highest average monthly rate divided by the number of months of service credit during that five (5) year period multiplied by twelve (12). The five (5) years may be fractional and need not be consecutive. If the number of months of service credit during the five (5) year period is less than forty-eight (48), one (1) or more additional fiscal years shall be used;
    2. For a member who is employed in a nonhazardous position, whose effective retirement date is between August 1, 2001, and January 1, 2009, and whose total service credit is at least twenty-seven (27) years and whose age and years of service total at least seventy-five (75), final compensation means the creditable compensation of the member during the three (3) fiscal years the member was paid at the highest average monthly rate divided by the number of months of service credit during that three (3) year period multiplied by twelve (12). The three (3) years may be fractional and need not be consecutive. If the number of months of service credit during the three (3) year period is less than twenty-four (24), one (1) or more additional fiscal years shall be used;
    3. For a member who begins participating before September 1, 2008, who is employed in a hazardous position, as provided in KRS 61.592 , the creditable compensation of the member during the three (3) fiscal years he or she was paid at the highest average monthly rate divided by the number of months of service credit during that three (3) year period multiplied by twelve (12). The three (3) years may be fractional and need not be consecutive. If the number of months of service credit during the three (3) year period is less than twenty-four (24), one (1) or more additional fiscal years, which may contain less than twelve (12) months of service credit, shall be used;
    4. For a member who begins participating on or after September 1, 2008, but prior to January 1, 2014, who is employed in a nonhazardous position, the creditable compensation of the member during the five (5) complete fiscal years immediately preceding retirement divided by five (5). Each fiscal year used to determine final compensation must contain twelve (12) months of service credit. If the member does not have five (5) complete fiscal years that each contain twelve (12) months of service credit, then one (1) or more additional fiscal years, which may contain less than twelve (12) months of service credit, shall be added until the number of months in the final compensation calculation is at least sixty (60) months; or
    5. For a member who begins participating on or after September 1, 2008, but prior to January 1, 2014, who is employed in a hazardous position as provided in KRS 61.592 , the creditable compensation of the member during the three (3) complete fiscal years he or she was paid at the highest average monthly rate divided by three (3). Each fiscal year used to determine final compensation must contain twelve (12) months of service credit. If the member does not have three (3) complete fiscal years that each contain twelve (12) months of service credit, then one (1) or more additional fiscal years, which may contain less than twelve (12) months of service credit, shall be added until the number of months in the final compensation calculation is at least thirty-six (36) months;
  15. “Final rate of pay” means the actual rate upon which earnings of an employee were calculated during the twelve (12) month period immediately preceding the member’s effective retirement date, and shall include employee contributions picked up after August 1, 1982, pursuant to KRS 78.610(4). The rate shall be certified to the system by the employer and the following equivalents shall be used to convert the rate to an annual rate: two thousand eighty (2,080) hours for eight (8) hour workdays, one thousand nine hundred fifty (1,950) hours for seven and one-half (7.5) hour workdays, two hundred sixty (260) days, fifty-two (52) weeks, twelve (12) months, one (1) year;
  16. “Retirement allowance” means the retirement payments to which a member is entitled;
  17. “Actuarial equivalent” means a benefit of equal value when computed upon the basis of the actuarial tables adopted by the board. In cases of disability retirement, the options authorized by KRS 61.635 shall be computed by adding ten (10) years to the age of the member, unless the member has chosen the Social Security adjustment option as provided for in KRS 61.635 (8), in which case the member’s actual age shall be used. For members who begin participating in the system prior to January 1, 2014, no disability retirement option shall be less than the same option computed under early retirement;
  18. “Normal retirement date” means the sixty-fifth birthday of a member unless otherwise provided in KRS 78.510 to 78.852 ;
  19. “Fiscal year” of the system means the twelve (12) months from July 1 through the following June 30, which shall also be the plan year. The “fiscal year” shall be the limitation year used to determine contribution and benefits limits as set out in 26 U.S.C. sec. 415 ;
  20. “Agency reporting official” means the person designated by the participating employer who shall be responsible for forwarding all employer and employee contributions and a record of the contributions to the system and for performing other administrative duties pursuant to the provisions of KRS 78.510 to 78.852 ;
  21. “Regular full-time positions,” as used in subsection (6) of this section, shall mean all positions that average one hundred (100) or more hours per month, determined by using the number of hours actually worked in a calendar or fiscal year, or eighty (80) or more hours per month in the case of noncertified employees of school boards, determined by using the number of hours actually worked in a calendar or school year, unless otherwise specified, except:
    1. Seasonal positions, which although temporary in duration, are positions which coincide in duration with a particular season or seasons of the year and that may recur regularly from year to year, in which case the period of time shall not exceed nine (9) months, except for employees of school boards, in which case the period of time shall not exceed six (6) months;
    2. Emergency positions that are positions that do not exceed thirty (30) working days and are nonrenewable;
    3. Temporary positions that are positions of employment with a participating agency for a period of time not to exceed twelve (12) months and not renewable;
    4. Probationary positions which are positions of employment with a participating employer that do not exceed twelve (12) months and that are used uniformly by the participating agency on new employees who would otherwise be eligible for participation in the system. Probationary positions shall not be renewable by the participating employer for the same employee, unless the employee has not been employed with the participating employer for a period of at least twelve (12) months; or
    5. Part-time positions that are positions that may be permanent in duration, but that require less than a calendar or fiscal year average of one hundred (100) hours of work per month, determined by using the number of months actually worked within a calendar or fiscal year, in the performance of duty, except in case of noncertified employees of school boards, the school term average shall be eighty (80) hours of work per month, determined by using the number of months actually worked in a calendar or school year, in the performance of duty;
  22. “Alternate participation plan” means a method of participation in the system as provided for by KRS 78.530(3);
  23. “Retired member” means any former member receiving a retirement allowance or any former member who has on file at the retirement office the necessary documents for retirement benefits and is no longer contributing to the system;
  24. “Current rate of pay” means the member’s actual hourly, daily, weekly, biweekly, monthly, or yearly rate of pay converted to an annual rate as defined in final rate of pay. The rate shall be certified by the employer;
  25. “Beneficiary” means the person, persons, estate, trust, or trustee designated by the member in accordance with KRS 61.542 or 61.705 to receive any available benefits in the event of the member’s death. As used in KRS 61.702 , beneficiary shall not mean an estate, trust, or trustee;
  26. “Recipient” means the retired member, the person or persons designated as beneficiary by the member and drawing a retirement allowance as a result of the member’s death, or a dependent child drawing a retirement allowance. An alternate payee of a qualified domestic relations order shall not be considered a recipient, except for purposes of KRS 61.623 ;
  27. “Person” means a natural person;
  28. “School term or year” means the twelve (12) months from July 1 through the following June 30;
  29. “Retirement office” means the Kentucky Public Pensions Authority office building in Frankfort;
  30. “Delayed contribution payment” means an amount paid by an employee for current service obtained under KRS 61.552 . The amount shall be determined using the same formula in KRS 61.5525 , except the determination of the actuarial cost for classified employees of a school board shall be based on their final compensation, and the payment shall not be picked up by the employer. A delayed contribution payment shall be deposited to the member’s account and considered as accumulated contributions of the individual member. In determining payments under this subsection, the formula found in this subsection shall prevail over the one found in KRS 212.434 ;
  31. “Participating” means an employee is currently earning service credit in the system as provided in KRS 78.615 ;
  32. “Month” means a calendar month;
  33. “Membership date” means the date upon which the member began participating in the system as provided in KRS 78.615 ;
  34. “Participant” means a member, as defined by subsection (8) of this section, or a retired member, as defined by subsection (23) of this section;
  35. “Qualified domestic relations order” means any judgment, decree, or order, including approval of a property settlement agreement, that:
    1. Is issued by a court or administrative agency; and
    2. Relates to the provision of child support, alimony payments, or marital property rights to an alternate payee;
  36. “Alternate payee” means a spouse, former spouse, child, or other dependent of a participant, who is designated to be paid retirement benefits in a qualified domestic relations order;
  37. “Accumulated employer credit” means the employer pay credit deposited to the member’s account and interest credited on such amounts as provided by KRS 16.583 and 61.597 ;
  38. “Accumulated account balance” means:
    1. For members who began participating in the system prior to January 1, 2014, the member’s accumulated contributions; or
    2. For members who began participating in the system on or after January 1, 2014, in the hybrid cash balance plan as provided by KRS 16.583 and 61.597 , the combined sum of the member’s accumulated contributions and the member’s accumulated employer credit;
  39. “Volunteer” means an individual who:
    1. Freely and without pressure or coercion performs hours of service for an employer participating in one (1) of the systems administered by Kentucky Retirement Systems or the County Employees Retirement System without receipt of compensation for services rendered, except for reimbursement of actual expenses, payment of a nominal fee to offset the costs of performing the voluntary services, or both; and
    2. If a retired member, does not become an employee, leased employee, or independent contractor of the employer for which he or she is performing volunteer services for a period of at least twelve (12) months following the retired member’s most recent retirement date;
  40. “Nominal fee” means compensation earned for services as a volunteer that does not exceed five hundred dollars ($500) per month. Compensation earned for services as a volunteer from more than one (1) participating employer during a month shall be aggregated to determine whether the compensation exceeds the five hundred dollars ($500) per month maximum provided by this subsection;
  41. “Nonhazardous position” means a position that does not meet the requirements of KRS 61.592 or has not been approved by the board as a hazardous position;
  42. “Hazardous position” means a position that meets the requirements of KRS 61.592 and has been approved by the board as hazardous;
  43. “Level-percentage-of-payroll amortization method” means a method of determining the annual amortization payment on the unfunded actuarial accrued liability as expressed as a percentage of payroll over a set period of years. Under this method, the percentage of payroll shall be projected to remain constant for all years remaining in the set period and the unfunded actuarially accrued liability shall be projected to be fully amortized at the conclusion of the set period;
  44. “Increment” means twelve (12) months of service credit which are purchased. The twelve (12) months need not be consecutive. The final increment may be less than twelve (12) months;
  45. “Monthly average pay” means the higher of the member’s monthly final rate of pay or the average monthly creditable compensation earned by the deceased member during his or her last twelve (12) months of employment;
  46. “Authority” means the Kentucky Public Pensions Authority as provided by KRS 61.505 ; and
  47. “Executive director” means the executive director of the Kentucky Public Pensions Authority.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1958, ch. 167, § 1; 1960, ch. 165, part III, § 1; 1962, ch. 31, § 1; 1964, ch. 49, § 1; 1966, ch. 34, § 1; 1972, ch. 116, § 61; 1974, ch. 87, § 1; 1974, ch. 128, § 32; 1976, ch. 321, §§ 32, 40; 1978, ch. 311, § 20, effective June 17, 1978; 1982, ch. 166, § 28, effective July 15, 1982; 1982, ch. 423, § 15, effective July 15, 1982; 1984, ch. 111, § 49, effective July 13, 1984; 1984, ch. 198, § 1, effective July 13, 1984; 1986, ch. 176, § 1, effective July 15, 1986; 1986, ch. 90, § 22, effective July 15, 1986; 1988, ch. 349, § 31, effective July 15, 1988; 1988, ch. 364, § 3, effective July 15, 1988; 1990, ch. 117, § 1, effective July 13, 1990; 1990, ch. 401, § 13, effective July 13, 1990; 1992, ch. 240, § 51, effective July 14, 1992; 1994, ch. 485, § 25, effective July 15, 1994; 1996, ch. 31, § 2, effective July 15, 1996; 1996, ch. 167, § 24, effective July 15, 1996; 1998, ch. 105, § 21, effective July 15, 1998; 1998, ch. 300, § 2, effective July 15, 1998; 2000, ch. 210, § 4, effective July 14, 2000; 2000, ch. 385, § 33, effective July 14, 2000; 2001, ch. 7, § 8, effective June 21, 2001; 2002, ch. 52, § 18, effective July 15, 2002; 2003, ch. 169, § 13, effective March 31, 2003; 2004, ch. 36, § 31, effective July 13, 2004; 2008 (1st Ex. Sess.), ch. 1, § 25, effective June 27, 2008; 2009, ch. 71, § 1, effective June 25, 2009; 2009, ch. 77, § 24, effective June 25, 2009; 2010, ch. 148, § 7, effective July 15, 2010; 2011, ch. 44, § 4, effective June 8, 2011; 2011, ch. 52, § 4, effective June 8, 2011; 2013, ch. 120, § 72, effective July 1, 2013; 2016 ch. 25, § 2, effective July 15, 2016; 2017 ch. 32, § 17, effective June 29, 2017; 2017 ch. 126, § 3, effective June 29, 2017; 2018 ch. 151, § 7, effective April 13, 2018; 2018 ch. 107, § 15, effective July 14, 2018; 2019 ch. 197, § 5, effective April 9, 2019; 2020 ch. 79, § 32, effective April 1, 2021.

78.520. Retirement system established — Fund created.

There is hereby created and established:

  1. A retirement system for employees to be known as the “County Employees Retirement System” by and in which name it shall, pursuant to the provisions of KRS 78.510 to 78.852 , transact all of its business and shall have the powers and privileges of a corporation; and
  2. A fund, called the “County Employees Retirement Fund,” which shall consist of all the assets of the system as set forth in KRS 78.510 to 78.852 . All assets received in the fund shall be deemed trust funds to be held and applied solely as provided in KRS 78.510 to KRS 78.852 .

History. Enact. Acts 1958, ch. 167, § 2; 2004, ch. 36, § 32, effective July 13, 2004.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

EEOC v. Jefferson County Sheriff’s Dep’t, 424 F.3d 467, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 20053 (6th Cir. 2005).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Where a county was delinquent in payments to the county employees’ retirement fund, which is a state fund under this section, and the board of trustees of the county employees’ retirement system proceeded under KRS 78.535 to collect this arrearage and the state treasurer under the authority of KRS 44.030 paid the arrearage to the retirement system fund out of funds which had been granted to the delinquent county by the state public defender’s office pursuant to KRS 31.050 and KRS 31.160 (now repealed), subsequently issuing a check to the delinquent county only for the amount of the grant from the public defender’s office less the retirement fund arrearage, this action violated neither Ky. Const., § 230 nor KRS 41.110 (KRS 44.030 , being considered an exception to the provisions of that section). OAG 73-561 .

A county coroner who is a full-time county employee within the meaning of subsection (6) of KRS 78.510 can participate in the county employees’ retirement system if the county is a participating member of the system under KRS 78.530 . OAG 81-407 .

A county coroner who operates his office on a part-time basis, as defined in subsection (21)(d) of KRS 78.510 , or on an on-call basis can be exempted from coverage of a county employees’ retirement system since he would be a part-time worker within the meaning of subsection (21)(d) of KRS 78.510 . OAG 81-407 .

78.530. Participation by political subdivisions — Payment — Closing of participation in local government systems — Hazardous duty coverage option. [Effective until April 1, 2021]

    1. Each county and school board, as defined in KRS 78.510 , will participate in the system by appropriate order authorizing such participation which has been entered and duly recorded in the records of the governing body of the county or school board. In cases where general purpose county government does not participate, but the sheriff and his employees or the county clerk and his employees do, the sheriff or the clerk shall retain the order in his office. The authority to issue and properly record such order of participation being hereby granted, permits such county to participate in the system. The effective date of such participation shall be fixed in the order. (1) (a) Each county and school board, as defined in KRS 78.510 , will participate in the system by appropriate order authorizing such participation which has been entered and duly recorded in the records of the governing body of the county or school board. In cases where general purpose county government does not participate, but the sheriff and his employees or the county clerk and his employees do, the sheriff or the clerk shall retain the order in his office. The authority to issue and properly record such order of participation being hereby granted, permits such county to participate in the system. The effective date of such participation shall be fixed in the order.
    2. Notwithstanding any statute to the contrary, after April 9, 2002, the systems shall deny the request for participation of any agency which does not have an irrevocable contract with the state Personnel Cabinet for health insurance coverage under KRS 18A.225 to 18A.229 for its active employees, except that:
      1. County governments entering the system between April 9, 2002, and July 1, 2003, under this section shall be excluded from this requirement; and
      2. Agencies entering the system on or after April 9, 2002, which were established by a merger or an interlocal agreement to provide public services shall be excluded from this requirement if all agencies entering into the merger or interlocal agreement had an initial participation date with the system prior to April 9, 2002.
  1. Once a county or school board participates, it shall thereafter continue to participate, except as provided in KRS 78.535 .
    1. Concurrent with the adoption of the appropriate resolution to participate in the system, a county may elect the alternate participation plan which will require the county to purchase on behalf of each employee electing coverage, at the time the county elected to participate in the system as provided under KRS 78.540(2), current service credit for employment in regular full-time positions between July 1, 1958, and the participation date of the county. Cities which participate in the system pursuant to subsection (6) of this section, KRS 79.080 , 90.400 , 90.410 , 95.520 , 95.621 , 95.761 , 95.768 , 95.852 , or 96.180 shall be required to purchase on behalf of each employee electing coverage only as much service credit as the employee has accumulated in the city-administered plan, up to the participation date of the city. Accumulated service shall include service for which an employee received a refund pursuant to KRS 95.620 or 95.866 , if such refund has been repaid. If the employee has not yet repaid the refund, he may make payment to the system by any method acceptable to the system, and the requirement of five (5) years of continuous reemployment prior to repayment of refunds shall not apply. Upon the employee’s repayment, the city shall purchase the associated service credit for the employee. Cost of such service credit over and above that which would be funded within the existing employer contribution rate shall be determined by the board’s consulting actuary. The expense of such actuarial service shall be paid by the county; (3) (a) Concurrent with the adoption of the appropriate resolution to participate in the system, a county may elect the alternate participation plan which will require the county to purchase on behalf of each employee electing coverage, at the time the county elected to participate in the system as provided under KRS 78.540(2), current service credit for employment in regular full-time positions between July 1, 1958, and the participation date of the county. Cities which participate in the system pursuant to subsection (6) of this section, KRS 79.080 , 90.400 , 90.410 , 95.520 , 95.621 , 95.761 , 95.768 , 95.852 , or 96.180 shall be required to purchase on behalf of each employee electing coverage only as much service credit as the employee has accumulated in the city-administered plan, up to the participation date of the city. Accumulated service shall include service for which an employee received a refund pursuant to KRS 95.620 or 95.866 , if such refund has been repaid. If the employee has not yet repaid the refund, he may make payment to the system by any method acceptable to the system, and the requirement of five (5) years of continuous reemployment prior to repayment of refunds shall not apply. Upon the employee’s repayment, the city shall purchase the associated service credit for the employee. Cost of such service credit over and above that which would be funded within the existing employer contribution rate shall be determined by the board’s consulting actuary. The expense of such actuarial service shall be paid by the county;
    2. The county shall establish a payment schedule subject to approval by the board for payment of the cost of such service over and above that which would be funded within the existing employer contribution rate. The maximum period allowed in a payment schedule shall be thirty (30) years, with interest at the rate actuarially assumed by the board. A shorter period is desirable and the board may approve any payment schedule provided it is not longer than a thirty (30) year period, except that cities which participate in the system pursuant to subsection (6) of this section, KRS 79.080, 90.400, 90.410, 95.520, 95.621, 95.761, 95.768, 95.852, or 96.180 may, at their option, extend the payment schedule to a maximum of thirty (30) years, may choose to make level payments at the interest rate actuarially assumed by the board over the life of the payment schedule chosen, and may retain employer contributions and the earnings thereon attributable to employees electing coverage;
    3. A city entering the system under the alternate participation plan, may, by ordinance, levy a special property tax to pay for current service credit purchased for the period between July 1, 1958, and the participation date of the city. The special tax shall be to pay, within a period of no more than fifteen (15) years, for the cost of such service credit over that which would be funded within the existing employer contribution rate, as determined by the board’s consulting actuary. The reason for levying the special tax and the disposition of the proceeds shall be part of the ordinance levying the tax. The special tax shall be rescinded when the unfunded prior service liability has been amortized, and shall not be subject to the provisions of KRS 132.017 or 132.027 . In addition, the city may maintain any tax, the proceeds of which had been devoted to funding pension obligations under the locally administered plan prior to participation in the system, for the purpose of funding current service costs incurred after the date of participation. The city may increase the tax to pay current service costs which exceed the local pension system costs to which the tax had been devoted, but the city shall not collect from the tax more revenues than are necessary to pay current service costs incurred after the date of participation. The city may continue the tax so long as it participates in the system, and the tax shall not be subject to the provisions of KRS 132.017 or 132.027 . The city shall not collect either tax authorized by this paragraph if its participation has been terminated pursuant to KRS 61.522 ;
    4. The county may at a later date purchase current service credit from July 1, 1958, to the participation date of the county by alternate participation plan for those employees who rejected membership in the system at the time the county first participated. In addition, the employer shall pay the employer contributions on the creditable compensation of the employees who later elect membership from the participation date of the county to the date the member elects participation. The employee shall pay the employee contributions on his creditable compensation from the participation date of the county to the date he elects membership plus interest at the current actuarial rate compounded annually on the employee and employer contributions. Cost of the service credit over and above that which would be funded within the existing employer contribution rate shall be determined by the board’s consulting actuary. The expense of the actuarial service shall be paid by the county. The county shall pay the cost of the service by lump sum or by adding it to the existing payment schedule established under paragraph (b) of this subsection;
    5. A county which did not participate by alternate participation may, until July 1, 1991, purchase current service credit for those employees who rejected membership in the system at the time the county first participated. The employer shall pay the employer contributions on the creditable compensation of the employees who later elect membership from the participation date of the county to the date the member elects participation. The employee shall pay the employee contributions on his creditable compensation from the participation date of the county to the date he elects membership plus interest at the current actuarial rate compounded annually on the employee and employer contributions. The county shall pay the cost of the service credit by lump sum or by establishing a payment schedule under paragraph (b) of this subsection; and
    6. A county which participated in the system but did not elect the alternate participation plan may at a later date elect the alternate participation plan. In this case, the county shall purchase on behalf of each employee participating in the system current service credit for employment in regular full-time positions between July 1, 1958, or a later date selected by the county government, and the participation date of the county. The county shall also purchase, for employees who decide to participate when the county elects the alternate participation plan, current service credit for employment in regular full-time positions between July 1, 1958, or the later date selected by the county government, and the participation date of the county. In addition, the county shall pay the employer contributions on the creditable compensation of the employees who later elect membership from the participation date of the county to the date the member elects participation. The employee shall pay the employee contributions on his creditable compensation from the participation date of the county to the date he elects membership plus interest at the current actuarial rate compounded annually on the employee and employer contributions. Cost of the service credit over that which would be funded within the existing employer contribution rate shall be determined by the board’s consulting actuary. The expense of the actuarial service shall be paid by the county. The county shall pay the cost of the service by lump sum or by a payment schedule established under paragraph (b) of this subsection.
    7. Notwithstanding any other provision of the Kentucky Revised Statutes to the contrary, this subsection shall not apply to members who begin participating in the system on or after January 1, 2014, and no county that elects to participate in the system on or after January 1, 2014, shall be eligible to participate under the alternate participation plan.
  2. Every school board not participating on June 21, 1974, shall enact a resolution of participation no later than July 1, 1976.
  3. The order of the governing body of a county, as provided for in subsection (1) of this section, may exclude from participation in the system hospitals and any other semi-independent agency. Each such excluded agency shall be identified in the order authorizing participation and such excluded agency may participate in the system as a separate agency.
    1. After August 1, 1988, except as permitted by KRS 65.156 , no local government retirement system shall be created pursuant to KRS 70.580 to 70.598 and any local government retirement systems created pursuant to KRS 79.080 , 90.400 , 90.410 , 95.768 , and KRS Chapter 96 shall be closed to new members. New employees who would have been granted membership in such retirement systems shall instead be granted membership in the County Employees Retirement System. Employees who would have been granted membership in retirement systems created pursuant to KRS 95.768 , or any other policemen or firefighters who would have been granted membership in retirement systems created pursuant to KRS 79.080 , 90.400 , or 90.410 , or any such policemen or firefighter members employed on or prior to August 1, 1988, who transfer to the County Employees Retirement System, shall be certified by their employers as working in hazardous positions. Each city participating in the County Employees Retirement System pursuant to this subsection shall execute the appropriate order authorizing such participation, shall select the alternate participation plan as described in subsection (3) of this section, and shall pay for the actuarial services necessary to determine the additional costs of alternate participation. Cities which closed their local pension systems to new members and participated in the system prior to July 15, 1988, whose employees at the time of transition were given the option to join the system shall not be required to offer said employees a second option to join the system. (6) (a) After August 1, 1988, except as permitted by KRS 65.156 , no local government retirement system shall be created pursuant to KRS 70.580 to 70.598 and any local government retirement systems created pursuant to KRS 79.080, 90.400, 90.410, 95.768, and KRS Chapter 96 shall be closed to new members. New employees who would have been granted membership in such retirement systems shall instead be granted membership in the County Employees Retirement System. Employees who would have been granted membership in retirement systems created pursuant to KRS 95.768, or any other policemen or firefighters who would have been granted membership in retirement systems created pursuant to KRS 79.080, 90.400, or 90.410, or any such policemen or firefighter members employed on or prior to August 1, 1988, who transfer to the County Employees Retirement System, shall be certified by their employers as working in hazardous positions. Each city participating in the County Employees Retirement System pursuant to this subsection shall execute the appropriate order authorizing such participation, shall select the alternate participation plan as described in subsection (3) of this section, and shall pay for the actuarial services necessary to determine the additional costs of alternate participation. Cities which closed their local pension systems to new members and participated in the system prior to July 15, 1988, whose employees at the time of transition were given the option to join the system shall not be required to offer said employees a second option to join the system.
    2. Notwithstanding any statute to the contrary, after April 9, 2002, the systems shall deny the request for participation of any agency which does not have an irrevocable contract with the state Personnel Cabinet for health insurance coverage under KRS 18A.225 to 18A.229 for its active employees, except that agencies entering the system on or after April 9, 2002, which were established by a merger or an interlocal agreement to provide public services shall be excluded from this requirement if all agencies entering into the merger or interlocal agreement had an initial participation date with the system prior to April 9, 2002.
  4. Any city which closed a police and firefighter pension plan to new members between January 1, 1988, and July 15, 1988, and participated in the system under the alternate participation plan shall, if its police and firefighters were not covered by Social Security, or any city which operates a pension under KRS 90.400 or 90.410 , shall be required to certify that its police and firefighters are working in hazardous positions, and shall offer its police and firefighters in service at the time of entry a second option to participate under hazardous duty coverage if they were not offered hazardous duty coverage at the time of their first option. The provisions of subsection (3)(b) of this section notwithstanding, a city affected by this subsection may, at its option, extend its payment schedule to the County Employees Retirement System for alternate participation to thirty (30) years at the rate actuarially assumed by the board.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1958, ch. 167, § 3; 1962, ch. 31, § 2; 1964, ch. 49, § 2; 1966, ch. 34, § 2; 1972, ch. 116, § 62; 1974, ch. 87, § 2; 1974, ch. 128, § 33, effective March 26, 1974; 1978, ch. 311, § 21, effective June 17, 1978; 1984, ch. 177, § 3, effective July 13, 1984; 1986, ch. 90, § 23, effective July 15, 1986; 1986, ch. 331, § 21, effective July 15, 1986; 1988, ch. 11, § 1, effective July 15, 1988; 1988, ch. 349, § 32, effective July 15, 1988; 1988, ch. 364, § 4, effective July 15, 1988; 1988, ch. 366, § 1, effective July 15, 1988; 1990, ch. 157, § 1, effective July 13, 1990; 1990, ch. 279, § 1, effective July 13, 1990; 1990, ch. 392, § 1, effective July 13, 1990; 2002, ch. 270, § 1, effective April 9, 2002; 2011, ch. 52, § 5, effective June 8, 2011; 2013, ch. 120, § 73, effective July 1, 2013; 2015 ch. 28, § 7, effective June 24, 2015.

Compiler’s Notes.

Acts 1988, ch. 11, § 19, provides “In order that city employees which a choice can make an informed decision on whether or not to join the county employees retirement system, Kentucky retirement systems shall conduct briefings for each affected pension system on the provisions of this Act. Each employee shall receive a written summary of the retirement benefits which the county employees retirement system offers, and each employee shall be given the opportunity to attend an oral presentation. All such presentations shall be completed by October 15, 1988, and each affected employee shall make his decision by November 1, 1988. Failure of an employee subject to the provisions of this Act to receive a written summary or to attend an oral briefing shall in no way invalidate any of the provisions of this Act.”

KRS 70.580 to 70.598 , referred to in subsection (7), have been repealed.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(6/8/2011). 2011 Ky. Acts ch. 52, sec. 6, provided that “if an agency meets the requirements of the exception provided in subsection (1)(b)2. of Section 5 of this Act, but was required under KRS 78.530 prior to the effective date of this Act to sign a contract with the Personnel Cabinet to provide its employees with health insurance coverage through the Public Employees Health Insurance Plan as a condition of its participation in the County Employees Retirement System, then the agency shall be eligible to opt out of the health insurance contract by notifying the secretary of the Personnel Cabinet.”

Opinions of Attorney General.

A county fiscal court could not legally refuse to authorize the participation of the county clerk in the county employees’ retirement system. OAG 66-791 .

The retirement system authorized for political subdivisions under this chapter provides the only existing statutory authority applicable to a water district and the board of commissioners must follow the dictates of this chapter in establishing a system. OAG 67-85 .

Under circumstances in which a chapter of the S. P. C. A. performs animal care and control functions under contract with a county, the society is to be regarded as an independent contractor and under such arrangement is not eligible for participation in the county employees’ retirement system. OAG 67-465 .

If a county elects to participate in the county employees’ retirement system, it must include the offices of the sheriff, jailer, constables, and magistrates. OAG 68-33 .

If the board of directors of a hospital joined the county employees’ retirement system, and a hospital district was subsequently formed which took in the hospital, the decision to join the retirement system would not be binding on that or any other hospital in the new district. OAG 70-789 .

Even though a city has not established a pension fund pursuant to KRS 90.410 and has elected to be covered under the county employees’ retirement system (KRS 78.510 (10) and 78.530 (1)) it nevertheless must continue to operate its civil service system (excluding retirement) pursuant to KRS Chapter 90. OAG 74-615 .

Since the board of aldermen of the city of Louisville, the Fiscal Court of Jefferson County, and the board of trustees of the Kentucky Retirement Systems have taken all those steps which are necessary for the Transit Authority of River City to participate in the county employees’ retirement system such authority is a participating employer. OAG 74-916 .

Where employees presently covered by the City Employees Pension Fund (CEPF) who did not elect County Employees Retirement System (CERS) coverage when the urban county government joined CERS, now elect CERS coverage, the CEPF would not be required to pay over to the CERS employee contributions as it did when the urban county government initially elected CERS coverage, because this “pay over” arrangement permitted under KRS 78.531(2) must be read in pari materia with KRS 78.530(3)(a) which created a onetime only opportunity for urban county government employees. OAG 80-420 .

The purchase of service credit at the time of initial participation pursuant to this section does not in any fashion whatsoever expose the county to liability to individuals who have since left the county and gone to work for other agencies or organizations or private concerns, or those employees of the county who have since left the county and come back. OAG 81-7 .

A county coroner who is a full-time county employee within the meaning of subsection (6) of KRS 78.510 can participate in the county employees’ retirement system if the county is a participating member of the system under this section. OAG 81-407 .

The Board of Trustees of the local Police and Firefighters’ Retirement Fund may transfer funds from the Local Fund to the County Employees’ Retirement System (CERS) to pay for prior service years of those employees who transferred from the local system to the county system; however, such transfer must be made with the approval of the Board of Trustees of the Local Fund, which must determine whether the amount requested to be transferred to the CERS can be done without negatively affecting the actuarial soundness of the Local Fund. OAG 90-49 .

Salaries of county attorney employees involved with the various law enforcement activities of the office and paid from fees generated by the county attorney’s collection of delinquent taxes, rather than county funds, are not subject to the requirements of the county employees retirement system; these individuals are not to be considered employees of a participating county, but rather, they are to be considered employees of the county attorney’s office. OAG 90-133 .

Section 18 of House Bill 1 of the 2004 Extraordinary Session of the Kentucky General Assembly prohibits the Personnel Cabinet from entering into any “new contracts required under KRS 78.530 for coverage of employees in the state health plan” from the effective date of the legislation through December 31, 2005, which has the effect of establishing a moratorium, during such period, on agencies beginning participation in the County Employees Retirement System. OAG 2005-01 .

78.530. Participation by political subdivisions — Payment — Closing of participation in local government systems — Hazardous duty coverage option. [Effective April 1, 2021]

    1. Each county and school board, as defined in KRS 78.510 , will participate in the system by appropriate order authorizing such participation which has been entered and duly recorded in the records of the governing body of the county or school board. In cases where general purpose county government does not participate, but the sheriff and his or her employees or the county clerk and his or her employees do, the sheriff or the clerk shall retain the order in his or her office. The authority to issue and properly record such order of participation being hereby granted, permits such county to participate in the system. The effective date of such participation shall be fixed in the order. (1) (a) Each county and school board, as defined in KRS 78.510 , will participate in the system by appropriate order authorizing such participation which has been entered and duly recorded in the records of the governing body of the county or school board. In cases where general purpose county government does not participate, but the sheriff and his or her employees or the county clerk and his or her employees do, the sheriff or the clerk shall retain the order in his or her office. The authority to issue and properly record such order of participation being hereby granted, permits such county to participate in the system. The effective date of such participation shall be fixed in the order.
    2. Notwithstanding any statute to the contrary, after April 9, 2002, the systems shall deny the request for participation of any agency which does not have an irrevocable contract with the state Personnel Cabinet for health insurance coverage under KRS 18A.225 to 18A.229 for its active employees, except that:
      1. County governments entering the system between April 9, 2002, and July 1, 2003, under this section shall be excluded from this requirement; and
      2. Agencies entering the system on or after April 9, 2002, which were established by a merger or an interlocal agreement to provide public services shall be excluded from this requirement if all agencies entering into the merger or interlocal agreement had an initial participation date with the system prior to April 9, 2002.
  1. Once a county or school board participates, it shall thereafter continue to participate, except as provided in KRS 78.535 .
    1. Concurrent with the adoption of the appropriate resolution to participate in the system, a county may elect the alternate participation plan which will require the county to purchase on behalf of each employee electing coverage, at the time the county elected to participate in the system as provided under KRS 78.540(1)(b) and (c), current service credit for employment in regular full-time positions between July 1, 1958, and the participation date of the county. Cities which participate in the system pursuant to subsection (6) of this section, KRS 79.080 , 90.400 , 90.410 , 95.520 , 95.621 , 95.761 , 95.768 , 95.852 , or 96.180 shall be required to purchase on behalf of each employee electing coverage only as much service credit as the employee has accumulated in the city-administered plan, up to the participation date of the city. Accumulated service shall include service for which an employee received a refund pursuant to KRS 95.620 or 95.866 , if such refund has been repaid. If the employee has not yet repaid the refund, he may make payment to the system by any method acceptable to the system, and the requirement of five (5) years of continuous reemployment prior to repayment of refunds shall not apply. Upon the employee’s repayment, the city shall purchase the associated service credit for the employee. Cost of such service credit over and above that which would be funded within the existing employer contribution rate shall be determined by the board’s consulting actuary. The expense of such actuarial service shall be paid by the county; (3) (a) Concurrent with the adoption of the appropriate resolution to participate in the system, a county may elect the alternate participation plan which will require the county to purchase on behalf of each employee electing coverage, at the time the county elected to participate in the system as provided under KRS 78.540(1)(b) and (c), current service credit for employment in regular full-time positions between July 1, 1958, and the participation date of the county. Cities which participate in the system pursuant to subsection (6) of this section, KRS 79.080 , 90.400 , 90.410 , 95.520 , 95.621 , 95.761 , 95.768 , 95.852 , or 96.180 shall be required to purchase on behalf of each employee electing coverage only as much service credit as the employee has accumulated in the city-administered plan, up to the participation date of the city. Accumulated service shall include service for which an employee received a refund pursuant to KRS 95.620 or 95.866 , if such refund has been repaid. If the employee has not yet repaid the refund, he may make payment to the system by any method acceptable to the system, and the requirement of five (5) years of continuous reemployment prior to repayment of refunds shall not apply. Upon the employee’s repayment, the city shall purchase the associated service credit for the employee. Cost of such service credit over and above that which would be funded within the existing employer contribution rate shall be determined by the board’s consulting actuary. The expense of such actuarial service shall be paid by the county;
    2. The county shall establish a payment schedule subject to approval by the board for payment of the cost of such service over and above that which would be funded within the existing employer contribution rate. The maximum period allowed in a payment schedule shall be thirty (30) years, with interest at the rate actuarially assumed by the board. A shorter period is desirable and the board may approve any payment schedule provided it is not longer than a thirty (30) year period, except that cities which participate in the system pursuant to subsection (6) of this section, KRS 79.080, 90.400, 90.410, 95.520, 95.621, 95.761, 95.768, 95.852, or 96.180 may, at their option, extend the payment schedule to a maximum of thirty (30) years, may choose to make level payments at the interest rate actuarially assumed by the board over the life of the payment schedule chosen, and may retain employer contributions and the earnings thereon attributable to employees electing coverage.
    3. A city entering the system under the alternate participation plan, may, by ordinance, levy a special property tax to pay for current service credit purchased for the period between July 1, 1958, and the participation date of the city. The special tax shall be to pay, within a period of no more than fifteen (15) years, for the cost of such service credit over that which would be funded within the existing employer contribution rate, as determined by the board’s consulting actuary. The reason for levying the special tax and the disposition of the proceeds shall be part of the ordinance levying the tax. The special tax shall be rescinded when the unfunded prior service liability has been amortized, and shall not be subject to the provisions of KRS 132.017 or 132.027 . In addition, the city may maintain any tax, the proceeds of which had been devoted to funding pension obligations under the locally administered plan prior to participation in the system, for the purpose of funding current service costs incurred after the date of participation. The city may increase the tax to pay current service costs which exceed the local pension system costs to which the tax had been devoted, but the city shall not collect from the tax more revenues than are necessary to pay current service costs incurred after the date of participation. The city may continue the tax so long as it participates in the system, and the tax shall not be subject to the provisions of KRS 132.017 or 132.027 . The city shall not collect either tax authorized by this paragraph if its participation has been terminated pursuant to KRS 78.535 .
    4. The county may at a later date purchase current service credit from July 1, 1958, to the participation date of the county by alternate participation plan for those employees who rejected membership in the system at the time the county first participated. In addition, the employer shall pay the employer contributions on the creditable compensation of the employees who later elect membership from the participation date of the county to the date the member elects participation. The employee shall pay the employee contributions on his or her creditable compensation from the participation date of the county to the date he or she elects membership plus interest at the current actuarial rate compounded annually on the employee and employer contributions. Cost of the service credit over and above that which would be funded within the existing employer contribution rate shall be determined by the board’s consulting actuary. The expense of the actuarial service shall be paid by the county. The county shall pay the cost of the service by lump sum or by adding it to the existing payment schedule established under paragraph (b) of this subsection.
    5. A county which did not participate by alternate participation may, until July 1, 1991, purchase current service credit for those employees who rejected membership in the system at the time the county first participated. The employer shall pay the employer contributions on the creditable compensation of the employees who later elect membership from the participation date of the county to the date the member elects participation. The employee shall pay the employee contributions on his or her creditable compensation from the participation date of the county to the date he or she elects membership plus interest at the current actuarial rate compounded annually on the employee and employer contributions. The county shall pay the cost of the service credit by lump sum or by establishing a payment schedule under paragraph (b) of this subsection.
    6. A county which participated in the system but did not elect the alternate participation plan may at a later date elect the alternate participation plan. In this case, the county shall purchase on behalf of each employee participating in the system current service credit for employment in regular full-time positions between July 1, 1958, or a later date selected by the county government, and the participation date of the county. The county shall also purchase, for employees who decide to participate when the county elects the alternate participation plan, current service credit for employment in regular full-time positions between July 1, 1958, or the later date selected by the county government, and the participation date of the county. In addition, the county shall pay the employer contributions on the creditable compensation of the employees who later elect membership from the participation date of the county to the date the member elects participation. The employee shall pay the employee contributions on his or her creditable compensation from the participation date of the county to the date he or she elects membership plus interest at the current actuarial rate compounded annually on the employee and employer contributions. Cost of the service credit over that which would be funded within the existing employer contribution rate shall be determined by the board’s consulting actuary. The expense of the actuarial service shall be paid by the county. The county shall pay the cost of the service by lump sum or by a payment schedule established under paragraph (b) of this subsection.
    7. Notwithstanding any other provision of the Kentucky Revised Statutes to the contrary, this subsection shall not apply to members who begin participating in the system on or after January 1, 2014, and no county that elects to participate in the system on or after January 1, 2014, shall be eligible to participate under the alternate participation plan.
  2. Every school board not participating on June 21, 1974, shall enact a resolution of participation no later than July 1, 1976.
  3. The order of the governing body of a county, as provided for in subsection (1) of this section, may exclude from participation in the system hospitals and any other semi-independent agency. Each such excluded agency shall be identified in the order authorizing participation and such excluded agency may participate in the system as a separate agency.
    1. After August 1, 1988, except as permitted by KRS 65.156 , no local government retirement system shall be created pursuant to KRS 70.580 to 70.598 and any local government retirement systems created pursuant to KRS 79.080 , 90.400 , 90.410 , 95.768 , and KRS Chapter 96 shall be closed to new members. New employees who would have been granted membership in such retirement systems shall instead be granted membership in the County Employees Retirement System. Employees who would have been granted membership in retirement systems created pursuant to KRS 95.768 , or any other policemen or firefighters who would have been granted membership in retirement systems created pursuant to KRS 79.080 , 90.400 , or 90.410 , or any such policemen or firefighter members employed on or prior to August 1, 1988, who transfer to the County Employees Retirement System, shall be certified by their employers as working in hazardous positions. Each city participating in the County Employees Retirement System pursuant to this subsection shall execute the appropriate order authorizing such participation, shall select the alternate participation plan as described in subsection (3) of this section, and shall pay for the actuarial services necessary to determine the additional costs of alternate participation. Cities which closed their local pension systems to new members and participated in the system prior to July 15, 1988, whose employees at the time of transition were given the option to join the system shall not be required to offer said employees a second option to join the system. (6) (a) After August 1, 1988, except as permitted by KRS 65.156 , no local government retirement system shall be created pursuant to KRS 70.580 to 70.598 and any local government retirement systems created pursuant to KRS 79.080, 90.400, 90.410, 95.768, and KRS Chapter 96 shall be closed to new members. New employees who would have been granted membership in such retirement systems shall instead be granted membership in the County Employees Retirement System. Employees who would have been granted membership in retirement systems created pursuant to KRS 95.768, or any other policemen or firefighters who would have been granted membership in retirement systems created pursuant to KRS 79.080, 90.400, or 90.410, or any such policemen or firefighter members employed on or prior to August 1, 1988, who transfer to the County Employees Retirement System, shall be certified by their employers as working in hazardous positions. Each city participating in the County Employees Retirement System pursuant to this subsection shall execute the appropriate order authorizing such participation, shall select the alternate participation plan as described in subsection (3) of this section, and shall pay for the actuarial services necessary to determine the additional costs of alternate participation. Cities which closed their local pension systems to new members and participated in the system prior to July 15, 1988, whose employees at the time of transition were given the option to join the system shall not be required to offer said employees a second option to join the system.
    2. Notwithstanding any statute to the contrary, after April 9, 2002, the system shall deny the request for participation of any agency which does not have an irrevocable contract with the state Personnel Cabinet for health insurance coverage under KRS 18A.225 to 18A.229 for its active employees, except that agencies entering the system on or after April 9, 2002, which were established by a merger or an interlocal agreement to provide public services shall be excluded from this requirement if all agencies entering into the merger or interlocal agreement had an initial participation date with the system prior to April 9, 2002.
  4. Any city which closed a police and firefighter pension plan to new members between January 1, 1988, and July 15, 1988, and participated in the system under the alternate participation plan shall, if its police and firefighters were not covered by Social Security, or any city which operates a pension under KRS 90.400 or 90.410 , shall be required to certify that its police and firefighters are working in hazardous positions, and shall offer its police and firefighters in service at the time of entry a second option to participate under hazardous duty coverage if they were not offered hazardous duty coverage at the time of their first option. The provisions of subsection (3)(b) of this section notwithstanding, a city affected by this subsection may, at its option, extend its payment schedule to the County Employees Retirement System for alternate participation to thirty (30) years at the rate actuarially assumed by the board.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1958, ch. 167, § 3; 1962, ch. 31, § 2; 1964, ch. 49, § 2; 1966, ch. 34, § 2; 1972, ch. 116, § 62; 1974, ch. 87, § 2; 1974, ch. 128, § 33, effective March 26, 1974; 1978, ch. 311, § 21, effective June 17, 1978; 1984, ch. 177, § 3, effective July 13, 1984; 1986, ch. 90, § 23, effective July 15, 1986; 1986, ch. 331, § 21, effective July 15, 1986; 1988, ch. 11, § 1, effective July 15, 1988; 1988, ch. 349, § 32, effective July 15, 1988; 1988, ch. 364, § 4, effective July 15, 1988; 1988, ch. 366, § 1, effective July 15, 1988; 1990, ch. 157, § 1, effective July 13, 1990; 1990, ch. 279, § 1, effective July 13, 1990; 1990, ch. 392, § 1, effective July 13, 1990; 2002, ch. 270, § 1, effective April 9, 2002; 2011, ch. 52, § 5, effective June 8, 2011; 2013, ch. 120, § 73, effective July 1, 2013; 2020 ch. 79, § 33, effective April 1, 2021.

78.5302. Duties of county attorney as employer.

  1. Any county attorney who employs persons paid from the county attorney’s delinquent tax fees, from federal or state grant funds received for the county attorney’s delinquent child support collection responsibilities, or from any other funding source not subject to the control of the fiscal court, urban-county government, or Prosecutors Advisory Council, or any county attorney who supplements the wages of a County Employees Retirement System or Kentucky Employees Retirement System member from these sources, shall participate as an employer in the County Employees Retirement System or the Kentucky Employees Retirement System in the manner prescribed in this section.
  2. It shall be the responsibility of each county attorney, participating as an employer in the County Employees Retirement System or the Kentucky Employees Retirement System, to determine membership in the appropriate retirement system for each employee being paid in the manner described in subsection (1) of this section. In making this determination, the participating county attorney shall consider whether the job function of each affected employee is related to the prosecutorial duties of the county attorney’s office and is therefore subject to Kentucky Employees Retirement System membership, or the legal representation of the fiscal court and other county officers and is therefore subject to County Employees Retirement System membership, and the county attorney shall certify the same to the board on forms provided by the board. For persons already participating in the County Employees Retirement System or the Kentucky Employees Retirement System, whose wages are supplemented by the participating county attorney, the county attorney shall make the required contributions for the supplementary wages to the person’s current retirement system.

History. Enact. Acts 1992, ch. 237, § 1, effective July 14, 1992.

78.531. Optional participation by members of retirement system in cities, counties, or urban-county governments.

  1. Any member of a retirement system created pursuant to KRS 67A.320 , 67A.340 , 67A.360 to 67A.690 , 79.080 , 90.310 to 90.410 , 95.290 , 95.520 to 95.620 , 95.621 to 95.629 , 95.767 to 95.784 , 95.852 to 95.884 , and KRS Chapter 96, notwithstanding any provisions of the statutes to the contrary, may elect to terminate coverage under the retirement system in which he is a member, if the city or urban-county government has adopted the provisions of the County Employees Retirement System pursuant to KRS 78.520 to 78.852 .
    1. If the city or urban-county government elects the alternate participation plan, as set forth in KRS 78.530(3), employee contributions made to the fund under authority of KRS 67A.320 , 67A.340 , 67A.360 to 67A.690 , 79.080 , 90.400(1), 90.410 , 95.290 , 95.520 to 95.620 , 95.621 to 95.629 , 95.767 to 95.784 , 95.852 to 95.884 , or KRS Chapter 96 shall be paid to the County Employees Retirement System and credited to the individual member’s account in the system for any employee electing to terminate coverage under the provisions of this section. Any person who is an active member of the County Employees Retirement System on July 15, 1990, who withdrew from service prior to August 1, 1988, under any of the plans enumerated in this section and who was not granted a refund of his employee contributions, shall be refunded employee contributions with any interest specified in the applicable statute or plan, unless the employee has a vested account in the former plan, in which case he may elect to leave his contributions in the fund in order to receive a pension from the plan when he becomes eligible. (2) (a) If the city or urban-county government elects the alternate participation plan, as set forth in KRS 78.530(3), employee contributions made to the fund under authority of KRS 67A.320 , 67A.340 , 67A.360 to 67A.690 , 79.080 , 90.400(1), 90.410 , 95.290 , 95.520 to 95.620 , 95.621 to 95.629 , 95.767 to 95.784 , 95.852 to 95.884 , or KRS Chapter 96 shall be paid to the County Employees Retirement System and credited to the individual member’s account in the system for any employee electing to terminate coverage under the provisions of this section. Any person who is an active member of the County Employees Retirement System on July 15, 1990, who withdrew from service prior to August 1, 1988, under any of the plans enumerated in this section and who was not granted a refund of his employee contributions, shall be refunded employee contributions with any interest specified in the applicable statute or plan, unless the employee has a vested account in the former plan, in which case he may elect to leave his contributions in the fund in order to receive a pension from the plan when he becomes eligible.
    2. Proper credit for these employee contributions shall be given to the city or urban-county government in computing the cost of participation under the alternate participation plan as provided by KRS 78.530(3). The cost of participation for employees who withdrew from service and who were not granted a refund for employee contributions shall be based only upon the time period for which the contributions were made. The cost shall be computed by the County Employees Retirement System in a manner consistent with the calculation of other delayed contribution payments, and shall be paid by the employee.
  2. If the city or urban-county government does not elect the alternate participation plan as set forth in KRS 78.530(3), the employee contributions paid into the fund under authority of KRS 67A.320 , 67A.340 , 79.080 , 90.400(1), 90.410 , 95.290 , 95.520 to 95.620 , 95.621 to 95.629 , 95.767 to 95.784 , 95.852 to 95.884 , or KRS Chapter 96 by each employee electing to terminate coverage under the provisions of this section shall be refunded to the employee with interest as specified in the applicable statute or plan, unless the employee has a vested account in which case he may elect to leave his contributions in the fund in order to later receive a pension when he becomes eligible.

History. Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 302, § 2; 1976, ch. 321, § 40; 1978, ch. 311, § 22, effective June 17, 1978; 1984, ch. 177, § 2; effective July 13, 1984; 1986, ch. 323, § 2, effective April 4, 1986; 1988, ch. 96, § 2, effective July 15, 1988; 1990, ch. 255, § 2, effective July 13, 1990; 1992, ch. 240, § 52, effective July 14, 1992; 1994, ch. 371, § 2, effective July 15, 1994; 2014, ch. 92, § 311, effective January 1, 2015; 2016 ch. 31, § 4, effective July 15, 2016.

Opinions of Attorney General.

Subsection (1) of this section must be read in pari materia with subsection (3) of KRS 78.540 . OAG 79-207 .

Subsection (1) of this section permits those employees who are members of the firemen and policemen’s pension fund, and who choose to do so, to terminate their membership in that retirement system once a city has adopted the provisions of the county employees’ retirement system (CERS) which makes the members eligible, pursuant to KRS 78.540 (2), to elect participation in the CERS; but the election must be made within 30 days following a city’s initial participation in the CERS or, in the case of those individuals who may be on leave at that time, within 30 days of their return to active service. OAG 79-207 , modified by OAG 84-119 .

Where employees presently covered by the City Employees Pension Fund (CEPF) who did not elect County Employees Retirement System (CERS) coverage when the urban county government joined CERS, now elect CERS coverage, the CEPF would not be required to pay over to the CERS employee contributions as it did when the urban county government initially elected CERS coverage, because this “pay over” arrangement permitted under subsection (2) of this section must be read in pari materia with KRS 78.530(3)(a) which created a onetime only opportunity for urban county government employees. OAG 80-420 .

A municipal electric and water plant board can by resolution convert from its present pension system for employees, authorized by KRS 96.180 , to the county employees retirement system (CERS), pursuant to this section. OAG 84-119 .

The Board of Trustees of the local Police and Firefighters’ Retirement Fund may transfer funds from the Local Fund to the County Employees’ Retirement System (CERS) to pay for prior service years of those employees who transferred from the local system to the county system; however, such transfer must be made with the approval of the Board of Trustees of the Local Fund, which must determine whether the amount requested to be transferred to the CERS can be done without negatively affecting the actuarial soundness of the Local Fund. OAG 90-49 .

78.532. Employees formerly employed by private employer — Credit for former service. [Repealed effective April 1, 2021]

In the event a county participating in the system or an employer thereof or an eligible county which elects to participate in the system, or an employer thereof has acquired a private corporation, company, organization, or entity:

  1. The county may elect, by adopting an order appropriate to its governing body under KRS 78.530 , that the employees of such former private employer who participate in a retirement plan be eligible for participation in the system.
  2. In the event the county adopts such order, regular full-time employees of the former private employer will be eligible for current service and prior service for the period of time said employees were employed by the private employer acquired if the employee elects to participate in the system as provided in KRS 78.540(2).
  3. If the county elects the alternate participation plan as set forth in KRS 78.530(3), employee contributions made to a retirement plan in which the employee formerly participated shall be paid into the County Employees Retirement System and credited to the individual member’s account for each employee electing to terminate coverage under his former retirement plan in order to participate in the system under the provisions of this section. Proper credit shall be given to the county for these employee contributions in computing the cost of participation under the alternate participation plan as provided by KRS 78.530(3).
  4. If the county does not elect the alternate participation plan as set forth in KRS 78.530(3), employee contributions paid into a former retirement plan by each employee electing to terminate coverage under his former retirement plan as authorized by this section, shall be refunded to the employee unless the employee has a vested account in which case he may elect to leave his contributions in the former retirement plan in order to later receive a pension when he becomes eligible.

History. Enact. Acts 1976, ch. 321, § 38; 1978, ch. 384, § 555, effective June 17, 1978.

78.532. Employees formerly employed by private employer — Credit for former service. [Repealed effective April 1, 2021]

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1976, ch. 321, § 38; 1978, ch. 384, § 555, effective June 17, 1978; repealed by 2020 ch. 79, § 44, effective April 1, 2021.

78.533. Employees of Metropolitan Park and Recreation Board of Jefferson County, credit for former service. [Repealed effective April 1, 2021]

  1. The Metropolitan Park and Recreation Board of Jefferson County, Kentucky established by joint and concurrent resolution of the Jefferson County Fiscal Court and ordinance of the board of aldermen of the City of Louisville to become effective on July 1, 1968, is hereby declared to be the successor of the Jefferson County Playground and Recreation Board for purposes of participation in the County Employees Retirement System.
  2. Regular full-time employees of the Metropolitan Park and Recreation Board of Jefferson County shall be given credit for regular full-time service before July 1, 1958, with the City of Louisville Department of Parks and Recreation, the Jefferson County Playground and Recreation Board and any other agency participating in the County Employees Retirement System.
  3. Any regular full-time employee of the Metropolitan Park and Recreation Board of Jefferson County shall be allowed credit for regular full-time service with the City of Louisville Department of Parks and Recreation, the Jefferson County Playground and Recreation Board and any other agency participating in the County Employees Retirement System, for the period July 1, 1958, to the date such employee becomes a member of the retirement system, provided such employee pays contributions to the retirement system in accordance with the provisions of KRS 61.552 .

History. Enact. Acts 1968, ch. 24, § 6; 1978, ch. 384, § 556, effective June 17, 1978.

78.533. Employees of Metropolitan Park and Recreation Board of Jefferson County, credit for former service. [Repealed effective April 1, 2021]

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1968, ch. 24, § 6; 1978, ch. 384, § 556, effective June 17, 1978; repealed by 2020 ch. 79, § 44, effective April 1, 2021.

78.534. Participation of qualified circuit clerks and deputy clerks — Transfer of service credit. [Repealed effective April 1, 2021]

  1. On and after August 1, 1996, each circuit clerk and deputy clerk who was a member of the Kentucky Employees Retirement System on July 31, 1996, each former circuit clerk or former deputy clerk who is vested in the Kentucky Employees Retirement System for service as a circuit clerk or deputy circuit clerk and who has not yet begun to draw benefits, and each circuit clerk or deputy clerk thereafter taking office shall participate in the County Employees Retirement System by appropriate order authorizing participation pursuant to KRS 78.530 . Upon participation, each member shall be bound by the terms and requirements of the County Employees Retirement System and shall receive the benefits.
  2. On July 31, 1996, the Kentucky Employees Retirement System shall transfer to the County Employees Retirement System for each member transferred pursuant to subsection (1) of this section the amount of his service credit in the Kentucky Employees Retirement System earned as a result of his service as circuit clerk or deputy clerk. The Kentucky Employees Retirement System shall also transfer for each member affected a dollar amount equal to the member’s and employer’s contribution attributable to that service credit, together with interest on the contributions from the date made to the date of transfer at the actuarially assumed interest rate of the Kentucky Employees Retirement System in effect at the time the contributions were originally made, compounded annually at the same interest rate. The member shall be entitled to the transferred service credit when he pays the total difference, if any, between the amount of the funds transferred by the Kentucky Employees Retirement System and the cost of the credit to the County Employees Retirement System, as determined by the board’s actuary.
  3. The transfer of a member’s service credit from the Kentucky Employees Retirement System to the County Employees Retirement System, in accordance with this section, shall terminate any credit in the Kentucky Employees Retirement System earned for service as a circuit clerk or deputy clerk. However, any credit a member has in any other retirement system, earned for service in any capacity other than a circuit clerk or deputy clerk, shall not be affected. No person shall attain credit in more than one (1) of the retirement systems mentioned in this section for the same period of time.

History. Enact. Acts 1996, ch. 31, § 3, effective July 15, 1996.

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Kentucky employees retirement system, KRS 61.510 to 61.705 .

78.534. Participation of qualified circuit clerks and deputy clerks — Transfer of service credit. [Repealed effective April 1, 2021]

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1996, ch. 31, § 3, effective July 15, 1996; repealed by 2020 ch. 79, § 44, effective April 1, 2021.

78.535. Involuntary cessation of participation — Court action. [Effective until April 1, 2021]

  1. If a participating county fails to fully comply with the provisions of KRS 78.510 to 78.852 , the board may require the county to involuntarily cease participation in the system as provided by KRS 61.522 .
  2. In lieu of cessation of participation of a county which fails to fully comply with the provisions of KRS 78.510 to 78.852 , the board may file an action in the Franklin Circuit Court to collect money owed and to attach so much of the general fund of the delinquent county as is necessary to achieve full compliance with the provisions of KRS 78.625 .

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1964, ch. 49, § 3; 1980, ch. 188, § 71, effective July 15, 1980; 1988, ch. 11, § 17, effective July 15, 1988; 1992, ch. 240, § 53, effective July 14, 1992; 2015 ch. 28, § 8, effective June 24, 2015.

Opinions of Attorney General.

Under a termination status, the county would have to pay in the aggregate amount of employer contributions required in subsection (5) of this section, the duration of such payments depending upon the applicable requirement provisions of this chapter. OAG 69-81 .

A county patrolman employed by a county which has ordered the establishment of a county policemen’s retirement system after having been a participating member of the county employees’ retirement system has the right to terminate his participation in the county employees’ retirement system. OAG 69-344 .

If an employee elects to remain in the county employees’ retirement system his participation would be governed by subsection (4) of this section, but if an employee accepts the refund of his contributions under subsection (2) of KRS 78.537 (repealed) and elects to participate in the new county system he cannot receive any service credit in the county employees’ retirement system for the time he is employed thereafter by that county police system. OAG 69-344 .

When a county policemen’s retirement system is established, an employee of the county police system has the right to continue as a participating member of the state system, and the county must continue to make contributions for an employee who has so elected. OAG 69-344 .

Where a county was delinquent in payments to the county employees’ retirement fund which is a state fund under KRS 78.520 , and the board of trustees of the county employees’ retirement system proceeded under KRS 78.535 to collect this arrearage and the state treasurer under the authority of KRS 44.030 to pay the arrearage to the retirement system fund out of funds which had been granted to the delinquent county by the state public defender’s office pursuant to KRS 31.050 and KRS 31.160 , subsequently issuing a check to the delinquent county only for the amount of the grant from the public defender’s office less the retirement fund arrearage, this action violated neither Ky. Const., § 230 nor KRS 41.110 (KRS 44.030 being considered an exception to the provisions of that section). OAG 73-561 .

Under subsection (4) of this section, a county was directly responsible for paying the employer’s contribution for bailiffs who were considered to be acting as deputy sheriffs. OAG 82-113 .

78.535. Voluntarily and involuntary cessation of participation — Rights and benefits of employees and members after cessation -- Administrative regulations -- Commonwealth held harmless -- Actions to ensure compliance. [Effective April 1, 2021]

Notwithstanding any other provision of KRS 78.510 to 78.852 to the contrary:

  1. For purposes of this section:
    1. “Active member” means a member who is participating in the system;
    2. “Employer” means the governing body of a county as defined by KRS 78.510 ;
    3. “Employer’s effective cessation date” means the last day of the system’s plan year in the year in which the employer has elected to cease participation in the system, provided the employer has met the requirements of this section and has given the system sufficient notice as provided by administrative regulations promulgated by the system; and
    4. “Inactive member” means a member who is not participating with the system.
  2. Any employer participating in the County Employees Retirement System on July 1, 2015, may:
    1. If the employer is a nonstock nonprofit corporation organized under KRS Chapter 273, voluntarily cease participation in the system subject to the requirements and restrictions of this section; or
    2. Be required to involuntarily cease participation in the system under the provisions of this section if the board has determined the employer is no longer qualified to participate in a governmental plan or has failed to comply with the provisions of KRS 78.510 to 78.852 .
    1. If an employer desires to voluntarily cease participation in the County Employees Retirement System as provided by subsection (2)(a) of this section: (3) (a) If an employer desires to voluntarily cease participation in the County Employees Retirement System as provided by subsection (2)(a) of this section:
      1. The employer shall adopt a resolution requesting to cease participation in the system and shall submit the resolution to the board for its approval;
      2. The cessation of participation in the system shall apply to all employees of the employer;
      3. The employer shall pay for all administrative costs of an actuarial study to be completed by the County Employees Retirement System consulting actuary and for any other administrative costs for discontinuing participation in the system as determined by the board and as provided by this section;
      4. The employer shall provide an alternative retirement program for employees who will no longer be covered by the system, which may include a voluntary defined contribution plan;
      5. If the alternative retirement program established by the employer meets the qualification requirements under 26 U.S.C. sec. 401(a) and is capable of accepting trustee-to-trustee transfers of both pre-tax and post-tax contributions, an employee of the employer ceasing participation may seek to transfer his or her account balance to the employer’s qualified alternate retirement program within sixty (60) days of the employer’s effective cessation date. An employee’s election to transfer his or her account balance within sixty (60) days of the employer’s effective cessation date is an irrevocable waiver of the right to obtain service credits in the system for the time worked for the employer ceasing participation; and
      6. The employer shall pay by lump sum to the system the full actuarial cost of the benefits accrued by its current and former employees in the system as determined separately for the pension fund and the insurance fund by the actuarial study required by subparagraph 3. of this paragraph. The full actuarial cost shall not include any employee who seeks to transfer his or her account balance to the alternative retirement program as provided by subparagraph 5. of this paragraph within sixty (60) days of the employer’s effective cessation date. The actuarial cost shall be fixed, and the employer shall not be subject to any increases or subsequent adjustments, once the lump sum is paid.
    2. If the board determines an employer must involuntarily cease participation in the system as provided by subsection (2)(b) of this section:
      1. The cessation of participation in the system shall apply to all employees of the employer;
      2. The employer shall pay for all administrative costs of an actuarial study to be completed by the County Employees Retirement System consulting actuary and for any other administrative costs for discontinuing participation in the system as determined by the board and as provided by this section; and
      3. The employer shall pay by lump sum to the system the full actuarial cost of the benefits accrued by its current and former employees in the system as determined separately for the pension fund and the insurance fund by the actuarial study required by subparagraph 2. of this paragraph. The actuarial cost shall be fixed, and the employer shall not be subject to any increases or subsequent adjustments, once the lump sum is paid.
  3. Any employee hired on or after the employer’s effective cessation date by an employer who has ceased participation in the system as provided by this section shall not, regardless of his or her membership date in the County Employees Retirement System, be eligible to participate in the County Employees Retirement System through the employer that ceased participation for the duration of his or her employment with that employer.
  4. If an employer has ceased participation in the system as provided by this section:
    1. The rights of recipients and the vested rights of inactive members accrued as of the employer’s effective cessation date shall not be impaired or reduced in any manner as a result of the employer ceasing participation in the system; and
    2. Employees of the employer ceasing participation shall accrue benefits through the employer’s effective cessation date but shall not accrue any additional benefits in the County Employees Retirement System, including earning years of service credit through the ceased employer, after the employer’s effective cessation date for as long as they remain employed by the employer. The day after the employer’s effective cessation date, each employee described by this paragraph shall be considered an inactive member with respect to his or her employment with the employer that ceased participation and, subject to the provisions and limitations of KRS 78.510 to 78.852 , shall:
      1. Retain his or her accounts with the County Employees Retirement System and have those accounts credited with interest in accordance with KRS 78.510 to 78.852 ;
      2. Retain his or her vested rights in accordance with paragraph (a) of this subsection; and
      3. Be eligible to take a refund of his or her accumulated account balance in accordance with KRS 61.625 or any other available distribution if eligible.
  5. For purposes of this section, the full actuarial cost shall be determined by the County Employees Retirement System consulting actuary separately for the pension fund and the insurance fund using the assumptions and methodology established by the system specifically for determining the full actuarial cost of ceasing participation as of the employer’s effective cessation date. For purposes of determining the full actuarial cost, the assumed rate of return used to calculate the cost shall be the lesser of the assumed rate of return utilized in the system’s most recent actuarial valuation or the yield on a thirty (30) year United States treasury bond as of the employer’s effective cessation date, but shall in no case be lower than the assumed rate of return utilized in the system’s most recent actuarial valuation minus three and one-half percent (3.5%).
  6. The system shall promulgate administrative regulations pursuant to KRS Chapter 13A to administer this section.
  7. Any employer who voluntarily ceases participation, or who is required to involuntarily cease participation as provided in this section, shall hold the Commonwealth harmless from damages, attorney’s fees, and costs from legal claims for any cause of action brought by any member or retired member of the departing employer.
  8. In lieu of cessation of participation of a county which fails to fully comply with the provisions of KRS 78.510 to 78.852 , the board may file an action in the Franklin Circuit Court to collect money owed and to attach so much of the general fund of the delinquent county as is necessary to achieve full compliance with the provisions of KRS 78.625 .
  9. The board may utilize the provisions of KRS 78.625(3)(b) or (4) to ensure employer compliance and payment of any amount payable by an employer under the provisions of this section.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1964, ch. 49, § 3; 1980, ch. 188, § 71, effective July 15, 1980; 1988, ch. 11, § 17, effective July 15, 1988; 1992, ch. 240, § 53, effective July 14, 1992; 2020 ch. 79, § 34, effective April 1, 2021.

78.537. Transfer of members from county employe’s retirement system to county police retirement system. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1968, ch. 160) was repealed by Acts 1976, ch. 321, § 41.

78.540. Membership. [Effective until April 1, 2021]

Membership in the system shall consist of the following:

  1. All persons who become employees of a participating county after the date the county first participates in the system, except that mayors and members of city legislative bodies may decline prior to their participation in the system and city managers or other appointed local government executives who participate in a retirement system, other than Social Security, may decline prior to their participation in the system;
    1. All persons who are employees of a county on the date the county first participates in the system, either in service or on authorized leave from service, and who elect within thirty (30) days next following the county’s participation, or in the case of persons on authorized leave, within thirty (30) days of their return to active service, to become members and thereby agree to make contributions as provided in KRS 78.520 to 78.852 ; (2) (a) All persons who are employees of a county on the date the county first participates in the system, either in service or on authorized leave from service, and who elect within thirty (30) days next following the county’s participation, or in the case of persons on authorized leave, within thirty (30) days of their return to active service, to become members and thereby agree to make contributions as provided in KRS 78.520 to 78.852 ;
    2. All persons who are employees of a county who did not elect to participate within thirty (30) days of the date the county first participated in the system or within thirty (30) days of their return to active service and who subsequently elect to participate the first day of a month after the county’s date of participation;
  2. All persons who declined participation in subsection (1) of this section and who later elect to participate. Persons who elect to participate under this subsection may purchase service credit for any prior years by paying a delayed contribution payment, provided the person began participating in the system prior to January 1, 2014. The service shall not be included in the member’s total service for purposes of determining benefits under KRS 61.702 ; and
  3. All persons electing coverage in the system under KRS 78.530(3)(d).
  4. The provisions of subsections (1) and (2) of this section notwithstanding, cities which participate in the CERS and close existing local pension systems to new, or all members pursuant to the provisions of KRS 78.530 , 95.520 , 95.621 , or 95.852 shall not be required to provide membership in the County Employees Retirement System to employees in any employee category not covered by a city pension system at the date of participation.
  5. Membership in the system shall not include persons who are not eligible to participate in the system as provided by KRS 61.522 or those employees who are simultaneously participating in another state-administered defined benefit plan within Kentucky other than those administered by the Kentucky Retirement Systems, except for employees who have ceased to contribute to one (1) of the state-administered retirement plans as provided in KRS 21.360 .

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1958, ch. 167, § 4; 1964, ch. 49, § 4; 1972, ch. 116, § 63; 1976, ch. 321, § 40; 1982, ch. 423, § 16; 1984, ch. 177, § 12; 1984, ch. 195, § 1; 1986, ch. 90, § 24; 1988, ch. 11, § 12, effective July 15, 1988; 1988, ch. 349, § 33, effective July 15, 1988; 1990, ch. 222, § 6, effective July 13, 1990; 1992, ch. 240, § 54, effective July 14, 1992; 1994, ch. 485, § 26, effective July 15, 1994; 1998, ch. 105, § 22, effective July 15, 1998; 2000, ch. 385, § 34, effective July 14, 2000; 2002, ch. 270, § 2, effective April 9, 2002; 2004, ch. 36, § 33, effective July 13, 2004; 2013, ch. 120, § 74, effective July 1, 2013; 2015 ch. 28, § 9, effective June 24, 2015; 2017 ch. 32, § 18, effective June 29, 2017.

Compiler’s Notes.

Section 10 of Acts 1990, ch. 222 provides that: “Any employee or former employee not retired who participated in more than one (1) retirement system administered by the Kentucky Retirement Systems prior to July 15, 1990, may retroactively choose to receive and shall be granted full service credit for time served in one (1) of those systems, and thereby shall relinquish service credit in the other systems for the same time period, and his contributions related to the relinquished credit shall be refunded.”

Opinions of Attorney General.

A county officer who once elects to participate in the system and is defeated for reelection must continue in membership until his term of office expires. OAG 61-833 .

An officeholder who made no contributions and did not elect to come under the system when his county participated could become a member when he was elected to a different county office. OAG 61-833 .

A county officer who was in office on the date his county participated in the county employees’ retirement system and who did not elect to become a member nor make contributions to the system, could become a member of the system when he was re-elected to the same office. OAG 61-833 .

All employees hired by the Transit Authority of River City after September 1, 1974, are required to participate in the county employees’ retirement system if, at the time they are hired, they are not otherwise covered by the continued pension plan of the previous private employer. OAG 74-916 .

Any ordinance enacted by the city establishing a local retirement system for top city management positions would be invalid if it permitted the employees in those positions the options of choosing coverage under the local retirement system or participation in the county employees’ retirement system as such an option would be in direct conflict with the statute governing the county system dealing with membership. OAG 75-531 .

A city may exclude its policemen and firemen from participation in the county employees’ retirement system (CERS) by an adoption of an ordinance to that effect. OAG 79-207 .

KRS 78.531 (1) must be read in pari materia with subsection (3) of this section. OAG 79-207 .

KRS 78.531 (1) permits those employees who are members of the firemen and policemen’s pension fund, and who choose to do so, to terminate their membership in that retirement system once a city has adopted the provisions of the county employees’ retirement system (CERS) which makes the members eligible, pursuant to subsection (2) of this section, to elect participation in the CERS; but the election must be made within 30 days following a city’s initial participation in the CERS or, in the case of those individuals who may be on leave at that time, within 30 days of their return to active service. OAG 79-207 , modified by OAG 84-119 .

Bailiffs who were treated as deputy sheriffs and who worked more than 100 hours per month were covered under the county retirement system since KRS 78.510 expressly provides that those working in excess of 100 hours qualify as regular full-time employees. OAG 82-113 .

Salaries of county attorney employees involved with the various law enforcement activities of the office and paid from fees generated by the county attorney’s collection of delinquent taxes, rather than county funds, are not subject to the requirements of the county employees retirement system; these individuals are not to be considered employees of a participating county, but rather, they are to be considered employees of the county attorney’s office. OAG 90-133 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Members to elect trustee for Kentucky employees’ retirement system, KRS 61.645 .

78.540. Membership — Cessation. [Effective April 1, 2021]

Membership in the system shall consist of the following:

    1. All persons who become employees of a participating county after the date the county first participates in the system, except that: (1) (a) All persons who become employees of a participating county after the date the county first participates in the system, except that:
      1. Mayors and members of city legislative bodies may decline prior to their participation in the system; and
      2. City managers or other appointed local government executives who participate in a retirement system, other than Social Security, may decline prior to their participation in the system;
    2. All persons who are employees of a county on the date the county first participates in the system, either in service or on authorized leave from service, and who elect within thirty (30) days next following the county’s participation, or in the case of persons on authorized leave, within thirty (30) days of their return to active service, to become members and thereby agree to make contributions as provided in KRS 78.520 to 78.852 ;
    3. All persons who are employees of a county who did not elect to participate within thirty (30) days of the date the county first participated in the system or within thirty (30) days of their return to active service and who subsequently elect to participate the first day of a month after the county’s date of participation;
    4. All persons who declined participation as provided by paragraph (a) of this subsection and who later elect to participate. Persons who elect to participate under this paragraph may purchase service credit for any prior years by paying a delayed contribution payment, provided the person began participating in the system prior to January 1, 2014. The service shall not be included in the member’s total service for purposes of determining benefits under KRS 61.702 ; and
    5. All persons electing coverage in the system under KRS 78.530(3)(d).
  1. The provisions of subsection (1)(a) to (c) of this section notwithstanding, cities which participate in the CERS and close existing local pension systems to new, or all members pursuant to the provisions of KRS 78.530 , 95.520 , 95.621 , or 95.852 shall not be required to provide membership in the County Employees Retirement System to employees in any employee category not covered by a city pension system at the date of participation.
  2. Membership in the system shall not include:
    1. Persons who are not eligible to participate in the system as provided by KRS 78.535 ; or
    2. Employees who are simultaneously participating in another state-administered defined benefit plan within Kentucky other than those administered by the Kentucky Retirement Systems or the County Employees Retirement System, except for employees who have ceased to contribute to one (1) of the state- administered retirement plans as provided in KRS 21.360 .
    1. The membership of any person in the system shall cease: (4) (a) The membership of any person in the system shall cease:
      1. Upon withdrawal of his or her accumulated account balance at or any time after termination of employment, regardless of length of service;
      2. Upon retirement;
      3. Upon death;
      4. For persons hired prior to August 1, 2000, upon termination of employment with prejudice, as defined by paragraph (b) of this subsection; or
      5. For persons hired on or after August 1, 2000, upon conviction of a felony relating to the person’s employment as provided in paragraph (c) of this subsection.
    2. For purposes of KRS 78.510 to 78.852 , termination of employment with prejudice shall mean termination as the result of conviction of the member in a court of competent jurisdiction of embezzlement or larceny of public funds or property or malfeasance in office, or the forcing of a member to make restitution for any funds or property criminally taken by the member at the time of termination of employment.
    3. Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, an employee hired on or after August 1, 2000, who participates in the system and who is convicted, in any state or federal court of competent jurisdiction, of a felony related to his or her employment shall forfeit rights and benefits earned under the system, except for the return of his or her accumulated contributions and interest credited on those contributions. The payment of retirement benefits ordered forfeited shall be stayed pending any appeal of the conviction. If the conviction is reversed on final judgment, no retirement benefit shall be forfeited. The employer shall notify the system when an employee is convicted under the provisions of this subsection.
    4. When membership ceases, except in the case of retirement, the member shall thereafter lose all right to any retirement allowance or benefits under KRS 78.510 to 78.852 arising from service prior to the date of such cessation of membership.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1958, ch. 167, § 4; 1964, ch. 49, § 4; 1972, ch. 116, § 63; 1976, ch. 321, § 40; 1982, ch. 423, § 16; 1984, ch. 177, § 12; 1984, ch. 195, § 1; 1986, ch. 90, § 24; 1988, ch. 11, § 12, effective July 15, 1988; 1988, ch. 349, § 33, effective July 15, 1988; 1990, ch. 222, § 6, effective July 13, 1990; 1992, ch. 240, § 54, effective July 14, 1992; 1994, ch. 485, § 26, effective July 15, 1994; 1998, ch. 105, § 22, effective July 15, 1998; 2000, ch. 385, § 34, effective July 14, 2000; 2002, ch. 270, § 2, effective April 9, 2002; 2004, ch. 36, § 33, effective July 13, 2004; 2013, ch. 120, § 74, effective July 1, 2013; 2015 ch. 28, § 9, effective June 24, 2015; 2020 ch. 79, § 35, effective April 1, 2021.

78.542. Required participation by retired hazardous members in an elected city or county office on June 21, 2001 — Election not to participate — Purchase of service credit. [Repealed effective April 1, 2021]

Any other provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, all retired hazardous members in an elected city or county office on June 21, 2001, shall contribute to the County Employees Retirement System unless they elect not to participate within sixty (60) days of June 21, 2001. Members who begin participating under the provisions of this section may purchase credit for service in the elected city or county office between July 15, 1998, and June 21, 2001, by paying to the system one hundred percent (100%) of the cost of the service.

History. Enact. Acts 2001, ch. 41, § 2, effective June 21, 2001.

78.542. Required participation by retired hazardous members in an elected city or county office on June 21, 2001 — Election not to participate — Purchase of service credit. [Repealed effective April 1, 2021]

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 2001, ch. 41, § 2, effective June 21, 2001; repealed by 2020 ch. 79, § 44, effective April 1, 2021.

78.545. Matters not specified in KRS § 78.510 to 78.852. [Declared void — See LRC Note Below]

The following matters shall be administered in the same manner subject to the same limitations and requirements as provided for the Kentucky Employees Retirement System as follows:

  1. Cessation of membership, conditions, as provided for by KRS 61.535 ;
  2. Statement of member and employer, as provided for by KRS 61.540 ;
  3. Beneficiary to be designated by member, change, rights, as provided for by KRS 61.542 ;
  4. Service credit determination, as provided for by KRS 61.545 ;
  5. Cessation of membership, loss of benefits, as provided for by KRS 61.550 ;
  6. Service credit, Armed Forces, as provided for by KRS 61.555 ;
  7. Normal and early retirement eligibility requirements, as provided for by KRS 61.559 ;
  8. Retirement allowance increases as provided for by KRS 61.691 ;
  9. Retirement application procedure, effective retirement date, as provided for by KRS 61.590 ;
  10. Disability retirement, conditions, as provided for by KRS 61.600 ;
  11. Disability retirement, allowance, as provided for by KRS 61.605 ;
  12. Medical examination after disability retirement, as provided for by KRS 61.610 ;
  13. Disability retirement allowance, reduction, as provided for by KRS 61.615 ;
  14. Determination of retirement allowance, as provided for by KRS 61.595 ;
  15. Refund of contributions, conditions, as provided for by KRS 61.625 ;
  16. Refund of contributions, death after retirement, as provided for by KRS 61.630 ;
  17. Optional retirement plans, as provided for by KRS 61.635 ;
  18. Suspension of retirement payments on reemployment, reinstatement, as provided for by KRS 61.637 ;
  19. Death before retirement, beneficiary’s options, as provided for by KRS 61.640 ;
  20. Board of trustees, conflict of interest, as provided for by KRS 61.655 ;
  21. Custodian of funds, payments made, when, as provided for by KRS 61.660 ;
  22. Medical examiners and hearing procedures, as provided for by KRS 61.665 ;
  23. Actuarial bases, as provided for by KRS 61.670 ;
  24. Employer’s administrative duties, as provided for by KRS 61.675 ;
  25. Correction of errors in records, as provided for by KRS 61.685 ;
  26. Exemptions of retirement allowances, and qualified domestic relations orders, as provided for by KRS 61.690 ;
  27. Credit for service prior to membership date, as provided for by KRS 61.526 ;
  28. Creditable compensation of fee officers, as provided for by KRS 61.541 ;
  29. Members’ account, confidential, as provided for by KRS 61.661 ;
  30. Retirement plan for employees determined to be in a hazardous position, as provided for by KRS 61.592 ;
  31. Maximum disability benefit, as provided for by KRS 61.607 ;
  32. Consent of employees to deductions and reciprocal arrangement between systems, as provided for by KRS 61.680 ;
  33. Employer contributions, as provided for by KRS 61.565 ;
  34. Recontribution and delayed contribution payments, purchase of service credit, interest, and installment payments, as provided for by KRS 61.552 ;
  35. Hospital and medical insurance plan, as provided by KRS 61.702 ;
  36. Death benefit, as provided by KRS 61.705 ;
  37. Reinstated employee, contributions on creditable compensation, as provided for by KRS 61.569 ;
  38. Statement to be made under oath, good faith reliance, as provided for in KRS 61.699 ;
  39. Disability procedure for members in hazardous positions as provided for in KRS 16.582 ;
  40. Direct deposit of recipient’s retirement allowance as provided for in KRS 61.623 ;
  41. Death or disability from a duty-related injury as provided in KRS 61.621 ;
  42. Purchase of service credit effective July 1, 2001, as provided in KRS 61.5525 ;
  43. Payment of small accounts upon death of member, retiree, or recipient without formal administration of the estate as provided in KRS 61.703 ;
  44. Hybrid cash balance plan and 401(a) money purchase plan provided to new members as provided by KRS 61.5956 and 61.597 ;
  45. Employer payment of increases in creditable compensation and adjustments to creditable compensation during the last five (5) years of employment as provided by KRS 61.598 ;
  46. Calculation of retirement allowance, as provided by KRS 61.599 ;
  47. Voluntary and involuntary cessation of participation by a participating agency as provided by KRS 61.522 ; and
  48. Benefit election for members of the Kentucky Retirement Systems who began participating prior to July 1, 2019, as provided by KRS 61.5955 .

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1972, ch. 107, § 2; 1972, ch. 116, § 64; 1974, ch. 128, § 34, effective March 26, 1974; 1976, ch. 321, §§ 33, 40; 1978, ch. 311, § 23, effective June 17, 1978; 1982, ch. 423, § 17, effective July 15, 1982; 1988, ch. 349, § 34, effective July 15, 1988; 1990, ch. 346, § 7, effective July 13, 1990; 1992, ch. 240, § 55, effective July 14, 1992; 1994, ch. 485, § 27, effective July 15, 1994; 2000, ch. 385, § 35, effective July 14, 2000; 2001, ch. 7, § 3, effective June 21, 2001; 2002, ch. 52, § 23, effective July 15, 2002; 2009, ch. 77, § 29, effective June 25, 2009; 2010, ch. 148, § 8, effective July 15, 2010; 2013, ch. 120, § 75, effective July 1, 2013; 2015 ch. 28, § 11, effective June 24, 2015; 2017 ch. 125, § 11, effective March 27, 2017; 2018 ch. 107, § 42, effective July 14, 2018.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(12/13/2018). On December 13, 2018, the Kentucky Supreme Court ruled that the passage of 2018 SB 151 (2018 Ky. Acts ch. 107), did not comply with the three-readings rule of Kentucky Constitution Section 46 and that the legislation is, therefore, constitutionally invalid and declared void. That ruling applies to changes made to this statute in that Act.

Compiler's Notes.

See KRS 61.705 relating to death benefits.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

EEOC v. Jefferson County Sheriff’s Dep’t, 424 F.3d 467, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 20053 (6th Cir. 2005).

78.545. Matters administered for County Employees Retirement System in same manner as for Kentucky Employees Retirement System -- References to Kentucky Retirement Systems to include County Employees Retirement System. [Effective April 1, 2021]

The following matters shall be administered for the County Employees Retirement System in the same manner subject to the same limitations and requirements as provided for the Kentucky Employees Retirement System as follows:

  1. Statement of member and employer, as provided for by KRS 61.540 ;
  2. Beneficiary to be designated by member, change, rights, as provided for by KRS 61.542 ;
  3. Service credit determination, as provided for by KRS 61.545 ;
  4. Service credit, Armed Forces, as provided for by KRS 61.555 ;
  5. Normal and early retirement eligibility requirements, as provided for by KRS 61.559 ;
  6. Retirement allowance increases as provided for by KRS 61.691 ;
  7. Retirement application procedure, effective retirement date, as provided for by KRS 61.590 ;
  8. Disability retirement, conditions, as provided for by KRS 61.600 ;
  9. Disability retirement, allowance, as provided for by KRS 61.605 ;
  10. Medical examination after disability retirement, as provided for by KRS 61.610 ;
  11. Disability retirement allowance, reduction, as provided for by KRS 61.615 ;
  12. Determination of retirement allowance, as provided for by KRS 61.595 ;
  13. Refund of contributions, conditions, as provided for by KRS 61.625 ;
  14. Refund of contributions, death after retirement, as provided for by KRS 61.630 ;
  15. Recontribution and delayed contribution payments, purchase of service credit, interest, and installment payments, as provided for by KRS 61.552 ;
  16. Optional retirement plans, as provided for by KRS 61.635 ;
  17. Suspension of retirement payments on reemployment, reinstatement, as provided for by KRS 61.637 ;
  18. Death before retirement, beneficiary’s options, as provided for by KRS 61.640 ;
  19. Board of trustees, conflict of interest, as provided for by KRS 61.655 ;
  20. Custodian of funds, payments made, when, as provided for by KRS 61.660 ;
  21. Medical examiners and hearing procedures, as provided for by KRS 61.665 ;
  22. Correction of errors in records, as provided for by KRS 61.685 ;
  23. Exemptions of retirement allowances, and qualified domestic relations orders, as provided for by KRS 61.690 ;
  24. Credit for service prior to membership date, as provided for by KRS 61.526 ;
  25. Members’ account, confidential, as provided for by KRS 61.661 ;
  26. Retirement plan for employees determined to be in a hazardous position, as provided for by KRS 61.592 ;
  27. Maximum disability benefit, as provided for by KRS 61.607 ;
  28. Consent of employees to deductions and reciprocal arrangement between systems, as provided for by KRS 61.680 ;
  29. Hospital and medical insurance plan, as provided by KRS 61.702 ;
  30. Death benefit, as provided by KRS 61.705 ;
  31. Reinstated employee, contributions on creditable compensation, as provided for by KRS 61.569 ;
  32. Statement to be made under oath, good faith reliance, as provided for in KRS 61.699 ;
  33. Disability procedure for members in hazardous positions as provided for in KRS 16.582 ;
  34. Direct deposit of recipient’s retirement allowance as provided for in KRS 61.623 ;
  35. Death or disability from a duty-related injury as provided in KRS 61.621 ;
  36. Purchase of service credit effective July 1, 2001, as provided in KRS 61.5525 ;
  37. Payment of small accounts upon death of member, retiree, or recipient without formal administration of the estate as provided in KRS 61.703 ;
  38. Hybrid cash balance plan provided to new members as provided by KRS 61.597 ;
  39. Employer payment of increases in creditable compensation and adjustments to creditable compensation during the last five (5) years of employment as provided by KRS 61.598 ;
  40. Calculation of retirement allowance, as provided by KRS 61.599 ; and
  41. Benefit election for members of the Kentucky Retirement Systems as provided by KRS 61.5955 .

Effective April 1, 2021, as it relates to KRS 16.582 , 61.545 , 61.552 , 61.590 , 61.598 , 61.600 , 61.615 , 61.655 , 61.660 , 61.665 , 61.691 , 61.703 , and 61.705 , references to “Kentucky Retirement Systems” or “systems administered by Kentucky Retirement Systems” as it relates to benefit eligibility shall include the County Employees Retirement System and references to “Kentucky Retirement Systems” or the “Kentucky Retirement Systems board of trustees” as it relates to administrative decisions, duties, requirements, or conflict of interest provisions shall for purposes of the County Employees Retirement System mean the County Employees Retirement System or County Employees Retirement System board of trustees, as applicable.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1972, ch. 107, § 2; 1972, ch. 116, § 64; 1974, ch. 128, § 34, effective March 26, 1974; 1976, ch. 321, §§ 33, 40; 1978, ch. 311, § 23, effective June 17, 1978; 1982, ch. 423, § 17, effective July 15, 1982; 1988, ch. 349, § 34, effective July 15, 1988; 1990, ch. 346, § 7, effective July 13, 1990; 1992, ch. 240, § 55, effective July 14, 1992; 1994, ch. 485, § 27, effective July 15, 1994; 2000, ch. 385, § 35, effective July 14, 2000; 2001, ch. 7, § 3, effective June 21, 2001; 2002, ch. 52, § 23, effective July 15, 2002; 2009, ch. 77, § 29, effective June 25, 2009; 2010, ch. 148, § 8, effective July 15, 2010; 2013, ch. 120, § 75, effective July 1, 2013; 2015 ch. 28, § 11, effective June 24, 2015; 2017 ch. 125, § 11, effective March 27, 2017; 2018 ch. 107, § 42, effective July 14, 2018; 2020 ch. 79, § 40, effective April 1, 2021.

78.550. Nonelection of membership.

Any person who is an employee on the date his county first participates in the system, either in service or on leave from service, who does not elect within the time set forth in KRS 78.510 to 78.852 to become a member and thereby make contributions required of him by KRS 78.510 to 78.852 , shall forfeit all right for credit for service with any county prior to the date he might subsequently elect to become a member, except as provided in KRS 61.552 or 78.530(3)(d).

History. Enact. Acts 1958, ch. 167, § 5; 1962, ch. 31, § 4; 1976, ch. 321, § 34, 40; 1988, ch. 349, § 35, effective July 15, 1988.

78.560. Cessation of membership — Conditions. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1958, ch. 167, § 6; 1962, ch. 31, § 5) was repealed by Acts 1972, ch. 116, § 78.

78.570. Statement of member and employer. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1958, ch. 167, § 7; 1962, ch. 31, § 6) was repealed by Acts 1972, ch. 116, § 78.

78.572. Beneficiaries to be designated by member — Change — Rights. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 34, § 16) was repealed by Acts 1972, ch. 116, § 78.

78.580. Service credit determination. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1958, ch. 167, § 8; 1966, ch. 34, § 3) was repealed by Acts 1972, ch. 116, § 78.

78.590. Cessation of membership — Loss of benefits. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1958, ch. 167, § 9) was repealed by Acts 1972, ch. 116, § 78.

78.600. Service credit — Armed forces. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1958, ch. 167, § 10; 1962, ch. 31, § 7) was repealed by Acts 1972, ch. 116, § 78.

78.605. Service credit for other public employment by delayed contribution payment — Recalculation of benefits for retirees. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1962, ch. 107, §§ 2, 4, 5; 1982, ch. 166, § 29, effective July 15, 1982; 1986, ch. 90, § 25, effective July 15, 1986; 1988, ch. 349, § 36, effective July 15, 1988; 1994, ch. 485, § 28, effective July 15, 1994) was repealed by Acts 2004, ch. 36, § 36, effective July 13, 2004.

78.606. Service credit earned upon retirement of noncertified employee — Recalculation of benefits.

  1. Upon retirement, a noncertified employee shall have his service credit earned after July 1, 1998, recalculated in accordance with KRS 78.615 except that the employee shall receive service credit determined by dividing the actual number of contracted days worked by twenty (20) and rounding any remainder to the next whole month, provided that the number of hours worked during the period averages eighty (80) or more hours.
  2. The Kentucky Retirement Systems shall adjust the service credit for all affected members who earned service credit for the school years 1996-97 and 1997-98 by recomputing the members’ service based on the rounding method provided in subsection (1) of this section.

History. Enact. Acts 1998, ch. 246, § 1, effective July 15, 1998; 2002, ch. 52, § 19, effective July 15, 2002.

78.607. Service credit — Regained or obtained. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1962, ch. 31, § 3; 1964, ch. 49, § 5; 1966, ch. 34, § 4; 1972, ch. 116, § 65) was repealed by Acts 1974, ch. 128, § 36, effective March 26, 1974.

78.608. Minimum service credit required. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 34. § 15) was repealed by Acts 1972, ch. 116, § 78.

78.610. Employee’s contribution — Rate — Deduction — Picked-up employee contributions. [Effective until April 1, 2021]

  1. Each employee shall, commencing on August 1, 1990, contribute, for each pay period for which he receives compensation, five percent (5%) of his creditable compensation.
  2. The agency reporting official of a participating county shall cause to be deducted from the “creditable compensation” of each employee for each and every payroll period subsequent to the date the county participated in the system the contribution payable by the member as provided in KRS 78.510 to 78.852 . The agency reporting official shall promptly pay the deducted employee contributions to the system in accordance with KRS 78.625 .
  3. The deductions provided for in subsection (2) of this section shall be made notwithstanding that the minimum compensation provided by law for any employee shall be reduced thereby. Every employee shall be deemed to consent and agree to the deductions made as provided in subsection (2) of this section; and payment of salary or compensation less the deductions shall be a full and complete discharge of all claims for services rendered by the person during the period covered by the payment, except as to any benefits provided by KRS 78.510 to 78.852 .
  4. Each employer shall, solely for the purpose of compliance with Section 414(h) of the United States Internal Revenue Code, pick up the employee contributions required by this section for all compensation earned after August 1, 1982, and the contributions picked up shall be treated as employer contributions in determining tax treatment under the United States Internal Revenue Code and KRS 141.010 . These contributions shall not be included as gross income of the employee until the contributions are distributed or made available to the employee. The picked-up employee contribution shall satisfy all obligations to the retirement system satisfied prior to August 1, 1982, by the employee contribution, and the picked-up employee contribution shall be in lieu of an employee contribution. Each employer shall pay these picked-up employee contributions from the same source of funds which is used to pay earnings to the employee. The employee shall have no option to receive the contributed amounts directly instead of having them paid by the employer to the system. Employee contributions picked up after August 1, 1982, shall be treated for all purposes of KRS 78.510 to 78.852 in the same manner and to the same extent as employee contributions made prior to August 1, 1982.
  5. The provisions of this section shall not apply to individuals who are not eligible for membership as provided by KRS 61.522 .

History. Enact. Acts 1958, ch. 167, § 11; 1962, ch. 31, § 8; 1964, ch. 49, § 6; 1966, ch. 34, § 5; 1972, ch. 116, § 66; 1976, ch. 321, § 40; 1978, ch. 384, § 557, effective June 17, 1978; 1980, ch. 186, § 19, effective July 15, 1980; 1982, ch. 166, § 3, effective July 15, 1982; 1986, ch. 90, § 26, effective July 15, 1986; 1986, ch. 176, § 2, effective July 15, 1986; 1986, ch. 293, § 5, effective July 15, 1986; 1990, ch. 221, § 2, effective July 13, 1990; 1990, ch. 222, § 7, effective July 13, 1990; 1990, ch. 476, Pt. VII D, § 647, effective April 11, 1990; 1992, ch. 240, § 56, effective July 14, 1992; 2015 ch. 28, § 10, effective June 24, 2015; 2018 ch. 171, § 72, effective April 14, 2018; 2018 ch. 207, § 72, effective April 27, 2018.

Compiler's Notes.

Section 10 of Acts 1990, ch. 222 provides that: “Any employee or former employee not retired who participated in more than one (1) retirement system administered by the Kentucky Retirement Systems prior to July 15, 1990, may retroactively choose to receive and shall be granted full service credit for time served in one (1) of those systems, and thereby shall relinquish service credit in the other systems for the same time period, and his contributions related to the relinquished credit shall be refunded.”

Section 414(h) of the United States Internal Revenue Code referred to in subsection (4) is compiled as 26 USCS § 414(h).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

Fact that employees’ contribution to retirement system was increased from 21/2 percent to 4 percent in June 1962 did not result in a reduction of a salary of an elective officer in violation of Ky. Const., §§ 161 and 235. Cook v. Chilton, 390 S.W.2d 656, 1965 Ky. LEXIS 364 ( Ky. 1965 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

A member of the county employees’ retirement system who has entered into a deferred compensation plan must contribute to the system on the basis of his gross salary as there is no legal authority which would indicate that one’s creditable compensation may be reduced by the amount a member would contribute to a deferred compensation plan. OAG 74-74 .

78.610. Employee’s contribution — Rate — Deduction — Picked-up employee contributions. [Effective April 1, 2021]

  1. Each employee shall, commencing on August 1, 1990, contribute, for each pay period for which he or she receives compensation, five percent (5%) of his or her creditable compensation.
  2. The agency reporting official of a participating county shall cause to be deducted from the “creditable compensation” of each employee for each and every payroll period subsequent to the date the county participated in the system the contribution payable by the member as provided in KRS 78.510 to 78.852 . The agency reporting official shall promptly pay the deducted employee contributions to the system in accordance with KRS 78.625 .
  3. The deductions provided for in subsection (2) of this section shall be made notwithstanding that the minimum compensation provided by law for any employee shall be reduced thereby. Every employee shall be deemed to consent and agree to the deductions made as provided in subsection (2) of this section; and payment of salary or compensation less the deductions shall be a full and complete discharge of all claims for services rendered by the person during the period covered by the payment, except as to any benefits provided by KRS 78.510 to 78.852 .
  4. Each employer shall, solely for the purpose of compliance with Section 414(h) of the United States Internal Revenue Code, pick up the employee contributions required by this section for all compensation earned after August 1, 1982, and the contributions picked up shall be treated as employer contributions in determining tax treatment under the United States Internal Revenue Code and KRS 141.010 . These contributions shall not be included as gross income of the employee until the contributions are distributed or made available to the employee. The picked-up employee contribution shall satisfy all obligations to the retirement system satisfied prior to August 1, 1982, by the employee contribution, and the picked-up employee contribution shall be in lieu of an employee contribution. Each employer shall pay these picked-up employee contributions from the same source of funds which is used to pay earnings to the employee. The employee shall have no option to receive the contributed amounts directly instead of having them paid by the employer to the system. Employee contributions picked up after August 1, 1982, shall be treated for all purposes of KRS 78.510 to 78.852 in the same manner and to the same extent as employee contributions made prior to August 1, 1982.
  5. The provisions of this section shall not apply to individuals who are not eligible for membership as provided by KRS 78.535 .

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1958, ch. 167, § 11; 1962, ch. 31, § 8; 1964, ch. 49, § 6; 1966, ch. 34, § 5; 1972, ch. 116, § 66; 1976, ch. 321, § 40; 1978, ch. 384, § 557, effective June 17, 1978; 1980, ch. 186, § 19, effective July 15, 1980; 1982, ch. 166, § 3, effective July 15, 1982; 1986, ch. 90, § 26, effective July 15, 1986; 1986, ch. 176, § 2, effective July 15, 1986; 1986, ch. 293, § 5, effective July 15, 1986; 1990, ch. 221, § 2, effective July 13, 1990; 1990, ch. 222, § 7, effective July 13, 1990; 1990, ch. 476, Pt. VII D, § 647, effective April 11, 1990; 1992, ch. 240, § 56, effective July 14, 1992; 2015 ch. 28, § 10, effective June 24, 2015; 2018 ch. 171, § 72, effective April 14, 2018; 2018 ch. 207, § 72, effective April 27, 2018; 2020 ch. 79, § 36, effective April 1, 2021.

78.615. Deduction of employee contributions — Service credit — Employer’s report — Picked-up employee contributions. [Effective until April 1, 2021]

  1. Employee contributions shall be deducted each payroll period from the creditable compensation of each employee of an agency participating in the system while he is classified as regular full-time as defined in KRS 78.510 unless the person did not elect to become a member as provided by KRS 78.540(2) or is not eligible to participate in the system as provided by KRS 61.522 . After August 1, 1982, employee contributions shall be picked up by the employer pursuant to KRS 78.610(4).
    1. For employees who are not employed by a school board, service credit shall be allowed for each month contributions are deducted or picked up during a fiscal or calendar year, if the employee receives creditable compensation for an average of one hundred (100) hours or more of work per month based on the actual hours worked in a calendar or fiscal year. If the average number of hours of work is less than one hundred (100) hours per month, the employee shall be allowed credit only for those months he receives creditable compensation for one hundred (100) hours of work.
    2. For noncertified employees of school boards, for service prior to July 1, 2000, service credit shall be allowed for each month contributions are deducted or picked up under the employee’s employment contract during a school year determined by dividing the actual number of contracted calendar days worked by twenty (20) and rounded to the nearest whole month if the employee receives creditable compensation for an average of eighty (80) or more hours of work per month based on the employee’s employment contract. The school board shall certify the number of calendar days worked, the rate of pay, and the hours in a work day for each employee monthly or annually. The employer shall file at the retirement office the final monthly report or the annual report for a fiscal year no later than twenty (20) days following the completion of the fiscal year. The retirement system shall impose a penalty on the employer of one thousand dollars ($1,000) if the information is not submitted by the date required with an additional two hundred and fifty dollars ($250) for each additional thirty (30) day period the information is reported late.
      1. If the employee works fewer than the number of contracted calendar days, the employee shall receive service credit determined by dividing the actual number of contracted calendar days worked by twenty (20) and rounded to the nearest whole month, provided that the number of hours worked during the period averages eighty (80) or more hours.
      2. If the employee works fewer than the number of contracted calendar days and the average number of hours worked is less than eighty (80) per month, then the employee shall receive service credit for each calendar month in which he worked eighty (80) or more hours.
      3. The retirement system shall refund contributions and service credit for any period for which the employee is not given credit under this subsection.
    3. For noncertified employees of school boards, for service on and after July 1, 2000, at the close of each fiscal year, the retirement system shall add service credit to the account of each employee who made contributions to his or her account during the year. Employees shall be entitled to a full year of service credit if their total paid calendar days were not less than one hundred eighty (180) calendar days for a regular school or fiscal year. In the event an employee is paid for less than one hundred eighty (180) calendar days, the employee may purchase credit according to administrative regulations promulgated by the system. In no case shall more than one (1) year of service be credited for all service performed in one (1) fiscal year. Employees who complete their employment contract prior to the close of a fiscal year and elect to retire prior to the close of a fiscal year shall have their service credit reduced by eight percent (8%) for each calendar month that the retirement becomes effective prior to July 1. Employees who are employed and paid for less than the number of calendar days required in their normal employment year shall be entitled to pro rata service credit for the fractional service. This credit shall be based upon the number of calendar days employed and the number of calendar days in the employee’s annual employment agreement or normal employment year. Service credit may not exceed the ratio between the school or fiscal year and the number of months or fraction of a month the employee is employed during that year.
    4. Notwithstanding paragraph (c) of this subsection, a noncertified employee of a school board who retires between July 1, 2000, and August 1, 2001, may choose to have service earned between July 1, 2000, and August 1, 2001, credited as described in paragraph (b) of this subsection, if the employee or retired member notifies the retirement system within one (1) year of his initial retirement. The decision once made shall be irrevocable.
  2. Employee contributions shall not be deducted from the creditable compensation of any employee or picked up by the employer while he is seasonal, emergency, temporary, or part-time. No service credit shall be earned.
  3. Contributions shall not be made or picked up by the employer and no service credit shall be earned by a member while on leave except:
    1. A member on military leave shall be entitled to service credit in accordance with KRS 61.555 ; and
    2. A member on educational leave who meets the criteria established by the state Personnel Cabinet for approved educational leave, who is receiving seventy- five percent (75%) or more of full salary, shall receive service credit and shall pay member contributions in accordance with KRS 78.610 , and his employer shall pay employer contributions or the contributions shall be picked up in accordance with KRS 61.565 . If a tuition agreement is broken by the member, the member and employer contributions paid or picked up during the period of educational leave shall be refunded.
  4. The retirement office, upon detection, shall refund any erroneous employer and employee contributions made to the retirement system and any interest credited in accordance with KRS 78.640 .

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1972, ch. 116, § 67; 1976, ch. 321, § 34; 1978, ch. 311, § 24, effective June 17, 1978; 1982, ch. 166, § 10, effective July 15, 1982; 1982, ch. 423, § 18, effective July 15, 1982; 1986, ch. 176, § 3, effective July 15, 1986; 1990, ch. 117, § 3, effective July 13, 1990; 1990, ch. 222, § 8, effective July 13, 1990; 1992, ch. 240, § 57, effective July 14, 1992; 1994, ch. 485, § 29, effective July 15, 1994; 1996, ch. 167, § 25, effective July 15, 1996; 1998, ch. 105, § 23, effective July 15, 1998; 1998, ch. 154, § 73, effective July 15, 1998; 2000, ch. 299, § 1, effective July 14, 2000; 2001, ch. 151, § 1, effective June 21, 2001; 2002, ch. 52, § 20, effective July 15, 2002; 2015 ch. 28, § 12, effective June 24, 2015; 2017 ch. 32, § 20, effective June 29, 2017.

Compiler’s Notes.

Section 10 of Acts 1990, ch. 222 provides that: “Any employee or former employee not retired who participated in more than one (1) retirement system administered by the Kentucky Retirement Systems prior to July 15, 1990, may retroactively choose to receive and shall be granted full service credit for time served in one (1) of those systems, and thereby shall relinquish service credit in the other systems for the same time period, and his contributions related to the relinquished credit shall be refunded.”

Opinions of Attorney General.

A member of the county employees’ retirement system who has entered into a deferred compensation plan must contribute to the system on the basis of his gross salary as there is no legal authority which would indicate that one’s creditable compensation may be reduced by the amount a member would contribute to a deferred compensation plan. OAG 74-74 .

78.615. Deduction of employee contributions — Service credit — Employer’s report — Picked-up employee contributions. [Effective April 1, 2021]

  1. Employee contributions shall be deducted each payroll period from the creditable compensation of each employee of an agency participating in the system while he or she is classified as regular full-time as defined in KRS 78.510 unless the person did not elect to become a member as provided by KRS 78.540 or is not eligible to participate in the system as provided by KRS 78.535 . After August 1, 1982, employee contributions shall be picked up by the employer pursuant to KRS 78.610(4).
    1. For employees who are not employed by a school board, service credit shall be allowed for each month contributions are deducted or picked up during a fiscal or calendar year, if the employee receives creditable compensation for an average of one hundred (100) hours or more of work per month based on the actual hours worked in a calendar or fiscal year. If the average number of hours of work is less than one hundred (100) hours per month, the employee shall be allowed credit only for those months he or she receives creditable compensation for one hundred (100) hours of work.
    2. For noncertified employees of school boards, for service prior to July 1, 2000, service credit shall be allowed for each month contributions are deducted or picked up under the employee’s employment contract during a school year determined by dividing the actual number of contracted calendar days worked by twenty (20) and rounded to the nearest whole month if the employee receives creditable compensation for an average of eighty (80) or more hours of work per month based on the employee’s employment contract. The school board shall certify the number of calendar days worked, the rate of pay, and the hours in a work day for each employee monthly or annually. The employer shall file at the retirement office the final monthly report or the annual report for a fiscal year no later than twenty (20) days following the completion of the fiscal year. The retirement system shall impose a penalty on the employer of one thousand dollars ($1,000) if the information is not submitted by the date required with an additional two hundred and fifty dollars ($250) for each additional thirty (30) day period the information is reported late.
      1. If the employee works fewer than the number of contracted calendar days, the employee shall receive service credit determined by dividing the actual number of contracted calendar days worked by twenty (20) and rounded to the nearest whole month, provided that the number of hours worked during the period averages eighty (80) or more hours.
      2. If the employee works fewer than the number of contracted calendar days and the average number of hours worked is less than eighty (80) per month, then the employee shall receive service credit for each calendar month in which he or she worked eighty (80) or more hours.
      3. The retirement system shall refund contributions and service credit for any period for which the employee is not given credit under this subsection.
    3. For noncertified employees of school boards, for service on and after July 1, 2000, at the close of each fiscal year, the retirement system shall add service credit to the account of each employee who made contributions to his or her account during the year. Employees shall be entitled to a full year of service credit if their total paid calendar days were not less than one hundred eighty (180) calendar days for a regular school or fiscal year. In the event an employee is paid for less than one hundred eighty (180) calendar days, the employee may purchase credit according to administrative regulations promulgated by the system. In no case shall more than one (1) year of service be credited for all service performed in one (1) fiscal year. Employees who complete their employment contract prior to the close of a fiscal year and elect to retire prior to the close of a fiscal year shall have their service credit reduced by eight percent (8%) for each calendar month that the retirement becomes effective prior to July 1. Employees who are employed and paid for less than the number of calendar days required in their normal employment year shall be entitled to pro rata service credit for the fractional service. This credit shall be based upon the number of calendar days employed and the number of calendar days in the employee’s annual employment agreement or normal employment year. Service credit may not exceed the ratio between the school or fiscal year and the number of months or fraction of a month the employee is employed during that year.
    4. Notwithstanding paragraph (c) of this subsection, a noncertified employee of a school board who retires between July 1, 2000, and August 1, 2001, may choose to have service earned between July 1, 2000, and August 1, 2001, credited as described in paragraph (b) of this subsection, if the employee or retired member notifies the retirement system within one (1) year of his or her initial retirement. The decision once made shall be irrevocable.
  2. Employee contributions shall not be deducted from the creditable compensation of any employee or picked up by the employer while he or she is seasonal, emergency, temporary, or part-time. No service credit shall be earned.
  3. Contributions shall not be made or picked up by the employer and no service credit shall be earned by a member while on leave except:
    1. A member on military leave shall be entitled to service credit in accordance with KRS 61.555 ; and
    2. A member on educational leave who meets the criteria established by the state Personnel Cabinet for approved educational leave, who is receiving seventy-five percent (75%) or more of full salary, shall receive service credit and shall pay member contributions in accordance with KRS 78.610 , and his or her employer shall pay employer contributions or the contributions shall be picked up in accordance with KRS 78.635 . If a tuition agreement is broken by the member, the member and employer contributions paid or picked up during the period of educational leave shall be refunded.
  4. The retirement office, upon detection, shall refund any erroneous employer and employee contributions made to the retirement system and any interest credited in accordance with KRS 78.640 .

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1972, ch. 116, § 67; 1976, ch. 321, § 34; 1978, ch. 311, § 24, effective June 17, 1978; 1982, ch. 166, § 10, effective July 15, 1982; 1982, ch. 423, § 18, effective July 15, 1982; 1986, ch. 176, § 3, effective July 15, 1986; 1990, ch. 117, § 3, effective July 13, 1990; 1990, ch. 222, § 8, effective July 13, 1990; 1992, ch. 240, § 57, effective July 14, 1992; 1994, ch. 485, § 29, effective July 15, 1994; 1996, ch. 167, § 25, effective July 15, 1996; 1998, ch. 105, § 23, effective July 15, 1998; 1998, ch. 154, § 73, effective July 15, 1998; 2000, ch. 299, § 1, effective July 14, 2000; 2001, ch. 151, § 1, effective June 21, 2001; 2002, ch. 52, § 20, effective July 15, 2002; 2015 ch. 28, § 12, effective June 24, 2015; 2020 ch. 79, § 37, effective April 1, 2021.

78.616. Purchase of service credit with retirement system for unused sick leave of members who began participating before January 1, 2014 — Members who began participating before September 1, 2008, who retire on or after July 1, 2023 — Alternative. [Declared void — See LRC Note Below]

  1. Any agency participating in the County Employees Retirement System which has formally adopted a sick-leave program that is universally administered to its employees may purchase service credit with the retirement system for up to six (6) months of unused sick leave for each retiring employee.
  2. Participation under this section shall be at the option of each participating employer. The election to participate shall be made by the governing authority of the participating employer and shall be certified in writing to the system on forms prescribed by the board. The certification shall provide for equal treatment of all employees participating under this section. Any employer in the County Employees Retirement System who has not elected to participate in a sick leave program established by this section prior to August 1, 2018, shall not be eligible to elect to participate in a sick leave program established by this section.
    1. Upon the member’s notification of retirement as prescribed in KRS 61.590 , the employer shall certify the retiring employee’s unused, accumulated sick- leave balance to the system. The member’s sick-leave balance, expressed in days, shall be divided by the average number of working days per month in county service and rounded to the nearest number of whole months. A maximum of six (6) months of the member’s sick-leave balance, expressed in months, shall be added to his service credit for the purpose of determining his annual retirement allowance under KRS 78.510 to 78.852 and for the purpose of determining whether the member is eligible to receive a retirement allowance under KRS 78.510 to 78.852 , except as provided by paragraphs (d) and (e) of this subsection. Accumulated sick-leave in excess of six (6) months shall be added to the member’s service credit if the member or employer pays to the retirement system the value of the additional service credit based on the formula adopted by the board, subject to the restrictions provided by paragraph (d) of this subsection. (3) (a) Upon the member’s notification of retirement as prescribed in KRS 61.590 , the employer shall certify the retiring employee’s unused, accumulated sick- leave balance to the system. The member’s sick-leave balance, expressed in days, shall be divided by the average number of working days per month in county service and rounded to the nearest number of whole months. A maximum of six (6) months of the member’s sick-leave balance, expressed in months, shall be added to his service credit for the purpose of determining his annual retirement allowance under KRS 78.510 to 78.852 and for the purpose of determining whether the member is eligible to receive a retirement allowance under KRS 78.510 to 78.852, except as provided by paragraphs (d) and (e) of this subsection. Accumulated sick-leave in excess of six (6) months shall be added to the member’s service credit if the member or employer pays to the retirement system the value of the additional service credit based on the formula adopted by the board, subject to the restrictions provided by paragraph (d) of this subsection.
    2. The employer may elect to pay fifty percent (50%) of the cost of the sick leave in excess of six (6) months on behalf of its employees. The employee shall pay the remaining fifty percent (50%). The payment by the employer shall not be deposited to the member’s account. Service credit shall not be credited to the member’s account until both the employer’s and employee’s payments are received by the retirement system.
    3. Once the employer elects to pay all or fifty percent (50%) of the cost on behalf of its employees, it shall continue to pay the same portion of the cost.
    4. For a member who begins participating in the retirement system on or after September 1, 2008, but prior to January 1, 2014, whose employer has established a sick-leave program under subsections (1) to (4) and (6) of this section:
      1. The member shall receive no more than twelve (12) months of service credit upon retirement for accumulated unused sick leave accrued while contributing to the retirement system from which the retirement benefit is to be paid;
      2. The service added to the member’s service credit shall be used for purposes of determining the member’s annual retirement allowance under KRS 78.510 to 78.852;
      3. The service added to the member’s service credit shall not be used to determine whether a member is eligible to receive a retirement allowance under KRS 78.510 to 78.852 or to reduce any applicable actuarial reductions; and
      4. The cost of the service provided by this paragraph shall be paid by the employer.
    5. For members who began participating in the retirement system prior to September 1, 2008, who retire on or after July 1, 2023, any service added for accumulated sick leave to the member’s service credit shall not be used to determine whether a member is eligible to receive a retirement allowance under KRS 78.510 to 78.852 or to reduce any applicable actuarial reductions.
  3. The system shall compute the cost of the sick-leave credit of each retiring employee and bill each employer with whom the employee accrued sick leave accordingly. The employer shall remit payment within thirty (30) days from receipt of the bill.
    1. As an alternative to subsections (1), (3), (4), and (6) of this section, any agency participating in the County Employees Retirement System which has formally adopted a sick-leave program that is universally administered to its employees, or administered to a majority of eligible employees in accordance with subsection (6) of this section, shall, at the time of termination, or as authorized by KRS 161.155 in the case of school boards, compensate the employee for unused sick-leave days the employee has accumulated which it is the uniform policy of the agency to allow. (5) (a) As an alternative to subsections (1), (3), (4), and (6) of this section, any agency participating in the County Employees Retirement System which has formally adopted a sick-leave program that is universally administered to its employees, or administered to a majority of eligible employees in accordance with subsection (6) of this section, shall, at the time of termination, or as authorized by KRS 161.155 in the case of school boards, compensate the employee for unused sick-leave days the employee has accumulated which it is the uniform policy of the agency to allow.
    2. The rate of compensation for each unused sick-leave day shall be based on the daily salary rate calculated from the employee’s current rate of pay. Payment for unused sick-leave days shall be incorporated into the employee’s final compensation if the employee and employer make the regular employee and employer contributions, respectively, on the sick-leave payment.
    3. The number of sick-leave days for which the employee is compensated shall be divided by the average number of working days per month in county service and rounded to the nearest number of whole months. This number of months shall be added to the employee’s total service credit and to the number of months used to determine creditable compensation, pursuant to KRS 78.510 , but no more than sixty (60) months shall be used to determine final compensation. For an employee who begins participating on or after September 1, 2008, but prior to January 1, 2014, the number of months added to the employee’s total service credit under this paragraph shall not exceed twelve (12) months, and the additional service shall not be used to determine whether a member is eligible to receive a retirement allowance under KRS 78.510 to 78.852 or to reduce any applicable actuarial reductions.
    4. For members who began participating in the retirement system prior to September 1, 2008, who retire on or after July 1, 2023, any service added for accumulated sick leave to the member’s service credit shall not be used to determine whether a member is eligible to receive a retirement allowance under KRS 78.510 to 78.852 or to reduce any applicable actuarial reductions.
  4. Any city of the first class that has two (2) or more sick-leave programs for its employees may purchase service credit with the retirement system for up to six (6) months of unused sick leave for each retiring employee who participates in the sick- leave program administered to a majority of the eligible employees of the city. An employee participating in a sick-leave program administered to a minority of the eligible employees shall become eligible for the purchase of service credit under this subsection when the employee commences participating in the sick-leave program that is administered to a majority of the eligible employees of the city.
  5. The provisions of this section shall not apply to employees who begin participating in the system on or after January 1, 2014, and no service credit shall be provided for accumulated sick leave balances of those employees who begin participating in the system on or after January 1, 2014.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1984, ch. 232, § 10, effective July 13, 1984; 1988, ch. 11, § 18, effective July 15, 1988; 1988, ch. 349, § 37, effective July 15, 1988; 1988, ch. 366, § 4, effective July 15, 1988; 1992, ch. 240, § 58, effective July 14, 1992; 1998, ch. 105, § 24, effective July 15, 1998; 1998, ch. 262, § 1, effective July 15, 1998; 2000, ch. 385, § 36, effective July 14, 2000; 2002, ch. 52, § 21, effective July 15, 2002; 2008 (1st Ex. Sess.), ch. 1, § 26, effective June 27, 2008; 2013, ch. 120, § 76, effective July 1, 2013; 2018 ch. 107, § 17, effective July 14, 2018.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(12/13/2018). On December 13, 2018, the Kentucky Supreme Court ruled that the passage of 2018 SB 151 (2018 Ky. Acts ch. 107), did not comply with the three-readings rule of Kentucky Constitution Section 46 and that the legislation is, therefore, constitutionally invalid and declared void. That ruling applies to changes made to this statute in that Act.

78.620. Employer’s contributions — Rate. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1958, ch. 167, § 12; 1962, ch. 31, § 9; 1972, ch. 116, § 68) was repealed by Acts 1974, ch. 128, § 36, effective March 26, 1974.

78.625. Filing of contributions, reimbursements, and reports — Collection — Suspension of benefits on delinquency. [Effective until April 1, 2021]

  1. The agency reporting official of the county shall file the following at the retirement office on or before the tenth day of the month following the period being reported:
    1. The employee and employer contributions required under KRS 78.610 , 61.565 , and 61.702 ;
    2. The employer contributions and reimbursements for retiree health insurance premiums required under KRS 61.637 ; and
    3. A record of all contributions to the system on the forms prescribed by the systems.
    1. If the agency reporting official fails to file at the retirement office all contributions and reports on or before the tenth day of the month following the period being reported, interest on the delinquent contributions at the actuarial rate adopted by the board compounded annually, but not less than one thousand dollars ($1,000), may be added to the amount due the system. (2) (a) If the agency reporting official fails to file at the retirement office all contributions and reports on or before the tenth day of the month following the period being reported, interest on the delinquent contributions at the actuarial rate adopted by the board compounded annually, but not less than one thousand dollars ($1,000), may be added to the amount due the system.
    2. Delinquent contributions, with interest at the rate adopted by the board compounded annually, or penalties may be recovered by action in the Franklin Circuit Court against the county liable or may, at the request of the board, be deducted from any other moneys payable to the county by any department or agency of the state.
  2. If an agency is delinquent in the payment of contributions due in accordance with any of the provisions of KRS 78.510 to 78.852 , refunds and retirement allowance payments to members of this agency may be suspended until the delinquent contributions, with interest at the rate adopted by the board compounded annually, or penalties have been paid to the system.

History. Enact. Acts 1964, ch. 49, § 7; 1968, ch. 24, § 1; 1972, ch. 116, § 69; 1976, ch. 321, § 36, 40; 1982, ch. 423, § 19, effective July 15, 1982; 1988, ch. 349, § 38, effective July 15, 1988; 1992, ch. 240, § 59, effective July 14, 1992; 1996, ch. 167, § 26, effective July 15, 1996; 1998, ch. 105, § 25, effective July 15, 1998; 2002, ch. 52, § 22, effective July 15, 2002; 2004, ch. 36, § 34, effective July 13, 2004; 2009, ch. 77, § 25, effective June 25, 2009; 2010, ch. 173, § 9, effective July 15, 2010; 2019 ch. 182, § 2, effective June 27, 2019.

Legislative Research Commission Notes.

(March 1, 2011). The Reviser of Statutes has corrected a manifest clerical or typographical error in the numbering of subsections in this section as they appeared in 2010 Ky. Acts ch. 173, sec. 9.

Opinions of Attorney General.

The duty and responsibility of keeping records and making reports in the county retirement system is upon the county treasurer unless another person has been designated to make such report by proper order of the fiscal court of such county. OAG 70-1 .

78.625. Filing of contributions, reimbursements, and reports — Collection — Suspension of benefits on delinquency. [Effective April 1, 2021]

  1. The employer shall prepare the reporting records necessary for the system to administer the provisions of KRS 78.510 to 78.852 and, from time to time, shall furnish the information the system may require in the discharge of its duties. Upon employment of an employee, the employer shall inform him or her of his or her duties and obligations in connection with the system as a condition of employment.
  2. The agency reporting official of the county shall file the following at the retirement office on or before the tenth day of the month following the period being reported:
    1. The employee and employer contributions required under KRS 61.702 , 78.610 , and 78.635 ;
    2. The employer contributions and reimbursements for retiree health insurance premiums required under KRS 61.637 ; and
    3. A record of all contributions to the system on the forms prescribed by the systems.
    1. If the agency reporting official fails to file at the retirement office all contributions and reports on or before the tenth day of the month following the period being reported, interest on the delinquent contributions at the actuarial rate adopted by the board compounded annually, but not less than one thousand dollars ($1,000), may be added to the amount due the system. (3) (a) If the agency reporting official fails to file at the retirement office all contributions and reports on or before the tenth day of the month following the period being reported, interest on the delinquent contributions at the actuarial rate adopted by the board compounded annually, but not less than one thousand dollars ($1,000), may be added to the amount due the system.
    2. Delinquent contributions, with interest at the rate adopted by the board compounded annually, or penalties may be recovered by action in the Franklin Circuit Court against the county liable or may, at the request of the board, be deducted from any other moneys payable to the county by any department or agency of the state.
  3. If an agency is delinquent in the payment of contributions due in accordance with any of the provisions of KRS 78.510 to 78.852 , refunds and retirement allowance payments to members of this agency may be suspended until the delinquent contributions, with interest at the rate adopted by the board compounded annually, or penalties have been paid to the system.
  4. The system may at any time conduct an audit of the employer in order to determine if the employer is complying with the provisions of KRS 78.510 to 78.852 . The system shall have access to and may examine all books, accounts, reports, correspondence files, and records of any employer. Every employer, employee, or agency reporting official of a county, as defined in KRS 78.510 (3), having records in its possession or under its control, shall permit access to and examination of the records upon the request of the system.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1964, ch. 49, § 7; 1968, ch. 24, § 1; 1972, ch. 116, § 69; 1976, ch. 321, § 36, 40; 1982, ch. 423, § 19, effective July 15, 1982; 1988, ch. 349, § 38, effective July 15, 1988; 1992, ch. 240, § 59, effective July 14, 1992; 1996, ch. 167, § 26, effective July 15, 1996; 1998, ch. 105, § 25, effective July 15, 1998; 2002, ch. 52, § 22, effective July 15, 2002; 2004, ch. 36, § 34, effective July 13, 2004; 2009, ch. 77, § 25, effective June 25, 2009; 2010, ch. 173, § 9, effective July 15, 2010; 2019 ch. 182, § 2, effective June 27, 2019; 2020 ch. 79, § 38, effective April 1, 2021.

78.630. Fund assets.

All of the assets of the system shall be held and invested in the county employees’ retirement fund and credited, according to the purpose for which they are held, to one (1) of three (3) accounts, namely, the members’ account, the retirement allowance account, and accounts established pursuant to 26 U.S.C. sec. 401(h) within the funds established in KRS 16.510 , 61.515 , and 78.520 , as prescribed by KRS 61.702(2)(b).

History. Enact. Acts 1958, ch. 167, § 13; 1964, ch. 49, § 7; 2009, ch. 77, § 26, effective June 25, 2009; 2013, ch. 120, § 77, effective July 1, 2013.

78.635. Determination of employer normal contribution rate and actuarially accrued liability contribution rate. [Effective April 1, 2021]

    1. Except as provided by subsection (5) of this section, each employer participating in the County Employees Retirement System as provided for in KRS 78.510 to 78.852 shall contribute annually to the system an amount equal to the percent, as computed under subsection (2) of this section, of the creditable compensation of its employees to be known as the “normal contributions,” and an additional amount to be known as the “actuarially accrued liability contribution” which shall be computed by amortizing the total unfunded actuarially accrued liability over a period of thirty (30) years using the level-percentage-of-payroll amortization method. The thirty (30) year amortization period shall begin with the 2013 actuarial valuation. (1) (a) Except as provided by subsection (5) of this section, each employer participating in the County Employees Retirement System as provided for in KRS 78.510 to 78.852 shall contribute annually to the system an amount equal to the percent, as computed under subsection (2) of this section, of the creditable compensation of its employees to be known as the “normal contributions,” and an additional amount to be known as the “actuarially accrued liability contribution” which shall be computed by amortizing the total unfunded actuarially accrued liability over a period of thirty (30) years using the level-percentage-of-payroll amortization method. The thirty (30) year amortization period shall begin with the 2013 actuarial valuation.
    2. Any significant increase in the actuarially accrued liability due to benefit improvements shall be amortized using the level-percentage-of-payroll amortization method over a separate thirty (30) year period commencing in the year of the actuarial valuation in which the benefit improvements are first reflected.
  1. The normal contribution rate shall be determined by the entry age normal cost funding method. The actuarially accrued liability shall be determined by actuarial method consistent with the methods prescribed for determining the normal contribution rate. Normal contributions and the actuarially accrued liability contribution shall be determined on actuarial assumptions and methods adopted by the board.
  2. Normal contribution and the actuarially accrued liability contribution rates shall be determined by the board on the basis of the annual actuarial valuation last preceding the July 1 of a new fiscal year.
  3. Employer contribution rates as provided by this section shall:
    1. Be developed separately for employers providing benefits to employees in nonhazardous positions and for employers providing benefits to employees in hazardous positions; and
    2. Include an employer contribution rate to fund pension benefits and an employer contribution rate to fund retiree health benefits.
  4. The employer contribution rate established by the board for the County Employees Retirement System that is payable on or after July 1, 2018, and until June 30, 2028, for the pension and retiree health insurance funds, including the normal cost contribution and the actuarially accrued liability contribution for each fund, shall not increase by more than a factor of one and twelve one hundredths (1.12) over the prior fiscal year’s employer contribution rate as determined by the system’s consulting actuary.
  5. The system shall advise each employer prior to the beginning of each fiscal year of any change in the employer contribution rate. Based on the employer contribution rate, each employer shall include in the budget sufficient funds to pay the employer contributions as determined by the board under this section.

HISTORY: 2020 ch. 79, § 8, effective April 1, 2021.

78.640. Members’ contribution account — Interest — Transfer of account balance to retirement allowance account. [Declared void — See LRC Note Below]

  1. The members’ account shall be the account to which:
    1. All members’ contributions, or contributions picked up by the employer after August 1, 1982, and interest allowances or investment returns as provided in KRS 78.510 to 78.852 shall be credited, except as provided by KRS 61.702(2)(b);
    2. For members who begin participating in the system on or after January 1, 2014, who are participating in the hybrid cash balance plan, the employer pay credit and interest credited on such amounts as provided by KRS 16.583 and 61.597 shall be credited; and
    3. For members who elect to participate in the 401(a) money purchase plan provided by KRS 21.374 , 61.5955 , or 61.5956 , the employer contribution and investment return on such amounts as provided by KRS 61.5956 . Only funds from this account shall be used to return the accumulated contributions or accumulated account balances of a member when required to be returned to him by reason of any provision of KRS 78.510 to 78.852 . Prior to the member’s retirement, death, or refund in accordance with KRS 61.625 , no funds shall be made available from the member account.
  2. Each member’s contribution or contribution picked up by the employer shall be credited to the individual account of the contributing member, except as provided by KRS 61.702(2)(b).
  3. Except for the portion of the member’s account balance in the 401(a) money purchase plan as provided by KRS 61.5956 :
    1. Each member shall have his individual account credited with interest on June 30 of each year.
    2. For a member who begins participating before September 1, 2008, interest shall be credited to his individual account at a rate determined by the board but not less than two percent (2%) per annum on the accumulated account balance of the member on June 30 of the preceding fiscal year.
    3. For a member who begins participating on or after September 1, 2008, but prior to January 1, 2014, interest shall be credited to his or her individual account at a rate of two and one-half percent (2.5%) per annum on the accumulated contributions of the member on June 30 of the preceding fiscal year.
    4. For a member who begins participating on or after January 1, 2014, in the hybrid cash balance plan, interest shall be credited in accordance with KRS 16.583 and 61.597 .
    5. The amounts of interest credited to a member’s account under this subsection shall be transferred from the retirement allowance account.
    1. Upon the retirement of a member who began participating in the system prior to January 1, 2014, his accumulated account balance shall be transferred from the members’ account to the retirement allowance account. (4) (a) Upon the retirement of a member who began participating in the system prior to January 1, 2014, his accumulated account balance shall be transferred from the members’ account to the retirement allowance account.
    2. Upon the retirement of a member who began participating in the system on or after January 1, 2014, or who elects to participate in the 401(a) money purchase plan, who elects to annuitize his or her accumulated account balance in the hybrid cash balance plan or 401(a) money purchase plan as prescribed by KRS 16.583(7)(a) or (b), 61.5956(6)(a) or (b), or 61.597(7)(a) or (b), the member’s accumulated account balance shall be transferred to the retirement allowance account.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1958, ch. 167, § 14; 1962, ch. 31, § 10; 1964, ch. 49, § 8; 1966, ch. 34, § 6; 1976, ch 321, § 40; 1978, ch. 311, § 25, effective June 17, 1978; 1982, ch. 166, § 30, effective July 15, 1982; 2000, ch. 385, § 37, effective July 14, 2000; 2008 (1st Ex. Sess.), ch. 1, § 27, effective June 27, 2008; 2009, ch. 77, § 27, effective June 25, 2009; 2013, ch. 120, § 78, effective July 1, 2013; 2018 ch. 107, § 21, effective July 14, 2018.

Legislative Research Commission Notes.

(12/13/2018). On December 13, 2018, the Kentucky Supreme Court ruled that the passage of 2018 SB 151 (2018 Ky. Acts ch. 107), did not comply with the three-readings rule of Kentucky Constitution Section 46 and that the legislation is, therefore, constitutionally invalid and declared void. That ruling applies to changes made to this statute in that Act.

(6/27/2008). The Revisor of Statutes has altered the numbering of subsection (3) of this statute from the way it appears in 2008 (1st Ex. Sess.) Ky. Acts ch. 1, § 27, under the authority of KRS 7.136(1)(c).

78.650. Retirement allowance account.

The retirement allowance account shall be the account in which shall be accumulated all employer contributions and amounts transferred from the members’ account, and to which all income from the invested assets of the system shall be credited. From this account shall be paid the expenses of the system and the board in administration of the system, retirement allowances, and any other benefits payable after a member’s retirement and from this account shall be transferred to the members’ account:

  1. The employer pay credit added monthly to each member’s individual accounts as provided by KRS 16.583 and 61.597 ;
  2. The employer contribution for the 401(a) money purchase plan as provided by KRS 61.5956 ; and
  3. The interest credited annually to a member’s individual account as provided by KRS 78.510 to 78.852 .

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1958, ch. 167, § 15, effective June 19, 1958; 1992, ch. 240, § 60, effective July 14, 1992; 2013, ch. 120, § 79, effective July 1, 2013; 2018 ch. 107, § 23, effective July 14, 2018.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(12/13/2018). On December 13, 2018, the Kentucky Supreme Court ruled that the passage of 2018 SB 151 (2018 Ky. Acts ch. 107), did not comply with the three-readings rule of Kentucky Constitution Section 46 and that the legislation is, therefore, constitutionally invalid and declared void. That ruling applies to changes made to this statute in that Act.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

Commonwealth ex rel. Armstrong v. Collins, 709 S.W.2d 437, 1986 Ky. LEXIS 262 ( Ky. 1986 ).

78.652. Excess benefit plan — Purpose — Excess benefit fund.

There is created and established:

  1. An excess benefit plan to be known as the County Employees Retirement System Excess Benefit Plan. The plan is created for the purpose of providing the retirement allowances payable from the retirement systems under KRS 78.520 to 78.852 that would otherwise be limited by 26 U.S.C. sec. 415 .
  2. A state fund to be known as the County Employees Retirement System Excess Benefit Fund which shall consist of all the assets of the plan.
  3. The administration and assets of the plan shall be as set forth in KRS 61.652 .

History. Enact. Acts 2000, ch. 385, § 39, effective July 14, 2000.

78.660. Uninvested funds — Maximum. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1958, ch. 34, § 16) was repealed by Acts 1972, ch. 116, § 78.

78.670. Service retirement — Conditions. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1958, ch. 34, § 17; 1962, ch. 31, § 11; 1964, ch. 49, § 9; 1966, ch. 34, § 7) was repealed by Acts 1972, ch. 116, § 78.

78.680. Service retirement — Allowance. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1958, ch. 167, § 18; 1962, ch. 31, § 12; 1966, ch. 34, § 8; 1968, ch. 24, § 2; 1972, ch. 116, § 70) was repealed by Acts 1976, ch. 321, § 41.

78.690. Disability retirement — Conditions. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1958, ch. 167, § 19; 1962, ch. 31, § 13; 1966, ch. 34, § 9; 1970, ch. 101, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1972, ch. 116, § 78.

78.700. Disability retirement — Allowance. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1958, ch. 167, § 20; 1962, ch. 31, § 14; 1966, ch. 34, § 10; 1970, ch. 101, § 2) was repealed by Acts 1972, ch. 116, § 78.

78.710. Medical examination after disability retirement. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1958, ch. 167, § 21; 1962, ch. 31, § 15) was repealed by Acts 1972, ch. 116, § 78.

78.720. Disability retirement allowance — Reduction. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1958, ch. 167, § 22; 1962, ch. 31, § 16) was repealed by Acts 1972, ch. 116, § 78.

78.730. Disability retirement allowance — Cessation. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1958, ch. 167, § 23; 1962, ch. 31, § 17; 1968, ch. 24, § 3) was repealed by Acts 1972, ch. 116, § 78.

78.740. Refund of contributions — Conditions. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1958, ch. 167, § 24; 1962, ch. 31, § 18; 1966, ch. 34, § 11) was repealed by Acts 1972, ch. 116, § 78.

78.750. Death after retirement — Refund of contributions. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1958, ch. 167, § 25; 1968, ch. 24, § 4) was repealed by Acts 1972, ch. 116, § 78.

78.760. Optional retirement plans. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1958, ch. 167, § 26; 1962, ch. 31, § 19; 1964, ch. 49, § 10; 1968, ch. 24, § 5) was repealed by Acts 1972, ch. 116, § 78.

78.765. Suspension of retirement payments on re-employment — Reinstatement. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 34, § 17; 1970, ch. 101, § 4) was repealed by Acts 1972, ch. 116, § 78.

78.770. Death before retirement. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1958, ch. 167, § 27) was repealed by Acts 1962, ch. 31, § 21.

78.775. Death before retirement — Beneficiary’s options. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1962, ch. 31, § 20; 1964, ch. 49, § 11; 1966, ch. 34, § 12) was repealed by Acts 1972, ch. 116, § 78.

78.780. Administration of systems by board of trustees of state system. [Repealed effective April 1, 2021]

  1. The government and control of the system is vested in the board of trustees of the Kentucky Retirement Systems. The board shall carry out the provisions of KRS 78.510 to 78.852 in the same manner in which it administers the Kentucky Employees Retirement System. In all matters concerning the administration of KRS 78.510 to 78.852 , the same rights, duties, and obligations shall apply to the board as apply under the provisions of KRS 61.510 to 61.705 , except that members of the board, when acting for the County Employees Retirement System, shall be paid a per diem of eighty dollars ($80), plus actual expenses.
  2. Expenses incurred by or on behalf of the system and the board in the administration of the system during a fiscal year shall be paid from the retirement allowance account. Any other statute to the contrary notwithstanding, authorization for all expenditures relating to the administrative operations of the system, including investment related expenditures, shall be contained in the biennial budget unit request, branch budget recommendation, and the financial plan adopted by the General Assembly pursuant to KRS Chapter 48. Nothing herein shall be construed as limiting appropriations which may be made to the system from other sources.

History. Enact. Acts 1958, ch. 167, § 28; 1960, ch. 165, part III, § 2; 1962, ch. 31, § 22; 1972, ch. 116, § 71; 1976, ch. 321, §§ 37, 40; 1980, ch. 186, § 23, effective July 15, 1980; 1988, ch. 349, § 39, effective July 15, 1988; 1990, ch. 489, § 7, effective July 13, 1990; 1992, ch. 240, § 61, effective July 14, 1992; 2000, ch. 385, § 38, effective July 14, 2000.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

Although this section is included in Acts 1980, ch. 186, the proposed change was deleted by committee amendment.

Opinions of Attorney General.

Eligible members of the board of trustees of the Kentucky retirement systems may receive per diem payments from each of the three state retirement systems providing they have acted for each of those systems at a particular board meeting and such is specifically reflected in the minutes thereof. OAG 80-10 .

78.780. Administration of systems by board of trustees of state system. [Repealed effective April 1, 2021]

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1958, ch. 167, § 28; 1960, ch. 165, part III, § 2; 1962, ch. 31, § 22; 1972, ch. 116, § 71; 1976, ch. 321, §§ 37, 40; 1980, ch. 186, § 23, effective July 15, 1980; 1988, ch. 349, § 39, effective July 15, 1988; 1990, ch. 489, § 7, effective July 13, 1990; 1992, ch. 240, § 61, effective July 14, 1992; 2000, ch. 385, § 38, effective July 14, 2000; repealed by 2020 ch. 79, § 44, effective April 1, 2021.

78.782. County Employees Retirement System board of trustees — Appointed and elected membership, vacancies, compensation, duties, and meetings — Board granted powers and privileges of corporation — Chief executive officer — Annual financial report — Expenses — Action for damages — Appeals — Transparency — Limitations on use of funds. [Effective April 1, 2021]

  1. The County Employees Retirement System shall be administered by the board of trustees composed of nine (9) members, who shall be selected as follows:
    1. Three (3) trustees, who shall be members or retired from the County Employees Retirement System, elected by the members and retired members of the County Employees Retirement System, of which:
      1. Two (2) shall have a majority of his or her service credit earned in the County Employees Retirement System in a nonhazardous position; and
      2. One (1) shall have a majority of his or her service credit earned in the County Employees Retirement System in a hazardous position;
    2. Six (6) trustees appointed by the Governor, subject to Senate confirmation in accordance with KRS 11.160 for each appointment or reappointment. Of the six (6) trustees appointed by the Governor:
      1. One (1) trustee with retirement experience shall be appointed from a list of three (3) applicants submitted by the Kentucky League of Cities;
      2. One (1) trustee with investment experience shall be appointed from a list of three (3) applicants submitted by the Kentucky League of Cities;
      3. One (1) trustee with retirement experience shall be appointed from a list of three (3) applicants submitted by the Kentucky Association of Counties;
      4. One (1) trustee with investment experience shall be appointed from a list of three (3) applicants submitted by the Kentucky Association of Counties;
      5. One (1) trustee with retirement experience shall be appointed from a list of three (3) applicants submitted by the Kentucky School Boards Association; and
      6. One (1) trustee with investment experience shall be appointed from a list of three (3) applicants submitted by the Kentucky School Boards Association. Notwithstanding the provisions of KRS 12.070(3), the Governor shall appoint each individual trustee described by subparagraphs 1. to 6. of this paragraph solely from each corresponding individual list required to be submitted by the Kentucky League of Cities, the Kentucky Association of Counties, or the Kentucky School Boards Association as provided by subparagraphs 1. to 6. of this paragraph, and the Governor shall not be able to reject the list of applicants submitted, request that another list be provided, or use a list different from the one (1) individual list required to be submitted for each specific appointment;
    3. For purposes of paragraph (b) of this subsection, a trustee with “investment experience” means an individual who does not have a conflict of interest, as provided by KRS 61.655 , and who has at least ten (10) years of experience in one (1) of the following areas of expertise:
      1. A portfolio manager acting in a fiduciary capacity;
      2. A professional securities analyst or investment consultant;
      3. A current or retired employee or principal of a trust institution, investment or finance organization, or endowment fund acting in an investment-related capacity;
      4. A chartered financial analyst in good standing as determined by the CFA Institute; or
      5. A university professor, teaching investment-related studies; and
    4. For purposes of paragraph (b) of this subsection, a trustee with “retirement experience” means an individual who does not have a conflict of interest, as provided by KRS 61.655 , and who has at least ten (10) years of experience in one (1) of the following areas of expertise:
      1. Experience in retirement or pension plan management;
      2. A certified public accountant with relevant experience in retirement or pension plan accounting;
      3. An actuary with relevant experience in retirement or pension plan consulting;
      4. An attorney licensed to practice law in the Commonwealth of Kentucky with relevant experience in retirement or pension plans; or
      5. A current or former university professor whose primary area of emphasis is economics or finance.
  2. The board is hereby granted the powers and privileges of a corporation, including but not limited to the following powers:
    1. To sue and be sued in its corporate name;
    2. To make bylaws not inconsistent with the law;
    3. To conduct the business and promote the purposes for which it was formed;
    4. Except as provided in KRS 78.790(6), to contract for investment counseling, auditing, medical, and other professional or technical services as required to carry out the obligations of the board subject to the provisions of KRS Chapters 45, 45A, 56, and 57. Actuarial consulting services shall be provided by a firm hired by the Kentucky Public Pensions Authority;
    5. To purchase fiduciary liability insurance;
    6. Except as provided in KRS 78.790(6), to acquire, hold, sell, dispose of, pledge, lease, or mortgage, the goods or property necessary to exercise the board’s powers and perform the board’s duties subject to KRS Chapters 45, 45A, and 56; and
    7. The board shall reimburse any trustee, officer, or employee for any legal expense resulting from a civil action arising out of the performance of his or her official duties. The hourly rate of reimbursement for any contract for legal services under this paragraph shall not exceed the maximum hourly rate provided in the Legal Services Duties and Maximum Rate Schedule promulgated by the Government Contract Review Committee established pursuant to KRS 45A.705 , unless a higher rate is specifically approved by the secretary of the Finance and Administration Cabinet or his or her designee.
  3. Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (1) of this section, each trustee shall serve a term of four (4) years or until his or her successor is duly qualified except as otherwise provided in this section. An elected or appointed trustee shall not serve more than three (3) consecutive four (4) year terms. An elected or appointed trustee who has served three (3) consecutive terms may be elected or appointed again after an absence of four (4) years from the board.
    1. The trustees selected by the membership of the system shall be elected by ballot. For each trustee to be elected, the board may nominate, not less than six (6) months before a term of office of a trustee is due to expire, three (3) constitutionally eligible individuals. (4) (a) The trustees selected by the membership of the system shall be elected by ballot. For each trustee to be elected, the board may nominate, not less than six (6) months before a term of office of a trustee is due to expire, three (3) constitutionally eligible individuals.
    2. Individuals may be nominated by the system members by presenting to the executive director, not less than four (4) months before a term of office of a trustee is due to expire, a petition, bearing the name, last four (4) digits of the Social Security number, and signature of no less than one-tenth (1/10) of the number voting in the last election by the system members.
    3. Within four (4) months of the nominations made in accordance with paragraphs (a) and (b) of this subsection, the executive director shall cause to be prepared an official ballot. The ballot shall carry the name, address, and position title of each individual nominated by the board and by petition. Provision shall also be made for write-in votes.
    4. Except as provided by paragraph (j) of this subsection, the ballots shall be distributed to the eligible voters by mail to their last known residence address.
    5. The ballots shall be addressed to the County Employees Retirement System in care of a predetermined box number at a United States Post Office or submitted electronically as provided by paragraph (j) of this subsection. Access to this post office box shall be limited to the board’s contracted firm. The individual receiving a plurality of votes shall be declared elected.
    6. The eligible voter shall cast his or her ballot by selecting the candidate of his or her choice. He or she shall sign and mail the ballot or submit the electronic ballot at least thirty (30) days prior to the date the term to be filled is due to expire. The latest mailing date, or date of submission in the case of electronic ballots, shall be provided on the ballot.
    7. The board’s contracted firm shall report in writing the outcome to the chair of the board of trustees. Costs of an election shall be payable from the funds of the system.
    8. For purposes of this subsection, an eligible voter shall be a person who was a member of the system on December 31 of the year preceding the election year.
    9. Each individual who submits a request to be nominated by the board under paragraph (a) of this subsection and each individual who is nominated by the membership under paragraph (b) of this subsection shall:
      1. Complete an application developed by the system which shall include but not be limited to a disclosure of any prior felonies and any conflicts of interest that would hinder the individual’s ability to serve on the board;
      2. Submit a resume detailing the individual’s education and employment history and a cover letter detailing the member’s qualifications for serving as trustee to the board; and
      3. Authorize the system to have a criminal background check performed. The criminal background check shall be performed by the Department of Kentucky State Police.
    10. In lieu of the ballots mailed to members and retired members as provided by this subsection, the systems may by promulgation of administrative regulation pursuant to KRS Chapter 13A conduct trustee elections using electronic ballots, except that the systems shall mail a paper ballot upon request of any eligible voter.
  4. Any vacancy which may occur in an appointed position shall be filled in the same manner which provides for the selection of the particular trustee, and any vacancy which may occur in an elected position shall be filled by appointment by a majority vote of the remaining elected trustees; however, any vacancy shall be filled only for the duration of the unexpired term. In the event of a vacancy of an elected trustee, the system shall notify members of the vacancy and the opportunity to be considered for the vacant position. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety (90) days of the position becoming vacant.
    1. Membership on the board of trustees shall not be incompatible with any other office unless a constitutional incompatibility exists. No trustee shall serve in more than one (1) position as trustee on the board and, if a trustee holds more than one (1) position as trustee on the board, he or she shall resign a position. (6) (a) Membership on the board of trustees shall not be incompatible with any other office unless a constitutional incompatibility exists. No trustee shall serve in more than one (1) position as trustee on the board and, if a trustee holds more than one (1) position as trustee on the board, he or she shall resign a position.
    2. A trustee shall be removed from office upon conviction of a felony or for a finding of a violation of any provision of KRS 11A.020 or 11A.040 by a court of competent jurisdiction.
    3. A current or former employee of the County Employees Retirement System, Kentucky Retirement Systems, or the Kentucky Public Pensions Authority shall not be eligible to serve as a member of the board.
  5. Trustees who do not otherwise receive a salary from the State Treasury shall receive a per diem of eighty dollars ($80) for each day they are in session or on official duty, and they shall be reimbursed for their actual and necessary expenses in accordance with state administrative regulations and standards.
    1. The board shall meet at least once in each quarter of the year and may meet in special session upon the call of the chair or the executive director. (8) (a) The board shall meet at least once in each quarter of the year and may meet in special session upon the call of the chair or the executive director.
    2. The board shall elect a chair and a vice chair. The chair shall not serve more than four (4) consecutive years as chair or vice chair of the board. The vice chair shall not serve more than four (4) consecutive years as chair or vice chair of the board. A trustee who has served four (4) consecutive years as chair or vice chair of the board may be elected chair or vice chair of the board after an absence of two (2) years from the positions.
    3. A majority of the trustees shall constitute a quorum, and all actions taken by the board shall be by affirmative vote of a majority of the trustees present.
    1. The board of trustees shall appoint or contract for the services of a chief executive officer and fix the compensation and other terms of employment for this position without limitation of the provisions of KRS Chapters 18A and 45A and KRS 64.640 . The chief executive officer shall serve as the legislative, legal, and executive adviser to the board and shall work with the executive director of the Kentucky Public Pensions Authority to carry out the provisions of KRS 78.510 to 78.852 . The executive director of the Kentucky Public Pensions Authority shall be the chief administrative officer of the board. (9) (a) The board of trustees shall appoint or contract for the services of a chief executive officer and fix the compensation and other terms of employment for this position without limitation of the provisions of KRS Chapters 18A and 45A and KRS 64.640 . The chief executive officer shall serve as the legislative, legal, and executive adviser to the board and shall work with the executive director of the Kentucky Public Pensions Authority to carry out the provisions of KRS 78.510 to 78.852 . The executive director of the Kentucky Public Pensions Authority shall be the chief administrative officer of the board.
    2. The board shall require the chief executive officer to execute bonds for the faithful performance of his or her duties notwithstanding the limitations of KRS Chapter 62.
    3. The board shall have a system of accounting established by the Kentucky Public Pensions Authority.
    4. The board shall do all things, take all actions, and promulgate all administrative regulations, not inconsistent with the provisions of KRS 78.510 to 78.852, necessary or proper in order to carry out the provisions of KRS 78.510 to 78.852. Notwithstanding any other evidence of legislative intent, it is hereby declared to be the controlling legislative intent that the provisions of KRS 78.510 to 78.852 conform with federal statute or regulation and meet the qualification requirements under 26 U.S.C. sec. 401(a) , applicable federal regulations, and other published guidance. Provisions of KRS 78.510 to 78.852 which conflict with federal statute or regulation or qualification under 26 U.S.C. sec. 401(a) , applicable federal regulations, and other published guidance shall not be available. The board shall have the authority to promulgate administrative regulations to conform with federal statute and regulation and to meet the qualification requirements under 26 U.S.C. sec. 401(a), including an administrative regulation to comply with 26 U.S.C. sec. 401(a)(9) .
    5. Notwithstanding any other provision of statute to the contrary, including but not limited to any provision of KRS Chapter 12, the Governor shall have no authority to change any provision of KRS 78.510 to 78.852 by executive order or action, including but not limited to reorganizing, replacing, amending, or abolishing the membership of the County Employees Retirement System board of trustees.
  6. The chief executive officer of the board shall serve during its will and pleasure. Notwithstanding any statute to the contrary, the chief executive officer shall not be considered a legislative agent under KRS 6.611 .
  7. The Attorney General, or an assistant designated by him or her, may attend each meeting of the board and may receive the agenda, board minutes, and other information distributed to trustees of the board upon request. The Attorney General may act as legal adviser and attorney for the board, and the board may contract for legal services, notwithstanding the limitations of KRS Chapter 12 or 13B.
    1. The system shall publish an annual financial report showing all receipts, disbursements, assets, and liabilities. The annual report shall include a copy of an audit conducted in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards. Except as provided by paragraph (b) of this subsection, the board may select an independent certified public accountant or the Auditor of Public Accounts to perform the audit. If the audit is performed by an independent certified public accountant, the Auditor of Public Accounts shall not be required to perform an audit pursuant to KRS 43.050(2)(a), but may perform an audit at his or her discretion. All proceedings and records of the board shall be open for inspection by the public. The system shall make copies of the audit required by this subsection available for examination by any member, retiree, or beneficiary in the offices of the County Employees Retirement System and in other places as necessary to make the audit available to all members, retirees, and beneficiaries. A copy of the annual audit shall be sent electronically to the Legislative Research Commission no later than ten (10) days after receipt by the board. (12) (a) The system shall publish an annual financial report showing all receipts, disbursements, assets, and liabilities. The annual report shall include a copy of an audit conducted in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards. Except as provided by paragraph (b) of this subsection, the board may select an independent certified public accountant or the Auditor of Public Accounts to perform the audit. If the audit is performed by an independent certified public accountant, the Auditor of Public Accounts shall not be required to perform an audit pursuant to KRS 43.050(2)(a), but may perform an audit at his or her discretion. All proceedings and records of the board shall be open for inspection by the public. The system shall make copies of the audit required by this subsection available for examination by any member, retiree, or beneficiary in the offices of the County Employees Retirement System and in other places as necessary to make the audit available to all members, retirees, and beneficiaries. A copy of the annual audit shall be sent electronically to the Legislative Research Commission no later than ten (10) days after receipt by the board.
    2. At least once every five (5) years, the Auditor of Public Accounts shall perform the audit described by this subsection, and the system shall reimburse the Auditor of Public Accounts for all costs of the audit. The Auditor of Public Accounts shall determine which fiscal year during the five (5) year period the audit prescribed by this paragraph will be completed.
  8. All expenses incurred by or on behalf of the system and the board in the administration of the system during a fiscal year shall be paid from the retirement allowance account.
  9. Except as provided under subsection (16) of this section or KRS 61.665 , any person adversely affected by a decision of the board involving KRS 78.510 to 78.852 may appeal the decision of the board to the Franklin Circuit Court within sixty (60) days of the board action.
    1. A trustee shall discharge his or her duties as a trustee, including his or her duties as a member of a committee: (15) (a) A trustee shall discharge his or her duties as a trustee, including his or her duties as a member of a committee:
      1. In good faith;
      2. On an informed basis; and
      3. In a manner he or she honestly believes to be in the best interest of the County Employees Retirement System.
    2. A trustee discharges his or her duties on an informed basis if, when he or she makes an inquiry into the business and affairs of the system or into a particular action to be taken or decision to be made, he or she exercises the care an ordinary prudent person in a like position would exercise under similar circumstances.
    3. In discharging his or her duties, a trustee may rely on information, opinions, reports, or statements, including financial statements and other financial data, if prepared or presented by:
      1. One (1) or more officers or employees of the system or authority whom the trustee honestly believes to be reliable and competent in the matters presented;
      2. Legal counsel, public accountants, actuaries, or other persons as to matters the trustee honestly believes are within the person’s professional or expert competence; or
      3. A committee of the board of trustees of which he or she is not a member if the trustee honestly believes the committee merits confidence.
    4. A trustee shall not be considered as acting in good faith if he or she has knowledge concerning the matter in question that makes reliance otherwise permitted by paragraph (c) of this subsection unwarranted.
    5. Any action taken as a trustee, or any failure to take any action as a trustee, shall not be the basis for monetary damages or injunctive relief unless:
      1. The trustee has breached or failed to perform the duties of the trustee’s office in compliance with this section; and
      2. In the case of an action for monetary damages, the breach or failure to perform constitutes willful misconduct or wanton or reckless disregard for human rights, safety, or property.
    6. A person bringing an action for monetary damages under this section shall have the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence the provisions of paragraph (e)1. and 2. of this subsection, and the burden of proving that the breach or failure to perform was the legal cause of damages suffered by the system.
    7. In discharging his or her administrative duties under this section, a trustee shall strive to administer the system in an efficient and cost-effective manner for the taxpayers of the Commonwealth of Kentucky and shall take all actions available under the law to contain costs for the trusts, including costs for participating employers, members, and retirees.
  10. When an order by the system substantially impairs the benefits or rights of a member, retired member, or recipient, except action which relates to entitlement to disability benefits, the affected member, retired member, or recipient may request a hearing to be held in accordance with KRS Chapter 13B. The board may establish an appeals committee whose members shall be appointed by the chair and who shall have authority to act upon the recommendations and reports of the hearing officer on behalf of the board. The member, retired member, recipient, or employer aggrieved by a final order of the board following the hearing may appeal the decision to the Franklin Circuit Court, in accordance with KRS Chapter 13B. The board may establish a joint administrative appeals committee with the Kentucky Retirement Systems and may also establish a joint disability appeals committee with the Kentucky Retirement Systems.
  11. The board shall establish a formal trustee education program for all trustees of the board. The program shall include but not be limited to the following:
    1. A required orientation program for all new trustees elected or appointed to the board. The orientation program shall include training on:
      1. Benefits and benefits administration;
      2. Investment concepts, policies, and current composition and administration of system investments;
      3. Laws, bylaws, and administrative regulations pertaining to the system and to fiduciaries; and
      4. Actuarial and financial concepts pertaining to the system. If a trustee fails to complete the orientation program within one (1) year from the beginning of his or her first term on the board, the system shall withhold payment of the per diem and travel expenses due to the board member under this section until the trustee has completed the orientation program;
    2. Annual required training for board members on the administration, benefits, financing, and investing of the system. If a trustee fails to complete the annual required training during the calendar or fiscal year, the retirement system shall withhold payment of the per diem and travel expenses due to the board member under this section until the board member has met the annual training requirements; and
    3. The system shall incorporate by reference in an administrative regulation, pursuant to KRS 13A.2251 , the trustee education program.
  12. In order to improve public transparency regarding the administration of the system, the board of trustees shall adopt a best practices model by posting the following information to the Kentucky Public Pensions Authority’s Web site and shall make available to the public:
    1. Meeting notices and agendas for all meetings of the board. Notices and agendas shall be posted to the Kentucky Public Pensions Authority’s Web site at least seventy-two (72) hours in advance of the board or committee meetings, except in the case of special or emergency meetings as provided by KRS 61.823 ;
    2. The Comprehensive Annual Financial Report with the information as follows:
      1. A general overview and update on the system by the executive director;
      2. A listing of the board of trustees;
      3. A listing of key staff;
      4. An organizational chart;
      5. Financial information, including a statement of plan net assets, a statement of changes in plan net assets, an actuarial value of assets, a schedule of investments, a statement of funded status and funding progress, and other supporting data;
      6. Investment information, including a general overview, a list of the system’s professional consultants, a total net of fees return on system investments over a historical period, an investment summary, contracted investment management expenses, transaction commissions, and a schedule of investments;
      7. The annual actuarial valuation report on the pension benefit and the medical insurance benefit; and
      8. A general statistical section, including information on contributions, benefit payouts, and retirement system demographic data;
    3. All external audits;
    4. All board minutes or other materials that require adoption or ratification by the board of trustees. The items listed in this paragraph shall be posted within seventy-two (72) hours of adoption or ratification of the board;
    5. All bylaws, policies, or procedures adopted or ratified by the board of trustees;
    6. The system’s summary plan description;
    7. A document containing an unofficial copy of the statutes governing the system;
    8. A listing of the members of the board of trustees and membership on each committee established by the board, including any investment committees;
    9. All investment holdings in aggregate, fees, and commissions for each fund administered by the board, which shall be updated on a quarterly basis for fiscal years beginning on or after July 1, 2021. The system shall request from all managers, partnerships, and any other available sources all information regarding fees and commissions and shall, based on the requested information received:
      1. Disclose the dollar value of fees and commissions paid to each individual manager or partnership;
      2. Disclose the dollar value of any profit sharing, carried interest, or any other partnership incentive arrangements, partnership agreements, or any other partnership expenses received by or paid to each manager or partnership; and
      3. As applicable, report each fee or commission by manager or partnership consistent with standards established by the Institutional Limited Partners Association (ILPA). In addition to the requirements of this paragraph, the system shall also disclose the name and address of all individual underlying managers or partners in any fund of funds in which system assets are invested;
    10. An update of net of fees investment returns, asset allocations, and the performance of the funds against benchmarks adopted by the board for each fund, for each asset class administered by the board, and for each manager. The update shall be posted on a quarterly basis for fiscal years beginning on or after July 1, 2021;
    11. A searchable database of the system’s expenditures and a listing of each individual employed by the system along with the employee’s salary or wages. In lieu of posting the information required by this paragraph to the Kentucky Public Pensions Authority’s Web site, the system may provide the information through a Web site established by the executive branch to inform the public about public employee salaries and wages;
    12. All contracts or offering documents for services, goods, or property purchased or utilized by the system for contracts or offering documents entered into on or after July 1, 2021; and
    13. Information regarding the system’s financial and actuarial condition that is easily understood by the members, retired members, and the public.
  13. Notwithstanding the requirements of subsection (18) of this section, the system shall not be required to furnish information that is protected under KRS 61.661 , exempt under KRS 61.878 , or that, if disclosed, would compromise the system’s ability to competitively invest in real estate or other asset classes, except that no provision of this section or KRS 61.878 shall exclude disclosure and review of all contracts, including investment contracts, by the board, the Auditor of Public Accounts, and the Government Contract Review Committee established pursuant to KRS 45A.705 or the disclosure of investment fees and commissions as provided by this section. If any public record contains material which is not excepted under this section, the system shall separate the excepted material by removal, segregation, or redaction, and make the nonexcepted material available for examination.
  14. Notwithstanding any other provision of KRS 78.510 to 78.852 to the contrary, no funds of the County Employees Retirement System, including fees and commissions paid to an investment manager, private fund, or company issuing securities, who manages systems assets, shall be used to pay fees and commissions to placement agents. For purposes of this subsection, “placement agent” means a third-party individual, who is not an employee, or firm, wholly or partially owned by the entity being hired, who solicits investments on behalf of an investment manager, private fund, or company issuing securities.

HISTORY: 2020 ch. 79, § 3, effective April 1, 2021.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(4/1/2021). This statute was created by Section 3 of 2020 Ky. Acts ch. 79. Section 46 of that Act reads as follows: “The three trustees elected by the County Employees Retirement System membership to serve a term on the Kentucky Retirement Systems board of trustees that includes April 1, 2021, shall serve as the three elected trustees of the County Employees Retirement System board of trustees as provided by Section 3 of this Act [this statute] and shall serve for the duration of the terms for which they were elected. The two trustees elected by the Kentucky Employees Retirement System membership and the one trustee elected by the State Police Retirement System membership who are serving as trustees of the Kentucky Retirement Systems board of trustees immediately prior to the effective date of this Act shall serve as the three elected trustees of the Kentucky Retirement Systems board of trustees as provided by Section 4 of this Act and shall serve for the duration of the terms for which they were elected. The three trustees who were appointed by a Governor to the Kentucky Retirement Systems board prior to April 1, 2021, who were selected by a Governor from lists submitted by the Kentucky Association of Counties, the Kentucky League of Cities, and the Kentucky School Boards Association and serving on the Kentucky Retirement Systems board immediately prior to April 1, 2021, shall, notwithstanding any other provision of Section 3 of this Act [this statute] to the contrary, serve on the County Employees Retirement System board of trustees as provided by Section 3 of this Act [this statute] for the duration of their term of office and shall be considered the three trustees appointed by the Governor who have retirement experience as provided by subsection (l)(b) and (l)(d) of Section 3 of this Act [this statute]. Notwithstanding any other provision of Section 4 of this Act to the contrary, the six trustees with investment experience appointed by a Governor to the Kentucky Retirement Systems board prior to April 1, 2021, and serving on the Kentucky Retirement Systems board immediately prior to April 1, 2021, shall serve for the duration of their term of office as the appointed trustees with investment experience and retirement experience of the newly constituted Kentucky Retirement Systems board of trustees effective April 1, 2021.”

(4/1/2021). This statute was created by Section 3 of 2020 Ky. Acts ch. 79. In that Act, Section 47 (effective 7/15/2020) reads as follows: “The Governor shall on or before March 1, 2021, appoint the three appointed trustees of the County Employees Retirement System board who must have investment experience as provided by subsection (1)(b) and (1)(d) of Section 3 of this Act [this statute] so that the new trustees can assume their term of office on April 1, 2021. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 3 of this Act [this statute] as it relates solely to terms of office, the three trustees appointed by the Governor pursuant to Section 3 of this Act [this statute] who must have investment experience shall be appointed to staggered terms, with one appointed trustee serving an initial term of two years, one appointed trustee serving an initial term of three years, and one appointed trustee serving an initial term of four years. The Kentucky League of Cities, the Kentucky Association of Counties, and the Kentucky School Boards Association shall submit a list of applicants with investment experience on or before January 1, 2021, to be appointed by the Governor pursuant to Section 3 of this Act [this statute].”

(4/1/2021). This statute was created by Section 3 of 2020 Ky. Acts ch. 79. In that Act, Section 48 (effective 4/7/2020) reads as follows: “Notwithstanding any other provision of statute to the contrary, including but not limited to any provision of KRS Chapter 12: (1) The Governor shall have no authority to change any provision of KRS 16.505 to 16.652 , 61.510 to 61.705 , and 78.510 to 78.852 as it relates to reorganizing, replacing, amending, or abolishing the membership of the County Employees Retirement System board of trustees as provided by Section 3 of this Act [this statute], the Kentucky Retirement Systems board of trustees as provided by KRS 61.645 , or the Kentucky Public Pensions Authority as provided by Section 2 of this Act; and (2) Effective April 1, 2021, the board of trustees of the Kentucky Retirement Systems and the County Employees Retirement System shall include the number and composition of the boards established by Sections 3 [this statute], and 4, 46, and 47 of this Act, as applicable respectively.”

78.784. Board’s administration of actuarial processes. [Effective April 1, 2021]

    1. As soon as practicable after its organization, the County Employees Retirement System board shall adopt the actuarial tables, assumptions, and methods necessary for the administration of the system and for the annual determination of actuarial assets, actuarial liabilities, and recommended employer contribution rates of the system as provided by KRS 61.702 and 78.635 , for the pension and retiree health funds. (1) (a) As soon as practicable after its organization, the County Employees Retirement System board shall adopt the actuarial tables, assumptions, and methods necessary for the administration of the system and for the annual determination of actuarial assets, actuarial liabilities, and recommended employer contribution rates of the system as provided by KRS 61.702 and 78.635 , for the pension and retiree health funds.
    2. The board shall cause an actuarial valuation to be made annually. The valuation shall at a minimum include:
      1. A description of the actuarial assumptions used in the actuarial valuation, which shall be reasonably related to the experience of the system and represent the actuary’s best estimate of anticipated experience;
      2. A description of any funding methods utilized or required by state law in the development of the actuarial valuation results;
      3. A description of any changes in actuarial assumptions and methods from the previous year’s actuarial valuation;
      4. The actuarially recommended contribution rate for employers for the upcoming budget periods;
      5. A twenty (20) year projection of the funding levels, unfunded liabilities, and actuarially recommended contribution rates for employers based upon the actuarial assumptions, funding methods, and experience of the system as of the valuation date; and
      6. A sensitivity analysis that evaluates the impact of changes in system assumptions, including but not limited to the investment return assumption, payroll growth assumption, and medical inflation rates, on employer contribution rates, funding levels, and unfunded liabilities.
    3. At least once in each five (5) year period, the board shall cause an actuarial investigation to be made of all the experience under the system relative to the actuarial assumptions and funding methods previously adopted by the board. The actuarial investigation shall include at a minimum a summary of the changes in actuarial assumptions and funding methods recommended in the investigation and the projected impact of the recommended changes on funding levels, unfunded liabilities, and actuarially recommended contribution rates for employers over a twenty (20) year period.
    4. Pursuant to the actuarial investigation the board shall, from time to time, revise the actuarial tables previously adopted by the board and shall thereupon revise the bases of the rates of employer contributions required under KRS 78.510 to 78.852 .
    5. For any change in actuarial assumptions, funding methods, retiree health insurance premiums and subsidies, or any other decisions made by the board that impact system liabilities and actuarially recommended contribution rates for employers and that are not made in conjunction with the actuarial investigation required by paragraph (c) of this subsection, an actuarial analysis shall be completed showing the projected impact of the changes on funding levels, unfunded liabilities, and actuarially recommended contribution rates for employers over a twenty (20) year period.
    6. All actuarial investigations, analyses, and valuations shall be certified to the board by an actuary who shall be a fellow of the Conference of Consulting Actuaries or a member of the American Academy of Actuaries.
  1. A copy of each five (5) year actuarial investigation, actuarial analysis, and annual valuation required by subsection (1) of this section shall be forwarded electronically to the Legislative Research Commission no later than ten (10) days after receipt by the board, and the Legislative Research Commission shall distribute the information received to the committee staff and co-chairs of any committee that has jurisdiction over the County Employees Retirement System. The actuarial valuation required by subsection (1)(b) of this section shall be submitted no later than November 15 following the close of the fiscal year. In addition, the County Employees Retirement System shall submit a summary of the actuarial valuation to the Public Pension Oversight Board by December 31 following completion of the actuarial valuation which shall include the employer contribution rates to be payable by participating employers in the upcoming fiscal year, key actuarial statistics and trends, any changes in assumptions or methods since the last valuation, and other pertinent actuarial data and information.

HISTORY: 2020 ch. 79, § 7, effective April 1, 2021.

78.790. Board trustee of funds — Investments — Registration of securities — Investment committee of funds — Cap on amount of assets managed by any one investment manager. [Effective until April 1, 2021]

  1. The board shall be the trustee of the several funds created by KRS 78.510 to 78.852 , and shall have full power to invest and reinvest such funds subject to the limitations that no investments shall be made except upon the exercise of bona fide discretion, in securities which, at the time of making the investment, are, by law, permitted for the investment of funds by fiduciaries in this state except that the board may, at its discretion, purchase common stocks in corporations that do not have a record of paying dividends to their stockholders. Subject to such limitations, the board shall have full power to hold, purchase, sell, assign, transfer or dispose of any of the securities or investments in which any of the funds created herein have been invested, as well as of the proceeds of such investments and any moneys belonging to such funds.
  2. All securities acquired under the authority of KRS 78.510 to 78.852 shall be registered in the name Kentucky Retirement Systems or nominee name as provided by KRS 286.3-225 and every change in registration, by reason of sale or assignment of such securities, shall be accomplished pursuant to written policies adopted by the board.
  3. The board, in keeping with its responsibility as the trustee and wherever feasible, shall give priority to the investment of funds in obligations calculated to improve the industrial development and enhance the economic welfare of the Commonwealth.
  4. The investment committee established pursuant to KRS 61.650 shall serve as the investment committee of the funds established by KRS 78.510 to 78.852 .
  5. Based upon market value at the time of purchase, the board shall limit the amount of assets managed by any one (1) active or passive investment manager to fifteen percent (15%) of the assets in the pension and insurance funds.

History. Enact. Acts 1958, ch. 167, § 29; 1960, ch. 165, part III, § 3; 1966, ch. 34, § 13; 1972, ch. 116, § 72; 1974, ch. 128, § 35, effective March 26, 1974; 1976, ch. 321, § 40; 1988, ch. 349, § 40, effective July 15, 1988; 2003, ch. 169, § 14, effective March 31, 2003; 2004, ch. 36, § 35, effective July 13, 2004; 2010, ch. 127, § 4, effective July 15, 2010; 2010, ch. 173, § 10, effective July 15, 2010.

Legislative Research Commission Notes.

(7/12/2006). 2006 Ky. Acts ch. 247 instructs the Reviser of Statutes to adjust KRS references throughout the statutes to conform with the 2006 renumbering of the Financial Services Code, KRS Chapter 286. Such an adjustment has been made in this statute.

78.790. Board trustee of funds — Investment committee — Standards of conduct — Registration of securities — Application of open records law — Cap on amount of assets managed by any one investment manager — Investment procurement policy. [Effective April 1, 2021]

    1. The board shall be the trustee of the several funds created by KRS 78.510 to 78.852 , and the County Employees Retirement System insurance trust fund as provided by KRS 61.701 ,and shall have full and exclusive power to invest and reinvest such funds in accordance with federal law. (1) (a) The board shall be the trustee of the several funds created by KRS 78.510 to 78.852 , and the County Employees Retirement System insurance trust fund as provided by KRS 61.701 ,and shall have full and exclusive power to invest and reinvest such funds in accordance with federal law.
      1. The board shall establish an investment committee that shall include members of the board with investment experience, elected members, or other members as determined by the board chair, and may also include nonvoting members who have investment expertise. (b) 1. The board shall establish an investment committee that shall include members of the board with investment experience, elected members, or other members as determined by the board chair, and may also include nonvoting members who have investment expertise.
      2. The investment committee shall have authority to implement the investment policies adopted by the board and act on behalf of the board on all investment-related matters and to acquire, sell, safeguard, monitor, and manage the assets and securities of the several funds.
    2. A trustee, officer, employee, employee of the Kentucky Public Pensions Authority, or other fiduciary shall discharge duties with respect to the system:
      1. Solely in the interest of the members and beneficiaries;
      2. For the exclusive purpose of providing benefits to members and beneficiaries and paying reasonable expenses of administering the system;
      3. With the care, skill, and caution under the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent person acting in a like capacity and familiar with those matters would use in the conduct of an activity of like character and purpose;
      4. Impartially, taking into account any differing interests of members and beneficiaries;
      5. Incurring any costs that are appropriate and reasonable; and
      6. In accordance with a good-faith interpretation of the law governing the system.
    3. In addition to the standards of conduct prescribed by paragraph (c) of this subsection:
      1. All internal investment staff, including investment staff of the Kentucky Public Pensions Authority, and investment consultants shall adhere to the Code of Ethics and Standards of Professional Conduct, and all board trustees shall adhere to the Code of Conduct for Members of a Pension Scheme Governing Body. All codes cited in this subparagraph are promulgated by the CFA Institute; and
      2. Investment managers shall comply with all applicable provisions of the federal Investment Advisers Act of 1940, as amended, and the rules and regulations promulgated thereunder, and shall comply with all other applicable federal securities statutes and related rules and regulations that apply to investment managers.
  1. All securities acquired under the authority of KRS 78.510 to 78.852 shall be registered in the name County Employees Retirement System or nominee name as provided by KRS 286.3-225 and every change in registration, by reason of sale or assignment of such securities, shall be accomplished pursuant to written policies adopted by the board.
  2. The board, in keeping with its responsibility as the trustee and wherever feasible, shall give priority to the investment of funds in obligations calculated to improve the industrial development and enhance the economic welfare of the Commonwealth.
  3. The contents of real estate appraisals, engineering or feasibility estimates, and evaluations made by or for the system relative to the acquisition or disposition of property, until such time as all of the property has been acquired or sold, shall be excluded from the application of KRS 61.870 to 61.884 and shall be subject to inspection only upon order of a court of competent jurisdiction.
  4. Based upon market value at the time of purchase, the board shall limit the amount of assets managed by any one (1) active or passive investment manager to fifteen percent (15%) of the assets in the pension and insurance funds.
  5. All contracts for the investment or management of assets of the system shall not be subject to KRS Chapters 45, 45A, 56, and 57. Instead, the board shall conduct the following process to develop and adopt an investment procurement policy with which all prospective contracts for the investment or management of assets of the system shall comply:
    1. The board shall consult with the secretary of the Finance and Administration Cabinet or his or her designee to develop an investment procurement policy, which shall be written to meet best practices in investment management procurement;
    2. Thirty (30) days prior to adoption, the board shall tender the preliminary investment procurement policy to the secretary of the Finance and Administration Cabinet or his or her designee for review and comment;
    3. Upon receipt of comments from the secretary of the Finance and Administration Cabinet or his or her designee, the board shall choose to adopt or not adopt any recommended changes;
    4. Upon adoption, the board shall tender the final investment procurement policy to the secretary of the Finance and Administration Cabinet or his or her designee;
    5. No later than thirty (30) days after receipt of the investment procurement policy, the secretary or his or her designee shall certify whether the board’s investment procurement policy meets or does not meet best practices for investment management procurement; and
    6. Any amendments to the investment procurement policy shall adhere to the requirements set forth by paragraphs (b) to (e) of this subsection.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1958, ch. 167, § 29; 1960, ch. 165, part III, § 3; 1966, ch. 34, § 13; 1972, ch. 116, § 72; 1974, ch. 128, § 35, effective March 26, 1974; 1976, ch. 321, § 40; 1988, ch. 349, § 40, effective July 15, 1988; 2003, ch. 169, § 14, effective March 31, 2003; 2004, ch. 36, § 35, effective July 13, 2004; 2010, ch. 127, § 4, effective July 15, 2010; 2010, ch. 173, § 10, effective July 15, 2010; 2020 ch. 79, § 5, effective April 1, 2021.

78.800. Board of trustees — Conflict of interest. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1958, ch. 167, § 30) was repealed by Acts 1972, ch. 116, § 78.

78.810. Custodian of fund — Payments make, when. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1958, ch. 167, § 31; 1962, ch. 31, § 23; 1966, ch. 34, § 14) was repealed by Acts 1972, ch. 116, § 78.

78.820. Medical examiners. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1958, ch. 167, § 32) was repealed by Acts 1972, ch. 116, § 78.

78.830. Actuarial bases. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1958, ch. 167, § 33; 1962, ch. 31, § 24) was repealed by Acts 1972, ch. 116, § 78.

78.840. Employer’s administrative duties. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1958, ch. 167, § 34) was repealed by Acts 1972, ch. 116, § 78.

78.850. Consent of members to deductions — Reciprocal arrangements among systems. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1958, ch. 167, § 35; 1962, ch. 31, § 25; 1964, ch. 49, § 12; 1972, ch. 116, § 73) was repealed by Acts 1974, ch. 128, § 36, effective March 26, 1974.

78.851. Increase of benefits in 1972. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1972, ch. 116, § 74) was repealed by Acts 1976, ch. 321, § 41.

78.852. Benefits not to be reduced or impaired for members who began participating before January 1, 2014 — Exceptions — Amendment of benefits and rights. [Effective until April 1, 2021]

  1. For members who begin participating in the County Employees Retirement System prior to January 1, 2014, it is hereby declared that in consideration of the contributions by the members and in further consideration of benefits received by the county from the member’s employment, KRS 78.510 to 78.852 shall constitute an inviolable contract of the Commonwealth, and the benefits provided therein shall not be subject to reduction or impairment by alteration, amendment, or repeal, except:
    1. As provided in KRS 6.696 ; and
    2. The General Assembly reserves the right to amend, reduce, or suspend any legislative changes to the provisions of KRS 78.510 to 78.852 that become effective on or after July 1, 2018.
    1. For members who begin participating in the County Employees Retirement System on or after January 1, 2014, the General Assembly reserves the right to amend, suspend, or reduce the benefits and rights provided under KRS 78.510 to 78.852 if, in its judgment, the welfare of the Commonwealth so demands, except that the amount of benefits the member has accrued at the time of amendment, suspension, or reduction shall not be affected. (2) (a) For members who begin participating in the County Employees Retirement System on or after January 1, 2014, the General Assembly reserves the right to amend, suspend, or reduce the benefits and rights provided under KRS 78.510 to 78.852 if, in its judgment, the welfare of the Commonwealth so demands, except that the amount of benefits the member has accrued at the time of amendment, suspension, or reduction shall not be affected.
    2. For purposes of this subsection, the amount of benefits the member has accrued at the time of amendment, suspension, or reduction shall be limited to the accumulated account balance the member has accrued at the time of amendment, suspension, or reduction.
    3. The provisions of this subsection shall not be construed to limit the General Assembly’s authority to change any other benefit or right specified by KRS 78.510 to 78.852, except the benefits specified by paragraph (b) of this subsection, for members who begin participating in the County Employees Retirement System on or after January 1, 2014.
  2. The provisions of this section shall not be construed to limit the General Assembly’s authority to amend, reduce, or suspend the benefits and rights of members of the County Employees Retirement System as provided by KRS 78.510 to 78.852 that the General Assembly had the authority to amend, reduce, or suspend, prior to July 1, 2013.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1972, ch. 116, § 75; 1976, ch. 321, § 40; 1993 (1st Ex. Sess.), ch. 4, § 80, effective September 16, 1993; 1996, ch. 167, § 27, effective July 15, 1996; 2013, ch. 120, § 80, effective July 1, 2013; 2018 ch. 107, § 34, effective July 14, 2018.

Legislative Research Commission Notes.

(12/13/2018). On December 13, 2018, the Kentucky Supreme Court ruled that the passage of 2018 SB 151 (2018 Ky. Acts ch. 107), did not comply with the three-readings rule of Kentucky Constitution Section 46 and that the legislation is, therefore, constitutionally invalid and declared void. That ruling applies to changes made to this statute in that Act.

Opinions of Attorney General.

In light of the contractual obligation created by this section, the General Assembly may now limit retirement benefits to a certain maximum percentage of final annual salary. OAG 78-4 .

The General Assembly could enact legislation guaranteeing members of this retirement system the amount each has contributed toward his retirement benefits but such legislation may not have retroactive effect. OAG 78-4 .

Since Chapter 4 of Acts 1993 (1st Ex. Sess.) contained an emergency clause [§ 92] it became effective as a whole when the Governor tendered the bill, which he had signed, to the Secretary of State on February 18, 1993. However, section 87 (13) of Ch. 4 of Acts 1993 (1st Ex. Sess.), provided that, except as provided in §§ 88, 89, and 90, §§ 1-84 of the Act should become effective two hundred ten (210) days after the effective date of the Act, September 16, 1993; other subsections within § 87 establish a transition schedule with other specific dates calculated from the effective date of the Act. Such schedule is actually a listing of deadlines within which certain actions called for in § 87 of the Act are to be completed. Such schedule is as follows: “within 45 days of the effective date of the act” = on or before April 5, 1993; “within 60 days of the effective date of the act” = on or before April 19, 1993; “within 75 days of the effective date of the act” = on or before May 4, 1993; “within 90 days of the effective date of the act” = on or before May 19, 1993; “within 150 days of the effective date of the act” = on or before July 19, 1993; “within 180 days of the effective date of the act” = on or before August 17, 1993; “two hundred ten (210) days after the effective date of the act” = September 16, 1993. OAG 93-25 .

78.852. Benefits not to be reduced or impaired for members who began participating before January 1, 2014 — Exceptions — Amendment of benefits and rights — Employers’ funding responsibility — Authority of board when employer fails to meet funding requirement. [Effective April 1, 2021]

  1. For members who begin participating in the County Employees Retirement System prior to January 1, 2014, it is hereby declared that in consideration of the contributions by the members and in further consideration of benefits received by the county from the member’s employment, KRS 78.510 to 78.852 shall, except as provided in KRS 6.696 effective September 16, 1993, constitute an inviolable contract of the Commonwealth, and the benefits provided therein shall not be subject to reduction or impairment by alteration, amendment, or repeal.
    1. For members who begin participating in the County Employees Retirement System on or after January 1, 2014, the General Assembly reserves the right to amend, suspend, or reduce the benefits and rights provided under KRS 78.510 to 78.852 if, in its judgment, the welfare of the Commonwealth so demands, except that the amount of benefits the member has accrued at the time of amendment, suspension, or reduction shall not be affected. (2) (a) For members who begin participating in the County Employees Retirement System on or after January 1, 2014, the General Assembly reserves the right to amend, suspend, or reduce the benefits and rights provided under KRS 78.510 to 78.852 if, in its judgment, the welfare of the Commonwealth so demands, except that the amount of benefits the member has accrued at the time of amendment, suspension, or reduction shall not be affected.
    2. For purposes of this subsection, the amount of benefits the member has accrued at the time of amendment, suspension, or reduction shall be limited to the accumulated account balance the member has accrued at the time of amendment, suspension, or reduction.
    3. The provisions of this subsection shall not be construed to limit the General Assembly’s authority to change any other benefit or right specified by KRS 78.510 to 78.852, except the benefits specified by paragraph (b) of this subsection, for members who begin participating in the County Employees Retirement System on or after January 1, 2014.
  2. The provisions of this section shall not be construed to limit the General Assembly’s authority to amend, reduce, or suspend the benefits and rights of members of the County Employees Retirement System as provided by KRS 78.510 to 78.852 that the General Assembly had the authority to amend, reduce, or suspend, prior to July 1, 2013.
  3. The responsibility for funding the provisions of KRS 78.510 to 78.852 shall be the responsibility of the employers participating in the County Employees Retirement System. For any employer failing to fund the requirements of KRS 78.510 to 78.852 , the board shall have the full authority under the law to:
    1. Require the employer to involuntarily cease participating and pay all costs for ceasing participation as provided by KRS 78.535 ; or
    2. Suspend benefit payments and refunds or to seek legal action as provided by KRS 78.625 for any employer failing to fund the requirements of KRS 78.510 to 78.852.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1972, ch. 116, § 75; 1976, ch. 321, § 40; 1993 (1st Ex. Sess.), ch. 4, § 80, effective September 16, 1993; 1996, ch. 167, § 27, effective July 15, 1996; 2013, ch. 120, § 80, effective July 1, 2013; 2020 ch. 79, § 39, effective April 1, 2021.

78.860. Errors in record. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1958, ch. 167, § 36) was repealed by Acts 1972, ch. 116, § 78.

78.870. Exemption of retirement allowance. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1958, ch. 167, § 37) was repealed by Acts 1972, ch. 116, § 78.

78.880. Alteration, amendment or repeal. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1958, ch. 167, § 38) was repealed by Acts 1972, ch. 116, § 78.

Penalties

78.990. Penalties.

Any person who shall knowingly violate any of the provisions of KRS 78.400 to 78.460 shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and shall upon conviction be punished by a fine of not less than fifty dollars ($50) nor more than one thousand dollars ($1,000) or by imprisonment for a term not to exceed six (6) months or by both such fine and imprisonment and if such person be an applicant for any employment covered hereby, he shall be excluded from such examination for a period of three (3) years thereafter and if the name of such person be on any eligible list of the said board, his name shall be removed therefrom and if he be an officer or employee of the county, he shall be removed forthwith therefrom and be ineligible for any such appointment to public office or employment for a period of three (3) years thereafter.

History. Enact. Acts 1952, ch. 141, § 5 subsec. (1).

78.991. Penalty for false statements. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1958, ch. 167, § 39) was repealed by Acts 1972, ch. 116, § 78 and Acts 1974, ch. 406, § 336, effective January 1, 1975.

CHAPTER 79 Intercity, Intercounty and City-County Compacts for Purchasing and Merit Systems — Retirement and Disability Plans for Employees of Counties and Cities

79.010. Intercity or intercounty compacts for purchasing and merit systems authorized. [Repealed]

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 43, § 1; repealed by 2019 ch. 44, § 35, effective June 27, 2019.

79.020. Expenses to be prorated — Rules and regulations. [Repealed]

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 43, § 2; repealed by 2019 ch. 44, § 35, effective June 27, 2019.

79.030. Intercity or intercounty commission — Membership — Compensation — Votes — Powers. [Repealed]

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 43, § 3; repealed by 2019 ch. 44, § 35, effective June 27, 2019.

79.040. Meetings of commission — Records — Reports. [Repealed]

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 43, § 5; repealed by 2019 ch. 44, § 35, effective June 27, 2019.

79.050. Comptroller — Appointment — Powers and duties — Term of employment. [Repealed]

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 43, §§ 3, 4, 6; repealed by 2019 ch. 44, § 35, effective June 27, 2019.

79.060. Comptroller to have access to records — Control of personnel — Purchase of supplies — Requisitions. [Repealed]

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 43, § 6; repealed by 2019 ch. 44, § 35, effective June 27, 2019.

79.070. Legal departments, courts and boards of education not affected. [Repealed]

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 43, § 7; repealed by 2019 ch. 44, § 35, effective June 27, 2019.

79.080. Retirement, disability, health maintenance organization coverage, or hospitalization benefits for employees and elected officers — Participation in state health insurance coverage program for state employees — Termination of participation — Coverage provided in County Employees Retirement System after August 1, 1988.

  1. The term “health maintenance organization” for the purposes of this section, means a health maintenance organization as defined in KRS 304.38-030 , which has been issued a certificate of authority by the Department of Insurance as a health maintenance organization and which is qualified under the requirements of the United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare, except as provided in subsection (4) of this section.
  2. Cities of all classes, counties, and urban-county governments and the agencies of cities, counties, charter county, and urban-county governments are authorized to establish and operate plans for the payment of retirement, disability, health maintenance organization coverage, or hospitalization benefits to their employees and elected officers, and health maintenance organization coverage or hospitalization benefits to the immediate families of their employees and elected officers. The plan may require employees to pay a percentage of their salaries into a fund from which coverage or benefits are paid, or the city, county, charter county, urban-county government, or agency may pay out of its own funds the entire cost of the coverage or benefits. A plan may include a combination of contributions by employees and elected officers and by the city, county, charter county, urban-county government, or agency into a fund from which coverage or benefits are paid, or it may take any form desired by the city, county, charter county, urban-county government, or agency. Each city, county, charter county, urban-county government, or agency may make rules and regulations and do all other things necessary in the establishment and operation of the plan.
  3. Cities of all classes, counties, charter counties, urban-county governments, the agencies of cities, counties, charter counties, and urban-county governments, and all other political subdivisions of the state may provide disability, hospitalization, or other health or medical care coverage to their officers and employees, including their elected officers, through independent or cooperative self-insurance programs and may cooperatively purchase the coverages.
  4. Any city, county, charter county, or urban-county government which is a contributing member to any one (1) of the retirement systems administered by the state may participate in the state health insurance coverage program for state employees as defined in KRS 18A.225 to 18A.229 . Should any city, county, charter county, or urban-county government opt at any time to participate in the state health insurance coverage program, it shall do so for a minimum of three (3) consecutive years. If after the three (3) year participation period, the city, county, charter county, or urban-county government chooses to terminate participation in the state health insurance coverage program, it will be excluded from further participation for a period of three (3) consecutive years. If a city, county, charter county, or urban-county government, or one (1) of its agencies, terminates participation of its active employees in the state health insurance coverage program and there is a state appropriation for the employer’s contribution for active employees’ health insurance coverage, neither the unit of government, or its agency, nor the employees shall receive the state-funded contribution after termination from the state employee health insurance program. The three (3) year participation and exclusion cycles shall take effect each time a city, county, charter county, or urban-county government changes its participation status.
  5. Any city, county, charter county, urban-county government, or other political subdivision of the state which employs more than twenty-five (25) persons and which provides hospitalization benefits or health maintenance organization coverage to its employees and elected officers, shall annually give its employees an option to elect either standard hospitalization benefits or membership in a qualified health maintenance organization which is engaged in providing basic health services in a health maintenance service area in which at least twenty-five (25) of the employees reside; except that if any city, county, charter county, urban-county government, or agencies of any city, county, charter county, urban-county government, or any other political subdivision of the state which does not have a qualified health maintenance organization engaged in providing basic health services in a health maintenance service area in which at least twenty-five (25) of the employees reside, the city, county, charter county, urban-county government, or agencies of the city, county, charter county, urban-county government, or any other political subdivision of the state may annually give its employees an option to elect either standard hospitalization benefits or membership in a health maintenance organization which has been issued a certificate of authority by the Department of Insurance as a health maintenance organization and which is engaged in providing basic health services in a health maintenance service area in which at least twenty-five (25) of the employees reside. Any premium due for health maintenance organization coverage over the amount contributed by the city, county, charter county, urban-county government, or other political subdivision of the state which employs more than twenty-five (25) persons for any other hospitalization benefit shall be paid by the employee.
  6. If an employee moves his place of residence or employment out of the service area of a health maintenance organization, under which he has elected coverage, into either the service area of another health maintenance organization or into an area of the state not within a health maintenance organization service area, the employee shall be given an option, at the time of the move or transfer, to elect coverage either by the health maintenance organization into which service area he moves or is transferred or to elect standard hospitalization coverage offered by the employer.
  7. Any plan adopted shall provide that any officer or member of a paid fire or police department who has completed five (5) years or more as a member of the department, but who is unable to perform his duties by reason of heart disease or any disease of the lungs or respiratory tract, is presumed to have contracted his disease while on active duty as a result of strain or the inhalation of noxious fumes, poison or gases, and shall be retired by the pension board under terms of the pension system of which he is a member, if the member passed an entrance physical examination and was found to be in good health as required.
  8. The term “agency” as used herein shall include boards appointed to operate waterworks, electric plants, hospitals, airports, housing projects, golf courses, parks, health departments, or any other public project.
  9. After August 1, 1988, except as permitted by KRS 65.156 , no new retirement plan shall be created pursuant to this section, and cities which were covered by this section on or prior to August 1, 1988, shall participate in the County Employees Retirement System effective August 1, 1988. Any city, county, charter county, urban-county, or agency thereof which provided a retirement plan for its employees, pursuant to this section, on or prior to August 1, 1988, shall place employees hired after August 1, 1988, in the County Employees Retirement System. The city, county, charter county, urban-county, or agency thereof shall offer employees hired on or prior to August 1, 1988, membership in the County Employees Retirement System under the alternate participation plan as described in KRS 78.530(3), but such employees may elect to retain coverage under this section.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1948, ch. 129, § 1; 1966, ch. 10; 1970, ch. 212, § 1; 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 35, § 3; 1984, ch. 177, § 10, effective July 13, 1984; 1986, ch. 292, § 1, effective July 15, 1986; 1988, ch. 11, § 7, effective July 15, 1988; 1994, ch. 350, § 5, effective July 15, 1994; 2000, ch. 438, § 5, effective April 21, 2000; 2010, ch. 24, § 74, effective July 15, 2010; 2018 ch. 112, § 1, effective July 14, 2018.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

Board of Trustees v. Nuckolls, 507 S.W.2d 183, 1974 Ky. LEXIS 678 ( Ky. 1974 ); Covington v. Tranter, 673 S.W.2d 744, 1984 Ky. App. LEXIS 527 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984).

Opinions of Attorney General.

The provisions of this section have no application to the police and fire departments of a second-class city. OAG 68-451 .

It is not mandatory that a member of the police or fire department of a second-class city who might qualify as to disability under this section be retired. OAG 68-451 .

A city could not legally enlarge the retirement, disability or hospitalization benefits it furnishes for its employees to include coverage for the members of the immediate families of such employees. OAG 69-657 .

The provisions of this section have no application to those police and fire departments mandatorily required to operate under the terms of KRS 95.851 to 95.885 (KRS 95.885 renumbered as KRS 95.991 ). OAG 70-140 .

A city of the fourth class could not take group hospital insurance and permit the mayor and city councilmen to be included in the coverage with the city paying one half of the premium. OAG 70-720 .

This section would not allow premium payments for deputy county clerks as such clerks are officers rather than “employees” of the county. OAG 72-540 .

A third-class city may, under the provisions of this section, pay more than fifty percent of the premiums for disability, retirement or hospitalization insurance for city policeman. OAG 72-709 .

Although any city may establish and operate a retirement plan for its employees, it cannot apply to municipal officers such as the clerk-treasurer or the chief of police and members of the police department of a fifth-class city, who are required to operate under KRS Chapter 95. OAG 73-283 .

County funds could be utilized to pay for Blue Cross medical insurance covering not only county employees but also county officials, including justices of the peace. OAG 73-589 .

The fiscal court could take out hospital and medical care insurance covering both elected county officials and county employees. OAG 74-281 .

Whether the presumption created by KRS 79.080 can be overcome by a physician is one that only the courts can decide. OAG 74-617 .

If group life insurance coverage under KRS 82.040 (now repealed) or health insurance coverage under KRS 79.080 were given to municipal officers to be paid for in whole or part by the city, such contribution would not constitute extra compensation in violation of Const., § 161. OAG 75-470 .

The fiscal court may pay all or any part of the insurance premiums of county employees but if county officials are included under the plan, they must pay their own premiums. See OAG 75-582 under this section for withdrawal of opinion. OAG 75-538 .

The fiscal court may pay the Blue Cross-Blue Shield premiums for county officers under the county’s home rule statute, KRS 67.083 , and that portion of OAG 75-538 in conflict with this opinion is withdrawn. OAG 75-582 .

The employees of a fire department of a city, county or urban-county government may be included with other city employees under a hospitalization plan adopted pursuant to the terms of this section. OAG 76-517 .

This section does not authorize the payment of premiums out of excess fees of constitutional officers for such insurance covering deputies of constitutional fee officers, since the legislature intended to cover only county “employees” hired under the aegis of fiscal court under KRS 67.083 , 67.710(7) and this section and this prevails over all conflicting opinions. OAG 78-806 .

A city, under the existing statutory provisions, is not authorized to establish a pension program for municipal officers, and municipal officers, such as the treasurer-clerk, could only participate in a municipal employees’ pension plan if those officers paid all required premiums from their own personal funds. OAG 79-20 .

A city of the fourth class may, under the provisions of this section, pay all or any part of the cost of its employees’ hospitalization plan. OAG 80-354 .

A city of the fourth class may not operate a pension plan for its police officers under subsection (2) of this section but, rather, it must utilize the provisions of KRS 95.767 to 95.785 or KRS 95.520 to 95.620 or KRS 90.300 to 90.420 . OAG 81-191 .

Municipal employees of a fourth-class city could be included in a retirement plan enacted pursuant to subsection (2) of this section; however, that subsection is limited to municipal employees and a municipal officer could only participate in such retirement plan if he paid all the required amounts due from his own personal funds. OAG 81-191 .

The terms of this section authorizing hospitalization coverage of city employees do not authorize the exclusion of a group of city employees for any reason, much less one based upon the total family income of the individual employee which is completely unrelated to his public employment duties. Such would be considered discriminatory and create an arbitrary classification in violation of Const., § 3 and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. OAG 82-247 .

A city of the fourth class can, pursuant to this section, provide its employees with a hospitalization plan. A city cannot, however, extend the coverage of such a plan to include city officers as this section is limited to employees and the immediate families of those employees. OAG 82-294 .

A county can pay the costs of hospitalization insurance coverage for its employees but it is for the courts to determine whether paying such costs for the immediate families of county employees is an expenditure of public money for a public purpose. OAG 82-294 .

Since cities and counties have the authority under subsection (2) of this section to establish and operate, individually, plans for the payment of hospitalization benefits, they may, under the authority of the Interlocal Cooperation Act, KRS 65.210 to 65.300 , operate such plans jointly with other cities and counties. The agreement must ultimately be approved by the attorney general. OAG 82-294 .

While this section provides in part that a hospitalization plan may take any form desired by the city and county and necessary rules and regulations may be adopted in the establishment and operation of such a plan, there are limitations as to how and for what purposes governmental units may expend their funds. The governmental units may pay the actual costs of the hospitalization insurance plan. If the program is successful, the benefits to the employees should be reflected in terms of lower rates or expanded coverage but not in terms of cash payments to employees. OAG 82-294 .

The statutory presumption of subsection (5) (now (7)) of this section that heart disease or respiratory disease was contracted by a member of the department while on active duty is subject to rebuttal by evidence that may be submitted by the board in conjunction with the medical examination required to be made under KRS 95.864 ; in other words, the burden of proof that the disease was not contracted while on active duty and as a result of strain or the inhalation of noxious fumes, poison or gas, shifts to the board. OAG 83-282 .

A city must pay its nonelective officers in accordance with the compensation set forth by ordinance which, of course, can be changed at any time by amendment. However, such compensation that has been fixed for such office should not include the amount contributed by the city for hospitalization insurance under a group program established pursuant to this section, particularly since such payment is unauthorized in the first place. OAG 84-294 .

There is no statutory authority which would allow a county clerk to pay the health insurance premiums on himself and his deputies without fiscal court approval. OAG 84-324 .

In reading subsection (2) of this section and KRS 304.18-020 together, any fiscal court is authorized to establish a program whereby the county will pay for the group health insurance coverage premiums on the part of the county’s employees, its elected county officials, and their deputies under proper budgeting procedure. OAG 85-13 .

For purposes of country-wide health insurance, the General Assembly has drawn no distinction among employees, assistants, deputies, and elected officers. In this section the legislature has authorized counties to procure health insurance for “employees and elected officers.” This includes deputies of elected officers. OAG 92-108 .

Statute authorizing cities, counties, urban counties, and agencies thereof, to establish health coverage programs for employees and elected officers does not provide for a pay raise in lieu of coverage under the governmentally provided program. OAG 94-15 .

An elected county fee official cannot offer his employees a health insurance benefits plan which provides a different level of coverage than that provided to the county fee official. OAG 94-15 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Civil service for city employees, KRS Chapter 90.

Disability benefits for policemen and firemen, KRS 95.290 , 95.550 , 95.773 .

Disability, medical and hospital benefits for police and firemen of cities of third and fourth classes, KRS 95.850 .

79.090. Authority for cities, counties and their agencies to participate in federal social security program. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enacts. Acts 1948, ch. 129, § 2) was repealed by Acts 1968, ch. 152, § 168.

79.100. Provisions of KRS 79.080 are supplemental.

The provisions of KRS 79.080 shall be in addition to any other authority of cities, counties and their agencies to provide retirement and disability benefits for their employees, and shall not repeal or modify any acts except those that may be in conflict with KRS 79.080 .

History. Enact. Acts 1948, ch. 129, § 3; 1980, ch. 188, § 72, effective July 15, 1980.

79.110. Political subdivisions may contract for joint governmental services in county.

Notwithstanding any existing means provided by law for joint functions by any political subdivisions of this state, the governing bodies of any two (2) or more political subdivisions within the same county, which may include the fiscal court, may enter into contractual arrangements with each other for the performance of governmental services anywhere within the boundaries of the county.

History. Enact. Acts 1954, ch. 34, § 1; 1964, ch. 144, § 1.

Opinions of Attorney General.

One city could not contract with another city for the furnishing of police services since it would involve the policemen holding incompatible offices in the two cities. OAG 65-718 .

The city and county could utilize the provisions of this act to contract for joint governmental services. OAG 73-570 .

Since a city and a county, individually, may directly operate an ambulance service, they could utilize the provisions of KRS 79.110 to 79.180 or KRS 65.210 to 65.300 to agree to directly operate, jointly, an ambulance service even though KRS 65.730 has been repealed. OAG 79-104 .

A local public housing agency may operate a section 8 existing housing program (42 USCS § 1437f) outside of its territorial jurisdiction but within the county in which it is located under the provisions of KRS 79.110 to 79.180 , as long as the fiscal court of the county and a city or cities within the county and a city housing authority join together in such an agreement. OAG 80-55 .

Not only may cities enact dog control ordinances, but they may join together with other cities in joint or cooperative undertakings to handle such matters of common concern. OAG 82-447 .

The county has definite and prescribed obligations under KRS Chapter 258, but they do not include the duty to accept dogs at the county pound which were picked up by the municipal dog control authorities, particularly where violations of municipal ordinances are involved. While the cities and the county have the authority to enter into a joint or cooperative agreement concerning dog control and the use of the county dog pound, which could include a boarding fee for dogs delivered to the pound by city dog control officers, the cities, in the absence of agreement with the county, cannot require the county to accept dogs picked up for violations of municipal ordinances; absent an agreement between the cities and the county relative to dog control, the cities will enforce their ordinances only and the county and all peace officers will enforce the provisions of KRS Chapter 258. OAG 82-447 .

A county fiscal court may not haul and apply county road materials to a city street which is wholly unconnected with the county road system, with the city paying the costs of the materials; also, this section and KRS 79.120 would not permit the city and county to contract for the county to supply some portion of the cost of the service on the theory that the residents of the city are also residents of the county paying both city and county taxes. OAG 83-439 .

79.120. Requisites of contracts.

Any contractual arrangement entered into under KRS 79.110 shall:

  1. Name the service or services to be performed and clearly define same;
  2. State which subdivision of government shall render the service or services;
  3. Define the area within which the service or services contracted for shall be performed;
  4. Provide the means of payment of the cost of the service or services;
  5. When the county government is one of the contracting parties, take cognizance of the fact that city residents are county residents and taxpayers to both governments, and provide for an equitable distribution of the cost of providing the service or services.

History. Enact. Acts 1954, ch. 34, § 2; 1964, ch. 144, § 2.

Opinions of Attorney General.

A county fiscal court may not haul and apply county road materials to a city street which is wholly unconnected with the county road system, with the city paying the costs of the materials; also, KRS 79.110 and this section would not permit the city and county to contract for the county to supply some portion of the cost of the service on the theory that the residents of the city are also residents of the county paying both city and county taxes. OAG 83-439 .

79.130. Authority of city or county officers, agents and employees to perform services under agreement — Positions not incompatible.

Insofar as is necessary to effect the purpose of KRS 79.110 to 79.180 , officers, agents, servants and employees of the subdivision of government providing the service shall be sworn in and authorized to act within the area covered by any contractual agreement and no such qualification or authorization to act shall be considered the holding of incompatible positions.

History. Enact. Acts 1954, ch. 34, § 3, effective June 17, 1954.

79.140. Inclusion of other political subdivisions in contract.

The governing body of any other political subdivision within the boundaries of the county, which may include the fiscal court, may, with the mutual consent of the governing body of each political subdivision constituting a party thereto, become a party to and beneficiary of a contract entered into under authority of KRS 79.110 . The inclusion of a third-party political subdivision in any such contract shall be by a writing in compliance with KRS 79.120 .

History. Enact. Acts 1954, ch. 34, § 4; 1964, ch. 144, § 3.

79.150. Abolition of unnecessary city or county offices.

  1. The governing body of any city electing to render or to receive governmental services under a contract authorized by KRS 79.110 to 79.180 may, by ordinance, abolish any office rendered unnecessary thereby, or may, by ordinance, declare any such office vacant during the term of the contract. Any such office occupied by an official elected by the qualified voters of the city shall not be abolished or declared vacant before the end of the term of the incumbent.
  2. The fiscal court or the appointing authority of any county or other political subdivision electing to render or to receive governmental services under a contract authorized by KRS 79.110 to 79.180 may declare vacant for the term of the contract any office rendered unnecessary thereby. Any such office occupied by an officer elected by the qualified voters of the county or other political subdivision shall not be declared vacant before the end of the term of the incumbent.

History. Enact. Acts 1954, ch. 34, § 5; 1964, ch. 144, § 4.

79.160. Transfer of employees — Applicability of civil service laws.

  1. When the governing bodies of any two or more political subdivisions within the same county, which may include the fiscal court, enter into a contract for the rendering of governmental services the contract shall make such provision for the transfer of employees from the departments of the one or more subdivision or subdivisions of government receiving the service to the departments of the subdivision of government rendering the service as may effect the efficient functioning of the plan for service to the people.
  2. In the event that in accordance with the provisions of subsection (1) of this section, employees are transferred to a governmental department subject to any civil service laws or regulation, those transferred employees shall during the term of the contract be subject to any such civil service laws or regulations. Such employees, when transferred, shall be considered as having satisfied all of the qualifications for obtaining original appointment under applicable civil service laws and regulations, and shall be considered as having been given probationary appointments as defined in such laws or regulations as of the date they are so placed in the classified service.

History. Enact. Acts 1954, ch. 34, § 6; 1964, ch. 144, § 5.

79.170. Duration of contracts — Renewal or termination.

Any contract entered into under the provisions of KRS 79.110 to 79.180 shall be for a term of at least two (2) years and not more than four (4) years. At least one (1) year before the termination date of any such contract, each contracting party shall in writing notify the other or others of its intention to enter into a new contract concerning the services rendered and received or of its intention to terminate the arrangements.

History. Enact. Acts 1954, ch. 34, § 7; 1964, ch. 144, § 6.

79.180. Pension rights of transferred employees.

Employees transferred, under the provisions of KRS 79.110 to 79.180 , to a governmental department which has pension rights and benefits for its employees shall not be entitled to participate in those rights or benefits. Employees transferred to a governmental department shall not, because of such a transfer, lose any pension rights or benefits provided for by the department from which he was transferred.

History. Enact. Acts 1954, ch. 34, § 8, effective June 17, 1954.

79.190. Construction, maintenance of street forming common boundary, contract for.

Any two (2) cities or a city and a county having any part of a public street as a common boundary line may contract to share the cost of construction, reconstruction, repair and maintenance of the street or sidewalk along the common boundary or any portion thereof.

History. Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 181, § 1.

Cooperative Compact Between City of First Class and Its County

79.310. Cooperative compact between a city of the first class and county containing that city — Term — Amendment — Termination — Renewal.

  1. Within one hundred and twenty (120) days of July 15, 1986, there shall be entered into by each city of the first class and a county containing such city of the first class a cooperative compact pursuant to this section and KRS 79.315 to 79.330 . Such compact shall provide a framework for cooperation between the city and the county and shall contain such provisions as are required by this section and KRS 79.315 to 79.330 and may contain any other provisions which are not in conflict with this section and KRS 79.315 to 79.330 as may be agreed upon by the city and the county. The compact shall be executed by the mayor of the city of the first class with the consent of the legislative body of the city and the county judge/executive of the county with the consent of the fiscal court.
  2. The compact entered into pursuant to subsection (1) of this section shall be for a period of twelve (12) years, except that if any mandatory provision of the compact or 1986 Acts Chapter 77 is adjudicated invalid or if any provision of this section or KRS 79.315 to 79.330 is amended or repealed by subsequent act of the General Assembly, the compact shall immediately terminate.
  3. Upon the expiration or termination of the cooperative compact entered into according to subsection (1) of this section, a city of the first class and a county containing a city of the first class may renew the cooperative compact according to this section and KRS 79.315 to 79.330 . Any cooperative compact renewed in accordance with this subsection shall be for a term of ten (10) years, and shall provide a framework for cooperation between the city and the county, shall contain the provisions as required by this section and KRS 79.315 to 79.330 , and may contain any other provisions which are not in conflict with this section and KRS 79.315 to 79.330 as may be agreed to by the city and the county. To become effective, the compact shall be executed by the mayor of the city of the first class with approval by the legislative body of the city and the county judge/executive of the county containing a city of the first class, with the approval by the fiscal court.
  4. Any compact entered into pursuant to this section and KRS 79.315 to 79.330 may be amended by the city and the county, provided that no such amendment shall conflict with the provisions of this section and KRS 79.315 to 79.330 .

History. Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 77, § 1, effective July 15, 1986; 1998, ch. 104, § 1, effective June 1, 1998.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Applicability.

Because a cooperative agreement was in effect when a first-class city sought to annex certain property, and because reintroduction of its first reading every six (6) months was a savings clause to keep the first reading from expiring, KRS 81A.005(3) and KRS 79.310 gave annexation priority to the first-class city over a fourth-class city. Louisville/Jefferson County Metro Gov't v. City of Prospect, 277 S.W.3d 227, 2009 Ky. LEXIS 6 ( Ky. 2009 ).

79.315. Matters to be agreed upon.

In the compact entered into pursuant to KRS 79.310 , a city of the first class and the county containing such city shall agree for the period the compact is in effect that:

  1. Any annexation by the city of the first class of unincorporated territory shall be pursuant to the procedures established by KRS 81A.005 ;
  2. Occupational license fees collected by the city and the county shall be divided between the city of the first class and the county in accordance with the formula established by KRS 79.325 ;
  3. The control and responsibility for specific boards, commissions and agencies established or controlled by either the city or the county or by the city and the county jointly shall be in accordance with the provisions of the compact pursuant to KRS 79.330 notwithstanding any provision of the Kentucky Revised Statutes to the contrary.

History. Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 77 § 2, effective July 15, 1986.

79.320. Definitions for KRS 79.325.

As used in KRS 79.325 , unless the context otherwise requires:

  1. “Base year collections” means the amount of combined collections received by the city of the first class and the county containing such city in calendar year 1985;
  2. “Collections” means the sums received (excluding penalties and interest) by a city of the first class and the county containing such city in a calendar year from its occupational license fee levy;
  3. “Combined inflation-adjusted base” means the base year collections of the city of the first class and the county containing such city adjusted by the increase or decrease in the consumer price index by using 1985 as the base year. Each year the combined inflation adjusted base shall be computed by multiplying the consumer price index in December of that year by base year collections and dividing the product by the December 1985 consumer price index;
  4. “Consumer price index” means the index for all urban consumers as published by the United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics; and
  5. “Occupational license fees” means license fees levied upon wages and net profits by a city of the first class pursuant to KRS 91.200 and by the county containing such city pursuant to KRS 68.180 , but shall not include occupational license fees imposed for educational purposes pursuant to KRS Chapter 160, for mass transportation programs pursuant to KRS 96A.310 to 96A.370 or license fees or taxes on insurance premiums for the privilege of engaging in the business of insurance.

History. Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 77, § 3, effective July 15, 1986.

79.325. Sinking fund apportionment.

  1. Effective the year the compact between the city and the county is entered into pursuant to KRS 79.310 to 79.330 , the sinking fund of the city of the first class shall calculate the distribution of the combined collections from the occupational license fees in accordance with the formula established by this section instead of in accordance within which jurisdiction the situs of the person or business subject to the tax is located. This section shall not change the manner in which such license fees are levied or collected by such city and county and the fees therefor, but merely directs that the combined collections from such license fees be apportioned between the two (2) local governments better to reflect the sharing of responsibilities and obligations agreed to by such city and the county in the cooperative compact under KRS 79.310 to 79.330 .
  2. If combined collections from occupational license fees in any calendar year are less than or equal to the base year collections, fifty-eight and seven hundred thirty-five thousandths percent (58.735%) of such combined collections shall be apportioned to the city of the first class and forty-one and two hundred sixty-five thousandths percent (41.265%) of such combined collections shall be apportioned to the county.
  3. If combined collections are greater than the base year collections but less than the combined inflation-adjusted base, the amount equal to the base year collections shall be divided between such city and county in accordance with subsection (2) of this section, and the remainder of combined collections shall be divided so that the city shall be apportioned fifty-nine and seven-tenths percent (59.7%) of such remainder and the county shall be apportioned forty and three-tenths percent (40.3%) of such remainder.
  4. If combined collections in any calendar year exceed the combined inflation-adjusted base, the amount of combined collections equal to the combined inflation-adjusted base shall be divided between the city and the county in accordance with subsection (3) of this section, ten percent (10%) of the combined collections in excess of the combined inflation-adjusted base shall be apportioned in accordance with subsection (5) of this section, and the remaining ninety percent (90%) shall be apportioned so that fifty-seven and two-tenths percent (57.2%) of the remainder shall be apportioned to the city of the first class and forty-two and eight-tenths percent (42.8%) of the remainder shall be apportioned to the county.
  5. Ten percent (10%) of the combined collections in excess of the combined inflation adjusted base shall be apportioned to the city of the first class or the county in accordance within which jurisdiction the growth in combined collections occurred. If the increase in combined collections is attributable to increased collections in both jurisdictions, the city and the county shall each be apportioned a percentage of the ten percent (10%) equal to the percentage of the increase in combined collections that is attributable to the increase in collections in its jurisdiction.

History. Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 77, § 4, effective July 15, 1986.

79.330. Transfer, alteration and appointment to joint city-county entities.

  1. When a city of the first class and a county containing such city have entered into a compact pursuant to KRS 79.310 to 79.325 , such city and county may provide for the transfer and alteration of joint city-county entities as provided in 1986 Acts Chapter 77.
  2. In making appointments to joint entities transferred or altered pursuant to 1986 Acts Chapter 77, the mayor and the county judge/executive, to the extent practicable, shall take into account the demographic characteristics of the county, including, but not limited to, race and sex.

History. Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 77, § 5, effective July 15, 1986.

79.335. Nonseverability of provisions governing cooperative compacts.

If any provision of KRS 79.310 , KRS 81A.005 , or KRS 79.315 to 79.330 is held to be unconstitutional or invalid, that provision shall not be severable but KRS 79.310 , KRS 81A.005 , and KRS 79.315 to 79.330 shall be invalidated, because it is the intention of the General Assembly that the provisions of KRS 79.310, KRS 81A.005, and KRS 79.315 to 79.330 are so essentially and inseparably connected with and dependent upon every other provision that KRS 79.310, KRS 81A.005, and KRS 79.315 to 79.330 would have not been enacted without the inclusion of every provision in KRS 79.310, KRS 81A.005, and in KRS 79.315 to 79.330.

History. Enact. Acts 1998, ch. 104, § 3, effective June 1, 1998.

CHAPTER 80 Low-Cost Housing

Definitions

80.010. Definitions for chapter.

As used in this chapter, unless the context otherwise requires:

  1. “Housing” means a building or buildings containing rooms to be provided as living quarters, together with shops, stores, garages, laundries, doctors’ and dentists’ offices, and other facilities and appurtenances deemed reasonably necessary by the housing authority to the successful and economical operation of the project. It also means any work or undertaking of a housing authority or of the federal government to:
    1. Demolish, clear, or remove a building or buildings from any slum area, including the adaptation of such area to recreational, community, or other public purposes;
    2. Provide decent, safe, and sanitary living accommodations for persons who lack the amount of income that is necessary, as determined by the authority undertaking the project, to enable them, without financial assistance, to obtain such accommodations; such work or undertaking may include buildings, land equipment, facilities, and other real or personal property for necessary, convenient, or desirable appurtenances, streets, sewers, water service, parks, site preparation, gardening, administrative, community, health, recreational, welfare, or other purposes;
    3. Accomplish a combination of the foregoing and any purposes and objectives permitted of public housing authorities authorized by the United States Housing Act of 1937, 42 U.S.C., sec. 1401, as amended from time to time;
  2. “Housing authority” or “authority” means any housing authority created pursuant to this chapter;
  3. “Public body” means any city, county, commission, district, authority, or other public body or political subdivision of the Commonwealth;
  4. “Federal government” includes the United States of America, the United States housing authority and its successor agencies, and any other agency or instrumentality of the United States of America;
  5. “Bonds” means any bonds, notes, interim certificates, debentures, or other obligations;
  6. “Clerk” means the clerk of the city or the clerk of the county, as the case may be, or the officer charged with the duties customarily imposed on such clerk;
  7. “Governing body” means, in the case of a city, the city council, the commission, board of commissioners, board of aldermen, or other legislative body of the city, and in the case of a county, the fiscal court;
  8. “Mayor” means the mayor of the city or the officer thereof charged with the duties customarily imposed on the mayor or executive head of the city;
  9. “Obligee of the authority” or “obligee” shall include any bondholder, trustee or trustees for any bondholders, or lessor demising to the authority property used in connection with a housing project, or any assignee or assignees of such lessor’s interest or any part thereof, and the federal government when it is a party to any contract with the authority;
  10. “Persons of low income” means persons or families who lack the amount of income which is necessary, as determined by the housing authority undertaking the housing development, to enable them, without financial assistance, to live in decent, safe, and sanitary dwellings, without overcrowding;
  11. “Real property” includes all lands, including improvements and fixtures thereon, and property of any nature appurtenant thereto, or used in connection therewith, and every estate, interest and right, legal or equitable, therein, including terms for years and liens by way of judgment, mortgage, or otherwise and the indebtedness secured by such liens;
  12. “Slum” means any area where dwellings predominate which, by reason of dilapidation, overcrowding, lack of ventilation, light, or sanitary facilities, or any combination of these factors are detrimental to safety, health and morals; and
  13. “Low income” and “moderate income” shall have those meanings as from time to time are promulgated by federal and state governmental agencies providing funding for the then applicable housing program.

History. 927a-3, 2741x-3, 2741x-18: amend. Acts 1964, ch. 146, § 1; 1984, ch. 361, § 1, effective July 13, 1984; 1996, ch. 237, § 1, effective July 15, 1996; 2019 ch. 44, § 9, effective June 27, 2019.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

Laws providing for slum clearance and low-cost housing projects and creation of housing commissions (authorities) for that purpose are constitutional, as the purpose is a public one. Spahn v. Stewart, 268 Ky. 97 , 103 S.W.2d 651, 1937 Ky. LEXIS 405 ( Ky. 1937 ).

2. Abatement of Nuisance Areas.

Law for municipal housing seemed to extend right of abatement to area where houses which constitute nuisances predominated, and, so that elimination might be properly effected, gave right to take buildings which standing alone might not be deemed nuisances, subject to due process of law and right to compensation as secured by Ky. Const., §§ 13 and 242. Douthitt v. Covington, 284 Ky. 382 , 144 S.W.2d 1025, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 502 ( Ky. 1940 ).

3. Low-cost Housing.

Municipal housing commission (authority) has the legal power under subsec. (1) of this section to erect a low-cost housing project without first clearing away a slum area. Offutt v. Barnes, 272 S.W.2d 808, 1954 Ky. LEXIS 1134 ( Ky. 1954 ).

4. Housing Authority.

The Newport Housing Authority was a “state agency” whose actions were “state actions” for the purpose of meeting jurisdictional requirements in an action brought by a terminated employee against the authority under the federal Civil Rights Act. Salisbury v. Housing Authority of Newport, 615 F. Supp. 1433, 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16651 (E.D. Ky. 1985 ), disapproved, Duchesne v. Williams, 849 F.2d 1004, 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 8409 (6th Cir. Mich. 1988).

Cited:

Webster v. Frankfort Housing Com., 293 Ky. 114 , 168 S.W.2d 344, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 559 ( Ky. 1943 ); Veail v. Louisville & Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer Dist., 303 Ky. 248 , 197 S.W.2d 413, 1946 Ky. LEXIS 830 ( Ky. 1946 ); Louisville Municipal Housing Com. v. Public Housing Administration, 261 S.W.2d 286, 1953 Ky. LEXIS 997 ( Ky. 1953 ); Noel v. Madisonville Municipal Housing Com., 279 S.W.2d 790, 1955 Ky. LEXIS 542 ( Ky. 1955 ); Danville Municipal Housing Com. v. Danville, 319 S.W.2d 460, 1958 Ky. LEXIS 168 ( Ky. 1958 ); Jenkins v. Cury, 347 S.W.2d 85, 1961 Ky. LEXIS 350 ( Ky. 1961 ); Norrell v. Judd, 374 S.W.2d 192, 1963 Ky. LEXIS 174 ( Ky. 1963 ); Middlesboro Housing Authority v. Kentucky Com. on Human Rights, 553 S.W.2d 57, 1977 Ky. App. LEXIS 737 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).

Opinions of Attorney General.

A municipal housing commission created pursuant to this chapter is not required to give a financial accounting to the city council. OAG 72-184 .

Under the broad definition in subsection (1) of this section of “housing project,” the Campbellsville Housing Authority qualifies as a public housing agency under 42 USCS § 1437a(6) since this is not a project involving the construction or acquisition of housing units to be publicly owned and operated. OAG 79-332 .

A city housing agency may not operate a section 8 existing housing program (42 USCS § 1437f) within the boundaries of another city. OAG 80-55 .

Subsections (3)(j) and (3)(q) of KRS 67.083 authorize a fiscal court to assist the Department of Housing and Urban Development in making subsidized rental payments to certain individuals and do not prevent the fiscal court from assisting such payments in unincorporated areas of the county, provided that there is no statute preempting that function in favor of a city within the county, and provided that there is no duplicating function being presently exercised by a city or cities within the county pursuant to subsection (1) of this section and KRS 80.020 . OAG 81-364 .

A housing authority established and operating pursuant to KRS Chapter 80 is required to comply with KRS 171.410 through 171.990 , dealing with state archives and records. OAG 84-375 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Acquisition and development of public projects by governmental units and agencies through revenue bonds, KRS Chapter 58.

Governmental unit may issue revenue bonds for any public project, KRS 58.010 to 58.120 .

Interlocal cooperation act, KRS 65.210 to 65.300 .

Legal notices, KRS Chapter 424.

Loans to housing authorities authorized, KRS 386.020 , 386.030 .

Redevelopment corporations in cities of the first or second class, KRS Chapter 99.

Urban renewal and redevelopment in cities and counties, KRS 99.330 to 99.510 .

Kentucky Law Journal.

Schiff, Some Constitutional Aspects of the Kentucky Municipal Housing Commission Act, 28 Ky. L.J. 66 (1939).

Municipal Housing Authorities

80.020. Housing developments and authorities — Purposes — Powers.

  1. Cities of all classes may acquire, establish, and operate, within their limits, housing, under the provisions of this chapter, for the purpose of providing adequate and sanitary living quarters for individuals or families, such housing to be for individuals or families with low or moderate income or for individuals or families having income in excess of low or moderate if such housing is acquired, established and operated in conjunction with, and located within one (1) mile of housing for individuals or families with low or moderate income. They may create city housing authorities, and they and the authorities created by them shall have all powers necessary and appropriate to engage in such housing and slum clearance projects, including, without limitation, all power specified in KRS 80.500 and the power in connection with the use of federal funds, with the approval of the federal funding agency, if applicable, to mortgage, encumber, pledge, assign, or otherwise grant or consent to a lien or security interest in, any real or personal property, or any interest therein, owned or held by the authority, to provide security for:
    1. The repayment of borrowed funds;
    2. Any guarantee of this repayment or any other performance of the authority or;
    3. Any payment or guarantee of performance of any subsidiary or affiliate of the authority, or of any business arrangement into which the authority shall have entered in furtherance of the purposes of this chapter. The conditions of any mortgage or other instrument granting or consenting to a security interest in property of a local housing authority may include any provisions that are customary in mortgages and other security interests used in commercial transactions.
  2. Housing authorities may engage in the maintenance and enhancement of adequate housing stock for low-income and moderate-income persons as set forth in this chapter.
  3. Housing authorities may loan moneys on the terms they deem advisable, subject to the approval of the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development, if that agency’s funds are used, to other governments or their agencies or to other owners of housing or of housing to be constructed or reconstructed, if the authority determines that the loans will result in the creation of housing.
  4. Housing authorities may lease or convey real property to other governments or agencies thereof or to nongovernmental owners or developers of housing for a consideration less than fair market value, if the housing authority determines that the action facilitates housing.

History. 927a-1, 2741x-1: amend. Acts 1942, ch. 70, § 34; 1984, ch. 226, § 1, effective July 13, 1984; 1984, ch. 361, § 2, effective July 13, 1984; 1996, ch. 237, § 2, effective July 15, 1996.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Purpose.

The purpose of law providing for municipal housing commission (authority) was to promote slum clearance by acquiring, establishing, erecting, maintaining, and operating low-cost housing projects in municipalities of the first and second class. Louisville v. German, 286 Ky. 477 , 150 S.W.2d 931, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 5 ( Ky. 1940 ).

Actions taken by a city’s housing authority which is a federally-subsidized, state-created, locally-administered corporate body, are actions taken under color of state law for purposes of the federal civil rights statute, 42 USCS § 1983. Tedder v. Housing Authority of Paducah, 574 F. Supp. 240, 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18431 (W.D. Ky. 1983 ).

2. Limitations on Projects.

In determining whether city, its board of commissioners, and its municipal housing commission (authority), should be enjoined from entering into and executing contracts for slum clearance projects, courts are not concerned with matters of policy, but only with questions of constitutional limitations and, in lesser degree, with statutory authority relating to the execution of the plan or methods employed by the public officers. Douthitt v. Covington, 284 Ky. 382 , 144 S.W.2d 1025, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 502 ( Ky. 1940 ).

3. Tax Exemptions.

Contract between city and housing commission (authority) providing for tax exemptions was valid. Jones v. Paducah, 283 Ky. 628 , 142 S.W.2d 365, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 386 ( Ky. 1940 ).

4. Preliminary Expenses.

A city may pay the preliminary expenses of its housing commission (authority). Spahn v. Stewart, 268 Ky. 97 , 103 S.W.2d 651, 1937 Ky. LEXIS 405 ( Ky. 1937 ).

5. Liability for Misrepresentation.

Municipal housing commission (authority) was liable in damages to subcontractor, growing out of misrepresentation by commission (authority) to principal contractor as to nature and extent of fixtures and equipment that contractor would be entitled to remove from buildings in demolition work preliminary to construction of housing development where specifications for development had stated what fixtures and equipment contractor was entitled to take as salvage were incorporated by reference into contracts between the parties, the circumstances being such as to create an exception to the general rule exempting municipal corporations from liability for torts committed in carrying out governmental functions. Cleveland Wrecking Co. v. Struck Const. Co., 41 F. Supp. 70, 1941 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2610 (D. Ky. 1941 ).

6. Public Work.

Work performed by and for a municipal housing commission (authority) is public work serving a public purpose, since its objective is promotion of public health, safety, morals, and general welfare of municipal citizens. It is a governmental function of the city. Louisville v. German, 286 Ky. 477 , 150 S.W.2d 931, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 5 ( Ky. 1940 ).

7. Fire Insurance.

A municipal housing commission (authority) is not an incorporated district within the meaning of Ky. Const., § 179 and therefore commission (authority) may insure its housing projects in a mutual fire insurance company. Louisville Municipal Housing Com. v. Public Housing Administration, 261 S.W.2d 286, 1953 Ky. LEXIS 997 ( Ky. 1953 ).

Kentucky Constitution, § 177 did not apply to municipal housing corporation for the prohibition of that section is directed to the Commonwealth and not to an agency such as the housing commission, thus commission (authority) may insure its housing projects in a mutual fire insurance company. Louisville Municipal Housing Com. v. Public Housing Administration, 261 S.W.2d 286, 1953 Ky. LEXIS 997 ( Ky. 1953 ).

8. Forcible entry and detainer complaint.

Circuit court erred in affirming an order of eviction because the executive director of the housing authority, in filing the forcible detainer complaint and appearing at the hearing, was not acting on her own behalf but rather in the interest of the housing authority; thus, the executive director was engaging in the unauthorized practice of law. Hornsby v. Hous. Auth. of Dry Ridge, 566 S.W.3d 587, 2018 Ky. App. LEXIS 306 (Ky. Ct. App. 2018).

Some housing authorities authorize their executive directors to file and proceed with forcible detainer actions on behalf of the housing authority in the absence of a licensed attorney; trial courts, however, are not at liberty to circumvent or evade the rules and statutory provisions by turning a blind eye to the requirements for the sake of expedience. Hornsby v. Hous. Auth. of Dry Ridge, 566 S.W.3d 587, 2018 Ky. App. LEXIS 306 (Ky. Ct. App. 2018).

Cited:

Salisbury v. Housing Authority of Newport, 615 F. Supp. 1433, 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16651 (E.D. Ky. 1985 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Once a municipal housing commission (authority) has been established, it cannot be abolished in the absence of specific legislative authority even though it intends to transfer its duties to the city commission (authority). OAG 67-415 .

No statutory authority exists for a municipal housing commission to enter into an agreement with a fiscal court whereby the municipal housing commission will establish housing units out in the county. OAG 79-47 .

A municipal housing authority, organized pursuant to the provisions of KRS 80.020 to 80.257 , may, within its discretion, borrow funds from the federal government to carry out statutorily authorized objectives within its territorial boundaries. OAG 79-499 .

A city housing authority may exercise its statutory functions only within the city limits or boundaries. OAG 79-617 .

Subsection (3)(j) and (3)(q) of KRS 67.083 authorize a fiscal court to assist the Department of Housing and Urban Development in making subsidized rental payments to certain individuals and do not prevent the fiscal court from assisting such payments in unincorporated areas of the county, provided that there is no statute preempting that function in favor of a city within the county, and provided that there is no duplicating function being presently exercised by a city or cities within the county pursuant to subsection (1) of KRS 80.010 and this section. OAG 81-364 .

The Kentucky Housing Corporation is the only entity with statewide authority to administer performance-based HUD rental subsidy contracts in Kentucky; no out-of-state entity would have authority under Kentucky law to administer such contracts in the Commonwealth. OAG 12-004 , 2012 Ky. AG LEXIS 79.

80.030. City housing authority, composition — Acceptance by authority of another city’s public housing program.

  1. Except as provided in subsection (2) of this section, a city housing authority shall consist of the mayor, ex officio, or his designee, and four (4) persons appointed by him with the approval of the city legislative body.
  2. If a city housing authority has agreed to accept a transfer or full transfer of ownership and operation of another city’s public housing program pursuant to the United States Housing Act of 1937, the housing authority shall consist of the mayor, ex officio, or the mayor’s designee; four (4) persons appointed by the mayor with the approval of the city legislative body; and one (1) additional person appointed by each mayor of a city divesting itself of its authority, with the approval of that city’s legislative body.

HISTORY: 927a-2, 2741x-2: amend. Acts 1942, ch. 70, § 34; 1986, ch. 23, § 2, effective July 15, 1986; 1990, ch. 218, § 1, effective July 13, 1990; 2018 ch. 45, § 1, effective July 14, 2018.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Appointing Authority.

Order of Kentucky Commission on Human Rights directing municipal housing authority, found to maintain illegally segregated public housing projects, to place at least one black representative on its board was set aside and reversed on the ground that the housing authority is not the appointing authority for its board members. Middlesboro Housing Authority v. Kentucky Com. on Human Rights, 553 S.W.2d 57, 1977 Ky. App. LEXIS 737 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).

2. Forcible entry and detainer complaint.

Circuit court erred in affirming an order of eviction because the executive director of the housing authority, in filing the forcible detainer complaint and appearing at the hearing, was not acting on her own behalf but rather in the interest of the housing authority; thus, the executive director was engaging in the unauthorized practice of law. Hornsby v. Hous. Auth. of Dry Ridge, 566 S.W.3d 587, 2018 Ky. App. LEXIS 306 (Ky. Ct. App. 2018).

Some housing authorities authorize their executive directors to file and proceed with forcible detainer actions on behalf of the housing authority in the absence of a licensed attorney; trial courts, however, are not at liberty to circumvent or evade the rules and statutory provisions by turning a blind eye to the requirements for the sake of expedience. Hornsby v. Hous. Auth. of Dry Ridge, 566 S.W.3d 587, 2018 Ky. App. LEXIS 306 (Ky. Ct. App. 2018).

Cited:

Salisbury v. Housing Authority of Newport, 615 F. Supp. 1433, 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16651 (E.D. Ky. 1985 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

When the mayor is temporarily absent from the city or unable to perform his duties because of disability, the mayor pro tem is empowered to act and vote in his place on the housing commission (authority). OAG 68-424 .

A newly elected council has no authority to appoint, reappoint or remove members of the municipal housing commission (authority). OAG 70-248 .

A city may not operate a housing authority without establishing a municipal housing commission pursuant to this section. OAG 72-323 .

In view of the provisions of KRS 83.410 and 83.520 a first-class city may by ordinance change the number of members of, and provide for proxy attendance at, the municipal housing commission contrary to the provisions of this section. OAG 74-702 .

Members of the housing commission, including the mayor as ex officio member, may appoint a proxy or give his proxy to another member for voting purposes at a commission meeting. OAG 77-147 (withdrawing OAG 77-54 ).

There is no statutory or constitutional incompatibility between the office of county attorney-prosecutor and membership on a municipal housing commission. OAG 78-291 .

Members of the Newport Housing Authority, who were appointed by the mayor but whose appointments the city legislative body would not act upon and who assumed positions as members of the city’s housing authority and acted in that capacity, were de facto officers and until those persons resigned, were removed from office or were appointed as lawful members pursuant to this section, they were de facto officers and their actions were valid as to members of the public and third parties dealing with them so long as the acts undertaken were capable of being legally exercised by a legally appointed municipal housing authority. OAG 80-546 .

Those persons improperly appointed as members of municipal housing authorities without approval of the city legislative bodies, because of a printing error contained in the Bobbs-Merrill Edition of the Kentucky Revised Statutes (this section) and who were functioning as members of such housing authorities, were de facto officers whose acts were valid as to members of the public and third parties dealing with them so long as the acts undertaken were those capable of being legally exercised by a municipal housing authority; once the statute was reprinted in its correct form, those cities whose housing authority members were not legally appointed should go back and reappoint the members pursuant to the terms and provisions of this section. OAG 80-546 .

80.040. Qualifications and terms of members of housing authority — Political affiliations.

    1. Each person appointed to a city housing authority shall be at least twenty-five (25) years of age and a bona fide resident of the city for which he was appointed for at least one (1) year preceding the appointment. No officer or employee of the city, whether holding a paid or unpaid office, is eligible to hold an appointment on the housing authority. Appointees to a city housing authority shall be originally appointed for terms of four (4) years. Upon the expiration of the term of the first appointees, their successors shall be appointed for terms of one (1), two (2), three (3) and four (4) years, respectively, and upon the expiration of the term of each of the second group of appointees his successor shall be appointed for a term of four (4) years. Vacancies shall be filled for unexpired terms in the same manner as the original appointment. (1) (a) Each person appointed to a city housing authority shall be at least twenty-five (25) years of age and a bona fide resident of the city for which he was appointed for at least one (1) year preceding the appointment. No officer or employee of the city, whether holding a paid or unpaid office, is eligible to hold an appointment on the housing authority. Appointees to a city housing authority shall be originally appointed for terms of four (4) years. Upon the expiration of the term of the first appointees, their successors shall be appointed for terms of one (1), two (2), three (3) and four (4) years, respectively, and upon the expiration of the term of each of the second group of appointees his successor shall be appointed for a term of four (4) years. Vacancies shall be filled for unexpired terms in the same manner as the original appointment.
    2. If a city housing authority has agreed to accept a transfer or full transfer of ownership and operation of another city’s public housing program pursuant to the United States Housing Act of 1937, an authority member appointed by the mayor of the divesting city, as set out in KRS 80.030 , shall be a resident of the city divesting itself of authority.
    1. If a city housing authority has not agreed to accept a transfer or full transfer of ownership and operation of another city’s public housing program pursuant to the United States Housing Act of 1937, then no more than two (2) appointees on any city housing authority shall be affiliated with the same political party. (2) (a) If a city housing authority has not agreed to accept a transfer or full transfer of ownership and operation of another city’s public housing program pursuant to the United States Housing Act of 1937, then no more than two (2) appointees on any city housing authority shall be affiliated with the same political party.
    2. If a city housing authority has agreed to accept a transfer or full transfer of ownership and operation of another city’s public housing program pursuant to the United States Housing Act of 1937, and:
      1. Has an even number of members, then no more than half of the appointees on any city housing authority shall be affiliated with the same political party; or
      2. Has an odd number of members, then no more than half of the appointees plus one (1) member of any city housing authority shall be affiliated with the same political party.

HISTORY: 927a-2, 2741x-2: amend. Acts 1942, ch. 70, § 34; 2018 ch. 45, § 2, effective July 14, 2018.

Opinions of Attorney General.

The position of city prosecuting attorney is a municipal office and the individual holding the position could not be appointed a member of the municipal housing commission (authority) under the terms of the statute. OAG 68-90 .

Housing commission (authority) members and employees of the commission (authority) are not city employees, which means that part-time employment with the commission (authority) would not constitute employment with the city. OAG 69-483 .

A member of the municipal housing commission (authority) who was employed by the city recreation department for two weeks was prohibited from holding membership on the housing commission (authority) but was disqualified only during the two-week period of city employment. OAG 69-527 .

A resident of one of the city housing projects would not be barred from serving on the municipal housing commission (authority). There may, however, be instances where a resident member should refrain from voting, particularly on matters that involve a pecuniary interest, such as rentals. OAG 70-135 .

Under this section a person serving as an employee of a city park and recreation committee may not hold an appointment on the housing authority. OAG 72-310 .

Any member of the municipal housing commission who takes up legal residence outside of the city limits becomes disqualified under the terms of this section. OAG 76-461 .

If a person who was chairman of urban renewal and a member of the board of directors of the housing project were to be elected to city council regardless of whether or not an incompatibility or conflict of interest would exist, the fact that he holds the positions mentioned would in no way affect his right to become a candidate for a public office in the primary and general election, and any incompatibility that might exist would not occur until he assumed the office of city council; however, if elected he would become disqualified from serving as a member of the housing commission pursuant to this section and also on the urban renewal agency, if it is operated by the city, since it would constitute a municipal office and KRS 61.080 and Ky. Const., § 165 prohibit a person from holding two municipal offices at the same time; but if the urban renewal agency was created as an independent agency under KRS Chapter 99 no incompatibility would exist. OAG 77-244 .

Prospective appointments to fill a vacancy certain to occur may be made but only by the appointing authority in office at the time of their occurrence. OAG 77-772 .

Where a person appointed to a city housing authority was a bona fide resident of that city when he was appointed but subsequently moved out of the city, he was disqualified from serving on the authority at the time he moved, or from being reappointed after his term expired; however, his disqualification would not affect the validity of his acts while serving as a member of the housing authority since he was a de facto member of the board. OAG 81-234 .

80.050. Corporate powers — Officers.

The persons appointed as provided in KRS 80.030 and 80.040 shall constitute a body corporate in the name of Housing Authority of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , with power to contract and be contracted with, to sue or be sued, and to adopt a seal and alter it at will. Each authority may establish bylaws, rules and regulations for its own government. Each authority shall elect a chairman and a vice chairman from its members and a secretary and treasurer who need not be a member of the authority. The duties of the offices of secretary and treasurer may be performed by the same person.

History. 927a-2, 2741x-2: amend. Acts 1942, ch. 70, § 34; 1970, ch. 44, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Forcible entry and detainer complaint.

Circuit court erred in affirming an order of eviction because the executive director of the housing authority, in filing the forcible detainer complaint and appearing at the hearing, was not acting on her own behalf but rather in the interest of the housing authority; thus, the executive director was engaging in the unauthorized practice of law. Hornsby v. Hous. Auth. of Dry Ridge, 566 S.W.3d 587, 2018 Ky. App. LEXIS 306 (Ky. Ct. App. 2018).

Some housing authorities authorize their executive directors to file and proceed with forcible detainer actions on behalf of the housing authority in the absence of a licensed attorney; trial courts, however, are not at liberty to circumvent or evade the rules and statutory provisions by turning a blind eye to the requirements for the sake of expedience. Hornsby v. Hous. Auth. of Dry Ridge, 566 S.W.3d 587, 2018 Ky. App. LEXIS 306 (Ky. Ct. App. 2018).

2. Immunity not waived.

Ky Rev. Stat. Ann. § 80.050 did not impliedly waive the Louisville Metro Housing Authority’s immunity where the language “a body corporate with power to contract and be contracted with, to sue or to be sued, or to adopt a seal and alter it at will” had previously been found not to waive immunity, and there nothing other than the bare language evidenced an intent to waive immunity. Bryant v. Louisville Metro Hous. Auth., 568 S.W.3d 839, 2019 Ky. LEXIS 83 ( Ky. 2019 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

The municipal housing authority of Louisville is a political entity and a public agency with both state and local governmental attributes. OAG 77-767 .

80.060. Compensation of housing authority’s members and officers — Interlocal agreements.

  1. Each member of a housing authority, except an ex officio member, may receive compensation either as a salary or as payment for meetings attended. The compensation of members of a housing authority shall be fixed by the legislative body of the city. The housing authority shall fix the compensation of the secretary and treasurer, but the city legislative body may fix or limit the salary.
  2. If a city housing authority has agreed to accept a transfer or full transfer of ownership and operation of another city’s public housing program pursuant to the United States Housing Act of 1937, the city may enter into an interlocal agreement pursuant to KRS 65.210 to 65.300 with the city that is divesting itself of the authority, agreeing to pay all or a portion of the compensation of the member representing that divesting city.

HISTORY: 927a-2, 2741x-2: amend. Acts 1942, ch. 70, § 34; 1984, ch. 361, § 3, effective July 13, 1984; 2018 ch. 45, § 3, effective July 14, 2018.

80.070. Employees.

  1. An authority may employ technical experts and attorneys, and any other employees that it deems necessary. The authority shall fix the compensation of its employees. The legislative body of a city may prescribe limitations to the compensation of employees of the city authority and may prescribe whether or not an employee shall devote his entire time to his duties as an employee of the authority.
  2. In fixing the compensation of its employees, an authority may, but is not required to, utilize an incentive compensation arrangement whereby the employee may receive, subject to appropriate limits, additional compensation measured by the extent of the achievement by the authority of specified operating goals, which goals shall be established by the authority prior to the commencement of work by the employee on the matter with respect to which the goals were set.

History. 927a-2, 2741x-2: amend. Acts 1984, ch. 226, § 2, effective July 13, 1984.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Salary.

Office of chief accountant and financial adviser of a municipal housing commission (authority) has most of the attributes of an office, and the duties thereof are official, thus city director of finance appointed to such position could not earn more than the amount permitted by Ky. Const., § 146. Louisville v. German, 286 Ky. 477 , 150 S.W.2d 931, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 5 ( Ky. 1940 ).

Cited:

Salisbury v. Housing Authority of Newport, 615 F. Supp. 1433, 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16651 (E.D. Ky. 1985 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

A full-time employee of a housing authority, which is an independent agency, could at the same time serve as campaign manager for a candidate in the May primary during his off-duty hours, since the provision authorizing the city to require an employee to devote his entire time to the duties of the authority does not include off-duty time between being an employee of a leasing authority and a campaign manager for a gubernatorial campaign. OAG 79-53 .

80.080. Member or employee not to be interested in project.

No member or employee of a housing authority shall acquire any interest, direct or indirect, in any project or in any property including or planned to be included in any project, nor shall he have any interest, direct or indirect, in any contract or proposed contract for materials or services to be furnished or used in connection with any project. If any member or employee of any authority owns or controls an interest, direct or indirect in any property included in any project, which interest was acquired prior to his appointment or employment, he shall disclose the same in writing to the authority at the time of his appointment and the disclosure shall be entered upon the minutes of the authority.

History. 927a-15, 2741x-13.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Purpose.

The first and foremost evil sought to be avoided by this section is self-dealing by an official or employee, that is the use of a public office or position for the purposes of self-enrichment. Norrell v. Judd, 374 S.W.2d 192, 1963 Ky. LEXIS 174 ( Ky. 1963 ).

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Kennedy, Comprehensive Planning Legislation: The Kentucky Experience, 59 Ky. L.J. 875 (1970).

80.090. Removal of member for incompetency, neglect or malfeasance.

Whenever it appears to the appointing officer that a member of a housing authority appointed by him is incompetent or guilty of neglect of duty or malfeasance, the appointing officer shall require the member to appear before him to show cause why he should not be removed from office. At least fifteen (15) days’ written notice of the hearing shall be given to the member whose conduct is in question and to all other members of the authority. At the hearing the member may be represented by counsel and may appear personally and present such pertinent evidence as he wishes or as the appointing officer requests. If after the hearing the appointing officer determines that a member has been incompetent or has been guilty of neglect of duty or malfeasance, he shall remove the member from the authority within seven (7) days, and there shall be a vacancy of the office.

History. 927a-15, 2741x-13: amend. Acts 1942, ch. 70, § 34.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

Salisbury v. Housing Authority of Newport, 615 F. Supp. 1433, 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16651 (E.D. Ky. 1985 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

This section authorizes the removal of members of the housing commission (authority) by the mayor for incompetency, neglect or malfeasance, but only following a written notice of a hearing to be given to all members of the commission, including the commissioner (member), subject to removal and removal under this statute is for cause only. OAG 78-543 .

80.095. Technical assistance by authority.

An authority may provide technical assistance to other authorities in consideration of appropriate fees therefor. An authority may also provide technical assistance to public and private developers and other builders of low-income and moderate-income housing stock if such technical assistance is not readily available in the private sector at a cost that would make low-income and moderate-income housing projects feasible. Such technical assistance may be provided in consideration of appropriate fees therefor. Such fees shall be established by the authority and shall, when received, be deemed to be funds provided under authority of this chapter.

History. Enact. Acts 1984, ch. 226, § 3, effective July 13, 1984.

80.100. Area of operation of county or regional housing commission. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (927a-2) was repealed by Acts 1942, ch. 70, § 35.

80.110. Projects subject to building, zoning and sanitary laws.

All low-income housing projects are subject to the planning, zoning, sanitary and building laws, ordinances, and regulations applicable to the locality in which the project is situated. In a city of the first class, the housing authority shall submit to the city planning and zoning commission the location, character, and extent of any new street, square, park or other public way, ground or open space, or any public structure or public utility, for approval in the manner provided in KRS 100.197 .

History. 927a-4, 2741x-4: amend. Acts 1966, ch. 255, § 93; 1968, ch. 152, § 57; 1996, ch. 237, § 3, effective July 15, 1996.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Exempt Projects.

A scattered-site, publicly-owned, four-to-ten-unit apartment complex is not a “public structure” within the meaning of this section; housing is not mentioned. Accordingly, a proposed housing project which contemplated the construction of a series of such apartment complexes was exempt from review by the city planning and zoning commission. Hall v. Housing Authority of Louisville, 660 S.W.2d 674, 1983 Ky. App. LEXIS 397 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983).

2. — Use of Buildings.

What is to be considered a public building, public structure, or public facility must be viewed in terms of the context of the entire statute; the use of the building, rather than its public or private ownership, is the relevant factor in determining the necessary involvement by the planning and zoning commission. Hall v. Housing Authority of Louisville, 660 S.W.2d 674, 1983 Ky. App. LEXIS 397 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983).

Opinions of Attorney General.

A “public structure,” as used in this section, does not include a building containing six to ten dwelling units used for the purpose of family living which is accessible only to the occupants and the officials and employees of the housing authority. OAG 80-281 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Area planning, KRS Chapter 147.

Planning and zoning, KRS Chapter 100.

Kentucky Law Journal.

Kentucky Law Survey, Bratt, Property, 73 Ky. L.J. 459 (1984-85).

80.120. Plans — Contracts — Surveys — Maps — Right of access.

  1. The authority shall:
    1. Prepare the proper plans and specifications for the construction of low-income housing;
    2. Select the location and determine the size, type, and method of construction;
    3. Make the necessary estimates of the probable cost of construction and of the acquisition of the land and rights for the sites;
    4. Enter into the necessary contracts to build the necessary buildings; and
    5. Cause a survey and map to be made of all lands, structures, rights of way, franchises, easements or other interests in land, owned by any person, the acquisition of which may be deemed necessary for the construction of the low-income housing, and cause the map and survey to be filed in its office.
  2. The members of the authority, or its agents and employees, after reasonable notice to the occupants, owners, or owners’ agent in charge thereof, may enter upon such lands and structures for the purpose of making surveys and maps.

History. 927a-4, 2741x-4: amend. Acts 1984, ch. 361, § 4, effective July 13, 1984; 1996, ch. 237, § 4, effective July 15, 1996.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Contract Misrepresentation.

Municipal housing commission (authority) was liable in damages to subcontractor, growing out of misrepresentation by commission (authority) to principal contractor as to nature and extent of fixtures and equipment that contractor would be entitled to remove from building in demolition work preliminary to construction of housing development where specifications for development had stated what fixtures and equipment contractor was entitled to take as salvage were incorporated by reference into contracts between the parties, the circumstances being such as to create an exception to the general rule exempting municipal corporations from liability for torts committed in carrying out governmental functions. Cleveland Wrecking Co. v. Struck Const. Co., 41 F. Supp. 70, 1941 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2610 (D. Ky. 1941 ).

80.130. Advertisement for bids — When required.

No contract or agreement with any contractor for the construction of low-income housing exceeding ten thousand dollars ($10,000) shall be made without advertising for bids. The bids shall be opened publicly and an award made to the best bidder, with power in the authority to reject any or all bids.

History. 927a-4, 2741x-4: amend. Acts 1984, ch. 361, § 5, effective July 13, 1984; 1996, ch. 237, § 5, effective July 15, 1996.

Opinions of Attorney General.

The provision in this section, requiring bids for the construction of a low-cost housing project exceeding $2,000 (now $10,000), has, in effect, been repealed by the provisions of KRS 45A.385 relating to small purchases. OAG 80-21 .

80.140. Authority may acquire land and housing stock.

  1. An authority may acquire by gift, devise, bequest, lease, grant, or purchase lands, structures, or interests in land necessary for the building of housing, upon terms, prices, or considerations considered reasonable by the authority and agreed upon between the authority and the owner. Title to all property acquired by the authority shall be taken in the corporate name of the authority.
  2. An authority may acquire by gift, devise, bequest, lease, grant, or purchase an interest in, by means of a partnership, joint venture, or other co-ownership arrangement, low-income and moderate-income housing stock.

History. 927a-5, 927a-11, 2741x-5: amend. Acts 1984, ch. 226, § 4, effective July 13, 1984; 1984, ch. 361, § 6, effective July 13, 1984; 1996, ch. 237, § 6, effective July 15, 1996.

Opinions of Attorney General.

A housing commission has the power to acquired land, either through gift, lease or purchase under this section or by condemnation pursuant to KRS 80.150 , and there is no requirement that prior approval of the city be obtained for such purpose. OAG 71-16 .

80.150. Condemnation authorized — Procedure.

If it becomes necessary to condemn property for the purpose of constructing any housing that an authority may be permitted to acquire, establish, and operate under KRS 80.020(1), or securing rights of way leading thereto, the authority may, by resolution reciting the need, order the condemnation of any land or improvement or interest in land, that it deems necessary. Proceedings for the condemnation shall be in the Circuit Court of the county in which the property lies, and shall be conducted in the name of the authority. The city attorney shall conduct the proceedings for the authority. The judgment of the court shall vest title in fee simple to the property condemned in the authority. In all other respects the form and manner of the proceedings shall be the same as that provided in the Eminent Domain Act of Kentucky. No payment or award in any condemnation proceedings, or for the cost or expense of the proceedings, shall be made except from funds provided under the authority of this chapter.

History. 927a-6, 2741x-6: amend. Acts 1942, ch. 70, § 34; 1958, ch. 160, § 2; 1976, ch. 140, § 27; 1984, ch. 361, § 7, effective July 13, 1984; 1996, ch. 237, § 7, effective July 15, 1996.

Compiler’s Notes.

The Eminent Domain Act of Kentucky referred to herein, is compiled as KRS 416.540-416.680.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Eminent Domain.

A housing commission (authority) is given the power to exercise the right of eminent domain. Spahn v. Stewart, 268 Ky. 97 , 103 S.W.2d 651, 1937 Ky. LEXIS 405 ( Ky. 1937 ). See Douthitt v. Covington, 284 Ky. 382 , 144 S.W.2d 1025, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 502 ( Ky. 1940 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

A commission, agency, or city has the power to condemn property of a school board for the general purpose for which each was created. OAG 65-330 .

A housing commission has the power to acquire land, either through gift, lease or purchase under KRS 80.140 or by condemnation pursuant to this section, and there is no requirement that prior approval of the city be obtained for such purpose. OAG 71-16 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Treatises

Caldwell’s Kentucky Form Book, 5th Ed., Practice Context for Condemnation (Eminent Domain), § 307.00.

80.160. Removal of obstructions to low-income housing.

All persons having buildings, structures, works, conduits, mains, pipes, tracks, or other physical obstructions in, under, over, or upon the public ways, that interfere with or impede the progress of low-income housing when in process of construction and establishment, shall, upon reasonable notice from the authority, promptly shift or remove the obstruction, to the extent necessary, at their own cost and expense, except as otherwise provided or required by law. In cities the city legislative body may prescribe by ordinance the penalty for failing to shift or remove the obstruction.

History. 927a-7, 2741x-7: amend. Acts 1984, ch. 361, § 8, effective July 13, 1984; 1996, ch. 237, § 8, effective July 15, 1996.

80.170. Authority must restore damaged public works.

Any public ways or public works damaged or destroyed by reason of the building of low-income housing shall be restored or repaired by the authority and placed in their original condition as nearly as practicable.

History. 927a-9, 2741x-9: amend. Acts 1984, ch. 361, § 9, effective July 13, 1984; 1996, ch. 237, § 9, effective July 15, 1996.

80.180. Authority to have full control of housing and housing stock.

  1. The authority shall, itself, or through agreements with other public or private entities, operate, manage, and control housing, fix the rate of rentals, and establish bylaws, rules, and regulations for the use and operation of the projects not inconsistent with the provisions of this chapter. The legislative body of a city may prescribe by ordinance penalties for the violation of bylaws, rules, and regulations of a project located within the city.
  2. The authority, itself, or through agreements with other public or private entities, may operate, manage and control housing stock not within the meaning of KRS 80.010(1) either in their entirety or in conjunction with other persons, whether private or public, or whether through partnership agreements, joint venture agreements and development agreements, limited liability company agreements, and other agreements of that type with other persons, public or private, who may earn a profit from the activities of that venture. Although public housing projects shall not be constructed or operated for profit, or as a source of revenue, other activities undertaken by an authority in conformance with this chapter to maintain or enhance the adequacy of housing stock for low-income and moderate-income persons shall not be subject to the limitation on construction or operation for profit, so long as any profits or any other net revenues generated thereby are utilized, directly or indirectly, in the furtherance of the maintenance and enhancement of housing.

History. 927a-8, 2741x-8: amend. Acts 1984, ch. 226, § 5, effective July 13, 1984; 1984, ch. 361, § 10, effective July 13, 1984; 1996, ch. 237, § 10, effective July 15, 1996.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Tort Liability.

Separate corporate identity of the housing authority relieved city from liability for alleged torts. Waldon v. Housing Auth. of Paducah, 854 S.W.2d 777, 1991 Ky. App. LEXIS 146 (Ky. Ct. App. 1991).

2. Forcible entry and detainer complaint.

Circuit court erred in affirming an order of eviction because the executive director of the housing authority, in filing the forcible detainer complaint and appearing at the hearing, was not acting on her own behalf but rather in the interest of the housing authority; thus, the executive director was engaging in the unauthorized practice of law. Hornsby v. Hous. Auth. of Dry Ridge, 566 S.W.3d 587, 2018 Ky. App. LEXIS 306 (Ky. Ct. App. 2018).

Some housing authorities authorize their executive directors to file and proceed with forcible detainer actions on behalf of the housing authority in the absence of a licensed attorney; trial courts, however, are not at liberty to circumvent or evade the rules and statutory provisions by turning a blind eye to the requirements for the sake of expedience. Hornsby v. Hous. Auth. of Dry Ridge, 566 S.W.3d 587, 2018 Ky. App. LEXIS 306 (Ky. Ct. App. 2018).

80.190. Housing not to be operated for profit — Authority to make payments in lieu of taxes.

The authority shall manage and operate its housing in an efficient manner so as to enable it to fix the rentals for dwelling accommodations at the lowest possible rates consistent with its providing decent, safe and sanitary dwelling accommodations, and no authority shall construct or operate any project for profit, or as a source of revenue of the city. Provided, however, that nothing contained in the housing authority law shall be construed to prohibit an authority from making payments in lieu of taxes to the city, or other public body, within the area in which any project is located in such amounts as the authority may determine to be consistent with maintaining the low-rent character of the dwelling accommodations.

History. 927a-13, 2741x-8a: amend. Acts 1942, ch. 70, § 34; 1946, ch. 181; 1984, ch. 361, § 11, effective July 13, 1984.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Tax Exemption.

The property and bonds of municipal housing commissions (authorities) are exempt from taxation, being public property used for public purposes. Webster v. Frankfort Housing Com., 293 Ky. 114 , 168 S.W.2d 344, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 559 ( Ky. 1943 ).

2. Rights of Applicants.

Applicants for public housing have a “property interest” cognizable under the Fourteenth Amendment; entitlement to public-assisted housing for the needy is a significant benefit granted by Congress, which the qualified are entitled to enjoy. Applicants for public housing have a legitimate expectation that their applications will be fully considered and not unfairly denied. Tedder v. Housing Authority of Paducah, 574 F. Supp. 240, 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18431 (W.D. Ky. 1983 ).

Cited:

Middlesboro Housing Authority v. Kentucky Com. on Human Rights, 553 S.W.2d 57, 1977 Ky. App. LEXIS 737 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).

Opinions of Attorney General.

The housing authority of Lexington, under the provisions of this section, is required to pay the utility gross receipts license tax for schools provided for in KRS 160.613 . OAG 70-788 .

80.200. Rentals and tenant selection — Participation in private and public developments.

  1. An authority may rent or lease the dwelling accommodations in a housing development only for housing purposes under this chapter.
  2. An authority may rent or lease to a tenant dwelling accommodations consisting only of the number of rooms that it deems necessary to provide safe and sanitary accommodations to the proposed occupants without overcrowding.
  3. The dwellings in any housing development shall be available solely for housing purposes under this chapter. Income limits for occupancy and rents shall be fixed by the authority after taking into consideration:
    1. The family size, composition, age, physical disabilities, and other factors which might affect the rent-paying ability of the family, and
    2. The economic factors which affect the finance and solvency of the housing development.
  4. The authority shall issue regulations establishing eligibility requirements, consistent with the purposes and objectives of this section, for admission to and continued occupancy in its developments.
  5. Nothing contained in subsections (1), (2), (3), and (4) of this section shall limit the power of an authority to vest in an obligee of the authority the right, in the event of a default by the authority, to take possession of a housing development or cause the appointment of a receiver thereof, free from all the restrictions imposed by this section.
  6. An authority may participate in private and public developments not falling within the definition of “housing,” as set forth in KRS 80.010 , except that:
    1. An authority may not purchase, divide, or subdivide land except as provided in this chapter or as set forth in KRS 80.140 ; and
    2. An authority may not develop, improve, construct upon, sell, or resell any real property except as provided in this chapter or as set forth in KRS 80.140 .

History. 927a-14, 2741x-8a: amend. Acts 1970, ch. 44, § 2; 1984, ch. 226, § 6, effective July 13, 1984; 1984, ch. 361, § 12, effective July 13, 1984; 1994, ch. 405, § 11, effective July 15, 1994; 1996, ch. 237, § 11, effective July 15, 1996.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Civil Rights Action of Authority.

Actions taken by a city’s housing authority which is a federally-subsidized, state-created, locally-administered corporate body, are actions taken under color of state law for purposes of the federal civil rights statute, 42 USCS § 1983. Tedder v. Housing Authority of Paducah, 574 F. Supp. 240, 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18431 (W.D. Ky. 1983 ).

2. Property Interest of Applicants.

Applicants for public housing have a “property interest” cognizable under the Fourteenth Amendment; entitlement to public-assisted housing for the needy is a significant benefit granted by Congress, which the qualified are entitled to enjoy. Applicants for public housing have a legitimate expectation that their applications will be fully considered and not unfairly denied. Tedder v. Housing Authority of Paducah, 574 F. Supp. 240, 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18431 (W.D. Ky. 1983 ).

3. Selection Policies.

The Fourteenth Amendment clause bars discrimination by public authorities in selecting tenants for living quarters in public housing projects owned or maintained by any state, or any subdivision or agency of a state. However, the court will uphold legislative actions which burden poor persons as a class under the equal protection guarantee if the actions have any “rational basis” to a legitimate end of government and are free from invidious discrimination; thus, in a challenge to public housing admissions practices, defendants must show that their selection policies are reasonably related to some permissible governmental goal or purpose. Tedder v. Housing Authority of Paducah, 574 F. Supp. 240, 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18431 (W.D. Ky. 1983 ).

There was no rational basis for a city housing authority’s alleged arbitrary practice of excluding all applicants for housing whose sole source of income was AFDC and Food Stamp benefits, and that exclusion interfered with the equal protection rights of those applicants. Tedder v. Housing Authority of Paducah, 574 F. Supp. 240, 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18431 (W.D. Ky. 1983 ).

Cited:

Middlesboro Housing Authority v. Kentucky Com. on Human Rights, 553 S.W.2d 57, 1977 Ky. App. LEXIS 737 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).

Opinions of Attorney General.

The city administration has no administrative rights concerning establishing guidelines relative to the eligibility of persons living in housing units built by the municipal housing commission, since the commission has complete control over the rental of the housing units and the selection of the tenants pursuant to this section. OAG 72-184 .

80.210. Issuance of bonds by county and regional commissions. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (927a-10, 927a-11) was repealed by Acts 1942, ch. 70, § 35.

80.220. Application of rents of county and regional commissions. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (927a-13) was repealed by Acts 1942, ch. 70, § 35.

80.230. Issuance of bonds by city authorities.

  1. Cities of all classes may provide funds for carrying out the purposes of this chapter by the issuance of revenue bonds pursuant to a resolution of the housing authority. The bonds or other obligations of a housing authority shall not constitute an obligation of the city. The bonds shall be payable only out of the properties, revenues, and assets of the housing authority. Nothing contained in this section shall authorize or permit any city to incur any indebtedness of any kind or nature prohibited by the Constitution. Subject to the restrictions set forth in this chapter, a city housing authority may incur any indebtedness and issue any obligations and give any security which it deems necessary or advisable in connection with any project undertaken by it. A city housing authority may issue its bonds to provide for the payment of its indebtedness from time to time in amounts, with maturities, upon the terms and conditions and upon the security as the authority deems necessary or advisable in connection with any project undertaken or to be undertaken by it. The bonds shall be signed by the chairman of the authority or other agent designated by the authority and by the mayor or by the presiding officer of the legislative body of the city under the city’s seal, attested by a finance officer of the city.
  2. A city housing authority may in connection with the borrowing of funds or otherwise enter into agreements with the federal government providing for supervision and control of the housing authority or any project and containing other covenants, terms, and conditions as the housing authority deems advisable. In connection with any loan by a government, a city housing authority is authorized to agree to limitations upon the exercise of any of its powers.
  3. Bonds issued pursuant to this section shall have, in the hands of a bona fide holder, all of the qualities of negotiable instruments. They shall be exempt from taxation by the state and its political subdivisions. It shall be plainly stated on the face of each bond that it has been issued under the provisions of this chapter and that it does not constitute an indebtedness of the city within the meaning of any constitutional provisions or limitations. In case any provisions are made for the redemption or prepayment of any bonds before maturity, the provisions shall require that the bonds to be redeemed or prepaid shall be selected by lot from the whole number of the issue then outstanding. The bonds may be issued without any other proceedings or conditions than those proceedings and conditions specified and required by this chapter or by the Constitution.

History. 2741x-10: amend. Acts 1986, ch. 23, § 3, effective July 15, 1986; 1996, ch. 274, § 15, effective July 15, 1996.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. In General.

Slum clearance project could not be enjoined on ground that city’s financial condition would not permit it to pay for property condemned or acquired, where statute, ordinance and contract indicated that funds were to be supplied by municipal housing commission (authority) from proceeds of bonds and federal subsidies and no financial obligation was created against city. Douthitt v. Covington, 284 Ky. 382 , 144 S.W.2d 1025, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 502 ( Ky. 1940 ).

2. Tax-exempt.

Bonds issued by a housing commission (authority) are properly exempt from taxation since the proceeds of the bonds are to be used for a public purpose. Spahn v. Stewart, 268 Ky. 97 , 103 S.W.2d 651, 1937 Ky. LEXIS 405 ( Ky. 1937 ).

The property and bonds of municipal housing commissions (authorities) are exempt from taxation, being public property used for public purposes. Webster v. Frankfort Housing Com., 293 Ky. 114 , 168 S.W.2d 344, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 559 ( Ky. 1943 ).

Cited:

Louisville v. German, 286 Ky. 477 , 150 S.W.2d 931, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 5 ( Ky. 1940 ); Middlesboro Housing Authority v. Kentucky Com. on Human Rights, 553 S.W.2d 57, 1977 Ky. App. LEXIS 737 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).

Opinions of Attorney General.

A municipal housing authority, organized pursuant to the provisions of KRS 80.020 to 80.257 , may, within its discretion, borrow funds from the federal government to carry out statutorily authorized objectives within its territorial boundaries. OAG 79-499 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

City may issue revenue bonds for any public project, KRS 58.010 to 58.120 .

Loans to housing authorities authorized, KRS 386.020 , 386.030 .

80.240. Application of receipts of city housing authority.

  1. The rents and other revenues of a city housing authority shall be applied: first to pay the interest and principal of the bonds issued under KRS 80.230 as payments fall due; next, to pay the costs of maintaining, repairing, improving and operating its developments; next, to create such reserve for depreciation as the housing authority deems necessary and proper. The excess, if any, of the rents received during any annual period may be applied to the prepayment of the obligations of the housing authority or may be placed in a special fund for the purpose of paying the principal and interest of the obligations as they become due.
  2. Receipts of revenues of a city housing authority in excess of the amounts required to pay:
    1. The interest and principal on bonds issued under this chapter as payments fall due;
    2. The cost of maintaining, repairing, improving and operating its projects; and
    3. Reserves for depreciation as the housing authority deems necessary and proper;

may be applied to the engagement by the authority in activities for the maintenance and enhancement of adequate housing stock for low-income and moderate-income persons, as defined in this chapter.

History. 2741x-11: amend. Acts 1984, ch. 226, § 7, effective July 13, 1984; 1984, ch. 361, § 13, effective July 13, 1984.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

This section was amended by two 1984 Acts which do not appear to be in conflict and have been compiled together.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

Middlesboro Housing Authority v. Kentucky Com. on Human Rights, 553 S.W.2d 57, 1977 Ky. App. LEXIS 737 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).

80.250. Authority may contract to manage.

A housing authority may contract with the federal government to manage or operate any low-income housing erected or owned by the federal government.

History. 927a-16, 2741x-14: amend. Acts 1984, ch. 361, § 14, effective July 13, 1984; 1996, ch. 237, § 12, effective July 15, 1996.

80.255. Validation of creation of municipal housing authorities.

The creation and establishment of housing authorities pursuant to the provisions of the Housing Authority Act (KRS Chapter 80) together with all proceedings, acts and things heretofore undertaken, performed or done with reference thereto, are hereby validated, ratified, confirmed, approved and declared legal in all respects notwithstanding any defect or irregularity therein or any want of statutory authority.

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 71, § 1; 1964, ch. 146, § 2.

80.256. Validation of contracts and undertakings.

All contracts, agreements, obligations and undertakings of housing authorities heretofore entered into relating to financing or aiding in the development, construction, maintenance or operation of any housing or to obtaining aid therefor from the United States Housing Authority and its successor agencies, including (without limiting the foregoing) loan and annual contributions contracts and leases with the United States Housing Authority and its successor agencies, agreements with cities, counties or other public bodies (including agreements which are pledged or authorized to be pledged for the protection of the holders of any notes or bonds issued by housing authorities or which are otherwise made a part of the contract with such holders of notes or bonds) relating to cooperation and contributions in aid of housing, payments (if any) in lieu of taxes, furnishing of municipal services and facilities, and the elimination of unsafe and unsanitary dwellings, and contracts for the construction of housing, together with all proceedings, acts and things heretofore undertaken, performed or done with reference thereto, are hereby validated, ratified, confirmed, approved and declared legal in all respects notwithstanding any defect or irregularity therein or any want of statutory authority.

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 71, § 2; 1964, ch. 146, § 3; 1984, ch. 361, § 15, effective July 13, 1984.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Services Without Charge.

Where contract between municipal housing commission (authority) and city provided that commission (authority) would make annual payment in lieu of taxes and other assessments and public services and facilities furnished the project and that city would furnish such public services and facilities which were provided without charge to other dwellings and inhabitants of city without charge to the housing project, such agreement limited city to furnishing such services and facilities without charge as long as it did not charge others for them and when city began to charge every water purchaser a sewer service charge it could require commission (authority) to pay such charges. Danville Municipal Housing Com. v. Danville, 319 S.W.2d 460, 1958 Ky. LEXIS 168 ( Ky. 1958 ).

80.257. Validation of notes and bonds.

All proceedings, acts and things heretofore undertaken, performed or done in or for the authorization, issuance, execution and delivery of notes and bonds by housing authorities for the purpose of financing or aiding in the development or construction of housing and all notes and bonds heretofore issued by housing authorities are hereby validated, ratified, confirmed, approved and declared legal in all respects, notwithstanding any defect or irregularity therein or any want of statutory authority.

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 71, § 3; 1964, ch. 146, § 4; 1984, ch. 361, § 16, effective July 13, 1984.

80.260. County and regional commissions may cooperate. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (927a-17) was repealed by Acts 1942, ch. 70, § 35.

City-County Housing Authority

80.262. Formation of city-county housing authority.

  1. If the governing body of a city and of a contiguous county by resolution declare that there is a need for one (1) housing authority to be created for the city and county to exercise in that city and county the powers and functions prescribed for a city-county housing authority, a public body corporate and politic to be known as a “city-county housing authority” (with such corporate name as it selects) shall thereupon exist for all of that city and county and exercise its powers and other functions within its area of operation (as herein defined) including the power to undertake projects therein.
  2. Provided, however, if there is an existing municipal or county housing commission, such resolution of the governing bodies of the city and contiguous county shall not take effect unless preceded by a request to do so in a resolution of the existing municipal or county housing commission or commissions. Such resolution of the governing body of a city and of a contiguous county shall also provide for the abolishment of any municipal and contiguous county housing commissions existing in the city and county adopting the resolution, on a day certain, on which day the authority, responsibilities, personnel and property, both real and personal, of said municipal and contiguous county housing commissions are then and there transferred to the newly created city-county housing authority, and the present commissioners of the existing municipal and contiguous county housing commissions shall continue to serve out their appointed terms as members of the newly created city-county housing authority. Thereafter, appointments shall be made as provided in KRS 80.266 .
  3. The city and county housing commissions to be abolished are hereby authorized and directed to take such actions and to execute such documents as will carry into effect the provisions and the intent of the resolutions and as will carry into effect said transfer.

History. Enact. Acts 1970, ch. 44, § 3.

Opinions of Attorney General.

Constitution, §§ 27 and 28 prohibit a member of the General Assembly from serving concurrently as a member of the governing body of a joint city-county housing authority. OAG 93-70 .

80.263. Compliance with KRS 65A.010 to 65A.090.

The board of each authority shall comply with the provisions of KRS 65A.010 to 65A.090 .

History. Enact. Acts 2013, ch. 40, § 34, effective March 21, 2013.

80.264. Legal effects of creation of city-county authority.

  1. On the day set in the resolutions of the city and contiguous county governing bodies:
    1. Any housing commission in said city and any housing commission in the contiguous county shall cease to exist as a body politic and corporate;
    2. All property, real and personal and mixed, belonging to the abolished city and contiguous county housing commissions shall vest in, belong to, and be the property of the city-county housing authority;
    3. All judgments, liens, rights of liens, and causes of action of any nature, in favor of the abolished commissions, shall remain, vest in, and inure to the benefit of the city-county housing authority;
    4. All rentals, taxes, assessments, and any other funds, charges or fees, owing to the abolished commissions shall be owed to and collected by the city-county housing authority;
    5. Any actions, suits, and proceedings pending against, or having been instituted by the abolished housing commissions shall not be abated by such abolition, but all such actions, suits and proceedings shall be continued and completed in the same manner as if abolition had not occurred, and the city-county housing authority shall be a party to all such actions, suits, and proceedings in the place and stead of the abolished housing commissions and shall pay or cause to be paid any judgments rendered against the abolished housing commissions in any such actions, suits, or proceedings, and no new process need be served in any such actions, suits or proceedings;
    6. All obligations of the abolished housing commissions, including outstanding indebtedness, shall be assumed by the city-county housing authority, and all such obligations and outstanding indebtedness shall be constituted obligations and indebtedness of the city-county housing authority; and
    7. All rules, regulations and policies of the abolished housing commissions shall continue in full force and effect until repealed or amended by the city-county housing authority.
  2. The creation of a city-county housing authority shall be subject to the same provisions and limitations of KRS 80.320 to 80.610 as are applicable to a regional housing authority.
  3. The area of operation of a city-county housing authority shall include all of the territory within the boundaries of the city and contiguous county joining in the creation of the authority.

History. Enact. Acts 1970, ch. 44, § 3; 1984, ch. 361, § 17, effective July 13, 1984.

Opinions of Attorney General.

The Kentucky Housing Corporation is the only entity with statewide authority to administer performance-based HUD rental subsidy contracts in Kentucky; no out-of-state entity would have authority under Kentucky law to administer such contracts in the Commonwealth. OAG 12-004 , 2012 Ky. AG LEXIS 79.

80.266. Membership of authority — Compensation — Interlocal agreements.

    1. Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this subsection, the city-county housing authority shall be composed of eight (8) members. The mayor shall appoint four (4) members, and the county judge/executive shall appoint four (4) members. No more than four (4) appointees on any housing authority shall be affiliated with the same political party. (1) (a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this subsection, the city-county housing authority shall be composed of eight (8) members. The mayor shall appoint four (4) members, and the county judge/executive shall appoint four (4) members. No more than four (4) appointees on any housing authority shall be affiliated with the same political party.
      1. If a city-county housing authority has agreed to accept a transfer or full transfer of ownership and operation of another city’s public housing program pursuant to the United States Housing Act of 1937, the housing authority shall be composed of four (4) members appointed by the mayor, four (4) members appointed by the county judge/executive, and one (1) additional person appointed by each mayor of a city divesting itself of its authority, with the approval of that city’s legislative body. (b) 1. If a city-county housing authority has agreed to accept a transfer or full transfer of ownership and operation of another city’s public housing program pursuant to the United States Housing Act of 1937, the housing authority shall be composed of four (4) members appointed by the mayor, four (4) members appointed by the county judge/executive, and one (1) additional person appointed by each mayor of a city divesting itself of its authority, with the approval of that city’s legislative body.
      2. If a city-county housing authority has agreed to accept a transfer or full transfer of ownership and operation of another city’s public housing program pursuant to the United States Housing Act of 1937, and:
        1. Has an even number of members, then no more than half of the appointees on any city-county housing authority shall be affiliated with the same political party; or
        2. Has an odd number of members, then no more than half of the appointees plus one (1) member of any city-county housing authority shall be affiliated with the same political party.
  1. Each person appointed to a city-county housing authority shall be at least twenty- five (25) years of age and a bona fide resident of the city or county for which he was appointed for at least one (1) year preceding the appointment. No officer or employee of the city or county, whether holding a paid or unpaid office, is eligible to hold an appointment on the housing authority. No more than two (2) appointees by the mayor or no more than two (2) appointees by the county judge/executive shall be affiliated with the same political party. Two (2) of the four (4) members appointed by the mayor shall be designated to serve for terms of two (2) years and two (2) for terms of four (4) years, respectively, from the date of their appointments. Two (2) of the four (4) members appointed by the county judge/executive shall be designated to serve for terms of two (2) years, and two (2) for terms of four (4) years, respectively, from the date of their appointments. Thereafter, all members of the city-county housing authority shall be appointed as aforesaid for a term of office of four (4) years, except that all vacancies shall be filled for the unexpired terms.
    1. Each member of a city-county housing authority may receive compensation either as a salary or as payment for meetings attended. Any compensation of the members of a city-county housing authority shall be fixed by the legislative body of the city and the county. The housing authority may fix the compensation of the secretary and treasurer, but the city and county legislative bodies may fix or limit the salary. (3) (a) Each member of a city-county housing authority may receive compensation either as a salary or as payment for meetings attended. Any compensation of the members of a city-county housing authority shall be fixed by the legislative body of the city and the county. The housing authority may fix the compensation of the secretary and treasurer, but the city and county legislative bodies may fix or limit the salary.
    2. If a city-county housing authority has agreed to accept a transfer or full transfer of ownership and operation of another city’s public housing program pursuant to the United States Housing Act of 1937, the city and county that are members of the housing authority may enter into an interlocal agreement pursuant to KRS 65.210 to 65.300 with the city that is divesting itself of the authority, agreeing to pay all or a portion of the compensation of the member representing that divesting city.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1970, ch. 44, § 4; 1972, ch. 146, § 1; 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 20, § 6, effective January 2, 1978; 1984, ch. 361, § 18, effective July 13, 1984; 2018 ch. 45, § 4, effective July 14, 2018.

Opinions of Attorney General.

As this section relates to the membership of a joint city-county housing authority applicable where there is a need for one housing authority for a city and contiguous county and KRS 80.310 to 80.420 (KRS 80.310 now repealed) relates to county and regional housing authorities with KRS 80.420 governing the membership composition of the housing authority created for the county alone, there would be no conflict between this section and KRS 80.420 as KRS 80.262 to this section and KRS 80.310 to 80.420 (KRS 80.310 now repealed) are mutually exclusive blocks of statutes. OAG 73-106 .

Aid to Housing Authority by Public Bodies

80.270. Public body may aid housing authority — Declaration of policy.

It is hereby declared that there exist in Kentucky unsafe and unsanitary housing conditions and a shortage of safe and sanitary dwelling accommodations for persons of low income; that these conditions necessitate excessive and disproportionate expenditures of public funds for crime prevention and punishment, public health and safety, fire and accident protection, and other public services and facilities; and that the public interest requires the remedying of these conditions. It is further declared that the assistance provided in KRS 80.280 to 80.300 for the remedying of such conditions constitutes a public use and purpose and an essential governmental function for which public money may be spent and other aid given; that it is a proper public purpose for any public body to aid any housing authority located or operating within its boundaries or jurisdiction, as the public body derives immediate benefits and advantages from such a housing authority or developments; and that the provisions of KRS 80.280 to 80.300 are necessary in the public interest.

History. 2741x-17: amend. Acts 1984, ch. 361, § 19, effective July 13, 1984.

80.280. Resolution or ordinance of public body for aid to authority.

The exercise by a public body of the power to aid a housing authority may be authorized by resolution or ordinance of the legislative body of the public body adopted by a majority of the members of the legislative body present at a meeting of the legislative body, which resolution or ordinance may be adopted at the meeting at which it is introduced. The resolution or ordinance shall take effect immediately and need not be laid over or published or posted.

History. 2741x-21.

80.290. Manners in which public body may aid authority.

  1. For the purpose of aiding and cooperating in the planning, undertaking, construction or operation of housing projects located within the area in which it is authorized to act, any public body may, upon such terms, with or without consideration, as it may determine:
    1. Dedicate, sell, convey or lease any of its interest in any property, or grant easements, licenses or any other rights or privileges therein to a housing authority or the federal government;
    2. Cause parks, playgrounds, recreational, community, educational, water, sewer or drainage facilities, or any other works which it is otherwise empowered to undertake, to be furnished adjacent to or in connection with housing projects;
    3. Furnish, dedicate, close, pave, install, grade, regrade, plan or replan public ways or other places which it is otherwise empowered to undertake;
    4. Plan or replan, zone or rezone any part of the public body; make exceptions from building regulations and ordinances; any city also may change its map;
    5. Cause services to be furnished to the housing authority of the character which the public body is otherwise empowered to furnish;
    6. Enter into agreements with respect to the exercise by such public body of its powers relating to the repair, closing or demolition of unsafe, unsanitary or unfit dwellings;
    7. Employ any funds belonging to or within the control of such public body, including funds derived from the sale or furnishing of property or facilities to a housing authority, in the purchase of the bonds or other obligations of a housing authority; and exercise all the rights of any holder of such bonds or other obligations;
    8. Do any and all things necessary or convenient to aid and cooperate in the planning, undertaking, construction or operation of housing;
    9. Incur the entire expense of any public improvements made by such public body in exercising the powers granted in this section; and
    10. Enter into agreements, which may extend over any period, with a housing authority respecting action to be taken by such public body pursuant to any of the powers granted by this section.
  2. Any sale, conveyance, lease or agreement provided for in this section may be made by a public body without appraisal, public notice, advertisement or public bidding.
  3. With respect to any housing which a housing authority has acquired or taken over from the federal government and which the housing authority by resolution has found and declared to have been constructed in a manner that will promote the public interest and afford necessary safety, sanitation and other protection, no public body shall require any changes to be made in the housing project or the manner of its construction or take any other action relating to the construction.

History. 2741x-19: amend. Acts 1984, ch. 361, § 20, effective July 13, 1984.

80.300. Loans to housing authority by county or city.

Any city or county located in whole or in part within the area of operation of a housing authority may from time to time lend or donate money to a housing authority or agree to take such action. The housing authority, when it has money available therefor, shall make reimbursements for all such loans made to it.

History. 2741x-20.

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

County or city not to lend credit to corporation, exceptions, Ky. Const., § 179.

County and Regional Housing Authorities

80.310. Definitions and construction. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 70, § 1; 1964, ch. 146, § 5; 1980, ch. 188, § 73, effective July 15, 1980) was repealed by Acts 1984, ch. 361, § 40, effective July 13, 1984.

80.320. Creation of county and regional housing authorities.

  1. If the governing body of a county by resolution declares (upon findings prescribed in this section and KRS 80.330 to 80.610 ) that there is a need for a housing authority to be created for such county to exercise therein powers and other functions prescribed for a housing authority of a county, a county housing authority shall thereupon exist for such county.
  2. If the governing body of each of two (2) or more contiguous counties by resolution declares (upon findings prescribed in this section and KRS 80.330 to 80.610 ) that there is a need for one (1) housing authority to be created for all of such counties to exercise in such counties powers and other functions prescribed for a regional housing authority, a regional housing authority shall thereupon exist for all of such counties and exercise its powers and other functions in such counties. If there is a county housing authority created for a county, the governing body of that county shall not adopt such resolution unless first, all holders of any outstanding bonds, notes, or other evidences of indebtedness of such county housing authority consent in writing to such action and the county housing authority adopts a resolution not to thereafter initiate any project within such county.

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 70, § 2; 1984, ch. 361, § 21, effective July 13, 1984.

Opinions of Attorney General.

A county already within the area of operation of a regional housing authority could not, at the same time, bring itself within the area of operation of a county housing authority. OAG 79-324 .

There is no specific statutory provision in KRS 80.310 (now repealed) to 80.610 providing for the dissolution of a regional housing authority nor is there a provision whereby a county may unilaterally exclude itself from the area of operation of a regional housing authority. OAG 79-324 .

80.322. Compliance with KRS 65A.010 to 65A.090.

The board of each authority shall comply with the provisions of KRS 65A.010 to 65A.090 .

History. Enact. Acts 2013, ch. 40, § 35, effective March 21, 2013.

80.330. Area of operation of county and regional authorities.

The area of operation of a housing authority created for a county shall include all of the county for which it is created and the area of operation of a regional housing authority shall include (except as otherwise provided in KRS 80.320 to 80.610 ) all of the counties for which such regional housing authority is created and established. But no county or regional housing authority shall undertake any housing within the boundaries of a city unless a resolution has been adopted by the governing body of the city (and also by any housing authority which has been created for that city pursuant to KRS 80.320 to 80.610 or KRS 80.010 to 80.250 ) declaring that there is a need for the county or regional housing authority to exercise its powers within that city.

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 70, § 3; 1984, ch. 361, § 22, effective July 13, 1984.

Compiler’s Notes.

KRS 80.100 , 80.210 and 80.220 , contained in the reference to KRS 80.010 to 80.250 , have been repealed.

Opinions of Attorney General.

The Kentucky Housing Corporation is the only entity with statewide authority to administer performance-based HUD rental subsidy contracts in Kentucky; no out-of-state entity would have authority under Kentucky law to administer such contracts in the Commonwealth. OAG 12-004 , 2012 Ky. AG LEXIS 79.

80.340. Increasing area of operation of regional authority.

The area of operation of a regional housing authority shall be increased from time to time to include one (1) or more additional contiguous counties not already within a regional housing authority if the governing body of each of the counties then included in the area of operation of the regional housing authority, the members of the regional housing authority and the governing body of each such additional county or counties each adopt a resolution declaring that there is a need for the inclusion of such additional county or counties in the area of operation of the regional housing authority. Such resolutions shall not be adopted if there is a county housing authority created for any such additional county, unless first, all holders of any outstanding bonds, notes, or other evidences of indebtedness of that county housing authority consent in writing to such action and the county housing authority adopts a resolution not to thereafter initiate any project within that county.

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 70, § 4.

80.350. Decreasing area of operation of regional authority.

The area of operation of a regional housing authority shall be decreased from time to time to exclude one or more counties from such area if the governing body of each of the counties in such area and the members of the regional housing authority each adopt a resolution declaring that there is a need for excluding such county or counties from such area. No action shall be taken pursuant to this section if the regional housing authority has outstanding any bonds, notes or other evidences of indebtedness, unless first, all holders of such evidences of indebtedness consent in writing to such action. If such action decreases the area of operation of the regional housing authority to only one (1) county, the authority shall thereupon constitute and become a housing authority for that county, in the same manner as though the authority were created pursuant to KRS 80.320 , and the members of such county housing authority shall be thereupon appointed as provided for the appointment of members of a housing authority created for a county.

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 70, § 5.

80.360. Facts justifying exclusion of counties from area of regional authority.

The governing body of each of the counties in the area of operation of the regional housing authority and the members of the regional housing authority shall adopt a resolution declaring that there is a need for excluding a county or counties from such area if:

  1. Each of the governing bodies of the counties to remain in the area of operation of the regional housing authority and the members of the regional housing authority find that (because of facts arising or determined subsequent to the time when such area first included the county or counties to be excluded) the regional housing authority would be a more efficient or economical administrative unit to carry out the purposes of KRS 80.320 to 80.610 if such county or counties were excluded from such area; and
  2. The governing body of each such county or counties to be excluded and the members of the regional housing authority each also find that (because of the aforesaid changed facts) the purposes of KRS 80.320 to 80.610 could be carried out more efficiently or economically in such county or counties if the area of operation of the regional housing authority did not include such county or counties.

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 70, § 6; 1984, ch. 361, § 23, effective July 13, 1984.

80.370. Disposition of property in excluded counties.

Any property held by a regional housing authority within a county or counties excluded from the area of operation of such authority, as herein provided, shall (as soon as practicable after the exclusion of said county or counties respectively) be disposed of by such authority in the public interest.

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 70, § 7.

80.380. Prerequisites to creation of authority for city, county or region.

No governing body of a city or county shall adopt a resolution under KRS 80.320 to 80.610 declaring that there is a need for a housing authority to be created, or to exercise its powers within such city or county, or that there is a need to include such city or county within the area of operation of a housing authority, unless such governing body shall have found substantially that:

  1. Unsanitary or unsafe inhabited dwelling accommodations exist in such city or county or that there is a shortage of safe or sanitary dwelling accommodations in such city or county available to persons of low income at rentals they can afford; and
  2. These conditions can be best remedied through the exercise of the housing authority’s powers within the territorial boundaries of such city or county.

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 70, § 8; 1984, ch. 361, § 24, effective July 13, 1984.

80.390. Factors to be considered in determining need for authority.

In determining under KRS 80.320 to 80.610 whether dwelling accommodations are unsafe or unsanitary, a governing body shall take into consideration the safety and sanitation of dwellings, the light and air space available to the inhabitants of such dwellings, the degree of overcrowding, the size and arrangement of the rooms and the extent to which conditions exist in such dwellings which endanger life or property by fire or other causes.

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 70, § 9; 1984, ch. 361, § 25, effective July 13, 1984.

80.400. Public hearing with regard to creation or area of regional authority.

The governing body of a county shall not adopt any resolution authorized by KRS 80.320 , 80.340 , 80.350 or 80.360 with regard to a regional housing authority unless a public hearing has first been held. The clerk of that county shall give notice of the public hearing by publication pursuant to KRS Chapter 424. Upon the date fixed for such public hearing an opportunity to be heard shall be granted to all residents of that county and to all other interested persons.

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 70, § 10; 1966, ch. 239, § 33.

80.410. Resolution creating authority — Form — Effect — Use in evidence.

In any suit, action or proceeding involving the validity or enforcement of or relating to any contract of an authority, the authority shall be conclusively deemed to have become created as a public body corporate and politic upon proof of the adoption of the resolution or resolutions of the governing body or bodies declaring the need for the authority as required in KRS 80.320 to 80.610 . Such resolution or resolutions shall be deemed sufficient if it declares that there is such need for the authority and finds in substantially the foregoing terms (no further detail being necessary) that the conditions enumerated in KRS 80.380 exist in the city or county, as the case may be. A copy of the resolution or resolutions duly certified by the clerk shall be admissible in evidence in any suit, action or proceeding.

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 70, § 11; 1984, ch. 361, § 26, effective July 13, 1984.

Opinions of Attorney General.

Where a county housing authority was properly created by order of the fiscal court, the authority would have continued legal existence as a corporate public body capable of exercising the powers of such an authority, and the mere fact that the authority has had no program to effectuate since its creation does not give it a legal death. OAG 76-209 .

80.420. Appointment and term of county authority — Vacancies.

If a housing authority is created for a county, the governing body of that county shall appoint five (5) persons as members of the housing authority. Three (3) of the five (5) members who are first appointed shall be designated to serve for terms of one (1), two (2) or three (3) years and two (2) of such members for terms of four (4) years, respectively, from the date of their appointments, but thereafter members of the housing authority shall be appointed as aforesaid for a term of office of four (4) years except that all vacancies shall be filled by the governing body for the unexpired terms.

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 70, § 12.

Opinions of Attorney General.

As KRS 80.266 relates to the membership of a joint city-county housing authority applicable where there is a need for one housing authority for a city and contiguous county and KRS 80.310 (now repealed) and KRS 80.320 to 80.420 relates to county and regional housing authorities with this section governing the membership composition of the housing authority created for the county alone, there would be no conflict between this section and KRS 80.266 as KRS 80.262 to 80.266 and KRS 80.310 (now repealed) and KRS 80.320 to 80.420 are mutually exclusive blocks of statutes. OAG 73-106 .

The fiscal court appoints members of the housing authority by proper motion and majority vote and also fills all vacancies, and thus the county judge has no authority to fill vacancies on the housing authority. OAG 78-161 .

A member of a county housing authority appointed April 20, 1976, and sworn in May 24, 1976, has his term of office expire April 19, 1979, but his successor’s term begins at the date of appointment, not necessarily April 20, 1979. OAG 79-318 .

This section specifically provides that the terms of office of county housing authority members begin from the date of their appointments. OAG 79-318 .

80.430. Appointment and term of regional authority members — Vacancies.

  1. The governing body of each county included in a regional housing authority shall appoint one (1) person as a member of such authority, and each such member to be first appointed by the governing body of a county may be appointed at or after the time of the adoption of the resolution declaring the need for such regional housing authority or declaring the need for the inclusion of such county in the area of operation of such regional housing authority. When the area of operation of a regional housing authority is increased to include an additional county or counties as provided above, the governing body of each such county shall thereupon appoint one (1) additional person as a member of the regional housing authority. The governing body of each county shall appoint the successor of the member appointed by it. If any county is excluded from the area of operation of a regional housing authority, the office of the member of such regional housing authority appointed by the governing body of such county shall be thereupon abolished.
  2. No more than four (4) of the members of the authority shall be affiliated with the same political party.
  3. If the area of operation of the regional housing authority consists at any time of an even number of counties, the members of the regional housing authority appointed by the governing bodies of such counties shall appoint one (1) additional member whose term of office shall be as herein provided for a member of a regional housing authority except that such term shall end at any earlier time that the area of operation of the regional housing authority shall be changed to consist of an odd number of counties. The members of such authority appointed by the governing bodies of such counties shall likewise appoint each person to succeed such additional member; provided, that the term of office of such person begins during the terms of office of the members appointing him.
  4. The members of a regional housing authority shall be appointed for terms of four (4) years except that all vacancies shall be filled by the appointing authority for the unexpired term.

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 70, § 13; 1984, ch. 361, § 27, effective July 13, 1984.

80.440. Certificate of appointment of member to be filed — Use in evidence — Members not to be county officers or employees — Term — Compensation.

  1. A certificate of the appointment of any member shall be filed with the clerk (provided, that in the case of appointment of a member of a regional housing authority by its other members, as provided in KRS 80.430 , such certificate shall be signed by the members making the appointment and filed with the other records of the regional housing authority) and such certificate shall be conclusive evidence of the due and proper appointment of such member.
  2. No member shall be an officer or employee of a county for which the authority is created. A member shall hold office until his successor has been appointed and has qualified, except as otherwise provided herein.
  3. A member may receive compensation either as salary or as payment for meetings attending. Any compensation of the members shall be fixed by the legislative body of the county.

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 70, § 14; 1984, ch. 361, § 28, effective July 13, 1984.

80.450. Quorum — Officers and employees — Legal services — Effect of compact — Appointment of secretary upon establishment of consolidated local government.

  1. The members shall constitute the housing authority. A majority of the members shall constitute a quorum for the purpose of conducting business and exercising powers and for all other purposes. Action may be taken by the authority upon a vote of a majority of the members present, unless in any case the bylaws of the authority require a larger number. An authority shall select from among its members a chairman and a vice chairman, and it may employ a secretary (who shall be executive director), technical experts, and such other officers, agents, and other employees, permanent and temporary, as it may require, and shall determine their qualifications, duties, and compensation. For such legal services as it may require, an authority may call upon the chief law officer of the city or a county for which it is created, or may employ its own counsel and legal staff. An authority may delegate to one (1) or more of its agents or employees such powers or duties as it deems proper.
  2. Notwithstanding subsection (1) of this section, when a city of the first class and a county containing such city have in effect a compact under KRS 79.310 to 79.330 , the secretary, who shall be the executive director, shall be appointed by and serve at the pleasure of the county judge/executive with the approval of the fiscal court pursuant to KRS 67.040 . Upon the establishment of a consolidated local government in a county where a city of the first class and a county containing such city have had in effect a cooperative compact pursuant to KRS 79.310 to 79.330 , the secretary, who shall be the executive director, shall be appointed by and shall serve at the pleasure of the mayor.

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 70, § 15; 1986, ch. 77, § 14, effective July 15, 1986; 2002, ch. 346, § 86, effective July 15, 2002.

Opinions of Attorney General.

A county housing authority may call upon the county attorney of the county for which it is created for needed legal services, but there is no authorization for the housing authority to expend funds to pay the county attorney or to employ the county attorney in his private capacity. OAG 79-318 .

The executive director of a county housing authority need not resign his office to run for the position of property valuation administrator, since there is no constitutional or statutory prohibition against holding that office while he runs for administrator, and, since this section does not require that the executive director devote his entire time to his duty, he is not precluded from holding another office simultaneously. OAG 81-147 .

80.460. Place of meetings — Residents of area eligible as members.

Meetings of the members of a housing authority (including any housing authority created pursuant to KRS 80.010 to 80.250 ) may be held anywhere within the perimeter boundaries of the area of operation or territorial jurisdiction of an authority or within any additional area where the housing authority is authorized to undertake a housing project, and any person may be appointed as a member of the housing authority who resides within boundaries or such additional area, and who is otherwise eligible for such appointment under KRS 80.320 to 80.610 or KRS 80.010 to 80.250 , as the case may be.

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 70, § 16; 1984, ch. 361, § 29, effective July 13, 1984.

Compiler’s Notes.

KRS 80.100 , 80.210 and 80.220 , contained in the reference to KRS 80.010 to 80.250 , have been repealed.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

Louisville Municipal Housing Com. v. Public Housing Administration, 261 S.W.2d 286, 1953 Ky. LEXIS 997 ( Ky. 1953 ).

80.470. Members and employees not to hold interest in housing.

No member or employee of an authority shall acquire any interest direct or indirect in any housing or in any property included or planned to be included in any project, nor shall he have any interest direct or indirect in any contract or proposed contract for materials or services to be furnished or used in connection with any housing. If any member or employee of an authority owns or controls an interest direct or indirect in any property included or planned to be included in any housing project, he immediately shall disclose the same in writing to the authority and such disclosure shall be entered upon the minutes of the authority. Failure so to disclose such interest shall constitute misconduct in office. Upon such disclosure such member or employee shall not participate in any action by the authority affecting such property.

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 70, § 17; 1984, ch. 361, § 30, effective July 13, 1984.

80.480. Removal of members — Effect of compact — Membership upon establishment of consolidated local government.

  1. For inefficiency or neglect of duty or misconduct in office, a member may be removed by the authority appointing him, but a member shall be removed only after he or she has been given a copy of the charges against him or her at least ten (10) days prior to the hearing and has had an opportunity to be heard in person or by counsel. In the event of the removal of any member, a record of the proceedings, together with the charges and findings, shall be filed as required for the certificate of appointment of the member.
  2. Notwithstanding subsection (1) of this section, when a city of the first class and a county containing such city have in effect a compact under KRS 79.310 to 79.330 , the terms of the members of the authority shall be for three (3) years and until their successors are appointed and qualified. Upon the effective date of the compact, the county judge/executive with the approval of the fiscal court shall adjust the terms of the sitting members so that two (2) shall expire in one (1) year, two (2) shall expire in two (2) years, and one (1) shall expire in three (3) years. Upon expiration of these staggered terms, successors shall be appointed for a term of three (3) years. Upon the establishment of a consolidated local government in a county where a city of the first class and a county containing such city have had in effect a cooperative compact pursuant to KRS 79.310 to 79.330 , all members of the authority shall be appointed by the mayor of the consolidated local government pursuant to the provisions of KRS 67C.139 for a term of three (3) years. Incumbent members upon the establishment of the consolidated local government shall continue to serve as members of the authority for the time remaining of their current term of appointment.

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 70, § 18; 1986, ch. 77, § 15, effective July 15, 1986; 2002, ch. 346, § 87, effective July 15, 2002.

80.490. Consolidated housing authority for two or more cities.

  1. If the governing body of each of two (2) or more cities (whether or not contiguous) by resolution declares that there is a need for one (1) housing authority to be created for all of such cities to exercise in such cities the powers and other functions prescribed for a consolidated housing authority, a public body corporate and politic to be known as a “consolidated housing authority” (with such corporate name as it selects) shall thereupon exist for all of such cities and exercise its powers and other functions within its area of operation (as herein defined), including the power to undertake projects therein.
  2. The creation of a consolidated housing authority and the finding of need therefor shall be subject to the same provisions and limitations of KRS 80.320 to 80.610 as are applicable to the creation of a regional housing authority, and all of the provisions of KRS 80.310 to 80.610 applicable to regional housing authorities and the members thereof shall be applicable to consolidated housing authorities and the members thereof.
  3. The area of operation of a consolidated housing authority shall include all of the territory within the boundaries of each city joining in the creation of such authority, except that such area of operation may be changed to include or exclude any city or cities in the same manner and under the same provisions as provided in KRS 80.320 to 80.610 for changing the area of operation of a regional housing authority by including or excluding a county or counties.
  4. If the area of operation of a consolidated housing authority is decreased to only one (1) city, such authority shall thereupon constitute and become a housing authority for such city, in the same manner as though such authority were thereupon created pursuant to KRS 80.010 to 80.250 ; and for all such purposes the term “county” shall be construed as meaning “city,” the terms “county housing authority” and “regional housing authority” shall be construed as meaning “housing authority of the city” and “consolidated housing authority,” respectively, and the term “governing body” as used in KRS 80.420 , 80.430 and 80.440 shall be construed as meaning “mayor,” unless a different meaning clearly appears from the context.

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 70, § 19; 1984, ch. 361, § 31, effective July 13, 1984.

Compiler’s Notes.

KRS 80.100 , 80.210 and 80.220 , contained in the reference to KRS 80.010 to 80.250 in subsection (4), have been repealed.

KRS 80.310 , contained in the reference to KRS 80.310 to 80.610 in subsection (2), has been repealed.

80.500. General powers of housing authority.

An authority shall constitute a public body corporate and politic, exercising public and essential governmental functions, and having all the powers necessary or convenient to carry out and effectuate the purposes and provisions of KRS 80.320 to 80.610 , including the following powers in addition to others herein granted:

  1. To sue and be sued; to have a seal and to alter the same at pleasure; to have perpetual succession; to make and execute contracts and other instruments necessary or convenient to the exercise of the powers of the authority; and to make and from time to time amend and repeal bylaws, rules and regulations, not inconsistent with KRS 80.320 to 80.610 , to carry into effect the powers and purposes of the authority.
  2. Within its area of operation, to prepare, carry out, acquire, lease and operate housing; to provide for the construction, reconstruction, improvement, alteration or repair of any housing project or any part thereof.
  3. To arrange or contract for the furnishing by any person or agency, public or private, of services, privileges, works, or facilities for, or in connection with, a housing development or the occupants thereof; and (notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in KRS 80.320 to 80.610 or in any other provision of law) to include in any contract let in connection with a development, stipulations requiring that the contractor and any subcontractors comply with requirements as to minimum wages and maximum hours of labor, and comply with any conditions which the federal government may have attached to its financial aid of the project.
  4. To lease or rent any dwellings, houses, accommodations, lands, buildings, structures or facilities embraced in any housing project and (subject to the limitations contained in KRS 80.320 to 80.610 ) to establish and revise the rents or charges therefor; to own, hold, and improve real or personal property; to purchase, lease, obtain options upon, acquire by gift, grant, bequest, devise, or otherwise any real or personal property or any interest therein; to acquire by the exercise of the power of eminent domain or condemnation any real property; to sell, lease, exchange, transfer, assign, pledge or dispose of any real or personal property or any interest therein; to insure or provide for the insurance of any real or personal property or operations of the authority against any risks or hazards.
  5. To invest any funds held in reserves or sinking funds, or any funds not required for immediate disbursement, in property or securities in which savings banks may legally invest funds subject to their control; to purchase its bonds at a price not more than the principal amount thereof and accrued interest, all bonds so purchased to be canceled.
  6. To exercise all or any part or combination of powers herein granted.

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 70, § 20; 1984, ch. 361, § 32, effective July 13, 1984.

Opinions of Attorney General.

Where a county housing authority was properly created by order of the fiscal court, the authority would have continued legal existence as a corporate public body capable of exercising the powers of such an authority, and the mere fact that the authority has had no program to effectuate since its creation does not give it a legal death. OAG 76-209 .

Since a county housing authority is a separate governmental entity and not part of a county itself, it is not exempted under KRS 337.010(3)(e) and is required to pay the prevailing wage; further, this section still requires the payment of minimum wages in contracts. OAG 82-560 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Investments authorized for banks, KRS 286.3-100 to 286.3-115 , 386.030 .

80.510. Power to provide housing for farmers of low income.

County housing authorities, city-county housing authorities, and regional housing authorities are specifically empowered and authorized to borrow money, accept grants and exercise their powers to provide housing for farmers of low income. In connection with such projects, any such housing authority may enter into such leases or purchase agreements, accept such conveyances and rent or sell dwellings forming part of such projects to or for farmers of low income, as such housing authority deems necessary in order to assure the achievement of the objectives of KRS 80.320 to 80.610 . Such leases, agreements or conveyances may include such covenants as the housing authority deems appropriate regarding such dwellings and the tracts of land described in any such instrument, which covenants shall be deemed to run with the land where the housing authority deems it necessary and the parties to such instrument so stipulate. Nothing in this section shall limit any other powers of any housing authority.

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 70, § 22; 1970, ch. 44, § 5; 1984, ch. 361, § 33, effective July 13, 1984.

80.520. “Farmers of low income” defined.

“Farmers of low income,” as used in KRS 80.510 and 80.530 , shall mean persons or families who at the time of their admission to occupancy in a dwelling of a housing authority:

  1. Live under unsafe or unsanitary housing conditions;
  2. Derive their principal income from operating or working upon a farm; and
  3. Had an aggregate average annual net income for the three (3) years preceding their admission that was less than the amount determined by the housing authority to be necessary, within its area of operation, to enable them, without financial assistance, to obtain decent, safe and sanitary housing, without overcrowding.

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 70, § 22.

80.530. Rentals and tenant selection — Restrictions.

Except with regard to housing for farmers of low income, a housing authority shall be subject to the same limitations and restrictions on rentals and tenant selection which are applicable to housing authorities created for cities under KRS 80.010 to 80.250 .

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 70, § 23.

Compiler’s Notes.

KRS 80.100 , 80.210 and 80.220 , contained in the reference to KRS 80.010 to 80.250 , have been repealed.

80.540. Power of condemnation — Procedure.

An authority shall have the right to acquire by condemnation any real property which it may deem necessary for its purposes under KRS 80.320 to 80.610 after the adoption by it of a resolution declaring that the acquisition of the real property described therein is necessary for such purposes. Proceedings for such condemnation shall be in accordance with the Eminent Domain Act of Kentucky and shall be conducted in the name of the authority by the attorney designated by the authority, and the judgment of the court shall vest title in fee simple to the property condemned in the authority.

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 70, § 24; 1958, ch. 160, § 1; 1976, ch. 140, § 28; 1984, ch. 361, § 34, effective July 13, 1984.

Compiler’s Notes.

The Eminent Domain Act of Kentucky, referred to herein, is compiled as KRS 416.540 to 416.680 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Condemnation for road purposes by fiscal courts, KRS 416.110 .

80.550. Issuance of bonds.

  1. An authority shall have power to issue bonds from time to time in its discretion, for any of its corporate purposes. An authority shall also have power to issue refunding bonds for the purpose of paying or retiring bonds previously issued by it.
  2. An authority may issue such types of bonds as it may determine, including (without limiting the generality of the foregoing) bonds on which the principal and interest are payable:
    1. Exclusively from the income and revenues of the housing project financed with the proceeds of such bonds;
    2. Exclusively from the income and revenues of certain designated housing developments whether or not they are financed in whole or in part with the proceeds of such bonds; or
    3. From its revenues generally.
  3. Any such bonds may be additionally secured by a pledge of any grant or contributions from the federal government or other source, or a pledge of any income or revenues of the authority, or a mortgage of any housing project, projects or other property of the authority.
  4. In connection with the issuance of bonds or the incurring of obligations under leases and in order to secure the payment of such bonds or obligations, a housing authority (including any housing authority created pursuant to KRS 80.010 to 80.250 ), in addition to its other powers, shall have power to agree to sell a project or projects, and to make and enter into such covenants and conditions and to do any and all such acts and things as may be necessary or desirable in order to secure its bonds, or, in the discretion of said authority, as will tend to make the bonds more marketable.
  5. In connection with the issuance of bonds or the incurring of other obligations, a regional housing authority may covenant as to limitations on its right to adopt resolutions relating to the increase or decrease of its area of operation.

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 70, § 25; 1984, ch. 361, § 35, effective July 13, 1984.

Compiler’s Notes.

KRS 80.100 , 80.210 and 80.220 , contained in the reference to KRS 80.010 to 80.250 in subdivision (4), have been repealed.

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Governmental unit may issue revenue bonds for any public project, KRS 58.010 to 58.120 .

Investments in housing bonds authorized, KRS 386.020 to 386.050 .

80.560. No personal or governmental liability on bonds — Tax exemption.

Neither the members nor any person executing the bonds shall be liable personally on the bonds by reason of the issuance thereof. The bonds and other obligations of an authority (and such bonds and obligations shall so state on their face) shall not be a debt of the city, the county, the Commonwealth or any political subdivision thereof and neither the city or the county, nor the Commonwealth or any political subdivision thereof shall be liable thereon, nor in any event shall such bonds or obligations be payable out of any funds or properties other than those of the authority. The bonds shall not constitute an indebtedness within the meaning of any constitutional or statutory debt limitation or restriction. Bonds of an authority are declared to be issued for an essential public and governmental purpose and to be public instrumentalities and, together with interest thereon and income therefrom, shall be exempt from taxes.

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 70, § 26.

Opinions of Attorney General.

Counties which create a regional housing authority are not responsible for the debts incurred by the regional housing authority. OAG 79-324 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Whiteside and Moss, Federal-State Income Tax Relationships — Conformity of Kentucky’s Personal Income Tax With The Federal Model, 61 Ky. L.J. 464 (1973).

80.570. Form of bonds — Sale — Negotiability — Presumption of validity.

  1. Bonds of an authority shall be authorized by its resolution and may be issued in one (1) or more series and shall bear a date or dates, mature at a time or times, bear interest at a rate or rates or method of determining rates, be in a denomination or denominations, be in a form, either coupon or registered, carry conversion or registration privileges, have a rank or priority, be executed in a manner, be payable in a medium of payment, at the place or places, and be subject to the terms of redemption (with or without premium) as the resolution, its trust indenture, or mortgage may provide.
  2. The bonds may be sold at public or private sale.
  3. In case any of the members or officers of the authority whose signatures appear on any bonds or coupons shall cease to be members or officers before the delivery of the bonds, their signatures shall, nevertheless, be valid and sufficient for all purposes, the same as if they had remained in office until the delivery. Any bonds issued pursuant to KRS 80.320 to 80.610 shall be fully negotiable.
  4. In any action or proceeding involving the validity or enforceability of any bond of an authority or its security, any bond reciting in substance that it has been issued by the authority to aid in financing a housing project to provide dwelling accommodations for persons of low income shall be conclusively deemed to have been issued for a housing development of that character and the project shall be conclusively deemed to have been planned, located, and constructed in accordance with the purposes and provisions of KRS 80.320 to 80.610 .

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 70, § 27; 1968, ch. 110, § 8; 1984, ch. 361, § 36, effective July 13, 1984; 1996, ch. 274, § 16, effective July 15, 1996.

80.580. Extension of operations of city authority to other cities.

In addition to its other powers, a housing authority created for a city pursuant to KRS 80.010 to 80.250 may exercise any or all of its powers within the territorial boundaries of any other city for the purpose of planning, undertaking, financing, constructing and operating a housing project or projects within the other city, if a resolution has been adopted by the governing body of the other city in which such authority is to exercise its powers and by the housing authority of the other city (if one has been theretofore created for such other city) declaring (upon findings prescribed in KRS 80.380 ) that there is a need for the housing authority of the aforesaid city to exercise its powers within the other city. The governing body of the other city shall not adopt a resolution pursuant to this section unless a public hearing has first been held. The clerk of such city shall give notice of the public hearing by publication pursuant to KRS Chapter 424. Upon the date fixed for such public hearing an opportunity to be heard shall be granted to all residents of such city and to all other interested persons.

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 70, § 28; 1966, ch. 239, § 34.

Compiler’s Notes.

KRS 80.100 , 80.210 and 80.220 , contained in the reference to KRS 80.010 to 80.250 , have been repealed.

Opinions of Attorney General.

A city housing agency may not operate a section 8 existing housing program (42 USCS § 1437f) within the boundaries of another city. OAG 80-55 .

This section is not designed to accommodate the distributions of the rent money program, since the statute is framed around actual “housing projects,” not owned by private persons. OAG 80-55 .

80.590. Cooperation between authorities.

Any two or more authorities (including any housing authority created under KRS 80.010 to 80.250 ) may join or cooperate with one another in the exercise, either jointly or otherwise, of any or all of their powers for the purpose of financing (including the issuance of bonds, notes or other obligations and giving security therefor), planning, undertaking, owning, constructing, operating or contracting with respect to housing located within the area of operation of any one or more of said authorities. For such purpose an authority may by resolution prescribe and authorize any other housing authority or authorities, so joining or cooperating with it, to act on its behalf with respect to any or all of such powers. Any authorities joining or cooperating with one another may by resolutions appoint from among the members of such authorities an executive committee with full power to act on behalf of such authorities with respect to any or all of their powers, as prescribed by resolutions of such authorities.

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 70, § 29; 1984, ch. 361, § 37, effective July 13, 1984.

Compiler’s Notes.

KRS 80.100 , 80.210 and 80.220 , contained in the reference to KRS 80.010 to 80.250 , have been repealed.

Opinions of Attorney General.

A city housing agency may not operate a section 8 existing housing program (42 USCS § 1437f) within the boundaries of another city. OAG 80-55 .

80.600. Acceptance of federal aid.

In addition to the powers conferred upon an authority by other provisions of KRS 80.320 to 80.610 , an authority is empowered to borrow money or accept contributions, grants or other financial assistance from the federal government for or in aid of any housing, to take over or lease or manage any housing project or undertaking constructed or owned by the federal government, and to these ends, to comply with such conditions and enter into such mortgages, trust indentures, leases or agreements as may be necessary, convenient or desirable. It is the purpose and intent of KRS 80.320 to 80.610 to authorize every housing authority to do any and all things necessary or desirable to secure the financial aid or cooperation of the federal government in the undertaking, construction, maintenance or operation of any housing project by such authority.

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 70, § 30; 1984, ch. 361, § 38, effective July 13, 1984.

80.610. Agreement to sell housing as security for federal aid.

In any contract or amendatory or superseding contract for a loan and annual contributions heretofore or hereafter entered into between a housing authority (including any housing authority created under KRS 80.010 to 80.250 ) and the federal government with respect to any housing undertaken by said housing authority, any such housing authority is authorized to make such covenants (including covenants with holders of obligations of said authority issued for purposes of the housing project involved), and to confer upon the federal government such rights and remedies, as said housing authority deems necessary to assure the fulfillment of the purposes for which the housing was undertaken. In any such contract, the housing authority may, notwithstanding any other provisions of law, agree to sell and convey the housing (including all lands appertaining thereto) to which such contract relates to the federal government upon the occurrence of such conditions, or upon such defaults on obligations for which any of the annual contributions provided in said contract are pledged, as may be prescribed in such contract, and at a price (which may include the assumption by the federal government of the payment, when due, of the principal of and interest on outstanding obligations of the housing authority issued for purposes of the housing project involved) determined as prescribed therein and upon such other terms and conditions as are therein provided. Any such housing authority is hereby authorized to enter into such supplementary contracts, and to execute such conveyances, as may be necessary to carry out the provisions hereof. Notwithstanding any other provisions of law, any contracts or supplementary contracts or conveyances made or executed pursuant to the provisions of this section shall not be or constitute a mortgage within the meaning or for the purpose of any of the laws of this Commonwealth.

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 70, § 31; 1984, ch. 361, § 39, effective July 13, 1984.

Compiler’s Notes.

KRS 80.100 , 80.210 and 80.220 , contained in the reference to KRS 80.010 to 80.250 , have been repealed.

Repair, Closing or Demolition of Unfit Structures by Cities

80.620. Definitions and construction. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 73, § 1; 1970, ch. 138, § 1; 1970, ch. 183, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1978, ch. 118, § 19.

80.630. Powers of cities to repair, close or demolish unfit structures. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 73, § 2; 1970, ch. 138, § 2; 1970, ch. 183, § 2) was repealed by Acts 1978, ch. 118, § 19.

80.640. Ordinances or resolutions relating to unfit structures. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 73, § 3; 1970, ch. 138, § 3; 1970, ch. 183, § 3) was repealed by Acts 1978, ch. 118, § 19.

80.650. Petition alleging that structure is unfit — Complaint. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 73, § 4; 1970, ch. 138, § 4; 1970, ch. 183, § 4) was repealed by Acts 1978, ch. 118, § 19.

80.660. Issuance of order to repair, alter, remove or demolish. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 73, § 5; 1970, ch. 138, § 5) was repealed by Acts 1978, ch. 118, § 19.

80.670. Repair, closing or demolition by city when order not complied with — Lien for expense. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 73, § 6; 1970, ch. 138, § 6) was repealed by Acts 1978, ch. 118, § 19.

80.680. Conditions that warrant finding of unfitness. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 73, § 7; 1970, ch. 138, § 7; 1970, ch. 183, § 5) was repealed by Acts 1978, ch. 118, § 19.

80.685. Eviction of occupants of condemned structure. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (1970, ch. 138, § 12; 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 70) was repealed by Acts 1978, ch. 118, § 19.

80.690. Service of complaints and orders. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 73, § 8; 1966, ch. 171; 1966, ch. 239, § 35; 1970, ch. 138, § 8; 1970, ch. 183, § 6) was repealed by Acts 1978, ch. 118, § 19.

80.700. Injunction to restrain enforcement of order. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 73, § 9; 1970, ch. 138, § 9) was repealed by Acts 1978, ch. 118, § 19.

80.710. Power of city or county officers to investigate structures and obtain evidence — Employes. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 73, § 10; 1970, ch. 138, § 10; 1970, ch. 183, § 7) was repealed by Acts 1978, ch. 118, § 19.

80.720. Estimates of cost of enforcement — Appropriation. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 73, § 11; 1970, ch. 138, § 11; 1970, ch. 183, § 8) was repealed by Acts 1978, ch. 118, § 19.

Housing for Persons in National Defense Work

80.730. Definitions and construction. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 72, § 1; 1944, ch. 30, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 255, § 283.

80.740. Housing commission may provide for housing for persons engaged in National Defense activities. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 72, § 2; 1944, ch. 30, § 2) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 255, § 283.

80.750. Commissions have same powers as for other projects — Removal of restrictions. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 72, § 3) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 255, § 283.

80.760. Area in which powers may be exercised — Administration after National Defense Period ends. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 72, § 4) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 255, § 283.

80.770. Commission may cooperate with act for, or sell project to, Federal government. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 72, § 5) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 255, § 283.

80.780. Cooperation by public bodies. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 72, § 6) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 255, § 283.

80.790. Bonds are legal investments. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 72, § 7) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 255, § 283.

80.800. Power to provide defense housing is independent — Removal of restrictions. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1942 ch. 72, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 255, § 283.

Veteran’s Housing

80.801. Definitions. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 134, Art. I, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 255, § 283.

80.802. Cities authorized to establish and operate veterans’ housing projects and create commissions. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 134, Art. I, § 2) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 255, § 283.

80.803. Membership of commission. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 134, Art. I, § 3) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 255, § 283.

80.804. Qualifications and terms of members — Vacancies. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 134, Art. I, § 4) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 255, § 283.

80.805. Corporate powers — Rules and regulations — Officers. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 134, Art. I, § 5) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 255, § 283.

80.806. Compensation of members and officers. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 134, Art. I, § 6) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 255, § 283.

80.807. Employes. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 134, Art. I, § 7) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 255, § 283.

80.808. Member or employe not to be interested in project. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 134, Art. I, § 8) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 255, § 283.

80.809. Removal of member for incompetency, neglect, misfeasance or malfeasance. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 134, Art. I, § 9) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 255, § 283.

80.810. Plans — Location — Construction — Estimates — Contracts — Surveys. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 134, Art. I, § 10) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 255, § 283.

80.811. Commission not to bind itself beyond funds. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 134, Art. I, § 11) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 255, § 283.

80.812. Advertising for bids, when required. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 134, Art. I, § 12) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 255, § 283.

80.813. Power to acquire land or structures — Title. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 134, Art. I, § 13) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 255, § 283.

80.814. Condemnation. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 134, Art. I, § 14) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 255, § 283.

80.815. Management of project — Rentals — Rules and regulations — Penalties. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 134, Art. I, § 15) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 255, § 283.

80.816. Project not to be operated for profit. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 134, Art. I, § 16) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 255, § 283.

80.817. Rental to veterans — Selection of tenants. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 134, Art. I, § 17) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 255, § 283.

80.818. Revenue bonds. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 134, Art. I, § 18) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 255, § 283.

80.819. Application of rents. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 134, Art. I, § 19) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 255, § 283.

80.820. Method by which city may aid project. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 134, Art. I, § 20) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 255, § 283.

80.821. City or county may lend or donate money to commission. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 134, Art. I, § 21) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 255, § 283.

County, Regional and Consolidated Veterans’ Housing Commission

80.822. Definitions. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 134, Art. II, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 255, § 283.

80.823. Creation of county or regional commission for veterans’ housing. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 134, Art. II, § 2) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 255, § 283.

80.824. Area of operation of county and regional commissions — When may embrace city. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 134, Art. II, § 3) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 255, § 283.

80.825. Increase of area of regional commission. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 134, Art. II, § 4) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 255, § 283.

80.826. Decrease of area of regional commission. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 134, Art. II, § 5) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 255, § 283.

80.827. Facts justifying exclusion of county from area of regional commission. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 134, Art. II, § 6) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 255, § 283.

80.828. Disposition of property in excluded county. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 134, Art. II, § 7) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 255, § 283.

80.829. Finding of need as prerequisite to creation of city, county or regional commission. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 134, Art. II, § 8) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 255, § 283.

80.830. Resolution creating commission — Sufficiency — Conclusiveness — Use in evidence. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 134, Art. II, § 9) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 255, § 283.

80.831. Appointment and term of county commission. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 134, Art. II, § 10) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 255, § 283.

80.832. Appointment and terms of regional commission — Vacancies. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 134, Art. II, § 11) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 255, § 283.

80.833. Certificate of appointment of commissioner — Filing — Use in evidence — Commissioners not to be county officers or employes — Term — Compensation. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 134, Art. II, § 12) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 255, § 283.

80.834. Quorum — Officers and employes — Legal services. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 134, Art. II, § 13) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 255, § 283.

80.835. Place of meetings — Residents of area eligible as commissioners. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 134, Art. II, § 14) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 255, § 283.

80.836. Commissioners and employes not to be interested in projects. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 134, Art. II, § 15) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 255, § 283.

80.837. Removal of commissioner for cause. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 134, Art. II, § 16) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 255, § 283.

80.838. Consolidated verterans’ housing commission for two or more cities. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 134, Art. II, § 17) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 255, § 283.

80.839. Corporate charter of commission — Powers. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 134, Art. II, § 18) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 255, § 283.

Miscellaneous Provisions As To Veterans’ Housing Commission

80.840. Obligations of veterans’ housing commissions eligible as security for deposits and investments. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 134, Art. III, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 255, § 283.

80.841. Cooperation with, or acting as agent for Federal Government. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 134, Art. III, § 2, para. 1) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 255, § 283.

80.842. Supplemental nature of veterans’ housing laws. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 134, Art. III, § 2, para. 2) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 255, § 283.

CHAPTER 81 City Classification, Boundaries, and Alternative Method of Consolidating Governmental Services

Classification

81.005. Classification of cities.

  1. Cities shall be organized into two (2) classes based on the form of their respective government. The two (2) classes of cities shall be:
    1. First class, which shall include cities organized and operating under the mayor-alderman plan of government in accordance with KRS Chapter 83; and
    2. Home rule class, which shall include any city government organized and operating under the following forms of government:
      1. City manager plan of government in accordance with KRS 83A.150 ;
      2. Mayor-council plan of government in accordance with KRS 83A.130 ; or
      3. Commission plan of government in accordance with KRS 83A.140 .
  2. Cities incorporated before January 1, 2015, shall be classified in accordance with the classes set out in subsection (1) of this section on January 1, 2015.
  3. When a city is incorporated on or after January 1, 2015, that city’s initial classification shall be the form of government designated by the court upon incorporation in accordance with KRS 81.060 .
  4. A city shall be deemed to be reclassified to the class designated under subsection (2) of this section upon the effective date of a change in the form of government pursuant to KRS 83A.160 .
  5. When a city changes class, it shall thereafter be governed by the laws relating to the class to which it is assigned, but the change from one (1) class to another shall not affect any ordinance previously enacted by the city, except that any ordinance in conflict with the laws relating to cities of the class to which the city is assigned shall be repealed to the extent the ordinance so conflicts.
  6. A city that is reclassified shall provide the Secretary of State written notice of the reclassification, including the effective date of the reclassification no later than thirty (30) days after the effective date of the reclassification pursuant to KRS 83A.160 .
  7. In order to update the record of incorporation of cities in the Secretary of State’s office, every city operating as a public corporation and a unit of local government shall file with the Secretary of State before January 1, 2015, a document listing the name of the city, the year of its incorporation, form of government, and the classification assigned the city by this section. If a city fails to comply with this subsection, it shall be barred from receiving state moneys until such time as the city complies.

History. Enact. Acts 2014, ch. 92, § 1, effective January 1, 2015; 2019 ch. 44, § 10, effective June 27, 2019.

81.006. Certification of city’s population if different than shown on most recent federal decennial census.

  1. If the General Assembly establishes a population requirement for cities and bases that population requirement upon the most recent federal decennial census, a city may file a petition with the circuit clerk of the county in which the city, or the largest part of the city, is contained, if the city is in more than one (1) county, and, as a consequence, more than one (1) judicial circuit, to certify the city’s population at a number different than shown by the most recent federal decennial census.
  2. The petition shall be presented in the form of a resolution passed by the city legislative body and shall contain:
    1. An accurate map of the city;
    2. An affidavit certifying new growth of the city that may be through any of the following:
      1. Annexation since the most recent federal decennial census;
      2. Property valuation records;
      3. Population counts conducted by the city, or by a person contracted with the city;
      4. Census estimates of the United States Bureau of Census; and
      5. Any other data that the city may provide to certify the additional growth of the city since the most recent federal decennial census.
  3. The petition shall be docketed for hearing not less than sixty (60) days from the date of filing the petition. Notice of the filing of the petition and of its object shall be given by publication pursuant to KRS Chapter 424.
  4. At the hearing, the court shall, if the proper notice has been given and publication made and no defense is interposed, enter a judgment declaring the city’s population as requested by the petition filed pursuant to this section, if the court finds that the information provided pursuant to subsection (2) of this section is accurate.
  5. Defense may be made to the petition by any resident of the city and, if so, the court shall hear and determine the same, and render a judgment either declaring the city’s population as requested by the petition, or by refusing to declare the city’s population as requested by the petition. If the court refuses to declare the city’s population as requested by the petition, then the population as determined by the most recent federal decennial census shall remain effective for determining the city’s population pursuant to the requirements in state law. If the court finds in favor of the petitioners, the court shall in the judgment direct the clerk of the court wherein the judgment is entered to, not later than ten (10) days thereafter, certify a copy thereof to the county clerk who shall properly index and file the judgment as a permanent record in his office.
  6. A judgment of the court of the city’s population shall be used to determine the city’s population for any population requirements established by the General Assembly wherein the most recent federal decennial census is used to measure the population of a city.
  7. At the time of the federal decennial census next following any judgment of the court finding the city’s population to be different than that of the federal decennial census, the judgment shall expire and that population determination of the most recent federal decennial census shall be used to determine the population for any population requirements established by the General Assembly until such time a city petitions the court for a determination of population under the provisions of this section.

History. Enact. Acts 2014, ch. 92, § 2, effective January 1, 2015.

81.010. Classification of cities. [Repealed.]

HISTORY: 2741, 2742: amend. Acts 1942, ch. 177, § 1; 1944, chs. 57, 116; 1946, chs. 9, 42, § 1; 1948, chs. 13, 215; 1950, chs. 14, 19, 37, 40, 46, 49, 61, 80, 82, 83, 84, 100, 114, 116, 135, 136, 144, 148, 149; 1952, chs. 10, 39, 66, 81, 95, 102, 108, 205, 217, 229; 1954, chs. 6, 19, 70, 72, 127, 184, 228; 1956, chs. 6, 7, 40, 42, 70, 92, 111, 127; 1958, chs. 14, 16, 19, 30, 31, 32, 79, 84, 91; 1960, chs. 30, 50; 1962, chs. 4, 77, 128, 192, 287; 1964, chs. 1, 11, 29, 39, 44, 52, 54, 62, 64, 94, 198; 1966, chs. 14, 54, 56, 57, 58, 65, 86, 98, 101, 141, 169, 186, 197, 206; 1968, chs. 5, 6, 7, 9, 16, 20, 57, 86, 111; 1970, ch. 31, § 1; 1970, ch. 52, § 1; 1970, ch. 107, § 1; 1970, ch. 113, § 1; 1970, ch. 144, § 1; 1970, ch. 187, § 1; 1970, ch. 235, § 1; 1970, ch. 253, § 1; 1972, ch. 7, § 1; 1972, ch. 10, § 1; 1972, ch. 68, § 1; 1972, ch. 69, § 1; 1972, ch. 106, § 1; 1972, ch. 350, § 1; 1974, ch. 94, § 1; 1974, ch. 102, § 1; 1974, ch. 129; 1974, ch. 171; 1974, ch. 197, § 1; 1974, ch. 233, § 1; 1974, ch. 234, § 1; 1974, ch. 240, § 1; 1974, ch. 344, §§ 1, 2; 1976, ch. 26, § 1; 1976, ch. 40, § 1; 1976, ch. 131, § 1; 1976, ch. 156, § 1; 1976, ch. 325, § 1; 1976, ch. 370, § 1; 1978, ch. 64, § 1, effective June 17, 1978; 1978, ch. 73, § 1, effective June 17, 1978; 1978, ch. 89, effective June 17, 1978; 1978, ch. 191, § 1, effective June 17, 1978; 1978, ch. 252, § 1, effective June 17, 1978; 1978, ch. 319, § 1, effective June 17, 1978; 1978, ch. 353, effective June 17, 1978; 1978, ch. 377, § 1, effective June 17, 1978; 1978, ch. 393, effective June 17, 1978; 1978, ch. 397, effective June 17, 1978; 1980, ch. 195, effective July 15, 1980; 1980, ch. 272, § 1, effective July 15, 1980; 1980, ch. 274, § 1, effective July 15, 1980; 1980, ch. 281, § 1, effective July 15, 1980; 1980, ch. 389, effective July 15, 1980; 1982, ch. 60, effective July 15, 1982; 1982, ch. 62, effective July 15, 1982; 1982, ch. 66, effective July 15, 1982; 1982, ch. 134, effective July 15, 1982; 1982, ch. 143, effective July 15, 1982; 1982, ch. 152, effective July 15, 1982; 1984, ch. 10, § 1, effective July 13, 1984; 1984, ch. 33, § 1, effective July 13, 1984; 1984, ch. 34, § 1, effective July 13, 1984; 1984, ch. 111, § 50, effective July 13, 1984; 1984, ch. 219, § 1, effective July 13, 1984; 1984, ch. 249, § 1, effective July 13, 1984; 1984, ch. 259, §§ 1, 2, effective July 13, 1984; 1984, ch. 273, §§ 1, 2, effective July 13, 1984; 1984, ch. 416, § 21, effective July 13, 1984; 1986, ch. 138, § 1, effective July 15, 1986; 1986, ch. 227, § 1, effective July 15, 1986; 1986, ch. 275, § 1, effective July 15, 1986; 1986, ch. 411, §§ 1, 2, effective July 15, 1986; 1990, ch. 13, § 1, effective July 13, 1990; 1990, ch. 230, § 1, effective July 13, 1990; 1990, ch. 298, § 1, effective July 13, 1990; 1990, ch. 313, § 1, effective July 13, 1990; 1992, ch. 4, § 1, effective July 14, 1992; 1992, ch. 74, § 1, effective July 14, 1992; 1992, ch. 205, § 1, effective July 14, 1992; 1992, ch. 435, § 13, effective July 14, 1992; 1994, ch. 29, § 1, effective July 15, 1994; 1994, ch. 273, § 1, effective July 15, 1994; 1996, ch. 76, § 1, effective July 15, 1996; 1998, ch. 5, § 1, effective July 15, 1998; 1998, ch. 354, § 1, effective July 15, 1998; 2000, ch. 24, § 1, effective July 14, 2000; 2000, ch. 36, § 1, effective July 14, 2000; 2000, ch. 119, § 1, effective July 14, 2000; 2000, ch. 159, § 1, effective July 14, 2000; 2000, ch. 175, § 1, effective July 14, 2000; 2000, ch. 181, § 1, effective July 14, 2000; 2000, ch. 231, §§ 1, 2, effective July 14, 2000; 2000, ch. 272, § 1, effective July 14, 2000; 2000, ch. 531, §§ 1-3, effective July 14, 2000; 2001, ch. 111, § 1, effective June 21, 2001; 2001, ch. 152, § 1, effective June 21, 2001; 2001, ch. 157, § 1, effective June 21, 2001; 2002, ch. 22, § 1, effective July 15, 2002; 2002, ch. 84, § 1, effective July 15, 2002; 2003, ch. 34, § 1, effective June 24, 2003; 2005, ch. 8, § 1, effective June 20, 2005; 2005, ch. 42, § 1 and 2, effective June 20, 2005; 2005, ch. 77, § 1, effective June 20, 2005; 2006, ch. 100, § 1, effective March 30, 2006; 2007, ch. 98, § 1, effective June 26, 2007; 2008, ch. 12, § 1, effective July 15, 2008; 2008, ch. 115, § 1, effective July 15, 2008; 2010, ch. 131, § 1, effective July 15, 2010; 2011, ch. 14, § 1, effective June 8, 2011; 2011, ch. 49, §§ 1-3, effective June 8, 2011; 2011, ch. 89, §§ 1-4, effective June 8, 2011; 2012, ch. 9, § 1, effective July 12, 2012; 2013, ch. 54, § 1, effective June 25, 2013; 2013, ch. 91, §§ 1-4, effective June 25, 2013; 2014, ch. 71, § 5, effective July 15, 2014; Repealed, Acts 2014, ch. 92, § 314, effective January 1, 2015.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(1/1/2015). 2014 Ky. Acts ch. 92, sec. 314, has repealed this statute effective January 1, 2015.

(7/15/2014). This statute was amended by 2014 Ky. Acts chs. 71 and 98, which do not appear to be in conflict and have been codified together.

(7/15/2014). 2014 Ky. Acts ch. 92, sec. 314, has repealed this statute effective January 1, 2015.

(7/14/92; revised 7/15/94, 7/15/96, 7/15/98, 7/14/2000, 6/21/2001, 7/15/2002, 6/24/2003, 6/20/2005, 3/30/2006, 6/26/2007, 7/15/2008, 7/15/2010, 6/8/2011, 7/12/2012, and 6/25/2013). Pursuant to 1990 Ky. Acts ch. 425, sec. 5, the Reviser of Statutes has modified the text of this statute to reflect reclassifications enacted by the General Assembly in 1992 Ky. Acts ch. 4, sec. 1; ch. 74, sec. 1; ch. 205, sec. 1; and ch. 435, sec. 13; in 1994 Ky. Acts ch. 29, sec. 1; and ch. 273, sec. 1; in 1996 Ky. Acts, ch. 76, sec. 1; in 1998 Ky. Acts ch. 5, sec. 1; and ch. 354, sec. 1; in 2000 Ky. Acts ch. 24, sec. 1; ch. 36, sec. 1; ch. 119, sec. 1; ch. 159, sec. 1; ch. 175, sec. 1; ch. 181, sec. 1; ch. 231, secs. 1 and 2; ch. 272, sec. 1; and ch. 531, secs. 1, 2, and 3; in 2001 Ky. Acts ch. 111, sec. 1; ch. 152, sec. 1; and ch. 157, sec. 1; in 2002 Ky. Acts ch. 22, sec. 1; and ch. 84, sec. 1; in 2003 Ky. Acts ch. 34, sec. 1; in 2005 Ky. Acts ch. 8, sec. 1; ch. 42, secs. 1 and 2; and ch. 77, sec. 1; in 2006 Ky. Acts ch. 100, sec. 1; in 2007 Ky. Acts ch. 98, sec. 1; in 2008 Ky. Acts ch. 12, sec. 1; and ch. 115, sec. 1; in 2010 Ky. Acts ch. 131, sec. 1; in 2011 Ky. Acts ch. 14, sec. 1; ch. 49, secs. 1, 2, and 3; and ch. 89, secs. 1, 2, 3, and 4; in 2012 Ky. Acts ch. 9, sec. 1; and in 2013 Ky. Acts ch. 54, sec. 1; ch. 91, secs. 1, 2, 3, and 4; and in 2014 Ky. Acts ch. 71, sec. 5; and ch. 98, secs. 1 to 9.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. In General.

Although law classified “Milldale, Kenton County,” as town of fifth class, it did not make such place a town, where the place had been incorporated in 1884 as “South Covington District” and was a civil district and not a town. Stephens v. Felton, 99 Ky. 395 , 35 S.W. 1116, 18 Ky. L. Rptr. 248 , 1896 Ky. LEXIS 92 (Ky. Ct. App. 1896).

A city incorporated prior to adoption of present constitution and which became a city of the sixth class by virtue of this section, remained such, unless in some manner it abandoned or forfeited its corporate capacity. Sizemore v. Commonwealth, 285 Ky. 142 , 147 S.W.2d 56, 1941 Ky. LEXIS 347 ( Ky. 1941 ).

2. Constitutionality.

Several laws that amended this section were held constitutional as they did not violate Ky. Const., § 51. London v. Brown, 183 Ky. 63 , 208 S.W. 317, 1919 Ky. LEXIS 436 ( Ky. 1919 ); Elizabethtown v. Lanz, 209 Ky. 815 , 273 S.W. 500, 1925 Ky. LEXIS 609 ( Ky. 1925 ).

Acts 1946, ch. 42 which amended this section and KRS 81.030 to 81.070 (KRS 81.030 , 81.040 , 81.070 now repealed) was held unconstitutional because the title violated Ky. Const., § 51. Engle v. Bonnie, 305 Ky. 850 , 204 S.W.2d 963, 1947 Ky. LEXIS 865 ( Ky. 1947 ).

3. Construction.

Legislature in originally enacting this section was dealing with places which had been incorporated, and did not intend to create towns that had no prior existence as such. Stephens v. Felton, 99 Ky. 395 , 35 S.W. 1116, 18 Ky. L. Rptr. 248 , 1896 Ky. LEXIS 92 (Ky. Ct. App. 1896).

4. Notice of Classification.

A city is chargeable with notice of class to which by act of the legislature it has been assigned. Hoerth v. Sturgis, 221 Ky. 835 , 299 S.W. 1074, 1927 Ky. LEXIS 841 ( Ky. 1927 ).

By remaining ignorant of class to which it belongs, city does not become entitled to operate in any class it desires. Hoerth v. Sturgis, 221 Ky. 835 , 299 S.W. 1074, 1927 Ky. LEXIS 841 ( Ky. 1927 ).

5. Existence Before Classification.

Taxing district of Highlands, Campbell County, having been incorporated as such in 1867, could not by a later law assigning cities and towns to classes, be made city of fourth class, since cities and towns must have legal existence as such before legislature can assign them to classes. Albershart v. Donaldson, 149 Ky. 510 , 149 S.W. 873, 1912 Ky. LEXIS 647 ( Ky. 1912 ).

6. Invalid Classification.

Law converting prior existing district, which possessed many powers of a municipal corporation, into city of fifth class, was invalid, notwithstanding it was not assailed until more than two years after city government was organized. Hurley v. Motz, 151 Ky. 451 , 152 S.W. 248, 1913 Ky. LEXIS 495 ( Ky. 1913 ).

7. Omission of Name.

Since amending this section related to classification of all cities and towns, omission of name of city or town from every other class had the effect of assigning it to the sixth class. London v. Brown, 183 Ky. 63 , 208 S.W. 317, 1919 Ky. LEXIS 436 ( Ky. 1919 ).

Town of London not being named among municipalities assigned to either of first five classes was intended by act amending this section to be placed in sixth class among all other unnamed towns, notwithstanding legislature by earlier law had made London a city of fourth class. London v. Brown, 183 Ky. 63 , 208 S.W. 317, 1919 Ky. LEXIS 436 ( Ky. 1919 ).

Where the legislature has not assigned a town to any particular class, if it is incorporated at all, it is presumed that it belongs in the sixth class. Elswick v. Commonwealth, 202 Ky. 703 , 261 S.W. 249, 1924 Ky. LEXIS 797 ( Ky. 1924 ).

8. Assignment to Proper Class.

Town which had been duly organized by Circuit Court did not lose status as sixth-class city by failure of legislature to assign it to proper class as required by Ky. Const., § 156 (now repealed). Commonwealth v. Rose, 105 Ky. 326 , 49 S.W. 29, 20 Ky. L. Rptr. 1220 , 1899 Ky. LEXIS 215 ( Ky. 1899 ).

9. Population.

Although population of town, which had been incorporated by legislature, subsequently became insufficient to authorize its organization into town, it retained its status until changed by legislature. Hill v. Anderson, 122 Ky. 87 , 90 S.W. 1071, 28 Ky. L. Rptr. 1032 , 1906 Ky. LEXIS 24 ( Ky. 1906 ).

City of Somerset was validly assigned to third class by provisions of law, as against contention that legislature did not have constitutional power to so assign it because it did not have necessary population for that class. Griffin v. Powell, 143 Ky. 276 , 136 S.W. 626, 1911 Ky. LEXIS 402 ( Ky. 1911 ).

10. Change of Class.

Legislature is vested with sole right to make transfer of city from one class to another, and hence court was unauthorized to adjudge that city which had been assigned to fourth class belonged to sixth class, regardless of population. Green v. Commonwealth, 95 Ky. 233 , 24 S.W. 610, 16 Ky. L. Rptr. 161 , 1894 Ky. LEXIS 4 ( Ky. 1894 ).

Ky. Const., § 156 (now repealed) vests in legislature exclusive right to classify cities and towns and to change assignment of a city or town from one class to another. London v. Brown, 183 Ky. 63 , 208 S.W. 317, 1919 Ky. LEXIS 436 ( Ky. 1919 ).

Since 1924 law amended and reenacted earlier classification of 1920 when Williamsburg was city of fifth class, result was to transfer Williamsburg from fourth class, where it had been placed by 1922 law back to fifth class. Nelson v. Board of Education, 215 Ky. 40 , 284 S.W. 386, 1926 Ky. LEXIS 649 ( Ky. 1926 ).

The 1968 Act (Acts 1968, ch. 5) reclassifying the City of Edgewood from a sixth to a fourth-class city did not vitiate the 1962 annexation ordinance of city attempting to annex Edgewood nor prevent the annexing city from going forward with the proposed annexation, for the legislative intent of said act was to do nothing more than carry out the mandate of Ky. Const., § 156 (now repealed) to make changes in classification as the population of the cities and towns increases or decreases and was not indicative of an intent to legislate the corporate limits of Edgewood, and even if it had been the intent of the legislature to set corporate limits of said city such intent would have been frustrated by Ky. Const., §§ 59 and 156 (§ 156 now repealed) prohibiting establishment of city boundaries by special and local laws. Covington v. Beck, 586 S.W.2d 284, 1979 Ky. App. LEXIS 453 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).

11. Specially Enacted Charters.

Ky. Const., §§ 156 (now repealed) and 166, and the general laws enacted under those sections for the classification, incorporation and government of cities, automatically repealed all specially enacted charters of cities. Mullins v. Wilson, 282 Ky. 316 , 138 S.W.2d 484, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 168 ( Ky. 1940 ).

12. Corporate Organization.

Town incorporated in 1876 retained status as such notwithstanding it had not kept up corporate organization and had lacked corporate authorities for many years, since, having been placed in sixth class, it remained there until changed by legislature. Hill v. Anderson, 122 Ky. 87 , 90 S.W. 1071, 28 Ky. L. Rptr. 1032 , 1906 Ky. LEXIS 24 ( Ky. 1906 ).

Cited:

North v. Russell, 427 U.S. 328, 96 S. Ct. 2709, 49 L. Ed. 2d 534, 1976 U.S. LEXIS 76 (1976); Cole v. Ridings, 271 Ky. 158 , 111 S.W.2d 605, 1937 Ky. LEXIS 209 ( Ky. 1937 ); Bailey v. Ravenna, 280 Ky. 21 , 132 S.W.2d 532, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 64 ( Ky. 1939 ); Engle v. Miller, 303 Ky. 731 , 199 S.W.2d 123, 1947 Ky. LEXIS 539 ( Ky. 1947 ); Pickard v. Jones, 243 S.W.2d 46, 1951 Ky. LEXIS 1117 ( Ky. 1951 ); St. Matthews v. Smith, 266 S.W.2d 347, 1954 Ky. LEXIS 819 ( Ky. 1954 ); Eline v. Lampe, 275 S.W.2d 64, 1955 Ky. LEXIS 347 ( Ky. 1955 ); Blackburn v. Pineville, 313 S.W.2d 860, 1958 Ky. LEXIS 277 ( Ky. 1958 ); Civil Service Com. v. Tankersley, 330 S.W.2d 392, 1959 Ky. LEXIS 187 ( Ky. 1959 ); Vincent v. Bowling Green, 349 S.W.2d 694, 1961 Ky. LEXIS 60 ( Ky. 1961 ); Riddle v. Howard, 357 S.W.2d 705, 1962 Ky. LEXIS 139 ( Ky. 1962 ); Mt. Vernon v. Banks, 380 S.W.2d 268, 1964 Ky. LEXIS 309 ( Ky. 1964 ); Griffin v. Paducah, 382 S.W.2d 402, 1964 Ky. LEXIS 348 ( Ky. 1964 ); Massey v. Franklin, 384 S.W.2d 505, 1964 Ky. LEXIS 105 (Ky. 1964); Tharp v. Urban Renewal & Community Development Agency, 389 S.W.2d 453, 1965 Ky. LEXIS 388 ( Ky. 1965 ); McIntosh v. Electric & Water Plant Board, 394 S.W.2d 471, 1965 Ky. LEXIS 186 ( Ky. 1965 ); Embry v. Caneyville, 397 S.W.2d 141, 1965 Ky. LEXIS 65 (Ky. 1965); Batten v. Hambley, 400 S.W.2d 683, 1966 Ky. LEXIS 448 ( Ky. 1966 ); Somerset v. Reid, 413 S.W.2d 611, 1967 Ky. LEXIS 395 ( Ky. 1967 ); Cole v. Commonwealth, 441 S.W.2d 160, 1969 Ky. LEXIS 306 ( Ky. 1969 ); Bowling Green v. Board of Education, 443 S.W.2d 243, 1969 Ky. LEXIS 244 ( Ky. 1969 ); McIntosh v. Electric & Water Plant Board, 394 S.W.2d 471, 1965 Ky. LEXIS 186 (Ky. 1965); Marks v. Board of Comm’rs, 504 S.W.2d 338, 1974 Ky. LEXIS 826 ( Ky. 1974 ); Wilson v. Jeffersontown, 511 S.W.2d 115, 1974 Ky. LEXIS 429 ( Ky. 1974 ); Corn v. Windy Hills, 528 S.W.2d 668, 1975 Ky. LEXIS 66 ( Ky. 1975 ); Powell v. Campbellsburg, 563 S.W.2d 488, 1978 Ky. App. LEXIS 483 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978); American Fidelity Bank & Trust Co. v. First Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 510 F. Supp. 1122, 1981 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17977 (E.D. Ky. 1981 ); Covington v. Tranter, 673 S.W.2d 744, 1984 Ky. App. LEXIS 527 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984); Merritt v. Campbellsville, 678 S.W.2d 788, 1984 Ky. App. LEXIS 625 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Where the legislature has classified a city as a city of the third class, the classification will not be disturbed by the courts. OAG 65-213 .

A city classification can only be changed by an act of the legislature. OAG 66-115 .

Sixth-class cities are not named in this statute and therefore it would appear possible that the name of a city of this class could be changed by a petition in the Circuit Court by essentially the same procedure as required for incorporation. OAG 68-608 .

Bellevue, a fourth-class city, does not possess statutory authority to contribute the city’s revenue sharing money to school construction or other school purposes and, while KRS 67.083 is the specific source of authority of a county to spend its revenue sharing money for school construction, there is no comparable authority for a fourth-class city. OAG 73-269 .

The terms “city” and “town” mean the same thing under Kentucky law so that incorporation as a town constitutes a city of the sixth class and, unless said town has been dissolved by statutory procedure, such town is entitled to issue industrial revenue bonds. OAG 73-793 .

The provisions of Ky. Const., § 156 (now repealed) are mandatory and require that all cities created within the commonwealth be classified in one of the six classes mentioned therein depending on the population attained by the city within the minimum and maximum population fixed therein for each class; thus, any attempt by the legislature to add a classification of cities such as one comprising both urban and rural areas within certain minimum and maximum population densities not recognized in the Constitution would violate Ky. Const., § 156 (now repealed) and would be invalid. OAG 84-350 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Assessments by annexing civil division, KRS 133.070 .

Classification of cities, Ky. Const., § 156a.

Legal notices, KRS Chapter 424.

Liability of city upon annexation of a sanitary district, KRS 220.530 .

Kentucky Law Journal.

Lassiter, Sufficiency of the Title to a Legislative Act — Engle v. Bonnie, 305 Ky. 850 , 204 S.W.2d 963, 1947 Ky. LEXIS 865 , 37 Ky. L.J. 192 (1949).

81.015. Areas designated “unincorporated urban places”.

  1. The Fairdale area of Jefferson County is an “unincorporated urban place” within the meaning of KRS 177.366 and 177.369 . The metes and bounds of the Fairdale area are as follows: Beginning at a point approximately 1,000 feet west of Smith Road on the Jefferson - Bullitt County line; running thence northwardly along a line behind improvements facing Smith Road, Top Hill Road, and Jefferson Hill Road 12,000 feet more or less to Lonesome Hollow Road; thence northwestwardly with Lonesome Hollow road 6,000 feet more or less to Blevins Gap Road; thence northeastwardly along Blevins Gap Road 2,000 feet more or less to Greyling Drive; thence northeastwardly along Greyling Drive 5,500 feet more or less to Manslick Road; thence northwardly along Manslick Road 2,000 feet more or less to the southeast right-of-way line of the Louisville, Henderson & Saint Louis Railroad; thence northeastwardly along said railroad 16,250 feet more or less to the west right-of-way line of the Louisville & Nashville Railroad; thence southwardly along the west right-of-way line of the Louisville & Nashville Railroad 4,000 feet more or less to the Outer Loop; thence eastwardly along the Outer Loop 10,250 feet more or less to Interstate 65; thence southwardly along Interstate 65 18,500 feet more or less to the Bullitt - Jefferson County line; thence westwardly with said county line 28,000 feet more or less to the beginning.
  2. The Parkers Lake area of McCreary County is an “unincorporated urban place” within the meaning of KRS 177.366 and 177.369 . The metes and bounds of the Parkers Lake area are as follows: Beginning point at U.S. 27; thence running westwardly to the South Fork River, of Cumberland; thence southeastwardly along the South Fork River, of Cumberland, to the end of Black Ridge Road; thence northeastwardly crossing U.S. 27, to Hwy. 90 and Vanover Ridge Road; thence northwestwardly to the beginning.
  3. The Whitley City area of McCreary County is an “unincorporated urban place” within the meaning of KRS 177.366 and 177.369 . The metes and bounds of the Whitley City area are as follows: Beginning at U.S. 27 at the U.S. Forest Service Ranger Station; thence west on Hwy 1651 to the South Fork River, of Cumberland, Alum Ford; thence south on the South Fork River, of Cumberland to Lick Creek; thence southeastwardly on Lick Creek Road crossing Hwy 1651; thence southeastwardly to Laurel Creek Bridge; thence westwardly on Hwy 478; thence southwestwardly to Jenny’s Branch; thence southwestwardly to Hatfield Subdivision Road; thence westwardly on Hatfield Subdivision Road; thence northwestwardly to the beginning.
  4. The Smithtown area of McCreary County is an “unincorporated urban place” within the meaning of KRS 177.366 and 177.369 . The metes and bounds of the Smithtown area are as follows: Beginning at the intersection of Hwys 92 and 1363; thence southeastwardly on the South Fork River, of Cumberland; thence east to Lick Creek Falls Road; thence southeastwardly to Hwy 701; thence westwardly to 92; thence westwardly on 92; thence southwestwardly to Barthell; thence north parallel of a creek to Yamacraw, to the beginning point.
  5. The Stearns area of McCreary County is an “unincorporated urban place” within the meaning of KRS 177.366 and 177.369 . The metes and bounds of the Stearns area are as follows: Beginning at U.S. 27; thence eastwardly to Laurel Bridge; thence southwestwardly on Laurel Creek to McCreary County Reservoir; thence northwestwardly on East Apple Tree to Hwy 92; thence westwardly on Hwy 92 to Hwy 701, to the beginning point.
  6. The Pine Knot area of McCreary County is an “unincorporated urban place” within the meaning of KRS 177.366 and 177.369 . The metes and bounds of the Pine Knot area are as follows: Beginning at U.S. 27 and Cal Hill Road to the Neal Road; thence northwardly on the Neal Road to Hwy 92; thence eastwardly on Hwy 92 to the West Road; thence northeastwardly on the West Road to the Smithy Road; thence southeastwardly on Smithy Road to Bethel Road; thence westwardly on the Bethel Road to Jackson Knob Road; thence northwestwardly to Meadows Grove Road; thence southwestwardly to the intersection of Hwy 27 and the Job Corps Road; thence westwardly on the Job Corps Road to Hwy 92; thence southwestwardly to Mud Cut Road; thence circling on Mud Cut Road to Hwy 92; thence eastwardly to Hwy 27, to the beginning point.

History. Enact. Acts 1978, ch. 372, § 1, effective June 17, 1978; 1988, ch. 327, § 4, effective July 15, 1988.

Opinions of Attorney General.

The provisions of this section (Acts 1978, ch. 372), enacted by the regular session of the 1978 Kentucky General Assembly, are applicable only to the Fairdale area of Jefferson County and purport to designate that specific area as an “unincorporated urban place” within the meaning of KRS 177.365 to 177.368 (KRS 177.367 , 177.368 now repealed), thereby bypassing the statutory procedure set forth in those provisions which are applicable to all other areas seeking such designation, and is probably unconstitutional as being in violation of Ky. Const., §§ 59(29) and 60. OAG 78-394 .

81.020. Terms of officers when city assigned to another class. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2741: amend. Acts 1942, ch. 177, § 2) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 115, § 4, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 81.026 .

81.025. Laws applicable to city established by order applicable until reassignment by General Assembly. [Repealed.]

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1980, ch. 115, § 1, effective July 15, 1980; Repealed, Acts 2014, ch. 92, § 314, effective January 1, 2015.

Compiler's Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1980, ch. 115, § 1, effective July 15, 1980) was repealed by Acts 2014, ch. 92, § 314, effective January 1, 2015.

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Bench & Bar.

Morris, The New Kentucky Municipal Law, Vol. 45, No. 3, July, 1981, Ky. Bench and Bar 24.

81.026. Effect of reclassification of city on existing ordinances and officers. [Repealed.]

History. Enact. Acts 1980, ch. 115, § 2, effective July 15, 1980; Repealed, Acts 2014, ch. 92, § 314, effective January 1, 2015.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

Law that attempted to authorize circuit courts to assign or transfer city from one class to another was unconstitutional, since that duty was conferred on legislature without power to delegate it to any tribunal. Jernigan v. Madisonville, 102 Ky. 313 , 43 S.W. 448, 19 Ky. L. Rptr. 1412 , 1897 Ky. LEXIS 112 ( Ky. 1897 ) (decided under prior law).

Although unconstitutional so far as it authorized Circuit Courts to assign or transfer city from one class to another, former law concerning reclassification was constitutional so far as it provided means for taking census for determining population. Jernigan v. Madisonville, 102 Ky. 313 , 43 S.W. 448, 19 Ky. L. Rptr. 1412 , 1897 Ky. LEXIS 112 ( Ky. 1897 ) (decided under prior law).

Former law which provided for the transfer of cities of third class to another class was valid to extent that it provided that after transfer city should be governed by laws applicable to class to which it was transferred, although it was unconstitutional to extent that it authorized court to make such transfer. Gilbert v. Paducah, 115 Ky. 160 , 72 S.W. 816, 24 Ky. L. Rptr. 1998 , 1903 Ky. LEXIS 87 ( Ky. 1903 ) (decided under prior law).

Although the part of former law providing for transfer of a city from third to second class by judgment of Circuit Court was unconstitutional, the remainder of said law was sufficient to constitute a “law previously enacted” within Ky. Const., § 156 (repealed), requiring such a law before transfer from one class to another. Gilbert v. Paducah, 115 Ky. 160 , 72 S.W. 816, 24 Ky. L. Rptr. 1998 , 1903 Ky. LEXIS 87 ( Ky. 1903 ) (decided under prior law).

2. Construction.

Former section governing effect of reclassification on city officers would be liberally construed to avoid conflicts during a city’s transitional period. Warren v. Blatt, 280 Ky. 185 , 132 S.W.2d 933, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 95 ( Ky. 1939 ); Somerset v. Caylor, 241 S.W.2d 990, 1951 Ky. LEXIS 1033 ( Ky. 1951 ) (decided under prior law).

3. Census.

Ky. Const., § 156 (repealed) recognizes that legislature may have other satisfactory information as to population than federal census, and authorizes city, through its council, to ascertain population. O’Bryan v. Owensboro, 113 Ky. 680 , 24 Ky. L. Rptr. 469 , 24 Ky. L. Rptr. 645 , 68 S.W. 858, 69 S.W. 800, 1902 Ky. LEXIS 92 ( Ky. 1902 ), overruled, Nelson County Fiscal Court v. McCrocklin, 175 Ky. 199 , 194 S.W. 323, 1917 Ky. LEXIS 316 ( Ky. 1917 ), overruled in part, Nelson County Fiscal Court v. McCrocklin, 175 Ky. 199 , 194 S.W. 323, 1917 Ky. LEXIS 316 ( Ky. 1917 ), reh’g denied, O’Bryan v. Owensboro, 113 Ky. 693 , 69 S.W. 800 (1902), overruled on other grounds, Nelson County Fiscal Court v. McCrocklin, 175 Ky. 199, 194 S.W. 323, 1917 Ky. LEXIS 316 (Ky. 1917) (decided under prior law).

There is no constitutional provision requiring that legislature, in transferring city from one class to another, shall have before it any census, whether taken by federal government or city authorities, although it may use either. Griffin v. Powell, 143 Ky. 276 , 136 S.W. 626, 1911 Ky. LEXIS 402 ( Ky. 1911 ) (decided under prior law).

Under provision of Ky. Const., § 156 (repealed) that in absence of other evidence legislature may resort to last census preceding law transferring city, it may exercise its discretion as to a manner of ascertaining population. Griffin v. Powell, 143 Ky. 276 , 136 S.W. 626, 1911 Ky. LEXIS 402 ( Ky. 1911 ) (decided under prior law).

4. Charter After Transfer.

After city is transferred to another class and takes its place therein, it remains same city as before transfer, only difference being that after transfer it is governed by different charter, which is, in effect, its constitution. Carroll v. Fullerton, 215 Ky. 558 , 286 S.W. 847, 1926 Ky. LEXIS 769 ( Ky. 1926 ), overruled, Ward v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 436 S.W.2d 794, 1968 Ky. LEXIS 189 ( Ky. 1968 ), overruled in part, Ward v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 436 S.W.2d 794, 1968 Ky. LEXIS 189 ( Ky. 1968 ), overruled on other grounds, Ward v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 436 S.W.2d 794, 1968 Ky. LEXIS 189 (Ky. 1968) (decided under prior law).

5. Contracts.

It is immaterial that contract between city and water company for water supply was made in name of “board of trustees,” after amendment to charter had changed corporate name to “board of councilmen,” where officers exercising powers theretofore vested in trustees did in fact enter into said contract after its ratification by voters. City of Harrodsburg v. Harrodsburg Water Co., 64 S.W. 658, 23 Ky. L. Rptr. 956 , 1901 Ky. LEXIS 438 (Ky. Ct. App. 1901) (decided under prior law).

6. De Facto City.

Where town was transferred by Circuit Court from sixth to fifth class and thereafter, as authorized in sixth but not in fifth-class cities, imposed license fee upon sellers of alcoholic beverages, and statute authorizing transfer was subsequently declared invalid, the license fee was not recoverable, since it was imposed by de facto city government. Providence v. Shackelford, 106 Ky. 378 , 50 S.W. 542, 20 Ky. L. Rptr. 1921 , 1899 Ky. LEXIS 49 ( Ky. 1899 ) (decided under prior law).

It was unnecessary to determine whether act changing city from fifth to fourth class was constitutional, where city had been operating for several years under charter of cities of fourth class, and hence, as to third parties, was de facto city of that class. Ball v. George M. Eady Co., 193 Ky. 813 , 237 S.W. 670, 1922 Ky. LEXIS 82 ( Ky. 1922 ) (decided under prior law).

7. Judgments.

Judgment recovered against city before its transfer to second class was binding upon city after transfer. Carroll v. Fullerton, 215 Ky. 558 , 286 S.W. 847, 1926 Ky. LEXIS 769 ( Ky. 1926 ), overruled, Ward v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 436 S.W.2d 794, 1968 Ky. LEXIS 189 ( Ky. 1968 ), overruled in part, Ward v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 436 S.W.2d 794, 1968 Ky. LEXIS 189 ( Ky. 1968 ), overruled on other grounds, Ward v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 436 S.W.2d 794, 1968 Ky. LEXIS 189 (Ky. 1968) (decided under prior law).

8. Ordinance After Transfer.

Ordinance passed by “trustees” of town which had been transferred to fifth-class city, enacted after transfer became effective, was valid, since trustees of old town became city council of city and were legally constituted legislative body after transfer became effective. Bybee v. Smith, 57 S.W. 789, 22 Ky. L. Rptr. 467 , 1900 Ky. LEXIS 623 (Ky. Ct. App. 1900) (decided under prior law).

9. School System.

After city became fifth-class city, it could no longer operate its local school as one of fourth-class city, since law creating system of schools for fourth-class cities and conferring their government and management upon city board independent of county board, made no provision for their creation and operation in cities of any other class. Nelson v. Board of Education, 215 Ky. 40 , 284 S.W. 386, 1926 Ky. LEXIS 649 ( Ky. 1926 ) (decided under prior law).

10. Street Improvements.

Entire proceedings to improve streets instituted by city of fifth class after transfer from fourth class but in mistaken belief that it was fourth-class city were not void, although they followed particular plan prescribed for fourth-class cities, where there was no essential difference in formality of enacting ordinance for improvement and either class of city was authorized to construct streets wholly at expense of abutting owners under ten-year plan of payment. Hoerth v. Sturgis, 221 Ky. 835 , 299 S.W. 1074, 1927 Ky. LEXIS 841 ( Ky. 1927 ) (decided under prior law).

11. City Officers.
12. — Abolition of Office.

In exercising constitutional authority to classify cities by transferring city of third to second class, legislature may abolish an office before the term of incumbent has expired except so far as incumbent’s right to retain the office is saved or protected by statute. Whitt v. Wilson, 212 Ky. 281 , 278 S.W. 609, 1925 Ky. LEXIS 1120 ( Ky. 1925 ) (decided under prior law).

13. — Board of Education.

Notwithstanding school district is included entirely within, or partly within and partly without city limits, terms of office of members of board of education cannot be interfered with before such terms expire, under claimed right to abolish offices as incident to reclassification of city since such members are state and not municipal officers. Whitt v. Wilson, 212 Ky. 281 , 278 S.W. 609, 1925 Ky. LEXIS 1120 ( Ky. 1925 ) (decided under prior law).

14. — Candidacy for Office Other Than That Held.

Where prosecuting attorney was elected for four year term in 1949 when city was third-class city and in 1950 it became a second-class city whereupon he became city attorney, until he resigned or unless the office was declared vacant for some valid reason, he had right to hold office for the four-year term for which he was elected even though he became a candidate for commonwealth attorney for one does not relinquish an office by becoming a candidate for another. Burton v. Graham, 242 S.W.2d 855, 1951 Ky. LEXIS 1075 ( Ky. 1951 ) (decided under prior law).

15. — Compensation after Reclassification.

Fact that board of trustees under old charter had fixed salary of police judge did not affect power of city council after city had been transferred to fifth class to fix salary of police judge who was elected at same time as council and who was holding the office created by the new act; council was authorized after election to fix salary which had not been fixed before. Barrett v. Falmouth, 109 Ky. 151 , 58 S.W. 520, 22 Ky. L. Rptr. 667 , 1900 Ky. LEXIS 175 ( Ky. 1900 ) (decided under prior law).

Officers of city functioning when city was transferred from third to second class continue to discharge their duties and receive same compensation as before transfer until induction of officers after next general election. Gilbert v. Paducah, 115 Ky. 160 , 72 S.W. 816, 24 Ky. L. Rptr. 1998 , 1903 Ky. LEXIS 87 ( Ky. 1903 ) (decided under prior law).

After city of Ashland was transferred to second class, prosecuting attorney continued to hold his office with right to collect same compensation after election and throughout projected unexpired portion of term as prosecuting attorney for second-class city. Carroll v. Fullerton, 215 Ky. 558 , 286 S.W. 847, 1926 Ky. LEXIS 769 ( Ky. 1926 ), overruled, Ward v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 436 S.W.2d 794, 1968 Ky. LEXIS 189 ( Ky. 1968 ), overruled in part, Ward v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 436 S.W.2d 794, 1968 Ky. LEXIS 189 ( Ky. 1968 ), overruled on other grounds, Ward v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 436 S.W.2d 794, 1968 Ky. LEXIS 189 (Ky. 1968) (decided under prior law).

Where city was transferred from city of fourth class to city of third class, attorney, who had been city attorney when city was of the fourth class, could not hold both the office of city attorney and prosecuting attorney of third-class city, since KRS 61.080 and Ky. Const., § 165 prohibit this, and thus he had the right of election of one office or the other; therefore even though he became a candidate for prosecuting attorney he never relinquished office of city attorney and could make his election to continue in that office; however, his compensation could be reduced since, although this section saves the tenure of an officer of a city that has been transferred from one class to another, it does not save the emoluments from change. Somerset v. Caylor, 241 S.W.2d 990, 1951 Ky. LEXIS 1033 ( Ky. 1951 ) (decided under prior law).

16. — Mayor.

Where B was elected trustee of sixth-class city for two years and during his term he was elected chairman of board, and when city became fifth-class city B acted as mayor it was held that B was not entitled to hold office until next regular election of mayors of fifth-class cities and vacancy would exist after expiration of two-year term, which vacancy should be filled in accordance with Ky. Const., § 152. Warren v. Blatt, 280 Ky. 185 , 132 S.W.2d 933, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 95 ( Ky. 1939 ) (decided under prior law).

Where X was elected mayor in 1953 of third-class city which was changed to second-class city by legislature in 1956, his term was not affected. Gerard v. Judd, 331 S.W.2d 119, 1959 Ky. LEXIS 2 ( Ky. 1959 ) (decided under prior law).

17. Rights of Officers.

If a city is transferred from one class to another, without any provision saving the rights of the officers, they have only such rights as are conferred by the law governing the city in the class to which it is assigned, as they take their offices subject to the constitutional right of the legislature to transfer the city from one class to another. Gilbert v. Paducah, 115 Ky. 160 , 72 S.W. 816, 24 Ky. L. Rptr. 1998 , 1903 Ky. LEXIS 87 ( Ky. 1903 ) (decided under prior law).

If the legislature abolishes a municipal corporation, the rights of the officers cease with its existence, for they take office subject to power of legislature to abolish them. Gilbert v. Paducah, 115 Ky. 160 , 72 S.W. 816, 24 Ky. L. Rptr. 1998 , 1903 Ky. LEXIS 87 ( Ky. 1903 ) (decided under prior law).

18. — Saving Tenure of Incumbent.

The legislature provided for saving the tenure of the incumbent of his office means he will occupy an office of the same or comparable duties in the new city organization. Somerset v. Caylor, 241 S.W.2d 990, 1951 Ky. LEXIS 1033 ( Ky. 1951 ) (decided under prior law).

Where third-class city become second-class city it could be said that members of “common council” of third-class city continued in office and functioned as the “board of councilmen” until their terms expired. Lowe v. Bowling Green, 247 S.W.2d 386, 1952 Ky. LEXIS 700 ( Ky. 1952 ) (decided under prior law).

19. — Status After Reclassifications.

In transferring a city from one class to another there is necessarily a break in the organization of the board of councilmen, but it was never contemplated that the city should be without officers at any time or should have two sets of officers at the same time. Tandy & Fairleigh Tobacco Co. v. Hopkinsville, 174 Ky. 189 , 192 S.W. 46, 1917 Ky. LEXIS 183 ( Ky. 1917 ) (decided under prior law).

Where city while in fourth class elected seven councilmen as authorized by charter, and city was then transferred to third class requiring 12 councilmen, board of seven councilmen in office at time transfer was made properly retained office until expiration of their terms, and ordinance passed by majority of such council between time of transfer and expiration of their office was validly passed. Tandy & Fairleigh Tobacco Co. v. Hopkinsville, 174 Ky. 189 , 192 S.W. 46, 1917 Ky. LEXIS 183 ( Ky. 1917 ) (decided under prior law).

When prosecuting attorney was elected in 1921 for four year term when city was of third class, and in 1924 city was transferred to second class, and election for prosecuting attorney should have been held in second-class city in 1923 and not in 1925, it was nevertheless duty of city to hold election for prosecuting attorney in 1925 to full vacancy which would occur in that year, and where city did hold such election and another prosecuting attorney was elected, and was also appointed by mayor in case election was invalid, the latter was entitled to the office, and former could not continue therein after his term expired in 1925. Fullerton v. Mann, 214 Ky. 764 , 284 S.W. 113, 1926 Ky. LEXIS 433 ( Ky. 1926 ) (decided under prior law).

20. Validity of Acts.

Validity of warrant of arrest issued by police judge could not be collaterally attacked on theory that he did not have jurisdiction to to issue it, where warrant was issued after town was transferred to fifth-class city and police judge elected, notwithstanding ordinance accepting transfer and ordering election of officers did not provide for election of police judge, who was nevertheless elected and thus became de facto officer. Orme v. Commonwealth, 55 S.W. 195, 21 Ky. L. Rptr. 1412 (1900) (decided under prior law).

81.028. Effect of reclassification of city in county containing consolidated local government as city of second class on personnel and retirement systems and police and fire protection services.

  1. Any city located in a county containing a consolidated local government which was reclassified as a city of the second class after March 16, 2000, but prior to January 1, 2015, under a classification system in effect before January 1, 2015, shall be exempt from the provisions of KRS 90.300 to 90.400 , 95.430 to 95.500 , and 95.851 to 95.991 relating to the organization and structure of civil service systems, police departments, fire departments, and pension systems in cities.
  2. In lieu of the requirements of these statutes, any city reclassified under the conditions set out in subsection (1) of this section shall ensure that police and fire protection services are provided for the citizens of the city in the same manner and at least at the same level of service as was being provided prior to the reclassification.
  3. Nothing in this section shall prevent a city from restructuring or creating a new civil service system, police department, or fire department after a reclassification under the conditions set out in subsection (1) of this section. Any city that restructures or creates a new civil service system, police department, or fire department may adopt any of the provisions of KRS 90.300 to 90.400 , 95.430 to 95.500 , and 95.851 to 95.991 relating to the organization and structure of civil service systems, police departments, fire departments, and pension systems.
  4. If fire protection service was being provided by a fire protection district in any city that was reclassified under the conditions set out in subsection (1) of this section, the reclassification shall in no way affect the operations of the fire protection district and the services it provides. If at any time after a city is reclassified, the fire protection district ceases to exist or fails to adequately provide for the fire protection needs of the city, the city shall have the right to create its own fire department or secure some other means for the provision of adequate fire protection services.

History. Enact. Acts 2000, ch. 121, § 1, effective March 16, 2000; 2002, ch. 346, § 88, effective July 15, 2002; 2014, ch. 92, § 3, effective January 1, 2015.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section was incorrectly set out as repealed in the 2014 Supplement. This section was instead amended by Act 2014, ch. 92, as set out above.

81.030. Transfer of third-class, fifth-class or sixth-class city to another class. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3264, 3608, 3609, 3661, 3662) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 115, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

81.032. Requirements for reclassification of an incorporated area. [Repealed.]

History. Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 151, § 1, effective July 15, 1986; Repealed, Acts 2014, ch. 92, § 314, effective January 1, 2015.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(9/18/95). Section 156 of the Constitution of Kentucky referenced in subsection (2) of this statute was repealed by an amendment ratified on November 8, 1994, which created Sections 156a and 156b. See 1994 Ky. Acts, ch. 168. Section 156a provides in part: “The classification of all cities and the law pertaining to the classifications in effect at the time of the adoption of this section shall remain in effect until otherwise provided by law.”

81.034. Recording of data by General Assembly. [Repealed.]

History. Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 151, § 2, effective July 15, 1986; Repealed 2014 Ky. Acts ch. 92, sec. 314, effective January 1, 2015.

81.036. Recording of reclassification with Secretary of State. [Repealed.]

History. Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 151, § 3, effective July 15, 1986; Repealed, Acts 2014, ch. 92, § 314, effective January 1, 2015.

Incorporations

81.040. Population necessary for incorporation as a city — Boundaries. [Repealed]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3713: amend. Acts 1964, ch. 139 (subsec. (1)) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 116, § 6 effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 81.060 .

81.045. City identity documents to be filed with the Secretary of State — Effect of noncompliance. [Repealed.]

History. Enact. Acts 1980, ch. 116, § 1, effective July 15, 1980; Repealed, Acts 2014, ch. 92, § 314, effective January 1, 2015.

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Bench & Bar.

Morris, The New Kentucky Municipal Law, Vol. 45, No. 3, July, 1981, Ky. Bench and Bar 24.

81.050. Proceedings to incorporate — Exception upon adoption of consolidated local government.

  1. Except as provided in KRS 67C.111(2), proceedings to incorporate a city shall be commenced by a petition being filed with the circuit clerk of the county in which the area to be incorporated is located. The petition shall contain:
    1. The signatures and addresses of:
      1. A number of registered voters equal to two-thirds (2/3) of the voters of the proposed territory; or
      2. A number of real property owners, the sum total of whose assessed value of real property is equal to at least two-thirds (2/3) of the assessed value of the real property in the proposed territory;
    2. A statement of the boundaries proposed and the number of residents;
    3. An accurate map of the proposed territory;
    4. A detailed statement of the reasons for incorporation including the services sought from the proposed city;
    5. A description of the existing facilities and services within the proposed territory; and
    6. A statement of the form of government under which the city will operate if incorporated.
  2. The petition shall be docketed for hearing not less than twenty (20) days from the date of filing the petition. Notice of the filing of the petition and of its object shall be given by publication pursuant to KRS Chapter 424.

History. 3714: amend. Acts 1966, ch. 239, § 36; 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 71, effective January 2, 1978; 1980, ch. 116, § 2, effective July 15, 1980; 2002, ch. 346, § 90, effective July 15, 2002.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section was amended by Acts 1946, ch. 42. However, the act was held unconstitutional in Engle v. Bonnie, 305 Ky. 850 , 204 S.W.2d 963 (1947), because of a defective title.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(1988). A technical correction has been made in this section by the Reviser of Statutes pursuant to KRS 7.136 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

Provision that charter shall be granted for organization of town when two-thirds of voters in designated area accept it by filing their petition and giving statutory publication, does not amount to unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority. Boone County v. Verona, 190 Ky. 430 , 227 S.W. 804, 1921 Ky. LEXIS 468 ( Ky. 1921 ).

2. Construction.

Strict compliance with the requirements of this section is required. Donald v. Glenview, 723 S.W.2d 861, 1986 Ky. App. LEXIS 1446 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986).

3. Petition.

The statute does not require that the list of signatures and addresses compiled as per subsection (1)(a) be attached to the items listed in subsection (1)(b)-(f) at the time of the signing. Griffin v. City of Robards, 990 S.W.2d 634, 1999 Ky. LEXIS 55 ( Ky. 1999 ).

4. Notice.

Legal requirements were met as to giving notice of filing petition and objects thereof, where notice was published in two issues of two newspapers published in the county, and also was posted for ten days, although both methods of publication were unnecessary. Vanover v. Dunlap, 172 Ky. 679 , 189 S.W. 915, 1916 Ky. LEXIS 255 ( Ky. 1916 ) (decision prior to 1966 amendment).

Although there must be a public notice, subsection (2) of this section does not require that it be filed concurrently with the petition, but only demands that it be published as required by KRS Chapter 424; thus, there need be only a petition for incorporation filed with the circuit clerk which commences the action, thereby constituting the first step. Jeffersontown v. Hurstbourne, 684 S.W.2d 23, 1984 Ky. App. LEXIS 584 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984).

5. — Purpose.

The purpose of notice is to inform residents of proposed boundary, and public generally, of proposed action, and to give them opportunity to protest and the fact that two residents living within proposed boundary appeared and protested did not constitute waiver of notice, since other residences who had not signed petition were entitled to notice. Dickerson v. Sharpe, 291 Ky. 391 , 164 S.W.2d 945, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 242 ( Ky. 1942 ).

6. — Failure to Publish.

Failure to publish notice in two issues of newspapers as required by this section, is jurisdictional defect, and deprives court of jurisdiction to establish town. Dickerson v. Sharpe, 291 Ky. 391 , 164 S.W.2d 945, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 242 ( Ky. 1942 ) (decision prior to 1966 amendment).

Failure to provide the required notice under this section is jurisdictional. Cole v. Stephens, 582 S.W.2d 657, 1979 Ky. App. LEXIS 419 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).

Where the publication failed to give proper notice as to the time for filing objection to the proposed incorporation and failed to give proper notice of the incorporation hearing, the deficient publication divested the trial court of jurisdiction and dismissal of the case was proper. Okolona v. Lindsey, 706 S.W.2d 835, 1986 Ky. LEXIS 251 ( Ky. 1986 ).

7. Nature of Proceeding.

Character of procedure for incorporation of towns is purely statutory and exclusively affects groups or particular units of public in governmental relations, and does not, except perhaps incidentally, involve private rights between individuals. Calhoun v. Lenahan, 261 Ky. 601 , 88 S.W.2d 288, 1935 Ky. LEXIS 698 ( Ky. 1935 ).

Where town was incorporated after enactment of proposal ordinance for annexation by first-class city with full knowledge of annexation proposal, the enactment of such ordinance did not preclude town from incorporating pending decision regarding annexation, nor did such incorporation bar annexation plan of city under KRS 81.100 (now KRS 81A.010 ) requiring it to complete its annexation proceedings under KRS 81.120 (now KRS 81A.030 and now repealed). Pfeiffer v. Louisville, 240 S.W.2d 560, 1951 Ky. LEXIS 973 ( Ky. 1951 ).

8. — Irregularities.

Irregularities in proceedings to incorporate municipalities can only be questioned by public officer and are not subject to collateral attack. Vanover v. Dunlap, 172 Ky. 679 , 189 S.W. 915, 1916 Ky. LEXIS 255 ( Ky. 1916 ).

In proceeding for writ of prohibition to prohibit Circuit Court judge from entering order incorporating portion of subdivision as sixth-class city under KRS 81.040 to 81.070 (KRS 81.040 and 81.070 now repealed), as no appeal is permitted by KRS 81.060 , action of judge in accepting petition which did not set out metes and bounds of the proposed city nor the number of voters in it as required by KRS 81.060 but contained such information in affidavit attached to it as in compliance with KRS 81.060 was not a misuse or usurpation of authority by lower court and did not warrant issuance of such writ. Schaetzley v. Wright, 271 S.W.2d 885, 1954 Ky. LEXIS 1056 ( Ky. 1954 ).

9. Political Questions.

KRS 81.040 to 81.070 (KRS 81.040 and 81.070 now repealed) denied to court power to determine political questions which would arise from a consideration of the propriety or necessity of establishing or refusing to establish the corporation. Boone County v. Verona, 190 Ky. 430 , 227 S.W. 804, 1921 Ky. LEXIS 468 ( Ky. 1921 ).

10. Injunction.

Efforts of group favoring creation of town in certain territory should not be enjoined as “vexatious litigation,” where such group had made two prior unsuccessful attempts to incorporate, had succeeded on third attempt, but thereafter the town had been dissolved by majority of voters. Calhoun v. Lenahan, 261 Ky. 601 , 88 S.W.2d 288, 1935 Ky. LEXIS 698 ( Ky. 1935 ).

Citizens of town had a right to maintain suit to enjoin town officers functioning under alleged void judgment incorporating town. Booth v. Copley, 283 Ky. 23 , 140 S.W.2d 662, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 285 ( Ky. 1940 ).

In citizens’ suit to enjoin town officers from functioning as such on ground that judgment incorporating town was void, motion to set aside alleged void judgment was properly made, as the action was in itself one seeking to set aside the judgment complained of. Booth v. Copley, 283 Ky. 23 , 140 S.W.2d 662, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 285 ( Ky. 1940 ).

11. Opposition to Incorporation.

In action for order of prohibition seeking to prevent judge from entering order incorporating subdivision into sixth-class city where form of proposed city was not a square, where none of the alleged petitioners to incorporate signed the complaint and only five of the alleged petitioners were named in the caption of the complaint and petitioner seeking prohibition order alleged that petition to incorporate stated no facts justifying inclusion of his undeveloped land as part of a city and that its inclusion was not in his best interest, such alleged errors were not of an extraordinary nature and judge did not misuse or usurp his authority so as to justify appellate court issuing an order of prohibition. Eline v. Lampe, 275 S.W.2d 64, 1955 Ky. LEXIS 347 ( Ky. 1955 ).

12. Concurrent Jurisdiction.

The first municipality to take statutory steps towards acquiring territory outside its limits is entitled to proceed to completion or, put another way, where two or more bodies politic have concurrent jurisdiction over the same area, the one first acquiring jurisdiction should prevail; thus this rule is not applicable to only coextensive annexations or simultaneous incorporations, but also governs in an annexation-incorporation situation. Jeffersontown v. Hurstbourne, 684 S.W.2d 23, 1984 Ky. App. LEXIS 584 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984).

Cited:

Hedger v. Kinsella, 284 Ky. 303 , 144 S.W.2d 515, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 486 ( Ky. 1940 ); Mullins v. Jones, 290 Ky. 796 , 162 S.W.2d 761, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 488 ( Ky. 1942 ); Schaetzley v. Wright, 271 S.W.2d 885, 1954 Ky. LEXIS 1056 ( Ky. 1954 ); Moore v. Smith, 307 S.W.2d 191, 1957 Ky. LEXIS 81 ( Ky. 1957 ); Colwell v. Ward, 428 S.W.2d 30, 1968 Ky. LEXIS 702 ( Ky. 1968 ); Stevens v. Flannery, 700 S.W.2d 78, 1985 Ky. App. LEXIS 688 (Ky. Ct. App. 1985).

Opinions of Attorney General.

With reference to sixth-class cities that are not named in KRS 81.010 , it would appear possible that the name of a city of this class would be changed by petition in the Circuit Court by essentially the same procedural manner required for incorporation. OAG 78-632 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Lewis, Kostas, and Carnes, Consolidation — Complete or Functional of City and County Governments in Kentucky, 42 Ky. L.J. 295 (1954).

81.060. Standards for incorporation — Court considerations — Judgment — Certification to Secretary of State.

  1. At the hearing the court shall, if the proper notice has been given or publication made, and no defense is interposed, enter a judgment establishing a city as requested by the petition, filed pursuant to KRS 81.050 , if the court finds as a matter of law that the following standards have been met:
    1. At least three hundred (300) persons reside in the territory sought to be incorporated;
    2. Incorporation constitutes a reasonable way of providing the public services sought by the voters or property owners of the territory, and there is no other reasonable way of providing the services;
    3. The territory is contiguous;
    4. The territory is able to provide necessary city services to its residents within a reasonable period after its incorporation; and
    5. The interest of other areas and adjacent local governments is not unreasonably prejudiced by the incorporation.
  2. In determining whether the standards for incorporation have been met, the court shall consider, but shall not be limited to the consideration of the following criteria:
    1. Whether the character of the territory is urban or rural;
    2. The ability of any existing city, county or district to provide needed services;
    3. Whether the territory and any existing city are interdependent or part of one (1) community;
    4. The need for city services in the territory;
    5. The development scheme of applicable land-use plans;
    6. The area and topography of the territory; and
    7. The effect of the proposed incorporation on the population growth and assessed valuation of the real property in the territory.
  3. Defense may be made to the petition by any inhabitant of the proposed city, and if defense is made, the court shall hear and determine the same, and render a judgment establishing or refusing to establish a city, as may seem proper.
  4. If the court renders judgment granting the petition, the order shall set out the name of the city, a metes and bounds description of its boundaries, the population contained therein, the form of government under which the city shall operate, and the class to which the city shall be assigned by reason of its form of government as set out in KRS 81.005 . The order shall appoint the officers appropriate to the class of the new city, who shall hold their respective offices until the next regular election at which city officers are elected, at which time officers shall be elected by the residents of the new city.
  5. Whenever any city shall be established in the manner above provided, the court shall in the judgment direct the clerk of the court wherein such judgment is entered to, not later than ten (10) days thereafter, certify a copy thereof to the Secretary of State, whose duty it shall be to properly index and file the same as a permanent record in his office.

History. 3715: amend. Acts 1942, ch. 133, §§ 1, 2; 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 72, effective January 2, 1978; 1980, ch. 116, § 3, effective July 15, 1980; 2014, ch. 92, § 4, effective January 1, 2015.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. In General.

A proceeding to incorporate a town is one in rem since its purpose is to change and alter the political status of a designated community. Booth v. Copley, 283 Ky. 23 , 140 S.W.2d 662, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 285 ( Ky. 1940 ).

The action of a Circuit Court pursuant to this section, in making findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a judgment as to whether a sixth-class city should be incorporated is a “case” for purposes of appeal pursuant to Ky. Const., § 115. Cole v. Stephens, 582 S.W.2d 657, 1979 Ky. App. LEXIS 419 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).

Where more than three-quarters (3/4) of a community asserts that the services being provided are insufficient, the court is obliged to defer to the community’s view and presume its validity unless otherwise controverted. Griffin v. City of Robards, 990 S.W.2d 634, 1999 Ky. LEXIS 55 ( Ky. 1999 ).

2. Constitutionality.

Law that conferred on Circuit Courts the power under certain conditions to establish towns and provided that no appeal should lie from the judgment was constitutional. Morton v. Woodford, 99 Ky. 367 , 35 S.W. 1112, 18 Ky. L. Rptr. 271 , 1896 Ky. LEXIS 91 ( Ky. 1896 ).

That portion of this section which reads, “but no appeal shall lie from the judgment,” is in direct conflict with Ky. Const., § 115 and is therefore an unconstitutional restriction on the rights of the appellants. Cole v. Stephens, 582 S.W.2d 657, 1979 Ky. App. LEXIS 419 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).

3. Application.

Former similar section applied only to creation and organization of towns in first instance, and not to towns, such as Fairview, organized by special charter and in existence when present constitution was adopted. Yancey v. Fairview, 66 S.W. 636, 23 Ky. L. Rptr. 2087 (1902) (decided under prior law)

It is to this section permitting original incorporation of a town located in more than one county that the machinery of municipal election of KRS 88.200 (now repealed) applies and not to a city which has attempted to annex contiguous territory located in another county. Elsmere v. Tanner, 245 Ky. 376 , 53 S.W.2d 522, 1932 Ky. LEXIS 575 ( Ky. 1932 ).

4. Amendment of Petition.

It was within judge’s judicial discretion to sustain objections to filing of amended petition for the incorporation of city where original petition was not properly drawn. Boone v. Smith, 263 S.W.2d 928, 1954 Ky. LEXIS 635 ( Ky. 1954 ) (decided under prior law).

5. Notice.

The publication of notice is essential to the jurisdiction of the court to hear and determine the cause. Booth v. Copley, 283 Ky. 23 , 140 S.W.2d 662, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 285 ( Ky. 1940 ).

6. Jurisdiction.

Service of process by publication is in derogation of the common law, and the practice authorizing it is subject to strict construction and must be strictly complied with to render service valid and give the court jurisdiction. Booth v. Copley, 283 Ky. 23 , 140 S.W.2d 662, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 285 ( Ky. 1940 ).

7. Contiguity of Territory.

A territory could not be incorporated as part of a city where it was connected to the city only by a strip of highway which had no concrete and tangible municipal value or purpose. Griffin v. City of Robards, 990 S.W.2d 634, 1999 Ky. LEXIS 55 ( Ky. 1999 ).

8. Defense by Inhabitant.

The city was precluded from participating in and objecting to the incorporation proceeding because it was not an inhabitant, where the incorporation did not so impair or impede the city’s ability to protect its interest as to mandate intervention, and the city’s interest in the action was represented, at least in part, by another party. Donald v. Glenview, 723 S.W.2d 861, 1986 Ky. App. LEXIS 1446 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986).

9. Benefit to Property Included.

By restrictions as to population and limits legislature intended to prevent unnecessary extension of town limits so as to include outlying territory which would not be substantially benefited from municipal government. Latonia v. Hopkins, 104 Ky. 419 , 47 S.W. 248, 20 Ky. L. Rptr. 620 , 1898 Ky. LEXIS 169 ( Ky. 1898 ) (decided under prior law).

Where landowner alleged that inclusion of property within town boundaries was for the purpose of imposing taxation upon landowner for the benefit of the other residents of the town without any benefits to the landowner or the town except for additional revenue, inclusion of the property within the boundaries of the town under these conditions would deprive landowner of property without just compensation in violation of Ky. Const., § 13 and would constitute an exercise of arbitrary power in violation of Ky. Const., § 2. Chesapeake & O. R. Co. v. Silver Grove, 249 S.W.2d 520, 1952 Ky. LEXIS 817 ( Ky. 1952 ) (decided under prior law).

Although former sections governing incorporation did not define the character of the property that could be incorporated legislature did not intend to authorize the incorporation into a municipality of property incapable of any municipal use, except to the extent that the incorporation of such property was incidental to the incorporation of other property which was or might be adaptable to that purpose, for the words “city” and “town” imply that the real estate incorporated should be reasonably susceptible to municipal development, and that some benefits will be returned to the incorporated area. Chesapeake & O. R. Co. v. Silver Grove, 249 S.W.2d 520, 1952 Ky. LEXIS 817 ( Ky. 1952 ) (decided under prior law).

10. Boundaries.

Strip of land on river bank was recoverable by town trustees as being within boundaries of town and as intended to afford public free access to river, where plat of town and act of legislature showed that town was bounded on west by Kentucky River. Giltner v. Trustees of Carrollton, 46 Ky. 680 , 1847 Ky. LEXIS 96 ( Ky. 1847 ) (decided under prior law).

Where map of town showed strip of land between street and Ohio River, boundary extended to river and fact that town was laid off upon bank of river showed that it extended to water unless contrary intention clearly appeared. Rowan's Ex'rs v. Portland, 47 Ky. 232 , 1847 Ky. LEXIS 161 ( Ky. 1847 ) (decided under prior law).

So far as boundary is concerned, sixth-class towns in existence on July 1, 1893, might have been of any size, which they retained, or might under charter provisions be extended any reasonable distance. Yancey v. Fairview, 66 S.W. 636, 23 Ky. L. Rptr. 2087 (1902) (decided under prior law).

11. Charter.

Legislature may grant charter to municipal corporation not to take effect until accepted by majority or some other number of its inhabitants. Boone County v. Verona, 190 Ky. 430 , 227 S.W. 804, 1921 Ky. LEXIS 468 ( Ky. 1921 ) (decided under prior law).

12. De Facto City.

Judgment incorporating town by court having jurisdiction of subject-matter and parties but embracing more territory than statutorily permitted, was not void but merely irregular, and town was regularly established and acquired de facto existence which could only be directly attacked in quo warranto proceedings. Saylor v. Wallins, 220 Ky. 651 , 295 S.W. 993, 1927 Ky. LEXIS 597 ( Ky. 1927 ) (decided under prior law).

13. Incorporation Under Prior Special Acts.

Although legislature is prohibited by constitution from passing special acts incorporating any particular locality into a town or other municipality, acts passed for that purpose prior to the adoption of the constitution were not repealed, in view of declaration in schedule adopted with constitution. Covington v. District of Highlands, 113 Ky. 612 , 68 S.W. 669, 24 Ky. L. Rptr. 433 , 1902 Ky. LEXIS 89 ( Ky. 1902 ) (decided under prior law).

14. Multi-county Towns.

Legislature gave express authority to create town originally with territory lying in more than one county. Elsmere v. Tanner, 245 Ky. 376 , 53 S.W.2d 522, 1932 Ky. LEXIS 575 ( Ky. 1932 ) (decided under prior law).

15. Validity of Incorporation.

Creation of municipal corporation is essentially political act, dependent solely on will of legislature, whose act, unless constitution so requires, does not depend for validity upon assent of people affected. Carrithers v. Shelbyville, 126 Ky. 769 , 104 S.W. 744, 31 Ky. L. Rptr. 1166 , 1907 Ky. LEXIS 92 ( Ky. 1907 ) (decided under prior law).

Proceedings whereby town was incorporated could not be declared void in action by residents on ground that there were not 125 (now 300) bona fide residents living in boundaries sought to be incorporated; town being de facto corporation exercising corporate powers and judgment of incorporation being assailable only by state in direct proceeding to forfeit franchise. Vanover v. Dunlap, 172 Ky. 679 , 189 S.W. 915, 1916 Ky. LEXIS 255 ( Ky. 1916 ) (decided under prior law).

16. Discretion.

If court is satisfied that required population exists within designated boundary and that required notice has been given, court has no discretion but must direct establishment of town. Boone County v. Verona, 190 Ky. 430 , 227 S.W. 804, 1921 Ky. LEXIS 468 ( Ky. 1921 ).

Under this section court has no discretion concerning the establishment of a town providing the jurisdictional facts were established in the proceedings requesting incorporation and enactment of proposed ordinance by first-class city did not preclude town from incorporating pending ultimate decision of city as to annexation where jurisdictional facts had been established. Pfeiffer v. Louisville, 240 S.W.2d 560, 1951 Ky. LEXIS 973 ( Ky. 1951 ).

17. Officers.

Officers appointed under this section hold office until the next election at which officers for cities and towns may be elected, namely, odd years. Beauchamp v. Rahm, 283 Ky. 50 , 140 S.W.2d 633, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 278 ( Ky. 1940 ).

18. — Term.

Where appellant on August 19, 1941 was appointed police judge of town recreated in the manner provided in KRS 80.050 his term expired upon the election and qualification of appellee who was elected at Nov. 4, 1941 election and who qualified Jan. 2, 1942 whether or not the election was one at which town officers were to be regularly elected, since there were other general, regular elections held that year at which the vacancy might have been filled under the terms of Ky. Const., § 152. Mullins v. Jones, 290 Ky. 796 , 162 S.W.2d 761, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 488 ( Ky. 1942 ).

19. Classification.

Judgment establishing town did not become void by mere failure of legislature to assign the town to proper class. Commonwealth v. Rose, 105 Ky. 326 , 49 S.W. 29, 20 Ky. L. Rptr. 1220 , 1899 Ky. LEXIS 215 ( Ky. 1899 ).

Town which has been duly established by judgment of Circuit Court becomes city of sixth class, and must so remain until assigned by legislature as provided in Ky. Const., § 156 (now repealed). Commonwealth v. Rose, 105 Ky. 326 , 49 S.W. 29, 20 Ky. L. Rptr. 1220 , 1899 Ky. LEXIS 215 ( Ky. 1899 ).

20. Appeal.

The creation or incorporation of a municipality is a political act and legislative function, and no right of appeal from this action will lie, but where, in the same instance there is presented the question of the constitutionality of an act of the legislature, it was not the intent of the legislature to prohibit an appeal. Engle v. Miller, 303 Ky. 731 , 199 S.W.2d 123, 1947 Ky. LEXIS 539 ( Ky. 1947 ).

In action seeking a writ of prohibition to restrain Circuit Court judge from entering judgment incorporating town in which would be included railroad yards of petitioner, since petitioner specifically brought into the case a question as to the constitutionality of this section or a particular application of this section and as this was the only ground for any error in the circuit proceedings in the Circuit Court an appeal would lie from the Circuit Court’s determination on that point and thus writ of prohibition was denied. Chesapeake & O. R. Co. v. Murphy, 314 Ky. 309 , 234 S.W.2d 969, 1950 Ky. LEXIS 1085 ( Ky. 1950 ).

Question of the constitutionality of an act of the General Assembly when brought into a case involving the incorporation of a town and a remonstrance against it is an issue separate and apart from the issues to be determined by the court under this section, therefore an appeal will lie from a determination on such an issue, though not on that part of the judgment dealing with a determination under this section. Chesapeake & O. R. Co. v. Murphy, 314 Ky. 309 , 234 S.W.2d 969, 1950 Ky. LEXIS 1085 ( Ky. 1950 ).

If the jurisdictional facts are present the circuit court has no discretion as to the establishment of the town for when the specified conditions are found to exist the court merely declares the statute operative and there is no appeal, however, where in the case there is presented the question of the constitutionality of a statute which is independent in its nature, strictly judicial and one of great consequence then an appeal is permitted. Chesapeake & O. R. Co. v. Silver Grove, 249 S.W.2d 520, 1952 Ky. LEXIS 817 ( Ky. 1952 ).

If a petitioner is not permitted, merely because of a change of mind, to withdraw his name, it is just an ordinary and routine error and not a miscarriage of justice and hence will not be reviewed on appeal. Colwell v. Ward, 428 S.W.2d 30, 1968 Ky. LEXIS 702 ( Ky. 1968 ).

Since the legislature, by this section, has indicated its intent to deny any review of routine or ordinary errors of the trial court in entering a judgment incorporating a city, the Court of Appeals will not exercise its power of control under Ky. Const., § 110 unless there is some error of an extraordinary nature resulting in an abuse of the judicial processes or constituting a miscarriage of justice, or unless there is some misuse or usurpation of authority by the lower court. Colwell v. Ward, 428 S.W.2d 30, 1968 Ky. LEXIS 702 ( Ky. 1968 ).

21. Writ of Mandamus or Prohibition.

In proceeding for writ of prohibition to prohibit Circuit Court judge from entering order incorporating portion of subdivision as sixth-class city under KRS 81.040 to 81.070 (KRS 81.040 and 81.070 now repealed), as no appeal is permitted by this section, action of judge in accepting petition which did not set out metes and bounds of the proposed city nor the number of voters in it as required by this section but contained such information in affidavit attached to it as in compliance with this section was not a misuse or usurpation of authority by lower court and did not warrant issuance of such writ. Schaetzley v. Wright, 271 S.W.2d 885, 1954 Ky. LEXIS 1056 ( Ky. 1954 ).

Since this section denies an appeal from a judgment incorporating a city where appellant alleged that court erred in not holding 59 persons qualified to vote and thus eligible petition signers in order to determine necessary two-thirds of the voters living within boundary of area proposed to be incorporated because such persons were unregistered, such alleged error was not a usurpation of jurisdiction, miscarriage of justice or abuse of judicial process and appellant received fair and due consideration before properly constituted court which had jurisdiction of the matter, hence court would not issue writ of prohibition to prohibit judge from entering order incorporating subdivision into sixth-class city. Moore v. Smith, 307 S.W.2d 191, 1957 Ky. LEXIS 81 ( Ky. 1957 ).

Where judge in support of judgment of declining to approve incorporation on the ground that it would violate constitutional provisions of depriving one of property without due process, though based on constitutional grounds the proposed action disapproved of the incorporation and thus would not deny the guaranty of due process to anybody and the status quo would not be changed, therefore, the petition for writ of mandamus to compel the entering of a judgment of incorporation was denied. Merrick v. Smith, 347 S.W.2d 537, 1961 Ky. LEXIS 370 ( Ky. 1961 ).

22. Final Disposition.

Where appellant remonstrated against inclusion of its property within boundaries of town upon its incorporation and trial court had sustained a demurrer to such remonstrance and appellate court held that the demurrer to the remonstrance should have been overruled, it was not final disposition of the case for incorporators did not waive their right to take further steps in event of reversal by appellate court even though trial court’s judgment recited that cause was submitted on joint motion of parties for judgment on the pleadings and exhibits. Chesapeake & O. R. Co. v. Silver Grove, 249 S.W.2d 520, 1952 Ky. LEXIS 817 ( Ky. 1952 ).

Cited:

Beauchamp v. Rahm, 283 Ky. 50 , 140 S.W.2d 633, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 278 ( Ky. 1940 ); Dickerson v. Sharpe, 291 Ky. 391 , 164 S.W.2d 945, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 242 ( Ky. 1942 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

There is no statute requiring that a copy of the town charter or judgment of incorporation establishing the city be kept at the city hall. OAG 68-128 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Kentucky Law Survey, Garvey and Doutt, Civil Procedure, 68 Ky. L.J. 529 (1979-1980).

Boundaries

81.065. Ohio River and state streams as boundaries — Jurisdiction.

Cities bounded in part by the Ohio River shall have concurrent jurisdiction with the Commonwealth over the waters of the river opposite to the city. If the boundary between a city and one (1) or more other cities, or between a city and a county other than that in which the city is situated, is a stream within the state, the city shall have concurrent jurisdiction with the other city or cities, or the county, over the waters of the stream opposite to the city.

History. Enact. Acts 1980, ch. 115, § 3, effective July 15, 1980.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Ohio River as Boundary.

Northern boundary of City of Covington is center or thread of Ohio River, since municipality was established on land purchased from individual whose deed fixed northern boundary as Ohio River and municipal corporations are entitled to same presumption as individual owners that boundary fixed upon nontide water stream extends to center or thread of stream. Covington v. State Tax Com., 231 Ky. 606 , 21 S.W.2d 1010, 1929 Ky. LEXIS 334 ( Ky. 1929 ).

Northern boundary of City of Covington, being definitely fixed under deed and laws as center or thread of Ohio River, is not to be deemed to extent to northern bank notwithstanding boundary of commonwealth extends to low-water mark on northern bank. Covington v. State Tax Com., 231 Ky. 606 , 21 S.W.2d 1010, 1929 Ky. LEXIS 334 ( Ky. 1929 ) (decided under prior law).

81.070. Laws as to sixth-class cities apply prior to classification. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3716) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 115, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

81.080. Streams as boundaries of second-class cities. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3039) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 115, § 4, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 81.065 .

81.090. Boundaries of third-class cities on Ohio River. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3239) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 115, § 4, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 81.065 .

Dissolution

81.094. Condition for dissolution — Procedure.

  1. If any city fails for one (1) year to maintain a city government by both the election or appointment of officers and the levying and collection of necessary taxes, it shall be dissolved by judgment of the Circuit Court on petition filed by a bona fide resident of the city.
  2. A city, except for a city which has long-term debt, or any debt in excess of the assets of the city, shall be dissolved by the following procedure:
    1. Any qualified voter of the city may file with the mayor of the city a petition seeking a referendum on the question whether the city shall be dissolved. All papers of the petition shall be uniform in size and style and shall be assembled as one (1) instrument for filing. Each signature shall be executed in ink or indelible pencil and shall be followed by the address of the person signing. When it is filed, each sheet of a petition shall have an affidavit executed by the circulator stating that he personally circulated the sheet; the number of signatures thereon; that all signatures were affixed in his presence; that he believes them to be the genuine signatures of registered voters in the city; and that each signer had an opportunity before signing to read the full text of the petition. Petitions shall contain or have attached throughout their circulation the full text of the following proposal: “We the undersigned registered voters of the City of  . . . . . . . . . .  hereby petition the mayor for an election on the question whether the city should be dissolved.”;
    2. If such a petition signed by registered voters of the city equal in number to at least twenty percent (20%) of the total number of votes cast in the city in the last presidential election is presented to the mayor, the mayor of the city shall deliver a certified copy of the petition to the county clerk of the county in which the greater part of the city is located within ten (10) working days after it is received by the mayor. The county clerk shall have printed on the ballot provided for use in each precinct embraced in whole or in part within the city the question: “Are you in favor of dissolving the City of  . . . . . . . . . . ?” The mayor shall file the petition with the county clerk within ten (10) working days after he receives it. The election shall be held at the next general election if the petition is filed with the county clerk and certified by the county clerk as sufficient not later than the second Tuesday in August preceding the general election; and
    3. If a majority of those voting in the election favor the dissolution of the city, the city shall cease to be an incorporated city within thirty (30) days of the certification of the election results. The terms of all elected and appointed officers shall terminate at such time and all assets of the city shall become the property of the fiscal court of the county in which the city is located. The county clerk shall note the dissolution in his records and notify the Secretary of State in writing of the dissolution.
  3. Each petition for dissolution filed with the Circuit Court pursuant to subsection (1) of this section shall be filed in the Circuit Court of the county in which the greater part of the city is located and shall set out the name and class of the city, a metes and bounds description of its boundaries, the reasons why dissolution is sought and other facts relevant to the petition.

History. Enact. Acts 1980, ch. 116, § 4, effective July 15, 1980; 1986, ch. 349, § 1, effective July 15, 1986; 1996, ch. 195, § 40, effective July 15, 1996.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Authority of Court.

In the absence of a sufficient defense based upon statutory requirements for creation or dissolution of a city, a court has no inherent authority to refuse to create or dissolve a municipal corporation once the statutory conditions are satisfied; the presence of the permissive term “may” in this section is not determinative. Stevens v. Flannery, 700 S.W.2d 78, 1985 Ky. App. LEXIS 688 (Ky. Ct. App. 1985).

2. Creditors.

A municipal corporation cannot defeat its creditors by dissolving, since to permit this would impair the obligation of the creditors’ contracts. However, in case of dissolution, creditors are entitled to mandamus to enforce levy and collection of taxes sufficient to pay their claims, and the judgment of dissolution must keep the municipal machinery intact for that purpose. Drane v. Weston, 276 Ky. 810 , 125 S.W.2d 722, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 592 ( Ky. 1939 ) (decided under prior law).

3. Discretion of Court.

In dissolution actions, the court exercises no discretion. Boone County v. Verona, 190 Ky. 430 , 227 S.W. 804, 1921 Ky. LEXIS 468 ( Ky. 1921 ); Green v. Davis, 253 Ky. 105 , 68 S.W.2d 750, 1933 Ky. LEXIS 976 ( Ky. 1933 ) (decided under prior law).

Where the record showed that a majority of registered voters petitioned the Circuit Court for the dissolution of a sixth-class city pursuant to former section, the court had no discretion except to enter judgment in conformity with the expressed will of the majority of the voters on the proposed dissolution. Pittsburg v. Fiechter, 550 S.W.2d 184, 1977 Ky. App. LEXIS 680 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977) (decided under prior law).

4. Forfeiture Procedure.

Former similar section was not self-executing and did not contemplate an ipso facto forfeiture; the forfeiture could have been declared only in a proceeding under KRS 82.020 (repealed). Sizemore v. Commonwealth, 285 Ky. 142 , 147 S.W.2d 56, 1941 Ky. LEXIS 347 ( Ky. 1941 ) (decided under prior law).

5. Nonexercise of Corporate Functions.

Town was not dissolved and county judge properly appointed trustees, notwithstanding town had not exercised corporate functions for 17 years, nor elected officers, as municipal corporation was not dissolved by such failure. Hill v. Anderson, 122 Ky. 87 , 90 S.W. 1071, 28 Ky. L. Rptr. 1032 , 1906 Ky. LEXIS 24 ( Ky. 1906 ) (decided under prior law).

6. Pendency of Other Action.

Pendency of action in county court under KRS 88.230 (repealed) to have trustees appointed did not preclude action in Circuit Court to have charter of city declared to have been forfeited under former similar section and KRS 82.220 (repealed) even though the proceedings in the Circuit Court related to the same general subject matter and the parties were practically the same for the relief sought was not the same and the jurisdiction of the two courts was not concurrent but exclusive, one or the other. Riddle v. Howard, 357 S.W.2d 705, 1962 Ky. LEXIS 139 ( Ky. 1962 ) (decided under prior law).

7. Petition.

Where a majority of voters signed petition, but the number because of deaths and removals fell below majority before judgment was rendered, the petition for dissolution should be dismissed. Ellingsworth v. Shacklette, 201 Ky. 246 , 256 S.W. 395, 1923 Ky. LEXIS 269 ( Ky. 1923 ) (decided under prior law).

The petition must allege the number of voters residing in the municipality and that a majority of them favor dissolution. Lawson v. Blanton, 245 Ky. 301 , 53 S.W.2d 556, 1932 Ky. LEXIS 588 ( Ky. 1932 ) (decided under prior law).

Opinions of Attorney General.

An incorporated municipality which has ceased to actively conduct its business need not formally dissolve itself through the procedures in this section and KRS 81.096 but may remain inactive, and the city can at any time in the future reactivate itself by appointing and electing city officials as provided by law. OAG 82-51 .

Once a municipality is incorporated it remains so until its charter is forfeited in a legal proceeding in Circuit Court pursuant to the dissolution procedure outlined in this section and KRS 81.096 . OAG 82-51 .

81.096. Defense — Criteria for judgment of dissolution — Certification to Secretary of State.

  1. Defense to the petition for dissolution may be made by any voter or resident of the city.
  2. Judgment dissolving a city may not be entered until:
    1. Notice has been published pursuant to KRS Chapter 424 by order of the court fixing a date by which motion for intervention may be filed; and
    2. Provision for equitable disposition of all assets of the city and discharge of all obligations of the city has been made and approved by the court.
  3. Whenever any city is dissolved the judgment shall direct the clerk of the Circuit Court wherein such judgment is rendered to certify a copy of said judgment not later than ten (10) days thereafter to the Secretary of State whose duty it shall be to properly index and file the same as a permanent record in that office.

History. Enact. Acts 1980, ch. 116, § 5, effective July 15, 1980.

Opinions of Attorney General.

An incorporated municipality which has ceased to actively conduct its business need not formally dissolve itself through the procedures in KRS 81.094 and this section but may remain inactive, and the city can at any time in the future reactivate itself by appointing and electing city officials as provided by law. OAG 82-51 .

Once a municipality is incorporated it remains so until its charter is forfeited in a legal proceeding in Circuit Court pursuant to the dissolution procedure outlined in KRS 81.094 and this section. OAG 82-51 .

Annexation

81.100. Annexation of unincorporated territory. [Renumbered.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2760, 2761: amend. Acts 1966, ch. 239, § 37) was renumbered as KRS 81A.010 by the Reviser under authority of KRS 7.136 .

81.110. Protest against annexation of unincorporated territory. [Renumbered.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2762, 2763) was renumbered as KRS 81A.020 by the Reviser under authority of KRS 7.136 .

81.120. Annexation of another city by a first-class city. [Renumbered.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2764-1, 2764-2) was renumbered by the Reviser as KRS 81A.030 under authority of KRS 7.136 and was repealed.

81.130. First-class city takes over rights and liabilities of city annexed. [Renumbered.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2764) was renumbered as KRS 81A.040 by the Reviser under authority of KRS 7.136 and was repealed.

81.140. Annexation of unincorporated territory or reduction of territory by a second-class city. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3050, 3051: amend. Acts 1966, ch. 239, § 38; 1968, ch. 142; 1976, ch. 62, § 82) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 303, § 15, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 81A.400 to 81A.530 .

81.145. Election on annexation of unincorporated territory by a city of the second class in a county containing a city of the second and third class. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1976, ch. 383, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 303, § 15, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 81A.400 to 81A.530 .

81.150. Condemnation authorized — Procedure. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3051) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 303, § 15, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 81A.400 to 81A.530 .

81.160. Removal of land. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3050a: amend. Acts 1978, ch. 300, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 303, § 15, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 81A.400 to 81A.530 .

81.170. Authority must restore damaged public works. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3053) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 303, § 15, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 81A.400 to 81A.530 .

81.180. Authority to have full control of housing projects. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3054) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 303, § 15, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 81A.400 to 81A.530 .

81.190. Annexation or reduction of territory by third-class city. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3287: amend. Acts 1966, ch. 239, § 39) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 303, § 15, effective July 15, 1980.

81.195. Annexation of unincorporated territory by third-class city located in two or more counties. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1954, ch. 109, §§ 2 to 4) was declared unconstitutional in Corbin v. Roaden, 453 S.W.2d 603 ( Ky. 1970 ) and was repealed by Acts 1972, ch. 203, § 55.

81.200. Third-class city takes over rights and obligations of city annexed. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3287) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 303, § 15, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 81A.400 to 81A.530 .

81.210. Annexation or reduction of territory by fourth-class city. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3483: amend. Acts 1966, ch. 239, § 40; 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 73) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 303, § 15, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 81A.400 to 81A.530 .

81.220. Protest against annexation by fourth-class city — Trial — Judgment. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3483: amend. 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 74) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 303, § 15, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 81A.400 to 81A.530 .

81.230. Annotation or reduction of territory by fifth-class city. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3611 to 3613: amend. Acts 1966, ch. 239, § 41; 1978, ch. 230, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 303, § 15, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 81A.400 to 81A.530 .

81.235. Acquisition of lands by city of fifth class for relocation — When — Expenditures for such purpose. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 112) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 303, § 15, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 81A.400 to 81A.530 .

81.240. Annexation or reduction of territory by sixth-class city. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3644 to 3666: amend. Acts 1966, ch. 239, § 42; 1978, ch. 320, § 2) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 303, § 15, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 81A.400 to 81A.530 .

81.250. Fifth or sixth-class city takes over rights and liabilities of city annexed. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3614, 3667) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 303, § 15, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 81A.400 to 81A.530 .

81.260. Liability of property owners in territory annexed to sixth-class city for debts of city incurred before annexation. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3666) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 303, § 15, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 81A.400 to 81A.530 .

81.270. Resubmission of proposal for annexation or reduction by city of any class when first proposal is denied by court or defeated by voters. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2762, 2764-2, 3050a-1, 3051, 3287, 3483, 3612, 3665) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 303, § 15, effective July 15, 1980.

81.275. Annexation of property of consenting landowners pending litigation. [Renumbered.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 155) was renumbered as KRS 81A.500 by the Reviser under authority of KRS 7.136 .

81.280. Annexation of territory with industrial plants. [Renumbered.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1956 (4th Ex. Sess.), ch. 1) was renumbered as KRS 81A.510 by the Reviser under authority of KRS 7.136 .

81.290. Copy of ordinance proposing annexation or reduction of territory by city in county containing a city of first class to be forwarded to fiscal court — Protest suit, fiscal court to be made a party. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 36, effective May 18, 1956) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 303, § 15, effective July 15, 1980.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Effect of Repeal.

Where the appearance of the fiscal court in an action challenging a proposed annexation was mandated by this section when the action was filed in 1979, the subsequent repeal of this section, effective July 15, 1980, did not affect the vested right of the fiscal court to appear and raise all questions concerning the annexation. Louisville v. Fiscal Court of Jefferson County, 623 S.W.2d 219, 1981 Ky. LEXIS 282 ( Ky. 1981 ).

81.295. Annexation of impoundments of water by cities of the fifth class. [Renumbered.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1972, ch. 57, § 1) was renumbered as KRS 81A.520 by the Reviser under authority of KRS 7.136 .

81.296. Publication of ordinance. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1972, ch. 57, § 2) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 303, § 15, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see 81A.400 to 81A.530 .

Alternate Method of Rendering Governmental Service in County Containing City of First Class and Extension of Boundaries of City of First Class

81.300. Plan for the improvement of local government in county containing city of first class may be submitted to fiscal court — Action by fiscal court — Election — Time within which fiscal court must act.

In any county containing a city of the first class, the mayor of the city of the first class with the approval of the board of aldermen, may submit to the fiscal court a plan for the improvement of local government in the county as set out herein below. The fiscal court shall, if they approve, deliver a certified copy of the plan to the county clerk, who shall cause to be submitted to the qualified voters of the affected areas at the next general election which does not occur within less than ninety (90) days of the submission by the mayor of the plan to the fiscal court, the question set out in KRS 81.350 , if the certified copy of the plan is filed with the county clerk not later than the second Tuesday in August preceding the general election. In any event the fiscal court shall express its approval or disapproval of the plan within thirty (30) days of the submission of the plan by the mayor to them.

History. Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 17, § 1, effective May 18, 1956; 1996, ch. 195, § 41, effective July 15, 1996.

81.310. Plan to define area and name governmental services to be rendered.

  1. Any such plan shall define the area within the county wherein density of population, land use, or other similar factors require municipal-type services for the residents thereof.
  2. Any such plan shall name the various governmental services which will be rendered in the county in a manner different after the approval of the plan than before, and it shall also specify the statutory authority for such change in service.
  3. Any such plan may include the rendition by the county or the city of services in accordance with the provisions of KRS 79.110 through 79.180 inclusive.

History. Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 17, §§ 2 to 4, effective May 18, 1956.

81.320. Tabulation of votes.

The votes on the plan shall be tabulated in the following manner:

  1. The total votes cast within the city of the first class shall be tabulated as a separate total.
  2. The total votes cast in the affected area as described pursuant to KRS 81.310 , but lying outside of the city of the first class shall be tabulated as a separate total; included within this total, the votes cast in each city within this area, which has been incorporated more than twelve (12) months prior to the submission to the qualified voters of the question on the plan, shall be tabulated as individual totals for the purposes described in subsections (2) and (3) of KRS 81.330 .

History. Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 17, § 5, effective May 18, 1956.

81.330. When plan to take effect — Exclusion of city from boundaries of new city — Result — Liability of city of first class.

  1. If more than half of the votes cast within the city of the first class and more than half of the votes cast in the affected area outside of the city of the first class are in favor of the plan, then it shall be effected and the boundaries of the city of the first class shall thirty (30) days after the certification of the election be extended so as to include the area described in accordance with KRS 81.310 , including any city of a lesser class within such area, except,
  2. If in any city other than of the first class within the area affected (except cities incorporated within twelve (12) months of the submission of the question on the plan to the voters), more than half of the votes cast are opposed to the plan, then such city shall be excluded from the new boundaries of the city of the first class. The total votes cast in any such city rejecting the plan shall be deducted from the total votes cast on the question so that the votes cast in such city shall have no effect upon the acceptance or rejection of the plan as a whole.
  3. If the plan is approved, thereafter, neither the county government nor any of its agencies or joint agencies shall be required to render any services within a rejecting city that it does not render within a city of the first class in accordance with the plan. However, the fiscal court may determine that the rendition of any governmental service within a rejecting city is necessary for the public health, safety or welfare in which event the rejecting city may be required to pay to the county the costs of such services rendered.
  4. The city of the first class shall be bound for all the debts and liabilities and shall be the owner of all corporate property, franchises and rights of any city included within its boundaries extended as hereinabove provided and becoming a part thereof; thirty (30) days after the certification of the approval of the plan by the voters any such city shall cease to exist.

History. Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 17, § 6, effective May 18, 1956.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Collateral Attack.

Where final judgment of appellate court authorized annexation of territory by first-class city, sixth-class city could not invalidate annexation ordinance of first-class city on ground that annexation was precluded by subsection (2) of KRS 81.270 (now repealed) for first-class city to extend its boundaries and municipal services as such action was collateral attack on final judgment of appellate court and granting of supersedeas bond to stay annexation proceedings was void for Circuit Court had no jurisdiction to grant order of supersedeas to appellate court judgment. Louisville v. St. Matthews, 316 S.W.2d 210, 1958 Ky. LEXIS 31 ( Ky. 1958 ).

81.340. Plan to be advertised.

The plan described in KRS 81.300 shall be advertised by the clerk of the fiscal court by publication pursuant to KRS Chapter 424.

History. Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 17, § 7; 1966, ch. 239, § 43.

81.350. Form of question to be submitted to voters.

The question submitted to the qualified voters in the affected area under KRS 81.300 to 81.360 shall be in substantially the following form: “Do you favor the proposed Plan for the Improvement of Local Government in _______________________________________ County submitted by the fiscal court calling for (1) regrouping and reorganization of certain governmental service functions, and (2) extension of the city limits of . . . . . ? YES . . . . . NO . . . . . ”.

History. Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 17, § 8, effective May 18, 1956.

81.360. KRS 81.300 to 81.360 to be considered as alternate method of extending city boundaries and consolidating governmental services.

The method of extending the boundaries of cities of the first class, and of consolidating governmental services described in KRS 81.300 to 81.360 shall be considered as alternative to any other existing means under the law for accomplishing those purposes, or either of them.

History. Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 17, § 9, effective May 18, 1956.

81.380. Relocation of corporate boundaries of a city located in a county containing a city of the first class or consolidated local government — Effects of relocation — Filing with Secretary of State — Renaming of relocated or relocating city.

  1. Any city, located in a county containing a city of the first class or a consolidated local government, which is located within an area which is adversely affected by a public project that was initiated by a city of the first class, or by action of a joint agency of a city of the first class and its county, after June 30, 1998, or upon the expiration of the initial twelve (12) year term provided in KRS 79.310 (2) of a cooperative compact which is in effect in the county pursuant to KRS 79.310 to 79.330 , may by ordinance relocate the corporate boundaries of the city to an unincorporated area of the county. The ordinance shall set out by metes and bounds that unincorporated area of the county where the city will be relocated. The area designated for relocation shall not exceed the acreage within the then existing boundaries of the relocating city.
  2. All financial assets and legal obligations of the city shall not be altered or interrupted by a relocation.
  3. A city of the first class or a consolidated local government shall relinquish all priority rights or any rights pursuant to the terms of a cooperative compact for annexation to that unincorporated area which is designated for the relocation of a city as provided for in subsection (1) of this section. Any priority rights or any rights pursuant to the terms of a cooperative compact for annexation which are relinquished for the relocation of a city shall then be attached in the name of the city of the first class or the consolidated local government to that area which has been abandoned by the relocating city pursuant to subsection (5) of this section. The relocating city shall forward a copy of the ordinance adopted pursuant to subsection (1) of this section to the mayor of the consolidated local government or the mayor of the city of the first class and the county judge/executive of the county.
  4. The right of a city to relocate is in no way meant to amend any provision of the statutes which govern the formation and operation of a cooperative compact created pursuant to KRS 79.310 to 79.330 .
  5. Upon the relocation of a city, the city clerk shall forward to the Secretary of State within one (1) year from the date of the relocation, a document listing the name of the city, the date of the relocation, the present classification of the city, and a certified copy of the ordinance adopted pursuant to subsection (1) of this section. If a city fails to comply with this subsection, it shall be barred from receiving state moneys until the city complies.
  6. Until ninety percent (90%) of the residential properties located within the relocating city’s boundaries are acquired for the public project, the boundaries of the city shall include both the old city site and the area designated for the location of the new site of the city.
  7. After ninety percent (90%) of the residential properties have been acquired as set forth in subsection (6) of this section, the boundaries of the city shall no longer include the area where the city existed before relocation.
  8. A city that is relocating, or has been relocated, according to the provisions of this section may change the name of the city by the adoption of an ordinance by the city legislative body. Any person objecting to renaming the relocating or relocated city under this section may present a petition objecting to the renaming of the city by submitting the petition to the county clerk of the county in which the city is located. The petition shall be in the following form: “The registered voters living within (provide the name of the existing relocating or relocated city) hereby object to the question of the renaming of the city.” If the petition is signed and dated by at least twenty-five percent (25%) of the registered voters residing in the relocating or relocated city, an election shall be held on the question of renaming the city. The county clerk shall examine the petition and verify the validity of the signatures. If a petition containing at least twenty-five percent (25%) of the registered voters residing in the relocating or relocated city is submitted to the county clerk, and certified by the county clerk as sufficient, by the second Tuesday in August, the question of renaming the relocating or relocated city shall be placed on the ballot for the next general election. The ballot shall contain at least two (2) but no more than four (4) names as potential new names for the relocating or relocated city.
  9. Upon the act of renaming a city, the city clerk shall forward to the Secretary of State, within one (1) year from the date of the renaming, a document listing the new name of the city, the date of the renaming, the present classification of the city, and a certified copy of the ordinance adopted in accordance with KRS 83A.060 . If a city fails to comply with the provisions of this subsection, it shall be barred from receiving state moneys until the city complies.

History. Enact. Acts 1996, ch. 159, § 1, effective July 15, 1996; 1998, ch. 217, § 1, effective July 15, 1998; 2000, ch. 224, § 1, effective July 14, 2000; 2002, ch. 346, § 89, effective July 15, 2002; 2006, ch. 220, § 1, effective July 12, 2006.

Merger of Contiguous Cities

81.410. Authority to merge — Ordinances.

  1. Any two or more contiguous cities in the Commonwealth may merge or consolidate into one (1) city by a majority vote of each city at elections called for such purpose.
  2. The legislative bodies of each of the cities desiring to merge or consolidate shall enact ordinances proposing the merger or consolidation and calling elections in the respective cities to determine the desire of the voters.

History. Enact. Acts 1960, ch. 194, §§ 1, 2, effective March 25, 1960.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

Covington v. Beck, 586 S.W.2d 284, 1979 Ky. App. LEXIS 453 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Where the city councils of two cities passed ordinances calling for a vote on the merger of the two cities, the newly elected council of one of the cities had no legal authority to repeal the ordinance enacted by its predecessor council. OAG 64-9 .

As the result of a merger of two cities pursuant to the terms of this section and KRS 81.420 to 81.440 , a new city is created and the old cities are abolished. KRS 81.430 preserves only the tenure members of the two legislative bodies and abolishes all other elective offices including police judge which must be filled by the combined legislative bodies pursuant to KRS 86.240 (repealed) in the case of cities of the fourth class. The unexpired term will have to be filled at the next regular election pursuant to Ky. Const., § 152. OAG 67-149 .

Any two contiguous cities located within the Commonwealth of Kentucky may merge or consolidate even though one of the cities is located in an adjoining county but a city could not annex any contiguous territory that was located in an adjoining county. OAG 73-839 .

81.420. Election whether to merge.

  1. Elections shall be held at the next regular election if the ordinances of the legislative bodies of the cities desiring merger or consolidation have been filed with the county clerk not later than the second Tuesday in August preceding the regular election. The qualifications of voters and all other matters in regard to the election shall be governed by the general election laws. The question shall be submitted in substantially the following form:

    “Are you in favor of merging or consolidating the city of _________ and the city of _________ into one city, to be known as the city of . . . . . ”?

    yes _________

    no _________

  2. If a majority of the legal votes cast at the election in all of the cities, each city being a separate unit in the elections, proposing to merge or consolidate shall favor the merger or consolidation, then thirty (30) days after the certification of the results of the election the cities shall become one (1) city of the class and organizational structure of the largest of the old cities, but if a majority of the legal voters in either city vote “No,” the merger or consolidation shall fail.
  3. In addition to other public notice requirements, a merged or consolidated city shall comply with the provisions of KRS 81A.470 , but shall not be required to comply with the provisions of KRS 81A.475 .

History. Enact. Acts 1960, ch. 194, §§ 3, 4, effective March 25, 1960; 1990, ch. 224, § 1, effective July 13, 1990; 1996, ch. 195, § 21, effective July 15, 1996; 2011, ch. 78, § 2, effective June 8, 2011.

Opinions of Attorney General.

Approval of a merger of two cities by referendum would result in the two cities becoming one thirty days after certification of the results of the referendum and if the thirty-day period ended prior to the inception of the newly elected officers’ term, the election would become a nullity and vacancies would exist, and the filling of same would be governed by third-class city law under which the merging cities would operate. OAG 75-494 .

81.430. Legislative bodies of merged cities.

  1. The members of the legislative bodies of the merging cities shall continue to hold their offices in the new city, until their respective terms of office expire, and shall constitute a combined legislative body of the new city.
  2. At the expiration of the terms of office of the combined legislative body members, which in no case shall be greater than two (2) years, an election shall be held to elect the correct member of legislative body members as required by the organizational structure of the city pursuant to KRS 83A.030 . The election shall be governed by the general election laws and shall be held at the same time as other city elections.
  3. If any member of the combined legislative body resigns his office prior to the expiration of the term of the office, the resignation shall be subject to one (1) of the following provisions:
    1. If after the resignation, the total number of combined legislative body members is greater than will be required by the organizational structure for the legislative body of the newly merged city, the vacancy shall not be filled and the provisions of KRS 83A.040 shall not apply; or
    2. If after the resignation, the total number of combined legislative body members is less than will be required by the organizational structure for the legislative body of the newly merged city, the vacancy shall be filled as provided by KRS 83A.040 .

History. Enact. Acts 1960, ch. 194, § 5, effective March 25, 1960; 1990, ch. 224, § 2, effective July 13, 1990.

Opinions of Attorney General.

In case of a merger of two cities this section preserves only the tenure of the two legislative bodies and there must be an election to fill other elective offices. OAG 67-149 .

Where at a general election the voters of three cities voted to merge and at the same election elected five trustees to assume office on January 1, following the election, the election of the trustees would be a nullity and five vacancies would automatically be created in the board of trustees for the newly created city. OAG 67-518 .

81.440. Obligations and special taxes are unimpaired.

A merger or consolidation shall not impair contractual obligations of either of the combined cities. Tax levies authorized for the payment of interest and the retirement of bonds or to create sinking funds for such purposes shall continue to be levied and collected over the same area by and for the new governing body in accordance with the laws under which the levies were originally made until all bonded obligations of the old city have been retired.

History. Enact. Acts 1960, ch. 194, § 6, effective March 25, 1960.

Transfer of Incorporated Territory

81.500. Transfer of incorporated areas between cities of the home rule class.

  1. When two (2) cities of the home rule class have a common boundary and it is determined that a specified area within one (1) city can be better served by the adjoining city, the specified incorporated area may be transferred to the adjoining city upon enactment of identical ordinances by each city legislative body and the submission of a petition in support of the transfer signed by voters in the area to be transferred.
  2. The ordinances declaring the transfer of property between two (2) cities shall include, but not be limited to, the following:
    1. A definition of the area to be transferred;
    2. A statement of the financial considerations between the two (2) cities regarding the area and the terms of any financial agreements;
    3. The resolution of any taxes or revenues from the area; and
    4. A statement of the land use or zoning regulations which would be applicable to the area being transferred if planning and zoning is in effect pursuant to KRS Chapter 100 in either city.
  3. Prior to the effective date of the transfer of the property, a petition in support of the transfer, containing a number of signatures of residents in the area to be transferred which is not less than fifty-one percent (51%) of the number of registered voters in the area to be transferred, shall be submitted to the county clerk of the county from which the property is being transferred. The county clerk shall within ten (10) working days of receipt of the petition notify each city of the validity of each signature and address on the petition. No petition shall be required to be submitted when the property proposed for transfer contains no residents and the property owners consent in writing to the transfer.
  4. The enactment of ordinances by each city shall be pursuant to KRS 83A.060 .
  5. The authority for the transfer of incorporated property between cities shall be exclusive of the provisions of KRS 81A.440 .
  6. In addition to other public notice requirements, cities involved in the transfer of incorporated areas between cities shall comply with the provisions of KRS 81A.470 and 81A.475 .
  7. The incorporated area being transferred shall assume the local option status of the city to which it is being transferred.

History. Enact. Acts 1992, ch. 17, § 1, effective February 28, 1992; 2014, ch. 92, § 5, effective January 1, 2015.

CHAPTER 81A Annexation

81A.005. Annexation by city of first class that has in effect a cooperative compact with its county.

  1. When a city of the first class, which has in effect a compact with the county pursuant to KRS 79.310 to 79.330 , desires to annex unincorporated territory, the legislative body of the city shall enact an ordinance stating the intention of the city to annex. If an ordinance proposing to annex unincorporated territory has been enacted prior to July 15, 1986, and the ordinance annexing the territory to the city has not been enacted, then in order for the city to annex the territory during the time the compact is in effect, the legislative body of the city shall reenact the ordinance only including the same territory as the original and stating the intention of the city to annex. Such ordinances shall accurately define the boundary of the unincorporated territory proposed to be annexed, and declare it desirable to annex the unincorporated territory.
  2. The mayor of the city shall deliver a certified copy of the ordinance to the county clerk of the county in which the territory proposed to be annexed is located, who shall have prepared to be placed before the voters in each precinct embraced in whole or in part within the territory proposed to be annexed the question: “Are you in favor of being annexed to the city of  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ?” If only a part of any precinct is embraced within the territory proposed to be annexed only persons who reside within the territory proposed to be annexed shall be permitted to vote. The question shall be submitted to the voters at the next regular election if the ordinance is filed with the county clerk not later than the second Tuesday in August preceding the regular election. The clerk shall cause the sheriff or sheriffs to deliver to the election officers in each precinct in the appropriate counties copies of the ordinance proposing to annex:
    1. If more than fifty percent (50%) of those voting on the question approve of the annexation, the legislative body may proceed to annex the territory. Within sixty (60) days of the certification of the election results in which more than fifty percent (50%) of those voting in the election approved the annexation, the legislative body of the city may enact an ordinance annexing to the city the territory described in the ordinance. Upon enactment of the ordinance the territory shall become part of the city for all purposes; or
    2. If fifty percent (50%) or less of those voting on the question approve the annexation, the ordinance proposing annexation shall become ineffectual for any purpose, subject to the provisions of KRS 81A.460 .
  3. Once the ordinance stating the intention of the city to annex an area has been given its first reading or enacted by the city legislative body, no part of such area may be incorporated or be annexed by another city, unless such incorporation or annexation is pending at the time the ordinance is given its first reading, until the annexation proposal by the city of the first class is defeated pursuant to subsection (2) of this section or until the ordinance is withdrawn, repealed, or amended as to the area to be annexed according to subsection (4) of this section. This subsection shall apply to any proposing ordinance which has had a first reading or has been enacted as of January 1, 1986. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this subsection, any annexation by a city other than the first class or incorporation prior to January 1, 1986, shall not be nullified by the application of KRS 79.310 to 79.330 ; provided, however, that any city of the first class shall retain any legal annexation priorities which existed on January 1, 1986, to the territory so annexed or incorporated. All pending litigation challenging annexation of a specific unincorporated territory by the city of the first class arising from ordinances proposing to annex such territory enacted prior to July 15, 1986, shall, at the discretion of the court, be remanded on the docket of the appropriate court without prejudice during the term of the compact.
  4. The legislative body of the city may elect to amend the description of the territory proposed to be annexed under an ordinance stating the intention of the city to annex an area as described in subsection (1) of this section at any time after June 1, 1998, and prior to September 30, 1998, for the purpose of excluding a specific area or areas from the ordinance in order to permit these areas to be annexed by an abutting city located in the county according to KRS 81A.412 . Amendment of the ordinance according to this subsection shall not affect the priority granted this annexation proposal according to subsection (3) of this section.

History. Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 77, § 6, effective July 15, 1986; 1996, ch. 195, § 42, effective July 15, 1996; 1998, ch. 104, § 2, effective June 1, 1998.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Priorities.

Because a cooperative agreement was in effect when a first-class city sought to annex certain property, and because reintroduction of its first reading every six (6) months was a savings clause to keep the first reading from expiring, KRS 81A.005(3) and KRS 79.310 gave annexation priority to the first-class city over a fourth-class city. Louisville/Jefferson County Metro Gov't v. City of Prospect, 277 S.W.3d 227, 2009 Ky. LEXIS 6 ( Ky. 2009 ).

81A.010. Annexation of unincorporated territory or reduction of territory by first-class city — Effect of compact.

  1. The boundaries of cities of the first class, except for a city which has in effect a compact with the county pursuant to KRS 79.310 to 79.330 , shall remain as established by law until changed as provided in this section or KRS 81A.020 , 81A.440 , or through merger with a contiguous city pursuant to KRS 81.410 to 81.440 . Whenever such city of the first class desires to annex any unincorporated territory or to reduce the boundaries of the city, the city legislative body may enact an ordinance, defining accurately the boundary of the territory proposed to be annexed or stricken off. The ordinance shall be published pursuant to KRS Chapter 424. In not less than thirty (30) days after the enactment of the ordinance, if the publication has been made and no petition has been filed in the Circuit Court as provided in KRS 81A.020 , the city legislative body may enact another ordinance annexing to the city or striking from the city the territory described in the ordinance. Upon the enactment of this ordinance, the territory shall become part of the city, or be stricken from the city.
  2. The boundaries of any city of the first class which has in effect a compact with the county pursuant to KRS 79.310 to 79.330 shall remain as established by law unless changed pursuant to the procedure set out in KRS 81A.005 . Upon the termination of such compact, boundary changes shall be governed by subsection (1) of this section.

History. 2760, 2761: amend. Acts 1966, ch. 239, § 37; 1984, ch. 416, § 13, effective July 13, 1984; 1986, ch. 77, § 7, effective July 15, 1986.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section was formerly compiled as KRS 81.100 and was renumbered by the Reviser under authority of KRS 7.136 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Construction.

This section was repealed insofar as it was in conflict with subsection (1) (b) of KRS 424.130 regarding the number of times the proposing ordinance in the annexation process of a second-class city should be published. Vincent v. Bowling Green, 349 S.W.2d 694, 1961 Ky. LEXIS 60 ( Ky. 1961 ). (decision prior to 1966 amendment).

2. City.

In annexation statutes the word “city” means a city that has existed and functioned as such over a sufficient period of time to establish an interest or prosperity. Hannah v. South Shore, 332 S.W.2d 247, 1959 Ky. LEXIS 12 ( Ky. 1959 ).

3. Existence.

Where three months after incorporation city attempted to annex surrounding territory that had area three times that of city and twice the population and in three-month period, with exception of police protection, city had not provided any of the usual municipal services such as water, street lights, sewage collection and disposal and fire protection, it was not in existence and functioning as a city so as to give a history and experience from which interest necessary for annexation could be found. Hannah v. South Shore, 332 S.W.2d 247, 1959 Ky. LEXIS 12 ( Ky. 1959 ).

4. Strict Compliance.

Since the process of annexation and de-annexation are children of the legislature and involve critical property and economic rights of property owners, the procedures set out by the statutes must be followed precisely. Louisville v. Fiscal Court of Jefferson County, 623 S.W.2d 219, 1981 Ky. LEXIS 282 ( Ky. 1981 ).

5. Boundaries.

Boundary line as fixed by map of city and as practically interpreted for over 20 years by lot owners and city should be deemed legally established boundary as regards imposition of city taxes upon lots within boundary, notwithstanding that uncertainty as to proper direction of one boundary of city could only be determined by authoritative construction of statute fixing it. Belknap v. Louisville, 93 Ky. 444 , 20 S.W. 309, 14 Ky. L. Rptr. 420 , 1892 Ky. LEXIS 107 ( Ky. 1892 ).

6. Striking Annexed Territory.

Where annexation ordinance has been passed and has become effective the annexed territory can only be stricken from the city by the method set out in this section and KRS 81.110 (now KRS 81A.020 ) and this method must be followed. Kaelin v. Indian Hills, 286 S.W.2d 898, 1956 Ky. LEXIS 428 ( Ky. 1956 ).

The board of commissioners of a second-class city had no authority to place on the general election ballot an initiated ordinance proposing to strike two recently annexed areas from the city boundaries, where the statute providing for legislation by initiative had been repealed before the proposed ordinance was submitted to the board of commissioners. Jacober v. Board of Comm'rs, 607 S.W.2d 126, 1980 Ky. App. LEXIS 374 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980).

7. Conditional Annexation.

An agreement between a first-class city and property owners in a proposed annexed area, which provided for a limited annexation subject to a condition subsequent whereby the individual owners could terminate the agreement and de-annex the property at their discretion, was invalid since this section and KRS 81A.020 provide a specific method for a first-class city to reduce its boundaries through de-annexation and nothing appears in the annexation statutes which allows an annexation on a condition subsequent permitting de-annexation at the whim of an annexed property owner. Louisville v. Fiscal Court of Jefferson County, 623 S.W.2d 219, 1981 Ky. LEXIS 282 ( Ky. 1981 ).

8. Piecemeal Annexation.

Court erred in entering summary judgment as to part of territory described in annexation ordinance for annexation ordinance must stand or fall as a whole as piecemeal annexation is not permitted. Donovan v. Louisville, 299 S.W.2d 636, 1956 Ky. LEXIS 49 ( Ky. 1956 ).

9. Ordinance.

Since the intent of the procedure embraced in the preliminary ordinance required by this section is to give persons in the sought-after territory notice that they are about to be annexed, such ordinance is a notice procedure comparable to the notice procedure with which such actions start and is not a general ordinance within the meaning of KRS 83.100 (repealed) and is not required to be included in compilation of ordinances required by KRS 83.100 (repealed). Donovan v. Louisville, 299 S.W.2d 636, 1956 Ky. LEXIS 49 ( Ky. 1956 ).

10. — Publication.

A newspaper is “published” in the place from which it emanates for “circulation.” Phillips v. Florence, 314 S.W.2d 938, 1958 Ky. LEXIS 320 ( Ky. 1958 ) (decision prior to 1966 amendment).

11. Pleadings.

In an annexation proceeding the city may amend its pleadings to show the adoption of a second ordinance which correctly describes the area to be annexed. Hopperton v. Covington, 415 S.W.2d 381, 1967 Ky. LEXIS 316 ( Ky. 1967 ).

12. Judgment.

There is no statutory provision delaying the action of the city legislative body any longer after a judgment favorable to annexation is obtained in the Circuit Court. Hocker v. Fisher, 590 S.W.2d 342, 1979 Ky. App. LEXIS 486 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).

13. Appeal.

Once a verdict and judgment in the Circuit Court are obtained upholding annexation, the city may proceed to annex the territory despite the fact that the judgment may be appealed to the Court of Appeals. Taustine v. Fleig, 374 S.W.2d 508, 1964 Ky. LEXIS 382 ( Ky. 1964 ).

14. Remonstrance.

The trial court could properly dismiss plaintiffs’ remonstrance action without prejudice over plaintiffs’ objection when the city’s legislative body repealed the annexation ordinance prior to any adjudication, but enacted a new ordinance proposing a similar annexation prior to the entry of the order of dismissal. Powell v. Campbellsburg, 563 S.W.2d 488, 1978 Ky. App. LEXIS 483 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).

Cited:

Sanitation Dist. of Jefferson County v. Louisville, 308 Ky. 368 , 213 S.W.2d 995, 1948 Ky. LEXIS 879 ( Ky. 1948 ); Pfeiffer v. Louisville, 240 S.W.2d 560, 1951 Ky. LEXIS 973 ( Ky. 1951 ); Yount v. Frankfort, 255 S.W.2d 632, 1953 Ky. LEXIS 676 ( Ky. 1953 ); Garner v. Lexington, 306 S.W.2d 305, 1957 Ky. LEXIS 48 ( Ky. 1957 ); Eddyville v. Kuttawa, 343 S.W.2d 404, 1961 Ky. LEXIS 422 ( Ky. 1961 ); McClain v. Independence, 351 S.W.2d 512, 1961 Ky. LEXIS 173 ( Ky. 1961 ); Voorhes v. Lexington, 377 S.W.2d 57, 1964 Ky. LEXIS 475 ( Ky. 1964 ); Danville v. Wilson, 395 S.W.2d 583, 1965 Ky. LEXIS 151 ( Ky. 1965 ); Corn v. Windy Hills, 528 S.W.2d 668, 1975 Ky. LEXIS 66 ( Ky. 1975 ); Wakefield v. Shelbyville, 563 S.W.2d 756, 1978 Ky. App. LEXIS 491 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Cities of the fifth class are authorized to annex adjacent property under this statute and KRS 81.110 (now KRS 81A.020 ) and 81.230 (repealed.) OAG 68-161 .

What constitutes a sufficient description of territory proposed to be annexed or stricken off is a question of fact for judicial determination. OAG 68-400 .

Citizens of an annexed territory are given the right to protest an annexation but not to vote on it. OAG 69-647 .

The provisions of this section, KRS 81.110 (now KRS 81A.020 ) and 81.140 (repealed) do not violate the principle of “one man, one vote” as announced in Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 88 S. Ct. 1114, 20 L. Ed. 2d 45, 1968 U.S. LEXIS 2061 (1968), as the question of annexation under Kentucky law, is not one submitted to a vote of the people of either the city or annexed territory. OAG 70-77 .

Though the citizens of a particular unincorporated territory proposed to be annexed have the right by statute to protest annexation, they have no right to initiate annexation by petition. OAG 71-542 .

The provisions of KRS 424.130(1) (a) would be applicable with respect to the publication of the initial ordinance referred to in this section. OAG 72-828 .

If no petition has been filed within 30 days after the enactment of an initial ordinance under this section and the ordinance has been published within the 30-day period, the city may thereafter enact a second ordinance striking the territory from the city and such action would be final. OAG 72-828 .

Cities of the fifth class are empowered to annex territory pursuant to the procedure outlined in this section and KRS 81.110 (now renumbered as KRS 81A.020 ), which permits one or more residents or freeholders of the territory proposed to be annexed to file a petition in Circuit Court protesting against annexation but there is no statutory authority for submitting such question to a vote of the people. OAG 75-550 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Extension of boundaries of city of first class, KRS 81.300 to 81.360 .

Sewers, construction of branch or lateral lines in certain annexed territory to connect with city’s sewer or drainage system, KRS 76.171 to 76.173 .

Territory annexed to first-class city becomes part of metropolitan sewer district, KRS 76.170 .

81A.020. Protest against annexation of unincorporated territory or reduction of territory by city of the first class — Trial — Judgment.

  1. Within thirty (30) days after the enactment of an ordinance proposing to annex unincorporated territory to a first-class city, or to reduce its limits, one or more residents or freeholders of the territory proposed to be annexed or stricken off may file a petition in the Circuit Court of the county, setting forth the reasons why the territory or any part of it should not be annexed, or why the limits should not be reduced. Summons shall issue on the petition and be executed on the chief executive officer of the city, and the answer of the city shall be filed within twenty (20) days after service of the summons. The case shall be tried according to the practice prescribed for the trial of jury cases.
  2. If the jury finds, upon a hearing, that less than seventy-five percent (75%) of the freeholders of the territory to be annexed or stricken off have remonstrated, and that the adding or striking off of the territory will be for the interest of the city, and will cause no manifest injury to the persons owning real estate in the territory sought to be annexed or stricken off, the annexation or reduction shall be approved and become final. If the jury finds that seventy-five percent (75%) or more of the resident freeholders of the territory sought to be annexed or stricken off have remonstrated, the annexation or reduction shall not take place, unless the jury finds from the evidence that a failure to annex or strike off will materially retard the prosperity of the city, and of the owners and inhabitants of the territory sought to be annexed or stricken off, in which case the annexation or reduction shall take place notwithstanding the remonstrance.
  3. An appeal from the judgment may be taken as in other cases, but there shall be no change of venue from the county. Costs shall follow the judgment.
  4. The judgment shall, when entered, be certified to the city legislative body, which may thereupon annex to or strike from the city the territory described in the judgment, and the territory shall then become, or cease to become, a part of the city.

History. 2762, 2763.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section was formerly compiled as KRS 81.110 and was renumbered by the Reviser under the authority of KRS 7.136 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. In General.

Act relating to annexation of territory conferred that right upon legislative body, and Circuit Courts were given, not the right to review legislative action, but after judicial investigation, to adjudge whether facts existed authorizing such action by local legislature. Lewis v. Brandenburg, 105 Ky. 14 , 47 S.W. 862, 20 Ky. L. Rptr. 1011 , 1898 Ky. LEXIS 238 ( Ky. 1898 ).

It is incumbent upon the legislature to prescribe the facts and conditions under which annexation may take place, and the only function of courts is to find whether the prescribed facts and conditions exist. Louisville v. Kraft, 297 S.W.2d 39, 1956 Ky. LEXIS 12 ( Ky. 1956 ).

2. Construction.

Annexation statutes, in authorizing annexation of territory by a city, mean a city that has some substantial experience of existence for they contemplate a city that has functioned as a city for a sufficient period of time to enable some rational projection of its future needs and prospects to be made. Hardin v. St. Matthews, 240 S.W.2d 554, 1951 Ky. LEXIS 971 ( Ky. 1951 ); Louisville v. Kraft, 297 S.W.2d 39, 1956 Ky. LEXIS 12 ( Ky. 1956 ).

The language of this section and KRS 81.100 (now KRS 81A.010 ) consistently and inexorably implies that the territory “sought to be annexed” in the original ordinance is the juristic entity that must be considered. Donovan v. Louisville, 299 S.W.2d 636, 1956 Ky. LEXIS 49 ( Ky. 1956 ).

The phrase, “in the Circuit Court of the county,” in subsection (1) of this section, means in the Circuit Court of the county in which the seat of municipal government is located. Willis v. Corbin, 572 S.W.2d 610, 1978 Ky. App. LEXIS 601 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).

3. “City.”

In annexation statutes the word “city” means a city that has existed and functioned as such over a sufficient period of time to establish an interest or prosperity. Hannah v. South Shore, 332 S.W.2d 247, 1959 Ky. LEXIS 12 ( Ky. 1959 ).

4. “Manifest Injury.”

Manifest injury to persons owning real estate in territory sought to be annexed means, not some injury to some of the property owners, but manifest injury to property owners as a class or to a majority of them. City of Louisville v. Brown, 119 S.W. 1196 ( Ky. 1909 ); Louisville v. Sullivan, 302 Ky. 86 , 193 S.W.2d 1017, 1946 Ky. LEXIS 601 ( Ky. 1946 ).

Landowners in territory sought to be annexed when less than 75 percent of freeholders in such territory have remonstrated, can defeat annexation if it would cause manifest injury to them, although it might be for interest of city. Langhan v. Louisville, 186 Ky. 438 , 216 S.W. 1082, 1919 Ky. LEXIS 204 ( Ky. 1919 ).

The fact that school children would be deprived of county bus transportation in event of annexation was not sufficient to establish that annexation would adversely affect prosperity of territory sought to be annexed. Loeffler v. Louisville, 308 Ky. 629 , 215 S.W.2d 535, 1948 Ky. LEXIS 1006 ( Ky. 1948 ).

The term “manifest injury” means the clear and obvious imposition of material or substantial burdens upon the owners of the property as a class or the majority of them. Masonic Widows & Orphans Home & Infirmary v. Louisville, 309 Ky. 532 , 217 S.W.2d 815, 1948 Ky. LEXIS 1081 ( Ky. 1948 ); Louisville v. Kraft, 297 S.W.2d 39, 1956 Ky. LEXIS 12 ( Ky. 1956 ).

In attempting to discover if annexation will cause manifest injury to the property owners by applying the test of whether there will be a clear and obvious imposition of material or substantial burden on the property owners, the obligations imposed are a burden only when the benefits to be derived are disproportionately low in comparison to the load. Louisville v. Kraft, 297 S.W.2d 39, 1956 Ky. LEXIS 12 ( Ky. 1956 ).

In determining whether or not a proposed annexation will cause no manifest injury to persons owning real estate in territory sought to be annexed, a consideration often overlooked is the burden of responsibility for the proper conduct of city affairs which is placed upon freeholders who are involuntarily made city voters. Cold Spring v. Laycock, 312 S.W.2d 882, 1957 Ky. LEXIS 11 ( Ky. 1957 ).

The responsibility of city citizenship is a burden that should be taken into account in determining whether there will be manifest injury to the resident freeholders but it is not a decisive thing. Voorhes v. Lexington, 377 S.W.2d 57, 1964 Ky. LEXIS 475 ( Ky. 1964 ).

Court improperly disapproved an annexation when it based its determination on fact that those who would be injured by annexation were owners of commercial and undeveloped land who owned 76.65% of the acreage and 65.9% of the assessed value of the land to be annexed since those property owners not injured were residential owners who made up a majority of the freeholders affected by the annexation. Northfield v. Holiday Manor, Inc., 508 S.W.2d 756, 1974 Ky. LEXIS 624 ( Ky. 1974 ).

5. “Interest of City.”

In determining whether an annexation ordinance is “to the interest of a city” or of “manifest injury” to the property owners, the situations and conditions are to be considered from the standpoint of the whole; the city as an organized community and the suburban property as an unorganized community and the overall character of the property, its use and adaptability or capacity of being absorbed into the city are to be regarded and this embraces the consideration of density of population and the extent of urban development and the view to be taken is of the entire area and not the separate parcels of real estate in isolation. Masonic Widows & Orphans Home & Infirmary v. Louisville, 309 Ky. 532 , 217 S.W.2d 815, 1948 Ky. LEXIS 1081 ( Ky. 1948 ).

The term “for the interest of the city” in subsection (2) is but to say that annexation would contribute to its prosperity and be generally advantageous to the municipality. Masonic Widows & Orphans Home & Infirmary v. Louisville, 309 Ky. 532 , 217 S.W.2d 815, 1948 Ky. LEXIS 1081 ( Ky. 1948 ); Louisville v. Kraft, 297 S.W.2d 39, 1956 Ky. LEXIS 12 ( Ky. 1956 ).

Where city on same day it was incorporated passed ordinance annexing territory that was 35 times its area and contained 50 times the number of people such annexation could not be found to be for the interest of the city and therefore should not take place. Hardin v. St. Matthews, 240 S.W.2d 554, 1951 Ky. LEXIS 971 ( Ky. 1951 ).

As proposed annexation of surrounding territory would have imposed obligations on city that it could not meet such annexation was not for the best interest of the city. Cold Spring v. Laycock, 312 S.W.2d 882, 1957 Ky. LEXIS 11 ( Ky. 1957 ).

Where three months after incorporation city attempted to annex surrounding territory that had area three times that of city and twice the population and in three-month period, with exception of police protection, city had not provided any of the usual municipal services such as water, street lights, sewage collection and disposal and fire protection, it was not in existence and functioning as a city so as to give a history and experience from which interest necessary for annexation could be found. Hannah v. South Shore, 332 S.W.2d 247, 1959 Ky. LEXIS 12 ( Ky. 1959 ).

The annexation of urban territory to a city cannot be held to be contrary to the interests of the city unless the annexation would constitute an over-extension of the capacities of the city to function as a going concern. Gordon v. Louisville, 357 S.W.2d 693, 1961 Ky. LEXIS 26 ( Ky. 1961 ).

6. “Retard Prosperity.”

Statutory provisions forbidding annexation where 75 percent of freeholders of territory proposed to be annexed remonstrate, unless there is finding that failure to annex will materially retard prosperity of town and inhabitants of such territory, means that upon such remonstrance court should not annex unless it appears to be for material good of town and of inhabitants of such territory. Williamstown v. Matthews, 103 Ky. 121 , 44 S.W. 387, 19 Ky. L. Rptr. 1766 , 1898 Ky. LEXIS 35 ( Ky. 1898 ).

As used in subsection (2) of this section, the term “retard prosperity” means to delay progress of the community as gauged by its attainments in the many fields affecting the welfare of its inhabitants and owners of property comprising its territorial limits; therefore, economic, religious, social, educational, safety and sanitary conditions are factors to be taken into consideration in determining the prosperity of the community as a whole. Loeffler v. Louisville, 308 Ky. 629 , 215 S.W.2d 535, 1948 Ky. LEXIS 1006 ( Ky. 1948 ); Likins v. Clarkson, 280 S.W.2d 491, 1955 Ky. LEXIS 155 ( Ky. 1955 ).

In cases where 75 percent or more of the freeholders object to annexation, the court is required to make a finding as to whether the failure to annex will retard the prosperity of the city and obviously the legislature had in mind that the court would determine from the history and experience of the city, whether there was a tendency towards increased prosperity that might be retarded by failure to annex and the legislature could not reasonably have intended to require the court to speculate as to the possibilities of prosperity of a brand new city. Hardin v. St. Matthews, 240 S.W.2d 554, 1951 Ky. LEXIS 971 ( Ky. 1951 ).

7. Piecemeal Annexation.

Where an area sought to be annexed by Louisville consisted of all that territory lying between Louisville city limits and the city limits of St. Matthews, for purposes of determining whether or not 75 percent of property owners had remonstrated, the entire area was regarded as one unit, as against contention of various property owners that the territory was reasonably separable into more than one unit. Masonic Widows & Orphans Home & Infirmary v. Louisville, 309 Ky. 532 , 217 S.W.2d 815, 1948 Ky. LEXIS 1081 ( Ky. 1948 ).

This section does not permit residents of territory sought to be annexed by first-class city to split the territory up into parcels for purpose of resisting annexation of one or more such parcels. Pfeiffer v. Louisville, 240 S.W.2d 560, 1951 Ky. LEXIS 973 ( Ky. 1951 ).

Court erred in entering summary judgment as to part of territory described in annexation ordinance for annexation ordinance must stand or fall as a whole as piecemeal annexation is not permitted. Donovan v. Louisville, 299 S.W.2d 636, 1956 Ky. LEXIS 49 ( Ky. 1956 ).

8. Conditional Annexation.

An agreement between a first-class city and property owners in a proposed annexed area, which provided for a limited annexation subject to a condition subsequent whereby the individual owners could terminate the agreement and de-annex the property at their discretion, was invalid since KRS 81A.010 and this section provide a specific method for a first-class city to reduce its boundaries through de-annexation, and nothing appears in the annexation statutes which allows an annexation on a condition subsequent permitting de-annexation at the whim of an annexed property owner. Louisville v. Fiscal Court of Jefferson County, 623 S.W.2d 219, 1981 Ky. LEXIS 282 ( Ky. 1981 ).

9. Striking Annexed Territory.

The board of commissioners of a second-class city had no authority to place on the general election ballot an initiated ordinance proposing to strike two recently annexed areas from the city boundaries, where the statute providing for legislation by initiative had been repealed before the proposed ordinance was submitted to the board of commissioners. Jacober v. Board of Comm'rs, 607 S.W.2d 126, 1980 Ky. App. LEXIS 374 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980).

10. Delegation of Power.

Act relating to annexation of territory does not confer legislative powers on judicial department, by giving to residents of territory sought to be annexed a right to resort to Circuit Courts, not by appeal from local legislative act, but by preventive proceeding. Lewis v. Brandenburg, 105 Ky. 14 , 47 S.W. 862, 20 Ky. L. Rptr. 1011 , 1898 Ky. LEXIS 238 ( Ky. 1898 ).

The legislature cannot constitutionally delegate to the courts its policy functions in regards to municipality’s annexation of territory or leave the courts to determine as a matter of discretion or judgment whether annexation should take place. Louisville v. Kraft, 297 S.W.2d 39, 1956 Ky. LEXIS 12 ( Ky. 1956 ).

The fact that the legislature seemingly has delegated a broad range of discretion to the courts in determining annexation questions cannot be used by the courts as a justification for exercising such a discretion because the legislature has no power to make such a delegation and the courts must limit themselves to the fact-finding function, doing the best they can to draw some line between the fact and policy. Louisville v. Kraft, 297 S.W.2d 39, 1956 Ky. LEXIS 12 ( Ky. 1956 ).

11. Conflicting Annexations.

The question of comparing benefits and taxes in contemplating annexation of territory as between those of first-class city and those of sixth-class city was not for the court to decide where there was no clear and obvious disproportion between the two. Louisville v. Kraft, 297 S.W.2d 39, 1956 Ky. LEXIS 12 ( Ky. 1956 ).

If right of first-class city to annex territory was upheld, having first been initiated it would prevail over annexation of same territory by sixth-class city. Louisville v. Kraft, 297 S.W.2d 39, 1956 Ky. LEXIS 12 ( Ky. 1956 ).

12. Contiguous Territory.

The annexation of contiguous territory to a city is a legislative function which has been delegated by the General Assembly through different enactments to the legislative bodies of the several classes of municipalities but with the provision that property owners affected may obtain a review by the courts. Masonic Widows & Orphans Home & Infirmary v. Louisville, 309 Ky. 532 , 217 S.W.2d 815, 1948 Ky. LEXIS 1081 ( Ky. 1948 ).

13. Percentage of Remonstrators.

Number of remonstrants at time case is submitted should control, notwithstanding original petition of remonstrance was by less than 75 percent of resident freeholders in territory sought to be annexed; it being immaterial whether remonstrants are parties to action, their number being matter of proof, and it being proper to show that some have withdrawn and others have remonstrated. Bloomfield v. Muir, 221 Ky. 815 , 299 S.W. 976, 1927 Ky. LEXIS 833 ( Ky. 1927 ).

14. — More Than 75 Percent.

Annexation to town of large territory should not be granted without reasonably clear showing that want of territory would materially injure town, where more than 75 percent of resident owners remonstrated and territory allegedly consisted chiefly of farm lands unfit for building lots. Williamstown v. Matthews, 103 Ky. 121 , 44 S.W. 387, 19 Ky. L. Rptr. 1766 , 1898 Ky. LEXIS 35 ( Ky. 1898 ).

Annexation to town against remonstrance of more than 75 percent of the resident freeholders therein, of 12 acres already subdivided into lots and occupied by persons doing business in town and containing railroad depot, was sustained. Collins v. Crittenden, 70 S.W. 183, 24 Ky. L. Rptr. 899 (1902).

Annexation of territory between town of 140 population and railroad station which townspeople had been instrumental in having located about one-fourth mile from town should have been approved, despite protest of more than 75 percent of inhabitants of territory, where land near station was platted, and buildings and stores had been erected in territory. Fredonia v. Rice, 115 Ky. 443 , 73 S.W. 1125, 24 Ky. L. Rptr. 2331 , 1903 Ky. LEXIS 111 ( Ky. 1903 ).

Where there is remonstrance by 75 percent of freeholders in territory sought to be annexed, annexation cannot take place unless failure to annex will materially retard prosperity of city and of owners and inhabitants of such territory. City of Louisville v. Brown, 119 S.W. 1196 ( Ky. 1909 ).

Annexation to town consisting of 125 acres of which 61 acres was inaccessible farm land not available for building without construction of streets which town was financially unable to do was properly disapproved against remonstrance of more than 75 percent of resident freeholders in territory, where there were vacant lots in town. Bloomfield v. Muir, 221 Ky. 815 , 299 S.W. 976, 1927 Ky. LEXIS 833 ( Ky. 1927 ).

Under this section it has been held that, if 75 percent or more of the freeholders remonstrate, the burden is on the city to show that a failure to annex will materially retard its prosperity or of that of the owners and inhabitants of the territory sought to be annexed. Buchanan v. Dayton, 363 S.W.2d 92, 1962 Ky. LEXIS 267 ( Ky. 1962 ).

15. — Less Than 75 Percent.

Court must be satisfied that adding territory to town will be for its interest and not materially injure owners of realty in territory sought to be annexed, despite failure of 75 percent of resident freeholders to join in remonstrance. Latonia v. Hopkins, 104 Ky. 419 , 47 S.W. 248, 20 Ky. L. Rptr. 620 , 1898 Ky. LEXIS 169 ( Ky. 1898 ).

In proceeding upon annexation of territory against remonstrance of less than 75 percent of freeholders thereof, evidence should be confined to two questions: Would such annexation to city be for its interest? Would such annexation cause manifest injury to landowners in such territory? City of Louisville v. Brown, 119 S.W. 1196 ( Ky. 1909 ).

Where less than 75 percent of freeholders in territory sought to be annexed remonstrate, annexation must take place if adding such territory to city will be for its interest and will cause no manifest injury to landowners in such territory. City of Louisville v. Brown, 119 S.W. 1196 ( Ky. 1909 ).

Annexation of territory was properly granted, where less than 75 percent of resident freeholders in territory remonstrated, and territory lay between town and depot and would be benefited by proper road, lighting and police supervision. Preston v. Paintsville, 158 Ky. 700 , 166 S.W. 188, 1914 Ky. LEXIS 683 ( Ky. 1914 ).

Annexation where less than 75 percent of freeholders in territory sought to be annexed have remonstrated cannot be effectuated unless the annexation will be for interests of city and will cause no manifest injury to the freeholders in such territory. Langhan v. Louisville, 186 Ky. 438 , 216 S.W. 1082, 1919 Ky. LEXIS 204 ( Ky. 1919 ).

If less than 75 percent of freeholders remonstrate, power of court to interpose in alteration of boundaries is conditioned on finding (a) that proposed alteration is for best interest of town, and (b) that it will cause no material injury to landowners in territory affected. Adams v. Jeffersontown, 240 Ky. 482 , 42 S.W.2d 704, 1931 Ky. LEXIS 431 ( Ky. 1931 ).

Although less than 75 percent of freeholders in subdivided territory sought to be detached remonstrated, detachment was not properly granted, where it would seriously injure town by casting added debt upon portion remaining by curtailing income, and by hindering maintenance of lighting system, and also by leaving detached portion without police protection, depressing realty values and increasing fire insurance rates. Adams v. Jeffersontown, 240 Ky. 482 , 42 S.W.2d 704, 1931 Ky. LEXIS 431 ( Ky. 1931 ).

Under this section, when less than 75 percent of the property owners have remonstrated against annexation, the annexation should be upheld unless it is proved that the annexation would not be for the interest of the city and that it would cause manifest injury to the property owners. Louisville v. Sullivan, 302 Ky. 86 , 193 S.W.2d 1017, 1946 Ky. LEXIS 601 ( Ky. 1946 ).

Where there existed factual evidence, both pro and con as to the benefits that would accrue to both city and area upon the annexation of the latter, the fact that less than 75 percent of the property owners of the area protested would as a matter of law require a directed verdict in favor of such annexation. Louisville v. Sullivan, 302 Ky. 86 , 193 S.W.2d 1017, 1946 Ky. LEXIS 601 ( Ky. 1946 ).

16. Public Services.

Annexation should not be denied on theory that protestant in territory sought to be annexed would not receive benefits of city government, because territory had not been assigned to ward and ward boundaries could not be altered for several years, nor because he would not receive water and gas, since presumption obtains that public services will in due time be extended into annexed territory. Specht v. Louisville, 58 S.W. 607, 22 Ky. L. Rptr. 699 , 1900 Ky. LEXIS 311 (Ky. Ct. App. 1900).

17. Incorporation Pending Annexation.

Where town was incorporated after enactment of proposal ordinance for annexation by first-class city with full knowledge of annexation proposal, the enactment of such ordinance did not preclude town from incorporating pending decision regarding annexation nor did such incorporation bar annexation plan of city under this section requiring it to complete its annexation proceedings under KRS 81.120 (now KRS 81A.030 and now repealed). Pfeiffer v. Louisville, 240 S.W.2d 560, 1951 Ky. LEXIS 973 ( Ky. 1951 ).

18. Jurisdiction.

While a remonstrance suit is pending which involves a unit of territory sought to be annexed, Circuit Court has exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether or not a part thereof should be annexed and city has no power or authority to enact legislation which invades the court’s jurisdiction of the subject matter. Garner v. Lexington, 306 S.W.2d 305, 1957 Ky. LEXIS 48 ( Ky. 1957 ); overruled on other grounds, King v. Corbin, 535 S.W.2d 85, 1976 Ky. LEXIS 85 ( Ky. 1976 ).

19. Remonstrance.

Validity of an annexation ordinance may be questioned independently of a remonstrance suit. Garner v. Lexington, 306 S.W.2d 305, 1957 Ky. LEXIS 48 ( Ky. 1957 ); overruled on other grounds, King v. Corbin, 535 S.W.2d 85, 1976 Ky. LEXIS 85 ( Ky. 1976 ).

Where city passed ordinance proposing to annex unincorporated territory and residents and freeholders of that territory remonstrated against such annexation and, while the remonstrance suit was pending, city passed second ordinance proposing to annex a part of the territory annexed in the first ordinance, such residents and freeholders could challenge the second ordinance even though they were not residents and freeholders of the territory proposed to be annexed in the second ordinance. Garner v. Lexington, 306 S.W.2d 305, 1957 Ky. LEXIS 48 ( Ky. 1957 ); overruled on other grounds, King v. Corbin, 535 S.W.2d 85, 1976 Ky. LEXIS 85 ( Ky. 1976 ).

The trial court could properly dismiss plaintiffs’ remonstrance action without prejudice over plaintiffs’ objection when the city’s legislative body repealed the annexation ordinance prior to any adjudication, but enacted a new ordinance proposing a similar annexation prior to the entry of the order of dismissal. Powell v. Campbellsburg, 563 S.W.2d 488, 1978 Ky. App. LEXIS 483 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).

20. — Petitions.

Circuit Court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to file supplemental petitions in suit protesting annexation by city where petition which pleaded that ordinance did not accurately define any territory to be annexed brought in a new issue one year after the original petition had been filed and after the jury had been sworn. Masonic Widows & Orphans Home & Infirmary v. Louisville, 309 Ky. 532 , 217 S.W.2d 815, 1948 Ky. LEXIS 1081 ( Ky. 1948 ).

Where freeholders filed action opposing annexation by city against 12 members of the board of common council but failed to name the city in its corporate capacity and later amended the petition to include the city as a party defendant, the amendment, being filed more than 20 days after the enactment of the ordinance, was untimely and did not relate back to the time when the original petition was filed. Danville v. Wilson, 395 S.W.2d 583, 1965 Ky. LEXIS 151 ( Ky. 1965 ).

21. — Timely Filing.

Action of remonstrance against annexation was properly dismissed where petition was not filed for more than 60 days after enactment of ordinance proposing annexation and hence after time allowed for filing same; that second ordinance was likewise published is irrelevant. Keathley v. Jenkins, 194 Ky. 156 , 238 S.W. 377, 1922 Ky. LEXIS 120 ( Ky. 1922 ).

Subsection (1) of this section requiring city to file answer to remonstrance petition within 20 days after service of the summons on the petition opposing annexation, is not mandatory. Yount v. Frankfort, 255 S.W.2d 632, 1953 Ky. LEXIS 676 ( Ky. 1953 ).

Where annexation ordinance was published on January 21, although adopted January 13, a remonstrance suit filed the following February 12, was timely. Shepherdsville v. Gentry, 395 S.W.2d 564, 1965 Ky. LEXIS 147 ( Ky. 1965 ).

An industrial plan may maintain an action to invalidate an annexation ordinance which fails to comply with statutory criteria, even though the plant has not filed a remonstrance suit within the 30-day statute of limitations. Erlanger v. American Isowall Corp., 607 S.W.2d 128, 1980 Ky. App. LEXIS 375 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980).

22. — Trial Procedure.

This section contemplates that the issues in a cause involving annexation should be tried according to the practice prescribed for the trial of jury cases. Sullivan v. Louisville, 295 Ky. 68 , 173 S.W.2d 981, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 202 ( Ky. 1943 ).

Provision in this section that issue of annexation should be tried by jury did not give protestants of annexation the absolute right to have jury decide the question in light of a finding by the court that protestants had not presented sufficient evidence to take the case to the jury, and peremptory instruction for annexation was not a violation of the protestants’ constitutional right to trial by jury. Masonic Widows & Orphans Home & Infirmary v. Louisville, 309 Ky. 532 , 217 S.W.2d 815, 1948 Ky. LEXIS 1081 ( Ky. 1948 ).

23. — Proof.

City council must determine what territory it will seek to annex, and after such determination proof cannot be made that it excluded certain rich men and included only poor persons. City of Louisville v. Brown, 119 S.W. 1196 ( Ky. 1909 ).

24. — Instructions.

Instruction in action resisting annexation where less than 75 percent of freeholders in territory sought to be annexed have remonstrated should have used disjunctive “or” instead of conjunctive “and,” in sentence “ . . . . . will be for its interest and cause no manifest injury to persons . . . . . ” Langhan v. Louisville, 186 Ky. 438 , 216 S.W. 1082, 1919 Ky. LEXIS 204 ( Ky. 1919 ).

Where majority of property owners protesting annexation could show no injury that would result from annexation, other than requirement of paying city taxes, peremptory instruction that jury find for annexation was proper. Masonic Widows & Orphans Home & Infirmary v. Louisville, 309 Ky. 532 , 217 S.W.2d 815, 1948 Ky. LEXIS 1081 ( Ky. 1948 ); Louisville v. Kraft, 297 S.W.2d 39, 1956 Ky. LEXIS 12 ( Ky. 1956 ).

25. — Successive Actions.

Where preceding case concerning annexation of territory was mentioned in subsequent case and where the petition in the subsequent proceeding identified it with the preceding action it was proper to sustain a general demurrer to the subsequent proceeding. Pfeiffer v. Louisville, 240 S.W.2d 560, 1951 Ky. LEXIS 973 ( Ky. 1951 ).

Where prior case concerned same ground as to annexation of territory as subsequent proceeding the judgment in prior case in favor of first class city’s proposal to annex the territory determined all the issues in the subsequent proceeding. Pfeiffer v. Louisville, 240 S.W.2d 560, 1951 Ky. LEXIS 973 ( Ky. 1951 ).

26. — Subdivisions.

Where city proposed to annex two separate subdivisions lying on one side of a street and a third separate subdivision wherein protestants resided on the other side of the street, this section authorized protestants residing in one of the subdivisions in the proposed annexation, to make protest as far as their respective subdivisions were concerned. Sullivan v. Louisville, 295 Ky. 68 , 173 S.W.2d 981, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 202 ( Ky. 1943 ).

27. — Multiple Suits.

Notwithstanding that several actions were pending protesting against annexation, city need not try every such suit before enactment of final ordinance extending city limits proposed in ordinance as required by this section if one of such actions had been determined favorably to annexation, thus authorizing final action by council. Specht v. Louisville, 58 S.W. 607, 22 Ky. L. Rptr. 699 , 1900 Ky. LEXIS 311 (Ky. Ct. App. 1900).

Although there may be more than one representative suit protesting annexation of a part or all of the proposed territory to be annexed under subsection (1) of this section, the actual decision of one of them under subsection (2) of this section covers the entire territory to be annexed as a unit and consequently decides them all. Pfeiffer v. Louisville, 240 S.W.2d 560, 1951 Ky. LEXIS 973 ( Ky. 1951 ).

28. — Second Ordinance.

Where city passed ordinance proposing to annex unincorporated area and remonstrance suit was filed against such annexation, city could not pass second ordinance proposing annexation of a part of the territory annexed in the first suit for court had exclusive jurisdiction of whether or not a part of such territory should be annexed and second ordinance was void and ineffective. Garner v. Lexington, 306 S.W.2d 305, 1957 Ky. LEXIS 48 ( Ky. 1957 ); overruled on other grounds, King v. Corbin, 535 S.W.2d 85, 1976 Ky. LEXIS 85 ( Ky. 1976 ).

29. Evidence.

Remonstrance to city council alleging facts showing that annexation ought not to take place was not properly admissible in evidence, except, perhaps, that part disclosing that property owners remonstrating and their names. City of Louisville v. Brown, 119 S.W. 1196 ( Ky. 1909 ).

In suit to protest annexation of certain territory, court refused to admit evidence on part of protesting property owners that the annexation plan in question was only a part of a larger plan and that the city was in no position to extend municipal services and had made no plans for the extension of governmental services to the entire larger area that included their particular area. Masonic Widows & Orphans Home & Infirmary v. Louisville, 309 Ky. 532 , 217 S.W.2d 815, 1948 Ky. LEXIS 1081 ( Ky. 1948 ).

Technical books of statistics sought to be offered in evidence by property owners protesting annexation, setting out that in cities of over 250,000 population and under 1,000,000, an increase in residential area and population increases the per capita cost of government, and decreases the relative prosperity of the city, were excluded by the court as being too speculative to have any probative value. Masonic Widows & Orphans Home & Infirmary v. Louisville, 309 Ky. 532 , 217 S.W.2d 815, 1948 Ky. LEXIS 1081 ( Ky. 1948 ).

30. — Judicial Review of Municipal Services.

If the evidence shows that the cost of providing municipal services to an area to be annexed is economically feasible, it is not a proper function of court to determine whether it is economically unwise. Hopperton v. Covington, 415 S.W.2d 381, 1967 Ky. LEXIS 316 ( Ky. 1967 ).

31. — Findings.

Trial court engaged in fact-finding as directed in this section must make its findings in light of conditions existing at the time of the trial rather than conditions at the time the annexation ordinance was enacted. Sullivan v. Paducah, 547 S.W.2d 769, 1977 Ky. App. LEXIS 633 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).

32. — Burden of Proof.

Burden of proof was upon remonstrant to show how many property owners were in territory sought to be annexed and how many of them remonstrated. City of Louisville v. Brown, 119 S.W. 1196 ( Ky. 1909 ).

Burden is upon remonstrants to show conditions entitling them to relief, if remonstrance is signed by less than 75 percent of freeholders. Adams v. Jeffersontown, 240 Ky. 482 , 42 S.W.2d 704, 1931 Ky. LEXIS 431 ( Ky. 1931 ).

Burden is upon town to show conditions warranting further proceeding if 75 percent or more of the freeholders protest against proposed change. Adams v. Jeffersontown, 240 Ky. 482 , 42 S.W.2d 704, 1931 Ky. LEXIS 431 ( Ky. 1931 ).

If annexation would be to the interest of the city, where less than 75 percent of the owners of property in the area have remonstrated, the ordinance of annexation is to be declared effectual unless the protestants have shown it would cause them manifest injury; the protestants carry the burden of proving it would not be to the interest of the city and would cause manifest injury to the property holders. Masonic Widows & Orphans Home & Infirmary v. Louisville, 309 Ky. 532 , 217 S.W.2d 815, 1948 Ky. LEXIS 1081 ( Ky. 1948 ).

Where city enacted ordinance to annex adjacent territory and more than 75 percent of the freeholders of the territory protested the annexation the burden was upon the town to prove that failure to annex would materially retard the prosperity of the town and of the owners and inhabitants thereof. Likins v. Clarkson, 280 S.W.2d 491, 1955 Ky. LEXIS 155 ( Ky. 1955 ).

Where, in attempt by city to annex adjacent territory, evidence showed that town contained bank, several stores, factory and had a population of approximately 600 and that annexed territory contained a garage, a filling station, a chinchilla ranch, an electric substation and lots and land suitable for other buildings, had a population of approximately 200, had no water system but with annexation could establish one and that with annexation territory would have better fire protection and lower insurance and electric rates, town met burden of proving that failure to annex would materially retard prosperity of town and owners and inhabitants of adjacent territory. Likins v. Clarkson, 280 S.W.2d 491, 1955 Ky. LEXIS 155 ( Ky. 1955 ).

Where record in action challenging legality of an annexation ordinance showed that prosperity of area to be annexed is completely dependent upon a continuation of the services provided by the city, the city has sustained its burden of proving that failure to annex would materially retard the prosperity of the city and the area sought to be annexed. Sullivan v. Paducah, 547 S.W.2d 769, 1977 Ky. App. LEXIS 633 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).

33. — Sufficiency.

Annexation to town of 275 population of 1050 acres of land chiefly agricultural and with few streets or houses and population of about 1500 to 2000, was properly denied upon remonstrance of certain freeholders, in view of heavy burden upon town of providing improvements and subjection of added territory to municipal taxation. Latonia v. Hopkins, 104 Ky. 419 , 47 S.W. 248, 20 Ky. L. Rptr. 620 , 1898 Ky. LEXIS 169 ( Ky. 1898 ).

Where 87 percent of freeholders in territory adjacent to city opposed annexation, and territory had adequate drainage, sewerage and garbage systems, and had adequate police, fire and educational services provided by the county, evidence was sufficient to warrant denial of annexation, especially in view of fact that city taxes would so burden the property owners of the territory as to reduce the value of their property and cause some to lose their homes. Lexington v. Rankin, 278 Ky. 388 , 128 S.W.2d 710, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 417 ( Ky. 1939 ).

In annexation attempt by city, evidence to the effect that city was prospering, growing city whose capacities would not be overtaxed by the annexation and that only possibility of detriment to interests of the city arose from fact that it would be required to establish fire fighting facilities in or near annexed territory at cost which would exceed immediately available tax revenues from annexed territory but that by reason of other annexations in vicinity a new fire station had to be constructed regardless and only a portion would be allocable to annexed area, and evidence to the effect that only detriment to property owners would be increased taxes was sufficient upon which to base findings that annexation would be in the best interest of the city and that there would be no manifest injury to property owners. Louisville v. Kraft, 297 S.W.2d 39, 1956 Ky. LEXIS 12 ( Ky. 1956 ).

In suit protesting annexation of surrounding territory by sixth-class city where it was shown that the annexation would impose obligations on the city that it could not meet and there was nothing in evidence to indicate that surrounding property would in any way be benefited, trial court was justified in disapproving proposed annexation. Cold Spring v. Laycock, 312 S.W.2d 882, 1957 Ky. LEXIS 11 ( Ky. 1957 ).

Where the court found that failure of a city to annex the land in question would retard the city’s development and that the annexation would not result in any injury to the persons within the area, the evidence was sufficient to find in favor of annexation. Ward v. Ashland, 476 S.W.2d 205, 1972 Ky. LEXIS 387 ( Ky. 1972 ).

34. — Prosperity Materially Retarded.

Annexation was approved against objection of more than 75 percent of freeholders residing in territory sought to be annexed, where failure to annex would deprive inhabitants of territory of governmental privileges, deter others from locating there, and postpone its development and price enhancement, thus retarding prosperity of city and of territory. Park v. Covington, 187 Ky. 311 , 218 S.W. 986, 1920 Ky. LEXIS 119 ( Ky. 1920 ).

Evidence that territory sought to be annexed might be deprived at any time of water service, limited police and fire protection, and other services it was receiving from the city on a voluntary basis, was sufficient to establish that prosperity of territory would be materially retarded by failure to annex, and this evidence, when coupled with undisputed evidence that prosperity of city would be retarded by failure to annex, supported finding of jury in favor of annexation, notwithstanding remonstrance by more than 75 percent of property owners in the territory. Loeffler v. Louisville, 308 Ky. 629 , 215 S.W.2d 535, 1948 Ky. LEXIS 1006 ( Ky. 1948 ).

Where the evidence established that the lack of undeveloped land has seriously hindered the city in its efforts to attract new industry and to implement its urban renewal program, that 346 residents of the 1620-acre area to be annexed were dependent on septic tanks for sewage disposal, although the soil was heavy clay, and that the city would provide needed municipal services, it was not error for the trial court to find that the failure to annex would materially retard the prosperity of the city and of the landowners and inhabitants of the area. Hopperton v. Covington, 415 S.W.2d 381, 1967 Ky. LEXIS 316 ( Ky. 1967 ).

35. Judgment.

There is no statutory provision delaying the action of the city legislative body any longer after a judgment favorable to annexation is obtained in the Circuit Court. Hocker v. Fisher, 590 S.W.2d 342, 1979 Ky. App. LEXIS 486 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).

36. Injury.
37. — Individual Financial Loss.

Fact that annexation of territory would impose financial losses on one of several protesting property owners was not sufficient to prevent annexation of the entire area. Masonic Widows & Orphans Home & Infirmary v. Louisville, 309 Ky. 532 , 217 S.W.2d 815, 1948 Ky. LEXIS 1081 ( Ky. 1948 ).

38. — Paying Taxes.

Annexation to town of 300 inhabitants of territory of 125 inhabitants was properly granted, where territory was platted into lots and lay between town and only public highway connecting with town and where 75 percent of resident freeholders in territory remonstrated, and only objection was municipal taxation which was light. Summers v. Elsmere, 55 S.W. 682, 21 Ky. L. Rptr. 1525 , 1900 Ky. LEXIS 553 (Ky. Ct. App. 1900).

The necessity of paying city taxes is not the character of injury contemplated by this section that would prevent annexation proceedings in view of the benefits, such as permanent water and sewerage services, street lighting, police and fire protection, reduced cost of public utility services, lower fire insurance rates, and improved school facilities, which would accrue to the property owners of the area to be annexed. Louisville v. Sullivan, 302 Ky. 86 , 193 S.W.2d 1017, 1946 Ky. LEXIS 601 ( Ky. 1946 ).

Considering the benefits accruing to property owners as a result of being annexed by the city, requirement that these property owners, when annexed, pay city taxes is not, within the contemplation of the annexation statutes, of that character of injury or detriment which may be set up to prevent annexation, although it is an element to be considered in connection with the benefits and enhancement of valuation. Masonic Widows & Orphans Home & Infirmary v. Louisville, 309 Ky. 532 , 217 S.W.2d 815, 1948 Ky. LEXIS 1081 ( Ky. 1948 ); Louisville v. Kraft, 297 S.W.2d 39, 1956 Ky. LEXIS 12 ( Ky. 1956 ).

While taxation as such is not a ground for denying annexation it may be considered as one of the burdens for which the property owner would receive no adequate return. Cold Spring v. Laycock, 312 S.W.2d 882, 1957 Ky. LEXIS 11 ( Ky. 1957 ).

The necessity of paying taxes is not the character of injury contemplated by the annexation statutes. Voorhes v. Lexington, 377 S.W.2d 57, 1964 Ky. LEXIS 475 ( Ky. 1964 ).

39. Appeal.

Once the verdict and judgment in the Circuit Court are obtained upholding annexation, the city may proceed to annex the territory despite the fact that the judgment may be appealed to the Court of Appeals. Taustine v. Fleig, 374 S.W.2d 508, 1964 Ky. LEXIS 382 ( Ky. 1964 ).

40. Certification of Judgment.

If judgment in fact has been entered, final ordinance may be passed whether it has been actually certified to city council or not, since provision for sending certified judgment to council is merely directory. Specht v. Louisville, 58 S.W. 607, 22 Ky. L. Rptr. 699 , 1900 Ky. LEXIS 311 (Ky. Ct. App. 1900).

Cited:

Engle v. Louisville, 312 Ky. 383 , 227 S.W.2d 407, 1950 Ky. LEXIS 641 ( Ky. 1950 ); Adkins v. Pineville, 271 S.W.2d 625, 1954 Ky. LEXIS 1048 ( Ky. 1954 ); Phillips v. Florence, 314 S.W.2d 938, 1958 Ky. LEXIS 320 ( Ky. 1958 ); Eddyville v. Kuttawa, 343 S.W.2d 404, 1961 Ky. LEXIS 422 ( Ky. 1961 ); Vincent v. Bowling Green, 349 S.W.2d 694, 1961 Ky. LEXIS 60 ( Ky. 1961 ); Kelley v. Dailey, 366 S.W.2d 181, 1963 Ky. LEXIS 9 ( Ky. 1963 ); St. Matthews v. Beechwood Village, 373 S.W.2d 427, 1963 Ky. LEXIS 161 ( Ky. 1963 ); Hellman v. Covington, 393 S.W.2d 889, 1965 Ky. LEXIS 252 ( Ky. 1965 ); Murrell v. Hurstbourne Acres, 401 S.W.2d 60, 1966 Ky. LEXIS 401 ( Ky. 1966 ); Robertson v. Hazard, 401 S.W.2d 223, 1966 Ky. LEXIS 408 ( Ky. 1966 ); Corn v. Windy Hills, 528 S.W.2d 668, 1975 Ky. LEXIS 66 ( Ky. 1975 ); Wakefield v. Shelbyville, 563 S.W.2d 756, 1978 Ky. App. LEXIS 491 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Where the Circuit Court found in favor of the city on its ordinance to initiate proceedings to annex property and the decision was appealed to the Court of Appeals but no supersedeas bond was posted, the city was authorized to immediately proceed to annex the territory by passing the second ordinance actually annexing the territory. OAG 66-1 .

A mere tenant who owns no interest in real estate proposed to be annexed, has no legal right to remonstrate against the annexation of such property. OAG 67-167 .

Cities of the fifth class are allowed to annex adjacent property under this section and KRS 81.100 (now KRS 81A.010 ) and 81.230 (repealed). OAG 68-161 .

What constitutes a sufficient description of territory proposed to be annexed or stricken off is a question of fact for judicial determination. OAG 68-400 .

Citizens of an annexed territory are given the right to protect an annexation but not to vote on it. OAG 69-647 .

The provisions of this statute and KRS 81.100 (now KRS 81A.010 ) and 81.140 (repealed) do not violate the principle of “one man, one vote” as announced in Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 88 S. Ct. 1114, 20 L. Ed. 2d 45, 1968 U.S. LEXIS 2061 (1968), as the question of annexation under Kentucky law, is not one submitted to a vote of the people of either the city or the annexed territory. OAG 70-77 .

Any person regardless of age who owns a fee interest in real property and who legally resides within the territory would be entitled to sign a petition as a resident freeholder remonstrating against annexation. However, whether a stockholder of a resident corporation having property in the area and who himself resided in the area to be annexed would be eligible to remonstrate as a resident freeholder is a question for the courts to decide when it arises. OAG 70-502 .

Sixth-class cities are authorized by this section and KRS 81.240 (repealed) to annex unincorporated territory, but there is no provision for submitting the question of annexation to a vote of the people. OAG 70-513 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Annexation of unincorporated territory containing industrial plants, KRS 81A.510 .

Extension of boundaries of city of first class, alternate method, KRS 81.300 to 81.360 .

81A.030. Annexation of another city by a first-class city. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2764-1, 2764-2: amend. Acts 1982, ch. 360, § 19, effective July 15, 1982) was repealed by Acts 1984, ch. 416, § 20, effective July 13, 1984.

81A.040. First class city takes over rights and liabilities of city annexed. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2764) was repealed by Acts 1984, ch. 416, § 20, effective July 13, 1984.

81A.050. Proceedings to incorporate.

Any city of the first class which proposes to annex territory pursuant to KRS 81A.010 shall, prior to the enactment of the first ordinance, hold public hearings as provided in KRS 81A.060 and prepare a report setting forth the plans for the extension of services to the area proposed to be annexed. The report shall include:

  1. A map of the city and adjacent territory to show the following information:
    1. The present and proposed boundaries of the city;
    2. The present streets, major trunk water mains, sewer interceptors and outfalls as well as other utility lines;
    3. The present areas receiving, or able to receive, major city services, and the proposed extension of such services to other areas;
    4. The prevailing general land use patterns existing in the area to be annexed; and
    5. If zoning has been adopted by the annexing city, a map showing the zoning that will be effective for the annexed area;
  2. A statement showing that the area to be annexed meets the requirements of KRS 81A.010 ;
  3. A statement setting forth the plans of the city for extending to the area to be annexed each major city service owned by the city or subsidized through city tax revenues and performed within the city at the time of annexation. Such statement shall:
    1. Provide for extending police and fire protection, garbage collection, and street maintenance services to the area to be annexed on the date of annexation, on substantially the same basis and in the same manner as such services are provided within the boundaries of the city prior to annexation;
    2. Provide for extension, into the area to be annexed, of streets and of major trunk water mains, sewer outfall lines, and lines for such utility services as the city provides to existing city residents and legally may provide in the annexed area, so that when such streets and utility lines are constructed, property owners in the area to be annexed will be able to secure the services, according to the policies in effect in the city for extending the services to individual lots or subdivisions; and shall name the government proposed to be responsible under the plans for any streets or form a boundary of the area to be annexed;
    3. Set forth a proposed timetable for the extension of, and if necessary, the construction for each major city service;
    4. Set forth a projected estimation of tax rates pursuant to KRS 81A.070 to be levied by the city upon the area to be annexed and affected residents of that area for each year until such time that all major city services have been provided; and
    5. Set forth the method under which the city plans to finance extension of services into the area to be annexed.

History. Enact. Acts 1980, ch. 303, § 12, effective July 15, 1980; 1984, ch. 416, § 14, effective July 13, 1984; 1986, ch. 141, § 42, effective July 15, 1986.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

Louisville v. Fiscal Court of Jefferson County, 623 S.W.2d 219, 1981 Ky. LEXIS 282 ( Ky. 1981 ).

81A.060. Public hearings — Authority of board of aldermen.

  1. After the preparation of the report required by KRS 81A.050 , any city of the first class proposing annexation shall hold at least two (2) public hearings on the proposed annexation prior to the enactment of the first ordinance. Additional hearings may be held. Notice of such hearings shall be published in accordance with KRS Chapter 424.
  2. The hearings held pursuant to this section shall provide an opportunity to be heard to all persons residing or owning property in the area described in the notice of the public hearing, and to all residents of the city.
  3. At each public hearing, a representative of the city shall make an explanation of the report required in KRS 81A.050 . Such explanation shall be as detailed as necessary so as to convey an accurate and definitive report.
  4. The board of aldermen shall take into consideration facts presented at the public hearings and shall have authority to amend the report required by KRS 81A.050 and to make changes in the plans for serving the area proposed to be annexed. If any amendment or change is approved by the board, another hearing shall be held to provide any person residing or owning property in the area to be annexed or any resident of the city an opportunity to be heard on the amendment or amendments. Such hearing shall be held not later than thirty (30) days after the board approves the amendment. Notice of such hearing shall be published in accordance with KRS Chapter 424.

History. Enact. Acts 1980, ch. 303, § 13, effective July 15, 1980.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

Louisville v. Fiscal Court of Jefferson County, 623 S.W.2d 219, 1981 Ky. LEXIS 282 ( Ky. 1981 ).

81A.070. Property tax in annexed area.

  1. A city of the first class shall tax property within the annexed area only in such amount as is commensurate with city services or facilities actually made available to the residents or property of the affected area including continuation of services provided prior to annexation.
  2. If services available from the city have been provided prior to annexation from another source in the annexed area, the city shall not tax for such services unless they are actually provided by the city as a lawful replacement for existing services.

History. Enact. Acts 1980, ch. 303, § 14, effective July 15, 1980.

81A.400. Powers of cities to annex or reduce boundaries.

The boundaries of any city other than a city of the first class shall remain as established by law until changed as provided in KRS 81A.410 to 81A.470 or KRS 81.500 . The legislative body of any city other than a city of the first class may annex any unincorporated territory pursuant to KRS 81A.420 , or reduce the boundaries of the city under the provisions of KRS 81A.440 . A city may merge with a contiguous city pursuant to KRS 81.410 to 81.440 , or there may be the transfer of incorporated territory between two (2) cities pursuant to KRS 81.500 .

History. Enact. Acts 1980, ch. 303, § 1, effective July 15, 1980; 1984, ch. 416, § 15, effective July 13, 1984; 1992, ch. 17, § 2, effective February 28, 1992.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. In General.

Annexation and detachment of territory of municipal corporation are governed by same principles. Adams v. Jeffersontown, 240 Ky. 482 , 42 S.W.2d 704, 1931 Ky. LEXIS 431 ( Ky. 1931 ) (decided under prior law).

2. Construction.

Annexation statutes in authorizing annexation of territory by a city mean a city that has some substantial experience of existence for they contemplate a city that has functioned as a city for a sufficient period of time to enable some rational projection of its future needs and prospects to be made. Hardin v. St. Matthews, 240 S.W.2d 554, 1951 Ky. LEXIS 971 ( Ky. 1951 ) (decided under prior law).

3. Discretion of City Legislative Body.

In enlarging city boundary, and determining extent and manner of annexation, city council acts in governmental and legislative capacity and its discretion is not to be controlled except by constitutional and statutory provisions. White v. Glasgow, 148 Ky. 13 , 146 S.W. 19, 1912 Ky. LEXIS 387 ( Ky. 1912 ) (decided under prior law).

4. Incorporation Pending Annexation.

Where the city of Covington had proceeded to begin annexation procedures against certain unincorporated territory in 1962, which territory was almost immediately incorporated and later consolidated into the pre-existing city of Edgewood, because Covington had begun annexation before incorporation, it would be entitled to couple to annexation, without regard to the referendum, provisions found elsewhere governing annexation of the territory of other cities. Covington v. Beck, 586 S.W.2d 284, 1979 Ky. App. LEXIS 453 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979) (decided under prior law).

In the case of rivalry between two annexing municipalities that which takes the first “public procedural step” to annex takes priority. Covington v. Beck, 586 S.W.2d 284, 1979 Ky. App. LEXIS 453 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979) (decided under prior law).

5. Legislative Power.

The same power which may adjudge necessity of establishing local government for unincorporated town, may likewise provide local government for contiguous territory or extend to it jurisdiction already created, expediency not power being the question of whether to incorporate contiguous territory into existing town or into a separate corporation. Cheaney v. Hooser, 48 Ky. 330 , 1848 Ky. LEXIS 73 ( Ky. 1848 ) (decided under prior law).

Legislation for annexation of territory by municipal legislature is embraced by Ky. Const., § 156 (now repealed), in term “organization and government” of cities of class to which municipality belongs, and hence, difference between rights of citizens residing outside of cities of different classes is authorized by that section of the constitution. Lewis v. Brandenburg, 105 Ky. 14 , 47 S.W. 862, 20 Ky. L. Rptr. 1011 , 1898 Ky. LEXIS 238 ( Ky. 1898 ) (decided under prior law).

Legislature has unlimited right to pass such laws for annexation of territory to municipal corporations as it deems best, and different method may be provided for each class of municipality. Lenox Land Co. v. Oakdale, 137 Ky. 484 , 125 S.W. 1089, 1910 Ky. LEXIS 591 ( Ky. 1910 ), dismissed, New Louisville Jockey Club v. Oakdale, 231 U.S. 739, 34 S. Ct. 317, 58 L. Ed. 461, 1913 U.S. LEXIS 2507 (1913), appeal dismissed, Lennox Land Co. v. Oakdale, 231 U.S. 739, 34 S. Ct. 317, 58 L. Ed. 461 (1913) (decided under prior law).

6. Publication.

Former act permitting annexation of territory after posting of notice of proposed annexation, but without publication thereof, was not invalid. Lenox Land Co. v. Oakdale, 137 Ky. 484 , 125 S.W. 1089, 1910 Ky. LEXIS 591 ( Ky. 1910 ), dismissed, New Louisville Jockey Club v. Oakdale, 231 U.S. 739, 34 S. Ct. 317, 58 L. Ed. 461, 1913 U.S. LEXIS 2507 (1913), appeal dismissed, Lennox Land Co. v. Oakdale, 231 U.S. 739, 34 S. Ct. 317, 58 L. Ed. 461 (1913) (decided under prior law).

7. School District Annexations.

City school districts are independent of the city government and legislative provision for school purpose annexation must be considered apart from statutes authorizing cities to annex territory for other purposes involving other consideration. Thomas v. Spragens, 308 Ky. 97 , 213 S.W.2d 452, 1948 Ky. LEXIS 861 ( Ky. 1948 ) (decided under prior law).

8. Taking of Property Without Just Compensation.

It was an unconstitutional taking of private property for public use without just compensation to impose city taxes upon tract of 167 acres of farming land which had been annexed to city by act of legislature, where only apparent purpose of including land in city was to subject it to tax for benefit of city without any advantage to landowner. Covington v. Southgate, 54 Ky. 491 , 1854 Ky. LEXIS 91 ( Ky. 1854 ) (decided under prior law).

The question of taking property without just compensation or due process of law has no application to annexation of territory to a municipality, for extension or reduction of a city’s boundaries is purely a political matter and the legislature has unlimited right to pass such laws for the annexation of territory to municipalities. Lewis v. Town of Brandenburg, 105 Ky. 14 , 48 S.W. 978 (1899); Lenox Land Co. v. Oakdale, 137 Ky. 484 , 125 S.W. 1089, 1910 Ky. LEXIS 591 ( Ky. 1910 ), dismissed, New Louisville Jockey Club v. Oakdale, 231 U.S. 739, 34 S. Ct. 317, 58 L. Ed. 461, 1913 U.S. LEXIS 2507 (1913); appeal dismissed, Lennox Land Co. v. Oakdale, 231 U.S. 739, 34 S. Ct. 317, 58 L. Ed. 461 (U.S. 1913); Yount v. Frankfort, 255 S.W.2d 632, 1953 Ky. LEXIS 676 ( Ky. 1953 ) (decided under prior law).

Cited:

Merritt v. Campbellsville, 678 S.W.2d 788, 1984 Ky. App. LEXIS 625 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984).

Opinions of Attorney General.

The repeal of KRS 81A.430 , along with amendments to KRS 81A.410(2) and (3), 81A.450 and this section, effectively prohibit a city from annexing any adjacent city or any portion of such adjacent city. OAG 84-266 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Annexation of unincorporated territory containing industrial plants, KRS 81A.510 .

81A.410. Area subject to annexation — Exception upon adoption of consolidated local government.

  1. Except as provided in KRS 67C.111(3), a city legislative body may extend the city’s boundaries to include any area:
    1. Which is adjacent or contiguous to the city’s boundaries at the time the annexation proceeding is begun; and
    2. Which by reason of population density, commercial, industrial, institutional, or governmental use of land, or subdivision of land, is urban in character or suitable for development for urban purposes without unreasonable delay.
  2. No part of the area to be annexed shall be included within the boundary of another incorporated city.
  3. If a city is considering the annexation of two (2) or more areas which are all adjacent to the city boundary but are not adjacent to one another, it may undertake simultaneous proceedings under the authority of KRS 81A.420 for the annexation of such areas.

History. Enact. Acts 1980, ch. 303, § 2, effective July 15, 1980; 1984, ch. 416, § 16, effective July 13, 1984; 2002, ch. 346, § 91, effective July 15, 2002.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

0.5. Generally.

Supreme Court of Kentucky reads KRS 81A.410 to allow a city to annex territory that is either nearby, e.g., perhaps separated by roadway or river, or touching the boundary of the city. City of Lebanon v. Goodin, 436 S.W.3d 505, 2014 Ky. LEXIS 90 ( Ky. 2014 ).

1. Property in Adjoining County.

The only authority under which cities of the sixth class may annex contiguous territory was given by former section governing annexation and the absence of express statutory authority authorizing a town of the sixth class to annex territory in a county other than that in which it was situated meant that such cities did not have the power to annex contiguous territory in an adjoining county for the term “any territory” means any annexable territory. Elsmere v. Tanner, 245 Ky. 376 , 53 S.W.2d 522, 1932 Ky. LEXIS 575 ( Ky. 1932 ) (decided under prior law).

Town was without power to annex property in adjoining county, or to enact ordinance creating a lien upon such property for extending street, and hence could not impose lien upon owners of annexed property for such street improvement. Hedger v. Kinsella, 284 Ky. 303 , 144 S.W.2d 515, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 486 ( Ky. 1940 )(decided under prior law).

2. Declared Invalid.

City of Lebanon’s annexation ordinance of land under KRS 81A.420 was properly declared invalid in favor of the landowners within the proposed annexed area. Summary judgment was granted because the City manipulated the boundaries to the annexed property and, thus, intentionally omitted sufficient dissenting property owners to ensure success of annexation. City of Lebanon v. Goodin, 2011 Ky. App. LEXIS 124 (Ky. Ct. App.), sub. op., 2011 Ky. App. Unpub. LEXIS 968 (Ky. Ct. App. July 15, 2011).

Lower court erred in granting the landowners summary judgment on an action to invalidate an annexation where it erroneously applied a natural or regular standard to the city’s decision, the terms adjacent and contiguous in KRS 81A.410(1)(b) were not to be read to be equivalent, and the city had fully complied with the statutory requirements in that the northern boundary of the territory touched the city’s current municipal border and the territory was suitable for urban development. City of Lebanon v. Goodin, 436 S.W.3d 505, 2014 Ky. LEXIS 90 ( Ky. 2014 ).

Cited:

Merritt v. Campbellsville, 678 S.W.2d 788, 1984 Ky. App. LEXIS 625 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Where a city wished to annex an area containing a university, any attempt to exclude the student population from voting in city elections by the creation of so-called islands of unincorporated territory within the territory annexed would be an unreasonable and unnatural division denying certain electors within the unit their right to vote; accordingly, any attempt to annex the university’s property to the exclusion of the student dormitories located on the university campus would be of doubtful validity. OAG 82-157 .

Unincorporated territory comprising a country club cannot be legally annexed by merely utilizing a portion of highway as a corridor to reach the club property unless the annexation of a portion of the highway, standing alone, has a municipal value. OAG 82-531 .

The repeal of KRS 81A.430 , along with amendments to KRS 81A.400 , 81A.450 and this section, effectively prohibit a city from annexing any adjacent city or any portion of such adjacent city. OAG 84-266 .

A city may “spot annex” individual areas. A city may not annex roads alone without a valid municipal purpose. A city must follow the procedures of KRS Chapter 81A in order to validly annex properties, and annexation ordinances not in compliance are voidable in court. OAG 12-005 , 2012 Ky. AG LEXIS 80.

81A.412. Annexation permitted when each of the owners gives prior consent.

A city may annex any area which meets the requirements of KRS 81A.410 , if each of the owners of record of the land to be annexed gives prior consent in writing to the annexation. In this event, the city shall not be required to enact the notification ordinance required by KRS 81A.420(1) or to comply with the notice requirements of KRS 81A.425 , and it shall not be required to wait the sixty (60) day period provided for in KRS 81A.420(2) prior to enacting a final ordinance annexing the area. When a city has obtained the prior written consent of each owner of record of the land to be annexed, the city may enact a single ordinance finally annexing the land described in the ordinance. If the city has elected to establish the zoning for the new territory pursuant to KRS 100.209 prior to the completion of annexation under this section, the ordinance annexing the territory shall include a map showing the zoning. Upon the enactment of this ordinance, the territory shall become a part of the city.

History. Enact. Acts 1988, ch. 6, § 1, effective February 12, 1988; 1994, ch. 101, § 1, effective July 15, 1994.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Standing.

In an annexation challenge, a trial court’s finding of lack of standing was proper and was affirmed; a taxpayer failed to show how he was affected by annexation differently from other city residents, and owners’ claimed reversionary interest in the road at issue, inter alia, was insufficient for standing. Fourroux v. City of Shepherdsville, 148 S.W.3d 303, 2004 Ky. App. LEXIS 301 (Ky. Ct. App. 2004).

Opinions of Attorney General.

A city may “spot annex” individual areas. A city may not annex roads alone without a valid municipal purpose. A city must follow the procedures of KRS Chapter 81A in order to validly annex properties, and annexation ordinances not in compliance are voidable in court. OAG 12-005 , 2012 Ky. AG LEXIS 80.

81A.420. Ordinance declaring intent to annex — Election on proposed annexation — When city may enact ordinance.

  1. When a city desires to annex unincorporated territory, the legislative body of the city proposing to annex shall enact an ordinance stating the intention of the city to annex. The ordinance shall accurately define the boundary of the unincorporated territory proposed to be annexed, and declare it desirable to annex the unincorporated territory.
  2. If following the publication of the annexation ordinance pursuant to subsection (1) of this section and within sixty (60) days thereof, or if in any annexation proceeding where the annexing city has not adopted a final annexation ordinance, within sixty (60) days of February 12, 1988, fifty percent (50%) of the resident voters or owners of real property within the limits of the territory proposed to be annexed petition the mayor in opposition to the proposal, an election shall be held at the next regular election if the petition is presented to the county clerk and certified by the county clerk as sufficient not later than the second Tuesday in August preceding the regular election:
    1. The mayor of the city shall deliver a certified copy of the ordinance to the county clerk of the county in which the territory proposed to be annexed is located, who shall have prepared to be placed before the voters in each precinct embraced in whole or in part within the territory proposed to be annexed the question: “Are you in favor of being annexed to the City of  . . . . . ?” If only a part of any precinct is embraced within the territory proposed to be annexed only persons who reside within the territory proposed to be annexed shall be permitted to vote. The clerk shall cause the sheriff or sheriffs to deliver to the election officers in each precinct in the appropriate counties copies of the ordinance proposing to annex;
    2. If less than fifty-five percent (55%) of those persons voting oppose annexation, the unincorporated territory shall become a part of the city; and
    3. If fifty-five percent (55%) or more of those persons voting oppose annexation, the ordinance proposing annexation shall become ineffectual for any purpose.
  3. In not less than sixty (60) days after the enactment of the ordinance, if no petition has been received by the mayor as set out herein, or within sixty (60) days of the certification of election results in which less than fifty-five percent (55%) of those persons voting opposed annexation, the legislative body may enact an ordinance annexing to the city the territory described in the ordinance. If the city has elected to establish the zoning for the new territory prior to the completion of the annexation pursuant to KRS 100.209 , the ordinance shall include a map showing the zoning. Upon the enactment of this ordinance, the territory shall become part of the city for all purposes.

History. Enact. Acts 1980, ch. 303, § 3, effective July 15, 1980; 1982, ch. 360, § 20, effective July 15, 1982; 1986, ch. 141, § 43, effective July 15, 1986; 1988, ch. 6, § 2, effective February 12, 1988; 1990, ch. 362, § 12, effective July 13, 1990; 1996, ch. 195, § 43, effective July 15, 1996.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. In General.

The Legislature has the right to pass such laws for the annexation of territory to municipal corporations as in its judgment will best achieve the desired end. Louisville Shopping Center, Inc. v. St. Matthews, 635 S.W.2d 307, 1982 Ky. LEXIS 266 ( Ky. 1982 ).

A party has no constitutional right to resist annexation; the right to present defenses to annexation is a statutory privilege. Louisville Shopping Center, Inc. v. St. Matthews, 635 S.W.2d 307, 1982 Ky. LEXIS 266 ( Ky. 1982 ).

In an annexation challenge, a trial court’s finding of lack of standing was proper and was affirmed; a taxpayer failed to show how he was affected by annexation differently from other city residents, and owners’ claimed reversionary interest in the road at issue, inter alia, was insufficient for standing. Fourroux v. City of Shepherdsville, 148 S.W.3d 303, 2004 Ky. App. LEXIS 301 (Ky. Ct. App. 2004).

2. Constitutionality.

This section enhances the rights of the people to overcome a decision which they view to be inimical to their interests, and clearly is not a violation of Ky. Const., § 2. Louisville Shopping Center, Inc. v. St. Matthews, 635 S.W.2d 307, 1982 Ky. LEXIS 266 ( Ky. 1982 ).

This section does not grant power over the “liberty and property” of citizens, but simply enables a minimum of 75 percent of the voters in an affected area to nullify the actions of a city legislative body through the process of referendum. Louisville Shopping Center, Inc. v. St. Matthews, 635 S.W.2d 307, 1982 Ky. LEXIS 266 ( Ky. 1982 ).

3. Legislative Intent.

The legislative intent embodied in subsection (2) of this section is that the petition of either 50% of the voters or 50% of the property owners is sufficient to require an election. Huls v. Winchester, 709 S.W.2d 835, 1986 Ky. App. LEXIS 1044 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986).

4. Reasons for Annexation.

The limits of a municipal corporation cannot be extended solely for the purposes of increasing the revenues of the city, except when the residents of urbanized areas which abut a municipality are using the municipal services of that city; however, the fact of additional taxes alone is no reason why unincorporated land should not be annexed when it will receive benefits such as police protection, decreased fire insurance rates, etc. Where residents are receiving some services and would potentially receive additional benefits, due process of law was not denied to residents and property owners in the area to be annexed. Louisville Shopping Center, Inc. v. St. Matthews, 635 S.W.2d 307, 1982 Ky. LEXIS 266 ( Ky. 1982 ).

5. Qualified Voters.

Under the clear wording of subdivisions (2)(b) and (2)(c) the 75 percent (now 55%) is to be determined by the number of “qualified voters,” that is, those who are registered and eligible under KRS 116.025(1). Louisville Shopping Center, Inc. v. St. Matthews, 635 S.W.2d 307, 1982 Ky. LEXIS 266 ( Ky. 1982 ).

Subdivisions (2)(b) and (2)(c) do not define what constitutes a “qualified voter” in any respect, and cannot be used to disenfranchise a voter who is eligible under the terms of the general voter eligibility statute. The phrase “qualified voter,” standing by itself, in the context of the annexation statutes, cannot be elevated to a disqualification under any other statute, as provided in KRS 116.025(1), in order to disqualify non-resident voters from voting in an annexation election. Louisville Shopping Center, Inc. v. St. Matthews, 635 S.W.2d 307, 1982 Ky. LEXIS 266 ( Ky. 1982 ).

Where only one registered voter resided within the limits of the territory proposed to be annexed, and that voter joined in the petition in opposition to the proposal, an election was required to be held, regardless of whether 50% of the owners of real property joined in the petition. Huls v. Winchester, 709 S.W.2d 835, 1986 Ky. App. LEXIS 1044 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986).

Where property owners were the only qualified voters to vote on an annexation question, and they both voted “no,” under the terms of KRS 81A.420(2)(c), the ordinance was thereby rendered ineffectual for any purpose; more than 55% of those persons voting opposed annexation. City of Pikeville v. Pike County, 297 S.W.3d 47, 2009 Ky. App. LEXIS 37 (Ky. Ct. App. 2009).

6. Publication of Notice.

The publication of this entire section does not reasonably inform the general public of the time frame for protesting an annexation proposal; in preference to giving the public notice by publishing this section in its entirety, a simple “notice” publication conforming to KRS 424.130(1)(b) and KRS 424.140 , informing the interested public of their right to protest would have been sufficient and not reasonably susceptible to misinterpretation. Merritt v. Campbellsville, 678 S.W.2d 788, 1984 Ky. App. LEXIS 625 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984).

The verbatim publication of this entire section did not constitute sufficient notice of a city’s proposed annexation in light of KRS 424.130 and 424.140(4), so as to give interested parties a fair opportunity to oppose the annexation, and for that reason the annexation was invalid. Merritt v. Campbellsville, 678 S.W.2d 788, 1984 Ky. App. LEXIS 625 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984).

7. Description of Area to be Annexed.

Ordinance that town limits be extended one-third of a mile from public well on designated street corner, north, south, east and west meant that territory was to be square and not circular, and that beginning point was center of well, and not sides. Hardesty v. Mt. Eden, 86 S.W. 687, 27 Ky. L. Rptr. 745 (1905) (decided under prior law).

Ordinance seeking annexation of part of town and bounding territory sought by well defined lines so that person of common understanding could know what part was sought, was sufficient. Cote Brilliante v. Newport, 195 Ky. 317 , 242 S.W. 2, 1922 Ky. LEXIS 297 ( Ky. 1922 ) (decided under prior law).

8. Multiple Ordinances.

Where city passed subsequent ordinances proposing annexation of parts of the same territory embraced in earlier ordinance, earlier ordinance was not repealed by implication by passing of subsequent ordinances. Voorhes v. Lexington, 377 S.W.2d 57, 1964 Ky. LEXIS 475 ( Ky. 1964 ) (decided under prior law).

Fact that ordinance proposing annexation was one of 18 ordinances simultaneously enacted on same day each proposing annexation of separately described areas did not support a contention that such action was a subterfuge on the part of the city in splitting the area proposed to be annexed on the divide and conquer principle. Voorhes v. Lexington, 377 S.W.2d 57, 1964 Ky. LEXIS 475 ( Ky. 1964 ) (decided under prior law).

9. Splitting up of Territory.

Former section governing annexation by sixth-class cities did not permit residents of territory sought to be annexed to split it up into parcels to resist annexation of one or more of such parcels. Lewis v. Brandenburg, 105 Ky. 14 , 47 S.W. 862, 20 Ky. L. Rptr. 1011 , 1898 Ky. LEXIS 238 ( Ky. 1898 ) (decided under prior law).

10. Time for Filing Petition.

Residents of territory sought to be annexed should not be prevented from making objections, though their petition was not filed within 30 (now 60) days after enactment of initiatory ordinance, where city was delayed in making publication until two months following enactment of ordinance. Bardstown v. Hurst, 121 Ky. 119 , 89 S.W. 147, 89 S.W. 724, 28 Ky. L. Rptr. 601 , 28 Ky. L. Rptr. 92 , 1905 Ky. LEXIS 195 (Ky. Ct. App. 1905) (decided under prior law).

11. Title of Ordinance.

Ordinance, which was entitled an ordinance to annex part of named town and which described in body thereof the portion sought to be annexed, did not embrace any unincorporated territory but only incorporated territory, and therefore related to only one subject which was expressed in the title. Cote Brilliante v. Newport, 195 Ky. 317 , 242 S.W. 2, 1922 Ky. LEXIS 297 ( Ky. 1922 ) (decided under prior law).

12. Declared Invalid.

City of Lebanon’s annexation ordinance of land under KRS 81A.420 was properly declared invalid in favor of the landowners within the proposed annexed area. Summary judgment was granted because the City manipulated the boundaries to the annexed property and, thus, intentionally omitted sufficient dissenting property owners to ensure success of annexation. City of Lebanon v. Goodin, 2011 Ky. App. LEXIS 124 (Ky. Ct. App.), sub. op., 2011 Ky. App. Unpub. LEXIS 968 (Ky. Ct. App. July 15, 2011).

Opinions of Attorney General.

A petition against annexation by a city cannot be filed by county residents living outside of the county property proposed to be annexed by the city since subsection (2) of this section clearly indicates that no protest petition can be filed by other than either resident voters or owners of real property located in the proposed area to be annexed; while there are no qualified voters living in the area, the county does own the property and it is possible that the fiscal court could, on behalf of the county, file a petition of protest. OAG 80-481 .

Where no petition against the city’s proposed annexation is filed, the city would normally have to wait until the conclusion of the 60-day waiting period to accomplish the annexation because this section itself makes no exception, however, the right to demonstrate against the proposed annexation can be waived by the parties in question, in which case the waiver should be done in writing, either jointly or separately by the parties, and filed with the city clerk. OAG 80-481 .

Since the city clerk is responsible for keeping the records of the city which would reflect when the petition had been filed to determine whether it was filed in compliance with the statutory deadline, it would be in proper compliance with the statute for the petition to be addressed to the mayor but filed with the clerk who, in turn, would be responsible for notifying the mayor of such filing and recording; it would be equally proper for the petition to be presented directly to the mayor. OAG 80-539 .

Where petition was filed with the city clerk on September 22, 1980, no election on the question of annexation could be held at the upcoming November 4, 1980 election under any circumstances since it would be impossible to comply with the 60-day minimum time period after the petition was presented to the county clerk and the referendum would be required to be held in abeyance until the following regular election occurring in November, 1981. OAG 80-539 .

Basically it is the mayor’s duty and responsibility to check the petition to see if it contains the required number of signatures and that said signatures are voters qualified to sign the petition; however, since he does not have at his disposal the registration records, he would necessarily have to have the assistance of the county board of elections and particularly the county clerk in determining the validity of the petition. OAG 80-604 .

Where the statute provides that the protesting petition is to be signed by the resident voters or owners of real property within the limits of the territory to be annexed, it means that the petition can include both resident voters and owners of real property located within the territory who may not be legal residents of the territory. OAG 80-604 .

Only the registered voters in the area to be annexed are entitled to vote on the annexation question. OAG 82-139 .

Where more than 75 percent of the property owners, in an unincorporated territory which a city proposed to annex, signed petition against annexation, the city properly ordered the question of annexation to be placed on the November ballot. OAG 82-139 .

Any referendum on annexation of territory by a city, required to be held under the provisions of subsection (2) of this section, can only be presented to the voters at a regular November election. OAG 83-149 .

Although the 60-day period from the date of the enactment of an annexation ordinance had passed and no opposing petition had been filed, the territory did not become automatically annexed, as subsection (3) of this section requires that a city in this situation enact a second ordinance annexing the territory before the annexation can become effective. OAG 83-274 .

An election on the question of annexation could only be held at a November election; those registered and qualified voters in the territory proposed to be annexed would be qualified to vote on the question, which would exclude qualified property owners who were not registered but who might have signed the petition. OAG 84-86 .

There is no particular time frame within which the petition opposing annexation must be reviewed by the mayor, except the 60-day provision under subsection (2) of this section to the effect that an election shall be held at the next regular election at least 60 days after the petition is presented to the clerk. OAG 84-86 .

Under subsection (2) of this section, any registered, and therefore qualified, voter residing within the proposed area to be annexed or any owner of real property located within the territory who may or may not be a registered voter and who may or may not actually live within the area, may sign the protesting petition; the percentage required can, of course, consist of a combination of registered voters and property owners. OAG 84-86 .

A city wishing to annex two different territories on opposite ends of the city, both of which are contiguous to the city but not to each other, should enact separate annexation ordinances for each of the separate tracts of territory, particularly in view of a referendum possibility and the fact that to lump the two separate territories together would require a single protesting petition which would not be legally proper. OAG 84-137 .

A city may not repeal an ordinance stating an intention to annex territory to thereby avoid a referendum on the question. The city must conduct the election as planned, and may, if it chooses, simply decline to adopt an ordinance completing annexation after the election. OAG 92-147 .

A city may “spot annex” individual areas. A city may not annex roads alone without a valid municipal purpose. A city must follow the procedures of KRS Chapter 81A in order to validly annex properties, and annexation ordinances not in compliance are voidable in court. OAG 12-005 , 2012 Ky. AG LEXIS 80.

81A.425. Notice of proposed annexation to property owners — Exception — Publication of annexation ordinance — Action to void annexation.

  1. Notwithstanding the provisions of KRS 83A.060(7) and except as otherwise provided in this section, a city which proposes to annex unincorporated territory shall send notice of the proposed annexation to each property owner whose property is proposed to be annexed into the city.
  2. The notice shall be sent to each property owner listed on the records of the county property valuation administrator as of January 1 of the year in which the ordinance proposing to annex property is to be enacted.
  3. The notice shall be sent by first-class mail no later than fourteen (14) days prior to the meeting at which the ordinance proposing the annexation shall receive its second reading. The city clerk shall certify the list of property owners to whom the notice was sent and the certified list shall be made a part of the official record of the meeting at which the ordinance proposing the annexation receives its second reading.
  4. The notice shall include the time, date, and location of the meeting at which the proposed ordinance shall receive its second reading, and a copy of the proposed ordinance.
  5. The provisions of this section shall not apply in any case in which the property owners of record have consented in writing to the proposed annexation as provided in KRS 81A.412 .
  6. Notwithstanding the provisions of KRS 424.130 , following the second reading and enactment of an ordinance proposing to annex property, a city shall be required to publish the ordinance only once in accordance with KRS 83A.060(9).
  7. The ordinance which effectuates an annexation shall be voidable in an action brought in the Circuit Court of competent jurisdiction, if the court determines that the city failed to substantially comply with the requirements of this section, and the failure resulted in material prejudice to the substantial rights of affected property owners.

History. Enact. Acts 1992, ch. 418, § 1, effective July 14, 1992.

Opinions of Attorney General.

A city may “spot annex” individual areas. A city may not annex roads alone without a valid municipal purpose. A city must follow the procedures of KRS Chapter 81A in order to validly annex properties, and annexation ordinances not in compliance are voidable in court. OAG 12-005 , 2012 Ky. AG LEXIS 80.

81A.427. Annexation of areas containing city-owned utility infrastructure.

  1. As used in this section, “utility infrastructure” means physical property existing in rights-of-way or easements that are used for any of the following:
    1. The generation, production, transmission, or distribution of electricity to or for the public for compensation, light, heat, power, or other uses;
    2. The production, manufacture, storage, distribution, sale, or furnishing of natural or manufactured gas, or a mixture of same, to or for the public for compensation, light, heat, power, or other uses;
    3. The transporting or conveying of gas, crude oil, or other fluid substance by pipeline to or for the public for compensation;
    4. The diverting, developing, pumping, impounding, distributing, or furnishing of water to or for the public for compensation; and
    5. The collection, transmission, or treatment of sewage for the public for compensation.
  2. In addition to the other requirements of this chapter, a city annexing or proposing to annex any area that includes the utility infrastructure owned by another city shall comply with the provisions of this section.
  3. A city which proposes to annex any unincorporated area under the provisions of KRS 81A.420 shall send notice of the proposed annexation to the mayor of each city government owning utility infrastructure within the area proposed to be annexed. The notice shall be sent by certified mail, return receipt requested, no later than fourteen (14) days prior to the meeting at which the ordinance proposing the annexation will receive its second reading. The notice shall:
    1. Include the time, date, and location of the meeting at which the proposed ordinance will receive its second reading;
    2. Include a copy of the proposed ordinance; and
    3. Inform the city of its right under this section to object to the annexation. The city clerk shall certify the list of cities to whom the notice was sent, and the certified list shall be made a part of the official record of the meeting at which the proposed ordinance receives its second reading.
  4. A city annexing territory by consent of property owners pursuant to KRS 81A.412 shall comply with subsection (3) of this section by sending the notice at least fourteen (14) days prior to the meeting at which the ordinance annexing the territory will receive its second reading.
  5. Any city receiving notice under this section and owning utility infrastructure in an area to be annexed or proposed to be annexed shall have the right to object and prevent the annexation by sending a certified copy of a municipal order enacted pursuant to KRS 83A.060 . The municipal order shall include a statement describing the utility infrastructure owned by the city and its location within the area to be annexed or proposed to be annexed. The objecting city may incorporate maps or other drawings into the municipal order to clearly identify utility infrastructure within the area. The certified copy of the municipal order shall be received by the city acting under KRS 81A.412 or 81A.420 at any time before or at the meeting where the ordinance is scheduled to receive its second reading. The municipal order shall be either delivered personally by a designated agent of the city or sent by certified mail, return receipt requested.
  6. The city acting under KRS 81A.412 or 81A.420 shall not annex any area that includes utility infrastructure owned by a city objecting under subsection (5) of this section; provided, however, that the cities in interest may agree otherwise through an interlocal agreement established pursuant to KRS 65.210 to 65.300 . If the city annexing or proposing to annex does not receive a municipal order prior to or at the meeting where the ordinance is to receive its second reading, the city may proceed to enact an ordinance proposing to annex or annexing the area, and the city owning utility infrastructure shall forfeit its right to object and shall be deemed to have consented to the annexation.
  7. If a city annexes any area containing utility infrastructure owned by another city without following the provisions of this section, the ordinance which effectuates an annexation shall be voidable in an action brought in the Circuit Court of competent jurisdiction, if the court determines that the annexing city failed to substantially comply with the requirements of this section and the failure resulted in material prejudice to the substantial rights of the affected city. Such an action shall be commenced no later than one (1) year following the date the final annexation ordinance becomes effective.

History. Enact. Acts 2008, ch. 171, § 1, effective July 15, 2008.

81A.430. Annexation of all or part of city. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1980, ch. 303, § 4, effective July 15, 1980; 1982, ch. 360, § 21, effective July 15, 1982) was repealed by Acts 1984, ch. 416, § 20, effective July 13, 1984.

81A.440. Reduction of boundaries.

  1. In areas that are inhabited:
    1. A city may reduce its boundaries by the enacting by its legislative body of an ordinance stating the intention of the city to reduce its boundaries. This ordinance shall accurately define the boundaries of the area to be stricken from the corporate limits of the city, and shall provide that the question of reduction of boundaries shall be submitted to the registered voters of the area to be stricken from the city at the next regular election. A copy of the ordinance shall be sent to the county clerk who shall have prepared, for presentation to the voters located within the area to be stricken, the question: “Are you in favor of being stricken from the City of  . . . . . , and becoming part of the unincorporated area of the county?” The election shall be held at the next regular election if the ordinance is filed with the county clerk not later than the second Tuesday in August preceding the regular election.
    2. If a majority of those voting on the question vote “Yes” to the question of being stricken, the legislative body of the city within ten (10) days of the certification of the election, shall enact an ordinance declaring the area to be stricken from the corporate limits of the city as of the date of the ordinance.
  2. In areas that are uninhabited, a city may reduce its boundaries by the following procedure:
    1. The legislative body of the city proposing to strike uninhabited territory shall enact an ordinance stating the intention of the city to strike the uninhabited area. The ordinance shall accurately define the boundary of the uninhabited territory proposed to be stricken, and declare its intention to strike this uninhabited territory. The clerk of the legislative body of the city shall send a copy of this ordinance to the county judge/executive of the territory to be stricken by certified mail, return receipt requested.
    2. In not less than thirty (30) days after receipt of proof of receipt by the county/judge executive of the county encompassing the territory to be stricken, if no ordinance objecting to the striking of the territory is received from the legislative body of the county encompassing the territory to be stricken, the legislative body may enact a second ordinance striking the territory described in the ordinance. Upon the enactment of this ordinance, the territory shall cease to be part of the city for all purposes.
    3. The county/judge executive of the county encompassing the territory to be stricken shall receive notice of the city’s intention to strike this territory from the city. The legislative body of the county encompassing the territory to be stricken may pass an ordinance objecting to the striking of the territory from the city’s boundaries. The clerk of the legislative body of the county shall send a copy of this ordinance objecting to the striking of territory to the mayor of the city striking the territory by certified mail, return receipt requested. This ordinance objecting to the striking of the territory shall prevent the city from striking that territory from its boundaries. Failure to pass an ordinance objecting to the striking of the territory shall constitute acceptance of the city’s decision to strike the territory.

History. Enact. Acts 1980, ch. 303, § 5, effective July 15, 1980; 1984, ch. 416, § 18, effective July 13, 1984; 1996, ch. 195, § 44, effective July 15, 1996; 2005, ch. 78, § 1, effective March 16, 2005.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Abandonment of Territory.

Only way in which limits of city could be reduced or changed was indicated by former section governing annexation by cities of fifth class; no supposed abandonment of territory being effective for that purpose. Bybee v. Smith, 57 S.W. 789, 22 Ky. L. Rptr. 467 , 1900 Ky. LEXIS 623 (Ky. Ct. App. 1900) (decided under prior law).

2. Invalid Ordinance.

Territory which was within town limits as fixed by act of incorporation was not removed therefrom, where ordinance proposing such removal was not published and second ordinance was not passed. Highland Park v. Reker, 173 Ky. 206 , 190 S.W. 706, 1917 Ky. LEXIS 431 ( Ky. 1917 ) (decided under prior law).

Territory which was in town limits as fixed by act of incorporation cannot be deemed to have been removed therefrom by estoppel against town, where ordinance for removal was void, boundaries were definitely fixed and there was no great lapse of time during which town had held out that territory was not within limits. Highland Park v. Reker, 173 Ky. 206 , 190 S.W. 706, 1917 Ky. LEXIS 431 ( Ky. 1917 ) (decided under prior law).

Where trustees of town incorporated by special act reduced its boundaries without having authority to do so, the territory struck off continued to be a part of the town, and its inhabitants contained to be subject to taxation by the town after the enactment of general laws relating to municipal corporations of the sixth class. Mullins v. Wilson, 282 Ky. 316 , 138 S.W.2d 484, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 168 ( Ky. 1940 ) (decided under prior law).

Opinions of Attorney General.

This section controls the reduction of a city boundary and requires any city desiring to strike territory from its boundary to submit the question of such reduction to the registered voters of the area to be stricken from the city at the next regular election; this means that the question of striking a portion of a precinct must be placed on the November ballot to enable only those registered voters in the territory to be stricken to vote on the question, even though there are only four registered voters in the affected area. It would not be legal for the county clerk to simply send absentee ballots to the four qualified voters in order to avoid placing the question on the ballot. OAG 84-319 .

81A.450. Responsibility for liabilities of annexed area — Uniform taxation.

Whenever any unincorporated territory is annexed by a city, the annexing city shall be liable for any indebtedness that is attached to or exists against the territory by reason of the same being then or previously a part of any taxing district, and the annexing city shall assume the liability, so that after annexation the burden of taxation shall be uniform throughout the city.

History. Enact. Acts 1980, ch. 303, § 6, effective July 15, 1980; 1984, ch. 416, § 19, effective July 13, 1984.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Assumption of Indebtedness.

Property in former village which had been annexed by city was liable for city debts after annexation, notwithstanding it was not receiving certain city services and that city had large indebtedness, whereas village had none. Pence v. Frankfort, 101 Ky. 534 , 41 S.W. 1011, 19 Ky. L. Rptr. 721 , 1897 Ky. LEXIS 224 ( Ky. 1897 ) (decided under prior law).

Upon annexation of another city by second-class city pursuant to statutes authorizing annexation, bonded debt of annexed city became bonded debt of annexing city. Matz v. Newport, 265 Ky. 126 , 95 S.W.2d 1071, 1936 Ky. LEXIS 422 ( Ky. 1936 ) (decided under prior law).

Any citizen or taxpayer within proper limitations may contest result of procedure whereby another city was annexed by second-class city, thereby challenging assumption of debt of annexed city by annexing city. Matz v. Newport, 265 Ky. 126 , 95 S.W.2d 1071, 1936 Ky. LEXIS 422 ( Ky. 1936 ) (decided under prior law).

2. Contractual Obligation.

Where city annexed portion of county which embraced highway on which original bridge was located it resulted in imposing on city whatever contractual obligation then lawfully existed between county and railroad in respect to maintenance and repair of the bridge, thus where contract between party alleged to represent county and railroad stated that county would maintain and repair bridge, contract was not authorized by fiscal court and such contract was not binding on county, therefore it was not binding on city. Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. R. Co. v. Lexington, 86 F. Supp. 913, 1949 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2341 (D. Ky. 1949 ) (decided under prior law).

3. Improvement Liens.

Individual whose property has been benefited with his acquiescence by construction of abutting street pursuant to municipal ordinance exercising without objection jurisdiction over such property under belief that the property was within its jurisdiction, cannot resist enforcement of improvement lien merely because annexation proceedings by which the property benefited was ostensibly brought under city’s jurisdiction, were subsequently adjudged ineffective for that purpose. Hedger v. Kinsella, 284 Ky. 303 , 144 S.W.2d 515, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 486 ( Ky. 1940 ) (decided under prior law).

4. Liability for Personal Injuries.

Deficiency of annexing ordinance does not relieve city of liability for injuries caused by collapse of bridge in annexed section where city has collected taxes in said section. Corbin v. Payne, 288 Ky. 566 , 156 S.W.2d 850, 1941 Ky. LEXIS 143 ( Ky. 1941 ) (decided under prior law).

5. Taxation.
6. — Benefits to Property Owner.

Law that extended boundaries of town so as to include residence situated near former boundary was not, because of imposition of city taxes, an unconstitutional taking of private property for public use without just compensation where owner enjoyed town advantages. Sharp's Ex'r v. Dunavan, 56 Ky. 223 , 1856 Ky. LEXIS 25 ( Ky. 1856 ) (decided under prior law).

Advantages of municipal government constitute just compensation for taxation to maintain it, and hence local taxation is not taking of property without just compensation unless it is palpable that property is subject to taxation for benefit of others for purposes in which its owners have no interest. Board of Trustees v. Gill, 94 Ky. 138 , 21 S.W. 579, 14 Ky. L. Rptr. 755 , 1893 Ky. LEXIS 15 ( Ky. 1893 ) (decided under prior law).

Where property owner’s residence in territory which has been annexed to city was so situated that he derived protection and benefits from municipal government in common with other taxpayers, he could not refuse to pay city taxes on ground that such taxation took his property for public use without just compensation. Board of Trustees v. Gill, 94 Ky. 138 , 21 S.W. 579, 14 Ky. L. Rptr. 755 , 1893 Ky. LEXIS 15 ( Ky. 1893 ) (decided under prior law).

One who participated in securing extension of city boundary to include his residence is estopped to allege that taxation upon it is taking private property for public use without compensation even if he is not receiving his full share of benefits of the city government. Lebanon v. Edmonson, 101 Ky. 216 , 40 S.W. 573, 19 Ky. L. Rptr. 297 (1897) (decided under prior law).

7. — Land Subject to Taxation.

Farming land located near railroad station serving town and enjoying benefits of municipal government was properly subjected to city taxes after annexation, and would not be exempted on doctrine that courts would relieve against municipal taxation following extension of city limits where legitimate object of improving city was palpably perverted merely to lessen taxation upon inhabitants. Briggs v. Russellville, 99 Ky. 515 , 36 S.W. 558, 18 Ky. L. Rptr. 389 , 1896 Ky. LEXIS 117 ( Ky. 1896 ) (decided under prior law).

Land which had been brought into city by law extending city limits was subject to city taxes notwithstanding it was used solely for agriculture. Board of Councilmen v. Scott, 101 Ky. 615 , 42 S.W. 104, 19 Ky. L. Rptr. 1068 , 1897 Ky. LEXIS 228 ( Ky. 1897 ) (decided under prior law).

8. — Legislative Power.

General power of legislature to extend city limits so that property theretofore free from municipal taxation is subjected to it is indisputable, and courts cannot interpose unless power is so exercised as to violate constitutional prohibition against taking private property for public use without just compensation. Board of Trustees v. Gill, 94 Ky. 138 , 21 S.W. 579, 14 Ky. L. Rptr. 755 , 1893 Ky. LEXIS 15 ( Ky. 1893 ) (decided under prior law).

9. — Reduction of City Limits.

Property, which was within city limits when street improvement bonds were issued but which was removed therefrom upon reduction of city limits, cannot be taxed to aid in paying such bonds. Miller v. Pineville, 121 Ky. 211 , 89 S.W. 261, 28 Ky. L. Rptr. 379 , 1905 Ky. LEXIS 223 ( Ky. 1905 ) (decided under prior law).

10. — School Taxes.

School taxes which were properly assessable by fiscal court at time when schools lay without city limits, were, after territory was annexed by city, properly collectible by sheriff, rather than by city tax collector. Board of Education v. Caudill, 228 Ky. 652 , 15 S.W.2d 452, 1929 Ky. LEXIS 605 ( Ky. 1929 ) (decided under prior law).

11. — Turnpike Tax.

Town which annexed part of turnpike district did not assume aliquot part of turnpike tax theretofore levied by county upon such districts in unincorporated territory to meet payment of bonds for roads. Carpenter v. Central Covington, 119 Ky. 785 , 81 S.W. 919, 26 Ky. L. Rptr. 430 , 1904 Ky. LEXIS 130 ( Ky. 1904 ).

Where city annexed town it imposed upon itself burden of taxation for turnpike road purposes, notwithstanding that, before annexation, town had annexed unincorporated territory subject to such taxes and it had been held that town was exempt from payment of portion of taxes to which theretofore unincorporated territory was liable. Covington v. Bussart, 149 Ky. 288 , 148 S.W. 68, 1912 Ky. LEXIS 612 ( Ky. 1912 ) (decided under prior law).

Opinions of Attorney General.

The repeal of KRS 81A.430 , along with amendments to KRS 81A.400 , 81A.410(2) and (3) and this section, effectively prohibit a city from annexing any adjacent city or any portion of such adjacent city. OAG 84-266 .

81A.460. Question of annexation or reduction of territory, once rejected, not to be raised again for five years.

If a proposal by a city to annex unincorporated territory, or to reduce its boundaries pursuant to KRS 81A.440 is rejected by the voters of the territory proposed to be annexed or stricken, no further steps to annex or strike the same territory shall be taken within five (5) years from the date of rejection, nor shall the question of annexation or striking off be again submitted within that period.

History. Enact. Acts 1980, ch. 303, § 7, effective July 15, 1980; 1984, ch. 416, § 17, effective July 13, 1984; 1992, ch. 17, § 3, effective February 28, 1992.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Collateral Attack.

Where final judgment of appellate court authorized annexation of territory by first-class city, sixth-class city could not invalidate annexation ordinance of first-class city on ground that annexation was precluded by former similar section because voters rejected proposal under KRS 81.300 to 81.360 for first-class city to extend its boundaries and municipal services since such action was collateral attack on final judgment of appellate court, granting of supersedeas bond to stay annexation proceedings was void since Circuit Court had no jurisdiction to grant order of supersedeas to appellate court judgment. Louisville v. St. Matthews, 316 S.W.2d 210, 1958 Ky. LEXIS 31 ( Ky. 1958 ) (decided under prior law).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Where city voters have rejected the annexation of a tract, the city is prohibited by this section from annexing property located within the tract when the property owner petitions the city for annexation before the expiration of the five-year period. OAG 81-412 .

This section applies only with respect to a negative vote on the question of the annexation of all or part of another city or unincorporated territory, or a reduction of the city’s boundaries and would apply in the event a city’s attempt to strike territory from its boundary fails. On the other hand, if the de-annexation is approved, the city would be authorized to attempt to re-annex the territory at any time by following the terms of KRS 81A.420 . OAG 84-41 .

81A.470. Map and certified copy of ordinance of annexed, transferred, or severed area to be recorded — Preparation of map and description — Taxation of residents or property in new territory by annexing city prohibited prior to compliance.

  1. If the limits of a city are enlarged or reduced, the city shall, within sixty (60) days of the enlargement or reduction, cause an accurate map and description of the annexed, transferred, or severed area, together with a copy of the ordinance duly certified, to be recorded in the office of the county clerk of the county or counties in which the city is located and in the office of the Secretary of State. The map and description shall be prepared by a professional land surveyor. The documents shall depict the parcel annexed, transferred, or severed as a closed geometric figure on a plat annotated with bearings and distances or sufficient curve data to describe each line. The professional land surveyor shall clearly state on the documents the location of the existing municipal boundary, any physical feature with which the proposed municipal boundary coincides, and a statement of the recorded deeds, plats, right-of-way plans, or other resources used to develop the documents depicting the municipal boundary.
  2. No city which has annexed unincorporated or accepted transfer of incorporated territory may levy any tax upon the residents or property within the annexed or transferred area until the city has complied with the provisions of subsection (1) of this section, and of KRS 81A.475 .

History. Enact. Acts 1980, ch. 303, § 8, effective July 15, 1980; 1984, ch. 416, § 11, effective July 13, 1984; 1992, ch. 17, § 4, effective July 14, 1992; 1992, ch. 33, § 1, effective July 14, 1992; 1998, ch. 69, § 41, effective July 15, 1998; 2004, ch. 166, § 1, effective July 13, 2004; 2007, ch. 47, § 58, effective June 26, 2007; 2010, ch. 10, § 2, effective July 15, 2010; 2010, ch. 117, § 64, effective July 15, 2010; 2011, ch. 78, § 1, effective March 16, 2011.

Legislative Research Commission Notes.

(3/16/2011). 2011 Ky. Acts ch. 78, sec. 4, provides that the amendments to KRS 81A.470 in 2011 Ky. Acts ch. 78. sec. 1, shall apply retroactively to July 15, 2010.

(7/15/2010). This section was amended by 2010 Ky. Acts chs. 10 and 117, which are in conflict. Under KRS 446.250 , Acts ch. 117, which was last enacted by the General Assembly, prevails.

Opinions of Attorney General.

There is nothing in the annexation act that requires a city to comply with the provisions of this section and KRS 81A.475 on the sole ground that the annexation proposal embraces part of certain precincts which would naturally cause split precinct voting with respect to the referendum; since the referred to statutes are only post-annexation effective, the city is not required to comply therewith prior to the referendum. OAG 83-188 .

This section and KRS 81A.475 establish requirements which are not to be complied with until after the territory has actually been annexed; these requirements are not to be complied with prior to the referendum on the question of whether or not the territory is to be annexed. OAG 83-188 .

A city may not impose its occupational tax upon employers and employees within an annexed area immediately upon publication of the annexing ordinance, since subsection (2) of this section prohibits the levying of any form of tax in the annexed area until the reporting requirements have been complied with. On the other hand, any individual residing in the annexed territory, but who is employed in the city proper, would be subject to an occupational tax, as would any other nonresident who works in the city; the same rule would apply to employers who may also operate a business facility within the city, outside the area in question. OAG 84-363 .

The imposition of an occupational tax upon employers and employes within an annexed area requires an amendment to the city’s budget, pursuant to KRS 91A.030 , since the budget should include the anticipated increase in tax revenue that may be expected from the annexed area. OAG 84-363 .

81A.475. Map and list of residents in area to be annexed to be filed with county clerk.

If any city annexes any unincorporated area, accepts the transfer of incorporated territory, or reduces the boundaries of the city, it shall be the duty of the legislative body of the city to provide within sixty (60) days, to the county clerk of the county in which the city is located, a map clearly delineating the boundaries of the area affected along with a list of properties included in the annexation, transfer, or reduction. The list of properties required by this section shall include the name and address of each property owner.

History. Enact. Acts 1980, ch. 155, § 1, effective July 15, 1980; 1984, ch. 416, § 12, effective July 13, 1984; 1992, ch. 17, § 5, effective February 28, 1992; 2010, ch. 10, § 3, effective July 15, 2010.

Opinions of Attorney General.

There is nothing in the annexation act that requires a city to comply with the provisions of KRS 81A.470 and this section on the sole ground that the annexation proposal embraces part of certain precincts which would naturally cause split precinct voting with respect to the referendum; thus, since the referred to statutes are only post-annexation effective, the city is not required to comply therewith prior to the referendum. OAG 83-188 .

KRS 81A.470 and this section establish requirements which are not to be complied with until after the territory has actually been annexed; these requirements are not to be complied with prior to the referendum on the question of whether or not the territory is to be annexed. OAG 83-188 .

81A.480. Application of provisions of KRS 81A.050 to 81A.070 and KRS 81A.400 to 81A.470. [Repealed]

History. Enact. Acts 1980, ch. 303, § 10, effective July 15, 1980; repealed by 2019 ch. 44, § 35, effective June 27, 2019.

81A.482. Standing on contest city’s annexation of property containing no residents — Standing to contest results of defeated KRS 81A.120 election.

  1. When a city annexes  or proposes to annex any territory in which no person is residing,  any person who pursues litigation against the annexation shall have  standing in a court of law to do so if that person:
    1. Owns property within  the area that is proposed to be annexed or that has been annexed by  a city; or
    2. Owns property directly adjoining a  parcel of land that contains either in whole or in part any territory  proposed to be annexed or annexed by the city. For the purposes of  this paragraph, “parcel” means a tract of real property  that is assessed as a single unit for purposes of determining ad valorem  tax liability.
  2. If an election on annexation held pursuant  to KRS 81A.420 is defeated, a city government  that proposed the annexation shall have standing to contest the results  of the election for the reasons and in a manner established in KRS 120.250 .
  3. The authority granted by this section  shall be construed to be in addition to any standing to pursue litigation  existing in statute, common law, or the rules of city procedure.

HISTORY: 2018 ch. 155, § 1, effective July 14, 2018.

81A.484. Presumption of annexation’s validity when not challenged within two years.

Any area annexed by a city pursuant to this chapter shall be conclusively deemed to be validly annexed if no person has contested the annexation in a court of competent jurisdiction within two (2) years following the effective date of the ordinance finally annexing the territory into the city.

HISTORY: 2018 ch. 155, § 2, effective July 14, 2018.

81A.490. Rights of utilities preserved.

Notwithstanding any other provision in this chapter, all rights of the utilities providing utility services in any area annexed by a city prior to the annexation, existing under other statutes, laws, or regulations are hereby expressly preserved.

History. Enact. Acts 1980, ch. 303, § 11, effective July 15, 1980.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

This section, to the extent it purports to give a utility the right to use a city’s streets without its consent, is unconstitutional. Florence v. Owen Electric Coop., Inc., 832 S.W.2d 876, 1992 Ky. LEXIS 72 ( Ky. 1992 ).

2. Police Power.

The General Assembly, by enacting this section, KRS 96.538 and KRS 279.110(5), has utilized its right to exercise its police power. This is an inclusion to regulate rates and services, not in the face of Ky. Const., § 163, but in harmony with the reserved power of the state to safeguard vital interests of the people. A constitutional prohibition against impairing the obligation of contracts (and the franchise being a contract) is not an absolute one to be read with literal exactness. Legislation enacted under police power is not invalid merely because of its incidental effect. Florence v. Owen Electric Coop., Inc., 832 S.W.2d 876, 1992 Ky. LEXIS 72 ( Ky. 1992 ).

81A.500. Annexation of property of consenting landowners pending litigation.

Whenever any city has enacted an ordinance proposing to annex any territory and the annexation of the territory is being challenged in the manner provided by law, the city may proceed to annex any land contained in the area proposed to be annexed, which is contiguous to the borders of the city, if the owner of such land consents to the annexation.

History. Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 155.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section was formerly compiled as KRS 81.275 and was renumbered by the Reviser under the authority of KRS 7.136 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

Powell v. Campbellsburg, 563 S.W.2d 488, 1978 Ky. App. LEXIS 483 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).

Opinions of Attorney General.

A city desiring to annex two divided tracts of land which are separated from the city by a county road could pursuant to this section annex the two noncontiguous tracts pursuant to one ordinance, provided both tracts will include the territory that is contiguous to the borders of the city. OAG 76-444 .

Since the term “contiguous” requires that the lands intended to be annexed actually touch at some point, real estate located directly across a county road from the boundaries of the city is not contiguous to the borders of the city and it would be necessary for the city to annex the county road lying between the two tracts in question in order to comply with the statutory requirements that the annexed territory must be contiguous to the city. OAG 76-444 .

Certain tracts of land could not be annexed by a fourth-class city under the provisions of this section where the city has failed to file the required petition in Circuit Court pursuant to KRS 81.210 (now repealed). OAG 77-635 .

81A.510. Annexation of unincorporated territory in which industrial plants are located — Public policy stated — Prerequisites — Protest and hearing.

  1. The General Assembly, recognizing that the general welfare and prosperity of the Commonwealth of Kentucky is very greatly dependent upon continued industrial development and expansion; and, further recognizing that reasonable assurances of fair treatment will greatly increase industrial development and expansion in Kentucky, it hereby is declared to be the public policy of the Commonwealth of Kentucky to encourage the location of new industries and the expansion of existing industries in Kentucky by prohibiting unfair and unreasonable annexation by municipal corporations of industries now or hereafter located in unincorporated areas. However, it is not the intent of the General Assembly to prohibit, restrict or hamper normal expansion of municipal boundaries if such normal development and expansion extends to and embraces such industrial properties.
  2. No unincorporated territory in which is located an industrial plant or plants shall be annexed by any municipality unless such territory is embraced within a broad, comprehensive plan of annexation. The territory to be annexed shall be contiguous to the boundary line or lines of such municipality, and the territory or area to be annexed shall be both compact and contiguous. The number of registered voters duly qualified to vote in the territory proposed to be annexed shall equal or exceed fifty percent (50%) of the average number of persons employed by industrial plants within such territory during the next preceding calendar year, the number of such registered voters to be determined by taking the total of such voters from the last closed registration books in the county clerk’s office.
  3. Nothing herein shall be construed as prohibiting any municipality from annexing any industrial plant or plants or its properties if the duly authorized representatives of such industrial plant or plants consent to or request such action.
  4. Any person or persons within the area proposed to be annexed shall have the right to file a protest and to have the protest heard and determined as now provided by existing statutes.

History. Enact. Acts 1956 (4th Ex. Sess.), ch. 1, effective May 2, 1956.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section was formerly compiled as KRS 81.280 and was renumbered by the Reviser under authority of KRS 7.136 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

This section does not violate Ky. Const., § 2. White v. Danville, 465 S.W.2d 67, 1971 Ky. LEXIS 433 ( Ky. 1971 ).

2. Construction.

The annexation of property by a municipality is a political act within the exclusive control of the legislature, and that body may enact any reasonable statutory procedures necessary in the premises. White v. Danville, 465 S.W.2d 67, 1971 Ky. LEXIS 433 ( Ky. 1971 ).

When the legislature enacted this section and KRS 154.170 (renumbered as KRS 154.20-140 ) creating industrial plants, they formed a compact with industries who were persuaded to locate in Kentucky under legislative assurance that they would not be subjected to municipal annexation and taxation until the number of persons in the territory of their location would equal 50 percent of the persons employed by such plants, and such compact cannot be taken lightly. White v. Danville, 465 S.W.2d 67, 1971 Ky. LEXIS 433 ( Ky. 1971 ).

This section has application as follows: (1) If the plan is arbitrary and not within normal expansion, the option is given industry to either forestall annexation through application of subsection (2) of this section or consent through subsection (3) of this section; however, (2) if the annexation is within normal expansion, subsection (4) of this section clearly intends the method of remedy for industry to be the same as that of any other person within the affected territory. Rector v. Bowling Green, 594 S.W.2d 891, 1979 Ky. App. LEXIS 513 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).

3. Purpose.

The purpose of this section is to attract industry to the Commonwealth through legislative assurances that industrial plants will not arbitrarily be included in municipal annexation plans solely for taxation purposes. Rector v. Bowling Green, 594 S.W.2d 891, 1979 Ky. App. LEXIS 513 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).

4. Noncontiguous Territory.

Annexation of noncontiguous territory is not authorized by the Kentucky statutes. Ridings v. Owensboro, 383 S.W.2d 510, 1964 Ky. LEXIS 48 ( Ky. 1964 ).

5. Consent or Waiver of Industry.

This section was intended to protect industries against “spot” annexation. When the annexation reflects a broad and comprehensive plan, the area is contiguous and reasonably compact, and there is no suggestion that the number of voters in the area does not equal or exceed the number of persons employed by the industrial plant or plants located therein, there is no need for the consent or waiver of the industrial plants. Hickman, Inc. v. Choate, 379 S.W.2d 238, 1964 Ky. LEXIS 227 ( Ky. 1964 ).

In the absence of the industry’s consent as provided in subsection (3) of this section, an annexation must comply with the conditions of subsection (2) of this section. Erlanger v. American Isowall Corp., 607 S.W.2d 128, 1980 Ky. App. LEXIS 375 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980).

6. Requirements Met.

The provisions of this section requiring the area to be annexed to be compact and contiguous are met when the area annexed has an irregular shape roughly similar to that of an hour-glass, the northern end of which adjoins the annexing city, the eastern boundary of which adjoins the boundaries of other cities, and the southern and western boundaries coincide with a railroad track and certain highways. Hopperton v. Covington, 415 S.W.2d 381, 1967 Ky. LEXIS 316 ( Ky. 1967 ).

7. Irregularity in Shape.

Mere irregularity in shape of the annexed area does not vitiate its compactness. Hopperton v. Covington, 415 S.W.2d 381, 1967 Ky. LEXIS 316 ( Ky. 1967 ).

8. Normal Expansion.

The specific statutory preference to industry means that only industry can place in issue the question of whether an annexation action is within “normal expansion” as determined by factors such as the ratio of registered voters to industrial employees; all persons other than industry are precluded from raising this issue. Rector v. Bowling Green, 594 S.W.2d 891, 1979 Ky. App. LEXIS 513 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).

9. Remonstrance Suit.

An industrial plan may maintain an action to invalidate an annexation ordinance which fails to comply with statutory criteria, even though the plant has not filed a remonstrance suit within the 30-day statute of limitations. Erlanger v. American Isowall Corp., 607 S.W.2d 128, 1980 Ky. App. LEXIS 375 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980).

The protection of subsection (2) of this section may be sought in an action which is not part of a remonstrance suit. Erlanger v. American Isowall Corp., 607 S.W.2d 128, 1980 Ky. App. LEXIS 375 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980).

10. Protection for Industry.

Nothing within either the words or the history of this statute indicates a special intent to protect or benefit any individual or group other than industry, and that protection is limited to recourse against unfair annexation, not that done during normal expansion. Rector v. Bowling Green, 594 S.W.2d 891, 1979 Ky. App. LEXIS 513 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).

Opinions of Attorney General.

The 30-day protest provision referred to in subsection (1) of KRS 81.110 (now KRS 81A.020 ) would apply with respect to any protest filed in connection with the proposed annexation of unincorporated territory in which is located an industrial plant insofar as cities of the third class are concerned. OAG 78-833 .

81A.520. Annexation of impoundments of water by cities of the fifth class. [Repealed.]

As an alternative to other methods of annexation of territories by cities and in addition to the methods heretofore provided by law any city of the fifth class may annex to the city any portion or all of any impoundment of water, not on a navigable stream, adjoining the city, created by a dam constructed by the annexing city from which that city lawfully obtains all or any part of its water supply including any lands lying within fifty (50) feet of such impounded water by enacting and publishing an ordinance describing accurately the boundary of the territory to be annexed provided however that the area annexed shall not exceed one-fourth (1/4) acre multiplied by the number of inhabitants of the annexing city.

History. Enact. Acts 1972, ch. 57, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1972, ch. 57, § 1) was repealed by Acts 2014, ch. 92, § 314, effective January 1, 2015.

81A.530. Authorization for, procedures for, and effects of annexation of a city with population of less than 1,000 by an adjoining city with a population of 1,000 or more.

  1. When any city with a population equal to or greater than one thousand (1,000) and a city with a population of less than one thousand (1,000) have a common boundary, and it is determined by the legislative body of the city with a population of less than one thousand (1,000) and of the adjoining city with a population equal to or greater than one thousand (1,000) that the entire area of the city with a population of less than one thousand (1,000) can be better served by the adjoining city, the entire area of the city with a population of less than one thousand (1,000) may be annexed to the adjoining city and the city once annexed shall be dissolved after the enactment of identical ordinances by each legislative body according to the provisions of this section.
  2. The ordinances declaring the annexation shall include but not be limited to the following:
    1. A statement of the financial consideration, if any, between the two (2) cities regarding the area of the city being annexed and the terms of any financial arrangements;
    2. The resolution of any taxes or revenues from the area of the city being annexed;
    3. A statement of the land use or the zoning regulations that would be applicable to the area of the city being annexed if planning and zoning is in effect pursuant to KRS Chapter 100 in either city; and
    4. The date that the annexation of the city being annexed by the adjoining city would be effective, which shall not be more than one (1) year after the date on which the last of the identical ordinances is adopted.
  3. In order for the annexation to be completed, either of the following procedures shall be followed and concluded:
    1. Prior to the effective date of the annexation of the area of the city being annexed into the adjoining city, a petition in support of the annexation, containing a number of signatures of residents in the area of the city being annexed that is not less than fifty-one percent (51%) of the number of registered voters in the area of that city, shall be submitted to the county clerk of the county in which the city being annexed is located. The county clerk shall within ten (10) working days of receipt of the petition notify each city of the validity of each signature and address on the petition; or
    2. An election shall be held to determine the desire of the voters in the city being annexed. An election shall be held at a regular election. The qualifications of voters and all other matters in regard to the election shall be governed by the general election laws. The question shall be submitted in substantially the following form: “Are you in favor of annexing the city of  _______________________________________  into the city of  _____________________________________________________________________  and dissolving the city of  _____________________________________________________________________ ? Yes  _______________________________________  No  _______________________________________ ”.
  4. If the requisite number of signatures is verified by the county clerk as provided in subsection (3)(a) of this section, or if a majority of the legal votes cast at the election in the city proposing to be annexed favors the annexation, the annexation shall proceed and become effective, and the city being annexed shall be dissolved at the date provided in the identical ordinances adopted by the legislative bodies of both cities upon the enactment by the legislative body of the adjoining city of an ordinance accepting the annexation of the city being annexed.
  5. All assets of the city being annexed existing on the date of annexation shall become the property of the annexing city. Any indebtedness for which the city being annexed is liable on the date of annexation shall be assumed by the annexing city, so that after annexation the burden of taxation shall be uniform throughout the area of the two (2) cities.
  6. The enactment of ordinances by each city shall be pursuant to KRS 83A.060 .
  7. The authority for the annexation of the city being annexed shall be exclusive of the provisions of KRS 81A.440 .
  8. In addition to other public notice requirements, the annexing city shall comply with the provisions of KRS 81A.470 , but shall not be required to comply with the provisions of KRS 81A.475 . The city clerk of the city being annexed shall, within sixty (60) days after the effective date of the dissolution of that city, give written notice of the dissolution and the date of the dissolution to the Secretary of State who shall properly index and file the notice and date as a permanent record in the secretary’s office.
  9. The area of the city being annexed shall assume the local option status of the city by which it is being annexed.
  10. For the purposes of this section, the city population shall be determined by using the populations contained in the most recent federal decennial census.

History. Enact. Acts 1998, ch. 379, § 1, effective July 15, 1998; 2001, ch. 152, § 2, effective June 21, 2001; 2014, ch. 92, § 6, effective January 1, 2015.

CHAPTER 82 General Provisions Applicable to Cities

General Provisions

82.010. Forfeiture of charter for failure to maintain city government. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2741c) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 116, § 6, effective July 15, 1980.

82.020. Procedure for forfeiture of charter. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2741c-2) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 116, § 6, effective July 15, 1980.

82.025. Kentucky Urban Affairs Council. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1972, ch. 101, § 1; 1986, ch. 175, § 1; 1990, ch. 401, § 14; 1998, ch. 69, § 42; 2002, ch. 346, § 92) was repealed by Acts 2007, ch. 47, § 95, effective June 26, 2007.

82.026. City historic preservation commissions.

The legislative body of any city may enact ordinances establishing local historic preservation commissions for the purpose of qualifying for historic preservation funding. The city shall comply with the 1966 National Historic Preservation Act, as amended, in order to meet the requirements for an adequate and qualified historic preservation commission, and the legislative body shall provide:

  1. A system for surveying and inventorying historic properties;
  2. Procedures for adequate public participation in the local historic preservation program, including the process of recommending properties to the national register;
  3. The enforcement of appropriate state and local legislation for the designation and protection of historic properties; and
  4. Such other responsibilities as may be required by the 1966 National Historic Preservation Act, as amended.

History. Enact. Acts 1984, ch. 196, § 1, effective July 13, 1984.

Compiler’s Notes.

The 1966 National Historic Preservation Act referred to in this section is compiled as 16 USCS § 470 et seq.

Research References and Practice Aids

Journal of Natural Resources & Environmental Law.

Articles, Historic Districts: A Look at the Mechanics in Kentucky and a Comparative Study of State Enabling Legislation, 11 J. Nat. Resources & Envtl. L. 229 (1995-96).

82.030. Payment of medical and hospital expenses of city employees. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 213) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

82.040. Group life insurance for city employees. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1948, ch. 178; 1974, ch. 13, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

82.050. Condemnation of property, issuance of bonds and pledge of parking meter revenues for off-street parking facilities. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1952, ch. 79, §§ 1, 2, effective June 19, 1952) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

82.060. City authorized to sell surplus real estate — When — Provisions as to park property held in trust. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 99; 1964, ch. 107, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

82.070. Councilmen’s compensation. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1958, ch. 41, § 1; 1968, ch. 28, § 2; 1974, ch. 39, § 2) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980.

82.075. Compensation of mayor in city of 15,000 or more. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1976, ch. 372, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980.

82.080. Adoption of codes and revisions of ordinances by reference. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1962, ch. 206, § 1; 1966, ch. 239, § 44) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980.

82.081. Corporate powers of cities.

Each city shall constitute a corporation, with capacity to sue and be sued, to contract and be contracted with, to acquire and dispose of property, and to have a common seal and change it at pleasure or act without a seal.

History. Enact. Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 1, effective July 15, 1980.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. In General.

Cities have only those powers which are (1) granted in express words; (2) necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to those expressly granted; or (3) essential to the accomplishment of the then declared objects and purposes. Barrow v. Bradley, 190 Ky. 480 , 227 S.W. 1016, 1921 Ky. LEXIS 481 ( Ky. 1921 ) (decided under prior law).

Municipalities possess no power except that expressly conferred by the legislature, or necessarily implied in order to carry out the expressly conferred authority. The charter of a city is its constitution, and no ordinance may be enacted in conflict therewith. Hargadon v. Silk, 279 Ky. 69 , 129 S.W.2d 1039, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 239 ( Ky. 1939 ) (decided under prior law).

Neither the constitution nor any statute attempts to enumerate each and every object or purpose for which a municipality may expend its funds within its general powers. Many purposes may be undertaken by municipalities under necessarily implied authority to carry out their governmental functions. Waddle v. Somerset, 281 Ky. 30 , 134 S.W.2d 956, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 4 ( Ky. 1939 ) (decided under prior law).

Cities possess only those powers expressly conferred upon them by their charters, or necessarily conferred by implication in order to carry out powers expressly given. Mullins v. Wilson, 282 Ky. 316 , 138 S.W.2d 484, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 168 ( Ky. 1940 ) (decided under prior law).

Ky. Const., §§ 156 (now repealed) and 166, and the general laws enacted under those sections for the classification, incorporation and government of cities, automatically repealed all specially enacted charters of cities. Mullins v. Wilson, 282 Ky. 316 , 138 S.W.2d 484, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 168 ( Ky. 1940 ) (decided under prior law).

A municipality possesses only such powers as are expressly granted, or which are necessarily implied in or incident to the powers expressly granted, or which are essential to the accomplishment of the declared objects and purposes. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Hazard, 304 Ky. 370 , 200 S.W.2d 917, 1947 Ky. LEXIS 648 ( Ky. 1947 ) (decided under prior law).

2. Appropriations.

A second-class city may appropriate money to secure location of state house of reform near its limits, it having the right to commit its juveniles to such institution. Board of Trustees v. Lexington, 112 Ky. 171 , 65 S.W. 350, 23 Ky. L. Rptr. 1470 , 1901 Ky. LEXIS 295 ( Ky. 1901 ) (decided under prior law).

3. Bonds.

Fourth-class cities have authority to issue refunding bonds without an election. Welch v. Nicholasville, 225 Ky. 312 , 8 S.W.2d 400, 1928 Ky. LEXIS 768 ( Ky. 1928 ) (decided under prior law).

4. Buildings.

A city owning a school building is authorized to sell it. Read v. Smith, 106 S.W. 1182, 32 Ky. L. Rptr. 716 (1908) (decided under prior law).

Second-class cities are authorized to erect a suitable building to house municipal offices, and for use as an auditorium. Wilkerson v. Lexington, 188 Ky. 381 , 222 S.W. 74, 1920 Ky. LEXIS 290 ( Ky. 1920 ) (decided under prior law).

Second-class cities have neither express nor inherent authority to erect a memorial building. Barrow v. Bradley, 190 Ky. 480 , 227 S.W. 1016, 1921 Ky. LEXIS 481 ( Ky. 1921 ) (decided under prior law).

A city cannot regulate the construction or design of state owned buildings under the general grant of police power to cities. Bowling Green v. T & E Electrical Contractors, Inc., 602 S.W.2d 434, 1980 Ky. LEXIS 247 ( Ky. 1980 ) (decided under prior law).

It is permissible for the Commonwealth to grant to cities the authority to inspect and control the construction of state buildings, but such power, when given, must be specifically delegated. Bowling Green v. T & E Electrical Contractors, Inc., 602 S.W.2d 434, 1980 Ky. LEXIS 247 ( Ky. 1980 ) (decided under prior law).

Where the legislature had not delegated its power to inspect and regulate buildings owned by the Commonwealth, the city of Bowling Green as a city of the second class did not have the power to inspect a building on the Western Kentucky University campus for electrical code compliance and it certainly could not require the state to pay for an inspection made gratuitously. Bowling Green v. T & E Electrical Contractors, Inc., 602 S.W.2d 434, 1980 Ky. LEXIS 247 ( Ky. 1980 ) (decided under prior law).

5. Creation of Offices.

Second-class cities may not create offices not authorized by law, but may provide for employees. Lowry v. Lexington, 113 Ky. 763 , 68 S.W. 1109, 24 Ky. L. Rptr. 516 , 1902 Ky. LEXIS 107 ( Ky. 1902 ) (decided under prior law).

Second-class cities are empowered to create office of market-master and prescribe his duties and salary. Potter v. Bell, 125 Ky. 288 , 101 S.W. 297, 30 Ky. L. Rptr. 1314 , 1907 Ky. LEXIS 276 ( Ky. 1907 ) (decided under prior law).

6. Delegation of Power.

City purchasing combined water and electric systems had power to create a board to manage and operate the systems similar to the boards provided for by KRS 96.530 and 96.740 , and such did not constitute an unlawful delegation of power. Cawood v. Coleman, 294 Ky. 858 , 172 S.W.2d 548, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 515 ( Ky. 1943 ) (decided under prior law).

7. Donations.

Cities cannot donate money for purposes which they are not authorized to carry out directly. Barrow v. Bradley, 190 Ky. 480 , 227 S.W. 1016, 1921 Ky. LEXIS 481 ( Ky. 1921 ) (decided under prior law).

8. Election of Officers.

When the charter does not otherwise provide, officers shall be elected by the general council. Potter v. Bell, 125 Ky. 288 , 101 S.W. 297, 30 Ky. L. Rptr. 1314 , 1907 Ky. LEXIS 276 ( Ky. 1907 ) (decided under prior law).

9. Employee Wages.

City ordinances establishing hourly wage rates for city firemen did not violate former section governing powers of second-class cities. Snyder v. Owensboro, 555 S.W.2d 246, 1977 Ky. LEXIS 499 ( Ky. 1977 ) (decided under prior law).

10. Enforcement of Penalties.

Second-class cities may require persons fined for misdemeanors, upon failure to pay or replevy, to work out the fine and costs on the streets, alleys and gravel pits, but may not authorize the working of a prisoner prior to conviction. Stone v. Paducah, 120 Ky. 322 , 86 S.W. 531, 27 Ky. L. Rptr. 717 , 1905 Ky. LEXIS 102 ( Ky. 1905 ) (decided under prior law).

11. Leases.

A city does not need special statutory authorization to lease property, unless to do so is in conflict with a statute mandating otherwise, and so long as such lease is consistent with a public purpose. Historic Licking Riverside Civic Asso. v. Covington, 774 S.W.2d 436, 1989 Ky. LEXIS 51 ( Ky. 1989 ).

The capacity to acquire and dispose of property includes the power to lease it. Historic Licking Riverside Civic Asso. v. Covington, 774 S.W.2d 436, 1989 Ky. LEXIS 51 ( Ky. 1989 ).

12. Liabilities.

Cities may not become liable by implication. Bellview Trustees v. Hohn, 82 Ky. 1 , 5 Ky. L. Rptr. 730 , 1884 Ky. LEXIS 31 ( Ky. 1 884) (decided under prior law).

A city is not liable for the negligence of its officers, nor for their acts in enforcing a void ordinance. Jolly's Adm'x v. Hawesville, 89 Ky. 279 , 12 S.W. 313, 11 Ky. L. Rptr. 477 , 1889 Ky. LEXIS 128 ( Ky. 1889 ); Hershberg v. Barbourville, 142 Ky. 60 , 133 S.W. 985, 1911 Ky. LEXIS 130 ( Ky. 1911 ) (decided under prior law).

A city is not liable for defect in street over which it has never assumed control, but is liable for improper construction of a drain. City of Maysville v. Stanton, 14 S.W. 675, 12 Ky. L. Rptr. 586 (1890) (decided under prior law).

A city acts through its council only, and is not liable for the acts of its officers that it neither authorized nor ratified; moreover it is not liable for the ultra vires acts of its council or the failure of the council to enact ordinances suppressing nuisances. Arnold v. Stanford, 113 Ky. 852 , 69 S.W. 726, 24 Ky. L. Rptr. 626 , 1902 Ky. LEXIS 112 ( Ky. 1902 ) (decided under prior law).

A city is liable for permitting an accumulation of dirt on a sidewalk which, when saturated with water from rainfall, will be converted into slippery mud, causing a pedestrian, in the exercise of ordinary care, to be injured by slipping and falling thereon. Covington v. Keal, 280 Ky. 237 , 133 S.W.2d 49, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 113 ( Ky. 1939 ) (decided under prior law).

A city is not ordinarily liable for mere slipperiness caused by snow and ice, but may be liable where the sidewalk was defective, or the snow or ice amounted to an obstruction, or its natural lay or condition was changed by artificial means, such as permitting its accumulation in ridges. Covington v. Keal, 280 Ky. 237 , 133 S.W.2d 49, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 113 ( Ky. 1939 ) (decided under prior law).

In determining whether city is liable for unsafe condition or sidewalks, it makes little difference whether the unsafe condition is due to defective plan, faulty construction, or allowing the condition to arise after construction. Covington v. Keal, 280 Ky. 237 , 133 S.W.2d 49, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 113 ( Ky. 1939 ) (decided under prior law).

It is the duty of a city to exercise reasonable care to keep its sidewalks in a reasonably safe condition for the use intended by those who exercise ordinary care for their safety. Covington v. Keal, 280 Ky. 237 , 133 S.W.2d 49, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 113 ( Ky. 1939 ) (decided under prior law).

13. Licenses.

A second-class city has no authority to license an illegal business. Jones v. Paducah, 157 Ky. 781 , 164 S.W. 101, 1914 Ky. LEXIS 383 ( Ky. 1914 ) (decided under prior law).

Second-class cities, as a police measure, may require applicants for licenses as junk dealers, pawnbrokers and automobile wreckers to consent in advance to an inspection and search of their premises. Mansbach Scrap Iron Co. v. Ashland, 235 Ky. 265 , 30 S.W.2d 968, 1930 Ky. LEXIS 338 ( Ky. 1930 ) (decided under prior law).

14. Limitations on Authority.

Persons dealing with cities and their officials must take knowledge of the limitations on their authority. Bellview Trustees v. Hohn, 82 Ky. 1 , 5 Ky. L. Rptr. 730 , 1884 Ky. LEXIS 31 ( Ky. 1 884) (decided under prior law).

Second-class cities have no authority to legislate upon the question of evidence, and of its weight and effect before the courts. McNulty v. Toopf, 116 Ky. 202 , 75 S.W. 258, 25 Ky. L. Rptr. 430 , 1903 Ky. LEXIS 176 ( Ky. 1903 ) (decided under prior law).

Second-class cities may enact any and all ordinances and fix fines and penalties to maintain the peace, good government, and welfare of the city; the only limitations being that they may not fix fines and penalties at less than that imposed by statute for the same offenses, and that such ordinances may not conflict with the Constitution and statutes. Stone v. Paducah, 120 Ky. 322 , 86 S.W. 531, 27 Ky. L. Rptr. 717 , 1905 Ky. LEXIS 102 ( Ky. 1905 ) (decided under prior law).

A city possesses only those powers expressly granted by the Constitution and statutes plus such powers as are necessarily implied or incident to the expressly granted powers and which are indispensable to enable it to carry out its declared objects, purposes and expressed powers. Bowling Green v. T & E Electrical Contractors, Inc., 602 S.W.2d 434, 1980 Ky. LEXIS 247 ( Ky. 1980 ) (decided under prior law).

15. Property.

Second-class cities are authorized to acquire land for park purposes. Lexington v. Kentucky Chautauqua Assembly, 114 Ky. 781 , 71 S.W. 943, 24 Ky. L. Rptr. 1568 , 1903 Ky. LEXIS 48 ( Ky. 1903 ) (decided under prior law).

City may rent premises for its governmental purposes in certain contingencies, and taxpayer attacking payment of rent as invalid has burden of proving that original rental contract was invalid. Waddle v. Somerset, 281 Ky. 30 , 134 S.W.2d 956, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 4 ( Ky. 1939 ) (decided under prior law).

A city may penalize those living outside the city limits who use the city’s sewer facilities without having a permit to do so. The offense constitutes a trespass upon the city’s property. Lexington v. Jones, 289 Ky. 719 , 160 S.W.2d 19, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 629 ( Ky. 1942 ) (decided under prior law).

Acquisition and use of property for a municipal parking lot is a proper municipal purpose, and city of fourth class has power to condemn land for such purpose. Miller v. Georgetown, 301 Ky. 241 , 191 S.W.2d 403, 1945 Ky. LEXIS 732 ( Ky. 1945 ) (decided under prior law).

Neither the city, nor the park board, nor both, could dispose of park property for a purpose inconsistent with its use as a public park. Baker v. Lexington, 273 S.W.2d 34, 1954 Ky. LEXIS 1143 ( Ky. 1954 ) (decided under prior law).

Where under plan park property would be conveyed in fee simple to municipal improvement corporation, whereupon corporation would issue bonds, with the property as security, in order to finance construction of public swimming pool in the park and corporation would lease the park back to the city for yearly rental sufficient to pay principal and interest on the bonds and when rental payments were sufficient to retire the bonds then corporation would reconvey the property to the city, and even though there was remote possibility of the loss of the property, involving a consequent use inconsistent with park purposes this did not condemn the plan the real purpose of which was the improvement of the park and since the risk of loss was remote and incidental it was a reasonable risk and plan was valid. Baker v. Lexington, 273 S.W.2d 34, 1954 Ky. LEXIS 1143 ( Ky. 1954 ) (decided under prior law).

The power to sell includes the power to lease. Abernathy v. Irvine, 355 S.W.2d 159, 1961 Ky. LEXIS 16 ( Ky. 1961 ), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 831, 83 S. Ct. 49, 9 L. Ed. 2d 67, 1962 U.S. LEXIS 649 (1962); cert. denied, Abernathy v. Irvine, 371 U.S. 831, 83 S. Ct. 49, 9 L. Ed. 2d 67, 1962 U.S. LEXIS 649 (U.S. 1962) (decided under prior law).

16. Suits in Corporate Name.

Sixth-class cities may properly sue and appeal in their corporate name. Mt. Pleasant v. Eversole, 96 S.W. 478, 29 Ky. L. Rptr. 830 (1906) (decided under prior law).

17. Taxation.

Cities have the right to determine the amount of their taxes within constitutional and statutory limits. Neither the state nor another municipality may require a city to levy a tax. The inhabitants of each city have the right to choose their own officers, manage their own domestic affairs, and raise and disburse their own taxes. Campbell County v. Newport, 174 Ky. 712 , 193 S.W. 1, 1917 Ky. LEXIS 258 ( Ky. 1917 ) ( Ky. 1917 ) (decided under prior law).

The council of a second-class city has authority to call an election on question of levying a tax for purposes of a municipal junior college. Pollitt v. Lewis, 269 Ky. 680 , 108 S.W.2d 671, 1937 Ky. LEXIS 659 ( Ky. 1937 ) (decided under prior law).

The power to tax belongs by necessary implication to every incorporated city, and a city charter is not invalid because of its failure to grant specifically the power to tax. Mullins v. Wilson, 282 Ky. 316 , 138 S.W.2d 484, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 168 ( Ky. 1940 ) (decided under prior law).

18. Use of Streets.

The acquisition of land for the purpose of widening a street is a municipal purpose. Bosshammer v. South Ft. Mitchell, 252 Ky. 785 , 68 S.W.2d 413, 1934 Ky. LEXIS 862 ( Ky. 1934 ) (decided under prior law).

Even though city had right to determine character of improvements made upon its streets chancellor had power to authorize appellee to pave six-foot strip of street which was obstructed and which lay between appellee’s property and paved portion of street, for to hold otherwise would render ineffectual public’s right to full use of street for purposes and intents for which street was dedicated. Druid Hills v. Broadway Baptist Church, 316 S.W.2d 698, 1958 Ky. LEXIS 56 ( Ky. 1958 ), cert. denied, Thomas v. Broadway Baptist Church, 359 U.S. 910, 79 S. Ct. 590, 3 L. Ed. 2d 576, 1959 U.S. LEXIS 1541 (1959); cert. denied, Thomas v. Broadway Baptist Church, 359 U.S. 910, 79 S. Ct. 590, 3 L. Ed. 2d 576, 1959 U.S. LEXIS 1541 (U.S. 1959) (decided under prior law).

In action by church to enjoin city from interfering with removal of obstructions placed upon street to prevent traffic from using street for ingress and egress from church’s property located at dead end of street where record supported view that church made diligent effort to enforce its right and that of the public to compel city to keep the street open for the primary purpose for which it was dedicated, church was not guilty of laches by failing to assert its claim to the prejudice of city. Druid Hills v. Broadway Baptist Church, 316 S.W.2d 698, 1958 Ky. LEXIS 56 ( Ky. 1958 ), cert. denied, Thomas v. Broadway Baptist Church, 359 U.S. 910, 79 S. Ct. 590, 3 L. Ed. 2d 576, 1959 U.S. LEXIS 1541 (1959); cert. denied, Thomas v. Broadway Baptist Church, 359 U.S. 910, 79 S. Ct. 590, 3 L. Ed. 2d 576, 1959 U.S. LEXIS 1541 (U.S. 1959) (decided under prior law).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Where a city had a 20-year contract, duly approved by a favorable vote of the citizens of the city, with a nonprofit corporation which was to provide fire protection to the city, the city could not legally rescind that contract in order to establish its own fire protection district because a city has no right to revoke an otherwise binding contract unless that power has been granted by the Constitution or by the legislature, which is not the case here. OAG 80-411 .

A department of a city, unless it is created as a separate, corporate body by statute, is an agency of that city; accordingly, the city as a single, corporate body including its agent department, may only bring a maximum of 25 suits in the Small Claims Division of District Court. OAG 81-191 .

This section, which gives each city the power to acquire and dispose of all types of property and the home rule provision, KRS 82.082 , giving cities the right to exercise any power and perform any function within its boundaries that is not in conflict with a section of the Constitution or statute, would give a city ample authority to dispose of any surplus real property no longer needed for public purposes. OAG 81-262 .

Although a city officer would be prohibited by KRS 61.270 (now repealed) from purchasing any city property being disposed of pursuant to this section, a city employee other than an officer would not be prohibited from purchasing such property. OAG 81-331 .

A city may sell its real and personal property in any feasible manner that is in the best interest of the city, and such sale may be either by auction or by bidding, though neither mode is required. OAG 82-41 .

Where a city sought to sell some excess property and received two sealed bids, the fact that the city rejected the high bid as too high and requested a common bid between the two original bidders would appear to have been improper; first, because it failed to seek new bids through appropriate advertisement which is normally required if the city is going to utilize the bidding process, and, secondly, by rejecting the high bid, the city turned down the sale price that would have most benefitted the city’s interest. OAG 82-41 .

A city may dispose of its property no longer needed for public use for a reasonable consideration pursuant to this section and, of course, under its general home rule power, KRS 82.082 . OAG 82-410 .

City and county governments have the authority to dispose of real property they no longer need and the power to sell includes the power to lease; in deciding upon the various elements and aspects of a leasing arrangement, local governments must use their good business judgment and consider the governmental unit’s best interests. OAG 82-522 .

A city’s jurisdiction over city streets is contained in this section and KRS 82.082 and the jurisdiction of the city is attended with the responsibility for maintaining its jurisdiction over the streets within its boundaries; there is no statute permitting the city to abdicate its responsibility and jurisdiction over existing city streets. OAG 83-321 .

Although the city has exclusive jurisdiction and control over its city streets, a fiscal court, with the consent of the city, may, pursuant to KRS 178.010 and 67.083 , take city streets into the county road system by fiscal court order for the purpose of expending county money on the construction or improvement of such streets. OAG 83-321 .

The county cannot legally accept title to city streets so as to militate against the jurisdiction of the city; in any event, where a city street is made a part of the county road system by fiscal court order, it would in no way take away the city’s control and jurisdiction as relates to city street right-of-ways needed for cable television and the county could not include city streets in its ordinance for a cable television franchise. OAG 83-321 .

A city could not donate real property to a private, not-for-profit hospital corporation for construction of a hospital nor could it sell the property to the hospital corporation for less than fair market value; a city cannot donate its property whether it be in the form of real estate or an appropriation of public funds to any private corporation as this would be in direct violation of Ky. Const., § 179. The city, of course, may sell its property no longer needed for public purpose pursuant to the terms of this section and KRS 82.082 in any manner that it desires; however, such property should be sold either for its fair cash value based on an independent appraisal, by auction or through the bidding method. OAG 84-74 .

A city cannot delegate or transfer its statutory right to acquire title to property to any of its departments or agencies; such authority only exists with respect to a utility commission where the state legislature has established such commission as an independent agency. Thus, a city itself must acquire the property on which its utility commission is considering constructing an office building by appropriate ordinance. OAG 85-112 .

The city has authority to employ school crossing guards to regulate traffic, while the local school board does not, and due to the city’s exclusive control over its streets, no other governmental entity has similar control. OAG 92-6 .

The city school board does not have the authority to regulate traffic, as the city has exclusive control over traffic and traffic control devices. OAG 92-6 .

There is no statutory authority allowing the city to abdicate its responsibility and jurisdiction over existing city streets; in fact, KRS 189.336(2) expressly authorizes a city, by ordinance, to install, at city expense, school flasher lights in school zones, as necessary. OAG 92-6 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Air pollution control districts, KRS Chapter 77.

Charters granted before adoption of Constitution, continuance of, Ky. Const., § 166.

City civil service, KRS Chapter 90.

City classification, boundaries, and method of consolidating governmental services, Ky. Const., § 156a; KRS Chapter 81.

Commission and city manager form of government, KRS 83A.140 , 83A.150 .

Constitutional provisions applicable to all cities, Ky. Const., §§ 156a to 168.

County government, KRS Chapter 67.

Establishment and incorporation of cities, KRS 81.045 to 81.060 .

Finance and revenue of cities of the first class, KRS Chapter 91, 91A.

Finance and revenue of cities other than the first class, KRS Chapter 92.

Housing projects, KRS Chapter 80.

Intercity, intercounty and city-county compacts for purchasing and merit system, retirement and disability plans for employees of counties and cities, KRS Chapter 79.

Interlocal cooperation act, KRS 65.210 to 65.300 .

Legal notices, KRS Chapter 424.

Local emergency management programs, KRS Chapter 39B.

Military leave for officers and employees, annual, KRS 61.396 .

Officers of cities:

Compensation not to be changed after election or appointment or during term, Ky. Const., § 161.

Election or appointment and terms, Ky. Const., §§ 160, 167.

Incompatible offices, Ky. Const., § 165.

Term not to be extended, Ky. Const., § 161.

Organization and government of cities, KRS Chapter 83A.

Penalty for violating city ordinance, effect of conviction, Ky. Const., § 168.

State planning in relation to cities, KRS 147.070 , 147.100 .

82.082. Power for public purpose only and not in conflict with Constitution or statutes.

  1. A city may exercise any power and perform any function within its boundaries, including the power of eminent domain in accordance with the provisions of the Eminent Domain Act of Kentucky, that is in furtherance of a public purpose of the city and not in conflict with a constitutional provision or statute.
  2. A power or function is in conflict with a statute if it is expressly prohibited by a statute or there is a comprehensive scheme of legislation on the same general subject embodied in the Kentucky Revised Statutes.

History. Enact. Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 2, effective July 15, 1980; 2019 ch. 44, § 11, effective June 27, 2019.

Compiler’s Notes.

The Eminent Domain Act of Kentucky referred to in this section is complied as KRS 416.540 to 416.680 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Collection of Garbage.

Cities still have the power over collection of garbage within their limits, and KRS Chapter 109 does not permit a county to preempt the entire field of waste collection and disposal. Radcliff v. Hardin County, 607 S.W.2d 132, 1980 Ky. App. LEXIS 376 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980).

2. Judicial Review of Administrative Decision.

A city, by ordinance, cannot limit the power of a court to review a decision made by an administrative agency of the city; thus, a section of a city ordinance, which purported to limit the time and scope of judicial review of a decision by the board of trustees of the city’s pension fund, was unconstitutional. Covington v. Tranter, 673 S.W.2d 744, 1984 Ky. App. LEXIS 527 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984).

Circuit court properly dismissed a commercial property owner's claims for declaratory and injunctive relief against a city and two non-profit corporations for lack of a justiciable case or controversy because the issues on appeal were not ripe for judicial determination where the city's decision to pass or decline to pass an ordinance was not one that could be compelled by the court, a petition was circulated, but the requisite signatures had not been obtained, the preliminary planning was within the city's statutory authority, and the issue of the property owners' right to withdraw their signatures from the petition was moot. Berger Family Real Estate, LLC v. City of Covington, 464 S.W.3d 160, 2015 Ky. App. LEXIS 80 (Ky. Ct. App. 2015).

3. Extraterritorial Powers.

This section has no effect on prior legislative grants of extraterritorial condemnation powers because it deals with powers which a city possesses within its boundaries. Baker v. Richmond, 709 S.W.2d 472, 1986 Ky. App. LEXIS 1136 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986).

4. Alcoholic Beverage Regulation.

The broad and detailed scheme regulating the manufacturing, sale and distribution of alcoholic beverages, KRS 241.010 to 244.990 , fits within the exception of the Home Rule statute set out in subsection (2) of this section, thus making that statute inapplicable and unavailable to authorize the city ordinance which limited the number of retail alcoholic beverage licenses to be issued by the city. Whitehead v. Estate of Bravard, 719 S.W.2d 720, 1986 Ky. LEXIS 289 ( Ky. 1986 ).

5. — Activities on Licensed Premises.

City ordinance forbidding nude or nearly-nude activities on ABC Board licensed premises in the city was not in “conflict” with a “comprehensive scheme” of state regulation, and therefore was not void pursuant to the Kentucky “home rule” statute. City of Louisville v. Michael A. Woods, Inc., 883 S.W.2d 881, 1993 Ky. App. LEXIS 69 (Ky. Ct. App. 1993).

6. Leases.

A city does not need special statutory authorization to lease property, unless to do so is in conflict with a statute mandating otherwise, so long as such lease is consistent with a public purpose. Historic Licking Riverside Civic Asso. v. Covington, 774 S.W.2d 436, 1989 Ky. LEXIS 51 ( Ky. 1989 ).

7. Invalid Exercise of Power.

In enacting KRS 506.030 , the General Assembly designed a comprehensive approach to prohibiting the solicitation of criminal acts, which includes a coherent classification scheme for determining the range of penalties from which an appropriate punishment may be imposed, and where a city ordinance conflicts with the statute by its description of the proscribed conduct and by the excessive penalty it authorizes, it is an invalid exercise of the power granted to cities under this section. Pierce v. Commonwealth, 777 S.W.2d 926, 1989 Ky. LEXIS 90 ( Ky. 1989 ).

Under KRS 82.082 , a city may exercise any power and perform any function that is in furtherance of a public purpose of the city and not in conflict with a constitutional provision or statute. Because the General Assembly had previously enacted a comprehensive scheme of legislation dealing with the regulation of alcoholic beverages, which prescribed no means whereby the local ABC Administrator can levy civil fines upon a non-licensee, the court found that the metro government impermissibly granted authority to the local ABC Administrator. Ky. Licensed Bev. Ass'n v. Louisville-Jefferson County Metro Gov't, 127 S.W.3d 647, 2004 Ky. LEXIS 39 ( Ky. 2004 ).

State statute prohibiting parking on a roadway under KRS 189.450 prevailed over a municipal ordinance pursuant to KRS 82.082 because the ordinance conflicted with the state provision. Norton v. Canadian Am. Tank Lines, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2184 (W.D. Ky. Jan. 12, 2009).

8. Discrimination.

A city ordinance which prohibited employment discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity did not violate KRS 83.430 as the Kentucky Civil Rights Act, KRS 344.010 et seq., does not prohibit municipalities from expanding the scope of antidiscrimination statutes to protect those individuals not covered by the act itself. Hyman v. City of Louisville, 132 F. Supp. 2d 528, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4016 (W.D. Ky. 2001 ).

9. Eminent Domain.

City, on its own behalf and on behalf of the Waterfront Development Corporation, complied with the applicable condemnation statutes in condemning a bridge as the existence of a franchise was a factor in determining the value of condemned property, but did not preclude condemnation, and the owner of the bridge did not have a franchise, as its predecessor had abandoned the franchise. Martingale, LLC v. City of Louisville, 151 S.W.3d 829, 2004 Ky. App. LEXIS 203 (Ky. Ct. App. 2004), cert. denied, 545 U.S. 1115, 125 S. Ct. 2913, 162 L. Ed. 2d 295, 2005 U.S. LEXIS 4688 (U.S. 2005).

KRS 82.082(1) gives a city, under a grant of home rule, the power of eminent domain in accordance with the provisions of the Eminent Domain Act of Kentucky, KRS 416.540 et seq.; KRS 83.520 provides that KRS ch. 97, including KRS 97.257 , shall be considered permissive rather than mandatory and restrictions therein shall not be considered as abridging the complete grant of home rule. Martingale, LLC v. City of Louisville, 151 S.W.3d 829, 2004 Ky. App. LEXIS 203 (Ky. Ct. App. 2004), cert. denied, 545 U.S. 1115, 125 S. Ct. 2913, 162 L. Ed. 2d 295, 2005 U.S. LEXIS 4688 (U.S. 2005).

10. City Police Officers.

Dismissal of indictments on unlawful arrest grounds was not warranted where the arrest was made by a city police officer outside of the city limits but within the county limits. Pursuant to KRS 82.082(1), the city’s municipal order directing the city officer’s to remain in the city could be validly enacted to control the police officers employment, but such an order did not affect the city police officer’s KRS 95.019(1) county-wide arrest authority. Commonwealth v. Bishop, 245 S.W.3d 733, 2008 Ky. LEXIS 37 ( Ky. 2008 ).

Municipal order directing that city police officers act within city limits was meant to keep police officers working in the city, where the city residents expected them to be, and could be validly enacted pursuant to KRS 82.082(2). The municipal order did not affect the authority of the city police officer, pursuant to KRS 95.019 (1), to arrest the defendants outside the city limits but within the county limits since the municipal order merely involved an employment decision and KRS 95.019 involved the county-wide power to arrest. Commonwealth v. Bishop, 245 S.W.3d 733, 2008 Ky. LEXIS 37 ( Ky. 2008 ).

Circuit court properly granted a city's motion for summary judgment on retired police officers' breach of contract action because the officers failed to prove the existence of a contract entitling them to education incentive pay; the city properly exercised its authority to fix the officers' compensation, and, therefore, the officers were only entitled to be paid what the city code of ordinances specified. Dearborn v. City of Frankfort, 2016 Ky. App. Unpub. LEXIS 902 (Ky. Ct. App. Dec. 9, 2016), review denied, ordered not published, 2017 Ky. LEXIS 290 (Ky. Aug. 16, 2017).

11. Discharge of weapons.

Under Kentucky’s Home Rule Statute, “comprehensive scheme” preemption only existed where there was a comprehensive scheme of legislation on the same general subject” as the challenged ordinance, KRS 82.082(2) and the city’s Bow-and-Arrow Ordinance on its face regulated only when bows and arrows could be fired within city limits and did not directly address hunting; thus, it weighed against a finding of preemption. Sheffield v. City of Fort Thomas, 620 F.3d 596, 2010 FED App. 0285P, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 18437 (6th Cir. Ky. 2010 ).

12. Minimum Wage.

Metro government's ordinance imposing a minimum wage higher than that set by the state was invalid where it directly conflicted with the state law, the state law was a comprehensive statutory scheme on the issue of wages, and thus, the conflict was of the type forbidden under Ky. Const. § 156b and Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 82.082(2). Ky. Rest. Ass'n v. Louisville/Jefferson Cnty. Metro Gov't, 501 S.W.3d 425, 2016 Ky. LEXIS 506 ( Ky. 2016 ).

Cited:

Barber v. Commissioner of Revenue, 674 S.W.2d 18, 1984 Ky. App. LEXIS 467 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984); Schilling v. Schoenle, 782 S.W.2d 630, 1990 Ky. LEXIS 5 ( Ky. 1990 ); Covington v. Court of Justice, 784 S.W.2d 180, 1990 Ky. LEXIS 13 ( Ky. 1990 ); Wal-Juice Bar, Inc. v. Elliott, 899 F.2d 1502, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 4877 (6th Cir. 1990); Dannheiser v. City of Henderson, 4 S.W.3d 542, 1999 Ky. LEXIS 114 ( Ky. 1999 ).

NOTES TO UNPUBLISHED DECISIONS

1. City Police Officers.

Circuit court properly granted summary judgment to a city on the retired police officers' action for education incentive back pay because they failed to prove the existence of a contract entitling them to education incentive pay, none of their “contracts” were signed by the mayor, the city was statutorily authorized to exercise any power in furtherance of its public purpose and to fix the compensation of its officers and employees, including a non-discriminatory reduction in pay or grade, the officers were presumed to know about the city ordinance then in effect that would control their access to such pay, and any erroneous information given to them by a city employee could not obligate the city to act contrary to its own ordinances. Dearborn v. City of Frankfort, 2016 Ky. App. LEXIS 201 (Ky. Ct. App.), sub. op., 2016 Ky. App. Unpub. LEXIS 902 (Ky. Ct. App. Dec. 9, 2016).

Opinions of Attorney General.

The city legislative body has the sole authority to designate not only the names of the various streets but also the numbering of the buildings and houses located thereon, so long as such actions are done by appropriate ordinances, and the fact that this power is vested in the city legislative body would appear to relieve it of any liability insofar as the federal government or the individual property owner is concerned, in the event any mail is lost or misplaced, or service is disrupted. OAG 80-283 .

Since KRS 183.132 governing local air boards does not expressly prohibit the dissolutionment of the board by the city establishing it, the city probably can do so under the home rule charter by the enactment of appropriate local legislation even though KRS Chapter 183 does contain a so-called comprehensive scheme of legislation on the general subject. OAG 80-345 .

A city ordinance requiring all property owners using their property within the city limits for commercial parking to blacktop said facilities or provide other hardtop surfaces, in order to reduce the amount of dirt and dust found in the streets of the city, is valid under the city’s police power in the interest of the public welfare. OAG 80-459 .

Cities not covered under the provisions of the Uniform Residential Landlord-Tenant Act, KRS 383.505 to 383.715 , may, pursuant to the home rule powers given them by the General Assembly in this section, voluntarily adopt by ordinance provisions identical to those in URLTA or similar thereto, so long as such provisions do not conflict with any general statutes applicable to or meant to otherwise govern rental agreements and property. OAG 80-467 .

This section applies to urban-county governments because they have the powers of the city of the highest class within the county. OAG 80-502 .

There is no residential requirement for those persons holding nonelective offices established by the city council pursuant to KRS 83A.130(12); however, it would appear that the city under its home rule authority under this section would have the power to require by ordinance that all such officers live within the city. OAG 80-657 ; 80-658.

Where a proposed street will run from a county recreational park to a city street, city commission approval of the proposed street means that the street will become a part of the city street system and the city will have exclusive municipal jurisdiction or control over it under this section; however, the fiscal court of the county may maintain the proposed street as a part of the county road system under the authority of KRS 178.010 and KRS 67.083 , assuming that the city approves of the dedication, subject to the approval of the city commission. OAG 81-142 .

A Kentucky city, which is a “public agency” as defined by KRS 65.230 , may, pursuant to the authority set forth in this section, enter into a contract for sewerage services with another unit of government, including a unit located in another state, under the provisions of the Interlocal Cooperation Act, KRS 65.210 , et seq., and the Kentucky city can utilize, pursuant to KRS 65.250 , the existing administrative machinery of the other “public agency” which is supplying the sewerage service for a designated fee, to serve as the administrative unit for the cooperative undertaking. OAG 81-220 .

KRS 82.081 , which gives each city the power to acquire and dispose of all types of property and this section, the home rule provision, which gives cities the right to exercise any power and perform any function within its boundaries that is not in conflict with a section of the Constitution or statute, would give a city ample authority to dispose of any surplus real property no longer needed for public purposes. OAG 81-262 .

While a city can no longer utilize the provisions of the Sunday Closing Law, under KRS 436.160 and KRS 436.165 , to prohibit a pool hall from operating on Sunday if that establishment is routinely operated for a substantial period of time each and every day of the week and if each of the employees of that establishment is allowed one full day off during each calendar week; however, the city may, under its police powers pursuant to this section to protect the public morals and the general welfare of its citizens, enact reasonable ordinances to regulate the operation, as to hours of operation and location, of pool halls within the city limits. OAG 81-298 .

Where a city sought to sell some excess property and received two sealed bids, the fact that the city rejected the high bid as too high and requested a common bid between the two original bidders would appear to have been improper; first, because it failed to seek new bids through appropriate advertisement which is normally required if the city is going to utilize the bidding process, and, secondly, by rejecting the high bid, the city turned down the sale price that would have most benefitted the city’s interest. OAG 82-41 .

A city may dispose of its property no longer needed for public use for a reasonable consideration pursuant to KRS 82.081 and, of course, under its general home rule power pursuant to this section. OAG 82-410 .

Assuming that the police department is not under any civil service program, including the state Law Enforcement Foundation Program Fund or KRS Ch. 90, police officers may be removed without cause and at the pleasure of the mayor under the terms of KRS 83A.130(9) as amended in 1982; the city can, of course, enact an ordinance under the terms of such statute that would prevent such removal except for cause, and also set up a procedure for the discipline of such officers. This can now be accomplished not only under the terms of KRS 83.130 (now repealed), but also under this section. OAG 82-501 .

The bond requirement statute for members of the police department and the chief of police was repealed which means that bond is not required by statute; however, a city could, in its ordinance establishing the police department, require bond of its members, particularly under its home rule authority. OAG 82-501 .

The office of city attorney is a municipal office provided it is so established by ordinance under the terms of KRS 83A.080 . The city may, under its general home rule authority, establish the position as a form of city employment, or as an alternative, authorize the execution of a personal service contract to employ the services of an attorney on an hourly basis. OAG 82-502 .

A city, pursuant to KRS 258.365 and this section, is authorized to enact ordinances with respect to the regulation of dogs which are not inconsistent with the provisions of KRS Chapter 258 and which could include authorizing the city dog warden to pick up dogs found running at large; such an ordinance could apply to licensed and unlicensed dogs. OAG 83-209 .

A proposed ordinance containing a provision allowing a landlord the right to immediately terminate a lease based on a tenant’s dangerous conduct is in conflict with the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act, KRS 383.505 to 383.715 , and the forcible entry and detainer provisions of KRS 383.200 et seq., and would, therefore, be invalid if enacted. OAG 83-251 .

A reasonable service charge imposed by the city for monitoring electronic devices, including burglar alarms, that are installed in various businesses and homes by private security companies and channeled to the police department would be a valid exercise of the city’s police power in order to cover the anticipated expense of monitoring the system, so long as the fee is uniform in application and nondiscriminatory; it should be in the form of a license or permit and should be initiated by ordinance. OAG 83-319 .

A city’s jurisdiction over city streets is contained in KRS 82.081 and this section and the jurisdiction of the city is attended with the responsibility for maintaining its jurisdiction over the streets within its boundaries; there is no statute permitting the city to abdicate its responsibility and jurisdiction over existing city streets. OAG 83-321 .

Although the city has exclusive jurisdiction and control over its city streets, a fiscal court, with the consent of the city, may, pursuant to KRS 178.010 and 67.083 , take city streets into the county road system by fiscal court order for the purpose of expending county money on the construction or improvement of such streets. OAG 83-321 .

The county cannot legally accept title to city streets so as to militate against the jurisdiction of the city; in any event, where a city street is made a part of the county road system by fiscal court order, it would in no way take away the city’s control and jurisdiction as relates to city street right-of-ways needed for cable television and the county could not include city streets in its ordinance for a cable television franchise. OAG 83-321 .

There is no question that a city can enact an ordinance regulating traffic under its home rule power as expressed in this section that could include towing away vehicles under certain conditions; it would appear that any traffic control ordinance enacted by the city should include provisions giving the owner of a vehicle found in violation of parking requirements, such as expired parking permits or meters, due notice and an opportunity to appear at the police department, for example, except in cases of emergency or in situations involving disabled or abandoned vehicles or areas clearly marked as towaway zones. OAG 83-361 .

While a city has the authority to require by ordinance property owners to repair or pay for the repair of the abutting sidewalks, in the absence of such an ordinance the obligation rests with the city to repair sidewalks abutting city streets. OAG 83-431 .

A municipality may not constitutionally foreclose all use of newsracks or other newspaper vending devices on its streets and sidewalks; however, municipalities may impose reasonable time, place and manner regulations on the use of newsracks which are clearly and narrowly drawn so as to avoid arbitrary and unnecessary curtailment of freedom of speech and press. Thus, a municipality may prohibit the placement of a newsrack in a location that unreasonably interferes with or impedes the flow of pedestrian or vehicular traffic. OAG 84-4 .

A city had no authority to enact an ordinance absolutely prohibiting all businesses from playing amplified music on the alleged basis of an existing nuisance since there was no showing that the absolute prohibition had a reasonable relation to the public safety, welfare or convenience of the city’s citizenry. Such ordinance was arbitrary and oppressive in its absoluteness and absence of any standards and thus was illegal and unconstitutional under Ky. Const., § 2 and the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. OAG 84-39 .

Under the broad powers of this section, and considering the public purpose to be subserved, cities in Kentucky may enact a landlord-tenant ordinance dealing with the important landlord-tenant relationships. OAG 84-62 .

A city could not donate real property to a private, not-for-profit hospital corporation for construction of a hospital nor could it sell the property to the hospital corporation for less than fair market value; a city cannot donate its property whether it be in the form of real estate or an appropriation of public funds to any private corporation as this would be in direct violation of Ky. Const., § 179. The city, of course, may sell its property no longer needed for public purposes pursuant to the terms of KRS 82.081 and this section in any manner that it desires; however, such property should be sold either for its fair cash value based on an independent appraisal, by auction or through the bidding method. OAG 84-74 .

A city that operates its own garbage collection and disposal system within the city can contract to furnish such services with the owners of a shopping center located outside the city. OAG 84-113 .

The city, under its police powers and general power statute, may enact reasonable regulations as to hours of business of the businesses specifically designated, involving a fair classification, where the regulations are reasonably related to a legitimate object of the police power, i.e., the public health, safety, morality or welfare. OAG 84-373 .

A city ordinance prohibiting mere possession of alcoholic beverages in a public park is unconstitutional. OAG 90-76 .

There is no statute that expressly prohibits a city of the fourth class from enacting an ordinance pertaining to the possession of alcohol, and the comprehensive scheme enacted by the state legislature in Chapters 241 through 244 of the Kentucky Revised Statutes, which pertains to alcohol, addresses only the manufacturing, sale, and distribution of alcoholic beverages; thus, the proposed ordinance does not appear to conflict with the comprehensive scheme enacted by the legislature or with the statute prohibiting alcohol intoxication in public places and prohibiting the possession of alcohol by persons under the age of 21. OAG 90-76 .

The creation of the new class of bias-related discrimination offenses or “hate crimes” in City of Louisville Ordinance 166, Series 1990 is the province of the General Assembly rather than local government, because this ordinance seeks to redefine statutory crimes by adding the element of discriminatory motive. OAG 90-95 .

The city has authority to employ school crossing guards to regulate traffic, while the local school board does not, and due to the city’s exclusive control over its streets, no other governmental entity has similar control. OAG 92-6 .

The city school board does not have the authority to regulate traffic, as the city has exclusive control over traffic and traffic control devices. OAG 92-6 .

There is no statutory authority allowing the city to abdicate its responsibility and jurisdiction over existing city streets; in fact, KRS 189.336(2) expressly authorizes a city, by ordinance, to install, at city expense, school flasher lights in school zones, as necessary. OAG 92-6 .

The General Assembly has delegated authority to cities and counties “to create rights to be free from discriminatory or biased conduct;” Louisville Ordinance No. 281 does not conflict with KRS Chapter 344, because that chapter expressly grants to cities and counties the authority to adopt and enforce ordinances prohibiting “all forms of discrimination.” OAG 92-68 .

City’s anti-mask ordinance did not interfere with the state’s control over its land and buildings, nor did it intrude upon the state’s administration of its activities, nor did it conflict with a comprehensive scheme of legislation on the subject; therefore the ordinance could be enforced throughout the city, including the portions of the city that extend to state property. OAG 92-163 .

Since state statutes and regulations have preempted the field of musseling in Kentucky, county and city local musseling ordinances were invalid. OAG 93-1 .

Since the providing of police services is a basic municipal function, and since KRS 95.790 and KRS 95.800 have been repealed, a sixth class city may utilize the provisions of this section to enact an ordinance which creates and maintains a municipal police department. OAG 93-57 .

A city of the first class is not authorized to enact a local ordinance regulating the registration of firearms and requiring notification to the local governing body of all firearms sales. OAG 93-71 .

A city ordinance regulating concealable firearms conflicted with KRS 65.870 and was therefore invalid under this section. OAG 99-10 .

Since ordinances banning pain clinics are not the subject of an express power granted to local governmental units by the General Assembly, and infringe upon the legislative policy embodied in statutes regulating the practice of medicine and distribution of controlled substances, such ordinances are beyond the legitimate authority of a unit of local government. OAG 11-003 , 2011 Ky. AG LEXIS 54.

A city may not unilaterally expend funds to maintain a waterway that is not within its boundaries. OAG 12-009 , 2012 Ky AG LEXIS 110.

A city may withdraw its participation from an existing tourism commission in accordance with its “home rule” powers under KRS § 82.082 . The legislature allows for a separate tax by allowing local governments to act separately in forming tourism commissions in KRS § 91A.350(1) and (2). OAG 2015-07

Research References and Practice Aids

Journal of Natural Resources & Environmental Law.

Articles, Historic Districts: A Look at the Mechanics in Kentucky and a Comparative Study of State Enabling Legislation, 11 J. Nat. Resources & Envtl. L. 229 (1995-96).

Kentucky Law Journal.

Kentucky Law Survey, Morris, Municipal Law, 70 Ky. L.J. 287 (1981-82).

Treatises

Caldwell’s Kentucky Form Book, 5th Ed., Practice Context for Condemnation (Eminent Domain), § 307.00.

82.083. Definition — Sale or other disposition of city property.

  1. As used in this section, “independent appraisal” means an appraisal made by:
    1. An individual or organization not affiliated with the city or its officers or employees, using a generally accepted national or professional standard; or
    2. A city’s officers or employees using a nationally published valuation of property based on the most recent edition of the publication.
  2. A city may sell or otherwise dispose of any of its real or personal property.
  3. Before selling or otherwise disposing of any real or personal property, the city shall make a written determination setting forth and fully describing:
    1. The real or personal property;
    2. Its intended use at the time of acquisition;
    3. The reasons why it is in the public interest to dispose of it; and
    4. The method of disposition to be used.
  4. Real or personal property may be:
    1. Transferred, with or without compensation, to another governmental agency;
    2. Transferred, with or without compensation, for economic development purposes, which shall include but not be limited to real property transfers for the elimination of blight;
    3. Sold at public auction following publication of the auction in accordance with KRS 424.130(1)(b);
    4. Sold by electronic auction following publication of the auction, including the uniform resource link (URL) for the site of the electronic auction, in accordance with KRS 424.130(1)(b);
    5. Sold by sealed bids in accordance with the procedure for sealed bids under KRS 45A.365(3) and (4);
    6. Traded towards the purchase of the same or similar type of property, if the trade-in value received equals or exceeds the actual fair market value of the property as determined using an independent appraisal as defined in subsection (1) of this section;
    7. Sold for its appraised fair market value or a greater amount if the property is valued at five thousand dollars ($5,000) or less in an independent appraisal. Property sold under this paragraph may not be sold to a city officer or employee or family member of a city officer or employee as defined in the city’s ethics ordinance adopted under KRS 65.003 ;
    8. Sold for scrap or disposed of as garbage in a manner consistent with the public interest if the property has no value, or is of nominal value as determined by an independent appraisal; or
    9. Sold by the Finance and Administration Cabinet under an agreement with the city.
  5. If a city receives no bids for the real or personal property, either at public or electronic auction or by sealed bid, the property may be disposed of, consistent with the public interest, in any manner deemed appropriate by the city. In those instances, a written description of the property, the method of disposal, and the amount of compensation, if any, shall be made.
  6. Any compensation resulting from the disposal of this real or personal property shall be transferred to the general fund of the city.

History. Enact. Acts 2004, ch. 153, § 1, effective July 13, 2004; 2016 ch. 22, § 1, effective July 15, 2016.

82.085. Rate variations in local ad valorem taxes — Permission to have.

  1. The legislative body of each consolidated local government, and of any city of any class, may provide by ordinance, for reasonable differences in the rate of ad valorem taxation within different areas of the same taxing district on that class of property which includes the surface of the land. Those differences shall relate directly to differences between nonrevenue-producing governmental services and benefits giving the land urban character which are available in one (1) or several areas of a taxing district in contrast to other areas of the same taxing district in which those services and benefits are not available.
  2. These nonrevenue-producing governmental services and benefits shall include but not be limited to police protection, fire protection, streets, street lighting, sidewalks, water service, and sewer facilities.
  3. This section shall be effective notwithstanding any other statute relating to the uniformity of ad valorem tax assessment.

History. Enact. Acts 1970, ch. 123, § 1; 2002, ch. 346, § 93, effective July 15, 2002; 2014, ch. 92, § 11, effective January 1, 2015.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Purpose.

The purpose of this section is to allow some tax relief to areas within a taxing district which are not afforded full services, such as fire protection. Barber v. Commissioner of Revenue, 674 S.W.2d 18, 1984 Ky. App. LEXIS 467 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984).

2. Differential Tax Rates.

This section, together with Ky. Const., § 172A, legitimates differential tax rates for service districts in the same urban county insofar as those rates apply to real estate other than severed mineral interests. Jacobs v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government, 560 S.W.2d 10, 1977 Ky. LEXIS 564 ( Ky. 1977 ).

3. Invalid Flat Rate.

Fire protection service charge based on a flat rate regardless of the value of the property would be invalid as an ad valorem tax. Barber v. Commissioner of Revenue, 674 S.W.2d 18, 1984 Ky. App. LEXIS 467 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984).

Fire protection service charge levied by city, for purpose of financing city’s fire protection services on property within the city, whereby various types of property were assessed at a flat rate was not an ad valorem tax or a special assessment and was not authorized by statute or the Constitution, and was, therefore, invalid. Barber v. Commissioner of Revenue, 674 S.W.2d 18, 1984 Ky. App. LEXIS 467 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984).

Applied in

Scalise v. Sewell-Scheuermann, 566 S.W.3d 539, 2018 Ky. LEXIS 451 ( Ky. 2018 ).

Cited:

Holsclaw v. Stephens, 507 S.W.2d 462, 1973 Ky. LEXIS 3 ( Ky. 1973 ); Louisville v. Fiscal Court of Jefferson County, 623 S.W.2d 219, 1981 Ky. LEXIS 282 ( Ky. 1981 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

This section implements Ky. Const., § 172A and permits a municipality to vary the property tax rate in the city depending upon the public services that are available to the property in question. OAG 70-258 .

This section, although permitting a city to vary the property tax rate in the city depending upon the public services that are available to the property in question, does not authorize a city to levy or collect no tax at all on any city property and any such action or inaction would be a violation of sections 170 and 172A of the Constitution. OAG 75-111 .

A city ordinance enacted in 1950 which levied a license fee on every exhibition, circus, show or similar amusement operating within the city limits and within one-half mile of the city limits would be invalid to the extent that the jurisdiction of the city was extended beyond its corporate limits. OAG 81-410 .

Where a city leased a parking lot from a railroad company, the city could not legally increase its lease payments to the railroad by the amount needed for the company to purchase its own insurance naming the city as an additional insured, since, even though a city can provide for its own protection through the provisions of this section, it is prohibited by Ky. Const., § 179 from appropriating public money for the benefit of a private corporation. OAG 81-418 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Bench & Bar.

Morris, The New Kentucky Municipal Law, Vol. 45, No. 3, July, 1981, Ky. Bench and Bar 24.

Kentucky Law Journal.

Markham, The Property Tax — A Withering Vine, 60 Ky. L.J. 174 (1971).

82.088. Regulation of adult establishments. [Repealed]

History. Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 500, § 1, effective July 15, 1986; repealed and reenact., Acts 1990, ch. 425, § 1, effective July 13, 1990; repealed by 2019 ch. 44, § 35, effective June 27, 2019.

82.090. Authorization for cities to impose occupational taxes on state officers and employees except elected officers paid on per diem basis.

  1. The legislative bodies of the cities of this Commonwealth are hereby severally authorized by ordinances applying to occupations generally to impose occupational taxes upon all state employees and officers, whether appointive or elective, for services performed therein, except those elected officers who are paid on a per diem basis.
  2. Except as provided in subsection (1) of this section, no person shall be relieved from liability for any occupational license tax levied for revenue purposes by any legislative body of a city of this Commonwealth by reason of his carrying on his occupation or performing services on any state property or area within the bounds of such city.

History. Enact. Acts 1962, ch. 182, §§ 1, 2; 1992, ch. 435, § 3, effective July 14, 1992.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Circuit Court Judges.

An ordinance creating an occupational license fee on compensation for certain services rendered in a city could be applied to Circuit Court judges under this section since the ordinance is simply a revenue tax imposing an occupational tax rather than a license placed upon the court system in an attempt to regulate it, and as such is a tax provided for in Ky. Const., § 181, and may be collected by the city under this section. Commissioners of Sinking Fund v. Hopson, 613 S.W.2d 621, 1980 Ky. App. LEXIS 429 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Where, prior to January 1, 1965, the Kentucky department of agriculture did not withhold city and county occupational license taxes from employees employed in the city and county, neither the department nor Commonwealth was liable for taxes, interest or penalty for any prior period, and the city and county would have to look to the employees for any unpaid taxes. OAG 65-845 .

The officers and employees chosen by the General Assembly pursuant to KRS 6.150 are not exempt from the Frankfort occupational license tax as elected officers. OAG 68-66 .

A city may impose a payroll tax on the salary of school teachers who earn their living teaching school within the corporate limits of the city, irrespective of the fact that it is earned on state property. OAG 82-156 .

The Commonwealth of Kentucky, by implication, is required under this section to deduct from state employees’ payroll checks applicable city occupational taxes; in order to implement such payroll deduction system and city enforcement of the occupational tax liability for the year 1982, the state, through its departmental payroll personnel, would be required to furnish the applicable cities for the calendar year 1982 with a listing of state employees from whom city occupational taxes had been withheld and the actual amounts withheld in each individual case. OAG 83-7 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

City license taxes, KRS 91.200 .

Members of General Assembly paid on per diem basis, KRS 6.190 .

ALR

“Property” which is to be taxed according to value, business or profession as. 34 A.L.R. 719.

Failure to obtain occupation or business license or permit as defense to tort action. 13 A.L.R.2d 157.

Right of person wrongfully refused license upon proper application therefor to do act for which license is required. 30 A.L.R.2d 1006.

Municipality’s liability in damages for its refusal to grant permit, license, or franchise. 37 A.L.R.2d 694.

Right to attack validity of statute, ordinance, or regulation relating to occupational or professional license as affected by applying for, or securing, license. 65 A.L.R.2d 660.

Single or isolated transactions as falling within provisions of commercial or occupational licensing requirements. 93 A.L.R.2d 90.

Application of occupation or license tax to miscellaneous occupations. 93 A.L.R.2d 101.

Pardon as restoring public office or license or eligibility therefor. 58 A.L.R.3d 1191.

82.092. City officers not to deal in claims against city. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3557) was repealed by Acts 1982, ch. 434, § 15, effective July 15, 1982.

82.095. Supplemental taxes levied by city with population of 3,000 to 19,999 in county containing consolidated local government.

  1. Any city with a population equal to or greater than three thousand (3,000) but less than twenty thousand (20,000) based upon the most recent federal decennial census, located in a county containing a consolidated local government, which provides police, fire, or garbage collection services for the residents of the city may levy a supplemental tax which shall be in addition to ad valorem property taxes.
  2. Such supplemental tax shall be in an amount not to exceed the reasonable cost of police, fire, and garbage collection services actually provided by the city. The rate of such tax shall be established by an ordinance which shall have readings at no less than two (2) different meetings of the city legislative body before passage.
  3. The rate of such supplemental tax may be apportioned in a reasonable manner, other than an ad valorem approach, so that the recipient of police, fire, or garbage collection services pays an amount based on the cost of services actually received.
  4. Any ordinance levying a supplemental tax pursuant to subsection (2) of this section may be recalled as provided in subsections (2) and (3) of KRS 160.485 , provided that the petition for recall shall be effective upon the signature of a number of registered and qualified voters as described therein equal to five percent (5%) instead of the percentage provided therein.

History. Enact. Acts 1976, ch. 304, § 1, effective January 1, 1977; 1986, ch. 353, § 1, effective July 15, 1986; 2002, ch. 346, § 94, effective July 15, 2002; 2014, ch. 92, § 12, effective January 1, 2015.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Applied in

Scalise v. Sewell-Scheuermann, 566 S.W.3d 539, 2018 Ky. LEXIS 451 ( Ky. 2018 ).

Inducing Location of Governmental Projects

82.105. Definitions for KRS 82.105 to 82.180.

As used in KRS 82.105 to 82.180 , the following words and terms have the following respective meanings unless it shall clearly appear from the context that another meaning is intended:

  1. “City” means a city of any class;
  2. “Governing body” means the legislative body of a city;
  3. “Governmental agency” means the Commonwealth, the United States, or any division, department, agency or instrumentality of either of them, including agencies and instrumentalities in corporate form, whether created by legislative enactment or organized as nonprofit corporations under general corporation laws for the purpose of serving as agencies or instrumentalities of either of them;
  4. “Governmental project” means any building, structure, installation, activity, undertaking or program proposed by a governmental agency in furtherance of any lawful governmental or proprietary function of a governmental agency;
  5. “Contract of inducement” means any contract, agreement, or offer and acceptance, whereby a city agrees to provide an inducement to a governmental agency, under authority of KRS 82.105 to 82.180 , either (i) to establish or locate in the city or its environs a governmental project which might, but for such inducement, be established elsewhere, or not at all; or (ii) to establish or locate upon one or more particular sites deemed by the city, acting through its governing body, to be best situated in the interests of future city planning and development, or otherwise in the best interests of the public health, safety, welfare or convenience of the citizens and inhabitants of the city and its environs, a governmental project otherwise chosen or under consideration for establishment or location upon one or more other sites in or near the same city;
  6. “Inducement” or “municipal inducement” means appropriation of public funds derived from any source and not required by law to be applied, reserved or appropriated to some other purpose, issuance of bonds and application of bond and application of bond proceeds, and provision of any lands, improvements or appurtenances authorized in KRS 82.105 to 82.180 to be acquired, constructed, installed or undertaken by a city as an inducement for a purpose authorized to be accomplished or promoted under the provisions of a contract of inducement;
  7. “Revenue bonds” and “general obligation bonds” mean, respectively, the bonds which a city is authorized in KRS 82.105 to 82.180 to issue under such designations;
  8. “Bonds” or “bond proceeds,” if unaccompanied by other designation, refer to either revenue bonds or general obligation bonds, or both of them, and the proceeds thereof, as the context may indicate.

History. Enact. Acts 1962, ch. 178, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

This section and KRS 82.110 describe within fair and reasonable specifications what the city may do to induce the choice of governmental agencies to locate within its boundaries or environs and thus KRS 82.110 does not violate Ky. Const., § 29 by delegating legislative power beyond the express or implied municipal powers. Grimm v. Moloney, 358 S.W.2d 496, 1962 Ky. LEXIS 180 ( Ky. 1962 ).

KRS 82.145 providing for issuance and payment of revenue bonds issued to raise funds for use as inducement to a governmental agency to locate within the city from surplus revenues of combined water and sewer system of city did not constitute the incurring of an indebtedness of the city without the approval of the voters in conflict with Ky. Const., §§ 157 and 158. Grimm v. Moloney, 358 S.W.2d 496, 1962 Ky. LEXIS 180 ( Ky. 1962 ).

Allocation of occupational taxes to sinking fund as provided by KRS 82.145 to fund bonds issued to raise moneys for use as inducement to a governmental agency to locate within the city was not in conflict with Ky. Const., §§ 49 and 50. Grimm v. Moloney, 358 S.W.2d 496, 1962 Ky. LEXIS 180 ( Ky. 1962 ).

2. Governmental Projects.

Governmental projects as defined by this section are not limited to such governmental projects as those involving employments of personnel. Watkins v. Fugazzi, 394 S.W.2d 594, 1965 Ky. LEXIS 194 ( Ky. 1965 ).

3. Impairment of Contract.

Ordinance authorized under the provision of KRS 82.145 that pledged surplus revenues of the combined water and sewer system of the city to pay revenue bonds issued by city to raise moneys to induce governmental agency to locate within its boundaries did not constitute an impairment of the contract between the city and the holders of its presently and previously issued revenue bonds of water and sewer system. Grimm v. Moloney, 358 S.W.2d 496, 1962 Ky. LEXIS 180 ( Ky. 1962 ).

Cited:

Decker v. Somerset, 838 S.W.2d 417, 1992 Ky. App. LEXIS 104 (Ky. Ct. App. 1992).

82.110. Acquisition of land for governmental projects — Improvement.

  1. A city may acquire by purchase, exercise of the power of eminent domain, option or lease, and may accept by way of grant, gift, devise or otherwise, a fee simple unencumbered title to, or any lesser interest in, lands which are suitable for and acceptable to a governmental agency as a site or sites for one or more governmental projects.
  2. In addition to such acquisition, a city may improve such lands in any manner which in the discretion of the governing body may be necessary or desirable to place the same in condition suitable and acceptable for use and occupancy, including, but not by way of limitation, demolition of existing buildings or structures, removal of debris, grading, provision of proper drainage, closure of public ways, establishment and improvement of new public ways, relocation and improvement of existing public ways, relocation of publicly or privately owned utility installations, erection of buildings, structures and other improvements, and extension of the services and facilities of any city-owned utility system to any such site or sites.

History. Enact. Acts 1962, ch. 178, § 2 subsecs. (1), (2).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

KRS 82.105 and this section describe within fair and reasonable specifications what the city may do to induce the choice of governmental agencies to locate within its boundaries or environs and thus it does not violate Ky. Const., § 29 by delegating legislative power beyond the express or implied municipal powers. Grimm v. Moloney, 358 S.W.2d 496, 1962 Ky. LEXIS 180 ( Ky. 1962 ).

Cited:

Decker v. Somerset, 838 S.W.2d 417, 1992 Ky. App. LEXIS 104 (Ky. Ct. App. 1992).

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Urban renewal and redevelopment, KRS Chapter 99.

82.115. Contract of inducement.

A city may in the discretion of its governing body enter into contracts of inducement with governmental agencies, and pursuant thereto may make a conveyance or lease of, or grant an option to acquire or lease, such lands, with or without site improvements, utility services, buildings, structures or other improvements, upon such terms and conditions as in the discretion of the governing body of the city may appear to be in the best interests of the public health, safety or general welfare of the citizens and inhabitants of the city. In its exercise of such discretion the governing body of the city may ascertain and declare as a legislative determination of fact, by ordinance duly adopted and made effective according to law, that by reason of immediate benefits to the city or to its citizens and inhabitants, or by reason of ultimate benefits reasonably to be anticipated in the way of relieving the city of public welfare obligations, facilitating proper municipal planning, increasing opportunities for gainful employment, increasing sources of tax or other revenues, or otherwise, a contract of inducement shall be made with a governmental agency in the public interests without concurrent tangible consideration in terms of cash or property, and solely or partly in anticipation of such prospective public benefits.

History. Enact. Acts 1962, ch. 178, § 2 subsec. (3).

82.120. Effect of concurrent urban renewal and redevelopment program.

A city may exercise all or any of the powers conferred upon it in KRS 82.105 to 82.180 as incidents to the exercise of its urban renewal and/or urban redevelopment functions authorized and contemplated in and by KRS Chapter 99, or otherwise. In the event a city has elected or may hereafter elect to perform and carry out its permissible urban renewal and/or urban redevelopment functions through, or without the intervention of, an independent corporate agency or instrumentality, such city may lawfully raise funds from any source or sources authorized or permitted by law, and by means thereof acquire such lands in its own name and pay therefor the resale or lease value established as provided in KRS Chapter 99, and thereby redeem and perform obligations and commitments to the United States or others within the meaning, intent and purpose of federal or Kentucky statutes relating to such urban renewal and urban redevelopment programs.

History. Enact. Acts 1962, ch. 178, § 2 subsec. (4).

82.125. Municipal inducements constitute lawful public purposes and uses.

Municipal inducements are hereby declared as a matter of legislative determination of the General Assembly to be lawful public purposes and public uses for which cities may exercise all powers authorized by the provisions of KRS 82.105 to 82.180 , or otherwise provided by law.

History. Enact. Acts 1962, ch. 178, § 3.

82.130. General obligation bonds — Issuance — Election — Requirements. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1962, ch. 178, § 4; 1984, ch. 111, § 51, effective July 13, 1984) was repealed by Acts 1996, ch. 274, § 65, effective July 15, 1996, and Acts 1996, ch. 280, § 30, effective July 15, 1996.

82.135. Revenue bonds authorized.

In order to provide all or any part of municipal inducements a city, acting in the discretion of its governing body, may issue revenue bonds as set forth in KRS 82.140 to 82.165 .

History. Enact. Acts 1962, ch. 178, § 5 (1st par.

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Issuance of bonds by cities, KRS Chapter 66.

82.140. Revenue bonds not to be city debt.

The revenue bonds and interest thereon shall be payable solely from a special fund or account of the city, and from such revenues as may be pledged to be set aside therein from permissible sources, as authorized and provided in KRS 82.140 to 82.165 , and shall not constitute indebtedness of the city. It shall be stated plainly on the face of each bond that it has been issued under the provisions of KRS 82.105 to 82.180 , and that it does not constitute an indebtedness of the city within the meaning of the Constitution.

History. Enact. Acts 1962, ch. 178, § 5 subsec. (1).

82.145. Special fund to repay revenue bonds — Pledge by city to segregate and protect revenues.

Prior to the issuance of the bonds, provision shall be made by ordinance for the creation of a separate and special fund or account of the city, identified as constituting the source of payment of principal and interest, and by covenant to be continued so long as any of the bonds shall remain outstanding and unpaid. By the provisions of such ordinance the city may pledge and covenant that it will cause to be set aside and deposited in such separate and special fund, from time to time, moneys received from any or all of the following sources, subject to the following conditions and limitations:

  1. In the event that the contract of inducement with the governmental agency is upon such terms as will cause the governmental project to produce direct revenues in the form of rents, royalties, fees, rates or charges of any character, including any payments to the city in lieu of property taxes, but not property taxes themselves, all or any portion thereof may be so pledged; but it shall not be a condition or requirement in the issuance of revenue bonds that such revenues be anticipated at all, nor that they be sufficient in themselves to provide for the payment of principal and interest when scheduled to become due.
  2. In the event that the contract of inducement with the governmental agency is upon such terms as in the opinion of the governing body of the city will cause the project to produce no direct revenues, or to produce direct revenues insufficient to give acceptable assurance of payment of principal and interest when scheduled to become due, then:
    1. The city may pledge and covenant that it will cause to be deposited in said special fund the revenues which it may derive from any municipally owned and operated water, electric, gas, sewer or other utility systems, or from any combination thereof, to the extent such revenues at the time may be or become surplus to the necessary costs of operating and maintaining such utility system or systems and surplus to any existing contractual commitments of the city to the holder or holders of outstanding revenue bonds payable from such revenues; and
    2. If the governing body of the city shall make a legislative finding of fact, as recited in the body of the ordinance authorizing issuance of the bonds, that the governmental project is of such nature as to provide increased revenues to the city by reason of increased employment and resulting increased receipts from occupational license fees or occupational license taxes, then the city may pledge and covenant that it will cause to be deposited in said separate and special fund the receipts which may be definitely identified as accruing from such occupational license fees or taxes by reason of employment in or directly related to the governmental project, less a proportionate part of the costs of collecting such fees or taxes.
  3. In the case of revenues originating from any of the sources and in the respective manners set forth in the paragraphs (a) and (b) of subsection (2) of this section, the city may covenant and pledge (i) that such revenues, or a stipulated amount thereof, will be set aside and deposited in the special fund when, as and if received; (ii) that as to any city-owned utility system the rate or schedule of rates prevailing at the time revenue bonds are issued will not be reduced so long as any of the bonds remain outstanding and unpaid, and (iii) in the case of a pledge of revenues of a city-owned utility system or combination of utility systems, that the city will not sell or otherwise dispose thereof without making provision for payment of the revenue bonds from the proceeds of such sale or other disposition, due regard being given to the priority of any previously issued bonds which are payable from such revenues; but a city may not additionally pledge that it will raise or adjust the rate or rates of any utility system, or of any combination of utility systems, or of any occupational license fee or occupational license tax solely for the purpose of assuring revenues from such sources adequate to provide for payment of revenue bonds issued under KRS 82.140 to 82.165 .

History. Enact. Acts 1962, ch. 178, § 5 (subsec. 2).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

This section providing for issuance and payment of revenue bonds issued to raise funds for use as inducement to a governmental agency to locate within the city from surplus revenues of combined water and sewer system of city did not constitute the incurring of an indebtedness of the city without the approval of the voters in conflict with Ky. Const., §§ 157 and 158. Grimm v. Moloney, 358 S.W.2d 496, 1962 Ky. LEXIS 180 ( Ky. 1962 ).

Allocation of occupational taxes to sinking fund as provided by this section to fund bonds issued to raise moneys for use as inducement to a governmental agency to locate within the city was not in conflict with Ky. Const., §§ 49 and 50. Grimm v. Moloney, 358 S.W.2d 496, 1962 Ky. LEXIS 180 ( Ky. 1962 ).

2. Impairment of Contract.

Ordinance authorized under the provision of this section that pledged surplus revenues of the combined water and sewer system of the city to pay revenue bonds issued by city to raise moneys to induce governmental agency to locate within its boundaries did not constitute an impairment of the contract between the city and the holders of its presently and previously issued revenue bonds of water and sewer system. Grimm v. Moloney, 358 S.W.2d 496, 1962 Ky. LEXIS 180 ( Ky. 1962 ).

3. Pledge of Occupational License Receipts.

After a city finds that the project will bring increased receipts from occupational license fees it may pledge all occupational license receipts that can be definitely identified as occurring by reason of employment directly related to governmental projects. Watkins v. Fugazzi, 394 S.W.2d 594, 1965 Ky. LEXIS 194 ( Ky. 1965 ).

82.150. Terms of revenue bonds — Form — Sale.

  1. The principal of and the interest on the bonds shall be payable solely from the funds provided for the payment. The bonds of any issue may be in one (1) or more series and any one (1) or more series may enjoy equal or subordinate status with respect to the pledge of funds from which they are payable, shall be dated, shall bear interest at a rate or rates or method of determining rates, shall mature at a time or times not exceeding forty (40) years from their date or dates, all as may be provided by the city, and may be made redeemable before maturity, at the option of the city, at a price or prices and under the terms and conditions as may be fixed by the city prior to the issuance of the bonds.
  2. The city shall determine the form of the bonds, including any interest coupons to be attached to the bonds, and shall fix the denomination or denominations of the bonds and the place or places for payment of principal and interest, which may be at any bank or trust company within or without the Commonwealth. The bonds shall be signed by the facsimile signature of the mayor and the seal of the city or a facsimile of the seal shall be affixed and attested by the manual signature of the city clerk, and any coupons attached shall bear the facsimile signature of the mayor and the city clerk. In case any officer whose signature or a facsimile of whose signature shall appear on any bonds or coupons shall cease to be an officer before the delivery of the bonds, the signatures or the facsimile shall nevertheless be valid and sufficient for all purposes the same as if he had remained in office until the delivery. All bonds issued under the provisions of KRS 82.140 to 82.165 shall have and are declared to have all the qualities and incidents of negotiable instruments under the negotiable instruments law of the Commonwealth. The bonds may be issued in coupon or in registered form, or both, as the city may determine, and provisions may be made for the registration of any coupon bonds as to principal alone and also as to both principal and interest, and for the reconversion into coupon bonds of any bonds registered as to both principal and interest.
  3. The city may sell the bonds at a public sale in a manner as it may determine will best effect the purposes of KRS 82.140 to 82.165 .

History. Enact. Acts 1962, ch. 178, § 5 (subsec. 2); 1968, ch. 110, § 9; 1986, ch. 23, § 4, effective July 15, 1986; 1996, ch. 274, § 17, effective July 15, 1996.

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Facsimile signatures and seals, and options as to negotiability, on certain public securities, KRS 61.390 .

82.155. Use of revenue bond proceeds — Temporary bonds.

  1. The proceeds of the bonds of each issue shall be used solely for the payment of the cost of the lands or property to be used as the site of the governmental project or projects for which such bonds shall have been issued, the cost of such improvements thereto as may have been agreed upon, and the cost of the issue, and shall be disbursed in such manner and under such restrictions, if any, as the city may provide in the proceedings authorizing the issuance of such bonds or in the trust indenture securing the same. If the proceeds of the bonds of any issue, by error of estimates or otherwise, shall be less than such costs additional bonds may in like manner be issued to provide the amount of such deficit, and, unless otherwise provided in the proceedings authorizing the issuance of such bonds or in the trust indenture securing the same, shall be deemed to be of the same issue and shall be entitled to payment from the same fund without preference or priority of the bonds first issued. If the proceeds of the bonds of any issue shall exceed such costs, the surplus shall be deposited to the credit of the sinking fund or funds for such bonds or any account or accounts therein as the city shall have provided in the proceedings or trust indenture authorizing and securing such bonds.
  2. Prior to the preparation of definitive bonds, the city may, under like restrictions, issue interim receipts or temporary bonds, with or without coupons, exchangeable for definitive bonds when such bonds shall have been executed and are available for delivery. The city may also provide for the replacement of any bonds which shall become mutilated or shall be destroyed or lost. Bonds may be issued under the provisions of KRS 82.140 to 82.165 without any other proceedings or the happening of any other conditions or things, except as specifically required by KRS 82.140 to 82.165 .

History. Enact. Acts 1962, ch. 178, § 5 subsecs. (4), (5).

82.160. Security for revenue bonds through trust indenture.

In the discretion of the city any bonds issued under the provisions of KRS 82.140 to 82.165 may be secured by a trust indenture by and between the city and a corporate trustee, which may be any trust company or bank having the powers of a trust company within or without the Commonwealth. Such trust indenture or the proceedings providing for the issuance of such bonds may pledge or assign the revenues to be received; but shall not convey or mortgage any project or any part thereof, except in the case of bonds issued through the agency and instrumentality of a nonprofit corporation organized under the general corporation laws of the Commonwealth, in which case there may be a conveyance or mortgage if such corporation be thereunto authorized by the governing body of the city. Such trust indenture or proceedings may contain such provisions for protecting and enforcing the rights and remedies of the bondholders as may be reasonable and proper and not in violation of law, including covenants setting forth the duties of the city in relation to the acquisition of property and the construction, improvement, maintenance, repair, operation and insurance of the project or projects in connection with which such bonds shall have been authorized, the rates of the rentals to be charged, and the custody, safeguarding and application of all moneys, if such covenants shall be appropriate to the issue. It shall be lawful for any bank or trust company incorporated under the laws of the Commonwealth which may act as depository of the proceeds of bonds or of revenues to furnish such indemnifying bonds or to pledge such securities as may be required by the city. Any such trust indenture may set forth the rights and remedies of the bondholders and of the trustee, and may restrict the individual right of action by bondholders. In addition to the foregoing, any such trust indenture or proceedings may contain such other provisions as the city may deem reasonable and proper for the security of the bondholders. All expenses incurred in carrying out the provisions of such trust indenture or proceedings may be treated as a part of the cost of the project or projects.

History. Enact. Acts 1962, ch. 178, § 5 subsec. (6).

82.165. Proceeds of revenue bonds constitute trust fund — Bondholder’s remedies.

  1. All moneys received pursuant to the provisions of KRS 82.140 to 82.165 , whether as proceeds from the sale of bonds or as revenues, shall be deemed to be trust funds to be held and applied solely as provided in KRS 82.140 to 82.165 . The proceedings or the trust indenture shall provide that any officer with whom, or any bank or trust company with which, such moneys shall be deposited shall act as trustee of such moneys and shall hold and apply the same for the purposes of KRS 82.140 to 82.165, subject to such regulations as KRS 82.105 to 82.180 and such proceedings or trust indenture may provide.
  2. Any holder of bonds issued under the provisions of KRS 82.140 to 82.165 or any of the coupons appertaining thereto, and the trustee under any trust indenture, except to the extent the rights in KRS 82.140 to 82.165 given may be restricted by such trust indenture, may, either at law or in equity, by suit, action, mandamus or other proceedings, protect and enforce any and all rights under the laws of the Commonwealth or granted under KRS 82.140 to 82.165 or under such trust indenture or the proceedings authorizing the issuance of such bonds, and may enforce and compel the performance of all duties required by KRS 82.140 to 82.165 or by such trust indenture or proceedings to be performed by the city or by any officer or employees thereof.

History. Enact. Acts 1962, ch. 178, § 5 subsecs. (7), (8).

82.170. Bonds exempt from taxation.

The exercise of the powers granted by KRS 82.105 to 82.180 will be in all respects for the benefit of the people of the Commonwealth and its political subdivisions, for the increase of their commerce and prosperity, and for the promotion of employment and the alleviation of unemployment; and as the acquisition of a governmental project or projects by a city will constitute the performance of essential governmental functions, and will aid in the performance of other governmental functions by the Commonwealth and by the United States, the bonds issued under the provisions of KRS 82.105 to 82.180 , whether general obligation or revenue bonds, their transfer and the income therefrom (including any profit made on the sale thereof) shall at all times be free from taxation within the Commonwealth.

History. Enact. Acts 1962, ch. 178, § 6.

82.175. Bonds constitute legal investments.

Bonds issued by a city under the provisions of KRS 82.105 to 82.180 are hereby made securities in which all public officers and public bodies, agencies and instrumentalities of the Commonwealth and its political subdivisions, all insurance companies, trust companies, banking associations, investment companies, executors, administrators, trustees and other fiduciaries, and all other persons whatsoever who are now or may hereafter be authorized to invest in bonds or other obligations of a similar nature may properly and legally invest funds, including capital in their control or belonging to them. Such bonds are hereby made securities which may properly and legally be deposited with and received by any state or municipal officer or any agency or political subdivision of the Commonwealth for any purpose for which the deposit of bonds or other obligations of the Commonwealth is now or may hereafter be authorized by law.

History. Enact. Acts 1962, ch. 178, § 7.

82.180. Power of eminent domain.

Whenever any property authorized to be acquired under KRS 82.105 to 82.120 cannot be acquired by purchase upon terms which a city, or an agency thereof designated to act for it, deems to be reasonable, or whenever the owner is legally incapacitated, absent, unknown, or unable to convey valid title, the city, or the agency acting therefor, is hereby authorized and empowered to acquire such property by condemnation or the exercise of the power of eminent domain in the manner prescribed by the Eminent Domain Act of Kentucky.

History. Enact. Acts 1962, ch. 178, § 8; 1976, ch. 140, § 29.

Compiler’s Notes.

The Eminent Domain Act of Kentucky, referred to herein, is compiled as KRS 416.540 to 416.680 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

Decker v. Somerset, 838 S.W.2d 417, 1992 Ky. App. LEXIS 104 (Ky. Ct. App. 1992).

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Municipal inducements are lawful public purposes and uses, KRS 82.125 .

Discrimination

82.210. City may prohibit discrimination in public places. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1962, ch. 171, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1968, ch. 152, § 168.

82.220. City Commission of human rights authorized. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1962, ch. 171, § 2) was repealed by Acts 1968, ch. 152, § 168.

82.230. Powers of commission. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1962, ch. 171, § 3) was repealed by Acts 1968, ch. 152, § 168.

82.240. Rules and regulations. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1962, ch. 171, § 4) was repealed by Acts 1968, ch. 152, § 168.

82.250. City may provide penal sanctions for violation of ordinances under KRS 82.210. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1962, ch. 171, § 5) was repealed by Acts 1968, ch. 152, § 168.

Municipal Statute Revision Commission

82.255. Purpose. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1976, ch. 120, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1982, ch. 434, § 15.

82.260. Membership. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1976, ch. 120, § 2) was repealed by Acts 1982, ch. 434, § 15.

82.265. Terms — Vacancies. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1976, ch. 120, § 3) was repealed by Acts 1982, ch. 434, § 15.

82.270. Compensation. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1976, ch. 120, § 4) was repealed by Acts 1982, ch. 434, § 15.

82.275. Reports. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1976, ch. 120, § 5) was repealed by Acts 1982, ch. 434, § 15.

82.280. Director. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1976, ch. 120, § 6) was repealed by Acts 1982, ch. 434, § 15.

Public Ways

82.400. Procedure for dedicating public way or easement — Waiver in certain instances — Presumption of dedication — Railroad exemption — Automatic acceptance — Penalty.

  1. If any person desires to offer for dedication by recorded plat any public way or easement within the jurisdictional limits of the city or a consolidated local government, he or she shall file with the legislative body of the city or a consolidated local government, a map or plat of the territory bounded, intersected, or immediately adjacent to the proposed public way or easement, showing the proposed name, nature, and dimensions of the public way or easement offered for dedication. If the legislative body of the city or a consolidated local government decides the proposed dedication would be beneficial to the public interest and suitable for the immediate or future acceptance of the city or consolidated local government, it shall approve the map or plat, and the mayor shall subscribe a certificate of approval on the map and acknowledge the execution thereof before any public officer authorized to take acknowledgments of deeds. The map or plat may then be recorded in the office of the county clerk.
  2. Except as provided for by ordinance in a consolidated local government, in a city of the first class, or in a county containing a city of the first class, subdivision regulations which have been adopted as provided in KRS Chapter 100, and where streets or public ways as dedicated on the final subdivision plat have been constructed, inspected, and approved in accordance with the subdivision regulations, then the procedure for filing the map or plat with the legislative body of the consolidated local government, city, or county, as the case may be, as required in subsection (1) of this section shall be waived, and the dedicated street or public way shall automatically be deemed beneficial to the public interest and shall be, by operation of law, automatically accepted for maintenance by the consolidated local government, city, or county, respectively, forty-five (45) days after inspection and final approval, and shall be a public way for all purposes, KRS Chapter 83A, regarding a city’s, county’s, or consolidated local government’s adoption of ordinances notwithstanding.
  3. When any property has been opened to the unrestricted use of the general public for five (5) consecutive years, it shall be conclusively presumed to have been dedicated to the city or consolidated local government as a public way or easement, subject to acceptance by the city or consolidated local government. The city or consolidated local government may, at any time after the expiration of five (5) years from the time the property is opened to the public, pass an ordinance declaring it so dedicated, and accepting the dedication, whereupon it shall be a public way or easement of the city or consolidated local government for all purposes. The lack of an actual dedication to the city or consolidated local government, or of a record title on the part of the city or consolidated local government, shall be no defense against the collection of any tax that may be levied against property abutting thereon for the payment of the cost of any improvement constructed thereon by order of the city or consolidated local government. Nothing herein shall be construed to require the expiration of five (5) years to raise a presumption of dedication in any case where, under any rule of law in force in this state, a dedication would be presumed in less than five (5) years. Provided, however, that property of a railroad company shall not be presumed to be dedicated as a public way or easement under this section or any other rule of law in force in this state unless the company consents to said dedication in writing.
  4. Any person who shall lodge for record in the county clerk’s office, and any county clerk or deputy who shall receive for record or permit to be lodged for record, any plat, map, deed, or other instrument contrary to the provisions of this section, shall be fined not less than twenty-five dollars ($25) nor more than one hundred dollars ($100) for each offense.

History. Enact. Acts 1980, ch. 233, § 1, effective July 15, 1980; 1988, ch. 371, § 1, effective July 15, 1988; 1990, ch. 362, § 13, effective July 13, 1990; 1992, ch. 435, § 4, effective July 14, 1992; 2000, ch. 417, § 9, effective December 1, 2000; 2002, ch. 346, § 95, effective July 15, 2002.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(12/1/2000). The contingency on the effectiveness of this statute set by 2000 Ky. Acts ch. 417, sec. 18, was met, the voters of the Commonwealth having ratified at the general election on November 7, 2000, a constitutional amendment (see 2000 Ky. Acts ch. 399) abolishing the Railroad Commission.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Dedication.

Approval of a preliminary plat by a planning commission does not bind a developer to dedicate streets or easements drawn in the preliminary plat; only upon final approval by the planning commission does a party acquire rights in an offer of dedication made on the plat. Subsection (3) of this section, a rule of evidence in common law dedications by prescription, is not satisfied by a preliminary plat’s depiction of a street when there was no street open for unrestricted use by the public for five (5) consecutive years. Henry Fischer Builder, Inc. v. Magee, 957 S.W.2d 303, 1997 Ky. App. LEXIS 126 (Ky. Ct. App. 1997).

2. — By Acquiescence.

Dedication may result from acquiescence, provided the use is of the necessary character and duration; “character” means the use is by members of the public believing they have a right to such use, continuous and substantial; the circumstances of the use must be plainly inconsistent with the owner’s right to claim the exclusive use of the land, but the public use need not be of sufficient duration to otherwise establish adverse possession or a prescriptive easement. Statewide Dev. Co. v. Lexington Fayette Urban County Government, 821 S.W.2d 97, 1991 Ky. App. LEXIS 156 (Ky. Ct. App. 1991).

3. — By Conduct.

Developer allowed county government to grade, pave, and develop the roadway, and roadway was used by the public as a major artery for six years prior to developer’s suit; therefore, developer’s conduct was sufficient to establish dedication. Statewide Dev. Co. v. Lexington Fayette Urban County Government, 821 S.W.2d 97, 1991 Ky. App. LEXIS 156 (Ky. Ct. App. 1991).

Circuit judge did not commit reversible error when he determined city was owner of land in question by virtue of condemnation and dedication as a public roadway when, although there was no formal proof of dedication, evidence of an 1831 city plan, numerous documents and deeds, and public belief was sufficient to show a continuous use of the land in question and such evidence of continuous use implied acceptance for public purpose. City of Louisville v. Louisville Scrap Material Co., 932 S.W.2d 352, 1996 Ky. LEXIS 62 ( Ky. 1996 ).

4. — By Non-Owner.

Non-owner of property cannot make a statutory dedication of roadway. Bluegrass Manor v. Mall St. Matthews Ltd. Pshp., 964 S.W.2d 431, 1998 Ky. App. LEXIS 22 (Ky. Ct. App. 1998).

Cited:

Nash v. Campbell County Fiscal Court, 345 S.W.3d 811, 2011 Ky. LEXIS 57 ( Ky. 2011 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

It is clear from the holding in Kemper v. Cooke, 576 S.W.2d 263, 1979 Ky. App. LEXIS 364 (Ky. App. 1979), that a dedicated street in a subdivision must be accepted by the city pursuant to statutory procedure before the streets can become part of the city street system required to be maintained by the city; on the other hand, however, it does nevertheless become a public way open to the public to be maintained by the abutting property owners as they see fit, or possibly by the subdivider; in no event, however, do the dedicated streets revert automatically to the subdivider or abutting property owners where the city has not formally accepted them. OAG 80-452 .

Where the owner of a subdivision rearranges the division of his lots to provide a road access from a county recreational park and future county fair to a city street, the city planning commission may refuse, after approving the subdivision change, to sign the plat for recording under the authority of this section, since the city may accept or reject the proposed street easement, according to its sound judgment in assessing the criterion as to whether the proposed dedication would be beneficial to the public interest and suitable for immediate or future acceptance by the city, and the commission may consider the relation or interrelation of the proposed street with the preexisting city street network. OAG 81-142 .

Under KRS 100.277 , dedicated streets within a subdivision plat do not necessarily have to be accepted before the subdivision plat can be approved by the planning commission and recorded; the acceptance of dedicated streets within a subdivision under subsection (3) (now (4)) of KRS 100.277 may occur at sometime in the future following the approval and recording of the subdivision plat and in the course of the development of the subdivision. As a consequence, there is no legal objection to the acceptance of the subdivision plat by the planning commission and its subsequent recording in the clerk’s office prior to the city legislative body’s acceptance of a street within the subdivision in the manner required by this section. OAG 83-27 .

Even if the procedures of this section have not been complied with relative to the dedication of certain drainage easements, and the specific drainage facilities in a subdivision which is now part of the city have not been accepted by the city, an obligation to provide some kind of adequate drainage facilities would still exist on the part of the city if city streets are involved; the city is basically responsible for maintaining an adequate drainage system adjacent to the city streets (those streets it has obligated itself to construct, maintain or control). OAG 83-431 .

While a city has the authority to require by ordinance property owners to repair or pay for the repair of the abutting sidewalks, in the absence of such an ordinance the obligation rests with the city to repair sidewalks abutting city streets. OAG 83-431 .

Whereas this section basically requires that all dedicated public ways must be accepted by the city pursuant to an appropriate ordinance before they officially become city streets subject to the city’s maintenance and control, a city which had traditionally not followed that procedure before exercising control over the streets should officially accept each present street by name and location pursuant to an appropriate ordinance. OAG 83-422 .

A city ordinance fixing minimum construction requirements for the city’s streets such as width, grading, drainage, etc., would be legal even though the city had not adopted planning and zoning. OAG 83-422 .

As far as alleyways are concerned, it is up to a city as to whether it wishes to exercise control over any or all alleyways; however, they cannot be closed under KRS 82.405 until they have first been accepted in the manner described in subsection (3) of this section. There is no distinction in law between a public street and a public alley, hence an alley is governed by the same rules applicable to streets. OAG 83-422 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Bench & Bar.

Morris, The New Kentucky Municipal Law, Vol. 45, No. 3, July, 1981, Ky. Bench & Bar 24.

Northern Kentucky Law Review.

Brandt, Kentucky Real Estate Law Survey: 1990 Through 1993, 21 N. Ky. L. Rev. 435 (1994).

82.405. Procedure for closing a public way.

  1. If a legislative body of a city determines that a public way located within the city should be closed in whole or in part, and that all property owners in or abutting the public way or portion thereof agree to the closing of the public way, the legislative body may proceed to close the public way or portion thereof as provided in subsection (2) of this section. If that determination is not made, a public way or portion thereof may be closed only as provided in subsections (3) and (4) of this section.
  2. The legislative body of a city may close a public way, in whole or in part, as provided in this subsection, if it makes the following findings of fact:
    1. Identification of all property owners in or abutting the public way or portion thereof to be closed;
    2. Written notice of the proposed closing was given to all property owners in or abutting the public way or portion thereof being closed; and
    3. All property owners in or abutting the public way or portion thereof being closed have given their written notarized consent to the closing, and copies of the consent shall be attached thereto.

      If the legislative body makes the findings of fact in subsections (2)(a), (b), and (c) of this section, it may enact an ordinance reciting the findings of fact and declaring the public way or portion thereof closed without any further action. The ordinance shall be recorded in the office of the county clerk of the county in which the city is located.

  3. Unless the findings of fact required in subsection (2) of this section are made, upon the adoption of an ordinance by the city legislative body closing the whole or any portion of a public way, the city shall institute an action in the Circuit Court to have it closed. All the owners of property in or abutting that public way, or the portion proposed to be closed, shall be made defendants.
  4. If all defendants fail to object to the closing within twenty (20) days after the date of service, the court shall render a decree accordingly, but if any defendant objects within that time, the court shall award damages, if any, in the same manner as prescribed by the Eminent Domain Act of Kentucky and shall direct that the public way be closed upon payment into court of the amount awarded. The court shall give these proceedings precedence over other cases.

History. Enact. Acts 1980, ch. 233, § 2, effective July 15, 1980; 1994, ch. 322, § 1, effective July 15, 1994.

Compiler’s Notes.

The Eminent Domain Act of Kentucky referred to in subsection (4) of this section is compiled as KRS 416.540 to 416.680 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. In General.

Under Kentucky law the only property right existing with regard to the continuance of a public way is that a landowner has a right of reasonable access to the public highway system. Wessels Constr. & Dev. Co. v. Kentucky, 560 F. Supp. 25, 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18287 (E.D. Ky. 1983 ).

Under KRS 82.405(2), the term “abutting” refers to property owners that directly touch upon a single point of the public way to be closed. These property owners are commonly located on either side of the public way to be closed or the portion thereof to be closed. City of Worthington Hills v. Worthington Fire Prot. Dist., 140 S.W.3d 584, 2004 Ky. App. LEXIS 169 (Ky. Ct. App. 2004).

Within the context of KRS 82.405(2), the term “in” signifies owners of property that are located inside or within the public way to be closed or portion thereof to be closed. These property owners would generally be those holding utility easements located “within” the public way to be closed or portion thereof to be closed. City of Worthington Hills v. Worthington Fire Prot. Dist., 140 S.W.3d 584, 2004 Ky. App. LEXIS 169 (Ky. Ct. App. 2004).

KRS 82.405(2) requires identification of, written notification to, and written consent of property owners that either: (1) directly touch upon a single point of the public way to be closed; (2) directly touch upon a single point of the portion of the public way to be closed; (3) are located within the public way to be closed; or (4) are located within the portion of the public way to be closed. City of Worthington Hills v. Worthington Fire Prot. Dist., 140 S.W.3d 584, 2004 Ky. App. LEXIS 169 (Ky. Ct. App. 2004).

2. Non-Abutting Landowners.

This section does not violate the equal protection rights of property owners whose property does not abut the road to be closed, because there is clearly a rational basis for making a distinction between property owners immediately abutting a public way sought to be closed and those living at some distance therefrom. Consequently, because it is obvious that the state must draw the line somewhere as to who must be heard and compensated with regard to these matters, the federal district court could not say that the manner in which it has been drawn in this section is without a rational basis. Wessels Constr. & Dev. Co. v. Kentucky, 560 F. Supp. 25, 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18287 (E.D. Ky. 1983 ).

In an action involving the closing of a portion of a city street, where the apartment buildings owned by the plaintiffs did not abut the portion of the street to be closed, the plaintiffs had no property rights that were impaired by the closing so long as ingress and egress to their property still existed. The fact that the value of the plaintiffs’ property was depreciated and that some apartment dwellers had to travel further to get to their apartment complexes due to the closing, were not legally recognized harms upon which to base a lawsuit. Wessels Constr. & Dev. Co. v. Kentucky, 560 F. Supp. 25, 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18287 (E.D. Ky. 1983 ).

3. Abutting Landowners.

Under KRS 82.405(2), the legislative body of a city must make findings of fact that provide the identification of, written notice to, and written consent of all property owners in or abutting the public way or portion thereof to be closed was given and received. These findings may be made contemporaneously with the passage of the ordinance effectuating road closure. City of Worthington Hills v. Worthington Fire Prot. Dist., 140 S.W.3d 584, 2004 Ky. App. LEXIS 169 (Ky. Ct. App. 2004).

Opinions of Attorney General.

As far as alleyways are concerned, it is up to a city as to whether it wishes to exercise control over any or all alleyways; however, they cannot be closed under this section until they have first been accepted in the manner described in KRS 82.400(3). There is no distinction in law between a public street and a public alley, hence an alley is governed by the same rules applicable to streets. OAG 83-422 .

Parking Citation Enforcement

82.600. Definitions.

As used in KRS 82.605 to 82.640 unless the context otherwise requires:

  1. “Local government” means a city of any class, a consolidated local government, or an urban-county government;
  2. “Hearing board” means a body established by ordinance and empowered to conduct hearings pursuant to KRS 82.605 to 82.640 ; and shall be composed of one (1) or more persons appointed in the manner provided by ordinance; and also means any hearing officer or officers appointed by the board. Any action of such hearing officer shall be deemed to be the action of the board; and
  3. “Parking ordinance” means an ordinance regulating parking, standing, or stopping upon the public streets or ways within the local government.

History. Enact. Acts 1984, ch. 416, § 1, effective July 13, 1984; 2003, ch. 93, § 1, effective June 24, 2003.

82.605. Enactment of parking ordinances by local government.

Any local government may enact parking ordinances and impose penalties for the violation of such ordinances. Such penalties may be enforced as criminal penalties or a local government may, by ordinance, elect to enforce parking ordinances as civil violations pursuant to the procedures set forth in KRS 82.600 to 82.640 .

History. Enact. Acts 1984, ch. 416, § 2, effective July 13, 1984.

82.610. Citation for parking violation — Notice.

  1. If any motor vehicle is found parked, standing or stopped in violation of a parking ordinance passed by the local government, the vehicle may be cited for the appropriate parking violation. The citing officer shall note the vehicle’s registration number and any other information concerning the vehicle which will identify it and, if the driver is not present, shall conspicuously affix to the vehicle a notice of the parking violation.
  2. The form of the notice of the parking violation shall be designated by the local government, but shall contain in substance the following information:
    1. A statement that the notice represents a determination that a parking violation has been committed by the owner of the vehicle and that the determination shall be final unless contested as provided in KRS 82.600 to 82.640 ;
    2. A statement that a parking violation may result in impoundment of the vehicle for which the owner may be liable for a fine and towing, handling and storage charges or fees;
    3. A statement of the specific parking violation for which the citation was issued;
    4. A statement of the monetary penalty established for the parking violation; and
    5. A statement of the options provided in KRS 82.600 to 82.640 for responding to the notice and the procedures necessary to exercise these options.
  3. The notice of parking violation represents a determination that a parking violation has been committed, and such determination shall be final unless contested as provided in KRS 82.600 to 82.640 .

History. Enact. Acts 1984, ch. 416, § 3, effective July 13, 1984.

82.615. Response to notice.

  1. Any person who receives notice of a parking violation shall respond to such notice as provided in this section within seven (7) days of the date of the notice, by either paying the fine set forth in the notice or requesting a hearing pursuant to KRS 82.620 .
  2. If the owner of a vehicle cited for a parking violation has not responded to the notice within seven (7) days as provided in subsection (1) of this section, the local government shall send a second notice by regular, first-class mail of the United States Postal Service to the last known address of the registered owner of the vehicle as listed on the certificate of title. Such notice shall state that if the owner of the vehicle does not respond to the notice by either paying the fine or by requesting in writing a hearing pursuant to KRS 82.620 , within seven (7) days of the receipt of the notice, the owner shall be deemed to have waived his right to a hearing and the determination that a violation was committed shall be considered final. Any person who fails to request a hearing or pay the fine within the seven (7) days shall be deemed to have refused to pay the fine levied by the citation.
  3. The registered owner of a vehicle at the time the violation occurred shall be liable for all fines, fees and penalties which he has refused to pay.

History. Enact. Acts 1984, ch. 416, § 4, effective July 13, 1984; 2011, ch. 95, § 5, effective June 8, 2011.

82.620. Contest of violation determination — Hearing — Appeal.

  1. Any person cited for a parking violation under KRS 82.610 may contest the determination that a violation occurred by requesting in writing a hearing before the hearing board. Such hearing shall be held no later than fourteen (14) days from the date of receipt of the request, unless prior to the hearing the person requesting such hearing requests an extension of time not to exceed fourteen (14) days. No less than seven (7) days prior to the date set for the hearing, the board shall notify the registered owner of the vehicle of the date, time and place of the hearing. Any person requesting a hearing who fails to appear at the time and place set for the hearing shall be deemed to have refused to pay the fine levied by the citation.
  2. At the hearing, after consideration of the evidence, the board shall determine whether a violation was committed. Where it has not been established that the violation was committed, an order dismissing the citation shall be entered. Where it has been established that a violation was committed, the board shall uphold the citation and order the owner to pay the citation within seven (7) days. A copy of such order shall be furnished the owner. Any person ordered to pay the fine who fails to do so within seven (7) days shall be deemed to have refused to pay the fine levied by the citation.
  3. The board may consider the parking citation and any other written report made under oath by the officer who issued the citation in lieu of the officer’s personal appearance at the hearing.
  4. An appeal from the hearing board’s determination may be made to the District Court of the county in which the city is located within seven (7) days of the board’s determination. The appeal shall be initiated by the filing of a complaint and a copy of the board’s order in the same manner as any civil action under the Rules of Civil Procedure. The action shall be tried de novo and the burden shall be upon the local government to establish that a violation occurred. If the court finds that a violation occurred, the owner shall be ordered to pay to the local government all fines, fees and penalties occurring as of the date of the judgment. If the court finds that a violation did not occur, the local government shall be ordered to dismiss the citation and the plaintiff shall be authorized to recover his costs.
  5. The judgment of the District Court may be appealed to the Circuit Court in accordance with the Rules of Civil Procedure.

History. Enact. Acts 1984, ch. 416, § 5, effective July 13, 1984.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

Highview Manor Ass’n, LLC v. Louisville Metro Health Dep’t, — S.W.3d —, 2008 Ky. App. LEXIS 185 (Ky. Ct. App. 2008).

82.625. Impoundment — Charges for towing, handling and storage — Hearing on validity of impoundment — Appeal.

  1. Any local government may impound a motor vehicle parked, stopped or standing upon a street or public way within its jurisdiction in violation of an ordinance or statute prohibiting parking, stopping or standing in the location, manner or at the time the vehicle is cited or for any other lawful reason.
  2. The local government, in addition to the fines levied for the parking or traffic offense, may by ordinance impose reasonable towing, handling and storage charges upon such impounded vehicle.
  3. A local government may condition the release of an impounded vehicle upon the payment of the towing, handling and storage charges imposed thereon, unless the owner or other person entitled to possession challenges the validity of the impoundment pursuant to subsection (4) of this section. A vehicle may be released to the owner or other person entitled to possession only upon proof of ownership or right to possession. The local government may require reasonable security, bond or other assurances of indemnification from a person who is not the registered owner of the vehicle prior to releasing the vehicle to such person.
  4. The owner of a motor vehicle which has been impounded pursuant to this section or other person entitled to possession, may challenge the validity of such impoundment and request in writing a hearing before the hearing board. The hearing shall be conducted within ten (10) business days of the date of the request, unless the owner or other person entitled to possession waives the limitation or the local government shows good cause for such delay. The local government shall retain possession of the vehicle pending the hearing, unless the owner or other person claiming right of possession posts a bond in an amount equal to the fines and fees accrued as of the date of the hearing request, or seventy-five dollars ($75) whichever is less. If the owner or person claiming possession of the vehicle is unable to pay the amount of the bond, the hearing shall be held within seventy-two (72) hours of the date the request for hearing is received, unless such person requests or agrees to a continuance.
    1. No less than five (5) days prior to the date set for the hearing, the local government shall notify the person requesting the hearing of the date, time and place of the hearing. In the case of a hearing required to be held within seventy-two (72) hours of the date of the request as provided in subsection (4) of this section, the person requesting the hearing shall be informed at the time of his request, or as soon thereafter as is practicable, of the date and time of the hearing. (5) (a) No less than five (5) days prior to the date set for the hearing, the local government shall notify the person requesting the hearing of the date, time and place of the hearing. In the case of a hearing required to be held within seventy-two (72) hours of the date of the request as provided in subsection (4) of this section, the person requesting the hearing shall be informed at the time of his request, or as soon thereafter as is practicable, of the date and time of the hearing.
    2. Any person who refuses or, except for good cause, fails to appear at the time and place set for the hearing shall be deemed to have conceded on his and the owner’s behalf the validity of the impoundment.
    3. At the hearing, after consideration of the evidence, the board shall determine whether the impoundment was valid and reasonable. Where it has not been established that the impoundment was justified, an order releasing the vehicle shall be entered. All fines and fees paid or amounts posted as bond because of the impoundment of the vehicle shall be returned. Where it has been established that the impoundment was justified, the board shall uphold the impoundment and condition the release of the vehicle upon payment of all fines and fees accruing thereto. If bond has been posted as security for release of the vehicle, said bond shall be forfeited to the local government. Any fines or fees in excess of the amount of the bond posted shall be ordered to be paid by the owner of the vehicle to the local government. The board shall furnish the owner or person appearing on the owner’s behalf with a copy of its order.
    4. The board may consider a parking citation and any other written report made under oath by the issuing officer in lieu of the officer’s personal appearance at the hearing.
    5. An appeal from the hearing board’s determination may be made to the District Court of the county in which the local government is located within seven (7) days of the board’s determination. The appeal shall be initiated by the filing of a complaint and a copy of the board’s order in the same manner as any civil action. The action shall be tried de novo and the burden shall be on the local government to establish that impoundment was justified. If the court finds that the impoundment was justified, the owner shall be ordered to pay all fees and fines accruing as of the date of judgment. If the court finds that the impoundment was not justified, the local government shall be ordered to release the vehicle, if applicable, and to return all fines and fees paid as a result of the impoundment and the plaintiff shall be authorized to recover his costs.
    6. The judgment of the District Court may be appealed to the Circuit Court in accordance with the Rules of Civil Procedure.

History. Enact. Acts 1984, ch. 416, § 6, effective July 13, 1984.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

Highview Manor Ass’n, LLC v. Louisville Metro Health Dep’t, — S.W.3d —, 2008 Ky. App. LEXIS 185 (Ky. Ct. App. 2008).

82.630. Vehicle deemed abandoned — Escheat to local government — Disposal of vehicle.

  1. If within ten (10) business days of impoundment a motor vehicle impounded by a local government has not been claimed, or a hearing has not been requested pursuant to KRS 82.625 , notice shall be mailed by certified mail to the registered owner, if known, and lienholders of record, if any, affording the parties the right within ten (10) days from the date of notice to claim the vehicle or request a hearing pursuant to KRS 82.625 . The notice shall state that, if no hearing is requested, the vehicle shall be deemed abandoned unless the charges thereon are paid within forty-five (45) days of receipt of notice.
  2. After forty-five (45) days from the date of notice required by subsection (1) of this section an impounded motor vehicle shall be deemed abandoned and the vehicle shall escheat to the local government.
  3. If the vehicle is judged suitable for use, the local government may obtain a certificate of registration and ownership from the county clerk pursuant to KRS 186.020 and either use the vehicle for governmental purposes or sell the vehicle at public auction to the highest bidder. If the vehicle is not suitable for use, it may be sold for its scrap or junk value.

History. Enact. Acts 1984, ch. 416, § 7, effective July 13, 1984; 1990, ch. 9, § 2, effective July 13, 1990.

Opinions of Attorney General.

In order to minimize potential liability to lien holders, a county police agency, or other agency, should, as a minimum, send notice, allowing a sufficient opportunity to respond, by certified mail, return receipt requested, of possible sale of a vehicle unclaimed following impoundment. Such notice should be sent to both the registered owner of such vehicle, and any lien holders of record regarding such vehicle. Such notice must be given with respect to both in-state and out-of-state vehicles. Agencies should retain documentation of their efforts in such regard. OAG 91-96 .

82.635. Lien for fines and other charges.

  1. The local government shall possess a lien on a motor vehicle impounded pursuant to KRS 82.625 for all fines, penalties, and towing, handling and storage charges and fees imposed thereon. Such lien shall be superior to and have priority over all other liens thereon.
  2. Nothing in KRS 82.600 to 82.640 shall otherwise affect the rights or obligations between the owner of the motor vehicle and those persons who claim a security interest therein.

History. Enact. Acts 1984, ch. 416, § 8, effective July 13, 1984.

82.640. Title.

KRS 82.600 to 82.635 may be cited as the “Local Government Parking Citation Enforcement Act.”

History. Enact. Acts 1984, ch. 416, § 10, effective July 13, 1984.

Overlay Districts

82.650. Definitions for KRS 82.660 and 82.670.

As used in KRS 82.660 and 82.670 , unless the context otherwise requires:

  1. “Major structural change” means structural alterations and structural repairs made within any twelve (12) month period costing in excess of fifty percent (50%) of the physical value of the structure, as determined by comparison of the extent/value of the alterations involved and the replacement value of the structure at the time the plans for the alteration are approved, using the Building Officials Conference of America (BOCA) chart for construction cost;
  2. “Ordinary repairs” means nonstructural reconstruction or renewal of any part of an existing building for the purpose of its maintenance or decoration, and shall include but not be limited to the replacement or installation of nonstructural components of the building, such as roofing, siding, windows, storm windows, insulation, drywall or lath and plaster, or any other replacement that does not alter the structural integrity, alter the occupancy or use of the building, or affect by rearrangement, exitways and means of egress; and
  3. “City” means a city of any class or a consolidated local government but does not mean an urban-county government.

History. Enact. Acts 1990, ch. 479, § 1, effective July 13, 1990; 2002, ch. 346, § 96, effective July 15, 2002.

82.660. Creation of overlay districts — Contents of ordinance — Effect of establishment of district.

  1. A city legislative body, except for urban-county governments, may by ordinance create one (1) or more overlay districts pursuant to this section to provide additional regulations for design standards and development within any area of the city determined to be:
    1. An area that has historical, architectural, natural, or cultural significance that is suitable for preservation or conservation; or
    2. An area that is located near a river or other body of water, or along an established commercial corridor that has a special character related to the location that is suitable for conservation.
  2. Upon the establishment of an overlay district, development within the area shall conform to all zoning regulations applicable to the area and shall also conform to all overlay district regulations.
  3. An ordinance establishing an overlay district shall, at a minimum, include the following provisions:
    1. An accurate description of the boundaries of the district;
    2. A description of the historical, architectural, cultural, aesthetic, natural, or other distinctive characteristics of the district that are to be preserved or conserved;
    3. A delegation of responsibility for the administration of overlay regulations to an appropriate entity of city government pursuant to KRS 82.670 ;
    4. The standards, guidelines, or criteria that shall govern development within the district to preserve, conserve, or protect the historical, architectural, cultural, aesthetic, or other distinctive characteristics of the district. These standards, guidelines, or criteria may be set out descriptively in the ordinance or by illustration, and may incorporate by reference established architectural standards or guidelines; and
  4. Any city participating in the Certified Local Government Historic Preservation Program shall comply with the regulations of the Kentucky Heritage Commission.
  5. Upon the effective date of the establishment of an overlay district, no person shall begin any major structural change or any ordinary repairs to any building or structure or change or create any surface parking lot, or clear a parcel or lot of trees or other major vegetation, or change the appearance to signage within an overlay district until the city has issued a permit, without cost, certifying that the person has complied with the provisions of the overlay district regulations governing the district. This prohibition shall not apply to emergency repairs that need to be made to a building or structure within an overlay district.

History. Enact. Acts 1990, ch. 479, § 2, effective July 13, 1990.

82.670. Overlay district regulations — Other provisions in ordinance establishing district.

  1. A city establishing an overlay district under KRS 82.660 , shall, in the ordinance that creates the overlay district, delegate the responsibility for the administration of overlay district regulations to a department or agency of the city, or to a nonprofit corporation established by the city pursuant to KRS Chapter 58. Overlay district regulations shall not conflict with the zoning regulations for the district and shall not permit uses prohibited by underlying zoning regulations or prohibit uses permitted by underlying zoning regulations. Overlay district regulations shall supplement underlying zoning regulations by establishing additional design standards, guidelines, and criteria for development within the district to preserve, conserve, or protect the historical, cultural, architectural, aesthetic, or other distinctive characteristics of the district.
  2. The ordinance establishing the district shall, in addition to the provisions of KRS 82.660 , contain the following provisions:
    1. A requirement that the designated department or agency of the city, or KRS Chapter 58 nonprofit corporation that has been delegated responsibility for administration of overlay district regulations, shall establish a body to assist in the review of design standards and development proposals that shall be composed of persons possessing expertise in architecture, urban design, urban planning, historic preservation, or other appropriate fields; and
    2. A procedure for the review of proposed development within the district that shall provide for adequate notice, public hearings, and timely consideration of applications.
  3. Any applicant denied a permit under KRS 82.660(4) shall have a right of appeal from such written denial to the Circuit Court of the county in which the city is located. The ordinance establishing the district may provide that any applicant shall first appeal such written denial to the city legislative body and that the decision of the city legislative body shall be the action appealable to the Circuit Court. The appeal from the denial of the city legislative body shall be taken within thirty (30) days of the date of such written denial.
  4. Any city legislative body that creates an overlay district pursuant to KRS 82.660 shall hold a public hearing prior to adoption of the ordinance establishing the district. Notice of the public hearing shall be published pursuant to KRS Chapter 424 and an owner of every parcel of property within the proposed district shall be notified by first class mail. Records of the county property valuation administrator may be relied upon to determine the identities and addresses of the property owners.
  5. The boundaries of an overlay district shall not be altered except by following the same procedure required for the establishment of an overlay district.

History. Enact. Acts 1990, ch. 479, § 3, effective July 13, 1990.

Abatement of Nuisances

82.700. Definitions for KRS 82.700 to 82.725. [Repealed]

History. Enact. Acts 1992, ch. 349, § 1, effective July 14, 1992; 1994, ch. 287, § 1, effective July 15, 1994; 2002, ch. 346, § 97, effective July 15, 2002; 2008, ch. 7, § 1, effective July 15, 2008; 2011, ch. 95, § 6, effective June 8, 2011; repealed by 2016 ch. 86, § 18, effective January 1, 2017.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1992, ch. 349, § 1, effective July 14, 1992; 1994, ch. 287, § 1, effective July 15, 1994; 2002, ch. 346, § 97, effective July 15, 2002; 2008, ch. 7, § 1, effective July 15, 2008; 2011, ch. 95, § 6, effective June 8, 2011) was repealed by Acts 2017, ch. 86, § 18, effective January 1, 2017.

82.705. Local government authorized to enact nuisance code. [Repealed]

History. Enact. Acts 1992, ch. 349, § 2, effective July 14, 1992; repealed by 2016 ch. 86, § 18, effective January 1, 2017.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1992, ch. 349, § 2, effective July 14, 1992) was repealed by Acts 2017, ch. 86, § 18, effective January 1, 2017.

82.710. Requirements for local government nuisance code. [Repealed]

History. Enact. Acts 1992, ch. 349, § 3, effective July 14, 1992; repealed by 2016 ch. 86, § 18, effective January 1, 2017.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1992, ch. 349, § 3, effective July 14, 1992) was repealed by Acts 2017, ch. 86, § 18, effective January 1, 2017.

82.715. Notice of violation — Liability of property owner — Appeal. [Repealed]

History. Enact. Acts 1992, ch. 349, § 4, effective July 14, 1992; 2011, ch. 95, § 7, effective June 8, 2011; repealed by 2016 ch. 86, § 18, effective January 1, 2017.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1992, ch. 349, § 4, effective July 14, 1992; 2011, ch. 95, § 7, effective June 8, 2011) was repealed by Acts 2017, ch. 86, § 18, effective January 1, 2017.

82.720. Lien of local government for fines and penalties — Effect on rights of secured parties. [Repealed]

History. Enact. Acts 1992, ch. 349, § 5, effective July 14, 1992; 2011, ch. 95, § 8, effective June 8, 2011; repealed by 2016 ch. 86, § 18, effective January 1, 2017.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1992, ch. 349, § 5, effective July 14, 1992; 2011, ch. 95, § 8, effective June 8, 2011) was repealed by Acts 2017, ch. 86, § 18, effective January 1, 2017.

82.722. KRS 82.700 to 82.725 not to be enforced upon agricultural land in unincorporated portion of county. [Repealed]

History. Enact. Acts 2011, ch. 95, § 9, effective June 8, 2011; repealed by 2016 ch. 86, § 18, effective January 1, 2017.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 2011, ch. 95, § 9, effective June 8, 2011) was repealed by Acts 2017, ch. 86, § 18, effective January 1, 2017.

82.725. Short title for KRS 82.700 to 82.725. [Repealed]

History. Enact. Acts 1992, ch. 349, § 6, effective July 14, 1992; repealed by 2016 ch. 86, § 18, effective January 1, 2017.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1992, ch. 349, § 6, effective July 14, 1992) was repealed by Acts 2017, ch. 86, § 18, effective January 1, 2017.

CHAPTER 83 Organization and Government of Cities of the First Class

83.010. Incorporation and general powers. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2742, 2782, 2783) was repealed by Acts 1972, ch. 243, § 35. For present law see KRS 83.420 .

83.011. General grant of power to legislative body. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1954, ch. 35, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1972, ch. 243, § 35. For present law see KRS 83.410 .

83.012. Legislative policy declared. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1954, ch. 35, §§ 2 to 4) was repealed by Acts 1972, ch. 243, § 35. For present law see KRS 83.410 .

83.020. Separation of powers. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2743) was repealed by Acts 1972, ch. 243, § 35. For present law see KRS 83.430 .

83.030. Legislative branch — Board of aldermen. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2765, 2767, 2769) was repealed by Acts 1972, ch. 243, § 35. For present law see KRS 83.440 .

83.040. Aldermen — Election — Term — Qualifications — Oath — Privileges — Compensation — Vacancies. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2767, 2768, 2771, 2772, 2776, 2779: amend. Acts 1954, ch. 28, § 1; 1970, ch. 220, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1972, ch. 243, § 35. For present law see KRS 83A.040 to 83A.070 .

83.050. President of the board of aldermen — President pro tem — Clerk — Sergeant at arms. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2770) was repealed by Acts 1972, ch. 243, § 35. For present law see KRS 83.460 .

83.060. Eligibility, discipline and expulsion of members. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2771) was repealed by Acts 1972, ch. 243, § 35. For present law see KRS 83.470 .

83.070. Quorum and meetings of board of aldermen. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2771, 2772, 2798) was repealed by Acts 1972, ch. 243, § 35. For present law see KRS 83.480 .

83.080. Journal of board of aldermen — City documents to be public records. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2773, 2775) was repealed by Acts 1972, ch. 243, § 35. For present law see KRS 83A.060 .

83.090. Ordinances — How passed — Amendment — Repeal — Veto. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2777, 2795, 2796) was repealed by Acts 1972, ch. 243, § 35. For present law see KRS 83.500 .

83.100. Compilation of ordinances. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2751) was repealed by Acts 1972, ch. 243, § 35. For present law see KRS 83A.060 .

83.110. Executive branch — Mayor and city departments and agencies. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2784, 2785) was repealed by Acts 1972, ch. 243, § 35. For present law see KRS 83.530 .

83.120. Mayor — Election — Term — Qualification. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2784, 2785, 2787, 2790) was repealed by Acts 1972, ch. 243, § 35. For present law see KRS 83A.040 .

83.130. Vacancy in office of mayor — Mayor pro tem — Election to fill unexpired term. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2788) was repealed by Acts 1972, ch. 243, § 35. For present law see KRS 83A.040 .

83.140. Temporary absence or disability of mayor, who to act — Compensation. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2789) was repealed by Acts 1972, ch. 243, § 35. For present law see KRS 83.560 .

83.150. Duties and powers of mayor. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2791 to 2794, 2797, 2799) was repealed by Acts 1972, ch. 243, § 35. For present law see KRS 83.580 .

83.160. Executive departments and directors. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2802: amend. Acts 1942, ch. 34, §§ 1, 5; 1950, ch. 161, § 1; 1954, ch. 162, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1972, ch. 243, § 35. For present law see KRS 83.570 .

83.165. Public wharves and landings — Control — Charges.

  1. The wharves and landings of cities of the first class shall be under the care and control of the Department of Public Works.
  2. The department shall fix and receive reasonable charges for the use of the wharves and landings and shall keep them in order.

History. 2860-1: amend. Acts 1952, ch. 55, § 12.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section was formerly compiled as KRS 93.110 and was renumbered by the Reviser under authority of KRS 7.136 .

83.170. Powers, functions and organization of department of public safety. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2861, 2876: amend. Acts 1954, ch. 213, § 2) was repealed by Acts 1972, ch. 243, § 35.

83.171. Powers and functions of department of sanitation. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1954, ch. 162, § 2; 1968, ch. 152, § 58) was repealed by Acts 1972, ch. 243, § 35.

83.172. Powers and functions of department of buildings and housing inspection. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1954, ch. 162, § 3) was repealed by Acts 1972, ch. 243, § 35.

83.175. Powers and functions of department of traffic engineering. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1950, ch. 161, § 2) was repealed by Acts 1972, ch. 243, § 35.

83.180. Appointment and removal of subordinate officers, agencies and employees. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2780, 2809, 2810) was repealed by Acts 1972, ch. 243, § 35. For present law see KRS 83.610 .

83.190. Rules and records of directors — Place of business. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2803, 2804) was repealed by Acts 1972, ch. 243, § 35.

83.200. Directors allowed to sit with board of aldermen — When required. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2807) was repealed by Acts 1972, ch. 243, § 35.

83.210. Annual reports of directors to mayor. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2815) was repealed by Acts 1972, ch. 243, § 35.

83.220. Power of directors to administer oaths. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2808) was repealed by Acts 1972, ch. 243, § 35.

83.230. Officers and agents of city — Qualifications — Oaths — Terms — Duties — Compensation. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2745, 2746, 2748, 2756, 2759) was repealed by Acts 1972, ch. 243, § 35. For present law see KRS 83A.080 .

83.240. Money paid to officers and employees of executive departments, reports and accounting of. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2811, 2812) was repealed by Acts 1972, ch. 243, § 35.

83.250. Statements and returns of fees, directors may require — Examination under oath. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2813) was repealed by Acts 1972, ch. 243, § 35.

83.260. Determination of conflicts between departments. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2814) was repealed by Acts 1972, ch. 243, § 35.

83.270. Removal of executive and ministerial officers — Appeal. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2781) was repealed by Acts 1972, ch. 243, § 35. For present law see KRS 83.660 .

83.280. Written contracts of executive department. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2817) was repealed by Acts 1972, ch. 243, § 35.

83.290. Claim under contract — Names of interested persons to be disclosed. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2819) was repealed by Acts 1972, ch. 243, § 35.

83.300. Real estate, how purchased for executive departments. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2823) was repealed by Acts 1972, ch. 243, § 35.

83.310. Protection against defective weights and measures. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2755) was repealed by Acts 1972, ch. 243, § 35.

83.320. Public liability insurance for city employees. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 112, §§ 1,2) was repealed by Acts 1972, ch. 243, § 35.

83.330. Power to regulate buildings, dwellings and structures. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1954, ch. 163, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1972, ch. 243, § 35.

83.340. Counties and cities may establish tourist and convention commission — Joint recreational, tourist and convention commissions. [Renumbered.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1968, ch. 138, § 1; 1974, ch. 324, § 1) was renumbered as KRS 91A.350 by the Reviser under authority of KRS 7.136 .

83.345. Membership of tourist and convention commission — Terms — Officers and employes — Audits — Removal of commissioners. [Renumbered.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1968, ch. 138, § 2; 1970, ch. 59, § 1; 1974, ch. 324, § 2; 1976, ch. 139, § 1; 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 20, § 6, effective January 2, 1978) was renumbered as KRS 91A.360 by the Reviser under authority of KRS 7.136 .

83.346. Membership of tourist and convention commission in county containing city of first class — Terms — Officers and employes — Audits — Removal of commissioners. [Renumbered.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1976, ch. 139, § 2; 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 20, § 6, effective January 2, 1978) was renumbered as KRS 91A.370 by the Reviser under authority of KRS 7.136 .

83.347. Membership of joint recreational, tourist and convention commissions — Terms — Officers and employes — Audit — Removal of commissioners. [Renumbered.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 324, § 3; 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 20, § 6, effective January 2, 1978; 1978, ch. 388, § 1, effective June 17, 1978) was renumbered by the Reviser as KRS 91A.380 under authority of KRS 7.136 .

83.350. Room tax — Use of proceeds — Commission’s power to borrow — Issuance of revenue bonds. [Renumbered.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1968, ch. 138, § 3; 1970, ch. 59, § 2; 1974, ch. 324, § 4) was renumbered as KRS 91A.390 under authority of KRS 7.136 .

Home Rule

83.410. Legislative finding and expression of legislative intent.

  1. This chapter is intended by the General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Kentucky to grant to citizens living within a city of the first class the authority to govern themselves to the full extent required by local government and not in conflict with the Constitution or laws of this state or by the United States.
  2. The powers herein granted shall be in addition to all other powers granted to cities by other provisions of law.
  3. The provisions of this chapter shall be broadly construed and considered in the light of the express legislative purpose set forth in subsections (1) and (2) hereof.
  4. The powers herein granted are based upon a legislative finding that the urban crisis cannot be solved by actions of the General Assembly alone, and that the most effective agency for the solution of these problems is the government of a city of the first class. This legislative finding is based upon hearings held by the General Assembly and the conclusion of its members that conditions found in cities of the first class are sufficiently different from those found in other cities to necessitate this grant of authority and complete home rule.

History. Enact. Acts 1972, ch. 243, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

Maupin v. Stansbury, 575 S.W.2d 695, 1978 Ky. App. LEXIS 663 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).

Opinions of Attorney General.

In view of the provisions of KRS 83.520 and of this section a first-class city may by ordinance change the number of members of, and provide for proxy attendance at, the municipal housing commission contrary to the provisions of KRS 80.030 . OAG 74-702 .

The Legislature has, at the same time it granted cities of the first class home rule authority pursuant to this section and KRS 83.520 , also enacted a specific statute governing the investigation and removal of executive and ministerial officers pursuant to KRS 83.660 and any attempt, by ordinance (pursuant to home rule authority), to go beyond, be broader than, add to or modify the powers specifically given under this statute would be in conflict therewith and therefore invalid. OAG 78-533 .

Under the provisions of the Home Rule Act, namely KRS 83.410 and 83.520 , a compensation change for elected municipal constitutional officers comes under the rubber dollar theory and such officers are entitled to salary increments during their term based on the cost of living index; likewise, salary increases for county officers also come under the rubber dollar theory and are valid so long as they do not exceed the established maximum. OAG 80-171 .

A city of the first class is not authorized to enact a local ordinance regulating the registration of firearms and requiring notification to the local governing body of all firearms sales. OAG 93-71 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Journal of Natural Resources & Environmental Law.

Articles, Historic Districts: A Look at the Mechanics in Kentucky and a Comparative Study of State Enabling Legislation, 11 J. Nat. Resources & Envtl. L.. 229 (1995-96).

Kentucky Law Journal.

Comment, Stansbury v. Maupin: Kentucky’s Refusal to Recognize Legislative Home Rule for First Class Cities, 69 Ky. L.J. 933 (1980-81).

Northern Kentucky Law Review.

Notes, County Government — Home Rule —The General Assembly Must Grant Governmental Powers to Fiscal Courts “With the Precision of a Rifle Shot and Not with the Casualness of a Shotgun Blast” — Fiscal Court v. City of Louisville, 559 S.W.2d 478, 1977 Ky. LEXIS 554 ( Ky. 1977 ), 5 N. Ky. L. Rev. 107 (1978).

Zielke, Public Sector Labor Law in Kentucky, 6 N. Ky. L. Rev. 327 (1979).

83.420. Incorporation and general powers.

The inhabitants of each city of the first class shall constitute a corporation, with power to govern themselves by any ordinances and resolutions for municipal purposes not in conflict with the Constitution or laws of this state or of the United States. In its corporate capacity the city may contract and be contracted with and may sue and be sued. It may adopt a common seal and change it at pleasure or act without a seal. It may acquire property for municipal purposes by purchase or otherwise. It may hold all its property either in its own name or in the name of others, to the use of the city, for the purposes for which the property was granted or dedicated, and may use, manage, improve, sell and convey, rent or lease its property.

History. Enact. Acts 1972, ch. 243, § 2; 1986, ch. 106, § 1, effective July 15, 1986.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. In General.

Municipal authority should generally be strictly construed. Kniper v. Louisville, 70 Ky. 599 , 1870 Ky. LEXIS 134 ( Ky. 1870 ); Broadway Baptist Church v. McAtee, 71 Ky. 508 , 1871 Ky. LEXIS 91 ( Ky. 1871 ); Johnston v. Louisville, 74 Ky. 527 , 1875 Ky. LEXIS 45 ( Ky. 1875 ) (decided under prior law).

Municipalities possess no power except that expressly conferred by the legislature, or necessarily implied in order to carry out the expressly conferred authority. The charter of a city is its constitution, and no ordinance may be enacted in conflict therewith. Hargadon v. Silk, 279 Ky. 69 , 129 S.W.2d 1039, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 239 ( Ky. 1939 ); Mullins v. Wilson, 282 Ky. 316 , 138 S.W.2d 484, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 168 ( Ky. 1940 ) (decided under prior law).

A municipal corporation, in the exercise of its legislative powers, cannot enact any ordinance violative of the constitutions of either the United States or the state, and, likewise, an ordinance enacted pursuant to a statute cannot violate the statutory law of the state, moreover municipal ordinances are subordinate to the laws of the state. Owensboro v. Board of Trustees, 301 Ky. 113 , 190 S.W.2d 1005, 1945 Ky. LEXIS 699 ( Ky. 1945 ) (decided under prior law).

A municipality possesses only such powers as are expressly granted, or which are necessarily implied in or incident to the powers expressly granted, or which are essential to the accomplishment of the declared objects and purposes. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Hazard, 304 Ky. 370 , 200 S.W.2d 917, 1947 Ky. LEXIS 648 ( Ky. 1947 ) (decided under prior law).

2. Ordinances.
3. — Conflict with Statutes.

Where a city ordinance made it illegal to conduct a messenger service designed to convey patrons’ wagers to pari-mutuel windows in authorized racetrack enclosures, the ordinance was in conflict with KRS 528.110 which exempts the same conduct from criminal penalty. Thomas v. Commonwealth, 563 S.W.2d 491, 1978 Ky. App. LEXIS 484 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).

4. Acquisition of Property.

The city has authority to accept title to a park for public purposes. Elliott v. Louisville, 123 Ky. 278 , 90 S.W. 990, 28 Ky. L. Rptr. 967 , 1906 Ky. LEXIS 113 ( Ky. 1906 ) (decided under prior law).

Cities may acquire land in contemplation of reasonable necessity in the future and employ the powers of condemnation to that end. Inland Waterways Co. v. Louisville, 227 Ky. 376 , 13 S.W.2d 283, 1929 Ky. LEXIS 892 ( Ky. 1929 ) (decided under prior law).

First-class cities may temporarily lease water front for wharf purposes. Inland Waterways Co. v. Louisville, 227 Ky. 376 , 13 S.W.2d 283, 1929 Ky. LEXIS 892 ( Ky. 1929 ) (decided under prior law).

Under former similar section first-class city was given authority to sell real estate but if the property was dedicated to a public use the city could not sell it. Brunner v. Louisville, 311 S.W.2d 402, 1958 Ky. LEXIS 195 ( Ky. 1958 ) (decided under prior law).

5. City Officers.

City is not liable for official misconduct of city officers. Ward v. Louisville, 55 Ky. 184 , 1855 Ky. LEXIS 31 ( Ky. 1855 ) (decided under prior law).

Persons dealing with cities and their officers are deemed to have knowledge of the limitations on their authority. Murphy v. Louisville, 72 Ky. 189 , 1872 Ky. LEXIS 31 ( Ky. 1872 ) (decided under prior law).

City is not liable for negligence or wilful neglect of policemen. Greenwood v. Louisville, 76 Ky. 226 , 1877 Ky. LEXIS 34 ( Ky. 1877 ) (decided under prior law).

City is not liable for negligence of firemen. Greenwood v. Louisville, 76 Ky. 226 , 1877 Ky. LEXIS 34 ( Ky. 1877 ) (decided under prior law).

First-class cities may create necessary offices. Louisville v. Vreeland, 140 Ky. 400 , 131 S.W. 195, 1910 Ky. LEXIS 284 ( Ky. 1910 ) (decided under prior law).

6. Compromise of Claims.

The city legislative body has no authority to compromise a liquidated claim due the city. Louisville v. Louisville R. Co., 111 Ky. 1 , 63 S.W. 14, 23 Ky. L. Rptr. 390 , 1901 Ky. LEXIS 174 ( Ky. 1 901) (decided under prior law).

7. Criminal Law Enforcement.

It is not the duty of a city to enforce the criminal laws of the state in which it is located, and which are applicable to all portions of the state, unless there is an express delegation of authority upon the city to so function for the state. Worden v. Louisville, 279 Ky. 712 , 131 S.W.2d 923, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 330 ( Ky. 1939 ) (decided under prior law).

8. Delegation of Power.

A city may not divest itself of its legislative power. Louisville C. R. Co. v. Louisville, 71 Ky. 415 , 1871 Ky. LEXIS 75 ( Ky. 1871 ); Poggel v. Louisville R. Co., 225 Ky. 784 , 10 S.W.2d 305, 1928 Ky. LEXIS 886 ( Ky. 1928 ) (decided under prior law).

A provision of a bond ordinance authorizing mayor to sell same at a lower rate than fixed in the ordinance is not a delegation of legislative discretion. Frantz v. Jacob, 88 Ky. 525 , 11 S.W. 654, 11 Ky. L. Rptr. 55 , 1889 Ky. LEXIS 79 ( Ky. 1889 ) (decided under prior law).

9. Franchises.

A city is empowered to erect, maintain and operate utilities plants and use the streets in furnishing utilities; or the city may sell franchises therefor, fix the terms of same, and designate an executive board to conduct said sale. Louisville Home Tel. Co. v. Louisville, 130 Ky. 611 , 113 S.W. 855, 1908 Ky. LEXIS 309 ( Ky. 1908 ) (decided under prior law).

10. — Arbitration.

City may legally agree to submit controversies with franchise holder to arbitration. Poggel v. Louisville R. Co., 225 Ky. 784 , 10 S.W.2d 305, 1928 Ky. LEXIS 886 ( Ky. 1928 ) (decided under prior law).

11. — Impairment or Forfeiture.

A first-class city may not impair or forfeit a franchise. Louisville v. Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co., 224 U.S. 649, 32 S. Ct. 572, 56 L. Ed. 934, 1912 U.S. LEXIS 2333 (U.S. 1912) (decided under prior law).

12. — Modification.

A city may by agreement modify a franchise in the interest of more effective service, or the securing of competition, even to its financial detriment, the agreement not constituting an “indebtedness or liability” under Ky. Const., § 52. Louisville Home Tel. Co. v. Louisville, 130 Ky. 611 , 113 S.W. 855, 1908 Ky. LEXIS 309 ( Ky. 1908 ) (decided under prior law).

A first-class city may, by agreement with a franchise holder, modify the terms of the franchise. Poggel v. Louisville R. Co., 225 Ky. 784 , 10 S.W.2d 305, 1928 Ky. LEXIS 886 ( Ky. 1928 ) (decided under prior law).

13. — Ratemaking.

A provision in a utility franchise granted by a city, that the utility should lower its rates whenever its rates charged in an adjoining city were lowered, is valid and is not an abdication or delegation of the rate-making power. Union Light, Heat & Power Co. v. Covington, 282 Ky. 558 , 139 S.W.2d 64, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 208 ( Ky. 1940 ) (decided under prior law).

During the period between the expiration of an old utility franchise granted by a city and the effective date of the new franchise, the chancellor may adjudge reasonable rates to be charged, and the rates so fixed may be the same as if the old franchise were still in force. Union Light, Heat & Power Co. v. Covington, 282 Ky. 558 , 139 S.W.2d 64, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 208 ( Ky. 1940 ) (decided under prior law).

The power of cities to contract with respect to utility rates does not deprive the state of its police power of regulation; however, this power was not exercised before June 14, 1934, when KRS ch. 278 was enacted, and therefore contracts made before that date are valid. Union Light, Heat & Power Co. v. Covington, 282 Ky. 558 , 139 S.W.2d 64, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 208 ( Ky. 1940 ) (decided under prior law).

14. — Sale.

In providing for the sale of a franchise, a city may eliminate from bidding the present franchise holders without violating Ky. Const., § 164. Louisville Home Tel. Co. v. Louisville, 130 Ky. 611 , 113 S.W. 855, 1908 Ky. LEXIS 309 ( Ky. 1908 ) (decided under prior law).

15. Exercise of Powers Outside City Limits.

A municipality has no authority to extend its public utility or fire-protection service outside its corporate limits, and a contract by which the city is to furnish fire protection to buildings outside the city, owned by the county and by independent governmental agencies, is ultra vires as to the city and void. Jefferson County Fiscal Court v. Jefferson County, 278 Ky. 785 , 129 S.W.2d 554, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 497 ( Ky. 1939 ) (decided under prior law).

16. Penalty Provisions.

Former section governing powers of first-class cities did not restrict council’s power to define offenses, but merely defined its authority in prescribing limits of punishment. Louisville v. Wehmoff, 116 Ky. 845 , 79 S.W. 201 ( Ky. 1903 ) (decided under prior law).

17. Police Power.

The city of Louisville was granted police powers by virtue of former similar section. Louisville v. Wehmoff, 116 Ky. 845 , 79 S.W. 201 ( Ky. 1903 ) (decided under prior law).

Police power inherently possessed by all sovereign governments may be delegated by them to municipalities, and this was done in reference to cities of first class by former similar section. Maupin v. Louisville, 284 Ky. 195 , 144 S.W.2d 237, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 473 ( Ky. 1940 ) (decided under prior law).

18. — Antidiscrimination Ordinance.

Police power granted by charter to cities of the first class is sufficient to authorize the adoption of an antidiscrimination ordinance by such cities. Commonwealth v. Beasy, 386 S.W.2d 444, 1965 Ky. LEXIS 502 ( Ky. 1965 ) (decided under prior law).

19. — Gambling.

The city has authority to prohibit a operation of premises for pool-selling, or transmission to such premises of information for use in such pool-selling under its police powers. Louisville v. Wehmoff, 116 Ky. 845 , 79 S.W. 201 ( Ky. 1903 ) (decided under prior law).

20. — Nuisances.

City may compel owner of nuisance to cease its use, and prescribe penalties for refusal to do so. Louisville C. R. Co. v. Louisville, 71 Ky. 415 , 1871 Ky. LEXIS 75 ( Ky. 1871 ) (decided under prior law).

Cities have authority, as a police measure, to abate as nuisances buildings so dilapidated as to endanger life, safety, health or property, provided their condition creates an emergency. Moll Co. v. Holstner, 252 Ky. 249 , 67 S.W.2d 1, 1934 Ky. LEXIS 759 ( Ky. 1934 ) (decided under prior law).

21. Occupational Licensing.

An ordinance requiring higher license for same business from a nonresident than from a resident, violates, insofar as it applies to nonresidents of the state, the privileges and immunities clause of the federal Constitution. Fecheimer v. Louisville, 84 Ky. 306 , 2 S.W. 65, 8 Ky. L. Rptr. 310 , 1886 Ky. LEXIS 91 ( Ky. 1886 ) (decided under prior law).

22. — Parking Regulations.

Car owners have no right, as an incident of the free use of a street, and as an incident of public travel, to park in a no parking area. Louisville v. Louisville Auto. Club, Inc., 290 Ky. 241 , 160 S.W.2d 663, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 392 ( Ky. 1942 ) (decided under prior law).

Louisville parking meter ordinance held out violative of state or federal constitutions. Louisville v. Louisville Auto. Club, Inc., 290 Ky. 241 , 160 S.W.2d 663, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 392 ( Ky. 1942 ) (decided under prior law).

First-class cities are vested with all reasonable police power, including the regulation of parking vehicles on the streets; under that power it has the right to provide means to assist in enforcing reasonable regulations. Louisville v. Louisville Auto. Club, Inc., 290 Ky. 241 , 160 S.W.2d 663, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 392 ( Ky. 1942 ) (decided under prior law).

Installation of parking meters in part of city does not discriminate against property owners within the meter zone. Louisville v. Louisville Auto. Club, Inc., 290 Ky. 241 , 160 S.W.2d 663, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 392 ( Ky. 1942 ) (decided under prior law).

Fact that fines for overparking in parking meter zone and outside said zone are different is not discriminatory. Louisville v. Louisville Auto. Club, Inc., 290 Ky. 241 , 160 S.W.2d 663, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 392 ( Ky. 1942 ) (decided under prior law).

Fact that parking meters are not installed in all portions of city is not discriminatory. Louisville v. Louisville Auto. Club, Inc., 290 Ky. 241 , 160 S.W.2d 663, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 392 ( Ky. 1942 ) (decided under prior law).

Fee may be charged by cities for privilege of parking for the purpose of acquiring, installing, maintaining and supervising meters. Louisville v. Louisville Auto. Club, Inc., 290 Ky. 241 , 160 S.W.2d 663, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 392 ( Ky. 1942 ) (decided under prior law).

In the absence of special restrictions, installation of parking meters does not constitute an abandonment of any grant under which the city acquired the streets, or for which the property was originally dedicated. Louisville v. Louisville Auto. Club, Inc., 290 Ky. 241 , 160 S.W.2d 663, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 392 ( Ky. 1942 ) (decided under prior law).

Parking meters are permissible as a police measure and not as a revenue measure. However, mere fact that revenue exceeds expense is not sufficient to invalidate the ordinance. If the proceeds are so excessive as to actually constitute revenue, the courts may require a reduction so as to remove the objectionable feature. Louisville v. Louisville Auto. Club, Inc., 290 Ky. 241 , 160 S.W.2d 663, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 392 ( Ky. 1942 ) (decided under prior law).

Parking meters do not constitute a nuisance nor an unreasonable obstruction of sidewalks, nor do they constitute an unreasonable obstruction of streets as to abutting business places, when reasonable unloading facilities are provided. Louisville v. Louisville Auto. Club, Inc., 290 Ky. 241 , 160 S.W.2d 663, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 392 ( Ky. 1942 ) (decided under prior law).

23. — Public Health and Safety.

City may regulate markets and penalize violations. Louisville v. Roupe, 45 Ky. 591 , 1846 Ky. LEXIS 71 ( Ky. 1846 ) (decided under prior law).

Cities may, under their police powers, make contracts in the furtherance of public health, such as contracting the privilege of disposing of all carcasses of dead animals. Louisville v. Weible, 84 Ky. 290 , 1 S.W. 605, 8 Ky. L. Rptr. 361 , 1886 Ky. LEXIS 76 ( Ky. 1886 ) (decided under prior law).

Although a first-class city may, under its police power, require buildings of a certain height to have fire escapes, the ordinance will not apply to buildings owned by the state. Kentucky Institution for Education of Blind v. Louisville, 123 Ky. 767 , 97 S.W. 402, 30 Ky. L. Rptr. 136 , 1906 Ky. LEXIS 213 ( Ky. 1906 ) (decided under prior law).

First-class cities may, as a police measure to prevent the sale of impure foods, provide at least for the inspection of such foods by a competent inspector, in places where they are offered for sale. Such inspection, in itself, does not constitute unreasonable search. Keiper v. Louisville, 152 Ky. 691 , 154 S.W. 18, 1913 Ky. LEXIS 734 ( Ky. 1913 ) (decided under prior law).

Ordinance that required each dwelling unit to be equipped with an inside bathroom including a toilet, lavatory basin and bathtub or shower and that required each kitchen sink, lavatory basin, bathtub or shower to be connected with hot and cold water lines, with water heating facilities and connection to the public sewer was reasonable and within the police powers of the city. Louisville v. Thompson, 339 S.W.2d 869, 1960 Ky. LEXIS 487 ( Ky. 1960 ) (decided under prior law).

24. — Streets and Sidewalks.

City ordinance authorizing mayor and council to designate streets on which motor carriers may operate and places where freight depots may be established does not confer arbitrary power, since discretion must be exercised properly and fairly, and can be controlled by courts. Bell Bros. Trucking Co. v. Kelley, 277 Ky. 781 , 127 S.W.2d 831, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 730 ( Ky. 1939 ) (decided under prior law).

Ordinance declaring it unlawful to use sidewalks or streets to conduct private business was not invalid because of prohibiting such use of streets to some businesses while others were so conducted without interference by city, since exercise of right of police power pro tanto is not invalid on ground that such right is not exercised in entirety. Maupin v. Louisville, 284 Ky. 195 , 144 S.W.2d 237, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 473 ( Ky. 1940 ) (decided under prior law).

Even if ordinance prohibiting sound trucks except where licensed by police department should be declared invalid, operation of such trucks upon streets would be prohibited by earlier ordinance making it unlawful to use sidewalks or streets to vend articles or to conduct or advertise business. Maupin v. Louisville, 284 Ky. 195 , 144 S.W.2d 237, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 473 ( Ky. 1940 ) (decided under prior law).

Operation of sound truck could be stopped under ordinance prohibiting such trucks except where licensed by police department, notwithstanding sound issued by such trucks could allegedly be subdued so as not to be loud or unusual, where sound would remain sufficient to attract attention of travelers and distract them from protection of themselves or other travelers. Maupin v. Louisville, 284 Ky. 195 , 144 S.W.2d 237, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 473 ( Ky. 1940 ) (decided under prior law).

25. — Sunday Closings.

First-class cities may enforce Sabbath observance by penalties not less than those prescribed by law. Ormsby v. Louisville, 79 Ky. 197 , 2 Ky. L. Rptr. 297 , 2 Ky. L. Rptr. 66 , 1880 Ky. LEXIS 112 (Ky. Ct. App. 1880) (decided under prior law).

26. — Zoning.

The City of Louisville has authority under its police powers to enact zoning legislation. Fowler v. Obier, 224 Ky. 742 , 7 S.W.2d 219, 1928 Ky. LEXIS 677 ( Ky. 1928 ) (decided under prior law).

27. Repeal of Specially Enacted Charters.

Kentucky Constitution, §§ 156 (now repealed) and 166, and the general laws enacted under those sections for the classification, incorporation and government of cities, automatically repealed all specially enacted charters of cities. Mullins v. Wilson, 282 Ky. 316 , 138 S.W.2d 484, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 168 ( Ky. 1940 ) (decided under prior law).

28. Retirement of Bonds.

City may be required by mandamus to levy and collect tax sufficient to retire bonds. Maddox v. Graham & Knox, 59 Ky. 56 , 1859 Ky. LEXIS 53 ( Ky. 1859 ); Fleming v. Dyer, 47 S.W. 444, 20 Ky. L. Rptr. 689 (1898) (decided under prior law).

29. Taxation.

Although the legislature may prescribe the purposes of municipal taxation, and prescribe a maximum tax therefor, the actual levy to be made lies within the discretion of the city legislative body under Ky. Const., § 181. McDonald v. Louisville, 113 Ky. 425 , 24 Ky. L. Rptr. 271 , 68 S.W. 413, 1902 Ky. LEXIS 64 ( Ky. 1902 ), overruled, Board of Trustees v. Paducah, 333 S.W.2d 515, 1960 Ky. LEXIS 196 ( Ky. 1960 ), overruled in part, Board of Trustees v. Paducah, 333 S.W.2d 515, 1960 Ky. LEXIS 196 ( Ky. 1960 ) (decided under prior law).

The power to tax belongs by necessary implication to every incorporated city, and a city charter is not invalid because of its failure to grant specifically the power to tax. Mullins v. Wilson, 282 Ky. 316 , 138 S.W.2d 484, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 168 ( Ky. 1940 ) (decided under prior law).

Where city executed deed to appellant for property sold to him for delinquent taxes through mistake of tax commissioner and where land belonged to city and commissioner had no right to assess it for taxes since property had been dedicated to public purposes of constructing sewer line and flood wall, such deed was void and appellant took no title thereunder. Brunner v. Louisville, 311 S.W.2d 402, 1958 Ky. LEXIS 195 ( Ky. 1958 ) (decided under prior law).

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Comments, A Challenge to Historic Preservation in Kentucky, 65 Ky. L.J. 895 (1976-77).

Northern Kentucky Law Review.

Zielke, Public Sector Labor Law in Kentucky, 6 N. Ky. L. Rev. 327 (1979).

83.430. Departments of city of the first class — Limitations.

In each city of the first class there shall be a legislative, an executive, and a judicial department. None of these departments shall exercise any power properly belonging to either of the others, except as permitted by law.

History. Enact. Acts 1972, ch. 243, § 3.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Generally.

The passage of an amendment to a city ordinance did not violate the statute, notwithstanding that the president of the board of aldermen, who voted in favor of amending the ordinance, was serving as mayor, pro tempore, at the time. Hyman v. City of Louisville, 132 F. Supp. 2d 528, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4016 (W.D. Ky. 2001 ).

83.440. Legislative branch — Board of aldermen.

The legislative power of each city of the first class is vested in a legislative body of twelve (12) members, known as the board of aldermen. Members of the board of aldermen shall be elected by the voters of the city at large in such a way that one (1) member shall be a resident of each ward of the city. Representation on the board of aldermen shall be equal and uniform, and for this purpose the board of aldermen shall lay off the city into twelve (12) wards, as nearly equal as practicable in population, as ascertained by the most recent federal census.

History. Enact. Acts 1972, ch. 243, § 4.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Abolition of Office.

Abolishing an office is a legislative function. Neumeyer v. Krakel, 110 Ky. 624 , 62 S.W. 518, 23 Ky. L. Rptr. 190 , 1901 Ky. LEXIS 124 ( Ky. 1901 ) (decided under prior law).

2. Determination of Number and Salaries of Policemen.

The power to determine the number of officers and men on the police force, and their salaries, is a legislative function. Neumeyer v. Krakel, 110 Ky. 624 , 62 S.W. 518, 23 Ky. L. Rptr. 190 , 1901 Ky. LEXIS 124 ( Ky. 1901 ) (decided under prior law).

3. Change of Ward Boundaries.

Change of ward boundaries does not effect a change in boundaries of legislative districts which boundaries had theretofore been identical. Mullen v. McDonald, 101 Ky. 87 , 39 S.W. 698, 19 Ky. L. Rptr. 224 , 1897 Ky. LEXIS 152 ( Ky. 1897 ) (decided under prior law).

4. Approval of Payrolls.

Approval of payrolls is a ministerial function. Neumeyer v. Krakel, 110 Ky. 624 , 62 S.W. 518, 23 Ky. L. Rptr. 190 , 1901 Ky. LEXIS 124 ( Ky. 1901 ) (decided under prior law).

Opinions of Attorney General.

A member of the board of aldermen is undoubtedly a public officer under the charter provisions applying to the City of Louisville, but could not be construed to be an “employee” of the city. OAG 80-501 .

83.450. Board of aldermen — Election — Term — Qualifications — Oath — Privileges — Compensation — Vacancies. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1972, ch. 243, § 5) has been repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170 .

83.460. Board of aldermen officers.

The board of aldermen shall elect from its members a president, and shall elect from its members a president pro tem when the president is absent. The board of aldermen shall elect a clerk, and may elect a sergeant at arms.

History. Enact. Acts 1972, ch. 243, § 6; 1988, ch. 157, § 1, effective January 1, 1990.

83.470. Eligibility and discipline of members.

The board of aldermen shall determine the eligibility and election of its members, and punish them for disorderly conduct.

History. Enact. Acts 1972, ch. 243, § 7.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Election Contests.

KRS 122.070 to 122.100 (repealed, see KRS 120.155 ) provide contest procedure when title to all or a majority of the city legislative offices is involved. Scholl v. Bell, 125 Ky. 750 , 102 S.W. 248, 31 Ky. L. Rptr. 335 , 1907 Ky. LEXIS 328 ( Ky. 1907 ) (decided under prior law).

Former similar section provided the exclusive contest procedure when only one or a minority of the city legislative offices was involved. Craft v. Davidson, 189 Ky. 378 , 224 S.W. 1082, 1920 Ky. LEXIS 436 ( Ky. 1920 ) (decided under prior law).

2. Eligibility.

From the beginning in this state the city councils (boards of aldermen) have been made the sole judges of the eligibility and election of their own members. Pratt v. Breckinridge, 112 Ky. 1 , 65 S.W. 136, 23 Ky. L. Rptr. 1356 , 1901 Ky. LEXIS 286 ( Ky. 1 901); Pratt v. Breckinridge, 66 S.W. 405, 23 Ky. L. Rptr. 1858 , 1902 Ky. LEXIS 463 ( Ky. 1902 ) (decided under prior law).

3. Investigation of Member.

Investigation of a member must be by the board of which he is a member, and must be one looking to the punishment or expulsion of the member. Commonwealth v. Hillenbrand, 96 Ky. 407 , 29 S.W. 287, 16 Ky. L. Rptr. 485 , 1895 Ky. LEXIS 96 ( Ky. 1895 ) (decided under prior law).

An investigation held prior to the time set for it is a nullity. Commonwealth v. Hillenbrand, 96 Ky. 407 , 29 S.W. 287, 16 Ky. L. Rptr. 485 , 1895 Ky. LEXIS 96 ( Ky. 1895 ) (decided under prior law).

83.480. Quorum and meetings of board of aldermen.

A majority of the members of the board of aldermen shall constitute a quorum, but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day. The board of aldermen shall adopt rules to govern its proceedings, and may enforce the attendance of members by rules or ordinances with appropriate fines. The board of aldermen shall upon notice meet within seven (7) days after its members have taken office, and shall thereafter hold two (2) regular meetings in each month. The mayor may call a special meeting at any time. Meetings shall be held in such rooms in the city as are provided by ordinance, and the place of meetings shall not be changed except by an ordinance for which two-thirds (2/3) of the members of the board of aldermen have voted.

History. Enact. Acts 1972, ch. 243, § 8.

83.490. Journal of board of aldermen — City documents to be public records. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1972, ch. 243, § 9) has been repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.060 .

83.500. Ordinances — How passed — Amendment — Repeal — Veto.

  1. No ordinance shall embrace more than one (1) subject, and that subject shall be expressed in its title.
  2. No ordinance shall be passed at the meeting of the board of aldermen at which it is introduced, nor shall it be passed at any succeeding meeting until it has been read in full at that meeting and free discussion allowed thereon. Any ordinance may be amended or repealed by another ordinance.
  3. Every ordinance or resolution, except a resolution to adjourn, that has passed the board of aldermen shall immediately be presented to the mayor for his approval or disapproval. The mayor may disapprove any item or items of an appropriation measure; the parts approved shall be in force and the item or items disapproved shall be void, unless repassed in the same manner required for passage of ordinances over the mayor’s veto. If the mayor approves the ordinance or resolution, he shall sign it and it shall then be in force. If he disapproves the ordinance or resolution, or any item of an appropriation measure, he shall return it, with his objections, to the board of aldermen, which shall enter his objections in full upon its journal and proceed at its next or at its second regular meeting thereafter to consider it. If, after such reconsideration, two-thirds (2/3) of the members of the board of aldermen agree to its passage, the ordinance shall be in force, but in such cases the votes shall be taken by yeas and nays and recorded in the journal.
  4. If the mayor does not sign an ordinance or resolution presented to him, and does not return it on or before the day on which the board of aldermen holds its regular meeting next after the meeting at which the ordinance or resolution was passed, and three (3) days have intervened between the presentation to the mayor and the meeting, the ordinance or resolution shall be in force as if he had signed it.

History. Enact. Acts 1972, ch. 243, § 10.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Purpose.

Purpose of former similar section was to prevent hasty and unconsidered action on part of board of aldermen, to afford time to study ordinance and make recommendation in respect thereto, and to give notice to public to enable it to take whatever legal steps it might desire in furtherance of protest to enactment of ordinance. Farnsley v. Henderson, 240 S.W.2d 82, 1951 Ky. LEXIS 951 ( Ky. 1951 ) (decided under prior law).

2. Adjournment.

A majority of the board, even after a declaration of adjournment by the chairman, may remain, reorganize, appoint another chairman, and carry on municipal business, and acts done by them are valid, even though passed following the adjourning hour provided in the rules of the board without any formal suspension of rules. Kentucky Electric Co. v. Barrett, 132 Ky. 717 , 116 S.W. 1186, 1909 Ky. LEXIS 140 ( Ky. 1909 ) (decided under prior law).

3. Conflicting Ordinances.

Where city had zoning ordinance that provided that variance could be issued by board of zoning and adjustment appeals and subsequent to zoning ordinance sign ordinance was enacted covering the same subject matter in more detailed and minute way which did not provide any form of relief in way of exception or variance nor for any appeal, sign ordinance prevailed over zoning ordinance, therefore, city’s department of building and housing inspection properly refused to issue permit for erection of sign larger than that permitted by sign ordinance even though variance had been granted by board of zoning and adjustment appeals. Morton v. Auburndale Realty Co., 340 S.W.2d 445, 1960 Ky. LEXIS 35 ( Ky. 1960 ) (decided under prior law).

4. Defects.

City may not plead defect in ordinance against property owners who were induced by the ordinance to incur substantial expenses. Gleason v. Barnett, 115 Ky. 890 , 61 S.W. 20, 22 Ky. L. Rptr. 1660 , 1901 Ky. LEXIS 8 ( Ky. 1901 ) (decided under prior law).

5. Injunction.

The council may be enjoined from passing an ordinance making an illegal disposition of city property. Roberts v. Louisville, 92 Ky. 95 , 17 S.W. 216, 13 Ky. L. Rptr. 406 , 1891 Ky. LEXIS 125 ( Ky. 1891 ) (decided under prior law).

6. New or Amending Ordinance.

An ordinance the title to which prescribes the organization of the department of public works, creating new divisions therein, and repealing inconsistent ordinances is not an amending ordinance required to set out in full the amended ordinance, but is a new ordinance. Bower v. Louisville, 269 Ky. 350 , 107 S.W.2d 238, 1937 Ky. LEXIS 600 ( Ky. 1937 ) (decided under prior law).

Where ordinance raising salaries of 33 job classifications was amended to eliminate five classifications, such modification did not change the original ordinance into a new ordinance so as to necessitate a second reading. Farnsley v. Henderson, 240 S.W.2d 82, 1951 Ky. LEXIS 951 ( Ky. 1951 ) (decided under prior law).

7. Presumption of Validity.

An ordinance is presumed to be valid. Hartman v. Louisville, 282 Ky. 487 , 138 S.W.2d 948, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 183 ( Ky. 1940 ) (decided under prior law).

8. Publication.

Publication of ordinances of first-class city is not necessary to render them valid. Reed v. Louisville, 61 S.W. 11, 22 Ky. L. Rptr. 1636 , 1901 Ky. LEXIS 402 (Ky. Ct. App. 1901) (decided under prior law).

9. Reading.

When the journal shows that the ordinance was separately read and passed, and the names of those voting for and against it, it will be presumed that it was read in full. Elliott v. Louisville, 101 Ky. 262 , 40 S.W. 690, 19 Ky. L. Rptr. 414 , 1897 Ky. LEXIS 182 ( Ky. 1897 ) (decided under prior law).

10. Resolutions.

If a resolution is adopted with all the formality of an ordinance, it will be binding as an ordinance. Gleason v. Barnett, 115 Ky. 890 , 61 S.W. 20, 22 Ky. L. Rptr. 1660 , 1901 Ky. LEXIS 8 ( Ky. 1901 ) (decided under prior law).

The council could not, by resolution, incur indebtedness, or create liability, or authorize the expenditure of public funds. All legislation affecting the material or substantial rights of the city shall be enacted by ordinance. Louisville v. Parsons, 150 Ky. 420 , 150 S.W. 498, 1912 Ky. LEXIS 903 ( Ky. 1912 ) (decided under prior law).

11. Signing.

In absence of mayor, the president of the board of aldermen may perform all his duties, including approval or veto of ordinances, and in so acting his official signature should be “Mayor, pro tempore.” Hunter v. Louisville, 208 Ky. 562 , 271 S.W. 690, 1925 Ky. LEXIS 330 ( Ky. 1925 ) (decided under prior law).

12. Subject.

An ordinance providing for submission of bond issue for park and sewer purposes embraces only one subject — the bond issue. Louisville v. Board of Park Comm'rs, 112 Ky. 409 , 65 S.W. 860, 24 Ky. L. Rptr. 38 , 1901 Ky. LEXIS 323 ( Ky. 1901 ) (decided under prior law).

An ordinance dealing in its various sections with several classes of persons contributing to the situation sought to be remedied embraces but one subject — the evil designated. Louisville v. Wehmhoff, 116 Ky. 812 , 76 S.W. 876, 79 S.W. 201, 25 Ky. L. Rptr. 1924 , 25 Ky. L. Rptr. 995 , 1903 Ky. LEXIS 250 ( Ky. 1903 ) (decided under prior law).

13. Title.

Title is sufficient if it calls attention to the subject concerning which the legislation was adopted. Elliott v. Louisville, 101 Ky. 262 , 40 S.W. 690, 19 Ky. L. Rptr. 414 , 1897 Ky. LEXIS 182 ( Ky. 1897 ); Louisville v. Wehmhoff, 116 Ky. 812 , 76 S.W. 876, 79 S.W. 201, 25 Ky. L. Rptr. 1924 , 25 Ky. L. Rptr. 995 , 1903 Ky. LEXIS 250 ( Ky. 1903 ) (decided under prior law).

A title referring to the improvement of a certain sidewalk is sufficiently broad to cover both regrading and recurbing. Gocke v. Staebler & McFarland, 141 Ky. 66 , 132 S.W. 167, 1910 Ky. LEXIS 411 ( Ky. 1910 ) (decided under prior law).

An ordinance transferring repair shops of all municipal departments to the department of public works is germane to title which mentions creation of new divisions in said department. Bower v. Louisville, 269 Ky. 350 , 107 S.W.2d 238, 1937 Ky. LEXIS 600 ( Ky. 1937 ) (decided under prior law).

14. Veto.

Return by mayor of an ordinance for rectification of a formal mistake does not amount to a veto. Oswald v. Gosnell, 56 S.W. 165, 21 Ky. L. Rptr. 1660 , 1900 Ky. LEXIS 481 (Ky. Ct. App. 1900) (decided under prior law).

15. Voting.

In the absence of timely objection, the passage of two ordinances by the same vote does not render them void. Louisville v. Gast, 118 Ky. 564 , 81 S.W. 693, 26 Ky. L. Rptr. 412 , 1904 Ky. LEXIS 73 ( Ky. 1904 ) (decided under prior law).

Opinions of Attorney General.

A board of aldermen cannot consider a mayor’s veto at the meeting of the board that it is received and recorded, but must consider said veto at either the next regular meeting thereafter or at the second regular meeting thereafter. OAG 78-275 .

83.510. Compilation of ordinances. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1972, ch. 243, § 11) has been repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.060 .

83.520. Board of aldermen — Powers — Tax levy — Other statutory provisions permissive.

The legislative body of a city of the first class shall have the power to exercise all of the rights, privileges, powers, franchises, including the power to levy all taxes, not in conflict with the Constitution and so as to provide for the health, education, safety and welfare of the inhabitants of the city, to the same extent and with the same force and effect as if the General Assembly had granted and delegated to the legislative body of the city all of the authority and powers that are within its powers to grant to a municipal corporation as if expressly enumerated herein. Nothing therein contained to the contrary, the provisions of KRS Chapters 65, 66, 76, 77, 79, 80, 91, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 103, 104, 106, 107, 108 and 109 shall be considered permissive rather than mandatory and the powers, rights and duties therein delineated may be modified or delegated by the legislative body to different departments and agencies of city government and any restrictions therein set forth shall not be considered abridging in any manner the complete grant of home rule set forth in this grant of power except no right heretofore vested by operation of statute shall in any way be affected.

History. Enact. Acts 1972, ch. 243, § 12; 1984, ch. 111, § 52, effective July 13, 1984.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Testimony of Witnesses.

Legislative power of a municipal corporation, of itself, does not embrace by implication the power to compel testimony and administer oaths to witnesses, or to confer similar authority to a committee. Stansbury v. Maupin, 599 S.W.2d 170, 1980 Ky. LEXIS 218 ( Ky. 1980 ).

2. Powers.

KRS 82.082(1) gives a city, under a grant of home rule, the power of eminent domain in accordance with the provisions of the Eminent Domain Act of Kentucky, KRS 416.540 et seq.; KRS 83.520 provides that the provisions of KRS Ch. 97, including KRS 97.257 , shall be considered permissive rather than mandatory and restrictions therein shall not be considered abridging the complete grant of home rule. Martingale, LLC v. City of Louisville, 151 S.W.3d 829, 2004 Ky. App. LEXIS 203 (Ky. Ct. App. 2004), cert. denied, 545 U.S. 1115, 125 S. Ct. 2913, 162 L. Ed. 2d 295, 2005 U.S. LEXIS 4688 (U.S. 2005).

Opinions of Attorney General.

In view of the provisions of KRS 83.410 and of this section a first-class city may by ordinance change the number of members of, and provide for proxy attendance at, the municipal housing commission contrary to the provisions of KRS 80.030 . OAG 74-702 .

Because the Louisville Water Company is judicially recognized to be an operating facility of the city, the city could purchase the indemnity insurance for the directors as directors or as members of the board of waterworks under the authority of this section. OAG 75-128 .

The legislature has, at the same time it granted cities of the first class home rule authority pursuant to KRS 83.410 and this section, also enacted a specific statute governing the investigation and removal of executive and ministerial officers pursuant to KRS 83.660 and any attempt, by ordinance (pursuant to home rule authority), to go beyond, be broader than, add to or modify the powers specifically given under this statute would be in conflict therewith and therefore invalid. OAG 78-533 .

Until such time that KRS 61.420 is amended by the general assembly, the City of Louisville has no authority under this section to provide for any treatment of sick leave benefits in any other way than that which is set out in KRS 61.410 through KRS 61.500 . OAG 79-267 .

Under the provisions of the Home Rule Act, namely KRS 83.410 and 83.520 , a compensation change for elected municipal constitutional officers comes under the rubber dollar theory and such officers are entitled to salary increments during their term based on the cost of living index; likewise, salary increases for county officers also come under the rubber dollar theory and are valid so long as they do not exceed the established maximum. OAG 80-171 .

A member of the board of aldermen is undoubtedly a public officer under the charter provisions applying to the City of Louisville, but could not be construed to be an “employee” of the city. OAG 80-501 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Comment, Stansbury v. Maupin: Kentucky’s Refusal to Recognize Legislative Home Rule for First Class Cities, 69 Ky. L.J. 933 (1980-81).

Kentucky Law Survey, Morris, Municipal Law, 70 Ky. L.J. 287 (1981-82).

Northern Kentucky Law Review.

Zielke, Public Sector Labor Law in Kentucky, 6 N. Ky. L. Rev. 327 (1979).

83.530. Executive branch — Mayor and city departments and agencies.

The executive power of the city is vested in the mayor, who shall be the chief executive officer, and in the departments and agencies authorized by the board of aldermen.

History. Enact. Acts 1972, ch. 243, § 13.

83.540. Mayor — Election — Term — Qualifications. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1972, ch. 243, § 14) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980. For present law, see KRS 83A.040 .

83.550. Vacancy in office of mayor — Mayor pro tem — Election to fill unexpired term. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1972, ch. 243, § 15) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980. For present law, see KRS 83A.040 .

83.560. Temporary absence or disability of mayor, who is to act — Compensation.

During the temporary absence or disability of the mayor his office shall be administered and its duties discharged by the president of the board of aldermen. The compensation of the president of the board of aldermen for such services shall be determined by the board of aldermen, but shall not exceed the rate allowed the mayor, and the compensation may be deducted in whole or in part from the salary of the mayor, as the board of aldermen determines.

History. Enact. Acts 1972, ch. 243, § 16.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. President of Board of Aldermen.

In absence of mayor, the president of the board of aldermen may perform all his duties, including approval or veto of ordinances, and in so acting his official signature should be “Mayor, pro tempore.” Hunter v. Louisville, 208 Ky. 562 , 271 S.W. 690, 1925 Ky. LEXIS 330 ( Ky. 1925 ) (decided under prior law).

83.570. Executive departments and directors.

The board of aldermen may establish such executive departments by ordinance as it deems necessary and proper for the efficient administration of governmental matters of the city. The board of aldermen shall designate the duties and powers of departments so established by ordinance and may transfer to any such department duties and powers which it may have previously assigned to another department. Each department shall be under the supervision and direction of a director appointed by the mayor and said directors of any departments so appointed shall be removable at any time at the pleasure of the mayor so appointing them, or any of his successors in office, but not by any officer who may merely for the time be filling the office of mayor in the absence or during the temporary disability of the regularly elected or appointed mayor. The directors of said departments shall have the same qualifications as members of the legislative body of the city and shall be selected for their special fitness for the work of the departments, and shall devote their entire time to the discharge of their duties and shall receive adequate compensation fixed by ordinance. No member of the legislative body shall be eligible to appointment as director of any department. Directors shall hold office until they resign or are removed as herein provided.

History. Enact. Acts 1972, ch. 243, § 17.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Board of Public Safety.

The board of public safety was authorized to revoke permits issued by the building inspector. O'Bryan v. Highland Apartment Co., 128 Ky. 282 , 108 S.W. 257, 33 Ky. L. Rptr. 349 , 1908 Ky. LEXIS 54 ( Ky. 1908 ) (decided under prior law).

2. Contracts Executed by Executive Departments.

Signature of mayor to contract, with city seal affixed, is sufficient. The name of the city need not appear as a part of the signature. Fehler v. Gosnell, 99 Ky. 380 , 35 S.W. 1125, 18 Ky. L. Rptr. 238 , 1896 Ky. LEXIS 96 ( Ky. 1896 ) (decided under prior law).

A contract for street improvements creates a valid lien though not approved by the council. Joyce v. Falls City Artificial Stone Co., 64 S.W. 912, 23 Ky. L. Rptr. 1201 , 1901 Ky. LEXIS 606 (Ky. Ct. App. 1901) (decided under prior law).

3. Expenditures.

Executive departments may expend unappropriated balances. Neumeyer v. Krakel, 110 Ky. 624 , 62 S.W. 518, 23 Ky. L. Rptr. 190 , 1901 Ky. LEXIS 124 ( Ky. 1901 ) (decided under prior law).

4. Officers.

Members of the board of public safety and board of public works, the secretary of the board of public works, assistant bailiffs and the city court clerk, are officers as defined in Ky. Const., § 161. Louisville v. Wilson, 99 Ky. 598 , 18 Ky. L. Rptr. 427 , 36 S.W. 944, 1896 Ky. LEXIS 120 ( Ky. 1896 ), overruled, Board of Education v. De Weese, 343 S.W.2d 598, 1960 Ky. LEXIS 116 ( Ky. 1960 ) (decided under prior law).

5. Public Records.

The records of the board of public works are public records, and open to public inspection, which right may be enforced by mandamus. Barrickman v. Lyman, 154 Ky. 630 , 157 S.W. 924, 1913 Ky. LEXIS 103 ( Ky. 1913 ) (decided under prior law).

6. Transfer of Functions.

The city was authorized to transfer the repair shop of the department of public safety to the department of works. Bower v. Louisville, 269 Ky. 350 , 107 S.W.2d 238, 1937 Ky. LEXIS 600 ( Ky. 1937 ) (decided under prior law).

83.580. Duties and powers of mayor — Information on city and officials to Department for Local Government — Representation of county districts on boards and commissions.

  1. The mayor shall:
    1. Cause the ordinances of the city and the laws of the state to be executed and enforced;
    2. Communicate to the board of aldermen at least once a year a statement of the finances and general condition of the affairs of the city and information in relation thereto as the board of aldermen requires;
    3. Recommend, by written message to the board of aldermen, the measures he deems expedient;
    4. Fill, with the consent of the board of aldermen, all vacancies in executive and ministerial offices and the filling of which is not otherwise provided for;
    5. Exercise a general supervision over all the executive and ministerial officers of the city and see that their official duties are honestly performed; and
    6. No later than January 31 of each year, mail to the Department for Local Government a list containing current city information including but not limited to the following:
      1. The correct name of the mayor, members of the board of aldermen, and the following appointed officials who are serving as of January 1 of each year:
        1. Clerk of the board of aldermen;
        2. City treasurer;
        3. City attorney;
        4. Finance director;
        5. Police chief;
        6. Fire chief; and
        7. Public works director;
      2. The correct name of the city, mailing address for city hall, and the telephone number of city hall; and
      3. The name and telephone number of either an elected or appointed official to serve as a contact person that may be reached during normal business hours of 8:00 a.m. to 4:30 p.m.
  2. The mayor shall appoint to those seats which are not subject to prior qualification on a board or commission an equal number of members from each county commissioner’s district, as created in accordance with KRS 67.045 , into which the authority of the board or commission extends. If there are more districts than members of a particular board or commission, the mayor shall not appoint more than one (1) member from any district. If there are more members of a particular board or commission than there are districts, the mayor shall equalize appointments from among districts to the extent possible. The mayor shall not be required, but shall use his best efforts, to balance appointments from among districts on a board or commission if the appointments are to be made from nominees submitted by other groups or individuals, or if nominees shall have a professional or technical background, expertise, or membership. The mayor shall attempt to balance appointments from among districts on all boards and commissions to equalize representation of all districts over the entire range of boards and commissions.
  3. The mayor may:
    1. Remove from office, by a written order, any officer appointed by him, unless otherwise provided by law;
    2. Appoint his own staff, and remove them at pleasure;
    3. Require from any executive or ministerial officer of the city or joint agency of the city a statement in writing concerning the discharge of his duties; and
    4. Exercise the same power to administer oaths that justices of the peace and other judicial officers of the state have.
  4. The Department for Local Government shall immediately forward one (1) copy of the information received from the mayor to the Legislative Research Commission.

History. Enact. Acts 1972, ch. 243, § 18; 1990, ch. 51, § 2, effective July 13, 1990; 1994, ch. 38, § 1, effective July 15, 1994; 1998, ch. 69, § 43, effective July 15, 1998; 2007, ch. 47, § 59, effective June 26, 2007; 2010, ch. 117, § 65, effective July 15, 2010.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Appointments.

The mayor may at any time appoint not over three competent persons to make any necessary examination. Audit Co. v. Louisville, 185 F. 349, 1911 U.S. App. LEXIS 3993 (6th Cir. Ky. 1911 ) (decided under prior law).

Appointments by mayor to fill vacancies are effective only until the vacancy can be filled by election. Shelley v. McCullouch, 97 Ky. 164 , 30 S.W. 193, 17 Ky. L. Rptr. 53 , 1895 Ky. LEXIS 162 ( Ky. 1895 ) (decided under prior law).

When election for all city officers is void, the governor appoints the mayor, aldermen, city judge, city prosecutor, and park commissioners; the mayor appoints the city treasurer, city auditor, city tax receiver, and bailiffs of the city court; and the judge of the city court appoints the clerk of the city court. Scholl v. Bell, 125 Ky. 750 , 102 S.W. 248, 31 Ky. L. Rptr. 335 , 1907 Ky. LEXIS 328 ( Ky. 1907 ) (decided under prior law).

2. Employment of Counsel.

The mayor has no authority to employ counsel for the city, except in case of emergency. Louisville v. Murphy, 86 Ky. 53 , 5 S.W. 194, 9 Ky. L. Rptr. 310 , 1887 Ky. LEXIS 98 ( Ky. 1887 ) (decided under prior law).

3. Administration of Oaths.

The mayor is authorized to administer oaths to witnesses during an investigation. Commonwealth v. Hillenbrand, 96 Ky. 407 , 29 S.W. 287, 16 Ky. L. Rptr. 485 , 1895 Ky. LEXIS 96 ( Ky. 1895 ) (decided under prior law).

83.590. Mayor’s reorganization powers — Appointment of advisory committees — Compensation.

  1. The mayor may establish, abolish, or alter the organization of any agency or administrative department under his control, including changing the name of a department to explain more clearly the function performed by it by recommending to the board of aldermen an ordinance stating the changes made and designating the functions, personnel, funds, equipment, facilities and records, as applicable, to be transferred.
  2. The mayor may appoint advisory or study committees to assist and advise him on problems concerning the various functions and departments of city government. Members of such committees shall serve without pay, but may be reimbursed for necessary and actual expenses.

History. Enact. Acts 1972, ch. 243, § 19.

83.600. Police court. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1972, ch. 243, § 20) was repealed by Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491, effective January 2, 1978.

83.610. Appointment and removal of subordinate officers, agents, and employees — Compensation.

  1. The director of each executive department may appoint chiefs of divisions of his department, and remove them at pleasure. Except as otherwise provided by law, he may employ such officers and agents as are necessary in his department, and may, subject to any limitations imposed by ordinance, fix their compensation. Each director of an executive department may administer oaths.
  2. All officers and agents of the city not required by law to be elected or appointed in any other manner shall be elected or appointed in the manner prescribed by ordinance.

History. Enact. Acts 1972, ch. 243, § 21.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Board of Public Safety.

The board of public safety names its appointees, assigns their position, and when the council does not fix the salary of an office within said department, the board of public safety may do so, subject to the amount of the appropriation. Neumeyer v. Krakel, 110 Ky. 624 , 62 S.W. 518, 23 Ky. L. Rptr. 190 , 1901 Ky. LEXIS 124 ( Ky. 1901 ) (decided under prior law).

2. City Engineer.

The city engineer is a city officer under the control of the board of public works, and his records are open to public inspection, which right may be enforced by mandamus. Barrickman v. Lyman, 154 Ky. 630 , 157 S.W. 924, 1913 Ky. LEXIS 103 ( Ky. 1913 ) (decided under prior law).

3. Division Chiefs.

There was no authority under former similar statute for fixing term of divisional chiefs. Parsons v. Breed, 126 Ky. 759 , 104 S.W. 766, 31 Ky. L. Rptr. 1136 , 1907 Ky. LEXIS 97 ( Ky. 1907 ) (decided under prior law).

Divisional chiefs may be removed at any time without cause or notice. Parsons v. Breed, 126 Ky. 759 , 104 S.W. 766, 31 Ky. L. Rptr. 1136 , 1907 Ky. LEXIS 97 ( Ky. 1907 ) (decided under prior law).

4. Officers.

Members of the board of public safety and board of public works and the secretary of the board of public works, are officers as defined in Ky. Const., § 161. Louisville v. Wilson, 99 Ky. 598 , 18 Ky. L. Rptr. 427 , 36 S.W. 944, 1896 Ky. LEXIS 120 ( Ky. 1896 ), overruled, Board of Education v. De Weese, 343 S.W.2d 598, 1960 Ky. LEXIS 116 ( Ky. 1960 ) (decided under prior law).

83.620. City officers — Elective — Qualifications — Terms — Compensation — Bond. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1972, ch. 243, § 22) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20. For present law see KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170 .

83.630. Determination of conflict between executive departments. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1972, ch. 243, § 23) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20. For present law see KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170 .

83.640. Money paid to officers and employes of executive department, report and accounting of. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1972, ch. 243, § 24) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20. For present law see KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170 .

83.650. Statement and return of fees, directors may require. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1972, ch. 243, § 25) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20. For present law see KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170 .

83.660. Removal of executive and ministerial officers — Appeals.

  1. Unless otherwise provided by law, executive and ministerial officers of the city may be removed by the board of aldermen, sitting as a court, under oath, upon charges preferred by the mayor or by any two (2) members of the board of aldermen, or, in case of charges against the mayor, upon charges preferred by not less than five (5) members of the board of aldermen. No alderman preferring a charge shall sit as a member of the board of aldermen when it tries that charge.
  2. Any person removed from office under the provisions of this section may appeal to the Circuit Court and from there to the Court of Appeals. The appeal to the Circuit Court shall be taken and tried in the same manner as civil cases are tried.

History. Enact. Acts 1972, ch. 243, § 26; 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 75, effective January 2, 1978.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Presentation of Evidence.

The express authority conferred by this section upon the board of aldermen to sit in judgment of charges against the mayor, and to remove him from office in consequence of those charges, does include as an indispensable concomitant the right to subpoena witnesses and physical evidence and to compel the giving of testimony under oath. Stansbury v. Maupin, 599 S.W.2d 170, 1980 Ky. LEXIS 218 ( Ky. 1980 ).

2. Power of Removal.

The power of removal is not strictly judicial, and may be exercised by legislative bodies. Gibbs v. Board of Aldermen, 99 Ky. 490 , 36 S.W. 524, 18 Ky. L. Rptr. 341 , 1896 Ky. LEXIS 109 ( Ky. 1896 ) (decided under prior law).

3. Removal for Cause.

Removal of officers in first-class cities must be for cause, and upon notice and hearing. Todd v. Dunlap, 99 Ky. 449 , 36 S.W. 541, 18 Ky. L. Rptr. 329 , 1896 Ky. LEXIS 112 ( Ky. 1896 ) (decided under prior law).

The cause must amount to malfeasance, misfeasance or unfitness. Todd v. Dunlap, 99 Ky. 449 , 36 S.W. 541, 18 Ky. L. Rptr. 329 , 1896 Ky. LEXIS 112 ( Ky. 1896 ) (decided under prior law).

4. Parks Commissioner.

The board of aldermen has jurisdiction to remove a park commissioner. Gibbs v. Board of Aldermen, 99 Ky. 490 , 36 S.W. 524, 18 Ky. L. Rptr. 341 , 1896 Ky. LEXIS 109 ( Ky. 1896 ) (decided under prior law).

Opinions of Attorney General.

No authorization is given for the subpoenaing of witnesses in connection with any investigation conducted under this section, or, for that matter the taking of testimony under oath, and the general rule is that in absence of specific authority to issue subpoenas or administer oaths, none exists. OAG 78-533 .

The legislature has, at the same time it granted cities of the first class home rule authority pursuant to KRS 83.410 and KRS 83.520 , also enacted a specific statute governing the investigation and removal of executive and ministerial officers pursuant to this section and any attempt, by ordinance (pursuant to home rule authority), to go beyond, the broader than, add to or modify the powers specifically given under this statute would be in conflict therewith and therefore invalid. OAG 78-533 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Comment, Stansbury v. Maupin: Kentucky’s Refusal to Recognize Legislative Home Rule for First Class Cities, 69 Ky. L.J. 933 (1980-81).

Kentucky Law Survey, Morris, Municipal Law, 70 Ky. L.J. 287 (1981-82).

83.670. Adoption of city manager form by city of the first class — Application for election. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1972, ch. 243, § 27; 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 20, § 6) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20. For present law see KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170 .

83.680. Form of government in second class city not altered by reclassification. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1972, ch. 243, § 28; 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 20, § 6) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20. For present law see KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170 .

83.690. City of first class organized under city manager form of government excluded from certain provisions. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1972, ch. 243, § 34) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20. For present law see KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170 .

CHAPTER 83A Organization of Government in Cities

83A.010. Definitions for chapter.

As used in this chapter, unless the context otherwise requires:

  1. “Board” means the board of commissioners in any city organized and governed under the city manager plan.
  2. “Code of ordinances” means a reenactment of the body of positive municipal law, read and interpreted as a whole, with the text arranged by subject matter and properly indexed.
  3. “Commission” means the city commission in any city organized and governed under the commission plan.
  4. “Composite index” means a loose-leaf compilation of all ordinances listed by date of passage, arranged by subject matter of the contents and indexed alphabetically.
  5. “Council” means the city legislative body in any city organized and governed under the mayor-council plan.
  6. “Executive authority” means the mayor in any city organized and governed under the mayor-council plan or the mayor-alderman plan as provided in KRS Chapter 83, the commission in any city organized and governed under the commission plan, or the board of commissioners in any city organized under the city manager plan.
  7. “Executive order” means an order issued by the executive authority of a municipality which is binding upon the officers and employees of the municipality and any governmental agency over which the municipality has jurisdiction.
  8. “Legislative body member” means a city councilman in any city organized and governed under the mayor-council plan, a city commissioner in any city organized and governed under the commission plan, or city manager plan, or a city alderman in any city of the first class organized under the mayor-alderman plan provided by KRS Chapter 83.
  9. “Municipal order” means an official act of the legislative body of a municipality which is binding upon the officers and employees of the municipality and any governmental agency over which the municipality has jurisdiction.
  10. “Officer” means any person elected to a position by the voters or any person appointed to a position which (a) is created by the Constitution, the General Assembly, or a city; (b) possesses a delegation of a portion of the sovereign power of government; (c) has powers and duties to be discharged which are conferred directly or by implication by the city; (d) has duties performed independently and without control of a superior power other than law; (e) has some permanency; (f) requires an official oath; (g) is assigned by a commission or other written authority; and (h) provides for an official bond if required by proper authority.
  11. “Ordinance” means an official action of a city legislative body, which is a regulation of a general and permanent nature and enforceable as a local law or is an appropriation of money.
  12. “Summary” means a brief narrative prepared under the supervision of an attorney succinctly covering the main points of an official statement, ordinance, or rule in a way reasonably calculated to inform the public in a clear and understandable manner as to its meaning.

History. Enact. Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 1, effective July 15, 1980; 1992, ch. 435, § 5, effective July 14, 1992.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Officers.

The police chief and the volunteer chief of a city of the fifth class are “officers” within the definition of subsection (10) of this section due to the nature of their offices and the duties associated with them. McCloud v. Whitt, 639 S.W.2d 375, 1982 Ky. App. LEXIS 246 (Ky. Ct. App. 1982).

Subdivision (10)(d) of this section would apparently embrace persons appointed as city policemen. Thornsberry v. Western Surety Co., 738 F. Supp. 209, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6717 (E.D. Ky. 1990 ).

2. Air Board.

Since KRS 183.132 specifically addresses the appointment of air board members, it must control over the general provisions of Chapter 83A. Preston v. Floyd/Johnson County Pilots Ass'n, 867 S.W.2d 474, 1993 Ky. App. LEXIS 36 (Ky. Ct. App. 1993).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Where a city council voted to appoint an individual as a police officer, that city council action would be of no legal effect because under KRS 83A.080(2) provision is made that all nonelective city officers, which would include police officers, shall be appointed by the executive authority of the city which, under the council-mayor form of government, is the mayor. OAG 80-457 .

The establishment of a police department under KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170 is a legislative matter of a permanent nature and therefore must be accomplished by the enactment of an appropriate ordinance rather than by a legislative order which is confined to matters involving the internal operation of the city. OAG 81-48 .

A city mayor can remove a city clerk, city attorney or other “officer” defined in this section under the provisions for removal of KRS 83A.080 without consulting the legislative body which approved the appointment; however, the city legislative body has the authority to enact an ordinance under KRS 83A.060 which would prohibit the removal of city officers except for cause and pursuant to a hearing. OAG 81-74 .

In city operating under the city manager form of government, the board of commissioners must either prepare the city budget or delegate the budget preparation authority to the city manager under KRS 83A.150 (7)(h); the latter course of action would resolve the conflict between the combined provisions of KRS 91A.010 and this section, which define the “executive authority” as the board of commissioners, and KRS 91A.030(5) which authorizes such “executive authority” to prepare the budget and the provisions of subsection (7)(c) of KRS 83A.150 which authorizes the city manager to prepare the budget. OAG 81-95 .

If, prior to July 15, 1980, a sixth-class city had by ordinance established the positions of city clerk and city treasurer and if neither position has been abolished by ordinance pursuant to subsection (3) (now (4)) of KRS 83A.080 since that date, then both positions are still in existence, and, since each position constitutes a city office, no person is permitted to fill both offices at the same time as no person is permitted to fill two municipal offices at the same time; thus, even if the office of city treasurer were to be abolished, the person handling the city’s financial affairs would be considered a city officer if he satisfied the definition of “officer” under subsection (9) (now (10)) of this section and he could not simultaneously hold the position of city clerk. OAG 81-153 .

Although a city commission itself possesses all executive as well as legislative authority under subsection (6) of this section the commission could delegate the actual drawing up of the legislative or executive order to the mayor and authorize him to sign the order in its behalf following its enactment. OAG 81-211 .

The mayor, as the chief administrative officer of the city pursuant to the terms of subsection (6) of this section and KRS 83A.130(3), has the responsibility to see that the affairs of the city are properly administered and, as a consequence, there is no legal objection to his being authorized to receive a key to the official city records to the exclusion of anyone else, including members of the city council. OAG 82-311 .

The term “resolution” is considered synonymous with the term “order.” OAG 83-64 .

The municipal code requires only ordinances to be published in order to be effective under the terms of KRS 83A.060 and, therefore, legislative orders or resolutions enacted for the purposes described in subdivision (8) (now (9)) of this section and in KRS 83A.060 are not required to be published in any form; of course, any attempt on the part of a city to enact, by resolution or legislative order, matters other than those involving the internal operation of city government mentioned in such statutes, without following the statutory procedure for the enactment of ordinances including publication, would be invalid and thus ineffective. OAG 83-64 .

A city may not confer peace officer powers on individuals and designate persons to function as municipal police officers by virtue of contracting with them individually and designating them as independent contractors. OAG 83-363 .

The publication requirements under KRS 83A.060(9) prevail over those requirements found under KRS 100.207 since zoning regulations adopted by the legislative body of the city under KRS 100.207 represent the official action of the legislative body and are of a general and permanent nature and. consequently, must be enacted by ordinance, and since all ordinances enacted by the legislative body, including ordinances relating to zoning, must be published as required by KRS 83A.060(9) which was amended in 1982 to specifically apply to zoning ordinances and which controls as being the later statute. OAG 84-72 .

The term “resolution” is synonymous with the term “order.” OAG 84-97 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Bench & Bar.

Morris, The New Kentucky Municipal Law, Vol. 45, No. 3, July, 1981, Ky. Bench & Bar 24.

Kentucky Law Journal.

Kentucky Law Survey, Morris, Municipal Law, 70 Ky. L.J. 287 (1981-82).

83A.020. Present organizational structure of city to remain until changed under this chapter — Status of ordinances not in conflict with chapter.

The present organizational structure of each city shall remain in force until changed under this chapter. All ordinances and resolutions presently in force in each city not in conflict with the provisions of KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170 shall remain in force until changed.

History. Enact. Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 2, effective July 15, 1980; 1992, ch. 435, § 6, effective July 14, 1992.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

Williams v. London Util. Comm’n, 375 F.3d 424, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 14077 (6th Cir. 2004).

Opinions of Attorney General.

All sixth-class cities of the Commonwealth currently governed and structured under KRS Chapter 88 (now repealed) are required by this section to be governed under the commission form of government, thereby making an organizational change in the structure of their form of government. OAG 80-439 .

A city legislative body may establish and place the duties of the treasurer under an administrative department created by ordinance; at the same time the commission may establish by ordinance all appointive offices and positions of employment and make appointments to fill such positions since all legislative, executive and administrative authority of the city is vested in the commission. OAG 80-565 .

Sixth class cities must convert to a commission form of government consisting of four commissioners and a mayor under this section and should do so at the 1981 general election; thus the attempted filing of papers for membership on the board of trustees should be refused by the county clerk so that the candidate can file for the office of commissioner. OAG 81-16 .

A city ordinance, adopted in 1949, which provided that the mayor should make appointments to the Utility Plant Board with the approval of the city council did not conflict with subsection (2) of KRS 83A.080 , which was enacted in 1980, and thus remain in force until repealed, as provided in this section. OAG 81-367 .

A city of the fourth class operating under the councilmanic form of government, composed of eight councilmen but divided into four wards, could not continue to legally operate indefinitely in such manner by virtue of an ordinance enacted in August 1980 so declaring. OAG 82-245 .

A city ordinance which was enacted under the provisions of former KRS 95.700 (repealed), and which provided that every two years on odd numbered years the city council would appoint a chief of police who would hold his office for a term of two years subject to removal for cause by the council, conflicted with KRS 83A.130(9) which gives the mayor the exclusive power to appoint all police officers, including the chief, and as a consequence the ordinance was void and unenforceable. OAG 84-207 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Kentucky Law Survey, Morris, Municipal Law, 70 Ky. L.J. 287 (1981-82).

83A.022. Powers and duties of city’s established population criteria not lost because of subsequent census population change or court judgment.

Once a city meets the population criteria established in KRS 67.750 , 82.095 , 92.281 , 96.060 , 96.189 , 97.120 , 99.615 , 100.137 , 100.209 , 100.217 , 100.253 , 241.160 , 242.1292 , 243.230 , 244.290 , 244.540 , and 281.014 under the most recent federal decennial census and has exercised the powers and duties pursuant to the section, the city shall not thereafter lose the ability to exercise the powers and duties provided in those sections because of an increase or decrease in population in a subsequent federal decennial census, or because of a judgment of a court pursuant to a petition to certify a city’s population as different than the federal decennial census made under KRS 81.006 . The city shall be permitted to continue to exercise the powers and duties under the applicable section as if it still meets the population requirements provided by the section. However, if there is a conflict between a power or privilege established under a lower population limit and a higher population limit, then the city shall follow the provisions required by the higher population limit.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 2014, ch. 92, § 9, effective January 1, 2015; 2017 ch. 62, § 116, effective June 29, 2017.

Compiler’s Notes.

For this section as effective until January 1, 2018, see the preceding section also numbered KRS 83A.022 .

83A.024. Registry of cities classified as cities of the second class as of August 1, 2014.

On or before January 1, 2015, the Department for Local Government shall create and maintain a registry of cities that, as of August 1, 2014, were classified as cities of the second class. The Department for Local Government shall make the information included on the registry available to the public by publishing it on its Web site. The mayoral term limits expressed in Kentucky Constitution Section 160 relating to cities of the second class shall apply only to the cities on the registry created pursuant to this section.

History. Enact. Acts 2014, ch. 92, § 10, effective January 1, 2015.

83A.030. Composition and size of city legislative bodies for mayor-council, commission, and city manager plans.

  1. Each city organized and governed under the mayor-council plan shall have a mayor and each shall have a legislative body composed of not less than six (6) nor more than twelve (12) members as prescribed by ordinance.
  2. Each city organized and governed under the commission plan or city manager plan shall have a legislative body composed of a mayor and four (4) commissioners.

History. Enact. Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 3, effective July 15, 1980; 1982, ch. 434, § 1, effective July 15, 1982; 1992, ch. 435, § 7, effective July 14, 1992; 2014, ch. 92, § 13, effective January 1, 2015.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Immunity.

Trial court properly granted summary judgment dismissal to a former mayor’s defamation claims against a current mayor, as his statements made in a city council meeting were entitled to an absolute privilege pursuant to KRS 83A.060(15); the town was organized and governed by a mayor-council plan pursuant to KRS 83A.030 , wherein the mayor presided at city council meetings and cast a vote in case of a tie. Smith v. Martin, 331 S.W.3d 637, 2011 Ky. App. LEXIS 22 (Ky. Ct. App. 2011).

Opinions of Attorney General.

All sixth-class cities of the Commonwealth currently governed and structured under KRS Chapter 88 (now repealed) are required by KRS 83A.020 to be governed by the commission form of government, thereby making an organizational change in the structure of their form of government. OAG 80-439 .

Where a city is organized and governed under a commission plan, the mayor is a voting member of the commission and, as such, his vote is effective in determining a quorum, since subsection (2) of this section provides that the legislative body under a commission plan consists of a mayor and four commissioners and since under subsection (2) of KRS 83A.140 the legislative body consisting of the mayor and commissioners are together called the city commission. OAG 81-211 .

An ordinance reducing the number of members of the city council of a third-class city from 12 to 10, which would be enacted approximately one year after an initial ordinance fixing the number at 12, would appear to be valid provided it was adopted not later than 240 days preceding the next regular election for city officers unless a vacancy should occur in one of the council seats. OAG 82-171 .

The number of members of the legislative body in a third-class city may be changed without a referendum on the question although no city can abolish an elective office later than 240 days preceding the regular election to fill said office except in the event of a vacancy in the office; there is no five-year limitation imposed on the city from changing its membership following a previous change. OAG 82-171 .

A city of the fourth class operating under the councilmanic form of government composed of eight councilmen but divided into four wards, could not continue to legally operate indefinitely in this manner by virtue of an ordinance enacted in August 1980 so declaring. OAG 82-245 .

Where it can be shown that the pecuniary and employment interest of two city commissioners is reasonably calculated to affect their judgment on city matters involving their private industry employer, the two city commissioners should refrain from attending city commission meetings at which questions relating to their industrial employer will be dealt with. OAG 84-136 .

Where the membership of a city council is increased from seven to nine effective January 1, 1986, since staggered terms for members of said city council had been established pursuant to KRS 83A.110 the establishment of staggered terms by prior referendum would necessarily include the two additional members; thus when the vacancies are filled by appointment pursuant to KRS 83A.040 , those selected must draw in the manner provided in KRS 83A.110 to determine who will serve a two-year term and who will serve only a one-year term. The member drawing the two-year term would have to run for the one-year unexpired term at the November 1986 election, as required by Ky. Const., § 152. The member drawing the one-year term would have to run for a regular two-year term at the November 1986 election. OAG 85-106 .

A city entitled to operate under this section and KRS 83A.040 may, pursuant to ordinance, increase its membership from seven to nine and at the same time provide that said ordinance shall not become effective until a future date, such as January 10, 1986, the beginning of the new legislative term, or any other date that appears feasible. When the additional legislative seats become effective on January 10, 1986, two automatic vacancies are created which will be filled by the remaining seven of the legislative body who assume the office on that date, and should such members not do so within 30 days pursuant to KRS 83A.040 (4) (now KRS 83A.040(5)), at that time the Governor assumes such authority. OAG 85-106 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Kentucky Law Survey, Morris, Municipal Law, 70 Ky. L.J. 287 (1981-82).

83A.040. Election of mayors and legislative bodies — Qualifications — Vacancies — Removal of elected officers.

  1. A mayor shall be elected by the voters of each city at a regular election. A candidate for mayor shall be a resident of the city for not less than one (1) year prior to his or her election. His term of office shall begin on the first day of January following his election and shall be for four (4) years and until his successor qualifies. If a person is elected or appointed as mayor in response to a vacancy and serves less than four (4) calendar years, then that period of service shall not be considered for purposes of re-election a term of office. A mayor shall be at least twenty-one (21) years of age, shall be a qualified voter in the city, and shall reside in the city throughout his term of office.
  2. If a vacancy occurs in the office of mayor, the following provisions shall apply:
    1. The legislative body of the city shall fill the vacancy within thirty (30) days.
    2. A member of the legislative body in any city organized and governed under the commission plan as provided by KRS 83A.140 or city manager plan as provided by KRS 83A.150 may vote for himself.
    3. A member of the legislative body in any city organized and governed under the mayor-council plan as provided by KRS 83A.130 and in any city of the first class organized under the mayor-alderman plan as provided by KRS Chapter 83 shall not vote for himself.
    4. The legislative body shall elect from among its members an individual to preside over meetings of the legislative body during any vacancy in the office of mayor in accordance with the provisions of KRS 83A.130 to 83A.150 .
  3. When voting to fill the vacancy created by a resignation of a mayor the resigning mayor shall not vote on his successor.
  4. Each legislative body member shall be elected at large by the voters of each city at a regular election. A candidate for a legislative body shall be a resident of the city for not less than one (1) year prior to his or her election. His term of office shall begin on the first day of January following his election and shall be for two (2) years, except as provided by KRS 83A.050 . A member shall be at least eighteen (18) years of age, shall be a qualified voter in the city, and shall reside in the city throughout his term of office.
  5. If one (1) or more vacancies on a legislative body occur in a way that one (1) or more members remain seated, the remaining members shall within thirty (30) days fill the vacancies one (1) at a time, giving each new appointee reasonable notice of his selection as will enable him to meet and act with the remaining members in making further appointments until all vacancies are filled. If vacancies occur in a way that all seats become vacant, the Governor shall appoint qualified persons to fill the vacancies sufficient to constitute a quorum. Remaining vacancies shall be filled as provided in this section.
  6. If for any reason, any vacancy in the office of mayor or the legislative body is not filled within thirty (30) days after it occurs, the Governor shall promptly fill the vacancy by appointment of a qualified person who shall serve for the same period as if otherwise appointed.
  7. No vacancy by reason of voluntary resignation in the office of mayor or on a legislative body shall occur unless a written resignation which specifies a resignation date is tendered to the legislative body. The resignation shall be effective at the next regular or special meeting of the city legislative body occurring after the date specified in the written letter of resignation.
  8. Pursuant to KRS 118.305(7), if a vacancy occurs which is required by law to be filled temporarily by appointment, the legislative body or the Governor, whichever is designated to make the appointment, shall immediately notify in writing both the county clerk and the Secretary of State of the vacancy.
  9. Except in cities of the first class, any elected officer, in case of misconduct, incapacity, or willful neglect in the performance of the duties of his office, may be removed from office by a unanimous vote of the members of the legislative body exclusive of any member to be removed, who shall not vote in the deliberation of his removal. No elected officer shall be removed without having been given the right to a full public hearing. The officer, if removed, shall have the right to appeal to the Circuit Court of the county and the appeal shall be on the record. No officer so removed shall be eligible to fill the office vacated before the expiration of the term to which originally elected.
  10. Removal of an elected officer in cities of the first class shall be governed by the provisions of KRS 83.660 .

History. Enact. Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 4, effective July 15, 1980; 1982, ch. 434, § 10, effective July 15, 1982; 1984, ch. 80, § 1, effective July 13, 1984; 1988, ch. 17, § 5, effective July 15, 1988; 1990, ch. 366, § 8, effective July 13, 1990; 2000, ch. 368, § 1, effective January 1, 2001; 2002, ch. 16, § 1, effective July 15, 2002; 2008, ch. 79, § 17, effective July 15, 2008; 2012, ch. 49, § 3, effective July 12, 2012.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Appointments.

When election for all city offices is void, the mayor is appointed by the Governor. Scholl v. Bell, 125 Ky. 750 , 102 S.W. 248, 31 Ky. L. Rptr. 335 , 1907 Ky. LEXIS 328 ( Ky. 1907 ) (decided under prior law).

Legislature had authority to provide that mayor be appointed by the council. Brown v. Holland, 97 Ky. 249 , 30 S.W. 629, 17 Ky. L. Rptr. 149 , 1895 Ky. LEXIS 180 ( Ky. 1895 ); Craft v. Baker, 194 Ky. 205 , 238 S.W. 389, 1922 Ky. LEXIS 126 ( Ky. 1922 ) (decided under prior law).

2. Contest.

Contest of an election for mayor was governed by the general election law. Lilly v. O'Brien, 224 Ky. 474 , 6 S.W.2d 715, 1928 Ky. LEXIS 644 ( Ky. 1928 ) (decided under prior law).

3. Nomination.

Where ordinance increasing size of city council from six to 12 was never published and thus was invalid and petitioners in good faith mistakenly nominated 12 persons for 12 offices when only six offices were vacant and then six of the 12 persons they sought to nominate withdrew, the fact of their error did not vitiate their petition and deprive electors of privilege of nominating the remainder. Queenan v. Mimms, 283 S.W.2d 380, 1955 Ky. LEXIS 313 ( Ky. 1955 ) (decided under prior law).

Since city was not divided into wards and each member of council was elected by the qualified voters of the entire city it followed that the nomination of candidates was the same. Queenan v. Mimms, 283 S.W.2d 380, 1955 Ky. LEXIS 313 ( Ky. 1955 ) (decided under prior law).

4. Oath of Office.

The oath of office was the only oath required of commissioners of second-class cities, and they were not required to take another oath before commencing hearing for removal of manager. Rawlings v. Newport, 275 Ky. 183 , 121 S.W.2d 10, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 397 ( Ky. 1938 ) (decided under prior law).

5. Reclassification of City.

Upon transfer of a city to a different class the old officers hold for the remainder of their term and at the same compensation as if no transfer had been made. Gilbert v. Paducah, 115 Ky. 160 , 72 S.W. 816, 24 Ky. L. Rptr. 1998 , 1903 Ky. LEXIS 87 ( Ky. 1903 ) (decided under prior law).

Upon transfer of a city to a different class the old officers hold for the remainder of their terms and at the same compensation as if no transfer had been made, however, when necessary the city shall provide for a short term election in order to bridge the hiatus. Fullerton v. Mann, 214 Ky. 764 , 284 S.W. 113, 1926 Ky. LEXIS 433 ( Ky. 1926 ) (decided under prior law).

Where mayor was elected in 1953 when city was third-class city and in 1956 city became city of second class and adopted city manager form of government, mayor’s term of office was not affected by change of classification and he had right to serve his term even if it overlapped and consumed almost two years of then existing term of mayor of second-class city. Gerard v. Judd, 331 S.W.2d 119, 1959 Ky. LEXIS 2 ( Ky. 1959 ) (decided under prior law).

6. Regular Election.

An election at which representatives and railroad commissioners are chosen was a “regular election”. Shelley v. McCullouch, 97 Ky. 164 , 30 S.W. 193, 17 Ky. L. Rptr. 53 , 1895 Ky. LEXIS 162 ( Ky. 1895 ) (decided under prior law).

An election at which presidential electors are chosen is a “regular election”. Todd v. Johnson, 99 Ky. 548 , 36 S.W. 987, 18 Ky. L. Rptr. 354 , 1896 Ky. LEXIS 121 ( Ky. 1896 ) (decided under prior law).

When an elected officer vacated office more than three months before an election at which only a United States representative was to be elected, the vacancy could not be filled by election at that time, but the appointee held over until the following election. Ferguson v. Hackett, 74 S.W. 708, 25 Ky. L. Rptr. 170 , 1903 Ky. LEXIS 353 (Ky. Ct. App. 1903).

Provision of Ky. Const., § 148 prohibiting election of local officers in same year in which members of congress are elected, and provision of Ky. Const., § 167 requiring election of city officers in odd years, do not apply to special elections to fill vacancies prescribed by Ky. Const., § 152. Smith v. Ruth, 308 Ky. 60 , 212 S.W.2d 532, 1948 Ky. LEXIS 847 ( Ky. 1948 ) (decided under prior law).

If there were only a member of congress and a United States senator to be elected at election, no election to fill vacancy in the office of mayor could be held. Smith v. Ruth, 308 Ky. 60 , 212 S.W.2d 532, 1948 Ky. LEXIS 847 ( Ky. 1948 ) (decided under prior law).

7. Removal.

Board may not oust a member, without right, after he has been inducted into office by a previous board, same being a vested property right entitled to protection by the courts. Hobbs v. Upington, 121 Ky. 170 , 89 S.W. 128, 28 Ky. L. Rptr. 131 , 1905 Ky. LEXIS 191 ( Ky. 1905 ); Kluemper v. Zimmer, 240 Ky. 225 , 41 S.W.2d 1111, 1931 Ky. LEXIS 370 ( Ky. 1931 ) (decided under prior law).

In the case of removal, the vacancy exists as of the date of removal, regardless of any appeal. Eagle v. Cox, 268 Ky. 58 , 103 S.W.2d 682, 1937 Ky. LEXIS 411 ( Ky. 1937 ) (decided under prior law).

Trial court erred in denying plaintiff’s petition for temporary injunction to preclude the city commission from holding a proposed removal hearing after the commission had denied the mayor and a commissioner their right to vote on joint charges brought against the two (2) of them. The mayor’s CR 65.07 motion for relief was granted to the extent that the commission was prohibited from preventing the commissioner from voting on the charges against the mayor’s removal and from preventing the mayor from voting on the commissioner’s removal. Walters v. Moore, 121 S.W.3d 210, 2003 Ky. App. LEXIS 271 (Ky. Ct. App. 2003).

8. Term of Office.

Former provision for two-year term did not violate Ky. Const., § 160. M'Dermott v. City of Louisville, 98 Ky. 50 , 32 S.W. 264, 17 Ky. L. Rptr. 617 , 1895 Ky. LEXIS 16 (Ky. Ct. App. 1895) (decided under prior law).

9. Vacancy.

When vacancies occur in elective offices more than three months before the following general election, the appointees hold only until that election. Scott v. Singleton, 171 Ky. 117 , 188 S.W. 302, 1916 Ky. LEXIS 306 ( Ky. 1916 ) (decided under prior law).

One appointed to fill a vacancy in an appointive office serves for the remainder of the unexpired term. Pinson v. Morrow, 189 Ky. 291 , 224 S.W. 879, 1920 Ky. LEXIS 418 ( Ky. 1920 ), overruled, Cawood v. Hensley, 247 S.W.2d 27, 1952 Ky. LEXIS 661 ( Ky. 1952 ) (decided under prior law).

Selection by board of a person to fill a vacancy was not an “election” within Ky. Const., § 147 which required a viva voce vote, but could be had by secret ballot. Nortonville v. Woodward, 191 Ky. 730 , 231 S.W. 224, 1921 Ky. LEXIS 371 ( Ky. 1921 ) (decided under prior law).

After resignation of mayor, the one appointed in his stead was mayor and not mayor pro tem, and his authority was not limited to the date of his appointment. Cahill-Swift Mfg. Co. v. Bardwell, 211 Ky. 482 , 277 S.W. 812, 1925 Ky. LEXIS 904 ( Ky. 1925 ) (decided under prior law).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Where vacancies occur in the office of mayor and in one of the positions on the city council in July, 1980, Ky. Const., § 152 requires that the unexpired terms be filled at the November, 1980 general election, since presidential electors will be elected then and they are considered statewide officers which would make that election qualify under the terms of Ky. Const., § 152. OAG 80-386 .

Where vacancies occur in the office of mayor and in one of the positions on a city council, the city council or its clerk should notify the county clerk that the two vacancies exist, and the fact that they must be filled at the November election pursuant to Ky. Const., § 152; any person who desires to run for the unexpired terms of said offices will be required to file a petition under the terms of KRS 118.215 and 118.315 . OAG 80-386 .

If a member of the city council has moved his legal residence outside of the city, he is no longer eligible to serve as a member of the council but he is considered a de facto officer which means that his acts are valid until he is ousted from office by the judgment of the court; during the time he continues to perform his council duties, he may be compensated for his services, although he could not compel such payment and the payments would not be recoverable by the public authorities. OAG 80-540 .

Where a city has enacted an ordinance providing for nonpartisan city elections under KRS 83A.170 , and at the special city primary in May, nominations were made for only three of the four city commissioner positions, write-in votes cannot be cast for the fourth position at the November election, since KRS 83A.170 requires a person to be nominated in a special city primary in order to hold the office to be filled in the November election; thus, because only three commissioners were nominated, only three can be elected at the November election and a vacancy will be created when the new commission members are to take office on the first Monday in January, at which time the elected commissioners would be authorized to fill the vacancy pursuant to subsection (4) (now (5)) of this section, subject to the provisions of Ky. Const., § 152, which would require an election to be held at the next regular election. OAG 81-263 .

Where at the special city primary in May only one person was nominated for the office of mayor and only three persons were nominated for four city commissioner positions, the names of the unopposed candidates would have to be placed on the November ballot for the offices they seek in order for them to be elected to office, since Ky. Const., § 160 and this section provide, in effect, that in order to hold the office of mayor and membership on a city legislative body, one must be elected by the voters at a November election. OAG 81-263 .

Although subsection (3) of KRS 84.280 (now repealed), which provided that the mayor of a second-class city was ineligible to serve successive terms, was impliedly repealed by the new municipal code effective in 1980, particularly by this section, KRS 83A.050 and 83A.150 which contain no restriction on successive terms for mayors or members of legislative bodies, successive terms are still prohibited by Ky. Const., § 160. OAG 81-380 .

If a duly elected member of the city council of a fourth-class city fails to assume office on the first Monday in January, the remaining incoming council must fill the vacancy within 30 days pursuant to subsection (4) (now (5)) of this section and, if they fail to do so, the Governor must promptly fill it by appointment; such appointee would serve until the position can be filled at an election for the unexpired term in accordance with Ky. Const., § 152. OAG 82-10 .

Where a city councilman-elect died in December, 1981, his death automatically created a vacancy in that city office as of the first Monday in January, 1982, at which time the incoming council had 30 days to fill the vacancy, and if the vacancy was not filled within 30 days, the power to fill the vacancy then vested in the Governor; the person appointed to fill the vacancy would hold office subject to the conditions prescribed in Ky. Const., § 152, which requires said vacancy to be filled at the next regular election that embraces the city in which the vacancy occurred. OAG 82-42 .

Since KRS 83A.050 requires cities to pay the cost of city elections only where the city election is held at a time other than the law prescribes for elections generally and since city officers can only be elected at general elections in November pursuant to Ky. Const., § 167 and this section, which is the time prescribed for elections for all state and local officers, cities whose officers were elected in 1981 election would not be liable for any part of the election cost involved at the 1981 general election. OAG 82-167 .

A councilman who is considering resigning may not vote on his replacement; the vacancy does not exist until after the resignation of the councilman has been received and accepted by the other members of the council by a majority vote and, thus, after the resignation has been accepted, the councilman is out of office and has no voting rights. OAG 82-184 .

A member of the city council is a municipal officer, irrespective of whether or not he receives compensation. OAG 82-282 .

An unpaid city council member who is also employed by the Kentucky Higher Education Assistance Authority as Executive Director, and by virtue of his position as Executive Director of the Kentucky Higher Education Assistance Authority is also the Executive Director of the Kentucky Higher Education Student Loan Corporation, is holding a municipal office and state employment, concerning which there is no constitutional or statutory objection. OAG 82-282 .

Where following entry into office, the duly elected commissioner and mayor proceeded to appoint two other commissioners and they in turn appointed a fourth commissioner, all of whom were sworn in by the county judge/executive, the provisions of this section were substantially complied with, irrespective of the fact that the appointments were not made one at a time as this section requires. OAG 82-286 .

Where there are vacancies in the entire legislative body of a city of the sixth class, the governor must fill the vacancies on the commission by selecting a sufficient number to constitute a quorum, remembering of course that the mayor is a voting member of the commission. He must appoint a mayor at the same time if more than 30 days have elapsed since the vacancies occurred. OAG 82-302 .

City council vacancy existing in April, 1982, could not be filled for the unexpired term unless there was no regular election in the fall of 1982 embracing the city. If there was such an election as, for example, a school board election or an election for the Supreme Court, then Ky. Const., § 152 would require the vacancy to be filled at that time for the unexpired term; if there was no qualifying election under the terms of the Constitution, then the mayor’s appointee would serve for the remainder of the term. OAG 82-351 .

Mayor has no authority to fill a vacancy on the city council. This can only be done by the city council itself pursuant to subsection (4) (now (5)) of this section. OAG 82-351 .

Subsection (3) (now (4)) of this section requires all members of the city legislative body as well as the mayor to reside within the city and be a qualified voter therein; the procedure for removing a person, who in fact no longer lives in the city and thus becomes a usurper, is for a request to be filed with the Attorney General. Under KRS 415.050 and case law, documented evidence must be presented to the Attorney General for consideration and he has discretion in authorizing an ouster proceeding to be brought in his name by an attorney designated by the requesting party or parties. OAG 83-467 .

The only officers required to reside in a city are members of the city legislative body and the mayor; thus, there is no requirement that either nonelective city officers or employes must live within the city. As to whether or not a city can legally enact an ordinance requiring residence in the city for employees is a question for the courts to determine and would raise a constitutional issue. OAG 84-12 .

If a candidate for a municipal office does in fact move out of the city prior to his election, the question of disqualifying him by having his name removed from the ballot is a matter that must be determined by a Circuit Court action brought by an opposing candidate under the terms of KRS 118.176 ; if such action is not brought at that time, his qualifications cannot be attacked after the election in a contest suit. On the other hand, if he is not a legal resident when he enters office, he becomes a usurper subject to removal by the Attorney General under the usurpation statute, particularly KRS 415.050 . OAG 84-12 .

Where councilman elected in November, 1983 failed to qualify in January, 1984 and in May, 1984 council declared the office vacant, the vacancy actually occurred on January 10 or within 30 days thereafter, the time frame mentioned in Brown v. Rose, 233 Ky. 549 , 26 S.W.2d 503, 1930 Ky. LEXIS 611 (1930), as being a reasonable time to qualify. The council’s declaration as to the vacancy was not controlling and the Governor had the sole authority to fill the vacancy by appointment, subject to an election in November, 1984 to fill the unexpired term of one year. OAG 84-245 .

Where the membership of a city council is increased from seven to nine effective January 1, 1986, since staggered terms for members of said city council had been established pursuant to KRS 83A.110 , the establishment of staggered terms by prior referendum would necessarily include the two additional members; thus when the vacancies are filled by appointment pursuant to this section, those selected must draw in the manner provided in KRS 83A.110 to determine who will serve a two-year term and who will serve only a one-year term. The member drawing the two-year term would have to run for the one-year unexpired term at the November 1986 election, as required by Ky. Const., § 152. The member drawing the one-year term would have to run for a regular two-year term at the November 1986 election. OAG 85-106 .

A city entitled to operate under KRS 83A.030 and this section may, pursuant to ordinance, increase its membership from seven to nine and at the same time provide that said ordinance shall not become effective until a future date, such as January 10, 1986, the beginning of the new legislative term, or any other date that appears feasible. When the additional legislative seats become effective on January 10, 1986, two automatic vacancies are created, which will be filled by the remaining seven of the legislative body who assume the office on that date, and should such members not do so within 30 days pursuant to subsection (4) (now (5)) of this section, at that time the Governor assumes such authority. OAG 85-106 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Kentucky Law Survey, Morris, Municipal Law, 70 Ky. L.G. 287 (1981-82).

83A.043. Laws governing election of city officers and dates for primary and regular elections.

  1. Election of city officers shall be governed by the provisions of KRS Chapters 116 to 121, except as provided in this chapter.
  2. Dates on which primary and regular elections are to be held shall be governed by the provisions of KRS 118.025 , except as provided in this chapter.

History. Enact. Acts 1988, ch. 17, § 1, effective July 15, 1988.

83A.045. Laws governing partisan and nonpartisan elections.

  1. Except as provided in KRS 83A.047 , partisan elections of city officers shall be governed by the following provisions, regardless of the form of government or classification of the city:
    1. A candidate for  party nomination to city office shall file his or her nomination papers with the county clerk of the county not earlier than the first Wednesday after the first Monday in November of the year preceding the year in which the office will appear on the ballot and not later than the first Friday following the first Monday in January before the day fixed by KRS Chapter 118 for holding a primary for the office sought. Signatures for nomination papers shall not be affixed on the document to be filed prior to the first Wednesday after the first Monday in November of the year preceding the year in which the office will appear on the ballot. All nomination papers shall be filed no later than 4 p.m. local time when filed on the last day on which the papers are permitted to be filed;
    2. An independent candidate for nomination to city office shall not participate in a primary, but shall file his or her nomination papers with the county clerk of the county not earlier than the first Wednesday after the first Monday in November of the year preceding the year in which the office will appear on the ballot and not later than the first Tuesday after the first Monday in June before the day fixed by KRS Chapter 118 for holding a regular election for the office. Signatures for nomination papers shall not be affixed on the document to be filed prior to the first Wednesday after the first Monday in November of the year preceding the year in which the office will appear on the ballot. All nomination papers shall be filed no later than 4 p.m. local time when filed on the last day on which the papers are permitted to be filed; and
    3. A candidate for city office who is defeated in a partisan primary shall be ineligible as a candidate for the same office in the regular election. However, if a vacancy occurs in the party nomination for which he or she was an unsuccessful candidate in the primary, his or her name may be placed on the voting machines for the regular election as a candidate of that party if he or she has been duly made the party nominee after the vacancy occurs, as provided in KRS 118.105 .
  2. Except as provided in KRS 83A.047 , nonpartisan elections of city officers shall be governed by KRS 83A.050 , 83A.170 , 83A.175 , and the following provisions, regardless of the form of government or classification of the city:
    1. A candidate for city office shall file his or her nomination papers with the county clerk of the county not earlier than the first Wednesday after the first Monday in November of the year preceding the year in which the office will appear on the ballot and not later than the first Friday following the first Monday in January before the day fixed by KRS Chapter 118 for holding a primary for nominations for the office. Signatures for nomination papers shall not be affixed on the document to be filed prior to the first Wednesday after the first Monday in November of the year preceding the year in which the office will appear on the ballot. All nomination papers shall be filed no later than 4 p.m. local time when filed on the last day on which the papers are permitted to be filed;
    2. Any city of the home rule class may by ordinance provide that the nomination and election of candidates for city office in a nonpartisan election shall be conducted pursuant to the provisions of this subsection:
      1. A city may forgo conducting a nonpartisan primary for the nomination of candidates to city office, regardless of the number of candidates running for each office, and require all candidates to file their nomination papers with the county clerk of the county not earlier than the first Wednesday after the first Monday in November of the year preceding the year in which the office will appear on the ballot and not later than the first Tuesday after the first Monday in June before the day fixed by KRS Chapter 118 for holding a regular election for the office. Signatures for nomination papers shall not be affixed on the document to be filed prior to the first Wednesday after the first Monday in November of the year preceding the year in which the office will appear on the ballot;
      2. All nomination papers shall be filed no later than 4 p.m. local time when filed on the last day on which the papers are permitted to be filed;
      3. If a city does not conduct a primary pursuant to this subsection, the election of candidates to city office shall be governed by the provisions of this subsection, KRS 83A.175 (2) to (6), and KRS Chapters 116 to 121;
      4. In the absence of a primary pursuant to this subsection, the number of candidates equal to the number of city offices to be filled who receive the highest number of votes cast in the regular election for each city office shall be elected;
      5. Candidates shall be subject to all other applicable election laws pursuant to this chapter and KRS Chapters 116 to 121;
      6. If a vacancy occurs in a candidacy for city office in any city which has not held a primary pursuant to this subsection after the expiration of time for filing nomination papers, or if there are fewer candidates than there are offices to be filled, the vacancy in candidacy shall be filled by write-in voting; and
      7. At the regular election, the voters shall be instructed to vote for one (1) candidate, except when there is more than one (1) candidate for which voters may vote, the instruction vote for up to candidates shall be used on the ballot; and
    3. A candidate for city office who is defeated in a nonpartisan primary shall be ineligible as a candidate for the same office in the regular election.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1988, ch. 17, § 2, effective July 15, 1988; 1990, ch. 48, § 92, effective July 13, 1990; 1990, ch. 169, § 1, effective July 13, 1990; 1990, ch. 366, § 1, effective July 13, 1990; 1992, ch. 288, § 31, effective July 14, 1992; 1996, ch. 195, § 22, effective July 15, 1996; 1998, ch. 2, § 14, effective July 15, 1998; 2008, ch. 79, § 18, effective July 15, 2008; 2014, ch. 17, § 1, effective July 15, 2014; 2014, ch. 92, § 14, effective January 1, 2015; 2018 ch. 162, § 1, effective November 7, 2018; 2019 ch. 187, § 1, effective November 6, 2019.

Opinions of Attorney General.

When candidates file as late as 30 days before the election, the county clerk must conduct a public drawing to determine the order of names on the ballot under KRS 118.225 , before the filing deadline has passed; there is no provision for a second drawing to be held, consequently, the only logical procedure is to add the names of the late filers at the end of the sequence established by the drawing in the order in which the clerk receives the filing papers. OAG 91-191 .

Since subsection (4) (now (5)) of KRS 117.085 which requires county clerks to have election ballots printed 50 days before the election and former subdivision (2)(b)(6)(a) of this section under certain conditions allows candidates for city offices in certain small cities to file for office up to 30 days before election are patent and irreconcilable, county clerks should proceed with the printing of the ballots as required by subsection (4) (now (5)) of KRS 117.085 even though there is still time for some candidates to file for certain city offices; if a candidate later files for one of the city races, the clerk may reprint the ballots for the precincts within the affected city. With regard to city voters who may receive an absentee ballot while the filing period is still open, the situation should be disclosed to them by attaching a notice to the absentee ballot so that they may choose to withhold voting until all the candidates are known. OAG 93-62 .

83A.047. KRS 83A.045 provisions apply when city boundaries extend beyond single county — Exception — Certification of vote totals.

In a city whose boundaries extend beyond those of a single county, candidates for nomination or election to city office shall be governed by the provisions contained in KRS 83A.045 , except that all nomination papers shall be filed with the county clerk of the county in which the candidate resides no later than 4 p.m. local time on the day provided for in KRS 83A.045 . On the day following the candidate filing deadline, each county clerk shall certify the names of all candidates for city office that filed nomination papers with him or her to the clerk of the other county into which the boundaries of the city extend. In the case of a candidate voted for by the electors of a city whose boundaries extend beyond those of a single county, each county clerk shall certify the vote totals for that candidate to the clerk of the other county into which the boundaries of the city extend.

History. Enact. Acts 1990, ch. 169, § 2, effective July 13, 1990; 2000, ch. 354, § 1, effective July 14, 2000; 2002, ch. 77, § 1, effective July 15, 2002.

83A.050. General election laws to govern election of city officers unless changed by ordinance.

  1. Election of city officers shall be governed by general election laws as provided in KRS Chapters 116 through 121 unless the city legislative body prescribes by ordinance that election of city officers shall be under nonpartisan city election laws as provided in KRS 83A.045 , 83A.170 , 83A.175 and 83A.047 . The ordinance shall become effective not later than twenty-three (23) days prior to the date prescribed by the election law generally for filing notification and declaration forms with the county clerk in a year in which a regular election is to be held in which any city office is to be filled. Immediately subsequent to publication of any ordinance prescribing that election of city officers be under nonpartisan city election laws, a copy of that ordinance shall be filed with the county clerk of the county in which the city is located.
  2. A city may change the manner of election of city officers within the provisions of subsection (1) of this section by ordinance, except that no change shall be made earlier than five (5) years from the last change.
  3. The city shall pay the costs of city elections only if city elections are held at a time other than prescribed by KRS Chapters 116 to 121.

History. Enact. Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 5, effective July 15, 1980; 1982, ch. 71, § 1, effective July 15, 1982; 1984, ch. 44, § 1, effective March 2, 1984; 1988, ch. 17, § 3, effective July 15, 1988; 1990, ch. 169, § 3, effective July 13, 1990; 2014, ch. 92, § 15, effective January 1, 2015.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. In General.

The legislature intended that municipal elections be held under the general election laws, by the same officers, and at the same time and place of holding the general election for state and county officers. Rice v. Mountz, 123 Ky. 590 , 96 S.W. 887, 29 Ky. L. Rptr. 1035 , 1906 Ky. LEXIS 188 ( Ky. 1906 ) (decided under prior law).

Contests for elective municipal offices are governed by the general election laws. Lilly v. O'Brien, 224 Ky. 474 , 6 S.W.2d 715, 1928 Ky. LEXIS 644 ( Ky. 1928 ) (decided under prior law).

2. Ballot.

When a precinct contained the same electors as the municipality one ballot could be used for both county and city officers. Cope v. Cardwell, 93 S.W. 3, 29 Ky. L. Rptr. 263 (1906) (decided under prior law).

When none of the voters involved lived outside the city, names of candidates for municipal and other offices could be placed on same ballot. Rice v. Mountz, 123 Ky. 590 , 96 S.W. 887, 29 Ky. L. Rptr. 1035 , 1906 Ky. LEXIS 188 ( Ky. 1906 ) (decided under prior law).

Where clerk in preparing ballots for 1952 election of general council in error inserted the words “unexpired term” such error could not change the fact that under law the election was for full terms and said error was not a prejudicial one. Miles v. Peay, 256 S.W.2d 373, 1953 Ky. LEXIS 730 ( Ky. 1953 ) (decided under prior law).

3. Certificates of Election.

Individual candidates for city office were not, when elected, entitled to separate certificates of election. Whitaker v. Reynolds, 234 Ky. 127 , 27 S.W.2d 672, 1930 Ky. LEXIS 127 ( Ky. 1930 ) (decided under prior law).

4. De Facto Officer.

An unqualified candidate, if elected, is a de facto officer. Reuter v. Meacham Contracting Co., 143 Ky. 557 , 136 S.W. 1028, 1911 Ky. LEXIS 464 ( Ky. 1911 ) (decided under prior law).

5. De Jure Clerk.

One elected and bonded as “secretary” of a town will be deemed the de jure clerk of the town. Griffin v. Corydon, 44 S.W. 629, 19 Ky. L. Rptr. 1872 (1898) (decided under prior law).

6. Effect of Annexation on Eligibility for Office.

A person who has resided the statutory period in annexed territory is eligible for office, even though the territory has not been within the city that length of time and the motive for annexation is immaterial. Gibson v. Wood, 105 Ky. 740 , 49 S.W. 768, 20 Ky. L. Rptr. 1547 , 1899 Ky. LEXIS 269 ( Ky. 1899 ); Meffert v. Brown, 132 Ky. 201 , 116 S.W. 779, 1909 Ky. LEXIS 133 ( Ky. 1909 ), overruled, Coffey v. Anderson, 371 S.W.2d 624, 1963 Ky. LEXIS 103 ( Ky. 1963 ), overruled in part, Coffey v. Anderson, 371 S.W.2d 624, 1963 Ky. LEXIS 103 ( Ky. 1963 ), overruled on other grounds, Coffey v. Anderson, 371 S.W.2d 624, 1963 Ky. LEXIS 103 (Ky. 1963) (decided under prior law).

7. Failure to Hold Election.

Where vacancy in office of police chief was temporarily filled by appointment of city council, failure due to oversight to hold election to fill such vacancy when there was regular election of members of the board of education in 1950 did not preclude election to fill such vacancy in 1951. Cawood v. Hensley, 247 S.W.2d 27, 1952 Ky. LEXIS 661 ( Ky. 1952 ) (decided under prior law).

8. Repeal of Election Ordinance.

Where on May 1, 1949 council enacted an ordinance providing that the police chief should be elected, and at November, 1949 election police chief was elected but on March 8, 1950 he resigned thereby creating a vacancy in the office, council could not repeal the ordinance and attempt to reinvest itself with the power to appoint the chief of police for it had only the authority to fill the vacancy created by the resignation until there could be a special election to fulfill the unexpired term and therefore appellee who had been elected to the office in the November, 1951 election was entitled to the office and not appellant who had been appointed by the council. Cawood v. Hensley, 247 S.W.2d 27, 1952 Ky. LEXIS 661 ( Ky. 1952 ) (decided under prior law).

9. Who are City Officers.

Members of the board of public safety and board of public works, the secretary of the board of public works, deputy bailiffs and city court clerks are city officers. Louisville v. Wilson, 99 Ky. 598 , 18 Ky. L. Rptr. 427 , 36 S.W. 944, 1896 Ky. LEXIS 120 ( Ky. 1896 ), overruled, Board of Education v. De Weese, 343 S.W.2d 598, 1960 Ky. LEXIS 116 ( Ky. 1960 ) (decided under prior law).

The bond recorder is a state officer, not a city officer. York v. Ross, 139 Ky. 215 , 129 S.W. 580, 1910 Ky. LEXIS 25 ( Ky. 1910 ) (decided under prior law).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Where a fourth-class city had previously conducted nonpartisan elections under a statute which is now repealed, it may continue to elect officers in a nonpartisan manner by adopting an ordinance electing to operate under KRS 83A.170 ; however, where the city did not enact such an ordinance at least 240 days prior to the general election, it must operate its elections under the general election laws, as provided in this section. OAG 81-155 .

Where a city of the fourth class has never enacted an ordinance to provide a special city nonpartisan primary pursuant to KRS 83A.170 , this section does not require that city to now hold a primary election for city office candidates, since this section is purely optional on the part of every city other than a city of the second class under a city manager form of government; however, if the city does not elect to operate under this section the city officers in a fourth-class city have the right to seek major party nomination in the May partisan primary, with the exception of those fourth-class cities operating under the city manager commission form of government pursuant to subsection (4) of KRS 118.105 . OAG 81-163 .

Although subsection (3) of KRS 84.280 (now repealed), which provided that the mayor of a second-class city was ineligible to serve successive terms, was impliedly repealed by the new municipal code effective in 1980, particularly by KRS 83A.040 , 83A.150 and this section which contain no restriction on successive terms for mayors or members of legislative bodies, successive terms are still prohibited by Ky. Const., § 160. OAG 81-380 .

Since this section requires cities to pay the cost of city elections only where the city election is held at a time other than the law prescribes for elections generally and since city officers can only be elected at general elections in November pursuant to Ky. Const., § 167 and KRS 83A.040 , which is the time prescribed for elections for all state and local offices, cities whose officers were elected in the 1981 election would not be liable for any part of the election cost involved at the 1981 general election. OAG 82-167 .

No referendum is required in order for the city to adopt a nonpartisan type of election. OAG 82-171 .

The former language of subsection (3) of this section, particularly the phrase “elections generally,” would also include primary elections at which municipal officers are either permitted or required to be nominated by law; if the legislature had intended to exclude primary elections, it could have easily so indicated by specifically referring to general elections to the exclusion of primary elections instead of simply using the words “elections generally.” OAG 82-198 .

Nonpartisan candidates running for nomination and election are not presently authorized under the terms of this section and KRS 83A.170 to appoint challengers. OAG 85-82 .

83A.060. Enactment of ordinances. [Effective until July 15, 2020]

  1. Each ordinance shall embrace only one (1) subject and shall have a title that shall clearly state the subject.
  2. Each ordinance shall be introduced in writing and shall have an enacting clause styled “Be it ordained by the City of  _____________________________________________________________________ ”.
  3. No ordinance shall be amended by reference to its title only, and ordinances to amend shall set out in full the amended ordinance or section indicating any text being added by a single solid line drawn underneath it. Text that is intended to be removed shall be marked at the beginning with an opening bracket and at the end with a closing bracket. The text between the brackets shall be stricken through with a single solid line.
  4. Except as provided in subsection (7) of this section, no ordinance shall be enacted until it has been read on two (2) separate days. The reading of an ordinance may be satisfied by stating the title and reading a summary rather than the full text.
  5. A city legislative body may adopt the provisions of any local, statewide, or nationally recognized standard code and codifications of entire bodies of local legislation by an ordinance that identifies the subject matter by title, source, and date and incorporates the adopted provisions by reference without setting them out in full, if a copy accompanies the adopting ordinance and is made a part of the permanent records of the city.
  6. Unless otherwise provided by statute, a majority of a legislative body shall constitute a quorum and a vote of a majority of a quorum shall be sufficient to take action.
  7. In an emergency, upon the affirmative vote of two-thirds (2/3) of the membership, a city legislative body may suspend the requirements of second reading and publication to provide for an ordinance to become effective by naming and describing the emergency in the ordinance. Publication requirements of subsection (9) of this section shall be complied with within ten (10) days of the enactment of the emergency ordinance.
  8. Every action of the city legislative body shall be made a part of the permanent records of the city and on passage of an ordinance the vote of each member of the city legislative body shall be entered on the official record of the meeting. The legislative body shall provide by ordinance for the maintenance and safekeeping of the permanent records of the city. The person assigned this responsibility and the presiding officer shall sign the official record of each meeting. All ordinances adopted in a city shall, at the end of each month, be indexed and maintained in the following manner:
    1. The city budget, appropriations of money, and tax levies shall be maintained and indexed so that each fiscal year is kept separate from other years.
    2. All other city ordinances shall be kept in the minute book or an ordinance book in the order adopted and indexed in a composite index or maintained in a code of ordinances.
  9. Except in cities of the first class, a charter county government, and as provided in subsection (7) of this section, no ordinance shall be effective until published pursuant to KRS Chapter 424. Ordinances may be published in full or in summary as designated by the legislative body. If the legislative body elects to publish an ordinance in summary, the summary shall be prepared or certified by an attorney licensed to practice law in the Commonwealth of Kentucky and shall include the following:
    1. The title of the ordinance;
    2. A brief narrative setting forth the main points of the ordinance in a way reasonably calculated to inform the public in a clear and understandable manner of the meaning of the ordinance; and
    3. The full text of each section that imposes taxes or fees.

      Ordinances that include descriptions of real property may include a sketch, drawing, or map, including common landmarks, such as streets or roads in lieu of metes and bounds descriptions.

  10. A city may specify by ordinance additional requirements for adoption of ordinances in greater detail than contained herein, but a city shall not lessen or reduce the substantial requirements of this section or any other statute relating to adoption of ordinances.
  11. At least once every five (5) years, each city shall cause all ordinances in the composite index or code of ordinances to be examined for consistency with state law and with one another and to be revised to eliminate redundant, obsolete, inconsistent, and invalid provisions.
  12. The legislative body may adopt municipal orders. Orders shall be in writing and may be adopted only at an official meeting. Orders may be amended by a subsequent municipal order or ordinance. All orders adopted shall be maintained in an official order book.
  13. In lieu of an ordinance, a municipal order may be used for matters relating to the internal operation and functions of the municipality and to appoint or remove or approve appointment or removal of members of boards, commissions, and other agencies over which the city has control.
  14. All ordinances, and orders of the city may be proved by the signature of the city clerk; and when the ordinances are placed in a printed composite index or code of ordinances by authority of the city, the printed copy shall be received in evidence by any state court without further proof of the ordinances.
  15. For anything said in debate, legislative body members shall be entitled to the same immunities and protections allowed to members of the General Assembly.

History. Enact. Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 6, effective July 15, 1980; 1982, ch. 434, § 2, effective July 15, 1982; 1990, ch. 401, § 15, effective July 13, 1990; 1992, ch. 34, § 1, effective July 14, 1992; 2006, ch. 8, § 1, effective July 12, 2006; 2014, ch. 5, § 2, effective July 15, 2014.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(7/15/2020). 2020 Ky. Acts ch. 91, sec. 73, which was effective April 15, 2020, stated the following:

“Publishing Requirements: Notwithstanding KRS 83A.060 , 91A.040 , and Chapter 424, a county containing a population of more than 90,000 or any city within a county containing a population of more than 90,000, as determined by the 2010 United States Census, may publish enacted ordinances, audits, and bid solicitations by posting the full ordinance, the full audit report including the auditor's opinion letter, or the bid solicitation on an Internet Web site maintained by the county or city government for a period of at least one (1) year. If a county or city publishes ordinances, audits, or bid solicitations on an Internet Web site, the county or city shall also publish an advertisement, in a newspaper qualified in accordance with KRS 424.120 , with a description of the ordinances, audits, or bid solicitations published on the Internet Web site, including the Uniform Resource Locator (URL) where the documents can be viewed. Any advertisement required to be published in a newspaper under KRS Chapter 424 shall contain the following statement at the end of the advertisement:

“This advertisement was paid for by [insert the name of the governmental body required to advertise in a newspaper] using taxpayer dollars in the amount of $[insert the amount paid for the advertisement].”.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Emergency Clause.

The affixing of an emergency clause to an ordinance, alone, does not make the ordinance an emergency measure within the meaning of the law. United Dry Forces v. Citizens for Progressive Community, 635 S.W.2d 478, 1982 Ky. LEXIS 272 ( Ky. 1982 ).

A declaration in an ordinance of an emergency is not conclusive. However, a court will not substitute its judgment for that of a duly constituted legislative body, and presumptively will view such ordinances as being a valid exercise of a local legislative prerogative. United Dry Forces v. Citizens for Progressive Community, 635 S.W.2d 478, 1982 Ky. LEXIS 272 ( Ky. 1982 ).

Where ordinance made a naked declaration that an emergency existed, which standing by itself did not meet the requirements of this section in that it did not describe the emergency, but the preamble described the emergency in some detail, the use of the preamble to detail the declaration of emergency was proper. United Dry Forces v. Citizens for Progressive Community, 635 S.W.2d 478, 1982 Ky. LEXIS 272 ( Ky. 1982 ).

2. Planning and Zoning.

Any action taken by a legislative body of local government with regard to planning and zoning is done in the form of passing an ordinance. Leslie v. Henderson, 797 S.W.2d 718, 1990 Ky. App. LEXIS 157 (Ky. Ct. App. 1990).

3. City Police Officers.

City police officer did not make an unlawful arrest when the city police officer arrested the defendants outside the city limits but within the county limits. A municipal order directing city police officers to operate inside the city limits was meant to keep police officers in the city and control the employment of such officers, and did not affect the KRS 95.019(1) county-wide power of city police officers to make an arrest. Commonwealth v. Bishop, 245 S.W.3d 733, 2008 Ky. LEXIS 37 ( Ky. 2008 ).

4. Adjourned Sessions.

An adjourned session of a regular meeting is a regular meeting and any business that might be transacted at the original session may be done at the adjourned session. The adjourned session is but a continuation of the original session. Hodgenville v. Kentucky Utilities Co., 250 Ky. 195 , 61 S.W.2d 1047, 1933 Ky. LEXIS 630 ( Ky. 1933 ) (decided under prior law).

5. Immunity.

Former statute governing terms and privileges of council members in second-class cities, as it related to the city manager form of government, was upheld against the contention that it violated Ky. Const., § 51 in that it dealt with more than one subject, regardless of the fact that it adopted by reference the immunities permitted to members of the General Assembly. Jacobs v. Underwood, 484 S.W.2d 855, 1972 Ky. LEXIS 158 ( Ky. 1972 ) (decided under prior law).

While secondary or quasi-legislative bodies such as city commissions only enjoyed a qualified privilege under the common law, former similar statute effectively granted to members of city legislative bodies an absolute privilege under which they could not be liable for statements made during a debate before a formal meeting of the assembly. Jacobs v. Underwood, 484 S.W.2d 855, 1972 Ky. LEXIS 158 ( Ky. 1972 ) (decided under prior law).

An action to recover for defamation of character is not an action to recover for injuries to persons or property as those words are used in Ky. Const., § 54 and, therefore, former statute, which extended immunity to members of city legislative bodies, did not violate Ky. Const., § 54 which prohibits the general assembly from limiting the amount which may be recovered for injuries to persons or property. Jacobs v. Underwood, 484 S.W.2d 855, 1972 Ky. LEXIS 158 ( Ky. 1972 ) (decided under prior law).

The air board is a legislative body and, as such, its members are granted absolute immunity for statements made while acting within the scope of the duties imposed upon them by the statute. Gray v. Central Bank & Trust Co., 562 S.W.2d 656, 1978 Ky. App. LEXIS 472 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978) (decided under prior law).

An air board member who investigated a bidder on a contract was acting within the scope of his duties inasmuch as he was seeking to insure that the contract was awarded to the lowest and best bidder, and thereby enjoyed an absolute privilege from liability for his remarks. Gray v. Central Bank & Trust Co., 562 S.W.2d 656, 1978 Ky. App. LEXIS 472 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978) (decided under prior law).

The rules regarding the entering and signing of orders nunc pro tunc are applicable to municipal legislative bodies; thus where upon discovery that resolution of council authorizing oil and gas lease of certain city property and report of clerk concerning that sale had not been entered into council’s minute book, council adopted nunc pro tunc resolution setting forth all the particulars concerning the lease and the steps that had been taken in connection therewith and where clipping of newspaper advertisement announcing the sale of such oil and gas lease was pasted in the minute book, such action was sufficient to constitute a ratification of the lease and authorize entry of the nunc pro tunc resolution. Ricketts v. Hiawatha Oil & Gas Co., 300 Ky. 548 , 189 S.W.2d 858, 1945 Ky. LEXIS 602 ( Ky. 1945 ) (decided under prior law).

Trial court properly granted summary judgment dismissal to a former mayor’s defamation claims against a current mayor, as his statements made in a city council meeting were entitled to an absolute privilege pursuant to KRS 83A.060(15); the town was organized and governed by a mayor-council plan pursuant to KRS 83A.030 , wherein the mayor presided at city council meetings and cast a vote in case of a tie. Smith v. Martin, 331 S.W.3d 637, 2011 Ky. App. LEXIS 22 (Ky. Ct. App. 2011).

Immunity afforded by KRS 83A.060(15), former KRS 84.050(5), and caselaw is not only limited to actual members of a legislative body, but also only to statements made while acting within the scope of the duties imposed upon them by statute; therefore, dismissal of a defamation case was improper because legislative immunity was not extended to an independent contractor hired to perform services to a legislative body. An absolute privilege under KRS 83A.060(15) did not attach to statements contained in a letter written by the contractor to a mayor. D.F. Bailey, Inc. v. GRW Eng'rs, Inc., 350 S.W.3d 818, 2011 Ky. App. LEXIS 119 (Ky. Ct. App. 2011).

6. Ordinances.
7. — Adoption by Reference.

A document proposed to be adopted by reference in an ordinance must first be made a part of the public records of the city by being read and approved by the city law making body in formal session, by a resolution duly passed and recorded showing that such action has been taken; thereafter such document may be enacted into law by reference in a duly passed and published ordinance, without spreading the document on the ordinance book. Hazard v. Collins, 304 Ky. 379 , 200 S.W.2d 933, 1947 Ky. LEXIS 655 ( Ky. 1947 ) (decided under prior law).

Although certain documents could be made a part of city ordinances by means of adoption by reference, if first properly made a part of the public records of the city, a standard building code, written in the form of an ordinance, could be made a part of the law of the city only by enacting it in the same manner as any other ordinance. Hazard v. Collins, 304 Ky. 379 , 200 S.W.2d 933, 1947 Ky. LEXIS 655 ( Ky. 1947 ) (decided under prior law).

An ordinance adopting a 300-page building code by reference only, except for an amendment to code’s penalty section, was invalid, where code was never read before being voted on by the city council, was not recorded in the city clerk’s office, and was not published. Hazard v. Collins, 304 Ky. 379 , 200 S.W.2d 933, 1947 Ky. LEXIS 655 ( Ky. 1947 ) (decided under prior law).

8. — Amendment.

A set of revised ordinances may be amended by reference to chapter or section, followed by the chapter or section as amended. Lowry v. Lexington, 113 Ky. 763 , 68 S.W. 1109, 24 Ky. L. Rptr. 516 , 1902 Ky. LEXIS 107 ( Ky. 1902 ) (decided under prior law).

An ordinance of a second-class city, amending a section of an earlier ordinance, was valid as an amendment where the portion of the earlier ordinance amended was set out in full, even though the entire earlier ordinance was not set out in full as amended. Pure Milk Producers & Distributors Ass'ns v. Morton, 276 Ky. 736 , 125 S.W.2d 216, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 575 ( Ky. 1939 ) (decided under prior law).

9. — Codification.

Ordinance, which clearly was a codification and reenactment of all ordinances that board of commissioners intended should remain in force, and which excepted only certain named ordinances, was effective to repeal all ordinances not included in the codification or embraced in the exception. Harrodsburg v. Southern R. Co., 278 Ky. 10 , 128 S.W.2d 233, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 389 ( Ky. 1939 ) (decided under prior law).

10. — Notice.

Contractors are chargeable with notice of ordinances of first-class cities. Murphy v. Louisville, 72 Ky. 189 , 1872 Ky. LEXIS 31 ( Ky. 1872 ); Craycraft v. Selvage, 73 Ky. 696 , 1874 Ky. LEXIS 111 ( Ky. 1874 ) (decided under prior law).

Citizens are chargeable with notice of the city legislative proceedings. Barret v. Godshaw, 75 Ky. 592 , 1877 Ky. LEXIS 120 ( Ky. 1877 ) (decided under prior law).

11. — Passage.

Ordinances of fifth-class cities become effective upon their passage by the votes of at least three members of the council and publication. Commonwealth v. Williams, 120 Ky. 314 , 86 S.W. 553, 27 Ky. L. Rptr. 695 , 1905 Ky. LEXIS 105 ( Ky. 1905 ) (decided under prior law).

When the mayor neither signed nor returned an ordinance, it became effective without his signature. Baker v. Combs, 194 Ky. 260 , 239 S.W. 56, 1922 Ky. LEXIS 165 ( Ky. 1922 ) (decided under prior law).

An ordinance could be enacted only in the manner pointed out in former similar section. Russell v. Bell, 224 Ky. 298 , 6 S.W.2d 236, 1928 Ky. LEXIS 577 ( Ky. 1928 ) (decided under prior law).

12. — Proof.

The mere keeping of memoranda by the clerk on slips of paper did not amount to the keeping of a “correct journal” of the proceedings of the board, and was not proof of the passage of ordinances. Louisville v. McKegney, 70 Ky. 651 , 1870 Ky. LEXIS 146 ( Ky. 1870 ) (decided under prior law).

It is sufficient, generally, in order to make out a prima facie case, to allege that the ordinance was passed. Preston v. Roberts, 75 Ky. 570 , 1877 Ky. LEXIS 119 ( Ky. 1877 ); Shuck v. Lebanon, 107 Ky. 252 , 53 S.W. 655, 21 Ky. L. Rptr. 969 , 1899 Ky. LEXIS 165 ( Ky. 1899 ); Tennessee Paving-Brick Co. v. Barker, 119 Ky. 654 , 59 S.W. 755, 22 Ky. L. Rptr. 1069 , 1900 Ky. LEXIS 114 ( Ky. 1900 ) (decided under prior law). See Richmond v. Madison Female Institute, 153 Ky. 301 , 155 S.W. 371, 1913 Ky. LEXIS 817 ( Ky. 1913 ).

Duly certified copies are sufficient evidence of the legality of passage and other necessary steps. Barret v. Godshaw, 75 Ky. 592 , 1877 Ky. LEXIS 120 ( Ky. 1877 ); McHenry v. Selvage, 99 Ky. 232 , 35 S.W. 645, 18 Ky. L. Rptr. 473 , 1896 Ky. LEXIS 82 ( Ky. 1896 ); Woolley v. Louisville, 114 Ky. 55 , 71 S.W. 893, 24 Ky. L. Rptr. 13576 , 1903 Ky. LEXIS 36 ( Ky. 1903 ) (decided under prior law).

An ordinance of a first-class city is sufficiently proven by an allegation of its title and effective date and copies need not be filed. Dumesnil v. Hexagon Tile-Walk Co., 58 S.W. 705, 23 Ky. L. Rptr. 144 , 1900 Ky. LEXIS 696 ( Ky. 1900 ); Gaertner v. Louisville Artificial Stone Co., 114 Ky. 160 , 70 S.W. 293, 24 Ky. L. Rptr. 940 , 1902 Ky. LEXIS 143 ( Ky. 1902 ); Woolley v. Louisville, 114 Ky. 556 , 71 S.W. 893, 24 Ky. L. Rptr. 1357 , 1903 Ky. LEXIS 36 ( Ky. 1903 ); Gnau v. Ackerman, 166 Ky. 258 , 179 S.W. 217, 1915 Ky. LEXIS 683 ( Ky. 1915 ); Louisville Trust Co. v. Morgan, 180 Ky. 609 , 203 S.W. 555, 1918 Ky. LEXIS 132 ( Ky. 1918 ); Hart v. Roth, 186 Ky. 535 , 217 S.W. 893, 1920 Ky. LEXIS 63 ( Ky. 1920 ) (decided under prior law).

Passage of an ordinance by the votes of at least three councilmen would be presumed when the transcript of the minutes was admittedly incomplete. Harrison v. Greenville, 146 Ky. 96 , 142 S.W. 219, 1912 Ky. LEXIS 21 ( Ky. 1912 ) (decided under prior law).

In absence of statute or ordinance to that effect, the minutes need not show that an ordinance was read in full prior to adoption and was adopted by a majority of those voting. The words “pass” and “adopt,” as applied to legislation, implied approval by a majority of a quorum, except when a higher percentage of vote was specifically required. An ordinance which was regular in appearance was prima facie valid. When the minutes did not itemize the incidental procedural steps, defects could be shown by evidence outside the record. Baker v. Combs, 194 Ky. 260 , 239 S.W. 56, 1922 Ky. LEXIS 165 ( Ky. 1922 ) (decided under prior law).

Ordinances of second-class cities must be proved according to former similar section, since judicial notice was not taken of them. Cline v. Cook, 216 Ky. 366 , 287 S.W. 927, 1926 Ky. LEXIS 919 ( Ky. 1926 ) (decided under prior law).

Where ordinance under which plaintiff was convicted appeared in the record book the presumption was that it had been passed by the requisite number of votes and as there was no evidence to overcome this presumption the court did not err in refusing to declare the ordinance void. Bailey v. Ravenna, 280 Ky. 21 , 132 S.W.2d 532, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 64 ( Ky. 1939 ) (decided under prior law).

13. — Publication.

Ordinances are effective from time of publication, and there is no limitation as to time of publication. McNulty v. Toopf, 116 Ky. 202 , 75 S.W. 258, 25 Ky. L. Rptr. 430 , 1903 Ky. LEXIS 176 ( Ky. 1903 ) (decided under prior law).

Publication of an ordinance will be presumed, and the burden is on the one attacking it to show that it was not published. Muir's Adm'rs v. Bardstown, 120 Ky. 739 , 87 S.W. 1096, 27 Ky. L. Rptr. 1150 , 1905 Ky. LEXIS 156 ( Ky. 1905 ) (decided under prior law).

Ordinances of fourth-class cities are invalid unless published following passage. Latonia v. Hedger, 125 Ky. 13 , 100 S.W. 267, 30 Ky. L. Rptr. 1091 , 1907 Ky. LEXIS 257 ( Ky. 1907 ); City of Maysville v. Davis, 166 Ky. 555 , 179 S.W. 463, 1915 Ky. LEXIS 732 ( Ky. 1915 ) (decided under prior law).

Ordinances of second-class cities are not effective until published in full. Newport v. Newport Nat'l Bank, 148 Ky. 213 , 146 S.W. 377, 1912 Ky. LEXIS 403 ( Ky. 1912 ) (decided under prior law).

Advertisement by typewritten handbills posted in eight or more conspicuous places in the city was sufficient. Gesser v. McLane, 156 Ky. 743 , 161 S.W. 1118, 1914 Ky. LEXIS 182 ( Ky. 1914 ) (decision prior to 1966 amendment).

The council records need not recite that an ordinance was published in the manner required by law. Bates v. Monticello, 173 Ky. 244 , 190 S.W. 1074, 1917 Ky. LEXIS 440 ( Ky. 1917 ) (decided under prior law).

Requirement that ordinances of second-class cities are not effective until published in full was mandatory. Newport v. Glazier, 175 Ky. 608 , 194 S.W. 771, 1917 Ky. LEXIS 353 ( Ky. 1917 ) (decided under prior law).

It was presumed that the newspaper in which the ordinance was published was within the city. Wallace v. Louisa, 217 Ky. 419 , 273 S.W. 720, 1925 Ky. LEXIS 982 ( Ky. 1925 ) (decision prior to 1966 amendment).

Where annexation ordinance provided that it would be in force after posting, posting by person who had no official connection whatever with the town could not be considered the action of the town and such posting could not put the ordinance into force. Kaelin v. Indian Hills, 286 S.W.2d 898, 1956 Ky. LEXIS 428 ( Ky. 1956 ) (decided under prior law).

Ordinance of second-class city proposing annexation of certain territory was invalid as it was not published three times as required by subsection (1)(b) of KRS 424.130 prior to its amendment in 1960. Vincent v. Bowling Green, 349 S.W.2d 694, 1961 Ky. LEXIS 60 ( Ky. 1961 ) (decided under prior law).

14. — Quorum.

The affirmative vote of three councilmen in fifth-class city did not dispense with requirement of quorum. Leitchfield Mercantile Co. v. Commonwealth, 143 Ky. 162 , 136 S.W. 639, 1911 Ky. LEXIS 407 ( Ky. 1911 ) (decided under prior law).

In the rule established in Pierson-Trapp Co. v. Knippenberg, 387 S.W.2d 587, 1965 Ky. LEXIS 473 (Ky. App. 1965), that when a quorum of a governing body is present those members who are present and do not vote will be considered as acquiescing with the majority, the word “majority” does not mean a numerical majority of the entire elected membership of the board, but means a majority of those present and voting. Payne v. Petrie, 419 S.W.2d 761, 1967 Ky. LEXIS 192 ( Ky. 1967 ) (decided under prior law).

Where quorum of city Board of Trustees required the presence of three board members under former law, the passage of an annexation ordinance by the only two board members at a meeting was invalid. Lile v. Powderly, 612 S.W.2d 762, 1981 Ky. App. LEXIS 225 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981) (decided under prior law).

15. Reading.

An ordinance read for the first time at a void special meeting, and given the remaining readings, and passed, at the next regular meeting, was invalid. Glazier v. Newport, 132 Ky. 181 , 116 S.W. 262, 1909 Ky. LEXIS 85 ( Ky. 1909 ) (decided under prior law).

Adoption of a resolution at a single session without suspension of requirement of reading at two meetings is insufficient, in absence of waiver, estoppel, or performance. Ashland v. Steele, 219 Ky. 341 , 292 S.W. 1098, 1926 Ky. LEXIS 127 ( Ky. 1926 ) (decided under prior law).

Former similar section specifically provided that the requirement of a reading at two separate meetings could be suspended by a vote of two-thirds of the members of the board. Payne v. Petrie, 419 S.W.2d 761, 1967 Ky. LEXIS 192 ( Ky. 1967 ) (decided under prior law).

16. — Recording.

The recording of ordinances need not be done as of the date of passage. McNulty v. Toopf, 116 Ky. 202 , 75 S.W. 258, 25 Ky. L. Rptr. 430 , 1903 Ky. LEXIS 176 ( Ky. 1903 ) (decided under prior law).

An averment that an ordinance was not recorded in the journal on the days of passage is insufficient; it should deny that it was recorded at all. McNulty v. Toopf, 116 Ky. 202 , 75 S.W. 258, 25 Ky. L. Rptr. 430 , 1903 Ky. LEXIS 176 ( Ky. 1903 ) (decided under prior law).

The spreading at large of an ordinance on the record of the proceedings of a council was not necessary to its validity, particularly where a separate ordinance book is maintained. Baker v. Combs, 194 Ky. 260 , 239 S.W. 56, 1922 Ky. LEXIS 165 ( Ky. 1922 ) (decided under prior law).

An ordinance of a sixth-class town was not invalid because copy of the ordinance was filed in but not recorded in the ordinance book. Kevil v. Hawthorne, 205 Ky. 426 , 265 S.W. 937, 1924 Ky. LEXIS 127 ( Ky. 1924 ) (decided under prior law).

A city ordinance, in order to be properly recorded, need not be copied in full in the journal; a synopsis or minute of the passage of the ordinance is sufficient. Pure Milk Producers & Distributors Ass'ns v. Morton, 276 Ky. 736 , 125 S.W.2d 216, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 575 ( Ky. 1939 ) (decided under prior law).

Irregularities in recording a city ordinance were not fatal to its validity, and courts would be liberal in their construction as to what constituted a sufficient recordation to make it part of public records of the city; however some recording was essential. Hazard v. Collins, 304 Ky. 379 , 200 S.W.2d 933, 1947 Ky. LEXIS 655 ( Ky. 1947 ) (decided under prior law).

17. — Rules of Construction.

The same rules that must be observed in the construction of statutes apply in the construction of municipal ordinances. Mayfield v. Reed, 278 Ky. 5 , 127 S.W.2d 847, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 367 ( Ky. 1939 ) (decided under prior law).

18. — Signing.

Signature of presiding officer to minutes sufficiently validates any ordinance which is not for the expenditure of money. Becker v. Henderson, 100 Ky. 450 , 38 S.W. 857, 18 Ky. L. Rptr. 881 , 1897 Ky. LEXIS 21 ( Ky. 1897 ) (decided under prior law).

When ordinance completely fills a page of the record, and the chairman and clerk sign at the top of the following page, the ordinance is properly signed. Whitley v. Stephens, 184 Ky. 277 , 211 S.W. 770, 1919 Ky. LEXIS 62 ( Ky. 1919 ) (decided under prior law).

Where a fifth-class city ordinance creating a water board was not signed by the mayor, the ordinance was not void because the purpose of the signing was simply to provide an evidence of the authenticity of the ordinance and did not affect its validity. Foley v. Kinnett, 486 S.W.2d 705, 1972 Ky. LEXIS 118 ( Ky. 1972 ) (decided under prior law).

19. — Subject.

An ordinance is sufficient as to subject matter, if its provisions relate to subjects naturally connected. Lowry v. Lexington, 113 Ky. 763 , 68 S.W. 1109, 24 Ky. L. Rptr. 516 , 1902 Ky. LEXIS 107 ( Ky. 1902 ) (decided under prior law).

An ordinance providing for a franchise for the furnishing of light, heat, fuel and power, by means of gas, hot water or steam, or a combination thereof, embraces three franchises, and is void. Silva v. Newport, 119 Ky. 587 , 84 S.W. 741, 27 Ky. L. Rptr. 212 , 1905 Ky. LEXIS 35 ( Ky. 1905 ) (decided under prior law).

Municipal ordinance entitled “an ordinance proposing to annex all of that territory to the north, east, south and west of present boundaries of city of Bowling Green, Ky.” which recited previous additions to the city, described the present boundaries, and described the territory to be annexed, was not void as embracing more than one subject not expressed in the title. Rigelwood v. Bowling Green, 238 S.W.2d 147, 1951 Ky. LEXIS 805 ( Ky. 1951 ) (decided under prior law).

20. — Title.

Fact that the subject matter is detailed in the title more minutely than is necessary does not invalidate an ordinance. McNulty v. Toopf, 116 Ky. 202 , 75 S.W. 258, 25 Ky. L. Rptr. 430 , 1903 Ky. LEXIS 176 ( Ky. 1903 ) (decided under prior law).

Where title to an ordinance described it as annexing part of an adjacent town, while the body of the ordinance annexed that part of the town lying within a described boundary; the title was held sufficient. Cote Brilliante v. Newport, 195 Ky. 317 , 242 S.W. 2, 1922 Ky. LEXIS 297 ( Ky. 1922 ) (decided under prior law).

It is not necessary that minute details contained in the body of an ordinance be incorporated in the title. Schoening v. Paducah Water Co., 230 Ky. 453 , 19 S.W.2d 1073, 1929 Ky. LEXIS 93 ( Ky. 1929 ); Scott v. Cincinnati, N. & C. R. Co., 268 Ky. 383 , 105 S.W.2d 169, 1937 Ky. LEXIS 482 ( Ky. 1937 ) (decided under prior law).

A title is not insufficient because the means and agencies by which the purposes of the ordinance are to be accomplished are designated in its body but not in the title. Dowdy v. Covington, 237 Ky. 274 , 35 S.W.2d 304, 1931 Ky. LEXIS 588 ( Ky. 1931 ) (decided under prior law).

Title is sufficient if the contents of the ordinance are germane to the accomplishment of the purpose of the subject stated in the title. Dowdy v. Covington, 237 Ky. 274 , 35 S.W.2d 304, 1931 Ky. LEXIS 588 ( Ky. 1931 ) (decided under prior law).

Titles of ordinances are sufficient if the general terms employed therein are broad enough to embrace the subject matter dealt with in the body of the enactment. Scott v. Cincinnati, N. & C. R. Co., 268 Ky. 383 , 105 S.W.2d 169, 1937 Ky. LEXIS 482 ( Ky. 1937 ) (decided under prior law).

The title need not be a complete index of the act or ordinance if it is sufficiently broad to inform the casual reader of the subject and purposes covered in the legislation. Paducah Automotive Trades Ass'n v. Paducah, 307 Ky. 524 , 211 S.W.2d 660, 1948 Ky. LEXIS 769 ( Ky. 1948 ) (decided under prior law).

21. — Validity.

The testimony of one who is not the legal custodian of the document in issue is insufficient to rebut the presumption of the validity of only certified copies. Louisville v. Cassady, 105 Ky. 424 , 49 S.W. 194, 20 Ky. L. Rptr. 1348 , 1899 Ky. LEXIS 225 ( Ky. 1899 ); Bernet v. Shanks, 55 S.W. 690, 21 Ky. L. Rptr. 1558 , 1900 Ky. LEXIS 521 (Ky. Ct. App. 1900) (decided under prior law).

One attacking the validity of an ordinance had the burden of proving its irregularity. Weatherhead v. Cody, 85 S.W. 1099, 27 Ky. L. Rptr. 631 (1905) (decided under prior law). See Muir's Adm'rs v. Bardstown, 120 Ky. 739 , 87 S.W. 1096, 27 Ky. L. Rptr. 1150 , 1905 Ky. LEXIS 156 ( Ky. 1905 ); City of Columbus v. Bank of Columbus, 122 S.W. 835, 1909 Ky. LEXIS 526 ( Ky. 1909 ); Bates v. Monticello, 173 Ky. 244 , 190 S.W. 1074, 1917 Ky. LEXIS 440 ( Ky. 1917 ); Wallace v. Louisa, 217 Ky. 419 , 273 S.W. 720, 1925 Ky. LEXIS 982 ( Ky. 1925 ).

The validity of ordinances of fifth-class city was not affected by the fact that the minutes of the meetings at which they were passed were not written up at the time the offense was committed. It was sufficient that the minutes were available as evidence at the time of trial. Commonwealth v. Williams, 120 Ky. 314 , 86 S.W. 553, 27 Ky. L. Rptr. 695 , 1905 Ky. LEXIS 105 ( Ky. 1905 ) (decided under prior law).

An ordinance, the penalty clause of which did not fix a maximum penalty, was void for uncertainty. Arnett v. Cardwell, 135 Ky. 14 , 121 S.W. 964, 1909 Ky. LEXIS 257 ( Ky. 1909 ) (decided under prior law).

The fact that the clerk, instead of writing the ordinance into the minutes, pasted in a printed copy at the proper place, does not affect its validity. Harrison v. Greenville, 146 Ky. 96 , 142 S.W. 219, 1912 Ky. LEXIS 21 ( Ky. 1912 ) (decided under prior law).

Failure of ordinance to provide penalty (other than fees and costs) for its breach did not invalidate it. Whitley v. Stephens, 184 Ky. 277 , 211 S.W. 770, 1919 Ky. LEXIS 62 ( Ky. 1919 ) (decided under prior law).

Mutilation of ordinance after passage did not affect its validity as passed. Kevil v. Nuckols, 198 Ky. 798 , 250 S.W. 84, 1923 Ky. LEXIS 553 ( Ky. 1923 ) (decided under prior law).

Any bona fide citizen may test the validity of a city ordinance without making prior demand of the city authorities. Schoening v. Paducah Water Co., 230 Ky. 453 , 19 S.W.2d 1073, 1929 Ky. LEXIS 93 ( Ky. 1929 ) (decided under prior law).

A proposed ordinance which was recorded and published but was never voted on by the council was a nullity. Peters v. Morehead, 266 Ky. 99 , 98 S.W.2d 41, 1936 Ky. LEXIS 599 ( Ky. 1936 ) (decided under prior law).

Generally the burden is upon the party asserting the invalidity of an ordinance to show the irregularity of its enactment, and where an ordinance is copied in an ordinance book kept by a city and appears to be regular, it will be presumed that the city authorities performed their duty. Bailey v. Ravenna, 280 Ky. 21 , 132 S.W.2d 532, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 64 ( Ky. 1939 ) (decided under prior law).

22. Records of City.
23. — Corrections.

Corrections in the minutes must be made before the minutes are signed. Becker v. Henderson, 100 Ky. 450 , 38 S.W. 857, 18 Ky. L. Rptr. 881 , 1897 Ky. LEXIS 21 ( Ky. 1897 ) (decided under prior law).

A board could correct its record so as to make it speak the truth. Morton v. Fullerton, 229 Ky. 76 , 16 S.W.2d 797, 1929 Ky. LEXIS 707 ( Ky. 1929 ); Ward v. Lester, 235 Ky. 595 , 31 S.W.2d 924, 1930 Ky. LEXIS 413 ( Ky. 1930 ) (decided under prior law).

24. — Evidence.

City attorney’s certification that purported copy of town board’s ordinance, authorizing the delivery of the entire issue of revenue bonds to sewer construction contractor was a true and correct copy, was not authorized by statute and did not make the copy admissible in evidence as a properly certified copy. Erlanger v. Berkemeyer, 207 F.2d 832, 1953 U.S. App. LEXIS 2983, 38 A.L.R.2d 918 (6th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 915, 74 S. Ct. 275, 98 L. Ed. 411, 1953 U.S. LEXIS 1370 (1953), cert. denied, Erlanger v. Berkemeyer, 346 U.S. 915, 74 S. Ct. 275, 98 L. Ed. 411, 1953 U.S. LEXIS 1370 (1953) (decided under prior law).

A record such as a city council is required to keep is evidence of no facts except those which the law requires it to contain may be shown by evidence aliunde the records of the city council. Bates v. Monticello, 173 Ky. 244 , 190 S.W. 1074, 1917 Ky. LEXIS 440 ( Ky. 1917 ) (decided under prior law).

Since a city speaks by its records, the record evidence must prevail as against the oral evidence of a witness contrary to the record and thus the showing of the minute book as to roll call on, and reading of an ordinance prevails over testimony of witness. Planters Bank & Trust Co. v. Hopkinsville, 289 Ky. 451 , 159 S.W.2d 25, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 584 ( Ky. 1942 ) (decided under prior law).

25. — Inspection.

Citizen and taxpayer having an interest in the official records of the city engineer’s office has right to inspect same by mandamus, even though inspection is desired in order to prepare suit. Barrickman v. Lyman, 154 Ky. 630 , 157 S.W. 924, 1913 Ky. LEXIS 103 ( Ky. 1913 ) (decided under prior law).

“Inspection” includes right of taxpayer to have audit made, subject to reasonable restrictions, even though city has just completed annual audit, and this right may be enforced by mandamus. Motch v. Middlesboro, 242 Ky. 653 , 47 S.W.2d 56, 1932 Ky. LEXIS 325 ( Ky. 1932 ) (decided under prior law).

26. — Recording of Votes.

An omission to record yea and nay votes could be cured by order nunc pro tunc. City of Pineville v. Burchfield, 42 S.W. 340, 19 Ky. L. Rptr. 984 (1897); Spalding v. Lebanon, 156 Ky. 37 , 160 S.W. 751, 1913 Ky. LEXIS 369 ( Ky. 1913 ) (decided under prior law).

Failure of the record to show complete vote was not material when it showed the names of those voting “aye” and they constituted a majority. Kevil v. Hawthorne, 205 Ky. 426 , 265 S.W. 937, 1924 Ky. LEXIS 127 ( Ky. 1924 ) (decided under prior law).

Where a yea and nay vote was recorded in the journal on each tax ordinance which record showed the page where the ordinance might be found the fact that the journal was not kept in an orderly or systematic manner was not a failure to comply with former section governing passage of ordinances in fourth-class cities. Richmond v. Goodloe, 287 Ky. 379 , 153 S.W.2d 921, 1941 Ky. LEXIS 558 ( Ky. 1941 ) (decided under prior law).

Ordinance imposing penalty and interest to expedite tax collection, was passed by yea and nay vote recorded in journal, where newspaper clipping of ordinance was pasted in journal, and minutes, although on different page, showed yea and nay vote on ordinance with reference to page where clipping was pasted. Richmond v. Goodloe, 287 Ky. 379 , 153 S.W.2d 921, 1941 Ky. LEXIS 558 ( Ky. 1941 ) (decided under prior law).

27. — Sufficiency.

The record should be sufficiently complete and correct to inform interested persons of what has been done, and to leave nothing to the discretion or interpretation of the clerk. Louisville v. McKegney, 70 Ky. 651 , 1870 Ky. LEXIS 146 ( Ky. 1870 ) (decided under prior law).

Typographical error in printed ordinance as to date of meeting was, in absence of injury, immaterial, it appearing that the original records showed the correct date, which correct date was well known in the community. Muir's Adm'rs v. Bardstown, 120 Ky. 739 , 87 S.W. 1096, 27 Ky. L. Rptr. 1150 , 1905 Ky. LEXIS 156 ( Ky. 1905 ) (decided under prior law).

Failure of council records to recite execution and approval of an official bond does not affect validity. Commonwealth use of Rosenthal v. Teel, 111 S.W. 340, 33 Ky. L. Rptr. 741 (1908) (decided under prior law).

Failure of city’s records to show street improvement lien does not affect the lien against a subsequent purchaser without notice. Hughes v. Wallace, 118 S.W. 324, 1909 Ky. LEXIS 494 ( Ky. 1909 ) (decided under prior law).

Such portion of the minutes as were written on the margin of the page of the minute book will, when the minutes have been signed and approved, be deemed valid. Martin v. Greenville, 145 Ky. 649 , 140 S.W. 1043, 1911 Ky. LEXIS 913 ( Ky. 1911 ) (decided under prior law).

The journal in respect to ordinances concerning improvements is intended to be an index that will show fairly and intelligently what the council did, rather than a full and complete record of its proceedings. Meacham Contracting Co. v. Kleiderer, 146 Ky. 441 , 142 S.W. 720, 1912 Ky. LEXIS 83 ( Ky. 1912 ) (decided under prior law).

The council records need not recite that an ordinance was published in the manner required by law. Bates v. Monticello, 173 Ky. 244 , 190 S.W. 1074, 1917 Ky. LEXIS 440 ( Ky. 1917 ) (decided under prior law).

Precision in the records of a sixth-class town was not expected, but such records must evidence at least a substantial compliance with constitutional and statutory requirements on the subject involved. Kevil v. Hawthorne, 205 Ky. 426 , 265 S.W. 937, 1924 Ky. LEXIS 127 ( Ky. 1924 ) (decided under prior law). See Rockport Coal Co.'s Trustee v. Tilford, 222 Ky. 288 , 300 S.W. 898, 1927 Ky. LEXIS 932 ( Ky. 1927 ); Citizens Nat'l Bank's Trustee v. Loyall, 262 Ky. 39 , 88 S.W.2d 952, 1935 Ky. LEXIS 757 ( Ky. 1935 ).

Fact that certain minutes were not recorded in order was immaterial where minute book was later rebound and the minutes placed in proper order. Orr v. Mann, 208 Ky. 46 , 270 S.W. 491, 1925 Ky. LEXIS 212 ( Ky. 1925 ) (decided under prior law).

28. Resolutions.

Declaration of necessity for waterworks bonds and calling of an election on incurrence of involved indebtedness could be done by resolution, although the actual incurring of the indebtedness and providing for payment thereof must be done by ordinance. Bernheim v. Anchorage, 159 Ky. 315 , 167 S.W. 139, 1914 Ky. LEXIS 792 ( Ky. 1914 ) (decided under prior law).

Fourth-class city could lawfully contract to purchase map of city by resolution instead of by ordinance. Waddle v. Somerset, 281 Ky. 30 , 134 S.W.2d 956, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 4 ( Ky. 1939 ) (decided under prior law).

Cited:

Merritt v. Campbellsville, 678 S.W.2d 788, 1984 Ky. App. LEXIS 625 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984); Schilling v. Schoenle, 782 S.W.2d 630, 1990 Ky. LEXIS 5 ( Ky. 1990 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

A city council speaks only through its records and minutes, and since the minutes of a meeting did not reflect that the council had accepted a deed to certain streets presented by the developer or that any vote on the matter was ever taken, the fact remains that the streets had not been accepted, even though the city clerk wrote a letter to the developer stating that the streets had been accepted. OAG 80-284 .

Under this section all ordinances of cities of the fourth class must be published in a local newspaper qualifying under KRS Chapter 424 before the ordinance becomes effective. OAG 80-365 .

A municipal order may not be used, pursuant to subsection (13) of this section in lieu of an ordinance to establish the procedure for the preparation of the budget proposal, since KRS 91A.030(6) specifically requires that the budget proposal be prepared in such form and detail as is prescribed by ordinance. OAG 80-380 .

Subsection (9) of this section (former provisions) clearly provides that only those ordinances that impose fines, forfeitures, imprisonment, taxes or fees must be published in full; with respect to all other ordinances, the legislative body is given the option of either publishing such ordinances in full or in summary. OAG 80-440 .

Where an amendment to a zoning ordinance is enacted which does not change the current penalty or fee provision of the zoning ordinance, or impose additions thereto, such amendment would not be required to be published in full, thereby giving the legislative body the right to publish such amendment in summary form, in the manner prescribed in subsection (9) of this section (former provisions). OAG 80-440 .

Where a zoning ordinance dealing with zoning regulations under KRS 100.207 and 100.211 is involved, those zoning statutes would take precedence over the general publication requirement of subsection (9) of this section under the rule of statutory construction that a specific statute on the subject controls a more general statute; thus, a zoning ordinance dealing with zoning regulations need only be published by title and general description. OAG 80-498 .

In connection with the enactment of a city payroll ordinance, publication between readings was not required so long as there were two readings on separate days and provided the ordinance was previously published in full. OAG 80-606 .

The establishment of a police department under KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170 is a legislative matter of a permanent nature and therefore must be accomplished by the enactment of an appropriate ordinance rather than by a legislative order which is confined to matters involving the internal operation of the city. OAG 81-48 .

A city mayor can remove a city clerk, city attorney or other “officer” defined in KRS 83A.010 under the provisions for removal contained in KRS 83A.080 without consulting the legislative body which approved the appointment; however, the city legislative body has the authority to enact an ordinance under this section which would prohibit the removal of city officers except for cause and pursuant to a hearing. OAG 81-74 .

A municipal order being adopted in lieu of an ordinance in order to regulate internal operations and functions of the municipality must be in writing and adopted at an official meeting; however, under subsections (12) and (13) of this section, the municipal order need not be read on two separate days as would be required for a municipal ordinance. OAG 81-80 .

In a fourth-class city where the city council is composed of six councilmen, a majority of the council would be four councilmen, since the mayor is not a member of city council; thus, it would take five affirmative votes out of the six-man council in order to override an ordinance vetoed by the mayor since, under subsection (6) of KRS 83A.130 , the mayor’s veto stands unless the council votes to override it by the affirmative vote of one more than the majority of the membership. OAG 81-132 .

Where the city council of a fourth-class city is composed of six councilmen, and a meeting is attended by five councilmen, the meeting may not continue after two members leave the meeting; since a quorum would no longer exist. OAG 81-132 .

Where the city council of a fourth class city is composed of six councilmen a quorum would consist of a majority (four) of the councilmen, since the mayor is not a member of a legislative body; thus, the city council cannot transact business when there are only three council members and the mayor present. OAG 81-132 .

Where all six members of a city council and the mayor were present for a city council meeting, but the vote on a proposal to lease property to a company resulted in two “yes” votes, two “no” votes and two abstentions, the mayor had the authority, pursuant to subsection (6) of KRS 83A.130 (now KRS 83A.130 (5)) to break the tie by voting “yes”; the abstaining members could not be counted either for or against the motion, even though they would normally be considered to acquiesce with the majority vote of those present and voting since there was no such majority. OAG 81-175 .

A finance committee, or any other committee or council member, has the right to introduce an ordinance for passage at a city council meeting without the mayor having seen or having knowledge of the ordinance, since an ordinance is not, under this section, required to be reviewed or approved by the mayor prior to its introduction or passage, although it must be submitted to the mayor after its passage for his approval or veto pursuant to the terms of subsection (6) (now (5)) of KRS 83A.130 . OAG 81-207 .

Where proposed ordinance had its first reading at one meeting, was read at another meeting a week later, but was not voted upon at that time so that the city attorney could determine if it was in the proper form, and then was introduced at a third meeting and passed based upon the two readings already given, the two readings were in compliance with this section, since it simply requires that an ordinance not be enacted until it has been read on two separate days. OAG 81-207 .

The municipal code requires only ordinances to be published in order to be effective under the terms of this section and, therefore, legislative orders or resolutions enacted for the purposes described in KRS 83A.010(8) (now (9)) and this section are not required to be published in any form; of course, any attempt on the part of a city to enact, by resolution or legislative order, matters other than those involving the internal operation of city government mentioned in such statutes, without following the statutory procedure for the enactment of ordinances including publication, would be invalid and thus ineffective. OAG 83-64 .

If the zoning map draft does not reflect the duly adopted and updated zoning regulations by reason of a mechanical error or a mistake on the part of the drafters and such mistake is thus reflected in the enacted ordinance, the zoning map could be corrected by the legislative body by simply amending the zoning ordinance pursuant to this section. OAG 83-348 .

Subsection (4) of this section simply requires that the ordinance be read on two separate days before its enactment, or in other words before a vote is taken as to whether or not it will be enacted. The language in no way requires a vote following the initial reading of the ordinance. OAG 83-404 .

The requirement of this section that no ordinance shall be amended by reference to its title only and that ordinances to amend shall set out in full the amended ordinance or sections indicating any words being added or deleted by a solid line underneath or a broken line through them, would not be applicable to those ordinances published by the summary method; in other words, only those ordinances published in full would require amendments to be made in that manner. OAG 84-72 .

The requirement of this section that ordinances that include descriptions of real property may include a sketch drawing or map, etc., in lieu of metes and bounds descriptions does not apply to the publication of zoning regulations, but only applies where an ordinance specifically describes a piece of real estate; a reference in the summary of the ordinance to the zoning map on file in the clerk’s office would be sufficient. OAG 84-72 .

The publication requirements under subsection (9) of this section prevail over those requirements found under KRS 100.207 since zoning regulations adopted by the legislative body of the city under KRS 100.207 represent the official action of the legislative body and are of a general and permanent nature and, consequently, must be enacted by ordinance, and since all ordinances enacted by the legislative body, including ordinances relating to zoning, must be published as required by subsection (9) which was amended in 1982 to specifically apply to zoning ordinances and which controls as being the later statute. OAG 84-72 .

A resolution adopted by a city council repealing an existing municipal premium tax ordinance would not be legally effective unless it was enacted by following the same procedure for enacting ordinances generally as required under subsection (9) of this section. OAG 84-97 .

A vote following the first reading of an ordinance is unnecessary since the language in this section in no way requires it; as a consequence, any ordinance enacted need only be voted on following its second reading. OAG 84-208 .

Where four members of a seven-man city council left a city council meeting before any business was transacted, the meeting became null and void because a quorum did not exist where only three members remained during which time business was transacted. OAG 84-208 .

Whatever transactions were made at a city council meeting at which only three members of the seven-man council were present, which included the appointment of the city clerk, were invalid and would have to be brought before the council at a subsequent meeting and passed, before such action became valid. OAG 84-208 .

The rule is that when a quorum of a governing body is present those members who are present and do not vote will be considered as acquiescing with the majority; the word “majority” as used in the rule does not mean a numerical majority of the entire elected membership board, but means a majority of those present and voting. OAG 84-299 .

Where a city council is composed of eight members and seven are present, a quorum exists; where three members vote in favor of a resolution or ordinance and four abstain, the four abstentions must be counted as having voted with the majority which was three thereby creating a unanimous vote in favor of the resolution or ordinance. OAG 84-299 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Kentucky Law Survey, Morris, Municipal Law, 70 Ky. L.J. 287 (1981-82).

83A.060. Enactment of ordinances. (See LRC Note) [Effective July 15, 2020]

  1. Each ordinance shall embrace only one (1) subject and shall have a title that shall clearly state the subject.
  2. Each ordinance shall be introduced in writing and shall have an enacting clause styled “Be it ordained by the City of ________:”.
  3. No ordinance shall be amended by reference to its title only, and ordinances to amend shall set out in full the amended ordinance or section indicating any text being added by a single solid line drawn underneath it. Text that is intended to be removed shall be marked at the beginning with an opening bracket and at the end with a closing bracket. The text between the brackets shall be stricken through with a single solid line.
  4. Except as provided in subsection (7) of this section, no ordinance shall be enacted until it has been read on two (2) separate days. The reading of an ordinance may be satisfied by stating the title and reading a summary rather than the full text.
  5. A city legislative body may adopt the provisions of any local, statewide, or nationally recognized standard code and codifications of entire bodies of local legislation by an ordinance that identifies the subject matter by title, source, and date and incorporates the adopted provisions by reference without setting them out in full, if a copy accompanies the adopting ordinance and is made a part of the permanent records of the city.
  6. Unless otherwise provided by statute, a majority of a legislative body shall constitute a quorum and a vote of a majority of a quorum shall be sufficient to take action.
  7. In an emergency, upon the affirmative vote of two-thirds (2/3) of the membership, a city legislative body may suspend the requirements of second reading and publication to provide for an ordinance to become effective by naming and describing the emergency in the ordinance. Publication requirements of subsection (9) of this section shall be complied with within ten (10) days of the enactment of the emergency ordinance.
  8. Every action of the city legislative body shall be made a part of the permanent records of the city and on passage of an ordinance the vote of each member of the city legislative body shall be entered on the official record of the meeting. The legislative body shall provide by ordinance for the maintenance and safekeeping of the permanent records of the city. The person assigned this responsibility and the presiding officer shall sign the official record of each meeting. All ordinances adopted in a city shall, at the end of each month, be indexed and maintained in the following manner:
    1. The city budget, appropriations of money, and tax levies shall be maintained and indexed so that each fiscal year is kept separate from other years.
    2. All other city ordinances shall be kept in the minute book or an ordinance book in the order adopted and indexed in a composite index or maintained in a code of ordinances.
  9. Except in cities of the first class, a charter county government, and as provided in subsection (7) of this section, no ordinance shall be enforceable until published pursuant to KRS Chapter 424. Ordinances may be published in full or in summary as designated by the legislative body. If the legislative body elects to publish an ordinance in summary, the summary shall be prepared or certified by an attorney licensed to practice law in the Commonwealth of Kentucky and shall include the following:
    1. The title of the ordinance;
    2. A brief narrative setting forth the main points of the ordinance in a way reasonably calculated to inform the public in a clear and understandable manner of the meaning of the ordinance; and
    3. The full text of each section that imposes taxes or fees. Ordinances that include descriptions of real property may include a sketch, drawing, or map, including common landmarks, such as streets or roads in lieu of metes and bounds descriptions.
  10. A city may specify by ordinance additional requirements for adoption of ordinances in greater detail than contained herein, but a city shall not lessen or reduce the substantial requirements of this section or any other statute relating to adoption of ordinances.
  11. At least once every five (5) years, each city shall cause all ordinances in the composite index or code of ordinances to be examined for consistency with state law and with one another and to be revised to eliminate redundant, obsolete, inconsistent, and invalid provisions.
  12. The legislative body may adopt municipal orders. Orders shall be in writing and may be adopted only at an official meeting. Orders may be amended by a subsequent municipal order or ordinance. All orders adopted shall be maintained in an official order book.
  13. In lieu of an ordinance, a municipal order may be used for matters relating to the internal operation and functions of the municipality and to appoint or remove or approve appointment or removal of members of boards, commissions, and other agencies over which the city has control.
  14. All ordinances, and orders of the city may be proved by the signature of the city clerk; and when the ordinances are placed in a printed composite index or code of ordinances by authority of the city, the printed copy shall be received in evidence by any state court without further proof of the ordinances.
  15. For anything said in debate, legislative body members shall be entitled to the same immunities and protections allowed to members of the General Assembly.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 6, effective July 15, 1980; 1982, ch. 434, § 2, effective July 15, 1982; 1990, ch. 401, § 15, effective July 13, 1990; 1992, ch. 34, § 1, effective July 14, 1992; 2006, ch. 8, § 1, effective July 12, 2006; 2014, ch. 5, § 2, effective July 15, 2014; 2020 ch. 87, § 5, effective July 15, 2020.

83A.065. Enforcement of city ordinances.

  1. Every city shall have the power to establish fines, penalties, and forfeitures that may be imposed for violation of its ordinances, and may secure injunctions and abatement orders, when appropriate, to insure compliance with its ordinances.
  2. A city may make the violation of any of its ordinances a misdemeanor or a violation by the express terms of the ordinance. When an offense is designated by ordinance as a misdemeanor, a criminal fine not to exceed the amounts set forth in KRS 534.040(2)(a), or a term of imprisonment not to exceed the periods set forth in KRS 532.090(1), or both, may be imposed for the offense. When an offense is designated by ordinance as a violation, a criminal fine not to exceed the amounts set forth in KRS 534.040(2)(c) may be imposed for the offense.
  3. If an ordinance fails to prescribe any penalty for noncompliance with its provisions, any noncompliance shall be deemed a violation and a criminal fine not to exceed the amount set forth in KRS 534.040(2)(c) may be imposed for the offense.
  4. As an alternative to or in conjunction with the criminal penalties authorized by subsection (2) of this section, an ordinance may provide by its express terms that a violation shall subject the offender to a civil penalty to be recovered by the city in a civil action in the nature of debt if the offender does not pay the penalty within a prescribed period of time after he has been cited for the violation of the ordinance.
  5. A city ordinance may provide a fine, penalty, forfeiture, or term of imprisonment for an act or omission to act which is also an offense under the Kentucky Revised Statutes. In that case, the fine, penalty, forfeiture, or term of imprisonment imposed by the ordinance shall not be less than or greater than that imposed by statute for the same offense.
  6. A city ordinance may provide, when appropriate, that each day a violation of the ordinance continues shall be a separate and distinct offense.
  7. Subject to the express terms of the ordinance, a city ordinance may be enforced by any one (1), all, or a combination of the remedies authorized by this section.
  8. Except where the charge of a violation of a city ordinance is joined with an indictment for a felony as provided in KRS 24A.110(2), the violation of all city ordinances prescribing a criminal penalty as authorized in subsection (2) of this section shall be prosecuted in the District Courts of the Commonwealth. The county attorney shall prosecute all violations of city ordinances for which the criminal penalties authorized by subsection (2) of this section may be imposed. The city attorney shall pursue all violations of ordinances for which a civil penalty or forfeiture may be imposed, or involving injunctive relief or abatement, by filing a petition with the court of appropriate jurisdiction. Nothing in this section shall be intended to preclude any remedy for the violation of a city ordinance, including any administrative remedy, authorized by any other statute.

History. Enact. Acts 1992, ch. 193, § 1, effective July 14, 1992.

83A.070. Compensation of elected officers, appointed officials, and employees.

  1. The legislative body of each city shall by ordinance fix the compensation of every elected city officer not later than the first Monday in May in the year the officer is elected. An elected officer’s compensation shall not be changed after his election or during his term of office.
  2. The legislative body of each city shall fix the compensation of city employees and nonelected city officers in accordance with a personnel and pay classification plan which shall be adopted by ordinance.
  3. All fees and commissions authorized by law shall be paid into the city treasury for the benefit of the city and shall not be retained by any officer or employee.
  4. The legislative body of each city may, by ordinance, establish the compensation for any elective city office on a salaried or per diem basis.

History. Enact. Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 7, effective July 15, 1980; 1992, ch. 311, § 1, effective July 14, 1992; 1992, ch. 435, § 8, effective July 14, 1992; 2002, ch. 271, § 1, effective July 15, 2002.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. In General.

The council, subject to statute, has power to determine what offices shall exist and the salaries to be paid, and has the right to approve all payrolls. Neumeyer v. Krakel, 110 Ky. 624 , 62 S.W. 518, 23 Ky. L. Rptr. 190 , 1901 Ky. LEXIS 124 ( Ky. 1901 ) (decided under prior law).

A city may not provide by resolution for the employment and payment of an officer or agent, but must do so by ordinance. Louisville v. Parsons, 150 Ky. 420 , 150 S.W. 498, 1912 Ky. LEXIS 903 ( Ky. 1912 ) (decided under prior law).

The city had authority to raise or lower the salaries of its police officers. Beckham v. Bowling Green, 743 S.W.2d 858, 1987 Ky. App. LEXIS 603 (Ky. Ct. App. 1987).

2. Compensation for Meetings.

Members are due compensation for each meeting whether or not they attend. The board to which a member belongs has the right to pass on excuses, and there is no forfeiture until imposed by such body. Barron v. Kaufman, 131 Ky. 642 , 115 S.W. 787, 1909 Ky. LEXIS 58 ( Ky. 1909 ) (decided under prior law).

3. Fixing of Salary After Election.

An officer’s salary may be fixed after his election when it had not been fixed before. Barrett v. Falmouth, 109 Ky. 151 , 58 S.W. 520, 22 Ky. L. Rptr. 667 , 1900 Ky. LEXIS 175 ( Ky. 1900 ) (decided under prior law).

4. Reduction of Salary.

Police court clerks are officers, and cannot agree to a reduction of salary during their term. Louisville v. Thomas, 257 Ky. 540 , 78 S.W.2d 767, 1935 Ky. LEXIS 54 ( Ky. 1935 ) (decided under prior law).

Deputy city assessors are officers, and cannot agree to a reduction of salary during their term. Louisville v. Fisher, 258 Ky. 84 , 79 S.W.2d 345, 1935 Ky. LEXIS 104 ( Ky. 1935 ) (decided under prior law).

5. Education incentive back pay.

Circuit court properly granted a city's motion for summary judgment on retired police officers' breach of contract action because the officers failed to prove the existence of a contract entitling them to education incentive pay; the city properly exercised its authority to fix the officers' compensation, and, therefore, the officers were only entitled to be paid what the city code of ordinances specified. Dearborn v. City of Frankfort, 2016 Ky. App. Unpub. LEXIS 902 (Ky. Ct. App. Dec. 9, 2016), review denied, ordered not published, 2017 Ky. LEXIS 290 (Ky. Aug. 16, 2017).

Cited:

Covington v. CovingtonLodge No. 1, etc., 622 S.W.2d 221, 1981 Ky. LEXIS 274 ( Ky. 1981 ).

NOTES TO UNPUBLISHED DECISIONS

1. Education Incentive Back Pay.

Circuit court properly granted summary judgment to a city on the retired police officers' action for education incentive back pay because they failed to prove the existence of a contract entitling them to education incentive pay, none of their “contracts” were signed by the mayor, the city was statutorily authorized to exercise any power in furtherance of its public purpose and to fix the compensation of its officers and employees, including a non-discriminatory reduction in pay or grade, the officers were presumed to know about the city ordinance then in effect that would control their access to such pay, and any erroneous information given to them by a city employee could not obligate the city to act contrary to its own ordinances. Dearborn v. City of Frankfort, 2016 Ky. App. LEXIS 201 (Ky. Ct. App.), sub. op., 2016 Ky. App. Unpub. LEXIS 902 (Ky. Ct. App. Dec. 9, 2016).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Arrest fees earned and collected by city policemen in cities of any class are required by subsection (4) (now (3)) of this section to be paid into the city treasury for the benefit of the city only, and therefore, there is no need for a city to enact an ordinance providing for the depositing of such fees into the city treasury. OAG 80-361 .

While this section did not explicitly repeal KRS 95.740 (now repealed), relating to fourth and fifth-class cities, the language of subsection (4) (now (3)) of this section clearly suggests that the payment of arrest fees into the city treasury is mandatory for all cities in Kentucky, therefore, KRS 95.740 (repealed), which made it permissive for cities of the fourth and fifth classes to direct such fees into the city treasury, was repealed by implication since it is impossible to reconcile the mandatory language of subsection (4) (now (3)) of this section with the permissive provisions of KRS 95.740 (repealed). OAG 80-361 .

It is mandatory under this section that elected and appointed municipal officers draw a salary; however, compensation in the amount of $1.00 per year is not compensation within the ordinary meaning of the term and a reasonable salary must be paid to such officers. OAG 81-8 .

Where a newly incorporated city of the fifth class has its initial city council and mayor appointed by a judge and has a general election for those seats set for November, 1981, the present city council members may enact an ordinance fixing compensation for themselves as well as for the council which will take office in January, 1982, notwithstanding the fact that such compensation will be fixed subsequent to the date set forth in this section, since compensation for these positions has never been fixed before. OAG 81-222 .

Subsection (3) (now (2)) of this section, which provides, in effect, that the legislative body of each city shall fix the compensation of city employes in accordance with the personnel and pay classification plan which shall be adopted by ordinance, is mandatory in requiring the city to initially adopt a pay classification schedule for all city employees although, once such a schedule has been adopted, the compensation of city employees can be altered at intervals by a change in pay grade or reclassification. OAG 81-272 .

All fees received by city policemen for the service of process must be turned over to the city pursuant to KRS 95.480 and this section. OAG 81-361 .

The statutory fees for services performed by city police officers are separately taxed in the costs and are payable to the police officers under the following conditions and circumstances: (1) the defendant is convicted; (2) the defendant, upon a judgment of conviction and costs being entered, pays the fee to the court clerk; (3) the court clerk, assuming conditions (1) and (2) have been satisfied should pay the appropriate statutorily authorized fee to the police officer; (4) the police officer receiving the fee must turn it over to the city treasury; the clerk is under no affirmative duty to collect such fees for the police officers and the city; such fees are payable only under the conditions set forth above. OAG 81-361 .

A mayor of a city has no authority to create any position of employment or to hire any person to a position that has not been established by ordinance but, rather, the legislative body has the sole responsibility of establishing job positions with the city and fixing the compensation, and until such is created, none legally exist; once a position of employment is established and the compensation fixed, pursuant to subsection (3) (now (2)) of this section, the mayor has the sole responsibility of hiring a person to fill such position without the approval of the city legislative body and the only instance where council approval is necessary for an appointment is in connection with the filling of a nonelective municipal office. OAG 82-110 .

Any city funds paid city employees that have not been duly and appropriately authorized are illegal and such funds may be recovered; the primary responsibility for the recovery of municipal funds illegally appropriated rests with the municipality itself, and before a taxpayer suit may be maintained, the appropriate officers of the city must be requested to act in the matter. OAG 82-184 .

The mayor has no vote on the question of fixing a salary for the office of city engineer; however, if the mayor’s vote was necessary, as in the event of a tie vote, in determining the salary of the city engineer where the city engineer was the mayor’s spouse, the mayor must refrain from voting as it would be against public policy based on self interest. OAG 82-200 .

There was no legal objection to a city council authorizing a salary for the city engineer who was the spouse of the mayor. OAG 82-200 .

A promotion in pay and grade of an employee is an executive function within the mayor’s exclusive authority and over which the legislative body has no control except insofar as provided by the classification ordinance, which can be amended from time to time. OAG 82-385 .

After the city council in a fifth-class city had appropriated moneys for the salaries of its council members, these salaries must be paid to council members even though they refused such payment. OAG 82-502 .

This section requires that the compensation for members of the city legislative body be fixed not later than the first Monday in May in the year in which they are elected and such sum cannot be changed during their term of office; this means in effect that once the compensation is fixed by ordinance as it is required to be for members of the legislative body it must be paid to those members. After they receive their salary, they may, of course, dispose of it in any manner that they see fit and could even donate it back to the city. OAG 82-502 .

A city cannot pay the members of the legislative body on a per meeting basis pursuant to ordinance and at the same time allow an additional fee for special meetings. OAG 83-59 .

An ordinance authorizing payment of the members of city legislative body on a fee basis was in violation of the present municipal code; since the compensation was fixed on a per meeting basis illegally in 1981, it was legally permissible for it to be fixed on an annual basis during the 1983 term, provided, that the compensation fixed during prior terms had been established in the same manner, that is, on a “per meeting” basis. OAG 83-59 .

If the compensation for members of a city council is not fixed by the first Monday in May of the year in which the officers are elected, or if it is fixed illegally such as on a per meeting basis, then the compensation fixed for the previous term becomes effective under KRS 64.730 for the present term; however, if not only was the salary not legally fixed at the May session of a certain year, having been set on a per meeting basis, but had never been fixed other than by this method, the compensation could be fixed after the May deadline or any time during the term of the elected officials. OAG 83-394 .

An ordinance enacted in March of 1984 by a city council raising the salary of members thereof to $3,000 and that of the mayor to $16,000 was illegal and contrary to Ky. Const., § 161 and the provisions of this section since it was enacted in the middle of the term of the members of the city council, elected in 1983, and that of the mayor, elected in 1981, none of whom would be up for election until November 1985; also, the mayor’s salary far exceeded the constitutional maximum fixed in Ky. Const., § 246. OAG 84-133 .

Subsection (2) of this section requires the legislative body to fix the compensation of each city officer by ordinance, which may be changed by ordinance; this statute requires that the salary of a nonelective officer be fixed by ordinance at a specific amount and not simply provide a maximum which cannot be exceeded. OAG 84-125 .

A city must pay its nonelective officers in accordance with the compensation set forth by ordinance which, of course, can be changed at any time by amendment. However, such compensation that has been fixed for such office should not include the amount contributed by the city for hospitalization insurance under a group program established pursuant to KRS 79.080 , particularly since such payment is unauthorized in the first place. OAG 84-294 .

The salary of the mayor and members of the city legislative body must initially be fixed not later than the first Monday in May of the year they are elected; once the salary is fixed, the legislative body can authorize a cost of living increase in compensation each year not exceeding the amount computed pursuant to KRS 83A.075 . OAG 84-351 .

Following the repeal of KRS 64.580 in 1980, KRS 64.730 would appear to have no application to cities, which set salaries pursuant to this section; however, even if KRS 64.730 does apply to cities and the salaries for the members of the Board of Aldermen for the City of Louisville for the new term are set at an amount which is the same as the previous term, the salaries may still be adjusted under the “rubber dollar” doctrine. OAG 90-2 .

If a city’s legislative body chooses to make “rubber dollar” adjustments, it may do so at any time following publication of that year’s “rubber dollar” changes. OAG 90-2 .

The designation of days constituting paid holidays for municipal employees is a legislative function and is not within the realm of the mayor’s powers and duties. OAG 90-44 .

The hiring of an attorney as a municipal officer on a part-time or as-needed basis at a specified hourly fee satisfies the provisions of KRS 83A.070 as the city ordinance has fixed the compensation at a specific amount even though it has not been calculated on an annual basis. OAG 92-129 .

83A.075. Equating of compensation rate of mayors and members of city legislative bodies with purchasing power of dollar — Limitation.

  1. In order to equate the compensation of mayors and members of city legislative bodies with the purchasing power of the dollar, the Department for Local Government shall compute by the second Friday in February of every year the annual increase or decrease in the consumer price index of the preceding year by using 1949 as the base year in accordance with Section 246 of the Constitution of Kentucky which provides that the mayor in cities of the first class shall be paid at a rate no greater than twelve thousand dollars ($12,000) per annum and mayors in cities other than the first class and legislative body members shall be paid at a rate no greater than seven thousand two hundred dollars ($7,200) per annum.
  2. The legislative body of the city shall set the compensation of the officer in accordance with KRS 83A.070 at a rate no greater than that stipulated by the Department for Local Government.

History. Enact. Acts 1984, ch. 50, § 1, effective July 13, 1984; 1994, ch. 508, § 40, effective July 15, 1994; 1998, ch. 69, § 44, effective July 15, 1998; 2007, ch. 47, § 60, effective June 26, 2007; 2010, ch. 117, § 66, effective July 15, 2010.

Opinions of Attorney General.

The salary of the mayor and members of the city legislative body must initially be fixed not later than the first Monday in May of the year they are elected; once the salary is fixed, the legislative body can authorize a cost of living increase in compensation each year not exceeding the amount computed pursuant to this section. OAG 84-351 .

The maximum annual compensation possible for county judge/executives, justices of the peace, county commissioners, county clerks, sheriffs, jailers and coroners, mayors (except in cities of the first class), and city legislative body members in 1988 was $34,861. OAG 88-10 .

Following the repeal of KRS 64.580 in 1980, KRS 64.730 would appear to have no application to cities, which set salaries pursuant to KRS 83A.070 ; however, even if KRS 64.730 does apply to cities and the salaries for the members of the Board of Aldermen for the City of Louisville for the new term are set at an amount which is the same as the previous term, the salaries may still be adjusted under the “rubber dollar” doctrine. OAG 90-2 .

If a city’s legislative body chooses to make “rubber dollar” adjustments, it may do so at any time following publication of that year’s “rubber dollar” changes. OAG 90-2 .

The members of the Board of Aldermen for the City of Louisville may adjust their salaries by any percentage up to the maximum as calculated for that particular year. OAG 90-2 .

The maximum annual compensation for 1990 for county judge/executives, justices of the peace, county commissioners, county clerks, sheriffs, jailers, coroners, mayors (except in cities of the first class), and city legislative body members would be $38,077, and for mayors in cities of the first class is $63,462. OAG 90-17 .

The Department of Local Government accurately computed the maximum annual compensation of the mayor in cities of the first class, and mayors in cities other than first class, and legislative body members, as $40,427 (rounded), and the maximum annual compensation of the mayor of a city of the first class as $67,378. OAG 91-29 .

For an opinion verifying the accuracy of computations to be used in adjusting salaries of constitutional officers in relation to changes in the Consumer Price Index, see OAG 93-21 .

For the adjustments to salaries of constitutional officers in relation to changes in the Consumer Price Index salary adjustment computations and therefore, the maximum annual compensation allowable by law for such positions in 1994 see OAG 94-7 .

For the adjustments to salaries of constitutional officers in relation to change in the Consumer Price Index salary adjustment computations and therefore, the maximum annual compensation allowable for such positions in 1995. OAG 95-5 .

83A.080. Nonelective city offices and officers — Appointment — Removal — Statement of reason for removal — Prohibition against creating or altering elected office.

  1. All nonelected city offices shall be created by ordinance which shall specify:
    1. Title of office;
    2. Powers and duties of office;
    3. Oath of office; and
    4. Bond, if required.
  2. A city may create nonelected offices other than those referred to in this subsection. For purposes of the requirements of this section, the following shall be considered nonelected offices:
    1. City clerk;
    2. City manager;
    3. City administrator;
    4. Chief of police; and
    5. Fire chief, other than a volunteer fire chief.
  3. All nonelected city officers shall be appointed by the executive authority of the city and, except in cities of the first class, all these appointments shall be with approval of the city legislative body if separate from the executive authority. The officers may be removed by the executive authority at will unless otherwise provided by statute or ordinance. Upon removal of a nonelected officer at will, the executive authority shall give the officer a written statement setting forth the reason or reasons for the removal. However, this requirement shall not be construed as limiting in any way the at-will dismissal power of the executive authority.
  4. Each appointed and elected city office existing upon adoption of this chapter shall continue until abolished by ordinance, except that the offices of mayor and legislative body members may not be abolished. No abolition of any elected office shall take effect until expiration of the term of the current holder of the office. No ordinance abolishing any elected office shall be enacted later than two hundred forty (240) days preceding the regular election for that office, except in the event of a vacancy in the office.
  5. No city may create any elected office. Existing elected offices may be continued under provision of subsection (4) of this section, but no existing elected office may be changed.

History. Enact. Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 8, effective July 15, 1980; 1982, ch. 434, § 3, effective July 15, 1982; 1988, ch. 70, § 1, effective July 15, 1988; 1992, ch. 435, § 9, effective July 14, 1992; 2001, ch. 118, § 1, effective June 21, 2001; 2002, ch. 271, § 2, effective July 15, 2002.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(6/21/2001). A reference to “subsection (3)” in subsection (5) of this statute has been changed in codification to “subsection (4)” under KRS 7.136(1)(e) and (h). In 2001 Ky. Acts ch. 118, sec. 1, subsection (3) was renumbered as subsection (4), but an internal reference in the existing language of this statute was overlooked.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Removal of Officers.

Municipal appointive officers may be removed without cause. London v. Franklin, 118 Ky. 105 , 80 S.W. 514, 25 Ky. L. Rptr. 2306 , 1904 Ky. LEXIS 19 ( Ky. 1904 ) (decided under prior law).

The fact that the volunteer fire chief of a city of the fifth class was appointed by a city council ordinance did not mean that the chief could only be removed from office by council action, and since subsection (2) (now (3)) vests removal power in the executive authority, the mayor had the authority to remove the chief at will. McCloud v. Whitt, 639 S.W.2d 375, 1982 Ky. App. LEXIS 246 (Ky. Ct. App. 1982).

Where a mayor of a city of the fifth class, acting under the discretionary power given him by subsection (2) (now (3)) of this section, removed the city’s chief of police from office without first holding a due process hearing, KRS 15.520 , which set certain administrative due process rights for police officers, had no application since the chief’s removal was not predicated upon any complaint of professional misconduct or upon any charge involving violation of any local unit of government rule or regulation, and therefore, the mayor acted within his statutory authority. McCloud v. Whitt, 639 S.W.2d 375, 1982 Ky. App. LEXIS 246 (Ky. Ct. App. 1982).

Former fire chief of a city’s volunteer fire department did not have a property interest in his employment protected by the Fourteenth Amendment because whether KRS 83A.130(9) applied because the fire chief was considered an employee, or whether KRS 83A.080(3) applied because the fire chief was considered an officer, both statutes reinforced that service was at the mayor’s pleasure. Amend v. City of Park Hills, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26563 (E.D. Ky. Nov. 2, 2005).

Police chief’s claims against the city and the mayor were properly dismissed because the mayor had the authority to terminate the chief under the Kentucky Home Rule Statutes; the statutes did not conflict with City of Georgetown, Ky., Ch. 2, Art. V, Div. 3, § 2-147, because it set forth another option for a valid termination of the chief of police by the city council for cause, and did not state that the mayor was stripped of his or her removal authority, nor that the city council had the sole authority to terminate the police chief. Reeves v. City of Georgetown, 539 Fed. Appx. 662, 2013 FED App. 0826N, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 19059 (6th Cir. Ky. 2013 ).

2. — When Permissible.

Subsection (2) (now (3)) of this section and KRS 83A.130(9) permit a local executive authority such as a mayor to terminate the employment of a nonelected city official such as a police officer, only if there is no statute which provides otherwise; KRS 95.765 is such a statute, and requires that a disciplinary hearing be conducted before the legislative body rather than before the mayor. Madisonville v. Sisk, 783 S.W.2d 885, 1990 Ky. App. LEXIS 15 (Ky. Ct. App. 1990).

3. Abolition of Offices.

City councils have no authority to abolish offices created by constitution or statute, unless such authority is expressly given. Standeford v. Wingate, 63 Ky. 440 , 1 Ky. Op. 318, 1866 Ky. LEXIS 32 ( Ky. 1866 ) (decided under prior law).

Any office created by ordinance may be abolished by ordinance. Board of Councilmen v. Brawner, 100 Ky. 166 , 18 Ky. L. Rptr. 684 , 37 S.W. 950, 1896 Ky. LEXIS 160 ( Ky. 1896 ), aff’d, 100 Ky. 172 , 38 S.W. 497 (1897) (decided under prior law).

The office of meat and milk inspector in Paducah was abolished by the adoption of the commission form of government, and thereafter the commissioners could at will change the salary of such position, or abolish the position entirely. Fisher v. Paducah, 256 Ky. 300 , 76 S.W.2d 21, 1934 Ky. LEXIS 406 ( Ky. 1934 ) (decided under prior law).

4. Bond.

Failure of council records to recite execution and approval of an official bond does not affect its validity. Commonwealth use of Rosenthal v. Teel, 111 S.W. 340, 33 Ky. L. Rptr. 741 (1908) (decided under prior law).

5. Police and Fire Supervisors.

The board of commissioners has authority to employ supervisors of the police and fire departments. Covington v. Hicks, 236 Ky. 369 , 33 S.W.2d 342, 1930 Ky. LEXIS 775 ( Ky. 1930 ) (decided under prior law).

6. Temporary Position.

Where a street improvement ordinance required the work to be approved by the city engineer, the city being small and not warranted in having a regularly employed official engineer, employment of an engineer for this particular project was sufficient. Wallace v. Louisa, 217 Ky. 419 , 273 S.W. 720, 1925 Ky. LEXIS 982 ( Ky. 1925 ); City of Springfield v. Haydon, 216 Ky. 483 , 288 S.W. 337, 1926 Ky. LEXIS 979 ( Ky. 1926 ) (decided under prior law).

7. Who are Officers.

The city prosecutor of a third-class city is an officer, not an employee. Whitney v. Skinner, 194 Ky. 804 , 241 S.W. 350, 1922 Ky. LEXIS 259 ( Ky. 1922 ) (decided under prior law).

Clerk, treasurer, auditor, assessor and engineer of third-class city operating under commission form of government are employees, and not officers, and therefore come within civil service law for city employees. Henderson v. Thomy, 307 Ky. 783 , 212 S.W.2d 303, 1948 Ky. LEXIS 831 ( Ky. 1948 ) (decided under prior law).

8. Rescinded Appointment.

Even though a mayor had the power to hire and fire city employees, because a city council made it clear that a city attorney’s appointment was conditional and unofficial, it was within the council’s authority to rescind that appointment when the attorney had not completed the act upon which his appointment was conditioned. As such, he was not officially a city employee. Taylor v. Carter, 333 S.W.3d 437, 2010 Ky. App. LEXIS 250 (Ky. Ct. App. 2010).

Cited:

City of Munfordville v. Sheldon, 977 S.W.2d 497, 1998 Ky. LEXIS 135 ( Ky. 1998 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Where a city council voted to appoint an individual as a police officer, that city council action would be of no legal effect because under subsection (2) of this section provision is made that all nonelective city officers, which would include police officers, shall be appointed by the executive authority of the city which, under the council-mayor form of government, is the mayor. OAG 80-457 .

Regardless of whether the position of city building inspector is an office or a form of employment, the mayor makes the appointment; the only difference being that if it is an office so established by ordinance, the council must first approve the appointment. OAG 80-551 .

The mayor has sole authority to appoint committees to assist in overseeing the proper administration of city government; on the other hand, the city council does have the authority to establish various departments of city government by ordinance but the appointments to fill the positions so established in the various departments and the conduct of those appointees in the performance of their duties, is under the control of the mayor where the city operates under the councilmanic form of government. OAG 80-551 .

A city legislative body may establish and place the duties of the treasurer under an administrative department created by ordinance; at the same time the commission may establish by ordinance all appointive offices and positions of employment and make appointments to fill such positions since all legislative, executive and administrative authority of the city is vested in the commission. OAG 80-565 .

KRS 100.271 together with the powers given cities under KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170 , clearly authorizes the city council, which is the legislative body of the city, to establish by ordinance the position of building inspector as a minor city office under the terms of KRS 83A.130(12), or as an alternative, the city council could designate one of its administrative officers to issue building permits; in any event, the person to fill the position is to be selected by the mayor with the approval of the city council under the terms of subsection (2) (now (3)) of this section and once the position is established the zoning committee could recommend someone to hold the position. OAG 80-657 .

Where city of sixth class has not yet converted to the commission form of government, the appointment of the chief of police would be the responsibility of the board of trustees under former KRS 88.010 (Repealed) until the city converts to the commission form, provided that there must be an ordinance initially establishing the position under this section prior to any such appointment. OAG 81-8 ; 81-40.

If a city had established the office of marshal as an elective office under KRS 95.790 (repealed) prior to its July 15, 1980 effective repeal date, the office could continue to be an elective office until it is abolished by an ordinance under subsection (3) (now (4)) of this section but if the office of marshal was not made an elective office prior to the July 15, 1980 effective repeal date it cannot be made elective under the terms of former subsection (4) of KRS 83A.030 which provides that no city may create any elective office. OAG 81-16 .

Since the mayor under the councilmanic form of government has the sole authority under subsection (2) (now (3)) of this section and KRS 83A.130(9) to remove nonelected officers and employees, he, rather than the council, would have the responsibility of hearing disciplinary charges against a police officer unless he has promulgated a different hearing proceeding that has been approved by the council under KRS 83A.130(4); on the other hand, the council could, under the authority of subsection (2) (now (3)) of this section and KRS 83A.130(9), enact an ordinance establishing a hearing board to hear the charges, the members of which are to be appointed by the mayor with the approval of the council. OAG 81-48 .

A city mayor can remove a city clerk, city attorney or other “officer” defined in KRS 83A.010 under the provisions for removal contained in this section without consulting the legislative body which approved the appointment; however, the city legislative body has the authority to enact an ordinance under KRS 83A.060 which would prohibit the removal of city officers, except for cause and pursuant to a hearing. OAG 81-74 .

Although the power of the city legislative body of a fourth-class city to appoint members of the police department has been repealed, the city legislative body retains the authority to establish the police department by ordinance, provide for the number of members, compensation, duties and responsibilities; however, the appointment of members of the department, including the chief of police, is placed in the hands of the mayor, with the approval of the city legislative body under subsection (2) (now (3)) of this section, since police officers are municipal officers. OAG 81-74 .

If, prior to July 15, 1980, a sixth-class city had by ordinance established the positions of city clerk and city treasurer and if neither position has been abolished by ordinance pursuant to subsection (3) (now (4)) of this section since that date, then both positions are still in existence, and, since each position constitutes a city office, no person is permitted to fill both offices at the same time just as no person is permitted to fill two municipal offices at the same time; thus, even if the office of city treasurer were to be abolished, the person handling the city’s financial affairs would be considered a city officer if he satisfied the definition of “officer” under subsection (9) (now (10)) of KRS 83A.010 and could not simultaneously hold the position of city clerk. OAG 81-153 .

Where a city passes an ordinance creating a personal service contract with an attorney to advise the city in legal matters, the attorney is an independent contractor rather than a non-elected city officer appointed under this section or an employee under subsection (3) of KRS 61.420 ; thus, he would not be subject to social security as a result of his contract. OAG 81-225 .

Where the position of assistant city solicitor, who serves in a part-time, non-civil service capacity, was not created by ordinance pursuant to this section, the conflict of interest provisions of KRS 61.260 (now repealed) would not apply to circumstances in which the assistant city solicitor was a partner in a general partnership which planned to rehabilitate an old downtown mansion into office spaces with financing to be provided with Kentucky industrial revenue bonds; however, the solicitor in question should not participate in the negotiations at all. OAG 81-302 .

A city ordinance, adopted in 1949, which provided that the mayor should make appointments to the Utility Plant Board with the approval of the city council did not conflict with subsection (2) (now (3)) of this section, which was enacted in 1980, and thus could remain in force until repealed, as provided in KRS 83A.020 . OAG 81-367 .

Where a mayor, with the approval of the outgoing city council, reappointed the current members of the planning and zoning commission, at the first council meeting in December, even though their terms did not expire until December 31, such reappointments and ratification were illegal, since the vacancies could not be filled until January 1, and the incoming council had the sole power to select officers whose terms begin during their term. OAG 82-17 .

A mayor of a city has no authority to create any position of employment or to hire any person to a position that has not been established by ordinance but, rather, the legislative body has the sole responsibility of establishing job positions with the city and fixing the compensation, and until such is created, none legally exist; once a position of employment is established and the compensation fixed, pursuant to KRS 83A.070(3) (now 83A.070(2)), the mayor has the sole responsibility of hiring a person to fill such position without the approval of the city legislative body and the only instance where council approval is necessary for an appointment is in connection with the filling of a nonelective municipal office. OAG 82-110 .

The mayor of a city has the authority to remove any nonelective officer or employee without the approval of the city legislative body pursuant to subsection (2) (now (3)) of this section and KRS 83A.130(9) unless such position is covered by civil service or unless the city has enacted an ordinance preventing the removal of the officer or employee without cause and an appropriate hearing. OAG 82-110 .

The position of police officer is a municipal office which must be created pursuant to ordinance, and no one can be hired as a police officer without the approval of the city legislative body since such position is considered a nonelective office. OAG 82-110 .

This section provides in effect that a municipal office can only be created by ordinance following the terms of the section, which criteria would have no application to city firefighters, who are city employees. OAG 82-127 .

Pursuant to KRS 83A.150(7) a board of commissioners composed of four commissioners and a mayor, is required to create the office of city manager by ordinance, which office carries with it the duties and responsibilities therein designated and those that may be given to it by the board in accordance with this section; the establishment of the office of city manager is mandatory on the part of the commission and the office must be filled as soon as it is possible to find a qualified individual. OAG 82-168 .

A councilman must refrain from participating in and voting on an appointment of a member of his family and also should refrain from voting on any ordinance authorizing a wage increase that involves a member of his family, regardless of whether it involves an office or employment. OAG 82-124 .

An appointment of a city councilman’s family member to a nonelective office must be approved by the council at a regular or special meeting that is required to be open to the public under the Open Meetings Act; such person cannot be legally hired at a closed meeting. OAG 82-124 .

Nonelective city officers, who serve at the pleasure of the mayor, need not be reappointed each time the council members go into office unless, of course, they are appointed for specific terms pursuant to ordinance. OAG 82-200 .

Under the 1982 amendment to KRS 83A.130(9), effective July 15, 1982, the mayor has the exclusive appointing authority over police officers, without the approval of the city legislative body. OAG 82-225 .

Offices of city treasurer and city attorney, elective by virtue of previous statutory authority so permitting, did not automatically become appointive rather than elective by virtue of the repeal of the related statutes by the enactment of the municipal code; in view of the clear language of subsections (3) and (4) of this section, such offices would continue to be elective offices until the ordinance so providing was repealed. OAG 82-245 .

The only instance where council approval is necessary for an appointment is in connection with the filling of a nonelective office as provided in subsection (2) (now (3)) of this section; however, under this section as amended in 1982, the right to restrict the removal of such officers can only be accomplished by statute and the council can no longer prevent such removal by ordinance. OAG 82-258 .

Any nonelective office established by the city or any position of employment may be abolished by appropriate ordinance. Of the office is an elective one, other than that of mayor or councilman which cannot be abolished, the officeholder is entitled to serve out his term. OAG 82-352 .

In order for office of city license administrator to be established it must follow the requirements of subsection (1) of this section; the mere fact that the ordinance defines the term “administrator” by indicating that it is an office and that the person appointed must qualify as any other city officer would not establish it as a municipal office. OAG 82-352 .

The duties of a city attorney will be determined by the city ordinance establishing the office or position of city attorney or by the contract between the city and the attorney, but the city attorney would not be expected to render advice to the joint planning commission concerning the city interests if doing so should create a conflict of interest situation. OAG 82-377 .

If a city has either established a position of legal advisor as a form of city employment or created the office of city attorney, no one could serve, at the same time, in the state office of trial commissioner and in the office of city attorney or as a city employee without violating Ky. Const., § 165 and KRS 61.080 . However, if an attorney is employed on a personal service contract basis, he would be considered an independent contractor and there would be no constitutional or statutory objection to his serving as trial commissioner of the district court. OAG 82-502 .

The office of city attorney is a municipal office provided it is so established by ordinance under the terms of this section. The city may under its general home rule authority, KRS 82.082 , establish the position as a form of city employment, or as an alternative, authorize the execution of a personal service contract to employ the services of an attorney on an hourly basis. OAG 82-502 .

Where a city ordinance enacted in February of 1983 abolished the office of comptroller and inspector effective at the end of the office holder’s term in November of 1983, the mere fact that a candidate filed in January of 1983 for the position for the ensuing term prior to the enactment of the ordinance was of no significance since the city had the authority under subsection (3) (now (4)) of this section to abolish that elected office, and therefore, the office could not be placed on the ballot in November of 1983. OAG 83-104 .

No due process hearing is required prior to removal of a city police officer in absence of a civil service requirement, even under the terms of KRS 15.520 , except where removal is predicated upon a complaint of professional misconduct in violation of KRS 15.520 , in which case the procedure under such statute would have to be followed. OAG 83-231 .

The mayor has the day-to-day control of the police department including the appointment and removal of the chief as well as all other police officers whether they be classified as deputies or special or extra policemen. OAG 83-353 .

The appointing power of the chief of police, detailed in KRS 95.740 (now repealed), has been superseded and repealed by implication by the 1980 Municipal Code wherein it specifically provides under subsection (2) (now (3)) of this section and KRS 83A.130(9) that the mayor shall have the sole authority to appoint all nonelective officers of the city as well as all employees, including police officers. OAG 83-353 .

Neither KRS 83A.085 nor any other section of the municipal code authorizes the council to fill nonelective positions such as the office of city clerk; thus, a municipal order appointing a city clerk was of no legal effect since only the mayor is authorized to make appointments to fill nonelective offices pursuant to subsection (2) (now (3)) of this section. Likewise, council’s enactment of a second order which repealed the first order was without legal effect. OAG 84-63 .

Where a city which had a volunteer fire department had not established the position of fire chief as an office, the position of fire chief could only be considered as a form of employment; accordingly, there was no constitutional or statutory conflict involved when the county magistrate was appointed as fire chief of the city. OAG 84-150 .

Subsection (3) (now (4)) of this section which states each appointed or elected city office existing upon the adoption of the Municipal Code (KRS Chapter 83A) shall continue until abolished by ordinance simply refers to the creation of the office or form of employment and does not contemplate or affect the manner in which the positions are filled. OAG 84-207 .

In view of the fact the 1980 Municipal Code (KRS Chapter 83A) does not establish terms for nonelective officers and employees, no city ordinance can provide otherwise; thus the terms established for certain nonelective offices in a pre-1980 city ordinance were void. OAG 84-207 .

If the positions of city attorney, treasurer, assessor and engineer have been established as nonelective offices as required under subsection (1) of this section, approval of such appointments rests with the city legislative body pursuant to subsection (2) (now (3)); such approval, however, does not apply to the chief of police or any police officer since the 1982 legislature placed police officers in the category of employees under the provisions of KRS 83A.130(9). OAG 84-207 .

There is no requirement under this section or any other statute relating to the Municipal Code that requires vacancies in nonelected offices to be advertised before they can be filled by appointment. Also, the mayor is not authorized to make any appointments, interim or otherwise, with respect to nonelected offices without the consent and approval of the city council; subsection (2) (now (3)) of this section appears clear that no appointment to a nonelected office becomes legally effective until approved by the council at, of course, a legal meeting. OAG 84-208 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Kentucky Law Survey, Morris, Municipal Law, 70 Ky. L.J. 287 (1981-82).

83A.085. Office of city clerk required, except in city of first class — Duties — Combination with other nonelected city office — Information on city and officials to Department for Local Government.

  1. Each city, except a city of the first class, shall establish the office of city clerk.
  2. The office of city clerk may be combined with any other nonelected city office by inclusion of the title and duties of the office in the ordinance establishing the office of city clerk.
  3. The duties and responsibilities of the clerk shall include but not be limited to the following:
    1. Maintenance and safekeeping of the permanent records of the city;
    2. Performance of the duties required of the “official custodian” or “custodian” in accordance with KRS 61.870 to 61.882 ;
    3. Possession of the seal of the city if used;
    4. No later than January 31 of each year, mail or electronically submit to the Department for Local Government a list containing current city information including but not limited to the following:
      1. The correct name, telephone number, and electronic mail address of the mayor, legislative body members, and the correct name, telephone number, and electronic mail address for the city’s appointed officials or employees who are serving in the following roles or substantially similar roles as of January 1 of each year:
        1. City clerk;
        2. City treasurer or chief financial officer;
        3. City manager or administrator;
        4. City attorney;
        5. Human resources director;
        6. Police chief;
        7. Fire chief;
        8. Public works director;
        9. Risk manager;
        10. Information technology manager;
        11. Public relations or communications officer; and
        12. Planning and zoning administrator.
      2. The correct name of the city, mailing address for city hall, and telephone number of city hall; and
      3. The name and telephone number of either an elected or appointed official to serve as a contact person that may be reached during normal business hours of 8 a.m. to 4:30 p.m.;
    5. Performance of all other duties and responsibilities required of the city clerk by statute or ordinance; and
    6. Once the information required to be reported under paragraph (d) of this subsection is compiled by the Department for Local Government, the department shall forward one (1) electronic copy of the compiled information to the Legislative Research Commission.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1982, ch. 302, § 1, effective July 15, 1982; 1990, ch. 51, § 1, effective July 13, 1990; 1998, ch. 69, § 45, effective July 15, 1998; 2007, ch. 47, § 61, effective June 26, 2007; 2010, ch. 117, § 67, effective July 15, 2010; 2018 ch. 47, § 1, effective July 14, 2018.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Open Records Act.

There was no waiver of the Open Records Act exemptions from disclosure for emails between a city mayor and the city commissioners, although they were inadvertently disclosed, as only the city clerk or the city, by a vote of its commissioners, could effectively make a disclosure of the city records pursuant to KRS 61.870 to 61.882 , 83A.085 , and 83A.150(3). Baker v. Jones, 199 S.W.3d 749, 2006 Ky. App. LEXIS 12 (Ky. Ct. App. 2006).

Opinions of Attorney General.

The city clerk is responsible for the safekeeping of the city records and is entitled to a key to wherever the records are stored; it is his or her responsibility that they remain in safekeeping as the Open Records Act (KRS 61.870 to 61.882 ) provides, subject to inspection as the act provides. OAG 82-311 .

Subsection (2) of this section provides that the office of city clerk may be combined with any other nonelective city office by the incorporation of the title and duties of such office in the ordinance that the city must enact in establishing the office of city clerk, which could, of course, include the office of tax administrator if such is in fact an office. If it is not an office, then the position of license administrator could simply be included with the duties of the clerk. OAG 82-352 .

The city clerk is not required to be a legal resident of the city. OAG 82-563 .

An officer of the city such as the city clerk can at the same time hold other city employment as well as outside employment with an independent agency as long as he or she can perform the duties of both at the same time; thus, there would exist no constitutional or statutory incompatibility were the clerk to serve as a part-time secretary for the municipal utility commission, assuming the clerk could perform the duties in both positions at the same time. OAG 83-119 .

The position of city clerk/treasurer is a municipal office. OAG 84-14 .

There is no fixed term authorized by statute for the office of city clerk or for that matter any other nonelected office; no doubt the reason for this is the fact that the appointee to this and other such offices may be removed by the mayor at will unless otherwise provided by statute. OAG 84-14 .

Neither this section nor any other section of the municipal code authorizes the council to fill nonelective positions such as the office of city clerk; thus, a municipal order appointing a city clerk was of no legal effect since only the mayor is authorized to make appointments to fill nonelective offices pursuant to KRS 83A.080(2) (now KRS 83A.080(3) Likewise, council’s enactment of a second order which repealed the first order was without legal effect. OAG 84-63 .

83A.087. Citation officers — Powers — Restrictions.

  1. The legislative body of any city may authorize the employment of citation officers as needed. Citation officers shall have the qualifications prescribed by ordinance. Citation officers shall not have the powers of peace officers to make arrests or carry deadly weapons, but may issue citations as authorized by ordinance upon observation of:
    1. Nonmoving motor vehicle offenses.
    2. Violations of ordinances except for moving motor vehicle offenses and except for offenses which constitute a violation of the Kentucky Penal Code.
  2. The procedure for citations issued by a citation officer shall be as provided in KRS 431.015 .
  3. This section shall not be a limitation on the power of a citation officer to make an arrest as a private person as provided in KRS 431.005 .

History. Enact. Acts 1992, ch. 48, § 2, effective July 14, 1992.

83A.088. Safety officers — Powers — Restrictions.

  1. The legislative body of any city may authorize the employment of safety officers as needed. Safety officers shall have duties as prescribed by ordinance, which may include, but not be limited to:
    1. Issuance of citations for violation of motor vehicle offenses as provided for in KRS Chapters 186 and 189. Safety officers shall not have the authority to issue citations for moving violations.
    2. Issuance of citations for violation of any motor vehicle or traffic safety ordinance enacted by the city.
    3. Control and direction of traffic on public thoroughfares.
    4. Removal of vehicles in violation of state or local laws.
  2. The ordinance prescribing the duties of safety officers shall set out in particular the city ordinances and the sections of KRS Chapters 186 and 189 for which citation authority will exist.
  3. A safety officer may issue a citation for a misdemeanor or a violation committed in his presence. The procedures for citations issued by safety officers shall be as provided in KRS 431.015 .
  4. Safety officers appointed by authority of this section shall have only the limited powers as provided by this section and shall not have the powers of peace officers to make arrests or carry deadly weapons.
  5. Safety officers shall successfully complete one hundred twenty (120) hours of appropriate training certified by the Kentucky Law Enforcement Council prior to being appointed as a safety officer.
  6. This section shall not be a limitation on the power of a safety officer to make an arrest as a private person as provided in KRS 431.005 .
  7. While in the process of securing information to complete accident reports and notwithstanding any statute to the contrary, safety officers may issue citations for violations of KRS 186.430 , 186.450 , 186.510 , and 186.540 .

History. Enact. Acts 1992, ch. 48, § 1, effective July 14, 1992; 1994, ch. 110, § 2, effective July 15, 1994.

83A.090. City administrative officer.

  1. Each city may create the position of city administrative officer which shall be directly responsible to the executive authority of the city. Prior to appointment of a city administrative officer, the city legislative body shall in accordance with KRS 83A.080 set qualifications, which shall include but not be limited to professional training and experience in administration sufficient to insure competence, and list duties and responsibilities of the position which shall include, but not be limited to the following:
    1. Advise the executive authority of the city in policy formulation on overall problems of the city;
    2. Have major responsibility for preparation and administration of operating and capital improvement budgets under direction of the executive authority;
    3. Advise the executive authority of the city in the appointment of subordinate administrative personnel if not delegated appointment authority by appropriate order; and
    4. Have continuing direct relationships with operating department heads on implementation and administration of programs.
  2. The city administrative officer shall carry out all additional duties lawfully delegated by appropriate order of the executive authority and shall have the same powers as the executive authority in carrying out such duties.

History. Enact. Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 9, effective July 15, 1980.

Opinions of Attorney General.

A city mayor can delegate his supervisory duties over the city clerk-treasurer and the police chief and his officers to the city administrative officer by executive order as provided in KRS 83A.130(7) and this section. OAG 80-468 .

The city commission, under the commission plan of government, supervises all departments established by ordinance but may establish the office of city administrator pursuant to this section to superintend the various departments of city government. OAG 84-50 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Kentucky Law Survey, Morris, Municipal Law, 70 Ky. L.J. 287 (1981-82).

83A.100. Division of city into wards or hybrid wards — Equality of population — Creation, alteration, or abolition of wards — Nomination and election of legislative body members.

  1. The legislative body of a city may by ordinance divide the city into wards by either of the following methods:
    1. The city may create the same number of wards as the number of legislative body members. Wards shall be as nearly equal in population as practicable and their boundaries shall be fixed by the ordinance: or
    2. The city may establish a hybrid ward system for the conduct of its legislative body elections. A city acting under this paragraph shall provide in the ordinance that a specific number of legislative body seats shall be subject to the ward system and that a specific number of legislative body seats shall be elected at large within the entire city without representing a particular ward. The wards created under this paragraph shall be as nearly equal in population as practicable and their boundaries shall be fixed by ordinance.
  2. The populations of wards shall be reviewed as necessary to ensure that populations are as nearly equal as practicable, but the populations of wards shall be reviewed for equalization at least as often as each regular federal census.
  3. Wards may be abolished by repeal of the ordinance creating them. No creation, alteration or abolition of wards shall occur within two hundred forty (240) days preceding a regular election.
  4. If a city is divided into wards, legislative body members shall be nominated and elected in the following manner:
    1. Members shall be elected in the regular November election at large, but each candidate shall reside in the ward he seeks to represent and shall be elected in such a manner that each ward is equally represented on the legislative body. The names shall be presented in the election to show for which ward each candidate is seeking election and voters shall be instructed to “vote for one candidate in each ward.” The candidate receiving the highest number of votes cast in each ward shall be deemed to be elected from such ward;
    2. Persons seeking the nomination of a political party for the office of legislative body member where a primary election is required for the political party, shall be voted upon exclusively by the eligible voters of the ward in which the person resides and seeks to represent;
    3. Except as provided by paragraph (d) of this subsection, persons seeking nomination for the office of legislative body member in a nonpartisan election where a primary is conducted pursuant to KRS 83A.170 shall be voted upon at large by the voters of the city, and the two (2) candidates receiving the highest number of votes cast in each ward shall be deemed to be nominated from that ward; and
    4. The city may provide specifically in the ordinance required by subsection (1) of this section that persons seeking nomination for the office of legislative body member in a nonpartisan primary conducted pursuant to KRS 83A.170 shall be voted upon exclusively by the eligible voters of the ward in which the person resides and seeks to represent. The two (2) candidates receiving the highest number of votes cast in each ward shall be deemed to be nominated from the ward.
  5. Any city enacting or amending an ordinance to establish or abolish wards, modify ward boundaries, or establish the manner of elections under subsection (4) of this section shall be completed within the time specified by subsection (3) of this section, and the city shall forward a copy of the ordinance to the county clerk or county clerks of the county or counties in which the city is located.

History. Enact. Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 10, effective July 15, 1980; 1982, ch. 360, § 22, effective July 15, 1982; 1982, ch. 434, § 9, effective July 15, 1982; 1990, ch. 366, § 6, effective July 13, 1990; 2014, ch. 17, § 3, effective July 15, 2014; 2016 ch. 22, § 2, effective July 15, 2016.

Opinions of Attorney General.

In the event there are no candidates filing for election from a particular ward, or wards, then the voters throughout the city have the opportunity at the November election to elect a person who resides in the ward by “write-in” votes. OAG 82-157 .

A city of the fourth class operating under the councilmanic form of government, composed of eight councilmen but divided into four wards, could not continue to legally operate indefinitely in that manner by virtue of an ordinance enacted in August 1980 so declaring. OAG 82-245 .

83A.110. Staggered terms for legislative body members. [Repealed.]

83A.120. Procedure for referendum on public question.

  1. Any public question authorized by statute may be submitted to the voters of a city by either a resolution of the city legislative body or a petition meeting the requirements of this section. The resolution or petition shall set out in full the matter to be considered. The proposal shall be drafted in such a way that a vote in favor of adoption shall be a vote in favor of the effect or impact of the proposal.
  2. Any five (5) qualified voters of the city may commence petition proceedings by filing with the county clerk an affidavit stating they constitute the petition committee and will be responsible for circulating the petition and filing it in proper form. The affidavit shall state their names and addresses and specify the address to which all notices to the committee are to be sent. It shall set out in full the proposal to be considered by the voters. Promptly after the affidavit of the petition committee is filed, the county clerk shall notify the petition committee of all statutory requirements for petitions under this section and shall deliver a copy of the affidavit to the legislative body of the city.
  3. All papers of a petition shall be uniform in size and style and shall be assembled as one instrument for filing. Each signature shall be executed in ink or indelible pencil and shall be followed by the address of the person signing. Petitions shall be signed by registered voters of the city equal in number to at least twenty percent (20%) of the total number of votes cast in the city in the last presidential election. When it is filed, each sheet of a petition shall have an affidavit executed by the circulator stating that he personally circulated the sheet, the number of signatures thereon, that all signatures were affixed in his presence, that he believes them to be the genuine signatures of registered voters in the city and that each signer had an opportunity before signing to read the full text of the proposal. Petitions shall contain or have attached throughout their circulation the full text of the proposal.
  4. Within thirty (30) days after the petition is filed, the county clerk shall complete a certificate as to its sufficiency, specifying, if it is insufficient, the particulars wherein it is defective and shall send a copy to the petition committee and to the city legislative body by registered mail. A petition certified insufficient for lack of the required number of valid signatures may be amended once if the petition committee files a notice of intention to amend it with the county clerk within five (5) days after receiving the copy of his certificate and files a supplemental petition upon additional sheets within thirty (30) days after receiving the certificate. The supplemental petition shall comply with the requirements of subsection (3) and within ten (10) days after it is filed the county clerk shall complete a certificate as to the sufficiency of the petition as amended and promptly send a copy of the certificate to the petition committee and to the city legislative body by certified mail.
  5. A final determination as to the sufficiency of a petition shall be subject to review in the Circuit Court of the county and shall be limited to the validity of the county clerk’s determination. A final determination of insufficiency shall not prejudice the filing in accordance with this section of a new petition for the same purpose.
  6. If, not later than the second Tuesday in August preceding the day established for a regular election, the county clerk receives a resolution requesting that the question be submitted to the voters or certifies that a petition is sufficient, the county clerk shall have prepared to place before the voters of the city at the next regular election the question, which shall be “Are you in favor of the proposal entitled  . . . . . . . . . . ? Yes  . . . . .  No  . . . . . ” The county clerk shall cause to be published in accordance with KRS Chapter 424, at the same time as the remaining voter information, the full text of the proposal. The county clerk shall cause to be posted in each polling place one (1) copy of the full text of the proposal.
  7. The provisions of general election law shall apply to public questions submitted to voters under this section. The certificate of the body authorized by law to canvass election returns shall be delivered to the mayor and the certificate shall be entered upon the records of the city at the next regular meeting of the city legislative body.

History. Enact. Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 12, effective July 15, 1980; 1982, ch. 360, § 23, effective July 15, 1982; 1996, ch. 195, § 23, effective July 15, 1996.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(1988). A technical correction has been made in this section by the Reviser of Statutes pursuant to KRS 7.136 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. In General.

It is the general rule that the initiative and the referendum are applicable only to acts which are legislative in character and not to those dealing with administrative or executive matters. Seaton v. Lackey, 298 Ky. 188 , 182 S.W.2d 336, 1944 Ky. LEXIS 859 ( Ky. 1944 ); Plageman v. Board of Comm'rs, 569 S.W.2d 191, 1978 Ky. App. LEXIS 560 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978) (decided under prior law).

2. Application.

This section does not come into play without specific authority, as the language “may” indicates this section is not mandatory. Baker v. Richmond, 709 S.W.2d 472, 1986 Ky. App. LEXIS 1136 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986).

Where the city proposed condemning property outside the city limits for a water line and issuing revenue bonds, the water system revenues were obligated to repay the bonds; therefore, there was no levy of tax upon the public-at-large which would mandate the necessary authorization for this section. Baker v. Richmond, 709 S.W.2d 472, 1986 Ky. App. LEXIS 1136 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986).

County occupational license fee was properly approved by public question pursuant to KRS 68.197 because the ballot question met the requirements of KRS 83A.120 and 120.250 . Further, a taxpayer’s challenge was untimely under KRS 120.250 in that it was not brought within 30 days after the election. King v. Campbell County, 217 S.W.3d 862, 2006 Ky. App. LEXIS 331 (Ky. Ct. App. 2006).

3. Mandamus.

Petition in mandamus seeking initiative on ordinance, which followed language of statute and filed as exhibit copy of petition addressed to board, was not demurrable for not alleging the number of votes cast for mayoralty candidates at preceding election or number of voters who actually signed petition. Rives v. Paducah, 287 Ky. 709 , 155 S.W.2d 33, 1941 Ky. LEXIS 627 ( Ky. 1941 ), overruled, Newport v. Gugel, 342 S.W.2d 517, 1960 Ky. LEXIS 95 ( Ky. 1960 ), overruled in part, Newport v. Gugel, 342 S.W.2d 517, 1960 Ky. LEXIS 95 ( Ky. 1960 ), overruled on other grounds. Newport v. Gugel, 342 S.W.2d 517, 1960 Ky. LEXIS 95 (Ky. 1960) (decided under prior law).

Mandamus lies to compel submission of an initiative or referendum proposition where all mandatory legal steps have been taken, or to restrain submission if necessary preliminary requirements have not been complied with sufficiently. Utz v. Newport, 252 S.W.2d 434, 1952 Ky. LEXIS 1004 ( Ky. 1952 ) (decided under prior law).

Writ of mandamus will be denied where the ordinance which petitioner is attempting to have submitted to electors for approval was unlawful or did not fall within the measures that might have been referred, for the court ought not to have compelled the doing of a vain thing and the useless spending of public money. Utz v. Newport, 252 S.W.2d 434, 1952 Ky. LEXIS 1004 ( Ky. 1952 ) (decided under prior law).

Mandamus lies to compel submission of an initiative referendum where all mandatory legal steps have been taken and the trial court has determined the validity of the proposed ordinance. Plageman v. Board of Comm'rs, 569 S.W.2d 191, 1978 Ky. App. LEXIS 560 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978) (decided under prior law).

4. Subjects of Referendum.

The construction of a light plant under KRS 96.520 to 96.540 , was a proper subject for referendum under former law that provided for referendum. Kentucky Utilities Co. v. Ginsberg, 255 Ky. 148 , 72 S.W.2d 738, 1934 Ky. LEXIS 180 ( Ky. 1934 ) (decided under prior law).

A revenue bond issue is subject to referendum. Board of Comm'rs v. Kentucky Utilities Co., 267 Ky. 99 , 101 S.W.2d 414, 1936 Ky. LEXIS 759 ( Ky. 1936 ) (decided under prior law).

Since under former law city manager form of government board of commissioners was vested with both legislative and administrative power, mere fact that board was empowered to take certain action by ordinance did not mean that action was legislative; therefore while overall comprehensive plan or policy for personnel administration of city government, giving consideration to such factors as money resources available, tax potential and its limitations and the requirements of unified budget would have been legislative in character and capable of being subject of initiative, the same could not have been said of ordinance that dealt only with a segregated portion of administrative personnel and with a part of administrative problems and merely prescribed details within framework of previously adopted general plan. Newport v. Gugel, 342 S.W.2d 517, 1960 Ky. LEXIS 95 ( Ky. 1960 ) (decided under prior law).

Ordinance authorizing purchase of certain property for city hall and other municipal use and providing for payment of $550,000 therefor was properly subject to referendum. Katter, Inc. v. Brockman, 349 S.W.2d 838, 1961 Ky. LEXIS 75 ( Ky. 1961 ) (decided under prior law).

Initiated ordinance that fixed minimum salaries for fire and police departments, prescribed minimum personnel for various departments, regulated working hours, vacations and days off without pay and provided for filling of certain positions from personnel of police department was administrative in nature and not within scope of initiative power. Newport v. Gugel, 342 S.W.2d 517, 1960 Ky. LEXIS 95 ( Ky. 1960 ) (decided under prior law).

Although the subject of granting a franchise might be termed to be legislative, since the city is required to sell a new franchise before the expiration of the old by KRS 96.010 , the adoption of an ordinance providing for the sale of a franchise under that section is not subject to initiative or referendum. Seaton v. Lackey, 298 Ky. 188 , 182 S.W.2d 336, 1944 Ky. LEXIS 859 ( Ky. 1944 ) (decided under prior law).

5. Sufficient Description.

Where it was alleged that initiated ordinance fixing working hours and minimum compensation of members of city fire department was invalid because when it was placed on ballot it was not sufficiently described to show that passage of such ordinance would cost the city, in order to comply with its terms, an additional amount of money each year in excess of current expenditures, such ordinance was valid since when it was placed on ballot it was in comprehensive form and described in minute detail and such description definitely submitted the scope and import of the proposed ordinance and had no misleading tendency. Covington v. Reagan, 284 S.W.2d 323, 1955 Ky. LEXIS 23 ( Ky. 1955 ) (decided under prior law).

6. “Voter.”

A person is a “voter” only if he is qualified under Ky. Const., § 145 and is also registered since registration is one of the essential qualifications of a voter. Coffey v. Anderson, 371 S.W.2d 624, 1963 Ky. LEXIS 103 ( Ky. 1963 ) (decided under prior law).

7. Withdrawal of Names.

Where a petition, asking that an election be held on the question of whether the commission form of government should be continued, had been filed with the court and the time in which the court had to or might act upon the petition had arrived, but final action had not been taken, the petitioners did not have the right to withdraw their names, merely because of a change of mind. Evans v. Maddox, 260 S.W.2d 661, 1953 Ky. LEXIS 984 ( Ky. 1953 ) (decided under prior law).

Cited:

Baker v. Richmond, 709 S.W.2d 472, 1986 Ky. App. LEXIS 1136 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Public questions can only be placed on the ballot where there exists a specific statute so authorizing. OAG 80-564 .

This section specifically requires that a public question be specifically authorized by statute before submission to the voters in conformance with this section can be utilized; accordingly, where a city had no statutory authority to ask its residents to assume the revenue bond indebtedness of the city’s recreational facilities corporation, the issue could not be placed on the ballot pursuant to this section. OAG 82-468 .

The question of staggered terms for members of the legislative body may be presented for vote by the resolution of the legislative body or by petition meeting the requirements of this section. OAG 83-24 .

A resolution proposing the establishment of staggered terms for members of a city council must specify the wording of the proposal to be voted upon as in the case of a proposal that is initiated by petition under subsection (2) of this section; it must, of course, be filed with the clerk as required under subsection (6) of this section. OAG 83-24 .

Under Ky. Const., § 148 and subsection (6) of this section, a referendum concerning staggered terms could not be presented to the voters at a May primary election but could only be presented at the general election in November. OAG 83-24 .

There is no statutory provision authorizing a referendum in connection with the establishment of a Tourist and Convention Commission and the levying of a tax to support the activities of such a commission. OAG 83-315 .

Where two city council members are elected for regular terms at the same November election in which the city residents vote to change their type of government from the mayor-council plan to a commission form of government, the newly elected council members would be entitled to take office and serve out their two-year term and the effective date of the change in government would be delayed for those two years. OAG 83-364 .

Since the statute that authorizes urban county government to impose the occupational tax, KRS 92.280 , contains no language authorizing a referendum, and where there is no other authority, statutory or constitutional, authorizing such a referendum, urban county government had no authority to amend its charter to provide for a referendum on occupational license taxes and the county clerk had no duty to place the proposed amendment on the general election ballot. OAG 94-54 .

83A.130. Mayor-council plan — Powers and duties of mayor and council.

  1. The form of government provided in this section shall be known as the mayor-council plan and this section shall together with KRS 83A.010 to 83A.120 govern any city declared to be under the mayor-council plan by KRS 83A.020 or which has adopted the mayor-council plan pursuant to KRS 83A.160 .
  2. Each city under this section shall be governed by an elected executive who shall be called mayor and by an elected legislative body which shall be called the city council, and by such other officers and employees as may be provided for by statute or city ordinance.
  3. The executive authority of the city shall be vested in and exercised by the mayor. The mayor shall enforce the mayor-council plan, city ordinances and orders and all applicable statutes. He shall supervise all departments of city government and the conduct of all city officers and employees under his jurisdiction and shall require each department to make reports to him required by ordinance or as he deems desirable. The mayor shall maintain liaison with related units of local government respecting interlocal contracting and joint activities. The mayor shall report to the council and to the public on the condition and needs of city government as he finds appropriate or as required by ordinance, but not less than annually. He shall make any recommendations for actions by the council he finds in the public interest.
  4. Subject to disapproval of the council, the mayor shall promulgate procedures to insure orderly administration of the functions of city government and compliance with statute or ordinance. Upon promulgation or upon revision or rescission of the procedures, copies shall be filed with the person responsible for maintaining city records as provided under KRS 83A.060 .
  5. The mayor shall preside at meetings of the council. The council may set by ordinance the manner in which one of its number may be selected to preside at meetings of the council in place of the mayor. The mayor may participate in council proceedings, but shall not have a vote, except that he may cast the deciding vote in case of a tie.
  6. All ordinances adopted by the council shall be submitted to the mayor who shall within ten (10) days after submission either approve the ordinance by affixing his signature or disapprove it by returning it to the council together with a statement of his objections. No ordinance shall take effect without the mayor’s approval unless he fails to return it to the legislative body within ten (10) days after receiving it or unless the council votes to override the mayor’s veto, upon reconsideration of the ordinance not later than the second regular meeting following its return, by the affirmative vote of one (1) more than a majority of the membership.
  7. Any delegation of the mayor’s power, duties or responsibilities to subordinate officers and employees and any expression of his official authority to fulfill executive functions shall be made by executive order. Executive orders shall be sequentially numbered by years and shall be kept in a permanent file.
  8. All bonds, notes, contracts and written obligations of the city shall be made and executed by the mayor or his agent designated by executive order.
  9. The mayor shall be the appointing authority with power to appoint and remove all city employees, including police officers, except as tenure and terms of employment are protected by statute, ordinance or contract and except for employees of the council.
  10. The mayor shall provide for the orderly continuation of the functions of city government at any time he is unable to attend to the duties of his office by delegating responsibility for any function to be performed in accordance with subsection (7) of this section, provided that the mayor shall not delegate the responsibility of presiding at meetings of the council and that approving ordinances or promulgating administrative procedures may only be delegated to an elected officer. With approval of the council, the mayor may rescind any action taken in his absence under this subsection within thirty (30) days of such action. If for any reason the disability of the mayor to attend to his duties persists for sixty (60) consecutive days, the office of mayor may be declared vacant by a majority vote of the council and the provisions of KRS 83A.040 shall apply.
  11. The legislative authority of the city shall be vested in and exercised by the elected council of the city. The council shall not perform any executive functions except those functions assigned to it by statute. Regular meetings of the council shall be held at least once each month at such times and places as are fixed by ordinance. Special meetings of the council may be called by the mayor or upon written request of a majority of the council. In the call, the mayor or council shall designate the purpose, time and place of the special meeting with sufficient notice for the attendance of council members and for compliance with KRS Chapter 61. At a special meeting no business may be considered other than that set forth in the designation of purpose. The minutes of every meeting shall be signed by the person responsible for maintaining city records provided under KRS 83A.060 and by the officer presiding at the meeting.
  12. The council shall by ordinance establish all appointive offices and the duties and responsibilities of those offices and codes, rules and regulations for the public health, safety and welfare. The council shall by ordinance provide for sufficient revenue to operate city government and shall appropriate the funds of the city in a budget which shall provide for the orderly management of city resources.
  13. The council shall have the right to investigate all activities of city government. The council may require any city officer or employee to prepare and submit to it sworn statements regarding his performance of his official duties. Any statement required by the council to be submitted or any investigation undertaken by the council, if any office, department or agency under the jurisdiction of the mayor is involved, shall not be submitted or undertaken unless and until written notice of the council’s action is given to the mayor. The mayor shall have the right to review any statement before submission to the council and to appear personally or through his designee on behalf of any department, office or agency in the course of any investigation.

History. Enact. Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 13, effective July 15, 1980; 1982, ch. 434, § 4, effective July 15, 1982.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Analysis

1. Purpose.

The purpose of former section governing councils in second-class cities was to prevent the application of the general rule of construction that a council may pass no ordinance unless expressly or impliedly authorized to do so. Stone v. Paducah, 120 Ky. 322 , 86 S.W. 531, 27 Ky. L. Rptr. 717 , 1905 Ky. LEXIS 102 ( Ky. 1905 ) (decided under prior law).

The purpose of former section in requiring the council to meet at the time and place fixed by ordinance was to afford the citizens an opportunity to be present and make suggestions. Shugars v. Hamilton, 122 Ky. 606 , 92 S.W. 564, 29 Ky. L. Rptr. 127 , 1906 Ky. LEXIS 80 ( Ky. 1906 ) (decided under prior law).

2. De Facto Councilmen.

Acts of de facto councilmen are valid. Pence v. Frankfort, 101 Ky. 534 , 41 S.W. 1011, 19 Ky. L. Rptr. 721 , 1897 Ky. LEXIS 224 ( Ky. 1897 ) (decided under prior law).

3. Judicial Notice.

The courts are not required to recognize all parliamentary rules that may be adopted by a body of legislative functions. Reuter v. Meacham Contracting Co., 143 Ky. 557 , 136 S.W. 1028, 1911 Ky. LEXIS 464 ( Ky. 1911 ); Tuell v. Meacham Contracting Co., 145 Ky. 181 , 140 S.W. 159, 1911 Ky. LEXIS 811 ( Ky. 1911 ) (decided under prior law).

4. Mayor Pro Tem.

Mayor pro tem may act within three days of his election. Chesapeake & O. R. Co. v. Maysville, 69 S.W. 728, 24 Ky. L. Rptr. 615 , 1902 Ky. LEXIS 324 (Ky. Ct. App. 1902) (decided under prior law).

The mayor pro tem is not denied the right to vote as a member of the council, but cannot vote again as mayor in case of a tie. He is counted for the purpose of making a quorum. The fact that he is mayor pro tem does not interfere with the performance of his duties as a councilman. Shugars v. Hamilton, 122 Ky. 606 , 92 S.W. 564, 29 Ky. L. Rptr. 127 , 1906 Ky. LEXIS 80 ( Ky. 1906 ) (decided under prior law).

Approval by mayor pro tem when mayor has not been absent for three days is cured by subsequent ratification by the council at a meeting presided over by the regular mayor. Baker v. Kelly, 226 Ky. 1 , 10 S.W.2d 467, 1928 Ky. LEXIS 20 ( Ky. 1 928) (decided under prior law).

5. Meetings.

The council and its members may act only when meeting as such; individual approval given when the council is not in session is ineffective. Leitchfield Mercantile Co. v. Commonwealth, 143 Ky. 162 , 136 S.W. 639, 1911 Ky. LEXIS 407 ( Ky. 1911 ) (decided under prior law).

6. — Call of Meeting.

When mayor refused to call a session of the general council as required by ordinance, a call by the clerk was held sufficient. Davis v. Claus, 125 Ky. 4 , 100 S.W. 263, 30 Ky. L. Rptr. 1082 , 1907 Ky. LEXIS 255 ( Ky. 1907 ) (decided under prior law).

A call need not designate the purpose in detail, and no particular method of delivery is required. Reuter v. Meacham Contracting Co., 143 Ky. 557 , 136 S.W. 1028, 1911 Ky. LEXIS 464 ( Ky. 1911 ); Meacham Contracting Co. v. Kleiderer, 146 Ky. 441 , 142 S.W. 720, 1912 Ky. LEXIS 83 ( Ky. 1912 ) (decided under prior law).

7. — Minutes.

Approval of the minutes of a prior meeting does not constitute a ratification of defects in the proceedings of the former meeting. Leitchfield Mercantile Co. v. Commonwealth, 143 Ky. 162 , 136 S.W. 639, 1911 Ky. LEXIS 407 ( Ky. 1911 ) (decided under prior law).

8. — Place.

When no regular meeting place has been designated by ordinance, a tax levy passed at a called meeting not held at the regular meeting place is invalid. Springfield v. People's Deposit Bank, 111 Ky. 105 , 63 S.W. 271, 23 Ky. L. Rptr. 519 , 1901 Ky. LEXIS 177 ( Ky. 1901 ) (decided under prior law).

Council meetings must be held at the place designated by ordinance, but a meeting held at another place for a cogent reason is valid, if the rights of its members and of citizens are not prejudiced thereby. Shugars v. Hamilton, 122 Ky. 606 , 92 S.W. 564, 29 Ky. L. Rptr. 127 , 1906 Ky. LEXIS 80 ( Ky. 1906 ); Dunn v. Cadiz, 140 Ky. 217 , 130 S.W. 1089, 1910 Ky. LEXIS 216 ( Ky. 1910 ); Wallace v. Louisa, 217 Ky. 419 , 273 S.W. 720, 1925 Ky. LEXIS 982 ( Ky. 1925 ) (decided under prior law).

9. — Presiding Officer.

Subsection (5) of this section by the use of “in the place of ” instead of “in the absence of ” in providing that council may set by ordinance the manner in which one of its number may be selected to preside at meetings of the council in place of the mayor did not authorize city council to provide by ordinance or municipal order that specified council members would preside over council meetings rather than the mayor, as the use of such words was not intended to permit drastic revision of the mayoral power at council’s whim. Smith v. Falk, 885 S.W.2d 702, 1994 Ky. LEXIS 112 ( Ky. 1994 ).

Sections 83A.080(2) and subsection (9) of this section permit a local executive authority such as a may or to terminate the employment of a nonelected city official such as a police officer only if there is no statute which provides otherwise; KRS 95.765 is such a statute, and requires that a disciplinary hearing be conducted before the legislative body rather than before the mayor. Madisonville v. Sisk, 783 S.W.2d 885, 1990 Ky. App. LEXIS 15 (Ky. Ct. App. 1990).

10. — Quorum.

When a quorum is present, all actions are valid if passed by a majority of those voting. Wheeler v. Commonwealth, 98 Ky. 59 , 32 S.W. 259, 17 Ky. L. Rptr. 636 , 1895 Ky. LEXIS 14 ( Ky. 1895 ) (decided under prior law).

When a quorum is present, all actions are valid if passed by a majority of those voting and it is immaterial that some of the councilmen are de facto officers. Pence v. Frankfort, 101 Ky. 534 , 41 S.W. 1011, 19 Ky. L. Rptr. 721 , 1897 Ky. LEXIS 224 ( Ky. 1897 ) (decided under prior law).

Former section in providing for a quorum meant a majority of the members of the council, elected as such and did not include the mayor. Somerset v. Smith, 105 Ky. 678 , 49 S.W. 456, 20 Ky. L. Rptr. 1488 , 1899 Ky. LEXIS 251 ( Ky. 1899 ) (decided under prior law).

At a regular council meeting in a city of the fifth class four councilmen constituted a quorum and the mayor would not be counted for that purpose. Bybee v. Smith, 61 S.W. 15, 22 Ky. L. Rptr. 1684 , 1901 Ky. LEXIS 399 (Ky. Ct. App. 1901); Williamsburg v. Weesner, 164 Ky. 769 , 176 S.W. 224, 1915 Ky. LEXIS 459 ( Ky. 1915 ) (decided under prior law).

At a regular meeting in a fifth-class city four councilmen constituted a quorum. Shugars v. Hamilton, 122 Ky. 606 , 92 S.W. 564, 29 Ky. L. Rptr. 127 , 1906 Ky. LEXIS 80 ( Ky. 1906 ) (decided under prior law).

A councilman interested in the granting of a permit may not be counted in making a quorum. Leitchfield Mercantile Co. v. Commonwealth, 143 Ky. 162 , 136 S.W. 639, 1911 Ky. LEXIS 407 ( Ky. 1911 ) (decided under prior law).

A majority of the councilmen constitutes a quorum. Barry v. New Haven, 162 Ky. 60 , 171 S.W. 1012, 1915 Ky. LEXIS 13 ( Ky. 1915 ) (decided under prior law).

Councilman not voting will be deemed to have voted affirmatively. Napier v. Gay, 264 Ky. 359 , 94 S.W.2d 682, 1936 Ky. LEXIS 321 ( Ky. 1936 ) (decided under prior law).

11. — Special Meetings.

The provisions as to giving notice of special meetings are mandatory, and special meetings called without notice to all the members, and when any of the members are absent, are invalid. Shugars v. Hamilton, 122 Ky. 606 , 92 S.W. 564, 29 Ky. L. Rptr. 127 , 1906 Ky. LEXIS 80 ( Ky. 1906 ) (decided under prior law).

Councils of fourth-class cities are not restricted in the nature of business that may be transacted at a special meeting. Mt. Sterling v. King, 126 Ky. 526 , 104 S.W. 322, 31 Ky. L. Rptr. 919 , 1907 Ky. LEXIS 67 ( Ky. 1907 ) (decided under prior law).

“To consider ordinances for street improvements on the first and second reading” is a sufficient designation of purpose. Reuter v. Meacham Contracting Co., 143 Ky. 557 , 136 S.W. 1028, 1911 Ky. LEXIS 464 ( Ky. 1911 ) (decided under prior law).

“To consider ordinances” is not a sufficient designation of purpose. Meacham Contracting Co. v. Kleiderer, 146 Ky. 441 , 142 S.W. 720, 1912 Ky. LEXIS 83 ( Ky. 1912 ) (decided under prior law).

The sufficiency of the notice is a jurisdictional fact that lies at the very bottom of the validity of everything that the council does at a special meeting. It gets its authority to attend to business from no other source. It can only do such things as the notice designates will be brought to its attention. Meacham Contracting Co. v. Kleiderer, 146 Ky. 441 , 142 S.W. 720, 1912 Ky. LEXIS 83 ( Ky. 1912 ) (decided under prior law).

Where council itself at a regular meeting called a meeting, designating the purpose thereof, and all members attended the called meeting, the presence of all members dispensed with necessity of notice. Tandy & Fairleigh Tobacco Co. v. Hopkinsville, 174 Ky. 189 , 192 S.W. 46, 1917 Ky. LEXIS 183 ( Ky. 1917 ) (decided under prior law).

Fourth-class cities may deal with street improvements in special session. Baker v. Kelly, 226 Ky. 1 , 10 S.W.2d 467, 1928 Ky. LEXIS 20 ( Ky. 1 928) (decided under prior law).

The requirement of written notice for special meetings is mandatory but where all the members of council are present the lack of notice is not prejudicial; however, where no written notice was given and one of the councilmen did not attend, ordinance passed at such meeting was invalid. Solomon v. Calvert City, 267 S.W.2d 719, 1954 Ky. LEXIS 852 ( Ky. 1954 ) (decided under prior law).

Where annexation ordinance was invalid because it was passed at special meeting of which no written notice was given and one of the councilmen was absent, fact that council could accomplish purpose of annexation by merely passing a valid ordinance to that effect did not make invalid ordinance valid since court could not ignore the requirement of written notice of a special meeting as it was enacted to accomplish a salutary purpose. Solomon v. Calvert City, 267 S.W.2d 719, 1954 Ky. LEXIS 852 ( Ky. 1954 ) (decided under prior law).

12. Tie Breaking.

The mayor casts the deciding vote in case of a tie, and decides all questions of order. Wheeler v. Commonwealth, 98 Ky. 59 , 32 S.W. 259, 17 Ky. L. Rptr. 636 , 1895 Ky. LEXIS 14 ( Ky. 1895 ) (decided under prior law).

The mayor may vote only in case of a tie. Bybee v. Smith, 61 S.W. 15, 22 Ky. L. Rptr. 1684 , 1901 Ky. LEXIS 399 (Ky. Ct. App. 1901); Williamsburg v. Weesner, 164 Ky. 769 , 176 S.W. 224, 1915 Ky. LEXIS 459 ( Ky. 1915 ) (decided under prior law).

Where a mayor’s general power to cast a tie-breaking vote under KRS 83A.130(5) did not prevail over the explicit language of KRS 100.211(1), a county planning commission was “aggrieved” pursuant to KRS 100.337 , 100.347 when its decision to deny a zoning application was not followed. Chandler v. Bullitt County Joint Planning Comm'n, 125 S.W.3d 851, 2002 Ky. App. LEXIS 2358 (Ky. Ct. App. 2002).

13. Powers of City Council.

Cities possess only such powers as are expressly conferred by the general assembly, and doubts will be resolved against the city. Gregory v. Raceland, 279 Ky. 316 , 130 S.W.2d 825 ( Ky. 1939 ) (decided under prior law).

14. — Accommodation Indorser.

A town is without power or authority to become accommodation indorser or surety. Knepfle's Ex'x v. Southgate, 194 Ky. 346 , 238 S.W. 1051, 1922 Ky. LEXIS 156 ( Ky. 1922 ) (decided under prior law).

15. — Appointments.

The council is authorized to adopt rules governing voting on appointments. Wheeler v. Commonwealth, 98 Ky. 59 , 32 S.W. 259, 17 Ky. L. Rptr. 636 , 1895 Ky. LEXIS 14 ( Ky. 1895 ) (decided under prior law).

When evidence shows special policemen to have been duly appointed, the court should instruct the jury as to their status. Barker v. Commonwealth, 209 Ky. 817 , 273 S.W. 503, 1925 Ky. LEXIS 610 ( Ky. 1925 ) (decided under prior law).

After resignation of mayor the person appointed by the council is mayor and not mayor pro tem and his authority is not limited to the date of his appointment. Cahill-Swift Mfg. Co. v. Bardwell, 211 Ky. 482 , 277 S.W. 812, 1925 Ky. LEXIS 904 ( Ky. 1925 ) (decided under prior law).

Where clerk was convicted of felony the council had the right to designate and pay a temporary clerk during the enforced absence of the regular clerk, and the latter had no right to designate a deputy. Pineville v. Collett, 294 Ky. 853 , 172 S.W.2d 640, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 543 ( Ky. 1943 ) (decided under prior law).

Where city council passed ordinance whereby police chief was to be elected by voters and chief was elected in 1949 election but resigned in 1950, vacancy could only be filled temporarily by appointment of city council until there could be a special election to fulfill the unexpired part of four-year term. Cawood v. Hensley, 247 S.W.2d 27, 1952 Ky. LEXIS 661 ( Ky. 1952 ) (decided under prior law).

16. — Creditor’s Agreement.

A town has authority to join in a creditor’s agreement. Citizens Nat'l Bank's Trustee v. Loyall, 262 Ky. 39 , 88 S.W.2d 952, 1935 Ky. LEXIS 757 ( Ky. 1935 ) (decided under prior law).

17. — Delegation of Authority.

Council may not delegate its discretion in the supervision of the construction of a sewer system and acceptance of bids. Lowery v. Lexington, 116 Ky. 157 , 75 S.W. 202, 25 Ky. L. Rptr. 392 , 1903 Ky. LEXIS 169 ( Ky. 1903 ) (decided under prior law).

City cannot contract away its governmental powers. South C. & C. R. Co. v. Covington, 146 Ky. 592 , 143 S.W. 28, 1912 Ky. LEXIS 130 ( Ky. 1912 ), rev’d, South Covington & C. S. R. Co. v. Covington, 235 U.S. 537, 35 S. Ct. 158, 59 L. Ed. 350, 1915 U.S. LEXIS 1840 (1915), reversed on other grounds, South Covington & C. S. R. Co. v. Covington, 235 U.S. 537, 35 S. Ct. 158, 59 L. Ed. 350, 1915 U.S. LEXIS 1840 (1915) (decided under prior law).

A council cannot divest itself of its control of the city cemetery. Hartford v. Gillespie, 260 Ky. 833 , 86 S.W.2d 1003, 1935 Ky. LEXIS 566 ( Ky. 1935 ) (decided under prior law).

18. — Elections.

Council may designate officers to hold election on question of incurring debt. Fidelity Trust & Safety Vault Co. v. Mayor, etc. of Morganfield, 96 Ky. 563 , 29 S.W. 442, 16 Ky. L. Rptr. 647 , 1895 Ky. LEXIS 126 ( Ky. 1895 ), overruled, Belknap v. Louisville, 99 Ky. 474 , 36 S.W. 1118, 18 Ky. L. Rptr. 313 , 1896 Ky. LEXIS 122 ( Ky. 1896 ) (decided under prior law).

19. — Executive Orders.

Former section authorizing council to enact ordinances to carry into effect the powers of the city was a grant of legislative, not executive, power to the city council and since it required an ordinance, the city council clearly had no authority to issue an executive order to the police department. George v. City Council of Lebanon, 424 S.W.2d 588, 1968 Ky. LEXIS 464 ( Ky. 1968 ) (decided under prior law).

20. — Franchises.

A city has no authority to control rates of public service corporations, except as a condition in the granting of a franchise or an easement over its streets. United Fuel & Gas Co. v. Commonwealth, 159 Ky. 34 , 166 S.W. 783, 1914 Ky. LEXIS 743 ( Ky. 1914 ) (decided under prior law).

Cities are authorized to amend ordinances granting franchises so as to increase rates to be charged. The citizens have no vested rights in the rate scales previously contracted for. In the absence of fraud or flagrant misconduct, it will be presumed that the increase was upon good consideration and that the rates agreed on were reasonable. Johnson County Gas Co. v. Stafford, 198 Ky. 208 , 248 S.W. 515, 1923 Ky. LEXIS 408 ( Ky. 1923 ) (decided under prior law).

21. — Improvements.

Decision of council as to necessity of an improvement is final, unless the facts are manifestly to the contrary. Preston v. Rudd, 84 Ky. 150 , 7 Ky. L. Rptr. 806 , 1886 Ky. LEXIS 48 (Ky. Ct. App. 1886); Allen v. Woods, 45 S.W. 106, 20 Ky. L. Rptr. 59 , 1898 Ky. LEXIS 323 (Ky. Ct. App. 1898) (decided under prior law).

22. — Plumbing Code.

A fifth-class city had the authority under its general powers to enact a city ordinance adopting the state plumbing code. Horse Cave v. Pierce, 437 S.W.2d 185, 1969 Ky. LEXIS 427 ( Ky. 1969 ) (decided under prior law).

23. — Police Power.

Sixth-class cities, under their police power could control, regulate and prohibit those callings hurtful to the morals, health or peace of society, and it was immaterial that there was a state license tax on such callings. Pikeville v. Huffman, 112 Ky. 360 , 65 S.W. 794, 23 Ky. L. Rptr. 1692 , 1901 Ky. LEXIS 314 ( Ky. 1901 ) (decided under prior law). See Arms v. Vine Grove, 203 Ky. 213 , 262 S.W. 11, 1924 Ky. LEXIS 884 ( Ky. 1924 ).

Former section governing powers of council in fifth-class cities did not authorize the council under its police powers to unreasonably interfere with the right of a zen to smoke a cigarette, at least in his home. Hershberg v. Barbourville, 142 Ky. 60 , 133 S.W. 985, 1911 Ky. LEXIS 130 ( Ky. 1911 ) (decided under prior law).

A council was not authorized under its police powers to prohibit sale of harmless drinks. Tolliver v. Blizzard, 143 Ky. 773 , 137 S.W. 509, 1911 Ky. LEXIS 501 ( Ky. 1911 ) (decided under prior law).

The police power of second-class cities was similar to that of the state; and it was within the police power of the state to protect any class of its citizens needing protection. South C. & C. R. Co. v. Covington, 146 Ky. 592 , 143 S.W. 28, 1912 Ky. LEXIS 130 ( Ky. 1912 ), rev'd, 235 U.S. 537, 35 S. Ct. 158, 59 L. Ed. 350, 1915 U.S. LEXIS 1840 (U.S. 1915); Silva v. Newport, 150 Ky. 781 , 150 S.W. 1024, 1912 Ky. LEXIS 994 ( Ky. 1912 ) (decided under prior law).

The power conferred upon the general council of second-class cities by former section was as broad as the state’s police power, and was not limited with respect to right of legislative body to take any action necessary to insure the peace, good government, and welfare of the city. Shepherd v. McElwee, 304 Ky. 695 , 202 S.W.2d 166, 1947 Ky. LEXIS 701 ( Ky. 1947 ) (decided under prior law).

24. — — Building Construction.

City councils have authority to establish fire zones, and regulate building construction within said limits, but such an ordinance must define what are acceptable standards, and cannot leave the matter to the arbitrary discretion of the trustees. Monticello v. Bates, 169 Ky. 258 , 183 S.W. 555, 1916 Ky. LEXIS 685 ( Ky. 1916 ) (decided under prior law).

Fourth-class cities have authority to create fire limits, regulate the erection of buildings therein, procure the removal of buildings erected contrary to the ordinance, and fine persons violating same. This power must not be exercised arbitrarily, nor may the council grant permission for the construction of buildings which would violate the ordinance. Galanty & Alper v. Maysville, 176 Ky. 523 , 196 S.W. 169, 1917 Ky. LEXIS 92 ( Ky. 1917 ) (decided under prior law).

Second-class city could use public funds to erect city building and auditorium. Wilkerson v. Lexington, 188 Ky. 381 , 222 S.W. 74, 1920 Ky. LEXIS 290 ( Ky. 1920 ) (decided under prior law).

Second-class cities could, under their police power, pass ordinances regulating construction and maintenance of buildings. Wilkins v. Hubbard, 271 Ky. 780 , 113 S.W.2d 441, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 57 ( Ky. 1938 ) (decided under prior law).

25. — — Disorderly Conduct.

Fourth-class city had authority to prohibit disorderly conduct. Mt. Sterling v. Holly, 57 S.W. 491, 22 Ky. L. Rptr. 358 (1900) (decided under prior law).

Fourth-class city was authorized to define the wearing of masks as disorderly conduct. Pineville v. Marshall, 222 Ky. 4 , 299 S.W. 1072, 1927 Ky. LEXIS 852 ( Ky. 1927 ) (decided under prior law).

26. — — Gambling.

An ordinance to punish persons engaged in games of chance is a valid exercise of the powers of the city. White v. Commonwealth, 122 Ky. 408 , 92 S.W. 285, 28 Ky. L. Rptr. 1312 , 1906 Ky. LEXIS 64 ( Ky. 1906 ) (decided under prior law).

27. — — Nuisances.

Fourth-class city was authorized to declare surface toilets a nuisance. Nourse v. Russellville, 257 Ky. 525 , 78 S.W.2d 761, 1935 Ky. LEXIS 53 ( Ky. 1935 ) (decided under prior law).

Under former section governing nuisances council of fourth-class city had authority to define and abate a nuisance. Mt. Sterling v. Donaldson Baking Co., 287 Ky. 781 , 155 S.W.2d 237, 1941 Ky. LEXIS 646 ( Ky. 1941 ) (decided under prior law).

City may not declare thing to be nuisance when it is not such, nor, under guise of police power, arbitrarily and unreasonably enact ordinance without rational relation to protection of common welfare. Mt. Sterling v. Donaldson Baking Co., 287 Ky. 781 , 155 S.W.2d 237, 1941 Ky. LEXIS 646 ( Ky. 1941 ) (decided under prior law).

28. — — Occupational Licenses.

A city may prohibit the sale of cider within its limits by levying an excessive license tax. Pikeville v. Huffman, 112 Ky. 360 , 65 S.W. 794, 23 Ky. L. Rptr. 1692 , 1901 Ky. LEXIS 314 ( Ky. 1901 ) (decided under prior law).

Sixth-class cities may, as a police measure, levy a prohibitive license tax on pool and billiard tables. Arms v. Vine Grove, 203 Ky. 213 , 262 S.W. 11, 1924 Ky. LEXIS 884 ( Ky. 1924 ) (decided under prior law).

Second-class city could levy license taxes on foreign insurance companies. Life & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Coleman, 233 Ky. 350 , 25 S.W.2d 748, 1930 Ky. LEXIS 558 ( Ky. 1930 ) (decided under prior law).

City councils have authority, as a police measure, to levy a prohibitory license tax on the sale of cigarettes. Commonwealth use of Wilmore v. McCray, 250 Ky. 182 , 61 S.W.2d 1043, 1933 Ky. LEXIS 628 ( Ky. 1933 ) (decided under prior law).

Municipal corporations have no inherent power to impose occupational license taxes, but only such power as is delegated to them by the state. Mayfield v. Reed, 278 Ky. 5 , 127 S.W.2d 847, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 367 ( Ky. 1939 ) (decided under prior law).

A city of the second class may levy a license fee on cigarette vending machines as an exercise of the police power. Lexington v. Edgerton, 289 Ky. 815 , 159 S.W.2d 1015, 1941 Ky. LEXIS 39 ( Ky. 1941 ) (decided under prior law).

For purposes of revenue and regulation a city of the second class had power to pass an ordinance imposing an occupational license tax under which various types of business were classified and taxes were fixed on the basis of gross receipts. Paducah Automotive Trades Ass'n v. Paducah, 307 Ky. 524 , 211 S.W.2d 660, 1948 Ky. LEXIS 769 ( Ky. 1948 ) (decided under prior law).

A tax on the rental of hotel and motel rooms may be characterized as a permissible license tax which a city could impose upon a business enterprise and not as an excise tax of the kind which cities, under Ky. Const., § 181, are not empowered to levy. Lexington v. Motel Developers, Inc., 465 S.W.2d 253, 1971 Ky. LEXIS 443 ( Ky. 1971 ) (decided under prior law).

If city has right to require a license for conducting a business within city, it has the right to revoke the license. Paducah v. Johnson Bonding Co., 512 S.W.2d 481, 1974 Ky. LEXIS 391 ( Ky. 1974 ) (decided under prior law).

29. — — Public Health.

Second-class city could require burial permits for interment in city cemeteries. Meyers v. Duddenhauser, 122 Ky. 873 , 93 S.W. 43 ( Ky. 1906 ) (decided under prior law).

Second-class city could prohibit retail sale of meat from vehicles under their specific sanitary police powers. Hahn v. Newport, 175 Ky. 185 , 194 S.W. 114, 1917 Ky. LEXIS 304 ( Ky. 1917 ) (decided under prior law).

Second-class cities were empowered to authorize by ordinance the establishment of quarantines by health officers and the arrest and detention by them of known prostitutes having infectious diseases. Duncan v. Lexington, 195 Ky. 822 , 244 S.W. 60, 1922 Ky. LEXIS 433 ( Ky. 1922 ) (decided under prior law).

City ordinance requiring license of milk distributors and imposing inspection fee on distributors to cover cost of inspecting plants of producers from whom distributors bought milk, as well as inspection of distributors’ plants, was valid, since the city, for the protection of the health of its inhabitants, had the right to regulate the sale of milk within the city, and could impose upon the distributors reasonable conditions, including provisions to insure that original source of milk was sanitary. Newport v. Hiland Dairy Co., 291 Ky. 561 , 164 S.W.2d 818, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 241 ( Ky. 1942 ) (decided under prior law).

30. — — Sewerage Systems.

Sewerage systems are a public necessity in fourth-class cities, and such cities have ample authority to construct and maintain sewerage systems. Princeton v. Pool, 171 Ky. 638 , 188 S.W. 758, 1916 Ky. LEXIS 408 ( Ky. 1916 ) (decided under prior law).

Although it is under no duty to furnish sewer service to those who reside outside its limits a city has the right to furnish such service to such nonresidents where it does not attempt to construct and operate extended facilities. Davisworth v. Lexington, 311 Ky. 606 , 224 S.W.2d 649, 1949 Ky. LEXIS 1170 ( Ky. 1949 ) (decided under prior law).

31. — — Streets and Ways.

The council has implied authority to open, alter and close streets. Commonwealth v. Illinois C. R. Co., 138 Ky. 749 , 129 S.W. 96, 1910 Ky. LEXIS 128 ( Ky. 1910 ) (decided under prior law).

Sixth-class cities have authority to purchase land for the purpose of widening streets. Bosshammer v. South Ft. Mitchell, 252 Ky. 785 , 68 S.W.2d 413, 1934 Ky. LEXIS 862 ( Ky. 1934 ) (decided under prior law).

32. — — — Parking.

City had power to enact ordinance providing that illegal parking should be prima facie evidence that parking was done by, or with permission of, owner of car. Commonwealth v. Kroger, 276 Ky. 20 , 122 S.W.2d 1006, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 527 ( Ky. 1938 ) (decided under prior law).

Acquisition and use of land by a city for a municipal parking lot was a proper municipal purpose, and city of fourth class had power to purchase or condemn land for such purpose. Miller v. Georgetown, 301 Ky. 241 , 191 S.W.2d 403, 1945 Ky. LEXIS 732 ( Ky. 1945 ) (decided under prior law).

City of fourth class had authority, under its general police powers, to provide for use of parking meters. Stephens v. Russell, 306 Ky. 727 , 209 S.W.2d 81, 1948 Ky. LEXIS 640 ( Ky. 1948 ) (decided under prior law).

A city of the fifth class had authority under its general powers to install parking meters. Falmouth v. Pendleton County Court, 308 Ky. 526 , 215 S.W.2d 101, 1948 Ky. LEXIS 978 ( Ky. 1948 ) (decided under prior law).

A sixth-class city could by ordinance properly prohibit parking in front of a bus station from 15 minutes before a bus was due until it left, could require the bus company to post signs showing the times at which buses arrived, and could require the bus company to have someone at the intersection to direct traffic when a bus was protruding into an intersection. Gibson v. Hardinsburg, 247 S.W.2d 31, 1952 Ky. LEXIS 662 ( Ky. 1952 ) (decided under prior law).

33. — — — Vehicle Licensing.

A vehicle license tax may be levied as a revenue measure or under the police powers of the city. The tax is not a revenue measure merely because the proceeds are spent on the streets. If a police measure, the tax must only be sufficient to compensate the city for issuing the license, keeping necessary records, and supervising the occupation. Unless discriminatory such a tax is not a restraint or regulation of interstate commerce. Newport v. French Bros. Bauer Co., 169 Ky. 174 , 183 S.W. 532, 1916 Ky. LEXIS 677 ( Ky. 1916 ) (decided under prior law).

Fourth-class city could license vehicles as a police measure, provided the fee was commensurate with the cost of supervision and issuance of licenses. Mayfield v. Carter Hardware Co., 191 Ky. 364 , 230 S.W. 298, 1921 Ky. LEXIS 317 ( Ky. 1921 ) (decided under prior law).

Fourth-class city could not exact a license tax or fee from nonresidents passing through the city, but could exact one from nonresident taxicab owners doing business in the city. Commonwealth use of Hazard v. Kelley, 229 Ky. 722 , 17 S.W.2d 1017, 1929 Ky. LEXIS 835 ( Ky. 1929 ) (decided under prior law).

City of second class could impose license tax on all persons regularly operating automobiles within the city limits, including nonresident using automobile in going to and returning from work in the city. Johnson v. Paducah, 285 Ky. 294 , 147 S.W.2d 721, 1941 Ky. LEXIS 380 ( Ky. 1941 ) (decided under prior law).

34. — — — Railways.

Fourth-class city could prohibit a railroad from switching cars across its principal street. Illinois C. R. Co. v. Mayfield, 35 F.2d 808, 1929 U.S. App. LEXIS 3074 (6th Cir. 1929), cert. denied, 280 U.S. 608, 50 S. Ct. 158, 74 L. Ed. 651, 1930 U.S. LEXIS 803 (1930), cert. denied, Illinois C. R. Co. v. Mayfield, 280 U.S. 608, 50 S. Ct. 158, 74 L. Ed. 651, 1930 U.S. LEXIS 803 (1930) (decided under prior law).

Sixth-class cities could not only require trains to signal at crossings within the city under KRS 277.190 , but they may also regulate the speed of same. Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. R. Co. v. Commonwealth, 126 Ky. 712 , 104 S.W. 771, 31 Ky. L. Rptr. 1113 , 1907 Ky. LEXIS 98 ( Ky. 1907 ) (decided under prior law).

Second-class city could regulate street railway companies and the working conditions of their employees. South C. & C. R. Co. v. Covington, 146 Ky. 592 , 143 S.W. 28, 1912 Ky. LEXIS 130 ( Ky. 1912 ), rev'd, 235 U.S. 537, 35 S. Ct. 158, 59 L. Ed. 350, 1915 U.S. LEXIS 1840 (U.S. 1915); Silva v. Newport, 150 Ky. 781 , 150 S.W. 1024, 1912 Ky. LEXIS 994 ( Ky. 1912 ) (decided under prior law).

The reasonable regulation of railroads within the city limits was within the police power of fourth-class cities. Versailles v. Kentucky H. R. Co., 153 Ky. 83 , 154 S.W. 388, 1913 Ky. LEXIS 768 ( Ky. 1913 ) (decided under prior law).

Fifth-class city had no authority to require railroads to erect safety gates at crossings. Chesapeake & O. R. Co. v. Harmon, 153 Ky. 669 , 156 S.W. 121, 1913 Ky. LEXIS 884 ( Ky. 1913 ) (decided under prior law).

A second-class city could require railroad companies to construct suitable crossings and viaducts, and eliminate grade crossings, but could not regulate them beyond the boundaries of the city’s streets and alleys, and could not require them, without compensation, to abandon a right of way and secure another over private property. Newport v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 174 Ky. 799 , 192 S.W. 838, 1917 Ky. LEXIS 245 ( Ky. 1917 ) (decided under prior law).

35. — — — Stock.

Fourth-class cities may prohibit running of stock at large, and inflict a fine on the owner. Chapman v. Mayfield, 104 S.W. 376, 31 Ky. L. Rptr. 982 (1907) (decided under prior law).

36. — Rules.

Councils of second-class cities may pass for the regulation of their business such rules as do not conflict with the constitution or statutes. Collopy v. Cloherty, 39 S.W. 431, 18 Ky. L. Rptr. 1061 (1897) (decided under prior law).

The council may prescribe its own rules of procedure, which are as binding upon it as statutes. Baker v. Combs, 194 Ky. 260 , 239 S.W. 56, 1922 Ky. LEXIS 165 ( Ky. 1922 ) (decided under prior law).

37. — Utilities.

In the absence of specific statutory authority, a fourth-class city could not regulate rates to be charged within its limits by a water company. Winchester v. Winchester Water Works Co., 251 U.S. 192, 40 S. Ct. 123, 64 L. Ed. 221, 1920 U.S. LEXIS 1726 (U.S. 1920) (decided under prior law).

Fourth-class cities could by ordinance regulate waterworks systems owned by them, and could provide for discontinuance of service to a building, even though one tenant tenders his share of the delinquent bill. Cox v. Cynthiana, 123 Ky. 363 , 96 S.W. 456, 29 Ky. L. Rptr. 780 , 1906 Ky. LEXIS 149 ( Ky. 1906 ) (decided under prior law).

Fourth-class cities had authority to maintain a municipal lighting plant. Overall v. Madisonville, 125 Ky. 684 , 102 S.W. 278, 31 Ky. L. Rptr. 278 , 1907 Ky. LEXIS 329 ( Ky. 1907 ), overruled, Payne v. Covington, 276 Ky. 380 , 123 S.W.2d 1045, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 549 ( Ky. 1938 ) (decided under prior law).

38. Powers of Mayor.
39. — Conduct of City Employees.

In the absence of any valid legislative or constitutional limitations, the mayor may issue proper orders relating to the performance of duties by members of the police department. George v. City Council of Lebanon, 424 S.W.2d 588, 1968 Ky. LEXIS 464 ( Ky. 1968 ) (decided under prior law).

40. — Employment of Counsel.

The mayor may not, generally, employ counsel for the city. Owensboro v. Weir, 95 Ky. 158 , 24 S.W. 115, 15 Ky. L. Rptr. 506 , 1893 Ky. LEXIS 139 ( Ky. 1893 ) (decided under prior law).

Even though a mayor had the power to hire and fire city employees, because a city council made it clear that a city attorney’s appointment was conditional and unofficial, it was within the council’s authority to rescind that appointment when the attorney had not completed the act upon which his appointment was conditioned. As such, he was not officially a city employee. Taylor v. Carter, 333 S.W.3d 437, 2010 Ky. App. LEXIS 250 (Ky. Ct. App. 2010).

41. — Suit on Behalf of City.

The mayor of a fifth-class city may file a suit on behalf of the city by virtue of his office. Williamsburg v. Weesner, 164 Ky. 769 , 176 S.W. 224, 1915 Ky. LEXIS 459 ( Ky. 1915 ) (decided under prior law).

The mayor of a fourth-class city had no authority to bring suit for the city without consent of the council, except in cases of emergency. Galanty & Alper v. Maysville, 176 Ky. 523 , 196 S.W. 169, 1917 Ky. LEXIS 92 ( Ky. 1917 ) (decided under prior law).

42. — Warrants.

The mayor and clerk have no right to issue warrants upon the treasury unless authorized by law and pursuant to appropriations by the council. Princeton v. Baker, 237 Ky. 325 , 35 S.W.2d 524, 1931 Ky. LEXIS 600 ( Ky. 1931 ) (decided under prior law).

Mayor and city clerk have no authority to issue and sign warrants unless warrants are authorized by council. Ordinance recognizing as valid an aggregate amount of outstanding warrants did not constitute ratification of specific warrants issued without authority of council. Jackson v. First Nat'l Bank, 289 Ky. 1 , 157 S.W.2d 321, 1941 Ky. LEXIS 10 ( Ky. 1 941) (decided under prior law).

43. Unfinished Business.

Business left unfinished by an outgoing council may be completed by the incoming council. Reuter v. Meacham Contracting Co., 143 Ky. 557 , 136 S.W. 1028, 1911 Ky. LEXIS 464 ( Ky. 1911 ) (decided under prior law).

44. Removal of Officers.

The fact that the volunteer fire chief of a city of the fifth class was appointed by a city council ordinance did not mean that the chief could only be removed from office by council action, since KRS 83.A.080(2) (now KRS 83A.080(3)) vests removal power in the executive authority, the mayor had the authority to remove the chief at will. McCloud v. Whitt, 639 S.W.2d 375, 1982 Ky. App. LEXIS 246 (Ky. Ct. App. 1982).

Police officers were not non-elected city officers for purposes of Independence, Ky., Code of Ordinances § 31.35(C), and a police captain was not entitled to a termination hearing before an attorney appointed by the city council; the city’s mayor, as the “appointing authority”, was authorized to conduct the hearing. Howard v. City of Independence, 199 S.W.3d 741, 2005 Ky. App. LEXIS 230 (Ky. Ct. App. 2005), abrogated in part, Pearce v. Univ. of Louisville, 2011 Ky. App. Unpub. LEXIS 998 (Ky. Ct. App. Nov. 18, 2011).

Former fire chief of a city’s volunteer fire department did not have a property interest in his employment protected by the Fourteenth Amendment because whether KRS 83A.130(9) applied because the fire chief was considered an employee, or whether KRS 83A.080(3) applied because the fire chief was considered an officer, both statutes reinforced that service was at the mayor’s pleasure. Amend v. City of Park Hills, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26563 (E.D. Ky. Nov. 2, 2005).

Police chief’s claims against the city and the mayor were properly dismissed because the mayor had the authority to terminate the chief under the Kentucky Home Rule Statutes; the statutes did not conflict with City of Georgetown, Ky., Ch. 2, Art. V, Div. 3, § 2-147, because it set forth another option for a valid termination of the chief of police by the city council for cause, and did not state that the mayor was stripped of his or her removal authority, nor that the city council had the sole authority to terminate the police chief. Reeves v. City of Georgetown, 539 Fed. Appx. 662, 2013 FED App. 0826N, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 19059 (6th Cir. Ky. 2013 ).

45. Contracts.

Former utility commission superintendent had been an employee of the city, not the commission, where the Home Rule Statutes, particularly KRS 83A.120 , went into effect prior to the execution of an employment contract with the superintendent and the contract was in contravention of that statute. Williams v. City of London, 252 F. Supp. 2d 388, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4752 (E.D. Ky. 2003 ).

Summary judgment in favor of defendants in former superintendent’s 42 USCS § 1983 action was affirmed because the utility commission lacked authority to hire the superintendent under KRS 83A.130(9) and as such the employment agreement was invalid. Therefore, the superintendent was an at-will employee who had no property interest in his employment. Williams v. London Util. Comm'n, 375 F.3d 424, 2004 FED App. 0215P, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 14077 (6th Cir. Ky. 2004 ).

In a zoning case, there was no breach of a municipal contract shown where letters authored by a mayor and a city attorney related to the amendment of an ordinance because, in order to have a valid contract for the passage of the amendment, approval was needed from the city council, and a written contract had to be signed by the mayor. Moreover, there was no promise to do anything but refer the amendment to a commission in exchange for the dismissal of pending lawsuits, none of the letters at issue mentioned anything about the passage of the amendment, and the appellate court was unable to read that requirement into the letters. Snowden v. City of Wilmore, 412 S.W.3d 195, 2013 Ky. App. LEXIS 9 (Ky. Ct. App. 2013).

Cited:

City of Munfordville v. Sheldon, 977 S.W.2d 497, 1998 Ky. LEXIS 135 ( Ky. 1998 ).

Notes to Unpublished Decisions

1. Immunity

Unpublished decision: Collateral order doctrine did not confer appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.S. § 1291 to review the district court’s denial of city council members’ Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c) motion to dismiss on grounds of legislative immunity the 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983 due process claims filed by property owners; although the council members acted pursuant to their authority under KRS § 83A.130 , further discovery was necessary to determine whether their denial of the property owners’ proposed site development plan was procedurally and substantively legislative. Jaggers v. City of Alexandria, 2009 FED App. 0085N, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 2048 (6th Cir. Ky. Feb. 2, 2009).

Opinions of Attorney General.

A city mayor can delegate his supervisory duties over the city clerk-treasurer and the police chief and his officers to the city administrative officer by executive order as provided in subsection (7) of this section and KRS 83A.090 . OAG 80-468 .

The mayor has sole authority to appoint committees to assist in overseeing the proper administration of city government; on the other hand, the city council does have the authority to establish various departments of city government by ordinance but the appointments to fill the positions so established in the various departments and the conduct of those appointees in the performance of their duties, is under the control of the mayor where the city operates under the councilmanic form of government. OAG 80-551 .

KRS 100.271 together with the powers given cities under KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170 , clearly authorizes the city council, which is the legislative body of the city, to establish by ordinance the position of building inspector as a minor city office under the terms of subsection (12) of this section, or as an alternative, the city council could designate one of its administrative officers to issue building permits; in any event, the person to fill the position is to be selected by the mayor with the approval of the city council under the terms of KRS 83A.080(2) and once the position is established the zoning committee could recommend someone to hold the position. OAG 80-657 .

There are no residential requirements for those persons holding nonelective offices established by the city council pursuant to subsection (12) of this section; however, it would appear that the city under its home rule authority, KRS 82.082 , would have the power to require by ordinance that all such officers live within the city. OAG 80-657 ; 80-658.

Since the mayor under the councilmanic form of government has the sole authority under KRS 83A.080(2) (now KRS 83A.080(3)) and subsection (9) of this section to remove nonelected officers and employees, he, rather than the council, would have the responsibility of hearing disciplinary charges against a police officer unless he has otherwise promulgated a different hearing proceeding that has been approved by the council under subsection (4) of this section; on the other hand, the council could, under the authority of KRS 83A.080(2) (now KRS 83A.080(3)) and subsection (9) of this section, enact an ordinance establishing a hearing board to hear the charges, the members of which are to be appointed by the mayor with the approval of the council under KRS 83A.080(2). OAG 81-48 .

The mayor of a city can hire all employees under subsection (9) of this section without consulting the city legislative body which created the positions by ordinance; however, a city legislative body could by ordinance restrict their removal, except for cause and pursuant to a hearing. OAG 81-74 .

The reference to “employees of the council” in subsection (9) of this section, concerning those employees the mayor may not appoint or remove, includes a clerk, bookkeeper, sergeant at arms, doorkeeper, secretarial help, legislative aide and attorney. OAG 81-74 .

In a fourth-class city, where the city council is composed of six councilmen, a majority of the council would be four councilmen, since the mayor is not a member of city council; thus, it would take five affirmative votes out of the six man council in order to override an ordinance vetoed by the mayor since, under subsection (6) of this section, the mayor’s veto stands unless the council votes to override it by the affirmative vote of one more than the majority of the membership. OAG 81-132 .

Where a city councilman of a fourth-class city submits his written resignation, the mayor cannot veto either the acceptance of the resignation or the action taken by the city council in filling the vacancy, since the mayor’s veto power applies only to city ordinances as provided in this section. OAG 81-132 .

A fifth-class city is allowed to have a police commissioner, but only the city legislative body can create or establish a nonelective office, such as the office of police commissioner, within the police department and fix his duties and powers, although the person appointed to fill such position would be under the direct supervision of the mayor pursuant to this section. OAG 81-133 .

Where the executive director of a community development agency, which was not created as an independent agency under KRS 99.350 , is elected to the office of mayor of the same city, there is no constitutional or statutory conflict pursuant to Ky. Const., § 165, or KRS 61.080 since a person can theoretically hold a municipal office and employment at the same time; however, the mayor could not continue to hold the executive director’s position without creating a common-law incompatibility or conflict of interest since he is presumed to possess the power under this section not only to hire, but also fire, the executive director. OAG 81-179 .

A city council can establish such nonelective offices and departments by ordinance as it deems necessary in order to properly operate the city government and at the same time detail the duties and responsibilities of such offices and departments; however, the council cannot delegate the statutory authority given to the mayor under this section to supervise and be responsible for the administration of such departments and officers. OAG 81-207 .

A finance committee or any other committee or council member has the right to introduce an ordinance for passage at a city council meeting without the mayor having seen or having knowledge of the ordinance, since an ordinance is not, under KRS 83A.060 , required to be reviewed or approved by the mayor prior to its introduction or passage, although it must be submitted to the mayor after its passage for his approval or veto pursuant to the terms of subsection (6) of this section. OAG 81-207 .

The mayor of a fifth-class city organized under the mayor-council form of government may, pursuant to subsection (5) of this section, vote to break a tie vote of the council in order to create the majority required by KRS 100.211 which is necessary to override the recommendation of the planning commission to disapprove a proposed zoning change. OAG 81-317 .

Where the mayor pro-tem of a third-class city stepped down from his position while presiding over a city council meeting and appointed another council member to chair the meeting, following which a vote was taken to appoint a person to fill the unexpired term of a council member who had recently resigned, with the mayor pro-tem voting last and tying the vote at five to five, the vote was proper since a member of city council chosen to serve as mayor pro-tem in the absence of the mayor does not lose his right to vote as a member of the city council; thus, the tie vote in this situation simply means that the vacancy was not legally filled at the meeting. OAG 81-338 .

If a city establishes the position of city attorney as a form of employment rather than as a city office, the mayor would have the authority, pursuant to subsection (9) of this section to hire an attorney to represent the city without the consent of the city legislative body. OAG 81-403 .

A city mayor is empowered by this section to issue an executive order to a one-man police department to enforce a license fee ordinance for the first time 31 years after the ordinance went into effect. OAG 81-410 .

A mayor of a city has no authority to create any position of employment or to hire any person to a position that has not been established by ordinance but, rather, the legislative body has the sole responsibility of establishing job positions with the city and fixing the compensation, and until such is created, none legally exist; once a position of employment is established and the compensation fixed, pursuant to KRS 83A.070(3) (now KRS 83A.070(2)), the mayor has the sole responsibility of hiring a person to fill such position without the approval of the city legislative body and the only instance where council approval is necessary for an appointment is in connection with the filling of a nonelective municipal office. OAG 82-110 .

The mayor of a city has the authority to remove any nonelective officer or employee without the approval of the city legislative body pursuant to KRS 83A.080(2) (now KRS 83A.080(3)) and subsection (9) of this section unless such position is covered by civil service or unless the city has enacted an ordinance preventing the removal of the officer or employee without cause and an appropriate hearing. OAG 82-110 .

The mayor has no vote on the question of fixing a salary for the office of city engineer; however, if the mayor’s vote was necessary, as in the event of a tie vote, in determining the salary of the city engineer where the city engineer was the mayor’s spouse, the mayor must refrain from voting as it would be against public policy based on self interest. OAG 82-200 .

Under the 1982 amendment to subsection (9), effective July 15, 1982, the mayor has the exclusive appointing authority over police officers, without the approval of the city legislative body. OAG 82-225 .

As of the effective date of the 1982 amendment (July 15, 1982), the mayor has the power to appoint and remove police officers as well as all other city employees over which he originally had such power under this section. OAG 82-248 .

Day-to-day operation of the city government is the sole responsibility of the mayor as chief executive officer of the city under the terms of this section; the duties of the city legislative body are confined solely to legislative matters as provided in this section. OAG 82-258 .

This section gives the mayor not only the power to appoint employees to established positions but also to remove them at will unless their tenure is fixed by ordinance or their removal is prohibited except for cause, which also can be accomplished by an appropriate ordinance. OAG 82-258 .

Under the new municipal code, effective July 15, 1980, a mayor of a city operating under the councilmanic form of government has no authority to create any position of employment or to hire any person to a position that has not been established by ordinance. The legislative body has the sole responsibility of establishing such positions with the city and fixing their compensation and duties. Once a position of employment is established and the compensation fixed pursuant to subsection (2) of KRS 83A.070 , the mayor has the sole power and responsibility of hiring a person to fill such position without the approval of the city legislative body. OAG 82-258 .

The mayor, as the chief administrative officer of the city pursuant to the terms of KRS 83A.010(6) and subsection (3) of this section, has the responsibility to see that the affairs of the city are properly administered and, as a consequence, there is no legal objection to his being authorized to receive a key to the official city records to the exclusion of anyone else, including members of the city council. OAG 82-311 .

While there is nothing in KRS 61.825 (now repealed) which requires that a notice of a special meeting must specify the purpose of the meeting or the subjects which will be discussed and acted on, city councils are governed by subsection (11) of this section, governing special meetings which preempts the Open Meetings Law, KRS 61.805 to 61.850 . OAG 82-327 .

A mayor may create advisory committees composed of citizens to advise him on various subjects, but he cannot create committees composed of council members. OAG 82-331 , affirmed OAG 82-571 .

Since subsection (11) of this section prohibits the city council in a mayor-council plan of city government from performing executive functions, the mayor cannot appoint city councilmen to committees to oversee or advise on administrative matters; this is in contrast to the commission plan of city government provided in KRS 83A.140 , where the city commission is given “all legislative, executive and administrative authority of the city.” OAG 82-331 , affirmed OAG 82-571 .

The legislative intent of this section is to prescribe the same type of separation of powers in city government as Ky. Const., § 27 provides for state government, that is, that the legislative, executive and judicial departments are confined to separate bodies of magistry. Under those terms, the mayor is confined to administration and the city council is confined to legislation. OAG 82-331 , affirmed OAG 82-571 .

A promotion in pay and grade of an employee is an executive function within the mayor’s exclusive authority and over which the legislative body has no control except insofar as provided by the classification ordinance, which can be amended from time to time. OAG 82-385 .

Assuming that the police department is not under any civil service program, including the state Law Enforcement Foundation Program Fund or KRS Chapter 90, police officers may be removed without cause and at the pleasure of the mayor under the terms of subsection (9) of this section as amended in 1982; the city can, of course, enact an ordinance under the terms of this section that would prevent such removal except for cause, and also set up a procedure for the discipline of such officers. This can now be accomplished not only under the terms of this section, but also under the home rule section of the Municipal Code, KRS 82.082 . OAG 82-501 .

The bond requirement statute for members of the police department and the chief of police was repealed which means that bond is not required by statute; however, a city could, in its ordinance establishing the police department, require bond of its members, particularly under its home rule authority. OAG 82-501 .

The repeal of former KRS 95.700 and KRS 95.720 eliminated terms of office for members of the police department and the chief, and as a consequence they serve at the pleasure of the mayor or under the terms of some civil service program. OAG 82-501 .

While a city can and should establish by ordinance positions of employment, qualifications, duties and compensation, as well as promotional procedures, an ordinance that clearly restricts the appointing power of the mayor by requiring prior approval of the legislative body violates subsection (9) of this section. OAG 82-606 .

Since subsection (9) of this section was enacted subsequent to KRS 95.764 and since KRS 95.700 was repealed by the 1980 municipal code, it was the intent of the legislature to vest in the mayor, rather than the council, the authority to make civil service appointments from the list submitted by the civil service commission under the terms of KRS 95.764 . OAG 83-54 .

There is no such office as “mayor pro tem” under the municipal code and such an office cannot legally be established in view of this section. OAG 83-92 .

In subsection (5) of this section, the word “may,” with respect to the passage of the ordinance setting forth the manner in which one of its members shall preside at meetings when the mayor is absent, is not mandatory, but merely directory; in other words, the council does not have to enact such an ordinance setting forth the procedure in order to function in the mayor’s absence and may, if it fails to do so, select by motion one of its members to preside at a meeting at which the mayor is not present. The councilman chosen to serve in the absence of the mayor does not lose his right to vote as a member of the city council. OAG 83-92 .

The mayor may select the city attorney to perform the everyday duties of the mayor in his absence with the exception of his responsibility to chair meetings of the council or approve ordinances or promulgate administrative procedures, which duties can only be designated to an elected officer, which can only mean a member of the city legislative body; this eliminates the possibility of incompatible offices, that of the city attorney holding the office of mayor at the same time as he is merely performing the duties of the office of mayor that have been delegated pursuant to the statute. OAG 83-92 .

The determination of the office location of city officers and employees (including the city administrative officer) is purely an executive and administrative function which lies exclusively within the jurisdiction of the mayor under the councilmanic form of government. OAG 83-176 .

The city council of a fourth class city may enact an ordinance providing that regular meetings shall be held at different locations, specifically identified, within the city on stated dates and at specified times. OAG 83-208 .

No due process is required prior to removal of a city police officer in absence of a civil service requirement, even under the terms of KRS 15.520 , except where removal is predicated upon a complaint of professional misconduct in violation of KRS 15.520 , in which case the procedure under such statute would have to be followed. OAG 83-231 .

Subsection (9) of this section clearly authorizes the mayor to remove any member of the city police force unless he is under a civil service program. OAG 83-231 .

The appointing power of the chief of police, detailed in KRS 95.740 (now repealed), has been superseded and repealed by implication by the 1980 Municipal Code wherein it specifically provides under KRS 83A.080(2) (now KRS 83A.080(3)) and subsection (9) of this section that the mayor shall have the sole authority to appoint all nonelective officers of the city as well as all employees, including police officers. OAG 83-353 .

The mayor has the day-to-day control of the police department including the appointment and removal of the chief as well as all other police officers whether they be classified as deputies or special or extra policemen. OAG 83-353 .

As chief executive officer of the city, the mayor has the authority to make the necessary appointments of police officers who are duly certified by the city’s civil service commission, to the various positions under the civil service program, and the city legislative body has no authority by resolution or otherwise to assign or reassign a reinstated police officer to any duties within the police department as this is purely an executive function. OAG 84-3 .

A mayor of a fourth-class city has the sole authority to appoint police officers and remove or reduce the rank of such officers at will and without the approval and consent of the city council; however, the right to remove police officers by the mayor is qualified where such officers are under some form of city civil service program, where charges are brought against them under the Policemen’s Bill of Rights statute, namely KRS 15.520 , or where the city council has enacted legislation prohibiting their removal except for cause which may include a due process hearing. OAG 84-24 .

The city legislative body of any city has the power under subsection (13) of this section to investigate all activities of city government including city officers and employees. Such investigation could naturally include purchases made by city employees that may possibly involve municipal funds; of course, if the purchases were made by the employee from his own personal funds for his own purpose, he is not accountable to the city. OAG 84-12 .

The mayor has no veto power over municipal or legislative orders; his veto power is restricted to municipal ordinances under the terms of subsection (6) of this section. OAG 84-63 .

A city ordinance which was enacted under the provisions of former KRS 95.700 (repealed), and which provided that every two years on odd numbered years the city council would appoint a chief of police who would hold his office for a term of two years subject to removal for cause by the council, conflicted with subsection (9) of this section which gives the mayor the exclusive power to appoint all police officers, including the chief, and as a consequence the ordinance was void and unenforceable. OAG 84-207 .

If the positions of city attorney, treasurer, assessor and engineer have been established as nonelective offices as required under KRS 83A.080(1), approval of such appointments rests with the city legislative body pursuant to KRS 83A.080(2) (now KRS 83A.080(3)); such approval, however, does not apply to the chief of police or any police officer since the 1982 legislature placed police officers in the category of employees under the provisions of subsection (9) of this section. OAG 84-207 .

“Constructive service notice” to the city clerk of a mayor’s veto of a city ordinance would never be a proper substitute for return to the city council, specified in KRS 83A.130(6), of a mayor’s veto of a city ordinance. OAG 07-07 .

Where a mayor in a city with a mayor-council form of government returns ordinances together with a statement of his objections to the city clerk, rather than the city council, his action does not constitute a veto of the ordinances involved, and, insofar as purporting to veto the ordinances, is a nullity. OAG 07-07 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Bench & Bar.

Morris, The New Kentucky Municipal Law, Vol. 45, No. 3, July, 1981, Ky. Bench & Bar 24.

Kentucky Law Journal.

Kentucky Law Survey, Morris, Municipal Law, 70 Ky. L.J. 287 (1981-82).

83A.140. Commission plan — Duties of mayor and commission.

  1. The form of government provided in this section shall be known as the commission plan and this section shall together with KRS 83A.010 to 83A.120 govern any city declared to be under the commission plan by KRS 83A.020 or which has adopted the commission plan pursuant to KRS 83A.160 .
  2. Each city under this section shall be governed by an elected officer who shall be called mayor and by elected legislative body members who shall be called city commissioners and which together shall be known as the city commission and by such other officers and employees as may be provided for by statute or city ordinance.
  3. All legislative, executive and administrative authority of the city shall be vested in and exercised by the commission. The commission shall enforce the commission plan, ordinances and orders of the city and all applicable statutes. The commission shall maintain liaison with related units of local government respecting interlocal contracting and joint activities. The commission shall supervise all departments of city government and the conduct of all city officers and employees under its jurisdiction and may require each department to make such reports to it as it finds necessary. The commission shall report to the public on the condition and needs of the city government as provided by ordinance, but not less than annually.
  4. The mayor shall preside at all meetings of the commission and may vote in all proceedings. All bonds, notes, contracts and written obligations of the city authorized by ordinance or resolution shall be executed by the mayor on behalf of the city. The commission shall designate one (1) city commissioner to serve as mayor pro tem. The mayor pro tem shall act for the mayor whenever the mayor is unable to attend to the duties of his office and he shall then possess all rights, powers and duties of mayor. If the disability of the mayor to attend to his duties continues for sixty (60) consecutive days, the office of mayor may be declared vacant by a majority vote of the commission membership, and the provisions of KRS 83A.040 shall apply.
  5. In carrying out its duty to supervise the departments of city government and the conduct of all city officers and employees under its jurisdiction, the commission may require any city officer or employee to prepare and submit to it sworn statements regarding the performance of his official duties.
  6. All administrative and service functions of the city shall be classified under departments created by ordinance which shall prescribe the functions of the department and the duties and responsibilities of the department head and his employees. The commission shall at its first regular meeting in each year designate the commission member to have superintendence over each department established under this subsection, except the commission may delegate responsibility for overall supervision of any or all departments to a city administrative officer established pursuant to KRS 83A.090 .
  7. Regular meetings of the commission shall be held at least once a month at such times and places as are fixed by ordinance. Special meetings may be called by the mayor or a majority of the city commissioners. In the call, the mayor or city commissioners shall designate the purpose, time and place of the special meeting with sufficient notice for the attendance of commission members and for compliance with KRS Chapter 61. At a special meeting no business may be considered other than that set forth in the designation of purpose. The minutes of every meeting shall be signed by the person responsible for maintaining city records provided under KRS 83A.060 and by the officer presiding at the meeting.
  8. The commission shall by ordinance establish all appointive offices and the duties and responsibilities of those offices and codes, rules and regulations for the public health, safety and welfare. The commission shall by ordinance provide for sufficient revenue to operate city government and shall appropriate such funds in a budget which shall provide for the orderly management of the city’s resources. The commission shall promulgate procedures to insure orderly administration of the functions of city government and compliance with statute, ordinance or order.

History. Enact. Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 14, effective July 15, 1980; 1982, ch. 434, § 5, effective July 15, 1982.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Limitation.

Trial court erred in denying plaintiff’s petition for temporary injunction to preclude city commission from holding a proposed removal hearing after the commission had denied the mayor and a commissioner their right to vote on joint charges brought against the two (2) of them. The mayor’s CR 65.07 motion for relief was granted to the extent that the commission was prohibited from preventing the commissioner from voting on the charges against the mayor’s removal and from preventing the mayor from voting on the commissioner’s removal. Walters v. Moore, 121 S.W.3d 210, 2003 Ky. App. LEXIS 271 (Ky. Ct. App. 2003).

2. Employment of City Manager.

In cities in which the city manager form of government is not authorized, the city commissioners may not lawfully employ one. Kluemper v. Zimmer, 240 Ky. 225 , 41 S.W.2d 1111, 1931 Ky. LEXIS 370 ( Ky. 1931 ) (decided under prior law).

3. Liability.

A city operating under the commission form of government maintained its fire department in its governmental capacity, and the city was not liable for the negligence of a fireman engaged in the performance of his duties. Young v. Lexington, 212 Ky. 502 , 279 S.W. 957, 1926 Ky. LEXIS 184 ( Ky. 1926 ) (decided under prior law).

The mayor and commissioners are liable on their bond for diversion of funds contrary to Ky. Const., § 180. Newport v. McLane, 256 Ky. 803 , 77 S.W.2d 27, 1934 Ky. LEXIS 491 ( Ky. 1934 ), overruled in part, Scalise v. Sewell-Scheuermann, 566 S.W.3d 539, 2018 Ky. LEXIS 451 ( Ky. 2018 ) (decided under prior law).

Neither the commissioner of finance, his sureties, nor the city are liable to the city school board for uncollected school taxes, penalties and interest, and if the board of commissioners wrongfully provided for waiver of penalty and interest, the liability remains that of the taxpayer. Board of Education v. Paducah, 261 Ky. 549 , 88 S.W.2d 292, 1935 Ky. LEXIS 700 ( Ky. 1935 ) (decided under prior law).

4. Mayor Pro Tem.

The mayor pro tem has all the power and authority of the mayor, and his acts have the same effect. Wilkerson v. Lexington, 188 Ky. 381 , 222 S.W. 74, 1920 Ky. LEXIS 290 ( Ky. 1920 ) (decided under prior law).

The signature of the mayor pro tem to an ordinance was sufficient and it was not necessary that the other commissioner also sign. Wilkerson v. Lexington, 188 Ky. 381 , 222 S.W. 74, 1920 Ky. LEXIS 290 ( Ky. 1920 ) (decided under prior law).

5. Municipal Officers.

City commissioners are municipal officers. Commonwealth ex rel. Steller v. Livingston, 171 Ky. 52 , 186 S.W. 916, 1916 Ky. LEXIS 298 ( Ky. 1916 ) (decided under prior law).

6. Powers of Board.

The board of commissioners has power to order elections, to control public ways and public grounds, to acquire, manage and dispose of property, to incur indebtedness and levy taxes. Wilkerson v. Lexington, 188 Ky. 381 , 222 S.W. 74, 1920 Ky. LEXIS 290 ( Ky. 1920 ) (decided under prior law).

7. — Delegation.

The board of commissioners could not delegate discretionary power even to one of its own members. Jameison v. Paducah, 195 Ky. 71 , 241 S.W. 327, 1922 Ky. LEXIS 267 ( Ky. 1922 ); Booth v. Owensboro, 274 Ky. 325 , 118 S.W.2d 684, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 258 ( Ky. 1938 ) (decided under prior law).

8. — Hospitals.

The board of commissioners had authority to establish hospitals, and could have joined in doing so with the county, but not with a private corporation or individual. Booth v. Owensboro, 274 Ky. 325 , 118 S.W.2d 684, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 258 ( Ky. 1938 ) (decided under prior law).

9. — Limitation.

Persons dealing with city officers are held to have notice of limitations upon their powers. Jameison v. Paducah, 195 Ky. 71 , 241 S.W. 327, 1922 Ky. LEXIS 267 ( Ky. 1922 ) (decided under prior law).

Doubt as to whether the city possesses a certain power is to be resolved against its existence. Allen v. Hollingsworth, 246 Ky. 812 , 56 S.W.2d 530, 1933 Ky. LEXIS 32 ( Ky. 1933 ) (decided under prior law). See Booth v. Owensboro, 274 Ky. 325 , 118 S.W.2d 684, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 258 ( Ky. 1938 ).

10. — Public Ways.

The closing of a street or alley was a discretionary governmental function as distinguished from being a proprietary or ministerial act and an injunction would not issue to prohibit the passage of ordinance closing an alley. Avey Drilling Mach. Co. v. Lukowsky, 261 S.W.2d 432, 1953 Ky. LEXIS 1015 ( Ky. 1953 ) (decided under prior law).

Ordering the closing of an alley was a matter of legislative action which was vested in the board of commissioners, however, such ordinance did not take effect until city instituted an action in the circuit court to have it closed as required by KRS 94.360 (now repealed) insuring compensation to property owners who might suffer direct and special injury. This was a condemnation in character and recognized that one’s property may not be taken or destroyed without compensation. Avey Drilling Mach. Co. v. Lukowsky, 261 S.W.2d 432, 1953 Ky. LEXIS 1015 ( Ky. 1953 ) (decided under prior law).

11. Records.

The board of commissioners could speak only through its records. The city could contract in no other way, and was liable on implied contract only when it had received and applied goods to its own use. Jameison v. Paducah, 195 Ky. 71 , 241 S.W. 327, 1922 Ky. LEXIS 267 ( Ky. 1922 ) (decided under prior law).

Opinions of Attorney General.

A city legislative body may establish and place the duties of the treasurer under an administrative department created by ordinance; at the same time the commission may establish by ordinance all appointive offices and positions of employment and make appointments to fill such positions since all legislative, executive and administrative authority of the city is vested in the commission. OAG 80-565 .

Where a city is organized and governed under a commission plan the mayor is a voting member of the commission and, as such, his vote is effective in determining a quorum, since subsection (2) of KRS 83A.030 provides that the legislative body under a commission plan consists of a mayor and four commissioners and since, under subsection (2) of this section, the legislative body consisting of the mayor and commissioners together is called the city commission. OAG 81-211 .

Since subsection (11) of KRS 83A.130 prohibits the city council in a mayor-council plan of city government from performing executive functions, the mayor cannot appoint city councilmen to committees to oversee or advise on administrative matters; this is in contrast to the commission plan of city government provided in this section, where the city commission is given “all legislative, executive and administrative authority of the city.” OAG 82-331 .

Although one of the commissioners is required to be appointed mayor pro tem pursuant to subsection (4), he can only serve as such and in the place of the mayor when the mayor is unable to attend to the duties of the office, and as a consequence he cannot serve as mayor pro tem when a vacancy has occurred. Thus, when a member of the commission is appointed to fill the office of mayor, he automatically vacates his position on the commission, as no person can hold two municipal offices at the same time under Ky. Const., § 165 and KRS 61.080 . OAG 82-397 .

The commission is vested with all legislative, executive and administrative powers over the city pursuant to subsection (3) of this section; such powers would include establishment of all nonelected offices and positions of employment and the appointment of individuals to fill these positions. In addition, the commission would have the power to remove such individuals at will unless they are covered by some form of civil service or unless the commission itself enacts an ordinance restricting the removal except for cause. OAG 84-50 .

The city commission, under the commission plan of government, supervises all departments established by ordinance but may establish the office of city administrator pursuant to KRS 83A.090 to superintend the various departments of city government. OAG 84-50 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Bench & Bar.

Morris, The New Kentucky Municipal Law, Vol. 45, No. 3, July, 1981, Ky. Bench & Bar 24.

Kentucky Law Journal.

Kentucky Law Survey, Morris, Municipal Law, 70 Ky. L.J. 287 (1981-82).

83A.150. City manager plan — Powers and duties of mayor, board of commissioners, and city manager.

  1. The form of government provided in this section shall be known as the city manager plan and this section shall together with KRS 83A.010 to 83A.120 govern any city declared to be under the city manager plan by KRS 83A.020 or which has adopted the city manager plan pursuant to KRS 83A.160 .
  2. Each city under this section shall be governed by an elected officer who shall be called mayor and by elected legislative body members who shall be called city commissioners and which together shall be known as the board of commissioners and by such other officers and employees as may be provided for by statute or city ordinance.
  3. All legislative and executive authority of the city shall be vested in and exercised by the board. The mayor shall preside at all meetings of the board and may vote in all proceedings. The mayor shall be recognized as the head of the city government by the Governor for purposes of military law, but shall have no regular administrative duties. The board shall designate one (1) city commissioner to serve as mayor pro tem. The mayor pro tem shall act for the mayor whenever the mayor is unable to attend to the duties of his office and he shall then possess all rights, powers and duties of mayor. If the disability of the mayor to attend his duties continues for sixty (60) consecutive days, the office of mayor may be declared vacant by a majority vote of the board membership and the provisions of KRS 83A.040 shall apply.
  4. Regular meetings of the board shall be held at least once each month at such times and places as are fixed by ordinance. Special meetings of the board may be called by the mayor or upon written request of a majority of the city commissioners. In the call, the mayor or commissioners shall designate the purpose, time and place of the special meeting with sufficient notice for the attendance of board members and for compliance with KRS Chapter 61. At a special meeting no business shall be considered other than that set forth in the designation of purpose. The minutes of every meeting shall be signed by the person responsible for maintaining city records provided under KRS 83A.060 and the officer presiding at the meeting.
  5. The board shall by ordinance establish all appointive offices and the duties and responsibilities of those offices and codes, rules, and regulations for the public health, safety, and welfare. The board shall by ordinance provide for sufficient revenue to operate city government and shall appropriate the funds of a city budget which shall provide for the orderly management of city resources.
  6. The board may require any city officer or employee to prepare and submit to it sworn statements regarding his performance of his official duties and may otherwise inquire into the conduct of duties of any department, office, or agency of the city.
  7. The board shall in accordance with KRS 83A.080 create the office of city manager and set qualifications for the office, which shall include, but not be limited to professional training or administrative qualifications with special reference to actual experience in or knowledge of accepted practice regarding duties of the office and list duties and responsibilities of the office which shall include, but not be limited to:
    1. Being responsible to the board for the proper administration of all duties imposed upon him by ordinance;
    2. Recommending to the board, subject to any statute, ordinance, or contract which relates to the appointment, tenure, or removal of any employee, the appointment, and when necessary for the good of the service, the removal of subordinate employees and officers of the city. No officer or employee of the city shall be appointed or removed except through action by the board, except that the city manager may fill vacancies in the classified service pending the appointment by the board and may employ personnel for temporary positions subject to such conditions as may be imposed by the board;
    3. Preparing the budget and submitting it to the board and being responsible for its administration after adoption;
    4. Preparing and submitting to the board as of the end of each fiscal year a complete report on the finances and administrative activities of the city for the preceding year;
    5. Keeping the board advised of the financial condition and future needs of the city and making recommendations as he deems desirable;
    6. Maintaining liaison with related units of local government respecting interlocal contracting and joint activities;
    7. Supervising all departments of city government and the conduct of all city officers and employees under his jurisdiction and requiring each department to make reports to him required by ordinance or as he deems desirable; and
    8. Performing other duties required of city executive authorities by statute or required of him by the board not inconsistent with this section.
  8. The board shall appoint a city manager by a majority vote of all its members. The city manager shall be appointed for an indefinite term and may be removed only by a majority vote of all board members. At least thirty (30) days before such removal shall become effective, the board shall by a majority vote of all its members adopt a preliminary resolution stating the reasons for his removal. The city manager may reply in writing and may request a public hearing which shall be held not earlier than twenty (20) days nor later than thirty (30) days after the filing of the request. After the public hearing, if requested, and after full consideration, the board by majority vote of all its members may adopt a final resolution of removal. By the preliminary resolution, the board may suspend the city manager from duty, but shall in any event cause to be paid to him any unpaid balance of his compensation and compensation for the next calendar month following adoption of the preliminary resolution.
  9. The city manager shall be the chief administrative officer and exercise those executive powers and duties delegated to him by ordinance and statute. He shall enforce the city manager plan, city ordinances and all applicable statutes. Subject to approval of the board, the city manager shall promulgate procedures to insure orderly administration of the functions of city government and compliance with statute or ordinance. Any delegation of the city manager’s duties or responsibilities to subordinate officers and employees shall be made by municipal order except that all bonds, notes, contracts, and written obligations of the city according to ordinance or resolution shall be made and executed by the mayor on behalf of the city.

History. Enact. Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 15, effective July 15, 1980; 1982, ch. 434, § 6, effective July 15, 1982.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Appointments.

Since board of commissioners had power in first instance to authorize appointment of special policemen, their action in adopting ordinance ratifying employment by city manager of special policemen to aid in upholding law while strike, during which there was trouble between striking and nonstriking employees was in process was not ultra vires, for such ratification of employment was as much as an act of the city as if the employment had been authorized by ordinance previously enacted and thus taxpayer could not recover for benefit of city amount expended for such employment. Shepherd v. McElwee, 304 Ky. 695 , 202 S.W.2d 166, 1947 Ky. LEXIS 701 ( Ky. 1947 ) (decided under prior law).

Where appellee was employed first on temporary basis as policeman and then was put on regular shift and he executed bond which was filed in office of city clerk and city manager was informed of his hiring but he was never formally hired by city commissioners and even though he was paid a salary and uniform allowance this too was done without formal approval of commissioners, thus appellee was never properly and legally appointed for such appointment must be made by a legal meeting of the commissioners and the actions of such commissioners are not official unless they are reflected by its formal records and there were no such records in this case. Pikeville v. Lee, 329 S.W.2d 580, 1959 Ky. LEXIS 177 ( Ky. 1959 ) (decided under prior law).

Where a city has both a mayor and a city manager the power lies in the mayor to appoint the members of the electric plant board. Kereiakes v. Graham, 458 S.W.2d 162, 1970 Ky. LEXIS 164 ( Ky. 1970 ) (decided under prior law).

2. Authority of Board.

The board of commissioners was vested with ultimate control and management of city’s affairs, and manager acted as principal administrative and financial officer for the board. Rawlings v. Newport, 275 Ky. 183 , 121 S.W.2d 10, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 397 ( Ky. 1938 ) (decided under prior law).

There was no waiver of the Open Records Act exemptions from disclosure for emails between a city mayor and the city commissioners, although they were inadvertently disclosed, as only the city clerk or the city, by a vote of its commissioners, could effectively make a disclosure of the city records pursuant to KRS 61.870 to 61.882 , 83A.085 , and 83A.150(3). Baker v. Jones, 199 S.W.3d 749, 2006 Ky. App. LEXIS 12 (Ky. Ct. App. 2006).

3. — Delegation.

Powers delegated to director of finance to make rules and regulations for administration of occupational license tax ordinance were merely powers to prescribe administrative details and were a valid delegation. Kohler v. Benckart, 252 S.W.2d 854, 1952 Ky. LEXIS 1025 ( Ky. 1952 ), overruled in part, D & W Auto Supply v. Department of Revenue, 602 S.W.2d 420, 1980 Ky. LEXIS 243 ( Ky. 1980 ) (decided under prior law).

The powers actually attempted to be exercised by an administrative officer under a delegation of authority do not furnish a measure for testing the validity of the delegation itself, and therefore fact that some of the regulations adopted by director of finance in prescribing administrative details of occupational tax ordinance allegedly went beyond scope of mere details and were legislative in character did not invalidate ordinance. Kohler v. Benckart, 252 S.W.2d 854, 1952 Ky. LEXIS 1025 ( Ky. 1952 ), overruled in part, D & W Auto Supply v. Department of Revenue, 602 S.W.2d 420, 1980 Ky. LEXIS 243 ( Ky. 1980 ) (decided under prior law).

4. Budget.

In preparation of the annual budget if due allowance is made in the estimates of revenues for a possible failure to collect 100 percent of the current taxes, it is proper to include the anticipated collections of delinquencies based upon experience and a reasonable regard for prospective economic conditions. Swinburne v. Newport, 297 Ky. 820 , 181 S.W.2d 421, 1944 Ky. LEXIS 821 ( Ky. 1944 ) (decided under prior law).

5. City Manager.
6. — Allocation of Tax Moneys.

The city manager is under the duty of seeing to the proper allocation of the tax moneys to the various funds and a legal disbursement thereof, and he is personally liable if he permits revenue to be diverted and expended for unauthorized purposes. Newport v. Rawlings, 289 Ky. 203 , 158 S.W.2d 12, 1941 Ky. LEXIS 25 ( Ky. 1941 ), overruled in part, Scalise v. Sewell-Scheuermann, 566 S.W.3d 539, 2018 Ky. LEXIS 451 ( Ky. 2018 ) (decided under prior law).

7. — Public Officer.

The city manager is a public officer, and his salary cannot exceed the limit prescribed by Ky. Const., § 246. Lexington v. Thompson, 250 Ky. 96 , 61 S.W.2d 1092, 1933 Ky. LEXIS 655 ( Ky. 1933 ) (decided under prior law).

8. — Election.

City managers need not be elected by the people, Ky. Const., § 160 not applying to them. Nor are Ky. Const., §§ 23 and 107 violated by a provision that they serve at the pleasure of the commissioners. Owensboro v. Hazel, 229 Ky. 752 , 17 S.W.2d 1031, 1929 Ky. LEXIS 843 ( Ky. 1929 ) (decided under prior law).

9. — Removal.

Evidence that manager caused overpayment and advance payment of certain employees, failed to transfer taxes to sinking fund and board of education when collected, overspent budgets, and did not prepare proper budgets, was sufficient to support removal. Rawlings v. Newport, 275 Ky. 183 , 121 S.W.2d 10, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 397 ( Ky. 1938 ) (decided under prior law).

The city manager cannot be excused for the unbusinesslike and questionable practices of his appointees in handling payrolls. Rawlings v. Newport, 275 Ky. 183 , 121 S.W.2d 10, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 397 ( Ky. 1938 ) (decided under prior law).

Unless commissioners acted arbitrarily or capriciously in removing manager, their action will not be reversed merely because they were prejudiced against manager. Rawlings v. Newport, 275 Ky. 183 , 121 S.W.2d 10, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 397 ( Ky. 1938 ) (decided under prior law).

In removal of city manager where a series of charges were made, it was sufficient if there was substantial evidence supporting one or more of them, and board was not required to make findings of fact or designate action taken on each charge. Rawlings v. Newport, 275 Ky. 183 , 121 S.W.2d 10, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 397 ( Ky. 1938 ) (decided under prior law).

After city manager had served six months, he could be removed only for good cause and legitimate reasons, and the procedure outlined in former law regarding removal of the city manager must have been followed. Rawlings v. Newport, 275 Ky. 183 , 121 S.W.2d 10, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 397 ( Ky. 1938 ) (decided under prior law).

Even though statutes made no provision for appeal from removal proceeding, court would review proceedings to determine whether removal was arbitrary or capricious, but removal would be upheld if there was a showing of legally sufficient cause and substantial evidence. Rawlings v. Newport, 275 Ky. 183 , 121 S.W.2d 10, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 397 ( Ky. 1938 ) (decided under prior law).

10. — Suspension.

When charges have been duly preferred against the manager, he may be suspended and an acting manager designated. Rawlings v. Newport, 275 Ky. 183 , 121 S.W.2d 10, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 397 ( Ky. 1938 ) (decided under prior law).

11. Mayor Pro Tem.

Where mayor of second-class city resigned and newly elected board of commissioners failed to agree upon a mayor pro tem, a commissioner previously elected mayor pro tem was not entitled to continue in this office beyond his term as commissioner held when so elected, though he had already been reelected for another term as commissioner. Culbertson v. Moore, 302 Ky. 768 , 196 S.W.2d 308, 1946 Ky. LEXIS 742 ( Ky. 1946 ) (decided under prior law).

12. Oath of Office.

The oath of office is the only oath required of commissioners and they are not required to take another oath before commencing hearing for removal of manager. Rawlings v. Newport, 275 Ky. 183 , 121 S.W.2d 10, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 397 ( Ky. 1938 ) (decided under prior law).

13. Removal of Commissioner.

Bias or prejudice does not disqualify the commission from trying charges against a fellow commissioner. Arbogast v. Weber, 249 Ky. 20 , 60 S.W.2d 144, 1933 Ky. LEXIS 477 ( Ky. 1933 ) (decided under prior law).

Circuit court properly granted a city's motion for summary judgment on retired police officers' breach of contract action because the officers failed to prove the existence of a contract entitling them to education incentive pay; the city properly exercised its authority to fix the officers' compensation, and, therefore, the officers were only entitled to be paid what the city code of ordinances specified. Dearborn v. City of Frankfort, 2016 Ky. App. Unpub. LEXIS 902 (Ky. Ct. App. Dec. 9, 2016), review denied, ordered not published, 2017 Ky. LEXIS 290 (Ky. Aug. 16, 2017).

Opinions of Attorney General.

This section would impliedly repeal the provision of KRS 241.170(2) insofar as it conflicts with this statute and would require that the city manager merely recommend to the board of commissioners for appointment a qualified person to serve as ABC Administrator. OAG 80-580 .

A city mayor in a city under the city manager form of government cannot have his signature on each numbered check to identify the person paid, the purchase order number and other information in the procurement procedure of the city since, under subsection (3) of this section, the mayor can have no regular administrative duties and cannot be delegated those authorities; however, the board of commissioners can delegate these duties to the city manager under subsection (7)(h) of this section. OAG 81-95 .

An inconsistency between a city procurement code which allows abbreviated purchasing procedures without the approval of the board of commissioners by giving the city manager the responsibility of executing contracts on behalf of the board and the provisions of KRS 91A.060 , which provides that all city funds are to be disbursed by written authorization approved by the board of commissioners, can be resolved by having the board of commissioners delegating the authority to the city manager under subsection (7)(h) of this section. OAG 81-95 .

In a city operating under the city manager form of government, the board of commissioners must either prepare the city budget or delegate the budget preparation authority to the city manager under KRS 83A.150(7)(h); the latter course of action would resolve the conflict between the combined provisions of KRS 91A.010 and KRS 83A.010 which define the “executive authority” as the board of commissioners, and KRS 91A.030(5) which authorizes such “executive authority” to prepare the budget, and the provisions of subsection (7)(c) of this section which authorize the city manager to prepare the budget. OAG 81-95 .

Although a city manager may make temporary promotions within the police and fire departments to acting assistant chief, acting captain, acting lieutenant and acting sergeant pursuant to subsection (7)(b) of this section, such positions must first be established by ordinance under subsection (5) of this section, and under the established pay scale for the various ranks within the departments, it would be assumed that once the temporary appointment expires and the promoted officer is returned to his initial rank, his compensation would revert to the rate provided for in such rank. OAG 81-340 .

Although subsection (3) of KRS 84.280 (now repealed), which provided that the mayor of a second-class city was ineligible to serve successive terms, was impliedly repealed by the new municipal code effective in 1980, particularly by KRS 83A.040 , 83A.050 and this section which contain no restriction on successive terms for mayors or members of legislative bodies, successive terms are still prohibited by Ky. Const., § 160. OAG 81-380 .

Any undue delay in filling the position of city manager could subject the commission to a mandamus action by any citizen to carry out the mandate of this section. OAG 82-168 .

Pursuant to subsection (7) of this section a board of commissioners composed of four commissioners and a mayor, is required to create the office of city manager by ordinance, which office carries with it the duties and responsibilities therein designated and those that may be given to it by the board in accordance with KRS 83A.080 ; the establishment of the office of city manager is mandatory on the part of the commission and the office must be filled as soon as it is possible to find a qualified individual. OAG 82-168 .

The commission possesses all legislative and executive authority under the city manager form of government and the mayor has no appointive power or regular administrative duties; thus, the mayor has no individual say-so as to who will fill the office of city manager or when it is to be filled as this is purely a matter for the commission itself to determine. OAG 82-168 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Bench & Bar.

Morris, The New Kentucky Municipal Law, Vol. 45, No. 3, July, 1981, Ky. Bench & Bar 24.

Kentucky Law Journal.

Kentucky Law Survey, Morris, Municipal Law, 70 Ky. L.J. 287 (1981-82).

83A.160. Change in form of government permitted by popular vote only.

  1. Any city may become organized and governed under the mayor-council plan, the commission plan or the city manager plan only by popular vote in accordance with KRS 83A.120 .
  2. If a majority of the votes cast are in favor of changing the organization and government of the city, the corporate entity of the city shall remain the same as it was before the change. All laws applicable to and governing cities and not inconsistent with the newly adopted plan shall continue to apply to and govern each city that so changes its plan. All city ordinances, resolutions and orders in force in any such city and not inconsistent with the newly adopted plan shall continue in force until amended or repealed in the manner provided in the new plan.
  3. Upon the expiration of the terms of the existing legislative body members, or if terms are staggered, when the terms of a sufficient number of members have expired to achieve a correct number of members remaining, or upon election of a sufficient number of additional members at the next regular election to achieve a correct number of members, the city shall be organized and governed under the newly adopted plan as provided in this chapter and shall take action necessary to be in compliance with this chapter. In no event shall a city not be in compliance two (2) years after the adoption of the new plan by the voters.
  4. Failure on the part of any ministerial officer to perform the duties required of him by this section shall not prevent the change of the plan of organization and government of the city.
  5. No city which changes the plan under which it is organized and governed under this section shall again change the plan sooner than five (5) years from the effective date of the last change.
  6. Any city with the largest population located in a county with a population equal to or greater than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) based upon the most recent federal decennial census may elect to become organized and governed under the mayor-alderman plan of government provided in KRS 83.410 to 83.660 by popular vote in accordance with KRS 83A.120 . The process for the adoption of the mayor-alderman plan of government shall be governed by subsections (2) to (5) of this section.

History. Enact. Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 16, effective July 15, 1980; 2014, ch. 92, § 7, effective January 1, 2015.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Alternative Methods.

Though former law provided a method of terminating the city manager form of government, the voters of Fayette County in adopting urban-county government pursuant to KRS 67A.010 to 67A.040 (KRS 67A.040 now repealed) used a legislatively authorized alternative procedure to terminate the government of the city of Lexington, and such termination was therefore valid. Holsclaw v. Stephens, 507 S.W.2d 462, 1973 Ky. LEXIS 3 ( Ky. 1973 ) (decided under prior law).

2. Confusing Questions on Same Ballot.

Since submitting the question of whether city should abandon commission form of government to the voters at the same time as submitting the question of whether the voters favored the city manager form of government would be confusing to the voters, county judge (now county judge/executive) properly refused to submit the question regarding the city manager form of government to the voters at the same election the abandonment question was submitted. Tanner v. Vogel, 261 S.W.2d 671, 1953 Ky. LEXIS 1047 ( Ky. 1953 ) (decided under prior law).

3. Void Election.

When the election on the issue of adoption is void, the city officials in office may enjoin the elected commissioners from interfering with them in the discharge of their duties for said commissioners are not even de facto officers. Goin v. Smith, 202 Ky. 486 , 260 S.W. 10, 1924 Ky. LEXIS 738 ( Ky. 1924 ) (decided under prior law).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Where two city council members are elected for regular terms at the same November election in which the city residents vote to change their type of government from the mayor-council plan to a commission form of government, the newly elected council members would be entitled to take office and serve out their two-year term and the effective date of the change in government would be delayed for those two years. OAG 83-364 .

83A.165. Election to fill unexpired term of city office.

  1. A candidate running to fill the unexpired term of any city office shall file his or her nomination papers in accordance with the provisions of KRS 83A.045 , 118.365 , 118.375 , and 83A.047 .
  2. Vacancies in the office of mayor or city legislative body that are to be filled temporarily by appointment shall be governed by the provisions of KRS 83A.040 and Section 152 of the Kentucky Constitution.
  3. Vacancies in the office of mayor or city legislative body that are to be filled by partisan election shall be governed by the following provisions:
    1. Vacancies in candidacy shall be governed by KRS 118.105 ;
    2. Nominations for unexpired terms shall be governed by KRS 118.115 and Section 152 of the Kentucky Constitution; and
    3. Independent candidates filing to fill a vacancy shall be governed by KRS 118.375 .
  4. Vacancies in the office of mayor or city legislative body that are to be filled by nonpartisan election shall be governed by the following provisions:
    1. If the vacancy occurs not less than one hundred sixty (160) days before a May primary, candidates to fill the vacancy shall be nominated at that primary in the manner prescribed in KRS 83A.170 ;
    2. If the vacancy occurs on or after the one hundred sixtieth day before a May primary or at any time before the time prescribed in KRS 118.365 for filing petitions of nomination, the election to fill the unexpired term shall be held without a primary in the manner prescribed in Section 152 of the Kentucky Constitution. Petitions of nomination for candidates to fill the vacancy shall be filed at the time and place prescribed in KRS 118.365 ;
    3. If the vacancy occurs after the time prescribed in KRS 118.365 for filing petitions of nomination, but not less than three (3) months before the regular election, petitions of nomination for candidates to fill the vacancy shall be filed not later than the second Tuesday in August preceding the regular election for the office sought; and
    4. Vacancies in candidacy in any city that has eliminated the nonpartisan primary election pursuant to KRS 83A.045 shall be governed by the provisions of KRS 83A.045 (2)(b)6.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1988, ch. 17, § 6, effective July 15, 1988; 1990, ch. 169, § 4, effective July 13, 1990; 1990, ch. 366, § 3, effective July 13, 1990; 1992, ch. 288, § 33, effective July 14, 1992; 2008, ch. 79, § 19, effective July 15, 2008; 2014, ch. 92, § 16, effective January 1, 2015; 2018 ch. 162, § 2, effective November 7, 2018; 2019 ch. 187, § 9, effective November 6, 2019.

83A.170. Nonpartisan primaries.

  1. In any city which has under the provisions of KRS 83A.045 or 83A.050 required nonpartisan city elections, no person shall be elected to city office except as provided in this section or as otherwise provided in this chapter relating to nonpartisan elections.
  2. No person shall be elected to city office without being nominated in the manner provided in this section at a nonpartisan primary to be held at the time prescribed by KRS Chapters 116 to 121, except as otherwise provided in this chapter. Nonpartisan primaries shall be conducted by the same officers, chosen and acting in the same manner, with the same rights and duties as in regular elections.
  3. Each applicant for nomination shall, not earlier than the first Wednesday after the first Monday in November of the year preceding the year in which the office will appear on the ballot and not later than the last date prescribed by the election law generally for filing notification and declaration forms with the county clerk as provided in KRS 83A.047 , file a petition of nomination, which shall be in the form prescribed by the State Board of Elections signed by at least two (2) registered voters in the city. Each voter may sign individual petitions equal to the number of offices to be filled. If a voter signs petitions for more candidates than he or she is authorized, he or she shall be counted as a petitioner for the candidate whose petition is filed first.
  4. The county clerk shall examine the petition of each candidate to determine whether it is regular on its face. If there is an error, the county clerk shall notify the candidate by certified mail within twenty-four (24) hours of filing.
  5. Immediately upon expiration of the time for filing petitions, the county clerk shall have published in accordance with KRS Chapter 424 the names of the applicants as they will appear before the voters at the primary.
  6. Subsection (5) of this section shall not apply if it appears, immediately upon expiration of the time for filing petitions, that there are not more than two (2) applicants for nomination for each city office to be filled, or, when the nominations are for city legislative body members in cities electing legislative body members at large, and there are no more than twice the number of applicants for nomination for the number of offices to be filled. In that case, the applicants for nomination shall thereby be nominated and no drawing for ballot position nor primary election shall be held for that office.
  7. The ballot position of a candidate shall not be changed after the ballot position has been designated by the county clerk.
  8. If, before the time of certification of candidates who will appear on the ballot, any candidate whose petition has been filed in the office of the county clerk dies or notifies the clerk in writing, signed and properly notarized, that he or she will not accept the nomination, the clerk shall not cause the candidate’s name to be printed on the ballot.
  9. If, after the certification of candidates who will appear on the ballot, any candidate whose name appears thereon shall withdraw pursuant to KRS 118.212 or die:
    1. Neither the precinct election officers nor the county board of elections shall tabulate or record the votes cast for the candidate;
    2. The county clerk shall provide notices to the precinct election officers who shall see that a notice is conspicuously displayed at the polling place advising voters of the change, and that votes for the candidate shall not be tabulated or recorded. If the county clerk learns of the death or withdrawal at least five (5) days prior to the election and provides the notices required by this subsection and the precinct officers fail to post the notices at the polling place, the officers shall be guilty of a violation; and
    3. In a primary, if there are only one (1) or two (2) remaining candidates on the ballot for that office, following the withdrawal or death of the other candidate or candidates, neither the precinct election officers nor the county board of elections shall tabulate or record the votes for the remaining candidate or candidates, and the officer with whom the remaining candidate or candidates has filed his or her nomination papers shall immediately issue and file in his or her office a certificate of nomination for that remaining candidate or candidates and send a copy to the remaining candidate or candidates.
  10. Names of applicants for each nomination shall be placed before the voters of the city. The voters shall be instructed to vote for one (1) candidate, except when there is more than one (1) candidate for which voters may vote, the instruction “vote for up to  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  candidates” shall be used on the ballot. No party designation or emblem of any kind nor any sign indicating any applicant’s political belief or party affiliation shall be used.
  11. Persons qualified to vote at a regular election shall be qualified to vote at a nonpartisan primary and the law applicable to challenges made at a regular election shall be applicable to challenges made at a nonpartisan primary.
  12. Votes shall be counted as provided in general election laws, pursuant to KRS Chapters 116 to 121, and the result shall be published as provided in KRS Chapter 424.
  13. The two (2) applicants receiving the highest number of votes for nomination for each city office shall be nominated; or where the nominations are for city legislative body members in cities electing legislative body members at large, there shall be nominated the number of applicants receiving the highest number of votes equal to twice the number of offices to be filled. If two (2) candidates are tied for the second highest number of votes in a mayoral election, the names of those two (2) candidates, plus the name of the candidate receiving the highest number of votes, shall be placed upon the ballot.
  14. At the regular election following a nonpartisan primary, the names of the successful nominees and candidates who have filed a petition of candidacy as provided in this chapter to fill a vacancy shall be placed before the voters.
  15. The nominee or candidate receiving the greater number of votes cast for each city office shall be elected.
  16. KRS Chapters 116 to 121 prescribing duties of county clerks and other public officers in the conduct of elections shall be applicable in all respects to nonpartisan city elections, except no election officer or other person within a polling place shall tell or indicate to a voter, by word of mouth or otherwise, the political affiliation of any candidate for city office.

History. Enact. Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 17, effective July 15, 1980; 1982, ch. 360, § 24, effective July 15, 1982; 1982, ch. 394, § 3, effective July 15, 1982; 1982, ch. 402, § 1, effective January 1, 1984; 1982, ch. 434, § 7, effective July 15, 1982; Acts 1984, ch. 44, § 2, effective March 2, 1984; 1984, ch. 185, § 4, effective July 13, 1984; 1984, ch. 185, § 33, effective April 3, 1984; 1986, ch. 470, § 4, effective July 15, 1986; 1988, ch. 17, § 4, effective July 15, 1988; 1990, ch. 48, § 93, effective July 13, 1990; 1990, ch. 169, § 5, effective July 13, 1990; 1990, ch. 366, § 4, effective July 13, 1990; 1992, ch. 288, § 32, effective July 14, 1992; 1998, ch. 2, § 15, effective July 15, 1998; 2000, ch. 354, § 2, effective July 14, 2000; 2003, ch. 61, § 1, effective June 24, 2003; 2003, ch. 101, § 2, effective June 24, 2003; 2008, ch. 79, § 20, effective July 15, 2008; 2014, ch. 17, § 2, effective July 15, 2014; 2014, ch. 92, § 17, effective January 1, 2015.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(1/1/2015). This statute was amended by 2014 Ky. Acts chs. 17 and 92, which do not appear to be in conflict and have been codified together.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Purpose.

The primary objective of former law that provided for the nonpartisan election of the mayor and the commissioners was to allow a city which elects to operate thereunder to eliminate partisan politics and party political labels insofar as city elections are concerned. Douglas v. Sturgill, 261 S.W.2d 290, 1953 Ky. LEXIS 999 ( Ky. 1953 ) (decided under prior law).

2. Legislative Authority.

The legislature was empowered by Ky. Const., § 160 to subject candidates for municipal office to the qualification that they must be nominated in a primary election. Hales v. Langford, 446 S.W.2d 647, 1969 Ky. LEXIS 136 ( Ky. 1969 ) (decided under prior law).

Cited:

Covington v. CovingtonLodge No. 1, etc., 622 S.W.2d 221, 1981 Ky. LEXIS 274 ( Ky. 1981 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

If there are four city commissioners to be elected and there are only eight applicants, two for each of the commissioners’ seats, there will be no primary; in like manner, if there are not more than 12 applicants for six council seats, there will be no primary. OAG 80-619 .

Sixth-class cities will automatically elect their officers in a nonpartisan general election in November, 1981, under subsection (3) of KRS 118.215 unless they elect to operate under the nonpartisan city primary statutory provision of this section by enacting an ordinance to that effect 240 days before the general election. OAG 81-32 .

A group of six or fewer candidates for the office of city council may not file a single petition for that position, since group filing is not permitted under subsection (3) of this section, even though it is permitted for independent petitions under KRS 118.315 . OAG 81-54 .

A qualified voter may not sign a petition for a candidate for city council and also sign a petition for the same candidate for the office of mayor, since the language of subsection (3) of this section restricts the voter from signing more than one applicant’s petition for any office, regardless of the fact that he is entitled to vote for up to six candidates for council and one candidate for mayor. OAG 81-54 .

Where a fourth-class city operating under the councilmanic form of government, with six council members elected at large, passed an ordinance electing to conduct its election pursuant to this section, the candidates for council would automatically be nominated under subsection (5) (now (6)) of this section if, after the deadline for filing, there were not more than 12 candidates for council, thereby eliminating the primary election for these offices. OAG 81-54 .

A city council may increase the size of the council from seven to eight by appropriate ordinance at any time, but preferably before the filing deadline for a nonpartisan primary procedure adopted pursuant to this section and may immediately fill the vacancy by appointment, subject to an election for the unexpired term as required by Ky. Const., § 152. OAG 81-131 .

A city of the fourth class, which has for a number of years conducted nonpartisan elections pursuant to KRS 89.060 (repealed) and desires to continue electing its officers in a nonpartisan manner, must adopt an ordinance electing to operate under this section. OAG 81-155 .

Where a fourth-class city had previously conducted nonpartisan elections under a statute which is now repealed, it may continue to elect officers in a nonpartisan manner by adopting an ordinance electing to operate under this section; however, where the city did not enact such an ordinance at least 240 days prior to the general election, it must operate its elections under the general election laws, as provided in KRS 83A.050 . OAG 81-155 .

Where a city of the fourth class has never enacted an ordinance to provide a special city nonpartisan primary pursuant to this section, KRS 83A.050 does not require that city to now hold a primary election for city office candidates, since KRS 83A.050 is purely optional on the part of every city, other than a city of the second class under a city manager form of government; however, if the city does not elect to operate under KRS 83A.050, the city officers in a fourth-class city have the right to seek major party nomination in the May partisan primary, with the exception of those fourth-class cities operating under the city manager commission form of government pursuant to subsection (4) of KRS 118.105 . OAG 81-163 .

Where a candidate for mayor and six candidates for city council in a special nonpartisan city primary, pursuant to this section, filed petitions which were signed by the same individuals, the petitions were contrary to the requirements of this section, but, since the validity of the petitions was not challenged prior to the primary, the nominations are valid and their names can appear on the November general election ballot. OAG 81-221 .

Where a city enacted an ordinance providing for nonpartisan city elections under this section, and, at the special city primary in May, nominations were made for only three of the four city commissioner positions, write-in votes could not be cast for the fourth position at the November election, since this section requires a person to be nominated in a special city primary in order to hold the office to be filled in the November election; thus, because only three commissioners were nominated, only three could be elected at the November election and a vacancy would be created when the new commission members took office on the first Monday in January, at which time the elected commissioners would be authorized to fill the vacancy pursuant to subsection (4) (now (5) of KRS 83A.040 , subject to the provisions of Ky. Const., § 152, which would require an election to be held at the next regular election. OAG 81-263 .

Where only one candidate has filed for the office of mayor and would be the only name on the November ballot for that office, the casting of “write-in” votes would be prohibited by this section which provides that no person can be elected to office in November unless he is first nominated in the special May primary. OAG 81-279 .

An election of city officials can be held in November without a primary election being held in May to nominate candidates for the fall election, provided the city has not enacted an ordinance 240 days prior to the next November election, requiring the city to conduct its elections pursuant to this section; thus, if the city has not enacted such an ordinance, the city election would be conducted pursuant to the regular election laws. OAG 81-327 .

An ordinance, proposing to change the election of city officers in a third-class city to a nonpartisan election pursuant to this section was appropriate provided it was adopted not less than 240 days before the next regular election; however, once the change was made, the procedure could not be changed for five years. OAG 82-171 .

No referendum is required in order for the city to adopt a nonpartisan type of election. OAG 82-171 .

Where a candidate’s petition contained only 18 valid signatures following the deduction of those who had previously signed an opposing candidate’s petition, the petition did not qualify under the terms of this section requiring a minimum of 20 petitioners. However, where the petition was not challenged either by an opponent or a qualified voter pursuant to KRS 118.176 before the primary, nor was the clerk requested, before the primary, to check the signatures against the registration record of signers and the candidate was, as a consequence, nominated for office, the filing papers could not be challenged after the nomination and before the election. OAG 82-512 .

This section, which requires a person to be nominated in the special city primary before he can be elected to any city office, prohibits the casting of “write-in” votes at the November general election. OAG 83-281 .

Nonpartisan candidates running for nomination and election are not presently authorized under the terms of KRS 83A.050 and this section to appoint challengers. OAG 85-82 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Kentucky Law Survey, Morris, Municipal Law, 70 Ky. L.J. 287 (1981-82).

83A.175. Filling vacancy in city office or in candidacy for city office.

  1. The election to fill the regular term of a nonpartisan city office shall be conducted in the manner prescribed in KRS 83A.165 when, in a regular election for nonpartisan city office no candidates nominated to an office as provided in KRS 83A.170 are available due to death, incapacity, or withdrawal, or when city legislative body members are to be elected at large and there are fewer nominees than there are offices to be filled, or when a city of the fourth to sixth class has not conducted a primary pursuant to KRS 83A.045 .
  2. Each candidate shall, not earlier than the first Wednesday after the first Monday in November of the year before the year in which the office will appear on the ballot and not later than the last date prescribed by the election law generally for filing petitions of nomination with the county clerk as provided in KRS 83A.047 , file a petition for candidacy. The petition shall be prescribed by the State Board of Elections and shall be signed by at least two (2) registered voters in the city. Each voter may sign individual petitions equal to the number of offices to be filled. If a voter signs petitions for more candidates than he or she is authorized, he or she shall be counted as a petitioner for the candidate whose petition is filed first.
  3. The county clerk shall examine the petition of each candidate to determine whether it is regular on its face. If there is an error, the county clerk shall notify the candidate by certified mail within twenty-four (24) hours of filing.
  4. The ballot position of a candidate shall not be changed after the ballot position has been designated by the county clerk.
  5. If, before the certification of candidates who will appear on the ballot, any candidate whose petition has been filed in the office of the county clerk, dies or notifies the clerk in writing, signed and properly notarized, that he or she will not accept the election, the clerk shall not cause his or her name to be printed on the ballot.
  6. If, after the certification of candidates who will appear on the ballot, any candidate whose name appears thereon shall withdraw pursuant to KRS 118.212 or die:
    1. Neither the precinct election officers nor the county board of elections shall tabulate or record the votes cast for the candidate;
    2. The county clerk shall provide notices to the precinct election officers who shall see that a notice is conspicuously displayed at the polling place advising voters of the change, and that votes for the candidate shall not be tabulated or recorded. If the county clerk learns of the death or withdrawal at least five (5) days prior to the election and provides the notices required by this subsection and the precinct officers fail to post the notices at the polling place, the officers shall be guilty of a violation;
    3. If there is only one (1) remaining candidate on the ballot for that office in a primary, following the withdrawal or death of the other candidate or candidates, neither the precinct election officers nor the county board of elections shall tabulate or record the votes for the remaining candidate, and the officer with whom the remaining candidate has filed his or her nomination papers shall immediately issue and file in his or her office a certificate of nomination for that remaining candidate and send a copy to the remaining candidate.

History. Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 470, § 1, effective July 15, 1986; 1988, ch. 17, § 7, effective July 15, 1988; 1990, ch. 48, § 94, effective July 13, 1990; 1990, ch. 169, § 6, effective July 13, 1990; 1990, ch. 366, § 5, effective July 13, 1990; 1998, ch. 2, § 16, effective July 15, 1998; 2000, ch. 354, § 3, effective July 14, 2000; 2003, ch. 101, § 3, effective June 24, 2003; 2008, ch. 79, § 21, effective July 15, 2008.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(7/13/90) This section was amended by three 1990 Acts. Where those Acts are not in conflict they have been compiled together. Where a conflict exists, the Act which was last enacted by the General Assembly prevails, pursuant to KRS 446.250 .

83A.175. Filling vacancy in city office or in candidacy for city office.

  1. The election to fill the regular term of a nonpartisan city office shall be conducted in the manner prescribed in KRS 83A.165 when, in a regular election for nonpartisan city office no candidates nominated to an office as provided in KRS 83A.170 are available due to death, incapacity, or withdrawal, or when city legislative body members are to be elected at large and there are fewer nominees than there are offices to be filled, or when a city has eliminated the primary pursuant to KRS 83A.045 .
  2. Each candidate shall, not earlier than the first Wednesday after the first Monday in November of the year before the year in which the office will appear on the ballot and not later than the last date prescribed by the election law generally for filing petitions of nomination with the county clerk as provided in KRS 83A.047 , file a petition for candidacy. The petition shall be prescribed by the State Board of Elections and shall be signed by at least two (2) registered voters in the city. Each voter may sign individual petitions equal to the number of offices to be filled. If a voter signs petitions for more candidates than he or she is authorized, he or she shall be counted as a petitioner for the candidate whose petition is filed first.
  3. The county clerk shall examine the petition of each candidate to determine whether it is regular on its face. If there is an error, the county clerk shall notify the candidate by certified mail within twenty-four (24) hours of filing.
  4. The ballot position of a candidate shall not be changed after the ballot position has been designated by the county clerk.
  5. If, before the certification of candidates who will appear on the ballot, any candidate whose petition has been filed in the office of the county clerk, dies or notifies the clerk in writing, signed and properly notarized, that he or she will not accept the election, the clerk shall not cause his or her name to be printed on the ballot.
  6. If, after the certification of candidates who will appear on the ballot, any candidate whose name appears thereon shall withdraw pursuant to KRS 118.212 or die:
    1. Neither the precinct election officers nor the county board of elections shall tabulate or record the votes cast for the candidate;
    2. The county clerk shall provide notices to the precinct election officers who shall see that a notice is conspicuously displayed at the polling place advising voters of the change, and that votes for the candidate shall not be tabulated or recorded. If the county clerk learns of the death or withdrawal at least five (5) days prior to the election and provides the notices required by this subsection and the precinct officers fail to post the notices at the polling place, the officers shall be guilty of a violation;
    3. If there is only one (1) remaining candidate on the ballot for that office in a primary, following the withdrawal or death of the other candidate or candidates, neither the precinct election officers nor the county board of elections shall tabulate or record the votes for the remaining candidate, and the officer with whom the remaining candidate has filed his or her nomination papers shall immediately issue and file in his or her office a certificate of nomination for that remaining candidate and send a copy to the remaining candidate.

History. Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 470, § 1, effective July 15, 1986; 1988, ch. 17, § 7, effective July 15, 1988; 1990, ch. 48, § 94, effective July 13, 1990; 1990, ch. 169, § 6, effective July 13, 1990; 1990, ch. 366, § 5, effective July 13, 1990; 1998, ch. 2, § 16, effective July 15, 1998; 2000, ch. 354, § 3, effective July 14, 2000; 2003, ch. 101, § 3, effective June 24, 2003; 2008, ch. 79, § 21, effective July 15, 2008; 2014, ch. 92, § 18, effective January 1, 2015.

83A.180. Administration of oath.

In cities of the home rule class, the official oath of any city officer, whether elected or appointed, may be administered by the mayor of the city for which the officer serves, except that a mayor’s official oath shall be administered by such person as otherwise provided by law.

History. Enact. Acts 1988, ch. 316, § 1, effective July 15, 1988; 2014, ch. 92, § 19, effective January 1, 2015.

CHAPTER 84 Organization and Government of Cities of the Second Class [Repealed]

84.010. Incorporation and general powers. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3038, 3058-9, 3058-16, 3058-23) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 82.081 , 82.082 .

84.020. Separation of powers. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3041: amend. Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 76, effective January 2, 1978) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 20, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170 .

84.030. Legislative branch — General counsel. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3042, 3043) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 20, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170 .

84.040. Wards, how established and altered. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3048, 3055 to 3057) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 20, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170 .

84.050. Members of general council — Terms — Qualifications — Privileges. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3043, 3047: amend. Acts 1948, ch. 8; 1958, ch. 41, § 2; 1960, ch. 57) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 20, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170 .

84.060. Officers of general council — Eligibility, discipline and expulsion of members. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3043) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 20, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170 .

84.070. Quorum and meetings of board of aldermen and board of councilmen. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3043, 3045, 3046, 3110) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 20, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170 .

84.080. Joint sessions of board of aldermen and board of councilmen. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3044) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 20, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170 .

84.090. Journals of board of aldermen and board of councilmen. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3045, 3117: amend. Acts 1966, ch. 239, § 45) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 20, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170 .

84.100. Ordinances, how passed — Amendment — Reenactment, veto — Publication. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3045, 3059, 3060, 3061, 3114, 3117: amend. Acts 1966, ch. 239, § 46; 1976, ch. 184, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 20, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170 .

84.110. Compilation of ordinances. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3061) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 20, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170 .

84.120. Official newspaper of city. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3117) was repealed by Acts 1944, ch. 155, § 2.

84.130. Recording of ordinances after passage — Use in evidence. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3062, 3063) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.060 .

84.140. Validity of ordinances, how tested. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3063: amend. Acts 1976, ch. 62, § 83) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.060 .

84.150. General powers of council. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3058, 3058-3, 3058-7, 3058-13, 3058-15, 3058-16, 3058-25 to 3058-27, 3061, 3172) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

84.160. Public ways, regulation of use. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3058, 3058-2, 3058-12, 3058-17) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

84.170. Bridges, culverts, sewers and watercourses. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3058, 3058-5) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

84.190. Parks, cemeteries and public grounds. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3058, 3058-24) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

84.190. Trades, occupations and professions — Businesses — Exhibitions and amusements. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3058, 3058-1 3058-2, 3058-7, 3058-8) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

84.200. Weights and measures — Inspection of commodities — Monopolistic practices. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3058, 3058-8, 3058-11) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

84.210. Protection of public health. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3058, 3058-1, 3058-11) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

84.220. Nuisances — Licensing of Dogs — Animals running at large. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3058, 3058-1, 3058-12, 3058-17, 3058-19: amend. Acts 1974, ch. 406, § 303) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

84.230. Fire prevention and protection — Safety inspection. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3058, 3058-11, 3058-22, 3066, 3067) was repealed by Acts 1982, ch. 434, § 15, effective July 15, 1982.

84.240. Building and vehicle inspection — Smoke abatement. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3066: amend. Acts 1974, ch. 131, § 16; 1978, ch. 117, § 59, effective August 31, 1979) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

84.250. Suppression of vice — Vagrants — Beggars — Gamblers — Prostitutes. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3058, 3058-2, 3058-18) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

84.260. Idiots, insane persons and inebriates — Poor persons. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3058, 3058-14) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

84.270. Franchises and privileges, advertisement before granting. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3068) was repealed by Acts 1982, ch. 434, § 15, effective July 15, 1982.

84.280. Mayor — Election — Term — Qualifications — Ineligible for succeeding term. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3106, 3107) was repealed by Acts 1982, ch. 434, § 15. For present law see KRS Chapter 83A.

84.290. Vacancy in office of mayor — Temporary absence or disability. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3049, 3204: amend. Acts 1950, ch. 123, § 29) was repealed by Acts 1982, ch. 434, § 15. For present law see KRS Chapter 83A.

84.300. Duties and powers of mayor. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3049, 3058-1, 3107 to 3112, 3114, 3116: amend. 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 77) was repealed by Acts 1982, ch. 434, § 15. For present law see KRS Chapter 83A.

84.310. Process and notices for city to be served on mayor. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3115) was repealed by Acts 1952, ch. 84, § 6, effective July 1, 1953.

84.320. City clerk and deputy — Appointment — Bond. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3133, 3136: amend. Acts 1950, ch. 123, § 29) was repealed by Acts 1982, ch. 434, § 14. For present law see KRS Chapter 83A.

84.330. Duties and powers of city clerk and deputy. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3133 to 3136) was repealed by Acts 1982, ch. 434, § 14. For present law see KRS Chapter 83A.

84.340. Officers, agents and employes of city — Appointment — Qualifications — Compensation — Duties and powers. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3049, 3064, 3065, 3202, 3203, 3205: amend. Acts 1968, ch. 152, § 59) was repealed by Acts 1982, ch. 434, § 14. For present law see KRS Chapter 83A.

84.350. Election of city officers — Time of taking office — Qualifications of voters. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3172: amend. Acts 1954, ch. 112, § 1; 1966, ch. 255, § 94; 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 78, effective January 2, 1978) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980.

84.360. Annual statements of executive and ministerial officers to mayor. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3113) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980.

84.370. Removal of executive, ministerial and judicial officers — Additional powers of board. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3201: amend. Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 79, effective January 2, 1978) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980.

84.990. Penalties. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3112) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980.

CHAPTER 85 Organization and Government of Cities of the Third Class [Repealed]

85.010. Incorporation and general powers. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3236, 3237) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 82.081 .

85.020. Process, when run into name of city. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3253) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see 82.082 .

85.030. Separation of powers. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3238: amend. Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 80, effective January 2, 1978) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170 .

85.040. Legislative branch — Common council. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3265, 3270) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170 .

85.050. Wards, how established and altered. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3286) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170 .

85.060. Members of common council — Terms — Qualifications. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3266, 3270, 3276, 3280: amend. Acts 1958, ch. 41, § 3; 1962, ch. 24, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170 .

85.070. Eligibility, discipline and expulsion of members — Interested member not to vote. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3267 to 3270, 3272) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170 .

85.080. Quorum and meetings of common council — Manner of voting — Committees. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3246, 3271, 3272, 3275, 3276, 3281, 3283, 3294, 3301) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170 .

85.090. Process to compel attendance of persons and production of papers. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3273) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170 .

85.100. Journal of the common council. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3274: amend. Acts 1966, ch. 239, § 47) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170 .

85.110. Ordinances, how passed — Veto — Publication — Compilation — Recording. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3248, 3274, 3279, 3289, 3304: amend. Acts 1976, ch. 184, § 2) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170 .

85.120. General powers of common council. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3240, 3284, 3290, 3290-2, 3290-16, 3290-22, 3290-29, 3290-40, 3364: amend. Acts 1976, ch. 140, § 30; 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 81, effective January 2, 1978) was repealed by Acts 1982, ch. 434, § 15, effective July 15, 1982.

85.125. City of third class may pay public funds to nonprofit hospital in city or county. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1980, ch. 179, § 1, effective July 15, 1980) was repealed by Acts 1982, ch. 434, § 15, effective July 15, 1982.

85.130. Survey and map of city. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3288, 3290, 3290-39) was repealed by Acts 1982, ch. 434, § 15, effective July 15, 1982.

85.140. Public buildings — Public ways and sewers — Promotion and regulation of navigation. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3290, 3290-4, 3290-7, 3290-30, 3290-31, 3290-32) was repealed by Acts 1982, ch. 434, § 15, effective July 15, 1982.

85.150. Regulation of vehicles — Ferries — Sale of food — Amusements. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3290, 3290-10, 3290-11, 3290-21, 3290-27) was repealed by Acts 1982, ch. 434, § 15, effective July 15, 1982.

85.160. Weights and measures — Inspection of commodities — Monopolistic practices. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3290, 3290-17 to 3290-21) was repealed by Acts 1982, ch. 434, § 15, effective July 15, 1982.

85.170. Contagious diseases — Quarantine — Paupers — City physician [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3290, 3290-3, 3448) was repealed by Acts 1982, ch. 434, § 15, effective July 15, 1982.

85.180. Nuisances — Firearms — Animals. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3290, 3290-14, 3290-16, 3290-23, 3290-28: amend. Acts 1974, ch. 406, § 304) was repealed by Acts 1982, ch. 434, § 15, effective July 15, 1982.

85.190. Fire protection and prevention — Unsafe buildings and structures. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3290, 3290-14, 3290-16, 3290-23, 3290-28: amend. Acts 1974, ch. 406, § 304) was repealed by Acts 1982, ch. 434, § 15, effective July 15, 1982.

85.200. Suppression of vice. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3290, 3290-13, 3290-22) was repealed by Acts 1982, ch. 434, § 15, effective July 15, 1982.

85.210. Release of indebtedness or liability to city. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3277) was repealed by Acts 1982, ch. 434, § 15, effective July 15, 1982.

85.220. Licenses issued by common council, when to expire. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3241: amend. Acts 1962, ch. 232, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1982, ch. 434, § 15, effective July 15, 1982.

85.230. Mayor — Election — Term — Qualifications. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3291 to 3293, 3308: amend. Acts 1950, ch. 123, § 29; 1956, ch. 174; 1962, ch. 24, § 2; 1964, ch. 70, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170 .

85.240. Mayor pro tem. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3309, 3310) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170 .

85.250. Duties and powers of mayor. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3243, 3296, 3297, 3299, 3300, 3302, 3303, 3305 to 3307) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170 .

85.260. City clerk — Appointment — Qualifications — Deputy. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3315, 3316, 3322) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170 .

85.270. Duties and powers of city clerk and deputy. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3317 to 3321) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170 .

85.280. Additional city officers — Appointment, duties and powers — Qualifications. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3282: amend. Acts 1976, ch. 356, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170 .

85.290. Bonds of city officers, agents and employes. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3251, 3252) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170 .

85.300. Failure of city officer to qualify — Disqualification after election. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3245, 3250, 3268) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170 .

85.310. Vacancies in city offices, how filled. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3285) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170 .

85.320. Compensation of temporary appointees. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3244) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170 .

85.330. Removal of city officers, agents, employes — Impeachment. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3249, 3254: amend. Acts 1960, ch. 41, § 1, effective June 16, 1960) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170 .

85.335. Removal of members of police and fire departments. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1960, ch. 41, § 2, effective June 16, 1960) was repealed by Acts 1982, ch. 434, § 15, effective July 15, 1982.

85.340. Records of city to be public records — Use in evidence. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3255, 3320) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980.

85.350. City contracts and obligations, how signed, sealed and attested. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3242) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980.

CHAPTER 86 Organization and Government of Cities of the Fourth Class

86.010. Incorporation and general powers. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3481: amend. Acts 1962, ch. 17, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 82.081 , 82.082 .

86.020. Separation of powers. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3482: amend. Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 82, effective January 2, 1978) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170 .

86.030. Legislative branch — City council. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3484: amend. Acts 1976, ch. 356, § 5) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170 .

86.040. Wards, how established and altered. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3485, 3490-33) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170 .

86.050. Members of city council — Terms — Qualifications. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3484, 3485, 3550: amend. Acts 1946, ch. 8; 1954, ch. 87, § 1; 1958, ch. 41, § 4) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170 .

86.053. Compensation of councilmen. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1968, ch. 28, § 1; 1974, ch. 39, § 3) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170 .

86.060. Chairman and clerk of city council — Eligibility, discipline and expulsion of members. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3486, 3487: amend. Acts 1952, ch. 122; 1976, ch. 356, § 2) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170 .

86.070. Quorum and meetings of city council. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3486, 3502) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170 .

86.080. Journal of proceedings of city council. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3487, 3503) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170 .

86.090. Ordinances, how passed — Veto — Publication. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3487, 3489, 3503: amend. Acts 1966, ch. 239, § 48) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170 .

86.100. Journal to be public record — Effect of copy of ordinance. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3488) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170 .

86.110. General powers of city council. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3490, 3490-1, 3490-4, 3490-5, 3490-11, 3490-22, 3490-24, 3490-28, 3490-29, 3490-33: amend. Acts 1976, ch. 140, § 31) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

86.120. Trades, occupations and professions — Amusements — Vehicles. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3490, 3490-12 to 3490-15) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

86.130. Weights and measures — Inspection of commodities — Sale of food. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3490, 3490-18, 3490-19, 3490-21) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

86.140. Protection of public health — Hospitals. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3490-6) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

86.150. Nuisances — Stock at large. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3490, 3490-7, 3490-20, 3490-31) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

86.160. Fire protection and prevention — Building inspection. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3490, 3490-16, 3490-17: amend. Acts 1978, ch. 164, § 14, effective June 17, 1978) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

86.170. Suppression of vice. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3490, 3490-14) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

86.180. Mayor — Election — Term — Qualifications. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3484, 3553: amend. Acts 1950, ch. 123, § 29) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

86.190. Mayor pro tem. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3486) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

86.200. Duties and powers of mayor. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3499, 3501, 3502) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

86.210. Fines and imprisonment, how remitted and suspended. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3500) was repealed by Acts 1976 (1st Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 491, effective January 2, 1978.

86.220. Election of city officers. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3485: amend. Acts 1958, ch. 168, effective June 19, 1958) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

86.225. Time of filing for city office. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1960, ch. 29) was repealed by Acts 1968, ch. 134.

86.230. City officers, when to take office. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3550: amend. Acts 1954, ch. 87, § 2, effective June 17, 1954) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170 .

86.240. Vacancies in city offices. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3551, 3552) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170 .

86.250. City officers not to deal in claims against city. [Renumbered.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3557) was renumbered as KRS 82.092 by the Reviser under authority of KRS 7.136 .

86.990. Penalties. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3557) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980.

CHAPTER 87 Organization and Government of Cities of the Fifth Class

87.010. Incorporation and general powers. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3615) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 82.081 , 82.082 .

87.020. Government vested in officers of the city. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3616: amend. Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 83, effective January 2, 1978) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170 .

87.030. City council meetings, when and where held -- Quorum -- Mayor to preside. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3617, 3633, 3634, 3648: amend. Acts 1968, ch. 97) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170 .

87.040. Council to judge qualifications and election of members — Rules — Proceedings. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3635) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170 .

87.050. Ordinances and resolutions — How passed — Publication — Testing validity. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3636, 3638, 3638a, 3639: amend. Acts 1966, ch. 239, § 49) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170 .

87.060. Penalties for violation of ordinances — Prosecution. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3637-5, 3642) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.130 .

87.070. General powers of city council. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3630, 3637-1, 3637-7) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.130 .

87.080. Power to acquire and dispose of property — Restrictions as to disposition of water front. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3637-1) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.130 ..

87.090. Power to condemn property. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3653: amend. Acts 1976, ch. 140, § 32) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.130 .

87.100. Real estate dedicated for streets may be used for public buildings. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3637-8) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.130 .

87.110. Council shall regulate city cemeteries. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3637-9) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.130 .

87.120. Power to regulate animals running at large. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3637-10) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.130 .

87.130. Mayor — Powers and duties. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3617, 3648) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170 .

87.140. Mayor pro tem — Powers. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3648) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170 .

87.150. City clerk — Duties — Financial statements. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3627) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170 .

87.160. Qualifications of city officers. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3625) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170 .

87.170. Election and appointment of city officers — Term. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3618: amend. Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 84, effective January 2, 1978) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170 .

87.175. Consolidation of offices of clerk and treasurer — Term — Removal -- Compensation Bond. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 237) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170 .

87.180. Conduct of city elections — Qualifications of voters — Expenses — Contests. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3624, 3658, 3659) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170 .

87.190. Bonds of clerk and treasurer. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3621) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170 .

87.200. Compensation of city officers. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3623: amend. Acts 1946, ch. 66) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170 .

87.210. Vacancies in city offices — How filled. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3622: amend. Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 85, effective January 1, 1978) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170 .

87.220. Publications — How made. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3638a) was repealed by Acts 1944, ch. 155, § 2.

CHAPTER 88 Organization and Government of Cities of the Sixth Class

88.010. Incorporation and general powers. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3660) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 82.081 , 82.082 .

88.020. Dissolution of charter — Proceedings — Certification of judgment to secretary of state. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3662a-1 to 3662a-3: amend. Acts 1942, ch. 132, §§ 1, 2; 1952, ch. 84, § 60; 1966, ch. 239, § 50; 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 86, effective January 2, 1978) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 116, § 6, effective July 15, 1980.

88.030. Government vested in officers of the city. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3680: amend. Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 87, effective January 2, 1978) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170 .

88.040. Board of trustees — Chairman — Meeting place — Quorum. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3696, 3697, 3708: amend. Acts 1962, ch. 231) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170 .

88.050. Board to judge qualifications and election of members — Rules — Journal. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3698) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170 .

88.060. Ordinances and resolutions — How passed — Style — Publication. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3699, 3700: amend. Acts 1966, ch. 239, § 51) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170 .

88.070. Violation of ordinances. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3702, 3704, 3704-5: amend. Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 88, effective January 2, 1978) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170 .

88.080. General powers of board of trustees. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3704, 3704-1, 3704-7) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170 .

88.090. Power to acquire, control and dispose of property. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3704-1) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170 .

88.100. Power to condemn property. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3668: amend. Acts 1976, ch. 140, § 33) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170 .

88.110. Power to use real estate dedicated for streets for public buildings. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3704-8) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170 .

88.120. City cemetery controlled by board of trustees — Endowment funds. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3704-9, 3704-9a) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170 .

88.130. Board may prohibit stock running at large. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3704-11) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170 .

88.140. Chairman of board — Powers and duties. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3708) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170 .

88.150. Chairman pro tem. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3697, 3708) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170 .

88.160. Duties of city clerk. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3684) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170 .

88.170. Qualifications of city officers. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3671: amend. Acts 1972, ch. 260, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170 .

88.180. Election and appointment of city officers — Term. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3681, 3682, 3685: amend. Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 89, effective January 2, 1978), was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

This section was amended in Acts 1980, ch. 188, § 74 and repealed in Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20. The repeal prevails as it was the later enactment.

88.190. Conduct of city elections — Qualifications of voters — Expenses — Contests. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3669, 3670) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170 .

88.200. Elections when city lies in several counties. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3670a) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170 .

88.210. Bonds of clerk and treasurer. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3688) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170 .

88.220. Compensation of clerk, treasurer, assessor and marshal. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3693) was repealed by Acts 1950, ch. 123, § 29. For present law see KRS 64.056 .

88.230. Vacancies in city offices — How filled. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3692: amend. Acts 1978, ch. 384, § 209, effective June 17, 1978) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980.

CHAPTER 89 Commission and City Manager Forms of Government [Repealed]

89.010. Cities of second to sixth class may adopt commission form of government. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2741f-1, 3235c-1, 3235c-2, 3480b-1, 3606b-1) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170 .

89.020. Existing laws and ordinances remain in force. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2741f-1, 3235c-2, 3480b-2, 3606b-2) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170 .

89.030. Election on question of adopting commission form of government. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3235c-3, 3235c-4, 3480b-3, 3606b-3, 3606b-10, 3606b-11: amend. Acts 1966, ch. 239, § 52; 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 90, effective January 2, 1978; 1978, ch. 384, § 210, effective June 17, 1978) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170 .

89.040. Existing offices abolished. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3235c-4, 3480b-4, 3606b-4: amend. Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 91, effective January 2, 1978) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170 .

89.050. Election and term of commissioners and mayor. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3235c-3, 3235c-5, 3235c-8, 3235c-10, 3480b-3, 3480b-5, 3480b-11, 3606b-3, 3606b-4, 3606b-5, 3606b-8, 3606b-10, 3606b-11: amend. Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 92, effective January 2, 1978) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170 .

89.060. Primary election in fourth-class city — How vacancies filled. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3235c-6, 3235c-26, 3606b-6, 3606b-26: amend. Acts 1946, ch. 242, § 29; 1946, ch. 55; 1948, ch. 81, § 1; 1966, ch. 239, § 53; 1972, ch. 188, § 44; 1976, ch. 247, § 1; 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 93, effective January 2, 1978) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170 .

89.070. Regular election in fourth-class city. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3235c-7, 3606b-7: amend. Acts 1948, ch. 81, § 2; 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 94, effective January 2, 1978) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170 .

89.080. Manner of holding elections in second-class city. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3235c-7, 3235d-1) was repealed by Acts 1948, ch. 81, § 3.)

89.090. Primary and regular elections in second and third-class cities. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3480b-10a: amend. Acts 1948, ch. 81, § 4; 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 95, effective January 2, 1978) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170

89.100. Qualifications of officers in second or fourth-class city. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3235c-9, 3606b-9) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170

89.110. Salaries of mayor and commissioners. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3235c-10, 3480b-11, 3606b-10, 3606b-11: amend. Acts 1948, ch. 43; 1974, ch. 39, § 4; 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 96, effective January 2, 1978) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170

89.120. Bonds of mayor and commissioners. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3235c-27, 3480b-27, 3606b-27) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170

89.130. Primary and regular elections in second and third-class cities. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3235c-12, 3480b-12, 3606b-12) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170

89.140. Mayor pro tem — Vacancies. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3235c-13, 3235c-21, 3480b-13, 3480b-21, 3606b-13, 3606b-21) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170

89.150. Removal of mayor or commissioner. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3235c-22, 3480b-22, 3606b-22) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170

89.160. Quorum — Voting — Method of passing measures. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3235c-13, 3480b-13, 3606b-13) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170

89.170. Meetings of board of commissioners. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3235c-15, 3480b-15, 3606b-15) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170

89.180. Administrative departments of city. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3235c-16, 3480b-16, 3606b-16) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170

89.190. Control of administrative departments by board. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3235c-17, 3480b-17, 3606b-17) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170

89.090 (3480b-10a: amend. Acts 1948, ch. 81, § 4; 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 95, effective January 2, 1978.)

89.200. Heads of city departments. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3235c-18, 3480b-18, 3606b-18) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170

89.205. Removal of member of board or commission in city of second class. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1950, ch. 184) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170

89.210. Commissioners to keep offices at city building. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3235c-11, 3480b-11, 3606b-11) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170

89.220. City employes. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3235c-19, 3480b-19, 3606b-19) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170

89.230. Ordinances relating to public works and franchises to remain on file — Effective date [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3235c-14, 3480b-14, 3606b-14) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170

89.240. Referendum. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3235c-23, 3480b-23, 3606b-23) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170

89.250. Initiative. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3235c-24, 3480b-24, 3606b-24) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170

89.260. Publication of ordinances before submission to voters. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3235c-25, 3480b-25, 3606b-25: amend. Acts 1966, ch. 239, § 54) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170

89.270. Annual audit of books and accounts. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3235c-20, 3480b-20, 3606b-20: amend. Acts 1944, ch. 155, § 2) was repealed by Acts 1948, ch. 26, § 2.

89.280. Board of education not affected by commission form of government — Exception. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3235c-28, 3480b-28, 3606b-28) was repealed by Acts 1978, ch. 33, § 1, effective June 17, 1978.

89.290. Termination of commission form of government. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3235c-29, 3480b-29, 3606b-29: amend. Acts 1966, ch. 239, § 55; 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 20, § 6, effective January 2, 1978; 1978, ch. 384, § 211, effective June 17, 1978) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170 .

89.300. Election on question of adopting commission form of government in city of fifth or sixth class. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 56, § 3; 1966, ch. 239, § 56; 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 20, § 6, effective January 2, 1978; 1978, ch. 384, § 212, effective June 17, 1978) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170 .

89.310. Offices abolished. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 56, § 4; 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 97, effective January 2, 1978) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170 .

89.320. Election of commissioners. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 56, § 5) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170 .

89.330. Term of office — Salary — Mayor — Mayor pro tem. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 56, § 3; 1966, ch. 239, § 56; 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 20, § 6, effective January 2, 1978; 1978, ch. 384, § 212, effective June 17, 1978) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170 .

89.340. Board of commissioners — Members, powers, quorum. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 56, § 7) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170 .

89.350. Qualifications of commissioners — Bond. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 56, § 8) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170 .

89.360. Meetings of board of commissioners. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 56, § 9) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170 .

89.370. Employes — Appointment, duties, compensation — Merit system to be used. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 56, § 10) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170 .

89.380. Termination of commission form of government. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 56, § 10) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170 .

89.390. Cities of first, second, third, or fourth class may adopt city manager form of government. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3235dd-16, 3480c-17, 3606c: amend. Acts 1970, ch. 285, § 1; 1972, ch. 243, § 29) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170 .

89.400. Existing laws and ordinances remain in force. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3235dd-17, 3480c-18, 3606c-1: amend. Acts 1970, ch. 285, § 2) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170 .

89.410. Election on question of adopting city manager form of government. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3235dd-18, 3480c-19, 3606c-2: amend. Acts 1966, ch. 239, § 57; 1970, ch. 285, § 3; 1972 ch. 243, § 30; 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 20, § 6, effective January 2, 1978; 1978, ch. 384, § 213, effective June 17, 1978) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170 .

89.415. Special provisions for first-class city reclassified from second class. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1970, ch. 285, §§ 16 to 19) was repealed by Acts 1972, ch. 243, § 35.

89.420. Existing offices abolished. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3235dd-19, 3480c-20, 3606c-3: amend. Acts 1970, ch. 285, § 4; 1972, ch. 243, § 31; 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 98, effective January 2, 1978) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170 .

89.430. Election and term of commissioners and mayor. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3235dd-20, 3235dd-25, 3235dd-27, 3235dd-28, 3480c-21, 3480c-26, 3480c-28, 3480c-29, 3606c-4, 3606c-9, 3606c-11 to 3606c-13: amend. Acts 1958, ch. 144; 1970, ch. 285, § 5; 1972, ch. 243, § 32; 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 99, effective January 2, 1978) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170 .

89.440. Primary election — How vacancies filled. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3235dd-21, 3235dd-22, 3480c-22, 3480c-23, 3606c-5, 3506c-6: amend Acts 1946, ch. 242, § 30; 1966, ch. 255, § 95; 1968, ch. 152, § 60; 1970, ch. 285, § 6; 1972, ch. 188, § 45; 1976, ch. 247, § 2; 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 100, effective January 2, 1978) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

This section was amended in Acts 1980, ch. 100, § 1 and repealed in Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20. The repeal prevails as it was the later enactment.

89.450. Regular election. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3235dd-23, 3480c-24, 3606c-7: amend. Acts 1966, ch. 255, § 96; 1970, ch. 285, § 7; 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 101, effective January 2, 1978) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

This section was amended in Acts 1980, ch. 100, § 2 and repealed in Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20. The repeal prevails as it was in the later enactment.

89.460. Manner holding elections. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3235dd-24, 2480c-25, 3606c-8: amend. Acts 1954, ch. 114, § 1; 1962, ch. 88, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170 .

89.470. Qualifications of officers. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3235dd-26, 3480c-27, 3606c-10) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170 .

89.480. Salary of mayor and commissioners. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3235dd-27, 3235dd-28, 3480c-28, 3480c-29, 3606c-11, 3606c-12: amend. Acts 1950, ch. 123, § 29; 1952, ch. 143; 1966, ch. 135, § 1; 1970, ch. 285, § 8; 1972, ch. 243, § 33; 1974, ch. 39, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170 .

89.490. Bonds of mayor, commissioners and employes. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3235dd-40, 3480c-41, 3606c-25: amend. Acts 1956, ch. 246, § 1; 1970, ch. 285, § 9) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170 .

89.500. Board of commissioners. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3235dd-29, 3480c-30, 3606c-14) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170 .

89.510. Duties of mayor. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3235dd-31, 3480c-32, 3606c-16: amend. Acts 1956, ch. 246, § 2, effective May 18, 1956) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170 .

89.520. Mayor pro tem — Vacancies in city offices. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3235dd-30, 3235dd-44, 3480c-31, 3480c-45, 3606c-15, 3606c-29: amend. Acts 1946, ch. 117, § 1; 1970, ch. 285, § 10) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170 .

89.530. Removal of mayor or commissioner. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3235dd-45, 3480c-46, 3606c-30) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170 .

89.540. Quorum — Voting — Method of passing measures. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3235dd-30, 3480c-31, 3606c-15) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170 .

89.545. Publication of ordinances in cities of first or second class. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1948, ch. 145; 1966, ch. 239, § 58; 1970, ch. 285, § 11) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170 .

89.550. Meetings of board of commissioners. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1948, ch. 145; 1966, ch. 239, § 58; 1970, ch. 285, § 11) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170 .

89.560. City manager — Appointment — Qualifications — Term — Compensation — Removal. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3235dd-32, 3235dd-33, 3480c-33, 3480c-34, 3606c-17, 3606c-18: amend. Acts 1948, ch. 200, § 1; 1956, ch. 246, § 3; 1970, ch. 285, § 12) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

This section was amended in Acts 1980, ch. 188, § 75 and repealed in Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20. The repeal prevails as it was the later enactment.

89.565. Acting city manager in cities of first or second class. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1948, ch. 146; 1970, ch. 285, § 13) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170 .

89.570. Duties of city manager — Recommend the appointment of employes — Board of equalization to be appointed by the board of commissioners — Attendance of board and committee meetings. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3235dd-32, 3235dd-34, 3480c-33, 3480c-35, 3606c-17, 3606c-19: amend. Acts 1942, ch. 75, § 2; 1956, ch. 246, § 4, effective May 18, 1956) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170 .

89.580. Administrative departments of city — Personnel. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3235dd-35, 3235dd-35a, 3480c-36, 3606c-20: amend. Acts 1956, ch. 246, § 5, effective May 18, 1956; 1978, ch. 164, § 15, effective June 17, 1978) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170 .

89.590. Ordinances relating to public works and franchises to remain on file — Effective date — Letting of contracts in city of first or second class. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3235dd-42, 3480c-43, 3606c-27: amend. Acts 1942, ch. 76, §§ 1, 2; 1948, ch. 147; 1966, ch. 239, § 59; 1970, ch. 285, § 14; 1972, ch. 147, § 2) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170 .

89.600. Referendum. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3235dd-46, 3480c-47, 3606c-31) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170 .

89.610. Initiative. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3235dd-47, 3480c-48, 3606c-32: amend. Acts 1968, ch. 196) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170 .

89.620. Publication of ordinances before submission to voters. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3235dd-48, 3480c-49, 3606c-33: amend. Acts 1966, ch. 239, § 60) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170 .

89.630. Annual budget. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3235dd-37, 3480c-38, 3606c-22: amend. Acts 1956, ch. 246, § 6, effective May 18, 1956) was repealed by both Acts 1980, ch. 232, § 7, effective July 15, 1980 and Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980.

89.640. Annual appropriation ordinance. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3235dd-38, 3480c-39, 3606c-23: amend. Acts 1956, ch. 246, § 7, effective May 18, 1956) was repealed by both Acts 1980, ch. 232, § 7, effective July 15, 1980 and Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980.

89.650. Audit of accounts of city officers. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3235dd-39, 3480c-40, 3606c-24) was repealed by Acts 1948, ch. 26, § 2.

89.660. Investigations of city affairs. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3235dd-36, 3480c-37, 3606c-21: amend. Acts 1956, ch. 246, § 8, effective May 18, 1956) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980.

89.670. Board of education not affected by city manager form of government. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3235dd-41, 3480c-42, 3606c-26) was repealed by Acts 1982, ch. 434, § 15, effective July 15, 1982.

89.680. Termination of city manager form of government. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3235dd-49, 3480c-50, 3606c-34: amend. Acts 1966, ch. 239, § 61; 1970, ch. 285, § 15; 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 20, § 6, effective January 2, 1978; 1978, ch. 384, § 214, effective June 17, 1978) was repealed by Acts 1982, ch. 434, § 15, effective July 15, 1982.

89.690. Adjustment of compensation of mayor and commissioners. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 39, § 5) was repealed by Acts 1982, ch. 434, § 15, effective July 15, 1982.

89.980. Election offenses. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1950, ch. 150) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

This section was amended in Acts 1980, ch. 188, § 76 and repealed in Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20. The repeal prevails as it was in the later enactment.

89.990. Penalties. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3235d-1, 3235dd-24, 3235dd-32, 3480c-25, 3480c-33, 3606c-8, 3606c-17: amend. Acts 1958, ch. 126, § 5; 1966, ch. 255, § 97) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980.

CHAPTER 90 City Civil Service

Cities of the First Class

90.010. Definitions. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2863-1) was repealed by Acts 1942, ch. 16, § 15.

90.020. Personnel commission. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2863-2) was repealed by Acts 1942, ch. 16, § 15.

90.030. Personnel director. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2863-3) was repealed by Acts 1942, ch. 16, § 15.

90.040. Employes to which law applies — Rules for classification, examination and selection of employes. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2863-4) was repealed by Acts 1942, ch. 16, § 15.

90.050. Appointments. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2863-1, 2863-4, 2863-5) was repealed by Acts 1942, ch. 16, § 15.

90.060. Dismissals and demotion. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2863-6) was repealed by Acts 1942, ch. 16, § 15.

90.070. Other functions of commission — Reports. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2863-7) was repealed by Acts 1942, ch. 16, § 15.

90.080. Extension to other positions. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2863-8) was repealed by Acts 1942, ch. 16, § 15.

90.090. Prohibition of political activity. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2863-9) was repealed by Acts 1942, ch. 16, § 15.

90.100. Appropriations. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2863-11) was repealed by Acts 1942, ch. 16, § 15.

90.110. Definitions for KRS 90.110 to 90.230.

The following terms, as used in KRS 90.110 to 90.230 , shall have the following meanings, unless the context clearly requires otherwise:

  1. “Emergency appointment” means any appointment to any position subject to the provisions of KRS 90.110 to 90.230 , which may be made only in the absence of an appropriate eligible list for the position and which may be made without competitive examination pending the establishment of an eligible list and which appointment shall not exceed the duration of the emergency and in no case to exceed ninety (90) days in any one (1) fiscal year.
  2. “Probationary appointment” means an appointment to any position subject to the provisions of KRS 90.110 to 90.230 , which shall be made in accordance with the provisions of KRS 90.180 and which shall not be less than six (6) months nor more than one (1) year in duration.
  3. “Regular appointment” means an appointment to a position subject to the provisions of KRS 90.110 to 90.230 made after an employee has served a probationary period in a manner deemed satisfactory to the appointing authority.
  4. “Director” means the personnel director, as provided for in KRS 90.140 .
  5. “Position” means every place of employment in the classified service hereunder including office.
  6. “Employee” means any person in the classified service hereunder.
  7. “Classified service” means all positions in cities of the first class within the jurisdiction of the board, and within the purview of KRS 90.110 to 90.230 .
  8. “Board” means the civil service board created hereunder.
  9. “Appointing authority” means the officer, board, commission, department, agency, person or group of persons, having the power of appointment to and removal from positions in the classified service as provided for in KRS 90.110 to 90.230 .
  10. “Competitive examination” shall include consideration and rating of any or all of the following qualifications of applicants: Education, training, experience, general adaptability, special aptitude, physical fitness, knowledge, skill, personality, character, and such other qualifications as may be deemed necessary for the satisfactory performance of the duties of the respective positions.
  11. “Eligible list” means a list of names of persons who have been found qualified through suitable competitive examinations for positions or classes of positions as provided for in KRS 90.110 to 90.230 .
  12. “Service ratings” means the evaluation of the efficiency and general worth of employees in positions subject to the provisions of KRS 90.110 to 90.230 as determined by the appointing authority.
  13. “Dismissal” means the discharge of an employee by the appointing authority.
  14. “Lay-off” means the separation of an employee from the classified service because of a reduction of force owing to decreased work or decreased funds in the department, commission, board or agency in which the employee has been employed.
  15. “Class” or “class of positions” means a position or group of positions subject to the provisions of KRS 90.110 to 90.230 sufficiently similar in duties, responsibilities and qualification requirements to be designated by the same title and placed within the same salary range.
  16. “Reinstatement” means the reappointment of a person who formerly held a position, subject to the provisions of KRS 90.110 to 90.230 , to such former position or to any other position in the same class.
  17. “Transfer” means a change by an employee from one (1) position to another position within the same class.
  18. “Promotion” means a change from a position in a lower class to a position in a higher class involving an increase in responsibility or a change in title.
  19. “Demotion” means a change from a position in a higher class to a position in a lower class involving a decrease in responsibility or a change in title.
  20. “Suspension” means the separation of an employee from the service for a temporary or fixed period of time, which separation is inflicted upon the employee by his appointing authority, as a disciplinary measure under the rules established by the board.
  21. “Public hearing” means such as may be given after public notice of at least five (5) days, so that any person or persons may have an opportunity to appear before the board and be heard on the matter involved.

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 16, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Demotion.

The definition of the term “demotion” contained in subdivision (19) of this section is applicable in interpreting the term “reduced in grade” referred to in KRS 90.360(1). Paducah v. Moore, 662 S.W.2d 491, 1984 Ky. App. LEXIS 435 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984).

2. Legislative Intent.

This section through 90.230 demonstrate that the legislature intended to establish an independent civilian civil service board which could review actions taken by the department heads of the City of Louisville and determine the justification for such actions. Louisville by Kuster v. Milligan, 798 S.W.2d 454, 1990 Ky. LEXIS 114 ( Ky. 1990 ).

Cited:

Henderson v. Thomy, 307 Ky. 783 , 212 S.W.2d 303, 1948 Ky. LEXIS 831 ( Ky. 1948 ); Middlesboro v. Harrell, 268 S.W.2d 430, 1954 Ky. LEXIS 911 ( Ky. 1954 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Neither subsection (2) of KRS 90.180 nor KRS 90.210 provide any statutory authorization for persons presently employed by the local board of health, who were formerly employed by the State Department for Human Resources, and who are now under a city civil service system (KRS 90.110 to 90.230 ), to be granted, for purposes of seniority and the accumulation of benefits under the city’s plan, employment dates corresponding to the dates on which they began their state employment. OAG 81-382 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Civil service for police and firemen, KRS Chapter 95.

Disability, hospitalization or retirement plans for city employees, cities may establish, KRS 79.080 .

Merit system for county and city employees may be set up under city-county compact, KRS 79.010 to 79.070 .

Military leave, annual, KRS 61.396 .

90.120. Civil service board — Membership — Appointment — Term — Vacancies — Ineligibility for other office — Removals.

  1. There is created and established in cities of the first class a civil service board to be known as  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Civil Service Board. The board consists of seven (7) members of whom six (6) shall be appointed by the mayor and the mayor is the seventh member ex officio. The mayor, as ex officio member, shall not have the right to vote except when necessary to break a tie. The appointive members shall be selected equally from the two (2) political parties casting the highest and the next highest number of votes at the last preceding general election. All members shall be appointed for a four (4) year term. Vacancies created by death, resignation and otherwise shall be filled for the unexpired portion of the term only. Any member of the board appointed according to the provisions of this section shall be eligible for reappointment unless his reappointment would offend the equal political division of said board.
  2. No member of the board shall be eligible for any appointive office of the city while a member of the board, or for one (1) year thereafter. If a member of the board becomes a candidate for an elective office, he thereby vacates his position as a member of the board.
  3. Any member of the board may be removed by the mayor, for cause, after hearing by the mayor, and after at least ten (10) days’ notice in writing has been given to the member, which notice shall contain a copy of charges preferred against him. At the hearing he may be represented by counsel. The finding of the mayor shall be final and removal results in vacancy in such office.

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 16, § 2; 1946, ch. 110, § 1; 1968, ch. 152, § 61; 1974, ch. 230, § 1.

90.130. Compensation of board members — Meetings — Minutes — Officers — Employees.

  1. Each member of the board may be paid a salary not to exceed a per diem allowance to be fixed from time to time by ordinance of the board of aldermen, for each meeting attended, provided, however, that the annual allowance of any one (1) member of the board shall not exceed the maximum sum fixed by the ordinance of the board of aldermen in any one (1) fiscal year, and in addition thereto members shall be reimbursed for necessary travel and other expenses incurred in connection with their duties as members.
  2. The board shall hold at least one (1) regular meeting in each month and shall hold such additional meetings as may be necessary.
  3. The board shall keep full and complete minutes of its proceedings, which minutes shall, subject to reasonable regulations, be open to public inspection.
  4. The board shall elect a chairman and a vice chairman from its members, and the personnel director shall be the secretary-treasurer thereof.
  5. The board is authorized and empowered to employ such persons as may be necessary and proper for the efficient conduct of its activities hereunder. The board may fix the compensation to be paid such employees, in accordance with the schedule of salaries established, or that may be established, by ordinance.

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 16, § 2; 1972, ch. 343, § 1.

90.140. Personnel director — Appointment — Qualifications — Removal — Duties — Employment of chief examiner — Certification of payroll changes.

  1. The board shall employ a personnel director who shall be the administrative officer of the board. The personnel director shall be, at the time of appointment, a person familiar, and in sympathy, with the principles, and experienced in the methods and technique, of personnel administration on the merit basis and a person of recognized character and ability.
  2. Beginning January 1, 1973, the personnel director shall be appointed for a term of one (1) year and shall serve thereafter on a year to year basis unless notified in writing thirty (30) days before the year expires that he will not be reappointed; provided however that the personnel director may be removed at any time only for cause and after public hearing by the board and after at least ten (10) days’ notice shall have been given to the said director, which notice shall contain a copy of the charges preferred against him, and the decision of the board thereon shall be final. At such hearing the personnel director may be represented by counsel.
  3. The personnel director shall be the secretary-treasurer of the board and shall attend all the meetings thereof; shall set up and direct the actual work of the board; supervise and direct the work of the employees thereof; make such investigations as may be deemed desirable and report thereon to the board. The personnel director shall submit to the board not later than the first day of November of each year an annual report on the operations of the board for the preceding fiscal year, and shall discharge all such other duties as the board may require.
  4. The board shall employ a chief examiner who shall be professionally qualified and experienced in the art of testing, and who shall formulate, give, grade, and retain control of, all written tests as required by the board, and said chief examiner shall report to the board the results of all tests given and he shall be solely responsible to the board. The job of personnel director may not be combined with the job of chief examiner. The chief examiner shall be responsible only to the civil service board and shall perform such other duties as the board may require.
  5. The director of finance of the city shall immediately certify to the personnel director the name of any person in the classified service added to or removed from the payroll.

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 16, § 3; 1972, ch. 73, § 1; 1984, ch. 280, § 1, effective July 13, 1984.

90.150. Offices, positions, and places of employment included in classified service.

  1. The classified service covered by KRS 90.110 to 90.230 , and hereby placed under the jurisdiction of the board, includes all offices, positions, and places of employment, except as herein provided, in the following departments and agencies in the service of the city, to wit: the department of public safety, the department of public health, the department of public welfare, and the civil service board. If any of such offices, positions or places of employment are transferred to or combined or consolidated with any other department or agency of or serving the city, the offices, positions or places of employment shall continue to be covered by KRS 90.110 to 90.230 . The classified service also includes all other offices and positions and places of employment in other departments or agencies of the city or serving the city to which the classified service may be hereafter extended pursuant to the provisions of KRS 90.210 , or any other law.
  2. The following offices, positions, and places of employment, in the departments and agencies hereinabove specifically named, are excluded from the classified service, to wit:
    1. The director of safety and the following positions in that department, to wit: the director of safety’s staff, including, but not limited to assistants and his private secretary, the chief of police and his private secretary, assistant chief of police, chief of detectives, chaplain for the police department, chief of firefighters and his private secretary, assistant chief of firefighters, chaplain for the fire department; superintendent and animal catchers, and caretakers, in the division of city pound; supervising inspector of weights and measures, and inspector of weights and measures, and deputy inspector, in the division of weights and measures.
    2. The director of health and the following positions in that department, to wit: private secretary, kitchen helpers, cleaners, waitresses, housemaids, janitresses, laundresses, hospital resident medical staff, university visiting staff, student nurses, bona fide university students.
    3. The director of welfare and the following positions in that department, to wit: private secretary, janitors, cleaners, laundresses, night watchman, truck drivers, kitchen helpers, janitresses, park laborers, bona fide university students.
    4. Members of the civil service board and the personnel director.
  3. The offices, positions, and places of employment excluded by paragraphs (a), (b), (c) and (d) of subsection (2) from the classified service may be placed in the classified service, in accordance with the provisions of KRS 90.210 , except that the offices or positions of director of safety including his staff, chief of police and his private secretary, assistant chief of police, chief of detectives, chaplain for the police department, chief of firefighters and his private secretary, assistant chief of firefighters, chaplain for the fire department, director of health, director of welfare, and members of the civil service board shall not be placed in the classified service.
  4. Any classified employee in the department of safety, who accepts an appointment and qualifies as chief of police or his private secretary, assistant chief of police, chief of detectives, chaplain for the police department, chief of firefighters or his private secretary, assistant chief of firefighters, or chaplain for the fire department, shall be deemed to have received a leave of absence from the classified service for and during the incumbency of any of those respective positions. If an individual should cease to serve in any of those positions, there shall be restored to him the same classification and rank which he held prior to his appointment.

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 16, § 6; 1946, ch. 110, § 2; 1968, ch. 152, § 62; 1974, ch. 238, § 1; 1978, ch. 164, § 16, effective June 17, 1978; 1980, ch. 350, § 1, effective July 15, 1980.

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Personnel of city-county board of health included in classified service, KRS 212.430 .

Personnel of department of public parks and recreation included in classified service, KRS 97.250 , 97.253 .

90.160. Rules and regulations governing classification, tests, eligible lists, probation, reinstatement, promotion — Other rules.

  1. The board shall, after public notice and hearing, make, promulgate, and if and when necessary, amend, rules and regulations for the appointment, transfer, laying-off, reinstatement, deductions from pay, leave of absence, promotion, demotion, dismissal, and suspension, of all employees of the city in the classified service within the purview of KRS 90.110 to 90.230 , including those who may hereafter be placed in the classified service pursuant hereto, and for the classification of such employees for appointment, promotion and transfer, and shall report its proceedings and rules to the mayor, legislative body, the director of public welfare, the director of public health, and the director of safety of the city. Such rules shall, among other things, provide:
    1. For the standardization and classification of all offices, positions and employment in the classified service and the classification thereof into groups and subdivisions to be based upon and created according to the respective duties and responsibilities thereof, and shall be so arranged as to promote the filling of the higher grade as far as practicable by promotion.
    2. For open competitive tests to ascertain the relative fitness of all applicants for appointment to said offices, positions and places of employment in the classified service within the purview of KRS 90.110 to 90.230 , including those which may hereafter be placed in the classified service pursuant hereto, and such tests shall be practicable and relate to matters which will fairly measure the relative fitness of candidates to discharge the duties of the positions or offices or places of employments to which they seek appointment. Notice of such tests shall be given by publication pursuant to KRS Chapter 424 and by posting notices in the city hall.
    3. For the creation of eligible lists upon which shall be entered the names of successful candidates in the order of their standing through examination; and for the filling of places in the classified service by the appointing authorities who shall select from not more than three (3) candidates graded highest on the appropriate eligible list.
    4. For a period of probation not exceeding twelve (12) months nor less than six (6) months, before an appointment or employment is made a regular appointment.
    5. For reinstatement on the eligible list of persons who, without default or delinquency, are separated from the service.
    6. For promotion from the lower grades to the higher based on records of efficiency and seniority to be furnished by the appointing authority and kept by the board, or upon competitive promotion tests, or both.
  2. The enumeration of the foregoing subject matter of rules and regulations is not exclusive, and the board may make and promulgate such other reasonable rules and regulations as are necessary or desirable to the enforcement of and not inconsistent with KRS 90.110 to 90.230 .

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 16, § 4; 1966, ch. 239, § 62.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Double Jeopardy.

Since double jeopardy is limited in its application to criminal prosecutions, there is no double jeopardy involved when disciplinary action is taken by a city under this section for conduct which is also prosecuted in the courts as a violation of the state criminal law. Louisville Civil Service Bd. v. Blair, 711 S.W.2d 181, 1986 Ky. LEXIS 267 ( Ky. 1986 ).

2. Eligibility List.

Eligibility of person who took and passed test for the position of superintendent of municipal relief bureau and was informed that he was sixth on the eligibility list could not be questioned in suit by appellant to have his name certified as eligible for the position. Neal v. Williams, 283 Ky. 165 , 140 S.W.2d 813, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 290 ( Ky. 1940 ) (decided under prior law).

Where under rule providing that an eligibility list should continue for one year unless the commission should substitute a more recently prepared list if it deemed it advisable, action of commission in having submitted a new list for the position of superintendent of the municipal relief bureau the day before the applicants were to appear before the director of welfare and long after the vacancy had occurred was arbitrary, capricious and discriminatory. Neal v. Williams, 283 Ky. 165 , 140 S.W.2d 813, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 290 ( Ky. 1940 ) (decided under prior law).

Cited:

Louisville Professional Fire Fighters Asso. v. Louisville, 508 S.W.2d 42, 1974 Ky. LEXIS 588 ( Ky. 1974 ), dismissed, Seidenfaden v. Louisville, 419 U.S. 1084, 95 S. Ct. 673, 42 L. Ed. 2d 677, 1974 U.S. LEXIS 3780 (1974).

90.170. Eligible lists — Period in force — Removal of names — Supplemental lists — Emergency appointments — Public inspection of lists — Reinstatement of names.

  1. Each eligible list shall remain in force until exhausted, or until replaced by a more recently prepared list, but not beyond two (2) years from the date of its establishment. The names of persons who have indicated in writing to the director that they are unwilling to accept appointment, or request in writing that their names be dropped from the list, or who have been certified for appointment three (3) times and not appointed, shall be dropped from the list.
  2. If during the lifetime of a list it shall have dwindled to the point that three (3) or fewer names remain thereon, or if for other reason the board deems it necessary for the good of the service to prepare and establish a supplemental list, the board may in its discretion do so; in such event the original list shall be combined with the supplemental list, and all names shall be placed on the combined list according to grade, without regard to priority in time of examination; provided, however, no name shall remain upon eligible lists for a period longer than two (2) years, at which time it shall be dropped from the list. The board, by rule, may prescribe other reasons for removal of names from an eligible list and for written notice to those so removed.
  3. In the absence of any appropriate eligible list any position or office may be filled temporarily by the appointing authority without examination for a period not to exceed ninety (90) days, during which time the board shall hold the necessary examination for the filling of the place regularly, but persons may be temporarily employed for emergency work without examination for the period of the emergency, in no event to exceed ninety (90) days in any one (1) fiscal year, such appointment to be an emergency appointment and the same shall not be renewed. No person shall be appointed or employed under any title not appropriate to the duties to be performed. No person shall be transferred to or assigned to perform any duties of any position subject to competitive tests unless he shall have been appointed to the position from which transfer is made as a result of a competitive test, equivalent to that required for the position to be filled, or appointed as otherwise herein provided under KRS 90.180 and 90.210 .
  4. Each list of eligibles, with the respective grades, shall be open to public inspection. Any person appointed from the eligible list and laid-off for lack of work, or lack of appropriation, shall be placed at the head of the eligible list, and shall be eligible for reappointment for a period of eligibility as provided by the rules of the board.

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 16, § 4.

90.180. Appointments to positions in classified service — Probationary appointments.

  1. All appointments to positions subject to the provisions of KRS 90.110 to 90.230 shall be made solely on the basis of merit and fitness, to be determined by competitive examinations, except in the case of emergency appointments which may be made only in accordance with the definition given in KRS 90.110 ; provided that all original appointments, except emergency appointments as defined in KRS 90.110, shall be probationary appointments for a period of not less than six (6), nor more than twelve (12), months, after which probationary period regular appointments shall be given to all probationary employees who are deemed to be satisfactory by the respective appointing authority.
  2. Except in the case of emergency appointments as defined in KRS 90.110 , all appointments to positions subject to the provisions of KRS 90.110 to 90.230 shall be made by appointing authorities only from an eligible list certified by the personnel director as qualified and eligible for appointment from an appropriate eligible list as defined in KRS 90.110; provided however, that all employees holding positions subject to the provisions of KRS 90.110 to 90.230 on the effective date thereof who were holding positions in classified service under provision of previous acts, shall be considered as having satisfied hereunder all of the qualifications for obtaining and holding such appointments as they then had, and further provided that all employees holding positions subject to the provisions of KRS 90.110 to 90.230, on the effective date thereof, and who were not holding positions in classified service under provisions of previous acts, shall be considered as having satisfied hereunder all of the qualifications for obtaining and holding original appointments under KRS 90.110 to 90.230, and shall be considered as having been given probationary appointments, as defined in KRS 90.110, as of the effective date thereof.

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 16, § 5.

Opinions of Attorney General.

Neither subsection (2) of this section nor KRS 90.210 provide any statutory authorization for persons presently employed by the local board of health, who were formerly employed by the State Department for Human Resources, and who are now under a city civil service system (KRS 90.110 to 90.230 ), to be granted for purposes of seniority and the accumulation of benefits under the city’s plan, employment dates corresponding to the dates on which they began their state employment. OAG 81-382 .

The reference in subsection (2) of this section to “previous acts” refers to previous acts of cities of the first class relating to merit system provisions in existence prior to the effective date of the provisions of KRS 90.110 to 90.230 ; it does not refer to merit system provisions covering state employees or merit system provisions applicable to employees in other classes of cities. OAG 81-382 .

90.190. Dismissals and demotions.

  1. Any suspension in excess of ten (10) days, dismissal or demotions of employees in positions subject to the provisions of KRS 90.110 to 90.230 may be made only by the appointing authority upon the filing of written statements of the reasons of such suspension in excess of ten (10) days, or dismissals or demotions with the board, provided that copies of all such statements shall be furnished to the employees so suspended, dismissed, or demoted, on or before the effective date of such suspension, dismissal, or demotion, provided further that employees holding probationary appointments may be dismissed without the appointing authority being required to furnish either the board or the suspended, or dismissed, or demoted employee with a written statement of the reasons for such suspension, dismissal, or demotion. Any employee who has been suspended in excess of ten (10) days, dismissed, or demoted holding a regular appointment, shall be entitled, upon written demand, to a public hearing by the board, at which time he shall have the right to introduce evidence in his own behalf, and to be represented by counsel.
  2. The board shall investigate and determine the justification for all suspensions in excess of ten (10) days, or dismissals, or demotions, reported, or complained of, according to the provisions of this section. The board shall keep an accurate record of its proceedings under this section, including evidence presented at any public hearing. The board’s order and findings shall be final subject to the right of appeal as set out in subsections (3) and (4) of this section. Enforcement of the suspension, dismissal or demotion shall not be suspended pending any proceeding or appeal provided in this section. Copies of the order and findings of the board shall be immediately delivered to the mayor, appointing authority, and to the suspended, dismissed, or demoted employee.
  3. Within thirty (30) days after the order of the board has been entered under subsection (2) of this section, any employee, who has been aggrieved by the order of the board, or the mayor or the appointing authority may appeal to the Circuit Court in the county in which the city is located in the following manner:
    1. Upon request in writing by the person making the appeal, and the payment of costs therefor, the secretary of the board shall provide a certified copy of the record and the findings of that body to the appellant. The appeal shall be prosecuted by filing a complaint in Circuit Court and shall otherwise be in accordance with the Rules of Civil Procedure. Upon the record being filed by the appellant, the case shall be docketed in the Circuit Court and tried de novo.
    2. If the secretary fails to provide a certified copy of the record to the appellant within thirty (30) days after the request is made, then the aggrieved person may file an affidavit in that court setting out as fully as possible the charges, together with a copy of the board’s findings and a statement that demand for the transcript had been made of the secretary more than thirty (30) days prior to the filing of the affidavit. Upon filing of this affidavit in the Circuit Court, the case shall be docketed in that court and the court may compel the filing of the transcript by the secretary by entering proper mandatory order, and upon failure of the secretary to do so, he shall be liable to fine and imprisonment for contempt. Such appeal shall have precedence over other business and be determined speedily.
  4. An appeal will lie from the judgment of the Circuit Court to the Court of Appeals as in other cases, in any controversy arising under this section.
  5. Nothing in KRS 90.110 to 90.230 shall permit the suspension, dismissal, or demotion of any employee subject to the provisions of KRS 90.110 to 90.230 on account of religious faith, race, color, creed, or political affiliation.

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 16, § 7; 1972, ch. 74, § 1; 1984, ch. 280, § 2, effective July 13, 1984.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Grounds.

Court dismissed as frivolous a constitutional challenge brought by an employee of the fire division who had been promoted to captain subject to a one-year probationary period, which claimed that this section allowed a demotion for the exercise of the right to free speech. Louisville Professional Fire Fighters Asso. v. Louisville, 508 S.W.2d 42, 1974 Ky. LEXIS 588 (Ky.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1084, 95 S. Ct. 673, 42 L. Ed. 2d 677, 1974 U.S. LEXIS 3780 (U.S. 1974).

2. Burden of Proof.

A trial court sitting in a de novo review of an administrative ruling may reverse the board if it concludes that the evidence preponderates against the board’s decision. The same rule applies to a quasi de novo review. In effect, this standard of review shifts the burden of proof to the discharged employee. Louisville Civil Service Bd. v. Thomas, 691 S.W.2d 233, 1985 Ky. App. LEXIS 571 (Ky. Ct. App. 1985).

3. Hearing.

Where the question of whether the police officer’s dismissal was justified had never been fully presented to the Civil Service Board as the Board proceedings had been abated pending exhaustion of all court procedures, the police officer was entitled to a hearing before the Board to determine whether there was sufficient evidence to support his dismissal for the underlying conduct, even though the officer had acquiesced in the abatement and sought judgment in the Circuit Court rather than an administrative hearing. Louisville Civil Service Bd. v. Blair, 711 S.W.2d 181, 1986 Ky. LEXIS 267 ( Ky. 1986 ).

4. Authority.

Any logical interpretation of this statute requires that the Civil Service Board have all the authority which is necessarily inferred or incident to the powers and duties expressly granted to it, and the power to modify discipline is reasonably necessary and appropriate to effect the express powers of the civil service board; to hold otherwise would be to frustrate the purpose of the civil service system. Louisville by Kuster v. Milligan, 798 S.W.2d 454, 1990 Ky. LEXIS 114 ( Ky. 1990 ).

The Louisville Civil Service Board has inherent authority pursuant to the statute to modify disciplinary actions which are found to be unjustified based on the facts and circumstances; the Board is the final local government authority for determining appropriate discipline and is authorized to modify discipline when it finds it to be unjustified. Louisville by Kuster v. Milligan, 798 S.W.2d 454, 1990 Ky. LEXIS 114 ( Ky. 1990 ).

5. — Modification of Discipline.

The power of the Civil Service Board to modify discipline which in its opinion is unjustified, is consistent with the legislative intent of the General Assembly as found by the Court of Appeals; subsection (2) of this section does not limit the authority of the Board to modify the penalty against a classified employee. Louisville by Kuster v. Milligan, 798 S.W.2d 454, 1990 Ky. LEXIS 114 ( Ky. 1990 ).

Where police officer shot at intruder who had broken into his home, and where the shooting was directed in part at moving car in which intruder was fleeing, the fact that said officer had 19 years of unblemished service and he testified that he was not only attempting to arrest a fleeing suspect, but that he also believed he was defending his home and a person living in his home who had previously been assaulted and was under the threat of additional assault by the intruder, under the circumstances, the Civil Service Board had the authority to determine that dismissal was not justified and was clearly erroneous. Louisville by Kuster v. Milligan, 798 S.W.2d 454, 1990 Ky. LEXIS 114 ( Ky. 1990 ).

6. Justification.

Justification is a noun and as used in subsection (2) of this section, means to justify or to prove to be right, just or reasonable; to show to have a sufficient reason. Louisville by Kuster v. Milligan, 798 S.W.2d 454, 1990 Ky. LEXIS 114 ( Ky. 1990 ).

7. Judicial Review.

A trial court sitting in a quasi de novo review, authorized by subsection (3) of this section, may only reverse the Civil Service Board if it concludes that the evidence preponderates against the decision of the Board. Louisville by Kuster v. Milligan, 798 S.W.2d 454, 1990 Ky. LEXIS 114 ( Ky. 1990 ).

No appointing authority may exercise absolute and arbitrary power without being subject to review either by another administrative agency or authority of the courts. Louisville by Kuster v. Milligan, 798 S.W.2d 454, 1990 Ky. LEXIS 114 ( Ky. 1990 ).

The standard of judicial review of administrative decisions in disciplinary actions against police officers is the “clearly erroneous” rule promulgated in CR 52.01, and the same standard of review should be applied in order to determine if the Civil Service Board’s modification of a disciplinary ruling was clearly erroneous. Louisville by Kuster v. Milligan, 798 S.W.2d 454, 1990 Ky. LEXIS 114 ( Ky. 1990 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

The Louisville Civil Service Board under subsection (6) of this section and the Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules 73.01, 73.02 and 73.03, can appeal a judgment from the lower court and under KRS 90.230 the city legislative body can appropriate funds necessary to make such appeal. OAG 78-257 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Northern Kentucky Law Review.

Notes, School Law — Nonrenewal of Nontenured Teacher’s Contract — Procedural Due Process —Wells v. Board of Regents, 545 F.2d 15, 1976 U.S. App. LEXIS 6054 (6th Cir. 1976) andPlummer v. Board of Regents, 552 F.2d 716, 1977 U.S. App. LEXIS 13918 (6th Cir. 1977),5 N. Ky. L. Rev. 141 (1978).

90.200. Investigations by board — Power to obtain evidence — General powers of board — Reports of director.

  1. The board may make investigations on its own initiative, or at the direction of the mayor or legislative body of the city, or upon the petition of an employee in the classified service, or of any person on a list kept by the board, concerning the enforcement or violation of or operation under KRS 90.110 to 90.230 . In the course of any investigation under the provisions of KRS 90.110 to 90.230 , each member of the board shall have the power to administer oaths, and the board is authorized and empowered to subpoena and require the attendance of witnesses and the production by them of books, papers, records and other documentary evidence pertinent to such investigation. In the event that any person should fail or refuse to appear under such subpoena, or to testify, or to attend, or produce the books, papers, records, or other documentary evidence lawfully required, the board may report to the Circuit Court or any judge thereof, such failure or refusal, and apply for a rule, and the Circuit Court, or any judge thereof, may, on such application of the board, compel obedience by proceedings for contempt as in the case of disobedience of the requirements of a subpoena issued from such court.
  2. The board shall perform such other functions as may relate to the efficiency of the personnel under its jurisdiction, including the maintenance of the personnel classification plan, the administration of service ratings, attendance records, training programs, promotions, transfers, lay-offs, suspensions, reinstatements and related activities, and shall prepare appropriate rules for the administration thereof, but such enumeration is not exclusive of other proper functions or activities of the board.
  3. The board shall receive, review and correct, if necessary, and transmit promptly to the mayor and the legislative body of the city, the annual report of the director. Such report of the director may be supplemented by any additional comment, criticism or suggestions for the more effectual accomplishment of the purposes of KRS 90.110 to 90.230 , that the board may care to submit.

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 16, § 4.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

Stansbury v. Maupin, 599 S.W.2d 170, 1980 Ky. LEXIS 218 ( Ky. 1980 ).

90.210. Extension of classified service to other offices and positions.

The board, without additional compensation, shall perform, under and pursuant to the provisions of KRS 90.110 to 90.230 , the same services and duties provided for herein, for any department, board or agency of such city or any joint board or joint agency of such city and such county, in which said city is located, if and when by statute or by action of the legislative governing body of the city, or the legislative governing bodies of the city and county or by action of the governing body of any independent agency, where appropriate, the personnel or part or parts thereof of such department, board or agency, or joint board or joint agency, is placed under the merit system, and is thereby subjected to the provisions of KRS 90.110 to 90.230 covering such offices, positions or classes of positions, or places of employment, in such agency, as the governing body of such agency may designate. This section shall also apply to any department of state government, or unit of a department, transferred as a result of a decision or agreement made between the Commonwealth of Kentucky and the city or city and county or independent agency in a city, where appropriate, or a change in funding of a department or unit from state to local. When the provisions hereof shall have been extended in the manner provided for in this section then all of the provisions of KRS 90.110 to 90.230 shall be applied to such offices, positions, and places of employment, in such departments, boards, agencies, and joint boards or joint agencies, the same as if originally included herein. The date of any extension of the provisions of KRS 90.110 to 90.230 to include additional offices, positions, or classes of positions, or places of employment, shall be considered as the effective date of those sections with respect thereto, and employees then holding such offices, positions, or places of employment, thereby made subject to the provisions of KRS 90.110 to 90.230, shall be considered as having satisfied all of the qualifications for obtaining original appointment under those sections, and shall be considered as having been given probationary appointments as defined in KRS 90.110, as of the date they are thus placed in the classified service hereunder. However, the employees of any department, unit, board or agency to which the classified service is extended hereunder shall retain their seniority relative to other employees in the department, unit, board or agency for the purposes of KRS 90.110 to 90.230.

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 16, § 9; 1946, ch. 110, § 3; 1974, ch. 229, § 1; 1984, ch. 280, § 3, effective July 13, 1984.

Opinions of Attorney General.

Neither subsection (2) of KRS 90.180 nor this section provide any statutory authorization for persons presently employed by the local board of health, who were formerly employed by the State Department for Human Resources, and who are now under a city civil service system (KRS 90.110 to 90.230 ), to be granted for purposes of seniority and the accumulation of benefits under the city’s plan, employment dates corresponding to the dates on which they began their state employment. OAG 81-382 .

There is nothing in this section permitting those persons not previously covered by the city’s merit system to include under the merit system any periods of time worked prior to the effective date of the application of KRS 90.110 to 90.230 to those persons and their positions. OAG 81-382 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Personnel of city-county board of health included in classified service, KRS 212.430 .

Personnel of department of public parks and recreation included in classified service, KRS 97.250 , 97.253 .

90.220. Political discrimination and political activity prohibited — Dismissal for violation.

  1. Persons holding positions in the classified service shall not be discriminated against in any way because of their political or religious opinions or affiliations or because of their exercise of their right to vote as they please.
  2. No person in the classified service, and neither the personnel director nor any member of the board, nor the chief of police, assistant chief of police, chief of firefighters, or assistant chief of firefighters, shall, directly or indirectly, give, solicit, receive, or remit, any assessment, subscription, or contribution, to or for any political party or any candidate for public office, or in any manner be concerned therewith; nor shall any such person be a member of any campaign committee or governing committee of any political organization nor an officer in either; nor shall any such person, while on duty or using public resources, propose or oppose the placement of a question or advocate for the adoption or defeat of a question to be voted upon by the voters of the government under which the person is employed; nor shall any such person be an election officer or work at the polls on election day, or participate in the purgation or registration of voters, provided, however, nothing herein shall prevent any such person from freely expressing his or her views as a citizen or from casting his or her vote in any election.
  3. Any such person who shall violate this section shall be summarily dismissed from the service by the appointing authority (or if a member of the board, by the mayor), and may not be employed in any service of the city, classified or unclassified, for a period of one (1) year next thereafter; provided however, that should the appointing authority fail or refuse to so dismiss, the board (except when a member thereof is charged with violation of this section) shall conduct a hearing, which the accused person may attend with counsel; if the board find the accused guilty of violation of this section, the board shall dismiss such violator, with the consequent disqualification. Such action of the board is final.

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 16, § 8; 1978, ch. 164, § 17, effective June 17, 1978; 2008, ch. 135, § 1, effective July 15, 2008.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Candidates.

Subsection (2) of this section, by implication, prohibits persons in classified service from becoming candidates for public office, and the implication is so obvious that it may be considered as expressed in plain and understandable language so as not to violate constitutional requirements. Louisville Lodge No. 6, Fraternal Order of Police v. Burton, 518 S.W.2d 777, 1975 Ky. LEXIS 187 (Ky.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1016, 95 S. Ct. 2424, 44 L. Ed. 2d 684, 1975 U.S. LEXIS 1952 (U.S. 1975).

2. Delegate to Conventions.

Although this section by necessary implication prohibits a person in the classified service from becoming a candidate for party nomination for an elective office, the statute does not by necessary implication prevent one from becoming a delegate to a party convention. Louisville v. FitzGerald, 600 S.W.2d 456, 1978 Ky. LEXIS 463 ( Ky. 1978 ).

This section did not prohibit attendance at a political convention by a person in the classified service of the city of Louisville, Kentucky, who had attained civil service status. Louisville v. FitzGerald, 600 S.W.2d 456, 1978 Ky. LEXIS 463 ( Ky. 1978 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Police officers of the city of Louisville may not engage in political activity and thus a policeman may not be a candidate for trustee of a sixth-class city while still a member of the force. OAG 75-246 .

A sergeant of a city fire arson squad, as a covered employee under the Civil Service Act, is prohibited under this section from engaging in political activities. OAG 85-34 , withdrawing OAG 81-339 .

90.230. Ordinances and appropriations.

The legislative body of each city of the first class is hereby empowered and authorized to pass such ordinances and provide such appropriations as are necessary to effectuate the purposes of KRS 90.110 to 90.230 .

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 16, § 11; 1954, ch. 164, § 2, effective June 17, 1954.

Opinions of Attorney General.

The Louisville Civil Service Board under KRS 90.190 (6) (now (4)) and the Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules 73.01, 73.02 and 73.03, can appeal a judgment from the lower court and under this section the city legislative body can appropriate funds necessary to make such appeal. OAG 78-257 .

90.240. Beginning date of operation — Repeal of former laws. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 16, §§ 13 to 15) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 255, § 283.

Cities of the Second and Third Classes

90.300. Definitions for KRS 90.310 to 90.410 — Application.

  1. In KRS 90.310 to 90.410 , unless the context requires otherwise:
    1. “Administrative or directorial position” means the head of a department of municipal government;
    2. “Appointing authority” means the officer, commission, board or body having the power of appointment or removal in any office, department, commission, board or institution;
    3. “Civil service” means the offices and positions of trust or employment in the service of the city not specifically excluded by KRS 90.310 to 90.410 or by ordinance of the city as provided in KRS 90.310;
    4. “Commission” means the board of civil service commissioners as established under KRS 90.310;
    5. “Dismissal” means the discharge of an employee;
    6. “Employee” means any person employed in the conduct of municipal affairs, but the term shall not include the mayor, city manager, city administrative officer, or an administrative or directorial position. The term “employee” shall not include the offices of the board of health, members of the planning and zoning commission, the board of trustees of the public library, members of the housing authority, municipal hospital commission or the trustees, members or corresponding officers of similar boards or commissions, persons employed on temporary and special projects or to persons whose regular employments with the city are seasonal and are less than nine (9) months in any one (1) year, persons in a class of employees designated by ordinance to be non-civil-service positions, and the city clerk or city assessor; and
    7. “Pension fund” means the moneys derived from the employees and the levy of a special tax, either or both, or any other sum derived from any other source, to be used for the retirement of employees after the prescribed years of service and for the benefit of disabled employees, and surviving spouses and dependent children in the case of death of an employee within the scope of his employment according to the terms of KRS 90.310 to 90.410 and the ordinance of the city.
  2. The provisions of KRS 90.310 to 90.410 are independent of and do not affect the laws governing the police and fire departments, nor their pension funds, as provided in KRS Chapter 95.

History. 3235h-1, 3235h-11, 3235h-11a, 3480e-1, 3480e-11: amend. Acts 1946, ch. 50, § 1; 1950, ch. 180, § 1; 1974, ch. 386, § 12; 1982, ch. 307, § 1, effective July 15, 1982; 2000, ch. 178, § 1, effective July 14, 2000; 2014, ch. 92, § 78, effective January 1, 2015.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Employees.

Clerk, treasurer, auditor, assessor and engineer of third-class city operating under commission form of government are employees, and not officers, and therefore come within civil service law for city employees. Henderson v. Thomy, 307 Ky. 783 , 212 S.W.2d 303, 1948 Ky. LEXIS 831 ( Ky. 1948 ).

2. City Attorney.

City attorney in third-class city operating under commission form of government could not be treated as an employee subject to civil service, notwithstanding provisions of KRS 89.040 (now repealed) authorizing abolishment of all nonelective offices in cities operating under commission form of government for such section abolished the office in name only and in no way repealed the provisions of KRS 69.480 (now repealed) and 69.490 (now repealed) fixing duties and qualifications of city attorney. Black v. Sutton, 301 Ky. 247 , 191 S.W.2d 407, 1945 Ky. LEXIS 733 ( Ky. 1945 ).

While office of city attorney in third-class cities under commission form of government was abolished by KRS 89.040 (now repealed) it was abolished in name only, the qualifications and duties of the office remaining the same, and fact that civil service ordinance referred to him as an employee could not make him an employee as he was still an official. Black v. Sutton, 301 Ky. 247 , 191 S.W.2d 407, 1945 Ky. LEXIS 733 ( Ky. 1945 ).

3. Misconduct.

Civil service commission of third-class city did not have authority to receive and hear charges of misconduct on part of its police chief since subsection (2) of this section excepts police department in third-class cities from provisions of KRS 90.300 to KRS 90.410 which established civil service for cities of third class, and KRS 95.430 (now repealed) which provides that in third-class cities legislative body has control of police department and KRS 95.450 which provides for civil service system for police department in third-class cities gives authority to hear such charges to the council. Middlesboro v. Harrell, 268 S.W.2d 430, 1954 Ky. LEXIS 911 ( Ky. 1954 ).

4. Police and Fire Departments.

The exclusionary provision of subsection (2) is not applicable to cities of the fourth and fifth classes and, accordingly, where a “lame duck” city council enacted an ordinance adopting KRS 90.310 to 90.410 and applying them to the police and fire departments, the ordinance was valid. Turner v. Cole, 559 S.W.2d 170, 1977 Ky. App. LEXIS 861 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).

Cited:

Covington v. Trenkamp, 287 Ky. 324 , 152 S.W.2d 999, 1941 Ky. LEXIS 547 ( Ky. 1941 ); Horlander v. Owensboro, 289 Ky. 181 , 158 S.W.2d 418, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 527 ( Ky. 1942 ); Owensboro v. Board of Trustees, 301 Ky. 113 , 190 S.W.2d 1005, 1945 Ky. LEXIS 699 ( Ky. 1945 ); Covington v. Crolley, 306 Ky. 252 , 206 S.W.2d 933, 1947 Ky. LEXIS 991 ( Ky. 1947 ); Middlesboro v. Welch, 275 S.W.2d 56, 1955 Ky. LEXIS 344 ( Ky. 1955 ); Hardesty v. Owensboro Municipal Utilities Com., 700 S.W.2d 798, 1985 Ky. App. LEXIS 586 (Ky. Ct. App. 1985).

Opinions of Attorney General.

The tax for a pension fund for civil service employees must be levied on all property subject to tax without regard to what may be exempted locally by the city from local city taxes. OAG 67-559 .

A person who leaves a civil service position prior to retirement in a city of the fourth class is not entitled to receive the money that he has contributed to the civil service fund. OAG 68-98 .

Where a fifth-class city was reclassified as a fourth-class city by an act of the general assembly, but before the reclassification became effective the city council passed an ordinance creating a civil service board for the police department which could relate only to a fourth-class city, the ordinance was invalid and ineffective. OAG 69-36 .

The police department of a city of the fourth class can be placed under a civil service system under the provisions of KRS 90.300 to 90.420 instead of under the provisions of KRS 95.761 to 95.785 relating to a fourth-class city. OAG 71-122 .

If a city has extended civil service protection to the city clerk and/or the deputy clerks, the city clerk could not remove the deputy clerk without affording the deputy clerk the same privileges and protections afforded to other civil service employees. OAG 76-197 .

The position of city superintendent is an administrative position which also could be included in a civil service program under the definition of “employee” found in this section. OAG 80-77 .

A city of the fourth class may not operate a pension plan for its police officers under KRS 79.080 (2) but, rather, it must utilize the provisions of KRS 95.767 to 95.785 or KRS 95.520 to 95.620 or KRS 90.300 to 90.420 . OAG 81-191 .

A pension plan adopted pursuant to KRS 95.761 and KRS 90.300 et seq., may not validly provide that, on repeal of the enabling ordinance, “all unexpended moneys appropriated to said pension fund out of the said city’s general fund to the Police and Fire Fighters’ Fund by the said Board of Council of such city and at the time of adoption of a repeal ordinance shall revert back to the city’s general fund,” and such contribution must remain in the fund to be paid on eventual retirement of the contributing police and fire fighters; KRS 95.761 (4) (now 95.761(5)) clearly prohibits the repeal of any pension ordinance adopted under KRS 90.300 to 90.410 or, for that matter, under KRS 95.520 to 95.620 . OAG 82-64 .

If a fourth-class city elects to operate its civil service program under KRS 95.762 to 95.778 , it cannot operate under any portions of KRS Chapter 90 or KRS 95.520 to 95.620 ; on the other hand, if the city does not adopt the civil service program under KRS Chapter 95, it has the right under KRS 95.761 (3) to adopt the provisions of KRS 90.300 to 90.420 , and in doing so has the option of adopting a pension fund as provided in KRS 90.410 ; however, the only pension fund it may adopt, if it operates under KRS Chapter 90, is the one provided for in that act and the city cannot, for example, utilize the pension system provided for under KRS 95.520 to 95.620 or the pension system under KRS 95.761 to 95.785 . OAG 82-64 .

The intent of subdivision (1)(f) of this section is to remove those persons in administrative or directorial positions from the definition of an employee for purposes of civil service coverage. OAG 83-57 .

In those circumstances where the city utility commission is required to extend civil service coverage to its employees, it would be only fair and consistent to extend coverage to those types of positions included under the city’s civil service system and exclude those types of positions excluded by the city’s civil service system. OAG 83-57 .

A city utility commission organized pursuant to KRS 96.530 is a corporate entity, separate from the city, and not included by KRS 90.300 to 90.410 as being within the civil service program applicable to employees of cities of the second and third classes; however, KRS 96.530 (1) requires that a city utility commission, in a city of the second or third class providing civil service coverage for city employees, provide such civil service coverage for its employees under the provisions of KRS 90.300 to 90.410 and the city utility commission would, therefore, be operating under the same civil service provisions as the cities of the second and third classes and would be subject to the definitions set forth in this section. OAG 83-57 .

Assuming that the position of a utility plant’s general manager corresponds to a head of a department of a municipal government, the utility system’s general manager is not an employee of the utility commission for purposes of civil service coverage as he is functioning in an “administrative or directorial position”; under the same line of reasoning, the assistant general manager of the utility plant is an employee of the utility commission for purposes of civil service coverage as he is not functioning in an “administrative or directorial position.” OAG 83-57 .

If city utility commission took action designating persons in administrative or directorial positions as employees prior to January 1, 1983, it would apply to persons subsequently hired to fill administrative or directorial positions, because those persons holding such positions at the effective date of the amendment would be protected for the remainder for their employment in such positions, even if no action was taken prior to January 1, 1983, to designate persons in those positions as employees for purposes of civil service coverage. OAG 83-57 .

An employee of the city utility commission, operating under the civil service provisions of KRS 90.300 to 90.410 , who is promoted to an administrative or directorial position with the utility commission after July 15, 1982, where the administrative or directorial position has not been designated an employee position prior to January 1, 1983, does not retain his civil service status as he is no longer an employee under subdivision (1)(f) of this section; neither KRS 90.400 , dealing with the pension fund in cities of the second class, nor any other section of KRS 90.300 to 90.410 , contains any provision for the retention of rights relative to civil service and a pension when a person ceases to be an employee as defined by statute. OAG 83-57 .

90.310. Adoption of civil service ordinance — Civil service commission.

  1. Except as provided in subsection (5) of this section, any city of the home rule class may elect to operate under KRS 90.310 to 90.410 , and, by ordinance, create a civil service commission which shall hold examinations as to the qualifications of applicants for municipal employment within the several departments of the city that are designated by ordinance. In all cities of the home rule class, the city may, by ordinance, classify employees and designate the class of employees it desires to include.
  2. The mayor, subject to the approval of the city legislative body, shall appoint at least three (3) but no more than five (5) persons who shall constitute the civil service commission of that city. Each appointee shall be at least thirty (30) years of age and not related by either blood or marriage to the mayor or any member of the city legislative body. The appointees shall originally be appointed one (1) for a term of three (3) years, one (1) for a term of two (2) years and all remaining appointments shall be for a term of one (1) year, and the successors to these appointees shall be appointed in like manner, each for a period of three (3) years and until his successor is appointed and qualified. A vacancy shall be filled for the unexpired term in the same manner as original appointments. At the time of any appointment, if the mayor elects to appoint only three (3) commissioners, not more than two (2) commissioners shall be adherents of the same political party. If the mayor elects to appoint more than three (3) commissioners not more than three (3) commissioners shall be adherents of the same political party. The appointee originally appointed for the term of three (3) years shall be secretary of the commission. Each appointee shall qualify by taking an oath of office as required by law. The salaries of the members of the commission may be fixed by the city legislative body.
  3. If the appointing authority of any city fails to appoint a civil service commission within thirty (30) days after he has the power to so appoint or after a vacancy exists, the mayor pro tem shall make the appointment and the appointee shall hold office until the expiration of the term and until his successor is appointed and qualified.
  4. The civil service commission shall make and enforce rules, not inconsistent with the provisions of KRS 90.310 to 90.410 or the ordinances of the city, for examinations and registrations therefor.
  5. No city shall adopt an ordinance pursuant to this section to create a civil service commission during the months of November or December in any even-numbered year.
  6. Any city that creates a civil service commission pursuant to this section may repeal or amend the ordinance at the discretion of the city legislative body. The city legislative body shall not repeal any provisions of the ordinance governing the maintenance of a pension fund.

History. 3235h-2, 3480e-2: amend. Acts 1944, ch. 107, § 1; 1946, ch. 50, § 2; 1968, ch. 152, § 63; 1982, ch. 281, § 1, effective July 15, 1982; 2000, ch. 178, § 2, effective July 14, 2000; 2014, ch. 121, § 1, effective July 15, 2014; 2014, ch. 92, § 79, effective January 1, 2015.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(1/1/2015). This statute was amended by 2014 Ky. Acts chs. 92 and 121, which do not appear to be in conflict and have been codified together.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

KRS 90.300 to 90.410 , and city ordinance passed thereunder, do not, in guaranteeing tenure and pension benefits to city employees, create a debt against the city in violation of Ky. Const., § 157. Henderson v. Thomy, 307 Ky. 783 , 212 S.W.2d 303, 1948 Ky. LEXIS 831 ( Ky. 1948 ).

The fact that adoption of civil service is optional with city does not make this law violative of Ky. Const., § 29. Henderson v. Thomy, 307 Ky. 783 , 212 S.W.2d 303, 1948 Ky. LEXIS 831 ( Ky. 1948 ).

2. Change in Form of Government.

A change in the form of government of a city does not repeal the civil service statutes nor destroy the civil service status of employees. Campbell v. Meredith, 239 S.W.2d 979, 1951 Ky. LEXIS 926 ( Ky. 1951 ).

3. Classification of Positions.

Under this section a city had the right and discretion at the time of its initial adoption of civil service to include classes of city employees in the system and to decline to include other classes, so that the plaintiff had no right to complain that the head of the refuse division of the public works department was not put under civil service. American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees v. Paducah, 471 S.W.2d 18, 1971 Ky. LEXIS 223 ( Ky. 1971 ).

4. Civil Service Ordinances.
5. — Repeal.

Repeal of civil service ordinance could not affect vested rights and inviolable contract of employees who were employed and qualified under the ordinance when it was in effect. Owensboro v. Board of Trustees, 301 Ky. 113 , 190 S.W.2d 1005, 1945 Ky. LEXIS 699 ( Ky. 1945 ).

Resolution adopted by city council, some time after civil service ordinance had been repealed, directing city attorney to draw an ordinance rescinding the repealing ordinance, “so that those who have been employed since that time will be under civil service,” could not be relied on as ground for holding that subsequent ordinance, repealing the repealing ordinance, had effect of reviving the original civil service ordinance. Owensboro v. Board of Trustees, 301 Ky. 113 , 190 S.W.2d 1005, 1945 Ky. LEXIS 699 ( Ky. 1945 ).

Where civil service ordinance was repealed by a repealing ordinance, a subsequent ordinance repealing the repealing ordinance did not have effect of reviving the original civil service ordinance. Owensboro v. Board of Trustees, 301 Ky. 113 , 190 S.W.2d 1005, 1945 Ky. LEXIS 699 ( Ky. 1945 ).

Where council repealed civil service ordinance and subsequently repealed the repealing ordinance, city was not estopped to question or deny the operation of the ordinance because of its conduct toward the employees and its attitude toward the ordinance as respects the employees who were employed after the repeal of the ordinance, for such ordinance was repealed and was not revived by the repealing of the repealing ordinance and no rights could arise under such ordinance nor could it affect any rights. Owensboro v. Board of Trustees, 301 Ky. 113 , 190 S.W.2d 1005, 1945 Ky. LEXIS 699 ( Ky. 1945 ).

Where ordinance repealing civil service ordinance was subsequently repealed, such repeal did not revive the original civil service ordinance; consequently, employees employed subsequent to repeal of original ordinance could have no vested rights under nonexistent ordinance and could not claim rights under it on the basis of estoppel. Owensboro v. Board of Trustees, 301 Ky. 113 , 190 S.W.2d 1005, 1945 Ky. LEXIS 699 ( Ky. 1945 ).

6. Abolishment of Old Positions.

City of third class, which had by ordinance adopted civil service regulations for its employees, was not required to retain firemen of boilers at old city water plant as boiler operators at new plant, nor former watch engineer as filter operator, where positions in new plant were not substantially the same as those held by plaintiffs in old plant and required certain technical knowledge and skill. Ordinance adopting civil service regulations permitted abolishment of positions in classified service. Horlander v. Owensboro, 289 Ky. 181 , 158 S.W.2d 418, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 527 ( Ky. 1942 ).

7. Exempt from Examination.

Provision of this section requiring commissioners to hold examinations of applicants for employment, did not apply to employee seeking restoration to position of truck driver after abolition of position of storekeeper to which he had been promoted, where he had been in continuous employ of city since prior to adoption of civil service law and ordinances. Covington v. Trenkamp, 287 Ky. 324 , 152 S.W.2d 999, 1941 Ky. LEXIS 547 ( Ky. 1941 ).

A city, which extended civil service protection to certain classes of its employees by the enactment of an ordinance which provided that all present employees would automatically be covered by the civil service law, did not have the authority to confer civil service status, without examination, upon an employee who had been employed by the city for 11 months and 10 days at the time of the adoption of the ordinance. Stovall v. Scottsville, 605 S.W.2d 767, 1980 Ky. App. LEXIS 354 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980).

8. Referendum.

Ordinance of third-class city operating under commission form of government, which reaffirmed prior ordinance adopting civil service, named each city employee and the classification to which he belonged, reappointed each employee to his position and declared him entitled to benefits of civil service, was not subject to referendum under KRS 89.240 (repealed). Henderson v. Thomy, 307 Ky. 783 , 212 S.W.2d 303, 1948 Ky. LEXIS 831 ( Ky. 1948 ).

9. Limitation of City’s Authority.

The obvious purpose of this section is to permit a city to include some classifications of employees in civil service and to exclude other classifications, but it is not the purpose to allow any employee to be brought under civil service without fulfilling the prerequisites set forth in KRS 90.310 to 90.410 . Stovall v. Scottsville, 605 S.W.2d 767, 1980 Ky. App. LEXIS 354 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980).

The statutory provisions for municipal civil service are not mandatory, but if the city elects to operate under the civil service statutes its authority is limited by those statutes. Stovall v. Scottsville, 605 S.W.2d 767, 1980 Ky. App. LEXIS 354 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980).

10. Examinations.

Civil service status is optional, but if a city does elect to go under civil service all employees in classified positions, except those exempt by KRS 90.340 , are required to take and pass the appropriate examination to acquire the protection afforded by the act. Stovall v. Scottsville, 605 S.W.2d 767, 1980 Ky. App. LEXIS 354 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980).

Employees cannot acquire civil service status through employment for a period of years without taking a civil service examination, nor can a city arbitrarily include its employees in a civil service status without an examination except such employees who qualify under KRS 90.340 . Stovall v. Scottsville, 605 S.W.2d 767, 1980 Ky. App. LEXIS 354 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980).

Cited:

Black v. Sutton, 299 Ky. 836 , 187 S.W.2d 731 (1945); Middlesboro v. Harrell, 268 S.W.2d 430, 1954 Ky. LEXIS 911 ( Ky. 1954 ); Hardesty v. Owensboro Municipal Utilities Com., 700 S.W.2d 798, 1985 Ky. App. LEXIS 586 (Ky. Ct. App. 1985).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Membership on a civil service commission would constitute the holding of a municipal office. OAG 72-808 .

Although a city may by ordinance include certain classes of employees in its civil service program and decline to include other classes, once a class of employees is included they must be made eligible for pension benefits. OAG 77-97 .

90.320. Examinations — Certifications — Preference points — Eligible list.

  1. The civil service commission shall prescribe and propound such examinations as are proper, commensurate with vacant positions within the various departments of the city, according to classification prescribed by ordinance, shall set such times and places for holding examinations as may be proper and shall give public notice of examinations by publication pursuant to KRS Chapter 424.
  2. The civil service commission shall, as soon after examinations as is practicable, certify to the mayor or other appointing authority a list of the applicants so examined, with the one (1) having the highest average ranked first and all others ranked numerically according to the result of the examination.
  3. Any honorably discharged soldier, sailor, marine, member of the Air Force, or member of any other branch of the military service who was inducted into that service through voluntary or involuntary enlistment, and who is an applicant for any municipal civil service position, and a registered voter of that municipality, shall be entitled to a five percent (5%) increase on his examination score. Any Red Cross nurse who served during the period of hostilities between the United States and the Central Powers in World War I and between the United States and Japan and Germany in World War II, and who is a registered voter of that municipality, shall be entitled to the same percentages. Such percentages shall be added to examination scores only if the score is determined by the civil service commission to be a passing score and after verification of the required service.
  4. The civil service commission of cities shall maintain an eligible list of not less than three (3) for each position to be filled.
  5. The appointing authority may designate certain civil service positions and prescribe that for such positions the examinations shall first be given exclusively to current employees; provided, however, that if less than three (3) employees with a minimum of two (2) years seniority achieve a passing grade, the examination shall be held in accordance with subsection (1) of this section.

History. 3235h-3, 3480e-3: amend. Acts 1948, ch. 154; 1956, ch. 246, § 9; 1962, ch. 137, § 1; 1966, ch. 239, § 63; 1988, ch. 129, § 3, effective July 15, 1988; 2014, ch. 92, § 80, effective January 1, 2015.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Necessity of Examination.

A city, which extended civil service protection to certain classes of its employees by the enactment of an ordinance which provided that all present employees would automatically be covered by the civil service law, did not have the authority to confer civil service status, without examination, upon an employee who had been employed by the city for 11 months and 10 days at the time of the adoption of the ordinance. Stovall v. Scottsville, 605 S.W.2d 767, 1980 Ky. App. LEXIS 354 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980).

Civil service status is optional, but if a city does elect to go under civil service all employees in classified positions, except those exempt by KRS 90.340 , are required to take and pass the appropriate examination to acquire the protection afforded by the act. Stovall v. Scottsville, 605 S.W.2d 767, 1980 Ky. App. LEXIS 354 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980).

Employees cannot acquire civil service status through employment for a period of years without taking a civil service examination, nor can a city arbitrarily include its employees in a civil service status without an examination except such employees who qualify under KRS 90.340 . Stovall v. Scottsville, 605 S.W.2d 767, 1980 Ky. App. LEXIS 354 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980).

2. Examinations Limited to Employees of Department.

This section contemplates that civil service examinations might be limited to the employees of a particular office, department, commission, board, or institution; therefore, subsection (5) of this section is not intended to proscribe examinations limited to all of the employees of a department of city government. Hardesty v. Owensboro Municipal Utilities Com., 700 S.W.2d 798, 1985 Ky. App. LEXIS 586 (Ky. Ct. App. 1985).

Opinions of Attorney General.

All civil service examinations must have a minimum and uniform passing grade established in advance unless there is a bona fide reason for establishing different minimum scores for different positions. OAG 76-160 .

If the job being performed by a CETA-sponsored worker is a job covered by the civil service system of a third-class city, the CETA-sponsored worker would be a municipal employee under the city’s civil service program and would be given priority along with other city employees in filling designated vacancies in the civil service. OAG 76-712 .

If the chief of police of a city whose civil service operates under KRS 90.300 to 90.420 retires, is terminated, resigns, or is otherwise relieved of his duties as chief, the city council is not required to elevate the assistant chief to the position of chief; the assistant chief serving at that time could only assume the position of chief provided he qualified for the position following his examination pursuant to this section, assuming, of course, that the position of chief continued to remain under the civil service program. OAG 83-215 .

90.330. Qualifications of applicants.

  1. The civil service commission shall examine all applicants as to their physical and mental qualification for the particular classification wherein they seek employment. To be eligible for examination a person must not be less than eighteen (18) nor have passed his or her forty-sixth birthday, a law-abiding citizen of sobriety and integrity, and must be able to read and write and understand the English language; provided, however, that any present employee who is over forty-five (45) years of age and who is otherwise qualified shall be eligible to take any promotional examinations.
  2. Except for those members whose qualifications are determined under KRS 95.440 , no person shall be appointed to a position under civil service until that person is a resident of the Commonwealth of Kentucky.
  3. Any city legislative body that operates under this chapter may by ordinance require persons appointed to civil service positions to be a resident of the county in which the city is located.

History. 3235h-6, 3480e-6: amend. Acts 1946, ch. 50, § 3; 1960, ch. 27; 1962, ch. 137, § 2; 1972, ch. 25, § 1; 1974, ch. 313, § 1; 2000, ch. 90, § 1, effective July 14, 2000.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Age and Residence.

Judgment holding that although city could suspend a competitive examination for an employee having peculiar and exceptional qualifications of a particular professional and educational character, it would not fail to conduct the noncompetitive examination and require the appointee to meet the qualifications set forth in this section, was erroneous because employee in such category was not required to meet the qualification as to age and residence. City Utility Com. v. Civil Service Com., 396 S.W.2d 801, 1965 Ky. LEXIS 133 ( Ky. 1965 ).

2. Additional Qualifications.

The implication of subsection (6) of KRS 90.350 is that the legislature has recognized that the appointing authority might require that an applicant possess certain qualifications beyond those set out in subsection (1) of this section where those qualifications bear a reasonable relationship to the applicant’s ability to satisfactorily perform the job which he seeks. Hardesty v. Owensboro Municipal Utilities Com., 700 S.W.2d 798, 1985 Ky. App. LEXIS 586 (Ky. Ct. App. 1985).

3. Arbitrary Limitation.

Where there was no evidence that the city’s civil service commission had established a requirement of present service as a lineman for filling the position of electrician in either its formal “job description” or “special qualifications” for the position, its action in limiting the civil service examination for the position of electrician to those employees classified as lineman was arbitrary. Hardesty v. Owensboro Municipal Utilities Com., 700 S.W.2d 798, 1985 Ky. App. LEXIS 586 (Ky. Ct. App. 1985).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Pursuant to KRS 95.440 firemen would not be required to reside in the city even though they served under the civil service act. OAG 68-523 .

The civil service commission is not authorized to add to the qualifications prescribed by statute. OAG 71-498 .

The fact that an applicant may have simply been charged with a criminal offense, but not convicted, would in no way disqualify him from serving as a police officer, provided he possesses the statutory qualifications prescribed in this section. OAG 71-498 .

The person appointed must have taken up legal residence in the city which can be done at any time that a person voices such intention, together with a showing of factual evidence of residing in the city. OAG 71-498 .

This section does not require that the applicant be a registered voter of the city or the county. OAG 71-498 .

Where, on an application for employment as a policeman, an applicant stated that he was a registered voter of the county and had never been charged with a criminal offense and, after he was employed, it was discovered the answers were false, the civil service commission was without authority to dismiss the police officer for having given the false answers. OAG 71-498 .

Fact that civil service employees worked at city utility plant outside the corporate limits of city would have no effect on their status as civil service employees of the city, nor would it affect their retirement rights as long as they are residents of the city and thereby qualified. OAG 73-624 .

The exclusion from eligibility for civil service examination and subsequent employment of persons over forty-five has been repealed by implication by the 1972 amendments to KRS 344.020 and 344.040 prohibiting an employer from discriminating in classification and hiring of persons between the ages of forty and sixty-five. OAG 74-138 .

A 58 year old person would be eligible to be appointed as a city assistant chief of police but he must otherwise qualify by taking the civil service examination unless the city ordinance electing to operate under KRS, ch. 90 excluded the position of assistant chief of police. OAG 74-539 .

A city civil service commission could not make the age requirements for applicants for policemen and fire fighters more stringent than those provided for under this section. OAG 82-147 .

Administrative Regulation 104 KAR 1:040 relating to job discrimination advertising under the Civil Rights Act, KRS Ch. 344, permits an employer to make application to the Commission on Human Rights for a “bona fide occupational qualification” exemption which could, if approved, reduce statutory maximum age protection. OAG 82-147 .

Maximum age of 45 in this section must give way to the requirements of the Kentucky Civil Rights Act, KRS Ch. 344, and particularly KRS 344.040 , which prohibits any discrimination between the ages of 40 and 70 (now 40 and over). OAG 82-147 .

Where a statute details the qualifications required of a particular office or employment, such qualifications cannot be reduced or enlarged or, in other words, changed in any way, by ordinance. OAG 82-147 .

90.340. Present employees.

Employees who at the time the provisions of KRS 90.310 to 90.410 are adopted by any city have been in the employ of that city for one (1) year last past shall not be required to stand an original examination, and shall be eligible for all the benefits provided by KRS 90.310 to 90.410 .

History. 3235h-5, 3480e-5: amend. 2014, ch. 92, § 81, effective January 1, 2015.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Validity.

This section is valid and gives employees with one year of previous service a valid civil service status. Henderson v. Thomy, 307 Ky. 783 , 212 S.W.2d 303, 1948 Ky. LEXIS 831 ( Ky. 1948 ).

2. Exempt from Examination.

KRS 90.310 requiring commissioners to hold examinations of applicants for employment, did not apply to employe seeking restoration to position of truck driver after abolition of position of storekeeper to which he had been promoted, where he had been in continuous employ of city since prior to adoption of civil service law and ordinances. Covington v. Trenkamp, 287 Ky. 324 , 152 S.W.2d 999, 1941 Ky. LEXIS 547 ( Ky. 1941 ).

3. Length of Employment.

A city, which extended civil service protection to certain classes of its employees by the enactment of an ordinance which provided that all present employees would automatically be covered by the civil service law, did not have the authority to confer civil service status, without examination, upon an employee who had been employed by the city for 11 months and 10 days at the time of the adoption of the ordinance. Stovall v. Scottsville, 605 S.W.2d 767, 1980 Ky. App. LEXIS 354 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980).

4. Limitation of City’s Authority.

Employees cannot acquire civil service status through employment for a period of years without taking a civil service examination, nor can a city arbitrarily include its employees in a civil service status without an examination except such employees who qualify under this section. Stovall v. Scottsville, 605 S.W.2d 767, 1980 Ky. App. LEXIS 354 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980).

Cited:

Ritte v. Covington, 308 Ky. 792 , 215 S.W.2d 980, 1948 Ky. LEXIS 1054 ( Ky. 1948 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Where the provisions of KRS 90.310 to 90.340 were adopted by a city in 1972, a 1979 amendment placing additional positions in the civil service program could in no way constitute the adoption of the general civil service program by the city and thus service for one year prior to 1979 would not be sufficient to exempt the individuals occupying those positions from taking the required civil service examination. OAG 80-77 .

90.350. Appointments — Promotions.

  1. The appointing authority shall make all civil service appointments, and the appointments shall be made only from the lists of applicants certified to him by the civil service commission after examination. Appointments shall be made only by the selection of one (1) of the three (3) holding the highest averages in the particular class and grade wherein the vacancy exists, except as provided in subsection (6) of this section.
  2. Whenever it is imperative to fill a vacancy in classified civil service before the commission can certify a list of as many as three (3) persons eligible for appointment after competitive examination, the appointing authority shall nominate a competent person from the same class or next lower rank to the commission for noncompetitive examination, and if certified by the commission as qualified after the noncompetitive examination he may be appointed provisionally to fill the vacancy until an appointment can be made after competitive examination. This provisional appointment shall continue only until a regular appointment can be made from the eligible list prepared by the commission, which eligible list shall be prepared within sixty (60) days after a vacancy occurs.
  3. In case of great emergency and when no one upon the eligible list or by promotion from a lower rank is available, an appointment may be made by the appointing authority without examination, but in no case shall such appointment continue longer than forty-five (45) days, and in no case shall successive appointments be made of the same person, or other persons, to such vacancy.
  4. Temporary appointments made necessary by reason of illness or disability of regular employees shall continue only during such period of disability.
  5. The death of an employee shall not authorize an appointment without examination.
  6. Whenever, from any cause, there shall be a vacancy in any of the classified services, the employee in said classification ranking next highest in seniority, if he chooses, shall succeed to and fill said vacancy, unless upon charges made by the city that said employee is not qualified to fill said vacancy, and after notice and upon trial to determine his qualifications in the same manner as is now required for the dismissal, suspension or reduction in grade or pay of an employee, it be established by the city that said employee has not the necessary qualifications to enable him to discharge the duties of the office or position in which the said vacancy occurs. Provided that in case of a vacancy in the classified service, where peculiar and exceptional qualifications of a particular professional or educational character are required, upon satisfactory evidence that for reasons stated in writing by the appointing authority, competitive examination in such case has failed to provide an eligible list; the commission may suspend the provisions requiring competitive examination under civil service.
  7. Where the service to be rendered by an appointee in the classified service is for a temporary period, and the need of such service is imperative, the appointing authority may select for that temporary service any person on the list of those eligible for permanent appointment. Successive temporary appointments to the same position shall not be made under this provision. The acceptance or refusal by an eligible applicant of a temporary appointment shall not affect his standing on the register for permanent employment, nor shall temporary service be counted as part of the probationary service in case of subsequent appointment to a permanent position.
  8. No person shall be certified by the commission from an eligible list more than four (4) times to the same appointing authority for the same or similar position.
  9. The appointing authority may provide that all appointments for initial permanent employment may be probationary appointments for a period of not more than twelve (12) months, after which probationary period regular appointments shall be given to all probationary employees who are deemed to be satisfactory by the respective appointing authority.

History. 3235h-4, 3480e-4: amend. Acts 1946, ch. 50, §§ 4, 5; 1956, ch. 246, § 10; 1962, ch. 137, § 3; 1974, ch. 289, § 1; 1982, ch. 281, § 2, effective July 15, 1982; 2014, ch. 92, § 82, effective January 1, 2015.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Exception.

The purpose in providing an exception was to enable cities to fill important positions of a peculiar character that cannot be filled by the regular examination procedure or because of the strict age and voting requirements of KRS 90.330 . City Utility Com. v. Civil Service Com., 396 S.W.2d 801, 1965 Ky. LEXIS 133 ( Ky. 1965 ).

2. Suspension of Examination Requirements.

When the competitive examination is suspended under this section, the requirements to take the examinations are likewise suspended. City Utility Com. v. Civil Service Com., 396 S.W.2d 801, 1965 Ky. LEXIS 133 ( Ky. 1965 ).

3. Age and Residence Requirements.

Judgment holding that although city could suspend a competitive examination for an employee having peculiar and exceptional qualifications of a particular professional and educational character but it could not fail to conduct a noncompetitive examination and require the appointee to meet the qualifications set forth in KRS 90.330 , was erroneous because employee in such category was not required to meet the qualifications as to age and residence. City Utility Com. v. Civil Service Com., 396 S.W.2d 801, 1965 Ky. LEXIS 133 ( Ky. 1965 ).

4. Additional Qualifications.

The implication of subsection (6) of this section is that the legislature has recognized that the appointing authority might require that an applicant possess certain qualifications beyond those set out in KRS 90.330(1) where those qualifications bear a reasonable relationship to the applicant’s ability to satisfactorily perform the job which he seeks. Hardesty v. Owensboro Municipal Utilities Com., 700 S.W.2d 798, 1985 Ky. App. LEXIS 586 (Ky. Ct. App. 1985).

5. Arbitrary Limitation.

Where there was no evidence that the city’s civil service commission had established a requirement of present service as a lineman for filling the position of electrician in either its formal “job description” or “special qualifications” for the position, its action in limiting the civil service examination for the position of electrician to those employees classified as lineman was arbitrary. Hardesty v. Owensboro Municipal Utilities Com., 700 S.W.2d 798, 1985 Ky. App. LEXIS 586 (Ky. Ct. App. 1985).

Cited:

Paducah v. Moore, 662 S.W.2d 491, 1984 Ky. App. LEXIS 435 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984).

Opinions of Attorney General.

“Seniority” refers to promotions within a class of the classified service which would appear to eliminate the possibility of creating a program of departmental seniority since there are many positions of the same class such as laborer, truck driver and equipment operator that are found in the various departments of city government. OAG 78-314 .

The assistant license inspector would not automatically move into the vacant position of license inspector; the assistant license inspector would have to be the person ranking highest in seniority within that classification established under the city’s civil service system which included license inspectors before he could automatically assume the vacant position. OAG 80-449 .

If the chief of police of a city whose civil service operates under KRS 90.300 to 90.420 retires, is terminated, resigns, or is otherwise relieved of his duties as chief, the city council is not required to elevate the assistant chief to the position of chief; the assistant chief serving at that time could only assume the position of chief provided he qualified for the position following his examination pursuant to KRS 90.320 , assuming, of course, that the position of chief continued to remain under the civil service program. OAG 83-215 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Police and firemen, cities of second and third classes, KRS 95.435 to 95.505 .

90.360. Dismissal, suspension, or reduction — Exclusions from classified service.

  1. No employee in the classified service shall be dismissed, suspended, or reduced in grade or pay for any reason except inefficiency, misconduct, insubordination, violation of law involving moral turpitude, or violation of any rule adopted by the city legislative body or civil service commission.
  2. Any person may prefer charges in writing against any employee by filing them with the mayor or other appointing authority who shall communicate the charges without delay to the civil service commission of the city. The charges must be signed by the person making them and must set out clearly each charge. The appointing authority shall, whenever probable cause appears, prefer charges against any employee whom he or she believes guilty of conduct justifying his or her removal. Upon the filing of charges, the clerk of the civil service commission shall notify its members and serve a copy of the charges upon the accused employee with a statement of the date, place, and hour at which the hearing of charges will begin, this hearing not to be held within three (3) days of the date of the service of charges upon the accused employee. The day on which the charges are served on the accused employee shall count as one (1) of the days of notice. The person accused may in writing waive the service of charges and demand trial within three (3) days after they have been filed with the clerk of the civil service commission.
  3. Upon the hearing, the charges shall be considered traversed and put in issue, and the trial shall be limited to the issues presented by the written charges.
  4. The civil service commission shall have the power to summon and compel attendance of witnesses at all hearings by subpoena issued by the clerk of that body and served upon the witnesses by members of the police department of the city or any officer authorized to serve subpoenas. If any witness fails to appear in response to a summons or refuses to testify concerning any matter on which he may lawfully be interrogated, any District Judge, on application of the commission, may compel obedience by proceedings for contempt as in the case of disobedience of a subpoena issued from the District Court. The accused employee shall have the right to have subpoenaed any witnesses he or she may desire, upon furnishing their names to the clerk. As many as ten (10) subpoenas may be served on the request of the accused employee without charge but each additional subpoena requested by him shall be issued by the clerk and served by the police department only upon payment of fifty cents ($0.50) to the city clerk by the employee. The action and decision of the civil service commission on the charges shall be reduced to writing and kept in a book for that purpose and the written charge shall be attached to the book containing the body’s decision.
  5. In cases where the head of the department or the appointing authority has probable cause to believe an employee has been guilty of conduct justifying his removal or punishment he shall immediately suspend that employee from duty or from both pay and duty pending trial and the employee shall not be placed on duty or allowed pay thereafter until the charges are heard by the civil service commission.
  6. The civil service commission shall punish any employee found guilty by reprimand or a suspension for any length of time not to exceed six (6) months, or by reducing the grade, if the employee’s classification warrants, or by combining any two (2) or more of these punishments, or by dismissal. No employee shall be reprimanded, removed, suspended, or dismissed except as provided in this section.
    1. Any of the following offices, positions, and places of employment, in the police and fire departments, may be excluded from the classified service: (7) (a) Any of the following offices, positions, and places of employment, in the police and fire departments, may be excluded from the classified service:
      1. Chief of police;
      2. Assistant chief of police;
      3. Chief of firefighters; and
      4. Assistant chief of firefighters.
    2. Any classified employee in either department who shall accept an appointment and qualify as chief of police, assistant chief of police, chief of firefighters, or assistant chief of firefighters shall be deemed to have received a leave of absence from the classified service for, and during the incumbency of, any of those respective positions. If an individual should cease to serve in any of those positions, there shall be restored to him or her the same classification and rank which he or she held prior to his or her appointment.

History. 3235h-7, 3480e-7: amend. Acts 1944, ch. 107, § 2; 1946, ch. 50, § 6; 1956, ch. 246, § 11; 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 102, effective January 2, 1978; 2000, ch. 359, § 1, effective July 14, 2000; 2014, ch. 92, § 83, effective January 1, 2015.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Restoration.

Where employee classified as “laborer” in water distribution division of city department of work and property was discharged following abolition of his classification, but other laborers younger in point of continuous service were reclassified as service men, he was entitled to restoration of his position. Covington v. Crolley, 283 Ky. 606 , 142 S.W.2d 151, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 377 ( Ky. 1940 ).

Where city employee began work as truck driver, was promoted to storekeeper, and thereafter storekeeper’s position was abolished for reasons of economy, and others younger in service had been promoted to position of truck driver, such employee, against whom no charges had been filed, was entitled to be restored to position of truck driver and allowed back pay, subject to any decrease in truck drivers’ salaries legally made. Covington v. Trenkamp, 287 Ky. 324 , 152 S.W.2d 999, 1941 Ky. LEXIS 547 ( Ky. 1941 ).

2. Reduction of Salary.

Where city soon after changing to city manager form of government passed an ordinance reducing the salary of the city clerk such ordinance was contrary to and in violation of this section and KRS 90.380 . Campbell v. Meredith, 239 S.W.2d 979, 1951 Ky. LEXIS 926 ( Ky. 1951 ).

3. Dismissal Without Cause or Charge.

City employee who did not take the requisite examination did not acquire any civil service status, and could not complain because of his dismissal from employment without cause or charges even though he had made regular pension payments into city fund out of his wages. Elliott v. Covington, 304 Ky. 802 , 202 S.W.2d 621, 1947 Ky. LEXIS 734 ( Ky. 1947 ).

4. Wrongful Discharge.
5. — Damages.

Where the superintendent of public works had apparently had his job responsibilities changed without notice so that he was unfamiliar with the procedures and where he did his best to handle the new task upon learning of it, it was unfair to accuse him of inefficiency, and accordingly he was entitled to damages for his wrongful discharge. Civil Service Board v. Fehler, 578 S.W.2d 254, 1978 Ky. App. LEXIS 669 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).

6. Hearing Required.

Where the utility accused the employee of misrepresenting the employee’s county of residence on the employment application, thereby enabling the employee to become a civil service employee until the alleged misrepresentation was discovered years later, the employee was entitled to a civil service hearing pursuant to KRS 90.360 before termination. City Util. Comm'n v. Phelps, 2003 Ky. App. LEXIS 303 (Ky. Ct. App.), sub. op., 2003 Ky. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1217 (Ky. Ct. App. Nov. 26, 2003).

7. Evidence.

In a hearing concerning dismissal of a superintendent on grounds of inefficiency in snow removal services, the civil service board violated subsection (3) of this section by introducing evidence of a garbage problem which had not been mentioned in the written charges. Civil Service Board v. Fehler, 578 S.W.2d 254, 1978 Ky. App. LEXIS 669 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).

8. Transfer.

City board of commissioners had no inherent authority to transfer a department head where a technical violation of the Civil Service Statutes may have existed in their doing so. Paducah v. Moore, 662 S.W.2d 491, 1984 Ky. App. LEXIS 435 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984).

Transfer from one job category to another with lesser authority is a reduction in grade and is prohibited by this section except for cause and after a hearing on appropriate charges. Paducah v. Moore, 662 S.W.2d 491, 1984 Ky. App. LEXIS 435 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984).

9. Reduction in Grade.

The definition of the term “demotion” contained in KRS 90.110 is applicable in interpreting the term “reduced in grade” referred to in subsection (1) of this section. Paducah v. Moore, 662 S.W.2d 491, 1984 Ky. App. LEXIS 435 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984).

Where, in his prior position, city employee had the responsibility and authority to supervise numerous employees while, in new position to which he was transferred, he was a department head in title only and had neither the duties, responsibility, nor authority to supervise anybody, the trial court did not err in finding and holding that he had been reduced in grade contrary to the provisions of this section. Paducah v. Moore, 662 S.W.2d 491, 1984 Ky. App. LEXIS 435 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984).

10. Authority.

A fourth-class city’s civil service commission lacked the statutory authority to discipline a police officer for allegedly participating in partisan political campaigning which predated not only the officer’s classification as a civil service employee, but the very existence of the commission itself; therefore, the commission’s dismissal of the officer was illegitimate, and the proper forum for any such action was the city council under KRS Ch. 95. Jones v. Hillview Civil Service Com., 760 S.W.2d 91, 1988 Ky. App. LEXIS 93 (Ky. Ct. App. 1988).

Cited:

Black v. Sutton, 299 Ky. 836 , 187 S.W.2d 731 (1945); Civil Service Com. v. Tankersley, 330 S.W.2d 392, 1959 Ky. LEXIS 187 ( Ky. 1959 ); Beckham v. Bowling Green, 743 S.W.2d 858, 1987 Ky. App. LEXIS 603 (Ky. Ct. App. 1987).

Opinions of Attorney General.

A violation of KRS 90.390 for political activity by an employee would constitute “misconduct” within the meaning of this section. OAG 68-382 .

A complaint by a citizen against a member of the police force can be recognized and acted upon by the city civil service commission only when presented through either the mayor or the appointing authority such as the city council and any change in this procedure would require an amendment to this section. OAG 73-515 .

Where charges of misconduct against a city employee are properly presented to a city civil service commission that commission must hold a hearing on such charges and the city council or the officer appointing the employee may not hold such hearing as a substitute, although they may, with probable cause, suspend such employee pending the hearing of the charges by the civil service commission. OAG 73-541 . (Affirming and extending OAG 73-515 .)

In view of KRS 61.815 , closed hearings of a city civil service board under this section or KRS 95.450 require no public notice. OAG 75-354 .

An employee being given a hearing by a city civil service board under this section or KRS 95.450 may, under KRS 61.810 , compel the exclusion from the hearing of all persons except the board members, himself, legal counsel, a stenographer and witnesses while testifying. OAG 75-354 .

In view of KRS 61.810 , hearings by a city civil service board under this section or KRS 95.450 need not be open to the public. OAG 75-354 .

Any failure on the part of the mayor to forward a complaint to the civil service commission would subject him to a mandamus action, either on the part of the person preferring the charges or on part of the commission, to require him to submit such charges to the commission. OAG 76-286 .

In view of the fact that a civil service commission is merely an agency of city government and possesses only those powers delegated to it by law or ordinance, a commission would not have the power to hire private counsel for representation at hearings relating to the dismissal, suspension or reduction of pay of a classified employee, and any decision concerning the appeal of adverse court decisions would fall within the jurisdiction of the city legislative body and not the commission. OAG 76-286 .

Although a utility commission operating under KRS 96.530 has authority to employ its own counsel to represent it in matters germane to the commission, when the commission itself is the complaining party before the civil service commission, it would be unethical for the utility commission’s attorney to represent the civil service commission, normally it is the responsibility of the city attorney, in a hearing under this section. OAG 79-171 .

An employee of the utility commission must be given an opportunity for a hearing before the civil service commission before dismissal or suspension. OAG 79-171 .

The hearing provisions of this section should be conducted in a trial-type manner for a record to be available for appeal. OAG 79-171 .

When the complaining party is the utility commission, the members of the commission appear to substantiate their charges, and at the same time be represented by the commission’s attorney for the purpose of presenting their argument and the cross-examination of witnesses. OAG 79-171 .

The city utility commission exercises the same authority over its employees as the city with respect to number and compensation; furthermore, the city utility commission is bound by the provisions of this section concerning dismissal, suspension or reduction. OAG 83-57 .

As chief executive officer of the city, the mayor has the authority to make the necessary appointments of police officers who are duly certified by the city’s civil service commission, to the various positions under the civil service program, and the city legislative body has no authority by resolution or otherwise to assign or reassign a reinstated police officer to any duties within the police department as this is purely an executive function. OAG 84-3 .

An employee’s request that he be allowed to return to job he held prior to promotion, which would involve a reduction in pay, involved a reduction in grade or pay or, in other words, a demotion within the meaning of this section. OAG 84-87 .

The purpose of this section is simply to prohibit a covered employee from being dismissed, suspended or reduced in grade or pay against his will without first affording him due process; an employee’s request to be allowed to return to his former position which constitutes a reduction in grade and pay, can be approved by the Civil Service Commission without violating the terms of this section. OAG 84-87 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Kentucky Law Survey, Rogers and Sims, Administrative Law, 69 Ky. L.J. 489 (1980-81).

90.370. Action in Circuit Court.

  1. Any employee of the city found guilty by the civil service commission of any charge as provided by KRS 90.360 may bring an action in the Circuit Court of the county in which the city is located to contest the action of that body.
  2. Upon request in writing by the accused, and the payment of costs therefor, the clerk of the civil service commission shall file a certified copy of the charges and the judgment of that body in the Circuit Court. Upon the transcript being filed the case shall be docketed in the Circuit Court and tried as an original action.
  3. If the clerk fails to certify the transcript to the Circuit Court within five (5) days after the request is made, then the aggrieved person may file an affidavit in that court setting out as fully as possible the charges made at the time of trial and judgment, together with a statement that demand for the transcript had been made of the clerk more than five (5) days prior to the filing of the affidavit. Upon filing of this affidavit in the Circuit Court, the case shall be docketed in that court and the court may compel the filing of the transcript by the clerk by entering proper mandatory order, and upon failure of the clerk so to do, he shall be liable to fine and imprisonment for contempt. Such action shall have precedence over other business and be determined speedily.

History. 3235h-8, 3480e-8: amend. Acts 1944, ch. 107, § 3; 1946, ch. 50, § 7; 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 103, effective January 2, 1978.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

Civil Service Com. v. Tankersley, 330 S.W.2d 392, 1959 Ky. LEXIS 187 ( Ky. 1959 ); Civil Service Board v. Fehler, 578 S.W.2d 254, 1978 Ky. App. LEXIS 669 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).

Opinions of Attorney General.

In view of the fact a civil service commission is merely an agency of city government and possesses only those powers delegated to it by law or ordinance, a commission would not have the power to hire private counsel for representation at hearings relating to the dismissal, suspension or reduction of pay of a classified employee, and any decision concerning the appeal of adverse court decisions would fall within the jurisdiction of the city legislative body and not the commission. OAG 76-286 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Kentucky Law Survey, Rogers and Sims, Administrative Law, 69 Ky. L.J. 489 (1980-81).

90.380. Number of employees — Salaries — Protection from dismissal, suspension, or reduction — Abolishment of office or position — Reinstatement.

  1. The city legislative body shall fix by ordinance the number and classification of city employees, and the salaries for each classification. When the number of employees and their classification has been fixed by ordinance, no employee shall be dismissed, suspended, or reduced in grade or pay for any reason except that set out in KRS 90.360 .
  2. Provided, further, that: Whenever in the exercise of a reasonable discretion, it shall be the judgment of the legislative body of the city that economic necessity requires it, or that there is no longer a need for a particular office or position to exist, the board of commissioners may abolish said office or position and any officer or employee occupying said office or position may be laid-off or suspended until and if such office or position is re-created or reestablished. The abolition of any office or position must not be a subterfuge to effect another purpose, but must be actual and bona fide and must not amount to the mere alteration, modification, or abolition of title only.
  3. Should any officer or employee conceive that he has been aggrieved by the abolition or the proposed abolition of said office or position, he may, at any time within ninety (90) days, file a petition in equity in the Circuit Court of the county wherein the city is located, stating his reason why the position or office has not been fairly abolished, or why it should not be abolished, and upon issue joined thereon by the city, the burden shall be on the latter to establish the necessity for and the good faith of the city in abolishing said office or position. The right to abolish and the right to have the office or position re-created shall be determined as other equitable actions are determined.
  4. If the office or position is re-created or reestablished within five (5) years, then any person who was deprived of his office or position shall be restored to the office or position he formerly held or occupied in the order of his seniority if he shall elect to do so, and the city shall advise said officer or employee at his last known address and advertise pursuant to KRS Chapter 424, that the office or position has been re-created or reestablished.

History. 3235h-9, 3480e-9: amend. Acts 1946, ch. 50, § 8; 1966, ch. 239, § 64.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Reduction in Grade.

Where, in his prior position, city employee had the responsibility and authority to supervise numerous employees while, in new position to which he was transferred, he was a department head in title only and had neither the duties, responsibility, nor authority to supervise anybody, the trial court did not err in finding and holding that he had been reduced in grade contrary to the provisions of KRS 90.360 . Paducah v. Moore, 662 S.W.2d 491, 1984 Ky. App. LEXIS 435 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984).

2. Transfer.

City board of commissioners had no inherent authority to transfer a department head where a technical violation of the Civil Service Statutes may have existed in their doing so. Paducah v. Moore, 662 S.W.2d 491, 1984 Ky. App. LEXIS 435 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984).

Cited:

Beckham v. Bowling Green, 743 S.W.2d 858, 1987 Ky. App. LEXIS 603 (Ky. Ct. App. 1987).

Opinions of Attorney General.

The city utility commission exercises the same authority over its employees as the city with respect to number and compensation; furthermore, the city utility commission is bound by the provisions of KRS 90.360 concerning dismissal, suspension or reduction. OAG 83-57 .

90.390. Prohibition of political activity.

  1. No person shall be appointed to any position because of political partisan service rendered by him or his family, or because of political sentiment or affiliation, nor shall any person be dismissed or reduced in grade because of any political opinion.
  2. No employee shall coerce or persuade another, or in any way actively participate in any election, or cause others to do so.

History. 3235h-6, 3480e-6; 2014, ch. 92, § 84, effective January 1, 2015.

Opinions of Attorney General.

A civil service employee of a city would violate this section if he were to become a candidate for state office and would jeopardize his civil service status with the city. OAG 67-91 .

A violation of this section for political activity by an employee would constitute “misconduct” within the meaning of KRS 90.360 . OAG 68-382 .

A violation of this section by a merit employee who files for a city commissioner would not affect the legality of the filing and the clerk would have to accept the candidate’s papers and place him on the special city primary ballot in accordance with the requirements of KRS 89.440 (now repealed); however, such civil service employee would be subject to possible dismissal under the terms of KRS 90.360 and would also be subject to the penalties provided for under KRS 90.990 . OAG 77-243 .

Civil service employees of second-class cities operating under KRS ch. 90 may not file for and seek an elective post as city commissioner while maintaining their employment in civil service status. OAG 77-243 .

A city employee of a second class city would be eligible to seek an elective office and continue to retain his employment unless he is under a civil service program such as that outlined in KRS Chapter 90 and particularly subsection (2) of this section. OAG 83-255 .

90.400. Pension fund in cities — Coverage provided in County Employees Retirement System after August 1, 1988 — Repeal of ordinances established for creation or maintenance of pension fund — Liquidation and distribution of residual assets — Report. [Effective until July 15, 2020]

  1. Any city maintaining a pension fund for employees under civil service hired before August 1, 1988, operating pursuant to this section as of January 1, 2015, shall continue to operate the existing pension fund in accordance with this section. The city may assess monthly such amount or percent of the salary of the employees as may be equitably determined on a fair actuarial basis, the assessment to be deducted from the employees’ salaries and paid in cash into the pension fund.
  2. The city may make current contributions to the fund on an actuarially funded basis, toward the annuities and benefits herein provided. These contributions shall be equal to the sum of the following:
    1. An annual amount resulting from the application of a rate percent of salaries of active members, representing the present value of the actuarial reserve requirements for membership service, for service retirement annuity, disability retirement annuity, and annuities to surviving spouses and children, and the one-year term premium for the city’s liability for death benefits, after applying the contribution by the active members. Such rate percent shall be fixed by the city legislative body at least once every three (3) to five (5) years after completion of the actuarial valuation required by KRS 65.156 , and shall be in effect until the next actuarial valuation is completed by the fund.
    2. An amount resulting from the application of a rate percent of the salaries of active members which will provide each year regular interest on the remaining liability for prior service.
  3. The city may create or continue to operate a board for the pension fund and designate trustees of that board to serve as the governing body of the fund, and may fix the powers of the trustees, determine the eligibility of employees or their dependents to a pension or other benefit, and may provide a monthly allowance for employees eligible for a pension.
  4. Temporary employees appointed without examination shall not be compelled to contribute to any pension fund and shall not be eligible to benefits.
  5. In no year shall the contribution by the city to the pension fund, in the manner provided in this section, be less than the total amount assessed upon and deducted from the salary of the employees.
  6. The trustees of the pension fund shall, at least once every three months, report in writing to the mayor the receipts, expenditures, and financial status of the pension fund, stating the places of deposit of funds, or the character of investments made, and the mayor shall cause copies of the report to be posted in at least three (3) places where city employees frequent and report.
  7. When any city maintaining a pension fund for employees under civil service hired before August 1, 1988, operating pursuant to this section as of January 1, 2015, picks up employee contributions pursuant to KRS 65.155 , or accepts from its employees a portion of their wages and contributes city funds therefor, an inviolable contract shall be created between the city as employer and its employees, and the city and its employees shall continue to operate under KRS 90.310 to 90.390 and the adopting ordinance, except that employees, pursuant to subsection (8) of this section, may choose to participate in the County Employees Retirement System. A repeal of that ordinance by the city shall in no wise affect such employees unless by the mutual consent of the city and an employee or employees.
  8. After August 1, 1988, no new pension fund shall be created pursuant to this section, and cities which were covered by this section on or prior to August 1, 1988, shall participate in the County Employees Retirement System effective August 1, 1988. Any city which provided a pension plan for its employees on or prior to August 1, 1988, shall place employees hired after August 1, 1988, in the County Employees Retirement System. The board shall offer employees hired on or prior to August 1, 1988, membership in the County Employees Retirement System under the alternate participation plan as described in KRS 78.530(3), but such employees may elect to retain coverage under this section.
  9. If all liabilities to all individuals entitled to benefits have been satisfied for a pension fund covered by this section, any ordinances established for creation or maintenance of the fund may be repealed by the majority vote of the duly elected members of the entire legislative body of the city. If repealed, the governing body of the fund shall, within sixty (60) days of repeal, proceed with the liquidation of any residual assets of the fund. All residual assets liquidated pursuant to this subsection shall be distributed by the fund’s governing body to the city government’s general fund so long as the return of assets complies with federal and state law governing the distribution of assets. Within thirty (30) days following the distribution of residual assets, the governing body of the fund shall as its last act file a complete report with the legislative body of the city of the actions taken to dissolve the fund and liquidate residual assets of the fund for retention by the city clerk the same as for other city records.

HISTORY: 3235h-2, 3235h-10: amend. Acts 1960, ch. 26; 2016 ch. 31, § 5, effective July 15, 2016.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Failure to Take Examination.

Where city employee did not attain lawful civil service status in the first instance, because he did not take the requisite examination, the fact that pension plan contributions were deducted from his wages during the period of his employment did not give him any civil service status under the provisions of subsection (6) (now (7)) of this section. Elliott v. Covington, 304 Ky. 802 , 202 S.W.2d 621, 1947 Ky. LEXIS 734 ( Ky. 1947 ).

2. Financial Report.

Where a second-class city published and made available to city employees a financial statement of the civil service pension fund, even though this section requires only that the trustees of the fund give a written report to the mayor every three months and post the report in a conspicuous place for the employees, the city’s action constituted sufficient compliance with this section. American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees v. Paducah, 471 S.W.2d 18, 1971 Ky. LEXIS 223 ( Ky. 1971 ).

3. Urban-county Government.

The statutes governing merit and pension systems of cities of the second class do not control the urban-county government established in Fayette County because provision of such systems is a matter of the structure of government and not its powers which could only be defined by the general assembly. Holsclaw v. Stephens, 507 S.W.2d 462, 1973 Ky. LEXIS 3 ( Ky. 1973 ).

4. Judicial Review of Administrative Decision.

A city, by ordinance, cannot limit the power of a court to review a decision made by an administrative agency of the city; thus, a section of a city ordinance, which purported to limit the time and scope of judicial review of a decision by the board of trustees of the city’s pension fund, was unconstitutional. Covington v. Tranter, 673 S.W.2d 744, 1984 Ky. App. LEXIS 527 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984).

Opinions of Attorney General.

The tax for a pension fund for civil service employees must be levied on all property subject to tax without regard to what may be exempted locally by the city from local city taxes. OAG 67-559 .

Where a city has established a pension fund and implemented it by ordinance creating a board of trustees of which the mayor and city comptroller are ex officio members, the mayor and city comptroller stand in the same position as the other members of the board and must be counted in determining a quorum, may participate in matters before the board and have the same voting rights as other members. OAG 76-595 .

The failure of a municipality to levy sufficient tax to meet pension demands will not render it liable in damages; however, a municipality must make contributions to the fund and, in appropriate instances, mandamus will lie to compel it to do so. OAG 80-363 .

This section apparently makes it optional on the part of a city of the second class as to whether or not its current contributions to the city employee’s pension fund are on an actuarially funded basis by the use of the word “may” in subsection (2) of this section which is a permissive term under KRS 446.010(20). OAG 80.363.

Only those employees placed under civil service by virtue of the adoption of KRS 90.300 to 90.410 are entitled to participate in the pension fund established by this section. OAG 83-15 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Police and firemen’s pension fund, cities of second class, KRS 95.520 to 95.620 .

90.400. Pension fund in cities — Coverage provided in County Employees Retirement System after August 1, 1988 — Option to convert pension benefits to annuity benefits — Repeal of ordinances established for creation or maintenance of pension fund — Liquidation and distribution of residual assets — Report. [Effective July 15, 2020]

  1. Any city maintaining a pension fund for employees under civil service hired before August 1, 1988, operating pursuant to this section as of January 1, 2015, shall continue to operate the existing pension fund in accordance with this section. The city may assess monthly such amount or percent of the salary of the employees as may be equitably determined on a fair actuarial basis, the assessment to be deducted from the employees’ salaries and paid in cash into the pension fund.
  2. The city may make current contributions to the fund on an actuarially funded basis, toward the annuities and benefits herein provided. These contributions shall be equal to the sum of the following:
    1. An annual amount resulting from the application of a rate percent of salaries of active members, representing the present value of the actuarial reserve requirements for membership service, for service retirement annuity, disability retirement annuity, and annuities to surviving spouses and children, and the one (1) year term premium for the city’s liability for death benefits, after applying the contribution by the active members. Such rate percent shall be fixed by the city legislative body at least once every three (3) to five (5) years after completion of the actuarial valuation required by KRS 65.156 , and shall be in effect until the next actuarial valuation is completed by the fund.
    2. An amount resulting from the application of a rate percent of the salaries of active members which will provide each year regular interest on the remaining liability for prior service.
  3. The city may create or continue to operate a board for the pension fund and designate trustees of that board to serve as the governing body of the fund, and may fix the powers of the trustees, determine the eligibility of employees or their dependents to a pension or other benefit, and may provide a monthly allowance for employees eligible for a pension.
  4. Temporary employees appointed without examination shall not be compelled to contribute to any pension fund and shall not be eligible to benefits.
  5. In no year shall the contribution by the city to the pension fund, in the manner provided in this section, be less than the total amount assessed upon and deducted from the salary of the employees.
  6. The trustees of the pension fund shall, at least once every three (3) months, report in writing to the mayor the receipts, expenditures, and financial status of the pension fund, stating the places of deposit of funds, or the character of investments made, and the mayor shall cause copies of the report to be posted in at least three (3) places where city employees frequent and report.
  7. When any city maintaining a pension fund for employees under civil service hired before August 1, 1988, operating pursuant to this section as of January 1, 2015, picks up employee contributions pursuant to KRS 65.155 , or accepts from its employees a portion of their wages and contributes city funds therefor, an inviolable contract shall be created between the city as employer and its employees, and the city and its employees shall continue to operate under KRS 90.310 to 90.390 and the adopting ordinance, except that employees, pursuant to subsection (8) of this section, may choose to participate in the County Employees Retirement System. A repeal of that ordinance by the city shall in no wise affect such employees unless by the mutual consent of the city and an employee or employees.
  8. After August 1, 1988, no new pension fund shall be created pursuant to this section, and cities which were covered by this section on or prior to August 1, 1988, shall participate in the County Employees Retirement System effective August 1, 1988. Any city which provided a pension plan for its employees on or prior to August 1, 1988, shall place employees hired after August 1, 1988, in the County Employees Retirement System. The board shall offer employees hired on or prior to August 1, 1988, membership in the County Employees Retirement System under the alternate participation plan as described in KRS 78.530(3), but such employees may elect to retain coverage under this section.
  9. If there are fewer than twelve (12) active and retired members or beneficiaries of the pension fund, the governing body of the fund may elect to offer to individuals entitled to benefits from the fund a one (1) time irrevocable option to convert monthly pension benefits from the fund to monthly annuity benefits from an insurance company for the same amount. An insurance company accepting a benefit transfer shall honor any features and options available under the existing plan. If the governing body of the fund elects to offer the option to convert monthly pension benefits to monthly annuity benefits, it shall provide to individuals entitled to benefits from the fund sufficiently complete and appropriate disclosures to assist in making an informed decision.
  10. If all liabilities to all individuals entitled to benefits have been satisfied for a pension fund covered by this section, any ordinances established for creation or maintenance of the fund may be repealed by the majority vote of the duly elected members of the entire legislative body of the city. If repealed, the governing body of the fund shall, within sixty (60) days of repeal, proceed with the liquidation of any residual assets of the fund. All residual assets liquidated pursuant to this subsection shall be distributed by the fund’s governing body to the city government’s general fund so long as the return of assets complies with federal and state law governing the distribution of assets. Within thirty (30) days following the distribution of residual assets, the governing body of the fund shall as its last act file a complete report with the legislative body of the city of the actions taken to dissolve the fund and liquidate residual assets of the fund for retention by the city clerk the same as for other city records.

HISTORY: 3235h-2, 3235h-10: amend. Acts 1960, ch. 26; 2016 ch. 31, § 5, effective July 15, 2016; 2020 ch. 121, § 1, effective July 15, 2020.

90.410. Pension fund in cities — Increase in benefits — Coverage provided in County Employees Retirement System after August 1, 1988 — Repeal of ordinances established for creation or maintenance of pension fund — Liquidation and distribution of residual assets — Report. [Effective until July 15, 2020]

  1. Any city maintaining a pension fund for employees under civil service hired before August 1, 1988, operating pursuant to this section as of January 1, 2015, shall continue to operate the existing pension fund in accordance with this section. The city may assess monthly such amount or percent of the salary of employees as may be equitably determined on a fair actuarial basis, not to exceed five percent (5%) of the monthly salary of any employee. The city legislative body shall contribute city revenues to the fund which shall be not less than the contributions of the employees.
  2. The city may create a board for the pension fund and designate trustees of that board to serve as the governing body of the fund, and may fix the powers of trustees, determine the eligibility of employees or their dependents to a pension or other benefit, and may provide a monthly allowance for employees eligible for a pension, not to exceed one-half (1/2) of the monthly salary of any employee at the time of his retirement.
  3. In order to adjust retirement benefits to the purchasing power of the dollar, the city may annually provide an increase in benefits paid pursuant to this section. The city may provide an increase of any amount up to the increase in the consumer price index calculated pursuant to KRS 64.527 , but in no case shall the annual increase exceed five percent (5%).
  4. When any city maintaining a pension fund for employees under civil service hired before August 1, 1988, operating pursuant to this section as of January 1, 2015, picks up employee contributions pursuant to KRS 65.155 , or accepts from its employees a portion of their wages and contributes city funds therefor, an inviolable contract shall be created between the city as employer and its employees, and the city and its employees shall continue to operate under KRS 90.310 to 90.390 and the adopting ordinance, except that employees, pursuant to subsection (5) of this section, may choose to participate in the County Employees Retirement System. A repeal of that ordinance by the city shall in no wise affect such employees unless by the mutual consent of the city and an employee or employees.
  5. After August 1, 1988, no new pension fund shall be created pursuant to this section, and cities which were covered by this section on or prior to August 1, 1988, shall participate in the County Employees Retirement System effective August 1, 1988. Any city which provided a pension plan for its employees on or prior to August 1, 1988, shall place employees hired after August 1, 1988, in the County Employees Retirement System. The board shall offer employees hired on or prior to August 1, 1988, membership in the County Employees Retirement System under the alternate participation plan as described in KRS 78.530(3), but such employees may elect to retain coverage under this section.
  6. If all liabilities to all individuals entitled to benefits have been satisfied for a pension fund covered by this section, any ordinances established for creation or maintenance of the fund may be repealed by the majority vote of the duly elected members of the entire legislative body of the city. If repealed, the governing body of the fund shall, within sixty (60) days of repeal, proceed with the liquidation of any residual assets of the fund. All residual assets liquidated pursuant to this subsection shall be distributed by the fund’s governing body to the city government’s general fund so long as the return of assets complies with federal and state law governing the distribution of assets. Within thirty (30) days following the distribution of residual assets, the governing body of the fund shall as its last act file a complete report with the legislative body of the city of the actions taken to dissolve the fund and liquidate residual assets of the fund for retention by the city clerk the same as for other city records.

HISTORY: 3480e-2, 3480e-10: amend. Acts 1982, ch. 166, § 47, effective July 15, 1982; 2016 ch. 31, § 6, effective July 15, 2016.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

Sections 90.300 to 90.400 , this section and city ordinance passed thereunder, do not, in guaranteeing tenure and pension benefits to city employees, create a debt against the city in violation of Ky. Const., § 157. Henderson v. Thomy, 307 Ky. 783 , 212 S.W.2d 303, 1948 Ky. LEXIS 831 ( Ky. 1948 ).

2. City Attorney.

Although KRS 89.040 (now repealed) abolished office of city attorney in third-class cities it had the effect of abolishing it in name only and did not affect KRS 69.480 (now repealed) and 69.490 (now repealed) fixing his qualifications and duties, therefore such city attorney is an officer and not an employee and as an officer he has no vested right in the office he holds, and appointment of city attorney under civil service ordinance whereby he has portion of his salary deducted and placed in pension fund does not make him an employee. Black v. Sutton, 301 Ky. 247 , 191 S.W.2d 407, 1945 Ky. LEXIS 733 ( Ky. 1945 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

There is no statutory or common-law incompatibility to prohibit the city clerk from also serving as secretary of the board of trustees of the pension fund and as a voting member of the board of trustees. OAG 61-1047 .

A city is authorized to repeal any civil service ordinance it may enact provided it has not at the time of the repeal elected to operate a pension fund system pursuant to this section. OAG 67-115 .

Under subsection (3) (now (4)) of this section a civil service employee is given an inviolable contract when the city adopts an ordinance creating a pension fund and the employee’s right to such pension cannot be altered unless by consent. OAG 67-235 .

A city has no authority to establish an employee’s pension plan under the operation of the combined electric, water and sewer systems of the city by the electric plant board organized under the TVA Act, particularly where the plan would involve an insurance company handling the pension fund. OAG 68-19 .

A city of the fourth class would be required to authorize the procedure outlined in this section with respect to establishing a pension fund for its employees. OAG 73-218 .

If a city of the fourth class creates a pension fund for its employees under this section, and creates a separate pension fund for the police and firemen under KRS 95.761 , subsection (4) would prohibit the combining of the two funds, since the adoption of such pension plans may not be revoked, rescinded or repealed. OAG 73-218 .

Even though a city has not established a pension fund pursuant to this section and has elected to be covered under the County Employees Retirement System (KRS 78.510(10) and 78.530(1)) it nevertheless must continue to operate its civil service system (excluding retirement) pursuant to KRS, ch. 90. OAG 74-615 .

A third-class city that has enacted by ordinance a pension system pursuant to this section has the power to enact and enforce as a part of that pension system a provision that members whose employment terminates prior to death or retirement are to receive as a refund only one half of their individual contributions. OAG 79-351 .

Neither this section nor any other provision under this chapter as it relates to pension funds adopted by cities of the third class contains any provision for refunding contributions though this section does create an inviolable contract between the city and its employees. OAG 79-351 .

A city may provide in the pension ordinance for consultation with a private investment company having expertise in this field, the cost to be paid as an administrative cost in connection with the operation of the fund or to be paid from the general fund of the city since there is no provision restricting the use of pension funds solely to the payment of pensions. OAG 82-64 .

A fourth-class city may create a board to administer the pension fund under subsection (2) of this section and such board is not limited in its ability to contract for investment advice provided it is authorized in an appropriate ordinance creating the board since there is no restriction in this section as to the powers and duties that can be given the board. OAG 82-64 .

A pension plan adopted pursuant to KRS 95.761 and KRS 90.300 et seq., may not validly provide that, on repeal of the enabling ordinance, “all unexpended moneys appropriated to said pension fund out of the said city’s general fund to the Police and Fire Fighters’ Fund by the said Board of Council of such city and at the time of adoption of a repeal ordinance shall revert back to the city’s general fund,” and such contribution must remain in the fund to be paid on eventual retirement of the contributing police and fire fighters; KRS 95.761 (4) (now KRS 95.761(5)) clearly prohibits the repeal of any pension ordinance adopted under KRS 90.300 to 90.410 or, for that matter, under KRS 95.520 to 95.620 . OAG 82-64 .

If a fourth-class city elects to operate its civil service program under KRS 95.762 to 95.778 , it cannot operate under any portions of Ch. 90 or KRS 95.520 to 95.620 ; on the other hand, if the city does not adopt the civil service program under Ch. 95, it has the right under KRS 95.761 (3) to adopt the provisions of KRS 90.300 to 90.420 , and in doing so has the option of adopting a pension fund as provided in this section; however, the only pension fund it may adopt, if it operates under Ch. 90, is the one provided for in that act and the city cannot, for example, utilize the pension system provided for under KRS 95.520 to 95.620 or the pension system under KRS 95.761 to 95.785 . OAG 82-64 .

An employee of the city utility commission, operating under the civil service provisions of KRS 90.300 to 90.410 , who is promoted to an administrative or directorial position with the utility commission after July 15, 1982, where the administrative or directorial position has not been designated an employee position prior to January 1, 1983, does not retain his civil service status as he is no longer an employee under KRS 90.300 (1)(f); neither KRS 90.400 , dealing with the pension fund in cities of the second class, nor any other section of KRS 90.300 to 90.410 , contains any provision for the retention of rights relative to civil service and a pension when a person ceases to be an employee as defined by statute. OAG 83-57 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Police and firemen’s pension fund, cities of third class, KRS 95.520 to 95.620 .

90.410. Pension fund in cities — Increase in benefits — Coverage provided in County Employees Retirement System after August 1, 1988 — Option to convert pension benefits to annuity benefits — Repeal of ordinances established for creation or maintenance of pension fund — Liquidation and distribution of residual assets — Report. [Effective July 15, 2020]

  1. Any city maintaining a pension fund for employees under civil service hired before August 1, 1988, operating pursuant to this section as of January 1, 2015, shall continue to operate the existing pension fund in accordance with this section. The city may assess monthly such amount or percent of the salary of employees as may be equitably determined on a fair actuarial basis, not to exceed five percent (5%) of the monthly salary of any employee. The city legislative body shall contribute city revenues to the fund which shall be not less than the contributions of the employees.
  2. The city may create a board for the pension fund and designate trustees of that board to serve as the governing body of the fund, and may fix the powers of trustees, determine the eligibility of employees or their dependents to a pension or other benefit, and may provide a monthly allowance for employees eligible for a pension, not to exceed one-half (1/2) of the monthly salary of any employee at the time of his or her retirement.
  3. In order to adjust retirement benefits to the purchasing power of the dollar, the city may annually provide an increase in benefits paid pursuant to this section. The city may provide an increase of any amount up to the increase in the consumer price index calculated pursuant to KRS 64.527 , but in no case shall the annual increase exceed five percent (5%).
  4. When any city maintaining a pension fund for employees under civil service hired before August 1, 1988, operating pursuant to this section as of January 1, 2015, picks up employee contributions pursuant to KRS 65.155 , or accepts from its employees a portion of their wages and contributes city funds therefor, an inviolable contract shall be created between the city as employer and its employees, and the city and its employees shall continue to operate under KRS 90.310 to 90.390 and the adopting ordinance, except that employees, pursuant to subsection (5) of this section, may choose to participate in the County Employees Retirement System. A repeal of that ordinance by the city shall in no wise affect such employees unless by the mutual consent of the city and an employee or employees.
  5. After August 1, 1988, no new pension fund shall be created pursuant to this section, and cities which were covered by this section on or prior to August 1, 1988, shall participate in the County Employees Retirement System effective August 1, 1988. Any city which provided a pension plan for its employees on or prior to August 1, 1988, shall place employees hired after August 1, 1988, in the County Employees Retirement System. The board shall offer employees hired on or prior to August 1, 1988, membership in the County Employees Retirement System under the alternate participation plan as described in KRS 78.530(3), but such employees may elect to retain coverage under this section.
  6. If there are fewer than twelve (12) active and retired members or beneficiaries of the pension fund, the governing body of the fund may elect to offer to individuals entitled to benefits from the fund a one (1) time irrevocable option to convert monthly pension benefits from the fund to monthly annuity benefits from an insurance company for the same amount. An insurance company accepting a benefit transfer shall honor any features and options available under the existing plan. If the governing body of the fund elects to offer the option to convert monthly pension benefits to monthly annuity benefits, it shall provide to individuals entitled to benefits from the fund sufficiently complete and appropriate disclosures to assist in making an informed decision.
  7. If all liabilities to all individuals entitled to benefits have been satisfied for a pension fund covered by this section, any ordinances established for creation or maintenance of the fund may be repealed by the majority vote of the duly elected members of the entire legislative body of the city. If repealed, the governing body of the fund shall, within sixty (60) days of repeal, proceed with the liquidation of any residual assets of the fund. All residual assets liquidated pursuant to this subsection shall be distributed by the fund’s governing body to the city government’s general fund so long as the return of assets complies with federal and state law governing the distribution of assets. Within thirty (30) days following the distribution of residual assets, the governing body of the fund shall as its last act file a complete report with the legislative body of the city of the actions taken to dissolve the fund and liquidate residual assets of the fund for retention by the city clerk the same as for other city records.

HISTORY: 3480e-2, 3480e-10: amend. Acts 1982, ch. 166, § 47, effective July 15, 1982; 2016 ch. 31, § 6, effective July 15, 2016; 2020 ch. 121, § 2, effective July 15, 2020.

90.420. Rights under former acts preserved. [Repealed.]

Any rights, benefits, choses in action or claims owned or possessed by any employee of a city of the second class or his estate or next of kin, on June 12, 1940, and which arose or grew out of the provisions of Chapter 53 of the Acts of 1938, and any rights, benefits, choses in action or claims arising under any ordinance passed by a city of the second class under the powers conferred by Chapter 53 of the Acts of 1938, are preserved and sustained. The acquired status of any such employee under the civil service system authorized by Chapter 53 of the Acts of 1938 shall not be changed, or his rank or classification altered, nor shall the immunity from examination or the rank or grade acquired by previous service to the city, under the provisions of Chapter 53 of the Acts of 1938 and the ordinances passed thereunder, be destroyed, reduced or altered.

History. 3235h-11a; § 314.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3235h-11a) was repealed by Acts 2014, ch. 92, § 314, effective January 1, 2015.

Penalties

90.990. Penalties.

Any person who shall knowingly, or wittingly, or intentionally, or through gross negligence, violate any of the provisions of this chapter shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall upon conviction thereof be subject to a fine of not less than fifty dollars ($50) nor more than five hundred dollars ($500), provided, however, that the provisions of this section shall not apply to KRS 90.220 .

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 16, § 10; 1962, ch. 137, § 4; 2014, ch. 92, § 87, effective January 1, 2015.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

Acts 1942, ch. 16, § 15, repealed KRS 90.990 of the Bill to Revise the Kentucky Statutes, which was derived from §§ 2863-9 and 2863-10 of Carroll’s Statutes.

CHAPTER 91 Finance and Revenue of Cities of the First Class

91.010. Fiscal year. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2754: amend. Acts 1944, ch. 89, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1952, ch. 56, § 2, effective June 19, 1952.

Financial Officers

91.020. Department of public finance — Organization and general powers. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2902-2, 2902-3, 2902-5, 2902-7) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980.

91.030. Receipt, custody and disbursement of city funds, receipts. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2902-3: amend. Acts 1948, ch. 71, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1952, ch. 56, § 2, effective June 19, 1952.

91.040. Depository for city funds. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2903) was repealed by Acts 1952, ch. 56, § 2, effective June 19, 1952.

91.050. Accounts and records kept by director of finance; duties as to claims against city; countersigning of checks. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2902-4, 2902-6: amend. Acts 1948, ch. 70, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1952, ch. 56, § 2, effective June 19, 1952.

91.060. Custody of city records and seal — Printing of ordinances — Copies of records. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2902-3, 2902-5) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980.

91.070. Reports to be made by director of finance. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2902-3, 2902-4) was repealed by Acts 1952, ch. 56, § 2, effective June 19, 1952.

91.080. Comptroller and inspector. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2897-1 to 2897-3, 2902-3) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 232, § 7 and by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980.

91.090. Accountant. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2901-1, 2901-2: amend. Acts 1948, ch. 72, §.n 1; 1958, ch. 126, § 7, effective June 19, 1958) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 232, § 7 and by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980.

91.100. Assessor. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2906) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980.

91.110. Tax receiver. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2904: amend. Acts 1948, ch. 69, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980.

91.120. City buyer — City purchases. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2801, 2822) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980.

Sinking Fund

91.125. Definitions. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1978, ch. 374, § 1, effective June 17, 1978) was repealed by Acts 1982, ch. 434, § 15, effective July 15, 1982.

91.130. Commissioners of the sinking fund. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3010-1 to 3010-6: amend. 1978, ch. 374, § 2, effective June 17, 1978) was repealed by Acts 1982, ch. 434, § 15, effective July 15, 1982.

91.140. Officers and employes of sinking fund — Powers as peace officers — Recording of names in district court. [Repealed]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3010-2, 3010-5, 3010-16: amend. Acts 1948, ch. 149, § 1; 1958, ch. 126, § 8; 1968, ch. 152, § 64; 1978, ch. 374, § 3, effective June 17, 1978) was repealed by Acts 1982, ch. 434, § 15, effective July 15, 1982.

91.150. Sinking fund, control and use of — Taxes for. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3010-8, 3010-9, 3010-13, 3010-18: amend. Acts 1948, ch. 149, § 2; 1978, ch. 374, § 4, effective June 17, 1978) was repealed by Acts 1982, ch. 434, § 15, effective July 15, 1982.

91.160. Depository for sinking fund — Withdrawals. [Repealed]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3010-12: amend. Acts 1978, ch. 374, § 5, effective June 17, 1978) was repealed by Acts 1982, ch. 434, § 15, effective July 15, 1982.

91.170. Power of sinking fund commissioners to borrow money. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3010-11: amend. 1978, ch. 374, § 6, effective June 17, 1978) was repealed by Acts 1982, ch. 434, § 15, effective July 15, 1982.

91.180. Monthly and annual statements of sinking fund. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3010-17: amend. 1978, ch. 374, § 7, effective June 17, 1978) was repealed by Acts 1982, ch. 434, § 15, effective July 15, 1982.

91.190. Excess revenues of sinking fund. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3024: amend. Acts 1944 ch. 89, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1948, ch. 149, § 3.

Taxation

91.200. City license taxes — Imposition — Rate — Collection — Transfer of surplus to general fund — Use — Restriction on ad valorem tax for sinking fund purposes — Issuance and enforcement of licenses — Regulation of ministers.

  1. The board of aldermen of every city of the first class, in addition to levying ad valorem taxes, may by ordinance impose license fees on franchises, provide for licensing any business, trade, occupation, or profession and the using, holding, or exhibiting of any animal, article, or other thing.
  2. License fees on a business, trade, occupation, or profession for revenue purposes may be imposed at a percentage rate not to exceed those hereinafter set forth on:
    1. Salaries, wages, commissions and other compensations earned by every person within the city for work done and services performed or rendered in the city (all of such being hereinafter collectively referred to as “wages”); and
    2. The net profits of all businesses, professions, or occupations from activities conducted in the city (hereinafter collectively referred to as “net profits”).
    1. Licenses imposed for regulatory purposes shall not be subject to such limitations as to form and amount. (3) (a) Licenses imposed for regulatory purposes shall not be subject to such limitations as to form and amount.
    2. No company that pays an ad valorem tax and a franchise tax is required to pay a license tax.
      1. It is the intent of the General Assembly to continue the exemption from local license fees and occupational taxes that existed on January 1, 2006, for providers of multichannel video programming services or communications services as defined in KRS 136.602 that were taxed under KRS 136.120 prior to January 1, 2006. (c) 1. It is the intent of the General Assembly to continue the exemption from local license fees and occupational taxes that existed on January 1, 2006, for providers of multichannel video programming services or communications services as defined in KRS 136.602 that were taxed under KRS 136.120 prior to January 1, 2006.
      2. To further this intent, no company providing multichannel video programming services or communications services as defined in KRS 136.602 shall be required to pay a license tax. If only a portion of an entity’s business is providing multichannel video programming services or communications services, including products or services that are related to and provided in support of the multichannel video programming services or communications services, this exclusion applies only to that portion of the business that provides multichannel video programming services or communications services including products or services that are related to and provided in support of the multichannel video programming services or communications services.
    3. No license tax shall be imposed upon or collected from any bank, trust company, combined bank and trust company or combined trust, banking and title business in this state, any savings and loan association whether state or federally chartered.
    4. No license tax shall be imposed upon income received by members of the Kentucky national guard for active duty training, unit training assemblies, and annual field training.
    5. No license tax shall be imposed on income received by precinct workers for election training or work at election booths in state, county, and local primary, regular, or special elections.
    6. No license tax shall be imposed upon any profits, earnings, or distributions of an investment fund which would qualify under KRS 154.20-250 to 154.20-284 to the extent any profits, earnings, or distributions would not be taxable to an individual investor, or in any other case where the city is prohibited by statute from imposing a license tax.
  3. The rate fixed on both “wages” and “net profits” shall be one and one-fourth percent (1.25%).
  4. License fees or taxes shall be collected by the commissioners of the sinking fund. The proceeds from the taxes shall be paid to the secretary and treasurer of the sinking fund until income from all sources of the sinking fund is sufficient to pay the cost of administration and the interest charges for the current fiscal year of the sinking fund in addition to a sum sufficient to amortize the outstanding principal indebtedness of the city on a yearly basis in accordance with regularly used amortization tables.
  5. Revenue remaining after meeting the foregoing requirements shall be transferred to the city. Such revenues shall be credited to the general fund of the city as received and may be expended for general purposes or for capital improvements.
  6. The term “capital improvements” as used in this section is limited to additions or improvements of a substantial and permanent nature and services rendered in connection therewith, and includes but is not limited to:
    1. The purchase of rights of way for highways, expressways, and the widening of existing streets;
    2. The purchase of lands for park, recreational, and other governmental facilities and for public off-street parking facilities;
    3. The purchase, construction, reconstruction, renovation, or remodeling of municipal buildings, and facilities;
    4. The replacement of machinery, wires, pipes, structural members or fixtures, and other essential portions of municipal buildings;
    5. The initial equipment of any newly acquired facility wherein any essential governmental function of the municipality may be located or carried on;
    6. The purchase and installation of traffic control devices and fire alarm equipment;
    7. The reconstruction and resurfacing, but not routine maintenance, of streets and other public ways;
    8. The acquisition of motorized equipment purchased as additions to, but not replacements for, existing equipment; and
    9. Engineering and other costs incurred by the city in connection with the construction of public improvements financed under a special assessment plan.
  7. Ad valorem taxes for the benefit of the sinking fund shall not be levied unless the income of the sinking fund is otherwise insufficient to meet such requirements.
  8. Licenses shall be issued and enforced on terms and conditions as prescribed by ordinance.
  9. Pursuant to this section, no city of the first class shall regulate any aspect of the manner in which any duly ordained, commissioned, or denominationally licensed minister of religion may perform his or her duties and activities as a minister of religion. Duly ordained, commissioned, or denominationally licensed ministers of religion shall be subject to the same license fees imposed on others in the city on salaries, wages, commissions, and other compensation earned for work done and services performed or rendered.

History. 2741w-1, 2980, 3011a, 3012, 3017: amend. Acts 1948, ch. 144, § 1; 1950, ch. 99; 1952, ch. 110, § 1; 1956, ch. 38; 1958, ch. 28; 1966, ch. 193, § 1(1) to (7); 1968, ch. 98, § 1; 1968, ch. 152, § 65; 1974, ch. 113, § 2; 1976, ch. 301, § 4; 1984, ch. 111, § 172, effective July 13, 1984; 1998, ch. 509, § 3, effective July 15, 1998; 2002, ch. 230, § 3, effective July 15, 2002; 2003, ch. 117, § 20, effective June 24, 2003; 2005, ch. 167, § 3, effective July 1, 2005; 2005, ch. 168, § 123, effective January 1, 2006.

Compiler’s Notes.

Acts 1960, ch. 80, § 6 provided that KRS 68.180 to 68.195 should not be construed as repealing this section. See KRS 68.195 .

Section 10 of Acts 1998, ch. 509, provided that the 1998 amendments to this section “apply to tax years beginning after December 31, 1997.”

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(1/1/2006). This section was amended by 2005 Ky. Acts chs. 167 and 168, which do not appear to be in conflict and have been codified together.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. In General.

Municipalities are agencies of the state government, and can levy and collect taxes only in the manner and amount authorized by the state. Life & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Coleman, 233 Ky. 350 , 25 S.W.2d 748, 1930 Ky. LEXIS 558 ( Ky. 1930 ).

2. Construction.

It is presumed all taxing statutes are prospective and not retrospective, unless an opposite intent is expressly stated. Ohio Valley Tel. Co. v. Louisville, 123 Ky. 193 , 94 S.W. 17, 29 Ky. L. Rptr. 631 , 29 Ky. L. Rptr. 682 , 1906 Ky. LEXIS 132 ( Ky. 1906 ).

This section extended, rather than narrowed, the right of city to license all businesses, trades, occupations and professions. Louisville v. Roberts & Krieger, 106 S.W. 1197, 32 Ky. L. Rptr. 823 (1908).

This section refers only to taxes that may be levied under the taxing power. It has no reference to the police power. Panke v. Louisville, 229 Ky. 186 , 16 S.W.2d 1034, 1929 Ky. LEXIS 718 ( Ky. 1929 ).

The license tax is not imposed on one who makes a single purchase, but only on those who carry on a business. National Bond & Inv. Co. v. Commissioners of Sinking Fund, 237 Ky. 576 , 36 S.W.2d 6, 1931 Ky. LEXIS 648 ( Ky. 1931 ).

3. Excessive Tax.

Before a tax is invalid as being prohibitive or confiscatory, it must be prohibitive or confiscatory on the whole, not merely in individual cases. Commonwealth v. Pearl Laundry Co., 105 Ky. 259 , 49 S.W. 26, 20 Ky. L. Rptr. 1172 , 1899 Ky. LEXIS 213 ( Ky. 1899 ).

The test of whether a license tax is so high as to be prohibitive is whether it bears so heavily on class taxed as to prohibit the occupation. Louisville v. Sagalowski, 136 Ky. 324 , 124 S.W. 339, 1910 Ky. LEXIS 487 ( Ky. 1910 ).

Party assailing license tax as unreasonable, oppressive and confiscatory has burden of proof and must show truth of charge by satisfactory evidence. Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Calhoun, 151 Ky. 241 , 151 S.W. 659, 1912 Ky. LEXIS 790 ( Ky. 1912 ).

Unless an occupation may be absolutely prohibited, taxes levied against it must not be prohibitive or confiscatory. Hartman v. Louisville, 282 Ky. 487 , 138 S.W.2d 948, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 183 ( Ky. 1940 ).

Where tax is so high as to result in taxed occupation earning no profit it is void. Lone Star Shows, Inc. v. Commissioner of Sinking Fund, 294 Ky. 114 , 171 S.W.2d 28, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 399 ( Ky. 1943 ).

Tax of $200 per day on carnivals was excessive and void. Lone Star Shows, Inc. v. Commissioner of Sinking Fund, 294 Ky. 114 , 171 S.W.2d 28, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 399 ( Ky. 1943 ).

Whether an ordinance imposing a license tax on a business or occupation is excessive should be measured by the receipts from average patronage of similarly equipped concerns engaged in such business. Lone Star Shows, Inc. v. Commissioner of Sinking Fund, 294 Ky. 114 , 171 S.W.2d 28, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 399 ( Ky. 1943 ).

4. Classification.

The state or municipality may classify even those of the same occupations, and impose a different tax on each class, if the classification is a natural and reasonable one and the tax imposed is the same upon all of the class. Strater Bros. Tobacco Co. v. Commonwealth, 117 Ky. 604 , 78 S.W. 871, 25 Ky. L. Rptr. 1717 , 1904 Ky. LEXIS 232 ( Ky. 1904 ); Louisville v. Sagalowski, 136 Ky. 324 , 124 S.W. 339, 1910 Ky. LEXIS 487 ( Ky. 1910 ).

A classification in imposing occupation taxes is constitutional if there are substantial differences between the occupations separately classified, and the differences need not be great. Hartman v. Louisville, 282 Ky. 487 , 138 S.W.2d 948, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 183 ( Ky. 1940 ).

The statutory limit upon license fees for brewers does not make an unconstitutional discrimination since the alcoholic beverage business is of such a special character that it may be treated as a separate classification for purposes of regulation and license taxation. George Wiedemann Brewing Co. v. Newport, 321 S.W.2d 404, 1959 Ky. LEXIS 282 ( Ky. 1959 ).

5. Double Taxation.

The city may impose either a license tax or a franchise tax upon corporations or individuals, for the privilege of doing business in the city, but it cannot impose both at the same time or for the same period. Adams Express Co. v. Boldrick, 141 Ky. 111 , 132 S.W. 174, 1910 Ky. LEXIS 414 ( Ky. 1910 ).

A corporation paying a license tax for doing business may also be required to pay a license tax upon vehicles used if they are not indispensable to its business. Adams Express Co. v. Boldrick, 141 Ky. 111 , 132 S.W. 174, 1910 Ky. LEXIS 414 ( Ky. 1910 ).

Where corporation has purchased franchise authorizing it to do business in city, it cannot be charged a license fee for privilege of doing same business. Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Calhoun, 151 Ky. 241 , 151 S.W. 659, 1912 Ky. LEXIS 790 ( Ky. 1912 ).

Imposition of a regulatory tax and a revenue raising tax on the same occupation is not double taxation. Hertz Drivurself Stations, Inc. v. Louisville, 294 Ky. 568 , 172 S.W.2d 207, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 489 ( Ky. 1943 ).

Double taxation is contrary to the public policy of Kentucky except where the legislative body has declared to the contrary. Hertz Drivurself Stations, Inc. v. Louisville, 294 Ky. 568 , 172 S.W.2d 207, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 489 ( Ky. 1943 ).

Ordinance of city of Louisville imposing license tax upon every “owner or operator of a motor truck” upon the city streets was not invalid as double taxation when applied to persons engaged in the business of renting trucks on a “U-drive-it” basis, although such persons were also required to pay a license tax for the privilege of engaging in such business, the first tax being a regulatory measure. Hertz Drivurself Stations, Inc. v. Louisville, 294 Ky. 568 , 172 S.W.2d 207, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 489 ( Ky. 1943 ).

6. Franchise Tax.

A franchise tax is not a license or occupation tax, but an ad valorem or property tax. Newport v. South C. & C. S. R. Co., 156 Ky. 403 , 161 S.W. 222, 1913 Ky. LEXIS 449 ( Ky. 1913 ).

7. License Tax.

Ordinance requiring established produce dealers to pay annual license fee of $100 and nonestablished dealers a fee of $250 was constitutional; the classification between established and nonestablished dealers being reasonable, and the fee as to nonestablished dealers not being confiscatory or prohibitive. Commonwealth v. Pearl Laundry Co., 105 Ky. 259 , 49 S.W. 26, 20 Ky. L. Rptr. 1172 , 1899 Ky. LEXIS 213 ( Ky. 1899 ).

Illegal license tax voluntarily paid, under invalid ordinance, cannot be recovered, even though a written protest was filed at time of payment. Morganfield v. Wathen, 202 Ky. 641 , 261 S.W. 12, 1924 Ky. LEXIS 778 ( Ky. 1924 ).

The license tax is for privilege of conducting the business; it is not a tax on the property employed in the business. National Bond & Inv. Co. v. Commissioners of Sinking Fund, 237 Ky. 576 , 36 S.W.2d 6, 1931 Ky. LEXIS 648 ( Ky. 1931 ).

Occupational license tax, created by city ordinance, imposing one percent (1%) tax on wages, salaries and net profits for the privilege of engaging in all occupations, trades, professions and businesses in city, was constitutional. Louisville v. Sebree, 308 Ky. 420 , 214 S.W.2d 248, 1948 Ky. LEXIS 907 ( Ky. 1948 ).

8. — Taxable Income.

Gain on the sale of assets is a natural part of the earnings an individual, a partnership or a corporation derives from a business and, as such, should be subject to the license tax in the same manner and to the same extent as capital gains are considered to be taxable income for federal taxes. Commissioners of Sinking Fund v. Estate of Doyle, 573 S.W.2d 932, 1978 Ky. App. LEXIS 615 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).

The legislature intended net profits to include all activities which generate income for a business, and if business income is generated by renting real estate, it should not be excluded from the net profit figure on which occupational tax is based. Commissioners of Sinking Fund v. Estate of Doyle, 573 S.W.2d 932, 1978 Ky. App. LEXIS 615 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).

9. — Businesses Subject to.

License for privilege of conducting a laundry business may be required. Commonwealth v. Pearl Laundry Co., 105 Ky. 259 , 49 S.W. 26, 20 Ky. L. Rptr. 1172 , 1899 Ky. LEXIS 213 ( Ky. 1899 ).

Company engaged in business of buying notes secured by chattel mortgages on automobiles was subject to city license tax imposed by ordinance under this section. National Bond & Inv. Co. v. Commissioners of Sinking Fund, 237 Ky. 576 , 36 S.W.2d 6, 1931 Ky. LEXIS 648 ( Ky. 1931 ).

City had no authority to pass ordinance levying occupational tax on operators of slot machines and on bookmakers, in view of KRS 436.230 and 436.490 (repealed. Now see KRS 528.020 and 528.030 ) making operation of slot machines and horse race books illegal. Beierle v. Newport, 305 Ky. 477 , 204 S.W.2d 806, 1947 Ky. LEXIS 847 ( Ky. 1947 ).

Fact that long-term nursing facility operators sold nearly all of their respective assets did not remove the transactions from the realm of “business activity” or the gains from the sales from the umbrella of “net profits” for purposes of an occupational license fee, as such was authorized by the local regulations pursuant to the authority under Ky. Const. § 181 and KRS 91.200 . Meadows Health Sys. East, Inc. v. Louisville/Jefferson County Metro Revenue Comm'n, 375 S.W.3d 71, 2012 Ky. App. LEXIS 132 (Ky. Ct. App. 2012).

Long-term nursing facility operators’ challenge to a revenue commission’s collection of an occupational license fee on their capital gains from the sale of their facilities lacked merit under Ky. Const. § 181 and KRS 91.200 , as such did not constitute an income tax, and the local authorities had discretion to determine what constituted “net profits” for such tax purposes. Meadows Health Sys. East, Inc. v. Louisville/Jefferson County Metro Revenue Comm'n, 375 S.W.3d 71, 2012 Ky. App. LEXIS 132 (Ky. Ct. App. 2012).

Long-term nursing facility operators’ challenge to a revenue commission’s collection of an occupational license fee on their capital gains from the sale of their facilities lacked merit under KRS 91.200(2)(b), as there was no limiting language requiring a business’s “net profits” to have been “earned” in order to be subject to the fee. Meadows Health Sys. East, Inc. v. Louisville/Jefferson County Metro Revenue Comm'n, 375 S.W.3d 71, 2012 Ky. App. LEXIS 132 (Ky. Ct. App. 2012).

10. — Federal Employees.

The right for a city to impose a license tax based on the amount earned by employees of the federal government who worked at an ordinance plant within the city limits was granted by USCS, tit. 4, §§ 105-110 known as the “Buck Act.” Howard v. Commissioners of Sinking Fund, 344 U.S. 624, 73 S. Ct. 465, 97 L. Ed. 617, 1953 U.S. LEXIS 2396 (U.S. 1953).

An annual city license fee of one percent (1%) of all salaries, wages, commissions and other compensation earned by every person in the city for work done or services performed or rendered in the city is not a tax on income but on taxpayer’s privilege of holding an office to be measured by the compensation of the office and federal employees are not immune. Cook v. Commissioners of Sinking Fund, 312 Ky. 1 , 226 S.W.2d 328, 1950 Ky. LEXIS 577 ( Ky. 1 950).

11. — Filing Return.

Statutes giving cities the authority to levy and collect an occupational license fee and providing that license shall be issued and enforced by local ordinance, authorize by implication the power to require the filing of a return and the enforcement of the requirement by means of a penalty as a necessary incident to the exercise of that power. Louisville v. Fischer Packing Co., 520 S.W.2d 744, 1975 Ky. LEXIS 171 ( Ky. 1975 ).

12. — Constructive Receipt.

Occupational license tax withheld by employers is constructively received by the city when withheld although it is not received actually until the close of the city’s fiscal year. Meyers v. Louisville, 310 Ky. 348 , 220 S.W.2d 852, 1949 Ky. LEXIS 923 ( Ky. 1949 ).

13. — Penalties.

Penalty provided by city ordinance for failure to file an occupational license tax return within the time due was not void for excessiveness since it was no greater than penalties authorized by congress for failure to file a federal tax return pursuant to 26 USCS § 6651(a) or by KRS 141.990(1) for failure to file a state income tax return, and it was substantially less than the penalty approved by the Court of Appeals in Davis v. Becker, 309 Ky. 775 , 219 S.W.2d 6, 1949 Ky. LEXIS 810 ( Ky. 1949 ); Louisville v. Fischer Packing Co., 520 S.W.2d 744, 1975 Ky. LEXIS 171 ( Ky. 1975 ).

Subsection 2 of KRS 91.270 relates only to a tax on personal property in lieu of an ad valorem tax and it is not applicable to license taxes imposed under this section and the penalty provisions in KRS 91.270 (2) are not applicable to delinquencies under this section. Louisville v. Fischer Packing Co., 520 S.W.2d 744, 1975 Ky. LEXIS 171 ( Ky. 1975 ).

The penalty provision in KRS 131.180 is not applicable to the occupational license fee levied in this section. Louisville v. Fischer Packing Co., 520 S.W.2d 744, 1975 Ky. LEXIS 171 ( Ky. 1975 ).

14. Motor Vehicles.

KRS 186.010 through 186.990 , the state motor license law, was not exclusive, and cities may license motor vehicles. Panke v. Louisville, 229 Ky. 186 , 16 S.W.2d 1034, 1929 Ky. LEXIS 718 ( Ky. 1929 ).

15. Inspection Fee.

A fifty cent ($0.50) fee imposed on farmers selling their own produce in city, by provision exempting them from license tax on wholesale dealers imposed by ordinance, was not an “excise tax” or “privilege tax,” but an “inspection fee” validly levied under the police power to aid in enforcement of ordinance. Hartman v. Louisville, 282 Ky. 487 , 138 S.W.2d 948, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 183 ( Ky. 1940 ).

16. Occupational Tax.

Lump-sum early retirement benefits, although calculated on the employee’s annual base rate of pay, were not “earned” compensation so as to render them subject to a city’s occupational tax. Commissioners of Sinking Fund v. South Cent. Bell Tel. Co., 809 S.W.2d 380, 1991 Ky. LEXIS 55 ( Ky. 1991 ).

Cited:

Paducah Automotive Trades Ass’n v. Paducah, 307 Ky. 524 , 211 S.W.2d 660, 1948 Ky. LEXIS 769 ( Ky. 1948 ); Kohler v. Benckart, 252 S.W.2d 854, 1952 Ky. LEXIS 1025 ( Ky. 1952 ); Raque v. Louisville, 402 S.W.2d 697, 1966 Ky. LEXIS 375 ( Ky. 1966 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Where, prior to January 1, 1965, the Kentucky department of agriculture did not withhold city and county occupational license taxes from employees employed in the city and county, neither the department nor commonwealth was liable for taxes, interest or penalty for any prior period, and the city and county would have to look to the employees for any unpaid taxes. OAG 65-845 .

Although KRS 92.300 and this section contain specific prohibitions against cities of the first to sixth classes imposing an occupational license tax on income received by national guard members for active duty training, there are no such prohibitions in the statutes dealing with the levying of an occupational license tax on a county basis where the tax is levied for specified county purposes and even though an exemption is provided for income of national guardsmen in KRS 68.197 , such exemption may not be applicable if a majority of the voters in the county approve the tax. OAG 75-480 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Alcoholic beverage licenses, KRS 242.220 , 243.070 , 243.610 .

Property exempt from taxation, Const., § 170.

Trucks and buses when city may not license, KRS 189.280 , 281.830 .

Kentucky Law Journal.

Kentucky Law Survey, Vasek and Bradley, Kentucky Taxation, 68 Ky. L.J. 777 (1979-1980).

ALR

Liability for license fee or occupation tax of one who had conducted business without required license or payment. 5 A.L.R. 1312; 107 A.L.R. 652.

Soft drinks, power to require license for sale of. 6 A.L.R. 1417.

Milk dealers, constitutionality of license regulations as to. 18 A.L.R. 253; 42 A.L.R. 556; 58 A.L.R. 672; 80 A.L.R. 1225; 101 A.L.R. 64; 110 A.L.R. 644; 119 A.L.R. 243; 155 A.L.R. 1383.

Receiver, franchise or excise tax on corporation in hands of. 18 A.L.R. 700; 26 A.L.R. 426.

Pool and billiard rooms and bowling alleys, licensing of. 20 A.L.R. 1482; 29 A.L.R. 41; 53 A.L.R. 149; 72 A.L.R. 1339.

Automobiles, conflict between statutes and local regulations as to. 21 A.L.R. 1186; 64 A.L.R. 993; 147 A.L.R. 522.

Automobile or its use, tax on, for cost of road or street construction, improvement or maintenance. 24 A.L.R. 937; 68 A.L.R. 200.

Trading stamp business, constitutionality of statutes or ordinances imposing license tax on. 26 A.L.R. 712; Stocker v. Nashville, 174 Tenn. 483, 126 S.W.2d 339, 1938 Tenn. LEXIS 114, 124 A.L.R. 345; 133 A.L.R. 1087.

Contracts of unlicensed hawkers and peddlers, validity and enforceability of. 30 A.L.R. 864; 42 A.L.R. 1226; 118 A.L.R. 646.

Junk dealers, construction of regulation requiring license. 30 A.L.R. 1430; 45 A.L.R.2d 1391.

Auctioneers, licensing of. 31 A.L.R. 304; 39 A.L.R. 773; 111 A.L.R. 473.

Reasonableness of amount of license fee exacted of peddlers or transient merchants. 39 A.L.R. 1385.

Gasoline, requiring licenses or permits to store. 43 A.L.R. 859; 128 A.L.R. 364.

Constitutional provision that legislature may invest power to levy taxes for corporate purposes in the local authorities, scope and effect of. 46 A.L.R. 609; 106 A.L.R. 906.

Taxation of raise fund for, as within constitutional provisions prohibiting legislature from imposing taxes for city or corporate purposes, or providing that legislature may invest power to levy such taxes in local authorities. 46 A.L.R. 683; 106 A.L.R. 906.

Slaughterhouse, power to prescribe manner or conditions of serving public. 46 A.L.R. 1486.

Wholesale produce dealers, validity of license regulations. 48 A.L.R. 453.

Unconstitutional statute or ordinance, personal liability of taxing officer for tax paid under. 48 A.L.R. 1395; 74 A.L.R. 1305.

Dry cleaning and dyeing establishments, power to license. 49 A.L.R. 110; 128 A.L.R. 678.

Inn or hotel, what constitutes, within licensing statutes. 53 A.L.R. 988.

Amusement, validity of license tax or fee on show or place of. 58 A.L.R. 1340; 111 A.L.R. 778.

Circus or carnival, validity of license tax on. 58 A.L.R. 1343; 111 A.L.R. 788.

Golf course, validity of license tax on. 58 A.L.R. 1343; 111 A.L.R. 778.

Discrimination against nonresidents by license statute or ordinance. 61 A.L.R. 348; 112 A.L.R. 63.

Money lenders, statutes regulating business of making small loans. 69 A.L.R. 581; 125 A.L.R. 743; 149 A.L.R. 1424.

Chain store tax, constitutionality of. 73 A.L.R. 1481; 85 A.L.R. 736; 112 A.L.R. 305.

Automobile, validity of privilege or business tax on common carriers by, for purpose of revenue. 75 A.L.R. 19.

Who may be classed as “itinerant vendor,” “transient merchant,” or the like. 94 A.L.R. 1076.

Dissolution of corporation as affecting franchise tax. 97 A.L.R. 501.

Cooperative corporations or associations formed by producers of agricultural products as within exemption provisions of taxing statute regarding agricultural products or producers. 100 A.L.R. 439.

Tax on telephone company as a property or a privilege tax. 103 A.L.R. 48.

State, classification made by, or its failure to classify, as affecting power of municipality to classify for purposes of license taxation. 110 A.L.R. 1203.

Vending machines, construction and application of statutes or ordinances licensing. 111 A.L.R. 755; 151 A.L.R. 1195.

Food, reasonableness of fee required of places where food is served for consumption upon the premises, and basis for fixing amount. 117 A.L.R. 1319.

Building or construction contractors, construction and application of license regulations as to business of. 118 A.L.R. 676.

Validity of statute or ordinance which requires liability or indemnity insurance or bond as condition of license for conducting business or profession. 120 A.L.R. 950.

Florist business or sale of flowers, validity of statute or ordinance requiring license for. 124 A.L.R. 547.

Transportation or travel bureau agents, licensing of. 126 A.L.R. 197.

Right of one who acquires title to or other interest in real property to benefit of a license previously issued by the public, permitting use of property for a specified purpose. 131 A.L.R. 1339.

Refreshments, licensing of dancing or other entertainment provided in connection with service of. 142 A.L.R. 572.

“Juke boxes” or other mechanical musical devices, validity of municipal regulation of. 151 A.L.R. 1178.

Coin-operated amusement machines, devices within contemplation of statutes or ordinances regulating. 151 A.L.R. 1213.

Regulation of practice of photography. 7 A.L.R.2d 416.

Application of occupation or license tax to one operating dining room, cafeteria, or beverage room incidental to other business. 13 A.L.R.2d 1362.

Maintenance or regulation by public authorities of tourist or trailer camps, motor courts, or motels. 22 A.L.R.2d 774.

Liability of municipality in damages for its refusal to grant permit, license, or franchise. 37 A.L.R.2d 694.

Validity of statute or ordinance requiring real-estate brokers to procure license. 39 A.L.R.2d 606.

Municipal regulation of junk dealers as affected by method of enactment. 45 A.L.R.2d 1397.

Municipal regulation of junk dealers in conflict with state legislation. 45 A.L.R.2d 1397.

Application, construction, and effect of provisions for regulation of jewelry auctions. 53 A.L.R.2d 1444.

Imposition of tax or license by both municipality and state on business of selling motor vehicles. 57 A.L.R.2d 1271.

Legislative power to exempt from taxation property, purposes, or uses additional to those specified in constitution. 61 A.L.R.2d 1031.

Exemption from taxation of college fraternity or sorority house. 66 A.L.R.2d 904.

Regulation of accountants. 70 A.L.R.2d 433, 4 A.L.R.4th 1201.

Single or isolated transactions as falling within provisions of commercial or occupational licensing requirements. 93 A.L.R.2d 90.

Validity and construction of license tax or fee, or business privilege or occupational tax, on persons renting or leasing out real estate. 93 A.L.R.2d 1136.

Conflict between state and local regulations affecting nursing or rest homes. 97 A.L.R.2d 1198.

Authorization, prohibition, or regulation by municipality of the sale of merchandise on streets or highways, or their use for such purpose. 14 A.L.R.3d 896.

What constitutes manufacturing and who is a manufacturer under tax laws. 17 A.L.R.3d 7.

Regulation of private employment agencies. 20 A.L.R.3d 599.

Validity and construction of statutes or ordinances regulating telephone answering services. 35 A.L.R.3d 1430.

Validity of municipal ordinance imposing income tax or license upon nonresidents employed in taxing jurisdiction (commuter tax). 48 A.L.R.3d 343.

Sale or use of narcotics or dangerous drugs on licensed premises as ground for revocation or suspension of liquor license. 51 A.L.R.3d 599.

Regulation of business of tattooing. 81 A.L.R.3d 1212.

Regulation of private detectives, private investigators, and security agencies. 86 A.L.R.3d 691.

Cable television equipment or services as subject to sales or use tax. 5 A.L.R.4th 754.

Classification, as real estate or personal property, of mobile homes or trailers for purposes of state or local taxation. 7 A.L.R.4th 1016.

Validity, construction, and effect of statutes or regulations governing practice of veterinary medicine. 8 A.L.R.4th 223.

Validity of statutes or ordinances requiring sex-oriented businesses to obtain operating licenses. 8 A.L.R.4th 1294.

91.210. Who liable for license fee — When and how paid. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3013, 3014, 3019) was repealed by Acts 1948, ch. 144, § 2.

91.220. Licenses, issuance and terms of — Transfer. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2741b-1, 3013 to 3016, 3018) was repealed by Acts 1948, ch. 144, § 2.

91.230. When license to be exhibited — Peddlers to carry license. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3020, 3021) was repealed by Acts 1948, ch. 144, § 2.

91.240. Administration of license laws — Effect of conviction for violation — Service of process in license cases. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2980, 3010-19, 3022, 3023) was repealed by Acts 1948, ch. 144, § 2.

91.250. Powers of police court with respect to licenses. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3014) was repealed by Acts 1948, ch. 144, § 2.

91.260. Ad valorem taxes — Taxes based on income, licenses and franchises — Exemption of manufacturing establishments, including qualified data centers.

  1. Each city of the first class shall raise a revenue from ad valorem taxes and from taxes based on income, licenses and franchises. The board of aldermen may each year, by ordinance, levy an ad valorem tax on all real and personal property subject to taxation for city purposes, at a rate within the limits prescribed in the Constitution, and may provide for taxation, for city purposes, on personal property based on income, licenses or franchises in lieu of an ad valorem tax thereon, but may not omit the imposition of an ad valorem tax on the taxable personal property of any steam, railroad, street railway, ferry, bridge, gas, water, heating, telephone, telegraph, electric light or electric power company, and may not levy or collect an income tax.
  2. The board of aldermen shall provide for the collection of all taxes imposed under this section.
    1. The board of aldermen may by ordinance exempt manufacturing establishments, including qualified data centers, from city taxation for a period not exceeding five (5) years, as an inducement to their location within the city limits. (3) (a) The board of aldermen may by ordinance exempt manufacturing establishments, including qualified data centers, from city taxation for a period not exceeding five (5) years, as an inducement to their location within the city limits.
    2. As used in this subsection:
      1. “Data center” means a structure or portion of a structure that is predominantly used to house and continuously operate computer servers and associated telecommunications, electronic data processing or storage, or other similar components;
      2. “Overall tier rating” means the overall tier rating of a data center according to the TIA-942 Telecommunications Infrastructure Standard for Data Centers established by the Telecommunications Industry Association and published in April 2005, exclusive of any amendments made subsequent to that date; and
      3. “Qualified data center” means a data center having an overall tier rating of three (3) or four (4) on the assessment date of a given taxable year, as established by the owner thereof.

History. 2980, 2980a; 2016 ch. 3, § 1, effective July 15, 2016.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(7/15/2016). 2016 Ky. Acts ch. 3, sec. 3 provided that amendments made to this statute in 2016 Ky. Acts ch. 3, sec. 1 apply only to new manufacturing establishments that locate in an applicable city or urban-county on or after July 15, 2016.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. In General.

The city may impose either a license tax or a franchise tax upon corporations or individuals, for the privilege of doing business in the city, but it cannot impose both at the same time or for the same period. Adams Express Co. v. Boldrick, 141 Ky. 111 , 132 S.W. 174, 1910 Ky. LEXIS 414 ( Ky. 1910 ).

Municipalities are agencies of the state government and can levy and collect taxes only in the manner and amount authorized by the state. Life & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Coleman, 233 Ky. 350 , 25 S.W.2d 748, 1930 Ky. LEXIS 558 ( Ky. 1930 ).

2. Construction.

This section refers only to taxes that may be levied under the taxing power. It has no reference to the police power. Panke v. Louisville, 229 Ky. 186 , 16 S.W.2d 1034, 1929 Ky. LEXIS 718 ( Ky. 1929 ).

3. Ad Valorem Taxes.

Nonnegotiable bonds owned by city and held solely to use income therefrom to pay street lighting expense of city, are public property used for public purpose, and are exempt from taxation. Board of Councilmen v. Commonwealth, 94 S.W. 648, 29 Ky. L. Rptr. 699 , 1906 Ky. LEXIS 323 (Ky. Ct. App. 1906).

A franchise tax is not a license or occupation tax, but an ad valorem or property tax. Newport v. South C. & C. S. R. Co., 156 Ky. 403 , 161 S.W. 222, 1913 Ky. LEXIS 449 ( Ky. 1913 ).

The provision of this section that the city may not omit the imposition of an ad valorem tax on the “taxable personal property” of certain utilities means only that the city may not substitute any other kind of tax for the ad valorem tax on such personal property of utilities as is subject by law to local taxation. The provision does not authorize or require the city to levy an ad valorem tax on the manufacturing machinery of utilities, which is exempted from local taxation by KRS 132.200 . Reeves v. Louisville Gas & Electric Co., 290 Ky. 25 , 160 S.W.2d 391, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 362 ( Ky. 1942 ).

4. Long-term Tax Rates.

While it is clearly the right and duty of the legislative body of a city to set the tax rate pursuant to this section, a provision of an agreement between the city and a proposed annexed area to set tax rates for 20 years was void as against public policy in light of the rule that a legislative body may not limit its power to act one way or another in the future governmental functions. Louisville v. Fiscal Court of Jefferson County, 623 S.W.2d 219, 1981 Ky. LEXIS 282 ( Ky. 1981 ).

5. Bases of Taxes.

Municipal authorities may substitute a tax based on income, licenses or franchises in lieu of an ad valorem tax on personal property. George Schuster & Co. v. Louisville, 124 Ky. 189 , 89 S.W. 689, 28 Ky. L. Rptr. 588 , 1905 Ky. LEXIS 165 ( Ky. 1905 ).

Party assailing license tax as unreasonable, oppressive and confiscatory has burden of proof and must show truth of charge by satisfactory evidence. Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Calhoun, 151 Ky. 241 , 151 S.W. 659, 1912 Ky. LEXIS 790 ( Ky. 1912 ).

6. — Occupational License Tax.

City ordinance imposing a one percent (1%) occupational license tax on net proceeds of businesses or practice of a profession, and on the gross wages and salaries of others is not a violation of the United States Const., 14th Amend.Louisville v. Sebree, 308 Ky. 420 , 214 S.W.2d 248, 1948 Ky. LEXIS 907 ( Ky. 1948 ).

Where, in city ordinance imposing an occupational license tax on trades, occupations and professions, provision for exemption of domestic servants employed in private homes could not be upheld on the ground assigned in the ordinance, the court could look to other grounds, and did so, finding one on which the exemption could be upheld. Louisville v. Sebree, 308 Ky. 420 , 214 S.W.2d 248, 1948 Ky. LEXIS 907 ( Ky. 1948 ).

In city ordinance imposing a one percent (1%) occupational license tax on wages, salaries and net profits for the privilege of engaging in occupations, trades, professions and businesses, provision for exemption of domestic servants employed in private homes was constitutional as a valid classification. Louisville v. Sebree, 308 Ky. 420 , 214 S.W.2d 248, 1948 Ky. LEXIS 907 ( Ky. 1948 ).

City ordinance imposing one percent (1%) license tax on wages, salaries and net profits for privilege of engaging in occupations, trades, professions and businesses, did not violate the provision of Const., § 181 which authorizes General Assembly to empower cities to provide for a personal property tax based on income, licenses or franchises in lieu of ad valorem tax. Louisville v. Sebree, 308 Ky. 420 , 214 S.W.2d 248, 1948 Ky. LEXIS 907 ( Ky. 1948 ).

Occupational license tax, created by Louisville city ordinance, imposing a one percent (1%) tax on wages, salaries and net profits for the privilege of engaging in all occupations, trades, professions and businesses in Louisville, was constitutional. Louisville v. Sebree, 308 Ky. 420 , 214 S.W.2d 248, 1948 Ky. LEXIS 907 ( Ky. 1948 ).

Occupational license tax, created by Louisville city ordinance, imposing a one percent tax on wages, salaries and net profits for the privilege of engaging in all occupations, trades, professions and businesses in Louisville, was not an income tax. Louisville v. Sebree, 308 Ky. 420 , 214 S.W.2d 248, 1948 Ky. LEXIS 907 ( Ky. 1948 ).

7. Exemptions.

In order to bring manufacturing establishment under the provision of this section for a five-year tax exemption such establishment must affirmatively allege that it had not before been engaged in the same class of business in the city and that the business in which it was engaged was a new manufacturing business; a mere allegation in the pleading that such a statement was filed with the assessor was not sufficient. Louisville Car Wheel & R. Supply Co. v. Louisville, 146 Ky. 573 , 142 S.W. 1043, 1912 Ky. LEXIS 102 ( Ky. 1912 ).

Electric company was a manufacturing plant and was entitled to the benefit of the five-year exemption from city taxes on its manufacturing plant but not on any of the property used by it to distribute, sell or dispose of its manufactured product. Kentucky Electric Co. v. Buechel, 146 Ky. 660 , 143 S.W. 58, 1912 Ky. LEXIS 142 ( Ky. 1912 ).

Where stockholders of old corporation formed new corporation, purchased plant from old corporation and began operations similar to those of old corporation, new corporation was not entitled to five-year exemption from taxation. Victor Cotton Oil Co. v. Louisville, 149 Ky. 149 , 148 S.W. 10, 1912 Ky. LEXIS 592 ( Ky. 1912 ).

Although the city may by ordinance exempt manufacturing establishments from city taxation for five (5) years, it cannot by such ordinance exempt them from payment of school taxes levied by city for benefit of its common schools. Louisville v. Board of Education, 154 Ky. 316 , 157 S.W. 379, 1913 Ky. LEXIS 66 ( Ky. 1913 ); North Vernon Lumber Co. v. Louisville, 163 Ky. 467 , 173 S.W. 1120, 1915 Ky. LEXIS 243 ( Ky. 1915 ).

Where new corporation, incorporated for the purpose of engaging in the manufacturing of ice and refrigerating machinery, bought property of two (2) other corporations in order to carry out this purpose, fact that it continued to make a few of the items once produced by the other corporations did not change the fact that the new corporation was in fact a new business and thus entitled to the five-year tax exemption. Voght Bros. Mach. Co. v. Sea, 181 Ky. 327 , 204 S.W. 76, 1918 Ky. LEXIS 509 ( Ky. 1918 ).

When a manufacturing plant shall have been permanently located and conducted within the limits of the city, no matter how or why, it is entitled to exemption from municipal taxes for five (5) years next after its location and commencement of business at the point where it was permanently located, whether at the time of its location, it was located within or without the then city limits. Bristow v. Wood-Mosaic Co., 205 Ky. 574 , 266 S.W. 60, 1924 Ky. LEXIS 177 ( Ky. 1924 ).

Where appellee’s plants were located in territory annexed to city within five (5) years after such location, appellee was, by terms of ordinance granting exemption, entitled to exemption from all municipal tax for five (5) years after it commenced to do business at such place and not for five (5) years after such place was annexed. Bristow v. Wood-Mosaic Co., 205 Ky. 574 , 266 S.W. 60, 1924 Ky. LEXIS 177 ( Ky. 1924 ).

The promotion of new and expanded industrial development, by providing tax benefits, is a fixed policy of the Commonwealth. Department of Revenue v. Spalding Laundry & Dry Cleaning Co., 436 S.W.2d 522, 1968 Ky. LEXIS 184 ( Ky. 1968 ).

8. — Expansion of Old Business.

Where railroad found that its work and repair shops were inadequate and thus bought a new tract of land, erected new buildings thereon, equipped them with the necessary machinery and abandoned the old shops, the railroad was not entitled to five-year tax exemption on the new shops. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Louisville, 143 Ky. 258 , 136 S.W. 611, 1911 Ky. LEXIS 391 ( Ky. 1911 ).

Where manufacturer of bakery goods was induced to move to a new location in the city and new capital was added and a corporation formed of which corporation manufacturer held a majority of the stock such business was not a new manufacturing establishment but merely an enlargement of an old business and thus was not entitled to the five-year tax exemption. Louisville v. New York Baking Co., 151 Ky. 758 , 152 S.W. 980, 1913 Ky. LEXIS 587 ( Ky. 1913 ).

Where company which made wooden boxes erected a building next to the one in which it made such boxes and installed in it machinery necessary for making of paper boxes, the making of which for commercial purpose had only been a manufacturing business for the past 10 years and the additional building and machinery were used exclusively for the making of paper boxes, a new manager who knew the paper box business was employed and about one third as many men as employed in making wooden boxes were employed in making paper boxes, such business was not a new manufacturing business but a mere enlargement and expansion of an old business and thus not entitled to the five-year tax exemption. Mengel Box Co. v. Sea, 167 Ky. 193 , 180 S.W. 347, 1915 Ky. LEXIS 828 ( Ky. 1915 ) ( Ky. 1915 ).

Where company was a wholesale jobber buying articles from wholesalers and selling them to retailers and its employees when not occupied with repair work assembled manufactured articles, such company when it built building and installed machinery and began extensive manufacturing of such articles could not be said to be a new manufacturing business and hence was not entitled to the five-year tax exemption. Louisville v. Louisville Tin & Stove Co., 170 Ky. 557 , 186 S.W. 124, 1916 Ky. LEXIS 65 ( Ky. 1916 ).

9. — Merger of Businesses.

Where appellant purchased establishments that were going concerns and were prosperous and no purpose existed to discontinue them and formed a new corporation, such corporation was not a new manufacturing establishment and was not entitled to five-year tax exemption. Continental Tobacco Co. v. Louisville, 123 Ky. 173 , 94 S.W. 11, 29 Ky. L. Rptr. 616 , 1906 Ky. LEXIS 129 ( Ky. 1906 ).

Where three (3) corporations, two (2) of which were going concerns at the time, were consolidated under one management and in appellant’s corporate name, such corporation was not a new manufacturing establishment and was not entitled to the five-year tax exemption. Jones Bros. v. Louisville, 142 Ky. 759 , 135 S.W. 301, 1911 Ky. LEXIS 299 ( Ky. 1911 ).

10. Filing of Return.

Statutes giving cities the authority to levy and collect an occupational license fee and providing that the license shall be issued and enforced by local ordinance, authorize by implication the power to require the filing of a return and the enforcement of the requirement by means of a penalty as a necessary incident to the exercise of that power. Louisville v. Fischer Packing Co., 520 S.W.2d 744, 1975 Ky. LEXIS 171 ( Ky. 1975 ).

11. Retaliatory Tax Act.

City taxes paid by a foreign insurance company doing business in this state should be considered as a part of the aggregate taxes paid in Kentucky, in construing the Kentucky Retaliatory Tax Act. Life & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Coleman, 233 Ky. 350 , 25 S.W.2d 748, 1930 Ky. LEXIS 558 ( Ky. 1930 ).

12. Classification.

Classes of property as to which the substitution is made may be defined by the municipal corporation. George Schuster & Co. v. Louisville, 124 Ky. 189 , 89 S.W. 689, 28 Ky. L. Rptr. 588 , 1905 Ky. LEXIS 165 ( Ky. 1905 ).

The state or municipality may classify even those of the same occupations, and impose a different tax on each class, if the classification is a natural and reasonable one and the tax imposed is the same upon all of the class. Strater Bros. Tobacco Co. v. Commonwealth, 117 Ky. 604 , 78 S.W. 871, 25 Ky. L. Rptr. 1717 , 1904 Ky. LEXIS 232 ( Ky. 1904 ); Louisville v. Sagalowski, 136 Ky. 324 , 124 S.W. 339, 1910 Ky. LEXIS 487 ( Ky. 1910 ).

13. Double Taxation.

A corporation paying a license tax for doing business may also be required to pay a license tax upon vehicles used if they are not indispensable to its business. Adams Express Co. v. Boldrick, 141 Ky. 111 , 132 S.W. 174, 1910 Ky. LEXIS 414 ( Ky. 1910 ).

Where corporation has purchased franchise authorizing it to do business in city, it cannot be charged a license fee for privilege of doing same business. Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Calhoun, 151 Ky. 241 , 151 S.W. 659, 1912 Ky. LEXIS 790 ( Ky. 1912 ).

14. Recovery of Tax.

City taxes illegally assessed upon notes but voluntarily paid under a mistake of law, and which the city has paid out and applied to purposes for which assessed and collected, cannot be recovered by the taxpayer. Louisville v. Becker, 139 Ky. 17 , 129 S.W. 311, 1910 Ky. LEXIS 4 ( Ky. 1910 ).

Illegal license tax voluntarily paid, under invalid ordinance, cannot be recovered, even though a written protest was filed at time of payment. Morganfield v. Wathen, 202 Ky. 641 , 261 S.W. 12, 1924 Ky. LEXIS 778 ( Ky. 1924 ).

Cited:

Paducah Automotive Trades Ass’n v. Paducah, 307 Ky. 524 , 211 S.W.2d 660, 1948 Ky. LEXIS 769 ( Ky. 1948 ).

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Acquisition of industrial building by city, for lease to industrial concern, KRS 103.200 to 103.285 .

City electric plant to pay sum equivalent to tax based on book value, KRS 96.820 .

City may adopt assessment made by property valuation administrator, KRS 132.285 .

Coin-operated machines, city license tax on, KRS 137.410 .

Distilled spirits, valuation and taxation, KRS 132.150 , 132.160 .

Life insurance companies, taxation by city where principal office located, KRS 136.320 .

Maximum tax rate, Const., § 157.

Municipal housing authority bonds, exemption from taxation, KRS 80.230 .

Poll taxes, Const., § 180.

Property exempt from taxation, Const., § 170.

Property subject to city taxation, KRS 132.030 , 132.050 , 132.200 .

Race tracks, limitations on city taxes, KRS 137.190 .

School taxes, KRS 160.475 and 160.476 .

State warrants, restriction on taxation by political subdivisions, KRS 41.200 .

Taxes based on income, licenses and franchises authorized, Const., § 181.

Kentucky Bench & Bar.

Tobergte, The Impact of Kentucky’s Present Constitution Upon Business Growth & Development, Volume 51, No. 3, Summer 1987 Ky. Bench & B. 21.

Kentucky Law Journal.

Markham, The Property Tax — A Withering Vine, 60 Ky. L.J. 174 (1971).

Treatises

Caldwell’s Kentucky Form Book, 5th Ed., Complaint in Class Action to Declare City Occupational Tax Unconstitutional and to Enjoin Same, Form 355.08.

ALR

Local taxation of domesticated foreign corporation. 18 A.L.R. 141; 126 A.L.R. 1503.

Income or receipts, double taxation by tax on corporations in nature of excise or privilege tax measured by. 71 A.L.R. 267.

Indebtedness of corporation as proper item for inclusion in computing franchise tax. 107 A.L.R. 1303.

Dividend for purpose of franchise tax, transfer of surplus to capital stock account as. 107 A.L.R. 1335.

Constitutionality of excise or franchise tax on foreign corporation as affected by inclusion or exclusion of intangibles in measuring or computing tax. 131 A.L.R. 940.

Interest paid to stockholders or their families, express limitations on deduction of, in computing franchise tax of corporation. 140 A.L.R. 1350.

Inclusion of investments in stock of other corporations in fixing base on taxation of corporation. 11 A.L.R.2d 323.

Liability of corporation which has previously paid franchise tax or fee on authorized or issued stock, for additional fee or tax on later increase after intermediate reduction. 16 A.L.R.2d 1090.

Validity of municipal ordinance imposing income tax or license upon nonresidents employed in taxing jurisdiction (commuter tax). 48 A.L.R.3d 343.

Validity of municipal admission tax for college football games or other college sponsored public events. 60 A.L.R.3d 1027.

Classification, as real estate or personal property, of mobile homes or trailers for purposes of state or local taxation. 7 A.L.R.4th 1016.

91.265. Power to levy all taxes authorized by Const., 181 — Exceptions.

[This is merely a reference entry, to call attention to the fact that the provisions of KRS 92.281 apply to cities of the first class as well as other cities.]

91.270. Taxes based on income, licenses and franchises — Payment and collection — Disposition of revenue — Penalty — Lien.

  1. The treasurer and secretary of the sinking fund shall collect all taxes on personal property based on income, licenses and franchises in lieu of an ad valorem tax, and shall pay them monthly to the director of finance, who shall give a receipt therefor. The treasurer and secretary shall furnish monthly to the director of finance a statement showing what persons have, during the previous month, paid such taxes, the amount paid by each, and the total amount paid by him to the director of finance.
  2. The revenue derived from taxes based on income, licenses and franchises in lieu of an ad valorem tax shall be paid at such time in the fiscal year, and apportioned and distributed, as may be fixed by ordinance, for the same purposes as the revenue derived from the ad valorem tax. In default of the payment of such taxes at the time fixed by ordinance, a penalty of five percent (5%) shall be added thereto and interest on the amount of such taxes shall be computed and paid by the delinquent from that date at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum until paid.
  3. A lien superior to all other liens, except the lien for state taxes, whether such liens were acquired before or after the maturity of the taxes referred to in this section, shall exist in favor of the city from the date the taxes are due, for the amount of the taxes, interest and penalties, upon all the real and personal property of the delinquent taxpayer. The city may enforce the lien by action in the name of the city in the Circuit Court, and in that action may also obtain a personal judgment against the delinquent taxpayer for the tax, penalties, interest, and costs of suit.

History. 2980, 2984b-1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Penalties.

The penalty imposed in this section only relates to the tax on personal property in lieu of an ad valorem tax and is not applicable to the occupational license tax levied in KRS 91.200 . Louisville v. Fischer Packing Co., 520 S.W.2d 744, 1975 Ky. LEXIS 171 ( Ky. 1975 ).

Cited:

Paducah Automotive Trades Ass’n v. Paducah, 307 Ky. 524 , 211 S.W.2d 660, 1948 Ky. LEXIS 769 ( Ky. 1948 ).

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Lien for city taxes, KRS 132.290 , 134.420 .

91.280. General and special tax levies — Crediting of collections — Diversion forbidden — Failure to make levy.

  1. The board of aldermen, in its annual levy of taxes, shall make such separate levies as are required by law or as the board deems necessary or desirable, and a general levy in such amount as in its judgment is necessary and advisable. The amounts levied shall be collected and paid to the city, the amount of each separate levy being carried to the credit of the agency for which levied, and the amount of the general levy being credited to the general fund of the city. The amount of any separate levy to be credited to any agency shall not be diverted from it, or used for any purpose other than that specified by the levy, but shall, except as otherwise provided by law, remain as a separate fund in the hands of the director of finance.
  2. In the ordinance or ordinances fixing the tax rates for any year, the board of aldermen shall subdivide the levy as follows:
    1. Separate levies for each agency for which a separate levy is to be made;
    2. A general levy for general city purposes.

      The board of aldermen shall cause the foregoing levies to be made for the purposes stated, by the ordinance or ordinances fixing the tax rates each year.

  3. If in any year the board of aldermen fails to pass a levy ordinance or ordinances, or if the levy ordinance or ordinances is or are invalid or inoperative, the rates of taxation for that fiscal year shall be the same as for the year before, item for item.

History. 2816, 2981, 2983: amend. Acts 1948, ch. 67; 1954, ch. 164, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Construction.

The court in construing together this section and KRS 91.290 (repealed) held that the general council is not required to levy a deficit tax unless there is an actual deficit in the revenues of the city for the year. McDonald v. Louisville, 113 Ky. 425 , 68 S.W. 413, 24 Ky. L. Rptr. 271 , 1902 Ky. LEXIS 64 ( Ky. 1902 ), overruled, Board of Trustees v. Paducah, 333 S.W.2d 515, 1960 Ky. LEXIS 196 ( Ky. 1960 ).

2. Failure to Impose Tax.

The failure of city to impose an ad valorem tax for the year on personal property used in business upon which a license tax was imposed is not such an irregularity as will render entire ordinance void, as the legal portion of levy can be separated from the illegal. Levi v. Louisville, 97 Ky. 394 , 30 S.W. 973, 16 Ky. L. Rptr. 872 , 1895 Ky. LEXIS 196 ( Ky. 1895 ).

3. Levy.
4. — Subdivision.

Where levy should be subdivided for various purposes, one of which was for street sprinkling, and levy ordinance did not provide for that purpose, street sprinkling was not considered embraced under term “general purposes,” and no part of levy under that head could be so used. Louisville v. Button, 118 Ky. 732 , 82 S.W. 293, 26 Ky. L. Rptr. 606 , 1904 Ky. LEXIS 92 ( Ky. 1904 ); Gilbert v. Greene, 185 Ky. 817 , 216 S.W. 105, 1919 Ky. LEXIS 380 ( Ky. 1919 ).

5. — Omission.

Levy of ad valorem tax for sinking fund may be omitted, and the commissioners (now property valuation administrators) cannot maintain an action to compel such a levy. Commissioners of Sinking Fund v. Grainger, 98 Ky. 319 , 32 S.W. 954, 17 Ky. L. Rptr. 901 , 1895 Ky. LEXIS 56 ( Ky. 1895 ).

6. Exemptions.

Although the city may by ordinance exempt manufacturing establishments from city taxation for five (5) years, it cannot by such ordinance exempt them from payment of school taxes levied by city for benefit of its common schools. Louisville v. Board of Education, 154 Ky. 316 , 157 S.W. 379, 1913 Ky. LEXIS 66 ( Ky. 1913 ); North Vernon Lumber Co. v. Louisville, 163 Ky. 467 , 173 S.W. 1120, 1915 Ky. LEXIS 243 ( Ky. 1915 ).

7. Special Assessments.

Special assessments for street improvements are not taxes within the meaning of the constitution requiring equality and uniformity of taxation. Gosnell v. Louisville, 104 Ky. 201 , 46 S.W. 722, 20 Ky. L. Rptr. 519 , 1898 Ky. LEXIS 156 ( Ky. 1898 ), limited, Kirwin v. Nevin, 111 Ky. 682 , 64 S.W. 647, 23 Ky. L. Rptr. 947 , 1901 Ky. LEXIS 246 ( Ky. 1901 ).

Cited:

Maydwell v. Louisville, 116 Ky. 885 , 76 S.W. 1091, 25 Ky. L. Rptr. 1062 , 1903 Ky. LEXIS 254 ( Ky. 1903 ); George v. Bernheim Distilling Co., 300 Ky. 179 , 188 S.W.2d 321, 1945 Ky. LEXIS 519 ( Ky. 1945 ).

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Civil service, tax to maintain, KRS 90.230 .

Ordinances of first-class city, how passed, KRS 83.500 .

Tax for city-county board of health, amount required, KRS 212.470 .

ALR

Smaller political units, taxation for financing or refinancing of, by municipality. 106 A.L.R. 608.

Special assessments, power of court to appoint receiver for collection and distribution of. 113 A.L.R. 755.

Valuation of property as affected by variation of tax rate for local or special purposes in different local taxing units, or inclusion of property within particular taxing unit. 119 A.L.R. 1300.

Exemption of public school property from assessments for local improvements. 15 A.L.R.3d 430.

Widening of city street as local improvement justifying special assessment of adjacent property. 46 A.L.R.3d 127.

Exemption of parsonage or residence of minister, priest, rabbi or other church personnel. 55 A.L.R.3d 356, 485.

91.285. Taxation of abandoned urban property by city of the first class.

  1. Any city of the first class which finds and declares that there exists abandoned urban property as defined in KRS 132.012(1) within the city or which finds that there exists blighted or deteriorated property pursuant to KRS 99.700 to 99.730 may levy a separate rate of taxation on abandoned urban property pursuant to KRS 132.012(2).
  2. Prior to levying a tax upon abandoned urban property, the legislative body of a city of the first class shall delegate to the vacant properties review commission, if established pursuant to KRS 99.700 to 99.730 or another department or agency of city government, the responsibility of determining which properties within the city are abandoned urban properties. A list of abandoned urban properties shall be furnished to the county property valuation administrator prior to the date fixed for the annual assessment of real property within the county. If a property classified as abandoned urban property is repaired, rehabilitated or otherwise returned to productive use, the owner shall notify the city which shall, if it finds the property is no longer abandoned urban property, notify the property valuation administrator to strike the property from the list of abandoned urban properties.

History. Enact. Acts 1990, ch. 513, § 2, effective July 13, 1990; 2016 ch. 127, § 14, effective July 15, 2016.

Research References and Practice Aids

Treatises

Caldwell’s Kentucky Form Book, 5th Ed., Complaint in Class Action to Declare City Occupational Tax Unconstitutional and to Enjoin Same, Form 355.08.

91.290. Expenditures limited — Deficits and surpluses in current revenue — Current borrowing. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2982) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 232, § 7, effective July 15, 1980.

91.300. City not to be bound beyond appropriation. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2820, 2821) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 232, § 7, effective July 15, 1980.

Assessment

91.310. Assessment of real and personal property — Definition of terms.

  1. The board of aldermen may annually provide by ordinance for the assessment of all real and personal property that is subject to city taxation, except such property as is required by law to be assessed by some other agency. Except as provided in KRS 91.620 to 91.680 , the city assessor shall assess all such property at its fair cash value as of July 1 of each year.
  2. For the purpose of assessment:
    1. “Land” means the soil.
    2. “Improvements” means everything built on or attached to the soil.
    3. “Personal property” means all articles other than improvements to land.
  3. Improvements owned by a tenant may be assessed in his name apart from the land.

History. 2980, 2984.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Exception.

Insofar as it provides for different assessment dates, KRS 132.285 forms an exception to this section when a city adopts the county assessment. Price v. Louisville, 237 S.W.2d 840, 1951 Ky. LEXIS 778 ( Ky. 1951 ).

2. Statutory Exemption.

A statutory exemption from taxation should not be extended beyond its plain letter. German Bank v. Louisville, 108 Ky. 377 , 56 S.W. 504, 22 Ky. L. Rptr. 9 , 1900 Ky. LEXIS 48 ( Ky. 1900 ), overruled, Bond v. Brand's Trustee, 115 Ky. 632 , 74 S.W. 673, 25 Ky. L. Rptr. 26 , 1903 Ky. LEXIS 139 ( Ky. 1903 ).

3. School Tax.

The city may assess the school tax, though it be in a sense a state tax, at the same time and in same manner as taxes for municipal purposes. North Vernon Lumber Co. v. Louisville, 163 Ky. 467 , 173 S.W. 1120, 1915 Ky. LEXIS 243 ( Ky. 1915 ).

4. Interest or Costs.

It is the duty of the city to make a correct assessment, and the property holder is not liable for costs or interest until an accurate assessment has been made. Thompson v. Williamsburg, 229 Ky. 81 , 16 S.W.2d 772, 1929 Ky. LEXIS 694 ( Ky. 1929 ).

5. Improvements Owned by Tenants.

A tenant’s permanent improvement standing on land leased for 99 years from a tax-exempt institution was taxable as tenant’s property even though the lease provided the permanent improvement was owned by the tax-exempt institution with actual possession delayed for 99 years. Broadway & Fourth Ave. Realty Co. v. Louisville, 303 Ky. 202 , 197 S.W.2d 238, 1946 Ky. LEXIS 814 ( Ky. 1946 ).

Although a lease provided that improvement on leased land would belong to the lessor, a charitable organization, at the end of the lease period, lessee who erected a building and who was receiving rents from a sublessee was liable as beneficial owner of the improvement to the city for real property taxes. Louisville Garage Corp. v. Louisville, 303 Ky. 553 , 198 S.W.2d 40, 1946 Ky. LEXIS 873 ( Ky. 1946 ).

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Assessments to be made at fair cash value, penalty for failure to assess, Const., § 172.

City may adopt assessment made by property valuation administrator, KRS 132.285 .

Levy and assessment of property taxes, KRS ch. 132.

Kentucky Law Journal.

Property Assessment Remedies for the Kentucky Taxpayer, 60 Ky. L.J. 84 (1971).

ALR

Particular educational, religious, or charitable institution, constitutionality of exemption of, from taxation. 2 A.L.R. 471.

“Owner,” scope and import of term, in statutes relating to assessment of taxes. 2 A.L.R. 792; 95 A.L.R. 1085.

Acceptance of dedicated street, necessity of, to relieve it from taxation. 5 A.L.R. 1537.

Government securities or property, state power to free from taxation as affected by constitutional enumeration of subjects of tax exemption. 9 A.L.R. 436.

Construction of exemption of religious body or society from taxation. 17 A.L.R. 1027; 168 A.L.R. 1222.

Labor organization, exemption of property from taxation. 23 A.L.R. 813; 172 A.L.R. 1070.

Prospective value as basis of valuation of land for purposes of property taxation. 24 A.L.R. 649.

Charitable organizations, exemption from taxation. 34 A.L.R. 634; 62 A.L.R. 328; 108 A.L.R. 284.

Shares owned by a resident in a foreign corporation as subject of property tax. 43 A.L.R. 686; 48 A.L.R. 997.

Exemption from taxation of college fraternity or sorority house. 66 A.L.R.2d 904.

Depreciation, deduction of fixed periodical percentage (“straight line method”) as proper method determining. 71 A.L.R. 971.

What property is within provision in relation to local taxation of certain railroad property under statute or constitution providing for assessment or taxation of railroad property by state commission or board. 80 A.L.R. 252.

Construction and application of statute prohibiting or restricting reassessment after assessment and payment of taxes. 85 A.L.R. 107.

Educational bodies or schools, what are, within contemplation of tax exemption provisions. 95 A.L.R. 62.

Remission, release or compromise of tax as an invalid exemption from taxation. 99 A.L.R. 1068.

Remission, release or compromise of tax claim, power of tax collector as to. 99 A.L.R. 1068; 28 A.L.R.2d 1425.

Aviation base for military purposes, as an “armory” within meaning of tax exemption statute. 99 A.L.R. 181.

Original cost of construction or reproduction cost as proper factors in assessing real property. 104 A.L.R. 790.

Basis of valuation of corporate stock for purposes of taxation. 107 A.L.R. 1263.

Injunction against assessment or collection of tax, applicability of statute denying remedy by, in case of attempt to collect penalties and coercive exactions. 108 A.L.R. 209.

“Right of way,” as employed in statute relating to taxation of railroads or railroad property. 108 A.L.R. 242.

What is a municipal corporation within constitutional or statutory tax exemption provision. 108 A.L.R. 577.

Appurtenant rights, easements, restrictions, or charges in respect of land as factors in taxation. 108 A.L.R. 829.

Excessive assessments as within contemplation of statute providing for refunding of taxes “erroneously or illegally charged.” 110 A.L.R. 670.

Tangible chattels, situs of, as between different states or countries for purposes of property taxation. 110 A.L.R. 707.

Sale under distress warrant, right of officer conducting, to refuse to accept best bid because inadequate. 110 A.L.R. 1077.

Common or public school entitled to exemption from taxation, what constitutes. 113 A.L.R. 715.

Grounds stated in protest against payment of property tax as a limitation of grounds upon which recovery back of tax may be claimed. 113 A.L.R. 1479.

Prohibition to control action of tax collector. 115 A.L.R. 20; 159 A.L.R. 627.

“Grain,” within exemption statute, what is. 122 A.L.R. 1436.

Housing authorities, constitutionality of exemption from taxation of property of. 130 A.L.R. 1088; 172 A.L.R. 966.

Declaratory judgment on question of exemption. 132 A.L.R. 1142; 11 A.L.R.2d 359.

Housing authority, exemption from taxation of property of. 133 A.L.R. 365; 152 A.L.R. 239.

Different parts or parcels of land in same ownership as single unit or separate units for tax assessment purposes. 133 A.L.R. 524.

Hospital as within tax exemption provision not specifically naming hospitals. 144 A.L.R. 1483.

Military service, construction and application of statutory and constitutional provisions, exempting property of persons in, or formerly in such service, from taxation. 149 A.L.R. 1485.

“Assessment” or “assessed valuation,” meaning of, when used as basis of tax limit. 156 A.L.R. 594.

Equitable title under executory contract for purchase of real property as sustaining exemption from taxation. 156 A.L.R. 1301.

Enforcement against tax-exempt property of tax on nonexempt property or on owner of tax-exempt property. 159 A.L.R. 461.

Price paid or received by taxpayer for property as evidence of its value for tax purposes. 160 A.L.R. 684.

Scope and application of exemption of cemeteries from taxation. 168 A.L.R. 283.

Cemetery, exemption as affected by use to which property is put or for which it is intended. 168 A.L.R. 285.

Consent to state taxation of federal property or instrumentalities as affecting exemption thereof under provision of state enabling act, constitution or statute. 168 A.L.R. 547.

Constitutional exemption from taxation as subject to legislative regulation respecting conditions of its assertion. 4 A.L.R.2d 744.

Property used by personnel as living quarters or for recreation purposes as within contemplation of tax exemptions extended to property of religious, educational, charitable, or hospital organizations. 15 A.L.R.2d 1064.

Effect of failure to pay taxes because of unjustifiable refusal of tax collector to accept payment. 21 A.L.R.2d 1300.

What is “scientific institution” within property tax exemption provision. 34 A.L.R.2d 1221.

Tax exemption of real property as affected by time of acquisition of title by private owner entitled to exemption. 54 A.L.R.2d 996.

Tax exemption of Blue Cross, Blue Shield, or other hospital or medical service corporation. 88 A.L.R.2d 1414.

What constitutes manufacturing and who is a manufacturer under tax laws. 17 A.L.R.3d 7.

Garage or parking lot as within tax exemption extended to property of educational, charitable, or hospital organizations. 33 A.L.R.3d 938.

Tax exemption of property used by fraternal or benevolent association for clubhouse or similar purposes. 39 A.L.R.3d 640.

Judicial notice as to assessed valuations. 42 A.L.R.3d 1439.

Construction of statute or ordinance giving property tax exemption or favorable property tax rate to older persons. 45 A.L.R.3d 1153.

Widening of city street as local improvement justifying special assessment of adjacent property. 46 A.L.R.3d 127.

Prospective use for tax exempt purposes as entitling property to tax exemption. 54 A.L.R.3d 9.

Availability of tax exemption to property held on lease from exempt owner. 54 A.L.R.3d 402.

Taxation exemption of parsonage or residence of minister, priest, rabbi, or other church personnel. 55 A.L.R.3d 356, 485.

Exemption of property leased by and used for purposes of otherwise tax exempt body. 55 A.L.R.3d 430.

Tax exemption of property of educational body as extending to property used by personnel as living quarters. 55 A.L.R.3d 485.

Separate assessment and taxation of air rights. 56 A.L.R.3d 1300.

Real-estate taxation of condominiums. 71 A.L.R.3d 952.

Sale price of real property as evidence in determining value for tax assessment purposes. 89 A.L.R.3d 1126.

Situs of tangible personal property for purposes of property taxation. 2 A.L.R.4th 432.

Classification, as real estate or personal property, of mobile homes or trailers for purposes of state or local taxation. 7 A.L.R.4th 1016.

Standing of one taxpayer to complain of underassessment or nonassessment of property of another for state and local taxation. 9 A.L.R.4th 428.

91.320. Property, how listed for assessment — Taxpayers’ lists — Assessment in office of property valuation administrator — Inquiries by assessor — Records of real estate transfers.

  1. Every person owning or holding taxable property, either in his own right or as a fiduciary or agent, shall return to the assessor or his assistant a true list of all such property, stating the value of the personal property, upon blanks prepared for that purpose by the assessor, in the form prescribed by ordinance, and shall make oath before the assessor or his assistant. However, if it be deemed expedient, the city assessor may mail, by postal card, appropriate notice to the last known address of the taxpayer and by agreement with the property valuation administrator receive the return of the said true list or schedule of all such taxable property in the office of the property valuation administrator simultaneously with the taking of such list or schedule for state and county purposes by the property valuation administrator, and under such arrangement the city tax assessor shall provide for such purpose a sufficient number of deputies to expeditiously perform such duties and they shall perform such duties in the office of the property valuation administrator during the period necessary to complete said duties. If such arrangement is made, both the city assessor and the property valuation administrator, and the deputies of each and either, are hereby empowered to administer any oath to the taxpayer, provided by law in connection with the return of any list or schedule, whether the property be located in the county outside the city or in the corporate limits of the city. The method of payment of salaries to said deputies engaged in said work shall not be affected by such arrangement. If the office of the property valuation administrator is put to any additional expense by reason of the taking of such lists or schedules for city property, such additional expense shall be paid by the city. Nothing in this section shall be construed as an acceptance by the city of the assessment of the property valuation administrator on property located in the city, but for the sole purpose of convenience and economy.
  2. If any such person fails to return a true list under oath, the assessor may, according to the best information he can obtain, assess the property.
  3. The district court shall, at the instance of the assessor, enforce by rule or process of contempt the return, under oath, of the list required by this section.
  4. The assessor shall each day make diligent search among the conveyances and probated wills recorded in the office of the county clerk and among the confirmations of sales in the courts, and shall also make personal inquiry in his yearly rounds about deaths among the owners of lands or improvements in the city.
  5. The assessor shall keep in alphabetical order a register of all transfers of real estate. All purchasers of real estate in the city shall furnish the assessor information thereof within two (2) days after the conveyance has been lodged for record. The assessor shall notify such purchasers of any taxes that remain unpaid and are a lien on the property bought.

History. 2907, 2988, 2989: amend. Acts 1944, ch. 87; 1976 (1st Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 104, effective January 2, 1978.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Purchaser at Decretal Sale.

The purchaser at a decretal sale, who acquired equitable title by commissioner (now property valuation administrator) accepting his bid and bonds for purchase money, became liable for all taxes which accrued against the property after that date. Bond v. Brand's Trustee, 115 Ky. 632 , 74 S.W. 673, 25 Ky. L. Rptr. 26 , 1903 Ky. LEXIS 139 ( Ky. 1903 ).

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Assessment dates; when, where and by whom property listed; liability for tax; listing of exempt real estate, KRS 132.220 .

Records of property valuation administrator of customer information furnished by utilities, assessor authorized to examine, KRS 132.275 .

ALR

Tax assessor’s civil liability to taxpayer for excessive or improper assessment of real property. 82 A.L.R.2d 1148.

Income or rental value as a factor in evaluation of real property for purpose of taxation. 96 A.L.R.2d 666.

Separate assessment and taxation of air rights. 56 A.L.R.3d 1300.

Sale price of real property as evidence in determining value for tax assessment purposes. 89 A.L.R.3d 1126.

Standing of one taxpayer to complain of underassessment or nonassessment of property of another for state and local taxation. 9 A.L.R.4th 428.

91.330. Correction of taxpayer’s list by assessor — Review.

If the assessor concludes that in any list filed under KRS 91.320 the taxpayer has omitted to list any of his taxable property or has valued any property too low, he may assess the property omitted or raise the valuation of the property valued too low, and shall immediately notify the owner or holder by mail as to the action taken. The owner or holder, within fifteen (15) days after the notice is mailed to him, may file in the office of the assessor a complaint either that the omitted property is not subject to taxation or that the increased valuation is too high, and if such a complaint is filed in time the assessment shall not become binding and no tax bill shall be issued thereon until the assessment has been passed upon by the board of equalization.

History. 2988.

Research References and Practice Aids

ALR

Notice to property owners of increase in assessment or valuation by board of equalization or review. 24 A.L.R. 331; 84 A.L.R. 197.

“Aggrieved” within statutes providing remedies in tax cases, who is. 74 A.L.R. 1221.

Overassessment, right of taxpayer to relief from, as affected by overassessment of the other property within the district. 87 A.L.R. 1296.

Delegating to other matters relating to computation of tax or extent of taxpayer’s liability, power of tax officials as to. 107 A.L.R. 1482.

Evidence as to assessable value, power of board of tax review to receive, without notice to taxpayer. 113 A.L.R. 990.

Who may complain of underassessment or nonassessment of property for taxation. 5 A.L.R.2d 576.

Standing of one taxpayer to complain of underassessment or nonassessment of property of another for state and local taxation. 9 A.L.R.4th 428.

91.340. Assessor to view property before assessing it.

The assessor or his assistant, before assessing any land or improvements, shall view the same, and before assessing any personal property shall go upon the premises where the personal property or the greater part of it is found. Failure to comply with this section shall not invalidate the assessment.

History. 2987.

91.350. Assessment returns to be available to public — What to show.

The assessor shall, on or before September 10 of each year, or as soon thereafter as is practicable, have available to the general public, records of the current assessment return which shall include the names of all owners or holders of lands, improvements or personal property, showing opposite the name of each owner or holder the number and block of each of his lots according to the maps in the office of the assessor, the aggregate value of each parcel of land, the value per front foot when the land fronts on a public way, the value of the improvements, and the assessed value of the personal property.

History. 2985: amend. Acts 1948, ch. 68.

Research References and Practice Aids

ALR

Abbreviations, use of, in description of land in tax proceedings. 1 A.L.R. 1228.

Map, plat, or survey, sufficiency of description of property by, on tax rolls or in tax proceedings. 137 A.L.R. 184.

91.360. Designation of real property — Errors and omissions.

  1. Any lot that is not designated by a number on the assessor’s maps, and any lot that is so designated but is subsequently subdivided, shall be given an appropriate serial number by the assessor, and shall be designated by that number in the assessment books. The board of aldermen may provide for additional assessment maps whenever necessary.
  2. The assessor shall not assess any property in such a name as “A B’s heirs,” “A B’s devisees,” “A B’s executors” or the like, but he may assess lands or improvements in the name of “A B’s unknown heirs,” “A B’s unknown devisees” or the like, when the names cannot be obtained after diligent inquiry has been made. When there are more than three (3) joint owners, three (3) of the names, with the words “and others,” may be used. Where a remainder, reversion or other future estate is outstanding, the holder of the particular estate shall be assessed with the words “holder of present estate” after his name. Whenever the names of all the owners are not given no lien for the taxes shall arise to the detriment of any purchaser from an owner not named, unless the assessment, by its own terms or by reference to the city maps, identifies the lands or improvements therein embraced.
  3. Whenever it appears that any property has been assessed in a name other than that of the owner or holder, whether for the current or any preceding year, the assessor shall notify the owner or holder by mail and at the same time make the correction in his books, and certify the correction to the tax receiver.
  4. No mistake in, or omission of, the correct name of the owner or holder of taxable lands or improvements shall impair the assessment, if the lands or improvements are designated in the assessment books by the number and block assigned to them on the assessor’s map, or otherwise fully identified in the assessment books.

History. 2986, 2990, 2991.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Holder of Present Estate.

Recital in authenticated tax bill that person is “holder of present estate” controls allegation in pleading that owner of life estate and remainderman were joint holders. Fenley v. Louisville, 119 Ky. 569 , 84 S.W. 582, 27 Ky. L. Rptr. 204 , 1905 Ky. LEXIS 30 ( Ky. 1905 ).

The assessment by the city tax assessor of property in the name of the life tenant, as holder of the present estate, rather than in the name of the remainderman, was proper. Brunner v. Home for Aged of Little Sisters of Poor, 429 S.W.2d 381, 1968 Ky. LEXIS 745 ( Ky. 1968 ).

2. Correction of Name.

Where property was first assessed in a name other than that of owner and correction was later made, limitation against action for collection of city tax did not begin to run until correction was made. City of Louisville v. Louisville Courier-Journal Co., 84 S.W. 773, 27 Ky. L. Rptr. 263 (1905).

Original suit for collection of taxes, based on corrected tax list first assessed in wrong name, made more than five (5) years after property should have been assessed, came too late. Louisville v. Clark, 173 Ky. 55 , 190 S.W. 478, 1917 Ky. LEXIS 411 ( Ky. 1917 ).

3. Mistake or Omission of Name.

The provision of this section relating to mistake or omission in assessor’s records, is not invalid as local and special legislation. Woolley v. Louisville, 114 Ky. 556 , 71 S.W. 893, 24 Ky. L. Rptr. 1357 , 1903 Ky. LEXIS 36 ( Ky. 1903 ).

Where the property was assessed and described in assessor’s books in accordance with statute, a mistake in name of person against whom it was assessed does not impair the assessment. Joyes v. Louisville, 82 S.W. 432, 26 Ky. L. Rptr. 713 , 1904 Ky. LEXIS 372 (Ky. Ct. App. 1904). See Louisville v. Louisville Courier-Journal Co., 140 Ky. 664 , 131 S.W. 509, 1910 Ky. LEXIS 341 ( Ky. 1910 ); Louisivlle v. Sonne, 148 Ky. 394 , 146 S.W. 739, 1912 Ky. LEXIS 438 ( Ky. 1912 ).

Research References and Practice Aids

ALR

Payment of tax assessment which improperly described property owned by taxpayer as good payment on that property. 23 A.L.R. 79.

Different parts or parcels of land in same ownership as single unit or separate units for tax assessment purposes. 133 A.L.R. 524.

91.370. Retrospective assessment.

When any lands, improvements or personal property are not assessed in any year, they may, when the omission is discovered, be assessed retrospectively for that year at any time not later than five (5) years thereafter, but the lien thereby accruing to the city shall not prejudice any rights acquired by purchasers before the assessment. The assessor guilty of the omission, and his sureties, shall be liable to the city for any damage by loss of lien. Any person retrospectively assessed may, within thirty (30) days after notice of the assessment is mailed to him, file in the assessor’s office the complaint provided for in KRS 91.400 , and if such a complaint is filed in time the assessment shall not become binding and no tax bill shall be issued thereon until the assessment has been passed upon by the board of equalization.

History. 2991.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Injunction Restraining Collection.

Taxpayer who does not show he filed complaint when he knew of retrospective assessment, even though he did not receive notice, or take any action to have assessment corrected by the board, has no ground for injunction restraining collection of taxes. Hegan v. Louisville, 107 S.W. 809, 32 Ky. L. Rptr. 1082 (1908).

2. Limitation on Collection.

Original suit for collection of taxes, based on corrected tax list first assessed in wrong name, made more than five (5) years after property should have been assessed, came too late. Louisville v. Clark, 173 Ky. 55 , 190 S.W. 478, 1917 Ky. LEXIS 411 ( Ky. 1917 ).

Research References and Practice Aids

ALR

Construction and application of statute prohibiting or restricting reassessment after assessment and payment of taxes. 85 A.L.R. 107.

Standing of one taxpayer to complain of underassessment or nonassessment of property of another for state and local taxation. 9 A.L.R.4th 428.

91.375. Omitted property.

All omitted property that should have been assessed for ad valorem taxes by cities of the first class or consolidated local governments is subject to a penalty of ten percent (10%) of the amount of the taxes, and interest at one percent (1%) per month from the date when the taxes would have been delinquent had the property been listed as required by law.

History. Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 22, § 2; 1968, ch. 152, § 66; 2002, ch. 346, § 98, effective July 15, 2002.

91.380. Remedies applicable to corrected and retrospective assessments.

The remedies provided in this chapter for the collection of taxes shall apply to corrected assessments made under subsection (3) of KRS 91.360 and to retrospective assessments made under KRS 91.370 , beginning with May 1 next after the corrected or retrospective assessment is certified to the tax receiver.

History. 2991.

Equalization

91.390. Board of equalization.

  1. The board of equalization shall consist of three (3) citizens of the city, to be elected annually in July by the board of aldermen. The board of aldermen may remove any member of the board of equalization, and shall fill all vacancies caused by removal, death, resignation or departure from the city. The board of aldermen may fix the compensation of members of the board of equalization at not more than ten dollars ($10) for each day of service, to be paid out of the city treasury.
  2. Two (2) members shall constitute a quorum. If two (2) or all of the members fail to attend, the mayor may, by writing signed by him, appoint others to take their places for the time being. The board of equalization shall convene on October 1, or on the succeeding day when October 1 falls on Sunday, and shall close its sessions on November 15 following except when November 15 falls on Sunday, in which case it shall close its sessions on November 14. The mayor may, from time to time, reconvene the board to pass on the complaints of persons retrospectively assessed. The board shall hold its meetings in the office of the assessor, and shall keep a full and true journal of its proceedings, to be preserved as part of the city records.
  3. The chairman of the board may summon and swear witnesses and hear all competent evidence on matters relating to the assessment of property.

History. 2993, 2995.

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Property Assessment Remedies for the Kentucky Taxpayer, 60 Ky. L.J. 84 (1971).

91.400. Proceedings before board of equalization — Appeal.

  1. The assessment books shall remain open in the assessor’s office from September 15 to September 30. Any person who thinks that his lands, improvements or personal property or those in which he has an interest have been assessed beyond their value may, before September 30, file with the assessor his complaint, specifically describing the property claimed to be assessed beyond its value and the alleged excess. The board of equalization shall investigate all complaints duly filed and shall, according to the justice of the case, approve, reduce or raise the assessment. When any complaint is heard by the board of equalization, the burden of proof shall be upon the person complaining to show that his property has been assessed beyond its value, or that he did not, on the assessing date, own the property sought to be assessed. If the board decides on investigation that any assessment is too low, it shall thereupon notify the taxpayer by mail, stating the value which it believes should be put upon the property involved, and fix a day for the taxpayer to appear before it, not earlier than five (5) days, exclusive of Sundays and holidays, after the mailing of the notice. If the taxpayer appears he shall be given an opportunity to show why the value suggested by the board is not correct, and the board shall thereupon fix the assessment of the property. If the taxpayer does not appear at the time set, the board shall fix the assessment of the property at its proper value.
  2. Any taxpayer feeling himself aggrieved by any action of the board of equalization may appeal to the Circuit Court within thirty (30) days after the final adjournment of the board of equalization, by filing with the court a copy of the action of the board, certified by the assessor. The assessor or the city attorney, if he feels that the city has been aggrieved by the action of the board of equalization or on account of the failure of the board to act, may appeal from the board to the Circuit Court by filing with that court a brief statement showing the action of the board or stating wherein it failed to properly act. The court shall hear evidence and pass upon all such appeals. The taxpayer, the assessor or the city attorney may appeal from the Circuit Court to the Court of Appeals as in other civil cases. When an appeal from the board is taken by a taxpayer, the city attorney shall represent the board in the Circuit Court and the Court of Appeals, and when an appeal from the board is taken by the city attorney or the city assessor, the city attorney shall represent the interests of the city in those courts.

History. 2992: amend. Acts 1976 (1st Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 105, effective January 2, 1978.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

McCracken Fiscal Court v. McFadden, 275 Ky. 819 , 122 S.W.2d 761, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 499 ( Ky. 1938 ); Board of Supervisors v. Pinnell, 292 Ky. 364 , 166 S.W.2d 882, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 108 ( Ky. 1942 ).

Research References and Practice Aids

ALR

Notice to property owners of increase in assessment or valuation by board of equalization or review. 24 A.L.R. 331; 84 A.L.R. 197.

“Aggrieved,” within statutes providing remedies in tax cases, who is. 74 A.L.R. 1221.

Overassessment, right of taxpayer to relief from, as affected by overassessment of the other property within the district. 87 A.L.R. 1296.

Adjournment or closing of books, power or duty of tax review or equalization board to act after date for. 106 A.L.R. 624.

Evidence as to assessable value, power of board of tax review to receive, without notice to taxpayers. 113 A.L.R. 990.

Who may complain of underassessment or nonassessment of property for taxation. 5 A.L.R.2d 576.

Standing of one taxpayer to complain of underassessment or nonassessment of property of another for state and local taxation. 9 A.L.R.4th 428.

91.410. Effect of failure to elect board or failure of board to act — Taxpayer’s complaint and remedy.

If in any year a board of equalization is not legally elected, or fails to meet, or fails to perform any essential act, or if, in any year, the assessment books do not remain open for the requisite time, the tax bills shall not thereby become void. When any taxpayer, in such a case, complains of his assessment, a board of equalization shall then be chosen as provided in KRS 91.390 , or the board already chosen shall meet, the complaint shall be heard as provided in KRS 91.400 , and the collection of tax bills from all taxpayers so complaining shall be suspended until the board has heard and disposed of their complaints.

History. 2994.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Assessment Complaint.

Taxpayer who has not complained of his assessment cannot complain that board of equalization was not regularly elected. Fonda v. Louisville, 49 S.W. 785, 20 Ky. L. Rptr. 1652 , 1899 Ky. LEXIS 448 (Ky. Ct. App. 1899); Woolley v. Louisville, 114 Ky. 556 , 71 S.W. 893, 24 Ky. L. Rptr. 1357 , 1903 Ky. LEXIS 36 ( Ky. 1903 ).

Collection—Tax Sales

91.420. Tax bills, how made out and listed for collection — Evidence of validity of tax.

During December of each year or as soon as the rates for the coming year are fixed, the tax bills shall be made out according to the provisions of the ordinances levying taxes and the following January shall be listed with the tax receiver for collection. Except as provided in KRS 133.240 , taxes on personal property may be included with those on some one (1) parcel of land and improvements. Any tax bill so listed with the tax receiver shall be prima facie proof that all steps have been taken to make it a binding tax bill for the amounts and purposes and against the person and property therein named or described.

History. 2996: amend. Acts 1948, ch. 66; 1984, ch. 54, § 10, effective January 1, 1985.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Holder of Present Estate.

Recital in authenticated tax bill that person is “holder of present estate” controls allegation in pleading that owner of life estate and remainderman were joint holders. Fenley v. Louisville, 119 Ky. 569 , 84 S.W. 582, 27 Ky. L. Rptr. 204 , 1905 Ky. LEXIS 30 ( Ky. 1905 ).

2. Prima Facie Evidence.

The provision that the authenticated tax bill is prima facie evidence of liability for taxes is valid. However, a plea denying the assessor signed tax bill would put burden of showing signing on city. Louisville v. Johnson, 95 Ky. 254 , 24 S.W. 875, 15 Ky. L. Rptr. 615 , 1894 Ky. LEXIS 10 ( Ky. 1894 ); Fonda v. Louisville, 49 S.W. 785, 20 Ky. L. Rptr. 1652 , 1899 Ky. LEXIS 448 (Ky. Ct. App. 1899); Woolley v. Louisville, 114 Ky. 556 , 71 S.W. 893, 24 Ky. L. Rptr. 1357 , 1903 Ky. LEXIS 36 ( Ky. 1903 ); Albin Co. v. Louisville, 117 Ky. 895 , 79 S.W. 274, 25 Ky. L. Rptr. 2055 , 1904 Ky. LEXIS 256 ( Ky. 1904 ).

91.430. Taxes, when to be paid — Discounts — Interest and penalties.

  1. Tax bills shall be payable in January after the same are listed with the tax receiver for collection, and shall become delinquent on May 1 of the year for which they are made out.
  2. The taxes paid before May 1 in the year for which they are made out may be reduced by discounts not to exceed three percent (3%) during such periods and in such amounts as the legislative body of the city may provide by ordinance.
  3. All tax bills uncollected in whole or in part on May 1 next succeeding the day on which they were listed with the tax receiver shall thereafter bear interest at the rate of one-half of one percent (0.5%) for every month or fraction thereof from May 1 until paid or until the property of the delinquent has been sold for the tax.
  4. On July 1 next succeeding the day on which the tax bills were listed with the tax receiver, a penalty of ten percent (10%) of the face of the bill shall be added to all unpaid tax bills, in addition to the interest.

History. 2996 to 2998: amend. Acts 1950, ch. 87.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Discounts and Rebates.

The provisions of this section for discount for early payment apply only to citizens and not to railroads. This is not such a discrimination as to be open to constitutional objection. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Louisville, 29 S.W. 865, 16 Ky. L. Rptr. 796 (1895), writ of error dismissed, 166 U.S. 709, 17 S. Ct. 725, 41 L. Ed. 1173, 1897 U.S. LEXIS 2063 (U.S. 1897).

Discounts or rebates may be allowed to taxpayer as an inducement to pay taxes before they become due. Board of Education v. Sea, 167 Ky. 772 , 181 S.W. 670, 1916 Ky. LEXIS 492 ( Ky. 1916 ).

The payment of taxes at a time when collection could not have been coerced, in order to secure discount fixed by law, was a voluntary payment. Nettleton's Ex'r v. Louisville, 191 Ky. 581 , 230 S.W. 957, 1921 Ky. LEXIS 347 ( Ky. 1921 ); Covington v. Lovell & Buffington Tobacco Co., 204 Ky. 40 , 263 S.W. 676, 1924 Ky. LEXIS 396 ( Ky. 1924 ).

Challenge of assessment under KRS 133.120 does not deprive taxpayer who was partially successful of tax discount on original payment made on taxpayer’s valuation. Meyers v. Parkway Professional Center, Inc., 344 S.W.2d 389, 1961 Ky. LEXIS 224 ( Ky. 1961 ).

2. Interest and Penalties.

Provisions for interest on unpaid taxes are valid. Walston v. Louisville, 66 S.W. 385, 23 Ky. L. Rptr. 1852 (1902); Woolley v. Louisville, 114 Ky. 556 , 71 S.W. 893, 24 Ky. L. Rptr. 1357 , 1903 Ky. LEXIS 36 ( Ky. 1903 ); Specht v. Louisville, 135 Ky. 548 , 122 S.W. 846, 1909 Ky. LEXIS 319 ( Ky. 1909 ).

Interest arising from tax delinquency is not a part of the tax, and, in absence of express provision to the contrary, the various subdivisions of city government receive only their share of the principal and none of the interest. Louisville v. Louisville School Board, 119 Ky. 574 , 84 S.W. 729, 27 Ky. L. Rptr. 209 , 1905 Ky. LEXIS 31 ( Ky. 1905 ); Gilbert v. Greene, 185 Ky. 817 , 216 S.W. 105, 1919 Ky. LEXIS 380 ( Ky. 1919 ).

Where law that provided for interest on unpaid tax bills of one percent (1%) for the first 12 months and for one percent (1%) per month thereafter was amended to provide for interest of one and one-half percent (11/2%) per month till paid and for a ten percent (10%) penalty to be added on after certain date, such amendment was not retroactive and applied to all unpaid tax bills on the date the amendment became effective. Louisville Car Wheel & R. Supply Co. v. Louisville, 146 Ky. 573 , 142 S.W. 1043, 1912 Ky. LEXIS 102 ( Ky. 1912 ).

In action by mortgagee to enforce his mortgage lien on property sold for taxes, the purchaser of the property is entitled to a lien for the ten percent (10%) penalty, if paid by him. Interstate Bond Co. v. Home Owners Loan Corp., 282 Ky. 569 , 139 S.W.2d 69, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 209 ( Ky. 1940 ).

Taxpayer who was partially successful in challenging assessment and who paid increased tax within 30 days after preparation of new tax bill is not subject to penalty under this section. Meyers v. Parkway Professional Center, Inc., 344 S.W.2d 389, 1961 Ky. LEXIS 224 ( Ky. 1961 ).

A taxpayer is excused from payment of the penalties and interest imposed by this section when it is judicially determined that he has resisted payment of his taxes in good faith. Meyers v. Arcadia Realty Foundation, Inc., 367 S.W.2d 836, 1963 Ky. LEXIS 30 ( Ky. 1963 ).

3. Illegal Tax.

The assessment being illegal and the taxes having been paid in ignorance of the law, if payment was involuntary or made under compulsion, it may be recovered. Louisville v. Anderson, 79 Ky. 334 , 2 Ky. L. Rptr. 344 , 1881 Ky. LEXIS 31 (Ky. Ct. App. 1881). See Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Commonwealth, 89 Ky. 531 , 12 S.W. 1064, 11 Ky. L. Rptr. 734 , 1890 Ky. LEXIS 20 ( Ky. 1890 ); Louisville v. Becker, 139 Ky. 17 , 129 S.W. 311, 1910 Ky. LEXIS 4 ( Ky. 1910 ); Greene v. E. H. Taylor, Jr. & Sons, 184 Ky. 739 , 212 S.W. 925, 1919 Ky. LEXIS 126 ( Ky. 1919 ); Nettleton's Ex'r v. Louisville, 191 Ky. 581 , 230 S.W. 957, 1921 Ky. LEXIS 347 ( Ky. 1921 ); Covington v. Lovell & Buffington Tobacco Co., 204 Ky. 40 , 263 S.W. 676, 1924 Ky. LEXIS 396 ( Ky. 1924 ).

An illegal tax, paid voluntarily under a mistake of law, which the city has paid out and applied to purposes for which assessed and collected, cannot be recovered. Louisville v. Becker, 139 Ky. 17 , 129 S.W. 311, 1910 Ky. LEXIS 4 ( Ky. 1910 ). See Nettleton's Ex'r v. Louisville, 191 Ky. 581 , 230 S.W. 957, 1921 Ky. LEXIS 347 ( Ky. 1921 ); Covington v. Lovell & Buffington Tobacco Co., 204 Ky. 40 , 263 S.W. 676, 1924 Ky. LEXIS 396 ( Ky. 1924 ).

4. Franchise Tax Bills.

Where there is a statutory provision that franchise tax bills shall be subject to the same discounts and penalties as other city tax bills, then whenever the general revenue laws of the city change the time or manner in which other city tax bills shall be due and collectible, and prescribe discounts and penalties thereon, the new law becomes at once applicable to franchise taxes. Kentucky Heating Co. v. Louisville, 174 Ky. 142 , 192 S.W. 4, 1917 Ky. LEXIS 165 ( Ky. 1917 ), writ of error dismissed, 250 U.S. 653, 40 S. Ct. 53, 63 L. Ed. 1191, 1919 U.S. LEXIS 1804 (U.S. 1919).

Cited:

Louisville v. Louisville Asphalt Co., 279 Ky. 318 , 130 S.W.2d 739, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 267 ( Ky. 1939 ); Logan v. Louisville, 283 Ky. 518 , 142 S.W.2d 161, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 379 ( Ky. 1940 ); Interstate Bond Co. v. Williams, 290 Ky. 850 , 162 S.W.2d 770, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 491 ( Ky. 1942 ); Department of Revenue v. To Your Door Pizza, Inc., 670 S.W.2d 482, 1983 Ky. App. LEXIS 358 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983).

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

State, county and district taxes, when due; interest, discounts, and penalties, KRS 134.020 .

ALR

Voluntary character of payment of tax made to avoid penalty. 64 A.L.R. 42; 84 A.L.R. 294.

Construction of statute providing for or authorizing waiver or reduction of penalty or interest in respect of taxes in default. 68 A.L.R. 431; 79 A.L.R. 999.

Retroactive effect of statutes relating to interest on delinquent taxes. 77 A.L.R. 1034.

Judgment for taxes, provisions in, as regards future penalties. 93 A.L.R. 793.

Contest in good faith of validity of tax as affecting liability to penalty for failure to pay tax. 96 A.L.R. 925; 147 A.L.R. 142.

Declaratory judgment as to tax penalty. 132 A.L.R. 1145; 11 A.L.R.2d 359.

Doubt as to liability for, or as to person to whom to pay tax, as affecting liability for penalties and interest. 137 A.L.R. 306.

Time of mailing or time of receipt as determinative of liability for penalty or additional amount for failure to pay tax within prescribed time. 158 A.L.R. 370.

91.440. Enforcement of taxes against fiduciaries, agents and trust estates.

  1. Every fiduciary appointed under the laws of this state or by a deed or will recorded in any county clerk’s office in this state who has the management of any lands or improvements in the city, every agent of a nonresident owner of property located in the city who collects the rent thereof, and every person who collects the rent or income or enjoys by occupation the profits of lands or improvements owned by his spouse and located in the city, shall, before July 1 of each year, pay out of the net income of the lands and improvements the city tax assessed upon the same in the preceding year, with accrued interest, before applying the income to the wants of, or paying it over to, his beneficiary or employer. In default thereof, he shall be liable for the tax to the amount of the income that he might have so applied, which liability may be enforced by equitable proceedings in any court of competent jurisdiction. In such proceedings it shall not be an answer that the city has a security in its lien upon the lands and improvements and the right to sell same for taxes.
  2. Tax bills assessed against an administrator, executor or trustee shall be a charge upon and may be enforced against the whole succession of trust estates, in addition to other remedies provided for in this chapter.

History. 2998, 2999: amend. Acts 1974, ch. 386, § 14.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Life Tenant and Remainderman.

Life tenant in possession should pay taxes levied during her life, but if she dies before payment remainderman must pay them. Joyes v. Louisville, 82 S.W. 432, 26 Ky. L. Rptr. 713 , 1904 Ky. LEXIS 372 (Ky. Ct. App. 1904).

Cited:

Board of Supervisors v. Pinnell, 292 Ky. 364 , 166 S.W.2d 882, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 108 ( Ky. 1942 ).

Research References and Practice Aids

ALR

Presentation of claim to executor before bringing action to recover taxes against property of decedent. 34 A.L.R. 387.

Death of owner, power after, to spread property taxes against property omitted from tax rolls for years prior to his death. 89 A.L.R. 848.

Situs for property taxation as between different governmental units within state, of personal property or interest therein held by trustees, executors, or administrators. 129 A.L.R. 273.

Liability of executor, administrator, trustee, or his counsel, for interest, penalty, or extra taxes assessed against estate because of tax law violations. 47 A.L.R.3d 507.

Liability of executor or administrator to estate because of overpaying or unnecessarily paying tax. 55 A.L.R.3d 785.

91.450. Tax notice.

Within a reasonable time after the tax bills for the year have been listed with the tax receiver, he shall mail a postpaid tax notice, directed to the best of his knowledge, to every person against whom a tax bill has been listed. In the case of an infant or mentally disabled person the notice shall be mailed to his guardian or conservator, and in the case of an absent owner whose address is unknown to the tax receiver it shall be mailed to the agent of the owner. The tax notice shall give a brief description of the property taxed, and shall state the number and amount of the bill listed against the taxpayer, the date of its maturity, and the penalties imposed for nonpayment. The failure of the tax receiver to send the tax notice, or of the taxpayer to receive it, shall not invalidate the tax, or the interest or penalties provided for by KRS 91.430 , or any subsequent proceeding for the collection of either.

History. 2998: amend. Acts 1978, ch. 92, § 7, effective June 17, 1978; 1982, ch. 141, § 49, effective July 1, 1982.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section was amended by § 52 of Acts 1980, ch. 396, which would have taken effect July 1, 1982; however, Acts 1982, ch. 141, § 146, effective July 1, 1982, repealed Acts 1980, ch. 396.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

Louisville v. Miller, 697 S.W.2d 164, 1985 Ky. App. LEXIS 646 (Ky. Ct. App. 1985).

Research References and Practice Aids

ALR

Notice to taxpayer, lack of, as affecting penalty for nonpayment of taxes when due. 102 A.L.R. 405.

Lack or insufficiency of notice as to one having an interest in or occupying the property, as affecting another occupying it or having another interest therein who received a sufficient notice. 140 A.L.R. 666.

91.460. Report of unpaid tax bills. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3000: amend. 1974, ch. 236, § 11) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 47, § 17, effective July 15, 1980. For present law, see KRS 91.484 to 91.527 .

91.470. Sale of personal for city taxes. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3001: amend. 1974, ch. 386, § 315) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 47, § 17, effective July 15, 1980. For present law, see KRS 91.484 to 91.527 .

91.480. Sale of real property for city taxes. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3001, 3003: amend. 1974, ch. 236, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 47, § 17, effective July 15, 1980. For present law, see KRS 91.484 to 91.527 .

91.481. Definitions for KRS 91.484 to 91.527 and 92.810.

As used in KRS 91.484 to 91.527 and 92.810 , unless the context otherwise requires:

  1. “Collector” means any city of the first class.
  2. “Land taxes” mean general taxes on real property and include the taxes both on land and improvements thereon.
  3. “Master commissioner” or “circuit clerk” means the master commissioner and the circuit clerk of the judicial district in which any city of the first class is located.
  4. “Tax bill” means the statement of the land taxes and the lien thereon, levied and assessed by any taxing authority.
  5. “Tax lien” means the lien of any tax bill established pursuant to KRS 91.560 .

History. Enact. Acts 1980, ch. 47, § 1, effective July 15, 1980; 1982, ch. 409, § 7, effective July 15, 1982.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

Louisville v. Miller, 697 S.W.2d 164, 1985 Ky. App. LEXIS 646 (Ky. Ct. App. 1985).

91.484. Preparation of list of delinquent taxes by collector — Contents.

  1. The collector of taxes shall, as early in the month of July as is practicable, make a list of all the tax bills remaining in whole or in part unpaid on the date due and payable. He shall at once file the list with the director of finance. A false report or a failure to report shall not invalidate subsequent proceedings for collection of the tax.
  2. The list of delinquent properties and lots prepared pursuant to subsection (1) of this section shall contain the following:
    1. A description of the land by district, block, lot and sub-lot and include the street address.
    2. A statement of the amount of each tax bill upon such parcel, including all tax bills thereon which are delinquent, the year of the assessment, the block, lot and sub-lot of each tax bill and the date from which and the rate at which interest and penalties shall be computed, and an appropriate designation of the owner or holder of each tax bill.
    3. The name of the last known person appearing on the records of the collector in whose name the tax bills on such real estate were listed or charged for the year preceding the calendar year in which such list is filed.

History. Enact. Acts 1980, ch. 47, § 2, effective July 15, 1980.

Opinions of Attorney General.

There is no provision in KRS Chapter 91 for the sale of tax bills and their subsequent conversion into certificates of delinquency; consequently, the city would be deemed the holder and owner of the delinquent tax bills. OAG 83-347 .

Where city does not have a director of finance, the list of delinquent taxes should still be compiled and should be filed with the chief fiscal officer of the city. OAG 83-347 .

91.487. Suit for enforcement of city’s tax lien.

  1. If any of the land or lots against which delinquent taxes are owed, remain unreleased or unpaid six (6) calendar months from the date due and payable, the collector may file suit in the Circuit Court against such land or lots to enforce the lien of the city created under KRS 91.560 .
  2. The collector shall note on the tax bill the fact that suit has been commenced.
  3. The collector shall note on the list of all city land tax bills collectible by the city, which are delinquent, prepared pursuant to KRS 91.481 , that suit has been filed and shall give the court docket the number of each suit and the date the suit was commenced.
  4. It shall be a defense to an action for recovery of taxes against real property that the action was not commenced within seven (7) years after delinquency.
  5. Any person interested in or the owner of any tract of land or lot contained in the records of delinquent land and lots in the collector’s office may release such tract of land or lot, or any part thereof, from such city’s lien thereon, by paying the taxes due the collector, together with interest from the date of delinquency.
  6. If suit shall have been commenced against any tract of land or lot for the collection of taxes, the person desiring to have the land released before judgment, in addition to the original taxes, interest and cost including attorneys’ fees, shall pay to the collector all necessary costs incurred in the court where the suit is pending, and the collector shall account to the clerk of the court in which the suit is filed for the court costs so collected.

History. Enact. Acts 1980, ch. 47, § 3, effective July 15, 1980; 1992, ch. 314, § 1, effective July 14, 1992.

Opinions of Attorney General.

There is no provision in KRS Chapter 91 for the sale of tax bills and their subsequent conversion into certificates of delinquency; consequently, the city would be deemed the holder and owner of the delinquent tax bills. OAG 83-347 .

Research References and Practice Aids

ALR

Applicability of general statute of limitations to real estate tax lien foreclosure action. 59 A.L.R.2d 1144.

91.488. Enforcement of city tax liens — Alternate remedy — Joinder of parcels — Separate listing.

  1. The collector may enforce city tax liens by bringing suit in rem against property so encumbered. This means of enforcement shall not be the exclusive remedy available to the collector and shall be in addition to all other remedies available at law or equity. Any number of parcels of real estate may be joined in one (1) petition or suit. Each separate tract or parcel of real estate joined in any one (1) action shall be included in a separate count to distinguish it from other parcels within the same action.
  2. Each separate tract or parcel of real estate joined in any one (1) action shall be listed by the collector by its tax district, block, lot and sub-lot and shall be separately indexed and docketed by the Circuit Court clerk in a book kept by the clerk for that purpose. For each parcel of real estate the Circuit Court clerk shall be allowed a fee of fifty cents ($0.50) which shall be taxed and paid as other costs.

History. Enact. Acts 1982, ch. 409, § 1, effective July 15, 1982.

Opinions of Attorney General.

It appears that in repealing the provisions of KRS Ch. 92 and in enacting KRS 91A.070 and KRS 91.488 through 91.488 5, the legislature decided to provide cities of the second through sixth classes with the option of having the county collect their taxes or of collecting their own taxes in the same manner as a city of the first class. Accordingly, where a sixth class city had its own tax collector, it was entitled to proceed to collect its delinquent taxes in the manner provided in KRS 91.488 through 91.4885 . OAG 83-159 .

91.4881. Petition.

  1. A suit for the enforcement of the tax liens brought pursuant to KRS 91.484 to 91.527 shall be instituted by filing with the Circuit Court clerk a petition, containing a caption in substantially the following form:
  2. The petition also shall contain a separate count for each parcel of real estate included in the action. Each count in the petition shall set forth those items of information required of the collector in KRS 91.484(2) and shall list the name of any taxing authority or person of record owning or holding any tax bill or claiming any right, title, or interest in or to, or lien upon, any such parcel of real estate as set out in the petition, and a claim. The specific right, title, or interest either owned or claimed, or lien held, by any taxing authority other than the city or by other interested persons of record need not be set forth in the action.
  3. The petition shall conclude with a claim that all city tax liens upon such real estate be enforced; that the court determine the amounts and priorities of all tax bills, together with interest, penalties and costs; that the court order such real estate to be sold by the master commissioner pursuant to the provisions of KRS 426.560 to 426.715 , except as otherwise provided in KRS 91.4885 , and that a report of the sale be made by the master commissioner to the court for further proceedings under the provisions of KRS 91.484 to 91.527 .
  4. The petition so filed shall have the same effect, with respect to each parcel of real estate described, as a separate suit instituted to enforce the tax lien against any one (1) of the parcels of real estate. The invalidity of any separate count shall not in any way affect the validity of the remainder of the proceedings with respect to any other count in the action.

Circuit Court Division No. City of VS. Parcels of Land Encumbered with Delinquent Tax Liens PlaintiffDefendants

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History. Enact. Acts 1982, ch. 409, § 2, effective July 15, 1982.

Opinions of Attorney General.

There is no provision in KRS Chapter 91 for the sale of tax bills and their subsequent conversion into certificates of delinquency; consequently, the city would be deemed the holder and owner of the delinquent tax bills. OAG 83-347 .

Since each of the taxing authorities whose levies are included in the county tax bill has a lien on the real estate by virtue of the operation of KRS 134.420 , a separate listing for each taxing authority is required under this section and KRS 91.4883 ; however, since the county attorney and the Revenue Cabinet are the two (2) enforcement entities for these liens pursuant to the provisions of KRS 134.500 , mailing of the notice provided for under KRS 91.4884 to the county attorney and to the Revenue Cabinet is sufficient notice to all taxing authorities represented on the county tax bill. OAG 83-347 .

91.4882. Action in rem — Pleadings — Default judgment — Cross-claim by taxing authority.

  1. Any action brought pursuant to KRS 91.488 to 91.488 5 shall constitute an action in rem and the pleadings therein shall consist of a petition and an answer or answers.
  2. An answer may be filed by any person or taxing authority owning or claiming any right, title or interest in or to any tax bill constituting a tax lien on the real estate described in the petition or by any person owning or claiming any right, title, or interest in or to, or lien upon, such real estate. An answer shall include the nature and amount of the interest and any defense or objection to the enforcement of the tax liens listed in the petitions, and may include the allegations usually incorporated by the appropriate pleadings.
  3. Any answers shall contain the caption and number of the case, and the count number or numbers, as set out in the petition, of the parcels of real estate concerned. Such answer must be filed with the Circuit Court clerk and a copy thereof served on the collector not later than fifty (50) days after the date of the first publication of the notice of enforcement.
  4. In the event of failure to answer within said fifty (50) day period, a default judgment may be taken on all parcels of real estate for which no answer has been filed.
  5. Any taxing authority owning or claiming any interest, right or title in or to any tax bill constituting a tax lien on the real property described in the petition filed pursuant to KRS 91.4881 may either file a cross-claim or join the action as a co-plaintiff using the provisions of KRS 91.484 to 91.527 , notwithstanding the provisions of KRS 134.010 et seq.

History. Enact. Acts 1982, ch. 409, § 3, effective July 15, 1982; 1984, ch. 111, § 53, effective July 13, 1984; 1986, ch. 42, § 1, effective July 15, 1986; 1992, ch. 314, § 2, effective July 14, 1992.

91.4883. Publication of notice.

  1. Within thirty (30) days after the filing with the Circuit Court clerk of an enforcement suit for the collection of unpaid taxes under the provisions of KRS 91.484 to 91.527 , the collector shall cause a notice of enforcement to be published two (2) times, once each week, during successive weeks, and on the same day of each week, otherwise in accordance with the provisions of KRS Chapter 424.
  2. Such notice shall be in substantially the following form:

NOTICE OF ENFORCEMENT OF LIEN FOR DELINQUENT LAND TAXESBY ACTION IN REM Public Notice is hereby given that on the day of , 19, the City of of County, Kentucky, filed a petition, being Action Number , in the Circuit Court of County, Kentucky, at (stating the city), for the enforcement of liens for delinquent land taxes against the real estate situated in such city, all as described in said petition. The object of said suit is to obtain from the court a judgment enforcing the city’s tax and other liens against such real estate and ordering the sale of such real estate for the satisfaction of said liens thereon (except right of redemption in favor of the United States of America if any), including principal, interest, penalties, and costs. Such action is brought against the real estate only and no personal judgment shall be entered therein. The count number assigned by the city to each parcel of real estate, a description of each such parcel by street address and the property valuation administrator’s tax parcel number (district, block, lot and sub-lot), a statement of the total principal amount of all delinquent city tax bills against each such parcel of real estate, all of which, as to each parcel, is more fully set out and mentioned by count in the aforesaid petition, and the name of any taxing authority or person of record owning or holding any tax bill or claiming any right, title, or interest in or to, or lien upon, any such parcel of real estate as set out in the petition, are respectively as follows: (Here set out the respective count numbers, property descriptions, names of taxpayers of record and statements of total principal amounts of tax bills, and names of those other interested persons of record next above referred to.) The total principal amounts of delinquent taxes set out in this notice do not include the lawful interest, penalties, and costs which have accrued against the respective parcels of real estate. Any person or taxing authority owning or holding any tax bill or claiming any right, title, or interest in or to, or lien upon, any such parcel of real estate must file an answer to such suit in the office of the Circuit Court clerk of county in , and a copy of such answer with the city of in accordance with the Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure, on or before the day of , 19 , and in such answer shall set forth in detail the nature and the amount of such interest and any defense or objection to the enforcement of the tax liens, or any affirmative relief he or it may be entitled to assert with respect thereto. Any person having any right, title, or interest in or to, or lien upon, any parcel of such real estate may have the city’s claims against such parcel dismissed from the action by paying all of the sums mentioned therein to the city of including principal, interest, penalties, and costs then due, at any time prior to the enforcement sale of such real estate by the master commissioner. In the event of failure to answer on or before the date herein fixed as the last day for filing answer in the suit, by any person having the right to answer, such person shall be forever barred and foreclosed as to any defense or objection he might have to the enforcement of such liens for delinquent taxes and the judgment of enforcement may be taken by default. Redemption may be made for a period of sixty (60) days after the master commissioner’s enforcement sale, if the sale price is less than the parcel’s current assessed value as certified by the Department of Revenue. Each such person having any right, title, or interest in or to, or any lien upon, any such parcel of real estate described in the petition so failing to answer or redeem, as aforesaid, shall be forever barred and foreclosed of any right, title, or interest in or to, or lien upon, or any equity of redemption in said real estate. , Kentucky (name of city) Attorney Address Phone Date of first publication

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History. Enact. Acts 1982, ch. 409, § 4, effective July 15, 1982; 1988, ch. 91, § 1, effective July 15, 1988; 2005, ch. 85, § 100, effective June 20, 2005.

Opinions of Attorney General.

There is no provision in KRS Chapter 91 for the sale of tax bills and their subsequent conversion into certificates of delinquency; consequently, the city would be deemed the holder and owner of the delinquent tax bills. OAG 83-347 .

Inclusion in the notice of the street address and the PVA’s identifying numbers is substantial compliance with the statute and will be sufficient notice. OAG 83-347 .

Since each of the taxing authorities whose levies are included in the county tax bill has a lien on the real estate by virtue of the operation of KRS 134.420 , a separate listing for each taxing authority is required under KRS 91.4881 and this section; however, since the county attorney and the Revenue Cabinet are the two (2) enforcement entities for these liens pursuant to the provisions of KRS 134.500 , mailing of the notice provided for under KRS 91.4884 to the county attorney and to the Revenue Cabinet is sufficient notice to all taxing authorities represented on the county tax bill. OAG 83-347 .

91.4884. Notice by mail to interested parties.

  1. The collector shall also cause to be prepared and mailed by first class mail, certified by a United States postal service certificate of mailing, within thirty (30) days after the filing of such petition, a brief notice of the filing of the suit to any taxing authority or person of record owning or holding any tax bills or claiming any right, title, or interest in or to, or lien upon, any such parcel of real estate as set out in the petition.
  2. The notice shall be substantially as follows:

To the person to whom this notice is addressed: Public records indicate that you may own or claim some right, title, or interest in or to, or hold a lien upon a certain parcel of real estate located at (here insert the street address and the property valuation administrator’s tax parcel number) and set out in count number in a certain petition bearing Action No.. filed in the Circuit Court of County, Kentucky at (city) on , 19 , wherein an enforcement of the liens of various delinquent tax bills is sought and a court order asked for the purpose of selling said real estate at a public sale for payment of all delinquent tax bills, together with interest, penalties, and costs. Publication of notice of such enforcement was commenced on the day of , 19, in (here insert name of city). Public records in the office of the county clerk or other public office indicate you may own or claim some interest in this parcel by reason of (Here insert specific reference to any public document of record as disclosed in a thorough examination of title status.). Unless all delinquent city taxes are paid upon the parcel of real estate described in said petition and unless the owners of said real estate shall either have discharged any city tax liens or satisfied any judgment rendered on said liens in favor of the city, prior to the time of the enforcement sale of such real estate by the master commissioner, or within sixty (60) days after the sale if the purchase price at sale is less than the parcel’s certified assessed value, the owner or any taxing authority or person of record claiming any right, title, or interest in or to, or lien upon, any such parcel of real estate shall be forever barred and foreclosed of all right, title and interest and equity of redemption in and to such parcel of real estate; provided, however, that any such person shall have the right to file an answer in said suit on or before the day of, 19 , in the office of the Circuit Court clerk and copy thereof to the city of , in accordance with the Kentucky rules of civil procedure, setting forth in detail the nature and amount of the interest and any defense or objection to the enforcement. Dated, 19 , Kentucky Attorney Address Phone

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History. Enact. Acts 1982, ch. 409, § 5, effective July 15, 1982; 1986, ch. 42, § 2, effective July 15, 1986.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Failure to Mail Notice.

The second provision contained in subsection (1) of this section providing that failure by collector to mail such notice would not affect the validity of any proceeding brought pursuant to it is invalid as a violation of the notice requirements set forth by the United States Supreme Court. Louisville v. Miller, 697 S.W.2d 164, 1985 Ky. App. LEXIS 646 (Ky. Ct. App. 1985).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Since each of the taxing authorities whose levies are included in the county tax bill has a lien on the real estate by virtue of the operation of KRS 134.420 , a separate listing for each taxing authority is required under KRS 91.4881 and 91.4883 ; however, since the county attorney and the Revenue Cabinet are the two enforcement entities for these liens pursuant to the provisions of KRS 134.500 , mailing of the notice provided for under this section to the county attorney and to the Revenue Cabinet is sufficient notice to all taxing authorities represented on the county tax bill. OAG 83-347 .

91.4885. Sale by master commissioner — Determination of owner’s equity of redemption.

  1. The court shall order the master commissioner to sell, pursuant to the provisions of KRS 426.560 to 426.715 , except as otherwise provided in this section, each parcel separately by individual count number. The court shall further order that a report of the sale be made by the master commissioner to the court for further proceedings under the provisions of KRS 91.484 to 91.527 .
  2. Prior to the master commissioner’s setting each parcel for sale pursuant to court order, the collector shall file with the Circuit Court clerk an affidavit as to the most recent certified tax assessment of each parcel to be sold. The most recent certified assessment of a property shall be the property valuation administrator’s last assessment which shall have been certified by the Kentucky Department of Revenue to the county clerk, as required by KRS 133.180 .
  3. The most recent certified assessment as sworn to in the affidavit furnished by the collector shall be used in all actions brought under KRS 91.484 to 91.527 to determine the owner’s equity of redemption as provided by KRS 91.511(2).

History. Enact. Acts 1982, ch. 409, § 6, effective July 15, 1982; 2005, ch. 85, § 101, effective June 20, 2005.

91.490. Tax bill sufficient authority for sale of property — Amount to be made from sale — Resale. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3001, 3003: amend. Acts 1974, ch. 236, § 2) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 47, § 17, effective July 15, 1980.

91.491. Petition — Action in rem — Joinder of tracts or parcels — Parties defendant — Answer — Default judgment. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1980, ch. 47, § 4, effective July 15, 1980) was repealed by Acts 1982, ch. 409, § 15, effective July 15, 1982.

91.494. Affidavits filed with circuit clerk — Effect.

Affidavits of publication of notice and of posting, mailing, or other acts required by the provisions of KRS 91.484 to 91.527 shall be filed in the office of the circuit clerk prior to the trial, and when so filed shall constitute part of the evidentiary document in the enforcement suit. The affidavits shall be prima facie evidence of the performance of acts therein described, and may be so used in the trial of the suit unless challenged by verified answer duly filed in the suit.

History. Enact. Acts 1980, ch. 47, § 5, effective July 15, 1980.

91.497. Service of interested parties — Publication of notice of enforcement of lien. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Acts 1980, ch. 47, § 6, effective July 15, 1980) was repealed by Acts 1982, ch. 409, § 15, effective July 15, 1982.

91.500. Purchase by city of real property at tax sale — Disposition of property — Purchaser’s duty to bring property into compliance with building and housing codes. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3002, 3004: amend. Acts 1974, ch. 236, § 4; 1978, ch. 384, § 215, effective June 17, 1978) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 47, § 17, effective July 15, 1980. For present law, see KRS 91.527 .

91.501. Consolidation of suits affecting the same land — Effect of statute of limitations on pending suits — Cross-claim for ad valorem tax.

  1. Any suit to collect delinquent tax bills which may be pending at the time of the commencement of any suit brought under the provisions of KRS 91.484 to 91.527 , affecting the same land, shall be consolidated with such suit brought under KRS 91.484 to 91.527 . The parties to the pending suit shall file answers, but any tax bill sought to be collected in any pending suit may be included in any list included as a part of any petition filed by the collector. If so included, the inclusion shall act as an abatement of any pending suit, and all amounts then due on any such tax bill, including interest, penalties and costs, shall be listed and charged, and shall continue in force the liens against the respective parcel of real estate listed in the petition filed pursuant to the provisions of KRS 91.484 to 91.527.
  2. Any suit brought under the provisions of KRS 91.484 to 91.527 , involving delinquent tax bills sought to be collected by any suit pending at the time suit is brought under KRS 91.484 to 91.527 , shall be tried as all other actions, and the statute of limitations shall not prevent the parties to such pending suit from asserting all rights and defenses which they then have.
  3. Any cross-claim of a taxing authority under KRS 91.484 to 91.527 may include a claim for the immediate enforcement of any ad valorem tax owed to the taxing authority, notwithstanding the provisions of KRS 134.010 et seq.

History. Enact. Acts 1980, ch. 47, § 7, effective July 15, 1980; 1986, ch. 42, § 3, effective July 15, 1986; 1992, ch. 314, § 3, effective July 14, 1992.

91.504. Trial — Master commissioner’s judgment sale — Appeal from judgment of the sale.

  1. Upon the trial of the cause upon the question of enforcement, the tax bill shall be prima facie proof that the tax described in the tax bill has been validly assessed at the time indicated by the tax bill and that the tax is unpaid. Any person alleging any jurisdictional defect or invalidity in the tax bill or in the sale thereof must particularly specify in his answer the defect or basis of invalidity, and must, upon trial, affirmatively establish the defense.
  2. After the court has first determined the validity of the tax liens of all tax bills affecting parcels of real estate described in the petition, the priorities of the tax bills and other interest and the amount due thereon, including principal, interest, penalties and costs, the court shall enter judgment of sale of the property and fix the time and place of the judgment sale.
  3. The petition shall be dismissed as to any parcel of real estate released or redeemed prior to the time fixed for the master commissioner’s sale as provided in KRS 91.484 to 91.527 .
  4. If the parcel of real estate sold at the master commissioner’s judgment sale is sold for a sum sufficient to fully pay the principal amount of all tax bills included in the judgment together with interest, penalties and costs, and for no more, and such sale is confirmed by the court, then all other proceedings as to such parcels of real estate shall be finally dismissed as to all parties of interest other than tax bill owners or holders; provided, however, that any party seeking relief other than an interest in or lien upon the real estate may continue with said suit to a final adjudication of such other issues. An appeal may be had as to any claim attacking the validity of the tax bill or bills or the priorities as to payment of proceeds of the judgment sale.
  5. If the parcel of real property sold at the master commissioner’s sale is sold for a sum greater than the total amount necessary to pay the principal amount of all tax bills included in the judgment, together with interest, penalties, and costs, and the sale is confirmed by the court, and no appeal is taken by any person claiming any right, title or interest in or to or lien upon the parcel of real estate or by any person or taxing authority owning or holding or claiming any right, title or interest in or to any tax bills within the time fixed by law for the filing of notice of appeal, the court shall order the master commissioner to make distribution to the owners or holders of the respective tax bill included in the judgment of the amount found to be due and in the order of priority. Thereafter, all proceedings in the suit shall be ordered by the court to be dismissed as to such persons owning, holding or claiming any right, title or interest in any such tax bill paid, and the case shall proceed as to any parties claiming any right, title or interest or lien upon the parcel of real estate affected by such tax bill as to their respective claims to the surplus funds then remaining in the hands of the court.
  6. Whenever an answer is filed to the petition, a severance of the action as to all parcels of real estate affected by such answer shall be granted, and the issues raised by the petition and the answer shall be tried separate and apart from the other issues in the suit, but the granting of the severance shall not delay the trial or other disposition of any other issues in the case.
  7. A separate appeal may be taken from any other issue in the case. A separate appeal may be taken from any action of the court affecting any right, title or interest in or to, or lien upon, such real estate, other than issues of law and fact, affecting the amount or validity of the lien of tax bills, but the proceeding to enforce the lien of any tax bills shall not be stayed by the appeal. The trial shall be conducted by the court without the aid of a jury. This action shall take precedence over and be triable before any other actions affecting the title to the real estate upon motion of any interested party.

History. Enact. Acts 1980, ch. 47, § 8, effective July 15, 1980.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Sale of Delinquent Tax Lien.

On the basis of the city’s tax lien, under subsec. (1) of KRS 91.560 the city many sell any delinquent tax bill to cover the tax, penalties, interest, and costs. Brunner v. Home for Aged of Little Sisters of Poor, 429 S.W.2d 381, 1968 Ky. LEXIS 745 ( Ky. 1968 ).

2. Prior Contractual Liens.

A sale of property to enforce tax liens is not proper proceeding in which to enforce prior contractual liens upon same property. Drane v. Graves, 261 Ky. 787 , 88 S.W.2d 927, 1935 Ky. LEXIS 732 ( Ky. 1935 ).

Purchaser of property at sale to enforce city tax lien takes title of owner, subject to prior contractual liens. Drane v. Graves, 261 Ky. 787 , 88 S.W.2d 927, 1935 Ky. LEXIS 732 ( Ky. 1935 ).

Research References and Practice Aids

ALR

Necessity of publishing list of lands delinquent for nonpayment of taxes and effect of failure to publish list. 81 A.L.R. 1246.

Place of sale, indefiniteness of notice, as regards. 120 A.L.R. 660.

Tax sale or resale for less than the amount of taxes due, constitutionality of statutes authorizing. 155 A.L.R. 1177.

Necessity of consent of court to tax sale of property in custody of court or of receiver or trustee appointed by it. 3 A.L.R.2d 893.

Property owner’s liability for unpaid taxes following acquisition of property by another at tax sale. 100 A.L.R.3d 593.

Inadequacy of price as basis for setting aside execution or sheriff’s sale — modern cases. 5 A.L.R.4th 794.

91.505. Notice required for action against city by lienholders. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Acts 1974, ch. 236, § 4; 1978, ch. 384, § 215, effective June 17, 1978) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 47, § 17, effective July 15, 1980.

91.507. Judgment after trial.

After the trial of the issues, the court shall render judgment as promptly as circumstances permit. If the court finds that no tax bill was delinquent when the suit was instituted or tried then the judgment of the court shall be that the cause be dismissed as to the parcels of real estate described in the tax bill. If the evidence warrants, the judgment may be for the principal amount of the delinquent tax bill upon the real estate upon which the suit was brought, together with interest, penalties, and court costs computed as of the date of the judgment. The court may decree that the lien upon the parcel of real estate described in the tax bill be enforced and such real estate be sold by the master commissioner and the cost continued for further proceedings as provided by KRS 91.484 to 91.527 .

History. Enact. Acts 1980, ch. 47, § 9, effective July 15, 1980; 1982, ch. 409, § 8, effective July 15, 1982.

91.510. Redemption of real property sold at tax sale. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3002: Acts 1974, ch. 236, § 5) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 47, § 17, effective July 15, 1980. For present law, see KRS 91.511 .

91.511. Discharge of lien or satisfaction of judgment — Redemption.

  1. At any time prior to the sale of the property any person having any right, title or interest in, or lien upon, any parcel of real estate described in the petition may discharge any city lien or satisfy a judgment in favor of the city as to said parcel of real estate by paying to the collector all of the sums mentioned therein, including the principal, interest, penalties, and costs then due.
  2. If the property is sold pursuant to the judgment or order of the court and does not bring its most recent assessed value certified by the Department of Revenue to the county clerk as required by KRS 133.180 , the owner may redeem it within sixty (60) days from the day of the sale, by paying the purchaser the original purchase money and interest at eighteen percent (18%) per annum. Any owner who redeems his land shall take a receipt from the purchaser and lodge it with the clerk of the court. The receipt shall be entered upon the records of the court.
  3. The owner may tender the redemption money to the purchaser, his agent or attorney, if found in the county where the land lies or in the county in which the judgment was obtained or order of sale made. If the money is refused, or if the purchaser does not reside in either of the counties, the owner may, before the expiration of the right of redemption, go to the clerk of the court in which the judgment was rendered or the order made, and make affidavit of the tender and refusal, or that the purchaser or his agent or attorney do not reside in either of the counties. He may then pay to the clerk the redemption money, and the clerk shall give receipt therefor and file the affidavit among the papers of the action.
  4. When the right of redemption exists, the owner may remain in possession of the property until it expires. Real property so sold shall not be conveyed to the purchaser until the right of redemption has expired. If it is redeemed, the sale shall, from and after the redemption or from and after the deposit of the redemption money with the clerk, be null and void.
  5. In the event of failure to redeem within the period provided for redemption, the owner or any other party in interest shall be barred forever of all his right, title and interest in and to the parcel of real estate described in the petition.
  6. Upon redemption, as permitted by this section, the person redeeming shall be entitled to a certificate of redemption from the collector describing the property in the same manner as it is described in the petition and the collector shall thereupon note on his records the word “redeemed” and the date of the payment opposite the description of the parcel of real estate.

History. Enact. Acts 1980, ch. 47, § 10, effective July 15, 1980; 1982, ch. 409, § 9, effective July 15, 1982; 2005, ch. 85, § 102, effective June 20, 2005.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Action by Purchaser for Possession.

A purchaser at a tax sale for delinquent city taxes cannot bring an action to recover possession until he has a deed which he cannot obtain until after the period for taxpayer’s right of redemption. Forwood v. Louisville, 283 Ky. 208 , 140 S.W.2d 1048, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 315 ( Ky. 1940 ).

2. Quiet Title Action by Owner.

A deed issued by a city tax receiver was ineffectual and invalid because of the failure of the purchaser to pay all later tax bills owing, a condition upon which title would vest, and the original owners could quiet title where they had paid all later taxes and had paid into court a sum sufficient to pay all claims purchaser might have by reason of his purchase at the tax sale. Interstate Bond Co. v. Williams, 290 Ky. 850 , 162 S.W.2d 770, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 491 ( Ky. 1942 ).

Research References and Practice Aids

ALR

Voluntary character of payment of tax made for purpose of redemption after tax sale. 64 A.L.R. 118; 84 A.L.R. 294.

Tender under protest of amount required for redemption from tax sale. 142 A.L.R. 1198.

91.514. Vesting title in purchases — Title subject to designated liens — Exceptions.

  1. Upon the confirmation of the sale by the court and the expiration of the right of redemption provided in KRS 91.511 , the title to any real estate purchased from the master commissioner pursuant to KRS 91.481 to 91.527 shall vest in the purchaser. The title of the real estate shall be an absolute estate in fee simple, subject to rights-of-way of public utilities on which tax has been otherwise paid and subject to any right of redemption of the United States of America, if any. All persons, including the Commonwealth of Kentucky, infants, incompetents, absentees, and nonresidents who may have had any right, title, interest, claim or equity of redemption in or to, or lien upon the land shall be barred of all right, title, interest, claim, lien or equity of redemption, and the court shall order that immediate possession of the real estate be given to the purchaser. Any person so barred shall thereafter have as his exclusive remedy a claim for a share of the proceeds of the sale of the real estate by the master commissioner.
  2. The title shall be subject to the liens of any tax bill which may have attached to the parcel of real estate prior to the time of the filing of the petition affecting the parcel of real estate not then delinquent, or which may have attached after the filing of the petition and prior to the expiration of the period provided for redemption and not including any answer to such petition.
  3. If the parcel of real estate is sold to the city or to a land bank authority created pursuant to KRS 65.350 to 65.375 , the title shall be free of any liens to the extent of the interest of any taxing authority in any such real estate.
  4. The title shall not be subject to the lien of special tax bills which have attached to the parcel of real estate but the lien of the special tax bill shall attach to the proceeds of the master commissioner’s sale or to the proceeds of the ultimate sale of the parcel by the city.
  5. Failure of any party other than the purchaser to follow the procedures set out in KRS 91.484 to 91.527 shall not affect the vesting of title in the purchaser.

History. Enact. Acts 1980, ch. 47, § 11, effective July 15, 1980; 1982, ch. 409, § 10, effective July 15, 1982; 1988, ch. 91, § 2, effective July 15, 1988; 1992, ch. 314, § 4, effective July 14, 1992.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Construction.

Former similar section must be closely followed and would be strictly construed against the purchaser in favor of the owner. Interstate Bond Co. v. Williams, 290 Ky. 850 , 162 S.W.2d 770, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 491 ( Ky. 1942 ).

A deed executed under former similar section was not valid unless the proceedings for the sale of the property were in compliance with all statutory requirements. Richardson v. Brunner, 356 S.W.2d 252, 1962 Ky. LEXIS 93 (Ky.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 815, 83 S. Ct. 27, 9 L. Ed. 2d 56, 1962 U.S. LEXIS 575 (U.S. 1962).

2. Failure to Pay Taxes.

Failure of purchaser to pay subsequent tax bill with interest renders deed invalid and prolongs right of redemption. Interstate Bond Co. v. Williams, 290 Ky. 850 , 162 S.W.2d 770, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 491 ( Ky. 1942 ).

Where purchaser at tax sale failed to pay taxes assessed against the property after the assessment of tax for which the property was sold as provided in this section, a condition to vesting of title did not exist and city tax receiver was without authority to execute a deed at the expiration of the two-year redemption period. Interstate Bond Co. v. Williams, 290 Ky. 850 , 162 S.W.2d 770, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 491 ( Ky. 1942 ).

3. Suit for Possession.

A suit to recover possession of property purchased at a tax sale may be brought by the purchaser at any time within five (5) years after he obtains a deed. Forwood v. Louisville, 283 Ky. 208 , 140 S.W.2d 1048, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 315 ( Ky. 1940 ).

A purchaser of property at a tax sale, made to enforce a tax lien, has no cause of action to recover possession of the property purchased by him until he obtains a deed, which he cannot do until the expiration of the taxpayer’s right of redemption. Forwood v. Louisville, 283 Ky. 208 , 140 S.W.2d 1048, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 315 ( Ky. 1940 ).

4. Payment of Mortgage Lien.

In action by mortgagee to enforce his mortgage lien on property sold for taxes, the purchaser of the property is entitled to a lien for the ten percent penalty, if the lien is paid by him. Interstate Bond Co. v. Home Owners Loan Corp., 282 Ky. 569 , 139 S.W.2d 69, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 209 ( Ky. 1940 ).

5. Questioning Validity of Sale.

This section does not prevent the taxpayer from questioning in court the validity of the tax sale proceedings either before or after the execution of the tax deed. Richardson v. Brunner, 356 S.W.2d 252, 1962 Ky. LEXIS 93 (Ky.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 815, 83 S. Ct. 27, 9 L. Ed. 2d 56, 1962 U.S. LEXIS 575 (U.S. 1962).

Opinions of Attorney General.

KRS 134.470 and subsection (1) of this section must be read in para materia; the intent of this section is to allow the city to force the sale of the property and, under KRS 134.470 , a certificate of delinquency may be enforced against any property of the delinquent taxpayer; however, against the property involved in the suit, subsection (1) of this section would extinguish the state lien against that property, although the state would have the right to defend its lien and possibly receive some proceeds from the sale. OAG 82-191 .

Neither subsection (1) nor (3) of this section adversely affects the state or county liens but, rather, the procedure merely gives the city a method of selling property for delinquent taxes; since other taxing districts must be made parties to the suit, they may protect their interests and the court must determine the disposition of the proceeds, following the provisions of KRS 91.517 . OAG 82-191 .

The lien provided in KRS 134.420(1) is not in conflict with KRS 91.481 through 91.527 and that lien is of equal rank for the state, county and city; KRS 91.481 through 91.527 provide a method for the city to enforce its lien, but all other taxing districts must be made parties. OAG 82-191 .

Research References and Practice Aids

ALR

Payment of taxes prior to sale of property for delinquency as ground for setting aside tax deed as cloud on title. 26 A.L.R. 629.

Invalid tax sale, reimbursement of purchaser at, as condition of right of owner to cancellation or setting aside of tax deed. 86 A.L.R. 1208.

Purchaser at tax sale, validity of statute abolishing right of, to lien for amount paid and for subsequent taxes paid, in case sale or certificate held invalid. 111 A.L.R. 257.

Other taxing unit of same state, lien for taxes as affected by lien or sale for tax imposed by. 135 A.L.R. 1464.

Discretion of court to set aside tax sale where all proceedings are in compliance with statutory requirements. 152 A.L.R. 887.

Direct attack upon purchase by attorney of client’s property at or through tax sale. 20 A.L.R.2d 1307.

91.517. Confirmation of sale by court — Priority of distribution of proceeds.

  1. After the master commissioner sells any parcel of real estate, the court shall, upon its own motion or upon motion of any interested party, set the cause down for hearing to confirm the sale, even though such parcels are not all of the parcels of real estate described in the notice of the master commissioner’s sale.
  2. If the sale is confirmed, the court shall order the proceeds of the sale applied in the following order:
    1. To the payment of all costs including court costs, publication costs, and costs otherwise associated with the action and sale of the parcel described in the particular count; and
    2. To the payment of all tax bills on the property, including principal, interest, and penalties. If after the payment, there is any sum remaining of the proceeds of the commissioner’s sale of the property, the court shall try and determine the other issues in the suit with respect to that particular count. If any of the answering parties has specifically appealed, the court, provided that the answering parties have, prior to the appeal, executed an appropriate supersedeas bond, shall retain custody of the funds pending disposition of the appeal, and upon disposition of the appeal shall make distribution. If there are not sufficient proceeds of the sale to pay all claims in any class described, the court shall order them to be paid in accordance with the priorities.
  3. If there are any funds remaining of the proceeds after the commissioner’s sale and after the distribution of the funds as herein set out and no person entitled to any such funds, whether or not a party to the suit, shall have appeared within two (2) years after the sale, and claimed the funds, they shall escheat to the state as provided in KRS Chapter 393.

History. Enact. Acts 1980, ch. 47, § 12, effective July 15, 1980; 1982, ch. 409, § 11, effective July 15, 1982; 1992, ch. 314, § 5, effective July 14, 1992.

91.520. Report and record of property sold for city taxes. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3003) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 47, § 17, effective July 15, 1980.

91.521. Appeal from judgment confirming or disapproving commissioner’s sale and distribution of proceeds.

The collector or any interested person or anyone on behalf of any incompetent may appeal from the judgment confirming or disapproving the commissioner’s sale and the distribution of proceeds. No questions may be raised upon the appeal that could have been raised upon an appeal from the judgment of the sale. The appeals shall be taken within thirty (30) days after the date of the judgment. The necessity for giving bond and the provisions thereof shall be the same as in the case of appeal from the judgment of sale.

History. Enact. Acts 1980, ch. 47, § 13, effective July 15, 1980.

91.524. Costs upon redemption.

If any party redeems any parcel of real estate from the lien of any tax bill, the party shall, in addition to all other amounts then due, including principal, interest, and costs, also pay costs to the collector as follows:

  1. One dollar ($1) per parcel of real estate for issuance of certificate of redemption;
  2. Five dollars ($5) per parcel of real estate, if notice of publication has been commenced; and
  3. Five dollars ($5) as an additional charge for parcel of real estate if notice of the commissioner’s sale has been commenced.

History. Enact. Acts 1980, ch. 47, § 14, effective July 15, 1980; 1992, ch. 314, § 6, effective July 14, 1992.

91.527. City may hold, sell, transfer, lease, or use real estate purchased at a commissioner’s sale.

Any property or real estate acquired by the city by virtue of purchase at the commissioner’s sale shall be held by the city and any property so held may be sold, transferred, leased or otherwise utilized by the city within its sole discretion.

History. Enact. Acts 1980, ch. 47, § 15, effective July 15, 1980.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Mistaken Sale of City Property.

Where tax commissioner mistakenly assessed city property and sold it to appellant for delinquent taxes such sale was void for it was not a sale of property the city had purchased at a tax sale but was sale of property to satisfy taxes the city was supposed to owe to itself. Brunner v. Louisville, 311 S.W.2d 402, 1958 Ky. LEXIS 195 ( Ky. 1958 ).

Where tax commissioner sold to appellant for delinquent taxes, land that had been dedicated for public purposes and executed deed to him therefor, city was not estopped from asserting title against appellant in derogation of its deed since tax commissioner made mistake in assessing taxes against property city owned for public purposes and sale was unauthorized, city cannot be estopped in prosecution of public affairs by errors, mistakes, or unauthorized acts or dereliction of duty on part of its officers or employees. Brunner v. Louisville, 311 S.W.2d 402, 1958 Ky. LEXIS 195 ( Ky. 1958 ).

91.530. Certificate of purchase of real property at tax sale. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3003) was repealed by Acts 1982, ch. 409, § 15, effective July 15, 1982.

91.540. Deed to purchaser at tax sale — Effect as evidence. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3004) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 47, § 17, effective July 15, 1980. For present law, see KRS 91.514 .

91.550. Collection of taxes on property of infant or person of unsound mind — Protection of future estates.

  1. The personal property of infants or persons judicially found to be of unsound mind shall not be distrained for taxes assessed on their real property.
  2. The real property of an infant or person judicially found to be of unsound mind shall not, during his disability, after ascertainment of such disability by the city, be sold without the appointment of a guardian ad litem to represent the interest of such person, for less than its certified assessed value on any judgment of sale rendered for taxes and costs alone, where the real property came to the infant or person of unsound mind by descent, distribution or devise, or by gift or settlement of some person then deceased, or where the real property belonged to the person of unsound mind before he became of unsound mind.
  3. No entire estate shall be sold, for taxes and costs chargeable to the owner of the particular estate, for less than its certified assessed value, so as to defeat any reversion, remainder or other future estate outstanding, unless the reversioners, remaindermen or holders of other future estates are ascertained and are of full age, and no such entire estate shall ever be put up to sale unless the particular estate of the taxpayer has first been put up and has failed to bring the amount of the taxes and costs.

History. 3007: amend. Acts 1982, ch. 409, § 12, effective July 15, 1982.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Application.

This section has no application to sales where the remaindermen are ascertained and are of full age. Woolley v. Louisville, 114 Ky. 556 , 71 S.W. 893, 24 Ky. L. Rptr. 1357 , 1903 Ky. LEXIS 36 ( Ky. 1903 ).

Cited:

Rains v. Lexington, 284 Ky. 609 , 145 S.W.2d 516, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 541 ( Ky. 1940 ).

Research References and Practice Aids

ALR

Liability of executor or administrator to estate because of overpaying or unnecessarily paying tax. 55 A.L.R.3d 785.

91.560. Tax lien.

  1. The fee simple of all lands, in a city of the first class or in a consolidated local government, and the full term and renewal of every leasehold carrying with it the value of the improvements thereon, shall be subject, from and after the assessment date each year, to a lien for the city taxes to be assessed thereon for the succeeding year. The lien shall be superior to homestead right and to all encumbrances, whether made before or after that date, except state taxes, and shall take precedence of dower, curtesy, remainders, reversions, and other future estates.
  2. From the beginning of any action to collect taxes against real property, a lien for each tax bill assessed against the same owner or set of joint owners shall also arise upon every tract of land or improvement still owned by him or them, with a view to the sale of less than all the tracts for the entire tax bill, subject to such marshaling of burdens as against third parties as the rules of equity require. The court may allow a purchaser or encumbrancer to release any tract from the tax lien thereon, by paying its share of the tax, interest, and costs.
  3. The tax lien on real property provided for by this section shall attach though, through error in the proceedings, the tax bill is unenforceable, in which case the lien reaching back to the date named shall support the claim of the city or consolidated local government for any taxes imposed afterward for the year in question under any curative act of the General Assembly.
  4. The city or a consolidated local government shall have a lien on personal property as provided in the case of real property for its taxes.

History. 3001, 3006: amend. Acts 1956, ch. 22, effective May 18, 1956; 1980, ch. 188, § 77, effective July 15, 1980; 2002, ch. 346, § 99, effective July 15, 2002.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Superior to Mortgage Lien.

The lien for city taxes given by this section is prior and superior to a mortgage lien. Faust v. Louisville Trust Co., 192 Ky. 3 , 232 S.W. 58, 1921 Ky. LEXIS 9 ( Ky. 1921 ).

2. Superior to Remainders.

The statute that gives the city’s tax lien priority over remainders means only that the tax purchaser has a charge against the property for the amount he paid for the person primarily liable for the tax and that this charge is valid against the remainderman as well as the life tenant. Brunner v. Home for Aged of Little Sisters of Poor, 429 S.W.2d 381, 1968 Ky. LEXIS 745 ( Ky. 1968 ).

The city has a lien for city taxes on the fee simple title to the land in the city, and this lien is superior to all encumbrances (except state taxes) and future estates including remainders. Brunner v. Home for Aged of Little Sisters of Poor, 429 S.W.2d 381, 1968 Ky. LEXIS 745 ( Ky. 1968 ).

3. Inferior to State Taxes.

The city has a lien upon the fee simple title in the property for city taxes, prior and superior to any other interest therein or claim or lien thereon, except for taxes due the state. Louisivlle v. Sonne, 148 Ky. 3 94, 146 S.W. 739, 1912 Ky. LEXIS 438 ( Ky. 1912 ); Davie's Ex'r v. Louisville, 171 Ky. 663 , 188 S.W. 911, 1916 Ky. LEXIS 441 ( Ky. 1916 ); Faust v. Louisville Trust Co., 192 Ky. 3 , 232 S.W. 58, 1921 Ky. LEXIS 9 ( Ky. 1921 ).

4. Notice to Purchaser.

A purchaser of realty is deemed to have knowledge of a lien for city taxes due within five (5) years of the purchase, but a purchaser without knowledge of a tax lien for taxes due for more than five (5) years takes free of the tax lien where the city has not recorded the lien. Carter v. Louisville, 147 Ky. 791 , 145 S.W. 739, 1912 Ky. LEXIS 334 ( Ky. 1912 ).

Purchaser without notice of action to enforce tax collection, where city did not file lis pendens, is protected after expiration of five (5) years from time tax became due. Carter v. Louisville, 147 Ky. 791 , 145 S.W. 739, 1912 Ky. LEXIS 334 ( Ky. 1912 ).

5. Action to Enforce.

In action to enforce lien for city taxes it is only necessary to make the person in whose name property was assessed party to suit, not all persons holding interests. Davie's Ex'r v. Louisville, 171 Ky. 663 , 188 S.W. 911, 1916 Ky. LEXIS 441 ( Ky. 1916 ).

6. Sale to Enforce.

Under the provisions of this section, it was not error to direct a sale of so many lots as necessary to make the judgment on tax lien. Woolley v. Louisville, 114 Ky. 556 , 71 S.W. 893, 24 Ky. L. Rptr. 1357 , 1903 Ky. LEXIS 36 ( Ky. 1903 ).

Where property is sold by the state for taxes due the state, county and city, a purchaser other than the state takes it encumbered with a lien for taxes due the city; where the state is purchaser it holds for the benefit of the state, county and city for whose taxes it was sold, and it remains in lien for taxes due the city. Kentucky Lands Inv. Co. v. Fitch, 144 Ky. 273 , 137 S.W. 1040, 1911 Ky. LEXIS 574 ( Ky. 1911 ).

Cited:

Louisville v. Louisville Asphalt Co., 279 Ky. 318 , 130 S.W.2d 739, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 267 ( Ky. 1939 ).

Research References and Practice Aids

ALR

Purchaser of personal property as liable for taxes assessed against former owner which are a lien on the property. 41 A.L.R. 189.

Personal property taxes, statutory lien of, upon real property subject to existing lien. 47 A.L.R. 378; 65 A.L.R. 677.

Constitutionality of statute impairing or postponing lien for taxes. 53 A.L.R. 1134; 136 A.L.R. 328.

Conditionally sold property, lien on. 110 A.L.R. 1501.

Undivided tract, enforceability against, of tax levied against part of it at one rate and part at another. 112 A.L.R. 73.

Rights in respect of real-estate taxes where property is taken in eminent domain. 45 A.L.R.2d 522.

Property owner’s liability for unpaid taxes following acquisition of property by another at tax sale. 100 A.L.R.3d 593.

91.570. Collection of taxes by action.

In addition to the powers given to cities of the first class to collect taxes by sale of the delinquent’s property under a tax bill, such cities may enforce collection of any tax bill due them by all remedies given for the recovery of debt in any court of this state otherwise competent for that purpose.

History. 3005.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Compromise of Claim for Taxes.

Neither the general council nor the city attorney has power to compromise claims for taxes. Louisville v. Louisville R. Co., 111 Ky. 1 , 63 S.W. 14, 23 Ky. L. Rptr. 390 , 1901 Ky. LEXIS 174 ( Ky. 1 901).

2. Parties to Action.

In action for recovery of taxes on land of deceased life tenant, children as heirs must be made parties before their interest can be sold. Louisville v. Kohnhorst's Adm'x, 76 S.W. 43, 25 Ky. L. Rptr. 532 (1903).

Cited:

Louisville v. Louisville Asphalt Co., 279 Ky. 318 , 130 S.W.2d 739, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 267 ( Ky. 1939 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

This section does not provide for the joinder of the county, state and city to collect delinquent real estate taxes. OAG 77-183 .

91.580. Taxes recovered by action to be paid to tax receiver. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3009) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 47, § 17, effective July 15, 1980.

91.590. Relief against unlawful distraint or garnishment. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2752, 3008: amend. Acts 1966, ch. 255, § 98) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 47, § 17, effective July 15, 1980.

91.600. Personal property tax bills to be canceled when uncollectible. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3009-1) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 47, § 17, effective July 15, 1980.

91.610. Obligation of city or consolidated local government to taxpayer — Deduction of tax owed.

The city or a consolidated local government shall deduct, from the amount of its obligation to any person, the amount of the taxes, interest, and penalties that such person owes or is liable for to the city or consolidated local government, and shall surrender to that person the canceled tax bills therefor, which shall be a discharge of the obligation of the city or consolidated local government to that person to the amount so deducted.

History. 2753; 2002, ch. 346, § 100, effective July 15, 2002.

Miscellaneous

91.620. Capital stock of incorporated banks, trust companies, and guaranty or security companies — Assessment procedure.

  1. Except as provided in subsection (2) of this section, the shares of stock of every incorporated bank, trust company, and guaranty or security company located in a city of the first class or consolidated local government shall be assessed for taxes by the city or consolidated local government assessor, to the extent and in the proportion its business is done in the city or consolidated local government.
  2. No assessment for city or consolidated local government taxes shall be made upon the shares of stock of any incorporated bank, trust company, or guaranty or security company that pays an ad valorem tax on its real estate and a license tax in lieu of an ad valorem tax on its personal estate.

History. 2984a-1; 2002, ch. 346, § 101, effective July 15, 2002.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. National Banks.

Only the shares of stock in the national banks may be taxed, and these cannot be taxed at a greater rate than is assessed upon state banks or moneyed capital of individual citizens. George Schuster & Co. v. Louisville, 124 Ky. 189 , 89 S.W. 689, 28 Ky. L. Rptr. 588 , 1905 Ky. LEXIS 165 ( Ky. 1905 ).

Cited:

Price v. Louisville, 237 S.W.2d 840, 1951 Ky. LEXIS 778 ( Ky. 1951 ).

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Assessment of public service companies for state and local taxes, KRS 136.120 .

Assessment of shares of banks and trust companies by local taxing authorities, KRS 132.200 and 136.030 .

Domestic life insurance companies, limitation on taxation of, KRS 136.320 .

License tax not to be imposed on domestic banks and trust companies, KRS 91.200 .

Limitation on city taxation of shares of banks and trust companies, KRS 136.270 .

91.630. Capital of individuals and unincorporated companies, how assessed.

Whenever any person or association of persons not a corporation and not having capital stock engages in this state in the business of a trust company or a guaranty or security company, the capital and property, or the certificates or other evidences of right or interest in the business or in the capital and property employed therein, shall be treated as the capital stock of such person or association for the purposes of KRS 91.620 to 91.680 , in like manner as if such person or association were a corporation.

History. 2984a-6.

91.640. Value of capital, how determined.

  1. Each company or individual subject to assessment under KRS 91.620 or 91.630 shall, between September 1 and October 1 each year, make and deliver to the city assessor a statement verified by its president, cashier, secretary, treasurer, manager, or other chief officer or agent, in such form as the city assessor prescribes, showing the following facts:
    1. The name and principal place of business of the company or individual.
    2. The kind of business engaged in.
    3. The amount of capital stock, preferred and common, and the number of shares of each.
    4. The amount of stock paid up, and the par and real value thereof.
    5. The highest price at which its stock was sold at a bona fide sale within twelve (12) months next before September 1 of the year in which the statement is required to be made.
    6. The amount of surplus funds and undivided profits, and the value of all other assets.
    7. The total amount of indebtedness as principal.
    8. The amount of gross and net earnings or income, including interest on investments and income from all other sources, for twelve (12) months next preceding September 1 of the year in which the statement is required.
    9. The amount and kind of tangible property, and where situated, assessed or liable to assessment, and its fair cash value, estimated at the price it would bring at a fair voluntary sale.
    10. Such other facts as the city assessor requires.
  2. If the company or individual does business outside the city as well as in the city, the statement shall show, in addition to the facts required by subsection (1) of this section, the gross and net income or earnings received on business done in the city, and the entire gross receipts of the company or individual on business done in the city and elsewhere, during the twelve (12) months next before September 1 of the year in which the assessment is required to be made. In cases where any of the facts required by this subsection cannot be given correctly, or where they will not afford any valuable information in determining the value of the capital stock to be assessed, the city assessor may excuse the officer from giving such information.
  3. From the statement required by this section and from other evidence he may have, the city assessor shall fix the value of the capital stock of the company or individual, and from the amount so fixed shall deduct the assessed value of all his or its tangible property. The remainder shall be the value of the capital stock subject to city taxation, if the company or individual does business entirely within the city. If the company or individual does business outside the city as well as in the city, the city assessor shall, after fixing the value of the entire capital stock, determine the proportion which the gross receipts from business done in the city within the twelve (12) months next before September 1 of the year in which the assessment is made bears to the entire gross receipts within the same twelve (12) months. The same proportion of the value of the entire capital stock, less the assessed value of all the tangible property of the company or individual assessed or liable to assessment, shall be the value of the capital stock subject to city taxation.

History. 2984a-2 to 2984a-4.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

Price v. Louisville, 237 S.W.2d 840, 1951 Ky. LEXIS 778 ( Ky. 1951 ); Cook v. Citizens State Bank, 304 S.W.2d 931, 1957 Ky. LEXIS 292 ( Ky. 1957 ).

91.650. Notice of assessment — Application for change of valuation.

The city assessor, immediately after fixing the value of the capital stock of any company or individual under KRS 91.640 , shall notify the company or individual of that fact. The company or individual shall have at least ten (10) days from the time of receiving the notice to go before the board of equalization of the city and ask for a change of the valuation, and may introduce evidence. The chairman of the board of equalization may summon and swear witnesses. After hearing the evidence the board may change the valuation as it deems proper, and its action shall be final.

History. 2984a-7.

91.660. Tax bills, how made out and collected.

The city assessor shall make out and authenticate the tax bills on the assessments made under KRS 91.640 and 91.650 , and such tax bills shall have the same effect as tax bills made out and authenticated by him on assessments of other property. He shall list the tax bills with the tax receiver for collection, and they shall be due and payable at the same time, be subject to the same discounts and penalties, and be collectible by distraint, garnishment and action in the same manner as other tax bills due the city.

History. 2984a-8.

91.670. Stockholders not required to list stock if corporation pays tax.

The individual stockholders of any corporation that is required to report and pay city taxes upon its capital stock under KRS 91.620 to 91.660 shall not be required to list their shares in the corporation so long as the corporation pays the city taxes on its capital stock under those sections.

History. 2984a-10.

91.680. Assessment of capital stock when no report filed.

If any company or individual fails to make the report required by KRS 91.640 on or before October 1 of any year, the city assessor shall ascertain the facts and values as required by KRS 91.640 in such manner and by such means as he deems proper, at the cost of the company or individual failing to make the report, and shall fix the value of the capital stock subject to city taxation, and the company or individual shall be taxed accordingly.

History. 2984a-12.

Management Districts

91.750. Definitions for KRS 91.750 to 91.762.

As used in KRS 91.750 to 91.762 , unless the context otherwise requires:

  1. “Economic improvement” means any activity or service for the improvement and promotion of a management district that is of special benefit to property within the district, but shall not include any service ordinarily provided throughout the city, consolidated local government, or urban-county from general fund revenues unless an increased level of the service is provided in the management district;
  2. “City” means a city of the first class;
  3. “Legislative body” means the legislative body of a city of the first class, a consolidated local government, or of an urban-county government;
  4. “Management district” means an area designated by a legislative body pursuant to KRS 91.750 to 91.762 , that is to be benefited by economic improvements and subjected to the payment of special assessments for the costs of the economic improvements. Areas that may be designated as a management district include, but are not limited to, neighborhoods and business districts;
  5. “Property” means any real property benefited by economic improvements;
  6. “Special assessment” means a special charge fixed on property to finance economic improvements in whole or in part;
  7. “Fair basis” means assessed value basis, front foot basis, square foot basis, or benefits received basis;
  8. “Urban-county” means a local government formed as provided by KRS Chapter 67A; and
  9. “Consolidated local government” means a local government formed as provided by KRS Chapter 67C.

History. Enact. Acts 1990, ch. 297, § 1, effective July 13, 1990; 1996, ch. 123, § 1, effective July 15, 1996; 2005, ch. 119, § 1, effective June 20, 2005.

Opinions of Attorney General.

Economic improvement as defined in this section may be financed through special assessments levied upon benefited property owners as provided in KRS 91.758 ; the statutes authorizing these assessments are constitutional as long as they are used to confer some benefit to the property assessed. OAG 92-2 .

91.752. Authority for establishment of district.

A city of the first class, consolidated local government, or urban-county government may establish one (1) or more management districts pursuant to KRS 91.750 to 91.762 , for the purpose of providing and financing economic improvements that specially benefit property within the management district.

History. Enact. Acts 1990, ch. 297, § 2, effective July 13, 1990; 1996, ch. 123, § 2, effective July 15, 1996; 2005, ch. 119, § 2, effective June 20, 2005.

91.754. Petition proceedings to request establishment of district.

  1. A city, consolidated local government, or urban-county government may initiate proceedings to establish a management district upon receipt by the executive authority of a written petition requesting the formation of a management district. A petition requesting the formation of a management district shall contain:
    1. The signatures and addresses of at least thirty-three percent (33%) of the owners of real property within the proposed management district and a number of real property owners, who together are the owners of real property equal to at least fifty-one percent (51%) of the assessed value of property within the proposed management district;
    2. An accurate description of the boundaries of the proposed management district;
    3. An economic improvement plan that shall provide:
      1. A description of the economic improvements to be provided within the district;
      2. A preliminary estimate of the annual costs of the proposed economic improvements;
      3. The proposed method of assessing the costs of the economic improvements against the properties; and
    4. The proposed makeup of the board of directors of the management district, its powers and duties.
  2. When a petition satisfying the requirements of subsection (1) of this section is received by the executive authority, he or she shall forward it to the legislative body which may proceed to enact an ordinance establishing a management district as provided in KRS 91.756 .

History. Enact. Acts 1990, ch. 297, § 3, effective July 13, 1990; 1996, ch. 123, § 3, effective July 15, 1996; 2005, ch. 119, § 3, effective June 20, 2005.

91.756. Ordinance — Requirements to be included.

  1. An ordinance establishing a management district shall include but not be limited to the following provisions:
    1. An accurate description of the boundaries of the management district designated either by map or perimeter description;
    2. A description of the economic improvements that may be undertaken within the management district by its board of directors, including but not limited to:
      1. The planning, administration, and management of development or improvement activities;
      2. Landscaping, maintenance, and cleaning of public ways and spaces;
      3. The promotion of commercial activity or public events;
      4. The conduct of activities in support of business recruitment and development;
      5. The provision of security for public areas;
      6. The construction and maintenance of capital improvements to public ways and spaces; and
      7. Any other economic improvement activity that specially benefits property;
    3. A requirement that the legislative body approve the annual budget and receive a copy of the annual economic improvement plan for the district;
    4. The method of assessment of the properties that may include any fair basis authorized by KRS 91A.200 to 91A.290 ;
    5. The method for collection of the assessment;
    6. A method by which the annual increase in assessments caused by inflation, new growth, and other factors shall be limited;
    7. The organizational structure of the board of directors for the management district and its powers and duties; and
    8. Any other provisions deemed necessary by the legislative body to implement the provisions of KRS 91.750 to 91.762 .
  2. After the first reading of the ordinance to establish the management district, but prior to its second reading and passage, a public hearing on the question of the establishment of the management district shall be held by the legislative body.
  3. A summary of the proposed plan for the management district shall be published in a newspaper in accordance with KRS Chapter 424 no less than twice, at least seven (7) but not earlier than twenty-one (21) days before the date of the public hearing. Notice shall also specify the date, time, and place of the hearing. In addition, a copy of the proposed ordinance and the notice of the hearing shall be mailed, by first class mail, to all property owners within the proposed management district.
  4. After the public hearing, the legislative body may give second reading to the ordinance that shall become effective if passed and approved pursuant to KRS 83.500 .
  5. After the establishment of a management district, the legislative body shall not decrease the level of publicly funded services in the management district existing prior to the creation of the district or transfer the burden of providing the services, unless the services at the same time are decreased throughout the city, consolidated local government, or urban-county.

History. Enact. Acts 1990, ch. 297, § 4, effective July 13, 1990; 1996, ch. 123, § 4, effective July 15, 1996; 2005, ch. 119, § 4, effective June 20, 2005; 2006, ch. 47, § 1, effective July 12, 2006.

91.758. Economic improvement plan — Annual budget — Levy and collection of assessments — Appeal — Lien.

  1. Upon the effective date of the ordinance establishing the management district, a board of directors shall be appointed and shall proceed to implement the economic improvements contained in the ordinance adopted by the legislative body.
  2. As soon as practicable after its appointment, and each year thereafter as provided by ordinance, the board of directors shall develop a plan for economic improvements within the management district and shall prepare an annual detailed budget for the costs of providing economic improvements and shall submit the budget to the legislative body for its approval.
  3. Upon approval of the annual budget, the board of directors shall:
    1. Submit the budget to the Department for Local Government as provided in KRS 65A.020 ;
    2. Publish the economic improvement plan pursuant to KRS Chapter 424; and
    3. Mail by first-class mail to each affected property owner a description of the plan, the fair basis of assessment to be utilized, the estimated cost to the property owner, and the ratio that the cost to each property owner bears to the total cost of the economic improvements.
  4. The ordinance establishing the management district shall provide a procedure for the annual collection of the assessment for the economic improvements.
    1. The board of directors may be directed to annually prepare and mail by first class mail to an owner of each parcel of real property the annual assessment, and to establish due dates and penalties and interest, if any, for delinquent payment; or
    2. The annual assessment may be collected in the same manner, at the same times, and by the office authorized by law for the collection and enforcement of general city, consolidated local government, or urban-county taxes, in which case the collector of taxes shall make regular remittances of the amounts collected to the board of directors. The penalties and interest for delinquent taxes may be applied to delinquent assessments, or separate penalties and interest may be imposed; however, no discount shall be provided for early payment.
    3. Notwithstanding the method of collection for the assessment that is adopted, any affected property owner shall be afforded the right to contest the amount of assessment or the inclusion of his or her property. The contest shall be filed with the board of directors within thirty (30) days of the receipt of the assessment. The property owner shall have the right to appear before the board of directors and present evidence. A record shall be made of the proceedings and the board of directors shall render a written decision. The decision of the board of directors may be appealed to the Circuit Court of the county in which the city, consolidated local government, or urban-county is located.
  5. The amount of any outstanding assessment on any property, and accrued interest and other charges, shall constitute a lien on the property. The lien shall take precedence over all other liens, whether created prior to or subsequent to the assessment, except a lien for state and county taxes, general municipal, consolidated local government, or urban-county taxes, and prior improvement assessments, and shall not be defeated or postponed by any private or judicial sale, by any mortgage, or by any error or mistake in the description of the property or in the names of the owners. No error in the proceedings of the city, consolidated local government, or urban-county legislative body or the board of directors of the management district shall exempt any property from the lien for the economic improvement assessment, or from payment thereof, or from the penalties or interest thereon, as herein provided.

History. Enact. Acts 1990, ch. 297, § 5, effective July 13, 1990; 1996, ch. 123, § 5, effective July 15, 1996; 2005, ch. 119, § 5, effective June 20, 2005; 2006, ch. 47, § 2, effective July 12, 2006; 2013, ch. 40, § 36, effective March 21, 2013.

Opinions of Attorney General.

Economic improvements as defined in KRS 91.750 may be financed through special assessments levied upon benefited property owners as provided in this section; the statutes authorizing these assessments are constitutional as long as they are used to confer some benefit to the property assessed. OAG 92-2 .

91.760. Memberships, powers, and responsibilities of board.

  1. The management district shall constitute a body corporate with the power to sue and be sued, and to contract, and shall be controlled by a board of directors.
  2. The number of members of the board of directors, their terms and qualifications, shall be established by the ordinance creating the district. All members of the board shall be property owners, representatives of property owners, or tenants within the district, except for specified ex officio members designated in the local ordinance. At least two-thirds (2/3) of the total number of board members, including ex officio members, must be property owners or the representatives of property owners within the district. The board members shall be appointed by the executive authority of the city, consolidated local government, or urban-county, with the approval of the legislative body. A board member may be removed by the executive authority for violation of the rules, regulations, or operating procedures adopted by the board of directors if the removal is recommended by a majority of the members of the board of directors.
  3. The powers of the board of directors shall include all powers set forth in KRS 91.750 to 91.762 and the ordinance establishing the management district. The board of directors may employ or contract with persons to assist it in its responsibilities.
    1. The board of directors shall manage the fiscal affairs of the management district and shall adopt rules and regulations governing the investment and disbursement of funds. (4) (a) The board of directors shall manage the fiscal affairs of the management district and shall adopt rules and regulations governing the investment and disbursement of funds.
    2. The board of directors may borrow money on a short-term or long-term basis as required. The total aggregate amount of long-term and short-term debt which may be carried by a management district shall not exceed five hundred thousand dollars ($500,000).
    3. The board of directors may hold funds in the name of the management district or may designate the city, consolidated local government, or urban-county as the fiscal agent for the management district.
    4. Money derived from the assessments imposed pursuant to KRS 91.750 to 91.762 shall be used only for economic improvements and the cost of administration of the management district and shall be used for no other purposes.
    5. As soon as practicable after the close of the fiscal year, the board of directors shall cause an audit to be performed of all funds of the management district by a certified public accountant.
    6. The board shall comply with the provisions of KRS 65A.010 to 65A.090 .
  4. In addition to receiving funds from assessments, the board of directors shall be authorized to receive grants, donations, and gifts.

History. Enact. Acts 1990, ch. 297, § 6, effective July 13, 1990; 1996, ch. 123, § 6, effective July 15, 1996; 2005, ch. 119, § 6, effective June 20, 2005; 2006, ch. 47, § 3, effective July 12, 2006; 2013, ch. 40, § 37, effective March 21, 2013.

91.762. Change of boundaries — Dissolution — Disposition of excess funds.

  1. The boundaries of the management district may be changed at any time by the legislative body in the same manner as provided in KRS 91.750 to 91.762 for the establishment of the management district.
  2. The management district shall be dissolved by the legislative body upon the receipt of a petition requesting dissolution that is signed by a number of real property owners who together are the owners of real property within the management district equal to at least fifty and one-tenth percent (50.1%) of the assessed value of the property and thirty-three percent (33%) of the number of property owners within the management district, except that a management district shall not be dissolved if the district has any outstanding indebtedness.
  3. If a management district is to be dissolved, and after the payment of all obligations and costs of administration incurred on behalf of the management district, there remain excess funds from assessments paid by property owners, then the city, consolidated local government, or urban-county, by ordinance, shall provide for:
    1. The return of the excess funds to the owners of properties in amounts proportionate to the amounts of the assessments they paid for the district;
    2. Use of the excess funds for continued provision of the economic improvements until the excess funds are fully spent; or
    3. Use of part of the excess funds for continued provision of economic improvements and return of the balance of the excess funds in proportionate amounts to affected property owners.

History. Enact. Acts 1990, ch. 297, § 7, effective July 13, 1990; 1996, ch. 123, § 7, effective July 15, 1996; 2005, ch. 119, § 7, effective June 20, 2005; 2006, ch. 47, § 4, effective July 12, 2006.

Land Bank Authorities

91.800. Definitions. [Repealed, reenacted and amended.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1988, ch. 92, § 1, effective July 15, 1988) was repealed, reenacted and amended as KRS 65.350 by Acts 1990, ch. 341, § 1, effective July 13, 1990.

91.805. Creation of authority. [Repealed, reenacted and amended.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1988, ch. 92, § 2, effective July 15, 1988) was repealed, reenacted and amended as KRS 65.355 by Acts 1990, ch. 341, § 2, effective July 13, 1990.

91.810. Board of authority. [Repealed, reenacted and amended.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1988, ch. 92, § 3, effective July 15, 1988) was repealed, reenacted and amended as KRS 65.360 by Acts 1990, ch. 341, § 3, effective July 13, 1990.

91.815. Acquisition and disposal of property. [Repealed, reenacted and amended.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1988, ch. 92, § 4, effective July 15, 1988) was repealed, reenacted and amended as KRS 65.370 by Acts 1990, ch. 341, § 5, effective July 13, 1990.

91.820. Conditions under which authority to take title to tax delinquent properties. [Repealed, reenacted and amended.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1988, ch. 92, § 5, effective July 15, 1988) was repealed, reenacted and amended as KRS 65.375 by Acts 1990, ch. 341, § 6, effective July 13, 1990.

Penalties

91.990. Penalties. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2821, 2984a-9, 3000, 3010-16) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980.

CHAPTER 91A Finance and Revenue of Cities

Financial Administration

91A.010. Definitions for KRS 91A.010 to 91A.060.

As used in KRS 91A.010 to 91A.060 , unless the context otherwise requires:

  1. “Budget” means a proposed plan for raising and spending money for specified programs, functions, activities, or objectives during a fiscal year.
  2. “Debt service” means the sum of money required to pay installments of principal and interest on bonds, notes, and other evidences of debt accruing within a fiscal year and to maintain sinking funds.
  3. “Encumbrances” means obligations in the form of purchase orders or contracts that are chargeable to an appropriation. An obligation ceases to be an encumbrance when paid or when the actual liability is recorded.
  4. “Executive authority” means the mayor in any city organized under the mayor-council plan or mayor-aldermen plan, the commission in any city organized under the commission plan, or the board in any city organized under the city manager plan.
  5. “Fiscal year” means the accounting period for the administration of fiscal operations.
  6. “Generally accepted governmental auditing standards” means those standards for audit of governmental organizations, programs, activities, and functions issued by the Comptroller General of the United States.
  7. “Generally accepted principles of governmental accounting” mean those standards and procedures promulgated and recognized by the Governmental Accounting Standards Board.
  8. “Legislative body” means the council in cities organized under the mayor-council plan, the board of aldermen in cities of the first class organized under the mayor-aldermen plan, the commission in cities organized under the commission plan and the board of commissioners in cities organized under the city manager plan.

History. Enact. Acts 1980, ch. 232, § 1, effective July 15, 1980; 1992, ch. 33, § 2, effective July 14, 1992.

Opinions of Attorney General.

Although a city commission is no longer required to establish the office of treasurer, the financial affairs of the city should be handled by someone designated by the commission or by a department established for this purpose since all cities must comply with the new act relating to finances. OAG 80-565 .

In a city operating under the city manager form of government, the board of commissioners must either prepare the city budget or, delegate the budget preparation authority to the city manager under KRS 83A.150 (7)(h); the latter course of action would resolve the conflict between the combined provisions of this section and KRS 83A.010 which define the “executive authority” as the board of commissioners, and KRS 91A.030(5) which authorizes such “executive authority” to prepare the budget, and the provisions of subdivision (7)(c) of KRS 83A.150 which authorizes the city manager to prepare the budget. OAG 81-95 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Bench & Bar.

Morris, The New Kentucky Municipal Law, Vol. 45, No. 3, July, 1981, Ky. Bench and Bar 24.

Kentucky Law Journal.

Kentucky Law Survey, Morris, Municipal Law, 70 Ky. L.J. 287 (1981-82).

91A.020. Accounting records.

  1. Each city shall keep its accounting records and render financial reports in such a way as to:
    1. Determine compliance with statutory provisions; and
    2. Determine fairly and with full disclosure the financial operations of constituent funds and account groups of the city in conformity with generally accepted governmental accounting principles.
  2. Municipal accounting systems shall be organized and operated on a fund basis.

History. Enact. Acts 1980, ch. 232, § 2, effective July 15, 1980; 2000, ch. 208, § 1, effective July 14, 2000.

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Kentucky Law Survey, Morris, Municipal Law, 70 Ky. L.J. 287 (1981-82).

91A.030. Annual budget.

  1. Each city shall operate under an annual budget ordinance adopted and administered in accordance with the provisions of this section. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no city shall expend any moneys from any governmental or proprietary fund, except in accordance with a budget ordinance adopted pursuant to this section.
  2. Moneys held by a city as a trustee or agent for individuals, private organizations, or other governmental units need not be included in the budget ordinance.
  3. If, in any fiscal year subsequent to a fiscal year in which a city has adopted a budget ordinance in accordance with this section, no budget ordinance is adopted, the budget ordinance of the previous fiscal year shall have full force and effect as if readopted.
  4. The budget ordinance of a city shall cover one (1) fiscal year.
  5. Preparation of the budget proposal shall be the responsibility of the executive authority of the city in cities operating pursuant to KRS Chapter 83, KRS 83A.130 or 83A.140 or the city manager in cities operating pursuant to KRS 83A.150 .
  6. The budget proposal shall be prepared in the form and detail as is prescribed by ordinance.
  7. The budget proposal together with a budget message shall be submitted to the legislative body not later than thirty (30) days prior to the beginning of the fiscal year it covers. The budget message shall contain an explanation of the governmental goals fixed by the budget for the coming fiscal year; explain important features of the activities anticipated in the budget; set forth the reasons for stated changes from the previous year in program goals, programs, and appropriation levels; and explain any major changes in fiscal policy.
    1. The legislative body shall adopt a budget ordinance making appropriations for the fiscal year in such sums as the legislative body finds sufficient and proper, whether greater or less than the sums recommended in the budget proposal. The budget ordinance may be in any form that the legislative body finds most efficient in enabling it to make the necessary fiscal policy decisions. (8) (a) The legislative body shall adopt a budget ordinance making appropriations for the fiscal year in such sums as the legislative body finds sufficient and proper, whether greater or less than the sums recommended in the budget proposal. The budget ordinance may be in any form that the legislative body finds most efficient in enabling it to make the necessary fiscal policy decisions.
    2. No budget ordinance shall be adopted which provides for appropriations to exceed revenues in any one (1) fiscal year in violation of Section 157 of the Kentucky Constitution.
  8. The full amount estimated to be required for debt service during the budget year shall be appropriated for all governmental fund types.
  9. The city legislative body may amend the budget ordinance after the ordinance’s adoption, if the amended ordinance continues to satisfy the requirements of this section.
  10. Administration and implementation of an adopted budget ordinance shall be the responsibility of the executive authority of the city. That responsibility shall include the preparation and submission to the legislative body of operating statements which shall include budgetary comparisons of each governmental fund for which an annual budget has been adopted. These reports shall be submitted not less than once every three (3) months in each fiscal year.
  11. To the extent practical, the system utilized in the administration and implementation of the adopted budget ordinance shall be consistent in form with the accounting system called for in KRS 91A.020 .
  12. No city agency, or member, director, officer, or employee of a city agency, may bind the city in any way to any extent beyond the amount of money at that time appropriated for the purpose of the agency. All contracts, agreements, and obligations, express or implied, beyond existing appropriations are void; nor shall any city officer issue any bond, certificate, or warrant for the payment of money by the city in any way to any extent beyond the unexpended balance of any appropriation made for the purpose.

History. Enact. Acts 1980, ch. 232, § 3, effective July 15, 1980; 1982, ch. 434, § 8, effective July 15, 1982; 1992, ch. 33, § 3, effective July 14, 1992; 1992, ch. 435, § 10, effective July 14, 1992.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(7/14/92). This section was amended by two 1992 Acts which do not appear to be in conflict and have been compiled together.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. In General.

KRS 91A.030(8) is clear that no budget ordinance shall be adopted which provides for appropriations to exceed revenues in any one fiscal year in violation of Ky. Const. § 157, which provides that the legislative body of a city shall adopt a budget showing total expected revenues and expenditures for the fiscal year. Likewise, KRS 91A.030(10) is equally clear that any amendments made to the original ordinance must continue to satisfy the same requirement of balance between revenue and expenditures. Taylor v. Carter, 333 S.W.3d 437, 2010 Ky. App. LEXIS 250 (Ky. Ct. App. 2010).

2. Violation.

At the time that a budget, or an amendment to a budget is passed, it need not be literally, “in balance” as of the date of passage because a city is certainly not expected to have, at the moment of passage, revenues adequate to meet all anticipated expenditures; however, the budget must be “in balance” insofar as anticipated expenditures not exceed anticipated revenues. Therefore, LaGrange, Ky., Ordinance 10-2008 violated KRS 91A.030(8), (10) and Ky. Const. § 157 because a tax decrease caused anticipated revenues to be less than anticipated expenditures; the city did not know at the time the ordinance was passed that it would later receive donations that served to offset the reduction in revenue. Taylor v. Carter, 333 S.W.3d 437, 2010 Ky. App. LEXIS 250 (Ky. Ct. App. 2010).

Opinions of Attorney General.

A municipal order may not be used, pursuant to KRS 83A.060(13), in lieu of an ordinance to establish the procedure for the preparation of the budget proposal, since this section specifically requires that the budget proposal be prepared in such form and detail as is prescribed by ordinance. OAG 80-380 .

Subsection (1) of this section clearly implies that cities must immediately comply with the terms of KRS 91A.010 to 91A.060 , and the only exception is that found under subsection (4) of this section which is not applicable at present since there is no legislation requiring cities to change their fiscal year. OAG 80-380 .

Under Const., § 169 and KRS 92.020 implementing same, no city other than that of the first class is required under present law to change its fiscal year from a calendar year to that of July 1 through June 30. OAG 80-380 .

In a city operating under the city manager form of government, the board of commissioners must either prepare the city budget or delegate the budget preparation authority to the city manager under KRS 83A.150(7)(h); the latter course of action would resolve the conflict between the combined provisions of KRS 91A.010 and 83A.010 , which define the “executive authority” as the board of commissioners, and subsection (5) of this section which authorizes such “executive authority” to prepare the budget, and the provisions of KRS 83A.150(7)(c) which authorizes the city manager to prepare the budget. OAG 81-95 .

The language of subsection (11) of this section which states that budget reports “shall be submitted not less than once every three (3) months” establishes a mandatory minimum, which enables a city council, at its discretion, to require monthly operating statements relating to the city budget to be submitted. OAG 81-273 .

Cities must operate within their duly adopted budget, which is based on the anticipated revenues to be received and no expenditures can be made by the city unless such funds are appropriated in the budget; accordingly, a city may not operate with a budget deficit. OAG 82-110 .

The imposition of an occupational tax upon employers and employees within an annexed area requires an amendment to the city’s budget, pursuant to this section, since the budget should include the anticipated increase in tax revenue that may be expected from the annexed area. OAG 84-363 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Kentucky Law Survey, Morris, Municipal Law, 70 Ky. L.J. 287 (1981-82).

ALR

56 Am.Jur.2d, Municipal Corporations, Counties and Other Political Subdivisions, § 581.

91A.040. Annual and biennial city audits — Exemption — Financial statement — Publication — Contents — Enforcement action — Penalties — Extension — Withholding of state funds for noncompliance — Audit expenses to be billed to audited city. (See LRC Note)

  1. Except as provided in subsections (2) to (4) of this section, each city shall, after the close of each fiscal year, cause each fund of the city to be audited by the Auditor of Public Accounts or a certified public accountant. The audit shall be completed by February 1 immediately following the fiscal year being audited. The city shall forward an electronic copy of the audit report to the Department for Local Government for information purposes by no later than March 1 immediately following the fiscal year being audited.
  2. In lieu of the annual audit requirements in subsection (1) of this section, a city with a population equal to or less than one thousand (1,000) based upon the most recent federal decennial census may elect to have an audit performed every other fiscal year in the following manner:
    1. After the close of each odd-numbered fiscal year, the city shall for that odd- numbered year cause each fund of the city to be audited by the Auditor of Public Accounts or a certified public accountant. The audits shall be completed by February 1 immediately following the fiscal year to be audited. The city shall forward an electronic copy of the audit report to the Department for Local Government for information purposes by no later than March 1 immediately following the fiscal year being audited; and
    2. After the close of each even-numbered fiscal year, the city shall not be required to complete an annual audit but shall forward an electronic copy of its financial statement prepared in accordance with KRS 424.220 to the Department for Local Government by no later than October 1 immediately following the close of the even-numbered fiscal year.
  3. In lieu of the annual audit requirements in subsection (1) of this section, a city with a population of more than one thousand (1,000) but less than two thousand (2,000) based upon the most recent federal decennial census may elect to have an audit performed every other fiscal year to cover the two (2) fiscal years occurring since the prior audit in the following manner:
    1. After the close of each odd-numbered fiscal year, the city shall cause each fund of the city to be audited by the Auditor of Public Accounts or a certified public accountant. The audit shall include both fiscal years since the prior audit and shall be completed by February 1 immediately following the fiscal years to be audited. The city shall forward an electronic copy of the audit report to the Department for Local Government for information purposes by no later than March 1 immediately following the fiscal years being audited; and
    2. After the close of each even-numbered fiscal year, the city shall not be required to complete an annual audit but shall forward an electronic copy of its financial statement prepared in accordance with KRS 424.220 to the Department for Local Government by no later than October 1 immediately following the close of the even-numbered fiscal year.
  4. Any city, which for any fiscal year receives and expends, from all sources and for all purposes, less than seventy-five thousand dollars ($75,000), and which has no long-term debt, whether general obligation or revenue debt, shall not be required to audit each fund of the city for that particular fiscal year. Each city exempted in accordance with this subsection shall annually prepare a financial statement in accordance with KRS 424.220 and shall, not later than October 1 following the conclusion of the fiscal year, forward one (1) electronic copy to the Department for Local Government for information purposes.
  5. If a city is required by another provision of law to audit its funds more frequently or more stringently than is required by this section, the city shall also comply with the provisions of that law.
  6. The Department for Local Government shall, upon request, make available electronic copies of the audit reports and financial statements received by it under subsections (1) to (4) of this section to the Legislative Research Commission to be used for the purposes of KRS 6.955 to 6.975 or to the Auditor of Public Accounts.
  7. Each city required by this section to conduct an annual or biennial audit shall enter into a written contract with the selected auditor. The contract shall set forth all terms and conditions of the agreement which shall include but not be limited to requirements that:
    1. The auditor be employed to examine the basic financial statements, which shall include the government-wide and fund financial statements;
    2. The auditor shall include in the annual or biennial city audit report an examination of local government economic assistance funds granted to the city under KRS 42.450 to 42.495 . The auditor shall include a certification with the annual or biennial audit report that the funds were expended for the purpose intended;
    3. All audit information be prepared in accordance with generally accepted governmental auditing standards which include tests of the accounting records and auditing procedures considered necessary in the circumstances. Where the audit is to cover the use of state or federal funds, appropriate state or federal guidelines shall be utilized;
    4. The auditor shall prepare a typewritten or printed report embodying:
      1. The basic financial statements and accompanying supplemental and required supplemental information;
      2. The auditor’s opinion on the basic financial statements or reasons why an opinion cannot be expressed; and
      3. Findings required to be reported as a result of the audit;
    5. The completed audit and all accompanying documentation shall be presented to the city legislative body at a regular or special meeting; and
    6. Any contract with a certified public accountant for an audit shall require the accountant to forward a copy of the audit report and management letters to the Auditor of Public Accounts upon request of the city or the Auditor of Public Accounts, and the Auditor of Public Accounts shall have the right to review the certified public accountant’s work papers upon request.
  8. A copy of an audit report which meets the requirements of this section shall be considered satisfactory and final in meeting any official request to a city for financial data, except for statutory or judicial requirements, or requirements of the Legislative Research Commission necessary to carry out the purposes of KRS 6.955 to 6.975 .
  9. Each city shall, within thirty (30) days after the presentation of an audit to the city legislative body, publish an advertisement in accordance with KRS Chapter 424 containing:
    1. The auditor’s opinion letter;
    2. The “Budgetary Comparison Schedules-Major Funds,” which shall include the general fund and all major funds;
    3. A statement that a copy of the complete audit report, including financial statements and supplemental information, is on file at city hall and is available for public inspection during normal business hours;
    4. A statement that any citizen may obtain from city hall a copy of the complete audit report, including financial statements and supplemental information, for his personal use;
    5. A statement which notifies citizens requesting a personal copy of the city audit report that they will be charged for duplication costs at a rate that shall not exceed twenty-five cents ($0.25) per page; and
    6. A statement that copies of the financial statement prepared in accordance with KRS 424.220 , when a financial statement is required by KRS 424.220 , are available to the public at no cost at the business address of the officer responsible for preparation of the statement.
  10. Any resident of the city or owner of real property within the city may bring an action in the Circuit Court to enforce the provisions of this section. Any person who violates any provision of this section shall be fined not less than fifty dollars ($50) nor more than five hundred dollars ($500). In addition, any officer who fails to comply with any of the provisions of this section shall, for each failure, be subject to a forfeiture of not less than fifty dollars ($50) nor more than five hundred dollars ($500), in the discretion of the court, which may be recovered only once in a civil action brought by any resident of the city or owner of real property within the city. The costs of all proceedings, including a reasonable fee for the attorney of the resident or property owner bringing the action, shall be assessed against the unsuccessful party.
  11. In the event of extenuating circumstances that prevent a city from completing and submitting a required audit or financial statement in compliance with the applicable deadlines in subsections (1) to (4) of this section, the city may submit a written request for an extension of time to the Department for Local Government on a form prescribed by the Department for Local Government. The Department for Local Government shall approve the request if it is submitted on or before the applicable deadline and, in the judgment of the Department for Local Government, the request is warranted by extenuating circumstances beyond the control of the city. Extensions granted under this subsection shall not exceed nine (9) months from the original due date of the audit or financial statement. If the Department for Local Government approves an extension for a city and the city fails to complete and submit the required audit or financial statement in compliance with that extended deadline, then the provisions of subsection (12) of this section shall apply.
  12. If a city fails to complete an audit or financial statement and submit it to the Department for Local Government as required in subsections (1) to (4) and (11) of this section, the Department for Local Government shall notify the Finance and Administration Cabinet that the city has failed to comply with the audit requirements of this section, and that any funds in the possession of any agency, entity, or branch of state government shall be withheld from the city until further notice. The Department for Local Government shall immediately notify the Finance and Administration Cabinet when the city complies with the requirements of subsections (1) to (4) and (11) of this section for all prior fiscal years it has failed to comply with the audit requirements of this section, and the Finance and Administration Cabinet shall direct the reinstatement of payments to the city, including any funds that were withheld due to the noncompliance.
  13. Within a reasonable time after the completion of a special audit or examination conducted pursuant to KRS 43.050 , the Auditor shall bill the city for the actual expense of the audit or examination conducted. The actual expense shall include the hours of work performed on the audit or examination as well as reasonable associated costs, including but not limited to travel costs. The bill submitted to the city shall include a statement of the hourly rate, total hours, and total costs for the entire audit or examination.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1980, ch. 232, § 4, effective July 15, 1980; 1982, ch. 393, § 45, effective July 15, 1982; 1982, ch. 407, § 1, effective July 15, 1982; 1982, ch. 430, § 1, effective July 15, 1982; 1984, ch. 111, § 173, effective July 13, 1984; 1986, ch. 331, § 22, effective July 15, 1986; 1990, ch. 52, § 1, effective July 13, 1990; 1992, ch. 33, § 4, effective July 14, 1992; 1998, ch. 69, § 46, effective July 15, 1998; 2000, ch. 89, § 1, effective July 14, 2000; 2006, ch. 8, § 2, effective July 12, 2006; 2007, ch. 47, § 62, effective June 26, 2007; 2010, ch. 117, § 68, effective July 15, 2010; 2014, ch. 5, § 3, effective July 15, 2014; 2016 ch. 17, § 2, effective July 15, 2016; 2018 ch. 10, § 1, effective July 14, 2018; 2019 ch. 91, § 1, effective June 27, 2019.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(4/8/2020). This KRS section was repealed, reenacted, and amended by Section 1 of 2020 Ky. Acts ch. 82. Section 4 of that Act states, “The Kentucky Retirement Systems board of trustees shall amend the 2019 actuarial valuation for the Kentucky Employees Retirement System, County Employees Retirement System, and State Police Retirement System in accordance with the provisions of Section 1 of this Act [this statute] and shall provide the information to the Governor and General Assembly for purposes of the 2020-2022 biennial budgeting process.”

(4/8/2020). This KRS section was repealed, reenacted, and amended by Section 1 of 2020 Ky. Acts ch. 82. Section 6 of that Act states, “Notwithstanding Section 1 of this Act [this statute] and KRS 61.702 , the employer contribution rates for the County Employees Retirement System from July 1, 2020, through June 30, 2021, shall remain 24.06 percent, consisting of 19.30 percent for pension and 4.76 percent for health insurance, for nonhazardous duty employees and 39.58 percent, consisting of 30.06 percent for pension and 9.52 percent for health insurance, for hazardous duty employees. Any future increases in the County Employees Retirement System after June 30, 2021, as provided by subsection (5) of Section 1 of this Act [this statute], shall use the employer contribution rate established by this section for County Employees Retirement System employers as the base rate to calculate future increases in County Employees Retirement System employer contribution rates.”

(1/1/2015). This statute was amended by 2014 Ky. Acts chs. 5 and 92, which do not appear to be in conflict and have been codified together.

Opinions of Attorney General.

The fact that the 1980 legislature placed new requirements on cities with respect to accounting records and financial reports, directed each city to operate under an annual budget ordinance and repealed two preexisting statutes which had required the publishing of a summary of an annual audit resulted in making the law such that each city must publish a summary of the audit report under this section, and also fully follow the publication requirements for a financial statement set out in KRS 424.220 . OAG 81-37 .

The report of the annual audit of a city is not exempt from mandatory public inspection by KRS 61.878(1)(g) or any other exception in the statute. An audit report made under the provisions of this section is a public record and should be made available for public inspection. OAG 82-340 .

Cities of the sixth class are no longer required to have annual audit but must have the audit completed in less than 270 days after the expiration of the term of the legislative body members. OAG 82-350 .

Acts 1982, ch. 430, effective July 15, 1982, as to its publication provisions for municipal governments, is applicable to those municipal governments for the fiscal year July 1, 1981 to June 30, 1982. OAG 82-353 .

Acts 1982, ch. 430 which amends several statutes relating to publication requirements of cities, including this section and KRS 424.220 , is basically an amendment of the municipal publication requirements and does not affect the city budget process, financial matters in cities, or matters relating to the administration of city finances. It gives a city a choice as to which of two (2) devices relating to finances and expenditures must be published annually rather than requiring that they both be published and affects what a city publishes after the completion of the fiscal year, but does not affect the activities of a city during the fiscal year; it does not impair any vested rights. OAG 82-353 .

A city of the sixth class must continue to prepare an audit and publish it under the terms of subsections (7), (8) or (9) of this section unless the city qualifies under the provisions of KRS 91A.041 (now repealed), in which case it may in lieu of preparing an audit publish a financial statement pursuant to KRS 424.220 . OAG 82-384 .

Where a city of the sixth class has already prepared an audit, it should either utilize the alternative publication method under KRS 424.190(2) or the publication requirements authorized by KRS 91A.041 (now repealed) if it qualifies, or publish the audit as provided in subsections (7) and (8) of this section. OAG 82-384 .

KRS 424.220 conflicts with this section and KRS 91A.041 (now repealed) in that it requires the publication of the financial statement within 60 days after the close of the fiscal year; since subsection (8) of this section is more specific in nature, in that it applies solely to cities, and since it is new legislation, it would prevail in its time requirement which is tied in with the 270-day time leeway permitted in subsection (1) of this section with regard to the preparation of the city’s audit. Of course, all other requirements of KRS Chapter 424 must be complied with, with respect to such publication. OAG 83-56 .

This section is applicable to funds of a city and not to funds of a joint city-county parks and recreation board. OAG 83-327 .

The city council and not the municipal utility commission has the authority to engage an accounting firm to audit the operations of the municipal utility commission. OAG 91-113 .

Whether the requested audits are completed but not in the possession of the City or whether they were not completed as required by KRS 91A.040(1), raises records retention and management questions. If the audits were completed and the City failed to maintain a copy of the annual audit reports, as required by record retention guidelines, or whether the City failed to complete the audits as required by KRS 91A.040(1), may warrant review by the Department for Libraries and Archives under authority of Chapter 171 of the Kentucky Revised Statutes. OAG 03-ORD-240.

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Kentucky Law Survey, Morris, Municipal Law, 70 Ky. L.J. 287 (1981-82).

91A.041. Audit exemptions. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1982, ch. 430, § 2, effective July 15, 1982) was repealed by Acts 1990, ch. 52, § 5, effective July 13, 1990. For present law see KRS 91A.040 .

91A.045. Exception to auditing requirement for city which receives and expends $25,000 or less in fiscal year. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1982, ch. 407, § 2, effective July 15, 1982) was repealed by Acts 1984, ch. 6, § 3, effective July 13, 1984.

91A.050. Technical assistance by the Department for Local Government.

The Department for Local Government shall make available to all cities assistance in meeting the requirements of KRS 91A.010 to 91A.060 , including the preparation and dissemination of model systems for accounting and budgeting, and other technical materials.

History. Enact. Acts 1980, ch. 232, § 5, effective July 15, 1980; 1982, ch. 393, § 46, effective July 15, 1982; 1986, ch. 374, § 11, effective July 15, 1986; 1998, ch. 69, § 47, effective July 15, 1998; 2007, ch. 47, § 63, effective June 26, 2007; 2010, ch. 117, § 69, effective July 15, 2010.

Opinions of Attorney General.

This section does not require a separate model system of accounting and budgeting for each class of city, thus, if the department for local government can prepare one model system of accounting and budgeting sufficiently flexible to allow cities of all classes to meet the requirements of KRS 91A.010 to 91A.060 , such would be sufficient. OAG 80-380 .

91A.060. Official depositories.

  1. The executive authority shall designate as the city’s official depositories one (1) or more banks, federally insured savings and loan companies or trust companies within the Commonwealth. The amount of funds on deposit in an official depository shall be fully insured by deposit insurance or collateralized in accordance with 12 U.S.C. sec. 1823 , to the extent uninsured, by any obligations, including surety bonds permitted by KRS 41.240(4).
  2. All receipts from any source of city money or money for which the city is responsible, which has not been otherwise invested or deposited in a manner authorized by law, shall be deposited in official depositories. All city funds shall be disbursed by written authorization approved by the executive authority which shall state the name of the person to whom funds are payable, the purpose of the payment and the fund out of which the funds are payable. Each authorization shall be numbered and recorded.

History. Enact. Acts 1980, ch. 232, § 6, effective July 15, 1980; 2000, ch. 207, § 1, effective July 14, 2000.

Opinions of Attorney General.

An inconsistency between a city procurement code which allows abbreviated purchasing procedures without the approval of the board of commissioners by giving the city manager the responsibility of executing contracts on behalf of the board and the provisions of this section which provide that all city funds are to be disbursed by written authorization approved by the board of commissioners, can be resolved by having the board of commissioners delegating the authority to the city manager under subdivision (7)(h) of KRS 83A.150 . OAG 81-95 .

91A.070. Collection of city ad valorem taxes by sheriff — Alternative collection procedures to be established by ordinance — Penalties — Amnesty program.

  1. Any city may by ordinance elect to have all city ad valorem taxes including delinquent taxes collected by the sheriff of the county. The election shall be effective only if a copy of the ordinance is delivered to the sheriff as soon as practicable, and a copy of the ordinance levying the taxes to be collected is delivered to the county clerk as soon as practicable. If the city so elects:
    1. The county clerk shall place city ad valorem taxes due on the tax bills of owners of property in the city, prepared in accordance with KRS 133.220 and 133.230 .
    2. The sheriff shall collect all city ad valorem taxes, including delinquent taxes, in the same manner as county ad valorem taxes as provided in KRS Chapter 134, and the sheriff shall be compensated in an amount calculated to defray additional costs to the sheriff for the services performed, but such amount shall not exceed the rates provided for tax collection by KRS Chapter 134. All procedures provided by KRS Chapter 134 concerning collection of delinquent taxes by counties shall be applicable.
  2. If a city does not elect to have city ad valorem taxes collected by the sheriff as provided in subsection (1) of this section, the city shall establish by ordinance procedures for the collection of ad valorem taxes which shall specify the following:
    1. The date that city ad valorem taxes are due and payable, except that ad valorem taxes on motor vehicles and motorboats shall be governed by the provisions of KRS 134.800 to 134.830 ;
    2. The manner of billing;
    3. The place and manner for payment, which may permit the payment of the taxes in installments under such terms and conditions specified in the ordinance;
    4. Discounts, if any, for early payment;
    5. Any penalties and interest for late payment or nonpayment; and
    6. Any other necessary procedures related to ad valorem tax administration not otherwise in conflict with state law.
  3. In cities proceeding under subsection (2) of this section, ad valorem taxes upon real or personal property shall be delinquent if not paid by the date due and payable by ordinance or statute. A lien superior to all other liens, except a lien for state taxes, whether such liens were acquired before or after the maturity of the taxes referred to in this section, shall exist in favor of the city from the date the taxes are due, for the amount of the taxes, interest and penalties, upon all the real and personal property of the delinquent taxpayer. The city may enforce the lien by action in the name of the city in the Circuit Court as provided by statute. In that action it may also obtain a personal judgment against the delinquent taxpayer for the tax, penalties, interest and costs of the suit.
  4. Any city establishing penalties and interest for the late payment or nonpayment of ad valorem property taxes under subsection (3) of this section may, by ordinance, provide an amnesty program as determined by the city’s legislative body for the forgiveness or a reduction of a taxpayer’s accumulated penalties and interest for late payment or nonpayment of ad valorem property taxes in previous tax years.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1982, ch. 434, § 12, effective July 15, 1982; 2015 ch. 99, § 1, effective June 24, 2015.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Tax Liability.

KRS 134.060 makes an owner of real property liable for the related property taxes and the tax is the personal debt of the person liable for payment, pursuant to KRS 134.050 , and the lien imposed by KRS 134.420 secures the payment of taxes, as does KRS 91A.070 . Radcliffe v. LPP Mortg., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5286 (W.D. Ky. Apr. 1, 2003), aff'd, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 5198 (6th Cir. Ky. Mar. 30, 2005).

Opinions of Attorney General.

It appears that in repealing the provisions of KRS Ch. 92 and in enacting this section and KRS 91.488 through 91.488 5, the legislature decided to provide cities of the second through sixth classes with the option of having the county collect their taxes or of collecting their own taxes in the same manner as a city of the first class. Accordingly, where a sixth class city had its own tax collector, it was entitled to proceed to collect its delinquent taxes in the manner provided in KRS 91.488 through 91.4885 . OAG 83-159 .

Subsection (2) of this section does not authorize the city to create ordinances controlling the manner in which a lawsuit must be brought to collect delinquent taxes. Instead, it simply authorizes the city to create ordinances to deal with tax collection procedures other than lawsuits. OAG 83-159 .

Any city may, by ordinance, elect to have its ad valorem taxes collected by the sheriff of the county; if the city has elected to have the sheriff collect its ad valorem taxes, then KRS 134.500 , providing for the county attorney to prosecute delinquent tax claims, applies. OAG 83-397 .

If a city follows the provisions of this section, the municipal ad valorem taxes on motor vehicles may be collected pursuant to the provisions of KRS Chapter 134 including KRS 134.800 et seq. OAG 83-400 .

Where a city elects to have the county sheriff handle its tax collections, the penalties and interest set out in KRS 134.020 and 134.370 apply and there is no provision for using a higher interest rate at the beginning of the year and a lower interest rate or penalty at the end of the year. OAG 84-77 .

There is no prohibition nor limitation to the collection of attorney’s fees by a city for collection of its delinquent taxes assuming that the city has not elected to utilize the sheriff and the procedures in KRS Chapter 134. OAG 84-222 .

Pursuant to subsection (2) of this section, a city that provides for its own collection procedures should provide for the payment of reasonable attorney’s fees as well. OAG 84-222 .

91A.080. License tax on insurance companies.

  1. The legislative body of each local government which elects to impose and collect license fees or taxes upon insurance companies for the privilege of engaging in the business of insurance may, except as provided in subsection (10) of this section, enact or change its license fee or rate of tax to be effective July 1 of each year on a prospective basis only and shall file with the commissioner of insurance at least one hundred (100) days prior to the effective date, a copy of all ordinances and amendments which impose a license fee or tax. No less than eighty-five (85) days prior to the effective date, the commissioner of insurance shall promptly notify each insurance company engaged in the business of insurance in the Commonwealth of those local governments which have elected to impose the license fees or taxes and the current amount of the license fee or rate of tax.
  2. Any license fee or tax imposed by a local government upon an insurance company with respect to life insurance policies may be based upon the first year’s premiums, and, if so based, shall be applied to the amount of the premiums actually collected within each calendar quarter upon the lives of persons residing within the corporate limits of the local government.
  3. Any license fee or tax imposed by a local government upon any insurance company with respect to any policy which is not a life insurance policy shall be based upon the premiums actually collected by the insurance company within each calendar quarter on risks located within the corporate limits of the local government on those classes of business which the insurance company is authorized to transact, less all premiums returned to policyholders. In determining the amount of license fee or tax to be collected and to be paid to the local government, the insurance company shall use the tax rate effective on the first day of the policy term. When an insurance company collects a premium as a result of a change in the policy during the policy term, the tax rate used shall be the rate in effect on the effective date of the policy change. With respect to premiums returned to policyholders, the license fee or tax shall be returned by the insurance company to the policyholder pro rata on the unexpired amount of the premium at the same rate at which it was collected and shall be taken as a credit by the insurance company on its next quarterly report to the local government.
  4. The Department of Insurance shall, by administrative regulation, provide for a reasonable collection fee to be retained by the insurance company or its agent as compensation for collecting the tax, except that the collection fee shall not be more than fifteen percent (15%) of the fee or tax collected and remitted to the local government or two percent (2%) of the premiums subject to the tax, whichever is less. To facilitate computation, collection, and remittance of the fee or tax and collection fee provided in this section, the fees or taxes set out in subsection (1), (2), or (3) of this section, together with the collection fee in this section, may be rounded off to the nearest dollar amount.
  5. Pursuant to KRS 304.3-270 , if any other state retaliates against any Kentucky domiciliary insurer because of the requirements of this section, the commissioner of insurance shall impose an equal tax upon the premiums written in this state by insurers domiciled in the other state.
  6. Accounting and reporting procedures for collection and reporting of the fees or taxes and the collection fee herein provided shall be determined by administrative regulations promulgated by the Department of Insurance.
    1. Upon written request of the legislative body of any local government, at the expense of the requesting local government, which shall be paid in advance by the local government to the Department of Insurance, the Department of Insurance shall audit, or cause to be audited by contract with qualified auditors, the books or records of the insurance companies or agents subject to the fee or tax to determine whether the fee or tax is being properly collected and remitted, and the findings of the audit shall be reported to the local government and the insurance company subject to the audit. An insurance company may appeal the findings of the audit conducted under this subsection and any assessment issued pursuant to the audit findings in accordance with the provisions of KRS 91A.0804(5). (7) (a) Upon written request of the legislative body of any local government, at the expense of the requesting local government, which shall be paid in advance by the local government to the Department of Insurance, the Department of Insurance shall audit, or cause to be audited by contract with qualified auditors, the books or records of the insurance companies or agents subject to the fee or tax to determine whether the fee or tax is being properly collected and remitted, and the findings of the audit shall be reported to the local government and the insurance company subject to the audit. An insurance company may appeal the findings of the audit conducted under this subsection and any assessment issued pursuant to the audit findings in accordance with the provisions of KRS 91A.0804(5).
    2. Willful failure to properly collect and remit the fee or tax imposed by a local government pursuant to the authority granted by this section shall constitute grounds for the revocation of the license issued to an insurance company or agent under the provisions of KRS Chapter 304.
    3. If the Department of Insurance finds that an insurance company has willfully engaged in a pattern of business conduct that fails to properly collect and remit the fee or tax imposed by a local government pursuant to the authority granted by this section, the Department of Insurance may assess the responsible insurance company an appropriate penalty fee no greater than ten percent (10%) of the additional license fees or taxes determined to be owed to the local government. The penalty fee shall be paid to the local government owed the license fee or tax less any administrative costs of the Department of Insurance in enforcing this section. Any insurance company or agent held responsible for a penalty fee may request a hearing with the Department of Insurance to be conducted pursuant to KRS 304.2-310 to 304.2-370 regarding the finding of a willful violation and the subsequent penalty fee.
  7. The license fees or taxes provided for by subsections (2) and (3) of this section shall be due thirty (30) days after the end of each calendar quarter. Annually, by March 31, each insurance company shall furnish each local government to which the tax or fee is remitted with a breakdown of all collections in the preceding calendar year for the following categories of insurance:
    1. Casualty;
    2. Automobile;
    3. Inland marine;
    4. Fire and allied perils;
    5. Health; and
    6. Life.
  8. Any license fee or tax not paid on or before the due date shall bear interest at the tax interest rate as defined in KRS 131.010(6) from the date due until paid. Such interest payable to the local government is separate of penalties provided for in subsection (7) of this section. In addition, the local government may assess a ten percent (10%) penalty for a tax or fee not paid within thirty (30) days after the due date.
  9. No license fee or tax imposed under this section shall apply to premiums:
    1. Received on policies of group health insurance provided for state employees under KRS 18A.225 ;
    2. Received on policies insuring employers against liability for personal injuries to their employees or the death of their employees caused thereby, under the provisions of KRS Chapter 342;
    3. Received on health insurance policies issued to individuals;
    4. Received on policies issued through Kentucky Access created in Subtitle 17B of KRS Chapter 304;
    5. Received on policies for high deductible health plans as defined in 26 U.S.C. sec. 223(c)(2) ;
    6. Received on multistate surplus lines, defined as non-admitted insurance as provided in Title V, Subtitle B, the Non-Admitted and Reinsurance Reform Act of 2010, of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203;
    7. Paid to insurance companies or surplus lines brokers by nonprofit self-insurance groups or self-insurance entities whose membership consists of school districts; or
    8. Paid to insurance companies or surplus lines brokers by nonprofit self-insurance groups or self-insurance entities whose membership consists of cities, counties, charter county governments, urban-county governments, consolidated local governments, unified local governments, school districts, or any other political subdivisions of the Commonwealth.
  10. No county may impose the tax authorized by this section upon the premiums received on policies issued to public service companies which pay ad valorem taxes.
  11. Insurance companies which pay license fees or taxes pursuant to this section shall credit city license fees or taxes against the same license fees or taxes levied by the county, when the license fees or taxes are levied by the county on or after July 13, 1990. For purposes of this subsection, a consolidated local government, urban-county government, charter county government, or unified local government shall be considered a county.
  12. No license fee or tax imposed under this section shall apply to premiums paid to insurers of municipal bonds, leases, or other debt instruments issued by or on behalf of a city, county, charter county government, urban-county government, consolidated local government, special district, nonprofit corporation, or other political subdivision of the Commonwealth. However, this exemption shall not apply if the bonds, leases, or other debt instruments are issued for profit or on behalf of for-profit or private organizations.
  13. A county may impose a license fee or tax covering the entire county or may limit the application of the fee or tax to the unincorporated portions of the county.

History. Enact. Acts 1982, ch. 434, § 13, effective July 15, 1982; 1984, ch. 52, § 1, effective July 13, 1984; 1984, ch. 170, § 1, effective January 1, 1985; Repealed, reenact. and amend. Acts 1988, ch. 334, § 1, effective July 15, 1988; 1990, ch. 481, § 1, effective July 13, 1990; 1992, ch. 244, § 1, effective July 14, 1992; 1998, ch. 82, § 14, effective July 15, 1998; 2000, ch. 425, § 2, effective July 14, 2000; 2000, ch. 476, § 30, effective July 14, 2000; 2001, ch. 164, § 5, effective June 21, 2001; 2004, ch. 28, § 1, effective July 13, 2004; 2005, ch. 31, § 1, effective June 20, 2005; 2005, ch. 144, § 14, effective June 20, 2005; 2008, ch. 94, § 5, effective July 15, 2008; 2010, ch. 24, § 75, effective July 15, 2010; 2010, ch. 165, § 4, effective July 15, 2010; 2011, ch. 48, § 2, effective June 8, 2011; 2014, ch. 101, § 1, effective July 15, 2014.; 2014, ch. 137, § 3, effective July 15, 2014.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(7/15/2014). This statute was amended by 2014 Ky. Acts chs. 101 and 137, which do not appear to be in conflict and have been codified together.

(6/8/2011). 2011 Ky. Acts ch. 48, sec. 5, provided that the provisions contained in Sections 2, 3, and 4 of that Act “shall take effect as provided in Article XIII of Section 1 of this Act, upon legislative enactment of the compact into law by two compacting states, provided the commission shall become effective for purposes of adopting rules, and creating the clearinghouse when there are a total of ten compacting states and contracting states or, alternatively, when there are compacting states and contracting states representing greater than 40 percent of the surplus lines insurance premium volume based on records of the percentage of surplus lines insurance.” The Reviser of Statutes has determined that, as of April 8, 2011, two states had enacted the compact, thereby triggering the initial effective date of the compact. Since 2011 Ky. Acts ch. 48, did not contain an emergency clause, this section became effective June 8, 2011, the normal effective date for 2011 legislation.

(7/15/2010). 2010 Ky. Acts chs. 165, sec. 7, provides “Notwithstanding any other statutory provision to the contrary, no license fee or tax imposed under KRS 91A.080 shall apply to premiums paid to insurance companies or surplus lines brokers by non-profit self-insurance groups whose membership consists of cities, counties, charter county governments, urban-county governments, consolidated local governments, school districts, or any other political subdivisions of the Commonwealth.” 2010 Ky. Acts ch. 165, sec. 8, states, “Section 7 of this act is effective for and applies to the fiscal year beginning July 1, 2010, and ending July 30, 2011, and the fiscal year beginning July 1, 2011, and ending June 30, 2012, and shall expire at the end of June 30, 2012.”

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Analysis

1. In General.

Insureds’ private cause of action for civil damages for violation of KRS 304.12-190 via KRS 446.070 was neither preempted nor precluded by KRS 304.2-165 . The insureds’ failure to lodge a written complaint with the commissioner concerning the alleged unlawfully charged local premium taxes did not otherwise bar the action for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Kendrick v. Std. Fire Ins. Co., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28461 (E.D. Ky. Mar. 31, 2007).

While the repayment of unremitted taxes is not expressly stated in KRS 91A.080 (7)(c), it can be inferred from other subsections that KRS 91A.080 provides for the recovery of actual damages in the form of unremitted taxes. Specifically, KRS 91A.080(8) mandates annual remittance of the tax revenue owed by insurance companies to each local government and KRS 91A.080(9) permits local governments to charge interest on tax revenue not remitted on or before the due date. Franklin County v. Am. Int'l S. Ins. Co., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101383 (E.D. Ky. Dec. 16, 2008).

2. Construction.

Since KRS 91A.080 declares an unlawful act and provides a specific remedy by which actual damages can be obtained, under Kentucky law, a county is limited to seeking relief via the remedy provided in KRS 91A.080 . Franklin County v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100150 (E.D. Ky. Dec. 11, 2008).

Based on the enactment of Ky. H.B. 524, it is clear that the Kentucky Legislature intended for the remedy in KRS 91A.080 (7) to be the exclusive remedy for all disputes after July 15, 2008. KRS 68.197(4)(d) is strongly indicative of the fact that the Legislature intended for the remedy in KRS 91A.080 to be the exclusive remedy for the county to collect unremitted tax revenue from an insurance company. Franklin County v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100150 (E.D. Ky. Dec. 11, 2008).

Because KRS 91A.080 declares an unlawful act and provides a specific remedy by which actual damages can be obtained, Franklin County was limited to seeking relief via the remedy provided in KRS 91A.080 , which provided the Kentucky Office of Insurance with exclusive jurisdiction over the County’s request for audits and delinquent taxes against the insurers. Franklin County v. Am. Int'l S. Ins. Co., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101383 (E.D. Ky. Dec. 16, 2008).

Even prior to the enactment of H.B. 524, the exclusive remedy available to local governments seeking to collect unremitted tax revenue was through KRS 91A.080 because H.B. 524 both amended KRS 91A.080 and enacted KRS 91A.0804 and, if the County was allowed to collect taxes against insurers through an action in federal court, the admonition in KRS 68.197(4)(d) would have been meaningless. Franklin County v. Am. Int'l S. Ins. Co., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101383 (E.D. Ky. Dec. 16, 2008).

Federal District Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over a county’s claim that insurance companies were not paying the full amount of taxes because exclusive jurisdiction vested in the Kentucky Office of Insurance; KRS 91A.080(7) provided the exclusive remedy through which the county could seek redress for unpaid or underpaid tax revenue. Franklin County v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104974 (E.D. Ky. Dec. 15, 2008).

3. Repayment of Unremitted Taxes.

While the repayment of unremitted taxes is not expressly stated in KRS 91A.080 (7), it can be inferred from other subsections that KRS 91A.080 provides for the recovery of actual damages in the form of unremitted taxes; specifically, KRS 91A.080(8) mandates annual remittance of the tax revenue owed by insurance companies to each local government, and KRS 91A.080(9) permits local governments to charge interest on tax revenue not remitted on or before the due date. The argument that these subsections do not apply to a delinquent insurance company after a Kentucky Office of Insurance audit determines that a local government has been underpaid is not persuasive. Franklin County v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100150 (E.D. Ky. Dec. 11, 2008).

Franklin County did not exhaust its available administrative remedy with the Kentucky Office of Insurance (KOI) before the County filed a federal action against the insurers for audits and delinquent taxes because the County did not specifically request audits of the insurers or ask that the KOI contract with outside auditors to perform the audits. Franklin County v. Am. Int'l S. Ins. Co., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101383 (E.D. Ky. Dec. 16, 2008).

Federal District Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over a county’s claim that insurance companies were not paying the full amount of taxes because the county did not properly exhaust its available administrative remedies under KRS 91A.080(7) before filing suit; the county did not specifically request audits of any of the companies or ask that the Kentucky Office of Insurance contract with outside auditors to perform the requested audits. Franklin County v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105355 (E.D. Ky. Dec. 17, 2008).

4. Taxpayer Intervention.

Taxpayers were not allowed to permissively intervene in the action of Franklin County for an accounting audit to determine whether the insurers remitted the proper amount of tax revenue under KRS 91A.080 because the taxpayers, who alleged the improper collection of taxes, and the County, who alleged the improper remission of taxes, asserted very different legal claims that arose from separate sets of facts and the only tangential connection between the facts and legal claims was that they both involved the tax imposed under KRS 91A.080 . Franklin County v. Travelers Prop. Cas. Ins. Co of Am., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100792 (E.D. Ky. Oct. 30, 2008), dismissed, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102113 (E.D. Ky. Dec. 16, 2008).

Notes to Unpublished Decisions

1. Construction.

Unpublished decision: Plaintiff county’s action to recover taxes it claimed were owed by defendant insurance companies was properly dismissed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) because the county’s exclusive remedy for the alleged underpayment was an administrative proceeding before the Kentucky Office of Insurance; the administrative-examination procedures of former KRS § 91A.080(7)(c), which were applicable to the county’s action, afforded a civil remedy sufficient to overcome the default presumption that a private cause of action would lie under KRS 446.070 . Franklin County v. Travelers Prop. Cas. Ins. Co. of Am., 368 Fed. Appx. 669, 2010 FED App. 0149N, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 5242 (6th Cir. Ky. 2010 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Annuity premiums represent policies written neither on the lives of persons nor on property and, consequently, the annuity premium does not represent a premium paid upon a risk located within the corporate limits of the city or urban-county government since there is no risk of loss in an annuity contract; because the annuity contract is not included within either of the three (3) categories of insurance which are subject to the city and urban-county insurance premiums tax of this section, annuity premiums are not included in the tax base for municipal premiums tax purposes. OAG 83-307 .

91A.0802. Definitions for chapter.

As used in this chapter:

  1. “LGPT” means the local government premiums tax authorized in KRS 91A.080 ;
  2. “Local government” means a city, county, charter county, consolidated local government, urban-county government, or unified local government;
  3. “Risk location system or program” means any electronic software, hardware, or other technology verified by the Kentucky Department of Insurance under KRS 91A.0806 used for locating risks that are subject to taxes or fees under KRS 91A.080 ; and
  4. “Tax period” means a twelve (12) month period ending on December 31 of each year.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 2008, ch. 94, § 1, effective July 15, 2008; 2010, ch. 24, § 76, effective July 15, 2010; 2018 ch. 182, § 2, effective July 14, 2018.

91A.0804. Exclusive remedy for adjustments relating to license fees or taxes imposed under KRS 91A.080.

  1. The provisions of this section shall provide the sole and exclusive method for the filing of amended returns and requests or assessments by any insurance company, local government, or policyholder for nonpayment, underpayment, or overpayment of any license fees or taxes imposed pursuant to KRS 91A.080 and the appeals from the denial or refusal thereof.
  2. All amended returns, requests for refunds or credits, and assessments shall be made within two (2) years of the due date of the annual reconciliation provided for in KRS 91A.080(8) for the tax period during which the error was made, except that in the case of fraudulent failure to file a return or the filing of a fraudulent return, the underpayment may be assessed at any time.
    1. Any insurance company that has paid a license fee or tax imposed by a local government pursuant to KRS 91A.080 may request a refund or credit for any overpayment of a license fee or tax or any payment when no tax was due within the time provided in subsection (2) of this section. (3) (a) Any insurance company that has paid a license fee or tax imposed by a local government pursuant to KRS 91A.080 may request a refund or credit for any overpayment of a license fee or tax or any payment when no tax was due within the time provided in subsection (2) of this section.
    2. A request for a refund or credit by an insurance company shall be made by mailing an amended return and supporting documentation to the local government to which the fee or tax was paid. A complete refund request shall include the amended return and supporting documentation showing the total amount of overpayment of license fee or tax that the insurance company believes was erroneously paid and a breakdown of information for each policy upon which a refund or credit is requested, including the location of the risk by street address or, if a street address is unavailable, another appropriate identifier of the physical location, the amount of the erroneous payment, the premium charged, the amount of tax or fee actually collected, the type or types of risk insured, and the period the policy was in force during the taxable year or years.
    3. The insurance company shall produce proof that it employed risk location systems or programs meeting the requirements of KRS 91A.0806 during the time for which the refund or credit is requested or a copy of a Department of Insurance order issued pursuant to the administrative regulation promulgated under KRS 91A.0806 (3). If the insurance company fails or is unable to produce such proof or a copy of the Department of Insurance order, the local government shall be entitled to keep a penalty in the amount of ten percent (10%) of the refund or credit that would have otherwise been due the insurance company. Any dispute regarding the imposition of a penalty shall be resolved under paragraph (d) of this subsection.
    4. A local government shall notify the insurance company within ninety (90) days whether or not an amended return or request for refund has been accepted. If a local government fails to accept the completed amended return or refuses to issue the requested refund or credit within ninety (90) days of its receipt, the insurance company may make application to the Department of Insurance to review the claim. The application shall be filed with the Department of Insurance within thirty (30) days of receipt of the response from the local government or, in the case of a local government’s failure to respond, within thirty (30) days of the end of the ninety (90) day period provided in this paragraph. The Department of Insurance shall, within sixty (60) days of the receipt of the complete application, issue an order of final agency action that the request for refund or credit is or is not warranted in whole or in part. The commissioner of the Department of Insurance may grant one (1) extension of thirty (30) days for the issuance of the order. As provided in KRS 304.2-310 , either party may file an administrative appeal from the order of the Department of Insurance within sixty (60) days of the issuance of the order.
      1. After it has been determined that a refund or credit is owed, insurance companies shall have a right to a full refund of a credit balance no later than one (1) year after the latest of the following: (e) 1. After it has been determined that a refund or credit is owed, insurance companies shall have a right to a full refund of a credit balance no later than one (1) year after the latest of the following:
        1. The due date of an original quarterly return;
        2. The filing date of an original quarterly return; or
        3. The filing date of an amended return.
      2. A local government may require an insurance company to carry forward a credit balance to subsequent quarters during this one (1) year period, but shall not require an insurance company to carry forward a credit balance past this one (1) year period. The credit balance carried forward may be used to offset amounts that would otherwise be due. The local government shall issue a refund of any credit balance remaining after the carryforward to the insurance company at the conclusion of the one (1) year period.
    5. If an insurance company submits an affidavit demonstrating that it is unlikely the insurance company will write additional insurance policies in the jurisdiction of the local government in the next twelve (12) month period, refunds or credits for any overpayment of a license fee or tax or any payment when no tax was due shall be distributed by the local government according to the following schedule:
      1. If the credit balance is ten percent (10%) or less of the total LGPT revenue receipts of the local government for the most recent full fiscal year, then the refund shall be issued within sixty (60) days of the due date of the return for an original return or within sixty (60) days of the filing date of an amended return. If an amended return has not been accepted within the sixty (60) day period, the refund shall be issued no later than thirty (30) days after the acceptance date, or after the completion of the process described in paragraph (d) of this section, whichever is later;
      2. If the credit balance is greater than ten percent (10%) but less than or equal to twenty-five percent (25%) of the total LGPT revenue receipts of the local government for the most recent full fiscal year, then the refund shall be issued within one hundred twenty (120) days of the due date of the return for an original return or within one hundred twenty (120) days of the filing date of an amended return;
      3. If the credit balance is greater than twenty-five percent (25%) but less than or equal to fifty percent (50%) of the total LGPT revenue receipts of the local government for the most recent full fiscal year, then the refund shall be issued within two hundred forty (240) days of the due date of the return for an original return or within two hundred forty (240) days of the filing date of an amended return; and
      4. If the credit balance is greater than fifty percent (50%) of the total LGPT revenue receipts of the local government for the most recent full fiscal year, then the local government may take the full one (1) year period to issue the full refund, with at least one-half (1/2) of the refund to be paid within two hundred forty (240) days and the other half by the conclusion of the one (1) year period.
    6. A local government and an insurance company may enter into a written agreement providing for an alternative payment plan.
    7. The total LGPT revenue received by the local government shall be documented and certified by the local government if a tiered payment plan is used under paragraph (f) of this subsection.
    8. No insurance company shall apply a credit to taxes or fees imposed by KRS 91A.080 without written agreement from the local government, without an order of final agency action from the Department of Insurance order that the refund is due, or without an administrative ruling from the Department of Insurance order that a refund is due. Each violation of this paragraph shall be punishable as provided in KRS 91A.080(7)(b) and (c).
    1. Any policyholder who has paid to an insurance company a license fee or tax imposed by a local government pursuant to KRS 91A.080 may request a refund or credit for an overpayment of a license fee or tax or any payment when no tax was due within the time provided in subsection (2) of this section. (4) (a) Any policyholder who has paid to an insurance company a license fee or tax imposed by a local government pursuant to KRS 91A.080 may request a refund or credit for an overpayment of a license fee or tax or any payment when no tax was due within the time provided in subsection (2) of this section.
    2. A request for a refund or credit by a policyholder shall be made by mailing the request to the insurance company to which the fee or tax was paid. The request shall include the name of the policyholder, the address of the location of the risk insured, the amount of overpayment of license fee or tax that was erroneously paid, the dates of coverage, the amount of the fee or tax that was paid, and the type of risk insured.
    3. If an insurance company fails to make payment or to grant credit to a policyholder as requested within ninety (90) days of its receipt, the policyholder may make application to the Department of Insurance to review the request. The application shall be filed with the Department of Insurance within thirty (30) days of receipt of the response from the insurance company or, in the case of an insurance company’s failure to respond, within thirty (30) days of the end of the ninety (90) day period provided in this paragraph. The Department of Insurance shall, within sixty (60) days of the receipt of the complete application, issue an order of final agency action that the request for refund or credit is or is not warranted in whole or in part. The commissioner of the Department of Insurance may grant one (1) extension of thirty (30) days for the issuance of the order. As provided in KRS 304.2-310 , either party may file an administrative appeal from the order of the Department of Insurance within sixty (60) days of the issuance of the order.
    1. If a local government has a reasonable basis to believe that a license fee or tax imposed by it in accordance with KRS 91A.080 has not been paid or has been underpaid, the local government shall request the Department of Insurance to conduct an audit pursuant to the provisions of KRS 91A.080 (7) within the time provided in subsection (2) of this section. (5) (a) If a local government has a reasonable basis to believe that a license fee or tax imposed by it in accordance with KRS 91A.080 has not been paid or has been underpaid, the local government shall request the Department of Insurance to conduct an audit pursuant to the provisions of KRS 91A.080(7) within the time provided in subsection (2) of this section.
    2. If the findings of the audit show that an insurance company did not pay or underpaid the local government, the local government may send an assessment by mail to the insurance company. The notice of assessment shall state the total amount of payment due from the insurance company based upon the findings of the audit conducted pursuant to KRS 91A.080(7), the geographic area affected, and the applicable license fee or tax rate.
    3. The insurance company may respond to the assessment by either paying the assessment in full within ninety (90) days of its receipt or by filing an appeal of the findings of the audit and the assessment with the Department of Insurance within ninety (90) days of the receipt of the assessment. An insurance company appealing the audit findings and assessment shall make application to the Department of Insurance and provide notice of the challenge to the local government by certified mail. The Department of Insurance shall, within sixty (60) days of the receipt of the completed application, issue an order of final agency action upon the findings of the audit and a determination that the assessment is or is not warranted in whole or in part. The commissioner of the Department of Insurance may grant one (1) extension of thirty (30) days for the issuance of the order. As provided in KRS 304.2-310 , either party may file an administrative appeal from the order of the Department of Insurance within sixty (60) days of the issuance of the order.
    4. If the insurance company fails to make the full payment as requested by the local government or fails to file an application of appeal with the Department of Insurance within ninety (90) days of receipt of the assessment, the findings of the audit and the assessment shall be deemed final, and the local government may provide notification to the Department of Insurance to impose a penalty in accordance with KRS 91A.080(7)(c). Any penalty imposed because of an insurance company’s failure to timely pay the assessment shall be in addition to any penalties imposed as a result of the audit. The notification shall be filed with the Department of Insurance within thirty (30) days of the end of the ninety (90) day period provided in paragraph (c) of this subsection. The Department of Insurance shall issue an order to the insurance company to pay the assessment and any additional penalties imposed within thirty (30) days of the order, or the Department of Insurance may revoke the license of the insurance company under the provisions of KRS 91A.080(7) and KRS Chapter 304.
    5. The Department of Insurance may determine the scope of any audit requested under this subsection and KRS 91A.080. Nothing in this chapter shall preclude the Department of Insurance from exercising its discretion to conduct an audit or examination of any insurance company under its authority as otherwise provided in KRS Chapter 304.
  3. An administrative hearing held pursuant to this section shall be conducted pursuant to KRS Chapter 13B. The hearing officer may compel any information necessary to make a determination. Information concerning rates, the names and addresses as of policyholders, and the expiration date of policies shall be proprietary and confidential, shall not be divulged to any person or organization not a party to the hearing, shall not be subject to disclosure or to the provisions of KRS 61.870 to 61.884 , and the record shall be sealed at the conclusion of the hearing.
    1. If a refund or credit is received by an insurance company that passed the fee or tax on to the policyholder, and the amount refunded or credited is not owed to another local government, the insurance company shall pass the full amount of the refund or credit, including any collection fee that has been retained by the insurance company pursuant to KRS 91A.080(4), on to the policyholder from whom the fee or tax was collected within ninety (90) days of receipt of the refund or credit. (7) (a) If a refund or credit is received by an insurance company that passed the fee or tax on to the policyholder, and the amount refunded or credited is not owed to another local government, the insurance company shall pass the full amount of the refund or credit, including any collection fee that has been retained by the insurance company pursuant to KRS 91A.080(4), on to the policyholder from whom the fee or tax was collected within ninety (90) days of receipt of the refund or credit.
    2. For a refund or credit received by an insurance company that is not owed to another local government, the insurance company shall pay a penalty fee of ten percent (10%) of the total amount of the refund or credit due to the policyholder if the insurance company is unable to produce proof of the use of a risk location system as required under subsection (3)(c) of this section.
    3. For all refunds or credits passed on to policyholders under this subsection, the insurance company shall document that the refund or credit has been passed on to the policyholder, including any collection fee or penalty, and shall provide the documentation to the local government upon request by the local government. The insurance company shall retain this documentation for a period of two (2) years.
  4. No legal action shall be filed by any party prior to the exhaustion of all administrative remedies provided under this section.
    1. Information on specific policies and policyholders provided to local governments pursuant to subsection (3) of this section shall be considered confidential and proprietary information of an insurance company and shall not be disclosed or subject to disclosure under KRS 61.870 to 61.884 . No present or former official or employee of a local government or any other person shall, intentionally and without authorization, inspect or divulge any information acquired by him or her of the affairs of any insurance company, or information regarding specific policies, policyholders, tax schedules, returns, or reports required to be filed with a local government, or any information produced by a hearing or investigation, insofar as the information may have to do with the proprietary information of the insurance company. All county judges/executive, mayors, local government legislative body members, and local government employees whose duties include the fiscal affairs of their local government, shall be deemed to have the necessary authorization to inspect such information. Any person who violates the provisions of this paragraph shall be guilty of a Class A misdemeanor for each offense and the disclosure of information on each policyholder shall constitute a separate offense. (9) (a) Information on specific policies and policyholders provided to local governments pursuant to subsection (3) of this section shall be considered confidential and proprietary information of an insurance company and shall not be disclosed or subject to disclosure under KRS 61.870 to 61.884 . No present or former official or employee of a local government or any other person shall, intentionally and without authorization, inspect or divulge any information acquired by him or her of the affairs of any insurance company, or information regarding specific policies, policyholders, tax schedules, returns, or reports required to be filed with a local government, or any information produced by a hearing or investigation, insofar as the information may have to do with the proprietary information of the insurance company. All county judges/executive, mayors, local government legislative body members, and local government employees whose duties include the fiscal affairs of their local government, shall be deemed to have the necessary authorization to inspect such information. Any person who violates the provisions of this paragraph shall be guilty of a Class A misdemeanor for each offense and the disclosure of information on each policyholder shall constitute a separate offense.
    2. Except for local governments that have been certified by the Internal Revenue Service or its agent as being in compliance with IRS safeguard requirements and authorized to receive federal tax information, any proprietary information provided to a local government for the purposes of compliance with subsection (3) of this section and all copies or other records related to such information shall be destroyed in an irreversible, secure, and confidential manner in accordance with KRS 171.410 to 171.740 and the administrative regulations promulgated or approved thereunder. A local government failing to destroy proprietary information in accordance with this paragraph shall be subject to a civil penalty payable to the insurance company of five hundred dollars ($500) for each offense, and the disclosure of information on each policyholder shall constitute a separate offense. An insurance company may commence a civil action in a court of competent jurisdiction for payment of the civil penalty. The total civil penalty shall not exceed ten thousand dollars ($10,000) per incident.
    3. This subsection shall not preclude the disclosure of information to the Department of Insurance or to the legal representative of the local government for purposes of administrative hearings or legal appeals therefrom, nor shall it prohibit the local government from verifying the accuracy of the information with an individual policyholder to whom the information pertains.
  5. The filing of amended returns, requests for refunds or credits, assessments, and all applications and notification by any party to the Department of Insurance for review under this section, shall be sent to the designated party or parties by certified mail, return receipt requested.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 2008, ch. 94, § 2, effective July 15, 2008; 2010, ch. 24, § 77, effective July 15, 2010; 2010, ch. 165, § 1, effective July 15, 2010; 2018 ch. 182, § 1, effective July 14, 2018.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. In General.

Even prior to the enactment of H.B. 524, the exclusive remedy available to local governments seeking to collect unremitted tax revenue was through KRS 91A.080 because H.B. 524 both amended KRS 91A.080 and enacted KRS 91A.0804 and, if the County was allowed to collect taxes against insurers through an action in federal court, the admonition in KRS 68.197(4)(d) would have been meaningless. Franklin County v. Am. Int'l S. Ins. Co., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101383 (E.D. Ky. Dec. 16, 2008).

2. Exhaustion of remedies.

Because plaintiffs failed to exhaust the administrative remedies required by KRS 91A.0804 , relating to the taxation of insurance premiums, the court did not have subject matter jurisdiction. Plaintiffs’ suit did not relate back to before the effective date of the statute, although their original claim was filed before the effective date, because the moving defendants were added as defendants after the effective date, and the failure to name them was not the result of a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, as required by CR 15.03(2)(b). Meiman v. Kenton County, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17383 (E.D. Ky. Feb. 22, 2011).

Cited:

Franklin County v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., — F. Supp. 2d —, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104974 (E.D. Ky. 2008 ).

91A.0806. Verification of risk location systems and programs — Administrative regulations.

  1. Before January 1, 2009, the Department of Insurance shall by administrative regulation establish criteria for the verification of risk location systems and programs. The criteria for verification shall include but not be limited to a requirement that the municipal and county boundary information of a risk location system or program uses the municipal and county boundary data available from the Commonwealth Office of Technology that is based upon municipal and other filings with the Secretary of State.
  2. Upon application of a vendor or insurance company for verification and payment of a two thousand five hundred dollar ($2,500) application fee to the Department of Insurance, the department shall test the risk location system or program to determine whether the program shall be verified as meeting the criteria promulgated in the administrative regulation required by subsection (1) of this section. The Department of Insurance shall maintain a list of verified risk location systems or programs and shall make the list available to insurance companies and the public. The verification of a risk location system or program shall remain valid for a period of three (3) years unless revoked by the Department of Insurance.
  3. The Department of Insurance shall, by administrative regulation, provide an option for an insurance company to apply for a written order by the commissioner of the Department of Insurance that the insurance company has a limited number of risk locations, not exceeding two hundred (200), in the Commonwealth that may be located by other means with an equivalent level of accuracy. Such an order shall remain valid for a period of three (3) years and as long as the insured risk of the insurance company does not exceed two hundred (200) in any calendar year.
  4. An insurance company shall be deemed to perform due diligence in the location of risks if the insurance company employs a verified risk location system or program in its collection of a tax or fee imposed pursuant to KRS 91A.080 and:
    1. Expends reasonable resources to accurately and reliably implement such method to collect and to remit the proper tax or fee due to the local government that has imposed a tax or fee pursuant to KRS 91A.080 ;
    2. Maintains adequate internal controls to correctly include in its database of policyholders the location of the risk insured, in the proper address format, so that matching with the database is accurate;
    3. Corrects errors in the assignment of addresses to local taxing jurisdictions within the next renewal period after the insurance company discovers the errors, and, if applicable, reports such errors to the provider of the risk location system or program; and
    4. In the case of insurance companies that issue policies covering multiple locations, maintains adequate internal controls and employs an accurate and consistent methodology to correctly prorate multilocation policies to assign risks to appropriate addresses or, if a street address in unavailable, through another appropriate identifier of physical location, and tax jurisdictions.
  5. Upon the presentation of proof that an insurance company has complied with the provisions of subsection (4) of this section or has received an order of the Department of Insurance under the administrative regulation promulgated pursuant to subsection (3) of this section, the insurance company:
    1. Shall not be subject to penalties for failure to comply with KRS 91A.080 that may otherwise be imposed pursuant to KRS Chapter 304 or KRS 91A.080 (7) for failure of a risk location system to properly locate risks;
    2. Shall be held harmless from any liability including but not limited to liability for penalties, except for the tax that is due and interest on the tax that an insurance company has failed to timely remit, that would otherwise be due solely as a result of a failure to properly collect and remit the tax or fee levied pursuant to KRS 91A.080 because of the failure of a risk location system to properly locate risks; and
    3. Shall not be subject to penalties under KRS 91A.0804(3)(c).
  6. On and after January 1, 2010, an insurance company shall use a verified risk location system or program during the calendar year if the total policies issued and renewed by the insurance company in Kentucky in the preceding calendar year is more than two thousand (2,000).

History. Enact. Acts 2008, ch. 94, § 3, effective July 15, 2008; 2010, ch. 24, § 78, effective July 15, 2010; 2010, ch. 165, § 5, effective July 15, 2010.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(7/15/2010). This section was amended by 2010 Ky. Acts chs. 24 and 165, which do not appear to be in conflict and have been codified together.

(7/15/2008). 2008 Ky. Acts ch. 94, sec. 2 created a new section which was numbered as KRS 91A.0804 . In reviewing the bill, subsection (2)(b) of this section was renumbered as subsection (2)(c). To conform, a reference to subsection (2)(b) of KRS 91A.0804 in Section 3 of the Act, KRS 91A.0806 , has been changed to KRS 91A.0804(2)(c) by the Reviser of Statutes under the authority of KRS 7.136(1)(c) and (e).

91A.0808. Local premium tax advisory council — Members — Purpose.

    1. The commissioner of the Department of Insurance shall appoint a local premium tax advisory council to provide advice and expertise on the imposition, administration, and collection of taxes and fees imposed pursuant to KRS 91A.080 . The council shall be chaired by the commissioner of the Department of Insurance and shall be composed of eight (8) members which shall include two (2) city government representatives nominated by the Kentucky League of Cities, two (2) county government representatives nominated by the Kentucky Association of Counties, one (1) independent insurance agent, one (1) representative of a domestic insurance company, one (1) representative of a foreign insurance company, and one (1) representative of an insurance trade association. Members shall serve four (4) year terms, except for the initial members whose appointments shall be staggered. (1) (a) The commissioner of the Department of Insurance shall appoint a local premium tax advisory council to provide advice and expertise on the imposition, administration, and collection of taxes and fees imposed pursuant to KRS 91A.080 . The council shall be chaired by the commissioner of the Department of Insurance and shall be composed of eight (8) members which shall include two (2) city government representatives nominated by the Kentucky League of Cities, two (2) county government representatives nominated by the Kentucky Association of Counties, one (1) independent insurance agent, one (1) representative of a domestic insurance company, one (1) representative of a foreign insurance company, and one (1) representative of an insurance trade association. Members shall serve four (4) year terms, except for the initial members whose appointments shall be staggered.
    2. The chair shall preside over meetings of the advisory council but shall have no vote except that he or she may cast a vote in order to break a tie.
    3. The Department of Insurance shall staff and assist the council which shall meet at least two (2) times per year at meetings called by the chair or a majority of the members.
  1. The council may identify ways to make the system more effective and efficient for all parties by making recommendations on needed legislative changes and providing comments on needed regulatory reforms. In addition, the council may provide information and assistance to insurance companies and local governments regarding procedures and practices related to compliance with provisions of this chapter related to the imposition, administration, and collection of taxes and fees imposed pursuant to KRS 91A.080 . At least once each year, the council shall review the criteria for verification of risk location systems or programs established by the Department of Insurance under KRS 91A.080 6 and make recommendations for updating and improving the verification criteria.

History. Enact. Acts 2008, ch. 94, § 4, effective July 15, 2008; 2010, ch. 24, § 79, effective July 15, 2010.

91A.0810. Identification of amount of local government tax charged and taxing jurisdiction due tax — Notice to policyholders.

  1. Effective December 31, 2008, if the local government premium tax is included in the premium charge to the policyholder, the insurance company shall include the amount of the local government tax charged for the period and the name of the taxing jurisdiction to which the local premium tax is due for:
    1. Newly issued policies on the:
      1. Policy;
      2. Declaration sheet; or
      3. Initial billing instruments; and
    2. Renewed policies on the:
      1. Renewal certificate; or
      2. Billing instrument for each period for which premium or additional premium is charged to a policyholder by the insurance company.
  2. Before December 31, 2008, each insurance company shall cause each current policyholder to be notified of the policyholder’s rights under this chapter. The one (1) time notice may be sent to the policyholder under any mode of communication normally used between the insurance company and the policyholder and may be sent as a separate notice or included as an additional item within routine statements, billings, or other notices. The Kentucky Department of Insurance shall promulgate by administrative regulation the text of such notice, which shall include:
    1. A statement that past and future premium charges may include a local insurance premium tax; and
    2. A statement that a policyholder who has been erroneously charged or overcharged the local insurance premium tax may obtain information for requesting a refund or credit by contacting the insurance company to which the local insurance premium tax was erroneously paid.
  3. Any insurance company contacted by a policyholder under subsection (2) of this section shall, within thirty (30) days of the contact, provide the policyholder the full text of KRS 91A.0804(4) to inform the policyholder of the procedural requirements for requesting a refund or a credit. The insurance company may, at its option, include a summary or explanation of the procedural requirements in addition to providing the text.

History. Enact. Acts 2008, ch. 94, § 7, effective July 15, 2008; 2010, ch. 24, § 80, effective July 15, 2010; 2010, ch. 165, §§ 3, 6, effective July 15, 2010.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(7/15/2010). This section was amended by 2010 Ky. Acts ch. 24, sec. 80, and ch. 165, secs. 3 and 6, which do not appear to be in conflict and have been codified together.

91A.0812. Biennial assessment for administration costs. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 2008 Ky. Acts ch. 94, § 8, effective July 15, 2008) was repealed by Acts 2008, ch. 94, § 9, effective July 1, 2010.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(7/1/2010). This section was amended by 2010 Ky. Acts ch. 24, sec. 81, effective July 15, 2010. However, 2008 Ky. Acts ch. 94, sec. 9 repealed this section effective July 1, 2010. Pursuant to KRS 446.100(2), the 2008 repeal of this section prevails over the 2010 amendment, since the 2008 repeal was not itself repealed prior to its effective date. The 2010 amendments made to this section will be given no effect, as they would have taken effect after the 2008 repeal.

91A.090. Incurring indebtedness beyond income for year — Issuance of bonds. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1982, ch. 434, § 14, effective July 15, 1982) was repealed by Acts 1996, ch. 274, § 65, effective July 15, 1996, and by Acts 1996, ch. 280, § 30, effective July 15, 1996.

91A.180. Sale or lease of property — Private improvements of governmentally owned realty under a conveyance and leaseback agreement.

  1. The legislative body of any city or urban-county government may sell or lease property, including any interest in real property, of the city or urban-county government which is not needed or has become unsuitable for public use by the city or urban-county government, or which property would be more suitably consistent with the public interest for some other use of a public nature.
  2. When the legislative body of a city or urban-county government finds that the purposes of one (1) or more of its departments and the public purposes of the Commonwealth would be promoted by the construction of buildings and improvements on land owned by the city or urban-county government, it may authorize the construction of such buildings and improvements by private entrepreneurs with private capital under a conveyance and leaseback agreement authorized by subsection (3) of this section.
  3. The legislative body of a city or urban-county government may, subsequent to a finding made pursuant to subsection (2) of this section, convey the fee interest in the particular real property to a private individual, corporation or partnership, subject to a written agreement by such private entrepreneur to construct such buildings and improvements on the fee simple holding and then subsequently, after placing a mortgage necessary to fund the capital improvements on the fee interest by the private entrepreneur, reconvey the fee title back to the city or urban-county government. The city or urban-county government shall in turn execute a long term lease on the real property back to the private entrepreneur. Under such conveyances the mortgage shall not constitute a general obligation or debt of the city or urban-county government. The city or urban-county government may, in event of default, redeem the mortgage if it so elects. In such a leaseback arrangement, with suitable rentals, the actual operation of such constructed facilities shall be conducted solely by the entrepreneur or his agent, but the operation will be considered a public purpose and public use of the property. However, the city or urban-county government and the lessee shall agree that, and with adequate insurance, the city or urban-county government shall be held harmless in connection with property loss and general liability for injuries or death suffered on the property. Under the leaseback agreements the facility will not be considered a governmental facility or function of the city or urban-county government.

History. Enact. Acts 1982, ch. 96, § 1, effective July 15, 1982; 2014, ch. 92, § 89, effective January 1, 2015.

Opinions of Attorney General.

Section 164 of the Kentucky Constitution does not prohibit a Mayor from entering into a lease for a term of 99 years. Furthermore, KRS 91A.180 does not restrict the Mayor’s authority to enter into leases on behalf of the city under his executive powers set forth in KRS 67C.105 . OAG 09-007 .

Improvements

91A.200. Limitation on special assessments.

A city may not finance any improvement through special assessments except pursuant to KRS 91A.200 to 91A.290 , or other statutory authority.

History. Enact. Acts 1980, ch. 234, § 1, effective July 15, 1980.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Invalid Flat Rate.

Fire protection service charge levied for the purpose of financing city’s fire protection services by city on property within the city, whereby various types of property were assessed at a flat rate that was a recurring annual charge, was not a special assessment. Barber v. Commissioner of Revenue, 674 S.W.2d 18, 1984 Ky. App. LEXIS 467 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984).

Fire protection service charge levied by city for purpose of financing city’s fire protection services on property within the city whereby various types of property were assessed at a flat rate was not an ad valorem tax or a special assessment and was not authorized by statute or the Constitution and was therefore invalid. Barber v. Commissioner of Revenue, 674 S.W.2d 18, 1984 Ky. App. LEXIS 467 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984).

Opinions of Attorney General.

In adopting the procedures of KRS 179.470 , special assessments may be imposed under the specific terms of KRS 91A.200 to 91A.290 and the properties subject to assessment for road maintenance are those abutting or contiguous to the road (or both sides of the road). OAG 80-636 .

City could legally assess property owners affected by improvement made on street which was substituted in improvement program, where such property owners were not notified and given the opportunity to be heard at initial hearing; thus, city would have to bear the costs incurred. OAG 85-39 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Bench & Bar.

Morris, The New Kentucky Municipal Law, Vol. 45, No. 3, July, 1981, Ky. Bench and Bar 24.

91A.210. Definitions for KRS 91A.200 to 91A.290.

As used in KRS 91A.200 to 91A.290 , unless the context otherwise requires:

  1. “Improvement” means construction of any facility for public use or services or any addition thereto, which is of special benefit to specific properties in the area served by such facility;
  2. “Property” means any real property benefited by an improvement;
  3. “Special assessment” or “assessment” means a special charge fixed on property to finance an improvement in whole or in part;
  4. “Fair basis” means assessed value basis, front foot basis, square foot basis or benefits received basis;
  5. “Assessed value basis” means the apportionment of cost of an improvement according to the ratio the assessed value of individual parcels of property bears to the total assessed value of all such properties;
  6. “Front foot basis” means the apportionment of cost of an improvement according to the ratio the front footage on the improvement of individual parcels of property bears to such front footage of all such properties;
  7. “Square foot basis” means the apportionment of cost of an improvement according to the ratio the square footage of individual parcels of property bears to the square footage of all such property;
  8. “Benefits received basis” means the apportionment of cost of an improvement according to equitable determination by the city legislative body of the special benefit received by property from the improvement, including assessed value basis, front foot basis, and square foot basis, or any combination thereof, and may include consideration of assessed value of land only, graduation for different classes of property based on nature and extent of special benefits received, and other factors affecting benefits received; and
  9. “Cost” means all costs related to an improvement, including planning, design, property or easement acquisition and construction costs, fiscal and legal fees, financing costs, and publication expenses.

History. Enact. Acts 1980, ch. 234, § 2, effective July 15, 1980.

Opinions of Attorney General.

For city ad valorem tax purposes, all property which is not exempted by Const., § 170 or by statute must be assessed uniformly at its fair cash value and an assessment of ad valorem tax based upon benefits received would not be valid; however, KRS 91A.200 to 91A.290 would allow a city of the sixth class to finance street lights through a special assessment on benefits-received basis, so long as the city complied with the requirements of those statutes before beginning work on the improvements. OAG 82-21 .

The method of assessment to be applied for the county’s maintenance of subdivision roads under KRS 179.470 , including any services of street lights, garbage collection, water and sewer systems, is to be determined through the sound judgment of the fiscal court, which assessment shall be geared to the legislative criterion that the cost of the improvement shall be apportioned equitably on a fair basis. In so using that standard, resort may be had to the use of one or more of the methods outlined in this section, depending upon the nature of the improvement and the general circumstances of property ownership related thereto. OAG 82-527 .

91A.220. Special assessments for improvements.

  1. A city may finance the cost of an improvement in whole or in part by special assessments made as provided in KRS 91A.200 to 91A.290 .
  2. Cost of an improvement shall be apportioned equitably on a fair basis.
  3. The city may provide for lump-sum or installment payment of assessments or for bond or other long-term financing, and for any improvement may afford property owners the option as to method of payment or financing.

History. Enact. Acts 1980, ch. 234, § 3, effective July 15, 1980.

Opinions of Attorney General.

For city ad valorem tax purposes, all property which is not exempted by Const., § 170 or by statute must be assessed uniformly at its fair cash value and an assessment of ad valorem tax based upon benefits received would not be valid; however, KRS 91A.200 to 91A.290 would allow a city of the sixth class to finance street lights through a special assessment on benefits-received basis, so long as the city complied with the requirements of those statutes before beginning work on the improvements. OAG 82-21 .

The method or procedure by which the property owner is to pay by installments under both this section and KRS 91A.230 is left to the discretion of the city in its improvement ordinance except that the payment of the first installment shall coincide with the payment of the ad valorem taxes. OAG 83-132 .

A city may, under the authority of subsection (3) of this section and its home rule powers, enact an ordinance providing for an installment plan and bond financing similar to the repealed provisions of KRS Chapter 94 and use this ordinance as a basis to provide for installment payment of assessments and for the issuance of valid tax exempt bonds to finance such deferred assessments for future projects. OAG 83-132 .

Research References and Practice Aids

ALR

Duty as between life tenant and remainderman as respects payment of improvement assessments. 10 A.L.R.3d 1309.

Exemption of public school property from assessments for local improvements. 15 A.L.R.3d 847.

Widening of city street as local improvement justifying special assessment of adjacent property. 46 A.L.R.3d 127.

Consideration of fact that landowner’s remaining land will be subject to special assessment in fixing severance damages. 59 A.L.R.3d 534.

91A.230. Apportionment of cost of improvement for property owned by government or educational, religious or charitable organizations.

The cost of any improvement shall be apportioned on a benefits received basis with respect to any property owned by the state, a local unit of government or any educational, religious, or charitable organization. The legislative body of the city may assess such property in the same manner as for privately owned property or it may pay the costs so apportioned out of general revenues.

History. Enact. Acts 1980, ch. 234, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

Opinions of Attorney General.

The method or procedure by which the property owner is to pay by installments under both KRS 91A.220 and this section is left to the discretion of the city in its improvement ordinance except that the payment of the first installment shall coincide with the payment of the ad valorem taxes. OAG 83-132 .

91A.240. Comprehensive report.

Before undertaking any improvements pursuant to KRS 91A.200 to 91A.290 , the city shall prepare a comprehensive report setting out:

  1. The nature of the improvement;
  2. The scope and the extent of the improvement, including the boundaries or other description of the area to be assessed;
  3. The preliminary estimated cost of the improvement;
  4. The fair basis of assessment proposed;
  5. If financing of assessments is provided, the proposed method, including the proposed years to maturity of any bonds to be issued in connection with the improvement; and
  6. Such other information as may further explain material aspects of the improvement, assessments, or financing.

History. Enact. Acts 1980, ch. 234, § 5, effective July 15, 1980.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

Chambers v. City of Newport, 101 S.W.3d 904, 2002 Ky. App. LEXIS 2353 (Ky. Ct. App. 2002).

91A.250. Public hearing.

After preparation of the report required by KRS 91A.240 , the city shall hold at least one (1) public hearing on the proposed improvement at which all interested persons shall be heard. Notice of the hearing shall be published pursuant to KRS Chapter 424, and mailed to each affected property owner by certified mail, return receipt requested, and shall include:

  1. The nature of the improvement;
  2. Description of area of the improvement;
  3. Statement that the city proposes to finance the improvement in whole or in part by special assessment of property and the method to be used;
  4. Time and place the report may be examined; and
  5. Time and place of the hearing.

History. Enact. Acts 1980, ch. 234, § 6, effective July 15, 1980.

Opinions of Attorney General.

City could not legally assess property owners affected by improvement made on street which was substituted in improvement program, where such property owners were not notified and given the opportunity to be heard at initial hearing; thus, city would have to bear the costs incurred. OAG 85-39 .

91A.260. Ordinance to proceed with improvement by special assessment — Publication — Notice to affected property owners.

Within ninety (90) days of conclusion of the hearing, the city shall determine whether to proceed with the improvement by special assessments, and if it determines to proceed shall adopt an ordinance so stating and containing all necessary terms, including the items referred to in KRS 91A.240 and description of all properties. Promptly upon passage the city shall publish such ordinance pursuant to KRS Chapter 424 and shall mail by certified mail to each affected property owner a notice of determination to proceed with the project, the fair basis of assessment to be utilized, the estimated cost to the property owner, and the ratio the cost to each property owner bears to the total cost of the entire project.

History. Enact. Acts 1980, ch. 234, § 7, effective July 15, 1980.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Timeliness of Appeal.

Where a city was not required to publish an assessment ordinance in a newspaper before mailing a notice to affected property owners and the time for mailing the notice did not begin to run after newspaper publication of the ordinance, the property owners’ appeal, which was filed 31 days after the notice was mailed, was untimely. Chambers v. City of Newport, 101 S.W.3d 904, 2002 Ky. App. LEXIS 2353 (Ky. Ct. App. 2002).

91A.270. Contest by property owner.

  1. Within thirty (30) days of the mailing of the notice provided for in KRS 91A.260 , any affected property owner may file an action in the Circuit Court of the county, contesting the undertaking of the project by special assessment, the inclusion of his property in the improvement, or the amount of his assessment. If the action contests the undertaking of the improvement by the special assessment method of the inclusion of the property of that property owner, no further action on the improvement insofar as it relates to any property owner who is a plaintiff shall be taken until the final judgment has been entered.
  2. The city may proceed with the improvement with respect to any properties whose owners have not filed or joined in an action as provided in this section or who have contested only the amounts of their assessments, and the provisions of the resolution shall be final and binding with respect to such property owners except as to contested amounts of assessments. After the lapse of time as herein provided, all actions by owners of properties shall be forever barred.

History. Enact. Acts 1980, ch. 234, § 8, effective July 15, 1980.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Timeliness of Appeal.

Where assessment appeals had to be made within 30 days of “mailing” rather than “the giving” or “the receipt” of a notice, the property owners’ appeal, which was filed 31 days after the notice was mailed, was untimely pursuant to KRS 91A.270(1). Chambers v. City of Newport, 101 S.W.3d 904, 2002 Ky. App. LEXIS 2353 (Ky. Ct. App. 2002).

91A.280. Payment of assessment or installment — Lien.

  1. After the passage of time for the action provided for in KRS 91A.270 , or after favorable final judgment in any such action, whichever comes later, the city may proceed with the improvement or part thereof as was stayed by the action, including notice requiring payment of special assessment or installment thereon and bonds or other methods proposed to finance the improvement. The first installment may be apportioned so that other payments will coincide with payment of ad valorem taxes.
  2. The amount of any outstanding assessment or installments thereof on any property, and accrued interest and other charges, shall constitute a lien on the property to secure payment to the bondholders or any other source of financing of the improvement. The lien shall take precedence over all other liens, whether created prior to or subsequent to the publication of the ordinance, except a lien for state and county taxes, general municipal taxes, and prior improvement taxes, and shall not be defeated or postponed by any private or judicial sale, by any mortgage, or by any error or mistake in the description of the property or in the names of the owners. No error in the proceedings of the city legislative body shall exempt any benefited property from the lien for the improvement assessment, or from payment thereof, or from the penalties or interest thereon, as herein provided.

History. Enact. Acts 1980, ch. 234, § 9, effective July 15, 1980.

Opinions of Attorney General.

A city may, under the authority of KRS 91A.220(3) and its home rule powers, enact an ordinance providing for an installment plan and bond financing similar to the repealed provisions of KRS Chapter 94 and use this ordinance as a basis to provide for installment payment of assessments and for the issuance of valid tax exempt bonds to finance such deferred assessments for future projects. OAG 83-132 .

91A.290. Further proceedings — Inclusion of additional property.

The city may undertake any further proceedings to carry out the improvement or any extension or refinancing thereof, except that KRS 91A.240 to 91A.280 shall apply if additional property is included in the improvement or if change is made in the method or period of financing; but additional property may be included in the improvement with the consent of the owner thereof without compliance with other sections if it does not increase the cost apportioned to any other property, or any other change may be made without such compliance if all property owners of the improvement consent.

History. Enact. Acts 1980, ch. 234, § 10, effective July 15, 1980.

Tourist and Convention Commissions

91A.350. Local tourist and convention commissions — Continued funding.

  1. The local governing bodies of counties containing cities of the first class and the local governing bodies of the cities of the first class located therein may, by joint or separate action, establish tourist and convention commissions for the purpose of promoting convention and tourist activity. The local governing body of a consolidated local government may establish or maintain tourist and convention commissions for the purpose of promoting convention and tourist activity.
  2. Except in a county containing a consolidated local government, the local governing bodies of counties containing an urban-county government and counties containing cities of the home rule class and the local governing bodies of the cities of the home rule class located therein may, by joint or separate action, establish tourist and convention commissions for the purpose of promoting and developing convention and tourist activities and facilities.
  3. The local governing bodies of two (2) or more counties may jointly establish tourist and convention commissions for the purpose of promoting convention and tourist activities and facilities.
  4. The local governing bodies of two (2) or more counties, which may include a consolidated local government, may jointly establish tourist and convention commissions for the purpose of promoting convention and tourist activities and facilities.
  5. Tourist and convention commissions may continue to fund recreational activities or projects not related to tourism or conventions that were funded by the commission prior to July 13, 1990, at a level no greater than that provided by the commission in the 1990 fiscal year.
  6. For the purpose of promoting recreational, convention, and tourist activity in cities and counties served by joint playground and recreation boards established under KRS 97.035 ; to provide the boards with the same authority to issue revenue bonds granted to cities by KRS 58.010 to 58.150 and 103.200 to 103.285 ; and to authorize the boards to build and issue bonds for facilities located on leasehold and permithold land.

History. Enact. Acts 1968, ch. 138, § 1; 1974, ch. 324, § 1; 1990, ch. 302, § 1, effective July 13, 1990; 1992, ch. 56, § 1, effective July 14, 1992; 2000, ch. 344, § 1, effective July 14, 2000; 2002, ch. 346, § 102, effective July 15, 2002; 2014, ch. 92, § 90, effective January 1, 2015.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Applicability.

Internet companies that sold hotel room rentals in the county area through their websites could not be subject to a transient room tax imposed by a county ordinance, which was written under the terms set forth in KRS 91A.350 , because the companies did not physically own or control hotel rooms within the county area as required by the plain terms of the ordinance and the statutes. Louisville/Jefferson County Metro Gov't v. Hotels.com, LP, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76415 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 26, 2008), aff'd, 590 F.3d 381, 2009 FED App. 0434P, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 28189 (6th Cir. Ky. 2009 ).

District court did not err in determining that defendant online travel companies were not “like or similar business accommodations” for purposes of KRS 91A.390(1); the companies had neither ownership, nor physical control, of the rooms they offered for rent. Louisville/Jefferson County Metro Gov't v. Hotels.com, L.P., 590 F.3d 381, 2009 FED App. 0434P, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 28189 (6th Cir. Ky. 2009 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

A sufficient portion of the transient room tax levied under KRS 91A.390 must go to the tax levying body if it determines that it is needed to finance facilities used for the attraction and promotion of tourist and convention business, which would include a designation of 75 percent for payment of the debt on a civic center. OAG 74-343 , withdrawing OAG 70-728 .

The fiscal court must establish a recreational, tourist and convention commission in order to levy the tax provided in KRS 91A.390 . OAG 74-383 .

The fiscal court cannot enact a five percent (5%) transient tax as it must conform to the requirements of this section and is bound by the three percent (3%) maximum of KRS 91A.390(1). OAG 74-383 .

There is no statutory provision for the withdrawal of a county from a multi-county convention and visitors commission nor for dissolution of the commission and, in the absence of any subsequent legislation on the matter or a determination by a court of law (perhaps by a declaratory judgment suit), it may be they cannot withdraw or dissolve such a commission. OAG 74-591 .

The tourist and convention commission is, for social security purposes, an administrative agency of the county government and not a separate entity or separate political subdivision. OAG 75-319 .

Where cities within a county fail to take action under these statutes, either joint or separate, then if the county takes action, the levied tax can be made effective in the entire county area, including territory within the city boundaries located in such county. OAG 75-319 ; 76-407.

A fiscal court which has established a tourist and convention commission may designate a portion of the commission’s operating funds for the specific purpose of financing the cost of acquisition, construction, operation and maintenance of a city park, provided the city park is calculated to be useful in the attraction and promotion of tourist and convention business. OAG 76-73 .

Where a fiscal court has taken no formal action to jointly establish a tourist and convention commission, a city in the county may act independently and separately in establishing such a commission, although the commission could effectively operate, and the room tax would apply, only in territory within the city boundaries. OAG 76-73 ; 76-407.

If a joint city-county commission is contemplated then both of the participating governmental entities must participate in the organization and functions of the commission. OAG 76-407 .

The holding by a legislator of membership on a tourist board would not constitute a violation of § 165 of the Constitution or KRS 61.080 . OAG 78-475 .

Since the tourism commission essentially is an agency of the city and county, the responsibility for collecting delinquent taxes due should be the joint responsibility of the city and county attorneys, and if for any good reason these two (2) officers are unable to perform this task, then under KRS 91A.360(4) the commission has the express authority to employ special counsel to do the job. OAG 78-488 .

A city may not allow the operators of motor courts, motels or hotels or similar establishments subject to the tax authorized by this section to KRS 91A.390 a collection fee for collecting, reporting and forwarding the tax imposed. OAG 81-371 .

A county containing no incorporated cities may establish a tourist and convention commission pursuant to subsection (2) of this section since even if the literal language “in counties containing cities” used in subsection (2) were deemed to be in apparent conflict with the general scheme of the statute, such language must surrender to the general purpose and intent of the statute, which is to allow all counties in the state to create tourist and convention commissions. OAG 81-393 .

Where this section mentions the word “city”, it refers to incorporated cities. OAG 81-393 .

There are no statutory provisions for dissolution of a county tourist commission once such a commission has been properly established, and the county judge/executive with or without the fiscal court has no authority to dissolve the commission. OAG 82-26 .

A motel-hotel license tax imposed by the fiscal court pursuant to KRS 91A.390 must be expended for the multi-purposes explicitly set forth in KRS 91A.390 (2). Those purposes include recreation as well as providing for the promotion of convention and tourist activities. OAG 83-148 .

Under subsection (2) of this section, a fiscal court for the county may, by its separate action alone, establish or create a recreational, tourist and convention commission. This poses no problem, although the membership of the commission is appointed, under KRS 91A.360 , by the joint action of the mayor of the largest city in the county and the county judge/executive. OAG 83-148 , modifying OAG 75-523 .

The room tax money to be expended directly by the city may cover a city park and any items reasonably necessary for its proper establishment, maintenance and operation, provided that the city park would be so constructed and maintained as to be useful in the attraction and promotion of tourist and convention business. OAG 83-236 .

Both a Tourist and Convention Commission and the tax to support the activities of such a commission should be established pursuant to an ordinance enacted by the local governing body. OAG 83-315 .

Sections 27 and 28 of the Kentucky Constitution would prohibit a member of the General Assembly from serving at the same time as a member of a Tourist and Convention Commission. OAG 93-70 .

A city may withdraw its participation from an existing tourism commission in accordance with its “home rule” powers under KRS § 82.082 . The legislature allows for a separate tax by allowing local governments to act separately in forming tourism commissions in KRS § 91A.350(1) and (2). OAG 2015-07

91A.360. Membership of tourist and convention commissions — Terms — Officers and employees — Audit — Compliance with KRS 65A.010 to 65A.090.

  1. The commission established pursuant to KRS 91A.350(2) shall be composed of seven (7) members to be appointed, in accordance with the method used to establish the commission. Members of a commission established by joint action of the local governing bodies of a county and a city or cities located therein shall be appointed, jointly, by the chief executive officers of the local governing bodies that established the commission. Members of a commission established by separate action of the local governing body of a county or a city located therein shall be appointed separately by the chief executive officer of the local governing body that established the commission. The chief executive officer of a city shall mean the mayor and the chief executive officer of a county shall mean the county judge/executive. Appointments to a commission shall be made by the appropriate chief executive officer or officers in the following manner:
    1. Two (2) commissioners shall be appointed from a list of three (3) or more names submitted by the local city hotel and motel association and one (1) commissioner shall be appointed from a list of three (3) or more names submitted by the local county hotel and motel association, provided that if only one (1) local hotel and motel association exists which covers both the city and county, then three (3) commissioners shall be appointed from a list of six (6) or more names submitted by it. If no formal local city or county hotel and motel association is in existence upon the establishment of a commission or upon the expiration of the term of a commissioner appointed pursuant to this subsection, then up to three (3) commissioners shall be appointed by the appropriate chief executive officer or officers from persons residing within the jurisdiction of the commission and representing local hotels or motels. A local city or county hotel and motel association shall not be required to be affiliated with the Kentucky Hotel and Motel Association to be recognized as the official local city or county hotel and motel association.
    2. One (1) commissioner shall be appointed from a list of three (3) or more names submitted by the local restaurant association or associations. If no formal local restaurant association or associations exist upon the establishment of a commission or upon the expiration of the term of a commissioner appointed pursuant to this subsection, then one (1) commissioner shall be appointed by the appropriate chief executive officer or officers from persons residing within the jurisdiction of the commission and representing a local restaurant. A local restaurant association or associations shall not be required to be affiliated with the Kentucky Restaurant Association to be recognized as the official local restaurant association or associations.
    3. One (1) commissioner shall be appointed from a list of three (3) or more names submitted by the chamber or chambers of commerce existing within those governmental units, which by joint or separate action have established the commission. If the commission is established by joint action of a county and a city or cities, then each chamber of commerce shall submit a list of three (3) names, and the chief executive officers of the participating governmental units shall jointly appoint one (1) commission member from the aggregate list. If no local chamber of commerce is in existence upon the establishment of a commission or upon the expiration of the term of a commissioner appointed pursuant to this subsection, then one (1) commissioner shall be appointed by the appropriate chief executive officer or officers from persons residing within the jurisdiction of the commission and representing local businesses.
    4. Two (2) commissioners shall be appointed in the following manner:
      1. By the chief executive officer of the county or city, if the commission has been established by separate action of a county or city; or
      2. One (1) each by the chief executive officer of the county and by the chief executive officer of the most populous city participating in the establishment of the commission, if the commission has been established by joint action of a county and a city or cities.
  2. A candidate submitted for appointment to the commission, pursuant to subsection (1)(a) to (1)(c), shall be appointed by the appropriate chief executive officer or officers within thirty (30) days of the receipt of the required list or lists. Vacancies shall be filled in the same manner that original appointments are made.
  3. The commissioners shall be appointed for terms of three (3) years, provided, that in making the initial appointments, the appropriate chief executive officer or officers shall appoint two (2) commissioners for a term of three (3) years, two (2) commissioners for a term of two (2) years and three (3) commissioners for a term of one (1) year. There shall be no limitation on the number of terms to which a commissioner is reappointed. Subsequent appointments shall be for three (3) year terms.
  4. The commission shall elect from its membership a chairman and a treasurer, and may employ personnel and make contracts necessary to carry out the purpose of KRS 91A.350 to 91A.390 . The contracts may include, but shall not be limited to, the procurement of promotional services, advertising services, and other services and materials relating to the promotion of tourist and convention business. Contracts of the type enumerated shall be made only with persons, organizations, and firms with experience and qualifications for providing promotional services and materials, such as advertising firms, chambers of commerce, publishers, and printers.
  5. The books of the commission and its account as established in KRS 91A.390(2) shall be audited as provided in KRS 65A.030 . The independent certified public accountant or Auditor of Public Accounts shall make a report to the commission, to the associations submitting lists of names from which commission members are selected, to the appropriate chief executive officer or officers, to the State Auditor of Public Accounts, and to the local governing body or bodies that established the commission that was audited. A copy of the audit report shall be made available by the commission to members of the public upon request and at no charge.
  6. A commissioner may be removed from office, by joint or separate action, of the appropriate chief executive officer or officers of the local governing body or bodies that established the commission, as provided by KRS 65.007 .
  7. The commission shall comply with the provisions of KRS 65A.010 to 65A.090 .

History. Enact. Acts 1968, ch. 138, § 2; 1970, ch. 59, § 1; 1974, ch. 324, § 2; 1976, ch. 139, § 1; 1976 (1st Ex. Sess.), ch. 20, § 6, effective January 2, 1978; 1980, ch. 18, § 7, effective July 15, 1980; 1980, ch. 153, § 1, effective July 15, 1980; 1992, ch. 56, § 2, effective July 14, 1992; 2000, ch. 344, § 2, effective July 14, 2000; 2013, ch. 40, § 38, effective March 21, 2013; 2014, ch. 7, § 7, effective March 19, 2014.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section was formerly compiled as KRS 83.345 but was renumbered by the Reviser of Statutes pursuant to KRS 7.136 .

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(3/19/2014). 2014 Ky. Acts ch. 7, sec. 11 provides that the amendments to this statute made in 2014 Ky. Acts ch. 7, sec. 7, shall apply retroactively beginning January 1, 2014.

Opinions of Attorney General.

The language of subsection (2) of KRS 91A.350 indicates that “jointly” means a county and city located therein, and two (2) or more counties may not jointly establish a recreational, tourist and convention commission under KRS 91A.350 and related statutes. OAG 73-535 . (Opinion prior to 1974 amendment.)

Where there is no hotel, motel or restaurant associations in existence, the mayor and county judge should contact all the hotel, motel and restaurant owners and have them submit a list of names from which commission members can be selected, and until this is done the mayor and county judge can make temporary appointments. OAG 74-482 .

Notwithstanding the provision of § 5.040 of the Lexington-Gazette Urban County Government Charter which gives the mayor the sole power to appoint all members of boards and commissions created by the charter and ordinances thereunder, the city-county tourist and convention commission created pursuant to this section must be appointed jointly by the mayor and county judge/executive. OAG 78-310 .

Persons appointed to the city tourist and convention commission may be nonresidents of the city. OAG 78-770 .

Subsection (4) of this section gives a tourist and convention commission authority to employ an attorney to collect delinquent transient room taxes. OAG 79-214 .

While the tax levying authority has at least implied authority to collect transient room taxes, subsection (4) of this section was designed to put the primary burden of transient room tax collection on the tourist and convention commission, which work is to be funded out of the commission’s budget, not the county’s nor city’s budget. OAG 79-214 .

A member of the state legislature can be employed by a joint city-county tourist and convention commission without offending Const., § 165 or KRS 61.080 , since members of the joint commission serve in both a city and county capacity and not one or the other. OAG 80-219 .

Since KRS 91A.350(2) clearly authorizes a city, by separate action, to establish a tourist and convention commission, and since this section only deals with the appointments to a joint city-county commission by the mayor and the county judge/executive, suggested that the mayor of the city alone make the seven appointments to the commission required by the statute including the one contemplated to be made specifically by the county judge/executive. OAG 81-371 .

Where a tourist and convention commission is created in a county which has no incorporated cities, the county judge/executive would have to appoint all the members. OAG 81-393 .

Since the appointment of a director involves a governmental function, his contract cannot extend beyond the term of the members of the commission who appointed him, thus a commission cannot enter into a contract of employment for a term of four (4) years when no member of the commission has as many as four (4) years remaining in his term. Where a commission has entered into a contract of employment which exceeds its authority, the subsequent commission has the authority to remove the director and appoint another person for that position or it can, if it chooses, reappoint the director for a period coinciding with the term of the subsequent commissioners. OAG 82-612 .

Under KRS 91A.350(2), a fiscal court for the county may, by its separate action alone, establish or create a recreational, tourist and convention commission. This poses no problem, although the membership of the commission is appointed, under this section, by the joint action of the mayor of the largest city in the county and the county judge/executive. OAG 83-148 , modifying OAG 75-523 .

Since there are no constitutional or statutory provisions requiring that the members of a recreational, tourist and convention commission selected from lists submitted by the local hotel and motel associations actually be employed by hotels or motels or that they retain their employment with hotels or motels during their tenure with the commission, persons selected from lists submitted by hotel and motel associations who leave their positions with the hotel and motel industry while serving on such a commission, do not automatically vacate their positions and may serve out the remainder of their terms of office, presuming they do not take up residence in another state. OAG 84-193 .

A member of the fiscal court may also serve as an appointed member of a county tourist commission as there is no inherent conflict of interest. OAG 99-4 .

A city may withdraw its participation from an existing tourism commission in accordance with its “home rule” powers under KRS § 82.082 . The legislature allows for a separate tax by allowing local governments to act separately in forming tourism commissions in KRS § 91A.350(1) and (2). OAG 2015-07

91A.370. Tourist and convention commission in county containing city of first class or consolidated local government.

  1. Except in a county containing a consolidated local government, the commission established pursuant to KRS 91A.350(1) shall be composed of nine (9) members to be appointed by the mayor of the largest city in the county, the county judge/executive and the Governor of the Commonwealth.
  2. Except in a county containing a consolidated local government, the mayor of the largest city in the county shall appoint three (3) commissioners in the following manner:
    1. One (1) commissioner from a list submitted by the local city hotel and motel association;
    2. One (1) commissioner from a list submitted by the chamber of commerce of the largest city in the county; and
    3. One (1) commissioner from a list submitted by the local restaurant association or associations.
  3. Except in a county containing a consolidated local government, the county judge/executive shall, with the approval of the fiscal court, appoint three (3) commissioners in the following manner:
    1. One (1) commissioner from a list submitted by the local county hotel and motel association, provided that if only one (1) local hotel and motel association exists which covers both the city and county, then the local hotel and motel association shall submit a list to the county judge/executive;
    2. One (1) commissioner from a list submitted by the board of directors of the largest incorporated Thoroughbred horse racing concern in the county, which list shall contain only directors, officers, or employees of that corporation; and
    3. One (1) commissioner who is a resident of the county and who has an active interest in the convention and tourist industry.
  4. Except in a county containing a consolidated local government, the Governor shall appoint three (3) commissioners in the following manner:
    1. One (1) commissioner from a list submitted by the State Fair Board;
    2. One (1) commissioner from a list submitted by the local countywide air board; and
    3. One (1) commissioner shall be appointed, in those counties not containing a consolidated local government, who is a resident of the county. In those counties containing a consolidated local government, one (1) commissioner shall be appointed who is a resident of the area comprising the consolidated local government.
  5. Vacancies shall be filled in the manner that original appointments are made.
  6. When a list as provided in subsections (2) and (3) of this section contains less than three (3) names or when a selection from such list is not made, the appointing authority shall request in writing the submission of a new list of names.
  7. Except in a county containing a consolidated local government, the commissioners shall be appointed for a term of three (3) years, provided that in making the initial appointments, the mayor, county judge/executive, and Governor of the Commonwealth shall each appoint one (1) commissioner for a term of one (1) year, one (1) commissioner for a term of two (2) years, and one (1) commissioner for a term of three (3) years.
  8. Upon the establishment of a consolidated local government in a county where a city of the first class and a county containing such city have had in effect a cooperative compact pursuant to KRS 79.310 to 79.330 , the commission shall have nine (9) members. Six (6) members of the commission shall be appointed by the mayor of the consolidated local government pursuant to the provisions of KRS 67C.139 for a term of three (3) years. The Governor of the Commonwealth shall appoint three (3) members of the commission for a term of three (3) years. Incumbent members upon the establishment of the consolidated local government shall continue to serve as members of the board for the time remaining of their current term of appointment.
  9. The commission shall elect from its membership a chairman and a treasurer, and may employ such personnel and make such contracts as are necessary to effectively carry out the purposes of KRS 91A.350 to 91A.390 . Such contracts may include but shall not be limited to the procurement of promotional services, advertising services, and other services and materials relating to the promotion of tourist and convention business; provided, contracts of the type enumerated shall be made only with persons, organizations, and firms with experience and qualifications for providing promotional services and materials such as advertising firms, chambers of commerce, publishers, and printers.
  10. The books of the commission shall be audited by an independent auditor who shall make a report to the commission, to the organizations submitting names from which commission members are selected, and to the mayor of a city or a consolidated local government, the county judge/executive in counties not containing a consolidated local government, and the Governor of the Commonwealth.
  11. Commission members appointed by the Governor shall serve at the pleasure of the Governor. Commission members appointed by the mayor of a city or a consolidated local government or the county judge/executive may be removed as provided by KRS 65.007 .
  12. The commission shall comply with the provisions of KRS 65A.010 to 65A.090 .

History. Enact. Acts 1976, ch. 139, § 2; 1976 (1st Ex. Sess.), ch. 20, § 6, effective January 2, 1978; 1980, ch. 18, § 8, effective July 15, 1980; 1988, ch. 315, § 1, effective July 15, 1988; 2002, ch. 346, § 103, effective July 15, 2002; 2013, ch. 40, § 39, effective March 21, 2013.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section was formerly compiled as KRS 83.346 but was renumbered by the Reviser of Statutes pursuant to KRS 7.136 .

OPINIONS OF ATTORNEY GENERAL.

A city may withdraw its participation from an existing tourism commission in accordance with its “home rule” powers under KRS § 82.082 . The legislature allows for a separate tax by allowing local governments to act separately in forming tourism commissions in KRS § 91A.350(1) and (2). OAG 2015-07

91A.372. Membership of tourist and convention commission in urban-county government — Terms — Officers and employees — Audit — Compliance with KRS 65A.010 to 65A.090.

  1. The commission established pursuant to KRS 91A.350(2) by an urban-county government shall be composed of nine (9) members appointed by the mayor of the urban-county government in the following manner:
    1. Three (3) commissioners from a list submitted by the local hotel and motel association.
    2. One (1) commissioner from a list submitted by the local restaurant association or associations.
    3. One (1) commissioner from a list submitted by the local chamber of commerce.
    4. Four (4) commissioners who shall be residents of the urban-county.
  2. Vacancies shall be filled in the same manner that original appointments are made.
  3. The commissioners shall be appointed for terms of three (3) years, provided, that in making the initial appointments, the chief elective official of the urban-county shall appoint three (3) commissioners for a term of three (3) years, three (3) commissioners for a term of two (2) years and three (3) commissioners for a term of one (1) year.
  4. The commission shall elect from its membership a chairman and a treasurer, and may employ such personnel and make such contracts as are necessary to effectively carry out the purpose of KRS 91A.350 to 91A.390 . Such contracts may include but shall not be limited to the procurement of promotional services, advertising services and other services and materials relating to the promotion of tourist and convention business; provided, contracts of the type enumerated shall be made only with persons, organizations, and firms with experience and qualifications for providing promotional services and materials, such as event coordinators, advertising firms, chambers of commerce, publishers and printers.
  5. The books of the commission shall be audited as provided in KRS 65A.030 . The independent certified public accountant or Auditor of Public Accounts shall make a report to the commission, to the organizations submitting names from which commission members are selected, and to the mayor of the urban-county government.
  6. The commission shall comply with the provisions of KRS 65A.010 to 65A.090 .

History. Enact. Acts 1982, ch. 77, § 1, effective July 15, 1982; 2000, ch. 344, § 3, effective July 14, 2000; 2013, ch. 40, § 40, effective March 21, 2013; 2014, ch. 7, § 8, effective March 19, 2014.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(3/19/2014). 2014 Ky. Acts ch. 7, sec. 11 provides that the amendments to this statute made in 2014 Ky. Acts ch. 7, sec. 8, shall apply retroactively beginning January 1, 2014.

OPINIONS OF ATTORNEY GENERAL.

A city may withdraw its participation from an existing tourism commission in accordance with its “home rule” powers under KRS § 82.082 . The legislature allows for a separate tax by allowing local governments to act separately in forming tourism commissions in KRS § 91A.350(1) and (2). OAG 2015-07

91A.380. Membership of joint recreational, tourist and convention commissions — Terms — Officers and employees — Audits — Removal of commissioners — Compliance with KRS 65A.010 to 65A.090.

  1. The commission established pursuant to KRS 91A.350(3) shall be composed of six (6) members from each county to be appointed by the county judge/executive, with the approval of the fiscal court in the following manner:
    1. Two (2) commissioners with an accounting, finance, or business background, one (1) of whom is a member of the local chamber of commerce;
    2. One (1) commissioner selected from the public at large;
    3. One (1) commissioner from the General Assembly;
    4. One (1) commissioner representing local restaurants; and
    5. One (1) commissioner representing local hotels and motels.
  2. Vacancies shall be filled in the same manner that original appointments are made.
  3. The commissioners shall be appointed for terms of three (3) years, provided that in making the initial appointments, the county judge/executive shall appoint two (2) commissioners for a term of three (3) years, two (2) commissioners for a term of two (2) years, and two (2) commissioners for a term of one (1) year.
  4. The commission shall elect from its membership a chairman and a treasurer, and may employ such personnel and make such contracts as are necessary to effectively carry out the purpose of KRS 91A.350 to 91A.390 . Such contracts may include but shall not be limited to the procurement of promotional services, advertising services and other services and materials relating to the promotion of tourist and convention business.
  5. The books of the commission and its account as established in KRS 91A.390(2) shall be audited as provided in KRS 65A.030 . The independent certified public accountant or Auditor of Public Accounts shall make a report to the commission, to the organizations submitting names from which commission members are selected, and to the county judge/executive of each county. A copy of the audit report shall be made available by the commission to members of the public upon request and at no charge.
  6. A commissioner may be removed from office as provided by KRS 65.007 .
  7. The commission shall comply with the provisions of KRS 65A.010 to 65A.090 .

History. Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 324, § 3; 1976 (1st Ex. Sess.), ch. 20, § 6, effective January 2, 1978; 1978, ch. 388, § 1, effective June 17, 1978; 1980, ch. 18, § 9, effective July 15, 1980; 2000, ch. 344, § 4, effective July 14, 2000; 2013, ch. 40, § 41, effective March 21, 2013; 2014, ch. 7, § 9, effective March 19, 2014; 2019 ch. 93, § 1, effective June 27, 2019.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section was formerly compiled as KRS 83.347 but was renumbered by the Reviser of Statutes pursuant to KRS 7.136 .

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(3/19/2014). 2014 Ky. Acts ch. 7, sec. 11 provides that the amendments to this statute made in 2014 Ky. Acts ch. 7, sec. 9, shall apply retroactively beginning January 1, 2014.

OPINIONS OF ATTORNEY GENERAL.

A city may withdraw its participation from an existing tourism commission in accordance with its “home rule” powers under KRS § 82.082 . The legislature allows for a separate tax by allowing local governments to act separately in forming tourism commissions in KRS § 91A.350(1) and (2). OAG 2015-07

91A.390. Room tax — Special transient room tax — Authorization for additional tax by a county with a city of the first class, urban-county governments, and multicounty tourist and convention commissions — Revenue bonds.

    1. The commission shall annually submit to the local governing body or bodies which established it a request for funds for the operation of the commission. (1) (a) The commission shall annually submit to the local governing body or bodies which established it a request for funds for the operation of the commission.
    2. The local governing body or bodies shall include the commission in the annual budget and shall provide funds for the operation of the commission by imposing a transient room tax on the rent for every occupancy of a suite, room, or rooms, charged by all persons, companies, corporations, or other like or similar persons, groups, or organizations doing business as motor courts, motels, hotels, inns, or like or similar accommodations businesses as follows:
      1. For a local governing body or bodies, other than an urban-county government, the tax rate shall not exceed three percent (3%); and
      2. For an urban-county government, the tax rate shall not exceed four percent (4%).
    3. In addition to the three percent (3%) levy authorized by paragraph (b)1. of this subsection, the local governing body other than an urban-county government may impose a special transient room tax not to exceed one percent (1%) for the purposes of:
      1. Meeting the operating expenses of a convention center; and
      2. In the case of a consolidated local government, financing the renovation or expansion of a convention center that is government-owned and located in the central business district of the consolidated local government, except that if a consolidated local government imposes the special transient room tax authorized under this paragraph on or after August 1, 2014, revenue derived from the levy shall not be used to meet the operating expenses of a convention center until any debt issued for financing the renovation or expansion of a government-owned convention center located in the central business district of the consolidated local government is retired.
    4. Transient room taxes shall not apply to the rental or leasing of an apartment supplied by an individual or business that regularly holds itself out as exclusively providing apartments. Apartment means a room or set of rooms, in an apartment building, fitted especially with a kitchen and usually leased as a dwelling for a minimum period of thirty (30) days or more.
    5. The local governing body or bodies that have established a commission by joint or separate action shall enact an ordinance for the enforcement of the tax measure enacted pursuant to this section and the collection of the proceeds of this tax measure on a monthly basis.
  1. All moneys collected pursuant to this section and KRS 91A.400 shall be maintained in an account separate and unique from all other funds and revenues collected, and shall be considered tax revenue for the purposes of KRS 68.100 and KRS 92.330 .
  2. A portion of the money collected from the imposition of this tax, as determined by the tax levying body, upon the advice and consent of the tourist and convention commission, may be used to finance the cost of acquisition, construction, operation, and maintenance of facilities useful in the attraction and promotion of tourist and convention business, including projects described in KRS 154.30-050 (2)(a). The balance of the money collected from the imposition of this tax shall be used for the purposes set forth in KRS 91A.350 . Proceeds of the tax shall not be used as a subsidy in any form to any hotel, motel, or restaurant, except as provided in KRS 154.30-050 (2)(a)3.c. Money not expended by the commission during any fiscal year shall be used to make up a part of the commission’s budget for its next fiscal year.
  3. A county with a city of the first class may impose an additional tax, not to exceed one and one-half percent (1.5%) of the room rent. This additional tax, if approved by the local governing body, shall be collected and administered in the same manner as the regular tax and shall be used for the purpose of funding additional promotion of tourist and convention business.
  4. An urban-county government may impose an additional tax, not to exceed one percent (1%) of the room rents included in this subsection. This additional tax shall be collected and administered in the same manner as the regular tax with the exception that this additional tax shall be used for the purpose of funding the purchase of development rights program provided for under KRS 67A.845 .
  5. Local governing bodies which have formed multicounty tourist and convention commissions as provided by KRS 91A.350(3) may impose an additional tax, not to exceed one percent (1%) of the room rents. This additional tax, if approved by each governing body, shall be collected and administered in the same manner as the regular tax, with the exception that this additional tax shall be used for the purpose of funding regional efforts relating to the promotion of tourist and convention business and convention centers. In no event shall any revenues collected as provided for under KRS 91A.350(3) be utilized for the construction, renovation, maintenance, or additions to any convention center that is located outside the boundaries of the Commonwealth of Kentucky.
  6. The commission, with the approval of the tax levying body, may borrow money to pay its obligations that cannot be paid at maturity out of current revenue from the transient room tax, but shall not borrow a sum greater than can be repaid out of the revenue anticipated from the transient room tax during the year the money is borrowed. The commission may pledge its securities for the repayment of any sum borrowed.
  7. The fiscal court or legislative body of a consolidated local government or city establishing a commission pursuant to KRS 91A.350 (1) or (2) and, in its own name, a commission established pursuant to of KRS 91A.350 (1) is authorized and empowered to issue revenue bonds pursuant to KRS Chapter 58 for public projects. Bonds issued for the purposes of KRS 91A.350 to 91A.390 , may be used to pay any cost for the acquisition of real estate, the construction of buildings and appurtenances, the preparation of plans and specifications, and legal and other services incidental to the project or to the issuance of the bonds. The payment of the bonds, with interest, may be secured by a pledge of and a first lien on all of the receipts and revenue derived, or to be derived, from the rental or operation of the property involved. Bond and interest obligations issued pursuant to this section shall not constitute an indebtedness of the county, consolidated local government, or city. All bonds sold under the authority of this section shall be subject to competitive bidding as provided by law, and shall bear interest at a rate not to exceed that established for bonds issued for public projects under KRS Chapter 58.
  8. A commission established pursuant to KRS 91A.350 (3) is authorized and empowered to issue revenue bonds in its own name, payable solely from its income and revenue, pursuant to KRS Chapter 58 for revenue bonds for public projects. Bonds issued for the purposes of KRS 91A.350 to 91A.390 , may be used to pay any cost for the acquisition of real estate, the construction of buildings and appurtenances, the preparation of plans and specifications, and legal and other services incidental to the project or to the issuance of the bonds. The payment of the bonds, with interest, may be secured by a pledge of and a first lien on all of the receipts and revenue derived, or to be derived, from the rental or operation of the property involved. Bond and interest obligations issued pursuant to this section shall not constitute an indebtedness of the county. All bonds sold pursuant to this section shall be subject to competitive bidding as provided by law, and shall not bear interest at rates exceeding those for bonds issued for public projects under KRS Chapter 58.

History. Enact. Acts 1968, ch. 138, § 3; 1970, ch. 59, § 2; 1974, ch. 324, § 4; 1986, ch. 11, § 1, effective July 15, 1986; 1990, ch. 302, § 2, effective July 13, 1990; 1992, ch. 56, § 3, effective July 14, 1992; 1992, ch. 165, § 4, effective July 14, 1992; 1994, ch. 505, § 1, effective July 15, 1994; 1998, ch. 372, § 8, effective July 15, 1998; 2000, ch. 154, § 2, effective July 14, 2000; 2000, ch. 344, § 5, effective July 14, 2000; 2002, ch. 167, § 1, effective July 15, 2002; 2002, ch. 346, § 104, effective July 15, 2002; 2007, ch. 95, § 27, effective March 23, 2007; 2008, ch. 178, § 26, effective July 15, 2008; 2014, ch. 38, § 1, effective August 1, 2014.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section was formerly compiled as KRS 83.350 but was renumbered by the Reviser of Statutes pursuant to KRS 7.136 .

Section 5 of Acts 1992, ch. 165 provides: “The provisions of Section 2 of this Act shall apply to taxable years beginning after June 30, 1992.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

There was no unconstitutional distinction in the use of tax revenue as between counties containing a city of the first class and all other counties since the legislature had reason to provide an additional function for tourist and convention commissions in counties other than those containing a city of the first class. Second Street Properties, Inc. v. Fiscal Court of Jefferson County, 445 S.W.2d 709, 1969 Ky. LEXIS 179 ( Ky. 1969 ).

In allowing local government to impose a tax on room rent to finance promotion of convention and tourist activity, the failure of the legislature to define a “transient room” did not make the KRS 83.340 to 83.350 (now KRS 91A.350 to 91A.390 ) void for indefiniteness. Second Street Properties, Inc. v. Fiscal Court of Jefferson County, 445 S.W.2d 709, 1969 Ky. LEXIS 179 ( Ky. 1969 ).

2. Tax on Hotel Rooms.

A tax imposed on the rental of transient rooms in hotels and motels, since it was imposed on the proprietors, did not impose a burden on interstate commerce. Second Street Properties, Inc. v. Fiscal Court of Jefferson County, 445 S.W.2d 709, 1969 Ky. LEXIS 179 ( Ky. 1969 ).

District court did not err in determining that defendant online travel companies were not “like or similar business accommodations” for purposes of KRS 91A.390(1); the companies had neither ownership, nor physical control, of the rooms they offered for rent. Louisville/Jefferson County Metro Gov't v. Hotels.com, L.P., 590 F.3d 381, 2009 FED App. 0434P, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 28189 (6th Cir. Ky. 2009 ).

3. Definite Purpose.

Statute allowing local government to impose a tax on room rent to finance promotion of convention and tourist activity was not void for vagueness and indefiniteness. Second Street Properties, Inc. v. Fiscal Court of Jefferson County, 445 S.W.2d 709, 1969 Ky. LEXIS 179 ( Ky. 1969 ).

The broad scope of the power granted is not the type of uncertainty which would void the act since the promotion of convention and tourist activity for the public purpose of improving the economy of cities and counties is sufficiently definite to circumscribe the permitted proper functions of the administrative agency. Second Street Properties, Inc. v. Fiscal Court of Jefferson County, 445 S.W.2d 709, 1969 Ky. LEXIS 179 ( Ky. 1969 ).

4. Double Tax.

The tax on the rental of transient rooms had none of the elements of double taxation. Second Street Properties, Inc. v. Fiscal Court of Jefferson County, 445 S.W.2d 709, 1969 Ky. LEXIS 179 ( Ky. 1969 ).

5. Classification.

The fact that hotels, motels and the like would realize a benefit from the function the tax was to be used for and the tax could be passed on to the guests sustained the classification which subjected the plaintiffs to the special tax burden. Second Street Properties, Inc. v. Fiscal Court of Jefferson County, 445 S.W.2d 709, 1969 Ky. LEXIS 179 ( Ky. 1969 ).

6. Standing.

Since the plaintiffs were located in a county containing a city of the first class they had no standing to raise the issue of the constitutionality of the possibility of an additional tax being imposed in counties other than those containing a city of the first class. Second Street Properties, Inc. v. Fiscal Court of Jefferson County, 445 S.W.2d 709, 1969 Ky. LEXIS 179 ( Ky. 1969 ).

Cited:

Kentucky Center for Arts Corp. v. Berns, 801 S.W.2d 327, 1990 Ky. LEXIS 142 ( Ky. 1990 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Tax revenue may be used as described in this section and the balance of such revenue must be devoted to uses described in KRS 91A.350 . OAG 72-281 .

The provisions for a transient room tax would not apply to houseboat rentals and campsites. OAG 72-299 .

A sufficient portion of the transient room tax levied under this section must go to the tax levying body if it determines that it is needed to finance facilities used for the attraction and promotion of tourist and convention business, which would include a designation of 75 percent for payment of the debt on a civic center. OAG 74-343 , withdrawing OAG 70-728 .

The fiscal court cannot enact a five percent (5%) transient tax as it must conform to the requirements of KRS 91A.350 and is bound by the three percent (3%) maximum of KRS 91A.390(1). OAG 74-383 .

The fiscal court must establish a recreational, tourist and convention commission pursuant to KRS 91A.350 in order to levy the tax provided for in this section. OAG 74-383 .

No part of the revenue from a transient tax can be used to subsidize the operation of the sheriff’s department or county ambulance service. OAG 74-383 .

The 3% room tax is a license or occupational tax. OAG 75-651 .

A fiscal court which has established a tourist and convention commission may designate a portion of the commission’s operating funds for the specific purpose of financing the cost of acquisition, construction, operation and maintenance of a city park, provided the city park is calculated to be useful in the attraction and promotion of tourist and convention business. OAG 76-73 .

If a joint city-county commission is contemplated then both of the participants must take affirmative action and impose the tax within their respective jurisdictional limits. OAG 76-407 .

In absence of any provisions to the contrary the respective governing bodies would collect the tax they had imposed if a joint county-city commission is established. OAG 76-407 .

Upon the collection of the tax under this section it should go into a special fund to be used for the specific purposes provided for in KRS 91A.350 to 91A.390 . OAG 76-407 .

The creation of the county tax board would be in compliance with this section and money collected by the sheriff on the room tax should be turned over to the board. OAG 77-647 .

This section would include the use of motel tax funds for the construction of recreational facilities such as a baseball park, tennis courts, etc., which appear to be in the same general category as athletic stadiums and which in turn would attract and promote tourist and convention business. OAG 79-146 .

A city may not allow the operators of motor courts, motels or hotels or similar establishments subject to the tax authorized by KRS 91A.350 to this section a collection fee for collecting, reporting and forwarding the tax imposed. OAG 81-371 .

A transient room tax established by a county and city pursuant to subsection (1) of this section to fund the tourist commission’s activities, may, under appropriate ordinances, be collected and accounted for by the tourist commission’s treasurer. OAG 82-26 .

A motel-hotel license tax imposed by the fiscal court pursuant to this section must be expended for the multi-purposes explicitly set forth in subsection (2) of this section. Those purposes include recreation as well as providing for the promotion of convention and tourist activities. OAG 83-148 .

Subsection (2) of this section permits the city legislative body to exercise its sound discretion in distributing the tax money; this section establishes no precise or arithmetical figures as to the distribution of the tourist room tax proceeds. OAG 83-236 .

A city park would be a legitimate expenditure by the city under subsection (2) of this section. OAG 83-236 .

The city is required to segregate the tourist room tax as a matter of financial accountability; thus its records must clearly show the amount of the tax spent by the city to promote tourist and convention business and the amount turned over to the tourist commission. OAG 83-236 .

The room tax money to be expended directly by the city may cover a city park and any items reasonably necessary for its proper establishment, maintenance and operation, provided that the city park would be so constructed and maintained as to be useful in the attraction and promotion of tourist and convention business. OAG 83-236 .

There is no statutory provision authorizing a referendum in connection with the establishment of a Tourist and Convention Commission and the levying of a tax to support the activities of such a commission. OAG 83-315 .

Both a Tourist and Convention Commission and the tax to support the activities of such a commission should be established pursuant to an ordinance enacted by the local governing body. OAG 83-315 .

A transient room tax imposed by a city and county or by either one individually pursuant to this section to fund the operations of a Tourist and Convention Commission is a license or occupational tax. OAG 83-315 .

The city legislative body does not have the authority to grant waivers in connection with payment of the tax. OAG 83-315 .

The tax is to be imposed directly by the local governing body and not pursuant to a referendum proceeding. OAG 83-315 .

The tax is levied upon the hotels and motels, and not on the persons or organizations occupying the rooms. OAG 83-315 .

A city may withdraw its participation from an existing tourism commission in accordance with its “home rule” powers under KRS § 82.082 . The legislature allows for a separate tax by allowing local governments to act separately in forming tourism commissions in KRS § 91A.350(1) and (2). OAG 2015-07

91A.392. Levy of additional transient room tax by consolidated local government or county containing an authorized city — Exceptions — Application of money collected from the tax — Required repeal of tax upon retirement of bonds.

  1. In addition to the three percent (3%) transient room tax authorized by KRS 91A.390 and the one percent (1%) transient room tax authorized by KRS 153.440 , a consolidated local government, or the fiscal court in a county containing an authorized city, except those counties that are included in a multicounty tourist and convention commission under KRS 91A.350 , may levy an additional transient room tax not to exceed two percent (2%) of the rent for every occupancy of a suite, room, or rooms charged by all persons, companies, corporations, or other similar persons, groups, or organizations doing business as motor courts, motels, hotels, inns, oEr similar accommodations businesses.
    1. Except as otherwise provided in paragraph (b) of this subsection, all money collected from the tax authorized by this section shall be applied toward the retirement of bonds issued pursuant to KRS 91A.390(8) to finance in part the expansion or construction or operation of a governmental or nonprofit convention center or fine arts center useful to the promotion of tourism located in the central business district of the consolidated local government or the authorized city located in the county. (2) (a) Except as otherwise provided in paragraph (b) of this subsection, all money collected from the tax authorized by this section shall be applied toward the retirement of bonds issued pursuant to KRS 91A.390(8) to finance in part the expansion or construction or operation of a governmental or nonprofit convention center or fine arts center useful to the promotion of tourism located in the central business district of the consolidated local government or the authorized city located in the county.
      1. This paragraph shall apply to the tax levied pursuant to this section, prior to July 1, 2015, by a fiscal court of a county having a population between seventy-five thousand (75,000) and one hundred thousand (100,000) based on the 2010 federal decennial census. (b) 1. This paragraph shall apply to the tax levied pursuant to this section, prior to July 1, 2015, by a fiscal court of a county having a population between seventy-five thousand (75,000) and one hundred thousand (100,000) based on the 2010 federal decennial census.
      2. When, in any fiscal year, the money collected from the tax authorized by this section exceeds the amount required to satisfy the annual debt service for the bond for that fiscal year, all or a portion of the excess amount collected for that fiscal year may be used to defray the costs to operate, renovate, or expand the governmental or nonprofit convention center or fine arts center described in paragraph (a) of this subsection, if an amount equal to one (1) year’s required debt service is held in reserve to satisfy any future debt service obligations of the bond.
  2. After the retirement of the bonds provided for in this section, the additional transient room tax levied pursuant to this section shall be void, and the consolidated local government or fiscal court shall take action to repeal the ordinance which levied the tax.
  3. As used in this section, “authorized city” means a city of the first class and a city included on the registry maintained by the Department for Local Government under subsection (5) of this section.
  4. On or before January 1, 2015, the Department for Local Government shall create and maintain a registry of cities that, as of August 1, 2014, were classified as cities of the second class. The Department for Local Government shall make the information included on the registry available to the public by publishing it on its Web site.

History. Enact. Acts 1994, ch. 505, § 2, effective July 15, 1994; 1998, ch. 372, § 9, effective July 15, 1998; 2000, ch. 154, § 1, effective July 14, 2000; 2000, ch. 344, § 7, effective July 14, 2000; 2002, ch. 167, § 2, effective July 15, 2002; 2002, ch. 346, § 105, effective July 15, 2002; 2014, ch. 92, § 91, effective January 1, 2015; 2015 ch. 30, § 1, effective July 1, 2015.

OPINIONS OF ATTORNEY GENERAL.

A city may withdraw its participation from an existing tourism commission in accordance with its “home rule” powers under KRS § 82.082 . The legislature allows for a separate tax by allowing local governments to act separately in forming tourism commissions in KRS § 91A.350(1) and (2). OAG 2015-07

91A.394. Civil action to compel compliance with KRS 91A.350 to 91A.390.

Any resident of the county may bring an action in the Circuit Court to enforce the provisions of KRS 91A.350 to 91A.390 . The Circuit Court shall hear the action and, on a finding that the commission has violated the provisions of KRS 91A.350 to 91A.390 , shall order the commission to comply with the provisions. The Circuit Court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the commission, court costs, to be paid from the commission’s account.

History. Enact. Acts 2000, ch. 344, § 6, effective July 14, 2000; 2014, ch. 7, § 10, effective March 19, 2014.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(3/19/2014). 2014 Ky. Acts ch. 7, sec. 11 provides that the amendments to this statute made in 2014 Ky. Acts ch. 7, sec. 10, shall apply retroactively beginning January 1, 2014.

OPINIONS OF ATTORNEY GENERAL.

A city may withdraw its participation from an existing tourism commission in accordance with its “home rule” powers under KRS § 82.082 . The legislature allows for a separate tax by allowing local governments to act separately in forming tourism commissions in KRS § 91A.350(1) and (2). OAG 2015-07

Restaurant Tax

91A.400. Restaurant tax in authorized cities.

  1. As used in this section, “authorized city” means a city on the registry maintained by the Department for Local Government under subsection (2) of this section.
  2. On or before January 1, 2015, the Department for Local Government shall create and maintain a registry of cities that, as of January 1, 2014, were classified as cities of the fourth or fifth class. The Department for Local Government shall make the information included on the registry available to the public by publishing it on its Web site.
  3. In addition to the three percent (3%) transient room tax authorized by KRS 91A.390 , the city legislative body in an authorized city may levy an additional restaurant tax not to exceed three percent (3%) of the retail sales by all restaurants doing business in the city. All moneys collected from the tax authorized by this section shall be turned over to the tourist and convention commission established in that city as provided by KRS 91A.350 to 91A.390 .

History. Enact. Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 21, effective July 15, 1980; 1986, ch. 203, § 1, effective July 15, 1986; 1992, ch. 435, § 11, effective July 14, 1992; 2014, ch. 92, § 92, effective January 1, 2015.

Special Ad Valorem Tax

91A.430. Enactment and administration of special ad valorem tax. [Repealed, reenacted and amended.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1988, ch. 109, § 1, effective July 15, 1988) was repealed, reenacted and amended as KRS 65.125 by Acts 1990, ch. 92, § 1, effective July 13, 1990.

User Fees

91A.510. Definition of user fee.

As used in KRS 91A.520 and 91A.530 , unless the context otherwise requires:

“User fee” means the fee or charge imposed by a local government on the user of a public service for the use of any particular service not also available from a nongovernmental provider.

History. Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 181, § 1, effective July 15, 1986.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

2. Assessment not user fee.

City’s sanitation assessment was not properly designated a “user fee,” but to the extent it was a fee/assessment for a local governmental service the excess revenues generated could be deemed taxes; when the annual sanitation assessment ordinances were passed and the monies collected it was clear that excess funds would be generated, and thus, even if the assessment was a service fee, the predictable excess regularly devoted to the city’s general expenditures was properly viewed as a tax. Scalise v. Sewell-Scheuermann, 566 S.W.3d 539, 2018 Ky. LEXIS 451 ( Ky. 2018 ).

NOTES TO UNPUBLISHED DECISIONS

1. Invalid User Fee.

It was error to grant summary judgment holding a fee imposed on water meters to fund a 911 service was a valid user fee because there was no direct relationship between the fee and the service provided, so the fee was not a valid user fee. City of Lancaster v. Garrard County, 2014 Ky. App. LEXIS 120 (Ky. Ct. App.), sub. op., 2014 Ky. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1054 (Ky. Ct. App. July 3, 2014).

91A.520. Limit on user fees.

User fees shall not generate revenues or profits in excess of the reasonable costs associated with providing a public service.

History. Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 181, § 2, effective July 15, 1986.

91A.530. Special revenue accounts — Administration.

  1. Local governments imposing user fees shall establish a special revenue account for each user fee.
  2. All user fees collected and all disbursement of such fees shall be administered according to generally accepted principles of governmental accounting.

History. Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 181, § 3, effective July 15, 1986.

Management Districts

91A.550. Definitions for KRS 91A.550 to 91A.580.

As used in KRS 91A.550 to 91A.580 , unless the context otherwise requires:

  1. “Board” means any appointed board of directors, or any existing governmental agency designated pursuant to the ordinance establishing a management district;
  2. “City” means a city of the home rule class;
  3. “Economic improvement” means any activity or service for the improvement and promotion of a management district that is of special benefit to property within the district, but shall not include any service ordinarily provided throughout the city from general fund revenues unless an increased level of the service is provided in the management district;
  4. “Fair basis” means assessed value basis, front foot basis, square foot basis, or benefits received basis;
  5. “Legislative body” means the legislative body of any city of the home rule class;
  6. “Management district” means an area designated by a legislative body pursuant to KRS 91A.555 to 91A.580 , that is to be benefited by economic improvements and subjected to the payment of special assessments for the costs of the economic improvements;
  7. “Property” means any real property benefited by economic improvements; and
  8. “Special assessment” means a special charge fixed on property to finance economic improvements in whole or in part.

History. Enact. Acts 1990, ch. 226, § 1, effective July 13, 1990; 2014, ch. 92, § 93, effective January 1, 2015.

91A.555. Authority to establish management districts in city of home rule class.

A city of the home rule class may establish one (1) or more management districts pursuant to KRS 91A.550 to 91A.580 , for the purpose of providing and financing economic improvements that specially benefit property within the management district.

History. Enact. Acts 1990, ch. 226, § 2, effective July 13, 1990; 2014, ch. 92, § 94, effective January 1, 2015.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Authority of city.

Circuit court properly dismissed a commercial property owner's claims for declaratory and injunctive relief against a city and two non-profit corporations for lack of a justiciable case or controversy because the issues on appeal were not ripe for judicial determination where the city's decision to pass or decline to pass an ordinance was not one that could be compelled by the court, a petition was circulated, but the requisite signatures had not been obtained, the preliminary planning was within the city's statutory authority, and the issue of the property owners' right to withdraw their signatures from the petition was moot. Berger Family Real Estate, LLC v. City of Covington, 464 S.W.3d 160, 2015 Ky. App. LEXIS 80 (Ky. Ct. App. 2015).

91A.560. Petition requesting formation of management district.

  1. A city may initiate proceedings to establish a management district upon receipt by the mayor of a written petition requesting the formation of a management district. A petition requesting the formation of a management district shall contain:
    1. The signatures and addresses of a number of real property owners, who together are the owners of fifty-one percent (51%) or more of the properties within the proposed district and who are the owners of real property equal to at least fifty-one percent (51%) of the assessed value of property within the proposed management district;
    2. An accurate description of the boundaries of the proposed management district;
    3. An economic improvement plan that shall provide:
      1. A description of the economic improvements to be provided within the district;
      2. A preliminary estimate of the annual costs of the proposed economic improvements; and
      3. The proposed method of assessing the costs of the economic improvements against the properties;
    4. The proposed makeup of the board of the management district, its powers and duties; and
    5. The number of years in which the assessments are proposed to be levied, not to exceed five (5) years.
  2. When a petition satisfying the requirements of subsection (1) of this section is received by the mayor, he shall forward it to the legislative body which may proceed to enact an ordinance establishing a management district as provided in KRS 91A.565 .

History. Enact. Acts 1990, ch. 226, § 3, effective July 13, 1990.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Authority of city.

Circuit court properly dismissed a commercial property owner's claims for declaratory and injunctive relief against a city and two non-profit corporations for lack of a justiciable case or controversy because the issues on appeal were not ripe for judicial determination where the city's decision to pass or decline to pass an ordinance was not one that could be compelled by the court, a petition was circulated, but the requisite signatures had not been obtained, the preliminary planning was within the city's statutory authority, and the issue of the property owners' right to withdraw their signatures from the petition was moot. Berger Family Real Estate, LLC v. City of Covington, 464 S.W.3d 160, 2015 Ky. App. LEXIS 80 (Ky. Ct. App. 2015).

91A.565. Ordinance establishing management district.

  1. An ordinance establishing a management district shall include, but not be limited to, the following provisions:
    1. An accurate description of the boundaries of the management district designated either by map or perimeter description;
    2. A description of the economic improvements that may be undertaken within the management district by its board, including but not limited to:
      1. The planning, administration, and management of development or improvement activities;
      2. Landscaping, maintenance, and cleaning of public ways and spaces;
      3. The promotion of commercial activity or public events;
      4. The conduct of activities in support of business recruitment and development;
      5. The provision of security for public areas;
      6. The construction and maintenance of capital improvements to public ways and spaces; and
      7. Any other economic improvement activity that specially benefits property;
    3. A requirement that the legislative body approve the annual budget and annual economic improvement plan for the district and establish a procedure and schedule for such approval;
    4. The method of assessment of the properties that may include any fair basis authorized by KRS 91A.200 to 91A.290 ;
    5. The method for collection of the assessment;
    6. The number of years, not exceeding five (5) years, that the assessments shall be levied;
    7. A method by which the annual increase in assessments caused by inflation, new growth, and other factors shall be limited;
    8. The makeup of the board for the management district and its powers and duties; and
    9. Any other provisions deemed necessary by the legislative body to implement the provisions of KRS 91A.550 to 91A.580 .
  2. After the first reading of the ordinance to establish the management district, but prior to its second reading and passage, a public hearing on the question of the establishment of the management district shall be held by the legislative body.
  3. A summary of the proposed plan for the management district shall be published in a newspaper in accordance with KRS Chapter 424 no less than twice, at least seven (7) but not earlier than twenty-one (21) days before the date of the public hearing. Notice shall also specify the date, time, and place of the hearing. In addition, a copy of the proposed ordinance and the notice of the hearing shall be mailed, by first class mail, to all property owners within the proposed management district.
  4. After the public hearing, the legislative body may give second reading to the ordinance that shall become effective if passed and approved pursuant to KRS 83A.060 .
  5. After the establishment of a management district, the legislative body shall not decrease the level of publicly funded services in the management district existing prior to the creation of the district or transfer the burden of providing the services, unless the services at the same time are decreased throughout the city.

History. Enact. Acts 1990, ch. 226, § 4, effective July 13, 1990.

91A.570. Duties of the board for the management district — Annual assessment — Collection — Appeal — Lien.

  1. Upon the effective date of the ordinance establishing the management district, the board shall implement the economic improvement plan adopted by the legislative body.
  2. As soon as practicable after its appointment, and each year thereafter as provided by ordinance, the board shall develop a plan for economic improvements within the management district and shall prepare an annual detailed budget for the costs of providing economic improvements and shall submit the plan and budget to the legislative body for its approval.
  3. Upon approval of the economic improvement plan and annual budget, the board shall:
    1. Submit the budget to the Department for Local Government as provided in KRS 65A.020 ;
    2. Publish pursuant to KRS Chapter 424 and mail by first-class mail to each affected property owner a description of the plan, the fair basis of assessment to be utilized, the estimated cost to the property owner, and the ratio that the cost to each property owner bears to the total cost of the economic improvements.
  4. The ordinance establishing the management district shall provide a procedure for the annual collection of the assessment for the economic improvements.
    1. The board may be directed to annually prepare and mail by first -class mail to an owner of each parcel of real property the annual assessment, and to establish due dates and penalties and interest, if any, for delinquent payment; or
    2. The annual assessment may be collected in the same manner, at the same times, and by the office authorized by law for the collection and enforcement of general city taxes, in which case the collector of taxes shall make regular remittances of the amounts collected to the board. The penalties and interest for delinquent taxes may be applied to delinquent assessments, or separate penalties and interest may be imposed; however, no discount shall be provided for early payment.
    3. Notwithstanding the method of collection for the assessment that is adopted, any affected property owner shall be afforded the right to contest the amount of assessment or the inclusion of his property. The contest shall be filed with the board within thirty (30) days of the receipt of the assessment. The property owner shall have the right to appear before the board and present evidence. A record shall be made of the proceedings and the board shall render a written decision. The decision of the board may be appealed to the Circuit Court of the county in which the city is located.
  5. The amount of any outstanding assessment on any property, and accrued interest and other charges, shall constitute a lien on the property. The lien shall take precedence over all other liens, whether created prior to or subsequent to the assessment, except a lien for state and county taxes, general municipal taxes, and prior improvement assessments, and shall not be defeated or postponed by any private or judicial sale, by any mortgage, or by any error or mistake in the description of the property or in the names of the owners. No error in the proceedings of the city legislative body or the board shall exempt any property from the lien for the economic improvement assessment, or from payment thereof, or from the penalties or interest thereon, as herein provided.

History. Enact. Acts 1990, ch. 226, § 5, effective July 13, 1990; 2013, ch. 40, § 42, effective March 21, 2013.

91A.575. Powers and duties of the management district board.

  1. The management district shall constitute a body corporate with the power to sue and be sued, and to contract, and shall be controlled by the board.
  2. The number of members of the board, their terms and qualifications, shall be established by the ordinance creating the district. No fewer than a majority of the board shall be property owners within the district. The board members shall be appointed by the mayor of the city, with the approval of the legislative body.
  3. The powers of the board shall include all powers set forth in KRS 91A.550 to 91A.580 and the ordinance establishing the management district. The board may employ or contract with persons to assist it in its responsibilities.
    1. The board shall manage the fiscal affairs of the management district and shall adopt regulations governing the investment and disbursement of funds. (4) (a) The board shall manage the fiscal affairs of the management district and shall adopt regulations governing the investment and disbursement of funds.
    2. The board may borrow money on a short-term basis as required.
    3. The board may hold funds in the name of the management district or may designate the city as the fiscal agent for the management district.
    4. Money derived from the assessments imposed pursuant to KRS 91A.550 to 91A.580 shall be used only for economic improvements and the cost of administration of the management district and shall be used for no other purposes.
    5. As soon as practicable after the close of the fiscal year, the board shall cause an audit to be performed of all funds of the management district by a certified public accountant.
    6. The board shall comply with the provisions of KRS 65A.010 to 65A.090 .
  4. In addition to receiving funds from assessments, the board shall be authorized to receive grants, donations, and gifts.

History. Enact. Acts 1990, ch. 226, § 6, effective July 13, 1990; 2013, ch. 40, § 43, effective March 21, 2013.

91A.580. Management district boundary change — District renewal or dissolution — Disposal of excess funds.

  1. The boundaries of the management district may be changed at any time by the legislative body in the same manner as provided in KRS 91A.550 to 91A.580 for the establishment of the management district.
  2. The management district may be renewed for subsequent periods, not to exceed five (5) years, by the legislative body. Prior to such renewal, the board shall prepare an economic improvement plan for the renewal period. The ordinance establishing the management district may provide for automatic renewals if the economic improvement plan is prepared for the renewal period. The management district shall not be renewed if a petition is received that objects to the renewal and is signed by a number of real property owners, who together are the owners of real property equal to at least fifty-one percent (51%) of the assessed value of property within the management district.
  3. The management district shall be dissolved by the legislative body upon the receipt of a petition requesting dissolution that is signed by a number of real property owners who together are the owners of fifty-one percent (51%) or more of the properties within the proposed district and who are the owners of real property within the management district equal to at least fifty-one percent (51%) of the assessed value of the property within the management district.
  4. If a management district is terminated or not renewed for a subsequent period, and after the payment of all obligations and costs of administration incurred on behalf of the management district, there remain excess funds from assessments paid by property owners, the city shall by ordinance provide for:
    1. The return of any excess funds to the owners of properties in amounts proportionate to the amounts of the assessments they paid for the district; or
    2. Use of the excess funds for continued provision of the economic improvements until the excess funds are fully spent; or
    3. Use of part of the excess funds for continued provision of economic improvements and return of the balance of the excess funds in proportionate amounts to affected property owners.

History. Enact. Acts 1990, ch. 226, § 7, effective July 13, 1990.

CHAPTER 92 Finance and Revenue of Cities Other Than the First Class

Application of Chapter

92.010. Effect of chapter on cities under commission or city manager form of government. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3189a, 3544a-16a) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980.

Fiscal Year

92.020. Fiscal year for cities other than the first class. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2741w, 3176, 3402: amend. Acts 1946, ch. 85, § 1; 1948, ch. 130; 1968, ch. 152, § 67) was repealed by Acts 1982, ch. 434, § 15, effective July 15, 1982.

Financial Officers

92.030. Treasurer and deputy in cities of second class — City depository. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3131, 3132: amend. Acts 1950, ch. 123, § 29) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 232, § 7 and by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980.

92.040. Report and settlement by treasurer in cities of second class. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3189) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 232, § 7 and by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980.

92.050. Treasurer in cities of third class. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3331 to 3337) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980.

92.060. Treasurer in cities of fourth class. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3554, 3555: amend. Acts 1966, ch. 239, § 66) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980.

92.070. Duties of treasurer in cities of fifth and sixth classes — Settlements. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3626, 3683) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980.

92.080. Auditor in cities of second class — Appointment and powers. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3126, 3127, 3129, 3130) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980.

92.090. Duties of auditor in cities of second class — Records. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3127 to 3129, 3211: amend. Acts 1976 (1st Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 106, effective January 2, 1978) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 232, § 7 and by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980.

92.100. Auditor in cities of third class. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3324 to 3330) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 232, § 7 and by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980.

92.110. Assessor and deputies in cities of second class. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3177) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980.

92.120. Assessor and deputies in cities of third class. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3404 to 3411) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980.

92.130. Assessor and deputies in cities of fourth class. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3531, 3532, 3541: amend. Acts 1976, ch. 356, § 4) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980.

92.140. Delinquent tax collector in cities of second class. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3188) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980.

92.150. Collector and deputy in cities of third class — Collector-treasurer or clerk-collector. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3395, 3412, 3413, 3423, 3425: amend. Acts 1950, ch. 163, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980.

92.160. Collector in cities of fourth class — When treasurer or clerk maybe made collector. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3545-1) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980.

92.170. Proceedings when clerk is made collector in cities of fourth class — Collection of street assessments. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3545-2, 3545-3: amend. Acts 1958, ch. 126, § 9; 1966, ch. 255, § 99) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980.

92.180. Collector in cities of fifth class. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3629a-7, 3629a-8: amend. Acts 1952, ch. 185, § 1(3), effective June 19, 1952) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980.

92.190. Collector in cities of sixth class. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3677, 3687) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980.

Sinking Fund

92.200. Commissioners of sinking fund in cities of second class. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3190, 3195) was repealed by Acts 1982, ch. 434, § 15, effective July 15, 1982.

92.210. Annual tax for sinking fund purposes. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3191) was repealed by Acts 1982, ch. 434, § 15, effective July 15, 1982.

92.220. Administration and investment of sinking fund. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3192 to 3194) was repealed by Acts 1982, ch. 434, § 15, effective July 15, 1982.

92.230. Board of sinking fund commissioners in cities of third class. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3290-37) was repealed by Acts 1982, ch. 434, § 15, effective July 15, 1982.

Appointment and Organization of Boards of Equalization and Boards of Supervisors

92.240. Board of equalization in cities of second class. [Repealed.]

  1. Each city of the second class shall have a board of equalization, to consist of three (3) persons selected by the city legislative body. No person shall be appointed a member of the board of equalization unless he is at the time a housekeeper and owner of real estate in the city, and has been a resident thereof for at least five (5) years next preceding his appointment. The board shall be paid such compensation as is fixed by ordinance. The members of the board shall take oath faithfully to discharge their duties, and shall elect from among themselves a chairman and a clerk.
  2. The board may cause the custodian of any city records to bring the records before the board for its inspection, and may retain them for defense, if necessary, by giving its receipt to the custodian. The board may also interrogate any city official, who shall, at its request, attend the meeting of the board and respond to all questions. Each member of the board may administer oaths, and the board may compel attendance of witnesses. A majority of a quorum may determine any question before the board.

History. 3181: amend. Acts 1942, ch. 148, §§ 1, 3; § 314.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3181: amend. Acts 1942, ch. 148, §§ 1, 3) was repealed by Acts 2014, ch. 92, § 314, effective January 1, 2015.

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Appointment by board of commissioners under city manager form of government, KRS 83A.150 .

Kentucky Law Journal.

Property Assessment Remedies for the Kentucky Taxpayer, 60 Ky. L.J. 84 (1971).

92.242. City board of tax supervisors.

  1. The board of tax supervisors shall consist of three (3) members who live in the city and own real property within the corporate limits of the city. Each member shall be appointed annually by the mayor, subject to the approval of the city legislative body. The members of the board of tax supervisors may be compensated as set out in ordinance.
  2. Each member of the board of tax supervisors shall take an oath to faithfully discharge his or her duties. The board shall elect from among its membership a chair. The board shall elect a member to serve as secretary unless the city provides by ordinance another individual to serve as clerk for the board.
  3. The board may cause the custodian of any city records to bring the records before the board for inspection, and may retain them for defense, if necessary, by giving its receipt to the custodian. The board may interrogate any city official who shall, at its request, attend the meeting of the board and respond to all questions. Each member of the board may administer oaths, and the board may compel attendance of witnesses.
  4. The board of tax supervisors shall carefully examine the assessor’s books and correct any errors of the assessor that are found. The board shall hear complaints of taxpayers either made in person, by agent, or by attorney, and may add to, increase, or decrease any list of property or the value thereof, or change the name of the person assessed.
  5. The board of tax supervisors shall provide at least ten (10) days’ printed notice of its meeting by publication pursuant to KRS Chapter 424.
  6. Failure or informality in the meetings or proceedings of the board of tax supervisors shall not affect the validity of any tax.

History. Enact. Acts 2014, ch. 92, § 104, effective January 1, 2015.

92.250. Board of supervisors in cities of third class. [Repealed.]

Between January 1 and February 1 of each year the mayor of each city of the third class shall, subject to the approval of the common council, appoint three (3) intelligent housekeepers residing in different wards of the city, who shall constitute the board of tax supervisors for the city.

History. 3382; § 314.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3382) was repealed by Acts 2014, ch. 92, § 314, effective January 1, 2015.

92.260. Supervisors of taxes in cities of the fourth class. [Repealed.]

The city council of each city of the fourth class shall each year appoint three (3) discreet freeholders as supervisors of taxes, and fix their compensation. The supervisors shall qualify by taking oath faithfully to perform the duties of their office without favor to rich or poor. They shall select a chairman by vote or lot, and he or either of the supervisors may administer an oath to tell the whole truth concerning his taxable property to any person appearing to have an assessment corrected.

History. 3542: amend. Acts 1954, ch. 88, § 1, effective June 17, 1954; § 314.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3542: amend. Acts 1954, ch. 88, § 1, effective June 17, 1954) was repealed by Acts 2014, ch. 92, § 314, effective January 1, 2015.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Increase of Assessments.

Board of supervisors may be appointed and meet at a time different from that prescribed by law, and when so convened may validly increase assessments. City of Richmond v. Shackelford, 187 Ky. 789 , 220 S.W. 758, 1920 Ky. LEXIS 206 (Ky. Ct. App. 1920).

Cited:

Board of Sup’rs v. Smith, 278 Ky. 223 , 128 S.W.2d 546, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 392 ( Ky. 1939 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

One not owning real estate is not qualified to serve as a member of the board of supervisors. OAG 62-540 .

Where two (2) of the three (3) members of the board of supervisors were qualified to serve, the presence of a third member not properly sitting did not destroy the validity of the acts of the board. OAG 62-540 .

92.270. Board of equalization in cities in fifth and sixth classes. [Repealed.]

  1. The legislative body of each city of the fifth class and sixth class that does not adopt the county assessment as made, shall appoint three (3) discreet property owners as a board of equalization.
  2. Each member of the board in a city of the fifth class shall receive five dollars ($5) for each day of actual service, and in a city of the sixth class not more than five dollars ($5) for each day of actual service.
  3. The city clerk shall act as clerk of the board of equalization.

History. 3645, 3678: amend. Acts 1956, ch. 34, § 1; 1986, ch. 23, § 5, effective July 15, 1986; § 314.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3645, 3678: amend. Acts 1956, ch. 34, § 1; 1986, ch. 23, § 5, effective July 15, 1986) was repealed by Acts 2014, ch. 92, § 314, effective January 1, 2015.

Taxation

92.280. General power of urban-county government and city of home rule class to tax.

  1. Except as provided in KRS 132.487 , the legislative body of an urban-county government and each city of the home rule class shall provide each year, by ordinance, for the assessment of all real and personal property within the corporate limits that is subject to taxation for urban-county government or city purposes, and shall levy an ad valorem tax thereon for those purposes.
  2. The legislative body of an urban-county government and each city of the home rule class may impose license fees on stock used for breeding purposes, and on franchises, trades, occupations, and professions, and may provide for the collection of such fees.

History. 3174, 3290-1, 3290-12, 3490-2, 3490-3, 3637-2 to 3637-4, 3704-2, 3704-3, 4281u-1: amend. Acts 1946, ch. 184; 1974, ch. 316, § 2; 1974, ch. 386, § 16; 1984, ch. 54, § 11, effective January 1, 1985; 2014, ch. 92, § 95, effective January 1, 2015.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

This section is general in its application, in that any or all cities of the third class are granted the same power and privilege, hence it does not violate subsection twenty-ninth of Const., § 59. Planters Bank & Trust Co. v. Hopkinsville, 289 Ky. 451 , 159 S.W.2d 25, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 584 ( Ky. 1942 ).

2. Construction.

Taxing statutes are presumed prospective, unless a retrospective operation is clearly indicated. Ohio Valley Tel. Co. v. Louisville, 123 Ky. 193 , 94 S.W. 17, 29 Ky. L. Rptr. 631 , 29 Ky. L. Rptr. 682 , 1906 Ky. LEXIS 132 ( Ky. 1906 ).

This section authorizes cities of the third class to enforce collection of license taxes and fees levied under the section. Planters Bank & Trust Co. v. Hopkinsville, 289 Ky. 451 , 159 S.W.2d 25, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 584 ( Ky. 1942 ).

3. Power to Tax.

It is exclusively the power and duty of the city legislative body to raise money for municipal purposes. Board of Education v. Paducah, 108 Ky. 209 , 56 S.W. 149, 21 Ky. L. Rptr. 1650 , 1900 Ky. LEXIS 32 ( Ky. 1900 ).

Fact that for many years town trustees had not used their power of taxation over certain part of town did not estop them from exercising that power whenever they might choose to do so. Mullins v. Wilson, 282 Ky. 316 , 138 S.W.2d 484, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 168 ( Ky. 1940 ).

The power to tax belongs by necessary implication to every incorporated city, and a city charter is not invalid because of its failure to grant specifically the power to tax. Mullins v. Wilson, 282 Ky. 316 , 138 S.W.2d 484, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 168 ( Ky. 1940 ).

A city is without any inherent authority to tax or regulate and is confined to any exercise of such powers by the authority delegated by the state. Erlanger v. KSL Realty Corp., 704 S.W.2d 649, 1986 Ky. LEXIS 228 ( Ky. 1986 ).

4. — Exemption.

A city cannot contract to release street railway company from payment of all taxes other than an ad valorem tax on real and personal property. South Covington & C. S. R. Co. v. Bellevue, 105 Ky. 283 , 49 S.W. 23, 20 Ky. L. Rptr. 1184 , 1899 Ky. LEXIS 212 ( Ky. 1899 ).

A city may tax its bonds held by a bank, in the absence of any contract or ordinance exempting them from municipal taxation. Bank of Russellville v. Russellville, 133 Ky. 637 , 118 S.W. 921, 1909 Ky. LEXIS 214 ( Ky. 1909 ).

5. Levy.

The city legislative body may levy a tax rate sufficient to provide for sinking fund for payment of bonded indebtedness. O'Bryan v. Owensboro, 113 Ky. 680 , 68 S.W. 858, 69 S.W. 800, 24 Ky. L. Rptr. 469 , 24 Ky. L. Rptr. 645 , 1902 Ky. LEXIS 92 ( Ky. 1902 ), overruled, Nelson County Fiscal Court v. McCrocklin, 175 Ky. 199 , 194 S.W. 323, 1917 Ky. LEXIS 316 ( Ky. 1917 ).

To maintain a levy of taxes it is indispensable that there should be an assessment of the property upon which the levy must be based. City of Covington v. Carroll, 108 S.W. 295, 32 Ky. L. Rptr. 1255 (1908).

Where levy for 1927 was not recorded and was thus void, city could in 1928 make a legal levy for 1927. Morton v. Fullerton, 229 Ky. 76 , 16 S.W.2d 797, 1929 Ky. LEXIS 707 ( Ky. 1929 ).

Where proceedings were instituted to dissolve a sixth-class city, creditors were entitled to mandamus to compel the trustees to perform their statutory duty to levy and collect taxes sufficient to pay the creditors’ claims. Drane v. Weston, 276 Ky. 810 , 125 S.W.2d 722, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 592 ( Ky. 1939 ).

If a city of the sixth class levied the maximum tax rate each year, an indebtedness incurred in those years is invalid unless it can be shown it was for necessary governmental purposes and a plan to fund the resulting floating indebtedness was improper. Henderson v. Mt. Vernon, 279 Ky. 829 , 132 S.W.2d 322, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 359 ( Ky. 1939 ).

Since KRS 97.281 gives all classes of cities authority to levy any and all taxes provided for in Const., § 181, a city of the second class has the authority to levy an occupational license tax upon the privilege of engaging in a business or profession or carrying on an occupation within the city, although the city has an ad valorem tax on personal property. Kohler v. Benckart, 252 S.W.2d 854, 1952 Ky. LEXIS 1025 ( Ky. 1952 ), overruled in part, D & W Auto Supply v. Department of Revenue, 602 S.W.2d 420, 1980 Ky. LEXIS 243 ( Ky. 1980 ), overruled on other grounds,. D & W Auto Supply v. Department of Revenue, 602 S.W.2d 420, 1980 Ky. LEXIS 243 ( Ky. 1980 ).

6. — Validity.

A tax levy made by less than a legal quorum of the city legislative body is invalid and unenforceable. Somerset v. Somerset Banking Co., 109 Ky. 549 , 60 S.W. 5, 22 Ky. L. Rptr. 1129 , 1900 Ky. LEXIS 239 ( Ky. 1900 ).

Ordinance imposing ten dollar yearly license fee on each coin operated merchandise vending machine was valid. Harrodsburg v. Devine, 418 S.W.2d 426, 1967 Ky. LEXIS 218 ( Ky. 1967 ).

7. — Limitation.

The courts cannot inquire into the necessity of a tax levy made by a city legislative body, if within the limits prescribed by the Constitution. Mayfield Woolen Mills v. Mayfield, 111 Ky. 172 , 61 S.W. 43, 22 Ky. L. Rptr. 1676 , 1901 Ky. LEXIS 169 ( Ky. 1901 ).

Where city levied tax in excess of statutory limit for cities of its class it exceeded its powers, and the Circuit Court could enjoin collection of tax in excess of correct levy. London v. Brown, 183 Ky. 63 , 208 S.W. 317, 1919 Ky. LEXIS 436 ( Ky. 1919 ).

Levy by city to pay for fire engine truck was not invalid because it included upkeep and handling of truck, where total levy did not exceed statutory limit. Ward v. Lester, 235 Ky. 595 , 31 S.W.2d 924, 1930 Ky. LEXIS 413 ( Ky. 1930 ).

8. — Real Property.

Cities are to levy taxes upon all real property within city, unless exempted by the constitution, regardless of any question of benefits or protection to property from city government. Board of Councilmen v. Scott, 101 Ky. 615 , 42 S.W. 104, 19 Ky. L. Rptr. 1068 , 1897 Ky. LEXIS 228 ( Ky. 1897 ); Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Barboursville, 105 Ky. 174 , 48 S.W. 985, 20 Ky. L. Rptr. 1105 , 1898 Ky. LEXIS 251 ( Ky. 1898 ).

9. License Fee.

Since city license tax applied to residents as well as nonresidents, it was not invalid as discriminatory. West v. Mt. Sterling, 65 S.W. 120, 23 Ky. L. Rptr. 1670 , 1901 Ky. LEXIS 379 (Ky. Ct. App. 1901).

As a revenue measure, fee must be reasonably related to license fees for other public entertainments in the city. Ziedman & Pollie, Inc. v. Ashland, 244 Ky. 279 , 50 S.W.2d 557, 1932 Ky. LEXIS 409 ( Ky. 1932 ).

A rental tax on hotel and motel rooms is a permissible license tax and not an excise tax which a city may not levy under Const., § 181, but in this case the tax violated the provisions of Const., § 171 as the tax imposed is heavier than that imposed on other business enterprises, as there is no reasonable basis for the difference in the tax rates. Lexington v. Motel Developers, Inc., 465 S.W.2d 253, 1971 Ky. LEXIS 443 ( Ky. 1971 ).

This section delegates to cities of the second to sixth classes the licensing power authorized under Ky. Const., § 181. Baker v. Corbin, 556 S.W.2d 449, 1977 Ky. App. LEXIS 817 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).

Where a license tax on apartment buildings was incremental based upon the number of units available for rental but exempted owners of one to three units, the tax bore no relation to amount of business and there was no showing that the question of administrative convenience or expense was raised; therefore, the tax was invalid. Beverly P. White Towers Ltd. Partnership v. Winchester, 704 S.W.2d 651, 1986 Ky. LEXIS 221 ( Ky. 1986 ).

10. — Amount.

If it is a police measure, the amount charged as a license fee should in some measure correspond to the cost of extra police service that might be rendered necessary. Ziedman & Pollie, Inc. v. Ashland, 244 Ky. 279 , 50 S.W.2d 557, 1932 Ky. LEXIS 409 ( Ky. 1932 ).

Ordinarily, the amount of a license fee imposed as a tax is a question for the taxing power, and the courts will not interfere with its discretion unless the tax amounts to a prohibition of a useful and legitimate business. White v. Richmond, 293 Ky. 477 , 169 S.W.2d 315, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 650 ( Ky. 1943 ).

11. — Franchises.

A franchise is property, and it must, under the Constitution, pay the same rate of taxation paid by other property. South Covington & C. S. R. Co. v. Bellevue, 105 Ky. 283 , 49 S.W. 23, 20 Ky. L. Rptr. 1184 , 1899 Ky. LEXIS 212 ( Ky. 1899 ).

The power given to cities to impose and collect license fees upon all franchises is a revenue provision. Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Hopkins, 121 Ky. 850 , 90 S.W. 594, 28 Ky. L. Rptr. 846 , 1906 Ky. LEXIS 268 ( Ky. 1906 ).

12. — Foreign Corporation.

Where agent of foreign corporation obtained orders in city in this state and corporation delivered the goods into this state by own trucks, city ordinance imposing license tax on such company was unconstitutional as interfering with interstate commerce. Winchester v. Lohrey Packing Co., 237 S.W.2d 868, 1951 Ky. LEXIS 789 ( Ky. 1951 ).

13. — Brewers.

In absence of some special restriction, a city may impose both a license tax for regulatory purposes and a license tax for revenue purposes but the $500 fee imposed on brewers under KRS 243.070 places a limit on all city license fees whether regulatory or to raise revenue and a general occupational license fee levied by city ordinance for revenue purposes cannot be collected from brewers. George Wiedemann Brewing Co. v. Newport, 321 S.W.2d 404, 1959 Ky. LEXIS 282 ( Ky. 1959 ).

14. — Pool Tables.

The city legislative body has the exclusive right and authority to pass upon the issuance of a license for pool tables. Decker v. Gilbert, 140 Ky. 108 , 130 S.W. 960, 1910 Ky. LEXIS 177 ( Ky. 1910 ).

15. — Motor Vehicles.

It was within power of the legislature, in imposing license taxes upon motor vehicles, to forbid municipalities imposing any additional fees or taxes thereon. Pineville v. Meeks, 254 Ky. 167 , 71 S.W.2d 33, 1934 Ky. LEXIS 48 ( Ky. 1934 ).

A city may, under the police power, levy a reasonable license fee on owners residing within corporation limits, of automobiles not used for hire. Daily v. Owensboro, 257 Ky. 281 , 77 S.W.2d 939, 1934 Ky. LEXIS 550 ( Ky. 1934 ).

An ordinance of a city of the fifth class, which did not regulate trucks, but licensed and taxed them at a graduated rate based on load capacity, so that license fees represented approximately 10 percent of the city’s revenues, was valid as a police measure, and not a revenue measure, since such fees were not shown to be unreasonable in view of the damage done to streets by heavy trucks. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co. v. Lancaster, 276 Ky. 585 , 124 S.W.2d 745, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 558 ( Ky. 1938 ).

A city having authority to levy a license tax on trucks using its streets may base the tax upon type, size, horsepower or number of trucks used. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co. v. Lancaster, 276 Ky. 585 , 124 S.W.2d 745, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 558 ( Ky. 1938 ).

A city of the fifth class may, under its police power, impose a license tax on firms doing business in the city by operating trucks on its streets, other than common carriers or contract carriers. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co. v. Lancaster, 276 Ky. 585 , 124 S.W.2d 745, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 558 ( Ky. 1938 ).

A city ordinance taxing all firms operating their own motor trucks on the city streets did not violate KRS 281.010 to 281.990 , since that statute regulated only common carriers and contract carriers. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co. v. Lancaster, 276 Ky. 585 , 124 S.W.2d 745, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 558 ( Ky. 1938 ).

An ordinance taxing trucks operating within a city, on the basis of load capacity, regardless of the number of miles actually traveled over the streets, was not discriminatory or confiscatory, and did not violate United States Const., Amend. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co. v. Lancaster, 276 Ky. 585 , 124 S.W.2d 745, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 558 ( Ky. 1938 ).

A city ordinance enacted under KRS 186.270 may tax each of the trucks owned by a single firm and operated by it over the city streets. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co. v. Lancaster, 276 Ky. 585 , 124 S.W.2d 745, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 558 ( Ky. 1938 ).

City of second class may impose license tax on all persons regularly operating automobiles within the city limits, including nonresidents using automobiles in going to and returning from work in the city. Johnson v. Paducah, 285 Ky. 294 , 147 S.W.2d 721, 1941 Ky. LEXIS 380 ( Ky. 1941 ).

16. — — Nonresidents.

Nonresidents operating motor vehicles for carrying passengers and freight and doing business within the city are subject to city license taxes on such motor vehicles. Young & Jones v. Campbellsville, 199 Ky. 284 , 250 S.W. 979, 1923 Ky. LEXIS 816 ( Ky. 1923 ).

Ordinance of city of fourth class imposing license tax on automobiles of nonresidents used in going to and returning from work within the city established an unreasonable classification and was arbitrary and invalid under Const., § 171, where tax was not imposed on residents of the city. Davis v. Pelfrey, 285 Ky. 298 , 147 S.W.2d 723, 1941 Ky. LEXIS 381 ( Ky. 1941 ).

Fact that appellant, a nonresident wholesaler, delivered previously ordered goods in its own trucks, whereas competing nonresident wholesalers delivered in a manner exempt from tax, did not entitle it to license as an operator of a truck “engaged in commerce for hire” instead of as a nonresident wholesaler selling and delivering inside the city. Jellico Grocery Co. v. Whitesburg, 286 Ky. 470 , 151 S.W.2d 35, 1941 Ky. LEXIS 280 ( Ky. 1941 ).

Fact that a nonresident wholesaler delivering previously ordered goods did not make regularly scheduled trips did not exempt it, under doctrine of isolated transactions, from paying a license tax as a nonresident wholesaler selling and delivering inside the city, although it might do so as a truck license. Jellico Grocery Co. v. Whitesburg, 286 Ky. 470 , 151 S.W.2d 35, 1941 Ky. LEXIS 280 ( Ky. 1941 ).

17. — Double Taxation.

Attempted license tax was a tax upon a privilege included in the property tax already imposed as a franchise tax, and therefore invalid as a tax upon the same property against the same owner for the same year. Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Hopkins, 121 Ky. 850 , 90 S.W. 594, 28 Ky. L. Rptr. 846 , 1906 Ky. LEXIS 268 ( Ky. 1906 ).

18. — Recovery of Tax Paid.

When city required applicant for license to pay more than was authorized by charter, the excess payment was not a voluntary one and could be recovered. Bruner v. Clay City, 100 Ky. 567 , 38 S.W. 1062, 18 Ky. L. Rptr. 1008 , 1897 Ky. LEXIS 36 ( Ky. 1897 ).

Where ordinance annexing property to city was held void, retailer with place of business located on such property could recover license taxes paid to city, except tax paid for license as package liquor retailer, which had been issued by state board only because premises were thought to be within city. Breeden v. Dry Ridge, 293 Ky. 657 , 170 S.W.2d 24, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 693 ( Ky. 1943 ).

If person has received no benefit or privilege from a void ordinance, he may recover license taxes paid under the ordinance, notwithstanding that the ordinance was passed at his solicitation. Breeden v. Dry Ridge, 293 Ky. 657 , 170 S.W.2d 24, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 693 ( Ky. 1943 ).

19. Trades, Occupations and Professions.

The terms “trade” and “occupation” are used synonymously with the term “business.” R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Lexington, 181 Ky. 503 , 205 S.W. 592, 1918 Ky. LEXIS 568 ( Ky. 1918 ).

Municipal corporations have no inherent power to impose occupation license taxes, but only such power as is delegated to them by the state. Mayfield v. Reed, 278 Ky. 5 , 127 S.W.2d 847, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 367 ( Ky. 1939 ).

The power to tax occupations refers to occupations followed or carried on in the city, and not to people who come there under specific employment to attend to a special matter, or the performance of a single or isolated transaction. Mayfield v. Reed, 278 Ky. 5 , 127 S.W.2d 847, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 367 ( Ky. 1939 ).

That occupational taxes are at times retaliatory is not a matter for the courts to redress. Jellico Grocery Co. v. Whitesburg, 286 Ky. 470 , 151 S.W.2d 35, 1941 Ky. LEXIS 280 ( Ky. 1941 ).

Cities have no inherent right to enact an occupational license ordinance. Paducah Automotive Trades Ass'n v. Paducah, 307 Ky. 524 , 211 S.W.2d 660, 1948 Ky. LEXIS 769 ( Ky. 1948 ).

Municipal ordinance imposing $35 fee on each taxicab, purportedly on occupation of operating taxicab, was revenue measure and not occupational tax and was therefore invalid. Pineville v. Lewis, 246 S.W.2d 584, 1952 Ky. LEXIS 639 ( Ky. 1952 ).

20. — Basis.

An ordinance imposing a license or privilege tax on all types of business in certain classes based upon the volume of business but with the percentage of the rate of taxation remaining the same regardless of the volume on which the amount of tax is determined, does not violate the Constitution, the statutory authorities and state precedents. Paducah Automotive Trades Ass'n v. Paducah, 307 Ky. 524 , 211 S.W.2d 660, 1948 Ky. LEXIS 769 ( Ky. 1948 ).

The imposition of city license taxes to cover general operating costs in excess of the ad valorem revenues must be based upon a fair apportionment of the cost of city services according to an objective standard reasonably related to the costs incurred. Erlanger v. KSL Realty Corp., 704 S.W.2d 649, 1986 Ky. LEXIS 228 ( Ky. 1986 ).

The law of this commonwealth permits imposition of license taxes calculated upon three theories — a uniform tax upon all persons engaged in the same business regardless of volume of business, a uniform tax upon volume of business, or a tax upon separate classes in a general class based upon the volume of business. Erlanger v. KSL Realty Corp., 704 S.W.2d 649, 1986 Ky. LEXIS 228 ( Ky. 1986 ).

21. — Classification.

Cities may classify different trades and occupations for taxation purposes, and subdivide the classes into particular classes by natural and well recognized lines of distinction. Williams v. Bowling Green, 254 Ky. 11 , 70 S.W.2d 967, 1934 Ky. LEXIS 12 ( Ky. 1934 ).

Ordinance classifying dry cleaners for licensing, with distinction between those operating plants within city and those operating them without city, was void because there was no sound basis for such classification. Long v. Benton, 285 Ky. 526 , 148 S.W.2d 701, 1941 Ky. LEXIS 424 ( Ky. 1941 ).

Cities of the second class have been given plenary power to enact ordinances imposing license taxes on trades, occupations and professions provided they are reasonable and are based on proper classifications. Paducah Automotive Trades Ass'n v. Paducah, 307 Ky. 524 , 211 S.W.2d 660, 1948 Ky. LEXIS 769 ( Ky. 1948 ).

22. — Limitation.

The power of the city to impose occupational license taxes is subject to no statutory limitations, territorial or otherwise. Judicial limitations are (1) that they not be discriminatory, (2) that they be based upon reasonable classification, and (3) that they not be confiscatory. There is no authority for further limitations. Jellico Grocery Co. v. Whitesburg, 286 Ky. 470 , 151 S.W.2d 35, 1941 Ky. LEXIS 280 ( Ky. 1941 ).

23. — Nonresident.

Fact that appellant was the only nonresident wholesaler using a truck and thus becoming subject to a certain occupational tax was not discriminatory since all nonresident wholesalers had right to deliver by truck. Jellico Grocery Co. v. Whitesburg, 286 Ky. 470 , 151 S.W.2d 35, 1941 Ky. LEXIS 280 ( Ky. 1941 ).

Fact that nonresident owns no property and has no agency within the city imposing the occupational tax is immaterial if it “does business” therein. Jellico Grocery Co. v. Whitesburg, 286 Ky. 470 , 151 S.W.2d 35, 1941 Ky. LEXIS 280 ( Ky. 1941 ).

24. — Excessive Tax.

An unreasonable or prohibitory tax under this power will not be sustained. Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. Owensboro, 151 Ky. 389 , 151 S.W. 932, 1912 Ky. LEXIS 811 ( Ky. 1912 ).

License fee of city of $1,500 per week upon carnival was so excessive as to be invalid. Ziedman & Pollie, Inc. v. Ashland, 244 Ky. 279 , 50 S.W.2d 557, 1932 Ky. LEXIS 409 ( Ky. 1932 ).

Claim that occupational taxes are confiscatory must be supported by evidence as to amount of profit derived. Jellico Grocery Co. v. Whitesburg, 286 Ky. 470 , 151 S.W.2d 35, 1941 Ky. LEXIS 280 ( Ky. 1941 ).

Whether an ordinance imposing a license tax on a business or occupation is excessive should be measured by the receipts from average patronage of similarly equipped concerns engaged in such business. Lone Star Shows, Inc. v. Commissioner of Sinking Fund, 294 Ky. 114 , 171 S.W.2d 28, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 399 ( Ky. 1943 ).

Where tax is so high as to result in taxed occupation earning no profit it is void. Lone Star Shows, Inc. v. Commissioner of Sinking Fund, 294 Ky. 114 , 171 S.W.2d 28, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 399 ( Ky. 1943 ).

Tax of $200 per day on carnivals was excessive and void. Lone Star Shows, Inc. v. Commissioner of Sinking Fund, 294 Ky. 114 , 171 S.W.2d 28, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 399 ( Ky. 1943 ).

25. — Accountants.

Ordinance taxing accountants did not apply to accountant from another state who was employed to make a single audit. Mayfield v. Reed, 278 Ky. 5 , 127 S.W.2d 847, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 367 ( Ky. 1939 ).

26. — Automobile Trailer Park.

City ordinance regulating automobile trailer parks, which required a space of 600 square feet of land for each trailer and imposed a fee of five dollars ($5.00) for each such space, and which prohibited the removing of the wheels of a trailer or otherwise permanently affixing it to the ground, was not unreasonable or arbitrary. White v. Richmond, 293 Ky. 477 , 169 S.W.2d 315, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 650 ( Ky. 1943 ).

A license tax imposed under police powers must be sufficient only to meet the city’s expenses of issuing the license and exercising supervisory regulation over the subject matter of the tax. There is no evidence that the expense in issuing a license for a multi-unit mobile home park is greater than the expense in issuing a license for a single unit mobile home park; therefore, a license tax based solely upon number of units is a revenue measure, not an exercise of the permissible police powers of the city. Erlanger v. KSL Realty Corp., 704 S.W.2d 649, 1986 Ky. LEXIS 228 ( Ky. 1986 ).

Where the city’s taxation of mobile home parks was on the number of spaces available for rental without consideration of the income derived therefrom or whether the space was rented or vacant, the license taxes were impermissibly fixed solely upon the number of units and were an illegal imposition of the occupational license tax. Erlanger v. KSL Realty Corp., 704 S.W.2d 649, 1986 Ky. LEXIS 228 ( Ky. 1986 ).

27. Mobile Home Park.

If it is clear that the amount of an occupational license tax is solely computed by the number of units an entity puts into operation, the tax is illegal and the mere fact that a unit, in this instance a mobile home park, does business is not sufficient to save the city’s occupational license tax ordinance where it is clear from the evidence that there is absolutely nothing about mobile home park’s actual volume of business in the City’s mathematical calculations. Erlanger v. KSL Realty Corp., 819 S.W.2d 707, 1991 Ky. LEXIS 152 ( Ky. 1991 ).

The City’s license tax as applied to mobile home park violates the constitutional requirement of uniformity and equality which is applicable to occupational license tax ordinances where a particular entity is singled out for special licensing and/or is required to bear a heavier burden than other entities are required to bear. Erlanger v. KSL Realty Corp., 819 S.W.2d 707, 1991 Ky. LEXIS 152 ( Ky. 1991 ).

28. — Trading Stamp Company.

A trading stamp company may be taxed under the power to tax franchises, trades, occupations and professions. Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. Owensboro, 151 Ky. 389 , 151 S.W. 932, 1912 Ky. LEXIS 811 ( Ky. 1912 ).

29. — Peddlers or Itinerant Retailers.

Cities may impose and collect a license fee upon peddlers or itinerant retailers of merchandise. Carlisle v. Hechinger, 103 Ky. 381 , 45 S.W. 358, 20 Ky. L. Rptr. 74 , 1898 Ky. LEXIS 77 ( Ky. 1898 ).

City license tax on “peddlers, or itinerant retailers,” did not violate state or federal constitution, nor interstate commerce law. West v. Mt. Sterling, 65 S.W. 120, 23 Ky. L. Rptr. 1670 , 1901 Ky. LEXIS 379 (Ky. Ct. App. 1901).

30. Poll Tax.

A person subject to poll tax is a “taxpayer” within the meaning of statutes conferring certain rights on taxpayers. De Haven v. Hardinsburg Graded Common School Dist., 164 Ky. 511 , 175 S.W. 994, 1915 Ky. LEXIS 398 ( Ky. 1915 ).

Cited:

Henderson v. Mt. Vernon, 279 Ky. 829 , 132 S.W.2d 322, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 359 ( Ky. 1939 ); Pineville v. Lewis, 246 S.W.2d 584, 1952 Ky. LEXIS 639 ( Ky. 1952 ); Grimm v. Moloney, 358 S.W.2d 496, 1962 Ky. LEXIS 180 ( Ky. 1962 ); Kelley v. Ashland, 562 S.W.2d 312, 1978 Ky. LEXIS 325 ( Ky. 1978 ); Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government v. Abney, 748 S.W.2d 376, 1988 Ky. App. LEXIS 53 (Ky. Ct. App. 1988); City of Barbourville v. Knox County Fiscal Court, 80 S.W.3d 765, 2001 Ky. App. LEXIS 75 (Ky. Ct. App. 2001).

Opinions of Attorney General.

While this section authorizes municipalities of the second to sixth class to levy an occupational license tax upon occupations, including the occupation of owning a vending machine, it does not empower a municipality to levy a tax on the vending machine itself. OAG 60-725 .

A municipality cannot impose a nominal occupation or use tax upon a franchise company in the absence of a franchise tax. OAG 60-1122 .

A city can impose both an occupational tax upon a business using a motor vehicle and a motor vehicle tax on the same motor vehicle subject to the limitations of KRS 189.280 and 281.830 . OAG 63-65 .

A city of the fourth class may either establish and operate a fire department or enter into a contract with an existing fire department and may obtain the money for either system through taxes imposed by city ordinance. OAG 64-247 .

Where a citizen of the county owned a boat that was licensed in the county but docked on a lake in another county, the boat would not be subject to tax in the city where the owner lived if it was satisfactorily shown that the boat was permanently located outside the city. OAG 65-18 .

The only way a city may obtain additional revenue is to increase the rate by not more than 10 percent after proper notice and hearing in conformity with KRS 68.240 . OAG 65-722 .

A city has no authority to annex territory and then exclude the same territory from the city tax rolls until certain benefits are furnished said territory. OAG 66-518 .

Merchants’ inventories are not exempted from ad valorem property tax in a city. OAG 67-13 .

The same rate that applies to other property subject to ad valorem property tax in the city should apply also to the value of the property assessed in merchants’ inventories. OAG 67-13 .

Agents for Avon products and for life insurance companies are not exempt from the payment of a city license fee. OAG 67-101 .

Where a city ordinance stated that the city’s first occupational license tax year began September 1, 1968, it actually began on September 3, 1968, since September 1 fell on a Sunday and September 2 was Labor Day, a legal holiday. OAG 69-263 .

The exemption from local taxation of domestic life insurance companies does not include agents of such companies. OAG 70-376 .

The city council of a fifth-class city can levy a two per cent occupational tax on its citizens. OAG 70-755 .

A city could legally levy a license tax and fee on a company’s agents who were soliciting students for a correspondence or home study school and such would also be applicable to any agents who came into that city from other states. OAG 71-479 .

Poll tax is not a prerequisite to the right to vote and is nothing more than another revenue measure for the taxing jurisdictions in question. OAG 72-816 .

Fourth class city may license private investigators for occupational tax purposes but there is no provision for the regulation or recognition of private detectives or security police and they are simply regarded as any other type of private enterprise with no privileges of arrest or carrying of concealed deadly weapon and have no authority not possessed by any private citizen. OAG 74-29 .

It is not possible to definitely conclude that a city occupational license tax ordinance does not have application to a county judge’s office. OAG 74-353 .

Cities or counties may not levy a poll tax since it has been eliminated by the amendment of KRS 68.090 , 160.475 and this section. OAG 74-631 .

A city may levy only three kinds of taxes (1) ad valorem under § 171, Ky. Const. (2) occupational or license taxes under § 181, Ky. Const., and (3) in lieu of an ad valorem tax, taxes on personal property, tangible or intangible, based on income, licenses or franchises, under KRS 92.281 and this section, and thus a $35.00 per year “charge” for fire protection service against residence and business property owners is not valid. OAG 75-411 .

A city of the fourth class has the authority to enact an occupational license tax ordinance whereby the city is empowered to examine the books and records of employers and taxpayers and reasonable inspections of licensees’ records, conducted in a manner fair to all competitors, are reasonable. OAG 75-519 .

A fee of 10¢ per ton charged by a city on coal processed or transported in the city is an excise tax and not a license tax and thus is not authorized by this section. OAG 76-32 .

Cities of the second to sixth classes may levy both a payroll tax and a gross receipt tax although it is not required that both be levied. OAG 76-101 .

A city of the second to sixth class may not levy both a gross receipt tax and a privilege tax since this would constitute double taxation due to the similarities of the taxes. OAG 76-101 .

In view of the fact that the City of Lexington occupational tax ordinance was continued in effect when the urban county government was formed, and since this section and KRS 92.281 do not call for a plebiscite, the present occupational tax is legal and does not require approval of the voters. OAG 78-802 .

A single isolated sale by a realtor under specific employment is not carrying on, conducting, or managing a business within a city’s licensing ordinance. OAG 79-477 .

If a real estate salesman posts a “for sale” sign, but makes no sale if this is a single isolated transaction or series of isolated transactions, a city occupational license tax ordinance should not apply. OAG 79-477 .

It is each independent real estate contractor/salesman, not the real estate broker, who is subject to a city’s occupational license tax. OAG 79-477 .

A city could not impose an occupational license fee on a district health department as a business operating within the city limits. OAG 80-578 .

Where an ice cream vendor has been licensed to sell ice cream from a truck on city streets within city limits, pursuant to Const., § 181, and this section, an independent park commission which runs a city park cannot separately license the vendor or prevent him from selling on a city street within the park in competition with a concession stand which the park commission leases out to another concessionaire, although the city may, by reasonable regulation, designate an area to which the truck sales are limited. OAG 81-190 .

A city of the sixth class can levy an ad valorem tax by ordinance and it need not hold a public hearing or election; however, for an ad valorem tax ordinance of a city of the sixth class to be valid, it must comply with all appropriate procedures and limitations contained in KRS Chapters 92 and 132. OAG 82-21 .

Although it is the primary responsibility of the marshal of a sixth-class city to collect the ad valorem tax, a sixth-class city may, pursuant to KRS 92.640 (now repealed), contract with the sheriff’s office to have its taxes collected by that official although the sheriff is not compelled to enter into such a contract. OAG 82-21 .

Any ad valorem tax ordinance enacted by a city of the sixth class must comply with the maximum rates as provided in KRS 132.027 . OAG 82-21 .

Although a fifth-class city may levy a license tax based on the licensee’s gross income pursuant to this section, the percentage rate of taxation would have to remain fixed because a license tax rate which was graduated according to the amount of gross sales made would be arbitrary and unequal under Const., §§ 2 and 171, and thus unconstitutional. OAG 82-33 .

A city of the fifth class may levy an occupational license fee, but it may not levy an income tax. OAG 82-290 .

The only taxes that a city may levy are (1) an ad valorem tax, (2) a license fee on trades, occupations, professions, etc., and (3) a tax on personal property, tangible and intangible, based on income, licenses or franchises, in lieu of an ad valorem tax thereon. OAG 82-290 .

A city of the fourth class has authority to enact an ordinance requiring its taxpayers to file federal income tax return schedules as a part of the city’s net profits tax returns as a verification of such returns. OAG 82-555 .

The forfeiture of funds mentioned in KRS 42.495 can only apply to an eligible city which has exercised the general assembly’s direction in this section and has engaged in a general tax effort, as defined in KRS 42.495 (2). OAG 82-558 .

A classification, for purposes of occupational license tax, of employer and employee is unreasonable and hence unconstitutional; the tax must be applied to all persons within a business, trade or occupation uniformly. OAG 84-76 .

Rental receipts received by an individual are susceptible to the imposition of a municipal occupational tax; a municipality contemplating the imposition of an occupational tax on rental proceeds should consider the inclusion within its enabling ordinance of a definition of the minimum degree of individual involvement or activity required to bring an income generating activity within the scope of the tax. OAG 87-17 .

The assessment of a privilege occupational license fee pursuant to this section against branch offices of bank is not permissible. OAG 91-199 .

County is obligated to pay the cost of taxes imposed on utilities that are passed through to the county as a consumer. County is not entitled to a refund of such taxes that have been previously paid. OAG 93-17 .

In enacting an occupational tax under the authority of a city, pursuant to subsection (2) of this section, an urban county does not “act under the guise” of being a city, but acts instead pursuant to specific statutory authorization. OAG 94-6 .

Since this section, which authorizes urban county government to impose the occupational tax, contains no language authorizing a referendum, and where there is no other authority, statutory or constitutional, authorizing such a referendum, urban county government had no authority to amend its charter to provide for a referendum on occupational license taxes and the county clerk had no duty to place the proposed amendment on the general election ballot. OAG 94-54 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Alcoholic beverage licenses and taxes, KRS 243.070 , 243.610 .

Band or orchestra (second to sixth-class cities), KRS 97.610 .

Banks and trust companies, to what extent cities may tax shares in, Const., § 171.

City electric plant to pay sum equivalent to tax based on book value, KRS 96.820 .

City may adopt assessment made by property valuation administrator, KRS 132.285 .

Classification of property for taxation, Const., § 171.

Coin-operated machines, city license tax on, KRS 137.410 .

Distilled spirits, taxation by cities, KRS 132.150 , 132.160 .

General assembly not to tax for benefit of cities, but may delegate power to tax, Const., § 181.

Health department (second-class cities), taxation to produce funds necessary to maintain, KRS 212.650 .

Indebtedness of city, constitutional limits on, Const., §§ 157, 158.

Library (second to sixth-class cities), annual appropriation amounts, KRS 173.360 .

Parks (second to sixth-class cities), levy of taxes for purchasing and maintaining, KRS 97.590 .

Poll tax bills, how made out, KRS 133.220 .

Poll taxes, limit on, Const., § 180.

Property subject to city taxation, KRS 132.200 .

School building funds, taxation for, KRS 160.476 .

School taxes, KRS 160.475 .

Tax and sinking fund to pay city indebtedness, Const., § 159.

Taxes based on income, licenses and franchises, Const., § 181.

Tax rate, constitutional limits on, Const., §§ 157, 180.

Kentucky Law Journal.

Lester, Security Interests in Thoroughbred and Standardbred Horses: A Transactional Approach, 70 Ky. L.J. 1065 (1981-82).

Snell, A Plea for a Comprehensive Liability Statute, 74 Ky. L.J. 521 (1985-86).

92.281. Levy of all taxes authorized by Constitution Section 181 — Exceptions — License fees — Occupational tax.

  1. Cities of all classes are authorized to levy and collect any and all taxes provided for in Section 181 of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, and to use the revenue therefrom for such purposes as may be provided by the legislative body of the city.
  2. Nothing in this section shall be construed to repeal, amend, or affect in any way the provisions of KRS 243.070 .
  3. This section shall not in any wise repeal, amend, affect, or apply to any existing statute exempting property from local taxation or fixing a special rate on proper classification or imposing a state tax which is declared to be in lieu of all local taxation, nor shall it be construed to authorize a city to require any company that pays both an ad valorem tax and a franchise tax to pay a license tax.
  4. This section shall also be subject to the provisions of KRS 91.200 in cities of the first class having a sinking fund and commissioners of a sinking fund.
  5. License fees or occupational taxes may not be imposed against or collected on income received by precinct workers for election training or work at election booths in state, county, and local primary, regular, or special elections.
  6. License fees or occupational taxes may not be imposed against or collected on any profits, earnings, or distributions of an investment fund which would qualify under KRS 154.20-250 to 154.20-284 to the extent any profits, earnings, or distributions would not be taxable to an individual investor.
    1. It is the intent of the General Assembly to continue the exemption from local license fees and occupational taxes that existed on January 1, 2006, for providers of multichannel video programming services or communications services as defined in KRS 136.602 that were taxed under KRS 136.120 prior to January 1, 2006. (7) (a) It is the intent of the General Assembly to continue the exemption from local license fees and occupational taxes that existed on January 1, 2006, for providers of multichannel video programming services or communications services as defined in KRS 136.602 that were taxed under KRS 136.120 prior to January 1, 2006.
    2. To further this intent, license fees or occupational taxes may not be imposed against any company providing multichannel video programming services or communications services as defined in KRS 136.602. If only a portion of an entity’s business is providing multichannel video programming services or communications services including products or services that are related to and provided in support of the multichannel video programming services or communications services, this exclusion applies only to that portion of the business that provides multichannel video programming services or communications services including products or services that are related to and provided in support of the multichannel video programming services or communications services.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1948, ch. 131; 1954, ch. 80, § 1; 1966, ch. 190; 1984, ch. 111, § 174, effective July 13, 1984; 1998, ch. 509, § 4, effective July 15, 1998; 2002, ch. 230, § 4, effective July 15, 2002; 2005, ch. 168, § 125, effective January 1, 2006; 2014, ch. 92, § 96, effective January 1, 2015; 2019 ch. 44, § 12, effective June 27, 2019.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

This section also applies to first-class cities. See KRS 91.265 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

Nothing in the procedures or classifications of this section which exempts businesses which pay ad valorem and franchise taxes from payment of a license tax violate either the Kentucky Constitution or the Constitution of the United States. Covington v. Cincinnati, Newport & Covington Transp. Co., 515 S.W.2d 617, 1974 Ky. LEXIS 240 ( Ky. 1974 ).

2. Construction.

This statute is treated as doing what Const., § 181 states the General Assembly may delegate to the cities, i.e., the right to levy license taxes on franchises, trades, occupations, and professions, even though the language of this section does not particularly so state. H. H. Leet Furniture Co. v. Richmond, 357 S.W.2d 329, 1962 Ky. LEXIS 123 ( Ky. 1962 ).

3. Occupational License Tax.

Since this section gives all classes of cities authority to levy any and all taxes provided for in Const., § 181, a city of the second class has the authority to levy an occupational license tax upon the privilege of engaging in a business or profession or carrying on an occupation within the city, although the city has an ad valorem tax on personal property. Kohler v. Benckart, 252 S.W.2d 854, 1952 Ky. LEXIS 1025 ( Ky. 1952 ), overruled in part, D & W Auto Supply v. Department of Revenue, 602 S.W.2d 420, 1980 Ky. LEXIS 243 ( Ky. 1980 ), overruled on other grounds,. D & W Auto Supply v. Department of Revenue, 602 S.W.2d 420, 1980 Ky. LEXIS 243 ( Ky. 1980 ).

Ordinance imposing ten dollar yearly license fee on each coin operated merchandise vending machine was valid. Harrodsburg v. Devine, 418 S.W.2d 426, 1967 Ky. LEXIS 218 ( Ky. 1967 ).

City occupational license tax on wages and salaries for work and services performed does not violate Const., § 181 prohibiting cities from levying income taxes notwithstanding the fact that the tax within the meaning of the Buck Act (4 USCS §§ 105-110) is an income tax and one for which federal employes are liable. Patrick v. Frankfort, 539 S.W.2d 275, 1976 Ky. LEXIS 44 ( Ky. 1976 ).

An ordinance creating an occupational license fee on compensation for certain services rendered in a city could be applied to Circuit Court judges under KRS 82.090 since the ordinance is simply a revenue tax imposing an occupational tax rather than a license placed upon the court system in an attempt to regulate it, and as such is a tax provided for in Const., § 181, and may be collected by the city under KRS 82.090 . Commissioners of Sinking Fund v. Hopson, 613 S.W.2d 621, 1980 Ky. App. LEXIS 429 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980).

4. — Exemptions.

Common carrier by motor vehicle operating under certificate of public convenience and necessity issued by department of motor transportation and subject to franchise and ad valorem taxes under KRS ch. 136 was not required to pay occupation tax imposed by city under this section. Pikeville v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 417 S.W.2d 140, 1967 Ky. LEXIS 242 ( Ky. 1967 ).

5. Uniformity.

The principle of uniformity in taxation applies even in absence of a constitutional provision. Commissioners of Sinking Fund v. Ohio Valley Grocery Co., 240 S.W.2d 56, 1951 Ky. LEXIS 940 ( Ky. 1951 ).

6. Returns.

Statutes giving cities the authority to levy and collect an occupational license fee and providing that the license shall be issued and enforced by local ordinance, authorize by implication the power to require the filing of a return and the enforcement of the requirement by means of a penalty as a necessary incident to the exercise of that power. Louisville v. Fischer Packing Co., 520 S.W.2d 744, 1975 Ky. LEXIS 171 ( Ky. 1975 ).

7. Franchise Fee.

A franchise fee based on a percentage of gross service revenues is not a tax, but is instead a charge bargained for in exchange for a specific property right, i.e., rental or compensation for the use of public streets. Berea College Utilities v. Berea, 691 S.W.2d 235, 1985 Ky. App. LEXIS 588 (Ky. Ct. App. 1985).

Cited:

Louisville v. Sebree, 308 Ky. 420 , 214 S.W.2d 248, 1948 Ky. LEXIS 907 ( Ky. 1948 ); George Wiedemann Brewing Co. v. Newport, 321 S.W.2d 404, 1959 Ky. LEXIS 282 ( Ky. 1959 ); Grimm v. Moloney, 358 S.W.2d 496, 1962 Ky. LEXIS 180 ( Ky. 1962 ); Casey County Fiscal Court v. Burke, 743 S.W.2d 26, 1988 Ky. LEXIS 4 ( Ky. 1988 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

A municipality cannot impose a nominal occupation or use tax upon a franchise company in the absence of a franchise tax. OAG 60-1122 .

A city is not authorized to adopt a city retail sales tax. OAG 62-322 .

If a company has a franchise to operate in a city, it cannot be required to pay an occupational license tax in addition to any payment it may be making for the franchise. OAG 62-452 .

A city would have no power to claim occupational taxes due from wages earned by an individual outside the city even though the payroll was prepared within the city. OAG 62-567 .

If persons subject to a city occupational license tax perform any substantial portion of their duties outside the city limits, they will not be subject to the tax on that proportion of their earnings derived from work performed outside the city. OAG 62-567 .

The administrative staff and clerks working for the county board of education in the county courthouse would be subject to the city occupational tax. OAG 62-567 .

A city is without authority to levy an occupational license tax on the operations of Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Company within the corporate limits of the city. OAG 62-644 .

A city is without authority to levy an occupational license tax on the operations of an electric power company within the corporate limits of the city. OAG 63-592 .

A city may impose a privilege license tax upon a federal savings and loan association at the same rate as imposed upon state chartered building and loan associations. OAG 63-867 .

A city of the fourth class has the power to impose an occupational or license tax. OAG 64-160 .

A city has the power to impose a tax on trades, occupations, and professions. OAG 64-745 .

A city may by ordinance levy an occupational license tax against a company for the privilege of soliciting business in the city, so long as the tax is the same as that applied to local merchants. OAG 65-247 .

The mere solicitation of orders for future delivery by common carrier would be sufficient to constitute an activity for which a city could require that an occupational license tax be paid. OAG 65-247 .

Where, prior to January 1, 1965, the Kentucky department of agriculture did not withhold city and county occupational license taxes from employes employed in the city and county, neither the department nor Commonwealth was liable for taxes, interest or penalty for any prior period, and the city and county would have to look to the employes for any unpaid taxes. OAG 65-845 .

A city could require all trucks unloading materials within the city limits to pay an annual tax of $25.00. OAG 66-435 .

A city tax on trucks unloading within the city could not apply to a person or company holding a common carrier’s license or permit issued by the state department of motor transportation. OAG 66-435 .

Where a nonresident hauled wood through a city which had a tax on trucks unloading within the city and unloaded the wood on property owned by a railroad within the city limits he would be subject to the tax. OAG 66-435 .

A city has no authority to impose an occupational license fee upon an attorney who neither lives nor maintains an office in the city but who irregularly practices his profession in the city under specific employment to attend to a special matter. OAG 67-18 .

A city’s occupational license fee ordinance was not applicable to “net profits” of franchise corporations, state banks and national banks even though they were not exempted in the ordinance. OAG 67-130 .

A license tax imposed by a city upon each motor vehicle operated in the city by any person who resides or is gainfully employed therein may be validly applied to nonresident employes of a state penitentiary located within the boundaries of the city. OAG 69-153 .

A sixth-class city is prohibited from levying a payroll tax on persons working in the boundaries of such city. OAG 69-478 .

A city cannot legally apply a car sticker license tax to the privately owned automobiles of the county sheriff and deputies which are used exclusively in the state service as outlined in the City of Georgetown v. Morrison, 362 S.W.2d 289, 1962 Ky. LEXIS 256 (Ky. App. 1962). OAG 74-340 .

Cities of the second to sixth classes may levy both a payroll tax and a gross receipt tax although it is not required that both be levied. OAG 76-101 .

A city of the second to sixth class may not levy both a gross receipt tax and a privilege tax since this would constitute double taxation due to the similarities of the taxes. OAG 76-101 .

Since a license tax on insurance business done within the city must be uniform on all insurance written within the city, no tax exemption can be imposed on an amount of insurance written for a particular client such as the county hospital. OAG 76-205 .

A fee paid by a community antenna television system for the privilege of operating within a city is not a franchise tax; therefore the city could require payment of a license tax on the system’s net profits. OAG 77-721 .

The prohibition against license fees on businesses and occupations does not extend to a license tax on motor vehicles for the use of the city streets and the levying of a license tax for the use of the streets of the City of Tollesboro where such vehicles were also subject to ad valorem tax was not within the rule against double taxation of the same property. OAG 78-590 .

Under this section and Const., § 181, a city has concurrent jurisdiction with the state to require a license permit for the conduct of professional wrestling matches within its corporate limits even though the state requires an annual license fee for such activity under KRS 229.071 , since KRS 229.071 does not prohibit a city from also imposing a license fee. OAG 81-410 .

A city of the sixth class can raise revenue by all means enumerated in Const., § 181 with regard to cities except those specifically exempted by subsection (5) of this section and 92.300(2). OAG 82-21 .

Any ad valorem tax ordinance enacted by a city of the sixth class must comply with the maximum rates as provided in KRS 132.027 . OAG 82-21 .

With the exception of the property described in KRS 92.300(1), a city of the sixth class has no alternative but to assess all property located within its jurisdictional limits which is not specifically exempted from local ad valorem taxation by the Constitution or by statute; a city ordinance attempting to exempt any other property will be void. OAG 82-21 .

A county public library is not exempt from the payment of a city franchise tax imposed on Kentucky utilities and which is, in turn, passed on to the utility’s customers in the affected area. OAG 82-34 .

A city may not levy an occupational license tax against public service corporations, when those organizations pay ad valorem and franchise taxes levied pursuant to KRS Ch. 136. OAG 82-93 .

A city of the fifth class may levy an occupational license fee, but it may not levy an income tax. OAG 82-290 .

The only taxes that a city may levy are (1) an ad valorem tax, (2) a license fee on trades, occupations, professions, etc., and (3) a tax on personal property, tangible and intangible, based on income, licenses or franchises, in lieu of an ad valorem tax thereon. OAG 82-290 .

A city is not required to relate reasons or standards for determining the occupational license fee levied against a particular type of business as long as the fee is reasonable and not discriminatory. OAG 83-101 .

A city government can enact a license tax on the privilege to do business, said license fee differing in amount depending on the type of business or occupation listed, even if the ordinance levying the tax fails to list standards concerning the reason for charging different yearly rates for the various businesses and professions, as long as the fee is uniformly imposed on all businesses within the specified classes. OAG 83-101 .

A franchise tax is generally defined as a governmental grant of a special privilege to engage in a particular business and may be measured by a percentage of the gross receipts or profits of a business. OAG 83-233 .

A city may levy a franchise tax or fee and such may be measured by the gross receipts of the franchisee; accordingly, a city which imposed a franchise fee on a power company for the right to distribute electrical energy in the city had not levied a forbidden excise tax. OAG 83-233 , superseding OAG 68-338 , to the extent of conflict.

KRS 136.120 levies a property tax and not a franchise tax; consequently, a city ordinance imposing a franchise fee on a power company for the right to distribute electrical energy in the city did not amount to double taxation. OAG 83-233 , superseding OAG 68-338 , to the extent of conflict.

This section and KRS 92.330 expressly authorized the levy and collection, pursuant to city ordinance, of a net profits license fee and authorized by implication the power to require the filing of a return, and the production of any books, papers, and records to assist in the auditing of the return; the requirement that businesses file federal forms or schedules with city returns was neither unreasonable nor arbitrary. OAG 83-336 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

See note to KRS 92.280 under heading 9. License Fee, City of Lexington v. Motel Developers, Inc., 465 S.W.2d 253, 1971 Ky. LEXIS 443 (Ky. App. 1971).

Kentucky Law Journal.

Snell, A Plea for a Comprehensive Liability Statute, 74 Ky. L.J. 521 (1985-86).

Treatises

Caldwell’s Kentucky Form Book, 5th Ed., Complaint by City to Recover Taxes, Form 331.08.

Caldwell’s Kentucky Form Book, 5th Ed., Complaint by City to Recover Taxes, Form 355.09.

92.285. License tax on insurance companies — Basis — Ordinances to be filed with department of insurance — Collection fee — Examination of books and records — When taxes due — Minimum tax. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Acts 1942, ch. 155, § 4; 1944, ch. 36; 1978, ch. 65, § 1, effective June 17, 1978) was repealed by Acts 1982, ch. 434, § 15, effective July 15, 1982. For present law, see KRS 91A.080 .

92.290. Situs for taxation in cities.

With the exception that the taxable situs of motor vehicles is governed by KRS 132.227 , all real and personal property within any city, and all personal property, except such tangible personal property as has an actual and bona fide situs without the city, of persons domiciled or actually residing in the city on the assessment date, and of all corporations having their chief office or place of business in the city on that date, and all franchises of same, shall be subject to assessment and taxation for city purposes, unless exempt from taxation by the Constitution or statutes of this state. Any franchise granted in whole or in part by a city, and exercised within the city, may be taxed by the city notwithstanding the corporation owning or exercising the same may have its chief office or place of business elsewhere. Any corporation doing business in a city, whether its franchise was granted by such city or not, may be required to pay a license tax.

History. 3374, 3654, 3673: amend. Acts 1984, ch. 54, § 12, effective January 1, 1985; 2014, ch. 92, § 97, effective January 1, 2015.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Bridge.

Whole bridge structure within corporate limits is liable for city taxes; neither benefits to bridge company, nor corresponding duty to bear full share of tax burdens, is impaired or affected by fact portion of bridge is over water. Henderson Bridge Co. v. Henderson, 105 Ky. 32 , 36 S.W. 561, 18 Ky. L. Rptr. 417 , 1896 Ky. LEXIS 177 ( Ky. 1896 ), aff'd, 173 U.S. 592, 19 S. Ct. 553, 43 L. Ed. 823, 1899 U.S. LEXIS 1464 (U.S. 1899).

2. Main Office.

The franchise of water company which has its chief office of place of business in the city may be taxed by the city, although its pumping station, reservoirs and part of its mains are without the city. Frankfort v. Stone, 108 Ky. 400 , 56 S.W. 679, 22 Ky. L. Rptr. 25 , 1900 Ky. LEXIS 58 ( Ky. 1900 ).

3. Exemption.

A corporation paying to the city its franchise tax for the year is exempt from city license or occupational tax for same year. American Ry. Express Co. v. Commonwealth, 187 Ky. 241 , 218 S.W. 453, 1919 Ky. LEXIS 387 ( Ky. 1919 ).

Cited:

Barber v. Commissioner of Revenue, 674 S.W.2d 18, 1984 Ky. App. LEXIS 467 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Where a leased automobile was garaged in the city and licensed in the county the city could assess it for property taxes although it was owned by a corporation located in another city and county. OAG 61-233 .

Where farm land was annexed to a fifth-class city, the city could not legally enter into an agreement with the annexed farm owners that the city would not assess the property for city ad valorem property taxes until the land had been divided into lots and sold. OAG 64-859 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Property subject to city taxation, KRS 132.200 .

92.300. Exemptions from city taxation in urban-county government and city of home rule class — Regulation of ministers.

    1. The legislative body of an urban-county government and any city of the home rule class may by ordinance exempt manufacturing establishments, including qualified data centers, from city taxation for a period not exceeding five (5) years as an inducement to their location in the urban-county government, or city. (1) (a) The legislative body of an urban-county government and any city of the home rule class may by ordinance exempt manufacturing establishments, including qualified data centers, from city taxation for a period not exceeding five (5) years as an inducement to their location in the urban-county government, or city.
    2. As used in this subsection:
      1. “Data center” means a structure or portion of a structure that is predominantly used to house and continuously operate computer servers and associated telecommunications, electronic data processing or storage, or other similar components;
      2. “Overall tier rating” means the overall tier rating of a data center according to the TIA-942 Telecommunications Infrastructure Standard for Data Centers established by the Telecommunications Industry Association and published in April 2005, exclusive of any amendments made subsequent to that date; and
      3. “Qualified data center” means a data center having an overall tier rating of three (3) or four (4) on the assessment date of a given taxable year, as established by the owner thereof.
    1. No city of the home rule class or urban-county government may impose or collect any license tax upon: (2) (a) No city of the home rule class or urban-county government may impose or collect any license tax upon:
      1. Any bank, trust company, combined bank and trust company, or trust, banking and title insurance company organized and doing business in this state;
      2. Any savings and loan association whether state or federally chartered; or
      3. The provision of multichannel video programming services or communications services as defined in KRS 136.602 . It is the intent of the General Assembly to continue the exemption from local license fees and occupational taxes that existed on January 1, 2006, for providers of multichannel video programming services or communications services as defined in KRS 136.602 that were taxed under KRS 136.120 prior to January 1, 2006. If only a portion of an entity’s business is providing multichannel video programming services or communications services including products or services that are related to and provided in support of the multichannel video programming services or communications services, this exclusion applies only to that portion of the business that provides multichannel video programming services or communications services including products or services that are related to and provided in support of the multichannel video programming services or communications services.
    2. No city of the home rule class or urban-county government may impose or collect any license tax upon income received:
      1. By members of the Kentucky National Guard for active duty training, unit training assemblies and annual field training; or
      2. By precinct workers for election training or work at election booths in state, county, and local primary, regular, or special elections.
  1. Pursuant to KRS 92.281 , no city shall regulate any aspect of the manner in which any duly ordained, commissioned, or denominationally licensed minister of religion may perform his or her duties and activities as a minister of religion. Duly ordained, commissioned, or denominationally licensed ministers of religion shall be subject to the same license fees imposed on others in the city enacted pursuant to KRS 92.281 .

HISTORY: 2741s, 2741w-1, 3074, 3278, 3490-16, 3490-32: amend. Acts 1974, ch. 113, § 3; 2016 ch. 3, § 2, effective July 15, 2016.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(7/15/2016). 2016 Ky. Acts ch. 3, sec. 3 provided that amendments made to this statute in 2016 Ky. Acts ch. 3, sec. 2 apply only to new manufacturing establishments that locate in an applicable city or urban-county on or after July 15, 2016.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Application.

This section, forbidding cities to impose or collect a license tax on banks, did not purport to be retroactive, and did not apply to license taxes levied prior to its enactment. Planters Bank & Trust Co. v. Hopkinsville, 289 Ky. 451 , 159 S.W.2d 25, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 584 ( Ky. 1942 ).

2. Manufacturing Establishments.

Authority to exempt manufacturing establishments, “as an inducement to their location,” cannot naturally refer to establishments already located. Middlesboro v. New South Brewing & Ice. Co., 108 Ky. 351 , 56 S.W. 427, 21 Ky. L. Rptr. 1782 , 1900 Ky. LEXIS 46 ( Ky. 1900 ).

Rebuilding and enlargement of plant partially destroyed by fire did not so constitute establishment of new enterprise as to authorize exemption from taxation. Elam v. Salisbury, 180 Ky. 142 , 202 S.W. 56, 1918 Ky. LEXIS 26 ( Ky. 1918 ).

The promotion of new and expanded industrial development, by providing tax benefits, is a fixed policy of the Commonwealth. Department of Revenue v. Spalding Laundry & Dry Cleaning Co., 436 S.W.2d 522, 1968 Ky. LEXIS 184 ( Ky. 1968 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Where a city made a lease of a building to a business and in the lease the city proposed to obtain the maximum tax advantage for the business, the commissioners of the city could exempt the property of the business from city taxes for a period not to exceed five (5) years. OAG 65-58 .

A city has authority to exempt a manufacturing establishment for at least five (5) years from city taxes only as an inducement to its location within the city, but no exemption is permitted from city school taxes. OAG 65-171 .

A city’s occupational license fee ordinance was not applicable to “net profits” of franchise corporations, state banks and national banks even though they were not exempted in the ordinance. OAG 67-130 .

A county fiscal court has no authority to exempt the property of a private firm or manufacturing concern from county, state, school or health taxes as an inducement to industrial development without acquiring title to such property. OAG 67-205 .

The city had no authority to exempt local manufacturing establishments from the tax levied for the support of the city’s junior college or for local libraries. OAG 67-559 .

The tax for a pension fund for civil service employes must be levied on all property subject to tax without regard to what may be exempted locally by the city from local city taxes. OAG 67-559 .

Where a city has voted a bonded indebtedness for sewers, regardless of what local exemptions might be granted by the municipality, the city has no recourse but to collect the levy in question from all taxable property in the city. OAG 67-559 .

City may pass an ordinance exempting two plants located in an industrial park that is being annexed by the city from city property tax for a period of five (5) years as an inducement to location in the city in connection with the city’s annexation program. OAG 73-600 .

City had no authority to exempt a medical clinic which was built in connection with a low rent project for the elderly because only allowable exemption is for manufacturing establishments for a period up to five (5) years. OAG 74-126 .

Although KRS 91.200 and this section contain specific prohibitions against cities of the first to sixth classes imposing an occupational license tax on income received by national guard members for active duty training, there are no such prohibitions in the statutes dealing with the levying of an occupational license tax on a county basis where the tax is levied for specified county purposes in the county and even though an exemption is provided for income of national guardsmen in KRS 68.197 , such exemption may not be applicable if a majority of the voters in the county approve the tax. OAG 75-480 .

A city of the sixth class can raise revenue by all means enumerated in Const., § 181 with regard to cities except those specifically exempted by KRS 92.281(5) and subsection (2) of this section. OAG 82-21 .

With the exception of the property described in subsection (1) of this section, a city of the sixth class has no alternative but to assess all property located within its jurisdictional limits which is not specifically exempted from local ad valorem taxation by the Constitution or by statute; a city ordinance attempting to exempt any other property will be void. OAG 82-21 .

State and national banks are exempt from occupational license taxes under the terms of subsection (2) of this section. OAG 83-101 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Acquisition of industrial buildings by city, for lease to industrial concerns, KRS 103.200 to 103.285 .

Constitutional exemptions from taxation, Const., §§ 170, 171.

License taxes, exemptions from, KRS 136.320 , 137.190 , 281.830 .

Property exempt from city taxation, KRS 41.200 , 132.030 , 132.050 , 132.200 , 136.300 .

Kentucky Bench & Bar.

Tobergte, The Impact of Kentucky’s Present Constitution Upon Business Growth & Development, Volume 51, No. 3, Summer 1987 Ky. Bench & B. 21.

Kentucky Law Journal.

Markham, The Property Tax — A Withering Vine, 60 Ky. L.J. 174 (1971).

92.305. Abandoned urban property in urban-county government and city of home rule class — Separate rate of taxation.

  1. Any urban-county government or city of the home rule class which finds and declares that there exists abandoned urban property as defined in KRS 132.012 within the urban-county government or city, or which finds that there exists blighted or deteriorated property pursuant to KRS 99.700 to 99.730 , may levy a separate rate of taxation on abandoned urban property pursuant to KRS 132.012 .
  2. Prior to levying a tax upon abandoned urban property, the legislative body of the urban-county government or the city of the home rule class shall delegate to the vacant properties review commission, if established pursuant to KRS 99.710 , or another department or agency of the urban-county or city government, the responsibility of determining which properties within the urban-county government or city are abandoned urban properties. A list of abandoned urban properties shall be furnished to the county property valuation administrator prior to the date fixed for the annual assessment of real property within the county. If a property classified as abandoned urban property is repaired, rehabilitated, or otherwise returned to productive use, the owner shall notify the urban-county government or city which shall, if it finds the property is no longer abandoned urban property, notify the property valuation administrator to strike the property from the list of abandoned urban properties.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 2004, ch. 76, § 1, effective July 13, 2004; 2016 ch. 127, § 13, effective July 15, 2016.

92.310. Licenses, how granted in cities of fifth and sixth classes. [Repealed.]

In cities of the fifth and sixth classes, no license shall be granted for any business or to any person for a longer time than one (1) year. In such cities the city legislative body shall have exclusive control of the granting of licenses, and may refuse any license in its discretion.

History. 3637-4, 3704-4; § 314.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3637-4, 3704-4) was repealed by Acts 2014, ch. 92, § 314, effective January 1, 2015.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Exclusive Control.

The city legislative body of a city of the fifth class has the exclusive right and authority to pass upon the issuance of a license for pool tables. Decker v. Gilbert, 140 Ky. 108 , 130 S.W. 960, 1910 Ky. LEXIS 177 ( Ky. 1910 ).

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Alcoholic beverages — Licenses and taxes, KRS ch. 243.

Alcoholic beverages — Local option, KRS ch. 242.

92.320. Licenses for horse-drawn vehicles, business authorized by. [Repealed.]

Any person having a license to operate a horse-drawn vehicle in the city in which he resides or has his principal place of business may also, for the purpose of doing business incidental to his principal business, operate the vehicle upon the streets of any other city without paying any additional license fee to such other city, but such license shall not authorize him to establish his principal place of business or conduct his principal business in any city except the one (1) that granted his license.

History. 2741b-1; § 314.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2741b-1) was repealed by Acts 2014, ch. 92, § 314, effective January 1, 2015.

Financial Administration

92.330. Purpose of tax levied or imposed by city of home rule class to be specified — Funds not to be diverted.

All taxes and license fees levied or imposed by cities of the home rule class shall be levied or imposed by ordinance. The purpose for which each tax is levied or license fee imposed shall be specified in the ordinance, and the revenue therefrom shall be expended for no other purpose than that for which the tax was levied or the license fee imposed. Failure to specify the purpose of the tax or license fee shall render the ordinance invalid.

History. 3175, 3290-12, 4281u-2; 2014, ch. 92, § 100, effective January 1, 2015.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Levy by Ordinance.

Taxes may be levied only by ordinance, and not by resolution, but if resolution is enacted with all the formalities requisite to an ordinance, the fact that it is called a resolution instead of an ordinance is immaterial. Hickman v. Helm, 264 Ky. 266 , 94 S.W.2d 665, 1936 Ky. LEXIS 315 ( Ky. 1936 ).

2. Purpose.

The fact that the ordinance pursuant to which certain taxes were levied and collected did not specify the purpose of the levy as required by this section would not relieve the tax collector of criminal liability for embezzling the tax money. Nickens v. Commonwealth, 228 Ky. 477 , 15 S.W.2d 261, 1929 Ky. LEXIS 561 ( Ky. 1929 ).

Ordinance merely providing that tax levy be fixed at a certain sum, without specifying the purpose of the tax, did not comply with this section. Nickens v. Commonwealth, 228 Ky. 477 , 15 S.W.2d 261, 1929 Ky. LEXIS 561 ( Ky. 1929 ).

Ordinance levying license fee is invalid unless purpose for which fee is levied is specified. Ziedman & Pollie, Inc. v. Ashland, 244 Ky. 279 , 50 S.W.2d 557, 1932 Ky. LEXIS 409 ( Ky. 1932 ); Newport v. McLane, 256 Ky. 803 , 77 S.W.2d 27, 1934 Ky. LEXIS 491 ( Ky. 1934 ), overruled in part, Scalise v. Sewell-Scheuermann, 566 S.W.3d 539, 2018 Ky. LEXIS 451 ( Ky. 2018 ).

Ordinance imposing license tax on motor vehicles for “the general fund” sufficiently specified the purpose of the tax. It was not necessary to state that the proceeds of the tax would be used for police regulation of motor vehicles. Daily v. Owensboro, 257 Ky. 281 , 77 S.W.2d 939, 1934 Ky. LEXIS 550 ( Ky. 1934 ).

Every ordinance of a second-class city imposing a license fee must substantially comply with the requirement that the purpose for which it is imposed be specified. Pure Milk Producers & Distributors Ass'ns v. Morton, 276 Ky. 736 , 125 S.W.2d 216, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 575 ( Ky. 1939 ).

An ordinance, imposing a license fee “to be paid into the general revenue funds of said city,” specifies the purpose of the levy sufficiently, since all revenue collected by a city is primarily for the purpose of paying its general expenses, and constitutes the “general fund,” whether or not such a fund is specifically set up by ordinance. Pure Milk Producers & Distributors Ass'ns v. Morton, 276 Ky. 736 , 125 S.W.2d 216, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 575 ( Ky. 1939 ). See Tandy & Fairleigh Tobacco Co. v. Hopkinsville, 174 Ky. 189 , 192 S.W. 46, 1917 Ky. LEXIS 183 ( Ky. 1917 ).

An ordinance levying a tax and providing “ . . . . . that said license fees are hereby fixed, established, impose and levied for the purpose of and to be paid into the general revenue funds of said city,” sufficiently specified the purpose for which the taxes were levied. Planters Bank & Trust Co. v. Hopkinsville, 289 Ky. 451 , 159 S.W.2d 25, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 584 ( Ky. 1942 ).

3. Diversion of Revenue.

Compromise agreement in connection with liquidation of insolvent bank, pursuant to which city was to receive a percentage of its general fund and sinking fund moneys on deposit in the bank, did not violate this section. Citizens Nat'l Bank's Trustee v. Loyall, 262 Ky. 39 , 88 S.W.2d 952, 1935 Ky. LEXIS 757 ( Ky. 1935 ).

Indebtedness of city to its sinking fund, resulting from diversion of sinking fund money to general city purposes, was a valid indebtedness which could be funded by the issuance of bonds since the diversion did not increase the obligations of the city. Wheeler v. Hopkinsville, 269 Ky. 289 , 106 S.W.2d 1016, 1937 Ky. LEXIS 594 ( Ky. 1937 ).

When school bond issue raises more funds than are needed, the application of the excess to the payment of the bonds and interest is not a diversion such as is prohibited by this section. Ashland v. Board of Education, 286 Ky. 69 , 149 S.W.2d 728, 1941 Ky. LEXIS 206 ( Ky. 1941 ).

Supreme court was willing to recognize the longstanding offset defense available to city officials, but commendable as the offset defense seemed to some citizens or courts, it was a policy determination that had to be left to the legislature going forward; the “new” Ky. Rev. Stat. §§ 92.330 and 92.340 hewed closely to the old Ky. Rev. Stat. § 3175, and the General Assembly made no effort to prohibit offset in plain and unmistakable language. Scalise v. Sewell-Scheuermann, 566 S.W.3d 539, 2018 Ky. LEXIS 451 ( Ky. 2018 ).

To the extent the City of Newport v. Rawlings, 289 Ky. 203 (1941) cases stand for the proposition that city officials may levy and collect assessments/taxes for one purpose but apply that revenue to other purposes and avoid liability through the offset doctrine, those cases are overruled; if there is to be an exception to the plain language of the statutes, it must come from the legislature. Scalise v. Sewell-Scheuermann, 566 S.W.3d 539, 2018 Ky. LEXIS 451 ( Ky. 2018 ).

Resident properly stated a cause of action on behalf of a city to recover the surplus sanitation revenue that was not devoted to trash collection and recycling because Ky. Rev. Stat. §§ 92.330 and 92.340 prohibited the use of the sanitation tax revenue for other non-sanitation purposes; the city council was avoiding the increasingly unpopular action of raising taxes and instead running the city in some part on the fully-expected excess sanitation revenue. Scalise v. Sewell-Scheuermann, 566 S.W.3d 539, 2018 Ky. LEXIS 451 ( Ky. 2018 ).

Ky. Rev. Stat. §§ 92.330 and 92.340 , though rarely used, continue to be important statutory provisions that provide for accountability on the part of those individuals acting on behalf of Kentucky’s cities in the expenditure of public tax revenues. Scalise v. Sewell-Scheuermann, 566 S.W.3d 539, 2018 Ky. LEXIS 451 ( Ky. 2018 ).

4. Remedy.

Allegation in plaintiff’s complaint that city board of trustees had enacted an ordinance providing for a license fee which did not conform to the requirements of this section had a statutory remedy provided by the legislature which conferred standing on citizens of the governmental unit to bring actions to compel adherence to the law. Fish v. Elliott, 554 S.W.2d 94, 1977 Ky. App. LEXIS 756 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).

Opinions of Attorney General.

A city of the fourth class may either establish and operate a fire department or enter into a contract with an existing fire department and may obtain the money for either system through taxes imposed by city ordinance. OAG 64-247 .

After a city has sufficient revenue in a sinking fund to retire bonds for which a specific tax has been levied, the city would then be bound by KRS 132.010 and 132.027 with respect to the tax rate which could be applied for general municipal purposes and it would be a violation of KRS 92.340 and this section to continue to levy the specific tax and divert it to general municipal purposes. OAG 74-368 .

There is no statutory authority to permit the board of trustees of a city to refund taxes that have validly been collected. OAG 75-584 ; OAG 77-37 .

When a city with two (2) outstanding general obligation floodwall issues has been levying a tax sufficient to pay the debt figure and the tax levy of one year produces approximately $5,000 in excess of the amount required to call all outstanding bonds, the tax rate must be reduced since there is no longer any need to levy a tax to retire the bonds and the excess would go into the general revenue fund since there is no authority to refund a tax that has been validly collected in a municipality. OAG 77-37 .

The present city council of a fourth class city may abolish two (2) ordinances which provided for a road maintenance fund and a capital fund and transfer such funds to a general fund account unless the two (2) ordinances created funds which have been used to construct major road improvements or to build public buildings which will be paid for over a period of years. OAG 78-8 .

KRS 92.281 and this section expressly authorized the levy and collection, pursuant to city ordinance, of a net profits license fee and authorized by implication the power to require the filing of a return, and the production of any books, papers, and records to assist in the auditing of the return; the requirement that businesses file federal forms or schedules with city returns was neither unreasonable nor arbitrary. OAG 83-336 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Ordinance levying tax must state purpose, and funds not to be diverted, Const., § 180.

Use of general funds for public projects, KRS 58.130 .

ALR

63 Am.Jur.2d, Public Funds, §§ 4, 5.

92.340. Liability of city of home rule class for violation of KRS 92.330 or 91A.030(13) — Remedies.

If, in any city of the home rule class, any city tax revenue is expended for a purpose other than that for which the tax was levied or the license fee imposed, each officer, agent or employee who, by a refusal to act, could have prevented the expenditure, and the members of the city legislative body who voted for the expenditure, shall be jointly and severally liable to the city for the amount so expended. The amount may be recovered of them in an action upon their bonds, or personally. The city attorney shall prosecute to recovery all such actions. If he fails to do so for six (6) months after the money has been expended, any taxpayer may prosecute such action for the use and benefit of the city. A recovery under this subsection shall not bar a criminal prosecution. Any indebtedness contracted by a city of the home rule class in violation of this subsection or of KRS 92.330 or 91A.030(13) shall be void, the contract shall not be enforceable by the person with whom made, the city shall never assume the same, and money paid under any such contract may be recovered back by the city.

History. 4281u-2, 4281u-6: amend. Acts 1942, ch. 63, § 2; 2014, ch. 92, § 101, effective January 1, 2015.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(1982). A technical correction has been made in this section by the Reviser of Statutes pursuant to KRS 7.136 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Application.

This section does not impose liability on the members of a municipal legislative body for spending money for a purpose not authorized by law, but only for spending money for a purpose other than that for which it was collected. Woodruff v. Shea, 152 Ky. 657 , 153 S.W. 1005, 1913 Ky. LEXIS 722 ( Ky. 1913 ).

Resident failed to demonstrate standing under either KRS 92.340 or generally to challenge an official act of the city; because he was a city taxpayer, the resident had standing to bring an action to challenge the imposition of the tax imposed by the ordinance. Catchen v. City of Park Hills, 356 S.W.3d 131, 2011 Ky. App. LEXIS 257 (Ky. Ct. App. 2011).

2. Liability.

Municipal officer who pays out tax money for purpose other than that for which the tax was levied is liable to the municipality, but is not liable to a person holding a claim against the municipality whose claim has not been paid because of the diversion of funds. Bernard v. McFarland, 267 Ky. 210 , 101 S.W.2d 913, 1937 Ky. LEXIS 292 ( Ky. 1937 ).

3. — Diversion of Funds.

Where money was diverted from sinking fund to general fund, the fact that the money was used to pay valid claims would not relieve the officers responsible for the diversion from liability for interest on the diverted funds, or from criminal liability. Wheeler v. Hopkinsville, 269 Ky. 289 , 106 S.W.2d 1016, 1937 Ky. LEXIS 594 ( Ky. 1937 ).

4. — Errors in Judgment.

Members of municipal legislative body are not liable under this section for errors of judgment in the expenditure of municipal funds. Boyd County v. Boyd Fiscal Court, 247 Ky. 183 , 56 S.W.2d 959, 1933 Ky. LEXIS 368 ( Ky. 1933 ).

3. Diversion of funds.

Supreme court was willing to recognize the longstanding offset defense available to city officials, but commendable as the offset defense seemed to some citizens or courts, it was a policy determination that had to be left to the legislature going forward; the “new” Ky. Rev. Stat. §§ 92.330 and 92.340 hewed closely to the old Ky. Rev. Stat. § 3175, and the General Assembly made no effort to prohibit offset in plain and unmistakable language. Scalise v. Sewell-Scheuermann, 566 S.W.3d 539, 2018 Ky. LEXIS 451 ( Ky. 2018 ).

To the extent the City of Newport v. Rawlings, 289 Ky. 203 (1941) cases stand for the proposition that city officials may levy and collect assessments/taxes for one purpose but apply that revenue to other purposes and avoid liability through the offset doctrine, those cases are overruled; if there is to be an exception to the plain language of the statutes, it must come from the legislature. Scalise v. Sewell-Scheuermann, 566 S.W.3d 539, 2018 Ky. LEXIS 451 ( Ky. 2018 ).

Ky. Rev. Stat. §§ 92.330 and 92.340 , though rarely used, continue to be important statutory provisions that provide for accountability on the part of those individuals acting on behalf of Kentucky’s cities in the expenditure of public tax revenues. Scalise v. Sewell-Scheuermann, 566 S.W.3d 539, 2018 Ky. LEXIS 451 ( Ky. 2018 ).

5. Action for Recovery of Funds.

In order to proceed against the members of a municipal legislative body under this section, it must be pleaded and proved that they appropriated money levied and collected for one purpose to some other distinct and different purpose. Woodruff v. Shea, 152 Ky. 657 , 153 S.W. 1005, 1913 Ky. LEXIS 722 ( Ky. 1913 ).

When a clear violation of duty on part of persons charged with duty of paying over to certain funds the taxes collected therefor was alleged, this was a sufficient allegation of prima facie case of liability such as to impose on them the duty of establishing that diverted funds were lawfully expended. Newport v. Rawlings, 289 Ky. 203 , 158 S.W.2d 12, 1941 Ky. LEXIS 25 ( Ky. 1941 ), overruled in part, Scalise v. Sewell-Scheuermann, 566 S.W.3d 539, 2018 Ky. LEXIS 451 ( Ky. 2018 ).

Allegations in plaintiff’s complaint that city board of trustees did not publish financial statements for the city pursuant to KRS 424.220 , that it had not adopted and published a budget pursuant to KRS 424.240 , that it had enacted an ordinance providing for a license fee which did not conform to the requirements of KRS 92.330 , and that it had not advertised for bids to obtain facilities for the city hall pursuant to KRS 424.260 had statutory remedy provided by the legislature which conferred standing on citizens of the governmental unit to bring actions to compel adherence to the law. Fish v. Elliott, 554 S.W.2d 94, 1977 Ky. App. LEXIS 756 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).

Since recovery for violation may be had only once, the certainty of plaintiff’s citizenship and consequent standing should appear on the face of the pleading. Fish v. Elliott, 554 S.W.2d 94, 1977 Ky. App. LEXIS 756 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).

Resident properly stated a cause of action on behalf of a city to recover the surplus sanitation revenue that was not devoted to trash collection and recycling because Ky. Rev. Stat. §§ 92.330 and 92.340 prohibited the use of the sanitation tax revenue for other non-sanitation purposes; the city council was avoiding the increasingly unpopular action of raising taxes and instead running the city in some part on the fully-expected excess sanitation revenue. Scalise v. Sewell-Scheuermann, 566 S.W.3d 539, 2018 Ky. LEXIS 451 ( Ky. 2018 ).

6. Duty, City Manager and Treasurer.

It is the duty of city manager and treasurer of city of second class to see that tax funds are properly allocated and legally expended. Newport v. Rawlings, 289 Ky. 203 , 158 S.W.2d 12, 1941 Ky. LEXIS 25 ( Ky. 1941 ), overruled in part, Scalise v. Sewell-Scheuermann, 566 S.W.3d 539, 2018 Ky. LEXIS 451 ( Ky. 2018 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

After a city has sufficient revenue in a sinking fund to retire bonds for which a specific tax has been levied, the city would then be bound by KRS 132.010 and 132.027 with respect to the tax rate which could be applied for general municipal purposes and it would be a violation of KRS 92.330 and this section to continue to levy the specific tax and divert it to general municipal purposes. OAG 74-368 .

There is no authority to permit the board of trustees of a city to refund taxes that have validly been collected. OAG 75-584 ; OAG 77-37 .

When a city with two (2) outstanding general obligation floodwall issues has been levying a tax sufficient to pay the debt figure and the tax levy of one (1) year produces approximately $5,000 in excess of the amount required to call all outstanding bonds, the tax rate must be reduced since there is no longer any need to levy a tax to retire the bonds and the excess would go into the general revenue fund since there is no authority to refund a tax that has been validly collected in a municipality. OAG 77-37 .

The present city council of a fourth class city may abolish two ordinances which provided for a road maintenance fund and a capital fund and transfer such funds to a general fund account unless the two (2) ordinances created funds which have been used to construct major road improvements or to build public buildings which will be paid for over a period of years. OAG 78-8 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Tax levied for one purpose not to be used for another, Const., § 180.

92.350. Separate accounts for funds of cities of second to sixth class — Semiannual statements — Disposition of general revenues. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3646, 3679, 4281u-3, 4281u-6: amend. Acts 1942, ch. 63, §§ 1 and 3) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 232, § 7, effective July 15, 1980.

92.360. Expenditure in excess of revenue and diversion of funds forbidden — Surplus to revert — Use of surplus for similar purpose. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3069, 3070,4281u-4, 4281u-5, 4281u-6: amend. Acts 1942, ch. 63, §§ 1 and 3; Acts 1942, ch. 188, sec. 1) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 232, § 7, effective July 15, 1980.

92.370. Annual apportionment of revenue and tax ordinance in cities of second class — Appropriation ordinances. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3071, 3183) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 232, § 7, effective July 15, 1980.

92.380. Current borrowing by cities of second class. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3071) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 232, § 7, effective July 15, 1980.

92.390. Publication of receipts and expenditures of cities of second class. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3075) was repealed by Acts 1944, ch. 155, § 2.

92.400. Demands against city of fifth or sixth class — How presented, audited and paid. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3640, 3701) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 232, § 7 and Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980.

92.403. Annual and other audits of officers in cities of second class — Notice of audit. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1964, ch. 27, § 1; 1978, ch. 384, § 216, effective June 17, 1978) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 232, § 7, effective July 15, 1980.

92.405. Annual audits of officers in cities of third and fourth class. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. 1948, ch. 26, § 1; 1964, ch. 27, § 2; 1966, ch. 239, § 67) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 232, § 7, effective July 15, 1980.

Assessment and Equalization

92.410. Definitions for purposes of assessment and taxation. [Repealed.]

For the purposes of assessment and taxation in cities of the second to sixth class:

  1. “Real estate” or “real property” means land and improvements thereon. “Land” means the soil, and “improvements” means everything attached to or built on the soil.
  2. “Personal estate” or “personal property” means every other kind of property, tangible or intangible.

History. 3376, 3533, 3657, 3676; § 314.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3376, 3533, 3657, 3676) was repealed by Acts 2014, ch. 92, § 314, effective January 1, 2015.

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Assessment to be at fair cash value, Const., § 172.

92.412. Property assessment procedures for ad valorem tax levies in city of home rule class not electing by ordinance to use annual county assessment.

  1. Any city of the home rule class that does not elect by ordinance under KRS 132.285 to use the annual county assessment as the basis for ad valorem tax levies for property situated within its boundaries shall follow the procedures set out in this section.
  2. The city legislative body of any city providing for its own assessment shall establish by ordinance the manner of assessment, levy, and collection of ad valorem taxes, except that taxes on motor vehicles and motorboats shall be governed by KRS 132.487 . The ordinance shall, at a minimum, include the following:
    1. The establishment of a board of tax supervisors that shall conform to the requirements of KRS 92.242 ;
    2. The date for assessment of all property subject to city taxation, excluding motor vehicles and motorboats;
    3. The method of assessment by an assessor and the development of an assessment list that shall conform as nearly as possible to that required by law of the property valuation administrator. The method of assessment shall include a mechanism by which the assessor can correct errors and notify owners;
    4. A statement that the assessment of any real property in the name of a person other than the true owner shall not invalidate the assessment or any liens created upon the property;
    5. Specific penalties for the failure of an owner to give a list of all taxable property when requested by the assessor and for providing a false or fraudulent list of property;
    6. The dates that the board of tax supervisors shall be required to meet and complete work unless called to meet earlier by the assessor;
    7. A method for taxpayers to appeal to the board of tax supervisors in the case of a dispute regarding the assessor’s valuation and a statement that a taxpayer shall have the right to appeal a decision of the board of tax supervisors to the Circuit Court of the county within thirty (30) days of the final adjournment of the board of tax supervisors by filing with the court a copy of the action of the board, certified by the clerk of the board;
    8. The method for preparation and delivery of tax bills; and
    9. The due date for ad valorem taxes, including any discounts for early payments and any penalties for delinquent payment.
  3. The city may file an action in District Court to request the court to compel answers by process of contempt from an owner who fails to provide a list of taxable property to the assessor or gives a false or fraudulent list and may recover the legal costs, including attorney’s fees, from the owner.
  4. If any property subject to taxation has not been listed by the assessor or board of supervisors, the city legislative body may assess it later, but not after more than five (5) years after the date when the assessment should have been made.
  5. The assessment of property, the levy of taxes on property, the tax bills, the sale of property for taxes and the report thereof, and all other acts of record of cities relating to the assessment of property and the levy of taxes on property shall be conclusive notice to all persons of the assessment, levy, and sales, as well as the liens and rights created thereby. No irregularity in the proceedings shall invalidate or defeat the collection of taxes by the city upon any property subject to taxation therein. The courts shall make all necessary orders to require all such property to bear its just proportion of taxation.
  6. The city shall give notice of the due date of taxes by publication pursuant to KRS Chapter 424.
  7. The city shall possess a lien on delinquent taxes in accordance with KRS 91A.070(3).

History. Enact. Acts 2014, ch. 92, § 103, effective January 1, 2015.

92.420. Assessment date for city taxation. [Repealed.]

Except as provided in KRS 132.487 , property subject to city taxation shall be assessed for city taxation as of the following dates:

  1. In cities of the second class, July 1;
  2. In cities of the third class, a date fixed by the city legislative body;
  3. In cities of the fourth class, January 1;
  4. In cities of the fifth class, January 1;
  5. In cities of the sixth class, January 1.

History. 3176, 3178, 3374, 3379, 3535, 3655, 3674: amend. Acts 1956, ch. 34, § 2; 1960, ch. 229; 1984, ch. 54, § 13, effective January 1, 1985; § 314.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3176, 3178, 3374, 3379, 3535, 3655, 3674: amend. Acts 1956, ch. 34, § 2; 1960, ch. 229; 1984, ch. 54, § 13, effective January 1, 1985) was repealed by Acts 2014, ch. 92, § 314, effective January 1, 2015.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Construction.

Taxing statutes are presumed prospective, unless a retrospective operation is clearly indicated. Ohio Valley Tel. Co. v. Louisville, 123 Ky. 193 , 94 S.W. 17, 29 Ky. L. Rptr. 631 , 29 Ky. L. Rptr. 682 , 1906 Ky. LEXIS 132 ( Ky. 1906 ).

Provision that assessment be “as of” a certain date is not regarded as mandatory, in absence of words importing that the assessment shall not be made at any other time than that designated. Fields v. Whitesburg, 195 Ky. 688 , 243 S.W. 930, 1922 Ky. LEXIS 396 ( Ky. 1922 ).

2. Basis of Assessment.

An assessment roll for tax levied by ordinance for the year 1954 prepared by the city assessor by copying the valuations from the county tax commissioner’s equalized assessment lists based on the county tax assessment date of January 1, 1953 with a few adjustments was valid where there was no assertion that the assessment valuations were unfair, unequal or excessive and all taxpayers had an opportunity to appear before the city board of equalization. St. Matthews v. Stallings, 298 S.W.2d 676, 1957 Ky. LEXIS 378 ( Ky. 1957 ).

3. Assessment Prior To Levy.

To maintain a levy of taxes it is indispensable that there should be an assessment of the property upon which the levy must be based. City of Covington v. Carroll, 108 S.W. 295, 32 Ky. L. Rptr. 1255 (1908).

4. Annexed Territory.

Where property is to be assessed in city of fourth class as of April 1, property within territory annexed May 23 cannot be taxed for that year. City of Latonia v. Meyer, 86 S.W. 686, 27 Ky. L. Rptr. 746 (1905).

Where property is to be assessed in city of second class as of September 15, property within territory annexed November 17 cannot be taxed for that year. City of Covington v. Carroll, 108 S.W. 295, 32 Ky. L. Rptr. 1255 (1908).

Since liability for ad valorem taxes is related to assessment date and not to levy date or collection date no inequality resulted in not permitting city to assess, levy and collect taxes on territory that was not annexed to city until after assessment date. St. Matthews v. Trueheart, 274 S.W.2d 52, 1954 Ky. LEXIS 1221 ( Ky. 1954 ).

5. Assessment Preceding Fiscal Year.

Where sixth-class city which had selected January 1 as the beginning of its fiscal year passed ordinance that provided for assessment, levy and collection of taxes for the period from January 1, 1954 to December 31, 1954, such ordinance was invalid under subsection (5) of this section. St. Matthews v. Trueheart, 274 S.W.2d 52, 1954 Ky. LEXIS 1221 ( Ky. 1954 ) (decision prior to 1956 amendment).

Although the statutes contemplated that a July 1 assessment date should precede a January 1 fiscal year beginning date for sixth-class cities, where a city was transferred from a sixth-class city in June 1954 to a fourth-class city and a court decision invalidated previously attempted levy for 1954 the unusual circumstances required a departure from the general intent which in the final analysis was based upon practicalities and it was not improper for the city to use July 1, 1954 rather than July 1, 1953 as assessment date and sixth-class city tax procedures. St. Matthews v. Stallings, 298 S.W.2d 676, 1957 Ky. LEXIS 378 ( Ky. 1957 ).

The only feasible July 1 assessment date for a city having a fiscal year commencing January 1 would be July 1 proceeding the beginning of the fiscal year because it is considered to be better practice for a governmental unit not to fix its tax rate until after equalization of the assessment lists upon which the rate will be levied and because the taxes cannot be collected until after the equalization process has been completed. St. Matthews v. Stallings, 298 S.W.2d 676, 1957 Ky. LEXIS 378 ( Ky. 1957 ).

Where Court of Appeals ordered positive compliance on next tax assessment date, January 1, 1966, with constitutional provisions which had been in effect since 1891, assessment for 1966 ad valorem taxes made September 1, 1965, was properly made since order did not mean that the constitutional provision was suspended until January 1, 1966, but only that court recognized impossibility of retroactive enforcement. Coleman v. Mayfield, 405 S.W.2d 289, 1966 Ky. LEXIS 249 ( Ky. 1966 ).

Cited:

Paducah v. Smith’s Ex’r, 273 Ky. 703 , 117 S.W.2d 924, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 7 05 ( Ky. 1938 ); Board of Sup’rs v. Farmers Nat’l Bank, 293 Ky. 157 , 168 S.W.2d 371, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 7 ( Ky. 1942 ); Board of Equalization v. Owens, 264 S.W.2d 651, 1954 Ky. LEXIS 676 ( Ky. 1954 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

A city of the fourth class may be by local ordinance adopt an assessment, valuation, assessment date, fiscal year, tax levy date, and due and delinquency dates of the county in which the city is situated, provided the requirements of KRS 132.285 are met. OAG 60-1243 .

Bills for ad valorem taxes payable on June 1 and October 1 of each year are actually for the previous year’s assessments. OAG 62-450 .

Where a taxpayer moved in September from a city where taxes were assessed on July 1 and due the next year to a city where taxes were assessed on January 1 of the year in which they were due, he was only liable for the tax assessed on July 1. OAG 64-234 .

Where a city adopted essentially the same assessment, levy and collection dates provided for county and state taxes under which the collection of city taxes would begin in September or October, a city tax levy in June would have been made at the proper time. OAG 68-57 .

As the assessment date under this section as amended in 1960 by chapter 229 was enacted at a later time than the assessment date in KRS 92.490 the provisions of this section are controlling and property which obtained a situs in a city subsequent to January 1, 1972 is subject to city taxes on January 1, 1973. OAG 72-286 .

Nothing in House Bill 44, enacted in the 1979 Extraordinary Session (Acts 1979 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 25) changes a city’s assessment date, or tax levy date, nor does it suggest such an amendment by implication. OAG 79-205 , 79-217.

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Assessment dates for cities adopting the county assessment, KRS 132.285 .

Kentucky Law Journal.

Stephenson, Property Assessment Remedies for the Kentucky Taxpayer, 60 Ky. L.J. 84 (1971).

92.430. Assessment lists and assessment procedure in cities of second class. [Repealed.]

  1. Except as provided in KRS 132.487 , the assessor in each city of the second class shall assess in one (1) book all property subject to city taxation, and in making the assessment for any year shall assess any property subject to taxation that he finds to have been omitted in any former year.
  2. On or before July 1 of each year the city assessor shall give notice, by publication pursuant to KRS Chapter 424 and by handbills posted throughout the city, that all persons owning real estate on July 1 and all persons owning or having in their possession or under their control on July 1 any personal property subject to city taxation shall, before September 1, appear at the assessor’s office and furnish him a true and complete list of the property, with its true cash value as of July 1, under oath, upon forms to be furnished by the assessor on application at his office, and that all merchants doing business in the city shall in like manner, in addition to listing their personal property, state the highest amount in value of all merchandise owned or kept on hand for sale by them during the three (3) months next preceding July. The assessor and his deputies may administer oaths, and examine any person on oath concerning his real and personal property and its value, and may examine merchants on oath as to the statements required of them. The assessor may also gather information by other means.
  3. For the purpose of assessing property for taxation, the assessor shall keep his office open, with himself or a deputy in attendance, during the hours from 8 a.m. to 6 p.m. or such other or additional hours as are fixed by ordinance, from July 1 to September 1, except Sundays and legal holidays. The assessor shall constantly keep on hand, and furnish to persons lawfully requesting them, all necessary blanks and forms for the lists and statements required by this section.
  4. If any taxpayer is an artificial person, its chief officer or agent in the city at the time shall perform the duties imposed upon the taxpayer by this section.
  5. On and after September 1 of each year and until the date fixed by ordinance for the closing of the assessment books, it shall be the duty of the assessor personally or through deputies to see in person or to call at the residence, usual place of abode or business place of all taxpayers who have not listed their property by appearing at the assessor’s office for that purpose prior to September 1 or whose property is not well known to him, and the assessor or his deputies shall secure the assessment list by making such calls and shall view the property when practicable to do so.
  6. Any person who fails or refuses to supply the assessor or his deputies with a complete list of his property and the value thereon when called upon at his residence, usual place of abode or place of business may be subject to a fine to be fixed by ordinance but not exceeding fifty dollars ($50).
  7. On or before December 1 of each year the assessor shall return to the auditor his assessment books, certified by him to be a full, careful and honest assessment of all property in the city subject to assessment. He shall take the auditor’s receipt therefor in duplicate, and shall transmit one (1) of the duplicates to each board of the general council at its first regular meeting in December. The assessment books and reports shall remain in the auditor’s office, subject to public inspection, until transmitted to the board of equalization.

History. 3179, 3180: amend. Acts 1946, ch. 183; 1966, ch. 239, § 68; 1984, ch. 54, § 14, effective January 1, 1985; § 314.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3179, 3180: amend. Acts 1946, ch. 183; 1966, ch. 239, § 68; 1984, ch. 54, § 14, effective January 1, 1985) was repealed by Acts 2014, ch. 92, § 314, effective January 1, 2015.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Situs for Listing.

The proper place to list personal property for taxation is in the county where the beneficial owner lives, not at residence of trustee. Lexington v. Fishback's Trustee, 109 Ky. 770 , 60 S.W. 727, 22 Ky. L. Rptr. 1392 , 1901 Ky. LEXIS 44 ( Ky. 1901 ).

2. Retroactive Assessment.

The existence of a city back-tax collector does not make it less the duty of the regular assessor to retrospectively assess omitted property. Bell's Trustee v. Lexington, 120 Ky. 199 , 85 S.W. 1081, 27 Ky. L. Rptr. 591 , 1905 Ky. LEXIS 89 ( Ky. 1905 ), aff'd, 203 U.S. 323, 27 S. Ct. 87, 51 L. Ed. 204, 1906 U.S. LEXIS 1594 (U.S. 1906).

City may not retroactively assess property of companies covered by KRS 136.120 , but may call upon the state tax commission for relief when an omission has been made. American Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Lexington, 288 Ky. 295 , 155 S.W.2d 848, 1941 Ky. LEXIS 75 ( Ky. 1941 ).

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

City may adopt assessment made by property valuation administrator, KRS 132.285 .

See notes to KRS 92.450 under heading 1. Railroad Property, City of Newport v. Pennsylvania R.R., 287 Ky. 613 , 154 S.W.2d 719, 1941 Ky. LEXIS 600 (Ky. App. 1941).

92.440. Equalization of assessments in cities of second class. [Repealed.]

  1. The board of equalization of each city of the second class shall meet at a suitable place provided by the city on any date during the year in which property is listed by owners for taxation purposes, or on the first day of January in the next succeeding year, but not later than the last mentioned date. If the board shall meet prior to the first Monday in January, the meeting date shall be fixed by ordinance. After taking office and electing a chairman and a clerk the board shall notify the auditor that it is ready to receive the assessment books, and the auditor shall then deliver them and take the receipt of the board therefor.
  2. The board shall compare the real estate assessments with the plat books in the auditor’s office and see that every parcel of real estate in the city has been assessed. If it finds that any real estate has been omitted, it shall certify that fact to the city solicitor, giving the number of parcels omitted. The board shall assess the parcels omitted.
  3. The board shall hear and determine all complaints made against assessments. It shall increase or decrease assessments on like property in order to make all assessments uniform, or to place a true value on the property. It may, by a resolution or order signed by at least two (2) members, increase or decrease all assessments of real estate uniformly by adding or subtracting a percentage of the assessments, and need not give notice of such an increase except by publication pursuant to KRS Chapter 424. No increase of an assessment shall be made except a uniform increase as above provided, without notice to the person whose assessment is to be increased.
  4. Where an assessment has been made against the property of a person who had actual notice to appear and list his property or make statements thereof but failed to do so, the board of equalization shall not decrease, but may increase, the assessment.
  5. The board shall remain in session as long as the business requires, but not for more than four (4) weeks, unless the city legislative body, for cause stated, extends the time. The assessor shall be in constant attendance on the board and shall furnish all information possible.
  6. The board shall not change any assessment by erasure, but shall make all changes and additions in appropriate columns provided for that purpose, and shall use ink of a different color from that used by the assessor.
  7. When the board has completed its work it shall prepare, under the signatures of its members a statement showing the gross assessments of real property and of personal property, and the total of both, and the increase or decrease made by the board in the total assessment. The board shall return the statement to the city auditor, with all assessment books, plats and papers received from him, and shall take his receipt therefor.
  8. The city auditor shall carefully verify the statement of the board of equalization and the assessment books, and if they are correct he shall certify the statement. If he finds a mistake, he shall cause the board of equalization to meet, and together with the board shall ascertain the correct amount. The auditor shall transmit the statement of the board, certified by him as correct, to the city legislative body as a basis for the annual levy ordinance.
  9. Any taxpayer whose assessment has been raised or whose assessment upon his complaint has not, after proper showing, been decreased by the board of equalization otherwise than by the uniform increase of assessments may, within thirty (30) days after the final adjournment of the board, appeal to the Circuit Court by filing with the clerk of that court a copy of the action of the board, certified by the clerk of the board. The clerk of the board shall furnish the taxpayer, on demand, with such a certified copy of the action of the board as is necessary for the appeal. Appeals to the Circuit Court shall be tried without the intervention of a jury, and in case of appeals by the taxpayer the burden shall be upon the taxpayer to show that his property has been inequitably assessed. The cost of the appeals shall be adjudged against the unsuccessful party. Either party may appeal to the Court of Appeals as in other civil cases.

History. 3179, 3181, 3182: amend. Acts 1942, ch. 148, §§ 1, 3; 1948, ch. 143; 1966, ch. 239, § 69; 1976 (1st Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 107, effective January 2, 1978; § 314.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3179, 3181, 3182: amend. Acts 1942, ch. 148, §§ 1, 3; 1948, ch. 143; 1966, ch. 239, § 69; 1976 (1st Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 107, effective January 2, 1978) was repealed by Acts 2014, ch. 92, § 314, effective January 1, 2015.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(1982). A technical correction has been made in this section by the Reviser of Statutes pursuant to KRS 7.136 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Notice.

Published notice was insufficient which was not addressed to the taxpayers and did not purport to be a notice to them but simply advised the mayor and general council that the raise had been made and a subsequent publication of ordinance merely extending the time of the board’s sitting was also not sufficient to charge the taxpayers with notice that the board would actually sit on those dates for the purposes mentioned in the ordinance. The published notice to taxpayers should have been notice that the board would sit on specific dates for the purpose of hearing complaints with reference to the increase. Draffen v. Paducah, 215 Ky. 139 , 284 S.W. 1027, 1926 Ky. LEXIS 684 ( Ky. 1926 ) (decision prior to 1966 amendment).

Where proposed increase in assessment is uniform as to all taxpayers, notice by publication is all that is required. Draffen v. Paducah, 215 Ky. 139 , 284 S.W. 1027, 1926 Ky. LEXIS 684 ( Ky. 1926 ) (decision prior to 1966 amendment).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Board of commissioners does not have the power by ordinance or other appropriate action to regulate, set aside or “rollback” all residential reappraisals on property belonging to persons over 65 years of age, leaving this group with their 1972 assessment as it was for the previous year as Kentucky Constitution § 3 prohibits exemption of any property from taxation except as provided in § 171 of the Kentucky Constitution and this section so that any taxpayer aggrieved by the assessment placed upon their property by the city assessor should protest to the board of equalization. OAG 73-195 .

92.450. Omitted property, action to assess in cities of second class. [Repealed.]

When any property subject to taxation by any city of the second class has been omitted from assessment for any year, the city may, by its duly authorized attorney or agent, bring action in the name of the city against the person liable for such taxes, and recover judgment for such amount as the taxes, interest and penalties would be if the property had been assessed at its assessable value for such year, and for the costs of the action. In the action it shall be sufficient for the city to allege and prove the description and value of the property, that it was subject to assessment and taxation by the city for the year in question and was omitted from assessment, that the taxes thereon for that year have not been paid, and that the defendant is liable for the taxes. The court may hear evidence and determine the assessable value of the property for the year in question. In cases where the omitted property has changed ownership the action may be against the person who was the owner at the time the assessment should have been made, or against the owner at the time of the action, or against both. Personal judgment may be given against the person who was the owner at the time the assessment should have been made, unless he was a person under disability, and a judgment in rem may be given against the property, under which the property may be sold by order of the court in satisfaction of the taxes, interest, penalties and costs.

History. 3187h; § 314.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3187h) was repealed by Acts 2014, ch. 92, § 314, effective January 1, 2015.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Railroad Property.

If the department of revenue (now Revenue Cabinet) fails to assess railroad property for city taxes provided by KRS 136.120 , the only remedy of the city is mandamus to compel the department to make the assessment. Newport v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 287 Ky. 613 , 154 S.W.2d 719, 1941 Ky. LEXIS 600 ( Ky. 1941 ).

This section authorizes a city of the second class to maintain an action to assess, as omitted property, only such property as could have been assessed in the first instance by the city authorities. It does not authorize the assessment of the franchise or tangible property of a railroad, with respect to which the department of revenue (now Revenue Cabinet) has the sole power of assessment. Newport v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 287 Ky. 613 , 154 S.W.2d 719, 1941 Ky. LEXIS 600 ( Ky. 1941 ).

2. Telephone Franchise.

A city cannot maintain an action under this section against a telephone company to assess a franchise as omitted property or to question the method of apportionment of the franchise adopted by the state tax commission (now Board of Tax Appeals) under KRS 136.170 . The only remedy the city has is a mandamus proceeding against the state tax commission (now Board of Tax Appeals). Lexington v. Lexington Tel. Co., 288 Ky. 640 , 157 S.W.2d 119, 1941 Ky. LEXIS 174 ( Ky. 1941 ).

DECISIONS UNDER PRIOR LAW

1. Collection of Omitted Taxes.

Action under law providing for the bringing of action by city for payment of taxes on personal property that has been omitted from taxation to recover judgment against person liable for taxes on such property is a special proceeding where ownership and valuation may be determined by the court rather than by a jury. Covington v. Shinkle, 175 Ky. 530 , 194 S.W. 766, 1917 Ky. LEXIS 351 ( Ky. 1917 ).

92.460. Assessment list and assessment procedure in cities of third class. [Repealed.]

  1. The assessor in each city of the third class shall, on the assessment date fixed under KRS 92.420 or as soon thereafter as practicable, begin to value and assess all property subject to city assessment. He shall finish the assessment list by January 1 next following and return it to the city legislative body.
  2. The holder of the legal title, the holder of the equitable title, and the claimant or bailee in possession of any taxable property on the assessment date shall be liable for the taxes thereon. The property may be assessed to either of such persons, and shall be valued without regard to any conflicting title.
  3. In assessing real estate, each lot or parcel shall be listed as a separate item, together with its number on the map of the city, the street and square where situated, the depth, and the amount of frontage on each street on which it bounds. The value of the land and of the improvements shall be given separately as to each lot.
  4. The city legislative body shall prescribe and provide, for the use of the assessor, books and blank schedules with appropriate headings and columns.
  5. The provisions of the statutes for the assessment of property for taxation for state purposes shall, as far as applicable, govern cities of the third class, except as otherwise provided in this chapter.

History. 3377 to 3381; § 314.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3377 to 3381) was repealed by Acts 2014, ch. 92, § 314, effective January 1, 2015.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Construction.

The provisions of this section for assessment details on real estate, when considered together with subsection (3) of KRS 92.470 are directory only and failure to comply with them will not invalidate assessment. Board of Councilmen v. Farmers' Bank of Kentucky, 61 S.W. 458, 22 Ky. L. Rptr. 1738 , 1901 Ky. LEXIS 665 (Ky. Ct. App. 1901).

2. Basis of Assessment.

Where new tax law did not go into effect until city taxes levied under old law were due, taxes could not be computed under new law. State Nat'l Bank v. Board of Councilmen, 207 Ky. 543 , 269 S.W. 726, 1925 Ky. LEXIS 134 ( Ky. 1925 ); Williamsburg v. First Nat'l Bank, 211 Ky. 606 , 277 S.W. 977, 1925 Ky. LEXIS 932 ( Ky. 1925 ).

3. Real Estate.
4. — Mortgage.

Mortgage and bonds on real property in this state, held by a nonresident, do not have a situs for taxation here. Board of Councilmen v. Fidelity Trust & Safety-Vault Co., 111 Ky. 667 , 64 S.W. 470, 23 Ky. L. Rptr. 908 , 1901 Ky. LEXIS 236 ( Ky. 1901 ).

5. Whiskey.

City was entitled to collect taxes on whiskey withdrawn for the years stated at the same rate of taxation as it applied to other property within its limits. Kraver v. Henderson, 155 Ky. 633 , 160 S.W. 257, 1913 Ky. LEXIS 331 ( Ky. 1913 ).

Cited:

Buckner v. Clay, 306 Ky. 194 , 206 S.W.2d 827, 1947 Ky. LEXIS 978 ( Ky. 194 7).

Opinions of Attorney General.

A taxpayer in a city of the third class was liable for penalty and interest on his city taxes even though the amount of tax due was omitted from the tax notice. OAG 61-521 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

City may adopt assessment made by property valuation administrator, KRS 132.285 .

Levy and assessment of property taxes, KRS ch. 132.

Supervision, equalization and review of assessments, KRS ch. 133.

92.470. Omitted property or irregular or improper assessment in cities of third class. [Repealed.]

  1. Where any property in a city of the third class has not been assessed, or has been irregularly or improperly assessed, or where notice of the time and place of the meeting of the board of supervisors has not been properly or regularly given, the city may pass an ordinance directing the assessment of the property, or making correction in the assessment irregularly or improperly made, and giving notice of the place and time of the meeting of the board of tax supervisors so that any taxpayer may appear before that board. For the purpose of collecting unpaid taxes, the city may appoint a special board of tax supervisors, who shall assess any omitted property, correct any improper or irregular assessment, or hear any complaints as to the assessment or value of any property upon which the taxes have not been paid. When any property is assessed or any assessment corrected, or where any taxpayer has the opportunity of being heard for previous years, the tax rate, levies and liens for such years shall apply. The provisions of this subsection shall not authorize the assessment of any omitted property or the correction of any error or irregularity after more than five (5) years have elapsed.
  2. The collector shall list for taxation any property he finds to have been omitted, and shall report such lists to the city clerk, who shall enter them on the tax book and charge the collector therewith. The collector shall have the same power to collect such lists as if they had been originally listed by the assessor.
  3. No error or irregularity in the assessment of property shall invalidate the assessment or any proceeding under it.

History. 3393, 3403; § 314.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3393, 3403) was repealed by Acts 2014, ch. 92, § 314, effective January 1, 2015.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Erroneous Assessment.

The actual owner of property erroneously assessed to another is not liable in suit for taxes until city has complied with law in respect to correction of error in assessment. Board of Councilmen v. Gordon, 180 Ky. 128 , 201 S.W. 472, 1918 Ky. LEXIS 15 ( Ky. 1918 ).

2. Void Assessment.

City of third class had right to create a new board of tax supervisors after it developed that the acts of previous board were void, because no notice of its action had been given the taxpayers, because generally, the void acts of officers of municipality do not estop municipality from proceeding to perform legal acts. Freeman v. Corbin, 254 S.W.2d 497, 1953 Ky. LEXIS 595 ( Ky. 1953 ).

92.480. Equalization of assessments in cities of third class. [Repealed.]

  1. The board of supervisors of each city of the third class shall convene in the council hall on any date during the year in which property is listed by owners for taxation purposes, or on the first Monday in February in the next succeeding year, or at some later date not later than the first Monday in April. Upon convening, the board shall proceed to the discharge of its duties. The assessor shall meet with the board and act as its clerk. The board shall supervise all assessments, and see that all property is assessed at its fair cash value, taking into consideration the width, depth and location of all lots, and the cost and condition of improvements and personal property.
  2. Upon finishing its work, the board shall return the tax book to the city clerk, who shall submit it to the common council. Any person aggrieved by the action of the assessor or board of supervisors may appeal to the common council, and upon such appeal the common council may make such changes in the assessment or valuation of that person’s list as are just and equitable. If the action of the common council is not satisfactory, the party aggrieved may appeal to the Circuit Court of the county in which the property is located, and from that court to the Court of Appeals, as in other civil cases.
  3. The provisions of the statutes governing the county supervisors of tax shall, as far as applicable, govern cities of the third class, except as otherwise provided in this chapter.

History. 3383 to 3385: amend. Acts 1948, ch. 121; 1976 (1st Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 108, effective January 2, 1978; § 314.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3383 to 3385: amend. Acts 1948, ch. 121; 1976 (1st Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 108, effective January 2, 1978) was repealed by Acts 2014, ch. 92, § 314, effective January 1, 2015.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Application.

In view of the fact that the provisions of KRS 133.120 are made applicable, by subsection (3) of this section, to equalization of city taxes of third-class cities, an increase of an assessment by board of supervisors of third-class city, without notice to taxpayer, was void. Buckner v. Clay, 306 Ky. 194 , 206 S.W.2d 827, 1947 Ky. LEXIS 978 ( Ky. 194 7).

2. Quorum of Board.

A quorum of the board of supervisors may legally act, and its work and report are valid. Corbin v. Board of Education, 206 Ky. 787 , 268 S.W. 560, 1925 Ky. LEXIS 1049 ( Ky. 1925 ).

3. Appeal to Council.

The city council may not wholly ignore the work of the board of supervisors and adopt in toto the assessment of the assessor, but may only change a particular list on application and showing of justification. Corbin v. Board of Education, 206 Ky. 787 , 268 S.W. 560, 1925 Ky. LEXIS 1049 ( Ky. 1925 ).

4. Appeal to Court.

Where, on appeal by taxpayer from board of equalization to quarterly court (now Circuit Court), the board made no defense and the judgment of the quarterly court recited that the “statement of appeal is taken for confessed,” the judgment of the quarterly court was not a “confessed judgment” within the rule prohibiting appeal from a confessed judgment, but was a default judgment from which an appeal could be taken by the board. Board of Supervisors v. Pinnell, 292 Ky. 364 , 166 S.W.2d 882, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 108 ( Ky. 1942 ).

The judgment of the quarterly court (now Circuit Court) on appeal from a board of equalization has the same status as any other judgment of a court. Board of Supervisors v. Pinnell, 292 Ky. 364 , 166 S.W.2d 882, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 108 ( Ky. 1942 ).

92.490. Assessment list and assessment procedure in cities of fourth class — Census. [Repealed.]

  1. The assessor in each city of the fourth class shall, on or before the first Monday in May of each year, take a list of all the taxable property in the city and return it to the city legislative body. Except as provided in KRS 132.487 , he shall list all personal property in the city, whether belonging to residents or to nonresidents, that is liable for taxation, in the same manner as provided by law for the property valuation administrator, and shall also list every male resident of the city who is twenty-one (21) years of age or over. He shall list the residents of the city and owners of property in the city together in one or more books, as nearly as possible in alphabetical order, and the books shall be ruled in columns so as to show the property subject to taxation and its value. The assessor shall value the property at its fair cash value, and shall enter in the book, opposite the name of the owner, the amount of each kind of property, and opposite the name of each adult male resident, the amount of poll tax.
  2. The assessor shall call upon each person from whom taxes are collectible, and shall administer to him an oath to give in a true and complete list of all taxable property in his possession, whether as owner or in the right of another, as of April 1, and that he will give true and correct answers to all questions asked concerning such taxable property. The assessor shall thereupon make out a list and assess the property of the taxpayer. In the case of corporations, one or more of its officers or agents found in the city shall perform the duties imposed by this section on individual taxpayers. If any person refuses to take the oath or to give in a list of his property or that of the person for which he is agent or attorney, the assessor shall assess the property from the best of his information.
  3. Every person who, on April 1, owns any taxable property or holds it in the right of another shall, when called upon, list it with the city assessor, and shall remain bound for the tax, notwithstanding he may have sold or parted with the property. The list shall be made upon blanks prepared by the assessor, and shall show the value of the personalty, the amount of investments, and all property assessed for state taxes. The person making the list shall make oath to the list before the assessor or one (1) of his deputies, who may administer the oath.
  4. Improvements not owned by the owner of the land may be assessed in the name of the owner of the improvements. The assessor shall not assess any property in such a name as “A B’s heirs,” “A B’s devisees,” “A B’s executor,” or the like, but may assess real property in such a name as “A B’s unknown heirs,” “A B’s unknown devisees,” or the like, when the names cannot be obtained by diligent inquiry. When there are more than three (3) joint owners, three (3) of the names with the words “and others,” shall be sufficient. Where remainders or future estates are outstanding, the name of the holder of the particular estate shall be assessed, with the words “holder of present estate” after his name.
  5. The assessor or one (1) of his deputies shall view all real property and tangible personal property before assessing it. Tangible personal property shall be viewed by going upon the premises where it or the greater part of it is found. The failure of the assessor to view any property shall not invalidate the assessment.
  6. The assessor shall obtain, at the expense of the city, copies of all recorded plats of land in the city. He shall keep them in his office, and mark on them all changes occurring in the ownership and in the subdivision or combination of the lots.
  7. The assessor shall take a census of the city every two (2) years.

History. 3533, 3535, 3537 to 3539: amend. Acts 1984, ch. 54, § 15, effective January 1, 1985; § 314.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3533, 3535, 3537 to 3539: amend. Acts 1984, ch. 54, § 15, effective January 1, 1985) was repealed by Acts 2014, ch. 92, § 314, effective January 1, 2015.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Basis of Assessment.

Where new tax law did not go into effect until city taxes levied under old law were due, taxes could not be computed under new law. State Nat'l Bank v. Board of Councilmen, 207 Ky. 543 , 269 S.W. 726, 1925 Ky. LEXIS 134 ( Ky. 1925 ); Williamsburg v. First Nat'l Bank, 211 Ky. 606 , 277 S.W. 977, 1925 Ky. LEXIS 932 ( Ky. 1925 ).

An assessment roll for tax levied by ordinance for the year 1954 prepared by the city assessor by copying the valuations from the county tax commissioner’s equalized assessment lists based on the county tax assessment date of January 1, 1953 with a few adjustments was valid where there was no assertion that the assessment valuations were unfair, unequal or excessive and all taxpayers had an opportunity to appear before the city board of equalization. St. Matthews v. Stallings, 298 S.W.2d 676, 1957 Ky. LEXIS 378 ( Ky. 1957 ).

Cited:

Pineville v. Moore, 190 Ky. 357 , 227 S.W. 477, 1921 Ky. LEXIS 446 ( Ky. 1921 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Although there is no fixed date for closing the assessment book of a city of the fourth class such a date can be set if it allows sufficient time for the completion of the assessment list and for taxpayer’s to appeal the assessments. OAG 60-1272 .

The failure of the assessor to view the property assessed would not invalidate the assessment. OAG 64-142 .

As the assessment date in this section was enacted prior to the assessment date set out in KRS 92.420 the provisions of this latter section are controlling and, therefore, property which obtained a situs in the city subsequent to January 1, 1972, is subject to city taxes on January 1, 1973. OAG 72-286 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

City may adopt assessment made by property valuation administrator, KRS 132.285 .

92.500. Assessment in wrong name in cities of fourth class — Failure to give true list of taxable property — Omitted property. [Repealed.]

  1. An assessment of any real property, in a city of the fourth class, in the name of a person other than the true owner shall not be invalid, nor shall the lien of the tax be affected thereby. The assessor or collector, upon learning of the error and after notifying the true owner by mail, shall correct the assessment in this respect, and all proceedings for the collection of the tax may then proceed, subject to the right of the owner to have the valuation corrected at a meeting of the board of supervisors to be called for that purpose.
  2. If any person fails to give a list of his taxable property when called on by the assessor, or gives a false or fraudulent list, the assessor shall return him on his books as a delinquent, and the District Court shall, upon application of the assessor, issue a rule against the delinquent and compel true answers by process of contempt, and adjudge against the delinquent the costs of the proceedings.
  3. If any property subject to taxation has not been listed, the city legislative body may assess it, but not after more than five (5) years elapsed.

History. 3534, 3540, 3542: amend. Acts 1976 (1st Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 109, effective January 2, 1978; § 314.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3534, 3540, 3542: amend. Acts 1976 (1st Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 109, effective January 2, 1978) was repealed by Acts 2014, ch. 92, § 314, effective January 1, 2015.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Purpose.

The purpose of subsection (1) of this section is to acquaint the owner of property with the assessment, and give him an opportunity to question it. Taylor v. Pineville, 299 Ky. 796 , 187 S.W.2d 736, 1945 Ky. LEXIS 798 ( Ky. 1945 ).

2. Incorrect Listing.

Where real property in a city of the fourth class was assessed in name of estate of deceased, rather than in name of the sole heir, who was a nonresident minor, a judgment directing sale of the property for delinquent taxes was not void because of nature of the assessment, even under assumption subsection (1) of this section applied, since real owner and her guardian and warning order attorney appeared in action before final judgment was entered and did not question validity or correctness of assessment. Taylor v. Pineville, 299 Ky. 796 , 187 S.W.2d 736, 1945 Ky. LEXIS 798 ( Ky. 1945 ).

3. Omitted Property.
4. — Mandatory Assessment.

Mandamus will lie to compel assessment by city legislative body of omitted property. Elam v. Salisbury, 180 Ky. 142 , 202 S.W. 56, 1918 Ky. LEXIS 26 ( Ky. 1918 ).

The provisions that the city legislative body “may assess” property subject to taxation that has not been listed imposes a mandatory duty to do so. Elam v. Salisbury, 180 Ky. 142 , 202 S.W. 56, 1918 Ky. LEXIS 26 ( Ky. 1918 ).

5. — Listing.

Where city authorities were under mistaken impression that taxpayer’s residence was outside corporate limits and for that reason did not assess property for taxation, it could be retrospectively assessed as omitted property. Asher v. Pineville, 140 Ky. 670 , 131 S.W. 512, 1910 Ky. LEXIS 343 ( Ky. 1910 ).

The city legislative body may list omitted property by an order entered upon record, without passing an ordinance. Graves' Adm'r v. Georgetown, 154 Ky. 207 , 157 S.W. 33, 1913 Ky. LEXIS 55 ( Ky. 1913 ).

6. Bridge.

City could assess bridge under this section. Ironton & Russell Bridge Co. v. Russell, 262 Ky. 778 , 91 S.W.2d 1, 1935 Ky. LEXIS 796 ( Ky. 1935 ).

7. Limitation.

Limitation in bar of right to assess omitted property under subsection (3) of KRS 92.500 is five years. Ironton & Russell Bridge Co. v. Russell, 262 Ky. 778 , 91 S.W.2d 1, 1935 Ky. LEXIS 796 ( Ky. 1935 ).

Cited:

Board of Sup’rs v. Farmers Nat’l Bank, 293 Ky. 157 , 168 S.W.2d 371, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 7 ( Ky. 1942 ).

92.510. Equalization of assessments in cities of fourth class. [Repealed.]

  1. The supervisors of taxes in each city of the fourth class shall meet in the office of the assessor on the first Monday in May of each year, and may meet at such time prior to the first Monday in May as they are called upon to meet by the tax assessor in the event the latter shall have completed the taking of the assessment list prior to the first Monday in May, pursuant to KRS 92.490 , and may adjourn from day to day until their work is completed, not exceeding twenty (20) days. Ten (10) days’ notice of the place of meeting shall be given by printed notice, and no assessment shall be increased unless the taxpayer, if he lives in the city, has been cited to appear before the supervisors. The assessor shall meet with the supervisors.
  2. The supervisors of taxes shall carefully examine the assessor’s books, and correct any errors of the assessor that are found. They shall hear complaints of taxpayers, made in person or by agent or attorney, and may add to, increase or decrease any list of property or the value thereof, or change the name of the person assessed.
  3. Failure or informality in the election of supervisors of taxes, or in their meetings or proceedings, shall not affect the validity of any tax.
  4. The provisions of subsection (2) of KRS 92.530 shall govern appeals from the action of the supervisors of taxes in cities of the fourth class.

History. 2741i-1, 3542: amend. Acts 1954, ch. 88, § 2; 1964, ch. 84, § 1; § 314.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2741i-1, 3542: amend. Acts 1954, ch. 88, § 2; 1964, ch. 84, § 1) was repealed by Acts 2014, ch. 92, § 314, effective January 1, 2015.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Meetings.

Board of supervisors may be appointed and meet at a time different from that prescribed by law, and when so convened may validly increase assessments. City of Richmond v. Shackelford, 187 Ky. 789 , 220 S.W. 758, 1920 Ky. LEXIS 206 (Ky. Ct. App. 1920).

2. — Notice.

Notice of meeting of board is for benefit of taxpayer and may be waived by him. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Somerset Board of Education, 86 S.W. 1120, 27 Ky. L. Rptr. 863 (1905).

Failure to give printed notice of meetings of board of supervisors will not invalidate the tax. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Somerset Board of Education, 86 S.W. 1120, 27 Ky. L. Rptr. 863 (1905).

3. — Notice of Hearing.

Notice served under this section on taxpayer, setting a date for hearing on proposed increase in her assessment, some eight (8) months after the date for meetings of the supervisors, at which time her taxes had been due for six (6) months and delinquent for more than a month, was insufficient as to point of time. Board of Equalization v. Owens, 264 S.W.2d 651, 1954 Ky. LEXIS 676 ( Ky. 1954 ).

4. Appeal.

Where, on appeal by taxpayer from board of equalization to quarterly court (now Circuit Court), the board made no defense and the judgment of the quarterly court recited that the “statement of appeal is taken for confessed,” the judgment of the quarterly court was not a “confessed judgment” within the rule prohibiting appeal from a confessed judgment, but was a default judgment from which an appeal could be taken by the board. Board of Supervisors v. Pinnell, 292 Ky. 364 , 166 S.W.2d 882, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 108 ( Ky. 1942 ).

The judgment of the quarterly court (now Circuit Court) on appeal from a board of equalization has the same status as any other judgment of a court. Board of Supervisors v. Pinnell, 292 Ky. 364 , 166 S.W.2d 882, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 108 ( Ky. 1942 ).

Cited:

St. Matthews v. Stallings, 298 S.W.2d 676, 1957 Ky. LEXIS 378 ( Ky. 1957 ).

92.520. Assessment list and assessment procedure in cities of fifth and sixth classes. [Repealed.]

  1. The assessor of each city of the fifth class shall, between January 1 and March 1 of each year, make out a true list of all taxable property in the city. Except as provided in subsection (4) of this section, the assessor of each city of the sixth class shall make out a similar list between July 1 and November 1 of each year. The mode of making out the list and the proceedings relating thereto, in cities of the fifth and sixth classes, shall be in conformity with the laws regulating the duties of the property valuation administrator, except as otherwise provided by statute or by ordinance. The assessor in each city of the fifth class shall verify the list by his oath, and shall deposit it with the city clerk on or before the first Monday in March. The assessor in each city of the sixth class shall verify the list by his oath, and shall deposit it with the city clerk on or before the first Monday in December.
  2. The assessor of each city of the fifth class shall also, during the time allowed for making out the assessment list, make a list of all persons residing within the city and verify it by oath, and shall deposit it with the city clerk on or before the first Monday in March. The assessor of each city of the sixth class shall make out a similar list and verify it by oath, and shall deposit it with the city clerk on or before the first Monday in December.
  3. The assessor and his deputy in each city of the fifth or sixth class may administer all oaths necessary in the performance of their duties.
  4. The city legislative body of any city of the sixth class may, by ordinance or resolution, provide that the assessment made by the property valuation administrator for state and county purposes shall be adopted as the assessment for city purposes, in lieu of the assessment provided for in subsection (1) of this section, and that the city tax bills shall be made from the county lists and property valuation administrator’s books after they have been supervised and corrected by the county board of equalization. In such cases the city clerk shall take the lists of all persons subject to city taxation who are not shown on the property valuation administrator’s books, and shall list all property a portion of which is in the city where the value of the portion in the city is not shown on the property valuation administrator’s books.

History. 3655, 3674: amend. Acts 1956, ch. 34, § 3; 1970, ch. 92, § 19; § 314.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3655, 3674: amend. Acts 1956, ch. 34, § 3; 1970, ch. 92, § 19) was repealed by Acts 2014, ch. 92, § 314, effective January 1, 2015.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

St. Matthews v. Trueheart, 274 S.W.2d 52, 1954 Ky. LEXIS 1221 ( Ky. 1954 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

City assessor is backed by ample authority in his job of assessing property at fair cash value in the city of Highland Heights but it is only after the board of equalization has met and examined and rectified the assessment list upon which tax can be levied that such list is a valid assessment roll to be certified by the city clerk. OAG 73-632 .

A sixth-class city which had not elected to adopt the county assessment must comply with the assessment procedures contained in KRS 92.540 and this section, and while those statutes allow the city a great deal of discretion in the manner of assessment, levy and collection of its ad valorem taxes, the city must operate within the limits of the Constitution. OAG 82-372 .

Assessing every lot within a sixth-class city at $12,500 without regard to the actual transfer prices reflected in recent deeds violated the “fair cash value” mandate contained in Const., § 172. OAG 82-372 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

City may adopt assessment made by property valuation administrator. KRS 132.285 .

92.530. Equalization of assessments in cities of fifth and sixth classes. [Repealed.]

  1. The board of equalization of each city of the fifth class shall meet at 10 a.m. on the first Monday of March each year. The board of equalization of each city of the sixth class shall meet at 10 a.m. on the first Monday of December each year. The board of equalization of each city of the fifth or sixth class shall continue in session from day to day until all the returns of the assessor have been rectified, except that in cities of the sixth class the board shall not remain in session more than three (3) days. The board may hear complaints, and correct, modify or strike out any assessments made by the assessor, and may, on their own motion, raise any assessment upon notice to the party whose assessment is to be raised. The corrected list for each tax shall be the assessment roll for that tax for the year, and shall be so certified by the city clerk.
  2. Any taxpayer feeling himself aggrieved by the action of the board of equalization of any city of the fifth or sixth class in assessing or increasing the valuation of his property for taxation may appeal to the circuit court of the county, within thirty (30) days after the final adjournment of the board, by filing with the court a copy of the action of the board, certified by the clerk of the board. The fee of the clerk for the copy shall be fifty cents ($0.50). If the clerk fails, on demand and tender of the fee, to furnish the person desiring to appeal with a certified copy of the action of the board, the person may appeal within the allowed time by filing his affidavit of the demand and tender with the court, who shall thereupon make an order directing the clerk to furnish and file the copy. The court shall hear evidence and pass upon the appeal, and either party may appeal as in other cases. The city attorney represents the board in all such cases.

History. 2741i-1, 3645, 3678: amend. Acts 1956, ch. 34, § 4; 1976 (1st Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 110, effective January 2, 1978; § 314.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2741i-1, 3645, 3678: amend. Acts 1956, ch. 34, § 4; 1976 (1st Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 110, effective January 2, 1978) was repealed by Acts 2014, ch. 92, § 314, effectiveJanuary 1, 2015.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Appeal.

Where, on appeal by taxpayer from board of equalization to quarterly court (now Circuit Court), the board made no defense and the judgment of the quarterly court recited that the “statement of appeal is taken for confessed,” the judgment of the quarterly court was not a “confessed judgment” within the rule prohibiting appeal from a confessed judgment, but was a default judgment from which an appeal could be taken by the board. Board of Supervisors v. Pinnell, 292 Ky. 364 , 166 S.W.2d 882, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 108 ( Ky. 1942 ).

The judgment of the quarterly court (now Circuit Court) on appeal from a board of equalization has the same status as any other judgment of a court. Board of Supervisors v. Pinnell, 292 Ky. 364 , 166 S.W.2d 882, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 108 ( Ky. 1942 ).

2. — Procedure.

Where on appeal from action of city board of equalization, a copy of the action of the board certified by the clerk of the board was not filed but there were filed copies of the original assessments transcribed from the assessment book certified by the city clerk, there was no appeal and the alleged appeal required dismissal. Manchester v. Asher, 396 S.W.2d 327, 1965 Ky. LEXIS 111 ( Ky. 1965 ).

Cited:

St. Matthews v. Trueheart, 274 S.W.2d 52, 1954 Ky. LEXIS 1221 ( Ky. 1954 ) (decision prior to 1956 amendment).

Opinions of Attorney General.

This section mandatorily requires that the board meet at the hour and on the date specified in the statute. OAG 61-294 .

City has no authority to intervene in an individual property owner’s assessment made by the board as it is up to the property owner himself to protest and appeal the board’s decision. OAG 72-398 .

City assessor has ample authority in his job of assessing property at fair cash value in the city of Highland Heights but it is only after the board of equalization has met and examined and rectified the assessment list upon which tax can be levied that such list is a valid assessment roll to be certified by the city clerk. OAG 73-632 .

Where a city was reclassified as a fifth-class city and as a result the board of equalization did not meet in March to certify the assessment list, there was no tax roll upon which the city tax rate could be levied. OAG 76-724 .

92.540. Manner of assessment, levy and collection, how regulated by ordinance in cities of second, fifth and sixth classes. [Repealed.]

  1. The city legislative body of any city of the second class may by ordinance change the manner of assessment, levy and collection of taxes provided in this chapter, and may prescribe by ordinance in what manner property shall be assessed and taxes levied and collected, except that the statutory interest and penalties shall not be increased, nor the period of redemption decreased, nor shall the notice to delinquent taxpayers after the sale of their property for taxes be dispensed with.
  2. The city legislative body of each city of the fifth or sixth class shall provide by ordinance a system for the assessment, levy and collection of all city taxes, not inconsistent with the statutes relating to revenue and taxation in cities of those classes. The system so adopted shall conform, as nearly as circumstances permit, to the provisions of the statutes relating to assessment, levy and collection of state and county taxes.

History. 3189b, 3644, 3677; § 314.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3189b, 3644, 3677) was repealed by Acts 2014, ch. 92, § 314, effective January 1, 2015.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Omitted Taxes.

A city of the fifth class may by ordinance provide for the assessment and collection of omitted taxes. Muir's Adm'rs v. Bardstown, 120 Ky. 739 , 87 S.W. 1096, 27 Ky. L. Rptr. 1150 , 1905 Ky. LEXIS 156 ( Ky. 1905 ).

2. Levy.

If city does not provide system for assessment, levy and collection of taxes, any act in that connection not authorized by statute is erroneous. Blades v. Falmouth, 124 Ky. 259 , 98 S.W. 1017, 30 Ky. L. Rptr. 420 , 1907 Ky. LEXIS 179 ( Ky. 1907 ).

A city of the fifth class may levy taxes for a certain year upon assessment made that year. Blades v. Falmouth, 124 Ky. 259 , 98 S.W. 1017, 30 Ky. L. Rptr. 420 , 1907 Ky. LEXIS 179 ( Ky. 1907 ).

3. Delinquent Taxes.

City of sixth class may impose penalty of 15 percent on delinquent taxes. Carpenter v. Lambert, 92 S.W. 607, 29 Ky. L. Rptr. 183 (1906).

Cited:

St. Matthews v. Trueheart, 274 S.W.2d 52, 1954 Ky. LEXIS 1221 ( Ky. 1954 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Where the sheriff entered into separate contracts with two (2) cities in the county to collect their taxes, fees collected from the two (2) cities should be deemed fees of the sheriff’s office and added to the total fees collected by the sheriff in computing the amount of excess fees to be turned over to the county. OAG 65-112 .

A city of the sixth class that has adopted the county assessment and uses the calendar year as its fiscal year could adopt an ordinance under which city real estate taxes become delinquent on November 1 and a penalty of ten percent and interest of six percent are added subsequent to that date. OAG 67-61 .

Where a city adopted essentially the same assessment, levy and collection dates provided for county and state taxes under which the collection of city taxes would begin in September or October, a city tax levy in June would have been made at the proper time. OAG 68-57 .

A fifth-class city must, by ordinance, levy an annual tax rate, prepare an annual budget and publish both the budget or summary thereof together with the rate in the local newspaper. OAG 70-630 .

If the legislative body in a sixth-class city has approved and directed that a city judge prepare the city tax bills, the city judge could compute the tax bills with the judge’s name appearing on such bills. OAG 76-238 .

A fifth-class city may charge an interest rate of 12 percent and a penalty of 6 percent on delinquent ad valorem taxes. OAG 82-189 .

A sixth-class city which had not elected to adopt the county assessment must comply with the assessment procedures contained in KRS 92.520 and this section, and while those statutes allow the city a great deal of discretion in the manner of assessment, levy and collection of its ad valorem taxes, the city must operate within the limits of the Constitution. OAG 82-372 .

Assessing every lot within a sixth-class city at $12,500 without regard to the actual transfer prices reflected in recent deeds violated the “fair cash value” mandate contained in Const., § 172. OAG 82-372 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Levy and assessment of property taxes, KRS ch. 132.

Payment, collection and refund of taxes, KRS ch. 134.

Kentucky Law Journal.

Stephenson, Property Assessment Remedies for the Kentucky Taxpayer, 60 Ky. L.J. 84 (1971).

92.550. City tax records in cities of second class constitute notice — Irregular tax proceedings. [Repealed.]

The assessment of property by cities of the second class, the levy of taxes thereon, the tax bills, the sale of property for taxes and the treasurer’s report thereof, and all other acts of record of such cities relating to the assessment of property and the levy of taxes thereon shall be conclusive notice to all persons of such assessment, levy and sales and the liens and rights created thereby. No irregularity in such proceedings shall invalidate or defeat the collection of taxes by the city upon any property subject to taxation therein. The courts shall make all necessary orders to require all such property to bear its just proportion of taxation.

History. 3187j; § 314.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3187j) was repealed by Acts 2014, ch. 92, § 314, effective January 1, 2015.

Collection of Taxes — Tax Sales

92.560. Tax bills, how made out and delivered in cities of second class. [Repealed.]

As soon as the tax levy ordinance in each city of the second class becomes in force, the auditor shall deliver the assessment books to the city clerk, who shall from them make out the tax bills. Each bill shall show each lot and the assessment thereon separately, the name of the supposed owner, the net total assessment of personal property, other than motor vehicles governed by the provisions of KRS 132.487 , against the person and the tax thereon. The tax bills shall be so arranged that the bill for each half-year may be detached and have each part intelligible. There shall be attached to each bill a stub showing in condensed form the items and amounts in the bill, and the bills and stubs shall be numbered consecutively, the number of each stub to correspond to the bill to which it is attached. The bills and stubs shall be bound in book form. As soon as practicable the clerk shall deliver the assessment books and tax bills to the auditor, and together they shall ascertain whether the sum of the tax bills equals the amount of the tax which, at the rate fixed, the total assessment should realize, and if it does not, they shall find and correct the error. When the error is corrected, the auditor shall receipt for the assessment books and tax bills. The auditor shall then deliver all tax bills to the treasurer and take his receipt for the gross amount of the bills. As soon as practicable after receiving the tax bills, the treasurer shall mail to each person against whom a tax bill has been listed, or to his guardian or conservator, a postpaid notice, directed to the best of his knowledge, stating the number and amount of the bill, the date when due and the penalties imposed for nonpayment. The failure of the treasurer to send the notice, or of the taxpayer, guardian or conservator to receive it, shall not invalidate the tax or the interest or penalties, or any subsequent proceeding for the collection thereof.

History. 3184: amend. Acts 1982, ch. 141, § 50, effective July 1, 1982; 1984, ch. 8, § 1, effective July 13, 1984; 1984, ch. 54, § 16, effective January 1, 1985; § 314.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3184: amend. Acts 1982, ch. 141, § 50, effective July 1, 1982; 1984, ch. 8, § 1, effective July 13, 1984; 1984, ch. 54, § 16, effective January 1, 1985) was repealed by Acts 2014, ch. 92, § 314, effective January 1, 2015.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

This section (3184: amend. Acts 1982, ch. 141, § 50, effective July 1, 1982; 1984, ch. 8, § 1, effective July 13, 1984; 1984, ch. 54, § 16, effective January 1, 1985) was amended by two 1984 Acts which do not appear to be in conflict and have been compiled together.

92.570. Tax bills, how made out and delivered in cities of third class. [Repealed.]

  1. After the tax book in any city of the third class has been amended or changed as provided in KRS 92.480 , the common council shall by resolution accept the tax book and fix the rate of taxation for the year, and place the tax book in the hands of the city clerk to be copied. The clerk shall write out the amount of taxes due on each list in the form prescribed by ordinance.
  2. The city clerk shall, after the completion of the work of the board of supervisors, make out tax bills, as directed by statute or ordinance, against all persons and property assessed, and deliver the bills not later than June 1 to the tax collector. Before delivering the tax bills to the collector, the clerk shall take from the collector a receipt for the gross amount of taxes due the city. The receipt shall be presented to the common council and recorded in its minutes, and the collector shall be charged with the gross amount of the taxes.
  3. The tax bills shall have, in the hands of the collector, the effect of an execution in favor of the city against the taxpayer and his property, for the tax due.

History. 3386 to 3389; § 314.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3386 to 3389) was repealed by Acts 2014, ch. 92, § 314, effective January 1, 2015.

Opinions of Attorney General.

Sufficient statutory authority exists for the imposition of a six percent interest rate on taxes unpaid to the city by October 1. OAG 60-1051 .

Although not required by statute, if taxes are due to the city by July 1 the city council should make some provision by ordinance for delivery of the bills or notification to the taxpayers in the city that the bills are due on July 1. OAG 67-271 .

92.580. Tax bills, how made out and delivered in cities of fourth class. [Repealed.]

As soon as practicable after the supervisors of taxes in any city of the fourth class have corrected the assessment lists, they shall return the lists to the city clerk. The clerk shall, from the assessment lists, make out the tax bills for ad valorem and poll taxes for the year, in a stub-book to be devised by the city council for that purpose, and shall sign the bills and turn them over to the city collector or treasurer, as may be provided by ordinance, and take his receipt therefor, showing the number of bills so turned over and the aggregate amount thereof. The tax bills shall be indorsed by the collector or treasurer. Within ten (10) days after receipt of the tax bills, and before July 1, and ten (10) days before September 1, the collector or treasurer shall give notice by publication pursuant to KRS Chapter 424, that the taxes for the current year are in his hands for collection and are due, and that in default of payment on or before the date fixed under subsection (4) or (6) of KRS 92.590 , the penalty prescribed by ordinance will be attached.

History. 3543, 3544a-1: amend. Acts 1966, ch. 239, § 70; § 314.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3543, 3544a-1: amend. Acts 1966, ch. 239, § 70) was repealed by Acts 2014, ch. 92, § 314, effective January 1, 2015.

Opinions of Attorney General.

A city may not legally place its city property taxes on its taxpayer’s utility bills for collection purposes and thereby carry the threat of discontinuing the utility services if the property owners fail to pay their property taxes, since aside from the fact that the property taxes must be collected separately by the tax collector pursuant to this section and KRS 92.590 , only utility bills can legally be listed together on a single bill and submitted to the property owner with the penalty of turning off the customer’s water supply. OAG 80-238 .

92.590. Time and manner of paying taxes in cities of second, third and fourth classes — Discounts, interest and penalties. [Repealed.]

  1. Taxes in cities of the second, third and fourth classes shall be due and payable as follows:
    1. Ad valorem taxes in cities of the second class, as determined by ordinance.
    2. All city taxes in cities of the third class, as soon as the bills come into the hands of the collector.
    3. All city taxes in cities of the fourth class, on July 1; but the city legislative body may provide, by ordinance enacted on or before July 1, that all ad valorem taxes shall be due and payable in two (2) installments, one-half (1/2) on July 1 next after the assessment date and one-half (1/2) on December 1, in which case, if the first installment is not paid on or before August 1, both installments shall be deemed to have become due and payable on July 1.
  2. In cities of the second class, taxpayers owing ad valorem taxes shall pay them, without demand therefor, at the treasurer’s office. The taxpayer may pay the whole tax at any time after the tax bills have been made out and delivered to him. The city legislative body may provide by ordinance that taxes paid during the second month preceding the date which they are due and payable may be reduced by a discount of three percent (3%), and taxes paid during the month immediately preceding the date which they are due and payable may be reduced by a discount of two percent (2%). Taxes not paid within one (1) calendar month after they are due shall be deemed delinquent and shall have added to them a penalty of ten percent (10%), and shall thereafter bear interest at the rate of one-half of one percent (0.5%) for each month or fraction of a month until paid, or until the property of the delinquent has been sold for the tax. When taxes are paid the treasurer shall note on the stub of the bill the amounts paid and the date thereof, and shall deliver the receipted bill, countersigned by the auditor, to the taxpayer. When any person desires to pay taxes on any one (1) item of real estate in a tax bill he shall be allowed to do so, if the city’s interest will not be prejudiced thereby, and shall be given a receipt showing the date and the amount of the payment, the number of the tax bill, the name of the person against whom the tax bill is made out and a sufficient description to identify the property on which the taxes are paid. A corresponding notation shall be made on the tax bill and the stub, and the city’s lien shall thereupon stand released as to that property, but the tax bill shall not be surrendered until paid in full.
  3. The common council of each city of the third class may provide by ordinance such discounts for prompt payment and penalties for late payment of taxes as it deems proper. All taxes owed to such cities shall bear interest at six percent (6%) per annum from October 1 of each year. The common council shall not refund to any person any taxes lawfully collected, nor extend the time for the payment of taxes, nor release any penalty incurred by nonpayment of taxes.
  4. The legislative body of each city of the fourth class may provide, by ordinance enacted on or before July 1, that:
    1. Any taxpayer may pay at any time, and the collector shall receive, any amount in even dollars as part payment or advance payment of taxes; a discount of six percent (6%) per annum, from the date of payment until the date when the taxes would have become due and payable, shall be allowed on all taxes paid in advance.
    2. All taxes remaining unpaid on the first day of the month following that in which they became due and payable shall be deemed delinquent, and shall bear interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the due date until paid; a penalty of six percent (6%) on the taxes so delinquent shall be paid, except when all installments are paid in full on or before December 1.
  5. When any city of the fourth class gives effect by ordinance to the provisions of subsection (4) and paragraph (c) of subsection (1) of this section, all statutes inconsistent with such provisions shall not apply.
  6. When a city of the fourth class does not give effect by ordinance to the provisions of subsection (4) and paragraph (c) of subsection (1) of this section, all tax bills remaining in the hands of the collector or treasurer on November 1 in each year, unpaid, shall be indorsed by him “delinquent,” and returned to the city clerk, and such bills found in the tax list returned by the clerk to be unpaid shall be credited to the collector or treasurer on his receipt. The city clerk shall thereupon proceed to attach to each tax bill the penalty prescribed by ordinance, not exceeding twenty-five percent (25%), and such interest as is provided by ordinance, and shall then deliver the tax bills to the collector and take his receipt therefor.

History. 3185, 3278, 3389, 3392, 3400, 3490-2a, 3490-2b, 3536, 3544a-1: amend. Acts 1948, ch. 128; 1984, ch. 8, § 2, effective July 13, 1984; § 314.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3185, 3278, 3389, 3392, 3400, 3490-2a, 3490-2b, 3536, 3544a-1: amend. Acts 1948, ch. 128; 1984, ch. 8, § 2, effective July 13, 1984) was repealed by Acts 2014, ch. 92, § 314, effective January 1, 2015.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Setoff Prohibited.

A setoff cannot be maintained against taxes due to municipalities. Somerset v. Somerset Banking Co., 109 Ky. 549 , 60 S.W. 5, 22 Ky. L. Rptr. 1129 , 1900 Ky. LEXIS 239 ( Ky. 1900 ). See Anderson v. Mayfield, 93 Ky. 230 , 19 S.W. 598, 14 Ky. L. Rptr. 370 , 1892 Ky. LEXIS 75 ( Ky. 1892 ).

2. Rate.

When city taxes became due before new law took effect, taxpayers were not entitled to new lower rate. Williamsburg v. First Nat'l Bank, 211 Ky. 606 , 277 S.W. 977, 1925 Ky. LEXIS 932 ( Ky. 1925 ).

3. Recovery of Taxes Paid.

Payment by executor of nondelinquent real estate taxes before distraint could be had under the law and at a time, when there was no threat, coercion, distraint or threat of distraint, constituted a voluntary payment and the overpayment could not be recovered though paid under mistake of law and under protest. Paducah v. Smith's Ex'r, 273 Ky. 703 , 117 S.W.2d 924, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 705 ( Ky. 1938 ).

4. Action to Collect.

City of fourth class has right to bring suit for taxes without regard to collector’s exhausting other remedies provided by statute. Ludlow v. Ludlow, 152 Ky. 545 , 153 S.W. 783, 1913 Ky. LEXIS 697 ( Ky. 1913 ).

5. Interest and Penalty.

City of third class may inflict penalty of ten percent (10%) for nonpayment of city taxes, in addition to interest provided for. Owensboro Waterworks Co. v. Owensboro, 75 S.W. 268, 25 Ky. L. Rptr. 434 (1903).

An interest charge upon overdue taxes is in the nature of a penalty, imposed to speedily collect the taxes. Specht v. Louisville, 135 Ky. 548 , 122 S.W. 846, 1909 Ky. LEXIS 319 ( Ky. 1909 ).

Amount of interest or penalty on unpaid taxes is a matter of legislative discretion, and will not be interfered with unless unreasonable, unjust or confiscatory. Specht v. Louisville, 135 Ky. 548 , 122 S.W. 846, 1909 Ky. LEXIS 319 ( Ky. 1909 ).

A city of the fourth class may by ordinance impose penalties calculated to expedite the collection of city taxes. Board of Education v. Hatton, 253 Ky. 828 , 70 S.W.2d 923, 1934 Ky. LEXIS 746 ( Ky. 1934 ).

In absence of ordinance, there is no penalty that can be imposed on either the taxpayer or the tax collector. Board of Education v. Hatton, 253 Ky. 828 , 70 S.W.2d 923, 1934 Ky. LEXIS 746 ( Ky. 1934 ).

6. — Disposition.

While city council of city of fourth class may fix amount of interest and penalty on delinquent school taxes, their disposition is controlled by statute, and it was improper to turn them over to city’s general fund. Pineville v. Board of Education, 272 Ky. 636 , 114 S.W.2d 1088, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 161 ( Ky. 1938 ).

7. — Board of Education.

City board of education is entitled to interest and penalty collected on taxes for its use and benefit. Board of Education v. Paducah, 261 Ky. 549 , 88 S.W.2d 292, 1935 Ky. LEXIS 700 ( Ky. 1935 ).

The taxpayers, and not the city, are liable for interest and penalty waived by city commissioners or commissioner of finance on taxes for board of education. Board of Education v. Paducah, 261 Ky. 549 , 88 S.W.2d 292, 1935 Ky. LEXIS 700 ( Ky. 1935 ).

City taxes assessed and levied for use of board of education of city of second class are included in authorization and direction for adding of interest and penalty to delinquent taxes. Board of Education v. Paducah, 261 Ky. 549 , 88 S.W.2d 292, 1935 Ky. LEXIS 700 ( Ky. 1935 ).

Cited:

Richmond v. Goodloe, 287 Ky. 379 , 153 S.W.2d 921, 1941 Ky. LEXIS 558 ( Ky. 1941 ); Newport v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 287 Ky. 613 , 154 S.W.2d 719, 1941 Ky. LEXIS 600 ( Ky. 1941 ); Chalk v. Chalk, 291 Ky. 702 , 165 S.W.2d 534, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 310 ( Ky. 1942 ); Board of Equalization v. Owens, 264 S.W.2d 651, 1954 Ky. LEXIS 676 ( Ky. 1954 ); St. Matthews v. Stallings, 298 S.W.2d 676, 1957 Ky. LEXIS 378 ( Ky. 1957 ).

DECISIONS UNDER PRIOR LAW

1. Refusal to Pay.

A taxpayer cannot refuse to pay his tax because taxes are being improperly expended, or on the ground its imposition was unnecessary. Anderson v. Mayfield, 93 Ky. 230 , 19 S.W. 598, 14 Ky. L. Rptr. 370 , 1892 Ky. LEXIS 75 ( Ky. 1892 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Sufficient statutory authority exists for the imposition of a six percent (6%) interest rate on taxes unpaid to the city by October 1. OAG 60-1051 .

A taxpayer in a city of the third class was liable for penalty and interest on his city taxes even though the amount of tax due was omitted from the tax notice. OAG 61-521 .

Bills for ad valorem taxes payable on June 1 and October 1 of each year are actually for the previous year’s assessments. OAG 62-450 .

A city of the fourth class could provide by ordinance that tax bills unpaid by November 1 would bear a ten percent (10%) penalty. OAG 62-1087 .

A city has no authority to collect ad valorem taxes on a monthly or quarterly basis or to add such taxes to the municipal water bill. OAG 63-299 .

Where a taxpayer moved in September from a city where taxes were assessed on July 1 and due the next year to a city where taxes were assessed on January 1 of the year in which they were due, he was only liable for the tax assessed on July 1. OAG 64-234 .

Although not required by statute, if taxes are due to the city by July 1 the city council should make some provision by ordinance for delivery of the bills or notification to the taxpayers in the city that the bills are due on July 1. OAG 67-271 .

In cities of the second class if the one-half of ad valorem tax due on June 1 and October 1 is not received by the close of business of June 30 or October 31, a ten percent (10%) penalty may be applied. OAG 67-384 .

While a tax assessment is in litigation that statutory penalty can be compromised since the assessment is not final until a ruling is made by the court. OAG 67-535 .

Under subsection (2) of this section, KRS 92.650 and 134.420 (2), delinquent tax bills of third class cities are liens against the person’s property located within such city and may be collected by the city as provided for in the statutes for the collection of such bills; however, there is no authority that would permit the city clerk to refuse to accept payment for current taxes unless all delinquent taxes not barred by limitations are paid in full. OAG 76-634 .

A city may not legally place its city property taxes on its taxpayer’s utility bills for collection purposes and thereby carry the threat of discontinuing the utility services if the property owners fail to pay their property taxes, since aside from the fact that the property taxes must be collected separately by the tax collector pursuant to KRS 92.580 and this section, only utility bills can legally be listed together on a single bill and submitted to the property owner with the penalty of turning off the customer’s water supply. OAG 80-238 .

Neither the school nor the tax collector can abate past due interest or penalty on local school taxes paid prior to or after filing suit for collection of the unpaid taxes, penalty, and interest. OAG 88-46 .

The rate of interest due on unpaid school taxes established by this section requires interest to be paid. OAG 88-46 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Vahlsing and Hudson, Inchoate Dower — An Idea Whose Time Is Past, 60 Ky. L.J. 671 (1972).

92.600. Collection of city taxes from fiduciary or agent in cities of second and fourth classes. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3187f, 3547: amend. Acts 1978, ch. 398, § 1, effective June 17, 1978) was repealed by Acts 1982, ch. 434, § 15, effective July 15, 1982.

92.610. Collection of taxes from debtor of taxpayer in cities of secondclass. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3187i: amend. Acts 1976 (1st Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 111, effective January 2, 1978) was repealed by Acts 1982, ch. 434, § 15, effective July 15, 1982.

92.620. Powers and duties of collector in cities of third class — Credit for delinquent taxes. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3390, 3394, 3421, 3422) was repealed by Acts 1982, ch. 434, § 15, effective July 15, 1982.

92.630. Settlements of collector with city council and board of education in cities of fourth class. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3548) was repealed by Acts 1982, ch. 434, § 15, effective July 15, 1982.

92.637. Map and statement showing taxes due, due date and collector filed with county clerk in fifth and sixth-class cities in county having first-class city. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1968, ch. 34, § 1; 1978, ch. 384, § 217, effective June 17, 1978) was repealed by Acts 1982, ch. 434, § 15, effective July 15, 1982.

92.640. Collection of city taxes in cities of fifth and sixth classes. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3629a-7, 3631, 3677, 3687, 3694: amend. Acts 1952, ch. 185, § 2) was repealed by Acts 1982, ch. 434, § 15, effective July 15, 1982.

92.650. Property subject to sale for taxes — Tax liens — Trust estates. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3176, 3187g, 3375, 3536, 3546, 3656, 3675) was repealed by Acts 1982, ch. 434, § 15, effective July 15, 1982.

92.660. Distraint and sale of personal property for taxes. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3186, 3187e, 3391, 3544a-2: amend. Acts 1978, ch. 398, § 2, effective June 17, 1978) was repealed by Acts 1982, ch. 434, § 15, effective July 15, 1982.

92.670. Levy upon and sale of real property for taxes in cities of second class — Certificates of delinquency. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3187: amend. Acts 1966, ch. 239, § 71; 1978, ch. 398, § 3, effective June 17, 1978) was repealed by Acts 1982, ch. 434, § 15, effective July 15, 1982.

92.672. Certificates of delinquency — Interest — Evidence. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1978, ch. 398, § 4, effective June 17, 1978) was repealed by Acts 1982, ch. 434, § 15, effective July 15, 1982.

92.674. Proceedings on certificate of delinquency — Limitations. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1978, ch. 398, § 5, effective June 17, 1978) was repealed by Acts 1982, ch. 434, § 15, effective July 15, 1982.

92.676. Payment of certificate of delinquency. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1978, ch. 398, § 6, effective June 17, 1978) was repealed by Acts 1982, ch. 434, § 15, effective July 15, 1982.

92.678. Enforcement of certificate of delinquency. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1978, ch. 398, § 7, effective June 17, 1978) was repealed by Acts 1982, ch. 434, § 15, effective July 15, 1982.

92.680. Levy upon and sale of real property for taxes in cities of third class. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3414, 3416, 3420) was repealed by Acts 1982, ch. 434, § 15, effective July 15, 1982.

92.690. Levy upon and sale of real property for taxes in cities of fourth class. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3544a-3 to 3544a-5, 3544a-7, 3544a-11: amend. Acts 1966, ch. 239, § 72) was repealed by Acts 1982, ch. 434, § 15, effective July 15, 1982.

92.700. Enforcement of tax liens in cities of fifth and sixth classes. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3644, 3677) was repealed by Acts 1982, ch. 434, § 15, effective July 15, 1982.

92.710. Report of tax sales in cities of second, third and fourth classes — Certificate to purchaser — Notice to owner. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3187a, 3416, 3417, 3544a-8, 3544a-9, 3544a-13, 3544a-14: amend. Acts 1974, ch. 386, § 17) was repealed by Acts 1982, ch. 434, § 15, effective July 15, 1982.

This section was amended by § 54 of Acts 1980, ch. 396, which would have taken effect July 1, 1982; however, Acts 1982, ch. 141, § 146, effective July 1, 1982, repealed Acts 1980, ch. 396.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

This section was amended by 1982 Acts Chapter 141, Section 51 and repealed by 1982 Acts Chapter 434, Section 15. Pursuant to KRS 446.260 , the repeal prevails.

92.720. Redemption of real property sold for taxes in cities of second class. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3187b) was repealed by Acts 1978, ch. 398, § 10, effective June 17, 1978.

92.730. Redemption of real property sold for taxes in cities of third class. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3415, 3419: amend. Acts 1974, ch. 386, § 18) was repealed by Acts 1982, ch. 434, § 15, effective July 15, 1982.

This section was amended by § 55 of Acts 1980, ch. 396, which would have taken effect July 1, 1982; however, Acts 1982, ch. 141, § 146, effective July 1, 1982, repealed Acts 1980, ch. 396.

92.740. Redemption of real property sold for taxes in cities of fourth class. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3544a-6, 3544a-8, 3544a-10, 3544a-13: amend. Acts 1974, ch. 386, § 19) was repealed by Acts 1982, ch. 434, § 15, effective July 15, 1982.

This section was amended by § 56 of Acts 1980, ch. 396, which would have taken effect July 1, 1982; however, Acts 1982, ch. 141, § 146, effective July 1, 1982, repealed Acts 1980, ch. 396.

92.750. Redemption of property sold for taxes in cities of fifth and sixth classes. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3644, 3677) was repealed by Acts 1982, ch. 434, § 15, effective July 15, 1982.

92.760. Conveyance to or vesting of title in purchaser. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3187c, 3418, 3419, 3544a-12, 3544a-15: amend. Acts 1978, ch. 398, § 8, effective June 17, 1978) was repealed by Acts 1982, ch. 434, § 15, effective July 15, 1982.

92.770. Recovery of taxes by action in cities of second class — Advertising. [Repealed]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3187d, 3187g: amend. Acts 1978, ch. 398, § 9, effective June 17, 1978) was repealed by Acts 1982, ch. 434, § 15, effective July 15, 1982.

92.780. Recovery of taxes by action in cities of third class. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3396 to 3400, 3424) was repealed by Acts 1982, ch. 434, § 15, effective July 15, 1982.

92.790. Recovery of taxes by action in cities of fourth class. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3544a-16, 3546: amend. Acts 1976 (1st Ex. Sess.) ch. 14, § 112, effective January 2, 1978) was repealed by Acts 1982, ch. 434, § 15, effective July 15, 1982.

92.800. Remedies for collection of taxes cumulative in cities of second class. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3187) was repealed by Acts 1982, ch. 434, § 15, effective July 15, 1982.

92.810. Enforcement of collection of tax bills by urban-county government and city of home rule class.

In addition to those powers granted in this chapter for the collection of ad valorem taxes, any urban-county government or city of the home rule class may enforce collection of any tax bill due it by the procedure authorized by the provisions of KRS 91.484 to 91.527 , except the statute of limitations shall, in all cases, be that set forth in KRS 134.546 .

History. Enact. Acts 1980, ch. 47, § 16, effective July 15, 1980; 1992, ch. 314, § 8, effective July 14, 1992; 2009, ch. 10, § 62, effective January 1, 2010; 2014, ch. 92, § 102, effective January 1, 2015.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

Louisville v. Miller, 697 S.W.2d 164, 1985 Ky. App. LEXIS 646 (Ky. Ct. App. 1985).

Penalties

92.990. Penalties. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3069, 3177, 3179, 3181, 3408, 3537, 3544a-3, 4281u-4: amend. Acts 1942, ch. 148, §§ 1 and 3; 1976 (1st Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 113, effective January 2, 1978) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980.

CHAPTER 93 Public Works in Cities of the First Class

93.010. Definitions. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2832, 2839b-20) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

Public Improvements Generally

93.015. Application of KRS 94.292 to 94.325 to first-class cities. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1960, ch. 252, § 1, effective June 16, 1960) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

Department of Public Works

93.020. Department of public works — Adiministration — Organization. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2824) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20 and by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

93.030. Division of engineering — Control — Chief engineer. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2810: amend. Acts 1952, ch. 56, § 3) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20 and by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

93.040. Plumbing department; control; annual report of chief inspector. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3037f-10) was repealed by Acts 1952, ch. 56, § 3.

93.050. Public ways, improvements and places — Control. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2825: amend. Acts 1954, ch. 162, § 4) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

93.060. Public buildings and improvements — Control. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2827: amend. Acts 1952, ch. 55, § 11, effective June 19, 1952) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

93.070. Work by department — Estimate of cost. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2828) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20 and by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

93.080. Work by contract — Specifications — Publication — Bids. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2829: amend. Acts 1966, ch. 239, § 73) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20 and by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

93.090. Alterations in plans. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2830) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20 and by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

93.100. Acquisition of property for use of city — Condemnation. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2741v, 2831: amend. Acts 1976, ch. 140, § 34) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

93.110. Public wharves and landings — Control — Charges. [Renumbered.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2860-1: amend. Acts 1952, ch. 55, § 12) was renumbered as KRS 83.165 by the Reviser of Statutes under authority of KRS 7.136 .

93.120. Lease of wharf property — Improvements. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2860-2, 2860-3: amend. Acts 1946, ch. 114, § 1; 1952, ch. 56, § 13, effective June 19, 1952) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

Sewerage Commission

93.130. Sewerage commission — Appointment — Vacancies. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3037a-1, 3037a-2) was repealed by Acts 1952, ch. 56, § 4, effective June 19, 1952.

93.140. Sewerage commission members; qualifications; term of office; salary. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3037a-2, 3037a-3) was repealed by Acts 1952, ch. 56, § 4, effective June 19, 1952.

93.150. Sewerage commission body corporate — Powers — Officers and employes — Salaries — Bonds. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3037a-3, 3037a-4, 3037a-5, 3037a-7) was repealed by Acts 1952, ch. 56, § 4, effective June 19, 1952.

93.160. Study of problems — Cooperation with department of public works. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3037a-2, 3037a-4) was repealed by Acts 1952, ch. 56, § 4, effective June 19, 1952.

93.170. Plans for sewer system — Submission and adoption. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3037a-6) was repealed by Acts 1952, ch. 56, § 4, effective June 19, 1952.

93.180. Particular powers of sewerage commission. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3037a-7) was repealed by Acts 1952, ch. 56, § 4, effective June 19, 1952.

93.190. Acquisition of property for sewerage system; condemnation; disposition. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3037a-8) was repealed by Acts 1952, ch. 56, § 4, effective June 19, 1952.

93.200. Contracts for work, supplies or materials for sewerage system. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3037a-10) was repealed by Acts 1952, ch. 56, § 4, effective June 19, 1952.

93.210. Removal of obstructions to sewer construction. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3037a-9) was repealed by Acts 1952, ch. 56, § 4, effective June 19, 1952.

93.220. Bond issue for sewerage system — Submission — Terms by ordinance — Resubmission. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3037a-12, 3037a-15) was repealed by Acts 1952, ch. 56, § 4, effective June 19, 1952.

93.230. Sewerage bonds — Control — Sale — Disposition of proceeds. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3037a-13) was repealed by Acts 1952, ch. 56, § 4, effective June 19, 1952.

93.240. Disbursements to come from proceeds of bonds — Temporary appropriation. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3037a-2, 3037a-14) was repealed by Acts 1952, ch. 56, § 4, effective June 19, 1952.

93.250. Completed sewer unit — Restoration of public way — Control of unit to department of public works. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3037a-11) was repealed by Acts 1952, ch. 56, § 4, effective June 19, 1952.

93.260. Appointment of new commission or continuance of old commission. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3037a-15, 3037a-16) was repealed by Acts 1952, ch. 56, § 4, effective June 19, 1952.

93.270. Dissolution of sewerage commission. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3037a-2, 3037a-15) was repealed by Acts 1952, ch. 56, § 4, effective June 19, 1952.

Garbage Disposal

93.275. Garbage disposal system. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section, which was a reference entry by the Legislative Research Commission, was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980. For present law, see KRS 109.011 to 109.310 .

Grade Crossing Elimination

93.280. Grade crossing elimination — Power to contract for. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2839a-1) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

93.290. Grade crossing elimination — Power to order — Plans — Specifications. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2839a-1, 2839a-2) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

93.300. Cost — Apportionment — Payment — Records. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2839a-3: amend. Acts 1950, ch. 153, § 1; 1952, ch. 228, § 1; 1968, ch. 152, § 68) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

93.310. Maintenance of roadways, bridges, on new grade crossing. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2839a-4) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

93.320. Condemnation for grade crossing elimination. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2839a-5, 2839a-6: amend. 1976, ch. 140, § 35) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

93.330. Bond issue for grade crossing elimination — Terms — Use of proceeds. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2839b-1, 2839b-4: amend. Acts 1952, ch. 227, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

93.340. Control of bonds — Sale — Proceeds. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2839b-2) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 234, § 11 and Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

93.350. Rejection of bond issue by voters — Resubmission. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2839b-3) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 234, § 11 and Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

Off-Street Parking Facilities

93.351. Declaration of need for off-street parking facilities. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 15, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980. For present law, see KRS 94.810 to 94.840 .

93.352. Powers of cities — Land acquisition — Construction, maintenance, operation, contracting for or leasing of parking facilities — Sale of property — Charges, rates, or fees. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 15, §§ 2 and 3; 1944, ch. 129, § 1; 1952, ch. 78, § 1, effective June 19, 1952; 1976, ch. 140, § 36) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

This section was amended in Acts 1980, ch. 188, § 78, and repealed in Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4. Since the amendment appears in the revisor’s bill, the repeal prevails. See KRS 7.136(3).

93.353. Rates or fees, how fixed. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 15, § 4; 1944, ch. 129, § 2) was repealed by Acts 1952, ch. 78, § 2, effective June 19, 1952.

93.354. Revenue bonds. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 15, § 5; 1944, ch. 129, § 3; 1952, ch. 78, § 3; 1966, ch. 255, § 100; 1968, ch. 110, § 10) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 234, § 11 and by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

93.355. Fees, charges — Operating, sinking and reserve funds — Use of excess revenues. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 15, § 6; 1944, ch. 129, § 4; 1952, ch. 78, § 4, effective June 19, 1952) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

93.356. State or federal aid. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 15, § 7; 1944, ch. 129, § 4) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

93.359. Lease of space on parking meter posts. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section, which was a reference entry by the Legislative Research Commission, was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

Public Ways — Regular Plan

93.360. Public ways — Dedication — Action to close — Damages. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2832: amend. Acts 1966, ch. 242, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 233, § 3, effective July 15, 1980.

93.370. Improvement of streets and alleys — Hearing — Curbing included — Apportionment of cost — Square defined — Ordinance as to city bearing cost. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2833: amend. Acts 1970, ch. 223, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

93.380. Fire hydrants — When city may install — Contract for installation — Apportionment of cost. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2833: amend. Acts 1952, ch. 188, § 1, effective June 19, 1952) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

93.390. Water, gas and sewer service pipes — Cost. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2833) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

93.400. Details to be fixed by ordinance. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2833,2834) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

93.410. Sidewalks and curbing — Apportionment of cost. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2835) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

93.420. Public way improvement by property owners. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2836) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

93.430. Inspection, acceptance of improvements — Notice — Hearing. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2837: amend. Acts 1966, ch. 239, § 74) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

93.440. State property liable for improvements. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2833a) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

93.450. Lien for improvements — Limits on liability of city and property owners. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2833,2834) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

93.460. Action to enforce lien — Redemption provisions — Deed. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2838) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 234, § 11 and by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

93.470. Apportionment warrants — Liens based on. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2839) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 234, § 11 and by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

93.480. Notice of improvement tax — Instalment payment option. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2839: amend. Acts 1966, ch. 239, § 75) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 234, § 11 and by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

93.490. Instalment agreement — Termination of option. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2839) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 234, § 11 and by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

This section was amended in Acts 1980, ch. 396, § 57 and repealed in Acts 1980, ch. 234, § 11 and ch. 239, § 4. The repeals prevail as they were the later enactments.

93.500. Instalments, when due — Interest — Acceleration privilege [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2839) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 234, § 11 and by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

93.510. Instalment notice — Default. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2839) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 234, § 11 and by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

93.520. Refund of excess instalments — Effect of noncollection. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2839) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 234, § 11 and by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

93.530. Instalment plans other than ten-year. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2839) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 234, § 11 and by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

93.540. Improvement bonds — Issuance — When due. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2839) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 234, § 11 and by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

93.550. Improvement bonds — Denomination — Interest rate — Form. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2839) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 234, § 11 and by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

93.560. Improvement bonds — Negotiable — Tax-exempt — Sale at par or to contractor. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2839: amend. 1966, ch. 239, § 76) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 234, § 11 and by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

93.570. Improvement bonds — Fund for payment — Redemption. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2839: amend. Acts 1966, ch. 239, § 77) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 234, § 11 and by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

93.580. Improvement bonds — Rights of holders — Foreclosure suits. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2839) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 234, § 11 and by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

93.590. Improvement fund — Custody — Disbursements — Improvement units to be separate. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2839) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 234, § 11 and by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

93.600. Improvement fund — Appropriation for deficits. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2839) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 234, § 11 and by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

Arterial Highways

93.610. Improvement of major streets, adoption of plan for — Plan is optional and supplemental. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2839b-6, 2839b-32) was repealed by Acts 1942, ch. 35, § 15.

93.620. Ordinance and plat to define improvement and benefited taxing district — Notice — Hearing — Adoption. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2839b-7) was repealed by Acts 1942, ch. 35, § 15.

93.630. Amending improvement by ordinance. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2839b-28) was repealed by Acts 1942, ch. 35, § 15.

93.640. Employment of experts to determine benefit to property. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2839b-8) was repealed by Acts 1942, ch. 35, § 15.

93.650. Action against owners whose property is to be taken, or is benefited only — Process — Petition. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2839b-9) was repealed by Acts 1942, ch. 35, § 15.

93.660. Publication and notice of proceeding to owners of property to be benefited. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2839b-11) was repealed by Acts 1942, ch. 35, § 15.

93.670. Unknown owners — Process — Publication. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2839b-11) was repealed by Acts 1942, ch. 35, § 15.

93.680. Lis pendens — Names of parties indexed. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2839b-21) was repealed by Acts 1942, ch. 35, § 15.

93.690. Amended or supplemental petitions. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2839b-15) was repealed by Acts 1942, ch. 35, § 15.

93.700. Dismissal of action — Repeal of ordinance — New ordinance and action. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2839b-31) was repealed by Acts 1942, ch. 35, § 15.

93.710. Appraisers — Appointment — Appraisal of damage to property — Notice — Hearing — Reports. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2839b-10) was repealed by Acts 1942, ch. 35, § 15.

93.720. Appraisal of benefit to property — Notice — Hearing — Reports. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2839b-10) was repealed by Acts 1942, ch. 35, § 15.

93.730. Appraisal reports — Filing — Notice — Time allowed for exceptions. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2839b-10, 2839b-13) was repealed by Acts 1942, ch. 35, § 15.

93.740. Exceptions to appraisal of value and damage — Appeal to courts — Payment of judgment — Possession. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2839b-12) was repealed by Acts 1942, ch. 35, § 15.

93.750. Exceptions to appraisal of benefit to property — Appeal to courts — Adjustment of inequalities. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2839b-12) was repealed by Acts 1942, ch. 35, § 15.

93.760. Immediate trial — New trial or appeal — Record — Court procedure. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2839b-14, 2839b-18) was repealed by Acts 1942, ch. 35, § 15.

93.770. Partial reports of appraisal — Payment of damages — Possession. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2839b-16) was repealed by Acts 1942, ch. 35, § 15.

93.780. Court costs — Fees and expenses of officers. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2839b-17) was repealed by Acts 1942, ch. 35, § 15.

93.790. When work to begin — No land taken or tax collected until final payment and decision — City to advance tax payment. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2839b-19) was repealed by Acts 1942, ch. 35, § 15.

93.800. Improvement taxes — Not to exceed benefits or cost of improvement. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2839b-20) was repealed by Acts 1942, ch. 35, § 15.

93.810. Improvement taxes — Payment in installments — Bonds. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2839b-22) was repealed by Acts 1942, ch. 35, § 15.

93.820. City may purchase without condemnation — Appraisal and assessment of city property — Lien — Sale. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2839b-23) was repealed by Acts 1942, ch. 35, § 15.

93.830. Preliminary bonds to pay for land — Estimate of construction cost. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2839b-24, 2839b-25) was repealed by Acts 1942, ch. 35, § 15.

93.840. City may pay portion of cost of improvement — May advance funds. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2839b-26) was repealed by Acts 1942, ch. 35, § 15.

93.850. Bondholders’ rights. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2839b-27) was repealed by Acts 1942, ch. 35, § 15.

93.860. Lien of city for improvement tax — Apportionment — Payment — Release of lien. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2839b-29) was repealed by Acts 1942, ch. 35, § 15.

93.870. Apportionment and payments to be entered in special book. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2839b-30) was repealed by Acts 1942, ch. 35, § 15.

93.880. Establishment of arterial highways plan authorized — Power to change existing streets, acquire property, construct improvements, assess cost. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Acts 1942, ch. 35, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

93.890. Improvement costs, what to include. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 35, § 2) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 234, § 11 and by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

93.900. Benefited area. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 35, § 3) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 234, § 11, and by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

93.910. Maps and plans — Division of benefited area into zones — Apportionment of assessments — Notice. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 35, § 4; 1966, ch. 239, § 78) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 234, § 11, and by Acts 1980 ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

93.920. Lien for assessments — Interest — Methods of paying assessments — Penalties — Collection — Use of funds — Additional assessments — Assessment of state property. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 35, §§ 4 and 7) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 234, § 11, and by Acts 1980 ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

93.930. Acquisition of rights of way — Condemnation — Application of ordinary street laws. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 35, §§ 5 and 6) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

93.940. Assessments limited to seventy-five percent of value of property. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Acts 1942, ch. 35, § 8) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 234, § 11 and by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

93.950. Effect on ordinary street laws — Repairs — Improvements — Sidewalks — Curbs — State or federal aid. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Acts 1942, ch. 35, §§ 9 to 12) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

CHAPTER 93A Pedestrian Mall Projects in First-Class Cities

93A.010. Definitions. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1970, ch. 214, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

93A.020. Legislative finding. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1970, ch. 214, § 2) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

93A.030. Further findings as to degree of benefit — Benefit zones — Assessments. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1970, ch. 214, § 3) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

93A.040. City’s authority in financing projects. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1970, ch. 214, § 4) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

93A.050. Limitations on scope of project. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1970, ch. 214, § 5) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

93A.060. Legislative finding. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1972, ch. 175, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

93A.070. Authority of second and third class cities to construct pedestrian mall — Definitions. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1972, ch. 175, § 2) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

CHAPTER 94 Public Works in Cities Other Than the First Class

Definitions

94.010. Definitions. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2741e-7, 2741e-13, 3096, 3450, 3459f-1, 3560, 3561, 3563, 3578a, 3579a-4: amend. Acts 1950, ch. 165, § 1; 1968, ch. 152, § 69) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20 and by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

Superintendent or Board of Public Works in Cities of Second Class

94.020. Board of public works instead of superintendent — Cities of second class. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3118, 3125) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20 and by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

94.030. Superintendent of public works — Employes — Appointment — Compensation. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3118, 3123) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20 and by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

94.040. Superintendent of public works — Powers. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3118, 3119, 3120, 3124) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20 and by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

94.050. Superintendent of public works — Duties — Appropriation for public works. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3120, 3121, 3122) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20 and by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

94.060. City engineer — Assistant — Appointment — Salaries — Duties. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3144, 3144a) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20 and by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

Board of Public Works in Cities of Third and Fourth Classes

94.070. Board of public works — Appointment — Salaries — Duties. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3426, 3435, 3580) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20 and by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980:

94.080. Term — Vacancies — Compensation — Meetings — Officers — Quorum. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3427 to 3432, 3434, 3581) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20 and by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

94.090. Proceedings — Journal — Legislative participation. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3433, 3436, 3582: amend. Acts 1966, ch. 239, § 79) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20 and by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980:

94.100. Estimate and tax levy for appropriations — Additional appropriations. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3439, 3443, 3584) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

94.110. Powers of board of public works. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3438, 3583) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20 and by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

94.120. Control of health and welfare departments and employes in cities of third class. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3437, 3438) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 234, § 11 and by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

94.130. Contracts for public works. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3438, 3440 to 3442, 3585 to 3587) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 234, § 11 and by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

94.140. Special provisions as to contracts for public works in cities of third class. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3444 to 3446) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 234, § 11 and by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

94.150. City engineer — Cities of third and fourth classes. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3447, 3558, 3559) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20 and by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

Sewerage Systems in Cities of Second to Sixth Class

94.160. Alternate method for cities of second and sixth class to acquire and generate sewerage system — Water system may be joined. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2741L-1 to 2741L-19) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 234, § 11 and by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 76.005 to 76.210 .

Legislative Research Commission Note.

This section was amended in Acts 1980, ch. 149, § 1 and repealed in Acts 1980, ch. 234, § 11, and Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4. The repeals prevail as they were the later enactments.

94.170. City of third, fourth, fifth or sixth class may condemn property for sewerage system under alternate method. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2741L-1: amend. Acts 1964, ch. 181, § 1; 1976, ch. 140, § 38) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 76.005 to 76.210 .

94.180. Sewers; construction or improvement in cooperation with W.P.A. or other Federal or state agencies; alternate method; cities of second to sixth class. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2741L-20a) was repealed by Acts 1950, ch. 165, § 34.

Sewerage Systems in Cities of Second Class

94.190. Sewers; construction; ordinance; apportionment and assessment of cost; tax. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3105) was repealed by Acts 1950, ch. 165, § 34.

94.200. Payment of assessments; assessment fund; monthly estimates and warrants; ten year plan. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3105) was repealed by Acts 1950, ch. 165, § 34.

94.205. Extension of sewers to common school outside city. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1952, ch. 169, effective June 19, 1952) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 76.005 to 76.210 .

Sewerage Systems in Cities of Third Class

94.210. Sewer improvements; power to make; apportionment of cost. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3459f-1, 3459f-5) was repealed by Acts 1950, ch. 165, § 34.

94.220. Sewer system; districts; apportionment of costs; city and state property; disposal or pumping plant; subsequent districts. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3449a-1, 3459f-2) was repealed by Acts 1950, ch. 165, § 34.

94.230. Sewer improvement; contract; procedure for apportionment; lien; collection; monthly estimate and warrants. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3450a-1, 3459f-2) was repealed by Acts 1950, ch. 165, § 34.

94.240. Annual installment plan; proceeds of previously issued bonds orfunds. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3459f-3, 3459f-4) was repealed by Acts 1950, ch. 165, § 34.

Sewerage Systems in Cities of Fourth Class

94.250. Sewer improvements; power to make; assessment of cost; disposal plants; subsequent districts. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3579a-1) was repealed by Acts 1950, ch. 165, § 34.

94.260. Sewer improvement; contract; procedure for apportionment; lien; collection. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3579a-1) was repealed by Acts 1950, ch. 165, § 34.

94.270. Annual installment plan; condemnation of land; engineer. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3579a-2, 3579a-3, 3579a-4) was repealed by Acts 1950, ch. 165, § 34.

Garbage Disposal in Cities of Second to Sixth Class

94.280. Garbage dump — Acquisition of land for — Road. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2741v) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

94.281. Definitions for KRS 94.282 to 94.286. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 69, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

94.282. Power of city to acquire and operate garbage disposal system — Acquisition of existing system. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 69, § 2; 1976, ch. 140, § 139; 1976 (1st Extra. Sess.), ch. 14, § 114, effective January 1, 1978) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

94.283. Ordinance for acquisition of system and issuance of bonds — Popular election — Plans and specifications — Acquisition of lands and easements. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 69, § 3; 1978, ch. 384, § 218, effective June 17, 1978) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

94.284. Issuance of bonds — Use of proceeds of bonds — Disposition of surplus revenue — Bond procedure. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 69, § 4) was repealed by Acts 1982, ch. 434, § 15, effective July 15, 1982.

94.285. Charges for services — Rules and regulations. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 69, § 4) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

94.286. Operation and management of system — Garbage disposal commission. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact, Acts 1946, ch. 69, § 5) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

94.287. Alternate method. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact, Acts 1946, ch. 69, § 6) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

Public Improvements Generally in Cities

94.290. Public ways; improvement in cooperation with W.P.A. or other federal or state agencies; apportionment of cost; alternate method only. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2741e-6, 2741e-7, 2741e-12, 2741e-13) was repealed by Acts 1950, ch. 165, § 34.

94.291. Application of KRS 94.291 to 94.325. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1950, ch. 165, § 2; 1960, ch. 252, § 2, effective June 16, 1960) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

94.292. Power of city to make public improvements — Preliminary resolution — Determinations by city legislative body. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1950, ch. 165, § 3; 1966, ch. 239, § 81) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

94.293. Provision for more than one improvement in a single ordinance. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1950, ch. 165, § 4) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

94.294. Complete or “stage” street improvements — Limitation on frequency of assessments. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1950, ch. 165, § 5) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 234, § 11, effective July 15, 1980.

94.295. Original ordinance — Provision for bids and levy of tax. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1950, ch. 165, § 6) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 234, § 11, effective July 15, 1980.

94.296. Original ordinance — How passed. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1950, ch. 165, § 7) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 234, § 11, effective July 15, 1980.

94.297. Apportionment of cost between city and property owners — Assessment of publicly-owned property. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1950, ch. 165, § 8; 1954, ch. 186, § 1, effective June 17, 1954) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 234, § 11, effective July 15, 1980.

94.298. Intersections of sidewalks, sewer lines or water lines. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1950, ch. 165, § 9) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 234, § 11, effective July 15, 1980.

94.299. Street intersections. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1950, ch. 165, § 10) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 234, § 11, effective July 15, 1980.

94.300. Tax for cost may be paid half when work begun, remainder when half completed; assessment of property owned by governmental agency. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2741e-7, 2741e-9) was repealed by Acts 1950, ch. 165, § 34.

94.301. Benefited property, what constitutes — Deferred assessments against potentially benefited property. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1950, ch. 165, § 11) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 234, § 11, effective July 15, 1980.

94.302. Assessment according to front feet or benefit received. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1950, ch. 165, § 12) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 234, § 11, effective July 15, 1980.

94.303. Assessment of corner lots. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1950, ch. 165, § 13) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 234, § 11, effective July 15, 1980.

94.304. Assessment to drainage limit or watershed dividing line, for sewerline or water line improvement. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1950, ch. 165, § 14) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 234, § 11, effective July 15, 1980.

94.305. Limit on amount of assessment. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1950, ch. 165, § 15) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 234, § 11, effective July 15, 1980.

94.306. Contract for work — Advisement for bids — Bid bond — Doing of work on force account. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1950, ch. 165, § 16; 1966, ch. 239, § 82) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 234, § 11, effective July 15, 1980.

94.307. Contractor’s performance bond. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1950, ch. 165, § 17) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 234, § 11, effective July 15, 1980.

94.308. Progress payments to contractor — Interest payments. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1950, ch. 165, § 18) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 234, § 11, effective July 15, 1980.

94.309. Certificate of apportionment — Inspection and acceptance of work — Ordinance of apportionment and levy — Notice to property owners. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1950, ch. 165, § 19; 1966, ch. 239, § 83) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 234, § 11, effective July 15, 1980.

94.310. Tax for cost may be paid when improvement completed, or on ten-year bond plan; assessment of county property. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2741e-13, 2741e-19, 2741e-21) was repealed by Acts 1950, ch. 165, § 34.

94.311. Credit to property owner for own improvements. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1950, ch. 165, § 20) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 234, § 11, effective July 15, 1980.

94.312. Copies of ordinances as evidence of validity of proceedings. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1950, ch. 165, § 21) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 234, § 11, effective July 15, 1980.

94.313. When improvement tax payable — Interest. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1950, ch. 165, § 22) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 234, § 11, effective July 15, 1980.

94.314. Lien — Effect of errors in proceedings. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1950, ch. 165, § 23; 1978, ch. 384, § 219, effective June 17, 1978) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 234, § 11, effective July 15, 1980.

94.315. Bills for improvement taxes — Payment of tax — Penalties and interest — Methods of collection. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1950, ch. 165, § 24) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 234, § 11, effective July 15, 1980.

94.316. Election to pay tax in instalments. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1950, ch. 165, § 25) was repealed by Acts 1954, ch. 124, § 1 and by 1980, ch. 234, § 11, effective July 15, 1980.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

This section was amended in Acts 1980, ch. 396, § 58 and repealed in Acts 1980, ch. 234, § 11. The repeal prevails as it was the later enactment.

94.317. Instalment payment plan. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1950, ch. 165, § 26) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 234, § 11, effective July 15, 1980.

94.318. Lien for instalments — Methods of collection. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1950, ch. 165, § 27) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 234, § 11, effective July 15, 1980.

94.319. Application of improvement tax payments — Separate accounts — Disposition of surplus. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1950, ch. 165, § 28) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 234, § 11, effective July 15, 1980.

94.320. Designation of improvement — Petition or protest by property owners — Excess assessment — Assessment proceeds. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2741e-8, 2741e-10, 2741e-11, 2741e-20, 2741e-22, 2741e-23) was repealed by Acts 1950, ch. 165, § 34.

94.321. Improvement bonds — Issuance — Terms and conditions. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1950, ch. 165, § 29) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 234, § 11, effective July 15, 1980.

94.322. Source of payment of bonds — Redemption — Defenses barred — Bondholders’ lien and suits. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1950, ch. 165, § 30) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 234, § 11, effective July 15, 1980.

94.323. General obligation bonds to finance improvement. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1950, ch. 165, § 31) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 234, § 11, effective July 15, 1980.

94.324. Railroad or street railway right of way — Improvement of. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1950, ch. 165, § 32) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 234, § 11, effective July 15, 1980.

94.325. Repair and maintenance of public improvements. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1950, ch. 165, § 33) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 234, § 11, effective July 15, 1980.

94.330. Improvement on ten-year bond plan — Issue and sale of bonds — Lien — Proceeds from sale of bonds. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2741e-14, 2741e-15) was repealed by Acts 1950, ch. 165, § 34.

94.340. Assessments for ten-year bond plan — Payment and action forcollection of installments. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2741e-16) was repealed by Acts 1950, ch. 165, § 34.

94.350. Lien for assessments under full-payment or ten-year bond plan — Satisfaction — Proceeds from assessments. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2741e-17, 2741e-18, 2741e-19) was repealed by Acts 1950, ch. 165, § 34.

94.351. Instalment payments for sewer line improvement. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1958, ch. 143, § 1, effective April 1, 1958) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 234, § 11, effective July 15, 1980.

94.352. Amount of first instalment. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1958, ch. 143, § 2, effective April 1, 1958) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 234, § 11, effective July 15, 1980.

94.353. Time of first instalment. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1958, ch. 143, § 3, effective April 1, 1958) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 234, § 11, effective July 15, 1980.

94.354. Payment of second instalment. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1958, ch. 143, § 4, effective April 1, 1958) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 234, § 11, effective July 15, 1980.

Public Ways

94.360. Public ways and places — Control — Action to close. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3094, 3290-41, 3449, 3560 to 3562: amend. Acts 1960, ch. 217, § 1, effective June 16, 1960) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 233, § 3, effective July 15, 1980.

94.370. Dedication of public ways — Plats or maps filed only when accepted and recorded — Cities of fourth class are repealed. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3562a-1) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 233, § 3, effective July 15, 1980.

94.380. Public ways — Provision for improvement — Assessment of cost — Lien — Collection — Improvement by street railway — Cities of second, third and fourth classes. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3096, 3450, 3560, 3563) was repealed by Acts 1950, ch. 165, § 34.

94.390. Assessment of cost of improvement in special instances — Records — Proceeds. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3096, 3449a-1, 3450, 3563) was repealed by Acts 1950, ch. 165, § 34.

94.400. Estimates of work done and warrants for improvement — Part of cost may be paid by city. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3096, 3450, 3450a-1, 3563) was repealed by Acts 1950, ch. 165, § 34.

94.410. Resolution for improvement — Publication — Petition on material or protest against improvement. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3097, 3453, 3570) was repealed by Acts 1950, ch. 165, § 34.

94.420. Determination of ways to be improved — Extent — Materials used — Advertisement for bids — Contractor’s bonds — Property owners in cities of second class may be permitted to improve. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3098, 3454, 3571) was repealed by Acts 1950, ch. 165, § 34.

94.430. Estimate of cost — Advertisement — Hearing of property owners — Report on improvement. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3099, 3455, 3573, 3578a) was repealed by Acts 1950, ch. 165, § 34.

94.440. Acceptance of improvement — Apportionment of cost — Tax — Lien — Enforcement. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3100, 3457, 3574) was repealed by Acts 1950, ch. 165, § 34.

94.450. Ten-year payment plan may be provided — Agreement of property owners — Payment of installments. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3101, 3458, 3575) was repealed by Acts 1950, ch. 165, § 34.

94.460. Assessment bonds for payment of improvement — Form, issue and sale — Tax exemption. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3102, 3459, 3577) was repealed by Acts 1950, ch. 165, § 34.

94.470. Assessment bonds for payment of improvement — Form, issue and sale — Tax exemption. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3102, 3459, 3577) was repealed by Acts 1950, ch. 165, § 34.

94.480. Payment and redemption of assessment bonds — Rights of bondholders — Action for collection. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3102, 3459, 3577) was repealed by Acts 1950, ch. 165, § 34.

94.490. Improvement bonds of city may be authorized by election — Issue and sale — Tax for payment. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3102, 3459, 3577) was repealed by Acts 1950, ch. 165, § 34.

Oiling of Public Ways

94.500. Oiling of public ways — Tax for cost — Provisions for — Cities of second class. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3104b-1, 3104b-2, 3104b-5: amend. Acts 1966, ch. 239, § 84) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

94.510. Oiling of public ways — Assessment and payment of cost — Cities of second class. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3104b-2, 3104b-3, 3104b-4) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

94.520. Oiling of streets — Cities of third class. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3290-42) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

94.530. Oiling of public ways — Resolution — Notice — Cities of fourth, fifth and sixth classes. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2741e-1, 2741e-2, 3704-10: amend. Acts 1966, ch. 239, § 85) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

94.540. Oiling of public ways — Tax for — Cities of fourth, fifth and sixth classes. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2741e-3, 2741e-4, 2741e-5. 3704-10) was repealed by Acts 1950, ch. 165, § 34.

Grade Crossing Elimination in Cities of Second Class

94.550. Grade crossing elimination — Provisions for work — Sharing and payment of cost — Cities of second class. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3104a-1 to 3104a-3, 3104a-5, 3104a-8, 3104a-9) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

94.560. Sharing of cost by railroads — Maintenance — Reconstruction. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3104a, 3104a-6) was repealed by Acts 1982, ch. 434, § 15, effective July 15, 1982.

94.570. Condemnation of property for grade crossing elimination. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3104a-7: amend. Acts 1976, ch. 140, § 40) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

Public Ways, Places and Sewers in Cities of Fifth and Sixth Classes

94.580. Public ways, places and sewers — Provisions for improvement — Assessment of cost — Cities of fifth and sixth classes. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3643-1, 3643-3, 3643-7, 3706) was repealed by Acts 1950, ch. 165, § 34.

94.590. When assessment made — Collection. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3643-7, 3706) was repealed by Acts 1950, ch. 165, § 34.

94.600. Contracts for improvements — Advertisement for bids. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3643-2, 3647, 3706, 3707) was repealed by Acts 1950, ch. 165, § 34.

94.610. Ten-year bond plan may be adopted — Payment of contractor. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3643-3, 3643-4, 3706) was repealed by Acts 1950, ch. 165, § 34.

94.620. Bonds for ten-year plan — Disposition of proceeds. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3643-5, 3643-6, 3706) was repealed by Acts 1950, ch. 165, § 34.

94.630. Collection of installments under ten-year plan — Disposition of proceeds. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3643-7, 3643-8, 3643-11, 3706) was repealed by Acts 1950, ch. 165, § 34.

94.640. Penalty and acceleration option in cities of fifth class — Action to enforce lien. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3643-7) was repealed by Acts 1950, ch. 165, § 34.

94.650. Lien for cost of improvement — Satisfaction — Release of parcels. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3643-9, 3643-10, 3706) was repealed by Acts 1950, ch. 165, § 34.

94.660. Issuance of city bonds for street improvement fund. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3643-12, 3706) was repealed by Acts 1950, ch. 165, § 34.

94.670. Public ways — Removal of obstructions — Opening when closed — Cities of sixth class. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3709) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

Condemnation of Property for Public Purposes in Cities of Second Class

94.680. Condemnation of property for public purposes in cities of second class. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3095: amend. Acts 1976, ch. 140, § 41) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

94.690. Commissioners to determine value. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3095a) was repealed by Acts 1976, ch. 140, § 129.

94.700. Exceptions to or confirmation of commissioners’ report. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3095b, 3095c) was repealed by Acts 1976, ch. 140, § 129.

94.710. Trial of exceptions in circuit court — Appeal to Court of Appeals. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3095d, 3095g: amend. Acts 1968, ch. 152, § 70) was repealed by Acts 1976, ch. 140, § 129.

94.720. Payment of damages and possession by city — Disposition of proceeds. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3095e, 3095f) was repealed by 1976, ch. 140, § 129.

94.730. Condemnation for flood wall. [Renumbered as KRS 104.170.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Acts 1942, ch. 61, §§ 1, 2; 1946, ch. 88) is recompiled as KRS 104.170 .

Parking Meters and Facilities

94.740. Cities of second class may provide and maintain parking meters. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 23, §§ 1 to 3; 1960, ch. 28, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 94.810 to 94.840 .

94.750. Off-street parking facilities — Acquisition and operation. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1944, ch. 129, § 6; 1976, ch. 140, § 42; 1976, ch. 287, § 8) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980. For present law see KRS 94.810 to 94.840 .

Legislative Research Commission Note.

This section was amended by Acts 1980, ch. 188, § 79, and repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4. The repeal prevails since the amendment appears in the reviser’s bill. See KRS 7.136(3).

94.760. Lease of advertising space on parking meter posts. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1950, ch. 35, §§ 1, 2) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

Motor Vehicle Parking Authorities

94.810. Creation — Powers — Fees — Joint city-county motor vehicle parking authorities.

  1. Any city by ordinance may create motor vehicle parking authorities, or at any time, the legislative body of a city by ordinance and the fiscal court of the county containing the city may enter into an agreement to form a joint city-county motor vehicle parking authority. Such parking authorities shall have the power of acquisition, creation and operation of public street and off-street parking facilities. The fees charged need not be limited to the cost of operation and administration but may be for revenue.
  2. If a city, already having a motor vehicle parking authority in existence, enters into an agreement to form a joint parking authority with the county, the agreement shall provide for the assumption of the debts and liabilities of the existing parking authority by the joint parking authority and the transfer of any assets of the existing parking authority, including real property and improvements, to the joint parking authority.
  3. The termination of an agreement between a city and county to form a joint parking authority will not result in the continued existence of a city motor vehicle parking authority, unless specifically provided for in the agreement.

History. Enact. Acts 1976, ch. 287, § 1; 1978, ch. 303, § 1, effective June 17, 1978.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(1982). A technical correction has been made in this section by the Reviser of Statutes pursuant to KRS 7.136 .

94.815. Appointment — Terms — Removal of members — Status of authority.

  1. A city parking authority shall consist of five (5) persons appointed by the mayor with the approval of the city legislative body, to serve as commissioners of the local parking authority. Three (3) of the commissioners who are first appointed shall be designated to serve for terms of one (1), two (2), and three (3) years, respectively, and the remaining two (2) of such commissioners shall be designated to serve for terms of four (4) years each, from the date of their appointment. Upon expiration of the staggered terms, the successors shall be appointed for a term of four (4) years. Appointments to complete unexpired terms of office shall be made in the same manner as the original appointments.
  2. A joint city-county parking authority shall consist of six (6) commissioners. Three (3) of the commissioners shall be appointed by the mayor with the approval of the city legislative body. Three (3) of the commissioners shall be appointed by the county judge/executive with the approval of the fiscal court. The three (3) commissioners who are first appointed by the mayor shall be designated to serve for terms of one (1), two (2) and three (3) years respectively and the same shall be true for the commissioners initially appointed by the county judge/executive. Upon expiration of the staggered terms, the successors shall be appointed for a term of four (4) years. Appointments to complete unexpired terms of office shall be made in the same manner.
  3. The commissioners shall constitute the governing body of the parking authority and shall adopt such bylaws, rules and regulations as are necessary for governing of the authority. Any commissioner may be removed from office upon a vote of a majority of the members of the governing body which approved his appointment for inefficiency, neglect of duty, misfeasance, nonfeasance, or malfeasance, after at least ten (10) days’ written notice of the hearing to the member whose conduct is in question and to all members of the governing body. At the hearing the member may be represented by counsel and may appear personally and present such pertinent evidence as he wishes. If after the hearing the governing body determines that he is guilty of the charges they shall remove the member from the authority within seven (7) days, and there shall be a vacancy of the office.
  4. The commissioners of a motor vehicle parking authority are a body corporate constituting a public corporation and a governmental agency within the meaning of KRS 58.010 , and shall have all the powers granted by KRS 58.010 to 58.170 .

History. Enact. Acts 1976, ch. 287, § 2; 1978, ch. 303, § 2, effective June 17, 1978; 1978, ch. 384, § 559, effective June 17, 1978.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

This section was amended by two 1978 acts which do not appear to be in conflict and which have been compiled together.

94.820. Compensation of commissioners.

The legislative body may fix the compensation of the commissioners whose appointment they approve. The compensation of a commissioner shall not be decreased during the term to which he was appointed.

History. Enact. Acts 1976, ch. 287, § 6; 1978, ch. 303, § 3, effective June 17, 1978.

94.825. Contract powers. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1976, ch. 287, § 3; 1978, ch. 303, § 4, effective June 17, 1978) was repealed by Acts 1982, ch. 434, § 15, effective July 15, 1982.

94.830. Property exempt from condemnation.

Property now used or hereafter acquired for off-street parking by a private operator shall not be subject to condemnation.

History. Enact. Acts 1976, ch. 287, § 4.

94.835. Rental or lease of property.

The parking authority may rent or lease to any individual, firm or corporation any portion of the premises established as an off-street parking facility for service concessions, commercial uses or otherwise, after first advertising for bids therefor by publication not less than once a week for two (2) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the city making two (2) publications in all.

History. Enact. Acts 1976, ch. 287, § 5.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(1982). A technical correction has been made in this section by the Reviser of Statutes pursuant to KRS 7.136 .

94.840. Interest in property or contract — Disclosure.

No member or employee of a parking authority shall acquire any interest, direct or indirect, in any project or in any property including or planned to be included in any project, nor shall he have any interest, direct or indirect, in any contract or proposed contract for materials or services to be furnished or used in connection with any project. If any member or employee of any authority owns or controls an interest, direct or indirect in any property included in any project, which interest was acquired prior to his appointment or employment, he shall disclose the same in writing to the authority at the time of his appointment and the disclosure shall be entered upon the minutes of the authority.

History. Enact. Acts 1976, ch. 287, § 7.

Penalties

94.990. Penalties. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3562a-2) was repealed by Acts 1992, ch. 435, § 14, effective July 14, 1992.

CHAPTER 95 City Police and Fire Departments

95.010. Definitions for KRS 95.160 to 95.290, 95.830 to 95.845, 95.440 to 95.629, and 95.761 to 95.784.

  1. As used in KRS 95.160 to 95.290 and in KRS 95.830 to 95.845 , unless the context requires otherwise:
    1. “Dismissal” means the discharge of an employee by the division or department head, civil service board, or other lawful authority;
    2. “Eligible list” means a list of names of persons who have been found qualified through suitable competitive examinations for positions or classes of positions;
    3. “Fire department” means the officers, firefighters, and clerical or maintenance employees, including the chief of the fire department;
    4. “Member” means any person in the police or fire department, other than the chief or assistant chief of the department;
    5. “Police department” means the officers, policemen, and clerical or maintenance employees, including the chief of police;
    6. “Police force” means the officers and policemen of the police department, other than the chief of police;
    7. “Policeman” means a member of the police department below the rank of officer, other than a clerical or maintenance employee;
    8. “Salary” means any compensation received for services; and
    9. “Suspension” means the separation of an employee from the service for a temporary or fixed period of time, by his appointing authority, as a disciplinary measure.
  2. As used in KRS 95.440 to 95.629 , the following words and terms shall have the following meaning, unless the context requires otherwise:
    1. “Dismissal” means the discharge of an employee by the division or department head, civil service board, or other lawful authority;
    2. “Eligible list” means a list of names of persons who have been found qualified through suitable competitive examinations for positions or classes of positions;
    3. “Fire department” means and includes all officers, firefighters, and clerical or maintenance employees of the fire department;
    4. “Police department” means and includes all officers, policemen, and clerical or maintenance employees of the police department;
    5. “Member” means any and all officers, firefighters, policemen, clerical or maintenance employees in the police or fire department, except as used in subsections (1) and (3) of KRS 95.440 , and KRS 95.450 , 95.460 , 95.470 , 95.550 , 95.560 , 95.565 , 95.570 and 95.580 ; it shall not include the chief of police in an urban-county government;
    6. “Police force” means and includes all officers and policemen in the police department;
    7. “Policeman” means a member of the police department below the rank of officer, other than a clerical or maintenance employee;
    8. “Firefighter” means a member of the fire department below the rank of officer, other than a clerical or maintenance employee;
    9. “Salary” means any compensation received for services;
    10. “Suspension” means the separation of an employee from the service for a temporary or fixed period of time, by his appointing authority, as a disciplinary measure; and
    11. “Pension fund” shall mean the moneys derived from the members of thepolice and fire departments’ salary or salaries and appropriations by the legislative body, or any other means derived from whatever source by gift or otherwise to be used for the retirement of members of the police and fire departments after the prescribed number of years of service, and for the benefit of disabled members of police and fire departments, and for the benefit of surviving spouses and dependent children or dependent fathers or mothers in the case of death of any member of the police or fire department within the scope of his employment.
  3. As used in KRS 95.761 to 95.784 , the following words and terms shall have the following meaning:
    1. “Regular police department.” For the purpose of KRS 95.761 to 95.784 , a “regular police department” is defined as one having a fixed headquarters, where police equipment is maintained and where a policeman or policemen are in constant and uninterrupted attendance to receive and answer police calls, and execute regular police patrol duties;
    2. “Regular fire department.” For the purpose of KRS 95.761 to 95.784, a “regular fire department” is defined as one having a fixed headquarters where firefighting apparatus and equipment are maintained, and where firefighters are in constant and uninterrupted attendance to receive and answer fire alarms;
    3. “Legislative body.” Wherever in KRS 95.761 to 95.784 the term “body” or “legislative body” is employed, it shall be construed to mean the legislative branch of the city government or urban-county government;
    4. “Commission.” The word “commission” shall mean the board of civil service commissioners, as established under the terms of KRS 95.761 to 95.784;
    5. “Trustees.” The word “trustees” shall mean the board of pension fund trustees, as established under the terms of KRS 95.761 to 95.784; and
    6. “Pension fund.” The term “pension fund” shall mean the moneys derived fromthe policeman or policemen and firefighter or firefighters salary or salaries, and appropriations by the legislative body, or any other sums derived from whatever source by gifts or otherwise to be used for the retirement of policeman or policemen and firefighter or firefighters after the prescribed number of years of service and for the benefit of disabled policeman or policemen and firefighter or firefighters, and for the benefit of surviving spouses and dependent children or dependent fathers or mothers in the case of death of a policeman or firefighter within the scope of his employment, according to the terms of KRS 95.761 to 95.784.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 9, § 1; 2016 ch. 31, § 7, effective July 15, 2016; 2019 ch. 44, § 33, effective June 27, 2019.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. “Fire Department.”

The term “fire department” includes an electrician. Covington v. Meyer, 376 S.W.2d 679, 1964 Ky. LEXIS 461 ( Ky. 1964 ).

2. Salary.
3. — Calculation.

Accrued terminal leave pay (unused sick and vacation time) is not to be included in the calculation of “average salary” for purposes of age and service pensions and “last rate of salary” for disability benefit pensions because the lump sum paid upon retirement for unused sick and vacation pay is not paid to the employee periodically and a determination otherwise would lead to unintended results. City of Covington v. Board of Trustees of the Policemen's & Firefighters' Retirement Fund, 903 S.W.2d 517, 1995 Ky. LEXIS 66 ( Ky. 1995 ).

Cited:

Middlesboro v. Welch, 275 S.W.2d 56, 1955 Ky. LEXIS 344 ( Ky. 1955 ); Covington v. Meyer, 376 S.W.2d 679, 1964 Ky. LEXIS 461 ( Ky. 1964 ); Board of Trustees v. Nuckolls, 507 S.W.2d 183, 1974 Ky. LEXIS 678 ( Ky. 1974 ); Caneyville Volunteer Fire Dep’t v. Green’s Motorcycle Salvage, Inc., 286 S.W.3d 790, 2009 Ky. LEXIS 158 ( Ky. 2009 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Where two (2) cities in a county had fire departments that did not qualify as “regular fire departments” under subsection (3) (b) of this section, the county fire protection district could properly annex the territory and levy a fire tax on property within the two (2) cities. OAG 69-373 .

A city could lease space in a municipally owned fire house for a reasonable sum to any private organization to be used for a purpose that is basically private. OAG 71-488 .

If a volunteer fire department is a municipal fire department governed by KRS ch. 95, the fire chief would be prohibited from also serving as a member of the city council. OAG 71-488 .

The city legislative body could authorize the use of the municipally owned fire house by civic organizations involved in community projects. OAG 71-488 .

The expression “members of the police or fire department” as used in KRS 95.520 , includes nonpeace officer employees of the city who are assigned to the police or fire department as radio operators, clerks and/or cleaning and maintenance employees, pursuant to the definition of “member” in subsection (2)(e) of this section. OAG 73-309 .

A fire department created pursuant to this chapter and operated by the city may incur liability if a fireman in the performance of his duties commits a tort. OAG 76-582 .

This section and KRS 95.015 are not in conflict since this section is limited to the provisions of KRS 95.150 to 95.290 and KRS 95.786 to 95.885 . OAG 76-620 .

Dispatchers and clerks of the police department of a city of the third class are generally members of the police department of that city. OAG 78-219 .

A full-time police dispatcher would be a member of the police department and a member of the pension fund; full-time members of the police department hired after the enactment of KRS 95.621 to 95.629 are required members of that pension system and cannot be excluded from participation in that system. OAG 82-627 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Exempt from attachment, execution, etc., pension fund is, KRS 427.120 .

Fire prevention and protection, KRS ch. 227.

Fire protection districts, KRS ch. 75.

General provisions as to offices and officers; social security for public employees; employees retirement system, KRS ch. 61.

Peace officers, generally:

Arrest, by, RCr 2.02 to 2.14.

Bail deposit in justice court, responsible for, RCr 4.08.

Compensation only as provided by law, KRS 61.310 .

Drunken or disorderly person, arrest and disposition of, RCr 2.14, 3.04, 3.06.

Gambling, to detect and prosecute, KRS 62.040 .

Motor vehicle laws, to enforce, KRS 281.765 .

Peace officers, powers, RCr 2.10.

Private employment prohibited, KRS 61.310 .

Qualifications where nonelective, affidavit and photo to be filed as public record, KRS 61.300 .

Removal by governor, KRS 63.090 to 63.130 .

“Sweating” of prisoner forbidden, KRS 422.110 .

Vehicle illegally transporting liquor, to seize, KRS 242.360 .

Police radios, possession of restricted, KRS 432.570 .

Kentucky Bench & Bar.

Morris, The New Kentucky Municipal Law, Vol. 45, No. 3, July, 1981, Ky. Bench and Bar 24.

ALR

Constitutional or statutory provision referring to “employees” as including public officers. 5 A.L.R.2d 415.

95.015. Rights and duties of police and firefighters.

Members of the police and fire departments in cities and urban-county governments shall abide by and adhere to the rules, regulations and laws set forth by the Kentucky Revised Statutes, and the legislative body of the city in which they are employed, provided, that no such rule, regulation or law shall apply that alters, abridges or otherwise restricts the constitutional rights of said members and said members, except when on duty, shall not be restrained from exercising their rights and privileges or from entering into any endeavor enjoyed by all other citizens of the city in which they reside.

History. Enact. Acts 1968, ch. 195; 1974, ch. 248, § 2.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Off-Duty Employment by Police Officers.

Prohibition of certain types of employment is one means of preventing conflicts of interest and a decline in community respect for the police; therefore, although most off-duty employment would not contravene this policy and thus would be immune from regulation, two (2) types of off-duty employment, direct involvement with the sale of alcoholic beverages and employment by persons with a criminal reputation, were determined by the local legislative body to constitute conduct which would inevitably result in a violation of departmental policy; the conduct was inherently conflicting with police duties and as a result, the prohibitions did not violate KRS 61.310 or this section. Puckett v. Miller, 821 S.W.2d 791, 1991 Ky. LEXIS 194 ( Ky. 1991 ).

2. — Insurance and Indemnity.

Regulations which require officers engaged in off-duty employment to provide insurance and indemnity for benefit of the Urban County Government do not violate KRS 61.310 or this section. Puckett v. Miller, 821 S.W.2d 791, 1991 Ky. LEXIS 194 ( Ky. 1991 ).

3. — Severability of Regulations.

The prior authorization by the Chief of Police required for officers to accept outside employment was held invalid but was separate from the general restrictions upon off-duty employment, as the restrictions were not essentially and inseparably connected with and dependent upon the prior authorization requirement and were complete and capable of standing alone; severance of the prior authorization provision did not affect the intent of the legislative body in enacting the remainder of the county police regulations. Puckett v. Miller, 821 S.W.2d 791, 1991 Ky. LEXIS 194 ( Ky. 1991 ).

Cited:

Caneyville Volunteer Fire Dep’t v. Green’s Motorcycle Salvage, Inc., 286 S.W.3d 790, 2009 Ky. LEXIS 158 ( Ky. 2009 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

A city chief of police could accept employment in his off-duty hours from a person in the county to act as a parking supervisor and keeper of the peace at functions for profit. OAG 71-327 .

A city policeman has a right to “moonlight,” to seek private employment during off duty hours. OAG 72-391 .

In view of this section and KRS 61.310 a city of the sixth class may, through its marshal, pursuant to KRS 95.800 (repealed), appoint a policeman who is also an employe of a private police organization. OAG 73-431 .

There is no provision under the Civil Service Act, KRS Ch. 90, covering city employees generally, or under this chapter, covering police and firemen, that would disqualify a retired employe from being employed in a non-civil service position by the city and still draw his pension. OAG 74-542 .

A city can employ an off-duty fireman as an auxiliary policeman. OAG 74-543 .

Under § 165 of the Const. and KRS 61.080 the office of city fire chief is not incompatible with employment by the Greater Cincinnati Airport fire department. OAG 75-568 .

In view of this section and KRS 61.310 a constable may be appointed under KRS 61.360 as a security guard at a school during his off-duty hours. OAG 75-631 .

KRS 95.010 and this section are not in conflict since KRS 95.010 is limited to the provisions of KRS 95.150 to 95.290 and KRS 95.786 to 95.885 . OAG 76-620 .

KRS 61.310 (4) and this section permit police officers to seek and obtain outside employment during their off-duty hours without any restrictions or limitations being imposed by local governmental units so long as it does not interfere with the performance of their official duties. OAG 76-620 .

In view of the fact that a police officer may be privately employed during off duty hours in any capacity, including that of a guard or watchman, he is certainly entitled to any compensation that may result from such employment whether it be in the form of an award or basic compensation. OAG 80-555 .

While municipal police officers have the statutory right under this section and subsection (4) of KRS 61.310 to seek and obtain outside employment during their off-duty hours, such employment cannot be permitted to create a conflict with their official duties as police officers and whether a particular outside interest, such as investigating crimes or noncriminal matters for law firms, insurance companies or other private entities, is sufficient to create a conflict is a factual question depending upon the circumstances of the particular case. OAG 81-358 .

While this section relates to city policemen, the legislative policy permits all nonelected peace officers to seek and obtain outside employment during their off hours without restrictions or limitations being imposed by local governments. OAG 83-86 .

KRS 61.310 , as supported by the policy expressed in this section, permits a county police officer to serve in private employment or in his own private business endeavor, provided that it is after regular hours and so long as it does not interfere with the performance of his regular duties as a county policeman. OAG 83-86 .

Municipal officers have the right under this section and KRS 61.310(4) to seek and obtain outside employment during their off-duty hours without any restrictions or limitations being imposed by local governmental units, so long as it does not interfere with the performance of their official duties. OAG 83-90 .

95.016. Actuarial evaluation of pension systems. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Acts 1978, ch. 311, § 26, effective June 17, 1978) was repealed by Acts 1982, ch. 297, § 11, effective July 15, 1982. For present law, see KRS 65.156 .

95.017. Rights of uniformed city or county police or fire employees regarding political activity.

Uniformed employees of any city or county police or fire department, while off duty and out of uniform, shall be entitled to:

  1. Place political bumper stickers on their privately-owned vehicles;
  2. Wear political buttons;
  3. Contribute money to political parties, political candidates and political groups of their choice;
  4. Work at the polls on election days;
  5. Aid in registration or purgation of voters;
  6. Become members of political groups; and
  7. Hold office in political groups and carry out the mandates of that group.

History. Enact. Acts 1978, ch. 128, § 1, effective June 17, 1978.

Opinions of Attorney General.

Members of the county police force, employed under the county police merit system as prescribed in KRS 78.435 , are entitled to participate in those political activities enumerated in this section, while they are off duty and out of uniform. OAG 78-524 .

A fireman can run for the office of city councilman without jeopardizing his civil service position, provided he conducts his candidacy while off duty. OAG 79-211 .

Regardless of a policeman’s or fire fighter’s right to become a candidate, if elected he could not continue to serve as city fire fighter or policeman in view of the common-law prohibition. OAG 79-211 .

A policeman in a second class city may run for a nonpartisan office, such as city council, so long as he does so while off duty. OAG 79-225 .

A police officer in a fifth-class city could hold a party precinct chairmanship of a political party and perform whatever duties are required of that office during off duty hours. OAG 80-536 .

An employe of a county police department who works under the county police merit system may be a campaign manager or treasurer for a candidate seeking political office under this section so long as he does so only when off duty and out of uniform, and the 1980 amendment to KRS 78.435 was not designed to override the effect of this section in permitting certain political activity. OAG 81-97 .

Policemen and firemen during off-duty hours are permitted to solicit votes on behalf of individual candidates, and there is no basic legal objection to such employees identifying themselves as members of the police and fire departments while working at the polls on election day, so long as they are not in uniform as prohibited by the provisions of this section. OAG 81-230 .

The provisions of this section which grant all police and firemen the right to participate in specifically named political activities while off duty, supersede and modify any conflicting provisions found under KRS 90.220 since this section was intended to apply to all police and fire employees, regardless of whether or not they are under a civil service program other than that found in KRS Chapter 95; even though an amendment to KRS 90.220 was enacted one (1) day after the enactment of this section and would normally prevail as being the later statute, that result only applies where the later statute is more specific than the earlier statute, which is not the case here; moreover, KRS 90.220 did not contain any express language expressing an intent to amend or repeal the preexisting statute. OAG 81-339 .

The phrase “political group,” as used in this section, means any organization of persons for a political purpose; such an organization obviously would include a candidate’s campaign organization. OAG 94-33 .

95.018. Fire department membership charges and subscriber fees may be added to property tax bills — Collection and distribution.

  1. If a city fire department is authorized by law to collect membership charges or subscriber fees for combatting fires or serving in other emergencies, the city legislative body may adopt an ordinance to require those annual membership charges or subscriber fees to be added to property tax bills. In any city where the legislative body has adopted such an ordinance, the county clerk shall add the annual membership charges or subscriber fees to the tax bills of the affected property owners.
  2. The membership charges or subscriber fees shall be collected and distributed by the sheriff to the appropriate fire departments in the same manner as the other taxes on the bill and unpaid fees or charges shall bear the same penalty as general state and county taxes. This shall be a lien on the property against which it is levied from the time of the levy.

History. Enact. Acts 2002, ch. 163, § 3, effective July 15, 2002.

95.019. Chief of police and police force in urban-county governments and cities to have common law and statutory powers of constables and sheriffs.

  1. The chief of police and all members of the police force in urban-county governments and cities shall possess all of the common law and statutory powers of constables and sheriffs. They may exercise those powers, including the power of arrest for offenses against the state, anywhere in the county in which the urban-county government or city is located, but the chief of police and members of the police force in a city shall not be required to police any territory outside of the city limits.
  2. The chief of police and all members of the police force in all urban-county governments and cities shall be entitled to the same fees, and the same remedies for collecting them, that are allowed to sheriffs and other officers for similar services, but all fees shall be paid into the urban-county government or city treasury.

History. Enact. Acts 1994, ch. 48, § 1, effective July 15, 1994; 2014, ch. 92, § 106, effective January 1, 2015.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Analysis

1. Arrest Without Warrant.

Arrest without warrant by policeman detailed to preserve order at election was authorized where, after closing of polls, dispute arose among persons claiming to be inspectors, and policeman then entered room and arrested them for disorderly conduct, if policeman had reasonable grounds to believe such offense was being committed, even if it was not. Weaver v. McGovern, 122 Ky. 1 , 90 S.W. 984, 28 Ky. L. Rptr. 883 , 1906 Ky. LEXIS 16 ( Ky. 1 906).

2. Arrests.

Legislature is not prohibited by Const., § 143 (repealed) from giving police officers of cities power to make arrests beyond city limits, and has authorized them to do so by this section. Earle v. Latonia Agricultural Ass'n, 127 Ky. 578 , 106 S.W. 312, 32 Ky. L. Rptr. 469 , 32 Ky. L. Rptr. 586 , 1907 Ky. LEXIS 171 ( Ky. 1907 ).

Former KRS 95.740 (see now this section) confers county-wide arrest powers upon police officers of fourth-class cities. Commonwealth v. Monson, 860 S.W.2d 272, 1993 Ky. LEXIS 100 ( Ky. 1993 ).

3. Extent of Arrest Powers.

Former KRS 95.150 (see now this section) provides that police officers in cities of the first class shall possess the common law and statutory powers of constables except for service of civil process, and since section 101 of the Constitution provides that the jurisdiction of constables shall be coextensive with the counties in which they reside, it follows that members of the police force of a first class city may make arrests throughout the county in which that city is located, even though the arrest takes place outside the city limits. Cook v. Commonwealth, 649 S.W.2d 198, 1983 Ky. LEXIS 242 ( Ky. 1983 ).

Trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to suppress in a trial for trafficking in a controlled substance; because officers who filed the complaint and served a warrant were employed by a police department in the county, and KRS 95.019(1) empowered the city police department to make lawful arrests within the county, the issue of whether a law enforcement task force of which the officers were members had jurisdiction to operate within the county was moot. Johnson v. Commonwealth, 2007 Ky. App. LEXIS 160 (Ky. Ct. App. May 25, 2007), review denied, ordered not published, 2007 Ky. LEXIS 250 (Ky. Nov. 15, 2007).

Dismissal of indictments was not required despite the argument that the city police officer who arrested the defendants acted unlawfully because the officer arrested them outside the city limits, although within the county limits. A municipal order directing city police to operate within the city limits was meant to keep officers in the city and did not affect the city police officer’s KRS 95.019(1) county-wide power to make an arrest. Commonwealth v. Bishop, 245 S.W.3d 733, 2008 Ky. LEXIS 37 ( Ky. 2008 ).

4. Fees.

Fees of chief of police in cities of fourth class as keeper of city jail should be fixed by ordinance, but, in absence of ordinance, parties may adjust rights by conduct in demanding and accepting payment. Corbin v. Davis, 193 Ky. 391 , 236 S.W. 564, 1922 Ky. LEXIS 8 ( Ky. 1922 ).

The provision of subsection (2) of this section that chief of police shall receive same fees as sheriff refers to fees which sheriff would receive for executing court processes, and not to fees that chief of police is entitled to as keeper of city prisons. Corbin v. Davis, 193 Ky. 391 , 236 S.W. 564, 1922 Ky. LEXIS 8 ( Ky. 1922 ).

5. Negligence.

City was not liable for wilful negligence of policeman appointed by it in making arrest for alleged felony, since municipal officers while performing duties relating to public safety or preservation of public peace, are servants of state. Pollock's Adm'r v. Louisville, 76 Ky. 221 , 1877 Ky. LEXIS 33 ( Ky. 1877 ).

6. Public Safety.

Policeman may be assigned for duty by board of public safety in any department of police service, and is still a policeman whether serving as traffic officer, walking or riding a beat, or performing any of many required duties. Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Boehnlein, 202 Ky. 601 , 260 S.W. 353, 1924 Ky. LEXIS 754 ( Ky. 1924 ).

7. Special Policemen.

Chief of police of fourth-class city with approval of mayor, could appoint special policeman notwithstanding no time was fixed for duration of his services, but chief could not appoint him for given time and by reappointments from time to time keep him in regular service as policeman. Maysville v. Purnell, 103 Ky. 344 , 45 S.W. 101, 20 Ky. L. Rptr. 94 , 1898 Ky. LEXIS 71 ( Ky. 1898 ).

8. Unlawful Assemblages, Speech or Conduct.

Police officers were properly enjoined from interfering with speech on “Americanism” proposed to be delivered on vacant lot and from disturbing audience during its delivery, where proposed speech violated no law and where assemblage to hear it was not an unlawful assemblage; but if speaker actually engaged in unlawful speech or conduct calculated to induce breach of peace, police should immediately interpose. Louisville v. Lougher, 209 Ky. 299 , 272 S.W. 748, 1925 Ky. LEXIS 486 ( Ky. 1925 ).

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Arrest, when permitted, how made, RCr 2.04 to 2.14.

Constables, powers of, KRS ch. 70.

District court, duties of police, KRS 24A.140 .

Fees of police for services to state, KRS 64.060 , 64.070 .

Jurors, sequestered, responsibility for needs, transportation, security, equipment and services, KRS 29A.180 .

Park police, powers of, KRS 97.255 .

Political activity by police prohibited, KRS 90.220 .

Residence, persons changing to report, KRS 116.065 .

Sheriffs, constables, patrols and guards, KRS ch. 70.

State fair grounds, policing of, KRS 247.150 .

ALR

Police officer’s power to enter private house or inclosure to make arrest, without a warrant, for a suspected misdemeanor. 76 A.L.R.2d 1432.

Duty and liability of owner or occupant of premises to fireman or policeman coming thereon in discharge of his duty. 86 A.L.R.2d 1205.

95.020. Civil service board. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2866-1) was repealed by Acts 1942, ch. 16, § 15.

95.021. Police officer prohibited from requesting or requiring victim of alleged sexual offense to submit to polygraph or other examination — Other prohibitions.

No police officer shall:

  1. As a condition of proceeding with an investigation or prosecution of a case, request or require a victim of an alleged sexual offense to submit to a polygraph examination or any other device designed for the purpose of determining whether a person is telling the truth; or
  2. Charge or threaten to charge the victim of an alleged sexual offense with prosecution for a criminal offense for refusing to submit to a polygraph examination or other device designed for the purpose of determining whether a person is telling the truth.

History. Enact. Acts 2008, ch. 112, § 4, effective July 15, 2008.

95.022. Employment of retired police officers. [Effective until April 1, 2021]

  1. As used in this section:
    1. “City” means any incorporated city, consolidated local government, unified local government, urban-county government, or charter county government, operating under the law of this Commonwealth, and the offices and agencies thereof; and
    2. “Police officer” has the same meaning as “police officer” in KRS 15.420 and as “officer” in KRS 16.010 .
  2. Subject to the limitations of subsection (7) of this section, a city may employ individuals as police officers under this section who have retired from the Kentucky Employees Retirement System, the County Employees Retirement System, or the State Police Retirement System.
  3. To be eligible for employment under this section, an individual shall have:
    1. Participated in the Law Enforcement Foundation Program fund under KRS 15.410 to 15.510 or retired as a commissioned officer pursuant to KRS Chapter 16;
    2. Retired with at least twenty (20) years of service credit;
    3. Been separated from service for the period required by KRS 61.637 so that the member’s retirement is not voided;
    4. Retired with no administrative charges pending; and
    5. Retired with no preexisting agreement between the individual and the city prior to the individual’s retirement for the individual to return to work for the city.
  4. Individuals employed under this section shall:
    1. Serve for a term not to exceed one (1) year. The one (1) year employment term may be renewed annually at the discretion of the employing city;
    2. Receive compensation according to the standard procedures applicable to the employing city; and
    3. Be employed based upon need as determined by the employing city.
  5. Notwithstanding any provisions of KRS 16.505 to 16.652 , 18A.225 to 18A.2287 , 61.510 to 61.705 , or 78.510 to 78.852 to the contrary:
    1. Individuals employed under this section shall continue to receive all retirement and health insurance benefits to which they were entitled upon retiring in the applicable system administered by Kentucky Retirement Systems;
    2. Individuals employed under this section shall not be eligible to receive health insurance coverage through the employing city;
    3. The city shall not pay any employer contributions or retiree health expense reimbursements to the Kentucky Retirement Systems required by KRS 61.637(17) for individuals employed under this section; and
    4. The city shall not pay any insurance contributions to the state health insurance plan, as provided by KRS 18A.225 to 18A.2287 , for individuals employed under this section.
  6. Individuals employed under this section shall be subject to any merit system, civil service, or other legislative due process provisions applicable to the employing city. A decision not to renew a one (1) year appointment term under this section shall not be considered a disciplinary action or deprivation subject to due process.
  7. A city government shall be limited in the number of retired police officers that it may hire under this section as follows:
    1. A city government that employed an average of five (5) or fewer police officers over the course of calendar year 2015 shall not be limited in the number of officers that they may hire under this section;
    2. A city government that employed an average of more than five (5) but fewer than one hundred (100) police officers over the course of calendar year 2015 shall not hire more than five (5) police officers or a number equal to twenty-five percent (25%) of the police officers employed by the city in calendar year 2015, whichever is greater; and
    3. A city government that employed an average of more than one hundred (100) police officers over the course of calendar year 2015 shall not hire more than twenty-five (25) police officers or a number equal to ten percent (10%) of the police officers employed by the city in calendar year 2015, whichever is greater.

HISTORY: 2016 ch. 78, § 1, effective July 15, 2016.

Legislative Research Commission Notes.

(4/1/2021). This statute was amended by 2020 Ky. Acts chs. 79 and 121, which do not appear to be in conflict and have been codified together.

95.022. Employment of retired police officers. [Effective April 1, 2021]

  1. As used in this section:
    1. “City” means any incorporated city, consolidated local government, unified local government, urban-county government, or charter county government, operating under the law of this Commonwealth, and the offices and agencies thereof; and
    2. “Police officer” has the same meaning as “police officer” in KRS 15.420 and as “officer” in KRS 16.010 .
  2. Subject to the limitations of subsection (7) of this section, a city may employ individuals as police officers under this section who have retired from the Kentucky Employees Retirement System, the County Employees Retirement System, or the State Police Retirement System.
  3. To be eligible for employment under this section, an individual shall have:
    1. Participated in the Law Enforcement Foundation Program fund under KRS 15.410 to 15.510 or retired as a commissioned officer pursuant to KRS Chapter 16;
    2. Retired with at least twenty (20) years of service credit;
    3. Been separated from service for the period required by KRS 61.637 so that the member’s retirement is not voided;
    4. Retired with no administrative charges pending; and
    5. Retired with no preexisting agreement between the individual and the city prior to the individual’s retirement for the individual to return to work for the city.
  4. Individuals employed under this section shall:
    1. Serve for a term not to exceed one (1) year. The one (1) year employment term may be renewed annually at the discretion of the employing city;
    2. Receive compensation according to the standard procedures applicable to the employing city; and
    3. Be employed based upon need as determined by the employing city.
  5. Notwithstanding any provisions of KRS 16.505 to 16.652 , 18A.225 to 18A.2287 , 61.510 to 61.705 , or 78.510 to 78.852 to the contrary:
    1. Individuals employed under this section shall continue to receive all retirement and health insurance benefits to which they were entitled upon retiring in the applicable system administered by Kentucky Retirement Systems or the County Employees Retirement System;
    2. Individuals employed under this section shall not be eligible to receive health insurance coverage through the employing city;
    3. The city shall not pay any employer contributions or retiree health expense reimbursements to the Kentucky Retirement Systems required by KRS 61.637(17) for individuals employed under this section; and
    4. The city shall not pay any insurance contributions to the state health insurance plan, as provided by KRS 18A.225 to 18A.2287 , for individuals employed under this section.
  6. Individuals employed under this section shall be subject to any merit system, civil service, or other legislative due process provisions applicable to the employing city. A decision not to renew a one (1) year appointment term under this section shall not be considered a disciplinary action or deprivation subject to due process.
  7. A city government shall be limited in the number of retired police officers that it may hire under this section as follows:
    1. A city government that employed an average of five (5) or fewer police officers over the course of calendar year 2015 shall not be limited in the number of officers that they may hire under this section;
    2. A city government that employed an average of more than five (5) but fewer than one hundred (100) police officers over the course of calendar year 2015 shall not hire more than five (5) police officers or a number equal to twenty-five percent (25%) of the police officers employed by the city in calendar year 2015, whichever is greater; and
    3. A city government that employed an average of one hundred (100) or more police officers over the course of calendar year 2015 shall not hire more than twenty-five (25) police officers or a number equal to ten percent (10%) of the police officers employed by the city in calendar year 2015, whichever is greater.
  8. Retired police officers employed by a city government for purposes of KRS 158.4414 shall not apply against the limitations provided by subsection (7) of this section.

HISTORY: 2020 ch. 121, § 9, effective July 15, 2020; 2020 ch. 79, § 41, effective April 1, 2021.

95.030. Board employes, compensation; tax levy. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2866-2) was repealed by Acts 1942, ch. 16, § 15.

95.040. Personnel to which law applies; rules for classification, examination and selection. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2866-3) was repealed by Acts 1942, ch. 16, § 15.

95.050. Appointments. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2866-3, 2866-4) was repealed by Acts 1942, ch. 16, § 15.

95.060. Examinations; religious or political discrimination forbidden. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2866-4, 2866-6) was repealed by Acts 1942, ch. 16, § 15.

95.070. Classified service; political activity forbidden; protection. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2866-4, 2866-5) was repealed by Acts 1942, ch. 16, § 15.

95.080. Discipline of members of police and fire departments. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2866-8, 2875, 2896a-10) was repealed by Acts 1952, ch. 56, § 5. A portion of the section was previously repealed by Acts 1942, ch. 16, § 15.

95.090. Manual of instruction. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2867) was repealed by Acts 1942, ch. 16, § 15.

95.100. Rules for police department; copy of rules as evidence. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2874) was repealed by Acts 1952, ch. 56, § 5.

95.110. Police personnel, rank. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2880) was repealed by Acts 1952, ch. 56, § 5.

95.120. Salaries; monthly payrolls; gratuities. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2872, 2884) was repealed by Acts 1952, ch. 56, § 5.

95.130. Chief of police and assistant chiefs, appointment. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2865) was repealed by Acts 1952, ch. 56, § 5.

95.140. Chief of police, powers and duties. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2868, 2886) was repealed by Acts 1952, ch. 56, § 5.

Cities of the First Class

95.150. Police, powers. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2869, 2879, 2885: amend. Acts 1952, ch. 56, § 5) was repealed by Acts 1994, ch. 48, § 4, effective July 15, 1994. For present law, see KRS 95.019 .

95.160. Special police.

  1. The director of safety may, in case of need, appoint special policemen to do special duty at any place within the city, on terms he deems proper and not in conflict with the civil service provisions.
  2. These special policemen shall be governed by such rules as the director may provide, and be given such powers as the director allows; if rules are not provided they shall have the powers and duties of regular policemen.

History. 2870, 2878: amend. Acts 1952, ch. 56, § 14.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Appointment of Special Police.

Commissioners of public safety (now director of safety) had power to appoint special police outside regular police force without authority of city council. City of Louisville v. Young, 65 S.W. 599, 23 Ky. L. Rptr. 1429 , 1901 Ky. LEXIS 494 (Ky. Ct. App. 1901).

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Special local peace officers, appointment by governor, KRS 61.360 .

95.170. Property clerk — Duties as to stolen or lost property. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2888 to 2890: amend. Acts 1954, ch. 213, § 3) was repealed by 1980 Acts, ch. 193, § 6, effective July 15, 1980.

95.180. Use of property as evidence — Disposition of unclaimed property. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2890, 2891: amend. Acts 1952, ch. 56, § 15; 1966, ch. 239, § 86) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 193, § 6, effective July 15, 1980.

95.190. Stations; patrol wagons; business equipment; sale of property. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2877, 2878) was repealed by Acts 1952, ch. 56, § 5.

95.200. Police, oath.

Each member of the police force, including special policemen, before entering upon the discharge of his duties, shall take an oath to faithfully discharge the duties of his office. This oath shall be subscribed by the person taking it and filed in the office of the department of public safety.

History. 2894: amend. Acts 1952, ch. 56, § 16, effective June 19, 1952.

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Oath of peace officers, to detect and prosecute gambling, KRS 62.040 .

Oath to be taken by all city officers, Const., § 228.

95.210. Police, exempt from civil process.

While actually on duty no member of the police force shall be liable to arrest on civil process or to serve with subpoenas from civil courts.

History. 2896.

95.220. Rules for fire department; copy of rules as evidence. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2896a-3, 2896a-4) was repealed by Acts 1952, ch. 56, § 5.

95.230. Fire department personnel, rank, appointments. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2896a-7) was repealed by Acts 1952, ch. 56, § 5.

95.240. Salaries; payrolls. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2896a-7, 2896a-13) was repealed by Acts 1952, ch. 56, § 5.

95.250. Chief of fire department and assistant chiefs, appointment. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2865) was repealed by Acts 1952, ch. 56, § 5.

95.260. Engine houses; business and other equipment. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2896a-6) was repealed by Acts 1952, ch. 56, § 5.

95.270. Firefighters, exempt from civil process.

The chief and members of the fire department, while on duty at a fire, shall be exempt from arrest on civil process and from service with subpoenas from civil courts.

History. 2896a-14.

95.275. Fire department platoons — Hours of work — Effect on pay.

The fire department of each first-class city shall be divided into three (3) platoons. Each platoon shall be on duty for twenty-four (24) consecutive hours after which the platoon serving twenty-four (24) hours shall be allowed to remain off duty for forty-eight (48) consecutive hours, except in cases of emergency. The chief of the fire department shall arrange the schedule of working hours to comply with the provisions of this section. The pay, rank or benefits, of the members and officers of the fire department, shall not be reduced as a result of this section.

History. Enact. Acts 1964, ch. 30, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Overtime Pay.

Secretary of the Kentucky Department of Labor misinterpreted 803 KAR 1:060 by ruling that 2,912 hours (the average hours firefighters worked per year) was the proper divisor to use to calculate their overtime pay, as the collective bargaining agreement and other evidence established that the parties intended to use additional elements of pay as compensation for a 40-hour work week (2,080 hours per year). Commonwealth v. Hasken, 265 S.W.3d 215, 2007 Ky. App. LEXIS 244 (Ky. Ct. App. 2007).

Cited:

Kentucky Municipal League v. Commonwealth, 530 S.W.2d 198, 1975 Ky. LEXIS 48 ( Ky. 1975 ).

95.280. Obstruction of or interference with fire department prohibited. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2896a-15) was repealed by Acts 1952, ch. 56, § 5.

95.290. Pension system for police and fire divisions — Governing bodies — Repeal of ordinances establishing pension fund — Liquidation and distribution of residual assets — Report — Distribution of funds — Administration expenses — Equal protection for beneficiaries — Participation by policemen and firefighters in County Employees Retirement System — Contributions. [Effective until April 1, 2021]

  1. The city legislative body in cities of the first class may enact ordinances providing for a system of pensions for retired and disabled members of the police and fire divisions of the department of public safety and their dependents, may appropriate funds for the purpose of paying such pensions, may allot and pay to the policemen’s pension fund or the firefighters’ pension fund or either or both of them, all fines and forfeitures imposed upon members of the respective divisions, and may provide for, assess, and collect contributions from the members for the benefit of the fund.
    1. There shall be a governing body of the policemen’s pension fund, and a governing body of the firefighters’ pension fund. The governing bodies of the respective funds shall hold title to all assets in their respective funds, and shall have exclusive authority relating to investment of the assets of the funds, including contracting with investment advisors or managers to perform investment services as deemed necessary and prudent by the board. A majority of the governing body of each fund shall be composed of persons receiving pension benefits from the respective pension systems, and no more than one (1) member of the city legislative body may be a member of the governing body of either the policemen’s or the firefighters’ pension fund, except if there are fewer than six (6) active and retired members of the policemen’s or the firefighters’ pension fund, the governing body of the pension fund shall be composed of the mayor, city treasurer or chief financial officer, and two (2) employees appointed by the mayor from the city’s respective police department or fire department. To be effective, an action of the governing body of a fund shall require only a simple majority of the votes cast at a properly convened meeting of the governing body where a quorum is present, with a quorum being a majority of the members of a governing body. (2) (a) There shall be a governing body of the policemen’s pension fund, and a governing body of the firefighters’ pension fund. The governing bodies of the respective funds shall hold title to all assets in their respective funds, and shall have exclusive authority relating to investment of the assets of the funds, including contracting with investment advisors or managers to perform investment services as deemed necessary and prudent by the board. A majority of the governing body of each fund shall be composed of persons receiving pension benefits from the respective pension systems, and no more than one (1) member of the city legislative body may be a member of the governing body of either the policemen’s or the firefighters’ pension fund, except if there are fewer than six (6) active and retired members of the policemen’s or the firefighters’ pension fund, the governing body of the pension fund shall be composed of the mayor, city treasurer or chief financial officer, and two (2) employees appointed by the mayor from the city’s respective police department or fire department. To be effective, an action of the governing body of a fund shall require only a simple majority of the votes cast at a properly convened meeting of the governing body where a quorum is present, with a quorum being a majority of the members of a governing body.
    2. If all liabilities to all individuals entitled to benefits from the policemen’s pension fund or firefighters’ pension fund have been satisfied, the ordinances establishing the fund may be repealed by the majority vote of the duly elected members of the entire legislative body. If repealed, the governing body of the policemen’s or firefighters’ pension fund shall, within sixty (60) days of repeal, proceed with the liquidation of any residual assets of the fund. All residual assets liquidated pursuant to this paragraph shall be distributed by the governing body to the city’s general fund provided the return of assets complies with federal and state law governing the distribution of assets. Within thirty (30) days following the distribution of residual assets, the governing body of the fund shall as its last act file a complete report with the legislative body of the city, for retention by the city clerk the same as for other city records, of the actions taken to dissolve the fund and liquidate residual assets of the fund.
  2. Any policemen’s pension fund or any firefighters’ pension fund established under the provisions of this section shall be held or distributed for, and only for, any of the following purposes of the respective fund as applicable:
    1. Paying pensions, and any bonus payments under applicable ordinances;
    2. Making payments to the city for transfer to the County Employees Retirement System for alternate participation pursuant to KRS 78.530(3)(a) and 78.531(2) or for the distribution of residual assets in the event the fund is dissolved pursuant to subsection (2)(b) of this section;
    3. Transferring pension assets through investment contract or other financial instrument for the purpose of amortizing unfunded service liabilities; and
    4. Payment from the city to the County Employees Retirement System for future pension contributions required pursuant to KRS 61.565 . Pursuant to the terms of this section, if policemen of the city of the first class elect entry into the County Employees Retirement System and thereby create excess funds over those required to provide for the purposes set forth in paragraphs (a), (b), and (c) of this subsection, these excess funds shall be distributed to the city for use by the city for any other purpose it may elect, including, but not limited to, the establishment of a reserve for payment under paragraph (d) of this subsection. The governing board of the fund may annually expend for the necessary expenses connected with the fund, including but not limited to expenses for medical, actuarial, accounting, and legal services, the amount such governing board deems proper.
    5. Payment from the city to the County Employees Retirement System for future pension contributions required pursuant to KRS 61.565 . Pursuant to the terms of this section, if firefighters of the city of the first class elect entry into the County Employees Retirement System and thereby create excess funds over those required to provide for the purposes set forth in paragraphs (a), (b), and (c) of this subsection, these excess funds shall be distributed according to the terms of an agreement negotiated between the city and the union organization representing the firefighters. The city may use its share of the distributed excess funds for any purpose it may elect, including, but not limited to, the establishment of a reserve for payment under paragraph (e) of this subsection.
    1. The governing body of each pension fund shall insure that all of the assets in the fund are distributed for the purposes in subsection (3) of this section, and only for these purposes. If in any calendar year the assets in either fund exceed those needed for the actuarial liability for payment of pension benefits and any anticipated liabilities under subsection (3)(b) and (c) of this section, the legislative body of the city establishing the pension system shall insure by pension bonus ordinance that a portion of these excess funds be distributed in an equitable manner to all eligible pension recipients. Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to require any change to be made to any pension ordinance as it exists on July 15, 1998. (4) (a) The governing body of each pension fund shall insure that all of the assets in the fund are distributed for the purposes in subsection (3) of this section, and only for these purposes. If in any calendar year the assets in either fund exceed those needed for the actuarial liability for payment of pension benefits and any anticipated liabilities under subsection (3)(b) and (c) of this section, the legislative body of the city establishing the pension system shall insure by pension bonus ordinance that a portion of these excess funds be distributed in an equitable manner to all eligible pension recipients. Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to require any change to be made to any pension ordinance as it exists on July 15, 1998.
    2. The governing board of either fund may annually expend for the necessary expenses connected with the fund, including but not limited to expenses for medical, actuarial, accounting, and legal or other professional services, the amount such governing board deems proper.
  3. Any ordinance establishing a pension fund under this section shall make equitable provision for the rights of persons having an interest in assets transferred to the fund from any fund heretofore established by statute.
  4. To assure equal protection for the beneficiaries of either fund, any action taken by the city executive or legislative body in cities of the first class that affects a policemen’s pension fund or a firefighters’ pension fund established under this section shall, to the maximum extent permitted by law, treat each fund in a uniform manner and shall not cause any change to be made to the structure or operation of either fund, whether through legislation, litigation, compromise, settlement, or otherwise, unless any proposed change is offered to the other fund before it takes effect. Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to require any change to be made to any pension ordinance as it exists on July 15, 1998.
  5. The legislative body in a city of the first class shall issue the appropriate order, pursuant to KRS 78.530(1), directing participation for policemen in the County Employees Retirement System. All new employees who would have been granted membership in the local policemen’s pension system shall be members of the County Employees Retirement System. All active members of the local policemen’s pension system at the time of transition to the County Employees Retirement System may choose membership in the County Employees Retirement System or may retain membership in the local system. The city shall elect the alternate participation plan, pursuant to KRS 78.530(3), for policemen who transfer to the County Employees Retirement System. Notwithstanding the provisions of KRS 78.530(3)(b), the city may, at its option, extend the payment period for the cost of alternate participation to a maximum of twenty (20) years with the interest at the rate actuarially assumed by the board. The city shall have the right to use assets in the local pension fund, other than assets necessary to pay benefits to the remaining active members of the local policemen’s pension system and to retirees and their survivors as determined by actuarial valuation, to assist in the payment of the annual installment cost of alternate participation. All policemen who become members of the County Employees Retirement System pursuant to this section shall be granted hazardous duty coverage, and the city may, at its option, purchase accumulated sick leave for each policeman upon retirement pursuant to KRS 78.616 .
  6. The legislative body in a city of the first class may issue the appropriate order, pursuant to KRS 78.530(1), directing participation for firefighters in the County Employees Retirement System. In the event that the legislative body in a city of the first class issues such an order, then all new employees who would have been granted membership in the local firefighters’ pension system shall be members of the County Employees Retirement System. All active members of the local firefighters’ pension system at the time of transition to the County Employees Retirement System may choose membership in the County Employees Retirement System or may retain membership in the local system. The city shall elect the alternate participation plan, pursuant to KRS 78.530(3), for firefighters who transfer to the County Employees Retirement System. Notwithstanding the provisions of KRS 78.530(3)(b), the city may, at its option, extend the payment period for the cost of alternate participation to a maximum of twenty (20) years with the interest at the rate actuarially assumed by the board. The city shall have the right to use assets in the local firefighters’ pension fund, other than assets necessary to pay benefits to the remaining active members of the local firefighters’ pension system and to retirees and their survivors as determined by actuarial valuation, to assist in the payment of the annual installment cost of alternate participation. After certification by the County Employees Retirement System of eligibility for hazardous duty coverage, each firefighter who becomes a member of the County Employees Retirement System pursuant to this section shall be granted hazardous duty coverage.
  7. Notwithstanding the provisions of KRS 61.565 , which relate to the contributions required of participating employers, any city of the first class participating in the County Employees Retirement System hazardous duty pension plan which has in effect a collective bargaining agreement with a group of employees who participate in said plan, shall have the right to enter into agreement with its employees or with their respective collective bargaining representatives. This agreement may include, but is not limited to, specifications of what portion of the required employer contribution shall be borne by the participating employer and what portion shall be borne by the participating employee. This provision in no way modifies the employer’s obligation to remit the contributions required by the County Employees Retirement System pursuant to KRS 61.565 , whether such contributions are borne by the city or by its participating employees.
  8. With regard to the employer participation or employer contributions pursuant to KRS 61.565 as it relates to future pension contribution requirements or as it relates to payback period or interest charge for service liability cost under alternate participation, if any statute or any resolution of the appropriate state board of trustees having authority over employer participation or employer contribution grants any terms or conditions to any city of the home rule class, or to any county, or to any urban-county government, which are more favorable in terms of participation than terms or conditions granted to any city of the first class, then said provisions for employer participation or contribution shall be available to the city of the first class, at its option and effective upon adoption by the city of the first class and notification to the County Employees Retirement System.

HISTORY: 2827b-1: amend. Acts 1952, ch. 56, § 17; 2016 ch. 31, § 8, effective July 15, 2016.

Legislative Research Commission Notes.

(4/1/2021). This statute was amended by 2020 Ky. Acts chs. 79 and 121, which do not appear to be in conflict and have been codified together.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Contributions to Fund.

Where a city established a fund which did not permit police officers who left the force to withdraw any part of their contribution unless they had served at least five (5) years and which did not grant a vested right in such contribution, the decision to establish such a fund was not arbitrary or capricious but was supported by rational considerations in that it encouraged police officers to remain in service, it removed at least one uncertainty of the actuary in making his calculation of the needs of the fund and it provided money for the administration of the fund. Louisville Policemen's Retirement Fund v. Bryant, 556 S.W.2d 6, 1977 Ky. LEXIS 515 ( Ky. 1977 ).

2. Discretion of City Legislative Bodies.

Since this section makes no mention of either refunding of contributions or vesting of rights, these questions are left to the discretion of the legislative bodies of first class cities. Louisville Policemen's Retirement Fund v. Bryant, 556 S.W.2d 6, 1977 Ky. LEXIS 515 ( Ky. 1977 ).

3. Breach of Fiduciary Duties.

Although subsection (2) of this section contains a broad grant of authority in the management of fund assets, it does not create a license to engage in intentional conduct amounting to a breach of fiduciary duties. Louisville v. Stock Yards Bank & Trust Co., 843 S.W.2d 327, 1992 Ky. LEXIS 193 ( Ky. 1992 ).

4. — Standing.

City had standing to bring an action for damages and injunctive relief against trustees of the policemen’s retirement fund and various other parties including a bank, a brokerage firm, investment advisors and stock brokers with whom the fund had entered into contracts and engaged in investment activities where allegations in its complaint that trustees engaged in knowing, intentional, and reckless conduct which resulted in the waste of fund assets went beyond any reasonable construction of exclusive investment authority provided for by subsection (2) of this section. Louisville v. Stock Yards Bank & Trust Co., 843 S.W.2d 327, 1992 Ky. LEXIS 193 ( Ky. 1992 ).

5. Widow's Pension.

Widow and children of policeman who accidentally shot himself while cleaning his pistol when off duty at home were not entitled to pensions under law allowing pensions if policeman be killed or die from injury received in line of duty. McAuliffe v. Board of Trustees, 115 S.W. 808 ( Ky. 1909 ).

The right of a widow to a pension is governed by the law in force at the time of her husband’s death. Arnold v. Browning, 294 Ky. 164 , 171 S.W.2d 239, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 411 ( Ky. 1943 ).

The benefit granted to a widow was not a continuation of the pension formerly paid to her husband; it was an entirely separate benefit to which the widow acquired no vested right until the death of her husband. Arnold v. Browning, 294 Ky. 164 , 171 S.W.2d 239, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 411 ( Ky. 1943 ).

6. Removal from Pension Rolls.

Newly constituted board of trustees of pension fund lacked authority to revise decision of predecessor board retiring fireman on pension after twenty years service by order that he be removed from pension roll and returned to active duty. Tyson v. Board of Trustees, 139 Ky. 256 , 129 S.W. 820, 1910 Ky. LEXIS 29 ( Ky. 1910 ).

Cited:

Talbott v. Thomas, 286 Ky. 786 , 151 S.W.2d 1, 1941 Ky. LEXIS 277 ( Ky. 1941 ).

Research References and Practice Aids

ALR

Home rule charters, pensions of members of police department as within exclusive control of municipalities under. 105 A.L.R. 263.

95.290. Pension system for police and fire divisions — Governing bodies — Option to convert pension benefits to annuity benefits — Repeal of ordinances establishing pension fund — Liquidation and distribution of residual assets — Report — Distribution of funds — Administration expenses — Equal protection for beneficiaries — Participation by policemen and firefighters in County Employees Retirement System — Contributions. [Effective April 1, 2021]

  1. The city legislative body in cities of the first class may enact ordinances providing for a system of pensions for retired and disabled members of the police and fire divisions of the department of public safety and their dependents, may appropriate funds for the purpose of paying such pensions, may allot and pay to the policemen’s pension fund or the firefighters’ pension fund or either or both of them, all fines and forfeitures imposed upon members of the respective divisions, and may provide for, assess, and collect contributions from the members for the benefit of the fund.
    1. There shall be a governing body of the policemen’s pension fund, and a governing body of the firefighters’ pension fund. The governing bodies of the respective funds shall hold title to all assets in their respective funds, and shall have exclusive authority relating to investment of the assets of the funds, including contracting with investment advisors or managers to perform investment services as deemed necessary and prudent by the board. A majority of the governing body of each fund shall be composed of persons receiving pension benefits from the respective pension systems, and no more than one (1) member of the city legislative body may be a member of the governing body of either the policemen’s or the firefighters’ pension fund, except if there are fewer than six (6) active and retired members of the policemen’s or the firefighters’ pension fund, the governing body of the pension fund shall be composed of the mayor, city treasurer or chief financial officer, and two (2) employees appointed by the mayor from the city’s respective police department or fire department. To be effective, an action of the governing body of a fund shall require only a simple majority of the votes cast at a properly convened meeting of the governing body where a quorum is present, with a quorum being a majority of the members of a governing body. (2) (a) There shall be a governing body of the policemen’s pension fund, and a governing body of the firefighters’ pension fund. The governing bodies of the respective funds shall hold title to all assets in their respective funds, and shall have exclusive authority relating to investment of the assets of the funds, including contracting with investment advisors or managers to perform investment services as deemed necessary and prudent by the board. A majority of the governing body of each fund shall be composed of persons receiving pension benefits from the respective pension systems, and no more than one (1) member of the city legislative body may be a member of the governing body of either the policemen’s or the firefighters’ pension fund, except if there are fewer than six (6) active and retired members of the policemen’s or the firefighters’ pension fund, the governing body of the pension fund shall be composed of the mayor, city treasurer or chief financial officer, and two (2) employees appointed by the mayor from the city’s respective police department or fire department. To be effective, an action of the governing body of a fund shall require only a simple majority of the votes cast at a properly convened meeting of the governing body where a quorum is present, with a quorum being a majority of the members of a governing body.
    2. If there are fewer than twelve (12) active and retired members or beneficiaries of the policemen’s or the firefighters’ pension fund, the governing body of the fund may elect to offer to individuals entitled to benefits from the fund a one (1) time irrevocable option to convert monthly pension benefits from the fund to monthly annuity benefits from an insurance company for the same amount. An insurance company accepting a benefit transfer shall honor any features and options available under the existing plan. If the governing body of the fund elects to offer the option to convert monthly pension benefits to monthly annuity benefits, it shall provide to individuals entitled to benefits from the fund sufficiently complete and appropriate disclosures to assist in making an informed decision.
    3. If all liabilities to all individuals entitled to benefits from the policemen’s pension fund or firefighters’ pension fund have been satisfied, the ordinances establishing the fund may be repealed by the majority vote of the duly elected members of the entire legislative body. If repealed, the governing body of the policemen’s or firefighters’ pension fund shall, within sixty (60) days of repeal, proceed with the liquidation of any residual assets of the fund. All residual assets liquidated pursuant to this paragraph shall be distributed by the governing body to the city’s general fund provided the return of assets complies with federal and state law governing the distribution of assets. Within thirty (30) days following the distribution of residual assets, the governing body of the fund shall as its last act file a complete report with the legislative body of the city, for retention by the city clerk the same as for other city records, of the actions taken to dissolve the fund and liquidate residual assets of the fund.
  2. Any policemen’s pension fund or any firefighters’ pension fund established under the provisions of this section shall be held or distributed for, and only for, any of the following purposes of the respective fund as applicable:
    1. Paying pensions, and any bonus payments under applicable ordinances;
    2. Making payments to the city for transfer to the County Employees Retirement System for alternate participation pursuant to KRS 78.530(3)(a) and 78.531(2) or for the distribution of residual assets in the event the fund is dissolved pursuant to subsection (2)(c) of this section;
    3. Making payments to the city for transfer to an insurance company for conversion of monthly pension benefits to monthly annuity benefits as provided in subsection (2)(b) of this section;
    4. Transferring pension assets through investment contract or other financial instrument for the purpose of amortizing unfunded service liabilities; and
    5. Payment from the city to the County Employees Retirement System for future pension contributions required pursuant to KRS 61.702 and 78.635 . Pursuant to the terms of this section, if policemen of the city of the first class elect entry into the County Employees Retirement System and thereby create excess funds over those required to provide for the purposes set forth in paragraphs (a), (b), (c), (d), and (e) of this subsection, these excess funds shall be distributed to the city for use by the city for any other purpose it may elect, including but not limited to the establishment of a reserve for payment under paragraph (e) of this subsection. The governing board of the fund may annually expend for the necessary expenses connected with the fund, including but not limited to expenses for medical, actuarial, accounting, and legal services, the amount such governing board deems proper.
    6. Payment from the city to the County Employees Retirement System for future pension contributions required pursuant to KRS 61.702 and 78.635 . Pursuant to the terms of this section, if firefighters of the city of the first class elect entry into the County Employees Retirement System and thereby create excess funds over those required to provide for the purposes set forth in paragraphs (a), (b), (c), (d), and (e) of this subsection, these excess funds shall be distributed according to the terms of an agreement negotiated between the city and the union organization representing the firefighters. The city may use its share of the distributed excess funds for any purpose it may elect, including but not limited to the establishment of a reserve for payment under paragraph (f) of this subsection.
    1. The governing body of each pension fund shall ensure that all of the assets in the fund are distributed for the purposes in subsection (3) of this section, and only for these purposes. If in any calendar year the assets in either fund exceed those needed for the actuarial liability for payment of pension benefits and any anticipated liabilities under subsection (3)(b) and (d) of this section, the legislative body of the city establishing the pension system shall ensure by pension bonus ordinance that a portion of these excess funds be distributed in an equitable manner to all eligible pension recipients. Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to require any change to be made to any pension ordinance as it exists on July 15, 1998. (4) (a) The governing body of each pension fund shall ensure that all of the assets in the fund are distributed for the purposes in subsection (3) of this section, and only for these purposes. If in any calendar year the assets in either fund exceed those needed for the actuarial liability for payment of pension benefits and any anticipated liabilities under subsection (3)(b) and (d) of this section, the legislative body of the city establishing the pension system shall ensure by pension bonus ordinance that a portion of these excess funds be distributed in an equitable manner to all eligible pension recipients. Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to require any change to be made to any pension ordinance as it exists on July 15, 1998.
    2. The governing board of either fund may annually expend for the necessary expenses connected with the fund, including but not limited to expenses for medical, actuarial, accounting, and legal or other professional services, the amount such governing board deems proper.
  3. Any ordinance establishing a pension fund under this section shall make equitable provision for the rights of persons having an interest in assets transferred to the fund from any fund heretofore established by statute.
  4. To assure equal protection for the beneficiaries of either fund, any action taken by the city executive or legislative body in cities of the first class that affects a policemen’s pension fund or a firefighters’ pension fund established under this section shall, to the maximum extent permitted by law, treat each fund in a uniform manner and shall not cause any change to be made to the structure or operation of either fund, whether through legislation, litigation, compromise, settlement, or otherwise, unless any proposed change is offered to the other fund before it takes effect. Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to require any change to be made to any pension ordinance as it exists on July 15, 1998.
  5. The legislative body in a city of the first class shall issue the appropriate order, pursuant to KRS 78.530(1), directing participation for policemen in the County Employees Retirement System. All new employees who would have been granted membership in the local policemen’s pension system shall be members of the County Employees Retirement System. All active members of the local policemen’s pension system at the time of transition to the County Employees Retirement System may choose membership in the County Employees Retirement System or may retain membership in the local system. The city shall elect the alternate participation plan, pursuant to KRS 78.530(3), for policemen who transfer to the County Employees Retirement System. Notwithstanding the provisions of KRS 78.530(3)(b), the city may, at its option, extend the payment period for the cost of alternate participation to a maximum of twenty (20) years with the interest at the rate actuarially assumed by the board. The city shall have the right to use assets in the local pension fund, other than assets necessary to pay benefits to the remaining active members of the local policemen’s pension system and to retirees and their survivors as determined by actuarial valuation, to assist in the payment of the annual installment cost of alternate participation. All policemen who become members of the County Employees Retirement System pursuant to this section shall be granted hazardous duty coverage, and the city may, at its option, purchase accumulated sick leave for each policeman upon retirement pursuant to KRS 78.616 .
  6. The legislative body in a city of the first class may issue the appropriate order, pursuant to KRS 78.530(1), directing participation for firefighters in the County Employees Retirement System. In the event that the legislative body in a city of the first class issues such an order, then all new employees who would have been granted membership in the local firefighters’ pension system shall be members of the County Employees Retirement System. All active members of the local firefighters’ pension system at the time of transition to the County Employees Retirement System may choose membership in the County Employees Retirement System or may retain membership in the local system. The city shall elect the alternate participation plan, pursuant to KRS 78.530(3), for firefighters who transfer to the County Employees Retirement System. Notwithstanding the provisions of KRS 78.530(3)(b), the city may, at its option, extend the payment period for the cost of alternate participation to a maximum of twenty (20) years with the interest at the rate actuarially assumed by the board. The city shall have the right to use assets in the local firefighters’ pension fund, other than assets necessary to pay benefits to the remaining active members of the local firefighters’ pension system and to retirees and their survivors as determined by actuarial valuation, to assist in the payment of the annual installment cost of alternate participation. After certification by the County Employees Retirement System of eligibility for hazardous duty coverage, each firefighter who becomes a member of the County Employees Retirement System pursuant to this section shall be granted hazardous duty coverage.
  7. Notwithstanding the provisions of KRS 61.702 and 78.635 , which relate to the contributions required of participating employers, any city of the first class participating in the County Employees Retirement System hazardous duty pension plan which has in effect a collective bargaining agreement with a group of employees who participate in said plan, shall have the right to enter into agreement with its employees or with their respective collective bargaining representatives. This agreement may include but is not limited to specifications of what portion of the required employer contribution shall be borne by the participating employer and what portion shall be borne by the participating employee. This provision in no way modifies the employer’s obligation to remit the contributions required by the County Employees Retirement System pursuant to KRS 61.702 and 78.635 , whether such contributions are borne by the city or by its participating employees.
  8. With regard to the employer participation or employer contributions pursuant to KRS 61.702 and 78.635 as it relates to future pension contribution requirements or as it relates to payback period or interest charge for service liability cost under alternate participation, if any statute or any resolution of the appropriate state board of trustees having authority over employer participation or employer contribution grants any terms or conditions to any city of the home rule class, or to any county, or to any urban-county government, which are more favorable in terms of participation than terms or conditions granted to any city of the first class, then said provisions for employer participation or contribution shall be available to the city of the first class, at its option and effective upon adoption by the city of the first class and notification to the County Employees Retirement System.

HISTORY: 2827b-1: amend. Acts 1952, ch. 56, § 17; 2016 ch. 31, § 8, effective July 15, 2016; 2020 ch. 121, § 3, effective July 15, 2020; 2020 ch. 79, § 42, effective April 1, 2021.

95.300. Police pension fund. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2872b-2 to 2872b-4) was repealed by Acts 1952, ch. 56, § 6.

95.310. Firemen’s pension fund; board of trustees. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2896b-5) was repealed by Acts 1952, ch. 56, § 7.

95.320. Pension fund, sources. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2896b-8: amend. Acts 1948, ch. 142, § 1, effective June 17, 1948) was repealed by Acts 1952, ch. 56, § 7.

95.330. Pension on death or retirement for disability; beneficiaries. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2896b-10) was repealed by Acts 1952, ch. 56, § 7.

95.340. Benefits on death or retirement for disability. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2896b-11) was repealed by Acts 1952, ch. 56, § 7.

95.350. Retirement without disability, benefits. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2896b-11) was repealed by Acts 1952, ch. 56, § 7.

95.360. Reexamination after retirement for disability. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2896b-12) was repealed by Acts 1952, ch. 56, § 7.

95.370. Pensions, payment. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2896b-13) was repealed by Acts 1952, ch. 56, § 7.

95.380. Trustees of pension fund; membership; powers; oath and bond; annual report. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2896b-2896b-6, 2896b-9) was repealed by Acts 1952, ch. 56, § 7.

95.390. Election of trustees. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2896b-7) was repealed by Acts 1952, ch. 56, § 7.

95.400. Investment of pension fund. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2896b-9) was repealed by Acts 1952, ch. 56, § 7.

95.410. Custody of pension fund. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2896b-9, 2896b-15) was repealed by Acts 1952, ch. 56, § 7.

95.420. Fund to be used solely for pensions and expenses. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2896b-14) was repealed by Acts 1952, ch. 56, § 7.

95.425. Transfer of assets to new fund. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1952, ch. 56, § 7(2)) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 255, § 283.

Cities of the Home Rule Class and Urban-County Governments

95.430. Police and fire departments — Control — Salaries. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3138-1, 3138-2, 3140, 3235dd-35, 3351a-1, 3351a-2: amend. Acts 1956, ch. 246, § 12, effective May 18, 1956; 1974, ch. 248, § 3; 1978, ch. 164, § 20) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980.

95.435. Custody and disposition of property taken by the police department of city of home rule class or urban-county government.

  1. The police department in cities of the home rule class and urban-county governments shall take charge of property, within their jurisdiction, alleged to be or suspected of being the proceeds of crime, property taken from the person of a prisoner, lost or abandoned property taken into the custody of any member of the police force or criminal court, and property taken from persons supposed to be insane, intoxicated or otherwise incapable of taking care of themselves. The officer or court having custody of such property shall as soon as practicable deliver it into the custody of the police department.
  2. All such property shall be particularly described and registered by the police department in a book kept for that purpose, containing the name of the owner, if ascertained, the place where found, the name of the person from whom taken, with the general circumstances, the date of its receipt, the name of the officer recovering the property, the names of all claimants thereto, and any final disposition of the property. The police department shall advertise the property pursuant to KRS Chapter 424 for the information of the public as to the amount and disposition of the property.
  3. If any property in the custody of the police department is desired as evidence in any criminal court, such property shall be delivered to any officer who presents an order to that effect from the court. Such property shall not be retained in the court but shall be returned to the police department.
  4. All property except firearms that remains in the custody of the police department for three (3) months, without any lawful claimant thereto, may be sold at public auction in a suitable room designated for that purpose after having been advertised pursuant to KRS Chapter 424. The proceeds of such sales shall be paid into the police and firefighters’ pension fund of said city or urban-county government if the city or urban-county government has a pension fund with active members or beneficiaries. If the city or urban-county government does not maintain a policemen’s and firefighters’ pension fund or no longer has active members or beneficiaries, then the proceeds shall be designated by the city or urban-county government for the exclusive use of the police department. Firearms shall be transferred to the Department of Kentucky State Police within ninety (90) days of abandonment, confiscation, release of the weapon as evidence, or forfeiture by a court, whichever occurs later.

History. Enact. Acts 1954, ch. 205; 1966, ch. 239, § 87; 1974, ch. 248, § 4; 1978, ch. 164, § 21, effective June 17, 1978; 1998, ch. 606, § 130, effective July 15, 1998; 2000, ch. 405, § 1, effective July 14, 2000; 2007, ch. 85, § 155, effective June 26, 2007; 2014, ch. 92, § 108, effective January 1, 2015.

Opinions of Attorney General.

Evidence relevant to the commission of a crime may not be attached while being held prior to trial. OAG 75-287 .

The finder of the property taken by a police department, which goes otherwise unclaimed for the three-month period provided for in subsection (4), could be considered a claimant and “lawful claimant” since it was originally found by him and therefore in his possession, assuming the finder of the property filed a claim within the three-month period and that no better claim was filed. OAG 84-85 .

95.440. Police and fire department members in city of home rule class or urban-county government — Qualifications — Examination — Tenure — Reinstatement.

  1. The legislative body of cities of the home rule class and urban-county governments may require, in addition to the peace officer professional standards training under KRS 15.380 to 15.404 , all applicants for appointments as members of the police or fire departments to be examined as to their qualifications for office, including their knowledge of the English language and the law and rules governing the duties of the position applied for.
  2. Each member of the police or fire department in cities and urban-county governments shall be able to read, write and understand the English language, and have such other qualifications as may be prescribed. No person shall be appointed a member of the police or fire department unless he is a person of sobriety and integrity and is and has been an orderly, law-abiding citizen. No person convicted of a felony is eligible for appointment.
  3. Members of the police and fire departments in cities required to comply with KRS 95.450 or urban-county governments qualified under this section shall hold their positions during good behavior, except that the legislative body may decrease the number of policemen or firefighters as it may deem proper.
  4. If the legislative body of a city required to comply with KRS 95.450 or urban-county government decreases the number of policemen or firefighters, the youngest members in point of service shall be the first to be released and returned to the eligible list of the department, there to advance according to the rules of the department.
  5. The legislative body in an urban-county government may by ordinance provide that any person who has successfully completed his probationary period and subsequently ceased working for the police or fire department for reasons other than dismissal may be restored to the position, rank and pay he formerly held or to an equivalent or lower position, rank or pay than that which he formerly held if he so requests in writing to the appointing authority. Such person shall be eligible for reinstatement for a period of one (1) year following his separation from the police or fire department and shall be reinstated only with the approval of the appointing authority.

History. 3138-1, 3138-3, 3141, 3235dd-35, 3351a-2: amend. Acts 1948, ch. 83; 1956, ch. 246, § 13; 1966, ch. 9; 1966, ch. 168; 1974, ch. 248, § 5; 1974, ch. 386, § 21; 1978, ch. 164, § 22, effective June 17, 1978; 1978, ch. 177, § 2, effective June 17, 1978; 1980, ch. 171, § 1, effective July 15, 1980; 1985 (1st Ex. Sess.), ch. 4, § 1, effective July 19, 1985; 2013, ch. 68, § 1, effective June 25, 2013; 2014, ch. 92, § 109, effective January 1, 2015.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

Law regulating qualification, appointment and removal of policemen, did not, by application to existing officers at time of enactment, violate Const., § 161, which applies to officers elected or appointed for fixed terms, and not to policemen. Middlesboro ex rel. Minton v. Gibson, 225 Ky. 120 , 7 S.W.2d 825, 1928 Ky. LEXIS 707 ( Ky. 1928 ).

There is no conflict between this section and Const., § 234, because a policeman in a city of the second class is not an officer designated in the Constitution. Newport v. Schindler, 449 S.W.2d 17, 1969 Ky. LEXIS 23 ( Ky. 1969 ).

2. Construction.

Law regulating appointment and removal of policemen deprived commissioners of third-class city of right to remove chief of police at pleasure, but left them right to prescribe qualifications of applicants for positions in police department and to require all applicants, including incumbents, to be examined as to qualifications. Middlesboro ex rel. Minton v. Gibson, 225 Ky. 120 , 7 S.W.2d 825, 1928 Ky. LEXIS 707 ( Ky. 1928 ).

The word “may” is permissive and is used in this section to give a city of the third class the option of operating under the provisions of KRS ch. 95. Mangrum v. Mayfield, 305 S.W.2d 312, 1957 Ky. LEXIS 305 ( Ky. 1957 ) (decision prior to 1966 amendment).

3. Application.

Pursuant to KRS 89.220 (repealed) commissioners of city of second class were authorized to appoint a supervisor of police and fire departments by ordinance which did not make him a member of those departments, but merely permitted him to make study and recommendations, this section being inapplicable. Covington v. Hicks, 236 Ky. 369 , 33 S.W.2d 342, 1930 Ky. LEXIS 775 ( Ky. 1930 ).

4. Appointment of Special Policemen Only.

There was no vitiating irregularity in appointment of policemen who, pursuant to ordinance providing for “reserve policemen” from whom future policemen were to be appointed as required, passed examination and later were inducted into city’s regular police service, replacing others. Marcum v. Boggs, 258 Ky. 401 , 80 S.W.2d 36, 1935 Ky. LEXIS 171 ( Ky. 1935 ).

Procedure followed by city in appointing no members of police department except “special” or “temporary” policemen is unauthorized in view of this section contemplating members of police department shall be qualified and serve during good behavior. White v. Hopkinsville, 280 Ky. 661 , 134 S.W.2d 236, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 191 ( Ky. 1939 ).

5. Qualifications.

In this Age Discrimination and Employment Act action, applicant had not demonstrated that he was qualified to serve as crime scene technician where whatever circumstances that contributed to decline of his practice, it was virtually impossible to reconcile applicant's repeated and willful breaches of fundamental ethics with statutory prerequisite of “integrity.” Winchester v. City of Hopkinsville, 93 F. Supp. 3d 752, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29715 (W.D. Ky. 2015 ).

6. — Examinations.

Notwithstanding ordinance of city of third class had declared that present firemen were qualified for positions and dispensed with examination, certain firemen were not entitled to be retained unless removed on charges, where subsequent ordinance fixed qualifications of firemen and declared that all applicants for appointment, including present incumbents of less than five-year service, must be examined, and such firemen did not present themselves for examination. Stolzy v. Henderson, 225 Ky. 358 , 8 S.W.2d 629, 1928 Ky. LEXIS 787 ( Ky. 1928 ).

Applicant for appointment as fireman, after taking examination prescribed by ordinance, could compel board of examiners to report to commissioners result of examination. Gamm v. Covington, 236 Ky. 711 , 33 S.W.2d 697, 1930 Ky. LEXIS 831 ( Ky. 1930 ).

In second-class cities operating on the city manager plan examinations under this section are of a qualifying nature and create no right to appointment either in persons passing same or the person making the highest grade. Seiter v. Covington, 290 Ky. 699 , 162 S.W.2d 524, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 475 ( Ky. 1942 ).

In second-class cities operating under the city manager plan, the mayor is not required to appoint to positions in the police and fire departments persons who have passed qualifying examinations. Seiter v. Covington, 290 Ky. 699 , 162 S.W.2d 524, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 475 ( Ky. 1942 ).

In second-class cities operating on the city manager plan examinations are not required for the purpose of qualifying persons already holding positions in the police department for promotion within that department. Seiter v. Covington, 290 Ky. 699 , 162 S.W.2d 524, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 475 ( Ky. 1942 ).

7. — Residence.

Ordinance that no person should be eligible to appointment as policemen who had not resided in city for six months referred to regular policemen, and not to special policemen appointed in emergencies for limited period. Barker v. Commonwealth, 209 Ky. 817 , 273 S.W. 503, 1925 Ky. LEXIS 610 ( Ky. 1925 ).

A person who has been a resident of a city of the third class for only one week is not eligible for appointment as a policeman. White v. Hopkinsville, 280 Ky. 661 , 134 S.W.2d 236, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 191 ( Ky. 1939 ).

The 1980 amendment to subsection (2) of this section repealed by implication KRS 15.335 , and a police officer who was not a qualified voter of the county containing his city of employment did not qualify as a police officer of that city. Bogard v. Commonwealth, 687 S.W.2d 533, 1984 Ky. App. LEXIS 597 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 843, 106 S. Ct. 130, 88 L. Ed. 2d 106, 1985 U.S. LEXIS 3560 (U.S. 1985).

A citation for driving under the influence, issued by a police officer who was not a qualified voter of the county containing his city of employment, was not invalidated by the fact that the officer did not qualify as a police officer of that city. The officer was a “de facto” officer acting under color of authority, and since his acts were made from valid motives of public policy to preserve the general public’s rights, as far as the public was concerned he was acting as a “de jure” officer and his actions were not subject to a collateral attack. Bogard v. Commonwealth, 687 S.W.2d 533, 1984 Ky. App. LEXIS 597 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 843, 106 S. Ct. 130, 88 L. Ed. 2d 106, 1985 U.S. LEXIS 3560 (U.S. 1985).

8. — Physical Condition.

Applicant for appointment as fireman, after examination and report to commissioners showing passing mark as to mental condition, but containing word “insubordination” as to physical condition, could not compel commissioners to appoint him. Gamm v. Covington, 236 Ky. 711 , 33 S.W.2d 697, 1930 Ky. LEXIS 831 ( Ky. 1930 ).

9. — Age.

A city has no power to ignore restrictions contained in statute as to the age limit in city’s police force or fire department. Callis v. Brown, 283 Ky. 759 , 142 S.W.2d 675, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 387 ( Ky. 1940 ).

The proper authorities may remove, without hearing, one who does not clearly bring himself within the immune class and where a policeman was over the statutory age limit at the time of appointment there never was a valid appointment. Callis v. Brown, 283 Ky. 759 , 142 S.W.2d 675, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 387 ( Ky. 1940 ).

The city council cannot waive the age qualification provided by statute for policemen. Callis v. Brown, 283 Ky. 759 , 142 S.W.2d 675, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 387 ( Ky. 1940 ).

Where police captain failed to apply for reinstatement after being dropped from his employment by a new administration and voluntarily obtained employment as a special policeman at a war plant for four (4) years, his re-employment in his former position at age of 57 was not a “reinstatement” but an “appointment” and was void under this section prohibiting appointment of person over 50 years of age in city of second class. Buckner v. Quisenberry, 303 Ky. 569 , 198 S.W.2d 211, 1946 Ky. LEXIS 888 ( Ky. 1946 ).

10. Chief of Police.
11. — Qualifications.

One who was not qualified voter in city of second class was not eligible to appointment as chief of police therein, as against contention that chief of police was officer, and not member of force. Leigh v. Commonwealth, 203 Ky. 752 , 263 S.W. 14, 1924 Ky. LEXIS 995 ( Ky. 1924 ).

Chief of police being officer of the force and therefore a member must possess every qualification required by law of every other member of the force. Leigh v. Commonwealth, 203 Ky. 752 , 263 S.W. 14, 1924 Ky. LEXIS 995 ( Ky. 1924 ).

12. — Removal.

Although ordinance of third-class city which declared that chief of police possessed qualifications required by law regulating appointment and removal of policemen and reappointed him to position, was ineffectual to protect him in position, he could not be removed and replaced without charges by subsequent resolution making no provision for examination of applicants for position, since such resolution nullified the statute. Middlesboro ex rel. Minton v. Gibson, 225 Ky. 120 , 7 S.W.2d 825, 1928 Ky. LEXIS 707 ( Ky. 1928 ).

13. Merit System.

A new ordinance of a city council of city of third class establishing a merit system and abolishing all ranks in the police department other than that of chief and in lieu thereof creating a schedule of grades with designated pay scales was not an unlawful delegation of legislative power and did not divest certain officers of rights in rank and seniority where the original ordinances made no provision concerning grades or ranks and since subsection (4) of this section applies only to cities of the second class. Middlesborough v. Grubbs, 363 S.W.2d 95, 1962 Ky. LEXIS 268 ( Ky. 1962 ) (decision prior to 1966, ch. 168 amendment).

Failure of ordinance establishing merit system for police department was not discriminatory for failure to include fire department and was not invalid for failure to set forth statutory requirement that policemen be qualified voters of the city and the statutory requirement that policemen be qualified voters remained in force regardless of failure of ordinance to set it forth. Middlesborough v. Grubbs, 363 S.W.2d 95, 1962 Ky. LEXIS 268 ( Ky. 1962 ) (decision prior to 1966 amendment).

14. Discharge.

A special policeman irregularly employed is not entitled to the statutory protection from discharge conferred upon regular policemen elected or appointed during “good behavior” who possessed the statutory qualifications and who had passed the civil service examination required by the board of the city. Seviers v. Middlesboro, 283 Ky. 124 , 140 S.W.2d 817, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 291 ( Ky. 1940 ).

Only regular policemen who have passed the civil service examination which the legislative body of the city has prescribed are entitled to the statutory protection from discharge. Wiltshire v. Callis, 289 Ky. 753 , 160 S.W.2d 173, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 646 ( Ky. 1942 ).

A police officer who never passed a civil service examination and was never placed on the eligible list does not hold his place under a valid appointment in the classified service so as to be entitled to the statutory protection against summary dismissal declared in this section. Middlesboro v. Welch, 275 S.W.2d 56, 1955 Ky. LEXIS 344 ( Ky. 1955 ).

Discharge of policeman without trial and without filing charges against him was illegal and void. Louisville v. Ross, 138 Ky. 764 , 129 S.W. 101, 1910 Ky. LEXIS 131 ( Ky. 1910 ).

15. — Illegal Removal.

The public interest requires that a public officer who has been wrongfully removed from office exercise a special diligence in seeking restoration and the doctrine of laches must be strictly applied against him. Newland v. Richmond, 293 F. Supp. 862, 1968 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8136 (E.D. Ky. 1968 ).

16. — Formal Charge and Hearing.

The minimal safeguard of a formal charge and hearing as provided in this section is a necessary prerequisite in the discharge of members of the police and fire departments in third-class cities under KRS 85.335 and a city ordinance providing a chief of police should serve at the pleasure of the commission must give way to the overruling statute. Morgan v. Winchester, 411 S.W.2d 682, 1967 Ky. LEXIS 485 ( Ky. 1967 ).

17. Reduction of Force.

It is doubtful whether court had authority to declare resolution reducing police force to be void on ground that it was unreasonable or arbitrary exercise of power, where evidence did not show that resolution was subterfuge to remove policemen and replace them with others. Middlesboro v. Byrd, 247 Ky. 348 , 57 S.W.2d 49, 1933 Ky. LEXIS 407 ( Ky. 1933 ).

18. — Discretion of City Legislature.

Act of mayor and commissioners in reducing police force from six (6) to four (4) was entirely within their discretion, with which courts would not interfere. Marcum v. Boggs, 258 Ky. 401 , 80 S.W.2d 36, 1935 Ky. LEXIS 171 ( Ky. 1935 ).

The legislative body of a city of the third class may, in its discretion, decrease the number of policemen, and the exercise of its discretion will not be interfered with unless it is found to be an attempt to evade the statute. White v. Hopkinsville, 280 Ky. 661 , 134 S.W.2d 236, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 191 ( Ky. 1939 ).

The act of the mayor and commissioners in reducing the force is a matter entirely within their discretion with which the courts should not interfere unless it is clearly abused. Callis v. Brown, 283 Ky. 759 , 142 S.W.2d 675, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 387 ( Ky. 1940 ).

The court will not interfere with discretion vested in the board of councilmen in the absence of abuse and changes in the number of policemen is a matter within its discretion and a reduction of the police force will not be deemed unreasonable or arbitrary if made as a matter of necessity and in the interest of economy. Wiltshire v. Callis, 289 Ky. 753 , 160 S.W.2d 173, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 646 ( Ky. 1942 ).

19. — Subsequent Increase.

Action of commissioners of third-class city in reducing, by resolution, its police force, being within its express authority, did not constitute wrongful discharge of policemen from civil service positions without cause or without hearing upon charges, it not being shown that resolution was only subterfuge for their removal and replacement by others, notwithstanding special policemen were at times thereafter found necessary to supplement regular force. Middlesboro v. Byrd, 247 Ky. 348 , 57 S.W.2d 49, 1933 Ky. LEXIS 407 ( Ky. 1933 ).

City of third class may decrease number of regular policemen under this section and appoint special policemen in addition to the regular force under KRS 85.250 . Middlesboro v. Byrd, 247 Ky. 348 , 57 S.W.2d 49, 1933 Ky. LEXIS 407 ( Ky. 1933 ).

Three policemen were improperly dismissed and should be reinstated where they were dismissed pursuant to ordinance that force be reduced by three members, and about two months thereafter council enacted ordinance pursuant to which three extra policemen were appointed, and no reason for dismissal was apparent other than desire to make place for others. Glass v. Board of Common Council, 262 Ky. 471 , 90 S.W.2d 700, 1936 Ky. LEXIS 50 ( Ky. 1936 ).

The act of the board of councilmen in increasing the number of policemen soon after decreasing the number and discharging certain members of the force is a circumstance to be considered in determining whether or not it acted in good faith in the first instance but is not conclusive. Wiltshire v. Callis, 289 Ky. 753 , 160 S.W.2d 173, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 646 ( Ky. 1942 ).

20. — Seniority.

While city of second class had power to reduce number of firemen to curtail expenses, it could not disregard provisions of subsection (4) of this section providing for reduction in inverse order of seniority. Paducah v. Gibson, 249 Ky. 434 , 61 S.W.2d 11, 1933 Ky. LEXIS 553 ( Ky. 1933 ).

Statutes controlling cities under commission form of government, including subsection (4) of this section requiring that decrease in number of firemen shall be in inverse order of seniority, were applicable and controlling in city of second class which changed from aldermanic and councilmanic to commission form. Paducah v. Gibson, 249 Ky. 434 , 61 S.W.2d 11, 1933 Ky. LEXIS 553 ( Ky. 1933 ).

Discharge of certain firemen in violation of seniority rule was void notwithstanding their discharge was pursuant to resolution of board of commissioners authorizing decrease in number of firemen. Singery v. Paducah, 253 Ky. 47 , 68 S.W.2d 770, 1934 Ky. LEXIS 603 ( Ky. 1934 ).

21. Probationary Period.

The board of commissioners of a third-class city did not exceed its powers in enacting an ordinance which provided that all appointments from the police eligibility list would be for an initial probationary period of one year, which provided that the chief of police would have sole responsibility for evaluating performance and determining which appointees were qualified for permanent employment, and which provided that during the probationary period an appointee would not be considered a permanent employe and therefore would not be entitled to procedural protections afforded police and fire department members. Rottinghaus v. Board of Comm'rs, 603 S.W.2d 487, 1979 Ky. App. LEXIS 536 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).

Cited:

Guthrie v. Board of Education, 298 S.W.2d 691, 1957 Ky. LEXIS 386 ( Ky. 1957 ); Frederick v. Combs, 354 S.W.2d 506, 1962 Ky. LEXIS 46 ( Ky. 1962 ); Hopwood v. Paducah, 424 S.W.2d 134, 1968 Ky. LEXIS 447 ( Ky. 1968 ); Covington v. CovingtonLodge No. 1, etc., 622 S.W.2d 221, 1981 Ky. LEXIS 274 ( Ky. 1981 ); City of Ashland v. Ashland F.O.P. #3, 888 S.W.2d 667, 1994 Ky. LEXIS 114 ( Ky. 1994 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

If policemen or firemen move their residence outside of the city employing them, they would be subject to removal. OAG 63-649 .

This section does not eliminate the requirement that police officers reside within the city. OAG 66-193 .

It was constitutional to provide that ordinary firemen employed by a city need reside only in the county in which the city is located. OAG 66-469 .

Pursuant to this section firemen would not be required to reside in the city even though they served under the civil service act. OAG 68-523 .

Subsection 2 of this section establishes the qualifications necessary to be a member of the police or fire departments and a city may not, by ordinance, change or enlarge the qualifications and require that members of the police or fire departments be residents of the city. OAG 70-138 .

A municipal ordinance which requires that members of the city fire department be residents and qualified voters of the city is invalid. OAG 70-202 .

Although members of the police and fire departments of second and third-class cities are required to be voters in their county of employment, there is no such statutory requirement for policemen in first-class cities so that a Louisville police officer, who is not an “officer” within the context of Const., § 234, may be employed without regard to where he votes or is a resident. OAG 72-57 .

Since subsection (2) of this section provides that a member of the fire department of a city of the second class must be a qualified voter in the county containing the city of employment, such person may not live outside said county or outside the state. OAG 75-198 .

A proposed urban county police department career plan advancing officers by temporary promotions based on examinations to specialist and technicians grades and requiring the officers participating to waive the provisions of KRS 95.450 would not be legally valid since under that section an officer cannot be promoted on a temporary basis, once promoted he cannot be reduced in grade except pursuant to that section and there is no provision which permits him to waive the statutory rights and requirements provided herein. OAG 75-253 .

The employment of substitute fire fighters, who apparently are not qualified as provided under this section and who have been placed on a work schedule contrary to the requirements of KRS 95.500 is in violation of the terms of these statutes and an action may be brought by any taxpayer of the city to compel compliance with the law. OAG 75-514 .

All members of the fire department in cities of the second class are required to possess the qualifications and be examined before employment as provided by this section and there is no authority for the employment of “substitute,” “special” or “temporary” firemen. OAG 75-514 .

Since the establishment of a police and fire department is considered mandatory and there is no provision for the dissolution of either department under this chapter relating to third-class cities, neither department can be legally abolished. OAG 79-40 .

Members of a fire department, operated pursuant to KRS 95.430 (repealed) to 95.470 , by a city of the third class, have no seniority or promotion rights under the referred to sections, therefore, unless the city, pursuant to its ordinance establishing the fire department, has established a system of promotions governed by seniority rights, the city legislative body has the authority to appoint anyone it believes to be qualified as chief of the fire department, irrespective of their years of service. OAG 80-228 .

A city may enact a reasonable anti-nepotism ordinance and the general ordinance that provided that a person could not be employed by a department of the city wherein the applicant for employment was related by blood or marriage to an existing employe of the department within certain degree would probably be applicable to fire fighters in a city of the second class because subsection (2) of this section provides that members of the fire department must possess certain enumerated qualifications and “have such other qualifications as may be prescribed.” OAG 82-575 .

Since the statutes dealing with the fire fighters retirement fund for cities of the second class do not set forth any provisions dealing with the mechanics of the reemployment process, it appears that if a firefighter who voluntarily left the fire service desires to seek reemployment with the fire service he would proceed through the city’s established practices relative to hiring (and rehiring); he would not automatically return to his old position but could do so if a vacancy existed and other requirements in the hiring process had been satisfied. OAG 84-239 .

This section was amended subsequent to the enactment of KRS 15.335 , and the amended statute repealed by implication the provisions of KRS 15.335 , even though the amendment did not relate to residency; as a consequence, police officers are governed by this section and KRS 95.710 , requiring county residency. The statutory requirement, that of county residency for police officers, cannot be altered by a city ordinance requiring city residency, as such would constitute a direct conflict. OAG 85-2 , withdrawing opinions to the contrary — see OAG 71-246 , 73-461, 73-556, 76-416, 78-268, 79-369, 79-505, 80-68, 82-225.

The age limitation requirement in this section prevails over the age limitation found in KRS 344.040 since the former statute was amended subsequently to the latter enacted statute; therefore, the 1986 amendment to the Federal Age Discrimination Act which excludes members of the police and fire departments activates the age limitation imposed by this section on police and firefighters in cities of the second class. OAG 87-18 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Comments, The Kentucky Divorce Statute: A Call for Reform, 66 Ky. L.J. 724 (1977-1978).

95.442. Authorization for civil service commission in city with population of 8,000 or more — Rights of employee accepting management position.

Any city with a population equal to or greater than eight thousand (8,000) based upon the most recent federal decennial census, may elect to operate under KRS 90.310 to 90.410 , and, by ordinance, create a civil service commission. Any classified employee in the police or fire department who accepts an appointment and qualifies as chief of police, assistant chief of police, chief of firefighters, or assistant chief of firefighters shall be deemed to have received a leave of absence from the classified service for, and during the incumbency of, any of those respective positions. If an individual should cease to serve in any of those positions, there shall be restored to him or her the same classification and rank which he or she held prior to his or her appointment.

History. Enact. Acts 2000, ch. 359, § 2, effective July 14, 2000; 2014, ch. 92, § 110, effective January 1, 2015.

95.445. Auxiliary police in city of home rule class or urban-county government — Exception.

  1. Except as provided in subsection (2) of this section, the legislative body of a city of the home rule class, or urban-county government, may by ordinance provide for the establishment or abolishment of an auxiliary police force to perform special duties within the city on terms it deems proper. The ordinance shall prescribe the number of officers and men of such force and the manner of their appointment, and rules and regulations governing the powers and duties of members of such force.
  2. No city containing a population of less than three thousand (3,000) based upon the most recent federal decennial census that is located within a county that contains a consolidated local government shall establish or otherwise provide for an auxiliary police force.

History. Enact. Acts 1960, ch. 210; 1968, ch. 135; 1970, ch. 162, § 1; 1974, ch. 248, § 6; 2014, ch. 92, § 111, effective January 1, 2015.

Opinions of Attorney General.

The members of an auxiliary police force established under the authority of this section are not automatically within the protection of the merit system provisions of KRS 95.450 . OAG 67-397 .

A city of the fourth class in a county containing a city of the first class has no authority to establish an auxiliary police force. OAG 68-377 .

Members of the auxiliary police department while under private employment on private property would not under any circumstances be considered as peace officers and could not arrest for any misdemeanors, and would have no broader power of arrest than would a private citizen. OAG 70-521 .

City may be able to appoint a person to serve as a special police officer either under subsection (4) of KRS 95.740 or this section if it does not appear feasible to assign one of its regular police officers to enforce the ordinance relating to dogs. OAG 72-36 .

Under this section the legislative body of a fourth-class city can provide by ordinance for the establishment of an auxiliary police force to perform special duties in the city on terms deemed proper by the legislative body. OAG 72-311 .

Where the owner of a filling station who repairs police cars may have such cars for several days during servicing and the city has installed a police radio system in the owner’s private car for convenience to the city, since such installation is illegal in all private cars the appointment of the owner as a special policeman or auxiliary policeman would not cure such illegality. OAG 73-690 .

Since KRS 61.080 and § 165, Const., prohibits a person from holding a state office and a county or city office at the same time, the office of an auxiliary police officer of a city of the third class created under this section, is incompatible with the office of deputy sheriff, a county office, and a conservation officer who is a state officer under KRS 150.090 . OAG 74-909 .

Where a city and a county operate a joint metro police force under the interlocal cooperation act and, under the authority of this section, the city establishes an auxiliary police force to perform special duties within the city, the members of the metro force under KRS 65.255 have county-wide jurisdiction but this extraterritorial jurisdiction would not extend to the members of the auxiliary force whose power of arrest is limited to the city. OAG 75-381 .

Although a city of the sixth class is authorized to provide for the establishment of an auxiliary police force to perform special duties, the city may not permit individuals to be sworn in as volunteer policemen who serve without compensation. OAG 76-241 .

The City of Ludlow can create pursuant to ordinance an auxiliary police force, the members of which will possess the same powers as regular policemen, including the power of arrest and the right to carry a weapon, and these powers are not limited to the time that they are on regular duty. OAG 78-675 .

A person may not, at the same time, serve as clerk of the district court and an auxiliary police officer for a city of the fourth class. OAG 80-522 .

Auxiliary police officers, generally, have the powers of regular police officers which are not limited to the time that they are on duty. OAG 82-183 .

Special policemen have the same powers as regular policemen unless their powers are expressly limited by statute or ordinance and special or auxiliary police officers have the same power of arrest under KRS 431.005 as is conferred upon regular policemen; in addition, a regular police officer’s power of arrest is not affected or limited by the number of hours he works and he has the same powers of arrest as any other regular member of the police force even if he works less than 40 hours a week. OAG 82-183 .

The provision of this section limiting an auxiliary police force to performance of special duties within the city on terms the city legislative body deems proper is an exception to the provisions of former KRS 95.740 and 95.786 which give the regular police force of a city of the fifth class county-wide jurisdiction; since this section was enacted subsequent to former KRS 95.740 and 95.786 , this section is controlling as to the jurisdiction of members of a city auxiliary police force and their jurisdiction is confined to within the city limits. OAG 82-183 .

While members of the city auxiliary police force must be paid at least the state minimum wage rate for those hours actually worked, even though they are part-time employes, they are not entitled to pay for that portion of time spent “on call” as opposed to hours actually worked. OAG 82-183 .

Where individual was both a municipal auxiliary police officer and a full-time instructor-coordinator at a state university, the fact that an auxiliary police officer is not generally considered a full-time position would eliminate the possibility of a common-law conflict of interest where the individual could not perform the duties of both positions at the same time with care and ability. OAG 83-29 .

No conflict of interest or incompatibility existed where an auxiliary police officer of a city was at the same time a full-time Instructor-Coordinator of the Department of Training at Eastern Kentucky University; an auxiliary police officer of a city has the same powers as a regular police officer and is, therefore, considered a municipal officer while the position of Instructor-Coordinator for a department at Eastern Kentucky University would at most be considered a form of state employment. Neither Const., § 165 of the Constitution nor KRS 61.080 prohibits a state employee from holding a municipal office. OAG 83-29 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Law Enforcement in Kentucky, VI. City Police, 52 Ky. L.J. 71 (1963).

95.450. Discipline of members of police and fire departments in urban-county governments and cities on DLG’s registry of cities that belonged to the second and third classes on January 1, 2014.

  1. The provisions of this section shall only apply to members of police and fire departments in urban-county governments and those cities that are included in the Department for Local Government registry created pursuant to subsection (9) of this section.
  2. Except as provided in subsection (6) of this section no member of the police or fire department in cities listed on the registry pursuant to subsection (9) of this section or an urban-county government shall be reprimanded, dismissed, suspended or reduced in grade or pay for any reason except inefficiency, misconduct, insubordination or violation of law or of the rules adopted by the legislative body, and only after charges are preferred and a hearing conducted as provided in this section.
  3. Any person may prefer charges against a member of the police or fire department by filing them with the clerk of the legislative body who shall immediately communicate the same to the legislative body. The mayor shall, whenever probable cause appears, prefer charges against any member whom he believes guilty of conduct justifying his dismissal or punishment. The charges shall be written and shall set out clearly the charges made. The person preferring the charges may withdraw them at any time prior to the conclusion of the hearing. The charges may thereupon be dismissed.
  4. Upon the hearing all charges shall be considered traversed and put in issue, and the trial shall be confined to matters related to the issues presented. Within three (3) days after the charges have been filed with the legislative body, that body shall proceed to hear the charges. At least two (2) days before the hearing the member accused shall be served with a copy of the charges and a statement of the day, place and hour at which the hearing of the charges will begin. The person accused may, in writing, waive the service of charges and demand trial within three (3) days after the charges are filed with the clerk.
  5. The legislative body may summon and compel attendance of witnesses at hearings by subpoena issued by the clerk of that body and served upon the witnesses by any officer authorized to serve court subpoenas. If any witness fails to appear in response to a summons or refuses to testify concerning any matter on which he may lawfully be interrogated, any District Judge, on application of the commission, may compel obedience by proceedings for contempt as in the case of disobedience of a subpoena issued from the District Court. The member accused may have subpoenaed any witnesses he may desire, upon furnishing their names to the clerk. The action and decision of the body on the charges shall be reduced to writing and entered in a book kept for that purpose, and the written charges filed in the matter shall be attached to the book containing the decision.
  6. When the appointing authority or the head of the department has probable cause to believe a member of the police or fire department has been guilty of conduct justifying dismissal or punishment, he or it may suspend the member from duty or from both pay and duty, pending trial, and the member shall not be placed on duty, or allowed pay, until the charges are heard. If the member is suspended, there shall be no continuances granted without the consent of the member accused.
  7. The legislative body shall fix the punishment of a member of the police or fire department found guilty, by a reprimand, suspension for any length of time not to exceed six (6) months, by reducing the grade if the accused is an officer, or by combining any two (2) or more of those punishments, or by dismissal from the service.
  8. A member of a police or fire department found guilty pursuant to the provisions of this section shall have the right to appeal to the Circuit Court under KRS 95.460 .
  9. On or before January 1, 2015, the Department for Local Government shall create a registry of cities that shall be required to comply with the provisions of this section. The Department for Local Government shall include each of those cities on the registry that were classified as cities of the second or third class as of January 1, 2014. The Department for Local Government shall make the information included on the registry available to the public by publishing it on its Web site.

History. 3138-1, 3138-4, 3235dd-35, 3351a-2: amend. Acts 1956, ch. 246, § 14; 1974, ch. 248, § 7; 1976, ch. 165, § 1; 1976 (1st Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 115, effective January 2, 1978; 2014, ch. 92, § 112, effective January 1, 2015.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Analysis

1. In General.

Sound public policy requires that the matter of punishment and discipline of the police officer be left to his employer. Richmond v. Howell, 448 S.W.2d 662, 1969 Ky. LEXIS 61 ( Ky. 1969 ).

2. Construction.

The term “grade” means rank and not job classification. Schrichte v. Bornhorn, 376 S.W.2d 683, 1964 Ky. LEXIS 465 ( Ky. 1964 ).

3. Purpose.

It was purpose of KRS 95.430 (repealed) and this section to place policemen and firemen of third-class cities under merit system, precluding removal except for cause. Middlesboro ex rel. Minton v. Gibson, 225 Ky. 120 , 7 S.W.2d 825, 1928 Ky. LEXIS 707 ( Ky. 1928 ).

KRS 95.435 , this section, and KRS 95.460 gave city power to provide efficient, law-abiding, capable, and honest police force while protecting individual officer from exercise of arbitrary power and unjust or unauthorized removal. Armstrong v. Board of Civil Service Comm'rs, 243 Ky. 415 , 48 S.W.2d 1055, 1932 Ky. LEXIS 102 ( Ky. 1932 ).

4. Application.

Fireman whose principal duties were that of a mechanic, but who was required to answer certain fire alarms and perform other duties of fireman, was entitled to protection of civil service law. Davis v. Paducah, 273 Ky. 108 , 115 S.W.2d 578, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 589 ( Ky. 1938 ).

The proper authorities may remove, without hearing, one who does not clearly bring himself within the immune class and where a policeman was over the statutory age limit at the time of appointment there never was a valid appointment. Callis v. Brown, 283 Ky. 759 , 142 S.W.2d 675, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 387 ( Ky. 1940 ).

The protection from arbitrary discharge provided by this section applies only to policemen appointed by the city legislative body “during good behavior,” and after passing civil service examination. Jenkins v. Keith, 285 Ky. 240 , 147 S.W.2d 397, 1941 Ky. LEXIS 365 ( Ky. 1941 ).

Policeman who was appointed by commissioner of public safety for definite term, but subject to be discharged at any time, and after the expiration of his term continued to serve for over a year without any recorded appointment, was merely a de facto officer, and could not, after accepting such an appointment, claim the benefits of the civil service provisions of this section. Jenkins v. Keith, 285 Ky. 240 , 147 S.W.2d 397, 1941 Ky. LEXIS 365 ( Ky. 1941 ).

City ordinance specifying by name the persons who are to be members of the police department makes the named persons permanent appointees, who cannot be removed except according to this section. Jenkins v. Keith, 285 Ky. 240 , 147 S.W.2d 397, 1941 Ky. LEXIS 365 ( Ky. 1941 ).

The protection from arbitrary discharge provided by this section does not apply to “special” or “temporary” appointees, or to de facto officers. Jenkins v. Keith, 285 Ky. 240 , 147 S.W.2d 397, 1941 Ky. LEXIS 365 ( Ky. 1941 ).

Only policemen who have passed the civil service examination required by ordinance are entitled to the statutory protection from discharge at will of city council. Wiltshire v. Callis, 289 Ky. 753 , 160 S.W.2d 173, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 646 ( Ky. 1942 ).

Application and definition of terms of dismissal, as provided in this subsection, are left to legislative body to be interpreted in light of customs of community. Harrell v. Middlesboro, 287 S.W.2d 614, 1956 Ky. LEXIS 475 ( Ky. 1956 ).

Although chief of police and chief of detectives hold office under KRS 95.440 the method for removal under this section is not exclusive and proceedings may be brought under KRS 63.100 charging them with neglect of duty and vacation of the offices by them with consent and approval of the city council, the body having authority to appoint their successors, will not render moot the proceedings under KRS 63.100 to disqualify them from holding office in the state for a period of four years. Frederick v. Combs, 354 S.W.2d 506, 1962 Ky. LEXIS 46 ( Ky. 1962 ).

The safeguards provided in this section as necessary prerequisites in the discharge of members of the police and fire departments are made applicable to third-class cities by KRS 85.335 . Morgan v. Winchester, 411 S.W.2d 682, 1967 Ky. LEXIS 485 ( Ky. 1967 ).

Provisions of KRS 95.450 were not violated when a fire chief imposed restrictions on a firefighter who returned to work after being disciplined because the restrictions did not involve a reprimand, dismissal, suspension, or reduction in grade or pay. Cherry v. City of Bowling Green, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67382 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 2, 2008), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 347 Fed. Appx. 214, 2009 FED App. 0672N, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 22096 (6th Cir. Ky. 2009 ).

5. — Special Policeman.

A special policeman irregularly employed by city of third class is not entitled to statutory protection from discharged conferred upon regular policemen elected or appointed during good behavior who possessed statutory qualifications and had passed civil service examination which the board of city may have provided. Seviers v. Middlesboro, 283 Ky. 124 , 140 S.W.2d 817, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 291 ( Ky. 1940 ).

6. Proceedings for Removal.

Proceedings for removal of police officer under civil service must be in accord with statutory provisions or other established rules. Removal must rest on sufficient grounds and be proved by legal evidence; removal without hearing is void. Davis v. Paducah, 273 Ky. 108 , 115 S.W.2d 578, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 589 ( Ky. 1938 ).

7. — Charges.

Amendment of charges by board of commissioners, seeking dismissal of policemen for improper conduct of betting on horse races, to make them definite and certain, was authorized. Bromfield v. Board of Comm'rs, 233 Ky. 250 , 25 S.W.2d 393, 1930 Ky. LEXIS 537 ( Ky. 1930 ).

This section prescribes no limitation on time in which misconduct authorizing dismissal from force must have occurred, although perhaps it would necessarily have to be so relevant in time as to raise inference of officer’s unfitness to hold office further. Bromfield v. Board of Comm'rs, 233 Ky. 250 , 25 S.W.2d 393, 1930 Ky. LEXIS 537 ( Ky. 1930 ).

Charges must be definite and certain and of such character as to establish inefficiency, misconduct, insubordination or violation of law by accused. Armstrong v. Board of Civil Service Comm'rs, 243 Ky. 415 , 48 S.W.2d 1055, 1932 Ky. LEXIS 102 ( Ky. 1932 ).

Charge that policeman and other officers accused certain persons of illegal transportation of liquor and then released them upon finding money with the liquor and dividing it among officers, was sufficiently specific to inform policeman of nature of charge and enable him to prepare defense. Hogan v. Fausz, 243 Ky. 514 , 49 S.W.2d 333, 1932 Ky. LEXIS 153 ( Ky. 1932 ).

The charges made against an officer must be definite and certain and of such character as to establish inefficiency, misconduct, insubordination or violation of law. Mason v. Seaton, 303 Ky. 528 , 198 S.W.2d 205, 1946 Ky. LEXIS 886 ( Ky. 1946 ).

Charges against nine police officers which failed to designate the conduct constituting alleged offenses on the times the infractions occurred violated subsection (2) of this section. Reed v. Richmond, 582 S.W.2d 651, 1979 Ky. App. LEXIS 417 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).

8. — Hearing.

Where disciplinary action was brought against the chief of police and eight officers, pursuant to this section, at a session closed to the public despite the accuseds’ request for an open hearing pursuant to subsection (6) of KRS 61.810 , and with neither a motion for a closed meeting nor announcement of it at an open meeting, in violation of KRS 61.815 , the action taken must be voided and a new hearing held. Reed v. Richmond, 582 S.W.2d 651, 1979 Ky. App. LEXIS 417 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).

Where procedural defects which required reversal occurred at the hearings held to determine disciplinary action, and where nothing was presented, and there were no rulings to indicate that any errors had been associated in the suspension process, it was only those portions of the action which occurred after the suspensions which were voided; and the suspension elements remained viable as if no hearings had yet been held. Reed v. Richmond, 602 S.W.2d 183, 1980 Ky. App. LEXIS 340 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980).

9. — Evidence.

In proceedings to discipline member of police force, evidence must establish with reasonable certainty that member was guilty of offense charged. Williams v. Newport, 229 Ky. 810 , 18 S.W.2d 283, 1929 Ky. LEXIS 852 ( Ky. 1929 ).

Voluntary admissions made to chief of police and mayor by policeman before being charged with improper conduct of betting on horse races were admissible on hearing of such charges; Const., § 11 was not applicable. Bromfield v. Board of Comm'rs, 233 Ky. 250 , 25 S.W.2d 393, 1930 Ky. LEXIS 537 ( Ky. 1930 ).

Evidence did not sustain charge that policeman had sworn falsely at an examining trial, where his testimony that he had never seen prosecuting witness sober was corroborated from several sources showing that such witness was habitually intoxicated. Armstrong v. Board of Civil Service Comm'rs, 243 Ky. 415 , 48 S.W.2d 1055, 1932 Ky. LEXIS 102 ( Ky. 1932 ).

Evidence did not sustain charge that policeman had improperly failed to make arrest for offense committed in his presence, where it showed that policeman, while off duty, sought to settle dispute between two (2) of his tenants, and did not arrest one of them who had knife but who did not offer to use it. Armstrong v. Board of Civil Service Comm'rs, 243 Ky. 415 , 48 S.W.2d 1055, 1932 Ky. LEXIS 102 ( Ky. 1932 ).

Evidence must be reasonably sufficient to sustain charges. Armstrong v. Board of Civil Service Comm'rs, 243 Ky. 415 , 48 S.W.2d 1055, 1932 Ky. LEXIS 102 ( Ky. 1932 ).

Refusal of accused fireman to testify at hearing on charges seeking his dismissal for intoxication may be considered as potent factor against him. Northcutt v. Hardebeck, 244 Ky. 842 , 52 S.W.2d 901, 1932 Ky. LEXIS 519 ( Ky. 1932 ).

Confession of patrolman was admissible in evidence, since proceeding was civil and not governed by criminal rules respecting corroboration of confessions. Brewer v. Ashland, 260 Ky. 678 , 86 S.W.2d 669, 1935 Ky. LEXIS 540 ( Ky. 1935 ).

Under the commission form of government the board of commissioners rather than the board of pension trustees had the authority to hear charges of irregularities and misconduct filed against chief of police and chief of fire department who served as secretary and president respectively of the board of trustees of the pension fund of policemen and firemen. Jenkins v. Keith, 285 Ky. 240 , 147 S.W.2d 397, 1941 Ky. LEXIS 365 ( Ky. 1941 ).

Civil service commission of third-class city did not have authority to receive and hear charges of misconduct on part of its police chief since subsection (2) of KRS 90.300 excepts police department in third-class cities from operation of KRS 90.300 to 90.410 establishing civil service for cities of third class, and KRS 95.430 (repealed) which provides that in third-class cities legislative body has control of police department and this section which provides for civil service system for such police departments give authority to hear such charges to city council. Middlesboro v. Harrell, 268 S.W.2d 430, 1954 Ky. LEXIS 911 ( Ky. 1954 ).

10. Cause for Removal.

Although rules for police force specifying numerous grounds of misconduct are not exclusive, where statute makes misconduct a ground for suspension or removal, other acts on same subject as those specified in rules will not be deemed such ground unless they plainly amount to misconduct within statutory meaning. Barney v. Ashland, 220 Ky. 657 , 295 S.W. 998, 1927 Ky. LEXIS 600 ( Ky. 1927 ).

Finding that alleged misconduct of policeman did not require removal from force should not be reversed, where it was shown that on Christmas Eve he aided in transporting beer in patrol wagon from house to hotel where party was being held. Marcum v. Smith, 258 Ky. 404 , 80 S.W.2d 38, 1935 Ky. LEXIS 172 ( Ky. 1935 ).

11. — Inefficiency.

Proof on trial of chief of police for inefficiency and neglect of duty was too indefinite to warrant judgment of guilt in failing to carry out orders of superiors, where evidence showed order to close gambling houses and houses of ill repute, and that they continued to run, but there was no proof that chief was furnished with facts as to specific houses upon which he should have taken action other than action shown to have been taken. Bregel v. Newport, 208 Ky. 581 , 271 S.W. 665, 1925 Ky. LEXIS 335 ( Ky. 1925 ).

Fact that chief of police is to some extent dependent upon subordinates, and that police cannot arrest or make search except as provided by law, must be considered in determining whether chief has been guilty of inefficiency or neglect. Bregel v. Newport, 208 Ky. 581 , 271 S.W. 665, 1925 Ky. LEXIS 335 ( Ky. 1925 ).

Charge against chief of police that he was inefficient and neglected performance of his duties was insufficient in not setting forth any charge with clearness or distinction, and not informing him of specific things he had done or omitted to do in violation of duty. Bregel v. Newport, 208 Ky. 581 , 271 S.W. 665, 1925 Ky. LEXIS 335 ( Ky. 1925 ).

Where the fire fighter was off work for almost a year due to a work-related back injury, the city had a legal cause to dismiss him from his position for inefficiency. Blair v. Winchester, 743 S.W.2d 28, 1987 Ky. App. LEXIS 550 (Ky. Ct. App. 1987).

12. — Betting.

Policeman was not protected from prosecution on charges of improper conduct of betting on horse races by law providing that witness who testifies in prosecution for gambling shall be discharged from all liability for gambling disclosed in his testimony where his guilt was known before he testified before grand jury and his conviction by board and circuit court did not depend on testimony given before grand jury. Bromfield v. Board of Comm'rs, 233 Ky. 250 , 25 S.W.2d 393, 1930 Ky. LEXIS 537 ( Ky. 1930 ).

13. — Drinking.

Mere taking of drink by policeman, without proof that such act was unlawful or improper, is not such misconduct as will authorize his suspension or dismissal, in absence of rule so providing. Barney v. Ashland, 220 Ky. 657 , 295 S.W. 998, 1927 Ky. LEXIS 600 ( Ky. 1927 ).

14. — Political Contributions.

Where police lieutenant solicited contribution for political campaign and accepted gifts of whiskey, dismissal was justified. Kilburn v. Colwell, 396 S.W.2d 803, 1965 Ky. LEXIS 134 ( Ky. 1965 ).

15. — Absent Without Leave.

Where city fireman had been absent without leave at various times city council has substantial grounds for his removal. Grubbs v. Middlesboro, 284 S.W.2d 668, 1955 Ky. LEXIS 34 ( Ky. 1955 ).

Where 32 fire fighters failed to report to work when their demands for collective bargaining were not met, the city was authorized to discharge the fire fighters for misconduct after a hearing conducted pursuant to this section. Abney v. Winchester, 558 S.W.2d 622, 1977 Ky. App. LEXIS 850 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).

16. — Immoral Habits.

Married patrolman was properly dismissed for immoral habits where evidence showed that he was father of child by woman who was not his wife. Brewer v. Ashland, 260 Ky. 678 , 86 S.W.2d 669, 1935 Ky. LEXIS 540 ( Ky. 1935 ).

17. — Conduct Unbecoming An Officer.

Evidence supported charge that police lieutenant was guilty of conduct unbecoming an officer and prejudicial to service, where, becoming angry at report made by patrolman to chief of police, he cursed and offered to “lick” patrolman. Williams v. Newport, 229 Ky. 810 , 18 S.W.2d 283, 1929 Ky. LEXIS 852 ( Ky. 1929 ).

18. — Intoxication.

Evidence that mayor smelled whiskey on breath of policeman at police station without claim that he was intoxicated or had entered place where liquor was sold or was guilty of any misconduct other than taking a drink did not justify his removal. Barney v. Ashland, 220 Ky. 657 , 295 S.W. 998, 1927 Ky. LEXIS 600 ( Ky. 1927 ).

Evidence of intoxication which was virtually undenied was reasonably sufficient to uphold determination of board of commissioners to dismiss fireman, especially where he did not testify at hearing. Northcutt v. Hardebeck, 244 Ky. 842 , 52 S.W.2d 901, 1932 Ky. LEXIS 519 ( Ky. 1932 ).

Court of Appeals considered only evidence of intoxication occurring after enactment of ordinance containing rule against intoxication on ground that it was doubtful if rule would apply to past occurrences. Northcutt v. Hardebeck, 244 Ky. 842 , 52 S.W.2d 901, 1932 Ky. LEXIS 519 ( Ky. 1932 ).

Evidence did not sustain charge that policeman was intoxicated while on duty, where companion officer testified that he was sober, and another person, who was angry at him for not making requested arrest, testified that he was drunk. Marcum v. Smith, 258 Ky. 404 , 80 S.W.2d 38, 1935 Ky. LEXIS 172 ( Ky. 1935 ).

19. Decrease of Force.

The legislative body of a city of the third class may, in its discretion, decrease the number of policemen, and the exercise of its discretion will not be interfered with unless it is found to be an attempt to evade the statute, the purpose of which is to remove police departments from city politics and assure efficiency of employes and the security of their employment during good behavior. White v. Hopkinsville, 280 Ky. 661 , 134 S.W.2d 236, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 191 ( Ky. 1939 ).

20. Demotion.

Chief of police was properly demoted to policeman by board of city commissioners for “misconduct” where he violated minutes of the board and statutory requirement of exercise of care usually exercised by prudent businessmen in making loans from the policemen and firemen’s pension fund while he was secretary of the board of trustees of the fund even though the fund ultimately suffered no loss. Jenkins v. Keith, 285 Ky. 240 , 147 S.W.2d 397, 1941 Ky. LEXIS 365 ( Ky. 1941 ).

21. Reduction in Grade or Pay.

Police chief had authority pursuant to ordinance to transfer a detective to the rank of lieutenant, the salaries and duties being comparable and not changed, without violating this section prohibiting reduction in grade except for cause and after hearing on appropriate charges. Schrichte v. Bornhorn, 376 S.W.2d 683, 1964 Ky. LEXIS 465 ( Ky. 1964 ).

City ordinances setting hourly wage rates for firemen did not conflict with this section. Snyder v. Owensboro, 555 S.W.2d 246, 1977 Ky. LEXIS 499 ( Ky. 1977 ).

Where an ordinance changed fire fighters’ pay from a monthly salary to an hourly rate, such ordinance did not violate this section since it was not disciplinary and did not constitute a reduction of pay. Miller v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government, 557 S.W.2d 430, 1977 Ky. App. LEXIS 835 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).

A transfer from one job category to another with lesser authority is a reduction of grade; authority connotes the power or right to give commands, enforce obedience, take supervisory action, make final supervisory decisions, etc. Hockensmith v. Frankfort, 723 S.W.2d 855, 1986 Ky. App. LEXIS 1094 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986).

Where the police officers were transferred from the criminal investigation division to the patrol division, the transfer was not a reduction in grade, as there was nothing in the record revealing that either assignment was a position of authority. Hockensmith v. Frankfort, 723 S.W.2d 855, 1986 Ky. App. LEXIS 1094 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986).

Police officers do not have a property interest under this section in their rate of compensation. Beckham v. Bowling Green, 743 S.W.2d 858, 1987 Ky. App. LEXIS 603 (Ky. Ct. App. 1987).

This section does not prohibit the reduction of police officers’ salaries absent disciplinary charges. Beckham v. Bowling Green, 743 S.W.2d 858, 1987 Ky. App. LEXIS 603 (Ky. Ct. App. 1987).

22. Restoration of Employment and Salary.

Claims of policeman and fireman for restoration of employment and salary were barred by laches. Davis v. Paducah, 273 Ky. 108 , 115 S.W.2d 578, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 589 ( Ky. 1938 ).

23. Recovery of Salary after Wrongful Removal.

Claim for salary of former chief of police who had been unlawfully removed from office by city’s common council, were it not barred by laches for failure to assert until more than four years after the cause of action accrued, would be against the de facto officers and not against the city. Newland v. Richmond, 293 F. Supp. 862, 1968 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8136 (E.D. Ky. 1968 ).

Policeman improperly removed cannot recover salary during period of removal where salary was paid to another policeman who replaced him, notwithstanding only method of establishing his right to office is by appeal, payment to de facto officer is defense to de jure officer’s claim for salary during same period. Ashland v. Barney's Adm'r, 231 Ky. 835 , 22 S.W.2d 255, 1929 Ky. LEXIS 363 ( Ky. 1929 ).

Discharge of firemen in violation of seniority rule being void and roster not being full and no others having been appointed in their places, they could by timely action recover salary during period of wrongful removal. Singery v. Paducah, 253 Ky. 47 , 68 S.W.2d 770, 1934 Ky. LEXIS 603 ( Ky. 1934 ).

24. Probationary Period.

A city ordinance which provided that a probationary appointee to the police department would not be entitled to procedural protections afforded police and fire department members until the appointee had successfully completed the one-year probationary period did not conflict with this section, because the ordinance was not a disciplinary regulation but rather a legislative directive setting up a process for evaluation of potential members of the police department. Rottinghaus v. Board of Comm'rs, 603 S.W.2d 487, 1979 Ky. App. LEXIS 536 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).

The board of commissioners of a third-class city did not exceed its powers in enacting an ordinance which provided that all appointments from the police eligibility list would be for an initial probationary period of one year, which provided that the chief of police would have sole responsibility for evaluating performance and determining which appointees were qualified for permanent employment, and which provided that during the probationary period an appointee would not be considered a permanent employee and therefore would not be entitled to procedural protections afforded police and fire department members. Rottinghaus v. Board of Comm'rs, 603 S.W.2d 487, 1979 Ky. App. LEXIS 536 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).

25. Reprimand.

The police chief’s memo describing the police officers’ shortcomings as the reason for the duty assignment transfer was not a “reprimand” under this section entitling them to file charges and a hearing, where the memorandum merely listed the police chief’s reasons for the reassignment. Hockensmith v. Frankfort, 723 S.W.2d 855, 1986 Ky. App. LEXIS 1094 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986).

The term “reprimand” in subsection (1) of this section means a reprimand by the employer. Hockensmith v. Frankfort, 723 S.W.2d 855, 1986 Ky. App. LEXIS 1094 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986).

Cited:

Mangrum v. Mayfield, 305 S.W.2d 312, 1957 Ky. LEXIS 3 05 ( Ky. 1957 ); Holsclaw v. Stephens, 507 S.W.2d 462, 1973 Ky. LEXIS 3 ( Ky. 1973 ); Paducah v. Moore, 662 S.W.2d 491, 1984 Ky. App. LEXIS 435 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984).

NOTES TO UNPUBLISHED DECISIONS

1. Cause for Removal.

Unpublished decision: Where a former police officer could not prove a necessary element of a constructive discharge claim — that the employer deliberately created intolerable working conditions as perceived by the reasonable employee — the appellate court held that summary judgment was properly granted in favor of the city and individual defendants; the court also found that because the former officer could not show that the officer suffered an adverse employment action, the officer could not prove the retaliation or First Amendment claims. Driggers v. City of Owensboro, 110 Fed. Appx. 499, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 18185 (6th Cir. Ky. 2004 ).

2. Application.
3. — Retired Police Officers.

Circuit court properly granted summary judgment to a city on the retired police officers' action for education incentive back pay because they failed to prove the existence of a contract entitling them to education incentive pay, none of their “contracts” were signed by the mayor, the city was statutorily authorized to exercise any power in furtherance of its public purpose and to fix the compensation of its officers and employees, including a non-discriminatory reduction in pay or grade, the officers were presumed to know about the city ordinance then in effect that would control their access to such pay, and any erroneous information given to them by a city employee could not obligate the city to act contrary to its own ordinances. Dearborn v. City of Frankfort, 2016 Ky. App. LEXIS 201 (Ky. Ct. App.), sub. op., 2016 Ky. App. Unpub. LEXIS 902 (Ky. Ct. App. Dec. 9, 2016).

Opinions of Attorney General.

A rated officer may not lawfully be reduced in pay or grade without cause and without formal preferment of charges and a hearing by the city legislative body. OAG 65-104 .

There can be no general objection to the use against an officer of the police or fire departments in a hearing under this section of prior testimony before a grand jury. OAG 65-104 .

If a rated officer was relieved from his duty assignment, his duties assigned to a subordinate, and the duties of his subordinate assigned to him and if such action was merely an administrative transfer of assignments made in good faith to promote the efficient operation of the department, it would not fall within subsection (1) of this section. OAG 65-104 .

The members of an auxiliary police force established under the authority of KRS 95.445 are not automatically within the protection of the provisions of this section. OAG 67-397 .

Where a private citizen has preferred charges of misconduct against a member of the police department in the manner prescribed by subsection (2) of this section, it is mandatory that the city legislative body proceed to determine the validity of the charges in the manner prescribed by the statute. OAG 68-460 .

Where a city of the third class changes its form of government from councilmanic to city manager, the provisions of KRS 89.420 (repealed) as to the abolishing of all nonelective city offices would have no application to the police and fire departments of the city. OAG 69-689 .

KRS 85.335 and this section governing the removal of policemen would apply irrespective of the fact that the city is changing from the councilmanic to the city manager form of government. OAG 69-689 .

An officer charged pursuant to the terms of this section would be entitled to legal representation. OAG 70-593 .

The commission has discretion in the matter of granting continuances. OAG 70-593 .

A preliminary finding of probable cause by the commission is not required before a formal hearing can be held. OAG 70-602 .

When charges are formally filed with the clerk by a citizen or a group of citizens, the city commission must hold a formal hearing within three (3) days after the charges have been communicated to this body as provided in subsections (1), (2) and (3) of this section. OAG 70-602 .

Where members of a city police department are under indictment the only action the city can take against them would be pursuant to this section. OAG 72-849 .

The appointing authority may suspend a member of the police department without a hearing when it has cause to believe the member has been guilty of conduct justifying dismissal or punishment. OAG 73-13 .

As there is no mention of a probationary period of employment, the provisions with respect to the discipline of members would be applicable during any probationary period. OAG 73-602 .

Police and firemen of a third-class city cannot be placed under the general civil service act found under KRS ch. 90 since the legislature has not seen fit to give cities of this class any option in this respect to cities of the fourth and fifth class under KRS 95.761 . OAG 73-602 .

A proposed urban county police department career plan advancing officers by temporary promotions to specialist and technician grades and requiring the officers participating to waive the provisions of this section would not be legally valid since under this section an officer cannot be promoted on a temporary basis, once promoted he cannot be reduced in grade except pursuant to this section and there is no provision which permits him to waive the statutory rights and requirements provided therein. OAG 75-253 .

For purposes of removing police officers from the force, it is immaterial whether or not they are working under a probationary status. OAG 78-26 .

Full-time dispatchers of the police department are covered by the provisions of this section while a part-time police department clerk cannot utilize the protection afforded by this section concerning the discipline of members of the police department. OAG 78-219 .

The protection afforded by this section applies to permanent and full-time personnel and not to temporary and part-time personnel although local ordinances and rules may have a bearing on the matter as, pursuant to KRS 95.430 , the legislative body may ordain and enforce rules for the government of the police department as it may deem expedient. OAG 78-219 .

A member of a police or fire department of a second or third class city or an urban-county government may not be required to pay for costs incurred in the prosecution of a disciplinary action pursuant to this section when as a result of that proceeding disciplinary action is taken. OAG 79-604 .

Members of the police and fire departments of an urban-county government who have had criminal charges filed against them cannot be suspended from duty by the appointing authority or the head of their departments, pending final disposition of the criminal charges, without following the procedures and requirements set forth in this section which require that charges be preferred and hearings conducted by the legislative body in connection with the persons whose suspensions are sought or who have been suspended. OAG 80-655 .

Where a complaint against a police officer results in a hearing, the officer must be given notice a minimum of three (3) days before the hearing as required by KRS 15.520 rather than two (2) days prior as required by this section, since KRS 15.520 was the later enacted of the two sections and must prevail where in conflict, under general rules of statutory construction. OAG 81-134 .

Where charges are filed against a police officer the requirement that the hearing be held within three (3) days after charges have been filed with the legislative body under this section is superseded by the provisions under KRS 15.520 to the effect that the hearing must be held within 60 days following the filing of any charges. OAG 81-134 .

Where charges are to be filed regarding a complaint against a police officer, such charges must be filed with the clerk of the legislative body as required by this section, since KRS 15.520 appears to be silent as to the person with whom charges are to be filed. OAG 81-134 .

Where charges were preferred against a police officer on a Friday, but a hearing was not scheduled until the following Tuesday, the requirement under this section of three (3) days notice before a hearing was properly met since the intervening Saturday and Sunday would not, under KRS 446.030 , be included in computing the three-day period. OAG 81-134 .

Assuming that there are no provisions for the evaluation of a fire district’s probationary fire fighters and thus no differentiation between probationary fire fighters and regular fire fighters, a fire protection district organized pursuant to KRS Chapter 75 probably could not discipline any of its fire fighters without following the provisions of this section. OAG 82-577 .

Since fire protection district that was not part of and was not located within the boundaries of a city of the second or third class was organized pursuant to KRS Chapter 75, its board of trustees must therefore follow the provisions of this section in connection with disciplinary matters. The organization of a fire protection district pursuant to KRS Chapter 75 rather than whether it encompasses or is located in portions of second and third class cities governs as to the application of this section to disciplinary matters. OAG 82-577 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Removal of peace officer, by governor, KRS 63.090 to 63.130 .

Treatises

Caldwell’s Kentucky Form Book, 5th Ed., Order Setting Trial (AOC 030), Form 4.07.

ALR

Action affecting personal rights or liabilities, removal of police officer for bringing or defending. 74 A.L.R. 500.

Home rule charters, exclusive control of municipalities under, of matters pertaining to dismissal, retirement or other removal of employes of police department. 105 A.L.R. 264.

Failure of public officer or employe to pay creditors, on claims not related to his office or position as ground or justification for his removal or suspension. 127 A.L.R. 495.

Acquiescence or delay as affecting rights of member of police department illegally discharged, suspended, or transferred. 145 A.L.R. 767.

Absence of member of board or commission from hearing as affecting validity of removal or discharge of policeman. 171 A.L.R. 175.

Accused’s right to discovery or inspection of records of prior complaints against, or similar personnel records of, peace officer involved in the case. 86 A.L.R.3d 1170.

95.460. Appeals to Circuit Court and Court of Appeals.

  1. Any member of the police or fire department found guilty by the legislative body of any charge, as provided by KRS 95.450 , may appeal to the Circuit Court of the county in which the city or urban-county government is located, but the enforcement of the judgment of the body shall not be suspended pending appeal. The notice of the appeal shall be filed not later than thirty (30) days after the date the legislative body makes its determination on the charge.
  2. Upon request of the accused, the clerk of the legislative body shall file a certified copy of the charges and the judgment of that body in the Circuit Court. Upon the transcript being filed, the case shall be docketed in the Circuit Court and tried as an original action.
  3. If the clerk fails to certify the transcript to the Circuit Court within seven (7) days after the request is made, the party aggrieved may file an affidavit in the Circuit Court setting out as fully as possible the charges made, the time of the hearing, and the judgment of the legislative body, together with a statement that demand for transcript was made upon the clerk more than five (5) days before the filing of the affidavit. Upon the filing of the affidavit in the Circuit Court, the case shall be docketed, and the Circuit Court may compel the filing of the transcript by the clerk by entering the proper mandatory order, and by fine and imprisonment for contempt. The appeal shall have precedence over other business, and be determined speedily.
  4. An appeal will lie from the judgment of the Circuit Court to the Court of Appeals as in other cases.

History. 3138-1, 3138-5, 3235dd-35, 3351a-2: amend. Acts 1970, ch. 211, § 1; 1974, ch. 248, § 8; 1976, ch. 165, § 2; 1976 (1st Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 116, effective January 2, 1978; 1982, ch. 38, § 1, effective July 15, 1982; 2014, ch. 92, § 113, effective January 1, 2015.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Appeal to Circuit Court.

A police officer of a third-class city who was discharged by the city council had a right to appeal to the Circuit Court from the decision of the council. Glasgow v. Duncan, 437 S.W.2d 199, 1969 Ky. LEXIS 432 ( Ky. 1969 ).

2. — Procedure.

Since the Circuit Court is required to try the case de novo the judge has the duty not only to pass on legal sufficiency of charges, but also to hear and decide case on merits, and either affirm or reverse order of removal. Hall v. Putthoff, 252 Ky. 570 , 67 S.W.2d 948, 1934 Ky. LEXIS 817 ( Ky. 1934 ).

The legislature intended that the ordinary appeal to the Circuit Court from an order of a city legislative body concerning action taken against a policeman or fireman should be heard by the court without a jury. Owensboro v. Noffsinger, 280 S.W.2d 517, 1955 Ky. LEXIS 169 ( Ky. 1955 ).

Because this statute does not require that the appellant file a document specifically entitled or denominated a “notice of appeal” and city, upon receiving complaint filed by patrolman appealing his dismissal, was on notice and was fully aware that patrolman was appealing its decision to the Circuit Court, dismissal was vacated and action was reinstated. Terry v. Williamson, 931 S.W.2d 469, 1996 Ky. App. LEXIS 168 (Ky. Ct. App. 1996).

3. — Trial De Novo.

Upon trial de novo in Circuit Court the common council’s finding as to the mores of the community should be given consideration. Harrell v. Middlesboro, 287 S.W.2d 614, 1956 Ky. LEXIS 475 ( Ky. 1956 ).

Where a policeman of a third-class city was discharged from the police force by the city council, on his appeal he was entitled to a trial de novo in the Circuit Court on the charges. Glasgow v. Duncan, 437 S.W.2d 199, 1969 Ky. LEXIS 432 ( Ky. 1969 ).

4. — Burden of Proof.

In a de novo hearing under this section the question to be determined by the Circuit Court is not whether there is substantial evidence to support the action of the city legislative body but whether the evidence preponderates against it, the practical effect of which is to shift the burden of proof to the appealing party, which means that the review is something less than purely de novo and where the Circuit Court found as a fact that a police lieutenant solicited a contribution for the political campaign of a candidate for mayor in violation of KRS 95.470 and accepted gifts of liquor which was prohibited by a regulatory ordinance of the city, the evidence did not preponderate against the board of commissioners in their dismissal of the police lieutenant. Kilburn v. Colwell, 396 S.W.2d 803, 1965 Ky. LEXIS 134 ( Ky. 1965 ).

In a de novo hearing under this section the question to be determined is not whether there is substantial evidence to support the action of the city legislative body, but whether the evidence preponderates against it which shifts the burden of proof to the appealing party and makes the review “something less than purely de novo.” Reed v. Richmond, 582 S.W.2d 651, 1979 Ky. App. LEXIS 417 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).

In any claim that the action of the board is arbitrary, the burden of proof rests upon the claimant, but the court will give full consideration to the fact that the same body acted as accuser, judge and jury. Reed v. Richmond, 582 S.W.2d 651, 1979 Ky. App. LEXIS 417 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).

5. — Change of Penalty or Punishment.

Court should not disturb action of board of commissioners in inflicting penalties on members of police force, where evidence is reasonably sufficient to uphold its action. Williams v. Newport, 229 Ky. 810 , 18 S.W.2d 283, 1929 Ky. LEXIS 852 ( Ky. 1929 ); Hogan v. Fausz, 243 Ky. 514 , 49 S.W.2d 333, 1932 Ky. LEXIS 153 ( Ky. 1932 ).

Where the Circuit Court specifically found that the discharged officer was guilty of some of the charges preferred against him but attempted to ameliorate the penalty, the Circuit Court was clearly without authority to change the penalty. Richmond v. Howell, 448 S.W.2d 662, 1969 Ky. LEXIS 61 ( Ky. 1969 ).

The statute indicates the legislative intent that the punishment should not be changed by the Circuit Court, but the Circuit Court or the Court of Appeals would not be precluded from setting aside a punishment for patently frivolous conduct. Richmond v. Howell, 448 S.W.2d 662, 1969 Ky. LEXIS 61 ( Ky. 1969 ).

6. Appeal to Court of Appeals.

Court of Appeals reposes confidence in findings of board of civil service commissioners and of Circuit Court, but evidence must be reasonably sufficient to sustain charges. Armstrong v. Board of Civil Service Comm'rs, 243 Ky. 415 , 48 S.W.2d 1055, 1932 Ky. LEXIS 102 ( Ky. 1932 ).

Appeal to Court of Appeals from judgment of Circuit Court, being permitted “as in other cases,” may be prosecuted by either party. Northcutt v. Hardebeck, 244 Ky. 842 , 52 S.W.2d 901, 1932 Ky. LEXIS 519 ( Ky. 1932 ).

The Court of Appeals cannot usurp the functions of local government agencies where it is apparent they are exercised reasonably and it is required to give due regard to the fact that the city council and the Circuit Court saw the witnesses. Grubbs v. Middlesboro, 284 S.W.2d 668, 1955 Ky. LEXIS 34 ( Ky. 1955 ).

7. — Discretion of City.

Discretion of legislative department of city will not be interfered with by the Court of Appeals unless the action is clearly shown to be contrary to the express provisions of the statute and its clear purpose and intent which is to remove the fire and police departments of city government from the contaminating influence of local politics and to thereby guarantee efficiency in service and to assure incumbents of the stability of their positions as long as they are guilty of no dereliction of duty or other act authorizing and justifying their removal. White v. Hopkinsville, 280 Ky. 661 , 134 S.W.2d 236, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 191 ( Ky. 1939 ).

8. — Remand.

Court of Appeals remanded case where Circuit Court had dismissed appeal from order of removal on ground that policeman had not been deprived of any constitutional guaranty and that there was no abuse of discretion by commissioners, but did not decide case on merits. Hall v. Putthoff, 252 Ky. 570 , 67 S.W.2d 948, 1934 Ky. LEXIS 817 ( Ky. 1934 ).

Cited:

Miller v. Price, 282 Ky. 611 , 139 S.W.2d 450, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 224 ( Ky. 1940 ); Hopwood v. Paducah, 424 S.W.2d 134, 1968 Ky. LEXIS 447 ( Ky. 1968 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

As CR 39.03 authorizes the court to try any issue with an advisory jury in actions not triable of right by a jury, the use of an advisory jury is discretionary with the court and the court is not bound by the jury’s conclusions and there is no conflict with this section which provides for trial de novo by the judge of the court. OAG 73-96 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Kentucky Law Survey, Rogers and Sims, Administrative Law, 69 Ky. L.J. 489 (1980-81).

Treatises

Caldwell’s Kentucky Form Book, 5th Ed., Order Setting Trial (AOC 030), Form 4.07.

ALR

Acquiescence or delay as affecting rights of public employe illegally discharged, suspended, or transferred. 145 A.L.R. 767.

Effect of court review of administrative decision. 79 A.L.R.2d 1141.

95.470. Prohibition of political activity for police and fire departments in cities of home rule class and urban-county governments.

  1. No person shall be appointed a member of the police or fire department in cities of the home rule class or urban-county governments on account of any political service, contribution, sentiment or affiliation. No member shall be dismissed, suspended or reduced in grade or pay for any political opinion.
  2. The appointment and continuance in office of members of the police or fire department shall depend solely upon their ability and willingness to enforce the law and comply with the rules of the department, and shall not be a reward for political activity or contribution to campaign funds.
  3. No member of either department shall be forced to pay or collect any assessments made by political organizations, contribute to political campaign funds, or be active in politics.
  4. No member of either department shall be active in politics or work for the election of candidates while on duty.

History. 3138-3, 3235dd-35, 3351a-2: amend. Acts 1974, ch. 248, § 9; 1978, ch. 169, § 1, effective June 17, 1978; 2014, ch. 92, § 114, effective January 1, 2015.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Solicitation of Contributions.

Solicitation of a contribution for the political campaign of a candidate for mayor by a police lieutenant is not merely a technical offense but is sufficiently grave to justify his dismissal. Kilburn v. Colwell, 396 S.W.2d 803, 1965 Ky. LEXIS 134 ( Ky. 1965 ).

Cited:

Hopwood v. Paducah, 424 S.W.2d 134, 1968 Ky. LEXIS 447 ( Ky. 1968 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Police officers of a city could actively engage in support of a referendum concerning a police and firemen’s mandatory retirement ordinance. OAG 70-676 .

Question of whether it is a violation for a chief of police to become a candidate for sheriff without resigning or taking a leave of absence from such position on the police force depends on whether the police department has elected to operate under this chapter for if it hasn’t made such an election as it relates to third-class cities, there would be no statutory prohibition to becoming a candidate while holding a position on the police force. OAG 73-58 (But see OAG 73-169 ).

Cities of third class no longer have the option of operating their police force under this chapter after a 1966 amendment made it mandatory rather than permissive and, as a consequence, political activity by members of the police force is prohibited and that portion of OAG 73-58 that concerns this option to operate under this chapter is withdrawn. OAG 73-169 .

This section relates to the election of individuals to office and does not apply to public questions and thus members of the fire department may solicit votes in the interest of the passage of matters pertaining to the fire department or firemen but may not solicit votes for candidates for office. OAG 75-198 .

While the statutory prohibition found under this section is applicable only to individual members of the police department and would not apply to a lodge of the fraternal order of police, if the fraternal order of police is incorporated it would be prohibited as a corporation from contributing, either directly or indirectly, any money, services or other things of value towards the nomination of any state, county, city, or district officer pursuant to KRS 121.025 ; only where such organization is not incorporated would there be no prohibition except such reporting requirements that may be necessary under the Corrupt Practices Act, KRS Ch. 121. OAG 77-22 .

A fire fighter can run for the office of city councilman without jeopardizing his civil service position, provided he conducts his candidacy while off duty. OAG 79-211 .

Regardless of a policeman’s or fire fighter’s right to become a candidate, if elected he could not continue to serve as city fire fighter or policeman in view of the common-law prohibition. OAG 79-211 .

A policeman in a second class city may run for a nonpartisan office, such as city council, so long as he does so while off duty. OAG 79-225 .

Subsection (4) of this section states that a police officer may not “work for the election of candidates while on duty,” and does not distinguish between partisan and nonpartisan elections. OAG 79-225 .

Research References and Practice Aids

ALR

Governmental control of actions or speech of public officers or employes in respect of matters outside the actual performance of their duties. 163 A.L.R. 1358.

Validity, construction, and effect of state statutes restricting political activities of public officers or employees. 51 A.L.R.4th 702.

What acts amount to violation of Hatch Act (5 USCS §§ 1501-1503) prohibiting political activity of certain state and local employees. 8 A.L.R. Fed. 343.

95.480. Duties and liabilities of chief of police and policemen — Fees — Cities of second class or urban-county government.

  1. The chief of police in cities or a policeman acting under his authority shall, if required by the city, attend all sessions of the legislative body, execute their orders, and preserve order at their sessions.
  2. The chief of police may receive the same fees, for the use of the city or urban-county government, that sheriffs are entitled to receive for like services, and have the same power to collect them.
  3. The chief of police, policemen deputized by him, and others to whom the process of a court is directed and comes for execution shall execute and return the process within the time prescribed by law for sheriffs to execute and return similar process, and on their failure they and their sureties shall be liable to the same penalties as sheriffs. They shall be subject to similar penalties for not paying over moneys collected on execution, making illegal charges, false returns and like illegal acts.
  4. The District Court may hear and determine motions against them and their sureties for failure to pay over moneys collected, as the Circuit Court has jurisdiction to hear and determine motions against defaulting sheriffs, or may proceed by fines and imprisonment to enforce the execution and return of process.

History. 3161, 3168: amend. Acts 1974, ch. 248, § 10; 1976 (1st Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 117, effective January 2, 1978; 2014, ch. 92, § 115, effective January 1, 2015.

Opinions of Attorney General.

A clerk is under no affirmative duty to collect the misdemeanor arrest fee payable to city policemen or a sheriff, but where the defendant is convicted and judgment of conviction and costs being entered, the defendant pays the fee to the clerk who pays the fee to the department of finance, then the arresting officer may collect his fee. OAG 79-125 .

A city police department may not place a juvenile in a city holding cell in contravention of a judge’s apprehension order which requires the juvenile to be placed in a detention center and then release the juvenile in contravention of the judge’s order, since the police department must place the juvenile in a detention center provided by the fiscal court under KRS 208.080 (now repealed) and KRS 208.192 (now repealed) and is required under this section to properly execute all process directed to it. OAG 81-60 .

Although second class city police may serve criminal process anywhere within the boundaries of their city, there is nothing in this section, relating to the duties of policemen in second class cities, which authorizes them to serve process outside of city boundaries. OAG 81-300 .

All fees received by city policemen for the service of process must be turned over to the city pursuant to this section and KRS 83A.070 . OAG 81-361 .

The statutory fees for services performed by city police officers are separately taxed in the costs and are payable to the police officers under the following conditions and circumstances: (1) the defendant is convicted; (2) the defendant, upon a judgment of conviction and costs being entered, pays the fee to the court clerk; (3) the court clerk, assuming conditions (1) and (2) have been satisfied should pay the appropriate statutorily authorized fee to the police officer; (4) the police officer receiving the fee must turn it over to the city treasury; the clerk is under no affirmative duty to collect such fees for the police officers and the city; such fees are payable only under the conditions set forth above. OAG 81-361 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

District court, duties of police, KRS 24A.140 .

Fees of sheriffs, KRS 64.090 .

Jurors, sequestered, responsibility for needs, transportation, security, equipment and services, KRS 29A.180 .

Malfeasance or neglect by sheriff, KRS 61.170 .

Prisoner released from penitentiary, chief of police to be notified when, KRS 197.170 .

Revocation of liquor license, notice to chief of police, KRS 243.530 .

ALR

Power of chief of police to take affidavit as basis for warrant of arrest. 16 A.L.R. 925.

Voluntary statement damaging to accused, not proper subject of testimony, uttered by testifying police or peace officer, effect of. 8 A.L.R.2d 1013.

Admissibility of report of police or other public officer or employe, or portions of report, as to cause of or responsibility for accident, injury to person, or damage to property. 69 A.L.R.2d 1148.

Civil liability of one making false or fraudulent return of process. 31 A.L.R.3d 1393.

Validity of service of summons or complaint on Sunday or holiday. 63 A.L.R.3d 423.

95.490. Oath and bond of members of police force — Cities of home rule class or urban-county governments.

  1. Each member of the police force in cities of the home rule class or in an urban-county government, before entering upon the discharge of his duties, shall take an oath to faithfully discharge the duties of his or her office. The oath shall be subscribed by the person taking it, and filed in the office of the city clerk, or in urban-county governments, the office most closely resembling such office.
  2. The chief of police and each other member of the police force shall give such bond to the city or urban-county government, and with such surety as may be required by ordinance, conditioned that they will faithfully perform the duties of their office and pay over to the persons entitled thereto all moneys that may come into their hands. A lien shall exist on the lands of the chief of police or policemen deputized by him, and their sureties, from the time of executing bond, for all sums of money that come into their hands.

HISTORY: 3141, 3168: amend. Acts 1974, ch. 248, § 11; 2016 ch. 22, § 3, effective July 15, 2016.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Bond.

The ordinance fixes the penalty of the bond and provides for the sureties, while the statute prescribes the conditions of the bond. Sauer v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 192 Ky. 758 , 234 S.W. 434, 1921 Ky. LEXIS 148 ( Ky. 1921 ).

Unless statute expressly provides otherwise, only those parts of bond which contravene statute are void, and other conditions are enforceable. Sauer v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 192 Ky. 758 , 234 S.W. 434, 1921 Ky. LEXIS 148 ( Ky. 1921 ).

Neither principal nor surety can complain that obligations of bond are less than statutorily prescribed, because of omission from bond of covenant that principal will pay over all money coming into his hands to person owning same. Sauer v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 192 Ky. 758 , 234 S.W. 434, 1921 Ky. LEXIS 148 ( Ky. 1921 ).

2. — Liabilities Covered.

Bond of policeman covers unlawful arrest or unnecessary or illegal punishment by officer. Connelly v. American Bonding & Trust Co., 113 Ky. 903 , 69 S.W. 959, 24 Ky. L. Rptr. 714 , 1902 Ky. LEXIS 119 ( Ky. 1902 ).

Liability was imposed under policeman’s bond which embraced condition not statutorily required that he would commit no trespasses under guise of officer and also condition statutorily prescribed that he would faithfully perform duties of position, where he so negligently operated police ambulance as to damage another automobile. Sauer v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 192 Ky. 758 , 234 S.W. 434, 1921 Ky. LEXIS 148 ( Ky. 1921 ).

When police officer is assigned to drive ambulance he is engaged in performing duties of his office as much as if he were walking beat or arresting disturbers of peace and he is covered by his bond. Sauer v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 192 Ky. 758 , 234 S.W. 434, 1921 Ky. LEXIS 148 ( Ky. 1921 ).

Bond of police officer to well and faithfully perform duties covered liability for accident to pedestrian from negligent operation of motorcycle while patrolling his beat, as against contention that bond covered duties as policeman but not as motorcycle policeman, and covered only duties imposed by law. Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Boehnlein, 202 Ky. 601 , 260 S.W. 353, 1924 Ky. LEXIS 754 ( Ky. 1924 ).

Bondsman was not responsible for arrest made by policeman outside territorial jurisdiction of city of second class, since policeman lacked authority to make arrest there, and hence was not acting under official authority as policeman. Brittain v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 219 Ky. 465 , 293 S.W. 956, 1927 Ky. LEXIS 357 ( Ky. 1927 ).

3. — Action On.

Petition in action on policeman’s bond alleging that arrest was “without warrant or judicial order,” did not state cause of action, despite additional averments that arrest was without “other authority of law” and was done “wrongfully,” which were mere conclusions of pleader, not stating issuable facts. Connelly v. American Bonding & Trust Co., 113 Ky. 903 , 69 S.W. 959, 24 Ky. L. Rptr. 714 , 1902 Ky. LEXIS 119 ( Ky. 1902 ).

Petition in action on policeman’s bond alleging that officer “wrongfully, cruelly, and severely assaulted, beat, and bruised the plaintiff,” did not state cause of action, since allegations did not negative presumption that officer did so under circumstances which justified him in using force against prisoner. Connelly v. American Bonding & Trust Co., 113 Ky. 903 , 69 S.W. 959, 24 Ky. L. Rptr. 714 , 1902 Ky. LEXIS 119 ( Ky. 1902 ).

Petition in action on policeman’s bond alleging that officers “without warrant, judicial order, or other authority of law wrongfully and forcibly compelled plaintiff to go with them through public street of city,” did not state cause of action. Connelly v. American Bonding & Trust Co., 113 Ky. 903 , 69 S.W. 959, 24 Ky. L. Rptr. 714 , 1902 Ky. LEXIS 119 ( Ky. 1902 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

The execution of a bond is a prerequisite to the qualifications of a police officer in a city of the second class. OAG 77-281 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Bonds of public officers, when required, conditions, recovery on, KRS 62.050 to 62.080 .

Oath of peace officers, to detect and prosecute gambling, KRS 62.040 .

Oath to be taken by all city officers, Const., § 228.

ALR

Municipal liability for personal injuries resulting from police officer’s use of excessive force in performance of duty. 88 A.L.R.2d 1330.

Liability of police officer or his bond for injuries or death of third persons resulting from operation of motor vehicle by subordinate. 15 A.L.R.3d 1189.

Peace officer’s liability for death or personal injuries caused by intentional force in arresting misdemeanant. 83 A.L.R.3d 238.

Liability of governmental unit or its officers for injury to innocent occupant of moving vehicle, or for damages to such vehicle, as result of police chase. 4 A.L.R.4th 865.

95.495. Hours of work and annual leave for members of police department in urban-county governments and cities on DLG’s registry of cities that belonged to the second and third classes on January 1, 2014.

  1. In cities listed on the registry pursuant to subsection (3) of this section or urban-county governments, except those in which, by ordinance, the patrolmen are employed or paid by the day, the members of the police department shall not be required to work more than eight (8) hours per day, for five (5) days each week or ten (10) hours per day, for four (4) days each week, except in the event of an emergency. Each member of the police department shall have an annual leave of fifteen (15) working days with full pay. Nothing in this section shall prohibit a member of the police department from voluntarily agreeing to work a different work schedule provided that the officer is paid overtime for any work performed in excess of forty (40) hours per week.
  2. The salary of the members of the police department shall not be reduced by reason of the enactment of this section.
  3. On or before January 1, 2015, the Department for Local Government shall create a registry of cities that shall comply with the provisions of this section. The Department for Local Government shall include each of those cities on the registry that were classified as cities of the second or third class on August 1, 2014. The Department for Local Government shall make the information included on the registry available to the public by publishing it on its Web site.

History. Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 1, §§ 1, 2; 1958, ch. 22; 1974, ch. 248, § 12; 1996, ch. 93, § 1, effective July 15, 1996; 2008, ch. 135, § 3, effective July 15, 2008; 2014, ch. 92, § 117, effective January 1, 2015.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Regulation of Off-duty Activities.

The city legislative body is empowered to make rules governing off-duty activities as well as on-duty activities such as restricting the number of hours in which other employment may be engaged. Hopwood v. Paducah, 424 S.W.2d 134, 1968 Ky. LEXIS 447 ( Ky. 1968 ).

2. Overtime

Municipal order which revised an overtime policy for city employees did not allow appellee city police officer to claim overtime after working 40 hours and claiming two additional hours of annual leave time; the order did not violate KRS 95.495(1) as the plain language of the statute only permitted overtime payment for any work performed. City of Bowling Green v. Helbig, 399 S.W.3d 445, 2012 Ky. App. LEXIS 195 (Ky. Ct. App. 2012).

Cited:

Hopwood v. Paducah, 424 S.W.2d 134, 1968 Ky. LEXIS 447 ( Ky. 1968 ).

95.497. Hours of work and annual leave for members of police department — Cities of third class. [Repealed.]

  1. In all cities of the third class, except those in which, by ordinance, the patrolmen are employed or paid by the day, the members of the police department shall not be required to work more than eight (8) hours per day, for five (5) days each week, except in the event of an emergency. Each member of the police department shall have an annual leave of fifteen (15) working days with full pay.
  2. The salary of the members of the police department shall not be reduced by reason of the enactment of this section.

History. Enact. Acts 1962, ch. 73; § 314.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1962, ch. 73) was repealed by Acts 2014, ch. 92, § 314, effective January 1, 2015.

Opinions of Attorney General.

This section would include not only police officers having authority to make arrests, but also police department clerical or maintenance employees. OAG 63-629 . Where city and police department agreed that members of the police force would work ten (10) hours a day, four (4) days a week, police were still entitled to 15 working days a year annual leave under this section. OAG 72-23 .

The provisions of this section may not be applied to police departments of fourth-class cities. OAG 72-331 .

This section makes no provision for a proportionate reduction in annual leave benefits for part-time members of the police department and, accordingly, full-time dispatchers in the police department are covered by the annual leave benefits, but a part-time clerk in the police department is not entitled to such benefits. OAG 78-219 .

While dispatchers and clerks are generally members of the police department, for purposes of the annual leave benefits set forth in this section, the members of the police department included therein are the permanent and full-time personnel as opposed to temporary or part-time workers. OAG 78-219 .

If a police department institutes a training program for its police officers, the police officers can only be required to attend the program if it is conducted at sometime during the 40 hours per week during which they are required to work. OAG 79-296 .

Members of the police department in cities of the third class cannot be required to work beyond the hours and days per week stated in this section but thay may work extra hours if they and the city can mutually agree to such an arrangement. OAG 79-296 .

There are no provisions in the minimum wage and overtime pay provisions allowing police officers to receive time off work or compensatory time instead of wages for overtime hours. OAG 79-296 .

An officer would not be entitled to utilize any of his annual leave, unless and until he has earned it, since to do otherwise would violate § 3 of the Constitution as payment for services not actually rendered. OAG 80-28 .

A city may give its police officers a one-hour lunch period and still require that those police officers work an eight-hour shift; although police officers cannot be required to work more than eight (8) hours per day, except in an emergency, the lunch break is not usually considered worktime. OAG 82-143 .

95.500. Powers and duties of chief of fire department — Hours of work and annual leave of firefighters — Applicable to urban-county governments and cities on DLG’s registry of cities that belonged to the second class on August 1, 2014.

  1. The chief of the fire department in cities or urban-county governments, or an officer acting under his authority, shall be present at all fires and investigate their cause. He may examine witnesses, compel the production of testimony, administer oaths, make arrests, and enter any building for the purpose of examination that, in his opinion, is in danger from fires. He shall report his proceedings to the city legislative body when required.
  2. The chief shall direct and control the operations of the members of the fire department in the discharge of their duties. He shall have access to and use of all cisterns, fireplugs, the waters of the waterworks, and the cisterns of private persons, for the purpose of extinguishing fires. He shall have the right to examine all cisterns, and all plugs and pipes of the waterworks, to see that they are in condition for use in case of fire. He shall have control of all buildings, hose, engines, and other equipment provided for the fire department. He shall perform such other duties as the legislative body shall, by ordinance, prescribe.
  3. The fire department of each city listed on the registry pursuant to subsection (5) of this section or urban-county government shall be divided into three (3) platoons of firefighters. Each platoon, excluding the chief, the assistant chief, clerical employees, maintenance employees, fire inspectors, fire investigators, and arson investigators, in fire departments in the cities listed on the registry or in urban-county governments, shall be on duty for twenty-four (24) consecutive hours, after which the platoon serving twenty-four (24) hours shall be allowed to remain off duty for forty-eight (48) consecutive hours, except in cases of dire emergency. The chief of the fire department shall arrange the schedule of working hours to comply with the provisions of this section. The pay, rank, or benefits of the members and officers of the fire department shall not be reduced as a result of this subsection.
  4. In each city or urban-county government listed on the registry, all employees of the fire department shall be given not less than two (2) weeks leave of absence annually, with full pay.
  5. On or before January 1, 2015, the Department for Local Government shall create a registry of cities that shall be required to comply with the provisions of subsections (3) and (4) of this section. The Department for Local Government shall include each of those cities on the registry that were classified as cities of the second class on August 1, 2014. The Department for Local Government shall make the information included on the registry available to the public by publishing it on its Web site.

History. 3142, 3235dd-35: amend. Acts 1946, ch. 7; 1962, ch. 257, § 1; 1974, ch. 248, § 13; 1992, ch. 3, § 1, effective July 14, 1992; 2000, ch. 177, § 1, effective July 14, 2000; 2014, ch. 92, § 118, effective January 1, 2015; 2015 ch. 115, § 1, effective June 24, 2015; 2018 ch. 128, § 8, effective January 1, 2019.

Compiler's Notes.

For the section as effective until January 1, 2019, see the bound volume.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Hours Off Duty.

An electrician in a fire department who was required to work on the basis of eight (8) hours per day five (5) days a week, Monday through Friday, was entitled to bring an injunction since loss of his rights under subsection (3) of this section constituted an irreparable injury for which he had no adequate remedy at law and subsection (2)(c) of KRS 95.010 defines “fire department” to include “ . . . . . maintenance employes. . . . . . ” Covington v. Meyer, 376 S.W.2d 679, 1964 Ky. LEXIS 461 ( Ky. 1964 ).

City ordinances setting hourly wage rates for firemen did not conflict with subsection (3) of this section. Snyder v. Owensboro, 555 S.W.2d 246, 1977 Ky. LEXIS 499 ( Ky. 1977 ).

Cited:

Kentucky Municipal League v. Commonwealth, 530 S.W.2d 198, 1975 Ky. LEXIS 48 ( Ky. 1975 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

The employment of substitute fire fighters, who are not qualified as provided under KRS 95.440 and who have been placed on a work schedule contrary to the requirements of this section, is in violation of the terms of these statutes and an action may be brought by any taxpayer of the city to compel compliance with the referred to sections. OAG 75-514 .

The use of the term “shall” in subsection (3) is mandatory and thus the city cannot require a fire department employee to work on a basis of eight (8) hours per day, five (5) days a week, Monday through Friday. OAG 75-514 .

A proposal by fire fighters to adopt a standard work week of 48 hours should be rejected since the Kentucky General Assembly has, in this section, established a mandatory procedure concerning the work hours of fire fighters in cities of the second class. OAG 78-510 , but see OAG 78-511 .

In reaching the conclusion that a fire chief and certain members of his staff may voluntarily work a different schedule than that outlined in this section, the language “shall be allowed to remain off duty” is of primary importance since this indicates that a fire department employee may not be forced to work a schedule different from that required by the statute, but may voluntarily do so; the intent to the statute itself clearly appears to be directed more toward the actual fire fighter than the administrative and supportive units, even though KRS 95.010 (2)(c), includes such units in the definition of fire department. OAG 78-511 , but see OAG 78-510 .

The language of this section indicates that the Legislature has limited the subpoena power of the chief of the fire department to the production of testimony by witnesses called pursuant to this section and, as a consequence, the chief has no authority to issue what is known as a subpoena duces tecum to require the production of records that may be at the disposal of the witness. OAG 78-769 .

Where a city and the fire fighters of that city are subject to and operating under the provisions of KRS Chapter 345, they may collectively bargain and negotiate with respect to wages, hours of work and other conditions of employment notwithstanding the requirements of this section. OAG 80-218 .

Fire fighter’s scheduled overtime, being regular, fixed, and required by this section, and callback overtime, being part of a fire fighter’s total annual compensation, are both includable in determining the 15 percent to be paid to the city for the fire fighter under KRS 95A.250 ; however, the payment for uniform allowances is not compensation for purposes of calculating the 15 percent. OAG 80-437 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Deputy state fire marshal, chiefs of city fire department may be deemed as when so ordered, KRS 227.230 .

ALR

Liability of municipal corporation for spread of fire purposely and lawfully kindled. 24 A.L.R.2d 291.

Liability of municipality for injury to children by fire under attractive nuisance doctrine. 27 A.L.R.2d 1194.

“Motor vehicle” or the like within statute waiving governmental immunity as to operation of such vehicles. 77 A.L.R.2d 945.

Liability for personal injury or damage from operation of fire department vehicle. 82 A.L.R.2d 312.

95.505. Firefighters, hours off duty, in cities not required to comply with KRS 95.500. [Repealed]

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 227, § 1; Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 227, § 1; 2014, ch. 92, § 119, effective January 1, 2015; repealed by 2019 ch. 44, § 35, effective June 27, 2019.

95.510. Powers of police — Cities of third class. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3298: amend. Acts 1982, ch. 427, § 2, effective July 15, 1982) was repealed by Acts 1994, ch. 48, § 4, effective July 15, 1994. For present law, see KRS 95.019 .

95.515. Powers of police in cities of second class. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1982, ch. 427, § 1, effective July 15, 1982) was repealed by Acts 1994, ch. 48, § 4, effective July 15, 1994. For present law, see KRS 95.019 .

Policemen’s and Firemen’s Pension Fund in Cities Meeting Qualifications of KRS 95.518

95.518. Applicability of KRS 95.520 to 95.620 and KRS 95.621 to 95.629.

The provisions of KRS 95.520 to 95.620 and KRS 95.621 to 95.629 shall only apply to those cities that were previously classified as cities of the third class on or before August 1, 1988, under the city classification system that was in effect on or before August 1, 1988, and have established a policemen’s and firefighters’ pension program specifically under the provisions of KRS 95.520 to 95.620 and KRS 95.621 to 95.629 on or before August 1, 1988, or to any other city that established a policemen’s and firefighters’ pension program specifically under the provisions of KRS 95.520 to 95.620 and KRS 95.621 to 95.629 on or before August 1, 1988.

History. Enact. Acts 2014, ch. 92, § 120, effective January 1, 2015.

95.520. Pension fund — Board of trustees — Coverage provided in County Employees Retirement System after August 1, 1988.

  1. In cities meeting the criteria set out in KRS 95.518 , there shall be a policemen’s and firefighters’ pension fund, and a board of trustees for that fund unless the policemen and firefighters are included in the membership of the County Employees Retirement System.
  2. The board of trustees is the trustee of the pension fund, and has exclusive control and management of the pension fund and of all moneys donated or paid for the relief or pensioning of members of the police and fire departments. It may do all things necessary to protect the fund.
    1. After August 1, 1988, no new locally administered pension fund shall be created pursuant to this section, and cities which were covered by this section on or prior to August 1, 1988, shall participate in the County Employees Retirement System effective August 1, 1988. (3) (a) After August 1, 1988, no new locally administered pension fund shall be created pursuant to this section, and cities which were covered by this section on or prior to August 1, 1988, shall participate in the County Employees Retirement System effective August 1, 1988.
    2. Cities which were covered by this section on or prior to August 1, 1988, shall provide for the retirement of police or firefighters rehired after August 1, 1988, by placing such employees in the County Employees Retirement System.
    3. Cities which were covered by this section on or prior to August 1, 1988, shall place police or firefighters newly hired after August 1, 1988, in the County Employees Retirement System.
    4. Cities which were covered by this section on or prior to August 1, 1988, shall offer employees hired on or prior to August 1, 1988, membership in the County Employees Retirement System under the alternate participation plan as described in KRS 78.530(3), but such employees may elect to retain coverage under this section.
    5. The city shall certify that all police and firefighters placed in the County Employees Retirement System, and not covered by Social Security for their employment with the city, are employed in hazardous positions. If the police and firefighters are covered by Social Security for their employment with the city, the city may certify that they are employed in hazardous positions.

History. 3142b-3 to 3142b-5, 3351a-3 to 3351a-5: amend. Acts 1966, ch. 255, § 102; 1972, ch. 58, § 1; 1978, ch. 164, § 23, effective June 17, 1978; 1984, ch. 177, § 4, effective July 13, 1984; 1988, ch. 11, § 3, effective July 15, 1988; 2014, ch. 92, § 121, effective January 1, 2015; 2015 ch. 28, § 13, effective June 24, 2015.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

Acts 1988, ch. 11, § 19, provides: “In order that city employees with a choice can make an informed decision on whether or not to join the county employees retirement system, Kentucky retirement systems shall conduct briefings for each affected pension system on the provisions of this Act. Each employee shall receive a written summary of the retirement benefits which the county employees retirement system offers, and each employee shall be given the opportunity to attend an oral presentation. All such presentations shall be completed by October 15, 1988, and each affected employee shall make his decision by November 1, 1988. Failure of an employee subject to the provisions of this Act to receive a written summary or to attend an oral briefing shall in no way invalidate any of the provisions of this Act.”

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Right to Pension.

A pension being a bounty springing from graciousness of sovereign may be given or withheld at pleasure; its granting in first instance does not constitute contract right or right vested by statute. Rohe v. Covington, 255 Ky. 164 , 73 S.W.2d 19, 1934 Ky. LEXIS 211 ( Ky. 1934 ).

A retired policeman was not entitled to share in pension fund, established long after he ceased to be an active policeman, to which he never contributed even though city failed to carry out its mandatory duty to establish the pension fund. Redmond v. Wheeler, 554 S.W.2d 391, 1977 Ky. App. LEXIS 758 (Ky. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 926, 97 S. Ct. 2628, 53 L. Ed. 2d 242, 1977 U.S. LEXIS 1897 (U.S. 1977).

2. Misconduct of Pension Fund Officers.

Chief of police was properly demoted to policeman by board of city commissioners for “misconduct” where he violated minutes of the board and statutory requirement of exercise of care usually exercised by prudent businessmen in making loans from the policemen and firemen’s pension fund while he was secretary of the board of trustees of the fund even though the fund ultimately suffered no loss. Jenkins v. Keith, 285 Ky. 240 , 147 S.W.2d 397, 1941 Ky. LEXIS 365 ( Ky. 1941 ).

Under the commission form of government the board of commissioners rather than the board of pension trustees had the authority to hear charges of irregularities and misconduct filed against chief of police and chief of fire department who served as secretary and president respectively of the board of trustees of the pension fund of policemen and firemen. Jenkins v. Keith, 285 Ky. 240 , 147 S.W.2d 397, 1941 Ky. LEXIS 365 ( Ky. 1941 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Employees of a city of the third class who are members of a pension fund established pursuant to this section, are not entitled to reimbursement of their contribution to the pension fund when leaving their employment prior to the time that they become qualified for benefits. OAG 68-20 .

The expression “members of the police or fire department” as used in this section, includes nonpeace officer employees of the city who are assigned to the police or fire department as radio operators, clerks and/or cleaning and maintenance employees, pursuant to the definition of “member” at KRS 95.010(2)(e). OAG 73-309 .

While it may be legally possible for the present city legislative body to abolish the civil service commission established by the outgoing city council pursuant to KRS 95.763 , the adoption by the outgoing council of the pension fund and levy of the necessary tax under the terms of this section and KRS 95.620 cannot be abolished in view of subsection (4) of KRS 95.761 . OAG 74-87 .

The General Assembly has authorized cities of the third class under KRS 95.621 to 95.629 , to adopt an alternative method relating to police and firemen’s pension fund aside from the method established pursuant to KRS 95.520 to 95.620 and the adoption of the alternate plan, while legal and permissible, is optional on the part of the city and legislative body. OAG 75-231 .

Since members of the board of trustees of a pension fund possess the sole power to vote on matters before it, the city council cannot participate in breaking tie votes that may arise at board meetings. OAG 76-706 .

Full-time dispatchers of the police department of a city of the third class are covered by the provisions of KRS 95.520 to 95.620 while a part-time clerk of that police department is not so covered. OAG 78-219 .

The pension benefits set forth in KRS 95.520 to 95.620 , applicable to members of the police department, refer to permanent and full-time members of the police department rather than temporary or part-time members of the department. OAG 78-219 .

A city of the fourth class may not operate a pension plan for its police officers under KRS 79.080 (2) but, rather, it must utilize the provisions of KRS 95.767 to 95.785 or KRS 95.520 to 95.620 or KRS 90.300 to 90.420 . OAG 81-191 .

A pension plan adopted pursuant to KRS 95.761 and KRS 90.300 et seq., may not validly provide that, on repeal of the enabling ordinance, “all unexpended moneys appropriated to said pension fund out of the said city’s general fund to the Policemen’s and Firemen’s Fund by the said Board of Council of such city and at the time of adoption of a repeal ordinance shall revert back to the city’s general fund,” and such contribution must remain in the fund to be paid on eventual retirement of the contributing police and firemen; KRS 95.761 (4) clearly prohibits the repeal of any pension ordinance adopted under KRS 90.300 to 90.410 or, for that matter, under KRS 95.520 to 95.620 . OAG 82-64 .

A fourth-class city which has not adopted a civil service system may, at its option, operate under the provisions of KRS 95.761(2) with respect to the establishment of its pension fund; this subsection authorizes the city to adopt the pension fund authorized for cities of the third class pursuant to KRS 95.520 to 95.620 but would not include the alternate method for third-class cities authorized under KRS 95.621 to 95.629 ; also, the city may operate its pension fund under the terms of KRS 95.762 to 95.785 governing fourth-class cities or under the general civil service act (KRS Ch. 90) relating to third-class cities pursuant to KRS 95.761(3). OAG 82-64 .

If a fourth-class city elects to operate its civil service program under KRS 95.762 to 95.778 , it cannot operate under any portions of KRS Ch. 90 or KRS 95.520 to 95.620 ; on the other hand, if the city does not adopt the civil service program under KRS Ch. 95, it has the right under KRS 95.761 (3) to adopt the provisions of KRS 90.300 to 90.420 , and in doing so has the option of adopting a pension fund as provided in KRS 90.410 ; however, the only pension fund it may adopt, if it operates under KRS Ch. 90, is the one provided for in that act and the city cannot, for example, utilize the pension system provided for under KRS 95.520 to 95.620 or the pension system under KRS 95.761 to 95.785 . OAG 82-64 .

Subsection (1) of this section mandatorily requires that all cities of the third class provide a pension fund for its policemen and fire fighters as well as a board of trustees for the fund. OAG 82-152 .

There is no provision for abolishing the pension fund once it is established, though those officers leaving the force are entitled to a refund of their contributions under the terms of KRS 95.620 . OAG 82-152 .

95.530. Board of trustees of pension fund established under KRS 95.520 — Members — Officers — Adoption of ordinance dissolving pension fund — Liquidation and distribution of residual assets — Report. [Effective until July 15, 2020]

  1. In cities with a pension fund established under KRS 95.520 where there are fewer than six (6) active members of the pension fund, except as provided by subsection (3) of this section, the board of trustees of the policemen’s and firefighter’s pension fund is composed of the mayor, city treasurer or chief financial officer, and one (1) retired member each from the police and fire departments. The retired members from the police and fire departments shall be elected by the respective retired members of those departments annually by ballot, one (1) from each department, and shall serve for one (1) year and until their respective successors are elected and qualified. The board shall select from their number a president and a secretary.
  2. If there are six (6) or more active members of the fund, there shall be two (2) additional board members added to the members established by subsection (1) of this section who shall be one (1) active member of the fund from each department elected by the active members of the fund from the respective departments and who shall serve for one (1) year and until their respective successors are elected and qualified. If all of the six (6) or more active members or all of the retired members are from one (1) department, then both of the active member board members or both of the retired board members, as the case may be, shall be elected from that department.
  3. If there are fewer than six (6) active and retired members of the policemen’s and the firefighters’ pension fund, the board of trustees shall be composed of the mayor, city treasurer or chief financial officer, and two (2) employees appointed by the mayor, one (1) from the city police department and one (1) from the city fire department, who shall serve for one (1) year and until their respective successors are appointed and qualified. If all of the members of the pension fund are from one (1) department, no appointment shall be made from the other department.
  4. The board of trustees’ membership shall be restructured according to the provisions of this section at the time of the next scheduled election of board members after July 15, 2016.
  5. If all liabilities to all individuals entitled to benefits from the policemen’s and firefighters’ pension fund have been satisfied, the legislative body of the city may by majority vote of the entire legislative body adopt an ordinance dissolving the fund. If adopted, the fund’s board of trustees shall, within sixty (60) days of adoption, proceed with the liquidation of any residual assets of the fund. All residual assets liquidated pursuant to this subsection shall be distributed by the board of trustees to the city’s general fund so long as the return of assets complies with federal and state law governing the distribution of assets. Within thirty (30) days following the distribution of residual assets, the board of trustees of the fund shall as its last act file a complete report with the legislative body of the city of the actions taken to dissolve the fund and liquidate residual assets of the fund for retention by the city clerk the same as for other city records.

HISTORY: 3142b-3, 3351a-3: amend. Acts 1960, ch. 40; 1966, ch. 255, § 103; 1978, ch. 164, § 24, effective June 17, 1978; 1990, ch. 83, § 2, effective July 13, 1990; 2014 ch. 92, § 122, effective January 1, 2015; 2016 ch. 31, § 9, effective July 15, 2016.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Misconduct of Pension Fund Officers.

Chief of police was properly demoted to policeman by board of city commissioners for “misconduct” where he violated minutes of the board and statutory requirement of exercise of care usually exercised by prudent businessmen in making loans from the policemen and firemen’s pension fund while he was secretary of the board of trustees of the fund even though the fund ultimately suffered no loss. Jenkins v. Keith, 285 Ky. 240 , 147 S.W.2d 397, 1941 Ky. LEXIS 365 ( Ky. 1941 ).

Under the commission form of government the board of commissioners rather than the board of pension trustees had the authority to hear charges of irregularities and misconduct filed against chief of police and chief of fire department who served as secretary and president respectively of the board of trustees of the pension fund of policemen and firemen. Jenkins v. Keith, 285 Ky. 240 , 147 S.W.2d 397, 1941 Ky. LEXIS 365 ( Ky. 1941 ).

95.530. Board of trustees of pension fund established under KRS 95.520 — Members — Officers — Option to convert pension benefits to annuity benefits — Adoption of ordinance dissolving pension fund — Liquidation and distribution of residual assets — Report. [Effective July 15, 2020]

  1. In cities with a pension fund established under KRS 95.520 where there are fewer than six (6) active members of the pension fund, except as provided by subsection (3) of this section, the board of trustees of the policemen’s and firefighters’ pension fund is composed of the mayor, city treasurer or chief financial officer, and one (1) retired member each from the police and fire departments. The retired members from the police and fire departments shall be elected by the respective retired members of those departments annually by ballot, one (1) from each department, and shall serve for one (1) year and until their respective successors are elected and qualified. The board shall select from their number a president and a secretary.
  2. If there are six (6) or more active members of the fund, there shall be two (2) additional board members added to the members established by subsection (1) of this section who shall be one (1) active member of the fund from each department elected by the active members of the fund from the respective departments and who shall serve for one (1) year and until their respective successors are elected and qualified. If all of the six (6) or more active members or all of the retired members are from one (1) department, then both of the active member board members or both of the retired board members, as the case may be, shall be elected from that department.
  3. If there are fewer than six (6) active and retired members of the policemen’s and the firefighters’ pension fund, the board of trustees shall be composed of the mayor, city treasurer or chief financial officer, and two (2) employees appointed by the mayor, one (1) from the city police department and one (1) from the city fire department, who shall serve for one (1) year and until their respective successors are appointed and qualified. If all of the members of the pension fund are from one (1) department, no appointment shall be made from the other department.
  4. The board of trustees’ membership shall be restructured according to the provisions of this section at the time of the next scheduled election of board members after July 15, 2016.
  5. If there are fewer than twelve (12) active and retired members or beneficiaries of the policemen’s and the firefighters’ pension fund, the governing body of the fund may elect to offer to individuals entitled to benefits from the fund a one (1) time irrevocable option to convert monthly pension benefits from the fund to monthly annuity benefits from an insurance company for the same amount. An insurance company accepting a benefit transfer shall honor any features and options available under the existing plan. If the governing body of the fund elects to offer the option to convert monthly pension benefits to monthly annuity benefits, it shall provide to individuals entitled to benefits from the fund sufficiently complete and appropriate disclosures to assist in making an informed decision.
  6. If all liabilities to all individuals entitled to benefits from the policemen’s and firefighters’ pension fund have been satisfied, the legislative body of the city may by majority vote of the entire legislative body adopt an ordinance dissolving the fund. If adopted, the fund’s board of trustees shall, within sixty (60) days of adoption, proceed with the liquidation of any residual assets of the fund. All residual assets liquidated pursuant to this subsection shall be distributed by the board of trustees to the city’s general fund so long as the return of assets complies with federal and state law governing the distribution of assets. Within thirty (30) days following the distribution of residual assets, the board of trustees of the fund shall as its last act file a complete report with the legislative body of the city of the actions taken to dissolve the fund and liquidate residual assets of the fund for retention by the city clerk the same as for other city records.

HISTORY: 3142b-3, 3351a-3: amend. Acts 1960, ch. 40; 1966, ch. 255, § 103; 1978, ch. 164, § 24, effective June 17, 1978; 1990, ch. 83, § 2, effective July 13, 1990; 2014 ch. 92, § 122, effective January 1, 2015; 2016 ch. 31, § 9, effective July 15, 2016; 2020 ch. 121, § 4, effective July 15, 2020.

95.540. Rules, applications — Records — Reports.

  1. The board of trustees of the pension fund established under KRS 95.520 may make all necessary rules for its government in the discharge of its duties, and shall hear and decide all applications for benefits or pensions. Its decision on these applications shall be conclusive, and not subject to revision or reversal, except by the board. A record shall be kept of the meetings and proceedings of the board.
  2. The board of trustees of the pension fund shall make an annual report on the condition of the pension fund to the city legislative body, at that body’s last meeting in August.

History. 3142b-5, 3142b-6, 3142b-17, 3351a-5, 3351a-6, 3351a-17: amend. Acts 1966, ch. 255, § 104; 2014, ch. 92, § 123, effective January 1, 2015.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

The provision of this section making the decisions of the board of trustees final was constitutional and did not deny due process of law. Miller v. Price, 282 Ky. 611 , 139 S.W.2d 450, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 224 ( Ky. 1940 ).

2. Authority of Board of Trustees.

Legislature has power to vest in board of trustees of pension fund authority as to its rules and regulations including findings as to eligibility of members for pensions. Lexington v. Wilburn, 265 S.W.2d 777, 1954 Ky. LEXIS 748 ( Ky. 1954 ).

3. Determination of Board.

Since courts lack jurisdiction to review determination of pension board, Court of Appeals could not review facts, even though board rejected claim arbitrarily, unlawfully, in fraud of claimant’s rights, and contrary to law and facts presented to it. Rohe v. Covington, 255 Ky. 164 , 73 S.W.2d 19, 1934 Ky. LEXIS 211 ( Ky. 1934 ).

Provision in this section placing control of pension fund in pension board with power to determine who shall be beneficiaries and making their action final within legislative power, the remedy is exclusive, and courts lack jurisdiction to review determination of board. Rohe v. Covington, 255 Ky. 164 , 73 S.W.2d 19, 1934 Ky. LEXIS 211 ( Ky. 1934 ).

Decision of trustees of fund denying pension to policeman’s widow on ground that his death from nephritis and heart complications was not due to service as policeman was final, despite stipulation respecting evidence that he died from causes growing out of exposure while performing duties. Bishop v. Marcum, 272 Ky. 322 , 114 S.W.2d 126, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 122 ( Ky. 1938 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Where a retirement benefit has been approved by the board where there was misrepresentation of fact, or factual information erroneously evaluated, or fraud, or restored physical condition and capacity of the member receiving a pension, the case properly could be reviewed by the board for appropriate action. OAG 66-93 .

The board has exclusive and continuing jurisdiction of each and every case in which retirement benefits are approved. OAG 66-93 .

Under this section, a minimum retirement age could be established by ordinance. OAG 70-379 .

Disability benefits under KRS 95.550 must be based upon work-related disabilities, and in order for the board to determine whether or not the disability was in fact work related, this section, concerning the board’s rule-making power, certainly authorizes it to request a physician of its own choice to examine the petitioner and submit a statement as to whether in his professional opinion the disability was or could be work related. OAG 82-240 .

95.550. Benefits for disability or death from pension fund established under KRS 95.520 — Beneficiaries — Amounts.

  1. The pensions or benefits paid for disability or death from the policemen’s and firefighters’ pension fund established under KRS 95.520 shall be as follows:
    1. If any member of the police or fire department becomes temporarily totally disabled, physically or mentally, while in the performance of duty and by reason of service in the department, the board of trustees of the pension fund shall order paid to him monthly, during his disability but not longer than one (1) year, a sum of not more than sixty dollars ($60) per month, the amount to be determined by the board. This provision shall not apply if a salary is paid during the same period. Provided, however, that the provisions of this paragraph shall not apply unless the disabled firefighter or policeman has served from one (1) day to ten (10) years consecutively in his department, such period of service to be fixed by the board of trustees;
    2. If any member of the police or fire department becomes permanently disabled, physically or mentally, while in the performance of duty and by reason of service in the department, so as to render necessary his retirement from service in the department, the board of trustees shall retire him from service and order paid to him monthly fifty percent (50%) of his monthly salary at the time of his retirement. Provided, however, that the provisions of this paragraph shall not apply unless the disabled firefighter or policeman has served from one (1) day to ten (10) years consecutively in his department, such period of service to be fixed by the board;
    3. If any member of the police or fire department is killed or dies as the result of an injury received in the performance of duty, or dies of any disease contracted by reason of his occupation, or dies while in the service from any cause as a result of his service in the department, or dies in service or while on the retired list from any cause after fifteen (15) consecutive years of service in the department, and leaves a widow, widower, or a child under eighteen (18) years of age, the board of trustees shall order a pension paid to the widow, widower, or child. There shall be paid monthly to the widow or widower, while unmarried, a pension of not less than thirty dollars ($30), or not more than fifty percent (50%) of the deceased’s monthly salary at the time of retirement or death and for each child until it reaches the age of eighteen (18) years, not less than six dollars ($6) or not more than ten percent (10%) of the deceased’s monthly salary, such amount to be determined by the board of trustees. The board may provide a minimum benefit of no more than four hundred dollars ($400) per month, initially, to the surviving spouse if the benefit can be supported on an actuarially-sound basis by the pension fund. The board may increase the minimum benefit pursuant to the provisions of KRS 95.560 . If the deceased member was unmarried and childless, a pension shall be paid to his dependent father and mother of not less than thirty dollars ($30) or not more than twenty percent (20%) of the deceased’s monthly salary. If one (1) parent is dead, the other shall receive the entire amount, and if both are living, each shall receive one-half (1/2) the amount, such amount to be determined by the board of trustees.
  2. No person shall receive a pension from the policemen’s and firefighters’ pension fund except as provided in this section.

History. 3142b-4, 3142b-5, 3142b-9, 3142b-13, 3351a-4, 3351a-5, 3351a-9, 3351a-13: amend. Acts 1956, ch. 31, § 1; 1976, ch. 117, § 1; 1978, ch. 164, § 25, effective June 17, 1978; 1994, ch. 50, § 4, effective July 15, 1994; 2014, ch. 92, § 124, effective January 1, 2015.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Right to Pension.

One whose name has not been placed on the pension list has no vested right to a pension. Miller v. Price, 282 Ky. 611 , 139 S.W.2d 450, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 224 ( Ky. 1940 ).

The fact that a pensioner has made compulsory contributions does not vest him with any rights in the pension fund. Miller v. Price, 282 Ky. 611 , 139 S.W.2d 450, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 224 ( Ky. 1940 ).

A retired policeman was not entitled to share in pension fund, established long after he ceased to be an active policeman, to which he never contributed even though city failed to carry out its mandatory duty to establish the pension fund. Redmond v. Wheeler, 554 S.W.2d 391, 1977 Ky. App. LEXIS 758 (Ky. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 926, 97 S. Ct. 2628, 53 L. Ed. 2d 242, 1977 U.S. LEXIS 1897 (U.S. 1977).

2. Line of Duty.

Dependents of policeman who accidentally shot himself while cleaning his pistol when off duty at home were not entitled to pensions under law allowing pensions if policeman be killed or die from injury received in line of duty. McAuliffe v. Board of Trustees, 115 S.W. 808 ( Ky. 1909 ).

Cited:

Bishop v. Marcum, 272 Ky. 322 , 114 S.W.2d 126, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 122 ( Ky. 1938 ); Henderson Police & Fireman Pension Bd. v. Riley, 674 S.W.2d 27, 1984 Ky. App. LEXIS 473 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984).

Opinions of Attorney General.

The disability that would entitle a member of the police or fire department to a pension under subsection (1)(b) of this section need not be caused exclusively by the officer’s service and the aggravation or acceleration of a pre-existing disease or injury which bears some relationship to the officer’s service will qualify the officer for a pension. OAG 69-689 .

The board of trustees of the pension fund could not alter the provision of subsection (1)(c) of this section regarding the number of years for eligibility or the amounts paid to widows or dependent parents. OAG 70-637 .

Where police officers who have already retired, received during their active service incentive pay from KLEFPF funds, but the city and the officers did not deduct nor contribute the 4% for pension fund purposes prescribed by KRS 95.580 and the officers’ pensions do not include credit for the incentive pay, the officers, if they voluntarily make the required contributions, retroactively, are entitled to an adjustment in their annuities crediting them with the incentive pay and the city is obligated to make its contribution retroactively. OAG 75-649 .

The requirement of “fifteen (15) consecutive years of service” found in subsection (1)(c) refers only to a member who dies from any cause other than a cause related to the performance of his duties as a police officer. OAG 77-435 .

Where the widows of policemen and firemen receiving pensions and the widow of a fireman killed in the line of duty receive a pension because they have fulfilled the requirements for a pension under subsection (1)(c) of this section and a pension has been granted, recipients acquire vested rights in the pension fund and those rights and benefits cannot be altered or abolished except pursuant to KRS 95.610(3), which permits a pro rata reduction in benefits to beneficiaries during those times when there is insufficient money in the fund to pay each beneficiary the full monthly amount to which he is entitled. OAG 81-318 .

Where the right of a fireman’s widow to pension benefits from a city of the third class had been terminated because of her remarriage, but the remarriage was subsequently annulled, the pension rights held by her prior to the remarriage should be restored. OAG 81-426 .

Where the right of a fireman’s widow to pension benefits from a city of the third class had been terminated because of her remarriage, but the remarriage was subsequently ended by divorce, the pension rights held by her prior to the remarriage could not be restored. OAG 82-67 .

Disability benefits under this section must be based upon work-related disabilities, and in order for the board to determine whether or not the disability was in fact work related, KRS 95.540 , concerning the board’s rule-making power, certainly authorizes it to request a physician of its own choice to examine the petitioner and submit a statement as to whether in his professional opinion the disability was or could be work related. OAG 82-240 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Retirement, disability or hospitalization plans for city employes may be established, KRS 79.080 .

95.560. Pensions on retirement in cities with pension fund established under KRS 95.520 — Increase — Health insurance for retirees.

  1. In cities that have a policemen’s and firefighters’ pension fund established under KRS 95.520 , any member of the police or fire department having served twenty (20) years or longer in the police or fire department may petition the board of trustees for retirement; and if his petition is granted, the board may order paid to him monthly fifty percent (50%) of his monthly salary at the time of retirement.
  2. In order to adjust retirement benefits to the purchasing power of the dollar, the board shall if it is actuarially feasible annually order an increase in benefits paid pursuant to this section and KRS 95.550 . The board shall if it is actuarially feasible order an increase in benefits by an amount equal to the increase in the cost-of-living increase for a recipient of Social Security, but the annual increase shall not exceed five percent (5%).
  3. The board may provide a group hospital and medical insurance plan for retirees and their spouses who have not reached the age to qualify for Federal Medicare, if providing insurance will not jeopardize the capacity of the board to pay retirement and survivor benefits. No insurance shall be provided for persons who are entitled to Medicare benefits or are receiving Medicare benefits.

History. 3142b-4, 3142b-11, 3351a-4, 3351a-11: amend. Acts 1966, ch. 255, § 105; 1982, ch. 90, § 3, effective July 15, 1982; 1990, ch. 118, § 1, effective July 13, 1990; 1996, ch. 109, § 1, effective July 15, 1996; 1998, ch. 260, § 3, effective July 15, 1998; 2014, ch. 92, § 125, effective January 1, 2015.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Construction.

This section is not self-executing in that an applicant for a pension need only satisfy the requirements set forth in it to be automatically entitled to the pension since KRS 95.540 gives the board of trustees administering the pension fund the right to adopt rules and regulations to determine who is “reasonably entitled” to retirement but any rules and regulations adopted by the board must be followed impartially. Lexington v. Wilburn, 265 S.W.2d 777, 1954 Ky. LEXIS 748 ( Ky. 1954 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Where a police department employee resigns and is rehired within a short time, whether he withdraws his pension funds or not, it is still a break in service and the consecutive service period begins on the date of rehiring. OAG 74-476 .

Where police officers who have already retired received during their active service incentive pay from KLEFPF funds, but the city and the officers did not deduct nor contribute the 4% for pension fund purposes prescribed by KRS 95.580 and the officers’ pensions do not include credit for the incentive pay, the officers, if they voluntarily make the required contributions retroactively, are entitled to an adjustment in their annuities crediting them with the incentive pay and the city is obligated to make its contribution retroactively. OAG 75-649 .

A policeman temporarily leaving his employment by virtue of a leave of absence granted by the police department would not violate the consecutive years of service requirement of this section. OAG 78-333 .

95.565. Credit under pension system established under KRS 95.520 for time spent in Armed Forces.

Any member of the police or fire department of a city with a pension fund established under KRS 95.520 , who, while a member of the police or fire department, entered the Armed Forces of the United States, and who was honorably discharged therefrom, shall upon his return to that police or fire department be entitled to the same pension or benefits provided by KRS 95.560 , and his beneficiaries shall be entitled to the same pension under KRS 95.550 , as if the member had remained on active duty with that police or fire department, and his time served in the Armed Forces shall be added to his previous service and shall be construed for purposes of eligibility for pensions or benefits, either for himself or his beneficiaries, as a part and continuation of his consecutive years of service with that police or fire department. This section shall apply only to those members who served in World War II, who apply for reinstatement within ninety (90) days after the date on which the member first received or could have received an honorable discharge, and shall not apply to those members reenlisting in the Armed Forces of the United States.

History. Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 76; 1968, ch. 152, § 71; 2014, ch. 92, § 126, effective January 1, 2015.

95.570. Funeral benefit.

When an active or retired member of the police or fire department dies under the conditions set out in paragraph (c) of subsection (1) of KRS 95.550 , the board of trustees of the pension fund may pay from the fund to the widow, widower or family a sum of not more than two hundred dollars ($200) for funeral expenses.

History. 3142b-12, 3351a-12: amend. Acts 1966, ch. 255, § 106; 1976, ch. 117, § 2; 2014, ch. 92, § 127, effective January 1, 2015.

95.580. Sources of pension fund established under KRS 95.520.

  1. The policemen’s and firefighters’ pension fund established under KRS 95.520 shall consist of:
    1. Revenues of the city authorized to be paid by the city legislative body, which shall be not less than the amount contributed by the members of the police and fire departments.
    2. All rewards, fees, gifts and emoluments paid or given on account of extraordinary service of any member of the police or fire department.
    3. Assessments, which the board of trustees of the pension fund may make, upon each member of the police and fire departments, of not less than one percent (1%) nor more than four percent (4%) of his salary, to be withheld from the monthly salary and paid by the city treasurer or chief financial officer into the pension fund.
  2. Both the principal and interest of the pension fund shall be applicable to the payment of pensions in cities with a pension fund established under KRS 95.520 .

HISTORY: 3142b-4, 3142b-5, 3142b-8, 3351a-4, 3351a-5, 3351a-8: amend. Acts 1948, ch. 75; 2016 ch. 31, § 10, effective July 15, 2016.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Assessments of Salaries.

It is discretionary with the board whether or not they will assess members of a fire department but when they do the amount is deducted from salaries and becomes a part of a public fund which may be controlled by proper authorities and in which a fireman whose name has not been placed on the retirement list has no vested rights. Miller v. Price, 282 Ky. 611 , 139 S.W.2d 450, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 224 ( Ky. 1940 ).

Cited:

Redmond v. Wheeler, 554 S.W.2d 391, 1977 Ky. App. LEXIS 758 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977), dismissed, 431 U.S. 926, 97 S. Ct. 2628, 53 L. Ed. 2d 242, 1977 U.S. LEXIS 1897 (1977).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Pension fund sources are limited to those authorized by this section and a city legislative body may not provide the pension fund by a transfer of funds from the general fund. OAG 69-654 .

Pension fund sources are limited to those authorized by this section and, therefore, a city may not transfer funds from the general fund of the city to the pension fund. OAG 72-424 .

As long as the 15 percent increment pay is in existence, such increment must constitute a part of the total salary for the purpose of computing the assessment and when the increment stops in any month, the assessment computation for that month and for subsequent months must take that into account. OAG 73-479 .

In view of KRS 15.490 , the incentive pay paid policemen from KLEFPF funds is subject to the 4% deduction for pension fund purposes prescribed by this section. OAG 75-649 .

Where a city has failed to make the 4% deduction prescribed by this section for pension fund purposes from the incentive pay paid policemen from KLEFPF funds, there is a responsibility on the part of the city and any current officer to make the 4% contributions retroactively. OAG 75-649 .

Where police officers who have already retired under KRS 95.550 or 95.560 received during their active service incentive pay from KLEFPF funds, but the city and the officers did not deduct nor contribute the 4% for pension fund purposes prescribed by this section and the officers’ pensions do not include credit for the incentive pay, the officers, if they voluntarily make the required contributions retroactively, are entitled to an adjustment in their annuities crediting them with the incentive pay and the city is obligated to make its contributions retroactively. OAG 75-649 .

If a city has elected to operate under this section, all rewards paid or given on account of extraordinary services to any member of the police department must be paid into the city’s pension fund. OAG 76-288 .

95.590. Custody of pension fund established under KRS 95.520.

  1. The city treasurer or chief financial officer, in cities with a pension fund established under KRS 95.520 , is ex officio treasurer of the board of trustees of the pension fund, and custodian of the pension funds.
  2. The treasurer, as custodian, shall securely keep the fund, subject to the control of the board, and shall keep his books and accounts concerning the fund in the manner prescribed by the board. The books and accounts are always subject to the inspection of the board or any board member.
  3. The treasurer shall, within ten (10) days after his appointment, execute a bond to the city with good surety, in the penal sum the board of trustees directs, to be approved by the board, conditioned for the faithful performance of the duties of his office, and that he will safely keep and well and truthfully account for all money and properties that come into his hands as treasurer of the pension fund, and that upon the expiration of his term of office he will deliver to his successor all securities, unexpended moneys and other properties that come into his hands as treasurer of the fund. The bond shall be filed in the office of the treasurer, and suit may be filed thereon in the name of the city for the use of the board or any person injured by its breach.

HISTORY: 3142b-3, 3142b-14, 3351a-3, 3351a-14: amend. Acts 1966, ch. 255, § 107; 2016 ch. 31, § 11, effective July 15, 2016.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Failure to Set Apart Assessments.

Treasurer who failed to set apart to the police and firemen’s pension fund money collected for that purpose was guilty of a violation of duty imposed on him by statute and this failure of duty was a breach of his bond conditioned upon the faithful performance of his duty such as to render his surety liable. Newport v. Rawlings, 289 Ky. 203 , 158 S.W.2d 12, 1941 Ky. LEXIS 25 ( Ky. 1941 ), overruled in part, Scalise v. Sewell-Scheuermann, 566 S.W.3d 539, 2018 Ky. LEXIS 451 ( Ky. 2018 ).

Cited:

Jenkins v. Keith, 285 Ky. 240 , 147 S.W.2d 397, 1941 Ky. LEXIS 365 ( Ky. 1941 ).

95.600. Pension fund investment.

The board of trustees established under KRS 95.520 may draw the pension fund from the treasury and shall invest it, in whole or in part, in the name of the board or nominee name as provided by KRS 286.3-225 , as the board deems most advantageous for the objects of the fund, in interest-bearing bonds of any county, or any city in this state, or in any securities in which trustees are permitted to invest trust funds under the laws of this state, including a local government pension investment fund created pursuant to KRS 95.895 . The securities shall be subject to the order of the board.

History. 3142b-4, 3142b-7, 3351a-4, 3351a-7: amend. Acts 1966, ch. 255, § 108; 1980, ch. 307, § 13, effective July 15, 1980; 2014, ch. 92, § 130, effective January 1, 2015.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(7/12/2006). 2006 Ky. Acts ch. 247 instructs the Reviser of Statutes to adjust KRS references throughout the statutes to conform with the 2006 renumbering of the Financial Services Code, KRS Chapter 286. Such an adjustment has been made in this statute.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

Jenkins v. Keith, 285 Ky. 240 , 147 S.W.2d 397, 1941 Ky. LEXIS 365 ( Ky. 1941 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Investments by the trustees of a pension fund must be made pursuant to this section and those provisions relating to investments authorized for trustees under KRS 386.020 , 386.030 and 386.050 . OAG 77-85 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Trust funds, investment of, KRS 386.020 , 386.030 , 386.050 .

95.610. Payments to pension fund established under KRS 95.520 — Disbursements — Insufficient funds.

  1. The officers of cities with pension funds established under KRS 95.520 that are designated by law to draw warrants on the city treasurer or chief financial officer shall, on request in writing by the board of trustees of the pension fund, draw warrants on the city treasurer or chief financial officer payable to the treasurer of the board of trustees of the pension fund for all funds belonging to the pension fund.
  2. Moneys ordered paid from the pension fund to any person shall be paid by the treasurer of the board of trustees only upon warrant signed by the president of the board and countersigned by the secretary. No warrant shall be drawn except by order of the board of trustees duly entered on the records of the proceedings of the board.
  3. If at any time there is not sufficient money in the pension fund to pay each beneficiary the full amount per month to which he is entitled, an equal percentage of the monthly payments due shall be paid to each until the fund is so replenished as to warrant payment in full to all beneficiaries.

HISTORY: 3142b-10, 3142b-15, 3142b-16, 3351a-10, 3351a-15, 3351a-16: amend. Acts 1966, ch. 255, § 109; 2016 ch. 31, § 12, effective July 15, 2016.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Misconduct of Pension Fund Officers.

Chief of police was properly demoted to policeman by board of city commissioners for “misconduct” where he violated minutes of the board and statutory requirement of exercise of care usually exercised by prudent businessmen in making loans from the policemen and firemen’s pension fund while he was secretary of the board of trustees of the fund even though the fund ultimately suffered no loss. Jenkins v. Keith, 285 Ky. 240 , 147 S.W.2d 397, 1941 Ky. LEXIS 365 ( Ky. 1941 ).

Under the commission form of government the board of commissioners rather than the board of pension trustees had the authority to hear charges of irregularities and misconduct filed against chief of police and chief of fire department who served as secretary and president respectively of the board of trustees of the pension fund of policemen and firemen. Jenkins v. Keith, 285 Ky. 240 , 147 S.W.2d 397, 1941 Ky. LEXIS 365 ( Ky. 1941 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Where the widows of policemen and firemen receiving pensions and the widow of a fireman killed in the line of duty receive a pension because they have fulfilled the requirements for a pension under subsection (1)(c) of KRS 95.550 and a pension has been granted, recipients acquire vested rights in the pension fund and those rights and benefits cannot be altered or abolished, except pursuant to subsection (3) of this section, which permits a pro rata reduction in benefits to beneficiaries during those times when there is insufficient money in the fund to pay each beneficiary the full monthly amount to which he is entitled. OAG 81-318 .

95.620. Pension fund established under KRS 95.520 to be used to pay pensions and benefits — Exceptions — Refund of contributions. [Effective until July 15, 2020]

  1. Except for court or administratively ordered current child support, or owed child support, or to-be-owed child support, and except as provided in KRS 65.156 , KRS 95.530(5), and subsections (2), (3), and (4) of this section, the policemen’s and firefighters’ pension fund established under KRS 95.520 shall be held and distributed for the purpose of paying pensions and benefits, and for no other purpose.
  2. From July 15, 1982, and thereafter, the board of trustees of the pension fund shall, upon the request of a member, refund a member’s contributions, including contributions picked up by the employer pursuant to KRS 65.155 , upon that member’s withdrawal from service prior to qualifying for pension. The member shall be entitled to receive a refund of the amount of contributions made by the member, including contributions picked up by the employer pursuant to KRS 65.155 , after the date of establishment, without interest.
  3. Any member receiving a refund of contributions shall thereby ipso facto forfeit, waive, and relinquish all accrued rights and benefits in the system, including all credited and creditable service. The board may, in its discretion, regardless of cause, withhold payment of a refund for a period not to exceed six (6) months after receipt of an application from a member.
  4. Any member who has received a refund shall be considered a new member upon subsequent reemployment if such person qualifies for membership under the provisions hereof. After the completion of at least five (5) years of continuous membership service following his latest reemployment, such member shall have the right to make a repayment to the system of the amount or amounts previously received as refund, including six percent (6%) interest from the dates of refund to the date of repayment. Such repayments shall not be picked up by the employer pursuant to KRS 65.155 . Upon the restoration of such refunds, as herein provided, such member shall have reinstated to his account all credited service represented by the refunds of which repayment has been made. Repayment of refunds by any member shall include all refunds received by a member prior to the date of his last withdrawal from service and shall be made in a single sum.

HISTORY: 3242b-18, 3351a-18: amend. Acts 1966, ch. 255, § 110; 1972, ch. 91, § 1; 1978, ch. 164, § 27, effective June 17, 1978; 1982, ch. 90, § 1, effective July 15, 1982; 1982, ch. 166, § 48, effective July 15, 1982; 1984, ch. 24, § 2, effective July 13, 1984; 1998, ch. 255, § 34, effective July 15, 1998; 2014 ch. 92, § 132, effective January 1, 2015; 2016 ch. 31, § 13, effective July 15, 2016.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Use of Fund.

The prohibition of subsection (1) of this section of using the fund only for the payment of pensions and benefits was not intended to defeat the right of a person to interest on funds erroneously denied but was instead aimed at preventing the abuse of pension funds through mismanagement or fraud. Henderson Police & Fireman Pension Bd. v. Riley, 674 S.W.2d 27, 1984 Ky. App. LEXIS 473 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984).

2. Payment of Interest and Costs.

Under KRS 360.040, widow erroneously denied benefits was properly entitled to interest, such money being merely compensation for the use of pension funds erroneously denied her; also her costs were in effect funds properly expended to establish her right to benefits. Thus both her costs and interest are directly related to the payment of benefits, and payment thereof did not constitute a violation of subsection (1) of this section. Henderson Police & Fireman Pension Bd. v. Riley, 674 S.W.2d 27, 1984 Ky. App. LEXIS 473 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984).

Opinions of Attorney General.

The 1972 amendment to this section by Chapter 91, § 1, must be considered prospective, therefore, no refund need be given to a member who withdrew prior to the effective date of this amendment on June 15, 1972. OAG 72-431 .

Under the 1972 amendment to this section by Chapter 91, § 1, a member would be entitled to a refund of all contributions made by him though some were made prior to the effective date of this amendment. OAG 72-431 .

Under the terms of the 1972 amendment to this section by Chapter 91, § 1, authorizing a refund of a member’s contribution is permissive but once authorized the board must refund all of the contributions made by the member. OAG 72-431 .

Where this section is not part of the alternative pension fund act under which a city is operating it would not be applicable under the alternate system and, therefore, would not require a refund of a member’s contribution to the alternative fund upon application of the member. OAG 72-735 .

The date of establishment referred to in this section means the date that the pension fund is established by the city and not the effective date of the act itself. OAG 72-751 .

A member of a city policemen’s pension fund, after the completion of five years of continuous service following reemployment as a city police officer, may make a single sum repayment to the pension system of the amounts previously received as a refund, including six percent interest from the date of refund to the date of repayment, which will reinstate to his account all credited service represented by the repayment of the refunds. OAG 74-47 .

While it may be legally possible for the present city legislative body to abolish the civil service commission established by the outgoing city council pursuant to KRS 95.763 , the adoption by the outgoing council of the pension fund and levy of the necessary tax under the terms of this section and KRS 95.520 cannot be abolished in view of subsection (4) of KRS 95.761 . OAG 74-87 .

Since subsection (4) relates solely to those members who have left the service and who have received a refund, this provision cannot be made applicable to any member who has left the service but has not received a refund. OAG 76-322 .

Since this section only authorizes a refund of a member’s contribution to the pension fund upon the member’s withdrawal from service, the board is prevented from authorizing the return of a member’s contribution to his estate following his death. OAG 76-641 .

Payments cannot be made from pension fund resources for the premiums on life and disability insurance policies for members of a fire department. OAG 76-714 .

Where a member withdraws from service prior to qualifying for a pension, the board of trustees of the pension fund may authorize a refund but it is not required to do so. OAG 76-718 .

Since the board of trustees has exclusive responsibility for the control and proper operation of the pension fund, the board can not delegate their functions to an investment counselor who is paid a fee for his services. OAG 77-85 .

The term “withdrawal” in subsection (2) of this section would not include a person who dies while in service prior to retirement. OAG 78-333 .

The use of the word “may” in subsection (2) of this section, gives to the board discretion in returning any contribution to a member upon his withdrawal, voluntarily or involuntarily, from service. OAG 78-333 .

Where a city erroneously paid Kentucky Law Enforcement Foundation Program Fund funds to one of its injured policemen, and the policeman subsequently resigned and asked for a refund of his contributions to the pension fund pursuant to subsection (2) of this section, the city must refund the funds to KLEFPF or risk having its participation terminated, and the policeman should repay such funds to the city; however, if he refused to do so, the pension fund trustees could not withhold his contributions to the fund since if the trustees elected to return his contributions they must refund all of such contributions and could not withhold a sum from the contributions representing what he owed to KLEFPF. OAG 78-385 .

The provision in this section giving credit to the reemployed fire fighter for previous years of service if he pays back the funds received as a refund does not provide for the reinstatement of that period of time during which the reemployed fire fighter was not employed as a fire fighter, as there is no authorization for him to pay into the fund an amount he would have contributed but for the break in his employment as a fire fighter. OAG 79-203 .

No matter which of the various civil service statutes a city of the fourth class chooses to operate its police and fire fighter’s pension fund under, the city is not required by law to reimburse a member’s contributions to the pension fund upon his resignation from the fire department since a contributor to a pension fund has no vested right in the fund until he becomes an actual beneficiary. OAG 80-212 .

There is no provision for abolishing the pension fund once it is established, though those officers leaving the force are entitled to a refund of their contributions under the terms of this section. OAG 82-152 .

The 1982 amendment to this section by Acts 1982, ch. 90, making the return of pension fund contributions mandatory, is not retroactive and applies only to those individuals leaving service following the effective date of said amendment, July 15, 1982. OAG 82-349 .

Any member of the pension fund as of July 15, 1982 who thereafter withdraws from service prior to retirement is entitled to a refund of all contributions he has been required to make to the fund from the time of its inception and not simply those made following the effective date of the 1982 amendment to subsection (2) of this section. OAG 82-579 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Exempt from attachment, execution, etc., pension fund, KRS 427.120 .

95.620. Pension fund established under KRS 95.520 to be used to pay pensions and benefits — Exceptions — Refund of contributions. [Effective July 15, 2020]

  1. Except for court or administratively ordered current child support, or owed child support, or to-be-owed child support, and except as provided in KRS 65.156 , KRS 95.530(6), and subsections (2), (3), and (4) of this section, the policemen’s and firefighters’ pension fund established under KRS 95.520 shall be held and distributed for the purpose of paying pensions and benefits, and for no other purpose.
  2. From July 15, 1982, and thereafter, the board of trustees of the pension fund shall, upon the request of a member, refund a member’s contributions, including contributions picked up by the employer pursuant to KRS 65.155 , upon that member’s withdrawal from service prior to qualifying for pension. The member shall be entitled to receive a refund of the amount of contributions made by the member, including contributions picked up by the employer pursuant to KRS 65.155 , after the date of establishment, without interest.
  3. Any member receiving a refund of contributions shall thereby ipso facto forfeit, waive, and relinquish all accrued rights and benefits in the system, including all credited and creditable service. The board may, in its discretion, regardless of cause, withhold payment of a refund for a period not to exceed six (6) months after receipt of an application from a member.
  4. Any member who has received a refund shall be considered a new member upon subsequent reemployment if such person qualifies for membership under the provisions hereof. After the completion of at least five (5) years of continuous membership service following his or her latest reemployment, such member shall have the right to make a repayment to the system of the amount or amounts previously received as refund, including six percent (6%) interest from the dates of refund to the date of repayment. Such repayments shall not be picked up by the employer pursuant to KRS 65.155 . Upon the restoration of such refunds, as herein provided, such member shall have reinstated to his or her account all credited service represented by the refunds of which repayment has been made. Repayment of refunds by any member shall include all refunds received by a member prior to the date of his or her last withdrawal from service and shall be made in a single sum.

HISTORY: 3242b-18, 3351a-18: amend. Acts 1966, ch. 255, § 110; 1972, ch. 91, § 1; 1978, ch. 164, § 27, effective June 17, 1978; 1982, ch. 90, § 1, effective July 15, 1982; 1982, ch. 166, § 48, effective July 15, 1982; 1984, ch. 24, § 2, effective July 13, 1984; 1998, ch. 255, § 34, effective July 15, 1998; 2014 ch. 92, § 132, effective January 1, 2015; 2016 ch. 31, § 13, effective July 15, 2016; 2020 ch. 121, § 5, effective July 15, 2020.

Alternative Police and Firefighters’ Pension Fund

95.621. Adoption by city described in KRS 95.518 of alternative fund, effect — Members excluded, how — Coverage provided in County Employees Retirement System after August 1, 1988.

  1. If a city described in KRS 95.518 adopted the alternative pension fund provisions under KRS 95.621 to 95.629 prior to August 1, 1988, to govern the pension fund for its policemen and firefighters, all the provisions in this section are mandatory. The provisions of KRS 95.620 shall apply to any city which has adopted KRS 95.621 to 95.629 .
  2. Any member of the police or fire department serving at the time of passage of the ordinance and not desiring to participate in the fund and its benefits may be excluded by notifying the board of trustees of the pension fund in writing of his desire not to participate within ten (10) days after the effective date of this ordinance.
    1. After August 1, 1988, no new pension fund shall be created pursuant to this section, and cities which were covered by this section on or prior to August 1, 1988, shall participate in the County Employees Retirement System effective August 1, 1988; (3) (a) After August 1, 1988, no new pension fund shall be created pursuant to this section, and cities which were covered by this section on or prior to August 1, 1988, shall participate in the County Employees Retirement System effective August 1, 1988;
    2. Cities which were covered by this section on or prior to August 1, 1988, shall provide for the retirement of police or firefighters rehired after August 1, 1988, by placing such employees in the County Employees Retirement System;
    3. Cities which were covered by this section on or prior to August 1, 1988, shall place police or firefighters newly hired after August 1, 1988, in the County Employees Retirement System;
    4. Cities which were covered by this section on or prior to August 1, 1988, shall offer employees hired on or prior to August 1, 1988, membership in the County Employees Retirement System under the alternate participation plan as described in KRS 78.530(3), but such employees may elect to retain coverage under this section; and
    5. The city shall certify that all police and firefighters placed in the County Employees Retirement System, and not covered by Social Security for their employment with the city, are employed in hazardous positions. If the police and firefighters are covered by Social Security for their employment with the city, the city may certify that they are employed in hazardous positions.

History. Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 8, § 1, 11; 1974, ch. 52, § 1; 1978, ch. 164, § 28, effective June 17, 1978; 1984, ch. 177, § 5, effective July 13, 1984; 1988, ch. 11, § 4, effective July 15, 1988; 2014, ch. 92, § 133, effective January 1, 2015; 2015 ch. 28, § 14, effective June 24, 2015.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

Acts 1988, ch. 11, § 19, provides: “In order that city employes with a choice can make an informed decision on whether or not to join the county employes retirement system, Kentucky retirement systems shall conduct briefings for each affected pension system on the provisions of this Act. Each employe shall receive a written summary of the retirement benefits which the county employes retirement system offers, and each employe shall be given the opportunity to attend an oral presentation. All such presentations shall be completed by October 15, 1988, and each affected employe shall make his decision by November 1, 1988. Failure of an employe subject to the provisions of this Act to receive a written summary or to attend an oral briefing shall in no way invalidate any of the provisions of this Act.”

Opinions of Attorney General.

A majority vote is sufficient for the pension board to act on a petition for retirement since there is no provision to the contrary. OAG 73-602 .

An applicant for the position of fireman in a city of the third class that has adopted the alternate police and firemen’s pension fund system must participate in the pension fund and as a consequence he cannot be excluded therefrom under the provisions of subdivision (2) of this section. OAG 74-788 .

A city of the third class may levy a tax in excess of the compensating tax rate where such is necessary to provide support for the alternative pension plan provided for in KRS 95.621 to 95.629 . OAG 75-203 .

The adoption of an alternative pension fund for police and firemen in a city of the third class is legal and permissible and optional on the part of the city legislative body. OAG 75-231 .

Unless and until members of a volunteer fire department are appointed as city firemen pursuant to KRS 95.440 , the members cannot be included under the city’s pension fund. OAG 76-714 .

The pension fund adopted pursuant to KRS 95.621 to 95.629 is limited to the officers and employes of the lawfully created police and fire departments in cities of the third class and does not apply to other city employees, officers or personnel. OAG 78-26 .

A fourth-class city which has not adopted a civil service system may, at its option, operate under the provisions of KRS 95.761(2) with respect to the establishment of its pension fund; this subsection authorizes the city to adopt the pension fund authorized for cities of the third class pursuant to KRS 95.520 to 95.620 but would not include the alternate method for third class cities authorized under KRS 95.621 to 95.629 ; also, the city may operate its pension fund under the terms of KRS 95.762 to 95.785 governing fourth-class cities or under the general civil service act (KRS Ch. 90) relating to third-class cities pursuant to KRS 95.761(3). OAG 82-64 .

Employees who were employed prior to the establishment of a pension system cannot receive credit under the subsequently established pension system for the prior years of work for the police department. OAG 82-627 .

Where police dispatcher was improperly excluded from participation in the existing pension system when she was initially hired, she should be given credit for that period of time from date she was hired to date she was permitted to participate in the pension system. OAG 82-627 .

A full-time police dispatcher would be a member of the police department and a member of the pension fund; full-time members of the police department hired after the enactment of KRS 95.621 to 95.629 are required members of that pension system and cannot be excluded from participation in that system. OAG 82-627 .

Members of a volunteer fire department are not considered members of a city fire department even if the volunteer fire fighters and the city have contracted for fire fighting services in the city; members of a volunteer fire department organized as a private corporation cannot be included in the policemen’s and fire fighters’ pension fund of a third-class city. OAG 82-627 .

In the apparent absence of a Kentucky case concerning the matter, since the pension statutes (KRS 95.621 to 95.629 ) do not contain any provisions relative to disqualification from pension benefits because of misconduct, an otherwise qualified applicant for pension benefits cannot be disqualified from receiving benefits because of misconduct. OAG 84-1 .

95.622. Pension fund created in cities adopting provisions of KRS 95.621 to 95.629 — Board of trustees, members, officers, powers — Repeal of ordinances establishing pension fund — Liquidation and distribution of residual assets — Report. [Effective until July 15, 2020]

  1. There shall be created in cities that elected to adopt the provisions of KRS 95.621 to 95.629 a policemen’s and firefighter’s pension fund, and a board of trustees for that fund.
    1. Except as provided by paragraph (c) of this subsection, in cities where there are fewer than six (6) active members of the pension fund, the board of trustees of the policemen’s and firefighter’s pension fund shall be composed of the mayor, city treasurer or chief financial officer, and one (1) retired member each from the police and fire departments shall be elected by the respective retired members of those departments annually by ballot, one (1) from each department, and shall serve for one (1) year and until their successors are elected and qualified. (2) (a) Except as provided by paragraph (c) of this subsection, in cities where there are fewer than six (6) active members of the pension fund, the board of trustees of the policemen’s and firefighter’s pension fund shall be composed of the mayor, city treasurer or chief financial officer, and one (1) retired member each from the police and fire departments shall be elected by the respective retired members of those departments annually by ballot, one (1) from each department, and shall serve for one (1) year and until their successors are elected and qualified.
    2. If there are six (6) or more active members of the fund, there shall be two (2) additional board members who shall be one (1) active member of the fund from each department elected by the active members of the fund from the respective departments and who shall serve for one (1) year and until their successors are elected and qualified. If all of the six (6) or more active members or all of the retired members are from one (1) department, then both of the active member board members or both of the retired board members, as the case may be, shall be elected from that department.
    3. If there are fewer than six (6) active and retired members of the fund, the board of trustees shall be composed of the mayor, city treasurer or chief financial officer, and two (2) employees appointed by the mayor, one (1) from the city police department and one (1) from the city fire department, who shall serve for one (1) year and until their respective successors are appointed and qualified. If all of the members of the pension fund are from one (1) department, no appointment shall be made from the other department.
    4. The board shall select from their number a president and a secretary. The board of trustees shall be the trustees of the pension fund and of all moneys donated or paid for the relief or pensioning of members of the police and fire departments. It may do all things necessary to protect the fund.
  2. The board of trustees may draw the pension fund from the treasury and invest it, in whole or in part, in the name of the board or nominee name as provided by KRS 286.3-225 , as the board deems most advantageous for the objects of the fund, in a local government pension investment fund created pursuant to KRS 95.895 or in any other securities in which trustees are permitted to invest trust funds under the laws of this state. The securities shall be subject to the order of the board.
  3. The board of trustees’ membership shall be restructured according to the provisions of this section at the time of the next scheduled election of board members after July 15, 2016.
  4. If all liabilities to all individuals entitled to benefits from the policemen’s and firefighters’ pension fund have been satisfied, the ordinances establishing the fund may be repealed by the majority vote of the duly elected members of the entire legislative body in accordance with the provisions established by KRS 95.530(5).

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 8, § 2; 1978, ch. 164, § 29, effective June 17, 1978; 1980, ch. 307, § 14, effective July 15, 1980; 1990, ch. 83, § 3, effective July 13, 1990; 2016 ch. 31, § 14, effective July 15, 2016.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(7/12/2006). 2006 Ky. Acts ch. 247 instructs the Reviser of Statutes to adjust KRS references throughout the statutes to conform with the 2006 renumbering of the Financial Services Code, KRS Chapter 286. Such an adjustment has been made in this statute.

95.622. Pension fund created in cities adopting provisions of KRS 95.621 to 95.629 — Board of trustees, members, officers, powers — Option to convert pension benefits to annuity benefits — Repeal of ordinances establishing pension fund — Liquidation and distribution of residual assets — Report. [Effective July 15, 2020]

  1. There shall be created in cities that elected to adopt the provisions of KRS 95.621 to 95.629 a policemen’s and firefighters’ pension fund, and a board of trustees for that fund.
    1. Except as provided by paragraph (c) of this subsection, in cities where there are fewer than six (6) active members of the pension fund, the board of trustees of the policemen’s and firefighters’ pension fund shall be composed of the mayor, city treasurer or chief financial officer, and one (1) retired member each from the police and fire departments shall be elected by the respective retired members of those departments annually by ballot, one (1) from each department, and shall serve for one (1) year and until their successors are elected and qualified. (2) (a) Except as provided by paragraph (c) of this subsection, in cities where there are fewer than six (6) active members of the pension fund, the board of trustees of the policemen’s and firefighters’ pension fund shall be composed of the mayor, city treasurer or chief financial officer, and one (1) retired member each from the police and fire departments shall be elected by the respective retired members of those departments annually by ballot, one (1) from each department, and shall serve for one (1) year and until their successors are elected and qualified.
    2. If there are six (6) or more active members of the fund, there shall be two (2) additional board members who shall be one (1) active member of the fund from each department elected by the active members of the fund from the respective departments and who shall serve for one (1) year and until their successors are elected and qualified. If all of the six (6) or more active members or all of the retired members are from one (1) department, then both of the active member board members or both of the retired board members, as the case may be, shall be elected from that department.
    3. If there are fewer than six (6) active and retired members of the fund, the board of trustees shall be composed of the mayor, city treasurer or chief financial officer, and two (2) employees appointed by the mayor, one (1) from the city police department and one (1) from the city fire department, who shall serve for one (1) year and until their respective successors are appointed and qualified. If all of the members of the pension fund are from one (1) department, no appointment shall be made from the other department.
    4. The board shall select from their number a president and a secretary. The board of trustees shall be the trustees of the pension fund and of all moneys donated or paid for the relief or pensioning of members of the police and fire departments. It may do all things necessary to protect the fund.
  2. The board of trustees may draw the pension fund from the treasury and invest it, in whole or in part, in the name of the board or nominee name as provided by KRS 286.3-225 , as the board deems most advantageous for the objects of the fund, in a local government pension investment fund created pursuant to KRS 95.895 or in any other securities in which trustees are permitted to invest trust funds under the laws of this state. The securities shall be subject to the order of the board.
  3. The board of trustees’ membership shall be restructured according to the provisions of this section at the time of the next scheduled election of board members after July 15, 2016.
  4. If there are fewer than twelve (12) active and retired members or beneficiaries of the policemen’s and firefighters’ pension fund, the governing body of the fund may elect to offer to individuals entitled to benefits from the fund a one (1) time irrevocable option to convert monthly pension benefits from the fund to monthly annuity benefits from an insurance company for the same amount. An insurance company accepting a benefit transfer shall honor any features and options available under the existing plan. If the governing body of the fund elects to offer the option to convert monthly pension benefits to monthly annuity benefits, it shall provide to individuals entitled to benefits from the fund sufficiently complete and appropriate disclosures to assist in making an informed decision.
  5. If all liabilities to all individuals entitled to benefits from the policemen’s and firefighters’ pension fund have been satisfied, the ordinances establishing the fund may be repealed by the majority vote of the duly elected members of the entire legislative body in accordance with the provisions established by KRS 95.530(6).

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 8, § 2; 1978, ch. 164, § 29, effective June 17, 1978; 1980, ch. 307, § 14, effective July 15, 1980; 1990, ch. 83, § 3, effective July 13, 1990; 2016 ch. 31, § 14, effective July 15, 2016; 2020 ch. 121, § 6, effective July 15, 2020.

95.623. Rules — Determination of pension applications — Reports — Legal adviser.

  1. The board of trustees of the pension fund may make all necessary rules for its government in the discharge of its duties, and shall hear and decide all applications for benefits or pensions. Its decision on these applications shall be conclusive, and not subject to revision or reversal, except by the board except as provided in subsection (1) of KRS 95.624 . A record shall be kept of the meetings and proceedings of the board.
  2. The board of trustees of the pension fund shall make an annual report on the condition of the pension fund to the city commission or council at its first meeting in May of each year.
  3. The city attorney shall, if requested, advise the board of trustees of the policemen’s and firefighters’ pension fund in all matters pertaining to its duties and to the management of the fund. He shall represent and defend the board in all actions that may be brought against it, and bring all action in its behalf that may be requested by the board.

History. Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 8, § 3; 1978, ch. 164, § 30, effective June 17, 1978.

Opinions of Attorney General.

A decision of the board which does not comply with the mandatory requirements of KRS 95.624 is not conclusive. OAG 70-269 .

In the apparent absence of a Kentucky case concerning the matter, since the pension statutes (KRS 95.621 to 95.629 ) do not contain any provisions relative to disqualification from pension benefits because of misconduct, an otherwise qualified applicant for pension benefits cannot be disqualified from receiving benefits because of misconduct. OAG 84-1 .

95.624. Pensions in cities adopting alternative provisions of KRS 95.621 — Service retirement — Disability pensions — Survivor’s benefits — Increase in benefits — Health insurance for retirees.

  1. In cities that have adopted the alternative pension fund provisions authorized by KRS 95.621 , any member of the police or fire department having served twenty (20) years or longer in the police or fire department may petition the board of trustees for retirement; and if his petition is granted, the board may order paid to him monthly fifty percent (50%) of his monthly salary at the time of retirement. If this petition for retirement is denied, any policeman or firefighter has the right of appeal in accordance with the Rules of Civil Procedure.
  2. The pension payable for periods of service between twenty (20) and twenty-five (25) years shall be fifty percent (50%) of salary plus two percent (2%) of salary for each year in excess of twenty (20). The pension payable for twenty-five (25) years of service shall be sixty percent (60%) of salary. The pension payable for periods of service between twenty-five (25) and thirty (30) years shall be sixty percent (60%) of salary plus three percent (3%) of salary for each year in excess of twenty-five (25). The pension payable for thirty (30) years of service shall be seventy-five percent (75%) of salary.
  3. The pensions or benefits paid for disability or death from the policemen’s and firefighters’ pension fund created under KRS 95.622 shall be as follows:
    1. If any member of the police and fire department becomes temporarily totally disabled, physically or mentally, the board of trustees of the pension fund shall order paid to him monthly, during his disability, until he has recovered and returned to active duty, a sum of not more than one-half (1/2) his salary per month, the amount to be determined by the board. This provision shall not apply if a salary is paid during the same period.
    2. If any member of the police or fire department becomes permanently disabled, physically or mentally, so as to render necessary his retirement from service in the department, the board of trustees shall retire him from service and order paid to him monthly fifty percent (50%) of his monthly salary at the time of his retirement.
    3. If any member of the police or fire department is killed or dies as the result of an injury received in the performance of duty, or dies of any disease contracted by reason of his occupation, or dies while in the service from any cause as a result of his service in the department, or dies in service or while on the retired list from any cause after one (1) year of service in the department and leaves a widow or a child under eighteen (18) years of age, the board of trustees shall order a pension paid to the widow, while unmarried, of one-half (1/2) of salary per month and for each child until it reaches the age of eighteen (18) years, twenty-four dollars ($24) per month. The board may provide a minimum benefit of no more than four hundred dollars ($400) per month, initially, to the surviving spouse if the benefit can be supported on an actuarially-sound basis by the fund. The board may increase the minimum benefit pursuant to the terms of subsection (4) of this section. If the deceased member was unmarried and childless, a pension shall be paid to his dependent father and mother of one-fourth (1/4) of salary per month. If one (1) parent is dead, the other shall receive the entire one-fourth (1/4) salary.
  4. In order to adjust retirement benefits to the purchasing power of the dollar, the board shall if it is actuarially feasible annually order an increase in benefits paid pursuant to this section. The board shall if it is actuarially feasible order an increase in benefits by an amount equal to the increase in the cost-of-living increase for a recipient of Social Security, but the annual increase shall not exceed five percent (5%).
  5. The board may provide a group hospital and medical insurance plan for retirees and their spouses who have not reached the age to qualify for federal Medicare, if providing insurance will not jeopardize the capacity of the board to pay retirement and survivor benefits. No insurance shall be provided for persons who are entitled to Medicare benefits or are receiving Medicare benefits, except that supplemental health insurance may be provided to those retirees and their spouses who are entitled to Medicare benefits or are receiving Medicare benefits if providing the supplemental health insurance will not jeopardize the capacity of the board to pay other existing retirement and survivor benefits.

History. Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 8, §§ 4, 5; 1978, ch. 164, § 31, effective June 17, 1978; 1982, ch. 90, § 4, effective July 15, 1982; 1990, ch. 118, § 2, effective July 13, 1990; 1994, ch. 50, § 5, effective July 15, 1994; 1996, ch. 109, § 2, effective July 15, 1996; 1998, ch. 260, § 4, effective July 15, 1998; 2008, ch. 65, § 1, effective July 15, 2008; 2014, ch. 92, § 135, effective January 1, 2015.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Classification of Cities.

Fact that KRS 95.860 and KRS 95.861 provide that in second-class cities a widow can receive benefits until she remarries, while this section provides that in third-class cities a widow can receive benefits while unmarried, did not unconstitutionally discriminate against widows in second-class cities whose benefits are expressly terminated upon their remarriage. Henderson Police & Fireman Pension Bd. v. Riley, 674 S.W.2d 27, 1984 Ky. App. LEXIS 473 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984).

2. Purpose of Survivor’s Benefits.

Fact that this section, in providing that a widow may receive benefits while unmarried, might overcompensate widows already provided for under will or property settlement and maintenance provisions did not defeat the purpose of the section, for its purpose is not only to provide replacement income for widows, but also to enhance the recruitment and retention of qualified personnel. Henderson Police & Fireman Pension Bd. v. Riley, 674 S.W.2d 27, 1984 Ky. App. LEXIS 473 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984).

3. Reinstatement of Survivor’s Benefits.

Subdivision (3)(c) of this section, which provides for pension benefits for a widow while unmarried, refers to the surviving spouse of a qualified employe during the periods she is not remarried; accordingly, a widow who remarried after receiving benefits for two (2) years and subsequently obtained a divorce was entitled to reinstatement of her pension benefits. Henderson Police & Fireman Pension Bd. v. Riley, 674 S.W.2d 27, 1984 Ky. App. LEXIS 473 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Under subsection (3)(c) of this section, it is mandatory that benefits of one-half (1/2) the deceased member’s salary and $24 per month for each eligible child be paid when the member dies for any cause after one (1) year of service and payment of the full benefit is not precluded because the member died at home from a self-inflicted gunshot wound. OAG 70-269 .

Where retired officer, who was drawing 50 percent of his salary plus two percent (2%) for each year of service over 20, died, his widow was entitled to receive 50 percent of his salary at the time he retired and not 50 percent of the total monthly pension payment which included the longevity payments. OAG 73-410 .

In the absence of a definition of the 20-year-service requirement, the board of trustees may promulgate a rule, pursuant to its authority under KRS 95.623 , that 20 years’ service would include the policeman’s initial service, that is the time spent as an extra or temporary replacement, as long as the service was continuous. OAG 73-602 .

A member of the police or fire departments must serve 20 consecutive years to qualify for a pension and a member who had served only 16 in unbroken sequence would not comply with this provision. OAG 73-643 .

Pension contributions should be deducted from the 15% incentive pay paid to police officers from the Kentucky Law Enforcement Foundation Program Fund under KRS 15.460 and an officer’s salary on which his pension is based should include such incentive pay. OAG 75-375 .

Where a member of a police department contributed to the pension fund during an initial employment of 28 months in the same manner as he contributed during his subsequent continuous service of 24 years, the officer’s pension should be based on his total accumulated time even though there was a gap in his service. OAG 76-748 .

Since the pensions prescribed in this section are based upon specific percentages, a pension board would not be authorized to grant cost of living increases to those persons receiving pensions. OAG 77-314 .

Where an employee, whose employment has been terminated, is later reemployed, his previous service or employment with which he may be credited cannot be counted as part of the 20 consecutive years of service required for retiring. OAG 77-735 .

A fire fighter’s pension should be based on his total credited service but he must have at least 20 consecutive years of service with the fire department regardless of his total credited years of service. OAG 79-203 .

Since the word “consecutively” as used in subsection (1) of this section conveys the meaning of an unbroken sequence or uninterrupted succession, the period of time during which a person’s fire service career is interrupted breaks the sequence of continuous service with the fire department. OAG 79-203 .

A fireman in a third class city, which is operating under the alternative police and fire fighter’s pension fund (KRS 95.621 to 95.629 ) probably cannot, pursuant to this section, recover disability or pension benefits from the pension fund for temporary total disability or permanent disability when that disability did not occur while in the performance of his official duties as a fireman. OAG 80-166 .

Where the right of a fireman’s widow to pension benefits from a city of the third class had been terminated because of her remarriage, but the remarriage was subsequently annulled, the pension rights held by her prior to the remarriage should be restored. OAG 81-426 .

In computing pension benefits as a percentage of salary, the police officer’s salary is what he receives from all sources in connection with his duties performed as a police officer, at the time of retirement. OAG 82-627 .

A city which operates its policemen’s and firemen’s pension fund pursuant to KRS 95.621 to 95.629 should award benefits to a fireman under subsection (3)(a) of this section if it finds on the basis of the evidence presented that the fireman is temporarily totally disabled even if it cannot initially determine the duration of that disability, as it is only obligated to pay under that statute during the existence of the temporary and total disability. OAG 83-156 .

In the apparent absence of a Kentucky case concerning the matter, since the pension statutes (KRS 95.621 to 95.629 ) do not contain any provisions relative to disqualification from pension benefits because of misconduct, an otherwise qualified applicant for pension benefits cannot be disqualified from receiving benefits because of misconduct. OAG 84-1 .

95.625. Military service of member, effect on alternative pension fund provisions.

Any member of the police or fire department of a city that has adopted the alternative pension fund provisions authorized by KRS 95.621 , who, while a member of the police or fire department entered the armed forces of the United States, and who was honorably discharged therefrom shall upon his return to that police or fire department be entitled to the same pension or benefits provided by KRS 95.621 to 95.629 as if the member had remained on active duty with that police or fire department, and his time served in the armed forces shall be added to his previous service and shall be construed for purposes of eligibility for pensions or benefits, either for himself or his beneficiaries, as a part and continuation of his consecutive years of service with that police or fire department; except this section shall apply only to those members who served in World War II or any emergency conflict called by the President of the United States, who apply for reinstatement within ninety (90) days after the date on which the member first received or could have received an honorable discharge and shall not apply to those members reenlisting in the armed forces of the United States.

History. Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 8, § 6; 2014, ch. 92, § 136, effective January 1, 2015.

95.626. Funeral benefit.

When an active or retired member of the police or fire department dies under the conditions set out in paragraph (c) of subsection (3) of KRS 95.624 the board of trustees of the pension fund may pay from the fund to the widow or family a sum of not more than one hundred dollars ($100) for funeral expenses.

History. Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 8, § 7.

95.627. Pension fund created pursuant to KRS 95.622, sources — Use.

  1. The policemen’s and firefighters’ pension fund created pursuant to KRS 95.622 shall consist of:
    1. Revenues of the city authorized by the city legislative body, which shall be not less than the amount contributed by the members of the police and fire departments. Policemen and firefighters shall contribute the same rate as Social Security from their salary; and
    2. All rewards, fees, gifts and emoluments paid or given on account of extraordinary service of any member of the police or fire department.
  2. Both the principal and interest of the pension fund shall be applicable to the payment of pensions governed by the provisions of KRS 95.621 to 95.629 .

History. Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 8, § 8; 1978, ch. 164, § 32, effective June 17, 1978; 1984, ch. 192, § 2, effective July 13, 1984; 2014, ch. 92, § 137, effective January 1, 2015.

Opinions of Attorney General.

This section and 95.629 superseded and provide an exception to KRS 132.027 . OAG 66-562 .

Pension contributions should be deducted from the 15% incentive pay paid to police officers from the Kentucky Law Enforcement Foundation Program Fund under KRS 15.460 and an officer’s salary on which his pension is based should include such incentive pay. OAG 75-375 .

Since fees collected for copies of accident and incident reports have no relation to “fees” given by reason of extraordinary service performed by a member of the police or fire department, such fees should be channeled into a city’s general fund rather than the pension fund. OAG 76-714 .

This section requires policemen and firemen to contribute to the pension fund the same amount that is deducted from their salary for social security, and if social security is deducted from all overtime as well as regular pay they receive, their total contributions to the pension fund must reflect a comparable amount. OAG 78-485 .

95.628. Treasurer of fund, duties, bond.

  1. The city treasurer or chief financial officer shall be ex officio treasurer of the board of trustees of the pension fund, and custodian of the pension fund.
  2. The treasurer, as custodian, shall securely keep the fund, subject to the control of the board, and shall keep his books and accounts concerning the fund in such manner as may be prescribed by the board. The books and accounts shall always be subject to the inspection of the board or any board member.
  3. The treasurer shall, within ten (10) days after his appointment, execute a bond to the city with good surety, in such penal sum as the board of trustees directs, to be approved by the board, conditioned for the faithful performance of the duties of his office, and that he will safely keep and well and truthfully account for all money and properties that come into his hands as treasurer of the pension fund, and that upon the expiration of his term of office he will deliver to his successor all securities, unexpended moneys and other properties that come into his hands as treasurer of the fund. The bond shall be filed in the office of the treasurer, and suit may be filed thereon in the name of the city for the use of the board or any person injured by its breach.

History. Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 8, § 9; 2016 ch. 31, § 15, effective July 15, 2016.

95.629. City’s obligation in alternative pension fund provisions — Pension fund support by city, how computed.

  1. In case of insufficient funds the city will be held responsible for the payment of the monthly payments of the pension fund after the entire proceeds of said pension fund have been transferred to the general fund of the city that has adopted the alternative pension fund provisions authorized by KRS 95.621 .
  2. Revenues of the city authorized by the city legislative body to support the pension fund shall be computed by determining the amount needed to meet the monthly requirements of KRS 95.621 to 95.629 .

History. Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 8, § 10; 1984, ch. 192, § 3, effective July 13, 1984; 2014, ch. 92, § 138, effective January 1, 2015.

Opinions of Attorney General.

A city of the third class may levy a tax in excess of the compensating tax rate to the extent that it is necessary to do so in order to maintain the alternative pension plan authorized by KRS 95.621 to 95.629 . OAG 66-562 .

Group Life Insurance

95.630. Group life insurance for police and fire departments in cities of home rule class. [Repealed]

HISTORY: 2741u: amend. Acts 1974, ch. 248, § 14; 2741u: amend. Acts 1974, ch. 248, § 14; 2014, ch. 92, § 139, effective January 1, 2015; repealed by 2019 ch. 44, § 35, effective June 27, 2019.

City Marshal

95.640. City marshal — Election — Term of office — Abolishment — Cities of third class. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3338, 3348, 3351) was repealed by Acts 1982, ch. 434, § 15, effective July 15, 1982.

95.650. Qualifications — Succession. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3339, 3340, 3351) was repealed by Acts 1982, ch. 434, § 15, effective July 15, 1982.

95.660. Office — Settlement of accounts. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3346, 3351: amend. Acts 1976 (1st Extra. Sess.), ch. 14, sec. 118, effective January 2, 1978) was repealed by Acts 1982, ch. 434, § 15, effective July 15, 1982.

95.670. Compensation. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3349, 3350) was repealed by Acts 1982, ch. 434, § 15, effective July 15, 1982.

95.680. Duties and powers. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3341 to 3345: amend. Acts 1976 (1st Extra. Sess.), ch. 14, § 119, effective January 2, 1978) was repealed by Acts 1982, ch. 434, § 15, effective July 15, 1982.

95.690. Deputy marshals — Appointment — Powers. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3347) was repealed by Acts 1982, ch. 434, § 15, effective July 15, 1982.

Cities with Population of 1,000 to 7,999

95.700. Police department — Appointments — Term of office. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3492, 3629: amend. Acts 1968, ch. 152, § 72; 1972, ch. 104, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

95.710. Qualifications of members of police and fire departments. [Repealed.]

To be eligible for appointment as a member of the police force or fire department of a city of the fourth or fifth class, except cities of the fourth class which have adopted KRS 95.761 to 95.784 , a person must be able to read and write the English language intelligibly, and sober, moral and sagacious. In addition, a member of a police department in a city of the fourth or fifth class shall be at least twenty-one (21) years of age, and a member of a fire department of a city of the fourth or fifth class shall be at least eighteen (18) years of age. No person who has been convicted of a felony is eligible for appointment. After appointment no member shall interfere in any election.

History. 3493, 3629a: amend. Acts 1944, ch. 125; 1954, ch. 81; 1968, ch. 152, § 73; 1976, ch. 159, § 1, effective March 29, 1976; 1982, ch. 40, § 1, effective July 15, 1982; 1985 (1st Ex. Sess.), ch. 4, § 2, effective July 19, 1985; § 314.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3493, 3629a: amend. Acts 1944, ch. 125; 1954, ch. 81; 1968, ch. 152, § 73; 1976, ch. 159, § 1, effective March 29, 1976; 1982, ch. 40, § 1, effective July 15, 1982; 1985 (1st Ex. Sess.), ch. 4, § 2, effective July 19, 1985) was repealed by Acts 2014, ch. 92, § 314, effective January 1, 2015.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Candidate for Office.

Policeman did not violate this section or KRS 95.760 by becoming candidate for office of police judge and being active on own behalf on election day, although such activities would render him ineligible to be policeman and would be ground for discharge. Strong v. Peters, 270 Ky. 323 , 109 S.W.2d 793, 1937 Ky. LEXIS 75 ( Ky. 1937 ).

This section and KRS 95.760 , prohibiting policeman from interfering in election, showed intent to prevent policeman from engaging in political activities, but did not expressly or impliedly forbid him from becoming candidate for office or render him ineligible to hold other office. Strong v. Peters, 270 Ky. 323 , 109 S.W.2d 793, 1937 Ky. LEXIS 75 ( Ky. 1937 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

While the provisions of this section are not applicable to determine the eligibility of a person to be chief of police, the person proposed must possess the qualifications for city officers contained in KRS 87.160 (repealed) and reside within the city as required by Const., § 234. OAG 67-242 .

The provisions of this section would not be applicable to a volunteer fire department of a city of the fourth class or restrict the employment by the department of persons under the age of 21 unless the city has elected to operate a fire department. OAG 68-131 .

The age requirement for policemen contained in this section was not amended by implication by the 1968 amendment to KRS 2.015 . OAG 69-248 .

A police officer of a city of the fifth class is a city officer within the meaning of Const., § 234 and a person must be a resident of the city to be appointed as a police officer or may be discharged for cause after his appointment if he refuses to become a resident of the city, despite the provisions of this section to the contrary. OAG 69-621 .

Where a volunteer fire department is actually a city fire department, the fire chief would not have the authority to deputize persons outside of the organization to assist the department. OAG 71-300 .

Twenty-one (21) is the minimum age for a policeman in a fourth-class city, including the chief of police. OAG 71-352 .

The disqualification referred to in this section would be removed if the person convicted of a felony had his civil rights restored by the governor under Const., § 150. OAG 72-602 .

The fire chief of a city of the fourth class can reside outside the city limits and continue to hold his position. OAG 73-139 .

In view of KRS 15.335 and Newport v. Schindler, 449 S.W.2d 17, 1969 Ky. LEXIS 23 , police officers are no longer required to be residents of the city or county in which they are employed. OAG 73-461 .

There are no applicable constitutional or statutory prohibitions against the increase in compensation during term, subject to the proper budgetary procedure of KRS Ch. 68, of the fire chief of a city of the fourth class, since appointment is by the city legislative body and the fire chief not an officer designated in Const. §§ 161 and 235 nor an elected officer prohibited by KRS 64.580 . OAG 74-400 , withdrawing OAG 74-366 .

Regardless of whether or not a city operates its fire department with or without a civil service program under this chapter, the qualifications for serving as a fire fighter include the fact that the individual be of the age of 21. OAG 79-331 .

The disqualification referred to in this section would be removed if the person convicted of a felony has had his civil rights restored by the governor under § 150 of the Constitution. OAG 79-359 .

Where a person who was appointed as a fire fighter did not possess the statutory qualifications required of the position, the appointment was void and the appointing body can remove that person and appoint a qualified person to fill the position. OAG 79-359 .

KRS 15.335 remains effective irrespective of the subsequent amendments to KRS 61.300 , 63.180 , and this section and consequently controls the residency requirements for police officers in cities of the fifth class. OAG 79-505 .

KRS 61.300 setting the qualifications for nonelective peace officers and this section which required city residency, if possible, or at least county residency, were impliedly repealed by the enactment of KRS 15.535, to the extent of the conflict. OAG 79-505 .

A police officer in a fifth-class city could hold a party precinct chairmanship of a political party and perform whatever duties are required of that office during off duty hours. OAG 80-536 .

Absent statutory authority, members of police and fire departments have no seniority rights; accordingly, the city council in a fifth class city acted legally when it appointed an assistant police chief who the council felt was the most qualified, even though he did not have the most seniority. OAG 84-158 .

KRS 95.440 was amended subsequent to the enactment of KRS 15.335 , and the amended statute repealed by implication the provisions of KRS 15.335 , even though the amendment did not relate to residency; as a consequence, police officers are governed by KRS 95.440 and this section, requiring county residency. The statutory requirement, that of county residency for police officers, cannot be altered by a city ordinance requiring city residency, as such would constitute a direct conflict. OAG 85-2 , withdrawing opinions to the contrary — see OAG 71-246 , 73-461, 73-556, 76-416, 78-268, 79-369, 79-505, 80-68, 82-225.

95.715. Firefighters, hours off duty — Cities of fourth class. [Repealed.]

In cities of the fourth class, the city legislative body may by ordinance provide that members of the fire department shall receive a period of twenty-four (24) consecutive hours off duty in each period of fourteen (14) days, in addition to receiving twenty-four (24) hours off duty in each period of forty-eight (48) hours, except in cases of extraordinary emergency.

History. Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 227, § 1; § 314.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 227, § 1) was repealed by Acts 2014, ch. 92, § 314, effective January 1, 2015.

Opinions of Attorney General.

The words “in addition to” mandate that a fire fighter be given 24 hours off duty in each period of 48 hours, except in cases of extraordinary emergency, and may, in the discretion of each city, be given an additional 24 hours off duty during each 14-day period (withdrawing OAG 74-186 and OAG 74-375 to the extent they conflict with this opinion). OAG 79-180 .

95.720. Chief of police — Selection — Term of office -- Compensation. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3504, 3506, 3629a-5, 3629a-6) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980.

95.730. Duties of chief of police. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3505 to 3507, 3629a-6: amend. Acts 1976 (1st Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 120, effective January 2, 1978) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980.

95.740. Powers of chief of police and policemen — Fees — Deputies — Special police. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3495, 3506, 3629a-2, 3629a-6: amend. Acts 1946, ch. 148, § 1; 1992, ch. 435, § 1, effective July 14, 1992) was repealed by Acts 1994, ch. 48, § 4, effective July 15, 1994. For present law, see KRS 95.019 .

95.750. Bond of chief of police, deputies, policemen. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3497, 3508, 3629a-9: amend. Acts 1974, ch. 327, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980.

95.760. Oath of policemen. [Repealed.]

In cities of the fourth and fifth classes except cities of the fourth class which have adopted KRS 95.761 to 95.784 , every member of the police force shall take an oath to faithfully perform the duties of his office, and that he possesses the required qualifications. In cities of the fourth class the oath shall also provide that he will not interfere in any election.

History. 3494, 3629a-1: amend. Acts 1968, ch. 152, § 74; § 314.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3494, 3629a-1: amend. Acts 1968, ch. 152, § 74) was repealed by Acts 2014, ch. 92, § 314, effective January 1, 2015.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Interference in Election.

KRS 95.710 and this section prohibiting policeman from interfering in election, showed intent to prevent policeman from engaging in political activities, but did not expressly or impliedly forbid him from becoming candidate for office or render him ineligible to hold other office. Strong v. Peters, 270 Ky. 323 , 109 S.W.2d 793, 1937 Ky. LEXIS 75 ( Ky. 1937 ).

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Oath of peace officers, to detect and prosecute gambling, KRS 62.040 .

Oath to be taken by all city officers, Const., § 228.

95.761. Adoption of civil service, employees retirement system, and police and firefighters’ pension plan in cities with population of 1,000 to 7,999 — Exemptions from classified service — Limitations on creation of new fund after August 1, 1988.

  1. Any city with a population equal to or greater than one thousand (1,000) but less than eight thousand (8,000) based upon the most recent federal decennial census which has now, or in which there may be hereafter established a regular police or fire department in the future, may by ordinance create a civil service commission, whose duties shall be to hold examinations as to the qualifications of applicants for employment within the police or fire departments. If a city elects to establish a civil service system for its police and fire employees under this section, then it may adopt either the provisions of this section, or KRS 95.762 to 95.766 , or it may adopt the provisions of KRS 90.300 to 90.420 . A city meeting the population criteria of this subsection may adopt the provisions of KRS 90.300 to 90.420 for municipal employees who are not police or fire personnel.
  2. Any city meeting the criteria of subsection (6) of this section may provide a retirement system for any of its employees, including police and firefighters, pursuant to KRS 90.400 or 90.410 . If a city creates a retirement system for its police and firefighters pursuant to KRS 90.400 or 90.410 , it shall establish a board of trustees for that system. The provisions of KRS 90.400 and 90.410 notwithstanding, a majority of the board shall be members of the retirement system elected by the members of the retirement system, except that if there are fewer than six (6) active and retired members of the fund, the board of trustees shall be composed of the mayor, city treasurer or chief financial officer, and two (2) employees appointed by the mayor, one (1) from the city police department and one (1) from the city fire department, who shall serve for one (1) year and until their respective successors are appointed and qualified. If all of the members of the pension fund are from one (1) department, no appointment shall be made from the other department. The board of trustees shall control and manage the retirement fund, for the exclusive purposes of providing benefits to members and their beneficiaries and defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan. The board may contract with investment advisors or managers to perform investment services as deemed necessary and prudent by the board.
  3. A city meeting the criteria of subsection (6) of this section may adopt the provisions of KRS 79.080 or 78.510 to 78.852 for any of its employees, or either KRS 95.520 to 95.620 or KRS 95.767 to 95.784 for its police and firefighters. After adoption of the provisions of any of the statutes listed in this section, the city may not revoke, rescind or repeal these adoptions for any employee covered thereby.
    1. Any of the following offices, positions, and places of employment, in the police and fire departments, may be excluded from the classified service: The chief of police, assistant chief of police, chief of firefighters and assistant chief of firefighters. (4) (a) Any of the following offices, positions, and places of employment, in the police and fire departments, may be excluded from the classified service: The chief of police, assistant chief of police, chief of firefighters and assistant chief of firefighters.
    2. Any classified employee in either department who shall accept an appointment and qualify as chief of police, assistant chief of police, chief of firefighters, or assistant chief of firefighters, shall be deemed to have received a leave of absence from the classified service for, and during the incumbency of, any of said respective positions. Should any such chief or assistant chief, cease to serve as such, the same classification and rank which he had prior to said appointment shall be restored to him.
  4. After August 1, 1988, no city shall create a new pension fund pursuant to this section other than by adopting KRS 78.510 to 78.852 , or by adopting a deferred compensation program pursuant to KRS 18A.270 or a defined contribution or money purchase plan qualified under Section 401(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 as amended. Any city which adopted a pension system pursuant to this section on or prior to August 1, 1988, shall participate in the County Employees Retirement System effective August 1, 1988.
  5. As used in subsections (2) and (3) of this section, “city” means only those cities that were previously classified as cities of the fourth and fifth class under the classification system that was in effect before August 1, 1988.
  6. Notwithstanding subsection (1) of this section, no city shall adopt any civil service system for any of its employees during the months of November or December in any even-numbered year.
  7. Any city that creates a civil service commission pursuant to this section may repeal or amend the ordinance at the discretion of the city legislative body. The city legislative body shall not repeal any provisions of the ordinance governing the maintenance of a pension fund.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 9, § 2; 1966, ch. 236; 1970, ch. 26, § 1; 1978, ch. 164, § 33, effective June 17, 1978; 1982, ch. 256, § 1, effective July 15, 1982; 1984, ch. 177, § 6, effective July 13, 1984; 1988, ch. 11, § 11, effective July 15, 1988; 2014, ch. 121, § 2, effective July 15, 2014; 2016 ch. 31, § 16, effective July 15, 2016; 2019 ch. 44, § 13, effective June 27, 2019.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

Acts 1988, ch. 11, § 19, provides: “In order that city employees with a choice can make an informed decision on whether or not to join the county employees retirement system, Kentucky retirement systems shall conduct briefings for each affected pension system on the provisions of this Act. Each employee shall receive a written summary of the retirement benefits which the county employees retirement system offers, and each employee shall be given the opportunity to attend an oral presentation. All such presentations shall be completed by October 15, 1988, and each affected employee shall make his decision by November 1, 1988. Failure of an employee subject to the provisions of this Act to receive a written summary or to attend an oral briefing shall in no way invalidate any of the provisions of this Act.”

(1/1/2015). This statute was amended by 2014 Ky. Acts chs. 92 and 121. Where these Acts are not in conflict, they have been codified together. Where a conflict exists, Acts ch. 92, which was last enacted by the General Assembly, prevails under KRS 446.250 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Analysis

1. Removal of Police Officer.

The removal of a police officer by the city council which had not adopted police and firemen’s civil service system did not require an administrative hearing prior to such removal, since there was no such provision for an administrative hearing in the statute. Wilson v. Jeffersontown, 511 S.W.2d 115, 1974 Ky. LEXIS 429 ( Ky. 1974 ).

2. Removal of Police Chief.

Where an ordinance establishing a civil service and applying to the police department referred only to “employees” and never to “officers,” the chief of police was not covered by the ordinance and he could only be replaced by a newly elected city council. Turner v. Cole, 559 S.W.2d 170, 1977 Ky. App. LEXIS 861 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).

3. Repeal of Civil Service Ordinance.

Where a city of the fourth class adopted an ordinance establishing a civil service under KRS 90.310 to 90.410 , a subsequently elected city council could not repeal such ordinance. Turner v. Cole, 559 S.W.2d 170, 1977 Ky. App. LEXIS 861 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).

Cited:

Cawood v. Hensley, 247 S.W.2d 27, 1952 Ky. LEXIS 661 ( Ky. 1952 ); Wilson v. Jeffersontown, 511 S.W.2d 115, 1974 Ky. LEXIS 429 ( Ky. 1974 ); Stovall v. Scottsville, 605 S.W.2d 767, 1980 Ky. App. LEXIS 354 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980).

Notes to Unpublished Decisions

1. Civil Service Commission Necessary Party.

Unpublished decision: Neither KRS 95.761 nor the city ordinances prohibited suit against the city civil service commission and authority from the Kentucky state courts indicated that a commission such as the city civil service commission a different type of entity from a mayor or police department, and one that was properly party to a suit. Accordingly, the city civil service commission was a necessary party and the district court abused its discretion in finding that the city civil service commission was not an entity that could be sued. Kindle v. City of Jeffersontown, 374 Fed. Appx. 562, 2010 FED App. 0159N, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 5320 (6th Cir. Ky. 2010 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

A city is authorized to repeal any civil service ordinance it may enact provided it has not at the time of the repeal elected to operate a pension fund system pursuant to KRS 90.410 . OAG 67-115 .

Where a fifth-class city was reclassified as a fourth-class city by an act of the general assembly, but before the reclassification became effective the city council passed an ordinance creating a civil service board for the police department which could relate only to a fourth-class city, the ordinance was invalid and ineffective. OAG 69-36 .

The chief of police and city policemen in a city of the fourth class can be included under civil service. OAG 70-653 .

The police department of a city of fourth class can be placed under a civil service system under the provisions of KRS 90.300 to KRS 90.420 instead of under the provisions of this section to KRS 95.785 relating to a fourth class city. OAG 71-122 .

When a city excludes the chief of police and assistant chief of police from the classified services, the tenure of these offices is determined by the provisions of KRS 95.720 (repealed). OAG 71-503 .

When a city excludes the chief of police from the classified services, the city council is authorized to remove the chief of police at any time, but only for legal cause. OAG 71-503 .

When the city excluded the assistant chief of police from the classified services, he could be removed at the pleasure of the city legislative body. OAG 71-503 .

Fourth-class city could separate its police and fire departments to the extent that the city may place only the police department under KRS Chapter 90 if it so desires. OAG 72-33 .

Fourth-class city of Scottsville could adopt an ordinance under this section purporting to create a police civil service commission and operate the police department under the terms of KRS 90.310 to 90.390 . OAG 72-33 .

This section does not authorize cities of the fourth class to elect to operate under KRS 95.497 pertaining to annual leave for members of the police department in third-class cities. OAG 72-331 .

If a city of the fourth class creates a pension fund for its employees under KRS 90.410 , and creates a separate pension fund for the police and firemen under this chapter, subsection (4) would prohibit the combining of the two funds, since the adoption of such pension plans may not be revoked, rescinded or repealed. OAG 73-218 .

Police and firemen of a city of the third class cannot be placed under the general civil service act found under KRS Chapter 90 since the legislature has not seen fit to give cities of this class any option in this respect. OAG 73-602 .

While it may be legally possible for the present city legislative body to abolish the civil service commission established by the outgoing city council pursuant to KRS 95.763 , the adoption by the outgoing council of the pension fund and levy of the necessary tax under the terms of KRS 95.520 and 95.620 cannot be abolished in view of subsection (4) of this section. OAG 74-87 .

A 58 year old person would be eligible to be appointed as a city assistant chief of police but he must otherwise qualify by taking the civil service examination unless the city ordinance electing to operate under KRS Ch. 90 excluded the position of assistant chief of police. OAG 74-539 .

Even though a city has not established a pension fund pursuant to KRS 90.410 and has elected to be covered under the county employees retirement system, KRS 78.510 (10) and 78.530 (1), it nevertheless must continue to operate its civil service system, excluding retirement, pursuant to KRS Ch. 90. OAG 74-615 .

A city policeman in a city of the fourth class that has elected not to operate under civil service may run for city office and still hold his job as city policeman. OAG 75-242 .

Although normally considered a municipal officer, the salary of the city fire chief may be increased during his term of office since he is not a constitutionally named officer. OAG 75-318 .

A city of the fourth class, not under the Civil Service Commission as described in KRS 95.761 to 95.784 , is regulated and subject to the provisions of KRS 95.700 to 95.760 which means that the appointment and removal of members of the police department and the chief of police are governed by the provisions of KRS 95.700 (repealed), 95.715 and 95.720 (repealed). OAG 76-435 .

Pursuant to subsection (3) of this section a city of the fourth class can adopt a civil service system for all city employees. OAG 79-232 .

A person who is serving as a police officer is not exempt from the statutory procedures and requirements pertaining to that position merely because he is paid by CETA funds. OAG 79-534 .

Where one of the applicants for a police job opening was discharged from another police department for alleged criminal misconduct, this would not be basis enough to bar him from consideration for the opening. OAG 79-534 .

If a city has elected to operate under civil service and all employees of the police and fire departments are contributing to the policemen’s and firemen’s fund, the contributions to the fund are mandatory. OAG 80-65 .

The chief of police and assistant chief of police may either be included or excluded from the classified service program. OAG 80-77 .

The positions of chief of police, assistant chief of police and city superintendent could properly be added to a pre-existing classified civil service program. OAG 80-77 .

If a fourth-class city elects to operate its civil service program under KRS 95.762 to 95.778 , it cannot operate under any portions of KRS Ch. 90 or KRS 95.520 to 95.620 ; on the other hand, if the city does not adopt the civil service program under KRS Ch. 95, it has the right under KRS 95.761 (3) to adopt the provisions of KRS 90.300 to 90.420 , and in doing so has the option of adopting a pension fund as provided in KRS 90.410 ; however the only pension fund it may adopt, if it operates under KRS Ch. 90, is the one provided for in that act and the city cannot, for example, utilize the pension system provided for under KRS 95.520 to 95.620 or the pension system under KRS 95.761 to 95.785 . OAG 82-64 .

In light of the permissive language in subsection (1) of this section, a fourth-class city may operate its police and fire departments without the benefit of a civil service system. It may do so under the various provisions set forth in the three subsections, but not under the alternate method for third-class cities set forth in KRS 95.621 to 95.629 . OAG 82-64 .

A pension plan adopted pursuant to KRS 95.761 and KRS 90.300 et seq., may not validly provide that, on repeal of the enabling ordinance, “all unexpended moneys appropriated to said pension fund out of the said city’s general fund to the Policemen’s and Firemen’s Fund by the said Board of Council of such city and at the time of adoption of a repeal ordinance shall revert back to the city’s general fund,” and such contribution must remain in the fund to be paid on eventual retirement of the contributing police and firemen; KRS 95.761 (4) clearly prohibits the repeal of any pension ordinance adopted under KRS 90.300 to 90.410 or, for that matter, under KRS 95.520 to 95.620 . OAG 82-64 .

A fourth-class city which has not adopted a civil service system may, at its option, operate under the provisions of KRS 95.761(2) with respect to the establishment of its pension fund; this subsection authorizes the city to adopt the pension fund authorized for cities of the third class pursuant to KRS 95.520 to 95.620 but would not include the alternate method for third class cities authorized under KRS 95.621 to 95.629 ; also, the city may operate its pension fund under the terms of KRS 95.762 to 95.785 governing fourth-class cities or under the general civil service act (KRS Ch. 90) relating to third-class cities pursuant to KRS 95.761(3). OAG 82-64 .

In order for a police officer who as a result of an injury was transferred to a position not covered by civil service to again become a police officer covered by civil service he must be reexamined. OAG 82-580 .

Where ordinance providing that city civil service system would operate under KRS 90.300 to 90.420 included the position of chief and assistant chief among the classified positions, those individuals serving in such capacity could not be excluded from civil service during their tenure by the abolition of either of these offices by subsequent action on the part of city council nor could the ordinance be again amended to exclude from coverage the office of chief or assistant chief to be effective during the present tenure of those persons holding these positions; however, following the termination of their employment for whatever reason, the ordinance could be amended to exclude these positions and the city could by separate ordinance abolish said positions by amending the ordinance establishing them initially. OAG 83-215 .

Absent statutory authority, members of police and fire departments have no seniority rights; accordingly, the city council in a fifth class city acted legally when it appointed an assistant police chief who the council felt was the most qualified, even though he did not have the most seniority. OAG 84-158 .

95.762. Examination and qualifications of applicants for police and fire departments — Political discrimination forbidden — Guarantee of tenure — Decrease of personnel.

  1. The commission shall require all applicants for appointments as members of the police or fire departments to be examined as to their qualifications to fill the office of policeman or firefighter, and as to their knowledge of the English language, and as to the law and rules governing the duties of policemen and firefighters. Every member of the police or fire department shall be able to read and write and understand the English language, and have such other general qualifications as may be prescribed.
  2. No person shall be appointed a member of the police or fire departments unless he is well known to be a person of sobriety and integrity, and has been and is an orderly, law-abiding citizen, nor shall any person be appointed as a member of said police or fire departments on account of any political, partisan service rendered by him or on account of political sentiments or affiliations, or who is under twenty-one (21) years of age or over forty (40), unless the applicant has had as much as five (5) years’ experience as a regular policeman or firefighter and is not over fifty-five (55) years of age. No member of the police or fire departments shall be removed or discharged or reduced in grade or pay for any political partisan opinion. The appointment and continuance upon the police and fire departments shall depend solely upon the ability and willingness of a person to comply with the rules of the said departments and to perform the duties of said departments. No appointment to or continuance as a member of a police or fire department shall be as a reward for political activity nor be obtained by political services or contributions to campaign funds.
  3. The examination and qualifications provided for in this section shall not apply to the members of the regular police and fire departments at this time, who have been continuously in the service for a period of three (3) years.
  4. Members of police and fire departments otherwise qualified under this law shall hold their positions during good behavior, provided, however, that the provisions of KRS 95.761 to 95.784 shall not prevent the said city legislative body from increasing or decreasing the number of policemen or firefighters, as may be deemed proper from time to time, and provided further, that in the event the said city legislative body decreases the number of policemen or firefighters, the youngest member in point of service shall be the first to be reduced and returned to the eligible list and to advance according to the rules and regulations of said department.
  5. The civil service commission may provide that appointments for initial permanent employment may be probationary appointments for a period of not more than twelve (12) months, after which probationary period regular appointments shall be given to all probationary employees who are deemed to be satisfactory by the respective appointing authority.

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 9, § 3; 1974, ch. 289, § 2; 1974, ch. 386, § 22; 1976, ch. 159, § 2, effective March 29, 1976; 1978, ch. 128, § 3, effective June 17, 1978; 1978, ch. 164, § 34, effective June 17, 1978; 1985 (1st Ex. Sess.), ch. 4, § 3, effective July 19, 1985; 2000, ch. 95, § 1, effective July 14, 2000; 2016 ch. 31, § 17, effective July 15, 2016.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

Cawood v. Hensley, 247 S.W.2d 27, 1952 Ky. LEXIS 661 ( Ky. 1952 ); Turner v. Cole, 559 S.W.2d 170, 1977 Ky. App. LEXIS 861 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Volunteer fire fighter of fourth-class city could not become a candidate for mayor of the city without violating prohibition against political activity on the part of firemen. OAG 72-105 .

If the city of Mount Olivet has not elected to place its police department under the civil service act there will be no legal objection to a police officer becoming a candidate for public office. OAG 73-346 .

Regardless of whether or not a city operates its fire department with or without a civil service program under this chapter the qualifications for serving as a fire fighter include the fact that the individual be of the age of 21. OAG 79-331 .

An oral examination could be utilized as part of the examination process provided such a test is uniformly and fairly applied to all candidates and measures some trait, skill, characteristic or ability of the applicants which is needed to perform the job or position in question. OAG 79-534 .

A fourth-class city which has not adopted a civil service system may, at its option, operate under the provisions of KRS 95.761(2) with respect to the establishment of its pension fund; this subsection authorizes the city to adopt the pension fund authorized for cities of the third class pursuant to KRS 95.520 to 95.620 but would not include the alternate method for third-class cities authorized under KRS 95.621 to 95.629 ; also, the city may operate its pension fund under the terms of KRS 95.762 to 95.785 governing fourth-class cities or under the general civil service act (KRS Ch. 90) relating to third-class cities pursuant to KRS 95.761(3). OAG 82-64 .

95.763. Appointment of civil service commission — Qualifications — Term — Vacancies — Officers — Oath.

The mayor, by and with the approval of the legislative body, shall appoint three (3) citizens, who have been taxpayers and voters of the city for five (5) years previous to their appointment, and who shall not be less than thirty (30) years of age, who shall constitute the civil service commission of said city. Such appointees shall originally be appointed for one (1) year, two (2) years and three (3) years, respectively, and the successors of such appointees shall be appointed in like manner, each for a period of three (3) years. Any member of the civil service commission shall be eligible for reappointment. Vacancies shall be filled in the same manner as appointments of said commissioners are made, provided that any person appointed to fill a vacancy shall serve only to the end of the term of the commissioner whose office was vacated. Said commissioners shall elect one (1) of their members as chairman and one (1) as secretary of the civil service commission. Each of said commissioners shall qualify by taking the oath as prescribed by the Constitution of Kentucky.

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 9, § 4.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

Preston v. Floyd/Johnson County Pilots Ass’n, 867 S.W.2d 474, 1993 Ky. App. LEXIS 36 (Ky. Ct. App. 1993).

Opinions of Attorney General.

While it may be legally possible for the present city legislative body to abolish the civil service commission established by the outgoing city council, the adoption by the outgoing council of the pension fund and levy of the necessary tax under the terms of KRS 95.520 and 95.620 cannot be abolished in view of subsection (4) of KRS 95.761 . OAG 74-87 .

If a member of the civil service commission was not appointed pursuant to the required statutory procedure of this section, he is serving in violation of this section and is subject to removal, but until the disqualified commission member either resigns or is removed from his position, he serves as a de facto officer and his acts, if otherwise authorized and permissible, are considered valid. OAG 79-534 .

95.764. Conduct of examinations — Notice — Certification of eligible list — Appointment from list — Rules and regulations — Compensation of commissioners.

The civil service commission shall conduct an examination of persons for appointment as members of the police and fire departments each time a vacancy shall occur in said departments. The mayor shall notify the commissioners each time a vacancy occurs in either of said departments and the commissioners shall within the two (2) weeks following the receipt of such notice hold an examination for persons seeking appointment to such vacancy after giving notice by publication pursuant to KRS Chapter 424. Within one (1) week following the holding of said examination, said commissioners shall certify to the legislative body the names of the three (3) persons receiving the highest grades. The legislative body may appoint any one (1) of said three (3) persons to said department. In the event a vacancy thereafter occurs in said department, or additions thereto of regular or substitute policemen or firefighters are made, within one (1) year following the certification of said names, the legislative body shall fill said vacancy or make such additions from the list of names certified. The commissioners shall make all rules and regulations for the proper conduct of their office. The civil service commissioners shall receive a salary each of one dollar ($1) per annum, paid out of the city’s general fund, and for their services and the expense of holding any one (1) examination by the commissioners after due notice by the mayor has been given to the chairman of the said commission that a vacancy occurs in either of said departments and after the eligible list has been exhausted, shall be paid by the legislative body out of the city’s general fund, not to exceed ten dollars ($10).

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 9, § 5; 1966, ch. 239, § 88; 1978, ch. 164, § 35, effective June 17, 1978.

Opinions of Attorney General.

Where the fire chief and assistant fire chief have been excluded from the classified service under KRS 95.761 vacancies may be filled without examination by the civil service commission. OAG 75-429 .

An oral examination could be utilized as part of the examination process provided such a test is uniformly and fairly applied to all candidates and measures some trait, skill, characteristic or ability of the applicants which is needed to perform the job or position in question. OAG 79-534 .

Since this section provides in part that the civil service commissioners shall certify to the legislative body the names of the three persons receiving the highest grades, even if the city involved had devised through its civil service commission some type of valid preference system for those currently working for the city, a recipient of such preference points or additional credits must be among the three persons receiving the highest grades if he is to be considered for appointment. OAG 79-534 .

The examination, if otherwise properly conducted pursuant to the power and authority of the civil service commission, is not invalid merely because a member of the commission was not properly appointed to the commission. OAG 79-534 .

Since KRS 83A.130(9) was enacted subsequent to this section and since KRS 95.700 was repealed by the 1980 municipal code, it was the intent of the legislature to vest in the mayor rather than the council the authority to make civil service appointments from the list submitted by the civil service commission under the terms of this section. OAG 83-54 .

Research References and Practice Aids

ALR

Promotion examinations for eligible list, discretion of civil service commission as regards. 75 A.L.R. 1234.

Competitive examination under civil service, objective test as condition of. 112 A.L.R. 665.

Validity, construction, and application of enactments relating to requirement of residency within or near specified governmental unit as condition of continued employment for policemen or firemen. 4 A.L.R.4th 380.

95.765. Removal or reduction in grade — Grounds — Procedure — Suspension — Punishment.

  1. No member of the police or fire departments shall be removed from the department or reduced in grade upon any reason except inefficiency, misconduct, insubordination or violation of law, or violation of the rules adopted for the departments. Any person may prefer charges against a member of the police or fire departments, which must be filed in the office of the mayor, who shall thereupon communicate said charges without delay to the legislative body. Said charges must be written, signed by the person making such charges and must set out with clearness and distinctness each and every charge. It shall be the duty of the mayor and each member of the legislative body, whenever probable cause appears, to prefer charges against any member of the police or fire departments whom he or she believes to have been guilty of any conduct justifying his removal or punishment in the interest of public order. The charges thus filed shall be written and shall set out with distinctness and clearness the charges made, and upon the hearing of any charges, as hereinafter provided, all said charges shall be considered traversed, and put in issue, and the trial shall be confined to matters related to the issue so presented. All charges against members of the police or fire departments shall be filed with the clerk of the legislative body, and within three (3) days after said filing the legislative body shall proceed to hear and examine said charges; provided two (2) days before said hearing the member of the police or fire departments, accused, has been served with a copy of said charges, and a statement of the day, place and hour at which and when the hearing of said charges shall begin. The person accused may, however, in writing, waive the service of said charges, and demand trial within three (3) days after said charges are filed with the clerk of said legislative body. The legislative body will have the power to summon and compel the attendance of witnesses at all hearings or sittings by said body, upon subpoena issued by the clerk of said body, and served upon said witnesses by any officer authorized to serve subpoenas from any court of justice in the county. If any witness fails to appear in response to a summons or refuses to testify concerning any matter on which he may lawfully be interrogated, any District Judge, on application of the commission, may compel obedience by proceedings for contempt as in the case of disobedience of a subpoena issued from the District Court. The member of the police or fire department, the accused, shall have the right to have subpoenaed, in his behalf, any witness he may desire, upon furnishing their names to the clerk of said body, and the action and decision of said body on said charges shall be reduced to writing and shall be entered in a book to be kept for that purpose by the clerk of said legislative body, and the written charges filed in this matter shall be preserved and securely attached to the book containing the legislative body’s decisions.
  2. In cases where the mayor or chief has probable cause to believe that a member of the police or fire department has been guilty of any conduct justifying removal or punishment, he may suspend said member from duty, or from both pay and duty, pending said trial, and said member shall not be placed on duty or allowed pay thereafter until the charges are heard by the legislative body. The said body shall fix punishment against a member of the police or fire departments found guilty of any charge under KRS 95.761 to 95.784 , by reprimand or suspension for any length of time in their judgment, not to exceed six (6) months, or by reducing the grade, if the accused be chief or other officer, or by combining any two (2) or more of said punishments, or by removal or dismissal from the service of any such member of the police or fire department. No member of the police or fire department except as provided in KRS 95.761 to 95.784 shall be reprimanded, removed, suspended, or dismissed from the department until written charges have been made, or preferred against him, and a trial had as herein provided.

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 9, § 6; 1976 (1st Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 121, effective January 2, 1978; 2016 ch. 31, § 18, effective July 15, 2016.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

0.5 Applicability.

Defendants were entitled to summary judgment on civil rights claims asserted by deputy sheriff who was discharged after he was convicted of hindering prosecution and official misconduct; KRS 95.765 applies to cities, not counties, and the deputy conceded that his reference to that provision was erroneous. Humphrey v. Scott County Fiscal Court, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32362 (E.D. Ky. Dec. 9, 2005), aff'd, 211 Fed. Appx. 390, 2006 FED App. 0861N, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 29193 (6th Cir. Ky. 2006 ).

1. Authority.

A city’s civil service commission lacked the statutory authority to discipline a police officer for allegedly participating in partisan political campaigning which predated not only the officer’s classification as a civil service employee, but the very existence of the commission itself; therefore, the commission’s dismissal of the officer was illegitimate, and the proper forum for any such action was the city council under KRS Ch. 95. Jones v. Hillview Civil Service Com., 760 S.W.2d 91, 1988 Ky. App. LEXIS 93 (Ky. Ct. App. 1988).

Sections 83A.080(2) and 83A.130(9) permit a local executive authority such as a mayor to terminate the employment of a nonelected city official such as a police officer only if there is no statute which provides otherwise; this section is such a statute, and requires that a disciplinary hearing be conducted before the legislative body rather than before the mayor. Madisonville v. Sisk, 783 S.W.2d 885, 1990 Ky. App. LEXIS 15 (Ky. Ct. App. 1990).

Cited:

Pikeville v. May, 374 S.W.2d 843, 1964 Ky. LEXIS 390 ( Ky. 1964 ); City of Munfordville v. Sheldon, 977 S.W.2d 497, 1998 Ky. LEXIS 135 ( Ky. 1998 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Where a city has not adopted the provisions of KRS 95.761 et seq. and that the city does not have a civil service program for its police officers, the provisions of this section do not cover the police officers in the city and are not applicable to them. OAG 79-150 .

Unless a city of the fourth class elects to adopt a civil service program pursuant to KRS 95.761 to 95.784 , the terms of this section requiring the preferring of charges and the holding of a hearing prior to the removal of a member of the police or fire department would not be applicable. OAG 79-342 .

Research References and Practice Aids

ALR

Power of civil service commission in classifying or grading positions in civil service. 134 A.L.R. 1103.

Pre-employment conduct as ground for discharge of civil service employee having permanent status. 4 A.L.R.3d 488.

Right of public employees to strike or engage in work stoppage. 37 A.L.R.3d 1147.

Mandatory retirement of public officer or employee based on age. 81 A.L.R.3d 811.

Validity, construction, and application of regulation regarding outside employment of governmental employees or officers. 94 A.L.R.3d 1230.

Sexual misconduct or irregularity as amounting to conduct unbecoming an officer, justifying officer’s demotion or removal or suspension from duty. 9 A.L.R.4th 614.

95.766. Action in Circuit Court.

  1. Any member of the police or fire departments who shall be found guilty by the legislative body of any charge as hereinbefore provided, may bring an action in the Circuit Court of the county in which said city may be located to contest the action of that body.
  2. Upon the request of the party accused, the clerk of said body shall file a certified copy of the charges made and the judgment or the findings of the said body in the Circuit Court; which transcript having been filed, the cause shall be docketed in the Circuit Court and tried as an original action by the judge of said court. Should the clerk of said body fail to certify and transmit the transcript aforesaid to the Circuit Court within five (5) days after the request is made for same, then the party aggrieved may file an affidavit in the said Circuit Court, setting out as fully as possible the charges made, the time of trial by said court and the judgment of said body, together with the statements of the facts that the demand for transcript had been made upon the clerk of said body more than five (5) days before the filing of said affidavit. Upon the filing of said affidavit in the Circuit Court, said cause shall be docketed in said court and the Circuit Court is hereby authorized to compel the filing of said transcript by said clerk by entering the proper mandatory orders, and by fine and imprisonment, as in cases of contempt. Such action shall have precedence over other business and be taken up and determined speedily.

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 9, § 7; 1976 (1st Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 122, effective January 2, 1978.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Circuit Court.

The test in the Circuit Court is not whether the administrative decision finds reasonable support in substantial evidence but whether or not the court, hearing witnesses anew, acting as a fact-finding body, from a consideration of all the evidence heard is of the opinion that the evidence preponderates against the decision made by the commission. Owensboro v. Noffsinger, 280 S.W.2d 517, 1955 Ky. LEXIS 169 ( Ky. 1955 ).

The ordinary appeal to the Circuit Court from an order of a city legislative body concerning action taken against a policeman or fireman should be heard by the court without a jury. Owensboro v. Noffsinger, 280 S.W.2d 517, 1955 Ky. LEXIS 169 ( Ky. 1955 ).

95.7665. Applicability of KRS 95.767 to 95.784.

The provisions of KRS 95.767 to 95.784 shall only apply to those cities that were previously classified as cities of the fourth or fifth class prior to August 1, 1988, under the city classification system that was in effect prior to August 1, 1988, or to any other city that established a policemen’s and firefighters’ pension program specifically under the provisions of KRS 95.767 to 95.784 prior to August 1, 1988.

History. Enact. 2014, ch. 92, § 141, effective January 1, 2015.

95.767. Board of trustees of pension fund — Membership — Officers — Treasurer. [Effective until July 15, 2020]

    1. There shall be organized in connection with the police and fire departments a board to be known as the board of trustees of the policemen’s and firefighter’s pension fund. (1) (a) There shall be organized in connection with the police and fire departments a board to be known as the board of trustees of the policemen’s and firefighter’s pension fund.
    2. If there are six (6) or more active members of the fund, the board shall be composed of the mayor of the city, city treasurer or chief financial officer, one (1) member of the city legislative body appointed by the mayor, one (1) retired member each from the police and fire departments elected by the respective retired members of those departments annually by ballot, and one (1) active member of the fund from each department elected by the active members of the fund from the respective departments annually. If all of the six (6) or more active members or all of the retired members are from one (1) department, then both of the active member board members or both of the retired board members, as the case may be, shall be elected from that department.
    3. If there are fewer than six (6) active members of the fund, no active members of the departments shall be elected to the board. The trustees shall select from their number a president and secretary. The city treasurer or chief financial officer shall be ex officio treasurer of the board and custodian of its funds.
    4. If there are fewer than six (6) active and retired members of the policemen’s and firefighters’ pension fund, the board of trustees shall be composed of the mayor, city treasurer or chief financial officer, one (1) member of the city legislative body appointed by the mayor, and two (2) employees appointed by the mayor, one (1) from the city police department and one (1) from the city fire department, who shall serve for one (1) year and until their respective successors are appointed and qualified. If all of the members of the pension fund are from one (1) department, no appointment shall be made from the other department.
  1. The board of trustees membership shall be restructured according to the provisions of this section at the time of the next scheduled election of board members after July 15, 2016.

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 9, § 8; 1978, ch. 164, § 36, effective June 17, 1978; 1990, ch. 83, § 4, effective July 13, 1990; 2016 ch. 31, § 19, effective July 15, 2016.

Opinions of Attorney General.

A city of the fourth class may operate its police and fire departments under the pension plan provided for in this section, or as an alternate, the pension plan provided for under KRS 95.520 to 95.620 or the general civil service and pension plan authorized under KRS 90.300 to 90.420 . OAG 72-762 .

A city of the fourth class may not operate a pension plan for its police officers under KRS 79.080 (2) but, rather, it must utilize the provisions of KRS 95.767 to 95.785 or KRS 95.520 to 95.620 or KRS 90.300 to 90.420 . OAG 81-191 .

95.767. Board of trustees of pension fund — Membership — Officers — Treasurer — Option to convert pension benefits to annuity benefits. [Effective July 15, 2020]

    1. There shall be organized in connection with the police and fire departments a board to be known as the board of trustees of the policemen’s and firefighters’ pension fund. (1) (a) There shall be organized in connection with the police and fire departments a board to be known as the board of trustees of the policemen’s and firefighters’ pension fund.
    2. If there are six (6) or more active members of the fund, the board shall be composed of the mayor of the city, city treasurer or chief financial officer, one (1) member of the city legislative body appointed by the mayor, one (1) retired member each from the police and fire departments elected by the respective retired members of those departments annually by ballot, and one (1) active member of the fund from each department elected by the active members of the fund from the respective departments annually. If all of the six (6) or more active members or all of the retired members are from one (1) department, then both of the active member board members or both of the retired board members, as the case may be, shall be elected from that department.
    3. If there are fewer than six (6) active members of the fund, no active members of the departments shall be elected to the board. The trustees shall select from their number a president and secretary. The city treasurer or chief financial officer shall be ex officio treasurer of the board and custodian of its funds.
    4. If there are fewer than six (6) active and retired members of the policemen’s and firefighters’ pension fund, the board of trustees shall be composed of the mayor, city treasurer or chief financial officer, one (1) member of the city legislative body appointed by the mayor, and two (2) employees appointed by the mayor, one (1) from the city police department and one (1) from the city fire department, who shall serve for one (1) year and until their respective successors are appointed and qualified. If all of the members of the pension fund are from one (1) department, no appointment shall be made from the other department.
  1. The board of trustees membership shall be restructured according to the provisions of this section at the time of the next scheduled election of board members after July 15, 2016.
  2. If there are fewer than twelve (12) active and retired members or beneficiaries of the policemen’s and firefighters’ pension fund, the governing body of the fund may elect to offer to individuals entitled to benefits from the fund a one (1) time irrevocable option to convert monthly pension benefits from the fund to monthly annuity benefits from an insurance company for the same amount. An insurance company accepting a benefit transfer shall honor any features and options available under the existing plan. If the governing body of the fund elects to offer the option to convert monthly pension benefits to monthly annuity benefits, it shall provide to individuals entitled to benefits from the fund sufficiently complete and appropriate disclosures to assist in making an informed decision.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 9, § 8; 1978, ch. 164, § 36, effective June 17, 1978; 1990, ch. 83, § 4, effective July 13, 1990; 2016 ch. 31, § 19, effective July 15, 2016; 2020 ch. 121, § 7, effective July 15, 2020.

95.768. Pension fund in cities establishing a fund under KRS 95.767 to 95.784 — Purpose — Investment — Coverage provided in County Employees Retirement System after August 1, 1988.

  1. The police and firefighters’ pension fund in cities that have established a fund pursuant to KRS 95.767 to 95.784 shall consist of:
    1. Revenues of the city authorized by the city legislative body, which shall not be less than the amount contributed by the members of the police and fire departments;
    2. All rewards, fees, gifts or emoluments paid or given on account of extraordinary service of any member of the police or fire department;
    3. Assessments, which the board of trustees of the pension fund shall make, upon each member of the police and fire departments, of not more than three and one-half percent (3.5%) of his salary, to be held from the monthly salary and paid by the city treasurer or chief financial officer into the pension fund. Beginning July 15, 1982, and thereafter, upon a member’s withdrawal from service prior to qualifying for a pension, the board of trustees shall be governed by the provisions of KRS 95.620(2), (3) and (4).
  2. Said fund shall be for the pensioning of any policeman or firefighter who has served in the police or fire departments for at least a period of twenty (20) years or more, providing that applicant has reached his fifty-first birthday, and all members of the police and fire departments shall be entitled to be credited with the services rendered continuously prior to the adoption ordinance under the provisions of KRS 95.761 , by said city, to the eligibility of the twenty (20) year or more, period for pension, not less than three (3), nor to exceed fifteen (15) years of previous service, and for the further purpose of pensioning any member of the police or fire department who may become permanently crippled while in the service and on duty, and for the further purpose of pensioning the widow or dependent children under fourteen (14) years of age, or either of them, of any member of said departments who may lose his life while in the service and on active duty. The payments made under the provisions of this section shall constitute and be kept as a fund to be called the “Policemen’s and Firefighters’ Pension Fund,” and the board of trustees of the policemen’s pension fund, are declared to be the trustees of said fund, and they shall have power, and it shall be their duty, from time to time, to invest the same, in whole or in part, as they shall deem most advantageous for the objects of said fund; and they are empowered to make all the necessary contracts and to pursue all the necessary remedies in the premises.
    1. After August 1, 1988, no new pension fund shall be created pursuant to this section, and cities which were covered by this section on or prior to August 1, 1988, shall participate in the County Employees Retirement System effective August 1, 1988. (3) (a) After August 1, 1988, no new pension fund shall be created pursuant to this section, and cities which were covered by this section on or prior to August 1, 1988, shall participate in the County Employees Retirement System effective August 1, 1988.
    2. Cities which were covered by this section on or prior to August 1, 1988, shall provide for the retirement of police or firefighters rehired after August 1, 1988, by placing such employees in the County Employees Retirement System.
    3. Cities which were covered by this section on or prior to August 1, 1988, shall place police or firefighters newly hired after August 1, 1988, in the County Employees Retirement System.
    4. Cities which were covered by this section on or prior to August 1, 1988, shall offer employees hired on or prior to August 1, 1988, membership in the County Employees Retirement System under the alternate participation plan as described in KRS 78.530(3), but such employees may elect to retain coverage under this section.
    5. The city shall certify that all police and firefighters placed in the County Employees Retirement System are employed in hazardous positions.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 9, § 9; 1952, ch. 103; 1978, ch. 164, § 37, effective June 17, 1978; 1982, ch. 90, § 2, effective July 15, 1982; 1982, ch. 297, § 10, effective July 15, 1982; 1984, ch. 177, § 7, effective July 13, 1984; 1984, ch. 192, § 4, effective July 13, 1984; 1988, ch. 11, § 6, effective July 15, 1988; 2016 ch. 31, § 20, effective July 15, 2016.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

Acts 1988, ch. 11, § 19, provides: “In order that city employees with a choice can make an informed decision on whether or not to join the county employees retirement system, Kentucky retirement systems shall conduct briefings for each affected pension system on the provisions of this Act. Each employee shall receive a written summary of the retirement benefits which the county employees retirement system offers, and each employee shall be given the opportunity to attend an oral presentation. All such presentations shall be completed by October 15, 1988, and each affected employee shall make his decision by November 1, 1988. Failure of an employee subject to the provisions of this Act to receive a written summary or to attend an oral briefing shall in no way invalidate any of the provisions of this Act.”

Opinions of Attorney General.

A person who leaves a civil service position prior to retirement in a city of the fourth class is not entitled to receive the money that he has contributed to the civil service fund. OAG 68-98 .

Since this section provides that the board of trustees of the police and firemen’s pension fund of a city of the fourth class shall have the exclusive control and management of the fund, it would appear to rule out the possibility that the board could enter into a contract to turn over all the assets of the pension fund to an insurance company to invest and administer pursuant to the Pension Fund Act in place of the board. OAG 71-154 .

A contract between the pension fund and an insurance company whereby the insurance company would engage in an investment program, subject to the overall control of the board of trustees of the pension fund with the principal and interest being guaranteed, would not be authorized by the statutes. OAG 71-202 .

As an alternative to the tax provided in this section, a city could appropriate sufficient money from its general fund provided such is available. OAG 71-357 .

Clauses (b) and (c) of subsection (1) of this section are mandatory. OAG 71-357 .

Subsection (1) (a) of this section pertaining to the levy of the annual tax for the pension fund is not mandatory, but merely permissive. OAG 71-357 .

A city legislative body could not make an assessment against each member of the police and fire departments of more than three and one-half per cent of that member’s salary as set by this section. OAG 71-402 .

While KRS 79.080 authorizes any city to establish and operate the retirement plan for its employees, such a retirement plan cannot apply to municipal officers and, pursuant to KRS 87.175 (repealed) the clerk-treasurer is a municipal officer and the chief of police, as well as the police department, of a fifth-class city is required to operate under this chapter, and in this respect they cannot be placed under KRS 79.080 . OAG 73-283 .

If a city has elected to operate under civil service and all employees of the police and fire departments are contributing to the policemen’s and firemen’s fund, the contributions to the fund are mandatory. OAG 80-65 .

The term “shall” as used in this statute is mandatory and would require a city to make such deductions for all members of the police and fire departments except those that may be excluded. OAG 80-65 .

This section requiring all awards, fees, or emoluments paid or given to the police officer, be paid into the pension fund would not apply to compensation received from private employment during off duty hours since the awards referred to are a result of extraordinary service by a member of the department in the performance of his duties as a member. OAG 80-555 .

Any member of the pension fund as of July 15, 1982 who thereafter withdraws from service prior to retirement is entitled to a refund of all contributions he has been required to make to the fund from the time of its inception and not simply those made following the effective date of the 1982 amendment to KRS 95.620(2). OAG 82-579 .

A police officer may not pay for the gap between his periods of service to the city as a policeman to lengthen his service for purposes of computing retirement benefits. However, in figuring the years of service to the city for purposes of eligibility for a pension, the police officer’s years of service as an officer do not have to be continuous and uninterrupted. OAG 85-15 .

95.769. Management of fund — Assessments against salaries of policemen and firefighters.

Said board of trustees of the policemen’s and firefighters’ pension fund shall have the exclusive control and management of the said fund and all moneys donated, paid or assessed for the relief or for pensioning retired, crippled or disabled members of the police or fire departments or the widows and dependent children under the age of fourteen (14) years or dependent fathers or mothers of any members of the departments killed in the service, while in line of duty, and shall assess each member of the police and fire departments not exceeding three and one-half percent (3.5%) of the salary of such member, to be deducted and withheld from the monthly pay of each member so assessed, the same to be placed by the treasurer or chief financial officer of such city to the credit of such fund, subject to the order of such board.

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 9, § 10; 1978, ch. 164, § 38, effective June 17, 1978; 2016 ch. 31, § 21, effective July 15, 2016.

Opinions of Attorney General.

The trustee of a police and firefighter’s pension fund in a city of the fourth class cannot hire an agent to handle the investment portfolio of the pension fund since this section provides that the board of trustees of the police and firefighter’s pension fund shall have the exclusive control and management of said fund, and there is no specific authorization permitting the board to delegate their powers to invest such funds. OAG 80-355 .

Though the language of the 1980 amendment to KRS 95.772 is not completely clear, it does suggest that the board of trustees could contract with an investing counseling firm or counselor to handle the investment of the funds; however, the board cannot relinquish its overall control and management of the fund which is clearly dictated by this section. OAG 80-582 .

95.770. [Renumbered as KRS 95.786.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3629a-3) is recompiled as KRS 95.786 .

95.771. Rules and regulations — Decisions on applications for pensions — Records.

The said board of trustees of the policemen’s and firefighters’ pension fund shall have all needful rules and regulations for its government in the discharge of its duties, and shall hear and decide all applications for relief or pensions under KRS 95.761 to 95.784 , and its decision of such applications shall be final and conclusive, and not subject to revisions or reversal, except by said board, and a record shall be kept of all meetings and the proceedings of said board.

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 9, § 11; 1978, ch. 164, § 39, effective June 17, 1978; 2016 ch. 31, § 22, effective July 15, 2016.

95.772. Investment of pension fund.

The said board of trustees of the policemen’s and firefighters’ pension fund shall have the power to draw such pension fund from the treasury and may invest the same, or any part thereof, in the name of the board of trustees of the policemen’s and firefighters’ pension fund or nominee name as provided by KRS 286.3-225 , in interest-bearing bonds of the United States or the State of Kentucky, or any county or city in the State of Kentucky, or in any securities in which trustees or guardians are permitted to invest trust or guardianship funds under the laws of this state including a local government pension investment fund created pursuant to KRS 95.895 , and all such securities shall be subject to the order of said board. Both the principal and interest of said pension fund shall be applicable to the payment of pensions under KRS 95.761 to 95.784 .

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 9, §§ 12, 13; 1978, ch. 164, § 40, effective June 17, 1978; 1980, ch. 307, § 15, effective July 15, 1980; 2016 ch. 31, § 23, effective July 15, 2016.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(7/12/2006). 2006 Ky. Acts ch. 247 instructs the Reviser of Statutes to adjust KRS references throughout the statutes to conform with the 2006 renumbering of the Financial Services Code, KRS Chapter 286. Such an adjustment has been made in this statute.

Opinions of Attorney General.

City ordinance authorizing the pension board to loan a portion of the police department pension fund to the city at a five percent interest rate is not valid, since such an investment is not authorized by this section. OAG 72-100 .

Though the language of the 1980 amendment is not completely clear, it does suggest that the board of trustees could contract with an investing counseling firm or counselor to handle the investment of the funds; however, the board cannot relinquish its overall control and management of the fund which is clearly dictated by KRS 95.769 . OAG 80-582 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Investment of trust funds, KRS 386.020 to 386.050 .

95.773. Disability, retirement and death benefits.

If any member of the police or fire department, while in the performance of his duty, becomes temporarily, totally disabled, physically or mentally, for services by reason of service in such departments, the board of trustees shall order the payment to such disabled member, monthly during such disability, not to exceed one (1) year, from such pension fund, not exceeding sixty dollars ($60) per month, the said amount to be determined by the board of trustees, provided such member, during the same period, is paid no salary as such member. If any member of the police or fire departments, while in the performance of his duty, becomes mentally or physically permanently disabled by reason of service in either of said departments so as to render necessary his retirement from service in either of said departments, said board of trustees shall retire such disabled member from service in either of said departments, provided no such retirement on account of disability shall occur unless said member has contracted said disability while on duty in the service of said police or fire department, and upon such retirement the board of trustees shall order the payment to such disabled member of such police or fire department, monthly, from such pension fund, a sum equal to one-half (1/2) of the monthly salary such member was receiving at the date of his retirement, provided such member has had twelve (12) or more years’ constant service in either of said departments. Any member of the said police or fire departments who has less than twelve (12) years of constant service in the said department and becomes disabled for service and eligible for retirement under this section shall receive monthly such sum from such pension fund fixed by the board of said trustees any amount not to exceed one-half (1/2) of the amount which such member of the police or fire department was receiving in monthly salary at the date of his retirement. If any member of said police or fire department shall, while in the performance of his duty, be killed or die as a result of an injury received in the line of his duty, or of any disease contracted by reason of his occupation, or shall die from any cause whatsoever as a result of his services in either of said departments, and while in said service, or after having served continuously for twelve (12) years shall die while in the service or on the retired list from any cause, and shall leave a widow, or child or children under the age of fourteen (14) years, said board of trustees shall direct the payment from said pension fund, monthly, to such widow, while unmarried, a sum equal to one-half (1/2) of the monthly salary or pension payment such member was receiving at the date of his death, and for each child until it reaches the age of fourteen (14) years, six dollars ($6), and to the dependent father and mother to be paid as follows: If the father be dead, the mother shall receive thirty dollars ($30), and if the mother be dead, the father shall receive thirty dollars ($30), and if both be living, each shall receive fifteen dollars ($15). The board may provide a minimum benefit of no more than four hundred dollars ($400) per month, initially, to the surviving spouse if the benefit can be supported on an actuarially-sound basis by the pension fund. When Social Security benefits are increased, the board may increase the surviving spouse’s minimum by a like percentage, but the increase shall not exceed five percent (5%).

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 9, § 14; 1960, ch. 196; 1994, ch. 50, § 6, effective July 15, 1994.

Opinions of Attorney General.

A city could pass a retroactive ordinance increasing benefits above those provided in this section. OAG 71-402 .

The trustees of a city’s pension fund could not pay disability, retirement or death benefits in excess of the amounts set forth in this section. OAG 71-402 .

Since this section refers to a pension equal to one-half of the monthly salary at the date of retirement, the pension cannot be calculated on the person’s average wages over a period of several months, and hence overtime wages earned may be excluded from the calculation. OAG 90-91 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Pension benefits exempt from execution, KRS 427.125 .

Retirement, disability or hospitalization plans for city employees may be established, KRS 79.080 .

95.774. Payments when fund is insufficient.

If at any time there shall not be sufficient money in such pension fund to pay each person entitled to the benefit thereof the amount per month as herein provided, then an equal percentage of each monthly payment shall be made to each beneficiary until the said fund shall be replenished to warrant the payment in full to each of said beneficiaries.

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 9, § 15.

95.775. Pension after twenty years’ service.

If any member of the police and fire departments of such cities has served twenty (20) years or more and has reached his fifty-first birthday in such police or fire departments, and if his application to be relieved from such police or fire departments is granted, the said board of trustees shall order and direct that such person be paid a monthly pension equal to one-half (1/2) of the amount of the salary said person is or was in receipt of as a member of said department at the time of granting application.

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 9, § 16.

Opinions of Attorney General.

A police officer may not pay for the gap between his periods of service to the city as a policeman to lengthen his service for purposes of computing retirement benefits. However, in figuring the years of service to the city for purposes of eligibility for a pension, the police officer’s years of service as an officer do not have to be continuous and uninterrupted. OAG 85-15 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Pension benefits exempt from execution, KRS 427.125 .

95.776. Funeral expense benefit.

Whenever an active or retired policeman or firefighter dies from any cause, the board of trustees shall appropriate from the pension fund a sum not exceeding one hundred dollars ($100), made payable to the widow or family, for funeral expenses.

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 9, § 17; 1978, ch. 164, § 41, effective June 17, 1978.

95.777. Persons entitled to benefits.

No person shall be entitled to receive any pension from the said pension fund under KRS 95.761 to 95.784 except a regularly retired member or a regular member in the said police or fire department, his widow, or children under the age of fourteen (14) years, or dependent mother or father.

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 9, § 18; 2016 ch. 31, § 24, effective July 15, 2016.

95.778. Books and accounts of treasurer — Bond.

The treasurer of the board of trustees of the policemen’s and firefighters’ pension fund shall be the custodian of said pension fund and shall securely and safely keep the same, subject to the control and direction of said board, and shall keep his or her books and accounts concerning such fund in such manner as may be prescribed by the board and the said books and accounts shall always be subject to the inspection of the board or any member thereof. The treasurer shall, within ten (10) days after his appointment, execute a bond to the city with good and sufficient surety, in such penal sum as the legislative body shall direct, to be approved by the legislative body of said city, conditioned for the faithful performance of the duties of his or her office, and that he or she will safely keep and well and truthfully account for all money and properties which may come into his or her hands as such treasurer; and that, upon the expiration of his or her term of office, he or she will surrender and deliver to his or her successor all bonds, securities, and all unexpended moneys or other properties which may have come into his or her hands as treasurer of said fund. Said bond shall be filed in the office of the city clerk, as other bonds, and may be sued on in the name of the said city, for the use of said board of trustees, or in the name of the board of trustees, or any person or persons injured by a breach thereof. The premium on said bond shall be paid out of said pension fund in the manner provided in KRS 95.761 to 95.784 for expending sums.

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 9, § 19; 1978, ch. 164, § 42, effective June 17, 1978; 2016 ch. 31, § 25, effective July 15, 2016.

95.779. Warrants for sums due pension fund.

It shall be the duty of such officer or officers of the said city as are designated by law, to draw warrants on the treasurer or chief financial officer of said city, on request in writing by said board of trustees, payable to the treasurer of said board of trustees for all funds belonging to said pension fund as aforesaid.

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 9, § 20; 2016 ch. 31, § 26, effective July 15, 2016.

95.780. [Renumbered as KRS 95.787.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3498, 3629a-4) is recompiled as KRS 95.787 .

95.781. Warrants for payments from pension fund.

All moneys ordered to be paid from said pension fund to any person or persons shall be paid by the treasurer of the board of trustees only upon warrants signed by the president of said board and countersigned by the secretary thereof, and no warrant shall be drawn except by order of the board, after having been duly entered on the records of the proceedings of the board of trustees.

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 9, § 21.

95.782. Report of trustees to city legislative body.

The board of trustees of the policemen’s and firefighters’ pension fund shall make a report in writing, signed by the president and secretary of said board, to the legislative body of said city, of the condition of said pension fund, on the first meeting in September of the legislative body of said city in each and every year.

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 9, § 22; 1978, ch. 164, § 43, effective June 17, 1978.

95.783. Repeal of pension fund ordinance — Disposition of funds — Repeal of ordinances establishing pension fund — Liquidation and distribution of residual assets — Report.

  1. Except as provided by subsection (2) of this section, in the event that the provisions of KRS 95.767 to 95.784 are accepted and adopted by the legislative body of a city, as authorized in KRS 95.7665 by ordinance, as herein provided, the repeal of such ordinance shall not become effective unless adopted by the unanimous vote of the duly elected members of such legislative body. In the event a repeal ordinance is adopted by such legislative body, all moneys or property belonging to the policemen’s and firefighters’ pension fund at the time of the repeal of the said adoption ordinance shall be dissolved or liquidated by the board of trustees of said policemen’s and firefighters’ pension fund and distributed by said board in the following manner: Within sixty (60) days of adoption by said legislative body of said repeal ordinance, the said board of trustees shall proceed with the liquidation of said pension fund as follows: All unexpended moneys appropriated to said pension fund out of the said city’s general fund to the policemen’s and firefighters’ pension fund by the said legislative body of such city and at the time of adoption of a repeal ordinance shall revert back to the city’s general fund. All other unexpended moneys or property which has come into the said pension fund’s hands shall be liquidated by said board of trustees in the following manner: All unexpended moneys in the said pension fund which accumulated thereto by pick up of employee contributions by the employer pursuant to KRS 65.155 or assessments from policemen’s and firefighters’ salaries and gifts, or accumulated thereto in any manner except appropriations from the said city’s general fund, shall revert back to the active or retired policemen and firefighters and dependents who have qualified under KRS 95.761 to 95.784 in such city. In the division to the beneficiaries, the board of said trustees shall use in the division of said fund the per centum of the present salaries of such members. After all disbursements have been made of said fund by the board of trustees, the said board of trustees shall file, as their last act, a complete report of same with said legislative body within thirty (30) days, and such report shall be kept in the office of the city clerk as other city records.
  2. If all liabilities to all individuals entitled to benefits from the policemen’s and firefighters’ pension fund have been satisfied, the ordinances establishing the fund may be repealed by the majority vote of the duly elected members of the entire legislative body. If repealed, the fund’s board of trustees shall, within sixty (60) days of repeal, proceed with the liquidation of any residual assets of the fund. All residual assets liquidated pursuant to this subsection shall be distributed by the board of trustees to the city’s general fund so long as the return of assets complies with federal and state law governing the distribution of assets. Within thirty (30) days following the distribution of residual assets, the board of trustees of the fund shall as its last act file a complete report with the legislative body of the city of the actions taken to terminate the fund and liquidate residual assets of the fund for retention by the city clerk the same as for other city records.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 9, § 25; 1978, ch. 164, § 44, effective June 17, 1978; 1982, ch. 166, § 49, effective July 15, 1982; 2014 ch. 92, § 144, effective January 1, 2015; 2016 ch. 31, § 27, effective July 15, 2016.

Opinions of Attorney General.

A city council has the authority to repeal a civil service ordinance. OAG 79-335 .

95.784. Conditions of pensions for voluntary retirement.

No policeman or firefighter shall be entitled to the benefits herein provided incidental to voluntary retirement from either of said departments on account of service, unless he shall have been employed continuously for a period of at least five (5) years from and after the date of the passage of the adoption ordinance by the legislative body, and the amount of such sum paid to such member shall be fixed by the board of trustees payable monthly, not to exceed one-half (1/2) of the salary such member was in receipt of at the time of voluntary retirement. The payments fixed by said trustees to such member shall not exceed one (1) year.

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 9, § 26; 1978, ch. 164, § 45, effective June 17, 1978.

95.785. Effect of adoption of KRS 95.761 to 95.784 on other statutes. [Repealed]

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 9, § 27; 2014 ch. 92, § 145, effective January 1, 2015; Repealed, Acts 2016, ch. 31, § 36, effective July 15, 2016.

95.786. Territorial authority of police in cities of fifth class. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section was formerly compiled as KRS 95.770 .

This section (3629a-3) was repealed by Acts 1994, ch. 48, § 4, effective July 15, 1994. For present law, see KRS 95.019 .

95.787. Arrested persons, where kept in cities of fourth or fifth class. [Repealed.]

Persons arrested for any bailable offense, in cities of the fourth or fifth class, may be placed in the station house, county jail or city jail for safekeeping, until taken before the court for examination.

History. 3498, 3629a-4: amend. Acts 1976 (1st Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 123, effective January 2, 1978; § 314.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3498, 3629a-4: amend. Acts 1976 (1st Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 123, effective January 2, 1978) was repealed by Acts 2014, ch. 92, § 314, effective January 1, 2015.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Confinement Without Warrant.

Under this section, facts may warrant confinement in county jail without warrant. Ratliff v. Stanley, 224 Ky. 819 , 7 S.W.2d 230, 1928 Ky. LEXIS 680 ( Ky. 1928 ).

2. Receipt of Prisoner.

Where police officer arrested man without warrant on Sunday, county jailer was authorized to receive prisoner without a mittimus. Easton v. Commonwealth, 82 S.W. 996, 26 Ky. L. Rptr. 960 , 1904 Ky. LEXIS 412 (Ky. Ct. App. 1904).

3. Refusal to Accept Bail.

Policeman, being unauthorized to grant bail, did not violate duties to alleged offender when he arrested offender at eight o’clock at night for bailable offense, confined him in jail, and refused to accept bail. Waddle v. Wilson, 164 Ky. 228 , 175 S.W. 382, 1915 Ky. LEXIS 367 ( Ky. 1915 ).

4. Liability for Death of Prisoner.

The city in the operation of its jail was performing a governmental function and was not liable for the death of a prisoner by fire even though no one was in charge so as to give aid in case of danger. Pelfrey's Adm'x v. Jackson, 291 Ky. 161 , 163 S.W.2d 300, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 192 ( Ky. 1942 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

The county jailer cannot refuse to accept prisoners committed to him by a judgment of the police court of a city while such court has jurisdiction to try the offense and the persons charged therewith. OAG 62-616 .

The county fiscal court had no authority to require that a city of the fourth class pay for half of the utilities in order to house city prisoners in the county jail. OAG 62-616 .

A city is authorized by statute to commit its prisoners to the county jail by paying the statutory fees allowable to the jailer for keeping and dieting such prisoners and the county fiscal court cannot legally refuse to accept city prisoners lawfully committed to the county jail when the city pays the prescribed statutory fees to the jailer. OAG 76-362 .

The City of Barbourville is entitled to operate a jail under this section, and although the fiscal court is responsible for maintaining a juvenile detention center, juveniles required to be detained for a hearing should be lodged in the county jail if there are adequate facilities in the county jail for such juveniles; if there are not adequate facilities in the county jail, and there are legally adequate facilities in the city jail of Barbourville, then they can be properly detained there, and the fiscal court would have to pay the dieting fee or cost for such juveniles detained. OAG 78-539 .

There is nothing in this section authorizing a city to operate a city jail to incarcerate defendants sentenced to a jail term. OAG 79-188 .

If the county jail is filled to capacity, a person arrested for any bailable offense in fourth-class cities may, under this section, be placed in the city jail for safekeeping until taken before the court for examination. OAG 81-28 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Bail, RCr 4.02 to 4.30.

Cities of the Sixth Class

95.790. City marshal — Selection — Term of office — Bond. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3681a, 3690: amend. Acts 1976, ch. 356, § 3) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980:

95.800. City marshal — Powers, duties. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3687: amend. Acts 1968, ch. 35, § 1; 1976 (1st Extra. Sess.), ch. 14, § 124, effective January 2, 1978) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 235, § 20, effective July 15, 1980:

95.810. Fire apparatus — Indebtedness — Tax levy. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3704a-1 to 3704a-3) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

95.820. Public liability insurance for police and fire departments — Cities of other than first class or urban-county governments. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2741u-1, 2741u-2: amend. Acts 1974, ch. 248, § 15) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

Cities of All Classes

95.830. Use of fire apparatus outside city limits, cities of all classes.

  1. Any city in the state owning or controlling fire apparatus may take it to extinguish fires to any point in the county in which that city is located, into a smaller territory in that county, or into areas of another county or state, as determined by the city legislative body. The apparatus shall be so used only in conformity with reasonable terms and regulations which the city legislative body may prescribe.
  2. The city shall not be liable in any manner on account of the use of the apparatus at any point outside of the corporate limits of the city. The apparatus shall be deemed to be employed in the exercise of a governmental function of the city.
  3. All city or fire protection district firefighters, full-paid or volunteer, serving at a fire or doing fire prevention work outside the corporate limits of a city or a fire protection district shall be considered as serving in their regular line of duty, as though they were serving within the corporate limits.
  4. Full-paid firefighters shall receive no additional compensation, and volunteer firemen shall receive only the compensation provided by ordinance for such cases.
  5. All full-paid firefighters and volunteer firemen are entitled to the benefits of any firefighters’ pension fund or volunteer firemen’s fund, the same as if the firefighting or fire prevention work had been within the corporate limits of the city or the fire protection district.

History. 2741u-3: amend. Acts 1966, ch. 255, § 111; 1978, ch. 164, § 46, effective June 17, 1978.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

This section to the extent it exempts officers and employes of cities from personal liability is void. Happy v. Erwin, 330 S.W.2d 412, 1959 Ky. LEXIS 195 ( Ky. 1959 ), overruled in part, Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Government Emples. Ins. Co., 635 S.W.2d 475, 1982 Ky. LEXIS 270 ( Ky. 1982 ).

Property owners’ claims against a fire department and a city were dismissed because KRS 75.070 and 95.830(2) provided the fire department with sovereign immunity, the statutes were constitutional under Ky. Const. §§ 230 and 231, and the statutes did not violate the jural rights doctrine under Ky. Const. §§ 14, 54, and 241. Caneyville Volunteer Fire Dep't v. Green's Motorcycle Salvage, Inc., 286 S.W.3d 790, 2009 Ky. LEXIS 158 ( Ky. 2009 ).

2. Service Outside City Limits.

Prior to the enactment of this section, a municipality had no authority to extend its public utility or fire-protection service outside its corporate limits, and thus a contract by which the city was to furnish fire protection to buildings outside the city, owned by the county and by independent governmental agencies, was ultra vires as to the city and void. Jefferson County Fiscal Court v. Jefferson County, 278 Ky. 785 , 129 S.W.2d 554, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 497 ( Ky. 1939 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

A city is authorized to contract with a volunteer fire department for fire protection within and without the city and compensate its members for services rendered, both within and without the city limits. OAG 67-42 .

If the fire chief is a member of the city volunteer fire department and is under contract along with the other members, his residence outside of the city is of no legal consequence. OAG 67-42 .

The attempt in this section to exempt cities from liability is unconstitutional under Const., §§ 14, 54 and 241. OAG 71-82 .

Firemen in charge of the extraterritorial unit of a city have control over buildings and endangered properties from their arrival until the fire has been extinguished and they have determined the cause of the fire and checked for arson whether the property is that of a subscriber or nonsubscriber as the city police power authorizing the city to enact such reasonable regulations as may be necessary to prevent the spreading of fires and protect property within the corporate limits has been extended to operations in unincorporated territory. OAG 73-744 .

Only cities owning or controlling fire apparatus may enter into an agreement for the use of fire equipment outside city limits. OAG 74-492 .

Pursuant to this section, a city may contract with a private party to provide fire protection outside the city limits. OAG 78-811 .

Since no liability would attach to a city in using its fire fighting equipment outside the city under appropriate authorization, such nonliability would equally apply to the city were a resident of the city to suffer fire damage to his property while the city’s fire apparatus is legally being operated outside the city. OAG 80-123 .

This section clearly authorizes the city to operate its fire fighting equipment outside the city and anywhere in the county, however, it must do so pursuant to an appropriate ordinance setting forth reasonable regulations; since no mention of compensation is made in the section, however, it is reasonable to assume that the use of such apparatus outside of the city should be pursuant to a contractual agreement between the city and the county for fire protection for county residents, involving reasonable compensation as consideration which would follow the enactment of an appropriate implementing and regulatory ordinance. OAG 80-123 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Contracts with fire protection districts, counties, other cities and political subdivisions for furnishing or receiving fire services, KRS 75.050 .

Protection of municipal firemen serving outside city limits, KRS 75.060 .

95.840. Accident and death benefits for members of volunteer fire departments. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 91, § 1; 1974, ch. 248, § 16) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

95.845. Custodian of property taken by peace officers or courts — Property clerks — Disposition.

  1. The executive authority of any city which maintains a police department may designate the chief of police as custodian of all property which comes within the purview of KRS 67.592 which is taken by peace officers or courts within the city.
  2. The legislative body of any city may authorize the employment of a property clerk and deputy property clerks, as necessary, subject to the same conditions as in KRS 67.592 and 67.594 . The property clerk and deputy property clerks shall be appointed by the executive authority of the city.
  3. Custody and disposition of all property in custody of the property clerk shall be governed by the provisions of KRS 67.592 and 67.594 except that:
    1. The legislative body of the city may prescribe the duties of the property clerk and deputy property clerks and require security for the faithful performance of the duties imposed by KRS 67.594 ; and
    2. The proceeds of all property subject to the provisions of subsection (4) of KRS 67.594 which is sold as provided in that section shall be credited to the police department.
  4. All other provisions of KRS 67.592 and 67.594 shall apply to the city and to the property clerk and deputies in the same manner as they do to the county.

History. Enact. Acts 1980, ch. 193, § 3, effective July 15, 1980; 1992, ch. 435, § 12, effective July 14, 1992.

95.850. Disability, medical, and hospital benefits for members of police and fire departments. [Repealed.]

  1. The legislative bodies of cities of the third and fourth classes may, in their discretion, pay unto any member of the police or fire departments, in case he is disabled from an injury received while acting in his official capacity and in the line of duty to such an extent as he is unable to execute the duties of his official capacity or pursue a gainful occupation for which he is fitted by training or experience, monthly compensation benefits equal to the member’s monthly earnings at the time of his injury, so long as his disability continues, but in no event shall the total amount paid as compensation benefits to any member exceed the sum of five thousand dollars ($5,000).
  2. The legislative bodies of cities of the third and fourth classes may, in their discretion, in addition to the compensation benefits provided for in subsection (1), pay the member’s medical and hospital expenses, but in no event shall the payments therefor exceed the sum of one thousand dollars ($1,000).
  3. The testimony of competent medical authorities shall be the sole test as to whether any member is disabled to the extent provided for in subsection (1).
  4. This section is not applicable in any city of the third or fourth class which has in operation, pursuant to statute, a pension system for policemen and firefighters, under which disability benefits are payable.

History. Enact. Acts 1948, ch. 140; 1968, ch. 152, § 75; 1978, ch. 164, § 47, effective June 17, 1978; § 314.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1948, ch. 140; 1968, ch. 152, § 75; 1978, ch. 164, § 47, effective June 17, 1978) was repealed by Acts 2014, ch. 92, § 314, effective January 1, 2015.

Police and Firefighters’ Retirement Fund in Cities as Defined in KRS 95.851

95.851. Definitions for KRS 95.851 to 95.884 and 95.991.

Words and phrases, used in KRS 95.851 to 95.884 and KRS 95.991 , unless a different meaning is clearly indicated by the context, shall have the following meanings:

  1. “Fund” shall mean the “Policemen’s and Firefighters’ Retirement Fund of the City of  _____________________________________________________________________ .”
  2. “City” shall mean any city that was previously classified as a city of the second class prior to August 1, 1988, under the city classification system that was in effect prior to August 1, 1988, or to any other city that established a policemen’s and firefighters’ retirement fund specifically under the provisions of KRS 95.851 to 95.884 prior to August 1, 1988.
  3. “Department” shall mean the police department or the fire department of a city.
  4. “Board” shall mean the board of trustees provided for herein as the agency responsible for the direction and operation of the affairs and business of the fund. The board shall hold title to all assets of the fund.
  5. “Member” shall mean any member of the police or fire department who is included in the membership of the fund.
  6. “Service” shall mean actual employment in a department of a city for salary or compensation, or service otherwise creditable as herein provided.
  7. “Prior service” shall mean service rendered prior to the date of establishment.
  8. “Membership service” shall mean service rendered on or after the date of establishment.
  9. “Total service” shall mean prior service, membership service, and military service.
  10. “Regular interest” shall mean such rate of interest as shall be fixed by the board, provided that for the first five (5) years of operation of the fund the rate shall be three percent (3%) per annum, compounded annually.
  11. “Occupational disability” shall mean disability due to occupational causes, including but not limited to injury or disease. The presumption of contracting disease “while on active duty as a result of strain or the inhalation of noxious fumes, poisons or gases” created by KRS 79.080 shall be a presumption of “occupational disability” hereunder.
  12. “Occupational death” shall mean death due to occupational causes, including but not limited to injury or disease.
  13. “Average salary” shall mean the highest average annual salary of the member for any three (3) consecutive years of service within the total service of the member, and includes employee contributions picked up by the employer pursuant to KRS 65.155 .
  14. The masculine pronoun, wherever used, shall include the feminine pronoun; also, widow shall include widower.
  15. The fiscal year of the fund shall date from July 1 of any year to June 30 of the next year following.
  16. “Total disability” shall mean a disability which substantially precludes a person from performing with reasonable regularity the substantial and material parts of any gainful work or occupation in the service of the department that he would be competent to perform were it not for the fact that the impairment is founded upon conditions which render it reasonably certain that it will continue indefinitely.

History. Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 16, § 3; 1974, ch. 396, § 1; 1978, ch. 164, § 48, effective June 17, 1978; 1980, ch. 188, § 81, effective July 15, 1980; 1982, ch. 166, § 50, effective July 15, 1982; 2014, ch. 92, § 146, effective January 1, 2015.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(11/21/96). In 1974, the Reviser of Statutes renumbered KRS 95.885 as KRS 95.991 . 1980 Ky. Acts ch. 188, sec. 81, a revisory act, mistakenly changed a reference in this statute from “KRS 95.851 to 95.885 ” to “KRS 95.851 to 95.991 .” Because this change would appear to effect a substantive change in the law, it has been disregarded, and the reference has been made to read “KRS 95.851 to 95.884 and KRS 95.991” under KRS 7.123(4) and 7.136(1)(a).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

KRS 95.851 to 95.885 establishing a new retirement and pension system for police and fire departments of cities of the second class is constitutional. Board of Trustees v. Paducah, 333 S.W.2d 515, 1960 Ky. LEXIS 196 ( Ky. 1960 ).

2. Average Salary.

The term, “average salary”, defined in subsection (m) (now (13)) included sums paid to assistant chief of city police by the city as a result of its voluntary participation in the law enforcement foundation program fund pursuant to KRS 15.410 to 15.510 . Policeman's & Fireman's Retirement Fund v. Richardson, 522 S.W.2d 452, 1975 Ky. LEXIS 136 ( Ky. 1975 ).

In computing average salary the total of both the sums paid to the police officer by the city from its general fund and from its participation in the law enforcement foundation program must be used. Policeman's & Fireman's Retirement Fund v. Richardson, 522 S.W.2d 452, 1975 Ky. LEXIS 136 ( Ky. 1975 ).

3. Annual Salary.

Retired firefighters’ unused accrued sick leave and terminal leave pay should have been included as part of their annual salary for the last year they worked and, therefore, included in calculating their retirement annuity. Covington v. Peare, 769 S.W.2d 761, 1989 Ky. App. LEXIS 50 (Ky. Ct. App. 1989).

Cited:

Louisville Policemen’s Retirement Fund v. Bryant, 556 S.W.2d 6, 1977 Ky. LEXIS 515 ( Ky. 1977 ); Policemen’s & Firemen’s Retirement Fund v. Rothrock, 625 S.W.2d 577, 1981 Ky. LEXIS 304 ( Ky. 1981 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

If a person was not a member on the date of establishment of the retirement system, he could not claim any prior service he might have. OAG 63-272 .

It is not mandatory that a member of the police or fire department of a second-class city who might qualify as to disability under KRS 79.080 be retired. OAG 68-451 .

The provisions of KRS 79.080 have no application to the police and fire departments of a second-class city. OAG 68-451 .

The provisions of KRS 79.080 have no application to those police and fire departments mandatorily required to operate under the terms of KRS 95.851 to KRS 95.885 . OAG 70-140 .

Nothing specifically authorizes the board to review a pensioner’s application for permanent disability pension status after he has retired on a regular service pension. OAG 73-720 .

An application for a disability annuity would be governed by the 1974 amendments to KRS 95.851 through 95.885 , which were effective June 21, 1974, where the applicant’s medical examination and decision of the pension fund board was not made until August 1 and August 6, respectively, assuming the withdrawal of a former request dated June 19, postmarked June 20, was accepted by the Board as of June 19 as reflected in its minutes. OAG 74-617 .

The 1974 amendment to subdivision (k) was for the purpose of changing the law applicable to police and firemen operating under KRS 95.850 to 95.885 so that they can benefit from the disability presumptions found under KRS 79.080 . OAG 74-617 , modifying OAG 63-272 , 70-140, 72-762.

The board of trustees of the policemen’s and fire fighter’s pension fund in a city of the second class, constitutes a “public agency,” and the meetings of such a “public agency” are open to the public at all times unless the particular meeting in question comes within the exceptions to the “Open Meetings” Law. OAG 80-569 .

Under KRS 95.869 , 95.872(3), and this section the Board of Trustees of the Police and Firefighter’s Retirement Fund is in charge of the funds of the Retirement Fund which would include city’s prior year contributions, thus, the city could not unilaterally withdraw from the Retirement Fund an amount of money equal to the sum of the city’s prior year contributions plus interest; such withdrawal would have to be done with the approval of the Board. OAG 90-47 .

95.852. Police and firefighters’ retirement and benefit fund established in cities — Name — Coverage provided in County Employees Retirement System after August 1, 1988.

  1. There is hereby established in cities, a retirement and benefit fund for members of the police and fire departments, their dependents and beneficiaries, unless the policemen and firefighters are included in the membership of the County Employees Retirement System and certified to be working in hazardous positions. The fund shall be established as of July 1, 1956, and shall be known as the “Policemen’s and Firefighters” Retirement Fund of the City of ______.” In such name all of its business shall be transacted, and in such name or nominee name as provided by KRS 286.3-225 all of its moneys invested and all of its accumulated reserves consisting of cash, securities, and other property shall be held.
    1. After August 1, 1988, no new pension fund shall be created pursuant to this section and cities which were covered by this section on or prior to August 1, 1988, shall participate in the County Employees Retirement System effective August 1, 1988; (2) (a) After August 1, 1988, no new pension fund shall be created pursuant to this section and cities which were covered by this section on or prior to August 1, 1988, shall participate in the County Employees Retirement System effective August 1, 1988;
    2. Cities which were covered by this section on or prior to August 1, 1988, shall provide for the retirement of police or firefighters rehired after August 1, 1988, by placing such employees in the County Employees Retirement System;
    3. Cities which were covered by this section on or prior to August 1, 1988, shall place police or firefighters newly hired after August 1, 1988, in the County Employees Retirement System;
    4. Cities which were covered by this section on or prior to August 1, 1988, shall offer employees hired on or prior to August 1, 1988, membership in the County Employees Retirement System under the alternate participation plan as described in KRS 78.530(3), but such employees may elect to retain coverage under this section; and
    5. The city shall certify that all police and firefighters placed in the County Employees Retirement System are employed in hazardous positions.

History. Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 16, § 1, effective July 1, 1956; 1978, ch. 164, § 49, effective June 17, 1978; 1980, ch. 307, § 16, effective July 15, 1980; 1984, ch. 177, § 1, effective July 13, 1984; 1988, ch. 11, § 5, effective July 15, 1988; 2014, ch. 92, § 147, effective January 1, 2015; 2015 ch. 28, § 15, effective June 24, 2015.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(7/12/2006). 2006 Ky. Acts ch. 247 instructs the Reviser of Statutes to adjust KRS references throughout the statutes to conform with the 2006 renumbering of the Financial Services Code, KRS Chapter 286. Such an adjustment has been made in this statute.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

Acts 1956, ch. 16, §§ 1 to 35 (KRS 95.851 to 95.885 ) establishing a new form of retirement and pension system for the police and fire departments of cities of the second class did not violate Const., § 51 because its title did not contain any notice that the act had provisions for contributions from city funds and for the investment of the pension funds including provisions for making up deficiencies arising from investment losses, since the title adequately expressed a general subject and all the provisions of the act related to that subject; moreover, it was not unconstitutional because the statute was not republished and set forth at length since it only superseded existing statutes. Board of Trustees v. Paducah, 333 S.W.2d 515, 1960 Ky. LEXIS 196 ( Ky. 1960 ).

Acts 1956, ch. 16, §§ 1 to 35 does not violate Const., § 181 prohibiting the general assembly from requiring a city to expend general city funds or to impose a city tax for strictly local purposes. Board of Trustees v. Paducah, 333 S.W.2d 515, 1960 Ky. LEXIS 196 ( Ky. 1960 ).

Cited:

Covington v. Peare, 769 S.W.2d 761, 1989 Ky. App. LEXIS 50 (Ky. Ct. App. 1989).

95.853. Purpose of fund.

The purpose of this fund is to provide retirement annuities and disability benefits for the members of the police and fire departments who become aged or otherwise incapacitated, and widows’ annuities and other benefits to the dependents of such members to the end that such members may accumulate reserves for themselves and their dependents to meet, without prejudice or hardship, the hazards of old age, disability, death, and termination of service, thereby encouraging qualified personnel to enter and remain in the service of such departments.

History. Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 16, § 2, effective July 1, 1956.

Opinions of Attorney General.

The duties of the board of trustees of a police and firefighters’ retirement fund as outlined in KRS 95.871 coincide with the purpose to which the fund is directed under this section. Thus, pension funds for police and firefighters cannot be used for any purpose other than those mentioned in related statutes and therefore cannot be utilized to provide health insurance benefits for the members of the departments. OAG 82-247 .

The Board of Trustees of the local Police and Firefighters’ Retirement Fund may transfer funds from the Local Fund to the County Employees’ Retirement System (CERS) to pay for prior service years of those employees who transferred from the local system to the county system; however, such transfer must be made with the approval of the Board of Trustees of the Local Fund, which must determine whether the amount requested to be transferred to the CERS can be done without negatively affecting the actuarial soundness of the Local Fund. OAG 90-49 .

95.854. Membership.

The following persons shall become members of the fund:

  1. All active full-time members of a department in service on the day prior to the date of establishment.
  2. All persons who become full-time members on or after the date of establishment who shall become members as a condition of employment.
  3. All members of a department who on the date of establishment are working in a civilian or appointive capacity for the city, the State of Kentucky, or the United States of America, while on an approved leave of absence from a department.

History. Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 16, § 4, effective July 1, 1956.

95.855. Credit for service — How computed.

  1. Each person becoming a member on the date of establishment shall be entitled to full credit for all service rendered prior to such date. Each person becoming a member after the date of establishment shall be entitled to credit after such date, provided contributions are made for all such subsequent service. Total service shall include prior service and membership service.
  2. The following types of service shall be eligible for service credit:
    1. Service as a full-time member of a department of the city;
    2. Service in a civilian or other capacity in the service of the city, state of Kentucky, or the federal government, while on approved leave of absence from a department, subject to maximum credit for such service of one (1) year;
    3. Service in any branch of the armed forces of the United States during a period of national emergency while on leave of absence from a department, provided (1) that such leave-of-absence-service shall not exceed five (5) years, and (2) that such member shall reenter the service of a department of the city within a period of six (6) months following the date of honorable discharge from such service;
    4. All service rendered in a civilian capacity as provided in KRS 95.854(3).
  3. In the computation of service credit, nine (9) months or more of service during a year shall entitle a member for one (1) year of service; six (6) to nine (9) months of service shall constitute three-quarters (3/4) of a year; three (3) to six (6) months, one-half (1/2) year; less than three (3) months, one-quarter (1/4) of a year.

History. Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 16, § 5, effective July 1, 1956.

Opinions of Attorney General.

If a person was a member on the date the system was established, all prior service, whether interrupted or continuous, would be counted. OAG 63-272 .

If a person was not a member on the date of establishment of the retirement system, he could not claim any prior service he might have. OAG 63-272 .

When an officer is reinstated and pays back into the pension fund the amount withdrawn plus interest he is credited for only that time that is represented by the refund and not for those years accumulated prior to the inception of the retirement system. OAG 69-92 .

95.856. Voluntary retirement — Prerequisites.

Any member may, at his option, retire on a service retirement annuity upon or after attainment of the age of 50 years, provided he shall have completed at least 20 years of total service. Upon fulfillment of these terms, it is mandatory that the board shall grant the retirement annuity upon receipt of the application of said member.

History. Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 16, § 6, effective July 1, 1956.

Opinions of Attorney General.

A fireman having worked 19 years, nine months and 15 days would have the equivalent of 20 years of service and would be eligible for voluntary service retirement. OAG 64-370 .

In the absence of a judicial decision to the contrary, it would appear that the retirement fund statutes applicable to the fire department of a city of the second class permit, but do not require, the reemployment of a fireman, who voluntarily withdrew from the fire service prior to qualifying for or actually receiving his retirement annuity, who subsequently seeks reemployment; KRS 95.866 does not deal with the mechanics of the reemployment process and does not specifically refer to a person who has already worked 20 years with the fire service but it appears to authorize any former member of the fire service, who has not actually retired and is, therefore, not eligible for the retirement annuity, to become reemployed with the fire service. OAG 84-239 .

95.857. Withdrawal from service.

Any member who withdraws from service prior to age 50 years after having completed at least 20 years of total service, and who does not accept a refund of contributions, shall receive, upon application, a certificate entitling him to a service retirement annuity upon his attainment of age 50, and specifying the amount of the annuity earned and accrued at the date of withdrawal from service.

History. Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 16, § 7, effective July 1, 1956.

95.858. Compulsory retirement.

Each member shall be subject to compulsory retirement according to the rules of the city in which he is employed, provided, however, that any member able to perform his assigned duties shall not be precluded from serving at least twenty (20) years.

History. Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 16, § 8, effective July 1, 1956.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Ordinance not Mandatory.

This section does not require cities of the second class to fix by ordinance a compulsory retirement age for police and fireman, but merely authorizes the city to do so and further, makes it clear that the police and firemen must yield to that authority, and the normal synonyms for the words “subject to” in the section are “subordinate to,” “subservient to,” “under the control,” “power or dominion of” or “liable to.” Terrill v. Barber, 515 S.W.2d 239, 1974 Ky. LEXIS 234 ( Ky. 1974 ).

95.859. Retirement annuity — Rate — Minimum payment — Annual cost-of-living increase.

  1. The rate of retirement annuity shall be two and one-half percent (2.5%) of average salary, as defined in KRS 95.851(13), for each year of total service up to and including thirty (30) years, subject to a maximum of seventy-five percent (75%) of average salary. Fractional periods of service shall be considered in the calculation of such annuities according to the aforesaid rate. If the calculated benefit for a member is less than four thousand eight hundred dollars ($4,800) per year, the board may increase the annual benefit to a minimum of four thousand eight hundred dollars ($4,800) if the increase can be supported on an actuarially sound basis by the fund.
  2. Any member who retired prior to June 21, 1974, shall receive an increase of ten dollars ($10) per month for each year or part thereof of retirement prior to June 21, 1974, with a maximum increase of one hundred seventy dollars ($170) per month. No surviving widow of a retiree shall receive a pension of less than one hundred and fifty dollars ($150) per month. The board may increase the minimum benefit to no more than five hundred dollars ($500) per month if the increase can be supported on an actuarially sound basis by the fund. When Social Security benefits are increased, the surviving widows’ minimum shall be increased by a like percentage, but the pension increase shall not exceed five percent (5%).
    1. Within six (6) months after the performance of the actuarial valuation required by KRS 95.872(6), the rate of retirement annuity of each annuitant shall be increased annually by an amount determined by the study to reflect so much of the annual increase in the cost of living of the annuitant as may be supported on an actuarially sound basis by the fund. So long as the same is published, such studies shall rely on the percentage increase in the annual average of the consumer price index for all items for the most recent calendar year as published by the United States Department of Labor’s Bureau of Labor Statistics, not to exceed five percent (5%). In any year that the percentage increase in the annual average of the consumer price index for all items is less than five percent (5%), the board may set the annual increase at a rate higher than the increase of the consumer price index but not in excess of five percent (5%), if the board determines that the increase can be supported on an actuarially sound basis by the fund. The increases shall be payable to all members of the fund on the effective date of the increases, and all increases granted on July 15, 1990, or thereafter shall be compounded. (3) (a) Within six (6) months after the performance of the actuarial valuation required by KRS 95.872(6), the rate of retirement annuity of each annuitant shall be increased annually by an amount determined by the study to reflect so much of the annual increase in the cost of living of the annuitant as may be supported on an actuarially sound basis by the fund. So long as the same is published, such studies shall rely on the percentage increase in the annual average of the consumer price index for all items for the most recent calendar year as published by the United States Department of Labor’s Bureau of Labor Statistics, not to exceed five percent (5%). In any year that the percentage increase in the annual average of the consumer price index for all items is less than five percent (5%), the board may set the annual increase at a rate higher than the increase of the consumer price index but not in excess of five percent (5%), if the board determines that the increase can be supported on an actuarially sound basis by the fund. The increases shall be payable to all members of the fund on the effective date of the increases, and all increases granted on July 15, 1990, or thereafter shall be compounded.
    2. If the board determines that no annual cost-of-living adjustment on annuities can be paid in accordance with paragraph (a) of this subsection, the city may, by action of the city’s legislative body, require the fund to provide an increase in annuities paid to annuitants of the fund subject to the following conditions:
      1. Any cost-of-living adjustment the city directs the fund to pay shall not exceed the percentage increase in the annual average of the consumer price index for all items for the most recent calendar year as published by the United States Department of Labor’s Bureau of Labor Statistics or five percent (5%), whichever is less;
      2. Each annual cost-of-living adjustment provided under this paragraph shall require the action of the city’s legislative body before being provided to annuitants of the fund; and
      3. The city’s legislative body shall have the authority to suspend, reduce, or repeal any cost-of-living adjustments approved under this paragraph if in their judgment the welfare of the city so demands.
  3. A surviving spouse who does not receive a pension increase pursuant to subsection (2) of this section or whose pension increase pursuant to the Social Security increase is less than the cost-of-living increase in subsection (3) of this section shall receive the same increase an annuitant receives pursuant to subsection (3) of this section, not to exceed a total of five percent (5%).

History. Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 16, § 9; 1972, ch. 185, § 1; 1974, ch. 396, § 2; 1984, ch. 351, § 1, effective July 13, 1984; 1990, ch. 118, § 4, effective July 13, 1990; 1994, ch. 50, § 1, effective July 15, 1994; 1996, ch. 124, § 1, effective July 15, 1996; 1996, ch. 132, § 1, effective July 15, 1996; 2000, ch. 341, § 1, effective July 14, 2000; 2012, ch. 111, § 1, effective July 12, 2012; 2016 ch. 31, § 28, effective July 15, 2016.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Prospective Effect of 1974 Amendment.

Since the 1974 amendments to this section and KRS 95.862 , which increased certain pensions for police and firefighters in second-class cities, contained no language expressly making the increases retroactive, the provisions governing the increases have prospective effect only, because KRS 95.879 and 446.080 require that any retroactivity be specifically declared. Policemen's & Firemen's Retirement Fund v. Rothrock, 625 S.W.2d 577, 1981 Ky. LEXIS 304 ( Ky. 1981 ).

2. Average Salary.

Accrued terminal leave pay (unused sick and vacation time) is not to be included in the calculation of “average salary” for purposes of age and service pensions and “last rate of salary” for disability benefit pensions because the lump sum paid upon retirement for unused sick and vacation pay is not paid to the employee periodically and a determination otherwise would lead to unintended results. City of Covington v. Board of Trustees of the Policemen's & Firefighters' Retirement Fund, 903 S.W.2d 517, 1995 Ky. LEXIS 66 ( Ky. 1995 ).

3. COLAs.
4. — Funding.

Subsection (3) of this section did not require a city to provide funding for annual cost of living adjustments (COLA) for pension beneficiaries; funding of a pension COLA by the city was discretionary. Keeton v. City of Ashland, 883 S.W.2d 894, 1994 Ky. App. LEXIS 79 (Ky. Ct. App. 1994).

5. Limitations on Appeal.

Action brought by about 74 retired city firefighters and policemen seeking to recompute their pension based upon recent decision regarding calculation of age and service and disability benefits was time barred, for KRS 95.882 and 95.883 , and not KRS 95.879 , controlled; any retiree who was dissatisfied with the determination of the Pension Board could have sought a rehearing within 20 days and appeal within 20 days thereafter. City of Covington v. Board of Trustees of the Policemen's & Firefighters' Retirement Fund, 903 S.W.2d 517, 1995 Ky. LEXIS 66 ( Ky. 1995 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

The benefits authorized by this section, in view of KRS 95.876 , are not available to retirees, or their widows, who retired under a retirement plan in force prior to the July 1, 1956 effective date of KRS 95.851 to 95.885 . OAG 74-721 .

95.860. Death of member due to occupational causes — Benefits to surviving widow, minor children, parents — Reduction of survivor benefits — Cost-of-living increases.

  1. Upon death of a member due to occupational causes, regardless of length of service, his surviving widow shall be entitled immediately upon cessation of salary or annuity, as the case may be, to an annuity equal to fifty percent (50%) of the member’s last rate of salary plus the total increase the retired member may have received in his annuity pursuant to KRS 95.859(3). This annuity shall be payable until she dies or remarries. No surviving widow shall receive an annuity of less than one hundred fifty dollars ($150) per month. The board may increase the minimum benefit to no more than five hundred dollars ($500) per month if the increase can be supported on an actuarially sound basis by the fund. When Social Security benefits are increased, the minimum shall be increased by a like percentage, provided the increase shall not exceed five percent (5%). In addition, if minor children under age eighteen (18) survive the member, the widow shall receive twenty-five percent (25%) of the member’s last rate of salary until the last child attains age eighteen (18). The combined payments to a widow and minor children, excluding cost-of-living increases or increases in the survivor benefit due to increases the retired member may have received in his annuity pursuant to KRS 95.859(3), shall not exceed seventy-five percent (75%) of his final rate of salary.
  2. If a widow does not survive the member, or if she remarries, and minor children under age eighteen (18) exist, the children shall be entitled to the benefits provided in KRS 95.861(3).
  3. If neither a widow nor minor children eligible for benefits survive the member, each dependent parent shall be entitled to an annuity equal to twenty-five percent (25%) of the member’s last rate of salary, or fifty percent (50%) to both parents.
  4. If a widow would receive from a combination of:
    1. Survivor benefits pursuant to this section, excluding benefits for minor children or increases in the survivor benefit due to increases the retired member may have received in his annuity pursuant to KRS 95.859(3); and
    2. Workers’ compensation benefits, excluding dependent children’s allowances or payments for medical expenses or legal fees related to the workers’ compensation claim, an amount greater than one hundred percent (100%) of the deceased member’s last rate of salary,

      then the pension system survivor benefits shall be reduced to the point that the combined payments equal one hundred percent (100%) of the last rate of salary. The survivor benefit shall not be reduced, however, below an amount equal to two and one-half percent (2.5%) of average salary for each year of the deceased member’s service. Any reduction in the survivor payment shall be based upon workers’ compensation benefits applicable at the time the survivor payment is granted, and not upon subsequent increases in either benefit. If workers’ compensation benefits are reduced at a subsequent time, the surviving spouse shall inform the board, and the board shall increase the survivor’s benefit by the amount of the reductions, but not by more than an amount which would increase the survivor’s benefit to fifty percent (50%) of last rate of salary, excluding cost-of-living increases or increases in the survivor benefit due to increases the retired member may have received in his annuity pursuant to KRS 95.859(3). The board of trustees may pay estimated benefits to a surviving spouse, upon qualification for the benefits, based upon an estimate of workers’ compensation benefits until such amounts are actually determined, at which time a final calculation of the spouse’s actual benefits shall be determined and the account corrected retroactive to the effective date of the survivor benefit. If workers’ compensation benefits are paid in lump sums, the board shall reduce the survivor benefit on a monthly rather than a lump-sum basis. The amount of the monthly reduction shall be based upon the life expectancy of the survivor. The board may request the assistance of the general manager of Kentucky Retirement Systems to calculate the reduction in survivor benefits when lump-sum payments are involved, and the general manager shall provide such assistance upon request.

  5. A surviving child or parent receiving benefits pursuant to this section shall receive the same cost-of-living increase granted to retirees pursuant to KRS 95.859(3). A surviving spouse who does not receive an increase pursuant to subsection (1) of this section or whose pension increase pursuant to the Social Security increase is less than the cost-of-living increase in KRS 95.859(3) shall receive the same increase an annuitant receives pursuant to KRS 95.859(3), not to exceed a total of five percent (5%).

History. Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 16, § 10; 1974, ch. 396, § 3; 1980, ch. 367, § 1, effective July 15, 1980; 1984, ch. 351, § 2, effective July 13, 1984; 1992, ch. 84, § 3, effective March 24, 1992; 1992, ch. 294, § 2, effective April 9, 1992; 1994, ch. 50, § 2, effective July 15, 1994; 1994, ch. 231, § 1, effective July 15, 1994; 1996, ch. 124, § 2, effective July 15, 1996; 2000, ch. 341, § 2, effective July 14, 2000.

Compiler’s Notes.

Section 5 of Acts 1992, ch. 84, provides: “Whereas the 1990 amendment to KRS 95.859 by 1990 Acts Chapter 118, Section 4, inadvertently failed to include disability retirees and survivors among those who would be eligible for cost-of-living increases from police and firefighter retirement systems in cities of the second class, and the General Assembly wishes to correct this oversight, an emergency is declared to exist, the effect of this Act shall be retroactive to September 1, 1989, and this Act shall become effective upon its passage and approval by the Governor.”

Section 6 of Acts 1992, ch. 294, provides: “Whereas the 1990 amendment to KRS 95.859 by 1990 Acts Chapter 118, Section 4, inadvertently failed to include survivors among those who would be eligible for cost-of-living increases from police and firefighter retirement systems in cities of the second class, and the General Assembly wishes to correct this oversight, an emergency is declared to exist, the effect of Sections 2 and 3 of this Act shall be retroactive to September 1, 1989, and Sections 2 and 3 of this Act shall become effective upon its passage and approval by the Governor.”

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(7/14/92). This section was amended by two 1992 Acts. Where those Acts are not in conflict, they have been compiled together. Where a conflict exists, the Act which was last enacted by the General Assembly prevails, pursuant to KRS 446.250 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Classification of Cities.

Fact that KRS 95.861 and this section provide that in second-class cities a widow can receive benefits until she remarries, while KRS 95.624 provides that in third-class cities a widow can receive benefits while unmarried, did not unconstitutionally discriminate against widows in second-class cities whose benefits are expressly terminated upon their remarriage. Henderson Police & Fireman Pension Bd. v. Riley, 674 S.W.2d 27, 1984 Ky. App. LEXIS 473 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984).

2. Limitations on Appeal.

Action brought by about 74 retired city firefighters and policemen seeking to recompute their pension based upon recent decision regarding calculation of age and service and disability benefits was time barred, for KRS 95.882 and 95.883 , and not KRS 95.879 , controlled; any retiree who was dissatisfied with the determination of the Pension Board could have sought a rehearing within 20 days and appeal within 20 days thereafter. City of Covington v. Board of Trustees of the Policemen's & Firefighters' Retirement Fund, 903 S.W.2d 517, 1995 Ky. LEXIS 66 ( Ky. 1995 ).

3. Salary.

Accrued terminal leave pay (unused sick and vacation time) is not to be included in the calculation of “average salary” for purposes of age and service pensions and “last rate of salary” for disability benefit pensions because the lump sum paid upon retirement for unused sick and vacation pay is not paid to the employee periodically and a determination otherwise would lead to unintended results. City of Covington v. Board of Trustees of the Policemen's & Firefighters' Retirement Fund, 903 S.W.2d 517, 1995 Ky. LEXIS 66 ( Ky. 1995 ).

Research References and Practice Aids

ALR

Relationship between policeman’s performance of official duties and his death, for purpose of recovery of benefits by survivors. 27 A.L.R.2d 1004.

Rights and survival benefits under public pension or retirement plan as between designated beneficiary and heirs, legatees, or personal representative of deceased employee. 5 A.L.R.3d 644.

Recovery, in action for benefit of decedent’s estate in jurisdiction which has both wrongful death and survival statutes, of value on earnings decedent would have made after death. 76 A.L.R.3d 125.

95.861. Death of member not occasioned by performance of duty — Benefits to surviving widow and minor children — Cost-of-living increases.

  1. Upon death of a member occurring while in service, arising from any cause other than in the performance of duty, provided the member has had at least three (3) years of total service, his widow shall receive an annuity equal to one and one-half percent (1-1/2%) of average salary for each year of total service, credited to the member, plus the total increase the retired member may have received in his retirement annuity pursuant to KRS 95.859(3), subject to a maximum payment, excluding cost-of-living increases of the member or the widow, to the widow of fifty percent (50%). If the member has had at least ten (10) years of total service, the widow shall receive an annuity of no less than one hundred fifty dollars ($150) per month. The board may increase the minimum benefit to not more than five hundred dollars ($500) per month if the increase can be supported on an actuarially sound basis by the fund. When Social Security benefits are increased, the minimum shall be increased by a like percentage, but the increase shall not exceed five percent (5%). Payment of the annuity shall be subject to the following conditions:
    1. The widow had been married to the member at least one (1) year prior to his death;
    2. The widow is at least forty-five (45) years of age, otherwise payment will be deferred until she attains such age, except that if she is or becomes totally disabled before age forty-five (45), or has a minor child or children by the member in her care under age eighteen (18) (including adopted children provided the proceedings for adoption were initiated at least one (1) year prior to death of member), payment of the widow’s annuity will begin immediately together with an additional allowance on account of the child or children; and
    3. The widow’s annuity will terminate in any event when the widow remarries. The annuity of each child or children shall continue until each child attains age eighteen (18).
  2. If the widow has minor children under age of eighteen (18), the annuity to the widow shall be increased one-half (1/2) on account of the first child and one-fourth (1/4) on account of each additional child, subject to a maximum combined payment, excluding cost-of-living increases or increases the retired member may have received in his annuity pursuant to KRS 95.859(3), to the widow and children of seventy-five percent (75%) of the average salary as defined in KRS 95.851(13).
  3. If the pensioner is not survived by a widow and there are minor children, the following benefits shall be paid:
    1. One (1) minor child, fifty percent (50%) of the average salary plus the total increase the retired member may have received in his annuity pursuant to KRS 95.859(3);
    2. Two (2) minor children, fifteen percent (15%) of the average salary additional; or
    3. Three (3) or more minor children, ten percent (10%) of the average salary additional,

      subject to a maximum combined payment, excluding cost-of-living increases of the member or the minor children, of seventy-five percent (75%) of the average salary as defined in KRS 95.851(13). The annuity of each child or children shall continue until each child attains age eighteen (18), or, in the case of a child regularly employed in full-time educational activities the age of twenty-three (23). The annuity payments shall be reduced in reverse order.

  4. These benefits shall also be payable upon death of the member while on retirement, provided marriage was in effect for at least one (1) year before death.
  5. A surviving child receiving benefits pursuant to this section shall receive the same cost-of-living increases granted to retirees pursuant to KRS 95.859(3). A surviving spouse who does not receive an increase pursuant to subsection (1) of this section or whose pension increase pursuant to the Social Security increase is less than the cost of living increase in KRS 95.859(3) shall receive the same increase an annuitant receives pursuant to KRS 95.859(3), not to exceed a total of five percent (5%).

History. Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 16, § 11; 1974, ch. 396, § 4; 1976, ch. 175, § 1; 1980, ch. 367, § 2, effective July 15, 1980; 1984, ch. 351, § 3, effective July 13, 1984; 1992, ch. 84, § 4, effective March 24, 1992; 1992, ch. 294, § 3, effective April 9, 1992; 1994, ch. 50, § 3, effective July 15, 1994; 1994, ch. 231, § 2, effective July 15, 1994; 1996, ch. 124, § 3, effective July 15, 1996; 2000, ch. 341, § 3, effective July 14, 2000.

Compiler’s Notes.

Section 5 of Acts 1992, ch. 84, provides: “Whereas the 1990 amendment to KRS 95.859 by 1990 Acts Chapter 118, Section 4, inadvertently failed to include disability retirees and survivors among those who would be eligible for cost-of-living increases from police and firefighter retirement systems in cities of the second class, and the General Assembly wishes to correct this oversight, an emergency is declared to exist, the effect of this Act shall be retroactive to September 1, 1989, and this Act shall become effective upon its passage and approval by the Governor.”

Section 6 of Acts 1992, ch. 294, provides: “Whereas the 1990 amendment to KRS 95.859 by 1990 Acts Chapter 118, Section 4, inadvertently failed to include survivors among those who would be eligible for cost-of-living increases from police and firefighter retirement systems in cities of the second class, and the General Assembly wishes to correct this oversight, an emergency is declared to exist, the effect of Sections 2 and 3 of this Act shall be retroactive to September 1, 1989, and Sections 2 and 3 of this Act shall become effective upon its passage and approval by the Governor.”

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Classification of Cities.

Fact that KRS 95.860 and this section provide that in second-class cities a widow can receive benefits until she remarries, while KRS 95.624 provides that in third-class cities a widow can receive benefits while unmarried, did not unconstitutionally discriminate against widows in second-class cities whose benefits are expressly terminated upon their remarriage. Henderson Police & Fireman Pension Bd. v. Riley, 674 S.W.2d 27, 1984 Ky. App. LEXIS 473 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984).

Opinions of Attorney General.

In view of the primary purpose of this section to assist widows and minor children of member firemen whose death while in service arises from any cause other than in the performance of duty, the General Assembly probably intended to use additional words such as “member firemen and policemen”, rather than “pensioner”, in subsection (3) and, accordingly, the benefits granted to minor children of a fireman who died, while in service, from a cause other than in the performance of duty, and who was not survived by a widow will be determined by this section. OAG 78-593 .

Where a policeman died while off-duty, leaving a 40-year old widow, who had neither dependent children nor was totally disabled, KRS 95.865(1) is inapplicable since there is a widow to whom a widow’s annuity is payable, except that, under subsection (1)(b) of this section, payment is merely deferred until she reaches 45. OAG 79-341 .

Research References and Practice Aids

ALR

Relationship between policeman’s performance of official duties and his death for purpose of recovery of benefits by survivors. 27 A.L.R.2d 1004.

Rights and survival benefits under public pension or retirement plan as between designated beneficiary and heirs, legatees, or personal representative of deceased employee. 5 A.L.R.3d 644.

Recovery, in action for benefit of decedent’s estate in jurisdiction which has both wrongful death and survival statutes, of value on earnings decedent would have made after death. 76 A.L.R.3d 125.

95.862. Permanent occupational disability — Annuity rate — Reduction of benefits — Cost-of-living increases.

  1. In the event a total and permanent occupational disability occurs, the member shall receive an annuity equal to seventy percent (70%) of his last rate of salary. If the calculated monthly benefit is less than five hundred dollars ($500) per month, the board may increase the monthly benefit to a minimum of five hundred dollars ($500) monthly if the increase can be supported on an actuarially sound basis by the fund. This benefit shall begin at such time as his salary may cease, and shall be paid during his entire lifetime. Any member who retired prior to June 21, 1974, shall receive an increase of ten dollars ($10) per month for each year or part thereof of retirement prior to June 21, 1974, with a maximum increase of one hundred and seventy dollars ($170) per month. Upon his death, his eligible widow and minor children, if any, shall receive the benefits as provided under KRS 95.860 .
  2. If the member retired for total and permanent occupational disability would receive from a combination of (a) pension disability payments pursuant to subsection (1) of this section, and (b) workers’ compensation payments, excluding spouse or dependent children’s allowances or payments for medical expenses or legal fees related to the workers’ compensation claim, an amount greater than one hundred percent (100%) of his last rate of salary, then the pension system benefits shall be reduced to the point that the combined payments equal one hundred percent (100%) of the last rate of salary. The benefit shall not be reduced, however, below an amount equal to two and one-half percent (2-1/2%) of average salary for each year of the member’s service. Any reduction in the payment shall be based upon workers’ compensation benefits applicable at the time the payment is granted, and not upon subsequent increases in either benefit. If workers’ compensation benefits are reduced at a subsequent time, the retiree shall inform the board, and the board shall increase the benefit by the amount of the reductions, but not by more than an amount which would increase the benefit to seventy percent (70%) of the last rate of salary, excluding cost-of-living increases. The board of trustees may pay estimated benefits to a retiree, upon qualification for the benefits, based upon an estimate of workers’ compensation benefits until such amounts are actually determined, at which time a final calculation of the actual benefits shall be determined and the account corrected retroactive to the effective date of the benefit. If workers’ compensation benefits are paid in lump sums, the board shall reduce the disability retirement annuity on a monthly rather than a lump-sum basis. The amount of the monthly reduction shall be based upon the life expectancy of the retired member. The board may request the assistance of the general manager of Kentucky Retirement Systems to calculate the reduction in the retirement benefit when lump sum payments are involved, and the general manager shall provide such assistance upon request.
  3. Any member retired pursuant to this section shall receive the same cost-of-living increases granted to other retirees pursuant to the terms of KRS 95.859(3).

History. Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 16, § 12; 1974, ch. 396, § 5; 1980, ch. 367, § 3, effective July 15, 1980; 1984, ch. 351, § 4, effective July 13, 1984; 1992, ch. 84, § 1, effective March 24, 1992; 1996, ch. 132, § 2, effective July 15, 1996; 2000, ch. 341, § 4, effective July 14, 2000.

Compiler’s Notes.

Section 5 of Acts 1992, ch. 84, provides: “Whereas the 1990 amendment to KRS 95.859 by 1990 Acts Chapter 118, Section 4, inadvertently failed to include disability retirees and survivors among those who would be eligible for cost-of-living increases from police and firefighter retirement systems in cities of the second class, and the General Assembly wishes to correct this oversight, an emergency is declared to exist, the effect of this Act shall be retroactive to September 1, 1989, and this Act shall become effective upon its passage and approval by the Governor.”

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Prospective Effect of 1974 Amendment.

Since the 1974 amendments to KRS 95.859 and this section, which increased certain pensions for police and firefighters in second-class cities, contained no language expressly making the increases retroactive, the provisions governing the increases have prospective effect only, because KRS 95.879 and 446.080 require that any retroactivity be specifically declared. Policemen's & Firemen's Retirement Fund v. Rothrock, 625 S.W.2d 577, 1981 Ky. LEXIS 304 ( Ky. 1981 ).

Cited:

Board of Trustees v. Nuckolls, 481 S.W.2d 36, 1972 Ky. LEXIS 211 ( Ky. 1972 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Where a uniformed employee has received a disability pension and is now engaged in full-time employment and from all external appearances is no longer permanently disabled, he could not be recalled to determine if he is still suffering from the disability since there is no provision under this section to the effect that if such person becomes gainfully employed at some future date, the pension may be discontinued or modified. OAG 73-724 .

The fact that a surviving widow did not marry the deceased until after he qualified for an annuity would in no way affect her right as a surviving widow to receive such benefits as are authorized by this section. OAG 77-695 .

In determining when a disabled employee’s salary ceases and he becomes eligible for benefits, sick leave payments or benefits are generally considered to be a part of the employee’s overall compensation earned during the period of his employment and forming a part of his salary, but fringe benefits such as hospitalization and life insurance would not be considered part of the employee’s salary. OAG 85-81 .

Research References and Practice Aids

ALR

Causal connection between policeman’s performance of official duties and his disability, for purpose of recovering disability benefits. 27 A.L.R.2d 974.

Injured person’s receipt of statutory disability unemployment benefits as affecting recovery against tortfeasor. 4 A.L.R.3d 535.

Right of tortfeasor to mitigate opponent’s damages for loss of earning capacity by showing that his compensation, notwithstanding disability, has been paid by his employer. 7 A.L.R.3d 516.

Determination whether firefighter’s disability is service-connected for disability pension purposes. 7 A.L.R.4th 799.

95.863. Total and permanent disability not occasioned by duties of member — Accrual of annuity — Cost-of-living increases.

  1. Upon total and permanent disability of a member as the result of any cause other than occupational disability, if a member shall have rendered at least ten (10) years of total service, he shall be entitled to a disability retirement annuity. The amount of such annuity shall be equal to two and one-half percent (2-1/2%) of average salary, as defined in KRS 95.851(13), for each full year of total service, subject to a minimum payment of twenty-five percent (25%) of such average salary, and a maximum payment, excluding cost-of-living increases, of fifty percent (50%) of average salary. If the calculated monthly benefit is less than five hundred dollars ($500) per month, the board may increase the monthly benefit to a minimum of five hundred dollars ($500) monthly if the increase can be supported on an actuarially sound basis by the fund. Payment of this annuity shall be made during disability of the member. Any member who retired prior to June 21, 1974, shall receive an increase of ten dollars ($10) per month for each year or part thereof of retirement prior to June 21, 1974, with a maximum increase of one hundred seventy dollars ($170) per month. Upon death of the member, if an eligible widow or minor children survive, such survivors shall be entitled to the regular annuities provided under KRS 95.861 .
  2. Any annuity for nonoccupational disability shall begin to accrue upon the expiration of ninety (90) days following the commencement of disability, provided that, if the member is receiving salary for sick leave for a period of more than ninety (90) days, payment shall accrue from the date such salary ceases. If written application for such annuity shall not have been filed with the board prior to the expiration of ninety (90) days from the date of disability, the annuity shall begin to accrue from the date the application shall be filed but not prior to the expiration of ninety (90) days from the date of disability, nor in any event prior to the time when salary payments to the employee shall have ceased.
  3. Any member retired pursuant to this section shall receive the same cost-of-living increases granted to other retirees pursuant to the terms of KRS 95.859(3).

History. Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 16, § 13; 1974, ch. 396, § 6; 1980, ch. 367, § 4, effective July 15, 1980; 1984, ch. 351, § 5, effective July 13, 1984; 1992, ch. 84, § 2, effective March 24, 1992; 1996, ch. 132, § 3, effective July 15, 1996; 2000, ch. 341, § 5, effective July 14, 2000.

Compiler’s Notes.

Section 5 of Acts 1992, ch. 84, provides: “Whereas the 1990 amendment to KRS 95.859 by 1990 Acts Chapter 118, Section 4, inadvertently failed to include disability retirees and survivors among those who would be eligible for cost-of-living increases from police and firefighter retirement systems in cities of the second class, and the General Assembly wishes to correct this oversight, an emergency is declared to exist, the effect of this Act shall be retroactive to September 1, 1989, and this Act shall become effective upon its passage and approval by the Governor.”

Research References and Practice Aids

ALR

Total disability or the like as referring to inability to work in usual occupation or in other occupations. 21 A.L.R.3d 1155.

95.864. Medical examination to determine disability — Certification of examining physicians — Termination of policeman’s or firefighter’s disability retirement annuity — Appeal.

  1. For the purpose of KRS 95.851 to 95.884 and KRS 95.991 , a member shall be considered totally and permanently disabled after the board shall have received written certification by at least two (2) licensed and practicing physicians selected by the board that the member is totally and likely to be permanently disabled for the further performance of the duties of any assigned position in the service of the department. If upon consideration of the report of such physicians and such other evidence as shall have been presented to it by the member or others interested therein, the board finds the member to be totally and permanently disabled, it shall grant him a disability retirement annuity upon written certification that the member has been separated from the service of the city because of total disability of such nature as to reasonably prevent further service for the employer, and as a consequence is not entitled to compensation from the city.
  2. If, after the board grants a policeman or firefighter a disability retirement annuity, the board determines that a policeman so retired is performing police work for another employer, or that a firefighter so retired is performing firefighting duties for another employer, and that the duties performed for the new employer are substantially the same as those which the retired member performed for the city, then the board may terminate the retired member’s disability retirement annuity.
  3. If the board terminates a retired member’s disability retirement annuity pursuant to subsection (2) of this section, the city shall offer the member reemployment with the police or fire department in order that the member may, if he chooses, complete the service required for normal retirement. Time spent in disability retirement shall not count as service credit for normal retirement.
  4. A retired member aggrieved by termination of his disability retirement annuity may appeal the decision of the board to the Circuit Court of the county in which the board is located. The scope of the appeal shall be limited to whether the board abused its discretion in terminating the retirement benefit.

History. Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 16, § 14, effective July 1, 1956; 1980, ch. 188, § 86, effective July 15, 1980; 1980, ch. 367, § 5, effective July 15, 1980.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(11/21/96). In 1974, the Reviser of Statutes renumbered KRS 95.885 as KRS 95.991 . 1980 Ky. Acts ch. 188, sec. 86, a revisory act, mistakenly changed a reference in this statute from “KRS 95.851 to 95.885 ” to “KRS 95.851 to 95.991 .” Because this change would appear to effect a substantive change in the law, it has been disregarded, and the reference has been made to read “KRS 95.851 to 95.884 and KRS 95.991” under KRS 7.123(4) and 7.136(1)(a).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Physicians’ fees for examining applicants for retirement cannot be paid out of the funds of the policemen’s and firemen’s retirement fund of a city of the second class. OAG 63-5 .

Where city retirement board denied an occupational disability claim on the basis that the claimant was not permanently and totally disabled and, subsequently, the claimant requested the board to reconsider its determination and moved that the board appoint two physicians to examine him pursuant to this section, the board could have utilized such section but was not required to do so, since the initial proof proffered by the claimant, which consisted of the medical reports of several physicians, did not indicate total and permanent disability for the “further performance of the duties of any assigned position in the service of the department.” OAG 77-225 .

This section does not require the board to appoint two examining physicians every time an applicant claims that he is totally disabled, but it does require that before the board determines that the applicant is totally disabled, it must utilize the procedures set forth in this section. OAG 77-225 .

There is no requirement in this section that the certificate of disability include a statement as to whether the cause of disability was “job-related”; if the member applies for disability under KRS 95.862 (job-related) rather than KRS 95.863 (not job-related), then expert evidence or testimony must be presented to the board of this fact in the form of either a doctor’s certificate or testimony before the board, or both, in order for the board to make a determination that the disability was, in fact, “job-related.” OAG 81-370 .

The statutory presumption of KRS 79.080(5) that heart disease or respiratory disease was contracted by a member of the department while on active duty is subject to rebuttal by evidence that may be submitted by the board in conjunction with the medical examination required to be made under this section. In other words, the burden of proof that the disease was not contracted while on active duty and as a result of strain or the inhalation of noxious fumes, poison or gas, shifts to the board. OAG 83-282 .

95.8641. Applicability of benefits.

The provisions of KRS 95.860 to 95.864 , as amended by 1980 Acts Chapter 367, relating to maximum benefits from a combination of disability or survivor benefits and workers’ compensation benefits, or reduction of disability or survivor benefits because of benefits paid pursuant to workers’ compensation laws, shall be retroactive to June 21, 1974, and shall supersede Sections 3.(4), 4.(4), 5. and 6.(3) of 1974 Acts Chapter 396 as they relate to reduction of disability or survivor benefits because of benefits paid pursuant to workers’ compensation laws.

History. Enact. Acts 1980, ch. 367, § 6, effective July 15, 1980.

95.865. Death of member — No widow’s or children’s annuities payable — Benefit to designated beneficiary.

  1. Upon death of a member, occurring while in active service, if no widow’s annuity or children’s annuities are payable, the designated beneficiary of the member or his estate shall be entitled to a death benefit equal to the total contributions made by the member, including those employee contributions picked up by the employer pursuant to KRS 65.155 , without interest, or three hundred dollars ($300), whichever is greater.
  2. Upon death of a retired member, if no widow’s annuity or children’s annuities shall be due or payable, a death benefit shall be paid to the designated beneficiary or estate of the member, equal to the excess, if any, of the total contributions made by the member to this fund to the date of retirement, including those employee contributions picked up by the employer pursuant to KRS 65.155 , without interest, over the total annuity payments received by the member. The minimum payment in such case shall be three hundred dollars ($300). If a widow’s annuity or children’s annuities are payable after the death of the retired member, the amount of such death benefit, if any, shall be determined upon termination of annuity payments to all survivors of the member, whether such termination occurs by death, remarriage or other cause.

History. Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 16, § 15, effective July 1, 1956; 1982, ch. 166, § 51, effective July 15, 1982.

Opinions of Attorney General.

Where a policeman died while off-duty, leaving a 40-year old widow, who had neither dependent children nor was totally disabled, subsection (1) of this section is inapplicable since there is a widow to whom a widow’s annuity is payable, except that, under KRS 95.861(1)(b), payment is merely deferred until she reaches 45. OAG 79-341 .

95.866. Withdrawal from service prior to retirement — Refund — Forfeitures.

  1. Upon withdrawal from service prior to retirement, a member shall be entitled to receive a refund of the amount of contributions made by the member after the date of establishment, including those employee contributions picked up by the employer pursuant to KRS 65.155 , without interest.
  2. Any member receiving a refund of contributions shall thereby ipso facto forfeit, waive, and relinquish all accrued rights and benefits in the system, including all credited and creditable service. The board may, in its discretion, regardless of cause, withhold payment of a refund for a period not to exceed six (6) months after receipt of an application from a member.
  3. Any member who has received a refund shall be considered a new member upon subsequent reemployment if such person qualifies for membership under the provisions hereof. After the completion of at least five (5) years of continuous membership service following his latest reemployment, such member shall have the right to make a repayment to the system of the amount or amounts previously received as refund, including six percent (6%) interest from the dates of refund to the date of repayment. Such repayment shall not be picked up by the employer pursuant to KRS 65.155 . Upon the restoration of such refunds, as herein provided, such member shall have reinstated to his account all credited service represented by the refunds of which repayment has been made. Repayment of refunds by any member shall include all refunds received by a member prior to the date of his last withdrawal from service and shall be made in a single sum.

History. Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 16, § 16, effective July 1, 1956; 1982, ch. 166, § 52, effective July 15, 1982.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Dismissal for Cause.

A policeman who was dismissed for cause was entitled to a refund of his contributions to the retirement fund since there is nothing in the statute to indicate a legislative intent to restrict the refund to those members who voluntarily withdrew from service prior to retirement. Policemen's & Firemen's Retirement Fund v. Shields, 521 S.W.2d 82, 1975 Ky. LEXIS 149 ( Ky. 1975 ).

Cited:

Louisville Policemen’s Retirement Fund v. Bryant, 556 S.W.2d 6, 1977 Ky. LEXIS 515 ( Ky. 1977 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

A person having prior service and who was a member upon establishment of the system, and who later resigns, receiving a refund, and rejoins the system at a later date may, upon five years of consecutive service following his latest re-employment, pay back the refund, plus six percent interest, for membership credit, but he would forfeit all prior service. OAG 63-272 .

In the absence of specific statutory authority, a retired employe cannot be reinstated under any circumstances. OAG 71-112 .

In the absence of a judicial decision to the contrary, it would appear that the retirement fund statutes applicable to the fire department of a city of the second class permit, but do not require, the reemployment of a fireman, who voluntarily withdrew from the fire service prior to qualifying for or actually receiving his retirement annuity, who subsequently seeks reemployment; this section does not deal with the mechanics of the reemployment process and does not specifically refer to a person who has already worked 20 years with the fire service but it appears to authorize any former member of the fire service, who has not actually retired and is, therefore, not eligible for the retirement annuity, to become reemployed with the fire service. OAG 84-239 .

Since the statutes dealing with the fire fighters retirement fund for cities of the second class do not set forth any provisions dealing with the mechanics of the reemployment process, it appears that if a firefighter who voluntarily left the fire service desires to seek reemployment with the fire service he would proceed through the city’s established practices relative to hiring (and rehiring); he would not automatically return to his old position but could do so if a vacancy existed and other requirements in the hiring process had been satisfied. OAG 84-239 .

95.867. Members’ contributions — Director of finance to deduct.

Each active member shall contribute a sum equal to eight percent (8%) of current salary. The director of finance of the city is hereby authorized to deduct such amount from the salary of each active member in semimonthly installments. This contribution shall be made as deduction from salary, notwithstanding that the salary paid in cash to such member may be reduced thereby below the established statutory rate. Every member of the fund shall be deemed to consent and agree to the deduction from salary as herein provided, and shall receipt for his full salary, and payment to such member of salary less such deduction shall constitute a full and complete discharge and acquittance of all claims and demands whatsoever for the services rendered by such member during the period covered by such payment, except as to the benefits herein provided.

History. Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 16, § 17; 1974, ch. 396, § 7.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Salary.

For purposes of computing his contribution, a member’s salary includes both the sums paid to him by the city from its general fund and from its participation in the law enforcement foundation program. Policeman's & Fireman's Retirement Fund v. Richardson, 522 S.W.2d 452, 1975 Ky. LEXIS 136 ( Ky. 1975 ).

Cited:

City of Covington v. Board of Trustees of the Policemen’s & Firefighters’ Retirement Fund, 903 S.W.2d 517, 1995 Ky. LEXIS 66 ( Ky. 1995 ), rehearing denied, City of Covington v. Board of Trustees of the Policemen’s & Firefighters’ Retirement Fund of Covington, 1995 Ky. LEXIS 91 ( Ky. 1995 ).

95.868. Contributions by city.

The city shall make current contributions to the fund on an actuarially funded basis, toward the annuities and benefits herein provided. These contributions shall be equal to the sum of the following:

  1. An annual amount resulting from the application of a rate percent of salaries of active members, representing the present value of the actuarial reserve requirements for membership service, for service retirement annuity, disability retirement annuity, and annuities to widows and children, and the one (1) year term premium for the city’s liability for death benefits, after applying the contributions by the active members. Such rate percent shall be fixed by the board at least once every three (3) to five (5) years after completion of the actuarial valuation of the fund as required by KRS 65.156 , and shall be in effect until the next actuarial valuation is completed by the fund. For the first three (3) fiscal years of operation of the fund, the city’s rate of contribution shall be at least twelve percent (12%) of the salaries of the active members participating in the fund.
  2. An amount resulting from the application of a rate percent of the salaries of active members which will provide each year regular interest on the remaining liability for prior service.

History. Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 16, § 18, effective July 1, 1956; 1982, ch. 297, § 8, effective July 15, 1982; 2016 ch. 31, § 29, effective July 15, 2016.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

Covington v. Peare, 769 S.W.2d 761, 1989 Ky. App. LEXIS 50 (Ky. Ct. App. 1989).

Opinions of Attorney General.

This section mandatorily requires the city to make contributions to the police and firemen’s retirement fund on an actuary basis and, of course, in accordance with the number and salaries of the employes. However, after the first five years of operation during which the city’s rate of contribution shall be at least 12 per cent of the salaries of the active members participating in the fund, there is no statutory requirement that the city increase its contribution percentage wise. OAG 71-186 .

The failure of a municipality to levy sufficient tax to meet pension demands will not render it liable in damages, however, a municipality must make contributions to the fund and, in appropriate instances, mandamus will lie to compel it to do so. OAG 80-363 .

This section requires a city of the second class to make current contributions to the police and firefighter’s pension fund on an actuarially funded basis since the word “shall” is used which is a mandatory word as defined in KRS 446.010(29). OAG 80-363 .

The Board of Trustees of the local Police and Firefighters’ Retirement Fund may transfer funds from the Local Fund to the County Employees’ Retirement System (CERS) to pay for prior service years of those employees who transferred from the local system to the county system; however, such transfer must be made with the approval of the Board of Trustees of the Local Fund, which must determine whether the amount requested to be transferred to the CERS can be done without negatively affecting the actuarial soundness of the Local Fund. OAG 90-49 .

95.869. Board of trustees to operate fund and direct policies — Membership — Removal for cause — Repeal of ordinances establishing pension fund — Liquidation and distribution of residual assets — Report. [Effective until July 15, 2020]

    1. The responsibility for the proper operation of the fund and the direction of its policies shall be vested in a board of trustees. (1) (a) The responsibility for the proper operation of the fund and the direction of its policies shall be vested in a board of trustees.
    2. If there are no active members of the fund, the board of trustees shall consist of four (4) members who shall be: (a) the mayor ex officio; (b) the city treasurer or chief financial officer ex officio; and (c) one (1) retired member of each department who shall be elected by ballot by the retired members of the respective departments. The mayor ex officio and the city treasurer ex officio shall serve for terms of one (1) year under rules adopted by the board. The two (2) retired members of the police and fire department shall serve for terms of at least one (1) year with a maximum of two (2) years under rules adopted by the board. If there are active members of the fund, there shall be two (2) additional board members who shall be one (1) active member of the fund from each department elected by ballot by the active members of the fund from the respective departments and who shall serve for terms of at least one (1) year with a maximum of two (2) years under rules adopted by the board. If all of the active members or all of the retired members are from one (1) department, then both of the active-member board members or both of the retired board members shall be elected from that department.
    3. If there are fewer than six (6) active and retired members of the fund, the board of trustees shall be composed of the mayor, city treasurer or chief financial officer, and two (2) employees appointed by the mayor, one (1) from the city police department and one (1) from the city fire department, who shall serve for one (1) year and until their respective successors are appointed and qualified. If all of the members of the pension fund are from one (1) department, no appointment shall be made from the other department.
    4. In the event of a vacancy of an elected member, the pension board may fill the vacancy by appointment until the next regular election.
  1. The board of trustees membership shall be restructured according to the provisions of this section at the time of the next scheduled election of board members after July 15, 2016.
  2. Any member of the board convicted of an offense relating to mismanagement or embezzlement of the fund created pursuant to KRS 95.852 shall be removed from the board and shall be prohibited from serving on the board. If the board member removed is an ex officio member, the city council shall appoint a replacement until another person shall fill the office entitled to a seat on the board. If the board member removed is an active policeman or firefighter, the board shall fill the vacancy by appointment of another active policeman or firefighter until the next regular election.
  3. If all liabilities to all individuals entitled to benefits from the policemen’s and firefighters’ pension fund have been satisfied, the ordinances establishing the fund may be repealed by the majority vote of the duly elected members of the entire legislative body. If repealed, the fund’s board of trustees shall, within sixty (60) days of repeal, proceed with the liquidation of any residual assets of the fund. All residual assets liquidated pursuant to this subsection shall be distributed by the board of trustees to the city’s general fund so long as the return of assets complies with federal and state law governing the distribution of assets. Within thirty (30) days following the distribution of residual assets, the board of trustees of the fund shall as its last act file a complete report with the legislative body of the city of the actions taken to terminate the fund and liquidate residual assets of the fund for retention by the city clerk the same as for other city records.

History. Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 16, § 19, effective July 1, 1956; 1980, ch. 188, § 87, effective July 15, 1980; 1982, ch. 437, § 1, effective July 15, 1982; 1990, ch. 83, § 1, effective July 13, 1990; 1994, ch. 286, § 1, effective July 15, 1994; 1998, ch. 260, § 1, effective July 15, 1998; 2016 ch. 31, § 30, effective July 15, 2016.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Authority.

The Board of Trustees of the Policemen’s and Firefighters’ Retirement Fund, not the city, has the exclusive authority to administer the retirement fund which includes the authority to consider and pass upon its retirees’ applications for retirement and determination of their retirement annuities. Covington v. Peare, 769 S.W.2d 761, 1989 Ky. App. LEXIS 50 (Ky. Ct. App. 1989).

A trial court’s judgment ordering a city to recompute retired firefighters’ retirement annuity and further ordering certain attendant incidental conditions, and not ordering the Board of Trustees of the Policemen’s and Firefighters’ Retirement Fund to do so, were all nullities because the city was not empowered to do so. Covington v. Peare, 769 S.W.2d 761, 1989 Ky. App. LEXIS 50 (Ky. Ct. App. 1989).

Opinions of Attorney General.

The board of trustees is not authorized to delegate its function of managing, operating and investing the policeman’s and fireman’s pension fund to an insurance company. OAG 67-426 .

Under KRS 95.851 , 95.872(3), and this section, the Board of Trustees of the Police and Firefighter’s Retirement Fund is in charge of the funds of the Retirement Fund which would include city’s prior year contributions, thus, the city could not unilaterally withdraw from the Retirement Fund an amount of money equal to the sum of the city’s prior year contributions plus interest; such withdrawal would have to be done with the approval of the Board. OAG 90-47 .

The Board of Trustees of the local Police and Firefighters’ Retirement Fund may transfer funds from the Local Fund to the County Employees’ Retirement System (CERS) to pay for prior service years of those employees who transferred from the local system to the county system; however, such transfer must be made with the approval of the Board of Trustees of the Local Fund, which must determine whether the amount requested to be transferred to the CERS can be done without negatively affecting the actuarial soundness of the Local Fund. OAG 90-49 .

95.869. Board of trustees to operate fund and direct policies — Membership — Removal for cause — Option to convert pension benefits to annuity benefits — Repeal of ordinances establishing pension fund — Liquidation and distribution of residual assets — Report. [Effective July 15, 2020]

    1. The responsibility for the proper operation of the fund and the direction of its policies shall be vested in a board of trustees. (1) (a) The responsibility for the proper operation of the fund and the direction of its policies shall be vested in a board of trustees.
    2. If there are no active members of the fund, the board of trustees shall consist of four (4) members who shall be: (a) the mayor ex officio; (b) the city treasurer or chief financial officer ex officio; and
    3. one (1) retired member of each department who shall be elected by ballot by the retired members of the respective departments. The mayor ex officio and the city treasurer ex officio shall serve for terms of one (1) year under rules adopted by the board. The two (2) retired members of the police and fire department shall serve for terms of at least one (1) year with a maximum of two (2) years under rules adopted by the board. If there are active members of the fund, there shall be two (2) additional board members who shall be one (1) active member of the fund from each department elected by ballot by the active members of the fund from the respective departments and who shall serve for terms of at least one (1) year with a maximum of two (2) years under rules adopted by the board. If all of the active members or all of the retired members are from one (1) department, then both of the active-member board members or both of the retired board members shall be elected from that department.

      (c) If there are fewer than six (6) active and retired members of the fund, the board of trustees shall be composed of the mayor, city treasurer or chief financial officer, and two (2) employees appointed by the mayor, one (1) from the city police department and one (1) from the city fire department, who shall serve for one (1) year and until their respective successors are appointed and qualified. If all of the members of the pension fund are from one (1) department, no appointment shall be made from the other department.

    4. If there are fewer than six (6) active and retired members of the fund from one (1) department, the board of trustees shall be composed of the mayor, city treasurer or chief financial officer, one (1) retired member of the department with six (6) or more active or retired members of the fund who shall be elected by ballot by the retired members of the department, and one (1) employee appointed by the mayor from the department with fewer than six (6) active and retired members of the fund who shall serve for one (1) year and until their respective successors are appointed and qualified.
    5. In the event of a vacancy of an elected member, the pension board may fill the vacancy by appointment until the next regular election.
  1. The board of trustees membership shall be restructured according to the provisions of this section at the time of the next scheduled election of board members after July 15, 2020.
  2. Any member of the board convicted of an offense relating to mismanagement or embezzlement of the fund created pursuant to KRS 95.852 shall be removed from the board and shall be prohibited from serving on the board. If the board member removed is an ex officio member, the city council shall appoint a replacement until another person shall fill the office entitled to a seat on the board. If the board member removed is an active policeman or firefighter, the board shall fill the vacancy by appointment of another active policeman or firefighter until the next regular election.
  3. If there are fewer than twelve (12) active and retired members or beneficiaries of the policemen’s and firefighters’ pension fund, the governing body of the fund may elect to offer to individuals entitled to benefits from the fund a one (1) time irrevocable option to convert monthly pension benefits from the fund to monthly annuity benefits from an insurance company for the same amount. An insurance company accepting a benefit transfer shall honor any features and options available under the existing plan. If the governing body of the fund elects to offer the option to convert monthly pension benefits to monthly annuity benefits, it shall provide to individuals entitled to benefits from the fund sufficiently complete and appropriate disclosures to assist in making an informed decision.
  4. If all liabilities to all individuals entitled to benefits from the policemen’s and firefighters’ pension fund have been satisfied, the ordinances establishing the fund may be repealed by the majority vote of the duly elected members of the entire legislative body. If repealed, the fund’s board of trustees shall, within sixty (60) days of repeal, proceed with the liquidation of any residual assets of the fund. All residual assets liquidated pursuant to this subsection shall be distributed by the board of trustees to the city’s general fund so long as the return of assets complies with federal and state law governing the distribution of assets. Within thirty (30) days following the distribution of residual assets, the board of trustees of the fund shall as its last act file a complete report with the legislative body of the city of the actions taken to terminate the fund and liquidate residual assets of the fund for retention by the city clerk the same as for other city records.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 16, § 19, effective July 1, 1956; 1980, ch. 188, § 87, effective July 15, 1980; 1982, ch. 437, § 1, effective July 15, 1982; 1990, ch. 83, § 1, effective July 13, 1990; 1994, ch. 286, § 1, effective July 15, 1994; 1998, ch. 260, § 1, effective July 15, 1998; 2016 ch. 31, § 30, effective July 15, 2016; 2020 ch. 121, § 8, effective July 15, 2020.

95.870. Election among active members — Method — Certification of vote.

  1. Subject to the foregoing provisions, there shall be held on the first Wednesday after the first Tuesday of September of each year an election among the active members for trustee of the fund. Under KRS 95.869 , if there are two (2) additional active board members of the fund serving from each department, their terms shall be for at least one (1) year with a maximum of two (2) years under rules adopted by the board.
  2. On or before August 10 preceding, nominations for candidates in the election shall be filed with the chief of the police department and the chief of the fire department. The nominations shall be in writing and shall be signed by not less than twenty-five percent (25%) of the members. Within five (5) days after the close of nominations, the chiefs of the respective departments shall certify in writing to all districts and bureaus of the departments the names of those placed in nomination.
  3. On the first Wednesday after the first Tuesday in September beginning at the hour of 12 noon on Wednesday and continuing thereafter for a forty-eight (48) hour period, an election shall be held under the supervision of the commanding officers of the districts and bureaus. Each member shall vote at the district or bureau of which he is a member, except those members who are not assigned to a specific district or bureau, who shall vote at the office of the chief of police or chief of the fire department, as the case may be. At the close of voting, the commanding officer of each district or bureau shall, in the presence of the nominees or their duly authorized agents, open the ballot box and count the votes. He shall then make a certificate of the count and send the certificate with the ballots in a sealed envelope to the mayor, who shall, on the following Wednesday, open all the certificates so received and, after counting all the returns, certify the results to the board. On the third Wednesday after the first Tuesday in September, the candidate or candidates receiving the most votes shall assume office.

History. Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 16, § 20; 1974, ch. 396, § 8; 1998, ch. 260, § 2, effective July 15, 1998.

Opinions of Attorney General.

Since this section provides that each member must vote at the district or bureau of which he is a member, absentee voting would not be permitted in the election of a pension fund trustee. OAG 77-780 .

95.871. Duties of board.

The board shall have, in addition to other duties arising out of KRS 95.851 to 95.884 and KRS 95.991 , the following duties:

  1. Establish and maintain an office in the facilities provided by the city for the meetings of the board and the keeping of the books, accounts, and records of the fund; hold regular meetings at least quarterly, and such special meetings as may be deemed necessary; and keep a full record of all of its proceedings, which shall be open to inspection by the public.
  2. Provide for the installation of a system of accounts and records that will give full effect to the requirements of KRS 95.851 to 95.884 and KRS 95.991 ; adopt all necessary actuarial tables to be used in the operation of the fund; and provide for the compilation of such statistical and financial data as may be required for actuarial valuations, periodic surveys, and calculations.
  3. Obtain such information from the participating members and the city as shall be necessary for the proper operation of the fund.
  4. Consider and pass upon all applications for annuities, benefits, refunds and other payments, and authorize the expenditure for such purposes, in accordance with the provisions hereof. The board shall have authority to promulgate such rules and regulations, not inconsistent with the provisions of KRS 95.851 to 95.884 and KRS 95.991 , necessary for the proper determination of all claims before it.
  5. Accept any gift, grant, or bequest of any money or property of any kind, for the purposes designated by the grantor if such purposes are specified as providing cash benefits to some or all of the members or annuitants of the fund; if no such purposes are designated, the same shall be credited to the account representing income from investments.
  6. Have the accounts of the fund audited as of the end of each fiscal year, by a competent accountant, and submit an annual report to the city as soon as possible following the close of the year, embodying, among other things, a balance sheet showing the financial and actuarial condition of the fund, a statement of income and expenditures for the year, a statement showing changes in the asset, liability, and reserve accounts during the year, a statement of investments owned by the fund, detailed statements of investments acquired and disposed of during the year, and such other financial or statistical data as are necessary for a proper interpretation of the condition of the fund and the results of its operations. The board shall also cause to be published for distribution among the members a synopsis of such report.

History. Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 16, § 21, effective July 1, 1956; 1980, ch. 188, § 88, effective July 15, 1980; 1996, ch. 124, § 4, effective July 15, 1996.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(11/21/96). In 1974, the Reviser of Statutes renumbered KRS 95.885 as KRS 95.991 . 1980 Ky. Acts ch. 188, sec. 88, a revisory act, mistakenly changed references in this statute from “KRS 95.851 to 95.885 ” to “KRS 95.851 to 95.991 .” Because these changes would appear to effect a substantive change in the law, they have been disregarded, and the references have been made to read “KRS 95.851 to 95.884 and KRS 95.991” under KRS 7.123(4) and 7.136(1)(a).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Retirement Fund.

The Board of Trustees of the Policemen’s and Firefighters’ Retirement Fund, not the city, has the exclusive authority to administer the retirement fund which includes the authority to consider and pass upon its retirees’ applications for retirement and determination of their retirement annuities. Covington v. Peare, 769 S.W.2d 761, 1989 Ky. App. LEXIS 50 (Ky. Ct. App. 1989).

A trial court’s judgment ordering a city to recompute retired firefighters’ retirement annuity and further ordering certain attendant incidental conditions, and not ordering the Board of Trustees of the Policemen’s and Firefighters’ Retirement Fund to do so, were all nullities because the city was not empowered to do so. Covington v. Peare, 769 S.W.2d 761, 1989 Ky. App. LEXIS 50 (Ky. Ct. App. 1989).

Opinions of Attorney General.

The duties of the board of trustees as outlined in this section coincide with the purpose to which the fund is directed under KRS 95.853 . Thus, pension funds for police and firefighters cannot be used for any purpose other than those mentioned in related statutes and therefore cannot be utilized to provide health insurance benefits for the members of the departments. OAG 82-247 .

95.872. Board officers — Treasurer — Legal adviser — Actuarial assistance — Rules and regulations.

  1. The officers of the board shall consist of a president, vice president, and a secretary. The president shall be the chief executive officer of the board, shall preside at all meetings and shall appoint all necessary committees. The vice president shall serve as president in the absence of the president.
  2. The board shall designate a secretary who may be a member of the board and shall fix his compensation. The secretary shall keep a full account of all proceedings of the board, shall give notice of all meetings and give effect to all resolutions, orders, and directives of the board. He shall be in charge of the detailed affairs of administration of the fund; shall keep the record of proceedings of all meetings; shall keep all books, files, records, and accounts of the fund; shall receive all applications for annuities, benefits, and refunds; shall prepare periodic reports relative to the financial operations of the fund for the information of the board and its membership; shall compile all statistics pertinent to the operations of the fund; and shall answer all correspondence received by the board.
  3. The city treasurer or chief financial officer shall be ex officio treasurer of the board, and custodian of the fund. He shall have custody of all cash and securities of the fund, subject to the authority and directives of the board, and shall keep such accounts and records as may be prescribed by the board. These accounts and records shall be subject to inspection of the board or any member thereof.
  4. The city treasurer or chief financial officer shall, within ten (10) days after his selection, execute a bond to the board, with good surety, in such penal sum as the board directs, to be approved by the board, conditioned upon the faithful performance of the duties of his office, and that he will safely keep and will truthfully account for all money and properties that come into his hands as treasurer of the fund, and that upon the expiration of his term of office, he will deliver to his successor all securities, unexpended moneys, and other properties that come into his hands as treasurer of the fund. The bond will be filed with the secretary of the board, and suit thereon may be filed in the name of the board for use of the board or any person injured by its breach. The premium on said bond may be paid out of the fund, except that the board shall have the power to hire independent counsel for any suits or actions of law, the cost of such independent counsel to be borne by the board.
  5. The director of law of the city shall serve as legal adviser to the board on all matters pertaining to the fund involving suits or actions at law, and on any questions of the interpretation of the provisions hereof, except that the board shall have the power to hire independent counsel for any suits or actions of law, the cost of such independent counsel to be borne by the board.
  6. The board may employ actuarial assistance from time to time to advise it in matters relating to the technical aspects of operations of the fund, to assist in the preparation of the periodic financial reports, to determine rates of city contribution, and to make periodic analyses of the operation of the fund. Within six (6) months after the establishment, an actuarial experience study shall be made for the purpose of recommending rates of mortality, disability, retirement, separations from service and other essential factors. At least once every five (5) years thereafter, an actuarial experience study and investigation shall be made of the operating experience of the fund, including a study of the rates of mortality, disability, retirement, separations from service and other essential factors. The actuary shall recommend all mortality and interest tables to be adopted by the board, and shall recommend, if appropriate, cost-of-living increases as provided in KRS 95.859(1) to (3)(a). In the event such survey is not undertaken as provided herein, any member of the fund or any annuitant may obtain an injunction or mandamus requiring such survey and investigation, or may obtain the appointment of a person or persons to make such study and investigation, from the Circuit Court of any county in which the city is located.
  7. The board shall establish rules and regulations to implement the provisions of KRS 95.851 to 95.884 and 95.991 , which shall not be inconsistent therewith.

History. Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 16, § 22; 1974, ch. 396, § 9; 1980, ch. 188, § 89, effective July 15, 1980; 1982, ch. 297, § 9, effective July 15, 1982; 2012, ch. 111, § 2, effective July 12, 2012; 2016 ch. 31, § 31, effective July 15, 2016.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(11/21/96). In 1974, the Reviser of Statutes renumbered KRS 95.885 as KRS 95.991 . 1980 Ky. Acts ch. 188, sec. 89, a revisory act, mistakenly changed a reference in this statute from “ KRS 95.851 to 95.885 ” to “ KRS 95.851 to 95.991 .” Because this change would appear to effect a substantive change in the law, it has been disregarded, and the reference has been made to read “ KRS 95.851 to 95.884 and KRS 95.991” under KRS 7.123(4) and 7.136(1)(a).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

Covington v. Peare, 769 S.W.2d 761, 1989 Ky. App. LEXIS 50 (Ky. Ct. App. 1989).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Subsection (3) of this section requiring the city treasurer, established under the councilmanic form of government, to serve as ex officio treasurer of the police and firemen’s pension fund could authorize the administrative head of the department of finance, established under the city manager government, to serve as ex officio treasurer to the board of trustees of the pension fund. OAG 79-656 .

If a board member is designated as the board’s secretary, he does not forfeit his right to vote as a member of the board, and when, in such a situation, the board’s secretary votes, he votes in his capacity as a statutory member of the board and not as the board’s secretary. OAG 80-569 .

Under KRS 95.851 , 95.869 and subsection (3) of this section, the Board of Trustees of the Police and Firefighter’s Retirement Fund is in charge of the funds of the Retirement Fund which would include city’s prior year contributions, thus, the city could not unilaterally withdraw from the Retirement Fund an amount of money equal to the sum of the city’s prior year contributions plus interest; such withdrawal would have to be done with the approval of the Board. OAG 90-47 .

95.873. Investments by board — Employment of consultants.

The board may invest the moneys accruing to the fund, in interest-bearing bonds of any county, urban-county government or city in this state, or in any securities in which trustees are permitted to invest trust funds under the laws of this state including participation in a local government pension investment fund created pursuant to KRS 95.895 . Such bonds shall be registered in the name of the board to the extent possible. The securities acquired by the board shall be subject to the order of the board. The board may, at its own cost, employ or engage consultants to provide investment advice to aid the board in its determinations.

History. Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 16, § 23; 1974, ch. 396, § 10; 1980, ch. 307, § 17, effective July 15, 1980; 2014, ch. 92, § 148, effective January 1, 2015.

95.874. Records and accounts — Accurate system to be maintained.

  1. An adequate system of accounts and records shall be established and maintained for the fund that will reflect fully the requirements of the provisions of KRS 95.851 to 95.884 and KRS 95.991 . This system shall be integrated, to the extent possible with the accounts, records, and procedures of the city to the end that the same shall operate most effectively and at minimum expense, and that duplication of records and accounts may be avoided.
  2. All assets of the fund shall be credited according to the purposes for which they are held in the following designated reserve accounts:
    1. Members’ Contribution Reserve. The amounts contributed by the members, including those employee contributions picked up by the employer pursuant to KRS 65.155 , shall be credited to this reserve, together with regular interest thereon as herein provided. An individual account shall be maintained for each member, to which shall be credited the amounts of his contributions. Upon the granting of a service retirement annuity, disability annuity, or survivor’s annuity or benefit, the accumulated contributions to the credit of the member concerned shall be transferred from this reserve to the retirement reserve. Refunds and death payments representing member’s contributions shall be charged to this reserve.
    2. Employer’s Contribution Reserve. The amounts contributed by the city under the provisions hereof, for service retirement annuity, disability retirement annuity, and benefits to survivors covering membership service and prior service, shall be credited to this reserve. Upon the granting of a service retirement annuity, disability retirement annuity, or survivor’s benefit, an amount representing the excess of the actuarial value of the annuity, or benefit over the accumulated contributions of the member, shall be transferred from this reserve to the retirement reserve.
    3. Retirement Reserve. Upon the granting of a service retirement annuity, disability retirement annuity, or survivor’s benefit, the accumulated contributions of the member and an amount representing the excess of the actuarial value of the annuity or benefit over such accumulated contributions, shall be transferred to this reserve from the member’s contribution reserve and employer’s contribution reserve, respectively. All income from investments, including gains on investment transactions, shall be credited to this reserve. All losses on investments shall be charged to this reserve. All payments on account of any annuity made by the fund shall be charged to this reserve. Any excess balance in this reserve, as determined by actuarial valuation as of the close of any fiscal year, shall be applied to reduce the city’s contributions for membership service for the fiscal years next following the date of such valuation. Any deficiency in this reserve shall be removed by an increase in the amount of city’s contributions for future membership service.

History. Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 16, § 24, effective July 1, 1956; 1980, ch. 188, § 90, effective July 15, 1980; 1982, ch. 166, § 53, effective July 15, 1982.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(11/21/96). In 1974, the Reviser of Statutes renumbered KRS 95.885 as KRS 95.991 . 1980 Ky. Acts ch. 188, sec. 90, a revisory act, mistakenly changed a reference in this statute from “KRS 95.851 to 95.885 ” to “KRS 95.851 to 95.991 .” Because this change would appear to effect a substantive change in the law, it has been disregarded, and the reference has been made to read “KRS 95.851 to 95.884 and KRS 95.991” under KRS 7.123(4) and 7.135(1)(a).

95.875. How moneys paid out.

  1. The officers of the city designated by law to draw warrants on the city treasurer or chief financial officer shall, on request in writing by the board, draw warrants on the city treasurer or chief financial officer, payable to the treasurer of the board, against moneys of the fund.
  2. Moneys ordered paid from the fund to any person shall be paid by the treasurer only, upon warrant signed by the president of the board and countersigned by the secretary. No warrant shall be drawn except by order of the board duly entered on the record of proceedings of the board.

History. Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 16, § 25, effective July 1, 1956; 2016 ch. 31, § 32, effective July 15, 2016.

95.876. Fund created by KRS 95.851 to 95.884 and KRS 95.991 to continue.

The fund created by KRS 95.851 to 95.884 and KRS 95.991 shall continue to make payment of all annuities, pensions, and benefits granted by superseded pension funds at the rates previously fixed and under the conditions previously in effect.

History. Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 16, § 26; 1968, ch. 152, § 77; 1980, ch. 188, § 91, effective July 15, 1980.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(11/21/96). In 1974, the Reviser of Statutes renumbered KRS 95.885 as KRS 95.991 . 1980 Ky. Acts ch. 188, sec. 91, a revisory act, mistakenly changed a reference in this statute from “KRS 95.851 to 95.885 ” to “KRS 95.851 to 95.991 .” Because this change would appear to effect a substantive change in the law, it has been disregarded, and the reference has been made to read “KRS 95.851 to 95.884 and KRS 95.991” under KRS 7.123(4) and 7.136(1)(a).

Opinions of Attorney General.

In view of this section the benefits authorized by KRS 95.859 are not available to retirees, or their widows, who retired under a retirement plan in force prior to the July 1, 1956 effective date of KRS 95.851 to 95.885 . OAG 74-721 .

95.877. Each member deemed to authorize deductions for contributions.

Each member shall, by virtue of the payment of contributions to the fund or pick up of employee contributions by the employer pursuant to KRS 65.155 , receive a vested interest in such contributions, and in consideration of such vested interest, shall be conclusively deemed to undertake and agree to pay the same and to have the amounts deducted from his salary as herein provided, or to have such contributions picked up by the employer pursuant to KRS 65.155 .

History. Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 16, § 27, effective July 1, 1956; 1982, ch. 166, § 54, effective July 15, 1982.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

Policemen’s & Firemen’s Retirement Fund v. Shields, 521 S.W.2d 82, 1975 Ky. LEXIS 149 ( Ky. 1975 ); Louisville Policemen’s Retirement Fund v. Bryant, 556 S.W.2d 6, 1977 Ky. LEXIS 515 ( Ky. 1977 ).

95.878. Benefits nonassignable — May not be attached — Exception.

Except for court or administratively ordered current child support, owed child support, or to-be-owed child support, the right to a retirement annuity, disability annuity, survivor’s annuity or benefit, death benefit, or any other benefit under the provision hereof, by whatever name called, or refund, is personal with the recipient thereof, and the assignment or transfer of such benefit or any part thereof shall be void, except as herein provided. Any such annuity, benefit, or refund shall not answer for debts contracted by the person receiving the same, and it is the intention of this section that they shall not be attached or affected by any judicial proceeding.

History. Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 16, § 28, effective July 1, 1956; 1998, ch. 255, § 37, effective July 15, 1998.

Opinions of Attorney General.

A refund from a second-class city’s policemen’s and firemen’s retirement fund is not subject to attachment. OAG 65-197 .

Any refund of contributions to which a policeman or fireman of a city of the second class would be entitled to receive in the event of his withdrawal from service could not be assigned to secure a loan from the city employees’ credit union. OAG 70-554 .

The assignment by a policeman or fireman of whatever interest he may have had in the policeman’s and fireman’s pension fund to the credit union of the city of Covington in consideration of a personal loan from the credit union was in direct conflict with the provisions of this section and was null and void by law. OAG 83-492 .

95.879. Payment of annuities.

Any service retirement annuity, disability retirement annuity, or any other annuity provided herein shall be payable in equal monthly installments as life annuities, and shall not be increased, decreased, revoked, or repealed, except for error, or except where specifically otherwise provided. The cost of providing death benefits for members in receipt of retirement annuities shall not be construed as a reduction in the life annuity payable to the member. The first payment of an annuity shall be made for the fraction of a month elapsing until the end of the first month; and the last payment shall be made as of the end of the month in which death occurs.

History. Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 16, § 29, effective July 1, 1956.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Prospective Effect of Increases.

Since the 1974 amendments to KRS 95.859 and KRS 95.862 , which increased certain pensions for police and firefighters in second-class cities, contained no language expressly making the increases retroactive, the provisions governing the increases have prospective effect only, because this section and KRS 446.080 require that any retroactivity be specifically declared. Policemen's & Firemen's Retirement Fund v. Rothrock, 625 S.W.2d 577, 1981 Ky. LEXIS 304 ( Ky. 1981 ).

2. Limitations on Appeal.

Action brought by about 74 retired city firefighters and policemen seeking to recompute their pension based upon recent decision regarding calculation of age and service and disability benefits was time barred, for KRS 95.882 and 95.883 , and not this section, controlled; any retiree who was dissatisfied with the determination of the Pension Board could have sought a rehearing within 20 days and appeal within 20 days thereafter. City of Covington v. Board of Trustees of the Policemen's & Firefighters' Retirement Fund, 903 S.W.2d 517, 1995 Ky. LEXIS 66 ( Ky. 1995 ).

95.880. Payment obligations of the city.

It is the intention of KRS 95.851 to 95.884 and KRS 95.991 that the payment of the required contributions by the city, all allowances, annuities, benefits, and administration expenses shall be the obligation of the city.

History. Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 16, § 30, effective July 1, 1956; 1980, ch. 188, § 82, effective July 15, 1980.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(11/21/96). In 1974, the Reviser of Statutes renumbered KRS 95.885 as KRS 95.991 . 1980 Ky. Acts ch. 188, sec. 82, a revisory act, mistakenly changed a reference in this statute from “KRS 95.851 to 95.885 ” to “KRS 95.851 to 95.991 .” Because this change would appear to effect a substantive change in the law, it has been disregarded, and the reference has been made to read “KRS 95.851 to 95.884 and KRS 95.991” under KRS 7.123(4) and 7.136(1)(a).

95.881. Effect of change of status of city.

Any city covered by KRS 95.851 to 95.884 and KRS 95.991 , which may subsequently change its form of government, its class, or other status shall continue to be covered by KRS 95.851 to 95.884 and KRS 95.991 .

History. Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 16, § 31; 1974, ch. 396, § 11; 1980, ch. 188, § 83, effective July 15, 1980.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(11/21/96). In 1974, the Reviser of Statutes renumbered KRS 95.885 as KRS 95.991 . 1980 Ky. Acts ch. 188, sec. 83, a revisory act, mistakenly changed references in this statute from “KRS 95.851 to 95.885 ” to “KRS 95.851 to 95.991 .” Because these changes would appear to effect a substantive change in the law, they have been disregarded, and the references have been made to read “KRS 95.851 to 95.884 and KRS 95.991” under KRS 7.123(4) and 7.136(1)(a).

95.882. Provision for rehearing by board.

After a determination has been made on any application by the board, any interested person may, within twenty (20) days after notice of the determination or finding of the board, apply for a rehearing with respect to any of the matters determined by the board. The application shall specify the matter of which a rehearing is sought. The board shall fix the time for the rehearing within twenty (20) days after the same is filed with the secretary of the board, in no event to be less than sixty (60) days from the date the application is filed unless otherwise agreed by the parties. Upon the rehearing a complete transcript shall be made of all evidence presented. The cost of such transcript shall be borne equally by the applicant for the rehearing and the board. Upon rehearing, the board may change, modify, vacate or affirm its previous order upon said application and enter such an order as it deems necessary.

History. Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 16, § 32, effective July 1, 1956.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Limitations on Appeal.

Action brought by about 74 retired city firefighters and policemen seeking to recompute their pension based upon recent decision regarding calculation of age and service and disability benefits was time barred, for this section and KRS 95.883 , and not KRS 95.879 , controlled; any retiree who was dissatisfied with the determination of the Pension Board could have sought a rehearing within 20 days and appeal within 20 days thereafter. City of Covington v. Board of Trustees of the Policemen's & Firefighters' Retirement Fund, 903 S.W.2d 517, 1995 Ky. LEXIS 66 ( Ky. 1995 ).

95.883. Appeal to Circuit Court.

  1. The order or determination of the board upon the rehearing shall be conclusive and binding, but any interested party may, within twenty (20) days after the rendition of the order of the board, by petition appeal to the Circuit Court of the county in which the city is located for a review of the order of the board.
  2. The petition shall state fully the grounds upon which a review is sought, assign all errors relied on and be verified by the petitioner who shall furnish a copy to the board at the time of the filing of the same. Summons shall be issued directing the board to answer within twenty (20) days and directing the board to send the original record to the circuit clerk certifying that such record is the entire original record of the rehearing which shall be filed by the clerk of the Circuit Court and such record shall then become and be considered by the Circuit Court on the review. The appeal provided for herein shall not be considered effective unless the person making the appeal has paid to the board one-half (1/2) of the cost of the transcript of the record of the rehearing within the period provided for making the appeal.
  3. No new nor additional evidence may be introduced in the Circuit Court except as to fraud or misconduct of some person engaged in the administration of KRS 95.851 to 95.884 and KRS 95.991 , and affecting the order, decision, or determination appealed from, but the court shall otherwise hear the cause upon the record as certified by the board and shall dispose of the cause in summary manner, its review being limited to determining whether or not:
    1. The board acted without or in excess of its powers;
    2. The order, decision, or determination was procured by fraud;
    3. The order, decision, or determination of the board is not in conformity with the provisions of KRS 95.851 to 95.884 and KRS 95.991 ;
    4. If findings of fact are in issue the party seeking to set aside any order, decision, or determination of the board shall have the burden of proof to show by clear and satisfactory evidence that the order, decision, or determination is unreasonable or unlawful. If upon appeal as herein provided the order, decision, or determination of the board is reversed the party perfecting the appeal shall be refunded by the board his portion of the costs paid for the transcript of the record made on the rehearing.
  4. The board and each interested party may appear before the Circuit Court. The court shall enter judgment affirming, modifying, or setting aside the order, decision, or determination appealed from, or in its discretion remand the cause to the board for further proceedings in conformity with the direction of the court. The court may, before judgment and upon a sufficient showing of fact, remand the cause to the board.

History. Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 16, § 33, effective July 1, 1956; 1980, ch. 188, § 84, effective July 15, 1980; 2014, ch. 92, § 149, effective January 1, 2015.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(11/21/96). In 1974, the Reviser of Statutes renumbered KRS 95.885 as KRS 95.991 . 1980 Ky. Acts ch. 188, sec. 84, a revisory act, mistakenly changed references in this statute from “KRS 95.851 to 95.885 ” to “KRS 95.851 to 95.991 .” Because these changes would appear to effect a substantive change in the law, they have been disregarded, and the references have been made to read “KRS 95.851 to 95.884 and KRS 95.991” under KRS 7.123(4) and 7.136(1)(a).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Limitation on Appeal.

Action brought by about 74 retired city firefighters and policemen seeking to recompute their pension based upon recent decision regarding calculation of age and service and disability benefits was time barred, for KRS 95.882 and this section, and not KRS 95.879 , controlled; any retiree who was dissatisfied with the determination of the Pension Board could have sought a rehearing within 20 days and appeal within 20 days thereafter. City of Covington v. Board of Trustees of the Policemen's & Firefighters' Retirement Fund, 903 S.W.2d 517, 1995 Ky. LEXIS 66 ( Ky. 1995 ).

Cited:

Board of Trustees v. Nuckolls, 481 S.W.2d 36, 1972 Ky. LEXIS 211 ( Ky. 1972 ).

95.884. Appeal to Court of Appeals.

  1. The judgment of the Circuit Court shall be subject to appeal to the Court of Appeals. The scope of review by the Court of Appeals shall include all matters subject to review by the Circuit Court and also errors of law arising in the Circuit Court and upon appeal made reviewable by the Rules of Procedure.
  2. The procedure as to appeal to the Court of Appeals shall be the same as in civil actions so far as it is applicable to and not in conflict with KRS 95.851 to 95.884 and KRS 95.991 .

History. Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 16, § 34, effective July 1, 1956; 1980, ch. 188, § 85, effective July 15, 1980.

95.885. [Renumbered as KRS 95.991.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section was renumbered as KRS 95.991 by the reviser.

Local Government Pension Investment Fund

95.890. Definitions for KRS 95.895 to 95.945.

For the purposes of KRS 95.895 to 95.945 , the following terms shall have the following meanings:

  1. “Beneficiary” shall mean a member, either active or retired, of a local government pension system which participates in the local government pension investment fund;
  2. “Board” shall mean the governing body of the local government pension investment fund, as provided for in KRS 95.905 ;
  3. “Fund” shall mean the local government pension investment fund, as created by KRS 95.895 to 95.945 ;
  4. “Qualified investment manager” shall mean a bank or trust company as defined and regulated in Subtitle 3 of KRS Chapter 286, or an investment adviser as defined in KRS 292.310 and registered under KRS 292.330 , or an investment adviser registered under the federal investment advisers act of 1940, or an insurance company certified pursuant to KRS 304.3-160 ;
  5. “Participant” shall mean a locally administered public pension system, created pursuant to KRS 79.080 , 90.400 , 90.410 , 95.290 , 95.520 to 95.620 , 95.621 to 95.629 , 95.767 to 95.784 , 95.851 to 95.884 , 95.991 or 96.180 , which chooses to invest in and thereby become a member of the local government pension investment fund.

History. Enact. Acts 1980, ch. 307, § 1, effective July 15, 1980; 1984, ch. 111, § 55, effective July 13, 1984; 1984, ch. 177, § 16, effective July 13, 1984; 2016 ch. 31, § 33, effective July 15, 2016.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(7/12/2006). 2006 Ky. Acts ch. 247 instructs the Reviser of Statutes to adjust KRS references throughout the statutes to conform with the 2006 renumbering of the Financial Services Code, KRS Chapter 286. Such an adjustment has been made in this statute.

This section was amended by two 1984 Acts which do not appear to be in conflict and have been compiled together.

95.895. Local government pension investment fund.

The governing bodies of local government pension systems which can qualify as participants may create a local government pension investment fund, comprised of assets and earnings thereon which participants invest in the fund. Membership in the fund shall be a voluntary act by a participant. A participant may invest its assets in the fund in accordance with procedures adopted by the board.

History. Enact. Acts 1980, ch. 307, § 2, effective July 15, 1980.

95.900. Allocation of units of participation.

The purposes of the fund shall be to enable each participant to enhance its investment power through aggregation of its resources with the resources of other participants, and to avail itself of options for centralized administrative and accounting services relating to pension system management. Participants shall be allocated units of participation in the fund representing the value of assets which they invest in the fund. Earnings of the fund shall be allocated to participants uniformly on the basis of degree of ownership of units of participation. There shall be no sharing of the pension liabilities of the various participants within the framework of the fund.

History. Enact. Acts 1980, ch. 307, § 3, effective July 15, 1980.

95.905. Governing board of fund — Membership.

The fund shall be governed by a board created in the following manner:

  1. A temporary council, comprised of the executive director of the Kentucky Municipal League or his designee, the president of the Fraternal Order of Police or his designee, and the president of the Associated Professional Firefighters or his designee shall exist for the purpose of receiving appointments to the board, establishing a date for receipt of moneys into the fund, and scheduling the first meeting of the board. Organizations or entities authorized to make appointments to the board shall submit those appointments to the temporary council. The temporary council shall cease to exist when the board has met and selected a chairman.
  2. Two (2) board members shall be appointed by the Kentucky State Lodge, Fraternal Order of Police, from among policemen whose local government pension systems have pledged to invest assets in the fund on the date established by the temporary council.
  3. Two (2) board members shall be appointed by the Associated Professional Firefighters from among firefighters whose local government pension systems have pledged to invest assets in the fund on the date established by the temporary council.
  4. Two (2) board members shall be appointed by the Kentucky Municipal League from among elected city officials or appointed city administrators whose city pension systems have pledged to invest assets in the fund on the date established by the temporary council.
  5. Two (2) board members shall be appointed from among employees whose city pension systems for nonuniformed employees have pledged to invest assets in the fund on the date established by the temporary council. The participants in this category shall consult among themselves to select their two (2) board members. Should there be only one (1) participant in this category, only one (1) member shall be appointed.
  6. One (1) board member shall be appointed by the board within three (3) months of the first board meeting from among persons who have demonstrated competence in a fiduciary capacity.
  7. In addition, any participant which has invested or pledged to invest at least two hundred thousand dollars ($200,000) in the fund, or fifteen (15) percent of the total assets of the fund, whichever is greater shall appoint one (1) board member from among its employees covered by the pension system, but no participant shall appoint a member under the provisions of this subsection if a member from the city of the participant has already been appointed under the provisions of subsection (2), (3), (4), or (5) of this section. Initial appointments pursuant to this subsection shall be effective upon the date when the board first meets. Appointments made pursuant to this subsection shall be reviewed on June 30 of each succeeding year, at which time new appointments shall be made and old appointments terminated as required by the criteria of this subsection.

History. Enact. Acts 1980, ch. 307, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

95.910. Terms, compensation, meetings of board members.

  1. Board members shall serve without compensation, but may be reimbursed for their reasonable and necessary expenses out of the earnings of the fund.
  2. The board shall at its first meeting select one (1) of its number to serve as chairman, and such other officers as it may deem necessary. The board may adopt bylaws to govern its internal affairs. The board may create committees from among its members to act in the name of the board.
  3. Except for board members selected pursuant to subsection (7) of KRS 95.905 , board members shall be appointed for two (2) year terms. Initially, however, one (1) of the two (2) members appointed pursuant to each of subsections (2), (3), (4), and (5) of KRS 95.905 shall be appointed for one (1) year. Subsequent appointments pursuant to these subsections shall be for two (2) years. Board members may be reappointed.
  4. In the event of a vacancy on the board, an appointment shall be made for the remainder of the unexpired term by the entity making the original appointment. Withdrawal of all assets by a participant shall cause any board member representing that participant to vacate his seat on the board.
  5. There shall be regularly scheduled periodic meetings of the board and the schedule shall be adopted in the bylaws. The chairman may call special meetings at times other than those adopted in the bylaws. In the absence of a call by the chairman, twenty-five percent (25%) of the membership of the board may call a special meeting. All board members shall be notified by mail of each meeting at least one (1) week prior to the meeting.
  6. No board member shall participate in any decision if he is in a position to benefit substantially from that decision. Substantial benefit shall not mean benefit derived through status as a beneficiary.
  7. Any board member convicted of a felony shall be removed from the board automatically upon his conviction.

History. Enact. Acts 1980, ch. 307, § 5, effective July 15, 1980.

95.915. Qualified investment managers — Appointment — Duties.

The board shall employ one (1) or more qualified investment managers, who shall invest and reinvest the assets of the fund. The qualified investment managers may make any investments which are allowed, at the time of making the investment, to fiduciaries in this state, except that the board may at its discretion authorize the qualified investment managers to purchase common stocks in corporations that do not have a record of paying dividends to their stockholders. Qualified investment managers operating pursuant to the provisions of KRS 95.895 to 95.945 shall not be required to seek District Court approval of investments authorized by KRS 386.020 (h) and (i). The board may grant the qualified investment managers authority to make timely investments. In investing and reinvesting moneys and in acquiring, managing and disposing of investments, the qualified investment managers shall discharge their duties with respect to the fund solely in the interest of the participants and their beneficiaries and:

  1. For the exclusive purpose of providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries and defraying reasonable expenses of administering the fund;
  2. With the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like character and with like aims;
  3. By diversifying the investments of the fund so as to minimize the risk of large losses, unless under the circumstances it is clearly prudent not to do so; and
  4. In accordance with the documents and instruments governing the fund as found in KRS 95.895 to 95.945 or policies adopted by the board.

History. Enact. Acts 1980, ch. 307, § 6, effective July 15, 1980.

95.920. Custodian of assets — Duties.

  1. The board shall employ a single custodian for the assets held by the fund. The custodian shall be responsible for:
    1. Physical safekeeping of all securities;
    2. Collection of all income;
    3. Effecting all principal and income transactions;
    4. Maintenance of a complete set of accounting records, including reporting to the board and participants on the assets, earnings and activity of each pool of the fund on a monthly basis, and reporting individual assets, earnings and activity to each participant on a monthly basis;
    5. Making principal payments to participants no later than forty-five (45) days after receipt of a request; and
    6. Making available earnings to participants on a monthly basis, or returning earnings to the fund for reinvestment as directed by the participant.
  2. The custodian may upon request of a participant perform optional services such as but not limited to the following:
    1. Make disbursements for the participant; and
    2. Prepare reports to beneficiaries or units of government.

History. Enact. Acts 1980, ch. 307, § 7, effective July 15, 1980.

95.925. Other employees.

The board may employ other persons to perform appropriate services for the fund, and may prescribe their responsibilities and compensation out of the earnings of the fund.

History. Enact. Acts 1980, ch. 307, § 8, effective July 15, 1980.

95.930. Investment pools.

The board may create various investment pools within the fund, restricted to certain types of investments, or combining various investments in order to offer different levels of return and risk. Each participant may choose those pools in which it will invest, and the degree of investment.

History. Enact. Acts 1980, ch. 307, § 9, effective July 15, 1980.

95.935. Annual audits.

The board shall arrange for an annual audit of the fund and pools thereof, and a copy of the audit report shall be given to each participant.

History. Enact. Acts 1980, ch. 307, § 10, effective July 15, 1980.

95.940. Bond required for employees.

The board shall require the qualified investment manager, custodian, or any person who has charge of, handles or has access to any of the moneys or other assets of the fund to be bonded in an amount of not less than the amount of fund assets normally in his possession or control.

History. Enact. Acts 1980, ch. 307, § 11, effective July 15, 1980.

95.945. Allocation of charges for services.

  1. Charges for investment and custodial or other services which by nature benefit all fund participants shall be allocated by general rules over all fund participants enjoying those services:
    1. Charges for investment services shall be allocated among the participants in direct proportion to their degree of ownership of the assets invested;
    2. Charges for custodial services may include both an asset charge directly proportional to the degree of ownership of the assets held, and a fixed charge associated with participation of any magnitude.
  2. Charges for services which clearly benefit individual participants, such as accounting services or preparation of reports for individual participants, shall be paid for by the individual participant.
  3. The board shall approve all charges prior to payment. In no event shall charges pursuant to subsection (1)(a) of this section exceed one percent (1%) of the principal amount of the fund.

History. Enact. Acts 1980, ch. 307, § 12, effective July 15, 1980.

Training for Local Law Enforcement Officers

95.950. Definitions for KRS 95.951 to 95.964.

As used in KRS 95.951 to 95.964 , unless the context requires otherwise:

  1. “Police officer” means a person who is employed as a sworn law enforcement officer by a city, urban-county, or charter county government law enforcement agency, excluding sheriffs, deputy sheriffs, constables, deputy constables, jailers, coroners, correctional officers, marshals, and special local peace officers.
  2. “Auxiliary police officer” means a person who is appointed as a member of an auxiliary police force created under KRS 95.445 and who has the authority to carry deadly weapons or make arrests.

History. Enact. Acts 1992, ch. 428, § 1, effective July 14, 1992.

95.951. Qualifications for police or auxiliary police officer.

As of July 14, 1992, no person shall be originally appointed or employed as a police officer or an auxiliary police officer by a city, urban-county, or charter county government in the Commonwealth unless he:

  1. Is at least twenty-one (21) years of age; and
    1. Is a high school graduate, regardless of whether the school is accredited or certified by a governing body, provided that the education received met the attendance and curriculum standards of Kentucky law at the time of graduation, as determined by the Kentucky Department of Education; or (2) (a) Is a high school graduate, regardless of whether the school is accredited or certified by a governing body, provided that the education received met the attendance and curriculum standards of Kentucky law at the time of graduation, as determined by the Kentucky Department of Education; or
    2. Has received a High School Equivalency Diploma.

History. Enact. Acts 1992, ch. 428, § 2, effective July 14, 1992; 1996, ch. 145, § 2, effective July 15, 1996; 2016 ch. 5, § 4, effective March 18, 2016; 2017 ch. 63, § 9, effective June 29, 2017.

95.955. Training requirements — Effect of failure to complete.

  1. All police officers and auxiliary police officers originally appointed or employed by a city, urban-county, or charter county government after July 14, 1992, shall, within one (1) year of their appointment or employment, successfully complete a basic training course as established by KRS 15.440 at a school certified or recognized by the Kentucky Law Enforcement Council.
  2. All police officers and auxiliary police officers specified in subsection (1) of this section shall, upon completion of the basic training required in the same section, successfully complete forty (40) hours of annual in-service training as established by KRS 15.440 (i)(e) at a school certified or recognized by the Kentucky Law Enforcement Council.
  3. All police officers and auxiliary police officers appointed or employed before July 14, 1992, shall successfully complete forty (40) hours of annual in-service training as established by KRS 15.440 (i)(e) at a school certified or recognized by the Kentucky Law Enforcement Council.
  4. In the event of extenuating circumstances beyond the control of the officer such as injury, illness, or personal tragedy which prevents the officer from completing the basic or in-service training within the time specified in subsections (1) to (3) of this section, the officer shall complete the training within one hundred eighty (180) days after return to duty. Any police officer or auxiliary police officer who fails to successfully complete the basic or in-service training within the specified time period shall not be authorized thereafter to carry deadly weapons or make arrests and may be dismissed from employment as a police officer or from membership on the auxiliary police force.

History. Enact. Acts 1992, ch. 428, § 3, effective July 14, 1992; 2000, ch. 480, § 13, effective July 14, 2000; 2016 ch. 112, § 4, effective July 15, 2016.

95.960. Reimbursement for salaries paid during training.

Funds in the Kentucky Law Enforcement Foundation Program Fund may be utilized by the Department of Criminal Justice Training to reimburse cities, urban-counties, or charter counties with regular police departments of ten (10) or fewer officers for the cost of the base salary for each regular, full-time police officer while the officer is obtaining the training required in KRS 95.955 . The city, urban-county, or charter county shall show to the satisfaction of the Department of Criminal Justice Training that it will be placed in a situation of undue hardship if the funding is not provided. The secretary of the Justice and Public Safety Cabinet shall promulgate administrative regulations upon the recommendation of the Kentucky Law Enforcement Council to define what constitutes “undue financial hardship” and to otherwise implement this section.

History. Enact. Acts 1992, ch. 428, § 4, effective July 14, 1992; 2007, ch. 85, § 156, effective June 26, 2007.

95.964. Construction of KRS 95.951 to 95.960.

  1. The provisions of KRS 95.951 to 95.960 shall be in addition to the requirements of KRS 61.300 or any other statute.
  2. The provisions of KRS 95.951 to 95.960 shall not be construed as limiting any city, urban-county, or charter county in the Commonwealth which appoints or employs peace officers or auxiliary police officers from requiring standards of performance stricter than those contained in KRS 95.951 to 95.960 .

History. Enact. Acts 1992, ch. 428, § 5, effective July 14, 1992.

95.970. School and student safety issues training encouraged — Collaboration between city police chief and local school district encouraged.

  1. The chief of police in each city is encouraged to receive training on issues pertaining to school and student safety and shall be invited to meet annually with local superintendents to discuss emergency response plans and emergency response concerns.
  2. The chief of police in each city is encouraged to collaborate with the local school district on policies and procedures for communicating to the school district any instances of trauma-exposed students.

History. Enact. Acts 2013, ch. 126, § 6, effective June 25, 2013; enact. Acts 2013, ch. 133, § 6, effective June 25, 2013; 2019 ch. 5, § 18, effective March 11, 2019; 2020 ch. 5, § 9, effective February 21, 2020.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(6/25/2013). This statute was created with identical text in 2013 Ky. Acts chs. 126 and 133, which were companion bills. These Acts have been codified together.

Penalties

95.990. Penalties. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

Subsection (1) (2866-7) of this section was repealed by Acts 1942, ch. 210, § 50; subsection (2) (2886, 2896a-15) of this section was repealed by Acts 1962, ch. 16, § 15.

95.991. Penalties.

Any person who knowingly makes any false statement, or falsifies, or permits to be falsified, any record or records of the fund defined by KRS 95.851 , in any attempt to defraud the fund, is guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall be fined not less than $500 or imprisoned in the county jail not less than twelve (12) months, or both, and the fund shall have the right to recover any payments made under false representations.

History. Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 16, § 35; 1974, ch. 396, § 12.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(11/21/96). This statute is the former KRS 95.885 , as amended, renumbered by the Reviser of Statutes in 1974. Because of this renumbering, the phrase “the fund defined by KRS 95.851 ” has been substituted for the phrase “this fund” that appeared in the original text of the statute in 1958 Ky. Acts ch. 16, sec. 35. See KRS 7.136(1)(a).

CHAPTER 95A Fire Protection Personnel

95A.010. Application of chapter.

  1. This chapter shall apply to the personnel of all fire departments in the state whether paid or unpaid, or both.
  2. Except as expressly provided in this chapter, nothing herein contained shall be deemed to limit the powers, rights, duties, and responsibilities of municipal or county governments, or the Firefighters’ and Policemen’s Civil Service Act.

History. Enact. Acts 1970, ch. 171, § 11; 1972, ch. 155, § 1; 1972, ch. 366, § 1; 1978, ch. 164, § 50, effective June 17, 1978.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

Acts 1972, ch. 366, § 1 also amended this section but did not conflict with the Acts 1972, ch. 155, § 1 amendment, so Acts 1972, ch. 366, § 1 was incorporated into Acts 1972, ch. 155, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

Caneyville Volunteer Fire Dep’t v. Green’s Motorcycle Salvage, Inc., 286 S.W.3d 790, 2009 Ky. LEXIS 158 ( Ky. 2009 ).

95A.020. Commission on Fire Protection Personnel Standards and Education.

  1. There is hereby created the Commission on Fire Protection Personnel Standards and Education, hereinafter called “commission,” which shall be attached to the Kentucky Community and Technical College System.
  2. The commission shall be composed of seventeen (17) members, residents of the State of Kentucky, appointed by the Governor. These members should be persons well qualified by experience or education in the field of fire protection or related fields.
  3. The membership of the commission shall include:
    1. Two (2) volunteer firefighters, neither of which is a fire chief or assistant fire chief;
    2. Three (3) paid firefighters, at least one (1) of whom shall be a full-time paid county firefighter and none of whom shall be a fire chief or assistant fire chief;
    3. One (1) trustee of a volunteer fire department or fire district who is not a volunteer firefighter;
    4. Two (2) fire chiefs of paid fire departments;
    5. One (1) licensed physician;
    6. Two (2) fire chiefs of volunteer fire departments;
    7. One (1) representative of the Kentucky Industrial Response Committee;
    8. One (1) representative of the Division of Emergency Management of the Department of Military Affairs;
    9. One (1) mayor of a Kentucky city;
    10. One (1) county judge/executive;
    11. One (1) representative of Kentucky industry or business enterprise; and
    12. One (1) representative of the general public.

      The chancellor for the Technical Institutions’ Branch of the Kentucky Community and Technical College System and the state fire marshal, or their designees, shall serve as ex officio members of the commission. Their designees shall have full voting rights. Appointive members shall be appointed for a term of four (4) years. Any member chosen by the Governor to fill a vacancy created otherwise than by expiration of term shall be appointed for the unexpired term of the member he is chosen to succeed.

  4. The commission shall:
    1. Meet at least six (6) times per year;
    2. Annually elect a chair, vice chair, and secretary in accordance with KRS 95A.030 ; and
    3. Set a schedule of at least six (6) meetings for the next twelve (12) months.
  5. A member of the commission who misses three (3) regular meetings, without the approval of the chairman, in one (1) year shall be deemed to have resigned from the commission and his or her position shall be deemed to be vacant. As used in this subsection, a “year” begins when the first meeting is missed and ends three hundred sixty-five (365) days later or when the third meeting is missed, whichever occurs first. The Governor shall appoint a similarly qualified person to fill the vacancy within ninety (90) days of the vacancy occurring. The failure of a commission member to attend a special or emergency meeting shall not result in any penalty. A person removed under this subsection shall not be reappointed to the commission for at least ten (10) years after removal.
  6. Members of the commission shall receive no compensation for their services but shall be allowed their actual and necessary expenses incurred in the performance of their functions.
  7. Members of the commission appointed pursuant to this section shall first be appointed on July 15, 1980. The terms of members appointed earlier shall terminate on July 15, 1980, but the Governor may reappoint those members who qualify under the provisions of this section.

History. Enact. Acts 1970, ch. 171, § 2; 1972, ch. 366, § 2; 1974, ch. 170, § 1; 1978, ch. 117, § 63, effective June 17, 1978; 1980, ch. 126, § 1, effective July 15, 1980; 1984, ch. 303, § 1, effective July 13, 1984; 1986, ch. 418, § 1, effective July 15, 1986; 1992, ch. 27, § 7, effective March 2, 1992; 1992, ch. 167, § 1, effective July 14, 1992; 1994, ch. 414, § 3, effective July 15, 1994; 1997 (1st Ex. Sess.), ch. 1, § 42, effective May 30, 1997; 2000, ch. 102, § 5, effective July 14, 2000; 2000, ch. 270, § 1, effective July 14, 2000; 2010, ch. 125, § 1, effective July 15, 2010.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(7/15/2020). Under the authority of KRS 7.136(1), the Reviser of Statutes has altered the internal numbering of the text in this statute during codification. The words in the text were not changed.

(7/14/92). This section was amended by two 1992 Acts. Where those Acts are not in conflict, they have been compiled together. Where a conflict exists, the Act which was last enacted by the General Assembly prevails, pursuant to KRS 446.250 .

95A.020. Commission on Fire Protection Personnel Standards and Education.

As used in this section, “chief fire officer” means an individual who plays an essential role in the administrative structure of his or her fire department.

  1. There is hereby created the Kentucky Fire Commission, hereinafter called “commission,” which shall be attached to the Kentucky Community and Technical College System for administrative purposes only.
    1. The commission shall include male, female, and racial minority representation. (2) (a) The commission shall include male, female, and racial minority representation.
    2. No more than three (3) appointed members shall reside in the same congressional district.
  2. The commission shall be composed of fourteen (14) members, residents of the State of Kentucky, and appointed by the Governor. These members should be persons well qualified by experience or education in the field of fire protection or related fields.
  3. The membership of the commission shall include:
    1. One (1) member of a fire department formed under KRS Chapter 75 or KRS Chapter 273 who is:
      1. Not a chief fire officer;
      2. Not a career employee of any department other than the one from which he or she is nominated; and
      3. Selected from a list of at least three (3) names submitted by the Kentucky Firefighters Association;
    2. One (1) member of a volunteer fire department who is:
      1. Not a chief fire officer;
      2. Not a career employee of any fire department other than the one from which he or she is nominated; and
      3. Selected from a list of at least three (3) names submitted by the Kentucky Firefighters Association;
    3. One (1) member of a fire department formed under KRS Chapter 95 selected from a list of at list three (3) names submitted by the Kentucky Professional Firefighters;
    4. One (1) chief fire officer of a paid fire department selected from a list of at least three (3) names submitted by the Kentucky Association of Fire Chiefs;
    5. One (1) licensed physician with experience in emergency medicine;
    6. A chief fire officer of a volunteer fire department who is not a career member of any other department, selected from a list of at least three (3) names submitted by the Kentucky Association of Fire Chiefs;
    7. One (1) member of a fire department formed under KRS Chapter 67, 75, or a fire department in a county containing an urban county government created pursuant to KRS Chapter 67A, who is selected from a list of at least three (3) names submitted by the Kentucky Professional Firefighters;
    8. The director of Homeland Security or his or her designee;
    9. One (1) mayor or other officer of a Kentucky city providing fire services under KRS Chapter 95 selected from a list of at least three (3) names submitted by the Kentucky League of Cities;
    10. One (1) county judge/executive or other officer of a Kentucky county selected from a list of at least three (3) names submitted by the Kentucky Association of Counties;
    11. One (1) representative of a Kentucky building, industry, or safety association;
    12. One (1) representative of the general public who is not an employee of any government or governmental agency;
    13. The State Fire Marshal or his or her designee;
    14. One (1) officer of a fire based emergency medical service selected from a list of at least three (3) names submitted by the Executive Director of the Kentucky Board of Emergency Medical Services.
  4. The Vice President of Administrative Services of the Kentucky Community and Technical College System, President of the Kentucky Firefighters Association, President of the Kentucky Professional Firefighters, and President of the Kentucky Association of Fire Chiefs, or their designees, shall serve as nonvoting ex officio members of the commission.
  5. The members of the commission who are firefighters shall possess a minimum of five (5) years of fire service experience and shall be certified with the following:
    1. One hundred fifty (150) hours of training for volunteer firefighters; or
    2. Four hundred (400) hours of training for professional firefighters.
  6. The Kentucky Firefighters Association, Kentucky Professional Firefighters, Kentucky Association of Fire Chiefs, Kentucky Board of Emergency Medical Services Association, Kentucky League of Cities, and Kentucky Association of Counties shall submit their lists of nominees by November 15 of each year as vacancies occur.
  7. The Governor shall appoint members of the commission to staggered terms not to exceed four (4) years. However, initial appointments shall be appointed as follows:
    1. Four (4) members shall serve for two (2) year terms ending November 30, 2021;
    2. Five (5) members shall serve three (3) year terms ending November 30, 2022; and
    3. Five (5) members shall serve four (4) year terms ending November 30, 2023.
  8. After the expiration of the initial appointments, appointive members shall be appointed for a term of four (4) years. Any member chosen by the Governor to fill a vacancy created otherwise than by expiration of term shall be appointed for the unexpired term of the member he or she is chosen to succeed.
  9. When vacancies occur other than by expiration of term and nominations are required, the Governor may request a new list or select an appointee from a previously submitted list. Appointive members shall not serve more than two (2) consecutive four (4) year terms.
  10. A majority of the voting members appointed to the commission shall constitute a quorum. The commission shall:
    1. Meet at least four (4) times per year upon call of the chair, or upon the written request of any five (5) members; and
    2. Annually elect a chair, vice chair, and secretary in accordance with KRS 95A.030
  11. A member of the commission who misses three (3) regular meetings, without the approval of the chairman, in one (1) year shall be deemed to have resigned from the commission and his or her position shall be deemed to be vacant. As used in this subsection, a “year” begins when the first meeting is missed and ends three hundred sixty-five (365) days later or when the third meeting is missed, whichever occurs first. The Governor shall appoint a similarly qualified person to fill the vacancy within ninety (90) days of the vacancy occurring. The failure of a commission member to attend a special or emergency meeting shall not result in any penalty. A person removed under this subsection shall not be reappointed to the commission for at least ten (10) years after removal.
  12. Members of the commission shall receive no compensation for their services but shall be allowed their actual and necessary expenses incurred in the performance of their functions.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1970, ch. 171, § 2; 1972, ch. 366, § 2; 1974, ch. 170, § 1; 1978, ch. 117, § 63, effective June 17, 1978; 1980, ch. 126, § 1, effective July 15, 1980; 1984, ch. 303, § 1, effective July 13, 1984; 1986, ch. 418, § 1, effective July 15, 1986; 1992, ch. 27, § 7, effective March 2, 1992; 1992, ch. 167, § 1, effective July 14, 1992; 1994, ch. 414, § 3, effective July 15, 1994; 1997 (1st Ex. Sess.), ch. 1, § 42, effective May 30, 1997; 2000, ch. 102, § 5, effective July 14, 2000; 2000, ch. 270, § 1, effective July 14, 2000; 2010, ch. 125, § 1, effective July 15, 2010; 2020 ch. 67, § 1.

95A.030. Officers — Quorum.

At the first meeting of the commission after January 1 of each year, the commission shall elect a chair, vice chair, and secretary from among the appointed members to fill regular terms. A majority of the members shall constitute a quorum.

History. Enact. Acts 1970, ch. 171, § 5; 1994, ch. 97, § 1, effective July 15, 1994; 2010, ch. 125, § 2, effective July 15, 2010.

95A.040. Powers of commission — Firefighter physical agility test — Administrative regulations.

  1. The commission shall make full and complete studies, recommendations and reports to the Governor, the Kentucky Community and Technical College System, and the Legislature for the purpose of establishing:
    1. Minimum standards and education of fire protection personnel appointed to positions in municipal fire departments, who are to be engaged in fire protection to include fire suppression, fire prevention, arson investigation, and other allied fields;
    2. Basic minimum courses of training for fire protection personnel;
    3. Procedure for the certification of fire protection personnel and the certification of fire protection instructors. The commission may provide financial support for certification, and this support may include the cost of training, training aids, and salaries of instructors; and
    4. Administrative regulations to require that each volunteer firefighter be able to read, write and understand the English language, is a person of sobriety and integrity, is and has been an orderly, law-abiding citizen, is a citizen of the United States, a permanent resident of the United States, or otherwise lawfully present in the United States, and has reached the age of eighteen (18).
    1. The commission shall establish by administrative regulation a candidate physical agility test to be administered to all candidates for professional firefighter positions. For the provisions of this section, “professional firefighter” shall include any paid firefighter who is a member of a: (2) (a) The commission shall establish by administrative regulation a candidate physical agility test to be administered to all candidates for professional firefighter positions. For the provisions of this section, “professional firefighter” shall include any paid firefighter who is a member of a:
      1. Municipal fire department organized under KRS Chapter 95;
      2. Fire protection district organized under KRS Chapter 75;
      3. County fire department created pursuant to KRS Chapter 67;
      4. Fire department under the jurisdiction of a consolidated local government;
      5. Fire department under the jurisdiction of a charter county government;
      6. Fire department under the jurisdiction of an urban-county government;
      7. Fire department under the jurisdiction of a unified local government; or
      8. Fire department created under KRS Chapter 273.
    2. The candidate physical agility test shall establish uniform standards of the physical abilities required for all firefighter candidates. The candidate physical agility test shall be required for all firefighter candidates hired on or after January 1, 2013.
    3. After June 25, 2009, the commission shall establish procedures for individual firefighter candidates to voluntarily take the candidate physical agility test. The commission shall also establish procedures for fire departments listed under paragraph (a) of this subsection to voluntarily require firefighter candidates hired by them to have successfully completed the candidate physical agility test. The procedures in this paragraph shall be established by administrative regulation.
    4. The candidate physical agility test shall be designed to assess a candidate’s ability to handle the physical demands of fighting fires and shall include exercises that simulate the most common tasks involved in fire suppression. These exercises shall include but are not limited to stair climb, hose drag, equipment carry, ladder raise and extension, forcible entry, search, rescue, ceiling breach, and pull.
    5. The commission may establish a fee to be charged to candidates participating in the candidate physical agility test. The fee shall be no greater than an amount specified by the commission to cover the costs of implementing and administering the candidate physical agility test.
    6. The commission shall promulgate administrative regulations, pursuant to KRS Chapter 13A, to establish and implement the candidate physical agility test and to carry out any other responsibility assigned by this section. The administrative regulations shall be promulgated no later than October 1, 2009.
  2. The commission shall have the authority to:
    1. Certify fire protection training and education programs as having attained the minimum required standards suggested by the commission, and provide financial support for the provision of training, training aids, and salaries of instructors in order to achieve these minimum standards;
    2. Certify instructors as having qualified as fire protection instructors under such conditions as the commission may prescribe;
    3. Direct research in the field of fire protection and accept gifts and grants for such purposes; and
    4. Recommend curricula for advanced courses and seminars in fire science training in colleges and institutions of higher education.
  3. The commission shall have authority to receive and, to the extent required by federal law, to disburse all grants and funds from the federal government for the purpose of fire protection personnel training and education. Except as otherwise provided by law, the commission shall administer all state programs and all state and federally funded grant programs related to fire protection personnel training and education.

History. Enact. Acts 1970, ch. 171, §§ 3, 7; 1974, ch. 170, § 2; 2000, ch. 270, § 2, effective July 14, 2000; 2000, ch. 386, § 1, effective July 14, 2000; 2008, ch. 77, § 2, effective July 15, 2008; 2009, ch. 41, § 1, effective June 25, 2009; 2010, ch. 125, § 3, effective July 15, 2010.

Opinions of Attorney General.

The powers and duties of the members of the commission on fire protection personnel standards and education involve more than mere ministerial functions and in the absence of any statutory authorization members of the commission cannot appoint proxies to attend commission meetings and to act in their behalf. OAG 83-110 .

95A.050. Meetings — Contract powers — Administrative regulations.

In carrying out its duties and responsibilities, the commission shall have the following additional duties:

  1. To meet at times and places in the State of Kentucky it deems proper. Meetings shall be called by the chairman upon his own motion, or upon the written request of a majority of the members;
  2. To contract with other agencies, public or private, or persons, it deems necessary for the rendition and affording of the services, facilities, studies, and reports it may require to cooperate with city, county, state, and federal agencies in training programs; and
  3. To promulgate reasonable administrative regulations relating to fire protection personnel.

History. Enact. Acts 1970, ch. 171, § 8; 1974, ch. 170, § 3; 1978, ch. 117, § 64, effective June 17, 1978; 1994, ch. 97, § 2, effective July 15, 1994; 2000, ch. 270, § 3, effective July 14, 2000.

95A.055. When a fire department is considered a special purpose governmental entity — Annual reports to commission — Penalties for noncompliance — Referral of irregularities — Corrective actions — Reported information is public record — Financial review and audit — Administrative regulations — Annual reports to Legislative Research Commission.

  1. As used in this section, “fire department” means:
    1. Any fire protection district or volunteer fire department district operating under KRS Chapter 75 with the higher of annual receipts from all sources or annual expenditures of less than one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000); or
    2. Any fire department incorporated under KRS Chapter 273.
  2. If a fire protection district or volunteer fire department district’s annual revenues or expenditures equals or exceeds one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000) for two (2) consecutive fiscal years, then the fire district shall, for the next reporting period and any subsequent reporting period for which it exceeds that amount, be considered a special purpose governmental entity as defined in KRS 65A.010 and shall comply with KRS Chapter 65A until its annual revenues or expenditures are less than one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000), whereupon it may again qualify as a fire department under this section.
  3. Each fire department shall for each fiscal year beginning on and after July 1, 2016, annually submit to the commission the information required by this section. The information shall be submitted at the time and in the form and format required by the commission. The information submitted shall include at a minimum the following:
    1. Administrative information:
      1. The name, address, and, if applicable, the term and appointing authority for each board member of the governing body of the fire department;
      2. The fiscal year of the fire department;
      3. The Kentucky Revised Statute and, if applicable, the local government ordinance under which the fire department was established; the date of establishment; the establishing entity; and the statute or statutes, local government ordinance, or interlocal agreement under which the fire department operates, if different from the statute or statutes, ordinance, or agreement under which it was established;
      4. The mailing address and telephone number and, if applicable, the Web site uniform resource locator (URL) of the fire department;
      5. The operational boundaries and service area of the fire department and the services provided by the fire department;
      6. A listing of the taxes or fees imposed and collected by the fire department, including the rates or amounts charged for the reporting period and the statutory or other source of authority for the levy of the tax or fee;
      7. The primary contact for the fire department for purposes of communication with the commission;
      8. The code of ethics that applies to the fire department, and whether the fire department has adopted additional ethics provisions;
      9. A listing of all federal, state, and local governmental entities that have oversight authority over the fire department or to which the fire department submits reports, data, or information; and
      10. Any other related administrative information required by the commission; and
    2. Financial information including budgets and financial expenditure information that are designed to ensure that all public funds received by the fire departments are being responsibly used. The commission shall, through the promulgation of an administrative regulation, establish the specific financial information that shall be filed to meet the requirements of this paragraph.
  4. The commission shall review the reports required by this section and, if the commission finds that a report submitted does not comply with the requirements established by this section and regulations promulgated hereunder, the commission shall notify the fire department in writing. The notification shall include a description of the specific deficiencies identified, and shall describe the process the fire department shall follow to correct the deficiencies, including the time within which a response must be provided.
  5. The commission shall ensure that every fire department shall at least once every four (4) years be subject to a financial review that shall include procedures developed by the commission and approved by the Auditor of Public Accounts in advance. Subsequent changes to these procedures shall also be approved by the Auditor of Public Accounts prior to the period in which they are performed.
  6. The commission may require any fire department with the higher of annual receipts from all sources or annual expenditures equal to or greater than one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000) but less than five hundred thousand dollars ($500,000) to once every four (4) years be subject to an independent audit in the manner specified in KRS 65A.030(2).
  7. The commission shall ensure that every fire department with the higher of annual receipts from all sources or annual expenditures equal to or greater than five hundred thousand dollars ($500,000) for two (2) consecutive fiscal years is audited annually in the manner specified in KRS 65A.030(2) until its annual revenues or expenditures are less than five hundred thousand dollars ($500,000).
  8. The Auditor of Public Accounts may, upon request, examine and review the reports and all related work papers and documents relating to a financial review or audit under this section.
  9. If a fire department fails to comply with this section or KRS 75.430 , then the commission may withhold:
    1. Incentive pay to qualified firefighters under KRS 95A.250 ;
    2. Volunteer fire department aid, funds used to purchase workers’ compensation insurance for fire departments, and the low-interest loans under KRS 95A.262 ;
    3. Funds from the thermal vision grant program under KRS 95A.400 to 95A.440 ; and
    4. Any other funds that the commission controls.
  10. The commission shall report any irregularities relating to the finances or operations of a fire department that it identifies to the Attorney General and Auditor of Public Accounts, and the commission may notify any other public official with jurisdiction over fire departments for further investigation and follow-up.
  11. The commission may prescribe corrective actions to bring fire departments that are, as of July 15, 2016, not in compliance with KRS Chapter 65A into compliance with this section. Any sanctions imposed by the Department for Local Government prior to July 15, 2016, shall be lifted upon notification by the commission to the department that the fire department in question has complied with the corrective actions prescribed by the commission.
  12. The information reported by fire departments under this section shall be considered public records under KRS 61.872 to 61.884 . The commission shall prominently post on its Web site the availability of the information required by this section and shall provide contact information and procedures for obtaining copies of the information.
  13. The fire commission shall promulgate administrative regulations under KRS Chapter 13A as soon as practicable after July 15, 2016, to implement this section and KRS 75.430 .
  14. By October 1, 2016, and on or before each October 1 thereafter, the commission shall file an annual report with the Legislative Research Commission detailing the compliance of the fire departments required to report under this section with subsection (3) of this section. The Legislative Research Commission shall refer the report to the Interim Joint Committee on Local Government for review.

HISTORY: 2016 ch. 91, § 3, effective July 15, 2016; 2018 ch. 90, § 3, effective July 14, 2018.

95A.055. When a fire department is considered a special purpose governmental entity — Annual reports to commission — Penalties for noncompliance — Referral of irregularities — Corrective actions — Reported information is public record — Financial review and audit — Administrative regulations — Annual reports to Legislative Research Commission.

  1. As used in this section, “fire department” means:
    1. Any fire protection district or volunteer fire department district operating under KRS Chapter 75 with the higher of annual receipts from all sources or annual expenditures of less than one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000); or
    2. Any fire department incorporated under KRS Chapter 273.
  2. If a fire protection district or volunteer fire department district’s annual revenues or expenditures equals or exceeds one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000) for two (2) consecutive fiscal years, then the fire district shall, for the next reporting period and any subsequent reporting period for which it exceeds that amount, be considered a special purpose governmental entity as defined in KRS 65A.010 and shall comply with KRS Chapter 65A until its annual revenues or expenditures are less than one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000), whereupon it may again qualify as a fire department under this section.
  3. Each fire department shall for each fiscal year beginning on and after July 1, 2016, annually submit to the commission the information required by this section. The information shall be submitted at the time and in the form and format required by the commission. The information submitted shall include at a minimum the following:
    1. Administrative information:
      1. The name, address, and, if applicable, the term and appointing authority for each board member of the governing body of the fire department;
      2. The fiscal year of the fire department;
      3. The Kentucky Revised Statute and, if applicable, the local government ordinance under which the fire department was established; the date of establishment; the establishing entity; and the statute or statutes, local government ordinance, or interlocal agreement under which the fire department operates, if different from the statute or statutes, ordinance, or agreement under which it was established;
      4. The mailing address and telephone number and, if applicable, the Web site uniform resource locator (URL) of the fire department;
      5. The operational boundaries and service area of the fire department and the services provided by the fire department;
      6. A listing of the taxes or fees imposed and collected by the fire department, including the rates or amounts charged for the reporting period and the statutory or other source of authority for the levy of the tax or fee;
      7. The primary contact for the fire department for purposes of communication with the commission;
      8. The code of ethics that applies to the fire department, and whether the fire department has adopted additional ethics provisions;
      9. A listing of all federal, state, and local governmental entities that have oversight authority over the fire department or to which the fire department submits reports, data, or information; and
      10. Any other related administrative information required by the commission; and
    2. Financial information including budgets and financial expenditure information that are designed to ensure that all public funds received by the fire departments are being responsibly used. The commission shall, through the promulgation of an administrative regulation, establish the specific financial information that shall be filed to meet the requirements of this paragraph.
  4. The commission shall review the reports required by this section and, if the commission finds that a report submitted does not comply with the requirements established by this section and regulations promulgated hereunder, the commission shall notify the fire department in writing. The notification shall include a description of the specific deficiencies identified, and shall describe the process the fire department shall follow to correct the deficiencies, including the time within which a response must be provided.
  5. The commission shall ensure that every fire department shall at least once every four (4) years be subject to a financial review that shall include procedures developed by the commission and approved by the Auditor of Public Accounts in advance. Subsequent changes to these procedures shall also be approved by the Auditor of Public Accounts prior to the period in which they are performed.
  6. The commission may require any fire department with the higher of annual receipts from all sources or annual expenditures equal to or greater than one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000) but less than five hundred thousand dollars ($500,000) to once every four (4) years be subject to an independent audit in the manner specified in KRS 65A.030(2).
  7. The commission shall ensure that every fire department with the higher of annual receipts from all sources or annual expenditures equal to or greater than five hundred thousand dollars ($500,000) for two (2) consecutive fiscal years is audited annually in the manner specified in KRS 65A.030(2) until its annual revenues or expenditures are less than five hundred thousand dollars ($500,000).
  8. The Auditor of Public Accounts may, upon request, examine and review the reports and all related work papers and documents relating to a financial review or audit under this section.
  9. If a fire department fails to comply with this section or KRS 75.430 , then the commission may withhold:
    1. Incentive pay to qualified firefighters under KRS 95A.250 ;
    2. Volunteer fire department aid, funds used to purchase workers’ compensation insurance for fire departments, and the low-interest loans under KRS 95A.262 ;
    3. Funds from the thermal vision grant program under KRS 95A.400 to 95A.440 ; and
    4. Any other funds that the commission controls.
  10. The commission shall report any irregularities relating to the finances or operations of a fire department that it identifies to the Attorney General and Auditor of Public Accounts, and the commission may notify any other public official with jurisdiction over fire departments for further investigation and follow-up.
  11. The commission may prescribe corrective actions to bring fire departments that are, as of July 15, 2016, not in compliance with KRS Chapter 65A into compliance with this section. Any sanctions imposed by the Department for Local Government prior to July 15, 2016, shall be lifted upon notification by the commission to the department that the fire department in question has complied with the corrective actions prescribed by the commission.
  12. The information reported by fire departments under this section shall be considered public records under KRS 61.872 to 61.884 . The commission shall prominently post on its Web site the availability of the information required by this section and shall provide contact information and procedures for obtaining copies of the information.
  13. The commission shall promulgate administrative regulations under KRS Chapter 13A as soon as practicable after July 15, 2016, to implement this section and KRS 75.430 .
  14. By October 1, 2016, and on or before each October 1 thereafter, the commission shall file an annual report with the Legislative Research Commission detailing the compliance of the fire departments required to report under this section with subsection (3) of this section. The Legislative Research Commission shall refer the report to the Interim Joint Committee on Local Government for review.

HISTORY: 2016 ch. 91, § 3, effective July 15, 2016; 2020 ch. 67, § 6.

95A.057. Commission may initiate consideration of dissolution of a fire protection district or volunteer fire department — Conditions — Procedures.

  1. Notwithstanding any provision of KRS 65.166 , the commission may initiate consideration of a dissolution of a fire protection district or volunteer fire department district providing fire protection services at any time that the requirements of this section are satisfied and without the petition required under KRS 65.166 .
  2. Upon receipt of a written affidavit from a resident, property owner, or local government that a fire protection district or volunteer fire department district formed for the purpose of providing fire protection services has failed to provide those services or that all or a portion of the services are being provided by another entity other than the district, the commission may:
    1. Refer the affidavit and any other supporting evidence that it has to the judge/executive of the county or counties for the county or counties to consider action to dissolve the special district or to alter its boundaries in accordance with KRS 65.166(4) to (6); or
    2. Initiate an investigation to be conducted by commission personnel under the direction of the executive director to determine the validity of the alleged complaint.
  3. If the commission undertakes an investigation under subsection (2)(b) of this section, it shall forward its findings in writing to the county or counties forming the fire protection district or volunteer fire department district and to any party submitting a written affidavit as set out in subsection (2) of this section. If, after investigation, the commission finds that the fire protection district or volunteer fire department district has failed to provide services, or that all or part of the services are being provided by another entity, the findings shall be considered by the fiscal court or courts, which may elect to:
    1. Initiate the procedure for dissolution or alteration of the boundaries of the fire protection district or volunteer fire department district in accordance with KRS 65.166(4) to (6); or
    2. Vote by a majority of the entire fiscal court membership to permit the commission to conduct the hearing in accordance with KRS 65.166(4) and permit the commission to make the written determination for action to either dissolve or alter the boundaries of the fire protection district or volunteer fire department district in accordance with KRS 65.166(5). Any decision to dissolve or alter the boundaries of the fire protection district or volunteer fire department district shall be ratified by the fiscal court within thirty (30) days following the issuance of the final written determination of the commission. If the fiscal court takes no action to ratify the decision of the commission, then the decision of the commission shall be deemed ratified.

HISTORY: 2016 ch. 117, § 5, effective July 15, 2016.

95A.060. Responsibility of Kentucky Community and Technical College System for education programs approved by the commission — Commission to ratify certain personnel decisions — Procedure for budget administration.

  1. The Kentucky Community and Technical College System shall conduct or contract for the delivery of all certificate, diploma, or associate degree programs approved by the commission.
  2. The Kentucky Community and Technical College System shall provide the fiscal and administrative support requested by the commission, through the chancellor’s Office of Technical Education and Workforce Development.
  3. The commission shall ratify all personnel decisions necessary to perform the functions required by the commission, subject to budget appropriation limits.
  4. The commission shall establish the proposed budget for all administrative, fire rescue training functions, and other activities in which the commission is authorized to engage, including, but not limited to, salaries, equipment, maintenance, utilities, insurance, and other matters. The commission shall submit the budget to the Kentucky Community and Technical College System, which shall submit the budget, through appropriate channels, for inclusion in the executive branch budget. The Kentucky Community and Technical College System shall not change the proposed budget which is submitted to it but may comment thereon in writing, with copies sent to the commission and to all agencies who receive the proposed budget during the budget process.

History. Enact. Acts 2000, ch. 270, § 8, effective July 14, 2000; 2008, ch. 77, § 3, effective July 15, 2008.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(6/20/2005). 2005 Ky. Acts chs. 11, 85, 95, 97, 98, 99, 123, and 181 instruct the Reviser of Statutes to correct statutory references to agencies and officers whose names have been changed in 2005 legislation confirming the reorganization of the executive branch. Such a correction has been made in this section.

95A.070. Payments for insurance coverage of firefighters permanently and totally disabled in line of duty — Documentation — Reduction in payments if firefighter has other coverage — Procedure upon termination of disability or coverage — Administrative regulations — Penalty for providing false information — Proration if funds insufficient.

  1. If a firefighter as defined in KRS 61.315 is, before, on, or after July 15, 2002, permanently and totally disabled as defined in KRS 342.0011 as a direct result of activities in the line of duty, then the firefighter shall be entitled to receive a monthly payment to be paid by the State Treasurer from the general fund appropriation to the police and firefighter-life insurance category contained in miscellaneous appropriations of the state/executive branch budget of:
    1. Three hundred dollars ($300) to help defray the costs of life insurance; and
    2. Three hundred dollars ($300) to help defray the costs of health insurance.
  2. In order to receive the monthly payment, the firefighter must present to the Commission on Fire Protection Personnel Standards and Education:
    1. A written statement from the fire chief of the fire department under whose command the firefighter was at the time of injury stating the fact that the firefighter was on active duty and on assignment with that fire department when the injury occurred; and
    2. A written statement from at least two (2) licensed and practicing physicians stating that the member is totally and likely to be permanently disabled as defined in KRS 342.0011 ; and
    3. Proof, in a form satisfactory to the commission, that the firefighter has either or both active life and health insurance policies.
    1. If a firefighter, either through a settlement of any kind or through any other source, has life insurance provided at no cost, then the firefighter shall not be eligible to receive the life insurance payment described in subsection (1)(a) of this section. If a firefighter receives partial payment of life insurance, and the portion of the payment that the firefighter is responsible for is less than the amount stated in subsection (1) of this section, then the firefighter shall only receive that portion of the payment to pay for the cost of the insurance. (3) (a) If a firefighter, either through a settlement of any kind or through any other source, has life insurance provided at no cost, then the firefighter shall not be eligible to receive the life insurance payment described in subsection (1)(a) of this section. If a firefighter receives partial payment of life insurance, and the portion of the payment that the firefighter is responsible for is less than the amount stated in subsection (1) of this section, then the firefighter shall only receive that portion of the payment to pay for the cost of the insurance.
    2. If a firefighter, either through a settlement of any kind or through any other source, has health insurance provided at no cost, then the firefighter shall not be eligible to receive the health insurance payment described in subsection (1)(b) of this section. If a firefighter receives partial payment of health insurance, and the portion of the payment that the firefighter is responsible for is less than the amount stated in subsection (1) of this section, then the firefighter shall only receive that portion of the payment to pay for the cost of the insurance.
  3. If the firefighter should no longer be considered permanently and totally disabled as defined in KRS 342.0011 , or if either or both life and health insurance policies are terminated, then the firefighter shall within thirty (30) days of that determination notify the Commission on Fire Protection Personnel Standards and Education, in writing, of that fact or facts. The commission shall then terminate the appropriate subsequent payments to that firefighter. A firefighter may continue to receive payments for one (1) type of insurance as long as the firefighter is still permanently and totally disabled and the insurance policy is active. If the firefighter fails to notify the commission within thirty (30) days and receives subsequent payments under this section, the firefighter shall be responsible for repaying any payments provided to the firefighter under this section from the date that the firefighter was no longer considered permanently and totally disabled.
  4. The Commission on Fire Protection Personnel Standards and Education shall promulgate administrative regulations in accordance with the provisions of KRS Chapter 13A establishing procedures and criteria applicable to the administration of this section by December 31, 2002.
  5. Any firefighter convicted of knowingly providing false information to receive the benefits in subsection (1) of this section shall be guilty of a Class D felony and shall be responsible for repaying the total amount paid to the firefighter, plus interest, under the provisions of this section within a time to be determined by the commission. The firefighter shall also no longer be eligible to receive any payments provided under this section.
  6. In the event sufficient funds do not exist to cover all the financial obligations of this section, then the payments shall be prorated among the participants evenly.

History. Enact. Acts 2002, ch. 289, § 3, effective July 15, 2002; 2012, ch. 78, § 1, effective July 12, 2012.

95A.070. Payments for insurance coverage of firefighters permanently and totally disabled in line of duty — Documentation — Reduction in payments if firefighter has other coverage — Procedure upon termination of disability or coverage — Administrative regulations — Penalty for providing false information — Proration if funds insufficient.

  1. If a firefighter as defined in KRS 61.315 is, before, on, or after July 15, 2002, permanently and totally disabled as defined in KRS 342.0011 as a direct result of activities in the line of duty, then the firefighter shall be entitled to receive a monthly payment to be paid by the State Treasurer from the general fund appropriation to the police and firefighter-life insurance category contained in miscellaneous appropriations of the state/executive branch budget of:
    1. Three hundred dollars ($300) to help defray the costs of life insurance; and
    2. Three hundred dollars ($300) to help defray the costs of health insurance.
  2. In order to receive the monthly payment, the firefighter must present to the Kentucky Fire Commission:
    1. A written statement from the fire chief of the fire department under whose command the firefighter was at the time of injury stating the fact that the firefighter was on active duty and on assignment with that fire department when the injury occurred; and
    2. A written statement from at least two (2) licensed and practicing physicians stating that the member is totally and likely to be permanently disabled as defined in KRS 342.0011 ; and
    3. Proof, in a form satisfactory to the commission, that the firefighter has either or both active life and health insurance policies.
    1. If a firefighter, either through a settlement of any kind or through any other source, has life insurance provided at no cost, then the firefighter shall not be eligible to receive the life insurance payment described in subsection (1)(a) of this section. If a firefighter receives partial payment of life insurance, and the portion of the payment that the firefighter is responsible for is less than the amount stated in subsection (1) of this section, then the firefighter shall only receive that portion of the payment to pay for the cost of the insurance. (3) (a) If a firefighter, either through a settlement of any kind or through any other source, has life insurance provided at no cost, then the firefighter shall not be eligible to receive the life insurance payment described in subsection (1)(a) of this section. If a firefighter receives partial payment of life insurance, and the portion of the payment that the firefighter is responsible for is less than the amount stated in subsection (1) of this section, then the firefighter shall only receive that portion of the payment to pay for the cost of the insurance.
    2. If a firefighter, either through a settlement of any kind or through any other source, has health insurance provided at no cost, then the firefighter shall not be eligible to receive the health insurance payment described in subsection (1)(b)of this section. If a firefighter receives partial payment of health insurance, and the portion of the payment that the firefighter is responsible for is less than the amount stated in subsection (1) of this section, then the firefighter shall only receive that portion of the payment to pay for the cost of the insurance.
  3. If the firefighter should no longer be considered permanently and totally disabled as defined in KRS 342.0011 , or if either or both life and health insurance policies are terminated, then the firefighter shall within thirty (30) days of that determination notify the Kentucky Fire Commission, in writing, of that fact or facts. The commission shall then terminate the appropriate subsequent payments to that firefighter. A firefighter may continue to receive payments for one (1) type of insurance as long as the firefighter is still permanently and totally disabled and the insurance policy is active. If the firefighter fails to notify the commission within thirty (30) days and receives subsequent payments under this section, the firefighter shall be responsible for repaying any payments provided to the firefighter under this section from the date that the firefighter was no longer considered permanently and totally disabled.
  4. The Kentucky Fire Commission shall promulgate administrative regulations in accordance with the provisions of KRS Chapter 13A establishing procedures and criteria applicable to the administration of this section by December 31, 2002.
  5. Any firefighter convicted of knowingly providing false information to receive the benefits in subsection (1) of this section shall be guilty of a Class D felony and shall be responsible for repaying the total amount paid to the firefighter, plus interest, under the provisions of this section within a time to be determined by the commission. The firefighter shall also no longer be eligible to receive any payments provided under this section.
  6. In the event sufficient funds do not exist to cover all the financial obligations of this section, then the payments shall be prorated among the participants evenly.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 2002, ch. 289, § 3, effective July 15, 2002; 2012, ch. 78, § 1, effective July 12, 2012; 2020 ch. 67, § 7.

95A.080. Certified volunteer firefighter identification program. [Repealed]

History. Enact. Acts 2005, ch. 151, § 1, effective June 20, 2005; 2008, ch. 77, § 1, effective July 15, 2008; repealed by 2015 ch. 92, § 1, effective June 24, 2015.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 2005, ch. 151, § 1, effective June 20, 2005; amended 2008, ch. 77, § 1, effective July 15, 2008) was repealed by Acts 2015, ch. 92, § 1, effective March 30, 2015.

95A.090. Acceptance of military training and service toward certification as firefighter — Administrative regulations.

  1. The commission shall develop a policy for reviewing and accepting the training and service of any member of the United States military who served as a firefighter towards certification as a firefighter in the Commonwealth of Kentucky.
  2. The commission shall promulgate administrative regulations in accordance with KRS Chapter 13A as necessary to implement the provisions of this section.

History. Enact. Acts 2013, ch. 32, § 153, effective June 25, 2013.

95A.100. Fire investigators, creation, appointment, and training — Peace officer powers — Prohibited acts.

  1. As used in this section and KRS 95A.102 , “fire investigator” means a professional firefighter, as defined in KRS 95A.210 , who has been appointed to be a fire investigator and to exercise peace officer powers.
  2. The chief of a fire department may appoint a professional firefighter, as defined in KRS 95A.210 , to be a fire investigator and to exercise peace officer powers in order to investigate crimes set out in KRS Chapter 513 and other crimes discovered in the course of investigation.
  3. An individual appointed to be a fire investigator and to exercise peace officer powers shall take an oath to faithfully perform the duties of his or her office, shall affirm that he or she possesses the minimum qualifications under KRS 15.382 , and shall undergo a basic training course approved by the Kentucky Law Enforcement Council.
  4. The employing agency or jurisdiction of the fire investigator shall pay for the training required for certification by the Kentucky Law Enforcement Council.
  5. Upon the Kentucky Law Enforcement Council’s verification that the required standards have been met, a fire investigator shall have peace officer powers to investigate crimes set out in KRS Chapter 513 and other crimes discovered in the course of investigation.
  6. A fire investigator may exercise his or her powers in a location other than the city or county in which he or she was appointed upon the request of:
    1. The chief of police, the chief of a fire department, the sheriff, or the chief executive of the city or county in which the fire investigator’s services are to be utilized; or
    2. A federal agency that has an ongoing investigation in the city or county in which the fire investigator’s services are to be utilized.
  7. A fire investigator shall not:
    1. Patrol the roads, streets, or highways;
    2. Issue traffic citations; or
    3. Perform general law enforcement duties outside of investigating crimes set out in KRS Chapter 513 and other crimes discovered in the course of investigation.

HISTORY: 2018 ch. 128, § 6, effective January 1, 2019.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(1/1/2019). Although 2018 Ky. Acts ch. 128, sec. 6, contained a citation to “Section 8 of this Act” (codified as KRS 95.500 ) in subsection (1) of this statute, it is clear from the context that Section 7 (codified as KRS 95A.102 ) was intended, and this manifest clerical or typographical error was corrected in codification under the authority of KRS 7.136 .

95A.102. Fire investigators exercising police officer powers — Training, basic and in-service.

  1. All fire investigators appointed to exercise peace officer powers under KRS 95A.100 that are appointed on or after January 1, 2019, shall, within one (1) year of their appointment or employment, successfully complete a basic training course as established by KRS 15.440 at a school certified or recognized by the Kentucky Law Enforcement Council.
  2. All fire investigators specified in subsection (1) of this section shall, upon completion of the basic training required in the same section, successfully complete forty (40) hours of annual in-service training as established by KRS 15.440(1)(e) that has been certified or recognized by the Kentucky Law Enforcement Council.
  3. All fire investigators appointed or employed before January 1, 2019, shall successfully complete forty (40) hours of annual in-service training as established by KRS 15.440(1)(e) that has been certified or recognized by the Kentucky Law Enforcement Council.
  4. In the event of extenuating circumstances beyond the control of the fire investigator such as injury, illness, or personal tragedy which prevents the fire investigator from completing the basic or in-service training within the time specified in this section, the officer shall complete the training within one (1) year after return to duty. Any fire investigator who fails to successfully complete the basic or in-service training within the specified time period shall not be authorized thereafter to carry deadly weapons or make arrests and may be removed from an appointment as a fire investigator.

HISTORY: 2018 ch. 128, § 7, effective January 1, 2019.

Professional Firefighters Foundation Program Fund

95A.200. Intention of General Assembly to assist local firefighters.

It is the intention of the General Assembly to assure that fire protection in the Commonwealth is continually strengthened, upgraded and attractive to highly qualified men and women who choose firefighting as a profession; and to retain qualified and experienced firefighters for the purpose of providing maximum protection and safety to the citizens of, and visitors to, this Commonwealth; and to offer a state monetary supplement for local firefighters while upgrading the educational and training standards of such firefighters.

History. Enact. Acts 1980, ch. 373, § 1, effective July 15, 1980.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Legislative Intent.

As indicated by KRS 95A.200 , the legislature intended, with respect to financial incentives for local firefighters, to offer a state monetary supplement to them while upgrading the education and training standards of such firefighters. Thus, each qualified professional firefighter whose local government received the incentive training funds was entitled to receive the training supplement from that local government, as recognized under KRS 95A.250(2)(a) and that local government was obligated to pay overtime to them according to the law applicable to it. Madison County Fiscal Court v. Ky. Labor Cabinet, 352 S.W.3d 572, 2011 Ky. LEXIS 114 ( Ky. 2011 ).

Research References and Practice Aids

2020-2022 Budget Reference.

See State/Executive Branch Budget, 2020 Ky. Acts ch. 92, Pt. I, K, 11, (2) at 898.

2018-2020 Budget Reference.

See State/Executive Branch Budget, 2018 Ky. Acts ch. 169, Pt. I, K, 11, (1) at 1337.

2016-2018 Budget Reference.

See State/Executive Branch Budget, 2016 Ky. Acts ch. 149, Pt. I, K, 11, (1) at 1091.

95A.210. Definitions for KRS 95A.200 to 95A.300. [Effective until July 15, 2020]

As used in KRS 95A.200 to 95A.300 , unless the context otherwise requires:

  1. “Commission” means the Commission on Fire Protection Personnel Standards and Education established pursuant to KRS 95A.020 ;
  2. “Established work schedule” means a work schedule adopted by or required of a local government setting a recurring pattern for time on and off duty for professional firefighters employed by the local government. An established work schedule includes but is not limited to a schedule of twenty-four (24) consecutive hours on duty, followed by forty-eight (48) consecutive hours off duty;
  3. “Executive director” means the executive director of the Commission on Fire Protection Personnel Standards and Education;
  4. “Fund” means Firefighters Foundation Program Fund;
  5. “Local government” means any city, county, urban-county government, charter county government, unified local government, consolidated local government, or any combination thereof of the Commonwealth;
  6. “Professional firefighter” means any member of a paid municipal fire department organized under KRS Chapter 95, 67A, or 67C, a fire protection district organized under KRS Chapter 75, or a county fire department created pursuant to KRS Chapter 67;
  7. “Program” means the Alan “Chip” Terry Professional Development and Wellness Program for firefighters established in KRS 95A.292 ;
  8. “Scheduled overtime” means work by a professional firefighter in excess of forty (40) hours per week which regularly recurs as part of an established work schedule; and
  9. “Unscheduled overtime” means work by a professional firefighter in excess of forty (40) hours per week which does not regularly recur as part of an established work schedule.

History. Enact. Acts 1980, ch. 373, § 2, effective July 15, 1980; 1992, ch. 381, § 3, effective July 14, 1992; 2009, ch. 33, § 1, effective March 20, 2009; 2019 ch. 67, § 1, effective March 25, 2019; 2020 ch. 91, § 48, effective April 15, 2020.

Legislative Research Commission Notes.

(7/15/2020). This statute was amended by 2020 Ky. Acts chs. 67 and 91, which do not appear to be in conflict and have been codified together.

Research References and Practice Aids

2020-2022 Budget Reference.

See State/Executive Branch Budget, 2020 Ky. Acts ch. 92, Pt. I, K, 11, (2) at 898.

2018-2020 Budget Reference.

See State/Executive Branch Budget, 2018 Ky. Acts ch. 169, Pt. I, K, 11, (1) at 1337.

2016-2018 Budget Reference.

See State/Executive Branch Budget, 2016 Ky. Acts ch. 149, Pt. I, K, 11, (1) at 1091.

95A.210. Definitions for KRS 95A.200 to 95A.300. [Effective July 15, 2020]

As used in KRS 95A.200 to 95A.300 , unless the context otherwise requires:

  1. “Commission” means the Kentucky Fire Commission established pursuant to KRS 95A.020 ;
  2. “Established work schedule” means a work schedule adopted by or required of a local government setting a recurring pattern for time on and off duty for professional firefighters employed by the local government. An established work schedule includes but is not limited to a schedule of twenty-four (24) consecutive hours on duty, followed by forty-eight (48) consecutive hours off duty;
  3. “Executive director” means the executive director of the Kentucky Fire Commission;
  4. “Fund” means Firefighters Foundation Program Fund;
  5. “Local government” means any city, county, urban-county government, charter county government, unified local government, consolidated local government, air board created under KRS Chapter 183, or any combination thereof of the Commonwealth;
  6. “Professional firefighter” means any member of a paid municipal fire department organized under KRS Chapter 95, 67A, or 67C, a fire protection district organized under KRS Chapter 75, a county fire department created pursuant to KRS Chapter 67, or any firefighter employed by an air board created under KRS Chapter 183;
  7. “Program” means the Alan “Chip” Terry Professional Development and Wellness Program for firefighters established in KRS 95A.292 ;
  8. “Scheduled overtime” means work by a professional firefighter in excess of forty (40) hours per week which regularly recurs as part of an established work schedule; and
  9. “Unscheduled overtime” means work by a professional firefighter in excess of forty (40) hours per week which does not regularly recur as part of an established work schedule.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1980, ch. 373, § 2, effective July 15, 1980; 1992, ch. 381, § 3, effective July 14, 1992; 2009, ch. 33, § 1, effective March 20, 2009; 2019 ch. 67, § 1, effective March 25, 2019; 2020 ch. 91, § 48, effective April 15, 2020; 2020 ch. 67, § 8, effective July 15, 2020.

95A.220. Firefighters Foundation Program fund — Funds accruing under KRS 42.190 and 136.392 — Lapsing of certain funds — Moneys appropriated.

  1. There is established the “Firefighters Foundation Program Fund” consisting of appropriations from the general fund of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, and insurance premium surcharge proceeds and earnings on the investments of those proceeds which accrue to this fund pursuant to KRS 42.190 and 136.392 . The fund may also receive any other funds, gifts or grants made available to the state for distribution to local governments and volunteer fire departments in accordance with the provisions of KRS 95A.200 to 95A.300 and KRS 95A.262 .
  2. All moneys remaining in this fund on July 1, 1982, and deposited thereafter, including earnings from their investment, shall be deemed a trust and agency account. Beginning with the fiscal year 1994-95, through June 30, 1999, moneys remaining in the account at the end of the fiscal year in excess of three million dollars ($3,000,000) shall lapse, but moneys in the revolving loan fund established in KRS 95A.262 shall not lapse. On and after July 1, 1999, moneys in this account shall not lapse.
  3. Moneys in the fund are hereby appropriated by the General Assembly for the purposes provided in KRS 95A.200 to 95A.300 .

History. Enact. Acts 1980, ch. 373, § 3, effective July 15, 1980; 1982, ch. 246, § 5, effective April 1, 1982; 1984, ch. 300, § 9, effective July 13, 1984; 1992, ch. 381, § 4, effective July 14, 1992; 1994, ch. 97, § 3, effective July 15, 1994; 1998, ch. 244, § 8, effective July 15, 1998; 1998, ch. 510, § 8, effective July 15, 1998; 2004, ch. 71, § 2, effective July 13, 2004.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Valid Emergency Clause.

The reason stated in the emergency clause of Acts 1982, ch. 246 which act deals generally with a surcharge upon certain insurance premiums collected in the state which is intended to fund a trust for the payment of incentives to the fire fighters and policemen of the various municipalities, to the effect that the general fund appropriations for fiscal year 1981-82 for the professional fire fighters foundation program fund as provided by KRS 95A.200 through 95A.990 , and the law enforcement foundation program fund as provided by KRS 15.410 through 15.510 , would lapse on June 30, 1982, sufficiently supported the legislative declaration of an emergency. American Ins. Asso. v. Geary, 635 S.W.2d 306, 1982 Ky. LEXIS 265 ( Ky. 1982 ).

Research References and Practice Aids

2020-2022 Budget Reference.

See State/Executive Branch Budget, 2020 Ky. Acts ch. 92, Pt. I, K, 11, (2) at 898.

2018-2020 Budget Reference.

See State/Executive Branch Budget, 2018 Ky. Acts ch. 169, Pt. I, K, 11, (1) at 1337.

2016-2018 Budget Reference.

See State/Executive Branch Budget, 2016 Ky. Acts ch. 149, Pt. I, K, 11, (1) at 1091.

95A.230. Requirements for participation in fund.

Each local government which meets the following requirements shall be eligible to share in the distribution of funds from the fund:

  1. Employs one (1) or more firefighters.
  2. Pays every firefighter a minimum annual salary of eight thousand dollars ($8,000).
  3. Maintains the minimum educational requirement of a high school degree, or its equivalent as determined by the commission, for employment of firefighters on or after August 1, 1980. All firefighters employed prior to August 1, 1980, shall be deemed to have met requirements of this subsection.
  4. Requires all firefighters employed on or after July 15, 1982, to successfully complete a basic training course of four hundred (400) hours duration or a lesser duration as established by the commission pursuant to KRS 95A.240 (5) as mandated by the commission as to subject matter and number of hours for each subject, within one (1) year of the date of employment at a school or method certified or recognized by the commission. The training requirement may be met through training and educational programs of a local government conducting its own annual in-service training school certified or recognized by the commission which may provide a different number of hours of instruction as established in KRS 95A.240 .
  5. Requires all firefighters, whether originally employed before or after August 1, 1980, to successfully complete in each calendar year an in-service training program appropriate to the firefighters rank and responsibility, of one hundred (100) hours duration or a lesser duration as established by the commission pursuant to KRS 95A.240(5) at a school certified or recognized by the commission. This requirement shall be waived for the period of time that a professional firefighter is serving on active duty in the United States Armed Forces. This waiver shall be retroactive for professional firefighters from the date of September 11, 2001.
  6. Requires compliance with all provisions of law applicable to local firefighters.
  7. Requires compliance with all rules and regulations, appropriate to the size and location of the local fire department or fire prevention district, issued by the commission to facilitate the administration of the fund and further the provisions of KRS 95A.200 to 95A.300 .

History. Enact. Acts 1980, ch. 373, § 4, effective July 15, 1980; 1982, ch. 125, § 1, effective July 15, 1982; 2003, ch. 106, § 1, effective June 24, 2003; 2016 ch. 112, § 11, effective July 15, 2016.

Research References and Practice Aids

2020-2022 Budget Reference.

See State/Executive Branch Budget, 2020 Ky. Acts ch. 92, Pt. I, K, 11, (2) at 898.

2018-2020 Budget Reference.

See State/Executive Branch Budget, 2018 Ky. Acts ch. 169, Pt. I, K, 11, (1) at 1337.

2016-2018 Budget Reference.

See State/Executive Branch Budget, 2016 Ky. Acts ch. 149, Pt. I, K, 11, (1) at 1091.

95A.240. Funds administered by commission — Changes in training requirements.

  1. The commission shall administer the fund pursuant to the provisions of KRS 95A.200 to 95A.300 and may issue such reasonable rules and regulations as, in its discretion, will facilitate the administration of the fund and further the purposes of KRS 95A.200 to 95A.300 .
  2. The commission shall determine which local governments are eligible to share in the fund and may withhold or terminate payments to any local government that does not comply with the requirements of KRS 95A.200 to 95A.300 or the rules and regulations issued by the commission thereunder.
  3. The commission shall, from the moneys appropriated to and accruing to the fund from any source, reimburse the Kentucky Community and Technical College System for salaries and other costs of administering the fund, including, but not limited to the costs of commission operations. The amount of reimbursement for any given year shall be determined by the commission and shall not exceed five percent (5%) of the total appropriation to the fund for that year.
  4. The commission or its personnel shall not:
    1. Increase the amount of the four hundred (400) hour training requirement required to be completed by firefighters for basic training as set out in KRS 95A.230(4), except that the commission may certify the basic training educational programs and schools of a local government conducting its own basic training courses of a different amount of hours from four hundred (400) hours that are approved by the commission in accordance with KRS 95A.040 ; or
    2. Increase the amount of the one hundred (100) hour training requirement required to be completed for annual in-service training established by KRS 95A.230(5), except that the commission may certify the training and educational programs of a local government conducting its own annual in-service training school of a different amount of hours from one hundred (100) hours that is approved by the commission in accordance with KRS 95A.040 .
  5. The commission shall have the authority to reduce or provide an alternative procedure to the required four hundred (400) hours of basic training established in KRS 95A.230(4) as well as the required one hundred (100) hours of required in-service training also established in KRS 95A.230(5) if the reduction in hours or alternative procedure is based on a certification or equivalence-based testing process determined by the commission. The commission shall specifically establish the lower required hours or alternative procedure based on specific standards through an administrative regulation promulgated in accordance with KRS Chapter 13A as it is authorized to do under KRS 95A.050 .
  6. Nothing in this chapter shall be interpreted to authorize the commission or its personnel to increase the amount of the one hundred fifty (150) hour requirement required to be completed by firefighters in a volunteer fire department in order for the department to qualify for volunteer department aid under KRS 95A.262(2). The commission shall have the authority to reduce or provide an alternative procedure to achieve the required number of hours if the reduction in hours is based on a certification or equivalence-based testing process determined by the commission. If the commission seeks to reduce the hours or provide an alternative procedure to achieve the required number of hours, it shall specifically establish the lower required hours or alternative procedure through an administrative regulation promulgated in accordance with KRS Chapter 13A as it is authorized to do so under KRS 95A.050 .

History. Enact. Acts 1980, ch. 373, § 5, effective July 15, 1980; 1982, ch. 125, § 2, effective July 15, 1982; 1984, ch. 327, § 1, effective July 13, 1984; 1992, ch. 381, § 5, effective July 14, 1992; 2000, ch. 270, § 4, effective July 14, 2000; 2016 ch. 112, § 12, effective July 15, 2016.

Research References and Practice Aids

2020-2022 Budget Reference.

See State/Executive Branch Budget, 2020 Ky. Acts ch. 92, Pt. I, K, 11, (2) at 898.

2018-2020 Budget Reference.

See State/Executive Branch Budget, 2018 Ky. Acts ch. 169, Pt. I, K, 11, (1) at 1337.

2016-2018 Budget Reference.

See State/Executive Branch Budget, 2016 Ky. Acts ch. 149, Pt. I, K, 11, (1) at 1091.

95A.245. Certification of program cost projections to Finance and Administration Cabinet.

Upon receipt of the written request by the Finance and Administration Cabinet for cost projections of the professional firefighters foundation program fund as prescribed in KRS 42.190 , the administrator of the fund shall certify, within twenty-one (21) calendar days, in writing said projections to the Finance and Administration Cabinet.

History. Enact. Acts 1982, ch. 246, § 4, effective April 1, 1982.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Valid Emergency Clause.

The reason stated in the emergency clause of Acts 1982, ch. 246 which act deals generally with a surcharge upon certain insurance premiums collected in the state which is intended to fund a trust for the payment of incentives to the fire fighters and policemen of the various municipalities, to the effect that the general fund appropriations for fiscal year 1981-82 for the professional fire fighters foundation program fund as provided by KRS 95A.200 through 95A.990 , and the law enforcement foundation program fund as provided by KRS 15.410 through 15.510 , would lapse on June 30, 1982, sufficiently supported the legislative declaration of an emergency. American Ins. Asso. v. Geary, 635 S.W.2d 306, 1982 Ky. LEXIS 265 ( Ky. 1982 ).

Research References and Practice Aids

2020-2022 Budget Reference.

See State/Executive Branch Budget, 2020 Ky. Acts ch. 92, Pt. I, K, 11, (2) at 898.

2018-2020 Budget Reference.

See State/Executive Branch Budget, 2018 Ky. Acts ch. 169, Pt. I, K, 11, (1) at 1337.

2016-2018 Budget Reference.

See State/Executive Branch Budget, 2016 Ky. Acts ch. 149, Pt. I, K, 11, (1) at 1091.

95A.250. Supplemental payments and pension contributions to local governments, the Kentucky Community and Technical College System, and the Department of Military Affairs from fund — Administrative expense reimbursement.

    1. An eligible local government shall be entitled to receive an annual supplement of three thousand dollars ($3,000) and, beginning July 1, 2018, an annual supplement of four thousand dollars ($4,000) for each qualified professional firefighter it employs, plus an amount equal to the required employer’s contribution on the supplement to the defined benefit pension plan, or to a plan qualified under Section 401(a) or Section 457 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 as amended. (1) (a) An eligible local government shall be entitled to receive an annual supplement of three thousand dollars ($3,000) and, beginning July 1, 2018, an annual supplement of four thousand dollars ($4,000) for each qualified professional firefighter it employs, plus an amount equal to the required employer’s contribution on the supplement to the defined benefit pension plan, or to a plan qualified under Section 401(a) or Section 457 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 as amended.
    2. The employer’s contribution to any of these plans on the supplement shall not exceed the required employer’s contribution to the County Employees Retirement System pursuant to KRS Chapter 78 for the hazardous duty category. The pension contribution on the supplement shall be paid whether the professional firefighter entered the system under hazardous duty coverage or nonhazardous coverage.
    3. The local unit of government shall pay the amount received for retirement coverage to the appropriate retirement system to cover the required employer contribution on the supplement.
    4. Should the foundation program funds be insufficient to pay employer contributions to the system, then the total amount available for pension payments shall be prorated to each eligible government so that each receives the same percentage of required pension costs attributable to the supplement.
      1. In addition to the payments received under paragraphs (a) and (b) of this subsection, but only if sufficient funds are available to fully reimburse each eligible local government for the employer contributions to the pension system, each local government shall receive an administrative expense reimbursement in an amount equal to seven and sixty-five one-hundredths percent (7.65%) of the total annual supplement received greater than three thousand one hundred dollars ($3,100) for each qualified professional firefighter it employs, subject to the cap established by subparagraph 3. of this paragraph. (e) 1. In addition to the payments received under paragraphs (a) and (b) of this subsection, but only if sufficient funds are available to fully reimburse each eligible local government for the employer contributions to the pension system, each local government shall receive an administrative expense reimbursement in an amount equal to seven and sixty-five one-hundredths percent (7.65%) of the total annual supplement received greater than three thousand one hundred dollars ($3,100) for each qualified professional firefighter it employs, subject to the cap established by subparagraph 3. of this paragraph.
      2. The local government may use the moneys received under this paragraph in any manner it deems necessary to partially cover the costs of administering the payments received under paragraph (a) of this subsection.
      3. The total amount distributed under this paragraph shall not exceed the total sum of two hundred fifty thousand dollars ($250,000) for each fiscal year. If there are insufficient funds to provide for full reimbursement as provided in subparagraph 1. of this paragraph, then the amount shall be distributed pro rata to each eligible local government so that each receives the same percentage attributable to its total receipt of the cash salary supplement.
    1. Each qualified professional firefighter, whose local government receives a supplement pursuant to subsection (1)(a) of this section due to employment of the firefighter, shall receive distribution of the supplement from that local government in twelve (12) equal monthly installments with his or her pay for the last pay period of each month. The monthly distribution shall be calculated by dividing the supplement amount established in subsection (1)(a) of this section by twelve (12). (2) (a) Each qualified professional firefighter, whose local government receives a supplement pursuant to subsection (1)(a) of this section due to employment of the firefighter, shall receive distribution of the supplement from that local government in twelve (12) equal monthly installments with his or her pay for the last pay period of each month. The monthly distribution shall be calculated by dividing the supplement amount established in subsection (1)(a) of this section by twelve (12).
    2. The supplement disbursed to a qualified professional firefighter pursuant to this section shall not be considered “wages” as defined by KRS 337.010(1)(c)1. and shall not be included in the hourly wage rate for calculation of overtime pursuant to KRS 337.285 for scheduled overtime. The supplement shall be included in the hourly wage rates for calculation of overtime for unscheduled overtime pursuant to KRS 337.285 .
    3. To determine the addition to the hourly wage rate for calculation of overtime on unscheduled overtime, the annual supplement shall be divided by two thousand eighty (2,080). The overtime rate for unscheduled overtime shall be calculated by adding the quotient, which is the amount of the annual supplement divided by two thousand eighty (2,080), to the hourly wage rate and multiplying the total by one and one-half (1.5). The enhanced overtime rate shall be paid only for unscheduled overtime. Scheduled overtime shall be paid at one and one-half (1.5) times the regular hourly wage rate, excluding the supplement.
    1. The Kentucky Community and Technical College System shall be entitled to receive annually a supplement equal to the amount determined in subsection (1) of this section for each Kentucky fire and rescue training coordinator employed by the Kentucky Community and Technical College System who meets the qualifications for individual firefighters required in KRS 95A.230 , plus an amount equal to the required employer’s contribution on the supplement to the defined benefit pension plan. (3) (a) The Kentucky Community and Technical College System shall be entitled to receive annually a supplement equal to the amount determined in subsection (1) of this section for each Kentucky fire and rescue training coordinator employed by the Kentucky Community and Technical College System who meets the qualifications for individual firefighters required in KRS 95A.230 , plus an amount equal to the required employer’s contribution on the supplement to the defined benefit pension plan.
    2. The Department of Military Affairs shall be entitled to receive annually a supplement equal to the amount determined in subsection (1) of this section for each civilian firefighter employed by the Department of Military Affairs who meets the qualifications for individual firefighters required in KRS 95A.230, plus an amount equal to the required employer’s contribution on the supplement to the defined benefit pension plan.
    3. Each fire and rescue training coordinator employed by the Kentucky Community and Technical College System and each civilian firefighter employed by the Department of Military Affairs, whose employer receives a supplement pursuant to this subsection, shall receive distribution from that employer of the supplement which his or her qualifications brought to the employer. The supplement distributed shall be in addition to his or her regular salary.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1980, ch. 373, § 6, effective July 15, 1980; 1982, ch. 246, § 6, effective July 1, 1982; 1988, ch. 11, § 15, effective July 15, 1988; 1988, ch. 366, § 3, effective July 15, 1988; 1996, ch. 339, § 1, effective July 15, 1996; 1998, ch. 244, § 4, effective July 15, 1998; 1998, ch. 510, § 4, effective July 15, 1998; 2006, ch. 113, § 1, effective July 12, 2006; 2009, ch. 33, § 2, effective March 20, 2009; 2018 ch. 89, § 12, effective July 1, 2018.

Compiler's Notes.

Sections 401(a) and 457 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 referred to in this section are compiled as 26 USCS, §§ 401(a) and 457.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Valid Emergency Clause.

The reason stated in the emergency clause of Acts 1982, ch. 246 which act deals generally with a surcharge upon certain insurance premiums collected in the state which is intended to fund a trust for the payment of incentives to the fire fighters and policemen of the various municipalities, to the effect that the general fund appropriations for fiscal year 1981-82 for the professional fire fighters foundation program fund as provided by KRS 95A.200 through 95A.990 , and the law enforcement foundation program fund as provided by KRS 15.410 through 15.510 , would lapse on June 30, 1982, sufficiently supported the legislative declaration of an emergency. American Ins. Asso. v. Geary, 635 S.W.2d 306, 1982 Ky. LEXIS 265 ( Ky. 1982 ).

2. Legislative Intent.

As indicated by KRS 95A.200 , the legislature intended, with respect to financial incentives for local firefighters, to offer a state monetary supplement to them while upgrading the education and training standards of such firefighters. Thus, each qualified professional firefighter whose local government received the incentive training funds was entitled to receive the training supplement from that local government, as recognized under KRS 95A.250(2)(a) and that local government was obligated to pay overtime to them according to the law applicable to it. Madison County Fiscal Court v. Ky. Labor Cabinet, 352 S.W.3d 572, 2011 Ky. LEXIS 114 ( Ky. 2011 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Firefighter’s scheduled overtime, being regular, fixed, and required by KRS 95.500 , and callback overtime, being part of a firefighter’s total annual compensation, are both includable in determining the 15 percent to be paid to the city for the firefighter; however, the payment for uniform allowances is not compensation for purposes of calculating the 15 percent. OAG 80-437 .

Research References and Practice Aids

2020-2022 Budget Reference.

See State/Executive Branch Budget, 2020 Ky. Acts ch. 92, Pt. I, K, 11, (2) at 898.

2018-2020 Budget Reference.

See State/Executive Branch Budget, 2018 Ky. Acts ch. 169, Pt. I, K, 11, (1) at 1337.

2016-2018 Budget Reference.

See State/Executive Branch Budget, 2016 Ky. Acts ch. 149, Pt. I, K, 11, (1) at 1091.

95A.260. Purposes for which assistance by fund may be used.

  1. Funds made available to local governments shall be received, held, and expended in accordance with the provisions of KRS 95A.200 to 95A.300 , any rules and regulations issued by the commission, and the following specific restrictions:
    1. Funds provided shall be used only as a supplemental distribution to firefighters, and for payments to the defined benefit pension plan to which the firefighter belongs to cover retirement costs on the supplemental distribution.
    2. Funds provided shall be distributed only to firefighters who have complied with subsections (3) and (4) of KRS 95A.230 .
    3. Each firefighter shall receive distribution of the state supplement which his or her qualifications brought to the local government.
    4. Funds shall not be used to supplement existing salaries or as a substitute for normal salary increases periodically due to firefighters.
  2. This section shall not apply to funds expended pursuant to KRS 95A.240(3).

History. Enact. Acts 1980, ch. 373, § 7, effective July 15, 1980; 1982, ch. 125, § 3, effective July 15, 1982; 1988, ch. 11, § 16, effective July 15, 1988; 2009, ch. 33, § 3, effective March 20, 2009.

Research References and Practice Aids

2020-2022 Budget Reference.

See State/Executive Branch Budget, 2020 Ky. Acts ch. 92, Pt. I, K, 11, (2) at 898.

2018-2020 Budget Reference.

See State/Executive Branch Budget, 2018 Ky. Acts ch. 169, Pt. I, K, 11, (1) at 1337.

2016-2018 Budget Reference.

See State/Executive Branch Budget, 2016 Ky. Acts ch. 149, Pt. I, K, 11, (1) at 1091.

95A.262. Hepatitis A and B inoculation of firefighters — Allotment of funds — Qualifications for allotment — Firefighters training center fund — Reimbursement for equipment losses — Low-interest loan fund — Implementation of programs.

  1. The Commission on Fire Protection Personnel Standards and Education shall, in cooperation with the Cabinet for Health and Family Services, develop and implement a continuing program to inoculate every paid and volunteer firefighter in Kentucky against hepatitis A and B. The program shall be funded from revenues allocated to the Firefighters Foundation Program fund pursuant to KRS 136.392 and 42.190 , not to exceed five hundred thousand dollars ($500,00) per fiscal year.
    1. Except as provided in subsection (3) of this section, the Commission on Fire Protection Personnel Standards and Education shall allot on an annual basis a share of the funds accruing to and appropriated for volunteer fire department aid to volunteer fire departments in cities of all classes, fire protection districts organized pursuant to KRS Chapter 75, county districts established under authority of KRS 67.083 , and volunteer fire departments created as nonprofit corporations pursuant to KRS Chapter 273. (2) (a) Except as provided in subsection (3) of this section, the Commission on Fire Protection Personnel Standards and Education shall allot on an annual basis a share of the funds accruing to and appropriated for volunteer fire department aid to volunteer fire departments in cities of all classes, fire protection districts organized pursuant to KRS Chapter 75, county districts established under authority of KRS 67.083 , and volunteer fire departments created as nonprofit corporations pursuant to KRS Chapter 273.
    2. The commission shall allot eleven thousand dollars ($11,000) annually to each qualifying department.
    3. Any qualifying department which fails to participate satisfactorily in the Kentucky fire incident reporting system as described in KRS 304.13-380 shall forfeit annually five hundred dollars ($500) of its allotment.
    4. If two (2) or more qualified volunteer fire departments, as defined in KRS 95A.500 to 95A.560 , merge after January 1, 2000, then the allotment shall be in accordance with the provisions of KRS 95A.500 to 95A.560 .
    5. Administrative regulations for determining qualifications shall be based on the number of both paid firefighters and volunteer firemen within a volunteer fire department, the amount of equipment, housing facilities available, and any other matters or standards that will best effect the purposes of the volunteer fire department aid law. A qualifying department shall:
      1. Include at least twelve (12) firefighters;
      2. Have a chief;
      3. Have at least one (1) operational fire apparatus or one (1) on order; and
      4. Have at least fifty percent (50%) of its firefighters who have completed at least one-half (1/2) of one hundred fifty (150) training hours, or as otherwise established by the commission under KRS 95A.240(6), toward certification within the first six (6) months of the first year of the department’s application for certification, and there shall be a plan to complete the one hundred fifty (150) training hours, or as otherwise established by the commission by KRS 95A.240(6), within the second year. These personnel, equipment, and training requirements shall not be made more stringent by the promulgation of administrative regulations.
    6. No allotment shall exceed the total value of the funds, equipment, lands, and buildings made available to the local fire units from any source whatever for the year in which the allotment is made.
    7. A portion of the funds provided for above may be used to purchase group or blanket health insurance and shall be used to purchase workers’ compensation insurance, and the remaining funds shall be distributed as provided in this section.
  2. There shall be allotted two hundred thousand dollars ($200,000) of the insurance premium surcharge proceeds accruing to the Firefighters Foundation Program fund that shall be allocated each fiscal year of the biennium to the firefighters training center fund, which is hereby created and established, for the purposes of constructing new or upgrading existing training centers for firefighters. If any moneys in the training center fund remain uncommitted, unobligated, or unexpended at the close of the first fiscal year of the biennium, then such moneys shall be carried forward to the second fiscal year of the biennium, and shall be reallocated to and for the use of the training center fund, in addition to the second fiscal year’s allocation of two hundred thousand dollars ($200,000). Prior to funding any project pursuant to this subsection, a proposed project shall be approved by the Commission on Fire Protection Personnel Standards and Education as provided in subsection (4) of this section and shall comply with state laws applicable to capital construction projects.
  3. Applications for funding low-interest loans and firefighters’ training centers shall be submitted to the Commission on Fire Protection Personnel Standards and Education for their recommendation, approval, disapproval, or modification. The commission shall review applications periodically, and shall, subject to funds available, recommend which applications shall be funded and at what levels, together with any terms and conditions the commission deems necessary.
  4. Any department or entity eligible for and receiving funding pursuant to this section shall have a minimum of fifty percent (50%) of its personnel certified as recognized by the Commission on Fire Protection Personnel Standards and Education.
  5. Upon the written request of any department, the Commission on Fire Protection Personnel Standards and Education shall make available a certified training program in a county of which such department is located.
  6. The amount of reimbursement for any given year for costs incurred by the Kentucky Community and Technical College System for administering these funds, including but not limited to the expenses and costs of commission operations, shall be determined by the commission and shall not exceed five percent (5%) of the total amount of moneys accruing to the Firefighters Foundation Program fund which are allotted for the purposes specified in this section during any fiscal year.
  7. The commission shall withhold from the general distribution of funds under subsection (2) of this section an amount which it deems sufficient to reimburse volunteer fire departments for equipment lost or damaged beyond repair due to hazardous material incidents.
  8. Moneys withheld pursuant to subsection (8) of this section shall be distributed only under the following terms and conditions:
    1. A volunteer fire department has lost or damaged beyond repair items of personal protective clothing or equipment due to that equipment having been lost or damaged as a result of an incident in which a hazardous material (as defined in any state or federal statute or regulation) was the causative agent of the loss;
    2. The volunteer fire department has made application in writing to the commission for reimbursement in a manner approved by the commission and the loss and the circumstances thereof have been verified by the commission;
    3. The loss of or damage to the equipment has not been reimbursed by the person responsible for the hazardous materials incident or by any other person;
    4. The commission has determined that the volunteer fire department does not have the fiscal resources to replace the equipment;
    5. The commission has determined that the equipment sought to be replaced is immediately necessary to protect the lives of the volunteer firefighters of the fire department;
    6. The fire department has agreed in writing to subrogate all claims for and rights to reimbursement for the lost or damaged equipment to the Commonwealth to the extent that the Commonwealth provides reimbursement to the department; and
    7. The department has shown to the satisfaction of the commission that it has made reasonable attempts to secure reimbursement for its losses from the person responsible for the hazardous materials incident and has been unsuccessful in the effort.
  9. If a volunteer fire department has met all of the requirements of subsection (9) of this section, the commission may authorize a reimbursement of equipment losses not exceeding ten thousand dollars ($10,000) or the actual amount of the loss, whichever is less.
  10. Moneys which have been withheld during any fiscal year which remain unexpended at the end of the fiscal year shall be distributed in the normal manner required by subsection (2) of this section during the following fiscal year.
  11. No volunteer fire department may receive funding for equipment losses more than once during any fiscal year.
  12. The commission shall make reasonable efforts to secure reimbursement from the responsible party for any moneys awarded to a fire department pursuant to this section.
  13. The commission, in accordance with the procedures in subsection (4) of this section, may make low-interest loans, and the interest thereon shall not exceed three percent (3%) annually or the amount needed to sustain operating expenses of the loan fund, whichever is less, to volunteer fire departments for the purposes of major equipment purchases and facility construction. Loans shall be made to departments which achieve the training standards necessary to qualify for volunteer fire department aid allotted pursuant to subsection (2) of this section, and which do not have other sources of funds at rates which are favorable given their financial resources. The proceeds of loan payments shall be returned to the loan fund for the purpose of providing future loans. If a department does not make scheduled loan payments, the commission may withhold any grants payable to the department pursuant to subsection (2) of this section until the department is current on its payments. Money in the low-interest loan fund shall be used only for the purposes specified in this subsection. Any funds remaining in the fund at the end of a fiscal year shall be carried forward to the next fiscal year for the purposes of the fund.
  14. Each fiscal year there shall be allotted one million dollars ($1,000,000) from the fund established in KRS 95A.220 to be used by the commission to conduct training-related activities.
  15. If funding is available from the fund established in KRS 95A.220 , the Commission on Fire Protection Personnel Standards and Education may implement the following:
    1. A program to prepare emergency service personnel for handling potential man-made and non-man-made threats. The commission shall work in conjunction with the state fire marshal and other appropriate agencies and associations to identify and make maps of gas transmission and hazardous liquids pipelines in the state;
    2. A program to provide and maintain a mobile test facility in each training region established by the Commission on Fire Protection Personnel Standards and Education with equipment to administer Comprehensive Physical Aptitude Tests (CPAT) to ascertain a firefighter’s ability to perform the physical requirements necessary to be an effective and safe firefighter;
    3. A program to provide defensive driving training tactics to firefighters. The commission shall purchase, instruct in the use of, and maintain mobile equipment in each of the training regions, and fund expenses related to equipment replacement;
    4. A program to annually evaluate equipment adequacy and to provide for annual physical examinations for instructors, adequate protective clothing and personal equipment to meet NFPA guidelines, and to establish procedures for replacing this equipment as needed;
    5. A program to establish a rotational expansion and replacement program for mobile fleet equipment currently used for training and recertification of fire departments;
    6. A program to expand and update current emergency medical services, emergency medical responder, emergency medical technician, advanced emergency medical technician, and paramedic training and certification instruction; and
    7. A program to purchase thermal vision devices to comply with the provisions of KRS 95A.400 to 95A.440 .

History. Enact. Acts 1958, ch. 93, § 5; 1960, ch. 237, § 1; 1962, ch. 239; 1966, ch. 255, § 21; 1972, ch. 167, § 1; 1974, ch. 74, Art. V, § 24(7); 1978, ch. 164, § 2, effective June 17, 1978; 1980, ch. 188, § 3, effective July 15, 1980; 1982, ch. 246, § 11, effective April 1, 1982; 1984, ch. 300, § 11, effective July 13, 1984; 1984, ch. 303, § 2, effective July 13, 1984; 1984, ch. 327, § 2, effective July 13, 1984; 1986, ch. 213, § 1, effective July 15, 1986; 1986, ch. 446, § 1, effective July 15, 1986; repealed, reenact. and amend. Acts 1992, ch. 381, § 7, effective July 14, 1992; 1994, ch. 43, § 9, effective July 15, 1994; 1998, ch. 244, § 5, effective July 15, 1998; 1998, ch. 426, § 97, effective July 15, 1998; 1998, ch. 510, § 5, effective July 15, 1998; 2000, ch. 270, § 5, effective July 14, 2000; 2000, ch. 402, § 1, effective July 14, 2000; 2002, ch. 289, § 2, effective July 15, 2002; 2002, ch. 309, § 8, effective July 15, 2002; 2004, ch. 71, § 1, effective July 13, 2004; 2005, ch. 99, § 114, effective June 20, 2005; 2006, ch. 113, § 2, effective July 12, 2006; 2008, ch. 77, § 4, effective July 15, 2008; 2010, ch. 24, § 82, effective July 15, 2010; 2016 ch. 112, § 13, effective July 15, 2016; 2018 ch. 89, § 13, effective July 1, 2018; 2019 ch. 57, § 1, effective June 27, 2019; 2019 ch. 100, § 22, effective June 27, 2019.

Compiler's Notes.

This section was formerly compiled as KRS 17.250 and was repealed, reenacted and amended as this section by Acts 1992, ch. 381, § 7, effective July 14, 1992.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(6/27/2019). This statute was amended by 2019 Ky. Acts chs. 57 and 100, which do not appear to be in conflict and have been codified together.

Research References and Practice Aids

2020-2022 Budget Reference.

See State/Executive Branch Budget, 2020 Ky. Acts ch. 92, Pt. I, K, 11, (2) at 898.See State/Executive Branch Budget, 2020 Ky. Acts ch. 92, Pt. I, K, 11, (3) at 898.

2018-2020 Budget Reference.

See State/Executive Branch Budget, 2018 Ky. Acts ch. 169, Pt. I, K, 11, (1) at 1337.See State/Executive Branch Budget, 2018 Ky. Acts ch. 169, Pt. I, K, 11, (2) at 1337.See State/Executive Branch Budget, 2018 Ky. Acts ch. 169, Pt. V, F, 1 at 1383.

2016-2018 Budget Reference.

See State/Executive Branch Budget, 2016 Ky. Acts ch. 149, Pt. I, K, 11, (1) at 1091.See State/Executive Branch Budget, 2016 Ky. Acts ch. 149, Pt. I, K, 11, (2) at 1091.

95A.265. Safety education fund — Education programs in public schools and agencies — Administrative regulations to establish funding criteria.

  1. There is hereby created a safety education fund to be administered by the Commission on Fire Protection Personnel Standards and Education to initiate education programs in the public schools and other agencies to reduce and prevent injuries and the loss of life. The fund shall:
    1. Provide funding for a statewide “Risk Watch” program to be implemented in the public schools;
    2. Provide funding for statewide fire safety initiatives and programs including the “Learn Not to Burn” program; and
    3. Allot grants to fire departments to provide resources for public education programs.
  2. The commission shall promulgate administrative regulations to establish the criteria for providing funds to initiate injury prevention curricula and training programs throughout the state. The funding criteria shall include requirements that the recipients of funds work in cooperation with other agencies to establish the programs.

History. Enact. Acts 2003, ch. 187, § 1, effective June 24, 2003.

Research References and Practice Aids

2020-2022 Budget Reference.

See State/Executive Branch Budget, 2020 Ky. Acts ch. 92, Pt. I, K, 11, (2) at 898.

2018-2020 Budget Reference.

See State/Executive Branch Budget, 2018 Ky. Acts ch. 169, Pt. I, K, 11, (1) at 1337.

2016-2018 Budget Reference.

See State/Executive Branch Budget, 2016 Ky. Acts ch. 149, Pt. I, K, 11, (1) at 1091.

95A.265. Safety education fund — Education programs in public schools and agencies — Administrative regulations to establish funding criteria.

  1. There is hereby created a safety education fund to be administered by the Kentucky Fire Commission to initiate education programs in the public schools and other agencies to reduce and prevent injuries and the loss of life. The fund shall:
    1. Provide funding for a statewide “Risk Watch” program to be implemented in the public schools;
    2. Provide funding for statewide fire safety initiatives and programs including the “Learn Not to Burn” program; and
    3. Allot grants to fire departments to provide resources for public education programs.
  2. The commission shall promulgate administrative regulations to establish the criteria for providing funds to initiate injury prevention curricula and training programs throughout the state. The funding criteria shall include requirements that the recipients of funds work in cooperation with other agencies to establish the programs.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 2003, ch. 187, § 1, effective June 24, 2003; 2020 ch. 67, § 10.

95A.270. Payment by Finance and Administration Cabinet.

The Finance and Administration Cabinet, on the certification of the commission, shall draw warrants as specified on the State Treasurer for the amount of the fund due each eligible local government or the Kentucky Community and Technical College System. Checks shall be issued by the State Treasurer and transmitted to the commission for distribution to the proper officials of participating local governments which have complied with the provisions of KRS 95A.200 to 95A.300 . Beginning January 1, 1981, and on the first day of each month thereafter, the share of each eligible local unit shall be distributed from the fund.

History. Enact. Acts 1980, ch. 373, § 8, effective July 15, 1980; 1982, ch. 125, § 4, effective July 15, 1982; 2000, ch. 270, § 6, effective July 14, 2000.

Research References and Practice Aids

2020-2022 Budget Reference.

See State/Executive Branch Budget, 2020 Ky. Acts ch. 92, Pt. I, K, 11, (2) at 898.

2018-2020 Budget Reference.

See State/Executive Branch Budget, 2018 Ky. Acts ch. 169, Pt. I, K, 11, (1) at 1337.

2016-2018 Budget Reference.

See State/Executive Branch Budget, 2016 Ky. Acts ch. 149, Pt. I, K, 11, (1) at 1091.

95A.280. Reports.

Each eligible local government, the Kentucky Community and Technical College System, and the Department of Military Affairs shall submit reports to the commission on fire protection on June 30, September 30, December 31, and March 31 of each year containing information relative to number, rank, education, training and compensation of firefighters and fire and rescue training coordinators in their jurisdictions and the disposition made of any state or other funds received pursuant to KRS 95A.200 to 95A.300 .

History. Enact. Acts 1980, ch. 373, § 9, effective July 15, 1980; 2006, ch. 113, § 3, effective July 12, 2006.

Research References and Practice Aids

2020-2022 Budget Reference.

See State/Executive Branch Budget, 2020 Ky. Acts ch. 92, Pt. I, K, 11, (2) at 898.

2018-2020 Budget Reference.

See State/Executive Branch Budget, 2018 Ky. Acts ch. 169, Pt. I, K, 11, (1) at 1337.

2016-2018 Budget Reference.

See State/Executive Branch Budget, 2016 Ky. Acts ch. 149, Pt. I, K, 11, (1) at 1091.

95A.280. Reports.

Each eligible local government, the Kentucky Community and Technical College System, and the Department of Military Affairs shall submit reports to the Kentucky Fire Commission on June 30, September 30, December 31, and March 31 of each year containing information relative to number, rank, education, training and compensation of firefighters and fire and rescue training coordinators in their jurisdictions and the disposition made of any state or other funds received pursuant to KRS 95A.200 to 95A.300 .

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1980, ch. 373, § 9, effective July 15, 1980; 2006, ch. 113, § 3, effective July 12, 2006; 2020 ch. 67, § 11.

95A.290. Distribution of insufficient funds — Exception.

  1. If funds appropriated by the General Assembly and otherwise made available to the fund are insufficient to provide the amount of money required by KRS 95A.250 , the commission shall make a uniform percentage reduction in the allotment of funds available.
  2. The provisions of subsection (1) of this section shall not apply to amounts due the Kentucky Community and Technical College System pursuant to KRS 95A.240 .
  3. Funds appropriated by the General Assembly and unexpended by the commission at the close of the fiscal year for which the funds were appropriated and otherwise made available to this fund pursuant to KRS 42.190 , 95A.220 and 136.392 shall not lapse as provided by KRS 45.229 , but shall be carried forward into the following fiscal year, and shall be used solely for the purposes specified in KRS 95A.200 to 95A.300 .

History. Enact. Acts 1980, ch. 373, § 10, effective July 15, 1980; 1982, ch. 125, § 5, effective July 15, 1982; 1982, ch. 246, § 7, effective April 1, 1982; 1984, ch. 300, § 10, effective July 13, 1984; 2000, ch. 270, § 7, effective July 14, 2000.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Valid Emergency Clause.

The reason stated in the emergency clause of Acts 1982, ch. 246 which act deals generally with a surcharge upon certain insurance premiums collected in the state which is intended to fund a trust for the payment of incentives to the fire fighters and policemen of the various municipalities, to the effect that the general fund appropriations for fiscal year 1981-82 for the professional fire fighters foundation program fund as provided by KRS 95A.200 through 95A.990 , and the law enforcement foundation program fund as provided by KRS 15.410 through 15.510 , would lapse on June 30, 1982, sufficiently supported the legislative declaration of an emergency. American Ins. Asso. v. Geary, 635 S.W.2d 306, 1982 Ky. LEXIS 265 ( Ky. 1982 ).

Research References and Practice Aids

2020-2022 Budget Reference.

See State/Executive Branch Budget, 2020 Ky. Acts ch. 92, Pt. I, K, 11, (2) at 898.

2018-2020 Budget Reference.

See State/Executive Branch Budget, 2018 Ky. Acts ch. 169, Pt. I, K, 11, (1) at 1337.

2016-2018 Budget Reference.

See State/Executive Branch Budget, 2016 Ky. Acts ch. 149, Pt. I, K, 11, (1) at 1091.

95A.292. Alan “Chip” Terry Professional Development and Wellness Program — Administrative regulations — Funding.

  1. The commission shall establish the Alan “Chip” Terry Professional Development and Wellness Program for firefighters.
  2. The program shall:
    1. Use seminar-based peer support and counseling services designed to reduce negative mental and behavioral health outcomes; and
    2. Be offered to Kentucky professional and volunteer firefighters in Kentucky at least two (2) times each calendar year.
  3. On a limited basis, the program may be offered to professional and volunteer firefighters from states other than Kentucky upon application to and approval by the executive director. However, no Kentucky professional and volunteer firefighters may be denied admission to the program if professional and volunteer firefighters from another state are admitted to the program.
  4. The commission shall promulgate administrative regulations in accordance with KRS Chapter 13A to implement this section. The administrative regulations shall address, at a minimum:
    1. The required qualifications and duties of any person used by the commission to implement or administer the program;
    2. The curriculum, programming, seminar type, and treatment modalities used in the program;
    3. The extent to which a participating firefighter’s relatives or friends may participate in seminars;
    4. The standards by which professional and volunteer firefighters from other states may be accepted into the program by the executive director; and
    5. A protocol for establishing reciprocity for interagency assistance with other state, federal, and tribal professional and volunteer firefighters in administering the program.
    1. Except as provided in paragraphs (b) and (c) of this subsection, communications, identifying data, and any reports made in the application for or in the course of a firefighter’s participation in the program shall be confidential and privileged from disclosure in any civil or criminal proceeding and shall not be subject to discovery, disclosure, or production upon the order or subpoena of a court or other agency with subpoena power, regardless of who possesses them. The participating firefighter is the holder of the privilege. (5) (a) Except as provided in paragraphs (b) and (c) of this subsection, communications, identifying data, and any reports made in the application for or in the course of a firefighter’s participation in the program shall be confidential and privileged from disclosure in any civil or criminal proceeding and shall not be subject to discovery, disclosure, or production upon the order or subpoena of a court or other agency with subpoena power, regardless of who possesses them. The participating firefighter is the holder of the privilege.
    2. The commission may use anonymous data for research, statistical analysis, and educational purposes.
    3. Any communication making an actual threat of physical violence against a clearly identified or reasonably identifiable victim or an actual threat of some specific violent act may be revealed by the program in order to prevent the commission of any physical violence or violent act using the protocol established in KRS 202A.400 .
    1. There is hereby established in the State Treasury a restricted fund to be known as the professional and volunteer firefighters professional development and wellness program fund. (6) (a) There is hereby established in the State Treasury a restricted fund to be known as the professional and volunteer firefighters professional development and wellness program fund.
    2. The fund shall consist of moneys received from the Firefighters Foundation Program Fund established in KRS 95A.220 , grants, gifts, state appropriations, and federal funds.
    3. The fund shall be administered by the commission.
    4. Amounts deposited in the fund shall be used only for administration of the program.
    5. Notwithstanding KRS 45.229 , fund amounts not expended at the close of a fiscal year shall not lapse but shall be carried forward to the next fiscal year.
    6. Any interest earnings of the fund shall become a part of the fund and shall not lapse.
    7. Moneys deposited in the fund are hereby appropriated for the purposes set forth in this section and shall not be appropriated or transferred by the General Assembly for any other purposes.

HISTORY: 2019 ch. 67, § 2, effective March 25, 2019.

Research References and Practice Aids

2020-2022 Budget Reference.

State/Executive Branch Budget, 2020 Ky. Acts ch. 92, Pt. I, K, 11, (2) at 898.

95A.300. Appeals.

An appeal may be taken from any decision of the commission to withhold or terminate payment from the fund to any local government. Appeal shall be to the Circuit Court of the circuit where the controversy originated.

History. Enact. Acts 1980, ch. 373, § 11, effective July 15, 1980.

Research References and Practice Aids

2020-2022 Budget Reference.

See State/Executive Branch Budget, 2020 Ky. Acts ch. 92, Pt. I, K, 11, (2) at 898.

2018-2020 Budget Reference.

See State/Executive Branch Budget, 2018 Ky. Acts ch. 169, Pt. I, K, 11, (1) at 1337.

2016-2018 Budget Reference.

See State/Executive Branch Budget, 2016 Ky. Acts ch. 149, Pt. I, K, 11, (1) at 1091.

Thermal Vision Grant Program

95A.400. Purpose of thermal vision grant program.

The thermal vision grant program, which is administered pursuant to KRS 95A.400 to 95A.440 and appropriations for the thermal vision grant program in the state budget, is designed to:

  1. Reduce and prevent the loss of life by creating better equipped firefighters throughout the Commonwealth; and
  2. Upgrade the capabilities of local firefighters by providing financial assistance to be used to purchase thermal vision devices.

History. Enact. Acts 2002, ch. 292, § 1, effective July 15, 2002.

95A.410. Responsibility for thermal vision grant program.

The commission shall have overall responsibility for policy, guidance, administration, implementation, and proper utilization of the thermal vision grant program. The commission, with the advice of the advisory committee, shall make determinations relating to thermal vision grant program applications and releasing equipment to fire departments.

History. Enact. Acts 2002, ch. 292, § 2, effective July 15, 2002.

95A.420. Definition for KRS 95A.400 to 95A.440.

For the purposes of KRS 95A.400 to 95A.440 , “thermal vision device” means any portable electronic device that displays a visible image from the infrared portion of the electromagnetic spectrum.

History. Enact. Acts 2002, ch. 292, § 3, effective July 15, 2002.

95A.430. Duties of commission.

The commission shall:

  1. Create the necessary application forms, any necessary supporting documents, compliance documents, or reporting documents for the thermal vision grant program as may be necessary by promulgating administrative regulations under KRS Chapter 13A;
  2. Make a determination of the characteristics of the most cost-effective thermal vision systems for use by fire departments participating in the thermal vision grant program;
  3. Make a determination of the manufacturer or manufacturers of thermal vision devices to be purchased by the thermal vision grant program;
  4. Make a determination of the most cost-effective purchase mechanism and price, under KRS Chapter 45A, for thermal vision systems;
  5. Accept and process applications for the purchase of thermal vision systems through the thermal vision grant program;
  6. Award eligible fire departments grants equal to fifty percent (50%), but not to exceed the sum of five thousand dollars ($5,000), of the agreed price for the purchase of thermal vision systems;
  7. Require recipients of thermal vision devices purchased through the thermal vision grant program to file any reports deemed necessary by the commission concerning usage, maintenance, or property accounting or loss with the commission; and
  8. Maintain these reports for evaluation by the commission.

History. Enact. Acts 2002, ch. 292, § 4, effective July 15, 2002.

95A.440. Grants to fire departments — Applications.

All fire departments formed under KRS Chapter 65, 75, 95, or 273 shall be eligible to receive grants through the thermal vision grant program. These fire departments may make application for a grant to purchase thermal vision devices through the thermal vision grant program to the commission. The application shall be made on forms provided by the commission. A fire department that receives a grant through the thermal vision grant program shall not make another application to the commission for a grant for a period of two (2) years. Fire departments receiving grants for the purchase of thermal vision devices through the thermal vision grant program shall comply with all administrative regulations concerning reporting requirements established by the commission. Failure to comply with these reporting requirements shall disqualify a fire department from participation in the thermal vision grant program for a period of five (5) years.

History. Enact. Acts 2002, ch. 292, § 5, effective July 15, 2002.

Merged Volunteer Fire Departments

95A.500. Volunteer fire department aid for merged departments.

If two (2) or more volunteer fire departments merge under the provisions of KRS 95A.500 to 95A.560 after January 1, 2000, and each is qualified to receive the volunteer fire department aid under KRS 95A.262(2) at the time of merger, then the volunteer fire department aid shall be disbursed according to the provisions of KRS 95A.500 to 95A.560 as long as the resulting district remains qualified to receive the volunteer fire department aid.

History. Enact. Acts 2002, ch. 309, § 1, effective July 15, 2002.

95A.510. Definitions for KRS 95A.500 to 95A.560.

As used in KRS 95A.500 to 95A.560 , unless the context requires otherwise:

  1. “Qualified fire department” means any volunteer fire department in any city of any class, fire protection districts organized pursuant to KRS Chapter 75, county districts established under authority of KRS 67.083 , and volunteer fire departments created as nonprofit corporations pursuant to KRS Chapter 273 eligible to receive volunteer fire department aid under KRS 95A.262(2); and
  2. “Qualified share” means the amount of money allocated by the Commission on Fire Protection Personnel Standards and Education for volunteer fire department aid under KRS 95A.262(2), less any penalties for failure to participate satisfactorily in the Kentucky fire incident reporting system as described in KRS 304.13-380 .

History. Enact. Acts 2002, ch. 309, § 2, effective July 15, 2002.

95A.510. Definitions for KRS 95A.500 to 95A.560.

As used in KRS 95A.500 to 95A.560 , unless the context requires otherwise:

  1. “Qualified fire department” means any volunteer fire department in any city of any class, fire protection districts organized pursuant to KRS Chapter 75, county districts established under authority of KRS 67.083 , and volunteer fire departments created as nonprofit corporations pursuant to KRS Chapter 273 eligible to receive volunteer fire department aid under KRS 95A.262(2); and
  2. “Qualified share” means the amount of money allocated by the Kentucky Fire Commission for volunteer fire department aid under KRS 95A.262(2), less any penalties for failure to participate satisfactorily in the Kentucky fire incident reporting system as described in KRS 304.13-380 .

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 2002, ch. 309, § 2, effective July 15, 2002; 2020 ch. 67, § 12.

95A.520. Shares of fire department aid for merged departments.

  1. The Commission on Fire Protection Personnel Standards and Education shall pay to the merged district, for the first, second, and third years after the merger, the number of qualified shares of volunteer fire department aid allotted under KRS 95A.262(2) equal to the total number of qualified shares that each department would have received previous to merger;
  2. The Commission on Fire Protection Personnel Standards and Education shall pay to the merged district, for the fourth, fifth, and sixth years after the merger, the number of qualified shares of volunteer fire department aid allotted under KRS 95A.262(2) equal to fifty percent (50%) of the total number of qualified shares that each department would have received previous to merger, plus one (1) yearly disbursal of four thousand dollars ($4,000) as a merger incentive; and
  3. The Commission on Fire Protection Personnel Standards and Education shall pay to the merged district, for the seventh year after the merger and thereafter, one (1) qualified share of volunteer fire department aid allotted under KRS 95A.262(2).

History. Enact. Acts 2002, ch. 309, § 3, effective July 15, 2002.

95A.520. Shares of fire department aid for merged departments.

  1. The Kentucky Fire Commission shall pay to the merged district, for the first, second, and third years after the merger, the number of qualified shares of volunteer fire department aid allotted under KRS 95A.262(2) equal to the total number of qualified shares that each department would have received previous to merger;
  2. The Kentucky Fire Commission shall pay to the merged district, for the fourth, fifth, and sixth years after the merger, the number of qualified shares of volunteer fire department aid allotted under KRS 95A.262(2) equal to fifty percent (50%) of the total number of qualified shares that each department would have received previous to merger, plus one (1) yearly disbursal of four thousand dollars ($4,000) as a merger incentive; and
  3. The Kentucky Fire Commission shall pay to the merged district, for the seventh year after the merger and thereafter, one (1) qualified share of volunteer fire department aid allotted under KRS 95A.262(2).

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 2002, ch. 309, § 3, effective July 15, 2002; 2020 ch. 67, § 13.

95A.530. Notification of merger or splitting.

The trustees of the volunteer fire district shall notify the Commission on Fire Protection Personnel Standards and Education, in writing, within thirty (30) days of the merger or splitting of a merged volunteer fire district created under the provisions of this chapter. Notification shall be made in the manner prescribed by the Commission on Fire Protection Personnel Standards and Education in administrative regulations promulgated in accordance with the provisions of KRS Chapter 13A.

History. Enact. Acts 2002, ch. 309, § 4, effective July 15, 2002.

95A.530. Notification of merger or splitting.

The trustees of the volunteer fire district shall notify the Kentucky Fire Commission, in writing, within thirty (30) days of the merger or splitting of a merged volunteer fire district created under the provisions of this chapter. Notification shall be made in the manner prescribed by the Kentucky Fire Commission in administrative regulations promulgated in accordance with the provisions of KRS Chapter 13A.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 2002, ch. 309, § 4, effective July 15, 2002; 2020 ch. 67, § 14.

95A.540. Share of aid for new department created from territory in existing department.

If a new volunteer fire department is created from territory in an existing fire department merged under the provisions of KRS 95A.500 to 95A.560 , the newly created volunteer fire district shall be able to receive one (1) share at the next regular disbursal date, if qualified. The parent fire department shall have aid allotted under KRS 95A.262(2) reduced by one (1) qualified share for calculations of aid, for the first, second, third, fourth, fifth, and sixth years after merger.

History. Enact. Acts 2002, ch. 309, § 5, effective July 15, 2002.

95A.550. Payments owed to certain merged districts — Proration if insufficient funds.

The Commission on Fire Protection Personnel Standards and Education shall calculate and disburse to each district merged after January 1, 2000, but before July 15, 2002, any payments owed the district according to the schedule set out in this section. In order to receive the payment, the trustees of the volunteer fire district shall notify the commission in writing within sixty (60) days of July 15, 2002, that there has been a merger in their jurisdiction within that time. If sufficient funds do not exist to make all the payments at one (1) time owed under the provisions of this subsection, then the available amount shall be prorated evenly and proportionately and disbursed among those merged districts each disbursal cycle until the total amount has been paid to each of those districts. The commission shall not reduce any other payments under KRS 95A.262 to make the payments under this subsection.

History. Enact. Acts 2002, ch. 309, § 6, effective July 15, 2002.

95A.550. Payments owed to certain merged districts — Proration if insufficient funds.

The Kentucky Fire Commission shall calculate and disburse to each district merged after January 1, 2000, but before July 15, 2002, any payments owed the district according to the schedule set out in this section. In order to receive the payment, the trustees of the volunteer fire district shall notify the commission in writing within sixty (60) days of July 15, 2002, that there has been a merger in their jurisdiction within that time. If sufficient funds do not exist to make all the payments at one (1) time owed under the provisions of this subsection, then the available amount shall be prorated evenly and proportionately and disbursed among those merged districts each disbursal cycle until the total amount has been paid to each of those districts. The commission shall not reduce any other payments under KRS 95A.262 to make the payments under this subsection.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 2002, ch. 309, § 6, effective July 15, 2002; 2020 ch. 67, § 15.

95A.560. Suspension of payments to department that does not remain qualified to receive aid.

If the resulting merged district does not remain qualified to receive the volunteer fire department aid under KRS 95A.262(2), then the Commission on Fire Protection Personnel Standards and Education shall suspend all payments calculated under KRS 95A.520 . The merged district shall have ninety (90) days to come into compliance with the requirements for qualification. If the merged district does so, then the commission shall resume payments as calculated under KRS 95A.520 . If the merged district does not come into compliance within ninety (90) days of the loss of qualification, then the commission shall not resume payments as calculated under KRS 95A.520. Should the merged district come into compliance after ninety (90) days, it shall receive only one (1) qualified share of the volunteer fire department aid under KRS 95A.262(2).

History. Enact. Acts 2002, ch. 309, § 7, effective July 15, 2002.

95A.560. Suspension of payments to department that does not remain qualified to receive aid.

If the resulting merged district does not remain qualified to receive the volunteer fire department aid under KRS 95A.262(2), then the Kentucky Fire Commission shall suspend all payments calculated under KRS 95A.520 . The merged district shall have ninety (90) days to come into compliance with the requirements for qualification. If the merged district does so, then the commission shall resume payments as calculated under KRS 95A.520 . If the merged district does not come into compliance within ninety (90) days of the loss of qualification, then the commission shall not resume payments as calculated under KRS 95A.520. Should the merged district come into compliance after ninety (90) days, it shall receive only one (1) qualified share of the volunteer fire department aid under KRS 95A.262(2).

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 2002, ch. 309, § 7, effective July 15, 2002; 2020 ch. 67, § 16.

Penalties

95A.990. Penalty.

Any person who knowingly or willfully makes any false or fraudulent statement or representation in any record or report to the commission under KRS 95A.280 shall be fined not less than one hundred dollars ($100) nor more than five hundred dollars ($500), or imprisoned for not less than thirty (30) days nor more than one (1) year, or both.

History. Enact. Acts 1980, ch. 373, § 12, effective July 15, 1980.

CHAPTER 96 Utilities in Cities

Sale of Franchises

96.010. Sale of public utility franchises by cities.

  1. At least eighteen (18) months before the expiration of any franchise acquired under or prior to the present Constitution, the legislative body of each city shall provide for the sale of a new franchise to the highest and best bidder on terms that are fair and reasonable to the city, to the purchaser of the franchise and to the patrons of the utility. The terms shall specify the quality of service to be rendered and, in cities of the first class, the price that shall be charged for the service.
  2. If there is no public necessity for the kind of public utility in question and if the city desires to discontinue entirely the kind of service in question, or if, in the case of cities other than those of the first class, the city owns or desires to own and operate a municipal plant to render the required service, this section shall not apply.

History. 2741m-1, 3037d-1, 3037d-4, 3037d-6.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

This section was not unconstitutional on theory that Const., § 163, providing that no public utility company should occupy streets without consent of council, precluded legislation which would compel consent of council to extent inherent in effectuating this section. Louisville v. Louisville Home Tel. Co., 279 F. 949, 1922 U.S. App. LEXIS 1647 (6th Cir. Ky. 1922 ).

This section and KRS 96.020 did not violate Const., §§ 19, 51, 163, 164, 181 or U. S. Const., Art. I, § 10. Kentucky Utilities Co. v. Board of Comm'rs, 254 Ky. 527 , 71 S.W.2d 1024, 1933 Ky. LEXIS 4 ( Ky. 1933 ).

2. Purpose.

Purpose of this section was to protect utilities whose franchises were expiring from being arbitrarily ejected by requiring procedure thereunder for benefit of utility as well as for benefit of city. Louisville v. Louisville Home Tel. Co., 279 F. 949, 1922 U.S. App. LEXIS 1647 (6th Cir. Ky. 1922 ); Norris v. Kentucky State Tel. Co., 235 Ky. 234 , 30 S.W.2d 960, 1930 Ky. LEXIS 335 ( Ky. 1930 ).

3. Construction.

Expressions “kind of public utility” and “kind of service” refer to kinds of utilities mentioned in Const., § 163, and do not refer to distinctions between publicly owned and privately owned utilities. Kentucky Utilities Co. v. Board of Comm'rs, 254 Ky. 527 , 71 S.W.2d 1024, 1933 Ky. LEXIS 4 ( Ky. 1933 ).

This section is mandatory in its direction to the legislative body of the city to offer a franchise before the expiration of an existing franchise performing the same service. Seaton v. Lackey, 298 Ky. 188 , 182 S.W.2d 336, 1944 Ky. LEXIS 859 ( Ky. 1944 ).

Although this section uses the word “desires” some bona fide, overt action by a city other than of the first class desiring to own and operate a municipal plant, towards the fulfillment of that desire was intended by the legislature to be required as a condition of the ouster of an existing utility. Momarc Utilities Corp. v. Salyersville, 323 S.W.2d 568, 1959 Ky. LEXIS 326 ( Ky. 1959 ).

4. Franchise.

Ordinance adjusting franchises of street railway company in city of first class and recognizing company’s right to operate over certain streets, but not giving right to operate at new locations, was not granting of new franchise, and hence it was unnecessary to follow provisions of subsection (1) of this section. Poggel v. Louisville R. Co., 225 Ky. 784 , 10 S.W.2d 305, 1928 Ky. LEXIS 886 ( Ky. 1928 ).

A franchise is a right or privilege granted by the sovereign to a party to do some act or acts which he could not do without this grant from the sovereign power. Mt. Vernon Tel. Co. v. Mt. Vernon, 313 Ky. 93 , 230 S.W.2d 451, 1950 Ky. LEXIS 818 ( Ky. 1950 ).

5. — Renewal.

Where city because it owned and operated its own electric plant in competition with private company was not required under this section to offer a renewal franchise upon expiration of franchise held by private utility company, the question of whether it would offer such a renewal franchise was legislative and not an administrative matter and thus city should have submitted the question of whether or not to offer the renewal franchise to the voters. Vanmeter v. Paris, 273 S.W.2d 49, 1954 Ky. LEXIS 1150 ( Ky. 1954 ).

6. — Authority to Sell.

In granting franchises for the public benefit a city council acts in a legislative capacity, and its discretion cannot be taken away by courts. Norris v. Kentucky State Tel. Co., 235 Ky. 234 , 30 S.W.2d 960, 1930 Ky. LEXIS 335 ( Ky. 1930 ).

In granting franchise for public benefit city council acts in legislative capacity. Norris v. Kentucky State Tel. Co., 235 Ky. 234 , 30 S.W.2d 960, 1930 Ky. LEXIS 335 ( Ky. 1930 ).

Defining and granting of a franchise is the exercise of legislative function of the state. Kentucky Utilities Co. v. Board of Comm'rs, 254 Ky. 527 , 71 S.W.2d 1024, 1933 Ky. LEXIS 4 ( Ky. 1933 ).

By constitutional and statutory provisions state may delegate its right to grant franchises to local political subdivision such as a municipality. Kentucky Utilities Co. v. Board of Comm'rs, 254 Ky. 527 , 71 S.W.2d 1024, 1933 Ky. LEXIS 4 ( Ky. 1933 ).

The granting of a franchise is a legislative function, but power to grant franchise may be delegated to local political subdivisions. Hatcher v. Kentucky & West Virginia Power Co., 280 Ky. 583 , 133 S.W.2d 910, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 168 ( Ky. 1939 ).

7. — Offer.

This section imposes duty upon city before expiration of a utility company’s franchise to offer for sale a suitable new franchise which company can purchase and thereby continue business and serve patrons without interruption caused by building new plants. Louisville v. Louisville Home Tel. Co., 279 F. 949, 1922 U.S. App. LEXIS 1647 (6th Cir. Ky. 1922 ).

Ordinance adjusting franchise of street railway in city of first class giving city right to purchase or to sell new franchise, with right to existing company, if it purchased, to continue operation for 20 years, was mere recitation of procedure in absence of ordinance, and was not granting a new franchise beginning at end of 20-year period; city retained right to sell new franchise upon expiration of existing one. Poggel v. Louisville R. Co., 225 Ky. 784 , 10 S.W.2d 305, 1928 Ky. LEXIS 886 ( Ky. 1928 ).

Neither Const., § 163 nor § 164 deprives legislature of power to require municipality which has granted a franchise to a public utility to give that utility, after it has established its plant and occupied streets, the opportunity on expiration of its franchise of procuring a new one on terms fair to city, utility and public, by bid which is highest and best in open competition. Kentucky Utilities Co. v. Board of Comm'rs, 254 Ky. 527 , 71 S.W.2d 1024, 1933 Ky. LEXIS 4 ( Ky. 1933 ).

Where utility which had held electric franchise obtained judgment prior to enactment of provision to this section requiring city to offer new franchise for sale, provision that city was not required to offer new franchise if city owned or desired to own and operate a municipal plant could not impair vested right of utility acquired by judgment, and city must offer new franchise. Paris v. Kentucky Utilities Co., 280 Ky. 492 , 133 S.W.2d 559, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 145 ( Ky. 1939 ).

This section did not create a purely public nor a purely private right, but both a public and private right — a public right for the benefit of the city and a private right for the holder of the expiring franchise. Paris v. Kentucky Utilities Co., 280 Ky. 492 , 133 S.W.2d 559, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 145 ( Ky. 1939 ).

Although the subject of granting a franchise otherwise might be termed legislative, since the city is required to sell a new franchise before the expiration of the old, the adoption of an ordinance providing for the sale of a franchise under this section is not subject either to initiative or referendum proceedings. Seaton v. Lackey, 298 Ky. 188 , 182 S.W.2d 336, 1944 Ky. LEXIS 859 ( Ky. 1944 ).

8. — Time for Sale.

As to time for sale of new franchise statute is directory, while as to other provisions it is mandatory. Norris v. Kentucky State Tel. Co., 235 Ky. 234 , 30 S.W.2d 960, 1930 Ky. LEXIS 335 ( Ky. 1930 ).

A municipality may grant a public service franchise before the expiration of a similar franchise then in operation. Hatcher v. Kentucky & West Virginia Power Co., 280 Ky. 583 , 133 S.W.2d 910, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 168 ( Ky. 1939 ).

This section, though mandatory in its other provisions, was merely directory as to time, and new franchise may be offered for sale either before, after, or at the period prescribed. Hatcher v. Kentucky & West Virginia Power Co., 280 Ky. 583 , 133 S.W.2d 910, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 168 ( Ky. 1939 ).

Sale of 20-year franchise was valid though company to which sale was made was owner of existing similar franchise which did not expire for more than four (4) years. Hatcher v. Kentucky & West Virginia Power Co., 280 Ky. 583 , 133 S.W.2d 910, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 168 ( Ky. 1939 ).

Where city, which owned and operated electric plant in competition with private utility, had sold ten-year franchise to utility company in 1944, and company in July, 1952 filed an initiative petition with board of commissioners requesting ordinance be passed providing for sale of new electric franchise, and on August 28, 1952 instituted suit seeking to compel commissioners to submit such ordinance to voters at next election, such action was not prematurely brought for although this section did not apply in the case it furnished a standard for measuring prematurity, and if such ordinance had been submitted to voters at November, 1952 election, and the new franchise had been offered, the offer would have taken place only 19 months before the expiration of the existing franchise, closely conforming to the statute. Vanmeter v. Paris, 257 S.W.2d 909, 1953 Ky. LEXIS 816 ( Ky. 1953 ).

9. — Minimum Bid Requirement.

Neither Ky. Const., § 164 nor this section expressly authorizes a minimum bid requirement. However, neither does either provision expressly prohibit such a precondition. Instead, both provisions would appear to implicitly authorize a minimum bid requirement, as § 164 empowers franchisors to “reject any and all bids,” while this section specifies sale of franchises “on terms that are fair and reasonable to the city, the purchaser of the franchise and to the patrons of the utility.” Given this additional language and the monopolistic nature of public utilities, an interpretation permitting franchisors to impose a minimum bid requirement on franchises is not only logical, realistic and just, but necessary. Berea College Utilities v. Berea, 691 S.W.2d 235, 1985 Ky. App. LEXIS 588 (Ky. Ct. App. 1985).

10. — Cable Television.

There exists a clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy to allow municipal regulation of the provision of cable television service and, foreseeably, to displace competition. Consolidated Television Cable Service, Inc. v. Frankfort, 857 F.2d 354, 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 12769 (6th Cir. Ky. 1988 ), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1082, 109 S. Ct. 1537, 103 L. Ed. 2d 842, 1989 U.S. LEXIS 1471 (U.S. 1989).

11. — Rejection of Bids.

Since city councilmen act as trustees for public to enable public to obtain such conveniences as telephones and electric lights, they may not, upon sale of franchise, arbitrarily or corruptly reject all bids and thus escape obligation to highest and best bidder. Norris v. Kentucky State Tel. Co., 235 Ky. 234 , 30 S.W.2d 960, 1930 Ky. LEXIS 335 ( Ky. 1930 ).

Rejection by council of reasonable bid by telephone company which owned existing franchise was arbitrary and its acceptance was properly ordered, where it was shown that mayor and certain councilmen were interested in competing company with less efficient facilities which actively opposed acceptance of bid. Norris v. Kentucky State Tel. Co., 235 Ky. 234 , 30 S.W.2d 960, 1930 Ky. LEXIS 335 ( Ky. 1930 ).

Upon sale of new franchise, if old franchise holder is not highest and best bidder, city is not compelled by Const., § 163 to let the franchise to an outsider. Kentucky Utilities Co. v. Board of Comm'rs, 254 Ky. 527 , 71 S.W.2d 1024, 1933 Ky. LEXIS 4 ( Ky. 1933 ).

12. — Terms and Conditions.

City, in renewing gas company franchise, had right to require that main service lines be joined at end to make a complete circuit, and also to require successful bidder for franchise to give bond to guarantee faithful performance, and to maintain office in city. Peoples Gas Co. v. Barbourville, 291 Ky. 805 , 165 S.W.2d 567, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 321 ( Ky. 1942 ).

Although court will not undertake to say just what should be the terms and conditions of a franchise, it may determine whether or not the proposed franchise comports with the requirements of the statute in fairness to interested parties, and whether or not there was arbitrary action on the part of the city authorities. Kentucky Utilities Co. v. Paris, 297 Ky. 440 , 179 S.W.2d 676, 1944 Ky. LEXIS 705 ( Ky. 1944 ).

Where city, which had constructed municipal plant, was required by court action, in compliance with former statute, to offer new franchise for sale, city could not impose such restrictive provisions in franchise ordinance as to make it practically impossible for private utility company to make a bid. Kentucky Utilities Co. v. Paris, 297 Ky. 440 , 179 S.W.2d 676, 1944 Ky. LEXIS 705 ( Ky. 1944 ).

The new franchise must be on terms and conditions which are fair and reasonable to the purchaser of the franchise and its patrons, regardless of conditions existing in the city, though all conditions, including those peculiar to the purchaser, may be taken into consideration in determining whether or not the proposed franchise is fair to the purchaser and its patrons. Kentucky Utilities Co. v. Paris, 297 Ky. 440 , 179 S.W.2d 676, 1944 Ky. LEXIS 705 ( Ky. 1944 ).

Where utility company, prior to expiration of franchise in 1929, requested city to offer new franchise for sale, but city did not do so, and utility thereafter continued to furnish service for a number of years without a franchise, until city built a municipal plant, and utility then forced city by court action to offer new franchise, provision of proposed franchise limiting term of franchise to two (2) years was arbitrary and unreasonable, notwithstanding fact that city had made large expenditures and incurred bonded indebtedness for municipal plant. Under the circumstances, a ten-year franchise would perhaps be reasonable. Kentucky Utilities Co. v. Paris, 297 Ky. 440 , 179 S.W.2d 676, 1944 Ky. LEXIS 705 ( Ky. 1944 ).

13. — Removal of Utility Lines and Poles.

In view of the present day trend to remove utility poles and lines from city streets, action by a fifth-class city in offering for sale a telephone franchise which required that existing telephone poles and lines be removed from two (2) certain streets and prohibiting erection of such additional installations thereon, was not arbitrary, capricious, oppressive or unreasonable. Mt. Vernon Tel. Co. v. Mt. Vernon, 313 Ky. 93 , 230 S.W.2d 451, 1950 Ky. LEXIS 818 ( Ky. 1950 ).

Even though telephone company alleged that it had procured permission of department of highways to construct and maintain telephone poles and lines on two (2) streets in the city which had been designated as part of primary road system by department of highways, action by the city in adopting two (2) ordinances, one prohibiting erection and maintenance of poles, lines and wires on the two (2) streets in question, and the other offering for sale a telephone franchise requiring removal of existing telephone poles and lines and prohibiting erection and maintenance of such installations on the two (2) streets, was not arbitrary, capricious, oppressive or unreasonable. Mt. Vernon Tel. Co. v. Mt. Vernon, 313 Ky. 93 , 230 S.W.2d 451, 1950 Ky. LEXIS 818 ( Ky. 1950 ).

14. — Rights after Expiration.

City was estopped to insist that telephone company had lost right to benefits of this section, where city did not timely proceed to offer new franchise, but participated in pending negotiations between franchise holder and competing company, and council pigeonholed proposed ordinance for new franchise. Louisville v. Louisville Home Tel. Co., 279 F. 949, 1922 U.S. App. LEXIS 1647 (6th Cir. Ky. 1922 ).

On expiration of franchise of telephone company in city of first class, council should enact new ordinance, and if it fails to do so, so long as such default continues, company could properly claim protection of equity against confiscatory regulation. Louisville v. Louisville Home Tel. Co., 279 F. 949, 1922 U.S. App. LEXIS 1647 (6th Cir. Ky. 1922 ).

Utility, whose franchise in city expired, was not estopped by laches from asserting its right to have city sell new franchise to highest and best bidder, despite contention of city that utility, after filing suit, had not pressed it vigorously and that city had expended money in acquiring own plant. Kentucky Utilities Co. v. Board of Comm'rs, 254 Ky. 527 , 71 S.W.2d 1024, 1933 Ky. LEXIS 4 ( Ky. 1933 ).

15. Rates and Service.

Although franchise ordinance granted to telephone company for as short a term as three (3) years and fixing rates for that period would comply with this section, if 20-year term is granted, it would not be inconsistent for city to provide for readjustment of rates every five (5) years. Louisville v. Louisville Home Tel. Co., 279 F. 949, 1922 U.S. App. LEXIS 1647 (6th Cir. Ky. 1922 ).

Where city of second class made contract with utility by which the utility was to make reduction of rates for customers in city whenever rates were reduced in adjoining city served by same utility, city of second class was entitled to recover from the utility an amount equal to an arbitrary sum distributed proportionately among the customers of the utility in the adjoining city in compromise of a rate controversy, since the effect was to lower retroactively the rates charged in that city. Union Light, Heat & Power Co. v. Covington, 282 Ky. 558 , 139 S.W.2d 64, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 208 ( Ky. 1940 ).

A provision in a utility franchise granted by a city, that the utility should lower its rates whenever its rates charged in an adjoining city were lowered, was valid and was not an abdication or delegation of the rate-making power. Union Light, Heat & Power Co. v. Covington, 282 Ky. 558 , 139 S.W.2d 64, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 208 ( Ky. 1940 ).

During the period between the expiration of an old utility franchise granted by a city and the effective date of the new franchise, the chancellor may adjudge reasonable rates to be charged, and the rates so fixed may be the same as if the old franchise were still in force. Union Light, Heat & Power Co. v. Covington, 282 Ky. 558 , 139 S.W.2d 64, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 208 ( Ky. 1940 ).

The power of cities to contract with respect to utility rates does not deprive the state of its police power of regulation; but this power was not exercised before June 14, 1934, when KRS 278.010 through 278.450 were enacted, and therefore contracts made before that date are valid. Union Light, Heat & Power Co. v. Covington, 282 Ky. 558 , 139 S.W.2d 64, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 208 ( Ky. 1940 ).

A city, in granting a public utility franchise, whether an entirely new franchise or a renewal of a prior one, has the right to prescribe the character of service to rendered and the rates to be charged at the beginning; thereafter the exclusive power to regulate the rates and service is vested in the public service commission. Peoples Gas Co. v. Barbourville, 291 Ky. 805 , 165 S.W.2d 567, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 321 ( Ky. 1942 ).

16. Municipal Plant.

Where a city other than the first class brings an action against a natural gas distributor operating in the city without a franchise claiming it desires to own and operate a municipal plant and the natural gas company counterclaims asking that the city be compelled to advertise and sell a franchise, city should be permitted a reasonable time of one (1) year to take positive action towards the acquisition of a municipal plant, giving the existing operator at least six months advance notice of an estimated completion date and if at the end of that period the city has not proceeded with due dispatch towards the acquisition of a municipal plant it will be compelled to sell a franchise and the existing operator will be entitled to continue operations until the new franchise is sold or until the specified completion date for the municipal plant. Momarc Utilities Corp. v. Salyersville, 323 S.W.2d 568, 1959 Ky. LEXIS 326 ( Ky. 1959 ).

To the extent that subsection (2) of this section provides that a city does not have to offer an electric franchise for sale in an annexed area already served by an electric utility in favor of service by a municipal plan, subsection (2) is impliedly repealed by KRS 96.538 . Nicholasville v. Blue Grass Rural Electric Cooperative Corp., 514 S.W.2d 414, 1974 Ky. LEXIS 300 ( Ky. 1974 ).

Cited:

Clay v. Catlettsburg, Kenova & Ceredo Water Co., 301 Ky. 456 , 192 S.W.2d 358, 1946 Ky. LEXIS 499 ( Ky. 1946 ); Lynchburg Foundry Co. v. Pikeville, 246 S.W.2d 594, 1952 Ky. LEXIS 643 ( Ky. 1952 ); Public Service Com. v. Paris, 299 S.W.2d 811, 1957 Ky. LEXIS 432 ( Ky. 1957 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

A city could grant a franchise to a private company authorizing it to construct and operate a sewerage system within the city and charge reasonable rates for such services providing the franchise conformed to the requirements of this section and Const., § 164. OAG 61-1106 .

The question of whether or not a new electric power franchise should be granted to a company by a city cannot be put to a vote of the people. OAG 64-354 .

The sale of a public utility franchise under this section must be made in compliance with the bid requirements of KRS 424.260 . OAG 70-136 .

Under this section a city of the fifth class may grant a franchise for a television cable system, but must comply with the bid requirements of KRS 96.010 . OAG 70-324 .

The renewal of a cable TV franchise, like the sale of other public utility franchises by cities, is controlled by this section. OAG 74-84 .

This section does not permit a fiscal court to cross over into municipal territory with its cable television franchise, since the city’s exclusive authority over streets as provided by statute would be in conflict with such attempted county action. OAG 77-111 .

Where a city failed to rebid three (3) franchises as mandated by this section, the urban-county government would be required to take the overdue action. OAG 77-263 .

Const., § 164 allows a city to grant any franchise or privilege; the city may receive compensation for the granting of this privilege. OAG 83-233 .

A city may levy a franchise tax or fee and such may be measured by the gross receipts of the franchise; accordingly, a city which imposed a franchise fee on a power company of the right to distribute electrical energy in the city had not levied a forbidden excise tax. OAG 83-233 , superseding OAG 68-338 , to the extent of conflict.

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Acquisition of waterworks by cities and water districts, KRS ch. 106.

Certificate of public convenience and necessity required, KRS 278.020 .

Interlocal cooperation act, KRS 65.210 to 65.300 .

Private toll bridges and ferries, KRS ch. 280.

Public service commission, regulation of utilities by, KRS ch. 278.

Railroad commission; rates and service of common carrier, KRS ch. 276.

Rates of public utilities, regulation by public service commission, KRS 278.040 , 278.200 , 278.270 .

Relocation or extension of utilities in connection with governmental project, KRS 82.110 .

Revenue bonds, KRS chs. 58 and 66.

Rural electric and rural telephone cooperative corporations, KRS ch. 279.

Utility gross receipts tax for schools, KRS 160.613 .

Kentucky Bench & Bar.

Morris, The New Kentucky Municipal Law, Vol. 45, No. 3, July, 1981, Ky. Bench and Bar 24.

ALR

Municipal purchase, construction or repair of public utility, what are “public utilities” within provisions relating to. 9 A.L.R. 1033; 35 A.L.R. 592.

Public utility acts, applicability of, to municipal corporations owning or operating a public utility. 10 A.L.R. 1432; 18 A.L.R. 946.

Taxation for purchase or construction of lighting plant as within constitutional provisions prohibiting legislature from imposing taxes for city and corporate purposes, or providing that legislature may invest power to levy such taxes in local authorities. 46 A.L.R. 706; 106 A.L.R. 906.

Boundaries, power of municipal corporation to extend its utility service beyond. 49 A.L.R. 1239; 98 A.L.R. 1001.

Power of municipality to sell, lease, or mortgage public utility plant or interest therein. 61 A.L.R.2d 595.

Validity, construction and effect of clause in franchise contract prohibiting transfer of franchise or contract. 59 A.L.R.3d 244.

Requirement that public contract be awarded on competitive bidding as applicable to contract for public utility. 81 A.L.R.3d 979.

Duty of public authority to disclose to contractor information, allegedly in his possession, affecting cost or feasibility of project. 86 A.L.R.3d 182.

Right of bidder for state or municipal contract to rescind bid on ground that bid was based upon his own mistake or that of his employee. 2 A.L.R.4th 991.

96.020. Deposit to accompany bid — Bidder to give bond.

  1. Each person desiring to bid for the franchise offered for sale under KRS 96.010 shall first deposit, with the proper officer of the city, cash or a certified check equal to five percent (5%) of the fair estimated cost of the plant required to render the service. The deposit shall be forfeited to the city in case the bid is accepted and the bidder fails, for thirty (30) days after the confirmation of the sale, to pay the price bid and to give a sufficient bond in a sum equal to one-fourth (1/4) of the fair estimated cost of the plant to be erected. The bond shall be conditioned to be enforceable in case the person giving it fails, within a reasonable time, to establish a suitable plant for rendering the service and begin rendering the service in the manner set forth in the terms of the sale.
  2. This section shall not apply to a person already owning, in a city other than a city of the first class, a plant and equipment sufficient to render the service required under the franchise.

History. 2741m-2, 3037d-4.

96.030. Exclusive franchise not to be granted by consolidated local government or city of the first class.

No exclusive privilege shall be acquired through the sale of a franchise under KRS 96.010 by a consolidated local government or a city of the first class. The sale of a franchise to one (1) person by a consolidated local government or a city of the first class shall not prevent a subsequent sale of a similar franchise to another person.

History. 3037d-5, 3037d-6; 2002, ch. 346, § 106, effective July 15, 2002.

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Franchise subject to revocation or amendment, Const., § 3.

96.040. City of the first class or consolidated local government may purchase public utility plant.

  1. If a city of the first class or a consolidated local government desires to own or operate a utility being operated under a franchise, and the city or consolidated local government takes the necessary steps within two (2) years before the expiration of the franchise, and offers to purchase, at a fair valuation, the plant of the company which is then rendering the service, the city or consolidated local government shall be under no obligation to sell, renew, or continue the franchise.
  2. The fair valuation of the plant shall be determined by three (3) persons; one (1) to be selected by the city or consolidated local government, one (1) to be selected by the owners of the plant, and the third to be selected by these two (2). The plant shall be valued as a going concern, but no allowance shall be made for future growth.

History. 3037d-2, 3037d-3, 3037d-6; 2002, ch. 346, § 107, effective July 15, 2002.

Research References and Practice Aids

ALR

Sewer as public utility within constitutional or statutory provision relating to purchase, construction or repair of public utility by municipal corporation. 9 A.L.R. 1034; 35 A.L.R. 592.

96.045. Rights of existing facilities.

  1. No municipality, in which there is located an existing electric, water or gas public utility plant or facility shall construct or cause to be constructed any similar utility plant or any similar public utility facility duplicating such existing plant or facility or to obtain or acquire any similar public utility plant or facility other than by the purchase of the existing plant or facility or by the acquisition of such existing plant or facility by the exercise of the power of eminent domain.
  2. “Municipality” means any county, city, and municipal corporation in the Commonwealth of Kentucky, and any board, commission or agency thereof.
  3. All laws and parts of laws in conflict herewith to the extent of such conflict are repealed.

History. Enact. Acts 1958, ch. 92, §§ 1 to 3; 2019 ch. 44, § 14, effective June 27, 2019.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Electric Utilities in Annexed Areas.

Since KRS 96.538 expressly authorizes an existing electric utility to serve new consumers in an annexed area, it impliedly repeals so much of this section as authorizes the city to take over the facilities of an existing electric utility by condemnation. Nicholasville v. Blue Grass Rural Electric Cooperative Corp., 514 S.W.2d 414, 1974 Ky. LEXIS 300 ( Ky. 1974 ).

Cited:

Cumberland Valley Rural Electric Cooperative Corp. v. Cox, 332 S.W.2d 534, 1960 Ky. LEXIS 153 ( Ky. 1960 ); Consolidated Television Cable Service, Inc. v. Frankfort, 465 F.2d 1190, 1972 U.S. App. LEXIS 8098 (6th Cir. 1972); Norrell v. Electric & Water Plant Board, 557 S.W.2d 900, 1977 Ky. App. LEXIS 843 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Where a city annexed territory in which water lines had been installed by a water district but never used, the city was not required to either purchase or condemn the water lines. OAG 67-238 .

The city of Russell would be authorized to build and maintain its own water service lines in the geographical area of the former city of Kenwood, which is now a part of the city of Russell, without acquiring the water lines presently located in the area owned by the city of Flatwoods. OAG 73-506 .

The language of this section is not sufficiently expressive to indicate that a city may condemn a utility system owned by another city. OAG 73-506 .

The reason for this section appears to be to protect existing private utility plants and their facilities operating pursuant to a franchise granted by the city. OAG 73-506 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Kentucky Law Survey, Garvey and Dorris, Civil Procedure, 67 Ky. L.J. 489 (1978-1979).

Control of Privately Owned Utilities

96.050. Authorized city may regulate construction and operation of utilities.

The legislative body of any authorized city may, by ordinance:

  1. Direct and control the laying and construction of railroad or street railway tracks, bridges, turnouts and switches, poles, wires, apparatus and appliances in the streets and alleys of the city, and the location of depot grounds within the city.
  2. Require that bridges, turnouts and switches be so constructed and laid as to interfere as little as possible with ordinary travel and the use of the streets and alleys, and that sufficient space be kept on either side of the tracks for safe and convenient passage.
  3. Prohibit the making of running switches.
  4. Require all railroad companies to construct and keep in repair suitable crossings at the intersections of streets, alleys, ditches, sewers and culverts, and to light and guard the same.
  5. Require railroad companies to erect gates at street crossings.
  6. Direct the use and regulate the speed of locomotive engines, steam, electric, street or other kind of cars within the limits of the city.
  7. Prohibit and restrain railroad companies from doing any storage and warehouse business, or collecting money for storage, except in cases where the consignor or consignee of goods or wares fails to remove them within a reasonable time from the depots of such companies.
  8. Compel telephone and telegraph companies and all persons using, controlling or managing telegraph or telephone wires to put and keep their wires underground.
  9. Compel gas and electric light companies and all persons using, controlling or managing electric light wires for any purpose to change and relocate poles, electric wires, conduits for electric wires, gas mains and pipes, place those above the surface of the ground below it, change the method of conveying light, and generally to do things conducive to the safety and comfort of the inhabitants of the city in the premises.
  10. Regulate the manner in which electric light, telephone and telegraph wires are placed underground, and the use of all such wires and connections therewith.
  11. As used in this section, “authorized city” means a city included on the registry maintained by the Department for Local Government under subsection (12) of this section.
  12. On or before January 1, 2015, the Department for Local Government shall create and maintain a registry of cities that, as of August 1, 2014, were classified as cities of the second class. The Department for Local Government shall make the information included on the registry available to the public by publishing it on its Web site.

History. 3058, 3058-6, 3058-20, 3058-21; 2014, ch. 92, § 150, effective January 1, 2015.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Regulation of Railroads and Street Railways.

Ordinance requiring stools for motormen was not unreasonable or arbitrary interference with business of street railway company, since it was protection to motormen and to traveling public. Silva v. Newport, 150 Ky. 781 , 150 S.W. 1024, 1912 Ky. LEXIS 994 ( Ky. 1912 ).

A state under its police power, or a municipality by authority of the state, may compel a railroad company, without compensation, to construct and maintain suitable crossings at streets extended over its right of way subsequently to the construction of the railroad. Newport v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 174 Ky. 799 , 192 S.W. 838, 1917 Ky. LEXIS 245 ( Ky. 1917 ).

Extraordinary power to compel railroad company to remove tracks from present location to new one about mile distant and to acquire new right of way over private property is of too broad and sweeping a character to be exercised in absence of specific authority. Newport v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 174 Ky. 799 , 192 S.W. 838, 1917 Ky. LEXIS 245 ( Ky. 1917 ).

A street railway company is not liable for injuries to travelers on the streets caused by slipperiness resulting from ice and snow, if the railway company has performed its duty to see that the street between the rails and adjacent thereto is kept so nearly level with the rails as not to endanger the lives or property of people using the street or crossing the rails. Pfiester's Adm'r v. Jones, 291 Ky. 151 , 163 S.W.2d 304, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 194 ( Ky. 1942 ).

2. Underground Wires.

A city may require a utility to place its transmission facilities underground. KRS 278.040 , giving the public service commission exclusive control over rates and service, does not deprive cities of the right to make regulations not affecting the quantity or quality of service, and it would be unconstitutional if it should be construed otherwise. Benzinger v. Union Light, Heat & Power Co., 293 Ky. 747 , 170 S.W.2d 38, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 698 ( Ky. 1943 ).

3. Television Antenna.

Since it was the general obligation of the city to provide its citizens with safe, clean, and unobstructed public ways and since the presence of television cables, even in connection with existing utilities, would be an added burden on the city, the right to operate a community antenna television service in a city was a subject for franchise. Owensboro v. Top Vision Cable Co., 487 S.W.2d 283, 1972 Ky. LEXIS 64 ( Ky. 1972 ), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 948, 93 S. Ct. 1926, 36 L. Ed. 2d 410, 1973 U.S. LEXIS 2643 (U.S. 1973).

Cited:

Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Commonwealth, 488 S.W.2d 329, 1972 Ky. LEXIS 35 ( Ky. 1972 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

A city had the statutory authority to enact an ordinance prohibiting the blocking of railroad crossings by moving or standing trains for a period in excess of five minutes. OAG 70-697 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Public utility not to use streets without consent of city, Const., § 163.

ALR

Merger or consolidation of utility without required permit as affecting validity of contracts. 30 A.L.R. 890; 42 A.L.R. 1226; 118 A.L.R. 646.

Liability of water distributor for damage caused by water escaping from main. 20 A.L.R.3d 1294.

Water distributor’s liability for injury due to condition of service lines, meters and the like, which serve individual consumer. 20 A.L.R.3d 1363.

Status of injured adult as trespasser on land not owned by electricity supplier, as affecting its liability for injuries inflicted upon him by electric wires it maintains thereon. 30 A.L.R.3d 777.

Propriety of injunctive relief against diversion of water by municipal corporation or public utility. 42 A.L.R.3d 426.

Liability of power company for injury or death resulting from contact of radio or television antenna with the electrical line. 82 A.L.R.3d 113.

96.060. City with population of 8,000 to 19,999 may grant rights-of-way to utilities — Conditions.

  1. The legislative body of any city with a population equal to or greater than eight thousand (8,000) but less than twenty thousand (20,000) based upon the most recent federal decennial census may, by ordinance, grant the right of way in streets, alleys and public grounds of the city to any railway, street railway, gas, water, steam heating, telephone or electric light or power company for a term not exceeding twenty (20) years. Before granting such privilege, the city shall, after advertising by publication pursuant to KRS Chapter 424, receive bids publicly, and award the privilege to the highest and best bidder, having the right to reject any and all bids.
  2. The city shall reserve the right to regulate and control the tracks, pipes and wires of such companies, and the public ways in which they are laid or constructed, and shall reserve the right to require any such company to conform to any changed grades of the streets and public grounds, to pay the cost of improving between its rails and for a reasonable distance on either side of its rails, to make culverts beneath them for the free flow of water, to change its rails, or mode of construction or operation, to suit public convenience, to raise or lower its pipes, or to take down its wires and lay them underground, as the public good requires.
  3. The city shall not be liable for the cost or damage occasioned by such changes, or for any damage for delay in the operation of the business of any such company occasioned by any street improvement or repairs, or the constructing, bursting or repairing of any sewer or pipe in or across any street, alley or public ground, or for injury by any mob or other violence.
  4. All such grants shall expire and become voidable, at the option of the city, although a consideration has been paid, unless a bona fide organization has taken place and business has been commenced and prosecuted under the grant in good faith within one (1) year from the date of the grant. The legislative body may impose other conditions and terms in addition to and not inconsistent with those enumerated in this section. The provisions in this section as to advertisements and bids, and limitation of the grant to twenty (20) years, shall not apply to the grant of the right of way to a trunk railway.

History. 3290, 3290-35: amend. Acts 1966, ch. 239, § 89; 2014, ch. 92, § 151, effective January 1, 2015.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Construction.

The requirement “by ordinance” is mandatory and the passage of a mere resolution is not sufficient. Continental Illinois Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Middlesboro, 109 F.2d 960, 1940 U.S. App. LEXIS 4026 (6th Cir. Ky. 1940 ).

2. Franchise Predating Present Constitution.

Where city, under its authority to regulate streets, granted franchise in 1889 to telephone company to construct plant in city and company promptly complied, such franchise created property right in perpetuity, unless limited in duration by grant itself or by general state law, which could not be terminated by ordinance enacted in 1909 requiring company to remove poles. Owensboro v. Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co., 230 U.S. 58, 33 S. Ct. 988, 57 L. Ed. 1389, 1913 U.S. LEXIS 2678 (U.S. 1913).

Where charter empowered city to regulate streets, and city in 1889 granted franchise to telephone company to erect poles in street and company promptly complied, and city used poles to carry its fire alarm wires, company was not trespasser on streets and could object to subsequently enacted rate ordinance which allegedly confiscated its property. Owensboro v. Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co., 174 F. 739, 1909 U.S. App. LEXIS 5249 (6th Cir. Ky. 1909 ).

Where franchise to construct street railway was granted in 1888 for 50-year term and work had begun thereunder before adoption of present constitution, fact that tracks had not been constructed throughout certain street did not cause constitution to apply, since selection of one route did not exhaust grant or disable company from extending its lines; grant being an entirety. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Bowling G. R. Co., 110 Ky. 788 , 63 S.W. 4, 23 Ky. L. Rptr. 273 , 1901 Ky. LEXIS 158 ( Ky. 1901 ).

Const., §§ 163 and 164, and this section which was enacted to effectuate constitutional provision, have no application, where franchise to construct street railway was granted in 1888 for 50-year term and work had begun thereunder before adoption of the present constitution. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Bowling G. R. Co., 110 Ky. 788 , 63 S.W. 4, 23 Ky. L. Rptr. 273 , 1901 Ky. LEXIS 158 ( Ky. 1901 ).

3. Franchise.
4. — Advertising Sale.

Purpose of statute providing that before granting franchise city shall advertise sale “for a period of thirty days” was met by publication in weekly paper in city lacking daily newspaper on August 10, 24, 31, and September 7, notwithstanding weekly publications were not consecutive. Corbin v. Joseph Greenspon's Sons Iron & Steel Co., 52 F.2d 939, 1931 U.S. App. LEXIS 3799 (6th Cir. Ky. 1931 ) (decision prior to 1966 amendment).

5. — Sale.

Objection that franchise was not sold within time fixed by ordinance directing its sale was untenable, where, although not made within time fixed, sale was made shortly thereafter, and was confirmed and approved by council. Corbin v. Joseph Greenspon's Sons Iron & Steel Co., 52 F.2d 939, 1931 U.S. App. LEXIS 3799 (6th Cir. Ky. 1931 ).

Legal right to operate telephone plant was not obtained by ordinance making indefinite grant as to time and without purchase of franchise as provided in Const., § 164. Merchants Police & Dist. Tel. Co. v. Citizens Tel. Co., 29 Ky. L. Rptr. 512 (1906).

Telephone company, which was citizen and taxpayer, and had franchise to operate, could sue another telephone company to prevent further operations by it, where latter had obtained franchise without complying with Const., § 164. Merchants Police & Dist. Tel. Co. v. Citizens Tel. Co., 29 Ky. L. Rptr. 512 (1906).

Franchise for less than term of years to operate telephone system was not valid where it had not been sold at public auction, after advertisement, to highest and best bidder, and hence holder thereof could not complain that ordinance established allegedly confiscatory rates. Frankfort Tel. Co. v. Common Council of Frankfort, 125 Ky. 59 , 100 S.W. 310, 30 Ky. L. Rptr. 885 , 1907 Ky. LEXIS 258 ( Ky. 1907 ).

6. — Duration.

Franchise to operate street railway was not invalid because of being for indefinite period not exceeding 20 years with right in purchaser to terminate it at any time on ten days’ notice, notwithstanding purchaser’s option to so terminate franchise would enable it to prevent city from exercising its option to require it to pay for street improvements. Common Council of Frankfort v. Morris, 201 Ky. 449 , 257 S.W. 16, 1923 Ky. LEXIS 317 ( Ky. 1923 ).

7. — Revocation.

General provision in charter of city that it might “make, publish and repeal ordinances,” refers to ordinances which are legislative in character and exertion of governmental power, and does not operate as reservation of power to revoke or destroy contractual rights, such as those granted by ordinance granting franchise to telephone company to erect poles in streets. Owensboro v. Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co., 230 U.S. 58, 33 S. Ct. 988, 57 L. Ed. 1389, 1913 U.S. LEXIS 2678 (U.S. 1913).

Provision of ordinance, which granted to telephone company franchise to erect poles in streets, that it may be “amended or altered as necessities of the city may demand,” merely reserved police power over streets, and did not reserve right to revoke the franchise ordinance or affect rights therein granted. Owensboro v. Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co., 230 U.S. 58, 33 S. Ct. 988, 57 L. Ed. 1389, 1913 U.S. LEXIS 2678 (U.S. 1913).

8. — Right to Erect Poles.

Under charter giving city right “to regulate the streets,” city could grant franchise to telephone company to erect poles on its public streets, whether fee was in city or its interest was an easement in land for street purposes. Owensboro v. Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co., 174 F. 739, 1909 U.S. App. LEXIS 5249 (6th Cir. Ky. 1909 ).

9. — Regulation of Service.

A city may require a utility to place its transmission facilities underground. KRS 278.040 , giving the public service commission exclusive control over rates and service, does not deprive cities of the right to make regulations not affecting the quantity or quality of service, and it would be unconstitutional if it should be construed otherwise. Benzinger v. Union Light, Heat & Power Co., 293 Ky. 747 , 170 S.W.2d 38, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 698 ( Ky. 1943 ).

10. — Garbage Disposal.

In the absence of constitutional restraint on the legislature in respect to granting of franchises for garbage disposal, subsections (6) and (7) of KRS 85.120 , authorizing a city of the third class to provide for the protection of the general health of residents of the territory over which it has jurisdiction, authorizes a city of the third class to let a franchise for garbage collection and disposal; and the passage of KRS 94.282 (repealed) by the legislature clearly indicates that that body construed the constitution and the then existing statutes to give cities of the third class such authority. Bowling Green v. Davis, 313 Ky. 203 , 230 S.W.2d 909, 1950 Ky. LEXIS 853 ( Ky. 1950 ).

11. Maintenance of Right of Way.
12. — Liability.

A street railway company is not liable for injuries to travelers on the streets caused by slipperiness resulting from ice and snow, if the railway company has performed its duty to see that the street between the rails and adjacent thereto is kept so nearly level with the rails as not to endanger the lives or property of people using the street or crossing the rails. Pfiester's Adm'r v. Jones, 291 Ky. 151 , 163 S.W.2d 304, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 194 ( Ky. 1942 ).

13. Cost of Improving Between Rails.

In granting franchise to street railway company, limitation requiring city to reserve right to require company to pay cost of improvements between rails is mandatory and cannot be surrendered, and hence no valid franchise can be granted without such provision either express or implied. Henderson v. Henderson Traction Co., 200 Ky. 183 , 254 S.W. 332, 1923 Ky. LEXIS 35 ( Ky. 1923 ).

Franchise to operate street railway was not invalid because of omission therefrom of provision reserving right of city to require purchaser of franchise to pay cost of paving between rails, such provision being read into franchise. Common Council of Frankfort v. Morris, 201 Ky. 449 , 257 S.W. 16, 1923 Ky. LEXIS 317 ( Ky. 1923 ); Henderson v. Henderson Traction Co., 200 Ky. 183 , 254 S.W. 332, 1923 Ky. LEXIS 35 ( Ky. 1923 ).

City may or may not, either in franchise or otherwise, contract with railway company for latter to pay cost of improvements between its rails, but city cannot surrender right to require such payment, and right must be reserved in franchise, to be exercised at option of council when ordinance for improvements is enacted. Board of Councilmen v. Morris, 200 Ky. 59 , 252 S.W. 142, 1923 Ky. LEXIS 19 ( Ky. 1923 ).

Notwithstanding right to require street railway company to pay cost of improvements between rails must be reserved to city, discretion is left to council ordering street improvements whether to direct payment to be made by company since this section does not mandatorily direct such payment by company. Board of Councilmen v. Morris, 200 Ky. 59 , 252 S.W. 142, 1923 Ky. LEXIS 19 ( Ky. 1923 ).

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Franchise limited to 20 years, Const., § 164.

Public utility not to use streets without consent of city, Const., § 163.

ALR

Right of way other than that of railroad or street railway. 58 A.L.R. 127.

Construction of highway through park as violation of use to which park property may be devoted. 60 A.L.R.3d 581.

96.070. City may grant rights-of-way to utilities — Conditions.

The legislative body of any city may grant rights-of-way over the public streets or public grounds of the city to any utility company, on such conditions as seem proper, shall have a supervising control over the use of same, and shall regulate the speed of cars and signals and fare on street cars. The legislative body may compel any railroad company to erect and maintain gates at street crossings and prevent railroads from obstructing public ways of the city, and fix penalties for the violation of these provisions. Nothing in this section shall prevent any property owner whose property abuts on a street on which a railroad is granted a right-of-way from recovering from the railroad any damage done to his property by the occupation or use of the street by the railroad.

History. 3490-25: amend. Acts 1980, ch. 188, § 92, effective July 15, 1980; 2014, ch. 92, § 152, effective January 1, 2015.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Regulation of Water Rates.

This section does not authorize fixing rates for water consumption; the right to regulate fares is specifically limited to fares on streetcars. Winchester v. Winchester Water Works Co., 251 U.S. 192, 40 S. Ct. 123, 64 L. Ed. 221, 1920 U.S. LEXIS 1726 (U.S. 1920).

Authority to regulate rates for water supplied in city does not arise from power to regulate the opening and use of streets or from the general right to control and regulate the right to erect works and lay pipes in streets. Winchester v. Winchester Water Works Co., 251 U.S. 192, 40 S. Ct. 123, 64 L. Ed. 221, 1920 U.S. LEXIS 1726 (U.S. 1920).

2. Regulation of Employment of Crewmen.

As there is no provision in the statutes authorizing cities of the fourth class to require railroad companies to keep certain crewmen on all engines and trains operating over and across any street, alley or public way of the city, provision of ordinance requiring crewman in such instances is invalid. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Hazard, 304 Ky. 370 , 200 S.W.2d 917, 1947 Ky. LEXIS 648 ( Ky. 1947 ).

Where municipal ordinance of fourth-class city, composed of one sentence, requiring railroad to maintain certain crewmen on trains operating across city streets and also requiring a flagman at crossings, was invalid insofar as it sought to compel employment of additional crewmen, the entire ordinance was invalid, since it was obvious that its primary purpose was to require use of additional men, one of whom would act as flagman, and since its passage would have been unlikely without the invalid provision. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Hazard, 304 Ky. 370 , 200 S.W.2d 917, 1947 Ky. LEXIS 648 ( Ky. 1947 ).

3. Gates at Street Crossings.

Fourth-class city was authorized to enact ordinance requiring railroad to erect and maintain safety gates at certain crossings, as against contention that such power was lodged solely in railroad commission under KRS 277.170 relating to powers of commission over crossings within one mile of city limits. Chesapeake & O. R. Co. v. Maysville, 69 S.W. 728, 24 Ky. L. Rptr. 615 , 1902 Ky. LEXIS 324 (Ky. Ct. App. 1902).

Authority to require railroad company to erect and maintain safety gates at dangerous crossings which is possessed by fourth-class cities under this section has been withheld from fifth-class cities. Chesapeake & O. R. Co. v. Harmon, 153 Ky. 669 , 156 S.W. 121, 1913 Ky. LEXIS 884 ( Ky. 1913 ).

Provisions of city ordinance requiring railroad to erect safety gates, providing no grace period but providing penalties for each day’s noncompliance, was required to be construed as allowing reasonable time to carry out its terms. Shively v. Illinois C. R. Co., 349 S.W.2d 682, 1961 Ky. LEXIS 59 ( Ky. 1961 ), appeal denied, 369 U.S. 120, 82 S. Ct. 653, 7 L. Ed. 2d 611, 1962 U.S. LEXIS 1687 (1962); appeal dismissed, Illinois C. R. Co. v. Shively, 369 U.S. 120, 82 S. Ct. 653, 7 L. Ed. 2d 611, 1962 U.S. LEXIS 1687 (U.S. 1962).

Railroad must assume entire expense of erecting and maintaining gates at street crossings. Shively v. Illinois C. R. Co., 349 S.W.2d 682, 1961 Ky. LEXIS 59 ( Ky. 1961 ), appeal denied, 369 U.S. 120, 82 S. Ct. 653, 7 L. Ed. 2d 611, 1962 U.S. LEXIS 1687 (1962); appeal dismissed, Illinois C. R. Co. v. Shively, 369 U.S. 120, 82 S. Ct. 653, 7 L. Ed. 2d 611, 1962 U.S. LEXIS 1687 (U.S. 1962).

4. Flagmen at Crossings.

Regulatory ordinance requiring electric railway company to maintain flagmen at certain points on streets did not invade property rights of railway by unconstitutional law enforceable by criminal proceedings, and hence, court of equity could not enjoin criminal proceedings under the ordinance. Camden Interstate R. Co. v. Catlettsburg, 129 F. 421, 1904 U.S. App. LEXIS 4756 (C.C.D. Ky. 1904 ).

Ordinance requiring flagman to be kept by railroad company at designated crossing between hours named was authorized by this section, and failure to comply would be negligence on part of company. Illinois C. R. Co. v. McGuire's Adm'r, 239 Ky. 1 , 38 S.W.2d 913, 1931 Ky. LEXIS 723 ( Ky. 1 931 ).

5. Switching Operations.

Ordinance prohibiting switching railroad cars across main street and requiring removal from crossing of two switching tracks did not violate United States Const., Amend. 14, since reasonable regulation although involving added expense does not violate that amendment. Neither did such ordinance violate the equal protection clause or the interstate commerce clause of the United States Constitution; nor did it violate the Transportation Act, U. S. Code, tit. 49, § 1 (21). Illinois C. R. Co. v. Mayfield, 35 F.2d 808, 1929 U.S. App. LEXIS 3074 (6th Cir. Ky. 1929 ), cert. denied, 280 U.S. 608, 50 S. Ct. 158, 74 L. Ed. 651, 1930 U.S. LEXIS 803 (U.S. 1930).

Ordinance providing that railroad cars should not be switched across main street was not unreasonable and arbitrary, where evidence showed that such use caused unusual delay to traveling public; nor was it invalid because of requiring removal from crossing of two switching tracks where such removal was incident to prohibition against switching. Illinois C. R. Co. v. Mayfield, 35 F.2d 808, 1929 U.S. App. LEXIS 3074 (6th Cir. Ky. 1929 ), cert. denied, 280 U.S. 608, 50 S. Ct. 158, 74 L. Ed. 651, 1930 U.S. LEXIS 803 (U.S. 1930).

6. Regulation of Street Crossings.

Under this section a city may regulate the use of a street crossing by a railroad but it does not give city power to regulate crossing by eliminating it entirely. Harrodsburg v. Southern R. Co., 313 S.W.2d 864, 1958 Ky. LEXIS 280 ( Ky. 1958 ).

Under this section a city may reasonably regulate the use of a street crossing by a railroad but it cannot require railroad to build an overpass or underpass at one of nine crossings within city limits thereby eliminating crossing entirely. Harrodsburg v. Southern R. Co., 313 S.W.2d 864, 1958 Ky. LEXIS 280 ( Ky. 1958 ).

A city ordinance prohibiting blocking of street crossing by train for more than five minutes was not unconstitutional as an unreasonable interference with interstate commerce, and since penalty involved a misdemeanor punishable by fine only, city could appeal for reversal of adverse decision under ordinance. Harrodsburg v. Southern R. Co., 455 S.W.2d 576, 1969 Ky. LEXIS 6 ( Ky. 1969 ).

7. Regulation and Control of Right-of-Way.

Although before passage of regulatory ordinance, electric railway company had been granted right, without reservation, to operate its line over streets upon certain terms and conditions, legislature had right under police power to authorize city to enact such regulatory ordinance. Camden Interstate R. Co. v. Catlettsburg, 129 F. 421, 1904 U.S. App. LEXIS 4756 (C.C.D. Ky. 1904 ).

In view of this section, state has delegated to fourth-class cities its power to regulate and control use and occupancy of their streets by railroad company. Illinois C. R. Co. v. Mayfield, 35 F.2d 808, 1929 U.S. App. LEXIS 3074 (6th Cir. Ky. 1929 ), cert. denied, 280 U.S. 608, 50 S. Ct. 158, 74 L. Ed. 651, 1930 U.S. LEXIS 803 (U.S. 1930).

By its franchise giving railroad right to maintain side tracks, state did not surrender right to regulate use and location of tracks, which it could delegate to city, and railroad risked having situation disturbed in interest of public. Illinois C. R. Co. v. Mayfield, 35 F.2d 808, 1929 U.S. App. LEXIS 3074 (6th Cir. Ky. 1929 ), cert. denied, 280 U.S. 608, 50 S. Ct. 158, 74 L. Ed. 651, 1930 U.S. LEXIS 803 (U.S. 1930).

Ordinance requiring railroad company to arch and wall its roadbed when passing through cuts or excavations on its private right-of-way was unreasonable and invalid exercise of police power possessed by council. Versailles v. Kentucky H. R. Co., 153 Ky. 83 , 154 S.W. 388, 1913 Ky. LEXIS 768 ( Ky. 1913 ).

A street railway company is not liable for injuries to travelers on the streets caused by slipperiness resulting from ice and snow, if the railway company has performed its duty to see that the street between the rails and adjacent thereto is kept so nearly level with the rails as not to endanger the lives or property of people using the street or crossing the rails. Pfiester's Adm'r v. Jones, 291 Ky. 151 , 163 S.W.2d 304, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 194 ( Ky. 1942 ).

8. Removal of Tracks.

Street railway company could not be deprived of right to use lot containing loop under ordinance providing that when necessary to repair streets, city might tear up track, if company declined to do so, but should relay them after repairs were completed. Dayton v. South C. & C. S. R. Co., 177 Ky. 202 , 197 S.W. 670, 1917 Ky. LEXIS 576 ( Ky. 1917 ) ( Ky. 1917 ).

This section vesting city with supervisory control over streets and right to regulate speed of cars, did not authorize city to destroy or wholly remove street railway tracks in street where tracks formed part of loop or turnout into adjoining lot. Dayton v. South C. & C. S. R. Co., 177 Ky. 202 , 197 S.W. 670, 1917 Ky. LEXIS 576 ( Ky. 1917 ) ( Ky. 1917 ).

9. Compelling Underground Facilities.

A city may require a utility to place its transmission facilities underground. KRS 278.040 , giving the public service commission exclusive control over rates and service, does not deprive cities of the right to make regulations not affecting the quantity or quality of service, and it would be unconstitutional if it should be construed otherwise. Benzinger v. Union Light, Heat & Power Co., 293 Ky. 747 , 170 S.W.2d 38, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 698 ( Ky. 1943 ).

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Franchise limited to 20 years, Const., § 164.

Public utility not to use streets without consent of city, Const., § 163.

Rates of public utilities, regulation by public service commission, KRS 278.040 , 278.200 , 278.270 .

ALR

Right of way other than that of railroad or street railway. 58 A.L.R. 127.

96.080. Water company may condemn land and material.

Any person constructing, maintaining or operating waterworks or pipelines for the supply of water to a municipality may condemn lands and materials necessary to carry out those purposes, in the manner prescribed in the Eminent Domain Act of Kentucky.

History. 4814d-1: amend. Acts 1976, ch. 140, § 43.

Compiler’s Notes.

The Eminent Domain Act of Kentucky is compiled as KRS 416.540 to 416.680 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Entry for Preliminary Survey.

Right of entry upon property, in good faith, for survey and investigation preliminary to condemnation is necessary right and incident thereto. Thomas v. Horse Cave, 249 Ky. 713 , 61 S.W.2d 601, 1933 Ky. LEXIS 588 ( Ky. 1933 ).

2. Right of Franchise Holder to Condemn.

In view of subsections (6), (7), (21) of KRS 446.010 defining corporation to include person, individual who was holder of franchise to supply water to city had same power to condemn land and material to construct, maintain, and operate waterworks as that possessed by corporations, companies and associations. Thomas v. Horse Cave, 249 Ky. 713 , 61 S.W.2d 601, 1933 Ky. LEXIS 588 ( Ky. 1933 ).

City Owned Stock in Utility Company

96.090. Sale of gas company stock owned by first-class city.

  1. Any city of the first class that owns stock in a gas company carrying on business within its boundaries may dispose of the stock upon such terms as may be prescribed by ordinance, but the stock shall not be sold for less than par.
  2. The proceeds of the sale of the stock shall be applied solely to the construction of public sewers, but the purchaser of the stock shall not be required to look to the application of the purchase money.

History. 2783a-1, 2783a-2.

Research References and Practice Aids

ALR

Stock of private corporation, constitutional or statutory provisions prohibiting municipalities from acquiring or subscribing to. 152 A.L.R. 495.

96.100. Amendment to charter of gas company in which first-class city owns stock.

The legislative body of a city of the first class may, on terms prescribed by ordinance, authorize the mayor to consent, on behalf of the legislative body, to such amendments to the charter of any gas company, in which the city owns stock, as are approved by the board of directors of the company, so as to vest in the board of directors and stockholders of the company the same authority to deal with its charter as the stockholders and directors of any other corporation organized under the law of Kentucky have.

History. 2783a-3.

96.110. Cities may subscribe for stock in water companies.

Any city may, with funds provided from the general levy or from the sale of bonds, purchase stock in any corporation owning or operating or organized for the purpose of owning or operating a waterworks within the corporate limits of the city.

History. 2741o-1: amend. 2014, ch. 92, § 153, effective January 1, 2015.

Compiler’s Notes.

For this section as effective until January 1, 2015, see the bound volume.

Research References and Practice Aids

ALR

Acquiring water plant by purchase of stock of private company as within constitutional or statutory provisions prohibiting acquisition of stock of private corporations. 152 A.L.R. 512.

Furnishing Water or Light to Another City or Outside Limits

96.120. City may acquire franchise to furnish water and light to another city — Powers to contract with other city and construct and maintain apparatus.

  1. Any city that owns and operates its own water or light plant may acquire a franchise to furnish water and light to any other city, in the same manner that any private corporation or individual may acquire such a franchise.
  2. Any city that owns and operates its own water or light plant may contract with any other city to furnish water and light to that other city. Those contracts may be entered into by the legislative bodies of the cities, and the legislative bodies are given full power to so contract in regard to the furnishing of water or light. Each contract shall be specific in its terms. Any city may pay to any other city a rental for water and light from year to year, or for a term of years.
  3. Any city may construct, lay, or maintain mains, pipes, lines, or other necessary apparatus to convey water or light from any city that owns and operates its own water or light plant, or may contract with the other city to do these things, and the other city shall have the same power. For this purpose, any city may acquire rights and rights-of-way in the same manner that private corporations or individuals may acquire rights and rights-of-way, and may do any other things in carrying into effect the provisions of this section that any individual or corporation may do.

History. 2741a-1; 2019 ch. 44, § 15, effective June 27, 2019.

Opinions of Attorney General.

The City of Paris can enter into an agreement with another city for the purchase of power even though neither city is subject to the regulations of the Public Service Commission and Paris obtains a portion of its power needs from Kentucky utilities. OAG 79-54 .

There is no conflict between this section and KRS 96.130 since KRS 96.520 permits the city to contract for services with a private utility for its own inhabitants or, as an alternative where the city owns its own facility, it may furnish such services to another city by contract or by franchise. OAG 79-54 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Board of municipal electric plant may acquire franchise to furnish electric service to another municipality, KRS 96.570 .

City may contract with county water district to receive water, KRS 74.120 .

96.130. City owning own plant may contract to furnish service to another city. [Repealed]

History. 2741a-2; repealed by 2019 ch. 44, § 35, effective June 27, 2019.

96.140. City may install apparatus and obtain rights of way necessary to furnish or receive service. [Repealed]

History. 2741a-2, 2741a-3; repealed by 2019 ch. 44, § 35, effective June 27, 2019.

96.150. Extending water supply or sanitary sewer system outside city limits — Limitation — Consideration of installation of fire hydrants on extended lines.

  1. Any city that owns or operates a water supply or sanitary sewer system may extend the system into, and furnish and sell water and provide sanitary sewers to any person within, any territory contiguous to the city, and may install within that territory necessary apparatus; provided, however, that the extension of a water supply or sanitary sewer system shall not enter into any territory served by an existing water supply or sanitary sewer district unless such district requests the extension of water or sewer services from a city. For these purposes the city or sanitation authority established by an interlocal agreement may condemn or otherwise acquire franchises, rights, and rights-of-way, as private corporations may do.
  2. When extending the system to any person, water district, or water association, the city may consider the installation of fire hydrants on the extended lines. The city may extend water lines which are incapable of servicing fire hydrants only if the city determines that servicing hydrants is not feasible. The determination shall include consideration of the incremental costs of adequately sized pipe and associated pumps and towers, and the benefits of real estate development, water sales, the availability of fire protection insurance, and the reduction in fire insurance premiums which may result from the installation of hydrants at specified intervals. When extending lines to a water district or water association, the determination may be made in consultation with the district or association, taking into consideration their fiscal capacity.

History. 2741a-4: amend. Acts 1962, ch. 233, § 1; 1964, ch. 31, § 1; 1974, ch. 36, § 1; 1986, ch. 34, § 1, effective July 15, 1986; 1992, ch. 122, § 1, effective July 14, 1992.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Construction.

Since this section expressly authorizes city water company to extend its facilities into territory within five miles of the city limits, there is no basis for a holding that the company cannot incur the expense of furnishing or installing the facilities in such territory. Louisville Water Co. v. Public Service Com., 318 S.W.2d 537, 1958 Ky. LEXIS 141 ( Ky. 1958 ), overruled, McClellan v. Louisville Water Co., 351 S.W.2d 197, 1961 Ky. LEXIS 160 ( Ky. 1961 ).

2. Controversies Between Utilities.

Since a city-owned water supply system is not a utility subject to the jurisdiction of the public service commission, the commission was without jurisdiction to resolve a territorial dispute between a city and a private water company where the city undertook to extend its water supply system beyond city limits into a contiguous territory served by the private company. Georgetown v. Public Service Com., 516 S.W.2d 842, 1974 Ky. LEXIS 173 ( Ky. 1974 ).

3. Annexation.

Where subdivision was annexed by city over a month after previously formed water district received a certificate of public convenience and necessity authorizing it to provide the subdivision with water, the city had a right to provide water in the subdivision and water district was excluded. Flemingsburg v. Public Service Com., 411 S.W.2d 920, 1966 Ky. LEXIS 28 ( Ky. 1966 ).

Cited:

Austin v. Louisa, 264 S.W.2d 662, 1954 Ky. LEXIS 684 ( Ky. 1954 ); Foley v. Kinnett, 486 S.W.2d 705, 1972 Ky. LEXIS 118 ( Ky. 1972 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

A city has complete discretion as to whether or not extensions of water lines are made to sections outside of the city limits. OAG 60-357 .

A city had the legal authority to abandon an old water line that served one nonresident customer and thus terminate this utility service. OAG 62-475 .

A city of the fifth class could extend its municipal water lines beyond the corporate limits of the city where the cost of the extension was paid for by the city. OAG 71-237 .

If the city of Bardstown elects to acquire and operate nonprofit corporation’s water system under this section, the provisions of KRS 96.360 need not necessarily be complied with. OAG 72-20 .

While the Mayfield Electric and Water System has authority to extend its water system up to 15 miles outside the corporate limits of a city and fix and regulate the prices to private consumers only the courts can determine whether the tap-on fee for residents to be serviced outside the city limits would be considered arbitrary and discriminatory (opinion prior to 1974 amendment). OAG 73-483 .

Utility companies supplying water may use highway rights of way to carry water for public purposes, pursuant to KRS 416.140 , but a determination must be made as to whether the potential industrial sites to be served are in territory contiguous to the city and within 15 miles of the corporate limits (opinion prior to 1974 amendment). OAG 73-748 .

In the absence of any statutory authority or the existence of an emergency situation concerning the health and sanitation of city residents, a city cannot force nonresidents to hook up to the city sewer system and to pay a sewage use charge for city sewer services the nonresidents do not use or do not want to use. OAG 74-618 .

Where the city water system does not extend beyond the city limits, nonresident individuals acquire no rights against the city. OAG 74-656 .

Whether or not a purchaser of a lot in a subdivision outside the city can be required by the subdivision developer who also installed the subdivision’s water system, to pay a fee beyond that required by the city for water services to hook onto this private system, said additional fee representing the pro rata share of the cost of the installation of the subdivision’s water system but which was not paid by prior purchasers of subdivision lots, is a private matter and the city should not become involved in a private dispute concerning a private water system. OAG 74-656 .

All lot owners in a particular subdivision should be charged the same city tap fee for receiving water from the city. OAG 74-656 .

A city may condemn right of way for its water system into territory contiguous to the city in the same manner as private corporations do so. OAG 74-753 .

A sewer line which was built outside the city limits and later connected to the city sewer system belongs to the property owners outside the city limits and not to the city since no emergency relating to the health and sanitation of the residents of the city exists and the line is outside the city limits. OAG 75-107 .

Pursuant to this section and KRS 86.110 (8) (repealed), under the broad discretion resting in a city through its council, a city has the power to condemn land in the county and outside of the city boundaries for the purpose of city water supply, even though another solution to the water problem may exist which would not involve condemnation, and such action cannot be overturned by the courts absent a showing that the council acted fraudulently, or in bad faith or grossly abused its discretion. OAG 75-151 .

While the city has the authority to extend its water system beyond the city limits it is not required to do so and, since the benefactors of the proposed water system are nonresidents the city cannot force these people to hook up to the system and pay for services they do not want. OAG 75-586 .

Not only may a city which has extended its water supply system outside of its boundary charge for water furnished by contract at higher rates than those charged resident customers, but the city may also require users of the extended water facility to provide their own conduit to the main line of the system or pay for the extension of the water mains. OAG 76-234 .

The authority of a city, which has extended its water supply system outside its boundaries and into a territory contiguous thereto, to install necessary apparatus would include fire hydrants along the main line. OAG 76-234 .

“Person,” as used in this section, includes any corporation or body politic so that a city could extend its water line to a water district boundary and sell water to the district. OAG 76-234 .

A city has the authority to contract with nonresidents in areas contiguous to the city in connection with the furnishing of water to those persons by the city even though these people reside within the territorial boundaries of a water district presumably organized pursuant to KRS Chapter 74. OAG 76-554 .

A city water company could not extend its system into another county as such territory would not be contiguous to the city. OAG 77-188 .

Inasmuch as the extension of lead water mains originating within a city to any territory outside the city would make such territory “contiguous” to the city regardless of the location of the actual area serviced, a city could extend its water system from the city limits to service an area in an adjoining county. OAG 77-559 .

A city is not required to extend its water system outside of its boundaries, but, if it desires to do so, it may extend the system and pay for the extension and at the same time charge a reasonable rate for water furnished by contract at a higher rate than that charged resident customers; the users of the extended water facility outside of the city can be required to provide their own conduit to the main line of the system and pay for the extension of the water mains. OAG 78-818 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

City may contract with county water district to receive water, KRS 74.120 .

Powers of Cities to Furnish Utility Services

96.160. Power of city to furnish water and light.

The legislative body of any city may, by ordinance:

  1. Provide the city with water; establish and regulate public cisterns, hydrants and reservoirs, within or beyond the limits of the city, for the extinguishment of fires and the convenience of the inhabitants; prevent the unnecessary waste of water; and compel any water company to change or relocate any water main or pipe.
  2. Provide, by itself or through others, for lighting the streets, public places and buildings of the city and furnishing light to its inhabitants; and regulate the quality and quantity of the light and the method, time and appliances for furnishing light.

History. 3058, 3058-4, 3058-6; 2014, ch. 92, § 154, effective January 1, 2015.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Proprietary Capacity of City.

In the operation of its waterworks, the city is acting in its proprietary capacity. Electric Plant Board v. Mayfield, 299 Ky. 375 , 185 S.W.2d 411, 1945 Ky. LEXIS 420 ( Ky. 1945 ).

2. Waterworks.

Power to provide and maintain waterworks system is conferred by this section. Commonwealth v. Covington, 128 Ky. 36 , 107 S.W. 231, 32 Ky. L. Rptr. 837 , 1908 Ky. LEXIS 28 ( Ky. 1908 ); Commonwealth v. Newport, 107 S.W. 232, 32 Ky. L. Rptr. 820 (1908).

3. — Exemption from Taxation.

Waterworks system owned and operated by city, being property used for public purposes, is exempt from taxation, notwithstanding city charges water rents to inhabitants and incidentally supplies water to persons beyond city limits. Commonwealth v. Covington, 128 Ky. 36 , 107 S.W. 231, 32 Ky. L. Rptr. 837 , 1908 Ky. LEXIS 28 ( Ky. 1908 ); Commonwealth v. Newport, 107 S.W. 232, 32 Ky. L. Rptr. 820 (1908); District of Highlands v. Covington, 164 Ky. 815 , 176 S.W. 192, 1915 Ky. LEXIS 446 ( Ky. 1915 ).

4. Gas Franchise.

Ordinance enacted on May 5, 1905 for franchise to supply gas in city for 20 years, but not requiring successful bidder to supply gas until June 12, 1907, was 20-year franchise from date bid was accepted by council, although bidder was not required to deliver gas until later. Truesdale v. Newport, 90 S.W. 589, 28 Ky. L. Rptr. 840 (1906), overruled, Florence v. Owen Electric Coop., Inc., 832 S.W.2d 876, 1992 Ky. LEXIS 72 ( Ky. 1992 ).

Franchise to supply gas to city as limits now exist or may be enlarged is binding over territory which is subsequently added to city. Truesdale v. Newport, 90 S.W. 589, 28 Ky. L. Rptr. 840 (1906), overruled, Florence v. Owen Electric Coop., Inc., 832 S.W.2d 876, 1992 Ky. LEXIS 72 ( Ky. 1992 ).

5. — Sale.

Under KRS 84.010 (repealed), subsection (2) of this section and provision of franchise reserving to city right to acquire gas plant at five-year periods, city was authorized to dispose of that right, such franchise right not being a nonassignable one, and city’s right to exercise its reserved power not having been exhausted by prior proceeding to acquire the plant which was discontinued by the city. Covington Gaslight Co. v. Covington, 58 S.W. 805, 22 Ky. L. Rptr. 796 , 1900 Ky. LEXIS 250 ( Ky. 1900 ).

Company which was created by consolidation of several electric utilities, none of which had franchise to conduct gas business, lacked authority to acquire gas plant which city sought to dispose of to it under city’s reserved option to acquire same from original franchise holder. Covington Gaslight Co. v. Covington, 58 S.W. 805, 22 Ky. L. Rptr. 796 , 1900 Ky. LEXIS 250 ( Ky. 1900 ).

In estimating value of gas plant which city was seeking to dispose of under its reserved option to acquire such plant, all elements of value should be considered, including cost of reproduction and additional value due to franchise which enhanced value because of successful development and operation. Covington Gaslight Co. v. Covington, 58 S.W. 805, 22 Ky. L. Rptr. 796 , 1900 Ky. LEXIS 250 ( Ky. 1900 ).

Research References and Practice Aids

ALR

Liability of water company for interruption of pressure during progress of fire. 27 A.L.R. 1273.

Liability of water company to private owner for breach of its contract with municipality to supply pressure for fire purposes. 62 A.L.R. 1205.

Hydrant, liability of municipality for obstruction inside of, causing injury to property by fire due to lack of water. 113 A.L.R. 664.

Fire loss due to failure of municipality to provide or maintain adequate water supply or pressure, liability of municipality for. 163 A.L.R. 348.

Validity under police power of ordinance involving chemical treatment of public water supply. 43 A.L.R.2d 453.

Liability of electric power or light company to patron for interruption, failure, or inadequacy of power. 4 A.L.R.3d 594.

Liability of water distributor for damage caused by water escaping from main. 20 A.L.R.3d 1294.

Water distributor’s liability for injury due to condition of service lines, meters and the like, which serve individual customer. 20 A.L.R.3d 1363.

Propriety of injunctive relief against diversion of water by municipal corporation or public utility. 42 A.L.R.3d 426.

Electricity, gas or water furnished by public utility as “goods” within provisions of Uniform Commercial Code, Article 2 on sales. 48 A.L.R.3d 1060.

Water company’s liability for injuries resulting from furnishing impure water. 54 A.L.R.3d 936.

Applicability of rule of strict liability to injury from electrical current escaping from power line. 82 A.L.R.3d 218.

Liability for overflow of water confined or diverted for public water power purposes. 91 A.L.R.3d 1065.

96.165. City classified from third class to second class to continue operation of combined electric and water system under provisions of KRS 96.171 to 96.188 — When. [Repealed.]

Immediately upon the effective date of any act of the General Assembly changing the classification of any city of the third class to a city of the second class, if such city while operating as a city of the third class had accepted and was operating under the provisions of KRS 96.171 to KRS 96.188 , inclusive, relating to the operation of a combined electric and water system, such city of the second class shall continue to operate such combined electric and water plant under the provisions of said sections of the Kentucky Revised Statutes as amended and said sections, and each of them, as amended, hereby are adopted by reference and shall apply to such city of the second class and the combined electric and water system of such city of the second class shall be operated under the provisions of KRS 96.172 and 96.188 , as amended. Said sections of the Kentucky Revised Statutes shall govern the appointment, qualifications, tenure, powers and duties of the members of the electric and water plant board of the city and the powers and duties of such board. The members of such board shall hold office for the respective terms to which they were appointed and qualified, and upon the expiration of their respective terms and upon the occurrence of a vacancy, the appointments to fill such expired terms or such vacancies shall be made as provided in said statutes. Such appointments shall be made by the mayor and approved by the legislative body of the city. All contracts and obligations incurred by such board, and between the city and such board, shall remain in full force and effect whether made after or prior to such city becoming a city of the second class.

History. Enact. Acts 1956 (1st Ex. Sess.), ch. 4, § 1, effective March 12, 1956; § 314.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1956 (1st Ex. Sess.), ch. 4, § 1, effective March 12, 1956) was repealed by Acts 2014, ch. 92, § 314, effective January 1, 2015.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

McIntosh v. Electric & Water Plant Board, 394 S.W.2d 471, 1965 Ky. LEXIS 186 ( Ky. 1965 ).

96.170. Power of city to furnish utility services.

The legislative body of any city may, by ordinance, provide the city and its inhabitants with water, light, power, and heat, by contract or by works of its own, located either within or beyond the boundaries of the city, make regulations for the management thereof, and fix and regulate the prices to private consumers and customers.

History. 3290-3290-5: amend. 2000, ch. 101, § 2, effective July 14, 2000; 2014, ch. 92, § 155, effective January 1, 2015.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Application.

City purchasing water plant alone must follow provisions of KRS 96.350 to 96.510 and this section does not apply. Cawood v. Coleman, 294 Ky. 858 , 172 S.W.2d 548, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 515 ( Ky. 1943 ).

City purchasing an electric plant alone must follow provisions of KRS 96.550 to 96.900 and this section does not apply. Cawood v. Coleman, 294 Ky. 858 , 172 S.W.2d 548, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 515 ( Ky. 1943 ).

2. Proprietary Capacity of City.

In the operation of its waterworks, the city is acting in its proprietary capacity. Electric Plant Board v. Mayfield, 299 Ky. 375 , 185 S.W.2d 411, 1945 Ky. LEXIS 420 ( Ky. 1945 ).

3. Ordinance Mandatory.

The requirement “by ordinance” is mandatory and the passage of a mere resolution is not sufficient. Continental Illinois Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Middlesboro, 109 F.2d 960, 1940 U.S. App. LEXIS 4026 (6th Cir. Ky. 1940 ).

4. Combined Water and Electric System.

City of third class desiring to purchase water system and electric system from private corporation which had operated systems together as a single unit for a number of years and was unwilling to sell either system separately was not required to follow either the provisions of KRS 96.350 to 96.510 or the provisions of KRS 96.550 to 96.900 . Cawood v. Coleman, 294 Ky. 858 , 172 S.W.2d 548, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 515 ( Ky. 1943 ).

City of third class purchasing combined water and electric system had power, without popular vote, to issue bonds payable solely from revenues, and constituting a lien only on revenues, such bonds not constituting a debt of the city. Cawood v. Coleman, 294 Ky. 858 , 172 S.W.2d 548, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 515 ( Ky. 1943 ).

City of third class purchasing combined water and electric systems had power to create a board to manage and operate the systems, similar to the boards provided for by KRS 96.530 and 96.740 , such not constituting an unlawful delegation of power. Cawood v. Coleman, 294 Ky. 858 , 172 S.W.2d 548, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 515 ( Ky. 1943 ).

5. Consolidation of Utility Companies.

Where gas companies holding long-existing franchises voluntarily consolidated into single new corporation, they ceased to exist, and newly consolidated corporation became subject to then existing laws including laws relating to regulation of rates. Kentucky Power & Light Co. v. Maysville, 36 F.2d 816, 1929 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1741 (D. Ky. 1929 ).

6. Appointment of Utility Commission.

When a light plant is acquired by the issuance of general obligation bonds of the city, pursuant to this section and KRS 66.060 and 85.120 , the utility commission contemplated by KRS 96.530 need not be appointed. King v. Rowland, 293 Ky. 198 , 168 S.W.2d 755, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 596 ( Ky. 1943 ).

7. Service Outside City Limits.

City of third class owning electric light plant was entitled to supply current to property owners outside of city limits. Henderson v. Young, 119 Ky. 224 , 83 S.W. 583, 26 Ky. L. Rptr. 1152 , 1904 Ky. LEXIS 163 ( Ky. 1904 ).

8. Issuance of Bonds.

By comparison of acts for various classes of cities, it appears that grant was made by implication to city of third class empowering it, by ordinance, to submit to voters proposition whether to issue bonds to erect or procure waterworks plants. O'Bryan v. Owensboro, 113 Ky. 680 , 68 S.W. 858, 69 S.W. 800, 24 Ky. L. Rptr. 469 , 24 Ky. L. Rptr. 645 , 1902 Ky. LEXIS 92 ( Ky. 1902 ), overruled, Nelson County Fiscal Court v. McCrocklin, 175 Ky. 199 , 194 S.W. 323, 1917 Ky. LEXIS 316 ( Ky. 1917 ).

The power to contract debts or issue bonds for the extension or reconstruction of a waterworks or lighting plant is governed by the provisions of KRS 96.540 , unless the procedure outlined in KRS 96.350 to 96.510 , or KRS 96.520 , is followed, in which case KRS 96.540 does not apply. Eagle v. Corbin, 275 Ky. 808 , 122 S.W.2d 798, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 507 ( Ky. 1938 ).

Where a city of the third class proposed to issue and sell revenue bonds, the proceeds of which were to be used for the construction of a gas transmission pipeline to serve the municipal natural gas distribution system, the city could not sell the revenue bonds privately rather than at a publicly advertised competitive sale. Haney v. Somerset, 530 S.W.2d 377, 1975 Ky. LEXIS 54 ( Ky. 1975 ).

9. Rates.

Power of city to fix rates was conferred by this section, even if earlier city charters did not confer it, and city was not precluded from exercising such right by ordinance giving company use of streets and authorizing it to make needful regulations not inconsistent with law. Owensboro v. Owensboro Waterworks Co., 191 U.S. 358, 24 S. Ct. 82, 48 L. Ed. 217, 1903 U.S. LEXIS 1456 (U.S. 1903).

Under this section, the purpose of which was to provide public utility service to third-class cities earlier by cities directly or by private persons, power is given to regulate management and fix rates. Owensboro v. Owensboro Waterworks Co., 191 U.S. 358, 24 S. Ct. 82, 48 L. Ed. 217, 1903 U.S. LEXIS 1456 (U.S. 1903).

Power to regulate rates of public utilities inheres in every sovereignty; it is legislative in character and part of police power; no city can exercise such power unless authorized to do so by state. Kentucky Power & Light Co. v. Maysville, 36 F.2d 816, 1929 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1741 (D. Ky. 1929 ).

During the period between the expiration of an old utility franchise granted by a city and the effective date of the new franchise, the chancellor may adjudge reasonable rates to be charged, and the rates so fixed may be the same as if the old franchise were still in force. Union Light, Heat & Power Co. v. Covington, 282 Ky. 558 , 139 S.W.2d 64, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 208 ( Ky. 1940 ).

10. Power to Contract.

Corporate charter provision authorizing utility to lay pipes and supply gas light to persons on such terms as company and person might agree gave utility right to make contracts as to rates, subject always to regulatory power of state. Kentucky Power & Light Co. v. Maysville, 36 F.2d 816, 1929 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1741 (D. Ky. 1929 ).

The power of cities to contract with respect to utility rates does not deprive the state of its police power of regulation; but this power was not exercised before June 14, 1934, when general laws governing public utilities were enacted, and therefore contracts made before that date are valid. Union Light, Heat & Power Co. v. Covington, 282 Ky. 558 , 139 S.W.2d 64, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 208 ( Ky. 1940 ).

A provision in a utility franchise granted by a city, that the utility should lower its rates whenever its rates charged in an adjoining city were lowered, was valid and was not an abdication or delegation of the rate-making power. Union Light, Heat & Power Co. v. Covington, 282 Ky. 558 , 139 S.W.2d 64, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 208 ( Ky. 1940 ).

11. Surrendering Authority.

Presumption obtains against claim that corporate charter provision worked surrender of state’s right to regulate utility’s rates, it being doubtful whether state can surrender all regulatory power even if it may contract with utility, within limits, as to rates chargeable. Kentucky Power & Light Co. v. Maysville, 36 F.2d 816, 1929 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1741 (D. Ky. 1929 ).

Even if corporate charter was construable as perpetually surrendering state’s authority to regulate utility rates, utility’s contracts as to rates would be subject to common-law rule requiring it to exact only reasonable compensation for services, thus vesting in courts jurisdiction to determine reasonableness. Kentucky Power & Light Co. v. Maysville, 36 F.2d 816, 1929 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1741 (D. Ky. 1929 ).

12. Appeal.

Since ordinance passed under power delegated by state to municipality was equivalent to legislative act in determining whether right secured by federal constitution had been thereby infringed, matter was within jurisdiction of federal courts, and appeal from federal Circuit Court on ground that rate ordinance contravened utility’s right under federal constitution, ran directly to U. S. Supreme Court, and not to U.S. Circuit Court of Appeal. Owensboro v. Owensboro Waterworks Co., 115 F. 318, 1902 U.S. App. LEXIS 4218 (6th Cir. Ky. 1902 ).

Ordinance fixing allegedly confiscatory rates for natural gas in city was subject to attack in federal courts as violative of federal Const., Art. 1, § 10, and Amendment 14, since such rates as fixed by ordinance should be deemed act authorized by state, or, if city did not have power, its attempt to fix rates should be deemed taking property without due process of law. Kentucky Power & Light Co. v. Maysville, 36 F.2d 816, 1929 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1741 (D. Ky. 1929 ).

Cited:

Booth v. Owensboro, 275 Ky. 491 , 122 S.W.2d 118, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 462 ( Ky. 1938 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Where a city deeded its publicly owned right-of-way along a city street to the Department of Highways, the department could not assume the responsibility for, or the costs of relocating sewer lines and laterals located within the public way. OAG 60-498 .

While the Mayfield Electric and Water System has authority to extend its water system up to 15 miles outside the corporate limits of a city and fix and regulate the prices to private consumers and customers, only the courts can determine whether the tap-on fee for residents to be serviced outside the city limits would be considered arbitrary and discriminatory. OAG 73-483 .

Since a city of the third class may create an administrative board to administer the city’s water and sewer services, the city can by ordinance provide the manner whereby members of the utility commission are to be appointed, the number of such commissioners and the power they may exercise. OAG 78-172 .

Although there are no specific statutory provisions authorizing the creation of a utility commission to operate such utilities in a city of the third class, a city has a legal authority to set up an administrative board in connection with the operation of the municipal utilities. OAG 79-131 .

If a particular utility board is an agency of a city, board members are city officers or employees, and the city is liable for the negligence of the board members, but if the utility board is an independent corporate body politic, the city would not be liable, and in neither case would sovereign immunity apply. OAG 79-131 .

If a utility was established pursuant to ordinance, under this section which created a board or commission to manage and operate the system and defined the duties of the commission, fixed the terms of the members and required an oath to be taken, members of the commission would be public officers and officers of the city, and such a commission would be an agency of the municipal government and not an independent political subdivision. OAG 79-131 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Public service commission, regulation of rates by, KRS 278.040 , 278.200 , 278.270 .

Combined City Electric and Water Plant

96.171. Adoption of provisions of KRS 96.172 to 96.188 by city.

The governing body of any municipality now or hereafter owning an electric and water system and operating them as one (1) combined system or plant may elect to operate under the provisions of KRS 96.172 to 96.188 , in which case, from the time of the exercise of such election and the appointment of a board under said sections, the electric and water system of such municipality shall be operated under the provisions of KRS 96.172 to 96.188 as an electric and water plant.

History. Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 212, § 1; 2014, ch. 92, § 156, effective January 1, 2015.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

KRS 96.171 to 96.188 do not violate Const., §§ 59 (29) or 60, even though at time of enactment Frankfort was only city having a combined electric and water plant for any third-class city owning and operating a combined electric and water plant may elect to come under its provisions. Settle v. Jones, 306 Ky. 9 , 206 S.W.2d 59, 1947 Ky. LEXIS 946 ( Ky. 1947 ).

Cited:

Henderson v. Thomy, 307 Ky. 783 , 212 S.W.2d 303, 1948 Ky. LEXIS 831 ( Ky. 1948 ); Brown v. Harrodsburg, 252 S.W.2d 44, 1952 Ky. LEXIS 979 ( Ky. 1952 ); Cumberland Valley Rural Electric Cooperative Corp. v. Cox, 332 S.W.2d 534, 1960 Ky. LEXIS 153 ( Ky. 1960 ).

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Classification of city from third to second class, continued operation of combined electric and water system under KRS 96.171 to 96.188 .

96.172. Ordinance of city adopting provisions of KRS 96.171 to 96.188 for operation of combined electric and water plant — Electric and water plant board — Appointment — Qualifications — Corporate powers — Prohibition of nepotism — Bond of board members — Oath — Term — Removal.

  1. Any municipality now or hereafter owning and operating an electric system and a water system and operating them as one (1) combined system or plant may elect to operate such systems as an electric and water plant under the provisions of KRS 96.171 to 96.188 by enacting an ordinance declaring therein the desire and intention of the municipality to accept and operate its electric and water system or plant under the provisions of KRS 96.171 to 96.188 and by providing in said ordinance that the municipality accepts and agrees to all of the provisions of KRS 96.171 to 96.188. The ordinance shall further authorize the mayor or chief executive to appoint a board, subject to the approval of the appointments by the governing body of the municipality. Upon the passage of such ordinance the mayor or chief executive of any such municipality shall, with the approval of the governing body of the municipality, appoint a board of public utilities, consisting of five (5) citizens, taxpayers, voters, and users of electric energy or water. Said board shall be appointed and qualified before the municipality shall have any authority to proceed further under the provisions of KRS 96.171 to 96.188. Said board, when so appointed and qualified, shall be and hereby is declared to be a body-politic and corporate, with perpetual succession; and said board may contract and be contracted with, sue and be sued, in and by its corporate name, and have and use a corporate seal. The name of the board shall be “Electric and Water Plant Board of the City of  _____________________________________________________________________ , Kentucky.”
  2. No person shall be appointed a member of the board who has, within two (2) years next before his appointment, held any public office, or who is related within the third degree to the mayor or any member of the governing body of the municipality.
  3. Neither the board, nor the superintendent appointed by the board as provided in KRS 96.176 , shall appoint to any subordinate office which it may create, nor employ in any capacity any person who is related within the third degree to any member of the board or to the superintendent or to the mayor of said municipality or to any member of the governing body of the municipality. No officer or employee of a municipality shall be eligible for such appointment until at least one (1) year after the expiration of the term of his office or employment.
  4. The members of the board shall be citizens, taxpayers, voters, and users of electric energy or water, and shall not at the time of their appointment be indebted to the municipality either directly or indirectly or be surety on the official bond of any officer of said municipality.
  5. If at any time during his term of office a member of the board becomes a candidate for or is elected or appointed to any public office, he shall automatically vacate his membership from the board, and another person shall be appointed to his place.
  6. Each member of said board shall execute bond, in an amount required by the governing body of the municipality by resolution or ordinance, conditioned upon the faithful performance of their official duties. The surety on said bonds shall be a surety company qualified to do business in Kentucky. The cost of said bonds shall be charged as an operating expense and paid by the board.
  7. Each member of the board shall qualify by taking the oath required by Section 228 of the Constitution.
  8. The original appointees shall serve two (2) for one (1) year, one (1) for two (2) years, one (1) for three (3) years and one (1) for four (4) years, respectively, from the date of their appointment, as the said mayor or chief executive officer of the municipality shall designate. Successors to retiring members so appointed shall be appointed for a term of four (4) years in the same manner, prior to the expiration of the term of office of the retiring members. Appointments to complete unexpired terms shall be made in the same manner as original appointments.
  9. Any member of the board may be removed from office upon a vote of a majority of the members of the governing body of the municipality for inefficiency, neglect of duty, misfeasance, nonfeasance, or malfeasance in office.

History. Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 212, §§ 2, 4, 6; 2014, ch. 92, § 157, effective January 1, 2015.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

Powers granted to the water and electric plant board by this section do not violate Const., § 2 or § 3 since the governing body of the city has supervision and control over the board and the classifications made for selection of board members and other employees was not arbitrary and unreasonable. Settle v. Jones, 306 Ky. 9 , 206 S.W.2d 59, 1947 Ky. LEXIS 946 ( Ky. 1947 ).

Restrictions on appointments and employments prescribed by this section do not violate Const., § 3 as such restrictions are not arbitrary or unreasonable. Settle v. Jones, 306 Ky. 9 , 206 S.W.2d 59, 1947 Ky. LEXIS 946 ( Ky. 1947 ).

2. Passage of Ordinance.

Ordinance adopting provisions of KRS 96.171 to 96.188 did not require two-thirds vote of common council for passage as required under KRS 85.110 (repealed) since that section relates to salaries paid out of the general fund and does not apply to salaries to be paid out of the proceeds from the operation of the plant. Settle v. Jones, 306 Ky. 9 , 206 S.W.2d 59, 1947 Ky. LEXIS 946 ( Ky. 1947 ).

3. Electric and Water Plant Board.

Where city of third class turned over management of its public utilities to a utility board the former employees of the city were employees of the board from the time of the board’s inception since the board was empowered under subsection (3) of KRS 96.173 and subsection (2) of KRS 96.176 to select its own employees and the city was absolved from liability under subsection (3) of KRS 96.173 for the payment of any of the board’s employees and a prior ordinance of the city providing time and a half for Sunday work by its employees was no longer effective. Chumley v. Cox, 311 S.W.2d 185, 1958 Ky. LEXIS 177 ( Ky. 1958 ).

The electric and water plant board is by this section a “body politic and corporate” with power to sue and be sued and has control of funds derived from its operation and a plaintiff is not required to furnish it notice under KRS 411.110 relating to actions against a city as a prerequisite to filing suit against the board for personal injuries. McIntosh v. Electric & Water Plant Board, 394 S.W.2d 471, 1965 Ky. LEXIS 186 ( Ky. 1965 ).

4. City Classification Changed.

When the classification of a city of the third class is changed to that of a second-class city, KRS 96.165 continues in force the status of the board of an electric and water plant established pursuant to this section. McIntosh v. Electric & Water Plant Board, 394 S.W.2d 471, 1965 Ky. LEXIS 186 ( Ky. 1965 ).

Cited in

Ky. Exec. Branch Ethics Comm'n v. Wooten, 2014 Ky. App. LEXIS 158 (Oct. 3, 2014).

Opinions of Attorney General.

A city has no authority to establish an employee’s pension plan under the operation of the combined electric, water and sewer systems of the city by the electric plant board organized under the T. V. A. Act, particularly where the plan would involve an insurance company handling the pension fund. OAG 68-19 .

Neither the Kentucky Constitution nor the statutory provisions provide that a member of an electric and water plant board may hold over after his term expires; therefore such a person cannot remain as a member of the board, until his successor is appointed by the mayor and the city commission, after the four-year term to which he had been appointed has expired. OAG 78-801 .

Where a statute requires, in effect, the joint approval of the mayor and the city commission in connection with appointments to the electric and water plant board, and where the commission refuses to confirm a person nominated by the mayor, the mayor must nominate someone else and must continue to do so until the city commission agrees with his selection. OAG 78-801 .

A city council member has the same right to inspect the records of the city’s electric plant board as does a member of the plant board or any other member of the general public, except that a member of the city council and a member of the plant board are not subject to the exemptions listed in KRS 61.878 , and a member of either body can inspect the records of the electric plant board but neither can require that lists of records be made for him which are not already in existence. OAG 80-369 .

Research References and Practice Aids

ALR

Board of corporate body, liability on official bond of individual member of, for nonperformance or improper performance of duty imposed upon. 123 A.L.R. 756.

96.173. Salaries of board members and secretary-treasurer — All salaries and expenses payable from revenues of plant.

  1. The salary of each member of the board shall be fixed by the board, and shall not exceed two thousand four hundred dollars ($2,400) per annum.
  2. Such salaries, as well as the salary of the secretary-treasurer of such board, shall constitute a cost of operation and maintenance of the plant.
  3. The municipality shall not be liable for the payment of any salary or compensation of any of the members of said board, or for the payment of the salary or compensation or expenses of any person employed by said board, and all such salaries, compensation and expenses and any and all liabilities, of whatever kind or character incurred by the board or any officer or employee thereof, shall be payable solely and only out of the revenues obtained by said board under the provisions of KRS 96.171 to 96.188 , and said liabilities shall be so limited.

History. Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 212, § 3; 1978, ch. 328, § 2, effective June 17, 1978; 1986, ch. 325, § 1, effective July 15, 1986.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Passage of Ordinance.

Ordinance adopting provisions of KRS 96.171 to 96.188 did not require two-thirds vote of common council for passage as required under KRS 85.110 (repealed) since that section related to salaries paid out of the general fund and did not apply to salaries to be paid out of the proceeds from the operation of the plant. Settle v. Jones, 306 Ky. 9 , 206 S.W.2d 59, 1947 Ky. LEXIS 946 ( Ky. 1947 ).

96.174. Quorum of board — Officers — Meetings — Bylaws and rules of procedure.

A majority of the board shall constitute a quorum and the board shall act by vote of a majority present at any meeting attended by a quorum. Vacancies in the board shall not affect its power or authority so long as a quorum remains. Within ten (10) days after appointment and qualification of members, the board shall hold a meeting and elect a chairman. The board shall at the same time elect a secretary-treasurer, and shall fix his compensation, which, together with his compensation as a member of the board, shall not exceed one thousand five hundred dollars ($1,500) per annum. The secretary may be removed by the board for cause. The board shall hold public meetings at least once each month, at such regular time and place as the board may determine. Any special meeting of the board may be called by the chairman or by two (2) members; but if such special meeting is called, written notice shall be sent to all members by the secretary. Except as otherwise expressly provided in KRS 96.171 to 96.188 , the board shall establish its own bylaws and rules of procedure.

History. Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 212, § 5.

Research References and Practice Aids

ALR

Validity, construction, and application of statutes making public proceedings open to the public. 38 A.L.R.3d 1070.

96.175. Powers of board.

Any board operating under the provisions of KRS 96.171 to 96.188 shall have the legal power and capacity to perform any act not repugnant to law and shall have the express power and capacity to do any and all acts or things necessary or convenient for the carrying out of the purposes of KRS 96.171 to 96.188 , including, but not by way of limitation, the following express powers:

  1. Acquire property, real and personal, tangible and intangible, necessary or incident to the proper conduct of its business.
  2. Operate, maintain, improve and extend the electric and water plant, and provide electric and water service to any user or consumer within and without the boundaries of any municipality, and charge and collect reasonable rates therefor.
  3. Fix and determine classifications, rates and charges for services; provided, however, the rates and charges so fixed and determined at all times shall be sufficient to produce revenues sufficient to pay all operating expenses, interest, and bond requirements, sinking fund requirements, adequate depreciation reserves, taxes, or payments in lieu of taxes, and reserves for contemplated extensions and improvements.
  4. Construct, lease, operate and control any and all works, lines, buildings and other facilities across, along or under any street or public highway, and over any lands which are now or may be the property of the Commonwealth or of any county or municipality within this Commonwealth. The board shall, however, at its own expense, restore any such street or highway to its former condition and state as nearly as may be possible and shall not use the same in a manner as to impair its usefulness or to interfere with or obstruct the maintenance thereof. Before exercising these powers the board shall obtain a permit or consent or approval in writing from the governing authority of the municipality, or the fiscal court, or the Department of Highways, having appropriate jurisdiction over any and all of such respective streets or public highways.
  5. Accept gifts, grants of property, real or personal, including money, from any person, municipality, or federal agency, and to accept voluntary and uncompensated services; provided, however, that when engineering services are required by the board no engineer or firm with which he is associated who is engaged in whole or in part in the business of buying or selling any electric or water equipment, machinery, fixtures, materials, supplies, or the sale or purchase of bonds shall be eligible for employment or for any service whatsoever under the provisions of KRS 96.171 to 96.188 .
  6. Contract debts and borrow money for the improvement and extension of any electric and water plant or for the refinancing of any existing bonded indebtedness on the property or any portion thereof, issue bonds therefor, provide for the rights of holders of the bonds and to secure the bonds as hereinafter provided, and pledge all or any of the net revenue derived from the electric and water plant to the payment of such debts or repayment of money borrowed.
  7. The title to any property, real or personal, which the board may acquire shall vest in the municipality for the use and benefit of the electric and water system. The board shall have the power to sell or otherwise dispose of any personal property used or useful in the operation of the electric and water system which may be or become obsolete or otherwise determined by the board not to be necessary in the operation of the electric and water system. Any bill of sale or other instrument of conveyance shall be executed by the chairman of the board and attested by the secretary of the board.
  8. Make contracts and execute instruments containing such covenants, terms and conditions as in the discretion of the board may be proper, necessary or advisable for the purpose of obtaining loans from any source, or grants, loans or other financial assistance from any governmental agency; make all other contracts and execute all other instruments as in the discretion of the board may be advisable in or for the furtherance of the operation, maintenance, improvement or extension of any electric and water plant and the furnishing of service; and carry out and perform the covenants, terms, and conditions of all such contracts or instruments, as well as all contracts and instruments in existence and effect at the time of the transfer of the property to the board as herein provided.
  9. Enter on any lands, waters and premises for the purpose of making surveys, soundings and examinations in connection with the operation, maintenance, improvement or extension of any electric and water plant and the furnishing of service.
  10. Do all acts and things necessary or convenient to carry out the powers expressly given in KRS 96.171 to 96.188 , except sell, convey or mortgage the real property.
  11. Make any contracts necessary or convenient for the full exercise of the powers herein granted, including, but not limited to, contracts for either the purchase or sale or both the purchase and sale of electric energy or power; and, in connection with any such contract with a governmental agency, the board may stipulate and agree to such covenants, terms, and conditions as it deems appropriate, including, but without limitation, covenants, terms, and conditions with respect to the resale rate, financial and accounting methods and the manner of disposing of the revenues or any part thereof derived from the operation of the plant as herein provided.
  12. Acquire by purchase or the exercise of eminent domain all lands, easements, rights of way, either upon or under or above the ground, reasonably necessary or desirable in connection with the operation, maintenance or extension of an electric and water plant.
  13. The board shall have the power to accept the provisions of and conduct its operations under the provisions of the Kentucky Workers’ Compensation Act.
  14. The board shall have the power to establish, create, provide and maintain a pension plan for its employees, and to pay out of operating revenues, as an operating expense, such portion of the cost of the creation and maintenance of such pension plan as may be properly payable by the board.

History. Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 212, § 7.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

This section does not vest board with legislative powers in violation of Const., § 160 as the board functions as an administrative body vested with discretion to carry out legislative intent. Settle v. Jones, 306 Ky. 9 , 206 S.W.2d 59, 1947 Ky. LEXIS 946 ( Ky. 1947 ).

This section does not violate Const., § 2 or 3. Settle v. Jones, 306 Ky. 9 , 206 S.W.2d 59, 1947 Ky. LEXIS 946 ( Ky. 1947 ).

2. Construction.

This section must be construed in connection with the limitation imposed by KRS 96.186 that no competition with rural electric cooperative corporations is allowed to electric and water plant boards. Cumberland Valley Rural Electric Cooperative Corp. v. Cox, 332 S.W.2d 534, 1960 Ky. LEXIS 153 ( Ky. 1960 ).

3. Holder of Legal Title.

Where the board of the electric and water plant had agreed to purchase revenue bonds issued by the city to raise funds for the construction of a hospital annex and did purchase and retire them, the city held a quasi-trusteeship of the naked legal title for the use and benefit of the board so that neither the city nor any taxpayer thereof was a real party in interest entitled to bring a suit to set aside a deed from city commissioners to a private corporation which was to operate a nonprofit hospital. Frankfort v. Silent Workers Circle of Kings Daughters & Sons, Inc., 548 S.W.2d 178, 1977 Ky. App. LEXIS 652 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).

Cited:

Perkins v. Frankfort, 276 S.W.2d 449, 1955 Ky. LEXIS 422 ( Ky. 1955 ); Norrell v. Electric & Water Plant Board, 557 S.W.2d 900, 1977 Ky. App. LEXIS 843 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Since title to any property acquired by a city plant board shall vest in the city for the use and benefit of the electric and water system, the plant board is exempt from taxation pursuant to Ky. Const., § 170 as public property used for public purposes. OAG 83-345 , modifying OAG 83-160 to the extent such opinion assumes that the plant board is liable for taxes.

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Permit required for construction of electric power lines along or across highway, KRS 416.140 .

ALR

Power of fire, water or health commission or the like to employ attorney. 2 A.L.R. 1212.

Temporary suspension of service, duty to notify patron in advance of. 52 A.L.R. 1078.

Power of board to appoint officer or make contract extending beyond its own term. 70 A.L.R. 794; 149 A.L.R. 336.

Power of boards or officials to depart from literal requirements in respect of deposits or loans of public funds in their control. 104 A.L.R. 623.

Discrimination between property within and that outside municipality or other governmental district as to public service or utility rates. 4 A.L.R.2d 595.

Power of eminent domain as between state and subdivision or agency thereof, or as between different subdivisions or agencies themselves. 35 A.L.R.3d 1293.

Initiative and referendum provisions, ordinance regulating utility rates as within operation of. 72 A.L.R.3d 1030.

Requirement that public contract be awarded on competitive bidding as applicable to contract for public utility. 81 A.L.R.3d 979.

96.176. Board to control plant — Employees — Rates and practices — Engineer — Contract.

  1. Upon and after a board has been appointed and qualified, the said board shall have charge of the exclusive supervision, management and control of the operation, maintenance and extension of the electric and water plant.
  2. All powers of the municipality to operate, maintain, improve and extend, and to furnish electric and water service, shall be exercised on behalf of the municipality by the board. The board shall employ all employees, fix their duties and compensation, and shall determine programs and make all determinations as to the operation, maintenance, improvement and extension of the electric and water plant, shall determine and fix the rates to be charged for the classes of service rendered, shall determine all financial practices, shall establish rules and regulations such as it deems necessary or appropriate to govern the operation of the plant and the furnishing of electric and water service, and shall collect all moneys from the operation, maintenance, improvement and extension of the electric and water plant and the furnishing of electric and water service and disburse same in the manner and for the purposes hereinafter provided.
  3. The board in the operation of such system may, in its discretion, engage the services of a professional engineer, qualified by education, training and experience in the operation, maintenance, improvement and extension of electric and water systems, as supervising engineer, upon terms and conditions of service such as may be satisfactory to the board. The employment of any such engineer shall be by written contract, which shall specify the services to be rendered by such person, and the compensation to be paid. Any such contract may be terminated upon sixty (60) days’ notice by either party. The board may, in its discretion, require of such person so engaged a bond, in a sum to be determined and approved by the board, conditioned upon his faithful performance of the services to be rendered by him under and by virtue of such employment. A copy of any such contract shall be filed in the office of the city clerk.
  4. A copy of the schedule of the current rates and charges in effect from time to time, and a copy of all rules and regulations of the board relating to electric and water service shall be kept on public file at the main and all branch offices of the electric and water plant board and also in the office of the municipal clerk.
  5. All contracts shall be let by the board, and all contracts for the purchase of materials, equipment and supplies in excess of five thousand dollars ($5,000) shall be let only after competitive bidding; provided, however, when any materials, equipment or supplies be not available in the open market, such materials, equipment and supplies may be purchased without competitive bidding. All contracts shall be in the corporate name of the board, and shall be signed by the chairman or vice chairman of the board, and attested by the secretary or treasurer of the board. The board shall make and keep or cause to be made and kept full and proper books and records.

History. Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 212, § 8; 1952, ch. 44, §§ 1, 2; ch. 209, § 1; 1978, ch. 238, § 1, effective June 17, 1978.

96.177. Charge for service furnished to city.

The board shall charge the municipality and all departments and works thereof for any electric and water service furnished to them at the rate applicable to other customers taking service under similar conditions. Revenues derived from such service shall be treated as other revenues.

History. Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 212, § 9.

96.178. Eminent domain.

Any board proceeding under KRS 96.171 to 96.188 shall have the right to acquire by the exercise of the power of eminent domain, all lands, easements, rights of way, either upon or under or above the ground, reasonably necessary or desirable in connection with the operation, maintenance, improvement or extension of its electric and water plant. The condemnation or eminent domain proceedings shall be brought in the name of the board, and proceed in the form and manner now prescribed for the condemnation of land by the Eminent Domain Act of Kentucky.

History. Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 212, § 10; 1976, ch. 190, § 44.

Compiler’s Notes.

The Eminent Domain Act of Kentucky is compiled as KRS 416.540 to 416.680 .

Research References and Practice Aids

ALR

Right to condemn property in excess of needs for particular public purpose. 6 A.L.R.3d 297.

Power of eminent domain as between state and subdivision or agency thereof, or as between different subdivisions or agencies themselves. 35 A.L.R.3d 1293.

Validity of appropriation of property for anticipated future use. 80 A.L.R.3d 1085.

Unsightliness of power line or other wire, or related structure, as element of damages in easement condemnation proceeding. 97 A.L.R.3d 587.

96.179. Payment of tax equivalent.

In lieu of taxes, the board may each year pay to each school district and municipality in which its property is located an amount equivalent to an annual ad valorem tax on the fair cash value of the property of the board located in each such jurisdiction, determined upon the tax rate prevailing in such year.

History. Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 212, § 11; repealed and reenact., Acts 1990, ch. 476, Pt. V, § 300, effective July 13, 1990.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

Perkins v. Frankfort, 276 S.W.2d 449, 1955 Ky. LEXIS 422 ( Ky. 1955 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

As used in this section, the “fair cash value” of the board’s property means the price it would bring at a fair voluntary sale. OAG 83-160 .

The intent of this section appears to be to exempt the plant board from state and county taxes if it chooses to make in lieu payments to the cities and school districts. The statute requires the plant board to make in lieu payments to the school districts and municipalities at the same rate as it would pay the ad valorem taxes of their districts; consequently, there appears to be no difference in the amount of money paid to the school districts and municipalities whether or not the plant board chooses to make in lieu payments or not. OAG 83-160 , modified by OAG 83-345 .

This section clearly states that the amount a plant board must pay in lieu of taxes is a specific, certain amount and there is no provision in this section for paying less than this amount. The board must pay this equivalent amount in full to each district. OAG 83-160 , modified by OAG 83-345 .

Since title to any property acquired by a city plant board shall vest in the city for the use and benefit of the electric and water system, the plant board is exempt from taxation pursuant to Ky. Const., § 170 as public property used for public purposes. OAG 83-345 , modifying OAG 83-160 to the extent such opinion assumes that the plant board is liable for taxes.

96.180. Pension plan for employees — Repeal of ordinances establishing pension fund — Liquidation and distribution of assets — Report — Coverage provided in County Employees Retirement System after August 1, 1988.

  1. The board may, by proper order, provide a pension plan for its employees. In the event the board elects to provide a pension plan, it shall determine and formulate the form of pension plan to be used; determine and prescribe the eligibility of employees or their dependents to a pension or other benefits; determine and prescribe the monthly allowance or pension for employees or their dependents so determined to be eligible for a pension or benefits under the pension plan, not to exceed, however, a sum equal to one-half (1/2) of the monthly salary or wages of any employee at the time of his or her retirement; appoint a commission, which shall consist of three (3) members possessing the qualifications of a member of the board, for the administration of the pension plan and prescribe the powers and duties of such commission; appoint a trustee of the pension fund, fix the term of his office and the compensation of such trustee, and prescribe the powers and duties of such trustee and do and perform any other or further acts necessary to effectuate such pension plan. When a pension plan shall have been adopted, a commission appointed to administer such plan and a trustee of the pension fund appointed and qualified, the board may annually appropriate and pay out of its operating revenue, as an operating expense, into the sinking fund, a sum sufficient, when determined on a fair actuarial basis, to maintain the pension plan so adopted, not exceeding, however, a sum equal to one-half of one percent (0.5%) of the fair value of the utility property and assets. The board may assess, and cause to be paid into the pension fund monthly, such amount or percent of the salary of all employees eligible under and electing to accept the pension plan as may be equitably determined on a fair actuarial basis, not to exceed, however, five percent (5%) of the monthly salary of any employee. The trustee of the pension fund shall give such bond as required by the board, the cost of which shall be payable out of the pension fund. The trustee of the pension fund shall each year file with the board a report showing his actions and his accounts as such trustee.
  2. The board shall have full power to receive any and all funds of property which may be available or become available to the board or the city for use in the creation or maintenance of a pension plan for the employees of the board, including but not limiting the power to sign, execute and deliver such receipts, indemnity agreement or other writing which either the board or the city may be required to sign, execute and deliver to obtain any such fund or property for such purpose.
  3. If all liabilities to all individuals entitled to benefits from the pension fund established under this section have been satisfied, the ordinances establishing the fund may be repealed by the majority vote of the entire board. If repealed, the fund’s trustees shall, within sixty (60) days of repeal, proceed with the liquidation of any residual assets of the fund. All residual assets liquidated pursuant to this subsection shall be distributed by the trustees to the board’s general fund so long as the return of assets complies with federal and state law governing the distribution of assets. Within thirty (30) days following the distribution of residual assets, the trustees of the fund shall as its last act file a complete report with the board of the actions taken to terminate the fund and liquidate residual assets of the fund.
    1. After August 1, 1988, except as permitted by KRS 65.156 , no new pension fund shall be created pursuant to this section and boards which were covered by this section on or prior to August 1, 1988, shall participate in the County Employees Retirement System effective August 1, 1988. (4) (a) After August 1, 1988, except as permitted by KRS 65.156 , no new pension fund shall be created pursuant to this section and boards which were covered by this section on or prior to August 1, 1988, shall participate in the County Employees Retirement System effective August 1, 1988.
    2. Any board which provided a pension plan for its employees on or prior to August 1, 1988, shall place employees hired after August 1, 1988, in the County Employees Retirement System. The board shall offer employees hired on or prior to August 1, 1988, membership in the County Employees Retirement System under the alternate participation plan as described in KRS 78.530(3), but such employees may elect to retain coverage under this section.

History. Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 212, § 12; 1964, ch. 19; 1984, ch. 177, § 11, effective July 13, 1984; 1988, ch. 11, § 10, effective July 15, 1988; 2016 ch. 31, § 34, effective July 15, 2016.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former KRS 96.180 (3290-43) was renumbered as KRS 96.189 .

Opinions of Attorney General.

A city has no authority to establish an employe’s pension plan under the operation of the combined electric, water and sewer systems of the city by the electric plant board organized under the T.V.A. Act, particularly where the plan would involve an insurance company handling the pension fund. OAG 68-19 .

A municipal electric and water plant board can, by resolution, convert from its present pension system for employees, authorized by this section, to the county employees retirement system (CERS), pursuant to KRS 78.531 . OAG 84-119 .

96.181. Deposit and disbursement of funds.

All moneys derived from the operation of the electric and water plant or any other operation of the board, shall be deposited to the credit of the board in a separate bank account or accounts, separate from all other municipal funds, and adequate records shall be kept of all such receipts and their sources. All withdrawals and payments from said fund, as well as any other fund which may be created, shall be only pursuant to appropriate action of the board, and the voucher, warrant or check withdrawing or paying out any part of said fund shall be signed by the treasurer or chairman of the board.

History. Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 212, § 13.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

McIntosh v. Electric & Water Plant Board, 394 S.W.2d 471, 1965 Ky. LEXIS 186 ( Ky. 1965 ).

96.182. Application of funds derived from operations — Use of surplus.

Subject to the provisions of outstanding bonds and contracts, the board shall apply all funds derived from operations: (1) to the payment of operating expenses, (2) to the payment of bond interest and retirement, (3) to sinking fund requirements, (4) to the maintenance of a fund to meet depreciation and the improvements and extension of the plant in an amount equal to six percent (6%) of the undepreciated book value of its property, (5) to the maintenance of a cash working fund equal to one (1) month’s revenue, (6) to the payment of other obligations incurred in the operation and maintenance of the plant and the furnishing of service, and (7) such taxes, if any, as the board may elect to pay under the provisions of KRS 96.179 , and any surplus revenues at the end of any twelve (12) months ending June 30 shall be transferred to the sinking fund, and used by the board only for the redemption or purchase of outstanding bonds, in which case such bonds shall be canceled, or for the creation and maintenance of a cash working fund, or the creation and maintenance of a fund for improvement and extension of the system, or for the reduction of rates, or the board, after the original cost of the property shall have been fully paid and satisfied may, in its sole discretion, use, apply and pledge all or a part of such surplus revenues for the acquisition, construction, maintenance, improvement, addition to and operation of any “public project” as the same is defined in subsection (1) of KRS 58.010 , or for the purpose of purchasing, paying, retiring, guaranteeing the payment of or underwriting revenue bonds issued by the city or any agency thereof to finance the acquisition, construction, maintenance, improvement, addition to and operation of such “public project,” which “public project” shall be located within the territory served by the board; the board is hereby vested with all of the powers, duties and responsibilities delegated and granted to a “governmental agency” under KRS 58.020 to 58.140 , both inclusive; provided, however, that the acquisition or construction of any “public project” as above defined, shall be first approved by the common council before such “public project” is undertaken.

History. Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 212, § 14; 1952, ch. 44, § 4; 1954, ch. 249, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

If the title of an act sets out the number of the section to be amended it is sufficiently in accord with Const., § 51 requiring the subject of an act to be expressed in the title; thus Acts 1954, ch. 249, § 1 entitled “An act relating to utilities in cities of a third class, and amending sections 96.182 and 96.184 of the Kentucky Revised Statutes” complied with Const., § 51. Perkins v. Frankfort, 276 S.W.2d 449, 1955 Ky. LEXIS 422 ( Ky. 1955 ).

The 1954 amendment to this section giving specific statutory authority to the board, in its sole discretion, to use, apply and pledge all or part of its surplus revenue for the purpose of purchasing, paying, retiring, guaranteeing the payment of or underwriting revenue bonds issued by a city of the third class or any agency thereof was not special legislation. Perkins v. Frankfort, 276 S.W.2d 449, 1955 Ky. LEXIS 422 ( Ky. 1955 ).

The proposal of an electric and water plant board operating under KRS 96.171 to KRS 96.188 to issue its revenue bonds to be payable solely from revenue, other than taxes, derived from rates and charges of services and not secured by lien on physical property of the electric and water systems and to use the proceeds of these bonds to purchase city revenue bonds issued under KRS ch. 58 to obtain funds to finance acquisition and construction by city of hospital building, recreational and parking facilities and to pledge the board’s surplus funds to the payment of its own bonds with the city bonds it purchases to be used as additional security is authorized by this section and would not create an indebtedness in violation of Const., §§ 157, 158. Perkins v. Frankfort, 276 S.W.2d 449, 1955 Ky. LEXIS 422 ( Ky. 1955 ).

2. Authority to Purchase Bonds at Private Sale.

The legislature may change the public policy as announced by the courts and the legislature by this section gives specific authority to the board to purchase bonds of a city at private sale for a negotiated price without violating the general public policy of the Commonwealth requiring cities, in most instances, to dispose of public property by competitive bids after reasonable advertisement of sale. Perkins v. Frankfort, 276 S.W.2d 449, 1955 Ky. LEXIS 422 ( Ky. 1955 ).

Cited:

McIntosh v. Electric & Water Plant Board, 394 S.W.2d 471, 1965 Ky. LEXIS 186 ( Ky. 1965 ).

96.183. Termination of operation under KRS 96.171 to 96.188.

The governing body of the municipality may terminate the operation and management of the electric and water plant by the board under the provisions of KRS 96.171 to 96.188 only by first complying with the following provisions, to wit:

  1. The governing body of the municipality, upon the adoption of an ordinance declaring the desire of the municipality to terminate the operation of the electric and water plant by the board under the provisions of KRS 96.171 to 96.188 , may direct that such question be submitted to an election of the qualified voters of the municipality. The mayor shall certify such ordinance to the county clerk not later than the second Tuesday in August preceding the next general election, who shall have prepared to be placed before the voters in the general November election, the question: “Are you in favor of the termination of the operation and management of the electric and water system of the city by the Electric and Water Plant Board?” The voters shall be instructed to indicate a “Yes” or a “No” vote.
  2. The mayor of such municipality shall advertise such election and the object thereof by publication pursuant to KRS Chapter 424, and also by printed handbills posted in not less than four (4) conspicuous places in each voting precinct in the city and at the courthouse door. All legal voters of such city shall be privileged to vote at such election.
  3. If two thirds (2/3) of all the qualified voters of the municipality voting in said general election on the question shall vote in the affirmative, the governing body of the municipality may adopt an ordinance rescinding its election to operate under the provisions of KRS 96.171 to 96.188 , and the board, on the first day of the month following the passage and approval of such ordinance, shall by resolution transfer the operation of the electric and water plant to the governing body of the municipality.

History. Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 212, § 15; 1952, ch. 44, § 5; 1966, ch. 239, § 90; 1978, ch. 384, § 220, effective June 17, 1978; 1982, ch. 360, § 25, effective July 15, 1982; 1996, ch. 195, § 45, effective July 15, 1996.

96.184. Revenue bonds.

  1. The board at any time may issue and sell revenue bonds to finance improvements or extensions of the plant, or the board, after the original cost of the property shall have been fully paid and satisfied, may, in its sole discretion, issue, sell, and pledge its revenues to secure the payment of revenue bonds the proceeds of which are to be used to finance the acquisition, construction, maintenance, improvement, addition to, and operation of “public projects” as defined in KRS 96.182 , or for the purpose of purchasing, paying, retiring, guaranteeing the payment of, or underwriting revenue bonds issued by the city or any agency of the city to finance the acquisition, construction, maintenance, improvement, addition to, and operation of a public project, and sell refunding bonds for the purpose of providing for the payment of any outstanding bonds.
  2. Bonds issued pursuant to KRS 96.171 to 96.188 may be issued in one or more series, may bear a date or dates, may mature at a time or times, not exceeding forty (40) years from their respective dates, may be in a denomination or denominations, may be in a form, either coupon or registered, may carry registration and conversion privileges, may be executed in a manner, may be payable in a medium of payment, at a place or places, may be sold in blocks, may be subject to terms of purchase or redemption of all or any of the bonds before maturity in a manner and at a price or prices as may be fixed by the board by resolution prior to the sale of the bonds.
  3. All revenue bonds issued pursuant to the provisions of KRS 96.171 to 96.188 in the hands of bona fide holders shall have all the qualities and incidents of negotiable instruments under the law merchant. All bonds shall be sold to the highest responsible bidder at the time and place as fixed by the board in the notice of sale of the bonds, which notice shall have been advertised by publication pursuant to KRS Chapter 424. The board shall receive written, sealed, competitive bids, which shall be publicly opened and read at the time and place specified in the notice of sale. The board may reject all bids and readvertise.
  4. No holder or holders of any revenue bonds issued under KRS 96.171 to 96.188 shall have the right to compel any exercise of taxing power of the municipality to pay the bonds or the interest on the bonds. Each bond issued under KRS 96.171 to 96.188 shall recite in substance that the bond, including interest on the bonds, is payable solely from the revenues pledged to the payment of the bond, and that the bond does not constitute a debt of the municipality within the meaning of any statutory or constitutional provision or limitation.
  5. Any holder or holders of bonds issued pursuant to KRS 96.171 to 96.188 shall have the right, in addition to all other rights:
    1. By action in court, to enforce his or their rights against the board, and any other proper officer, agent, or employee, including, but without limitation, the right to require the board, and any proper officer, agent, or employee of the board, to fix and collect rates and charges adequate to carry out any agreement as to, or pledge of, revenues from the plant, and to require the board and any officer, agent, or employee of the board, to carry out any other covenants or agreements and to perform its and their duties under KRS 96.171 to 96.188 .
    2. By action in equity, to enjoin any act or thing which may be unlawful or a violation of the rights of the holder of bonds.
  6. If there is a default in the payment of the principal or interest of any bonds issued pursuant to KRS 96.171 to 96.188 , any court having jurisdiction may, upon the petition of the holders of not less than twenty-five percent (25%) of the outstanding bonds, appoint a receiver to administer the electric plant on behalf of the board, with power to charge and collect rates sufficient to provide for the payment of any bonds or obligations outstanding against the plant and for the payment of the operating expenses and to apply the income and revenues in conformity with KRS 96.171 to 96.188 .
  7. All bonds issued pursuant to KRS 96.171 to 96.188 , bearing the signatures of officers in office on the date of the signing of the bonds, shall be valid and binding obligations, notwithstanding that before the delivery and payment of the bonds, any or all the persons whose signatures appear on the bonds shall have ceased to be members of the board issuing the same. The resolution of the board authorizing the issuance of the bonds shall contain a recital that the revenue bonds are issued pursuant to KRS 96.171 to 96.188 , which recital shall be prima facie evidence of their validity and of the regularity of their issuance.
  8. Bonds may be issued under KRS 96.171 to 96.188 without respect to the provisions of any laws requiring the prior approval of any court, commission, board, or regulatory authority.
  9. All moneys received from the sale and issuance of bonds shall be used solely for the purpose for which the bonds were issued, except that any premium received for the bonds may be used for the payment of interest and principal of the bonds.

History. Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 212, § 16; 1954, ch. 249, § 2; 1966, ch. 239, § 91; 1996, ch. 274, § 18, effective July 15, 1996.

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

See notes to KRS 96.182 under heading 1. Constitutionality, Perkins v. City of Frankfort, 276 S.W.2d 449, 1955 Ky. LEXIS 422 (Ky. App. 1955).

ALR

Unlawfully issued bond, liability of municipality for money received for. 7 A.L.R. 353.

Estoppel as to purpose of bonds by recitals therein. 86 A.L.R. 1086; 158 A.L.R. 938.

Revenue bonds or other bonds not creating indebtedness as within constitutional or statutory requirement of prior approval by electors of issuance of bonds or incurring indebtedness by municipality. 146 A.L.R. 604.

Limitation of actions: when limitations begin to run against actions on public securities or obligations to be paid out of a special or particular fund. 50 A.L.R.2d 271.

96.185. Books and records — Audit — Inspection.

The board shall keep a complete and accurate record of all meetings and actions taken, and of all receipts and disbursements. Such records shall be open to inspection at any and all times to the governing body of the city. An audit of the board’s records shall be made annually by a certified public accountant to be selected by the board, and the expense of such audit shall constitute an operating expense and be paid as such by the board. The board shall furnish a copy of such audit to the common council when requested so to do.

History. Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 212, § 17.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

Nicholasville v. Blue Grass Rural Electric Cooperative Corp., 514 S.W.2d 414, 1974 Ky. LEXIS 300 ( Ky. 1974 ).

96.186. Not to compete with REA corporation.

No board operating an electric and water plant under the provisions of KRS 96.171 to 96.188 shall construct any facilities or extend its existing facilities in competition with any existing facilities of any rural electric cooperative corporation.

History. Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 212, § 18.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Construction.

KRS 96.175 , permitting a city to operate and extend an electric and water plant, and to provide electric and water services to any user or consumer within and without the boundaries of a city, must be construed in connection with the limitation imposed by this section which is designed to protect not only the affected utility, but consumers as well. Cumberland Valley Rural Electric Cooperative Corp. v. Cox, 332 S.W.2d 534, 1960 Ky. LEXIS 153 ( Ky. 1960 ).

96.187. Limitation on action attacking proceedings.

Any action challenging the validity of any ordinance electing to operate under KRS 96.171 to 96.188 , or any bond resolution of the board, or any election resolution or election held hereunder, shall be brought within sixty (60) days from the date on which such ordinance, election resolution or bond resolution was adopted or election held, as the case may be, and, if not brought within said time, shall be forever barred.

History. Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 212, § 19.

96.188. Effective date of ordinance or resolution under KRS 96.171 to 96.188.

Every ordinance or resolution adopted by the governing body of the municipality or board under the provisions of KRS 96.171 to 96.188 shall become effective from and after its passage, and no such resolution or ordinance shall be subject to any referendum or election except as expressly provided in KRS 96.171 to 96.188 .

History. Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 212, § 20.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

Farmers Rural Electric Cooperative Corp. v. Glasgow, 415 S.W.2d 85, 1967 Ky. LEXIS 297 ( Ky. 1967 ).

Powers of City of 8,000 or More Concerning Utility Services and Utility Companies

96.189. Acquisition of transportation system by city.

  1. Any city may, pursuant to an ordinance so providing, acquire any streetcar system existing in the city, with all its appliances, or may establish and install a streetcar system, and may operate within and not more than ten (10) air miles beyond the corporate limits of the city, improve and extend a system so acquired or installed upon the terms and conditions as may be provided by ordinance and by the terms of the contract by which the system is acquired or installed. Any city may acquire, establish, and install a street omnibus or taxicab system, and operate it upon the terms and conditions as are prescribed by ordinance.
  2. To provide for the financing of the streetcar system or street omnibus or taxicab line, the city may issue bonds at not less than par and accrued interest, to bear interest at a rate or rates or method of determining rates as the city determines, payable at least annually, and to mature at any time not exceeding twenty (20) years after their date, and may provide for a sinking fund to meet the bonds at their maturity. No bonds shall be issued except in compliance with the general law in reference to the amount of indebtedness that may be incurred by the city, nor until after a vote is taken as required by law to authorize the incurring of indebtedness.

HISTORY: 3290-43: amend. Acts. 1968, ch. 29, § 1; 1996, ch. 274, § 19, effective July 15, 1996; 3290-43: amend. Acts. 1968, ch. 29, § 1; 1996, ch. 274, § 19, effective July 15, 1996; 2014, ch. 92, § 158, effective January 1, 2015; 2019 ch. 44, § 16, effective June 27, 2019.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

Chrisman v. Cumberland Coach Lines, 249 S.W.2d 782, 1952 Ky. LEXIS 865 ( Ky. 1952 ); Youtsey v. County Debt Com., 501 S.W.2d 266, 1973 Ky. LEXIS 132 ( Ky. 1973 ).

Research References and Practice Aids

ALR

Unlawfully issued bond, liability of municipality for. 7 A.L.R. 353.

Undelivered bonds or other obligations authorized but not delivered prior to adoption or effective date of tax limitation provision as affected by such provision. 109 A.L.R. 961.

Bond issue in excess of amount permitted by law, validity of, within authorized debt, tax or voted limit. 175 A.L.R. 823.

Power of municipal corporation to limit exclusive use of designated lanes or streets to buses and taxicabs. 43 A.L.R.3d 1394.

96.190. Power of city to furnish utility services — Power to regulate rates and service of utilities operating under old franchises.

  1. The legislative body of any city may provide the city and all persons in the city with water, gas, electric power, light, and heat, by contract with any person or by works and facilities owned or leased by the city and located within or beyond the city boundaries.
  2. In all cases where the person furnishing the services is operating under a charter or franchise granted by the General Assembly prior to the adoption of the present Constitution of Kentucky the city legislative body may make and enforce rules and regulations for the furnishing and sale of such services, fix and regulate the quality, character and standards of such services, and fix and regulate the rates charged consumers for such services.

History. 3490-8, 3490-10, 3490-36; 2000, ch. 101, § 3, effective July 14, 2000; 2014, ch. 92, § 159, effective January 1, 2015.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Power to Furnish Utility Service.

City is authorized to install lighting plant to light its streets and public places, and incidentally to supply light to its inhabitants. Overall v. Madisonville, 125 Ky. 684 , 102 S.W. 278, 31 Ky. L. Rptr. 278 , 1907 Ky. LEXIS 329 ( Ky. 1907 ), overruled, Payne v. Covington, 276 Ky. 380 , 123 S.W.2d 1045, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 549 ( Ky. 1938 ).

City is authorized to acquire utility plant by pledging revenue derived from the plant, without obligating itself to take portion of product, but merely giving it option to do so upon same rates as charged to inhabitants. Reconstruction Finance Corp. v. Richmond, 249 Ky. 787 , 61 S.W.2d 631, 1933 Ky. LEXIS 602 ( Ky. 1933 ).

City had authority to acquire additional machinery and equipment for its municipally owned electric light plant and to pay therefor by issuance of bonds payable solely from fixed portion of revenue of plant. Security Trust Co. v. Paris, 264 Ky. 846 , 95 S.W.2d 781, 1936 Ky. LEXIS 408 ( Ky. 1936 ).

2. — Purpose.

Subsection (1) of this section authorizes city to acquire and operate the utility service mentioned therein, primarily to serve its inhabitants. Reconstruction Finance Corp. v. Richmond, 249 Ky. 787 , 61 S.W.2d 631, 1933 Ky. LEXIS 602 ( Ky. 1933 ).

3. Proprietary Capacity of City.

In the operation of its waterworks, the city is acting in its proprietary capacity. Electric Plant Board v. Mayfield, 299 Ky. 375 , 185 S.W.2d 411, 1945 Ky. LEXIS 420 ( Ky. 1945 ).

4. Regulation of Rates.

City, having power to grant franchise including power to fix terms thereof, is authorized to fix rates either in the franchise ordinance or in subsequent ordinance, where such right is reserved in the former, irrespective of whether there is general power to fix rates. Central Kentucky Natural Gas Co. v. Mt. Sterling, 32 F.2d 338, 1928 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1747 (D. Ky. 1928 ).

Ordinance prescribing allegedly confiscatory rates for natural gas did not violate United States Const., Amend. 14 against deprivation of property without due process of law, where it provided for judicial determination of reasonableness of rates and did not impose penalties pending hearing, especially where utility agreed to procedure by accepting franchise. Central Kentucky Natural Gas Co. v. Mt. Sterling, 32 F.2d 338, 1928 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1747 (D. Ky. 1928 ).

Rate ordinance did not impair obligation of franchise in violation of United States Const., Art. I, § 10, where franchise ordinance accepted by company provided that council, after granting franchise and without hearing or investigation, might enact rate ordinance which it deemed reasonable. Central Kentucky Natural Gas Co. v. Mt. Sterling, 32 F.2d 338, 1928 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1747 (D. Ky. 1928 ).

Subsection (2) of this section does not empower city to coerce public corporations to contract with it upon reasonable terms, but merely empowers it to regulate rates and service being rendered under franchises granted prior to adoption of Constitution of 1891. Ludlow v. Union Light, Heat & Power Co., 231 Ky. 813 , 22 S.W.2d 909, 1929 Ky. LEXIS 375 ( Ky. 1929 ).

During the period between the expiration of an old utility franchise granted by a city and the effective date of the new franchise, the chancellor may adjudge reasonable rates to be charged, and the rates so fixed may be the same as if the old franchise were still in force. Union Light, Heat & Power Co. v. Covington, 282 Ky. 558 , 139 S.W.2d 64, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 208 ( Ky. 1940 ).

A provision in a utility franchise granted by a city, that the utility should lower its rates whenever its rates charged in an adjoining city were lowered, was valid and was not an abdication or delegation of the rate-making power. Union Light, Heat & Power Co. v. Covington, 282 Ky. 558 , 139 S.W.2d 64, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 208 ( Ky. 1940 ).

The power of cities to contract with respect to utility rates does not deprive the state of its police power of regulation; but this power was not exercised before June 14, 1934, when general laws governing public utilities were enacted, and therefore contracts made before that date are valid. Union Light, Heat & Power Co. v. Covington, 282 Ky. 558 , 139 S.W.2d 64, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 208 ( Ky. 1940 ).

When city supplied current outside its corporate limits, its exemption from regulation as to rates and service by the public service commission ceased and the city came within the jurisdiction of the commission and was subject to such regulation by it but commission should have required city to make its rates reasonable and service adequate instead of granting REC certificate of convenience and necessity to supply such service until a court of competent jurisdiction holds that the city was acting ultra vires in rendering this service. Olive Hill v. Public Service Com., 305 Ky. 249 , 203 S.W.2d 68, 1947 Ky. LEXIS 801 ( Ky. 1947 ), limited, Cold Spring v. Campbell County Water Dist., 334 S.W.2d 269, 1960 Ky. LEXIS 223 ( Ky. 1960 ), overruled, McClellan v. Louisville Water Co., 351 S.W.2d 197, 1961 Ky. LEXIS 160 ( Ky. 1961 ).

5. Termination of Franchise.

Upon termination of franchise contract between city and natural gas company at end of 20 years, company had reasonable time to remove its property from streets, and could be compelled to make such removal. Ludlow v. Union Light, Heat & Power Co., 231 Ky. 813 , 22 S.W.2d 909, 1929 Ky. LEXIS 375 ( Ky. 1929 ).

6. Compelling Continuance of Service.

Notwithstanding KRS 278.010 through 278.450 railroad commission was without jurisdiction to compel natural gas company to continue its service, in view of Const., § 164 vesting in city the granting of franchise rights in streets. Ludlow v. Union Light, Heat & Power Co., 231 Ky. 813 , 22 S.W.2d 909, 1929 Ky. LEXIS 375 ( Ky. 1929 ).

7. Issuance of Bonds.

Proposed bonds payable solely out of fixed portion of revenues of municipally owned electric light plant would not constitute indebtedness of city in violation of Const., §§ 157 and 158. Security Trust Co. v. Paris, 264 Ky. 846 , 95 S.W.2d 781, 1936 Ky. LEXIS 408 ( Ky. 1936 ).

Proposed refunding bonds having all characteristics of and being payable in same manner as outstanding certificates theretofore issued to purchase additional machinery for city’s municipally owned electric light plant were authorized. Security Trust Co. v. Paris, 264 Ky. 846 , 95 S.W.2d 781, 1936 Ky. LEXIS 408 ( Ky. 1936 ).

A city of the fourth class may issue bonds, in anticipation of deficits, to pay off waterworks improvement bonds when they mature, if it provides that the new bonds shall not be sold except when necessary to meet deficits, and that they shall not begin to bear interest until after interest ceases to run on the bonds paid off by them. First & Peoples Bank v. Russell, 279 Ky. 849 , 132 S.W.2d 304, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 355 ( Ky. 1939 ).

8. Payments by City for Water.

Ordinance obligating city to pay out of corporate funds into special fund charges made against it by waterworks plant did not create indebtedness under Const., § 157, where city did not undertake to use any specific amount of water, but merely to pay for such water as it used at rates charged other users. Kentucky Utilities Co. v. Paris, 248 Ky. 252 , 58 S.W.2d 361, 1933 Ky. LEXIS 195 ( Ky. 1933 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

A fourth-class city may acquire a natural gas system located within or beyond the city boundaries under the provisions of this section. OAG 73-219 .

Under this section a city may set up a utility commission pursuant to an ordinance, and the ordinance could require the commission members to be residents of the city or it could allow nonresidents to be members. OAG 74-487 .

A city has the authority to not only create a commission to acquire and operate city utility services but to abolish such a commission provided its existence is not part of the contract between the city and the utility bondholders. OAG 77-694 .

A city has the authority to supply water service at flat rates rather than meter rates, but the city should not establish a water rate based on the number of occupants or residents in the household. OAG 79-449 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Energy and utility regulatory commission, regulation of rates by, KRS 278.040 , 278.200 , 278.270 .

Kentucky Law Journal.

Meuth, The Development of Financing Public Improvements by Kentucky Municipalities, 25 Ky. L.J. 230 (1937).

Kentucky Law Survey, Morris, Municipal Law, 70 Ky. L.J. 287 (1981-82).

ALR

Liability of municipal corporation for damages for maintenance of sewer disposal plant as nuisance. 40 A.L.R.2d 1198.

Municipality’s liability for damage resulting from obstruction or clogging of drains or sewers. 59 A.L.R.2d 281.

Sewer or drain, municipality’s liability arising from negligence or other wrongful act of its officer, agent, or employe in carrying out construction or repair of. 61 A.L.R.2d 874.

Liability of water distributor for damage caused by water escaping from main. 20 A.L.R.3d 1294.

Propriety of injunctive relief against diversion of water by municipal corporation or public utility. 42 A.L.R.3d 426.

Right of municipality to refuse services provided by it to resident for failure of resident to pay for other unrelated services. 60 A.L.R.3d 714.

Liability of one excavating in highway for injury to public utility cables, conduits or the like. 73 A.L.R.3d 987.

Applicability of rule of strict liability to injury from electrical current escaping from power line. 82 A.L.R.3d 218.

96.195. City may issue interest-bearing warrants for improvements and extensions to electric power plants or waterworks.

Municipal corporations in the Commonwealth of Kentucky which own and operate municipal electric power plants or waterworks are authorized to issue interest-bearing warrants in payment for extensions and improvements to electric power plants or waterworks. The warrants shall bear interest at the rate or rates or method of determining rates as the legislative body of the municipal corporation determines and be due not more than five (5) years from date. They shall be payable only out of the income from the operation of the electric power plants or waterworks.

History. Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 241; 1996, ch. 274, § 20, effective July 15, 1996; 2014, ch. 92, § 160, effective January 1, 2015.

Research References and Practice Aids

ALR

Negotiability of municipal warrants. 36 A.L.R. 949.

Right of one accepting invalid bonds in exchange for valid warrants, to recover the value of such warrants. 93 A.L.R. 447.

Tax anticipation warrants, constitutionality of statute authorizing or requiring payment of. 99 A.L.R. 1039.

96.200. Use of profits from city-owned public utility.

Except as otherwise provided in KRS 96.550 to 96.900 , the legislative body of any city may, by ordinance, provide in what manner and for what purpose any profits, earnings or surplus funds arising from the operation of any public utility owned or operated by the city may be used and expended. The ordinance may be amended or repealed from time to time. Until such an ordinance is enacted any surplus earnings shall be paid into the city treasury, to be expended for the general purposes of government in the city.

HISTORY: 3490-35: amend. Acts 1960, ch. 231; 3490-35: amend. Acts 1960, ch. 231; 2014, ch. 92, § 161, effective January 1, 2015; 2019 ch. 44, § 17, effective June 27, 2019.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Payment of Tax Equivalents by Waterworks Board.

City of fourth class has authority to require its waterworks board to pay reasonable tax equivalents, and the amounts so paid may be charged as operating expenses in determining whether the profits from the plant exceed a fair return such as to require a reduction of rates to consumers. Electric Plant Board v. Mayfield, 299 Ky. 375 , 185 S.W.2d 411, 1945 Ky. LEXIS 420 ( Ky. 1945 ).

2. Fire Hydrant Rental.

Where waterworks of fourth-class city had a surplus over and above the amount necessary to meet the requirements of KRS 96.430 and 96.440 , the city council had the right to make a retroactive reduction of fire hydrant rental rate paid by the city to the waterworks board. Electric Plant Board v. Mayfield, 299 Ky. 375 , 185 S.W.2d 411, 1945 Ky. LEXIS 420 ( Ky. 1945 ).

3. Surplus Revenue.

A city of the fourth class, under this section has no authority to withdraw any sum of money from the revenues of its water plant until funds sufficient to meet the requirements of KRS 96.430 and 96.440 have been set aside. Electric Plant Board v. Mayfield, 299 Ky. 375 , 185 S.W.2d 411, 1945 Ky. LEXIS 420 ( Ky. 1945 ).

Under authority of this section, a city of the fourth class operating a waterworks has authority to transfer, to the general fund of the city, any surplus revenues of the waterworks remaining after meeting the requirements of KRS 96.430 and 96.440 , at least to the extent such surplus revenues do not exceed a fair return on the property used and usable. Electric Plant Board v. Mayfield, 299 Ky. 375 , 185 S.W.2d 411, 1945 Ky. LEXIS 420 ( Ky. 1945 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

This section does not authorize a municipal legislative body to use a portion of the surplus funds of its municipally owned water utility as a donation to a local private swimming pool corporation in the amount of the corporation’s monthly water bill, since such use would not be for a public purpose. OAG 67-228 .

The limitations of KRS 58.070 must be observed in respect to transferring any surplus funds derived from the combined water and sewer system to the city’s general fund. OAG 68-548 .

A municipal water and sewer commission could loan surplus funds to the city on a short time basis provided sufficient revenue is maintained to cover not only the principal and interest on the utility’s bonds but also operating and maintenance costs. OAG 70-669 .

Unless limited by the provisions of a waterworks bond issue a city may transfer excess funds in a waterworks account to the general fund of the city within the limits of this section and used for public corporate purposes. OAG 72-449 .

Profits in connection with the operation of a public utility by a city are not prohibited, and the General Assembly intended that such profits, if any, be used to supplement the city’s general fund. OAG 78-656 .

96.210. Power of fifth-class city to furnish water and light. [Repealed.]

The legislative body of any city of the fifth class may contract for supplying the city with water and light.

History. 3637-1; § 314.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3637-1) was repealed by Acts 2014, ch. 92, § 314, effective January 1, 2015.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Waterworks and Electric Plant.

City having power “to contract” for supplying city with water and light, is empowered to own and maintain waterworks and electric light plant for use of inhabitants, and to sell bonds to construct and maintain it. Fidelity Trust & Safety Vault Co. v. Mayor, etc. of Morganfield, 96 Ky. 563 , 29 S.W. 442, 16 Ky. L. Rptr. 647 , 1895 Ky. LEXIS 126 ( Ky. 1895 ), overruled, Belknap v. Louisville, 99 Ky. 474 , 36 S.W. 1118, 18 Ky. L. Rptr. 313 , 1896 Ky. LEXIS 122 ( Ky. 1896 ); Swann v. Murray, 146 Ky. 148 , 142 S.W. 244, 1912 Ky. LEXIS 36 ( Ky. 1912 ).

Fifth-class cities have authority hereunder to buy engines for their water and light plants. Bardwell v. Southern Engine & Boiler Works, 130 Ky. 222 , 113 S.W. 97, 1908 Ky. LEXIS 258 ( Ky. 1908 ).

2. Maintenance of Fire Department.

City had authority to purchase fire extinguishing hose, since this section included power and authority to maintain fire department with necessary equipment. Fabric Fire Hose Co. v. Louisa, 253 Ky. 407 , 69 S.W.2d 726, 1934 Ky. LEXIS 672 ( Ky. 1934 ).

96.220. Power of sixth-class city to furnish water and light. [Repealed.]

The legislative body of any city of the sixth class may contract for supplying the city with water and light.

History. 3704-1; § 314.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3704-1) was repealed by Acts 2014, ch. 92, § 314, effective January 1, 2015.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Power to Own Public Utilities.

Under KRS 88.080 sixth-class cities may acquire electric light plants for lighting the streets, and may sell surplus current to citizens, but may not acquire plants solely for the purpose of selling to citizens. In the latter event bonds issued to pay for same would violate Const., §§ 157 and 158 even though in the form of revenue bonds. Juett v. Williamstown, 248 Ky. 235 , 58 S.W.2d 411, 1933 Ky. LEXIS 218 ( Ky. 1933 ).

City has the power to purchase, own and operate a gas plant and issue bonds for payment thereof, even though it is manifest that the primary purpose in the purchase and operation is to supply its streets and public buildings and places with light and as a secondary purpose to sell the surplus privately and apply the revenues to a retirement of the bonds. Cook v. North Middletown, 275 Ky. 338 , 121 S.W.2d 719, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 428 ( Ky. 1938 ).

2. Regulation of Rates.

In view of KRS 88.080 (repealed) empowering town trustees to pass ordinance and enact local police, sanitary and other regulations, city could by ordinance fix rates chargeable by natural gas utility to which franchise had been granted. Johnson County Gas Co. v. Stafford, 198 Ky. 208 , 248 S.W. 515, 1923 Ky. LEXIS 408 ( Ky. 1923 ).

Waterworks in Cities of the First Class

96.230. City of the first class or consolidated local government to control waterworks.

Whenever any city of the first class or consolidated local government owns, through its commissioners of the sinking fund or revenue commission, respectively, all the shares of capital stock in any corporation engaged in supplying water to its inhabitants, the city or consolidated local government shall control, manage, and operate the plant of the corporation, its franchise, and all its other property, in the manner provided in KRS 96.240 to 96.310 . The provisions of KRS 96.230 to 96.310 shall not affect the status of the stock as part of the assets of the sinking fund or revenue commission, respectively.

History. 3024a-1, 3024a-5; 2002, ch. 346, § 108, effective July 15, 2002.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

KRS 96.230 to 96.310 permitting first-class city to control waterworks and creating board of waterworks to acquire all stock of existing waterworks company, and operate company for benefit of city, did not create private corporation to conduct private business in violation of Const., § 59; nor was it special legislation in violation of Const., § 59, being applicable to all cities that were then or might thereafter be embraced in given class, although Louisville was only existing city in that class. Kirch v. Louisville, 125 Ky. 391 , 101 S.W. 373, 30 Ky. L. Rptr. 1356 , 1907 Ky. LEXIS 294 ( Ky. 1907 ).

2. Water Company Entity Separate.

A water company is a distinct corporate entity separate and apart from the city owning all its stock and has the legal right to contract with the board of waterworks of the city to furnish the city and its inhabitants with water and the court has no right to interfere with the price or rates agreed on between the parties so long as such rates are not exorbitant or unreasonable. Dolan v. Louisville Water Co., 295 Ky. 291 , 174 S.W.2d 425, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 232 ( Ky. 1943 ).

3. — Agent of City.

Although KRS 96.260 gives the Louisville Water Company corporate powers and enables it to sue and be sued, this section makes the Louisville Water Company an agent of the city, and where the Louisville Fire Department, due to an inoperable fire hydrant, was unable to extinguish a fire at plaintiff’s house, even though the fire department relied upon the Louisville Water Company to maintain the hydrants, the water company was not an indispensable party under the circumstances of this case and the city was properly held responsible for plaintiff’s loss. Barber v. Louisville, 777 S.W.2d 919, 1989 Ky. LEXIS 82 ( Ky. 1989 ).

4. Refunding Bonds.

Bonds, secured by mortgage and income of waterworks company, all of whose stock had been acquired by city, issued by waterworks board of city to refund bonds previously issued by company, were not invalidated by failure to submit question to vote of people under Const., §§ 157 and 158. Gaulbert v. Louisville, 97 S.W. 342, 30 Ky. L. Rptr. 50 (1906).

Cited:

Board of Comm’rs v. Yunker, 239 S.W.2d 984, 1951 Ky. LEXIS 928 ( Ky. 1951 ), overruled, Louisville Water Co. v. Public Service Com., 318 S.W.2d 537, 1958 Ky. LEXIS 141 ( Ky. 1958 ), overruled in part, Louisville Water Co. v. Public Service Com., 318 S.W.2d 537, 1958 Ky. LEXIS 141 ( Ky. 1958 ); Burkholder v. Louisville, 276 S.W.2d 29, 1955 Ky. LEXIS 411 ( Ky. 1955 ).

Research References and Practice Aids

ALR

Right to compel municipality to extend its water system. 48 A.L.R.2d 1222.

Liability of water distributor for damage caused by water escaping from main. 20 A.L.R.3d 1294.

Water distributor’s liability for injury due to condition of service lines, meters, and the like, which serve individual consumer. 20 A.L.R.3d 1363.

Propriety of injunctive relief against diversion of water by municipal corporation or public utility. 42 A.L.R.3d 426.

Electricity, gas, or water furnished by public utility as “goods” within provision of Uniform Commercial Code, Article 2 on sales. 48 A.L.R.3d 1060.

Liability for overflow of water confined or diverted for public water power purposes. 91 A.L.R.3d 1065.

96.240. Board of waterworks — Appointment — Qualifications — Term — Oath.

The mayor of a consolidated local government which is formed upon the consolidation of a city of the first class with its county, and which receives upon the consolidation from the city of the first class the shares of capital stock in any corporation engaged in supplying water to the area comprising the consolidated local government, shall appoint, subject to the provisions of KRS 67C.139 , six (6) persons, no more than three (3) of whom shall be members of the same political party, who with the mayor as an ex officio member shall constitute a body corporate known as the “board of waterworks.” Each appointee shall be at least thirty (30) years of age and shall be a resident of the county containing a consolidated local government and be the owner in his or her own right of real estate situated in the consolidated local government. At least one (1) such appointee shall be qualified, as specified in KRS 96.250 , to serve as president of the board. No officer or employee of the consolidated local government, whether holding a paid or unpaid office, shall be eligible for appointment to the board. Of the persons first appointed, two (2) shall be appointed for a term of two (2) years, two (2) for a term of three (3) years, and two (2) for a term of four (4) years, and such terms shall expire on the date of the annual meeting of the board of waterworks. Their successors shall be appointed in the same manner, but for terms of four (4) years each. Appointees shall be eligible to succeed themselves. All vacancies shall be filled for the unexpired term by appointment in the same manner. Each member shall hold his office until his or her successor has been appointed and qualified. The oath of office of each member shall be filed with the board of the revenue commission of the consolidated local government.

History. 3024a-2, 3024a-3: amend. Acts 1964, ch. 32, § 1; 2002, ch. 346, § 109, effective July 15, 2002.

96.250. Officers of board of waterworks — Employees.

The board of waterworks shall annually elect a president, treasurer, secretary and chief engineer, who shall hold their offices for one (1) year, or until their successors have been elected and qualified, and devote all their time to the duties of their respective offices. The member elected president shall have had at least five (5) years executive or major administrative experience in public utility operation or administration. The offices of secretary and treasurer may at the election of the board, be combined in one (1) person. No member of the board except the president shall receive a salary, but the board may allow reasonable compensation to each member other than the president for attendance upon the meetings of the board. The president shall be elected from the members of the board. The president, secretary and treasurer, or the secretary-treasurer if the offices are combined in one (1) person, shall each give bond, with approved surety, in an amount fixed by the board, payable to the board and conditioned that the makers will faithfully perform the duties of their several offices. The board may appoint such other employees as it deems necessary or proper and may fix the compensation of its officers and employees, provided, however, the board shall not be bound in fixing the compensation or providing for retirement benefits by the provisions of KRS 78.530 and 65.156 .

History. 3024a-4: amend. Acts 1950, ch. 41; 1964, ch. 45, § 1; 1988, ch. 75, § 2, effective July 15, 1988.

96.260. Powers of board.

The board of waterworks shall be vested with all the authority and privileges, exercise all the franchises, and have possession, control, and management of all the property, of the corporation of which the consolidated local government or city owns all the stock. It may make contracts and sue and be sued, but only in the name of the corporation.

History. 3024a-5; 2002, ch. 346, § 110, effective July 15, 2002.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Proprietary Functions.

Employment of experts to investigate and audit present value and needs of waterworks company whose capital stock was owned by city, preparatory to change in its form of management, was action of proprietary and not of governmental nature, notwithstanding expense had to be raised by taxation. Audit Co. v. Louisville, 185 F. 349, 1911 U.S. App. LEXIS 3993 (6th Cir. Ky. 1911 ).

2. Agency Relationship.

Although this section gives the Louisville Water Company corporate powers and enables it to sue and be sued, KRS 96.230 makes the Louisville Water Company an agent of the city, and where the Louisville Fire Department, due to an inoperable fire hydrant, was unable to extinguish a fire at plaintiff’s house, even though the fire department relied upon the Louisville Water Company to maintain the hydrants, the water company was not an indispensable party under the circumstances of this case and the city was properly held responsible for plaintiff’s loss. Barber v. Louisville, 777 S.W.2d 919, 1989 Ky. LEXIS 82 ( Ky. 1989 ).

Where the legislature made clear that the Louisville Water Company, through the Board of Waterworks, was prohibited from contracting or acting on behalf of the city, such was not characteristic of an agency relationship, and such language was evidence that the city did not control the contractual endeavors of Louisville Water Company, and was therefore not responsible for any liabilities incurred therefrom. Phelps v. Louisville Water Co., 103 S.W.3d 46, 2003 Ky. LEXIS 85 ( Ky. 2003 ).

Cited:

Veail v. Louisville & Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer Dist., 303 Ky. 248 , 197 S.W.2d 413, 1946 Ky. LEXIS 830 ( Ky. 1946 ); Burkholder v. Louisville, 276 S.W.2d 29, 1955 Ky. LEXIS 411 ( Ky. 1955 ).

96.265. Extension of service to persons not currently served — Costs — Assessments — Apportionment warrants — Liens.

The board of waterworks may extend the waterwork corporation’s facilities to provide water service to persons within and outside the city of the first class, including extensions into counties adjoining its county of origin. In extending service to persons not presently served within the city and county of the waterwork corporation’s origin it may, but is not required to, make water line extensions recovering the cost thereof, KRS 96.539 notwithstanding, by assessment as provided in this section.

  1. The board of waterworks, acting on its own motion, may hold a public hearing to consider the extension of the waterwork corporation’s facilities to provide water service to persons not currently served. Alternatively, in response to a petition signed by the majority of owners in an area not currently served by the waterwork corporation’s service, which petition shall describe the area proposed to be served, the board of waterworks shall hold a public hearing to consider the benefits of extending its service to that area. Notice of the hearing shall be published in accordance with KRS Chapter 424. The board of waterworks shall designate a member of the board or an officer of the waterworks corporation to preside over the hearing. Following the public hearing, the board of waterworks shall determine whether it is feasible and beneficial to extend its service. If the board of waterworks determines that it is feasible and beneficial to extend its service, it shall refer the matter to the legislative body governing the area to which service shall be extended. If the legislative body determines that service should be extended, it shall pass an ordinance providing for the extension of service.
  2. The costs of such extension shall be apportioned by the ordinance against the property to which the waterwork corporation’s service will be made available by reason of such extension according to an equitable basis, considering the size, configuration, and suitability as building sites of the lots or tracts to be served. Any of the following methods, or a combination thereof, may be used:
    1. The costs of such extension may be apportioned according to the number of square feet in any lot or tract abutting the publicly-dedicated right-of-way in which the water line extension is located. The rate of apportionment shall be the same for each square foot in any lot or tract abutting a publicly-dedicated right-of-way in which a water line extension is located, except the portions of any such lot or tract which lie a distance greater than a number of feet, as stated in the ordinance, from the water line extension, or which lie within a number of feet, as stated in the ordinance, from an existing water line located in a publicly-dedicated right-of-way which also abuts such lot or tract, shall not be subject to assessment nor included in the calculations of the square footage of such lot or tract. The rate of apportionment shall be determined by dividing the costs of the extension by the assessable area of all lots or tracts abutting the publicly-dedicated right-of-way in which a water line extension is located.
    2. The costs of such extension may be assessed against the lots or tracts according to the number of feet in the lot or tract fronting on the publicly-dedicated right-of-way in which a water line extension is located. The rate of apportionment shall be the same for each such foot of frontage, and shall be determined by dividing the assessable costs of the water line extension by the total front footage of all lots or tracts fronting on the part of the publicly-dedicated right-of-way in which a water line extension is located.
    3. The costs of such extension may be assessed against the lots or tracts abutting publicly-dedicated rights-of-way in which water line extensions are located according to the value of any such lot or tract, without regard to any improvements on such lots or tracts, as determined as of the date of the most recent assessment by the property valuation administrator of the county in which such lots or tracts are located. The rate of apportionment shall be the same for each dollar of assessed value of lots or tracts abutting the parts of the publicly-dedicated right-of-way in which the water line extension is located, except portions of such lots or tracts that are a distance greater than a number of feet, as stated in the ordinance, from the water line extension or that are within a number of feet, as stated in the ordinance, from an existing water line of the corporation located in a publicly-dedicated right-of-way which also abuts such lot or tract shall not be assessed. The value of any lot or tract, portions of which are excluded from assessment, shall be determined by multiplying the value of the entire property by a ratio, the numerator of which is the number of square feet of the lot or tract to be assessed and the denominator of which is the number of square feet in the entire lot or tract. The rate of apportionment shall be determined by dividing the assessable costs of the water line extension by the total assessed value of all assessable lots or tracts abutting the parts of the publicly-dedicated rights-of-way in which water line extensions are located.
    4. The costs of such extension may be assessed against the lots or tracts that may be served by the extension at a rate that is the same for each such lot or tract, where each such lot or tract is suitable for or limited to a single building site.
    5. If any lots or tracts abut on more than one (1) dedicated right-of-way in which a water line extension is made, such lots or tracts shall be assessed as if they abutted on only one (1) such right-of-way.
    6. In the event of a subdivision of a lot or tract assessed under this section, which subdivision requires a new water line extension, nothing herein shall prohibit the assessment of the newly subdivided lots or tracts, except those that abut a dedicated right-of-way with an existing water line.
  3. The waterwork corporation shall determine the percentage share of the total costs of the extension to be assessed against each lot or tract and shall notify each owner of such share to be assessed against his lot or tract. Any owner may, within thirty (30) days after receiving notice of the method of apportionment or the percentage share of the total costs to be assessed against his property, appeal the percentage share to be assessed against his property by filing a written appeal with the waterwork corporation setting forth the bases for the challenge. The president of the waterwork corporation shall appoint one (1) or more officers of the corporation to review such appeal, which review may include holding a hearing on the appeal. Any determination by the officer or officers that affects only the assessment of the aggrieved property owner shall not require further legislative action. If, however, as a result of the appeal, the hearing officer or officers recommend that the method of apportionment be changed, the matter shall be referred back to the legislative body that passed the ordinance provided for in subsection (1) of this section for consideration of an amendment thereto.
  4. The cost of property service connections from the water line extension to the property line as required shall be assessed against the individual lots or tracts to which such property service connections are furnished. The costs to be assessed for the property service connection shall be fixed by regulation of the board of waterworks based on its experience of costs for such work. No lot or tract owner shall be required to connect to the water line extension by reason of this section, but such failure to connect to the water line extension shall not exempt such lot or tract owner from its proportionate share of the costs as provided in subsection (2) of this section.
  5. All lots or tracts abutting the publicly-dedicated right-of-way in which the water line extension is located shall be assessed as provided in the ordinance, except property dedicated to use for public roadways and property owned by cities of the first class and any joint agencies of cities of the first class and the counties in which such cities are located, if the extension is located in the city of the first class.
    1. The actual construction work to provide the water line extension and property service connections shall be done by, or under the control of, the board of waterworks. (6) (a) The actual construction work to provide the water line extension and property service connections shall be done by, or under the control of, the board of waterworks.
    2. The total cost of the water line extension, which is assessed against property served under subsection (2) of this section, shall include not only the actual construction costs and the costs of any easements required for the water line extension, but also costs of surveys, designs, plans, specifications, notices, inspection, project legal and administrative services, and administration. However, costs included in the assessment which are other than actual construction costs and costs of easements shall not exceed fifteen percent (15%) of the actual construction costs and the costs of any easements of the project.
  6. A lien superior to all liens except the liens for state, county, city, school, and road taxes and liens prior in time for other public improvements shall exist against the respective lots or tracts of land for the cost of the water line extension for apportionment as hereinafter provided and the interest due thereon, commencing with the date of issuance of the apportionment warrant.
  7. Upon completion of the water line extension, the board of waterworks shall issue all apportionment warrants against the properties assessed and shall immediately list the record owners thereof in alphabetical order upon a register kept for that purpose. Each apportionment warrant shall be payable to the waterworks corporation, or its assignee, in equal monthly installments, not exceeding two hundred forty (240) months, of principal and interest and shall be the obligation of the owners of and a lien upon the applicable lots or tracts until paid in full. The apportionment warrants may bear interest at an annual fixed rate as then determined by the board of waterworks pursuant to KRS 58.430 . When the warrant has been paid in full, the holder thereof shall notify the board of waterworks, and it shall mark upon the register the fact of payment and release the lien. If any installment of principal or of interest on the warrant is not paid when due, the holder thereof may foreclose the lien securing the payment of the warrant in the same manner as mortgage liens are foreclosed.
  8. The lien shall exist from the date of the apportionment warrant. The board of waterworks shall cause such warrant or a notice thereof to be recorded in the office of the clerk of the county in which the affected property is located.
  9. After any water line extensions have been constructed in conformity with this section, the board of waterworks shall notify each affected property owner of the cost apportioned to his property at his address as shown at the time the notice is sent on the records of the property valuation administrator for the county in which the affected property is located. Failure of any property owner to receive this notice shall not affect the validity of the lien.
  10. If, by private agreement with the owners of lots or tracts, the waterworks corporation extends its water lines to those lots or tracts, and the private agreement provides for a lien on the lots or tracts to secure payment to the waterworks corporation of the cost of the extension, and a notice of such lien is recorded, that lien shall be superior to all liens except the liens for state, county, city, school, and road taxes and liens prior in time for other public improvements.

History. Enact. Acts 1988, ch. 75, § 1, effective July 15, 1988.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1988, ch. 75, § 1, effective July 15, 1988) was renumbered as KRS 96.265 by the Reviser of Statutes under authority of KRS 7.136 .

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(6/16/94). Pursuant to KRS 7.136(1)(a), this statute has been renumbered from KRS 96.315 to its current number. 1988 Ky. Acts ch. 75, sec. 1, had enacted the statute as a new section of KRS 96.230 to 96.310 , but it was inadvertently codified outside of that range.

96.270. Consolidated local government to receive water without charge — Property to be exempted from taxation.

The consolidated local government shall have, through its board of waterworks, the use free of charge of all the water necessary for its fire department, police department, public buildings principally occupied by its employees, parks, parkways, its property principally used for public purposes, all of its agencies, and any waterfront parks located within the boundaries of the consolidated local government. It shall in turn exempt from taxation for consolidated local government purposes all the property of which it has the control through its board of waterworks. Nothing in this section shall affect the right and duty of the board of waterworks to fix and collect reasonable rates for the use of water furnished to any other person, whether by assessment or meter measurement.

History. 3024a-6; 2002, ch. 346, § 111, effective July 15, 2002.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Application.

This section applies exclusively to cities of the first class. Electric Plant Board v. Mayfield, 299 Ky. 375 , 185 S.W.2d 411, 1945 Ky. LEXIS 420 ( Ky. 1945 ).

2. Compensation Unalterable.

Where construction of interstate highways disrupted the water company’s existing water mains and forced them to construct a new grid system in order to fulfill their statutory obligation to furnish an ample water supply for fire protection, the water company was not entitled to compensation from the highway department for the costs of constructing the new grid system. Commonwealth Department of Highways v. Louisville Water Co., 479 S.W.2d 626, 1972 Ky. LEXIS 311 ( Ky. 1972 ).

3. District Merger.

Where an independent city school district merged with a county school district, the city water company was not required to furnish free water to the schools located within the boundaries of the former city school district and the water company was not only justified but required to bill the county board of education for such water. Board of Education v. Louisville Water Co., 555 S.W.2d 587, 1977 Ky. App. LEXIS 789 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).

Opinions of Attorney General.

A city was liable to a water district for rent upon fire plugs maintained by the water district in the city for the city’s use. OAG 66-209 .

Research References and Practice Aids

ALR

Enforcement against tax-exempt property of tax on nonexempt property or on owner of tax-exempt property. 159 A.L.R. 461.

Prospective use for tax exempt purposes as entitling property to tax exemption. 54 A.L.R.3d 9.

96.280. Consolidated local government to prescribe conditions for use of streets by board.

The legislative body of the consolidated local government may, by ordinance, fix reasonable conditions upon which the board of waterworks may cut into the public ways of the consolidated local government.

History. 3024a-7; 2002, ch. 346, § 112, effective July 15, 2002.

96.290. Debts to be paid by waterworks.

All the existing obligations of the waterworks corporation and all the obligations created by the board of waterworks in the management and operation of the properties and in the performance of its duties, shall be discharged out of the property and rents, earnings, and incomes of the waterworks. The consolidated local government shall not be liable as a municipal corporation for such obligations.

History. 3024a-8; 2002, ch. 346, § 113, effective July 15, 2002.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Agency Relationship.

Where the legislature made clear that the Louisville Water Company, through the Board of Waterworks, was prohibited from contracting or acting on behalf of the city, such was not characteristic of an agency relationship, and such language was evidence that the city did not control the contractual endeavors of Louisville Water Company, and was therefore not responsible for any liabilities incurred therefrom. Phelps v. Louisville Water Co., 103 S.W.3d 46, 2003 Ky. LEXIS 85 ( Ky. 2003 ).

96.300. Ability of board of waterworks to borrow money — Issuance of bonds — Limitation of indebtedness.

The board of waterworks may borrow money for the purpose of meeting any of the obligations of the waterworks corporation and for current expenses of the board. In addition, the board may, after the commissioners of the sinking fund have by resolution consented, issue the bonds of the waterworks corporation or issue bonds for the refunding of bonds of the waterworks corporation, and these bonds may be issued and may be secured by the revenues of the waterworks corporation; by a mortgage upon the rights, privileges, franchises, and property of the corporation; or by both. The bonds may be issued in denominations, with maturities, bear interest, and be payable, as may be in the best interest of the waterworks corporation as determined by the board with the consent of the commissioners of the sinking fund and as otherwise required by the laws of the Commonwealth. No indebtedness, bonded or otherwise, may be authorized or consented to if, as a result of that borrowing, the waterworks corporation’s net aggregate debt service on all outstanding indebtedness in any one year, multiplied by one and three-tenths (1.3), will exceed the corporation’s net income, determined in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles, for the fiscal year immediately preceding the borrowing.

History. 3024a-9: amend. Acts 1992, ch. 72, § 1, effective July 14, 1992.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Issuance of Bonds.

Bonds, secured by mortgage and income of waterworks company all of whose stock had been acquired by city, issued by waterworks board to refund bonds previously issued by company, were not invalidated by failure to submit question to vote under Const., §§ 157 and 158. Gaulbert v. Louisville, 97 S.W. 342, 30 Ky. L. Rptr. 50 (1906).

Cited:

Burkholder v. Louisville, 276 S.W.2d 29, 1955 Ky. LEXIS 411 ( Ky. 1955 ).

96.310. Rules for government of board — Reports.

The board of waterworks may establish and enforce reasonable rules and regulations for its own government. The board shall make a quarterly financial statement, showing its liabilities, receipts, and expenditures, and deliver a copy to the consolidated local government legislative body for introduction and inclusion into the minutes of the legislative body. The books and accounts of the board shall at all times be open to inspection by the mayor and the commissioners of the sinking fund or revenue commission, respectively, through their agents.

History. 3024a-10; 2002, ch. 346, § 114, effective July 15, 2002.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

Burkholder v. Louisville, 276 S.W.2d 29, 1955 Ky. LEXIS 411 ( Ky. 1955 ).

96.315. Extension of service to persons not currently served — Costs — Assessments — Apportionment warrants — Liens. [Renumbered.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1988, ch. 75, § 1, effective July 15, 1988) was renumbered as KRS 96.265 by the Reviser of Statutes under authority of KRS 7.136 .

Waterworks in Cities Other Than Cities of the First Class

96.320. Operation of waterworks in cities — Commissioners of waterworks — Employees — Reports.

Cities that own a waterworks may operate such waterworks as a department of the city, or may appoint a commission to operate such waterworks. If such a commission is appointed, it may be styled “Commissioners of Waterworks,” and shall be composed of from three (3) to six (6) members to be appointed by the mayor, subject to the approval of the city legislative body. If a commission is composed of six (6) members, the mayor shall appoint, in addition to the six (6) members, a member of the legislative body of the city who shall be an ex officio member of the commission. All commissioners shall reside in the area served by the waterworks and be registered voters in the county. A majority of the commissioners shall be residents of the city. The terms of the members shall be fixed by the city legislative body, or they may be appointed for indefinite terms, subject to removal by the city legislative body for cause. The commissioners shall give bond for the faithful performance of their duties in the sum of five thousand dollars ($5,000). The commissioners shall manage the water system of the city. They may appoint a superintendent, secretary, treasurer and other necessary employees and fix their salaries. They shall make full monthly reports to the city legislative body of the operation and condition of the water system, including all receipts and expenditures. A majority of the members of the board shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of business.

History. 3143: amend. Acts 1946, ch. 158; 1952, ch. 146; 1984, ch. 97, § 1, effective July 13, 1984; 2014, ch. 92, § 162, effective January 1, 2015.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Salary of Commissioners.

Under this section the board styled “commissioners of waterworks” is a board operating in the private corporate capacity of the city and the legislature cannot fix a minimum salary for these commissioners. Board of Aldermen v. Hunt, 284 Ky. 720 , 145 S.W.2d 814, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 551 ( Ky. 1940 ).

2. Claim for Water Service.

It was unlawful to refuse to turn on water again in building which purchaser had bought from owner whose water supply had been turned off pursuant to city ordinance for failure to pay rates, where purchaser tendered quarterly payment in advance; claim for water rates being against occupant and not lien on building. Covington v. Ratterman, 128 Ky. 336 , 108 S.W. 297, 32 Ky. L. Rptr. 1225 , 1908 Ky. LEXIS 59 ( Ky. 1908 ).

3. Jurisdiction of Commission.

The Public Service Commission (PSC) has exclusive jurisdiction over the regulation of utility rates and service which extends to a city contracting for the sale and supply of water to a PSC-regulated county water district. Simpson County Water Dist. v. City of Franklin, 872 S.W.2d 460, 1994 Ky. LEXIS 13 ( Ky. 1994 ).

Cited:

Cawood v. Coleman, 294 Ky. 858 , 172 S.W.2d 548, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 515 ( Ky. 1943 ).

Research References and Practice Aids

ALR

Public utility acts as applicable to municipal corporations owning or operating waterworks. 10 A.L.R. 1432; 18 A.L.R. 946.

Park, construction of water supply system in or across. 18 A.L.R. 1265; 63 A.L.R. 484; 144 A.L.R. 502.

Constitutionality of statute or ordinance for protection of supply. 72 A.L.R. 673.

Municipal operation of plant as governmental or proprietary function, for purposes of tort liability. 57 A.L.R.2d 1336.

Liability of water distributor for damage caused by water escaping from main. 20 A.L.R.3d 1294.

Water distributor’s liability for injury due to condition of service lines, meters, and the like, which serve individual consumer. 20 A.L.R.3d 1363.

Propriety of injunctive relief against diversion of water by municipal corporation or public utility. 42 A.L.R.3d 426.

Electricity, gas, or water furnished by public utility as “goods” within provision of Uniform Commercial Code, Article 2 on sales. 48 A.L.R.3d 1060.

96.330. Disposition of revenue from waterworks in city with population of 20,000 or more. [Repealed]

HISTORY: 3104; amend. 2014, ch. 92, § 163, effective January 1, 2015; repealed by 2019 ch. 44, § 35, effective June 27, 2019.

96.340. Punishment for damaging waterworks in city — Connections with pipes or mains. [Repealed]

HISTORY: 3490-30; amend. 2014, ch. 92, § 164, effective January 1, 2015; repealed by 2019 ch. 44, § 35, effective June 27, 2019.

96.350. City of home rule class may acquire and operate waterworks — Sewerage system may be joined.

  1. Any city of the home rule class may, under the provisions of KRS 96.350 to 96.510 , purchase, establish, erect, maintain and operate waterworks, together with extensions and necessary appurtenances thereto, within or without the corporate limits of the city, for the purpose of supplying the city and its inhabitants with water.
  2. A sewerage system may be acquired with a water system and joined in one (1) project with the water system for the purpose of original financing.
  3. KRS 96.350 to 96.510 constitute a method for the acquisition of waterworks by any city of the home rule class in addition or as an alternate to any other method authorized by statute. No proceedings shall be required for the acquisition of any waterworks or the issuance of bonds under KRS 96.350 to 96.510 except the proceedings required by KRS 96.350 to 96.510.

History. 2741L-1, 2741L-19, 2741L-23, 2741L-41: amend. 2014, ch. 92, § 166, effective January 1, 2015.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Construction.

KRS 96.350 to 96.510 create an alternate authority and method of financing the acquisition, extension, addition or improvement of waterworks plants which does not require consent of the electorate through compulsory referendum and to which KRS 96.540 does not apply and where ordinance of city of third class conformed to KRS 96.350 to KRS 96.510 a bond issue approved by a majority of the voters under KRS 89.440 , relating to a referendum on any ordinance of a city of the third class, was valid. Booth v. Owensboro, 275 Ky. 491 , 122 S.W.2d 118, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 462 ( Ky. 1938 ).

This section authorizes a city to construct either a waterworks system or a sewage system or to combine the two in one project but it nowhere provides for the mortgaging of either system for the benefit of the other unless they are joined together at the start. Jones v. Stearns, 275 Ky. 729 , 122 S.W.2d 766, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 500 ( Ky. 1938 ).

This section is sufficiently broad to authorize a sixth-class city to purchase a “water reservoir.” Embry v. Caneyville, 397 S.W.2d 141, 1965 Ky. LEXIS 65 ( Ky. 1965 ).

2. Proprietary Capacity of City.

In the operation of its waterworks, the city is acting in its proprietary capacity. Electric Plant Board v. Mayfield, 299 Ky. 375 , 185 S.W.2d 411, 1945 Ky. LEXIS 420 ( Ky. 1945 ).

City’s water and sewer commissioner was dismissed as a party to plaintiffs’ Clean Water Act citizen suit because it was not an entity that had the capacity to be sued pursuant to KRS 96.350 , Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(b), and 33 U.S.C.S. §§ 1365 and 1362(5). Am. Canoe Ass'n v. City of Louisa Water & Sewer Comm'n, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131652 (E.D. Ky. Feb. 27, 2009).

3. Alternative Methods.

Third-class city desiring to purchase water system and electric system from private corporation which had operated systems together as a single unit for a number of years and was unwilling to sell either system separately was not required to follow either the provisions of KRS 96.350 to 96.510 or the provisions of KRS 96.550 to 96.900 but could rely on the broad statutes, KRS 66.060 , 85.120 and 96.170 passed contemporaneously with KRS 96.350 to 96.510 . Cawood v. Coleman, 294 Ky. 858 , 172 S.W.2d 548, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 515 ( Ky. 1943 ).

4. Issuance of Revenue Bonds.

Argument that revenues from city utilities are needed for current city expenses will not prevent court from approving revenue bonds for reconstruction and extension of utilities, the matter being within the discretion of the city legislative body. Eagle v. Corbin, 275 Ky. 808 , 122 S.W.2d 798, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 507 ( Ky. 1938 ).

Revenue bonds may be issued for a unified waterworks and electric plant, though there are separate statutes relating to electric plants and waterworks, since the authority and procedure under the two statutes are the same. Eagle v. Corbin, 275 Ky. 808 , 122 S.W.2d 798, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 507 ( Ky. 1938 ).

The restrictions of KRS 96.510 , on conveyance or encumbrance of waterworks or lighting system without assent of majority of voters, applies only to existing utility plants and does not apply to proceedings under this act to purchase or construct waterworks and sewage system. Eagle v. Corbin, 275 Ky. 808 , 122 S.W.2d 798, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 507 ( Ky. 1938 ).

The fact that act creating electric system (KRS 96.520 and 96.530 ) referred to certain sections of law concerning water systems for designated classes of cities (KRS 96.350 to 96.510 ) did not in any way change the terms or conditions of the sections which were referred to and provision in act creating electric systems which provided qualifications for members of commission did not become part of act concerning water system, and in the absence of a statute prohibiting city acting in its proprietary capacity city had full right to set out in ordinance creating extension to waterworks system the manner in which the commissioners should be appointed and when bonds were sold under the ordinance the city was bound. Keathley v. Martin, 246 S.W.2d 152, 1951 Ky. LEXIS 1271 ( Ky. 1951 ).

5. — Waterworks.

KRS 96.350 to 96.510 authorizes city to issue revenue bonds to construct extension to existing municipally owned waterworks plant. Bowling Green v. Kirby, 220 Ky. 839 , 295 S.W. 1004, 1927 Ky. LEXIS 603 ( Ky. 1927 ).

City of fifth class had right to construct waterworks system and issue bonds therefor pursuant to this section since KRS 94.160 (repealed) did not take away from cities of fifth and sixth classes authority to acquire waterworks. Williams v. Raceland, 245 Ky. 212 , 53 S.W.2d 370, 1932 Ky. LEXIS 573 ( Ky. 1932 ).

A city of the fourth class may issue bonds, in anticipation of deficits, to pay off waterworks improvement bonds when they mature, if it provides that the new bonds shall not be sold except when necessary to meet deficits, and that they shall not begin to bear interest until after interest ceases to run on the bonds paid off by them. First & Peoples Bank v. Russell, 279 Ky. 849 , 132 S.W.2d 304, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 355 ( Ky. 1939 ).

6. Authority to Obtain Water Outside City.

This section authorizes cities of classes named to obtain water outside city limits and bring it to city. Smith v. Raceland, 258 Ky. 671 , 80 S.W.2d 827, 1935 Ky. LEXIS 218 ( Ky. 1935 ).

7. Authority to Supply Water Outside City.

If city of fifth class has no authority, either statutory or inherent, to extend waterworks beyond city limits, certificate of public service commission under KRS 278.020 could not give that right. Smith v. Raceland, 258 Ky. 671 , 80 S.W.2d 827, 1935 Ky. LEXIS 218 ( Ky. 1935 ) (decision prior to enactment of KRS 96.120 to 96.150 ).

City of fifth class lacks authority to extend its waterworks beyond city limits to supply outside community. Smith v. Raceland, 258 Ky. 671 , 80 S.W.2d 827, 1935 Ky. LEXIS 218 ( Ky. 1935 ) (decision prior to enactment of KRS 96.120 to 96.150 ).

This section does not prohibit city from selling its surplus water supply to outside community which constructs its own line to the line of the city supplying the service. Smith v. Raceland, 258 Ky. 671 , 80 S.W.2d 827, 1935 Ky. LEXIS 218 ( Ky. 1935 ) (decision prior to enactment of KRS 96.120 to 96.150 ).

8. Mortgage of Acquired Waterworks.

This section, providing that waterworks of third-class city could be mortgaged without assent of voters, modified KRS 96.540 which required such assent. Bowling Green v. Kirby, 220 Ky. 839 , 295 S.W. 1004, 1927 Ky. LEXIS 603 ( Ky. 1927 ).

9. Governing Board.

While the water system act (KRS 96.350 to 96.510 ) made no provision for the creation of a governing body for the utility, by the acquisition and operation of a water plant the municipality acted in a proprietary capacity and had full right to set up an administrative board in connection with its operation. Foley v. Kinnett, 486 S.W.2d 705, 1972 Ky. LEXIS 118 ( Ky. 1972 ).

Cited:

Cook v. North Middletown, 275 Ky. 338 , 121 S.W.2d 719, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 428 ( Ky. 1938 ); Settle v. Jones, 306 Ky. 9 , 206 S.W.2d 59, 1947 Ky. LEXIS 946 ( Ky. 1947 ); Hazard v. Salyers, 311 Ky. 667 , 224 S.W.2d 420, 1949 Ky. LEXIS 1149 ( Ky. 1949 ); Lynchburg Foundry Co. v. Pikeville, 246 S.W.2d 594, 1952 Ky. LEXIS 643 ( Ky. 1952 ); Jones v. Robinson, 351 S.W.2d 185, 1961 Ky. LEXIS 154 ( Ky. 1961 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

The fact that the legislature has specifically enacted certain methods of acquiring waterworks and constructing extensions thereto precludes the construction of such facilities by any other method, particularly the construction of such facilities by a private developer which would in turn require the city to pay off the costs of methods not authorized under the statutes. OAG 63-289 .

Where bonds were issued to pay for the construction of a waterworks system a surplus in the balance of the depreciation fund account of the waterworks system could not legally be paid to the general fund of the city. OAG 64-798 .

Unless an ordinance requires otherwise a municipal water commission can employ a nonresident attorney or manager of the municipal water commission on an annual salary basis. OAG 67-219 .

The question of whether or not the city will purchase a water company submitted by a petition for a referendum cannot be legally accepted by the city council for submission to a vote of the people. OAG 68-286 .

An ordinance establishing a water and sewer board and setting the terms of the commissioners for six years was valid and the provisions of KRS 94.070 did not apply. OAG 68-549 .

A city does not have the authority to delegate to the waterworks commission the authority to borrow money in the absence of some statutory authority. OAG 71-487 .

A waterworks commission created under this section and KRS 96.355 to 96.510 does not possess sufficient authority to borrow money. OAG 71-487 .

Bardstown could acquire nonprofit corporation’s water system under this section. OAG 72-20 .

Cities of the fifth class are authorized to acquire and operate a waterworks and sewage system jointly and the city, by ordinance, can create a board of commissioners to operate the system including the power to enter into and sign contracts with cities, villages, corporations and individuals to run water mains and sell water furnished by the city to them, outside the city. OAG 72-21 .

Although subsection (2) of this section authorizes a fourth-class city to acquire a sewerage system with a water system as one project, such a sewerage system could not be outside the city limits, since only a water system may be located outside of the city under subsection (1) of this section. OAG 73-219 .

A city water and sewer commission established under this section has no power independent of the city council to acquire and hold the property and may not without the approval of the city council acquire such property or issue bonds for its purchase under KRS 58.020 . OAG 73-527 .

While a city may purchase and operate a waterworks for the purpose of supplying the city and its inhabitants with water, it is not settled whether a city can acquire a water system to serve customers in another city. OAG 73-748 .

Although the water system act makes no provision for the creation of a utility commission in connection with the acquisition and operation of a utility plant, a municipality acts in a proprietary capacity and may pass an ordinance creating such a commission and, at its discretion, abolish the commission provided that its existence was not part of a contract between the city and the utility bond holders. OAG 74-83 .

A contract providing for the construction of a water and sewer system by a private developer which would require the city to pay off the costs by a refund agreement calling for fifty per cent of the water and sewer charge made to each consumer in the subdivision, would be invalid. OAG 74-569 .

Since a city of the third class may create an administrative board to administer the city’s water and sewer services, the city can by ordinance provide the manner whereby members of the utility commission are to be appointed, the number of such commissioners and the power they may exercise. OAG 78-172 .

While KRS 278.047 provides that the rates charged for services and the standards of services maintained by municipally owned electric utilities shall be the same for customers inside and outside the corporate limits, there is no such provision for municipal water companies; therefore, water rates set by the city water company may vary for resident and nonresident users so long as they are based on reasonable and legitimate differences in connection with providing the water service. OAG 78-656 .

Although there is no statutory provision for the creation of a governing board for utility services, a city has legal authority to set up an administrative board in connection with their operation. OAG 78-661 .

A city of the fourth class may create an administrative board or commission to administer its water and sewer services. OAG 78-662 .

A city has the authority to supply water service at flat rates rather than meter rates, but the city should not establish a water rate based on the number of occupants or residents in the household. OAG 79-449 .

A water and sewer system, organized by a city pursuant to this section and operating on a fiscal-year basis ending April 30, must change its fiscal year to one provided for in KRS 92.020 (repealed), pursuant to the city’s authority to do so under Const., § 169, since an entity created under this section is not an independent agency and thus is subject to the restrictions of KRS 92.020 (repealed). OAG 81-324 .

If the organization and existence of a municipal water commission or board, established pursuant to a city ordinance, is part of the contract between the city and the bondholders, such commission or board cannot be substantially altered or abolished while the contract is in existence and while any of the bonds are outstanding; the water commission or board could be substantially altered or abolished if the contract between the city and the bondholders has expired or if the creation and existence of the board or commission was not made a part of the contract between the city and the bondholders. OAG 82-218 .

While there is no specific provision authorizing a city to create a governing board for municipal waterworks or waterworks and sewer system, a city has legal authority to set up an administrative board to operate such utility services. OAG 82-218 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Certificate of public convenience and necessity required, KRS 278.020 .

City may contract with county water district to receive water, KRS 74.120 .

Kentucky Law Journal.

Meuth, The Development of Financing Public Improvements by Kentucky Municipalities, 25 Ky. L.J. 230 (1937).

96.3501. Powers of KRS 96.350 to 96.510 possessed by urban-county governments.

Having the powers of the city of the highest class at the time of the creation of an urban-county government, the provisions of KRS 96.350 to 96.510 are hereby affirmed to be possessed by urban-county governments. Any reference to a city, mayor, city legislative body, or agency of a city in KRS 96.350 to 96.510 shall also mean an urban-county government, mayor of an urban-county government, legislative body of an urban-county government, or agency of an urban-county government, respectively.

History. Enact. Acts 2014, ch. 92, § 165, effective January 1, 2015.

96.351. Waterworks or waterworks and sewerage commissions in cities in counties of more than 50,000 other than counties containing a consolidated local government or urban-county government.

  1. The city council of cities in a county containing a population of more than fifty thousand (50,000) other than a county containing a consolidated local government or urban-county government which have acquired a waterworks or a waterworks and sewerage system pursuant to KRS 96.350 , and which are operating under the council form of government, may, by ordinance, establish either a waterworks commission or a waterworks and sewerage commission. The ordinance shall require the appointment of the commission in one (1) month from the passage of the ordinance. No two (2) members of the commission shall be selected from the same ward. The commission shall be appointed by the mayor, and shall consist of the mayor, who shall be a non-voting ex-officio member and either three (3) or five (5) freehold electors of the city who have been bona fide residents of the city for two (2) years next before their appointment. One (1) member shall be a member of the city legislative body. No appointed member shall be related to the mayor or a member of the city council within the third degree of consanguinity or affinity under the civil law.
  2. The members of the commission shall enter upon the discharge of their duties as soon as appointed, and shall hold office four (4) years and until their successors are appointed and qualified, except that the member of the commission who is a member of the city legislative body shall hold office for one (1) year and until his successor is appointed and qualified. Any vacancy shall be filled in the same way the original appointments were made. The compensation of members shall be fixed by the city council prior to their appointment. The commission shall hold at least one (1) meeting each month, or more if required. Meetings shall be held at stated times, except special meetings.
  3. The commission may designate a member to act as chairman in the absence of the mayor, with the same powers the mayor would have if presiding. If the commission consists of five (5) members, three (3) members shall constitute a quorum. If the commission consists of three (3) members, two (2) members shall constitute a quorum. The mayor or any two (2) members may call a special meeting. The city auditor shall be ex-officio clerk of the commission and custodian of its records. Copies of its records attested by him as clerk shall be competent evidence in all courts.

History. Enact. Acts 1978, ch. 192, § 1, effective June 17, 1978; 2014, ch. 92, § 167, effective January 1, 2015.

Opinions of Attorney General.

This section is in all probability unconstitutional as special local legislation in violation of §§ 59 and 156 of the Kentucky Constitution, the latter of which provides that the organization and powers of each class of city shall be defined and provided for by general law so that all municipal corporations of the same class shall possess the same powers and be subject to the same restrictions. OAG 78-463 .

This section leaves it within the discretion of the city council to determine whether there will be a sewerage and waterworks commission, but once the city council has reached the decision to establish a waterworks and sewerage commission, the commission must be established or, if already in existence, reorganized to conform with the provisions of that statute. OAG 78-463 .

96.355. Legislative body of city of the home rule class may provide city with waterworks system — Police protection for waterworks system located outside city limits.

  1. The legislative body of any city of the home rule class may by ordinance:
    1. Provide the city with water; establish, regulate and control public cisterns, hydrants and reservoirs, together with extensions and appurtenances thereto, within or without the limits of the city, for fire protection and the use and convenience of its inhabitants;
    2. Provide for the enforcement of said regulations for the health, welfare and well-being of its inhabitants.
  2. Whenever cisterns, hydrants, reservoirs or any other portion of a waterworks system owned by any city set forth in subsection (1) of this section is located in whole or in part outside the city limits of any such city, the city may provide police protection as is necessary to prevent damage to or destruction of such property and to safeguard the water supply of the city from possible contamination.

History. Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 46, § 1; 2014, ch. 92, § 168, effective January 1, 2015.

Opinions of Attorney General.

A city is authorized under its police power to license and regulate all boats being operated on its municipal lake or reservoir. OAG 63-766 .

An ordinance imposing a license tax on all boats operated on the city’s reservoir was valid and effective against a nonresident. OAG 63-766 .

The police court of a fourth-class city would have no jurisdiction to try an offense committed outside of the city even though the offense occurred on city-owned property. OAG 68-52 .

Subsection (2) of this section, together with KRS 95.786 , authorizes policemen of a city of the fifth class to arrest persons who live outside of the city limits for violations of an ordinance which prohibits tampering with the property of a municipal water system which extends outside the city limits. OAG 70-184 .

Research References and Practice Aids

ALR

Validity and construction of anti-water pollution statutes and ordinances. 32 A.L.R.3d 215.

Validity and construction of statutes, ordinances, or regulations controlling discharge of industrial wastes into sewer system. 47 A.L.R.3d 1224.

Liability of water supplier for damages resulting from furnishing impure water. 54 A.L.R.3d 936.

96.360. Acquisition of existing waterworks — Notice of agreement — Petition — Election.

  1. One (1) or more waterworks, owned by one (1) or more persons, may be acquired as a single enterprise, and the city legislative body may agree with the owner as to the value of the waterworks and purchase it at such value, after giving forty-five (45) days’ notice by publishing the agreement of purchase, pursuant to KRS Chapter 424, setting out the price, interest rate, condition of plant, possible depreciation and repairs.
  2. If, within the period of forty-five (45) days, a petition calling for an election on the proposition is filed with the county clerk of the county, signed by twenty-five percent (25%) of the qualified voters of the city who voted at the last preceding regular election, stating the residence of each signer and verified as to signatures and residence by the affidavits of one (1) or more persons, an election shall be held on the proposition. Notice of the election, setting forth the price, terms of bonds, interest, general repairs and condition of plant and nature of the election, shall be given by publication pursuant to KRS Chapter 424. The election shall be held at the next November election if the petition is filed with the county clerk and certified by the county clerk as sufficient not later than the second Tuesday in August preceding the regular election. The question to be submitted to the voters at the election shall be: “Are you in favor of the city of  . . . . .  purchasing  . . . . .  at the price of  . . . . . ”? The purchase shall not be consummated unless a majority of the qualified voters voting on the proposition vote in favor of the purchase.

History. 2741L-3, 2741L-25: amend. Acts 1966, ch. 239, § 92; 1982, ch. 360, § 26, effective July 15, 1982; 1996, ch. 195, § 46, effective July 15, 1996.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Alternative Methods.

City of third class desiring to purchase water system and electric system from private corporation which had operated systems together as a single unit for a number of years and was unwilling to sell either system separately was not required to follow either the provisions of KRS 96.350 to 96.510 or the provisions of KRS 96.550 to 96.900 , but could rely on the broad statutes, KRS 66.060 , 85.120 and 96.170 , passed contemporaneously with KRS 96.350 to 96.510 . Cawood v. Coleman, 294 Ky. 858 , 172 S.W.2d 548, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 515 ( Ky. 1943 ).

2. Acceptance of T.V.A. Act.

City desiring to operate electric plant under T.V.A. Act, KRS 96.550 to 96.900 , was not required to surrender its contract right, under franchise previously granted to electric company, to acquire the plant by procedure set out by KRS 96.520 and 96.360 to 96.510 instead of procedure provided by T.V.A. Act, notwithstanding provision of KRS 96.740 that cities desiring to come within T.V.A. Act must accept all its provisions. Kentucky Utilities Co. v. Paducah, 308 Ky. 305 , 214 S.W.2d 258, 1948 Ky. LEXIS 908 ( Ky. 1948 ).

Passage of T.V.A. Act, KRS 96.550 to 96.900 , providing new and exclusive procedure for electric plant acquisition by municipality, did not abrogate existing contract right of city of Paducah, under franchise granted to electric company in 1910, to acquire privately owned electric plant by method of procedure set out in KRS 96.360 to 96.520 . Kentucky Utilities Co. v. Paducah, 308 Ky. 305 , 214 S.W.2d 258, 1948 Ky. LEXIS 908 ( Ky. 1948 ).

Cited:

Dunn v. Hart, 290 Ky. 764 , 162 S.W.2d 767, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 490 ( Ky. 1942 ); Keathley v. Martin, 246 S.W.2d 152, 1951 Ky. LEXIS 1271 ( Ky. 1951 ); Miller v. Owensboro, 343 S.W.2d 398, 1961 Ky. LEXIS 421 ( Ky. 1961 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

If Bardstown elects to acquire and operate nonprofit corporation’s water system under KRS 96.150 , the provisions of this section need not necessarily be complied with. OAG 72-20 .

Research References and Practice Aids

ALR

“Public utility” which city may purchase, waterworks system as. 9 A.L.R. 1034; 35 A.L.R. 592.

96.370. Issuance of bonds — Ordinance to authorize.

For the purpose of defraying the cost of acquiring any such waterworks and appurtenances or extensions thereto, either by purchase or construction, the city may borrow money and issue negotiable bonds, but only after an ordinance has been adopted specifying the proposed undertaking, the amount of bonds to be issued and the maximum rate of interest the bonds are to bear. The ordinance shall further provide that the proposed waterworks and appurtenances or extensions are to be acquired pursuant to the provisions of KRS 96.350 to 96.510 .

History. 2741L-2, 2741L-24.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Bonds.

Revenue bonds issued by fifth-class city for construction of waterworks system did not create an indebtedness of city, and did not require approval of court pursuant to KRS 66.210 , as that section does not apply to bonds which are not payable out of public treasury from taxes. Williams v. Raceland, 245 Ky. 212 , 53 S.W.2d 370, 1932 Ky. LEXIS 573 ( Ky. 1932 ).

Bonds issued for necessary and reasonable expenses of acquisition of utility plant payable solely from income from the utility system are not obligations of the city. Jones v. Benton, 285 Ky. 523 , 148 S.W.2d 683, 1941 Ky. LEXIS 418 ( Ky. 1941 ).

2. — Constitutionality.

Revenue bonds issued by fifth-class city for construction of waterworks system pursuant to ordinance merely giving city option to take and pay for water like any other customer did not contravene Const., §§ 157, 158. Williams v. Raceland, 245 Ky. 212 , 53 S.W.2d 370, 1932 Ky. LEXIS 573 ( Ky. 1932 ).

3. — Issuance.

Argument that revenues from city utilities are needed for current city expenses will not prevent court from approving revenue bonds for reconstruction and extension of utilities, the matter being within the discretion of the city legislative body. Eagle v. Corbin, 275 Ky. 808 , 122 S.W.2d 798, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 507 ( Ky. 1938 ).

4. Refunding Bonds.

The power of a city to issue revenue bonds for a proposed sewerage system is clear just as its power to issue its waterworks revenue bonds already outstanding is clear but there is no authority, express or implied, for the combination of refunding waterworks bonds with sewerage bonds in one project under one lien. Jones v. Stearns, 275 Ky. 729 , 122 S.W.2d 766, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 500 ( Ky. 1938 ).

A city of the fifth class may, in the first instance, join its waterworks system and sewerage system in one project and issue revenue bonds therefor, but it may not issue bonds for the combined purpose of refunding an earlier issue of waterworks bonds and constructing a new sewerage system. Jones v. Stearns, 275 Ky. 729 , 122 S.W.2d 766, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 500 ( Ky. 1938 ).

Revenue bonds cannot be issued under this section to refund money already paid and expended years before or even recently, in improving and extending the facilities of a municipally owned utility since this previous expenditure constitutes a general indebtedness of the city. Daily v. Smith's Adm'x, 297 Ky. 689 , 180 S.W.2d 861, 1944 Ky. LEXIS 783 ( Ky. 1944 ), overruled in part, Scalise v. Sewell-Scheuermann, 566 S.W.3d 539, 2018 Ky. LEXIS 451 ( Ky. 2018 ).

5. Ordinance.

Ordinance authorizing city of third class to issue revenue bonds to construct extension of existing municipally owned waterworks plant but not authorizing tax to pay principal or income, and not authorizing taking of plant to discharge debts thereof, did not create indebtedness against city within Const., §§ 157, 158. Bowling Green v. Kirby, 220 Ky. 839 , 295 S.W. 1004, 1927 Ky. LEXIS 603 ( Ky. 1927 ).

Fourth-class city could authorize construction of waterworks system and issuance of revenue bonds therefor without assent of two-thirds (2/3) of voters, since KRS 96.350 to 96.510 making no provision for assent of voters, dealt with original purchase and construction of waterworks system, while KRS 96.540 requiring assent of two-thirds (2/3) of voters, dealt with waterworks systems theretofore acquired. Sturgis v. Christenson Bros. Co., 235 Ky. 346 , 31 S.W.2d 386, 1930 Ky. LEXIS 359 ( Ky. 1930 ).

Cited:

Lynchburg Foundry Co. v. Pikeville, 246 S.W.2d 594, 1952 Ky. LEXIS 643 ( Ky. 1952 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

The fact that the legislature has specifically enacted certain methods of acquiring waterworks and constructing extensions thereto precludes the construction of such facilities by any other method, particularly the construction of such facilities by a private developer which would in turn require the city to pay off the costs by methods not authorized under the statutes. OAG 63-289 .

City has authority to borrow money and issue revenue bonds for the acquisition or construction of a waterworks system pursuant to a number of methods among them those enumerated in KRS Ch. 58 and this section. This, however, must be done by the city council pursuant to ordinance. OAG 72-21 .

A city’s cost in financing acquisition of a water system may be met by the issuance of bonds pursuant to ordinance enacted in compliance with this statute. OAG 74-753 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

City may issue revenue bonds for any public project, KRS 58.010 to 58.120 .

96.380. Interest rate and maturity of bonds.

Bonds may be issued bearing interest at a rate or rates or method of determining rates, payable at least annually, and shall be executed in a manner and be payable at times not exceeding forty (40) years from the date of issue and at the place or places as the city legislative body determines.

History. 2741L-4, 2741L-26: amend. Acts 1968, ch. 110, § 11; 1996, ch. 274, § 21, effective July 15, 1996.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Competitive Bidding.

The decision in Eagle v. City of Corbin, 275 Ky. 808 , 122 S.W.2d 798, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 507 (1938), does not prohibit the sale of bonds by a municipality upon competitive bids upon interest rates, as long as the ordinance states the maximum rate of interest. Funk v. Strathmoor Village, 278 Ky. 627 , 129 S.W.2d 151, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 477 ( Ky. 1939 ).

Bonds may be sold at an open coupon rate of interest under ordinance providing that bonds should bear interest at such rate as should be determined by competitive bidding, upon a basis to yield not more than six percent (6%) and with a coupon interest rate not to exceed four percent (4%). Funk v. Strathmoor Village, 278 Ky. 627 , 129 S.W.2d 151, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 477 ( Ky. 1939 ).

Cited:

Pulaski County v. Ben Hur Life Ass’n, 286 Ky. 119 , 149 S.W.2d 738, 1941 Ky. LEXIS 210 ( Ky. 1941 ).

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Removal of interest rate limits, KRS 58.430 .

96.390. Bonds negotiable and tax-free — Method of sale — Payable solely from revenues.

Bonds issued pursuant to KRS 96.370 shall be negotiable and shall not be subject to taxation. If any officer whose signature or countersignature appears on the bonds or coupons ceases to be an officer before delivery of the bonds, his signature or countersignature shall nevertheless be valid and sufficient for all purposes the same as if he had remained in office until delivery. The bonds shall be sold in a manner and upon the terms as the city or urban-county government legislative body deems for the best interest of the city or urban-county government, or any contract for the purchase or acquisition of any waterworks may provide that payment shall be made in bonds. The bonds shall be payable solely from the revenue funds derived from the waterworks as provided in KRS 96.430 and shall not constitute an indebtedness of the city or urban-county government within the meaning of the Constitution. It shall be plainly stated on the face of each bond that it has been issued under the provisions of KRS 96.350 to 96.510 and that it does not constitute an indebtedness of the city or urban-county government within the meaning of the Constitution.

History. 2741L-5, 2741L-27: amend. Acts 1968, ch. 110, § 12; 1996, ch. 274, § 22, effective July 15, 1996; 2014, ch. 92, § 169, effective January 1, 2015.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Competitive Bidding.

A contract to sell bonds, made before they were issued or authorized, with a single bidder and without advertisement, cannot be ratified by the city. Eagle v. Corbin, 275 Ky. 808 , 122 S.W.2d 798, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 507 ( Ky. 1938 ).

Bonds can be sold only upon competitive bidding after public and reasonable advertisement or a proposal to receive bids or offers for bonds proposed to be issued and sold; however, this decision is not retroactive, and applies only to future transactions. Eagle v. Corbin, 275 Ky. 808 , 122 S.W.2d 798, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 507 ( Ky. 1938 ).

2. Interest Rate.

The decision in Eagle v. City of Corbin, 275 Ky. 808 , 122 S.W.2d 798, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 507 (1938), does not prohibit the sale of bonds by a municipality upon competitive bids upon interest rates, as long as the ordinance states the maximum rate of interest. Funk v. Strathmoor Village, 278 Ky. 627 , 129 S.W.2d 151, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 477 ( Ky. 1939 ).

Bonds may be sold at an open coupon rate of interest under ordinance providing that bonds should bear interest at such rate as should be determined by competitive bidding, upon a basis to yield not more than six percent (6%) and with a coupon interest rate not to exceed four percent (4%). Funk v. Strathmoor Village, 278 Ky. 627 , 129 S.W.2d 151, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 477 ( Ky. 1939 ).

3. Limitation on Actions.

Fifteen-year statute of limitation as provided by subsec. (2) of KRS 413.090 applies to an action to collect past due principal and interest on city sewer revenue bonds since it is not an action to enforce financial obligation against city but an action against city for breach of its written obligation to collect revenues from the city sewer system and apply them to payment of the bonds. Erlanger v. Berkemeyer, 207 F.2d 832, 1953 U.S. App. LEXIS 2983 (6th Cir. Ky.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 915, 74 S. Ct. 275, 98 L. Ed. 411, 1953 U.S. LEXIS 1370 (U.S. 1953).

Cited:

Cole v. McCracken County, 297 Ky. 797 , 181 S.W.2d 461, 1944 Ky. LEXIS 835 ( Ky. 1944 ); Lynchburg Foundry Co. v. Pikeville, 246 S.W.2d 594, 1952 Ky. LEXIS 643 ( Ky. 1952 ).

Research References and Practice Aids

ALR

Revenue bonds or others bonds not creating indebtedness as within constitutional or statutory requirement of prior approval by electors of issuance of bonds or incurring indebtedness by municipality. 146 A.L.R. 604.

96.400. Application of proceeds of bonds — Lien.

All moneys received from the bonds shall be applied solely for the purchase, establishment or erection of the waterworks and extensions and appurtenances thereto, or to advance the payment of the interest on the bonds during the first three (3) years following the date of the bonds. A statutory mortgage lien shall exist upon the waterworks and appurtenances and extensions so acquired in favor of the holders of the bonds and coupons.

History. 2741L-6, 2741L-28.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Proceeds of Bonds.

Necessary and reasonable expenses incurred in connection with the acquisition of an electric plant may be included in the bond issue. Jones v. Benton, 285 Ky. 523 , 148 S.W.2d 683, 1941 Ky. LEXIS 418 ( Ky. 1941 ).

Proceeds from the sale of utility revenue bonds should be applied solely for the purpose for which they were issued and none other and cannot be used to pay off general indebtedness of city although part of the general indebtedness was previously incurred in making repairs and improvements to the city utility. Daily v. Smith's Adm'x, 297 Ky. 689 , 180 S.W.2d 861, 1944 Ky. LEXIS 783 ( Ky. 1944 ), overruled in part, Scalise v. Sewell-Scheuermann, 566 S.W.3d 539, 2018 Ky. LEXIS 451 ( Ky. 2018 ).

The setting up of reserves reasonably necessary to put the plant on a sound operating basis may be considered to be an element of “establishment” of the plant within the meaning of the statute. Miller v. Owensboro, 343 S.W.2d 398, 1961 Ky. LEXIS 421 ( Ky. 1961 ).

2. Lien.

The city and the purchasers of the bonds have power to provide by agreement that the bonds shall constitute a lien only on the revenues, and not on the properties. Cawood v. Coleman, 294 Ky. 858 , 172 S.W.2d 548, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 515 ( Ky. 1943 ).

Cited:

Babcock v. Erlanger, 34 F. Supp. 293, 1940 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2797 (D. Ky. 1940 ).

96.410. Rights of bondholders to enforce lien.

The waterworks so acquired, together with the extensions and appurtenances, shall remain subject to the statutory lien until the payment in full of the principal and interest of the bonds. Any holder of the bonds or coupons may, by action at law or in equity, protect and enforce the lien and enforce and compel performance of all duties required by KRS 96.350 to 96.510 , including the making and collecting of sufficient rates, the segregation of the income and revenue, and the application thereof.

History. 2741L-7, 2741L-29.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Sale of Plant.

Ordinance authorizing third-class city to issue revenue bonds to construct extension to existing municipally owned waterworks plant and declaring that bondholder should have statutory mortgage lien for security of bonds would not authorize bondholder to enforce lien by sale of plant, but he must look to income from plant, with right to compel imposition of reasonable rates and to place property in receivership until his debt is satisfied. Bowling Green v. Kirby, 220 Ky. 839 , 295 S.W. 1004, 1927 Ky. LEXIS 603 ( Ky. 1927 ).

2. Waiver of Lien Against Property.

The city avoided the creation of a lien against the physical property of the utility as provided by KRS 96.400 and this section where the bonds issued to purchase the utility pledged only the revenue from the operation of the properties for interest and liquidation which, in effect, constituted a waiver of the provisions by the city and the bondholders. Cawood v. Coleman, 294 Ky. 858 , 172 S.W.2d 548, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 515 ( Ky. 1943 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

So long as any of a city’s waterworks improvement bonds are outstanding, the city cannot permit the water system to be idle and thus buy water from an outside source, nor can the water system be sold. OAG 76-526 .

96.420. Receiver.

If there is any default in the payment of the principal or interest of any bond, any court having jurisdiction of the action may appoint a receiver to administer the waterworks on behalf of the city, with power to charge and collect rates sufficient to provide for the payment of any bonds or obligations outstanding against the waterworks and for the payment of the operating expenses, and to apply the income and revenue in conformity with KRS 96.350 to 96.510 and the ordinance referred to in KRS 96.430 .

History. 2741L-8, 2741L-30.

96.430. Maintenance, operation and depreciation funds — Rates.

At or before the issuance of bonds the city legislative body shall, by ordinance, set aside and pledge the income and revenue of the waterworks into a separate and special fund to be used and applied in payment of the cost thereof and in the maintenance, operation and depreciation thereof. The ordinance shall definitely fix and determine the amount of revenue necessary to be set apart and applied to the payment of the principal and interest of the bonds, and the proportion of the balance of the income and revenues to be set aside as a proper and adequate depreciation account, and the remaining proportion of such balance shall be set aside for the reasonable and proper operation and maintenance of the waterworks. The rates to be charged for service from the waterworks shall be fixed and revised from time to time so as to be sufficient to provide for payment of interest upon all bonds and to create a sinking fund to pay the principal thereof when due, and to provide for the operation and maintenance of the waterworks and an adequate depreciation account.

History. 2741L-9, 2741L-31.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Ordinance.

An ordinance requiring specific payments into the sinking fund, and setting aside “a sufficient and reasonable portion of the balance of the income” for operation and maintenance, and for depreciation, complies with this section. Eagle v. Corbin, 275 Ky. 808 , 122 S.W.2d 798, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 507 ( Ky. 1938 ).

2. Reduction of Rates.

Where waterworks of fourth-class city had a surplus over and above the amount necessary to meet the requirements of this section and KRS 96.440 , the city council had the right to make a retroactive reduction of fire hydrant rental rate paid by the city to the waterworks board. Electric Plant Board v. Mayfield, 299 Ky. 375 , 185 S.W.2d 411, 1945 Ky. LEXIS 420 ( Ky. 1945 ).

3. Transfer of Surplus Funds.

Under authority of KRS 96.200 , a city of the fourth class operating a waterworks has authority to transfer, to the general fund of the city, any surplus revenues of the waterworks remaining after meeting the requirements of this section and KRS 96.440 , at least to the extent such surplus revenues do not exceed a fair return on the property used and usable. Electric Plant Board v. Mayfield, 299 Ky. 375 , 185 S.W.2d 411, 1945 Ky. LEXIS 420 ( Ky. 1945 ).

4. Withdrawal of Funds.

A city of the fourth class, under KRS 96.200 , has no authority to withdraw any sum of money from the revenues of its water plant until funds sufficient to meet the requirements of this section and KRS 96.440 have been set aside. Electric Plant Board v. Mayfield, 299 Ky. 375 , 185 S.W.2d 411, 1945 Ky. LEXIS 420 ( Ky. 1945 ).

5. Payment of Tax Equivalents.

City of fourth class has authority to require its waterworks board to pay reasonable tax equivalents, and the amounts so paid may be charged as operating expenses in determining whether the profits from the plant exceed a fair return such as to require a reduction of rates to consumers. Electric Plant Board v. Mayfield, 299 Ky. 375 , 185 S.W.2d 411, 1945 Ky. LEXIS 420 ( Ky. 1945 ).

Cited:

Covington v. Public Service Com., 313 S.W.2d 391, 1958 Ky. LEXIS 254 ( Ky. 1958 ).

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Second or third-class cities, water plant, miscellaneous provisions regarding, KRS 96.535 .

96.440. Transfer of surplus to depreciation fund.

If a surplus is accumulated in the operating and maintenance funds equal to the cost of maintaining and operating the waterworks during the remainder of the calendar, operating or fiscal year and during the succeeding like year, any excess over such amount may be transferred at any time by the city legislative body to the depreciation account, to be used for improvements, extensions or additions to the waterworks.

History. 2741L-10, 2741L-32.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Construction.

The provisions of this section as to transferring surplus to the depreciation account are mandatory only when conditions require the direction to be followed in the exercise of reasonable judgment; that is, when improvements, extensions, or additions reasonably should be anticipated. Electric Plant Board v. Mayfield, 299 Ky. 375 , 185 S.W.2d 411, 1945 Ky. LEXIS 420 ( Ky. 1945 ).

2. Reduction of Rate.

Where waterworks of fourth-class city had a surplus over and above the amount necessary to meet the requirements of KRS 96.430 and this section, the city council had the right to make a retroactive reduction of fire hydrant rental rate paid by the city to the waterworks board. Electric Plant Board v. Mayfield, 299 Ky. 375 , 185 S.W.2d 411, 1945 Ky. LEXIS 420 ( Ky. 1945 ).

3. Transfer of Surplus Funds.

Under authority of KRS 96.200 , a city of the fourth class operating a waterworks has authority to transfer, to the general fund of the city, any surplus revenues of the waterworks remaining after meeting the requirements of KRS 96.430 and this section, at least to the extent such surplus revenues do not exceed a fair return on the property used and usable. Electric Plant Board v. Mayfield, 299 Ky. 375 , 185 S.W.2d 411, 1945 Ky. LEXIS 420 ( Ky. 1945 ).

4. Withdrawal of Revenue.

A city of the fourth class, under KRS 96.200 , has no authority to withdraw any sum of money from the revenues of its water plant until funds sufficient to meet the requirements of KRS 96.430 and this section have been set aside. Electric Plant Board v. Mayfield, 299 Ky. 375 , 185 S.W.2d 411, 1945 Ky. LEXIS 420 ( Ky. 1945 ).

5. Payment of Tax Equivalents.

City of fourth class has authority to require its waterworks board to pay reasonable tax equivalents, and the amount so paid may be charged as operating expenses in determining whether the profits from the plant exceed a fair return such as to require a reduction of rates to consumers. Electric Plant Board v. Mayfield, 299 Ky. 375 , 185 S.W.2d 411, 1945 Ky. LEXIS 420 ( Ky. 1945 ).

96.450. Expenditure and investment of depreciation fund.

The funds accumulating to the depreciation account shall be expended in balancing depreciation in the waterworks or in making new constructions, extensions or additions thereto. Any such accumulations may be invested as the city legislative body may designate, and if invested the income from such investments shall be carried into the depreciation account.

History. 2741L-11, 2741L-33.

Opinions of Attorney General.

The utility commission could make a loan to the city from the depreciation fund of the waterworks system as an investment only if it could be affected within the basic requirements of KRS 386.020 . OAG 64-798 .

96.460. City to pay for water used by it.

The reasonable cost and value of any service rendered to the city by the waterworks may be charged against the city and shall be paid for monthly as the service accrues from the current funds or proceeds of taxes which the city shall levy in an amount sufficient for that purpose. The funds so paid shall be accounted for in the same manner as other revenues of the waterworks.

History. 2741L-12, 2741L-34.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Retroactive Reduction of Rate.

Where waterworks of fourth-class city had a surplus over and above the amount necessary to meet the requirements of KRS 96.430 and 96.440 , the city council had the right to make a retroactive reduction of fire hydrant rental rate paid by the city to the waterworks board. Electric Plant Board v. Mayfield, 299 Ky. 375 , 185 S.W.2d 411, 1945 Ky. LEXIS 420 ( Ky. 1945 ).

96.470. Refunding bonds.

The city may issue new bonds to provide funds for the payment of any outstanding bonds, in accordance with the procedure prescribed by KRS 96.350 to 96.510 . The new bonds shall be secured to the same extent and shall have the same source of payment as the bonds refunded.

History. 2741L-13, 2741L-35.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Conditions of Refunding Bonds.

A city of the fourth class may issue bonds, in anticipation of deficits, to pay off waterworks improvement bonds when they mature, if it provides that the new bonds shall not be sold except when necessary to meet deficits, and that they shall not begin to bear interest until after interest ceases to run on the bonds paid off by them. First & Peoples Bank v. Russell, 279 Ky. 849 , 132 S.W.2d 304, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 355 ( Ky. 1939 ).

96.480. Additional bonds.

If the city legislative body finds that the bonds authorized will be insufficient to accomplish the purpose desired, additional bonds may be authorized and issued in the same manner.

History. 2741L-14, 2741L-36.

96.490. Bonds for extensions and improvements.

Any city acquiring any waterworks pursuant to the provisions of KRS 96.350 to 96.510 may, at the time of issuing the bonds for such acquisition, provide for additional bonds for extensions and permanent improvements to be placed in escrow and to be negotiated from time to time as proceeds for that purpose may be necessary, or the city may, at any time, provide for the extension, addition or improvement of the waterworks by an additional issue of bonds. Bonds placed in escrow shall, when negotiated, have equal standing with the bonds of the same issue.

History. 2741L-15, 2741L-16, 2741L-37, 2741L-38.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Construction.

This section permits extension, addition or improvement of a utility acquired before the passage of this act. Eagle v. Corbin, 275 Ky. 808 , 122 S.W.2d 798, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 507 ( Ky. 1938 ).

2. Issuance Discretionary.

Argument that revenues from city utilities are needed for current city expenses will not prevent court from approving revenue bonds for reconstruction and extension of utilities, the matter being within the discretion of the city legislative body. Eagle v. Corbin, 275 Ky. 808 , 122 S.W.2d 798, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 507 ( Ky. 1938 ).

3. Necessary Parties on Appeal.

Court of Appeals will not make a declaration of rights as to validity of bonds issued by city for extensions and improvements to waterworks system, where holders of prior bonds secured by same property and revenues are not made parties to or represented in the proceedings. First & Peoples Bank v. Russell, 279 Ky. 849 , 132 S.W.2d 304, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 355 ( Ky. 1939 ).

96.500. Administration of income and revenues.

The city legislative body may provide by ordinance such provisions and stipulations for the administration of the income and revenues of the waterworks and for the security of the bondholders as it deems necessary.

History. 2741L-17, 2741L-39.

96.510. Payment of encumbrance existing at time of acquisition of waterworks.

The ordinances required by KRS 96.370 and 96.430 may set apart a fund equal to the amount of any secured debt or charge subject to which a waterworks is acquired, and shall set aside to that fund, from the balance of the income and revenues of the waterworks remaining after setting aside the funds for payment of principal and interest of bonds, a sum sufficient to comply with the requirements of the instrument creating the lien or securing the charge. If the instrument does not make any provision therefor, the ordinance shall fix and determine the amount that shall be set aside for interest on the secured debt or charge and a fixed amount to pay the principal thereof at maturity. Any surplus after satisfying the secured debt or charge may be used for the redemption of the principal and interest of bonds. Bonds may be issued pursuant to the provisions of KRS 96.350 to 96.510 in exchange for or in satisfaction of such secured debt or charge, or may be sold and the proceeds applied in payment of the secured debt or charge at or before maturity.

History. 2741L-18, 2741L-40.

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Meuth, The Development of Financing Public Improvements by Kentucky Municipalities, 25 Ky. L.J. 230 (1937).

Electric Plants in Cities of Home Rule Class

96.520. City of the home rule class or urban-county government may acquire and operate electric light, heat, and power plants — Regulation of provision of telecommunications services or municipal telephone service — Interconnection agreements with utilities or utility affiliates — Bonds.

  1. Any city of the home rule class or urban-county government may purchase, establish, erect, maintain, and operate electric light, heat, and power plants, with extensions and necessary appurtenances, within or without the corporate limits of the city or the urban-county government, for the purpose of supplying the city or urban-county government and its inhabitants with electric light, heat, power, and telecommunications. Any city-owned or urban-county government-owned utility created under this section that provides telecommunications services shall be regulated as to that service by KRS Chapter 278. Any city-owned or urban-county government-owned utility created under this section that provides municipal telephone service shall be regulated as to that service by KRS Chapter 278. For the purpose of providing electric light, heat, power, and telephone services, a city of the home rule class or urban-county government may enter into and fulfill the terms of an interconnection agreement with any electric or combination electric or gas utility whose rates and service are regulated by the Public Service Commission of Kentucky (or, if not so regulated, operating and having customers only outside of Kentucky), or an affiliate entirely owned by or under complete common ownership with an electric or combination electric and gas utility whose rates and service are regulated by the Public Service Commission of Kentucky. Any city of the home rule class or urban-county government may establish, erect, maintain, and operate plants, individually or jointly with any of these utilities or utility affiliate. In the case of any joint action, a city or urban-county government and utility or utility affiliate may provide by contract for their respective responsibilities, for operation and maintenance and for the allocation of expenses, revenues, and power. If in the accomplishment of this purpose a city or urban-county government at any time has capacity or energy surplus to the immediate needs of the city or urban-county government and its inhabitants, the surplus, if not disposed of for consumption outside this state, may be disposed of to an electric or combination electric and gas utility whose rates and service are regulated by the Public Service Commission of Kentucky, to an affiliate entirely owned by or under complete common ownership with such a utility, or to a city-owned or urban-county government-owned utility established pursuant to KRS Chapter 96.
  2. The city or urban-county government shall proceed in the same manner and be governed by the same conditions as are set forth in KRS 96.360 to 96.510 for the acquisition and operation of a water system, with the following exceptions:
    1. A petition calling for an election on the proposition of purchasing an existing plant shall be signed by at least two hundred (200) qualified voters of the city or urban-county government, rather than by twenty-five percent (25%) of the qualified voters of the city or urban-county government who voted at the last preceding regular election.
    2. Notwithstanding any other laws, bonds may be issued bearing interest at a rate or rates and may be sold on a basis to yield interest at a rate or rates as may be determined upon the sale of the bonds.
    3. Bonds of an issue, or bonds of two (2) or more issues consolidated for the purposes of sale, which equal or exceed $10,000,000 in the aggregate principal amount may be sold at public or private sale without compliance with KRS 424.360 .
  3. This section constitutes a method for the acquisition of an electric light, heat, and power plant by any city of the home rule class or urban-county government in addition or as an alternate to any other method authorized by statute, provided that the city or urban-county government was operating an electric plant on June 1, 1942, and has not elected to operate under KRS 96.550 to 96.900 . No proceedings shall be required for the acquisition of any electric light, heat, or power plant or the issuance of bonds under this section except the proceedings required by KRS 96.360 to 96.510 .

History. 3480d-1 to 3480d-19: amend. Acts 1970, ch. 36, § 1; 1998, ch. 229, § 2, effective July 15, 1998; 2000, ch. 101, § 4, effective July 14, 2000; 2000, ch. 486, § 2, effective July 14, 2000; 2002, ch. 108, § 1, effective July 15, 2002; 2014, ch. 92, § 170, effective January 1, 2015.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Application.

KRS 96.540 does not apply to proceedings under this section. Eagle v. Corbin, 275 Ky. 808 , 122 S.W.2d 798, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 507 ( Ky. 1938 ).

This section applies only when the city purposes to finance the plant by revenue bonds. A city of the third class has the alternative of proceeding under KRS 66.060 , 85.120 and 96.170 , which authorize the issuance of general obligation bonds of the city. King v. Rowland, 293 Ky. 198 , 168 S.W.2d 755, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 596 ( Ky. 1943 ).

The fact that law creating electric system referred to certain sections of law concerning water systems for designated classes of cities did not in any way change the terms or conditions of the sections which were referred to and provision in law creating electric systems which provided qualifications for members of commission did not become part of law concerning water system. Keathley v. Martin, 246 S.W.2d 152, 1951 Ky. LEXIS 1271 ( Ky. 1951 ).

No municipality shall become liable for the payment of tax equivalents except out of the earnings from the resale of such electrical energy as is acquired from T.V.A. and the T.V.A. Act (KRS 96.550 to 96.900 ) cannot be considered applicable to a situation where a municipality obtains electric energy from other sources. Monticello Electric Plant Board v. Department of Revenue, 392 S.W.2d 440, 1965 Ky. LEXIS 278 ( Ky. 1965 ).

2. Purchase of Electric Plant Alone.

City purchasing an electric plant alone must follow the provisions of KRS 96.550 to 96.900 if it was not operating an electric plant on June 1, 1942. Cawood v. Coleman, 294 Ky. 858 , 172 S.W.2d 548, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 515 ( Ky. 1943 ).

3. Purchase of Combined Water and Electric Systems.

Revenue bonds may be issued for a unified waterworks and electric plant, though there are separate statutes relating to electric plants and waterworks, since the authority and procedure under the two statutes are the same. Eagle v. Corbin, 275 Ky. 808 , 122 S.W.2d 798, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 507 ( Ky. 1938 ).

City desiring to purchase water system and electric system from private corporation which had operated systems together as a single unit for a number of years and which was unwilling to sell either system separately was not required to follow either the provisions of KRS 96.350 to 96.510 or the provisions of KRS 96.550 to 96.900 . Cawood v. Coleman, 294 Ky. 858 , 172 S.W.2d 548, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 515 ( Ky. 1943 ).

4. Distributing Plant Without Generating Plant.

A city may erect a distributing system without a generating plant, and purchase electric current for delivery to that system. Middlesboro v. Kentucky Utilities Co., 284 Ky. 833 , 146 S.W.2d 48, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 587 ( Ky. 1940 ).

5. Pre-existing Systems.

This section permits extension, addition or improvement of a utility acquired before the passage of this section and KRS 96.530 . Eagle v. Corbin, 275 Ky. 808 , 122 S.W.2d 798, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 507 ( Ky. 1938 ).

6. Proceedings Instituted Prior to T.V.A. Act.

City instituting proceedings under KRS 96.520 may, after passage of KRS 96.560 to 96.900 , either consummate the initial proceedings or at its option institute proceedings under KRS 96.560 to 96.900 . Dunn v. Hart, 290 Ky. 764 , 162 S.W.2d 767, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 490 ( Ky. 1942 ).

7. Existing Contracts Not Abrogated by T.V.A. Act.

City desiring to operate electric plant under T.V.A. Act, KRS 96.550 to 96.900 , was not required to surrender its contract right, under franchise previously granted to electric company, to acquire the plant by procedure set out by KRS 96.360 to 96.520 instead of procedure provided by T.V.A. Act, notwithstanding provision of KRS 96.740 that cities desiring to come within T.V.A. Act must accept all its provisions. Kentucky Utilities Co. v. Paducah, 308 Ky. 305 , 214 S.W.2d 258, 1948 Ky. LEXIS 908 ( Ky. 1948 ).

Passage in 1942 of T.V.A. Act, KRS 96.550 to 96.900 , providing new and exclusive procedure for electric plant acquirement by municipality, did not abrogate existing contract right of city of Paducah, under franchise granted to electric company in 1910, to acquire privately-owned electric plant by method of procedure set out in this section and KRS 96.360 to 96.510 . Kentucky Utilities Co. v. Paducah, 308 Ky. 305 , 214 S.W.2d 258, 1948 Ky. LEXIS 908 ( Ky. 1948 ).

8. Plant or Service Outside City Limits.

A city may not acquire an electric power system separate and distinct from its municipal plant, and located outside the corporate limits of the city, for the sole purpose of furnishing electric energy to rural consumers or to residents of another city. Fleming-Mason Rural Electric Co-operative Corp. v. Vanceburg, 292 Ky. 130 , 166 S.W.2d 269, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 58 ( Ky. 1942 ).

To be authorized activity under the statute it must be for the purpose of supplying the city and its inhabitants with electric light, heat and power, and only under exceptional circumstances may be supplying of those outside the city limits be correlated with purpose. Corbin v. Kentucky Utilities Co., 447 S.W.2d 356, 1969 Ky. LEXIS 82 ( Ky. 1969 ).

9. Anticipation of Future Needs.

City’s plan to build new electric generating plant and sell excess power to Kentucky Utilities Company did not violate this statute as the primary purpose of the plan was to provide, on the basis of a reasonable anticipation of future needs, a plant adequate to supply the energy demands of the city and its inhabitants for a substantial period of years. Miller v. Owensboro, 343 S.W.2d 398, 1961 Ky. LEXIS 421 ( Ky. 1961 ).

Where the evidence showed that the city had a present inadequacy of generating capacity and would have an increasing need in the future, and that the most practical way to provide the power was to build two plants and sell the excess energy generated, the plan constituted the exercise by the city of a valid public purpose and was within the authority granted by this section. Wilson v. Henderson, 461 S.W.2d 90, 1970 Ky. LEXIS 610 ( Ky. 1970 ).

10. Procedure.

This section and KRS 96.530 authorizing acquisition of electric light plants by self-liquidating or revenue plan, although specific as to what may be done and how project is to be financed, contemplates that procedure prescribed in city charters not inconsistent with these sections shall be followed in accomplishing plan. Middlesboro v. Kentucky Utilities Co., 284 Ky. 833 , 146 S.W.2d 48, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 587 ( Ky. 1940 ).

11. Certificate of Convenience and Necessity.

A city may not begin construction of an electric plant until it has obtained a certificate of convenience and necessity from the public service commission. Vanceburg v. Plummer, 275 Ky. 713 , 122 S.W.2d 772, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 502 ( Ky. 1938 ), overruled, Flemingsburg v. Public Service Com., 411 S.W.2d 920, 1966 Ky. LEXIS 28 ( Ky. 1966 ).

12. Ordinance.

Ordinance for original construction of electrical generating plant by proposed loan agreement with United States and issuance of revenue bonds must be allowed to lie over for week after introduction, and after final adoption does not become effective for ten days, nor if referendum is sought, until majority vote in favor thereof. Kentucky Utilities Co. v. Ginsberg, 255 Ky. 148 , 72 S.W.2d 738, 1934 Ky. LEXIS 180 ( Ky. 1934 ).

Ordinance for original construction of electrical generating plant is subject to referendum pursuant to KRS 89.240 (repealed), notwithstanding subsection (2) of this section provides specifically for referendum only where existing plant is acquired. Kentucky Utilities Co. v. Ginsberg, 255 Ky. 148 , 72 S.W.2d 738, 1934 Ky. LEXIS 180 ( Ky. 1934 ).

Citizens, residents and voters in city of third class could enjoin, pending referendum, proceeding under ordinance for erection of electrical generating plant by proposed loan agreement whereby United States was to make grant and loan, and receive revenue bonds, as against contention that taxpayers could not raise question since bonds were payable from net revenue and plant was being erected by city in its proprietary capacity. Kentucky Utilities Co. v. Ginsberg, 255 Ky. 148 , 72 S.W.2d 738, 1934 Ky. LEXIS 180 ( Ky. 1934 ).

Where repeal of, or referendum on, ordinance seeking to finance erection of electrical generating plant by loan from, and issuance of revenue bonds to, United States, is asked, and temporary injunction obtained against proceeding under that ordinance, and where ordinance is thereupon repealed and new ordinance enacted proposing to sell bonds on competitive bids, council has not violated temporary injunction, and such injunction should not be made permanent except as to original financing ordinance. Ginsberg v. Kentucky Utilities Co., 260 Ky. 60 , 83 S.W.2d 497, 1935 Ky. LEXIS 398 ( Ky. 1935 ).

13. Revenue Bonds.
14. — Issuance and Sale.

Bonds can be sold upon competitive bidding after public and reasonable advertisement or a proposal to receive bids or offers for bonds proposed to be issued and sold; however, this decision is not retroactive, and applies only to future transactions. Eagle v. Corbin, 275 Ky. 808 , 122 S.W.2d 798, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 507 ( Ky. 1938 ) (decision prior to 1970 amendment).

A contract to sell bonds, made before they were issued or authorized, with a single bidder and without advertisement, cannot be ratified by the city. Eagle v. Corbin, 275 Ky. 808 , 122 S.W.2d 798, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 507 ( Ky. 1938 ) (decision prior to 1970 amendment).

Argument that revenues from city utilities are needed for current city expenses will not prevent court from approving revenue bonds for reconstruction and extension of utilities, the matter being within the discretion of the city legislative body. Eagle v. Corbin, 275 Ky. 808 , 122 S.W.2d 798, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 507 ( Ky. 1938 ).

Rights under revenue bonds which were issued and sold without competitive bidding at time when Court of Appeals had construed statute so as to permit such procedure were not affected by subsequent ruling against such procedure. Middlesboro v. Kentucky Utilities Co., 284 Ky. 833 , 146 S.W.2d 48, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 587 ( Ky. 1940 ) (decision prior to 1970 amendment).

Bonds may be issued for necessary and reasonable expenses of acquisition of electric plant, payable solely from income from electric system, and these bonds are not obligations of the city. Jones v. Benton, 285 Ky. 523 , 148 S.W.2d 683, 1941 Ky. LEXIS 418 ( Ky. 1941 ).

It was never contemplated by the legislature that revenue bonds issued for the purpose of providing funds for improvements and extensions of an electric light and power system could be used to refund money already paid and expended years before, or even recently, in improving and extending the facilities. Daily v. Smith's Adm'x, 297 Ky. 689 , 180 S.W.2d 861, 1944 Ky. LEXIS 783 ( Ky. 1944 ), overruled in part, Scalise v. Sewell-Scheuermann, 566 S.W.3d 539, 2018 Ky. LEXIS 451 ( Ky. 2018 ).

The inhibitions of Const., §§ 157 and 158 are not applicable to revenue bonds issued to finance construction of new municipal power plant. Selle v. Henderson, 309 Ky. 599 , 218 S.W.2d 645, 1949 Ky. LEXIS 772 ( Ky. 1949 ).

15. — Diversion of Funds.

The plaintiff in his capacity as a customer or patron of the municipally owned electric plant could not maintain an action to recover money diverted from issuance of revenue bonds into the general fund of the city. Daily v. Smith's Adm'x, 297 Ky. 689 , 180 S.W.2d 861, 1944 Ky. LEXIS 783 ( Ky. 1944 ), overruled in part, Scalise v. Sewell-Scheuermann, 566 S.W.3d 539, 2018 Ky. LEXIS 451 ( Ky. 2018 ).

City commissioners were personally liable for diversion of proceeds of revenue bonds issued for city-owned electric light and power plant to extent that city had been injured thereby, but were not liable for such funds as were used to pay valid debts of city. Daily v. Smith's Adm'x, 297 Ky. 689 , 180 S.W.2d 861, 1944 Ky. LEXIS 783 ( Ky. 1944 ), overruled in part, Scalise v. Sewell-Scheuermann, 566 S.W.3d 539, 2018 Ky. LEXIS 451 ( Ky. 2018 ).

16. — Interest Rate.

The decision in Eagle v. City of Corbin, 275 Ky. 808 , 122 S.W.2d 798, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 507 (1938), does not prohibit the sale of bonds by a municipality upon competitive bids upon interest rates, as long as the ordinance states the maximum rate of interest. Funk v. Strathmoor Village, 278 Ky. 627 , 129 S.W.2d 151, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 477 ( Ky. 1939 ) (decision prior to 1971 amendment).

17. Lien of Contractor.

Provision in contract for construction of municipal electric plant that title to machinery should remain in contractor until paid for, or if title passed to city contractor should have lien for purchase price, did not contravene subsection (1) of KRS 96.540 which prohibits bonding or encumbering theretofore acquired plant without vote of people, but is inapplicable to an original purchase. Kentucky Utilities Co. v. Paris, 256 Ky. 226 , 75 S.W.2d 1082, 1934 Ky. LEXIS 388 ( Ky. 1934 ).

Cited:

Tennessee Electric Power Co. v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 306 U.S. 118, 59 S. Ct. 366, 83 L. Ed. 543, 1939 U.S. LEXIS 973 (1939), overruled in part, Bond v. United States, — U.S. —, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 180 L. Ed. 2d 269, 2011 U.S. LEXIS 4558 (U.S. 2011), overruled in part as stated, Bond v. United States, — U.S. —, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 180 L. Ed. 2d 269, 2011 U.S. LEXIS 4558 (U.S. 2011); Cincinnati v. Commonwealth, 292 Ky. 597 , 167 S.W.2d 709, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 147 ( Ky. 1942 ); Hazard v. Salyers, 311 Ky. 667 , 224 S.W.2d 420, 1949 Ky. LEXIS 1149 ( Ky. 1949 ); Paducah v. Kentucky Utilities Co., 264 S.W.2d 848, 1953 Ky. LEXIS 1272 ( Ky. 1953 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

This section is a specific statute dealing with utility service agreements between a city and a public service corporation, such as Kentucky utilities, to which the interlocal act would not apply since it deals solely with mutual agreements between governmental bodies. OAG 79-54 .

This section permits the city to contract for services with a private utility for its own inhabitants or, as an alternative where the city owns its own facility, it may furnish such services to another city by contract or by franchise. OAG 79-54 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Certificate of public convenience and necessity required, KRS 278.020 .

City may issue revenue bonds for any public project, KRS 58.010 to 58.120 .

T.V.A. Act, KRS 96.550 to 96.900 .

Kentucky Law Journal.

Meuth, The Development of Financing Public Improvements by Kentucky Municipalities, 25 Ky. L.J. 230 (1937).

Russell, The Development of Revenue Bond Financing of Municipal Electric Utility Systems in Kentucky, 60 Ky. L.J. 696 (1972).

ALR

Liability of electric power or light company to patron for interruption, failure, or inadequacy of power. 4 A.L.R.3d 594.

Electric generating plant or transformer station as a nuisance. 4 A.L.R.3d 902.

Electricity, gas, or water furnished by public utility as “goods” within provisions of Uniform Commercial Code Article 2 on Sales. 48 A.L.R.3d 1060.

Advertising or promotional expenditures of public utility as part of operating expenses for ratemaking purposes. 83 A.L.R.3d 963.

96.530. Operation of electric light, heat, and power plants — Utility commission.

  1. Any city acquiring or constructing an electric light, heat, and power plant under the provisions of KRS 96.520 shall, by ordinance, appoint a city utility commission consisting of three (3) commissioners to operate, manage, and control the plant, except that a city with a population equal to or greater than twenty thousand (20,000) based upon the most recent federal decennial census shall appoint five (5) commissioners. The utility commission shall have absolute control of the plant in every respect, including its operation and fiscal management and the regulation of rates, except that in fixing rates the commission shall be governed by the provisions of KRS 96.430 , as it is made applicable to those plants by KRS 96.520 , and by any ordinance enacted under that section, except that in fixing rates the commission in a city with a population equal to or greater than eight thousand (8,000) based upon the most recent federal decennial census shall be governed by the provisions of KRS 96.535 and any ordinance enacted according to this section. The utility commission, when so appointed, shall be a public body politic and corporate, with perpetual succession; and the body may contract and be contracted with, sue and be sued, in and by its corporate name, and have and use a corporate seal. The utility commission shall provide rules for the management of the plant, and it shall fix the number, qualifications, pay, and terms of employment of all employees needed to operate the plant. In cities with populations equal to or greater than eight thousand (8,000) based upon the most recent federal decennial census providing civil service coverage for city employees, the utility commission appointed under this section may provide civil service coverage for all of its employees, and it shall exercise the powers and functions with respect to their employees which are vested in the city legislative body with respect to the city employees by KRS 90.380 . Employees who have been in the employment of the utility commission for one (1) year immediately preceding the adoption of an order by the utility commission placing all of its employees under civil service coverage shall not be required to stand a civil service examination, and they shall be eligible for all the benefits provided by civil service coverage. Out of the revenue of the plant, it shall pay operating expenses, repairs, and necessary additions and provide sufficient reserve fund against any emergency that may arise. The commission shall from time to time pay to the city the surplus revenue derived from the operation of the plant as is provided in KRS 96.430 and 96.440 , as they are made applicable to the plants by KRS 96.520, except that the commission in a city with a population equal to or greater than eight thousand (8,000) based upon the most recent federal decennial census shall pay to the city the surplus revenue derived from the operation of the plant as is provided in KRS 96.535 and any ordinance adopted according to this section. Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions, the utility commission, for the purpose stated in KRS 96.520(1), may enter into an agreement for the operation of any of its plants or other facilities.
  2. Except as provided in KRS 61.070 , no person shall be appointed a member of the commission who has, within the last two (2) years before his appointment, held any city, county, state, or federal office, or been a member of any committee of any political party, or who is related within the third degree to the mayor, or a member of a city legislative body. The commission shall not appoint to any subordinate office that it may create any person who is related to any commissioner, to the mayor or to any member of the city legislative body. No officer or employee of the city, whether holding a paid or unpaid office, shall be eligible to be appointed as a member of the commission or to be employed by the commission in any capacity. The members of the commission shall be citizens, taxpayers, and legal voters of the city and shall not at the time of appointment be indebted to the city or be surety on the official bond of any officer of the city. However, one (1) commission member may be appointed who lives in a portion of the utility’s service area that is not within the city if that portion contains ten percent (10%) or more of the utility’s customers and that member has been a customer of the utility for not less than one (1) year. If at any time during his term of office any member of the commission becomes a candidate for or is elected or appointed to any public office, he shall automatically vacate his membership on the commission, and another person shall be appointed in his place.
  3. The city shall pay the cost of securing bonds for the commissioners from a surety company, and each commissioner shall execute bond to be approved by the city legislative body.
  4. The city legislative body shall fix the salary to be paid each member of the commission at a sum not to exceed two thousand four hundred dollars ($2,400) per annum. The Department for Local Government shall compute by the second Friday in February of every year the annual increase or decrease in the Consumer Price Index of the preceding year by using 1998 as the base year, and the salary of the commissioners may be adjusted at a rate no greater than that stipulated by the Department for Local Government.
  5. The first commissioners appointed under this section shall be appointed one (1) for the term of one (1) year, one (1) for the term of two (2) years, and one (1) for the term of three (3) years. Upon the expiration of the first terms, successors shall be appointed for a term of three (3) years. On a commission with five (5) members, not more than two (2) members shall hold concurrent terms of office.
  6. All commission members appointed subsequent to the initial members shall be appointed by the mayor or chief executive of the municipality, with the approval of the governing body of the municipality.

HISTORY: 3480d-20: amend. Acts 1964, ch. 36, § 1; 1966, ch. 248; 1970, ch. 36, § 2; 1976, ch. 320, § 1; 1978, ch. 328, § 3, effective June 17, 1978; 1984, ch. 200, § 1, effective July 13, 1984; 1986, ch. 325, § 2, effective July 15, 1986; 1988, ch. 424, § 1, effective July 15, 1988; 1990, ch. 231, § 1, effective July 13, 1990; 1998, ch. 229, § 1, effective July 15, 1998; 2007, ch. 47, § 64, effective June 26, 2007; 2010, ch. 117, § 70, effective July 15, 2010; 2014 ch. 92, § 171, effective January 1, 2015; 2016 ch. 61, § 1, effective July 15, 2016.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Construction.

This section and KRS 278.270 relative to rates were not inconsistent, the former applying only to utility plants operated by cities and the latter to utility plants operated by private persons. Vanceburg v. Plummer, 275 Ky. 713 , 122 S.W.2d 772, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 502 ( Ky. 1938 ), overruled, Flemingsburg v. Public Service Com., 411 S.W.2d 920, 1966 Ky. LEXIS 28 ( Ky. 1966 ).

The provision of this section that no person shall be appointed a member of commission who has within two years before appointment held any city, county or federal office or been a member of any committee of any political party did not become part of KRS 96.350 to 96.510 because of reference in this section to those sections. Keathley v. Martin, 246 S.W.2d 152, 1951 Ky. LEXIS 1271 ( Ky. 1951 ).

2. Appointment of Commission.

Where revenue bonds have been issued under KRS 96.520 for extending or adding to a municipal utility acquired before the passage of KRS 96.520 and this section, a utility commission must be appointed. Eagle v. Corbin, 275 Ky. 808 , 122 S.W.2d 798, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 507 ( Ky. 1938 ).

The establishment of a utility commission is not a condition precedent to the issuance of revenue bonds to finance reconstruction or extension, and a commission need not be appointed until the plant is ready for operation. Eagle v. Corbin, 275 Ky. 808 , 122 S.W.2d 798, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 507 ( Ky. 1938 ).

A utility commission is required to be appointed only when a plant is acquired by issuing revenue bonds pursuant to KRS 96.520 . If a plant is acquired by issuing general obligation bonds under KRS 66.060 , 85.120 and 96.170 , no utility commission need be appointed. King v. Rowland, 293 Ky. 198 , 168 S.W.2d 755, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 596 ( Ky. 1943 ).

3. Duties.

Though municipal corporation in maintaining electric light plant distributing electricity for domestic uses acts in quasi-private and not governmental capacity, and its officials in that relationship are deemed administrative agents rather than public officers, nevertheless they have duties which cannot be surrendered unless expressly or impliedly authorized by law regulating those duties. Middlesboro v. Kentucky Utilities Co., 284 Ky. 833 , 146 S.W.2d 48, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 587 ( Ky. 1940 ).

4. Combined Water and Electric Systems.

City purchasing combined water and electric systems had power to create a board to manage and operate the systems, similar to the boards provided for by this section and KRS 96.740 , such not constituting an unlawful delegation of power. Cawood v. Coleman, 294 Ky. 858 , 172 S.W.2d 548, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 515 ( Ky. 1943 ).

5. Ultra Vires Contract.

Contract between city and T. V. A. (before enactment of KRS 96.550 to 96.900 ) to supply city with electricity for 20 years was ultra vires of city, where, in every material respect, it permitted federal agency to say how, when, and where city should distribute electricity and where city undertook not to modify rates without permission of federal agency, even if rates proved insufficient to liquidate bonds and maintain plant. Middlesboro v. Kentucky Utilities Co., 284 Ky. 833 , 146 S.W.2d 48, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 587 ( Ky. 1940 ).

6. Employes.

Employes who were hired by a city utility commission and whose compensation and terms of employment were fixed by the commission were not city employes and they were not entitled to benefits under a city ordinance providing incentive and longevity salary increments for employees of the city. Bruner v. Owensboro, 522 S.W.2d 440, 1975 Ky. LEXIS 131 ( Ky. 1975 ).

Cited:

Tennessee Electric Power Co. v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 306 U.S. 118, 59 S. Ct. 366, 83 L. Ed. 543, 1939 U.S. LEXIS 973 (1939), overruled in part, Bond v. United States, — U.S. —, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 180 L. Ed. 2d 269, 2011 U.S. LEXIS 4558 (U.S. 2011), overruled in part as stated, Bond v. United States, — U.S. —, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 180 L. Ed. 2d 269, 2011 U.S. LEXIS 4558 (U.S. 2011); Dunn v. Hart, 290 Ky. 764 , 162 S.W.2d 767, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 490 ( Ky. 1942 ); Lynchburg Foundry Co. v. Pikeville, 246 S.W.2d 594, 1952 Ky. LEXIS 643 ( Ky. 1952 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

This section authorizes the commissioners of a municipal power and light utility organized pursuant to this section to enter into a contract with the city for computer service in connection with the billing of service charges to customers as a joint operation with other municipal utilities. OAG 67-41 .

A member of a county registration and purgation board is a state or county officer within the meaning of subsection (2) of this section and may not be appointed to a municipal electric plant commission organized under this section within two years of his resignation from the purgation board. OAG 68-466 .

Subsection (1) of this section authorizes the city legislative body to appoint the utility commission members. OAG 72-103 .

While a utility commission is not an agency of the city and its employees are not city employees, such utility commission is authorized to provide civil service coverage for its employees similar to coverage given city employees. OAG 73-864 .

Where a city is operating its electric distribution system pursuant to this section, members of the utility commission must live within the corporate limits of the city. OAG 74-487 .

There is no statutory authority for the popular election of the utility commissioners and such authority cannot be supplied by referendum approved at a local election. OAG 75-382 .

The city utility commission, created pursuant to this section, is independent of the city so long as it is in existence and, as a consequence, the city has no control over the management of the utility or its employees. OAG 76-587 .

This section deals with the means of establishing a city utility commission for the operation of any electric, heat, light and power system acquired by a city, and does not authorize the establishment of a commission to operate a municipally owned sewerage or waterworks system. OAG 78-463 .

If a particular utility board is an agency of a city, board members are city officers or employees, and the city is liable for the negligence of the board members, but if the utility board is an independent corporate body politic, the city would not be liable, and in neither case would sovereign immunity apply. OAG 79-131 .

This section provides that a utility commission shall have absolute control of the utility plant in every respect, including its operation and fiscal management, which commission is declared to be a public body politic and corporate, with the power to fix the number, qualifications, pay and terms of employment of all employees needed to operate the plant and such a utility commission is independent of the city as long as it is in existence. OAG 79-131 .

Although a utility commission operating under this section has authority to employ its own counsel to represent it in matters germane to the commission, when the commission itself is the complaining party before the civil service commission, it would be unethical for the utility commission’s attorney to represent the civil service commission, normally it is the responsibility of the city attorney, in a hearing under KRS 90.360 . OAG 79-171 .

An employee of the utility commission must be given an opportunity for a hearing before the civil service commission before dismissal or suspension. OAG 79-171 .

The city utility commission exercises the same authority over its employees as the city with respect to number and compensation, and the provision relating to dismissal, suspension and reduction as provided in KRS 90.380 . OAG 79-171 .

The city utility commission exercises the same authority over its employees as the city with respect to number and compensation; furthermore, the city utility commission is bound by the provisions of KRS 90.360 concerning dismissal, suspension or reduction. OAG 83-57 .

In those circumstances where the city utility commission is required to extend civil service coverage to its employees it would be only fair and consistent to extend coverage to those types of positions included under the city’s civil service system and exclude those types of positions excluded by the city’s civil service system. OAG 83-57 .

A city utility commission organized pursuant to this section is a corporate entity, separate from the city, and not included by KRS 90.300 to 90.410 as being within the civil service program applicable to employees of cities of the second and third classes; however, subsection (1) of this section requires that a city utility commission, in a city of the second or third class providing civil service coverage for city employees, provide such civil service coverage for its employees under the provisions of KRS 90.300 to 90.410 and the city utility commission would, therefore, be operating under the same civil service provisions as the cities of the second and third classes and would be subject to the definitions set forth in KRS 90.300. OAG 83-57 .

Assuming that the position of the utility plant’s general manager corresponds to a head of a department of the municipal government, the utility system’s general manager is not an employee of the utility commission for purposes of civil service coverage as he is functioning in an “administrative or directorial position”; under the same line of reasoning, the assistant general manager of the utility plant is an employee of the utility commission for purposes of civil service coverage as he is not functioning in an “administrative or directorial position.” OAG 83-57 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Bonds of public officers, conditions and recovery on, KRS 62.060 to 62.080 .

Energy and utility regulatory commissions, regulation of rates by, KRS 278.270 .

96.531. Regulation of telecommunications services provided by municipal utility.

Any legislative body of any city may provide telecommunications service. Any city that owns, operates, or controls, either directly or indirectly, a municipal utility that provides telecommunications services as defined in KRS 278.010(3)(e) shall, as to telephone service solely, be subject to the provisions of KRS Chapter 278 in the same manner as other nonmunicipal providers of telephone services.

History. Enact. Acts 2000, ch. 101, § 1, effective July 14, 2000; 2014, ch. 92, § 172, effective January 1, 2015.

Miscellaneous Provisions

96.533. Director of utility board or commission.

  1. This section and the applicable provisions of KRS 65.200 to 65.2006 shall apply to any director of any municipal utility board or commission created or operated pursuant to KRS Chapter 96.
  2. A director shall discharge his duties as a director, including his duties as a member of a committee:
    1. In good faith;
    2. On an informed basis; and
    3. In a manner he honestly believes to be in the best interest of the utility board or commission.
  3. A director shall discharge his duties on an informed basis if he makes inquiry, with the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would exercise under similar circumstances, into the business and affairs of the utility board or commission, or into a particular action to be taken or decision to be made.
  4. In discharging his duties, a director may rely on information, opinions, reports, or statements, including financial statements and other financial data, if prepared or presented by:
    1. One (1) or more officers or employees of the utility board or commission whom the director honestly believes to be reliable and competent in the matters presented;
    2. Legal counsel, public accountants, or other persons as to matters the director honestly believes are within the person’s professional or expert competence; or
    3. A committee of the board of directors of which he is not a member if the director honestly believes the committee merits confidence.
  5. A director shall not be considered as acting in good faith if he has knowledge concerning the matter in question that makes reliance otherwise permitted by subsection (4) of this section unwarranted.
  6. Any action taken as a director, or any failure to take any action as a director, shall not be the basis for monetary damages or injunctive relief unless:
    1. The director has breached or failed to perform the duties of the director’s office in compliance with this section; and
    2. In the case of an action for monetary damages, the breach or failure to perform constitutes willful misconduct or wanton or reckless disregard for human rights, safety or property.
  7. A person bringing an action for monetary damages under this section shall have the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence the provisions of subsection (6)(a) and (b) of this section, and the burden of proving that the breach or failure to perform was the legal cause of damages suffered.
  8. Nothing in this section shall eliminate or limit the liability of any director for any act or omission occurring prior to July 15, 1988.

History. Enact. Acts 1988, ch. 224, § 25, effective July 15, 1988.

96.534. Rate increase for municipally owned electric utilities — Rates to be uniform.

  1. The rates charged for services by municipally owned electric utilities shall not be increased except after a public hearing following reasonable notice thereof.
  2. The rates charged for services and the standards of services maintained by municipally owned electric utilities shall be the same for customers inside and outside the corporate limits.

History. Enact. Acts 1976, ch. 88, § 15, effective March 29, 1976; 1976 (1st Ex. Sess.), ch. 5, § 1; 1978, ch. 379, § 10, effective April 1, 1979.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section was formerly compiled as KRS 278.047 .

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(1982). A technical correction has been made in this section by the Reviser of Statutes pursuant to KRS 7.136 .

96.535. Water plant or electric light, heat and power plant of city with population of 8,000 or more — Maintenance, operation and depreciation funds for — Payment of surplus to general fund of city — Fair return on property.

  1. At the time or before or after the issuance of revenue bonds for the acquisition, extension or maintenance of a system of waterworks or electric light, heat and power plants in cities with populations equal to or greater than eight thousand (8,000) based upon the most recent federal decennial census, which bonds do not represent the general obligation of the city, the city legislative body shall, by ordinance, set aside and pledge the income and revenue of any such municipally owned utility into a separate and special fund to be used and applied in the payment of the cost thereof, and in the maintenance, operation and depreciation thereof, and for the purposes hereinafter set out. The ordinance shall definitely fix and determine the amount of revenue necessary to be set apart and applied to the payment of the principal and interest of the bonds, and the portion of the balance of the income and revenue to be set aside as a proper and adequate depreciation account, and the portion to be set aside for the reasonable and proper operation and maintenance of the utility, and may provide that the surplus not needed for the purposes aforesaid shall be paid over to and become a part of the general funds of such city. The rates to be charged for services from the utility shall be fixed and revised from time to time by the board appointed to operate the utility by and with the approval of the legislative body of the city so as to be sufficient to provide for the payment of interest upon all bonds and to create a sinking fund to pay the principal thereof when due; to provide for the operation and maintenance of the utility and an adequate depreciation account; and such rates may be fixed as will furnish a fair and reasonable return to the municipality on the fair value of the used and useful property of the utility.
  2. Nothing in this section shall apply to electrical plants acquired or operated under provisions of KRS 96.550 to 96.900 .

History. Enact. Acts 1944, ch. 28; 2014, ch. 92, § 173, effective January 1, 2015.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Fair Return on Property.

In the case of a publicly-owned utility serving consumers outside the ownership area, the initial approach in fixing rates should be to apply the customary rule applicable to privately-owned utilities of a fair return on the investment, although a problem might arise where this return would not be sufficient to meet the obligations of revenue bonds issued to finance the acquisition of property used for serving out-of-city consumers, and by statute, rates are required to be charged sufficient to retire the bonds. Covington v. Public Service Com., 313 S.W.2d 391, 1958 Ky. LEXIS 254 ( Ky. 1958 ).

Cited:

McKinney v. Owensboro, 305 Ky. 254 , 203 S.W.2d 24, 1947 Ky. LEXIS 780 ( Ky. 1947 ).

96.536. City owned light, water, or gas plant may pay tax equivalent to school district.

  1. Each board of education of a public school district in which is located the property or properties of a publicly-owned light, water, or gas plant may each year be paid by the governing board of the plant from the proceeds of the sale of electrical energy, water, or gas an amount which shall not exceed that determined by multiplying the book value of the property or properties of the publicly-owned light, water, or gas plant as of the beginning of each year by the current tax rate levied for school purposes for the school district in which the property or properties may be located. “Book value,” as used in this section, means the cost of tangible property plus additions, extensions, and betterments, less reasonable depreciation or retirement reserve, and “year” as herein used shall mean the twelve (12) month period ending June 30. The book value so determined shall be in accordance with standard accounting practices. No payment may be made under this section except pursuant to a resolution of the governing board of the plant, adopted by a unanimous vote of the members of the board.
  2. Amounts for any year, as provided in subsection (1) of this section, shall be paid to the board of education on or before January 1 of each year.
  3. This section shall not apply to any publicly owned electric plant that is subject to the provisions of KRS 96.820 .
  4. This section shall be construed only as an enabling act and shall in no way confer upon any board of education of a public school district authority to require this money to be paid to it.

History. Enact. Acts 1948, ch. 54; 1990, ch. 476, Pt. IV, § 123, effective July 13, 1990.

96.537. City operated natural gas distribution system — Bonds — Negotiated sale.

The legislative body of any city operating a municipal system for the acquisition and distribution of natural gas may, by ordinance, authorize the issuance of revenue bonds to pay all or any part of the costs of any project for the improvement or extension of the system, or for obtaining new sources of supply. The revenue bonds may be sold and issued in the manner provided for the sale and issuance of revenue bonds under the provisions of KRS 58.010 to 58.140 , 58.150 , 58.155 , and 58.180 , including by negotiated sale, or, upon a determination of a legislative body, acting upon the advice of the city attorney or city solicitor, that the proposed bonds will be industrial development bonds within the meaning of federal statutes, the revenue bonds, whether or not exempt from federal income taxation, may be sold in any manner provided for the sale of industrial building revenue bonds under the terms of KRS 103.200 to 103.285 , inclusive; provided, however, that the contract with the private corporation which is deemed to give rise to the federal classification of industrial development bonds need not take the form of a lease agreement, and no request in writing from any contracting private corporation shall be required for any negotiated sale, and provided, further, that in the event of a negotiated sale, a report of negotiations shall be made to a consultant who shall be employed by the city to make a recommendation to the legislative body on the adequacy of such negotiations and of the terms of sale in the light of market conditions. The provisions of KRS 424.360 shall not apply to any negotiated sale under this section.

History. Enact. Acts 1976, ch. 64, § 1, effective March 18, 1976; 2000, ch. 286, § 1, effective July 14, 2000.

96.5375. Rights of city owning or operating natural gas system to sell natural gas within and without city boundaries — Limitations — Prohibitions — Definitions.

  1. Subject to the limitations of subsection (4) of this section and KRS 96.045 and 96.538 , any city that owns and operates a municipal system for the acquisition, distribution, or transmission of natural gas may extend the system into and furnish and sell natural gas to any person or entity within the boundaries of the city or within any territory outside of the city’s boundaries. In exercising the authority provided by this subsection, the city may install the necessary apparatus to provide natural gas distribution or transmission service and may also condemn or otherwise acquire rights-of-way as private utilities may do. The provisions of this subsection shall apply to all cities of this Commonwealth transporting or distributing natural gas as well as any board, commission, or agency thereof.
  2. A city, other than a city of the first class or a consolidated local government, may acquire the entire plant of an existing natural gas distribution system only under the same process and subject to the same limitations established by KRS 96.580 , 96.590 , and 96.600 .
  3. No property owned or operated by an existing natural gas distribution system located within the Commonwealth may be condemned by a city from another state.
  4. A natural gas utility, which, for purposes of this subsection, means a public, private or municipally owned gas utility distributing or transporting natural gas to customers within this Commonwealth, shall not:
    1. Extend its system for the purposes of furnishing or selling natural gas to any person or entity that is currently being served by another natural gas utility; or
    2. Extend its system to furnish or sell natural gas to any person or entity when there is another natural gas utility in closer proximity to the person or entity to be served, unless the natural gas utility in closer proximity has declined to provide service.
  5. The provisions of subsection (4) of this section shall only apply to extension of service issues between a municipally owned natural gas utility servicing customers located outside its municipal boundaries and a private or investor-owned natural gas utility. The term “municipally owned” shall include systems distributing or transporting natural gas that are owned by a city from another state.

History. Enact. Acts 2013, ch. 96, § 1, effective June 25, 2013.

96.538. Right of existing utility in annexed area.

  1. Any utility providing electric service in any area annexed, subsequent to June 16, 1960, by any municipality shall have the dominant right to continue to provide electric service in said area to consumers then being served and to new consumers located nearer to its facilities than to the facilities of any other utility as all those facilities were located immediately prior to annexation.
  2. Any utility providing water, sewer or gas service in any area annexed, subsequent to July 15, 1980, by any municipality shall have the dominant right to continue to provide water, sewer or gas service in said area to consumers then being served and to new consumers located nearer to its facilities than to the facilities of any other utility as all those facilities were located immediately prior to annexation.

History. Enact. Acts 1960, ch. 32, effective June 16, 1960; 1980, ch. 201, § 1, effective July 15, 1980.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. In General.

The authority for an existing electric utility in an annexed area to provide service to new customers impliedly repeals KRS 96.045 insofar as it authorizes the city to take over the facilities of an electric utility by condemnation. Nicholasville v. Blue Grass Rural Electric Cooperative Corp., 514 S.W.2d 414, 1974 Ky. LEXIS 300 ( Ky. 1974 ).

To the extent that subsection (2) of KRS 96.010 provides that a city does not have to offer an electric franchise for sale in an annexed area already served by an electric utility in favor of service by a municipal plant, it is impliedly repealed by this section. Nicholasville v. Blue Grass Rural Electric Cooperative Corp., 514 S.W.2d 414, 1974 Ky. LEXIS 300 ( Ky. 1974 ).

2. Constitutionality.

This section is unconstitutional to the extent it purports to give a utility the right to use a city’s streets without its consent. Nicholasville v. Blue Grass Rural Electric Cooperative Corp., 514 S.W.2d 414, 1974 Ky. LEXIS 300 ( Ky. 1974 ).

The authority of cities to operate municipally owned utilities is statutory and not constitutional and thus the legislative provision prohibiting a city from extending its services into annexed areas already being served by another utility is not unconstitutional. Nicholasville v. Blue Grass Rural Electric Cooperative Corp., 514 S.W.2d 414, 1974 Ky. LEXIS 300 ( Ky. 1974 ).

To the extent that this section purports to give a utility the right to use a city’s streets without its consent it is unconstitutional as a violation of sections 163 and 164 of the Constitution. Nicholasville v. Blue Grass Rural Electric Cooperative Corp., 514 S.W.2d 414, 1974 Ky. LEXIS 300 ( Ky. 1974 ).

This section, as determined by City of Nicholasville v. Blue Grass Rural Elec. Coop. Corp., 514 S.W.2d 414, 1974 Ky. LEXIS 300 ( Ky. 1974 ), is unconstitutional to the extent it purports to give a utility the right to use a city’s streets without its consent. Florence v. Owen Electric Coop., Inc., 832 S.W.2d 876, 1992 Ky. LEXIS 72 ( Ky. 1992 ).

3. Police Power.

The General Assembly, by enacting KRS 81A.490 , this section and KRS 279.110(5), has utilized its right to exercise its police power. This is an inclusion to regulate rates and services, not in the face of Const., § 163, but in harmony with the reserved power of the state to safeguard vital interests of the people. A constitutional prohibition against impairing the obligation of contracts (and the franchise being a contract) is not an absolute one to be read with literal exactness. Legislation enacted under police power is not invalid merely because of its incidental effect. Florence v. Owen Electric Coop., Inc., 832 S.W.2d 876, 1992 Ky. LEXIS 72 ( Ky. 1992 ).

4. Consumer.

Determination of whether a particular entity or individual is a “consumer” under KRS 96.538 is a question best left up to the trial court, as the finder of fact, on a case-by-case basis, and the analysis may certainly take into account “who pays the bills.” However, the question of “who pays the bills,” cannot be the sole determinant in every case, lest situations arise where the entity paying the bill is quite obviously not the “consumer” in the traditional sense; rather, it seems more appropriate that a court should consider both who pays for the service and who uses the service. W. Ky. Rural Elec. Coop. Corp. v. City of Bardwell, 362 S.W.3d 351, 2011 Ky. App. LEXIS 239 (Ky. Ct. App. 2011).

Because KRS 96.538 draws no distinction between consumers who “add new services,” neither shall the Court of Appeals of Kentucky draw any distinction for consumers who “add new services.” W. Ky. Rural Elec. Coop. Corp. v. City of Bardwell, 362 S.W.3d 351, 2011 Ky. App. LEXIS 239 (Ky. Ct. App. 2011).

5. Dominant Right.

In a dispute over the provision of utility services to an annexed area, a first utility had the dominant right to provide service under KRS 96.538 because a fiscal court was the consumer both before and after the annexation. Even though the trial court focused on who paid the bill to determine which party was the consumer, a county both paid for the services and used the services; moreover, the trial court properly considered annexation of several properties as a single annexation. W. Ky. Rural Elec. Coop. Corp. v. City of Bardwell, 362 S.W.3d 351, 2011 Ky. App. LEXIS 239 (Ky. Ct. App. 2011).

96.539. Development of rules to govern extension of water and sewer service by city.

Any water or sewer utility owned by a city shall develop rules to govern extensions of service to unserved customers and areas. These rules may require that the applicant or applicants for new service pay to the utility all or part of the cost of extending utility lines. Where such payment is required, however, the cost of any extension greater than one hundred (100) feet per applicant shall be subject to refund by the utility on a prorated basis for each additional customer whose service line is directly connected to the extension line paid for by the initial applicant or applicants. The refund period shall extend at least ten (10) years, and in no case shall the refund amounts exceed the amount paid. Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent a water or sewer utility from adopting extension or refund policies which are more lenient to customers than are herein specified.

History. Enact. Acts 1980, ch. 303, § 9, effective July 15, 1980.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Eligibility for Reimbursement.

Trial court erred in awarding reimbursement to developers for installation of utility lines in subdivisions, as pursuant to KRS 96.539 , the developers were not customers of the utility as they did not apply for water or sewer services, and thus the developers were not entitled to reimbursement. Georgetown Mun. Water And Sewer Serv. v. Bur-Wal, Inc., 242 S.W.3d 661, 2007 Ky. App. LEXIS 181 (Ky. Ct. App. 2007).

96.5395. Public hearing required for city-owned or city-controlled electric generating facility considering acquiring property for wind-based electric generating facility.

  1. Any city-owned or city-controlled electric generating entity shall hold a public meeting in any county where acquisition of real estate or any interest in real estate is being considered for construction of a wind-based electric generating facility. A request for a public meeting may be made by any city or county governmental entity with jurisdiction. The meeting shall be held not more than thirty (30) days from the date of the request.
  2. The purpose of the meeting is to fully inform the public, landowners, and other interested parties of the full extent of the project being considered, including the project time line. One (1) or more representatives of the city-owned or city-controlled electric generating entity with full knowledge of all aspects of the project shall be present and shall answer questions from the public.
  3. Notice of the time, subject, and location of the meeting shall be posted in both a local newspaper, if any, and a newspaper of general circulation in the county. Notice shall also be placed on the Web site of the city-owned or city-controlled electric generating entity.
  4. A person that, on or before April 10, 2014, has started acquiring interests in real estate for a project as described in subsection (1) of this section shall hold a meeting that complies with this section within thirty (30) days of April 10, 2014.

History. Enact. Acts 2014, ch. 88, § 8, effective April 10, 2014.

96.540. Restrictions on conveyance or encumbrance of waterworks or lighting system by a city of the home rule class.

  1. Except as provided in KRS 96.171 to 96.188 , inclusive, and in KRS 96.5405 , no city of the home rule class that owns a lighting system by gas or electricity, shall sell, convey, lease, or encumber the system or the income therefrom without the assent of a majority of the total number of legal voters of the city voting at an election held for that purpose, after notice of the election has been published pursuant to KRS Chapter 424.
  2. In the case of a city with a population of less than eight thousand (8,000) based upon the most recent federal decennial census, the election shall be ordered and the election officers shall be selected by the city legislative body, the city clerk shall prepare the question for presentation to the voters, and a tabulation of the vote shall be done by the city legislative body in the presence of the mayor; in all other respects the election shall be conducted under the regular election laws.
  3. Except as provided in KRS 96.171 to 96.188 , inclusive, and in KRS 96.5405 , no city of the home rule class that owns a waterworks system, shall sell, convey, lease, or encumber the system or the income therefrom without the assent of a majority of the legislative body for the city or of a majority of the total number of legal voters of the city voting at an election held for that purpose, after notice of the election has been published pursuant to KRS Chapter 424.
  4. This section shall not apply to the issuance of revenue bonds under the provisions of KRS 96.350 to 96.520 .

History. 2741L-21, 2741L-22, 3172-1, 3290a-1: amend. Acts 1952, ch. 62; 1966, ch. 239, § 93; 1982, ch. 360, § 27, effective July 15, 1982; 1990, ch. 153, § 1, effective March 30, 1990; 2000, ch. 529, § 11, effective July 14, 2000; 2014, ch. 92, § 174, effective January 1, 2015.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Application.

KRS 96.350 , providing that waterworks of third-class city could be mortgaged without assent of voters, modified subsection (1) of this section which required such assent. Bowling Green v. Kirby, 220 Ky. 839 , 295 S.W. 1004, 1927 Ky. LEXIS 603 ( Ky. 1927 ).

This section relates alone to purchase or extension of single utility and not to joint projects under KRS 96.350 to 96.510 . Jones v. Stearns, 275 Ky. 729 , 122 S.W.2d 766, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 500 ( Ky. 1938 ).

The provision of this section that a two-thirds vote was not necessary for the issue of bonds for the purpose of acquiring, extending or improving a waterworks system, related to the acquisition, extension or improvement of a single utility, and not to joint projects. Jones v. Stearns, 275 Ky. 729 , 122 S.W.2d 766, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 500 ( Ky. 1938 ) (decision prior to 1952 amendment).

This section did not apply to the issuance of revenue bonds for reconstruction or extension of a utility under the provisions of KRS 96.350 to 96.520 . Eagle v. Corbin, 275 Ky. 808 , 122 S.W.2d 798, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 507 ( Ky. 1938 ).

This section applies to the sale of an entire plant; a vote is not required for the sale of a fractional part of an electric system that is not essential to the operation of the system. Fleming-Mason Rural Electric Co-operative Corp. v. Vanceburg, 292 Ky. 130 , 166 S.W.2d 269, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 58 ( Ky. 1942 ).

The pledging of the revenue of water and electric system, a joint system, to secure payment of bonds for construction of sewer system did not contravene this section since KRS 58.040 specifically authorizes an encumbrance of this revenue. Hazard v. Salyers, 311 Ky. 667 , 224 S.W.2d 420, 1949 Ky. LEXIS 1149 ( Ky. 1949 ); Williams v. Barbourville, 246 S.W.2d 591, 1952 Ky. LEXIS 642 ( Ky. 1952 ); Brown v. Harrodsburg, 252 S.W.2d 44, 1952 Ky. LEXIS 979 ( Ky. 1952 ).

The vote requirements of this section do not apply to KRS Chapter 58 bonds, since KRS 58.040 was passed after this section and allows the encumbrance of such revenues; therefore, any prohibition in this section was superseded, and when this section was re-enacted, it was only to make a change in the amount of votes needed to carry a referendum, not to require a vote on Chapter 58 bonds. Baker v. Richmond, 709 S.W.2d 472, 1986 Ky. App. LEXIS 1136 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986).

2. Alternative Method.

KRS 96.350 to 96.510 creates an alternate authority and method of financing the acquisition, extension, addition or improvement of waterworks plants which does not require consent of the electorate through compulsory referendum and to which this section does not apply. The other authority of a city of the third class to acquire waterworks is contained in KRS 96.170 as qualified by this section. Booth v. Owensboro, 275 Ky. 491 , 122 S.W.2d 118, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 462 ( Ky. 1938 ).

3. Encumbrance of Water System Prohibited.

It was not a sale or encumbrance upon waterworks property of city of third class for city to erect hospital upon unused part of reservoir land which was subject to lien of waterworks bonds. Massey v. Bowling Green, 206 Ky. 692 , 268 S.W. 348, 1925 Ky. LEXIS 1035 ( Ky. 1925 ).

A city may not, even by a two-thirds vote of its people, encumber its existing waterworks system in order to acquire a sewerage system. Jones v. Stearns, 275 Ky. 729 , 122 S.W.2d 766, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 500 ( Ky. 1938 ) (decision prior to 1952 amendment).

4. Sale of Separate System Without Vote.

Where city owned an electric plant serving the city, and also owned a separate system serving rural consumers and an adjoining city, latter system could be sold without a vote. Fleming-Mason Rural Electric Co-operative Corp. v. Vanceburg, 292 Ky. 130 , 166 S.W.2d 269, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 58 ( Ky. 1942 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Although holding an election for the purpose of submitting a public question is in a sense a special election, when held it must be on the day fixed by Kentucky Const., § 148, the first Tuesday after the first Monday in November and although this section suggests a separate set of election officers, separate ballots and voting at the city hall, the voting should be conducted in the regular precincts of the city by the use of voting machines in accordance with KRS 125.005 (repealed) which governs as the latest legislative expression on election procedures where questions are submitted to the voters. OAG 73-553 .

Since a proposed merger of a city and county water systems under this section would involve a conveyance to a different legal entity a vote of the people of a city would be required by this section and in addition such merger would be conditioned upon there being no impairment of the obligations of any bond contracts of either the city or the county. OAG 73-553 .

The sale of the water and sewer lines through which a city obtains its water from a private source would not constitute a “waterworks system” within the meaning of this section and therefore no prior election by the city’s voters would be required to approve the sale. OAG 81-101 .

The term “waterworks system” referred to in this section means not only the water lines but the grounds and structures necessary to prepare the water for domestic use. OAG 81-101 .

96.5405. Sale, lease, or transfer of utility system in emergency by city with population of less than 1,000 — Procedure.

  1. A city with a population of less than one thousand (1,000) based upon the most recent federal decennial census may, in an emergency situation, sell, lease, or otherwise transfer a utility system which it owns after obtaining the approval of two-thirds (2/3) of the utility’s customers by petition, as specified in this section, without holding an election under KRS 96.540 .
  2. The city legislative body shall enact an ordinance pursuant to 83A.060 which shall describe the terms of the proposed sale, lease, or other transfer of the city-owned utility system, declare an emergency, and set out the reasons why the proposed transaction is deemed to be an emergency. The ordinance also shall set a deadline for obtaining the necessary signatures, and specify who will certify the petition.
  3. At least two (2) public hearings shall be held to inform the public of the proposed sale, lease, or other transfer of the utility system, and to obtain public comment on the proposal. The hearings shall be publicized at a minimum, in accordance with KRS 424.130(1)(d).
  4. The petition may consist of several separate units, and shall include a full address and the date with each signature. Unless the ordinance provides otherwise, only a person named on an account shall be a valid signer of the petition. The utility shall make available a list of the names and addresses of all current customers.

History. Enact. Acts 1990, ch. 153, § 2, effective March 30, 1990; 2014, ch. 92, § 175, effective January 1, 2015.

96.5407 Home heating assistance fund.

An electric power system owned and operated by a municipality may establish a home heating assistance fund to receive voluntary contributions from customers to assist individuals in preventing the termination of home heating service. This fund may be administered by the electric power system or through a community action agency or charitable organization that identifies individuals in need and makes such assistance available. This fund shall be administered as described in KRS 278.287 .

History. Enact. Acts 2006, ch. 231, § 2, effective July 12, 2006.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(7/12/2006). Under the authority of KRS 7.136(1)(c), the Revisor of Statutes has determined that the division of 2006 Ky. Acts ch. 231, sec. 2, into subsections was unnecessary.

Artificial Gas Systems

96.541. Definitions for KRS 96.542 to 96.546.

As used in KRS 96.542 to 96.546 , the term “acquire” shall mean and include construct, acquire by purchase, by lease, devise, gift, or the exercise of the right of eminent domain in the manner now or hereafter provided by law for the exercise thereof and acquisition by any other mode.

History. Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 68, § 1.

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

City may issue revenue bonds for any public project, KRS 58.010 to 58.120 .

96.542. Power of city of any class to acquire and operate artificial gas system — Acquisition of existing system.

  1. Any city may acquire, maintain and operate an artificial gas system, together with extensions and necessary appurtenances thereto within or without the limits of the city.
  2. If any such artificial gas system is acquired from a company having a franchise, such system may be acquired under the provisions of the Eminent Domain Act of Kentucky, except as otherwise provided in KRS 96.543 to 96.546 and 96.600 .

History. Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 68, § 2; 1976, ch. 140, § 45.

Compiler’s Notes.

The Eminent Domain Act of Kentucky is compiled as KRS 416.540 to 416.680 .

Opinions of Attorney General.

Unless authority is specifically given by statute to a specific utility type (such as water or artificial gas), city-owned utilities may only sell surplus utilities to non-residents and thus may not distribute those utilities through additional city-owned facilities dedicated to non-resident customers. OAG 02-1 .

96.543. Ordinance for acquisition of system and issuance of bonds — Election — Plans and specifications — Acquisition of lands and easements.

  1. Before any city may acquire, maintain, or operate any such artificial gas system, the legislative body of the city shall pass an ordinance declaring it desirable that this be done, and shall prepare an estimate of the probable cost of the system. If revenue bonds are to be issued to pay the cost the ordinance shall so provide. An election shall be had on the adoption of the ordinance if a number of legal voters of the city equal to twenty-five percent (25%) of the total number of votes cast in the city at the last regular election file a petition within ten (10) days after the ordinance is passed asking that the question of approval of the ordinance be submitted to a vote of the people. If the petition is filed with the county clerk and certified by the county clerk as sufficient not later than the second Tuesday in August preceding the next regular election, the election shall be held at the next regular election held in the city. If no petition is filed, the city may proceed immediately with the acquisition of an artificial gas system.
  2. If an election is petitioned for, the presiding officer of the city shall certify the ordinance to the county clerk, who shall cause to be prepared for presentation to the voters the question: “Are you in favor of acquiring, maintaining and operating an artificial gas system in accordance with the estimate of cost adopted by the  . . . . . . (here insert name of city) and the issuance of revenue bonds in the amount of $ . . . . . . (here insert total face amount of bonds estimated by the legislative body of the city to be necessary to pay the cost of the system, based upon the estimate of cost).” The voters shall indicate a “Yes” or a “No” vote. The presiding officer of the city shall advertise the election and its object by publication pursuant to KRS Chapter 424. All legal voters of the city may vote at the election.
  3. If an election is held, the city shall not acquire, maintain or operate the system or issue revenue bonds unless a majority of all the qualified voters voting on the question vote in favor thereof.
  4. Before revenue bonds are issued the legislative body of the city shall select the location of the system, prepare the necessary plans and specifications, and take all steps necessary in its judgment for the acquisition of the land, right of ways, constructions, franchises and easements necessary for the construction of the system.

History. Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 68, § 3; 1966, ch. 239, § 94; 1978, ch. 384, § 221, effective June 17, 1978; 1982, ch. 360, § 28, effective July 15, 1982; 1996, ch. 195, § 47, effective July 15, 1996.

Research References and Practice Aids

ALR

Property interest as disqualifying one to participate in proceeding to establish public improvement. 11 A.L.R. 193.

Injunction against signing or approval of ordinance by mayor. 140 A.L.R. 444.

Cotenancy as factor in determining representation of property owners in petition for, or remonstrance against, public improvement. 3 A.L.R.2d 127.

Initiative and referendum provisions, ordinance as to local improvement as within operation of. 72 A.L.R.3d 1030.

96.544. Issuance of bonds — Use of proceeds of bonds — Disposition of surplus revenue — Bond procedure.

  1. Except where an election has been held and the proposition has been defeated, any city may borrow money and issue negotiable bonds, but only after an ordinance has been adopted specifying the proposed undertaking, the amount of bonds to be issued, and the maximum rate of interest the bonds are to bear. The ordinance shall further provide that the proposed system, with necessary appurtenances thereto, is to be acquired pursuant to the provisions of KRS 96.541 to 96.546 . Any bonds issued under the provisions of KRS 96.541 to 96.546 shall be payable solely from the revenue derived from the operation of the artificial gas system, and shall not constitute an indebtedness of the city within the meaning of the Constitution.
  2. Money received from bonds issued as provided in subsection (1) of this section may be used to advance the expense of operation and maintenance for one (1) month after the establishment of the system. If a surplus is accumulated, from revenue, in the operation and maintenance fund equal to the cost of maintaining and operating the artificial gas system during the remainder of the calendar, operating or fiscal year, as may be provided by ordinance on or before issuance of the bonds, the legislative body of the city may at any time transfer the excess to the depreciation account to be used for any improvements or additions to the system.
  3. Except as provided in subsection (2) of this section, all of the provisions of KRS 96.380 to 96.500 shall be applicable to proceedings under KRS 96.541 to 96.546 .

History. Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 68, § 4.

Research References and Practice Aids

ALR

Revenue bonds or other bonds not creating indebtedness as within constitutional or statutory requirement of prior approval by electors of issuance of bonds or incurring indebtedness by municipality. 146 A.L.R. 604.

96.545. Operation and management of system — Artificial gas commission.

  1. Any city acquiring any such artificial gas system under the provisions of KRS 96.541 to 96.546 may by ordinance provide for the operation of the system under the direction of an official of the city as designated by the legislative body, or may delegate the authority to operate the system to a commission created for the operation of some other public works in the city, including a waterworks or electric plant, or may provide for the appointment of a commission of seven (7) members to operate, manage and control the system, which commission shall be known as the “ Artificial Gas Commission.” The commission shall provide rules, regulations and bylaws for the artificial gas system and shall, out of the revenue of the system, pay necessary operating expenses, repairs and additions thereto, and provide a sufficient reserve fund to insure that the system is kept in repair and in safe and sanitary condition and to provide against any emergency that may arise. The commission shall from time to time pay to the city the surplus revenue derived from the operation of the system as provided in KRS 96.541 to 96.546 .
  2. In order that the commission may be nonpartisan and nonpolitical, no person shall be appointed a member thereof who has, within the last two (2) years before his appointment, held any city, county, state or federal office, or who is related within the third degree to the mayor or any member of the legislative body of the city. The commission shall not appoint, to any subordinate office created by it, any person who is related to any member of the city legislative body or to the mayor or chief executive of the city, or to any member of the commission. No officer or employee of the city, whether holding a paid or unpaid office, shall be eligible to be a member of the commission. The members of the commission shall be citizens, taxpayers and legal voters of the city and shall not at the time of their appointment be indebted to the city or be surety on the official bond of any officer of the city. No member of the commission shall be interested in any contract for the furnishing of supplies or services of any kind to the system, or to the city. If at any time during his term of office any member of the commission becomes a candidate for or is elected or appointed to any public office, he shall automatically vacate his office on the commission and another person shall be appointed.
  3. Each commissioner shall execute bond with a surety company in the penal sum of one thousand dollars ($1,000), conditioned upon the faithful performance of his official duties. The bonds shall be approved by the legislative body of the city and the premiums shall be paid by the city. An action may be maintained upon any commissioner’s bond by any person injured by a violation of the covenants therein contained.
  4. The members of the commission shall serve without compensation.
  5. The first artificial gas commission appointed in each city under this section shall be appointed for terms as follows: Two (2) members for a term of one (1) year, two (2) for a term of two (2) years, and three (3) for a term of three (3) years. Upon the expiration of the first terms, successors shall be appointed for a term of three (3) years.

History. Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 68, § 5.

96.546. Alternate method.

KRS 96.541 to 96.545 are intended to create an additional and alternate method for the acquisition of the artificial gas systems mentioned in KRS 96.542 , and are not intended to alter, amend or repeal any other statute.

History. Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 68, § 6.

Condemnation

96.547. Condemnation and eminent domain.

Except as provided in KRS 96.550 to 96.900 , any city utility shall have the same rights with respect to condemnation and eminent domain as given corporations and partnerships under KRS 278.502 and 416.130 .

History. Enact. Acts 1972, ch. 360, § 1; 1976, ch. 140, § 46.

Opinions of Attorney General.

A city utility operating under the Little TVA Act which specifically authorizes condemnation pursuant to KRS 96.550 to 96.900 , cannot utilize the condemnation procedure authorized by this section. OAG 74-498 .

T.V.A. Act

96.550. Definitions for KRS 96.550 to 96.900.

As used in KRS 96.550 to 96.900 , unless the context requires otherwise:

  1. “Acquire” shall mean and include construct, acquire by purchase, by lease, devise, gift, or the exercise of the right of eminent domain in the manner now or hereafter provided by law for the exercise thereof and acquisition by any other mode.
  2. “Board” shall mean a board of public utilities established pursuant to KRS 96.740 .
  3. “Bonds” shall mean either general obligation bonds or revenue bonds.
  4. “Constitution” shall mean the Constitution of Kentucky.
  5. “Electric plant” shall mean and include any plant, works, systems, facilities, and properties (including poles, wires, stations, transformers, and any and all equipment and machinery), together with all parts thereof and appurtenances thereto, used or useful in the generation, production, transmission, or distribution of energy.
  6. “Energy” shall mean and include any and all electric energy no matter where or how generated, produced, transmitted, or conveyed.
  7. “Electric service” shall mean the furnishing of electric power and energy for any purpose for which electric power and energy can be used.
  8. “General obligation bonds” shall mean direct or general obligations of any municipality, issued within the limits and subject to the provisions of Sections 157 and 158 of the Constitution.
  9. “Governing body” shall mean the board, council, commission, fiscal court, or other general governing body of the municipality.
  10. “Governmental agency” includes the United States, the President, the federal works agency, the federal lending agency, Tennessee Valley Authority, or any other similar agency, instrumentality, or corporation of the United States, or of Kentucky or any political subdivision thereof, created by or pursuant to any Act of Congress or by state legislation.
  11. “Improve” shall mean and include construct, reconstruct, improve, extend, enlarge, alter, better, and repair.
  12. “Improvement” shall mean any improvement, extension, betterment, or addition to any electric plant.
  13. “Law” shall mean any statute of this state.
  14. “Mayor” shall mean the mayor of any class city unless there be a city manager, then it shall mean city manager, or the county judge/executive of any county. “Mayor” shall also mean the mayor of a consolidated local government.
  15. “Municipality” shall mean any county, city, consolidated local government, or municipal corporation of any and every class in the Commonwealth of Kentucky.
  16. “Revenue bonds” shall mean obligations payable solely from the revenues derived from the operation of an electric plant and such bonds shall not constitute an indebtedness of any municipality within the meaning of the provisions or limitations of the Constitution.
  17. “Net revenues” shall mean revenues remaining after payments of:
    1. All payments provided for herein to be made to the state, county, school or other taxing district;
    2. The payments of salaries, and premiums on bonds of officers and employees of the board; and
    3. All other ordinary and necessary operating expenses of the board in the operation of the electric plant including reserves for depreciation.

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 18, § 1; 2002, ch. 346, § 115, effective July 15, 2002.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Pre-existing Contracts.

The T.V.A. Act of 1942 declaring that cities desiring to come within the act must accept all its provisions did not blot out 1940 franchise provisions as to city’s purchase right and acquirement method of utility company’s property in city since utility company had a contractual obligation with the city under the 1940 franchise which could not be removed legally under the Constitution. Kentucky Utilities Co. v. Paducah, 308 Ky. 305 , 214 S.W.2d 258, 1948 Ky. LEXIS 908 ( Ky. 1948 ).

While a city is proceeding in part under the T.V.A. Act it has the right to have the price determined by appraisal under the provisions of a franchise ordinance by which city reserved option to purchase electric company’s system within the city at price to be fixed by appraisal. Paducah v. Kentucky Utilities Co., 264 S.W.2d 848, 1953 Ky. LEXIS 1272 (Ky. Ct. App. 1953).

2. Payment in Lieu of Taxes.

The T.V.A. Act which was passed for the exclusive benefit of consumers recognizes the soundness of the theory that the city is entitled to be compensated for the loss in taxation resulting from its acquisition of the utility therein authorized. Electric Plant Board v. Mayfield, 299 Ky. 375 , 185 S.W.2d 411, 1945 Ky. LEXIS 420 ( Ky. 1945 ).

Where a municipal electric plant paid the city an amount in lieu of taxes the amounts paid were not to be counted in computing the total revenue received from “public service companies” to determine the total revenue received in the previous year to be used as a basis for computing the property tax rollback. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Hopkinsville, 443 S.W.2d 224, 1969 Ky. LEXIS 240 ( Ky. 1969 ).

3. Electricity As Service.

Where the defendant did not generate electricity but rather, received electricity from TVA and distributed that power to its customers, under Kentucky law, the defendant did not manufacture a “product”; it provided a service. G & K Dairy v. Princeton Electric Plant Bd., 781 F. Supp. 485, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20439 (W.D. Ky. 1991 ).

Cited:

Settle v. Jones, 306 Ky. 9 , 206 S.W.2d 59, 1947 Ky. LEXIS 946 ( Ky. 1947 ); Bowling Green v. Davis, 313 Ky. 203 , 230 S.W.2d 909, 1950 Ky. LEXIS 853 ( Ky. 1950 ); Perkins v. Frankfort, 276 S.W.2d 449, 1955 Ky. LEXIS 422 ( Ky. 1955 ); Warren Rural Electric Co-op. Corp. v. Electric Plant Board, 331 S.W.2d 117, 1959 Ky. LEXIS 1 ( Ky. 1959 ); Kereiakes v. Graham, 458 S.W.2d 162, 1970 Ky. LEXIS 1 64 ( Ky. 1970 ); Grayson Rural Elec. Corp. v. City of Vanceburg, 4 S.W.3d 526, 1999 Ky. LEXIS 67 ( Ky. 1999 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Membership on the playground and recreation board would disqualify the person from serving on the electric plant board. OAG 61-846 .

The secretary and treasurer of the city board of education and the treasurer of the county board of education were disqualified from serving on the electric plant board. OAG 61-846 .

Where a city purchased property of a water company, part of which was located in another city, if the city was operating the water company under the T.V.A. Act it was required to make in lieu tax payments on the portion of the property located in the second city. OAG 63-862 .

The rate structure of the street light system composed of an energy charge plus an investment charge was in reasonable conformity with the state and federal law on the subject. OAG 64-872 .

The mayor cannot serve as a member of the electric plant board under the T.V.A. Act. OAG 66-18 .

A city has no authority to establish an employe’s pension plan under the operation of the combined electric, water and sewer systems of the city by the electric plant board organized under the T.V.A. Act, particularly where the plan would involve an insurance company handling the pension fund. OAG 68-19 .

An electric system functioning under KRS 96.550 to 96.900 , may also condemn property pursuant to the Eminent Domain Act, KRS 416.430 to 416.530 (repealed and replaced by KRS 416.540 to 416.680 ), regardless of the exclusive language of KRS 96.560 , as the Eminent Domain Act was passed later and as an alternative method of condemnation. OAG 74-498 .

City utility board established under the Little TVA Act, KRS 96.550 et seq., is an independent agency pursuant to KRS 96.740 , which declares it to be a body politic, a corporate agency with the power to contract, be contracted with, sue and be sued, in and by its corporate name; the board is, therefore, independent of the city. OAG 82-138 .

In view of the fact that utility board established under KRS 96.550 et seq. is an independent public body with the right to execute contracts independent of the city, contracts executed between mayor or city councilman of the city and the utility board are legal and not in violation of the conflict of interest statute, KRS 61.270 (now repealed), even though mayor has the power to appoint members of the board under the terms of KRS 96.740 . OAG 82-138 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

See note to KRS 96.580 . Ralston v. City of Middlesboro, 251 S.W.2d 233, 1952 Ky. LEXIS 902 (Ky. App. 1952).

Kentucky Law Journal.

Comments, Procedures for Termination of Utility Service: The Requirements of Due Process, 64 Ky. L.J. 180 (1975-1976).

96.560. Scope of KRS 96.550 to 96.900 — Legislative purpose and intent.

  1. The provisions of KRS 96.550 to 96.900 shall not apply in the case of a municipality now operating an electric plant under any existing law, but the governing body of any such municipality may elect to operate under the provisions of KRS 96.550 to 96.900 , in which case, from the time of the exercise of such election and the appointment of a board hereunder, the electric plant of such municipality shall be operated under the provisions of KRS 96.550 to 96.900.
  2. KRS 96.550 to 96.900 are intended to be the complete law of this state with respect to municipalities acquiring electric plants after June 1, 1942, and the complete law of this state with respect to the operation of electric plants acquired by any municipality after June 1, 1942. Any proceedings heretofore taken by any municipality relating to the subject matter of KRS 96.550 to 96.900 , whether or not commenced under any other law, may be discontinued by the municipality and new proceedings instituted under KRS 96.550 to 96.900.
  3. It hereby is declared to be the legislative purpose and intent to vest in the municipalities of all the classes in this Commonwealth full power and authority to establish, acquire, own and operate electric plants; to empower and authorize said municipalities to contract with and acquire from the Tennessee Valley Authority or any governmental agency electric power or current for resale and to authorize and require the payment, out of earnings from the sale of electric power or current, of certain amounts to the state, counties, municipalities, school districts and other taxing districts in order that they may not suffer from loss of revenue resulting from the tax exemption created by the transfer of property from private to public ownership, and in the interest of the general welfare.
  4. It hereby is declared to be the further legislative intent that KRS 96.550 to 96.900 shall be the complete law of this state with respect to municipalities acquiring electric plants, after June 1, 1942, and the complete law of this state with respect to the operation of electric plants acquired by any municipality after June 1, 1942; and that all laws and parts of laws in conflict herewith, to the extent of such conflict, hereby are repealed.

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 18, §§ 2, 34; 1966, ch. 165, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Construction.

KRS 96.890 controls and restricts the broad grant of power given to the municipalities by KRS 96.550 et seq. and, therefore, a city cannot establish its own municipal electric utility and compete with a rural electric cooperative which has been previously serving a territory; however, a city can create an electric plant board and provide electric service to its own facilities. Electric Plant Bd. v. Kenergy Corp., 2000 Ky. App. LEXIS 21 (Ky. Ct. App. Feb. 25, 2000).

2. Application.

City instituting proceedings under KRS 96.520 could, after passage of KRS 96.550 to 96.900 either consummate the initial proceedings or at its option institute proceedings under the new act. Dunn v. Hart, 290 Ky. 764 , 162 S.W.2d 767, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 490 ( Ky. 1942 ).

3. Purchase of Electric Plant Alone.

City purchasing an electric plant alone must follow provisions of KRS 96.550 to 96.900 . Cawood v. Coleman, 294 Ky. 858 , 172 S.W.2d 548, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 515 ( Ky. 1943 ).

4. Purchase of Combined Water and Electric System.

City desiring to purchase water system and electric system from private corporation which had operated system together as a single unit for a number of years and was unwilling to sell either system separately was not required to follow either the provisions of KRS 96.350 to 96.510 or the provisions of KRS 96.550 to 96.900 . Cawood v. Coleman, 294 Ky. 858 , 172 S.W.2d 548, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 515 ( Ky. 1943 ).

Cited:

Monticello Electric Plant Board v. Department of Revenue, 392 S.W.2d 440, 1965 Ky. LEXIS 278 ( Ky. 1965 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

The exclusive language in subsection (2) of this section does not prevent use of the Eminent Domain Act, KRS 416.430 to 416.530 (repealed and replaced by KRS 416.540 to 416.680 ), as a method of condemnation as that act was passed later and as an alternative means of condemnation. OAG 74-498 .

The Kentucky Model Procurement Act (KRS 45A.010 to 45A.990 ), which became effective for local public agencies as of January 1, 1980, applies to the purchasing procedures of a municipally owned Electric distribution system operating under the Little TVA Act. OAG 80-63 .

96.570. Powers of boards for municipal electric plants.

Except as otherwise specifically provided in KRS 96.550 to 96.900 , the board of the municipality shall exercise all powers conferred upon the municipality by KRS 96.550 to 96.900 . Any board operating under the provisions of KRS 96.550 to 96.900 shall have the legal power and capacity to perform any act not repugnant to law and shall have the express power and capacity to do any and all acts or things necessary or convenient for the carrying out of the purposes of KRS 96.550 to 96.900, including, but not by way of limitation, the following express powers:

  1. Acquire, hold and dispose of property, real and personal, tangible and intangible, necessary or incident to the proper conduct of its business.
  2. Construct, acquire, own, lease, operate, maintain and improve electric plant or plants as defined in KRS 96.550 , and may provide electric service to any user or consumer within and without the boundaries of any municipality, and charge and collect reasonable rates therefor.
  3. Construct, acquire, own, lease, operate, maintain and improve distribution or transmission line or lines, or generating plant or plants, together with all necessary and appropriate facilities, equipment and appurtenances, individually or jointly with any other municipality or rural electric cooperative corporation organized under the laws of Kentucky for the purpose of generating, distributing, or transmitting electric power or energy and connecting their respective electric plants with a wholesale source of supply, and in the case of any such joint action, such municipalities and rural electric cooperative corporations may provide by contract for the method of holding title, for the allocation of responsibility, for operation and maintenance and for the allocation of expenses and revenues.
  4. Construct, own, lease, operate and control any and all works, lines, buildings and other facilities across, along, or under any street or public highway, and over any lands which are now or may be the property of the Commonwealth or of any county or municipality within this Commonwealth. The board shall, however, at its own expense, restore any such street or highway to its former condition and state as nearly as may be possible and shall not use the same in a manner as to impair its usefulness or to interfere with or obstruct the maintenance thereof. Before exercising these powers the board shall obtain a permit or consent or approval in writing from the governing authority of the municipality, or the fiscal court, or the Department of Highways having appropriate jurisdiction over any and all of such respective streets or public highways.
  5. Accept gifts, grants of property, real or personal, including money, from any person, municipality, or federal agency, or both, and to accept voluntary and uncompensated services; provided, however, that when engineering services are required by any municipality or any board or any appraisers or board of appraisers, appointed pursuant to the provisions of KRS 96.550 to 96.900 to render any services authorized or required or incident to surveys, plans, estimates of cost, or the valuation of property, or in the preparation of reports authorized by KRS 96.550 to 96.900 , no engineer who is engaged in whole or in part in the business of buying or selling any electric equipment, machinery, fixtures, materials, supplies, or the sale or purchase of bonds shall be eligible for employment or for any services whatsoever under the provisions of KRS 96.550 to 96.900. The limitations hereinabove provided shall also apply to any firm of engineers and to any member of any firm of engineers, if the firm or member of the firm is engaged in whole or in part in the business of buying or selling any electric machinery, equipment, fixtures, materials, supplies, or the sale or purchase of bonds; and no such firm or member of such firm shall be eligible for employment or for any service whatsoever under the provisions of KRS 96.550 to 96.900. Provided, further, that the provisions of this section shall not be construed to prohibit the board or the governing authority of any municipality from obtaining the advice or services of any engineer in the regular employment of the state or any federal governmental agency.
  6. Contract debts and borrow money for the acquisition or improvement of any electric plant, issue bonds to finance such acquisition or improvement, provide for the rights of holders of the bonds and to secure the bonds as hereinafter provided, and pledge all or any of the net revenues derived from electric service to the payment of such debts or repayment of money borrowed.
  7. Acquire, hold, and, subject to the provisions of KRS 96.860 and the applicable provisions of any bonds or contracts, dispose of any property, real or personal, tangible or intangible, or any right or interest in any such property in connection with any electric plant, and whether or not subject to mortgages, liens, charges, or other encumbrances.
  8. Make contracts and execute instruments containing such covenants, terms, and conditions as in the discretion of the board may be necessary, proper, or advisable for the purpose of obtaining loans from any source, or grants, loans or other financial assistance from any governmental agency, including, but without limitation, covenants, terms, and conditions with respect to the acquisition or construction of any electric plant or any improvement thereto with money in whole or in part borrowed from or granted by any governmental agency; make all other contracts and execute all other instruments as in the discretion of the board may be advisable in or for the furtherance of the acquisition, improvement, operation and maintenance of any electric plant and the furnishing of electric service; and carry out and perform the covenants, terms, and conditions of all such contracts or instruments.
  9. Enter on any lands, waters and premises for the purpose of making surveys, soundings and examinations in connection with the acquisition, improvement, operation or maintenance of any electric plant and the furnishing of electric service.
  10. Do all acts and things necessary or convenient to carry out the powers expressly given in KRS 96.550 to 96.900 .
  11. Make any contracts necessary or convenient for the full exercise of the powers herein granted, including, but not limited to, contracts for either the purchase or sale or both the purchase and sale of electric energy or power, and contracts for the acquisition or improvement of all or any part of an electric plant; and, in connection with any such contract with a governmental agency, the board may stipulate and agree to such covenants, terms, and conditions as the governing body deems appropriate, including, but without limitation, covenants, terms, and conditions with respect to the resale rates, financial and accounting methods and the manner of disposing of the revenue of the electric plant conducted and operated by the board, except that the board shall not have power to contract with the Tennessee Valley Authority or any other governmental agency for the purchase and resale of electric energy or power unless the contract shall provide that the resale rates of the board for electric service or electric energy shall be sufficient to cover all operating expenses, interest charges, and bond payments, other expenses, and payments to the state, any county, any school district, any municipality, and any other special taxing district in which the board operates, of amounts determined as provided in KRS 96.820 ; nor unless such contract provides that the payments to such taxing jurisdictions be made to them as hereinafter prescribed.
  12. Acquire a franchise to furnish electric service to any other municipality or county or the inhabitants thereof, and to contract with any other municipality or county to furnish it with electric service. Such contracts may be entered into by the governing bodies of the other cities or county.

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 18, § 3.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Application.

Where legislative body of city under the broad powers of KRS 96.170 purchases stock of an operating company thereby acquiring physical properties of a unified city water and light system this section does not apply. Cawood v. Coleman, 294 Ky. 858 , 172 S.W.2d 548, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 515 ( Ky. 1943 ).

2. Power to Sue.

City electric plant board had a right to maintain suit to determine whether it could provide electric service to city water plant outside city without joining city and its water and sewer commission. Farmers Rural Electric Cooperative Corp. v. Glasgow, 415 S.W.2d 85, 1967 Ky. LEXIS 297 ( Ky. 1967 ).

3. Payment of Tax Equivalents.

This section compels tax equivalents to be paid by a municipality only when and if it enters into a contract to purchase electrical energy from T.V.A. Monticello Electric Plant Board v. Department of Revenue, 392 S.W.2d 440, 1965 Ky. LEXIS 278 ( Ky. 1965 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Where a city deeded its publicly owned right of way along a city street to the department (now bureau) of highways, the department could not assume the responsibility for, or the costs of relocating sewer lines and laterals located within the public way. OAG 60-498 .

The rate structure of the street light system composed of an energy charge plus an investment charge was in reasonable conformity with the state and federal law on the subject. OAG 64-872 .

The electric plant board of a city organized pursuant to the Little TVA Act would be considered a municipal board or commission referred to in KRS 424.260 and would be required to comply with the bidding requirements of KRS 424.260 . OAG 70-798 .

Membership on the Princeton electric plant board is confined to persons who reside in and are legal voters of the city of Princeton. OAG 74-519 .

The Kentucky Model Procurement Act (KRS 45A.010 to 45A.990 ), which became effective for local public agencies as of January 1, 1980, applies to the purchasing procedures of a municipally owned electric distribution system operating under the Little TVA Act. OAG 80-63 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Permission of bureau of highways required for use of highways for electric lines and poles, KRS 416.140 .

ALR

Liability of electric power or light company to patron for interruption, failure, or inadequacy of power. 4 A.L.R.3d 594.

Right of public utility to deny service at one address because of failure to pay past service rendered at another. 73 A.L.R.3d 1292.

96.580. Proceedings to agree upon sale price of existing plant required before condemnation or construction of competing plant.

  1. Before a board or municipality may condemn an existing electric plant under the provisions of KRS 96.550 to 96.900 the board shall notify the owner of the existing electric plant, hereinafter referred to as the owner, in writing of its desire to purchase the plant or that portion thereof located or situated within said municipality and of its desire to enter into an agreement as to the value thereof. If no fair and reasonable price and terms of purchase and sale shall be agreed upon between the board and the owner within sixty (60) days after the aforesaid notice has been given the owner, and if either party desires that further efforts to determine a fair price and terms of purchase and sale be made, a board of appraisers consisting of two (2) members shall be appointed, one (1) by the board and the other by the owner. Such appointments shall be made within thirty (30) days after the expiration of the time given the board and the owner to agree upon the value of the existing electric plant, or that part thereof which the board desires to purchase. Should the two (2) members of the board of appraisers be unable to agree within thirty (30) days after their appointment upon a fair and reasonable price, a third member of the board of appraisers shall be selected by them. In the event the two (2) appraisers cannot agree upon the third member of the board of appraisers, then upon application of either the board or the owner, the Governor of the Commonwealth shall name the third appraiser. The board of appraisers shall consult with the state Public Service Commission in its efforts to arrive at a fair price for the electric plant, and the state Public Service Commission shall make available to the board of appraisers its facilities and any information in its possession bearing on the value of the electric plant. It shall be the duty of the board of appraisers to make a survey of, appraise and submit to the board and the owner in writing, its valuation of the electric plant. The board shall file its written report within six (6) months from the date of the appointment of the first two (2) members. The value fixed by two (2) of the three (3) members of the board of appraisers shall be the finding of the board. In the event two (2) of the three (3) members cannot agree within six (6) months after the appointment of the first two (2) members, the entire first board, unless given further time by agreement between the board and the owner, shall be discharged, and a second board, if desired by both the board and the owner, may be appointed as provided herein, which shall make its final report within six (6) months after the appointment of the first two (2) members thereof. The board shall pay all compensation to the member appointed by it, and the owner shall pay all compensation to the member appointed by it, and the board and the owner shall each pay one-half (1/2) of the compensation due the third member and one-half (1/2) of all other costs incurred in connection with the work of the board of appraisers. These costs may be included as a part of the purchase price agreed upon. Neither the board nor the owner shall be required to accept the report of the board of appraisers. If the owner fails or refuses to appoint an appraiser or appraisers as and within the time limits hereinabove provided, the board may proceed to exercise all of the powers granted by KRS 96.550 to 96.900 without waiting for the expiration of all or any part of the time authorized for making the appraisal herein provided for.
  2. After the board has complied with the provisions of this section, it may proceed in the manner and subject to the terms and conditions in KRS 96.590 to 96.900 provided to (a) enter into a contract with the owner for the purchase from the owner of the electric plant; or (b) institute condemnation proceedings and acquire the electric plant by the exercise of the powers of eminent domain. The governing authority of the municipality shall determine which of the courses hereinabove authorized shall be followed by the board.

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 18, § 3; 1968, ch. 152, § 76.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Negotiation for Existing Plant.

Electric company plant operating in Middlesboro was “an existing electric plant” within the meaning of this section and ordinance declaring that city would not negotiate for purchase of present plant should have been declared to be of no effect. Ralston v. Middlesboro, 251 S.W.2d 233, 1952 Ky. LEXIS 902 ( Ky. 1952 ).

Cited:

Monticello Electric Light Co. v. Monticello, 259 S.W.2d 486, 1953 Ky. LEXIS 964 ( Ky. 1953 ); Weller v. McCauley, 383 S.W.2d 356, 1964 Ky. LEXIS 36 ( Ky. 1964 ).

96.590. Power of condemnation.

  1. Any board proceeding under KRS 96.550 to 96.900 shall have the right to acquire by the exercise of the power of eminent domain, all lands, easements, rights of way, either upon or under or above the ground, any existing electric plant, or that part of an electric plant within the corporate limits of such city, and any and all real estate, franchise or personal property reasonably necessary or desirable in connection with the construction or operation or maintenance of electric plants or improvements or extensions thereto; and the right of such board to acquire such electric plant and facilities hereby is declared to be a superior and paramount right and superior and paramount to any other public use. Provided, however, That no board, by exercise of the power of eminent domain, shall have the right to acquire any central generating plant or station or substation or transmission lines, dams, or other property or facilities primarily and principally used by any public or private utility in the production and transmission of electric energy by such public or private utility for use outside the area to be served by the municipal electric plant; and, Provided further, That in the eminent domain proceedings to acquire from any public or private utility an electric plant, the property condemned must include all of the property owned by the utility within the city limits which is used or useful in connection with the business, of rendering electric service, subject only to the proviso next hereinabove in this section stated.
  2. The condemnation or eminent domain proceedings shall be brought in the name of the board, and title to the property so condemned shall be taken in the name of the board.

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 18, § 4.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Negotiation.

This section sets up even more elaborately the terms for negotiation than does the statute in most condemnation proceedings and negotiation as contemplated by this section was not had where city sent only a notice of intent to purchase and did nothing during the 60-day negotiation period and then sent a letter appointing an appraiser. Weller v. McCauley, 383 S.W.2d 356, 1964 Ky. LEXIS 36 ( Ky. 1964 ).

Research References and Practice Aids

ALR

Incidental private benefit, effect of. 53 A.L.R. 21.

Right to condemn property in excess of needs for particular public purpose. 6 A.L.R.3d 297.

Power of eminent domain as between state and subdivision or agency thereof, or as between different subdivisions or agencies themselves. 35 A.L.R.3d 1293.

Validity of appropriation of property for anticipated future use. 80 A.L.R.3d 1085.

Unsightliness of powerline or other wire, or other related structure, as element of damages in easement condemnation proceeding. 97 A.L.R.3d 587.

96.600. Procedure for condemnation — Report of commissions — Jury award — Procedure when condemnor not a utility.

  1. When the board of any municipality authorized to acquire, construct, own or operate an electric plant under the provisions of KRS 96.550 to 96.900 shall be unable to contract with the owner of any land, easement, right of way, electric plant, or any facilities or property needed by such board for its use for the purposes thereof and desires to exercise the right of eminent domain, the board shall proceed to condemn the property pursuant to the Eminent Domain Act of Kentucky except that, in lieu of determining the award to the owners in the manner prescribed in KRS 416.580(1) the commissioners shall ascertain and determine the value of the property taken; the value of real estate, tangible personal property, intangible property and franchises, if any such value is found to exist, shall be determined and stated separately in their report; and they shall also award damages, if any, resulting to the remainder of the electric plant or system of the owner, considering the purposes for which the property is taken, and the amount of said damages, if any, shall be stated separately in their report. The jury award shall be made in this manner rather than in the manner prescribed in KRS 416.660(1).
  2. Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (1) of this section, when the owner of any land, easement, right of way or facility to be acquired by exercise of the right of eminent domain is not a utility, the award to the owners thereof shall be determined pursuant to the Eminent Domain Act of Kentucky.

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 18, § 4; 1952, ch. 84, § 61; 1970, ch. 92, § 20; 1974, ch. 386, § 23; 1976, ch. 140, § 47; 1984, ch. 83, § 1, effective July 13, 1984.

Compiler’s Notes.

The Eminent Domain Act of Kentucky is compiled as KRS 416.540 to 416.680 .

96.610. Trial of exceptions — Appeal — When entitled to possession. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 18, § 4) was repealed by Acts 1976, ch. 140, § 129.

96.620. Transfer to circuit court when title to land involved. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 18, § 4) was repealed by Acts 1976, ch. 140, § 129.

96.630. Method of appealing to circuit court — Costs — Appeal to Court of Appeals. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 18, § 4; 1968, ch. 152, § 78) was repealed by Acts 1976, ch. 140, § 129.

96.640. Election by voters on question of constructing, purchasing, or condemning electric plant, or issuing bonds therefor.

  1. Before any municipality shall have authority to (a) construct or cause to be constructed an electric plant, (b) acquire an electric plant by purchase, (c) institute condemnation proceedings for acquiring by eminent domain an electric plant, or (d) issue revenue bonds for the construction, purchase, or acquisition of an electric plant, the question shall be submitted to the qualified voters of the municipality as hereinafter in this section provided.
  2. Before any municipality shall be authorized or empowered to purchase or establish and thereafter operate an electric plant, or to issue bonds therefor, the legislative body of such municipality shall pass an ordinance declaring it desirable that the municipality shall purchase or construct and operate a municipal electric plant, and if it is proposed to construct such electric plant, the board shall cause an engineer or engineers duly qualified and licensed under the laws of this Commonwealth (a) to prepare the necessary and proper plans and specifications for the construction of the electric plant, (b) select the location therefor, (c) determine the size, type and method of construction thereof, (d) make the necessary estimates of the cost of construction and of the acquisition of the land and rights of way, and (e) a survey of all lands, structures, rights of way, franchises and easements, the acquisition of which is deemed necessary by said engineers and the board for the construction and operation of such municipal electric plant, all of which shall be approved by the board; and, Provided further, That the question of whether or not revenue bonds shall be issued to provide for the payment of the cost thereof shall be submitted to the qualified voters of such municipality at the next regular November election to be held in said municipality if the ordinance is certified to the county clerk not later than the second Tuesday in August preceding the next regular election. The mayor shall certify such ordinance to the county clerk, who shall have prepared to be placed before the voters in the general November election, the question: “Are you in favor of the city constructing and operating a municipal electric plant in accordance with the plans and specifications adopted by the Electric Plant Board of  . . . . .  (here insert name of municipality) and the issuance of revenue bonds in the maximum amount of $  . . . . .  (here insert maximum total face amount of bonds estimated by the board to be necessary to pay the cost of such plant, based upon the estimate hereinabove provided).” The voters shall respond to the question by voting “Yes” or “No”.
  3. The mayor of such municipality shall advertise such election and the object thereof by publication pursuant to KRS Chapter 424, and also by printed handbills posted in not less than four (4) conspicuous places in each voting precinct in the municipality and at the courthouse door. All legal voters of such municipality shall be privileged to vote at such election. The city shall have no authority to construct a municipal electric plant, or to issue revenue bonds unless a majority of all the qualified voters voting in said election on this question vote in favor thereof.
  4. Any contract of a municipality for the purchase of an electric plant shall be conditioned upon the approval of the qualified voters of the municipality at an election held at the time and in the manner provided in subsections (2) and (3) of this section, except that the clerk shall have prepared to be placed before the voters the following question: “Are you in favor of the City of  . . . . .  purchasing from  . . . . .  (insert the name of owner or owners) an electric plant at the price of $  . . . . .  (herein insert the amount of the agreed purchase price) and the issuance of revenue bonds in the amount of $  . . . . .  (herein insert total face amount of bonds required to pay the agreed purchase price).” The voters shall respond to the question by voting “Yes” or “No”.
  5. Before any municipality shall be authorized or empowered to institute condemnation or eminent domain proceedings to acquire an electric plant, the legislative body of such city shall pass an ordinance declaring it desirable that the municipality shall acquire by condemnation an electric plant, and shall describe in the ordinance the property which it deems necessary to be acquired, and there shall be submitted, in the manner provided in subsections (2) and (3) of this section, to the qualified voters of the municipality at the next regular November election, the following question: “Are you in favor of the City of  . . . . .  (here insert name of city) acquiring an electric plant by the exercise of the power of eminent domain and the issuance of revenue bonds in an amount sufficient to pay the entire damages and costs of such acquisition.” The voters shall respond to the question by voting “Yes” or “No”.
  6. No municipality or board shall have authority to purchase, construct, or acquire, or to institute condemnation proceedings for acquiring an electric plant, or to issue revenue bonds or other obligations or evidences of indebtedness for the payment of the costs thereof unless a majority of all the qualified voters voting in said election on the question vote in favor thereof. Elections held pursuant to the provisions of KRS 96.550 to 96.900 shall be governed by the laws of this state relative to elections to the extent that such laws are not inconsistent herewith.

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 18, § 5; 1966, ch. 239, § 95; 1978, ch. 384, § 222, effective June 17, 1978; 1982, ch. 360, § 29, effective July 15, 1982; 1996, ch. 195, § 48, effective July 15, 1996.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Construction.

This section does not specifically bar holding more than one referendum or holding another after the lapse of a year. Hatchett v. Glasgow, 340 S.W.2d 248, 1960 Ky. LEXIS 30 ( Ky. 1960 ).

2. Application.

This section is not applicable where a city of the third class under the broad powers of KRS 96.170 purchases the capital stock of an operating company thereby acquiring the physical properties of a unified city water and light system. Cawood v. Coleman, 294 Ky. 858 , 172 S.W.2d 548, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 515 ( Ky. 1943 ).

3. Valid Appraisal Prerequisite to Election.

In absence of valid appraisal city was properly enjoined from submitting question of purchase to voters where city by franchise ordinance reserved option to purchase electric company’s system within city at a price to be determined by valid appraisal since the determination of the purchase price by appraisal was a prerequisite to submission of question of purchase to voters. Paducah v. Kentucky Utilities Co., 264 S.W.2d 848, 1953 Ky. LEXIS 1272 (Ky. Ct. App. 1953).

96.650. Power to issue revenue bonds.

Any municipality, by action of its board, may issue and sell revenue bonds, subject to the provisions of KRS 96.550 to 96.900 , to pay the cost of construction or acquiring an electric plant.

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 18, § 6.

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

City may issue revenue bonds for any public project, KRS 58.010 to 58.120 .

96.660. Validity of revenue bonds.

All bonds issued pursuant to KRS 96.550 to 96.900 , bearing the signature of officers in office on the date of the signing thereof, shall be valid and binding obligations, notwithstanding that before the delivery thereof and payment therefor, any or all the persons whose signatures appear thereon shall have ceased to be officers of the municipality issuing the same. The resolution of the board shall contain a recital that the revenue bonds are issued pursuant to KRS 96.550 to 96.900 , which recital shall be prima facie evidence of their validity and of the regularity of their issuance.

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 18, § 7.

96.670. Limitation of actions to challenge validity of ordinance, resolution or election.

Any action challenging the validity of any ordinance electing to operate under KRS 96.550 to 96.900 or any election resolution, bond resolution, or election adopted or held thereunder, shall be brought within sixty (60) days from the date on which such ordinance or election resolution or bond resolution was adopted or election held, as the case may be, and if not brought within such time shall be forever barred.

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 18, § 8.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Timeliness of Action.

Where electric plant board, for the purpose of acquiring an electric utility system, was created by ordinance issued December 5 and 10, 1964, and resolution pledging credit to obtain loan was passed February 12, 1962, suit attacking validity of ordinance filed on March 19, 1962, was timely.

96.680. Revenue bonds not debts of municipality.

No holder or holders of any revenue bonds issued under KRS 96.550 to 96.900 shall have the right to compel any exercise of taxing power of the municipality to pay the bonds or the interest thereon. Each revenue bond issued under KRS 96.550 to 96.900 shall recite in substance that the bond, including interest thereon, is payable solely from the revenue pledged to the payment thereof, and that the bond does not constitute a debt of the municipality within the meaning of any statutory or constitutional provision or limitation.

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 18, § 9.

Research References and Practice Aids

ALR

Revenue bonds or other bonds not creating indebtedness as within constitutional or statutory requirement of prior approval by electors of issuance of bonds or incurring indebtedness by municipality. 146 A.L.R. 604.

96.690. Form and terms of bonds — Sale — Bonds for improvement — Refunding or additional bonds — Negotiability — Interest rate.

  1. Bonds issued pursuant to KRS 96.550 to 96.900 may be issued in one (1) or more series, may bear a date or dates, may mature at a time or times, not exceeding forty (40) years from their respective dates, may be in a denomination or denominations, may be in a form, either coupon or registered, may carry registration and conversion privileges, may be executed in a manner, may be payable in such medium of payment, at such place or places, may be sold or hypothecated in blocks, may be subject to the terms of repurchase or redemption of all or any of the bonds before maturity in a manner and at a price or prices as may be fixed by the board prior to the sale of the bonds.
  2. The board at any time may issue and sell revenue bonds to finance improvements or issue and sell refunding bonds for the purpose of providing funds for the payment of any outstanding bonds issued in accordance with the provisions of KRS 96.550 to 96.900 . The new bonds shall be issued, sold, and secured in accordance with the provisions of KRS 96.550 to 96.900 for the issuance of the original revenue bonds, except no election shall be necessary or required to ascertain the will of the voters of the city. Should the board find that the bonds originally authorized will be insufficient to accomplish the purpose desired, additional bonds may be authorized and issued, subject to the same procedure and conditions as original revenue bonds.
  3. All revenue bonds issued pursuant to the provisions of KRS 96.550 to 96.900 in the hands of bona fide holders shall have all the qualities and incidents of negotiable instruments under the law merchant. Except as provided in subsection (5) of this section, all bonds shall be sold to the highest responsible bidder at a time and place as has been fixed by the board in the notice of the sale of the bonds, which notice has been advertised by publication pursuant to KRS Chapter 424. The board shall receive written, sealed, competitive bids, which shall be publicly opened and read at the time and place specified in the notice of sale. The board may reject all bids and readvertise. Notwithstanding any law to the contrary, bonds may be issued bearing interest at a rate or rates and may be sold at a price equal to, less than or greater than, the aggregate principal amount of the bonds, as is satisfactory to and acceptable by the board. “Highest responsible bidder” as used in this section means the responsible bidder whose bid generates the lowest net interest costs for the issue.
  4. After revenue bonds have been offered for sale by the board, as in this section provided, if no bid satisfactory or acceptable to the board is received, the board may sell, issue, and deliver the bonds to any federal governmental agency or other responsible purchaser at private sale upon terms, not in conflict with the provisions of KRS 96.550 to 96.900 , as may be agreed upon between the board and the federal governmental agency or other responsible purchaser at private sale; but the net interest cost paid on the bond shall not be greater than that received from the highest responsible bidder.
  5. Notwithstanding any law to the contrary, bonds of an issue, or bonds of two (2) or more issues consolidated for the purposes of sale, which equal or exceed ten million dollars ($10,000,000) in the aggregate principal amount may be sold at public sale in compliance with KRS 424.360 or at private sale without compliance with KRS 424.360 , and bonds for the purpose of raising funds for the completion of any project for which a previous bond issue, or issues consolidated for the purposes of sale, equaled or exceeded ten million dollars ($10,000,000) in the aggregate principal amount may likewise be sold at a public sale in compliance with KRS 424.360 or a private sale without compliance with KRS 424.360.

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 18, § 10; 1966, ch. 239, § 96; 1980, ch. 164, § 1, effective July 15, 1980; 1996, ch. 274, § 23, effective July 15, 1996.

96.700. Power of board to make provisions to secure payment of bonds.

In order to secure the payment of any of the bonds issued pursuant to KRS 96.550 to 96.900 , and interest thereon, or in connection with such bonds, the board of any municipality shall have power as to such bonds, to the extent not inconsistent with the mandatory provisions of KRS 96.550 to 96.900 :

  1. To pledge all or any part of the net revenues derived from sale of electric service;
  2. To provide for the terms, form, registration, exchange, execution and authentication of any bonds;
  3. To provide for the replacement of lost, destroyed, or mutilated bonds;
  4. To covenant as to the use and disposition of the proceeds from the sale of such bonds;
  5. To covenant as to the rates and charges of the electric plant;
  6. To redeem such bonds, and to covenant for their redemption and to provide the terms and conditions thereof;
  7. To covenant and prescribe as to what happenings or occurrences shall constitute “events of default,” and the terms and conditions upon which any or all of such bonds shall become or may be declared due before maturity and as to the terms and conditions upon which such declaration and its consequences may be waived;
  8. To covenant as to the rights, liabilities, powers and duties arising upon the breach by it of any covenant, condition or obligation;
  9. To vest in a trustee or trustees the right to receive all or any part of the net income and revenue pledged and assigned to, or for the benefit of, the holder or holders of bonds issued hereunder, and to hold, apply and dispose of the same, and the right to enforce any covenant made to secure or pay or in relation to the bonds; to execute and deliver a trust agreement or trust agreements which may set forth the powers and duties and the remedies available to such trustee or trustees and limiting the liabilities thereof and describing what occurrences shall constitute “events of default,” and prescribing the terms and conditions upon which such trustee or trustees or the holder or holders of bonds of any specified amount or percentage may exercise such rights and enforce any and all such covenants and resort to such remedies as may be appropriate;
  10. To make covenants other than, and in addition to, the covenants herein authorized of like or different character, necessary or advisable to effectuate the purpose of KRS 96.550 to 96.900 ; and
  11. To execute all instruments necessary or convenient in the exercise of the powers herein granted or in the performance of its covenants or duties.

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 18, § 11.

Research References and Practice Aids

ALR

Stolen bonds, right of purchaser of. 1 A.L.R. 717; 85 A.L.R. 357; 102 A.L.R. 28.

Duplicates of mutilated, lost, or destroyed bonds, statute in relation to issuance of. 39 A.L.R. 1246; 63 A.L.R. 388.

96.710. Remedies of holders of bonds.

Any holder or holders of bonds issued pursuant to KRS 96.550 to 96.900 , including a trustee or trustees for holders of such bonds, shall have the right, in addition to all other rights:

  1. By action in court, to enforce his or their rights against the board, and any other proper officer, agent or employee, including, but without limitation, the right to require the board, and any proper officer, agent or employee thereof, to fix and collect rates and charges adequate to carry out any agreement as to, or pledge of, electric plant revenues, and to require the board and any officer, agent or employee thereof to carry out any other covenants and agreements and to perform its and their duties under KRS 96.550 to 96.900 ; and
  2. By action in equity to enjoin any act or thing which may be unlawful or a violation of the rights of such holder of bonds.

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 18, § 12.

96.720. Receiver.

If there is a default in the payment of the principal or interest of any bonds issued pursuant to KRS 96.550 to 96.900 , any court having jurisdiction may, upon the petition of the holders of not less than twenty-five percent (25%) of the outstanding bonds, appoint a receiver to administer said electric plant on behalf of the board, with power to charge and collect rates sufficient to provide for the payment of any bonds or obligations outstanding against said electric plant and for the payment of the operating expenses and to apply the income and revenues in conformity with KRS 96.550 to 96.900 .

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 18, § 13.

96.730. Payment of preliminary expenses.

  1. All expenses incurred by the board or the governing body of any municipality in the making of surveys, estimates of cost and of revenues, employment of engineers, attorneys, or other employees, the giving of notices, taking of options, selling of bonds, and all other preliminary expenses of whatever nature which such board or governing body deems necessary in connection with or precedent to the acquisition or improvement of any electric plant and which it deems necessary to be paid prior to the issuance and delivery of the bonds issued pursuant to the provisions of KRS 96.550 to 96.900 , may be met and paid out of the general fund of said municipality not otherwise appropriated, or from any other available fund.
  2. All such payments from the general or other funds of the municipality shall be considered as temporary loans and shall be repaid immediately upon sale and delivery of the bonds, and claim for such repayment shall have priority over all other claims against the proceeds derived from the sale of such bonds.

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 18, § 14.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Payment from Existing Funds.

Payment of expenses from existing funds is authorized but city has no power to pledge its credit for a loan to obtain the funds. Weller v. McCauley, 383 S.W.2d 356, 1964 Ky. LEXIS 36 ( Ky. 1964 ).

Cited:

Hatchett v. Glasgow, 340 S.W.2d 248, 1960 Ky. LEXIS 30 ( Ky. 1960 ).

96.740. Election to operate under KRS 96.550 to 96.900 — Creation of board of public utilities — Appointment — Qualifications — Incompatibility with other offices — Bond — Oath — Not to hire relatives.

  1. Any municipality desiring to acquire and operate an electric plant under the provisions of KRS 96.550 to 96.900 or any municipality now owning and operating an electric plant may elect to operate under the provisions of KRS 96.550 to 96.900 by enacting an ordinance declaring therein the desire and intention of the municipality to accept and operate under the provisions of KRS 96.550 to 96.900 and by providing in the ordinance that the municipality accepts and agrees to all of the provisions of KRS 96.550 to 96.900, and to all of the provisions as they may be from time to time amended by the acts of the General Assembly of Kentucky. The ordinance shall further authorize the mayor or chief executive to appoint a board, subject to the approval of the appointments by the governing body of the municipality as hereinafter in KRS 96.750 to 96.900 provided. Upon the passage of the ordinance the mayor or chief executive of any municipality may, with the approval of the governing body of the municipality, appoint a board of public utilities, consisting of four (4) residents of the municipality who have resided therein for not less than one (1) year next preceding the date of the appointment. However, one (1) board member may be appointed who lives in a portion of the utility’s service area that is not within the city if that portion contains ten percent (10%) or more of the utility’s customers and that member is a customer of the utility for not less than one (1) year. The board must be appointed and qualified before the municipality shall have any authority to proceed further under the provisions of KRS 96.550 to 96.900. The board, when so appointed and qualified, shall be and hereby is declared to be a body politic and corporate, with perpetual succession; and may contract and be contracted with, sue and be sued, in and by its corporate name, and have and use a corporate seal. The name of the board shall be “Electric Plant Board of the City of __________” (The name of the municipality to be inserted.)
  2. No person shall be appointed a member of the board who has, within the last two (2) years next before his or her appointment, held any public office, or who is related within the third degree to the mayor or any member of the governing body of the municipality.
  3. Neither the board nor the superintendent appointed by the board shall appoint to any subordinate office which it may create nor employ in any capacity any person who is related within the third degree to any member of the board or to the mayor of the municipality or to any member of the governing body of that municipality. No officer or employee of a municipality shall be eligible for such appointment until at least one (1) year after the expiration of the term of his or her public office, or employment, except that the one (1) year waiting period after the expiration of the term of public office or employment shall not apply to an employee of a municipality that is not related within the third degree to the mayor or any member of the governing body of the municipality, at the time of appointment or employment by the board.
  4. Except as provided in subsection (1) of this section, the members of the board shall be citizens, taxpayers, and legal voters of the municipality and shall not at the time of the appointment be indebted to the municipality either directly or indirectly or be surety on the official bond of any officer of the municipality.
  5. If at any time during his or her term of office a member of the board becomes a candidate for or is elected or appointed to any public office, he or she shall automatically vacate his or her membership from the board, and another person shall be appointed to his or her place.
  6. The municipality shall pay the cost of securing bonds for board members from a surety company qualified to do business in Kentucky, and members shall execute bond in an amount required by resolution of the governing body, and conditioned upon the faithful performance of their official duties.
  7. Each member of the board shall qualify by taking the oath required by Section 228 of the Constitution.

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 18, § 15; 2000, ch. 486, § 1, effective July 14, 2000; 2016 ch. 61, § 2, effective July 15, 2016.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Creation.

City purchasing combined water and electric systems had power to create a board to manage and operate the systems, similar to the boards provided for by KRS 96.530 and 96.740 , such not constituting an unlawful delegation of power. Cawood v. Coleman, 294 Ky. 858 , 172 S.W.2d 548, 1943 Ky. LEXIS 515 ( Ky. 1943 ).

2. Powers of Board.

Failure to win majority approval at election on question of condemnation did not end board’s powers. Hatchett v. Glasgow, 340 S.W.2d 248, 1960 Ky. LEXIS 30 ( Ky. 1960 ).

3. Unauthorized Acts.

Electric company operating a city is not entitled to rely upon action of board which clearly was unauthorized. Monticello Electric Light Co. v. Monticello, 259 S.W.2d 486, 1953 Ky. LEXIS 964 ( Ky. 1953 ).

4. Board Members.

Holding membership on the electric plant board is not filling a municipal office within the meaning of Const., § 165. Kereiakes v. Graham, 458 S.W.2d 162, 1970 Ky. LEXIS 164 ( Ky. 1970 ).

5. — Appointment.

Where a city has both a mayor and a city manager, the power lies in the mayor to appoint the members of the electric plant board. Kereiakes v. Graham, 458 S.W.2d 162, 1970 Ky. LEXIS 164 ( Ky. 1970 ).

6. Employees.

The city board of commissioners may not employ for the electric plant board an assistant city solicitor or require that the payment for his services be made from funds of the plant. Kereiakes v. Graham, 458 S.W.2d 162, 1970 Ky. LEXIS 164 ( Ky. 1970 ).

This section prohibits city employees from being electric plant employees. Kereiakes v. Graham, 458 S.W.2d 162, 1970 Ky. LEXIS 164 ( Ky. 1970 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Membership on the playground and recreation board would disqualify the person from serving on the electric plant board. OAG 61-846 .

The secretary and treasurer of the city board of education and the treasurer of the county board of education were disqualified from serving on the electric plant board. OAG 61-846 .

The mayor was authorized to break the tie vote of the city council on a person to fill a vacancy on the water and light board and then appoint the person to the board. OAG 61-922 .

A person holding the position of city clerk-tax collector was eligible for the position of plant superintendent, irrespective of the fact that he held a municipal office from which he planned to resign, provided that he was qualified by training and experience for the position of superintendent. OAG 62-682 .

An auditor under contract to audit the books of the electric plant board would be considered an independent contractor and the prohibition against the hiring of an employe who has within the year held public office within the city would not apply to him. OAG 68-534 .

Subsection (3) of this section prohibits an employe of an electric plant board of a city of the fourth class from continuing as an employe of the board after his election to the office of mayor. OAG 69-66 .

Any board member who attempts to continue to serve after being disqualified by reason of residence could be removed by the appointing authorities. OAG 71-14 .

Any electric plant board member who changes his legal residence from within the city to the service area outside its corporate limits would become disqualified from serving on the board. OAG 71-14 .

The “service area” outside of the city limits cannot be considered a part of the municipality. OAG 71-14 .

An individual who served within the past two years on the city board of public works, since abolished, cannot be appointed to the electric plant board. OAG 72-669 .

The power of appointment is vested in the mayor or chief executive subject to the approval of the city legislative body and, therefore, a city board of commissioners can only consent to or not consent to the appointees and cannot alone fill any vacancies. OAG 72-669 .

Where there is a deadlock among the commissioners in a vote of approval of an appointment the deadlock may be broken by the vote of the mayor. OAG 72-713 .

A sixth-class city can enact an ordinance levying a reasonable service charge for the use of its sewer system under this chapter and at the same time enforce such charges pursuant to KRS 96.930 to 96.943 inclusive or under its general authority. OAG 73-664 .

When a city owns and operates the utility all the board members must reside within the corporate limits of the city which excludes membership on the board of residents from any fringe area in the county or other municipality served by the city but not a part of the city. OAG 74-519 .

Joint approval of the utility board members by the mayor and the city council is required under this section, and where the city legislative body refuses to approve a person selected by the mayor, the mayor must select someone else and continue to do so until the board agrees with such selection. OAG 75-705 .

Since the position of electric plant superintendent is nothing more than a form of employment, a person could serve, at the same time, as city manager and as plant superintendent of the electric plant board. OAG 76-211 .

A city cannot merge its water and sewer departments with its electric plant board, created under this section, and require the electric plant board to operate those other city utilities, and it cannot create a utility board or a utility commission which would take over the functions of the electric plant board. OAG 78-661 .

City utility board established under the Little TVA Act, KRS 96.550 et seq., is an independent agency pursuant to this section, which declares it to be a body politic, a corporate agency with the power to contract, be contracted with, sue and be sued, in and by its corporate name; the board is, therefore, independent of the city. OAG 82-138 .

In view of the fact that the utility board established under KRS 96.550 et seq. is an independent public body with the right to execute contracts independent of the city, contracts executed between mayor or city councilman of the city and the utility board are legal and not in violation of the conflict of interest statute, KRS 61.270 (now repealed), even though the mayor has the power to appoint members of the board under the terms of this section. OAG 82-138 .

Subsection (2) of this section does not preclude the husband of the mayor’s wife’s sister from being appointed as a member of a city’s electric plant board. OAG 82-454 .

The proposed hiring of the present city attorney to serve as attorney for the city’s electric plant board would be pursuant to a personal service contract, and since the city attorney would be hired in his professional capacity under a personal service contract to perform legal services connected with the construction of a proposed hydroelectric plant project, he would not be considered either an officer or an employee of the municipality under the terms of subsection (3) of this section, but an independent contractor. As a consequence no statutory conflict would exist in the attorney holding both positions. OAG 83-418 .

96.750. Compensation of board members and others.

  1. The salary of each member of a board of public utilities may be fixed by the board at not exceeding two thousand four hundred dollars ($2,400) per annum.
  2. Such salaries, as well as the salary of the secretary-treasurer, shall constitute a cost of operation and maintenance of the electric plant.
  3. The governing body of the municipality may, by resolution or ordinance, provide that the municipality shall not be liable for the payment of any salary or compensation of any of the members of said board, or for the payment of the salary or compensation or expenses of any person employed by said board, and that such salaries, compensation and expenses and any and all liabilities, of whatever kind or character incurred by the board or any officer or employee thereof, shall be payable solely and only out of revenues obtained by said board under the provisions of KRS 96.560 to 96.900 , and said liabilities shall then be so limited.

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 18, § 16; 1964, ch. 153, § 1; 1978, ch. 328, § 1, effective June 17, 1978; 1986, ch. 325, § 3, effective July 15, 1986.

Opinions of Attorney General.

The salaries of the members of the utility plant board, which is organized pursuant to KRS 96.550 to 96.900 , cannot exceed $300 per annum since subsection (1)(d) of this section specifically states that such salaries cannot exceed $300 per annum and KRS 64.660 precludes an increase in compensation for members of a public board whose salaries are fixed by statute. OAG 77-505 .

96.760. Term of board members — Vacancies — Removals.

  1. The original appointees shall serve for one (1), two (2), three (3) and four (4) years respectively, from the date of appointment, as the said mayor or chief executive officer shall designate. Successors to retiring members so appointed shall be appointed for a term of four (4) years in the same manner, prior to the expiration of the term of office of the retiring members. In addition to the members so appointed, the said mayor or chief executive officer shall also, with the approval of the governing body, designate a member of such governing body, or in his discretion the city manager, to serve as a fifth member of the board. The term of such member shall be for such time as the appointing officer may fix, but not beyond such appointee’s term of office in such governing body, or his employment as city manager. Appointments to complete unexpired terms of office shall be made in the same manner as original appointments.
  2. Any member of the board may be removed from office upon a vote of a majority of the members of the governing body of the municipality for inefficiency, neglect of duty, misfeasance, nonfeasance, or malfeasance in office.

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 18, §§ 17, 19.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Board Members.

There is no prohibition against a member of the board of commissioners being the fifth member of the electric plant board. Kereiakes v. Graham, 458 S.W.2d 162, 1970 Ky. LEXIS 164 ( Ky. 1970 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

A member who attempts to continue as such beyond his term would technically have no legal status as a member, but until he is replaced he would be considered a de facto officer, making his acts valid. OAG 71-14 .

A person whose term of office with a city’s electric plant board has expired may not “hold over” or continue to hold his seat on the board until his successor is appointed. OAG 82-454 .

96.770. Quorum of board — Officers — Meetings.

A majority of the board shall constitute a quorum and the board shall act by vote of a majority present at any meeting attended by a quorum. Vacancies in the board shall not affect its power or authority so long as a quorum remains. Within ten (10) days after appointment and qualification of members, the board shall hold a meeting and elect a chairman. The board shall at the same time elect a secretary-treasurer, and shall fix his compensation. The board shall hold public meetings at least once each month, at such regular time and place as the board may determine. Changes in such time and place of meeting shall be made known to the public as far in advance as practicable. Any special meeting may be called by the chairman or by two (2) members of the board, but, if such special meeting is called, written notice shall be sent to all members of the board by the chairman or secretary-treasurer. Except as otherwise expressly provided, the board shall establish its own bylaws and rules of procedure.

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 18, § 18.

Research References and Practice Aids

ALR

Validity, construction, and application of statutes making public proceedings open to the public. 38 A.L.R.3d 1070.

96.780. Board to control plant — Superintendent — Public filing of rates and regulations — Employees — Contracts — Records.

  1. After a board has been appointed and qualified, it shall have charge of the general supervision and control of the acquisition, improvement, operation and maintenance of the electric plant of the municipality. The board shall employ an electric plant superintendent (herein called “superintendent”), who shall be qualified by training and experience for the general superintendence of the acquisition, improvement and operation of the electric plant. His salary shall be fixed by the board. The superintendent shall be removable by the board for inefficiency, neglect of duty, misfeasance, or malfeasance in office. He shall be required to execute a bond, in a sum to be determined and approved by the board, conditioned upon the faithful performance of his official duties. The cost of the bond may be charged as an expense of the operation of the electric plant.
  2. Within the limits of the funds available therefor, all powers of a municipality to acquire, improve, operate and maintain, and to furnish electric service, and all powers necessary or convenient thereto, conferred by KRS 96.550 to 96.900 , shall be exercised on behalf of the municipality by the board and the superintendent, respectively. Subject to the provisions of applicable bonds or contracts, the board shall determine programs and make all plans for the acquisition of the electric plant, shall make all determinations as to improvements, rates and financial practices, may establish such rules and regulations as it deems necessary or appropriate to govern the furnishing of electric service, and may disburse all moneys available in the electric plant fund hereinafter established for the acquisition, improvement, operation and maintenance of the electric plant and the furnishing of electric service.
  3. A copy of the schedule of the current rates and charges in effect from time to time and a copy of all rules and regulations of the board relating to electric service shall be kept on public file at the main and all branch offices of the electric plant and also in the office of the municipal clerk or recorder. The superintendent shall have charge of all actual construction, the immediate management and operation of the electric plant and the enforcement and execution of all rules, regulations, programs, plans and decisions made or adopted by the board.
  4. The superintendent shall appoint all employees and fix their duties and compensation subject to and with the approval of the board. Subject to the limitations and provisions of KRS 96.550 to 96.900 , the superintendent, with the approval of the board, may acquire and dispose of all property, real and personal, necessary to effectuate the purposes of KRS 96.550 to 96.900 . The title to all property purchased or acquired shall be taken in the corporate name of the board.
  5. The superintendent shall let all contracts, subject to the approval of the board, but may, without such approval, obligate the electric plant on purchase orders up to an amount to be fixed by the board, not to exceed twenty thousand dollars ($20,000). All contracts shall be in the corporate name of the board and shall be signed by the superintendent and attested by the secretary-treasurer or chairman of the board. The superintendent shall make and keep or cause to be made and kept full and proper books and records, subject to the supervision and direction of the board, and the provisions of applicable contracts.

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 18, § 20; 1978, ch. 352, § 1, effective June 17, 1978; 2001, ch. 127, § 1, effective June 21, 2001.

Opinions of Attorney General.

A person holding the position of city clerk-tax collector was eligible for the position of plant superintendent, irrespective of the fact that he held a municipal office from which he planned to resign, provided that he was qualified by training and experience for the position of superintendent. OAG 62-682 .

The rate structure of the street light system composed of an energy charge plus an investment charge was in reasonable conformity with the state and federal law on the subject. OAG 64-872 .

The Kentucky Model Procurement Act (KRS 45A.010 to 45A.990 ), which became effective for local public agencies as of January 1, 1980, applies to the purchasing procedures of a municipally owned electric distribution system operating under the Little TVA Act. OAG 80-63 .

Research References and Practice Aids

ALR

Power of board to appoint officer or make contract extending beyond its own term. 70 A.L.R. 794; 149 A.L.R. 336.

Power of boards or officials to depart from literal requirements in respect of deposits or loans of public funds in their control. 104 A.L.R. 623.

Board of corporate body, liability on official bond of individual member of, for nonperformance or improper performance of the duty imposed upon. 123 A.L.R. 756.

Doctrine of apparent authority as applied to agent of municipality. 77 A.L.R.3d 925.

Requirement that public contract be awarded on competitive bidding as applicable to contract for public utility. 81 A.L.R.3d 979.

Duty of public authority to disclose to contractor information, allegedly in its possession, affecting cost or feasibility of project. 86 A.L.R.3d 182.

Validity of state statute prohibiting award of government contract to person or business entity previously convicted of bribery or attempting to bribe state public employee. 7 A.L.R.4th 1202.

96.790. Separate account for funds of electric plant.

All moneys derived from the issuance of bonds under KRS 96.550 to 96.900 , together with any governmental grant made in connection therewith, and all receipts from electric service or any other operation of the board, shall be deposited in a separate bank account or accounts, separate from all other municipal funds, and adequate records shall be kept of all such receipts and their sources.

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 18, § 22.

96.800. Use of proceeds from sale of bonds.

All moneys received from the sale and issuance of bonds shall be used solely to defray the cost of acquiring or improving an electric plant, except that such proceeds may in the discretion of the board also be used for the payment of the interest on the bonds until such acquisition and improvement is completed and for a period of not more than eighteen (18) months thereafter. The cost of the electric plant shall include all costs of acquisition or improvement, including all preliminary expenses described in KRS 96.730 ; the cost of acquiring all property, franchises, easements, and rights which, in the judgment of the board, are necessary or convenient; engineering and legal expenses; expenses for estimates of cost and revenues; expenses for plans, specifications and surveys; other expenses incident or necessary to determining the feasibility or practicability of the enterprise; administrative expense; and such other expense as may be incurred in the financing herein authorized, the acquisition or improvement of the electric plant, the placing of such plant in operation, including the creation of a cash working fund, and the performance of the things herein required or permitted in connection therewith.

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 18, § 23; 1984, ch. 81, § 1, effective July 13, 1984.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

Miller v. Owensboro, 343 S.W.2d 398, 1961 Ky. LEXIS 421 ( Ky. 1961 ).

96.810. Use of revenues — Reduction of rates — Equity of municipality.

  1. The board shall devote all moneys derived from any source other than the issuance of bonds to or for the payment of all operating expenses; bond interest and retirement and sinking fund payments; the acquisition and improvement of the electric plant; contingencies; other obligations incurred in the operation and maintenance of the electric plant and the furnishing of electric service; the state, any county, any school district, any municipality, and any other special taxing district in which the board operates, of the same respective amounts as provided in KRS 96.820 , or any other additional amounts which the board pursuant to its contract with the Tennessee Valley Authority or other governmental agencies collects as tax equivalents for any taxing jurisdiction if the board contracts with the Tennessee Valley Authority or any governmental agency for the purchase and resale of electrical energy, or if the board does not contract with the Tennessee Valley Authority or any other governmental agency for the purchase or resale of any electrical energy and if it has met all obligations imposed on it by KRS 96.550 to 96.900 it may at the end of any twelve (12) months ending June 30 transfer any surplus to the general fund of the municipality which authorized it; the redemption and purchase of electric plant bonds, in which case the bonds should be canceled; the creation and maintenance of a cash working fund; and the payment of an amount to the general funds of the municipality.
  2. After the establishment of proper reserves, if any, and after complying with the above provisions of this section, any surplus of proceeds shall be devoted solely to the reduction of rates. The equity of the municipality contracting with the Tennessee Valley Authority or other governmental agency for the purchase and resale of electrical power or energy shall be the purchase price of the electric plant, less the face value of outstanding bonds, or, if there is no purchase price, the original cost of the plant as defined by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, less accrued depreciation, less the face value of the outstanding bonds. The payment of bonds or the acquisition or improvement of property from the receipts derived from electric service or any other operation of the board shall not be considered to increase the equity or investment of the municipality.

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 18, § 24; 1996, ch. 274, § 24, effective July 15, 1996; 2002, ch. 89, § 1, effective July 15, 2002.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Upkeep Included in Tax.

Tax of 25 cents on each $100 to pay for the fire engine and upkeep and handling thereof was not invalid, because of including upkeep and handling, where it fell within total tax which council was authorized to levy under Const., § 157. Ward v. Lester, 235 Ky. 595 , 31 S.W.2d 924, 1930 Ky. LEXIS 413 ( Ky. 1930 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Assuming that a city contracts with T.V.A. for its electrical energy, the amount payable into the city’s general fund may not exceed an accumulation of six percent per annum of equity, if any, of the municipality; after this amount has been determined, the balance of the surplus, if any, after the city has complied with the other payments set forth in this section, shall be devoted solely to the reduction of rates. OAG 78-172 .

Where the purchase price of the utility system is $225,000 and there are no longer any outstanding bonds, the equity that the city has in the utility system would be the purchase price of $225,000, and, assuming that the other provisions of this section are complied with, it would appear that the city would be entitled to receive into its general fund six percent per annum of $225,000. OAG 78-435 .

96.820. Payment of sums equivalent to taxes based on book value.

  1. For the purposes of this section, unless the context requires otherwise:
    1. “Taxing jurisdiction” shall mean each county, each school district, each municipality, and each other special taxing district located within the state.
    2. “State” shall mean the Commonwealth of Kentucky.
    3. “Tax equivalent” shall mean the amount in lieu of taxes computed according to this section which is required to be paid by each board to the state and to each taxing jurisdiction in which the board operates and required by subsection (11) of KRS 96.570 to be included in resale rates.
    4. “Tax year” shall mean the twelve (12) calendar-month period ending with December 31.
    5. “Current tax rate” shall mean the actual levied ad valorem property tax rate of the state and of each taxing jurisdiction which is applicable to all property of the same class as a board’s property subject to taxation for the tax year involved.
    6. “Book value of property” or “book value of property owned by the board” shall mean the sum of:
      1. The original cost (less reasonable depreciation or retirement reserve) of a board’s electric plant in service on December 31 of the immediately preceding calendar year located within the state, used and held for use in the transmission, distribution, and generation of electric energy, and
      2. The cost of the material and supplies owned by a board on December 31 of the immediately preceding calendar year. For the purpose of this definition, “electric plant in service” shall mean those items included in the “electric plant in service” account prescribed by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission uniform system of accounts for electric utilities, and “material and supplies” shall mean those items included in the accounts grouped under the heading “material and supplies” in the said system of accounts.
    7. “Adjusted book value of property” or “adjusted book value of property owned by the board” shall mean the book value of property owned by the board excluding manufacturing machinery as interpreted by the Department of Revenue for franchise tax determination purposes.
    8. The “adjustment factor” shall be one hundred twenty-five percent (125%) for the tax year 1970. For each tax year thereafter, it shall be the duty of the Department of Revenue to compute the adjustment factor for that tax year as follows: For each five (5) percentage points or major fraction thereof by which the adjustment ratio for electric utility property for the immediately preceding tax year exceeded or was less than one hundred sixteen percent (116%), five (5) percentage points shall be added to or subtracted from one hundred twenty-five percent (125%). For the purposes of this computation, “adjustment ratio for electric utility property” shall mean the ratio of total assessed value to total property value for all public service corporations distributing electric energy to more than fifty thousand (50,000) retail electric customers within the state. “Total assessed value” shall mean the total actual cash value assigned by the Department of Revenue for ad valorem property tax purposes to the property of such corporations located within the state (properly adjusted for property under construction). “Total property value” shall mean the sum of:
      1. The depreciated original cost of the total utility plant in service of such corporations within the state, and
      2. The book value of material and supplies of such corporations located within the state, both as derived from published reports of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, or in the absence thereof, from information provided to the Department of Revenue by such corporations.
    9. “Electric operations” shall mean all activities associated with the establishment, development, administration, and operation of any electric system and the supplying of electric energy and associated services to the public, including without limitation the generation, purchase, sale, and resale of electric energy and the purchase, use, and consumption thereof by ultimate consumers.
  2. It shall be the duty of each board, on or before April 30, to certify to the Department of Revenue the book value of property owned by the board and the adjusted book value of property owned by the board and located within the state and within each taxing jurisdiction in which the board operates. A copy of the certification shall also be sent by the board to each such taxing jurisdiction. The book value of property and adjusted book value of property shall be determined, and the books and records of the board shall be kept in accordance with standard accounting practices, and the books and records of each board shall be subject to inspection by the Department of Revenue and by representatives of the affected taxing jurisdictions and to adjustment by the Department of Revenue if found not to comply with the provisions of this section. Upon the receipt of the required certification from a board, the Department of Revenue shall make any inspection and adjustment, hereinabove authorized, as it deems necessary, and no earlier than September 1 of each year the Department of Revenue shall certify to the board and to the county clerk of each county in which the board operates the book value of property owned by the board and the adjusted book value of property owned by the board, located within each taxing jurisdiction in which the board operates and within the state. At the same time, the Department of Revenue shall certify to the board and to the county clerk the adjustment factor for the tax year. The county clerk shall promptly certify the book value of property, the adjusted book value of property, and the adjustment factor certified by the Department of Revenue, to the respective taxing jurisdiction in which the board operates.
    1. Each board shall pay for each tax year, beginning with the tax year 1970, to the state and to each taxing jurisdiction in which the board operates, a tax equivalent from the revenues derived from the board’s electric operations for that tax year, computed according to this subsection. (3) (a) Each board shall pay for each tax year, beginning with the tax year 1970, to the state and to each taxing jurisdiction in which the board operates, a tax equivalent from the revenues derived from the board’s electric operations for that tax year, computed according to this subsection.
    2. The tax equivalent for each tax year payable to the state shall be the total of:
      1. The book value of the property owned by the board within the state, multiplied by the adjustment factor, multiplied by the current tax rate of the state, less thirty cents ($0.30), plus
      2. The state’s portion of the amount payable under paragraph (d) of this subsection.
    3. The tax equivalent for each tax year payable to each taxing jurisdiction in which the board operates shall be the total of:
      1. The adjusted book value of property owned by the board within the taxing jurisdiction, multiplied by the adjustment factor, multiplied by the current tax rate of the taxing jurisdiction; provided, however, for the purpose of this calculation the tax rate for school districts shall be increased by thirty cents ($0.30), plus
      2. The taxing jurisdiction’s portion of the amount payable under paragraph (d) of this subsection.
    4. For purposes of this subsection, “amount payable” shall mean four-tenths of one percent (0.4%) of the book value of property owned by the board located within the state. The state shall be paid the same proportion of the amount payable as the payment to the state under subparagraph 1. of paragraph (b) of this subsection represents of the total payments to the state and all taxing jurisdictions in which the board operates required by subparagraph 1. of paragraph (b) and subparagraph 1. of paragraph (c) of this subsection. Each taxing jurisdiction in which the board operates shall be paid the same proportion of the amount payable as the payment to the taxing jurisdiction under subparagraph 1. of paragraph (c) of this subsection represents of the total payments to the state and all taxing jurisdictions in which the board operates required by subparagraph 1. of paragraph (b) and subparagraph 1. of paragraph (c) of this subsection. Under the regulations the Department of Revenue may prescribe, upon the board’s receipt from the state and taxing jurisdictions of notice of the amount due under subparagraph 1. of paragraph (b) and subparagraph 1. of paragraph (c) of this subsection, the board shall compute the portion of the amount payable which is due the state and each taxing jurisdiction in which the board operates.
    5. Payment of the tax equivalent under this section for each tax year shall be made by each board to the state within thirty (30) days after receipt by the board of the certification from the Department of Revenue required by subsection (2) of this section and shall be made directly to each taxing jurisdiction in which the board operates within thirty (30) days from the date of the certifications by the county clerk required by subsection (2) of this section. The state and each taxing jurisdiction in which a board operates shall have a superior lien upon the proceeds of the sale of electric energy by that board for the amounts required by this section to be paid to it.
  3. Except as hereinafter provided, the tax equivalents computed under this section shall be in lieu of all state, municipal, county, school district, special taxing district, other taxing district, and other state and local taxes or charges on the tangible and intangible property, the income, franchises, rights, and resources of every kind and description of any municipal electric system operating under KRS 96.550 to 96.900 and on the electric operations of any board established pursuant thereto, and the tax equivalent for any tax year computed and payable under this section to the state or to any taxing jurisdiction in which any board operates shall be reduced by the aggregate amount of any tax or charge within the meaning of this sentence which is imposed by the state, or by any taxing jurisdiction in which a board operates, on the board, the electric system, or the board’s electric operations. Provided, however, that if any school district in which property of a board is located has elected, or does hereafter elect, to apply the utility gross receipts license tax for schools to all utility services as provided by KRS 160.613 through KRS 160.617 , or as may hereafter be provided by other statutes, the amount of such utility gross receipts license tax shall not reduce, or in any manner affect, the amount payable to any such board or boards under the provisions of this section. It is the intent and purpose of this provision to eliminate all sums received by any such board or boards by reason of the utility gross receipts license tax from any computation of the amount payable under this section to any such board or boards, irrespective of the manner in which that payment is computed, so that, in no event, shall any sum received by any school district by reason of the utility gross receipts license tax reduce, directly or indirectly, the amount payable to such district under this chapter. Provided, further, that if the state shall levy a statewide retail sales or use tax on electric power or energy, collected by retailers of the energy from the vendees or users thereof, and imposed at the same rate or rates as are generally applicable to the sale or use of personal property or services, including natural or artificial gas, fuel oil, and coal as well as electric power or energy, the retail sales or use tax shall not be deemed to be a tax or charge within the meaning of the first sentence of this subsection, and the tax equivalent payable for the tax year to the state under this section shall not be reduced on account of such retail sales or use tax.
    1. Notwithstanding subsection (3) of this section, until the first tax year in which the total of: (5) (a) Notwithstanding subsection (3) of this section, until the first tax year in which the total of:
      1. The tax equivalent payable to the state, or to any taxing jurisdiction in which the board operates, computed under subsection (3) of this section, plus
      2. The additional amounts permitted to be paid to the state or taxing jurisdiction without deduction under the second and third sentences of subsection (4) of this section, exceeds the minimum payment to the state or taxing jurisdiction specified in paragraph (b) of this subsection, the tax equivalent for each tax year payable to the state or taxing jurisdiction shall be an amount equal to the minimum payment computed under paragraph (b) of this subsection.
    2. For purposes of this subsection, the minimum payment to the state or to any taxing jurisdiction in which the board operates shall mean an amount equal to the total of:
      1. The largest actual payment made by the board pursuant to this section to the state or to the taxing jurisdiction for any of the tax years 1964, 1965, or 1966, plus
      2. The state’s or taxing jurisdiction’s pro rata share of an amount equal to four-tenths of one percent (0.4%) of the increase since July 1, 1964, in the book value of property owned by the board within the state. For the purposes of this paragraph “pro rata share” shall mean the same proportion of the amount computed under this subparagraph as the largest actual payment in lieu of taxes made by the board to the state or taxing jurisdiction for the applicable tax year under subparagraph 1. of this paragraph represents of the total amount of the largest actual payments in lieu of taxes made by the board to the state and to all taxing jurisdictions in which it operated for any of the applicable tax years.
    3. The provisions of paragraph (e) of subsection (3) of this section shall apply to all payments required under this subsection.
    4. This subsection shall not be applicable for the first tax year specified in paragraph (a) of this subsection or for any tax year thereafter, except however, that tax year 1977 shall not be deemed as the “first tax year” as specified in paragraph (a) and this subsection shall continue to apply in such cases.

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 18, § 25; 1966, ch. 165, § 2; 1968, ch. 170; 1970, ch. 286, § 2; 1972, ch. 219, § 1; 1978, ch. 163, § 1, effective June 17, 1978; 1978, ch. 384, § 223, effective June 17, 1978; 1990, ch. 476, Pt. IV, § 124, effective July 13, 1990; 2002, ch. 89, § 2, effective July 15, 2002; 2005, ch. 85, § 103, effective June 20, 2005.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Amount in Lieu of Taxes.

Where a municipal electric plant paid the city an amount in lieu of taxes the amounts paid were not to be counted in computing the total revenue received from “public service companies” to determine the total revenue received in the previous year to be used as a basis for computing the property tax rollback. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Hopkinsville, 443 S.W.2d 224, 1969 Ky. LEXIS 240 ( Ky. 1969 ).

Where an action for collection in lieu of tax payments was pending at the time the parties joined in a suit for a declaratory judgment on the same issue, the suit for collection should be abated pending the outcome of the declaratory judgment action but not dismissed. Paducah v. Electric Plant Board of Paducah, 449 S.W.2d 907, 1970 Ky. LEXIS 483 ( Ky. 1970 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Where a city purchased property of a water company, part of which was located in another city, if the city was operating the water company under the T.V.A. Act it was required to make in lieu of taxes payments on the portion of the property located in the second city. OAG 63-862 .

Revenue received by school districts from electric plant boards is not ad valorem tax revenue for purposes of KRS 160.470 and a plant board does not have net assessment growth that can be included in the department of revenue’s certification of net assessment growth as required in subsec. (3)(b) of KRS 160.470 . OAG 66-441 .

An electric plant board will make in lieu of taxes payments at the rate of 20.7 cents per $100 of the book value of its property for the year 1966. OAG 66-633 .

The amount of payment in lieu of taxes due for each year under this section is determined on the statutory assessment date by multiplying the book value of the property of the electric system located in each such jurisdiction by the current tax rate, and the fact that the electric plant operates on a fiscal year basis has no bearing on when payment will be made or on the rate that will be applied. OAG 66-639 .

An electric plant board may bypass the sheriff’s office in the county and make in lieu of tax payments directly to the taxing district concerned. OAG 71-13 .

96.830. Charge for electric service furnished municipality.

The board shall charge the municipality and all departments and works thereof for any electric service furnished to them at the rates applicable to other customers taking service under similar conditions. Revenues derived from such service shall be treated as all other revenues.

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 18, § 26.

96.840. Records and reports of board — Audits.

  1. The board shall keep a complete and accurate record of all meetings and actions taken, and of all receipts and disbursements, and shall make reports of the same to the governing body at stated intervals, not to exceed one (1) year. Said report shall be in writing, shall be filed in open meeting of the governing body, at stated intervals, not to exceed one (1) year, and a copy shall be filed with the municipal clerk or recorder as a public record. An audit of the board’s records shall be made annually by an auditor selected by the legislative body of the municipality. The expense of such an audit shall constitute an operating expense.
  2. The board shall comply with the requirements of KRS Chapter 65A.

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 18, § 27; 2014, ch. 7, § 6, effective March 19, 2014.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(3/19/2014). 2014 Ky. Acts ch. 7, sec. 11 provides that the amendments to this statute made in 2014 Ky. Acts ch. 7, sec. 6, shall apply retroactively beginning January 1, 2014.

96.850. Power of municipality to issue general obligation bonds.

Any municipality is hereby authorized and empowered to issue general obligation bonds under the limitations imposed by Section 158 of the Constitution for carrying out the purposes of KRS 96.550 to 96.900 , but general obligation bonds shall not be issued for such purposes without the assent of two-thirds (2/3) of the voters voting in an election conducted in the manner set out in KRS 96.640 .

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 18, § 28.

96.860. Disposal of plant.

The board or the municipality may sell or dispose of all or substantially all of that part of an electric plant located within the boundary of the municipality, owned and operated by it, only by first complying with the following provisions, to wit:

  1. The board shall adopt a resolution which shall state in substance (a) that the board has approved the proposed sale or disposition, (b) a full description of the property to be sold or disposed of, (c) the transferee or transferees or purchasers thereof, (d) the consideration to be received by the board for such sale or disposition, (e) the terms or conditions of such sale or disposition, (f) the date on which an election shall be held, which shall be the day of the regular November election.
  2. The resolution of the board shall be submitted to the governing body of the municipality; and if approved by the governing body of the municipality, the question shall be submitted to an election of the qualified voters in the manner provided in KRS 96.640 , except that the question to be presented to the voters in the general election shall be: “Are you in favor of the sale or disposition of the electric plant, for the consideration of $ . . . . .  (here state the consideration).” The voters shall indicate a “Yes” or a “No” vote. If a majority of all of the qualified voters of the municipality voting in said general election on the question shall vote in favor of the sale or disposition of the electric plant, the sale shall be consummated, otherwise the sale or disposition shall not be made.
  3. The board may dispose of all or any part of an electric plant located without the boundary of the municipality without an election or any other approval or authority than that in the board.

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 18, § 29; 1982, ch. 360, § 30, effective July 15, 1982.

96.870. Effective date of resolutions and ordinances.

Every resolution or ordinance adopted by the governing body of any municipality under the provisions of KRS 96.550 to 96.900 shall become effective from and after its passage, and no such resolution or ordinance shall be the subject of any referendum or election except as expressly provided in KRS 96.550 to 96.900 .

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 18, § 30.

96.880. Plant not subject to authority of Public Service Commission except as to extension of service — Bonds do not require approval.

  1. It shall not be necessary for any municipality proceeding under KRS 96.550 to 96.900 to obtain any certificate of convenience and necessity, license, permit, or other authorization, from any board, commission, or other agency of Kentucky, in order to acquire, maintain and operate any electric plant.
  2. Neither the Public Service Commission of Kentucky nor any other board or commission of like character shall, unless in the future expressly authorized, have jurisdiction over such board or municipality in the management and control of any electric plant whether within or without its boundaries, or any power or authority over the regulation of rates or charges, except that the Public Service Commission may, when it determines that such action is in the public interest and will not jeopardize the financial structure of the system, require any such municipality to extend service within or without its boundaries to customers not previously served by such municipality. Its orders may be enforced by mandamus or mandatory injunction.
  3. If and when any board organized and operating under the provisions of KRS 96.550 to 96.900 shall be required by the Public Service Commission to extend its services within or without its boundaries to customers not previously served by such municipality or board, revenue bonds may be issued and sold by the board in an amount sufficient for the board to obtain all money necessary to pay the cost of such extended service.
  4. Bonds may be issued under KRS 96.550 to 96.900 without respect to the provisions of any laws requiring the prior approval of any court, commission, board, or regulatory authority.

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 18, § 31.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

Warren Rural Electric Co-op. Corp. v. Electric Plant Board, 331 S.W.2d 117, 1959 Ky. LEXIS 1 ( Ky. 1959 ); Cold Spring v. Campbell County Water Dist., 334 S.W.2d 269, 1960 Ky. LEXIS 223 ( Ky. 1960 ).

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Powers of public service commission as to utilities in municipalities, KRS 278.010 , 278.040 , 278.200 .

Kentucky Law Journal.

Comments, Procedures for Termination of Utility Service: The Requirements of Due Process, 64 Ky. L.J. 180 (1975-1976).

96.890. Competition with rural electric cooperative or other municipal plant forbidden — Cooperative agreements.

No municipality or board operating an electric plant under the provisions of KRS 96.550 to 96.900 shall enter into competition with, or construct, maintain, or operate, any facilities or service in competition with any rural electric cooperative corporation or electric plant operated by another municipality or board organized under the laws of this state in any territory being served by any such rural electric cooperative corporation or other municipality or board; but any municipality or board operating an electric plant under the provisions of KRS 96.550 to 96.900 may enter into cooperative agreements with any such rural electric cooperative corporation or other municipality or board for a connection for cooperative service upon such terms and conditions as may be mutually agreed upon between any such municipality or board and any such rural electric cooperative corporation or other municipality or board. Such agreements may provide, but not by way of limitation, for exchange of electric service, the cooperative use of transmission lines and other facilities, and the common use or exchange of other service or facilities.

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 18, § 32.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Purpose.

The plain purpose and intent of this section is to prevent any public utility from competing with any other publicly owned utility in any territory being served by the other. Warren Rural Electric Co-op. Corp. v. Electric Plant Board, 331 S.W.2d 117, 1959 Ky. LEXIS 1 ( Ky. 1959 ).

2. Construction.

This section controls and restricts the broad grant of power given to the municipalities by KRS 96.550 et seq. and, therefore, a city cannot establish its own municipal electric utility and compete with a rural electric cooperative which has been previously serving a territory; however, a city can create an electric plant board and provide electric service to its own facilities. Electric Plant Bd. v. Kenergy Corp., 2000 Ky. App. LEXIS 21 (Ky. Ct. App. Feb. 25, 2000).

3. Electricity For Own Water Plant.

City in providing electricity to its own water plant in territory otherwise served by rural electric cooperative was not competing with the cooperative and was entitled to provide such power. Farmers Rural Electric Cooperative Corp. v. Glasgow, 415 S.W.2d 85, 1967 Ky. LEXIS 297 ( Ky. 1967 ).

4. Electric Plant Boards.

Where a city operated its municipally-owned electric utility as an electric plant board under KRS 96.550 , it could provide electric service to users or consumers outside the city (but not to a designated area), but was restricted from entering into competition with, or constructing, maintaining, or operating any facilities or service in competition with any rural electric cooperative corporation. Grayson Rural Elec. Corp. v. City of Vanceburg, 4 S.W.3d 526, 1999 Ky. LEXIS 67 (Ky.), modified, 4 S.W.3d 526, 1999 Ky. LEXIS 146 ( Ky. 1999 ).

The mere fact that a rural electric cooperative may purchase from a third party the electric power which it then supplies to its retail customers does not operate as a waiver of its statutory right to be free of competition from an electric plant board. Electric Plant Bd. v. Kenergy Corp., 2000 Ky. App. LEXIS 21 (Ky. Ct. App. Feb. 25, 2000).

Cited:

Nicholasville v. Blue Grass Rural Electric Cooperative Corp., 514 S.W.2d 414, 1974 Ky. LEXIS 300 ( Ky. 1974 ).

96.895. Proration and distribution of payments of sums equivalent to taxes based on book value among the state, counties, cities, and school districts — Regional development agency assistance fund — Portion of TVA payment received by state to be transferred to fund for distribution to regional development agencies in fund-eligible counties.

  1. As used in this section, unless the context requires otherwise:
    1. “Book value” means original cost unadjusted for depreciation as reflected in the TVA’s books of account;
    2. “Fund” means the regional development agency assistance fund established in subsection (4) of this section;
    3. “Fund-eligible county” means one (1) of Adair, Allen, Ballard, Barren, Bell, Butler, Caldwell, Calloway, Carlisle, Christian, Clinton, Cumberland, Edmonson, Fulton, Graves, Grayson, Harlan, Hart, Henderson, Hickman, Livingston, Logan, Lyon, Marshall, McCracken, McCreary, Metcalfe, Monroe, Muhlenberg, Ohio, Russell, Simpson, Todd, Trigg, Union, Warren, Wayne, Webster, or Whitley Counties;
    4. “Regional development agency” or “agency” means a local industrial development authority established under KRS 154.50-301 to 154.50-346 that is designated by a fiscal court to receive a payment pursuant to this section;
    5. “TVA” means the Tennessee Valley Authority; and
    6. “TVA property” means land owned by the United States and in the custody of the TVA, together with improvements that have a fixed situs on the land, including work in progress but excluding temporary construction facilities, if these improvements either:
      1. Were in existence when title to the land on which they are situated was acquired by the United States; or
      2. Are allocated by the TVA or determined by it to be allocable to power. However, manufacturing machinery as interpreted by the Department of Revenue for franchise tax determination; ash disposal systems; and coal handling facilities, including railroads, cranes and hoists, and crushing and conveying equipment, shall be excluded.
  2. Book value shall be determined, for purposes of applying this section, as of the June 30 used by the TVA in computing the annual payment to the Commonwealth that is subject to redistribution by the Commonwealth.
  3. Except for payments made directly by the TVA to counties, the total fiscal year payment received by the Commonwealth of Kentucky from the TVA, as authorized by Section 13 of the Tennessee Valley Authority Act, as amended, shall be prorated thirty percent (30%) to the general fund of the Commonwealth and seventy percent (70%) among counties, cities, and school districts, as provided in subsections (6) and (7) of this section.
    1. The regional development agency assistance fund is hereby established in the State Treasury. (4) (a) The regional development agency assistance fund is hereby established in the State Treasury.
    2. The fund shall be administered by the Department for Local Government for the purpose of providing funding to agencies that are designated to receive funding in a given fiscal year by the fiscal court of each fund-eligible county through the Regional Development Agency Assistance Program established in KRS 96.905 .
    3. The fund shall only receive the moneys transferred from the general fund pursuant to subsection (5) of this section.
    4. Notwithstanding KRS 45.229 , any moneys remaining in the fund at the close of the fiscal year shall not lapse but shall be carried forward into the succeeding fiscal year. Any interest earnings of the fund shall become a part of the fund and shall not lapse.
  4. For fiscal years beginning on or after July 1, 2018, a portion of the total fiscal year payment received by the Commonwealth that is allocated to the general fund shall be transferred from the general fund to the regional development agency assistance fund established in subsection (4) of this section. This portion shall be equal to:
    1. In fiscal year 2018-2019, two million dollars ($2,000,000);
    2. In fiscal year 2019-2020, four million dollars ($4,000,000); and
    3. In each fiscal year, beginning with the 2020-2021 fiscal year, six million dollars ($6,000,000).
  5. The payment to each county, city, and school district shall be determined by the proportion that the book value of TVA property in such taxing district, multiplied by the current tax rate, bears to the total of the book values of TVA property in all such taxing districts in the Commonwealth, multiplied by their respective tax rates. However, for purposes of this calculation, each public school district shall have its tax rate increased by thirty cents ($0.30).
  6. As soon as practicable after the amount of payment to be made to the Commonwealth is finally determined by the TVA, the Department of Revenue shall determine the book value of TVA property in each county, city, and school district and shall prorate the payments allocated to counties, cities, and school districts under subsection (3) of this section among the distributees as provided in subsection (6) of this section. The Department of Revenue shall certify the payment due each taxing district to the Finance and Administration Cabinet which shall make the payment to such district.
  7. In each fiscal year, after the Department of Revenue has calculated the prorated payment amount that is due to each county pursuant to subsection (7) of this section, the Department for Local Government shall then make a written request to the fiscal court of each fund-eligible county for the name and address of the agency the fiscal court designates to receive a payment from the fund pursuant to subsection (5) of this section.
  8. Within sixty (60) days of the date of the Department for Local Government’s request, each fiscal court shall designate in writing one (1) agency that shall receive a share of the total amount of funds transferred to the fund in that fiscal year pursuant to subsection (5) of this section. Each agency’s share shall be calculated as the total amount of funds transferred to the fund in that fiscal year divided by the total number of agencies designated to receive funds by fiscal courts of fund-eligible counties. Once the amount is determined by the Department for Local Government, the payment shall be paid by the Finance and Administration Cabinet directly to the designated agency. No amount shall be taken from the fund to pay administrative expenses by the Department for Local Government.
  9. If a fiscal court does not respond to the Department for Local Government within sixty (60) days of the date of the Department for Local Government’s request, the payment otherwise due to an agency designated by that fiscal court shall be reallocated equally among the agencies that have been designated to receive payments by the other fiscal courts.
  10. All agencies receiving funds under this section shall provide a written report annually, no later than October 1, to the fiscal court that designated it for payment and to the Interim Joint Committee on Appropriations and Revenue. The report shall describe how the funds were expended and the results of the use of funds in terms of economic development and job creation.
  11. This section shall be applicable to all payments received after April 10, 2018, from the TVA under Section 13 of the Tennessee Valley Authority Act as amended.

History. Enact. Acts 1952, ch. 61, § 1, effective June 19, 1952; 1978, ch. 163, § 2, effective March 29, 1978; 1986, ch. 27, § 1, effective February 24, 1986; repealed and reenact., Acts 1990, ch. 476, Pt. V, § 301, effective July 13, 1990; 2005, ch. 85, § 104, effective June 20, 2005; 2018 ch. 129, § 1, effective April 10, 2018; 2019 ch. 151, § 2, effective June 27, 2019.

Compiler’s Notes.

Section 13 of the Tennessee Valley Authority Act, referred to in subsections (1) and (5) of this section, is compiled as 16 USCS § 831 l .

96.900. Estoppel to question validity of KRS 96.550 to 96.890.

Any municipality or board exercising any of the powers granted under KRS 96.550 to 96.890 or any person accepting benefits conferred thereby shall be estopped to question the validity of any provision of KRS 96.550 to 96.890 .

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 18, § 33.

96.901. Authorization for municipal utility operating under KRS 96.550 to 96.900 to participate in group purchasing program.

  1. A municipal utility that owns or operates an electric utility under KRS 96.550 to 96.900 may authorize:
    1. Membership and participation in a group purchasing program when the municipal utility deems that the purchase of power through a group purchasing program can affect economy or efficiency in the operations of the municipal utility; or
    2. The purchase of wholesale electric power for the purpose of resale from any person or entity when the purchase is deemed advantageous to the municipal utility.
  2. “Group purchasing program” means a voluntary program that may consist of both public and private utilities for the purchase of wholesale electric power.
  3. A municipal utility that is purchasing wholesale electric power for resale to the ultimate customers of the municipal utility as provided under subsection (1) of this section shall not be subject to the provisions of KRS 45A.365 and KRS 424.260 .

History. Enact. Acts 2000, ch. 510, § 1, effective July 14, 2000.

96.905. Regional Development Agency Assistance Program — Grants for economic development and job creation activities — Annual reports — Certification of proper use of funds.

  1. A Regional Development Agency Assistance Program is established to consist of a system of grants to agencies designated by fiscal courts of counties designated in KRS 96.895 . Grants shall be administered by the Department for Local Government.
    1. Grants obtained under this program shall be used for: (2) (a) Grants obtained under this program shall be used for:
      1. Economic development and job creation activities that the agency is empowered to undertake in that county;
      2. Acquiring federal, state, or private matching funds to the extent possible; and
      3. Debt service for approved projects.
    2. Grants obtained under this program shall not be used for salaries or consulting fees.
  2. Applications for grants from funds provided for in KRS 96.895 shall be made by the legislative bodies of one (1) or more counties entitled to receive money from the regional development agency assistance fund.
  3. The Department for Local Government shall review and approve grant applications from counties for agencies that operate in, or serve the interest of, the county whose fiscal court designated it to receive funding. Multiple counties may also submit a joint application requesting that part of their allotted funds be directed to an agency for a project that affects the counties.
  4. By October 1 of each year, the commissioner of the Department for Local Government shall provide, in writing, to each the Governor and the Legislative Research Commission a listing of all applications for grants received pursuant to this section since the last report, a listing of all grants awarded, the amount of the award, the recipient agency, and the related project.
  5. The Department for Local Government shall require that any funds granted under this section include an agreement that the recipient agency shall certify that the funds were expended for the purpose intended. The department shall determine whether the certification should be an independent annual audit or an internal certification, taking into account the size of the agency and the financial burden an independent annual audit may impose on the agency. In the case of an independent annual audit, the audit report shall include a certification that the funds were expended for the purpose intended. A copy of the audit or certification of compliance shall be forwarded to the Department for Local Government within eighteen (18) months after the end of the fiscal year.

HISTORY: 2018 ch. 129, § 2, effective April 10, 2018.

Classification of Sewer Users

96.910. Declaration of policy of KRS 96.910 to 96.927.

The public health, safety and welfare require that new and alternative measures be authorized to encourage, promote, and make more feasible the provision of facilities for the collection, treatment, and disposal of sewage by cities, by sewer service charges established with due consideration for cost of necessary new or additional facilities, benefits received and to be received, and approximate ultimate equality of financial burden.

History. Enact. Acts 1958, ch. 169, § 2, effective June 19, 1958.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Sewer User Charges.

The mere fact that sewer user charges prescribed by the government are in lieu of taxes previously assessed and are utilized for the same purposes for which taxes previously were levied does not serve to make the sewer user charges a tax. Board of Education v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government, 691 S.W.2d 218, 1985 Ky. App. LEXIS 518 (Ky. Ct. App. 1985).

2. — Payment by County Board of Education.

Sewer user charges of a county government for the construction and maintenance of public sanitary sewers were not taxes, and the County Board of Education had no constitutional exemption from the payment of such charges by virtue of § 170 of the Kentucky Constitution. Board of Education v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government, 691 S.W.2d 218, 1985 Ky. App. LEXIS 518 (Ky. Ct. App. 1985).

Sewer user charges imposed upon a county board of education bear a reasonable and rational relationship to the value of the services provided, and therefore are exclusively for the benefit of and necessary for the maintenance of the public schools. Board of Education v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government, 691 S.W.2d 218, 1985 Ky. App. LEXIS 518 (Ky. Ct. App. 1985).

Opinions of Attorney General.

A city could raise the service charges to finance the construction of a sewage disposal plant. OAG 71-103 .

96.911. Definitions for KRS 96.910 to 96.927.

As used in KRS 96.910 to 96.927 , unless the context otherwise requires:

  1. “City” means an incorporated municipality of any class and a county that has adopted an urban-county government, except those communities served by a metropolitan sewer district, under the provisions of KRS Chapter 76;
  2. “Governing body” means the municipal legislative body of a city;
  3. “Cabinet” means the Energy and Environment Cabinet;
  4. “Sewer” means any structure or installation for the drainage of liquid wastes, but only insofar as they relate to sanitation and the control of water pollution, as distinguished from the drainage of storm or surface waters; however, where both functions are carried out by the same system, it is to be construed as a sewer;
  5. “Natural drainage area” means any geographical area within which liquids flow by gravity to a common point, which is necessary, reasonable, or practicable from the standpoint of sewage treatment and disposal, as approved by the cabinet.

History. Enact. Acts 1958, ch. 169, § 3; 1974, ch. 74, Art. VI, § 39; 2010, ch. 24, § 83, effective July 15, 2010.

96.912. Authority to classify users.

The governing body of any city may classify sewer users upon any reasonable basis and may establish different service rates for each class, provided such rates are uniform as to all sewer users in the same class. Such classifications may be of limited or indefinite duration.

History. Enact. Acts 1958, ch. 169, § 4, effective June 19, 1958.

96.913. Standards for classifying users.

In determining and defining special classes, the governing body of a city shall have as its objectives the interests of public health, safety, and general welfare of the entire community, and reasonable ultimate quality of financial burden to users similarly situated.

History. Enact. Acts 1958, ch. 169, § 5, effective June 19, 1958.

96.915. Authority to apply different charges.

A city may establish a basic sewer service charge or basic schedule of graduated charges, applying to all sewer users alike, and may, in its discretion, establish and apply to one or more special classes of users additional service charges.

History. Enact. Acts 1958, ch. 159, § 6, effective June 19, 1958.

96.916. Standards for establishing charges.

In prescribing schedules of charges, and in determining the aggregate of revenues required to be raised, the governing body shall consider the cost and value of existing, planned and foreseeably needed sewer facilities, the cost of operation and maintenance, repairs, replacements, extensions and improvements, and financial requirements for the proper servicing of existing and prospective borrowings which may be necessary, or desirable. Charges may be varied by the city in its discretion.

History. Enact. Acts 1958, ch. 169, § 7, effective June 19, 1958.

96.918. Procedure for establishment of classification — First ordinance.

The governing body of any city desiring to establish special classes of sewer users shall initiate proceedings by adopting an ordinance to be known as the “First Ordinance,” which shall state:

  1. The special classes of sewer users proposed to be created, the reasons and justifications for each classification, and the general geographical boundaries of each class, if susceptible of geographic identification;
  2. Whether a basic sewer service charge is proposed;
  3. The charges proposed initially for each special class; or, if such charges are dependent upon factors later to be determined, the formula, method, or basis upon which such charges will be established;
  4. Whether differences in charges, or schedules thereof shall be of indefinite duration, or of limited duration;
  5. Whether immediate construction and installation of sewer facilities, including reconstructing, replacing, repairing, extending, improving, enlarging, adding to, or completing any existing facilities, is proposed, and if so, a brief summary of preliminary findings and recommendations of an engineer, licensed by the Commonwealth, showing the occasion for such necessity and the general nature, scope, and estimated cost thereof; and
  6. The aggregate of revenues to be produced, and the amount of annual revenue estimated to be produced from users of each proposed special class.

History. Enact. Acts 1958, ch. 169, § 8, effective June 19, 1958.

96.919. Publication of first ordinance.

The first ordinance shall be published pursuant to KRS Chapter 424. A certified copy of the first ordinance shall be delivered to the county judge/executive or county clerk of each county in which any area affected by the ordinance outside the city may be situated, and the county judge/executive, or county clerk, shall, upon receiving the same, cause it to be posted at the county courthouse door, as in the case of notices of judicial sales of real property.

History. Enact. Acts 1958, ch. 169, § 9; 1966, ch. 239, § 97; 1976 (1st Ex. Sess.), ch. 20, § 6, effective January 2, 1978; 1978, ch. 384, § 224, effective June 17, 1978.

96.920. Areas proposed to be annexed.

If a city contemplates annexation of areas outside its corporate limits when the First Ordinance is published, or if annexation is then in progress, it may state that its proposed establishment of special classes of sewer users will be applicable to such areas, and is conditioned as to such areas upon the final annexation thereof.

History. Enact. Acts 1958, ch. 169, § 10, effective June 19, 1958.

96.922. Public hearing.

The First Ordinance shall provide for a public hearing at a time and place to be specified therein not less than one (1) week after publication. Such hearing shall be presided over by a person or persons designated by the governing body of the city. Written minutes of the meeting shall be kept, and shall be made a part of a written report, to be submitted by the designated presiding person or persons, to the municipal governing body of the city. At such hearing any affected sewer user, including affected prospective sewer users in any area contemplated to be annexed or in the course of annexation proceedings, may appear and be heard.

History. Enact. Acts 1958, ch. 169, § 11, effective June 19, 1958.

96.923. Hearing rights and procedures.

Any sewer user, or prospective sewer user, within any of the proposed special classes of sewer users may appear at the public hearing in person or by a representative and may submit in writing a statement of any reasons for advocating, or objecting to, any matter set forth in the required notice. Such statement shall be attached to, or included in, the written report of the hearing. The person presiding at the hearing may require those in attendance to identify themselves as sewer users, or prospective sewer users, and may call for a vote of persons properly identified, on any pertinent matter. The results of such vote shall be included in the subsequent written report to the governing body. The hearing may be adjourned to convene again, either at a time and place announced at the hearing, or upon public notice of such time and place, to be made in the same manner as that required for First Ordinances.

History. Enact. Acts 1958, ch. 169, § 12, effective June 19, 1958.

96.924. Final determination — Second ordinance.

At any subsequent regular meeting of the governing body the written report of the public hearing concerning the first ordinance shall be submitted. At such meeting, any sewer users, or prospective sewer user, may again be heard, in person or by representative. The governing body may adopt an ordinance to be known as the “Second Ordinance” which may provide for rejection or adoption or partial adoption of the first ordinance proposals, or total or partial adoption with modifications. If the governing body shall determine that more than fifty percent (50%) of the sewer users or prospective sewer users, both in number and in source of projected revenues, object to the proposals finally adopted by the governing body, it may adopt the second ordinance only upon the affirmative vote of three-fifths (3/5) of the membership of the governing body. The second ordinance shall be published in the same manner as required with respect to first ordinance.

History. Enact. Acts 1958, ch. 169, § 13, effective June 19, 1958.

96.926. User’s appeal to Circuit Court.

  1. Any sewer user, or prospective sewer user, affected by the Second Ordinance may, within thirty (30) days after publication of the Second Ordinance, file an action in the Circuit Court of the county in which the city is situated attacking the validity of the Second Ordinance from the standpoint of whether the governing body acted in conformity with the procedures made mandatory by KRS 96.910 to 96.927 . Provided, however, that if any aggrieved sewer user or prospective sewer user files in the office of the city clerk a written notarized statement of intent to file such an action, the time for filing actions in the Circuit Court shall be fifteen (15) days after such notice of intent to sue is filed with the clerk, or thirty (30) days after publication of the Second Ordinance, whichever is later.
  2. Proceedings in the Circuit Court shall be tried according to the practice prescribed for equity cases.
  3. In the event an action is filed as provided for by this section, the effective date of the proposed sewer service charges as prescribed by the Second Ordinance shall be the date judgment is entered by the Circuit Court, if such judgment is favorable.

History. Enact. Acts 1958, ch. 169, § 14; 1976 (1st Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 125.

96.927. Construction of KRS 96.910 to 96.927.

Proceedings under KRS 96.910 to 96.927 are purely discretionary. KRS 96.910 to 96.927 is not intended to be in derogation of any other law, and does not repeal or amend any other law.

History. Enact. Acts 1958, ch. 169, § 1, effective June 19, 1958.

Enforcement of Sewer Charge Collections

96.930. Declaration of policy of KRS 96.930 to 96.943.

The General Assembly hereby recognizes and declares that the use of water in any manner tending to contaminate it, raises a correlative public duty to provide for the proper disposition thereof according to the highest public health standards, and that such public duty includes full responsibility for paying the cost of such disposition.

History. Enact. Acts 1958, ch. 170, § 1, effective June 19, 1958.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

Board of Education v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government, 691 S.W.2d 218, 1985 Ky. App. LEXIS 518 (Ky. Ct. App. 1985).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Where a city ordinance makes it mandatory that a connection be made to the city sewer system, a city cannot order the water services discontinued from property, the owner of which has refused to connect to the city sewer system. OAG 64-665 .

A city of the fourth class has no authority to discontinue the utility services of a property owner for his failure to pay his real estate taxes or occupational license fees. OAG 70-400 .

A city of the sixth class can proceed to enact an ordinance levying a reasonable service charge for the use of its sewer system and at the same time enforce such charges under this chapter or under its general authority. OAG 73-664 .

If a sewerage system is not functioning at all, and consequently the connected users are receiving no service in the disposal of their sewage, they cannot legally be required to continue to pay the service fee. OAG 76-690 .

While reasonable sewer charges can be enforced by cutting off the water supply pursuant to KRS 96.930 to 96.945, a property owner is not subject to a sewer rental charge until he has connected or has been made to connect to the city sewer system and therefore his water service cannot be cut off in order to force him to hook up to the sewer system. OAG 77-23 .

Research References and Practice Aids

ALR

Liability of premises, or their owner or occupant, for electricity, gas, or water charges, irrespective of who is the user. 19 A.L.R.3d 1227.

Validity and construction of statutes, ordinances, or regulations controlling discharge of industrial wastes into sewer system. 47 A.L.R.3d 1224.

96.931. Definitions for KRS 96.930 to 96.943.

As used in KRS 96.930 to 96.943 , unless the context otherwise requires:

  1. “City” means an incorporated municipality of any class;
  2. “Governing body” means the body vested by law with the legislative power of a city;
  3. “Sewer body” means the body vested with responsibility for the control, operation, and maintenance of a city’s sewer facilities, which may be the governing body or a board, commission, or agency, created by statute or by city ordinance, or a private person, performing such functions under lawful contract with the city;
  4. “Water supplier” means any person supplying water intended to be used, or actually used, in any manner resulting in contamination and includes the city itself, other cities and public bodies, and private operators of water-supplying facilities;
  5. “Public health standards” means such standards as are lawfully prescribed from time to time by the secretary for health and family services, the United States Public Health Service, or any lawfully constituted county, city, or other public board, department, or agency, vested with responsibility in this area.

History. Enact. Acts 1958, ch. 170, § 2, effective June 19, 1958; 1998, ch. 426, § 98, effective July 15, 1998; 2005, ch. 99, § 115, effective June 20, 2005.

Opinions of Attorney General.

Water district organized pursuant to KRS Chapter 74 could, pursuant to KRS 96.940 , contract for the collection of charges of separate and distinct sewage district by water district if the sewer system is a sewer body as defined by subdivision (c) of this section. OAG 82-592 .

96.932. Enforcement of sewer charge collections by discontinuing water service.

In the interests of the public health, safety, and general welfare, cities may enforce collection of lawful rates and charges for the use of municipal sewer facilities by requiring that water service, whether provided publicly or privately, be discontinued until payment is made or some satisfactory arrangement is reached. Cities may delegate to sewer bodies the power to issue orders to water suppliers to discontinue service to any person who is delinquent in paying sewer charges.

History. Enact. Acts 1958, ch. 170, § 3, effective June 19, 1958.

Opinions of Attorney General.

A local board of health does not have the power to order a water company, private or public, to discontinue water services to a customer who is responsible for a public health nuisance. OAG 63-1078 .

Where a city ordinance makes it mandatory that a connection be made to the city sewer system, a city cannot order the water services discontinued from property, the owner of which has refused to connect to the city sewer system. OAG 64-665 .

Where nonresidents were connected to the city sewerage system without their permission, they were subject to a fee for the service as long as they used it and their water service could be discontinued for failure to pay the sewerage fee. OAG 66-574 .

96.934. Coordination of sewer body with water supplier.

  1. If a city is also the water supplier, the governing body may provide that rates for water service and sewer service be billed simultaneously and that water service shall be discontinued upon failure to pay any part of such charges, including penalties, interest, and reasonable fees for disconnection and reconnection;
  2. If a city is not also the water supplier, then in the event of failure on the part of any sewer user to pay, when due, the bill for sewer service charges, the sewer body may, when such power has been delegated to it by the city, give notice in writing, signed by an authorized person, to the water supplier, to discontinue water service to premises designated in the notice, until notified otherwise. The notice shall identify the delinquent sewer user in such manner as reasonably to enable the water supplier to identify the water service connection which is to be cut off pursuant thereto. Upon receipt of such notice, the water supplier shall discontinue water service to the premises until notified otherwise by the sewer body.

History. Enact. Acts 1958, ch. 170, § 4, effective June 19, 1958.

96.936. Rights of water supplier.

  1. A water supplier may in writing served upon the city clerk, set forth (a) reasonable fees or charges for disconnecting and reconnecting water service connections, and (b) whether or not it will require that an authorized agent of the sewer body accompany its own agent or employee when disconnection is undertaken pursuant to any order to discontinue service by the sewer operator.
  2. If, at the time a water supplier receives notice to discontinue service the terms of the written instrument delivered to the city clerk require that an authorized agent of the sewer body be present when the water connection is cut off, the water supplier shall not be required to effect the discontinuance of water service if it is unable to procure the presence of an authorized agent of the sewer body.

History. Enact. Acts 1958, ch. 170, § 5, effective June 19, 1958.

96.938. Adjustments of sewer charges.

No payment of the bill for sewer service charges disputed by the sewer user shall be deemed a waiver by the sewer user of any right thereafter to claim and recover from the sewer body any and all sums improperly included in the bill. In the event of such dispute, the authorized agent of the sewer body may make adjustment for any apparent error in mathematical computation of the bill, he may tentatively agree to any proposed plan for delayed payment, or he may refer the dispute to the sewer operator for consideration. In such event the agent of the sewer body may direct that the water service not be discontinued at that time, and he shall indorse such direction upon the water supplier’s discontinuance notice. If a water supplier is directed not to discontinue service, after sending an agent to perform such duty, it shall be entitled to receive its proper fee as if the discontinuance had been made.

History. Enact. Acts 1958, ch. 170, § 6, effective June 19, 1958.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

Board of Education v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government, 691 S.W.2d 218, 1985 Ky. App. LEXIS 518 (Ky. Ct. App. 1985).

96.940. Contract for joint collection of charges.

Any sewer body and any water supplier may enter into a contract relating to any of the provisions of KRS 96.930 to 96.943 . Such contract may provide that the water supplier shall furnish to the sewer body copies of its records, or that the water supplier will compute sewer charges for the sewer body. However, no such contract shall render nugatory the right of a sewer body, to order water suppliers to terminate water service to any premise, provided such authority has been delegated to the sewer body by the city.

History. Enact. Acts 1958, ch. 170, § 7, effective June 19, 1958.

Opinions of Attorney General.

Water district organized pursuant to KRS Chapter 74 could, pursuant to this section, contract for the collection of charges of separate and distinct sewage district by water district if the sewer system is a sewer body as defined by subsection (3) of KRS 96.931 . OAG 82-592 .

96.942. Nonliability for discontinuing service.

No water supplier who discontinues water service pursuant to an order from the sewer body as provided in KRS 96.930 to 96.943 , shall incur any liability by reason thereof, except to the extent of its own negligence or other improper conduct.

History. Enact. Acts 1958, ch. 170, § 8, effective June 19, 1958.

96.943. Liability for failure to discontinue service.

Any water supplier which wrongfully fails or refuses to discontinue water service pursuant to an order properly made to it by a sewer body and continues such failure or refusal for a period of thirty (30) days after receipt of the notice, shall be liable to the sewer body for any amount due from the sewer user involved.

History. Enact. Acts 1958, ch. 170, § 9, effective June 19, 1958.

CHAPTER 96A Mass Transit Authorities

96A.010. Definitions for chapter.

As used in this chapter, unless the context otherwise requires, the following words or terms shall mean as follows:

  1. “City” means any incorporated city in the Commonwealth;
  2. “County” means any county in the Commonwealth wherein there is located an incorporated city and for the purpose of this chapter shall also mean a county which has adopted an urban-county government or consolidated local government;
  3. “State” means the Commonwealth;
  4. “Transit authority” or “authority” means a transit authority created pursuant to this chapter;
  5. “Board” means the board of a transit authority;
  6. “Public body” means any city or county of the Commonwealth;
  7. “Governing body” means, as to a county, the fiscal court thereof; as to a consolidated local government, the legislative council thereof; and as to a city, the legislative body thereof, howsoever the same may be denominated according to law;
  8. “Proceedings” means, in the case of a county, a resolution of its fiscal court; and in the case of a city or consolidated local government, an ordinance adopted and made effective according to law by its governing body;
  9. “Joint proceedings” relates only to the establishment of a transit authority by two (2) or more public bodies acting in concert or by agreement, and means the proceedings, taken collectively, by the governing bodies of the public bodies participating in the creation and establishment of a transit authority;
  10. “Appointing authority” means, as to a county, the county judge/executive thereof; and as to any city or consolidated local government, the elected chief executive officer, whether designated as its mayor or otherwise;
  11. “Area” or “transit area” means the geographical area which may be encompassed from time to time within the lawful boundaries of such cities and counties as may be involved in the creation and establishment of an authority; and of any cities or counties within any single unified metropolitan area which may subsequently become participants as provided in this chapter;
  12. “Mass transit” or “mass transportation” means the transportation of persons and their baggage within or without a transit area, but shall not include the for-hire operation of a taxicab, or bus as defined by KRS Chapter 281;
  13. “Human service transportation delivery” means the same as defined in KRS 281.010 ;
  14. “Delivery area” means the same as defined in KRS 281.010 ; and
  15. “Broker” means the same as defined in KRS 281.010 .

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1970, ch. 243, § 2; 1974, ch. 138, § 4; 1976 (1st Ex. Sess.), ch. 20, § 6, effective January 2, 1978; 1980, ch. 324, § 1, effective July 15, 1980; 1998, ch. 607, § 1, effective July 15, 1998; 2000, ch. 346, § 12, effective July 14, 2000; 2002, ch. 346, § 116, effective July 15, 2002; 2015 ch. 19, § 34, effective June 24, 2015.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

Kestler v. Transit Auth., 758 S.W.2d 38, 1988 Ky. LEXIS 63 ( Ky. 1988 ).

96A.020. Creation of authority — Which governmental units may form or join — General powers and purposes.

  1. A transit authority may be created and established under the provisions of this chapter by proceedings or joint proceedings, and the name thereof shall be “Transit Authority of  . . . . . ” If established by a city alone, or by a county alone, the name shall be completed by identification of the city or county. If created and established by joint proceedings, the name may be completed by inserting words generally identifying the area intended to be served, in such manner as the public bodies may determine by concert or agreement in their joint proceedings. Such transit authority shall constitute an agency and instrumentality for accomplishing essential governmental functions of the public body or public bodies creating and establishing the same, and shall be a political subdivision and a public body corporate, with power to contract and be contracted with, to sue and be sued, to establish, alter and enforce rules and regulations in furtherance of the purposes of its creation, to adopt, use and alter a corporate seal, and to have and exercise, generally, all of the powers of private corporations, as enumerated in KRS 271B.3-020 , except to the extent the same may be inconsistent with this chapter. An authority shall be authorized to promote and develop mass transportation in its transit area and adjoining areas, including acquisition, operation and extension of existing mass transit systems; and an authority shall have and may exercise such powers as may be necessary or desirable to carry out such purposes.
  2. Subsequent to the creation and establishment of a transit authority, one (1) or more additional public bodies may be permitted to join therein, in such manner and subject to such conditions as may be prescribed by the board of the authority with the concurrence and approval of all public bodies which have theretofore participated in the establishment or previous enlargement of the authority.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1970, ch. 243, § 3; 1972, ch. 274, § 145; 1980, ch. 324, § 2, effective July 15, 1980; 1986, ch. 160, § 2, effective July 15, 1986; 1988, ch. 23, § 174, effective January 1, 1989; 2015 ch. 19, § 35, effective June 24, 2015.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Construction.

The language of this section read in conjunction with KRS 96A.120 authorizes the issuance of bonds to provide funds for the operation of a mass transit system and is not limited to the acquisition or establishment of such a system. Youtsey v. County Debt Com., 501 S.W.2d 266, 1973 Ky. LEXIS 132 ( Ky. 1973 ).

2. Exercise of Discretion.

The county transit authority is an agency of government, a political subdivision; thus, the governing board’s exercise of discretion in policy matters and management decisions cannot be delegated to an arbitrator. Transit Authority of Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government v. Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 639, 698 S.W.2d 520, 1985 Ky. LEXIS 266 ( Ky. 1985 ).

2.5. Sovereign Immunity.

Transit Authority of River City did not enjoy sovereign immunity from the underlying negligence action filed by a pedestrian to recover injuries he sustained after being struck by a TARC bus because KRS 96A.020 clearly stated that a transit authority was a public body corporate with the power to sue and be sued and to have and exercise, generally, all of the powers of private corporations. Transit Auth. of River City v. Bibelhauser, 432 S.W.3d 171, 2013 Ky. App. LEXIS 142 (Ky. Ct. App. 2013).

Cited:

Kestler v. Transit Auth., 758 S.W.2d 38, 1988 Ky. LEXIS 63 ( Ky. 1988 ); Paradise Tomato Kitchens, Inc. v. Louisville-Jefferson County Metro Revenue Comm’n, — S.W.3d —, 2008 Ky. App. LEXIS 143 (Ky. Ct. App. 2008).

Opinions of Attorney General.

The Transit Authority of Louisville & Jefferson County is an agency of the city and county rather than a state agency; thus, with regard to UMTA capital grants, interim interest on invested funds must be subtracted from the total grants. OAG 76-219 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Kentucky Law Survey, Morris, Municipal Law, 70 Ky. L.J. 287 (1981-82).

96A.030. Time when existence begins.

A transit authority created and established under the provisions of this chapter shall become a corporate entity:

  1. In the case of an authority created and established by a single public body, upon the effective date of the proceedings of the governing body thereof, and
  2. In the case of an authority created by joint proceedings, upon the effective date of the last of such joint proceedings.

History. Enact. Acts 1970, ch. 243, § 4.

96A.040. Managing board — Membership — Effect of compact — Membership upon establishment of consolidated local government.

  1. The business, activities, and affairs of a transit authority shall be managed, controlled, and conducted by a board consisting of members appointed as follows:
    1. If the authority is established by one (1) city alone, or by a county alone, the members shall be eight (8) in number and shall be appointed by the appointing authority of such city or county;
    2. If the authority is established by joint proceedings of two (2) public bodies, the membership shall be eight (8) in number, four (4) of whom shall be appointed by the appointing authority of each of such public bodies;
    3. If an authority is created and established by joint proceedings of more than two (2) public bodies, the membership shall be eight (8) in number, plus one (1) additional member for each participating public body in excess of two (2), and the members thereof shall be appointed by the appointing authorities of the participating public bodies in such manner as may be set forth in the joint proceedings; and
    4. If an authority is created and established, and subsequently one (1) or more other public bodies are permitted to join therein, the membership of the board may be enlarged, with the concurrence and approval of the governing bodies of the public bodies theretofore participating, by not more than one (1) additional member for each additional public body so permitted to join the authority.
  2. No officer or employee of any public body represented in the creation, establishment, or enlargement of an authority shall be eligible for appointment to the board.
  3. After the effective date of the creation of an authority as provided in this chapter, the appointing authority or the appointing authorities, as the case may be, shall, in such manner as may be specified in the proceedings or joint proceedings, appoint at least two (2) members for terms of one (1) year, at least two (2) members for terms of two (2) years, at least two (2) members for terms of three (3) years, and the remaining number for terms of four (4) years; such terms to expire, in each instance, on June 30 and thereafter until a successor is appointed and accepts appointment. Upon the expiration of these initial staggered terms, successors shall be appointed by the respective appointing authorities, for terms of four (4) years, and until successors are appointed and accept their appointments. Members shall be eligible for reappointment.
  4. Any member of the board may be removed by his or her appointing authority for inefficiency, neglect of duty, malfeasance, conflict of interest, or want of mental or physical capacity to serve. Any appointing authority exercising the power to remove a member of the board shall submit to the board a written statement setting forth the reasons for removal. Notice shall be given to the member named in such statement; a hearing, if requested, shall be conducted within thirty (30) days before the members of the board who are not the subject of such removal proceedings; a record of the hearing shall be made by the secretary-treasurer of the board; and the member named in such removal notice may appeal any adverse decision, within ten (10) days after the rendering thereof, to the Circuit Court of any county which is served in whole or in part by the facilities of the transit authority, such appeal to be perfected by filing with the clerk of such court a copy of the removal proceedings certified by the secretary-treasurer of the board. The court, upon application of the member removed, may in its discretion order that the original record of the proceedings be filed with the clerk as the basis for such appeal. There shall be a right of appeal to the Court of Appeals.
  5. Members of the board shall be allowed reasonable expenses necessarily incurred by them in the conduct of the affairs of the authority. Compensation may be paid to members of the board if so provided in the proceedings or joint proceedings, subject to such limitations as may be set forth therein.
  6. Notwithstanding subsection (3) of this section, when a city of the first class and a county containing such city have in effect a compact under KRS 79.310 to 79.330 , the terms of the members on the board shall be for three (3) years and until their successors are appointed and qualified. Upon the effective date of the compact, the mayor, and county judge/executive with the approval of the fiscal court, shall adjust the terms of the sitting members so that the terms of two (2) of each of their appointments expire in one (1) year, the term of one (1) of each of their appointments expire in two (2) years and the term of one (1) of each of their appointments expire in three (3) years. Upon expiration of these staggered terms, successors shall be appointed for a term of three (3) years. Upon the establishment of a consolidated local government in a county where a city of the first class and a county containing such city have had in effect a cooperative compact pursuant to KRS 79.310 to 79.330 , all members of the board shall be appointed by the mayor of the consolidated local government pursuant to the provisions of KRS 67C.139 for a term of three (3) years. Incumbent members upon the establishment of the consolidated local government shall continue to serve as members of the board for the time remaining of their current term of appointment.

History. Enact. Acts 1970, ch. 243, § 5; 1976, ch. 62, § 84; 1986, ch. 77, § 16, effective July 15, 1986; 2002, ch. 346, § 117, effective July 15, 2002.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Exercise of Discretion.

The county transit authority is an agency of government, a political subdivision; thus, the governing board’s exercise of discretion in policy matters and management decisions cannot be delegated to an arbitrator. Transit Authority of Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government v. Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 639, 698 S.W.2d 520, 1985 Ky. LEXIS 266 ( Ky. 1985 ).

96A.050. Fiscal year.

Each authority shall operate for an initial fiscal period ending on June 30 next following the effective date of its creation as a corporate entity; and shall thereafter operate on a fiscal year basis beginning each July 1 and ending on the next ensuing June 30.

History. Enact. Acts 1970, ch. 243, § 6.

96A.060. Board meetings — Quorum.

  1. Regular meetings of the board shall be held at least once in each calendar month, at such time and place as may be fixed by the board as a matter of record. Special meetings of the board may be called by the chairman or any two (2) members of the board upon oral or written notice to all members at least forty-eight (48) hours in advance. Each notice of a special meeting shall state the time, place and purpose or purposes thereof. Notice may be waived by any member, orally or in writing, before, at or after such special meeting; and the presence of any member at any such special meeting shall constitute a waiver of any defect of notice, unless such member shall cause it to appear of record that his attendance is only for the purpose of objecting to any deficiency in the notice or the time or manner of giving the same.
  2. A majority of the members of the board shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of business, but a smaller number may adjourn from time to time, and may compel the attendance of absent members in such manner and under such penalties as the authority may previously have provided for, according to its bylaws. The affirmative vote of a majority of a quorum shall be necessary for the adoption of any motion, measure or resolution. Passage of any motion, measure or resolution may be by voice vote, provided:
    1. At the request of any member the yea and nay votes shall be recorded upon call of the roll, and
    2. Such record shall be made in all proceedings involving any adjustment of rates and charges for use of the services and facilities of the mass transportation system of the authority, authorization of proceedings to acquire property through exercise of the power of eminent domain, the issuance of revenue bonds or mortgage bonds of the authority, a request that general obligation bonds be issued by any public body for the benefit of the authority, or approval and authorization of any lease agreement wherein the authority is the lessor and a public body or public bodies (or any combination thereof) may be the lessee or lessees, as provided in this chapter.

History. Enact. Acts 1970, ch. 243, § 7.

96A.070. Board officers, executive committee, director, employees — Effect of compact — Appointment of executive director or secretary-treasurer upon establishment of consolidated local government.

  1. The board shall, within sixty (60) days after the appointment of its entire initial membership, and thereafter in July of each year, elect from its members a chairman and a vice chairman. It may, in its discretion, employ an executive director and a secretary-treasurer, neither of whom shall be a member of the board; provided, however, if the creation and establishment of the authority is shown by the provisions of the proceedings or joint proceedings to have been undertaken only on a standby basis, the board may defer the employment of an executive director and may, on an interim basis, designate a secretary-treasurer from its own membership.
  2. The board may, in its discretion, employ necessary legal counsel and other agents and employees to carry out its work and functions, and may from time to time prescribe and alter such rules and regulations as it may deem necessary.
  3. The executive director, if and when employed in the discretion of the board, shall be experienced and knowledgeable in the field of transportation; and if and when employed, such executive director shall be the chief executive officer of the authority, having such powers and duties as the board may prescribe. Such executive director may recommend the establishment or alteration of rules and regulations, and of rates and charges for use of the services and facilities of the mass transportation system of the authority; but action in such respects, and in the issuance of revenue bonds or mortgage bonds of the authority, and in requesting the issuance of general obligation bonds by other public bodies for the benefit of the authority, and in authorizing leases of the properties of the authority for financing purposes, shall be taken by the board, or by the executive committee of the board if properly thereunto authorized.
  4. The secretary-treasurer shall keep the minutes of all meetings of the board, and shall also keep a set of books showing the receipts and expenditures of the board. He or she shall preserve on file duplicate vouchers for all expenditures and shall present to the board, upon request, complete reports of all financial transactions and the financial condition of the board. Such books and vouchers shall at all times be subject to examination by the governing body of any public body by which the authority was created or enlarged. He or she shall transmit at least once annually a detailed report of all acts and doings of the board to the public body or bodies by whom the board was created. He or she shall cause all moneys of the authority coming into his or her hands to be deposited in one (1) or more financial institutions, as designated from time to time by the board.
  5. The board shall require its secretary-treasurer, and its executive director, if and when such executive director shall be employed, each to execute bond in favor of the authority, in such respective penal sums as the board may fix, in favor of the authority, and conditioned upon faithful performance of the duties of such offices and full accounting to the authority. Each such bond shall be with corporate surety, provided by a corporate surety company qualified to transact business in Kentucky and approved, in each instance, by the board. The board may in like manner require similar bonds, with corporate surety, to be given by other officers, agents, and employees in such manner and in such penal sums, as it may specify from time to time. Premiums payable to sureties upon such bonds shall be paid by the authority and may be chargeable as an operating expense of the authority.
  6. The board shall fix the salaries, wages, or other compensation of the officers, agents, and employees whom it may engage from time to time; in each case within such limitations, if any, as may be prescribed in the proceedings or joint proceedings set forth in the establishment of the authority, or as such proceedings may be amended; but such salaries, wages, or other compensation shall constitute obligation of the authority only, and shall be payable from the authority’s revenues and any other available resources, and shall not constitute obligations of any city or county participating in the creation and establishment, or subsequent enlargement, of the authority.
  7. The board may, by resolution duly adopted and spread at large upon its public records, establish an executive committee, composed of such members of the board as may be specified in such resolution, and may authorize such executive committee to exercise in intervals between board meetings any powers of the board except those powers which are expressly required by this chapter or by other controlling provisions of law to be exercised by the board.
  8. The board may create such other committees of its members as it may deem necessary or proper; but the same shall be advisory in nature and shall report to the board or to the executive committee, and shall not be authorized to take any independent action except in such advisory capacity.
  9. Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, when a city of the first class and a county containing such city have in effect a compact under KRS 79.310 to 79.330 , the executive director and a secretary-treasurer or any individual, corporation, or partnership, either by contract or employment, who serves as executive director or secretary-treasurer in the management of the affairs of the board, shall be appointed by and serve at the joint pleasure of the mayor, and the county judge/executive with the approval of fiscal court pursuant to KRS 67.040 . Upon the establishment of a consolidated local government in a county in which a city of the first class and a county containing the city have had in effect a cooperative compact under KRS 79.310 to 79.330 , an executive director or secretary-treasurer shall be appointed by, and shall serve at the pleasure of, the mayor.

History. Enact. Acts 1970, ch. 243, § 8; 1986, ch. 77, § 17, effective July 15, 1986; 2002, ch. 346, § 118, effective July 15, 2002.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Exercise of Discretion.

The county transit authority is an agency of government, a political subdivision; thus, the governing board’s exercise of discretion in policy matters and management decisions cannot be delegated to an arbitrator. Transit Authority of Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government v. Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 639, 698 S.W.2d 520, 1985 Ky. LEXIS 266 ( Ky. 1985 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

A transit authority could institute a program of incentives to its employees whereby nominal compensation in the form of cash of less than $50.00 would be awarded to employees who submit time or money saving suggestions or contribute substantially to the improvement of the system so long as the payments are made for work actually performed and the plan for such payments is set out in advance and authorized by the board of the transit authority in accordance with this section. OAG 76-88 .

96A.080. Acquisition of transportation systems by purchase or condemnation — Subsidies.

  1. A transit authority may establish mass transportation within its transit area and adjoining areas, but may not inaugurate service in direct competition with any existing certificated carrier.
  2. In addition to the power conferred upon an authority by this chapter, an authority may acquire real or personal property, easements, franchises, bus certificates, or other rights by any lawful means necessary to its operation of any existing mass transit system within its transit area and adjoining areas, provided that having acquired an existing transit system it shall not thereafter inaugurate service in direct competition with any other existing certificated carrier.
  3. An authority may, if unable to contract or agree with the owner or owners thereof, acquire real and personal property, franchises, bus certificates, easements and other rights when necessary in and to the accomplishments of the public purposes of the authority, through exercise of the power of eminent domain; provided, however, that in acquiring any private bus company pursuant to this section, the authority may not do so piecemeal but shall acquire the entire system including that which may be outside the area then included within the authority. An authority shall not condemn any real and personal property, franchises, bus certificates, easements and other rights of a private bus company the majority of whose passengers move between termini without the transit area. Any exercise of such power shall be initiated by resolution of the board of the authority identifying the properties or rights to be acquired, reciting the board’s determination that acquisition by such means is necessary, and authorizing initiation of proceedings as required by law; and such resolution of the board of the authority shall not be conclusive of such determination but shall be subject to the approval of the fiscal court or courts of the county or counties in which the property sought to be condemned is located.
  4. Proceedings in the exercise of the power of eminent domain herein vested in an authority shall, except where inconsistent with this chapter, be such as are prescribed for the Department of Highways by the Eminent Domain Act of Kentucky, and as the same may be amended and supplemented from time to time. All such proceedings shall be governed by the provisions of the Rules of Civil Procedure except where the provisions of this chapter or of the Eminent Domain Act of Kentucky specifically or by necessary implication provide otherwise. If a privately owned mass transportation system, or other property sought to be acquired by an authority, shall have been acquired or improved in whole or in part at the expense of the authority, the cost and value of such acquisitions and improvements shall be excluded in any proceedings to establish the fair value thereof.
  5. During any period when negotiations for the purchase of a mass transit system are in progress, and/or during any period when proceedings for acquisition of a mass transportation system through exercise of the power of eminent domain may be pending, an authority may make reasonable subsidy payments to the owner or owners of such mass transit system if, in the judgment of the board of the authority, such subsidy payments are necessary in order to give reasonable assurance that there will be no substantial reduction of transportation service to the public. Such subsidy payments may be made by an authority from any resources available to it, or from appropriations made or agreed to be made to it by any public body having an interest in the preservation of mass transit service to the public; and if bonds are ultimately issued for the purchase or other acquisition of such mass transit system, the aggregate amount of such subsidy payments may be included as a part of the cost of acquisition and made payable from the proceeds of such bonds. In no event, however, shall any action on the part of a board of an authority in this connection create an indebtedness of the authority beyond its available resources or such appropriations or the proceeds of such bonds, if and when bonds are issued.

History. Enact. Acts 1970, ch. 243, § 9; 1974, ch. 74, Art. IV, § 20(1); 1976, ch. 140, § 48; 1980, ch. 324, § 3, effective July 15, 1980.

Compiler’s Notes.

The Eminent Domain Act of Kentucky referred to in subsection (4) is compiled as KRS 416.540 to 416.680 .

96A.090. Authority’s capacity to accept appropriations, grants.

  1. No transit authority established or created under and pursuant to this chapter shall be vested with any power to levy taxes of any nature or in any amount.
  2. The governing body of any public body participating in the creation and establishment of an authority, or in the subsequent enlargement thereof, may, in the proceedings or joint proceedings, or by subsequent action, appropriate and pay over to an authority from its general funds or from other resources not required by law to be appropriated for other purposes, any sum or sums of money, or any property which such public body shall determine to be necessary or advisable in furtherance of the public purposes of the authority as set forth in this chapter. An authority may receive moneys or property from any such source, and may use the same in furtherance of its proper purposes; but an authority shall not pledge anticipated appropriations from any such source for any period beyond the period for which any such appropriations shall be made, except to the extent of committing that any such appropriation, when and if actually received by the authority, without commitment as to the possible amount thereof, will be applied by the authority in certain specified ways.
  3. An authority may accept gifts, grants, or loans of money or other property from the United States, the state or any person or entity for such purposes, may enter into any agreement required in connection therewith, may comply with any federal or state laws or regulations applicable thereto, and may hold, use, and dispose of such money or property in accordance with the terms of the gift, grant, loan, or agreement relating thereto.

History. Enact. Acts 1970, ch. 243, § 10.

96A.095. Authorization for the Transportation Cabinet to accept funds for promotion of, development of, and provision of capital for mass transit services and human service transportation delivery — Authority to promulgate administrative regulations.

  1. The Transportation Cabinet may receive and accept from the Commonwealth or any of its agencies, including the Cabinet for Health and Family Services and the Department of Workforce Investment, and from federal agencies appropriations or grants to promote, develop, and provide capital and operating subsidies for mass transit services and human service transportation delivery in Kentucky, and to receive and accept aid or contributions from any source of either money, property, labor, or other things of value to promote mass transit services. Subject to the provisions of Section 230 of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, any of these funds, property, or things of value received by the Transportation Cabinet may be given directly to any of the following entities in order to accomplish the purposes of this section:
    1. A local transit authority as created under this chapter;
    2. A city;
    3. A county;
    4. Other public mass transit providers;
    5. A nonprofit or public mass transit provider operating under 49 U.S.C. sec. 5310 or 5311; or
    6. An entity providing human service transportation delivery.
  2. The Transportation Cabinet is authorized and directed to apply for any available federal funds for operating subsidies, either on a matching basis or otherwise and to make any of these funds received available to any of the following entities in order to accomplish the purposes of this section:
    1. A local transit authority as created under this chapter;
    2. A city;
    3. A county;
    4. Other public mass transit providers;
    5. A nonprofit or public mass transit provider operating under 49 U.S.C. sec. 5310 or 5311; or
    6. An entity promoting or providing transit services such as safety, planning, research, coordination, or training activities.

      In those cases where federal laws or regulations preclude the Transportation Cabinet from direct application for this type of federal funds, the cabinet is authorized and directed to provide assistance to any of the entities listed in this subsection as necessary to enable it to apply for and obtain this type of federal funds in order to accomplish the purposes of this section.

  3. The Transportation Cabinet is authorized to assist cities and counties in the formation of local transit authorities in conformance with this chapter, but nothing in this chapter shall be construed as preventing the Transportation Cabinet from providing assistance as authorized in this chapter to cities or counties where local transit authorities do not exist.
  4. The Transportation Cabinet is authorized to contract, in accordance with the provisions of KRS Chapters 45A and 281, with a broker to provide human service transportation delivery within a specific delivery area.

History. Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 138, § 2; 1986, ch. 164, § 1, effective July 15, 1986; 1998, ch. 17, § 1, effective July 15, 1998; 1998, ch. 607, § 2, effective July 15, 1998; 2000, ch. 346, § 13, effective July 14, 2000; 2005, ch. 99, § 19, effective June 20, 2005; 2006, ch. 211, § 15, effective July 12, 2006.

96A.096. Kentucky public transportation development fund.

There is created in the State Treasury a special fund to be known as the “Kentucky Public Transportation Development Fund.” All moneys deposited or paid into this fund are appropriated and shall be available to the cabinet for the purposes of KRS 96A.095 . All moneys in this fund shall be expended for public transportation capital and operating subsidies, public transportation development, or administrative costs incidental to these developments. The fund shall consist of all money appropriated by the state and all money received from the United States or from any other source for the purpose of providing public transportation capital and operating subsidies and public transportation development funds. All moneys in the Kentucky public transportation development fund shall be deposited, administered, and dispersed in the same manner and under the same conditions and requirements as are provided by law for other special funds in the State Treasury, except that any balance in this fund shall not lapse at any time but shall be continuously available to the cabinet for the purposes of carrying out the provisions of KRS 96A.095 . A general statement that all continuing appropriations are repealed shall not be construed as abolishing this fund.

History. Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 164, § 2, effective July 15, 1986; 1998, ch. 17, § 2, effective July 15, 1998.

96A.100. Management contracts.

An authority may operate any mass transit system which it establishes or acquires; or instead of operating the same in its own name, an authority may enter into one (1) or more management contracts for operating the same or any part thereof, under such terms and conditions as it may determine to be proper and desirable; provided, however, any such management contract shall retain in the authority the power to establish, and to adjust from time to time, rates and charges to be exacted from the public for use of the services and facilities referred to therein, and the power to issue revenue bonds, mortgage bonds, or other obligations of the authority payable from the income and revenues thereof.

History. Enact. Acts 1970, ch. 243, § 11.

96A.110. Responsibility for planning, coordination.

An authority shall be responsible for over-all planning of mass transit in its transit area. An authority must consult, cooperate and coordinate with any other state, local or federal planning agency or department, having responsibilities and/or authority in the same transit area according to federal and state laws. The ultimate goal of such planning shall be improvement of mass transit service. In carrying out its purposes, the authority shall consider its highway, road and street systems on federal, state and local levels.

History. Enact. Acts 1970, ch. 243, § 12.

96A.120. Permissible types of financing.

For the purposes of acquiring or otherwise establishing one (1) or more transit systems, or parts thereof, or for the purpose of adding to, extending, operating, or improving one (1) or more mass transportation systems owned or to be acquired or established, or for any combination of these purposes, an authority may, in addition to other methods permitted by law, resort to financing according to any of the following financing methods, or any combination thereof, to the extent not inconsistent, one with another:

  1. Upon determination of its financing needs, an authority, by resolution of its board, may request the public body responsible for its creation and establishment, or any one (1) or more of the public bodies if there be more than one (1):
    1. To appropriate and pay over to the authority all or any part of the amount determined to be necessary; or
    2. To provide the amount determined to be necessary, or any part thereof, from the proceeds of general obligation bonds of the public body or public bodies, in which event the governing body or governing bodies of the public body or public bodies may, in its or their discretion, take action as may be required by the Constitution and applicable statutes of the Commonwealth to submit to the voters thereof, at one (1) or more elections to be held for that purpose, a proposal or proposals that the issuance of general obligation bonds be approved and authorized, and if so approved and authorized, the general obligation bonds may be issued and the proceeds may be appropriated to the authority in the manner requested;
  2. An authority may issue revenue bonds in its own name, payable solely from its income and revenues, and not constituting or purporting to constitute an indebtedness of the authority or of any other public body within the meaning of debt-limiting provisions of the Constitution and applicable statutes of the Commonwealth, in the manner and in accordance with the procedures set forth in KRS 58.010 to 58.170 , inclusive, and KRS 61.390 , subject to any interest rate limitations which may be applicable as provided by law;
  3. An authority may issue its mortgage bonds, as authorized by statute and may make provision for obtaining revenues for the payment of the principal of and interest thereon, and for the payment of costs of operating and maintenance, and for the accumulation of reserves for renewals, replacements, extensions, and improvements, and for debt service reserves, by leasing any mass transportation system owned by the authority, or to be acquired or established by the authority, or, if there be more than one (1) mass transportation system, by leasing the same individually or in any combination, to one (1) or more public bodies, whether or not the public bodies, or any of them, shall have participated in the creation and establishment of the authority. Any lease shall be a written instrument, executed by the authority as lessor, and by one (1) or more public bodies, as a lessee or lessees, for a period of one (1) year, which may be from the date of the mortgage bonds, or from the date of acquisition or other establishment of the mass transit system or systems, with exclusive options to the lessee or lessees to renew the same thereafter, from year to year, upon the rentals and other terms and provisions as will provide to the authority annual sums sufficient to provide for the purposes of this subsection;
  4. General obligation bonds issued for the benefit of an authority, or revenue bonds or mortgage bonds issued by an authority may, in the discretion of the parties involved in the issuance, be refinanced, whether at maturity or upon prior redemption in accordance with the terms, by the issuance of bonds, according to any of the financing plans herein authorized.

History. Enact. Acts 1970, ch. 243, § 13; 1980, ch. 324, § 4, effective July 15, 1980; 1996, ch. 274, § 63, effective July 15, 1996.

Compiler’s Notes.

KRS 58.170 referred to in subsection (2) of this section was repealed by Acts 1996, ch. 274, § 65.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Public Purpose.

The issuance of bonds to provide low cost mass transportation services fulfills a public purpose not only in promoting the economy in areas of employment and commerce through facility of travel, but also in reducing traffic congestion, air pollution, and the excessive devoting of land to automobile related uses. Youtsey v. County Debt Com., 501 S.W.2d 266, 1973 Ky. LEXIS 132 ( Ky. 1973 ).

2. Financing of Operations.

The language of this section read in conjunction with KRS 96A.020 authorizes the issuance of bonds to provide funds for the operation of a mass transit system and is not limited to the acquisition or establishment of such a system. Youtsey v. County Debt Com., 501 S.W.2d 266, 1973 Ky. LEXIS 132 ( Ky. 1973 ).

City transit authority could not issue a refund for the overpayment of occupational taxes independently from a county metro revenue commission because the transit authority neither collected nor dispersed the funds generated by the license fee; the city was the public body that, through the electorate, levied the license fee. Paradise Tomato Kitchens, Inc. v. Louisville-Jefferson County Metro Revenue Comm'n, 2008 Ky. App. LEXIS 143 (Ky. Ct. App. May 9, 2008), review denied, ordered not published, 2008 Ky. LEXIS 306 (Ky. Dec. 10, 2008).

Opinions of Attorney General.

County was permitted to appropriate such funds derived from a county occupational tax to the transit authority for purposes specified in this section. OAG 72-318 .

Since subsection (3) of this section provides that a mass transit authority may use the procedures set forth in KRS 58.010 to (former) 58.170 , subject to any interest rate limitations which may be applicable thereto as provided by law, and as between KRS 58.170 (now repealed) and 96A.120 the specific governs over the general, anticipatory notes issued by transit authority are within KRS 58.430 and not subject to the interest limitations of former KRS 58.170. OAG 83-152 .

96A.130. Authority’s bonds are legal investments.

Bonds issued by an authority, or by public bodies for the benefit of an authority, under the provisions of this chapter, are hereby made securities in which all public officers and public bodies of the state and its political subdivisions, all insurance companies, trust companies, banking associations, investment companies, credit unions, savings and loan associations, executors, administrators, trustees and other fiduciaries may properly and legally invest funds, including capital in their control or belonging to them. Such bonds are hereby made securities which may properly and legally be deposited with and received by any state or municipal officer of any agency or political subdivision of the state for any purpose for which the deposit of bonds or obligations is now or may hereafter be authorized by law.

History. Enact. Acts 1970, ch. 243, § 14.

96A.140. Tax-exempt nature of authority’s property, bonds.

Revenue bonds and mortgage bonds of an authority, together with interest thereon, shall be exempt from ad valorem and income taxation by the Commonwealth and all of its political subdivisions. The properties, moneys and other assets of an authority, and all revenues or other income of an authority, shall be exempt from all taxation, licenses, fees, or charges of any kind imposed by the state or by any county, municipality, political subdivision, taxing district, or other public agency or body of the state.

History. Enact. Acts 1970, ch. 243, § 15.

96A.150. Bond anticipation notes.

When an authority has made a determination, as a matter of record, that it will authorize and issue in its own name revenue bonds under authority of subsection (2) of KRS 96A.120 , or mortgage bonds under authority of subsection (3) of KRS 96A.120 , such authority may obtain interim construction or acquisition financing moneys through the authorization and issuance of its revenue bond anticipation notes, or its mortgage bond anticipation notes, as the case may be, the same to be shown in the text thereof to be payable as to principal and interest solely from the proceeds of the authorized revenue bonds or mortgage bonds, as the case may be. Such notes shall mature not later than one (1) year from the date of issuance thereof, as the authority may determine, and shall be renewable at or prior to maturity according to the provisions of the authority’s proceedings incident to the issuance thereof. Such anticipation notes need not be offered at an advertised competitive public sale, but may be offered in the manner provided for in the case of similar notes of certain state agencies, according to KRS 56.513 .

History. Enact. Acts 1970, ch. 243, § 22.

96A.160. Power of other agencies to sell property to authority.

Any department or agency of the United States or state government or any county, municipality, or other public agency may sell, lease, grant, transfer, or convey to an authority, with or without consideration, any facilities or any part or parts thereof or any real or personal property or interest therein which may be useful to the authority for any authorized purpose. In any case where the construction or installation of any such facilities has not been completed, the public agency concerned may also transfer, sell, assign, and set over to the authority, with or without consideration, any existing contract for the construction or installation of the facilities.

History. Enact. Acts 1970, ch. 243, § 16.

96A.170. Exemption from jurisdiction of Transportation Cabinet — Cabinet assistance permitted.

An authority created and established under this chapter, together with its ownership, financing, operation, rates and charges for use of its services and facilities, rules and regulations, routes, schedules, size and character of its equipment and quality of service shall be exempt from all jurisdiction of the Transportation Cabinet of the Commonwealth, provided, however, that no new service may be instituted within or outside of the authority’s transit area in competition with an existing certificated bus company without an application to and a grant of authority from the Transportation Cabinet as provided by KRS Chapter 281 or KRS 96A.095(4), provided further that nothing in this section shall deny the Transportation Cabinet the authority to render such advice and assistance, including financial aid, engineering, planning and technical assistance, as it deems advisable, to enable an authority as created under this chapter to acquire, construct, expand, maintain, and operate a mass transit system as defined in this chapter and to establish regulations to promote local transit authorities and to ensure compliance with the requirements of the United States Federal Transit Administration.

History. Enact. Acts 1970, ch. 243, § 17; 1974, ch. 138, § 1; 1974, ch. 247, § 1; 1980, ch. 324, § 5, effective July 15, 1980; 1986, ch. 160, § 1, effective July 15, 1986; 1998, ch. 607, § 3, effective July 15, 1998.

96A.180. Insurance of authority’s properties.

An authority shall provide insurance, or may provide for self-insurance and establish for that purpose such reserves as it deems prudent, for its properties, and for workers’ compensation, and for public liability, and may provide for the insuring of its officers or employees, and the expense of obtaining such insurance, and of paying the premiums therefor from time to time, shall be borne by the authority and be chargeable as an operating expense of the authority.

History. Enact. Acts 1970, ch. 243, § 18; 1980, ch. 324, § 6, effective July 15, 1980; 1986, ch. 253, § 1, effective July 15, 1986; 1988, ch. 188, § 1, effective July 15, 1988.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Waiver of Immunity.

The Mass Transit Authorities Enabling Statute, which requires liability insurance, operates as a limited waiver, to the extent of the insurance coverage, of the governmental immunity granted to the transit authority, even though no funds were specifically set aside for the payment of claims against the transit authority. Kestler v. Transit Auth., 758 S.W.2d 38, 1988 Ky. LEXIS 63 ( Ky. 1988 ).

96A.190. Annual audit — Compliance with KRS 65A.010 to 65A.090.

  1. Each authority shall employ a certified public accountant, or firm thereof, to make an annual audit of the authority’s financial accounts and affairs, and to make a report thereof, including comments of the auditor regarding whether or not the authority is in compliance with statutory requirements and with lawful covenants and commitments made in its contract or bond proceedings. A copy of each audit report shall be filed and kept open for public inspection in the office of the secretary-treasurer of the authority, and a copy shall be provided to the clerk, secretary or other appropriate office of record of each public body which may have participated in the creation and organization of the authority, or in the subsequent expansion thereof.
  2. Each authority shall comply with the provisions of KRS 65A.010 to 65A.090 .

History. Enact. Acts 1970, ch. 243, § 19; 2013, ch. 40, § 44, effective March 21, 2013.

96A.200. Duties to employees transferred from acquired system.

If an authority acquires an existing transit system, the authority shall assume and observe all existing labor contracts and pension obligations. All employees of such system who are necessary for the operation thereof by the authority shall be transferred to and appointed as employees of the authority. Such employees shall be given seniority credit and sick leave, vacation, insurance, and pension credits in accordance with the records or labor agreements from the acquired transit system. The authority shall assume the obligations of any transit system acquired by it with regard to wages, salaries, hours, working conditions, sick leave, health and welfare and pension or retirement provisions for employees. The authority and the employees, through their representatives for collective bargaining purposes, shall take whatever action may be necessary to have pension trust funds presently under the joint control of the acquired transportation system and the participating employees through their representatives transferred to the trust fund to be established, maintained and administered jointly by the authority and the participating employees through their representatives. No employee of any acquired transportation system who is transferred to a position with the authority shall by reason of such transfer be placed in any worse position with respect to workers’ compensation, pension, seniority, wages, sick leave, vacation, health and welfare insurance or any other benefits than he enjoyed as an employee of such acquired transportation system.

History. Enact. Acts 1970, ch. 243, § 20.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Existing Labor Contracts.

Although this section requires a transit authority to assume and observe all existing labor contracts and pension obligations of any existing transit system acquired by it, it does not mean that constitutionally invalid provisions of any such labor contracts or pension systems must be assumed and observed, nor does this section constitute legislative authority for transit authority boards to delegate their management prerogatives to an arbitrator. Transit Authority of Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government v. Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 639, 698 S.W.2d 520, 1985 Ky. LEXIS 266 ( Ky. 1985 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Pension fund obligations assumed by the transit authority must be limited to those existing at the time that portion of the private transit system was transferred to the authority and, as a consequence, applicable only to those employes of the private system transferred, so other employes cannot be included in the pension fund system as the terms of the existing plan cannot be altered. OAG 73-137 .

When a transit authority acquires an existing mass transit system, the employes of the acquired system become employees of the authority. OAG 76-138 .

96A.210. Interstate transit authorities.

Counties and cities of this state abutting upon the boundary line between this state and any other state are hereby authorized separately, jointly with each other, or jointly with any other county, municipality or political subdivision of any such abutting state to form a transit authority or to become a part of an existing transit authority as authorized by this chapter, with the broad and specific powers granted hereunder; or under KRS Chapter 65; provided, however, that any contract, agreement or compact authorized to be made under this section, shall be made with due regard to such federal or state constitutional requirements, as may prevail at the time of the making thereof.

History. Enact. Acts 1970, ch. 243, § 21.

96A.220. Power to conduct studies, apply for subpoenas.

A transit authority may conduct such surveys and studies, gather such information, and institute such programs and plans as may be reasonably necessary to carry out the purposes of this chapter. If necessary, it may make application for subpoenas, or subpoenas duces tecum to any Circuit Court having proper venue for the production of any records, books or other documents of any privately owned mass transit system operating in whole, or substantially in part, within its transit area when required in the bona fide pursuit of its purposes as specified in this chapter.

History. Enact. Acts 1970, ch. 243, § 23.

96A.230. Citation of chapter.

This chapter shall be known and may be cited as the “Kentucky Transit Authority Act.”

History. Enact. Acts 1970, ch. 243, § 1.

Mass Transportation Program

96A.310. Legislative findings.

The General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Kentucky hereby finds and determines as a legislative finding of fact that the institution, acquisition, preservation and continuation of mass transportation facilities to serve the general public is vital to the health, safety and material well-being of the citizens and inhabitants of the Commonwealth, and that the preservation and continuation of operations of mass transit facilities at reasonable rates to the public constitutes a proper application of the police power, will result in decreased automotive congestion, safer and more efficient utilization of the public ways, and the safe and effective movement of persons and property, and will thereby serve the public safety, health, convenience, enjoyment and general welfare.

History. Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 169, § 1, effective March 27, 1974.

Opinions of Attorney General.

A transit authority river city (TARC) occupational license tax may legally be levied on the salaries and other compensation, regardless of the source of payment, of nonresidents working in Jefferson County. OAG 75-93 .

96A.320. Submission of proposal to establish program — Voters — Program financing.

  1. As used in KRS 96A.310 to 96A.370 , the term “mass transportation program” shall mean the provision of necessary funds by public bodies to transit authorities created pursuant to KRS Chapter 96A with which to acquire, operate, and preserve mass transportation facilities. A “mass transportation program” may also include a method for the public body or public bodies to finance principal and interest payments on any general obligation bonds issued pursuant to KRS 96A.120 , or to finance transportation-related facilities to promote the movement of vehicles and people. Urban-county governments which initiate a “mass transportation program” may include in this program the improvement of existing roads and the construction of new roads.
  2. Public bodies which have been parties to the creation and establishment of transit authorities, or who constitute the membership of such transit authorities, may, acting either individually or jointly, submit to either the electorates of such public bodies, or the electorate of the transit area encompassed by any such transit authority, but only in the manner and pursuant to the procedures set forth in KRS 96A.310 to 96A.370 , one (1) or more proposals for the approval of a mass transportation program to be financed by additional voted levies of ad valorem taxes upon all taxable property in such public body or public bodies. Such additional voted levies of ad valorem taxes upon all taxable property in any such public body shall never exceed in the aggregate the limits prescribed by the Constitution of Kentucky for any such public body.
  3. Public bodies which have been parties to the creation and establishment of transit authorities, or who constitute the membership of such transit authorities, may, acting either individually or jointly, submit to either the electorates of such public bodies, or the electorate of the transit area encompassed by any such transit authority, but only in the manner and pursuant to the procedures set forth in KRS 96A.310 to 96A.370 , one (1) or more proposals for the approval of a mass transportation program to be financed by voted levies of occupational license fees. Such voted levies of occupational license fees shall not exceed one percent (1%) of:
    1. Salaries, wages, commissions, and other compensation earned by persons for work done and services performed or rendered; and
    2. The net profits of businesses, trades, professions, or occupations from activities conducted in the public body, or the transit area, except public service companies, banks, trust companies, combined banks and trust companies, combined trust, banking and title companies, any savings and loan association whether state or federally chartered, and in all other cases where a public body is prohibited by law from imposing a license fee.
    1. Public bodies which have been parties to the creation and establishment of transit authorities, or who constitute the membership of such transit authorities, may, acting either individually or jointly, submit to either the electorates of such public bodies, or the electorate of the transit area encompassed by any such transit authority, but only in the manner and pursuant to the procedures set forth in KRS 96A.310 to 96A.370 , one (1) or more proposals for the approval of a mass transportation program to be financed by the voted levy of a sales tax upon all retailers at a rate not to exceed one-half of one percent (0.5%) of the gross receipts of any retailer derived from “retail sales” or “sales at retail” made within the public body or public bodies, provided, however, that public transit sales tax shall not be levied on those retail sales which are exempted from the state sales tax by KRS Chapter 139 on June 19, 1976, or hereafter exempted. (4) (a) Public bodies which have been parties to the creation and establishment of transit authorities, or who constitute the membership of such transit authorities, may, acting either individually or jointly, submit to either the electorates of such public bodies, or the electorate of the transit area encompassed by any such transit authority, but only in the manner and pursuant to the procedures set forth in KRS 96A.310 to 96A.370 , one (1) or more proposals for the approval of a mass transportation program to be financed by the voted levy of a sales tax upon all retailers at a rate not to exceed one-half of one percent (0.5%) of the gross receipts of any retailer derived from “retail sales” or “sales at retail” made within the public body or public bodies, provided, however, that public transit sales tax shall not be levied on those retail sales which are exempted from the state sales tax by KRS Chapter 139 on June 19, 1976, or hereafter exempted.
    2. Any sales tax levied for said purpose shall be in addition to the sales tax authorized by Chapter 139 of the Kentucky Revised Statutes. Said public transportation sales tax shall be collected and administered under the provisions of Chapter 139 of the Kentucky Revised Statutes and the rules and regulations of the Kentucky Department of Revenue.
  4. The Kentucky Department of Revenue shall refund that portion of the sales tax collected as a public transportation tax to the public body or bodies imposing said tax.
  5. Notwithstanding any other provision contrary hereto, a mass transportation program financed by a public body or public bodies from said sales tax shall be restricted by the following order of priorities, to wit:
    1. First, the annual payment of principal, interest, and sinking fund requirements on any general obligation bonds issued pursuant to KRS 96A.120 ;
    2. Second, appropriations to the transit authority to provide local matching funds for any available federal or state capital, operating, or planning and demonstration grant projects in accordance with the annual approved budget; and
    3. Third, any excess funds in the control of each public body receiving said tax shall be transferred to the general fund of each such public body for public transportation and traffic improvement projects at any location within a city or county, in any manner which said public body or public bodies determine will improve transportation, road or traffic conditions, or in general will promote the movement of people and vehicles.

History. Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 169, § 2; 1976, ch. 301, § 6; 1976, ch. 350, § 1; 1978, ch. 384, § 560, effective June 17, 1978; 1990, ch. 417, § 1, effective July 13, 1990; 2005, ch. 85, § 105, effective June 20, 2005.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

Paradise Tomato Kitchens, Inc. v. Louisville-Jefferson County Metro Revenue Comm’n, — S.W.3d —, 2008 Ky. App. LEXIS 143 (Ky. Ct. App. 2008).

Opinions of Attorney General.

A transit authority river city (TARC) occupational license tax may legally be levied on the salaries and other compensation, regardless of the course of payment, of nonresidents working in Jefferson County. OAG 75-93 .

Since a county can levy only two kinds of taxes, ad valorem taxes and license or occupational taxes, a sales tax for financing mass transit authorities provided for by subsection (4) of this section, which did not fall within either of these classifications but was a sales tax to be levied by the fiscal courts of a number of counties, was wholly and irredeemably unconstitutional. OAG 76-623 .

A county or fiscal court can enact by ordinance or resolution an occupational tax, subject to other statutory provisions. OAG 78-101 .

96A.330. Resolution or ordinance to submit proposal to electorate — Simultaneous elections in transit area — Notice.

  1. Any transit authority created pursuant to the provisions of KRS Chapter 96A may, by resolution duly adopted by its board in the manner prescribed by KRS 96A.060 , request one (1) or more of the public bodies which, upon the date of adoption of such resolution constitute members of such transit authority, either:
    1. To submit to their respective electorates; or
    2. To jointly submit to the electorate of the entire transit area encompassed by such transit authority a proposal for the approval or disapproval of a mass transportation project.
  2. The resolution shall set forth in detail, or shall incorporate by reference a detailed study in respect of, the mass transportation program proposed for submission to such electorate or electorates, together with the proposed source or sources of funding thereof, subject to the limitations of KRS 96A.310 to 96A.370 . The mass transportation project of an urban-county government may consist of specific road construction and improvement projects. The funding source may be proposed for a limited period of time as specified in the mass transportation program proposal at the conclusion of which the funding source shall terminate unless it has been extended by referendum in accordance with the provision of this chapter.
  3. Upon receipt of any such resolution of the board of any such transit authority, the governing body of each public body to which the resolution is directed shall cause the resolution and the study for mass transportation program contained therein to be carefully reviewed. The public body or public bodies may cause further studies to be made with respect to such request of the transit authority, and may require the transit authority to submit such further and additional date, statistics, and information as may be required by such public body or public bodies in order to enable them to make a proper decision regarding any proposed mass transportation program.
  4. If the governing body of any such public body shall determine that the public welfare requires the establishment of the mass transportation program as proposed by the transit authority, the governing body of such public body may by resolution or ordinance determine that a proposal for the establishment of such mass transportation program shall be submitted to the electorate of the public body. Such resolution or ordinance of the public body shall describe the mass transportation program to be submitted to the electorate, together with the proposed source of funding therefor, which shall be expressed as one of the following:
    1. An ad valorem tax levy expressed as a certain maximum number of cents per each one hundred dollars ($100) of assessed valuation, subject to constitutional limits;
    2. An occupational license tax, subject to the limitations of KRS 96A.310 to 96A.370 ; or
    3. A sales tax upon all retailers at a rate not to exceed one-half of one percent (0.5%) of the gross receipts of any retailer derived from “retail sales” or “sales at retail” as defined in KRS Chapter 139.
  5. In the event the membership of any such transit authority consists of more than one (1) public body, and in the event the resolution of the board of such transit authority is directed to all such public bodies, all such public bodies may, by adoption of appropriate resolutions or ordinances determine that the proposition for the establishment of the mass transportation program, together with the identified funding source therefor, shall be submitted to the electorate of the transit area of the transit authority rather than to the separate electorates of such public bodies. In that event, the election on the proposition regarding the mass transportation program shall be held simultaneously within the transit area by all such public bodies and the notice of the election shall be uniform.

History. Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 169, § 3; 1976, ch. 350, § 2; 1990, ch. 417, § 2, effective July 13, 1990.

Opinions of Attorney General.

Where a county or fiscal court enacts an occupational tax, there must be a referendum to effectuate the occupational tax; if the transit authority is county-wide, a referendum must be called for all individuals or the electorate in the county, but if, on the other hand, the transit authority includes more than one county, a referendum must be called to submit the proposal to the electorate of each county or to submit the proposal jointly to the electorate of the entire transit area encompassed by the transit authority. OAG 78-101 .

96A.340. Publication of resolution or ordinance — Framing of proposal — Majority required — Status of voted levies.

  1. The resolution or ordinance of each public body determining that a proposition for the establishment of a mass transportation program be submitted to the electorate of such public body or to the electorate of the transit area of such transit authority, as the case may be, shall in each case be published in the newspaper having the largest bona fide circulation in the area affected and KRS 424.120 notwithstanding, in the following manner:
    1. The advertisement shall contain a notification that there is to be a referendum, the subject of which is to be the proposed sales tax.
    2. The advertisement shall contain the amount of the proposed sales tax and the subject(s) thereof.
    3. The advertisement shall include the manner in which the tax shall be levied.
    4. The advertisement shall include the manner in which and purposes for which revenues resulting from the tax levy shall be spent.
    5. The advertisement shall be no less than one-quarter (1/4) page in size, and
    6. Shall be published at least once weekly for the nine (9) weeks immediately prior to the date of the referendum,
    7. And daily for the week immediately prior to the date of the publication in those papers with daily publication.
    8. The advertisement shall begin with the word “Tax.” Thereafter such public body or public bodies shall cause the proposition to be prepared for submission to the electorate of either such public bodies or such transit area of the transit authority, as the case may be, at an election to be called and held for such purpose. Such election may be held upon any date stipulated by the public body or public bodies and shall be held pursuant to notice as prescribed in KRS 424.130 . Said election may, but need not, be held in conjunction with a regularly scheduled November election or a primary election as otherwise provided by law. The proposal to be submitted to the electorate of such public body or public bodies, or transit area of such transit authority, as the case may be, shall be so framed that any voter who wishes to vote in favor of the mass transportation program and the financing source therefor may signify his approval by voting “yes,” and any voter who wishes to vote against the mass transportation program and the funding therefor may do so by voting “no.”
  2. In the event any such mass transportation program proposal is submitted to the electorate of any individual public body, such proposition and the source of funding therefor shall be approved if a majority of those voting on the proposal within the public body shall vote “yes.”
  3. In the event any such mass transportation program proposal is submitted to the electorate of any transit area of any such transit authority by simultaneous submission by all public bodies who are at the time of such submission members of such transit authority, such proposition and the source of funding therefor shall be approved if a majority of those voting on the proposal within the transit area of such transit authority shall vote “yes.”
  4. Any additional voted levies of ad valorem taxes approved by electorates pursuant to KRS 96A.310 to 96A.370 , shall in the case of individual public bodies, be added to and constitute legal tax levies of such individual public bodies within the meaning of the Constitution of Kentucky, and shall, in the case of votes taken in transit areas of transit authorities, constitute legal tax levies of each and every individual public body which is a member of any such transit authority within the meaning of the Constitution of Kentucky.

History. Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 169, § 4; 1976, ch. 350, § 3; 1976 (1st Ex. Sess.), ch. 37, § 1.

Opinions of Attorney General.

The provisions of this section notwithstanding, an election whereby a regional transit authority seeks the approval of the electorate for a mass transportation program can only be held at a regular November election, in view of the fact that the election does not come within any exception to the constitutional restrictions found under § 148 of the Constitution. OAG 76-190 .

96A.350. Elections — Collection of tax receipts.

  1. The elections herein authorized shall, in the case of any individual public body, be called and held by the particular public officials of said public body responsible for the calling and holding of general elections. All ad valorem tax receipts, occupational tax receipts and public transportation sales tax receipts derived in respect of any such elections shall be collected by the public officials of such public body statutorily responsible for such collection, and shall pending disbursement be held in a separate and special trust fund identified as the mass transit trust fund by said public body to be used solely and only for purposes of the mass transportation program approved by the electorate of such public body, as hereinafter provided. Moneys therefrom shall be disbursed only upon order of the chief financial officer of such public body.
  2. In the event any election authorized by KRS 96A.310 to 96A.370 is, pursuant to the provisions of KRS 96A.310 to 96A.370 , to be submitted to the electorate of any transit area of a transit authority by all of the public bodies which are members of any such transit authority, and if one of such public bodies is a county which encompasses one or more additional public bodies, the county clerk of such county (or each county clerk in the event more than one county shall be a member of such transit authority) shall cause such election proposition to be prepared for presentation to the voters at the election on such proposition. All ad valorem tax receipts, occupational tax receipts and public transportation sales tax receipts derived in respect of any such elections shall be collected or received by the proper public officials of such county or counties statutorily responsible for such collection or receipt, and shall pending disbursement be held in a separate and special trust fund identified as the mass transit trust fund to be used solely and only for purposes of the mass transportation program approved by the electorate of such transit area, as hereinafter provided. Said mass transit trust fund shall in such case be held in the custody of all public bodies which are members of such transit authority and moneys therefrom shall be disbursed only upon orders of the chief financial officers of all such public bodies.

History. Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 169, § 5; 1976, ch. 350, § 4; 1978, ch. 384, § 225, effective June 17, 1978; 1982, ch. 360, § 31, effective July 15, 1982.

96A.360. Annual budget and report of transit authority required.

Not less than annually any transit authority for the benefit of which a mass transportation program has been approved by the electorate of any public body, or by the electorate of its transit area in the event all public bodies comprising the membership of such transit authority have submitted such mass transportation program to the electorate of such transit area as provided by KRS 96A.310 to 96A.370 , shall file with such public body or public bodies an annual budget of current expenses and an annual report, together with such other periodic reports and data as such public bodies may reasonably require and prescribe. Such annual budget may be approved or disapproved by such public body or public bodies, or may be caused by such public body or public bodies to be revised, amended, or otherwise altered in the sound discretion of such public body or public bodies. Provided, however, that no disbursement of any funds within any mass transit trust fund shall be made until such annual budget shall in its final form be approved by the governing bodies of all such public bodies.

History. Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 169, § 6, effective March 27, 1974.

96A.370. Joint agreements and multimunicipal compacts — Commuter transportation agreements.

  1. In addition to all other powers and rights granted by KRS Chapter 96A, public bodies are expressly authorized and empowered to enter into joint agreements and multimunicipal compacts with transit authorities, and all other units of government, both federal and state, for the acquisition, maintenance and operation of mass transportation facilities. Any such agreements may provide for proportionate payments by such public bodies for transit purposes based upon any reasonable criteria, including, but not by way of limitation, population and actual mass transit services rendered, or percentage of funding.
  2. Any such joint agreement or multimunicipal compact may provide by its terms that notwithstanding the fact that a mass transportation program, together with the source of funding therefor, has been approved by the electorate or electorates of one (1) or more of such public bodies, any such public body may, in any annual period, in lieu of utilizing such source of funding as approved by the electorate of any such public body, use and apply for purposes of making payments or contributions under such joint agreement or multimunicipal compact any other funds of such public body legally available therefor. Provided, however, that any source of funding approved by the electorate in connection with the approval of such a mass transportation program shall not, as a result of such permissive funding by any such public body from other legally available sources, be rendered void or nugatory.
  3. Notwithstanding any provision to the contrary any transit authority created pursuant to this chapter may enter into agreements with the Commonwealth or agency thereof for the transportation of governmental employees to and from work stations located within or outside the authority’s transit area. For the purposes of this subsection the Commonwealth may provide demonstration funds to encourage commuter transportation for its employees. These funds shall be limited to one (1) year of operation of new routes and shall not be used to subsidize the individual governmental employee’s cost of transportation.

History. Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 169, § 7; 1976, ch. 350, § 5; 1980, ch. 282, § 1, effective July 15, 1980.

Opinions of Attorney General.

A city, under its general powers to provide for the public welfare, may appropriate funds to the public transit authority so long as the city and the residents thereof receive benefits in the public interest as a result of such appropriation. OAG 77-124 .

CHAPTER 97 Parks, Playgrounds, And Recreation

97.010. City and county recreation facilities.

  1. The acquisition, development, maintenance and operation of parks, playgrounds and recreation centers, which may include but is not limited to zoos and museums, is a proper municipal purpose for all cities and counties. The legislative body of any city or the fiscal court of any county may dedicate for use as parks, playgrounds and recreation centers any lands or buildings owned or leased by the city or county and not devoted to an inconsistent public use and may acquire real property for such purpose by purchases, lease, condemnation or otherwise, at any place reasonably accessible to the inhabitants of the city or county and either within or without the boundaries of the city or the county.
  2. Any two (2) or more cities, or any city and county, may jointly establish, maintain and conduct a park and recreation system. Any school district may join with any city or county in providing and conducting public parks, playgrounds and recreation centers.

History. 3909a-1, 3909a-4: amend. Acts 1958, ch. 124, § 1; 1978, ch. 382, § 1, effective June 17, 1978.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Construction.

A zoo qualifies for inclusion in this section’s authorization of “parks, playgrounds and recreation centers.” O'Bryan v. Louisville, 382 S.W.2d 386, 1964 Ky. LEXIS 341 ( Ky. 1964 ).

2. Use of School Funds.

While there is no explicit provision for the expenditure by the board of education of public school funds in such amount as may appear to it in the exercise of reasonable discretion necessary to further the purpose of maintenance of a joint recreation plan with the county, the power and authority granted by this section includes that which is necessarily implied as incident to the accomplishment of those things which are expressly authorized, and therefore board may appropriate funds for such project. Dodge v. Jefferson County Board of Education, 298 Ky. 1 , 181 S.W.2d 406, 1944 Ky. LEXIS 815 ( Ky. 1 944).

Purchase by a school district, acting alone, of land in another county for the establishment of a recreation center for the joint benefit of school children and 4-H club members was an arbitrary administration of public funds and, thus illegal. Wilson v. Graves County Board of Education, 307 Ky. 203 , 210 S.W.2d 350, 1948 Ky. LEXIS 704 ( Ky. 1948 ).

3. Lease of School Facilities.

Action of fiscal court which leased school buildings and lands for recreational purposes and agreed to pay annual rental was authorized by law and not violative of constitutional provisions. Sawyer v. Jefferson County Fiscal Court, 392 S.W.2d 83, 1965 Ky. LEXIS 275 ( Ky. 1965 ).

4. Condemnation.

Under this section cities of the sixth class have power to condemn property outside the city limits for both a water reservoir and for recreational use. Embry v. Caneyville, 397 S.W.2d 141, 1965 Ky. LEXIS 65 ( Ky. 1965 ).

5. Sovereign Immunity.

Operating a golf course is not an “integral” function of state government; thus, a statutorily created agency so functioning as a non-profit, no capital stock corporation, formed to provide recreational facilities for the county, operated without the shield of sovereign immunity. Kenton County Pub. Parks Corp. v. Modlin, 901 S.W.2d 876, 1995 Ky. App. LEXIS 70 (Ky. Ct. App. 1995).

Cited:

Kesselring v. Bonnycastle Club, Inc., 299 Ky. 585 , 186 S.W.2d 402, 1945 Ky. LEXIS 471 ( Ky. 1945 ); Hazard v. Salyers, 311 Ky. 667 , 224 S.W.2d 420, 1949 Ky. LEXIS 1149 ( Ky. 1949 ); Owensboro v. Department of Revenue, 314 Ky. 172 , 234 S.W.2d 664, 1950 Ky. LEXIS 1046 ( Ky. 1950 ); Board of Education v. Williams, 256 S.W.2d 29, 1953 Ky. LEXIS 714 ( Ky. 1953 ); Boone v. Cook, 365 S.W.2d 100, 1963 Ky. LEXIS 214 ( Ky. 1963 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Membership on the playground and recreation board would disqualify the person from serving on the electric plant board. OAG 61-846 .

Where the program is operated solely by the city and where there is no true joint planning or maintenance, a county may not contribute to a city park and recreation program. OAG 62-808 .

A fiscal court would not be authorized to make a contribution to the chamber of commerce for the purpose of promoting a folk festival in the county. OAG 64-252 .

Park and recreational facilities of a second-class city and the county may be merged. OAG 67-64 .

Neither the city nor the playground and recreational board could lease the city recreational park to a local civic club if the club would be vested with the control and operation of the park. OAG 68-36 .

A city is legally authorized to appropriate public funds to the recreational board to pay various employes in the operation and control of the recreation department. OAG 68-129 .

An appropriation voted by the city council to grant money to lease property in an adjacent city on which to develop and operate a playground would be valid. OAG 68-398 .

Where the county assigned a city a contract involving more than $1,000, the city could not enter into the contract without letting out new bids. OAG 68-479 .

Where the city and county leased property for a golf course and the county advertised for and conditionally accepted a bid for the construction of the golf course, acceptance by the city of the contract and the county’s interest in the lease would not convert the county’s conditional acceptance into a firm contract. OAG 68-479 .

A city of the fifth class had ample statutory authority to purchase property for use as a city hall building, for a playground, and to be used in a new street pattern. OAG 68-592 .

In view of Const., § 179, a city cannot legally appropriate funds to assist a women’s civic club to construct an amphitheater on land owned by the board of education, a separate public entity. The city could, however, build the amphitheater as a public project, or jointly establish a recreational system with the school district pursuant to this section which could include the amphitheater or, pursuant to the same statute, the city could lease land from the school board to establish a recreational center. OAG 70-514 .

A proposed community center to be constructed with funds partly supplied by the federal government, the county and the school board and to be operated when complete by the board of education and superintendent of schools as agent of the fiscal court does not meet the criterion of a multi-educational program, and, in view of the projects and activities to be conducted and the mix of school and nonschool purposes projected for the proposed community center, goes far beyond the limitations established by the case law and this section and the school board cannot spend money for such purposes. OAG 71-184 .

While a school board may furnish property and cooperate in many ways to provide recreational facilities and programs as an official function of the governmental unit and, while a school board has authority to sell school property for its fair market value, it would be a violation of Const., § 3 for a school board to sell school property to any person or organization for a nominal sum simply because the purchaser proposed to use the property for laudable public purposes and although KRS 45.360 does not apply to school boards, such a board and its members would be well advised to follow the procedure prescribed therein for their own protection. OAG 72-30 .

A school board may not make a contribution to a park commission which is seeking to accumulate a fund in order to secure matching federal funds for development of a community recreation park as the school board would have no ownership or control over the property, this would not be the kind of cooperative enterprise envisioned in subsection (2) of this section and such action is unconstitutional under §§ 180 and 186 of the Kentucky constitution. OAG 72-95 .

The joint use of school-owned property as a mini-park by both school pupils and city residents is permissible as long as title to property stays in the school board. OAG 72-376 .

Where the board of education desires to lease to the city council six-tenths (6/10) of an acre of school property for the construction of tennis courts for a minimum of ten (10) years so that a federal grant may be secured but the state department of education has refused to grant approval for a lease of more than one (1) year, a board of education may lease surplus property for any duration if it receives a fair rental for said property and it may do so even if the state board of education disapproves as there is no statutory authority which requires that the state board of education give its approval to the sale or leasing of property by a school board. OAG 73-177 .

The expenditure of city funds for the purpose of using and maintaining land as a sports field for boys and girls under 18 years as a recreational park would be legal because the restrictions as to the use is not inconsistent with the phrase “inhabitants of the city” appearing in this section and KRS 97.060 (repealed) and the intent is to merely restrict city parks in general to city residents. OAG 73-401 .

There is no authority for the levy of a recreation tax by a county recreation commission or by the city or county on behalf of the commission or for placing such a question on any ballot to be voted upon by the voters of the city and county. OAG 74-695 .

When this section, KRS 97.030 , 97.035 and 97.060 are read together, it appears that the parks board, formed by a joint city-county agreement, is vested with a certain autonomy in the control and management of parks, subject to any specific delimitation by the city and county governments acting jointly, which would include the setting of the director’s salary. OAG 75-46 .

A city may lease land from a school board over a long term, and may install recreational facilities thereon, when those facilities will be beneficial to the school district. OAG 78-472 .

A county fiscal court has the authority, pursuant to Const., § 157, to place the question of a special ad valorem tax levy for park construction and maintenance on the November general election ballot, if a contractual indebtedness in connection with the park is envisioned and such contractual indebtedness cannot be funded out of current county revenues; the requisite vote for passage is two thirds of the voters voting at such election. OAG 80-381 .

There is no statutory authority for a fiscal court to contribute to a city park program. OAG 85-99 .

An expenditure of common school funds or a donation of school property for a public purpose other than for the benefit of public education is not permissible under Const., §§ 180, 184 and 186; therefore, under Const., §§ 180, 184, and 186, any transfer of surplus school buildings to community service organizations must be based on the fair market value of the property. OAG 91-85 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Acquisition and development of public projects by governmental units and agencies through revenue bonds, KRS ch. 58.

Housing projects, cities may cooperate in furnishing park facilities for, KRS 80.290 .

Interlocal cooperation act, KRS 65.210 to 65.300 .

Issuance of bonds and control of funds, KRS ch. 66.

State and national parks, KRS ch. 148.

State planning board, functions with respect to parks, KRS 147.070 , 147.100 .

Kentucky Law Journal.

Lewis, Kostas, and Carnes. Consolidation — Complete or Functional — of City and County Governments in Kentucky, 42 Ky. L.J. 295 (1954).

ALR

Uses to which park property may be devoted. 18 A.L.R. 1246; 63 A.L.R. 484; 144 A.L.R. 486.

Conveyance or lease of park property, municipal power as to. 18 A.L.R. 1259; 63 A.L.R. 489; 144 A.L.R. 498.

“Public utility,” park as, within constitutional or statutory provision relating to purchase, construction, or repair of public utility by municipal corporation. 9 A.L.R. 1034; 35 A.L.R. 592.

Abutting owner’s right to complain of misuse of public park or violation of rights or easements appurtenant thereto. 60 A.L.R. 770.

Diversion of park property to other uses as taking or damaging neighboring property without compensation. 83 A.L.R. 1435.

Statutes relating to establishment or administration of parks as encroachment on right of local self-government. 88 A.L.R. 228.

Nursery, quarry and gravel pit, implied power of municipality to operate, for production of materials for use in connection with parks, playgrounds and other recreational purposes. 104 A.L.R. 1342.

Use of parks for religious purposes. 133 A.L.R. 1402.

Liability for injury as affected by interference by outside agency with object, other than automobile, abandoned or temporarily left in public street or park. 158 A.L.R. 880.

Liability of municipality for drowning of child on its premises. 8 A.L.R.2d 1254.

Liability of municipality owning public ball park for injuries by ball to person on nearby premises. 16 A.L.R.2d 1458.

Weeds and the like, tort liability of municipality or other governmental unit in connection with destruction of. 34 A.L.R.2d 1210.

Liability of municipality for injury to or death of child caused by burning from hot ashes, cinders, or other waste material in park. 42 A.L.R.2d 930, 947.

Maintenance of auditorium, community recreational center building, or the like by municipal corporation as governmental or proprietary function for purposes of tort liability. 47 A.L.R.2d 544.

Liability of municipality for injury or death of child caused by cut or puncture from broken glass or other sharp object. 47 A.L.R.2d 1053.

Judicial notice of matters relating to public thoroughfares and parks. 48 A.L.R.2d 1102.

Municipal operation of bathing beach or swimming pool as governmental or proprietary function, for purposes of tort liability. 55 A.L.R.2d 1434.

Power of municipal corporation to exchange its real property used for a park or public square. 60 A.L.R.2d 289.

Slide or chute, municipal liability for injury from. 69 A.L.R.2d 1067.

Sale of merchandise in public squares, municipal authorization, prohibition, or regulation of. 14 A.L.R.3d 896.

Validity and construction of statute or ordinance requiring land developer to dedicate portion of land for recreational purposes, or make payment in lieu thereof. 43 A.L.R.3d 862.

Liability of business establishments, places of accommodation or recreation, and the like, for injury or damage occurring on the premises caused by the accidental starting up of parked motor vehicle. 43 A.L.R.3d 952.

Power of municipality to charge nonresidents higher fees than residents for use of municipal facilities. 57 A.L.R.3d 998.

Construction of highway through park as violation of use to which park property may be devoted. 60 A.L.R.3d 581.

97.020. Establishment of local recreational facilities.

The legislative body of any city or the fiscal court of any county may establish a park, playground and recreation system and may vest the power to provide, maintain and conduct parks, playgrounds and recreation centers in a park board, board of education, playground and recreation board or other existing board. Any board so designated may maintain and equip parks, playgrounds and recreation centers and the buildings thereon, and may employ trained and qualified park superintendents, playground directors, supervisors, recreation superintendents or other officers and employees as it deems proper.

History. 3309a-2: amend. Acts 1958, ch. 124, § 2.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

Boone v. Cook, 365 S.W.2d 100, 1963 Ky. LEXIS 214 ( Ky. 1963 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Where property is conveyed to a city in trust for the use and benefit of the citizens as a recreation center, statutory provisions relating to the appointment of a recreation board control over provisions of the dedicatory deed which prescribe conditions as to the recreation board, since the operation and maintenance of recreation property by a municipality is a governmental function and boards to implement this function are established in the statutes. OAG 76-181 .

An appointed member of the park and recreation system board may not sell equipment to the park board from his private business, with or without competitive bids, since it is assumed that he intends to make a profit and this violates public policy. OAG 81-107 .

97.030. Creation of board to administer recreation facilities.

If the legislative body of any city or fiscal court of any county determines that the power to provide, conduct and maintain parks, playgrounds and recreation centers shall be exercised by a playground and recreation board, or a parks, playground and recreation board, the legislative body of the city or fiscal court may, by resolution or ordinance, establish a playground and recreation board, or a parks, playground and recreation board, which shall possess all the powers and be subject to all the responsibilities of KRS 97.010 to 97.050 . The board shall consist of five (5) persons to be appointed by the mayor or county judge/executive, to serve for terms of four (4) years and until their successors are appointed, except that the members first appointed shall be one (1) for one (1) year, one (1) for two (2) years, one (1) for three (3) years and two (2) for four (4) years. Vacancies shall be filled in the same manner as original appointments and for the unexpired term.

History. 3909a-3: amend. Acts 1958, ch. 124, § 3.

Opinions of Attorney General.

Membership on the playground and recreation board would disqualify the person from serving on the electric plant board. OAG 61-846 .

Membership on the board is, in effect, a public office. OAG 61-846 .

A city is legally authorized to appropriate public funds to the recreational board to pay various employes in the operation and control of the recreation department. OAG 68-129 .

Membership on the park board constitutes a municipal office so that employees of the board would be considered city employees and, as city employees would be compensated from the city payroll and entitled to coverage under the city’s workmen’s compensation plan as well as its group insurance plan. OAG 73-716 .

The mayor is authorized to appoint members to a playground and recreation board who are not residents of the city since this section has no residential qualifications. OAG 73-810 .

This section is not in conflict with KRS 97.550 which prescribes a two year term for board members, and a city of the fourth class has the option of proceeding under either section. OAG 74-481 .

When this section, KRS 97.010 , 97.035 and 97.060 (repealed) are read together, the parks board, formed by a joint city-county agreement, is vested with an autonomy in the control and management of the parks, subject to any specific delimitation by the city and county governments acting jointly, which would include the setting of the director’s salary. OAG 75-46 .

Where property is conveyed to a city in trust for the use and benefit of the citizens as a recreation center, statutory provisions relating to the appointment of a recreation board control over provisions of the dedicatory deed which prescribe conditions as to the recreation board, since for the operation and maintenance of recreation property by a municipality is a governmental function and boards to implement this function are established in the statutes. OAG 76-181 .

Since a member of a board created to administer a city’s recreational facilities is a municipal officer, a city councilman could not be appointed to serve on that board. OAG 77-539 .

An appointed member of the park and recreation system board may not sell equipment to the park board from his private business, with or without competitive bids, since it is assumed that he intends to make a profit and this violates public policy. OAG 81-107 .

Fiscal court’s motion limiting to two (2) the number of consecutive terms that members of the airport board, library board, water commission, district board of health, planning commission and parks and recreation board might serve was illegal, since there is no statutory authority for such action. While KRS 173.340 and 212.855 impose a limit on consecutive terms, as relate to a library board and a district board of health, the General Assembly has established no policy limiting the number of consecutive terms for members of the other boards and commissions, and there is no statutory authority for the fiscal court’s enacting such a policy as relates to the four bodies not covered by statute. OAG 85-116 .

Research References and Practice Aids

ALR

59 Am Jur. 2d, Parks, Squares, and Playgrounds, § 14.

97.035. Establishment of joint system of recreational facilities — Joint board — Effect of compact — Effect on joint department upon establishment of consolidated local government.

  1. If two (2) or more political subdivisions determine to jointly establish, maintain, and conduct a park and recreation system or systems, which may include but shall not be limited to the establishment, maintenance, and conduct of zoos and museums, the legislative bodies of such counties, cities, or other districts involved may by ordinance, order, or resolution approve a plan for the establishment of such joint project and for the creation of a joint board representative of the subdivisions involved, and possessed with all the powers and duties of KRS 97.010 to 97.050 . This subsection authorizes the creation of a joint board by any two (2) or more cities or any city and county for purposes of establishment, maintenance, and conduct of zoos and the creation of another joint board for purposes of establishment, maintenance, and conduct of museums.
  2. Except in a county containing a consolidated local government, such board shall consist of not less than five (5) members. The plan shall provide for distribution of membership and all participating governmental units shall have representation thereon. The members of the board shall be appointed by the county judge/executive, mayor of the city, or governing body of the district, as the case may be, for terms of four (4) years to serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority. Vacancies shall be filled for unexpired terms by appointment of the authority appointing the member whose office is vacant. The terms of office of such members shall be staggered as provided by order or resolution of the political subdivisions concerned. Members of the board shall serve without compensation but shall be reimbursed for necessary expenses incurred in the performance of their duties.
  3. The board shall be a body corporate for all purposes, and shall elect from its membership a chairman, secretary, and treasurer. The treasurer shall execute a bond conditioned on the faithful performance of his or her duties sufficient in amount to cover funds coming into his or her hands. The premium on such bond shall be paid from board funds.
  4. Any park, playground, or recreation system operated jointly by two (2) or more political subdivisions as provided in KRS 97.010 (2), on June 19, 1958, shall be governed by this section.
  5. Notwithstanding subsections (1), (2), and (3) of this section, when a city of the first class and a county containing such city have in effect a compact under KRS 79.310 to 79.330 , such city and county shall by joint action create a joint city/county department to maintain and conduct a park and recreational system or systems. In such event, the board shall be dissolved as a corporate entity and all assets and liabilities of the board shall be transferred to the joint department. An advisory board may be established by joint agreement of such city and county. Upon the establishment of a consolidated local government in a county where a city of the first class and a county containing such city have had in effect a cooperative compact pursuant to KRS 79.310 to 79.330 , the joint department shall become a department of the consolidated local government and all assets and liabilities of the joint department shall be transferred to the consolidated local government. An advisory board may be established or maintained by a consolidated local government. Members of the advisory board shall be appointed pursuant to the provisions of KRS 67C.139 and shall serve at the pleasure of the mayor of the consolidated local government.

History. Enact. Acts 1958, ch. 124, § 4; 1976 (1st Ex. Sess.), ch. 20, § 6, effective January 2, 1978; 1978, ch. 382, § 2, effective June 17, 1978; 1986, ch. 77, § 18, effective July 15, 1986; 2002, ch. 346, § 119, effective July 15, 2002.

Compiler’s Notes.

KRS 78.310 to 78.390 , included within the reference to KRS 78.310 to 79.330 in subsection (5) of this section, have been repealed.

Opinions of Attorney General.

Where the program is operated solely by the city and where there is no true joint planning or maintenance, a county may not contribute to a city park and recreation program. OAG 62-808 .

Where the county assigned a city a contract involving more than $1,000, the city could not enter into the contract without letting out new bids. OAG 68-479 .

Where the city and county leased property for a golf course and the county advertised for and conditionally accepted a bid for the construction of the golf course, acceptance by the city of the contract and the county’s interest in the lease would not convert the county’s conditional acceptance into a firm contract. OAG 68-479 .

Where there is no true joint planning or maintenance of a recreational system, a county may not contribute to a city park and recreation program. OAG 70-452 .

Membership on a joint recreational commission established pursuant to this section would constitute neither a city nor county office but would be a hybrid office not contemplated by either Const., § 165 or KRS 61.080 . OAG 70-731 .

There would be no constitutional or statutory provision that would prohibit one from serving as city attorney and at the same time serving on a joint recreational commission. OAG 70-731 .

Where a joint recreation board proposes to lease an area from the United States Forest Service for the purpose of developing public recreation facilities, the subject “permit area” under the proposed grant of permit or lease would constitute a “park, playground, and recreation system” under the purview of this section. OAG 72-132 .

A public corporation organized under this section could enter into a contractual arrangement with a private corporation which would require both corporations to sign a 30-year lease with the national forest service as joint lessees and to be mutually responsible for observing the obligations imposed by the lease, where the joint venture with the private corporation was necessary to finance a resort and recreation complex, and where the exclusive control and operative management would be vested in the public corporation. OAG 73-319 .

When this section, KRS 97.010 , 97.030 and 97.060 (repealed) are read together, the parks board, formed by a joint city-county agreement, is vested with an autonomy in the control and management of parks, subject to any specific delimitation by the city and county governments acting jointly, which would include the setting of the director’s salary. OAG 75-46 .

Since the wording of this section indicates a purposeful and deliberate delegation of power within the specific frame of a joint system of recreational facilities, ordinances adopting a basic plan for the establishment of such a joint project would be constitutionally valid. OAG 77-741 .

Since the provisions of subsection (2) of this section and KRS 67.710 (8) regarding removal of members of the park board are irreconcilable such that effect cannot reasonably be given to both, KRS 67.710 (8) amends by implication the provisions of this section. OAG 78-353 .

Were it not for this section, the establishment of a park system would be by ordinance, since it is a subject matter lasting in nature and general in character as a function in general government for the general public benefit, but the options as to legal format in this section (ordinance, order or resolution) govern, since the statute deals with a specific subject, i.e., creation of a park system. OAG 78-783 .

Since the word “shall” means “mandatory” (KRS 446.010 (29)), the treasurer of a joint city-county park board created pursuant to this section is required to execute a bond sufficient in amount to cover the funds coming into his hands. OAG 78-794 .

Morganfield and Union counties may both budget and disburse their money for expenditure by the joint park and recreation board under the board’s statutory authority. OAG 79-19 .

The members of the park and recreation board and employees are held responsible, personally, for their own individual negligence and misfeasance, and any insurance designed to cover those areas of personal liability would have to be procured by such individual board members and employes. OAG 79-19 .

The park board is an autonomous political subdivision subject to the same immunity as the State and county. OAG 79-19 .

A joint park board established under this section is immune from tort liability, since the board is characterized as a political subdivision and an agency of the state. OAG 79-363 .

If a joint park board has an area of liability in tort, then it has the power to procure any necessary liability insurance, which power has to be reasonably implied as necessary to carry out its express powers. OAG 79-363 .

There is no constitutional or statutory provision that would prohibit a member of a joint park board from also serving as the director of golf to oversee golf course operations at the various Kentucky state parks. OAG 80-199 .

A county fiscal court does not have the authority under KRS 67.080 and 67.083 to appropriate funds to youth sport programs by funding through a joint recreation board; although the fiscal court may under KRS 67.083 (3)(f), appropriate money, properly budgeted for such purposes, directly to the youth sports organization concerned, a recreation board has no statutory authority to act as an arm of fiscal court to handle county appropriations which are to finally go to various youth sports program organizations. OAG 80-303 .

The fiscal court of a county that owns a county farm does not have the authority under KRS 67.080 and 67.083 to lease a part of the county farm to a joint recreation board for use by the fair board as a county fairground; however, under KRS 67.083 (3)(f) and (q) of the fiscal court may lease the property to the county fair board for county fair purposes. OAG 80-303 .

A director of county parks and recreation board, which is a joint city-county board created by this section, can be elected also to the city council, since the joint board is a hybrid whose members are neither city nor county officers and, thus, there would be no violation of KRS 61.080 or Const., § 165, which prohibit a person from holding two municipal offices or a municipal and a county office at the same time. OAG 81-240 .

As a political subdivision, a city-county parks and recreation board created pursuant to this section would be subject to the requirements of KRS 424.220 relative to the publication of an annual financial statement. OAG 83-327 .

The definition of a district in KRS 65.060 does not extend to a city-county parks and recreation board created pursuant to this section. OAG 83-327 .

97.040. Gifts for recreation facilities.

Any authority in which is vested the power to provide, conduct and maintain parks, playgrounds, and recreation centers under KRS 97.030 or 97.035 , may accept any grant or devise of real estate or any bequest or gift of money or any donation, the principal or income of which is to be used for park, playground, or recreation purposes. Money received for such purposes shall, unless otherwise provided by the terms of the bequest, be deposited with the treasurer or department of finance of the city or with the county treasurer or treasurer of the joint board to the account of the authority having charge of such parks, playgrounds, and recreation centers and may be withdrawn and paid out in the same manner as money appropriated for recreational purposes.

History. 3909a-5: amend. Acts 1958, ch. 124, § 5.

Opinions of Attorney General.

Expenditure of city funds to use and maintain land as a sports field for children under 18 would be legal because the restrictions as to use are not inconsistent with the phrase “inhabitants of the city” in KRS 97.010 and 97.060 (repealed) and the intent is merely to restrict city parks to city residents. OAG 73-401 .

The city must usually conform to the dedicated purpose in a deed of gift or trust, unless a law or public policy dictates otherwise. OAG 73-401 .

The joint park board has no statutory authority to dispose of park property. OAG 82-427 .

97.050. Appropriations for recreation facilities.

Whenever the legislative body of any city or the fiscal court of any county or one (1) of them in conjunction with a school district establishes a supervised park, playground and recreation system as provided in KRS 97.010 to KRS 97.040 , or jointly, as provided in KRS 97.035 , the legislative body or the fiscal court or other authority participating may appropriate money out of the general fund of the city or county or other authority for the purpose of expanding, equipping, maintaining and operating such park, playground or recreation center.

History. 3909a-6: amend. Acts 1958, ch. 124.

Opinions of Attorney General.

Where the program is operated solely by the city and where there is no true joint planning or maintenance, a county may not contribute to a city park and recreation program. OAG 62-808 .

A city is legally authorized to appropriate public funds to the recreational board to pay various employees in the operation and control of the recreation department. OAG 68-129 .

Where a fiscal court has not yet established a recreation center or parks area under KRS chapter 97 it is not authorized to spend county money for the purpose of acquiring or maintaining such park lands. OAG 72-481 .

A fiscal court can authorize an appropriation of county funds for the construction of a park roadway located entirely within the city if the project was approved by the joint board which regulates the joint city-county park and recreation system. OAG 76-164 .

A parks and recreation department has no authority to authorize the placement of a special tax levy on the ballot since its only duties are to advise and consult with the county judge and fiscal court on matters concerning the parks. OAG 76-167 .

Special tax levies may not be used to fund park facilities or the maintenance of a park. OAG 76-167 .

This section involves expenditures for equipping, maintaining and operating a park, playground or recreation center, but neither it nor KRS 67.083 authorizes an expenditure for school band trips. OAG 79-129 .

A county fiscal court does not have the authority under KRS 67.080 and 67.083 to appropriate funds to youth sport programs by funding through a joint recreation board created under KRS 97.035 ; although the fiscal court may under KRS 67.083 (3)(f), appropriate money, properly budgeted for such purposes, directly to the youth sports organization concerned, a recreation board has no statutory authority to act as an arm of fiscal court to handle county appropriations which are to finally go to various youth sports program organizations. OAG 80-303 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

See note to KRS 97.010 under heading 3. Lease of School Facilities, Sawyer v. Jefferson County Fiscal Court, 392 S.W.2d 83, 1965 Ky. LEXIS 275 (Ky. App. 1965).

97.055. Revenue bonds for recreation facilities.

For the purpose of establishing or acquiring parks, playgrounds and recreation centers, and appurtenances thereto, a playground and recreation board or a board, as provided in KRS 97.030 or 97.035 , shall have the same authority to issue revenue bonds granted to cities by KRS 97.150 to 97.240 and all of the provisions of said section shall be applicable in the case of issuance of revenue bonds by such boards.

History. Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 170; 1958, ch. 124, § 7.

Opinions of Attorney General.

Where the county assigned a city a contract involving more than $1,000, the city could not enter into the contract without letting out new bids. OAG 68-479 .

Special tax levies may not be used to fund park facilities or the maintenance of a park. OAG 76-167 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Governmental unit may issue revenue bonds for any public project, KRS 58.010 to 58.120 .

97.060. Cities of all classes may acquire land for parks — Ordinance — Creation of commission. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2741p-5, 2741p-6, 2741p-101) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

97.070. Appointment of commission — Members — Terms — Employes. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2741p-9) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

97.080. Cities may appropriate money and accept grants for park purposes. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2741p-7; amend. Acts 1954, ch. 167, § 1, effective June 17, 1954) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

97.090. Charges for use of park facilities.

The city may, by ordinance, prescribe admission, fees, rentals, concessions and other charges for the use of any such area or its facilities, or may delegate such power to the commission.

History. 2741p-8.

Opinions of Attorney General.

A park commission does not have the authority, under this section, to impose a fee on a vendor licensed by the city to sell on the public streets for the privilege of selling on the streets within the city park it controls, since a park commission’s authority over concessions in the park does not extend to control over licensed vendors on the city streets. OAG 81-190 .

Research References and Practice Aids

ALR

Grant of licenses or special privileges in parks. 18 A.L.R. 1263; 63 A.L.R. 490; 144 A.L.R. 501.

Power of municipality to charge nonresidents higher fees than residents for use of municipal facilities. 57 A.L.R.3d 998.

97.095. Method for creating or joining regional park authority — Powers — Tax levy — Governing board — Compliance with KRS 65A.010 to 65A.090.

  1. For the purpose of acquiring, building, operating, and maintaining parks and green space, two (2) or more counties may form a regional park authority.
    1. The regional park authority may be established by a vote of the fiscal courts of the participating counties or by a vote of the majority of the voters in each participating county voting in an election. The issue shall be placed upon the ballot if supported by a petition signed by a number of people from the participating counties equal to one percent (1%) of the voters in the last regular election. (2) (a) The regional park authority may be established by a vote of the fiscal courts of the participating counties or by a vote of the majority of the voters in each participating county voting in an election. The issue shall be placed upon the ballot if supported by a petition signed by a number of people from the participating counties equal to one percent (1%) of the voters in the last regular election.
    2. A county may join an existing regional park authority by a vote of the fiscal court of each participating county and of the fiscal court of the joining county, or by a vote of the majority of voters from each participating county and the joining county voting in an election. The issue shall be placed upon the ballot if supported by a petition signed by a number of people from the participating and joining counties equal to one per cent (1%) of the voters from each participating county and one percent (1%) of the voters from the joining county, voting in the last regular election.
  2. A regional park authority is authorized to:
    1. Levy taxes and issue bonds;
    2. Accept donations, land, and equipment;
    3. Reject unusable or unmanageable land donations;
    4. Hire employees and contract for services; and
    5. Enter into agreements with public and private entities under the provisions of the Interlocal Cooperation Act, KRS 65.210 to 65.300 , and contracts authorizing the use of private facilities for public recreation.
  3. A regional park authority may levy taxes not exceeding five cents ($0.05) on each one hundred dollars ($100) of all taxable property within the regional park authority’s boundaries. The tax shall not be levied until a public referendum has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of KRS 83A.120 and has been adopted by the majority of the voters voting in an election in each county involved.
  4. A regional park authority shall be governed by a board made up of three (3) citizens from each participating county. Board members shall be appointed by the fiscal court from a list of candidates provided by the cities within the county and by the county planning commission if there is one in that county.
  5. A regional park authority shall comply with the provisions of KRS 65A.010 to 65A.090 .

History. Enact. Acts 1998, ch. 597, § 4, effective July 15, 1998; 2013, ch. 40, § 45, effective March 21, 2013.

97.100. Cities of all classes may acquire and operate recreational projects — Definition.

  1. In addition to any other method authorized by statute, a city of any class may, under the provisions of KRS 97.100 to 97.240 , establish, acquire, maintain and operate municipal recreational projects and all necessary club houses, bathhouses, locker rooms, shower rooms and necessary appurtenances, within or without the corporate limits of the city, for the purpose of supplying the city with suitable and safe recreational facilities.
  2. “Project,” as used in KRS 97.100 to 97.240 , means golf courses, tennis courts, bridle paths, swimming pools, bathing pools and other similar projects made available to the public for recreational purposes, but does not mean any recreational facility conducted in connection with the maintenance of public parks established by a city under the general law.

History. 2741p-11, 2741p-12, 2741p-25.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

Owensboro v. Department of Revenue, 314 Ky. 172 , 234 S.W.2d 664, 1950 Ky. LEXIS 1046 ( Ky. 1950 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Park and recreational facilities of a second-class city and the county may be merged. OAG 67-64 .

Research References and Practice Aids

ALR

Liability of business establishments, places of accommodation or recreation, and the like, for injury or damage occurring on the premises caused by the accidental starting up of parked motor vehicle. 43 A.L.R.3d 952.

Public swimming pool as a nuisance. 49 A.L.R.3d 652.

Liability of swimming facility operator for injury or death inflicted by third person. 90 A.L.R.3d 533.

97.110. City recreational commission to be established — General powers.

Any city establishing or acquiring and desiring to maintain and operate a recreational project or projects under the provisions of KRS 97.100 to 97.240 shall by ordinance provide for the appointment of a city recreational commission to operate and control the project or projects. The commission shall be a corporation with perpetual succession, and may contract and be contracted with, sue and be sued, have and use a corporate seal and alter and renew it at pleasure.

History. 2741p-13.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

Owensboro v. Department of Revenue, 314 Ky. 172 , 234 S.W.2d 664, 1950 Ky. LEXIS 1046 ( Ky. 1950 ).

97.120. Appointment of recreational commission — Members — Terms — Removal — Vacancies — Rules and regulations — Revenues — Fees — Compliance with KRS 65A.010 to 65A.090.

  1. In cities of the first class and in cities with populations equal to or greater than twenty thousand (20,000) based upon the most recent federal decennial census, the city recreational committee shall consist of not less than three (3) nor more than seven (7) members, the exact number to be at the discretion of the city legislative body. In cities with populations of less than twenty thousand (20,000) based upon the most recent federal decennial census, the city recreational committee shall consist of three (3) members.
    1. In cities of any class the city recreational committee shall be appointed by the mayor, with the approval of a majority of the members of the legislative body of the city, for terms of four (4) years, except that the members first appointed shall be so appointed that the terms of the members will expire in different years.
    2. The members shall serve without compensation.
    3. The members shall be legal voters of the city.
    4. If any member during the term of his or her office becomes a candidate for, or is elected or appointed to any public office, he or she shall automatically vacate his membership on the commission and another person shall be appointed in his or her place; but this provision shall not prevent a member of the commission from serving as a member of any other appointive commission of the city, county, state or federal government.
  2. Any member of the commission may be removed by the vote of three-fourths (3/4) of the elected members of the city legislative body. Vacancies shall be filled in the same manner as in the original appointment. The city may require each commissioner to execute a bond in the penal sum of one thousand dollars ($1,000). If the commissioners are required to execute bonds, the bonds shall be approved by the legislative body of the city, and the cost thereof may either be paid by the city or by the commission out of its revenue.
  3. The commission shall provide rules and regulations for the management of the recreational project or projects, and out of the revenue derived from the project or projects it shall pay all operating expenses, provide for necessary repairs and additions, provide a sufficient reserve fund to insure the buildings and improvements against fire and tornado, provide a fund for payment of any incidental or emergency expenses that may arise, and set up a fund to provide for the payment of any debts created in connection with the establishment and maintenance of the project or projects.
  4. The commission may levy and collect fees for the use of or admission to the project or projects and expend or invest the income from the fees for the purposes set forth in this section.
  5. The commission shall comply with the provisions of KRS 65A.010 to 65A.090 .

History. 2741p-14: amend. Acts 1948, ch. 86; 2013, ch. 40, § 46, effective March 21, 2013; 2014, ch. 92, § 176, effective January 1, 2015.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

Owensboro v. Department of Revenue, 314 Ky. 172 , 234 S.W.2d 664, 1950 Ky. LEXIS 1046 ( Ky. 1950 ).

97.130. Property and admission fees to be tax-exempt.

All property which a city acquires for the establishment and maintenance of a recreational project under KRS 97.100 to 97.240 shall be exempt from taxation to the same extent as other public property used for public purposes. All fees charged or collected for the admission to or the use of such a project shall be exempt from taxation.

History. 2741p-15.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Public Entertainment Fees.

Fees charged for admission to municipal field house for public entertainment are not exempt from state admission tax but fees for amateur basketball games in which one participant represents a state institution are exempt. Owensboro v. Department of Revenue, 314 Ky. 172 , 234 S.W.2d 664, 1950 Ky. LEXIS 1046 ( Ky. 1950 ).

Research References and Practice Aids

ALR

Taxation for public parks as within constitutional provisions prohibiting legislature from imposing taxes for city, county or corporate purposes or providing that legislature may invest power to levy such taxes in local authorities. 46 A.L.R. 707; 106 A.L.R. 917.

Property used by personnel as living quarters or for recreation purposes as within contemplation of tax exemptions extended to property of religious, educational, charitable or hospital organizations. 15 A.L.R.2d 1064; 55 A.L.R.3d 356, 485.

Exemption from taxation of municipally owned or operated stadium, auditorium and similar property. 16 A.L.R.2d 1376.

97.140. Property which cities may acquire — Methods of acquisition — Title in city.

Any city that establishes a recreational project may purchase solely from the funds provided under the authority of KRS 97.100 to 97.240 , or may acquire by gift, devise, bequest or grant, lands, structures, rights of way, franchises, easements or other interests in land necessary for the establishment and maintenance of the project, upon such terms, prices and considerations as the city considers reasonable. Title to all property acquired for such purposes shall be taken in the name of the city.

History. 2741p-16.

97.150. Issuance of bonds to finance project.

For the purpose of defraying the cost of establishing, erecting, and acquiring any recreational project and necessary appurtenances, any city may borrow money and issue bonds. The bonds may be issued bearing interest at a rate or rates or method of determining rates, payable at least annually, and shall be executed in a manner and be payable at times, not exceeding thirty (30) years from the date of issuance, and at a place as the legislative body determines.

History. 2741p-17: amend. Acts 1968, ch. 110, § 13; 1996, ch. 274, § 25, effective July 15, 1996.

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

City may issue revenue bonds for any public project, KRS 58.010 to 58.120 .

97.160. Bonds to be negotiable and tax-exempt — Sale — Cities not to be obligated.

The bonds issued pursuant to KRS 97.150 shall be negotiable and shall not be subject to taxation. If the officers whose signatures or countersignatures appear on the bonds or coupons cease to be officers before delivery of the bonds, the signatures or countersignatures shall nevertheless be valid. The bonds shall be sold in a manner and upon the terms as the legislative body of the city deems for the best interests of the city, or any contract for the acquisition of a project may provide that payment shall be made in bonds. The bonds shall be payable solely from the revenue funds derived from the operation of the project, and the bonds and other obligations incurred for the establishment and maintenance of a recreational project shall not constitute an indebtedness of the city within the meaning of the Constitution. It shall be plainly stated on the face of each bond that it has been issued under the provisions of KRS 97.100 to 97.240 and does not constitute an indebtedness of the city within the meaning of the Constitution.

History. Enact. Acts 1968, ch. 110, § 14; 1996, ch. 274, § 26, effective July 15, 1996.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

Pulaski County v. Ben Hur Life Ass’n, 286 Ky. 119 , 149 S.W.2d 738, 1941 Ky. LEXIS 210 ( Ky. 1941 ).

97.170. Use of money received from sale of bonds.

All money received from any bonds issued pursuant to KRS 97.150 shall be applied solely to the establishment, erection and acquisition of the recreational project and necessary appurtenances, except that the money may be used to advance the payment of interest on bonds during the first three (3) years following the date of the bonds and to advance the expenses of operation and maintenance for one (1) month after the opening of the project.

History. 2741p-19.

97.180. Bondholders’ lien — Action to enforce.

There shall be a statutory mortgage lien upon the recreational project and necessary appurtenances acquired through the issuance of bonds, in favor of the holders of the bonds and the holders of the coupons. The project and appurtenances shall remain subject to the lien until the payment in full of the principal and interest of the bonds. Any holder of the bonds or coupons may, by action at law or in equity, protect and enforce the lien and compel performance of all duties required by KRS 97.100 to 97.240 , including the making and collecting of sufficient fees and the segregation and application of the revenue.

History. 2741p-19.

Research References and Practice Aids

ALR

Mortgage or pledge of property or income thereof, power as to. 71 A.L.R. 828.

97.190. Receiver in case of default.

If there is a default in the payment of the principal or interest of any of the bonds, any court having jurisdiction may appoint a receiver to administer the project on behalf of the city, with power to charge and collect rates for the services rendered and for the use of or admission to the project sufficient to provide for the payment of any bonds or obligations outstanding and for payment of the operating expenses. The receiver shall apply the revenue in conformity with KRS 97.100 to 97.240 .

History. 2741p-20.

97.200. Funds for payment of bonds, maintenance and depreciation.

At or before the issuance of bonds the legislative body of the city shall, by ordinance, set aside and pledge the revenue of the project into a special fund to be used and applied in payment of the cost of the project and its maintenance, operation and depreciation. The ordinance shall definitely fix the amount of revenue necessary to be set aside and applied to the payment of the principal and interest of the bonds, and the portion of the balance of the revenue to be set aside as a proper and adequate depreciation account, and the remaining portion of the balance shall be set aside for the reasonable and proper operation and maintenance of the project. The fees to be charged for the use of or admission to the project shall be fixed and revised from time to time so as to be sufficient to provide for the payment of interest upon all bonds and to create a sinking fund to pay the principal when it becomes due, and to provide for operation and maintenance and an adequate depreciation account. If any surplus is accumulated in the operating and maintenance fund equal to the cost of maintaining and operating the project during the remainder of the calendar or fiscal year, the commission may at any time transfer the excess to the depreciation account to be used for any improvements or additions to the project.

History. 2741p-21.

97.210. Depreciation account — Disposition of.

The funds accumulating to the depreciation account shall be expended in balancing depreciation or in making new constructions or additions to the project. Any such accumulations may be invested as the commission designates, and the income from the investments shall be carried into the depreciation account.

History. 2741p-22.

97.220. Refunding and additional bonds.

  1. The city may issue new bonds for the purpose of providing funds for the payment of any outstanding bonds, subject to the procedure described in KRS 97.100 to 97.240 . The new bonds shall be secured to the same extent and shall have the same source of payment as the bonds that are refunded.
  2. If the legislative body of the city finds that the original bonds authorized will be insufficient to accomplish the purpose desired, additional bonds may be authorized and issued subject to the procedure described in KRS 97.100 to 97.240 .

History. 2741p-23.

97.230. Bonds for additions and improvements.

Any city acquiring a recreational project may at any time provide for the addition to and improvement of the project by an additional issue of bonds, subject to the procedure required for the issuance of original bonds, or the city may, at the time of issuing bonds for the acquisition, provide for additional bonds for additions and permanent improvements to be placed in escrow and to be negotiated from time to time as necessary. The bonds placed in escrow shall, when negotiated, have equal standing with bonds of the same issue.

History. 2741p-24.

97.240. No other proceedings necessary.

No proceedings shall be required for the acquisition, establishment or management of any recreational project or the issuance of bonds under KRS 97.100 to 97.230 except the proceedings prescribed in those sections.

History. 2741p-25.

97.250. Powers of department of public parks and recreation in first-class cities — Employees — Director of parks and recreation.

  1. The department of public parks and recreation of any city of the first class shall exercise all of the powers and perform all of the functions and duties of any former board of park commissioners of the city, except as otherwise provided by law or by KRS 97.250 to 97.257 . The agents and employees of the department of public parks and recreation, except as provided herein, shall be employed and governed in accordance with the merit system, as provided by any law or amendments thereof, and any rules and regulations issued pursuant thereto, authorizing, creating and governing any city board or commission empowered to administer and enforce civil service laws, rules and regulations in and for the city.
  2. The department of public parks and recreation of any city of the first class shall be under the supervision and direction of a director to be designated director of parks and recreation, and shall have exclusive direction, supervision and control of all park property, as herein defined, except as otherwise provided by law or by KRS 97.250 to 97.257 or by ordinance of the legislative body of said city; and shall provide for and supervise all public amusements and recreation in parks, playgrounds, and community centers. The director of the department may adopt rules and regulations for the reasonable and proper use, management and control of public park, playground and community center property, and may organize the department for administrative purposes into the divisions necessary for the proper conduct of the business of said department, and appoint heads or chiefs of the divisions, who, under the supervision and control of the director, shall have the direction of such divisions.

History. 2840, 2841, 2844, 2847: amend. Acts 1942, ch. 34, § 2; 1968, ch. 152, § 79.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

Sweeney v. Louisville, 102 F. Supp. 525, 1951 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3826 (D. Ky. 1951 ), aff’d, Muir v. Louisville Park Theatrical Asso., 202 F.2d 275, 1953 U.S. App. LEXIS 3231 (6th Cir. Ky. 1953 ), rev’d, Tureaud v. Louisiana State University & A. & M. College, 74 S. Ct. 784, 98 L. Ed. 1112 (U.S. 1954), rev’d, Florida ex rel. Hawkins v. Board of Control, 347 U.S. 971, 74 S. Ct. 783, 98 L. Ed. 1112, 1954 U.S. LEXIS 2047 (1954); Sweeney v. Louisville, 309 Ky. 465 , 218 S.W.2d 30, 1949 Ky. LEXIS 739 ( Ky. 1949 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

A person who holds the position of director of the city’s recreation program could not continue to serve as such and at the same time serve as a member of the local board of education. OAG 76-434 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Civil service in cities of first class, KRS 90.110 to 90.230 .

See note to KRS 97.252 under heading 1. Conveyance of Park Property, City of Louisville v. Milton, 247 S.W.2d 975, 1952 Ky. LEXIS 725 (Ky. App. 1952).

97.251. Definition of “park property.”

The term “park property” includes all parks, squares and areas of land owned or used by said city for park purposes, and all buildings, structures, improvements, seats, benches, fountains, walks, drives, roads, trees, plants, herbage, flowers, and other things thereon, and inclosures of the same; all shade trees on streets or thoroughfares throughout park property and said city; all resting places, watering stations, playgrounds, parade grounds, community centers, or the like; all connecting parkways and roads or drives between parks, and all avenues, roads, ways, drives, walks, with all trees, shrubbery, vines, flowers and ornaments of any description thereon, acquired for park purposes; and all birds, animals or curiosities, or objects of interest or instruction placed in or on any of such inclosures, ways, parkways, roads or places; and said term shall be liberally construed.

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 34, § 2.

Research References and Practice Aids

ALR

Public comfort stations in. 42 A.L.R. 891; 55 A.L.R. 472.

Relative rights, as between municipality and abutting landowners, to minerals, oil, and gas underlying parks. 62 A.L.R.2d 1311.

97.252. Title to and control of park property — Exemption from taxation — Use for streets — Contracts for use of aviation fields — Control of public ways acquired for park purposes.

  1. The title to all property with all improvements and equipment acquired for park, airport or aviation field purposes, subject to any existing leases thereof, shall be held by the city in strict and inviolable trust for such public purposes, free from all taxation, imposts or assessments by state, county, district, municipal, or other governmental subdivision; but the city may use any portion of such property as is necessary and proper for the construction, extension, or widening of streets, boulevards, thoroughfares or other public ways, and may enter into contracts or agreements, with reference to properties acquired for airport or aviation field purposes, for the use of the field and airport for aviation purposes, with the United States government or any agency thereof, or any state government or any agency thereof, or any board of aviation established under any act of the General Assembly of this Commonwealth, or of any other commonwealth or state, or any individual, firm or corporation. However, it shall at no time and in no way enter into any contract or agreement that prevents its carrying out the main purpose of the establishment and maintenance of a public municipal aviation field and airport, for the general use of the citizens of the city as a park purpose.
  2. Such park property as consists of all connecting parkways and roads or drives between public parks, and all avenues, roads, ways, drives, walks, outside of or on the boundaries of public parks which were or are acquired for park purposes, shall be under the direction, control, maintenance and management of the department of public works of the city, and any such property may be declared by resolution of the board of aldermen to be a part of the public ways of the city.

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 34, § 2; 1956, ch. 8; 1968, ch. 152, § 80.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Conveyance of Park Property.

City had the right to convey a portion of park embracing the drives and parkways therein to the department (now bureau) of highways to be used by the department as a part of the state primary road system. Louisville v. Milton, 247 S.W.2d 975, 1952 Ky. LEXIS 725 ( Ky. 1952 ).

2. Drainage Assessments.

Under this section a public park of a city is exempt from assessments for drainage improvements. Curtis v. Louisville & Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer Dist., 311 S.W.2d 378, 1958 Ky. LEXIS 185 ( Ky. 1958 ).

3. Driveway of Abutting Landowner.

Fee simple title to a grass plot 40 feet in width on each side of a 40-foot paved road was in the city as “park property” under this section and where abutting landowner failed to allege a driveway he had constructed over the grass plot with permission of the superintendent of parks was necessary for ingress and egress to and from his home or that the superintendent of parks had power to grant a perpetual easement over property owned in fee by the city and held for public use or that the superintendent of parks was acting within the scope of his authority, city could remove the concrete driveway constructed by the abutting landowner. Frederick v. Louisville, 307 Ky. 740 , 212 S.W.2d 267, 1948 Ky. LEXIS 817 ( Ky. 1948 ).

Cited:

Louisville v. Milton, 247 S.W.2d 975, 1952 Ky. LEXIS 725 ( Ky. 1952 ).

Research References and Practice Aids

ALR

Right of municipality to devote park property to airport. 83 A.L.R. 346; 99 A.L.R. 173.

Power of exclusion or regulation of vehicles in parks or park boulevards. 121 A.L.R. 566.

Liability of municipality for torts in connection with airport. 66 A.L.R.2d 634.

Power of park commission to directly regulate or prohibit abutter’s access to street or highway. 73 A.L.R.2d 671.

Liability of air carrier to one injured or killed by slip or fall at airport. 3 A.L.R.3d 938.

Liability of owner or operator of airport in connection with furnishing rescue equipment or services. 34 A.L.R.3d 1449.

Validity of municipal regulation of aircraft flight paths or altitudes. 36 A.L.R.3d 1314.

Liability of municipality as bailee for damages to airplane. 44 A.L.R.3d 862.

Airport operations or flight of aircraft as nuisance. 79 A.L.R.3d 253.

Airport operations liability insurance. 92 A.L.R.3d 1267.

97.253. Employees are subject to civil service.

  1. The employees of any former board of park commissioners in any city of the first class, except the special park police, shall be employed by and continued in the service of the department of public parks and recreation. The employees, except as herein provided, are subject to any law or amendments thereof, or any rules and regulations issued pursuant thereto, governing any city board or commission empowered to administer and enforce civil service laws, rules and regulations in and for the city, it being the intent and purpose of KRS 97.250 to 97.257 to make such laws, rules and regulations applicable to the offices, positions and places of employment in the department of public parks and recreation.
  2. The following offices, positions, and places of employment in the department of public parks and recreation, to wit: director of parks and recreation, private secretary to the director, golf professionals, golf greensmen, checkers, countermen, locker attendants, caretakers, janitors, janitresses, laundresses, cleaners, tractor and truck drivers, teamsters and stablemen, and laborers, are hereby specifically excepted from the provisions of the civil service law, rules and regulations. The foregoing excepted offices, positions, and places of employment, except the office of director, may hereafter be placed in the classified service, under the law, by the legislative body of the city by ordinance.

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 34, § 2; 1968, ch. 152, § 81.

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Civil service in cities of first class, KRS 90.110 to 90.230 .

97.254. Special park police transferred to department of public safety, under civil service. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 34, § 2) was repealed by Acts 1952, ch. 56, § 8.

97.255. Power of police to arrest for offenses committed on park property.

Officers and members of the division of police of the department of public safety of said city shall have the power to make arrests in any parks or any park property or upon any parkways or park boulevards under the control of any city of the first class, within the boundaries of said city; or in any place within the county wherein such city is located outside the boundaries of said city, if the offense or violation for which such arrest is being made was committed upon park property, parkways, park boulevards, or property under the control of said city; and any and all persons so arrested or taken into custody by members of said division of police shall be tried in courts having jurisdiction over the place where the offense for which such arrest was made was committed.

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 34, § 2.

97.256. Recreation division employes transferred to department of public parks and recreation, under civil service. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Acts 1942, ch. 34, § 2) was repealed by Acts 1952, ch. 56, § 8, effective June 19, 1952.

97.257. Power of condemnation for park purposes.

Whenever property shall be needed by any city of the first class for any park, playground, or community center purpose contemplated in KRS 97.250 to 97.257 , either within or beyond the boundaries of such city, in the county in which such city is located, the director of parks and recreation may, with the consent of the legislative body of such city, order the condemnation of such property in the manner provided in the Eminent Domain Act of Kentucky.

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 34, § 2; 1976, ch. 140, § 49.

Compiler’s Notes.

The Eminent Domain Act of Kentucky is compiled as KRS 416.540 to 416.680 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Value of Condemned Property.

Verdict of $132,000 for 42.9 acres of unimproved land condemned by city for a zoo is not grossly inadequate. Mengel Properties v. Louisville, 400 S.W.2d 690, 1965 Ky. LEXIS 20 ( Ky. 1965 ).

2. Power.

KRS 82.082(1) gives a city, under a grant of home rule, the power of eminent domain in accordance with the provisions of the Eminent Domain Act of Kentucky, KRS 416.540 et seq.; KRS 83.520 provides that the provisions of KRS ch. 97, including KRS 97.257 , shall be considered permissive rather than mandatory and restrictions therein shall not be considered abridging the complete grant of home rule. Martingale, LLC v. City of Louisville, 151 S.W.3d 829, 2004 Ky. App. LEXIS 203 (Ky. Ct. App. 2004), cert. denied, 545 U.S. 1115, 125 S. Ct. 2913, 162 L. Ed. 2d 295, 2005 U.S. LEXIS 4688 (U.S. 2005).

Opinions of Attorney General.

A city cannot require a subdivider to dedicate certain lands, shown or not shown on the master plan of current adoption, to the public for use as a site for schools and/or parks. OAG 65-417 .

97.258. Disposition of sums appropriated to former board of park commissioners. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 34, § 2) was repealed by Acts 1952, ch. 56, § 9, effective June 9, 1952.

97.260. Oath and bond. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2841, 2842, 2843) was repealed by Acts 1942, ch. 34, § 5.

97.270. Officers and employes; duties; compensation. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2845, 2846) was repealed by Acts 1942, ch. 34, § 5.

97.280. Member cannot hold other office; not to be interested in contracts. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2846) was repealed by Acts 1942, ch. 34, § 5.

97.290. Powers and duties of board of park commissioners in first-class cities. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2840, 2848, 2849, 2851) was repealed by Acts 1942, ch. 34, § 5.

97.300. Locating parks; accepting gifts; title to park property; tax exemption; conveyance to city. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2849, 2850) was repealed by Acts 1942, ch. 34, § 5.

97.310. Park precincts; conveyance of real estate to board. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2851) was repealed by Acts 1942, ch. 34, § 5.

97.320. Condemnation of property for park purposes. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2852) was repealed by Acts 1942, ch. 34, § 5.

97.330. Acquisition of property owned by member of board. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2852, 1903 ed.) was repealed by Acts 1942, ch. 34, § 5.

97.340. Tax for park purposes. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2853) was repealed by Acts 1942, ch. 34, § 5.

97.350. Bonds; vote on issuance. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2854) was repealed by Acts 1942, ch. 34, § 5.

97.360. Board shall not create charge on future income. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2855) was repealed by Acts 1942, ch. 34, § 5.

97.370. Records of board; report to mayor. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2856) was repealed by Acts 1942, ch. 34, § 5.

97.380. Special park police in first-class cities; powers; duties; oaths; supervision. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2857) was repealed by Acts 1942, ch. 34, § 5.

97.390. Scope of park property in first-class cities. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2858) was repealed by Acts 1942, ch. 34, § 5.

97.400. Board of Park Commissioners in second-class cities; members; vacancies; terms. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3235b-1, 3235b-2) was repealed by Acts 1956, ch. 25, § 11.

97.405. Powers and duties of boards of park commissioners vested in cities of second class. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 25, § 2; 1966, ch. 255, § 112) was repealed by Acts 2007, ch. 10, § 5, effective June 26, 2007.

97.410. Oath and bond. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3235b-3, 3235b-4) was repealed by Acts 1956, ch. 25, § 11, effective May 18, 1956.

97.415. Title to park property transferred to and vested in city. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 25, § 2) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 255, § 283.

97.420. Elections of officers; records; report to mayor. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3235b-5) was repealed by Acts 1956, ch. 25, § 11.

97.425. “Park property” defined.

The term “park property” as used in KRS 97.425 to 97.485 shall be liberally construed, and includes all parks, squares, and areas of land within the management of the city; all buildings, structures, improvements, seats, benches, fountains, trees, plants, herbage, flowers, and other things thereon and the inclosures of same; all shade trees on street or thoroughfares, resting places, watering stations, playgrounds necessary and incidental to such public parks and property, parade grounds, and the like; all connecting parkways and roads or drives between parks, all avenues, roads, ways, drives, walks, with all trees, shrubbery, vines, flowers, and ornaments of any description; all birds, animals, or curiosities or objects of interest or instruction placed in or on any such inclosures, ways, parkways, roads, or places; all maintenance and construction equipment, recreation supplies, and facilities, and any interest or right which the city is able to exercise.

History. Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 25, § 3; 1966, ch. 255, § 113; 2007, ch. 10, § 1, effective June 26, 2007.

97.430. Compensation of secretary and treasurer; members not to receive pay or hold other office. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3235b-6: amend. Acts 1944, ch. 52, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1956, ch. 25, § 11, effective May 18, 1956.

97.435. City legislative body may create administrative department for administration of public parks and recreational activities in second-class cities. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 25, § 4, effective May 18, 1956) was repealed by Acts 1982, ch. 434, § 15, effective July 15, 1982.

97.440. Powers and duties of boards of park commissioners in second-class cities. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3235b-1, 3235b-7, 3235b-8, 3235b-10) was repealed by Acts 1956, ch. 25, § 11, effective May 18, 1956.

97.441. Powers and duties of cities over parks and boulevards.

  1. Any city that has the care, management and custody of the parks and grounds used for park purposes, the boulevards and parkways belonging to the city or in the control of the city, and all property acquired for park purposes or public squares by the city may:
    1. Acquire and hold property for public parks and public squares and for parkways connecting the parks, by condemnation, contract, purchase or gift;
    2. Lay out and improve the parks, parkways, squares and other property held or managed by it with walks, drives, roads, trees and other proper improvements, and contract for such improvements;
    3. Protect all park property and improvements belonging to the city or under its management or control from injury or decay;
    4. Adopt rules and regulations for the reasonable and proper use and for preventing injuries to or misuse of all parks, parkways, public squares, boulevards, driveways, walks and park property generally;
    5. Prevent disorder and improper conduct within the precincts of any park or inclosure, or upon any drive, walk or avenue under the control of the city;
    6. Control and manage the planting and care of all shade trees along the sidewalks and thoroughfares of the city, and adopt and enforce rules and regulations necessary for the protection and care of the trees.
  2. In locating parks the city shall regard the needs of the different sections of the city and the suitability of the ground for park purposes, as well as the cost thereof. The city shall have discretion as to the location and improvement of parks.
  3. The police power of the city extends over the park property of every kind, as it is acquired. All violations of the park rules and regulations and all other offenses committed within any park property or precinct shall be punished as provided by law in cases of misdemeanors and violations of city ordinances.

History. Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 255, § 114; 2014, ch. 92, § 177, effective January 1, 2015.

Opinions of Attorney General.

Where a city of the second class leased property outside of the city limits and created a municipal park, it would have the power to police the park although outside the city limits. OAG 71-388 .

97.445. Employes of boards of park commissioners to be employes of city; status; “probationary employe” defined. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 25, § 5) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 255, § 283.

97.450. Acceptance of gifts; title to park property; tax exemption. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3235-9) was repealed by Acts 1956, ch. 25, § 11, effective May 18, 1956.

97.455. Board of park commissioners — Membership — Appointment — Term — Removal.

There shall be established in each city electing to operate under KRS 97.425 to 97.485 a board to be known as the “Board of Park Commissioners.” The board shall consist of not less than five (5) nor more than seven (7) members as determined by the legislative body of the city and shall be appointed by the mayor with the approval of a majority of the legislative body for terms of four (4) years, except that the members first appointed shall be so appointed that the terms of not more than two (2) members shall expire in the same year. Any member of the board may be removed by a majority vote of the members of the city legislative body.

History. Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 25, § 6; 2007, ch. 10, § 2, effective June 26, 2007; 2014, ch. 92, § 178, effective January 1, 2015.

97.460. Condemnation of property for park purposes; acquisition of land owned by member of board. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3235b-11) was repealed by Acts 1956, ch. 25, § 11, effective May 18, 1956.

97.465. Board of park commissioners, advisory only — Election of officers of board — Rules — Promotion of park facilities.

The board of park commissioners shall be an advisory board only, it being the intention of KRS 97.425 to 97.485 to vest all powers relating to parks, playgrounds, and recreation in the city, subject to the provisions of KRS 97.020 . The board of park commissioners, after their appointment, shall convene and elect a president of the board and a secretary. It shall establish rules, not inconsistent with the provisions of KRS 97.405 to 97.485 , and shall fix the time and place for the holding of its meetings. The board shall advise the legislative body of the city on appropriate park and recreational programs and projects, and shall promote the full use of all park facilities in the interest of the public.

History. Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 25, § 7; 2007, ch. 10, § 3, effective June 26, 2007.

97.470. Appropriations for park purposes; separate funds for white and colored park board. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3235b-12, 3235b-13: amend. Acts 1942, ch. 53, §§ 1 and 2; 1944, ch. 52, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1956, ch. 25, § 11.

97.475. Park police.

The legislative body of the city may from time to time provide by ordinance for special park police.

History. Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 25, § 8, effective May 18, 1956.

97.480. Vote on bond issue. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3235b-14) was repealed by Acts 1956, ch. 25, § 11, effective May 18, 1956.

97.485. Construction of KRS 97.425 to 97.485.

Nothing in KRS 97.425 to 97.485 shall be construed to conflict with the provisions of KRS 97.020 .

History. Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 25, §§ 9, 10; 1966, ch. 255, § 115; 2007, ch. 10, § 4, effective June 26, 2007.

97.490. Power of boards to borrow money; not to create charge on future income. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3235b-15) was repealed by Acts 1956, ch. 25, § 11, effective May 18, 1956.

97.500. Special park police. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3235b-16) was repealed by Acts 1956, ch. 25, § 11, effective May 18, 1956.

97.510. Scope of park property in second-class cities. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3235b-17) was repealed by Acts 1956, ch. 25, § 11, effective May 18, 1956.

97.520. Board may require services of city officers. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3235b-17) was repealed by Acts 1956, ch. 25, § 11, effective May 18, 1956.

97.530. Powers of cities with respect to parks, cemeteries, squares, avenues, and fountains.

The legislative body of any city may, by ordinance, acquire, establish and maintain public cemeteries, parks, squares, avenues, promenades, and fountains, either within or without the city; repeal ordinances heretofore or hereafter enacted creating such public cemeteries, parks, squares, avenues, promenades, and fountains where the same were not acquired or given to the city for such specific purposes, and provide, by appropriate ordinances, for the use of said lands, easements, buildings, and appurtenances thereon or appertaining thereto for other purposes; make all necessary appropriations for the cost and maintenance of same; and make regulations for the use, management and direction thereof.

History. 3290, 3290-33; 2014, ch. 92, § 179, effective January 1, 2015.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Application.

This statute applies only where the city by its own exclusive authority, is establishing a park. Pulaski County v. Somerset, 364 S.W.2d 334, 1963 Ky. LEXIS 204 ( Ky. 1963 ).

2. Dedication.

Where land has been dedicated for park purposes, city cannot dispose of or abandon it, or divert it to other purposes, nor can city repeal dedication ordinance. Bedford-Nugent Co. v. Argue, 281 Ky. 827 , 137 S.W.2d 392, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 44 ( Ky. 1939 ).

Fact that land had never been used as a park and had been leased for sand and gravel business for many years cannot operate as abandonment of dedication or estop taxpayer from attacking diversion. Bedford-Nugent Co. v. Argue, 281 Ky. 827 , 137 S.W.2d 392, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 44 ( Ky. 1939 ).

3. Failure to Dedicate.

Land purchased by city under deeds reciting that purchase is for waterworks purposes is not irrevocably dedicated to park purposes, even if reservoir occupies only part of land and roads have been constructed in remainder rendering it suitable, among other purposes, for park. Massey v. Bowling Green, 206 Ky. 692 , 268 S.W. 348, 1925 Ky. LEXIS 1035 ( Ky. 1925 ).

4. Disposal or Inconsistent Use.

In absence of legislative authority, city which purchases or condemns land for park purposes and establishes parks, cannot dispose of or devote such land to inconsistent purposes. Massey v. Bowling Green, 206 Ky. 692 , 268 S.W. 348, 1925 Ky. LEXIS 1035 ( Ky. 1925 ).

Cited:

Ricketts v. Hiawatha Oil & Gas Co., 300 Ky. 548 , 189 S.W.2d 858, 1945 Ky. LEXIS 602 ( Ky. 1945 ); Shamburger v. Duncan, 244 S.W.2d 759, 1951 Ky. LEXIS 1247 ( Ky. 1951 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

A city of the third class acting in its proprietary capacity pursuant to this section, may establish a commission to administer a public cemetery. OAG 80-136 .

97.540. Condemnation of property by city for parks or cemeteries.

Whenever, in the opinion of the legislative body of any city, land or other property located either within or without the boundaries of the city and within the county in which the city is located is needed for cemetery or park purposes and the legislative body is not able to contract with the owner of the property for its purchase, the legislative body may, by resolution reciting such need, order the condemnation of such property. The proceedings shall be conducted in the manner provided in the Eminent Domain Act of Kentucky.

History. 3240a-1, 3240a-2: amend. Acts 1976, ch. 140, § 50; 1988, ch. 343, § 1, effective July 15, 1988; 2014, ch. 92, § 180, effective January 1, 2015.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

Embry v. Caneyville, 397 S.W.2d 141, 1965 Ky. LEXIS 65 ( Ky. 1965 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

A city cannot require a subdivider to dedicate certain lands, shown or not shown on the master plan of current adoption, to the public for use as a site for schools and/or parks. OAG 65-417 .

Research References and Practice Aids

ALR

Municipal power to condemn land for cemetery. 54 A.L.R.2d 1322.

Right to condemn property in excess of needs for particular public purpose. 6 A.L.R.3d 297.

97.550. Local governments may acquire property for parks or playgrounds — Appointment of park board — Terms of office.

  1. Cities of any class, counties, charter counties, and urban-county governments may acquire, by purchase or donation, property for the purpose of maintaining public parks or playgrounds within the jurisdictional limits.
  2. The city legislative body, the fiscal court, or the legislative body of a charter county or an urban-county government may appoint a park board of not more than eight (8) persons, whose qualifications shall be prescribed by the city legislative body or fiscal court, and whose terms of office shall be for two (2) years and until their successors are appointed and qualified, except that three (3) members of the first board appointed shall be appointed for terms of only one (1) year. The members of the board shall not receive any salary for their services. The board shall be a corporation with perpetual succession, and may, in its corporate name, contract and be contracted with, sue and be sued, have and use a corporate seal, and alter or renew it at pleasure.

History. 3606d-1, 3606d-3, 3606d-9; 1998, ch. 597, § 2, effective July 15, 1998.

Opinions of Attorney General.

A city cannot require a subdivider to dedicate certain lands, shown or not shown on the master plan of current adoption, to the public for use as a site for schools and/or parks. OAG 65-417 .

This section is an alternative to KRS 97.030 for cities of the fourth class and thus the two sections do not conflict. OAG 74-481 .

Members of a city council of a city of the fourth class cannot serve on park boards created pursuant to this section without violating KRS 61.080(5)(g) which provides that the office of member of the city council is incompatible with any other office. OAG 74-608 .

97.560. Oath of board members.

Each person appointed to the board shall appear before the city clerk and make and subscribe to an oath that he will faithfully, diligently and to the best of his ability perform all the duties as member of the board; that he will not in any manner, directly or indirectly, be concerned in any contract, purchase, sale or emolument of any kind in connection with or growing out of any business of the board, or the providing, purchasing, managing or improving of any park or playground property. The oath shall be filed in the office of the city clerk and shall be a public record.

History. 3606d-4.

97.570. Selection of officers — Duties of officers.

As soon as it is convenient, the members of the board shall meet and choose a president and a secretary from among its members, each to serve for a term of one (1) year, and annually thereafter a president and secretary shall be chosen. The duties of such officers shall be the usual duties incumbent upon such an office and such other duties as the board prescribes.

History. 3606d-5.

97.580. Powers and duties of board.

The board shall have the care, management and control of all parks and playgrounds within the limits of the city, shall lay out and improve them with walks, drives, roads and trees, provide appliances and equipment for playgrounds, and provide for the proper lighting of the parks and playgrounds.

History. 3606d-6.

97.590. Tax levy — Requirement of public referendum — Disbursements — Exception.

  1. For the purpose of purchasing and maintaining public parks within the jurisdictional limits, cities of any class, counties, charter counties, and urban-county governments may levy taxes not exceeding five cents ($0.05) on each one hundred dollars ($100) of all taxable property within the corporate limits, subject only to the aggregate limits on property taxes set forth in the Kentucky Constitution, but not subject to the recall provisions of KRS 132.017 . No city, county, charter county, or urban-county government shall levy the tax until a public referendum has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of KRS 83A.120 in the case of a city, county, or charter county or in accordance with the provisions of KRS 67A.160 in the case of an urban-county government and has been adopted by the city’s, county’s, charter county’s, or urban-county government’s voters. The public referendum provisions in this section shall not apply to any city, county, charter county, or urban-county government that has in effect on July 15, 1998, a tax for park purposes in accordance with this section or KRS 97.550 .
  2. The funds derived from the levy shall be held by the treasurer of the city or the treasurer of the county in a separate and distinct fund designated the “Park Fund.” The funds shall be paid out by the treasurer only upon order issued by the park board signed by the secretary and countersigned by the president after the bill for the withdrawal has been approved by the board, unless a park board has not been appointed under KRS 97.550 to 97.600 , in which case the funds shall be appropriated by the city legislative body, the fiscal court, or the legislative body of the charter county government or urban-county government for purposes consistent with the levy. The treasurer shall not honor in any one (1) year orders for a greater sum than the amount apportioned and levied for that year for park and playground purposes.

History. 3606d-2, 3606d-7; 1998, ch. 597, § 1, effective July 15, 1998; 2000, ch. 355, § 3, effective July 14, 2000.

Research References and Practice Aids

ALR

Quo warranto to test right of municipal corporation to levy and collect tax. 109 A.L.R. 328.

Valuation of property as affected by variation of tax rate for local or special purposes in different local taxing units, or inclusion of property within particular taxing unit. 119 A.L.R. 1300.

Sale price of real property as evidence in determining value for tax assessment purposes. 89 A.L.R.3d 1126.

Situs of tangible personal property for purposes of property taxation. 2 A.L.R.4th 432.

97.600. Reports and records — Compliance with KRS 65A.010 to 65A.090.

  1. The park board shall keep a set of books showing the receipts and expenditures of the board. The books shall at all times be subject to examination by the mayor or any committee of the legislative body authorized to make such examination, either by themselves or by a certified public accountant. The board shall each January transmit to the mayor and legislative body a full and detailed report and statement of the acts of the board for the preceding year, with a complete and itemized account of all receipts and disbursements of money and an itemized estimate of the money needed for park and playground purposes.
  2. The board shall comply with the provisions of KRS 65A.010 to 65A.090 .

History. 3606d-8; 2013, ch. 40, § 47, effective March 21, 2013.

97.610. Tax for maintenance of band or orchestra in cities of the home rule class — Procedure — Submission to vote.

  1. Cities of the home rule class may levy an annual tax of not more than ten (10) mills on the assessed valuation of the city, for the purpose of providing a fund for the maintenance or employment of a band or orchestra.
  2. Before such tax may be levied a petition signed by five percent (5%) of the legal voters of the city, as shown by the last regular municipal election, must be filed with the city legislative body, requesting that the following question be submitted to the voters: “Shall a tax of not exceeding ten (10) mills be levied each year for the purpose of furnishing a fund for the maintenance or employment of a municipal band or orchestra?”
  3. The petition shall be filed with the county clerk and the county clerk shall certify whether the petition is sufficient not later than the second Tuesday in August preceding a general election, and the legislative body shall cause the question to be submitted to the voters at the first following general municipal election.
  4. The levy shall be authorized if a majority of the electors voting at the election cast votes in favor of the proposition, and the legislative body may then enact an ordinance carrying the plan into effect.

History. 2741j-7 to 2741j-10, 2741j-12: amend. Acts 1982, ch. 360, § 32, effective July 15, 1982; 1996, ch. 195, § 49, effective July 1, 1996; 2014, ch. 92, § 181, effective January 1, 2015.

97.620. Repeal of tax.

At any time not earlier than three (3) years thereafter, a similar petition may be presented to the legislative body asking that the following proposition be submitted: “Shall the power to levy a tax for the maintenance or employment of a band or orchestra be repealed?” The submission shall be made at any general municipal election, and if a majority of the vote cast is in favor of the repeal, no further levy shall be made.

History. 2741j-11.

97.630. War memorial commissions in cities of the first class and the home rule class.

  1. Any city of the first class that has constructed a war memorial under the provisions of Chapter 23 of the Acts of 1922 shall have a memorial commission consisting of seven (7) members. Members shall be not less than twenty-five (25) years of age and shall be bona fide residents of the county in which the city is situated. Upon the expiration of the terms of the members of the commission appointed or elected under the provisions of Chapter 23 of the Acts of 1922, the remaining members of the commission shall elect members to succeed those whose terms have expired, to serve for terms of seven (7) years each, and annually thereafter members to succeed those whose terms have expired shall be elected for terms of seven (7) years each by the remaining members of the commission. Vacancies in the terms of members shall be filled by the remaining members of the commission. Members selected to fill vacancies shall serve for the unexpired term. The members of the commission shall serve without compensation, but shall be allowed their necessary expenses for travel when engaged on the business of the commission.
  2. A city of the home rule class that has constructed a war memorial under the provisions of Chapter 128 of the Acts of 1946, may, by ordinance, have a memorial commission consisting of fifteen (15) members. Members of the commission shall be nominated and appointed by the mayor and approved by the city legislative body. Five (5) of said members shall be appointed to serve five (5) years; five (5) members shall be appointed to serve six (6) years; and five (5) members shall be appointed to serve seven (7) years. Thereafter, members to succeed those whose terms have expired shall be elected by the remaining members of the commission for terms of three (3) years. Vacancies in the terms of members shall be filled by the remaining members of the commission. Members selected to fill vacancies shall serve for the unexpired term. The members of the commission shall serve without compensation, but shall be allowed their necessary expenses for travel when engaged in the business of the commission.
  3. In lieu of the requirements of subsection (2) of this section, the legislative body of any city of the home rule class may enact an ordinance to establish an alternative number of members, not less than five (5), to serve on the city’s war memorial commission, each for a term of three (3) years. The appointment, filling of vacancies, and compensation of members appointed pursuant to this subsection shall be governed in the same manner as provided in subsection (2) of this section. A city acting pursuant to this subsection that establishes a number of members less than are currently serving shall not require the removal of any serving member, but, upon expiration of the term, shall not fill such position, to ensure that the number of members equals that which the city has provided in the ordinance.

HISTORY: 3037i-1: amend. Acts 1982, ch. 363, § 1, effective July 15, 1982; 2016 ch. 22, § 4, effective July 15, 2016.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

Acts 1922, ch. 23 establishing war memorial commissions in first-class cities and setting forth its powers and duties is not unconstitutional as violative of Const., §§ 29, 60, 171 or 181a. Hunter v. Louisville, 204 Ky. 562 , 265 S.W. 277, 1924 Ky. LEXIS 552 ( Ky. 1924 ).

97.640. Officers and employees of commissions.

  1. A commission in a city of the first class shall annually elect a chairman from its members, to serve for the term of one (1) year. The commission may elect a secretary and treasurer, not a member of the commission, who shall hold the combined office at the pleasure of the commission, and may receive a salary to be fixed and paid by the commission, not exceeding $2,500 per annum. The commission may select and fix the compensation of such officers or employees as it deems necessary to properly carry on the work of the commission, to serve at the pleasure of the commission. The compensation of all officers and employees of the commission employed in the operation or maintenance of the memorial shall constitute maintenance expenses and shall be paid as such.
  2. A commission in a city of the home rule class shall annually elect a chairman from its members, to serve for the term of one (1) year. The commission may elect a secretary and treasurer, not a member of the commission, who shall hold the combined office at the pleasure of the commission, and may receive a salary to be determined by the commission. The commission may select and fix the compensation of such officers or employees as it deems necessary to properly carry on the work of the commission, to serve at the pleasure of the commission. The compensation of all officers and employees of the commission employed in the operation or maintenance of the memorial shall constitute maintenance expenses and shall be paid as such.

History. 3037i-2, 3037i-20: amend. Acts 1982, ch. 363, § 2, effective July 15, 1982; 2014, ch. 92, § 183, effective January 1, 2015.

97.650. Powers of commission.

The commission shall be a corporation and may:

  1. Arrange for and supervise the maintenance of the grounds and structures of the memorial.
  2. Exact from any of its officers or employees such surety or indemnity bonds for the appropriate performance of their respective duties as the commission deems proper.
  3. Establish and enforce reasonable rules and regulations for its own government, and for the supervision, protection, management and conduct of its work and the maintenance of the memorial structures, and for the cost thereof, which rules and regulations, to the extent they are not in conflict with law, shall have the force of law.
  4. Make and enter into, in its corporate name, any and all contracts, agreements or stipulations, germane to the scope of its duties, or in accordance with the purposes of KRS 97.630 to 97.780 .
  5. Sue and be sued in its corporate name, adopt a corporate seal and alter it at pleasure.
  6. Do all other acts reasonable or necessary to effectively carry out the work intended or required by KRS 97.630 to 97.780 .

History. 3037i-1, 3037i-3.

97.660. Bonds of officers — Payment of bond premiums.

The chairman and secretary and treasurer of the commission shall each give bond with approved surety, in a sum fixed by the commission. The bonds shall be payable to the commission, and shall obligate the makers to faithfully perform the duties of their offices and to faithfully account for and pay over all money or other thing of value that comes into their hands. The premiums for such bonds shall be paid by the commission.

History. 3037i-4.

97.670. Form of the memorial — Title to property — Tax exemption.

The memorial shall commemorate the valorous and patriotic deeds and service of the soldiers and sailors, of the city and county in which the commission acts, who were engaged in the Army and Navy of the United States during the World War of 1914 to 1918, the World War of 1941 to 1945, the Korean and Vietnam conflicts, and other international armed conflicts in which the United States participated. The memorial shall be permanent in character, and shall take the form of a building or buildings, with halls and auditoriums ample for both large and small assemblages, conventions, theatrical, musical and other entertainments, and with suitable offices, rooms, and equipment to properly maintain and operate the building or buildings, and appropriate statuary and works of memorial art, and all grounds necessary or appropriate for such purposes, all of which shall be embraced by the term “memorial.” The commission may maintain in the memorial such flags, insignia, mementos, records, and archives of the war, or of historical significance in connection therewith, as may fittingly exemplify or illustrate the patriotic services rendered the United States in the war by the soldiers and sailors, as well as by the citizens and residents of the city and county who were not engaged in the military or naval service of the United States during the war. The title to the memorial and all property acquired by the commission shall be vested in the commission and shall be held in trust for the city for the purposes contemplated in KRS 97.630 to 97.780 , free from all taxation or assessments.

History. 3037i-5, 3037i-23: amend. Acts 1982, ch. 363, § 3, effective July 15, 1982.

97.680. Power of commission to acquire property — Methods of acquisition.

The commission may acquire, by gift, purchase, lease or condemnation, any real or personal property situated wholly within the city or county, or any interest, franchise, easement, right or privilege in the city or county, of any buildings, tools, machinery, materials or supplies that may be required for the purpose of furnishing, maintaining or operating the memorial. The proceedings for condemnation shall be conducted in the name of the commission in the method prescribed by the Eminent Domain Act of Kentucky. All property acquired by the commission shall be held, used and controlled by it for the purposes named in KRS 97.630 to 97.780 .

History. 3037i-1, 3037i-6: amend. Acts 1976, ch. 140, § 51.

Compiler’s Notes.

The Eminent Domain Act of Kentucky is compiled as KRS 416.540 to 416.680 .

97.690. Work to go to lowest and best bidder — Work may be done by commission.

All work to be done or supplies or materials to be purchased involving an expenditure of five hundred dollars ($500) or more shall be awarded by contract to the lowest and best bidder, but the commission may reject any bid. The commission may do any part of the work, under such conditions as it prescribes, by day labor or other noncontract method, whenever, in its judgment, this is the best method to pursue. This section does not limit the power of the commission in the employment of architects, employees, clerks or agents.

History. 3037i-9.

97.700. Appropriation or tax levy to maintain memorial.

  1. In order to provide sufficient funds for maintaining the memorial and for carrying on the work of the commission the city legislative body in cities of the first class shall annually appropriate from the general fund of the city such sums as in the judgment of the legislative body shall, when supplemented by any funds received by the commission from gifts or earnings of the memorial, be reasonably necessary for such purposes. All moneys so appropriated may be paid over to the commission by the director of finance of such city in regular monthly installments. If it appears from the report or statement of the commission that funds received by gift or from earnings of the memorial, available for maintenance of the memorial for any fiscal year, are fully adequate for the purpose, the appropriation for such year may be withheld by the legislative body.
  2. For the purpose of providing necessary funds for maintaining such memorial and for carrying on the work of the commission a city legislative body of cities of the home rule class may annually appropriate from the general fund of the city or annually levy and collect a tax not exceeding five cents ($0.05) on each one hundred dollars ($100) worth of taxable property in such city as determined by the last regular assessment of such city, and the taxes so levied shall be collected in the customary way and shall be paid over to said commission for the purpose named in this section; provided, however, that if it shall appear from the report or statement of the commission that funds received by gift or from earnings of the memorial, available for maintenance of the memorial for any fiscal year, are fully adequate therefor after deductions therefrom are made as herein provided, the said tax levy for such year may be withheld by the city legislative body.

History. 3037i-10, 3037i-11: amend. Acts 1954, ch. 164, § 4; 1982, ch. 363, § 4, effective July 15, 1982; 2014, ch. 92, § 184, effective January 1, 2015.

97.710. Limit on expense to be incurred.

Except with the approval of the city legislative body, the commission shall not incur for maintenance purposes of the memorial, or permit the incurrence of, any liability or expense exceeding the total funds derived or to be derived for any fiscal year by appropriation from the city for such year, or the levying and collection of taxes for such purpose in the fiscal year, supplemented by income from the memorial and by donations in money or property reduced to money made to the commission for maintenance purposes.

History. 3037i-12: amend. Acts 1954, ch. 164, § 5; 1982, ch. 363, § 5, effective July 15, 1982.

97.720. Fiscal year — Annual financial statement — Improvement and replacement fund — Compliance with KRS 65A.010 to 65A.090.

  1. The fiscal year of the commission shall be the same as that of the city. The commission shall, each May, prepare and certify to the mayor, to be by him transmitted to the legislative body, a statement showing the total funds that, in the judgment of the commission, will be needed for maintaining the memorial for the ensuing fiscal year; setting forth in detail the sums needed for the different classes of expenditure; setting forth the estimated balance that will be on hand on the first of July following the certification of the statement and available for expenditure during the ensuing fiscal year for maintenance purposes; and indicating, as nearly as possible, what additional assets other than those derived from the city appropriation will become available for maintenance purposes for the ensuing fiscal year.
  2. The legislative body, in making the appropriation or levy of the tax for maintenance purposes, shall take into consideration the amount of funds held or derived by the commission from donations for maintenance purposes. The commission may set aside and retain from year to year, out of the maintenance funds derived by gift or appropriation, a reasonable fund to be known as an “improvement and replacement fund,” to cover needed improvements, replacements and equipment for, and depreciation of, the memorial. The funds shall be placed at interest in a bank of the city, with the mayor’s approval, or invested in United States government interest-bearing bonds, or bonds of the city or any of its instrumentalities. The amount set aside each year for such purposes shall be made with the approval of the mayor, and shall be held and used as occasion requires as a further memorial building and improvement fund to improve and further equip the memorial, and for replacement purposes if the memorial or any portion of it is destroyed by casualty or decay. The cost of ordinary repairs shall be paid for out of maintenance funds.
  3. The commission shall comply with the provisions of KRS 65A.010 to 65A.090 .

History. 3037i-13: amend. Acts 1954, ch. 164, § 6; 1982, ch. 363, § 6, effective July 15, 1982; 2013, ch. 40, § 48, effective March 21, 2013.

97.730. Annual report of operations — Records — Examination of records.

Within sixty (60) days after the close of each fiscal year the commission shall make a full, detailed report to the mayor of the city, showing all the financial operations and the general scope of the operations of the commission and of the memorial during the preceding fiscal year. The report shall be transmitted by the mayor to the city legislative body. The commission shall adopt and maintain an efficient system of accounting, covering all of its fiscal work and that of the memorial. The mayor may cause the accounts and records to be examined at any time, and report of such examinations shall be made to the mayor. The mayor and the legislative body may call upon the commission at any time for any information or report concerning the fiscal or other operations of the commission.

History. 3037i-14.

97.740. Operation of memorial — Charges for use.

The commission may use and permit the use of the memorial for conventions, theatrical and musical performances, public entertainments and other like meetings or assemblages, and may collect reasonable charges therefor, except where such use is for purposes of such a distinct civic character or purely public benefit as shall, in the discretion of the commission, render any charge for such use undesirable. All revenues thus derived shall be held and used by the commission to the extent necessary to maintain and operate the memorial, and to provide for a replacement and improvement fund as provided for in KRS 97.770 , with balances to be covered with the city treasury under certain circumstances as provided in KRS 97.630 to 97.780 .

History. 3037i-15.

97.750. Gifts to the memorial commission.

The commission may accept gifts of property of any description, for any of the purposes of the commission, if the gift is accompanied by a suitable instrument, executed by the donor, setting forth the purposes for which the gift is made. The gift or the proceeds thereof when reduced to money shall be used by the commission only for the purpose for which given. The commission may exchange or sell, for the purposes set out in KRS 97.630 to 97.780 , any of the property given to it for such purposes.

History. 3037i-16, 3037i-23.

97.760. Procedure in sale of bonds — Disposition of proceeds.

Bonds issued pursuant to Chapter 23 of the Acts of 1922 shall be placed under the control of the commission, which shall determine when, and at what price and how they shall be sold. Any premium obtained from the sale of the bonds shall constitute a part of the sinking fund for their ultimate retirement. As the bonds are sold, their proceeds shall go to the credit of the commission in the same depositories that are selected for the deposit of the funds held by the commissioners of the sinking fund of the city, upon like agreements as to interest. The proceeds of the bonds shall be withdrawn only upon the checks of the secretary and treasurer of the commission, countersigned in a manner and accompanied by a voucher as may be prescribed by administrative regulations promulgated by the commission.

History. 3037i-18; 1996, ch. 274, § 27, effective July 15, 1996.

97.770. Disposition of income after bonds are paid.

After the bonds issued pursuant to Chapter 23 of the Acts of 1922 are fully paid, the commission, with the mayor’s approval, may annually set aside a portion of the income derived from the operation of the memorial, and it shall be either deposited, at interest, in banks or trust companies selected by the commission with the mayor’s approval, or invested by the commission, with the mayor’s approval, in high-class interest-bearing securities, and so held, to be used in either case for the purposes of improvement, replacement or reconstruction of the memorial, or any portion thereof, as conditions may require or render advisable. All such work shall be done by or under the supervision of the commission. The remainder of the annual income, less such portion as may be required or used for the maintenance of the memorial, shall be paid into the city treasury.

History. 3037i-19.

97.780. Legal services.

All legal services or advice required by the commission shall be rendered by the city attorney and his assistants, without additional compensation.

History. 3037i-25.

County Parks

97.790. Counties may acquire and dedicate lands or buildings for park purposes. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1952, ch. 54, § 1, effective June 19, 1952) was repealed by Acts 1978, ch. 118, § 19, effective June 17, 1978.

97.791. Establishment of division of parks — Director of parks — Authority to adopt regulations. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1952, ch. 54, § 2, effective June 19, 1952) was repealed by Acts 1978, ch. 118, § 19, effective June 17, 1978.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

KRS 67.150 , 70.550 , 70.560 , 70.570 , 97.791 , 179.190 , 182.030 , 182.040 , 204.050 , were amended in revisor’s bill, Acts 1978, ch. 384, HB 607, §§ 145, 165, 166, 167, 226, 318, 322, 323 and 341; however, Acts 1978, ch. 118, HB 152, § 19 repealed them and prevails. See KRS 7.136(3).

97.792. Authority to accept grants, devises, bequests and donations. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1952, ch. 54, § 3, effective June 19, 1952) was repealed by Acts 1978, ch. 384, § 19, effective June 17, 1978.

97.793. Fiscal court may appropriate funds for park purposes. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1952, ch. 54, § 4, effective June 19, 1952) was repealed by Acts 1978, ch. 384, § 19, effective June 17, 1978.

97.794. Construction and maintenance of hotel, motel or lodge in park. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1964, ch. 122, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1978, ch. 384, § 19, effective June 17, 1978.

CHAPTER 98 Health and Welfare in Cities of the First Class and in Counties Containing Such Cities

98.010. Department of public welfare — Powers — Duties.

The department of public welfare of cities of the first class shall be under the supervision and direction of a director to be designated director of welfare, and shall, except as otherwise provided by law, have exclusive control, under the acts of the General Assembly and the ordinances of the legislative body of said cities, of all matters relating to the provision for and the supervision of the care of dependents and persons mentally deficient; the investigation of conditions that develop dependency, delinquency and mental deficiency; the education of the public regarding such conditions and the adoption of remedial measures; the supervision of public baths, comfort stations and cemeteries, the home for the aged and infirm, and the city workhouse; and may prescribe rules and regulations for the government and discipline of the inmates of the city’s charitable and penal institutions; and the supervision of the maintenance at the University of Louisville of classes in social welfare in order to provide trained workers for service in said department; and such other matters as may by ordinance be placed under the control of the said department not in conflict with any act of the General Assembly. The director of welfare shall have the power to organize the said department for administrative purposes into such divisions as may be necessary for the proper conduct of the business of said department, and to appoint heads or chiefs of such divisions, who, under the supervision and control of said director, shall have the direction of such divisions.

History. 2862: amend. Acts 1942, ch. 41, §§ 22, 25; 1976 (1st Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 126, effective January 2, 1978.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Construction.

KRS 201.010 through 201.990 were not repealed by this section and the Louisville director of welfare has no control over the Louisville and Jefferson County Children's Home. Jefferson County Fiscal Court v. Louisville, 276 Ky. 64 , 122 S.W.2d 1026, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 533 ( Ky. 1938 ).

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Board of health for cities, KRS 212.170 , 212.180 , 212.260 .

Civil service board to report rules and proceedings to department, KRS 90.160 .

Civil service for personnel of department, KRS 90.150 .

Health officers for cities, KRS 212.170 to 212.190 .

Hospitals and clinics, KRS ch. 216.

Interlocal cooperation act, KRS 65.210 to 65.300 .

Local health units and officers, KRS ch. 212.

Plumbers and plumbing, supervision and regulation of, KRS ch. 318.

Probation and parole, KRS ch. 439.

Tuberculosis sanatoria, KRS ch. 215.

98.011. Recovery of money payments or value of general assistance from certain recipients — Time limit upon claim.

Any department of public welfare established under the provisions of KRS 83.570 and KRS 98.010 may recover from any person who receives general assistance in the form of money payments an amount equal to the sum of such money payments, and such department may recover an amount of money equal to the value of any assistance in kind or service to or for the benefit of any person only in the following circumstances: if the recipient though destitute at the time he receives assistance subsequently receives from other than public sources income or other support in sufficient amount to reimburse the department, partially or wholly. Nothing in this section shall be construed to authorize the department to make or cause to be made any claim for recovery of assistance except within two (2) years from the date the assistance was rendered in money, kind or service to or for the benefit of the recipient.

History. Enact. Acts 1952, ch. 211, § 1, effective June 19, 1952; 1980, ch. 188, § 93, effective July 15, 1980.

98.012. Claim against estate of recipient of general assistance — Priority — Filing.

Upon the death of any person who has been paid general assistance by or through the department of public welfare of a city of the first class, said city shall have a claim against the estate of the deceased for all amounts of general assistance paid to him or on his behalf. The claim shall have priority over all unsecured claims against such estate except the burial expenses of the decedent, the cost of administration of his estate, the cost of his last illness and claims by the Commonwealth of Kentucky for public assistance rendered by it to the decedent. The claim shall be filed against the estate of the deceased person in the same manner as other claims are filed against decedents’ estates.

History. Enact. Acts 1952, ch. 211, § 2, effective June 19, 1952.

98.013. City to have lien upon real property of general assistance recipient — Notice — Filing, recording and indexing — Filing fee — Enforceability of lien — Waiver — Precipitation.

  1. On and after July 1, 1952 a city of the first class shall have a lien upon all real estate and rights to real estate belonging to or thereafter acquired by any recipient of general assistance through said city’s department of public welfare. The lien shall become effective upon the first payment of assistance to the recipient after June 19, 1952, and shall be cumulative and shall include all amounts paid to the recipient. The lien shall continue until it is satisfied, or becomes unenforceable.
  2. The lien shall not be effectual as against any mortgage, purchaser, or judgment creditor without actual notice until notice thereof has been filed by the director of public welfare of the city in the office of the county clerk of the county in which the property is located. Such notice, from the date of the filing thereof, shall constitute notice of all payments of assistance, whether paid prior or subsequent to the date of the filing of the notice. Such notice shall be filed by the director of public welfare in those cases in which it is discovered that the recipient has sufficient real estate to justify the filing of such a notice.
  3. The director of public welfare shall file an adequate notice of the existence of the lien provided for by this section which notice shall not specify the amount of assistance paid but the director of public welfare shall furnish to any authorized person upon proper request the total amount of the lien as of the date of the inquiry.
  4. The county clerk shall file, record and index such notices as other liens on real estate are required by law to be filed, recorded and indexed but shall index said lien only in the name of the recipient. The lien shall be designated “City’s Lien.”
  5. The clerk shall be entitled to a fee pursuant to KRS 64.012 for filing and indexing the lien. The department of public welfare of the city shall pay the fee but the fee shall become a part of the lien as an added cost to the recipient to be recovered at the time a lien is satisfied.
  6. The lien shall not be enforceable while the real estate is occupied by the surviving spouse or until she remarries, or is occupied by a dependent child, provided, no other action is brought to settle the estate.
  7. In any case in which it appears that it would be to the best interest of the recipient to sell his real estate and reinvest the proceeds in other real estate, the department of public welfare of the city may grant permission and waive the lien to the extent necessary for the purpose of effecting the transfer but such lien shall attach to the reinvested property.
  8. Any claim under KRS 98.011 to 98.014 may be precipitated and the lien provided by this section may be enforceable during the lifetime of any person who has received general assistance in order to recover any amount obtained as a result of such person knowingly making a false statement or representation or knowingly failing to disclose a fact to procure, increase, or continue any material benefit for himself.

History. Enact. Acts 1952, ch. 211, § 3, effective June 19, 1952; 1978, ch. 384, § 227, effective June 17, 1978; 2006, ch. 255, § 13, effective January 1, 2007.

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Statutory liens, KRS ch. 376.

98.014. Welfare department may receive payment from patient or inmate of institution.

If any inmate or patient of any institution operated under the provisions of KRS 83.570 , except the city workhouse, who is eligible for admission to said institution under the ordinances of the city and rules and regulations of the city’s department of public welfare is financially able to pay a portion of the cost of his care, the city’s department of public welfare shall have the authority to receive such payment as he is able to make.

History. Enact. Acts 1952, ch. 211, § 4, effective June 19, 1952; 1980, ch. 188, § 94, effective July 15, 1980.

98.020. Department of public health; powers; duties; abolishment. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2862: amend. Acts 1942, ch. 41, §§ 22 and 25) was repealed by Acts 1952, ch. 56, § 10, effective June 19, 1952.

98.030. Location of institutions.

The legislative body of any city of the first class may, by ordinance, locate any of its institutions that are under the supervision of the department of public safety, the department of public welfare or the department of health upon land owned by the city, or hereafter provided for that purpose, anywhere in the county in which the city is situated, or may authorize the directors of the departments to select the location of institutions under their supervision within the county.

History. 2863.

98.040. Construction and improvement of hospitals and institutions.

When the legislative body of any city of the first class desires to construct a new hospital or a new home for the aged and infirm or desires to reconstruct, improve, alter, extend or repair any existing hospital or home for the aged and infirm, and to equip and furnish such buildings, it may do so under KRS 98.040 to 98.170 .

History. 3037e-1.

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Hospitals and clinics, KRS ch. 216.

Tuberculosis sanatoria, KRS ch. 215.

98.050. Building commission to be appointed — Ordinance — Appropriation.

If there is no building commission, of the type contemplated by this section, in the city of the first class, the legislative body of the city may, by ordinance, request the mayor to appoint building commissioners. The ordinance shall define in general terms the work proposed to be done by the building commission and shall make an appropriation for the necessary expenses of the commission. If the mayor approves the ordinance, he shall thereupon make the appointments.

History. 3037e-2.

98.060. Members of building commission — Qualifications — Term.

The building commission shall consist of four (4) appointive members, and the mayor of the city ex officio. Each appointive member shall be at least twenty-five (25) years of age and reside within the city or the county in which the city is located, and be the owner of real estate or a householder. No officer or employee of the city, whether holding a paid or unpaid office, shall be eligible for appointment to the commission. All appointees shall be subject to the approval of the legislative body of the city. The term of office shall be four (4) years and until their successors are appointed and qualified. The commission may be continued by appointments made in the same manner as the original appointment.

History. 3037e-3.

98.070. Commission to constitute a corporation — Corporate powers.

The persons appointed as members of the commission shall constitute a body corporate under the name of “Commissioners of Charitable Buildings of _______________________________________ ,” and may contract and be contracted with, sue and be sued in that name and to adopt a seal and alter it at pleasure. If any commission appointed under KRS 98.040 to 98.170 is dissolved, the corporation shall be continued in the ex officio member thereof, but shall have no power to do any act until four (4) appointive members are appointed.

History. 3037e-4.

98.080. Organization — Employees — Bonds of employees.

  1. Each commission shall elect a chairman from the appointed members, and a secretary and treasurer not a member of the commission, who shall hold the combined offices at the pleasure of a majority of the commission and receive a salary to be fixed by the commission. It may also elect a superintendent of construction, who shall not be a member of the commission. This officer must be a draughtsman experienced in and familiar with fireproof construction, the erection of large buildings and their mechanical equipment and experienced in reading and executing architect’s plans and specifications. He shall give his entire attention to the affairs of the commission, shall receive a salary to be fixed by the commission and shall be removable at the pleasure of the commission. The commission may employ one or more architects to submit and carry out plans for the construction and furnishing, and shall pay them a reasonable compensation. The commission may employ such other professional or technical advisers and such agents and employees as it deems requisite for the proper execution of the duties of the commission, and may fix their compensation and remove or discharge them at pleasure.
  2. The commission may exact from any of its officers or employees indemnity bonds for the proper performance of their duties. The commission may pay the premiums on the indemnity bonds of any of its officers or employees.

History. 3037e-5.

98.090. Powers of commission.

  1. The commission may:
    1. Make such preliminary investigations and do such preliminary work as should, in its judgment, precede the actual construction of the building or improvement.
    2. Determine upon a proper site for the building or improvement. If the city owns a public building, that site, as it exists or as enlarged by the acquisition of adjacent property recommended by the commission, shall be used unless the commission determines that it is unsuitable for the purpose and recommends to the mayor the acquisition of another site. The mayor shall submit the recommendation to the legislative body for approval. The new site shall be adopted only upon the approval of the change by legislative resolution approved by the mayor. In the event the existing building on the old site is to be abandoned, the old site may be sold and the proceeds applied to the purchase of the new site.
    3. Provide accommodations for patients or inmates of the existing public building while the new building is in course of erection and furnishing. The legislative body may, out of its levy for the department having supervision of such buildings, assume the whole or part of the expense of providing such temporary accommodations.
    4. Establish and enforce reasonable rules and regulations for its own government and for the supervision, protection, management and conduct of its work and the payment therefor as it deems expedient.
    5. Purchase, hire or otherwise obtain the use of such lands, buildings, machinery, supplies, materials and working agencies as it needs for its purposes.
    6. Acquire by gift, purchase, lease or condemnation, any property situated within the city or county where the city is located, or any interest or privilege in the property, required for the building or improvement. The method of condemnation shall be the same as in the Eminent Domain Act of Kentucky.
  2. The enumeration of special powers in this section does not restrict the general powers of the commission to carry out the purposes of KRS 98.040 to 98.170 .

History. 3037e-7: amend. Acts 1976, ch. 140, § 52.

Compiler’s Notes.

The Eminent Domain Act of Kentucky is compiled as KRS 416.540 to 416.680 .

98.100. Duties of commission — Procedure in adopting plan.

  1. The commission shall examine methods of constructing, equipping and furnishing buildings or improvements of the type contemplated so as to determine the plan that will best answer the needs of the city, taking into consideration its probable growth.
  2. When the commission has decided upon a general plan for the construction and furnishing of the buildings or for making the improvements, it shall report the plan, with such alternative plans as it deems expedient, to the mayor, giving a description of the general plan and the probable cost of carrying out each plan. The mayor shall submit this report to the legislative body of the city and the plan recommended by the commission shall be adopted and carried out, unless the plan is rejected and disapproved by a two-thirds (2/3) vote of the legislative body within thirty (30) days from the time it is received by the legislative body. If the plan is rejected by the legislative body, then at any time within thirty (30) days thereafter one (1) of the alternative plans may be considered by the legislative body and of these plans the one (1) shall finally be adopted that is approved by a two-thirds (2/3) vote of the legislative body. If none of the plans receives the necessary two-thirds (2/3) vote within thirty (30) days after the one (1) recommended by the commission has been rejected, the commission, with the approval of the mayor, may choose a plan and carry it out. The legislative body shall have no power to vary any plan presented by the commission, but in adopting one (1) of those reported must adopt it in its entirety.

History. 3037e-6.

98.110. Awarding of contracts — Commission may do part of work.

All work done or supplies or materials purchased in carrying out the purposes of KRS 98.040 to 98.170 , when involving an expenditure of five hundred dollars ($500) or more, shall be by contract awarded to the lowest and best bidder. All bids or parts of bids for any such work or supplies may be rejected by the commission. Any commission may, with the consent of four (4) of its members, do any part of its work by day labor under such conditions as it may prescribe, when such procedure is recommended in writing by the superintendent of construction.

History. 3037e-8.

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

City may make purchases from federal government without taking bids, KRS 66.470 .

98.120. Issuance of bonds — Ordinance — Submission to voters — Resubmission.

  1. In order to provide money for the building and improvements, the legislative body of the city may, at any time and as often as it deems necessary, adopt an ordinance submitting to the voters of the city at any regular election the question whether bonds of the city shall be issued for the purpose of carrying out the work. The ordinance shall be filed with the county clerk not later than the second Tuesday in August preceding the regular election. The ordinance shall provide the number, date and maturity of the bonds, the rate of interest they shall bear and the total amount to be then issued. The ordinance shall also contain the necessary details in reference to the execution and delivery of the bonds, their denominations, coupons to be annexed, tax to be levied to pay the interest, and a sinking fund to retire the bonds at maturity.
  2. If any issue of bonds is voted on and not carried, or if any issue of bonds is voted on favorably and the money is about to be fully expended, or in the opinion of the legislative body will be expended, either before or within such time after an election that the work of the commission may be suspended from lack of funds, the legislative body of the city may pass as many ordinances and submit to a vote the question of issuing bonds at as many other regular elections held in the city as it may see fit.

History. 3037e-9, 3037e-12; 1996, ch. 195, § 50, effective July 15, 1996.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

Bonds to erect city hospital were properly issued under authority of law providing for issuance of bonds to provide funds for construction of hospital upon affirmative vote of the voters, as against contention that law violated Const., § 157 in that it only required affirmative vote of two-thirds of votes cast to authorize bonds, and also violated Const., § 3 in that it required members of hospital commission to be members of Democratic or Republican parties. Render v. Louisville, 142 Ky. 409 , 134 S.W. 458, 1911 Ky. LEXIS 200 ( Ky. 1911 ).

Research References and Practice Aids

ALR

“Necessary Expense”: Construction of public hospital or maintenance or care of indigent sick in hospital as within exception in constitutional or statutory provisions requiring vote of people to authorize contraction of debt by municipality or county or limiting amount of such indebtedness. 113 A.L.R. 1207.

98.130. Sale of bonds — Disposition of proceeds.

If the voters of the city vote in favor of issuing the bonds, they shall, when issued, be placed under the control of the commission, which shall determine when and at what price and how they shall be sold. No bonds shall be sold for less than par, and any premiums and accrued interest obtained from the bonds shall constitute a part of the sinking fund for their ultimate retirement. As the bonds are sold, their proceeds shall go to the credit of the commission in the same depositories that are selected for the deposit of the funds of the sinking fund commissioners of the city, and upon the same agreement as to interest, and shall be withdrawn only upon the checks of the secretary and treasurer of the commission, countersigned by the chairman, accompanying a voucher approved by the superintendent of construction or other employee designated by the commission for that purpose.

History. 3037e-10.

98.140. Disbursements to come from proceeds of bonds or appropriation by city.

  1. All disbursements of the commission, including compensation to its members, officers and employees, shall come out of the proceeds of the sale of the bonds, or out of an appropriation by the city.
  2. The legislative body of the city may make an appropriation to the commission out of any funds available, without an issuance of bonds or in addition to the bonds.
  3. If the money provided for the use of the commission has been expended, the director of works shall notify the mayor and legislative body of the city, and the mayor and legislative body of the city shall forthwith decide whether the commission shall be dissolved or shall be continued. If the commission is continued, the legislative body of the city shall, by ordinance approved by the mayor, fix the limit of expenditures of the commission and shall pay same out of such funds of the city as they deem best until a new appropriation for work has been made or a new bond issue has been passed to provide further funds for the commission, or until such time as the mayor and legislative body of said city decide that it is best to discontinue the commission.

History. 3037e-3, 3037e-11, 3037e-14.

98.150. Procedure on completion of building or improvement.

When the commission decides that any building or improvement, or any distinct portion thereof, has been completed and is ready for actual use, the commission shall notify the department of the city that has charge of buildings or improvements of the character of the one (1) completed, and such department shall thereafter have exclusive control of the building or improvement. Prior to that time the commission shall have sole supervision and control, notwithstanding the provisions of KRS 98.010 .

History. 3037e-15, 3037e-17: amend. Acts 1962, ch. 210, § 18.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(1982). A technical correction has been made in this section by the Reviser of Statutes pursuant to KRS 7.136 .

98.160. Appointment of new commission or continuance of old commission.

  1. If a commission is in existence at the time a bond issue is authorized, the commission and its successors shall continue any work provided for in KRS 98.040 to 98.170 , and shall have all the rights granted to the commission in the first instance. All of its property of every kind shall be vested in it as a corporation and the corporation shall be a continuance of the corporation then existing under any former act of the general assembly theretofore passed.
  2. If no commission exists at the time any bond issue is authorized, a new commission may be appointed and the provisions of KRS 98.040 to 98.170 shall apply to each new issue of bonds and to each new commission and the continuance of the work of the commission and to the carrying out of the work of KRS 98.040 to 98.170 , the same as in the first instance.

History. 3037e-12, 3037e-13.

98.170. Dissolution of commission.

  1. If the work upon which a commission is engaged is completed and no further work is contemplated within a definite time, the director of works shall notify the mayor and legislative body of the city, and the mayor and legislative body shall forthwith decide whether the commission shall be dissolved or shall be continued.
  2. If any commission is dissolved, all debts of the commission shall be first paid, and if any money remains in its hands from the proceeds of bond sales, such money shall be paid to the commissioners of the sinking fund of the city, to be used as a sinking fund for the bonds from the sale of which the money was derived.
  3. Upon the dissolution of a commission, the mayor shall take charge of and preserve all the office furniture, fixtures, machinery, tools, instruments, books and papers, and upon the appointment of another commission the same shall be turned over to the new commission, unless the legislative body of the city provides, by ordinance, for the sale or other disposition of the office furniture, fixtures, tools, instruments and machinery.

History. 3037e-3, 3037e-12.

98.180. Authority of city of first class and county containing such city to establish combined welfare organization.

The fiscal court of any county containing a city of the first class and the legislative body of any city of the first class in the county may, upon their joint action, combine, consolidate and jointly control, the departments, boards and other organizations created for the purpose of serving either the county or the city, or both, in the administration and supervision of: All forms of public assistance, general relief, and social services to adults and children in homes or eleemosynary and correctional institutions; city and county eleemosynary institutions; city and county penal institutions including the establishment of rules and regulations for the custody, government, and parole of inmates; other public welfare activities or services which are placed within the control of the city or fiscal court.

History. Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 211, § 1; 1966, ch. 255, § 116.

Compiler’s Notes.

Former section KRS 98.180 (2948-1) was repealed by Acts 1942, ch. 41.

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Lewis, Kostas, and Carnes. Consolidation — Complete or Functional — of City and County Governments in Kentucky, 42 Ky. L.J. 295 (1954).

98.190. Joint city-county board of welfare; appointment; term; vacancies; removal. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 211, § 2) was repealed by Acts 1956 (1st Ex. Sess.), ch. 3, § 11, effective June 6, 1956.

98.200. Inclusion of existing welfare agencies in board. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 211, § 3) was repealed by Acts 1956 (1st Ex. Sess.), ch. 3, § 11, effective June 6, 1956.

98.210. Oath of board members. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 211, § 4) was repealed by Acts 1956 (1st Ex. Sess.), ch. 3, § 11, effective June 6, 1956.

98.220. Compensation of board members; meetings; books and records. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 211, § 5) was repealed by Acts 1956 (1st Ex. Sess.), ch. 3, § 11, effective June 6, 1956.

98.230. Rules and regulations; divisions and subdivisions. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 211, § 6) was repealed by Acts 1956 (1st Ex. Sess.), ch. 3, § 11, effective June 6, 1956.

98.240. Director of welfare; employes. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 211, § 7) was repealed by Acts 1956 (1st Ex. Sess.), ch. 3, § 11, effective June 6, 1956.

98.250. Compensation of employes; civil service. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 211, § 8) was repealed by Acts 1956 (1st Ex. Sess.), ch. 3, § 11, effective June 6, 1956.

98.260. Condemnation of property; ownership and control of property; acceptance of donations; conveyance of property of other agencies. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 211, § 9) was repealed by Acts 1956 (1st Ex. Sess.), ch. 3, § 11, effective June 6, 1956.

98.270. Funds; governmental aid; appropriations; taxes. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 211, § 10) was repealed by Acts 1956 (1st Ex. Sess.), ch. 3, § 11, effective June 6, 1956.

98.280. Accounting and financial records and reports; audits; disposition of funds on dissolution. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 211, § 11) was repealed by Acts 1956 (1st Ex. Sess.), ch. 3, § 11, effective June 6, 1956.

98.290. Transfer of employes of existing agencies. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 211, § 12) was repealed by Acts 1956 (1st Ex. Sess.), ch. 3, § 11, effective June 6, 1956.

98.300. Fiscal court of county containing a city of first class may establish department of welfare — Consolidated local government may establish department of welfare — Employees.

In each county containing a city of the first class, the fiscal court of the county may, by resolution, establish a department of welfare to be governed by the provisions of KRS 98.300 to 98.390 . A consolidated local government may by resolution or ordinance establish or maintain a department of welfare to be governed by the provisions of KRS 98.300 to 98.390 . Such department shall function from a date specified in such resolution or ordinance. The department shall consist of a director of welfare and such assistants and other employees as are necessary for the efficient performance of the welfare services of the county.

History. Enact. Acts 1956 (1st Ex. Sess.), ch. 3, § 1, effective June 6, 1956; 2002, ch. 346, § 120, effective July 15, 2002.

98.310. Fiscal court or mayor of consolidated local government to appoint director — Qualifications — Powers — Duties — Bond.

The director shall be appointed by the fiscal court except in those counties containing a consolidated local government, in which case the director shall be appointed by the mayor. The director shall be trained and experienced in public welfare administration. Subject to rules and regulations approved by the fiscal court or the consolidated local government, respectively, the director shall have full charge of the department, with power to employ and dismiss employees subject to the limitations of KRS 98.370 . The director shall prepare for submission to and approval of the fiscal court or the consolidated local government, respectively, an annual budget, authorize expenditures in conformity with the budget, and prepare an annual report of the activities and expenditures of the department for submission to the fiscal court or the consolidated local government, respectively. Before entering upon the discharge of his or her duties, the director shall give a bond approved by the fiscal court or the consolidated local government, respectively, and the fiscal court or the consolidated local government, respectively, may, in its discretion, require bonds for other employees within the department.

History. Enact. Acts 1956 (1st Ex. Sess.), ch. 3, § 2, effective June 6, 1956; 2002, ch. 346, § 121, effective July 15, 2002.

98.320. Duties of the department.

The department shall administer the public welfare functions of the county, which shall include, but not be limited to, public assistance, general assistance, institutional care of children and adults, social services to families and individuals, and child welfare services, except as otherwise provided by law. Services shall not be limited to financial aid.

History. Enact. Acts 1956 (1st Ex. Sess.), ch. 3, § 3, effective June 6, 1956.

98.330. By agreement department may succeed to property and functions of board of city-county children’s home.

By agreement between the fiscal court of the county and the mayor and the board of aldermen of the city, the department may succeed to the property and functions of the board of a city-county children’s home established under Chapter 201, Kentucky Revised Statutes, to any extent as to management, operation, maintenance and ownership as said agreement may authorize and direct. In the event that such agreement so provides, the board of the city-county children’s home shall take all proper steps to effect the legal transfer of title to its property as directed by said agreement.

History. Enact. Acts 1956 (1st Ex. Sess.), ch. 3, § 4, effective June 6, 1956.

98.340. By agreement department may assist in administering or administer any state or local welfare function — Agreement to be in writing.

  1. The department may administer or assist in administering any state or local public welfare function by agreement between the fiscal court and the legislative body or officers, department, or agency in which the responsibility for administration of such activity is vested. Such agreements may include the performance of any duties and the exercise of any powers imposed upon or vested in such legislative body or officer, department, or agency, with respect to the administration of such function. Such agreement shall be in writing by the other party to the agreement, in the necessary form, and the acceptance shall be in the form of a resolution of the fiscal court. When such resolution becomes effective, the exercise of the powers and duties to which the agreement relates, including those provided in KRS 98.010 , shall be transferred to the department, and the other party shall be exempt from all further responsibility for the exercise of the powers and duties so transferred during the life of the agreement.
  2. Such agreement may be revoked at the option of either party by a resolution or ordinance or order of the revoking party filed in the office of the county clerk, and a copy shall be delivered to the other party. Such revocation shall become effective at the end of the fiscal year occurring at least one (1) year following the filing of said resolution or order. In the absence of such revocation so filed, the agreement shall continue indefinitely.
  3. The transfer of property and records of other state or local public welfare activities shall be according to the terms of the agreement.

History. Enact. Acts 1956 (1st Ex. Sess.), ch. 3, § 5, effective June 6, 1956.

98.350. Fiscal court or mayor of consolidated local government to appoint advisory board — Number — Term — Compensation — Duties.

The fiscal court, except in a county containing a consolidated local government, in which case it shall be the mayor pursuant to the provisions of KRS 67C.139 , shall appoint a bipartisan county welfare advisory board of not less than five (5) nor more than nine (9) residents of the county. The members shall be appointed in such a manner that the term of at least one (1) member shall expire annually. Any vacancy shall be filled for the unexpired term in the same manner as the original appointment. Members of the county welfare advisory board shall serve without compensation. The county welfare advisory board shall suggest rules and regulations to the county director of welfare with respect to the organization of the county department of welfare, and shall advise the director and the fiscal court or consolidated local government, respectively, as to budget estimates, policies, and other problems of welfare activities.

History. Enact. Acts 1956 (1st Ex. Sess.), ch. 3, § 6, effective June 6, 1956; 2002, ch. 346, § 122, effective July 15, 2002.

98.360. County to own property of department — Exception.

All property used in the functions of the department shall be property of the county except as provided in any contract or agreement executed pursuant to KRS 98.330 and 98.340 .

History. Enact. Acts 1956 (1st Ex. Sess.), ch. 3, § 7, effective June 6, 1956.

98.370. Personnel — Civil service.

The personnel of the department, except the director of welfare and his private secretary, shall be in the classified service from the date of the establishment of the department; and until such time as the county has an appropriate civil service facility, the positions and places of employment shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the civil service board of the first-class city contained in such county, and shall be governed by and made subject to the provisions of KRS 90.110 to 90.230 , with the exception of KRS 90.210 . Insofar as practicable, and as may be provided for in any agreements executed in pursuance of KRS 98.300 to 98.390 , all employees holding positions in the classified civil service, who have been appointed on the basis of a competitive examination and whose duties are transferred or may be transferred to the county department of welfare, shall be utilized for duties of a similar character and in the same class by the appointing authority. Persons not in the classified service, upon transfer, shall be included in the classified service hereunder and shall be considered as having satisfied all the requirements for obtaining original appointments and having completed their probationary periods of employment in the same or similar class or position held at the time of their transfer. The employees of any local public welfare department or agency administered by the department under KRS 98.330 and 98.340 shall be, insofar as it is economical and as may be provided in any agreements executed in pursuance of KRS 98.300 to 98.390 , retained as employees of the department and become subject to the laws, rules and regulations of the classified service, as are other employees of the department. This section shall not be construed to compel the appointment of more employees than are necessary to perform properly the duties of the department nor as applying to persons employed less than six (6) months prior to their transfer to the department.

History. Enact. Acts 1956 (1st Ex. Sess.), ch. 3, § 8, effective June 6, 1956.

98.380. City to be reimbursed by fiscal court for cost incurred by civil service board by reason of requirement of KRS 98.370.

The fiscal court shall reimburse the city of the first class for costs incurred by the city civil service board by reason of the requirement of KRS 98.370 , as may be provided for in any agreements executed pursuant to KRS 98.330 to 98.390 .

History. Enact. Acts 1956 (1st Ex. Sess.), ch. 3, § 9, effective June 6, 1956.

98.390. Suspension of applicable provisions of KRS Chapter 201.

The provisions of Kentucky Revised Statutes, Chapter 201, relating to the establishment of a board for city and county children’s home, shall be suspended upon the transfer of control of the functions and property of said board as provided in KRS 98.330 , during the term of such agreement.

History. Enact. Acts 1956 (1st Ex. Sess.), ch. 3, § 10, effective June 6, 1956.

CHAPTER 99 Urban Renewal and Redevelopment

Cities of the First and Second Classes

99.010. Definitions for KRS 99.010 to 99.310.

  1. The following terms, whenever used or referred to in KRS 99.010 to 99.310 shall, unless a different intent clearly appears from the context, be construed as follows:
    1. “Area” means a portion of a city which a planning commission has found or shall find to be substandard or insanitary, so that the clearance, replanning, rehabilitation, or reconstruction thereof is necessary or advisable to effectuate the public purposes declared in KRS 99.020 . An area may include any buildings or improvements not in themselves substandard or insanitary, and any real property, whether improved or unimproved, the inclusion of which is deemed necessary for the effective clearance, replanning, reconstruction, or rehabilitation of the area of which such buildings, improvements, or real property form a part;
    2. “City” means and is deemed to relate to any city of the first class, a city with a population of fifteen thousand (15,000) or more based upon the most recent federal decennial census, or urban-county government in the Commonwealth of Kentucky;
    3. “Development” means a specific work, repair, or improvement to put into effect a development plan. The term includes the real property, buildings, and improvements owned, constructed, managed, or operated by a redevelopment corporation;
    4. “Development area” means that portion of an area to which a development plan is applicable;
    5. “Development cost” means the amount determined by the supervising agency to be the actual cost of the development, or of the part thereof for which such determination is made, and includes, among other costs, the reasonable costs of planning the development, including preliminary studies and surveys, neighborhood planning, and architectural and engineering services, the reasonable value of the services performed by or for the incorporators of a redevelopment corporation in connection with the development plan prior to the time when the redevelopment corporation was incorporated or became a redevelopment corporation, fees for acquisition costs, the costs of financing the development, including carrying charges during construction, working capital in an amount not exceeding five percent (5%) of development cost, the actual cost of real property or any part thereof where acquired partly or wholly in exchange for securities, then, an amount which shall be approved by the supervising agency as being equal to the reasonable value of the real property acquired therefor, the actual cost of demolition of existing structures, the actual cost of utilities, landscaping, and roadways, the actual cost of construction, equipment, and furnishing of buildings and improvements, including architectural, engineering and builder’s fees, the actual cost of reconstruction, rehabilitation, remodeling, or initial repair of existing buildings and improvements, reasonable management, and operation costs until the development is ready for use, and the actual cost of improving that portion of the development area which is to remain as open space, together with such additions to development cost as shall equal the actual cost of additions to or changes in the development in accordance with the original development plan or after approved changes in or amendments thereto;
    6. “Development plan” means a plan for the redevelopment of all or any part of an area, and includes any amendments thereto approved in accordance with the requirements of KRS 99.070 ;
    7. “Local legislative body” means the board of aldermen or other board or body vested by the charter of the city or other law with jurisdiction to adopt or enact ordinances or local laws;
    8. “Mortgage” means a mortgage, trust indenture, deed of trust, building and loan contract, or other instrument creating a lien on real property, and the indebtedness secured by each of them;
    9. “Neighborhood unit” means a primarily residential district having the facilities necessary for well-rounded family living, such as schools, parks, playgrounds, parking areas, and local shopping districts;
    10. “Planning commission” means the official bureau, board, planning and zoning or other commission, or agency of the city or city and county authorized to prepare, adopt, and amend or modify plans for the development and improvement of the city generally;
    11. “Supervising agency” means the director of finance or such other person or city agency as may be authorized by the local legislative body under KRS 99.090 ;
    12. “Real property” includes lands, buildings, improvements, land under water, waterfront property, and any and all easements, franchises, and hereditaments, corporeal or incorporeal, and every estate, interest, privilege, easement, franchise, and right therein, or appurtenant thereto, legal or equitable, including rights-of-way, terms for years and liens, charges, or encumbrances by mortgage, judgment, or otherwise;
    13. “Redevelopment” means the clearance, replanning, reconstruction, or rehabilitation of a substandard or insanitary area, and the provision of such industrial, commercial, residential, or public structures and spaces as may be appropriate, including recreational and other facilities incidental or appurtenant thereto;
    14. “Redevelopment corporation” means a corporation organized pursuant to the corporation laws of the Commonwealth of Kentucky whose articles of incorporation shall comply with the requirements of KRS 99.100 to 99.130 ; and
    15. “State” means the Commonwealth of Kentucky.
  2. “Owner” as used in KRS 99.220 to 99.240 , includes a person having an estate, interest, or easement in the real property to be acquired or a lien, charge, or encumbrance thereon.

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 36, §§ 2, 14; 1968, ch. 152, § 82; 2014, ch. 92, § 185, effective January 1, 2015.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

Louisville v. Thompson, 339 S.W.2d 869, 1960 Ky. LEXIS 487 ( Ky. 1960 ); Grimm v. Moloney, 358 S.W.2d 496, 1962 Ky. LEXIS 180 ( Ky. 1962 ); Idol v. Knuckles, 383 S.W.2d 910, 1964 Ky. LEXIS 64 ( Ky. 1964 ); Watkins v. Fugazzi, 394 S.W.2d 594, 1965 Ky. LEXIS 194 ( Ky. 1965 ); Cartmell v. Urban Renewal & Community Development Agency, 419 S.W.2d 719, 1967 Ky. LEXIS 176 ( Ky. 1967 ); Cartmell v. Urban Renewal & Community Development Agency, 430 S.W.2d 649, 1968 Ky. LEXIS 408 ( Ky. 1968 ).

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Eminent Domain Act, KRS 416.540 to 416.680 .

General provisions concerning private corporations, KRS Ch. 271B.

Health and welfare in cities of the first class and in counties containing such cities, KRS Ch. 98.

Housing projects, KRS Ch. 80.

Improving land acquired to induce location of governmental agency, KRS 82.110 , 82.120 .

Interlocal cooperation act, KRS 65.210 to 65.300 .

Issuance of bonds for public projects, KRS Ch. 58.

Legal notices, KRS Ch. 424.

Municipal improvements; alternate method, KRS Ch. 107.

Planning and zoning, KRS Ch. 100.

Kentucky Law Journal.

Schroder, The Preservation of Historical Areas, 62 Ky. L.J. 940 (1973-1974).

ALR

Constitutionality, construction, and application of statutes or governmental projects for improvement of housing conditions (slum clearance). 130 A.L.R. 1069; 172 A.L.R. 966.

Right of owner of housing development to restrict canvassing, peddling, solicitation of contributions. 3 A.L.R.2d 1431.

Delegation of powers to administrative agency by statute providing for urban development by private enterprise. 44 A.L.R.2d 1427.

Redevelopment purposes, validity of provision for exemption from taxation of property transferred to private parties for. 44 A.L.R.2d 1446.

Suability and liability of public housing authority for torts. 61 A.L.R.2d 1246.

Validity and construction of statute or ordinance providing for repair or destruction of residential building by public authorities at owner’s expense. 43 A.L.R.3d 916.

What constitutes “blighted area” within urban renewal and redevelopment statutes. 45 A.L.R.3d 1096.

Validity and construction of zoning ordinance requiring developer to devote specified part of development to low and moderate income housing. 62 A.L.R.3d 880.

Liability of urban redevelopment authority or other state or municipal agency or entity for injuries occurring in vacant or abandoned property owned by governmental entity. 7 A.L.R.4th 1129.

99.020. Declaration of necessity for and purpose of KRS 99.010 to 99.310.

It is hereby declared that in cities, as defined in KRS 99.010 , that substandard and insanitary areas exist which have resulted from inadequate planning, excessive land coverage, lack of proper light, air, and open space, defective design and arrangement of buildings, lack of proper sanitary facilities, and the existence of buildings which, by reason of age, obsolescence, inadequate or outmoded design, or physical deterioration, have become economic or social liabilities, or both; that such conditions are prevalent in areas where substandard, insanitary, outworn, or outmoded industrial, commercial, or residential buildings prevail, and are conducive to ill health, transmission of disease, infant mortality, juvenile delinquency, crime, and poverty; that such conditions impair the economic value of large areas, infecting them with economic blight and that such areas are characterized by depreciated values, impaired investments, and reduced capacity to pay taxes; that such conditions are chiefly in areas which are so subdivided into small parcels in divided ownerships and frequently with defective titles, that their assembly for purposes of clearance, replanning, rehabilitation, and reconstruction is difficult and costly; that the existence of such conditions and the failure to clear, replan, rehabilitate, or reconstruct these areas result in a loss of population by the areas and further deterioration, accompanied by added costs to the communities for creation of new public facilities and services elsewhere; that it is difficult and uneconomic for individual owners independently to undertake to remedy such conditions; that it is desirable to encourage owners of property or holders of claims thereon in such areas to join together, with or without other persons, or other persons to join together, in corporate groups, for the purpose of the clearance, replanning, rehabilitation, and reconstruction of such areas by joint action; that it is necessary to create, with proper safeguards, inducements, and opportunities for the employment of private investment and equity capital in the clearance, replanning, rehabilitation, and reconstruction of such areas; that such conditions require the employment of such capital on an investment rather than a speculative basis, allowing, however, the widest latitude in the amortization of any indebtedness created thereby; that such conditions further require the acquisition at fair prices of adequate areas, the gradual clearance of such areas through demolition of existing obsolete, inadequate, unsafe, and insanitary buildings and the redevelopment of such areas under proper supervision with appropriate planning, land use, and construction policies; that the clearance, replanning, rehabilitation, and reconstruction of such areas on a large scale basis are necessary for the public welfare; that the clearance, replanning, reconstruction, and rehabilitation of such areas are public uses and purposes for which private property may be acquired; that such substandard and insanitary areas constitute a menace to the health, safety, morals, welfare, and reasonable comfort of the citizens of such cities and the state; that such conditions require the creation of the agencies, instrumentalities, and corporations hereinafter described, for the purpose of attaining the ends herein recited; that the protection and promotion of the health, safety, morals, welfare, and reasonable comfort of the citizens of such cities and the state are matters of public concern; and the necessity in the public interest for the provisions hereinafter enacted is hereby declared as a matter of legislative determination.

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 36, § 1; 1968, ch. 152, § 83; 2014, ch. 92, § 186, effective January 1, 2015.

Research References and Practice Aids

Journal of Energy, Natural Resources & Environmental Law.

Daugherty, 2006 Eminent Domain Ballot Initiatives: Citizens’ Voice or Crying Wolf?, 21 J. Energy, Nat. Res. & Env’l L. 99 (2007).

99.030. Development plan — What to include.

  1. A development plan shall contain:
    1. A metes and bounds or other legal description of the development area;
    2. A statement of the various stages, if more than one (1) is intended, by which the development is proposed to be constructed or undertaken, and the time limit for the completion of each stage, together with a metes and bounds description of the real property to be included in each stage;
    3. A statement of the existing buildings or improvements in the development area to be demolished immediately, if any;
    4. A statement of the existing buildings or improvements in the development area not to be demolished immediately, if any, and the approximate period of time during which the demolition, if any, of each such building or improvement is to take place;
    5. A statement of the proposed improvements, if any, to each building not to be demolished immediately, any proposed repairs or alterations to such building, and the approximate period of time during which such improvements, repairs or alterations are to be made;
    6. A statement of the type, number and character of each new industrial, commercial, residential or other building or improvement to be erected or made;
    7. A statement of those portions, if any, of the development area which may be permitted or will be required to be left as open space, the use to which each such open space is to be put, the period of time each such open space will be required to remain an open space and the manner in which it will be improved and maintained, if at all;
    8. A statement of those portions, if any, of the development area which the redevelopment corporation proposes to sell, donate, exchange or lease to, with or from the city, and an outline of the terms of such proposed sale, donation, exchange or lease;
    9. A statement of the proposed changes, if any, in zoning ordinances or maps, necessary or desirable for the development and its protection against blighting influences;
    10. A statement of the proposed changes, if any, in streets or street levels and any proposed street closings;
    11. A statement of the character of the existing dwelling accommodations, if any, in the development area, the approximate number of families residing therein, together with a schedule of the rentals being paid by them, and a schedule of the vacancies in such accommodations, together with the rental demanded therefor;
    12. A statement of the character, approximate number of units, approximate rentals and approximate date of availability of the proposed dwelling accommodations, if any, to be furnished during construction and upon completion of the development;
    13. A statement of the proposed method of financing the development, in sufficient detail to evidence the probability that the redevelopment corporation will be able to finance or arrange to finance the development; and
    14. A statement of persons who it is proposed will be active in or associated with the management of the redevelopment corporation during a period of at least one (1) year from the date of the approval of the development plan.
  2. The development plan, and any application to the planning commission or supervising agency for approval thereof, may contain in addition such other statements or materials as may be deemed relevant by the proposer thereof, including limits on the amounts which may be paid as compensation for services to the officers and employees of the redevelopment corporation, suggestions for the clearance, replanning, reconstruction or rehabilitation of one or more areas which may be larger than the development area but which include it, and any other provisions for the redevelopment of such area or areas.

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 36, § 3.

99.040. Approval of development plan required.

No development shall be initiated until certificates of approval of the development plan therefor shall have been issued by both the planning commission and the supervising agency.

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 36, § 3.

99.050. Conditions of approval of plan by planning commission.

  1. A planning commission may approve a development plan, but no certificate of approval thereof shall be issued by it unless and until an application for approval has been filed with it, together with the development plan, and unless and until, after a public hearing before it, notice of which hearing giving the time, place and purpose of the hearing shall be given by publication pursuant to KRS Chapter 424, and by one or more handbills posted up in the area sought to be redeveloped giving the time, place and purpose of the hearing, the planning commission finds:
    1. That the area within which the development area is included is substandard or insanitary and that the redevelopment of the development area in accordance with the development plan is necessary or advisable to effectuate the public purposes declared in KRS 99.020 ;
    2. That the development plan is in accord with the master plan, or city map, if any, of the city;
    3. That the development area is of sufficient size to allow its redevelopment in an efficient and economically satisfactory manner;
    4. That the various stages, if any, by which the development is proposed to be constructed or undertaken, as stated in the development plan, are practicable and in the public interest;
    5. That public facilities, including, but not limited to school, fire, police, transportation, park, playground and recreation, are presently adequate, or will be adequate, at the time that the development is ready for use, to service the development area;
    6. That the proposed changes, if any, in zoning ordinances or maps and in streets and street levels, or any proposed street closing, are necessary or desirable for the development and its protection against blighting influences and for the city as a whole; and
    7. Upon the data submitted by or on behalf of the redevelopment corporation, or upon data otherwise available to the planning commission, that the carrying into effect of the development plan will not cause undue hardship to the families, if any, occupying dwelling accommodations in the development area to such a degree as to outweigh the public purpose defined in KRS 99.020 .
  2. Any such findings shall be conclusive evidence of the facts so determined except upon proof of fraud or willful misfeasance. In arriving at such determination, the planning commission shall consider only those elements of the development plan relevant to such determination under paragraphs (a) through (g) of subsection (1) of this section and to the type of development which is physically desirable for the development area concerned from a city planning viewpoint, and from a neighborhood unit viewpoint if the development plan provides that the development area is to be primarily residential. Upon approval of a development plan by the planning commission, it shall forthwith issue a certificate of approval thereof.
  3. Such planning commission may state general standards of city and neighborhood unit planning to which a development plan should conform to be approved by it. Such standards, however, shall be as flexible as possible and only for the guidance of prospective proponents of development plans. Variations therefrom shall be freely allowed upon a showing of their advisability, to the end that individual initiative be encouraged.

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 36, § 3; 1966, ch. 239, § 98.

99.060. Conditions of approval of plan by supervising agency.

  1. A supervising agency may approve a development plan, but no certificate of approval thereof shall be issued by it unless and until the planning commission shall first have approved thereof and there has been filed with the supervising agency the development plan, the certificate of approval by the planning commission and an application for approval by the supervising agency, and unless and until the supervising agency shall find:
    1. That the proposed method of financing the development is feasible and that it is probable that the redevelopment corporation will be able to finance or arrange to finance the development; and
    2. That the persons who it is proposed will be active in or associated with the management of the redevelopment corporation during a period of at least one (1) year from the date of the approval of the development plan have sufficient ability and experience to cause the development to be undertaken, consummated and managed in a satisfactory manner.
  2. Any such determination shall be conclusive evidence of the facts so determined except upon proof of fraud or willful misfeasance. In considering whether or not a certificate of approval of the development plan shall be issued, the supervising agency shall consider only those elements of the development plan relevant to such determination under paragraphs (a) and (b) of subsection (1) of this section. Upon approval of a development plan by the supervising agency, it shall forthwith issue a certificate of approval thereof.

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 36, § 3.

99.070. Approval of amendments to plan.

The planning commission and the supervising agency may approve an amendment or amendments to a development plan, but no such amendment to a development plan which has theretofore been approved by the planning commission and the supervising agency shall be approved unless and until an application therefor has been filed with the planning commission or the supervising agency by the redevelopment corporation containing that part of the material required by KRS 99.030 which shall be relevant to the proposed amendment, and unless and until the planning commission or the supervising agency, as the case may be, shall make the findings required by KRS 99.050 or 99.060 which shall be relevant to the proposed amendment.

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 36, § 3.

99.080. Fees for supervisory services — Development by more than one corporation.

  1. The planning commission and the supervising agency may each adopt a schedule of fees to be paid said commission or said agency, as the case may be, upon the filing of the development plan, amendments thereto and other instruments in connection therewith. The amount of these fees shall not exceed the reasonable cost of the examining, inspectional and supervisory services required under KRS 99.010 to 99.310 .
  2. An area may be developed by one (1) redevelopment corporation, or an area may be divided into two (2) or more development areas, each to be developed by a different redevelopment corporation, as the planning commission and supervising agency may direct, having due regard to all factors, including but not limited to planning and zoning laws, rules and regulations, the environment of the area and redevelopment area, the public safety, health, morals, and general welfare, and the interests of the development corporations, to the end that the purposes of KRS 99.010 to 99.310 may be best accomplished; but if the planning commission and the supervising agency are unable to agree thereupon, the local legislative body shall by resolution determine the matter.

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 36, § 3; 1944, ch. 128, § 2.

99.090. Designation of supervising agency — Grant of powers by ordinance.

The local legislative body of such cities is hereby authorized by general ordinance or local law to appoint, establish or designate the chief financial officer of the city or some other official or bureau, commission or agency as the person or body to exercise the powers and perform the duties held by or incumbent upon a supervising agency pursuant to KRS 99.010 to 99.310 , except that if there is a director of finance in the city he shall have the power and perform the duties of such supervising agency unless otherwise provided by ordinance. In the event the planning commission or the supervising agency of such city does not now have sufficient authority to carry out their respective duties under KRS 99.010 to 99.310 , or to accomplish the purposes of those sections, then such authority may be provided by general ordinance of the local legislative body of such city.

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 36, § 4.

99.100. Organization of redevelopment corporation — Articles.

  1. At any time within twenty (20) years of June 1, 1942, three (3) or more persons may form a redevelopment corporation on making, subscribing, acknowledging and filing articles of incorporation and obtaining a certificate or charter pursuant to the general corporation law, which charter shall be entitled and indorsed “Certificate or Charter of Incorporation of  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Redevelopment Corporation,” the blank space being filled in with the remainder of the name of the corporation. Such articles of incorporation shall contain the provisions required in, and may contain any provisions consistent with the provisions of KRS 99.010 to 99.310 permitted in, articles of incorporation filed pursuant to the general corporation law, except that:
    1. Included among the purposes for which the corporation is formed shall be the formulation, obtaining the approval of, and putting into effect of a development plan, the acquisition of real property in a development area, and the construction, maintenance and operation of a development pursuant to KRS 99.010 to 99.310 ;
    2. The duration of the corporation shall not be less than twenty (20) years; and
    3. The certificate or charter shall contain a declaration that the redevelopment corporation has been organized to serve a public purpose, and that it shall be subject to supervision and control as provided in KRS 99.010 to 99.310.
  2. A copy of such articles of incorporation shall be filed with the planning commission and the supervising agency having jurisdiction within thirty (30) days of its being filed in the office of the Secretary of State.

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 36, § 5.

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Articles of incorporation, KRS 271B.2-020 .

99.110. Existing corporation may become redevelopment corporation by amending articles.

At any time within twenty (20) years of June 1, 1942, any domestic corporation which is not a redevelopment corporation but which has been incorporated pursuant to the general corporation law, may become a redevelopment corporation by filing an appropriate amendment to its articles of incorporation and obtaining certificate or certificates pursuant to the general corporation law changing the provisions of its articles and charter or certificate of incorporation to eliminate any provisions therein inconsistent with the provisions of KRS 99.010 to 99.310 and adding or substituting the provisions required by KRS 99.100 to 99.130 , by changing its name to a name corresponding to the form “ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Redevelopment Corporation,” and making all the other changes necessary to enable it to conform with all of the provisions of KRS 99.010 to 99.310 . Any such amended articles of incorporation shall be prepared and filed pursuant to the general corporation law, except that in addition to citing such law in the title of such certificate, the title shall also state that it is being made pursuant to this section.

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 36, § 5.

99.120. Forfeiture of rights of redevelopment corporation.

If a redevelopment corporation shall not have obtained the certificates of approval of its development plan required by KRS 99.040 to 99.060 within twelve (12) months of the date upon which it became a redevelopment corporation, or shall not substantially comply with the development plan within the time limit for the completion of each stage thereof as therein stated, reasonable delays caused by unforeseen difficulties excepted, then upon the filing in the Department of State of a certified copy of the order of the court establishing such failure to obtain such certificate or substantially so to comply, obtained pursuant to KRS 99.190 , such redevelopment corporation shall cease to have the special rights, powers and privileges granted to, or be subject to the special duties, liabilities and restrictions imposed upon, a redevelopment corporation by KRS 99.010 to 99.310 , and shall thereafter change its name to remove the word “redevelopment” therefrom. In such event, however, such corporation may thereafter continue in existence as a corporation, subject to the general corporation law. In the event that a certified copy of such order shall be so filed, all real property acquired by or for such redevelopment corporation by condemnation shall be disposed of, either alone or in conjunction with additional real property not so acquired, within a reasonable time by bona fide sale. All amounts received by the redevelopment corporation for such real property in excess of an amount equal to that portion of the development cost allocable to the real property being disposed of, shall be paid to the city.

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 36, § 5.

99.130. Other corporations not to use “redevelopment” in name.

No corporation now organized under the laws of this state shall change its name to a name, and no such corporation hereafter organized shall have a name, containing the word “redevelopment” as a part thereof, unless and until such corporation is or becomes a redevelopment corporation. No foreign corporation now authorized to do business in this state shall change its name to a name, and no such corporation shall hereafter be authorized to do business in this state with a name, containing the word “redevelopment” as a part thereof.

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 36, § 5.

99.140. Restrictions on redevelopment corporations.

No redevelopment corporation shall:

  1. Undertake any clearance, reconstruction, improvement, alteration or construction in connection with any development until the certificates of approval required by KRS 99.040 to 99.060 have been issued;
  2. Change, alter, amend, add to or depart from the development plan until the planning commission or the supervising agency, as the case may be, has issued a certificate of approval of that portion of such change, alteration, amendment, addition or departure relevant to the finding required to be made by it as set forth in KRS 99.070 ;
  3. After a development has been commenced, sell, transfer or assign any real property in the development area without first obtaining the consent of the planning commission and the supervising agency;
  4. Undertake more than one (1) development;
  5. Pay dividends, if any, except out of net earnings;
  6. Pay as compensation for services to, or enter into contracts for the payment of compensation for services to, its officers or employees in an amount greater than the limit thereon contained in the development plan, or in default thereof, then in an amount greater than the reasonable value of the services performed or to be performed by such officers or employees;
  7. Lease an entire building or improvement in the development area to any person or corporation without obtaining the approval of the supervising agency, which may be withheld only if the lease is being made for the purpose of evading the regulatory provisions of KRS 99.010 to 99.310 ;
  8. Mortgage any of its real property without obtaining the approval of the planning commission and the supervising agency;
  9. Make any guarantee without obtaining the approval of the supervising agency;
  10. Dissolve without obtaining the approval of the supervising agency, which may be given upon such conditions as the supervising agency may deem necessary or appropriate to the protection of the interest of the city in the proceeds of the sale of the real property acquired by condemnation as provided in KRS 99.120 , such approval to be indorsed on the certificate of dissolution and such certificate not to be filed in the Department of State in the absence of such indorsement; or
  11. Reorganize without obtaining the approval of the supervising agency.

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 36, § 6.

99.150. General corporation laws apply.

The provisions of the general corporation law as presently in effect and as hereafter from time to time amended, shall apply to redevelopment corporations, except where such provisions are in conflict with the provisions of KRS 99.010 to 99.310 .

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 36, § 7.

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Private corporations, KRS Ch. 271B.

99.160. Stock not to be issued except for value received.

No redevelopment corporation shall issue stock except for money or property actually received for the use and lawful purposes of the corporation or services actually performed for the corporation.

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 36, § 8.

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Corporation stock to be issued for value, Const., § 193.

99.170. Determination of development cost.

  1. Upon the completion of a development a redevelopment corporation shall, or upon the completion of a principal part of a development a redevelopment corporation may, file with the supervising agency an audited statement of the development cost thereof. Within a reasonable time after the filing of such statement, the supervising agency shall determine the development cost applicable to the development or such portion thereof and shall issue to the redevelopment corporation a certificate stating the amount thereof as so determined.
  2. A redevelopment corporation may, at any time, whether prior or subsequent to the undertaking of any contract or expense, apply to the supervising agency for a ruling as to whether any particular item of cost therein may be included in development cost when finally determined by the supervising agency, and the amount thereof. The supervising agency shall, within a reasonable time after such application, render a ruling thereon, and in the event that it shall be ruled that any item of cost may be included in development cost, the amount thereof as so determined shall be so included in development cost when finally determined.

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 36, § 9.

99.180. Reports to supervising agency — Reserves — Accounts.

A redevelopment corporation shall:

  1. Furnish to the supervising agency from time to time, as required by it, but with respect to regular reports not more often than once every six (6) months, such financial information, statements, audited reports or other material as such supervising agency shall require, each of which shall conform to such standards of accounting and financial procedure as the supervising agency may by general regulation prescribe.
  2. Establish and maintain such depreciation and other reserves, surplus and other accounts as the supervising agency may reasonably require.

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 36, § 10.

99.190. Proceedings in Circuit Court to compel compliance with law by redevelopment corporations.

Whenever a redevelopment corporation shall not have obtained the certificates of approval of its development plan required by KRS 99.040 to 99.060 within twelve (12) months of the date upon which it became a redevelopment corporation, or shall not have substantially complied with its development plan within the time limits for the completion of each stage thereof as therein stated, reasonable delays caused by unforeseen difficulties excepted, or shall do, permit to be done or fail or omit to do anything contrary to or required of it by, as the case may be, KRS 99.010 to 99.310 , or shall be about so to do, permit to be done or fail or omit to have done, as the case may be, then any such fact may be certified by the planning commission or the supervising agency, whichever shall have supervision thereof, to the chief legal officer of the city, who may thereupon commence a proceeding in the Circuit Court of the county in which such city is located in the city’s name for the purpose of having such action, failure or omission, or threatened action, failure or omission, established by order of the court for the purpose stated in KRS 99.120 , or stopped, prevented or otherwise rectified by mandamus, injunction or otherwise. Such proceedings shall be commenced by a petition to the Circuit Court alleging the violation complained of and praying for appropriate relief. It shall thereupon be the duty of the court to specify the time, not exceeding twenty (20) days after service of a copy of the petition, within which the redevelopment corporation complained of must answer the petition. The court shall, immediately after a default in answering or after answer, as the case may be, inquire into the facts and circumstances in such manner as the court shall direct without other or formal proceedings, and without respect to any technical requirements. Such other persons or corporations as it shall seem to the court necessary or proper to join as parties in order to make its orders of judgment effective may be joined as parties. The final judgment or order in any such action or proceeding shall dismiss the action or proceeding or establish the failure complained of or direct that a mandamus order, or an injunction, or both, issue, or grant such other relief as the court may deem appropriate.

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 36, § 11.

99.200. Authority to transfer real property to redevelopment corporations.

Notwithstanding any requirement of law to the contrary or the absence of direct provision therefor in the instrument under which a fiduciary is acting, every executor, administrator, trustee, guardian, conservator or any other person holding trust funds or acting in a fiduciary capacity, unless the instrument under which such fiduciary is acting expressly forbids, the state, its subdivisions, cities, all other public bodies, all public officers, corporations organized under or subject to the provisions of the banking law (including savings banks, savings and loan associations, trust companies, banking corporations), the commissioner of the Department of Financial Institutions as conservator, liquidator or rehabilitator of any such person, partnership or corporation, persons, partnerships and corporations organized under or subject to the provisions of the insurance law, the commissioner of the Department of Insurance as conservator, liquidator or rehabilitator of any such person, partnership or corporation, any of which owns or holds any real property within a development area, may grant, sell, lease or otherwise transfer any such real property to a redevelopment corporation, and receive and hold any cash, stocks, notes, mortgages, or other securities or obligations, which they are allowed by law to acquire, exchanged therefor by such redevelopment corporation, and may execute such instruments and do such acts as may be deemed necessary or desirable by them or it and by the redevelopment corporation in connection with the development and the development plan.

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 36, § 12; 1982, ch. 141, § 54, effective July 1, 1982; 2010, ch. 24, § 84, effective July 15, 2010.

Compiler’s Notes.

Acts 1980, ch. 396, which would have taken effect on July 1, 1982, was repealed by Acts 1982, ch. 141, § 146, effective July 1, 1982; accordingly, the amendment to this section by § 59 of ch. 396 never took effect.

99.210. Power of corporation to acquire real property — City may condemn and convey to corporation — Federal or state aid — Alternate method of acquiring and conveying land.

  1. A redevelopment corporation may, whether before or after the certificates of approval of its development plan required by KRS 99.040 to 99.060 have been issued, acquire real property or secure options in its own name or in the name of nominees to acquire real property, by gift, grant, lease, purchase or otherwise.
  2. Such city may, upon request by a redevelopment corporation, and after a certificate of approval of condemnation with respect to the real property in question has been issued pursuant to KRS 99.220 , acquire, or obligate itself to acquire, for such redevelopment corporation, any real property included in such certificate of approval of condemnation, by condemnation. Real property acquired by such city for a redevelopment corporation shall be conveyed by such city to the redevelopment corporation upon payment to the city of all sums expended or required to be expended by the city in the acquisition of such real property.
  3. In connection with the activities and projects of redevelopment corporations, the city may apply for, receive, and accept grants-in-aid, gifts, credits, and all other aid and in all forms, whether similar to or dissimilar from those particularly enumerated, from the federal government, which embraces the United States of America, its agencies and instrumentalities, or from the Commonwealth of Kentucky, its agencies and instrumentalities or from both, under such lawful contracts, terms, and conditions, as may be agreed upon.
  4. In order to further the accomplishment of the purposes of KRS 99.010 to 99.310 , and in addition to the powers heretofore or which may hereafter be granted to it, the city may, as an alternate method of acquiring by gift, purchase, or condemnation, and selling and transferring real property to a redevelopment corporation, by ordinance or ordinances, proceed as follows:
    1. From time to time designate an area within such city as under consideration for development under the provisions of KRS 99.010 to 99.310 and provide for consultation with and aid from any and all city departments, commissions, officers, employees, agencies, and instrumentalities, relating to the initiation of the project.
    2. Apply for and receive gifts, grants, credits, and obtain loans for the accomplishment of each development or developments generally, and obligate such city to supervise the application of such funds for such purpose or purposes, and also accept gifts, grants, conveyances and leaseholds within such area or areas, and to provide funds, where necessary, to obtain gifts, grants, credits or loans from the federal government, its agencies and instrumentalities, or from the Commonwealth of Kentucky, its agencies and instrumentalities, or from both or any other agency under such lawful contracts, terms and conditions as may be agreed upon.
    3. Appropriate funds acquired under paragraph (b) or by taxation for the acquisition of all or any part or parts of the property in each such area for development under KRS 99.010 to 99.310 by purchase and by condemnation, and for the clearance of all or any part or parts of the property owned by or thus acquired by such city. Such condemnation shall be under the provisions of KRS 99.010 to 99.310, but the city may waive request for condemnation or deposit or obligation to furnish the funds, as set out in KRS 99.230 .
    4. Advertise for the submission of development plans for such designated area by a redevelopment corporation under the provisions of KRS 99.010 to 99.310, application therefor to be accompanied by a bid for such lands and estates therein as the city owns or may obligate itself to purchase, or otherwise acquire and lease, sublease, sell, or convey to the redevelopment corporation, provided a plan is submitted and is finally accepted and approved under the provisions of KRS 99.010 to 99.310. If more than one (1) plan and bid is submitted for any one (1) project thus advertised, then the plan and bid that together would prove most beneficial to the city in accomplishing the purposes of KRS 99.010 to 99.310 shall be submitted for approval under the terms of KRS 99.010 to 99.310, but the city may reject any and all applications, bids and plans. Said city shall be the sole judge as to which plan is the most beneficial. Such advertisement shall clearly describe the area under consideration for development, the part or parts thereof owned by the city or which it will acquire, and the estates in each parcel that is being offered for sale, the terms and conditions, and shall be published pursuant to KRS Chapter 424.
    5. The terms of the bid for such land or lands or leaseholds may be for all cash, or part cash and part on time, or all on time, with or without interest, and with or without lien retained. Any term of payment shall not be for a period exceeding five (5) years from date of completion of the project.
    6. As a further inducement, the terms of the bid may provide for a discount not exceeding ten percent (10%) a year on such bid for each year, not exceeding five (5), in event the development during each such year is in accordance with the development plan.

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 36, § 13; 1944, ch. 128, § 1; 1966, ch. 239, § 99.

99.220. Certificate of approval of condemnation.

  1. When it is desired that any real property in a development area be acquired by condemnation, there shall be presented to the supervising agency by the redevelopment corporation a verified petition requesting the issuance of a certificate of approval of condemnation of such real property which shall contain, among other things:
    1. A metes and bounds description or other legal description of the real property involved and a statement of the estate, interest, privilege, franchise or right therein or appurtenant thereto to be condemned;
    2. Proof that such real property is within the development area; and
    3. Proof that certificates of approval of the development plan required by KRS 99.040 to 99.060 have been issued.
  2. The supervising agency shall determine within a reasonable time thereafter the truth or sufficiency of the statements and proof contained in such petition, and, if such determination shall be in the affirmative, the supervising agency shall issue to the petitioner a certificate of approval of condemnation. Such certificate shall contain a description of the real property proposed to be condemned, the facts so determined with respect thereto, and a statement that the real property proposed to be condemned is required for a public use and that its acquisition for such use is necessary. No condemnation proceeding to acquire real property in a development area, by a city for a redevelopment corporation, shall be commenced until such a certificate of approval of condemnation shall have been issued.

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 36, § 14.

99.230. Method of condemnation — Conveyance of property to corporation.

Before condemnation proceedings for a redevelopment corporation shall be instituted the redevelopment corporation shall make written request to the mayor of the city to cause the city to institute proceedings to acquire for the redevelopment corporation any real property in the development area. Such request shall be granted or rejected by the city through action of its local legislative body, and the ordinance granting such request shall contain a requirement that the redevelopment corporation shall pay to the city all sums expended or required to be expended by the city in the acquisition of such real property, and the time of payment and manner of securing payment thereof, and may require that the city shall receive, before proceeding with the acquisition of such real property, such assurances as to payment or reimbursement thereof by the redevelopment corporation, or otherwise, as the city may deem advisable. Upon the passage of such ordinance by the local legislative body, granting the petition, the redevelopment corporation shall cause to be made three (3) copies of surveys or maps of the real property described in the petition, one (1) of which shall be filed in the office of the redevelopment corporation, one (1) in the office of the chief law officer of the city, and one (1) in the office in which instruments affecting real property in the county are recorded. The filing of such copies of surveys or maps shall constitute the acceptance by the redevelopment corporation of the terms and conditions contained in such ordinance. Proceedings for such condemnation shall be conducted in the Circuit Court of the county in which the property lies, and shall be conducted in the name of such city by the city attorney, and the judgment of the court shall vest fee simple title to the property condemned in the city. In all other respects and except as herein specifically provided, the form and manner of the proceedings shall be the same as that provided for the condemnation of property for park purposes in such city. When title to the real property shall have vested in the city, it shall for use in such redevelopment convey the same to the redevelopment corporation upon payment by the redevelopment corporation of the sums and the giving of the security required by the ordinance granting the request. As soon as title shall have vested in the city, the redevelopment corporation may, upon the authorization of the local legislative body, enter upon the real property taken, take over and dispose of existing improvements, and carry out the terms of the development plan with respect thereto.

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 36, § 14.

99.240. Kinds of evidence admissible on question of value of condemned property — Expedition of proceedings — Condemnation of property devoted to public use.

The following provisions shall apply to any proceedings for the assessment of compensation and damages for real property in a development area taken or to be taken by condemnation for a redevelopment corporation:

  1. Evidence of the price and other terms upon any bona fide sale, or the rent received or reserved, and other terms upon any bona fide sale, option, lease or tenancy relating to any of the real property taken or to be taken or to any comparable real property in the vicinity when the option, sale, or lease was given, occurred or the tenancy existed, within a reasonable time of the trial, shall be admissible on direct examination.
  2. Any time during the pendency of such action or proceeding, the redevelopment corporation, the city or any owner may apply to the court for an order directing any owner, the redevelopment corporation, or the city, as the case may be, to show cause why further proceedings should not be expedited, and the court may upon such application make an order requiring that the hearings proceed and that any other steps be taken with all possible expedition.
  3. For the purposes of KRS 99.010 to 99.310 , the award of compensation shall not be increased by reason of any increase in the value of the real property caused by the assembly, clearance or reconstruction, or proposed assembly, clearance or reconstruction for the purposes of KRS 99.010 to 99.310 of the real property in the development area. No allowance shall be made for the improvements begun on real property after notice to the owner of such property of the institution of the proceedings to condemn such property.
  4. Evidence shall be admissible bearing upon the insanitary, unsafe or substandard condition of the premises, or the illegal use thereof, or the enhancement of rentals from such illegal use, and such evidence may be considered in fixing the compensation to be paid, notwithstanding that no steps to remedy or abate such conditions have been taken by the department or officer having jurisdiction. If a violation order is on file against the premises in any such department, it shall constitute prima facie evidence of the existence of the condition specified in such order.
  5. If any of the real property in the development area which is to be acquired by condemnation has, prior to such acquisition, been devoted to another public use, it may nevertheless be acquired, Provided, That no real property belonging to the city or to any other governmental body, or agency or instrumentality thereof, corporate or otherwise, may be acquired without its consent.
  6. Upon the trial, evidence of the price and other terms upon a sale or assignment or of a contract for the sale or assignment of a mortgage, award, proposed award, transfer of a tax lien or lien of a judgment relating to property taken, shall be relevant, material and competent, upon the issue of value or damage and shall be admissible on direct examination.
  7. Upon the trial, a statement, affidavit, deposition, report, transcript of testimony in an action or proceeding, or appraisal made or given by any owner or prior owner of the premises taken, or by any person on his behalf, to any court, governmental bureau, department or agency respecting the value of the real property for tax purposes, shall be relevant, material and competent upon the issue of value or damage and shall be admissible on direct examination.

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 36, § 14.

99.250. Temporary occupation of real property after acquisition and before development.

  1. When title to real property has vested in a redevelopment corporation or city by gift, grant, devise, purchase or otherwise, or in the city by condemnation proceedings or otherwise, the redevelopment corporation or city, as the case may be, may agree with the previous owners of such property, or any tenants continuing to occupy or use it, or any other persons who may occupy or use or seek to occupy or use such property, that such former owner, tenant or other person may occupy or use such property upon the payment of a fixed sum of money for a definite term or upon the payment periodically of an agreed sum of money. Such occupation or use shall not be construed as a tenancy from month to month, nor require the giving of notice by the redevelopment corporation or the city, as the case may be, for the termination of such occupation or use or the right to such occupation or use, but immediately upon the expiration of the term for which payment has been made the redevelopment corporation or city, as the case may be, shall be entitled to possession of the real property and may maintain summary proceedings by forcible detainer or otherwise, and shall be entitled to such other remedy as may be provided by law for obtaining immediate possession thereof. A former owner, tenant or other person occupying or using such property shall not be required to give notice to the redevelopment corporation or city, as the case may be, at the expiration of the term for which he has made payment for such occupation or use, as a condition to his cessation of occupation or use and termination of liability therefor.
  2. In the event that a city has acquired real property for a redevelopment corporation, the city shall, in transferring title to the redevelopment corporation, deduct from the consideration or other moneys which the redevelopment corporation has become obligated to pay to the city for such purpose, and credit the redevelopment corporation with, the amounts received by the city as payment for temporary occupation and use of the real property by a former owner, tenant, or other person, as in this section provided, less the cost and expense incurred by the city for the maintenance and operation of such real property.

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 36, § 15.

99.260. Power of corporation to borrow money and execute mortgages.

  1. Upon first obtaining the approval of the supervising agency, any redevelopment corporation may borrow funds for use in the redevelopment, before or during such redevelopment, and secure the repayment of same by mortgage or mortgages. Every such mortgage shall be a lien upon no other property except that forming the whole or a part of a single development area.
  2. Any redevelopment corporation may also borrow funds and secure the repayment thereof by mortgage or mortgages. Every such mortgage shall contain reasonable amortization provisions and be a lien upon no other real property except that forming the whole or a part of a single development area.
  3. Any redevelopment corporation may mortgage the real property in a development area, or any part thereof, and create a first lien, or a second or other junior lien, upon such real property, as the case may be.

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 36, § 16.

99.270. Obligations of redevelopment corporation are authorized investments.

Certificates, bonds, and notes, or part interests therein, or any part of an issue thereof, which are secured by a first mortgage on the real property in a development area, or any part thereof, shall be securities in which all the following persons, partnerships, or corporations and public bodies or public officers may legally invest the funds within their control, provided that the principal amount secured by such mortgage shall not exceed the limits, if any, imposed by law for such investments by the person, partnership, corporation, public body, or public officer making the same: Every executor, administrator, trustee, guardian, conservator, or other person or corporation holding trust funds or acting in a fiduciary capacity; the state, its subdivisions, cities, all other public bodies, all public officers; persons, partnerships, and corporations organized under or subject to the provisions of the banking law (including savings banks, savings and loan associations, trust companies, banking corporations); the commissioner of the Department of Financial Institutions as conservator, liquidator, or rehabilitator of any such person, partnership, or corporation; persons, partnerships, or corporations organized under or subject to the provisions of the insurance law; fraternal benefit societies; and the commissioner of the Department of Insurance as conservator, liquidator, or rehabilitator of any such person, partnership, or corporation.

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 36, § 16; 1982, ch. 141, § 55, effective July 1, 1982; 2010, ch. 24, § 85, effective July 15, 2010.

Compiler’s Notes.

Acts 1980, ch. 396, which would have taken effect on July 1, 1982, was repealed by Acts 1982, ch. 141, § 146, effective July 1, 1982; accordingly, the amendment to this section by § 60 of ch. 396 never took effect.

99.280. Obligations insured under Federal Housing Act not subject to investment limits.

The limits as to principal amount secured by mortgage referred to in KRS 99.270 shall not apply to certificates, bonds and notes, or part interests therein, or any part of an issue thereof, which are secured by first mortgage on real property in a development area, or any part thereof, which the federal housing administrator has insured or has made a commitment to insure under the National Housing Act. Any such person, partnership, corporation, public body or public officer may receive and hold any debentures, certificates or other instruments issued or delivered by the federal housing administrator, pursuant to the National Housing Act, in compliance with the contract of insurance of a mortgage on real property in the development area, or any part thereof.

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 36, § 16.

Compiler’s Notes.

The National Housing Act referred to in this section is compiled as 12 USCS § 1701 et seq.

99.290. Sale of real property by city to corporation.

  1. The local legislative body may by ordinance determine that real property specified and described in such ordinance, title to which is held by the city and which was not acquired by condemnation under the provisions of KRS 99.010 to 99.310 , is needed for the redevelopment project and may authorize the city to convey, sell, such real property to a redevelopment corporation. Provided, however, that the title of the city to such real property be not declared inalienable by charter of the city, or other similar law or instrument.
  2. Notwithstanding the provisions of any general, special or local law or ordinance, such sale may be made without appraisal, public notice or public bidding for such price and upon such terms as may be agreed upon between the city and the redevelopment corporation.
  3. Before such sale to a redevelopment corporation shall be authorized, a public hearing shall be held by the local legislative body to consider the proposed sale. Notice of such hearing shall be published pursuant to KRS Chapter 424.
  4. The deed to such real property shall be executed in the same manner as a deed by the city of other real property owned by it and may contain such appropriate conditions and provisions as are authorized by KRS 99.010 to 99.310 relating to such redevelopment corporation and any conditions or provisions of deeds to the city.
  5. A redevelopment corporation purchasing real property from a city shall not, without the consent of the legislative body of the city, use such real property for any purpose except in connection with the redevelopment. The deed may contain a condition that the redevelopment corporation will devote the real property granted only for the purposes of its development subject to the restrictions of KRS 99.010 to 99.310 .

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 36, § 17; 1966, ch. 239, § 100.

99.300. Certificates of completion — Sale or mortgage of completed development.

  1. It shall be the duty of the supervising agency, upon any request from a redevelopment corporation, to determine whether the redevelopment of any unit or units in the development area has been achieved, and if the supervising agency finds that such redevelopment has been finished and achieved it shall issue to the redevelopment corporation a certificate of completion showing that the redevelopment of such parcel or parcels has or have been completed, describing such unit or units.
  2. It shall be the duty of the supervising agency, upon request from a redevelopment corporation, to determine whether the redevelopment of the development area has been achieved, and if the supervising agency finds that such redevelopment has been finished and achieved it shall issue to the redevelopment corporation a certificate of completion showing that the redevelopment of such area has been completed. No such determination or finding shall affect any unit or units for which certificates of completion have been issued under subsection (1) of this section.
  3. Such redevelopment property or unit thereof, may be sold or mortgaged, provided, however, that such sale or mortgage shall be authorized as herein provided and such property shall, after such sale or mortgage, be used for the general purposes of KRS 99.010 to 99.310 and maintained in accordance with the standards provided therefor by the planning commission of such city in the original certificate of approval issued for such redevelopment under and pursuant to the provisions of KRS 99.040 to 99.060 .
  4. Such certificate or certificates of completion shall be conclusive evidence, upon which any one (1) dealing with such property may rely, that the redevelopment of the property therein described has been fully completed in conformity with KRS 99.010 to 99.310 and the development plan.

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 36, § 18.

99.310. Liberal construction.

KRS 99.010 to 99.300 shall be construed liberally to effectuate the purposes thereof, and the enumeration of specific powers in those sections shall not operate to restrict the meaning of any general grant of power contained in those sections or to exclude other powers comprehended in such general grant.

History. Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 36, § 19.

99.320. KRS 99.010 to 99.310 made applicable to cities of the second class. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1948, ch. 155) was repealed by Acts 1968, ch. 152, § 168.

Urban Renewal and Community Development

99.330. Legislative finding and policy.

  1. It is hereby found and declared:
    1. That there exist in many communities in this Commonwealth slum areas and blighted areas (as defined by KRS 99.340 ) which constitute a serious and growing menace, are injurious and inimical to the public health, safety, and welfare of the people of the Commonwealth, and are beyond remedy and control solely by regulatory process in the exercise of the police power;
    2. That such areas contribute substantially and increasingly to the spread of disease and crime and necessitate excessive and disproportionate expenditures for the preservation of the public health and safety, for crime prevention, correction, prosecution, and punishment, and the treatment of juvenile delinquency, and for the maintenance of adequate police, fire, and accident protection and other public services and facilities;
    3. That this menace cannot be effectively dealt with by private enterprise without the aids in KRS 99.330 to 99.510 ; and
    4. That the benefits which would result from eliminating slum conditions and conditions of blight will accrue to the inhabitants of the communities in which these conditions exist and to the inhabitants of this Commonwealth generally.
  2. It is hereby declared:
    1. That it is the policy of this Commonwealth to protect and promote the health, safety, and welfare of the people of the Commonwealth and particularly of the communities in which slum areas and blighted areas exist by the elimination of slum conditions and conditions of blight;
    2. That the elimination of such conditions and the preparation of the land in such areas for sale or lease for development or redevelopment constitute a public use and purpose for which public money may be expended and private property acquired and are governmental functions in the interest of the health, safety, and welfare of the people of the Commonwealth; and
    3. That the necessity in the public interest for the provisions enacted in KRS 99.340 to 99.510 is hereby declared to be a legislative determination.

History. Enact. Acts 1950, ch. 119, § 2.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

There are no provisions of Kentucky law, constitutional or otherwise, that would permit court to hold that KRS 99.330 to 99.550 , providing for elimination of slums and blighted areas, is not a legitimate objection for the exercise of police power of the state. Miller v. Louisville, 321 S.W.2d 237, 1959 Ky. LEXIS 269 ( Ky. 1959 ).

Since the prerequisites for adoption of redevelopment and renewal program of KRS 99.330 to 99.550 are so specific and detailed and they afford proper notice and hearing, KRS 99.370 , as well as appeals to courts, KRS 99.390 , and sufficient safeguards are provided to individuals both in the courts and within administrative agencies charged with execution of the program, the conclusion that there is an improper delegation of legislative power is precluded. Miller v. Louisville, 321 S.W.2d 237, 1959 Ky. LEXIS 269 ( Ky. 1959 ).

Plan of KRS 99.330 to 99.550 to eliminate slums and blighted areas is within the scope of general health and welfare purposes of police power and is not illegal merely because in accomplishing such purpose it seeks to do so through the overall plan rather than through uncoordinated, piecemeal action as do laws providing for zoning and abatement of nuisances. Miller v. Louisville, 321 S.W.2d 237, 1959 Ky. LEXIS 269 ( Ky. 1959 ).

2. Publication of Ordinance.

Fact that city did not publish, in the manner provided by KRS 424.270 , ordinance that provided for mode of creating and paying indebtedness authorized by votes for proposed urban renewal and development project was of no consequence since such ordinance did not come within the scope of that section. Miller v. Louisville, 321 S.W.2d 237, 1959 Ky. LEXIS 269 ( Ky. 1959 ).

3. Amendment of Plan.

Authority for amendment of an urban renewal plan to embrace additional territory may be implied, provided it is consistent with the purposes of the act and done in good faith. Prudential Bldg. & Loan Asso. v. Urban Renewal & Community Development Agency, 464 S.W.2d 629, 1971 Ky. LEXIS 495 ( Ky. 1971 ).

Cited:

Griswold v. Louisville, 351 S.W.2d 62, 1961 Ky. LEXIS 139 ( Ky. 1961 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Where a project was to be undertaken to relocate a highway, a railroad, and divert a river within the cut, the urban renewal and community development agency of the city could serve as the contracting agency, or project authority, to administer the project on behalf of the city, the railroad and the department of highways. OAG 69-96 .

A man may serve on both the Urban Renewal and Community Development Agency of Elsmere and the Kenton County and Municipal Planning and Zoning Commission and there would exist no incompatible situation under Const., § 165 and KRS 61.080 since the individual in question would not be holding two municipal offices or a municipal and a county office at the same time. OAG 76-562 .

There is no provision under KRS 99.330 to 99.510 authorizing the fiscal court or city governing body to dissolve an urban renewal and community development agency and to proceed to perform the duties assigned to such an agency, after the agency has begun operations. OAG 82-75 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Journal of Energy, Natural Resources & Environmental Law.

Daugherty, 2006 Eminent Domain Ballot Initiatives: Citizens’ Voice or Crying Wolf?, 21 J. Energy, Nat. Res. & Env’l L. 99 (2007).

Kentucky Law Journal.

Shroder, The Preservation of Historical Areas, 62 Ky. L.J. 940 (1973-1974).

Northern Kentucky Law Review.

Comment, Kentucky’s Power of Eminent Domain, 7 N. Ky. L. Rev. 421 (1980).

99.340. Definitions for KRS 99.330 to 99.510.

The following words or terms shall have the following meanings wherever used in KRS 99.330 to 99.510 , unless a different meaning is clearly indicated by the context:

  1. “Slum area” means an area in which there is at least one-fourth (1/4) of all buildings or a predominance of improvements which by reason of dilapidation, deterioration, age or obsolescence, inadequate provision for ventilation, light, sanitation, or open spaces, high density of population and overcrowding, or any combination of such factors, are unsafe or unfit to occupy; are conducive to ill health, transmission of disease, infant mortality, juvenile delinquency, or crime; injuriously affect the entire area; or constitute a menace to the public health, safety and welfare. A slum area may include lands, structures, or improvements, the acquisition of which is necessary in order to assure the proper clearance and redevelopment of the entire area and to prevent the spread or recurrence of slum conditions thereby protecting the public health, safety, and welfare;
  2. “Blighted area” means an area (other than a slum area as defined in this section) where by reason of the predominance of defective or inadequate street layout, faulty lot layout in relation to size, adequacy, accessibility, or usefulness, submergency of lots by water or other unsanitary or unsafe conditions, deterioration of site improvements, diversity of ownership, tax delinquency, defective or unusual conditions of title, improper subdivision or obsolete platting, or any combination of such reasons, development of such blighted area (which may include some incidental buildings or improvements) into predominantly housing uses is being prevented;
  3. “Redevelopment” means the planning or replanning, design or redesign, acquisition, clearance, development, disposal, rehabilitation, historic preservation, or any combination of these, of a development area and the preparation of such area for such residential, commercial, industrial, public, recreational, or other structures, works, improvements, facilities, or spaces as may be appropriate or necessary. “Redevelopment” and derivatives thereof shall mean develop as well as redevelop;
  4. “Community” means any city or county;
  5. “Mayor” means the mayor of a city or the county judge/executive of a county, or the officer thereof having the duties customarily imposed upon the executive head of a city or county;
  6. “Council” means the legislative authority of a city or the fiscal court of a county;
  7. “Redevelopment project” means any or a combination of one (1) or more of the following:
    1. Acquisition of a slum area or a blighted area (as defined in this section);
    2. Demolition, removal, rehabilitation, or historic preservation of structures and improvements;
    3. Installation, construction, or reconstruction of streets, utilities, and other site improvements essential to the preparation of sites for uses in accordance with the development plan; and
    4. Making the land available for development or redevelopment by private enterprise or public bodies for uses in accordance with the development plan;
  8. “Development area” means the area of a redevelopment project;
  9. “Development plan” means a plan for the redevelopment of all or any part of a development area;
  10. “Agency” means a public corporate body created pursuant to KRS 99.350 ;
  11. “Public body” means any city, county, commission, district authority, or other public body or political subdivision of the Commonwealth;
  12. “Area of operation” means:
    1. In the case of a city, the area within the city and the area within five (5) miles of the territorial boundaries thereof, except that the area of operation of a city under KRS 99.330 to 99.510 shall not include any area which lies within the territorial boundaries of another city unless a resolution has been adopted by the council of the other city declaring a need therefor; and
    2. In the case of a county, the area within the county, except that the area of operation of a county shall not include any area which lies within the territorial boundaries of a city unless a resolution has been adopted by the council of the city declaring a need therefor;
  13. “Real property” includes all lands, including improvements and fixtures thereon, and property of any nature appurtenant thereto, or used in connection therewith, and every estate, interest, and right, legal or equitable, therein, including terms for years and liens by way of judgment, mortgage, or otherwise and the indebtedness secured by such liens;
  14. “Planning commission” means a city, county, or joint city-county planning and zoning commission or a planning commission established pursuant to the provisions of KRS Chapter 100 having authority and responsibility with respect to the area of the community; and
  15. “Bonds” means any bonds, notes, interim certificates, debentures, or other obligations.

History. Enact. Acts 1950, ch. 119, § 3; 1968, ch. 152, § 84; 1986, ch. 23, § 6, effective July 15, 1986; 2002, ch. 307, § 1, effective July 15, 2002.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Blight.

Noise is not one of the enumerated conditions in the statutory definitions of blight, and even if noise could reasonably be linked to one of the enumerated factors constituting blight, there was not substantial evidence in the record as to a noise problem rising to the level of safety or such that it was preventing the use of the area in question for housing. Prestonia Area Neighborhood Ass'n v. Abramson, 797 S.W.2d 708, 1990 Ky. LEXIS 100 ( Ky. 1990 ).

2. Property Included in Plan.

In urban renewal case, where five years had elapsed from the time of establishment of the original project to the time of amendment adding territory which was in the form of small irregular protuberance upon the former rectangularly shaped area, and which was not intended to be used for housing developments required by this section and some of which was not itself blighted, a presumption existed that the added territory was not blighted and was not necessary to the accomplishment of the overall renewal plan and so, prima facie, the territory could not validly be included in the project. Prudential Bldg. & Loan Asso. v. Urban Renewal & Community Development Agency, 464 S.W.2d 629, 1971 Ky. LEXIS 495 ( Ky. 1971 ).

Cited:

Miller v. Louisville, 321 S.W.2d 237, 1959 Ky. LEXIS 269 ( Ky. 1959 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

This section and KRS 99.360 read together clearly authorize the urban renewal agency to condemn real property outside the city boundaries and up to five miles thereof for the purposes of redevelopment. OAG 73-593 .

In view of the definitions of “community” and “redevelopment,” a city of the fourth class may establish an agency to handle the preparation of a plan for redevelopment in the city. OAG 77-653 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Northern Kentucky Law Review.

Comment, Kentucky’s Power of Eminent Domain, 7 N. Ky. L. Rev. 421 (1980).

99.350. Creation of agency — Agency may be dissolved by vote of legislative body — Appointment and tenure of members — Structure and organization.

  1. If the council of any community by resolution finds and declares:
    1. That there exist in the community slum areas or blighted areas;
    2. That there is need in the community for the exercise of powers, functions and duties conferred by KRS 99.330 to 99.510 ; and
    3. That the exercise of such powers, functions and duties by an agency created and established pursuant to this section would be more efficient and more in the public interest than the exercise of such powers, functions and duties by the community or the housing commission of the community pursuant to KRS 99.490 , an agency, to be known as the urban renewal and community development agency of the city or county, as the case may be, shall thereupon exist for such community with the powers, duties and functions provided for in KRS 99.330 to 99.510 .
  2. An urban renewal and community development agency created pursuant to subsection (1) of this section may be dissolved at any time by the council which created it by a three-fifths (3/5) vote of the legislative body.
  3. Upon adoption of a resolution creating an agency, the mayor shall be promptly notified and he shall appoint, with the approval of a majority of the council, five (5) resident electors of the community as members of the agency.
  4. Three (3) of the members who are first appointed shall be designated to serve for terms of one (1), two (2) and three (3) years respectively, and the remaining two (2) of such members shall be designated to serve for terms of four (4) years each, from the date of their appointment. Any appointments heretofore made for a term of five (5) years are hereby confirmed and declared to be appointments for a term of four (4) years from the date of such appointment. Thereafter, members shall be appointed as aforesaid for a term of office of four (4) years, except that all vacancies occurring during a term shall be filled for the unexpired term. A member shall hold office until his successor has been appointed and qualified.
  5. The agency shall elect a chairman from among its members. The term of office as chairman of the agency, unless otherwise prescribed by the council, shall be for the calendar year, or for that portion thereof remaining after each such chairman is designated or elected.
  6. The powers of each agency shall be vested in the members thereof then in office. Members of an agency or their staff shall receive their actual and necessary expenses, including traveling expenses, provided, however, that such other compensation, if prescribed, shall be paid exclusively from community funds.
  7. For inefficiency, neglect of duty or misconduct in office, a member of an agency may be removed by the council, but the member may be removed only after he shall have been given a copy of the charges at least ten (10) days prior to a public hearing thereon and has had an opportunity to be heard in person or by counsel.
  8. No officer or employee of the community or of the agency, who in the course of his duties is required to participate in the formulation of plans or policies for the redevelopment of a development area, or to approve such plans or policies, shall acquire any interest in any property included within a development area within the community. If any such officer or employee owns or has financial interest, direct or indirect, in any property included within such a development area, he shall immediately disclose, in writing, such interest to the agency and to the council and such disclosure shall be entered in the minutes of the agency and of the council. Failure to so disclose such interest shall constitute misconduct in office. No payment shall be made to any member or officer of an agency for any property or interest therein acquired by the agency from such member or officer unless the amount of such payment is fixed by court order in eminent domain proceedings, or unless such payment is unanimously approved by the council.
  9. When an agency is created for any community, the council may at that time, and from time to time thereafter, appropriate such amounts of money to the agency as it deems necessary for the administrative purposes of the agency. The administrative purposes of the agency may include staff and consultants for research, studies and surveys, designation of development areas, preparation of development plans, estimates of the cost of acquisition, clearance and conditioning of land for redevelopment, estimates of the fair use value of the land and any other administrative expenses considered necessary by the council.
  10. Each such agency shall file with the council a detailed report of all its transactions, including a statement of all revenues and expenditures, at such intervals as the council may prescribe.

History. Enact. Acts 1950, ch. 119, § 4; 1958, ch. 159, § 1; 1962, ch. 42; 1988, ch. 333, § 1, effective July 15, 1988.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(1988). A technical correction has been made in this section by the Reviser of Statutes pursuant to KRS 7.136 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

Titles of Acts 1956, ch. 215 and Acts 1958, ch. 159 adequately apprised general assembly of their copious contents as required by Ky. Const., § 51. Miller v. Louisville, 321 S.W.2d 237, 1959 Ky. LEXIS 269 ( Ky. 1959 ).

2. Ordinance.
3. — Validity.

Ordinance classifying an area as a slum area is valid unless shown to be arbitrary, made in bad faith or that the area is not a blighted or slum area. Dinwiddie v. Urban Renewal & Community Development Agency, 393 S.W.2d 872, 1965 Ky. LEXIS 247 ( Ky. 1965 ).

4. — Appeals Prior to Public Hearing.

KRS 99.390 contemplates appeals only from actions taken or decisions made after the public hearing has been held and an attempted appeal from a resolution under this section designating the area as “appropriate for” an urban renewal project and approving the undertaking by the city of surveys and plans for the project and making a request to federal agency for concurrence in commencement of the plans and surveys was properly dismissed. Griswold v. Louisville, 351 S.W.2d 62, 1961 Ky. LEXIS 139 ( Ky. 1961 ).

Cited:

Cartmell v. Urban Renewal & Community Development Agency, 419 S.W.2d 719, 1967 Ky. LEXIS 176 ( Ky. 1967 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Once an agency has begun operations, the city council cannot dissolve the agency and take over its operations. OAG 68-134 .

There is no statutory or constitutional incompatibility between the position of director of the urban renewal agency and membership on the independent board of education. OAG 70-587 .

Where a city is engaged in operating an urban renewal project, it is vested with the same powers under the urban renewal act that would be possessed if an urban renewal agency was established pursuant to the urban renewal act. OAG 71-130 .

An employee of the urban renewal agency whose job was as a reviewing officer to insure compliance with redevelopment plans would be prohibited from acquiring any interest in the land to be redeveloped. OAG 71-275 .

Members of a city urban renewal and community development agency must be resident electors of the city. OAG 76-652 .

Where a city has established a separate independent agency to administer the Urban Renewal Act, that urban renewal agency would constitute a “local public agency” as defined in KRS 45A.345 and, therefore, the agency would have to follow the requirements of the Model Procurement Code. OAG 80-169 .

Where city, by ordinance, established an independent urban renewal and community development agency under this section, a member of city council was not prohibited by KRS former 61.270 from selling mobile home units to the agency since a contract between the councilman and the independent agency would not constitute a contract between the councilman and the city under former KRS 61.270 . OAG 81-9 .

Where the executive director of a community development agency which was not created as an independent agency under KRS 99.350 is elected to the office of mayor of the same city, there is no constitutional or statutory conflict under Ky. Const., § 165, or KRS 61.080 , since a person can theoretically hold a municipal office and employment at the same time; however, the mayor could not continue to hold the executive director’s position without creating a common-law incompatibility or conflict of interest since he is presumed to possess the power under KRS 83A.130 to not only hire, but also fire, the executive director. OAG 81-179 .

Where an urban renewal and community development agency had been exercising its duties and powers and had been involved in the types of projects contemplated by this section, the fiscal court could not utilize the provisions of subsection (10) of this section to dissolve the agency, either temporarily or permanently and assume its duties. OAG 82-75 .

Once an urban renewal and community development agency has been created by a county pursuant to this section, the county may not dissolve the agency in the absence of legislative authority nor may it place the duties of the agency in itself or a county housing authority under KRS 99.490 . OAG 82-75 ; OAG 83-220 .

Subsection (2) of this section would appear to require that the appointments to community development boards come from individuals in the private sector who are duly registered and qualified voters of the city, thus excluding the appointment of any city officials. A mayor cannot legally appoint himself, though approved by the council, to a Community Development Agency Board established pursuant to this section; moreover, such appointment would be against public policy, based on self-interest. OAG 82-94 .

Subsection (2) of this section would appear to require that the appointments come from individuals in the private sector who are duly registered and qualified voters of the county, thus excluding the appointment of any county officials; there is no statutory provision for county officials to serve on the board of an urban renewal and community development agency. OAG 83-220 .

Appointments by a county judge/executive of himself and fiscal court magistrates to an urban renewal and community development agency established pursuant to this section were void as they were in violation of subsection (2) of this section and they violated public policy which prohibits those who have the appointing power from appointing themselves to public offices or positions. OAG 83-220 .

This section does not authorize the mayor or county judge/executive to serve as an ex-officio member of an urban renewal and community development agency. OAG 83-220 .

Once an urban renewal and community development agency has been established pursuant to this section, the fiscal court may not place the duties of the agency in either itself or a county housing commission; an urban renewal and community development agency established pursuant to this section is an independent agency and a separate corporate body from that of the county. OAG 83-220 .

An urban renewal agency established pursuant to this section constitutes a separate corporate body and an independent agency that is neither a state, city nor a county agency and such an agency has the power to administer the act including the acceptance of grants from the federal or state government, or from any other source as provided in subsection (1)(e) of KRS 99.360 as well as under the terms of KRS 99.555 . OAG 83-230 .

The fiscal court, having established a county urban renewal and community development agency, loses control of such agency in administering the Urban Renewal Act, and cannot, thereafter, legally establish a county administrative board or commission to administer federal or state grants made under the Urban Renewal Act; as a consequence, all such grants should be directed to the agency itself as KRS 99.360 and 99.555 clearly envision. OAG 83-230 .

A city’s urban renewal agency appears to have no statutory power to convey property, assign funds and delegate its authority to a private nonprofit corporation for the purpose of redeveloping a building to be used as a community center which was a use included in the urban renewal agency’s development plan. OAG 83-355 .

Subsection (7) of this section is broad enough to preclude a member of an urban renewal and community development agency from purchasing, during his term of office, property from the agency of which he is a member. OAG 84-211 .

Since the three authorized methods for conducting urban development activities found under this section are exclusive, a city must follow one of these methods if it wishes to operate under KRS Chapter 99; thus, a city cannot legally enter into any agreement with a private nonprofit association and appropriate funds thereto, as well as other facilities and services, for the purpose of operating a community development program authorized by KRS Chapter 99. OAG 84-247 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Kennedy, Comprehensive Planning Legislation: The Kentucky Experience, 59 Ky. L.J. 875 (1970).

99.360. Powers of the agency.

  1. Each agency created for the purpose of KRS 99.330 to 99.510 shall constitute a public body, corporate and politic, exercising public and essential governmental functions, and shall have the following powers in addition to the others granted:
    1. To sue and be sued; to have a seal; to make and execute contracts and other instruments necessary or convenient to the exercise of its powers;
    2. To make, and from time to time amend and repeal bylaws, rules and regulations not inconsistent with KRS 99.330 to 99.510 to carry into effect the powers and purposes thereof;
    3. To select and appoint such officers, agents, counsel and employees, permanent and temporary, as it may require, and determine their qualifications, duties and compensation, subject, however, to the provision of its budget;
    4. Within its area of operation, for purposes of redevelopment within the development area, to purchase, lease, obtain option upon, acquire by gift, grant, bequest, devise or otherwise, any real or personal property, or any interest therein, together with any improvements thereon; to acquire by the exercise of the power of eminent domain any real property; to clear any and all buildings, structures or other improvements from any real property so acquired and to dispose of any personal property resulting therefrom; to sell, lease, exchange, subdivide, transfer, assign, pledge, encumber (by mortgage, deed of trust or otherwise), or otherwise to dispose of any real or personal property or any interest therein at its fair value for uses in accordance with the development plan, irrespective of the cost of acquiring and preparing real property for redevelopment; to insure or provide for the insurance of any real or personal property or operation of the agency against risks or hazards; and pursuant to the provisions of KRS 99.450 to rent, maintain, manage, operate, and repair such real property;
    5. To borrow from and to accept loans and grants from the federal government or any agency thereof, or from any sources, public or private, for the purposes of KRS 99.330 to 99.510, and to pledge such security as may be required; an agency, notwithstanding the provisions of any other law, may include in any contract for financial assistance with the federal government any conditions which the federal government may attach to its financial aid of a redevelopment project, not inconsistent with the purposes of KRS 99.330 to 99.510;
    6. Within its area of operation, to develop as a building site or sites, any real property owned or acquired by it, and in this connection to cause streets and highways to be laid out and graded, and pavements or other road surfacing, sidewalks and curbs, and public utilities of every kind to be constructed and installed, or to close any streets according to the development plan;
    7. Within its area of operation, to prepare from time to time plans for the improvement or rehabilitation of slum and blighted areas; to make, periodically, investigations and surveys pertaining to slum clearance and urban redevelopment;
    8. To invest any funds held in reserves or sinking funds or any funds not required for immediate disbursement, in property or securities in which savings banks may legally invest funds subject to their control; to purchase its bonds at a price not more than the principal amount thereof and accrued interest, all bonds so purchased to be canceled;
    9. To obligate lessees or purchasers of land acquired in a redevelopment project: To use such land for the purpose designated in the development plan; to begin the building of specified improvements within a period of time which the agency fixes as reasonable; and to comply with such other conditions as in the opinion of the agency are necessary to carry out the purposes of KRS 99.330 to 99.510; the agency, by provision in the contract, deed or lease may make any of the purchaser’s obligations covenants or conditions running with the land, whose breach shall cause the fee to revert to the agency;
    10. To exercise all or any part or combination of the powers herein granted; and
    11. To expend public funds for the rehabilitation of private property within the agency’s area of operation through loans or grants to the owners or occupants of such property.
  2. Nothing contained in this section shall authorize such agency to construct any of the buildings for residential, commercial, industrial or other use contemplated by the development plan.

History. Enact. Acts 1950, ch. 119, § 5; 1980, ch. 235, § 19, effective July 15, 1980.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Termination Not Automatic.

The agency’s area of operation was created specifically by this statute and the agency was not automatically terminated by the abolition of the city of Lexington when the voters of Fayette County adopted an urban-county form of government. Holsclaw v. Stephens, 507 S.W.2d 462, 1973 Ky. LEXIS 3 ( Ky. 1973 ).

Cited:

Miller v. Louisville, 321 S.W.2d 237, 1959 Ky. LEXIS 269 ( Ky. 1959 ); Cartmell v. Urban Renewal & Community Development Agency, 419 S.W.2d 719, 1967 Ky. LEXIS 176 ( Ky. 1967 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

A commission, agency, or city has the power to condemn property of a school board for the general purpose for which each was created. OAG 65-330 .

Where a project was to be undertaken to relocate a highway, a railroad, and divert a river within the cut, the urban renewal and community development agency of the city could serve as the contracting agency, or project authority, to administer the project on behalf of the city, the railroad and the department of highways. OAG 69-96 .

Under this section and KRS 99.420 an urban renewal and community development agency may acquire property owned by a railroad company. OAG 72-519 .

The fiscal court, having established a county urban renewal and community development agency, loses control of such agency in administering the Urban Renewal Act, and cannot, thereafter, legally establish a county administrative board or commission to administer federal or state grants made under the Urban Renewal Act; as a consequence, all such grants should be directed to the agency itself as this section and KRS 99.555 clearly envision. OAG 83-230 .

An urban renewal agency established pursuant to KRS 99.350 constitutes a separate corporate body and an independent agency that is neither a state, city nor a county agency and such an agency has the power to administer the act including the acceptance of grants from the federal or state government, or from any other source as provided in subsection (1)(e) of this section as well as under the terms of KRS 99.555 . OAG 83-230 .

A city’s urban renewal agency appears to have no statutory power to convey property, assign funds and delegate its authority to a private nonprofit corporation for the purpose of redeveloping a building to be used as a community center which was a use included in the urban renewal agency’s development plan. OAG 83-355 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Lewis, Kostas, and Carnes, Consolidation — Complete or Functional — of City and County Governments in Kentucky, 42 Ky. L.J. 295 (1954).

99.370. Prerequisites for adoption of a development plan.

No agency may acquire title to any land for the purpose of carrying out a development plan unless the following conditions have been met:

  1. A general or master plan of the community has been adopted by the planning commission of the community.
  2. A development plan for the proposed development area has been approved by the planning commission of the community and has been made available for public inspection. The development plan shall designate, among other things, the location, character and extent of the public and private land ownership and uses proposed within the area, such as street, sewer, public transportation, school, recreation, dwelling, business, industry and such others as may be suitable. The development plan may be made by the agency, or at the request of the agency or at the direction of the council, be prepared by the planning commission of the community.
  3. A public hearing held by the agency on the redevelopment project, whereat an opportunity shall be afforded to all persons interested to be heard, either in person or by counsel. Notice of such hearings shall be published pursuant to KRS Chapter 424. Notices of the hearing shall be mailed at least ten (10) days before the hearing, to the last known owner of each parcel of land in the development area at the last known address of such owner as shown by the records of the assessor and shall contain a description of the proposed development area by its location in relation to highways, streets, streams or otherwise. Such notices shall further state that maps, plats and particular description of the development plan, together with such zoning maps and ordinances as may relate thereto, are available for public inspection at a place to be designated in such notice. The failure of any owner to receive a copy of such notice shall not invalidate the proceedings of the agency.
  4. A finding has been made by the agency that there is a feasible method for the temporary or permanent relocation of families displaced from the development area, and that there are, or are being provided, in the development area or in other areas not less desirable in regard to public utilities and public and commercial facilities and at rents or prices within the financial means of the families displaced from the development area decent, safe, and sanitary dwellings for such displaced families.
  5. After public hearing, the agency has made and certified to the council the development plan and an estimate of the cost required of the community for the redevelopment of such area, for the guidance of the council in providing funds therefor, an estimate of the total cost of such redevelopment including an estimate of the cost of appraisals, the value of the real estate, and any other costs and expenses which, in the judgment of the agency may be incurred by the agency in the exercise of the powers granted in KRS 99.330 to 99.510 , and an estimate of the revenue from the sale or lease of the property after demolition and conditioning for redevelopment, and the amount of deficit, if any, which is expected to be incurred.
  6. A finding has been made by the council:
    1. That the area is a slum area or that all the following conditions exist:
      1. That the area is a blighted area;
      2. That a shortage of housing of sound standards and design adequate for family life exists in the community;
      3. That the need for housing accommodations has been or will be increased as a result of the demolition of residential units in slum areas under development plans; and
      4. That the conditions of blight in the area and the shortage of decent, safe, and sanitary housing in the community cause or contribute to an increase in and spread of disease and crime and constitute a menace to the public health, safety, and welfare;
    2. That the development plan will afford maximum opportunity consistent with the sound needs of the community as a whole for the redevelopment of the development area by private enterprise;
    3. That the development plan conforms to the general or master plan for the development of the community as a whole; and
    4. That federal assistance is necessary to enable the development area to be redeveloped in accordance with the development plan and funds will be available for the community share of the cost as required by the Housing Act of 1949 or other federal acts providing federal financial assistance, or that federal financial assistance is not necessary and all funds will be available from other sources;
  7. The council has approved the development plan.

History. Enact. Acts 1950, ch. 119, § 6; 1958, ch. 159, § 2; 1966, ch. 239, § 101.

Compiler’s Notes.

The portion of the Housing Act of 1949 concerning slum clearance and urban renewal referred to in subsection (6)(d) is compiled in 42 USCS § 1441 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. In General.

The findings required by the statute are necessary for the adoption of a development plan, regardless of whether a city desires to take property by eminent domain. Henn v. City of Highland Heights, 69 F. Supp. 2d 908, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15507 (E.D. Ky. 1999 ), vacated, 248 F.3d 1148, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 12551 (6th Cir. Ky. 2001 ).

2. Constitutionality.

Since the prerequisites for adoption of redevelopment and renewal program of KRS 99.330 to 99.550 are so specific and detailed and they afford proper notice and hearing, KRS 99.370 , as well as appeals to courts, KRS 99.390 , and sufficient safeguards are provided to individuals both in the courts and within administrative agencies charged with execution of the program the conclusion that there is an improper delegation of legislative power is precluded. Miller v. Louisville, 321 S.W.2d 237, 1959 Ky. LEXIS 269 ( Ky. 1959 ).

3. Public Hearing.

Under the provisions of this section no effectuating action or decision can be taken or made until after the public hearing. Griswold v. Louisville, 351 S.W.2d 62, 1961 Ky. LEXIS 139 ( Ky. 1961 ).

4. Arbitrariness.

It is not for the court to interfere in the process of drawing the boundary lines for an urban renewal plan, however, it is appropriate for the court to determine whether or not the inclusion of the entirety of each of the subject neighborhoods was arbitrary. Prestonia Area Neighborhood Ass'n v. Abramson, 797 S.W.2d 708, 1990 Ky. LEXIS 100 ( Ky. 1990 ).

There was no substantial evidence in the record to support the declaration of blight made by the Board of Aldermen, and merely establishing a large administrative and legislative record does not entitle a Legislature or administrative agency to declare an apple to be an orange; the record may be replete with expert testimony on similarities between the fruits, however, a Legislature or administrative agency, regardless of the size of the record it establishes, cannot lawfully make such a declaration; to declare, by legislative fiat, an object to be something it is not is such an abuse of discretion as to be arbitrary. Prestonia Area Neighborhood Ass'n v. Abramson, 797 S.W.2d 708, 1990 Ky. LEXIS 100 ( Ky. 1990 ).

5. Taking Private Property.

The taking of private property for the purpose of transfer to another private enterprise is not permitted. Prestonia Area Neighborhood Ass'n v. Abramson, 797 S.W.2d 708, 1990 Ky. LEXIS 100 ( Ky. 1990 ).

6. Evidence.

There was no substantial evidence supporting a city’s finding of blight where: (1) there was no shortage of housing of sound standards in the area at issue, but rather a normal real estate market of moderately priced housing existed in that community; (2) no demolition was slated for residential units in slum areas under the development plans and, therefore, the need for housing accommodations had not been and would not be increased by reason of such development; and (3) there was no evidence that conditions of blight in the area and the shortage of decent, safe and sanitary housing in the community caused or contributed to an increase in and spread of disease and crime that constituted a menace to the public, health, safety and welfare. Henn v. City of Highland Heights, 69 F. Supp. 2d 908, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15507 (E.D. Ky. 1999 ), vacated, 248 F.3d 1148, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 12551 (6th Cir. Ky. 2001 ).

Cited:

Newport Municipal Housing Com. v. Turner Advertising, Inc., 334 S.W.2d 767, 1960 Ky. LEXIS 231 ( Ky. 1960 ); Hazard v. Baker, 419 S.W.2d 535, 1967 Ky. LEXIS 153 ( Ky. 1967 ); Cartmell v. Urban Renewal & Community Development Agency, 419 S.W.2d 719, 1967 Ky. LEXIS 176 ( Ky. 1967 ); Prudential Bldg. & Loan Asso. v. Urban Renewal & Community Development Agency, 464 S.W.2d 629, 1971 Ky. LEXIS 495 ( Ky. 1971 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

The city of Covington could not acquire title to vacant city lots for private disposition by its general condemnation authority or by utilizing the condemnation authority under the Urban Renewal Act unless it elected to operate thereunder. OAG 80-62 .

99.380. Issuance of building permits and certificates of occupancy in development area.

After adoption of the development plan by the council, no building permit or certificate of occupancy shall be issued for any structure or use within the area (except for construction or uses which are necessary for the immediate protection of the public health or safety) without the approval in writing by the agency, based upon a determination by the agency that the proposed construction is not inconsistent with the development plan. Upon the sale or lease of the redevelopment project or any portion thereof by the agency, no building permits or certificates of occupancy shall be issued for any structures or uses that do not conform to the development plan.

History. Enact. Acts 1950, ch. 119, § 7.

Opinions of Attorney General.

Although developers may be denied building permits for construction that does not comply with the urban renewal plan, they may appeal the denial to circuit court under KRS 99.390 , and it is possible that a court would resolve the conflict by giving priority to the zoning ordinance on the grounds that the failure to draft the urban renewal plan in compliance with the comprehensive plan renders the urban renewal plan ineffective. OAG 91-228 .

The provisions of this section require that development comply with the urban renewal plan and the statute restricts developers to the construction of buildings that are consistent with the urban renewal plan, regardless of any inconsistent provisions in the zoning ordinance. OAG 91-228 .

Urban renewal begins with a plan, which must “conform to the general or master plan for the development of the community as a whole,” and apparently the general or master plan means the comprehensive plan adopted by a planning commission pursuant to KRS 100.183 ; therefore, the requirement that the urban renewal plan conform to the comprehensive plan was perhaps intended to prevent conflicts between urban renewal plans and the comprehensive plan. OAG 91-228 .

99.390. Appeals.

  1. Any person, firm, corporate organization, public officer or governmental agency or department, being a party of record at any hearing conducted by the agency in connection with the designation of a redevelopment project which has applied for a building permit or certificate of occupancy under KRS 99.380 , claiming to be injuriously affected or aggrieved by refusal of the agency to approve such permit or certificate, may appeal from such action to the Circuit Court of the county wherein the agency is located, and jurisdiction is hereby given to such Circuit Court to hear and determine all questions and issues brought before it on such appeal. An appeal shall stay all action by all parties of record in the matter appealed from. Such appeal shall be taken within thirty (30) days after notice of such action or decision has been given by the agency to the party affected by the decision of said agency, by filing in the office of the clerk of the Circuit Court of such county a statement of appeal, setting forth the action or decision of the agency appealed from, the date thereof, the reasons for said appeal, and attaching thereto as a part thereof a certified copy of such action or decision and asking that an order to show cause be issued against and served upon the agency as to why such building permit or certificate of occupancy should not be issued.
  2. After the appeal is taken the procedure shall be the same as in common law actions, except that said appeals shall have preference over other cases on the docket and may, upon the motion of any party, be set down for trial in advance of other cases. Upon filing an appeal, notice thereof must be immediately given to the agency and all parties of record, by actual notice served or by service of summons. Hearings in the Circuit Court shall be de novo and heard by the judge and appeals may be taken from the decision of said Circuit Court to the Court of Appeals in the same manner as common law cases are appealed, except that all appeals to the Court of Appeals must be made within sixty (60) days from the date of judgment in the Circuit Court.

History. Enact. Acts 1950, ch. 119, § 8; 1958, ch. 159, § 3; 1962, ch. 266.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Time for Appeal.

This section contemplates appeals only from actions taken or decisions made after the public hearing has been held. Griswold v. Louisville, 351 S.W.2d 62, 1961 Ky. LEXIS 139 ( Ky. 1961 ).

Cited:

Cartmell v. Urban Renewal & Community Development Agency, 419 S.W.2d 719, 1967 Ky. LEXIS 176 ( Ky. 1967 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Although developers may be denied building permits for construction that does not comply with the urban renewal plan, they may appeal the denial to circuit court under this section and it is possible that a court would resolve the conflict by giving priority to the zoning ordinance on the grounds that the failure to draft the urban renewal plan in compliance with the comprehensive plan renders the urban renewal plan ineffective. OAG 91-228 .

99.400. Grant of funds by community — Funds obtained by levy of taxes or issuance of bonds.

Any community located in whole or in part within the area of operation of an agency may grant funds to an agency for the purpose of aiding such agency in carrying out any of its powers and functions under KRS 99.330 to 99.510 . To obtain funds for this purpose, the community may levy taxes or may issue and sell its general obligation or revenue bonds. Any bonds to be issued by the community pursuant to the provisions of this section shall be issued in the manner and within the limitations, except as otherwise provided in KRS 99.330 to 99.510 , prescribed by the laws of this Commonwealth for the issuance and authorization of such bonds for public purposes generally.

History. Enact. Acts 1950, ch. 119, § 9.

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Issuance of revenue bonds for public projects, KRS Ch. 58.

99.410. Cooperation by public bodies.

  1. A public body shall have power to aid an agency within its area of operation and such aid may be authorized by a resolution or ordinance of the legislative body of such public body adopted by a majority of its members present at a meeting of such legislative body. A public body may aid an agency in the following manner and upon such terms, with or without consideration, as it may determine:
    1. Dedicate, sell, convey or lease any of its interest in any property, or grant easements, licenses or any other rights or privileges therein to an agency;
    2. Cause parks, playgrounds, recreational, community, educational, water, sewer or drainage facilities, or any other works which it is otherwise empowered to undertake, to be furnished in connection with a redevelopment project;
    3. Furnish, dedicate, close, pave, install, grade, regrade, plan or replan public streets or ways or other public places which it is otherwise empowered to undertake;
    4. Plan or replan, zone or rezone any part of the public body; make exceptions from building regulations and ordinances; and any city may also change its boundaries;
    5. Cause services to be furnished to the agency of the character which the public body is otherwise empowered to furnish;
    6. Enter into agreements with respect to the exercise by such public body of its powers relating to the repair, closing or demolition of unsafe, unsanitary or unfit dwellings;
    7. Incur the entire expense of any public improvements made by such public body in exercising the powers granted in this section; and
    8. Do any and all things necessary or convenient to aid and cooperate in the redevelopment of a development area.
  2. Any sale, conveyance, lease or agreement provided for in this section may be made by a public body without appraisal, public notice, advertisement or public bidding.

History. Enact. Acts 1950, ch. 119, § 10.

Opinions of Attorney General.

A commission, agency, or city has the power to condemn property of a school board for the general purpose for which each was created. OAG 65-330 .

99.420. Eminent domain.

Whenever in the opinion of the agency, land or other property, right of way or easement over or through any property is needed by the agency in order to accomplish the purposes of KRS 99.330 to 99.510 , it may by resolution authorize the purchase or condemnation in the name of the agency, of the land or other property, or right of way or easement necessary for the purpose, and may proceed to condemn and acquire the property pursuant to the Eminent Domain Act of Kentucky.

History. Enact. Acts 1950, ch. 119, § 11; 1956, ch. 215, § 9; 1958, ch. 159, § 4; 1960, ch. 104, § 1; 1968, ch. 152, § 85; 1970, ch. 194, § 1; 1976, ch. 62, § 85; 1976, ch. 140, § 53.

Compiler’s Notes.

The Eminent Domain Act of Kentucky is compiled as KRS 416.540 to 416.680 .

Legislative Research Commission Note.

This section was amended by two 1976 Acts which do not appear to be in conflict and have been compiled together.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

Titles of Acts 1956, ch. 215 and Acts 1958, ch. 159 adequately apprised general assembly of their copious contents as required by Ky. Const., § 51. Miller v. Louisville, 321 S.W.2d 237, 1959 Ky. LEXIS 269 ( Ky. 1959 ).

KRS, Chapter 99 is constitutional. Newport Municipal Housing Com. v. Turner Advertising, Inc., 334 S.W.2d 767, 1960 Ky. LEXIS 231 ( Ky. 1960 ).

This section is constitutional notwithstanding that it authorizes the taking of property which is well kept and income-producing, and in no way or manner can be classified as slum property, where the acquisition is necessary to the accomplishment of the overall plan. Dinwiddie v. Urban Renewal & Community Development Agency, 393 S.W.2d 872, 1965 Ky. LEXIS 247 ( Ky. 1965 ).

2. Evidentiary hearing.

Circuit court properly denied an owner’s motion for an evidentiary hearing and entered an interlocutory judgment to a public utility because the utility had the right to condemn the easement in the owner’s real property and was permitted to take possession of the easement upon payment of the compensation awarded, there was no need for, nor a right to, another hearing, the utility did not act arbitrarily when it petitioned the court to condemn the modified, but overlapping, easement in order to avoid a small cemetery found along the original route, and the owner did not seek an injunction or post a supersedeas bond to stay enforcement of the interlocutory judgment. Allard v. Big Rivers Elec. Corp., 2020 Ky. App. LEXIS 61 (Ky. Ct. App. May 15, 2020).

Cited:

Whitesburg Muincipal Housing Com. v. Caudill, 369 S.W.2d 124, 1963 Ky. LEXIS 66 ( Ky. 1963 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Property owned by the Commonwealth, even in its proprietary capacity, may not be taken by a city or its urban renewal agency in eminent domain proceedings. OAG 64-197 .

A commission, agency, or city has the power to condemn property of a school board for the general purpose for which each was created. OAG 65-330 .

The city of Covington could not acquire title to vacant city lots for private disposition by its general condemnation authority or by utilizing the condemnation authority under the Urban Renewal Act unless it elects to operate thereunder. OAG 80-62 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Inducing location of governmental project, eminent domain powers of city, KRS 82.180 .

99.430. Bonds, notes, and obligations of the agency.

  1. Any agency shall have power to issue revenue bonds from time to time at its discretion for any of its corporate purposes under KRS 99.330 to 99.510 . An agency shall also have power to issue refunding bonds for the purpose of paying or retiring bonds previously issued by it. An agency may issue revenue bonds on which the principal and interest are payable:
    1. Exclusively from the income and revenues of the redevelopment project or projects financed from the proceeds of the bonds; or
    2. Exclusively from the income and revenues together with grants and contributions from the federal government or other sources. Any bonds may be additionally secured by a mortgage, deed of trust, or other lien or encumbrance on the property in the redevelopment project or projects financed from the proceeds of the bonds.
  2. Neither the members of an agency or any person executing the bonds shall be liable personally on the bonds by reason of the issuance of the bonds. The bonds and other obligations of an agency (and the bonds and obligations shall so state on their face) issued under this section shall not be a debt of the city, the county, the State, or any political subdivision of the State within the meaning of any constitutional or statutory debt limitation or restriction and neither the city, the county, the State, nor any political subdivision of the State shall be liable, nor in any event shall the bonds or obligations be payable out of any funds or properties other than those of the agency.
  3. Bonds of an agency shall be authorized by its resolution. The bonds may be issued in one (1) or more series and shall bear a date or dates, mature at a time or times, bear interest at a rate or rates or method of determining rates, be in a denomination or denominations, be in form, either coupon or registered, carry conversion or registration privileges, have rank or priority, be executed in a manner, be payable in a medium of payment, at a place or places, and be subject to the terms of redemption (with or without premium) as the resolution, its trust indenture, or mortgage may provide.
  4. The bonds may be sold at public sale held after notice has been given by publication pursuant to KRS Chapter 424. The bonds, however, may be sold to the federal government at private sale without advertisement.
  5. In case any of the members or officers of the agency whose signatures appear on any bonds, coupons, notes, or other obligations shall cease to be members or officers before the delivery of the bonds, coupons, notes, or other obligations, the signatures shall, nevertheless, be valid and sufficient for all purposes, the same as if they had remained in office until delivery of the bonds. Any provision of any law to the contrary notwithstanding, any bonds, coupons, notes, or other obligations issued pursuant to KRS 99.330 to 99.510 shall be fully negotiable.
  6. In any suit, action, or proceedings involving the validity or enforceability of any bonds of an agency or their security, any bonds reciting in substance that they have been issued by the agency to aid in financing a redevelopment project shall be conclusively deemed to have been issued for a redevelopment project and the project shall be conclusively deemed to have been planned, approved, located, and carried out in accordance with the purposes and provisions of KRS 99.330 to 99.510 .
  7. In connection with the issuance of bonds, an agency, in addition to its other powers, shall have power:
    1. To pledge all or any part of its gross or net revenue to which its right then exists or may thereafter come into existence;
    2. To encumber (by mortgage, deed of trust, or otherwise) all or any part of its real or personal property in the redevelopment project;
    3. To covenant against pledging all or any part of its revenues, or against encumbering all or any part of its real or personal property, to which its right or title then exists or may thereafter come into existence or against permitting or suffering any lien on revenues or property; to covenant with respect to its sale, leasing, or other disposition of any redevelopment project or any part of the project; and to covenant as to what other or additional debts or obligations may be incurred by it;
    4. To covenant as to the bonds to be issued and as to the issuance of the bonds in escrow or otherwise, and as to the use and disposition of the proceeds of the bonds; to provide for the replacement of lost, destroyed, or mutilated bonds, to covenant against extending the time for the payment of its bonds or interest on the bonds; and to redeem the bonds, and to covenant for their redemption and to provide the terms and conditions of the bonds;
    5. To covenant as to the amounts to be charged in the sale or lease of properties in a redevelopment project or projects, the amount to be raised from revenue each year or other period of time, and as to the use and disposition to be made of this amount; to create or to authorize the creation of special funds for moneys held for redevelopment or other costs, debt service, reserves, or other purposes, and to covenant as to the use and disposition of the money held in special funds;
    6. To prescribe the procedure, if any, by which the terms of any contract with bondholders may be amended or abrogated, the amount of bonds the holders of which must consent thereto, and the manner in which consent may be given;
    7. To covenant as to the use of any or all of its real or personal property; and to covenant as to the maintenance of its real and personal property, its replacement, the insurance to be carried, and the use and disposition of insurance moneys;
    8. To covenant as to the rights, liabilities, powers, and duties arising upon the breach of any covenant, condition, or obligation; and to covenant and prescribe as to events of default and terms and conditions upon which any or all of its bonds or obligations shall become or may be declared due before maturity, and as to the terms and conditions upon which a declaration and its consequences may be waived;
    9. To vest in a trustee or trustees or the holders of bonds or any proportion of them the right to enforce the payment of the bonds or any covenant securing or relating to the bonds; to vest in a trustee or trustees the right, in the event of a default by an agency, to take possession of any redevelopment project or part of the project, and to collect the rents and revenues arising or due the agency in connection with the project, and to dispose of the moneys in accordance with the agreement of the agency with the trustee; to provide for the powers and duties of a trustee or trustees and to limit the liabilities of the trustees; and to provide the terms and conditions upon which the trustee or trustees or the holders of bonds or any proportion of them may enforce any covenant or rights securing or relating to the bonds; and
    10. To exercise all or any part or combination of the powers granted; to make covenants other than and in addition to the covenants expressly authorized of like or different character; to make the covenants and to do any and all the acts and things as may be necessary or convenient or desirable in order to secure its bonds, or, in the discretion of the agency, except as otherwise provided in KRS 99.330 to 99.510 , as will tend to make the bonds more marketable notwithstanding that the covenants, acts, or things may not be enumerated within this section.
  8. The bonds, notes, and other obligations of an agency are declared to be issued for an essential public and governmental purpose, and together with interest and income from the bonds, notes, and other obligations shall be exempt from all taxes.
  9. Notwithstanding any restrictions on investments contained in any laws of this Commonwealth, the Commonwealth and all public officers, municipal corporations, political subdivisions, and public bodies; all banks, bankers, trust companies, savings banks and institutions, building and loan associations, savings and loan associations, investment companies, and other persons carrying on a banking business; all insurance companies, insurance associations and other persons carrying on an insurance business; and all executors, administrators, guardians, trustees, and other fiduciaries may legally invest any sinking funds, moneys, or other funds belonging to them or within their control in any bonds or other obligations issued by an agency, as defined by KRS 99.340 , or issued by any community or other public body in the United States, when the bonds and other obligations are secured by a contract for financial assistance to be paid by the United States government or any of its agencies, and the bonds, and other obligations shall be authorized security for all public deposits; it being one (1) of the purposes of KRS 99.330 to 99.510 to authorize any persons, firms, corporations, associations, political subdivisions, bodies, and officers, public or private, to use any funds owned or controlled by them including (but not limited to) sinking, insurance, investment, retirement, compensation, pension, and trust funds, any funds held on deposit, for the purchase of any bonds or other obligations; provided, however, that nothing contained in KRS 99.330 to 99.510 shall be construed as relieving any person, firm, or corporation from any duty of exercising reasonable care in selecting securities.

History. Enact. Acts 1950, ch. 119, § 12; 1966, ch. 239, § 102; 1996, ch. 274, § 28, effective July 15, 1996.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

Turnpike Authority of Kentucky v. Wall, 336 S.W.2d 551, 1960 Ky. LEXIS 331 ( Ky. 1960 ).

99.440. Procedure for submitting question of bond issue.

Upon the approval by the council of the development plan, the agency shall proceed to carry out the redevelopment. In the event that a bond issue is to be submitted by the community to the voters for the purpose of providing funds to pay for the cost of the redevelopment project or any part thereof, the question of issuing bonds shall be submitted as required in KRS 66.040 and 91A.090 , both inclusive.

History. Enact. Acts 1950, ch. 119, § 13; 1958, ch. 159, § 5; 1984, ch. 111, § 56, effective July 13, 1984.

Compiler’s Notes.

KRS 66.040 and 91A.090 , referred to in this section, have been repealed.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. In General.

Question submitted to voters concerning proposed bond issue for urban renewal project presented salient facts to voters clearly and in a way that there was little chance that a patient and thoughtful voter would be misled. Miller v. Louisville, 321 S.W.2d 237, 1959 Ky. LEXIS 269 ( Ky. 1959 ).

2. Constitutionality.

Titles of Acts 1956, ch. 215 and Acts 1958, ch. 159 adequately apprised general assembly of their copious contents as required by Ky. Const., § 51. Miller v. Louisville, 321 S.W.2d 237, 1959 Ky. LEXIS 269 ( Ky. 1959 ).

3. Construction.

Amendments to law regarding urban renewal and development law that were enacted in 1958 were merely of a minor clarifying or administrative nature and did not vitiate proceedings and vote of 1956 authorizing issuance of bonds for purpose of urban redevelopment project. Miller v. Louisville, 321 S.W.2d 237, 1959 Ky. LEXIS 269 ( Ky. 1959 ).

99.450. Disposal of property in development area.

The agency may sell, exchange, lease, or otherwise transfer real property acquired under the provisions of KRS 99.330 to 99.510 to one or more private individuals or to public bodies, and thereafter the real property shall be used only in accordance with the limitations and conditions set forth in the development plan, or the development plan as modified under KRS 99.330 to 99.510 . Maximum opportunity, consistent with the sound needs of the locality, shall be given private enterprise in the redevelopment of development areas. The agency shall sell, lease, exchange, or withhold for public use by the state or any public body thereof, all of the property which it has acquired in such development area as soon as feasible and in the public interest. Prior to any such sale or exchange of real property, the agency shall obtain appraisals made by independent appraisers of the value of such real property proposed to be sold or exchanged, which appraisals shall be based upon the new uses established for such real property. These appraisals shall be used as a guide for the agency in disposing of its real property, but the agency shall not be bound thereby.

History. Enact. Acts 1950, ch. 119, § 14; 1958, ch. 159, § 6.

99.460. Modification of development plan.

If a proposal by an agency to modify a development plan is made in writing to the planning commission and the council of the community, the planning commission and council shall consider the proposed modification, and if they approve such modification in writing, the development plan shall be changed accordingly. No modification of a plan shall affect, without the written consent of the owner or lessee, as the case may be, any property previously sold, leased, or exchanged by the agency.

History. Enact. Acts 1950, ch. 119, § 15.

99.470. Temporary leasing during development.

An agency shall have the right to lease any parcel or parcels obtained by it pursuant to its proceedings under KRS 99.330 to 99.510 for such uses and purposes as may be deemed desirable, even though not in conformity with the development plan, during the period of the development of any project, provided, however, that no such leases shall be made for a term longer than three (3) years or beyond the date of the completion of the redevelopment work, whichever may be the shorter term.

History. Enact. Acts 1950, ch. 119, § 16.

Opinions of Attorney General.

Once an agency has begun operations, the city council cannot dissolve the agency and take over its operations. OAG 68-134 .

99.480. Contracts for work — Satisfaction of legal requirements.

Before the agency enters into any contracts for work of demolition, grading, clearing or construction of utilities or other facilities or site improvements, it shall satisfy all requirements of the law, applicable to similar contracts of the community, relating to the advertisement and acceptance of bids, execution of bonds, and award of contracts.

History. Enact. Acts 1950, ch. 119, § 17; 2017 ch. 3, § 2, effective January 9, 2017.

99.490. Exercise of agency powers by community or housing authority.

If the council within its discretion finds and determines that it would be more efficient and in the public interest for the powers, functions, and duties of an agency to be exercised by the community or the housing authority of the community, such community or housing authority shall have all of the powers, functions, rights, duties and privileges (subject to the limitations thereon) of an agency under KRS 99.330 to 99.510 , and any powers of a public body (including a community) to assist an agency, or a project thereof, may be exercised to assist such community or housing authority or the project thereof. For such purposes, the term “agency,” as used in KRS 99.330 to 99.510 , shall mean the housing authority or the city or county, as the case may be, unless a different meaning clearly appears from the context. If a community has, pursuant to this section, determined to exercise the powers, functions, and duties of an agency, it may delegate any of them to a department or departments of such community, or may create a special department to exercise the powers and perform the functions and duties of an agency; provided that no such department or departments shall have the power to issue the bonds or acquire title to real property, this power being reserved to the community. Bonds issued by the community or by the housing authority of the community for any purposes under KRS 99.330 to 99.590 may be revenue bonds.

History. Enact. Acts 1950, ch. 119, § 18; 1956, ch. 215, § 10.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

Titles of Acts 1956, ch. 215 and Acts 1958, ch. 159 adequately apprised general assembly of their copious contents as required by Ky. Const., § 51. Miller v. Louisville, 321 S.W.2d 237, 1959 Ky. LEXIS 269 ( Ky. 1959 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Property owned by the Commonwealth, even in its proprietary capacity, may not be taken by a city or its urban renewal agency in eminent domain proceedings. OAG 64-197 .

A city could repeal a resolution creating a municipal housing commission, thereby reinvesting the board of commissioners with the functions of the housing commission. OAG 70-779 .

Once an urban renewal and community development agency has been created by a county pursuant to KRS 99.350 , the county may not dissolve the agency in the absence of legislative authority nor may it place the duties of the agency in itself or a county housing authority under this section. OAG 82-75 ; OAG 83-220 .

99.500. Cooperation between communities.

Two or more communities may jointly exercise the powers granted under KRS 99.330 to 99.510 and in such case the planning commissions, councils, and agencies may hold joint meetings, but all public hearings shall be held in each community which is affected under KRS 99.330 to 99.510 . By resolution finding and declaring a need therefor, the council of each of the communities may designate the agency of one (1) of the communities to act as the agency of each of such communities and such agency shall constitute an agency created and established by and for each such community pursuant to KRS 99.330 to 99.510 within the meaning of any provisions thereof. In this event the agency designated shall cooperate with the planning commission of each community in formulating development plans. The councils of the communities involved shall have the power to contract with each other in order to carry out the plan approved.

History. Enact. Acts 1950, ch. 119, § 19.

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Lewis, Kostas, and Carnes, Consolidation — Complete or Functional — of City and County Governments in Kentucky, 42 Ky. L.J. 295 (1954).

99.510. Additional conferred powers.

The powers conferred by KRS 99.330 to 99.510 shall be in addition and supplemental to the powers conferred by any other law.

History. Enact. Acts 1950, ch. 119, § 20.

99.520. Legislative finding and policy of KRS 99.520 to 99.590.

It is hereby found and declared that (1) there exist in communities of the state, slum, blighted and deteriorated areas which constitute a serious and growing menace, injurious to the public health, safety, morals and welfare of the residents of the state, and the findings and declarations heretofore made in KRS 99.330 with respect to slum and blighted areas are hereby affirmed and restated, (2) certain slum, blighted or deteriorated areas, or portions thereof, may require acquisition and clearance, as provided in KRS 99.330 to 99.510 , since the prevailing condition of decay may make impracticable the reclamation of the area by conservation or rehabilitation, but other areas or portions thereof may, through the means provided in KRS 99.330 to 99.510 and KRS 99.520 to 99.590 , be susceptible of conservation or rehabilitation in such a manner that the conditions and evils hereinbefore enumerated may be eliminated, remedied or prevented, and to the extent feasible salvable slum and blighted areas should be conserved and rehabilitated through voluntary action and the regulatory process, and (3) all powers conferred by KRS 99.330 to 99.510 and KRS 99.520 to 99.590 , are for public uses and purposes for which public money may be expended and such other powers exercised, and the necessity in the public interest for the provisions of KRS 99.330 to 99.510 and KRS 99.520 to 99.590, is hereby declared as a matter of legislative determination. A community, to the greatest extent it determines to be feasible in carrying out the provisions of KRS 99.330 to 99.510 and KRS 99.520 to 99.590, shall afford maximum opportunity, consistent with the sound needs of the community as a whole, to the rehabilitation or redevelopment of areas by private enterprise.

History. Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 215, § 1; 1958, ch. 159, § 7.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

Titles of Acts 1956, ch. 215 and Acts 1958, ch. 159 adequately apprised General Assembly of their copious contents as required by Ky. Const., § 51. Miller v. Louisville, 321 S.W.2d 237, 1959 Ky. LEXIS 269 ( Ky. 1959 ).

Cited:

Prestonia Area Neighborhood Ass’n v. Abramson, 797 S.W.2d 708, 1990 Ky. LEXIS 100 ( Ky. 1990 ).

Research References and Practice Aids

Journal of Energy, Natural Resources & Environmental Law.

Daugherty, 2006 Eminent Domain Ballot Initiatives: Citizens’ Voice or Crying Wolf?, 21 J. Energy, Nat. Res. & Env’l L. 99 (2007).

Kentucky Law Journal.

Schroder, The Preservation of Historical Areas, 62 Ky. L.J. 940 (1973-1974).

99.530. Urban renewal projects.

  1. In addition to its authority under KRS 99.330 to 99.510 , an agency is hereby authorized to plan and undertake urban renewal projects. As used in KRS 99.520 to 99.590 , an urban renewal project may include undertakings and activities for the prevention of the development or spread of slums or blighted, deteriorated, or deteriorating areas, or the elimination thereof, and may involve any work or undertaking for such purpose constituting a redevelopment project or any rehabilitation or conservation work, or any combination of such undertaking or work. For this purpose, “rehabilitation or conservation work” may include:
    1. Carrying out plans for a program of voluntary or compulsory repair and rehabilitation of buildings or other improvements;
    2. Acquisition of real property and demolition, removal, relocation, historic preservation, or rehabilitation of buildings and improvements thereon where necessary to eliminate unhealthful, unsanitary, or unsafe conditions; lessen density; reduce traffic hazards; eliminate obsolete or other uses detrimental to the public welfare; remove or prevent the spread of blight or deterioration; or provide land or buildings, and improvements thereon, for needed public facilities;
    3. Installation, construction, or reconstruction of streets, utilities, parks, playgrounds, and other improvements necessary for carrying out the objectives of the urban renewal project; and
    4. The disposition, for uses in accordance with the objectives of the urban renewal project, of any property or part thereof acquired in the area of such project; provided that such disposition shall be in the manner prescribed in KRS 99.450 for the disposition of property in a redevelopment project area.
  2. Notwithstanding any other provisions of KRS 99.330 to 99.510 and KRS 99.520 to 99.590 , where the local governing body certifies that an area is in need of redevelopment or rehabilitation as a result of a flood, fire, hurricane, earthquake, storm, or other catastrophe respecting which the Governor of the State has certified the need for disaster assistance under Public Law 875, Eighty-First Congress, or other federal law, the local governing body may approve an urban renewal plan and an urban renewal project with respect to such area without regard to any provisions of KRS 99.330 to 99.510 and KRS 99.520 to 99.590 , requiring public hearings or requiring that the urban renewal plan conform to a general or master plan for the community as a whole, or that the urban renewal area be a slum area, or a blighted, deteriorated, or deteriorating area, or that the urban renewal area be predominantly residential in character or be developed or redeveloped for residential uses.

History. Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 215, § 2; 1958, ch. 159, § 8; 2002, ch. 307, § 2, effective July 15, 2002.

Compiler’s Notes.

Public Law 875, referred to herein, was repealed. For present disaster relief provisions, see 42 USCS § 5121 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Construction.

Amendments to law regarding urban renewal and development law that were enacted in 1958 were merely of a minor clarifying or administrative nature and did not vitiate proceedings and vote of 1956 authorizing issuance of bonds for purpose of urban redevelopment project. Miller v. Louisville, 321 S.W.2d 237, 1959 Ky. LEXIS 269 ( Ky. 1959 ).

Cited:

Watkins v. Fugazzi, 394 S.W.2d 594, 1965 Ky. LEXIS 194 ( Ky. 1965 ); Prestonia Area Neighborhood Ass’n v. Abramson, 797 S.W.2d 708, 1990 Ky. LEXIS 100 ( Ky. 1990 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Urban renewal projects conducted pursuant to urban renewal plans contemplate the improvement and redevelopment of particular areas rather than individual structures and lots in various locations scattered throughout the city. Individual structures and lots within a defined project area, in accordance with an urban renewal plan for that particular area, could be acquired and resold but acquiring and reselling structures and lots at scattered locations and outside of specified project areas would not be permissible. OAG 82-567 .

99.540. Urban renewal plan.

Any urban renewal project undertaken pursuant to the preceding section shall be undertaken in accordance with an urban renewal plan for the area of the project. As used in KRS 99.520 to 99.590 , an “urban renewal plan” means a plan, as it exists from time to time, for an urban renewal project, which plan (1) shall conform to the general or master plan for the community as a whole, except as provided for disaster areas; and (2) shall be sufficiently complete to indicate such land acquisition, demolition and removal of structures, redevelopment, improvements, and rehabilitation as may be proposed to be carried out in the area of the urban renewal project, zoning and planning changes, if any, land uses, maximum densities, building requirements, and the plan’s relationship to definite local objectives respecting appropriate land uses, improved traffic, public transportation, public utilities, recreational and community facilities, and other public improvements. An urban renewal plan shall be prepared and approved pursuant to the same procedure as provided in KRS 99.330 to 99.510 with respect to a development plan. Where real property acquired by an agency is to be transferred in accordance with the urban renewal plan, any contract for such transfer and the urban renewal plan, or such part or parts of such contract or plan as the agency may determine, may be recorded in the land records of the community in such manner as to afford actual or constructive notice thereof.

History. Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 215, § 3; 1958, ch. 159, § 9.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Court’s Authority.

It is not for the court to interfere in the process of drawing the boundary lines for an urban renewal plan, however, it is appropriate for the court to determine whether or not the inclusion of the entirety of each of the subject neighborhoods was arbitrary. Prestonia Area Neighborhood Ass'n v. Abramson, 797 S.W.2d 708, 1990 Ky. LEXIS 100 ( Ky. 1990 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Urban renewal projects conducted pursuant to urban renewal plans contemplate the improvement and redevelopment of particular areas rather than individual structures and lots in various locations scattered throughout the city. Individual structures and lots within a defined project area, in accordance with an urban renewal plan for that particular area, could be acquired and resold but acquiring and reselling structures and lots at scattered locations and outside of specified project areas would not be permissible. OAG 82-567 .

In general, urban renewal plans differ from ordinary zoning in that the agency is authorized to assume ownership of property in deteriorated areas and to provide for the improvement and disposition of the property. OAG 91-228 .

Urban renewal begins with a plan, which must “conform to the general or master plan for the development of the community as a whole,” and apparently the general or master plan means the comprehensive plan adopted by a planning commission pursuant to KRS 100.183 ; therefore, the requirement that the urban renewal plan conform to the comprehensive plan was perhaps intended to prevent conflicts between urban renewal plans and the comprehensive plan. OAG 91-228 .

99.550. Power and authority of agency with respect to urban renewal.

An agency shall have all the powers necessary or convenient to undertake and carry out urban renewal plans and urban renewal projects, including the authority to acquire and dispose of property, to issue bonds and other obligations, to borrow and accept grants from the federal government or other source and to exercise the other powers which KRS 99.330 to 99.510 confer on an agency with respect to redevelopment projects. In connection with the planning and undertaking of any urban renewal plan or urban renewal project, the agency, the community, and all public and private officers, agencies, and bodies shall have all the rights, powers, privileges, and immunities which they have with respect to a development plan or redevelopment project, in the same manner as though all of the provisions of KRS 99.330 to 99.510 applicable to a development plan or redevelopment project were applicable to an urban renewal plan or urban renewal project; Provided That for such purpose the word “redevelopment” as used in KRS 99.330 to 99.510 and KRS 99.520 to 99.590 , except in this section and in the definition of “redevelopment project” in KRS 99.340 , shall mean “urban renewal,” the words “slum area” and the words “blighted area” as used in KRS 99.330 to 99.510 and KRS 99.520 to 99.590 , except in this section and in the definitions in subsections (1) and (2) of KRS 99.340 , shall mean “blighted, deteriorated, or deteriorating area,” and the finding prescribed in KRS 99.370 with respect to a slum area or blighted area shall not be required; Provided further That any disaster area, referred to in KRS 99.530 , shall constitute a “blighted area”; and Provided further That this section shall not change the corporate name of the agency or amend any section of KRS 99.330 to 99.510. In addition to the surveys and plans which an agency is otherwise authorized to make, an agency is hereby specifically authorized to make (1) plans for carrying out a program of voluntary repair and rehabilitation of buildings and improvements, (2) plans for the enforcement of laws, codes, and regulations relating to the use of lands and the use and occupancy of buildings and improvements, and to the compulsory repair, rehabilitation, demolition, or removal of buildings and improvements, (3) plans for the relocation of persons, including families, business concerns and others, displaced by an urban renewal project, (4) preliminary plans outlining urban renewal activities for neighborhoods to embrace two (2) or more urban renewal areas, and (5) preliminary surveys to determine if the undertaking and carrying out of an urban renewal project are feasible. The agency is authorized to make relocation payments to or with respect to persons, including families, business concerns and others, displaced by an urban renewal project, for moving expenses and losses of property for which reimbursement or compensation is not otherwise made, including the making of such payments financed by the federal government. The agency also is authorized to develop, test, and report methods and techniques, and carry out demonstrations and other activities, for the prevention and the elimination of slums and urban blight.

History. Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 215, § 4; 1958, ch. 159, § 10.

Opinions of Attorney General.

Property owned by the Commonwealth, even in its proprietary capacity, may not be taken by a city or its urban renewal agency in eminent domain proceedings. OAG 64-197 .

A commission, agency, or city has the power to condemn property of a school board for the general purpose for which each was created. OAG 65-330 .

A city engaged in an urban renewal project with the cooperation of the housing and urban development agency is given sufficient authority under the Urban Renewal Act to comply generally with the cooperative assistance requirements under the federal Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisitions Policies Act of 1970 regarding the payment of relocation expenses to displaced persons. OAG 71-130 .

Urban renewal projects conducted pursuant to urban renewal plans contemplate the improvement and redevelopment of particular areas rather than individual structures and lots in various locations scattered throughout the city. Individual structures and lots within a defined project area, in accordance with an urban renewal plan for that particular area, could be acquired and resold but acquiring and reselling structures and lots at scattered locations and outside of specified project areas would not be permissible. OAG 82-567 .

In general, urban renewal plans differ from ordinary zoning in that the agency is authorized to assume ownership of property in deteriorated areas and to provide for the improvement and disposition of the property. OAG 91-228 .

99.555. Authority to receive grants.

In addition to the power and authority of any agency under KRS 99.550 , such agency shall have the power and authority to act and receive grants from the federal government, local government, or any other sources, for the preparation, planning and completion of community renewal programs, and as authorized and provided for by section 405 of the Federal Housing Act of 1959, amending and adding to section 103 of the Housing Act of 1949, as amended. Communities and other public bodies shall, in addition to the assistance permitted to be given by them under KRS 99.560 , have the power and authority to provide, either directly or to the agency, that portion of the total cost of the preparation, planning and completion of the community renewal program for which a grant is not made by the federal government under said section 405 of the Federal Housing Act of 1959.

History. Enact. Acts 1960, ch. 109, § 2, effective June 16, 1960.

Compiler’s Notes.

Section 103 of the Housing Act of 1949 and § 405 of the Federal Housing Act of 1959, referred to herein, were compiled as 42 USCS § 1453. However, such section is no longer applicable due to 42 USCS § 5316.

Opinions of Attorney General.

An urban renewal agency established pursuant to KRS 99.350 constitutes a separate corporate body and an independent agency that is neither a state, city nor a county agency and such an agency has the power to administer the act including the acceptance of grants from the federal or state government, or from any other source as provided in subsection (1)(e) of KRS 99.360 as well as under the terms of this section. OAG 83-230 .

The fiscal court, having established a county urban renewal and community development agency, loses control of such agency in administering the Urban Renewal Act, and cannot, thereafter, legally establish a county administrative board or commission to administer federal or state grants made under the Urban Renewal Act; as a consequence, all such grants should be directed to the agency itself as KRS 99.360 and this section clearly envision. OAG 83-230 .

99.560. Assistance to urban renewal by communities and other public bodies.

Any community or other public body is hereby authorized (without limiting any provision in the preceding section) to do any and all things necessary to aid and cooperate in the planning and undertaking of an urban renewal project in the area in which such community or public body is authorized to act, including the furnishing of such financial and other assistance as the community or public body is authorized by KRS 99.330 to 99.510 to furnish for or in connection with a redevelopment plan or redevelopment project. An agency is hereby authorized to delegate to a community or other public body any of the powers or functions of the agency with respect to the planning or undertaking of an urban renewal project in the area in which such community or public body is authorized to act, and such community or public body is hereby authorized to carry out or perform such powers or functions for the agency. Any public body is hereby authorized to enter into agreements (which may extend over any period, notwithstanding any provision or rule of law to the contrary) with any other public body or bodies respecting action to be taken pursuant to any of the powers granted by KRS 99.330 to 99.510 and KRS 99.520 to 99.590 , including the furnishing of funds or other assistance in connection with an urban renewal plan or urban renewal project.

History. Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 215, § 15, effective February 28, 1956.

99.565. Acquisition of property in order to receive federal funds.

The council of any community, whose agency has received certification of availability of federal funds pursuant to section 101(c) of the National Housing Act of 1949, as amended may authorize the agency to acquire, by eminent domain, purchase, gift, grant, devise or otherwise, any real property in the development area or urban renewal area without regard to the conditions, restrictions, or provisions set forth in KRS 99.370 , or any other section of this chapter; if it finds by resolution that it is desirable and feasible to obtain federal financial assistance authorized by section 403 of the Housing Act of 1959 in acquiring such real property, and to sell, grant and convey any such real property if by resolution the agency consents to the disposal thereof.

History. Enact. Acts 1960, ch. 109, § 3, effective June 16, 1960.

Compiler’s Notes.

Section 101 of the National Housing Act of 1949 and section 403 of the Housing Act of 1959, referrred to herein, were compiled as 42 USCS §§ 1451 and 1452 respectively. However, such sections are no longer applicable due to 42 USCS § 5316.

99.570. Workable program authorized.

The governing body of the community, or such public officer or public body as it may designate, is hereby authorized to prepare a workable program (which may include an official plan of action, as it exists from time to time for effectively dealing with the problem of urban slums and blighted, deteriorated, or deteriorating areas within the community and for the establishment and preservation of a well-planned community with well-organized residential neighborhoods of decent homes and suitable living environment for adequate family life) for utilizing appropriate private and public resources to eliminate, and prevent the development or spread of, slums and urban blight and deterioration, to encourage needed urban rehabilitation, to provide for the redevelopment of blighted, deteriorated, or slum areas, or to undertake such of the aforesaid activities or other feasible activities as may be suitably employed to achieve the objectives of such a program.

History. Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 215, § 6, effective February 28, 1956.

99.580. Provisions of KRS 99.520 to 99.590 severable.

Notwithstanding any other evidence of legislative intent, it is hereby declared to be the controlling legislative intent that if any provision of KRS 99.520 to 99.590 , or the application thereof to any person or circumstances, is held invalid, the remainder of KRS 99.520 to 99.590 and the application of such provision to persons or circumstances other than those as to which it is held invalid shall not be affected thereby.

History. Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 215, § 7, effective February 28, 1956.

99.590. Powers conferred by KRS 99.520 to 99.590 supplemental.

The powers conferred by KRS 99.520 to 99.590 shall be in addition and supplemental to the powers conferred by any other law.

History. Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 215, § 8, effective February 28, 1956.

Property Assessment and Reassessment Moratoriums

99.595. Definitions for KRS 99.595 to 99.605 and 132.452.

  1. “Administering agency” means the agency delegated responsibility by the legislative body to implement the provisions of KRS 99.595 to 99.605 and 132.452 .
  2. “Commercial facility” means any structure the primary purpose and use of which is the operation of a commercial business enterprise and which is twenty-five (25) years old or older.
  3. “Existing residential building” means a residential building which has been in existence for at least twenty-five (25) years and use of which is to provide independent living facilities for one (1) or more persons.
  4. “Legislative body” means the board of aldermen in a city of the first class operating under KRS Chapter 83, the city council in a city operating pursuant to KRS 83A.130 , the city commission in a city operating pursuant to KRS 83A.140 , the board of commissioners in a city operating pursuant to KRS 83A.150 , the fiscal court in a county, the legislative council in a consolidated local government operating pursuant to KRS Chapter 67C, and the legislative body in an urban-county government operating pursuant to KRS Chapter 67A.
  5. “Local government” means a county, municipal, consolidated local government, or urban-county government.
  6. “Rehabilitation” means the process of returning an existing structure to a state of utility through repair or alteration which makes possible an efficient contemporary use.
  7. “Repair” means the reconstruction or renewal of any part of an existing structure for the purpose of maintenance.
  8. “Restoration” means the process of accurately recovering the form and details of a structure and its setting as it appeared at a particular period of time by removal of later work or by the replacement of missing earlier work.
  9. “Stabilization” means the process of applying measures designed to reestablish a weather-resistant enclosure and the structural stability of an unsafe or deteriorated property while maintaining the essential form as it exists.
  10. “Assessment or reassessment moratorium” means the act of deferring the value of the improvements from the taxable assessment of qualifying units of real property for a maximum period of five (5) years.

History. Enact. Acts 1982, ch. 327, § 1, effective July 15, 1982; 2002, ch. 346, § 123, effective July 15, 2002.

Opinions of Attorney General.

Although the General Assembly has provided the qualification standards to be used in determining the property which can qualify for the moratorium program, the local administering agency will have the responsibility of determining whether the improvements on qualified property constitutes “rehabilitation,” “repair,” “restoration” or “stabilization” as defined in subsections (6) through (9) of this section. OAG 82-381 .

Pursuant to the definitions in subsections (6) to (9) of this section, only improvements to existing structures would be eligible for a moratorium certificate. OAG 82-381 .

The assessment or reassessment moratorium would not freeze the assessment on the entire unit of qualifying real property, but would only defer the addition of the improvement to the total assessment for the taxable unit for the duration of the moratorium period. OAG 82-381 .

The qualification standards of this section and 99.605 as enumerated by the General Assembly pursuant to the authority given it by Ky. Const., § 172B are exclusive, and place no minimum on the value of the improvements. OAG 82-381 .

99.600. Moratoriums on property assessment or reassessment.

  1. Any local government may by ordinance establish a program granting property assessment or reassessment moratoriums for existing residential properties or commercial facilities for the purpose of encouraging the repair, rehabilitation, restoration or stabilization of existing improvements thereon. Any such program shall be established pursuant to the provisions of KRS 99.595 to 99.605 and 132.452 and shall specify the duration of effect for such assessment or reassessment moratoriums provided that any moratorium for an individual property certified by a local government shall not exceed five (5) years.
  2. The assessment or reassessment moratorium shall become effective on the assessment date next following the issuance of the moratorium certificate by the administering agency.
  3. The taxable assessment of property qualifying for an assessment or reassessment moratorium shall be that assessment provided for in KRS 99.605(2).
  4. On the assessment date next following the expiration, cancellation or revocation of an assessment or reassessment moratorium, property shall be assessed on the basis of its full fair cash value.
  5. Any property granted an assessment or reassessment moratorium may be eligible for a subsequent moratorium certification provided that reapplication be made no sooner than three (3) years following the expiration of the original moratorium, or any other moratorium, and provided that such property shall otherwise meet the requirements for the assessment or reassessment moratorium.

History. Enact. Acts 1982, ch. 327, § 2, effective July 15, 1982.

Opinions of Attorney General.

Although the General Assembly has provided the qualification standards to be used in determining the property which can qualify for the moratorium program, the local administering agency will have the responsibility of determining whether the improvements on qualified property constitutes “rehabilitation,” “repair,” “restoration” or “stabilization” as defined in subsections (6) through (9) of KRS 99.595 . OAG 82-381 .

The assessment or reassessment moratorium would not freeze the assessment on the entire unit of qualifying real property, but would only defer the addition of the improvement to the total assessment for the taxable unit for the duration of the moratorium period. OAG 82-381 .

Property assessment or reassessment moratorium program established by a particular local taxing authority will be applicable only to the assessments or reassessments of qualified property for the taxing authority establishing the program and it cannot limit the assessments or reassessments of property for state ad valorem tax purposes. OAG 82-381 .

The assessments of qualified property for the ad valorem tax levied by the state and those local governments which have not established moratorium programs pursuant to Acts 1982, ch. 327 must be made in accordance with the provisions of Ky. Const., §§ 172 and 174, requiring assessment at fair cash value; consequently, qualified property will have one assessment for those local governments which have established a moratorium program and another assessment for the state and those local taxing authorities which have not established such moratorium programs. OAG 82-381 .

99.605. Applications for moratorium certificates — Extensions — Lapsing of certificates — Transfers.

  1. Any owner of an existing residential building, or any owner or lessee of a commercial facility, may make application to the administering agency for a property assessment or reassessment moratorium certificate. The application shall be filed within thirty (30) days before commencing restoration, repair, rehabilitation, or stabilization and shall be filed in a manner prescribed by the administering agency and on a form prescribed by the Department of Revenue. The application shall contain or be accompanied by a general description of the property and a general description of the proposed use of the property, the general nature and extent of the restoration, repair, rehabilitation, or stabilization to be undertaken and a time schedule for undertaking and completing the project. If the property is a commercial facility, the application shall in addition, be accompanied by a descriptive list of the fixed building equipment which will be a part of the facility and a statement of the economic advantages expected from the moratorium, including expected construction employment.
  2. Except as otherwise provided herein, the property valuation administrator, or other assessing official, and the administering agency shall maintain a record of all applications for a property assessment or reassessment moratorium and shall assess or reassess the property within thirty (30) days of receipt of the application. The administering agency shall issue a moratorium certificate only after completion of the project. The applicant shall notify the administering agency when the project is complete and the administering agency shall then conduct an on-site inspection of the property for purposes of verifying improvements.
  3. The applicant shall have two (2) years in which to complete the improvement unless granted an extension by the administering agency. In no case shall the application be extended beyond two (2) additional years. This provision shall not preclude normal reassessment of the subject property.
  4. Any application for an assessment or reassessment moratorium not acted upon by the applicant shall become void two (2) years from the date of application and shall be purged from the files of the administering agency.
  5. An assessment or reassessment moratorium certificate may be transferred or assigned by the holder of the certificate to a new owner or lessee of the property.

History. Enact. Acts 1982, ch. 327, § 3, effective July 15, 1982; 2005, ch. 85, § 106, effective June 20, 2005.

Opinions of Attorney General.

Although the General Assembly has provided the qualification standards to be used in determining the property which can qualify for the moratorium program, the local administering agency will have the responsibility of determining whether the improvements on qualified property constitutes “rehabilitation,” “repair,” “restoration” or “stabilization” as defined in subsections (6) through (9) of KRS 99.595 . OAG 82-381 .

Pursuant to the definitions in subsections (6) to (9) of KRS 99.595 , only improvements to existing structures would be eligible for a moratorium certificate. OAG 82-381 .

The assessment or reassessment moratorium would not freeze the assessment on the entire unit of qualifying real property, but would only defer the addition of the improvement to the total assessment for the taxable unit for the duration of the moratorium period. OAG 82-381 .

The qualification standards of KRS 99.595 and this section as enumerated by the general assembly pursuant to the authority given it by Const., § 172B are exclusive, and place no minimum on the value of the improvements. OAG 82-381 .

Local Development Authorities

99.610. Legislative finding and policy.

It is hereby declared to be the policy of the Commonwealth to assist in the preservation and revitalization of historically or economically significant local areas, including open spaces, of cities of the first class, cities with populations equal to or greater than fifteen thousand (15,000) based upon the most recent federal decennial census, consolidated local governments, and urban-county governments, for the purpose of planning and financing the preservation and revitalization of areas of said cities which are of economic or historical significance, while at the same time accommodating necessary and desirable central city and suburban growth, to the extent funds are available for the accomplishment of such purposes.

History. Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 131, § 1; 2014, ch. 92, § 187, effective January 1, 2015.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

A state legislature may delegate legislative powers to cities, but it may not authorize a city to pass such powers on to an administrative agency and since the Local Development Act, KRS 99.610 to 99.680 , authorizes the agency to exercise choices that the people are entitled to have exercised by their elected representatives such act is unconstitutional under Ky. Const., §§ 27 and 28. Miller v. Covington Development Auth., 539 S.W.2d 1, 1976 Ky. LEXIS 40 ( Ky. 1976 ).

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Kentucky Law Survey, Rogers and Sims, Administrative Law, 69 Ky. L.J. 489 (1980-81).

Northern Kentucky Law Review.

Ziegler, Legitimizing the Administrative State: The Judicial Development of the Nondelegation Doctrine in Kentucky, 4 N. Ky. L. Rev. 87 (1977).

99.615. Definitions for KRS 99.610 to 99.680.

The following words or terms shall have the following meanings wherever used in KRS 99.610 to 99.680 unless a different meaning is clearly indicated by the context:

  1. “Act” means KRS 99.610 to 99.680 which may be called the “Local Development Authority Act”;
  2. “Technical advisory council” means that committee appointed under the terms of KRS 99.655 ;
  3. “Price advisory council” means that committee appointed under the terms of KRS 99.680 ;
  4. “Agency” means a development authority established by this statute in and for cities of the first class, cities with populations equal to or greater than fifteen thousand (15,000) based upon the most recent federal decennial census, a consolidated local government, and urban-county governments;
  5. “Bonds” means any bonds, notes, interim certificates, debentures, or other obligations issued by an agency pursuant to the provisions and purposes of KRS 99.610 to 99.680 ;
  6. “Project area” means any area or specific property designated by an agency or any area or specific property actually acquired or formally proposed for acquisition by an agency, for historical or open space preservation purposes, or for the development permitted by KRS 99.610 to 99.680 ;
  7. “City” means any city of the first class, cities with populations equal to or greater than fifteen thousand (15,000) based upon the most recent federal decennial census, a consolidated local government, or an urban-county government, in which an agency has been established;
  8. “Development” means the acquisition, planning, designing, clearance, renovation, or rehabilitation of existing improvements, development, and disposal, or any combination thereof, of a project area, including the preparation of such project area for the development of residential, commercial, industrial, public, recreational, open space, or other uses, including the preservation of existing residential, commercial, industrial, public, recreational, open spaces, or other uses valued locally for their economic or historical importance as may be appropriate or necessary, in the opinion of the board of commissioners of an agency;
  9. “Subdevelopment” means the actual construction, renovation, or rehabilitation of improvements to real property including the installation of or improvement to existing utilities, curbs, gutters, sidewalks, storm sewers, and other necessary works and improvements, consistent with the established development plan for each specific project area in order to market, through private enterprise, said improvements to individuals, commercial business, and industry;
  10. “Development plan” means the plan for the development as defined, of all or any part of a project area;
  11. “Mayor” means the mayor of a city as defined in this section;
  12. “Governing board” means a board of aldermen or commissioners, a legislative council in a consolidated local government, an urban-county council, or any legislative body of a city as defined in this section;
  13. “Project” means any undertaking within a project area and any such undertaking which may be included in, and financed by, a single or separate financing agreement or bond issue;
  14. “Persons and families of lower income” means persons and families who lack the amount of income which is necessary (as determined by standards established by the agency) to enable them, without financial assistance, to live in decent, safe, and sanitary dwellings, without overcrowding; and
  15. “Residential housing project” means a specific work or improvement undertaken primarily to provide or to rehabilitate dwelling accommodations for persons and families of lower income, including the acquisition, construction, and rehabilitation of land, buildings, and improvements and such other facilities as may be incidental or appurtenant thereto.

History. Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 131, § 2; 2002, ch. 346, § 124, effective July 15, 2002; 2014, ch. 92, § 188, effective January 1, 2015.

99.620. Creation of development authority.

There is hereby authorized, created, and established in cities as defined in KRS 99.615 , upon adoption of a resolution so declaring by a majority of the governing board of said cities, an agency to be known by the name of the city, and the words “Development Authority.” Said agency shall exist for each such city with the powers, duties, and functions hereinafter provided.

History. Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 131, § 3; 2002, ch. 346, § 125, effective July 15, 2002; 2014, ch. 92, § 189, effective January 1, 2015.

99.625. Appointment of commissioners — Term — Reimbursement of expenses.

Upon the date of the creation of the development authority, or within a reasonable time thereafter, the mayor shall appoint, with the approval of a majority of the governing board as aforesaid, seven (7) citizens of the city as members of the agency, each of whom shall bear the title of commissioner and shall constitute, with the other commissioners, a board of commissioners of said agency. The commissioners initially designated shall serve one (1) for a term of one (1) year, two (2) for a term of two (2) years, two (2) for a term of three (3) years, and two (2) for a term of four (4) years, from January 1, 1974, the length of said terms to be noted by the mayor in the written document making each of said appointments. Thereafter members shall be appointed as aforesaid for a term of office of four (4) years, except that all vacancies occurring during a term shall be filled for the unexpired term. A commissioner shall hold office until his successor has been appointed and qualified. The mayor or his designee shall be an ex officio nonvoting member of the agency. Commissioners shall serve without compensation but shall be reimbursed for any actual and necessary expenses incurred by them in the conduct of the affairs of the agency.

History. Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 131, § 4.

99.630. Officers.

The agency shall elect a chairman and a vice chairman from among the members of its board of commissioners. The term of office of each of said officers, unless otherwise prescribed by the agency, shall be for the calendar year or for that portion thereof remaining after each such officer is designated or elected. Other officers may be selected without regard to membership on the board of commissioners. The powers and duties of all officers shall be established by bylaws adopted by the board of commissioners, subject to approval, amendment or modification by the governing board.

History. Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 131, § 5.

99.635. Powers vested in commissioners — Removal procedure.

The powers of the agency shall be vested in the commissioners appointed as members of the board of commissioners. For inefficiency or neglect of duty or misconduct in office, a commissioner may be removed by the governing board of the city, but only after he shall have been given a copy of the charges made against him at least ten (10) days prior to a public hearing thereon, if such a public hearing is requested within two (2) days after notice of charges.

History. Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 131, § 6.

99.640. Disclosure of interest in property in project area.

No officer, employee or consultant of an agency, who in the course of his duties is required to participate in the formulation of plans or policies for the development of a project area, or in the implementation of such plans or policies, shall acquire any interest in any property to be included within a project area. If any such officer, employee or consultant owns or has or seeks to establish a financial interest, directly or indirectly, in any property to be included within such a project area, he shall immediately disclose, in writing, such interest to the board of commissioners of the agency, and such disclosure shall be entered in the minutes of the board of commissioners. Failure to so disclose such interest shall constitute misconduct in office. No payment shall be made to any commissioner or officer of an agency for any property or interest therein acquired by the agency from such commissioner or officer unless such payment is unanimously approved by the price advisory board and board of commissioners at public meetings of said boards subsequent to the meeting at which the interest in property has been disclosed in writing.

History. Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 131, § 7.

99.645. Appropriation and receipt of funds.

The board of commissioners of an agency is authorized to receive, and the governing board of the city for which the agency is established, is authorized to appropriate, such amounts of money as may be necessary for the administrative purposes of the agency, which may include payments to staff and consultants for research, various studies and surveys, designation of project areas, preparation of development plans, estimates of the cost of acquisition, clearance, renovation, rehabilitation, improvement of project areas, and payments for architectural, engineering, legal and financial advisory services and other administrative expenses deemed necessary by the board of commissioners. The board of commissioners is also authorized to receive, and the governing board of the city is authorized to appropriate, moneys necessary to meet any contractual commitments made by the city to the agency for any project undertaken by agreement between the city and the agency.

History. Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 131, § 8.

99.650. Powers of agency.

  1. Each agency created under the terms of KRS 99.610 to 99.680 shall constitute a public body corporate and politic, exercising public and essential governmental functions, and shall have all of the powers necessary and convenient to carry out and effectuate the purposes and provisions of KRS 99.610 to 99.680 including but without limiting the generality of the foregoing, the following powers in addition to other powers granted herein and by other statutory authority:
    1. To sue and be sued; to have a seal; to make and execute contracts and other instruments necessary or convenient to the exercise of its powers;
    2. To make, and from time to time amend and repeal bylaws, rules, and regulations not inconsistent with KRS 99.610 to 99.680, to carry into effect the powers and purposes thereof, subject to approval, amendment, or modification by the governing board;
    3. To select and appoint such officers, agents, counsel, and employees, permanent and temporary, as it may require, and determine their qualifications, duties, and compensation, subject, however, to the provisions of its budget;
    4. Within the jurisdiction of the city in which it is established, and for the purpose of developing a project area or areas, to purchase, lease, obtain option upon, acquire by gift, grant, bequest, devise, or otherwise, any real or personal property or any interest therein, together with any improvements thereon; to clear any and all buildings, structures, or other improvements from any real property so acquired; to renovate or rehabilitate any improvements to such real property so acquired and to dispose of any personal property resulting therefrom; to develop and construct residential housing for persons and families of lower income; to sell, lease, exchange, subdivide, transfer, assign, pledge, encumber by mortgage, deed of trust or otherwise, or otherwise to dispose of any real or personal property or any interest therein at its fair value for uses in accordance with the development plan, irrespective of the cost of acquiring and preparing said property; to insure or provide for the insurance of any real or personal property or operation of the agency against risks or hazards; and pursuant to the provisions of KRS 99.610 to 99.680, to rent, maintain, manage, operate, and repair such real property and any improvements thereto;
    5. Within the jurisdiction of the city in which it is established, and for the purpose of developing a project area or areas: to make or participate in the making of construction, land development, mortgage, and rehabilitation loans and to purchase or participate in the purchase of construction, land development, mortgage, and rehabilitation loans for residential housing projects, provided, however, that such loans shall be made only upon the determination by the agency that such loans are not otherwise available, wholly or in part, from private lender upon reasonably equivalent terms and conditions; to insure or reinsure construction, land development, mortgage, and rehabilitation loans on residential housing projects provided, however, that any such insurance or reinsurance shall be made only upon the determination by the agency that such insurance or reinsurance is not otherwise available wholly or in part from private insurers upon reasonably equivalent terms and conditions; to make grants from appropriated funds, and any other funds from any source available to the agency, to builders, developers, and owners of residential housing for the development, construction, rehabilitation, or maintenance of residential housing and such facilities related thereto as the agency shall deem important for a proper living environment, all on such terms and conditions as may be deemed appropriate by the agency; to sell, at public or private sale, all or any part of any mortgage or other instrument or document securing a construction land development, or rehabilitation loan for residential housing projects of any type, appropriate to the purpose of the agency; to consent, whenever it deems it necessary or desirable in the fulfillment of its corporate purposes, to the modification of the rate of interest, time of payment of any installment of principal or interest, or any other terms, of any mortgage loan, mortgage loan commitment, construction or land development loan, rehabilitation loan, contract, or agreement of any kind relating to residential housing projects to which the agency is a party;
    6. Within a project area, to cause streets and highways to be laid out and graded, and pavements or other road surfacing, sidewalks, curbs, gutters, storm sewers, and public utilities of every kind to be improved, constructed, and installed and to close any streets according to the development plan;
    7. To invest any funds held in reserves or sinking funds or any funds not required for immediate disbursement, in property or securities in which banks or insurance companies may legally invest funds subject to their control; to purchase its bonds at a price not more than the principal amount thereof and accrued interest, all bonds so purchased to be canceled;
    8. To obligate lessees or purchasers of land acquired in a project: (1) to use such land for the purpose designated in the development plan; (2) to begin the building of specified improvements or renovation of existing improvement within a period of time which the agency fixes as reasonable; and (3) to comply with such other conditions as in the opinion of the agency are necessary to carry out the purposes of KRS 99.610 to 99.680; the agency, by provision in the contract, deed, or lease may make any of the purchaser’s obligations, covenants or conditions running with the land, whose breach shall cause the fee to revert to the agency;
    9. To contract as, and to accept the obligations of, an owner of benefited property under the terms of KRS 107.010 to 107.220 , inclusive;
    10. To exercise all powers granted to governmental agencies under proposed legislation which deals with the use of “tax increment” revenues and financing of public purpose projects through the use thereof;
    11. To exercise all powers granted to governmental agencies by KRS 58.010 to 58.140 , inclusive;
    12. To make periodic grants to reduce principal and interest payments on mortgages or rentals payable by persons and families of low income;
    13. To rehabilitate, acquire, establish, and operate, lease, and sublease, residential housing for persons and families of lower income and to enter into agreements or other transactions with any federal, state, or local government agency for the purpose of providing adequate living quarters for such persons and families and to contract to assume the rights, powers, duties, and obligations of any local housing authority or similar agency of the federal, state, city, or urban-county governments;
    14. To borrow from and to accept loans and grants from the federal, state, city, or urban-county governments or any agency thereof, or from any sources, public or private, for the purposes of KRS 99.610 to 99.680, and to pledge such security as may be required, an agency, notwithstanding the provisions of any other law, may include in any contract for financial assistance with the federal, state, city, or urban-county government any conditions which the federal, state, city, or urban-county government may attach to its financial aid not inconsistent with the purposes of KRS 99.610 to 99.680; and
    15. To exercise all or any part or combination of the powers herein granted.
  2. Nothing contained in this section shall authorize such agency to construct any of the buildings for residential, commercial, industrial, or other use contemplated by the development plan, except as to the development and construction of residential housing for persons and families of lower income and except insofar as any industrial building may be authorized to be constructed by a lessee, on behalf of the agency, under the provisions of KRS 103.200 to 103.285 , inclusive.

History. Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 131, § 9; 1980, ch. 188, § 95, effective July 15, 1980.

99.655. Prerequisites for acquisition of land: Plan — Technical advisory board.

No agency may acquire title to any land for the purpose of carrying out a development plan unless the following conditions have been met: A development plan clearly fixing the boundaries of the proposed project area has been approved by the board of commissioners and the plan has been made available for public inspection. The development plan shall designate, among other things, the proposed location, character and extent of the public and private land ownership and uses proposed within the area. The development plan may be amended from time to time including the extension of established project boundaries. All such amendments shall be made available for public inspection. There shall also be established a technical advisory board appointed by the mayor of the city or urban-county government. There shall be eleven (11) members and the chairman of the board of commissioners shall serve as the eleventh member and chairman of said board. The board shall be composed of professions in the various developmental disciplines and shall include, but not be limited to architects, land use planners, engineers, civic leaders in the area of historical preservation, related agency heads of city or urban-county government, developers, builders, and other members of the community whose knowledge and ability will contribute to the purposes established in KRS 99.610 to 99.680 .

History. Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 131, § 10.

99.660. City, consolidated local government, or urban-county aid.

A city, consolidated local government, or urban-county shall have the power to aid an agency in any manner provided for aid by public bodies to urban renewal and community development agencies by KRS 99.410 .

History. Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 131, § 11; 2002, ch. 346, § 126, effective July 15, 2002.

99.665. Housing rehabilitation development fund — Purpose.

  1. An agency may create and establish a special revolving loan fund to be known as the housing rehabilitation development fund and to be administered by the agency as a trust fund separate and distinct from any other moneys or funds administered by the agency.
  2. The housing rehabilitation development fund shall be comprised of, and the agency is hereby authorized to receive and accept for such fund, the proceeds of grants, contributions, appropriations, repayment of loans made from the fund, and the proceeds of bonds and any other moneys which may be made available to the agency for the purpose of the fund from any other source.
  3. The purpose of the housing rehabilitation development fund is to provide a source from which the agency may make loans, and invest in loans, for rehabilitation of residential housing projects, and the agency is authorized to make such loans and to invest in such loans from such fund, at such interest rate or rates as may be determined by the agency to be for the best interest of the agency and best effectuate the purposes of the agency, and with such security for repayment as the agency deems reasonably necessary and practicable. In administering the housing rehabilitation development fund, the agency may exercise all powers granted in KRS 99.610 to 99.680 .

History. Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 131, § 12.

99.670. Bond issue — Agency powers.

  1. An agency shall have power to issue bonds from time to time at its discretion for any of its corporate purposes under KRS 99.610 to 99.680 . An agency shall also have power to issue refunding bonds for the purpose of paying or retiring bonds previously issued by it. An agency may issue bonds on which the principal and interest are payable:
    1. Exclusively from the income and revenues, including the increment of tax revenues as allowed by law, of the project or projects financed from the proceeds of such bonds; or
    2. Exclusively from such income and revenues together with grants and contributions from the federal, state, city, or urban-county government, or other sources. Any such bonds may be additionally secured by a mortgage, deed of trust, or other lien or encumbrance on the property, including pledges of tax increments as allowed by law in the project or projects financed from the proceeds of such bonds.
  2. Neither the members of the board of commissioners of an agency nor any person executing the bonds shall be liable personally on the bonds by reason of the issuance thereof. The bonds and other obligations of an agency shall so state on their face that such bonds and obligations issued under this section shall not be a debt of the city, the county, the state, or any political subdivision thereof within the meaning of any constitutional or statutory debt limitation or restriction and neither the city, the county, the state, nor any political subdivision thereof shall be liable thereon, nor, in any event, shall such bonds or obligations be payable out of any funds or properties other than those of said agency, except as provided by contract.
  3. Bonds of an agency shall be authorized by resolution of its board of commissioners. Such bonds may be issued in one (1) or more series, each of which may be separately secured, and shall bear such date or dates, mature at such time or times, bear interest at such rate or rates, be in such denomination or denominations, be in such form either coupon or registered, carry such conversion or registration privileges, have such rank or priority, be executed in such manner, be payable in such medium of payment, at such place or places, and be subject to such terms of redemption, with or without premium, as such resolution, its trust indenture or mortgage may provide.
  4. The bonds may be sold at less than par, and shall be sold at public sale held after notice has been given by publication pursuant to KRS Chapter 424, except as follows:
    1. Bonds may be sold at private sale without advertisement to the federal, state or urban-county governments, or to an agency of any such governments;
    2. Payment for any portion of a project area may be made in bonds, provided, however, that:
      1. Any such transaction shall be approved by the price advisory council before its consummation;
      2. Such exchange is valid and legal pursuant to regulations of the Internal Revenue Service.
  5. The bonds may be sold with provision that they bear no interest, or only nominal interest, for a period of years, after which they may bear greater interest; and provision may be made for the capitalization of interest for periods not in excess of five (5) years. More than one (1) project may be established within the same project area, and each such project may be financed with a different issue or bonds with differing security. Each of said bond issues may be designed to meet standards required under federal statutes or regulations pertaining to the issuance of tax-exempt bonds; provided, however, that nothing herein shall be deemed to prohibit the issuance of any series of bonds, the interest on which may not be exempt from federal income tax.
  6. In case any of the members or officers of the agency whose signatures appear on any bonds, coupons, notes, or other obligations shall cease to be such members or officers before the delivery of such bonds, coupons, notes, or other obligations, such signatures shall, nevertheless, be valid and sufficient for all purposes, the same as if they had remained in office until such delivery. Any provision of any law to the contrary notwithstanding, any bonds, coupons, notes, or other obligations issued pursuant to KRS 99.610 to 99.680 shall be fully negotiable except as limited by their terms.
  7. In any suit, action, or proceedings involving the validity or enforceability of any bonds of an agency or the security therefor, any such bonds reciting in substance that they have been issued by the agency to aid in financing a project shall be conclusively deemed to have been issued for a project and said project shall be conclusively deemed to have been planned, approved, located, and carried out in accordance with the purposes and provisions of KRS 99.610 to 99.680 .
  8. In connection with the issuance of bonds, an agency, in addition to its other powers, shall have power:
    1. To pledge all or any part of its gross or net revenue to which its right then exists or may thereafter come into existence;
    2. To encumber, by mortgage, deed of trust, or otherwise, all or any part of its real or personal property in the project;
    3. To covenant against pledging all or any part of its revenues, or against encumbering all or any part of its real or personal property, to which its right or title then exists or may thereafter come into existence or against permitting or suffering any lien on such revenues or property; to covenant with respect to its sale, leasing, or other disposition of any project or any part thereof; and to covenant as to what other, or additional debts or obligations may be incurred by it;
    4. To covenant as to the bonds to be issued and as to the issuance of such bonds in escrow or otherwise, and as to the use and disposition of the proceeds thereof; to provide for the replacement of lost, destroyed, or mutilated bonds, to covenant against extending the time for the payment of its bonds or interest thereon; and to redeem the bonds, and to covenant for their redemption and to provide the terms and conditions thereof;
    5. To covenant as to the amounts to be charged in the sale or lease of properties in a project or projects, the amount to be raised from revenue each year or other period of time and as to the use and disposition to be made thereof; to create or to authorize the creation of special funds for moneys held for development or other costs, debt service, reserves, or other purposes, and to covenant as to the use and disposition of the money held in such funds;
    6. To prescribe the procedure, if any, by which the terms of any contract with bondholders may be amended or abrogated, the amount of bonds the holders of which must consent thereto and the manner in which such consent may be given;
    7. To covenant as to the use of any or all of its real or personal property; and to covenant as to the maintenance of its real and personal property, the replacement thereof, the insurance to be carried thereon, and the use and disposition of insurance moneys;
    8. To covenant as to the rights, liabilities, powers, and duties arising upon the breach of any covenant, condition, or obligation; and to covenant and prescribe as to events of default and terms and conditions upon which any or all of its bonds or obligations shall become or may be declared due before maturity, and as to the terms and conditions upon which such declaration and its consequences may be waived;
    9. To vest in a trustee or trustees or the holders of bonds or any proportion of them the right to enforce the payment of the bonds or trustees the right, in the event of a default by said agency, to take possession of any project or part thereof, and to collect the rents and revenues arising therefrom, or due the agency in connection therewith, and to dispose of such moneys in accordance with the agreement of the agency with said trustee; to provide for the powers and duties of a trustee or trustees and to limit the liabilities thereof; and to provide the terms and conditions upon which the trustee or trustees or the holders of bonds or any proportion of them may enforce any covenant or rights securing or relating to the bonds;
    10. To exercise all or any part or combination of the powers herein granted; to make covenants other than and in addition to the covenants herein expressly authorized of like or different character; to make such covenants and to do any and all such acts and things as may be necessary or convenient or desirable in order to secure its bonds, or, in the discretion of said agency, except as otherwise provided in KRS 99.610 to 99.680 , as will tend to make the bonds more marketable notwithstanding that such covenants, acts, or things may not be enumerated herein.
  9. The bonds, notes, and other obligations of an agency are declared to be issued for an essential public and governmental purpose, and together with interest thereon and income therefrom shall be exempt from all taxes.

History. Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 131, § 13.

99.675. Sale or exchange of real property.

The agency may sell, exchange, lease, or otherwise transfer real property acquired under the provisions of KRS 99.610 to 99.680 to one (1) or more private individuals or to public bodies, and thereafter the real property shall be used only in accordance with the limitations and conditions set forth in the development plan. Maximum opportunity, consistent with the sound needs of the locality, shall be given private enterprise in the development and subdevelopment of project areas. The agency shall sell, lease, exchange, or withhold for public use by the state or any public body thereof, all of the property which it has acquired in such project area as soon as feasible and in the public interest. Prior to any such sale or exchange of real property, the agency shall obtain appraisals made by independent appraisers of the value of such real property proposed to be sold or exchanged, which appraisals shall be based upon the new uses established for such real property. These appraisals shall be used as a guide for the agency in disposing of its real property, but the agency shall not be bound thereby.

History. Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 131, § 14.

99.680. Price advisory council.

A price advisory council is hereby established in each agency which shall be entirely separate from the board of commissioners. Said price advisory council shall consist of seven (7) persons who shall be appointed for terms of four (4) years in the same manner provided herein for appointment of commissioners. Said price advisory council shall be required to pass upon the propriety of all proposed prices fixed for either purchase or sale of any real estate.

History. Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 131, § 15.

Blighted and Deteriorated Properties

99.700. Legislative findings and policy.

  1. It is hereby found:
    1. That there exist within the jurisdiction of many local governments in this Commonwealth blighted and deteriorated properties in neighborhoods which cause the deterioration of those and contiguous neighborhoods and constitute a serious and growing menace which is injurious to the public health, safety, morals, and general welfare of the residents of the Commonwealth, and are beyond remedy and control solely by regulatory process in the exercise of the police power;
    2. That the existence of blighted and deteriorated properties within neighborhoods, and the growth and spread of blight and deterioration or the threatened deterioration of other neighborhoods and properties:
      1. Contribute substantially and increasingly to the spread of disease and crime, and to losses by fire and accident;
      2. Necessitate expensive and disproportionate expenditures of public funds for the preservation of the public health and safety, for crime prevention, correction, prosecution, and punishment, for the treatment of juvenile delinquency, for the maintenance of adequate police, fire and accident protection, and for other public services and facilities;
      3. Constitute an economic and social liability;
      4. Substantially impair or arrest the sound growth of the community;
      5. Retard the provision of decent, safe, and sanitary housing accommodations;
      6. Depreciate assessable values;
      7. Cause an abnormal exodus of families from these neighborhoods; and
      8. Are detrimental to the health, the well-being, and the dignity of many residents of these neighborhoods;
    3. That this menace cannot be effectively dealt with by private enterprise without the aids provided herein; and
    4. That the benefits which would result from eliminating the blighted properties that cause the blight and deterioration of neighborhoods will accrue to the inhabitants of the neighborhoods in which these conditions exist and to the inhabitants of this Commonwealth generally.
  2. It is hereby declared:
    1. That it is the policy of this Commonwealth to protect and promote the health, safety, and welfare of the people of the Commonwealth by eliminating the blight and deterioration of neighborhoods through the elimination of blighted and deteriorated properties within these neighborhoods;
    2. That the elimination of such blight and deterioration and the preparation of the properties for sale or lease, for development or redevelopment, constitute a public use and purpose for which public money may be expended and private property acquired and are governmental functions in the interest of the health, safety, and welfare of the people of the Commonwealth; and
    3. That the necessity in the public interest for the provisions enacted herein is hereby declared to be a legislative determination.

History. Enact. Acts 1984, ch. 248, § 1, effective July 13, 1984; 1988, ch. 170, § 1, effective July 15, 1988; 2002, ch. 346, § 127, effective July 15, 2002; 2016 ch. 127, § 1, effective July 15, 2016.

Research References and Practice Aids

Journal of Energy, Natural Resources & Environmental Law.

Daugherty, 2006 Eminent Domain Ballot Initiatives: Citizens’ Voice or Crying Wolf?, 21 J. Ennergy, Nat. Res. & Env’l L. 99 (2007).

99.705. Definitions for KRS 99.700 to 99.730.

As used in KRS 99.700 to 99.730 :

  1. “Alternative government entity” means an entity established by the legislative body of a local government pursuant to KRS 65.350 to 65.375 , 99.330 to 99.510 , 99.520 to 99.590 , or 99.610 to 99.680 , with a purpose compatible with the purposes expressed in KRS 99.700 ;
  2. “Blighted” or “deteriorated” property means any vacant structure or vacant or unimproved lot or parcel of ground in a predominantly built-up neighborhood:
    1. Which because of physical condition or use is regarded as a public nuisance at common law or has been declared a public nuisance in accordance with the housing, building, plumbing, fire, nuisance, or related codes;
    2. Which because of physical condition, use, or occupancy is considered an attractive nuisance to children, including but not limited to abandoned wells, shafts, basements, excavations, and unsafe fences or structures;
    3. Which, because it is dilapidated, unsanitary, unsafe, vermin-infested, or lacking in the facilities and equipment required by the housing or nuisance code of the local government in which it is located, has been designated by the department responsible for enforcement of the housing or nuisance code as unfit for human habitation;
    4. Which is a fire hazard, or is otherwise dangerous to the safety of persons or property;
    5. From which the utilities, plumbing, heating, sewerage, or other facilities have been disconnected, destroyed, removed, or rendered ineffective so that the property is unfit for its intended use;
    6. Which by reason of neglect or lack of maintenance has become a place for accumulation of trash and debris, or a haven for rodents or other vermin;
    7. Which has been tax delinquent for a period of at least three (3) years; or
    8. Which has not been brought into compliance with the housing, building, plumbing, electrical, fire, or nuisance code of the local government within which it is located within the time constraints placed upon the owner by the appropriate code enforcement agency;
  3. “Commission” means a vacant property review commission established under KRS 99.710 ;
  4. “Local government” means any city, county, urban-county government, consolidated local government, unified local government, or charter county;
  5. “Nuisance code” means an ordinance or ordinances adopted by a local government pursuant to KRS 82.700 to 82.725 or a similar ordinance or ordinances adopted by a local government pursuant to any other authority; and
  6. “Redevelopment” means the planning or replanning, design or redesign, acquisition, clearance, development, and disposal or any combination of these, of a property in the preparation of such property for residential, commercial, public, or related uses, as may be appropriate or necessary.

History. Enact. Acts 1984, ch. 248, § 2, effective July 13, 1984; 1988, ch. 170, § 2, effective July 15, 1988; 2002, ch. 346, § 128, effective July 15, 2002; 2004, ch. 76, § 3, effective July 13, 2004; 2016 ch. 127, § 2, effective July 15, 2016.

99.710. Ordinance adopting provisions of state statutes on blighted or deteriorated areas — Vacant property review commission.

  1. If the legislative body of a local government finds and declares that there exist within the jurisdiction of the local government blighted or deteriorated properties and that there is need for the exercise of powers, functions, and duties conferred by KRS 99.700 to 99.730 within the jurisdiction of the local government, the legislative body may adopt the provisions of KRS 99.700 to 99.730 by ordinance.
  2. The ordinance adopting the provisions of KRS 99.700 to 99.730 shall:
    1. Establish a vacant property review commission, which shall certify properties as blighted or deteriorated to the legislative body. The ordinance shall specify the duties of, the number of members that will serve on, the requirements of membership, and the makeup of the commission. Members of the commission shall be appointed by the mayor or the county judge/executive, as the case may be, and approved by the legislative body; or
    2. Assign the duties that would otherwise be fulfilled by a vacant property review commission under KRS 99.700 to 99.730 to an alternative government entity.
  3. The governing body of a local government adopting the provisions of KRS 99.700 to 99.730 may also, by ordinance, authorize the commission or alternative government entity to identify and certify properties for inclusion in a tax delinquency diversion program established by the local government as provided in KRS 99.727 .
  4. No officer or employee of the local government whose duties include enforcement of housing, building, plumbing, fire, nuisance, or related codes shall be appointed to the commission or serve on the governing body of an alternative government entity.
  5. Nothing in KRS 99.705 to 99.730 shall prevent the duties of a vacant property review commission from being assigned to a local government code enforcement board established pursuant to KRS 65.8801 to 65.8839 .

History. Enact. Acts 1984, ch. 248, § 3, effective July 13, 1984; 1988, ch. 170, § 3, effective July 15, 1988; 2002, ch. 346, § 129, effective July 15, 2002; 2004, ch. 76, § 4, effective July 13, 2004; 2016 ch. 86, § 14, effective July 15, 2016; 2016 ch. 127, § 3, effective July 15, 2016.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(7/15/2016). This statute was amended by 2016 Ky. Acts chs. 86 and 127, which do not appear to be in conflict and have been codified together.

99.715. Acquisition and disposal of blighted property by local government.

A local government may acquire, by eminent domain pursuant to KRS Chapter 416, any property determined to be blighted or deteriorated pursuant to KRS 99.700 to 99.730 , and shall have the power to hold, clear, manage, or dispose of property so acquired pursuant to the provisions of KRS 99.700 to 99.730 .

History. Enact. Acts 1984, ch. 248, § 4, effective July 13, 1984; 1988, ch. 170, § 4, effective July 15, 1988; 2004, ch. 76, § 5, effective July 13, 2004; 2016 ch. 127, § 4, effective July 15, 2016.

99.720. Certification of blight deterioration — Notice to owner demanding abatement.

  1. The legislative body shall not institute eminent domain proceedings pursuant to KRS 99.700 to 99.730 unless the commission or alternative government entity has certified that the property is blighted or deteriorated. A property which has been referred to the commission or alternative government entity by a local government as blighted or deteriorated may only be certified to the legislative body as blighted or deteriorated after the commission or alternative government entity has determined:
    1. That the owner of the property or designated agent has been sent an order by the appropriate local government agency to eliminate the conditions which are in violation of local codes or law;
    2. That the property is vacant;
    3. That the property is blighted and deteriorated; and
    4. That the commission or alternative government entity has notified the property owner or designated agent that the property has been determined to be blighted or deteriorated and the time period for correction of such condition has expired and the property owner or agent has failed to comply with the notice.
  2. The findings required by subsection (1) of this section shall be in writing and included in the report to the legislative body.
    1. The commission or alternative government entity shall notify the owner of the property or a designated agent that a determination of blight or deterioration has been made and that failure to eliminate the conditions causing the blight shall render the property subject to condemnation by the local government under KRS 99.700 to 99.730 . (3) (a) The commission or alternative government entity shall notify the owner of the property or a designated agent that a determination of blight or deterioration has been made and that failure to eliminate the conditions causing the blight shall render the property subject to condemnation by the local government under KRS 99.700 to 99.730 .
    2. Notice shall be mailed to the owner or designated agent by certified mail, return receipt requested. However, if the address of the owner or a designated agent is unknown and cannot be ascertained by the commission or alternative government entity in the exercise of reasonable diligence, copies of the notice shall be posted in a conspicuous place on the property affected.
    3. The written notice sent to the owner or his or her agent or posted on the property shall describe the conditions that render the property blighted and deteriorated, and shall demand abatement of the conditions within ninety (90) days of the receipt of such notice.
  3. An extension of the ninety (90) day time period may be granted by the commission or alternative government entity if the owner or designated agent demonstrates that such period is insufficient to correct the conditions cited in the notice.

History. Enact. Acts 1984, ch. 248, § 5, effective July 13, 1984; 1988, ch. 170, § 5, effective July 15, 1988; 2002, ch. 346, § 130, effective July 15, 2002; 2004, ch. 76, § 6, effective July 13, 2004; 2016 ch. 127, § 5, effective July 15, 2016.

99.725. Eminent domain proceedings by local government.

The legislative body of the local government may institute eminent domain proceedings pursuant to KRS Chapter 416 against any property which has been certified as blighted or deteriorated by the commission or alternative government entity if it finds:

  1. That such property has deteriorated to such an extent as to constitute a serious and growing menace to the public health, safety and welfare;
  2. That such property is likely to continue to deteriorate unless corrected;
  3. That the continued deterioration of such property may contribute to the blighting or deterioration of the area immediately surrounding the property; and
  4. That the owner of such property has failed to correct the deterioration of the property.

History. Enact. Acts 1984, ch. 248, § 6, effective July 13, 1984; 1988, ch. 170, § 6, effective July 15, 1988; 2004, ch. 76, § 7, effective July 13, 2004; 2016 ch. 127, § 6, effective July 15, 2016.

Research References and Practice Aids

Treatises

Caldwell’s Kentucky Form Book, 5th Ed., Practice Context for Condemnation (Eminent Domain), § 307.00.

99.727. Consolidated local government may establish a tax delinquency diversion program for blighted property.

  1. As used in this section:
    1. “Census block” means an area within the jurisdiction of a local government identified by the United States Census Bureau using a unique four (4) digit number;
    2. “Certificate of delinquency” has the same meaning as in KRS 134.010 ;
    3. “Individual parcel” means a parcel of property not located in a priority project area that has been designated by the commission or alternative government entity as blighted, and for which the area in which the property is located:
      1. Exhibits conditions that are favorable for development;
      2. Has the resources needed for urban redevelopment; and
      3. Has characteristics that can be promoted as part of a campaign to retain existing residents and attract new residents to the area; and
    4. “Priority project area” means a specific group of properties identified by census block, which are located in an area where:
      1. There are a significant number of blighted properties;
      2. Existing conditions are favorable for development;
      3. Existing resources needed for urban redevelopment are present; and
      4. Existing characteristics of the area can be promoted as part of a campaign to retain existing residents and attract new residents to the area.
  2. The legislative body of a consolidated local government may, by ordinance, establish a tax delinquency diversion program for blighted property.
  3. The ordinance establishing the program shall designate the commission or an alternative government entity as the body responsible for identifying and certifying priority project areas and individual parcels of property for inclusion in the tax delinquency diversion program.
  4. The commission or alternative government entity shall submit recommended priority project areas and qualifying individual parcels of property to the governing body of the consolidated local government for consideration.
  5. Certificates of delinquency related to property approved by the governing body of the consolidated local government for inclusion in the tax delinquency diversion program shall not be available for purchase by any person for a period of up to five (5) years following the year in which the property is placed in the tax delinquency diversion program.
  6. The commission or alternative government entity shall provide to the county attorney a list of all properties included in the tax delinquency diversion plan, and the county attorney shall place the identified properties on the protected list required by KRS 134.504(10).

HISTORY: 2016 ch. 127, § 8, effective July 15, 2016.

99.730. Acquisition by certain employees prohibited — Disclosure of previous interest required — Payment under eminent domain proceedings.

  1. No officer or employee of a local government, the vacant property review commission, or an alternative government entity, who in the course of his or her duties is required to participate in the determination of property blight or deterioration or the issuance of notices on code violations which may lead to a determination of blight or deterioration, shall acquire any interest in any property declared to be blighted or deteriorated.
  2. If any such officer or employee owns or has financial interest, direct or indirect, in any property certified to be blighted or deteriorated, he or she shall immediately disclose, in writing, such interest to the commission or alternative government entity and to the legislative body, and such disclosure shall be entered in the minutes of the commission or alternative government entity and of the legislative body. Failure to so disclose such interest shall constitute misconduct in office.
  3. No payment shall be made to any officer or employee for any property or interest acquired by the local government from such officer or employee unless the amount of such payment is fixed by court order in eminent domain proceedings, or unless payment is unanimously approved by the legislative body.

History. Enact. Acts 1984, ch. 248, § 7, effective July 13, 1984; 1988, ch. 170, § 7, effective July 15, 1988; 2002, ch. 346, § 131, effective July 15, 2002; 2004, ch. 76, § 8, effective July 13, 2004; 2016 ch. 127, § 7, effective July 15, 2016.

Tax Increments

99.750. Definitions for KRS 99.750 to 99.770. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 132, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1986, ch. 13, § 6, effective July 15, 1986.

99.751. Definitions for KRS 99.756 to 99.771. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 13, § 1, effective July 15, 1986) was repealed by Acts 2000, ch. 326, § 7, effective July 14, 2000. For present law, see KRS 65.490 et seq.

99.755. Imposition of ad valorem tax in development area. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 132, § 2) was repealed by Acts 1986, ch. 13, § 6, effective July 15, 1986.

99.756. Purpose. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 13, § 2, effective July 15, 1986) was repealed by Acts 2000, ch. 326, § 7, effective July 14, 2000. For present law, see KRS 65.490 et seq.

99.760. Contracts with taxing districts for release of increments. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 132, § 3) was repealed by Acts 1986, ch. 13, § 6, effective July 15, 1986.

99.761. Contracts for release of increments to agency by taxing districts. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 13, § 3, effective July 15, 1986) was repealed by Acts 2000, ch. 326, § 7, effective July 14, 2000. For present law, see KRS 65.490 et seq.

99.765. Taxing district authority for contract of release. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 132, § 4) was repealed by Acts 1986, ch. 13, § 6, effective July 15, 1986.

99.766. Automatic renewals of contracts of release. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 13, § 4, effective July 15, 1986) was repealed by Acts 2000, ch. 326, § 7, effective July 14, 2000. For present law, see KRS 65.490 et seq.

99.770. Notice of contract of release to tax collection official. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 132, § 5) was repealed by Acts 1994, ch. 279, § 6, effective July 15, 1994. For present law, see KRS 65.490 et seq.

99.771. Notification to tax collector — Distribution of funds. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 13, § 5, effective July 15, 1986) was repealed by Acts 2000, ch. 326, § 7, effective July 14, 2000. For present law, see KRS 65.490 et seq.

CHAPTER 99A Neighborhood Redevelopment

99A.005. Title.

This chapter may be cited as the “Neighborhood Redevelopment Act.”

History. Enact. Acts 1984, ch. 174, § 1, effective July 13, 1984.

99A.010. Definitions for chapter.

As used in this chapter unless the context otherwise requires:

  1. “Corporation” means the Kentucky Housing Corporation;
  2. “Executive director” means the executive director of the Kentucky Housing Corporation;
  3. “Insurer” means any company qualified to write mortgage guaranty insurance in accordance with Subtitle 23 of KRS Chapter 304;
  4. “Local government” means a county, city, consolidated local government, or urban-county;
  5. “Mortgage” shall mean a first mortgage on real estate, in fee simple, or on a leasehold under a lease for not less than ninety-nine (99) years which is renewable, or under a lease having a period of not less than fifty (50) years to run from the date the mortgage was executed;
  6. “Mortgage guaranty fund” means the fund created pursuant to KRS 99A.080 ;
  7. “Mortgagee” means the original lender under a mortgage and his successors and assigns;
  8. “Mortgagor” means the original borrower under a mortgage and his successors and assigns;
  9. “Rehabilitation” means the process of returning a structure to a state of utility through repair or alteration which makes possible an efficient contemporary use while preserving those portions or features of the property which are significant to historical, architectural, and cultural values;
  10. “Rehabilitation loan” means a loan, advance of credit, or purchase of an obligation representing a loan or advance of credit, made for the purpose of financing:
    1. The rehabilitation of an existing residential building;
    2. The rehabilitation of such a structure and the refinancing of the outstanding indebtedness on such structure and the real property on which the structure is located; or
    3. The rehabilitation of such a structure and the purchase of the structure and the real property on which it is located; and
  11. “Residential building” means a building in which sleeping accommodations or sleeping accommodations and cooking facilities as a unit are provided except when classified as an institution under the Kentucky Building Code.

History. Enact. Acts 1984, ch. 174, § 2, effective July 13, 1984; 2002, ch. 346, § 132, effective July 15, 2002.

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Building Code, KRS 198B.010 to 198B.270 .

99A.020. Ordinance establishing neighborhood redevelopment zone.

  1. Any local government may by ordinance establish one (1) or more neighborhood redevelopment zones. Such zones shall be substantially residential in character and shall consist chiefly of residential buildings at least twenty-five (25) years of age. To be eligible for designation as a neighborhood redevelopment zone the area shall be found by the legislative body to be characterized by:
    1. Deteriorating housing stock;
    2. Abandoned residential buildings or vacant lots where the dwelling has been demolished by fire, vandalism or as an unsafe structure;
    3. Such other characteristics which cause the legislative body of the local government to believe the neighborhood is in a deteriorating economic and physical condition; or
    4. Such detrimental conditions that the effect is to discourage mortgagees from making loans for, and present or prospective property owners from investing in the purchase and rehabilitation of residential buildings.
  2. The legislative body of the local government may establish a neighborhood redevelopment zone in accordance with subsection (1) of this section either on its own initiative or upon a petition filed with the clerk of the legislative body, signed by the owners or lessees of seventy-five percent (75%) of the assessed value of the property located within the proposed zone.
  3. No zone shall be established by a local government unless certified by the executive director as qualifying pursuant to this chapter.
  4. Prior to the first reading of an ordinance proposing to establish a neighborhood redevelopment zone, the legislative body shall give notice by mail to the last known owner of all real property within the proposed redevelopment zone and hold a public hearing on the question of establishment of the zone. The notice shall contain a description of the boundaries of the proposed zone and shall set out a date for a public hearing on the establishment of the zone at which any of the owners, their lessees or any other resident or taxpayer of the local government may appear.
  5. Once established, a neighborhood redevelopment zone may be dissolved only by ordinance, but in no event sooner than ten (10) years from its establishment.
  6. Upon the effective date of the ordinance establishing the zone all residential property located therein shall be subject to the provisions of this chapter.

History. Enact. Acts 1984, ch. 174, § 3, effective July 13, 1984.

99A.030. Codes applicable to residential buildings — Variances.

  1. Prior to or concurrent with the establishment of a neighborhood redevelopment zone, the legislative body of the local government shall adopt by ordinance the BOCA Basic Property Maintenance Code as drafted by the Building Officials and Codes Administrators International, Inc., and the Kentucky Building Code which shall be applicable to all residential buildings within the neighborhood redevelopment zone. The local government shall delegate responsibility for enforcement to the local agency responsible for local enforcement of the state building code, or such other agency deemed best qualified to carry out the responsibilities under this chapter.
  2. Variances from provisions of the Kentucky Building Code may be granted in specific cases pursuant to the provisions of this subsection.
    1. If a submitted plan for rehabilitation of a residential building is disapproved by the local enforcement agency for nonconformity with the building code, the owner or his agent may, in writing, apply to the Department of Housing, Buildings and Construction for a variance from the building code with respect to such plans. In making the determination to approve or disapprove the application for variance, the department shall consider:
      1. The architectural and historical significance of the structure;
      2. The health, safety, and welfare of the public;
      3. The costs of complying with the standards;
      4. The ability of the applicant to proceed with the project if the variance is not granted; and
      5. The significance to the neighborhood of the project.

        The department may impose a reasonable fee for the evaluation of a requested variance.

    2. The Department of Housing, Buildings and Construction shall respond in writing within twenty (20) working days of the application, and such response shall be binding upon the local enforcement agency. Appeals from the determination of the Department of Housing, Buildings and Construction may be taken to the board of appeals.
    3. The Department of Housing, Buildings and Construction shall maintain a central file of all such determinations, making them available upon request, to all interested parties, and using them as precedent for other cases.
    4. The Kentucky Department of Housing, Buildings and Construction, the Kentucky State Historic Preservation Office, and the Kentucky Housing Corporation are authorized to establish a joint task force to identify and recommend changes in the state building code as it applies to the rehabilitation of existing housing.
  3. The United States Secretary of the Interior’s standards of rehabilitation shall apply to the rehabilitation of the exterior of any housing listed individually on the National Register of Historic Places or located in an historic district listed on the National Register of Historic Places.

History. Enact. Acts 1984, ch. 174, § 4, effective July 13, 1984; 2010, ch. 24, § 86, effective July 15, 2010.

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Building Code, KRS 198B.010 to 198B.270 .

99A.040. Inspection of buildings — Correction of code violations.

  1. Any person acquiring title to a residential building located within a neighborhood redevelopment zone, after the effective date of establishment of the zone, shall permit such building to be inspected by the local agency responsible for carrying out the duties under this chapter and shall correct within a reasonable time any violations of the applicable codes which are cited by the inspectors. Any residential building containing more than one (1) housing unit or which is not the residence of the owner of the building, that has not been inspected and brought into compliance with applicable codes within five (5) years of the date of establishment of the zone, shall be inspected by the local government and the owner thereof required to correct any code violations which exist.
  2. The purchaser shall have an affirmative duty to notify the agency given the responsibility for enforcement of the code and request an inspection. The agency shall make the inspection within three (3) working days of the notice and request.
  3. The local government may impose a reasonable fee, not to exceed twenty dollars ($20), for such inspection.

History. Enact. Acts 1984, ch. 174, § 5, effective July 13, 1984.

99A.050. Assessment or reassessment moratoriums.

Any local government establishing a neighborhood redevelopment zone shall establish a program for granting property assessment or reassessment moratoriums pursuant to KRS 99.595 to 99.605 . Any residential building located within the neighborhood redevelopment zone shall be eligible for a property assessment moratorium certificate if such building is repaired, restored, rehabilitated or stabilized in accordance with the provisions of KRS 99.595 to 99.605 .

History. Enact. Acts 1984, ch. 174, § 6, effective July 13, 1984.

99A.060. Special endorsements on policies of mortgage guaranty insurance.

  1. The commissioner of the Department of Insurance shall approve the issuance of special endorsements on policies of mortgage guaranty insurance by an insurer pursuant to this section. The commissioner of the Department of Insurance within ten (10) days of approval shall notify the executive director of the Kentucky Housing Corporation of the name of the insurer.
  2. No insurer shall be authorized to issue special endorsements except upon submission of an application to and approval of such application by the commissioner of the Department of Insurance. In granting such applications the commissioner of the Department of Insurance shall consider:
    1. The financial condition of the insurer;
    2. The percentage of defaulted loans insured by the insurer within the past five (5) years; and
    3. Such other standards as prescribed by the commissioner of the Department of Insurance.
  3. Upon approval by the commissioner of the Department of Insurance, the insurer may issue special endorsements on policies of mortgage guaranty insurance covering that portion of a mortgage or rehabilitation loan which exceeds ninety percent (90%) but is less than one hundred twenty-five percent (125%) of the appraised value of the residential building and the property on which it is located after completion of the rehabilitation.
  4. An insurer shall issue a special endorsement only upon certification by the mortgagee that:
    1. The residential property subject to the mortgage or rehabilitation loan is located within the boundaries of a neighborhood development zone established pursuant to KRS 99A.020 ;
    2. The mortgagor is unable to secure the necessary funds for rehabilitation upon reasonable terms and conditions without the guaranty provided by the special endorsement;
    3. The loan is an acceptable risk, taking into consideration the need for the rehabilitation, the security for the loan or loans, and the ability of the mortgagor to repay the mortgage or rehabilitation loan; and
    4. The mortgage or rehabilitation loan transaction complies with such other terms, conditions and restrictions as may be prescribed by the executive director of the Kentucky Housing Corporation.
  5. Each mortgagee who holds a mortgage covered by a policy of mortgage guaranty insurance with a special endorsement pursuant to this section shall submit a quarterly report to the executive director of the Kentucky Housing Corporation listing each mortgage or rehabilitation loan covered by such special endorsement and the status of such mortgage or rehabilitation loan.
  6. The commissioner of the Department of Insurance in his discretion or when requested by the executive director of the Kentucky Housing Corporation as needed to protect the mortgage guaranty fund may withdraw the approval to an insurer to issue special endorsements on policies of mortgage guaranty insurance.
  7. Any insurer subject to approval by the commissioner of the Department of Insurance may charge a premium for the special endorsement issued pursuant to this section, of which sixty-six percent (66%) shall be remitted to the executive director of the Kentucky Housing Corporation to be used pursuant to KRS 99A.080 .

History. Enact. Acts 1984, ch. 174, § 7, effective July 13, 1984; 2010, ch. 24, § 87, effective July 15, 2010.

99A.070. Reimbursement from mortgage guaranty fund.

  1. If any insurer pursuant to the terms of the special endorsement to a guaranty makes payment upon a defaulted loan to the holder thereof, he shall apply to the executive director for reimbursement out of the mortgage guaranty fund for the amount guaranteed by the special endorsement.
  2. Upon payment to an insurer pursuant to subsection (1) of this section, the mortgage guaranty fund shall be subrogated to the rights of the mortgagee for such amount paid.

History. Enact. Acts 1984, ch. 174, § 8, effective July 13, 1984.

99A.080. Mortgage guaranty fund established.

  1. There is created a mortgage guaranty fund which shall be used by the executive director for carrying out the provisions of KRS 99A.060 and 99A.070 .
  2. The fund shall be credited with such moneys as are appropriated by the General Assembly thereto, the premium charges paid by mortgagees pursuant to KRS 99A.060 less the costs of administration, and contributions.
  3. The mortgage insurance fund shall be used solely as a reserve for insurance guarantees given under the provisions of this chapter. At no time shall the executive director permit the aggregate principal amount of the mortgages or rehabilitation loans, guaranteed by special endorsements issued by issuers, to exceed twenty-five (25) times the amount in the fund.

History. Enact. Acts 1984, ch. 174, § 9, effective July 13, 1984.

Penalties

99A.990. Penalty.

Any owner or agent who willfully violates the provisions of KRS 99A.030 shall be fined not less than twenty-five dollars ($25) nor more than two hundred dollars ($200) for each day the violation continues, or imprisoned for not more than ninety (90) days.

History. Enact. Acts 1984, ch. 174, § 10, effective July 13, 1984.

CHAPTER 100 Planning and Zoning

100.010. Definitions. [Renumbered as KRS 100.314.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2741zz-1, 3037h-111: amend. Acts 1942, ch. 176, § 17; 1958, ch. 154, § 1) was renumbered as KRS 100.314 , which was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 91.

100.020. Construction of chapter. [Renumbered as KRS 100.316.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2741z-9, 3037h-135, 3235f-11) was renumbered as KRS 100.316 which was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 91.

100.030. Power to create planning and zoning commission. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3037h-112) was repealed by Acts 1942, ch. 176, § 17.

100.031. Agreement between city of first class, and county containing such city, for planning and zoning. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 176, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 91.

100.032. Power to adopt plans and make rules and regulations; creation of planning and zoning commission and board of zoning adjustment and appeals. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 176, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 91.

100.033. Adoption of KRS 100.031 to 100.097 by other cities in county. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 176, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 91.

100.034. Fiscal year of commission and board. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 176, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 91.

This section (Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 176, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 91.

100.035. Continuation of existing plans, ordinances and regulations; transfer of functions to new commission and board. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 176, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 91.

100.036. Membership of planning and zoning commission; appointment; qualifications; term; vacancies; oath; removal; compensation. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 176, § 2; 1964, ch. 69, § 2) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 91.

100.037. Officers of commission; meetings; records; votes; quorum. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 176, § 2; 1950, ch. 67, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 91.

100.038. Employes; employment of professional services. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 176, § 2) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 91.

100.039. Custody of funds; expenditures; audits; depository; indebtedness. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 176, § 2) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 91.

100.040. Members; terms; vacancies. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3037h-113) was repealed by Acts 1942, ch. 176, § 17.

100.041. Membership of board of zoning adjustment and appeals; appointment; qualifications; term; vacancies; oath; removal; compensation. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 176, § 3) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 91.

100.042. Officers of board; meetings; records; votes. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 176, § 3) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 91.

100.043. Employees of board; expenses. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 176, § 3) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 91.

100.044. Adoption of comprehensive plan; what to include; purpose. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 176, § 4) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 91.

100.045. Powers and duties of commission as to comprehensive plan. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 176, § 4) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 91.

100.046. Master plan; what to include. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 176, § 5) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 91.

100.047. Master plan; what to include. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 176, § 5) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 91.

100.048. Public hearing of master plan; adoption by commission; revisions; adoption by fiscal court and city legislative body. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 176, § 5) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 91.

100.049. Procedure when plan is rejected by fiscal court or city legislative body. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 176, § 5) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 91.

100.050. Chairman; meetings; rules. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3037h-114) was repealed by Acts 1942, ch. 176, § 17.

100.051. Filing of approved plan as public record. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 176, § 5) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 91.

100.052. Adjustments in master plan; how made effective; proposal. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 176, § 6; 1960, ch. 199, § 1, effective March 28, 1960) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 91.

100.053. Public hearing on proposed adjustments. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 176, § 6) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 91.

100.054. Approval of adjustments by fiscal court and city legislative body. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 176, § 6) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 91.

100.055. Delegation to commission of power to approve adjustments; controlling factors; recording of approved adjustments. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 176, § 6; 1960, ch. 199, § 2, effective March 28, 1960) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 91.

100.056. Procedure for approval of adjustments by commission. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 176, § 6; 1960, ch. 199, § 3, effective March 28, 1960) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 91.

100.057. Appeal to courts from decision of commission on question of approving adjustments. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 176, § 6) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 91.

100.058. When action of commission on adjustments to be final; recording of adjustments finally approved. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 176, § 6) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 91.

100.059. Public works or public utilities not to be constructed until approved; public hearing. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 176, § 7) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 91.

100.060. Employes. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3037h-115) was repealed by Acts 1942, ch. 176, § 17.

100.061. Approval of construction by fiscal court or city legislative body. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 176, § 7) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 91.

100.063. Appeal to courts from decision of commission on construction. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 176, § 7) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 91.

100.064. Effect of court decision or failure to appeal on approval of construction. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 176, § 7) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 91.

100.065. Approval of proposed action, other than construction with respect to public works or public utilities. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 176, § 7) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 91.

100.066. Zoning plan; what to include; adoption; adjustment. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 176, § 8) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 91.

100.067. Power to make zoning regulations; subjects regulated; districts. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 176, § 8; 1954, ch. 57, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 91.

100.068. Nonconforming uses of land, continuance of. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 176, § 8; 1948, ch. 104, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 91.

100.069. Nonconforming uses of buildings or structures; continuance or change of. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 176, § 8; 1948, ch. 104, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 91.

100.070. Duties of commission; master plan. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3037h-116) was repealed by Acts 1942, ch. 176, § 17.

100.071. Eventual termination of non-conforming uses. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 176, § 8) was repealed by Acts 1948, ch. 104, § 3.

100.073. Protection of nonconforming lot areas. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 176, § 8) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 91.

100.074. Zoning enforcement officers; fees for permits and certificates. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 176, § 9) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 91.

100.075. Zoning permits and certificates of occupancy; when required; conditions of issuance. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 176, § 9) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 91.

100.076. Construction in building setback area prohibited; granting of permit for variance. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 176, § 9) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 91.

100.077. Permit required for construction in street or highway; conditions of issuance. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 176, § 9) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 91.

100.078. Zoning regulations do not apply until after adoption of comprehensive plan and master plan. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 176, § 9) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 91.

100.079. Appeal from zoning enforcement officer to board; how taken; parties. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 176, § 10) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 91.

100.080. Purposes of master plan. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3037h-117) was repealed by Acts 1942, ch. 176, § 17.

100.081. Appeal stays action; exception. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 176, § 10; 1960, ch. 211, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 91.

100.082. Powers and duties of board as to appeals, petitions, granting of variances. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 176, § 10) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 91.

100.083. Meetings of board to be public; votes; power of board to obtain evidence, administer oaths; enforcement of orders and process. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 176, § 10) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 91.

100.084. Board to make prompt decisions; notice and copies to parties. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 176, § 10) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 91.

100.085. Appeal from board to circuit court. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 176, § 10) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 91.

100.086. Other remedies. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 176, § 10) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 91.

100.087. Subdivision control regulations; what to include; adoption; adjustment. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 176, § 11) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 91.

100.088. Approval of subdivisions required; procedure. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 176, § 11; 1960, ch. 211, § 1, effective June 16, 1960) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 91.

This section (Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 176, § 10; 1960, ch. 211, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 91.

100.089. Notice of approval or disapproval; appeal. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 176, § 11) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 91.

100.090. Adoption of master plan. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3037h-118) was repealed by Acts 1942, ch. 176, § 17.

100.091. Effect of court decision or failure to appeal on approval of plat; recording. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 176, § 11) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 91.

100.092. Recording of approved plat; unapproved plat not to be recorded; instruments referring to unapproved plat not to be recorded; recorded plat is part ofmaster plan. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 176, § 11) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 91.

100.093. Sale or transfer of property in unapproved subdivision prohibited; contracts and conveyances void. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 176, § 12; 1954, ch. 57, § 2) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 91.

100.094. Sale of entire interest in subdivision; abandonment of subdivision. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 176, § 12) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 91.

100.095. County attorney or city attorney to represent commission and board. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 176, § 13) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 91.

100.096. Separate action by county or city in case of withdrawal from joint agreement. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 176, § 14; 1950, ch. 64, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 91.

100.097. Regulation by city of adjacent area when county fails to act. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 176, § 14) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 91.

100.098. Repeal of former laws. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 176, § 16 and 17) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 91.

100.100. Legal status of master plan. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3037h-119) was repealed by Acts 1942, ch. 176, § 17.

100.110. General powers of the commission. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3037h-120) was repealed by Acts 1942, ch. 176, § 17.

Definitions

100.111. Definitions for chapter.

As used in this chapter, unless the context otherwise requires:

  1. “Administrative official” means any department, employee, or advisory, elected, or appointed body which is authorized to administer any provision of the zoning regulation, subdivision regulations, and, if delegated, any provision of any housing or building regulation or any other land use control regulation;
  2. “Agricultural use” means the use of:
    1. A tract of at least five (5) contiguous acres for the production of agricultural or horticultural crops, including but not limited to livestock, livestock products, poultry, poultry products, grain, hay, pastures, soybeans, tobacco, timber, orchard fruits, vegetables, flowers, or ornamental plants, including provision for dwellings for persons and their families who are engaged in the agricultural use on the tract, but not including residential building development for sale or lease to the public. For purposes of this subsection, “livestock” means cattle, sheep, swine, goats, horses, alpacas, llamas, buffaloes, and any other animals of the bovine, ovine, porcine, caprine, equine, or camelid species;
    2. Regardless of the size of the tract of land used, small farm wineries licensed under KRS 243.155 ;
    3. A tract of at least five (5) contiguous acres used for the following activities involving horses:
      1. Riding lessons;
      2. Rides;
      3. Training;
      4. Projects for educational purposes;
      5. Boarding and related care; or
      6. Shows, competitions, sporting events, and similar activities that are associated with youth and amateur programs, none of which are regulated by KRS Chapter 230, involving seventy (70) or less participants. Shows, competitions, sporting events, and similar activities that are associated with youth and amateur programs, none of which are regulated by KRS Chapter 230, involving more than seventy (70) participants shall be subject to local applicable zoning regulations; or
    4. A tract of land used for the following activities involving horses:
      1. Riding lessons;
      2. Rides;
      3. Training;
      4. Projects for educational purposes;
      5. Boarding and related care; or
      6. Shows, competitions, sporting events, and similar activities that are associated with youth and amateur programs, none of which are regulated by KRS Chapter 230, involving seventy (70) or less participants. Shows, competitions, sporting events, and similar activities that are associated with youth and amateur programs, none of which are regulated by KRS Chapter 230, involving more than seventy (70) participants shall be subject to local applicable zoning regulations. This paragraph shall only apply to acreage that was being used for these activities before July 13, 2004;
  3. “Board” means the board of adjustment unless the context indicates otherwise;
  4. “Citizen member” means any member of the planning commission or board of adjustment who is not an elected or appointed official or employee of the city, county, or consolidated local government;
  5. “Commission” means planning commission;
  6. “Conditional use” means a use which is essential to or would promote the public health, safety, or welfare in one (1) or more zones, but which would impair the integrity and character of the zone in which it is located, or in adjoining zones, unless restrictions on location, size, extent, and character of performance are imposed in addition to those imposed in the zoning regulation;
  7. “Conditional use permit” means legal authorization to undertake a conditional use, issued by the administrative official pursuant to authorization by the board of adjustment, consisting of two (2) parts:
    1. A statement of the factual determination by the board of adjustment which justifies the issuance of the permit; and
    2. A statement of the specific conditions which must be met in order for the use to be permitted;
  8. “Development plan” means written and graphic material for the provision of a development, including any or all of the following: location and bulk of buildings and other structures, intensity of use, density of development, streets, ways, parking facilities, signs, drainage of surface water, access points, a plan for screening or buffering, utilities, existing manmade and natural conditions, and all other conditions agreed to by the applicant;
  9. “Fiscal court” means the chief body of the county with legislative power, whether it is the fiscal court, county commissioners, or otherwise;
  10. “Housing or building regulation” means the Kentucky Building Code, the Kentucky Plumbing Code, and any other building or structural code promulgated by the Commonwealth or by its political subdivisions;
  11. “Legislative body” means the chief body of the city, consolidated local government, urban-county government, charter county government, or unified local government with legislative power, whether it is the board of aldermen, the general council, the common council, the city council, the board of commissioners, or otherwise; at times it also implies the county’s fiscal court;
  12. “Mayor” means the chief elected official of the city, consolidated local government, urban-county government, charter county government, or unified local government, whether the official designation of his office is mayor or otherwise;
  13. “Nonconforming use or structure” means an activity or a building, sign, structure, or a portion thereof which lawfully existed before the adoption or amendment of the zoning regulation, but which does not conform to all of the regulations contained in the zoning regulation which pertain to the zone in which it is located;
  14. “Planning operations” means the formulating of plans for the physical development and social and economic well-being of a planning unit, and the formulating of proposals for means of implementing the plans;
  15. “Planning unit” means any city, county, consolidated local government, urban- county government, charter county government, or unified local government, or any combination of cities, counties, or parts of counties, or parts of consolidated local governments engaged in planning operations;
  16. “Plat” means the map of a subdivision;
  17. “Political subdivision” means any city, county, consolidated local government, urban-county government, charter county government, or unified local government;
  18. “Several” means two (2) or more;
  19. “Public facility” means any use of land whether publicly or privately owned for transportation, utilities, or communications, or for the benefit of the general public, including but not limited to libraries, streets, schools, fire or police stations, county buildings, municipal buildings, recreational centers including parks, and cemeteries;
  20. “Street” means any vehicular way;
  21. “Structure” means anything constructed or made, the use of which requires permanent location in or on the ground or attachment to something having a permanent location in or on the ground, including buildings and signs;
  22. “Subdivision” means the division of a parcel of land into three (3) or more lots or parcels except in a county containing a city with a population equal to or greater than eight thousand (8,000) based upon the most recent federal decennial census or in an urban-county government or consolidated local government where a subdivision means the division of a parcel of land into two (2) or more lots or parcels; for the purpose, whether immediate or future, of sale, lease, or building development, or if a new street is involved, any division of a parcel of land; provided that a division of land for agricultural use and not involving a new street shall not be deemed a subdivision. The term includes resubdivision and when appropriate to the context, shall relate to the process of subdivision or to the land subdivided; any division or redivision of land into parcels of less than one (1) acre occurring within twelve (12) months following a division of the same land shall be deemed a subdivision within the meaning of this section;
  23. “Unit” means planning unit; and
  24. “Variance” means a departure from dimensional terms of the zoning regulation pertaining to the height, width, length, or location of structures, and the size of yards and open spaces where such departure meets the requirements of KRS 100.241 to 100.247 .

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 1; 2017 ch. 129, § 1, effective June 29, 2017.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. In General.

Strict compliance with this chapter is mandatory. Green v. Bourbon County Joint Planning Com., 637 S.W.2d 626, 1982 Ky. LEXIS 281 ( Ky. 1982 ).

A local government has no authority to alter a definition of a term defined in this section. Hardin County v. Jost, 897 S.W.2d 592, 1995 Ky. App. LEXIS 2 (Ky. Ct. App. 1995).

2. Purpose.

The interference or regulation by public authority of the use of a citizen’s property must have been for the superior interest and rights of the public, and the power must have been exercised in a reasonable and fair manner for promotion of common good of a community as a whole; more particularly, it must have borne substantial relation to public health, safety, morals or welfare and this was the purpose of the zoning statute. Hamilton Co. v. Louisville & Jefferson County Planning & Z. Com., 287 S.W.2d 434, 1955 Ky. LEXIS 115 ( Ky. 1955 ) (decided under prior law).

3. Discretion of Board.

By virtue of Louisville ordinances of 1927 creating the city planning commission, the board of public safety, on appeal from refusal to grant permit, had discretion and its having permitted violation of the strict letter of the ordinance would not have been assumption of legislative powers, but would have been the carrying out of the spirit of ordinance. Fowler v. Obier, 224 Ky. 742 , 7 S.W.2d 219, 1928 Ky. LEXIS 677 ( Ky. 1928 ) (decided under prior law).

4. Legislative Intent.

This chapter was not intended to apply to a city ordinance which regulates the use to which publicly-owned property constituting part of a “boulevard” may be put by private interests. Rieke v. Louisville, 827 S.W.2d 694, 1991 Ky. App. LEXIS 106 (Ky. Ct. App. 1991).

5. Procedural Due Process.

Procedural due process by an administrative body includes a hearing, the taking and weighing of evidence if such is offered, a finding of fact based upon a consideration of the evidence, the making of an order supported by substantial evidence, and, where the party’s constitutional rights are involved, a judicial review of the administrative action. Morris v. Catlettsburg, 437 S.W.2d 753, 1969 Ky. LEXIS 454 ( Ky. 1969 ).

6. Invalid Ordinances.

Where the administrative and legislative bodies of the city acted arbitrarily in rezoning a parcel of property, the ordinance effectuating the zoning was void. Fallon v. Baker, 455 S.W.2d 572, 1970 Ky. LEXIS 265 ( Ky. 1970 ).

7. Regulation.

The definition of “regulation” under subsection (17) includes zoning ordinances. Daviess County v. Snyder, 556 S.W.2d 688, 1977 Ky. LEXIS 528 ( Ky. 1977 ).

8. Conditional Use.

The philosophy of the conditional use concept is one which attempts to permit such uses as schools, fire and police stations, and other essential service type uses in zones which are predominantly built with other use types, but which need such conditional uses nearby to provide essential and necessary services. Carlton v. Taylor, 569 S.W.2d 679, 1978 Ky. App. LEXIS 561 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).

Since county’s zoning and planning ordinance, a single zone planning scheme entitled, “Development Guidance System,” was predicated upon every use being a “conditional use” and since that term as defined in subsection (6) of this section made no sense when applied in that context, the system was invalid. Hardin County v. Jost, 897 S.W.2d 592, 1995 Ky. App. LEXIS 2 (Ky. Ct. App. 1995).

As a board of adjustment failed to make the threshold findings required by a county zoning ordinance as to the desirabilty, utility, and safety of a proposed golf course, it erred by approving a developer’s application for conditional use permits. Murphy v. Key West Crossing, LLC, 152 S.W.3d 876, 2004 Ky. App. LEXIS 341 (Ky. Ct. App. 2004).

County board of adjustment clearly erred by granting a property owner a conditional use permit to operate a “tourist home,” as the board’s definition of “tourist home” under the zoning ordinance was essentially the same as a “bed and breakfast,” and the owner’s application described a use that was closer to a hotel/motel, which was not a permitted conditional use in the A-1 zone. Keogh v. Woodford County Bd. of Adjustments, 243 S.W.3d 369, 2007 Ky. App. LEXIS 371 (Ky. Ct. App. 2007).

9. Subdivisions.

The statutory definition of subdivision is designed to mandate that the prior planning and zoning requirements and subdivision regulations of a local planning authority be applied to all significant land divisions; the exemption for a division of land for agricultural purposes into parcels of five acres or more, not involving a new street, is designed to insure that any division of agricultural land is made for the purpose of protecting agricultural interests. McCord v. Pineway Farms, 569 S.W.2d 690, 1978 Ky. App. LEXIS 564 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).

Where a county ordinance provided that lots of five acres or more in an agricultural zone were presumed to be devoted to agricultural use, such presumption was not a natural or logical extension of subsection (22), providing that a division into parcels of five acres or more not involving a new street was not a subdivision, and was in conflict with the provisions of KRS Chapter 100 dealing with the subdivision of land and the designation of land use. Consequently, it was invalid. Green v. Bourbon County Joint Planning Com., 637 S.W.2d 626, 1982 Ky. LEXIS 281 ( Ky. 1982 ) (decision prior to 1982 amendment).

Where owner of farm sought to divide it into parcels of five acres or more and such subdivision would not involve a new street, the proposed subdivision, in effect, constituted a change of the land use from agricultural to residential and the action of the planning commission in approving the plat was not supported by substantial evidence and was arbitrary. Green v. Bourbon County Joint Planning Com., 637 S.W.2d 626, 1982 Ky. LEXIS 281 ( Ky. 1982 ) (decision prior to 1982 amendment).

Where utility assessment of 30 feet was demarcated on the plat of a residential subdivision, such easement applied to neighboring owners lots and any subsequent conveyances of the lots did not require specific deeds of conveyance and subsequent purchasers took subject to all dedications, easements or conveyances delineated on the recorded plat, as well as subject to restrictions, easements or encumbrances existing in the chain of title or set out in subsequent deeds. Kelly v. Cook, 899 S.W.2d 517, 1995 Ky. App. LEXIS 115 (Ky. Ct. App. 1995).

Planning commission properly denied property owners’ subdivision plan because the preliminary plan had expired and was not eligible for reapproval or an extension and the owners’ proposed development of residential one-acre lots did not fit into an agricultural exemption to the zoning ordinance under KRS 100.203(4) and KRS 100.111(2). Sebastian-Voor Props., LLC v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Gov't, 2008 Ky. LEXIS 39 (Ky. Feb. 21, 2008), sub. op., 265 S.W.3d 190, 2008 Ky. LEXIS 301 ( Ky. 2008 ).

10. Improvement of County Roads.

The planning and zoning commission has no control of improvement of county roads since that is the function of the fiscal court, thus, the planning commission cannot compel the fiscal court to enlarge the width of the pavement and an attempt by the commission to attach, as a condition of plat approval, a requirement that the fiscal court accept the improvement of a county road was an unlawful exercise of power by the commission and the condition was invalid. Lampton v. Pinaire, 610 S.W.2d 915, 1980 Ky. App. LEXIS 408 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980).

11. Agricultural Use.

The definition of “agricultural use” found in this section has nothing to do with the kinds of uses which may be permitted within an area zoned agricultural, but rather only explains what is meant by the term “agricultural use” as it is employed throughout KRS Chapter 100 as, for example, when it is used in the definition of a “subdivision” in subsection (22) of this section. Sladon v. Shawk, 1991 Ky. App. LEXIS 44 (Ky. Ct. App. Apr. 12, 1991).

Presumption that five-acre tracts were devoted to agricultural uses was not a natural or logical extension of KRS 100.111(22). Campbell County Fiscal Court v. Nash, 2008 Ky. App. LEXIS 373 (Ky. Ct. App. Dec. 12, 2008), review granted, transferred, 2010 Ky. LEXIS 40 (Ky. Jan. 13, 2010), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 345 S.W.3d 811, 2011 Ky. LEXIS 57 ( Ky. 2011 ).

To the extent that Campbell County, Ky., Ordinance 0-18-04 & 0-20-04 require planning commission approval before property can be divided into agricultural parcels, the ordinances are void because they conflict with the statutory wording and scheme of KRS 100.111(22), 100.111(2), 100.203(4), and 100.273 et seq., as well as KRS 413.072 , which prohibits local regulations on agricultural uses. To the extent the ordinances seek to amend the subdivision regulations, they are void because the adoption or amendment of subdivision regulations are functions of the planning commission, at least initially. Nash v. Campbell County Fiscal Court, 345 S.W.3d 811, 2011 Ky. LEXIS 57 ( Ky. 2011 ).

Subdivision of land did not qualify for an agricultural exemption because the conveyances did not meet the requirement that the use was restricted to agricultural uses. Moreover, the conveyances did not meet the third requirement, which was that all parcels had to have frontage on an existing street. Nash v. Campbell County Fiscal Court, 345 S.W.3d 811, 2011 Ky. LEXIS 57 ( Ky. 2011 ).

12. Plat.

A general dedication, reservation, etc., in a plat, is sufficient to grant a public utility the right to the use of the easement for purposes such as installation and maintenance of electrical service lines, and it is not necessary that the plat specifically designate a particular utility. Kelly v. Cook, 899 S.W.2d 517, 1995 Ky. App. LEXIS 115 (Ky. Ct. App. 1995).

13. Single the Zone Planning.

Because the county zoning and planning ordinance, a single zone planning scheme entitled, “Development Guidance System,” bears no substantial relation to the objects and purposes set forth in KRS Chapter 100, it is invalid. Hardin County v. Jost, 897 S.W.2d 592, 1995 Ky. App. LEXIS 2 (Ky. Ct. App. 1995) (decided under prior law).

14. Zoning Emanates from Police Power.

The right of the state to delegate zoning powers to various cities emanated from elusive power of the state called “police power” which had been defined as the power to promote and protect public health, safety, morals and general welfare of the people. Mathis v. Hannan, 306 S.W.2d 278, 1957 Ky. LEXIS 34 ( Ky. 1957 ) (decided under prior law).

15. Street.

KRS 100.111(20) defines “street” as any vehicular way; a “vehicle” is a means of transporting or carrying persons or property, and a “way” is a thoroughfare leading from one place to another. Thus, a vehicular way is a passage suitable to use by vehicles. Campbell County Fiscal Court v. Nash, 2008 Ky. App. LEXIS 373 (Ky. Ct. App. Dec. 12, 2008), review granted, transferred, 2010 Ky. LEXIS 40 (Ky. Jan. 13, 2010), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 345 S.W.3d 811, 2011 Ky. LEXIS 57 ( Ky. 2011 ).

Passageways proposed by property owners for access to the otherwise landlocked parcels were clearly “vehicular ways” and were therefore “streets” within the definition established by KRS 100.111(20); the conclusion that these passageways are “streets” cannot be avoided by a claim that the passageways were not new since they merely followed existing farm roads. The record was devoid of any proof that any persons other than the owners currently had a right to use these passages; however, once the divisions were made or approved, the other lot owners, and their guests and invitees, would have the right to use the passageways. Campbell County Fiscal Court v. Nash, 2008 Ky. App. LEXIS 373 (Ky. Ct. App. Dec. 12, 2008), review granted, transferred, 2010 Ky. LEXIS 40 (Ky. Jan. 13, 2010), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 345 S.W.3d 811, 2011 Ky. LEXIS 57 ( Ky. 2011 ).

Cited:

Davis v. Richardson, 507 S.W.2d 446, 1974 Ky. LEXIS 703 ( Ky. 1974 ); Kindred Homes, Inc. v. Dean, 605 S.W.2d 15, 1979 Ky. App. LEXIS 538 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979); Hall v. Housing Authority of Louisville, 660 S.W.2d 674, 1983 Ky. App. LEXIS 397 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983); Greenway Enters. v. City of Frankfort, 148 S.W.3d 298, 2004 Ky. App. LEXIS 292 (Ky. Ct. App. 2004).

Opinions of Attorney General.

The exemption involving land used for agricultural purposes, set forth in subsection (22) of this section must apply to those transactions executed on and after June 16, 1966. OAG 66-442 .

Neither KRS 67.040 nor KRS 67.070 has application to deadlocks existing in the selection of members of the zoning commission by the county judge (now county judge/executive) under the terms of KRS 100.141 . OAG 66-510 .

Where a subdivision has complied with the terms of KRS 100.277 any lot therein is free to be sold without further reference to the requirements of KRS 100.277 . OAG 67-316 .

If so desired, the respective governmental units could abolish their planning program and the commission through which it is operated. OAG 67-321 .

The board of adjustment is not required to hold a public hearing as a prerequisite to its decision on an application for a dimensional variance. OAG 67-528 .

The word “subdivision” as used in KRS 100.111 to 100.361 would not include a trailer park, and the planning commission could not require that the owners of a trailer park obtain its approval as a subdivision in order for it to operate. OAG 67-546 .

Whether or not schools and other public agencies are authorized to have their proposed facility needs placed on the official map depends upon whether or not the proposed facilities are part of a capital improvement program adopted and budgeted by said agency on a short-term basis. OAG 68-430 .

If easements cannot be adequately described in the instruments of conveyance so that they can be readily located on the ground, actual surveys would become necessary with the requirements of KRS 322.400 being applicable. OAG 69.105 .

If the owner divided a tract into two or more parcels upon which were located house trailers in a more or less permanent manner, a subdivision would be created requiring the commission’s approval of the subdivision plan and its subsequent recording. OAG 69-469 .

The exemption for schools contained in subsection (2) of KRS 100.361 would not apply until the property is acquired. OAG 69-659 .

A school board is not required to obtain prior approval of the local planning unit in order to construct a new school building. OAG 69-659 .

The selling of one acre of land off of a 20-acre tract would not constitute the creation of a subdivision within the meaning of this section. OAG 69-679 .

A city, even though it was reclassified from a fifth to a fourth-class city without sufficient population by the legislature, could have an enforceable zoning ordinance. OAG 70-596 .

Facilities owned and operated by a private college would not be exempt from the jurisdiction of the planning and zoning commission created pursuant to this chapter. OAG 70-629 .

The mere enlargement of a lot within the subdivision at the expense of an adjoining lot with no attempt to subdivide the lots into three lots would not constitute a subdivision of land within the meaning of subsection (22) of this section. OAG 71-206 .

Where two of the members of the board of adjustment were elected councilmen of member cities and one was a city clerk, the members did not qualify as citizen members and the board was illegally composed. OAG 71-335 .

There is no provision in this chapter which would allow the question of whether or not the county will operate under the zoning laws of this state to be placed to a vote of the people. OAG 72-137 .

The term “nonconforming uses” is defined to include nonconforming structures as well as uses. OAG 72-370 .

The term “agricultural purposes” would appear to exclude the construction of a residence or any structure other than one to be used for agricultural purposes. OAG 72-409 .

Where a landowner intends to lease a number of 10-acre lots where a family residence would be erected but where the primary use of the land would be to farm the acreage, this would constitute a subdivision within the meaning of this section and, therefore, such a plan would not come within the exception of land being divided solely for agricultural purposes. OAG 72-409 .

If a lot which exceeds five acres is to be used for agricultural purposes and an easement for access to the lot is not a street to be used as a public road for future building development then the division of land in question would probably fall within the exception under this section and would not constitute a subdivision requiring the plat to be approved by the planning commission. OAG 72-516 .

Where a developer buys a section of land and divides it into lots, constructs homes, sells the homes and rents the lot on which the home is located to the homeowner on a monthly basis, the developer must conform to applicable subdivision regulations since such transactions constitute “subdivision” and the terms “sale” and “lease” are broad enough to embrace such contracts of sale and lease, although the title to these properties may not pass until a certain amount of the purchase price is paid. OAG 73-392 .

If a person sells a portion of two noncontiguous lots or a lot and half of another adjoining lot, since the contiguous property is considered as one tract and the tract sold is one contiguous parcel, neither transaction would constitute a subdivision and KRS 100.277 would not apply. OAG 73-688 .

Where lots were sold to industries for their own industrial use within the 21/2 mile limit of Morganfield, such lots were not within the definition of subdivisions and plats of such lands do not require the approval of the planning commission before the deeds are recorded. OAG 73-688 .

Where the owner of several lots described in the original plat of the city of Sturgis conveyed two of the lots during her lifetime and her heirs conveyed the remaining contiguous lots to one person, this transaction is not a subdivision and KRS 100.277 would not apply. OAG 73-688 .

A city of the sixth class cannot enact a deed restriction ordinance constituting a zoning regulation unless it has adopted planning and zoning pursuant to this chapter. OAG 74-398 .

Where the owner of a 35-acre farm tract located in a county containing a third-class city, with a house and barn on it, sold off a 9-acre tract, intending to continue to use the residual tract of 26 acres for farming, such transaction was not a “subdivision” as defined in subsection (22) of this section and mentioned in KRS 100.277 . OAG 77-230 .

The fact that an individual is a member of the board of trustees and initially voted in favor of adopting a zoning ordinance in no way prevents him, from a legal standpoint, from later acting in a private capacity to contest the validity of the procedure utilized in adopting the zoning ordinance where his private property interests are involved. OAG 78-155 .

When a tract of land is subdivided, the residual parcel or that portion of the original tract retained by the seller-subdivider constitutes one of the parcels or lots following the subdivision of that original tract. OAG 78-306 .

Where a driveway previously in existence to serve a farmhouse was utilized as a street for some five (5) to eight (8) homes built on lots fronting on the driveway, such driveway would probably constitute a new street subjecting the area in question to subdivision regulations. OAG 78-306 .

Where land which has been subdivided so as to bring it within the definition of “subdivision” is resubdivided into parcels of less than one acre within 12 months following the original subdivision of that same land, such resubdivided land constitutes a subdivision, making the provisions of KRS 100.277 applicable and thereby requiring planning commission approval for such resubdivision. OAG 78-306 , 78-518.

Subsection (22) of this section provides that a division of land for agricultural purposes into lots of five (5) acres or more and not involving a new street shall not be deemed a subdivision; however, where the division does, in fact, involve a new street or a road which has been constructed and not adequately maintained, it seems obvious that even where five or more acres are involved, such would constitute a subdivision. OAG 78-325 .

A division of land will be a subdivision if the division was done for the purpose of sale, lease or building development, or if the division involves the creation of a new street, but where the clear purpose of the division of a tract by will was to provide each of the testator’s children with a fee simple piece of land, the division would not be a subdivision under the “purpose” test of subsection (22) of this section. OAG 78-501 .

Although a street is defined in subsection (20) of this section as “any vehicular way,” it has been pointed out that a “technical reading of the definition serves no useful planning purpose, and thus the definition will have to be administered so that an unnecessary hardship will not be imposed on those whose . . . . . use of the land does not alter the existing use and movement systems in the area or require additional . . . . . services”; therefore not all rights-of-way or easements for the purpose of ingress and egress serve to bring a division of land within the definition of a subdivision, even though all easements or rights-of-way for the purpose of ingress and egress are technically “vehicular ways.” OAG 78-501 .

If the reserved right-of-way is intended to be a public road for a future building development, then the reserved right-of-way serves to bring the division of land within the meaning of the term “subdivision,” and all rules pertaining to subdivisions would have to be complied with, but if the reserved right-of-way is intended for use only as a means of private access to land which will not be sold, leased or developed, then the reservation of the right-of-way will not bring the division of land within the meaning of “subdivision.” OAG 78-501 .

This section clearly provides that a division of land for agricultural purposes into lots of five acres or more and not involving a new street shall not be termed a subdivision, but where the division of agricultural land does in fact involve a new street, it appears obvious that such would constitute a subdivision within the meaning of the above referred to definition. OAG 78-577 .

A division of a parcel of land into less than three lots would not constitute a subdivision where the county did not contain a city of the first, second or third class, or urban county government. OAG 78-813 .

KRS 67.083(3)(k), which speaks in terms of ordinances for zoning purposes, is a zoning statute to that extent and a zoning regulation in the form of a resolution would be in conflict with KRS 67.083(3)(k) and 67.075 et seq. OAG 78-815 .

On and after June 17, 1978, any zoning regulation action taken by a fiscal court in the form of a resolution, where KRS 67.075 et seq., and KRS 67.083(3)(k), are not followed, is void. OAG 78-815 .

This chapter must be read together with KRS 67.075 et seq., and KRS 67.083(3)(k) since statutes on the same subject, in pari materia, should be integrated so as to give effect to the legislative intention. OAG 78-815 .

Where a fiscal court had passed zoning regulations as resolutions, it could ratify them as ordinances and make them retroactive to the dates of the original measures. OAG 78-815 .

A city does not have the authority, under its general police powers, to adopt an ordinance which prohibits the underground mining of coal within the city limits, since underground coal mining is not a nuisance per se but, pursuant to its zoning power set forth in this chapter, such city may utilize the zoning provisions to reasonably regulate underground mining within the city limits. OAG 79-29 .

Neither subdivision regulations, nor zoning regulations enacted by a county, would be applicable where the land involved is simply the division of agricultural tracts of five acres or more that do not involve a new street. OAG 79-283 .

In the absence of any specific authority to do so and in recognition of the distinction between building codes and zoning ordinances, the fiscal court does not have the authority to transfer the county housing inspector to the Metropolitan Planning Commission and place him under the supervision of the director of the Metropolitan Planning Commission since building codes are not part of zoning programs and, while the two are related, there is no statutory authority for bringing the building code program under the authority of the planning and zoning commission. OAG 81-145 .

Where the City of Elizabethtown and Hardin County have established and are operating as separate independent planning units, which each can do provided the interrogation procedure under the terms of KRS 100.117 has been followed, such city and county are separate planning units, which means that each would adopt its individual comprehensive plan governing its respective jurisdictions; as a consequence, the county would not adopt Elizabethtown’s Comprehensive Plan. It is only where the city and county are operating a joint planning commission, that each adopts a joint comprehensive plan. OAG 82-223 .

A campground, the owners of which plan to lease small lots thereon for the encampment of trailers, would constitute a subdivision within the meaning of the term as defined in subsection (22) (now (23)) of this section and would thus require the owner of the campground to first present a plat to the commission for approval pursuant to KRS 100.277 before any leasing of lots can be made. OAG 82-285 .

The division of a parcel of land into two, three or more parcels in certain instances, depending on the size, and classification of cities within the county, for the purpose of immediate or future sale or lease or building development, constitutes a subdivision under the Planning and Zoning Act which would require, pursuant to KRS 100.277 , plat approval by the planning commission before any sale or lease of such parcels of land could legally be consummated. OAG 82-285 .

Where owners of certain commercial lots in an approved subdivision in the county wish to lease part of the lots to other businessmen for the purpose of establishing a new business on the lot, unless the lot lines on a recorded plat are altered, the mere construction of a commercial facility on a portion of the lot per lease agreement would not constitute a resubdivision of the land requiring the commission’s approval pursuant to KRS 100.277 . OAG 82-440 .

The fact that the 1982 Legislature defined the term “agricultural use” and amended the definition of the term “subdivision” to compliment same, would not in any way affect the basic power of the Planning and Zoning Commission to regulate agricultural land as such. These changes simply mean that if land is used for agricultural purposes as defined in the definition and is divided into five or more acres, such division will not constitute a subdivision within the meaning of the act. OAG 82-448 .

The 1982 amendments to this section did not change the basic zoning concept relating to the regulation of agricultural land; thus, the contention that any division of agricultural land into five or more acres must initially be zoned residential, was erroneous. On the other hand, a planning commission can, through its zoning regulations, determine whether an area may be used for agricultural purposes, as in the case of metropolitan expansion, and can determine whether a division of land used for agricultural purposes is in fact made for residential purposes and subject to approval by the commission, though the lot size comes within the subdivision definition exception for agricultural land. OAG 82-448 .

If land is divided for agricultural use and does not involve a new street as stated in subdivision (23) of this section and further involves tracts of at least five (5) acres as mentioned in the term “agricultural use” in subdivision (2) of this section, such division would not constitute a subdivision and therefore would not require the planning commission’s approval for recording under KRS 100.277 ; however, whether the use is agricultural depends upon the facts and there can be no presumption that the land is for agricultural purposes. OAG 83-468 .

The definitions of subdivision and agricultural land under this section have nothing to do with the power of the planning and zoning commission to regulate agricultural land usage pursuant to legally adopted zoning regulations in accordance with the comprehensive plan; it is within the discretion of the zoning authority to determine whether or not an area may or may not be used for agricultural purposes and to limit the extent of such usage. In other words, the planning and zoning commission can, pursuant to zoning regulations, designate what area is agricultural, and restrict the use of such land for other purposes, such as residential, which would include a division of agricultural lands into five or more acres that normally would be presumed to be for agricultural purposes under the definition. OAG 83-468 .

The statutory definition of what constitutes a subdivision detailed in subdivision (23) of this section would control over an ordinance defining the term “subdivision.” OAG 84-67 .

Where only one conveyance was made, involving the one parcel, under subsection (23) of this section no “subdivision” was involved; therefore, commission approval for subdivisions, as required by KRS 100.277 , was not applicable. OAG 85-12 .

An area development district is not an agency of state government for purposes of compliance with local planning and zoning requirements, nor does an area development district have authority to operate an offender re-entry program. OAG 13-004 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

City-county metropolitan sewer, sewer construction and sanitation districts, KRS Ch. 76.

Control by air pollution control board of equipment producing air contaminants, KRS Ch. 77.

Municipal improvements, alternate methods, KRS Ch. 107.

Progress commission, state and regional planning, KRS Ch. 147.

Public works in cities of the first class, KRS Ch. 93.

Public works in cities other than the first class, KRS Ch. 94.

Redevelopment corporations in cities of first or second class, KRS Ch. 99.

Kentucky Bench & Bar.

Baker and Baker, Title Examination in Kentucky, 48 Ky. Bench & B. 12 (1984).

Moore, Practicing Before a Board of Adjustment: Seven Practical Tips, Volume 75, No. 1, January 2011, Ky. Bench & Bar 10.

Kentucky Law Journal.

Tarlock, Kentucky Planning and Land Use Control Enabling Legislation: An Analysis of the 1966 Revision of KRS Chapter 100, 56 Ky. L.J. 556 (1968).

Kentucky Law Survey, Griffin and Becker, Zoning, 67 Ky. L.J. 627 (1978-1979).

Kentucky Law Survey, Bratt and Brown, Environmental Law, 70 Ky. L.J. 455 (1981-82).

Article: The Lexington-Fayette Urban County Board of Adjustment: Fifty Years Later, 100 Ky. L.J. 435 (2011/2012).

Northern Kentucky Law Review.

Comments, An Unanswered Question Concerning Planning and Zoning in Kentucky: Must the Entire Comprehensive Plan be Approved by the Fiscal Court and the Legislative Bodies of the Planning Unit?, 5 N. Ky. L. Rev. 231, 1978.

Comments, Planning and Zoning in Kentucky: Who Really Adopts the Comprehensive Plan?, 9 N. Ky. L. Rev. 499 (1982).

Greenwell, On the Constitutionality of Kentucky’s Mineral Deed Act, 13 N. Ky. L. Rev. 219 (1986).

ALR

“Radius,” meaning of term employed in contract, statute, or ordinance as descriptive of area, location or distance. 10 A.L.R.2d 605.

What constitutes a “building” within restrictive covenant. 18 A.L.R.2d 850.

Meaning of term “garage” as used in zoning regulation. 11 A.L.R.3d 1187.

Meaning of the term “hotel” as used in zoning ordinances. 28 A.L.R.3d 1240.

Zoning or other public restrictions on the use of property as affecting rights and remedies of parties to contract for the sale thereof. 39 A.L.R.3d 362.

What constitutes “church,” “religious use,” or the like within zoning ordinance. 62 A.L.R.3d 197.

What constitutes “school,” “educational use,” or the like within zoning ordinance. 64 A.L.R.3d 1087.

What constitutes a “family” within meaning of zoning regulation or restrictive covenant. 71 A.L.R.3d 693.

Planning Units

100.113. Types of planning units permitted.

Before any planning operations may begin, a planning unit must be formed and designated. Planning units may consist of a city or county, acting independently in accordance with KRS 100.117 ; cities and their county, jointly, in accordance with KRS 100.121 ; or groups of counties and their cities, regionally, in accordance with KRS 100.123 .

History. Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 2; 1978, ch. 384, § 22, effective June 17, 1978.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Failure To Follow Procedure.

Zoning ordinances of city were void ab initio where city did not follow the requirements of KRS Chapter 100 in adopting such ordinances. Bellefonte Land, Inc. v. Bellefonte, 864 S.W.2d 315, 1993 Ky. App. LEXIS 143 (Ky. Ct. App. 1993).

Opinions of Attorney General.

A county can adopt a comprehensive plan for the development of the area within this jurisdiction without the adoption of zoning. OAG 67-69 .

A city-county ordinance could define the phrase “for agricultural purposes” as it relates to not only subdivisions, but to permitted uses and the definition should be substantially the same for both unless the agricultural classification of permitted uses is broadened to include uses other than strictly agricultural. OAG 67-432 .

Because of the interrogation requirement, the positive or negative position of the county really determines whether there will be one or more planning units. OAG 69-187 .

Where the provisions of KRS Chapter 100 have not been followed in connection with planning and zoning and there is no planning unit, no planning commission and no comprehensive plan, subdivision regulations cannot be adopted by county government. OAG 79-105 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Tarlock, Kentucky Planning and Land Use Control Enabling Legislation: An Analysis of the 1966 KRS Chapter 100, 56 Ky. L.J. 556 (1968).

Kentucky Law Survey, Griffin and Becker, Zoning, 67 Ky. L.J. 627 (1978-1979).

Kentucky Law Survey, Bratt and Brown, Environmental Law, 70 Ky. L.J. 455 (1981-82).

Northern Kentucky Law Review.

Comments, Planning and Zoning in Kentucky: Who Really Adopts the Comprehensive Plan?, 9 N. Ky. L. Rev. 499 (1982).

100.117. Independent planning units.

Any city or county may establish a planning program as an independent operation if the following required procedure is unsuccessful in establishing a joint planning unit encompassing the county and cities therein.

  1. A city shall interrogate the county and every other city therein to determine whether they desire to enter into an agreement to form a joint planning unit. The interrogation shall be in writing, addressed to the various legislative bodies stating proposed reasonable terms for combination and the reasoned purpose and objectives. The political subdivisions which have been interrogated shall have sixty (60) days in which to answer in writing and the city may assume that the answer is negative if no response is received within the sixty (60) days. If the county answers in the negative, then the city may engage in an independent planning operation. If the county responds affirmatively, then a joint planning unit shall be established, and no city located in such county may form an independent planning unit. If a city has been operating under an agreement under which its planning operations have been combined with one (1) or several counties or cities and the combination is broken, then it shall follow the procedure set forth in this subsection before it engages in an independent planning operation.
  2. A county shall interrogate every incorporated city within its boundaries and otherwise be subject to following the procedure established for an independent city operation.
  3. In a county where independent planning units have been created in accordance with this section, another interrogation shall not be permitted for a period of four (4) years from the date of the previous letter of interrogation. If another interrogation is initiated, the required procedure as defined by this section, shall be followed. If the result of such an interrogation is creation of a joint planning unit, as permitted by KRS 100.121 , then all the existing independent planning units shall be dissolved, and no city located in such county may form an independent planning unit. A period of one (1) year from the date of the letter of interrogation shall be permitted for the newly formed joint planning unit to come into existence, during which time the other necessary steps required by this chapter must be complied with and the dissolution of the independent units shall be effective upon compliance with requirements of this chapter, for creation of the joint planning unit, or at the end of the one (1) year period, whichever is first.
  4. Any independent planning unit in existence on June 20, 2005, in a county containing all or a portion of a joint planning unit may continue to exist and operate as an independent planning unit and shall not be required to:
    1. Conduct any interrogation under the provisions of subsection (1) of this section;
    2. Be subject to the interrogation process in subsection (2) of this section; or
    3. Dissolve in accordance with the provisions of subsection (3) of this section.

History. Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 3; 1986, ch. 141, § 2, effective July 15, 1986; 2005, ch. 119, § 8, effective June 20, 2005.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Immunity.

Franklin-Simpson County, Ky., Board of Zoning Adjustment was created pursuant to state enabling legislation by Simpson County, making the Board an agent of the county, a government entitled to immunity; the Board was either created by Simpson County pursuant to Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 100.117 , or by Simpson County and the City of Franklin jointly pursuant to Ky. Stat. Ann. § 100.121 . The Board’s function is governmental and regulatory and not proprietary and thus the Board is cloaked with governmental immunity. Franklin-Simpson Cty. Bd. of Zoning Adjustment v. Drakes Creek Holding Co., LLC, 2020 Ky. App. LEXIS 57 (Ky. Ct. App. May 8, 2020).

Cited:

Daviess County v. Snyder, 556 S.W.2d 688, 1977 Ky. LEXIS 528 ( Ky. 1977 ); Creative Displays, Inc. v. Florence, 602 S.W.2d 682, 1980 Ky. LEXIS 248 ( Ky. 1980 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

A city of the sixth class can establish an independent planning program if the county does not desire to enter into an agreement to form a joint planning unit or program. OAG 66-233 .

Where a county fails to interrogate every incorporated city within its boundaries but indicates in response to a city’s request that it does not desire to join, the city would be permitted to zone independently. OAG 66-399 .

If the county gets a negative response from all the cities, it can plan and operate independently. OAG 66-704 .

If a city does not desire to operate under the planning and zoning act but does desire to continue to operate under its plans, regulations and organization existing as of June 16, 1966, it may do so by responding negatively to the county’s interrogation. OAG 66-704 .

Because of the interrogation requirement, the positive or negative position of the county really determines whether there will be one or more planning units. OAG 69-187 .

Where the county elected to operate under the 1966 act following its interrogation of the various cities in the county, the five-year limitation in KRS 100.367 (now repealed) would have no application. OAG 70-227 .

Where two (2) cities not having zoning or planning decided not to join in the county joint zoning program, the county planning commission would have no jurisdiction within the boundaries of the two cities. OAG 70-334 .

Where multiple cities are involved with the county in establishing a joint planning commission the participating units of government must decide by mutual consent the representation on the commission. OAG 70-334 .

Even though a city was operating under a planning commission prior to the inception of KRS 100.111 to 100.367 , it must follow the procedure outlined in these sections. OAG 71-51 .

Where a city has legally created an independent planning commission pursuant to this section, its refusal to later enter into an agreement to create a joint planning unit would not prevent such city from continuing to operate as an independent planning unit. OAG 71-205 .

Where a joint planning unit is once formed as provided for in KRS 100.121 any one or more of the participating units may voluntarily withdraw but so long as the joint unit continues through the continuing operation within it of two or more units as provided by KRS 100.127 a withdrawing unit may not establish an independent planning unit. OAG 74-701 .

A county after once refusing to join a city in establishing a joint planning unit, may, at a later date, change its mind and proceed to interrogate the city to determine if it would create a joint planning commission and if the city refuses, the county may form an independent commission. OAG 75-350 .

Cities in a county could refuse to join a joint planning unit when interrogated by the county and could continue planning independently, in which case the city planning commission would have jurisdiction over any land annexed by the city. OAG 78-110 .

A member of a joint city-county planning unit may withdraw from the unit, but it must satisfy any contractual or financial obligations established in connection with the joint planning, and once the city or county withdraws, it cannot plan independently unless it goes through the interrogation procedure initially provided for in establishing an independent planning unit pursuant to this section; however, the planning unit that does not withdraw continues to have the power to plan and zone as an independent unit. OAG 78-658 .

If a city should withdraw from a joint planning and zoning commission, thus dissolving the joint planning unit, the nonwithdrawing city would not have to follow the interrogation procedures outlined in this statute before it engages in an independent planning operation. OAG 79-492 .

If a city withdraws from a joint planning commission established in accordance with KRS Chapter 100, and if the members of the remaining planning commission respond favorably to the city’s letters of interrogation, the city could not refuse to join and proceed to plan independently since this section permits independent planning only in the event the interrogating city receives a negative response; under such circumstances, the city would have to negotiate a reasonable agreement with the remaining members to rejoin the planning unit if it desires to reinstate its planning and zoning program pursuant to KRS Chapter 100. OAG 80-404 .

Where the City of Elizabethtown and Hardin County have established and are operating as separate independent planning units, which each can do provided the interrogation procedure under the terms of KRS 100.117 has been followed, such city and county were separate planning units, which means that each would adopt its individual comprehensive plan governing its respective jurisdiction; as a consequence, the county would not adopt Elizabethtown’s Comprehensive Plan. It is only where the city and county are operating a joint planning commission, that each adopts a joint comprehensive plan. OAG 82-223 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Tarlock, Kentucky Planning and Land Use Control Enabling Legislation: An Analysis of the 1966 Revision of KRS Chapter 100, 56 Ky. L.J. 556 (1968).

Kentucky Law Survey, Griffin and Becker, Zoning, 67 Ky. L.J. 627 (1978-1979).

Kentucky Law Survey, Bratt and Brown, Environmental Law, 70 Ky. L.J. 455 (1981-82).

Northern Kentucky Law Review.

Comments, Planning and Zoning in Kentucky: Who Really Adopts the Comprehensive Plan?, 9 N. Ky. L. Rev. 499 (1982).

100.120. Zoning authority granted. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3037h-121) was repealed by Acts 1942, ch. 176, § 17.

100.121. Joint planning units.

  1. At any time, the legislative bodies of cities and the fiscal court of the county containing the cities may enter into an agreement to form a joint planning unit by combining planning operations in order that they may carry out a joint city-county planning program. Combinations may include any combination of cities with their county or parts thereof; provided, however, that no self-excluded city in such county may form an independent planning unit.
  2. When a planning unit includes a county and a city of the first class or consolidated local government created pursuant to KRS Chapter 67C, then all other cities within the county shall also be parts of the unit.

History. Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 4; 2002, ch. 346, § 134, effective July 15, 2002.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Interim Authority of City.

Until such time as new system of joint planning and zoning by city and county is placed in operation, old system remained in effect and city had power to enact zoning ordinances. Louisville v. Bryan S. McCoy, Inc., 286 S.W.2d 546, 1955 Ky. LEXIS 102 ( Ky. 1955 ) (decided under prior law).

2. Immunity.

Franklin-Simpson County, Ky., Board of Zoning Adjustment was created pursuant to state enabling legislation by Simpson County, making the Board an agent of the county, a government entitled to immunity; the Board was either created by Simpson County pursuant to Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 100.117 , or by Simpson County and the City of Franklin jointly pursuant to Ky. Stat. Ann. § 100.121 . The Board’s function is governmental and regulatory and not proprietary and thus the Board is cloaked with governmental immunity. Franklin-Simpson Cty. Bd. of Zoning Adjustment v. Drakes Creek Holding Co., LLC, 2020 Ky. App. LEXIS 57 (Ky. Ct. App. May 8, 2020).

Cited:

Daviess County v. Snyder, 556 S.W.2d 688, 1977 Ky. LEXIS 528 ( Ky. 1977 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Because of the interrogation requirement, the positive or negative position of the county really determines whether there will be one or more planning units. OAG 69-187 .

Where two cities not having zoning or planning decided not to join in the county joint zoning program, the county planning commission would have no jurisdiction within the boundaries of the two cities. OAG 70-334 .

If a city joins the joint commission and if that city is the only municipality with a zoning ordinance, the agreement establishing the joint commission cannot contain a provision for the appointment of a board of adjustment for that city only. OAG 71-205 .

In the absence of the legislature’s indication of the degree of representation that multiple cities and counties are to have, the participation units of government must make this determination by mutual agreement under KRS 100.127 . OAG 71-205 .

The statutory reference to “self-excluded” cities in this section refers to those cities that have not previously established a planning commission pursuant to KRS 100.111 et seq. OAG 71-205 .

If a city is not operating a planning commission and, upon interrogation pursuant to KRS 100.117 , has refused to participate in a joint commission, it may not form an independent planning unit but may later join in a joint planning commission. OAG 72-266 .

Where a joint planning unit is once formed any one or more of the participating units may voluntarily withdraw but so long as the joint unit continues through the continuing operation within it of two (2) or more units as provided for in KRS 100.127 a withdrawing unit may not establish an independent planning unit under KRS 100.117 . OAG 74-701 .

In order to initiate planning and zoning, following the interrogation procedure outlined in KRS 100.117 , the units desiring to join can only do so by initially creating a planning commission composed of all the units of government and then, following the establishment of the joint planning commission, it in turn could readopt as interim legislation under KRS 100.328 the existing zoning regulations applicable to the various cities. OAG 78-110 .

It would be a proper procedure for a county and several cities to enter an agreement to form a joint planning unit and to appoint a planning commission which, together with the fiscal court and the legislative bodies, would adopt statements of objectives and principles, following which the cities would adopt interim zoning regulations identical to the ones already in existence. OAG 78-110 .

The readoption of existing zoning regulations of the various cities by a joint planning commission would not require a public hearing since no actual change is being made in such regulations. OAG 78-110 .

If a city withdraws from a joint planning commission established in accordance with KRS Chapter 100, and if the members of the remaining planning commission respond favorably to the city’s letters of interrogation pursuant to KRS 100.117 , the city could not refuse to join and proceed to plan independently since KRS 100.117 permits independent planning only in the event the interrogating city receives a negative response; under such circumstances, the city would have to negotiate a reasonable agreement with the remaining members to rejoin the planning unit if it desires to reinstate its planning and zoning program pursuant to KRS Chapter 100. OAG 80-404 .

The Boone County Planning Commission is a separate political subdivision consisting of members representative of other political subdivisions in a cooperative, joint effort to provide consolidated planning and zoning activities for the various political subdivisions which make up the entity. Therefore, the commission is a separate political subdivision for purposes of the definition of a political subdivision found in KRS 61.420(5) governing social security for public employees and is not part of Boone County which is governed by Boone County Fiscal Court. OAG 82-278 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Tarlock, Kentucky Planning and Land Use Control Enabling Legislation: An Analysis of the 1966 Revision of KRS Chapter 100, 56 Ky. L.J. 556 (1968).

Kentucky Law Survey, Griffin and Becker, Zoning, 67 Ky. L.J. 627 (1978-1979).

Kentucky Law Survey, Bratt and Brown, Environmental Law, 70 Ky. L.J. 455 (1981-82).

Northern Kentucky Law Review.

Comments, Planning and Zoning in Kentucky: Who Really Adopts the Comprehensive Plan?, 9 N. Ky. L. Rev. 499 (1982).

100.123. Regional planning units.

At any time, the legislative bodies of the cities and counties comprising two (2) or more adjacent planning units whose combined territory form a logical functional area, or portion thereof, by reasons of physical, economic, or social features may enter into an agreement to form a regional planning unit. The agreement for such regional unit may permit the continuation of any of the joint units and their planning commissions, or may serve to replace them. If any joint units are to continue in operation, the agreement shall state clearly the division or assignment of functions between the regional and joint units. Such regional units, shall be financed by the legislative parties in accordance with the agreement.

History. Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 5.

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Tarlock, Kentucky Planning and Land Use Control Enabling Legislation: An Analysis of the 1966 Revision of KRS Chapter 100, 56 Ky. L.J. 556 (1968). Kentucky Law Survey, Griffin and Becker, Zoning, 67 Ky. L.J. 627 (1978-1979).

Northern Kentucky Law Review.

Comments, Planning and Zoning in Kentucky: Who Really Adopts the Comprehensive Plan?, 9 N. Ky. L. Rev. 499 (1982).

100.127. Written agreements for joint or regional planning units — Filing fees — Exception when planning unit includes county with consolidated local government.

  1. All agreements for joint or regional planning units shall be in writing, and shall describe the boundaries of the area involved, and shall contain all details which are necessary for the establishment and administration of the planning unit in regard to planning commission organization, preparation of plans, and aids to plan implementation. The agreement shall be adopted as an ordinance by the legislative bodies which are parties to the agreement in accordance with the procedures for the adoption of an ordinance pursuant to KRS Chapters 67, 67A, 67C, 83, and 83A, and filed in the office of the county clerk of all counties which are parties to the agreement or which contain a city which is a party to the agreement. The county clerk may charge a fee pursuant to KRS 64.012 for the filing of the agreement. Combination under this subsection shall be permitted notwithstanding the fact that the governmental units are also involved in area planning under KRS 147.610 to 147.705 . Combined planning operations shall be jointly financed, and the agreement shall state the method of proration of financial support.
  2. Agreements for planning units shall be in existence as long as at least two (2) of the original signators are operating under the combination despite the fact that other signators have withdrawn from the unit. In addition, any enlargement of a unit may be accomplished under the existing agreement by filing a copy of the agreement in the office of the county clerk of all member counties along with a statement as to when it was admitted to the unit. The clerk may charge a fee pursuant to KRS 64.012 for the filing.
  3. If the planning unit, or any part thereof, has adopted regulations for historical districts under KRS 100.201 and 100.203 , the planning agreement may provide for the creation of a three (3) or five (5) member board to advise the zoning administrator regarding issuance of permits in such districts, the board being guided by the standards and restrictions of the community’s comprehensive plan and by the historical district regulations adopted by the planning unit.
  4. Notwithstanding any other provisions of this section, when a planning unit includes a county with a consolidated local government created pursuant to KRS Chapter 67C, a planning agreement is not required.

History. Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 6; 1972, ch. 323, § 1; 1978, ch. 384, § 228, effective June 17, 1978; 1982, ch. 253, § 11, effective July 15, 1982; 1986, ch. 141, § 3, effective July 15, 1986; 2002, ch. 346, § 135, effective July 15, 2002; 2006, ch. 255, § 14, effective January 1, 2007.

Opinions of Attorney General.

The creation of a joint city-county planning commission would serve to terminate a previously appointed county planning commission. OAG 69-177 .

If a city enters into a joint agreement with the county and other municipalities within the county to form a joint planning commission, the present city planning commission would cease to exist except insofar as it might operate as a subcommittee by agreement under this section concerning matters peculiar to that city. OAG 71-205 .

Where a joint planning unit is once formed under KRS 100.121 any one or more of the participating units may voluntarily withdraw but so long as the joint unit continues as provided in this section a withdrawing unit may not establish an independent planning unit. OAG 74-701 .

Two cities within a county may continue to operate as a joint planning unit, where the county was an original signator, but subsequently withdrew from the joint planning unit. OAG 79-450 .

The specific requirement found in this section to the effect that combined planning and zoning operations “shall” be jointly financed and that the agreement “shall” state the method of prorating the financial support, obligates the city to appropriate sufficient funds to meet its responsibility with respect to the joint operation of the commission, taking into consideration any other funds it has or may receive from other sources as also provided in KRS 100.177 and this is true even though KRS 100.177 uses the word “may” with respect to the city’s making appropriations to accommodate the commission since the requirements of this section are more direct and binding on the city to fund the program. OAG 81-167 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Journal of Natural Resources & Environmental Law.

Articles, Historic Districts: A Look at the Mechanics in Kentucky and a Comparative Study of State Enabling Legislation, 11 J. Nat. Resources & Envtl. L. 229 (1995-96).

Kentucky Law Journal.

Tarlock, Kentucky Planning and Land Use Control Enabling Legislation: An Analysis of the 1966 Revision of KRS Chapter 100, 56 Ky. L.J. 556 (1968).

Comments, A Challenge to Historic Preservation in Kentucky, 65 Ky. L.J. 895 (1976-77).

Kentucky Law Survey, Griffin and Becker, Zoning, 67 Ky. L.J. 627 (1978-1979).

Note, Historic Preservation — An Individual’s Perspective, 67 Ky. L.J. 1018 (1978-1979).

100.130. Districts. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3037h-121) was repealed by Acts 1942, ch. 176, § 17.

100.131. Area of jurisdiction.

An independent city planning unit or members of a joint planning unit composed only of two (2) or more cities may exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction for the purposes of subdivision regulations and other regulations up to five (5) miles from all points upon the city’s boundary, with the consent of the fiscal court, but not beyond the county boundary, nor within the boundary of any city not in the planning unit, provided, however, that where the extraterritorial jurisdiction of planning units overlap, the boundary shall be midway between them. The jurisdiction of joint city-county and regional planning units shall be coterminous with their political boundaries. Nothing herein shall prevent any planning unit from making planning studies of areas located outside its jurisdiction.

History. Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 7; 1984, ch. 412, § 2, effective July 13, 1984; 1996, ch. 370, § 2, effective July 15, 1996.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Withdrawal of Jurisdiction.

County fiscal court can withdraw extraterritorial planning and zoning jurisdiction from city pursuant to resolution where no contract rights are affected. Elizabethtown v. Hardin County Fiscal Court, 551 S.W.2d 252, 1977 Ky. App. LEXIS 718 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Where a subdivision has complied with the terms of KRS 100.277 any lot therein is free to be sold without further reference to the requirements of that section. OAG 67-316 .

A city planning commission under the old law had jurisdiction over the subdivision of land lying within five (5) miles of the corporation limits of the city and not located in any other city. The present law, KRS 100.131 provides that an independent city may exercise jurisdiction for the purpose of subdivision regulations and with the consent of the fiscal court other regulations up to five (5) miles from all points upon the city’s boundaries. Under both laws the commission’s jurisdiction is basically limited to the adoption of subdivision regulations, however, under the 1966 act other regulations aside from subdivision regulations may be adopted, with the consent of the fiscal court. OAG 67-466 .

If land lies beyond the five-mile jurisdictional limit of the city and the county has not elected to operate under KRS Chapter 100, the land would not be subject to the provisions of the planning and zoning act under KRS Chapter 100. OAG 69-679 .

The jurisdiction of the various units of a county joint planning commission which includes a number of cities is coterminous with their political boundaries pursuant to this section. Therefore one of the member cities of the commission could not exercise subdivisional jurisdiction outside of its political boundaries. OAG 71-180 .

When a city has acquired the consent of the fiscal court to adopt housing and building codes for an area up to five (5) miles from all points of the city boundary such codes would be enforceable in that area. OAG 72-323 .

The Legislature can authorize the city to exercise zoning powers beyond its corporate limits but there may be a limitation on the extent that such authority may be given which would be a matter for the courts to decide. OAG 73-761 .

In light of the basic right of both the city and county to form independent planning units under certain conditions, the city’s jurisdiction would be limited to its corporate limits, with the county having jurisdiction over all of the incorporate area beyond the city limits. OAG 74-462 .

When a joint city-county planning commission is established pursuant to KRS Chapter 100, the jurisdiction of participating cities and the county is limited to their political boundaries and the cities lose their five-mile subdivision jurisdiction which, in turn, means that the joint city-county planning commission would have to readopt, either on an interim or permanent basis, subdivision regulations for the participating cities but not beyond the statutory five-mile limit and, where the comprehensive plan has not yet been adopted, could adopt proper zoning regulations on an interim basis for property outside the five-mile limit. OAG 74-515 .

The city ordinance establishing the joint commission should be amended to eliminate the county representatives on the commission; the remaining commission members representing the city, including the member appointed by the county judge (now county judge/executive) pursuant to KRS 100.133(2) and under the jurisdictional conditions referred to in this section, would constitute the city planning commission with each such member having full voting powers. OAG 78-658 .

A county can delegate the decision with regard to zoning matters to a municipality, where the area in question lies in the county and outside of the boundaries of the corporate city limits for a distance of two miles adjacent to the city. OAG 79-210 .

No notice is required on the part of a fiscal court to the respective cities concerning action to redefine the area of permitted planning and zoning jurisdiction outside of the corporate boundaries of cities since the fiscal court has the legal right at any time to withdraw its extraterritorial planning and zoning jurisdiction. OAG 79-210 .

A joint planning unit composed of two cities may not exercise extra-territorial jurisdiction for the purpose of subdivision regulations in an area five (5) miles from each city’s respective boundary. OAG 79-450 .

Once a joint planning unit has dissolved, and a city has again legally established an independent planning unit and elected to exercise extra-territorial jurisdiction for the purpose of subdivision regulations in an area five miles from all points upon its boundary, this extra-territorial jurisdiction would be limited solely to the adoption and enforcement of regulations covering those matters delineated in KRS 100.281 . OAG 79-492 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Tarlock, Kentucky Planning and Land Use Control Enabling Legislation: An Analysis of the 1966 Revision of KRS Chapter 100, 56 Ky. L.J. 556 (1968).

Kentucky Law Survey, Griffin and Becker, Zoning, 67 Ky. L.J. 627 (1978-1979).

Planning Commission

100.133. Planning commission — Members, appointment — Qualifications.

  1. Before a planning unit may engage in planning operations, a planning commission shall be appointed for the unit in conformance with an adopted agreement.
  2. A planning commission shall consist of at least five (5), but not more than twenty (20) members.
  3. The Governor shall have the privilege of appointing a member to the commission to which the capital city belongs in addition to the number of members specified for that planning commission.
  4. Where extraterritorial jurisdiction is exercised for subdivision regulations or other regulations, the county judge/executive of each affected county may appoint a member to the planning commission of the planning unit exercising such jurisdiction in addition to the number of members specified for that planning commission.
  5. At least two-thirds (2/3) of the members of every planning commission shall be citizen members.
  6. A regional planning commission shall include at least one (1) citizen member from each joint planning unit who is also a member of the joint planning commission.
  7. If one (1) city only joins with one (1) county, then each shall have equal representation.
  8. Except as provided in KRS 100.137 , at least one (1) of the county representatives of the planning commission of a joint planning unit containing a county with an unincorporated area population exceeding one thousand (1,000) persons shall be a resident of the unincorporated area of that county.
  9. Whenever this chapter requires a city without its consent to belong to a joint planning unit, then KRS 100.137 shall apply.

History. Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 172, §§ 8, 9; 1984, ch. 153, § 1, effective July 13, 1984; 1986, ch. 141, § 4, effective July 15, 1986; 1992, ch. 268, § 1, effective July 14, 1992.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Creation of Commission.

Ordinance of Louisville creating planning commission with advisory powers, with emergency ordinance to maintain status quo, did not deprive lot owner of property without due process of law, or deny him equal protection of the laws, or take his property for public purposes without just compensation. Fowler v. Obier, 224 Ky. 742 , 7 S.W.2d 219, 1928 Ky. LEXIS 677 ( Ky. 1928 ) (decided under prior law).

2. Function of Commission.

Basically, the function of planning is vested in a planning commission whereas the function of zoning remains with the governing bodies of the respective cities and counties that are members of the planning unit. Daviess County v. Snyder, 556 S.W.2d 688, 1977 Ky. LEXIS 528 ( Ky. 1977 ).

3. Members.

The statute does not prohibit appointment of city council members to a planning commission. Lagrange City Council v. Hall Bros. Co., 3 S.W.3d 765, 1999 Ky. App. LEXIS 83 (Ky. Ct. App. 1999).

Both due process and public policy prohibit a person from serving simultaneously as a member of the city council and as a member of the planning commission as fundamental fairness does not permit the same person to exercise decision-making authority in one capacity and then review the same matter in another capacity. Lagrange City Council v. Hall Bros. Co., 3 S.W.3d 765, 1999 Ky. App. LEXIS 83 (Ky. Ct. App. 1999).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Elected officials can be nominated by the mayor and county judge (now county judge/executive) to serve as ex officio members in the city-county planning commission without creating an incompatible situation. OAG 66-586 .

Where only one city joins with the county, the commission membership must be divided equally, half of the members representing the city and one-half representing the county. OAG 68-198 .

The statute would not tolerate anything less than equal representation from a city and a county. OAG 69-177 .

Where multiple cities are involved with the county in establishing a joint planning commission the participating units of government must decide by mutual consent the representation on the commission. OAG 70-334 .

Any member of the planning commission, regardless of whether he may be a public official, has the right to vote on any official business before the commission. OAG 71-204 .

One third (1/3) of the members of the planning commission may be composed of city officials. OAG 71-204 .

The mayor of a third-class city could not appoint himself to the planning commission pursuant to this section, since such an appointment would be against public policy; the fact that the city council approved the mayor’s appointment of himself would not alter this opinion. OAG 72-186 .

Under this section and KRS 100.217 a city which adopted an ordinance on May 1, 1967 establishing a planning commission but thereafter never implementing the ordinance would not to date have any power to operate a planning and zoning program within the meaning of KRS Chapter 100. OAG 72-266 .

Under this section if a single city joins with one county they shall have equal representation. OAG 72-266 .

Since service on the planning and zoning commission by an officer of a political party would not constitute a contract or involve a pecuniary interest, no conflict of interest would exist under this section and as the position of county chairman of either political party is not a constitutional or statutory office, there would be no incompatibility between that position and service on the planning and zoning commission created pursuant to Ky. Const., § 165 and KRS 61.080 . OAG 75-436 .

The chairman of the board of trustees of a city would be authorized to appoint another member of the board of trustees to represent the city on the joint city-county planning commission and no constitutional or statutory incapability would be created as a result of such appointment. OAG 76-459 .

A city belonging to a four-city, one-county joint planning commission can appoint as one of its representatives an individual who resides outside of the corporate limits of said city. OAG 76-560 .

A man may serve on both the Urban Renewal and Community Development Agency of Elsmere and the Kenton County and Municipal Planning and Zoning Commission and there would exist no incompatible situation under Ky. Const., § 165 and KRS 61.080 since the individual in question would not be holding two (2) municipal offices or a municipal and a county office at the same time. OAG 76-562 .

Since a member cannot serve both as an ex officio member by virtue of his office and at the same time serve as a citizen member, a citizen member who is elected to the fiscal court would have to resign his citizen membership in order to be eligible to be selected by the county judge (now county judge/executive) as an ex officio member. OAG 77-602 .

Where the county judge (now county judge/executive) appoints an individual who is a member of the city council, that person serves as an ex officio member with his commission term corresponding with his term as city councilman and he cannot serve as a citizen member unless appointed as such after the expiration of his term as an ex officio member by virtue of his elected office. OAG 77-602 .

If the total membership of the county planning commission is sufficiently large, the balance of the membership could conceivably consist of all of the members of the fiscal court. OAG 77-769 .

A person can be appointed to a county planning commission even if he lives outside the area of the county planning unit in a city which is a separate planning unit inasmuch as this section makes no restrictions on residency. OAG 77-769 .

There are no statutory provisions setting forth how often members of the commission must attend regular and special meetings. OAG 78-137 .

Where only one county and one city have formed a joint planning commission, the membership of said commission must be equally divided, and only when multiple cities have formed with the county can the membership of the joint planning commission be varied by agreement among the various participating units. OAG 78-326 .

The fact that a city had apparently complied with the requirements of this chapter, particularly this section, KRS 100.207 and 100.217 clearly indicated that such city continued to have the legal authority to plan and zone in spite of the fact that the commission created in 1968 had been dormant for a period of time and no updating of the comprehensive plan or zoning ordinance had taken place for some time. OAG 78-356 .

The city ordinance establishing the joint commission should be amended to eliminate the county representatives on the commission; the remaining commission members representing the city, including the member appointed by the county judge (now county judge/executive) pursuant to subsection (2) of this section and under the jurisdictional conditions referred to in KRS 100.131 , would constitute the city planning commission with each such member having full voting powers. OAG 78-658 .

Fiscal court’s motion limiting to two (2) the number of consecutive terms that members of the airport board, library board, water commission, district board of health, planning commission and parks and recreation board might serve was illegal, since there is no statutory authority for such action. While KRS 173.340 and 212.855 impose a limit on consecutive terms, as relate to a library board and a district board of health, the General Assembly has established no policy limiting the number of consecutive terms for members of the other boards and commissions, and there is no statutory authority for the fiscal court’s enacting such a policy as relates to the four bodies not covered by statute. OAG 85-116 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Tarlock, Kentucky Planning and Land Use Control Enabling Legislation: An Analysis of the 1966 Revision of KRS Chapter 100, 56 Ky. L.J. 556 (1968).

Kentucky Law Survey, Griffin and Becker, Zoning, 67 Ky. L.J. 627 (1978-1979).

Kentucky Law Survey, Bratt and Brown, Environmental Law, 70 Ky. L.J. 455 (1981-82).

Northern Kentucky Law Review.

Comments, An Unanswered Question Concerning Planning and Zoning in Kentucky: Must the Entire Comprehensive Plan be Approved by the Fiscal Court and the Legislative Bodies of the Planning Unit?, 5 N. Ky. L. Rev. 231 (1978).

Comments, Planning and Zoning in Kentucky: Who Really Adopts the Comprehensive Plan?, 9 N. Ky. L. Rev. 499 (1982).

100.137. Planning commission in county of 300,000 and county with consolidated local government — Qualifications — Appointment — Conflicts of interest — Legislation regarding plan.

  1. Except in a consolidated local government, counties with a population of 300,000 or more inhabitants shall be a planning unit and shall have a planning commission which commission shall be composed of three (3) members, who are nonresidents of the largest city of the county, appointed by the county judge/executive of such county; three (3) members who are residents of the largest city of the county appointed by the mayor of that city; and the mayor of the largest city, or his designee; the county judge/executive, or his designee; the director of works of the largest city in the county; and the county road engineer. The county judge/executive and the mayor together shall ensure that three (3) of the six (6) appointees are citizens who have no direct financial interest in the land development and construction industry. If the commission appoints a citizen member to fill a vacancy, the commission shall ensure that the balance is maintained. All ten (10) members of the planning commission shall be required to disclose any personal or family commercial interest relevant to land use, new development supply, or new development construction. The disclosure shall be a written, signed statement of the general nature of the member’s interest. The disclosure shall be filed with the commission’s records under KRS 100.167 and shall be available for public inspection during regular business hours. A member shall not vote on an issue in which the member or member’s family has an interest. The willful failure of a member to disclose an interest, or a member’s voting on an issue in which the member or member’s family has a known interest, shall subject the member to removal proceedings under KRS 100.157 .
  2. A county with a consolidated local government created pursuant to KRS Chapter 67C shall be a planning unit and shall have a planning commission which shall include eight (8) members who are residents of the planning unit, approved by the mayor of the consolidated local government pursuant to the provisions of KRS 67C.139 . The membership of the planning commission shall also include the mayor of the consolidated local government, or his or her designee, and the director of public works of the consolidated local government, or his or her designee, or the county engineer as determined by the mayor. If the director of public works designates a designee, the designee shall be either a civil or highway engineer licensed under KRS Chapter 322, and shall have at least three (3) years’ practical road building, road design, or transportation planning experience. The mayor shall ensure that four (4) of the eight (8) appointees are citizens who have no direct financial interest in the land development and construction industry. If the commission appoints a citizen member to fill a vacancy, the commission shall ensure that the balance is maintained. All ten (10) members of the planning commission shall be required to disclose any personal or family commercial interest relevant to land use, new development supply, or new development construction. The disclosure shall be a written, signed statement of the general nature of the member’s interest. The disclosure shall be filed with the commission’s records pursuant to KRS 100.167 and shall be available for public inspection during regular business hours. A member shall not vote on an issue in which the member or member’s family has an interest. The willful failure of a member to disclose an interest, or a member’s voting on an issue in which the member or member’s family has a known interest, shall subject the member to removal proceedings pursuant to KRS 100.157 .
  3. In counties containing a consolidated local government, all legislation implementing or amending the plan or amended plan which affects cities with a population equal to or greater than three thousand (3,000) based upon the most recent federal decennial census or any city with a population of less than three thousand (3,000) based upon the most recent federal decennial census that regulated land use under the provisions of this chapter prior to January 1, 2014, shall be enacted by such cities and all other legislation implementing the plan or amended plan shall be enacted by the fiscal court or, in the case of a consolidated local government, by the consolidated local government.
  4. In all other counties the establishment of a planning unit is optional, but any planning unit established in other counties shall comply with the remaining provisions of this chapter.

History. Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 10; 1990, ch. 100, § 1, effective July 13, 1990; 1998, ch. 534, § 1, effective July 15, 1998; 2002, ch. 346, § 136, effective July 15, 2002; 2013, ch. 95, § 4, effective June 25, 2013; 2014, ch. 92, § 191, effective January 1, 2015.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Membership Change — Presumption.

Where the board which conducted the hearing had undergone a change of membership before the final decision was rendered and where the new board had the record of the hearing available to it, there was a rebuttable presumption that the board had acted properly and that the member not present at the taking of the evidence considered the evidence in reaching his decision. Kannapell v. Dulworth, 497 S.W.2d 718, 1973 Ky. LEXIS 366 ( Ky. 1973 ).

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Tarlock, Kentucky Planning and Land Use Control Enabling Legislation: An Analysis of the 1966 Revision of KRS Chapter 100, 56 Ky. L.J. 556 (1968).

Kentucky Law Survey, Bratt and Brown, Environmental Law, 70 Ky. L.J. 455 (1981-82).

100.140. Purposes of zoning. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3037h-121) was repealed by Acts 1942, ch. 176, § 17.

100.141. Appointing authority.

Except in counties containing a consolidated local government, the mayor of each city entitled to one (1) or more members and the county judge/executive of each county shall appoint the members of the planning commission with the approval of their respective legislative bodies.

History. Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 11; 2002, ch. 346, § 137, effective July 15, 2002.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

Preston v. Floyd/Johnson County Pilots Ass’n, 867 S.W.2d 474, 1993 Ky. App. LEXIS 36 (Ky. Ct. App. 1993).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Where a county has never entered into planning and zoning, the establishing of a planning unit is optional but if a county establishes a planning unit it is required to comply with the provisions of KRS 100.111 to 100.361 . OAG 66-428 .

The mayor cannot appoint himself to the planning commission. OAG 71-204 .

The city legislative body may reject a person who has been recommended by the mayor to serve on the planning commission and the mayor must then select someone else. OAG 71-452 .

If vacancies on the planning commission are not filled by the mayor, so that there is no quorum and if mayor refuses to make such appointments, a mandamus action could be brought by a citizen or a member of the commission to require him to perform this duty but, if the commission is established and a quorum exists although certain positions are not filled, in accordance with KRS 100.147 , vacancies on the commission may be filled by the commission if they are not filled within 60 days by the appointing authority. OAG 73-138 .

Since the city council neither appoints nor removes city members of the planning and zoning commission who are appointed under this section by the mayor with the approval of the city council, such members must be removed in accordance with KRS 100.157 and the city council does not have the authority to remove from office planning and zoning board members. OAG 75-518 .

This section and KRS 100.147 , governing appointments to fill vacancies on the planning commission, must be read and interpreted together to ascertain the legislative intent, and, as a consequence, the term “appropriate appointing authority” used in KRS 100.147 must include the legislative body; therefore, any appointment to fill a vacancy on the part of the mayor must first be approved by the city legislative body. OAG 78-709 .

Where a mayor, with the approval of the outgoing city council, reappointed the current members of the planning and zoning commission, at the first council meeting in December, even though their terms did not expire until December 31, such reappointments and ratification were illegal, since the vacancies could not be filled until January 1, and the incoming council had the sole power to select officers whose terms begin during their term. OAG 82-17 .

If the mayor of a fourth-class city refuses to remove an appointee to the planning commission or board of adjustment for the city, there is no method by which the legislative body of the city can remove the appointee for any of the statutory reasons. Of course, any civil officer can be impeached through the state legislature under Ky. Const., §§ 66 and 68, and the procedure for such removal is detailed in KRS 63.020 et seq. OAG 83-164 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Tarlock, Kentucky Planning and Land Use Control Enabling Legislation: An Analysis of the 1966 Revision of KRS Chapter 100, 56 Ky. L.J. 556 (1968).

Northern Kentucky Law Review.

Comments, An Unanswered Question Concerning Planning and Zoning in Kentucky: Must the Entire Comprehensive Plan be Approved by the Fiscal Court and the Legislative Bodies of the Planning Unit?, 5 N. Ky. L. Rev. 231 (1978).

Comments, Planning and Zoning in Kentucky: Who Really Adopts the Comprehensive Plan?, 9 N. Ky. L. Rev. 499 (1982).

100.143. Term of office.

The term of office of all elected public officials appointed to a planning commission shall be the same as their official tenure in office. The term of office for other members of the planning commission shall be four (4) years, but the term of office of members first appointed shall be staggered so that a proportionate number serve one (1), two (2), three (3), and four (4) years respectively, and later appointments or reappointments shall continue the staggered pattern. The pattern for staggering the terms of the members first appointed shall be stated in a regulation or in the agreement under which the unit operates, as applicable.

History. Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 12.

Opinions of Attorney General.

Elected officials can be nominated by the mayor and county judge to serve as ex officio members on the city-county planning commission without creating an incompatible situation. OAG 66-586 .

Term of members of the commission is four years even though their appointments may have been for three-year terms as statutory requirements always prevail over any ordinance or resolution to the contrary. OAG 73-138 .

Although this section contains no provision for a member of the commission to continue to serve until his successor is appointed, acts done by such a person, serving under color of title to the office, pending appointment of a successor, would be valid. OAG 79-284 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Tarlock, Kentucky Planning and Land Use Control Enabling Legislation: An Analysis of the 1966 Revision of KRS Chapter 100, 56 Ky. L.J. 556 (1968).

Kentucky Law Survey, Griffin and Becker, Zoning, 67 Ky. L.J. 627 (1978-1979).

Northern Kentucky Law Review.

Comments, Planning and Zoning in Kentucky: Who Really Adopts the Comprehensive Plan?, 9 N. Ky. L. Rev. 499 (1982).

100.147. Vacancies.

Vacancies on the planning commission, shall be filled within sixty (60) days by the appropriate appointing authority. If the authority fails to act within that time, the planning commission shall fill the vacancy. When a vacancy occurs other than through expiration of the term of office, it shall be filled for the remainder of that term.

History. Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 13.

Opinions of Attorney General.

If a vacancy on the planning commission involves the county representative and the fiscal court does not approve the county judge’s appointment within 60 days from the date the vacancy occurs, the planning commission must fill the vacancy. OAG 70-70 .

If vacancies on the planning commission are not filled by the mayor pursuant to KRS 100.141 , so that there is no quorum and if he refuses to make such appointments, a mandamus action could be brought by a citizen or a member of the commission to require him to perform this duty but, if the commission is established and a quorum exists in accordance with this section vacancies on the commission may be filled by the commission if they are not filled within 60 days by the appointing authority. OAG 73-138 .

This section and KRS 100.141 , which gives the mayor authority to appoint members of the planning commission with the approval of the city legislative body, must be read and interpreted together to ascertain the legislative intent, and, as a consequence, the term “appropriate appointing authority” must include the legislative body; therefore, any appointment to fill a vacancy on the part of the mayor must first be approved by the city legislative body. OAG 78-709 .

Where the magistrates reject the nominations made by the county judge/executive to the planning commission it is up to the judge/executive to continue to make new nominations until they satisfy the fiscal court. OAG 79-284 .

This chapter does not have a hold-over provision but based on public policy, current city appointees are acting as defacto officers until such time as their successors may be appointed by the commission pursuant to this section. OAG 91-17 .

Where a legal vacancy existed on the Commission and where it would also appear that more than sixty (60) days have elapsed since the terms expired the power of appointment passed from the city to the Commission under this section. OAG 91-17 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Tarlock, Kentucky Planning and Land Use Control Enabling Legislation: An Analysis of the 1966 Revision of KRS Chapter 100, 56 Ky. L.J. 556 (1968).

100.150. Procedure. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3037h-121) was repealed by Acts 1942, ch. 176, § 17.

100.151. Oath of office.

All members of a planning commission shall, before entering upon their duties, qualify by taking the oath of office prescribed by Section 228 of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Kentucky before any judge, county judge/executive, notary public, clerk of a court, or justice of the peace within the district or county in which he resides.

History. Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 14; 1980, ch. 184, § 2, effective July 15, 1980.

100.153. Reimbursement or compensation.

In the agreement under which the planning unit operates, reimbursement for expenses or compensation, or both, may be authorized for citizen members of a planning commission. Reimbursement for expenses may be authorized for public officials and employees of participating cities and counties who are members of the planning commission, but such members shall receive no compensation.

History. Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 15; 1986, ch. 141, § 5, effective July 15, 1986.

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Tarlock, Kentucky Planning and Land Use Control Enabling Legislation: An Analysis of the 1966 Revision of KRS Chapter 100, 56 Ky. L.J. 556 (1968).

100.157. Removal — Effect of compact — Membership upon establishment of consolidated local government.

  1. Any member of a planning commission may be removed by the appropriate appointing authority for inefficiency, neglect of duty, malfeasance, or conflict of interest. Any appointing authority who exercises the power to remove a member of the planning commission shall submit a written statement to the commission setting forth the reasons for removal, and the statement shall be read at the next meeting of the planning commission, which shall be open to the general public. The member so removed shall have the right of appeal in the Circuit Court.
  2. Notwithstanding subsection (1) of this section, and KRS 100.143 , when a city of the first class and a county containing such city have in effect a compact pursuant to KRS 79.310 to 79.330 , the terms of the appointed members on the commission shall be for three (3) years and until their successors are appointed and qualified. Upon the effective date of the compact, the mayor, and county judge/executive with the approval of the fiscal court, shall adjust the terms of the sitting members so that the terms of one (1) of each of their appointments expire in one (1) year, the term of one (1) of each of their appointments expire in two (2) years and the term of one (1) of each of their appointments expire in three (3) years. Upon expiration of these staggered terms, successors shall be appointed for a term of three (3) years.
  3. Notwithstanding subsections (1) and (2) of this section, and KRS 100.143 , upon the establishment of a consolidated local government in a county where a city of the first class and a county containing that city have had in effect a cooperative compact pursuant to KRS 79.310 to 79.330 , the terms of the appointed citizen members of the planning commission shall be for three (3) years and until their successors are appointed and qualified, and the term of office of members appointed shall be staggered. Members appointed to the planning commission prior to consolidation of a city of the first class and the county containing the city pursuant to KRS Chapter 67C shall continue to serve as members of the planning commission for the consolidated local government, and shall serve the remainder of the terms for which the members were appointed and until their successors are appointed and qualified pursuant to KRS 100.137(2).

History. Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 16; 1986, ch. 77, § 19, effective July 15, 1986; 2002, ch. 346, § 138, effective July 15, 2002.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

Ratliff v. Phillips, 746 S.W.2d 405, 1988 Ky. LEXIS 17 ( Ky. 1988 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Since the city council neither appoints nor removes city members of the planning and zoning commission who are appointed under KRS 100.141 by the mayor with the approval of the city council, such members must be removed in accordance with this section and the city council does not have the authority to remove from office planning and zoning board members. OAG 75-518 .

If the mayor of a fourth-class city refuses to remove an appointee to the planning commission or board of adjustment for the city, there is no method by which the legislative body of the city can remove the appointee for any of the statutory reasons. Of course, any civil officer can be impeached through the state Legislature under Ky. Const., §§ 66 and 68, and the procedure for such removal is detailed in KRS 63.020 et seq. OAG 83-164 .

If a planning commission member stands to benefit personally from actions that inure to the benefit of his employer, then his interest is probably sufficiently direct to require his disqualification. On the other hand, if the commission’s actions in a particular circumstance provide a relatively feeble benefit to the employer, and if that benefit is so slight that it could not in turn favorably affect the member to an observable extent, then the member probably would not have an interest that would require his disqualification. OAG 93-33 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Tarlock, Kentucky Planning and Land Use Control Enabling Legislation: An Analysis of the 1966 Revision of KRS Chapter 100, 56 Ky. L.J. 556 (1968).

Kentucky Law Survey, Griffin and Becker, Zoning, 67 Ky. L.J. 627 (1978-1979).

Northern Kentucky Law Review.

Comments, Planning and Zoning in Kentucky: Who Really Adopts the Comprehensive Plan?, 9 N. Ky. L. Rev. 499 (1982).

100.160. Changes. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3037h-121) was repealed by Acts 1942, ch. 176, § 17.

100.161. Officers.

Each planning commission annually shall elect a chairman, and any other officers which it deems necessary. All officers shall be citizen members, and shall be eligible for reelection at the expiration of his term.

History. Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 17.

Opinions of Attorney General.

This section, in providing that each planning commission shall elect a chairman, means that the chairman of the commission is to be selected from the membership of the commission and is therefore a voting member of said commission with the same right to cast a vote on the measures before the commission as any other member. OAG 76-75 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Kentucky Law Survey, Griffin and Becker, Zoning, 67 Ky. L.J. 627 (1978-1979).

Northern Kentucky Law Review.

Comments, Planning and Zoning in Kentucky: Who Really Adopts the Comprehensive Plan?, 9 N. Ky. L. Rev. 499 (1982).

100.163. Meetings.

The planning commission shall conduct regular meetings as it deems necessary for the transaction of its business; but there shall be at least six (6) regular meetings annually. The schedule for regular meetings shall be expressed in the rules and regulations of the commission. Special meetings shall be held at the call of the chairman who shall give written or oral notice to all members at least seven (7) days prior to the meeting, which notice shall contain the date, time and place, and the subject or subjects which shall be discussed.

History. Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 18.

Opinions of Attorney General.

Once a planning commission is established, its failure to meet for a period of time or its failure to have a minimum number of meetings would not automatically terminate its existence and require its re-establishment. OAG 74-584 .

Special meetings cannot be called in order to “catch up” with the required minimum six meetings per year. OAG 74-584 .

The failure of planning commissions to meet six (6) times annually has no legal effect upon the ordinances and planning documents, nor does it jeopardize any decisions or recommendations made by the commissions at a regular or special meeting. OAG 74-584 .

Additional regular meetings may be scheduled pursuant to the rules and regulations adopted in accordance with this section. OAG 74-584 .

There appears to be no penalty under KRS Chapter 100 for failure of the planning commission to meet for the minimum number of times provided in this section. OAG 74-584 .

There are no statutory provisions setting forth how often members of the commission must attend regular and special meetings. OAG 78-137 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Kentucky Law Survey, Griffin and Becker, Zoning, 67 Ky. L.J. 627 (1978-1979).

Northern Kentucky Law Review.

Comments, Planning and Zoning in Kentucky: Who Really Adopts the Comprehensive Plan?, 9 N. Ky. L. Rev. 499 (1982).

100.167. Minutes and bylaws.

The planning commission shall adopt bylaws for the transaction of business, and shall keep minutes and records of all proceedings, including regulations, transactions, findings, and determinations, and the number of votes for and against each question, and if any member is absent or disqualifies from voting, indicating the fact, all of which shall, immediately after adoption, be filed in the office of the commission or board, as applicable. If the commission has no office, such records shall be filed in the office of the county clerk. A transcript of the entire proceedings of a planning commission shall be provided if requested by a party, at the expense of the requesting party, and the transcript shall constitute the record.

History. Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 19; 1978, ch. 384, § 229, effective June 17, 1978.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Cost of Transcripts.

The commission is responsible for the compilation and preparation of records; transcripts are to be available to parties willing to bear the expense of individual copies, not the full expense of maintaining the minutes and records of all proceedings at that session. Hocker v. Fisher, 590 S.W.2d 342, 1979 Ky. App. LEXIS 486 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).

Opinions of Attorney General.

While there is no specific statutory requirement calling for the publication of subdivision regulations, the commission could in the public interest adopt a bylaw pursuant to this section requiring publication of subdivision regulations pursuant to KRS 100.207 . OAG 72-42 .

There is no legal requirement that a planning commission publish in its notice of proposed zoning change the legal description of the property based upon recent surveys or the deed of the property involved, unless the commission has so required in rules and regulations enacted pursuant to this section; however, a brief, concise description of the property and the purpose of the hearing, as well as the time and place of the hearing as required by KRS 424.140 , would be legally sufficient notice since it would give the average newspaper reader reasonable warning that the property is the subject of a request to be rezoned. OAG 81-301 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Tarlock, Kentucky Planning and Land Use Control Enabling Legislation: An Analysis of the 1966 Revision of KRS Chapter 100, 56 Ky. L.J. 556 (1968).

Kentucky Law Survey, Griffin and Becker, Zoning, 67 Ky. L.J. 627 (1978-1979).

Northern Kentucky Law Review.

Comments, Planning and Zoning in Kentucky: Who Really Adopts the Comprehensive Plan?, 9 N. Ky. L. Rev. 499 (1982).

100.170. Boundaries; preliminary report. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3037h-121) was repealed by Acts 1942, ch. 176, § 17.

100.171. Quorum — Member may conduct hearing or preside.

  1. A simple majority of the total membership of a planning commission as established by agreement shall constitute a quorum, except that a planning unit created pursuant to KRS 100.137 may specify in its planning agreement that five (5) members of the planning commission shall constitute a quorum. Any member of a planning commission who has any direct or indirect financial interest in the outcome of any question before the body shall disclose the nature of the interest and shall disqualify himself from voting on the question, and he shall not be counted for the purpose of a quorum. A simple majority vote of all members present where there is a properly constituted quorum shall be necessary to transact any business of the commission, except that a vote of a simple majority of the total membership shall be necessary for the adoption or amendment of the comprehensive plan.
  2. A planning commission may appoint one (1) or more of its members to act as a hearing examiner or examiners to preside over a public hearing and make recommendations to the commission based upon a transcript of record of the hearing.

History. Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 20; 1982, ch. 20, § 1, effective July 15, 1982; 1986, ch. 141, § 6, effective July 15, 1986.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Disqualification.

Where the planning commission members had been sued for $1,600 in damages by a construction company which had been denied multi-family zoning application, the financial threat or other duress created by the damage suit did not disqualify, under this section, all commission members from rehearing the application since the purpose of the statute is to prevent direct and indirect financial enrichment to a board member or his business associates who have property or matters for consideration by the commission; to hold otherwise would enable an applicant to eliminate the commission from the planning and zoning procedure merely by bringing damage suits. City-County Planning Com. v. Jackson, 610 S.W.2d 930, 1980 Ky. App. LEXIS 412 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980).

2. Unanimous Vote.

Resolution recommending changes in zoning districts passed by zoning commission composed of seven (7) members by unanimous vote of six (6) members, seventh being absent, was “unanimous vote of the commission.” Gumm v. Lexington, 247 Ky. 139 , 56 S.W.2d 703, 1933 Ky. LEXIS 352 ( Ky. 1933 ) (decided under prior law).

Opinions of Attorney General.

In the absence of a quorum of legal members, the planning commission cannot conduct business and would remain inactive until such time as a quorum is attained. OAG 73-138 .

Since voting on whether to recommend a zoning change would not constitute the “adoption” of a “regulation” within the meaning of this section, a simple majority vote of all members present where there is a properly constituted quorum is all that is necessary to recommend a zoning change to the legislative body or fiscal court for its ultimate adoption or rejection. OAG 74-218 .

Since the total membership of a joint planning commission consists of 14 members with a quorum of eight members which constitute a simple majority, the quorum consists of a majority of the membership of the body which should include all of the members provided for, whether or not the positions are actually filled, so vacancies on the commission as well as nonparticipating members, must be counted in determining a quorum. OAG 74-912 .

No statutory authority exists permitting the chairman or vice chairman, when serving as chairman, to cast a second vote to break a tie in addition to that otherwise granted to them under this section. OAG 75-335 .

Nothing in this section prevents the chairman or vice chairman, when serving as chairman, from voting except in order to break a tie. OAG 75-335 .

A member of a planning commission who is present and is not disqualified for any reason but abstains from voting is counted as voting with the majority. OAG 76-75 .

Where a zoning enforcement officer was employed on a part-time basis by the city to issue permits and where the fees received for such duties were deposited into the bank account of the county planning commission from which account, by joint agreement of county and city, he was paid, such account was merely a conduit of the city administration and the employee’s retirement would be governed by a city ordinance requiring retirement at age 70 rather than by any rule of the commission. OAG 77-522 .

This section envisions the hiring of personnel only to perform the commission’s statutory duties and the work of a zoning enforcement officer who issued permits in connection with city zoning ordinances did not fall within the ambit of such a statutory function. OAG 77-522 .

Where a vote was taken by a joint planning commission on a new comprehensive plan, resulting in a seven (7) to five (5) vote with the chairman not voting, his vote is counted with the majority, giving the plan eight (8) votes, the simple majority needed for passage. OAG 78-810 .

A planning commissioner who has heard all the testimony at the public hearing on a zoning issue cannot vote by proxy on the zoning issue at the planning commission meeting held two (2) weeks later, because no specific statutory authority exists granting members of the planning commission the right to vote by proxy. OAG 80-446 .

The fact that two vacancies exist on a nine (9) member planning commission would have no effect in determining the necessary quorum since this section clearly says that such is determined by a simple majority of the total membership, which in this case is nine (9); as a consequence, a majority necessary to constitute a quorum would be five out of the seven remaining members of the commission. OAG 80-446 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Tarlock, Kentucky Planning and Land Use Control Enabling Legislation: An Analysis of the 1966 Revision of KRS Chapter 100, 56 Ky. L.J. 556 (1968).

Kentucky Law Survey, Griffin and Becker, Zoning, 67 Ky. L.J. 627 (1978-1979).

Kentucky Law Survey, Bratt and Brown, Environmental Law, 70 Ky. L.J. 455 (1981-82).

Northern Kentucky Law Review.

Comments, Planning and Zoning in Kentucky: Who Really Adopts the Comprehensive Plan?, 9 N. Ky. L. Rev. 499 (1982).

ALR

What constitutes requisite majority of members of municipal council voting on issue. 43 A.L.R.2d 698.

Disqualification for bias or interest of administrative officer sitting in zoning proceeding. 10 A.L.R.3d 694.

Right to cross-examination of witnesses in hearings before administrative zoning authorities. 27 A.L.R.3d 1304.

100.173. Employing planners or other persons.

The planning commission may employ a staff or contract with planners or other persons as it deems necessary to accomplish its assigned duties under this chapter.

History. Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 21.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

Danville-Boyle County Planning & Zoning Com. v. Prall, 840 S.W.2d 205, 1992 Ky. LEXIS 158 ( Ky. 1992 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Under this section, planning and zoning commission could appoint someone as a nonvoting adviser to the planning commission to serve for a two-year period. OAG 72-61 .

The compensation for the city attorney, under KRS 69.560 (repealed), includes his work on planning commission legal matters since there is no statute providing extra compensation for such work and assuming the legislative body has required him to do the legal work for the planning commission, although the planning unit may employ special counsel if necessary. OAG 73-778 .

Under KRS 69.210 and 69.560 (repealed) the county and city attorneys must furnish legal advice to a joint city-county planning commission formed between a city of the fourth class and the county in which it is located, although the commission may, pursuant to this section, employ independent counsel. OAG 75-256 ; 78-518.

If, under this section, a joint city-county planning commission retains independent counsel, the legislative bodies of the city and county must appropriate, out of their general revenues as a required and necessary governmental expense, the sums necessary to defray the expense of such counsel. OAG 75-256 .

Pursuant to this section, a joint planning commission may, in its discretion, employ an attorney or attorneys (private practitioners) for advice and representation and the legislative bodies of the city and county should appropriate sufficient funds to cover such expenses. OAG 82-377 .

The fact that the mayor of a city might, by virtue of his having appointed members of the planning and zoning commission, have some impact on their decision to employ him as financial secretary was too remote to constitute a common-law conflict and, consequently, the mayor could serve as financial secretary to such commission. OAG 83-72 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Tarlock, Kentucky Planning and Land Use Control Enabling Legislation: An Analysis of the 1966 Revision of KRS Chapter 100, 56 Ky. L.J. 556 (1968).

100.177. Finances.

The legislative bodies in the planning unit may appropriate out of general revenues for the expenses and accommodations necessary for the work of the commission. Any planning commission shall have the right to receive, hold, and spend funds which it may legally receive from any and every source both in and out of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, including the United States government, for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of this chapter. All bylaws shall describe the method for administration of funds, and an annual audit shall be performed of all receipts, expenditures, and funds on hand by the Auditor of Public Accounts or an independent certified public accountant. The report of every audit, including financial statements, shall be kept in the same manner prescribed in this chapter for other records. Every independently budgeted planning commission shall annually publish a financial statement, pursuant to the requirements set forth in KRS Chapter 424.

History. Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 22; 1986, ch. 141, § 7, effective July 15, 1986; 1990, ch. 362, § 16, effective July 13, 1990.

Opinions of Attorney General.

The specific requirement found in KRS 100.127 to the effect that combined planning and zoning operations “shall” be jointly financed and that the agreement “shall” state the method of prorating the financial support, obligates the city to appropriate sufficient funds to meet its responsibility with respect to the joint operation of the commission, taking into consideration any other funds it has or may receive from other sources as also provided in this section and this is true even though this section uses the word “may” with respect to the city’s making appropriations to accommodate the commission since the requirements of KRS 100.127 are more direct and binding on the city to fund the program. OAG 81-167 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Northern Kentucky Law Review.

Comments, Planning and Zoning in Kentucky: Who Really Adopts the Comprehensive Plan?, 9 N. Ky. L. Rev. 499 (1982).

100.180. Finances. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3037h-115) was repealed by Acts 1942, ch. 176, § 17.

100.181. Assigning other agency functions to commission.

The legislative body or mayor of the city and the fiscal court or county judge/executive of the county may assign to the planning commission of the planning unit of which it is a member, or to an area planning commission if in existence, any powers, duties and functions relating to urban renewal, public housing, or community development.

History. Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 23; 1986, ch. 141, § 8, effective July 15, 1986.

Research References and Practice Aids

Northern Kentucky Law Review.

Comments, Planning and Zoning in Kentucky: Who Really Adopts the Comprehensive Plan?, 9 N. Ky. L. Rev. 499 (1982).

100.182. Effect of failure to comply strictly with procedural provisions or publication requirements — Limitation.

All other provisions of this chapter to the contrary notwithstanding, no comprehensive plan, land use or zoning regulation, subdivision regulation, public improvements program, or official map regulation shall be invalidated in its entirety for failure to strictly comply with any procedural provision of this chapter or with the requirements of KRS Chapter 424 in making any publication required to be made under this chapter, unless a court finds that the failure to strictly comply with any procedural requirement results in material prejudice to the substantive rights of an adversely affected person and that such rights cannot be adequately secured by any remedy other than invalidating the comprehensive plan, land use or zoning regulation, subdivision regulation, public improvements program, or official map regulation in its entirety.

History. Enact. Acts 1984, ch. 412, § 1, effective July 13, 1984; 1986, ch. 141, § 9, effective July 15, 1986.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Notice.

Prior to enactment of this section in 1984, Kentucky adhered to the general rule that failure to abide by statutory notice requirements deprives a planning commission of authority to act and renders actions void ab initio. However, this section ameliorated the requirement of strict compliance to procedural provisions when certain safeguards are met. Minton v. Fiscal Court of Jefferson County, 850 S.W.2d 52, 1992 Ky. App. LEXIS 197 (Ky. Ct. App. 1992).

2. Notice of Hearing.

Where property owners, who were not notified by the Planning and Zoning Commission of a hearing concerning proposed subdivision of adjacent land, appealed dismissal of their action, the court held that although the failure to provide notice violated a zoning ordinance requirement, the property owners did have knowledge that the property was being subdivided and a building permit was granted and that there was no impediment to an appeal after they learned of the Commission’s action and the zoning administrator’s grant of a permit, but that since they did not appeal, as required by KRS 100.261 or KRS 100.347 , within 30 days after they first learned of the respective decisions, their appeal came too late. Taylor v. Duke, 896 S.W.2d 618, 1995 Ky. App. LEXIS 75 (Ky. Ct. App. 1995).

Cited:

Helm v. Citizens to Protect the Prospect Area, 864 S.W.2d 312, 1993 Ky. App. LEXIS 141 (Ky. Ct. App. 1993).

Comprehensive Plan

100.183. Comprehensive plan required.

The planning commission of each unit shall prepare a comprehensive plan, which shall serve as a guide for public and private actions and decisions to assure the development of public and private property in the most appropriate relationships. The elements of the plan may be expressed in words, graphics, or other appropriate forms. They shall be interrelated, and each element shall describe how it relates to each of the other elements.

History. Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 24; 1986, ch. 141, § 10, effective July 15, 1986.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

This section gives authority for city planning commission to establish a neighborhood development unit or floating zone, and does not violate Ky. Const., § 156, as an unlawful delegation of legislative power to an administrative body. Bellemeade Co. v. Priddle, 503 S.W.2d 734, 1973 Ky. LEXIS 47 ( Ky. 1973 ).

2. Duties of Commission.

In the planning function of the planning commission, its duties and functions are as follows: (1) the overall responsibility for development of a comprehensive plan, (2) the preparation and adoption of a statement of objectives and principles, the first element of the comprehensive plan, and, (3) the adoption of remaining elements of the comprehensive plan as they are completed, or as a whole when all have been completed. Lakeside Park v. Quinn, 672 S.W.2d 666, 1984 Ky. LEXIS 258 ( Ky. 1984 ).

3. Adoption of Elements of Plan.

The legislative body of a city must have adopted the goals and objectives or principles of the entire comprehensive plan prior to enacting zoning regulations in order for a zoning code, so adopted, to be valid and enforceable, but the body need not have adopted all of the elements of the comprehensive plan before taking such action. Lakeside Park v. Quinn, 672 S.W.2d 666, 1984 Ky. LEXIS 258 ( Ky. 1984 ).

4. Change in Comprehensive Plan.

It is not arbitrary for the city commission to reconsider a zoning change which had previously been denied particularly since a land use plan has been adopted annexing the land which was zoned agricultural in the interim between the two applications. Johnson v. Lagrew, 447 S.W.2d 98, 1969 Ky. LEXIS 74 ( Ky. 1969 ).

5. Invalid Plan.

Where a county-wide planning and zoning commission was formed in 1966, which encompassed three cities and the county, the comprehensive zoning plan adopted by the commission did not comply with the requirements of KRS 100.183 et seq. where the commission merely pro forma adopted the preexisting zoning plans of the county and one of the cities because: (1) such adoption did not constitute the “preparation of a comprehensive plan” for the newly created unit as required by this section; (2) “the goals and objectives” of the other two cities were not considered as required by KRS 100.187 ; (3) the commission did no specialized “research or analysis” on a unit-wide basis as required by KRS 100.191 ; (4) and most significantly the commission held no “public hearings” prior to the adoption of the plan as required by KRS 100.197 . Therefore, since the county-wide plan did not conform to KRS Chapter 100 on June 16, 1971, the plan ceased to exist on that date pursuant to KRS 100.367 (now repealed), and the zoning ordinances adopted pursuant to the plan were void. Creative Displays, Inc. v. Florence, 602 S.W.2d 682, 1980 Ky. LEXIS 248 ( Ky. 1980 ).

6. Substantial Compliance.

The Supreme Court has consistently construed the language of KRS Chapter 100 strictly, and there is no authority for the position that “substantial compliance” with the requirements of the chapter is sufficient. Creative Displays, Inc. v. Florence, 602 S.W.2d 682, 1980 Ky. LEXIS 248 ( Ky. 1980 ).

Cited:

Hines v. Pinchback--Halloran Volkswagen, Inc., 513 S.W.2d 492, 1974 Ky. LEXIS 374 ( Ky. 1974 ); Snyder v. Owensboro, 528 S.W.2d 663, 1975 Ky. LEXIS 63 ( Ky. 1975 ); Daviess County v. Snyder, 556 S.W.2d 688, 1977 Ky. LEXIS 528 ( Ky. 1977 ); Wolf Pen Preservation Ass’n v. Louisville & Jefferson County Planning Comm’n, 942 S.W.2d 310, 1997 Ky. App. LEXIS 29 (Ky. Ct. App. 1997).

Opinions of Attorney General.

The use of hearings and recommendations of technical and professional groups, in applying the general doctrine of the comprehensive plan to each subdivision application, is legal. OAG 69-200 .

A comprehensive plan is merely a plan for land use and control and the adoption of such a plan will not necessarily mean that all elements of the plan will become part of zoning ordinances. OAG 72-509 .

The comprehensive plan is merely a guide and is not law in the usual and technical sense. OAG 72-509 .

A land use plan must be amended to include a property located in the central business district and zoned commercial in the area assigned for special preservation on the land use atlas and the zoning ordinance must be re-adapted prior to the plan being enforceable. OAG 75-316 .

A special district must be specified in a community’s comprehensive plan before it can be made a part of the zoning ordinance. OAG 75-316 .

Where the City of Elizabethtown and Hardin County have established and are operating as separate independent planning units, which each can do provided the interrogation procedure under the terms of KRS 100.117 has been followed, such city and county were separate planning units, which means that each would adopt its individual comprehensive plan governing its respective jurisdiction; as a consequence, the county would not adopt Elizabethtown’s Comprehensive Plan. It is only where the city and county are operating a joint planning commission, that each adopts a joint comprehensive plan. OAG 82-223 .

Urban renewal begins with a plan, which must “conform to the general or master plan for the development of the community as a whole,” and apparently the general or master plan means the comprehensive plan adopted by a planning commission pursuant to this section; therefore, the requirement that the urban renewal plan conform to the comprehensive plan was perhaps intended to prevent conflicts between urban renewal plans and the comprehensive plan. OAG 91-228 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Tarlock, Kentucky Planning and Land Use Control Enabling Legislation: An Analysis of the 1966 Revision of KRS Chapter 100, 56 Ky. L.J. 556 (1968).

Kentucky Law Survey, Griffin and Becker, Zoning, 67 Ky. L.J. 627 (1978-1979).

Kentucky Law Survey, Bratt and Brown, Environmental Law, 70 Ky. L.J. 455 (1981-82).

Northern Kentucky Law Review.

Comments, An Unanswered Question Concerning Planning and Zoning in Kentucky: Must the Entire Comprehensive Plan be Approved by the Fiscal Court and the Legislative Bodies of the Planning Unit?, 5 N. Ky. L. Rev. 231 (1978).

Comments, Planning and Zoning in Kentucky: Who Really Adopts the Comprehensive Plan?, 9 N. Ky. L. Rev. 499 (1982).

ALR

Requirement that zoning variances or exceptions be made in accordance with comprehensive plan. 40 A.L.R.3d 372.

100.187. Contents of comprehensive plan.

The comprehensive plan shall contain, as a minimum, the following elements:

  1. A statement of goals and objectives, which shall serve as a guide for the physical development and economic and social well-being of the planning unit;
  2. A land use plan element, which shall show proposals for the most appropriate, economic, desirable, and feasible patterns for the general location, character, extent, and interrelationship of the manner in which the community should use its public and private land at specified times as far into the future as is reasonable to foresee. Such land uses may cover, without being limited to, public and private, residential, commercial, industrial, agricultural, and recreational land uses;
  3. A transportation plan element, which shall show proposals for the most desirable, appropriate, economic, and feasible pattern for the general location, character, and extent of the channels, routes, and terminals for transportation facilities for the circulation of persons and goods for specified times as far into the future as is reasonable to foresee. The channels, routes, and terminals may include, without being limited to, all classes of highways or streets, railways, airways, waterways; routings for mass transit trucks, etc.; and terminals for people, goods, or vehicles related to highways, airways, waterways, and railways;
  4. A community facilities plan element which shall show proposals for the most desirable, appropriate, economic, and feasible pattern for the general location, character, and the extent of public and semipublic buildings, land, and facilities for specified times as far into the future as is reasonable to foresee. The facilities may include, without being limited to, parks and recreation, schools and other educational or cultural facilities, libraries, churches, hospitals, social welfare and medical facilities, utilities, fire stations, police stations, jails, or other public office or administrative facilities;
    1. Provisions for the accommodation of all military installations greater than or equal in area to three hundred (300) acres that are: (5) (a) Provisions for the accommodation of all military installations greater than or equal in area to three hundred (300) acres that are:
      1. Contained wholly or partially within the planning unit’s boundaries;
      2. Abutting the planning unit’s boundaries; or
      3. Contained within or abutting any county that contains a planning unit.
    2. The goal of providing for the accommodation of these military installations shall be to minimize conflicts between the relevant military installations and the planning unit’s residential population. These provisions shall be made after consultation with the relevant installation’s command authorities to determine the needs of the relevant military installation. These consultations shall include but not be limited to questions of installation expansion, environmental impact, issues of installation safety, and issues relating to air space usage, to include noise pollution, air pollution, and air safety concerns; and
  5. The comprehensive plan may include any additional elements such as, without being limited to, community renewal, housing, flood control, pollution, conservation, natural resources, regional impact, historic preservation, and other programs which in the judgment of the planning commission will further serve the purposes of the comprehensive plan.

History. Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 25; 1986, ch. 141, § 11, effective July 15, 1986; 1990, ch. 362, § 1, effective July 13, 1990; 2003, ch. 167, § 10, effective June 24, 2003.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Duties of Commission.

In the planning function of the planning commission, its duties and functions are as follows: (1) the overall responsibility for development of a comprehensive plan, (2) the preparation and adoption of a statement of objectives and principles, the first element of the comprehensive plan, and, (3) the adoption of remaining elements of the comprehensive plan as they are completed, or as a whole when all have been completed. Lakeside Park v. Quinn, 672 S.W.2d 666, 1984 Ky. LEXIS 258 ( Ky. 1984 ).

2. Adoption of Elements of Plan.

The legislative body of a city must have adopted the goals and objectives or principles of the entire comprehensive plan prior to enacting zoning regulations in order for a zoning code, so adopted, to be valid and enforceable, but the body need not have adopted all of the elements of the comprehensive plan before taking such action. Lakeside Park v. Quinn, 672 S.W.2d 666, 1984 Ky. LEXIS 258 ( Ky. 1984 ).

3. Change in Land Use Plan.

It is not arbitrary for the city commission to reconsider a zoning change which had previously been denied particularly since a land use plan had been adopted annexing the land which was zoned agricultural in the interim between the two applications. Johnson v. Lagrew, 447 S.W.2d 98, 1969 Ky. LEXIS 74 ( Ky. 1969 ).

4. Map Amendment.

Although a land use plan element is a prime consideration in determining whether the map amendment is in agreement with the community’s comprehensive plan, it is not the only portion of the comprehensive plan which need be consulted in determining whether the map amendment is in agreement with the comprehensive plan. McKinstry v. Wells, 548 S.W.2d 169, 1977 Ky. App. LEXIS 650 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).

Fiscal court's approval of rezoning agricultural land for coal mining was appropriate because (1) the planning staff's findings were supported by substantial evidence; (2) the planning commission properly relied on the findings even though one commissioner's personal opinions found their way into the record, as the planning staff's findings were independent of the commissioner's statements; and (3) the use of the land for coal mining was in compliance with a comprehensive plan. Huxol v. Daviess Cnty. Fiscal Court, 507 S.W.3d 574, 2016 Ky. App. LEXIS 210 (Ky. Ct. App. 2016).

5. Invalid Plan.

Where a county-wide planning and zoning commission was formed in 1966, which encompassed three cities and the county, the comprehensive zoning plan adopted by the commission did not comply with the requirements of KRS 100.183 et seq. where the commission merely pro forma adopted the preexisting zoning plans of the county and one of the cities because: (1) such adoption did not constitute the “preparation of a comprehensive plan” for the newly created unit as required by KRS 100.183 ; (2) “the goals and objectives” of the other two cities were not considered as required by this section; (3) the commission did no specialized “research or analysis” on a unit-wide basis as required by KRS 100.191 ; (4) and most significantly the commission held no “public hearings” prior to the adoption of the plan as required by KRS 100.197 . Therefore, since the county-wide plan did not conform to KRS Chapter 100 on June 16, 1971, the plan ceased to exist on that date pursuant to KRS 100.367 (now repealed), and the zoning ordinances adopted pursuant to the plan were void. Creative Displays, Inc. v. Florence, 602 S.W.2d 682, 1980 Ky. LEXIS 248 ( Ky. 1980 ).

County zoning and planning ordinance, a single zone planning scheme entitled, “Development Guidance System,” whose stated purpose was to “indicate how county government will react when certain events occur, rather than attempt to foresee the future,” calls for zoning decisions based on the government’s reaction to future events rather than present planning for the future and is therefore in direct contravention of subsection (2) of this section and invalid. Hardin County v. Jost, 897 S.W.2d 592, 1995 Ky. App. LEXIS 2 (Ky. Ct. App. 1995).

6. Specific Uses of Buildings.

The master plan authority dealt with the general character and location of buildings and not with specific uses to which a building might have been put and a high school could have been built on site designated for a junior high school. Louisville v. Board of Education, 343 S.W.2d 394, 1961 Ky. LEXIS 419 ( Ky. 1961 ) (decided under prior law).

7. Light Industry Zone.

In establishing a light industry zone the only proper consideration is whether in the light of a comprehensive, coordinated zoning plan the particular area should be set aside for general light industry uses. Fritts v. Ashland, 348 S.W.2d 712, 1961 Ky. LEXIS 29 ( Ky. 1961 ) (decided under prior law).

8. Restriction to a Particular Use.

Authority of law, giving to zoning commission power to establish zones or districts, did not give commission authority to establish a zone or district that was limited to only one particular use; therefore, resolution provided that if an owner of land desired change of zoning classification to allow the use of the land for a shopping center, he must have submitted a plan showing his financial ability, that the center would have been completed within a specified time, that it was needed, that the site was adequate, that traffic problem would not have been created, and that it would have conformed to stated requirements, and that commission would have then held hearing and then might have rezoned tract as the center was unconstitutional to the extent that it made it a condition of rezoning that the property was restricted to a particular use. Pierson Trapp Co. v. Peak, 340 S.W.2d 456, 1960 Ky. LEXIS 42 ( Ky. 1960 ) (decided under prior law).

Cited:

Hines v. Pinchback--Halloran Volkswagen, Inc., 513 S.W.2d 492, 1974 Ky. LEXIS 374 ( Ky. 1974 ); Daviess County v. Snyder, 556 S.W.2d 688, 1977 Ky. LEXIS 528 ( Ky. 1977 ); Hall v. Housing Authority of Louisville, 660 S.W.2d 674, 1983 Ky. App. LEXIS 397 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Where the county commission has never adopted a comprehensive plan or at least the objectives of the land use plan elements which are a part of the comprehensive plan, or any subsequent zoning regulations, it has no initial authority to zone or to authorize neighborhood zoning by petition. OAG 68-547 .

The planning commission may recommend zoning regulations, including the text and map, without having first completed the research requirements of KRS 100.191 for the entire comprehensive plan of this section. OAG 68-558 .

A municipality can adopt by ordinance a zoning map, recommended by a joint city-county planning commission although the map is at variance with a land use plan previously adopted provided the map and ordinance are in basic harmony with the land use plan and provided that the material variance with the land use plan would not result in an arbitrary, unreasonable or discriminatory exercise of the zoning power. OAG 68-558 .

The use of hearings and recommendations of technical and professional groups, in applying the general doctrine of the comprehensive plan to each subdivision application, is legal. OAG 69-200 .

A special district must be specified in a community’s comprehensive plan before it can be made a part of the zoning ordinance. OAG 75-316 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Commission to consider municipal housing plans, KRS 80.110 .

Planning and zoning commission to cooperate with housing projects, KRS 80.290 .

Journal of Natural Resources & Environmental Law.

Articles, Tree Preservation Methods: Zoning Regulation vs. Conservation Servitude, 14 J. Nat. Resources & Envtl. L. 253 (1998-99).

Kentucky Law Journal.

Tarlock, Kentucky Planning and Land Use Control Enabling Legislation: An Analysis of the 1966 Revision of KRS Chapter 100, 56 Ky. L.J. 556 (1968).

Ausness, Water Use Permits in a Riparian State: Problems, 66 Ky. L.J. 191 (1977-1978).

Kentucky Law Survey, Griffin and Becker, Zoning, 67 Ky. L.J. 627 (1978-1979).

Kentucky Law Survey, Bratt and Brown, Environmental Law, 70 Ky. L.J. 455 (1981-82).

Northern Kentucky Law Review.

Comments, An Unanswered Question Concerning Planning and Zoning in Kentucky: Must the Entire Comprehensive Plan be Approved by the Fiscal Court and the Legislative Bodies of the Planning Unit?, 5 N. Ky. L. Rev. 231 (1978).

Comments, Planning and Zoning in Kentucky: Who Really Adopts the Comprehensive Plan?, 9 N. Ky. L. Rev. 499 (1982).

ALR

Zoning: planned unit, cluster, or greenbelt zoning. 43 A.L.R.3d 888.

100.190. Board of adjustment and appeals. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3037h-122) was repealed by Acts 1942, ch. 176, § 17.

100.191. Research requirements for comprehensive plan.

All elements of the comprehensive plan shall be based upon but not limited to, the following research, analysis, and projections:

  1. An analysis of the general distribution and characteristics of past and present population and a forecast of the extent and character of future population as far into the future as is reasonable to foresee;
  2. An economic survey and analysis of the major existing public and private business activities, and a forecast of future economic levels, including a forecast of anticipated necessary actions by the community to increase the quality of life of its current and future population through the encouragement of economic development as far into the future as is reasonable to foresee;
  3. Research and analysis as to the nature, extent, adequacy, and the needs of the community for the existing land and building use, transportation, and community facilities in terms of their general location, character and extent, including, the identification and mapping of agricultural lands of statewide importance and analysis of the impacts of community land use needs on these lands; and
  4. Additional background information for the elements of the comprehensive plan may include any other research analysis, and projections which, in the judgment of the planning commission, will further serve the purposes of the comprehensive plan.

History. Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 26; 1986, ch. 141, § 12, effective July 15, 1986; 1994, ch. 390, § 31, effective July 15, 1994.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. In General.

A comprehensive plan cannot be adopted by the planning commission without compliance with research requirements of this section and holding of a public hearing as required by KRS 100.197 . Hines v. Pinchback--Halloran Volkswagen, Inc., 513 S.W.2d 492, 1974 Ky. LEXIS 374 ( Ky. 1974 ).

2. Invalid Plan.

Where a county-wide planning and zoning commission was formed in 1966, which encompassed three cities and the county, the comprehensive zoning plan adopted by the commission did not comply with the requirements of KRS 100.183 et seq. where the commission merely pro forma adopted the preexisting zoning plans of the county and one of the cities because: (1) such adoption did not constitute the “preparation of a comprehensive plan” for the newly created unit as required by KRS 100.183 ; (2) “the goals and objectives” of the other two cities were not considered as required by KRS 100.187 ; (3) the commission did no specialized “research or analysis” on a unit-wide basis as required by this section; (4) and most significantly the commission held no “public hearings” prior to the adoption of the plan as required by KRS 100.197 . Therefore, since the county-wide plan did not conform to KRS Chapter 100 on June 16, 1971, the plan ceased to exist on that date pursuant to KRS 100.367 (now repealed), and the zoning ordinances adopted pursuant to the plan were void. Creative Displays, Inc. v. Florence, 602 S.W.2d 682, 1980 Ky. LEXIS 248 ( Ky. 1980 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

The planning commission may recommend zoning regulations, including the text and map, without having first completed the research requirements of this section for the entire comprehensive plan of KRS 100.187 . OAG 68-558 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Tarlock, Kentucky Planning and Land Use Control Enabling Legislation: An Analysis of the 1966 Revision of KRS Chapter 100, 56 Ky. L.J. 556 (1968).

Kentucky Law Survey, Griffin and Becker, Zoning, 67 Ky. L.J. 627 (1978-1979).

Kentucky Law Survey, Bratt and Brown, Environmental Law, 70 Ky. L.J. 455 (1981-82).

Northern Kentucky Law Review.

Comments, An Unanswered Question Concerning Planning and Zoning in Kentucky: Must the Entire Comprehensive Plan be Approved by the Fiscal Court and the Legislative Bodies of the Planning Unit?, 5 N. Ky. L. Rev. 231 (1978).

Comments, Planning and Zoning in Kentucky: Who Really Adopts the Comprehensive Plan?, 9 N. Ky. L. Rev. 499 (1982).

Greenwell, On the Constitutionality of Kentucky’s Mineral Deed Act, 13 N. Ky. L. Rev. 219 (1986).

100.193. Statement of goals and objectives — Action on statement by legislative bodies and fiscal courts — Notice — Hearing.

  1. The planning commission of each planning unit shall prepare and adopt the statement of goals and objectives to act as a guide for the preparation of the remaining elements and the aids to implementing the plans. The statement shall be presented for consideration, amendment, and adoption by each legislative body and fiscal court in the planning unit. The legislative bodies and fiscal courts shall take action upon the proposed statement of goals and objectives within ninety (90) days of the date upon which the legislative body or fiscal court receives the planning commission’s final action upon such proposal. If no action is taken within the ninety (90) day period, the statement of goals and objectives shall be deemed to have been approved by operation of law.
  2. Each legislative body and fiscal court in the planning unit may develop goals and objectives for the area within its jurisdiction which the planning commission shall consider when preparing or amending the comprehensive plan. During its preparation and that of the other plan elements, it shall be the duty of the planning commission to consult with public officials and agencies, boards of health, school boards, public and private utility companies, civic, educational, professional, and other organizations, and with citizens.
  3. During the preparation of the statement of goals and objectives, and at least fourteen (14) days prior to any public hearing on the adoption, amendment, or readoption of any element of the comprehensive plan, the planning commission shall give notice of the preparation of the statement or the hearing to the following public officials in each city and county adjacent to the planning unit:
    1. If the adjacent city or county is part of a planning unit, the notice shall be sent to the planning commission of that unit; or
    2. If the adjacent city or county is not part of a planning unit, the notice shall be sent to the chief executive officer of that city or county government.
  4. The notice required in subsection (3) of this section, and a copy of the proposed comprehensive plan element, shall also be given to the regional planning council for the area in which the planning unit is located. The council shall coordinate the review and comments of local governments and planning commissions serving planning units affected by the proposal and make recommendations designed to promote coordinated land use in the regional planning council’s area of jurisdiction.
  5. Any planning commission which is adopting, amending, or readopting any element of the comprehensive plan may conduct a hearing to receive testimony from adjacent planning units, city or county governments, or the regional planning council of the affected area.

History. Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 27; 1986, ch. 141, § 13, effective July 15, 1986; 1990, ch. 362, § 2, effective July 13, 1990; 1992, ch. 268, § 2, effective July 14, 1992; 2008, ch. 167, § 1, effective July 15, 2008.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Floating Zone.

This section when read together with KRS 100.197 is broad enough to constitute a general law authorizing a city legislative body to delegate authority to planning commission to locate a floating zone, and thus such a procedure provided in zoning ordinance satisfied the constitutional requirement of Ky. Const., § 156. Bellemeade Co. v. Priddle, 503 S.W.2d 734, 1973 Ky. LEXIS 47 ( Ky. 1973 ).

2. Duties of Commission.

In the planning function of the planning commission, its duties and functions are as follows: (1) the overall responsibility for development of a comprehensive plan, (2) the preparation and adoption of a statement of objectives and principles, the first element of the comprehensive plan, and, (3) the adoption of remaining elements of the comprehensive plan as they are completed, or as a whole when all have been completed. Lakeside Park v. Quinn, 672 S.W.2d 666, 1984 Ky. LEXIS 258 ( Ky. 1984 ).

3. Duties of Legislative Body.

In the zoning function of the legislative body, its duties and functions are as follows: to approve, amend, or reject the statement of goals and objectives prepared by the planning commission and to adopt zoning regulations after the planning commission has adopted objectives and the land use plan elements. Lakeside Park v. Quinn, 672 S.W.2d 666, 1984 Ky. LEXIS 258 ( Ky. 1984 ).

4. Adoption of Statement of Objectives.

The legislative body of a city must have adopted the goals and objectives or principles of the entire comprehensive plan prior to enacting zoning regulations in order for a zoning code, so adopted, to be valid and enforceable, but the body need not have adopted all of the elements of the comprehensive plan before taking such action. Lakeside Park v. Quinn, 672 S.W.2d 666, 1984 Ky. LEXIS 258 ( Ky. 1984 ).

Cited:

Daviess County v. Snyder, 556 S.W.2d 688, 1977 Ky. LEXIS 528 ( Ky. 1977 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Where the county commission has never adopted a comprehensive plan or at least the objectives of the land use plan elements which are a part of the comprehensive plan, or any subsequent zoning regulations, it has no initial authority to zone or to authorize neighborhood zoning by petition. OAG 68-547 .

Where a county and four (4) cities have formed a joint planning unit, the statement of objectives and principles adopted by the joint city-county planning commission as a guide for preparing the elements of the comprehensive plan must be presented for consideration, amendment and adoption not only to the county fiscal court but also to the city councils of the participating cities since they are a part of the joint planning unit. OAG 75-708 .

The legislative bodies of each city and the county must adopt a statement of objectives as required by this section before the adoption of the comprehensive plan by the planning commission under KRS 100.197 . OAG 76-86 .

A joint city-county planning commission is not bound by any regulations established and adopted by an independent city planning commission which it replaced although the prior regulations may be adopted. OAG 76-131 .

The statement of objectives and principles prepared and adopted by the planning commission of a planning unit must be adopted by the city legislative bodies and the fiscal court in the planning unit before the comprehensive plan is adopted pursuant to KRS 100.197 . OAG 77-309 .

The statement of objectives and principles, as a part of the comprehensive plan, can be adopted by the fiscal court by a resolution. OAG 78-815 .

There is no legal objection to the combination or integration of the individual goals and objectives as outlined for the incorporated and unincorporated area of the planning unit into one statement. OAG 82-411 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Journal of Natural Resources & Environmental Law.

Articles, Tree Preservation Methods: Zoning Regulation vs. Conservation Servitude, 14 J. Nat. Resources & Envtl. L. 253 (1998-99).

Kentucky Law Journal.

Tarlock, Kentucky Planning and Land Use Control Enabling Legislation: An Analysis of the 1966 Revision of KRS Chapter 100, 56 Ky. L.J. 556 (1968).

Kentucky Law Survey, Griffin and Becker, Zoning, 67 Ky. L.J. 627 (1978-1979).

Kentucky Law Survey, Bratt and Brown, Environmental Law, 70 Ky. L.J. 455 (1981-82).

Northern Kentucky Law Review.

Comments, An Unanswered Question Concerning Planning and Zoning in Kentucky: Must the Entire Comprehensive Plan be Approved by the Fiscal Court and the Legislative Bodies of the Planning Unit?, 5 N. Ky. L. Rev. 231 (1978).

Comments, Planning and Zoning in Kentucky: Who Really Adopts the Comprehensive Plan?, 9 N. Ky. L. Rev. 499 (1982).

100.197. Adoption of plan elements — Periodic amendment or readoption.

  1. All elements of the comprehensive plan shall be prepared with a view towards carrying out the statement of goals and objectives. The various elements may be adopted as they are completed, or as a whole when all have been completed. The planning commission shall hold a public hearing and adopt the elements. The comprehensive plan elements, and their research basis, shall be reviewed from time to time in light of social, economic, technical, and physical advancements or changes. At least once every five (5) years, the commission shall amend or readopt the plan elements. It shall not be necessary to conduct a comprehensive review of the research done at the time of the original adoption pursuant to KRS 100.191 , when the commission finds that the original research is still valid. The amendment or readoption shall occur only after a public hearing before the planning commission.
  2. The elements of the comprehensive plan shall be reviewed by the planning commission at least once every five (5) years and amended if necessary. If the goals and objectives statement is proposed to be amended then the proposed amendments shall be submitted to the legislative bodies and fiscal courts in the planning unit for consideration, amendment, and adoption. The legislative bodies and fiscal courts shall take action upon the proposed statement of goals and objectives within ninety (90) days of the date upon which the legislative body or fiscal court receives the planning commission’s final action upon such proposal. If no action is taken within the ninety (90) day period, the proposed amendments to the statement of goals and objectives shall be deemed to have been approved by operation of law. If the goals and objectives statement is not proposed to be amended, it shall not be necessary to submit it to the legislative bodies and fiscal courts for action. If the review is not performed, any property owner in the planning unit may file suit in the Circuit Court. If the Circuit Court finds that the review has not been performed, it shall order the planning commission, or the legislative body in the case of the statement of goals and objectives element, to perform the review, and it may set a schedule or deadline of not less than nine (9) months for the completion of the review. No comprehensive plan shall be declared invalid by the Circuit Court unless the planning commission fails to perform the review according to the court’s schedule or deadline. The procedure set forth in this section shall be the exclusive remedy for failure to perform the review.
  3. Within thirty (30) days after its adoption, amendment, or readoption by the planning commission, a copy of each element of the comprehensive plan shall be sent to public officials in adjacent cities, counties, and planning units, following the procedures provided in subsection (3) of KRS 100.193 .

History. Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 28; 1986, ch. 141, § 14, effective July 15, 1986; 1990, ch. 362, § 3, effective July 13, 1990; 2008, ch. 167, § 2, effective July 15, 2008.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Duties of Commission.

In the planning function of the planning commission, its duties and functions are as follows: (1) the overall responsibility for development of a comprehensive plan, (2) the preparation and adoption of a statement of objectives and principles, the first element of the comprehensive plan, and, (3) the adoption of remaining elements of the comprehensive plan as they are completed, or as a whole when all have been completed. Lakeside Park v. Quinn, 672 S.W.2d 666, 1984 Ky. LEXIS 258 ( Ky. 1984 ).

A county planning and zoning commission, conducting a public hearing regarding a rezoning request, should have considered testimony regarding traffic, drainage, sewage, and other factors rather than simply allow the proposed rezoning because it conformed with the comprehensive plan. The comprehensive plan must constantly undergo review and should be modified when necessary, even if the land is exempt from zoning under the “agricultural supremacy clause” or through case law. 21st Century Dev. Co. LLC v. Watts, 958 S.W.2d 25, 1997 Ky. App. LEXIS 138 (Ky. Ct. App. 1997).

2. Adoption of Statement of Objectives.

The legislative body of a city must have adopted the goals and objectives or principles of the entire comprehensive plan prior to enacting zoning regulations in order for a zoning code, so adopted, to be valid and enforceable, but the body need not have adopted all of the elements of the comprehensive plan before taking such action. Lakeside Park v. Quinn, 672 S.W.2d 666, 1984 Ky. LEXIS 258 ( Ky. 1984 ).

3. Floating Zone.

This section when read together with KRS 100.193 is broad enough to constitute a general law authorizing a city legislative body to delegate authority to planning commission to locate a floating zone, and thus such a procedure provided in zoning ordinance satisfied the constitutional requirement of Ky. Const., § 156. Bellemeade Co. v. Priddle, 503 S.W.2d 734, 1973 Ky. LEXIS 47 ( Ky. 1973 ).

4. Amendment.

Where the Louisville and Jefferson County planning and zoning commission adopted a resolution amending the master plan of the unincorporated territory of the county so that the ultimate effect would have been to incorporate appellants’ land into ponding areas as a part of a flood protection project of the city and county, the action was unconstitutional in that it amounted to the taking of property without due process of law and an appropriation of private property for public use without just compensation. Hager v. Louisville & Jefferson County Planning & Zoning Com., 261 S.W.2d 619, 1953 Ky. LEXIS 1026 ( Ky. 1953 ) (decided under prior law).

The procedure for amendment of comprehensive plan is the same as for the adoption of the original plan. Hines v. Pinchback--Halloran Volkswagen, Inc., 513 S.W.2d 492, 1974 Ky. LEXIS 374 ( Ky. 1974 ).

Any amendments to the comprehensive plan require approval by the fiscal court and where the fiscal court did not approve the 1977 amendments to a city-county plan they were without effect. Kindred Homes, Inc. v. Dean, 605 S.W.2d 15, 1979 Ky. App. LEXIS 538 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).

5. Adoption.

When Jefferson County fiscal court directly, by ordinance, effectuated county master plan through construction of public utilities, property owners had no right to appeal to circuit court, notwithstanding such appeal was authorized when fiscal court indirectly through administrative agency so effectuated the master plan. East Jeffersontown Improv. Asso. v. Louisville & Jefferson County Planning & Zoning Com., 285 S.W.2d 507, 1955 Ky. LEXIS 85 ( Ky. 1955 ) (decided under prior law).

6. Prerequisites to Adoption or Amendment.

A comprehensive plan cannot be adopted nor amended without compliance with research requirements of KRS 100.191 and the holding of a public hearing under this section. Hines v. Pinchback--Halloran Volkswagen, Inc., 513 S.W.2d 492, 1974 Ky. LEXIS 374 ( Ky. 1974 ).

7. Interim Zoning.

It is the goals and objectives which provide the basis for interim zoning and it appears naturally to follow that the comprehensive plan provides the basis for permanent zoning. Kindred Homes, Inc. v. Dean, 605 S.W.2d 15, 1979 Ky. App. LEXIS 538 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).

8. Invalid Plan.

Where a county-wide planning and zoning commission was formed in 1966, which encompassed three (3) cities and the county, the comprehensive zoning plan adopted by the commission did not comply with the requirements of KRS 100.183 et seq. where the commission merely pro forma adopted the preexisting zoning plans of the county and one of the cities because: (1) such adoption did not constitute the “preparation of a comprehensive plan” for the newly created unit as required by KRS 100.183 ; (2) “the goals and objectives” of the other two cities were not considered as required by KRS 100.187 ; (3) the commission did no specialized “research or analysis” on a unit-wide basis as required by KRS 100.191 ; (4) and most significantly the commission held no “public hearings” prior to the adoption of the plan as required by this section. Therefore, since the county-wide plan did not conform to KRS Chapter 100 on June 16, 1971, the plan ceased to exist on that date pursuant to KRS 100.367 (now repealed), and the zoning ordinances adopted pursuant to the plan were void. Creative Displays, Inc. v. Florence, 602 S.W.2d 682, 1980 Ky. LEXIS 248 ( Ky. 1980 ).

9. Challenge to Existing Plan.

The mere fact that plan was based on 1978 data and had not been updated did not invalidate the plan or make the county council’s reliance upon it arbitrary; moreover, subsection (2) provides an exclusive remedy for a landowner aggrieved by a plan, the procedures for which the landowner did not follow. Gramex Corp. v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Gov't, 973 S.W.2d 75, 1998 Ky. App. LEXIS 17 (Ky. Ct. App. 1998).

Cited:

Snyder v. Owensboro, 528 S.W.2d 663, 1975 Ky. LEXIS 63 ( Ky. 1975 ); Daviess County v. Snyder, 556 S.W.2d 688, 1977 Ky. LEXIS 528 ( Ky. 1977 ); Green v. Bourbon County Joint Planning Com., 637 S.W.2d 626, 1982 Ky. LEXIS 281 ( Ky. 1982 ); Hall v. Housing Authority of Louisville, 660 S.W.2d 674, 1983 Ky. App. LEXIS 397 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983).

Opinions of Attorney General.

A municipality can adopt by ordinance a zoning map, recommended by a joint city-county planning commission although the map is at variance with a land use plan previously adopted provided the map and ordinance are in basic harmony with the land use plan and provided that the material variance with the land use plan would not result in an arbitrary, unreasonable or discriminatory exercise of the zoning power. OAG 68-558 .

A comprehensive plan may be changed after it is adopted by the planning commission and the fiscal court. OAG 72-509 .

Although the county and the participating cities of a joint planning unit may initially amend and adopt the statement of objectives and principles of the plan elements as referred to in KRS 100.193 , there is no authorization for referring the plan to the fiscal courts or legislative bodies of the planning unit under this section. OAG 75-708 .

The legislative bodies of each city and the county must adopt a statement of objectives as required by KRS 100.193 before the adoption of the comprehensive plan by the planning commission under this section. OAG 76-86 .

A joint city-county planning commission is not bound by any regulations established and adopted by an independent city planning commission which it replaced although the prior regulations may be adopted. OAG 76-131 .

Neither the comprehensive plan adopted by a joint planning commission nor any amendments to the plan have to be ratified by the legislative bodies of the participating units. OAG 77-562 .

In view of the fact that the legislative bodies of the various members of a planning unit are not empowered to enact or approve the comprehensive plan, the validity of an existing comprehensive plan would not be affected by the fiscal court’s attempt to repeal its approval of the plan. OAG 77-748 .

Where a vote was taken by a joint planning commission on a new comprehensive plan, resulting in a seven (7) to five (5) vote with the chairman not voting, his vote is counted with the majority, giving the plan eight (8) votes, the simple majority needed for passage. OAG 78-810 .

A comprehensive plan may be adopted only by the planning commission and the fiscal court is not authorized to adopt the comprehensive plan under this section nor is there any provision for referring the completed comprehensive plan, as such, to the fiscal court. OAG 78-815 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Tarlock, Kentucky Planning and Land Use Control Enabling Legislation: An Analysis of the 1966 Revision of KRS Chapter 100, 56 Ky. L.J. 556 (1968).

Kentucky Law Survey, Griffin and Becker, Zoning, 67 Ky. L.J. 627 (1978-1979).

Kentucky Law Survey, Bratt and Brown, Environmental Law, 70 Ky. L.J. 455 (1981-82).

Northern Kentucky Law Review.

Comments, An Unanswered Question Concerning Planning and Zoning in Kentucky: Must the Entire Comprehensive Plan be Approved by the Fiscal Court and the Legislative Bodies of the Planning Unit?, 5 N. Ky. L. Rev. 231 (1978).

Comments, Planning and Zoning in Kentucky: Who Really Adopts the Comprehensive Plan?, 9 N. Ky. L. Rev. 499 (1982).

ALR

Constitutionality of building regulations contained in city or town planning statutes or ordinances. 12 A.L.R. 679.

100.200. Meetings; appeals; notice. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3037h-122) was repealed by Acts 1942, ch. 176, § 17.

Land Use Management

100.201. Interim and permanent land use regulations authorized — Designation and regulation of urban residential zones.

  1. Except as provided in subsection (3) of KRS 100.137 , when the planning commission and legislative bodies have adopted the statement of goals and objectives, and the planning commission has additionally adopted at least the land use element for the planning unit, the various legislative bodies and fiscal courts of the cities and counties, which are members of the unit, may enact interim zoning or other kinds of growth management regulations which shall have force and effect within their respective jurisdictions for a period not to exceed twelve (12) months, during which time the planning commission shall complete the remaining elements of the comprehensive plan as prescribed by KRS 100.187 . Interim regulations shall become void upon the enactment of permanent regulations as provided in subsection (2) of this section, or after twelve (12) consecutive months from the date such interim regulations are enacted, whichever occurs first.
  2. When all required elements of the comprehensive plan have been adopted in accordance with the provisions of this chapter, then the legislative bodies and fiscal courts within the planning unit may enact permanent land use regulations, including zoning and other kinds of growth management regulations to promote public health, safety, morals, and general welfare of the planning unit, to facilitate orderly and harmonious development and the visual or historical character of the unit, and to regulate the density of population and intensity of land use in order to provide for adequate light and air. In addition, land use and zoning regulations may be employed to provide for vehicle parking and loading space, as well as to facilitate fire and police protection, and to prevent the overcrowding of land, blight, danger, and congestion in the circulation of people and commodities, and the loss of life, health, or property from fire, flood, or other dangers. Land use and zoning regulations may also be employed to protect airports, highways, and other transportation facilities, public facilities, schools, public grounds, historical districts, central business districts, prime agricultural land, and other natural resources; to regulate the use of sludge from water and wastewater treatment facilities in projects to improve soil quality; and to protect other specific areas of the planning unit which need special protection by the planning unit.
  3. Land use and zoning regulations may include the designation of specifically defined areas to be known as urban residential zones, in which:
    1. The majority of the structures were in use prior to November 22, 1926; and
      1. The entire area embodies the distinctive characteristics of a type, period, or method of construction; or (b) 1. The entire area embodies the distinctive characteristics of a type, period, or method of construction; or
      2. The entire area represents a significant and distinguishable entity whose components may lack individual distinction.

The usage of structures within an urban residential zone may be regulated on a structure-by-structure basis, permitting a mixture of uses in the zone, including single-family and multifamily residential, retail, and service establishments, which stabilizes and protects the urban residential character of the area. The regulation of the usage of any structure shall be guided by the architecture, size, or traditional use of the building.

History. Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 29; 1980, ch. 188, § 96, effective July 15, 1980; 1986, ch. 141, § 15, effective July 15, 1986; 1988, ch. 28, § 1, effective July 15, 1988; 1990, ch. 353, § 2, effective July 13, 1990; 1996, ch. 370, § 1, effective July 15, 1996; 2002, ch. 346, § 139, effective July 15, 2002.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Purpose.

The effect of a zoning change on the value of neighboring property was only one factor to have been considered, since the purpose of zoning was not to protect value of property of particular individuals but rather to have promoted welfare of community as a whole. Fritts v. Ashland, 348 S.W.2d 712, 1961 Ky. LEXIS 29 ( Ky. 1961 ) (decided under prior law).

Basically, the function of planning is vested in the planning commission whereas the function of zoning remains with the governing body of the respective cities and counties that are members of the planning unit. Daviess County v. Snyder, 556 S.W.2d 688, 1977 Ky. LEXIS 528 ( Ky. 1977 ).

2. Statement of Objectives.

In light of the requirement of KRS 100.193 that the statement of the objectives and principles be adopted by the legislative bodies and fiscal court and the planning unit as a prerequisite to preparation and adoption of the remaining elements of a comprehensive plan, this section and KRS 100.207 provide no authority for any sort of zoning unless such a statement has been so adopted. Daviess County v. Snyder, 556 S.W.2d 688, 1977 Ky. LEXIS 528 ( Ky. 1977 ).

Where the county and cities in a planning unit had not adopted a statement of principles and objectives, there was no authority for the enactment of an interim zoning ordinance establishing zoning classifications, which was therefore invalid, and a landowner consequently needed no approval by the fiscal court or the planning commission to convert his property from agricultural to residential use. Daviess County v. Snyder, 556 S.W.2d 688, 1977 Ky. LEXIS 528 ( Ky. 1977 ).

The legislative body of a city must have adopted the goals and objectives or principles of the entire comprehensive plan prior to enacting zoning regulations in order for a zoning code, so adopted, to be valid and enforceable, but the body need not have adopted all of the elements of the comprehensive plan before taking such action. Lakeside Park v. Quinn, 672 S.W.2d 666, 1984 Ky. LEXIS 258 ( Ky. 1984 ).

3. Duties of Legislative Body.

In the zoning function of the legislative body, its duties and functions are as follows: to approve, amend, or reject the statement of goals and objectives prepared by the planning commission and to adopt zoning regulations after the planning commission has adopted objectives and the land use plan elements. Lakeside Park v. Quinn, 672 S.W.2d 666, 1984 Ky. LEXIS 258 ( Ky. 1984 ).

4. Interim Zoning Ordinances.

Where the only zoning regulations were in county interim ordinances adopted prior to the comprehensive plan in order to implement the goals and objectives until a comprehensive plan and attendant permanent regulations were formulated, such regulations were not compatible with the comprehensive plan and were invalid; accordingly, a developer was not bound by fiscal court rulings based on the ordinances. Kindred Homes, Inc. v. Dean, 605 S.W.2d 15, 1979 Ky. App. LEXIS 538 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).

Although this section mentions interim and permanent zoning, the inclusion of interim in lieu of permanent regulations was not to sanction interim zoning but merely to show what any zoning regulation purports or is authorized to accomplish. Kindred Homes, Inc. v. Dean, 605 S.W.2d 15, 1979 Ky. App. LEXIS 538 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).

5. Failure To Follow Procedure.

Zoning ordinances of city were void ab initio where city did not follow the requirements of KRS Chapter 100 in adopting such ordinances. Bellefonte Land, Inc. v. Bellefonte, 864 S.W.2d 315, 1993 Ky. App. LEXIS 143 (Ky. Ct. App. 1993).

6. Power to Enact.

Enactment of Louisville planning commission ordinance of March 27, 1927 and emergency ordinance of June 1927 were authorized under police power, notwithstanding that act of 1922, known as City Planning and Zoning Act applicable to cities of first and second classes, was repealed in 1924. Fowler v. Obier, 224 Ky. 742 , 7 S.W.2d 219, 1928 Ky. LEXIS 677 ( Ky. 1928 ) (decided under prior law).

Zoning ordinances were enacted under police power. Fowler v. Obier, 224 Ky. 742 , 7 S.W.2d 219, 1928 Ky. LEXIS 677 ( Ky. 1928 ); Bosworth v. Lexington, 277 Ky. 90 , 125 S.W.2d 995, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 615 ( Ky. 1939 ) (decided under prior law).

City of third class in exercise of its police power might have passed a zoning ordinance reasonably necessary for preservation of public health, morals, safety, and general welfare of community. Standard Oil Co. v. Bowling Green, 244 Ky. 362 , 50 S.W.2d 960, 1932 Ky. LEXIS 427 ( Ky. 1932 ) (decided under prior law).

The providing of employment opportunities is merely one element of general welfare as that term relates to the zoning field. Sociological factors, protection of property values, traffic and safety considerations, preservation of health, and providing adequate light and air, all enter into the question of general welfare. Fritts v. Ashland, 348 S.W.2d 712, 1961 Ky. LEXIS 29 ( Ky. 1961 ) (decided under prior law).

7. Classes of Use.

The provision in law providing that zoning authority may lay off and establish “zones or districts” meant zones or districts based upon classes of uses. Pierson Trapp Co. v. Peak, 340 S.W.2d 456, 1960 Ky. LEXIS 42 ( Ky. 1960 ) (decided under prior law).

8. Land Outside City.

Not being subject to annexation by a city of the fourth class, land located in another county outside the corporate limits of the city could not have been so reasonably related to city’s development as to fall within purposes of law authorizing such cities to plan and zone surrounding territory bearing relation to city planning and zoning. Smeltzer v. Messer, 311 Ky. 692 , 225 S.W.2d 96, 1949 Ky. LEXIS 1213 ( Ky. 1949 ) (decided under prior law).

In zoning city property, where there was no county zoning, and city zoning authority did not extend beyond city limits, a city was not required to give substantial weight to present use of property outside the city limits since it might well have been that the best interests of the city, under a comprehensive zoning plan, would have been to zone suburban territory, after annexation, for use different from its present use. Adams v. Richmond, 340 S.W.2d 204, 1960 Ky. LEXIS 13 ( Ky. 1960 ) (decided under prior law).

9. Zones, Establishment.

An ordinance not establishing zones in which buildings for business purposes might be constructed, but which by its terms referred only to building and land on a certain avenue, was invalid. Darlington v. Board of Councilmen, 282 Ky. 778 , 140 S.W.2d 392, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 258 ( Ky. 1940 ) (decided under prior law).

10. Validity of Council’s Actions.

The validity of the action of city council could only have been measured by what it did officially and not by private expressions of its various members and when it took official action on the zoning commission’s recommendation whether or not the deliberation was extensive and open-minded was of no concern. Adams v. Richmond, 340 S.W.2d 204, 1960 Ky. LEXIS 13 ( Ky. 1960 ) (decided under prior law).

11. Status Quo Ordinance.

Louisville emergency ordinance of June 1927 to maintain status quo of conditions while planning commission was gathering information for report to general council was not invalid as suspending the building laws of the city. Fowler v. Obier, 224 Ky. 742 , 7 S.W.2d 219, 1928 Ky. LEXIS 677 ( Ky. 1928 ) (decided under prior law).

Where city had enacted zoning ordinance setting up machinery to carry out statute, city had power to enact emergency ordinance to maintain status quo until general zoning ordinance could become operative. Darlington v. Board of Councilmen, 282 Ky. 778 , 140 S.W.2d 392, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 258 ( Ky. 1940 ) (decided under prior law).

12. Consideration of Board.

Zoning regulations were to have been made after reasonable consideration of character of district, its suitability for particular uses, and with view to conserving value of buildings and encouraging most appropriate use of land. Schmidt v. Craig, 354 S.W.2d 292, 1962 Ky. LEXIS 39 ( Ky. 1962 ) (decided under prior law).

13. Termination of Use.

Mere ownership of property which could have been utilized for the conduct of a lawful business did not constitute a right to so utilize it which could not have been terminated by a zoning ordinance. Darlington v. Board of Councilmen, 282 Ky. 778 , 140 S.W.2d 392, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 258 ( Ky. 1940 ) (decided under prior law).

Cited:

Greenway Enters. v. City of Frankfort, 148 S.W.3d 298, 2004 Ky. App. LEXIS 292 (Ky. Ct. App. 2004); Sebastian-Voor Props., LLC v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Gov’t, — S.W.3d —, 2008 Ky. LEXIS 39 ( Ky. 2008 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

By proper zoning regulation a city could regulate and control the height of fences near intersections and require them to be either removed or reduced in height to a point where visibility would not be impaired. OAG 67-332 .

Although the city or county may adopt planning without zoning, once it zones an area it must necessarily become applicable to the area and not be held in abeyance pending a request that the area be zoned. OAG 68-514 .

Where the county commission has never adopted a comprehensive plan or at least the objectives of the land use plan elements which are a part of the comprehensive plan, or any subsequent zoning regulations, it has no initial authority to zone or to authorize neighborhood zoning by petition. OAG 68-547 .

A municipality can adopt by ordinance a zoning map, recommended by a joint city-county planning commission although the map is at variance with a land use plan previously adopted provided the map and ordinance are in basic harmony with the land use plan and provided that the material variance with the land use plan would not result in an arbitrary, unreasonable or discriminatory exercise of the zoning power. OAG 68-558 .

The planning commission may recommend zoning regulations, including the text and map, without having first completed the research requirements of KRS 100.191 for the entire comprehensive plan of KRS 100.187 . OAG 68-558 .

The zoning function must be exercised, if at all, by the legislative bodies of the city and county independently within their respective territorial jurisdictions. OAG 69-177 .

Under the broad powers granted in this section to city or county planning units, the restriction of alcoholic beverage outlets to particular areas through zoning would not appear to be an unlawful use of the zoning power if it was shown that these restrictions were related to the general welfare of the community or to police protection, or any other matters relating to morals and health of the community as a whole. However, even though the zoning power could be used for this purpose, such an exercise of the zoning power would be less subject to question if the power was exercised collectively against all commercial enterprises having a similar character and nature. The question of whether the alcoholic beverage commission law (subsection (2) of KRS 241.060 ) would preempt this power would be eliminated. OAG 70-520 .

The only way whereby a city can plan and zone is by election to operate under KRS Chapter 100 which requires the city to establish a planning commission, a board of adjustment, and at the same time authorizes the adoption of zoning regulations. OAG 71-452 .

A comprehensive plan is merely a plan for land use and control and the adoption of such a plan will not necessarily mean that all elements of the plan will become part of zoning ordinances. OAG 72-509 .

Violations of a county planning and zoning ordinance requiring building permits and certificates of occupancy punishable under KRS 100.991 , not being felonies, are subject to the one (1) year statute of limitations in KRS 500.050 , which begins to run, with regard to building permit violations, upon the completion of the structural improvement or alterations and, with regard to certificate of occupancy violations, on the last day of occupancy since each day of occupancy is a separate violation. OAG 75-632 .

Zoning regulations, as mentioned in this section and KRS 100.203 , must take the form of ordinances and, accordingly, KRS 67.075 through 67.078 , relating to formal requisites of ordinances, must be observed. OAG 78-815 .

A peace officer may issue a citation instead of making an arrest for a violation he observes in connection with the enforcement of a zoning ordinance. OAG 82-393 .

If a misdemeanor or violation committed in connection with a zoning ordinance is not committed in the presence of a peace officer, he would have to follow the procedure set forth in RCr 2.02 and 2.04 to obtain a warrant of arrest or summons for the violation or misdemeanor; a private person could follow such procedures to get a warrant of arrest or summons issued. OAG 82-393 .

The definitions of subdivision and agricultural land under KRS 100.111 have nothing to do with the power of the planning and zoning commission to regulate agricultural land usage pursuant to legally adopted zoning regulations in accordance with the comprehensive plan; it is within the discretion of the zoning authority to determine whether or not an area may or may not be used for agricultural purposes and to limit the extent of such usage. In other words, the planning and zoning commission can, pursuant to zoning regulations, designate what area is agricultural, and restrict the use of such land for other purposes, such as residential, which would include a division of agricultural lands into five or more acres that normally would be presumed to be for agricultural purposes under the definition. OAG 83-468 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Journal of Natural Resources & Environmental Law.

Articles, Historic Districts: A Look at the Mechanics in Kentucky and a Comparative Study of State Enabling Legislation, 11 J. Nat. Resources & Envtl. L. 229 (1995-96).

Articles, Tree Preservation Methods: Zoning Regulation vs. Conservation Servitude, 14 J. Nat. Resources & Envtl. L. 253 (1998-99).

Kentucky Law Journal.

Tarlock, Kentucky Planning and Land Use Control Enabling Legislation: An Analysis of the 1966 Revision of KRS Chapter 100, 56 Ky. L.J. 556 (1968).

Schneider, Strip Mining in Kentucky, 59 Ky. L.J. 652 (1971).

Schroder, The Preservation of Historical Areas, 62 Ky. L.J. 940 (1973-1974).

Comments, A Challenge to Historic Preservation in Kentucky, 65 Ky. L.J. 895 (1976-77).

Kentucky Law Survey, Griffin and Becker, Zoning, 67 Ky. L.J. 627 (1978-1979).

Note, Historic Preservation — An Individual’s Perspective, 67 Ky. L.J. 1018 (1978-1979).

Northern Kentucky Law Review.

Comments, Planning and Zoning in Kentucky: Who Really Adopts the Comprehensive Plan?, 9 N. Ky. L. Rev. 499 (1982).

ALR

Purchaser of real property as precluded from attacking validity of zoning regulations existing at the time of the purchase and affecting the purchased property. 17 A.L.R.3d 743.

Requirement that zoning variances or exceptions be made in accordance with comprehensive plan. 40 A.L.R.3d 372.

Adoption of zoning ordinance or amendment thereto through initiative process. 72 A.L.R.3d 991.

Initiative and referendum: adoption of zoning ordinance or amendment thereto as subject of referendum. 72 A.L.R.3d 1030.

100.202. Land use regulation permitting placement of all property within planning unit within a single zone — Addressing land use proposals as conditional use.

  1. Subject to KRS 100.137(3), nothing in this chapter shall preclude the legislative bodies and fiscal courts of cities and counties comprising a planning unit from enacting a land use regulation which places all property within their respective jurisdictions in a single zone and addressing all land use proposals therein as conditional use permits.
  2. The text of any land use regulation enacted pursuant to this section need not comply with the provisions of KRS 100.203 , and may provide that the planning commission shall assume all powers and duties of a board of adjustment as provided in KRS 100.217 to 100.263 . Any appeal from an action of the planning commission in granting or denying a variance or conditional use permit shall be taken pursuant to KRS 100.347(2).

History. Enact. Acts 1988, ch, 144, § 10, effective July 15, 1988; 2002, ch. 346, § 140, effective July 15, 2002.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Single Zone Planning.

Under county’s single zone zoning and planning ordinance, “Development Guidance System,” which was declared invalid, no conditional use was pre-deemed compatible with any location prior to an application for a conditional use permit; neither subsection (1) of this section, permitting single zone planning, nor subsection (1)(e) of KRS 100.203 , authorizing districts of special interest, authorized such deviation from the statutory scheme of KRS Chapter 100. Hardin County v. Jost, 897 S.W.2d 592, 1995 Ky. App. LEXIS 2 (Ky. Ct. App. 1995).

100.203. Content of zoning regulations — Appeal — Special provisions for urban-county governments.

Cities and counties may enact zoning regulations which shall contain:

  1. A text, which shall list the types of zones which may be used, and the regulations which may be imposed in each zone, which must be uniform throughout the zone. In addition, the text shall make provisions for the granting of variances, conditional use permits, and for nonconforming use of land and structures, and any other provisions which are necessary to implement the zoning regulation. The city or county may regulate:
    1. The activity on the land, including filling or excavation of land, and the removal of natural resources, and the use of watercourses, and other bodies of water, as well as land subject to flooding;
    2. The size, width, height, bulk, location of structures, buildings and signs;
    3. Minimum or maximum areas or percentages of areas, courts, yards, or other open spaces or bodies of water which are to be left unoccupied, and minimum distance requirements between buildings or other structures;
    4. Intensity of use and density of population floor area to ground area ratios, or other means;
    5. Districts of special interest to the proper development of the community, including, but not limited to, exclusive use districts, historical districts, planned business districts, planned industrial districts, renewal, rehabilitation, and conservation districts; planned neighborhood and group housing districts;
    6. Fringe areas of each district, by imposing requirements which will make it compatible with neighboring districts; and
    7. The activities and structures on the land at or near major thoroughfares, their intersections, and interchanges, and transportation arteries, natural or artificial bodies of water, public buildings and public grounds, aircraft, helicopter, rocket and spacecraft facilities, places having unique interest or value, flood plain areas, and other places having a special character or use affecting or affected by their surroundings;
  2. The text may provide that the planning commission, as a condition to the granting of any zoning change, may require the submission of a development plan, which shall be limited to the provisions of the definition contained in KRS 100.111(8). Where agreed upon, this development plan shall be followed. As a further condition to the granting of a zoning change, the planning commission may require that substantial construction be initiated within a certain period of time of not less than one (1) year; provided that such zoning change shall not revert to its original designation unless there has been a public hearing;
  3. A map, which shall show the boundaries of the area which is to be zoned, and the boundaries of each zone;
  4. Text provisions to the effect that land which is used for agricultural purposes shall have no regulations except that:
    1. Setback lines may be required for the protection of existing and proposed streets and highways;
    2. All buildings or structures in a designated floodway or flood plain or which tend to increase flood heights or obstruct the flow of flood waters may be fully regulated;
    3. Mobile homes and other dwellings may be permitted but shall have regulations imposed which are applicable, such as zoning, building, and certificates of occupancy; and
    4. The uses set out in KRS 100.111(2)(c) may be subject to regulation as a conditional use;
  5. The text may empower the planning commission to hear and finally decide applications for variances or conditional use permits when a proposed development requires a map amendment and one (1) or more variances or conditional use permits;
  6. In any regulation adopted pursuant to subsection (5) of this section:
    1. The text shall provide that the planning commission shall assume all powers and duties otherwise exercised by the board of adjustments pursuant to KRS 100.231 , 100.233 , 100.237 , 100.241 , 100.243 , 100.247 , and 100.251 , in a circumstance provided for by subsection (5) of this section; and
    2. The text shall provide that the applicant for the map amendment, at the time of the filing of the application for the map amendment, may elect to have any variances or conditional use permits for the same development to be heard and finally decided by the planning commission at the same public hearing set for the map amendment, or by the board of adjustments as otherwise provided for in this chapter;
  7. Any judicial proceeding to appeal the planning commission action authorized by subsection (5) of this section in granting or denying any variance or conditional use permit shall be taken pursuant to KRS 100.347(2);
  8. In urban-county governments, in addition to any other powers permitted or required to be exercised by this chapter, the text of the zoning regulations may provide, as a condition to granting a map amendment, that the planning unit may:
    1. Restrict the use of the property affected to a particular use, or a particular class of use, or a specified density within those permitted in a given zoning category;
    2. Impose architectural or other visual requirements or restrictions upon development in areas zoned historic; and
    3. Impose screening and buffering restrictions upon the subject property;

The text shall provide the method whereby such restrictions or conditions may be imposed, modified, removed, amended and enforced.

History. Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 30; 1974, ch. 360, § 1; 1986, ch. 141, § 16, effective July 15, 1986; 1986, ch. 190, § 1, effective July 15, 1986; 2004, ch. 150, § 2, effective July 13, 2004.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Floating Zone.

Authorization to establish a floating zone was not tantamount to granting a variance, and such zones were not bound by the requirement of subsection (1) that all regulations be uniform throughout the zone. Bellemeade Co. v. Priddle, 503 S.W.2d 734, 1973 Ky. LEXIS 47 ( Ky. 1973 ).

2. Subdivisions.

If a division of land falls within the statutory definition of subdivision, then under KRS 100.277 the division must be approved by the local planning commission; however, the statutes do not specify what the size of the lots within a subdivision must be, the particular zones into which a locality must be divided, or the use to which land may be put within a district zoned agricultural, and therefore, the ultimate authority to establish various zones and the uses permitted within each of those zones is given to local governments to be exercised through zoning regulations. Sladon v. Shawk, 1991 Ky. App. LEXIS 44 (Ky. Ct. App. Apr. 12, 1991).

Planning commission properly denied property owners’ subdivision plan because the preliminary plan had expired and was not eligible for reapproval or an extension and the owners’ proposed development of residential one-acre lots did not fit into an agricultural exemption to the zoning ordinance under KRS 100.203(4) and KRS 100.111(2). Sebastian-Voor Props., LLC v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Gov't, 2008 Ky. LEXIS 39 (Ky. Feb. 21, 2008), sub. op., 265 S.W.3d 190, 2008 Ky. LEXIS 301 ( Ky. 2008 ).

3. Single Zone Planning.

Under county’s single zone zoning and planning ordinance, “Development Guidance System,” which was declared invalid, no conditional use was pre-deemed compatible with any location prior to an application for a conditional use permit; neither subsection (1) of KRS 100.202 , permitting single zone planning, nor subsection (1)(e) of KRS 100.203 , authorizing districts of special interest, authorized such deviation from the statutory scheme of KRS Chapter 100. Hardin County v. Jost, 897 S.W.2d 592, 1995 Ky. App. LEXIS 2 (Ky. Ct. App. 1995).

4. Land Used for Agriculture.

The “agricultural supremacy clause” does not make a farm a legal nonconforming use but takes it outside the zoning ordinances’ jurisdiction, although not outside the master or comprehensive plan; this is an important distinction because by exempting agricultural land from application of the zoning ordinance, the provisions which deal with changes in nonconforming uses do not apply. Grannis v. Schroder, 978 S.W.2d 328, 1997 Ky. App. LEXIS 128 (Ky. Ct. App. 1997).

The appellants’ land was used for agriculture, even though they only maintained a residence and produced hay. Grannis v. Schroder, 978 S.W.2d 328, 1997 Ky. App. LEXIS 128 (Ky. Ct. App. 1997).

The user of agricultural land can change one agricultural use to another with impunity. Grannis v. Schroder, 978 S.W.2d 328, 1997 Ky. App. LEXIS 128 (Ky. Ct. App. 1997).

Ordinances addressing the division, platting and transfer of property, as opposed to the use to which the property was put, did not violate the agricultural supremacy clause of KRS 100.203(4). A presumption that five-acre tracts were devoted to agricultural uses was not a natural or logical extension of KRS 100.111(22); “five acres” was not necessarily a magic number for determining an agricultural division. Campbell County Fiscal Court v. Nash, 2008 Ky. App. LEXIS 373 (Ky. Ct. App. Dec. 12, 2008), review granted, transferred, 2010 Ky. LEXIS 40 (Ky. Jan. 13, 2010), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 345 S.W.3d 811, 2011 Ky. LEXIS 57 ( Ky. 2011 ).

To the extent that Campbell County, Ky., Ordinance 0-18-04 & 0-20-04 require planning commission approval before property can be divided into agricultural parcels, the ordinances are void because they conflict with the statutory wording and scheme of KRS 100.111(22), 100.111(2), 100.203(4), and 100.273 et seq., as well as KRS 413.072 , which prohibits local regulations on agricultural uses. To the extent the ordinances seek to amend the subdivision regulations, they are void because the adoption or amendment of subdivision regulations are functions of the planning commission, at least initially. Nash v. Campbell County Fiscal Court, 345 S.W.3d 811, 2011 Ky. LEXIS 57 ( Ky. 2011 ).

Subdivision of land did not qualify for an agricultural exemption because the conveyances did not meet the requirement that the use was restricted to agricultural uses. Moreover, the conveyances did not meet the third requirement, which was that all parcels had to have frontage on an existing street. Nash v. Campbell County Fiscal Court, 345 S.W.3d 811, 2011 Ky. LEXIS 57 ( Ky. 2011 ).

5. Application of Ordinance.

A zoning ordinance in order to have been valid must apply to the city as a whole and not alone to particular streets. Darlington v. Board of Councilmen, 282 Ky. 778 , 140 S.W.2d 392, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 258 ( Ky. 1940 ) (decided under prior law).

6. Validity of Ordinances.

Louisville emergency ordinance of June 1927 to maintain status quo of conditions while planning commission was gathering information for report to general council was authorized, as against contention that council could not have passed ordinance of temporary nature. Fowler v. Obier, 224 Ky. 742 , 7 S.W.2d 219, 1928 Ky. LEXIS 677 ( Ky. 1928 ) (decided under prior law).

Zoning ordinances enacted pursuant to statutory authority are generally upheld. Smith v. Selligman, 270 Ky. 69 , 109 S.W.2d 14, 1937 Ky. LEXIS 23 ( Ky. 1937 ) (decided under prior law).

A building ordinance failing to prescribe standards governing the discretion of city council in granting or refusing permits, or by which applicant’s right to a permit could be determined, and making that right dependent upon the consent of neighboring property owners, was invalid. Darlington v. Board of Councilmen, 282 Ky. 778 , 140 S.W.2d 392, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 258 ( Ky. 1940 ) (decided under prior law).

If the action of the city council did in fact bear an appropriate relation to the objects of the zoning statute it was not material what prompted the council to take the action and the courts did not inquire into the motives of the council. Adams v. Richmond, 340 S.W.2d 204, 1960 Ky. LEXIS 13 ( Ky. 1960 ) (decided under prior law).

The judicial test applied to the zoning ordinance was whether or not the ordinance bears any substantial relation to the objects set forth in a law which specified the purposes of zoning regulations in cities of the first to sixth classes, and if it had no such relation it was invalidated as arbitrary and capricious. Adams v. Richmond, 340 S.W.2d 204, 1960 Ky. LEXIS 13 ( Ky. 1960 ) (decided under prior law).

7. Residential Zone.

Term “designed” in Louisville emergency ordinance of June 1927 defining residence zone as land fronting on both sides of public street or court where less than 25% of frontage was used or designed for business, meant that there must have been some overt act or setting apart of the land, beyond merely what owner had in mind. Fowler v. Obier, 224 Ky. 742 , 7 S.W.2d 219, 1928 Ky. LEXIS 677 ( Ky. 1928 ) (decided under prior law).

8. Commercial Zone.

Mere fact that the area running into the city from the limits is residential in nature did not preclude establishment of a commercial zone on the edge. Adams v. Richmond, 340 S.W.2d 204, 1960 Ky. LEXIS 13 ( Ky. 1960 ) (decided under prior law).

Even if weight were given to the present use of the adjoining suburban property in city zoning it would not have established that zoning ordinance was arbitrary and unreasonable which zoned lots on the edge of the city as commercial where area on the west side of the highway outside the city limits was not barred from commercial development and there were some nonresidential uses in the area on the east side since the area had not acquired such an exclusively residential character that to establish a commercial zone on its edge would have been without any relation to the statutory zoning object. Adams v. Richmond, 340 S.W.2d 204, 1960 Ky. LEXIS 13 ( Ky. 1960 ) (decided under prior law).

The zoning of lots for commercial use could not have been classed as spot zoning because the location of the lots on the edge of the city across the street from a commercial zone and the physical characteristics of the lots made them distinguishable in character from the adjoining property to the south. Adams v. Richmond, 340 S.W.2d 204, 1960 Ky. LEXIS 13 ( Ky. 1960 ) (decided under prior law).

Zoning ordinance had a substantial relation to the objects of the statute and there was nothing inappropriate in providing for a commercial zone at the edge of the city, even though the area running into the city from the limits was residential in nature, where there had been a commercial zone of several years’ standing on the west side of the highway at the city limits, the lots in question were somewhat separated from adjoining property by railroad fill and the lots required considerable filling to bring them up to street level. Adams v. Richmond, 340 S.W.2d 204, 1960 Ky. LEXIS 13 ( Ky. 1960 ) (decided under prior law).

9. Main Building.

Storage garage so constructed as to have been attached to apartment building by one wall, but otherwise structurally independent, and so that either building could have been torn down without disturbing the other, was not “constructed as a part of the main building” within the meaning of zoning ordinance. Selligman v. Western & Southern Life Ins. Co., 277 Ky. 551 , 126 S.W.2d 419, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 570 ( Ky. 1938 ) (decided under prior law).

10. Plumbing Facilities.

Ordinance outlawing outside frost-proof flush toilets and requiring inside enclosed flush toilet and a kitchen sink both connected to an approved water and sewer system was not in conflict with zoning statutes or with plumbing code. Louisville v. Thompson, 339 S.W.2d 869, 1960 Ky. LEXIS 487 ( Ky. 1960 ) (decided under prior law).

11. Alteration of Building.

“Structural alterations” intended to be prohibited by zoning ordinance were the changing of an old building in such a way as to convert it into a new or substantially different structure. A. L. Carrithers & Son v. Louisville, 250 Ky. 462 , 63 S.W.2d 493, 1933 Ky. LEXIS 716 ( Ky. 1933 ) (decided under prior law).

12. Nonconforming Use.

Right to alter building to meet requirements of ordinance regulating sale of milk should not have been controlled entirely by provision of zoning ordinance prohibiting structural alterations unless otherwise provided in ordinance, in view of another provision that nonconforming uses might have been extended through building provided no structural alterations were made, except those required by law or ordinance. A. L. Carrithers & Son v. Louisville, 250 Ky. 462 , 63 S.W.2d 493, 1933 Ky. LEXIS 716 ( Ky. 1933 ) (decided under prior law).

13. Submission of Plan.

KRS 100.203(2) did not require the submission and approval of a development plan with a request for a zoning change, only its submission. Any issues with the development plan should have been addressed prior to the recommendation of the zone change to the Board of Commissioners of the City of Danville, not alongside it. Bd. of Comm'rs v. Davis, 238 S.W.3d 132, 2007 Ky. App. LEXIS 400 (Ky. Ct. App. 2007).

14. Enactment of Ordinances.

Pursuant to KRS 100.203 , a planning unit may choose to regulate one type of activity or structure, but not another; thus, the Kentucky Supreme Court’s reading of the word “may” in KRS 100.987(1) is that a planning unit has the discretion to enact regulations pertaining to cellular antenna towers, as they do with any other activities or structures, but this exercise of discretion is not a condition of jurisdiction. If the area of the proposed cellular tower has a planning unit that has adopted planning and zoning regulations, the jurisdiction over matters relating to cellular tower placement and construction rests with that planning commission, not the Kentucky Public Service Commission, regardless of whether the planning unit has enacted regulations specifically relating to cellular towers; however, if there are no regulations specifically pertaining to cellular towers, the applicant will, however, still need to meet the general restrictions of the particular zone in which the proposed cell tower is to be constructed, e.g. permitted uses within the zone, height, and setback requirements, etc. Ky. PSC v. Shadoan, 325 S.W.3d 360, 2010 Ky. LEXIS 278 ( Ky. 2010 ).

Cited:

Wells v. Fiscal Court of Jefferson County, 457 S.W.2d 498, 1970 Ky. LEXIS 211 ( Ky. 1970 ); McCord v. Pineway Farms, 569 S.W.2d 690, 1978 Ky. App. LEXIS 564 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978); McCollum v. City of Berea, 53 S.W.3d 106, 2000 Ky. App. LEXIS 41 (Ky. Ct. App. 2000); Greenway Enters. v. City of Frankfort, 148 S.W.3d 298, 2004 Ky. App. LEXIS 292 (Ky. Ct. App. 2004).

Opinions of Attorney General.

By proper zoning regulation a city could regulate and control the height of fences near intersections and require them to be either removed or reduced in height to a point where visibility would not be impaired. OAG 67-332 .

Where the county commission has never adopted a comprehensive plan or at least the objectives of the land use plan elements which are a part of the comprehensive plan, or any subsequent zoning regulations, it has no initial authority to zone or to authorize neighborhood zoning by petition. OAG 68-547 .

The zoning function must be exercised, if at all, by the legislative bodies of the city and county independently within their respective territorial jurisdictions. OAG 69-177 .

The terms of this section would not apply to a residence used for such purpose on land used for agricultural purposes. OAG 70-796 .

The zoning regulations referred to in this section cannot be imposed on buildings used for agricultural purposes located on land used solely for such purposes. OAG 70-796 .

Subsection (4) of this section should be construed to mean that no more than one mobile home used as a dwelling can be placed unrestricted on farm land. OAG 74-471 .

Unless floodways and flood plains are identified and so designated, counties are precluded by subsection (4) of this section from adopting the zoning and building regulations required by the federal insurance administration for sale by the counties of flood insurance under the national flood insurance program. OAG 74-501 .

A municipal zoning ordinance can prohibit a property owner from building a single family dwelling in a commercial zone provided the ordinance is reasonable and uniform throughout the zone. OAG 74-515 .

The exemption under subsection (4) of this section applies if the land is obviously held solely for agricultural uses, though not actually used at all times for such purposes. OAG 75-549 .

Any size piece of ground can be exempt if used for agricultural purposes since subsection (4) of this section does not contain limitations as to the acreage. OAG 74-549 .

“Agricultural use” includes the use of land for the preparing and cultivating of the soil, the planting of seeds, the raising and harvesting of crops or of agricultural or horticultural commodities on such land, the feeding, breeding, raising and managing of poultry and livestock or other domestic animals for food or racing purposes, the managing of a dairy and whatever the land produces but it does not include the commercial processing, packing, drying, storing, or canning of such commodities for market or making cheese or butter or other dairy products for market. OAG 74-549 .

Under this section and KRS 100.253 a municipality must include in its zoning ordinances specific regulations with regard to nonconforming uses. OAG 74-711 .

A city has without question the right to regulate the location of signs under the statutory zoning authority as well as its general police power, regardless of whether the sign is located on private property over which the city has acquired a right-of-way, or public property owned and controlled by the city. OAG 79-76 .

A city and county joint planning commission can adopt appropriate zoning regulations which include the conditional use of certain lands for the removal of natural resources, such as oil shale from land zoned agricultural and the board of adjustment can, in turn, issue a conditional use permit for the removal of such minerals, provided the purposes for which the application for conditional use permit is made meets the conditions imposed under KRS 100.237 . OAG 80-294 .

Subsection (4) of this section, which provides that no regulations on agricultural building shall be imposed on land zoned agricultural, does not pre-empt the right of zoning authorities to delegate zones in which agricultural use of land is allowed and those in which it is not allowed. OAG 81-121 .

A peace officer may issue a citation instead of making an arrest for a violation he observes in connection with the enforcement of a zoning ordinance. OAG 82-393 .

If a misdemeanor or violation committed in connection with a zoning ordinance is not committed in the presence of a peace officer, he would have to follow the procedures set forth in RCr 2.02 and 2.04 to obtain a warrant of arrest or summons for the violation or misdemeanor; a private person could follow such procedures to get a warrant of arrest or summons issued. OAG 82-393 .

Since zoning or subdivision regulations have no retroactive effect, the owner of a prefiled plat may sell lots in accordance with the recorded plat irrespective of subsequent regulations to the contrary. However, the subsequent adoption of zoning regulations under this section and subdivision regulations under KRS 100.281 that are not in contradiction to the prerecorded plat would be enforceable in a subdivision as it is developed. OAG 82-581 .

The regulation of lot sizes within the corporate limits of a city is basically a zoning matter that is specifically controlled under KRS Chapter 100, and particularly this section which requires a city that has adopted planning and zoning to enact appropriate regulations relating to lot sizes among other things; unless, however, the city has adopted planning and zoning in accordance with the specific requirements of KRS Chapter 100, it cannot enact regulations governing lot sizes required under this section. In other words, unless the city elects to operate under KRS Chapter 100, there can be no planning and zoning within the city, and in such event the local health department could on its own under its public health powers regulate the size of lots where on-site sewage disposal systems are involved. OAG 83-158 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

State planning board, KRS 147.070 to 147.120 .

Journal of Natural Resources & Environmental Law.

Articles, Historic Districts: A Look at the Mechanics in Kentucky and a Comparative Study of State Enabling Legislation, 11 J. Nat. Resources & Envtl. L. 229 (1995-96).

Articles, Tree Preservation Methods: Zoning Regulation vs. Conservation Servitude, 14 J. Nat. Resources & Envtl. L. 253 (1998-99).

Kentucky Law Journal.

Tarlock, Kentucky Planning and Land Use Control Enabling Legislation: An Analysis of the 1966 Revision of KRS Chapter 100, 56 Ky. L.J. 556 (1968).

Schroder, The Preservation of Historical Areas, 62 Ky. L.J. 940 (1973-1974).

Comments, A Challenge to Historic Preservation in Kentucky, 65 Ky. L.J. 895 (1976-77).

Kentucky Law Survey, Griffin and Becker, Zoning, 67 Ky. L.J. 627 (1978-1979).

Note, Historic Preservation — An Individual’s Perspective, 67 Ky. L.J. 1018 (1978-1979).

Article: The Lexington-Fayette Urban County Board of Adjustment: Fifty Years Later, 100 Ky. L.J. 435 (2011/2012).

Northern Kentucky Law Review.

Comments, Planning and Zoning in Kentucky: Who Really Adopts the Comprehensive Plan?, 9 N. Ky. L. Rev. 499 (1982).

ALR

City or town planning ordinances. 12 A.L.R. 679.

Validity of public regulation of garages. 40 A.L.R. 341; 55 A.L.R. 372; 84 A.L.R. 1147.

Validity of statute or ordinance in relation to doors. 53 A.L.R. 920.

Validity of building regulations as against objection of indefiniteness. 140 A.L.R. 1210.

Delegation of legislative authority by zoning ordinance or similar public regulation requiring consent of neighboring property owners to permit or sanction specified uses or construction of buildings. 21 A.L.R.2d 553.

Validity of zoning regulations prohibiting residential use in industrial district. 38 A.L.R.2d 1141.

Validity of zoning regulations with respect to uncertainty and indefiniteness of district boundary lines. 39 A.L.R.2d 766.

Permissible activities under zoning laws permitting greenhouses and nurseries. 40 A.L.R.2d 1459.

What zoning regulations are applicable to territory annexed to a municipality. 41 A.L.R.2d 1463.

Spot zoning. 51 A.L.R.2d 263.

What is a “club” or “clubhouse” within provisions of zoning regulations. 52 A.L.R.2d 1098.

Applicability of zoning regulations to governmental projects or activities. 61 A.L.R.2d 970.

What is a lodging house or boardinghouse within provisions of zoning ordinance or regulation. 64 A.L.R.2d 1167.

Churches, zoning regulations, as affecting. 74 A.L.R.2d 377.

Validity and construction of zoning regulation requiring garage or parking space. 74 A.L.R.2d 418.

Invalid delegation of power by zoning regulations as to gasoline filling stations. 75 A.L.R.2d 168.

Zoning regulations as to shopping centers. 76 A.L.R.2d 1172.

Zoning regulations as forbidding or restricting restaurants, diners, “drive-ins,” or the like. 82 A.L.R.2d 989.

What constitutes “racing” or a “race track” within zoning regulation forbidding such activity. 83 A.L.R.2d 877.

Zoning regulations as applied to dancing schools. 85 A.L.R.2d 1150.

Validity of front setback provisions in zoning ordinance or regulation. 93 A.L.R.2d 1223.

Validity of zoning regulations requiring open side or rear yards. 94 A.L.R.2d 398.

Construction of zoning regulations requiring side or rear yards. 94 A.L.R.2d 419.

Use of trailer or similar structure for residence purposes as within limitation of restrictive covenant, zoning provision, or building regulation. 96 A.L.R.2d 232.

Validity and construction of zoning regulations prescribing a minimum width or frontage for residence lots. 96 A.L.R.2d 1367.

Validity and construction of zoning regulations prescribing maximum percentage of residence lot area which may be occupied by buildings. 96 A.L.R.2d 1396.

Construction and application of terms “agricultural,” “farm,” “farming,” or the like in zoning regulations. 97 A.L.R.2d 702.

Application of zoning requirements to research and laboratory facilities. 98 A.L.R.2d 225.

Imposing restriction as to hours or days of operation of business as condition of allowance of special zoning exception or variance. 99 A.L.R.2d 227.

Validity, construction, and effect of zoning regulations as regards “garden-type apartments” and “row housing.” 99 A.L.R.2d 873.

Construction of provisions precluding sale of intoxicating liquors within specified distance from another establishment selling such liquors. 7 A.L.R.3d 809.

Construction and application of zoning regulations in connection with bomb or fallout shelters. 7 A.L.R.3d 1443.

Zoning as a factor in determination of damages in eminent domain. 9 A.L.R.3d 291.

Prohibiting or regulating removal or exploitation of oil and gas, minerals, soil, or other natural products within municipal limits. 10 A.L.R.3d 1226.

Application of zoning regulations to automatic vending machines. 11 A.L.R.3d 1004.

Meaning of term “garage” as used in zoning regulations. 11 A.L.R.3d 1187.

Aesthetic objectives or considerations as affecting validity of zoning ordinances. 21 A.L.R.3d 1222.

Application of zoning regulations to motor courts or motels. 23 A.L.R.3d 1210.

Construction and effect of zoning provision permitting accessory use for “professional office.” 24 A.L.R.3d 1128.

Application of zoning regulations to college fraternities or sororities. 25 A.L.R.3d 921.

Validity and construction of zoning regulations expressly referring to hospitals, sanitariums, nursing homes. 27 A.L.R.3d 1022.

Meaning of term “hotel” as used in zoning ordinance. 28 A.L.R.3d 1240.

Validity and effect of “interim” zoning ordinance. 30 A.L.R.3d 1196.

Application of zoning regulations to golf courses, swimming pools, tennis courts, or the like. 32 A.L.R.3d 424.

Validity and construction of “zoning with compensation” regulation. 41 A.L.R.3d 636.

Validity and construction of zoning ordinance regulating architectural style or design of structure. 41 A.L.R.3d 1397.

Validity and application of zoning regulations relating to mobile home or trailer parks. 42 A.L.R.3d 598.

Planned-unit, cluster, or greenbelt zoning. 43 A.L.R.3d 888.

Validity and construction of statute or ordinance regulating or prohibiting self-service gasoline filling stations. 46 A.L.R.3d 1393.

Validity, construction, and application of enactments restricting land development by dredging or filling. 46 A.L.R.3d 1422.

Exclusionary zoning. 48 A.L.R.3d 1210.

Buffer provision in zoning ordinance as applicable to abutting land in adjoining municipality. 48 A.L.R.3d 1303.

Retroactive effect of zoning regulation, in absence of saving clause, on validly issued building permit. 49 A.L.R.3d 13.

Zoning provisions protecting landowners who applied for or received building permit prior to change in zoning. 49 A.L.R.3d 1150.

Retroactive effect of zoning regulation in absence of saving clause, on pending application for building permit. 50 A.L.R.3d 596.

Validity, construction, and application of zoning ordinance relating to operation of junkyard or scrap metal processing plant. 50 A.L.R.3d 837.

Validity of ordinance zoning the entire municipality for residential use. 54 A.L.R.3d 1292.

Validity and construction of zoning regulation respecting permissible use as affected by division of lot or parcel by zone boundary line. 58 A.L.R.3d 1241.

Applicability of zoning regulations to waste disposal facilities of state or local governmental entities. 59 A.L.R.3d 1244.

What constitutes “church,” “religious use,” or the like within zoning ordinance. 62 A.L.R.3d 197.

Validity and construction of zoning ordinance requiring developer to devote specified part of development to low and moderate income housing. 62 A.L.R.3d 880.

Validity of zoning ordinance deferring residential development until establishment of public services in area. 63 A.L.R.3d 1184.

What constitutes “school,” “educational use,” or the like within zoning ordinance. 64 A.L.R.3d 1087.

Zoning regulations as applied to colleges, universities, or similar institutions for higher education. 64 A.L.R.3d 1138.

What constitutes a “family” within meaning of zoning regulation or restrictive covenant. 71 A.L.R.3d 693.

Zoning or building regulations as applied to condominiums. 71 A.L.R.3d 866.

Zoning regulations as applied to private and parochial schools below the college level. 74 A.L.R.3d 14.

Zoning regulations as applied to public elementary and high schools. 74 A.L.R.3d 136.

Zoning regulations creating and placing “floating zones.” 80 A.L.R.3d 95.

Application of zoning regulation to radio or television facilities. 81 A.L.R.3d 1086.

Validity of zoning for senior citizen communities. 83 A.L.R.3d 1084.

Zoning regulations as applied to homes or housing for the elderly. 83 A.L.R.3d 1103.

Applicability of zoning regulation to nongovernmental lessee of government-owned property. 84 A.L.R.3d 1187.

Applicability of zoning regulations to projects of nongovernmental public utility as affected by utility’s power of eminent domain. 87 A.L.R.3d 1265.

Construction and application of zoning regulations in connection with funeral homes. 92 A.L.R.3d 328.

Validity of municipality’s ban on construction until public facilities comply with specific standards. 92 A.L.R.3d 1073.

Validity of zoning ordinances prohibiting or regulating outside storage of house trailers, motor homes, campers, vans, and the like, in residential neighborhoods. 95 A.L.R.3d 378.

Zoning regulations in relation to cemeteries. 96 A.L.R.3d 921.

Zoning or licensing regulation prohibiting or restricting location of billiard rooms and bowling alleys. 100 A.L.R.3d 252.

Zoning regulations prohibiting or limiting fences, hedges, or walls. 1 A.L.R.4th 373.

Validity of “war zone” ordinances restricting location of sex-oriented businesses. 1 A.L.R.4th 1297.

Validity and construction of provisions of zoning statute or ordinance regarding protest by neighboring property owners. 7 A.L.R.4th 732.

Validity of zoning or building regulations restricting mobile homes or trailers to established mobile home or trailer parks. 17 A.L.R.4th 106.

Validity and construction of zoning laws setting minimum requirements for floorspace or cubic footage inside residence. 87 A.L.R.4th 294.

Validity of zoning laws setting minimum lot size requirements. 1 A.L.R.5th 622.

100.204. Effect of KRS 100.203.

Nothing in KRS 100.203 shall be deemed to abrogate laws, regulations and ordinances of cities and counties which relate to health, safety and sewage requirements.

History. Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 360, § 2.

100.205. Identical zoning regulations among cities and counties comprising joint planning unit not required.

Except as provided in KRS 100.137(3), nothing contained in this chapter shall be construed or implied as requiring the legislative bodies of cities and counties comprising the same joint planning unit to adopt identical zoning regulations. Nor shall the adoption or amendment of a zoning regulation by the legislative body of any city or county contained within a joint planning unit be made contingent on the adoption or amendment of such zoning regulation by the legislative body of any other city or county within the planning unit.

History. Enact. Acts 1988, ch. 144, § 11, effective July 15, 1988; 2002, ch. 346, § 141, effective July 15, 2002.

100.207. Text and map of zoning regulations — Notice and publication.

  1. Before a city or county enacts zoning regulations, as authorized by KRS 100.201 , the planning commission shall prepare the text and map of all zoning regulations and shall hold at least one (1) public hearing. Notice of the public hearing shall be given in accordance with the provisions of KRS Chapter 424.
  2. Subsequent to the public hearing, the planning commission shall submit, along with their recommendation, a copy of the approved zoning regulation text and map to the various legislative bodies and fiscal courts for adoption. A majority of the entire legislative body or fiscal court shall be required for passage of an ordinance adopting these regulations. Notwithstanding publication requirements, the ordinance by which these regulations are originally adopted may be published by stating the title and general description of the regulations and referring to the place within the unit where a copy of the complete ordinance may be examined without charge.
  3. The procedure for amending the zoning regulation text and map shall be as set forth in KRS 100.211 .

History. Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 31; 1986, ch. 141, § 17, effective July 15, 1986; 1988, ch. 19, § 1, effective July 15, 1988.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Statement of Objectives.

In light of the requirement of KRS 100.193 that the statement of objectives and principles be adopted by the legislative bodies and fiscal courts in the planning unit as a prerequisite to preparation and adoption of the remaining elements of a comprehensive plan, this section and KRS 100.201 provide no authority for any sort of zoning unless such a statement has been so adopted. Daviess County v. Snyder, 556 S.W.2d 688, 1977 Ky. LEXIS 528 ( Ky. 1977 ).

2. Interim Zoning Ordinances.

Where the counties and cities in a planning unit had not adopted a statement of principles and objectives, there was no authority for the enactment of an interim zoning ordinance establishing zoning classifications, which were therefore invalid, and a landowner needed no approval by the fiscal court or the planning commission to convert his property from agricultural to residential use. Daviess County v. Snyder, 556 S.W.2d 688, 1977 Ky. LEXIS 528 ( Ky. 1977 ).

3. Duties of Legislative Body.

In the zoning function of the legislative body, its duties and functions are as follows: to approve, amend, or reject the statement of goals and objectives prepared by the planning commission and to adopt zoning regulations after the planning commission has adopted objectives and the land use plan elements. Lakeside Park v. Quinn, 672 S.W.2d 666, 1984 Ky. LEXIS 258 ( Ky. 1984 ).

4. Adoption as Acceptance of Dedication.

Adoption, by ordinance, of official map, constituted acceptance of dedication of streets shown as city streets on the map. Sullivan v. Louisville, 291 Ky. 60 , 163 S.W.2d 17, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 167 ( Ky. 1942 ) (decided under prior law).

5. Judicial Review.

Where the local zoning ordinance does not contain any time limitations on zoning map amendment applications as authorized by KRS 100.213(2), and the lower courts denied the subsequent petitions on res judicata grounds, adopting the doctrine of res judicata is not appropriate because res judicata is a judicial doctrine, while rezoning is a legislative function. While res judicata may apply to subsequent litigation(s) of a zone change application, it does not, nor can it apply to a subsequent zone change map amendment application. Hume v. Franklin County Fiscal Court, 276 S.W.3d 748, 2008 Ky. LEXIS 201 ( Ky. 2008 ).

Cited:

Sebastian-Voor Props., LLC v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Gov’t, — S.W.3d —, 2008 Ky. LEXIS 39 ( Ky. 2008 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

The legislative body or the fiscal court is authorized to override the planning commission’s approval or disapproval of an amendment to a zoning regulation. OAG 67-151 .

A city board of commissioners does not have the power to approve or disapprove an application for an alteration or change in a zoning and map regulation without the consent or approval of the planning and zoning commission. OAG 68-482 .

Public hearings for a zoning change must be conducted by the planning commission rather than the city legislative body. OAG 68-482 .

To pass zoning regulation changes requires a majority vote of the entire fiscal court under this section and KRS 100.211 rather than a majority of a quorum under KRS subsection (3) of 67.040 . OAG 68-524 .

The planning commission may recommend zoning regulations, including the text and map, without having first completed the research requirements of KRS 100.191 for the entire comprehensive plan of KRS 100.187 . OAG 68-558 .

A municipality can adopt by ordinance a zoning map, recommended by a joint city-county planning commission although the map is at variance with a land use plan previously adopted provided the map and ordinance are in basic harmony with the land use plan and provided that the material variance with the land use plan would not result in an arbitrary, unreasonable or discriminatory exercise of the zoning power. OAG 68-558 .

The zoning function must be exercised, if at all, by the legislative bodies of the city and county independently within their respective territorial jurisdictions. OAG 69-177 .

Although zoning regulations may be published pursuant to this section by simply stating their title and general description, an ordinance embracing the comprehensive planning and zoning program of a city including the zoning regulations should be published in full. OAG 70-741 .

Joint planning commission could adopt a bylaw pursuant to KRS 100.167 requiring the publication of subdivision regulations pursuant to this section in spite of the fact that no specific requirement under KRS Chapter 100 calls for the publication of subdivision regulations. OAG 72-42 .

Given the exception as to full publication of zoning regulations contained in this section it would not be necessary to publish the full text of zoning regulations adopted by a city. OAG 72-241 .

Where it appears necessary for a city to make a major change in its zoning map and regulations it can repeal them and enact an entirely new zoning map and regulations as authorized under this section thereby avoiding the expense of notifying each affected property owner as required by KRS 100.212 which is apparently designed to cover individual zoning changes or proposed amendments. OAG 74-513 .

The full text of a proposed zoning ordinance need not be published as this section provides an exception to the normal publication requirements for ordinances in KRS 424.130 . OAG 75-141 modifying OAG 75-121 .

Decisions on land use and objectives are under the authority of the joint city-county planning commission regardless of the location of the land; however, any proposed changes in the zoning or subdivision regulations must be approved by the appropriate city or county legislative body. OAG 76-108 .

Where a major change in zoning regulations and map amendments is involved, the notice requirements found under either this section or KRS 100.211 would be sufficient, which means that notice prior to the hearing must be given pursuant to KRS Chapter 424. OAG 78-137 .

Where a community belonging to a joint city-county planning commission held all required public hearings prior to adoption of a zoning ordinance and official map, in absence of any statutory time limitation between the public hearing conducted by the joint city-county planning commission and consideration and adoption or rejection of the recommendations of said commission by the legislative body, the city council could review and act upon such recommendations even though there existed a lapse in time of some eight months between said hearings and the city’s consideration of the commission’s recommendations. OAG 78-287 .

The fact that a city had apparently complied with the requirements of this chapter, particularly KRS 100.133 , 100.217 and this section clearly indicated that the city continued to have the legal authority to plan and zone in spite of the fact that the commission created in 1968 had been dormant for a period of time and no updating of the comprehensive plan or zoning ordinance had taken place for some time. OAG 78-356 .

Where there is a major change in zoning regulations and map amendments, the notice requirements under either this section or KRS 100.211 would be sufficient. OAG 78-788 .

Where there is a major change in zoning regulations and map amendments the notice requirements under either this section or KRS 100.211 would be sufficient. OAG 79-310 .

Where developer sought and had approved by the city council a subdivision plat reserving 2.5 acres for commercial use in 1969, and where the council, in 1974, adopted a comprehensive plan zoning the entire platted areas as residential the city’s zoning ordinance controlled over the earlier approval of the subdivision plat. OAG 79-549 .

Where a zoning ordinance dealing with zoning regulations under this section and KRS 100.211 is involved, those zoning statutes would take precedent over the general publication requirement of KRS 83A.060(9) under the rule of statutory construction that a specific statute on the subject controls a more general statute; thus, a zoning ordinance dealing with zoning regulations need only be published by title and general description. OAG 80-498 .

If the zoning map draft does not reflect the duly adopted and updated zoning regulations by reason of a mechanical error or a mistake on the part of the drafters and such mistake is thus reflected in the enacted ordinance, the zoning map could be corrected by the legislative body simply amending the zoning ordinance pursuant to KRS 83A.060 . OAG 83-348 .

To correct a simple mechanical error in drafting the zoning map to conform with the enacted regulations would not necessitate going through the zoning amendment procedure since the zoning regulations apart from the map mistake would not be affected and going through such a procedure would serve no valid purpose; the erroneously drawn map would probably not be enforceable against any affected property owners and the city should proceed to immediately correct the mechanical errors in the zoning ordinance by amendment to avoid possible litigation. OAG 83-348 .

The publication requirements under KRS 83A.060(9) prevail over those requirements found under this section since zoning regulations adopted by the legislative body of the city under this section represent the official action of the legislative body and are of a general and permanent nature and, consequently, must be enacted by ordinance, and since all ordinances enacted by the legislative body, including ordinances relating to zoning, must be published as required by KRS 83A.060(9) which was amended in 1982 to specifically apply to zoning ordinances and which controls as being the later statute. OAG 84-72 .

The requirement of KRS 83A.060 that ordinances that include descriptions of real property may include a sketch, drawing or map, etc., in lieu of metes and bounds descriptions does not apply to the publication of zoning regulations, but only applies where an ordinance specifically describes a piece of real estate; a reference in the summary of the ordinance to the zoning map on file in the clerk’s office would be sufficient. OAG 84-72 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Publication of ordinances, KRS 83A.060 .

Kentucky Law Journal.

Tarlock, Kentucky Planning and Land Use Control Enabling Legislation: An Analysis of the 1966 Revision of KRS Chapter 100, 56 Ky. L.J. 556 (1968).

Kentucky Law Survey, Griffin and Becker, Zoning, 67 Ky. L.J. 627 (1978-1979).

Kentucky Law Survey, Bratt and Brown, Environmental Law, 70 Ky. L.J. 455 (1981-82).

Northern Kentucky Law Review.

Comments, Planning and Zoning in Kentucky: Who Really Adopts the Comprehensive Plan?, 9 N. Ky. L. Rev. 499 (1982).

ALR

101A C.J.S, Zoning and Land Planning, §§ 12-17.

Motive of member of municipal authority approving or adopting zoning ordinance or regulation as affecting its validity. 71 A.L.R.2d 568.

100.208. Transferable development rights.

  1. Any city, county, consolidated local government, or urban-county government which is part of a planning unit may provide, by ordinance, for:
    1. The voluntary transfer of the development rights permitted on one (1) parcel of land to another parcel of land;
    2. Restricting or prohibiting further development of the parcel from which development rights are transferred; and
    3. Increasing the density or intensity of development of the parcel to which such rights are transferred.
  2. The ordinance shall designate and show on the zoning map areas from which development rights may be transferred and areas to which such rights may be transferred and used for development. These zones may be designated as separate use districts or as overlaying other zoning districts.
  3. Any city within a county that adopts an ordinance providing for the transfer of development rights, may also adopt a transfer of development rights ordinance, and the county and city by adoption of mutual provisions may provide for the transfer of development rights on land located in one to land located in another.
  4. “Transferable development rights” means an interest in real property that constitutes the right to develop and use property under the zoning ordinance which is made severable from the parcel to which the interest is appurtenant and transferable to another parcel of land for development and use in accordance with the zoning ordinance. Transferable development rights may be transferred by deed from the owner of the parcel from which the development rights are derived and upon the transfer shall vest in the grantee and be freely alienable. The zoning ordinance may provide for the method of transfer of these rights and may provide for the granting of easements and reasonable regulations to effect and control transfers and assure compliance with the provisions of the ordinance.

History. Enact. Acts 1990, ch. 286, § 1, effective July 13, 1990; 2002, ch. 346, § 142, effective July 15, 2002.

100.209. Amendment of comprehensive plan prior to annexation permitted — Land use management regulation in newly annexed or reclassified territory.

  1. When a city which has adopted zoning or other land use regulations pursuant to this chapter proposes to annex unincorporated or accept the transfer of incorporated territory, it may amend its comprehensive plan and official zoning map to incorporate and establish zoning or other land use regulations for the property proposed for annexation or transfer prior to adoption of the ordinance of annexation or transfer. If the city elects to follow this procedure, the planning commission shall hold a public hearing, after the adoption of the ordinance stating the city’s intention to annex or transfer property and prior to final action upon the ordinance of annexation or transfer, for the purpose of adopting the comprehensive plan amendment and making its recommendations as to the zoning or other land use regulations which will be effective for the property upon its annexation or transfer. Notice setting forth the time, date, location, and purpose of the public hearing shall be published as required by KRS Chapter 424 and shall be given to the owners of all properties within the area proposed for annexation or transfer and to adjoining property owners in accordance with KRS 100.212(2). The city legislative body shall take final action upon the planning commission’s recommendations prior to adoption of the ordinance of annexation or transfer and shall include in the ordinance of annexation or transfer a map showing the zoning or other land use regulations which will be effective for the annexed or transferred property. If the city elects not to follow the procedure provided for in this section prior to the adoption of the ordinance of annexation or transfer, the newly annexed or transferred territory shall remain subject to the same land use restrictions, if any, as applied to it prior to annexation or transfer until those restrictions are changed by zoning map amendments or other regulations in accordance with this chapter.
  2. When a city is created or when a city that does not regulate land use within the confines of the city equals or exceeds a population of three thousand (3,000) based upon the most recent federal decennial census in a county containing a consolidated local government, and that city intends to regulate land use within the confines of the city, the process for adopting or amending the comprehensive plan and adopting zoning or other land use regulations shall be as provided for in this chapter. Until such actions have been taken, the properties within the city shall remain subject to the land use restrictions, if any, as applied prior to the city’s creation or the city’s exceeding of the population threshold set out in this subsection.

History. Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 141, § 18, effective July 15, 1986; 1990, ch. 362, § 4, effective July 13, 1990; 1992, ch. 17, § 6, effective February 28, 1992; 2002, ch. 346, § 143, effective July 15, 2002; 2014, ch. 92, § 192, effective January 1, 2015.

100.210. Powers of board of adjustment and appeals. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3037h-122) was repealed by Acts 1942, ch. 176, § 17.

100.211. Procedure for amending zoning map and text of regulation — Notice — Hearing — Time limit for final action.

  1. For the purposes of this section, “administratively complete” means that a proposal for a zoning map amendment is accurate and complete by meeting all the applicable requirements of this chapter and any other applicable administrative regulatory requirements or approvals formally required by the local legislative body or applicable state law.
    1. A proposal for a zoning map amendment may originate with the planning commission of the unit, with any fiscal court or legislative body which is a member of the unit, or with an owner of the property in question. (2) (a) A proposal for a zoning map amendment may originate with the planning commission of the unit, with any fiscal court or legislative body which is a member of the unit, or with an owner of the property in question.
    2. The proposed amendment shall be referred to the planning commission before adoption. The planning commission shall:
      1. Hold at least one (1) public hearing after notice as required by this chapter; and
      2. Make findings of fact and a recommendation of approval or disapproval of the proposed map amendment to the various legislative bodies or fiscal courts involved.
      1. The planning commission shall make its recommendation within sixty (60) days of the date of the receipt of the administratively complete proposed amendment. (c) 1. The planning commission shall make its recommendation within sixty (60) days of the date of the receipt of the administratively complete proposed amendment.
      2. The originator of the proposed map amendment may waive the sixty (60) day requirement for the recommendation.
      3. If the planning commission fails to make a recommendation upon the proposal within sixty (60) days of its receipt of the administratively complete proposed amendment and the time has not been waived by the originator, the application shall be forwarded to the fiscal court or legislative body without a recommendation of approval or disapproval.
    3. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (c) of this subsection:
      1. The planning commission of a consolidated local government shall make its recommendation within one hundred twenty (120) days of the date of the receipt of the administratively complete proposed amendment;
      2. The originator of the proposed map amendment may waive the one hundred twenty (120) day requirement for the recommendation; and
      3. If the planning commission of a consolidated local government fails to make a recommendation upon the proposal within one hundred twenty (120) days of its receipt of the administratively complete proposed amendment, and the time has not been waived by the originator, the application shall be forwarded to the legislative body of the consolidated local government without a recommendation of approval or disapproval.
    4. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (c) of this subsection:
      1. The legislative body of the jurisdiction that created the planning commission may, via ordinance, extend the provisions of paragraph (c) of this subsection to either ninety (90) or one hundred twenty (120) days; or
      2. The legislative bodies which are members of a joint planning commission may, via ordinances passed separately, extend the provisions of paragraph (c) of this subsection to either ninety (90) or one hundred twenty (120) days.
    5. The findings of fact and recommendation shall include a summary of the evidence and testimony presented by the proponents and opponents of the proposed amendment.
    6. A tie vote shall be subject to further consideration by the planning commission for a period not to exceed thirty (30) days, at the end of which, if the tie has not been broken, the application shall be forwarded to the fiscal court or legislative body without a recommendation of approval or disapproval.
    7. It shall take a majority of the entire legislative body or fiscal court to override the recommendation of the planning commission and it shall take a majority of the entire legislative body or fiscal court to adopt a zoning map amendment whenever the planning commission forwards the application to the fiscal court or legislative body without a recommendation of approval or disapproval due to a tie vote.
    8. Unless a majority of the entire legislative body or fiscal court votes to override the planning commission’s recommendation, such recommendation shall become final and effective and if a recommendation of approval was made by the planning commission, the ordinance of the fiscal court or legislative body adopting the zoning map amendment shall be deemed to have passed by operation of law.
  2. A proposal to amend the text of any zoning regulation which must be voted upon by the legislative body or fiscal court may originate with the planning commission of the unit or with any fiscal court or legislative body which is a member of the unit. Regardless of the origin of the proposed amendment, it shall be referred to the planning commission before adoption. The planning commission shall hold at least one (1) public hearing after notice as required by KRS Chapter 424 and make a recommendation as to the text of the amendment and whether the amendment shall be approved or disapproved and shall state the reasons for its recommendation. In the case of a proposed amendment originating with a legislative body or fiscal court, the planning commission shall make its recommendation within sixty (60) days of the date of its receipt of the proposed amendment. It shall take an affirmative vote of a majority of the fiscal court or legislative body to adopt the proposed amendment.
  3. Procedures prescribed in KRS 100.207 applicable to the publication of notice also shall apply to any proposed amendment to a zoning regulation text or map; provided that:
    1. Any published notice shall include the street address of the property in question, or if one is not available or practicable due to the number of addresses involved, a geographic description sufficient to locate and identify the property, and the names of two (2) streets on either side of the property which intersect the street on which the property is located; and
    2. When the property in question is located at the intersection of two (2) streets, the notice shall designate the intersection by name of both streets rather than name the two (2) streets on either side of the property.
  4. When a property owner proposes to amend the zoning map of any planning unit other than a planning unit containing a city of the first class or a consolidated local government, the provisions of KRS 100.212 shall apply in addition to the requirements and procedures prescribed in subsection (4) of this section.
  5. When a property owner proposes to amend the zoning map of any planning unit comprising any portion of a county containing a city of the first class or a consolidated local government, the provisions of KRS 100.214 shall apply in addition to the requirements and procedures prescribed in subsection (4) of this section.
  6. In addition to the public notice requirements prescribed in subsection (4) of this section, when the planning commission, fiscal court, or legislative body of any planning unit originates a proposal to amend the zoning map of that unit, notice of the public hearing before the planning commission, fiscal court, or legislative body shall be given at least thirty (30) days in advance of the hearing by first-class mail to an owner of every parcel of property the classification of which is proposed to be changed. Records by the property valuation administrator may be relied upon to determine the identity and address of said owner.
  7. The fiscal court or legislative body shall take final action upon a proposed zoning map amendment within ninety (90) days of the date upon which the planning commission takes its final action upon such proposal.

History. Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 32, 33; 1978, ch. 327, § 1, effective June 17, 1978; 1986, ch. 134, § 2, effective July 15, 1986; 1986, ch. 141, § 19, effective July 15, 1986; 1988, ch. 19, § 2, effective July 15, 1988; 1988, ch. 144, § 9, effective July 15, 1988; 1990, ch. 362, § 15, effective July 13, 1990; 2002, ch. 346, § 144, effective July 15, 2002; 2014, ch. 113, § 1, effective July 15, 2014.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

Legislature may permissibly delegate zoning authority to local legislative bodies, where such delegation is for a limited period of time, such as the 90-day period in this section. Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan Soc'y v. Albert Oil Co., 969 S.W.2d 691, 1998 Ky. LEXIS 62 ( Ky. 1998 ).

2. Zoning Change after Amendment.

It is not arbitrary for the city commission to reconsider a zoning change which has previously been denied particularly since there has been a drastic change in the zoning laws in the interim between the two applications. Johnson v. Lagrew, 447 S.W.2d 98, 1969 Ky. LEXIS 74 ( Ky. 1969 ).

Affirmation of zoning board’s rejection of developer’s application for a zone map or text amendment pursuant to KRS 100.211 was not arbitrary or clearly erroneous. It was foreseeable that, during developers’ four-decade delay in completing its subdivision development, zoning laws would have changed, past improper approval did not bind the current board, and equitable estoppel did not apply. Sebastian-Voor Props., LLC v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Gov't, 265 S.W.3d 190, 2008 Ky. LEXIS 301 ( Ky. 2008 ).

3. Procedural Requirements.

After a property owner has received a hearing before the zoning commission, this section makes it clear that the legislative body is then acting in an adjudicatory fashion when it considers the zoning commission’s recommendation, so that the legislative body must follow due process requirements by acting on the basis of a record and on the basis of substantial evidence. Louisville v. McDonald, 470 S.W.2d 173, 1971 Ky. LEXIS 268 ( Ky. 1971 ).

The zoning commission is required by this section to hold at least one public hearing after notice and then make recommendations to the legislative body concerning the rezoning; it will then take a majority of the entire legislative body to override the recommendation of the zoning commission. Louisville v. McDonald, 470 S.W.2d 173, 1971 Ky. LEXIS 268 ( Ky. 1971 ).

Trial court erred in holding that property was not subject to a multifamily development restriction where, in adopting the relied-upon ordinance, the city commission neither adopted the planning commission’s recommendation, overrode the planning commission’s recommendation, nor made separate findings of fact rejecting the land use restriction, and thus, the planning commission’s recommendation became effective as a matter of law and the subject property had been rezoned with a restriction on multifamily development. City of Richmond v. Spangler Apts., LLC, 547 S.W.3d 556, 2018 Ky. App. LEXIS 114 (Ky. Ct. App. 2018).

4. Conflict with County Charters.

Insofar as a county charter purported to modify the criteria of subsection (1) of this section, it represented an attempted usurpation of the legislative power of the General Assembly, offending Const., § 29. Hacker v. Baesler, 812 S.W.2d 706, 1991 Ky. LEXIS 45 ( Ky. 1991 ), modified, 1991 Ky. LEXIS 130 (Ky. Aug. 29, 1991).

5. Final Action.

It is apparent that the General Assembly intended that an ordinance adopting a zoning amendment, enacted pursuant to this section, is final and effective, subject only to judicial review pursuant to KRS 100.347(3) and the statutory procedure does not contemplate that the ordinance is subject to veto. Hacker v. Baesler, 812 S.W.2d 706, 1991 Ky. LEXIS 45 ( Ky. 1991 ), modified, 1991 Ky. LEXIS 130 (Ky. Aug. 29, 1991).

If the majority of the entire legislative body votes to override the recommendation of the planning commission, under subsection (1) of this section, a timely expression of its action in the form of a resolution is sufficient and an ordinance is not required. City of Lyndon v. Proud, 898 S.W.2d 534, 1995 Ky. App. LEXIS 105 (Ky. Ct. App. 1995).

6. Voting by Planning Commission.

Kentucky courts for years have followed the rule that members of legislative and administrative bodies who are present at a meeting, but who do not vote on a proposition, are counted with the majority vote of those members present and voting; therefore, it was clear that the 4-3 vote of the fiscal court constituted a majority of those present and voting in favor of the motion to override the planning commission’s recommendation and, furthermore, county judge who did not vote must also be counted with the majority, making it five (5) votes, and a clear majority of the nine-member fiscal court. Hunters Ridge Homeowners Ass'n v. Hicks, 818 S.W.2d 623, 1991 Ky. App. LEXIS 135 (Ky. Ct. App. 1991).

7. Findings of Fact and Recommendation.

Planning Commission did not fail to set forth findings of fact as provided in this section where the minutes of the Commission’s meeting were replete with findings and explanations showing compliance with the Commission’s guidelines. Where minutes comprised some nine (9) single-spaced pages setting forth facts and summarizing the evidence supporting the commission’s recommendations, there was certainly substantial evidence in the record to support the Commission’s recommendations. Minton v. Fiscal Court of Jefferson County, 850 S.W.2d 52, 1992 Ky. App. LEXIS 197 (Ky. Ct. App. 1992).

8. Vote of Legislative Body.
9. — Majority.

Change in zoning recommended by planning commission was not overruled by 12-member city council because a six (6) to five (5) vote did not satisfy required majority of entire legislative body as required by subsection (1) of this section. City of Glasgow by & Through Glasgow Common Council v. Holmes, 885 S.W.2d 957, 1994 Ky. App. LEXIS 133 (Ky. Ct. App. 1994).

Where a mayor’s general power to cast a tie-breaking vote under KRS 83A.130(5) did not prevail over the explicit language of KRS 100.211(1), a county planning commission was “aggrieved” pursuant to KRS 100.337 and 100.347 when its decision to deny a zoning application was not followed. Chandler v. Bullitt County Joint Planning Comm'n, 125 S.W.3d 851, 2002 Ky. App. LEXIS 2358 (Ky. Ct. App. 2002).

10. — 90-Day Limit.

The 90-day period during which, pursuant to this section, a local legislative body or fiscal court must take final action on a planning and zoning commission recommendation regarding a proposed zoning map, is mandatory. Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan Soc'y v. Albert Oil Co., 969 S.W.2d 691, 1998 Ky. LEXIS 62 ( Ky. 1998 ).

The 90-day limit contained in subsection (7) of this section is mandatory and cannot be waived. Nicholasville Rd. Neighborhood Consortium v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Gov't, 994 S.W.2d 521, 1999 Ky. App. LEXIS 68 (Ky. Ct. App. 1999).

11. Relation to General Welfare.

An amendment to zoning law rezoning the highest type residential property to “neighborhood business purposes” was invalid since special benefits were being conferred which were not related to the general welfare of the entire community and which were detrimental to those who resided around the rezoned area. Mathis v. Hannan, 306 S.W.2d 278, 1957 Ky. LEXIS 34 ( Ky. 1957 ) (decided under prior law).

12. Correction of Classification.

Where a particular piece of ground was improperly classified during the original zoning, classification may be corrected by subsequent action without showing a change of condition. Mathis v. Hannan, 306 S.W.2d 278, 1957 Ky. LEXIS 34 ( Ky. 1957 ) (decided under prior law).

13. Spot Zoning.

Commissioners of a city of the second class could not “spot zone” without showing a change of condition although they might, from time to time, have changed the comprehensive plan without showing a change of condition. Mathis v. Hannan, 306 S.W.2d 278, 1957 Ky. LEXIS 34 ( Ky. 1957 ) (decided under prior law).

14. Rezoning.

The effect of zoning change on value of neighboring property was one factor that might have been taken into consideration in determining reasonableness of change, but it was only one factor and mere fact, standing alone, that neighboring property might have been decreased in value was not ground for invalidating change as arbitrary and capricious. Pierson Trapp Co. v. Peak, 340 S.W.2d 456, 1960 Ky. LEXIS 42 ( Ky. 1960 ) (decided under prior law).

What sewage facilities would have been provided for particular structure that eventually might have been erected on land was not proper factor for consideration in determining whether there should have been change of zoning classification, thus allegation of complaint that commission did not require the owners of the rezoned tract to make adequate provision for disposal of sewage but permitted them to furnish bond to guarantee that there would be adequate disposal did not state claim on which relief could have been granted. Pierson Trapp Co. v. Peak, 340 S.W.2d 456, 1960 Ky. LEXIS 42 ( Ky. 1960 ) (decided under prior law).

Where the local zoning ordinance does not contain any time limitations on zoning map amendment applications as authorized by KRS 100.213(2), and the lower courts denied the subsequent petitions on res judicata grounds, adopting the doctrine of res judicata is not appropriate because res judicata is a judicial doctrine, while rezoning is a legislative function. While res judicata may apply to subsequent litigation(s) of a zone change application, it does not, nor can it apply to a subsequent zone change map amendment application. Hume v. Franklin County Fiscal Court, 276 S.W.3d 748, 2008 Ky. LEXIS 201 ( Ky. 2008 ).

15. Reclassification.

Where commercial structures were on opposite side of road and on same side of road to the west of land in dispute, and such land was unsuitable for residential purposes, maintenance of its single residence classification and rejection of its reclassification as commercial was not warranted as promoting the common good or general welfare of the community and zoning commission would be ordered to reclassify the land as commercial. Hamilton Co. v. Louisville & Jefferson County Planning & Z. Com., 287 S.W.2d 434, 1955 Ky. LEXIS 115 ( Ky. 1955 ) (decided under prior law).

When an application was made for reclassification of tract of land from one zone to another, there was presumption that zones established by original zoning ordinance were well planned and arranged and were intended to have been more or less permanent, subject to change only when there were genuine changes in conditions. Hodge v. Luckett, 357 S.W.2d 303, 1962 Ky. LEXIS 111 ( Ky. 1962 ).

Cited:

Hines v. Pinchback--Halloran Volkswagen, Inc., 513 S.W.2d 492, 1974 Ky. LEXIS 374 ( Ky. 1974 ); Wolf Pen Preservation Ass’n v. Louisville & Jefferson County Planning Comm’n, 942 S.W.2d 310, 1997 Ky. App. LEXIS 29 (Ky. Ct. App. 1997); Brownsboro Rd. Area Def., Inc. v. McClure, — S.W.3d —, 2004 Ky. App. LEXIS 77 (Ky. Ct. App. 2004).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Filing an application seeking a zoning reclassification or change would constitute the beginning of “proceedings.” OAG 66-394 .

Regardless of the planning commission’s recommendation the city legislative body is authorized by a majority vote to override such recommendation and proceed to either adopt or reject the proposed change. OAG 67-129 .

The legislative body or the fiscal court is authorized to override the planning commission’s approval or disapproval of an amendment to a zoning regulation. OAG 67-1511 .

A city board of commissioners does not have the power to approve or disapprove an application for an alteration or change in a zoning and map regulation without the consent or approval of the planning and zoning commission. OAG 68-482 .

Public hearings for a zoning change must be conducted by the planning commission rather than the city legislative body. OAG 68-482 .

To pass zoning regulation changes requires a majority vote of the entire fiscal court under KRS 100.207 and this section. OAG 68-524 .

Where the planning commission makes a recommendation to the respective legislative body on a proposed zoning change or amendment to the zoning ordinance and the legislative body disagrees with the planning commission’s recommendation, an affected landowner can seek a judicial review of the legislative body’s action on the proposed zoning change for arbitrariness. OAG 73-392 .

Hearing must be held on proposed amendment to zoning regulation at which testimony is taken from sworn witnesses, transcript is prepared and commission makes specific, written findings of fact with order based on evidence presented which is presented on appeal for judicial review. OAG 73-729 .

An application to a city of the third class for a zoning change from residential R-1 to residential R-2 for the purpose of placing a trailer court in the area calls for an amendment to the zoning regulation which is governed by this section. OAG 74-324 .

The fiscal court has the power to overrule the denial of a change of zoning by the planning and zoning commission. OAG 74-334 .

The rezoning of property from residential “1” to part industrial “2” and part commercial would be “spot” zoning which is generally disallowed by the courts. OAG 74-334 .

The fiscal court has the power only to change the zoning classification under this section and no authority to impose use restrictions on the property as a use restriction would probably come under the category of a conditional use permit over which the board of adjustment has jurisdiction pursuant to KRS 100.237 . OAG 74-334 .

Appropriate parties in zoning appeals from the fiscal to the Circuit Court generally must be those aggrieved by the decision by reason of its adverse effect upon their property rights and the planning and zoning commission would not fall in this category. OAG 74-334 .

Planning commission action of denying a request for a zoning change of one half of an old school building to commercial and the remaining one half to residential in an area presently zoned residential was reasonable where the existing zoning regulation required that a commercial building be set back 25 feet from any residential property line and the proposed change could not meet such requirement. OAG 75-133 .

The fiscal court in dealing with modular homes in a zoning frame would necessarily treat the subject in the form of zoning regulations; thus the fiscal court can amend the regulations on its own initiative, under this section, if it desires to correct the subject definition now contained in its zoning regulations so as to eliminate the idea that a modular home is included in the definition of a mobile home and in this manner the corrected regulation would be consistent with statutory definitions of a mobile home in KRS 219.320 . OAG 75-249 .

The hearing before a planning commission on a rezoning application must be a trial-type due process hearing, which includes the taking and weighing of offered evidence, a finding of fact based upon a consideration of the evidence and conclusions supported by substantial evidence. OAG 77-617 .

The fiscal court may not remove a zoning change request from the planning commission before it has an opportunity to make its recommendation unless possibly the commission fails to act within the 60-day provision found in KRS 100.321 (now repealed). OAG 77-766 .

Where a major change in zoning regulations and map amendments is involved, the notice requirements found under either KRS 100.207 or this section would be sufficient which means that notice prior to the hearing must be given pursuant to KRS Chapter 424. OAG 78-137 .

The fact that KRS 100.321 (now repealed) only mentions the “overriding” of a “disapproved” zoning change by the commission is of no significance in the legislative body’s right to override an “approved” zoning change in light of existing case law and the specific authority to do so given it in this section which must be read in conjunction with KRS 100.321 (now repealed). OAG 78-722 .

Where there is a major change in zoning regulations and map amendments, the notice requirements under either KRS 100.207 or this section would be sufficient. OAG 78-788 .

The action of a city council in its failure to approve a proposed change by a majority vote, when it cast a three to three vote, negated the planning commission’s recommendation thereby denying the rezoning petition request. OAG 78-826 .

A hearing under this section must be a trial-type hearing which requires that witnesses must testify under oath administered by a notary or some other officer authorized by law to administer same; a transcript of the testimony must be made and the commission must make a finding of fact in writing based upon the evidence and must issue an order based on same, to permit a judicial review of the commission’s action. OAG 79-114 .

This section and KRS 100.212 must be read together and embrace all proposed zoning amendments regardless of whether they involve a single piece of property or a part of the text of the zoning ordinance. OAG 79-310 .

Where there is a major change in zoning regulations and map amendments the notice requirements under either KRS 100.207 or this section would be sufficient. OAG 79-310 .

Where developer sought and had approved by the city council a subdivision plat reserving 2.5 acres for commercial use in 1969, and where the council, in 1974, adopted a comprehensive plan zoning the entire platted area as residential, the city’s zoning ordinance controlled over the earlier approval of the subdivision plat. OAG 79-549 .

If the planning and zoning commission conducted a trial-type of due process hearing and, based thereon, made factual findings supported by the evidence contained in the record, the legislative body could follow the commission’s recommendation without a hearing or only an argument-type of hearing. OAG 79-557 .

If the planning commission itself originates a proposed change, it can, following the required hearing, change its recommendation to the legislative body in a way that is in complete variance with the original proposal, but where a proposed change is made by a property owner, the zoning commission, pursuant to a fact finding hearing, must either recommend that the proposed change be adopted or denied in whole or in part. OAG 79-621 .

Where a fiscal court is reviewing proposed zoning changes recommended by the planning commission pursuant to a trial-type hearing as required under KRS 100.211 to 100.214 , the fiscal court may hear and consider additional testimony in a trial-type hearing of its own if it feels the evidence submitted at the previous hearing before the commission is not sufficient. OAG 80-244 .

The transcript of a hearing held under this section in connection with a proposed zoning change does not have to be a verbatim transcript of all the testimony given at the hearing; the transcript need only reflect the essential substance of the testimony that adequately reflects the elements necessary for judicial review. OAG 80-262 .

Where a zoning ordinance dealing with zoning regulations under KRS 100.207 and this section is involved, those zoning statutes would take precedent over the general publication requirement of KRS 83A.060(9) under the rule of statutory construction that a specific statute on the subject controls a more general statute; thus, a zoning ordinance dealing with zoning regulations need only be published by title and general description. OAG 80-498 .

Although KRS 67.075 et seq. requires a vote of a majority of the fiscal court to pass a zoning ordinance, the provisions of this section, which require a majority of the fiscal court to override the recommendation of a planning commission, would apply where there is a deadlock of the fiscal court in voting on a zoning amendment recommended by the planning commission, since these sections are in pari materia, and thus, where there is a tie vote on a proposed zoning amendment, such tie vote does not result in a silent or constructive approval or enactment of the amendment. OAG 81-199 .

The mayor of a fifth-class city organized under the mayor-council form of government may, pursuant to subsection (5) of KRS 83A.130 , vote to break a tie vote of the council in order to create the majority required by this section, which is necessary to override the recommendation of the planning commission to disapprove a proposed zoning change. OAG 81-317 .

The individual notice requirement of KRS 100.212 was designed for the purpose of notifying adjacent property owners of a proposed individual zoning change made by a property owner, the legislative body or the planning commission; however, where there is a general zoning revision of the zoning text and map involved, general publication of the notice of the hearing, as required by this section, would constitute sufficient notice and individual notification of adjacent property owners would not be necessary. OAG 82-84 .

An individual who merely holds an option to purchase a piece of property, cannot qualify as a “property owner” and therefore cannot make application for a zoning change under the terms of this section; neither could a person holding a contract to purchase the property make such an application since the contract itself does not vest title to the property in the person until it is fulfilled and the property transferred by appropriate deed. OAG 83-30 .

An affected property owner is the proper person to raise the question concerning the validity of the fiscal court’s action in altering the planning commission’s rezoning proposal by appeal from the fiscal court’s decision. The zoning enforcement officer would have no responsibility in this regard. OAG 83-180 .

The fiscal court has the right to approve, alter or reject a zoning change recommendation made by the planning commission, but it must make findings of facts either supported by the record at the initial hearing conducted by the commission or supported by the record compiled at a trial-type hearing held by the court itself. OAG 83-180 .

There is no direct or implied directive in this section that all zoning proposals go initially to the legislative body for any purpose. OAG 83-275 .

KRS 100.321 (renumbered as KRS 100.215 and subsequently repealed in 1988) must be read in conjunction with this section and simply amplifies the fact that before any legislative body can make a zoning change such proposals must first be referred to the commission for review. KRS 100.321 (renumbered as KRS 100.215 and subsequently repealed in 1988) does not require all proposed changes be initially referred to the legislative body and there appears to be no case law so indicating. OAG 83-275 .

If the zoning map draft does not reflect the duly adopted and updated zoning regulations by reason of a mechanical error or a mistake on the part of the drafters and such mistake is thus reflected in the enacted ordinance, the zoning map could be corrected by the legislative body simply amending the zoning ordinance pursuant to KRS 83A.060 . OAG 83-348 .

To correct a simple mechanical error in drafting the zoning map to conform with the enacted regulations would not necessitate going through the zoning amendment procedure since the zoning regulations apart from the map mistake would not be affected and going through such a procedure would serve no valid purpose; the erroneously drawn map would probably not be enforceable against any affected property owners and the city should proceed to immediately correct the mechanical errors in the zoning ordinance by amendment to avoid possible litigation. OAG 83-348 .

When a public agency, such as a city council, after giving notice to the parties, is conducting a fact-finding hearing which will affect the substantial rights of an individual and will render a decision based on its discretion, the agency is performing a quasi-judicial function. Hearings held by a city council regarding rezoning proposals are open to the public, as mandated in rezoning amendments by this section; however, once arguments are heard and evidence received, the city council can then retire into closed session to deliberate and reach a decision. OAG 83-446 .

A planning and zoning commission was acting as a quasi-judicial body when it went into closed session to discuss and reach a decision following a public hearing on rezoning, held pursuant to subsection (1) of this section; accordingly, as a quasi-judicial body, the commission was not subject to and therefore did not violate the Open Meetings Law. OAG 84-162 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Tarlock, Kentucky Planning and Land Use Control Enabling Legislation: An Analysis of the 1966 Revision of KRS Chapter 100, 56 Ky. L.J. 556 (1968).

Kentucky Law Survey, Griffin and Becker, Zoning, 67 Ky. L.J. 627 (1978-1979).

Kentucky Law Survey, Bratt and Brown, Environmental Law, 70 Ky. L.J. 455 (1981-82).

Northern Kentucky Law Review.

Comments, Planning and Zoning in Kentucky: Who Really Adopts the Comprehensive Plan?, 9 N. Ky. L. Rev. 499 (1982).

ALR

Validity, construction, and effect of agreement to rezone, or amendment to zoning ordinance, creating special restrictions or conditions not applicable to other property similarly zoned. 70 A.L.R.3d 125.

Right of real property owner to relief under Federal Civil Rights Acts against amendment of zoning ordinance increasing minimum lot requirements. 25 A.L.R. Fed. 850.

100.2111. Alternative regulation for zoning map amendment.

A legislative body or fiscal court may adopt, in lieu of the provisions of KRS 100.211 , a regulation to provide as follows:

  1. A proposal for a map amendment may originate with the planning commission of the unit, with any fiscal court or legislative body which is a member of the unit, or with the owner of the property in question.
  2. Regardless of the origin of the proposed amendment, it shall be referred to the planning commission before adoption.
  3. The planning commission shall then hold at least one (1) public hearing after notice as required by KRS Chapter 424 and this chapter and make recommendations to the various bodies or fiscal courts involved.
  4. A planning commission recommendation relating to the proposed amendment shall become final and the map amendment shall be automatically implemented subject to the provisions of KRS 100.347 , all as set forth in the planning commission recommendations, unless within twenty-one (21) days after the final action by the planning commission:
    1. Any aggrieved person files a written request with the planning commission that the final decision shall be made by the appropriate legislative body or fiscal court; or
    2. The appropriate legislative body or fiscal court files a notice with the planning commission that the legislative body or fiscal court shall decide the map amendment.
  5. It shall take a majority of the entire legislative body or fiscal court to override the recommendation of the planning commission.
  6. All procedures for public notice and publication as well as for adoption shall be the same as for the original enactment of a zoning regulation, and the notice of publication shall include the street address of the property in question, or if one is not available, or if it is not practicable due to the number of addresses involved, a geographic description sufficient to locate and identify the property, and the names of the two (2) streets on either side of the property which intersect the street on which the property is located. If the property is located at the intersection of two (2) streets, the notice shall designate the intersection by name of both streets rather than name the two (2) streets on either side of the property.

History. Enact. Acts 1988, ch. 31, § 1, effective July 15, 1988.

100.212. Notice of hearing on proposed map amendment.

When in any planning unit except for a planning unit containing a city of the first class or a consolidated local government, a hearing is scheduled on a proposal by a property owner to amend any zoning map, the following notice shall be given in addition to any other notice required by statute, local regulation, or ordinance:

  1. Notice of the hearing shall be posted conspicuously on the property the classification of which is proposed to be changed for fourteen (14) consecutive days immediately prior to the hearing. Posting shall be as follows:
    1. The sign shall state “zoning change” and the proposed classification change in letters three (3) inches in height. The time, place, and date of hearing shall be in letters at least one (1) inch in height; and
    2. The sign shall be constructed of durable material and shall state the telephone number of the appropriate zoning commission; and
  2. Notice of the hearing shall be given at least fourteen (14) days in advance of the hearing by first-class mail, with certification by the commission secretary or other officer of the planning commission that the notice was mailed to an owner of every parcel of property adjoining the property the classification of which is proposed to be changed. It shall be the duty of the person or persons proposing the map amendment to furnish to the planning commission the names and addresses of the owners of all adjoining property. Records maintained by the property valuation administrator may be relied upon conclusively to determine the identity and address of the owner. If the property is in condominium or cooperative forms of ownership, the person notified by mail shall be the president or chairman of the owner group which administers property commonly owned by the condominium or cooperative owners. A joint notice may be mailed to two (2) or more co-owners of an adjoining property who are listed in the property valuation administrator’s records as having the same address.
  3. If the property the classification of which is proposed to be changed adjoins property in a different planning unit, or property which is not part of any planning unit, notice of the hearing shall be given at least fourteen (14) days in advance of the hearing, by first-class mail to certain public officials, as follows:
    1. If the adjoining property is part of a planning unit, notice shall be given to that unit’s planning commission; or
    2. If the adjoining property is not part of a planning unit, notice shall be given to the mayor of the city in which the property is located or, if the property is in an unincorporated area, notice shall be given to the judge/executive of the county in which the property is located.

History. Enact. Acts 1972, ch. 233, § 1; 1974, ch. 315, § 7; 1976, ch. 66, § 1; 1980, ch. 114, § 11, effective July 15, 1980; 1982, ch. 20, § 2, effective July 15, 1982; 1986, ch. 141, § 20, effective July 15, 1986; 1988, ch. 144, § 2, effective July 15, 1988; 1990, ch. 362, § 5, effective July 13, 1990; 2002, ch. 346, § 145, effective July 15, 2002.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Due Process.

In a zoning case, an argument that due process was violated based on the 14-day window in KRS 100.212 and Fort Thomas, Ky., Zoning Ordinance § 17.2 was rejected because an adjoining landowner was given a meaningful opportunity to be heard before a planning commission. While he was denied the opportunity to present additional evidence before a city council, there was no requirement that he be allowed to do so. Yocum v. Legislative Body of Fort Thomas, 2013 Ky. App. LEXIS 21 (Ky. Ct. App. Feb. 1, 2013), review denied, ordered not published, 2013 Ky. LEXIS 673 (Ky. Dec. 11, 2013).

Opinions of Attorney General.

The requirements of paragraphs (a) and (b) of subsection 1 (designated (1) and (2) by the Legislative Research Commission) of this section have no bearing on the public notice procedures of KRS 100.263 . OAG 72-395 .

Subsection (1)(b) (subsection 2 as designated by the Legislative Research Commission) places the responsibility of giving notice of the hearing on the planning unit and not on the property owner. OAG 72-395 .

Subsection (1)(b) (subsection 2 as designated by the Legislative Research Commission) clearly requires that the notice of the hearing be given by registered mail. (Opinion prior to 1974 amendment.) OAG 72-395 .

The planning commission is responsible for notifying the adjoining property owners by registered mail but there is no provision for the commission to charge a fee for this service. (Opinion prior to 1974 amendment.) OAG 72-408 .

The term “adjoining” in many cases means touching or contiguous and in circumstances involving zoning changes would also include property located across a public street. OAG 72-408 .

This section appears to confine the notice of hearing to all property adjoining the property for reclassification. OAG 72-408 .

This section does not require that the posting of notice be done at the same time that the notice of the hearing must be given to adjoining property owners but the notice must be posted within a reasonable time after notice by mail and prior to the hearing. OAG 72-408 .

The term “amendment” refers only to individual proposals to change the classification of a particular piece of property. OAG 72-446 ; 78-788.

The term “planning unit containing any portion of a county” refers only to those units comprising a combination of a city and a county or portion thereof and not to an independent city planning unit irrespective of its subdivision jurisdiction outside of the city. OAG 72-446 .

This section does not apply to a complete revision of the zoning ordinance and map initiated by the planning commission. OAG 72-446 .

This section does not apply to the preparation of an initial zoning ordinance and map for a community. OAG 72-446 .

Where it appears necessary for a city to make a major change in its zoning map and regulations it can repeal them and enact an entirely new zoning map and regulations as authorized under KRS 100.207 thereby avoiding the expense of notifying each affected property owner as required by this section which is apparently designed to cover individual zoning changes or proposed amendments. OAG 74-513 .

An owner of property located across a railroad track would be considered an adjoining property owner where the property sought to be rezoned extends to the property line abutting the railroad; however if there is intervening property not subject to the zoning change between the railroad and the property involved, notification would not be required. OAG 77-339 .

The notice requirements under this section apply only to individual proposed zoning changes of a particular piece of property and not to massive revisions. OAG 78-137 .

The notice requirements under this section apply only to individually proposed changes of a particular piece of property and not to partial or general revisions of the zoning ordinance involved. OAG 78-788 .

KRS 100.211 and this section must be read together and embrace all proposed zoning amendments regardless of whether they involve a single piece of property or a part of the text of the zoning ordinance. OAG 79-310 .

Where property which is proposed to be reclassified is separated from certain property owners by other property, notice to those property owners would not be required by subsection (2) of this section, since such property is not adjoining the property which is the subject of the proposed reclassification. OAG 81-253 .

The individual notice requirement of this section was designed for the purpose of notifying adjacent property owners of a proposed individual zoning change made by a property owner, the legislative body or the planning commission; however, where there is a general zoning revision of the zoning text and map involved, general publication of the notice of the hearing, as required by KRS 100.211 , would constitute sufficient notice and individual notification of adjacent property owners would not be necessary. OAG 82-84 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Kentucky Law Survey, Griffin and Becker, Zoning, 67 Ky. L.J. 627 (1978-1979).

100.213. Findings necessary for proposed map amendment — Reconsideration.

  1. Before any map amendment is granted, the planning commission or the legislative body or fiscal court must find that the map amendment is in agreement with the adopted comprehensive plan, or, in the absence of such a finding, that one (1) or more of the following apply and such finding shall be recorded in the minutes and records of the planning commission or the legislative body or fiscal court:
    1. That the existing zoning classification given to the property is inappropriate and that the proposed zoning classification is appropriate;
    2. That there have been major changes of an economic, physical, or social nature within the area involved which were not anticipated in the adopted comprehensive plan and which have substantially altered the basic character of such area.
  2. The planning commission, legislative body, or fiscal court may adopt provisions which prohibit for a period of two (2) years, the reconsideration of a denied map amendment or the consideration of a map amendment identical to a denied map amendment.

History. Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 34; 1968, ch. 198, § 1; 1980, ch. 325, § 1, effective July 15, 1980; 1986, ch. 141, § 21, effective July 15, 1986.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. In General.

Purpose of this section is to require that zoning conform to the basic scheme of prior community planning and to prohibit indiscriminate changes which do not conform to the original comprehensive plan. Hines v. Pinchback--Halloran Volkswagen, Inc., 513 S.W.2d 492, 1974 Ky. LEXIS 374 ( Ky. 1974 ).

Where a city zoning ordinance permitting planned unit developments in various districts, if found by the zoning commission to meet designated standards, and the city council approved an amendment permitting planned unit developments in a district not covered by the original ordinance following a public hearing, the council’s subsequent approval of a specific proposal for a condominium on the rezoned tract was not a map amendment but an approval of a use specifically authorized by the terms of a text amendment of the ordinance and therefore, findings of fact were not required. Cetrulo v. Park Hills, 524 S.W.2d 628, 1975 Ky. LEXIS 111 ( Ky. 1975 ).

The three alternatives available to the legislative body if the planning and zoning commission conducts a trial-type due process hearing are: (1) following the commission’s recommendation without a hearing or only an argument-type hearing; (2) reviewing the record made before the commission and determining from that evidence adjudicative facts which differ from those found by the commission; or, (3) holding its own trial-type hearing and, based upon the evidence there presented, finding different adjudicative facts than those found by the commission. McKinstry v. Wells, 548 S.W.2d 169, 1977 Ky. App. LEXIS 650 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).

What is satisfactory to meet the criteria for a change in the zone map must be a value judgment based on the facts of each case within the framework of existing statutes and court decisions. Bryan v. Salmon Corp., 554 S.W.2d 912, 1977 Ky. App. LEXIS 785 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).

A county planning and zoning commission, conducting a public hearing regarding a rezoning request, should have considered testimony regarding traffic, drainage, sewage, and other factors rather than simply allow the proposed rezoning because it conformed with the comprehensive plan; the comprehensive plan must constantly undergo review and should be modified when necessary, even if the land is exempt from zoning under the “agricultural supremacy clause” or through case law. 21st Century Dev. Co. LLC v. Watts, 958 S.W.2d 25, 1997 Ky. App. LEXIS 138 (Ky. Ct. App. 1997).

It is not required that a local government find both that the proposed zoning classification conforms to the comprehensive plan and that the property's current zoning classification is inappropriate and the proposed zoning classification is appropriate. Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 100.213(1). Southwest Clark Neighborhood Ass'n v. Branham, 2017 Ky. App. LEXIS 64 (Ky. Ct. App. Mar. 31, 2017).

2. Construction.

Where this section is amended to substitute the word “or” for “and,” the amendment could as well be designed to change the law as to correct it; thus it cannot be said that the section when originally passed was in error. Boron Oil Co. v. Cathedral Foundation, Inc., 434 S.W.2d 640, 1968 Ky. LEXIS 239 ( Ky. 1968 ).

Where prior to the 1968 amendment of this section substituting the word “or” for “and” following the words “the planning commission,” the defendant was denied a zoning map change by the zoning commission but the map change was approved by ordinance by the city commissioners, the ordinance was invalid. Boron Oil Co. v. Cathedral Foundation, Inc., 434 S.W.2d 640, 1968 Ky. LEXIS 239 ( Ky. 1968 ).

In order to interchange the words “or” and “and” in a statute it must be obvious that the intent of the Legislature is thwarted if the change is not made and such is not the situation in regards to this section. Boron Oil Co. v. Cathedral Foundation, Inc., 434 S.W.2d 640, 1968 Ky. LEXIS 239 ( Ky. 1968 ).

3. Comprehensive Plan.

While the comprehensive plan is extremely important and must not be treated lightly in considering applications for zone changes, it is a guide rather than a straightjacket. Bryan v. Salmon Corp., 554 S.W.2d 912, 1977 Ky. App. LEXIS 785 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).

Decision to rezone property was in accordance with KRS 100.213(1) and based upon substantial evidence because, under a comprehensive plan, hillside developments were permitted. Yocum v. Legislative Body of Fort Thomas, 2013 Ky. App. LEXIS 21 (Ky. Ct. App. Feb. 1, 2013), review denied, ordered not published, 2013 Ky. LEXIS 673 (Ky. Dec. 11, 2013).

4. Compelling Need.

What is a “compelling need” calling for a zone map change must be determined by the circumstances of each case. Bryan v. Salmon Corp., 554 S.W.2d 912, 1977 Ky. App. LEXIS 785 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).

“Compelling need” for zone map change existed where growth trends in an agriculturally zoned area resulted in a housing a shortage and demand for urban services which had not been anticipated when the comprehensive plan was developed. Bryan v. Salmon Corp., 554 S.W.2d 912, 1977 Ky. App. LEXIS 785 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).

Where a compelling need for rezoning was not demonstrated by the evidence presented to the planning commission, the legitimate concerns of the residents opposing the specific type of structure proposed together with the importance of compliance with the objectives of the comprehensive plan were sufficient to ensure that denial of the rezoning was not an arbitrary decision by the planning commission and fiscal court. Landgrave v. Watson, 593 S.W.2d 875, 1979 Ky. App. LEXIS 507 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).

Neither the alleged need for more retail establishments nor the landowner’s potential for greater profits constituted a “compelling need” for changing a property’s zoning classification from residential to commercial for purposes of building a shopping center. Gramex Corp. v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Gov't, 973 S.W.2d 75, 1998 Ky. App. LEXIS 17 (Ky. Ct. App. 1998).

5. Changes Altering Basic Character.

Where the minutes of the city commission show that before the adoption of the ordinance the annexation of the property to the city, the availability of urban services and the fact that it can only be used for highway services are discussed, there is substantial compliance with the statute even though there is no specific finding of fact that a change has occurred. Johnson v. Lagrew, 447 S.W.2d 98, 1969 Ky. LEXIS 74 ( Ky. 1969 ).

Where the commission found that the property formerly zoned agricultural is now located in the city and that all urban services are available to it and that it does fulfill the requirements for interchange service use as defined in the ordinances, such findings refute the charge that the city commission acted in an arbitrary or unreasonable manner in zoning the property for interchange service use. Johnson v. Lagrew, 447 S.W.2d 98, 1969 Ky. LEXIS 74 ( Ky. 1969 ).

Where a city zoning ordinance changed the zone classification of a one-quarter block area from residential to business usage and where at the time of the original zoning the area was almost exclusively residential, the fact that the area contained a small motel, a warehouse and a school and that numerous businesses were located in an adjacent zoning area was not sufficient evidence to support the finding of the city legislative body that the original zoning was inappropriate. Manley v. Maysville, 528 S.W.2d 726, 1975 Ky. LEXIS 87 ( Ky. 1975 ).

Where the legislative body made a finding that major economic, physical and social changes, not anticipated by the comprehensive plan, had substantially altered the basic character of the area, but did not specify what changes had occurred, how it was determined they had not been anticipated, or how the basic character had been altered, no rezoning could be permitted, since this constituted a mere parroting of the statutory language. Beechwood Village v. Council of St. Matthews, 574 S.W.2d 322, 1978 Ky. App. LEXIS 617 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).

There was no error in county council’s ruling that the construction of a shopping center across the street from landowner’s property did not fundamentally alter the nature of landowner’s property so as to allow rezoning of the subject property for a commercial use. Gramex Corp. v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Gov't, 973 S.W.2d 75, 1998 Ky. App. LEXIS 17 (Ky. Ct. App. 1998).

Further consideration was required concerning the approval of a zoning change authorized by a county court, because while the county court had not adopted the optional rule provided for in KRS 100.213(2) which provided for up to a two-year limitations period between the filing of a new application following action on a prior application, the county court failed to determine whether there had been changes since the decision in a prior case concerning the same property, which was required to determine whether res judicata applied. Bizzack v. Hume, 2006 Ky. App. LEXIS 106 (Ky. Ct. App. Apr. 7, 2006), rev'd, in part sub. nom., Hume v. Franklin County Fiscal Court, 276 S.W.3d 748, 2008 Ky. LEXIS 201 ( Ky. 2008 ).

A fiscal court’s decision to reject a planning commission’s recommendation that an owner’s application for a zoning map amendment be approved was not arbitrary where: (1) there was not overwhelming evidence that the commission reached the correct decision, (2) the land use contemplated by the owner was incompatible with land’s classification under the comprehensive plan, (3) the fiscal court’s finding that concerns about the potential for pollution, reduction of property values, physical damage to neighboring homes, water quality, storm and waste water control, noise, traffic, and destruction of nearby historic and prehistoric cultural resources were justified was supported by substantial evidence, and (4) the recommendation of the commission did not dictate the decision of the fiscal court. Hilltop Basic Res., Inc. v. County of Boone, 191 S.W.3d 642, 2006 Ky. App. LEXIS 113 (Ky. Ct. App. 2006).

6. Spot Zoning.

The real evil of “spot” zoning consists in the reclassification of a site for a use not consistent with the character of the neighborhood or area; the evil is not in the preference of one lot owner over another in the selection of the particular site for a use appropriate to a neighborhood or area. Wells v. Fiscal Court of Jefferson County, 457 S.W.2d 498, 1970 Ky. LEXIS 211 ( Ky. 1970 ).

7. Partial Reclassification.

Although this section contemplates a change in the neighborhood or section, the change in zoning treatment would not necessarily involve a change in the zoning classification of the entire area, but could consist of the reclassification of one or more sites for uses suitable to the current character of the area, so long as it did not constitute “spot” zoning. Wells v. Fiscal Court of Jefferson County, 457 S.W.2d 498, 1970 Ky. LEXIS 211 ( Ky. 1970 ).

8. Valid Rezoning.

Rezoning to allow apartment buildings in what had been zoned as a single family residence area was not arbitrary where it was shown that due to new highways the demand for apartments had increased while the development plans for single residences had never progressed. Wells v. Fiscal Court of Jefferson County, 457 S.W.2d 498, 1970 Ky. LEXIS 211 ( Ky. 1970 ).

Where the Planning Commission found that the proposed zone change was in conformance with all applicable guidelines of the comprehensive plan, there was therefore no need to make any findings concerning the inappropriateness of the existing zoning classification or whether there had been major economic, physical, or social changes which altered the basic character of the area and justified reclassification; the alternative grounds for zone change are not applicable if the reclassification is in agreement with the comprehensive plan. Minton v. Fiscal Court of Jefferson County, 850 S.W.2d 52, 1992 Ky. App. LEXIS 197 (Ky. Ct. App. 1992).

Before a zone change request is granted, (map amendment), the planning commission or respective legislative body must find either that the request is in agreement with the comprehensive plan or that the existing zoning classification is inappropriate and that the proposed zoning classification is appropriate; or that there have been major changes of an economic, physical, or social nature in the area which were not anticipated in the current comprehensive plan and which substantially alter the character of the area. Fritz v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Gov't, 986 S.W.2d 456, 1998 Ky. App. LEXIS 77 (Ky. Ct. App. 1998).

Under the evidence presented to the Planning Commission and reviewed by the Fiscal Court, the Fiscal Court could have made the finding that they did, or that those proposed uses on the development plan were more appropriate under KRS 100.213(1)(a) or (b). Thus, the Fiscal Court’s decision was not arbitrary. Hume v. Franklin County Fiscal Court, 276 S.W.3d 748, 2008 Ky. LEXIS 201 ( Ky. 2008 ).

County fiscal court had authority to rezone property to allowing quarrying activity under Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 100.213(1) where the amendment was in accord with the comprehensive plan principles, and the term “quarrying” fit into the zoning regulations' broad definition of quarrying in light of the applicant's intent that quarrying was to be the first step in production. Southwest Clark Neighborhood Ass'n v. Branham, 2017 Ky. App. LEXIS 64 (Ky. Ct. App. Mar. 31, 2017).

Fiscal court's approval of rezoning agricultural land for coal mining was appropriate because (1) the planning staff's findings were supported by substantial evidence; (2) the planning commission properly relied on the findings even though one commissioner's personal opinions found their way into the record, as the planning staff's findings were independent of the commissioner's statements; and (3) the use of the land for coal mining was in compliance with a comprehensive plan. Huxol v. Daviess Cnty. Fiscal Court, 507 S.W.3d 574, 2016 Ky. App. LEXIS 210 (Ky. Ct. App. 2016).

9. Invalid Rezoning.

In the absence of a showing that the original zoning classification was inappropriate or that there had been major changes altering the character of the area which were not anticipated in the comprehensive plan, the zoning of property for commercial or highway business usage, which was, on its face, in disagreement with a plan that designates residential usage for the property, was an impermissible map amendment to zoning regulations. Hines v. Pinchback--Halloran Volkswagen, Inc., 513 S.W.2d 492, 1974 Ky. LEXIS 374 ( Ky. 1974 ).

Since the purpose of this section was to require zoning to conform to the basic scheme of prior planning and to prohibit indiscriminate attempts to rezone, a city zoning ordinance which changed the zone classification of a one-quarter block area from residential to business usage was not in conformity with a master plan which designated residential usage of the area and the amendment to the zoning ordinance was invalid. Manley v. Maysville, 528 S.W.2d 726, 1975 Ky. LEXIS 87 ( Ky. 1975 ).

10. Evidence.

The court was correct in refusing to allow property owners to introduce evidence on the merits of the rezoning. Wells v. Fiscal Court of Jefferson County, 457 S.W.2d 498, 1970 Ky. LEXIS 211 ( Ky. 1970 ).

Trial court erred in finding that no substantial evidence existed to support granting the map amendment for the property owners’ property contained in the zoning ordinance subsequently enacted by the Fiscal Court; the evidence in the record showed that the Fiscal Court relied on substantial evidence to find that the area had experienced changes since the last application filed by the property owners to justify the granting of the map amendment. Morris v. Carter, 2007 Ky. App. LEXIS 259 (Ky. Ct. App. Aug. 10, 2007).

11. Arbitrary Refusal to Rezone.

Where a piece of property was obviously better suited to commercial use than to its residential zoning use and the arguments against rezoning were based on emotion rather than facts, the commission acted arbitrarily in refusing to change the classification. Taylor v. Coblin, 461 S.W.2d 78, 1970 Ky. LEXIS 605 ( Ky. 1970 ).

Denial of landowners’ petition for a zone change to permit the operation of a subsurface limestone mine in an area designated for agricultural and commercial services purposes was not an arbitrary decision and was supported by substantial evidence in the record. Martin Marietta Materials, Inc. v. Boone County Fiscal Court, 89 S.W.3d 428, 2002 Ky. App. LEXIS 2225 (Ky. Ct. App. 2002).

12. Due Process.

Findings by the board of commissioners in a change of zoning application which merely parroted the words of the statute did not provide meaningful facts for judicial review and thereby failed to meet the requirements of due process. Caller v. Ison, 508 S.W.2d 776, 1974 Ky. LEXIS 631 ( Ky. 1974 ).

13. — Hearing.

Whether a proposed change on a zoning map is in conformity with a comprehensive plan or whether substantial changes have occurred which have altered the basic character of an area, are questions of fact which must be resolved by a trial-type adjudicatory hearing. Beechwood Village v. Council of St. Matthews, 574 S.W.2d 322, 1978 Ky. App. LEXIS 617 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).

14. — Findings.

Findings of legislative facts cannot be a substitute for findings of adjudicative facts which due process requires be made in deciding a request for zone map amendment. McKinstry v. Wells, 548 S.W.2d 169, 1977 Ky. App. LEXIS 650 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).

Where the fiscal court elected to decide a request for zone map amendment on the basis of hearings before the county planning and zoning commission but declined to follow the recommendations of the commission without making any findings of adjudicative facts, that action was clearly arbitrary. McKinstry v. Wells, 548 S.W.2d 169, 1977 Ky. App. LEXIS 650 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).

Since enactment of a comprehensive plan is based upon a finding of legislative facts, the adoption of a comprehensive plan by a county planning and zoning commission does not provide sufficient factual findings to decide a request for zone map amendment. McKinstry v. Wells, 548 S.W.2d 169, 1977 Ky. App. LEXIS 650 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).

When determining whether to grant a zone map amendment, the legislative body must decide whether an individual, because of his own particular factual situation, is or is not entitled to some form of relief and make a finding of adjudicative facts. McKinstry v. Wells, 548 S.W.2d 169, 1977 Ky. App. LEXIS 650 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).

When a planning commission has recommended denial of a map amendment, the legislative body is empowered to review the record made before the planning commission and from the evidence may make adjudicatory findings different from the findings made by the commission provided the record will support the findings. Beechwood Village v. Council of St. Matthews, 574 S.W.2d 322, 1978 Ky. App. LEXIS 617 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).

15. Authority of Circuit Court.

Although action of fiscal court in deciding a request for zone map amendment may have been arbitrary, the Circuit Court had no authority to direct that the property be rezoned for the particular classification recommended by the zoning commission but should have directed the fiscal court to make the findings of adjudicative facts necessary for judicial review. McKinstry v. Wells, 548 S.W.2d 169, 1977 Ky. App. LEXIS 650 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).

Where both planning commission and Circuit Court found that “compelling need” for zone change existed, Circuit Court had authority to require a rezoning. Bryan v. Salmon Corp., 554 S.W.2d 912, 1977 Ky. App. LEXIS 785 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).

16. Appropriate Classification.

Under the statute, in order to get a requested zone change, the proponent must show, inter alia, that the proposed zoning classification is appropriate. Fritz v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Gov't, 986 S.W.2d 456, 1998 Ky. App. LEXIS 77 (Ky. Ct. App. 1998).

Trial court erred in remanding the decision of the City and Board of Commissioners denying the applicant’s zone change request for a 70-acre parcel from agricultural-residential to highway-commercial; neither of the findings required under KRS 100.213 for a zone change were made by the Planning Commission’s findings and recommendations that were adopted by the City and Board, as the finding that the existing zoning may have been inappropriate did not equate to a finding that such zoning was inappropriate, and the applicant failed to carry its burden to show that a zone map amendment for the entire parcel was appropriate. Danville-Boyle County Planning Comm'n v. Centre Estates, 190 S.W.3d 354, 2006 Ky. App. LEXIS 86 (Ky. Ct. App. 2006).

17. Time Limitations.

Where the local zoning ordinance does not contain any time limitations on zoning map amendment applications as authorized by KRS 100.213(2), and the lower courts denied the subsequent petitions on res judicata grounds, adopting the doctrine of res judicata is not appropriate because res judicata is a judicial doctrine, while rezoning is a legislative function. While res judicata may apply to subsequent litigation(s) of a zone change application, it does not, nor can it apply to a subsequent zone change map amendment application. Hume v. Franklin County Fiscal Court, 276 S.W.3d 748, 2008 Ky. LEXIS 201 ( Ky. 2008 ).

Cited:

Shields v. Pittsburg & Midway Coal Mining Co., 634 S.W.2d 440, 1982 Ky. App. LEXIS 219 (Ky. Ct. App. 1982); Historic Licking Riverside Civic Asso. v. Covington, 774 S.W.2d 436, 1989 Ky. LEXIS 51 ( Ky. 1989 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

The legislative body or the fiscal court is authorized to override the planning commission’s approval or disapproval of an amendment to a zoning regulation. OAG 67-151 .

A city board of commissioners does not have the power to approve or disapprove an application for an alteration or change in a zoning and map regulation without the consent or approval of the planning and zoning commission. OAG 68-482 .

Public hearings for a zoning change must be conducted by the planning commission rather than the city legislative body. OAG 68-482 .

Although the fiscal court may override a negative recommendation for a zoning change by the planning commission, if the only reason given for the authorized change by the fiscal court was that the applicant “deserved it,” such finding would not be sufficient under this section. OAG 72-116 .

The approval of a zoning map change by the legislative body of Frankfort was premature and ineffective where the findings required by this section were not made; however it could, by subsequent action, comply with said requirement and amend its previous action thereby curing the defect. OAG 73-229 .

The planning commission of Frankfort was required to make the findings called for in this section in making a recommendation to the city legislative body for the passage of a new zoning regulation and zoning map. OAG 73-229 .

Planning commission action of denying a request for a zoning change of one half of an old school building to commercial and remaining half to residential in an area presently zoned residential was reasonable where the existing zoning regulation required that a commercial building be set back 25 feet from any residential property line and the proposed change could not comply. OAG 75-133 .

If the zoning map draft does not reflect the duly adopted and updated zoning regulations by reason of a mechanical error or a mistake on the part of the drafters and such mistake is thus reflected in the enacted ordinance, the zoning map could be corrected by the legislative body simply amending the zoning ordinance pursuant to KRS 83A.060 . OAG 83-348 .

To correct a simple mechanical error in drafting the zoning map to conform with the enacted regulations would not necessitate going through the zoning amendment procedure since the zoning regulations apart from the map mistake would not be affected and going through such a procedure would serve no valid purpose; the erroneously drawn map would probably not be enforceable against any affected property owners and the city should proceed to immediately correct the mechanical errors in the zoning ordinance by amendment to avoid possible litigation. OAG 83-348 .

Where applicant was denied a request to change the zoning of 6.132 acres of land from A-1 to I-1, and where within a month of the denial applicant filed a new zone change request which asked that the zoning for 2.5 acres of the original 6.132 acre tract be changed from A-1 to I-1, since the second zone change request was not “identical” to the first zone change request, as they were neither exactly equal and alike nor so similar as to be essentially equal or interchangeable, the second request did not violate subdivision (2) of this section. OAG 90-40 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Bench & Bar.

Moore, Practicing Before a Board of Adjustment: Seven Practical Tips, Volume 75, No. 1, January 2011, Ky. Bench & Bar 10.

Kentucky Law Journal.

Kentucky Law Survey, Griffin and Becker, Zoning, 67 Ky. L.J. 627 (1978-1979).

Kentucky Law Survey, Bratt and Brown, Environmental Law, 70 Ky. L.J. 455 (1981-82).

Northern Kentucky Law Review.

Comments, Planning and Zoning in Kentucky: Who Really Adopts the Comprehensive Plan?, 9 N. Ky. L. Rev. 499 (1982).

100.214. Hearing on proposed map amendment in county containing city of the first class or consolidated local government.

When in any planning unit containing any portion of a county containing a city of the first class or a consolidated local government a hearing is scheduled on a proposal by a property owner to amend any zoning map, the following notice shall be given in addition to any other notice required by statute, local regulation, or ordinance to be given:

  1. Notice of the hearing shall be posted conspicuously on the property the classification of which is proposed to be changed at least fourteen (14) days immediately prior to the hearing. Posting shall be as follows:
    1. The sign shall state “zoning change” and the proposed classification change in letters three (3) inches in height. The time, place, and date of hearing shall be in letters at least one (1) inch in height; and
    2. The sign shall be constructed of durable material and shall state the telephone number of the appropriate zoning commission;
  2. Notice of the hearing shall be given at least fourteen (14) days in advance of the hearing by first-class mail, with certification by the commission secretary or other officer of the planning commission that the notice was mailed, to the mayor and city clerk of any city with a population of less than three thousand (3,000) based upon the most recent federal decennial census so affected, to an owner of every parcel of property adjoining at any point the property the classification of which is proposed to be changed, to an owner of every parcel of property directly across the street from said property, and to an owner of every parcel of property which adjoins at any point the adjoining property or the property directly across the street from said property; provided, however, that no first-class mail notice, required by this subsection, shall be required to be given to any property owner whose property is more than five hundred (500) feet from the property which is proposed to be changed. It shall be the duty of the person or persons proposing the map amendment to furnish to the planning commission the names and addresses of the owners of all property as described in this subsection. Records maintained by the property valuation administrator may be relied upon conclusively to determine the identity and address of said owner. In the event such property is in condominium or cooperative forms of ownership, then the person notified by mail shall be the president or chairman of the owner group which administers property commonly owned by the condominium or cooperative owners. A joint notice may be mailed to two (2) or more co-owners of an adjoining property who are listed in the property valuation administrator’s records as having the same address;
  3. If the hearing has been scheduled for a time during normal working hours, and if, within ten (10) days of the scheduled date of the hearing the planning commission shall receive a petition from two hundred (200) property owners living within the planning unit requesting that the hearing be rescheduled for a time after normal working hours, then the planning commission shall reschedule the hearing for a time after normal working hours on a date no earlier than the date of the original hearing. The planning commission shall then publish notice of the new hearing time and date according to the provisions of KRS 100.211 , except that notice shall occur at least seven (7) days prior to the public hearing. The sign required by subsection (1) of this section shall be changed to reflect the new hearing time and date at least seven (7) days prior to the public hearing. The persons who receive mail notice according to the provisions of subsection (2) of this section shall again be notified in the same manner of the new hearing time and date at least seven (7) days prior to the hearing. The hearing time shall not be changed more than once by the procedures of this section except in the event of intervening emergency which requires the cancellation of a hearing; and
  4. Notice by mail shall include a list of the names and addresses of each person so notified, and a description of the procedure by which those notified can petition for a change in the hearing time.

History. Enact. Acts 1978, ch. 327, § 2, effective June 17, 1978; 1980, ch. 114, § 12, effective July 15, 1980; 1982, ch. 20, § 3, effective July 15, 1982; 1986, ch. 141, § 22, effective July 15, 1986; 1988, ch. 144, § 3, effective July 15, 1988; 2002, ch. 346, § 146, effective July 15, 2002; 2013, ch. 95, § 5, effective June 25, 2013; 2014, ch. 92, § 193, effective January 1, 2015.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Notice.

Prior to enactment of KRS 100.182 in 1984, Kentucky adhered to the general rule that failure to abide by statutory notice requirements deprives a planning commission of authority to act and renders actions void ab initio. However, KRS 100.182 ameliorated the requirement of strict compliance to procedural provisions when certain safeguards are met. Minton v. Fiscal Court of Jefferson County, 850 S.W.2d 52, 1992 Ky. App. LEXIS 197 (Ky. Ct. App. 1992).

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Kentucky Law Survey, Griffin and Becker, Zoning, 67 Ky. L.J. 627 (1978-1979).

100.215. Planning commission to approve changes in zoning regulations. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 79) was repealed by Acts 1988, ch. 19, § 3, effective July 15, 1988.

100.216. Noncommercial dog kennel not prohibited in area zoned for residential use. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 116, § 1), which had formerly been compiled as KRS 100.365 , was repealed by Acts 1986, ch. 141, § 45, effective July 15, 1986.

Board of Adjustment

100.217. Board of adjustment — Membership — Appointment — Terms — Vacancies — Oath — Compensation — Removal — Officers — Effect of compact — Membership upon establishment of consolidated local government.

    1. Before any zoning regulation may have legal effect within the planning unit, a board or boards of adjustment shall be appointed for the planning unit as stated in the agreement under which the unit operates. The agreement may provide for a joint board of adjustment. The agreement may provide for additional boards of adjustment with jurisdiction of a particular city or area within the planning unit. Provided, that the jurisdiction of the boards of adjustment so established shall be clearly defined as to territorial limits, that all territory within the planning unit is within the jurisdiction of some board of adjustment so established and, that no territory is subject to the jurisdiction of more than one (1) board of adjustment, except as provided in KRS 100.203(5). (1) (a) Before any zoning regulation may have legal effect within the planning unit, a board or boards of adjustment shall be appointed for the planning unit as stated in the agreement under which the unit operates. The agreement may provide for a joint board of adjustment. The agreement may provide for additional boards of adjustment with jurisdiction of a particular city or area within the planning unit. Provided, that the jurisdiction of the boards of adjustment so established shall be clearly defined as to territorial limits, that all territory within the planning unit is within the jurisdiction of some board of adjustment so established and, that no territory is subject to the jurisdiction of more than one (1) board of adjustment, except as provided in KRS 100.203(5).
    2. Except as provided by paragraph (c) of this subsection, in a county containing a consolidated local government where a planning agreement is not required, there shall be one (1) board of adjustment which shall be established by ordinance of the consolidated local government. Until such time as the consolidated local government establishes and appoints a board of adjustment pursuant to this subsection, the existing board of adjustment for the county shall serve as the board of adjustment for the entire planning unit.
    3. A city with a population equal to or greater than twenty thousand (20,000) based upon the most recent federal decennial census within a county containing a consolidated local government where a planning agreement is not required may establish, by ordinance, a board of zoning adjustment under the provisions of this section. If such a city creates a board of zoning adjustment, then that board of zoning adjustment shall have exclusive jurisdiction within that city’s territorial boundaries.
    1. A board of adjustment shall consist of either three (3), five (5), or seven (7) members, all of whom must be citizen members, and not more than two (2) of whom may be citizen members of the planning commission. (2) (a) A board of adjustment shall consist of either three (3), five (5), or seven (7) members, all of whom must be citizen members, and not more than two (2) of whom may be citizen members of the planning commission.
    2. A joint board of adjustment shall consist of no fewer than three (3) members, all of whom must be citizen members, and no more than two (2) of whom may be citizen members of the planning commission. Each appointing authority whose jurisdiction is represented by the joint board shall be entitled to appoint one (1) member to represent that jurisdiction.
  1. The mayor shall be the appointing authority for cities, and the county judge/executive shall be the appointing authority for counties, subject to the approval of their respective legislative bodies. The mayor shall be the appointing authority for a consolidated local government pursuant to the provisions of KRS 67C.139 .
  2. The term of office for the board of adjustment shall be four (4) years, but the term of office of members first appointed shall be staggered so that a proportionate number serve one (1), two (2), three (3), and four (4) years respectively.
  3. Vacancies on the board of adjustment shall be filled within sixty (60) days by the appropriate appointing authority. If the authority fails to act within that time, the planning commission shall fill the vacancy. When a vacancy occurs other than through expiration of the term of office, it shall be filled for the remainder of that term.
  4. All members of boards of adjustment shall, before entering upon their duties, qualify by taking the oath of office prescribed by Section 228 of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Kentucky before any judge, county judge/executive, notary public, clerk of a court, or justice of the peace within the district or county in which he resides.
  5. Reimbursement for expenses or compensation or both may be authorized for members on a board of adjustment.
  6. Any member of a board of adjustment may be removed by the appropriate appointing authority for inefficiency, neglect of duty, malfeasance, or conflict of interest. Any appointing authority who exercises the power to remove a member of the board of adjustment shall submit a written statement to the commission setting forth the reasons for removal, and the statement shall be read at the next meeting of the board of adjustment, which shall be open to the general public. The member so removed shall have the right of appeal from the removal to the Circuit Court of the county in which he resides.
  7. Notwithstanding subsection (4) of this section, when a city of the first class and a county containing such city have in effect a compact pursuant to KRS 79.310 to 79.330 , the terms of the members on the board shall be for three (3) years and until their successors are appointed and qualified. Upon the effective date of the compact, if the board is not reorganized pursuant to subsection (1) of this section, the mayor, and county judge/executive with approval of the fiscal court, shall adjust the terms of the sitting members to provide that the terms of one-third (1/3) plus one (1) of the members expire in one (1) year, the terms of one-third (1/3) of the members in two (2) years, and the terms of one-third (1/3) of the members expire in three (3) years. Upon expiration of these staggered terms, successors shall be appointed for a term of three (3) years. Notwithstanding subsection (4) of this section, upon the establishment of a consolidated local government in a county where a city of the first class and a county containing such city have had in effect a cooperative compact pursuant to KRS 79.310 to 79.330 , the terms of the members on the board shall be for three (3) years and until their successors are appointed and qualified. Upon expiration of the terms of incumbent members, their successors shall be appointed to three (3) year terms which are staggered.
  8. Each board of adjustment annually shall elect a chairman, vice chairman, and secretary and any other officers it deems necessary, and any officer shall be eligible for reelection at the expiration of his term.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 172, §§ 35 to 43; 1980, ch. 184, § 3, effective July 15, 1980; 1986, ch. 77, § 20, effective July 15, 1986; 1986, ch. 141, § 23, effective July 15, 1986; 2002, ch. 346, § 147, effective July 15, 2002; 2012, ch. 56, § 1, effective July 12, 2012; 2014, ch. 92, § 194, effective January 1, 2015; 2018 ch. 130, § 1, effective July 14, 2018.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Power to Zone.

The power to zone property belonged to the legislative body of the city, and such power could not have been exercised by the board of adjustment. Bray v. Beyer, 292 Ky. 162 , 166 S.W.2d 290, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 67 ( Ky. 1942 ) (decided under prior law).

2. Adjustment Board.

Adjustment board was not a planning and zoning agency. It was an administrative body which only supplied the “safety valve” function for making a zoning plan workable. Kline v. Louisville & Jefferson County Bd. of Zoning Adjustment & Appeals, 325 S.W.2d 324, 1959 Ky. LEXIS 53 ( Ky. 1959 ) (decided under prior law).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Under KRS 100.367 (now repealed) and this section, when a city and county elect to operate a joint planning commission, a new board of adjustment should be appointed with joint representation pursuant to this section. Any authorization given to the city thereafter to adopt and enforce regulations on zoning is unauthorized. OAG 71-133 .

Where two (2) of the members of the board of adjustment were elected councilmen of member cities and one was a city clerk, the members did not qualify as citizen members and the board was illegally composed. OAG 71-335 .

Since there are no residential requirements for membership on the board of adjustments, the appointing authority could select a member who is a nonresident of the city. OAG 77-206 .

The fact that a city had apparently complied with the requirements of this chapter, particularly KRS 100.133 , 100.207 and this section, clearly indicated that the city continued to have the legal authority to plan and zone in spite of the fact that the commission created in 1968 had been dormant for a period of time and no updating of the comprehensive plan or zoning ordinance had taken place for some time. OAG 78-356 .

If the mayor of a fourth-class city refuses to remove an appointee to the planning commission or board of adjustment for the city, there is no method by which the legislative body of the city can remove the appointee for any of the statutory reasons. Of course, any civil officer can be impeached through the state legislature under Const., §§ 66 and 68, and the procedure for such removal is detailed in KRS 63.020 et seq. OAG 83-164 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Bench & Bar.

Moore, Practicing Before a Board of Adjustment: Seven Practical Tips, Volume 75, No. 1, January 2011, Ky. Bench & Bar 10.

Kentucky Law Journal.

Tarlock, Kentucky Planning and Land Use Control Enabling Legislation: An Analysis of the 1966 Revision of KRS Chapter 100, 56 Ky. L.J. 556 (1968).

Kentucky Law Survey, Bratt and Brown, Environmental Law, 70 Ky. L.J. 455 (1981-82).

Northern Kentucky Law Review.

Comments, Planning and Zoning in Kentucky: Who Really Adopts the Comprehensive Plan?, 9 N. Ky. L. Rev. 499 (1982).

100.220. Appeal to circuit court. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3037h-122) was repealed by Acts 1942, ch. 176, § 17.

100.221. Meetings of board — Quorum — Minutes — Bylaws — Hearing examiner.

  1. Each board of adjustment shall conduct meetings at the call of the chairman who shall give written or oral notice to all members of the board at least seven (7) days prior to the meeting, which notice shall contain the date, time and place for the meeting, and the subject or subjects which will be discussed.
  2. A simple majority of the total membership of a board of adjustment as established by agreement shall constitute a quorum. Any member of a board of adjustment who has any direct or indirect financial interest in the outcome of any question before the body shall disclose the nature of the interest and shall disqualify himself from voting on the question.
  3. All boards of adjustment shall adopt bylaws for the transaction of business and shall keep minutes and records of all proceedings, including regulations, transactions, findings, and determinations, and the number of votes for and against each question, and if any member is absent or abstains from voting, indicating the fact, all of which shall, immediately after adoption, be filed in the office of the board. If the board has no office, such records may be kept in custody of an officer of the board and shall be available to the general public. A transcript of the minutes of a board of adjustment shall be provided if requested by a party, at the expense of the requesting party, and the transcript shall constitute the record.
  4. A board of adjustment may appoint one (1) or more of its members to act as hearing examiner to preside over a public hearing or public meeting and make recommendations to the board based upon a transcript or record of the hearing.

History. Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 172, §§ 44 to 46; 1986, ch. 141, § 24, effective July 15, 1986.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Minutes.

The provision in this section that the transcript of the minutes shall constitute the record is intended merely to express the standard rule that a public body can speak only through its records. Gentry v. Ressnier, 437 S.W.2d 756, 1969 Ky. LEXIS 455 ( Ky. 1969 ).

It is not necessary for the transcript of evidence heard by the board to be incorporated into the minutes by reference to be considered by the court because there will normally be no problem of certainty. Gentry v. Ressnier, 437 S.W.2d 756, 1969 Ky. LEXIS 455 ( Ky. 1969 ).

2. Procedural Due Process.

Procedural due process by an administrative body includes a hearing, the taking and weighing of evidence if such is offered, a finding of fact based upon a consideration of the evidence, the making of an order supported by substantial evidence, and, where the party’s constitutional rights are involved, a judicial review of the administrative action. Morris v. Catlettsburg, 437 S.W.2d 753, 1969 Ky. LEXIS 454 ( Ky. 1969 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

The board of adjustment, rather than the applicant-property owner, bears the responsibility and cost of giving notice of public hearings. OAG 79-75 .

The Board of Adjustments, a public body, cannot vote by secret ballot and the minutes of the meetings must indicate how each member voted on each issue before the Board. OAG 91-196 .

100.223. Employing planners or other persons.

Any board of adjustments may employ or contract with planners or other persons as it deems necessary to accomplish its assigned duties under this chapter.

History. Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 47.

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Tarlock, Kentucky Planning and Land Use Control Enabling Legislation: An Analysis of the 1966 Revision of KRS Chapter 100, 56 Ky. L.J. 556 (1968).

100.227. Finances.

Any board of adjustments shall have the right to receive, hold, and spend funds which it may legally receive from any and every source both in and out of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, including the United States government, for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of this chapter.

History. Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 48.

100.230. Subdivision jurisdiction. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3037h-124) was repealed by Acts 1942, ch. 176, § 17.

100.231. Subpoena power.

Any board of adjustments shall have the power to issue subpoenas to compel witnesses to attend its meetings and give evidence bearing upon the questions before it. The sheriff shall serve such subpoenas. The Circuit Court may, upon application by the board compel obedience to such court or such subpoena by proceedings of contempt.

History. Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 49.

Opinions of Attorney General.

The legislative body or the fiscal court is authorized to override the planning commission’s approval or disapproval of an amendment to a zoning regulation. OAG 67-151 .

100.233. Administration of oaths.

The chairman of any board of adjustments shall have the power to administer an oath to witnesses prior to their testifying before the board on any issue.

History. Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 50.

100.237. Conditional use permits.

The board shall have the power to hear and decide applications for conditional use permits to allow the proper integration into the community of uses which are specifically named in the zoning regulations which may be suitable only in specific locations in the zone only if certain conditions are met:

  1. The board may approve, modify, or deny any application for a conditional use permit. If it approves such permit it may attach necessary conditions such as time limitations, requirements that one (1) or more things be done before the request can be initiated, or conditions of a continuing nature. Any such conditions shall be recorded in the board’s minutes and on the conditional use permit, along with a reference to the specific section in the zoning regulation listing the conditional use under consideration. The board shall have power to revoke conditional use permits, or variances for noncompliance with the condition thereof. Furthermore, the board shall have a right of action to compel offending structures or uses removed at the cost of the violator and may have judgment in personam for such cost.
    1. Granting of a conditional use permit does not exempt the applicant from complying with all of the requirements of building, housing, and other regulations. (2) (a) Granting of a conditional use permit does not exempt the applicant from complying with all of the requirements of building, housing, and other regulations.
    2. If the applicant submits a modified plan to the relevant regulatory authorities in order to comply with all of the requirements of building, housing, and other regulations that expands the applicant’s conditional use beyond the previously established geographic boundaries of the original conditional use permit, then the expanded conditional use shall be reviewed by the board. This review shall be limited to an examination solely of the expanded geographic boundaries of the modified plan. The board may deny the applicant’s conditional use permit for the expanded geographic area.
    3. The applicant shall have the duty of informing the board of modifications made in accordance with paragraph (b) of this subsection, within fourteen (14) days of their submission. The applicant’s failure to provide the board with notification shall be grounds for the board to revoke the conditional use permit, after a hearing before the board.
  2. In any case where a conditional use permit has not been exercised within the time limit set by the board, or within one (1) year if no specific time limit has been set, such conditional use permit shall not revert to its original designation unless there has been a public hearing. “Exercised,” as set forth in this section, shall mean that binding contracts for the construction of the main building or other improvement have been let; or in the absence of contracts that the main building or other improvement is under construction to a substantial degree, or that prerequisite conditions involving substantial investment under contract, in development, are completed. When construction is not a part of the use, “exercised” shall mean that the use is in operation in compliance with the conditions as set forth in the permit.
  3. The administrative official shall review all conditional use permits, except those for which all conditions have been permanently satisfied, at least once annually and shall have the power to inspect the land or structure where the conditional use is located in order to ascertain that the landowner is complying with all of the conditions which are listed on the conditional use permit. If the landowner is not complying with all of the conditions listed on the conditional use permit, the administrative official shall report the fact in writing to the chairman of the board of adjustment. The report shall state specifically the manner in which the landowner is not complying with the conditions on the conditional use permit, and a copy of the report shall be furnished to the landowner at the same time that it is furnished to the chairman of the board of adjustment. The board shall hold a hearing on the report within a reasonable time, and notice of the time and place of the hearing shall be furnished to the landowner at least one (1) week prior to the hearing. If the board of adjustment finds that the facts alleged in the report of the administrative official are true and that the landowner has taken no steps to comply with them between the date of the report and the date of the hearing, the board of adjustment may authorize the administrative official to revoke the conditional use permit and take the necessary legal action to cause the termination of the activity on the land which the conditional use permit authorizes.
  4. Once the board of adjustment has completed a conditional use permit and all the conditions required are of such type that they can be completely and permanently satisfied, the administrative official, upon request of the applicant, may, if the facts warrant, make a determination that the conditions have been satisfied, and enter the facts which indicate that the conditions have been satisfied and the conclusion in the margin of the copy of the conditional use permit which is on file. Thereafter said use, if it continues to meet the other requirements of the regulations, will be treated as a permitted use.
  5. When an application is made for a conditional use permit for land located within or abutting any residential zoning district, written notice shall be given at least fourteen (14) days in advance of the public hearing on the application to the applicant, administrative official, the mayor and city clerk of any city with a population of less than three thousand (3,000) based upon the most recent federal decennial census so affected within any county containing a consolidated local government, an owner of every parcel of property adjoining the property to which the application applies, and such other persons as the local zoning ordinance, regulations, or board of adjustment bylaws shall direct. Written notice shall be by first-class mail with certification by the board’s secretary or other officer that the notice was mailed. It shall be the duty of the applicant to furnish to the board the name and address of an owner of each parcel of property as described in this subsection. Records maintained by the property valuation administrator may be relied upon conclusively to determine the identity and address of said owner. In the event such property is in condominium or cooperative forms of ownership, then the person notified by mail shall be the president or chairperson of the owner group which administers property commonly owned by the condominium or cooperative owners. A joint notice may be mailed to two (2) or more co-owners of an adjoining property who are listed in the property valuation administrator’s records as having the same address.
  6. When any property within the required notification area for a public hearing upon a conditional use permit application is located within an adjoining city, county, or planning unit, notice of the hearing shall be given at least fourteen (14) days in advance of the hearing, by first-class mail to certain public officials, as follows:
    1. If the adjoining property is part of a planning unit, notice shall be given to that unit’s planning commission; or
    2. If the adjoining property is not part of a planning unit, notice shall be given to the mayor of the city in which the property is located or, if the property is in an unincorporated area, notice shall be given to the judge/executive of the county in which the property is located.

History. Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 51; 1978, ch. 384, § 23, effective June 17, 1978; 1986, ch. 134, § 1, effective July 15, 1986; 1988, ch. 30, § 6, effective July 15, 1988; 1988, ch. 144, § 1, effective July 15, 1988; 1990, ch. 362, § 10, effective July 13, 1990; 2002, ch. 346, § 148, effective July 15, 2002; 2014, ch. 113, § 2, effective July 15, 2014; 2014, ch. 92, § 195, effective January 1, 2015.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(1/1/2015). This statute was amended by 2014 Ky. Acts chs. 92 and 113, which do not appear to be in conflict and have been codified together.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Applicability.

KRS 100.237 gave the board the power to grant conditional use permits, and Woodford County, Kentucky, Zoning Regulations, art. VII, KRS 701.4 specifically named “Tourist Home along State or Federal Highway” as a conditional use in the A-1 zone; appellants failed to meet their burden showing that the board acted outside its regulatory authority in granting an owner a conditional use permit to allow a “tourist home.” Allen v. Woodford County Bd. of Adjustments, 228 S.W.3d 573, 2007 Ky. App. LEXIS 190 (Ky. Ct. App. 2007).

2. Minutes.

Minutes of board of zoning adjustments regarding refusal to grant conditional use permit for nursing home in residential district do not constitute sole record on appeal where board has held a hearing and formal testimony is taken and transcribed and tendered by the board to the Circuit Court since applicant has burden of showing board’s decision is arbitrary on basis of evidence before the board. Gentry v. Ressnier, 437 S.W.2d 756, 1969 Ky. LEXIS 455 ( Ky. 1969 ).

It is not necessary for the transcript of evidence heard by the board regarding conditional use permit for nursing home in residential area to be incorporated into the minutes by reference to be considered by the court on appeal since decisions of the board demand a formal record but not evidence heard by the board. Gentry v. Ressnier, 437 S.W.2d 756, 1969 Ky. LEXIS 455 ( Ky. 1969 ).

3. Findings.

Where board of adjustments did not show that its determination to grant the conditional use permit was based on consideration of its effects on public health, safety and welfare and on the overall zoning scheme, board’s determination was remanded for further consideration and findings of fact relevant to the standards for granting a conditional use in the statute. Davis v. Richardson, 507 S.W.2d 446, 1974 Ky. LEXIS 703 ( Ky. 1974 ).

As a board of adjustment failed to make the threshold findings required by a county zoning ordinance as to the desirabilty, utility, and safety of a proposed golf course, it erred by approving a developer’s application for conditional use permits. Murphy v. Key West Crossing, LLC, 152 S.W.3d 876, 2004 Ky. App. LEXIS 341 (Ky. Ct. App. 2004).

County board of zoning adjustment (board) had a sufficient basis to issue a conditional use permit because (1) the use was available in the property's zone, (2) the board found the use served the public interest, and (3) objecting neighbors' due process rights were not violated. Drakes Creek Holding Co., LLC v. Franklin-Simpson Cnty. Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 518 S.W.3d 174, 2017 Ky. App. LEXIS 62 (Ky. Ct. App. 2017).

Circuit court properly affirmed the decision of the board of adjustments, which denied a company's application for a conditional use permit to allow a dockage facility on property because the board did not abuse its authority by its interpretation of the undefined text of an ordinance and the ordinance as a whole; the board thought it contrary to the ordinance to permit heavy-industrial docking facilities in a zone that limited itself in every respect to recreation and conservation activity. Harrison Silvergrove Prop., LLC v. Campbell County & Mun. Bd. of Adjustment, 492 S.W.3d 908, 2016 Ky. App. LEXIS 116 (Ky. Ct. App. 2016).

4. Failure to Follow Procedure.

Zoning ordinances of city were void ab initio where city did not follow the requirements of KRS Chapter 100 in adopting such ordinances. Bellefonte Land, Inc. v. Bellefonte, 864 S.W.2d 315, 1993 Ky. App. LEXIS 143 (Ky. Ct. App. 1993).

5. Revocation.

It was error to revoke a conditional use permit (CUP) when ordinances enacted after the CUP was issued required a route change because (1) the ordinances did not make compliance with the CUP's conditions impossible, and (2) the property's owners did not impermissibly expand the CUP's scope, as the ordinances did not bar the use, any commercial infeasibility did not equal impossibility, and Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 100.237(2)(a) and the CUP conditions let the owners use the alternate route. Drakes Creek Holding Co., LLC v. Franklin-Simpson Cnty. Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 518 S.W.3d 174, 2017 Ky. App. LEXIS 62 (Ky. Ct. App. 2017).

Cited:

Louisville & Jefferson County Bd. of Zoning Adjustment v. Joseph C. Hofgesang Sand Co., 617 S.W.2d 40, 1981 Ky. LEXIS 253 ( Ky. 1981 ), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1085, 102 S. Ct. 643, 70 L. Ed. 2d 620, 1981 U.S. LEXIS 4694, 50 U.S.L.W. 3447 (1981); Spainhoward v. Henderson, 7 S.W.3d 396, 1999 Ky. App. LEXIS 148 (Ky. Ct. App. 1999); Sebastian-Voor Props., LLC v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Gov’t, — S.W.3d —, 2008 Ky. LEXIS 39 ( Ky. 2008 ); Campbell County Fiscal Court v. Nash, — S.W.3d —, 2008 Ky. App. LEXIS 373 (Ky. Ct. App. 2008).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Any change or alteration in the building which might change the conditions authorized by the conditional use permit would have to have the approval of the board and conform to the zoning ordinance. OAG 67-148 .

The board of adjustment cannot permit a conditional use or special exception that is not listed in the zoning ordinance. OAG 67-148 .

The board of adjustment is not authorized to grant a “conditional use” or “special exception” to permit a use not listed as an “exception” in the zoning ordinance, or to grant a “variance” other than a dimensional variance which cannot contradict a zoning regulation. OAG 69-151 .

A public hearing was required with respect to granting or denying a conditional use permit pursuant to this section. OAG 71-497 .

In applying its authority, the board of adjustment must look to the standards in the zoning regulations on the specific exception applied for and since this section is generally stated and fails to prescribe definite or precise guidelines in the issuance of permits, the board must look to the guidelines contained in the applicable zoning regulations and may not utilize extrinsic guidelines, such as the environmental impact approach, in the exercise of its duties under this section. OAG 73-698 .

The fiscal court has the power only to change the zoning classification under KRS 100.211 and not to impose restrictions on the property as to its use, as a use restriction would probably come under the category of a conditional use permit over which the board of adjustment has sole jurisdiction pursuant to this section. OAG 74-334 .

The board is authorized to approve, modify, or deny any application for a conditional use permit, and if it approves such permit, it may attach necessary conditions such as time limitations, requirements that one or more things be done before the requests can be initiated, or conditions of a continuing nature, so that the board could control the continued use of the property by specifying that such conditional use would continue only so long as the owner of the property utilized the conditional use. OAG 75-475 .

In order to qualify to file an application for a conditional use permit, the individual must be a landowner, which means that he must own legal or equitable title to the land and this of course would exclude a person having only an option to purchase land. OAG 76-593 .

The board of adjustment is required to hold a public hearing in connection with the granting or withholding of a conditional use permit and a dimensional variance and to satisfy the other requirements of procedural due process. OAG 79-75 .

A county zoning ordinance delegating the authority to a county planning commission to hear and determine applications for conditional use permits is contrary to the provisions of KRS Chapter 100, and particularly this section which gives such authority to the board of adjustments created in part for such purpose. OAG 80-27 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Bench & Bar.

Moore, Practicing Before a Board of Adjustment: Seven Practical Tips, Volume 75, No. 1, January 2011, Ky. Bench & Bar 10.

Kentucky Law Journal.

Tarlock, Kentucky Planning and Land Use Control Enabling Legislation: An Analysis of the 1966 Revision of KRS Chapter 100, 56 Ky. L.J. 556 (1968).

Kentucky Law Survey, Griffin and Becker, Zoning, 67 Ky. L.J. 627 (1978-1979).

Kentucky Law Survey, Bratt and Brown, Environmental Law, 70 Ky. L.J. 455 (1981-82).

Article: The Lexington-Fayette Urban County Board of Adjustment: Fifty Years Later, 100 Ky. L.J. 435 (2011/2012).

100.240. Recording and transfer of land. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3037h-125, 3037h-128) was repealed by Acts 1942, ch. 176, § 17.

100.241. Variances.

The board shall have the power to hear and decide on applications for variances. The board may impose any reasonable conditions or restrictions on any variance it decides to grant.

History. Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 52; 1980, ch. 188, § 97, effective July 15, 1980; 1986, ch. 141, § 25, effective July 15, 1986.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Construction.

Speaking broadly, a “variance” is authority extended to owner to use his property in manner forbidden by zoning enactment; an “exception,” on the other hand, allows him to put his property to use which enactment expressly permits. Kline v. Louisville & Jefferson County Bd. of Zoning Adjustment & Appeals, 325 S.W.2d 324, 1959 Ky. LEXIS 53 ( Ky. 1959 ) (decided under prior law).

2. Discretion to Grant.

In determining whether to permit variance from terms of zoning ordinance where, due to special conditions, enforcement would entail unwarranted hardship and injustice, board was vested with broad discretion, which, unless abused, would not have been interfered with by courts. Smith v. Selligman, 270 Ky. 69 , 109 S.W.2d 14, 1937 Ky. LEXIS 23 ( Ky. 1937 ) (decided under prior law).

The board has discretion as to whether or not it will grant a variation. Selligman v. Western & Southern Life Ins. Co., 277 Ky. 551 , 126 S.W.2d 419, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 570 ( Ky. 1938 ) (decided under prior law).

Where board was expressly granted discretion by statute, the general rule “that zoning ordinance must prescribe a definite standard and neither the board or city council may exercise discretion in granting building permits” was not applicable. Selligman v. Western & Southern Life Ins. Co., 277 Ky. 551 , 126 S.W.2d 419, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 570 ( Ky. 1938 ) (decided under prior law).

3. Exceptions.

Finding of “hardship” was not required for exception for off-street parking which would relieve traffic congestion drawn into a residential area by a nearby commercial activity. Kline v. Louisville & Jefferson County Bd. of Zoning Adjustment & Appeals, 325 S.W.2d 324, 1959 Ky. LEXIS 53 ( Ky. 1959 ) (decided under prior law).

4. Refusal.

Refusal to make variance from terms of zoning ordinance was proper, where applicants for permit to establish funeral home were then conducting business on another street and city was divided into 11 districts in seven of which funeral home could have been established. Smith v. Selligman, 270 Ky. 69 , 109 S.W.2d 14, 1937 Ky. LEXIS 23 ( Ky. 1937 ) (decided under prior law).

5. Hardship Condition.

Legislature in the enactment of law providing for procedure to be followed on petitions for variances and special exceptions intended a clear demarcation to be maintained between situations under which variance may be invoked and those under which an exception may be solicited, and exceptions were to be granted without showing of any hardship, but hardship was a condition precedent to authorization of variance. Kline v. Louisville & Jefferson County Bd. of Zoning Adjustment & Appeals, 325 S.W.2d 324, 1959 Ky. LEXIS 53 ( Ky. 1959 ) (decided under prior law).

Where the proposed house, if built in accordance with existing zoning ordinances, would be positioned directly on top of a sink hole, such evidence established an extraordinary situation or condition of the site which authorized the variance. Menefee v. Board of Adjustment, 494 S.W.2d 519, 1973 Ky. LEXIS 447 ( Ky. 1973 ) (decided under prior law).

6. Injunction to Force Variance.

Filing of a complaint seeking mandatory injunction to compel county planning and zoning board of adjustments and appeals to make zoning variation so that builders could use certain land for storing and processing building material in connection with an adjoining subdivision was a remedy to which aggrieved party was not entitled since he should have filed an appeal for review and the running of time for taking the appeal for review was not suspended by filing the complaint for injunction. L. Le Roy Highbaugh, Jr. Builder, Inc. v. Louisville & Jefferson County Planning & Zoning Board, Etc, 287 S.W.2d 169, 1956 Ky. LEXIS 452 ( Ky. 1956 ) (decided under prior law).

7. Failure To Follow Procedure.

Zoning ordinances of city were void ab initio where city did not follow the requirements of KRS Chapter 100 in adopting such ordinances. Bellefonte Land, Inc. v. Bellefonte, 864 S.W.2d 315, 1993 Ky. App. LEXIS 143 (Ky. Ct. App. 1993) (decided under prior law).

Opinions of Attorney General.

The board of adjustment is not required to hold a public hearing as a prerequisite to its decision on an application for a dimensional variance. OAG 67-528 .

The board of adjustment is not authorized to grant a “conditional use” or “special exception” to permit a use not listed as an “exception” in the zoning ordinance, or to grant a “variance” other than a dimensional variance which cannot contradict a zoning regulation. OAG 69-151 .

Once a subdivision plat has been approved pursuant to KRS 100.277 the streets become county roads, and their width is controlled by KRS 178.040 ; therefore a county board of adjustments has no authority pursuant to this section to grant a variance of such a street’s right-of-way only to 26 feet since KRS 178.040 (2) mandates a 30-foot right-of-way, but a lesser width may be all that need be actually paved. OAG 78-567 .

The board of adjustment is required to hold a public hearing in connection with the granting or withholding of a conditional use permit and a dimensional variance and to satisfy the other requirements of procedural due process. OAG 79-75 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Kentucky Law Survey, Griffin and Becker, Zoning, 67 Ky. L.J. 627 (1978-1979).

Kentucky Law Survey, Bratt and Brown, Environmental Law, 70 Ky. L.J. 455 (1981-82).

Article: The Lexington-Fayette Urban County Board of Adjustment: Fifty Years Later, 100 Ky. L.J. 435 (2011/2012).

ALR

Who may apply for variance, special exception, or use permit, or appeal from denial thereof. 89 A.L.R.2d 663.

Requirement that zoning variances or exceptions be made in accordance with comprehensive plan. 40 A.L.R.3d 372.

Authority of zoning commission to impose, as condition of allowance of special zoning exception, permit, or variance, requirements as to highway and traffic changes. 49 A.L.R.3d 492.

Zoning board’s grant of new application for zoning change, variance, or special exception after denial of previous application covering same property or part thereof. 52 A.L.R.3d 494.

100.243. Findings necessary for granting variances.

  1. Before any variance is granted, the board must find that the granting of the variance will not adversely affect the public health, safety or welfare, will not alter the essential character of the general vicinity, will not cause a hazard or a nuisance to the public, and will not allow an unreasonable circumvention of the requirements of the zoning regulations. In making these findings, the board shall consider whether:
    1. The requested variance arises from special circumstances which do not generally apply to land in the general vicinity, or in the same zone;
    2. The strict application of the provisions of the regulation would deprive the applicant of the reasonable use of the land or would create an unnecessary hardship on the applicant; and
    3. The circumstances are the result of actions of the applicant taken subsequent to the adoption of the zoning regulation from which relief is sought.
  2. The board shall deny any request for a variance arising from circumstances that are the result of willful violations of the zoning regulation by the applicant subsequent to the adoption of the zoning regulation from which relief is sought.

History. Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 53; 1986, ch. 141, § 27, effective July 15, 1986; 1988, ch. 144, § 4, effective July 15, 1988.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Showing of Hardship.

Board of adjustment exceeded its powers in granting permit to erect filling station in residential zone, there having been no showing that compliance with ordinance would result in unnecessary hardship. Bray v. Beyer, 292 Ky. 162 , 166 S.W.2d 290, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 67 ( Ky. 1942 ) (decided under prior law).

Where the proposed house, if built in accordance with existing zoning ordinances, would be positioned directly on top of a sink hole, such evidence established an extraordinary situation or condition of the site which authorized the variance. Menefee v. Board of Adjustment, 494 S.W.2d 519, 1973 Ky. LEXIS 447 ( Ky. 1973 ).

2. Waiver.

A board of adjustment cannot circumvent the requirements for the grant of a variance by granting a “waiver,” rather than a variance; therefore, innovative subdivision regulations promulgated in a county were unlawful because they purported to grant variances, denominated as waivers. Louisville & Jefferson County Planning Comm'n v. Schmidt, 83 S.W.3d 449, 2001 Ky. LEXIS 84 ( Ky. 2001 ), modified, 2002 Ky. LEXIS 172 (Ky. Sept. 26, 2002).

3. Variance and Exception.

The power of authorizing special exceptions to and variations from the general provisions of the zoning law was to have been exercised only under exceptional circumstances and not for the purpose of amending the law or changing its scheme in essential particulars such as making changes in boundary lines of districts or authorizing the erection of a building forbidden by the zoning law to have been erected. Bray v. Beyer, 292 Ky. 162 , 166 S.W.2d 290, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 67 ( Ky. 1942 ) (decided under prior law).

“Variance” was authority extended to owner to use his property in manner forbidden by particular zoning enactment, while “exception” gave him permission to put his property to use which zoning enactment expressly allowed. Schmidt v. Craig, 354 S.W.2d 292, 1962 Ky. LEXIS 39 ( Ky. 1962 ) (decided under prior law).

4. Limitation of Time to Grant Variance.

A municipal zoning ordinance, denying the board of adjustment the right to grant an exception or make a variance from the literal provisions of the ordinance unless application had been made within five (5) years after its passage, would conflict with law, providing that board of adjustment may grant variances and exceptions under certain circumstances, and have been invalid. Bosworth v. Lexington, 277 Ky. 90 , 125 S.W.2d 995, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 615 ( Ky. 1939 ) (decided under prior law).

5. Special Use Permits.

The validity of ordinance giving board of adjustment and appeals of city power to grant special use permits could not have been properly put in issue upon the statutory appeal to circuit court by fire department from decision of the board denying application for a special use permit, the only issue having been whether the decision of the board denying the special use permit should have been reversed upon a finding that the board acted arbitrarily and capriciously without regard to the general welfare of the community. Board of Adjustment & Appeals v. Dixie Suburban Volunteer Fire Dept., Inc., 320 S.W.2d 109, 1958 Ky. LEXIS 7 ( Ky. 1958 ) (decided under prior law).

There was no showing that the board of zoning adjustment acted in an arbitrary and discriminatory manner but that it acted well within its authority and discretion upon adequate and substantial evidence in granting special exception to use property for a funeral home in residential zone where it would not alter the general character of the existing neighborhood. Schmidt v. Craig, 354 S.W.2d 292, 1962 Ky. LEXIS 39 ( Ky. 1962 ) (decided under prior law).

6. Sufficiency of Findings.

Upon review of a board of adjustment’s grant of a variance pursuant to KRS 100.243 , as there was no suggestion that the variance could adversely affect the public health, safety, or welfare, or that it would cause a hazard or nuisance to the public, extensive findings on those issues were not warranted or even possible. Ball v. Oldham County Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 375 S.W.3d 79, 2012 Ky. App. LEXIS 131 (Ky. Ct. App. 2012).

Review of a board of adjustment’s grant of a variance pursuant to KRS 100.243 indicated that it made sufficient findings as to the multiple statutory criteria in order to support the variance; issues for which there was a complete lack of evidence did not necessitate a finding of fact. Ball v. Oldham County Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 375 S.W.3d 79, 2012 Ky. App. LEXIS 131 (Ky. Ct. App. 2012).

Substantial evidence supported the grant of a variance under KRS 100.243(1), as a property owner’s efforts to subdivide and sell the property qualified as a “reasonable use” of land, and denial of the requested variance would deprive the owner of the use. Ball v. Oldham County Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 375 S.W.3d 79, 2012 Ky. App. LEXIS 131 (Ky. Ct. App. 2012).

Cited:

Bourbon County Bd. of Adjustment v. Currans, 873 S.W.2d 836, 1994 Ky. App. LEXIS 36 (Ky. Ct. App. 1994).

Opinions of Attorney General.

The board of adjustment is not required to hold a public hearing as a prerequisite to its decision on an application for a dimensional variance. OAG 67-528 .

The board of adjustment is not authorized to grant a “conditional use” or “special exception” to permit a use not listed as an “exception” in the zoning ordinance, or to grant a “variance” other than a dimensional variance which cannot contradict a zoning regulation. OAG 69-151 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Bench & Bar.

Moore, Practicing Before a Board of Adjustment: Seven Practical Tips, Volume 75, No. 1, January 2011, Ky. Bench & Bar 10.

Kentucky Law Journal.

Tarlock, Kentucky Planning and Land Use Control Enabling Legislation: An Analysis of the 1966 Revision of KRS Chapter 100, 56 Ky. L.J. 556 (1968).

Kentucky Law Survey, Griffin and Becker, Zoning, 67 Ky. L.J. 627 (1978-1979).

Article: The Lexington-Fayette Urban County Board of Adjustment: Fifty Years Later, 100 Ky. L.J. 435 (2011/2012).

100.247. Variance cannot contradict zoning regulation.

The board shall not possess the power to grant a variance to permit a use of any land, building, or structure which is not permitted by the zoning regulation in the zone in question, or to alter density requirements in the zone in question.

History. Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 54.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Construction.

This section does not restrict the establishment of a floating zone, as it is not a prohibited use, nor is it a “variance” within the meaning of subsection (1) of KRS 100.203 . Bellemeade Co. v. Priddle, 503 S.W.2d 734, 1973 Ky. LEXIS 47 ( Ky. 1973 ).

2. Failure To Follow Procedure.

Zoning ordinances of city were void ab initio where city did not follow the requirements of KRS Chapter 100 in adopting such ordinances. Bellefonte Land, Inc. v. Bellefonte, 864 S.W.2d 315, 1993 Ky. App. LEXIS 143 (Ky. Ct. App. 1993).

3. Condition of Granting Variance.

The board could have, as a condition to granting a variation from the zoning ordinance, imposed reasonable restrictions not contained in the ordinance and which the board could not have imposed originally, but the courts would have set aside unreasonable or arbitrary conditions. Selligman v. Western & Southern Life Ins. Co., 277 Ky. 551 , 126 S.W.2d 419, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 570 ( Ky. 1938 ) (decided under prior law).

Opinions of Attorney General.

The board of adjustment cannot permit a conditional use or special exception that is not listed in the zoning ordinance. OAG 67-148 .

The board of adjustment is not authorized to grant a “conditional use” or “special exception” to permit a use not listed as an “exception” in the zoning ordinance, or to grant a “variance” other than a dimensional variance which cannot contradict a zoning regulation. OAG 69-151 .

A county zoning ordinance which empowers the board of adjustments to alter the density requirements in a zone conflicts with this statute and must defer to it. OAG 75-140 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Bench & Bar.

Moore, Practicing Before a Board of Adjustment: Seven Practical Tips, Volume 75, No. 1, January 2011, Ky. Bench & Bar 10.

Kentucky Law Journal.

Tarlock, Kentucky Planning and Land Use Control Enabling Legislation: An Analysis of the 1966 Revision of KRS Chapter 100, 56 Ky. L.J. 556 (1968).

Kentucky Law Survey, Griffin and Becker, Zoning, 67 Ky. L.J. 627 (1978-1979).

Article: The Lexington-Fayette Urban County Board of Adjustment: Fifty Years Later, 100 Ky. L.J. 435 (2011/2012).

100.250. Extent of subdivision regulations; notice; hearing. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3037h-126) was repealed by Acts 1942, ch. 176, § 17.

100.251. Variance runs with the land.

A variance applies to the property for which it is granted, and not to the individual who applied for it. A variance runs with the land and is transferable to any future owner of the land, but it cannot be transferred by the applicant to a different site.

History. Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 55; 1986, ch. 141, § 27, effective July 15, 1986.

100.253. Existing nonconforming use, continuance — Change — Effect of nonconforming use of ten years’ duration — Application.

  1. The lawful use of a building or premises, existing at the time of the adoption of any zoning regulations affecting it, may be continued, although such use does not conform to the provisions of such regulations, except as otherwise provided herein.
  2. The board of adjustment shall not allow the enlargement or extension of a nonconforming use beyond the scope and area of its operation at the time the regulation which makes its use nonconforming was adopted, nor shall the board permit a change from one (1) nonconforming use to another unless the new nonconforming use is in the same or a more restrictive classification, provided, however, the board of adjustment may grant approval, effective to maintain nonconforming-use status, for enlargements or extensions, made or to be made, of the facilities of a nonconforming use, where the use consists of the presenting of a major public attraction or attractions, such as a sports event or events, which has been presented at the same site over such period of years and has such attributes and public acceptance as to have attained international prestige and to have achieved the status of a public tradition, contributing substantially to the economy of the community and state, of which prestige and status the site is an essential element, and where the enlargement or extension was or is designed to maintain the prestige and status by meeting the increasing demands of participants and patrons.
  3. Any use which has existed illegally and does not conform to the provisions of the zoning regulations, and has been in continuous existence for a period of ten (10) years, and which has not been the subject of any adverse order or other adverse action by the administrative official during said period, shall be deemed a nonconforming use. Thereafter, such use shall be governed by the provisions of subsection (2) of this section.
  4. The provisions of subsection (3) of this section shall not apply to counties containing a city of the first class, a consolidated local government, an urban-county government, or a city with a population equal to or greater than twenty thousand (20,000) based upon the most recent federal decennial census.

History. Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 56; 1978, ch. 327, § 3, effective June 17, 1978; 1984, ch. 412, § 3, effective July 13, 1984; 1986, ch. 141, § 28, effective July 15, 1986; 2002, ch. 346, § 149, effective July 15, 2002; 2014, ch. 92, § 196, effective January 1, 2015.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Analysis

1. Established Use.

“Established use” of property was not limited to the actual activities on the day of its enactment. Bowling Green v. Miller, 335 S.W.2d 893, 1960 Ky. LEXIS 284 ( Ky. 1960 ).

Where owner had actively embarked on plans to convert a motel into apartments and to establish a mobile home park 12 months before the enactment of the zoning freeze, and at the time of enactment had expended approximately $12,000 of the $29,000 estimated cost of conversion, the property had obtained the status of a nonconforming use so as to exempt it from compliance with the zoning ordinance. Perkins v. Joint City-County Planning Com., 480 S.W.2d 166, 1972 Ky. LEXIS 278 ( Ky. 1972 ).

Zoning ordinance providing that nonconforming use of junk yards must be discontinued within two years from effective date of the ordinance was invalid as applied to junk yard owner who operated a junk yard prior to the lot’s being annexed by the city and prior to enactment of the ordinance which had the effect of making his junk yard a nonconforming use. Paducah v. Johnson, 522 S.W.2d 447, 1975 Ky. LEXIS 134 ( Ky. 1975 ).

Subsection (1) of this section applies to both nonconforming buildings and nonconforming uses or premises. Grannis v. Schroder, 978 S.W.2d 328, 1997 Ky. App. LEXIS 128 (Ky. Ct. App. 1997).

2. Shift of Use.

Where building was occupied for the display, storage and delivery of furnaces, subsequent use of building by purchaser to carry on a plumbing, heating and sheet metal business constituted a substantial change in the former use of the building, since the sheet metal business was a shift from passive use for storage and sales to a manufacturing enterprise. Bowling Green v. Miller, 335 S.W.2d 893, 1960 Ky. LEXIS 284 ( Ky. 1960 ) (decided under prior law).

Where a shift in use was contemplated, an important consideration was to have been certain that type of activity carried on under second use was merely incidental to major activity allowed by former nonconforming use. Attorney Gen. v. Johnson, 355 S.W.2d 305, 1962 Ky. LEXIS 67 ( Ky. 1962 ) (decided under prior law).

The question of good faith will arise in any case where the owners or buyers of rezoned property rush into any building activity or change of use before the time expires for appealing a rezoning decision. Petty v. Barrentine, 594 S.W.2d 903, 1980 Ky. App. LEXIS 297 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980).

Subsection (2) of this section permits a nonconforming use to be changed to a different nonconforming use of the same or a more restrictive zoning category without requiring the new use to be incidental to the old use. Prewitt v. Johnson, 710 S.W.2d 238, 1986 Ky. App. LEXIS 1148 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986).

Where the city zoning board concluded that the automobile sales business was of the same classification as the automobile service station, such use change was permissible under subsection (2) of the section. Prewitt v. Johnson, 710 S.W.2d 238, 1986 Ky. App. LEXIS 1148 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986).

Where the property owner requested a new nonconforming use permit to use the property, previously used as a service station, and as a used car lot, the city planning board had the right to specifically condition the property owner’s continuing use of the property on his removing the alleged burden from neighboring landowners, by using shaded lights, locating his stock a minimum distance from the public sidewalk, and restricting the use of signs and banners. Prewitt v. Johnson, 710 S.W.2d 238, 1986 Ky. App. LEXIS 1148 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986).

Auction house’s enclosure of its porch to provide restroom facilities, and its increase in weekly auctions from two to three, did not justify a Board of Adjustments finding that the owner had impermissibly enlarged the property’s nonconforming use so as to render it illegal. Board of Adjustments v. Brown, 969 S.W.2d 214, 1998 Ky. App. LEXIS 44 (Ky. Ct. App. 1998).

3. Abandonment.

Nine (9) months’ vacancy did not terminate well established commercial use. Bowling Green v. Miller, 335 S.W.2d 893, 1960 Ky. LEXIS 284 ( Ky. 1960 ) (decided under prior law).

A temporary vacancy or nonuser of premises without evidence of an intention to abandon the nonconforming use did not extinguish it, particularly when there was a nonconforming structure on the premises, the existence of which would have at least constructively continued for a reasonable time the nonconforming use of the land. Bowling Green v. Miller, 335 S.W.2d 893, 1960 Ky. LEXIS 284 ( Ky. 1960 ) (decided under prior law).

Where premises had not been used for grocery store purposes for approximately five (5) years and for part of that time main building had been used by club for social meetings and portion of premises had also been used for secondary real estate office, the existing nonconforming use had been abandoned, since an existing use must be held within a rigid boundary and could not have been enlarged or extended and a change to a substantially different use was not allowable. Attorney Gen. v. Johnson, 355 S.W.2d 305, 1962 Ky. LEXIS 67 ( Ky. 1962 ) (decided under prior law).

The question of abandonment, like the question of an established use, must have been approached upon the basis that the law was concerned, not with a mere plan in mind on a change of intention, but with acts or a failure to have acted. Attorney Gen. v. Johnson, 355 S.W.2d 305, 1962 Ky. LEXIS 67 ( Ky. 1962 ) (decided under prior law).

A considerable lapse of time in discontinuance of nonconforming use may show intention to abandon the right and may be considered in connection with acts manifesting that intention. Attorney Gen. v. Johnson, 355 S.W.2d 305, 1962 Ky. LEXIS 67 ( Ky. 1962 ) (decided under prior law).

A ten-year period of nonuse of quarry was sufficient to show an intention to abandon that use and when the nonconforming use existed no longer, there could be nothing incidental to it, nor could a higher nonconforming use be made of it. Holloway Ready Mix Co. v. Monfort, 474 S.W.2d 80, 1968 Ky. LEXIS 135 ( Ky. 1968 ) (decided under prior law).

A nonconforming use is a property right that is constitutionally protected; it can, however, be abandoned. In each case, the abandonment rests upon intent; while intent may be inferred from a long period of disuse, the general rule is that mere discontinuance of the nonconforming use does not in itself constitute abandonment. The circumstances surrounding each case must be considered. Martin v. Beehan, 689 S.W.2d 29, 1985 Ky. App. LEXIS 500 (Ky. Ct. App. 1985).

4. Failure to Follow Procedure.

Zoning ordinances of city were void ab initio where city did not follow the requirements of KRS Chapter 100 in adopting such ordinances. Bellefonte Land, Inc. v. Bellefonte, 864 S.W.2d 315, 1993 Ky. App. LEXIS 143 (Ky. Ct. App. 1993).

5. Existing Use.

The right to use property for the conduct of a lawful business not inimicable to the health, safety or morals of the community became vested when, prior to the enactment of restrictions, the owner had in good faith performed a series of acts necessary to accomplish the end intended. Such rights were protected from encroachment by the states by United States Const., Amend. 14, and by United States Const., Amend. 5. Darlington v. Board of Councilmen, 282 Ky. 778 , 140 S.W.2d 392, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 258 ( Ky. 1940 ) (decided under prior law).

Where there was a conflict in the evidence as to whether a nonconforming use of zoned property had begun prior to the zoning of the area, the finding of the chancellor that appellants did not establish that they had maintained a stand for sale of both home grown and imported produce on property prior to enactment of a zoning law was not clearly erroneous. Deerfield Co. v. Stanley, 441 S.W.2d 119, 1969 Ky. LEXIS 289 ( Ky. 1969 ) (decided under prior law).

Nonconforming use of a sand and gravel mining operation properly included land which was not being actively mined at the time the zoning ordinance establishing the nonconforming use was enacted, since the operation necessarily involved mining one area at a time until resources were depleted, and the entire property was demonstrably dedicated to mining at the time of zoning. Legrand v. Ewbank, 284 S.W.3d 142, 2008 Ky. App. LEXIS 284 (Ky. Ct. App. 2008).

For purposes of nonconforming use, in cases of a diminishing asset, the enterprise is using all that land which contains the particular asset and which constitutes an integral part of the operation, notwithstanding the fact that a particular portion may not yet be under actual excavation. Legrand v. Ewbank, 284 S.W.3d 142, 2008 Ky. App. LEXIS 284 (Ky. Ct. App. 2008).

6. Strict Limitation on Nonconforming Uses.

The policy and spirit of zoning law of this state ordained gradual elimination of nonconforming uses, and general intent of ordinances dealing with the subject matter was to hold nonconforming uses within strict limits. Attorney Gen. v. Johnson, 355 S.W.2d 305, 1962 Ky. LEXIS 67 ( Ky. 1962 ) (decided under prior law).

7. Ordinance Prohibiting Existing Use Invalid.

Zoning ordinance prohibiting erection or operation of gasoline filling stations in residential zones was invalid as applied to filling station on corner of streets in residential district, where it had been erected about six (6) years before ordinance was enacted, its removal would destroy value of building and lot, it was not unsightly, and had not adversely affected safety, morals, health or public welfare of neighborhood. Standard Oil Co. v. Bowling Green, 244 Ky. 362 , 50 S.W.2d 960, 1932 Ky. LEXIS 427 ( Ky. 1932 ) (decided under prior law).

Where property owners operated a bed and breakfast, tearoom, and catering service as an accessory use and the board of adjustment imposed restrictions pursuant to an amended ordinance, since the board did not retain the authority to reasonably restrict the accessory uses of the property that existed prior to the adoption of the amended ordinance, the restrictions on the uses of the property as a tearoom and the catering of special events were illegally imposed. Greater Harrodsburg/Mercer County Planning & Zoning Comm'n v. Romero, 250 S.W.3d 355, 2008 Ky. App. LEXIS 92 (Ky. Ct. App. 2008).

8. Extension or Alteration of Existing Structures.

Provisions of ordinance permitting extension or alteration of structures erected and maintained before passage of zoning ordinance, and made nonconforming uses by the ordinance, should have been liberally construed to carry out the spirit of the law and prevent hardship to the owner. Bosworth v. Lexington, 277 Ky. 90 , 125 S.W.2d 995, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 615 ( Ky. 1939 ) (decided under prior law).

9. Injunction.

When complainants knew or could have known that zoning commission, with full knowledge of owner’s operations, had granted a permit allowing use of the building for light industry and as residents of a small suburban community knew, or could have known, that building was gradually being converted to manufacturing use, failure to bring suit until after owner had made substantial changes and improvement, expenditures which made the cost of moving the operations elsewhere prohibitive, constituted laches. McMahan v. Wittlig, 310 S.W.2d 777, 1958 Ky. LEXIS 405 ( Ky. 1958 ) (decided under prior law).

10. Estoppel of Enforcement.

Where city building inspector had advised that nonconforming business use of property could be maintained by the placing of a sign on building indicating that it was to be used for real estate office board was not estopped to deny issuance of permit for coin-operated laundry on property previously used for a grocery store since the doctrine of estoppel did not apply to municipality acting in governmental capacity as distinguished from proprietary capacity. Attorney Gen. v. Johnson, 355 S.W.2d 305, 1962 Ky. LEXIS 67 ( Ky. 1962 ) (decided under prior law).

11. Evidence of Use.

Where the testimony attempting to establish a continuing nonconforming use was vague and uncertain, the chancellor’s finding of the absence of nonconforming use was properly supported. Hofgesang v. McMakin, 457 S.W.2d 950, 1969 Ky. LEXIS 3 ( Ky. 1969 ) (decided under prior law).

12. — Intermittent Use.

Intermittent use of property was not sufficient to show that the owners had entered on the performance of acts to accomplish the end intended prior to the enactment of the zoning ordinance. Hofgesang v. McMakin, 457 S.W.2d 950, 1969 Ky. LEXIS 3 ( Ky. 1969 ) (decided under prior law).

Cited:

Landgrave v. Watson, 593 S.W.2d 875, 1979 Ky. App. LEXIS 507 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).

Notes to Unpublished Decisions

1. Established Use.

Unpublished decision: Advertising company’s benches, which were excluded from the public right-of-way by a city ordinance, did not qualify as a non-conforming use; prior to enactment of the ordinance, the benches were placed pursuant to licenses granted by the city, and the company as licensee could not assert a right to a non-conforming use. Bench Billboard Co. v. City of Covington, Ky., 465 Fed. Appx. 395, 2012 FED App. 0179N, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 3031 (6th Cir. Ky. 2012 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Where a house trailer had been located on property prior to the enactment of an ordinance prohibiting house trailers there, the owner could legally remove the trailer and replace it with another at the same site. OAG 70-718 .

Where a person replaced an older mobile home not owned by her with a new one which she owned after the enactment of an ordinance prohibiting house trailers there, the removal and replacement was legal. OAG 70-718 .

Where a property owner replaced a mobile home which was a legally permissible nonconforming use, with a larger mobile home, there was not a sufficient extension of a nonconforming use to constitute a violation of this statute. OAG 73-856 .

The change of a store, operated in a multi-family zone as a nonconforming use because the store existed in its present location prior to the adoption of the zoning ordinance, into four specialty shops, by dividing the interior of the store, which would engage in the retail sale of goods similar in nature, would constitute not only a structural change but also a change in use in violation of this section. OAG 74-579 .

Under this section and KRS 100.203 a municipality must include in its zoning ordinances specific regulations with regard to nonconforming uses. OAG 74-711 .

The operator of a nonconforming use structure and premises could not expand his parking lot to accommodate additional clientele. OAG 77-267 .

A city could not prevent the reconstruction of a nonconforming use structure that is destroyed by casualty. OAG 77-267 .

Where property was used for maintaining a residential mobile home prior to the enactment of a zoning ordinance prohibiting such use, the nonconforming use of the property could continue and an older mobile home could be replaced with a newer, larger one. OAG 77-421 .

Where there was no indication that the land in question, which was zoned for single family dwellings only, has been utilized for any purpose, much less the construction of a multi-family dwelling, the owner has not entered upon the performance of a series of acts that would lead to the establishment of a nonconforming use and thus does not meet the requirements of this section. OAG 79-619 .

An addition to an existing building, which addition simply encloses an area already used in the open for a nonconforming use, is not an enlargement or extension of the nonconforming use within the meaning of the first sentence of subsection (2) of this section, and may be approved by a board of adjustment. OAG 80-6 .

The mere change in the location of an advertising sign on nonconforming property from one side of the property to the other would not constitute a violation of this section as it was not a substantial structural change, but one that was merely incidental to the continued operation of the nonconforming use. OAG 83-91 .

An ordinance prohibiting a nonconforming use facility to move any portion of a structure from one part of a premise to another was too restrictive and extended beyond the intent of this section and, thus, was invalid and unenforceable; this section relates to changes in the use of the property and structural changes which are substantial in nature and not mere changes incidental to the nonconforming use. OAG 83-91 .

Subsection (1) of this section would not be violated by the enactment of a reasonable ordinance providing for the automatic abandonment of a nonconforming use after the lapse of a reasonable period of nonuse since the statute simply authorizes the property owner to continue his nonconforming use. This language clearly implies that if the use is discontinued it ceases to exist. OAG 83-283 , modifying OAG 73-47 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Bench & Bar.

Moore, Practicing Before a Board of Adjustment: Seven Practical Tips, Volume 75, No. 1, January 2011, Ky. Bench & Bar 10.

Kentucky Law Journal.

Tarlock, Kentucky Planning and Land Use Control Enabling Legislation: An Analysis of the 1966 Revision of KRS Chapter 100, 56 Ky. L.J. 556 (1968).

Kentucky Law Survey, Griffin and Becker, Zoning, 67 Ky. L.J. 627 (1978-1979).

Article: The Lexington-Fayette Urban County Board of Adjustment: Fifty Years Later, 100 Ky. L.J. 435 (2011/2012).

ALR

Validity of provisions for amortization of nonconforming uses. 22 A.L.R.3d 1134.

Retroactive effect of zoning regulation, in absence of saving clause, on validly-issued building permit. 49 A.L.R.3d 13.

Retroactive effect of zoning regulation in absence of saving clause, on pending application for building permit. 50 A.L.R.3d 596.

Right to resume nonconforming use of premises after involuntary break in the continuity of nonconforming use caused by difficulties unrelated to governmental activity. 56 A.L.R.3d 14.

Right to resume nonconforming use of premises after involuntary break in the continuity of nonconforming use caused by governmental activity. 56 A.L.R.3d 138.

Right to resume nonconforming use of premises after voluntary or unexplained break in the continuity of nonconforming use. 57 A.L.R.3d 279.

Building in course of construction as establishing valid nonconforming use or vested right to complete construction for intended use. 89 A.L.R.3d 1051.

Validity of provisions for amortization of nonconforming uses. 8 A.L.R.5th 391.

100.257. Administrative review.

The board of adjustment shall have the power to hear and decide cases where it is alleged by an applicant that there is error in any order, requirement, decision, grant, or refusal made by an administrative official in the enforcement of the zoning regulation. Such appeal shall be taken within thirty (30) days.

History. Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 57; 1986, ch. 141, § 29, effective July 15, 1986.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Review — Mandatory.

Where the property owner did not contact the board of adjustment until after he had filed suit in the circuit court, he was precluded from filing a suit in the circuit court inasmuch as the statutory scheme mandates that the board of adjustment first be allowed to review the action of the enforcement officer. Burns v. Peavler, 721 S.W.2d 715, 1986 Ky. App. LEXIS 1205 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986).

Order affirming a board’s grant of a conditional use permit to allow a “tourist home” was proper because appellants admittedly became aware of the zoning compliance officer’s recommended interpretation of the term “tourist home” at an earlier hearing, but did not timely appeal the officer’s actions to the board. as required by KRS 100.261 . Allen v. Woodford County Bd. of Adjustments, 228 S.W.3d 573, 2007 Ky. App. LEXIS 190 (Ky. Ct. App. 2007).

2. Void Ab Initio.

Zoning ordinances of city were void ab initio where city did not follow the requirements of KRS Chapter 100 in adopting such ordinances. Bellefonte Land, Inc. v. Bellefonte, 864 S.W.2d 315, 1993 Ky. App. LEXIS 143 (Ky. Ct. App. 1993).

3. Opportunity for Review.

Plaintiff’s claim of violation of his right to due process failed because by telling plaintiff in person that he was violating the city’s nuisance ordinance and warning plaintiff that the city was planning to remove the vehicles, the city provided plaintiff with the opportunity to comply with the law by relocating the offending vehicles or to protest their removal before he was deprived of his property. Plaintiff was also provided with post-tow notice of the city’s removal of the vehicles and plaintiff never appealed the towing to the Board of Adjustment as provided by KRS 100.257 and KRS 100.261 . Duffy v. City of Stanton, 423 F. Supp. 2d 683, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13281 (E.D. Ky. 2006 ).

Cited:

Transitions, Inc. v. Board of Zoning Adjustment, 729 S.W.2d 459, 1987 Ky. App. LEXIS 457 (Ky. Ct. App. 1987).

Opinions of Attorney General.

No duly elected official, county or city, would have any authority to overrule a decision made by the administrator of zoning regulations. OAG 82-390 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Bench & Bar.

Moore, Practicing Before a Board of Adjustment: Seven Practical Tips, Volume 75, No. 1, January 2011, Ky. Bench & Bar 10.

Kentucky Law Journal.

Tarlock, Kentucky Planning and Land Use Control Enabling Legislation: An Analysis of the 1966 Revision of KRS Chapter 100, 56 Ky. L.J. 556 (1968).

Kentucky Law Survey, Griffin and Becker, Zoning, 67 Ky. L.J. 627 (1978-1979).

Article: The Lexington-Fayette Urban County Board of Adjustment: Fifty Years Later, 100 Ky. L.J. 435 (2011/2012).

100.260. Commission’s action on the plat; effect of approval. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3037h-127) was repealed by Acts 1942, ch. 176, § 17.

100.261. Procedure for all appeals to board.

Appeals to the board may be taken by any person, or entity claiming to be injuriously affected or aggrieved by an official action, order, requirement, interpretation, grant, refusal, or decision of any zoning enforcement officer. Such appeal shall be taken within thirty (30) days after the appellant or his agent receives notice of the action of the official by filing with said officer and with the board a notice of appeal specifying the grounds thereof, and giving notice of such appeal to any and all parties of record. Said officer shall forthwith transmit to the board all papers constituting the record upon which the action appealed from was taken and shall be treated as and be the respondent in such further proceedings. At the public hearing on the appeal held by the board, any interested person may appear and enter his appearance, and all shall be given an opportunity to be heard.

History. Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 58; 1986, ch. 141, § 30, effective July 15, 1986.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Due Process Required.

Where the proceedings before the board of zoning adjustment does not afford procedural due process in that there is no real hearing, no taking of evidence, no finding of fact, nor anything to support the order, the action is arbitrary and cannot properly be upheld by the Circuit Court. Morris v. Catlettsburg, 437 S.W.2d 753, 1969 Ky. LEXIS 454 ( Ky. 1969 ).

Plaintiff’s claim of violation of his right to due process failed because by telling plaintiff in person that he was violating the city’s nuisance ordinance and warning plaintiff that the city was planning to remove the vehicles, the city provided plaintiff with the opportunity to comply with the law by relocating the offending vehicles or to protest their removal before he was deprived of his property. Plaintiff was also provided with post-tow notice of the city’s removal of the vehicles and plaintiff never appealed the towing to the Board of Adjustment as provided by KRS 100.257 and KRS 100.261 . Duffy v. City of Stanton, 423 F. Supp. 2d 683, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13281 (E.D. Ky. 2006 ).

Summary judgment for a city on its claim for relief against property owners relating to an access point to the owners’ property was error because the notice to the owners that the zoning administrator was revoking the temporary access did not set out the reasons for the decision or inform the owners of their right to appeal to the board of adjustment, did not comport with the minimum requirements of due process, did not give any basis for meaningful appellate review by the board, and left the owners to guess the appropriate course of action; since the notice was so defective, the owners’ right to administrative review was not extinguished. Godman v. City of Fort Wright, 234 S.W.3d 362, 2007 Ky. App. LEXIS 317 (Ky. Ct. App. 2007).

2. Review Mandatory.

Where the property owner did not contact the board of adjustment until after he had filed suit in the Circuit Court, he was precluded from filing a suit in the Circuit Court inasmuch as the statutory scheme mandates that the board of adjustment first be allowed to review the action of the enforcement officer. Burns v. Peavler, 721 S.W.2d 715, 1986 Ky. App. LEXIS 1205 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986).

3. Time Limit.

Where property owners, who were not notified by the Planning and Zoning Commission of a hearing concerning proposed subdivision of adjacent land, appealed dismissal of their action, the court held that although the failure to provide notice violated a zoning ordinance requirement, the property owners did have knowledge the property was being subdivided and a building permit was granted and that there was no impediment to an appeal after they learned of the Commission’s action and the zoning administrator’s grant of a permit, but that since they did not appeal, as required by KRS 100.347 or this section, within 30 days after they first learned of the respective decisions, their appeal came too late. Taylor v. Duke, 896 S.W.2d 618, 1995 Ky. App. LEXIS 75 (Ky. Ct. App. 1995).

Order affirming a board’s grant of a conditional use permit to allow a “tourist home” was proper because appellants admittedly became aware of the zoning compliance officer’s recommended interpretation of the term “tourist home” at an earlier hearing, but did not timely appeal the officer’s actions to the board. as required by KRS 100.261 . Allen v. Woodford County Bd. of Adjustments, 228 S.W.3d 573, 2007 Ky. App. LEXIS 190 (Ky. Ct. App. 2007).

Cited:

Rosary Catholic Parish v. Whitfield, 729 S.W.2d 27, 1987 Ky. App. LEXIS 480 (Ky. Ct. App. 1987); Owensboro Metropolitan Bd. of Adjustments v. Midwest Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 729 S.W.2d 446, 1987 Ky. App. LEXIS 428 (Ky. Ct. App. 1987).

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Tarlock, Kentucky Planning and Land Use Control Enabling Legislation: An Analysis of the 1966 Revision of KRS Chapter 100, 56 Ky. L.J. 556 (1968).

ALR

Standing of lot owner to challenge validity or regularity of zoning changes dealing with neighboring property. 37 A.L.R.2d 1143.

Attack on validity of zoning ordinance on ground of improper delegation of authority to board or officer. 58 A.L.R.2d 1083.

Disqualification for bias or interest of administrative officer sitting in zoning proceeding. 10 A.L.R.3d 694.

Purchaser of real property as precluded from attacking validity of zoning regulations existing at the time of the purchase and affecting the purchased property. 17 A.L.R.3d 743.

Right to cross-examination of witnesses in hearings before administrative zoning authorities. 27 A.L.R.3d 1304.

Standing of municipal corporation or other governmental body to attack zoning of land lying outside its borders. 49 A.L.R.3d 1126.

Standing of owner of property adjacent to zoned property, but not within territory of zoning authority, to attack zoning. 69 A.L.R.3d 805.

100.263. Public notice of appeal hearing.

The board shall fix a reasonable time for hearing the appeal and give public notice in accordance with KRS Chapter 424, as well as written notice to the appellant and the administrative official at least one (1) week prior to the hearing, and shall decide it within sixty (60) days. The affected party may appear at the hearing in person or by attorney.

History. Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 59.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Time Requirement Directory.

Notwithstanding use of the word “shall,” the Legislature intended the time requirement of this section to be directory rather than mandatory. Ratliff v. Phillips, 746 S.W.2d 405, 1988 Ky. LEXIS 17 ( Ky. 1988 ).

2. Mandamus to Compel Decision.

Sixty days from the date of the hearing, either party is entitled to a writ of mandamus from the Circuit Court to compel the Board of Zoning Adjustment to decide the action. Ratliff v. Phillips, 746 S.W.2d 405, 1988 Ky. LEXIS 17 ( Ky. 1988 ).

3. Failure to Render Decision.

The failure of the Board of Zoning Adjustment to render its decision within 60 days after the hearing did not divest the Board of jurisdiction. Ratliff v. Phillips, 746 S.W.2d 405, 1988 Ky. LEXIS 17 ( Ky. 1988 ).

4. Lack of Notice, Effect.

Owners of adjoining property were not prejudiced by lack of actual notice of first meeting of board of zoning adjustment on special exception, where a full hearing was later afforded them at their request at which they were given a complete opportunity to present their reasons for opposing the board’s actions. Schmidt v. Craig, 354 S.W.2d 292, 1962 Ky. LEXIS 39 ( Ky. 1962 ) (decided under prior law).

Opinions of Attorney General.

The decision of the board of adjustment is to be made within 60 days after the hearing of the appeal has been concluded. OAG 72-749 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Article: The Lexington-Fayette Urban County Board of Adjustment: Fifty Years Later, 100 Ky. L.J. 435 (2011/2012).

100.267. Restraint of construction without permit.

If no building permit has been issued and a builder begins or continues to build, a restraining order may be obtained upon application to the proper court of record and evidence of the lack of a building permit shall establish a prima facie case for the issuance of the restraining order.

History. Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 60.

Opinions of Attorney General.

The owner of property in a commercial district must obtain a building permit in order to proceed with a proposed development project, even though the proposal may be in harmony with the county’s zoning ordinance. OAG 77-449 .

100.270. Status of existing statutes. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3037h-130) was repealed by Acts 1942, ch. 176, § 17.

100.271. Administrator of zoning regulations, powers.

An administrative official shall be designated by the city or county to administer the zoning regulation, and, if delegated, housing or building regulations. The administrative official may be designated to issue building permits or certificates of occupancy, or both, in accordance with the literal terms of the regulation, but may not have the power to permit any construction, or to permit any use or any change of use which does not conform to the literal terms of the zoning regulation.

History. Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 61.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Refusal of Permit.

Permit for milk plant existing in four-family district to relocate and rearrange can-washing and by-products rooms to meet ordinance regulating sale of milk products was improperly refused by board on ground that necessary structural changes would indefinitely prolong life of plant and materially increase size of building. A. L. Carrithers & Son v. Louisville, 250 Ky. 462 , 63 S.W.2d 493, 1933 Ky. LEXIS 716 ( Ky. 1933 ) (decided under prior law).

Permit for milk plant existing in four-family district to extend plant to include office space was properly refused by board, where such office had not theretofore been used in plant, and was not specified by milk inspector as required to meet ordinance for sale of milk products. A. L. Carrithers & Son v. Louisville, 250 Ky. 462 , 63 S.W.2d 493, 1933 Ky. LEXIS 716 ( Ky. 1933 ) (decided under prior law).

Refusal of permit for funeral home in block in apartment district was not unjust discrimination, notwithstanding there were two (2) funeral homes in block existing when zoning ordinance was enacted, where applicant had not acquired option on property or applied for permit until after its enactment. Smith v. Selligman, 270 Ky. 69 , 109 S.W.2d 14, 1937 Ky. LEXIS 23 ( Ky. 1937 ) (decided under prior law).

2. Revocation of Permit.

Board of adjustments and building inspectors would not have been estopped from revoking a permit although person to whom permit had been issued had spent large sums where permit was issued on misapprehension of fact for which permittee’s representative was partly responsible and permit was for a nonconforming structure. Selligman v. Western & Southern Life Ins. Co., 277 Ky. 551 , 126 S.W.2d 419, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 570 ( Ky. 1938 ) (decided under prior law).

3. Granting Special Exception.

Where board had before it substantial and adequate evidence to warrant its conclusion that a funeral home could be operated on property without impairing the residential character of the neighborhood, it acted within its authority and discretion in granting a special exception for operation of a funeral home. Schmidt v. Craig, 354 S.W.2d 292, 1962 Ky. LEXIS 39 ( Ky. 1962 ) (decided under prior law).

An exception gave property owner permission to put his property to use which zoning enactment expressly allowed and the granting was not contingent upon existence of either difficulty or hardship. Schmidt v. Craig, 354 S.W.2d 292, 1962 Ky. LEXIS 39 ( Ky. 1962 ) (decided under prior law).

Cited:

Burns v. Peavler, 714 S.W.2d 163, 1986 Ky. App. LEXIS 1515 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986).

Opinions of Attorney General.

The planning commission is authorized to take action to restrain subdivision construction that does not comply with the subdivision regulation. OAG 69-42 .

There is no statutory requirement that a nonelective officer of the city, such as the building inspector, reside within the city limits although the city could so provide, under its home rule power as expressed in KRS 82.082 , if it so desires. OAG 80-657 .

This section together with the powers given cities under KRS 83A.010 to 83A.170 , clearly authorizes the city council, which is the legislative body of the city, to establish by ordinance the position of building inspector as a minor city office under the terms of KRS 83A.130(12), or as an alternative, the city council could designate one of its administrative officers to issue building permits; in any event, the person to fill the position is to be selected by the mayor with the approval of the city council under the terms of KRS 83A.080(2) and once the position is established the zoning committee could recommend someone to hold the position. OAG 80-657 .

While there is no statutory prohibition against a building inspector engaging in the building trade, a possible common-law conflict of interest could develop by his being in the building trade; however, the city legislative body under its home rule authority could prohibit by ordinance any person serving as a building inspector from at the same time being engaged in the building trade on the grounds of a possible common-law conflict. OAG 80-657 .

No duly elected official, county or city, would have any authority to overrule a decision made by the administrator of zoning regulations. OAG 82-390 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Tarlock, Kentucky Planning and Land Use Control Enabling Legislation: An Analysis of the 1966 Revision of KRS Chapter 100, 56 Ky. L.J. 556 (1968).

Subdivision Management

100.273. Land subdivision regulations by planning commission or fiscal court — Procedures for urban-county government.

  1. Any planning commission which has completed the objectives, land use plan, transportation plan, and community facilities elements of a comprehensive plan may adopt regulations for the subdivision of land within its boundaries, except that, in the case of urban-county governments, the planning commission shall make recommendations to the legislative body of the urban-county government as to the regulations, and it shall take a majority of the entire legislative body to override the recommendation of the planning commission.
  2. A county which does not wish to establish a planning program or form a planning unit may adopt regulations for the subdivision of land within its boundaries. In this case, the county shall be governed by the provisions of KRS 100.111(22), 100.277 , 100.281 , 100.283 , 100.287 and 100.291 , but any powers delegated to a planning commission in these sections shall instead be delegated to the fiscal court, any reference to the planning unit shall be considered a reference to the county, and any reference to the chairman of the planning commission shall be considered a reference to the county judge/executive.

History. Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 62; 1986, ch. 25, § 1, effective July 15, 1986; 1986, ch. 141, § 31, effective July 15, 1986.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

This section was amended by two 1986 Acts which do not appear to be in conflict and have been compiled together.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Failure to Follow Procedure.

Zoning ordinances of city were void ab initio where city did not follow the requirements of KRS Chapter 100 in adopting such ordinances. Bellefonte Land, Inc. v. Bellefonte, 864 S.W.2d 315, 1993 Ky. App. LEXIS 143 (Ky. Ct. App. 1993).

While the Fiscal Court initially passed the ordinances at issue, those ordinances provided that the Planning Commission and its Director were to determine whether a proposed division of land was a “subdivision.” Regardless of whether the Fiscal Court was in fact vested with the power to enact the ordinances initially, pursuant to KRS 100.273 , the Planning Commission subsequently adopted the text of the ordinances as a part of its subdivision regulations, pursuant to KRS 100.277(1), thereby rendering moot any issue regarding the Fiscal Court’s exercise of its authority. Campbell County Fiscal Court v. Nash, 2008 Ky. App. LEXIS 373 (Ky. Ct. App. Dec. 12, 2008), review granted, transferred, 2010 Ky. LEXIS 40 (Ky. Jan. 13, 2010), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 345 S.W.3d 811, 2011 Ky. LEXIS 57 ( Ky. 2011 ).

2. Applicability.

Planning commission properly denied property owners’ subdivision plan because the preliminary plan had expired and was not eligible for reapproval or an extension, and the owners’ proposed development of residential one-acre lots did not fit into the then current zoning enacted under KRS 100.273 , nor did it fit into an agricultural exemption to the zoning ordinance under KRS 100.203(4) and KRS 100.111(2). Sebastian-Voor Props., LLC v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Gov't, 2008 Ky. LEXIS 39 (Ky. Feb. 21, 2008), sub. op., 265 S.W.3d 190, 2008 Ky. LEXIS 301 ( Ky. 2008 ).

3. Ordinances.

To the extent that Campbell County, Ky., Ordinance 0-18-04 & 0-20-04 require planning commission approval before property can be divided into agricultural parcels, the ordinances are void because they conflict with the statutory wording and scheme of KRS 100.111(22), 100.111(2), 100.203(4), and 100.273 et seq., as well as KRS 413.072 , which prohibits local regulations on agricultural uses; to the extent the ordinances seek to amend the subdivision regulations, they are void because the adoption or amendment of subdivision regulations are functions of the planning commission, at least initially. Nash v. Campbell County Fiscal Court, 345 S.W.3d 811, 2011 Ky. LEXIS 57 ( Ky. 2011 ).

Cited:

Lampton v. Pinaire, 610 S.W.2d 915, 1980 Ky. App. LEXIS 408 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980); Sladon v. Shawk, 815 S.W.2d 404, 1991 Ky. App. LEXIS 44 (Ky. Ct. App. 1991); Sebastian-Voor Props., LLC v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Gov’t, 265 S.W.3d 190, 2008 Ky. LEXIS 301 ( Ky. 2008 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

KRS 100.277 , requiring commission approval for subdivisions, does not apply in the absence of the adoption of subdivision regulations pursuant to this section and KRS 100.281 . OAG 68-563 .

The use of hearings and recommendations of technical and professional groups, in applying the general doctrine of the comprehensive plan to each subdivision application, is legal. OAG 69-200 .

A metropolitan planning commission composed of two (2) cities and the county could adopt interim regulations governing the planning and zoning of its area’s jurisdiction pending the completion of the various elements of the comprehensive plan pursuant to KRS 100.329 . OAG 71-440 .

There is no conflict between the provisions of this section and KRS 100.329 . OAG 71-440 .

Planning commission is not required to establish subdivision regulations for the entire county. OAG 72-31 .

In light of the basic right of both the city and county to form independent planning units under certain conditions, the city’s jurisdiction would be limited to its corporate limits, with the county having jurisdiction over all of the incorporated area beyond the city limits. OAG 75-462 .

Subdivision regulations for a particular city operating under a joint city-county planning commission can only be adopted by the joint commission. OAG 76-48 .

There is nothing specific or implied in this section that would authorize or require subdivision regulations adopted by a planning commission to be submitted to the fiscal court for approval or rejection as is the case with respect to zoning regulations and amendments thereto under KRS 100.207 and 100.211 . OAG 78-96 .

Where a joint city-county planning commission is considering the adoption of subdivision regulations for the entire county, subdivision regulations could be exercised for a particular area not coterminous to the city boundaries. OAG 78-286 .

Owner of a tract may sell lots therein in accordance with original plat recorded prior to city’s adoption of regulations pursuant to KRS 100.273 et seq., and would thus not be required to obtain the commission’s approval under the terms of KRS 100.277 . OAG 82-389 .

There is nothing in this chapter, particularly with respect to the adoption of subdivision regulations under KRS 100.270 (repealed) or the approval of subdivision plats under KRS 100.277 , indicating that such provisions have retroactive effect. OAG 82-389 .

Subdivision regulations adopted pursuant to this section have no retroactive effect. OAG 83-210 .

The fiscal court has no authority to approve or adopt subdivision regulations in order for them to become effective as such is the sole responsibility of the planning commission. OAG 83-210 .

There is nothing specific or even implied in this section that would authorize or require subdivision regulations adopted by a planning commission to be submitted to the fiscal court for approval or rejection before they become effective: thus, the date of the adoption by the fiscal court of subdivision regulations drafted but presumably not adopted by the planning commission has no legal significance. In other words, subdivision regulations become effective when and only when the planning commission adopts them by appropriate action. OAG 83-210 .

County clerk could accept for recording subdivision plats without the approval of the planning commission until the commission itself officially adopted subdivision regulations in accordance with this section; after that point in time, approval of all subdivision plats must be given by the commission before they could be filed in compliance with KRS 100.277 . OAG 83-210 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Kentucky Law Survey, Griffin and Becker, Zoning, 67 Ky. L.J. 627 (1978-1979).

Kentucky Law Survey, Bratt and Brown, Environmental Law, 70 Ky. L.J. 455 (1981-82).

Northern Kentucky Law Review.

Comments, Planning and Zoning in Kentucky: Who Really Adopts the Comprehensive Plan?, 9 N. Ky. L. Rev. 499 (1982).

100.277. Commission approval required for subdivisions.

  1. All subdivision of land shall receive commission approval.
  2. No person or his agent shall subdivide any land before securing the approval of the planning commission of a plat designating the areas to be subdivided, and no plat of a subdivision of land within the planning unit jurisdiction shall be recorded by the county clerk until the plat has been approved by the commission and the approval entered thereon in writing by the chairman, secretary, or other duly authorized officer of the commission.
  3. No person owning land composing a subdivision, or his agent, shall transfer or sell any lot or parcel of land located within a subdivision by reference to, or by exhibition, or by any other use of a plat of such subdivision, before such plat has received final approval of the planning commission and has been recorded. Any such instrument of transfer or sale shall be void and shall not be subject to be recorded unless the subdivision plat subsequently receives final approval of the planning commission, but all rights of such purchaser to damages are hereby preserved. The description of such lot or parcel by metes and bounds in any instrument of transfer or other document used in the process of selling or transferring same shall not exempt the person attempting to transfer from penalties provided or deprive the purchaser of any rights or remedies he may otherwise have. Provided, however, any person, or his agent, may agree to sell any lot or parcel of land located within a subdivision by reference to an unapproved or unrecorded plat or by reference to a metes and bounds description of such lot and any such executory contract of sale or option to purchase may be recorded and shall be valid and enforceable so long as the subdivision of land contemplated therein is lawful and the subdivision plat subsequently receives final approval of the planning commission.
  4. Any street or other public ground which has been dedicated shall be accepted for maintenance by the legislative body after it has received final plat approval by the planning commission. Any street that has been built in accordance with specific standards set forth in subdivision regulations or by ordinance shall be, by operation of law, automatically accepted for maintenance by a legislative body forty-five (45) days after inspection and final approval.
  5. Any instrument of transfer, sale or contract that would otherwise have been void under this section and under any of its subsections previously, is deemed not to have been void, but merely not subject to be recorded unless the subdivision plat subsequently receives final approval of the planning commission. This subsection shall not apply to instruments of transactions affecting property in counties containing cities of the first class, in consolidated local governments created pursuant to KRS Chapter 67C, or in urban-counties created pursuant to KRS Chapter 67A.

History. Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 63; 1986, ch. 141, § 32, effective July 15, 1986; 1986, ch. 461, § 21, effective July 15, 1986; 1988, ch. 144, § 5, effective July 15, 1988; 1988, ch. 343, § 4, effective July 15, 1988; 1990, ch. 362, § 14, effective July 13, 1990; 2002, ch. 346, § 150, effective July 15, 2002.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Streets.
2. — Acceptance.

A street may be dedicated to public use by approval of the planning commission and recording of a plat pursuant to this section and KRS 100.283 , but it must still be accepted by the fiscal court through the procedures in KRS Chapter 178 before it becomes a street which is open for the use of the public generally; acceptance by the county is not mandatory. Kemper v. Cooke, 576 S.W.2d 263, 1979 Ky. App. LEXIS 364 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).

3. Subdivisions.

Where a county zoning ordinance provided that lots of five (5) acres or more in an agricultural zone were presumed to be devoted to agricultural use, such presumption was not a natural or logical extension of KRS 100.111 (22), providing that a division into parcels of five (5) acres or more not involving a new street was not a subdivision, and was in conflict with the provisions of KRS Chapter 100 dealing with the subdivision of land and the designation of land use. Consequently, it was invalid. Green v. Bourbon County Joint Planning Com., 637 S.W.2d 626, 1982 Ky. LEXIS 281 ( Ky. 1982 ) (decision prior to 1982 amendment of KRS 100.111 ).

Where owner of farm sought to divide it into parcels of five (5) acres or more and such subdivision would not involve a new street, the proposed subdivision, in effect, constituted a change of the land use from agricultural to residential and the action of the planning commission in approving the plat was not supported by substantial evidence and was arbitrary. Green v. Bourbon County Joint Planning Com., 637 S.W.2d 626, 1982 Ky. LEXIS 281 ( Ky. 1982 ) (decision prior to 1982 amendment of KRS 100.111 ).

If a division of land falls within the statutory definition of subdivision, then under this section the division must be approved by the local planning commission; however, the statutes do not specify what the size of the lots within a subdivision must be, the particular zones into which a locality must be divided, or the use to which land may be put within a district zoned agricultural, and therefore the ultimate authority to establish various zones and the uses permitted within each of those zones is given to local governments to be exercised through zoning regulations. Sladon v. Shawk, 1991 Ky. App. LEXIS 44 (Ky. Ct. App. Apr. 12, 1991).

This section prohibits dividing property and selling parcels of land without an approved, recorded map — a plat — of the subdivision; this section was intended to insure that subdivision development complies with local zoning laws and that streets and services are adequate to meet the increased demand brought on by development. Statewide Dev. Co. v. Lexington Fayette Urban County Government, 821 S.W.2d 97, 1991 Ky. App. LEXIS 156 (Ky. Ct. App. 1991).

Where utility assessment of 30 feet was demarcated on the plat of a residential subdivision, such easement applied to neighboring owners lots and any subsequent conveyances of the lots did not require specific deeds of conveyance and subsequent purchasers took subject to all dedications, easements or conveyances delineated on the recorded plat, as well as subject to restrictions, easements or encumbrances existing in the chain of title or set out in subsequent deeds. Kelly v. Cook, 899 S.W.2d 517, 1995 Ky. App. LEXIS 115 (Ky. Ct. App. 1995).

Until a subdivision plat becomes final by having received final plat approval by a planning commission, public improvements in the plat cannot be accepted by a legislative body for maintenance, and it is only after such acceptance that public officials have a ministerial duty to build and maintain the improvements; thus, where the final plat for a phase of a residential subdivision had not yet been approved, no duty regarding a storm drainage system for the subdivision had attached, and a city manager and the city’s sewer director could not be found negligent in their individual capacities for failing to fulfill any ministerial duties owed to the developer of the subdivision. Greenway Enters. v. City of Frankfort, 148 S.W.3d 298, 2004 Ky. App. LEXIS 292 (Ky. Ct. App. 2004).

Subdivision plats are approved by a planning commission as a ministerial function to insure compliance with the subdivision regulations under KRS 100.277 and KRS 100.281(1). Sebastian-Voor Props., LLC v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Gov't, 2008 Ky. LEXIS 39 (Ky. Feb. 21, 2008), sub. op., 265 S.W.3d 190, 2008 Ky. LEXIS 301 ( Ky. 2008 ).

While the Fiscal Court initially passed the ordinances at issue, those ordinances provided that the Planning Commission and its Director were to determine whether a proposed division of land was a “subdivision.” Regardless of whether the Fiscal Court was in fact vested with the power to enact the ordinances initially, pursuant to KRS 100.273 , the Planning Commission subsequently adopted the text of the ordinances as a part of its subdivision regulations, pursuant to KRS 100.277(1), thereby rendering moot any issue regarding the Fiscal Court’s exercise of its authority. Campbell County Fiscal Court v. Nash, 2008 Ky. App. LEXIS 373 (Ky. Ct. App. Dec. 12, 2008), review granted, transferred, 2010 Ky. LEXIS 40 (Ky. Jan. 13, 2010), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 345 S.W.3d 811, 2011 Ky. LEXIS 57 ( Ky. 2011 ).

The zoning ordinances assisted the county clerk and the Property Valuation Administrator (PVA) in properly performing their statutorily required duties, including the county clerk’s duty to record lawful deeds under KRS 382.110 and KRS 382.335 , and the PVA’s duty to maintain lists of all real property additions to the property tax rolls for the county under KRS 132.015 . A ruling that the ordinances interfered with those duties ignored that, under KRS 100.277 , a planning commission was authorized to approve plats of subdivisions of land, such approval had to be obtained before plats may be recorded, and instruments referring to unapproved plats or subdivisions were void. Campbell County Fiscal Court v. Nash, 2008 Ky. App. LEXIS 373 (Ky. Ct. App. Dec. 12, 2008), review granted, transferred, 2010 Ky. LEXIS 40 (Ky. Jan. 13, 2010), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 345 S.W.3d 811, 2011 Ky. LEXIS 57 ( Ky. 2011 ).

To the extent that Campbell County, Ky., Ordinance 0-18-04 & 0-20-04 require planning commission approval before property can be divided into agricultural parcels, the ordinances are void because they conflict with the statutory wording and scheme of KRS 100.111(22), 100.111(2), 100.203(4), and 100.273 et seq., as well as KRS 413.072 , which prohibits local regulations on agricultural uses; to the extent the ordinances seek to amend the subdivision regulations, they are void because the adoption or amendment of subdivision regulations are functions of the planning commission, at least initially. Nash v. Campbell County Fiscal Court, 345 S.W.3d 811, 2011 Ky. LEXIS 57 ( Ky. 2011 ).

4. Utility Easement.

A general dedication, reservation, etc., in a plat, is sufficient to grant a public utility the right to the use of the easement for purposes such as installation and maintenance of electrical service lines, and it is not necessary that the plat specifically designate a particular utility. Kelly v. Cook, 899 S.W.2d 517, 1995 Ky. App. LEXIS 115 (Ky. Ct. App. 1995).

Cited:

Snyder v. Owensboro, 528 S.W.2d 663, 1975 Ky. LEXIS 63 ( Ky. 1975 ); Sebastian-Voor Props., LLC v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Gov’t, 265 S.W.3d 190, 2008 Ky. LEXIS 301 ( Ky. 2008 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Where a city has established an independent city planning unit under KRS 100.111 and decides to exercise territorial jurisdiction for the purposes of subdivision regulations under KRS 100.131 , the provisions of this section, including subsection (2), must be complied with in connection with the subdivision of land within the five (5) mile zone. OAG 66-428 .

For recording of a plat to be required, two (2) or more lots or parcels must be involved. OAG 66-682 .

If a farmer sold off lots one at a time within a reasonable period of time, the actions would indicate an intention to subdivide which would require recording a plat. OAG 66-682 .

Where a subdivision has complied with the terms of this section any lot therein is free to be sold without further reference to the requirements of this section. OAG 67-316 .

The mere designation or installation of the streets in the plat may have the effect of implied dedication. OAG 67-390 .

A subdivision regulation requiring streets to be dedicated was valid and could not be waived by the commission. OAG 67-390 .

A city-county ordinance could define the phrase “for agricultural purposes” as it relates to not only subdivisions, but to permitted uses and the definition should be substantially the same for both unless the agricultural classification of permitted uses is broadened to include uses other than strictly agricultural. OAG 67-432 .

The transfer of land by the University of Kentucky to the veterans administration for use as a hospital site does not require the approval of the plat from the Lexington-Fayette county planning commission. OAG 68-555 .

This section, requiring commission approval for subdivisions, does not apply in the absence of the adoption of subdivision regulations pursuant to KRS 100.273 and 100.281 . OAG 68-563 .

Acceptance of the streets dedicated in a plat must be by specific action on the part of the legislative body following favorable recommendation by the planning commission. OAG 69-243 .

The approval of a subdivision plat by the planning commission, which includes the streets therein, does not automatically constitute an acceptance of the streets dedicated in the plat. OAG 69-243 .

If the owner divided a tract into two (2) or more parcels upon which were located house trailers in a more or less permanent manner, a subdivision would be created requiring the commission’s approval of the subdivision plat and its subsequent recording. OAG 69-469 .

Any amended plat should be approved by the commission before it can be recorded. OAG 71-113 .

When a subdivision has been approved and a plat of it filed of record, the planning commission has the power and authority to amend and change lot lines without the written approval of the owners of the remaining lots in the subdivision. OAG 71-206 .

In a city operating under planning and zoning a rededicated street must first receive favorable recommendation from the planning commission before the city can officially accept the street pursuant to KRS 94.370 (repealed). OAG 72-724 .

The planning commission and not the local legislative body must approve subdivision plats before the subdivision can be divided and lots sold or transferred therein, unless the city has not adopted subdivision regulations. OAG 73-337 .

If a person sells a portion of two noncontiguous lots or a lot and half of another adjoining lot, since the contiguous property is considered as one tract and the tract sold is one contiguous parcel, neither transaction would constitute a subdivision and this section would not apply. OAG 73-688 .

Where lots were sold to industries for their own industrial use within the 21/2 mile limit of Morganfield, such lots were not within the definition of subdivisions and plats of such lands did not require the approval of the planning commission before the deeds were recorded. OAG 73-688 .

Where the owner of several lots described in the original plat of the city of Sturgis conveyed two (2) of the lots during her lifetime and her heirs conveyed the remaining contiguous lots to one person, this transaction was not a subdivision and this section would not apply. OAG 73-688 .

Plats or surveys may be placed on record in book form or in looseleaf form under an adequate filing system under KRS 322.400 and this section and the fact that the looseleaf system is not a book does not make it invalid. OAG 75-205 .

A street dedicated to public use under this section and KRS 178.100 may be accepted by the fiscal court as a part of the county road system but acceptance by the fiscal court is not mandatory. OAG 76-489 .

Where the owner of a 35-acre farm tract located in a county containing a third class city, with a house and barn on it, sold off a 9-acre tract, intending to continue to use the residual tract of 26 acres for farming, such transaction was not a “subdivision” as defined in subsection (22) of KRS 100.111 and mentioned in this section. OAG 77-230 .

There is nothing specific or implied in this section that would authorize or require subdivision regulations adopted by a planning commission to be submitted to the fiscal court for approval or rejection as is the case with respect to zoning regulations and amendments thereto under KRS 100.207 and 100.211 . OAG 78-96 .

Where land which has been subdivided so as to bring it within the definition of “subdivision” is resubdivided into parcels of less than one acre within 12 months following the original subdivision of that same land, such resubdivided land constitutes a subdivision, making the provisions of this section applicable and thereby requiring planning commission approval for such resubdivision. OAG 78-306 .

This section apparently attempts to provide that the subdivision regulations are meant only to force the developer to comply with them and are not intended to deprive an innocent purchaser of an action for damages. OAG 78-518 .

It is clear from the holding in Kemper v. Cooke, 576 S.W.2d 263, 1979 Ky. App. LEXIS 364 (Ky. App. 1979), that a dedicated street in a subdivision must be accepted by the city pursuant to statutory procedure, KRS 82.400(2), before the streets can become part of the city street system required to be maintained by the city; on the other hand, however, it does nevertheless become a public way open to the public to be maintained by the abutting property owners as they see fit, or possibly by the subdivider; in no event, however, do the dedicated streets revert automatically to the subdivider or abutting property owners where the city has not formally accepted them. OAG 80-452 .

A campground, the owners of which plan to lease small lots thereon for the encampment of trailers, would constitute a subdivision within the meaning of the term as defined in KRS 100.111(22) (now (23)) and would thus require the owner of the campground to first present a plat to the commission for approval pursuant to this section before any leasing of lots can be made. OAG 82-285 .

The division of a parcel of land into two, three or more parcels in certain instances, depending on the size, and classification of cities within the county, for the purpose of immediate or future sale or lease or building development, constitutes a subdivision under the Planning and Zoning Act which would require, pursuant to this section, plat approval by the planning commission before any sale or lease of such parcels of land could legally be consummated. OAG 82-285 .

The owner of a tract may sell lots therein in accordance with original plat recorded prior to city’s adoption of regulations pursuant to KRS 100.273 et seq., and would thus not be required to obtain the commission’s approval under the terms of this section. OAG 82-389 .

There is nothing in this chapter, particularly with respect to the adoption of subdivision regulations under KRS 100.270 (repealed) or the approval of subdivision plats under this section, indicating that such provisions have retroactive effect. OAG 82-389 .

A joint planning commission has the authority to delay its approval for subdivision development plats for 90 days for the intended purpose of drafting subdivision regulations and can declare a moratorium on building construction for that specific period of time. OAG 82-390 .

It would not be legal or proper for a county judge/executive to order an administrative official to sign written approval for subdivision development while the same administrative official had been instructed not to approve subdivision development plats by the planning commission, since this section specifically requires that all subdivisions of land shall be approved by the planning commission, and thus, the matter of subdivision approval is strictly under the jurisdiction of the planning commission and no other city or county official. OAG 82-390 .

Where owners of certain commercial lots in an approved subdivision in the county wish to lease part of the lots to other businessmen for the purpose of establishing a new business on the lot, unless the lot lines on a recorded plat are altered, the mere construction of a commercial facility on a portion of the lot per lease agreement would not constitute a resubdivision of the land requiring the commission’s approval pursuant to this section. OAG 82-440 .

Under this section, dedicated streets within a subdivision plat do not necessarily have to be accepted before the subdivision plat can be approved by the planning commission and recorded; the acceptance of dedicated streets within a subdivision under subsection (3) of this section may occur at some time in the future following the approval and recording of the subdivision plat and in the course of the development of the subdivision. As a consequence, there is no legal objection to the acceptance of the subdivision plat by the planning commission and its subsequent recording in the clerk’s office prior to the city legislative body’s acceptance of a street within the subdivision in the manner required by KRS 82.400 . OAG 83-27 .

The fiscal court has no authority to approve or adopt subdivision regulations in order for them to become effective as such is the sole responsibility of the planning commission. OAG 83-210 .

County clerk could accept for recording subdivision plats without the approval of the planning commission until the commission itself officially adopted subdivision regulations in accordance with KRS 100.273 ; after that point in time, approval of all subdivision plats must be given by the commission before they could be filed in compliance with this section. OAG 83-210 .

Unless and until the planning commission itself adopts subdivision regulations, this section’s requirement of the planning commission’s approval before a subdivision plat can be recorded has not been complied with. OAG 83-210 .

If land is divided for agricultural use and does not involve a new street as stated in KRS 100.111(23) and further involves tracts of at least five acres as mentioned in the term “agricultural use” in KRS 100.111(2), such division would not constitute a subdivision and therefore would not require the planning commission’s approval for recording under this section; however, whether the use is agricultural depends upon the facts and there can be no presumption that the land is for agricultural purposes. OAG 83-468 .

A fiscal court is strictly a creature of statute, as relates to its legislative powers, and it cannot legislate in areas not permitted by statute; thus this section is preemptive and controlling, and a fiscal court has no authority to impose, as an added condition for a valid transfer of title to real estate and the recording of same by the county clerk, the provisions of a proposed ordinance relating to certification by the grantor. OAG 84-359 .

Where only one conveyance was made, involving the one parcel, under KRS 100.111(23) no “subdivision” was involved; therefore, commission approval for subdivisions, as required by this section, was not applicable. OAG 85-12 .

The attorney general opined that the 1990 amendment of this section does not provide, even in effect, for assumption of “legal and financial responsibility” for maintenance of all subdivision roads accepted prior to July, 1990, under KRS 179.470 , by a fiscal court. OAG 92-52 .

The provisions of KRS 179.470(2) and (3), requiring owners of property abutting certain subdivision roads, in certain counties, to reimburse the county for a proportionate share of the cost of maintenance of such roads, remain effective after the 1990 amendment to this section; accordingly, a county does not assume “legal and financial responsibility” for maintenance of subdivision roads accepted prior to July 1990, if, by “assumption of legal and financial responsibility,” one means assumption of full responsibility for maintenance of such roads, without reimbursement from owners of property abutting them, where KRS 179.470(2) and (3) are applicable. OAG 92-52 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Bench & Bar.

Baker and Baker, Title Examination in Kentucky, 48 Ky. Bench & B. 12 (1984).

Kentucky Law Journal.

Tarlock, Kentucky Planning and Land Use Control Enabling Legislation: An Analysis of the 1966 Revision of KRS Chapter 100, 56 Ky. L.J. 556 (1968).

Kentucky Law Survey, Griffin and Becker, Zoning, 67 Ky. L.J. 627 (1978-1979).

Kentucky Law Survey, Bratt and Brown, Environmental Law, 70 Ky. L.J. 455 (1981-82).

Northern Kentucky Law Review.

Brandt, Kentucky Real Estate Law Survey: 1990 Through 1993, 21 N. Ky. L. Rev. 435 (1994).

100.280. Official map of the city. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3037h-131) was repealed by Acts 1942, ch. 176, § 17.

100.281. Contents of subdivision regulations.

Subdivision regulations shall be based on the comprehensive plan, in those counties which have adopted a comprehensive plan, and all subdivision regulations shall contain:

  1. The procedure for the submission and approval of preliminary and final plat and the recordation of final plats. The commission may delegate to its secretary or any other officer or employee the power to approve plats in accordance with the commission’s adopted requirements, but all plats, preliminary and final, shall be approved or disapproved within ninety (90) days;
  2. Specifications for the contents and the format of all subdivision plats;
  3. Requirements for the design of streets, blocks, lots, utilities, recreation areas, other facilities, hazardous areas, and areas subject to flooding. Such requirements may deal with all forms of land use including residential, commercial, industrial, and other uses. If the subdivision plat includes a proposal for any street to cross a jurisdictional line out of the planning unit, the commission shall require that notice of the proposal be given to the planning commission serving the planning unit into which the road will cross. If there is no planning unit for that area, the notice shall be given to the affected city or county government;
  4. Specifications for the physical improvements of streets, utilities, and other facilities, and the extent to which they shall be installed or dedicated as conditions precedent to approval of any plat, including the provision of good and sufficient surety to insure proper completion of physical improvements; and
  5. Specifications for the extent to which land is to be used for public purposes shall be reserved as a condition precedent to approval by the commission of any subdivision plat. The planning commission may require a reservation, not to exceed two (2) years, for parks, open space, school, and other public uses.
  6. The text may empower the planning commission to hear and finally decide applications for variances when a proposed development requires a subdivision and one (1) or more variances.
  7. In any regulation adopted pursuant to subsection (6) of this section:
    1. The text shall provide that the planning commission shall assume all powers and duties otherwise exercised by the board of adjustment pursuant to KRS 100.231 , 100.233 , 100.237 , 100.241 , 100.243 , 100.247 , and 100.251 in a circumstance provided for by subsection (6) of this section; and
    2. The text shall provide that the applicant for the subdivision at the time of the filing of the application for the subdivision may elect to have any variance for the same development to be heard and finally decided by the planning commission at the same public hearing set for the subdivision, or by the board of adjustment as otherwise provided for in this chapter.

History. Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 64; 1986, ch. 25, § 2, effective July 15, 1986; 1986, ch. 141, § 33, effective July 15, 1986; 1988, ch. 144, § 6, effective July 15, 1988; 1990, ch. 362, § 11, effective July 13, 1990.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. In General.

KRS 100.281(1) provides for the recording of final plats only, and only when the plat becomes final are the parties’ rights and expectations fixed; thus, where the fifth phase of a residential development had not yet been granted final approval by a city’s planning commission, a developer’s right to a storm water drainage system had not yet become fixed and a city manager and the city’s sewer director could not be held liable in their official capacities for delaying approval of the drainage system. Greenway Enters. v. City of Frankfort, 148 S.W.3d 298, 2004 Ky. App. LEXIS 292 (Ky. Ct. App. 2004).

Because peformance bonds did not adhere to a city’s regulations, the bonds could not satisfy the posting of “good and sufficient surety,” and the statute could not create the valid contract governmental entities claimed they had with a principal; the city gad to bear responsibility for failing to ensure the surety’s bonds were correct and adequate for their intended purpose. W. Sur. Co. v. City of Nicholasville, 552 S.W.3d 101, 2018 Ky. App. LEXIS 182 (Ky. Ct. App. 2018).

2. Specific Standards.

Since this section and due process requirements contemplate that specific standards rather than broad generalizations shall be set forth in regulations to be applied in determining whether approval of preliminary plats is to be granted, a metropolitan planning commission’s disapproval of a proposed plat for a subdivision was invalid where none of the stated reasons for disapproval related in clear and concise terms to any specific provision of law or regulations applicable to the plat. Snyder v. Owensboro, 528 S.W.2d 663, 1975 Ky. LEXIS 63 ( Ky. 1975 ).

Planning and Zoning commission did not violate KRS 100.281(3) when it rejected a subdivision plan that conflicted with the current zoning or the current agricultural exemption. Considering the proposed land use and corresponding lot size, a residential zone allowing one-acre lots would have required a proposed subdivision plat to have at least one-acre lots; the proposed development of residential one-acre lots did not fit into the current zoning, nor did it seem to fit into any agricultural exemption to the zoning ordinance. Sebastian-Voor Props., LLC v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Gov't, 265 S.W.3d 190, 2008 Ky. LEXIS 301 ( Ky. 2008 ).

3. Dedication Requirements.

So long as the taking of a portion of the land, whether on the exterior or from the interior, is based on the reasonably anticipated burdens to be caused by the development, the dedication requirements as a condition precedent to plat approval are not an unconstitutional taking of land without just compensation. Lampton v. Pinaire, 610 S.W.2d 915, 1980 Ky. App. LEXIS 408 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980).

Where a state’s statutes authorize it, a local government may adopt subdivision regulations which require a dedication of land for public purposes but such a power may not be totally unbridled and its application is subject to the standards for due process and reasonableness. Lampton v. Pinaire, 610 S.W.2d 915, 1980 Ky. App. LEXIS 408 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980).

A subdivision regulation requiring dedication of additional right-of-way if necessary to meet minimum street width requirements is not unreasonable on its face and such regulation is permitted by subsections (4) and (5) of this section. Lampton v. Pinaire, 610 S.W.2d 915, 1980 Ky. App. LEXIS 408 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980).

Approval of a preliminary plat by a planning commission does not bind a developer to dedicate streets or easements drawn in the preliminary plat; only upon final approval by the planning commission does a party acquire rights in an offer of dedication made on the plat. KRS 82.400(3), a rule of evidence in common law dedications by prescription, is not satisfied by a preliminary plat’s depiction of a street when there was no street open for unrestricted use by the public for five (5) consecutive years. Henry Fischer Builder, Inc. v. Magee, 957 S.W.2d 303, 1997 Ky. App. LEXIS 126 (Ky. Ct. App. 1997).

4. Cost of Improvements.

A developer should not be made to contribute to the cost of public improvements in an amount that far exceeds the anticipated use necessitated by his/her development. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Gov't v. Schneider, 849 S.W.2d 557, 1992 Ky. App. LEXIS 204 (Ky. Ct. App. 1992).

The burden for public improvements must bear a reasonable relationship to the benefits conferred on the subject development, to the overall benefit to the surrounding neighborhoods, and to the need for improvements necessitated by the development. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Gov't v. Schneider, 849 S.W.2d 557, 1992 Ky. App. LEXIS 204 (Ky. Ct. App. 1992).

The Planning Commission’s conditioning of a zone change on construction of a bridge was arbitrary and capricious as the developer of a proposed subdivision could not be saddled with an expense not borne by other developers in order to provide a road in which the lion’s share of the use would come from the surrounding neighborhoods rather than from the entire proposed subdivision. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Gov't v. Schneider, 849 S.W.2d 557, 1992 Ky. App. LEXIS 204 (Ky. Ct. App. 1992).

State has not adopted so narrow a test as the “uniquely attributable test,” wherein a developer is obligated to pay for such a public improvement in its entirety only if the need for the improvement is solely attributable to his development. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Gov't v. Schneider, 849 S.W.2d 557, 1992 Ky. App. LEXIS 204 (Ky. Ct. App. 1992).

5. Conditions of Approval.

Local governments may not put unreasonable burdens on developers as a condition precedent to approval of a subdivision. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Gov't v. Schneider, 849 S.W.2d 557, 1992 Ky. App. LEXIS 204 (Ky. Ct. App. 1992).

Subdivision plats are approved by a planning commission as a ministerial function to insure compliance with the subdivision regulations under KRS 100.277 and KRS 100.281(1). Furthermore, pursuant to KRS 100.281(3), the commission could not approve a subdivision preliminary plat that conflicted with the then current zoning or the then current agricultural exemption. Sebastian-Voor Props., LLC v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Gov't, 2008 Ky. LEXIS 39 (Ky. Feb. 21, 2008), sub. op., 265 S.W.3d 190, 2008 Ky. LEXIS 301 ( Ky. 2008 ).

6. Utility Easement.

Where utility assessment of 30 feet was demarcated on the plat of a residential subdivision, such easement applied to neighboring owners lots and any subsequent conveyances of the lots did not require specific deeds of conveyance and subsequent purchasers took subject to all dedications, easements or conveyances delineated on the recorded plat, as well as subject to restrictions, easements or encumbrances existing in the chain of title or set out in subsequent deeds. Kelly v. Cook, 899 S.W.2d 517, 1995 Ky. App. LEXIS 115 (Ky. Ct. App. 1995).

A general dedication, reservation, etc., in a plat, is sufficient to grant a public utility the right to the use of the easement for purposes such as installation and maintenance of electrical service lines, and it is not necessary that the plat specifically designate a particular utility. Kelly v. Cook, 899 S.W.2d 517, 1995 Ky. App. LEXIS 115 (Ky. Ct. App. 1995).

Opinions of Attorney General.

The mere designation or installation of the streets in the plat may have the effect of implied dedication. OAG 67-390 .

A subdivision regulation requiring streets to be dedicated was valid and could not be waived by the commission. OAG 67-390 .

KRS 100.277 , requiring commission approval for subdivisions, does not apply in the absence of the adoption of subdivision regulations pursuant to KRS 100.273 and this section. OAG 68-563 .

The use of hearings and recommendations of technical and professional groups, in applying the general doctrine of the comprehensive plan to each subdivision application, is legal. OAG 69-200 .

It is implicit that subdivision regulations approved by the planning commission and the pertinent legislative bodies must be integrated with a comprehensive plan under KRS 100.183 and 100.187 covering the area in question. OAG 72-31 .

This section’s requirement that all subdivision regulations shall be based on the comprehensive plan does not require that subdivision regulations be passed for an entire county. OAG 72-31 .

There is nothing specific or implied in this section that would authorize or require subdivision regulations adopted by a planning commission to be submitted to the fiscal court for approval or rejection as is the case with respect to zoning regulations and amendments thereto under KRS 100.207 and 100.211 . OAG 78-96 .

Though the location or relocation of water pipes is outside of the jurisdiction of the planning commission and its subdivision regulations, the size of the pipe and dimension of the waterlines would remain within the jurisdiction of the planning commission pursuant to its subdivision regulations and the commission could therefore compel the water district by mandamus, if necessary, to comply with its regulations. OAG 78-253 .

The planning commission possesses the power to require a water district to install appropriate fire hydrants to its existing and future waterlines pursuant to its subdivision regulations. OAG 78-790 .

Since zoning or subdivision regulations have no retroactive effect, the owner of a prefiled plat may sell lots in accordance with the recorded plat irrespective of subsequent regulations to the contrary. However, the subsequent adoption of zoning regulations under KRS 100.203 and subdivision regulations under this section that are not in contradiction to the prerecorded plat would be enforceable in a subdivision as it is developed. OAG 82-581 .

Under the 90-day approval deadline provision of subsection (1), the commission is entitled to a period of 90 days following the submission of the preliminary plat for approval or disapproval and the same period of time (90 days) to approve or disapprove the final plat. OAG 84-75 .

In the absence of a statutory amendment or a judicial decision to the contrary, subdivision regulations enacted pursuant to this section must contain, among other things, a provision relating to subdivision performance bonds to insure proper completion of required physical improvements, rather than provisions relating to letters of credit and escrow accounts. OAG 84-121 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Journal of Natural Resources & Environmental Law.

Articles, Tree Preservation Methods: Zoning Regulation vs. Conservation Servitude, 14 J. Nat. Resources & Envtl. L. 253 (1998-99).

Kentucky Law Journal.

Tarlock, Kentucky Planning and Land Use Control Enabling Legislation: An Analysis of the 1966 Revision of KRS Chapter 100, 56 Ky. L.J. 556 (1968).

Kentucky Law Survey, Griffin and Becker, Zoning, 67 Ky. L.J. 627 (1978-1979).

Kentucky Law Survey, Bratt and Brown, Environmental Law, 70 Ky. L.J. 455 (1981-82).

Northern Kentucky Law Review.

Comments, Planning and Zoning in Kentucky: Who Really Adopts the Comprehensive Plan?, 9 N. Ky. L. Rev. 499 (1982).

ALR

Validity and construction of statute or ordinance requiring land developer to dedicate portion of land for recreational purposes, or make payment in lieu thereof. 43 A.L.R.3d 862.

100.283. Recording final plats.

After the approval of a subdivision plat by the planning commission, it shall be recorded at the expense of the subdivider in the office of the county clerk. The plat shall be in the form of a rectangle and the clerk shall not be required to record a plat exceeding twenty-four (24) inches on one side and thirty-six (36) inches on the other. The county clerk shall provide a plat cabinet with an appropriate index for those plats which are too large to be placed in a plat book.

History. Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 65; 1978, ch. 384, § 230, effective June 17, 1978; 1980, ch. 143, § 1, effective July 15, 1980.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Streets.

A street may be dedicated to public use by approval of the planning commission and recording of a plat pursuant to KRS 100.277 and this section, but it must still be accepted by the fiscal court through the procedures in KRS Chapter 178 before it becomes a street which is open for the use of the public generally; acceptance by the county is not mandatory. Kemper v. Cooke, 576 S.W.2d 263, 1979 Ky. App. LEXIS 364 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).

100.285. Revocation of subdivision plat.

  1. Upon application of all persons owning land comprising a subdivision, the planning commission may revoke the approval of a subdivision plat, including all dedications of public facilities, easements and rights-of-way.
  2. Before any plat shall be revoked, all owners shall, as part of their application for revocation, state under oath that no person has purchased a lot shown on the plat.
  3. A revocation shall become effective only upon:
    1. A notation on the margin of the recorded plat stating that such plat has been revoked and the date of such vote of revocation; such notation shall be signed by the chairman, secretary, or other duly authorized officer of the commission; and
    2. A written approval of such revocation filed with the commission, duly signed by each entity to which an offer of dedication of any public or private facility, easement or right-of-way was made on the plat.
  4. The remedy provided in this section is in addition to all other remedies provided by law and shall not impair the right of the commission or any interested party from filing an action in Circuit Court for such relief as may be appropriate.

History. Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 141, § 38, effective July 15, 1986.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. In General.

Pursuant to KRS 100.285(3)(b), only upon final approval by a planning commission does a public or private entity acquire rights in an offer of dedication made on a plat. Sebastian-Voor Props., LLC v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Gov't, 2008 Ky. LEXIS 39 (Ky. Feb. 21, 2008), sub. op., 265 S.W.3d 190, 2008 Ky. LEXIS 301 ( Ky. 2008 ).

100.287. Department of Highways may review plats.

The State Department of Highways may file with the planning commission of any planning unit exercising subdivision jurisdiction, a map of the territory within one (1) mile on either or both sides of any existing or proposed highway. After receipt of the map by the planning commission, no preliminary plats shall be approved by the commission until one (1) copy of such preliminary plat has been referred to the designated office of the Department of Highways for its review. If the Department of Highways desires to make any recommendations on the plan, it shall communicate such to the planning commission within fifteen (15) days after the receipt of the plat.

History. Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 66.

100.290. Buildings in beds of mapped streets; review. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3037h-132) was repealed by Acts 1942, ch. 176, § 17.

100.291. Restraint of subdivision construction.

The planning commission shall have the power to apply for an injunction against any type of subdivision construction by the subdivider or the landowner where a subdivision’s regulations have been violated.

History. Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 67.

Opinions of Attorney General.

The planning commission is authorized to take action to restrain subdivision construction that does not comply with the subdivision regulation. OAG 69-42 .

100.292. Land sold in violation of chapter — Plats filed — Effect.

When it has been discovered that land has been sold or transferred, or that a contract has been entered into for the sale or transfer of land in violation of the provisions of this chapter pertaining to the regulation of subdivisions, the owner or owners of record shall file plats of the land in accordance with this chapter. When land is sold or transferred, or a contract has been entered into for the sale or transfer of land in violation of this chapter, the land shall be governed by the subdivision regulations both prior to and after the platting of the land by the owner of record as if a plat had been filed in accordance with the provisions of this chapter pertaining to subdivision regulations. Plats filed pursuant to this section may be filed by the last transferee in the chain of title including holders of deeds which may otherwise be void under KRS 100.277(2).

History. Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 68 (2nd sentence); 1986, ch. 461, § 22, effective July 15, 1986.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section was formerly compiled as KRS 100.341 .

Opinions of Attorney General.

The county clerk cannot refuse to file or record subdivision plats that have not first received the approval of the county health department even though the health department passed a regulation requiring such approval. OAG 70-279 .

When a subdivision has been approved and a plat of it filed of record, the planning commission has the power and authority to amend and change lot lines without the written approval of the owners of the remaining lots in the subdivision. OAG 71-206 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Tarlock, Kentucky Planning and Land Use Control Enabling Legislation: An Analysis of the 1966 Revision of KRS Chapter 100, 56 Ky. L.J. 556 (1968).

Northern Kentucky Law Review.

Brandt, Kentucky Real Estate Law Survey: 1990 Through 1993, 21 N. Ky. L. Rev. 435 (1994).

Map for Planning Unit

100.293. Official map authorized.

When all components of the comprehensive plan which are prescribed under this chapter as a minimum for a planning unit and a public facilities improvement program have been prepared and adopted, the commission and legislative bodies and fiscal courts of the cities and counties shall have the power to prepare and adopt an official map regulation. The regulation shall incorporate a map of the entire area under jurisdiction, but it may be accomplished by parts in which case the first part shall be passed as the original regulation and all other parts shall be treated as amendments to the original regulation.

History. Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 69.

Opinions of Attorney General.

Whether or not schools and other public agencies are authorized to have their proposed facility needs placed on the official map depends upon whether or not the proposed facilities are part of a capital improvement program adopted and budgeted by said agency on a short term basis. OAG 68-430 .

Acceptance of the streets dedicated in a plat must be by specific action on the part of the legislative body following favorable recommendation by the planning commission. OAG 69-243 .

The approval of a subdivision plat by the planning commission, which includes the streets therein, does not automatically constitute an acceptance of the streets dedicated in the plat. OAG 69-243 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Tarlock, Kentucky Planning and Land Use Control Enabling Legislation: An Analysis of the 1966 Revision of KRS Chapter 100, 56 Ky. L.J. 556 (1968).

Northern Kentucky Law Review.

Comments, Planning and Zoning in Kentucky: Who Really Adopts the Comprehensive Plan?, 9 N. Ky. L. Rev. 499 (1982).

100.297. Official map, contents — Hearing, posting.

  1. The official map may show, without being limited to, the location and extent of existing and proposed public streets, including rights-of-way, watercourses, parks and playgrounds, public schools and building sites, and other public facilities needs.
  2. Prior to the adoption or amendment of the official map, the planning commission shall review the map or changes to it in light of the comprehensive plan, shall hold a public hearing on the map or proposed changes pursuant to public notice as prescribed by KRS Chapter 424, and shall recommend its approval or disapproval to the legislative bodies.
  3. After the passage of the official map regulation for all or part of the city or county, all streets, watercourses, parks and playgrounds, public buildings, public school sites, or other public facilities which have been approved under subdivision regulations as provided in this chapter, shall be posted to the official map; no public hearing need be held for such additions to the official map.

History. Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 172, §§ 70 to 72.

Research References and Practice Aids

Northern Kentucky Law Review.

Comments, Planning and Zoning in Kentucky: Who Really Adopts the Comprehensive Plan?, 9 N. Ky. L. Rev. 499 (1982).

100.300. Improvements in streets ; exceptions to zoning regulations. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3037h-133) was repealed by Acts 1942, ch. 176, § 17.

100.301. Adoption of map, how construed.

The passage of the official map regulation shall not be deemed as opening or establishing of any street, or as a taking or as an acceptance of any land for a street, watercourse, or public ground; nor shall it obligate the city or county to improve or maintain any such street or facility.

History. Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 73.

Opinions of Attorney General.

Acceptance of the streets dedicated in a plat must be by specific action on the part of the legislative body following favorable recommendation by the planning commission. OAG 69-243 .

The approval of a subdivision plat by the planning commission, which includes the streets therein, does not automatically constitute an acceptance of the streets dedicated in the plat. OAG 69-243 .

100.303. Construction permits required.

For the purpose of preserving the integrity of the official map of the city or county, no permit shall be issued for the construction or material alteration of any building within the lines of any streets, including right-of-way, watercourse, parks and playgrounds, public schools, or other public building sites shown on the official map, except as provided in this section. The official map of a city may include the area outside the city limits over which the approval of subdivision plats is required. Any persons desiring to construct or materially alter a building in the lines of any proposed facility shown on the official map shall apply to the administrative official of the city or county for a building permit. Unless such application is made and the permit is granted, no person shall recover any damages for the taking for public use of any structure or improvement constructed within the lines shown on the map, and any such structure or improvement shall be removed at the expense of the owner when the land is acquired for public use.

History. Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 74.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Issuance of Permits.

Practitioners representing protesters of zoning changes can more thoroughly protect their clients’ interests by filing notices of lis pendens, by obtaining quicker services of process, and by seeking injunctions to prevent the issuance of building permits on contested properties; furthermore those individuals representing buyers, owners, builders or lenders must be certain that any new construction or building modifications be done in good faith; finally, those individuals responsible for enforcing local zoning laws must be extremely cautious in issuing building permits in order to assure that the character and integrity of a zone is maintained. Petty v. Barrentine, 594 S.W.2d 903, 1980 Ky. App. LEXIS 297 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980).

2. Change of Use.

The question of good faith will arise in any case where the owners or buyers of rezoned property rush into any building activity or change of use before the time expires for appealing a rezoning decision. Petty v. Barrentine, 594 S.W.2d 903, 1980 Ky. App. LEXIS 297 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980).

Opinions of Attorney General.

A city could not require a contractor to obtain a building permit for the construction of a county school within the city limits. OAG 70-636 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Tarlock, Kentucky Planning and Land Use Control Enabling Legislation: An Analysis of the 1966 Revision of KRS Chapter 100, 56 Ky. L.J. 556 (1968).

100.307. Permits for unprofitable land.

If the land shown on the official map is not yielding a fair return, the board of adjustment shall have the power to grant a permit for the building which will, as little as practicable, increase the cost of future acquisition, and the board may impose reasonable requirements as a condition of granting such permits. Such a permit shall not be granted when the applicant will not be substantially damaged by placing his building outside the boundary lines of the proposed facility.

History. Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 75.

100.310. Enforcement of regulations. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3037h-134) was repealed by Acts 1942, ch. 176, § 17.

Miscellaneous Provisions

100.311. Public improvement program.

Any city or county may prepare and adopt a program and budget for capital improvements which the planning commission may recommend. The long-term capital improvements program shall list, in priority order of need, all of the public facility improvements proposed on the comprehensive plans for the entire time period covered thereby. The short-term capital improvements budget shall include those capital improvements which are programmed for the first five (5) or six (6) years, shall show estimates of cost, where applicable, for land acquisition, planning and design, construction and equipment, and all other necessary capital outlays, and shall relate such capital improvements costs to over-all city or county governmental costs by projecting revenues and expenditures for the five (5) or six (6) year period on a year by year basis. The resulting short-term capital improvements budget will assure the ability of the city or county to meet its capital needs without impairment to its operating needs. The first year of the short-term capital improvements budget shall automatically become part of that year’s current operating budget, at which time the short-term capital improvements budget shall be revised and another year added. For purpose of year to year budget revision and updating, the long-term capital improvements program may be reviewed and revised at any time in keeping with the review and revision of the comprehensive plans. Nothing herein shall prevent any city or county from preparing and adopting a public facility improvement program in the absence of a proposed public improvements map regulation.

History. Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 76; 1986, ch. 141, § 34, effective July 15, 1986.

Opinions of Attorney General.

Whether or not schools and other public agencies are authorized to have their proposed facility needs placed on the official map depends upon whether or not the proposed facilities are part of a capital improvement program adopted and budgeted by said agency on a short term basis. OAG 68-430 .

The establishment of a revolving capital improvement fund with money borrowed from the city investment fund and to be repaid over a five-year period from ad valorem taxes would be a violation of Const., § 158. OAG 69-255 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Tarlock, Kentucky Planning and Land Use Control Enabling Legislation: An Analysis of the 1966 Revision of KRS Chapter 100, 56 Ky. L.J. 556 (1968).

Northern Kentucky Law Review.

Comments, Planning and Zoning in Kentucky: Who Really Adopts the Comprehensive Plan?, 9 N. Ky. L. Rev. 499 (1982).

100.314. Definitions for KRS 100.320 to 100.990. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2741zz-1, 3037h-111: amend. Acts 1942, ch. 176, § 17; 1958, ch. 154, § 1) which was formerly compiled as KRS 100.010 , was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 91.

100.316. Construction of KRS 100.320 to 100.830. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2741z-9, 3037h-135, 3235f-11) which was formerly compiled as KRS 100.020 , was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 91.

100.317. Relationship to official map.

No proposed public facility improvements shall be placed upon the official map other than those included in the short-term capital improvements budget.

History. Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 77.

100.320. Planning Commission. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3235f-1: amend. Acts 1958, ch. 154, § 2) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 91.

100.321. Planning commission to approve changes in zoning regulations. [Renumbered and repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 79) was renumbered as KRS 100.215 and subsequently repealed by Acts 1988, ch. 19, § 3, effective July 15, 1988.

100.324. Public utility facilities excepted — Review of proposed acquisition, disposition, or change by commission.

  1. All other provisions of this chapter to the contrary notwithstanding, public utilities operating under the jurisdiction of the Public Service Commission, except as specified in KRS 100.987 , or the Department of Vehicle Regulation or Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, any municipally owned electric system, and common carriers by rail shall not be required to receive the approval of the planning unit for the location or relocation of any of their service facilities. Service facilities include all facilities of such utilities and common carriers by rail other than office space, garage space, and warehouse space and include office space, garage space, and warehouse space when such space is incidental to a service facility. The Public Service Commission and the Department of Vehicle Regulation shall give notice to the planning commission of any planning unit of any hearing which affects locations or relocations of service facilities within that planning unit’s jurisdiction.
  2. The nonservice facilities excluded in subsection (1) of this section must be in accordance with the zoning regulations.
  3. Upon the request of the planning commission, the public utilities referred to in this section shall provide the planning commission of the planning unit affected with information concerning service facilities which have been located on and relocated on private property.
  4. Any proposal for acquisition or disposition of land for public facilities, or changes in the character, location, or extent of structures or land for public facilities, excluding state and federal highways and public utilities and common carriers by rail mentioned in this section, shall be referred to the commission to be reviewed in light of its agreement with the comprehensive plan, and the commission shall, within sixty (60) days from the date of its receipt, review the project and advise the referring body whether the project is in accordance with the comprehensive plan. If it disapproves of the project, it shall state the reasons for disapproval in writing and make suggestions for changes which will, in its opinion, better accomplish the objectives of the comprehensive plan. No permit required for construction or occupancy of such public facilities shall be issued until the expiration of the sixty (60) day period or until the planning commission issues its report, whichever occurs first.

History. Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 80; 1984, ch. 304, § 1, effective July 13, 1984; 1988, ch. 144, § 7, effective July 15, 1988; 1996, ch. 383, § 1, effective July 15, 1996; 1998, ch. 231, § 3, effective July 15, 1998; 2002, ch. 89, § 3, effective July 15, 2002; 2002, ch. 343, § 1, effective April 23, 2002; 2002, ch. 346, § 151, effective July 15, 2002.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(4/23/2002). This section was amended by 2002 Ky. Acts ch. 89, sec. 3, ch. 343, sec. 1, and ch. 346, sec. 151. Chs. 89 and 343 are not in conflict and have been codified together. Chs. 343 and 346 appear to be in conflict, and where a conflict exists, the substantive changes in ch. 343 have been allowed to prevail over the revisory changes in ch. 346. Cf. KRS 7.123 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Analysis

1. Public Utilities Facilities.

The mobile telephone service was not subject to the conditional use and dimensional variance ordinances of the county in locating its service facilities. Oldham County Planning & Zoning Com. v. Courier Communications Corp., 722 S.W.2d 904, 1987 Ky. App. LEXIS 421 (Ky. Ct. App. 1987).

City that was an instrumentality of the state did have to seek a “mandatory review” by a planning commission under KRS 100.324(4) before making changes affecting the public roads but was not required to comply with the planning commission’s ultimate decision. City of Worthington Hills v. Worthington Fire Prot. Dist., 140 S.W.3d 584, 2004 Ky. App. LEXIS 169 (Ky. Ct. App. 2004).

2. School Board.

In order to harmonize subsection (4) of this section and KRS 100.361(2), they must be construed as mandating that the school board furnish adequate information concerning proposed public facilities to the planning commission for its review and opinion, yet in the final analysis, the school board may disregard the opinion of the planning commission. Hopkinsville-Christian County Planning Comm'n v. Christian County Bd. of Educ., 903 S.W.2d 531, 1995 Ky. App. LEXIS 142 (Ky. Ct. App. 1995).

3. Sanitation District.

By enacting KRS 100.361(2), the Legislature showed its intent that zoning regulations and planning requirements should not override implementation of governmental functions; thus, a sanitation district was not required to submit a draft of its proposal to acquire the property owners’ land prior to initiating condemnation proceedings under KRS 100.324(4) because the sanitation district, as an autonomous political subdivision, was immune from zoning regulations and planning requirements. Garriga v. Sanitation Dist. No. 1, 2003 Ky. App. LEXIS 305 (Ky. Ct. App. Dec. 5, 2003).

Cited:

Hall v. Housing Authority of Louisville, 660 S.W.2d 674, 1983 Ky. App. LEXIS 397 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983).

Notes to Unpublished Decisions

1. Public Utilities Facilities.

Unpublished decision: City’s ordinance that prohibited placement of privately owned benches and other objects in the public right-of-way did not violate an advertising company’s equal protection rights because the ordinance was not unconstitutionally underinclusive; sandwich boards and newsracks, which were exempt, were smaller than benches, and an exemption for bus shelters and benches placed by quasi-governmental agencies was arguably required by state law. Bench Billboard Co. v. City of Covington, Ky., 465 Fed. Appx. 395, 2012 FED App. 0179N, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 3031 (6th Cir. Ky. 2012 ).

Unpublished decision: Transit authority’s exemption as a public utility from obtaining city approval for locating or relocating its facilities did not extend to exempt the placement of advertising benches on public rights-of-way near the transit authority’s bus stops in violation of a city ordinance prohibiting encroachment on public rights-of-way. Bench Billboard Co. v. City of Covington, 547 Fed. Appx. 695, 2013 FED App. 0940N, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 22310 (6th Cir. Ky. 2013 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

The exemption for schools contained in subsection (2) of KRS 100.361 would not apply until the property is acquired. OAG 69-659 .

A school board is not required to obtain prior approval of the local planning unit in order to construct a new school building. OAG 69-659 .

Where a telephone company set up a mobile office building in a trailer at the rear of their existing office to provide necessary space for company engineers to draw plans for the laying of new cable lines and construction, the trailer was used as a temporary facility for improving the telephone service of the company and was thus a service facility and was also an office incidental to a service facility and under this section was exempt from local zoning regulations prohibiting mobile homes or trailers in the area. OAG 73-543 .

Where a property owner adjoining a telephone company warehouse, a preexisting nonconforming use, blacktopped his property, which was allowable under the regulations of the county planning commission, and then permitted the telephone company to use his property to park trucks and store cable and cable spools, the blacktop area did not constitute a service facility of a public utility and was not exempt from the jurisdiction of the planning commission. OAG 74-712 .

The term “service facility” as used in subsection (1) of this section would appear to clearly include waterlines installed in new subdivisions in Henderson County, which was included within a water district, and which are excluded from the approval of the planning commission, particularly insofar as their location or relocation. OAG 78-253 .

Though the location or relocation of the water pipes is outside of the jurisdiction of the planning commission and its subdivision regulations, the size of the pipe and dimension of the waterlines would remain within the jurisdiction of the planning commission pursuant to its subdivision regulations and the commission could therefore compel the water district by mandamus, if necessary, to comply with its regulations. OAG 78-253 .

The waste utility landfill would be a facility incidental to a service facility and therefore included within the definition of service facility for purposes of exemption from planning and zoning under this section; the key determinant is that the landfill would be handling only scrubber wastes which are a by-product unique to the provision of electrical service and scrubber wastes are incidental to the provision of electrical service in a way that office and cafeteria wastes, although produced by the employees of an electric utility, are not; accordingly, a facility designed to receive this scrubber waste is a facility incidental to the electric utility’s service facilities and is exempt from planning and zoning review. OAG 92-33 .

This section removes utility waste disposal facilities from planning unit review. OAG 92-33 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Cox, What May States Do About Out-of-State Waste in Light of Recent Supreme Court Decisions Applying the Dormant Commerce Clause? Kentucky As Case Study in the Waste Wars, 83 Ky. L.J. 551 (1994-95).

100.325. Unlawful restrictions on federally licensed firearms manufacturer, importer, or dealer.

No city, county, urban-county government, charter county, or consolidated local government shall utilize the zoning process to prohibit a federally licensed firearms manufacturer, importer, or dealer from locating at any place within the jurisdiction at which any other business may locate. This section shall not prohibit local jurisdictions from subjecting the businesses of federally licensed firearms manufacturers, importers, and dealers to the same restrictions related to the exterior appearance of the property and number of paid employees applied to other commercial uses in residential zones. No restrictions shall be enacted that could be reasonably construed to solely affect federally licensed firearms manufacturers, importers, or dealers.

History. Enact. Acts 2004, ch. 187, § 1, effective July 13, 2004.

100.327. KRS 100.215 and 100.324 apply, when.

Only after the statement of goals and objectives and land use plan elements of the comprehensive plan, at least, have been adopted for the unit, KRS 100.215 and 100.324 shall govern.

History. Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 78; 1986, ch. 141, § 35, effective July 15, 1986.

Compiler’s Notes.

KRS 100.215 , referred to in this section, has been repealed.

100.328. Bylaws and procedures.

  1. The planning commission shall have the authority to adopt all bylaws and procedures necessary to carry out the functions of this chapter.
  2. The contents of and procedure for adoption and amendment of interim regulations, as provided in KRS 100.201 shall be the same as for permanent zoning or other kinds of growth management regulations.

History. Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 172, §§ 81, 88A; 1986, ch. 141, § 36, effective July 15, 1986; 1988, ch. 28, § 2, effective July 15, 1988.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section was formerly compiled as KRS 100.334 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Interim Regulations.

Action of city denying application for building permit to construct a filling station was arbitrary since city’s zoning ordinance had ceased to exist by virtue of KRS 100.367 (now repealed) and reenactment of existing zoning regulations did not amount to interim regulations as provided for in this section as that section is concerned with interim regulations of the planning commission in formulating a comprehensive plan. Erlanger v. Hoff, 535 S.W.2d 86, 1976 Ky. LEXIS 86 ( Ky. 1976 ).

While this section covers zoning ordinances, such ordinances necessarily remain subject to the qualifications imposed by KRS 100.201 and 100.207 and these three interrelated sections must be construed in harmony with one another since, otherwise, this section would nullify the requirements for interim zoning under the other two provisions. Daviess County v. Snyder, 556 S.W.2d 688, 1977 Ky. LEXIS 528 ( Ky. 1977 ).

Where the only zoning regulations in a county were interim ordinances adopted prior to the comprehensive plan in order to implement the goals and objectives until a comprehensive plan and attendant permanent regulations were formulated, such regulations were not compatible with the comprehensive plan and were invalid; accordingly, a developer was not bound by fiscal court rulings based on the ordinances. Kindred Homes, Inc. v. Dean, 605 S.W.2d 15, 1979 Ky. App. LEXIS 538 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).

Cited:

Ridge Realty Co. v. Oldham County Planning & Zoning Com., 497 S.W.2d 432, 1973 Ky. LEXIS 326 ( Ky. 1973 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

A planning commission could temporarily adopt the old planning studies and regulations as interim legislation pursuant to this section to allow it to legally operate until it could enact the necessary legislation pursuant to the terms of KRS 100.111 to 100.361 . OAG 71-51 .

Where a city and county established a joint city-county planning commission which in turn adopted an interim regulation authorizing the city to adopt and enforce zoning regulations within an area which extended beyond city limits, such interim regulation was unauthorized because of the commission’s failure to create a joint board of adjustment pursuant to KRS 100.217 . OAG 71-133 .

A metropolitan planning commission composed of two cities and the county could adopt interim regulations governing the planning and zoning of its area’s jurisdiction pending the completion of the various elements of the comprehensive plan pursuant to this section. OAG 71-440 .

There is no conflict between the provisions of KRS 100.273 and this section. OAG 71-440 .

Joint planning commission had authority to adopt subdivision regulations covering area three miles outside of city boundaries subject to the approval or rejection of such regulations in that county zone by the fiscal court, and provided the regulations were in conformity with the comprehensive plan. OAG 72-31 .

The fiscal court may approve subdivision regulations involving a three-mile zone outside city boundaries, since the zone is in county territory and is outside any incorporated areas. OAG 72-31 .

A city of the fourth class would have the authority to enact an amendment to its zoning ordinance declaring a moratorium on development in a certain area in order to allow the city a period of 12 to 16 months in which to seek the help of state agencies in updating the city’s comprehensive planning and zoning ordinance. OAG 77-540 .

The readoption of existing zoning regulations of the various cities by a joint planning commission would not require a public hearing since no actual change was being made in such regulations. OAG 78-110 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Kentucky Law Survey, Griffin and Becker, Zoning, 67 Ky. L.J. 627 (1978-1979).

Kentucky Law Survey, Bratt and Brown, Environmental Law, 70 Ky. L.J. 455 (1981-82).

Northern Kentucky Law Review.

Comments, An Unanswered Question Concerning Planning and Zoning in Kentucky: Must the Entire Comprehensive Plan be Approved by the Fiscal Court and the Legislative Bodies of the Planning Unit?, 5 N. Ky. L. Rev. 231 (1978).

Comments, Planning and Zoning in Kentucky: Who Really Adopts the Comprehensive Plan?, 9 N. Ky. L. Rev. 499 (1982).

100.329. Recording of plats.

All final plats approved by the planning commission shall be recorded at the expense of the applicant in the office of the county clerk. A copy of all regulations and the official maps of each planning unit shall be filed with the appropriate agency as provided in this chapter, or as otherwise provided by law.

History. Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 88; 1978, ch. 384, § 231, effective June 17, 1978; 1988, ch. 30, § 7, effective July 15, 1988.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section was formerly compiled as KRS 100.344 .

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(1982). A technical correction has been made in this section by the Reviser of Statutes pursuant to KRS 7.136 .

100.3291. Restrictions imposing highest standards apply.

Whenever any other restrictions or covenants impose a higher standard than permitted by this chapter, then such other restriction or covenant shall govern.

History. Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 76; 1986, ch. 141, § 37, effective July 15, 1986.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section was formerly compiled as KRS 100.349 .

Opinions of Attorney General.

The phrase “any other restrictions or covenants” mentioned in this section is limited to restrictions on the use of lands arising from deeds or contracts as zoning generally does not affect such restrictions. OAG 76-161 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Tarlock, Kentucky Planning and Land Use Control Enabling Legislation: An Analysis of the 1966 Revision of KRS Chapter 100, 56 Ky. L.J. 556 (1968).

100.330. Members of commission — Term of office — Vacancies. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3235f-2: amend. Acts 1958, ch. 154, § 3; 1962, ch. 40; 1962, ch. 297, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 91.

100.331. Grant of legislative powers to fiscal courts — Exception.

Except in counties containing a consolidated local government, fiscal courts are granted all the legislative powers granted to all cities for purposes of adopting regulations and legislation proposed under this chapter.

History. Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 86; 2002, ch. 346, § 152, effective July 15, 2002.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Judicial Review.

There is no authority in KRS Chapter 100 that even inferentially would grant the right of a local legislative body to limit judicial review of an action of local boards or commissions. Fiscal Court of Jefferson County v. Don Ridge Land Developing Co., 669 S.W.2d 922, 1984 Ky. LEXIS 233 ( Ky. 1984 ).

A fiscal court ordinance dealing with judicial review of its action for zone changes, which provided that judicial review had to be initiated by an aggrieved party within 30 days from the time such action became effective, was invalid because it went beyond the grant of powers given to local governments by KRS Chapter 100. Fiscal Court of Jefferson County v. Don Ridge Land Developing Co., 669 S.W.2d 922, 1984 Ky. LEXIS 233 ( Ky. 1984 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

The zoning function must be exercised, if at all, by the legislative bodies of the city and county independently within their respective territorial jurisdictions. OAG 69-177 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Tarlock, Kentucky Planning and Land Use Control Enabling Legislation: An Analysis of the 1966 Revision of KRS Chapter 100, 56 Ky. L.J. 556 (1968).

100.334. Rules and regulations — Interim regulations. [Renumbered.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 172, §§ 81, 88A) is now compiled as KRS 100.328 .

100.337. Enforcement by commission.

Commission shall have a cause of action for all appropriate relief including injunctions against any governmental bodies or any aggrieved person who violates this chapter or regulations adopted hereunder.

History. Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 84.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Aggrievement.

Where a mayor’s general power to cast a tie-breaking vote under KRS 83A.130(5) did not prevail over the explicit language of KRS 100.211(1), a county planning commission was “aggrieved” pursuant to KRS 100.337 and 100.347 when its decision to deny a zoning application was not followed. Chandler v. Bullitt County Joint Planning Comm'n, 125 S.W.3d 851, 2002 Ky. App. LEXIS 2358 (Ky. Ct. App. 2002).

2. Injunction Proper Remedy.

Injunction was proper remedy to prevent continuation of violation of zoning ordinance. Louisville v. Koenig, 290 Ky. 562 , 162 S.W.2d 19, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 450 ( Ky. 1942 ) (decided under prior law).

3. Properly Constructed Building.

Violation of zoning ordinance by use of properly constructed building for improper use did not warrant destruction of building. Louisville v. Koenig, 290 Ky. 562 , 162 S.W.2d 19, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 450 ( Ky. 1942 ) (decided under prior law).

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Kentucky Law Survey, Griffin and Becker, Zoning, 67 Ky. L.J. 627 (1978-1979).

100.340. Chairman — Meeting — Quorum. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3235f-2) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 91.

100.341. Land sold in violation of act — Plats filed — Effect. [Renumbered.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 68 (2nd sentence).) is now compiled as KRS 100.292 .

100.344. Recording of plats, variances, conditional use permits. [Renumbered.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 88; 1978, ch. 384, § 231, effective June 17, 1978) is now compiled as KRS 100.329 .

100.345. Presiding body to adopt rules of procedure for public hearing.

Whenever a public hearing is required by this chapter, the presiding body may prescribe the procedures to be followed. No information offered at the hearing shall be excluded for failure to follow judicial rules of evidence. The presiding body may adopt its own rules to determine the kind of information that will be received. Members of the presiding body may visit a site pertinent to a hearing prior to the final decision of the presiding body. All information allowed to be received shall constitute evidence upon which action may be based.

History. Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 141, § 40, effective July 15, 1986.

100.347. Appeal from board of adjustment, planning commission, or legislative body action — Final action defined.

  1. Any person or entity claiming to be injured or aggrieved by any final action of the board of adjustment shall appeal from the action to the Circuit Court of the county in which the property, which is the subject of the action of the board of adjustment, lies. Such appeal shall be taken within thirty (30) days after the final action of the board. All final actions which have not been appealed within thirty (30) days shall not be subject to judicial review. The board of adjustment shall be a party in any such appeal filed in the Circuit Court.
  2. Any person or entity claiming to be injured or aggrieved by any final action of the planning commission shall appeal from the final action to the Circuit Court of the county in which the property, which is the subject of the commission’s action, lies. Such appeal shall be taken within thirty (30) days after such action. Such action shall not include the commission’s recommendations made to other governmental bodies. All final actions which have not been appealed within thirty (30) days shall not be subject to judicial review. Provided, however, any appeal of a planning commission action granting or denying a variance or conditional use permit authorized by KRS 100.203(5) shall be taken pursuant to this subsection. In such case, the thirty (30) day period for taking an appeal begins to run at the time the legislative body grants or denies the map amendment for the same development. The planning commission shall be a party in any such appeal filed in the Circuit Court.
  3. Any person or entity claiming to be injured or aggrieved by any final action of the legislative body of any city, county, consolidated local government, or urban-county government, relating to a map amendment shall appeal from the action to the Circuit Court of the county in which the property, which is the subject of the map amendment, lies. Such appeal shall be taken within thirty (30) days after the final action of the legislative body. All final actions which have not been appealed within thirty (30) days shall not be subject to judicial review. The legislative body shall be a party in any such appeal filed in the Circuit Court.
  4. The owner of the subject property and applicants who initiated the proceeding shall be made parties to the appeal. Other persons speaking at the public hearing are not required to be made parties to such appeal.
  5. For purposes of this chapter, final action shall be deemed to have occurred on the calendar date when the vote is taken to approve or disapprove the matter pending before the body.

History. Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 82; 1986, ch. 141, § 39, effective July 15, 1986; 1988, ch. 144, § 8, effective July 15, 1988; 2002, ch. 346, § 153, effective July 15, 2002.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Analysis

1. Application.

This section only applies to appeals from final actions of planning commissions and boards of adjustment, not from actions of the county fiscal court, a legislative body. Fiscal Court of Jefferson County v. Don Ridge Land Developing Co., 669 S.W.2d 922, 1984 Ky. LEXIS 233 ( Ky. 1984 ).

KRS 100.347(5) applies to actions of a planning commission as well as legislative bodies, including county and city governments. Triad Developmental/Alta Glyne, Inc. v. Gellhaus, 150 S.W.3d 43, 2004 Ky. LEXIS 221 ( Ky. 2004 ).

2. Final Action.

The 1988 amendment to this section now simply extends its application to legislative bodies of local government, and the language in neither the old law nor the new law is clear as to what date constitutes “final action”; the “final action” in the present zoning case was when the ordinance was given its second reading and final passage, as with regard to judicial economy, interpreting the statute otherwise could lead to an unsound result since it is possible that one could appeal from an initial zoning change decision and have the matter heard, only to find that the ordinance effecting the change did not pass. Leslie v. Henderson, 797 S.W.2d 718, 1990 Ky. App. LEXIS 157 (Ky. Ct. App. 1990).

It is apparent that the General Assembly intended that an ordinance adopting a zoning amendment, enacted pursuant to this section, is final and effective, subject only to judicial review pursuant to subsection (3) of this section and the statutory procedure does not contemplate that the ordinance is subject to veto. Hacker v. Baesler, 812 S.W.2d 706, 1991 Ky. LEXIS 45 ( Ky. 1991 ), modified, 1991 Ky. LEXIS 130 (Ky. Aug. 29, 1991).

3. Issuance of Summons.

In an action challenging planning commission’s approval of a plat dividing a farm into smaller tracts, where summons was issued and served on each member of commission but not on commission in its official capacity, the commission waived service of summons by participating extensively in the litigation. Green v. Bourbon County Joint Planning Com., 637 S.W.2d 626, 1982 Ky. LEXIS 281 ( Ky. 1982 ).

Since a summons may not be issued until after the appeal is filed, the issuance of a summons cannot under the statute constitute an essential element in the filing of the appeal. It is a condition subsequent to the filing; it is procedural and not jurisdictional. Green v. Bourbon County Joint Planning Com., 637 S.W.2d 626, 1982 Ky. LEXIS 281 ( Ky. 1982 ).

Court of appeals properly affirmed an order dismissing property owners’ appeal of a county planning commission’s approval of a plat amendment because the action was not commenced before the expiration of the time allotted since the owners failed to comply with the “good faith” element in the issuance of the summons; the owners’ counsel did nothing to effectuate service for three weeks, and counsel’s effort to secure the waiver of service was not a good faith effort to have the summons served. Isaacs v. Caldwell, 530 S.W.3d 449, 2017 Ky. LEXIS 439 ( Ky. 2017 ).

Summons for a bank was regarded as issued contemporaneously with the filing of property owners' appeal of a county planning commission's decision before the expiration of the time limitation because the owners' counsel had done all that was required by law to secure the issuance of the summons and did nothing to cause the delay; equitable principles applicable to original civil actions are equally applicable to original actions seeking judicial review of a planning commission action. Isaacs v. Caldwell, 530 S.W.3d 449, 2017 Ky. LEXIS 439 ( Ky. 2017 ).

Summons to be served on bank should have been issued by the clerk and returned to property owners' counsel when the owners' appeal was filed because counsel had done all that was required by law to secure the issuance of the summons and did nothing to cause the delay; counsel filed the Appeal before the expiration of the time prescribed by the statute, and the lack of an address for service on the bank afforded the clerk no justification for refusing to issue the summons. Isaacs v. Caldwell, 530 S.W.3d 449, 2017 Ky. LEXIS 439 ( Ky. 2017 ).

4. Transcript of Evidence.

The rule that a public body can speak only through its records has reference only to the actions of the body and does not preclude consideration of a record of evidence heard by the body upon which it based its action. Gentry v. Ressnier, 437 S.W.2d 756, 1969 Ky. LEXIS 455 ( Ky. 1969 ).

Where the applicants for a conditional use permit, in appealing from an order of the zoning board denying the permit does not bring up the transcript of the evidence, the applicants fail in their burden of proof and judgment should be entered upholding the decision of the board. Gentry v. Ressnier, 437 S.W.2d 756, 1969 Ky. LEXIS 455 ( Ky. 1969 ).

It is not necessary for the transcript of evidence heard by the board to be incorporated into the minutes by reference to be considered by the court because there will normally be no problem of certainty. Gentry v. Ressnier, 437 S.W.2d 756, 1969 Ky. LEXIS 455 ( Ky. 1969 ).

5. Parties.

Motion to amend statement of appeal to include persons, appearing at hearing before zoning commission, to testify to lack of objection to zoning change did not preclude protestants from maintaining that persons had not been parties and were not entitled to notice on appeal. Ray v. Luckett, 332 S.W.2d 848, 1960 Ky. LEXIS 176 ( Ky. 1960 ) (decided under prior law).

Although he need not file the complete record, an appealing party must have affirmatively shown by some part of commission’s record, that his appearance was entered as a protestant and that he was injured or aggrieved by the commission’s decision. Woodrow v. Louisville & Jefferson County Planning & Zoning Com., 346 S.W.2d 538, 1961 Ky. LEXIS 316 ( Ky. 1961 ) (decided under prior law).

In appealing from an order of the county zoning board denying a conditional use permit, the planning commission and the property owners who have appeared before the board in protest of the application are not indispensable parties. Gentry v. Ressnier, 437 S.W.2d 756, 1969 Ky. LEXIS 455 ( Ky. 1969 ).

If a complaint is simply an appeal from a decision of the board of adjustments, the failure to join the planning commission is fatal under subsection (2) of this section. Greater Cincinnati Marine Service, Inc. v. Ludlow, 602 S.W.2d 427, 1980 Ky. LEXIS 245 ( Ky. 1980 ).

Where a landowner’s complaint alleged various violations of state zoning law and the federal Constitution, challenged the establishment and actions of the board of adjustments, attacked the legality of the local zoning ordinance, and questioned the jurisdictional limits of the city, the complaint was far more than an appeal under the aegis of subsection (2) of this section; therefore, the requirement that the planning commission be joined as a party was applicable only to the part of the complaint which sought review of the decision of the board of adjustments, and the Court of Appeals erred when it held that the failure to join the planning commission was fatal to the landowner’s total position on appeal. Greater Cincinnati Marine Service, Inc. v. Ludlow, 602 S.W.2d 427, 1980 Ky. LEXIS 245 ( Ky. 1980 ).

Trial court did not lack jurisdiction to make decisions regarding the authority the planning and zoning commission after dismissing the commission as a party, because the commission was a subsidiary of the city and KRS 100.347(3) clearly stated that the legislative body, the Board of Commissioners of the City of Danville, shall be a party, not the commission, and no objections to the dismissal order were made at the trial court level. Bd. of Comm'rs v. Davis, 238 S.W.3d 132, 2007 Ky. App. LEXIS 400 (Ky. Ct. App. 2007).

6. Burden of Proof.

On appeal from the county zoning board’s denial of a conditional use permit, the burden is on the applicants, in the circuit court, to show that the decision of the board is arbitrary on the basis of the evidence heard by the board. Gentry v. Ressnier, 437 S.W.2d 756, 1969 Ky. LEXIS 455 ( Ky. 1969 ).

7. Dismissal.

The absence of a record showing a due process proceeding is not a ground for dismissing an appeal to the Circuit Court, for if that were so an administrative agency could effectively forestall any judicial review of its action simply by denying a due process hearing. Morris v. Catlettsburg, 437 S.W.2d 753, 1969 Ky. LEXIS 454 ( Ky. 1969 ).

There is no error in the court’s refusal to dismiss the proceedings because of the failure of the appellants to file a certified copy of the ordinance. Johnson v. Lagrew, 447 S.W.2d 98, 1969 Ky. LEXIS 74 ( Ky. 1969 ).

In appealing an order of the circuit court dismissing their claim against a county planning commission, appellants were aware of the property owner's identity, yet they chose not to name the property owner as a party to the complaint and appeal filed 30 days later. Although appellants argued the circuit court erred in not granting leave to amend their complaint to include the property owner, one of the conditions precedent to the exercise of judicial power by the circuit court was not met, and the circuit court was required to dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction. Robbins v. Lexington-Fayette Urban Cnty. Planning Comm'n, 538 S.W.3d 294, 2017 Ky. App. LEXIS 53 (Ky. Ct. App. 2017).

Circuit court properly dismissed the trustees's appeal of an order of a city board of adjustment as untimely because the statute at issue provided that a final action of the board was deemed to have occurred on the calendar date when the vote was taken to approve or disapprove the matter pending before the board and the trustees received notice of the final action taken by the board at their regular meeting. Moore v. Corbin Bd. of Adjustment, 544 S.W.3d 666, 2018 Ky. App. LEXIS 99 (Ky. Ct. App. 2018).

8. Absence of Due Process.

Where the proceedings before the board of zoning adjustment do not afford procedural due process in that there is no real hearing, no taking of evidence, no finding of fact, nor anything to support the order, the action is arbitrary and cannot properly be upheld by the Circuit Court. Morris v. Catlettsburg, 437 S.W.2d 753, 1969 Ky. LEXIS 454 ( Ky. 1969 ).

Fiscal court failed to provide an unbiased, impartial tribunal, since two (2) of its members had pre-judged the issue of whether to approve a mining company’s request to rezone land to allow mining; this violation of the company’s due process rights required remand so a proper hearing could be held. Hilltop Basic Res., Inc. v. County of Boone, 2003 Ky. App. LEXIS 250 (Ky. Ct. App. Oct. 10, 2003), rev'd, 180 S.W.3d 464, 2005 Ky. LEXIS 390 ( Ky. 2005 ).

9. Trial De Novo.

On appeal from an order of the zoning board, the Circuit Court has no power to conduct a de novo trial for its power is limited to determining whether the board had acted arbitrarily. Morris v. Catlettsburg, 437 S.W.2d 753, 1969 Ky. LEXIS 454 ( Ky. 1969 ).

Where the comprehensive land use plan designated one classification, the planning commission recommended the same classification, the legislative body developed no evidence to refute the evidence relied upon by the planning commission and no evidence was adduced that a category for use other than that designated might have been more appropriate, the circuit judge’s action in declaring that actions of the legislative body in refusing to rezone the land was arbitrary merely pronounced the result required from the record before the planning body and the legislative body and did not make an impermissible de novo determination between possible alternative zoning classifications. Louisville v. Kavanaugh, 495 S.W.2d 502, 1973 Ky. LEXIS 401 ( Ky. 1973 ).

10. — Findings of Law.

Board of Adjustments’ finding that actions by auction house owner constituted expansion of a nonconforming use so as to render it illegal was a finding of law, reviewable by the Circuit Court under this section. Board of Adjustments v. Brown, 969 S.W.2d 214, 1998 Ky. App. LEXIS 44 (Ky. Ct. App. 1998).

11. Pleading Error.

Court properly overruled motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim where complaint was filed attacking planning commission action and containing necessary allegations, even though complaint was styled as a prayer for injunctive relief. Lexington--Fayette County Planning & Zoning Com. v. Levas, 504 S.W.2d 685, 1973 Ky. LEXIS 32 ( Ky. 1973 ).

Given the plain language of KRS 100.347(3), a person or entity has to claim in its complaint on appeal to be injured or aggrieved by a final action of a legislative body to pursue an appeal to the Circuit Court. Spencer County Pres., Inc. v. Beacon Hill, LLC, 214 S.W.3d 327, 2007 Ky. App. LEXIS 11 (Ky. Ct. App. 2007).

Circuit Court properly granted a fiscal court and the local officials summary judgment on an organization’s challenge to a zoning amendment where the organization failed to meet the requirement in KRS 100.347(3) that it allege that it had been injured or aggrieved by the final action. Spencer County Pres., Inc. v. Beacon Hill, LLC, 214 S.W.3d 327, 2007 Ky. App. LEXIS 11 (Ky. Ct. App. 2007).

12. Limitation of Actions.

The Legislature has granted to persons aggrieved by the final action of the board of adjustments the grace of appeal to the circuit court provided they perfect that appeal by filing it in the Circuit Court, including the planning commission as a party, within 30 days; and where the appeal was filed within the 30-day limitation, but no effort was made to include the commission as a party until 68 days after the final action of the board, one of the conditions precedent to the exercise of judicial power by the circuit court was not met and it was required to dismiss the appeal for the want of jurisdiction. Board of Adjustments v. Flood, 581 S.W.2d 1, 1978 Ky. LEXIS 460 ( Ky. 1978 ).

Where an ordinance changing the zoning in an area was adopted on May 28, 1974, and an action questioning its validity was not filed until May 5, 1975, the action was barred by this section. Musser v. Leon Coal Processing Co., 560 S.W.2d 833, 1978 Ky. App. LEXIS 460 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978), overruled, Fiscal Court of Jefferson County v. Don Ridge Land Developing Co., 669 S.W.2d 922, 1984 Ky. LEXIS 233 ( Ky. 1984 ).

There is no authority in KRS Chapter 100 that even inferentially would grant the right of a local legislative body to limit judicial review of an action of local boards or commissions. Fiscal Court of Jefferson County v. Don Ridge Land Developing Co., 669 S.W.2d 922, 1984 Ky. LEXIS 233 ( Ky. 1984 ).

A fiscal court ordinance dealing with judicial review of its action for zone changes, which provided that judicial review had to be initiated by an aggrieved party within 30 days from the time such action became effective, was invalid because it went beyond the grant of powers given to local governments by KRS Chapter 100. Fiscal Court of Jefferson County v. Don Ridge Land Developing Co., 669 S.W.2d 922, 1984 Ky. LEXIS 233 ( Ky. 1984 ).

Where property owners, who were not notified by the Planning and Zoning Commission of a hearing concerning proposed subdivision of adjacent land, appealed dismissal of their action, the court held that although the failure to provide notice violated a zoning ordinance requirement, the property owners did have knowledge the property was being subdivided and a building permit was granted and that there was no impediment to an appeal after they learned of the Commission’s action and the zoning administrator’s grant of a permit, but that since they did not appeal, as required by KRS 100.261 or this section, within 30 days after they first learned of the respective decisions, their appeal came too late. Taylor v. Duke, 896 S.W.2d 618, 1995 Ky. App. LEXIS 75 (Ky. Ct. App. 1995).

Appeal from a planning commission’s approval of a subdivision plan was properly dismissed as untimely because KRS 100.347(2) began to run on the date the planning commission voted to approve the plan; ministerial approval of construction plans during and after the vote did not toll or extend the appeal time provided in KRS 100.347(2). Triad Developmental/Alta Glyne, Inc. v. Gellhaus, 150 S.W.3d 43, 2004 Ky. LEXIS 221 ( Ky. 2004 ).

As appellants’ right to appeal a planning commission’s grant of a subdivision plan was codified as a statutory procedure, the parties were required to strictly follow those procedures, including the requirement that the appeal be filed within 30 days of the commission’s final action; the right to at least one appeal conferred by Ky. Const., § 151 was satisfied because the aggrieved parties litigated the matter from Circuit Court to the Kentucky Court of Appeals and to the Kentucky Supreme Court. Triad Developmental/Alta Glyne, Inc. v. Gellhaus, 150 S.W.3d 43, 2004 Ky. LEXIS 221 ( Ky. 2004 ).

Where residents alleged tort claims, seeking to stop defendant from building a cell-phone tower near their homes, the residents' claims constituted an improper collateral attack on the county planning commission's decision to approve the tower, a decision that was appealed in state court but dismissed as untimely. Robbins v. New Cingular Wireless PCS, LLC, 854 F.3d 315, 2017 FED App. 0055P, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 4433 (6th Cir. Ky. 2017 ).

Where residents alleged tort claims, seeking to stop defendant from building a cell-phone tower near their homes, because the decision to approve the tower's site and design was a final action of the county planning commission, and Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 100.987 contained no independent statute of repose, Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 100.347(2) applied to any § 100.987 (10) appeal and barred a potential § 100.987(10) action. Robbins v. New Cingular Wireless PCS, LLC, 854 F.3d 315, 2017 FED App. 0055P, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 4433 (6th Cir. Ky. 2017 ).

13. Review by Board Mandatory.

Where the property owner did not contact the board of adjustment until after he had filed suit in the circuit court, he was precluded from filing a suit in the circuit court inasmuch as the statutory scheme mandates that the board of adjustment first be allowed to review the action of the enforcement officer. Burns v. Peavler, 721 S.W.2d 715, 1986 Ky. App. LEXIS 1205 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986).

14. Statutory Privilege.

The grant of a statutory privilege such as that granted pursuant to this section, does not automatically exempt those who use it from accusations of improper motive. Bourbon County Joint Planning Com. v. Simpson, 799 S.W.2d 42, 1990 Ky. App. LEXIS 68 (Ky. Ct. App. 1990).

15. Standing.

A neighboring property owner had standing to oppose a developer’s rezoning request; this section is read broadly to give anyone aggrieved by a proposed zoning change standing to oppose the change. 21st Century Dev. Co. LLC v. Watts, 958 S.W.2d 25, 1997 Ky. App. LEXIS 138 (Ky. Ct. App. 1997).

Where a mayor’s general power to cast a tie-breaking vote under KRS 83A.130(5) did not prevail over the explicit language of KRS 100.211(1), a county planning commission was “aggrieved” pursuant to KRS 100.337 and 100.347 when its decision to deny a zoning application was not followed. Chandler v. Bullitt County Joint Planning Comm'n, 125 S.W.3d 851, 2002 Ky. App. LEXIS 2358 (Ky. Ct. App. 2002).

16. Right to Appeal.

One whose application for permit was refused was “aggrieved,” and might have appealed from action of board as well as action of circuit court, though he might not have been entitled to relief. Smith v. Selligman, 270 Ky. 69 , 109 S.W.2d 14, 1937 Ky. LEXIS 23 ( Ky. 1937 ).

Since the ordinances adopted by the Planning Commission stated that any subdivider claiming to be aggrieved by any actions of the Planning Commission’s duly authorized representative may appeal such actions to the Planning Commission, and since KRS 100.347 provided for an appeal from the final action of the Planning Commission to the Circuit Court, a review mechanism was set in place; thus, on its face, the subdivision review process did not appear arbitrary or violative of due process as contemplated by Ky. Const. § 2. Campbell County Fiscal Court v. Nash, 2008 Ky. App. LEXIS 373 (Ky. Ct. App. Dec. 12, 2008), review granted, transferred, 2010 Ky. LEXIS 40 (Ky. Jan. 13, 2010), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 345 S.W.3d 811, 2011 Ky. LEXIS 57 ( Ky. 2011 ).

Language of Ky. Rev. Stat. § 23A.010 is a legislative directive that the judicial review of administrative actions shall be governed by the same procedural rules of the courts applicable to original actions; the judicial review authorized by Ky. Rev. Stat. § 100.347(2) falls squarely within that mandate. Isaacs v. Caldwell, 530 S.W.3d 449, 2017 Ky. LEXIS 439 ( Ky. 2017 ).

17. Notice on Filing Appeal.

Notice on filing appeal was to be given to persons whose appearance had indicated their desire to be active advocates or adversaries on either side of the controversy. Ray v. Luckett, 332 S.W.2d 848, 1960 Ky. LEXIS 176 ( Ky. 1960 ).

18. Suspension of Time for Appeal.

When aggrieved party pursued a remedy to which he was not entitled there was no suspension of time for appeal of decision of zoning board. L. Le Roy Highbaugh, Jr. Builder, Inc. v. Louisville & Jefferson County Planning & Zoning Board, Etc, 287 S.W.2d 169, 1956 Ky. LEXIS 452 ( Ky. 1956 ).

19. Complaint for Mandatory Injunction.

An appeal was not perfected by filing a complaint for mandatory injunction to require planning and zoning board to make variation with service of summons of notice on board. L. Le Roy Highbaugh, Jr. Builder, Inc. v. Louisville & Jefferson County Planning & Zoning Board, Etc, 287 S.W.2d 169, 1956 Ky. LEXIS 452 ( Ky. 1956 ).

20. Board Action Without Public Hearing.

If zoning commission rejected an application for a zoning change without a public hearing, the applicant could not have appealed but must have brought an independent action to determine whether the commission acted arbitrarily or contrary to law. Blakey v. Louisville & Jefferson County Planning & Zoning Com., 351 S.W.2d 524, 1961 Ky. LEXIS 179 ( Ky. 1961 ).

21. Direct Action Fiscal Court.

When Jefferson County fiscal court directly, by ordinance, effectuated county master plan through construction of public utilities, property owners had no right to appeal to Circuit Court, notwithstanding such appeal was authorized when fiscal court indirectly through administrative agency so effectuated the master plan. East Jeffersontown Improv. Asso. v. Louisville & Jefferson County Planning & Zoning Com., 285 S.W.2d 507, 1955 Ky. LEXIS 85 ( Ky. 1955 ).

22. Evidence.

Since court’s review was limited to consideration of evidence heard by board, trial court erred in conditioning affirmance of order of board of adjustment on modification of construction of building, where no evidence supporting modification was heard by board. Bosworth v. Lexington, 277 Ky. 90 , 125 S.W.2d 995, 1939 Ky. LEXIS 615 ( Ky. 1939 ).

On appeal to circuit court from order of board, whether or not garage was “constructed as a part of the main building” within meaning of ordinance, was question for the court, and not a question to be answered by opinion evidence. Selligman v. Western & Southern Life Ins. Co., 277 Ky. 551 , 126 S.W.2d 419, 1938 Ky. LEXIS 570 ( Ky. 1938 ).

23. Grounds for Setting Aside Determination of Board.

Court should not have set aside determination of public officers unless their action was clearly without reasonable foundation and was mere arbitrary or irrational exercise of power without substantial relation to public health, morals, safety or welfare. Fowler v. Obier, 224 Ky. 742 , 7 S.W.2d 219, 1928 Ky. LEXIS 677 ( Ky. 1928 ).

County board of adjustment clearly erred by granting a property owner a conditional use permit to operate a “tourist home,” as the board’s definition of “tourist home” under the zoning ordinance was essentially the same as a “bed and breakfast,” and the owner’s application described a use that was closer to a hotel/motel, which was not a permitted conditional use in the A-1 zone. Keogh v. Woodford County Bd. of Adjustments, 243 S.W.3d 369, 2007 Ky. App. LEXIS 371 (Ky. Ct. App. 2007).

24. Court of Appeals.

Court of Appeals considered zoning case without a jury as though Circuit Court decided the case independently and without reliance on commission’s findings for refusal to rezone. Hamilton Co. v. Louisville & Jefferson County Planning & Z. Com., 287 S.W.2d 434, 1955 Ky. LEXIS 115 ( Ky. 1955 ).

Determination on appeal that owner of agricultural land was entitled to permit from airport zoning authorities, under former KRS 183.745 to 183.758 (now see KRS 183.861 to 183.873 ) did not mean he could have proceeded to construct hotel, where he had made no effort to secure a permit from city-county zoning authorities since this question remained to be determined, and it was inappropriate to determine it on appeal from airport zoning authorities. Banks v. Fayette County Board of Airport Zoning Appeals, 313 S.W.2d 416, 1958 Ky. LEXIS 263 ( Ky. 1958 ).

In deciding, in zoning case, whether all of evidence it heard preponderated for or against decision of commission, Circuit Court made a determination of fact, and when that finding of fact was questioned on appeal, Court of Appeals could have reversed only if such finding was clearly erroneous. Louisville & Jefferson County Planning & Zoning Com. v. Cope, 318 S.W.2d 842, 1958 Ky. LEXIS 146 ( Ky. 1958 ).

Cited:

Davis v. Richardson, 507 S.W.2d 446, 1974 Ky. LEXIS 703 ( Ky. 1974 ); Snyder v. Owensboro, 528 S.W.2d 663, 1975 Ky. LEXIS 63 ( Ky. 1975 ); City-County Planning Com. v. Jackson, 610 S.W.2d 930, 1980 Ky. App. LEXIS 412 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980); Stratford v. State-House, Inc., 542 F. Supp. 1008, 1982 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13896 (E.D. Ky. 1982 ); Hamner v. Best, 656 S.W.2d 253, 1983 Ky. App. LEXIS 308 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983); Kentucky Bd. of Tax Appeals v. Simpson, 691 S.W.2d 221, 1985 Ky. App. LEXIS 528 (Ky. Ct. App. 1985); Rosary Catholic Parish v. Whitfield, 729 S.W.2d 27, 1987 Ky. App. LEXIS 480 (Ky. Ct. App. 1987); Transitions, Inc. v. Board of Zoning Adjustment, 729 S.W.2d 459, 1987 Ky. App. LEXIS 457 (Ky. Ct. App. 1987); City of Lyndon v. Proud, 898 S.W.2d 534, 1995 Ky. App. LEXIS 1 05 (Ky. Ct. App. 1995); Presbyterian Child Welfare Agency of Buckhorn, Ky., Inc. v. Nelson County Bd. of Adjustment, 185 F. Supp. 2d 716, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8482 (W.D. Ky. 2001 ); Harrison v. Park Hills Bd. of Adjustment, 330 S.W.3d 89, 2011 Ky. App. LEXIS 1 (Ky. Ct. App. 2011).

Notes to Unpublished Decisions

12. Limitation of Actions.

Unpublished decision: Residents' suit seeking to stop the construction of a cell phone tower near the residents' homes was an improper collateral attack on a planning commission's decision approving the tower because (1) a challenge to the planning commission's decision was time-barred, as a property owner was not named as a defendant within 30 days, as required, (2) the suit merely reiterated an appeal of the planning commission's decision, (3) any claim of decreased property values was based solely on the planning commission's decision, and (4) the statute of repose barred any claim under Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 100.987 , on the siting of cell phone towers. Robbins v. New Cingular Wireless PCS, LLC, 2017 FED App. 0085N, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 1818 (6th Cir. Ky. Jan. 30, 2017).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Appeal provisions have no application to a proposed zone change, regardless of what recommendation the planning commission reaches. OAG 72-116 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Appeals to be docketed in the Court of Appeals within the time specified in statute where the statute limits the taking of the appeal to a specific time, KRS 446.190 .

Kentucky Law Journal.

Tarlock, Kentucky Planning and Land Use Control Enabling Legislation: An Analysis of the 1966 Revision of KRS Chapter 100, 56 Ky. L.J. 556 (1968).

Kentucky Law Survey, Griffin and Becker, Zoning, 67 Ky. L.J. 627 (1978-1979).

ALR

Attack on validity of zoning statute, ordinance, or regulation on ground of improper delegation of authority to board or officer. 58 A.L.R.2d 1083.

Standing of municipal corporation or other governmental body to attack zoning of land lying outside its borders. 49 A.L.R.3d 1126.

Mandamus to compel zoning officials to cancel permit granted in violation of zoning regulation. 68 A.L.R.3d 166.

Standing of owner of property adjacent to zoned property, but not within territory of zoning authority, to attack zoning. 69 A.L.R.3d 805.

100.3471. Bond for appeal of Circuit Court’s final decision in KRS Chapter 100 matter.

  1. Any party that appeals the Circuit Court’s final decision made in accordance with any legal challenge under this chapter shall, upon motion of an appellee as set forth in subsection (2) of this section, be required to file an appeal bond as set forth in this section.
  2. Within thirty (30) days of the filing of the notice of appeal in Circuit Court, any appellee may file a motion for the Circuit Court, pursuant to the jurisdictional authority established in Rule 73.06 of the Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure, to order the appellant to post an appeal bond, which the Circuit Court shall impose, subject to the other requirements of this sections. If an appellee does not move the Circuit Court to require the appellant to post an appeal bond, the right to request an appeal bond is waived.
    1. Within thirty (30) days of an appellee filing a motion in Circuit Court for the appellant to post an appeal bond, the Circuit Court shall conduct a hearing to determine the amount of the appeal bond, issue findings of fact, and set the bond amount with good and sufficient surety. (3) (a) Within thirty (30) days of an appellee filing a motion in Circuit Court for the appellant to post an appeal bond, the Circuit Court shall conduct a hearing to determine the amount of the appeal bond, issue findings of fact, and set the bond amount with good and sufficient surety.
    2. In determining the amount of the appeal bond, the Circuit Court shall determine if the appeal is presumptively frivolous, including but not limited to:
      1. Whether the appeal is of a ministerial or discretionary decision; and
      2. Whether or not there exists a reasoned interpretation supporting the appellant’s position.
    3. If the Circuit Court determines that an appeal is presumptively frivolous, the Circuit Court shall consider all costs, economic loss, and damages that the appellee may suffer or incur during the pendency of, or that will be caused by, the appeal, including attorney fees and court costs, up to a maximum bond amount of two hundred fifty thousand dollars ($250,000).
    4. If the Circuit Court determines that an appeal is not presumptively frivolous, the Circuit Court shall consider the costs that the appellee may incur during the pendency of the appeal, including but not limited to attorney fees and court costs, plus interest payable on land acquisition or development loans, up to a maximum bond amount of one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000).
    5. Whether the Circuit Court makes a determination under paragraph (c) or (d) of this subsection:
      1. Costs and damages shall not include expenses incurred prior to the date the notice of appeal is filed with the Circuit Court: and
      2. The appellee has the burden to present sufficient evidence establishing the appellee’s cost and damages.
    6. The appeal shall be dismissed if the bond is not posted within fifteen (15) days of the Circuit Court’s determination of the bond amount.
    1. Once an appeal pursuant to this section becomes final and unappealable, either the appellant or the appellee may make a motion in the originating Circuit Court requesting that the Circuit Court conduct a hearing to determine the actual costs and damages to be paid to the appellee under the appeal bond. (4) (a) Once an appeal pursuant to this section becomes final and unappealable, either the appellant or the appellee may make a motion in the originating Circuit Court requesting that the Circuit Court conduct a hearing to determine the actual costs and damages to be paid to the appellee under the appeal bond.
    2. The Circuit Court shall hold the hearing within thirty (30) days of the request and issue findings of fact as to the costs and damages within an additional thirty (30) days.
    3. Costs and damages awarded under this subsection shall be limited to the amount of the appeal bond.
    4. If neither party moves the Circuit Court within sixty (60) days pursuant to this subsection, the Circuit Court may on its own motion release the appeal bond.
  3. Subsections (1) and (2) of this section shall not apply to the United States, the Commonwealth of Kentucky or any of its municipal corporations or political subdivisions, or any of their agencies or officers acting for or on their behalf, or to a person challenging the creation or expansion of a landfill.

HISTORY: 2017 ch. 181, § 1, effective April 11, 2017.

100.348. Compatibility standards for manufactured homes — Definitions — Adoption of standards by local governments.

  1. The Kentucky General Assembly hereby recognizes and affirms that the protection of property values is a legitimate issue to local governments and the enactment of regulations designed to protect property values is a proper exercise of local government legislative power.
  2. As used in this section, unless the context requires otherwise:
    1. “Compatibility standards” means standards that have been enacted by a local government under the authority of this section for the purpose of protecting and preserving the monetary value of real property located within the local government’s jurisdiction;
    2. “Local government” means a city, county, urban-county government, charter county government, or consolidated local government that is engaged in planning and zoning under KRS Chapter 100;
    3. “Manufactured home” means a single-family residential dwelling constructed after June 15, 1976, in accordance with the National Manufactured Home Construction and Safety Standards Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. Section 5401, et seq., as amended, and designed to be used as a single-family residential dwelling with or without permanent foundation when connected to the required utilities, and which includes the plumbing, heating, air conditioning, and electrical systems contained therein;
    4. “Qualified manufactured home” means a manufactured home that meets all of the following criteria:
      1. Is manufactured on or after July 15, 2002;
      2. Is affixed to a permanent foundation and is connected to the appropriate facilities and is installed in compliance with KRS 227.570 ;
      3. Has a width of at least twenty (20) feet at its smallest width measurement or is two (2) stories in height and oriented on the lot or parcel so that its main entrance door faces the street;
      4. Has a minimum total living area of nine hundred (900) square feet; and
      5. Is not located in a manufactured home land-lease community; and
    5. “Permanent foundation” means a system of supports that is:
      1. Capable of transferring, without failure, into soil or bedrock, the maximum design load imposed by or upon the structure;
      2. Constructed of concrete; and
      3. Placed at a depth below grade adequate to prevent frost damage.
  3. Any local government may adopt and enforce, as a part of its zoning regulations, compatibility standards governing the placement of qualified manufactured homes in residential zones within the local government’s jurisdiction. Compatibility standards shall be adopted, amended, and enforced in the same manner as other zoning regulations and shall be in addition to any zoning regulations that are generally applicable to single-family residences. The compatibility standards shall be designed to ensure that when a qualified manufactured home is placed in a residential zone it is compatible, in terms of assessed value, with existing housing located with a one-eighth (1/8) mile or less radius from the proposed location of the qualified manufactured home. The compatibility standards adopted by a local government shall relate to architectural features that have a significant impact on the overall assessed value of the structure, including, for example, but not limited to features such as:
    1. Roof pitch;
    2. Square footage of livable space;
    3. Type and quality of exterior finishing materials;
    4. Foundation skirting; and
    5. Existence and type of attached structures.
  4. Nothing in this section shall be construed to affect, modify, or abolish restrictions contained in recorded deeds, covenants, or developers’ subdivision restrictions.
  5. Nothing in this section shall be construed as limiting in any way the authority of local governments to adopt regulations designed to protect historic properties or historic districts.

History. Enact. Acts 2002, ch. 337, § 1, effective July 1, 2003.

100.349. Restrictions imposing highest standards apply. [Renumbered.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 76) is now compiled as KRS 100.3291 .

100.350. Powers of commission. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3235f-3: amend. Acts 1958, ch. 161; 1962, ch. 297, § 2) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 91.

100.351. Powers of commission as to county area. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1958, ch. 154, § 4; 1962, ch. 297, § 3) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 91.

100.352. Standards for master plan. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1958, ch. 154, § 5) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 91.

100.353. Adoption of master plan by commission. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1958, ch. 154, § 6) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 91.

100.354. Effect of adoption of master plan. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1958, ch. 154, § 7; 1962, ch. 297, § 4) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 91.

100.355. Nonconforming uses of buildings or premises; continuance or change of. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1952, ch. 118, §§ 1, 2; 1962, ch. 297, § 5) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 91.

100.360. Preparation and submission of subdivision plats. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1958, ch. 154, § 8; 1962, ch. 297, § 6) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 91.

100.361. Construction of chapter.

  1. Nothing in this chapter shall apply or affect zoning regulations adopted pursuant to KRS Chapter 183.
  2. Nothing in this chapter shall impair the sovereignty of the Commonwealth of Kentucky over its political subdivisions. Any proposal affecting land use by any department, commission, board, authority, agency, or instrumentality of state government shall not require approval of the local planning unit. However, adequate information concerning the proposals shall be furnished to the planning commission by the department, commission, board, authority, agency, or instrumentality of state government. If the state proposes to acquire, construct, alter, or lease any land or structure to be used as a penal institution or correctional facility, and the proposed use is inconsistent with or contrary to local planning regulations or the comprehensive plan for the area, the secretary of the Justice and Public Safety Cabinet, or his or her designee, shall notify, in accordance with KRS 424.180 , the planning commission, the local governing body who has jurisdiction over the area involved, and the general public of the state’s proposals for the area, and he or she shall hold a public hearing on the proposals within the area at least ninety (90) days prior to commencing the acquisition, construction, alteration, or leasing. A final report on the public hearing shall be submitted to the Governor and members of the General Assembly within twenty-five (25) days of the public hearing, and prior to commencing any construction, alteration, acquisition, or leasing of such property or facilities.

History. Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 89; 1984, ch. 178, § 1, effective July 13, 1984; 1992, ch. 211, § 15, effective July 14, 1992; 2007, ch. 85, § 157, effective June 26, 2007.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. In General.

The grant of legislative immunity from zoning applies to a county’s use of the property rather than its ownership thereof. City of Louisville Bd. of Zoning Adjustment v. Gailor, 920 S.W.2d 887, 1996 Ky. App. LEXIS 84 (Ky. Ct. App. 1996).

2. Legislative Intent.

The Legislature, by enacting subsection (2) of this section, showed its intent that zoning regulations may not override implementation of governmental functions. Edelen v. County of Nelson, 723 S.W.2d 887, 1987 Ky. App. LEXIS 431 (Ky. Ct. App. 1987).

By enacting KRS 100.361(2), the Legislature showed its intent that zoning regulations and planning requirements should not override implementation of governmental functions; thus, a sanitation district was not required to submit a draft of its proposal to acquire the property owners’ land prior to initiating condemnation proceedings under KRS 100.324(4) because the sanitation district, as an autonomous political subdivision, was immune from zoning regulations and planning requirements. Garriga v. Sanitation Dist. No. 1, 2003 Ky. App. LEXIS 305 (Ky. Ct. App. Dec. 5, 2003).

Under KRS 100.361(2), the Legislature has expressly exempted an “instrumentality of state government” from complying with county planning and zoning, and a sixth class city clearly constitutes an instrumentality of state government under KRS 100.361(2) and, thus, is immune from complying with planning and zoning regulations; therefore, a city that qualified as a sixth class city was not bound by a county development code. City of Worthington Hills v. Worthington Fire Prot. Dist., 140 S.W.3d 584, 2004 Ky. App. LEXIS 169 (Ky. Ct. App. 2004).

3. County Jail.

Subsection (2) of this section does not require the Secretary of Corrections Cabinet, or his or her designee, to notify certain entities of the proposal for the county jail and to hold a hearing on the proposal. Edelen v. County of Nelson, 723 S.W.2d 887, 1987 Ky. App. LEXIS 431 (Ky. Ct. App. 1987).

Court agreed with appellants contention that a county jail is exempt from zoning because: 1) KRS 100.361(2) grants immunity to any instrumentality of the state from the approval of a local planning unit, and 2) the operation of a county jail was a governmental function of fiscal court, and as the fiscal court had contracted with Corrections to operate the facility, the jail operation enjoyed the same immunity from the local zoning ordinance regulations as it would have if the fiscal court and its jailer owned and ran the facility. City of Louisville Bd. of Zoning Adjustment v. Gailor, 920 S.W.2d 887, 1996 Ky. App. LEXIS 84 (Ky. Ct. App. 1996).

4. School Board.

In order to harmonize KRS 100.324(4) and subsection (2) of this section, they must be construed as mandating that the school board furnish adequate information concerning proposed public facilities to the planning commission for its review and opinion, yet in the final analysis, the school board may disregard the opinion of the planning commission. Hopkinsville-Christian County Planning Comm'n v. Christian County Bd. of Educ., 903 S.W.2d 531, 1995 Ky. App. LEXIS 142 (Ky. Ct. App. 1995).

Opinions of Attorney General.

A city does not possess the authority to require a building permit or fee of the Commonwealth (directly or indirectly) in connection with a building project of a state university. OAG 67-552 .

The transfer of land by the University of Kentucky to the veterans administration for use as a hospital site does not require the approval of the plat from the Lexington-Fayette County planning commission. OAG 68-555 .

The exemption for schools contained in subsection (2) of KRS 100.361 would not apply until the property is acquired. OAG 69-659 .

A school board is not required to obtain prior approval of the local planning unit in order to construct a new school building. OAG 69-659 .

Exemption from local planning unit approval refers to property owned by the Commonwealth and not to property leased by it. OAG 72-440 .

Where county board of education voted to purchase a residence adjacent to the present high school grounds which it proposed to use as a central office facility but which residence was located in a zoned residential area and when application was made to zoning board for rezoning the request was denied, while under similar circumstances the attorney general’s office has determined that school facilities, being state property, were exempt from local planning and zoning regulations under this section and since there are no cases construing the question the board of education may have to take it to court for determination. OAG 73-209 .

Subsection (2) exempts the state, its agencies and its instrumentalities from local zoning legislation which would include the various state universities, local school boards, cities and counties, but would not exempt federal agencies. OAG 73-315 .

Purchase of four acres of land by a city for the use of a gas supplement station does not require approval of the planning commission for the clerk to record the deed as it does not involve a subdivision of land and any proposal affecting land use by an instrumentality of state government, such as a city, does not require approval of the local planning unit. OAG 73-652 .

School property is not subject to regulation by a local zoning board and thus there is no necessity for a school district to apply for a conditional use permit. OAG 75-108 .

While cities through ordinances cannot regulate the construction and maintenance of State buildings in the absence of a specific statutory provision authorizing them to do so, cities may fix rates in connection with the use of their sewers. OAG 78-127 .

Since the state, its agencies and instrumentalities are exempt from local zoning legislation, if a directional sign is erected on the state right-of-way, it would in all probability be a matter for the state bureau of highways to determine whether it may remain or be removed. OAG 79-76 .

County roads, that is, public roads which have been accepted by the fiscal court of the county as a part of the county road system (and which include necessary drains and ditches), are exempt from planning and zoning. OAG 79-105 .

A county road which will be part of a county fairgrounds project need not be approved for such use by the planning and zoning commission since under this section any proposal affecting land use by a county does not require approval by the local planning unit. OAG 81-111 .

A county which is constructing a community building and county fairgrounds project need not, under this section, submit the plans and specifications for the project to the planning and zoning commission since any proposal affecting land use by a county does not require approval by the local planning board. OAG 81-111 .

A hearing by a planning and zoning commission on a proposed county fairgrounds project is not necessary since, under this section, a governmental entity is not required to obtain the approval of the local planning unit where the proposal concerns land use although the governmental unit must provide the planning unit with adequate information concerning its land use proposals. OAG 81-111 .

Private property leased to a city for a legitimate governmental purpose is covered by the exemption set forth in subsection (2) of this section and the city does not have to seek the approval of the local planning unit in connection with the operation of its landspreading waste disposal activity on land it has leased from a private person; the statutory exemption prevails over any conflicting state regulations or local ordinances. OAG 84-146 (modifying OAG 72-440 ).

An area development district is not an agency of state government for purposes of compliance with local planning and zoning requirements, nor does an area development district have authority to operate an offender re-entry program. OAG 13-004 .

100.362. Reservation of land for future acquisition. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1958, ch. 154, § 10) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 91.

100.364. Commission approval of subdivision plats. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1958, ch. 154, § 9) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 91.

100.365. Noncommercial dog kennel not prohibited in area zoned for residential use. [Renumbered and Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 116, § 1) was renumbered as KRS 100.216 and subsequently repealed by Acts 1986, ch. 141, § 45, effective July 15, 1986.

100.367. Time allotted for transfer to this new legislation. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 85) was repealed by Acts 1986, ch. 141, § 45, effective July 15, 1986.

Recording of Land Use Restrictions

100.3681. Filing of certificate of land use restrictions required — Contents — Amendments — Effect of failure to file or file properly.

  1. Effective October 1, 1988, the county clerk of every county containing a planning unit which has enacted land use regulations pursuant to this chapter shall, upon receipt of a recording fee pursuant to KRS 64.012 , file and maintain among the official records of his office certificates of land use restriction completed according to this section and KRS 100.3682 to 100.3684 . The certificates shall be in the form designated in KRS 100.3683 ; shall be completed and filed by the secretary of the planning commission, board of adjustment, legislative body, or fiscal court which finally adopts or imposes the land use restriction described in the certificate; and shall be filed within thirty (30) days of the date upon which the body takes final action to impose or adopt the restriction. The certificate shall set forth the name and address of the property owner; the address of the property; the name of the subdivision or development, if there is one; the name and address of the body which maintains the original records containing the restriction; and shall indicate the type of land use restriction adopted or imposed upon the subject property on or after October 1, 1988, including variances, conditional use permits, conditional zoning conditions, unrecorded preliminary subdivision plats, and development plans; but not including zoning map amendments which impose no limitations or restrictions upon the use of the subject property other than those generally applicable to properties within the same zone and not including any recorded subdivision plat. The county clerk shall index the certificates by property owner and, if applicable, name of subdivision or development. The county clerk shall maintain in his office a record of the name and address of the agency having custody of the official zoning map for each planning unit within the county. All zoning map amendments shall be reflected on the official zoning map within thirty (30) days of the date upon which final action approving the amendments is taken by the planning unit.
  2. The planning unit shall collect the county clerk’s filing fee for the certificate from the applicant at the time any proceeding is initiated which may result in the imposition, adoption, amendment, or release of any land use restriction provided for in this chapter; and the planning unit may also charge the applicant a fee for the reasonable cost of completing and filing the certificate, not to exceed ten dollars and fifty cents ($10.50), in addition to any other applicable filing or administrative fee, to compensate the planning unit for completing and filing the certificate. The fees permitted by this subsection shall be refunded to the applicant in the event no land use restriction is imposed or adopted as a result of the proceeding.
  3. When a restriction reflected on the certificate is amended, a new certificate shall be filed. In the case of such amendment or in the event the original restriction is released, the previous certificate shall be released by the secretary of the body which amended or released the restriction in the same manner as releases of encumbrances upon real estate.
  4. The failure to file, to file on time, or to complete the certificate properly or accurately shall not affect the validity or enforceability of any land use restriction or regulation. Any improper filing may be cured by a subsequent proper filing. Nothing herein shall affect the running of time for any appeal or other act for which a time limit is prescribed by this chapter.

History. Enact. Acts 1988, ch. 30, § 1, effective July 15, 1988; 1990, ch. 362, § 6, effective July 13, 1990; 2006, ch. 255, § 15, effective January 1, 2007.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Duty to Issue Certificate.

The Circuit Court properly issued a writ of mandamus to require the fiscal court to comply with this section since the vote to override the recommendation of the planning commission was passed by the requisite majority of the fiscal court and the fiscal court had a statutory duty to issue the certificate of land use restrictions; therefore, a ministerial duty was involved, and mandamus was proper. Hunters Ridge Homeowners Ass'n v. Hicks, 818 S.W.2d 623, 1991 Ky. App. LEXIS 135 (Ky. Ct. App. 1991).

100.3682. Certificate for contiguous properties and properties part of same proceeding.

If a planning commission, fiscal court, or legislative body originates a zoning map amendment for more than five (5) contiguous properties, upon approval of the map amendment, there shall be filed a single certificate setting forth the required information for all the properties, and the originating body shall pay a single filing fee for such certificate. When a land use restriction is imposed upon two (2) or more properties or lots in the same proceeding, including but not limited to the approval of an unrecorded preliminary subdivision plat or development plan for multiple lots, a single certificate shall be filed for all the properties or lots collectively and a single filing fee shall be paid therefor.

History. Enact. Acts 1988, ch. 30, § 3, effective July 15, 1988; 1990, ch. 362, § 7, effective July 13, 1990.

100.3683. Form of certificate.

The form for the certificate of land use restriction required by KRS 100.3681 shall be as follows:

CERTIFICATE OF LAND USE RESTRICTION 1. NAME AND ADDRESS OF PROPERTY OWNER(s) 2. ADDRESS OF PROPERTY 3. NAME OF SUBDIVISION OR DEVELOPMENT (if applicable) 4. TYPE OF RESTRICTION(s) (Check all that apply): … Zoning Map Amendment to Conditional Zoning … Zone Condition … Development Plan Other … Unrecorded Subdivision Plat … Variance … Conditional Use Permit 5. NAME AND ADDRESS OF PLANNING COMMISSION, BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT, LEGISLATIVE BODY OR FISCAL COURT WHICH MAINTAINS THE ORIGINAL RECORDS CONTAINING THE RESTRICTION

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History. Enact. Acts 1988, ch. 30, § 4, effective July 15, 1988; 1990, ch. 362, § 8, effective July 13, 1990.

100.3684. Effect of KRS 100.3681 to 100.3683.

Nothing in KRS 100.3681 to 100.3683 shall affect other recording requirements imposed by this chapter.

History. Enact. Acts 1988, ch. 30, § 2, effective July 15, 1988.

100.370. Employes. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3235f-5: amend. Acts 1958, ch. 154, § 11) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 91.

100.380. Finances. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3235f-5: amend. Acts 1962, ch. 297, § 7) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 91.

100.390. Preliminary report; publication; notice; hearing. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3235f-6) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 91.

100.400. Final report; property inside the city; consideration by legislative body. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3235f-7) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 91.

Binding Element Enforcement Act

100.401. Legislative intent.

It is the intent of KRS 100.401 to 100.419 to strengthen the enforcement of binding elements which have been approved as part of a land use development plan in a county containing a consolidated local government. This is intended to be done by extending to a planning commission in counties containing a consolidated local government the authority to issue remedial orders and impose civil fines in order to provide an equitable, expeditious, effective, and inexpensive method of ensuring compliance with approved land use plans as they apply to binding element agreements. KRS 100.401 to 100.419 is intended and shall be construed to provide an additional or supplemental means of obtaining compliance with local zoning ordinances and nothing contained in KRS 100.401 to 100.419 shall prohibit the enforcement of local zoning ordinances by any other means authorized by law.

History. Enact. Acts 1998, ch. 10, § 1, effective July 15, 1998; 2002, ch. 346, § 154, effective July 15, 2002; 2014, ch. 92, § 197, effective January 1, 2015.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Applicability.

Although the Binding Elements Enforcement Act, Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 100.401 et seq., did not apply to the county, it nonetheless had the authority to adopt a zoning amendment with a binding element that reasonably related to the benefits conferred on the subject development. Southwest Clark Neighborhood Ass'n v. Branham, 2017 Ky. App. LEXIS 64 (Ky. Ct. App. Mar. 31, 2017).

100.403. Definitions for KRS 100.401 to 100.419.

As used in KRS 100.401 to 100.419 , unless the context otherwise requires:

  1. “Land use enforcement officer” in a county containing a consolidated local government means an officer authorized by a planning commission to enforce binding elements.
  2. “Land use ordinance” in a county containing a consolidated local government means an official action of a local government body which is a regulation of a general and permanent nature relating to the use and development of land within the jurisdictional boundary of the planning commission. It is enforceable as a local law and shall include any provision of a code of ordinances adopted by a local government which embodies all or part of an ordinance.
  3. “Local government” means a county containing a consolidated local government and all cities with a population equal to or greater than three thousand (3,000) or any city with a population of less than three thousand (3,000) based upon the most recent federal decennial census that regulated land use under the provisions of this chapter prior to January 1, 2014, within the county.
  4. “Binding element” in a county containing a consolidated local government means a binding requirement, provision, restriction, or condition imposed by a planning commission or its designee, or a promise or agreement made by an applicant in writing in connection with the approval of a land use development plan or subdivision plan.

History. Enact. Acts 1998, ch. 10, § 2, effective July 15, 1998; 2002, ch. 346, § 155, effective July 15, 2002; 2014, ch. 92, § 198, effective January 1, 2015.

100.405. Enforcement of binding elements classified as civil offenses — Exception to powers of classification.

  1. The planning commission in counties containing a consolidated local government may issue remedial orders and impose civil fines as a method of enforcing a binding element when a violation of that binding element has been classified as a civil offense in accordance with this section.
  2. Subject to the limitations set forth in subsections (1) and (3) of this section, if a local government elects to enforce a binding element as a civil offense, it shall do so by ordinance, which shall provide:
    1. That a violation of the binding element is a civil offense; and
    2. A maximum civil fine that may be imposed for each violation of a binding element.
  3. No local government shall classify the violation of a binding element as a civil offense if the violation would also constitute an offense under any provision of the Kentucky Revised Statutes, including specifically and without limitation any provision of the Kentucky Penal Code and any moving motor vehicle offense.

History. Enact. Acts 1998, ch. 10, § 3, effective July 15, 1998; 2002, ch. 346, § 156, effective July 15, 2002; 2014, ch. 92, § 199, effective January 1, 2015.

100.407. Specific powers of planning commissions to enforce binding elements.

Each planning commission which is given the authority by the local government to enforce binding elements shall have the power to:

  1. Adopt rules and regulations to govern its operation and the conduct of its hearings that are consistent with the requirements of KRS 100.401 to 100.419 .
  2. Conduct hearings to determine whether there has been a violation of a binding element.
  3. Subpoena alleged violators, witnesses, and evidence to its hearings. Subpoenas issued by the planning commission may be served by any land use enforcement officer.
  4. Take testimony under oath. The chairman of the planning commission may administer oaths to witnesses prior to their testimony before the planning commission on any matter.
  5. Make findings and issue orders that are necessary to remedy any violation of a binding element.
  6. Impose civil fines as authorized in the ordinance on any person found to have violated any binding element that the planning commission is authorized to enforce.

History. Enact. Acts 1998, ch. 10, § 4, effective July 15, 1998.

100.409. Powers of land use enforcement officer to deal with violation — Citation — Response of alleged violation — Hearing — Final order.

  1. When a land use enforcement officer, based upon personal observation or investigation, has reasonable cause to believe that a violation of a binding element has occurred, the officer may issue a warning notice and citation to the offender. Prior to issuing a citation, the officer shall issue a warning notice giving the offender a specified period of time in which to remedy the violation. If the person to whom the notice is given fails or refuses to remedy the violation within the time specified, the land use enforcement officer may issue a citation. However, if the violation is deemed by the land use enforcement officer to be a threat to public safety, then a citation shall be immediately issued without a prior warning notice.
  2. Enforcement proceedings shall be initiated by the issuance of a citation by a land use enforcement officer.
  3. The citation issued by the land use enforcement officer shall be in a form prescribed by the planning commission and shall contain, in addition to any other information required by the planning commission:
    1. The date and time of issuance;
    2. The name and address of the person to whom the citation is issued;
    3. The date and time the violation of the binding element was committed;
    4. The facts constituting the violation of the binding element;
    5. A specific description of the binding element violated;
    6. The name of the land use enforcement officer;
    7. The civil fine that will be imposed for the violation if the person does not contest the citation;
    8. The procedure for the person to follow in order to pay the civil fine or to contest the citation; and
    9. A statement that if the person fails to pay the civil fine set forth in the citation or to contest the citation within the time allowed, the person shall be deemed to have waived the right to a hearing before the planning commission to contest the citation, and that the determination that a violation was committed shall be final.
  4. After issuing a citation to an alleged violator, the land use enforcement officer shall notify the planning commission by delivering the citation to the administrative official designated by the planning commission.
  5. All citations issued shall be hand delivered to the alleged violator.
  6. When a citation is issued, the person to whom the citation is issued shall respond to the citation within fourteen (14) days of the date the citation is issued by either paying the civil fine set forth in the citation or requesting, in writing, a hearing before the planning commission to contest the citation. If the person fails to respond to the citation within fourteen (14) days, the person shall be deemed to have waived the right to a hearing to contest the citation and the determination that a violation was committed shall be considered final. In this event, the planning commission shall enter a final order determining that the violation was committed and imposing the civil fine set forth in the citation.

History. Enact. Acts 1998, ch. 10, § 5, effective July 15, 1998.

100.410. Final report; property outside city; consideration by fiscal court. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3235f-7) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 91.

100.411. Hearing before planning commission — Waiver of rights to hearing — Determination of existence of violation — Criminal order.

  1. When a hearing before a planning commission has been requested, the planning commission, through its clerical and administrative staff, shall schedule a hearing. The hearing shall be conducted within thirty (30) days of the date of the request, unless the person who requested the hearing requests or agrees to a continuance not to exceed thirty (30) days. All continuances must receive the approval of the planning commission. Not less than seven (7) days before the date set for the hearing, the planning commission shall notify the person who requested the hearing of the date, time, and place of the hearing. The notice may be given by certified mail, return receipt requested; by personal delivery; or by leaving the notice at the person’s usual place of residence with any individual residing therein who is eighteen (18) years of age or older and who is informed of the contents of the notice. Any person requesting a hearing before the planning commission who fails to appear at the time and place set for the hearing shall be deemed to have waived the right to a hearing to contest the citation and the determination that a violation was committed shall be final. In this event, the planning commission shall enter a final order determining that the violation was committed and imposing the civil fine set forth in the citation.
  2. Each case before a planning commission shall be presented by an attorney who shall be counsel to the commission.
  3. All testimony shall be under oath and shall be recorded. The planning commission shall take testimony from the land use enforcement officer, the alleged offender, and any witnesses to the alleged violation offered by the land use enforcement officer or the alleged offender. Formal rules of evidence shall not apply, but fundamental due process shall be observed and shall govern the proceedings.
  4. After the hearing, the planning commission shall determine, based on the evidence presented, whether a violation was committed. When the commission determines that no violation was committed, an order dismissing the citation shall be entered. When the commission determines that a violation has been committed, the commission shall issue an order upholding the citation and may order the offender to pay a civil fine in an amount up to the maximum authorized by the ordinance, or may order the offender to remedy a continuing violation within a specified time to avoid the imposition of a fine, or both, as authorized by the ordinance.
  5. Every final order of a planning commission shall be reduced to writing, which shall include the date the order was issued, and a copy of the order shall be furnished to the person named in the citation. If the person named in the citation is not present at the time a final order of the planning commission is issued, the order shall be delivered to that person by certified mail, return receipt requested; by personal delivery; or by leaving a copy of the order at that person’s usual place of residence with any individual residing therein who is eighteen (18) years of age or older and who is informed of the contents of the order.

History. Enact. Acts 1998, ch. 10, § 6, effective July 15, 1998.

100.413. Appeals from final order of planning commission and judgment of District Court.

  1. An appeal from any final order issued by a planning commission may be made to the District Court of the county in which the planning commission is located. The appeal shall be taken within thirty (30) days of the date the order is issued. The appeal shall be initiated by the filing of a complaint and a copy of the commission’s order in the same manner as any civil action under the Rules of Civil Procedure. The action shall be tried de novo and the burden shall be upon the planning commission to establish that a violation has occurred. If the court finds that a violation occurred, judgment shall be entered ordering the offender to pay to the planning commission all fines assessed for the violation. If the court finds a violation did not occur, the complaint shall be dismissed.
  2. A judgment of the District Court may be appealed to the Circuit Court in accordance with the Rules of Civil Procedure.
  3. If no appeal from a final order of a planning commission is filed within the time period set forth in this section, the planning commission’s order shall be deemed final for all purposes.

History. Enact. Acts 1998, ch. 10, § 7, effective July 15, 1998.

100.415. Responsibility for fines — Other remedies.

The person or entity found to have committed a violation of a binding element shall be responsible for the amount of all fines assessed for the violation. A planning commission may bring a civil action against the person or entity and shall have the same remedies as provided for the recovery of a debt.

History. Enact. Acts 1998, ch. 10, § 8, effective July 15, 1998.

100.417. Powers of local government to deal with serious violations.

Nothing contained in KRS 100.401 to 100.419 shall prohibit a local government from taking immediate action to remedy a violation of a binding element when there is reason to believe that the existence of the binding element violation presents a serious threat to the public health, safety, and welfare, or if in the absence of immediate action, the effects of the binding element violation will be irreparable or irreversible.

History. Enact. Acts 1998, ch. 10, § 9, effective July 15, 1998.

100.419. Short title for KRS 100.401 to 100.419.

The provisions of KRS 100.401 to 100.419 may be cited as the “Binding Element Enforcement Act.”

History. Enact. Acts 1998, ch. 10, § 10, effective July 15, 1998.

100.420. Changes in established plans. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3235f-8: amend. Acts 1958, ch. 154, § 12) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 91.

100.430. Board of adjustment; appointment; removal; vacancies. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3235f-9: amend. Acts 1962, ch. 297, § 8) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 91.

100.440. Meetings of board of adjustment. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3235f-9) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 91.

100.450. Special exceptions; appeals to board. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3235f-9: amend. Acts 1958, ch. 154, § 13) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 91.

100.460. Procedure for exceptions and on appeal. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3235f-9: amend. Acts 1958, ch. 154, § 14) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 91.

100.470. Powers of board of adjustment. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3235f-9: amend. Acts 1958, ch. 154, § 15; 1962, ch. 297, § 9) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 91.

100.480. Appeal from board of adjustment; summons. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3235f-9a) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 91.

100.490. Scope of review; parties. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (3235f-9a) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 91.

100.500. Power to regulate. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2741z-1) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 91.

100.510. Districts. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2741z-2) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 91.

100.520. Purposes of regulations. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2741z-3) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 91.

100.530. Establishment of regulations; notice; hearing. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2741z-4) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 91.

100.540. Changes in regulations. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2741z-5) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 91.

100.550. Zoning commission to be appointed; report of commission. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2741z-6) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 91.

100.560. Board of adjustment. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2741z-7) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 91.

100.570. Meetings; appeals; notice. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2741z-7) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 91.

100.580. Powers of board of adjustment. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2741z-7) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 91.

100.590. Appeal to circuit court. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2741z-7) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 91.

100.600. Enforcement of regulations. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2741z-8) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 91.

100.610. City planning commission. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2741zz-2) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 91.

100.620. Members; terms; vacancies. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2741zz-3) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 91.

100.630. Chairman; meetings; records. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2741zz-4) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 91.

100.640. Employes. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2741zz-5) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 91.

100.650. Duties of commission; master plan. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2741zz-6) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 91.

100.660. Purpose of master plan. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2741zz-7) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 91.

100.670. Adoption of master plan. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2741zz-8) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 91.

100.680. Legal status of master plan. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2741zz-9) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 91.

100.690. General powers of the commission. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2741zz-10) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 91.

100.700. Finances. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2741zz-5) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 91.

100.710. Zoning powers transferred to planning commission. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2741zz-11) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 91.

100.720. Subdivision jurisdiction. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2741zz-12) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 91.

100.730. Recording and transfer of land. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2741zz-13, 2741zz-16) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 91.

100.740. Extent of subdivision regulation; notice; hearing. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2741zz-14) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 91.

100.750. Commission’s action on the plat; effect of approval. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2741zz-15) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 91.

100.760. Improvements in unapproved street; acceptance of unapproved street; acceptance of unapproved street. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2741zz-18) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 91.

100.770. Building permits. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2741zz-19) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 91.

100.780. Status of existing statutes. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2741zz-20) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 91.

100.790. Reservation of locations. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2741zz-21) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 91.

100.800. Appraisers; compensation for reservations. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2741zz-22) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 91.

100.810. Report of appraisers; hearing; action of legislative body. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2741zz-23) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 91.

100.820. Appeal from compensation awards. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2741zz-24) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 91.

100.830. Buildings in reserved street locations. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2741zz-25) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 91.

100.845. Fiscal court to adopt planning and zoning regulations for sixth class cities. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1964, ch. 139, § 1(2)) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 91.

100.850. Agreement between city and county. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1960, ch. 69, § 1, effective March 18, 1960) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 91.

100.852. Joint city-county powers; planning and zoning commission; boardof zoning adjustment and appeals. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1960, ch. 69, § 2, effective March 18, 1960) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 91.

100.854. Functions of commission; effect of commission’s regulations on certain other laws. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1960, ch. 69, § 3, effective March 18, 1960) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 91.

100.856. Commission membership. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1960, ch. 69, § 4, effective March 18, 1960) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 91.

100.858. Commission organization. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1960, ch. 69, § 5, effective March 18, 1960) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 91.

100.860. Amendments to comprehensive plan. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1960, ch. 69, § 5, effective March 18, 1960) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 91.

100.862. Enforcement. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1960, ch. 69, § 6, effective March 18, 1960) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 91.

100.864. Membership and organization of board of zoning adjustment and appeals. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1960, ch. 69, § 7, effective March 18, 1960) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 91.

100.866. Powers of board. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1960, ch. 69, § 8, effective March 18, 1960) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 91.

100.868. County’s powers when no city desires to participate. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1960, ch. 69, § 9, effective March 18, 1960) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 91.

100.870. County’s powers when county contains no incorporated city. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1960, ch. 69, § 10, effective March 18, 1960) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 91.

100.872. Appeals to court; procedure. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1960, ch. 69, § 11, effective March 18, 1960) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 91.

100.970. Appeals; when to be taken. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. 1948, ch. 217; 1952, ch. 84, § 56; 1960, ch. 104, § 5, effective June 16, 1960) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 91.

100.980. Injunctions. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2741z-8, 2741zz-16, 3037h-128, 3037h-134, 3235f-10: amend. Acts 1942, ch. 176, §§ 12, 17; 1958, ch. 154, § 16, effective June 19, 1958) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 91.

Residential Care Facilities for Handicapped Persons

100.982. Definitions for KRS 100.982 to 100.984.

As used in KRS 100.982 to 100.984 , unless the context otherwise requires:

  1. “Person with a disability” means a person with a physical, emotional, or mental disability, including, but not limited to, an intellectual disability, cerebral palsy, epilepsy, autism, deafness or hard of hearing, sight impairments, and orthopedic impairments, but not including convicted felons or misdemeanants on probation or parole or receiving supervision or rehabilitation services as a result of their prior conviction, or mentally ill persons who have pled guilty but mentally ill to a crime or not guilty by reason of insanity to a crime. “Person with a disability” does not include persons with current, illegal use of alcohol or any controlled substance as regulated under KRS Chapter 218A.
  2. “Residential care facility” means a residence operated and maintained by a sponsoring private or governmental agency to provide services in a homelike setting for persons with disabilities.
  3. “Services” means, but is not limited to, supervision, shelter, protection, rehabilitation, personal development, and attendant care.

History. Enact. Acts 1990, ch. 91, § 1, effective July 13, 1990; 1992, ch. 144, § 8, effective July 14, 1992; 1994, ch. 405, § 12, effective July 15, 1994; 2012, ch. 146, § 10, effective July 12, 2012; 2015 ch. 66, § 2, effective March 25, 2015.

100.984. Residential care facility for persons with disabilities.

Any sponsoring private or governmental agency shall be permitted to operate a residential care facility in any residential district, zone, or subdivision subject only to compliance with the same limitations upon area, height, yard, screening, parking, number of dwelling units, and number of occupants per dwelling unit as apply to other residences in the district, zone, or subdivision. For purposes of determining the number of occupants in a residential care facility, or in any of the dwelling units which comprise the facility, employees of the sponsoring agency providing services to persons with disabilities shall be counted only if their permanent residence is maintained at the facility. No conditional use permit not otherwise required for other residences within a zone or land use category shall be required for the operation of a residential care facility.

History. Enact. Acts 1990, ch. 91, § 2, effective July 13, 1990; 1994, ch. 405, § 13, effective July 15, 1994.

Regulation of Cellular Antenna Towers

100.985. Definitions for KRS 100.985 to 100.987.

In addition to the definitions set forth in KRS 100.111 , the following definitions shall apply to KRS 100.985 to 100.987 :

  1. “Cellular antenna tower” means a tower constructed for, or an existing facility that has been adapted for, the location of transmission or related equipment to be used in the provision of cellular telecommunications services or personal communications services;
  2. “Cellular telecommunications service” means a retail telecommunications service that uses radio signals transmitted through cell sites and mobile switching stations;
  3. “Co-location” means locating two (2) or more transmission antennas or related equipment on the same cellular antenna tower;
  4. “Personal communication service” has the meaning as defined in 47 U.S.C. sec. 332(c) ;
  5. “Uniform application” means an application to construct a cellular antenna tower submitted to a planning commission in conformity with KRS 100.9865 and 100.987 ;
  6. “Utility” has the meaning as defined in KRS 278.010(3); and
  7. “Antennas or related equipment” means transmitting, receiving, or other equipment used to support cellular telecommunications service or personal communications service. This definition does not include towers.

History. Enact. Acts 1998, ch. 231, § 1, effective July 15, 1998; 2002, ch. 343, § 2, effective April 23, 2002; 2002, ch. 346, § 157, effective July 15, 2002.

Compiler’s Notes.

Section 6 of Acts 1998, ch. 231, stated: “If any provision of this Act or the application thereof to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the invalidity shall not affect other provisions or applications of the Act that can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this Act are severable.”

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(4/23/2002). This section was amended by 2002 Ky. Acts ch. 343, sec. 2, and ch. 346, sec. 157, which appear to be in conflict. The changes made by ch. 346 are revisory in nature, while the changes made by ch. 343 are substantive. The changes of ch. 343 have been allowed to prevail. Cf. KRS 7.123 .

100.986. Prohibited actions of planning commission in regulating placement of cellular antenna towers.

In regulating the placement of cellular antenna towers, a planning commission shall not:

  1. Regulate the placement of a cellular antenna tower on the basis of the environmental effects of radio frequency emissions to the extent that these facilities comply with the regulations of the Federal Communications Commission concerning radio frequency emissions;
  2. Institute a moratorium upon the siting of cellular antenna towers;
  3. Charge an application fee that exceeds an amount that is reasonably related to expenses associated with processing an application to construct a cellular antenna tower, and to issue any necessary permits including any required building permit, up to a maximum of two thousand five hundred dollars ($2500). Application fee amounts shall not be raised after June 15, 2002;
  4. Regulate the placement of antennas or related equipment on an existing structure; or
  5. Require the submission of application materials in addition to those required by KRS 100.9865 and 100.987 , unless agreed by both parties.

History. Enact. Acts 2002, ch. 343, § 4, effective April 23, 2002.

100.9865. Contents of uniform application.

In addition to the requirements of KRS 100.987 , a uniform application shall include:

  1. The full name and address of the applicant;
  2. The applicant’s articles of incorporation, if applicable;
  3. A geotechnical investigation report, signed and sealed by a professional engineer registered in Kentucky, that includes boring logs and foundation design recommendations;
  4. A written report, prepared by a professional engineer or land surveyor, of findings as to the proximity of the proposed site to flood hazard areas;
  5. Clear directions from the county seat to the proposed site, including highway numbers and street names, if applicable, with the telephone number of the person who prepared the directions;
  6. The lease or sale agreement for the property on which the tower is proposed to be located, except that, if the agreement has been filed in abbreviated form with the county clerk, an applicant may file a copy of the agreement as recorded by the county clerk and, if applicable, the portion of the agreement demonstrating compliance with KRS 100.987(2);
  7. The identity and qualifications of each person directly responsible for the design and construction of the proposed tower;
  8. A site development plan or survey, signed and sealed by a professional engineer registered in Kentucky, that shows the proposed location of the tower and all easements and existing structures within five hundred (500) feet of the proposed site on the property on which the tower will be located, and all easements and existing structures within two hundred (200) feet of the access drive, including the intersection with the public street system;
  9. A vertical profile sketch of the tower, signed and sealed by a professional engineer registered in Kentucky, indicating the height of the tower and the placement of all antennas;
  10. The tower and foundation design plans and a description of the standard according to which the tower was designed, signed, and sealed by a professional engineer registered in Kentucky;
  11. A map, drawn to a scale no less than one (1) inch equals two hundred (200) feet, that identifies every structure and every owner of real estate within five hundred (500) feet of the proposed tower;
  12. A statement that every person who, according to the records of the property valuation administrator, owns property within five hundred (500) feet of the proposed tower or property contiguous to the site upon which the tower is proposed to be constructed, has been:
    1. Notified by certified mail, return receipt requested, of the proposed construction, which notice shall include a map of the location of the proposed construction;
    2. Given the telephone number and address of the local planning commission; and
    3. Informed of his or her right to participate in the planning commission’s proceedings on the application;
  13. A list of the property owners who received the notice, together with copies of the certified letters sent to the listed property owners;
  14. A statement that the chief executive officer of the affected local governments and their legislative bodies have been notified, in writing, of the proposed construction;
  15. A copy of the notice sent to the chief executive officer of the affected local governments and their legislative bodies;
  16. A statement that:
    1. A written notice, of durable material at least two (2) feet by four (4) feet in size, stating that “[Name of applicant] proposes to construct a telecommunications tower on this site” and including the addresses and telephone numbers of the applicant and the planning commission, has been posted and shall remain in a visible location on the proposed site until final disposition of the application; and
    2. A written notice, at least two (2) feet by four (4) feet in size, stating that “[Name of applicant] proposes to construct a telecommunications tower near this site” and including the addresses and telephone numbers of the applicant and the planning commission, has been posted on the public road nearest the site;
  17. A statement that notice of the location of the proposed construction has been published in a newspaper of general circulation in the county in which the construction is proposed;
  18. A brief description of the character of the general area in which the tower is proposed to be constructed, which includes the existing land use for the specific property involved;
  19. A statement that the applicant has considered the likely effects of the installation on nearby land uses and values and has concluded that there is no more suitable location reasonably available from which adequate service to the area can be provided, and that there is no reasonably available opportunity to locate its antennas and related facilities on an existing structure, including documentation of attempts to locate its antennas and related facilities on an existing structure, if any, with supporting radio frequency analysis, where applicable, and a statement indicating that the applicant attempted to locate its antennas and related facilities on a tower designed to host multiple wireless service providers’ facilities or on an existing structure, such as a telecommunications tower or other suitable structure capable of supporting the applicant’s antennas and related facilities; and
  20. A map of the area in which the tower is proposed to be located, that is drawn to scale, and that clearly depicts the necessary search area within which an antenna tower should, pursuant to radio frequency requirements, be located.

History. Enact. Acts 2002, ch. 343, § 5, effective April 23, 2002.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Notice.

Applicant seeking approval of a cell phone tower site did not have to notice all those affected by the applicant’s entire network because the applicant’s notice complied with KRS 100.9865(12) and (17), meeting minimum due process requirements. Hampson v. Boone Co. Planning Comm'n, 2014 Ky. App. LEXIS 63 (Ky. Ct. App. Apr. 11, 2014), op. withdrawn, sub. op., 460 S.W.3d 912, 2014 Ky. App. LEXIS 130 (Ky. Ct. App. 2014).

100.987. Local government may plan for and regulate siting of cellular antenna towers — Duties of utility or company proposing to construct antenna tower — Confidentiality of information contained in application — Duties and powers of planning commission — Co-location — Public Service Commission approval of cellular antenna towers on certain properties of the state or instrumentality of the state.

  1. A planning unit as defined in KRS 100.111 and legislative body or fiscal court that has adopted planning and zoning regulations may plan for and regulate the siting of cellular antenna towers in accordance with locally adopted planning or zoning regulations in this chapter, except as otherwise provided in this section.
  2. Every utility or a company that is engaged in the business of providing the required infrastructure to a utility that proposes to construct an antenna tower for cellular telecommunications services or personal communications services within the jurisdiction of a planning unit that has adopted planning and zoning regulations in accordance with this chapter shall:
    1. Submit a copy of the applicant’s completed uniform application to the planning commission of the affected planning unit to construct an antenna tower for cellular or personal telecommunications services. The uniform application shall include a grid map that shows the location of all existing cellular antenna towers and that indicates the general position of proposed construction sites for new cellular antenna towers within an area that includes:
      1. All of the planning unit’s jurisdiction; and
      2. A one-half (1/2) mile area outside of the boundaries of the planning unit’s jurisdiction, if that area contains either existing or proposed construction sites for cellular antenna towers;
    2. Include in any contract with an owner of property upon which a cellular antenna tower is to be constructed, a provision that specifies, in the case of abandonment, a method that the utility will follow in dismantling and removing a cellular antenna tower, including a timetable for removal; and
    3. Comply with any local ordinances concerning land use, subject to the limitations imposed by 47 U.S.C. sec. 332(c) , KRS 278.030 , 278.040 , and 278.280 .
  3. All information contained in the application and any updates, except for any map or other information that specifically identifies the proposed location of the cellular antenna tower then being reviewed, shall be deemed confidential and proprietary within the meaning of KRS 61.878 . The local planning commission shall deny any public request for the inspection of this information, whether submitted under Kentucky’s Open Records Act or otherwise, except when ordered to release the information by a court of competent jurisdiction. Any person violating this subsection shall be guilty of official misconduct in the second degree as provided under KRS 522.030 .
  4. After an applicant’s submission of the uniform application to construct a cellular antenna tower, the planning commission shall:
    1. Review the uniform application in light of its agreement with the comprehensive plan and locally adopted zoning regulations;
    2. Make its final decision to approve or disapprove the uniform application; and
    3. Advise the applicant in writing of its final decision within sixty (60) days commencing from the date that the uniform application is submitted to the planning commission or within a date certain specified in a written agreement between the local planning commission and the applicant. If the planning commission fails to issue a final decision within sixty (60) days and if there is no written agreement between the local planning commission and the applicant to a specific date for the planning commission to issue a decision, the uniform application shall be deemed approved.
  5. If the planning commission disapproves of the proposed construction, it shall state the reasons for disapproval in its written decision and may make suggestions which, in its opinion, better accomplish the objectives of the comprehensive plan and the locally adopted zoning regulations. No permit for construction of a cellular or personal communications services antenna tower shall be issued until the planning commission approves the uniform application or the sixty (60) day time period has expired, whichever occurs first.
  6. The planning commission may require the applicant to make a reasonable attempt to co-locate additional transmitting or related equipment. A planning commission may provide the location of existing cellular antenna towers on which the commission deems the applicant can successfully co-locate its transmitting and related equipment. If the local planning commission requires the applicant to attempt co-location, the applicant shall provide the local planning unit with a statement indicating that the applicant has:
    1. Successfully attempted to co-locate on towers designed to host multiple wireless service providers’ facilities or existing structures such as a telecommunications tower or another suitable structure capable of supporting the applicant’s facilities, and that identifies the location of the tower or suitable structure on which the applicant will co-locate its transmission and related facilities; or
    2. Unsuccessfully attempted to co-locate on towers designed to host multiple wireless service provider’s facilities or existing structures such as a telecommunications tower or another suitable structure capable of supporting the applicant’s facilities and that:
      1. Identifies the location of the towers or other structures on which the applicant attempted to co-locate; and
      2. Lists the reasons why the co-location was unsuccessful in each instance.
  7. The local planning commission may deny a uniform application to construct a cellular antenna tower based on an applicant’s unwillingness to attempt to co-locate additional transmitting or related equipment on any new or existing towers or other structures.
  8. In the event of co-location, a utility shall be considered the primary user of the tower, if the utility is the owner of the antenna tower and if no other agreement exists that prescribes an alternate arrangement between the parties for use of the tower. Any other entity that co-locates transmission or related facilities on a cellular antenna tower shall do so in a manner that does not impose additional costs or operating restrictions on the primary user.
  9. Upon the approval of an application for the construction of a cellular antenna tower by a planning commission, the applicant shall notify the Public Service Commission within ten (10) working days of the approval. The notice to the Public Service Commission shall include a map showing the location of the construction site. If an applicant fails to file notice of an approved uniform application with the Public Service Commission, the applicant shall be prohibited from beginning construction on the cellular antenna tower until such notice has been made.
  10. A party aggrieved by a final action of a planning commission under the provisions of KRS 100.985 to 100.987 may bring an action for review in any court of competent jurisdiction.
  11. Applications for approval of cellular antenna towers on property owned by any state agency, university electing to perform financial management of its real properties pursuant to KRS 164A.555 to 164A.630 , department, board, commission, authority, or other instrumentality of the state that is exempt from zoning regulations under KRS 100.361 , other than property for which the use is controlled by the secretary of the Finance and Administration Cabinet pursuant to KRS 56.463(4)(a), shall be submitted to the Public Service Commission for approval under KRS 278.650 .

History. Enact. Acts 1998, ch. 231, § 2, effective July 15, 1998; 2002, ch. 343, § 3, effective April 23, 2002; 2002, ch. 346, § 158, effective July 15, 2002; 2016 ch. 74, § 1, effective July 15, 2016.

Compiler’s Notes.

Section 6 of Acts 1998, ch. 231, stated: “If any provision of this Act or the application thereof to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the invalidity shall not affect other provisions or applications of the Act that can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this Act are severable.”

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(4/23/2002). This section was amended by 2002 Ky. Acts ch. 343, sec. 3, and ch. 346, sec. 158, which appear to be in conflict. The changes made by ch. 346 are revisory in nature, while the changes made by ch. 343 are substantive. The changes of ch. 343 have been allowed to prevail. Cf. KRS 7.123 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Analysis

1. Applicability.

In appealing an order of the circuit court dismissing their claim against a county planning commission, appellants were aware of the property owner's identity, yet they chose not to name the property owner as a party to the complaint and appeal filed 30 days later. Although appellants argued the circuit court erred in not granting leave to amend their complaint to include the property owner, one of the conditions precedent to the exercise of judicial power by the circuit court was not met, and the circuit court was required to dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction. Robbins v. Lexington-Fayette Urban Cnty. Planning Comm'n, 538 S.W.3d 294, 2017 Ky. App. LEXIS 53 (Ky. Ct. App. 2017).

The legislature intended to make local planning units primarily responsible for approving or disapproving placement of cell towers within their geographic boundaries. KRS 100.987 (1) means that, while a local planning unit must approve or disapprove the siting of cell towers within its geographical boundaries, it has the option of adopting its own regulations or of using the regulations set forth in KRS Chapter 100, specifically KRS 100.985 to 100.987 , to plan for and regulate the siting of cell towers. Ky. PSC v. Shadoan, 2008 Ky. App. LEXIS 193 (Ky. Ct. App. June 20, 2008), op. withdrawn, sub. op., 2008 Ky. App. LEXIS 382 (Ky. Ct. App. Dec. 31, 2008).

2. Construction.

KRS 100.987(1) affords a planning unit discretionary authority to regulate cellular tower construction within its political boundaries and this authority is triggered by the local adoption of regulations specific to the construction of cellular towers. This interpretation of the plainly permissive language of KRS 100.987(1) also harmonizes with the language of KRS 278.650 that envisions the possibility that under some circumstances, an application for a proposed cellular tower may fall outside the regulatory authority (i.e., “jurisdiction”) of a local planning commission. Kentucky PSC v. Shadoan, 2008 Ky. App. LEXIS 382 (Ky. Ct. App. 2008).

3. Jurisdiction of PSC.

Local planning commission’s (LPC) failure to adopt regulations concerning the proposed construction or location of cellular towers was essentially a declination by the LPC to exercise the jurisdiction over such matters granted to it by KRS 100.987(1); thus, under KRS 278.650 , the Kentucky Public Service Commission was the entity with jurisdiction to consider a company’s application for the construction of a cellular tower. Kentucky PSC v. Shadoan, 2008 Ky. App. LEXIS 382 (Ky. Ct. App. 2008).

Kentucky Supreme Court reads the word “shall” in KRS 100.987(2), in requiring “every” applicant to submit a copy of the application to the planning commission of the affected planning unit, as demonstrating the Kentucky Legislature’s intent that jurisdiction over cellular tower siting and construction will always be in the local planning commission if the area in question has such a commission. Therefore, it was error to conclude that the Kentucky Public Service Commission had jurisdiction over the siting and construction of a proposed cellular antenna tower, even though a local planning commission had not enacted specific regulations pertaining to the construction of cellular towers. Ky. PSC v. Shadoan, 325 S.W.3d 360, 2010 Ky. LEXIS 278 ( Ky. 2010 ).

Pursuant to KRS 100.203 , a planning unit may choose to regulate one type of activity or structure, but not another; thus, the Kentucky Supreme Court’s reading of the word “may” in KRS 100.987(1) is that a planning unit has the discretion to enact regulations pertaining to cellular antenna towers, as they do with any other activities or structures, but this exercise of discretion is not a condition of jurisdiction. If the area of the proposed cellular tower has a planning unit that has adopted planning and zoning regulations, the jurisdiction over matters relating to cellular tower placement and construction rests with that planning commission, not the Kentucky Public Service Commission, regardless of whether the planning unit has enacted regulations specifically relating to cellular towers; however, if there are no regulations specifically pertaining to cellular towers, the applicant will, however, still need to meet the general restrictions of the particular zone in which the proposed cell tower is to be constructed, e.g. permitted uses within the zone, height, and setback requirements, etc. Ky. PSC v. Shadoan, 325 S.W.3d 360, 2010 Ky. LEXIS 278 ( Ky. 2010 ).

4. Substantial Evidence.

Substantial evidence that a cellular antenna tower’s visual impact on surrounding historic properties would be minimal supported a decision from the Louisville Metro Planning Commission approving the application to construct the tower as consistent with the comprehensive plan and zoning under KRS 100.987(4)(a). Masonic Homes of Ky., Inc. v. Louisville Metro Planning Comm'n, 2013 Ky. App. LEXIS 29 (Ky. Ct. App. Feb. 8, 2013), review denied, ordered not published, 2013 Ky. LEXIS 685 (Ky. Dec. 11, 2013).

5. Standing.

Failure to raise a standing challenge at the administrative level waived the issue. The agency’s limited jurisdiction did not render inapplicable the rule that lack of standing, unlike subject-matter jurisdiction, is a defense that must be timely raised or deemed waived. Masonic Homes of Ky., Inc. v. Louisville Metro Planning Comm'n, 2013 Ky. App. LEXIS 29 (Ky. Ct. App. Feb. 8, 2013), review denied, ordered not published, 2013 Ky. LEXIS 685 (Ky. Dec. 11, 2013).

6. Due Process.

Planning commission’s approval of an alternate cell phone tower site did not violate landowners’ due process rights because (1) the landowners had notice and a chance to be heard, (2) no separate hearing was required, and (3) the commission satisfied KRS 100.987 . Hampson v. Boone Co. Planning Comm'n, 2014 Ky. App. LEXIS 63 (Ky. Ct. App. Apr. 11, 2014), op. withdrawn, sub. op., 460 S.W.3d 912, 2014 Ky. App. LEXIS 130 (Ky. Ct. App. 2014).

7. Limitation of Actions.

Where residents alleged tort claims, seeking to stop defendant from building a cell-phone tower near their homes, because the decision to approve the tower's site and design was a final action of the county planning commission, and Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 100.987 contained no independent statute of repose, Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 100.347(2) applied to any § 100.987 (10) appeal and barred a potential § 100.987(10) action. Robbins v. New Cingular Wireless PCS, LLC, 854 F.3d 315, 2017 FED App. 0055P, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 4433 (6th Cir. Ky. 2017 ).

Cited:

Cellco P’ship v. Franklin County, 553 F. Supp. 2d 838, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32324 (E.D. Ky. 2008 ).

Notes to Unpublished Decisions

1. Applicability.

Unpublished decision: Residents' suit seeking to stop the construction of a cell phone tower near the residents' homes was an improper collateral attack on a planning commission's decision approving the tower because (1) a challenge to the planning commission's decision was time-barred, as a property owner was not named as a defendant within 30 days, as required, (2) the suit merely reiterated an appeal of the planning commission's decision, (3) any claim of decreased property values was based solely on the planning commission's decision, and (4) the statute of repose barred any claim under Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 100.987 , on the siting of cell phone towers. Robbins v. New Cingular Wireless PCS, LLC, 2017 FED App. 0085N, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 1818 (6th Cir. Ky. Jan. 30, 2017).

Penalties

100.990. Penalties. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2741z-8, 2741zz-16, 2741zz-17, 3037h-128, 3037h-129, 3037h-134, 3235f-10: amend. Acts 1942, ch. 176, §§ 11, 12, 17; 1958, ch. 154, § 17) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 91.

100.991. Penalties.

  1. Any person or entity who violates any of the provisions of KRS 100.201 to 100.347 or any of the regulations adopted pursuant thereto for which no other penalty is provided, shall upon conviction, be fined not less than ten dollars ($10) but not more than five hundred dollars ($500) for each conviction. Each day of violation shall constitute a separate offense.
  2. Any person, owner or agent who violates this chapter shall, upon conviction, be fined not less than one hundred dollars ($100) nor more than five hundred dollars ($500) for each lot or parcel which was the subject of sale or transfer, or a contract for sale or transfer.
  3. Any person who intentionally violates any provision of KRS 100.3681 to 100.3684 shall be guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by a fine of not less than one hundred dollars ($100) nor more than five hundred dollars ($500).
  4. A commission may appoint enforcement officers who shall have authority to issue citations for violations of this chapter which the officer has observed, but shall not have powers of peace officers to make arrests or carry deadly weapons. The defendant shall appear within a designated time pursuant to the citation.
  5. The procedure for citations issued by an enforcement officer shall be as provided in KRS 431.015 .

History. Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 172, § 68 (1st sentence), 83; 1986, ch. 141, § 41, effective July 15, 1986; 1988, ch. 30, § 5, effective July 15, 1988.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

Ratliff v. Phillips, 746 S.W.2d 405, 1988 Ky. LEXIS 17 ( Ky. 1988 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Violations of a county planning and zoning ordinance requiring building permits and certificates of occupancy which are punishable under this section, not being felonies, are subject to the one year statute of limitations in KRS 500.050 , which begins to run, with regards to building permit violations, upon the completion of the structural improvements or alterations and, with regard to certificate of occupancy violations, on the last day of occupancy, since each day of occupancy is a separate violation. OAG 75-632 .

The broad penalty provisions of this section were designed to preempt the field of zoning law criminal penalties; thus, the fiscal court does not have the authority to impose by ordinances fines for violations of county ordinances. OAG 85-50 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Kentucky Law Survey, Griffin and Becker, Zoning, 67 Ky. L.J. 627 (1978-1979).

CHAPTER 101 Tenement and Apartment Houses in Cities of the First Class [Repealed]

101.010 to 101.780,. 101.990. Tenement and apartment houses in cities of the first class. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

These sections (3037g-2 to 3037g-5, 3037g-7 to 3037g-24, 3037g-26 to 3037g-81) were repealed by Acts 1954, ch. 163, § 2.

CHAPTER 102 Chambers of Commerce

102.010. Creation and purpose.

For the purpose of advertising and developing their natural resources, and promoting the general welfare, better business methods and civic conditions, a corporate body, to be known as the chamber of commerce, is authorized in cities of the home rule class.

History. 2741n-1; 2014, ch. 92, § 200, effective January 1, 2015.

Opinions of Attorney General.

“Public agency” does not include a chamber of commerce under the generally accepted definition of that kind of organization, whether organized under KRS Chapters 102 or 273, and the organization is not subject to the requirements of KRS 61.810 pertaining to open meetings. OAG 74-566 .

102.020. Articles of incorporation.

  1. The articles of incorporation shall be as follows: “We, the undersigned business and professional persons resident, or conducting a business, or having a branch office, in the city of  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ., county of  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , Kentucky, adopt the following articles of incorporation:

    “Article I. The objects of this corporation shall be to advance and improve civic welfare, and to advertise and develop the industries and resources of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , Kentucky.

    “Article II. The name of this corporation shall be . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Chamber of Commerce.

    “Article III. The affairs of this corporation shall be conducted by a board of not less than six (6) directors, and such officers as may be established by the bylaws of the corporation.

    “Article IV. The annual dues of the members of this corporation shall be not less than twelve dollars ($12), payable as provided in the bylaws of the corporation.

    “Article V. Any resident of the city or county, or any firm or individual operating a business or branch office therein, whose application meets with the approval of the board of directors, may become a member by paying the first dues, and thereafter complying with the articles of incorporation and bylaws.

    “Article VI. This corporation shall continue until terminated by operation of law.

    “Article VII. The board of directors shall adopt such bylaws as they deem necessary for the regulation of the affairs of this corporation.”

  2. The articles of incorporation shall be recorded by the county clerk without fee.

History. 2741n-2, 2741n-4: amend. Acts 1960, ch. 118; 1974, ch. 386, § 24.

102.030. Corporate powers.

The chamber of commerce may sue and be sued. The private property of members shall be exempt from corporate debts. It may have a seal, which it may alter at pleasure. It shall have power to take property by gift, purchase, devise or bequest, and to sell and convey it. It shall have all necessary and proper power for the successful carrying out of its purposes. It may use part or all of the sum annually received from any source to employ special agents and to do anything expedient to advertise and promote the resources and advantages of the city as a business and industrial center.

History. 2741n-3.

102.040. No salaries to officers — No dividends.

No salary shall be paid to any officer. No dividend shall be declared by the chamber of commerce.

History. 2741n-5, 2741n-6.

102.050. General secretary.

The board of directors may employ a general secretary, whose salary shall be fixed before his employment.

History. 2741n-5.

102.060. Appropriation from city or county funds — Expenditure. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2741n-8; Acts 1966, ch. 241, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1978, ch. 118, § 19, effective June 17, 1978.

102.070. Duties of treasurer.

The treasurer shall receive all funds belonging to the chamber of commerce, including all appropriations of the city governing body. He shall pay out the same on bills allowed by the board of directors, upon warrants certified by the president and secretary.

History. 2741n-9.

102.080. Bonds and reports of secretary and treasurer.

  1. The treasurer and the secretary shall give bond, the amount to be fixed by the directors at not less than the sum likely to come into their hands.
  2. The secretary and treasurer shall, at the close of each semiannual period, file with the board of directors an accurate detailed report of all receipts and disbursements of the chamber of commerce, showing the source of such receipts, and to whom paid and for what purpose. The report shall be sworn to by the secretary and treasurer. If an appropriation has been obtained from the city during the period covered by the report a copy of it shall be filed with the city clerk.

History. 2741n-7.

102.990. Penalties. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (2741n-6, 2741n-10) was repealed by Acts 1974, ch. 406, § 336, effective January 1, 1975.

CHAPTER 103 Revenue Bonds for Miscellaneous City or County Projects

Cemeteries in Cities of Fifth and Sixth Classes

103.010 to 103.100. Cemeteries in cities of fifth and sixth classes. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

The following sections were repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980:

103.010 Power of cities of fifth and sixth classes to establish and operate cemeteries — Acquisition of property. (Enact. Acts 1944, ch. 69, § 1.)

103.020 Board of commissioners for cemetery — Rules and regulations — Use of revenue — Charges for lots and upkeep.(Enact. Acts 1944, ch. 69, § 2.)

103.030 Tax exemption. (Enact. Acts 1944, ch. 69, § 4.)

103.040 Acquisition of property for cemetery — Condemnation. (Enact. Acts 1944, ch. 69, § 5; 1978, ch. 384, § 24, effective June 17, 1978.)

103.050 Revenue bonds — Issuance — Terms — Additional bonds. (Enact. Acts 1944, ch. 69, § 6.)

103.060 Bonds negotiable and tax-free — Payable only from revenue. (Enact. Acts 1944, ch. 69, § 7.)

103.070 Use of proceeds of bonds — Lien in favor of bondholders. (Enact. Acts 1944, ch. 69, § 8.)

103.080 Dedication of existing cemetery property. (Enact. Acts 1944, ch. 69, § 9.)

103.090 Acceptance of gifts and donations. (Enact. Acts 1944, ch. 69, § 10.)

103.100 Deposit and withdrawal of funds. (Enact. Acts 1944, ch. 69, § 11; 1968, ch. 152, § 86.)

Market Places in Cities of Third Class

103.110 to 103.190. Market places in cities of third class. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

The following sections were repealed by Acts 1978, ch. 118, § 19, effective June 17, 1978.

103.110 Definitions for KRS 103.110 to 103.190. (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 24, § 1.)

103.120 Issuance of bonds — County may proceed jointly with city. (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 24, § 2.)

103.130 Interest on bonds — Terms. (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 24, § 3.)

103.140 Bonds negotiable and tax-free — Disposal — Payable only from revenue. (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 24, § 4.)

103.150 Use of proceeds of bonds. (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 24, § 5.)

103.160 Receiver in case of default. (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 24, § 6.)

103.170 Application of revenue — Charges for service. (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 24, § 7.)

103.180 Depreciation account. (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 24, §§ 8 and 9.)

103.190 Receiver in case of default. (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 24, §§ 10 to 12.)

Industrial Buildings and Pollution Control Facilities for Cities and Counties

103.195. Issuance of revenue bonds for housing project outside jurisdictional boundaries.

After July 12, 2006, no city, county, charter county, urban-county, consolidated local government, or special district shall issue revenue bonds as provided in this chapter for any housing project which is located outside the jurisdictional boundaries of the issuing entity without the express written consent of the elected legislative body of the city, county, charter county, urban-county, or consolidated local government in which the housing project will be located.

History. Enact. Acts 2006, ch. 178, § 1, effective July 12, 2006.

103.200. Definitions for KRS 103.200 to 103.285.

As used in KRS 103.200 to 103.285 :

  1. “Building” or “industrial building” means any land and building or buildings (including office space related and subordinate to any of the facilities enumerated below), any facility or other improvement thereon, and all real and personal properties, including operating equipment and machinery deemed necessary in connection therewith, whether or not now in existence, which shall be suitable for the following or any combination thereof:
    1. Any activity, business, or industry for the manufacturing, processing or assembling of any commercial product, including agricultural, mining, or manufactured products and solar-generated electricity, together with storage, warehousing, and distribution facilities in respect thereof;
    2. Any undertaking involving the construction, reconstruction, and use of airports, mass commuting facilities, ship canals, ports or port facilities, docks or wharf facilities or harbor facilities, off-street parking facilities or of railroads, monorails, or tramways, railway or airline terminals, cable television, mass communication facilities, and related facilities;
    3. Any buildings, structures, and facilities, including the site thereof and machinery, equipment, and furnishings suitable for use as health-care or related facilities, including without limitation hospitals, clinics, nursing homes, research facilities, extended or long-term care facilities, including housing for the aged or the infirm and all buildings, structures, and facilities deemed necessary or useful in connection therewith;
    4. Any nonprofit educational institution in any manner related to or in furtherance of the educational purposes of such institution, including but not limited to classroom, laboratory, housing, administrative, physical educational, and medical research and treatment facilities;
    5. Any facilities for any recreation or amusement park, public park, or theme park, including specifically facilities for the use of nonprofit entities in making recreational and cultural benefits available to the public;
    6. Any facilities involving manufacturing and service industries which process raw agricultural products, including timber, provide value-added functions, or supply ingredients used for production of basic agricultural crops and products;
    7. Any facilities incident to the development of industrial sites, including land costs and the costs of site improvements thereon, such as grading, streets, drainage, storm and sanitary sewers, and other facilities and structures incidental to the use of such site or sites for industrial use;
    8. Any facilities for the furnishing of water, if available on reasonable demand to members of the general public;
    9. Any facilities for the extraction, production, grading, separating, washing, drying, preparing, sorting, loading, and distribution of mineral resources, together with related facilities;
    10. Any convention or trade show facilities, together with all related and subordinate facilities necessary to the development and proper utilization thereof;
    11. Any facilities designed and constructed to be used as hotels and/or motels, together with all related and subordinate facilities necessary to the operation thereof, including site preparation and similar facilities;
    12. Any activity designed for the preservation of residential neighborhoods, provided that such activity receives approval of the heritage division and insures the preservation of not fewer than four (4) family units;
    13. Any activity designed for the preservation of commercial or residential buildings which are on the National Register of Historic Places or within an area designated as a national historic district or approved by the heritage division;
    14. Any activity, including new construction, designed for revitalization or redevelopment of downtown business districts as designated by the issuer; and
    15. Any use by an entity recognized by the Internal Revenue Service as an organization described in 26 U.S.C. sec. 501(c)(3) in any manner related to or in the furtherance of that entity’s exempt purposes where the use would also qualify for federally tax-exempt financing under the rules applicable to a qualified 501(c)(3) bond as defined in 26 U.S.C. sec. 145 .
  2. “Bonds” or “negotiable bonds” means bonds, notes, variable rate bonds, commercial paper bonds, bond anticipation notes, or any other obligations for the payment of money issued by a city, county, or other authority pursuant to KRS 103.210 to 103.285 .
  3. “Substantiating documentation” means an independent finding, study, report, or assessment of the economic and financial impact of a project, which shall include a review of customary business practices, terms, and conditions for similar types of projects, both taxable and tax-exempt, in the current market environment.

History. Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 58, § 1; 1952, ch. 172; 1962, ch. 268, § 1; 1964, ch. 90, § 1; 1970, ch. 64, § 1; 1972, ch. 292, § 1; 1976, ch. 214, § 1; 1978, ch. 95, § 1, effective June 17, 1978; 1980, ch. 339, § 1, effective July 15, 1980; 1982, ch. 322, § 1, effective July 15, 1982; 1982, ch. 396, § 9, effective July 15, 1982; 1984, ch. 122, § 1, effective July 13, 1984; 1986, ch. 248, § 1, effective July 15, 1986; 2006, ch. 228, § 1, effective July 12, 2006; 2014, ch. 131, § 2, effective July 15, 2014; 2019 ch. 35, § 5, effective June 27, 2019; 2020 ch. 91, § 47, effective April 15, 2020.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Use of Surplus Revenues of City Electric System.

Surplus revenues from municipally owned electric system not already required by contract or by law to be used cannot be applied to the acquisition by a city of an industrial plant under either the “holding company plan” or KRS 103.200 to 103.280 . Corbin v. Johnson, 316 S.W.2d 217, 1958 Ky. LEXIS 35 ( Ky. 1958 ).

2. Lending of Credit.

Where city proposes to issue revenue bonds for acquisition of site outside city and construction of plant to lease under KRS 103.200 to 103.280 and enters into contract with company to lease such plant which contract contains option to purchase from city such option to purchase is not the lending of city’s credit in violation of Ky. Const., § 179. Bennett v. Mayfield, 323 S.W.2d 573, 1959 Ky. LEXIS 331 ( Ky. 1959 ).

3. Competitive Bids.

Where city proposes to issue revenue bonds for acquisition of site outside city and construction of plant to lease under authority of KRS 103.220 to 103.280 and enters into contract with company to lease such plant which contract contains option to purchase from city, such option provision is not such a contract of alienation or sale of property that requires advertisement and sale on competitive bids. Bennett v. Mayfield, 323 S.W.2d 573, 1959 Ky. LEXIS 331 ( Ky. 1959 ).

4. Public Purpose within Power of Municipality.

By enacting KRS 103.200 to 103.280 authorizing a city to issue bonds to construct an industrial building for lease to private persons, the General Assembly deems such a program to be a “public project,” and the legislative determination of what is a “public project” will not be interfered with by the courts unless the judicial mind conceives it to be without reasonable relation to the public interest or welfare and to be without the scope of legitimate government. Faulconer v. Danville, 313 Ky. 468 , 232 S.W.2d 80, 1950 Ky. LEXIS 901 ( Ky. 1950 ).

5. Industrial Facilities.

The owning and leasing of an industrial plant is a proprietary and not a governmental function and a contract of rental for a definite term of 25 years with an option to renew for a like period does not violate Ky. Const., § 164 providing no municipality shall be authorized or permitted to grant any franchise or privilege or make any contract in reference thereto for a term exceeding 20 years. Faulconer v. Danville, 313 Ky. 468 , 232 S.W.2d 80, 1950 Ky. LEXIS 901 ( Ky. 1950 ).

KRS 103.210 expressly permits the acquisition of an industrial building (as defined in this section) even though the industrial building is composed of existing facilities coupled with newly built facilities. Massey v. Franklin, 384 S.W.2d 505, 1964 Ky. LEXIS 105 ( Ky. 1964 ).

6. Hospitals.

A hospital facility leased to a nonprofit, charitable organization was an “industrial building” and the county had authority to issue bonds to finance its expansion. Ladt v. County of McCracken, 555 S.W.2d 620, 1977 Ky. App. LEXIS 796 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).

Where construction of a hospital was financed by the issuance of public project revenue bonds pursuant to KRS 58.010 et seq., those bonds could be refunded by the issuance of revenue bonds under this chapter. Ladt v. County of McCracken, 555 S.W.2d 620, 1977 Ky. App. LEXIS 796 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).

7. Appeals.

Since KRS 103.195 et seq., creating the Kentucky Private Activity Bond Allocation Committee, does not provide either for administrative review or for an appeal from Committee rulings, the general administrative appeal statute, KRS 13B.140 , governs, and that statute imposes a 30-day limitations period for appeals to a court from final administrative rulings. Bear Creek Capital, LLC v. Toebben, Ltd., 2007 Ky. App. LEXIS 135 (Ky. Ct. App.), sub. op., 2007 Ky. App. Unpub. LEXIS 309 (Ky. Ct. App. May 4, 2007).

Cited:

Tierney v. Shamburger, 240 S.W.2d 836, 1951 Ky. LEXIS 1022 ( Ky. 1951 ); Henderson v. Todd, 314 S.W.2d 948, 1958 Ky. LEXIS 323 ( Ky. 1958 ); Grimm v. Moloney, 358 S.W.2d 496, 1962 Ky. LEXIS 180 ( Ky. 1962 ); In re Allgeier & Dyer, Inc., 18 B.R. 82, 1982 Bankr. LEXIS 4878 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1982 ); Crowder v. Conlan, 740 F.2d 447, 1984 U.S. App. LEXIS 19893 (6th Cir. 1984).

Opinions of Attorney General.

In the absence of specific legislative authority one city cannot construct industrial buildings under the terms of KRS 103.200 to 103.280 within the corporate limits of another city. OAG 61-966 .

Where bonds were issued by a city to purchase an industrial building to be leased to a business, the revenue bonds and the interest thereon were exempt from all state, county, school and municipal taxes, including the state income tax. OAG 63-398 .

Where bonds were issued by a city to purchase an industrial building to be leased to a business, the interest from the bonds was exempt from Kentucky state income tax. OAG 63-398 .

Where bonds were issued by a city to purchase an industrial building to be leased to a business the bonds were bonds of a municipality within the meaning of Ky. Const., § 171 and were not subject to ad valorem taxation. OAG 63-398 .

Where a building and grounds were owned by the city and leased to an electrical manufacturing concern, so long as the property was owned by the city it would be exempt from property taxes as public property used for public purposes. OAG 64-144 .

A county fiscal court has no authority to exempt the property of a private firm or manufacturing concern from county, state, school or health taxes as an inducement to industrial development without acquiring title to such property. OAG 67-205 .

Construction material, machinery, equipment, and other appurtenances used in the construction of a building financed by city through the stage-payment plan where the company which intends to lease the plant will pay the construction costs in stages as the work progresses and the only thing that the city does is to issue bonds to finance the project, would be subject to sales and use tax pursuant to KRS 139.110 and department of revenue regulation SU-54-2, and the company may not claim that the purchase of materials or fixtures is not subject to tax because the property is to be used in fulfilling a contract with the federal or state government. OAG 73-157 .

A resolution of the city of Morehead approving an agreement of intent to issue revenue bonds for the financing of a health care project is permissible under this chapter but a bond counsel should be consulted to see that the city adheres to the procedures outlined in those sections in order for the project to be valid. OAG 73-696 .

The terms “town” and “city” mean the same thing under Kentucky law so that incorporation as a town constitutes a city of the sixth class and, unless said town has been dissolved by statutory procedure, such town is entitled to issue industrial revenue bonds. OAG 73-793 .

Neither the term “facility for the treatment or care of the aged or infirm” nor any of the recited types of buildings are broad enough to include a senior citizen housing project. OAG 74-391 .

An auto dealership involving the buying, selling, servicing and repairing of automobiles does not qualify under the term “industrial building” as used in this section and therefore does not qualify under KRS 103.200 et seq. OAG 77-6 .

A city cannot finance its industrial building by issuing “notes” rather than revenue bonds since there is no authorization under KRS Chapters 103 or 58 for the issuing of “notes” for industrial or public projects. OAG 78-15 .

A county may develop a public project within a city in that county but the fiscal court, in this situation, would carry none of the prerogatives of sovereignty and would function as a private corporation subject to applicable city ordinances. OAG 78-92 .

Payments made, pursuant to a lease for a building constructed by a city beyond its boundaries under the provisions of this section, are in lieu of all other taxes except those under KRS 132.020 , and, as such payments are not technically city revenue, the city is free to designate the local school district as beneficiary of the contract if it so desires. OAG 79-132 .

Since it is axiomatic that a city cannot provide services beyond its corporate geographical limits, even though a county has elected not to aid a business under the provisions of this section, where one of the cities in the county elected to erect a building for the business beyond the municipal boundary of the city, it is the county, not the city, which must provide police and fire protection and other necessary governmental services. OAG 79-132 .

Since the proprietary project is acquired from proceeds of an industrial revenue bond issue, and not from the general fund or tax revenues of the city, the project property can only represent, in this total context, the money from whence the project property came. OAG 79-439 .

While a city has an obligation of good faith to the industrial building revenue bondholders under the bond documents, that is not equivalent to the financial obligation of the city or city indebtedness under Ky. Const., §§ 157 and 158. OAG 79-439 .

Where a county fiscal court has formally adopted the Model Procurement Code, the provisions of that code apply to the construction of a personal care home on behalf of a tenant, which will be a Kentucky nonprofit corporation, the funding of which construction will be effected by a revenue bond issue of fiscal court; however, where the fiscal court has taken no formal action to come under the model procurement code, the code does not apply, and KRS 424.260 , requiring bidding on the construction contract, would apply. OAG 80-297 .

Where a fiscal court commissioner is also a member of a law firm from which he draws a regular salary, and it is anticipated that his law firm may be retained by a corporate client seeking assistance in the issuance of industrial revenue bonds of the county, the commissioner should neither attend nor participate in any fiscal court meeting dealing with the bond issue matter affecting his law firm. OAG 80-479 .

Subsection (5) (now subsection (3)) of this section clearly authorizes any city or county to issue industrial building revenue bonds for “housing for the aged” although the statute does not define the term “aged”; the term “aged” should probably be considered in its popular meaning. OAG 82-71 .

According to rules of grammar and sheer contextual implication, the language “any recreation or amusement park” in subdivision (5) of this section should be construed to include, as intended, “any recreational or amusement park.” OAG 82-490 .

A proposed park project, which includes bowling lanes, miniature golf courses and picnic areas, fits practicably within the language “any recreation or amusement park” of subdivision (5) of this section. OAG 82-490 .

The review and approval function in the case, which involved issuance of industrial revenue bonds by Kentucky Development Finance Authority for benefit of corporation which desired to finance certain new equipment, should be restricted to these factors: (1) a determination that the proposed bonds were in reasonable conformity with the general legislative policy expressed in KRS Chapters 103 and 154; and (2) the evaluation of revenue projections relative to the proposed bond issue including a reasonable determination of the fiscal or financial soundness of the company; in a revenue bond issue of this category, the division of investment and debt management has no authority to require by regulations a rating agency presentation, competitive bidding of all advisers, consultants, trustees, underwriters and bond counsel and a determination that the proposed bond issue has been legally authorized by and/or determined feasible in a biennial budget. OAG 83-453 .

The manufacturing of computer software in “industrial buildings” would qualify, for purposes of industrial revenue bond financing, under subdivisions (1) and (7) of this section as a business or industry for the manufacturing, processing or assembling of a particular commercial product, namely, computer software. OAG 84-11 .

A city could purchase and develop, through the issuance of revenue bonds, property within the corporate limits of another city. OAG 84-230 .

KRS 103.220 and this section in no explicit language establish pollution control projects as the sole category of projects subject to a variable rate of interest, and the pertinent statutes amended by Acts 1984, Ch. 122 (KRS 103.200 , 103.210 , 103.210 1, 103.220 to 103.240 , 103.280 ) in no way prohibit the application of the variable rate to projects other than pollution control projects; they merely emphasize pollution control projects, but not to the detriment of other kinds of projects falling within the broad range of KRS 103.200 to 103.285 . Moreover, KRS 58.430 is a specific statute dealing only with interest rates on public bonds and is so flexibly worded as to support variable rate structures in the issuance of public bonds and even if the sections in KRS Chapter 103 amended by Acts 1984, Ch. 122 were to be said to be in some conflict with the provisions of KRS 58.430 , the specific statute, KRS 58.430, should control over the provisions of KRS Chapter 103. OAG 84-257 .

When reading the entire legislation of 1984, and considering the history and purpose of KRS Chapter 103 (industrial revenue bonds), and in connection with any industrial revenue bonds covered by KRS 103.200 to 103.285 , an agreed fluctuating or variable rate of interest, under terms whereby the bonds bear interest at a fluctuating or variable rate, adjustable in accordance with whatever formula is agreed upon by the issuer, the borrower, and the purchaser, is permissible; to construe KRS 103.200 and 103.220 as permitting a variable interest rate for pollution control projects only would constitute an unreasonable and absurd premise, especially when considering the realities of the present day use of KRS Chapter 103 in Kentucky. OAG 84-257 .

Under subdivision (1)(a) and (i) of this section, the City of Hazard could properly issue industrial revenue bonds for construction of a proposed headquarters building for a minerals company. OAG 85-56 .

This chapter and KRS Chapter 58 separately, and when considered in pari materia, provide for variable interest rate bonds. OAG 85-103 .

City’s approval of a bond issue to help finance renovation and expansion of the campus of a high school operated by the Archdiocese of Louisville did not violate the establishment clause where the financing arrangement indicated that the public nature of the bond issue provided nothing more than a tax and interest advantage for bondholders. OAG 93-80 .

Fiscal courts of two (2) counties could lawfully issue industrial revenue bonds to finance the construction of electric generating stations as electric generating stations constitute “industrial buildings” as defined by the statute and satisfy the statutory definition of “industrial buildings” because they are used to “manufacture” electricity, and electricity constitutes a “commercial product.” OAG 01-2 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Treatises

Caldwell’s Kentucky Form Book, 5th Ed., Procedural Context for Environmental Protection, § 350.00.

103.210. Issuance of bonds.

  1. In order to promote the economic development of the Commonwealth, to relieve conditions of unemployment, to encourage the increase of industry in this state, and to aid in the retention of existing industry through improved energy efficiency in manufacturing facilities, or through conversion of energy facilities to more readily available fuels, any city or county may borrow money and issue negotiable bonds for the purpose of defraying the cost of acquiring any industrial building or pollution control facility, either by purchase or construction, but only after an ordinance or resolution has been adopted by the legislative body of the city or the fiscal court of the county, or by the Kentucky Economic Development Finance Authority, if requested by the legislative body of the city or the fiscal court of the county, as the case may be, specifying the proposed undertaking, the maximum amount of bonds to be outstanding at any one (1) time, and the maximum rate of interest the bonds are to bear. This section shall not be deemed to require, however, that such ordinance or resolution be adopted prior to interim financing of the project, if such interim financing was undertaken by the proposed lessee corporation upon the basis of discussions between the corporation and responsible officials of the issuer which were later formally ratified by the appropriate governing body of the issuer.
  2. The ordinance or resolution shall further provide that the industrial building or the pollution control facility is to be acquired pursuant to the provisions of KRS 103.200 to 103.285 . Each such bond-authorizing ordinance or resolution shall be effective only after publication, in a newspaper authorized to publish official advertisements for the issuer, of the title to said ordinance or resolution, together with a statement signed by the clerk of the issuer setting forth the maximum amount of bonds to be outstanding at any one (1) time, the name of the lessee corporation, and the fact that the bonds are to be retired from the proceeds of either the lease payments as set forth in KRS 103.200 to 103.285 , inclusive, or the loan payments or sale payments in the event the industrial building financing transaction is carried out pursuant to a loan agreement, sale agreement, or other tax incentive agreement. No publication of the complete ordinance or resolution shall be required, but said ordinance or resolution shall be entered upon the records of the issuer and shall be available for public inspection.
  3. Any industrial buildings financed by bonds pursuant to KRS 103.200 to 103.285 and leased in connection with the bond financing from a tax-exempt governmental unit, or tax-exempt statutory authority, shall require the prior approval by the Kentucky Economic Development Finance Authority of the reduced ad valorem tax for industrial buildings under KRS 132.020 , the standards for which the Kentucky Economic Development Finance Authority shall establish through its operating procedures or by the promulgation of administrative regulations in accordance with KRS Chapter 13A. The authority shall consider, along with other indicators, when establishing standards, the number of jobs to be created, the amount of capital to be invested, and the wages and benefits to be paid.
  4. The Kentucky Economic Development Finance Authority, any air board established pursuant to KRS 183.132 , and any riverport authority established as provided in KRS 65.510 to 65.650 , inclusive, shall have and possess all power and authority granted to cities and counties by the provisions of KRS 103.200 to 103.285 , excluding condemnation powers under KRS 103.245 , for the financing of industrial buildings. For such purposes, the terms “city,” “county,” and “issuer” as used in KRS 103.200 to 103.285 , inclusive, shall also mean and refer to the Kentucky Economic Development Finance Authority, any air board established pursuant to KRS 183.132 , and any riverport authority established as provided in KRS 65.510 to 65.650 . The power and authority granted to the Kentucky Economic Development Finance Authority, any air board, and any riverport authority shall be and constitute an additional and alternative grant of power and authority to such governmental agencies, and shall not be construed as being in derogation of any other powers vested in each of such governmental agencies.

History. Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 58, § 2; 1962, ch. 268, § 2; 1970, ch. 64, § 2; 1976, ch. 214, § 2; 1978, ch. 95, § 2, effective June 17, 1978; 1980, ch. 339, § 2, effective July 15, 1980; 1984, ch. 122, § 2, effective July 13, 1984; 1992, ch. 105, § 67, effective July 14, 1992; 2002, ch. 338, § 16, effective July 15, 2002; 2014, ch. 131, § 3, effective July 15, 2014.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Public Purpose Required.

Resolution authorizing purchase of industrial plant with proceeds of revenue bonds and leasing it back to seller where there is no evidence that seller would increase the industrial operations or hire additional persons is invalid as serving no public purpose. Manning v. Fiscal Court of Jefferson County, 405 S.W.2d 755, 1966 Ky. LEXIS 272 ( Ky. 1966 ).

2. Evidence of Unemployment.

Evidence indicates sufficient unemployment to justify public project where unemployment based on unemployment insurance had ranged from 8.2% to 12% in the area for a period of ten (10) years, during which time the national average had ranged from 4% to 6%, the existing unemployment rate being 9.2% and where the United States Department of Labor has designated the area as one of chronic and persistent unemployment. Norvell v. Danville, 355 S.W.2d 689, 1962 Ky. LEXIS 84 ( Ky. 1962 ).

Evidence that bond issue was key factor in inducing construction of plant and that project would alleviate unemployment and encourage industry in state was sufficient. White v. Hickman, 415 S.W.2d 379, 1967 Ky. LEXIS 315 ( Ky. 1967 ).

Where the expansion of a hospital facility would immediately require the employment of 20 to 25 additional people, the purpose of this chapter to produce new employment was met. Ladt v. County of McCracken, 555 S.W.2d 620, 1977 Ky. App. LEXIS 796 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).

3. Purchase of Existing Facilities.

This section expressly permits the acquisition of an industrial building (as defined in KRS 103.200 ) even though the industrial building is composed of existing facilities coupled with newly built facilities. Massey v. Franklin, 384 S.W.2d 505, 1964 Ky. LEXIS 105 ( Ky. 1964 ).

4. Location in Another City.

A city has power under this section to issue revenue bonds to purchase industrial property in another city for lease to a private corporation and the issuance is not a lending of credit under Const., § 179. Norvell v. Danville, 355 S.W.2d 689, 1962 Ky. LEXIS 84 ( Ky. 1962 ).

5. Progress Payment Plan.

A purchase through a progress payment plan is a purchase within the literal meaning of the statute and does not violate the spirit of the statute. Gregory v. Lewisport, 369 S.W.2d 133, 1963 Ky. LEXIS 70 ( Ky. 1963 ).

Cited:

In re Allgeier & Dyer, Inc., 18 B.R. 82, 1982 Bankr. LEXIS 4878 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1982 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

If bonds were issued for an industrial building and the industrial lessee defaulted on the lease so that there was not sufficient rent to meet the bond payments, neither the city nor the members of the city council would be liable if the bonds were not an indebtedness of the city. OAG 71-349 .

The “loan agreement” method when used by a city, county, or Kentucky Industrial Development Finance Authority, in financing industrial buildings does not violate the anti-lending of credit provisions of Ky. Const., §§ 177 and 179 since no loan of government tax revenues is involved and the money loaned comes purely from the bond sale. OAG 80-320 .

Where a fiscal court commissioner is also a member of a law firm from which he draws a regular salary, and it is anticipated that his law firm may be retained by a corporate client seeking assistance in the issuance of industrial revenue bonds of the county, the commissioner should neither attend nor participate in any fiscal court meeting dealing with the bond issue matter affecting his law firm. OAG 80-479 .

Although a county fiscal court resolution approving the issuance of bonds for a shopping center could only become effective after publication in the precise manner set out in this section, the formalities of a county ordinance do not, under subsection (1) of KRS 67.076 , apply to a resolution of the fiscal court; accordingly, the requirement of two (2) readings applied by subsection (1) of KRS 67.077 to a county ordinance does not apply to a resolution. OAG 81-409 .

While an ordinance is partly defined in subsection (1) of KRS 67.075 as “an official written act of a fiscal court, the effect of which is general and lasting in nature,” subsection (1) of this section explicitly and clearly provides that the fiscal court may issue industrial revenue bonds by “ordinance or resolution”; accordingly, approval of a bond issue for a shopping center need not be in the form of an ordinance rather than a resolution even though the bonds are general and lasting in nature. OAG 81-409 .

KRS 103.200 and 103.220 in no explicit language establish pollution control projects as the sole category of projects subject to a variable rate of interest and the pertinent statutes amended by Acts 1984, Ch. 122 (KRS 103.200 , 103.210 , 103.210 1, 103.220 to 103.240 , 103.280 ) in no way prohibit the application of the variable rate to projects other than pollution control projects; they merely emphasize pollution control projects, but not to the detriment of other kinds of projects falling within the broad range of KRS 103.200 to 103.285 . Moreover, KRS 58.430 is a specific statute dealing only with interest rates on public bonds and is so flexibly worded as to support variable rate structures in the issuance of public bonds and even if the sections in KRS Chapter 103 amended by Acts 1984, Ch. 122 were to be said to be in some conflict with the provisions of KRS 58.430 , the specific statute, KRS 58.430, should control over the provisions of KRS Chapter 103. OAG 84-257 .

When reading the entire legislation of 1984, and considering the history and purpose of KRS Chapter 103 (industrial revenue bonds), and in connection with any industrial revenue bonds covered by KRS 103.200 to 103.285 , an agreed fluctuating or variable rate of interest, under terms whereby the bonds bear interest at a fluctuating or variable rate, adjustable in accordance with whatever formula is agreed upon by the issuer, the borrower, and the purchaser, is permissible; to construe KRS 103.200 and 103.220 as permitting a variable interest rate for pollution control projects only would constitute an unreasonable and absurd premise, especially when considering the realities of the present day use of KRS Chapter 103 in Kentucky. OAG 84-257 .

Under KRS 103.200 (2), variable rate bonds do not apply only to pollution control facilities bonds; thus, the Kentucky Development Finance Authority may lawfully issue variable rate bonds with Put and Remarketing features in a proposed Internal Revenue Bond issue for the financing of the construction and equipping of airport facilities, under KRS 103.200 to 103.285 , as amended by Chapter 122, 1984 Session, and KRS 58.430 . OAG 84-377 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Bench & Bar.

Tobergte, The Impact of Kentucky’s Present Constitution Upon Business Growth & Development, Volume 51, No. 3, Summer 1987 Ky. Bench & B. 21.

Herrington, Executive Branch Ethics Commission Advisory Opinion 94-4 and Lobbying Registration Requirements Applicable to Attorneys, Vol. 59, No. 1, Winter 1995, Ky. Bench & Bar 22.

103.2101. State local debt officer — Kentucky Private Activity Bond Allocation Committee — Review and approval or disapproval of projects — Statement of assurance — Maximum length of bond authorization.

  1. It shall be the duty of the state local debt officer to review only those projects authorized by KRS 103.200 (1) (k), (l), (m), and (n), and only off-street parking facilities, cable television, and mass communication facilities as authorized by KRS 103.200 (1)(b), whether by cities, counties, urban-county governments, air boards, or riverport authorities. The Kentucky Private Activity Bond Allocation Committee shall review only those projects to be issued by the Kentucky Economic Development Finance Authority and authorized by KRS 103.200(1) (k), (l), (m), and (n). Such review shall include but need not be limited to the following:
    1. Whether the project creates long-term economic growth, creates or retains jobs in a previously designated empowerment or enterprise zone, or aids in the prevention or elimination of slums or blight;
    2. Whether there is substantiating documentation to demonstrate that the project places an unjustified competitive disadvantage on existing business in the area;
    3. Whether there is substantiating documentation to demonstrate that normal commercial financing is unavailable for this project or, if available, at what rates it must be secured and under what terms and conditions;
    4. If the project is in accord with the intent of KRS 103.200 to 103.285 , this section, and KRS 103.2451 ; and
    5. The project’s economic soundness.
  2. If the committee or the state local debt officer finds that the project does not meet all of the above listed criteria, it shall deny approval of the project until the objections thereto have been met.
  3. The committee and the state local debt officer may require the submission of testimony, project data, or any other information deemed appropriate with regard to any project submitted to it for approval.
  4. The committee and the state local debt officer, within fourteen (14) days of receiving application, shall notify in writing the agency or unit of government proposing the issuance of bonds, the appropriate county judge/executive, mayor, and school superintendent, and the developers of the project of the date on which the project will be considered by the committee at a public hearing. Any person may attend the hearing and may personally, or through counsel, address the committee with regard to the project and make recommendations to the committee thereon. Notice shall be given to the agency or unit of government proposing to issue the bonds and the developers of the project not less than forty-five (45) days before the date the committee has set for the hearing on the project. The agency or unit of government proposing the issuance of the bonds shall publish notice of the hearing in the manner required by KRS Chapter 424. The agency or unit of government proposing the issuance of the bonds shall require the developer of the project (if it is other than the agency or unit of government) to reimburse the agency or unit of government for the cost of the advertising required herein. A hearing officer may conduct the hearing with a proposed order to the committee or the state local debt officer.
  5. The committee and the state local debt officer shall have the right to approve or disapprove any project submitted to it, and over which it has jurisdiction as described in subsection (1) of this section, and no bonds or other evidence of indebtedness for any such project shall be issued until the project has been approved by the committee.
  6. When the revenues of the respective local government or school district are negatively impacted by the project, the committee and the state local debt officer shall require submission of a written statement of assurance that the appropriate county judge/executive, mayor, and school superintendent are in agreement with the negotiated financial arrangement. This written statement of assurance shall be used for advisory purposes.
  7. The maximum length of any bond authorization under this section shall not exceed the anticipated useful life of the building or equipment purchased or forty (40) years, whichever is shorter.

History. Enact. Acts 1980, ch. 339, § 6, effective July 15, 1980; 1982, ch. 322, § 3, effective July 15, 1982; 1982, ch. 396, § 10, effective July 15, 1982; 1984, ch. 122, § 7, effective July 13, 1984; 1990, ch. 484, § 5, effective July 13, 1990; 1992, ch. 105, § 63, effective July 14, 1992; 2006, ch. 228, § 2, effective July 12, 2006; 2019 ch. 35, § 6, effective June 27, 2019.

Compiler’s Notes.

Acts 1982, ch. 322, § 2, provided: “Any bond issue approved by the industrial revenue bond oversight committee prior to July 15, 1982, shall be unaffected by this Act.”

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(7/12/2006). 2006 Ky. Acts ch. 228, sec. 3, provides that “[i]f the agency or unit of government proposing the issuance of bonds adopted a resolution indicating an intent to issue bonds for a project prior to February 1, 2006, then this project shall be subject to the provisions of KRS 103.2101 in effect upon the date of the passage of the resolution of intent to issue bonds.”

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

The power to appoint members of boards and agencies within the executive department of government is an essentially executive power which cannot be exercised by any member of the legislative department; accordingly, the provisions in this section by which the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President Pro Tem of the Senate are authorized to make appointments to the industrial revenue bond oversight committee are an invalid unconstitutional incursion by the General Assembly, or in this case, its designees, into the separation of powers doctrine. Legislative Research Com. by Prather v. Brown, 664 S.W.2d 907, 1984 Ky. LEXIS 300 ( Ky. 1984 ).

2. Notice of Meeting.

Combined effect of KRS 424.130(1)(d) and KRS 103.2101 was a requirement of at least two notices of the Kentucky Private Action Bond Allocation Committee’s public hearings, one not less than 30 days and another between seven and 21 days prior to the hearing. Bear Creek Capital, LLC v. Toebben, Ltd., 2007 Ky. App. LEXIS 135 (Ky. Ct. App.), sub. op., 2007 Ky. App. Unpub. LEXIS 309 (Ky. Ct. App. May 4, 2007).

When the Kentucky Private Activity Bond Allocation Committee considered a city’s application to approve the city’s issuance of industrial revenue bonds, the notice of that hearing did not comply with the combined effect of KRS 424.130(1)(d) and KRS 103.2101 , because those statutes required at least two notices of such hearings, and only one notice was given. Bear Creek Capital, LLC v. Toebben, Ltd., 2007 Ky. App. LEXIS 135 (Ky. Ct. App.), sub. op., 2007 Ky. App. Unpub. LEXIS 309 (Ky. Ct. App. May 4, 2007).

3. Appeals.

Since KRS 103.195 et seq., creating the Kentucky Private Activity Bond Allocation Committee, does not provide either for administrative review or for an appeal from Committee rulings, the general administrative appeal statute, KRS 13B.140 , governs, and that statute imposes a 30-day limitations period for appeals to a court from final administrative rulings. Bear Creek Capital, LLC v. Toebben, Ltd., 2007 Ky. App. LEXIS 135 (Ky. Ct. App.), sub. op., 2007 Ky. App. Unpub. LEXIS 309 (Ky. Ct. App. May 4, 2007).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Where a project was reviewed and presumably found to meet the statutory conditions of subsection (4) of this section the mere transfer of the project from city to county would not appear to alter or affect the nature of the project or the conditions required to be met by the committee before the initial approval, and therefore reapproval of the project before transferring it to the county would not be required, particularly in view of the fact that the trade area embraced by the project encompassed the entire county including, of course, the city as well as surrounding counties. OAG 82-319 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Snyder and Irland, The Separation of Governmental Powers Under the Constitution of Kentucky: A Legal and Historical Analysis of L.R.C. v. Brown, 73 Ky. L.J. 165 (1984-85).

103.215. Alternative procedure for issuance of bonds.

  1. As an alternative to the procedures set forth in KRS 103.200 to 103.285 , inclusive, any city or county, for the purpose of financing the acquisition of an industrial building, may issue negotiable bonds pursuant to KRS 103.200 to 103.285 under one (1) of the following methods in lieu of fee simple ownership:
    1. Loan the proceeds from the sale of such bonds to any person to finance the acquisition of such industrial building facilities;
    2. Sell such industrial building facilities to any person pursuant to agreement; or
    3. Lease such industrial building facilities from any person and sublease same to such person. In the event of use of such alternative financing procedure, such bonds shall not constitute an indebtedness of such city or county within the meaning of the Constitution of Kentucky, but shall be payable as to principal and interest solely from the revenues derived from payments, repayments, or sublease payments made by such person to such city or county in respect of such loan, sale, or sublease.
  2. In the event that an alternate procedure authorized by this section is to be utilized in the financing of an industrial building:
    1. The provisions of KRS 103.200 to 103.285 , inclusive, shall apply, except that the proceedings and procedures therein described shall contemplate and authorize a transaction in the form of:
      1. A loan of the proceeds from the sale of such bonds by such city or county to any person for the acquisition of such industrial building;
      2. A sale of such industrial building to any person pursuant to agreement; or
      3. A lease of such industrial building from any person and sublease of same to such person; and
    2. The loan, sale, lease, and sublease and any agreement or contract with respect thereto may include such provisions as such city or county shall deem appropriate to effect the securing of the financing undertaken in respect of such industrial building, including, but not by way of limitation:
      1. The pledge of the general credit of any such person;
      2. The making of guarantees to an indenture trustee or to such city or county in respect of amortization of such bonds by any such person;
      3. The creation of liens or security interests on any property or portion thereof of any such person, either senior or junior to, or ranking equally with, any other lien, security interest, or rights of others, including any party or parties to any agreement in connection with such financing and/or its or their respective security holders and indenture trustees or mortgage trustees; and
      4. The pledge of other direct securities of such person in respect of such bonds.
  3. In the event any city or county shall finance an industrial building pursuant to the express authority contained in this section, title to such industrial building shall not be acquired by such city or county in the case of a loan or lease transaction, and, in the case of a sale transaction, title may pass at any time; and neither the statutory mortgage lien for which provision is made in KRS 103.250 nor the foreclosable mortgage lien for which provision is made in KRS 103.251 shall apply to any such industrial building facilities.

History. Enact. Acts 1980, ch. 339, § 3, effective July 15, 1980.

Opinions of Attorney General.

The “loan agreement” method when used by a city, county, or Kentucky Industrial Development Finance Authority, in financing industrial buildings does not violate the anti-lending of credit provisions of Ky. Const., §§ 177 and 179 since no loan of government tax revenues is involved and the money loaned comes purely from the bond sale. OAG 80-320 .

103.220. Interest on bonds — Terms — Approval — Marketing — Refunding. [Effective until July 15, 2020]

  1. The bonds may be issued to bear interest at any rate or rates, either fixed or variable, in accordance with such method as shall be set by the governing body of the issuer, payable either annually or at shorter intervals, may be of such terms and maturities, may bear such conversion privileges, may be executed by the manual or facsimile signatures of such officers of the issuer and shall be executed in such manner and at such time or times or from time to time and be payable at such times not exceeding thirty (30) years from the date thereof, or if commercial paper, from the date of issuance thereof, and at such place or places as the governing body of the issuer determines.
  2. The bonds may provide that they or any of them may be called for redemption prior to maturity under conditions set by the governing body of the issuer before issuing the bonds.
    1. Any bonds issued and outstanding hereunder may, at any time on or after the earliest redemption date provided therefor at the time of their issuance, be refunded by the issuer or any other city, county or authority, with the consent of the lessee, industrial concern or utility company, in such amount as the governing body may deem necessary to refund the principal of the bonds to be refunded, together with any unpaid interest thereon, to create any necessary debt service reserve fund, and to pay the costs of any improvements or additions to the project, and of any premiums, expenses and commissions required to be paid in connection therewith. Any refunding bonds issued under the authority of this section shall be payable from the revenues out of which the bonds to be refunded were payable. (3) (a) Any bonds issued and outstanding hereunder may, at any time on or after the earliest redemption date provided therefor at the time of their issuance, be refunded by the issuer or any other city, county or authority, with the consent of the lessee, industrial concern or utility company, in such amount as the governing body may deem necessary to refund the principal of the bonds to be refunded, together with any unpaid interest thereon, to create any necessary debt service reserve fund, and to pay the costs of any improvements or additions to the project, and of any premiums, expenses and commissions required to be paid in connection therewith. Any refunding bonds issued under the authority of this section shall be payable from the revenues out of which the bonds to be refunded were payable.
    2. At the time of the initial issuance of the bonds, the issuer may designate individual officials of its governing body as agent for purposes of approving the principal amount, the interest rate, the discount, if any, and the maturity date of bonds being issued later to refund the maturing bonds; provided, however, that, at the time of the initial issuance of such bonds, the governing body of the issuer shall set the maximum principal amount, the maximum interest rate, and the maximum discount, if any, of the refunding bonds plus the final maturity date of the last issue of such refunding bonds; and provided further that the issuer shall retain the right to revoke any such agent’s authority at any time and for any reason whatsoever. Individual issues of commercial paper, issued as part of a continuing financing program, may be refunded by the approvals of such agent of the issuer and separate proceedings of the issuer pursuant to KRS 103.210 shall not be required.
    3. At the time of issuance of bonds which bear interest at a variable rate or rates, the governing body of the issuer may designate individuals or institutions who in the sole judgment of such governing body have financial market expertise to serve as agent for the issuer for establishing and changing from time to time while such bonds remain outstanding the rate of interest to be borne by and the price to be paid for the bonds; provided, however, that the rate-setting procedures and authority of each such agent shall be set forth in writing, and may include a formula or an index or indices based upon market factors, and shall be established by the issuer at the time of issuance of such bonds; and provided further that at the time of the issuance of the bonds, the governing body of the issuer shall establish the maximum interest rate to be borne by the bonds; and provided further that the issuer shall retain the right to remove or replace any such agent at any time and for any reason whatsoever.
  3. Any bonds issued and outstanding hereunder and the coupons appertaining to such bonds shall prior to the maturity or redemption date thereof be deemed to have been paid to the same extent as if they had actually been paid in cash and retired, if:
    1. In case any of such bonds are to be redeemed on any date prior to their maturity, the issuer of such bonds shall have given a trustee appointed for the holders of such bonds in connection with their issuance, in form satisfactory to such trustee and in conformity with the requirements of the ordinance or resolution authorizing their issuance, irrevocable instructions to give notice of redemption of such bonds to the holders thereof by publication or by other method which is satisfactory to such trustee;
    2. There shall have been deposited with the trustee either money in an amount which shall be sufficient, or direct obligations of or obligations guaranteed by the United States of America, the principal of and the interest on which, when due, will provide money which, together with the money, if any, deposited with the trustee at the same time, shall be sufficient to pay when due the principal and the interest due and to become due on such bonds on and prior to redemption date or maturity date thereof, as the case may be; and
    3. In the event that such bonds are not to be redeemed within the next succeeding sixty (60) days, the issuer shall have given the trustee in form satisfactory to it irrevocable instructions to give, as soon as practicable, in a manner satisfactory to it, a notice to the holders of such bonds and coupons that the deposit required by paragraph (b) of this subsection has been made with the trustee, that such bonds and coupons are deemed to have been paid in accordance with the provisions hereof and stating such maturity or redemption date upon which money is to be available for the payment of the principal of and interest on such bonds. Any deposits made under paragraph (b) of this subsection, to the extent not secured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, shall be secured by the pledging of direct obligations of or obligations guaranteed by the United States of America.
  4. It is hereby declared and determined that the issuance of any and all refunding bonds as provided herein will be for a public purpose if the legislative body of the issuer authorizing such bonds so declares in the proceedings authorizing same, it being hereby declared and determined that the ability of any domestic or foreign corporation renting or leasing any facilities financed by the bonds to cause refunding bonds to be issued will be an inducement for such domestic or foreign corporation to establish in Kentucky the facilities provided for in KRS 103.210 and will tend to further the purposes of KRS 103.200 to 103.285 .
  5. No bonds shall be issued hereunder in violation of federal statutes or regulations prohibiting arbitrage profits.

History. Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 58, § 3; 1962, ch. 268, § 3; 1968, ch. 39, § 1; 1970, ch. 64, § 3; 1976, ch. 214, § 3; 1978, ch. 95, § 3, effective June 17, 1978; 1984, ch. 122, § 3, effective July 13, 1984; 1986, ch. 248, § 2, effective July 15, 1986; 2014, ch. 131, § 4, effective July 15, 2014.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Payment from Sale of Building.

Where city proposes to issue bonds for acquisition of site and construction of plant to lease under authority of KRS 103.200 to 103.280 and enters into contract with company to lease such plant which contract contains option to purchase from city, payment of bonds from proceeds of sale of building realized upon exercise of option is authorized and within meaning of provision of KRS 103.230 that all bonds shall be payable solely by revenue derived from building since revenue includes proceeds from sale of public building and under authority of subsection (2) of this section ordinance provides that bonds can be called for redemption prior to maturity. Bennett v. Mayfield, 323 S.W.2d 573, 1959 Ky. LEXIS 331 ( Ky. 1959 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

KRS 103.200 and this section in no explicit language establish pollution control projects as the sole category of projects subject to a variable rate of interest and the pertinent statutes amended by Acts 1984, Ch. 122 (KRS 103.200 , 103.210 , 103.210 1, 103.220 to 103.240 , 103.280 ) in no way prohibit the application of the variable rate to projects other than pollution control projects; they merely emphasize pollution control projects, but not to the detriment of other kinds of projects falling within the broad range of KRS 103.200 to 103.285 . Moreover, KRS 58.430 is a specific statute dealing only with interest rates on public bonds and is so flexibly worded as to support variable rate structures in the issuance of public bonds and even if the sections in KRS Chapter 103 amended by Acts 1984, Ch. 122 were to be said to be in some conflict with the provisions of KRS 58.430 , the specific statute, KRS 58.430, should control over the provisions of KRS Chapter 103. OAG 84-257 .

When reading the entire legislation of 1984, and considering the history and purpose of KRS Chapter 103 (industrial revenue bonds), and in connection with any industrial revenue bonds covered by KRS 103.200 to 103.285 , an agreed fluctuating or variable rate of interest, under terms whereby the bonds bear interest at a fluctuating or variable rate, adjustable in accordance with whatever formula is agreed upon by the issuer, the borrower, and the purchaser, is permissible; to construe KRS 103.200 and this section as permitting a variable interest rate for pollution control projects only would constitute an unreasonable and absurd premise, especially when considering the realities of the present day use of KRS Chapter 103 in Kentucky. OAG 84-257 .

Under KRS 103.200 (2), variable rate bonds do not apply only to pollution control facilities bonds; thus, the Kentucky Development Finance Authority may lawfully issue variable rate bonds with Put and Remarketing features in a proposed Internal Revenue Bond issue for the financing of the construction and equipping of airport facilities, under KRS 103.200 to 103.285 , as amended by Chapter 122, 1984 Session, and KRS 58.430 . OAG 84-377 .

This chapter and KRS Chapter 58 separately, and when considered in pari materia, provide for variable interest rate bonds. OAG 85-103 .

103.220. Interest on bonds — Terms — Approval — Marketing — Refunding. [Effective July 15, 2020]

  1. The bonds may be issued to bear interest at any rate or rates, either fixed or variable, in accordance with such method as shall be set by the governing body of the issuer, payable either annually or at shorter intervals, may be of such terms and maturities, may bear such conversion privileges, may be executed by the manual or facsimile signatures of such officers of the issuer and shall be executed in such manner and at such time or times or from time to time and be payable at such times not exceeding forty (40) years from the date thereof, or if commercial paper, from the date of issuance thereof, and at such place or places as the governing body of the issuer determines.
  2. The bonds may provide that they or any of them may be called for redemption prior to maturity under conditions set by the governing body of the issuer before issuing the bonds.
    1. Any bonds issued and outstanding hereunder may, at any time on or after the earliest redemption date provided therefor at the time of their issuance, be refunded by the issuer or any other city, county or authority, with the consent of the lessee, industrial concern or utility company, in such amount as the governing body may deem necessary to refund the principal of the bonds to be refunded, together with any unpaid interest thereon, to create any necessary debt service reserve fund, and to pay the costs of any improvements or additions to the project, and of any premiums, expenses and commissions required to be paid in connection therewith. Any refunding bonds issued under the authority of this section shall be payable from the revenues out of which the bonds to be refunded were payable. (3) (a) Any bonds issued and outstanding hereunder may, at any time on or after the earliest redemption date provided therefor at the time of their issuance, be refunded by the issuer or any other city, county or authority, with the consent of the lessee, industrial concern or utility company, in such amount as the governing body may deem necessary to refund the principal of the bonds to be refunded, together with any unpaid interest thereon, to create any necessary debt service reserve fund, and to pay the costs of any improvements or additions to the project, and of any premiums, expenses and commissions required to be paid in connection therewith. Any refunding bonds issued under the authority of this section shall be payable from the revenues out of which the bonds to be refunded were payable.
    2. At the time of the initial issuance of the bonds, the issuer may designate individual officials of its governing body as agent for purposes of approving the principal amount, the interest rate, the discount, if any, and the maturity date of bonds being issued later to refund the maturing bonds; provided, however, that, at the time of the initial issuance of such bonds, the governing body of the issuer shall set the maximum principal amount, the maximum interest rate, and the maximum discount, if any, of the refunding bonds plus the final maturity date of the last issue of such refunding bonds; and provided further that the issuer shall retain the right to revoke any such agent’s authority at any time and for any reason whatsoever. Individual issues of commercial paper, issued as part of a continuing financing program, may be refunded by the approvals of such agent of the issuer and separate proceedings of the issuer pursuant to KRS 103.210 shall not be required.
    3. At the time of issuance of bonds which bear interest at a variable rate or rates, the governing body of the issuer may designate individuals or institutions who in the sole judgment of such governing body have financial market expertise to serve as agent for the issuer for establishing and changing from time to time while such bonds remain outstanding the rate of interest to be borne by and the price to be paid for the bonds; provided, however, that the rate-setting procedures and authority of each such agent shall be set forth in writing, and may include a formula or an index or indices based upon market factors, and shall be established by the issuer at the time of issuance of such bonds; and provided further that at the time of the issuance of the bonds, the governing body of the issuer shall establish the maximum interest rate to be borne by the bonds; and provided further that the issuer shall retain the right to remove or replace any such agent at any time and for any reason whatsoever.
  3. Any bonds issued and outstanding hereunder and the coupons appertaining to such bonds shall prior to the maturity or redemption date thereof be deemed to have been paid to the same extent as if they had actually been paid in cash and retired, if:
    1. In case any of such bonds are to be redeemed on any date prior to their maturity, the issuer of such bonds shall have given a trustee appointed for the holders of such bonds in connection with their issuance, in form satisfactory to such trustee and in conformity with the requirements of the ordinance or resolution authorizing their issuance, irrevocable instructions to give notice of redemption of such bonds to the holders thereof by publication or by other method which is satisfactory to such trustee;
    2. There shall have been deposited with the trustee either money in an amount which shall be sufficient, or direct obligations of or obligations guaranteed by the United States of America, the principal of and the interest on which, when due, will provide money which, together with the money, if any, deposited with the trustee at the same time, shall be sufficient to pay when due the principal and the interest due and to become due on such bonds on and prior to redemption date or maturity date thereof, as the case may be; and
    3. In the event that such bonds are not to be redeemed within the next succeeding sixty (60) days, the issuer shall have given the trustee in form satisfactory to it irrevocable instructions to give, as soon as practicable, in a manner satisfactory to it, a notice to the holders of such bonds and coupons that the deposit required by paragraph (b) of this subsection has been made with the trustee, that such bonds and coupons are deemed to have been paid in accordance with the provisions hereof and stating such maturity or redemption date upon which money is to be available for the payment of the principal of and interest on such bonds. Any deposits made under paragraph (b) of this subsection, to the extent not secured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, shall be secured by the pledging of direct obligations of or obligations guaranteed by the United States of America.
  4. It is hereby declared and determined that the issuance of any and all refunding bonds as provided herein will be for a public purpose if the legislative body of the issuer authorizing such bonds so declares in the proceedings authorizing same, it being hereby declared and determined that the ability of any domestic or foreign corporation renting or leasing any facilities financed by the bonds to cause refunding bonds to be issued will be an inducement for such domestic or foreign corporation to establish in Kentucky the facilities provided for in KRS 103.210 and will tend to further the purposes of KRS 103.200 to 103.285 .
  5. No bonds shall be issued hereunder in violation of federal statutes or regulations prohibiting arbitrage profits.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 58, § 3; 1962, ch. 268, § 3; 1968, ch. 39, § 1; 1970, ch. 64, § 3; 1976, ch. 214, § 3; 1978, ch. 95, § 3, effective June 17, 1978; 1984, ch. 122, § 3, effective July 13, 1984; 1986, ch. 248, § 2, effective July 15, 1986; 2014, ch. 131, § 4, effective July 15, 2014; 2020 ch. 76, § 5, effective July 15, 2020.

103.230. Bonds negotiable — Disposal — Private sale, when — Payable only from revenue.

  1. Notwithstanding the form or tenor, and in the absence of an express recital on the face thereof that the bond is nonnegotiable, all bonds issued pursuant to KRS 103.200 to 103.285 shall at all times be and shall be treated as, and have all the qualities and incidents of negotiable instruments for all purposes. If any officer whose signature or counter signature appears on the bonds or coupons ceases to be such officer before delivery of the bonds, his signature or countersignature shall nevertheless be valid and sufficient for all purposes the same as if he had remained in office until delivery. The bonds shall be sold upon such terms as the city legislative body or the fiscal court of the county, as the case may be, deems best, or any contract for the acquisition of any industrial building may provide that payment shall be made in such bonds. The issuing authority may sell such bonds in such manner, either at public or private sale, and for such price, as it may determine will best effect the purposes of KRS 103.230 to 103.260 ; provided, however, that no private or negotiated sale shall be made unless the corporation which is contracting to lease the industrial building shall have requested in writing, addressed to the chief executive of the issuing authority, that the sale of the bonds shall be made privately upon a negotiated basis.
  2. The bonds shall be payable solely from the revenue derived from the building, and shall not constitute an indebtedness of the city or county within the meaning of the Constitution. It shall be plainly stated on the face of each bond that it has been issued under the provisions of KRS 103.200 to 103.280 and that it does not constitute an indebtedness of the city or county within the meaning of the Constitution.

History. Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 58, § 4; 1962, ch. 268, § 4; 1966, ch. 119, § 1; 1968, ch. 39, § 2; 1970, ch. 64, § 4; 1972, ch. 282, § 2; 1984, ch. 122, § 4, effective July 13, 1984.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. “Revenue” Includes Proceeds From Sale.

Where city proposes to issue bonds for acquisition of site and construction of plant to lease under authority of KRS 103.200 to 103.280 and enters into contract with company to lease such plant which contract contains option to purchase from city, payment of bonds from proceeds of sale of building realized upon exercise of option is authorized and within meaning of provision of this section that all bonds shall be payable solely by revenue derived from building since revenue includes proceeds from sale of public building and under authority of subsection (2) of KRS 103.220 ordinance provides that bonds can be called for redemption prior to maturity. Bennett v. Mayfield, 323 S.W.2d 573, 1959 Ky. LEXIS 331 ( Ky. 1959 ).

2. Private or Negotiated Sale.

Revenue bonds issued by a city to finance the construction of a gas transmission pipeline were not industrial building revenue bonds that could be sold at a private or negotiated sale. Haney v. Somerset, 530 S.W.2d 377, 1975 Ky. LEXIS 54 ( Ky. 1975 ).

Cited:

Pattie A. Clay Infirmary Asso. v. First Presbyterian Church, 605 S.W.2d 52, 1980 Ky. App. LEXIS 368 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980).

Opinions of Attorney General.

A bond issue by a county for financing construction of a meat packing and food processing plant under the authority of KRS 103.200 and 103.280 would not constitute an indebtedness of the county within the meaning of the constitution regardless of the performance or nonperformance of the lessee of the plant. OAG 72-379 .

Where bonds are properly issued, they must be paid solely from the revenue derived from the building and such bonds shall not constitute an indebtedness of the city, city council members, or taxpayers. OAG 73-696 .

An industrial revenue bond issue does not give rise to an obligation on the part of the county since the bonds are payable solely out of the revenue derived from the use of the building. OAG 74-151 .

Research References and Practice Aids

ALR

Revenue bonds or other bonds not creating indebtedness as within constitutional or statutory requirement of prior approval by electors of issuance of bonds or incurring indebtedness by municipality. 146 A.L.R. 604.

103.240. Use of proceeds of bonds.

All money received from the sale of the bonds shall be applied solely for:

  1. The acquisition of the industrial building and:
    1. Any utilities;
    2. Pollution control structures or equipment;
    3. Equipment or technologies employed to increase the energy efficiency of manufacturing facilities; or
    4. Other equipment requisite to the use of these assets;
  2. The acquisition of pollution control facilities and the structures or equipment requisite to the use thereof;
  3. The necessary expense of preparing, printing and selling said bonds;
  4. The refunding of any issued and outstanding bonds whether matured or otherwise;
  5. Providing a debt service reserve fund or any other reserve funds, if necessary; or
  6. To advance the payment of interest on the bonds during any portion of the first three (3) years following the date of the bonds.

History. Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 58, § 5; 1966, ch. 119, § 2(1); 1970, ch. 64, § 5; 1984, ch. 122, § 5, effective July 13, 1984; 2014, ch. 131, § 5, effective July 15, 2014.

Opinions of Attorney General.

Where the ordinance authorizing the sale of bonds provided the proceeds were to be used to pay for the site and construction of a building, attorney fees for a wage dispute involving the construction of the building could not be paid from the bond sale proceeds. OAG 61-691 .

A county fiscal court has no authority to exempt the property of a private firm or manufacturing concern from county, state, school or health taxes as an inducement to industrial development without acquiring title to such property. OAG 67-205 .

103.245. Definition of “building” and “industrial building” — Acquisition procedure.

  1. For purposes of the exercise of the power of eminent domain, “building” or “industrial building” shall be deemed to include only the following: coal conversion facilities, hospitals, primary medical centers, health care clinics, convention centers, or any industrial building as defined in KRS 103.200 , which is to be located in a blighted area as defined in KRS 99.010(1)(a), or any of these things, to be rented or leased to a domestic or foreign corporation by the Kentucky Economic Development Finance Authority, the city or the county by which it is acquired.
  2. An industrial building within the meaning of subsection (1) of this section may be acquired by a city or a county by purchase, gift, or condemnation. Whenever a city or a county shall determine that land or other property, right of way, or easement over or through any property is needed by such city or county, as the case may be, to accomplish the purposes of KRS 103.210 to 103.285 , inclusive, it may by ordinance or resolution authorize the purchase or condemnation, in the name of such city or county, of said land or other property, or right of way or easement necessary for such purposes, and may proceed to condemn and acquire such property in the manner set forth in the Eminent Domain Act of Kentucky. All property, rights of way and easements already held by its owner or lessee for industrial development shall be exempt from condemnation under this section.

History. Enact. Acts 1964, ch. 90, § 2; 1976, ch. 140, § 54; 1980, ch. 339, § 5, effective July 15, 1980; 1992, ch. 105, § 68, effective July 14, 1992.

Compiler’s Notes.

The Eminent Domain Act of Kentucky is compiled as KRS 416.540 to 416.680 .

Opinions of Attorney General.

This section authorizes cities to acquire land for industrial development by condemnation. OAG 67-399 .

103.2451. Eminent domain power not conferred.

Nothing in KRS 103.200 or 103.210 confers nor shall be deemed to confer the power of eminent domain except as provided by KRS 103.245 .

History. Enact. Acts 1980, ch. 339, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

103.246. Financing pollution control facilities for industrial concerns and utility companies by cities and counties. [Effective until July 15, 2020]

    1. The term “pollution control facilities” means any land, building, structure, machinery, equipment, device, system or facility functionally related thereto designed for the control, containment, reduction, prevention or abatement of atmospheric pollutants or contaminants, solid waste, noise, radiation, or water pollution produced by industrial concerns and utility companies, including, but not by way of limitation, any such facilities used in whole or in part to control, contain, reduce, prevent or abate atmospheric, solid waste, noise, radiation, or water pollution by removing, altering, containing, disposing or storing pollutants, contaminants, wastes, whether gaseous, solid or liquid, thermal or radioactive. Said term includes all pollution control facilities whenever constructed, reconstructed, purchased, leased or otherwise acquired and placed in use, which may legally be financed by issuance of bonds determined to be tax-exempt pursuant to the provisions of Section 103(b) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended, and regulations promulgated thereunder. Pollution control facilities may be constructed as part of, and may include, facilities also designed for the recovery of chemicals or other by-products or to serve other purposes which also contribute to the control of or abatement of atmospheric, solid waste and water pollution. (1) (a) The term “pollution control facilities” means any land, building, structure, machinery, equipment, device, system or facility functionally related thereto designed for the control, containment, reduction, prevention or abatement of atmospheric pollutants or contaminants, solid waste, noise, radiation, or water pollution produced by industrial concerns and utility companies, including, but not by way of limitation, any such facilities used in whole or in part to control, contain, reduce, prevent or abate atmospheric, solid waste, noise, radiation, or water pollution by removing, altering, containing, disposing or storing pollutants, contaminants, wastes, whether gaseous, solid or liquid, thermal or radioactive. Said term includes all pollution control facilities whenever constructed, reconstructed, purchased, leased or otherwise acquired and placed in use, which may legally be financed by issuance of bonds determined to be tax-exempt pursuant to the provisions of Section 103(b) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended, and regulations promulgated thereunder. Pollution control facilities may be constructed as part of, and may include, facilities also designed for the recovery of chemicals or other by-products or to serve other purposes which also contribute to the control of or abatement of atmospheric, solid waste and water pollution.
    2. The term “industrial concern” means any domestic or foreign corporation, company, partnership, association, rural electric cooperative corporation, or any other legal entity.
  1. It is hereby determined and declared that the acquisition and financing of pollution control facilities for utilization by industrial concerns and utility companies by the issuance of bonds of cities and counties amortized by payments made by such industrial concerns and utility companies inures to the public interest, and constitutes the performance of a proper governmental purpose. It is the intent of this section to afford to cities and counties alternative methods of financing pollution control facilities to the end that atmospheric, solid waste and water pollution in the Commonwealth may be abated and controlled to the maximum possible extent.
  2. As an alternative to the procedure set forth in KRS 103.200 to 103.285 , inclusive, any city or county, for the purpose of financing the acquisition of pollution control facilities for any industrial concern or utility company, may issue negotiable bonds pursuant to KRS 103.200 to 103.285 , inclusive, and either (a) loan the proceeds from the sale of such bonds to an industrial concern or utility company to finance the acquisition of such pollution control facilities, (b) sell such pollution control facilities to an industrial concern or utility company pursuant to agreement, or (c) lease such pollution control facilities from an industrial concern or utility company and sublease same to such industrial concern or utility company. In the event of use of such alternative financing procedure, such bonds shall not constitute an indebtedness of such city or county within the meaning of the Constitution of Kentucky, but shall be payable as to principal and interest solely from the revenues derived from payments, repayments, or sublease payments made by such industrial concern or utility company to such city or county in respect of such loan, sale or sublease.
  3. In the event that an alternate procedure authorized by this section is to be utilized in the financing of pollution control facilities, (i) the provisions of KRS 103.200 to 103.285 , inclusive, shall apply, except that the proceedings and procedures therein described shall contemplate and authorize a transaction in the form of (a) a loan of the proceeds from the sale of such bonds by such city or county to an industrial concern or utility company for the acquisition of such pollution control facilities, (b) a sale of such pollution control facilities to an industrial concern or utility company pursuant to agreement, or (c) a lease of such pollution control facilities from an industrial concern or utility company and sublease of same to such industrial concern or utility company; and (ii) the loan, sale, lease and sublease and any agreement or contract with respect thereto may include such provisions as such city or county shall deem appropriate to effect the securing of the financing undertaken in respect of such pollution control facilities, including, but not by way of limitation, (a) the pledge of the general credit of any such industrial concern or utility company, (b) the making of guarantees to an indenture trustee or to such city or county in respect of amortization of such bonds by any such industrial concern or utility company, (c) the creation of liens of security interests on any property or portion thereof of any such industrial concern or utility company, either senior or junior to, or ranking equally with, any other lien, security interest or rights of others, including any party or parties to any agreement in connection with such financing and/or its or their respective security holders and indenture trustees or mortgage trustees, and (d) the pledge of other direct securities of such industrial concern or utility company in respect of such bonds.
  4. In the event any city or county shall finance pollution control facilities pursuant to the express authority contained in this section, title to such pollution control facilities shall not be acquired by such city or county in the case of a loan or lease transaction, and, in the case of a sale transaction, title may pass at any time, and the statutory mortgage lien for which provision is made in KRS 103.250 shall not apply to any such pollution control facilities.
  5. Bonds issued by cities and counties pursuant to the authority contained in this section may be caused to mature as to principal in term or serial maturities not to exceed thirty (30) years from date of issue.

History. Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 342, § 1.

Compiler’s Notes.

Section 103(b) of the Internal Revenue Code, referred to in subsection (1)(a) of this section, is compiled as 26 USCS § 103(b).

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(1982). A technical correction has been made in this section by the Reviser of Statutes pursuant to KRS 7.136 .

103.246. Financing pollution control facilities for industrial concerns and utility companies by cities and counties. [Effective July 15, 2020]

    1. The term “pollution control facilities” means any land, building, structure, machinery, equipment, device, system or facility functionally related thereto designed for the control, containment, reduction, prevention or abatement of atmospheric pollutants or contaminants, solid waste, noise, radiation, or water pollution produced by industrial concerns and utility companies, including, but not by way of limitation, any such facilities used in whole or in part to control, contain, reduce, prevent or abate atmospheric, solid waste, noise, radiation, or water pollution by removing, altering, containing, disposing or storing pollutants, contaminants, wastes, whether gaseous, solid or liquid, thermal or radioactive. Said term includes all pollution control facilities whenever constructed, reconstructed, purchased, leased or otherwise acquired and placed in use, which may legally be financed by issuance of bonds determined to be tax-exempt pursuant to the provisions of Section 103(b) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended, and regulations promulgated thereunder. Pollution control facilities may be constructed as part of, and may include, facilities also designed for the recovery of chemicals or other by- products or to serve other purposes which also contribute to the control of or abatement of atmospheric, solid waste and water pollution. (1) (a) The term “pollution control facilities” means any land, building, structure, machinery, equipment, device, system or facility functionally related thereto designed for the control, containment, reduction, prevention or abatement of atmospheric pollutants or contaminants, solid waste, noise, radiation, or water pollution produced by industrial concerns and utility companies, including, but not by way of limitation, any such facilities used in whole or in part to control, contain, reduce, prevent or abate atmospheric, solid waste, noise, radiation, or water pollution by removing, altering, containing, disposing or storing pollutants, contaminants, wastes, whether gaseous, solid or liquid, thermal or radioactive. Said term includes all pollution control facilities whenever constructed, reconstructed, purchased, leased or otherwise acquired and placed in use, which may legally be financed by issuance of bonds determined to be tax-exempt pursuant to the provisions of Section 103(b) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended, and regulations promulgated thereunder. Pollution control facilities may be constructed as part of, and may include, facilities also designed for the recovery of chemicals or other by- products or to serve other purposes which also contribute to the control of or abatement of atmospheric, solid waste and water pollution.
    2. The term “industrial concern” means any domestic or foreign corporation, company, partnership, association, rural electric cooperative corporation, or any other legal entity.
  1. It is hereby determined and declared that the acquisition and financing of pollution control facilities for utilization by industrial concerns and utility companies by the issuance of bonds of cities and counties amortized by payments made by such industrial concerns and utility companies inures to the public interest, and constitutes the performance of a proper governmental purpose. It is the intent of this section to afford to cities and counties alternative methods of financing pollution control facilities to the end that atmospheric, solid waste and water pollution in the Commonwealth may be abated and controlled to the maximum possible extent.
  2. As an alternative to the procedure set forth in KRS 103.200 to 103.285 , inclusive, any city or county, for the purpose of financing the acquisition of pollution control facilities for any industrial concern or utility company, may issue negotiable bonds pursuant to KRS 103.200 to 103.285 , inclusive, and either (a) loan the proceeds from the sale of such bonds to an industrial concern or utility company to finance the acquisition of such pollution control facilities, (b) sell such pollution control facilities to an industrial concern or utility company pursuant to agreement, or (c) lease such pollution control facilities from an industrial concern or utility company and sublease same to such industrial concern or utility company. In the event of use of such alternative financing procedure, such bonds shall not constitute an indebtedness of such city or county within the meaning of the Constitution of Kentucky, but shall be payable as to principal and interest solely from the revenues derived from payments, repayments, or sublease payments made by such industrial concern or utility company to such city or county in respect of such loan, sale or sublease.
  3. In the event that an alternate procedure authorized by this section is to be utilized in the financing of pollution control facilities, (i) the provisions of KRS 103.200 to 103.285 , inclusive, shall apply, except that the proceedings and procedures therein described shall contemplate and authorize a transaction in the form of (a) a loan of the proceeds from the sale of such bonds by such city or county to an industrial concern or utility company for the acquisition of such pollution control facilities, (b) a sale of such pollution control facilities to an industrial concern or utility company pursuant to agreement, or (c) a lease of such pollution control facilities from an industrial concern or utility company and sublease of same to such industrial concern or utility company; and (ii) the loan, sale, lease and sublease and any agreement or contract with respect thereto may include such provisions as such city or county shall deem appropriate to effect the securing of the financing undertaken in respect of such pollution control facilities, including, but not by way of limitation, (a) the pledge of the general credit of any such industrial concern or utility company, (b) the making of guarantees to an indenture trustee or to such city or county in respect of amortization of such bonds by any such industrial concern or utility company, (c) the creation of liens of security interests on any property or portion thereof of any such industrial concern or utility company, either senior or junior to, or ranking equally with, any other lien, security interest or rights of others, including any party or parties to any agreement in connection with such financing and/or its or their respective security holders and indenture trustees or mortgage trustees, and (d) the pledge of other direct securities of such industrial concern or utility company in respect of such bonds.
  4. In the event any city or county shall finance pollution control facilities pursuant to the express authority contained in this section, title to such pollution control facilities shall not be acquired by such city or county in the case of a loan or lease transaction, and, in the case of a sale transaction, title may pass at any time, and the statutory mortgage lien for which provision is made in KRS 103.250 shall not apply to any such pollution control facilities.
  5. Bonds issued by cities and counties pursuant to the authority contained in this section may be caused to mature as to principal in term or serial maturities not to exceed forty (40) years from date of issue.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 342, § 1; 2020 ch. 76, § 6, effective July 15, 2020.

103.250. Lien of bondholders on building — Receiver on default.

  1. A statutory mortgage lien shall exist upon the industrial building so acquired in favor of the holders of the bonds and coupons. The industrial building so acquired shall remain subject to the statutory mortgage lien until the payment in full of the principal of the bonds, and all interest due thereon. Said statutory mortgage lien shall be effective from and after the recording of a lease of the property, which has been acquired by the issuer of the bonds, to the lessee corporation, and said lien shall attach to all of the property described in said lease, including machinery, equipment and appurtenances described therein in either general or specific terms. No filing or recording or notice of said lien on property held or thereafter acquired by the issuer from the proceeds of the bonds shall be required under the Uniform Commercial Code.
  2. If there is any default in the payment of principal or interest of any bond, any court having jurisdiction of the action may appoint a receiver to administer the industrial building on behalf of the city or county, as the case may be, with power to charge and collect rents sufficient to provide for the payment of any bonds or obligations outstanding against the building, and for the payment of operating expenses, and to apply the income and revenue in conformity with KRS 103.200 to 103.280 and the ordinance referred to in KRS 103.210 .

History. Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 119, §§ 2(2), 3; 1976, ch. 241, § 4.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

Pattie A. Clay Infirmary Asso. v. First Presbyterian Church, 605 S.W.2d 52, 1980 Ky. App. LEXIS 368 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980).

Opinions of Attorney General.

The issuer of industrial building revenue bonds has an option to rely either upon the statutory lien of this section or the mortgage deed of trust as provided in KRS 103.251 . OAG 79-439 .

103.251. Mortgage deed of trust by issuer of bonds.

Notwithstanding the provisions of KRS 103.250 , it may be provided in the proceedings authorizing bonds issued under the terms of KRS 103.200 to 103.285 , inclusive, that the issuer, in connection with the issuance of its bonds, execute a mortgage deed of trust in favor of the trustee on the project acquired or constructed through the application of the proceeds of the bonds, providing that in the event of default by the issuer in the payment of interest on or principal of its bonds, or in the event of default of any other covenant contained in such mortgage deed of trust, the trustee, upon behalf of the bondholders, may institute and carry through foreclosure proceedings in which the property secured by the mortgage deed of trust may be sold, the proceeds of such sale to be applied to the payment of the bonds and any interest or premium due thereon, and to the costs of the proceedings. In connection with such plan of financing, such provisions may be inserted in the bonds themselves and in the mortgage deed of trust as may be necessary to protect the bondholders and to make such bonds salable with the lowest net interest cost to the issuer. If the issuer declares its intent by ordinance or resolution to follow the provisions of this section the statutory mortgage lien provided in KRS 103.250 shall not attach and all other provisions of KRS 103.200 to 103.285 , inclusive, which are necessarily inconsistent with the mortgage deed of trust shall be inapplicable to the extent of such necessary inconsistency.

History. Enact. Acts 1976, ch. 214, § 5.

Opinions of Attorney General.

The issuer of industrial building revenue bonds has an option to rely either upon the statutory lien of KRS 103.250 or the mortgage deed of trust as provided in this section. OAG 79-439 .

The mortgage provisions applied in this section are constitutional in terms of the indebtedness restrictions of Ky. Const., §§ 157 and 158, since no general fund revenues or tax revenues of the city will ever be involved, even should the mortgage ever be foreclosed and the property sold, no deficiency judgment can be obtained against the city and the bond transaction does not fall within the rule given in Bowling Green v. Kirby, 220 Ky. 839 , 295 S.W. 1004, 1927 Ky. LEXIS 603 ( Ky. 1927 ), that where a mortgagee could foreclose on project property, which was acquired by city revenues, the foreclosure and sale constituted payment of a debt by the municipality. OAG 79-439 .

103.260. Application of revenue — Charges for use.

  1. At or before the issuance of bonds the city legislative body or the fiscal court of the county, as the case may be, shall, by ordinance or resolution, set aside and pledge the income and revenue of the industrial building into a separate and special fund to be used and applied in payment of the cost thereof and in the maintenance, operation and depreciation thereof. The ordinance or resolution shall definitely fix and determine the amount of revenue necessary to be set apart and applied to the payment of principal and interest of the bonds, and the proportion (if any) of the balance of the income and revenue to be set aside as a proper and adequate depreciation account, and the remaining proportion of such balance shall be set aside for the reasonable and proper operation and maintenance of the industrial building.
  2. The rents to be charged for the use of the building shall be fixed and revised from time to time so as to be sufficient to provide for payment of interest upon all bonds and to create a sinking fund to pay the principal thereof when due, and to provide for the operation and maintenance of the building and an adequate depreciation account, if any depreciation account has been established.

History. Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 58, § 7; 1962, ch. 268, § 6; 1966, ch. 119, § 4; 1972, ch. 282, § 3.

Opinions of Attorney General.

Where a building and grounds were owned by the city and leased to an electrical manufacturing concern, so long as the property was owned by the city it would be exempt from property taxes as public property used for public purposes. OAG 64-144 .

103.270. Depreciation account.

  1. If a surplus is accumulated in the operating and maintenance funds equal to the cost of maintaining and operating the industrial building during the remainder of the calendar, operating or fiscal year, and during the succeeding like year, any excess over such amount may be transferred at any time by the city legislative body, or the fiscal court of the county, as the case may be, to the depreciation account, to be used for improvements, extensions or additions to the building.
  2. The funds accumulating to the depreciation account shall be expended in balancing depreciation in the industrial building or in making new constructions, extensions or additions thereto. Any such accumulations may be invested as the city legislative body, or the fiscal court of the county, as the case may be, may designate, and if invested the income from such investment shall be carried into the depreciation account.

History. Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 58, §§ 8, 9; 1962, ch. 268, § 7.

103.280. Additional bonds — Issuance of new bonds by city or county to pay outstanding bonds, whether or not city or county was original issuer of bonds.

  1. If the city legislative body, or the fiscal court of the county, as the case may be, finds that the bonds authorized will be insufficient to accomplish the purpose desired, additional bonds may be authorized and issued in the same manner.
  2. Any city or county acquiring any industrial building pursuant to the provisions of KRS 103.200 to 103.280 may, at the time of issuing the bonds for such acquisition, provide for additional bonds for extensions and permanent improvements to be placed in escrow and to be negotiated from time to time as proceeds for that purpose may be necessary. Bonds placed in escrow shall, when negotiated, have equal standing with the bonds of the same issue.
  3. A city or county may issue new bonds to provide funds for the payment of any outstanding bonds which have or have not matured, in accordance with the procedure prescribed by KRS 103.200 to 103.280 , whether or not that city or county was the original issuer of said bonds. The new bonds shall be secured to the same extent and shall have the same source of payment as the bonds refunded.

History. Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 58, §§ 10 to 12; 1962, ch. 268, § 8; 1984, ch. 122, § 6, effective July 13, 1984.

Opinions of Attorney General.

When reading the entire legislation of 1984, and considering the history and purpose of KRS Chapter 103 (industrial revenue bonds), and in connection with any industrial revenue bonds covered by KRS 103.200 to 103.285 , an agreed fluctuating or variable rate of interest, under terms whereby the bonds bear interest at a fluctuating or variable rate, adjustable in accordance with whatever formula is agreed upon by the issuer, the borrower, and the purchaser, is permissible; to construe KRS 103.200 and 103.220 as permitting a variable interest rate for pollution control projects only would constitute an unreasonable and absurd premise, especially when considering the realities of the present day use of KRS Chapter 103 in Kentucky. OAG 84-257 .

KRS 103.200 and 103.220 in no explicit language establish pollution control projects as the sole category of projects subject to a variable rate of interest, and the pertinent statutes amended by Acts 1984, Ch. 122 (KRS 103.200 , 103.210 , 103.210 1, 103.220 to 103.240 , 103.280 ) in no way prohibit the application of the variable rate to projects other than pollution control projects; they merely emphasize pollution control projects, but not to the detriment of other kinds of projects falling within the broad range of KRS 103.200 to 103.285 . Moreover, KRS 58.430 is a specific statute dealing only with interest rates on public bonds and is so flexibly worded as to support variable rate structures in the issuance of public bonds and even if the sections in KRS Chapter 103 amended by Acts 1984, Ch. 122 were to be said to be in some conflict with the provisions of KRS 58.430 , the specific statute, KRS 58.430, should control over the provisions of KRS Chapter 103. OAG 84-257 .

103.282. Issuance of bonds to assist small or medium-sized manufacturers with energy efficiency projects through guaranteed energy savings contracts.

  1. As used in this section:
    1. “Energy service company” means an entity in the business of providing evaluation, design, implementation, installation, measurement and verification, and other related services under guaranteed energy savings contracts;
    2. “Guaranteed energy savings contract” means a contract for the evaluation and recommendation of energy, water, and wastewater conservation measures and for implementation of one (1) or more of those measures. The contract may provide that payments, except obligations on termination of the contract before its expiration, are to be made over time and shall provide that the savings are guaranteed to the extent necessary to make payments for the cost of the design, installation, and maintenance of energy, water, and wastewater conservation measures; and
    3. “Small or medium-sized manufacturer” means any existing business entity organized for profit that is operating an industrial building used as a manufacturing facility in the Commonwealth, and that has three hundred (300) or fewer full-time employees located at that manufacturing facility at the time bonds are to be issued pursuant to this section.
  2. In order to further the purposes stated in KRS 103.210 and to advance the Commonwealth’s goals of achieving a greater proportion of its energy needs through increased efficiency and conservation in the private sector, bonds may be issued by any city, county, air board, riverport authority, or the Kentucky Economic Development Finance Authority to assist a small or medium-sized manufacturer with developing or improving its manufacturing facilities through the use of a guaranteed energy savings contract to increase the energy efficiency thereof.
  3. Bonds shall only be issued pursuant to this section if:
    1. The energy efficiency project being undertaken through the guaranteed energy savings contract is to be performed by a qualified provider as defined in KRS 45A.345 ; and
    2. The energy service company provides a guarantee that the project will achieve a reduction in energy consumption:
      1. That is measurable and verifiable; and
      2. Which will result in cost savings that are equal to or greater than the cost of the project within a seven (7) year payback period.

History. Enact. Acts 2014, ch. 131, § 7, effective July 15, 2014.

103.285. Property acquired under KRS 103.200 to 103.280 exempt from taxation.

All properties, both real and personal, which a city or county may acquire to be rented or leased to an industrial concern according to KRS 103.200 to 103.280 , shall be exempt from taxation to the same extent as other public property used for public purposes, as long as the property is owned by the city or county.

History. Enact. Acts 1960, ch. 78; 1962, ch. 268, § 9.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Improvements by Lessee.

Where the lessee, at his own expense, constructed additional improvements on the land leased from the city, such improvements were not tax exempt although they were located on tax exempt land. Hobart Mfg. Co. v. Kentucky Board of Tax Appeals, 515 S.W.2d 232, 1974 Ky. LEXIS 231 ( Ky. 1974 ).

Cited:

Standard Oil Co. v. Boone County Board of Supervisors, 562 S.W.2d 83, 1978 Ky. LEXIS 319 ( Ky. 1978 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Where a building and grounds were owned by the city and leased to an electrical manufacturing concern, so long as the property was owned by the city it would be exempt from property taxes as public property used for public purposes. OAG 64-144 .

So long as title to property remains in the city or county, it is immaterial whether it is located within the corporate limits of the city or some other place for the property to be exempt from local ad valorem property and school taxes. OAG 67-185 .

The exemption is only applicable so long as the property is owned and the title is vested in the county. OAG 67-205 .

A county fiscal court has no authority to exempt the property of a private firm or manufacturing concern from county, state, school or health taxes as an inducement to industrial development without acquiring title to such property. OAG 67-205 .

A vesting of a real property interest for a term of years is sufficient ownership in the county during such period to permit exemption of the property from ad valorem property taxes. OAG 67-222 .

As long as an original building and equipment, purchased by a city from a private corporation and leased back to the corporation with an option to purchase at the end of the lease period, is owned by the city it is exempt from ad valorem property taxes as public property used for public purposes. OAG 74-344 .

Since payments made pursuant to lease between county that issued revenue bonds for construction of industrial project and corporation which provided that the corporation would make payments to the county and school board in lieu of taxes did not arise under KRS Chapter 134, the county attorney is not allowed the 20% fee for the collecting of these payments. OAG 82-639 .

Industrial Development Bond Allocation Committee

103.286. Kentucky Private Activity Bond Allocation Committee.

  1. The Kentucky Private Activity Bond Allocation Committee is established. The purpose of the committee shall be to ensure compliance by the Commonwealth, its political subdivisions, and other authorized issuers within the Commonwealth of Kentucky, of private activity bonds, as defined in the Internal Revenue Code of the United States, with the state ceiling on the issuance of the bonds imposed by the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 26 U.S.C. sec. 146 . The committee shall be attached to the Finance and Administration Cabinet for administrative purposes and staff services. The committee shall be composed of the secretary of the Finance and Administration Cabinet, who shall be chairman of the committee; the secretary of the Cabinet for Economic Development; the state budget director; the state controller, Finance and Administration Cabinet; and the secretary of the Governor’s Cabinet, or their respective designees.
  2. The committee shall attempt to allocate the state ceiling of Kentucky in order to best effectuate the issuance of private activity bonds, foster economic development within the Commonwealth, and promote the general welfare of its citizens and the public purposes of the Commonwealth.
    1. For each calendar year, during the period in which the issuance of private activity bonds is authorized by the federal government, the first fifty percent (50%) of the term shall be designated as a period in which the committee shall provide that no less than:
      1. Sixty percent (60%) of the private activity cap be reserved for state bond issuance authorities; and
      2. Ten percent (10%) of the private activity cap be reserved for manufacturing facility energy efficiency bonds issued by any issuer pursuant to KRS 103.282 .
    2. For each calendar year, during the period in which the issuance of private activity bonds is authorized by the federal government, the last fifty percent (50%) of the term shall be designated by the committee as the period in which the remaining unallocated cap shall revert to a single pool to be allocated in accordance with subsection (3) of this section.
  3. The secretary of the Finance and Administration Cabinet shall promulgate regulations in accordance with KRS Chapter 13A, to provide for the allocation of the state ceiling on private activity bonds among all issuers of the bonds within the Commonwealth of Kentucky.
  4. No bonds governed by this section shall be issued that are not in compliance with the state ceiling, subsection (2)(a) and (b) of this section, or with the allocation, application, or review procedures established by the secretary of the Finance and Administration Cabinet.

History. Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 340, § 1, effective July 15, 1986; 1988, ch. 352, § 1, effective July 15, 1988; 1990, ch. 358, § 1, effective July 13, 1990; 1990, ch. 484, § 6, effective July 13, 1990; 1994, ch. 508, § 41, effective July 15, 1994; 1998, ch. 170, § 1, effective March 27, 1998; 2014, ch. 131, § 6, effective July 15, 2014.

103.287. Legislative finding of fact — Governor to prescribe most appropriate formula for allocation of state ceiling on issuance of private activity bonds. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 340, § 1, effective July 15, 1986) was repealed by Acts 1988, ch. 352, § 2, effective July 15, 1988.

Courthouses or Other County Buildings

103.290 to 103.410. Courthouses or other county buildings. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

The sections listed below were repealed by Acts 1978, ch. 118, § 19, effective June 17, 1978.

103.290 Fiscal court may acquire county buildings, land and equipment for buildings. (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 169, § 1.)

103.300 Issuance of bonds. (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 169, § 2.)

103.310 Interest on bonds — Terms. (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 169, § 3.)

103.320 Bonds negotiable — Disposal — Payable only from revenue. (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 169, § 4; 1966, ch. 239, § 112; 1968, ch. 152, § 87.)

103.330 Obligation of county on bonds. (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 169, § 4.)

103.340 Use of proceeds of bonds. (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 169, § 5.)

103.350 Lien in favor of bondholders. (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 169, § 5 and 6.)

103.360 Receiver in case of default. (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 169, § 7.)

103.370 Application of revenue — Rents, fees and charges for services. (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 169, § 4.)

103.380 Surplus in maintenance fund. (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 169, § 9.)

103.390 Obligation of county on bonds. (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 169, § 10 and 11.)

103.400 Orders for administration of buildings and income, and security of bondholders — Contract between county and bondholders. (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 169, § 12 and 13.)

103.410 Alternate method for acquisition of county buildings. (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 169, § 14.)

CHAPTER 104 Flood Control and Water Usage

Condemnation by County or City for Flood Control

104.010. Condemnation for any county or city for flood control purposes. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 220; 1976, ch. 140, § 55; 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 127) was repealed by Acts 1978, ch. 118, § 19, effective June 17, 1978.

City Flood Control Systems

104.020. Definitions for KRS 104.030 to 104.160. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 226, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

104.030. Power of cities to extend flood control systems outside city boundaries — Acquisition of property.

  1. For the purpose of protecting property within and beyond their limits from floods or high water, cities of all classes are authorized to extend a flood control system outside the city boundaries by constructing, enlarging, extending, equipping, maintaining and operating walls or other barriers with necessary appurtenances and equipment beyond the boundaries of the city.
  2. For that purpose every city may acquire all necessary and convenient land, rights of way and other property therefor by gift, purchase or condemnation, and cause the walls or barriers and their appurtenances and equipment to be erected, maintained and operated. The city is authorized to accept upon such terms as the governing authority may deem necessary or appropriate any gift, contribution or allotment of money or property by the government of the United States or any of its agencies or by any individual or corporation.

History. Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 226, § 2; 1980, ch. 239, § 3, effective July 15, 1980.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Assessment of Property Benefited.

Plan to levy special charges against property particularly benefited by a proposed flood control wall does not assess a particular class of taxpayers in violation of Ky. Const., § 171 and United States Const., Amend. 14. Miller v. Ashland, 310 Ky. 680 , 221 S.W.2d 620, 1949 Ky. LEXIS 986 ( Ky. 1949 ).

Ordinance providing for floodwall to be three feet higher than the highest water in a previous flood was not void on the contention it was unreasonable and impracticable because those theoretically benefited by the extra three feet of protection would realize no practical advantages. Miller v. Ashland, 310 Ky. 680 , 221 S.W.2d 620, 1949 Ky. LEXIS 986 ( Ky. 1949 ).

Where city proposed to levy special assessments against realty to finance construction and maintenance of floodwall which would particularly benefit realty assessed, failure of city to specially assess personalty, which likewise would be particularly benefited, was not an arbitrary discrimination. Miller v. Ashland, 310 Ky. 680 , 221 S.W.2d 620, 1949 Ky. LEXIS 986 ( Ky. 1949 ).

2. Financing.

Plan of city to issue $150,000 general obligation bonds approved by two-thirds (2/3) of the voters of a city, proceeds to be used for a floodwall in cooperation with the federal government and with special assessments by the city against the property to be benefited did not violate limitation of indebtedness, Ky. Const., § 157 nor did it violate Ky. Const., § 158 in the absence of showing city would be required to exceed maximum assessment percentage fixed in order to liquidate the bonds. Miller v. Ashland, 310 Ky. 680 , 221 S.W.2d 620, 1949 Ky. LEXIS 986 ( Ky. 1949 ).

3. Contribution by Federal Government.

Since this section specifically authorizes a city to accept contributions from the United States on such terms as the city’s governing authority deems necessary or appropriate there is no valid objection to the city cooperating with the federal government in the control of a project to which they jointly contribute. Miller v. Ashland, 310 Ky. 680 , 221 S.W.2d 620, 1949 Ky. LEXIS 986 ( Ky. 1949 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

The public utilities whose pipes and other apparatus are under the public streets and rights-of-ways may be required to move such pipes and apparatus at their expense when the city in the public interest decides to construct a floodwall which necessitates the relocation of the pipes and apparatus of a public utility under city streets and rights-of-ways. OAG 78-186 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Kentucky Law Survey, Morris, Municipal Law, 70 Ky. L.J. 287 (1981-82).

104.040. Ordinance for establishment of flood control system — Notice — Hearing — Passage over protest. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 226, § 3; 1968, ch. 152, § 88) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4.

104.050. What agency to control system — Contracts. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 226, § 4) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4.

104.060. Payment of preliminary expenses. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 226, § 5) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4.

104.070. Condemnation. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 226, § 6) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4.

104.080. Expenses for which bonds may be issued. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 226, § 7) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4.

104.090. Issuance of general obligation bonds. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 226, § 8) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4.

104.100. Issuance of assessment bonds. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 226, §§ 9, 9a, and 9b) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4.

104.110. Assessments against benefited property. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 226, § 10) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4.

104.120. Levy and collection of assessments — Lien. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 226, § 11) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4.

104.130. Collection of delinquent assessments. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 226, § 12) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4.

104.140. Court review of proceedings. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 226, § 13) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4.

104.150. Contribution from county. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 226, § 14) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4.

104.160. Power is additional — Jurisdiction outside corporate limits of city. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 226, § 15) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4.

Condemnation by Cities, Counties and Districts for Flood Control or Drainage

104.170. Condemnation for flood control, flood protection or drainage. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1942, ch. 61, §§ 1, 2; 1946, ch. 88; 1950, ch. 98; 1976, ch. 140, § 57; 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 14, § 128) was repealed by Acts 1978, ch. 118, § 19, effective June 15, 1978 and by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

104.180. Condemnation by city of fourth class for purpose of straightening or widening a creek. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 106; 1976, ch. 140, § 58) was repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980.

Federal Flood Control Payments

104.190. Receipt and disbursement of federal flood control payments.

The Finance and Administration Cabinet is authorized to receive and distribute sums paid to this state, for the benefit of particular counties of this state, under the Federal Flood Control Act of June 28, 1938, as amended. The Finance and Administration Cabinet shall keep a separate account of such funds and shall issue its warrant upon the State Treasurer, in favor of the county treasurer of the county which is entitled to the money, and the State Treasurer shall thereupon issue his check against said funds in favor of said county treasurer, for the amount thereof.

History. Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 232.

Compiler’s Notes.

The Federal Flood Control Act of 1938, referred to herein, is compiled as 33 USCS §§ 701b, 701b-1, 701b-2, 701c, 701c-1, 701f, 701f-1, 701i, 701j, 702a-11, 706.

Flood Control Systems for Fourth-Class Cities

104.200 to 104.380. Flood control systems for fourth-class cities. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

The following sections were repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 234, § 11 and by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980:

104.200 Definitions for KRS 104.210 to 104.380. (Enact. Acts 1948, ch. 102, § 1.)

104.210 Power of city of fourth class to establish flood control system — Acquisition of property and construction of works — System deemed to benefit property. (Enact. Acts 1948, ch. 102, § 2.)

104.220 Methods of securing funds for system. (Enact. Acts 1948, ch. 102, § 3.)

104.230 Cost of system, what constitutes — Preliminary expenses. (Enact. Acts 1948, ch. 102, § 4.)

104.240 Initial resolution for establishment of system. (Enact. Acts 1948, ch. 102, § 5.)

104.250 Notice of hearing on initial resolution. (Enact. Acts 1948, ch. 102, § 6; 1966, ch. 239, § 113.)

104.260 Objections or protests. (Enact. Acts 1948, ch. 102, § 7.)

104.270 Final ordinance for establishment of system. (Enact. Acts 1948, ch. 102, § 8.)

104.280 Construction of system by contract or force account — Letting of contract on bids — Acceptance of work. (Enact. Acts 1948, ch. 102, § 9; 1966, ch. 239, § 114.)

104.290 Preliminary expenses, payment of. (Enact. Acts 1948, ch. 102, § 10.)

104.300 Assessment bonds, issuance of. (Enact. Acts 1948, ch. 102, § 11.)

104.310 Assessments on benefited property. (Enact. Acts 1948, ch. 102, § 12.)

104.320 Collection of assessments by suit. (Enact. Acts 1948, ch. 102, § 13.)

104.330 Bonds, effect and validity of — Incontestability of bonds and assessments. (Enact. Acts 1948, ch. 102, § 14.)

104.340 Annual assessment for operation and maintenance of system. (Enact. Acts 1948, ch. 102, § 15.)

104.350 Condemnation. (Enact. Acts 1948, ch. 102, § 16; 1976, ch. 140, § 59.)

104.360 Appeal to courts. (Enact. Acts 1948, ch. 102, § 17.)

104.370 County may make contribution. (Enact. Acts 1948, ch. 102, § 18.)

104.380 KRS 104.210 to 104.380 are supplemental to other laws, and complete grant of power. (Enact. Acts 1948, ch. 102, § 19.)

State Flood Control and Water Usage Board

104.390. State Flood Control and Water Usage Board created; membership; terms; qualifications; advisors and consultants; oath; meetings; chairman; quorum; travel expenses; administrative units and staffs. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1948, ch. 229, § 1; 1952, ch. 201, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1964, ch. 67, § 11.

104.391. Definitions. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1964, ch. 67, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 23, § 39.

104.395. Division of Flood Control and Water Resources Development; director, duties, power. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1964, ch. 67, § 3) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 23, § 39.

104.400. Powers and duties of division. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1948, ch. 229, § 2; 1964, ch. 67, § 5) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 23, § 39.

104.403. Effect of rules and regulation. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1964, ch. 67, § 10(2)) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 23, § 39.

104.407. Study of water resources; legislative proposals. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1964, ch. 67, § 4) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 23, § 39.

104.410. Powers of board in case of flood emergency. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1948, ch. 229, § 3) was repealed by Acts 1964, ch. 67, § 11.

104.420. Appeal from order of division denying permit; procedure. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1948, ch. 229, § 4; 1964, ch. 67, § 7) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 23, § 39.

104.430. Surveys of proposed projects involving expenditure of state funds. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1948, ch. 229, § 5; 1964, ch. 67, § 8) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 23, § 39.

104.433. City officials to enforce regulations. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1964, ch. 67, § 10(1)) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 23, § 39.

This section (Enact. Acts 1948, ch. 229, § 4; 1964, ch. 67, § 7) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 23, § 39.

104.437. Duties of local prosecuting officials, state police. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1964, ch. 67, § 10(3) and (4)) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 23, § 39.

104.440. Powers of other agencies as to flood control and water usage, how affected. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1948, ch. 229, § 7) was repealed by Acts 1964, ch. 67, § 11.

104.441. Obstruction of stream prohibited. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1964, ch. 67, § 6) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 23, § 39.

104.445. Violation of KRS 104.400 or order or failure to obtain permit, penalty. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1964, ch. 67, § 9) was repealed by Acts 1966, ch. 23, § 39.

Districts to Maintain and Operate Flood Control Works

104.450. Definitions for KRS 104.450 to 104.680.

As used in KRS 104.450 to 104.680 , unless the context otherwise requires:

  1. “Secretary” means the secretary of the Energy and Environment Cabinet of the Commonwealth of Kentucky.
  2. “Flood control work” means all land, pumping equipment, buildings, motor vehicles, mowing machines, or any other fixtures, tools or equipment a part of or used in connection with a floodwall or other construction designed to protect an area from being flooded.
  3. “District” means a flood control district organized and created under the terms of KRS 104.450 to 104.680 .
  4. “Board” or “directors” means the board of directors of a flood control district organized and created under the terms of KRS 104.450 to 104.680 .
  5. “Director” means a person appointed as a member of the board of directors as provided in KRS 104.450 to 104.680 .
  6. “Person” means any person, firm, copartnership, association or corporation other than a public corporation.
  7. “Public corporation” means any county, city, school district, water district or drainage district, and any other governmental agency or political subdivision clothed with the power of levying general or special taxes or issuing bonds payable from special funds.
  8. “Land” or “property” means real property.

History. Enact. Acts 1950, ch. 42, § 1; 1966, ch. 255, § 118; 2010, ch. 24, § 88, effective July 15, 2010.

104.460. Power of secretary for energy and environment to establish districts.

The secretary, in addition to his other duties and powers, is invested with jurisdiction, power and authority to establish flood control districts in accordance with the provisions of KRS 104.450 to 104.680 .

History. Enact. Acts 1950, ch. 42, § 2.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(6/20/2005). 2005 Ky. Acts chs. 11, 85, 95, 97, 98, 99, 123, and 181 instruct the Reviser of Statutes to correct statutory references to agencies and officers whose names have been changed in 2005 legislation confirming the reorganization of the executive branch. Such a correction has been made in this section.

Opinions of Attorney General.

While KRS Chapters 268 and 104 both deal with flood control, they provide entirely separate means of establishing and financing flood control districts; under Chapter 268, the district is created by order of the fiscal court and is funded by beneficial assessments which are not a tax and are collected under the mechanism established in KRS 268.420 ; under Chapter 104, the district is established by the secretary for natural resources and environmental protection and the tax authorized is a property tax that is added to the regular property tax bills. OAG 92-23 .

104.470. Districts — When may be established — Purpose — Boundaries.

A flood control district may be established for the purpose of maintaining and operating any flood control works heretofore or hereafter constructed in any city or county of the state. The boundaries of such a flood control district shall be the floodwall or levee and the contour line on the land back of the floodwall or levee of the same elevation as the elevation of the top of the floodwall or levee.

History. Enact. Acts 1950, ch. 42, § 3.

104.480. Petition for district — Signature requirements.

  1. Before the secretary shall establish a flood control district, a petition shall be filed with the secretary, containing valid signatures of seventy percent (70%) of those in possession claiming as freeholders within the boundaries of the proposed flood control district. Each joint owner of property shall be counted as a separate freeholder.
  2. In determining when seventy percent (70%) of the landowners have signed the petition the secretary shall consult with the landowners whose names appear upon the county tax duplicate, which for all purposes of KRS 104.450 to 104.680 shall be prima facie evidence of such ownership. The secretary shall further require evidence to determine the fact that all signatures on the petition are genuine, and a notification by ordinary mail sent to the respective addresses shown on the petition shall establish the genuineness of a signature if the petitioner so notified fails to report in writing within ten (10) days that he did not sign the petition. When authorized by ordinance, such a petition may be signed by a majority of the governing body of any municipality lying wholly or partly within the proposed district. When so signed by a majority of such governing body the petition shall fill all requirements of representation on the part of the freeholders of the municipality as they appear upon the assessment roll of the municipality, and individuals within the municipality shall not sign the petition.

History. Enact. Acts 1950, ch. 42, § 4; 1982, ch. 217, § 1, effective July 15, 1982.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(6/20/2005). 2005 Ky. Acts chs. 11, 85, 95, 97, 98, 99, 123, and 181 instruct the Reviser of Statutes to correct statutory references to agencies and officers whose names have been changed in 2005 legislation confirming the reorganization of the executive branch. Such a correction has been made in this section.

104.490. Contents of petition.

The petition shall contain:

  1. The proposed name of the district, which shall be “Flood Control District No. . . . . . . . . . .  of  . . . . . . . . . .  County, (or counties), Kentucky.”
  2. The necessity for maintaining and operating any flood control works of the district and that such maintenance and operation will be conducive to the public health, safety, comfort, convenience or welfare.
  3. A general description of the flood control works to be maintained and operated and of the territory to be included in the proposed district. The description need not be given by metes and bounds or by legal subdivision, but it shall be sufficient if a reasonably accurate description is given of the territory to be organized as a district by showing the boundaries of such district on a map or by other means. The territory may include one or more political subdivisions or portions thereof, and, except as provided in KRS 104.450 to 104.680 , shall not be included wholly within the limits of a single municipality. The territory need not be contiguous if it is so situated that the public health, safety, comfort, convenience or welfare will be promoted by its organization as a single district.
  4. A prayer for the organization of the district.

History. Enact. Acts 1950, ch. 42, § 5.

104.500. Amendment of petition — Multiple petitions.

No petition with the requisite number of valid signatures shall be declared void on account of alleged defects, but the secretary may at any time permit the petition to be amended in form and substance to conform to the facts, by correcting any errors in the description of the territory or in any other particular, but shall not add or deduct area except as provided in KRS 104.520 . Several similar petitions or duplicate copies of the same petition for the organization of the same district may be filed and shall together be regarded as one (1) petition. All such petitions filed shall be considered the same as though filed with the first petition placed on file.

History. Enact. Acts 1950, ch. 42, § 6.

104.510. Bond or deposit for costs.

At the time of filing the petition, or at any time subsequent thereto and prior to the time of the giving of notice by the secretary, as provided in KRS 104.530 , the petitioners shall either file bond with the secretary with security approved by him, or deposit cash or securities with him in an amount sufficient to pay the costs in the proceedings thereafter involved. If the secretary at any time during the proceedings is not satisfied that the bond or deposit is sufficient or that the surety on the bond is safe, he may require the execution of an additional bond or the giving of additional surety or an additional deposit within a time to be fixed not less than ten (10) days thereafter, and upon the failure of the petitioners to comply, the secretary may refuse to proceed further and may refuse to organize the district.

History. Enact. Acts 1950, ch. 42, § 7.

104.520. Boundaries of district — Determination of — When cities with population of 8,000 or more may be included.

  1. When the petition is filed with the secretary, he shall investigate at once the boundary of the district proposed to be organized, and may, at the cost of the petitioners, cause to be made surveys necessary to establish with reasonable accuracy a boundary that will, in his judgment, accomplish the purpose sought by the creation of the district in a practicable and workable manner, and that will be sufficiently comprehensive to avoid confusion or interference with any other similar district then existing or that may be created. The boundary established by the secretary need not follow the boundary proposed by the petitioners, but if the boundary established by the secretary results in a material change from that proposed in the original petition the petitioners shall secure, in case of a larger or smaller area, the signatures of seventy percent (70%) of the freeholders or owners in the area as established by the secretary.
  2. Should it be found desirable to include in a flood control district all or a portion of a city with a population equal to or greater than eight thousand (8,000) based upon the most recent federal decennial census, the governing body of such city shall determine by ordinance whether the city or portion thereof shall be included in the district, or whether the city shall bind itself to pay the taxes levied for the benefits of the district in such area.

History. Enact. Acts 1950, ch. 42, § 8; 2014, ch. 92, § 201, effective January 1, 2015.

104.530. Notice of application for creation of district.

When seventy percent (70%) of those qualified within the boundary fixed by the secretary are found to have petitioned for the establishment of a flood control district, and the secretary has established the boundaries thereof, the secretary shall give notice of the application for the creation of the district by publication pursuant to KRS Chapter 424.

History. Enact. Acts 1950, ch. 42, § 9; 1966, ch. 239, § 115.

104.540. Court action opposing creation of district.

Any owner of real property in the proposed district who has not signed the original petition for the creation of the district and who wishes to object to the organization of the district shall, within sixty (60) days after the giving of notice by the secretary, file his petition in the Circuit Court of the county in which the larger part of the proposed district is located, naming the secretary defendant and setting out in the petition his objections to the organization of the district. The secretary shall be represented in the Circuit Court by the county attorney and in the Court of Appeals by the Attorney General and he also may require his defense to be made by the petitioners or some of them. The issues may be made up and the case may be docketed for hearing as in an action for a declaration of rights, and an appeal may be taken and judgment shall become final as provided for in such procedure. The burden of proof shall be upon the plaintiff to show cause why the district should not be organized. If the court renders judgment against the secretary, the judgment shall point out the changes required for the establishment of a district, which, if met by the secretary, shall authorize the creation of the district. If the changes are not met by the secretary, the proposed district shall not be organized unless new proceedings are instituted for the creation of a district, but such new proceedings shall not be instituted for a period of six (6) months after the date of judgment. If the court gives judgment against the plaintiff, the secretary shall organize the district. An appeal taken as authorized in this section shall suspend the judgment until the case has been passed upon by the Court of Appeals and final judgment rendered. Either the plaintiff or the secretary may appeal from the judgment of the Circuit Court to the Court of Appeals, but the secretary shall not be required to make any appeal bond. Except as otherwise provided in this section, the pleadings and practice shall be the same as in other suits in equity.

History. Enact. Acts 1950, ch. 42, § 10.

104.550. Certificate of establishment of district — Issuance — Filing — General powers of district.

If no suit is filed against the secretary under KRS 104.540 , or if suit is filed and final judgment in the Circuit Court or on appeal is in favor of the secretary, the secretary shall forthwith declare the district organized into a flood control district and give it a corporate name as provided in KRS 104.490 , by which in all proceedings it shall thereafter be known. The secretary shall certify his act to the county clerk of each county in which any part of the district is located, and to the Secretary of State, each of whom shall record the certificate as articles of incorporation. The secretary shall also certify his act to the county judge/executive of each county in which any part of the district is located. The district shall then be a political subdivision and shall have perpetual existence, with power to sue and be sued, contract and be contracted with, incur liabilities and obligations, exercise the right of eminent domain, assess, tax, issue bonds, and do and perform all acts expressly authorized in KRS 104.450 to 104.680 and all acts necessary and proper for the carrying out of the purpose for which the district was created, and for executing the powers with which it is invested.

History. Enact. Acts 1950, ch. 42, § 11; 1974, ch. 74, Art. III, § 1; 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 20, § 6, effective January 2, 1978; 1978, ch. 384, § 232, effective June 17, 1978.

104.560. Conclusiveness of certificate.

The certificate establishing the district shall be deemed final and binding upon the real property in the district, and shall finally and conclusively establish the regular organization of the district against all persons except the state upon suit commenced by the Attorney General. The organization of the district shall not be directly or collaterally questioned in any action except as expressly authorized in KRS 104.450 to 104.680 .

History. Enact. Acts 1950, ch. 42, § 12.

104.570. Office and records of district.

The secretary shall designate in the certificate the place where the office of the district shall be located, which shall be within the corporate limits of the district if practicable. The place may be changed by the board of directors of the district from time to time, by the certification of the change to the county clerk of each county in which the district is located and the notation thereof on the records of the clerk. The records of the district shall have “Flood Control District Records” printed, stamped, or written thereon. They shall be kept at the office and shall be open to inspection as are the records of the fiscal court.

History. Enact. Acts 1950, ch. 42, § 13; 1974, ch. 74, Art. III, § 1; 1978, ch. 384, § 233, effective June 17, 1978.

104.580. Board of directors — Appointment — Qualifications — Term — Vacancies — Removal of board members.

  1. Within thirty (30) days after the secretary certifies to the county clerk of each county in which the district is located that the district is incorporated, there shall be appointed a board of directors for the district, consisting of five (5) members, which shall control and manage the affairs of the district. If all or part of a city with a population equal to or greater than eight thousand (8,000) based upon the most recent federal decennial census lies within the district, the mayor of such city shall appoint three (3) members of the board of directors, and the county judge/executive shall appoint two (2) members, or if the district lies within two (2) counties, each county judge/executive shall appoint one (1) member, or if the district lies within more than two (2) counties, the county judge/executive of each of two (2) of the counties, in rotation as determined by lot, shall appoint one (1) member. If all or part of two (2) cities with a population equal to or greater than eight thousand (8,000) based upon the most recent federal decennial census lies within the district the mayor of each city shall each appoint two (2) members of the board of directors, and the fifth member shall be appointed by the county judge/executive of the county in which the major portion of the district lies. If all or part of more than two (2) cities with a population equal to or greater than eight thousand (8,000) based upon the most recent federal decennial census lies within the district the mayor of each city shall appoint one (1) member of the board and one (1) additional member shall be appointed by each mayor of the city or cities containing most of the district to make the full number of five (5) directors. If no city with a population equal to or greater than eight thousand (8,000) based upon the most recent federal decennial census, or part thereof, lies within the district, the county judge/executive shall appoint all five (5) members, or if the district lies in two (2) counties, the county judge/executive of the county in which the major portion of the district is located shall appoint three (3) members and the county judge/executive of the other county shall appoint two (2) members, or if the district lies in more than two (2) counties, the county judge/executive of each county shall appoint one (1) member and one (1) additional member shall be appointed by each county judge/executive of the county or counties containing most of the district to make the full number of five (5) directors. No director shall in any way be associated or connected with the ownership, operation or control of any privately-owned public utility operating within the district. Two (2) of the members of the first board of directors shall hold their offices for one (1) year, and the others shall hold their offices for two (2), three (3) and four (4) years, respectively, from the dates of their appointments, the length of the term of office of each member to be determined by lot at their first meeting. After the expiration of the respective terms of office of the members of the first board of directors, each director shall be appointed and shall serve for a period of four (4) years and until his successor has been appointed and has qualified. Vacancies resulting from any cause other than expiration of a term of office shall be filled only for the unexpired term and until a successor has been appointed and has qualified. The directors shall at all times be residents and real estate owners within the district, and the office of any director who moves his residence outside the district or who ceases to be a real estate owner within the district shall automatically be vacated.
    1. All appointments by a county judge/executive pursuant to this section shall be with the approval of the fiscal court. (2) (a) All appointments by a county judge/executive pursuant to this section shall be with the approval of the fiscal court.
    2. A member of the board of directors may be removed from office as provided by KRS 65.007 .

History. Enact. Acts 1950, ch. 42, § 14; 1980, ch. 18, § 10, effective July 15, 1980; 2014, ch. 92, § 202, effective January 1, 2015.

104.590. Oath and bond of directors.

  1. Each director, before entering upon his official duties, shall take and subscribe to an oath that he will honestly, faithfully and impartially perform the duties of his office, and that he will not be interested in any contract let for the purpose of carrying out any of the provisions of KRS 104.450 to 104.680 . The oath shall be filed with the clerk of the county represented by the director or of the county in which is located the city represented by the director.
  2. Each director shall give a good and sufficient bond, to be approved by the officer appointing him, for the faithful and honest performance of his duties and as security for all moneys coming into his hands or under his control. The cost of the bond shall be paid by the district.

History. Enact. Acts 1950, ch. 42, § 15; 1978, ch. 384, § 234, effective June 17, 1978.

104.600. Quorum of board — How business conducted.

A majority of the directors shall constitute a quorum and concurrence of the majority in any matter within the duties of the board shall be sufficient for its determination. All actions taken by the directors shall be by resolution, and in each instance the name and vote of each director shall be recorded in the minutes.

History. Enact. Acts 1950, ch. 42, § 16.

104.610. Officers and employees of board — Seal — Records — Expenses — Rules and regulations — Civil liabilities — Audits — Compliance with KRS 65A.010 to 65A.090.

  1. The board of directors shall, upon taking oath, elect one (1) of their members as president of the board, and shall select some suitable person as secretary, who need not be a member of the board. The secretary shall serve as treasurer of the district, or the board may select a treasurer. The selection of the secretary and treasurer shall be evidenced on the minutes of the board, with their compensation. He or they shall serve at the pleasure of the board.
  2. The board shall adopt a seal, and shall keep in a well-bound book a record of all proceedings, minutes of meetings, certificates, contracts, bonds given by employees, and all corporate acts, which shall be open to the inspection of any owner of property in the district as well as all other interested persons.
  3. The board of directors shall be the governing body of the flood control district, and shall exercise all the powers and manage and control all of the affairs and property of the district.
  4. No compensation shall be paid to directors, but each director shall be reimbursed for expenses incurred in attending meetings or for expenses incurred in other activities authorized by the board of directors as necessary for carrying out the purposes of the flood control district.
  5. The board of directors may adopt all necessary rules and regulations for the proper management and conduct of the business of the board and of the corporation, and for carrying into effect the other objects for which the district was formed. The board of directors may also make and enforce rules and regulations pertaining to the use by persons of land or properties connected with or a part of the flood control works. All such rules and regulations shall become effective on the date when a notice of their adoption is published pursuant to KRS Chapter 424; such notice shall not contain the rules and regulations in full but shall only summarize their contents and shall state where any interested person may examine the full texts of such rules and regulations.
  6. The board of directors may recover by civil action from any person or public corporation violating such rules and regulations a sum not less than one hundred dollars ($100) nor more than one thousand dollars ($1,000), together with costs. The board may enforce by mandamus or otherwise all necessary and authorized rules and regulations made by it, and may take summary action to remove any improper construction or to terminate any unauthorized practices in connection with flood control works. Any person or public corporation willfully failing to comply with rules and regulations of the board shall be liable for damages caused by such failure and for the cost of renewing or replacing any part of the flood control works damaged or destroyed.
  7. The board of directors shall have an annual audit made by a certified public accountant, copies of which shall be filed with the Secretary of State and with the county judge/executive of the county or counties in which the flood control district is located.
  8. The board of directors shall comply with the provisions of KRS 65A.010 to 65A.090 .

History. Enact. Acts 1950, ch. 42, § 17; 1966, ch. 239, § 116; 2013, ch. 40, § 49, effective March 21, 2013.

104.620. Secretary — Duties — Attestation of records.

The secretary shall be the custodian of the seal, minutes and records of the district, and shall assist the board of directors in such particulars as the board directs in the performance of its duties. The secretary shall attest, under the seal of the district, such records as are required of him by the provisions of KRS 104.450 to 104.680 , or by any person ordering the same, and shall receive for such transcription the same compensation allowed county clerks for copying records. Any portion of the record so certified and attested shall prima facie import verity.

History. Enact. Acts 1950, ch. 42, § 18.

104.630. Treasurer — Duties — Bond — Countersigning of checks.

The treasurer shall keep an accurate account of all money received or disbursed by the district, make periodic accountings and reports thereof as directed by the board of directors, make regular semiannual accountings, assist any auditors employed by the board to check the financial records of the district, sign all checks or vouchers of the district, deposit all funds received in any bank selected by the board, and perform all other functions as chief financial officer of the district as directed by the board. No check or voucher shall be valid until countersigned by the president of the board. The treasurer shall give a good and sufficient bond to the board for the faithful and honest performance of his duties and as security for all money coming into his hands or under his control. The cost of the bond shall be paid by the district.

History. Enact. Acts 1950, ch. 42, § 19.

104.640. Attorney, engineer, and other employees — Supplies and equipment.

The board of directors may employ an attorney and a chief engineer for the district, who shall hold office at the pleasure of the board and who shall give such bond as is required by the board. The board may employ such other engineers, attorneys, agents and assistants as may be needed, and may prescribe the duties and fix the compensation of all the employees of the district. The board may maintain, furnish and equip an office or offices, and purchase such office supplies, equipment, apparatus, appliances, instruments and tools as are necessary, which, with all other necessary expenditures shall be taken as a part of the cost of maintaining and operating the flood control works. The employment of the engineer, attorney and other personnel for the district shall be evidenced on the minutes of the board, with their compensation, and their term of employment shall be at the pleasure of the board.

History. Enact. Acts 1950, ch. 42, § 20.

104.650. Contracts for work, materials or supplies.

All contracts for work, materials or supplies that may exceed one thousand dollars ($1,000) shall be advertised for bids by publication pursuant to KRS Chapter 424. The contract shall be let to the lowest and best bidder who shall give bonds with approved and ample surety for the faithful performance of the contract. The contract shall be in writing, in duplicate, and shall be accompanied by or refer to plans and specifications for the work to be done, prepared by the chief engineer. The plans and specifications shall be made and considered a part of the contract. The contract shall be adopted by the board and signed by its president and by the contractor, and shall become a part of the records of the district.

History. Enact. Acts 1950, ch. 42, § 21; 1966, ch. 239, § 117.

104.660. Stream and rain gages, scientific survey, etc. — Reports.

The board of directors may establish and maintain stream gages and rain gages, and may make such surveys and examinations of rainfall, stream flow and other scientific and engineering subjects as are necessary and proper for the purpose of the district. The board may issue reports of its findings.

History. Enact. Acts 1950, ch. 42, § 22.

104.670. Tax for district, levy and collection of.

The board of directors, as soon as duly appointed and qualified, may levy an annual tax of not more than fifteen cents ($0.15) upon each one hundred dollars ($100) of assessed valuation of property within the district. This tax shall be certified to the county clerks of the various counties and by them to the respective treasurers of their counties. The tax shall be based upon the last preceding assessment for state and county purposes, its collection shall conform to the collection of taxes for counties, and it shall constitute a lien against the property subordinate only to state, county and city ad valorem taxes, and the same provisions concerning the collection of delinquent taxes for counties shall apply. The tax shall be added by the county clerk, as a separate item, to the next state and county tax bill following the levy of the tax by the board of directors, and shall be collected concurrently with the state and county taxes. Neither the property valuation administrator nor the county clerk shall be entitled to any additional compensation for services rendered in connection with the listing of property for taxation nor shall the sheriff receive any additional compensation for the collection of the tax.

History. Enact. Acts 1950, ch. 42, § 23; 1978, ch. 384, § 235, effective June 17, 1978.

Opinions of Attorney General.

While KRS Chapters 268 and 104 both deal with flood control, they provide entirely separate means of establishing and financing flood control districts; under Chapter 268, the district is created by order of the fiscal court and is funded by beneficial assessments which are not a tax and are collected under the mechanism established in KRS 268.420 ; under Chapter 104, the district is established by the secretary for natural resources and environmental protection and the tax authorized is a property tax that is added to the regular property tax bills. OAG 92-23 .

Since the Spencer County Flood Wall Commission was organized under Chapter 268, the provisions in that chapter apply and the Commission must follow the tax collection procedure set out in Chapter 268, which precludes the inclusion of the assessment on county property tax bills. OAG 92-23 .

104.680. Depreciation fund — Operation and maintenance fund.

The board of directors shall, by resolution, set aside from its annual tax revenue a proper and adequate amount to be deposited into a depreciation fund, which fund shall be used solely for replacing capital equipment, new construction, extensions or additions to the flood control works. The remainder of its annual tax revenue shall be deposited into an operation and maintenance fund to be used solely for operating and maintenance expenses in connection with the flood control works. Money accumulated in the depreciation fund may be invested by the board of directors in the manner authorized by statute for other trust funds and the income from such investments shall be deposited into the depreciation fund.

History. Enact. Acts 1950, ch. 42, § 24.

CHAPTER 105 War Memorials [Repealed]

Cities and Counties Generally

105.010 to 105.040. War memorials — Cities and counties generally. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

The following sections were repealed by Acts 1978, ch. 118, § 19, effective June 17, 1978:

105.010 Power of counties and cities to establish or erect war memorials — Use of prisoners for maintenance. (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 214, §§ 1 to 3; 1960, ch. 14, § 1, effective June 16, 1960.)

105.020 Commission for memorial — Appointment — Vacancies — Term — Oath and bond. (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 214, §§ 7 to 11; 1960, ch. 14, § 1, effective June 16, 1960.)

105.030 Powers of commission — Compensation. (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 214, §§ 12 and 13; 1960, ch. 14, § 1, effective June 16, 1960.)

105.040 Financing of memorials. (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 214, §§ 4 to 6; 1960, ch. 14, § 1, effective June 16, 1960.)

Cities of the Third Class

105.050 to 105.180. War memorials in cities of the third class. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

The following sections were repealed by Acts 1980, ch. 239, § 4, effective July 15, 1980:

105.050 Memorial commission — Appointment — Powers — Term — Vacancies — Compensation — Expenses. (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 128, § 1.)

105.060 Officers and employes of commission. (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 128, § 2.)

105.070 Bonds of officers. (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 128, § 4.)

105.080 Powers of commission in carrying out enumerated purposes. (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 128, § 3.)

105.090 Nature of memorial. (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 128, § 5.)

105.100 Plans for memorial — Investigation and report. (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 128, §§ 6, 7.)

105.110 Financing of memorial. (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 128, §§ 15 to 17.)

105.120 Bids for labor and material. (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 128, § 8; 1968, ch. 152, § 89.)

105.130 Report on completion of memorial — Tax levy for maintenance. (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 128, §§ 9, 10.)

105.140 Fiscal year — Financial statement on funds needed for maintenance — Improvement and replacement fund. (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 128, § 12.)

105.150 Limitation of maintenance expense. (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 128, § 11.)

105.160 Annual report — Accounting system — Examination and reports of accounts and records. (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 128, § 13.)

105.170 Use of memorial — Charges — Disposition of revenue. (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 128, § 14.)

105.180 City attorney to render legal service. (Enact. Acts 1946, ch. 128, § 19.)

CHAPTER 106 Acquisition of Waterworks by Cities and Water Districts

106.010. Authority of water districts and cities of the home rule class to acquire and operate waterworks.

Any water district created pursuant to KRS Chapter 74 or any city of the home rule class may, by purchase or by condemnation, acquire, establish, erect, maintain and operate waterworks, together with extensions and necessary appurtenances thereto, and including both real or personal property within or without the corporate limits of the said water district or city, for the purpose of supplying the water district or the city and its inhabitants thereof with water.

History. Enact. Acts 1954, ch. 18, § 1, effective June 17, 1954; 2014, ch. 92, § 203, effective January 1, 2015.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Location of Property.

A city has the general power to condemn land outside its corporate limits for a waterline if the city cannot acquire necessary land within or without the city limits. Baker v. Richmond, 709 S.W.2d 472, 1986 Ky. App. LEXIS 1136 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Bardstown could acquire and operate nonprofit corporation’s water system under the provisions of this section. OAG 72-20 .

A contract providing for the construction of a water and sewer system by a private developer which would require the city to pay off the costs by a refund agreement calling for fifty percent (50%) of the water and sewer charge made to each consumer in the subdivision, would be invalid. OAG 74-569 .

Whether or not a purchaser of a lot in a subdivision outside the city can be required by the subdivision developer who also installed the subdivision’s water system, to pay a fee beyond that required by the city for water services to hook onto this private system, said additional fee representing the pro rata share of the cost of the installation of the subdivision’s water system but which was not paid by prior purchasers of subdivision lots, is a private matter and the city should not become involved in a private dispute concerning a private water system. OAG 74-656 .

While KRS 96.534 provides that the rates charged for services and the standards of services maintained by municipally owned electric utilities shall be the same for customers inside and outside the corporate limits, there is no such provision for municipal water companies; therefore, water rates set by the city water company may vary for resident and nonresident users so long as they are based on reasonable and legitimate differences in connection with providing the water service. OAG 78-656 .

Research References and Practice Aids

ALR

Municipality’s liability arising from negligence or other wrongful act in carrying out construction or repair of sewers and drains. 61 A.L.R.2d 874.

Liability of water distributor for damage caused by water escaping from main. 20 A.L.R.3d 1294.

Water distributor’s liability for injury due to condition of service lines, meters, and the like, which serve individual consumer. 20 A.L.R.3d 1363.

Electricity, gas, or water furnished by public utility as “goods” within provision of Uniform Commercial Code, Article 2 on sales. 48 A.L.R.3d 1060.

Discrimination in provision of municipal services or facilities as civil rights violation. 51 A.L.R.3d 950.

106.020. Authority to acquire sewerage system with water system.

A sewerage system may be acquired with a water system and joined in one (1) project with the water system for the purpose of original financing.

History. Enact. Acts 1954, ch. 18, § 2, effective June 17, 1954.

106.030. Provisions of chapter are alternative.

This chapter shall not affect the provisions of any other laws providing any alternate plan for the acquisition and operation of water systems.

History. Enact. Acts 1954, ch. 18, § 3, effective June 17, 1954.

106.040. Agreement as to purchase price of waterworks.

The water district commissioners of water districts or the legislative body of any of the aforesaid cities may agree with the owner or owners as to the value of said waterworks and purchase it at such value.

History. Enact. Acts 1954, ch. 18, § 4, effective June 17, 1954.

106.050. Authority to borrow money and issue bonds.

For the purpose of defraying the cost of acquiring by condemnation, purchase or construction any such waterworks, including real and personal property of same and appurtenances or extensions thereto, the water district or the city may borrow money and issue negotiable bonds, but only after a resolution has been adopted by the water district commissioners or an ordinance has been adopted by the legislative body of the said city specifying the proposed undertaking, the amount of bonds to be issued and the maximum rate of interest the bonds are to bear.

History. Enact. Acts 1954, ch. 18, § 5, effective June 17, 1954.

Research References and Practice Aids

ALR

Improvement district permanently organized, priority as between successive issues of obligations of. 99 A.L.R. 1488.

106.060. Interest and payment of bonds.

Bonds may be issued bearing interest at a rate or rates or method of determining rates, payable at least annually, and shall be executed in a manner and be payable at times not exceeding forty (40) years from the date of issue, and at a place or places as the water district commissioners or the city legislative body determines.

History. Enact. Acts 1954, ch. 18, § 6, effective June 17, 1954; 1996, ch. 274, § 29, effective July 15, 1996.

106.070. Bonds negotiable — Sale — Nonliability of city.

Bonds issued pursuant to this chapter shall be negotiable and shall not be subject to taxation. If any officer whose signature or countersignature appears on the bonds or coupons ceases to be an officer before delivery of the bonds, his signature or countersignature shall nevertheless be valid and sufficient for all purposes the same as if he had remained in office until delivery. The bonds shall be sold in a manner and upon terms as the water district commissioners or the city legislative body deems for the best interest of the water district or city, or any contract for the purchase or acquisition of any waterworks may provide that payment shall be made in bonds. The bonds shall be payable solely from the revenue funds derived from the waterworks and shall not constitute an indebtedness of the city within the meaning of the Constitution. It shall be plainly stated on the face of each bond that it does not constitute an indebtedness of the city within the meaning of the Constitution.

History. Enact. Acts 1954, ch. 18, § 7, effective June 17, 1954; 1996, ch. 274, § 30, effective July 15, 1996.

106.080. Proceeds of bonds not to be diverted — Lien on waterworks property.

All moneys received from the bonds shall be applied solely for the purchase by agreement or condemnation or establishment or erection of the waterworks and extensions and appurtenances thereto, or to advance the payment of the interest on the bonds during the first three (3) years following the date of the bonds. A statutory mortgage lien shall exist upon the waterworks and appurtenances and extensions so acquired in favor of the holders of the bonds and coupons.

History. Enact. Acts 1954, ch. 18, § 8, effective June 17, 1954.

106.090. Remedies of bondholders.

The waterworks so acquired, together with the extensions and appurtenances, shall remain subject to the statutory lien until the payment in full of the principal and interest of the bonds. Any holder of the bonds or coupons may, by action at law or in equity, protect and enforce the lien and enforce and compel performance of all duties required by this chapter, including the making and collecting of sufficient rates, the segregation of the income and revenue, and the application thereof.

History. Enact. Acts 1954, ch. 18, § 9, effective June 17, 1954.

106.100. Procedure in case of default.

If there is any default in the payment of the principal and interest of any bond, any court having jurisdiction of the action may appoint a receiver to administer the waterworks on behalf of the water district or city, with power to charge and collect rates sufficient to provide for the payment of any bonds or obligations outstanding against the waterworks and for the payment of the operating expenses, and to apply the income and revenue in conformity with the provisions of this chapter and in conformity with the resolution adopted by the water district commissioners or the ordinance adopted by the city legislative body as hereinbefore set out.

History. Enact. Acts 1954, ch. 18, § 10, effective June 17, 1954.

106.110. Pledge of income and revenue — Form of resolution or ordinance.

At or before the issuance of the bonds the water district commissioners shall, by resolution, or the city legislative body shall, by ordinance, set aside and pledge the income and revenue of the waterworks into a separate and special fund to be used and applied in payment of the cost thereof and in the maintenance, operation and depreciation thereof. The resolution or ordinance shall definitely fix and determine the amount of revenue necessary to be set apart and applied to the payment of the principal and interest of the bonds, and the proportion of the balance of the income and revenues to be set aside as a proper and adequate depreciation account, and the remaining proportion of such balance shall be set aside for the reasonable and proper operation and maintenance of the waterworks. The rates to be charged for service from the waterworks shall be fixed and revised from time to time so as to be sufficient to provide for payment of interest upon all bonds and to create a sinking fund to pay the principal thereof when due, and to provide for the operation and maintenance of the waterworks and an adequate depreciation account.

History. Enact. Acts 1954, ch. 18, § 11, effective June 17, 1954.

106.120. Transfer of surplus in operating and maintenance funds to depreciation account.

If a surplus is accumulated in the operating and maintenance funds equal to the cost of maintaining and operating the waterworks during the remainder of the calendar, operating or fiscal year and during the succeeding like year, any excess over such amount may be transferred at any time by the water district commissioners or city legislative body to the depreciation account, to be used for improvements, extensions or additions to the waterworks.

History. Enact. Acts 1954, ch. 18, § 12, effective June 17, 1954.

106.130. Expenditure of depreciation account funds.

The funds accumulating to the depreciation account shall be expended in balancing depreciation in the waterworks or in making new constructions, extensions or additions thereto. Any such accumulations may be invested as the water district commissioners or city legislative body may designate and if invested the income from such investments shall be carried into the depreciation account.

History. Enact. Acts 1954, ch. 18, § 13, effective June 17, 1954.

106.140. City to pay charges for waterworks service.

The reasonable cost and value of any service rendered to the city by the waterworks may be charged against the city and shall be paid for monthly as the service accrues from the current funds or proceeds of taxes which the city shall levy in an amount sufficient for that purpose. The funds so paid shall be accounted for in the same manner as other revenues of the waterworks.

History. Enact. Acts 1954, ch. 18, § 14, effective June 17, 1954.

Opinions of Attorney General.

A city was liable to a water district for rent upon fire plugs maintained by the water district in the city for the city’s use. OAG 66-209 .

106.150. Funding bonds.

The water district or city may issue new bonds to provide funds for the payment of any outstanding bonds, in accordance with the procedure prescribed by this chapter. The new bonds shall be secured to the same extent and shall have the same source of payment as the bonds refunded.

History. Enact. Acts 1954, ch. 18, § 15, effective June 17, 1954.

106.160. Additional bonds.

If the water district commissioners or city legislative body finds that the bonds authorized will be insufficient to accomplish the purpose desired, additional bonds may be authorized and issued in the same manner.

History. Enact. Acts 1954, ch. 18, § 16, effective June 17, 1954.

106.170. Additional bonds for extensions and permanent improvements.

Any water district or city acquiring any waterworks pursuant to the provisions of this act may, at the time of issuing the bonds for such acquisition, provide for additional bonds for extensions and permanent improvements to be placed in escrow and to be negotiated from time to time as proceeds for that purpose may be necessary, or the water district or city may, at any time, provide for the extension, addition or improvement of the waterworks by an additional issue of bonds. Bonds placed in escrow shall, when negotiated, have equal standing with the bonds of the same issue.

History. Enact. Acts 1954, ch. 18, § 17, effective June 17, 1954.

106.180. Authority to provide for administration and security of bondholders.

The water district commissioners of a water district may provide by resolution or the city legislative body may provide by ordinance such provisions and stipulations for the administration of the income and revenues of the waterworks and for the security of the bondholders as it deems necessary.

History. Enact. Acts 1954, ch. 18, § 18, effective June 17, 1954.

106.190. Setting aside of fund equal to amount of secured debt or charge.

The resolutions or ordinances required by this chapter may set apart a fund equal to the amount of any secured debt or charge subject to which a waterworks is acquired, and shall set aside to that fund, from the balance of the income and revenues of the waterworks remaining after setting aside the funds for payment of principal and interest of bonds, a sum sufficient to comply with the requirements of the instrument creating the lien or securing the charge. If the instrument does not make any provision therefor, the resolution or ordinance shall fix and determine the amount that shall be set aside for interest on the secured debt or charge and a fixed amount to pay the principal thereof at maturity. Any surplus after satisfying the secured debt or charge may be used for the redemption of the principal and interest of bonds. Bonds may be issued pursuant to the provisions of this chapter in exchange for or in satisfaction of such secured debt or charge, or may be sold and the proceeds applied in payment of the secured debt or charge at or before maturity.

History. Enact. Acts 1954, ch. 18, § 19, effective June 17, 1954.

106.200. Procedure for sale, conveyance, rental, or lease of waterworks system owned by city of the home rule class.

No city of the home rule class which owns a waterworks system shall sell, convey, rent, or lease the system without the assent of a majority of the legislative body for the city or of those voting at an election held for that purpose after notice of the election has been published pursuant to KRS Chapter 424. This section shall not apply to the issuance of revenue bonds provided for under the provisions of this chapter.

History. Enact. Acts 1954, ch. 18, § 20; 1966, ch. 239, § 118; 1984, ch. 6, § 1, effective July 13, 1984; 2000, ch. 529, § 10, effective July 14, 2000; 2014, ch. 92, § 204, effective January 1, 2015.

106.210. Powers and functions of water district commissioners and city legislative bodies.

Except as otherwise specifically provided in this chapter the water district commissioners of the water district and the legislative body of the municipalities shall exercise all powers conferred by virtue of this chapter. Any board operating under the provisions of this chapter shall have the legal power and capacity to perform any act not repugnant to law and shall have the express power and capacity to do any and all acts or things necessary or convenient for the carrying out of the purposes of this chapter, including but not by way of limitation, the following express powers:

  1. Acquire, hold and dispose of property, real and personal, tangible and intangible, necessary or incident to the proper conduct of its business;
  2. Construct, acquire, own, lease, operate, maintain and improve plants or works for the production, pumping, filtration, treatment, distribution or sale of water and may provide water service to any user or consumer within and without the boundaries of said water district or municipality and may charge and collect reasonable rates therefor;
  3. Construct, own, lease, rent, operate and control any and all works, buildings, facilities and equipment across, along, or under any street or public highway, and over any lands which are now or may be the property of the Commonwealth of Kentucky or of any county or municipality within this Commonwealth. The water district or municipality shall, however, at its own expense, restore any such street or highway to its former condition and state as nearly as may be possible and shall not use the same in a manner as to impair its usefulness or to interfere with or obstruct the maintenance thereof. Before exercising these powers the board shall obtain a permit or consent or approval in writing from the governing authority of the municipality, or the fiscal court, or the Department of Highways having appropriate jurisdiction over any and all of such respective streets or public highways;
  4. Accept gifts, grants of property, real or personal, including money, from any person, municipality, or federal agency, or both, and to accept voluntary and uncompensated services; Provided, however, that when engineering services are required by any water district or municipality to render any services authorized or required or incident to surveys, plans, estimates of cost, or the valuation of property, or in the preparation of reports authorized by this chapter, no engineer who is engaged in whole or in part in the business of buying or selling any waterworks or water distribution system equipment, machinery, fixtures, materials, supplies, or the sale or purchase of bonds shall be eligible for employment or for any services whatsoever under the provisions of this chapter. The limitations hereinabove provided shall also apply to any firm of engineers and to any member of any firm of engineers, if the firm or member of the firm is engaged in whole or in part in the business of buying or selling any waterworks or water distribution system machinery, equipment, fixtures, materials, supplies, or the sale or purchase of bonds; and no such firm or member of such firm shall be eligible for employment or for any service whatsoever under the provisions of this chapter. Provided, further, that the provisions of this chapter shall not be construed to prohibit the board or the governing authority of any water district or municipality from obtaining the advice or services of any engineer in the regular employment of the state or any federal governmental agency;
  5. Contract debts and borrow money for the acquisition or improvement of any water plant and appurtenances thereto, issue bonds to finance such acquisition or improvement, provide for the rights of holders of the bonds and to secure the bonds as hereinafter provided, and pledge all or any of the net revenues derived from sale of water to the payment of such debts or repayment of money borrowed;
  6. Acquire, hold, and, subject to the provisions of this chapter, and the applicable provisions of any bonds or contracts, dispose of any property, real or personal, tangible or intangible, or any right or interest in any such property in connection with any water plant and appurtenances thereto and whether or not subject to mortgages, liens, charges, or other encumbrances, subject to the provisions and requirements of this chapter;
  7. Make contracts and execute instruments containing such covenants, terms, and conditions as in the discretion of the board may be necessary, proper, or advisable for the purpose of obtaining loans from any source, or grants, loans or other financial assistance from any governmental agency, including, but without limitation, covenants, terms, and conditions with respect to the acquisition or construction of any water plant and appurtenances thereto or any improvement thereto with money in whole or in part borrowed from or granted by any governmental agency; make all other contracts and execute all other instruments as in the discretion of the board may be advisable in or for the furtherance of the acquisition, improvement, operation and maintenance of any water plant and appurtenances thereto and the furnishing of water service; and carry out and perform the covenants, terms, and conditions of all such contracts or instruments;
  8. Enter on any lands, waters and premises for the purpose of making surveys, soundings and examinations in connection with the acquisition, improvements, operation or maintenance of any water plant and appurtenances thereto and the furnishing of water service;
  9. Do all acts and things necessary or convenient to carry out the powers expressly given in this chapter;
  10. Make any contracts necessary or convenient for the full exercise of the powers herein granted, including, but not limited to, contracts for either the purchase or sale or both the purchase and sale of water and contracts for the acquisition or improvement of all or any part of a water plant and appurtenances thereto; and in connection with any such contract with a governmental agency, the board may stipulate and agree to such covenants, terms, and conditions as the governing body deems appropriate including, but without limitation, covenants, terms and conditions with respect to the resale rates, financial and accounting methods and the manner of disposing of the revenue of the water plant and appurtenances thereto conducted and operated by the board.

History. Enact. Acts 1954, ch. 18, § 21, effective June 17, 1954.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Ordinance.

A city ordinance requiring an owner of real estate to pay for water services furnished to his real estate, thus treating the owner as the consumer, is not arbitrary or unreasonable. Puckett v. Muldraugh, 403 S.W.2d 252, 1966 Ky. LEXIS 326 ( Ky. 1966 ).

106.220. Power of eminent domain.

  1. Any water district or municipality referred to herein shall have the right to acquire by exercise of the power of eminent domain all lands, easements, rights of way, either upon or under or above the ground, any existing water plant or water distribution system and appurtenances thereto, or any part of same, within the boundaries or corporate limits of such water district or city, and any and all real estate, franchises or personal property reasonably necessary or desirable in connection with the construction or operation or maintenance of water plants or water distribution systems, or improvements or extensions thereto, and the right to acquire same is hereby declared to be a superior and paramount right, superior and paramount to any other public use, and further provided that as in the eminent domain proceedings to acquire from any public or private utility a water plant or water distribution system the property condemned must include all the property owned by the utility within the corporate limits of the said water district or the city which is used or useful in connection with the business of providing water service.
  2. The condemnation or eminent domain proceedings shall be brought in the name of the water district or in the name of the municipality, and title to the property so condemned shall be taken in the name of the water district or municipality as the case may be.

History. Enact. Acts 1954, ch. 18, § 22, effective June 17, 1954.

Research References and Practice Aids

ALR

Incidental private benefit, effect of. 53 A.L.R. 21.

106.230. Procedure for condemnation.

When the board of any water district or municipality authorized to acquire, construct, own or operate a waterworks or water distribution system and appurtenances thereto, under the provisions of this chapter shall be unable to contract with the owner of any land, easements, rights of way, waterworks, water distribution systems and appurtenances thereto, or any facilities or property needed by such board for its use for the purposes thereof and desires to exercise the right of eminent domain, the board shall proceed pursuant to the Eminent Domain Act of Kentucky.

History. Enact. Acts 1954, ch. 18, § 23; 1974, ch. 386, § 25; 1976, ch. 140, § 60.

Compiler’s Notes.

The Eminent Domain Act of Kentucky is compiled as KRS 416.540 to 416.680 .

106.240. Trial of exceptions to report — Appeal. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1954, ch. 18, § 26; 1966, ch. 239, § 119; 1968, ch. 110, § 17) was repealed by Acts 1976, ch. 140, § 129. For present law see KRS 416.620 .

106.250. Limitation on right to challenge validity of resolution or ordinance.

Any action challenging the validity of any resolution adopted by any water district commissioners of a water district or challenging the validity of any ordinance adopted by the legislative body of any of the cities electing to operate under this chapter, any bond resolution or ordinance, or other resolution or ordinance, shall be brought within twenty (20) days from the date on which such resolution or ordinance was adopted, as the case may be, and if such action challenging the validity of same is not brought within such time the same shall be forever barred.

History. Enact. Acts 1954, ch. 18, § 25; 1966, ch. 69, § 1.

106.260. Form of bonds — Improvement or refunding bonds — Negotiability — Procedure for sale.

  1. Bonds issued pursuant to this chapter by water district commissioners and by a legislative body of a municipality may be issued in one (1) or more series, may bear a date or dates, may mature at a time or times, not exceeding forty (40) years from their respective dates, may be in a denomination or denominations, may be in a form, either coupon or registered, may carry registration and conversion privileges, may be executed in a manner, may be payable in a medium of payment, at a place or places, may be sold or hypothecated in blocks, and may be subject to the terms of repurchase or redemption of all or any of the bonds before maturity in a manner, and at a price or prices as may be fixed by the board prior to the sale of the bonds.
  2. The board at any time may issue and sell revenue bonds to finance improvement or issue and sell refunding bonds for the purpose of providing funds for the payment of any outstanding bonds issued in accordance with the provisions of this chapter. The new bonds shall be issued, sold, and secured in accordance with the provisions of this chapter for the issuance of the original revenue bonds.
  3. All revenue bonds issued pursuant to the provisions of this chapter in the hands of bona fide holders, shall have all the qualities and incidents of negotiable instruments under the law merchant. All bonds shall be sold to the highest responsible bidder at a time and place as shall have been fixed by the board in the notice of the sale of the bonds, which notice shall have been advertised by publication pursuant to KRS Chapter 424. The board shall receive written, sealed competitive bids, which shall be publicly opened and read at the time and place specified in the notice of sale. The board may reject all bids and readvertise.

History. Enact. Acts 1954, ch. 18, § 26; 1966, ch. 239, § 119; 1968, ch. 110, § 17; 1996, ch. 274, § 31, effective July 15, 1996.

106.270. Public Service Commission and other state agencies to have no jurisdiction over waterworks.

Neither the Public Service Commission nor any other board, commission or agency of Kentucky shall, unless in the future expressly authorized, have any jurisdiction over such water district or municipality, operation, management and control of any water plant or water distribution system or appurtenances thereto, or any power or authority over the regulation of rates or charges.

History. Enact. Acts 1954, ch. 18, § 27, effective June 17, 1954.

CHAPTER 107 Municipal Improvements — Alternate Methods

107.010. Construction and finance of improvements — Alternate method authorized.

Incorporated municipalities are authorized to provide for, construct, and finance improvements, as herein defined, according to the plan set forth in this chapter. The authority hereby conferred is not intended to be in derogation of any authority otherwise conferred upon such municipalities, but is alternative and in addition thereto. If a municipality has taken any step or steps under any other law to provide for, construct or finance any improvements allowed to be undertaken by this chapter, it may abandon the procedure under the other law, if it so desires, and proceed under the provisions of this chapter, if it can do so without impairing any contractual right or contractual rights.

History. Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 239, § 1; 1970, ch. 242, § 1.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Construction.

This chapter does not attempt to require payment from a common school appropriation, but rather provides that payment shall be made from any funds which may happen to be in the state treasury and have not been appropriated for some other purpose. Robertson v. Danville, 291 S.W.2d 816, 1956 Ky. LEXIS 400 ( Ky. 1956 ).

2. Invalid Flat Rate Tax.

Fire protection service charge levied by city, for purpose of financing city’s fire protection services on property within the city, whereby various types of property were assessed at a flat rate, was not an ad valorem tax or a special assessment and was not authorized by statute or the Constitution and was, therefore, invalid. Barber v. Commissioner of Revenue, 674 S.W.2d 18, 1984 Ky. App. LEXIS 467 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984).

Opinions of Attorney General.

If a city of the fourth class desires to construct a proposed sewer line and desires to proceed on the assessment method, the provisions in either KRS Chapter 94 (repealed) or 107 must be utilized and complied with in regard to the assessment of property and property owners and a flat charge of $1,000 against the affected residents, whether considered an assessment or tap-on fee is not statutorily permissible. OAG 75-577 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

City bridges, tunnels and ferries, KRS Ch. 181.

City streets connecting with state or federal highways, construction and maintenance by state, KRS 177.047 .

Injury on public way, action against city, KRS 411.110 .

Metropolitan sewer districts, KRS 76.005 to 76.210 .

Prevailing wages to be paid on public works, KRS 337.510 .

Public works involving $2000 or more to be planned by registered engineer or architect, KRS 322.360 .

Railroad construction upon streets, KRS 277.060 .

Sanitation districts, KRS Ch. 220.

Sewer construction district, provisions for establishment of in counties containing metropolitan sewer district, KRS 76.295 to 76.420 .

Street may be established or dedicated as limited-access facility, KRS 177.220 to 177.310 .

Streets, taking by private corporations, Ky. Const., § 163.

Telephone and telegraph lines, regulation of, Ky. Const., § 199.

107.015. Purpose of KRS 107.020, 107.030, 107.085, 107.140, and 107.190.

It is the purpose of KRS 107.020 , 107.030 , 107.085 , 107.140 , and 107.190 to extend permissive authority of municipalities for assessment financing of certain public improvements according to the “assessed value” basis by (a) permitting such financing of sewage treatment plants and appurtenances, as well as other sewer installations, (b) simplifying procedures under certain conditions, (c) permitting assessment bonds for sewer projects to mature over a period up to thirty (30) years, and (d) amending and reenacting certain specified sections of this chapter to make them consistent herewith.

History. Enact. Acts 1960, ch. 226, § 1; 1970, ch. 242, § 1.

107.020. Definitions.

  1. The term “governing body,” as used in this chapter, means and includes the legislative body of any city, whether the same be designated by applicable statutes as a general council, a common council, a city council, a board of commissioners, or otherwise. The term “governing body,” as used in KRS 107.010 to 107.220 shall include the legislative body of any county unless the context requires otherwise. The terms “municipality” and “city” as used in KRS 107.010 to 107.220 shall include county within their meaning unless the context requires otherwise.
  2. The term “ordinance” means and includes any ordinance enacted in accordance with the general laws applicable to ordinances of the class of city in question, and the form of government thereof, and in accordance with the provisions of this chapter.
  3. The term “public way” means and includes streets, boulevards, avenues, roads, lanes, alleys, parkways, courts, terraces, and other courses of travel open to the general public by whatsoever name designated.
  4. The terms “improvement” and “project” mean and include:
    1. The construction of public ways or the substantial reconstruction or widening thereof;
    2. The construction, installation, or substantial reconstruction of sanitary, storm, or combined sewers and appurtenances;
    3. The construction, enlargement or substantial reconstruction of sewage treatment plants for rendering sewage less hazardous to public health, safety, and general welfare;
    4. The construction, installation, or substantial replacement of fire hydrants and necessary water mains and appurtenances in any city; or
    5. Any combination of the same. Bonds for improvements defined in paragraphs (b), (c) and (d) of this subsection may be caused to mature as to principal in term or serial maturities not to exceed thirty (30) years from date of issue.
  5. The term “costs” as applied to any project undertaken under this chapter includes the cost of labor, materials, and equipment necessary to complete the project in a satisfactory manner, cost of land acquired, and every expense connected with the project, including preliminary and other surveys, inspections of the work, engineers’ fees and costs, attorneys’ fees, preparation of plans and specifications, publication of ordinances and notices, interest which will accrue on the bonds until the due date of the first annual improvement assessment levied in connection therewith, a sum equal to any discount in the sale of the bonds (if discount bids are authorized and permitted by the governing body), a reasonable allowance for unforeseen contingencies, the printing of bonds, and other costs of financing which may include the payment of a fee to a fiscal agent for advice and assistance in the preparation and marketing of the bonds. As applied to wastewater collection projects undertaken by metropolitan sewer districts “costs” also include:
    1. The cost of inspections of work as construction progresses;
    2. Interest which will accrue on the bonds until the due date of the first annual improvement assessment if a lump sum is not paid;
    3. Capitalized interest on the bonds for a period not to exceed three (3) years;
    4. All or any portion of the debt service reserve requirement, if determination is made to finance same from bond proceeds;
    5. Payment of attorneys’ fees, underwriting and fiscal agency fees, trustees’ fees, rating service fees if approved by the fiscal court; and
    6. Other costs of issuance of bonds.
  6. The term “assessed value basis” means the plan for the levying of annual improvement benefit assessments on the basis of the assessed values of the benefited properties, as authorized by this chapter. As applied to wastewater collection projects undertaken by metropolitan sewer districts, “assessed value basis” means the plan for the levying of annual improvement benefit assessments upon benefited property for the benefits conferred by the construction of projects on the basis of the ad valorem assessed values (land only) of the benefited property, whether the owners pay such levies in full or on an annual basis to amortize bonds. Identical annual improvement benefit assessments upon classified zones of benefited property may also be included in this plan where determination is made by order of a metropolitan sewer district, as provided in KRS 107.030 , that benefits conferred by construction of a project are substantially equal and that the assessed value (land only) of all benefited property or designated zones thereof shall therefore be deemed equal in respect of a given wastewater collection project.
  7. The term “front-foot basis” refers to the plan for financing improvements by apportioning the cost among benefited properties upon the basis of the number of linear feet thereof abutting upon the improvement project, as otherwise provided by law.
  8. The terms “property to be benefited,” “properties to be benefited,” “benefited property” and “benefited properties” all mean and refer to the property or properties defined in KRS 107.140 . As applied to wastewater collection projects undertaken by metropolitan sewer districts, “benefited property” and “property to be benefited” mean the property (land only) proposed to be benefited by construction of a wastewater collection project instituted by a metropolitan sewer district and against which lump-sum or annual improvement benefit assessments are to be levied.
  9. “Construction” means the following services and facilities provided by a metropolitan sewer district:
    1. Preliminary planning to determine the economic and engineering feasibility of construction of wastewater collection projects, and any engineering, architectural, legal, fiscal, and economic investigations and studies necessary. Also included are all necessary surveys, designs, plans, working drawings, specifications, procedures, and other required actions incident to the construction of wastewater collection projects;
    2. The building, acquisition, installation, erection, alteration, remodeling, improvement, expansion, or extension of wastewater collection projects and any other physical devices reasonably associated with such projects;
    3. The provision of sewer collection services and facilities to benefited property although not directly financed by the issuance of bonds; and
    4. Inspection and supervision incident to the acquisition, construction, and installation of wastewater collection projects.
  10. “Debt service reserve requirement” means with respect to any particular issue of bonds for a wastewater collection project of a metropolitan sewer district, the maximum annual requirements for payment of principal of and interest on such bond issue funded either in whole or in part by application of bond proceeds or accrued by the levying of improvement benefit assessments as provided in KRS Chapters 76 and 107.
  11. “Metropolitan sewer district” means a joint metropolitan sewer district which has been duly created under KRS 76.005 to 76.210 .
  12. “Order” means a formal and binding enactment of the board of a metropolitan sewer district entered in connection with the financing by such district of a wastewater collection project.
  13. “Wastewater” means any water or liquid substance containing sewage, industrial waste, or other pollutants or contaminants.
  14. “Wastewater collection project” means treatment plants and all or part of any facilities and systems of a metropolitan sewer district used in the collection, holding, or transmission of wastewater from a benefited property to wastewater treatment plants or other similar facilities for final disposition. These terms shall include, without being limited to, sanitary sewage collection lines, intercepting sewers, outfall sewers, sewer laterals, power stations and pumping stations, and other equipment and their appurtenances necessary to enable the project to fulfill its function, including land acquisition, if required, whether such project facilities are provided by funds derived from issuance of bonds or otherwise provided by a district in any manner.
  15. “Classified zone” means any portion of any construction phase of a wastewater collection project designated by a metropolitan sewer district after a determination that all property located in such zone is benefited substantially equal by such construction.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 239, § 2; 1960, ch. 226, § 2; 1964, ch. 161, § 1; 1970, ch. 242, § 2; 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 13, § 10; 1982, ch. 388, § 4, effective July 15, 1982; 1984, ch. 111, § 57, effective July 13, 1984; 1986, ch. 23, § 8, effective July 15, 1986; 1994, ch. 63, § 1, effective July 15, 1994; 2014, ch. 92, § 205, effective January 1, 2015; 2019 ch. 44, § 18, effective June 27, 2019.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Improvement Benefit Assessment.

An improvement benefit assessment, though levied on an ad valorem basis, is not an ad valorem tax and is not a tax within the constitutional concept. Robertson v. Danville, 291 S.W.2d 816, 1956 Ky. LEXIS 400 ( Ky. 1956 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

A municipal corporation can install a sanitary sewer line and assess therefor not only the abutting property owners but the owners of property not abutting, but who are contained in the drainage limit. OAG 68-104 .

107.030. Procedure for use of alternate method.

If a municipality desires to authorize, construct, and finance an improvement pursuant to this chapter, its governing body shall initiate the proceedings by adopting an ordinance, herein called the “First Ordinance,” in which announcement shall be made of the public way or ways (which need not be contiguous) proposed to be improved and the geographical limits of the proposed improvement in such manner as to identify the benefited properties or the identity of the property or properties to be benefited by the fire hydrant in a city or by the sewer installations (which may include a sewage treatment plant) which properties may be identified by naming the public way or ways upon which they abut, if any, or by geographical location, or both. In either case the ordinance shall recite the nature and scope of the improvement, a preliminary estimate of the costs thereof, as submitted in writing by an engineer, or firm of engineers, holding a license from the Commonwealth of Kentucky, and the amount, if any, which the city proposes to appropriate from available city funds toward the estimated cost. Any metropolitan sewer district desiring to initiate a wastewater collection project pursuant to this chapter shall, by order of its board cause a written preliminary engineering and financing report to be prepared by one (1) or more engineers, or one (1) or more firms of engineers, licensed to do business in the Commonwealth of Kentucky, or alternatively, by district personnel, for submission to the district. The preliminary engineering and financing report shall designate a geographical area in which a wastewater collection project is recommended for construction. The report shall contain a reasonable description of the project facilities proposed to be constructed, a statement as to benefits to be conferred by the proposed project, the distribution of the benefits and an estimate of the cost of the proposed project. The board of the district shall receive the preliminary engineering and financing report at a regular meeting. The board shall study and evaluate it, and by duly entered order either approve, disapprove the report as submitted, or amend and approve the report. Following approval of the preliminary engineering and financing report by the board of the metropolitan sewer district, the board shall formally initiate proceedings for the construction and financing of the proposedwastewater collection project. This announcement shall identify all benefited properties by naming the public way upon which such benefited properties abut, if any, or by geographical location, or by other appropriate description. The first ordinance shall describe the nature, scope and preliminary cost estimate of the wastewater collection project being proposed. The ordinance shall determine that each parcel of land identified as benefited property shall be afforded benefits by the projects unless specifically excluded. A public hearing shall be held in respect of the proposed wastewater collection project. In all succeeding proceedings, the city shall be bound and limited by the preliminary report of the engineer, or engineers, with regard to the nature, scope, and extent of the proposed improvement project (unless the first ordinance be amended, as hereinafter provided); but shall not be bound by, or limited to, the preliminary estimate of costs. The costs shall be determined upon the basis of construction bids publicly solicited as hereinafter provided, and shall be binding upon the city, and upon the owners of property to be benefited by the proposed improvement project, whether the same turn out to be equal to, below, or above such preliminary estimate. Architects, attorneys, consultants, engineers, and fiscal agents shall be employed after reasonable advertisement of the need for their services and with such competition as is permitted by law. In a first ordinance for a wastewater collection project, the board of a metropolitan sewer district shall make findings of fact regarding the degree and nature of the benefit which will accrue to benefited properties by the installation of the project. If the board determines as a fact that groups of or all of the benefited properties will be affected and benefited in substantially the same manner and to substantially the same degree, the board may classify such benefited properties into one (1) or more assessment zones based upon the similarity of benefits to be derived. In such case, the board may deem all benefited properties within a particular assessment zone to be equally benefited and therefore equally treated for purposes of levying improvement benefit assessments for amortization of bonds issued to provide funds to pay the costs of the project. It is the intent of KRSChapters 76 and 107 to vest in the board of any metropolitan sewer district undertaking a project authority to make findings of fact in order to classify properties according to benefits conferred from the construction of projects. The board may, by appropriate order, determine that identified groups of benefited properties will be benefited in substantially the same manner by a project and these properties shall be treated equally for purposes of annual improvement benefit assessment of such benefited properties. The board may rely upon any pertinent data in making such findings of fact, including the size and diameter of sanitary sewer service connections to be made available. If the board of the district determines that all properties situated within a particularly described geographic area will not receive substantially equal benefits from the project, the board shall determine in the first ordinance that such properties shall be annually assessed for benefits conferred based upon the relative assessed land valuation of each benefited property as it relates to the aggregated assessed land valuation of all benefited properties within such particularly described geographic area. Whichever basis of assessment is selected, it shall be used both initially, when land owners may pay improvement benefit assessments in a lump sum, and subsequently during each annual period in which project bonds are outstanding if a lump-sum payment is not paid. The first ordinance shall provide for a public hearing at a time and place specified therein (not less than one (1) week after publication) and shall give notice that at the hearing any owner of property to be benefited may appear and be heard as to:

  1. Whether the proposed project should be undertaken or abandoned;
  2. Whether the nature and scope of the project shall be altered;
  3. Whether the project shall be financed through the issuance of bonds according to the “assessed value basis,” authorized by this chapter; or
  4. Whether the project shall be financed through assessments made and apportioned on a front-foot basis, as may otherwise be authorized by law. The first ordinance shall be published pursuant to KRS Chapter 424. The first ordinance may designate a person, who may be the mayor, a member of the governing body, or any city official, to preside at and conduct such public hearing. In the absence of a designation in the ordinance, the mayor or a person designated by the mayor shall preside. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the public hearing shall not be deemed irregular or improper if it is in fact presided over and conducted at the designated time and place by any elected city officer or member of the governing body.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 239, § 3; 1960, ch. 226, § 3; 1964, ch. 161, § 2; 1966, ch. 239, § 120; 1970, ch. 92, § 21; 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 13, § 11; 1986, ch. 23, § 9, effective July 15, 1986; 2014, ch. 92, § 206, effective January 1, 2015; 2019 ch. 44, § 19, effective June 27, 2019.

Opinions of Attorney General.

A municipal corporation can install a sanitary sewer line and assess therefor not only the abutting property owners but the owners of property not abutting, but who are contained in the drainage limit. OAG 68-104 .

A city may, to finance a storm sewer system to correct surface water flooding situations in certain areas, assess all or a part of the cost against the benefited property owners. OAG 74-718 .

Research References and Practice Aids

ALR

“Owner,” scope and import of term in statutes as to giving notice of making of local improvements. 2 A.L.R. 790; 95 A.L.R. 1085.

107.040. Public hearing — Record — Owners of affected property to be heard — Written statements — Vote — Results to be included in report.

A public hearing shall be held at the time and place designated in the first ordinance. Any person qualifying under the provisions of KRS 107.030 may preside and conduct such hearing. Such presiding person, or any person whom he or she may designate, shall make reasonable notes or minutes of the proceedings, and the same shall be submitted in writing to a subsequent regularly scheduled meeting of the governing body. Any owner of property intended to be benefited by the proposed improvement project may be heard at such public hearing, in person or by a representative. Any such owner may submit to the person presiding, or to the designated clerk, if one (1) be designated, a written instrument in which such owner is identified by name, address, and designation of the property owned, and containing a statement of any reason for advocating, or objecting to, any of the aspects of the proposed improvement project as set forth in subsection (1), (2), (3), or (4) of KRS 107.030 , and such written instruments shall be attached to, or included in, the written report of the hearing. Whether or not any such written instruments are submitted, the person presiding at such hearing may require those in attendance to identify themselves as owners of property to be benefited, or otherwise, and may call for a vote of such identified owners, by secret ballot or show-of-hands, on any pertinent controversial matter, and the results thereof shall be included in the subsequent written report to the governing body. The presiding officer may impose reasonable rules upon the conduct of the public hearing. Reports of local health agencies, summaries, engineering and health reports and other informative data may be made a part of the public hearing. The hearing may be adjourned to convene again, and from time to time, either at a time and place announced at the hearing, or any adjourned session, or upon public notice of such time and place, to be given in such manner as the person presiding may announce prior to the adjournment. If no owners of property to be benefited by the proposed project appear at such hearing, or if no substantial controversy develops at such hearing, regarding any of the matters enumerated in subsection (1), (2), (3), or (4) of KRS 107.030, the hearing may be adjourned sine die by the person presiding, and such facts shall be set forth in the written report to the governing body.

History. Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 239, § 4; 1970, ch. 92, § 22; 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 13, § 12.

107.050. Procedure following public hearing — Second ordinance.

  1. At a subsequent regular meeting of the governing body, the said written report of said public hearing shall be publicly received, read, and considered by the governing body of the city. At such meeting, or at any subsequent properly convened regular, adjourned or special meeting, owners of properties to be benefited may again be heard, in person or by a representative, and the governing body may adopt an ordinance (hereinafter referred to as the “Second Ordinance”), which may provide for (a) abandonment of the project, or (b) the undertaking of the proposed project, with provision for the financing thereof according to the “assessed value basis” set forth in this chapter, or (c) the undertaking of the project, with provision for the financing thereof according to any other method which may be permitted by law, or (d) altering the nature and scope of the proposed project, in which event the procedure for public hearing and a further report shall be repeated according to the preceding provisions of this chapter. If the governing body shall determine that the owners of more than fifty percent (50%), both in number of lots or parcels and in aggregate assessed value of the properties to be benefited by the project, object to the financing thereof through annual assessments levied upon the “assessed value basis,” as authorized in this chapter, the governing body may enact the second ordinance only upon the affirmative vote of members constituting not less than three- fifths (3/5) of the membership of the governing body, the names of the members so voting to be recorded in the minutes of the meeting whether or not there be any other requirement of such procedure in any other law applicable to the class of city in question. The second ordinance shall be published as provided in this chapter with respect to publication of the first ordinance.
  2. Before the second ordinance for a wastewater collection project adopted by the board of a metropolitan sewer district shall become effective, the following shall take place: (a) if the benefited property is situated outside a city of the first class, the second ordinance shall also be adopted by appropriate ordinance or resolution of the fiscal court of the county in which the district is situated, or (b) if the benefited property is situated within a city of the first class, the second ordinance shall be adopted by an appropriate ordinance of the board of aldermen of that city.

History. Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 239, § 5; 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 13, § 13.

107.060. Action by aggrieved property owner.

  1. Any owner of property to be benefited by the proposed project, including wastewater collection projects undertaken by metropolitan sewer districts may, within thirty (30) days after passage and publication of the second ordinance:
    1. File an action in the Circuit Court of the county in which the city is situated (or, if the city be situated in more than one county, in the Circuit Court of any such county) seeking relief by declaratory judgment, injunction, or otherwise; or
    2. File in the office of the city clerk a written, notarized statement of intent to file such an action, indorsed by a licensed attorney at law to the effect that, in his opinion, his client has a reasonable and legitimate probable cause for such proposed litigation, in which event the time for filing such action shall be extended for fifteen (15) days after the date such statement is filed.
  2. In the event of either (a) or (b), above, all proceedings of the city with respect to the proposed project shall be abated until final judicial determination of the controversies presented thereby. In the absence of action by any owner of property proposed to be benefited, as herein provided, the provisions of the second ordinance shall be final and binding. After the lapse of time as herein provided, all actions by owners of properties to be benefited shall be forever barred.

History. Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 239, § 6; 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 13, § 28.

107.070. Procedure when second ordinance authorizes undertaking.

  1. If the aforesaid second ordinance authorizes the undertaking of the proposed project and the financing thereof according to the “assessed value basis,” which is authorized by this chapter, and if owners of benefited properties do not take action as permitted by KRS 107.060 , or if such action be taken and shall result in final judgment permitting the city to proceed according to the first and second ordinances, the governing body of the city may proceed as authorized in this chapter.
  2. If the second ordinance of a wastewater collection project undertaken by a metropolitan sewer district authorizes the undertaking and financing of the project according to the first ordinance, and if no action is initiated as permitted in KRS 107.060 , or if such action be taken and shall result in final judgment allowing the second ordinance to stand the board of the district may implement and finance construction of the project as authorized by this chapter.

History. Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 239, § 7; 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 13, § 14.

107.080. Construction contracts — Bids — Performance bond — Wastewater collection project assessments — Bonds.

  1. Proposals for the construction of the project shall be solicited upon the basis of the submission of sealed competitive bids after advertisement, by publication pursuant to KRS Chapter 424. Upon or after the acceptance by the governing body of a bid, or combination of bids, the governing body may determine the principal amount of bonds to be issued for the proposed project, taking into account the amount of the accepted bid or bids, and all other costs of the project, as herein defined. Each contract shall be supported by a performance bond for the full amount thereof, with good surety to be approved by the governing body. In the construction of a wastewater collection project by a metropolitan sewer district, if the provisions of KRS 107.070 are met, proposals for the construction of the project shall be solicited upon the basis of submission of sealed, competitive bids after advertisement by publication pursuant to KRS Chapter 424. The district may authorize assessment levies, lump-sum payments and issuance of bonds for a project based upon estimates of construction costs or based upon partial bidding, if a determination is made that the entire project may not be feasibly bid for construction prior to authorization and issuance of bonds. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the project shall be constructed only upon or after the acceptance by the board of a competitive bid or a combination of competitive bids for construction of the project. Each contract for construction shall be supported by a performance bond for the full amount with good corporate surety to be approved by the board of the district.
  2. After all costs of a wastewater collection project undertaken by a metropolitan sewer district have been determined in accordance with this section the costs shall be apportioned among the owners of benefited property by the method of assessment previously determined in the first ordinance and the second ordinance. However, in determining the apportionment of individual costs for purposes of allowing the owners of benefited property the privilege of paying such assessment levied in full on a lump-sum basis, the district shall exclude amounts required for the creation of the debt service reserve fund, capitalized interest cost, and any bond discount which the district may allow in connection with the sale of bonds to provide funds for the cost of construction not paid initially by the owners of benefited properties on a lump-sum basis. In calculating the assessment amount to be paid by a property owner on a lump-sum basis, the district shall take into account the amount of interest the lump-sum payment may accrue in the trust account required by subsection (4) of this section between the time of the owner’s payment and the time the construction of the collector portion of the project is completed and ready for use by the assessed property and shall reduce the amount of the lump-sum payment accordingly.
  3. The owners of benefited property in wastewater collection projects undertaken by a metropolitan sewer district shall be notified in writing of the exact amount levied by the district against their individual properties. Owners may pay the amount levied in full within ninety (90) days. Owners shall be notified that if the costs of construction of the original project exceed assessments financed by both lump-sum payments and bond proceeds, additional assessments of costs will be made and that all owners who paid the initial improvement benefit assessment on a lump-sum basis must likewise pay any additional assessment on such basis. The statement shall also advise the owners that if the owners do not elect to pay the special improvement benefit assessment in full within the period of ninety (90) days from receipt, the district shall issue bonds pursuant to KRS Chapters 76 and 107 for the purpose of providing the costs of construction of the project, including the debt service reserve fund, if paid from bond proceeds, capitalized interest costs, any bond discount, together with all other costs, as such term is defined in KRS Chapters 76 and 107. The owners of benefited property shall also be advised that such bonds and their interest shall be amortized by annual improvement benefit assessment levied against all benefited properties, for which lump-sum payments have not been paid, in accordance with the method of apportionment provided by the first ordinance and the second ordinance.
  4. At the conclusion of the ninety (90) days permissive lump-sum payment period, the district board in wastewater collection projects shall determine the aggregate principal amount of assessments paid in full by owners of benefited properties and shall deposit these moneys in a trust account to be used solely to pay the costs of construction of the project. These moneys shall not be disbursed until bond proceeds are available. The district board shall aggregate all unpaid improvement benefit assessments for the purposes of determining the principal amount of bonds to be issued by such district to provide the remaining costs of the project. The district board also: (a) shall compute the debt service reserve fund in respect of such bonds, if such fund is to be capitalized from bond proceeds; (b) shall determine the bond discount and capitalized interest which shall be applicable to the issue of bonds; and (c) shall proceed to complete the financing of the costs of construction of the project through the adoption of the third ordinance as provided in KRS 107.090 and the sale of bonds authorized pursuant thereto. If, by reason of miscalculation or unforeseen events, the proceeds of the bonds authorized plus lump-sum payments previously collected should prove to be insufficient to provide for the completion of the project and full payment of all costs, the district shall be required to levy pro rata an additional assessment on owners of all benefited properties. The district shall collect sufficient additional lump-sum payments and shall issue and sell sufficient additional bonds to make up the deficiency. Any such additional bonds shall rank on a parity as to security and source of payment with the bonds originally authorized.

History. Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 239, § 8; 1966, ch. 239, § 121; 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 13, § 15.

107.085. Request for waiver of formalities — Recordation.

In the event the owner or owners of all property or properties which will be subject to assessment for an improvement proposed to be undertaken shall tender to the city their written request or requests, that the improvement be undertaken and financed according to KRS 107.010 to 107.220 , and shall waive the formalities of the “First Ordinance,” the holding of a public hearing, the “Second Ordinance,” and the provisions of KRS 107.060 , permitting litigation; the governing body may, in its discretion, dispense with all of said proceedings and formalities, and may proceed as provided in KRS 107.090 with reference to the “Third Ordinance”; but in all such instances, the written requests of the owners of all properties which will be subject to assessment shall be in recordable form and shall be recorded in the office of the county clerk of the county wherein the respective properties may be situated, and said clerk is authorized to record such instruments as in the case of mortgages, and may charge and receive fees therefor as in the case of mortgages. Each ordinance by which an improvement is undertaken according to this section shall contain a recitation of the receiving of written requests and waivers from the owners of all properties which will be subject to assessment for each such improvement. In such instances the lien for which provision is made in KRS 107.160 shall attach upon publication of the ordinance (equivalent to the “Third Ordinance”) which authorizes issuance of the improvement assessment bonds.

History. Enact. Acts 1960, ch. 226, § 4, effective March 30, 1960; 1978, ch. 384, § 236, effective June 17, 1978.

107.090. Third ordinance — Purpose — Adoption.

  1. Upon compliance with KRS 107.080 the governing body may adopt an ordinance, hereinafter referred to as the “Third Ordinance”:
    1. Finally authorizing the issuance of bonds of the city which shall be designated “Improvement Assessment Bonds” and shall, in addition, identify the project by name of streets, number, or otherwise;
    2. Determining the principal amount thereof;
    3. Establishing the denominations and maturity dates thereof, which may be term or serial maturities, not to exceed thirty (30) years from date of issue;
    4. Levying an annual assessment effective only upon the benefited properties, according to their respective assessed values as determined for the purposes of general city taxation, but without regard to any constitutional or other limits otherwise applicable to taxation for general city purposes, the annual rate of such improvement assessment to be fixed when city taxes are levied, and to be sufficient in each year to provide for the payment of such bonds and interest coupons as they mature; and, in the case of the first such levy, sufficient to provide, in addition, a sum equal to twenty percent (20%) of average annual principal and interest requirements, the same to constitute a “debt service reserve” as a precaution against possible default by reason of failures in the collection of the annual levies, as hereinafter provided;
    5. Covenanting with the holders of said bonds and coupons, that until the payment in full thereof the city will levy annually an improvement assessment upon the benefited properties only, as provided in the foregoing subsection (d) hereof;
    6. Covenanting with the holders of said bonds and coupons, that until payment in full thereof, the city will pursue and exhaust, at the city’s expense, all remedies available to the city and for the benefit and protection of the bondholders, including enforcement to judgment and decretal sale of the liens upon benefited properties, as provided in this chapter;
    7. Designating one (1) or more places of payment of principal and interest, within or without the Commonwealth;
    8. Specifying, or omitting, provisions for redemption and payment prior to stated maturities, and the terms thereof;
    9. Providing for the payment by the city of any and all reasonable and customary charges for the services of paying agents, to the end that the holders of the bonds and coupons will receive the sums therein stipulated, without deductions for such charges; and
    10. Any other provisions not contrary to law.
  2. Following compliance with the foregoing provisions of KRS Chapter 107 for a wastewater collection project undertaken by a metropolitan sewer district, the board of the district may adopt a third ordinance which shall make those provisions set forth in this subsection.
    1. The third ordinance shall determine and confirm:
      1. The nature and scope of a project;
      2. The real properties to be benefited, which shall be all benefited properties identified in the first ordinance and the second ordinance, excepting properties for which lump-sum payment of improvement benefit assessment levies had been made within the statutory period;
      3. The exact method of assessment of the benefited properties; and
      4. The costs of the project;
    2. The third ordinance shall authorize the issuance of bonds of the district periodically. The bonds shall be designated “improvement lien bonds” and shall additionally identify the project by reference to its name or title;
    3. The third ordinance shall determine the principal amount of the bond issue, subject to the provisions of KRS 107.210 ;
    4. The third ordinance shall establish the denominations and maturity dates of the bonds. The bonds may be term or serial maturities not to exceed thirty (30) years from the date of issue, and may provide for the issuance of the bonds in series, each such series to be equally secured without preference as to bondholders by improvement benefit assessments levied on all benefited properties and by liens in respect thereto;
    5. The third ordinance shall levy an annual improvement benefit assessment on the benefited properties, for which lump-sum payments were not made, pursuant to the assessed value basis according to either:
      1. Their respective assessed land values as determined for purposes of general ad valorem taxation; or
      2. Upon a basis of equality by zones, pursuant to findings of fact by the board that benefited properties in particular zone classifications are to be treated equally for assessment purposes because of substantial equality of benefits conferred. The assessments may be made without regard to any constitutional or other limits otherwise applicable to taxation for general ad valorem purposes. The annual rate of the improvement assessment shall be fixed when regular county ad valorem taxes are levied and shall be sufficient in each year to provide for the payment of the bonds and interest coupons as they mature. In each year, until accrual of the debt service reserve requirement, the annual rate shall be sufficiently large to provide an additional sum equal to twenty percent (20%) of maximum principal and interest requirement, which additional sum shall constitute a debt service reserve fund as a precaution against possible default by reason of failures in the collection of the annual levies; provided, however, that if the district shall have provided by the third ordinance that the debt service reserve requirement be financed from bond proceeds as one of the costs of the project, the additional annual benefit assessment shall be omitted, but additional levies shall promptly be instituted at any time necessary to maintain the debt service reserve requirement at its prescribed level;
    6. The third ordinance shall covenant with the holders of the bonds and coupons that until their payment in full, the district shall levy annually an improvement benefit assessment upon each and every benefited property, as provided in subsection (2)(e) of this section; provided, however, the district may provide by order that certain benefited properties be omitted from assessment during initial periods not to exceed three (3) years because of construction scheduling;
    7. The third ordinance shall covenant with the holders of the bonds and coupons that until payment in full, the district shall pursue and exhaust at the district’s expense all remedies available to the district for the benefit and protection of the bondholders. These remedies include both termination of water service to delinquent real properties and enforcement to judgment and sale of the liens upon benefited properties which are granted by this chapter;
    8. The third ordinance shall designate one or more places of payment of principal and interest within or without the Commonwealth;
    9. The third ordinance shall specify or omit provisions for redemption and payment prior to stated maturities and the terms thereof;
    10. The third ordinance shall provide for the payment by the district of all reasonable and customary charges for the services of trustees and paying agents to the end that the holders of the bonds and coupons will receive the sums stipulated without deduction for such charges; and
    11. The third ordinance may contain any other provisions not contrary to law. The district is expressly empowered to finance any particular project by an issue of bonds which may be sold and delivered in one or more series. Each series shall be equally and indistinguishably secured, as provided in KRS Chapters 76 and 107, by improvement benefit assessments levied upon all benefited properties and by liens granted for the security of bondholders by KRS Chapters 76 and 107 on benefited properties. The assessments and liens shall apply to each benefited property and in favor of each bond of each series whenever issued.
  3. In the discretion of the board of a metropolitan sewer district relating to a wastewater collection project, any improvement lien bonds or bond anticipation notes issued under KRS Chapters 76 and 107 may be secured by a trust indenture between the district and a corporate trustee, which may be any trust company or bank having the powers of a trust company within or without the Commonwealth of Kentucky. The trust indenture may pledge or assign for the security of the improvement lien bonds or notes all or any part of the proceeds of improvement benefit assessments received by the district. The trust indenture shall contain any provisions for protecting and enforcing the rights and remedies of the bondholders as may be reasonable, proper and not in violation of law, including:
    1. Covenants setting forth the duties of the district in relation to the purposes to which improvement lien bond proceeds may be applied;
    2. The disposition and pledging of receipts of improvement benefit assessments; and
    3. The custody, safeguarding and application of all improvement benefit assessment revenues. It shall be lawful for any Kentucky bank or trust company acting as depository of the proceeds of bonds, notes or district revenues, to furnish indemnity bonds or to pledge securities as required by the trust indenture of the district. Any trust indenture may set forth the rights and remedies of the bondholders and indenture trustee and it may restrict the individual right of action by bondholders. In addition, any trust indenture may contain such other provisions as the district may determine to be reasonable for the further security of the holders of the bonds. All expenses of the trust indenture shall be treated as a part of the costs of the project and shall be paid from either the proceeds of the bonds or improvement benefit assessments.
  4. All bonds issued by metropolitan sewer districts under the provisions of KRS Chapters 76 and 107 shall possess all of the qualities and incidences of negotiable instruments under the laws of Kentucky. The bonds may be issued in coupon or in registered form or in both. Provision also may be made for the registration of any coupon bonds as to principal only and also as to both principal and interest and for the reconversion into coupon bonds of any bonds registered as to both principal and interest. The district shall sell the bonds at public sale at a price that will best effect the purposes of KRS Chapters 76 and 107.
  5. Any metropolitan sewer district initiating a wastewater collection project pursuant to KRS Chapters 76 and 107 shall have and possess all powers and the authority set forth in KRS 58.150 .
  6. No benefit assessment bonds shall be sold without competitive bidding.

History. Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 239, § 9; 1970, ch. 92, § 23; 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 13, § 16.

Opinions of Attorney General.

Under this section the payment of a public improvement sewer bond is specifically limited to assessments against benefited property and, as a consequence, the city cannot supplement the payment of the bonded indebtedness by appropriating money from its general fund. OAG 71-190 .

107.100. Sale of bonds authorized by KRS 107.090 — Sealed bids — Advertisement.

After the third ordinance has been adopted (and without regard for its date of publication), the city may solicit the submission of bids or proposals for the purchasing of the bonds authorized by the third ordinance, the same to be received upon a sealed competitive basis after advertisement by publication pursuant to KRS Chapter 424. Such bids or proposals may be solicited on the basis of competition as to price and/or interest coupon rates, as may be specified in the published notice, and bids offering less than the par or face value of the bonds may be considered and accepted if so stated in the published notice of the sale. If no bids are received upon terms acceptable to the governing body and conforming to the published notice, bids may again be solicited by similar published notice, until a purchase bid is received upon terms acceptable to the governing body, but the bonds, or a portion thereof, may be awarded to a contractor, or contractors, as provided in KRS 107.200 .

History. Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 239, § 10; 1966, ch. 239, § 122.

107.110. Proceeds from sale of bonds to be deposited — Security — Disbursement.

When the bonds are delivered and the proceeds are received by the city, the same shall be deposited in a bank or trust company, or combined bank and trust company, together with the proceeds of all payments received from benefited property owners on a lump-sum basis, and to the extent such deposit may exceed insurance provided by Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, (if the depository be a member thereof, otherwise the full amount), the same shall be secured by a valid pledge of bonds or notes of the United States government, or fully guaranteed thereby, having at all times a market value equal to the undisbursed balance of such deposit; or shall be secured in such other manner as the governing body may prescribe or approve. Costs of the project which may then be earned and payable, may be paid forthwith. There shall be set aside into the sinking fund, hereinafter created, a sum from bond proceeds equal to all interest which will accrue on said bonds until the date when the first improvement assessment levied in connection therewith will become due and payable. The remainder may be disbursed from time to time in payment of costs of the project, as herein defined, except that payments on account of the construction contracts shall not exceed ninety percent (90%) of the amount shown by a written certificate of the engineer to have been earned for materials furnished and/or labor performed by any contractor, the retained ten percent (10%) to be disbursed only upon final acceptance of the finished work of such contractor. If, after completion, acceptance and payment of the work of all contractors, and the payment of all costs of the improvement project, as herein defined, there shall remain an unexpended balance of bond proceeds, such balance shall be transferred to the sinking fund created and maintained in connection with the project, as provided in this chapter. If, after completion, there remains any unexpended balance of lump-sum payments, it shall be returned, pro rata, to the payors.

History. Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 239, § 11; 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 13, § 17.

107.120. Bonds not to constitute debt against city — Not subject to taxation — Liquidation — City liable to bondholders for failure to pursue available remedies for collection of improvement assessments.

Each of said bonds shall bear on its face the statement that it has been issued under this chapter, and that it does not constitute an indebtedness of the city within the meaning of the Constitution. The bonds, and the receipt of interest thereon, shall not be subject to taxation. The bonds shall have all the qualities and incidents of negotiable instruments. The bonds, and the interest thereon, shall be payable exclusively from the proceeds of the annual improvement assessments levied from time to time upon the properties benefited by the project identified in the bonds and from the debt service reserve fund; but the city shall become directly and personally liable to the bondholders for any deficiencies which may arise from its failure to pursue to exhaustion, and in timely fashion, all remedies lawfully available in the collection of such improvement assessments.

History. Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 239, § 12; 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 13, § 18.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Construction.

The provisions of this section do not constitute an indebtedness of the city as contemplated in Ky. Const., §§ 157, 158. Robertson v. Danville, 291 S.W.2d 816, 1956 Ky. LEXIS 400 ( Ky. 1956 ).

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Election to incur indebtedness, debt limitation, Ky. Const., § 157.

Issuance of bonds by cities, KRS Ch. 66.

Time within which indebtedness to be paid, Ky. Const., § 159.

107.130. Assessment against benefited properties — Determination of assessment ratio — Special assessment.

The sum required annually for the sinking fund and consequent amortization of the outstanding bonds of a wastewater collection project undertaken by a metropolitan sewer district, whether all authorized bonds have been issued or not, shall be assessed against the benefited properties for benefits conferred. The sum shall include any amounts required annually to pay trustees’ fees, paying agents’ fees, cost of administration of the wastewater collection project, and the cost of billing, collecting and enforcing improvement benefit assessments, including fees of proper governmental bodies incident to placing assessment bills on tax statements, and collecting, enforcing and remitting same. If the board of a metropolitan sewer district in relation to a wastewater collection project has determined that all benefited properties within classified zones are substantially equally benefited, the same assessment levy shall be made against each benefited property within a classified zone. Otherwise the sum required to be raised annually for the sinking fund shall be assessed against the property benefited in the proportion that the assessed value of each lot or parcel for city taxation shall bear to the whole assessed value of the benefited properties, as shown by the records upon which city taxation may, from time to time, be based. Where there is no such record, as in the case of public property, or property owned by religious, charitable, or educational institutions, the same (except that owned by the United States government) shall be specially assessed by the proper assessing officers, and for such special assessment reasonable compensation may be made. Any such special assessment shall be subject to all procedures for equalization and judicial review as may be provided by law in connection with ordinary assessments.

History. Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 239, § 13; 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 13, § 19.

107.140. Benefited property, what constitutes, assessment of governmental property — Procedure against state.

    1. In the case of improvements of public ways, the benefited property shall consist of all real property abutting upon both sides of the improvement project, and the cost of improving intersections shall be included in the total costs to be assessed and apportioned, unless and to the extent the city shall appropriate, within constitutional limitations, from available funds, a definite and specified sum as a contribution thereto, or a portion of the aggregate cost, or the cost of specified portions of the improvement; provided, however, that if provisions shall be made for sidewalk improvements, as an integral part of the improvement of a “public way,” as defined in subsection (3) of KRS 107.020 , upon only one side of the project, the costs of the sidewalk improvement shall be ascertained and assessed separately against the property abutting upon that side only, but the governing body may provide that such assessment shall include a fair share of the over-all costs as herein defined, other than the amounts of the actual construction contracts. (1) (a) In the case of improvements of public ways, the benefited property shall consist of all real property abutting upon both sides of the improvement project, and the cost of improving intersections shall be included in the total costs to be assessed and apportioned, unless and to the extent the city shall appropriate, within constitutional limitations, from available funds, a definite and specified sum as a contribution thereto, or a portion of the aggregate cost, or the cost of specified portions of the improvement; provided, however, that if provisions shall be made for sidewalk improvements, as an integral part of the improvement of a “public way,” as defined in subsection (3) of KRS 107.020 , upon only one side of the project, the costs of the sidewalk improvement shall be ascertained and assessed separately against the property abutting upon that side only, but the governing body may provide that such assessment shall include a fair share of the over-all costs as herein defined, other than the amounts of the actual construction contracts.
    2. In the case of improvements for draining sewage, storm water, or a combination thereof, the benefited properties shall consist of all properties which are thereby afforded a means of drainage, including not only the properties which may be contiguous to the improvements, but also adjacent properties within a reasonable distance therefrom as the governing body may in the proceedings set forth.
    3. In the case of an improvement project consisting in whole or in part of a sewage treatment plant, or enlargement or substantial reconstruction of an existing sewage treatment plant, the benefited properties shall be all those properties the sewage from which is treated in such plant, including properties already provided with sewer drainage facilities as well as those properties which the improvement project will provide with such drainage facilities, but the governing body may classify properties according to the extent of benefits to be afforded to them, and may establish one (1) rate of assessment applicable to all properties participating in the benefits of the sewage treatment installations, and an additional rate of assessment applicable to properties for which the improvement project will also provide sewer drainage facilities. In relation to wastewater collection projects constructed by metropolitan sewer districts, benefited property shall consist of all property whether improved or unimproved to which the project affords a means of discharging wastewater.
    4. The governing body may, either in the proceedings initiating an improvement project, or in subsequent proceedings, recognize the necessity or desirability in the interest of the public health, safety and general welfare, that properties other than the properties originally benefited by an improvement under paragraphs (b) or (c) of this subsection, be permitted to connect to such sewer drainage and/or treatment facilities, and may make equitable provisions which may be adjustable from year to year as bonds are retired, whereby the owners of such later-connecting properties, may, by paying charges for the privilege of connecting, and/or by assuming a share of improvement assessments, or otherwise, be placed as nearly as practicable on a basis of financial equity with the owners of properties initially provided to be assessed.
    5. The governing body may, either in the proceedings initiating an improvement project, or in subsequent proceedings, recognize the necessity or desirability in the interest of the public health, safety and general welfare that residential properties within one thousand feet (1000’), measured along paved roads, of a fire hydrant in a city may be assessed on the same basis as property abutting upon a street where a fire hydrant is to be installed.
    1. Benefited property owned by the city or county, or owned by the United States government or any of its agencies, if such property is subject to assessment by Act of Congress, shall be assessed annually the same as private property, and the amount of the annual assessment shall be paid by the city, county, or United States government, as the case may be. The same right of action shall lie against the county as against a private owner. (2) (a) Benefited property owned by the city or county, or owned by the United States government or any of its agencies, if such property is subject to assessment by Act of Congress, shall be assessed annually the same as private property, and the amount of the annual assessment shall be paid by the city, county, or United States government, as the case may be. The same right of action shall lie against the county as against a private owner.
    2. Benefited property owned by the state, except property the title to which is vested in the Commonwealth for the benefit of a district board of education pursuant to KRS 162.010 , shall be assessed as follows: Before assessing the state, the governing body shall serve written notice on the secretary of the Finance and Administration Cabinet setting forth specific details including the estimated total amount of any improvement assessment proposed to be levied against any state property relative to any proposed improvement project. Said written notice shall be served prior to the next even-numbered-year regular session of the General Assembly so that the amount of any specific improvement assessment may be included in the biennial executive branch budget recommendation to be submitted to the General Assembly. Payment of any assessment shall be made only from funds specifically appropriated for that assessment. If an amount sufficient to pay the total amount of any assessment has been appropriated, then the total amount shall be paid; if an amount sufficient only to pay annual assessments has been appropriated, then only the amount of the annual assessment shall be paid. The amount of the assessment shall be certified by the city treasurer to the Finance and Administration Cabinet, which shall thereupon draw a warrant upon the State Treasurer, payable to the city treasurer, and the State Treasurer shall pay the same.
    3. In the case of property the title to which is vested in the Commonwealth for the benefit of a district board of education, the amount of the annual assessment shall be paid by the city or other local governmental agency or authority which undertook the improvement project.
  1. No benefited property shall be exempt from assessment.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 239, § 14; 1960, ch. 226, § 5; 1964, ch. 161, § 3; 1964, ch. 175, § 1; 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 13, § 20; 1982, ch. 450, § 64, effective July 1, 1983; 2001, ch. 58, § 14, effective June 21, 2001; 2014, ch. 92, § 207, effective January 1, 2015; 2019 ch. 44, § 20, effective June 27, 2019.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(1982). A technical correction has been made in this section by the Reviser of Statutes pursuant to KRS 7.136 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Benefited Property.

The provision in subsection (1) “that the benefited property shall consist of all real property abutting on both sides of the project” means that the land only, and not land plus improvements, shall be the basis of the special assessment, regardless of which method of apportionment is used. Robertson v. Danville, 291 S.W.2d 816, 1956 Ky. LEXIS 400 ( Ky. 1956 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Where the fee simple title to school property was owned by the county and the city wanted to blacktop certain roads on the property, the county was liable for its apportionate cost of the improvement as a benefited property owner. OAG 60-377 .

The city council’s requiring the board of education to make repairs in the sidewalk in front of the high school would be in direct violation of Ky. Const., § 184. OAG 68-67 .

A municipal corporation can install a sanitary sewer line and assess therefor not only the abutting property owners but the owners of property not abutting, but who are contained in the drainage limit. OAG 68-104 .

Eastern Kentucky University was not exempt from payment of a sewer bond assessment tax levied by the city of Richmond. OAG 70-377 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Title to all property owned by a school district is vested in the Commonwealth for the benefit of the district board of education, KRS 162.010 .

ALR

Parkway occupied by street railway as assessable for street improvements. 10 A.L.R. 164.

Liability of street railway which paves or is liable for paving occupied portion of street to assessment for improvement of remainder. 29 A.L.R. 679.

107.150. When levy to be made — When due — Penalties for nonpayment — Collection of improvement benefit assessments.

The annual improvement assessment for each project shall be levied by the governing body when the levy for general city or county taxes is made; and such improvement assessment levy shall be due at the same time, or times, when the general city or county taxes are due, and shall be subject to the same penalties and accrual of interest in the event of nonpayment as in the case of such general city or county taxes. The improvement benefit assessments for a wastewater collection system undertaken by a metropolitan sewer district shall be collected by the county officer charged with responsibility for the collection of ad valorem county taxes and shall be enforced in like manner.

History. Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 239, § 15; 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 13, § 21.

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross-References.

Assessment dates for cities not adopting assessment made by the property valuation administrator, KRS 91.310 , 92.420 .

Cities may adopt assessment made by the property valuation administrator, KRS 132.285 .

Tax bills in cities of the first class, when to be paid; interest and penalties, KRS 91.430 .

Time of paying taxes in cities of the second, third and fourth classes; interest and penalties, KRS 92.590 .

107.160. Assessment to constitute lien on benefited property — Precedence.

Each annual improvement assessment, including an initial levy payable on a lump-sum or cash basis, with any penalty or interest incident to the nonpayment thereof, shall constitute a lien upon the lot or parcel of benefited property against which it is assessed. The lien shall attach to each lot or parcel of benefited property as the same is described by the owner’s deed of record in the county clerk’s office at the time of the publication of the first ordinance, as herein provided, and thereupon shall take precedence over all other liens, whether created prior to or subsequent to the publication of said ordinance, except state and county taxes, general municipal taxes, and prior improvement taxes and shall not be defeated or postponed by any private or judicial sale, by any mortgage, or by any error or mistake in the description of the property or in the names of the owners. No error in the proceedings of the governing body shall exempt any benefited property from the lien for the improvement assessment, or from the payment thereof, or from the penalties or interest thereon, as herein provided. No error in the proceedings of the governing body shall exempt any property from liability for payment of any annual improvement assessment, or for any interest or penalty incident to nonpayment thereof. The city’s governing body, or any court of competent jurisdiction, shall have power to make such rules and orders as may be required to do justice to all parties.

History. Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 239, § 16, effective February 29, 1956; 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 13, § 22; 1978, ch. 384, § 237, effective June 17, 1978.

Research References and Practice Aids

ALR

Installment plan of payment as affecting duration of lien of special assessment. 114 A.L.R. 399.

Property owner’s liability for unpaid taxes following acquisition of property by another at tax sale. 100 A.L.R.3d 593.

107.170. Proceeds from assessment to be segregated — Shall constitute sinking fund.

The proceeds received by the city from each and every annual improvement assessment levy made in connection with each separate improvement project, as authorized by this chapter, shall be segregated from and kept always separate and apart from all other receipts of the city from any and all other sources, and shall be deposited in a separate and special account in a financial institution in an account so specially designated by number or other designation as to identify the same in such manner as to distinguish the receipts and deposits from each such project from the receipts and deposits from every other such project, and from any and every other account or fund of the city. The same shall constitute the “sinking fund” referred to in this chapter.

History. Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 239, § 17, effective February 29, 1956.

107.180. Sums received and deposited in sinking fund — How held — Debt service reserve — Deficiency assessment — Refund of surplus.

All sums received and deposited in the sinking fund shall be held inviolate and applied by the city solely for the payment of the principal of, and interest on, the bonds issued for the financing of the identified improvement project. The amount collected, and deposited in the sinking fund from the first improvement assessment levied in connection with any project, in excess of maturing principal and interest of the bonds, and for the purpose of creating a “debt service reserve,” shall be held in the sinking fund for that purpose. If the collections from the first annual improvement assessment levy shall fail to produce a sum sufficient to provide a “debt service reserve” equal to twenty percent (20%) of future average annual principal and interest requirements, the next annual improvement assessment shall be fixed at such level as may be calculated to restore the “debt service reserve” to such level after providing for current principal and interest maturities. The debt service reserve requirement of a wastewater collection project by a metropolitan sewer district may be funded from the proceeds of the bonds. If, at the time of any annual levy of the improvement assessment, the sum held in the sinking fund as said “debt service reserve” shall exceed the level herein specified, such excess may be taken into account in fixing the rate of the improvement assessment for the ensuing year; and if the amount so held in said “debt service reserve” is below said specified level, the next annual improvement assessment levy shall be increased in a corresponding manner. In making the improvement assessment levy for the year preceding the final maturity of bonds for any improvement project, the governing body may take into account, and make allowance for, the amount held in the sinking fund of the particular project as a “debt service reserve”; and if in making such levy the governing body shall miscalculate and provide funds insufficient to pay the final maturing principal and interest, the governing body shall be authorized to, and shall be required, to make a subsequent improvement assessment levy upon the benefited properties sufficient to make up the deficiency, with interest to date of payment. If the procedures required by this chapter shall result in a surplus after payment of the bonds, and all interest thereon to date of payment, such surplus shall be refunded, pro rata, to the owners of benefited properties, as determined at the date such surplus is ascertained by the governing body to exist.

History. Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 239, § 18; 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 13, § 23.

107.190. Action by city where ordinances and proceedings encompass less than all the undertakings contemplated by KRS 107.020, where all are encompassed and city undertakes additional improvements.

  1. If the ordinances and proceedings authorized by this chapter shall encompass and include less than all of the undertakings authorized and contemplated by the definitions set forth in KRS 107.020 , (i.e., a street improvement project with or without sidewalk, curb, gutter, and/or storm or surface water sewers or drains or sanitary sewers, or sewage treatment facilities or fire hydrant in a city ), the city shall not be precluded from ordaining and requiring the omitted matters and structures to be constructed at the expense of the benefited properties at any time in the future, in accordance with the provisions of this chapter, or in accordance with any other applicable laws.
  2. If the improvement project shall encompass all of the elements included in the definition of “improvement” or “project” as set forth in this chapter, the city shall not thereafter undertake any project for any part of the improvements as herein defined, except:
    1. At the exclusive cost of the city;
    2. At the cost of the benefited properties from and after fifteen (15) years after completion and acceptance of the project, or
    3. From the proceeds of revenue bonds payable from service charges.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 239, § 19; 1960, ch. 226, § 6; 1964, ch. 161, § 4; 2014, ch. 92, § 208, effective January 1, 2015; 2019 ch. 44, § 21, effective June 27, 2019.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(6/27/2019). Under the authority of KRS 7.136(1), the Reviser of Statutes has inserted an internal numbering system in this statute. No words were changed in the process.

107.200. Procedure by city where no bids received on offered bonds.

If any city of the classes referred to in this chapter shall adopt the third ordinance and shall publicly solicit the submission of bids or proposals for the purchasing of its “improvement assessment bonds” for the project identified, and shall fail to receive a bid upon terms of price and/or interest coupon rate, or rates, conforming to the published notice and acceptable to the governing body, the bonds, or a portion of the bonds, may be awarded to the contractor, or contractors, at a price of not less than the minimum price permitted by the published notice, but only upon the following conditions:

  1. The entire bond issue authorized by the third ordinance may be awarded to the contractor, or contractors, if it or they shall submit to, and obtain formal approval by, the governing body of the city, of a written undertaking (approved as to form and substance by the city’s duly designated legal counsel):
    1. Agreeing to accept in full and agreed payment of the amount, or the aggregate of the amounts, of their respective contracts, bonds as authorized by the third ordinance equal in principal amount (or as near as may be practicable) to the amount, or the aggregate of the amounts of their contracts (in which event the bonds shall be the latest maturing and highest numbered of the bonds authorized by the third ordinance); and
    2. Agreeing to pay to the city, in cash, the purchase price of the bonds to the extent that the bonds exceed the aggregate amount of the contracts of the contractor, or contractors, who are signatories of the written instrument; or
  2. Bonds equal to the amount, or amounts, of the contracts of the contractor, or contractors, who are signatories of a written instrument agreeing to accept the same in payment of the bonds, approved as to form and substance by the city’s properly designated legal counsel, may be awarded to a contractor, or contractors, in the event the city is able to, and does, (within constitutional restrictions) appropriate from available funds a sum in cash sufficient to defray all costs of the project, as defined in this chapter, in excess of the amount of the construction contract, or the aggregate of the several contracts. In that event, the sum so appropriated by the governing body of the city shall be applied to the payment of the costs;
  3. In the event of procedure as set forth in either subsection (1) or (2) of this section, the bonds awarded to the contractor, or contractors (other than those paid for in cash as set forth in the foregoing subsection (1)), shall be placed by the city, in escrow, with a responsible financial institution, with written instructions that the bonds may be released to the contractor, or contractors, from time to time, but in principal amount not exceeding seventy-five percent (75%) of the amount certified in writing by the engineer, or engineers, to the escrow agent, and the city, to have been earned by and payable to the identified contractor, or contractors, under the terms and conditions of their respective contracts. Upon final approval and acceptance of the project by the governing body, the reserved twenty-five percent (25%) of the bonds may be released and delivered to the contractor, or contractors.

History. Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 239, § 20; 1968, ch. 110, § 18; 1996, ch. 274, § 32, effective July 15, 1996.

107.210. Procedure where proceeds of bonds authorized by third ordinance insufficient.

If, by reason of miscalculation or the happening of unforeseen events or conditions, the proceeds of the bonds authorized by the third ordinance should prove to be insufficient to provide for the completion of the project and the payment in full of all costs thereof, the governing body shall be authorized to issue and sell additional bonds sufficient to make up the deficiency, and such additional bonds shall rank on a parity as to security and source of payment with the bonds originally authorized. In the case of wastewater collection projects, the metropolitan sewer district shall be required to levy pro rata an additional assessment on owners of benefited property who have elected to make lump-sum payments in full.

History. Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 239, § 21; 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 13, § 24.

107.220. Refunding bonds — When issued.

The governing body may issue refunding bonds for the purpose of providing for payment of any outstanding bonds. The refunding bonds shall be secured to the same extent and shall have the same source of payment as the bonds which are refunded.

History. Enact. Acts 1956, ch. 239, § 22, effective February 29, 1956.

Community Improvement Districts

107.310. Definitions.

As used in KRS 107.320 to 107.500 , unless the context otherwise requires:

  1. “District” means a county community improvement district established as provided in KRS 107.310 to 107.500 ;
  2. “Board” means the board of commissioners which controls and manages the affairs of the district;
  3. “Governmental unit” means a county or any city of any class, or any corporate agency of any such county or city, or any independent district, authority or other municipal corporation except a board of education, existing within the area of the district; and
  4. “Building and related facilities,” or “building” or “facilities” means any real or personal property, including but not limited to structures, sites, parks, forests, wharves, floodwalls, boats and other improvements except sewers, drainage facilities and other utilities unless related to one of the foregoing.

History. Enact. Acts 1970, ch. 155, § 1.

107.320. Community improvement districts for counties containing a city with population of 3,000 or more — Corporate powers.

In counties containing a city with a population equal to or greater than three thousand (3,000) based upon the most recent federal decennial census, a community improvement district may be created as provided in KRS 65.182 for the purpose of erecting buildings and related facilities for any governmental unit, or combination of governmental units, in the county. Any community improvement district so created shall include all of the territory in the county, including the area of incorporated cities, and shall be designated the “County Community Improvement District” (hereinafter called the “district”). The district shall constitute a public body corporate, with perpetual succession and power in its name to contract and be contracted with, sue and be sued, adopt bylaws, have and use a corporate seal, and exercise all of the powers granted to public nonprofit corporations generally by KRS Chapter 273, except such powers as may be inconsistent with specific provisions of KRS 107.310 to 107.500 .

History. Enact. Acts 1970, ch. 155, § 2; 1972, ch. 313, § 1; 1978, ch. 384, § 238, effective June 17, 1978; 1984, ch. 100, § 9, effective July 13, 1984; 1994, ch. 175, § 1, effective July 15, 1994; 2014, ch. 92, § 209, effective January 1, 2015.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Establishment of District.

The county court has no choice in establishing the district, since the district exists by virtue of the passage of KRS 107.310 to 107.500 and the county court simply notes of record the fact of such existence. Lowery v. Jefferson, 458 S.W.2d 168, 1970 Ky. LEXIS 167 ( Ky. 1970 ).

2. Taxation.

Although KRS 107.310 to 107.500 does not validly provide for the establishment of a separate, independent taxing district, the district board may be established and function under the terms of KRS 107.310 to 107.500 as a corporate arm of the county government with the tax upon voter approval of projects being levied as a county tax. Lowery v. Jefferson, 458 S.W.2d 168, 1970 Ky. LEXIS 167 ( Ky. 1970 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Sections 27 and 28 of the Kentucky Constitution preclude a member of the General Assembly from serving at the same time as a member of the Board of Commissioners of a Community Improvement District. OAG 93-70 .

A jail may be constructed through a community improvement district under this section, but revenues derived from a community improvement district ad valorem tax, under KRS 107.350 , may be lawfully applied only to the operation of the building under KRS 107.370(6), in which the jail is housed, and not to the general expenses of “operating of the jail.” Additionally, the question to be submitted to the voters in connection with a proposed community improvement district project or projects is whether they approve or disapprove of a project or projects, rather than solely whether they approve of a given tax increase under the provisions of KRS 107.360 . OAG 95-14 .

107.330. Purpose of district.

The purpose of the district shall be to provide for the acquisition or construction, and the necessary equipping of, such buildings and related facilities as may be needed, for any project which serves a county purpose, by any governmental unit within the territorial limits of the district, or any combination of any such units.

History. Enact. Acts 1970, ch. 155, § 4; 1972, ch. 313, § 2.

107.340. Board of commissioners — Membership — Terms — Officers — Quorum — Removal of board members.

  1. A district shall be administered by a board of commissioners (the “board”), which shall control and manage the affairs of the district. The term of each commissioner shall be four (4) years except as herein specified. The board shall consist of four (4) members who shall be appointed by the county judge/executive with the approval of the fiscal court. Initial appointments shall be for terms of one (1), two (2), three (3) and four (4) years as designated by the county judge/executive. Thereafter, as the term of each member expires, his successor shall be appointed for a term of four (4) years. Not more than three-fourths (3/4) of the persons appointed to membership on the board shall be members of the same political party, as determined, in the case of each person, by such person’s registration record at the time of his or her appointment.
  2. The board shall elect its chairman from among its members and may appoint a secretary, an executive director, and other officials and employees who need not be members of the board. Members of the board shall not receive compensation for their services, but shall be reimbursed for their actual expenses necessarily incurred in the performance of their duties. A quorum for the transacting of the business of the board shall consist of three (3) members.
  3. A member of the board may be removed from office as provided by KRS 65.007 .

History. Enact. Acts 1970, ch. 155, § 3; 1972, ch. 313, § 3; 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 20, § 6, effective January 2, 1978; 1980, ch. 18, § 11, effective July 15, 1980.

107.350. Levy of ad valorem tax.

In order to accomplish its purposes the district, through its board, may request the fiscal court of the county in which it is located to levy an ad valorem tax on all property within the district which is assessed for local taxation at a rate which shall not exceed ten (10) cents per $100 of assessed value of said property and which shall not exceed the amount necessary to amortize any bonds (whether revenue or general obligation bonds) issued or proposed to be issued to finance the project or projects proposed by the district, plus operating expenses of the district. All ad valorem taxes authorized by KRS 107.310 to 107.500 shall be collected in the same manner as are county ad valorem taxes and shall be turned over to the board as the governing body of the district. Such ad valorem taxes shall be solely for the benefit and purposes of the district and shall be in addition to all other ad valorem taxes. Said fiscal court shall levy the ad valorem tax so requested initially and from year to year thereafter if required to amortize any bonds (whether revenue or general obligation bonds) issued or proposed for a project not disapproved under the authority of KRS 107.310 to 107.500 , but it shall refuse to levy any tax if no bonds (whether revenue or general obligation bonds) are issued or outstanding, and if the proposed project to be financed by the bonds has been disapproved as set out in KRS 107.360 .

History. Enact. Acts 1970, ch. 155, § 5.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Tax Levy.

The fiscal court of the county in which the district is created has the power of ultimate decision on every question of importance and it cannot be required to levy a tax in any year except to the extent necessary to amortize general obligation bonds. Lowery v. Jefferson, 458 S.W.2d 168, 1970 Ky. LEXIS 167 ( Ky. 1970 ).

2. — Expenditure of Funds.

Tax money obtained by the district board under KRS 107.310 to 107.500 as a county tax must be expended only for projects that constitute valid county purposes and any tax so levied must be counted under Ky. Const., § 157 as part of the regular tax rate of the county. Lowery v. Jefferson, 458 S.W.2d 168, 1970 Ky. LEXIS 167 ( Ky. 1970 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

A jail may be constructed through a community improvement district under KRS 107.320 , but revenues derived from a community improvement district ad valorem tax, under this section, may be lawfully applied only to the operation of the building under KRS 107.370(6), in which the jail is housed, and not to the general expenses of “operating of the jail.” Additionally, the question to be submitted to the voters in connection with a proposed community improvement district project or projects is whether they approve or disapprove of a project or projects, rather than solely whether they approve of a given tax increase under the provisions of KRS 107.360 . OAG 95-14 .

107.360. Submission of question of project to voters — Procedure on approval.

  1. Prior to or concurrently with the adoption by the board of a resolution requesting the fiscal court to levy an ad valorem tax, the board shall have determined the nature and approximate cost of the project or projects to be financed through the issuance of bonds (whether revenue or general obligation bonds) to be retired through the levy of the tax. In determining the nature of a project the board may include more than one (1) improvement item in a single project. The resolution designating the project or projects and the estimated and approximate cost of each, shall be forwarded to the fiscal court, which shall thereafter, on behalf of the district, cause said resolution to be published in the newspaper of bona fide circulation as provided in KRS 424.130 . Thereafter the fiscal court shall cause to be prepared a question for submission to the voters of the district at the next regularly scheduled November election as to whether or not the project, or any one (1) or more projects if there be more than one (1), shall be disapproved. The question shall be filed with the county clerk not later than the second Tuesday in August preceding the regular election. The question shall be so framed that any voter who wishes to vote for the project, or for any project designated as a single project if there be more than one (1) project, may signify his approval by voting “yes,” and any voter who wishes to vote against any project so designated may do so by voting “no” on the question of that project. If a majority of those voting on the question of any project shall approve the particular project, that project shall be adopted, and the board shall proceed to initiate issuance of the authorized bonds as provided in KRS 107.310 to 107.500 . The county clerk shall cause such question to be prepared for presentation to the voters, and the election results shall be canvassed and certified by the county board of election commissioners.
  2. If the project is approved as herein provided, the tax necessary to finance the approved project shall be computed by the board and transmitted to the fiscal court, which shall levy the tax as provided in KRS 107.350 . Nothing in KRS 107.310 to 107.500 shall be deemed to require the fiscal court to levy a tax in any year unless general obligation bonds have been issued as provided in KRS 107.460 , and then only to the extent of requirements for amortization of such bonds.

History. Enact. Acts 1970, ch. 155, § 6; 1972, ch. 313, § 4; 1978, ch. 384, § 239, effective June 17, 1978; 1982, ch. 360, § 33, effective July 15, 1982; 1996, ch. 195, § 51, effective July 15, 1996.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Constitutionality.

KRS 107.310 to 107.500 is not invalid as requiring a vote of the people to take effect, since Ky. Const., § 60, expressly excluded from its prohibition, laws relating to public buildings or improvements and the regulation by counties of their local affairs. Lowery v. Jefferson, 458 S.W.2d 168, 1970 Ky. LEXIS 167 ( Ky. 1970 ).

2. Submission to Voters.

In so framing the question to be submitted to the voters as to allow a separate vote on each project, as required by this section, structures or facilities having unrelated purposes could not be joined as one project. Lowery v. Jefferson, 458 S.W.2d 168, 1970 Ky. LEXIS 167 ( Ky. 1970 ).

It is sufficient for the question to the voters to set forth a clear and concise description of the project and its estimated cost, without stating the amount or duration of the annual tax levy required to finance the project. Lowery v. Jefferson, 458 S.W.2d 168, 1970 Ky. LEXIS 167 ( Ky. 1970 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

A jail may be constructed through a community improvement district under KRS 107.320 , but revenues derived from a community improvement district ad valorem tax, under KRS 107.350 , may be lawfully applied only to the operation of the building under KRS 107.370(6), in which the jail is housed, and not to the general expenses of “operating of the jail.” Additionally, the question to be submitted to the voters in connection with a proposed community improvement district project or projects is whether they approve or disapprove of a project or projects, rather than solely whether they approve of a given tax increase under the provisions of this section. OAG 95-14 .

107.370. Powers of board.

In addition to its general powers specified in KRS 107.310 to 107.500 , the board, after approval of any proposed project by resolution of the fiscal court, shall have power to finance and construct buildings and related facilities for the joint or separate use of any one (1) or more of the governmental units within the territorial limits of the county, or of federal agencies, and to convey or lease said buildings and facilities in whole or in part, or space therein, to said governmental units or federal agencies in accordance with the provisions of KRS 107.310 to 107.500 . The board may cause any such building and related facilities to be designed in anticipation of reasonably foreseeable future needs; and to the extent the capacity thereof may be surplus to needs existing at the time of occupancy, such surplus capacity may be leased to nongovernmental persons or parties, subject to cancellation upon reasonable notice when such capacity or facilities shall be required for the purposes of governmental units. Said board shall have the government, management, regulation, control and operation of any buildings financed, constructed and leased pursuant to the provisions of KRS 107.310 to 107.500 and shall have the power to improve, reconstruct, repair and maintain said buildings and all additions thereto; provided, however, that the board may contract with the lessee of any building for the maintenance and operation of such building. The board shall also have power, acting in the name of the district, as follows:

  1. To condemn, appropriate, lease, rent, purchase and hold any real estate, regardless of whether the same be then held for a governmental or public use, and materials or personal property needed or deemed useful in connection with buildings constructed or to be constructed pursuant to KRS 107.310 to 107.500 ;
  2. To enter upon any lots or lands for the purpose of surveying or examining the same for a proper public purpose under KRS 107.310 to 107.500 ;
  3. To design, order, contract for and construct, reconstruct and maintain such buildings and related facilities and to make all necessary or desirable improvements to the grounds and premises under its control;
  4. To determine, allocate and adjust space in said buildings to be used by any governmental unit;
  5. To construct, maintain and operate auditoriums, public meeting places, and parking facilities in conjunction with or as a part of said buildings;
  6. To operate any such buildings, to receive and collect any moneys due on account of such operation or otherwise relating to such buildings and to expend such moneys for proper purposes; and in connection therewith to let concessions for the operation of restaurants, cafeterias, public telephones, news and cigar stands, and vending machines, the above concessions for operations of said restaurants, cafeterias, public telephones, news and cigar stands and vending machines shall be let on open and competitive bidding, and to employ such managers, superintendents, architects, engineers, attorneys, auditors, clerks, foremen, custodians, and other employees, as it may deem necessary for the proper carrying on and operation of any such buildings and to fix compensation of all such employees; provided, however, that no contract of employment shall be made for a longer fixed period than four (4) years, but may be extended or renewed from time to time thereafter;
  7. To make and enter into all leases, contracts and other agreements necessary or incidental to the performance of its duties and the execution of its powers under KRS 107.310 to 107.500 .

History. Enact. Acts 1970, ch. 155, § 21.

Opinions of Attorney General.

A jail may be constructed through a community improvement district under KRS 107.320 , but revenues derived from a community improvement district ad valorem tax, under KRS 107.350 , may be lawfully applied only to the operation of the building under subsection (6) of this section, in which the jail is housed, and not to the general expenses of “operating of the jail.” Additionally, the question to be submitted to the voters in connection with a proposed community improvement district project or projects is whether they approve or disapprove of a project or projects, rather than solely whether they approve of a given tax increase under the provisions of KRS 107.360 . OAG 95-14 .

107.380. Annual report — Compliance with KRS 65A.010 to 65A.090.

  1. The board shall annually file a written report concerning its operations with the county judge/executive.
  2. The board shall comply with the provisions of KRS 65A.010 to 65A.090 .

History. Enact. Acts 1970, ch. 155, § 21; 2013, ch. 40, § 50, effective March 21, 2013.

107.390. Condemnation powers of board.

The district shall have the same power to condemn property for its purposes as the Department of Highways of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, and shall institute any action for condemnation under the provisions of the statutes applicable to said department. The official order of the board shall be conclusive of the public use of the condemned property and the board’s decision as to the necessity for taking the property will not be disturbed in the absence of fraud, bad faith, or abuse of discretion.

History. Enact. Acts 1970, ch. 155, § 8.

107.400. Approval necessary to condemnation action.

Prior to the instituting of an action for condemnation the board shall secure the approval of the fiscal court for such action.

History. Enact. Acts 1970, ch. 155, § 20.

107.410. Lease of buildings and facilities to governmental units — Sublease.

  1. Any governmental unit within the territorial limits of the county shall be authorized to lease all or any part of the buildings and related facilities from the district, subject to constitutional limitations, and the district shall have the power to lease buildings or any part thereof to said governmental units. Any governmental unit which enters into such contract of lease may sublease a part or parts of such leased premises to other governmental units within the territorial limits of the county. No such contract of lease or any sublease to another governmental unit of a particular building shall be entered into for a period of more than forty (40) years but said contract of lease and each such sublease may be renewable for a like or lesser period. The rentals to be paid to the district by the lessee shall be specified in the lease agreement, and the district may agree to contribute a portion or all of such payments from its own funds. The district shall be bound for the amount of the contribution agreed upon, provided, however, that such contribution will be payable only from such income and revenue as actually has been provided to the district.
  2. In determining the amount of the contribution which the board agrees to pay the board shall take into consideration any previous contributions which may have been allowed to the particular lessee, previous contributions which may have been allowed to other governmental units, and the relative assessed values of the property in the various governmental units in the county.

History. Enact. Acts 1970, ch. 155, § 9; 1972, ch. 313, § 5.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Renewal of Leases.

The renewal authority of the board is limited to committing funds already in the hands of the board or which will be received by the board if the fiscal court chooses to levy the tax. Lowery v. Jefferson, 458 S.W.2d 168, 1970 Ky. LEXIS 167 ( Ky. 1970 ).

2. Contribution of Rent.

Although the provision of this section authorize the district board, on a year-to-year basis, to agree to contribute a portion of the rental payments under a lease agreement, the power of the district board to agree, for any year, to contribute such rental payments must be confined to payment from such income and revenue as actually has been provided to the board for that year and only for projects that would serve a county purpose. Lowery v. Jefferson, 458 S.W.2d 168, 1970 Ky. LEXIS 167 ( Ky. 1970 ).

107.420. Contract of lease prior to acquisition of site and construction of buildings.

Any governmental unit within the territorial limits of the county may, in anticipation of the construction and erection of such buildings, including the necessary equipment and appurtenances thereof, make and enter into a contract of lease with such district prior to the actual acquisition of a site, if a site is to be acquired, and the construction and erection of such buildings.

History. Enact. Acts 1970, ch. 155, § 10.

107.430. Lease options.

Any such lease may provide that the lessee may have an option to renew said lease for a like or lesser term, on such conditions as may be provided for in such lease and may contain an option to purchase at any time prior to the expiration of the term of such lease on such date or dates in any year as may be fixed therein, at a price to be computed by a method which shall be set forth in said contract of lease, and such option may be given to one or more of the lessees acting jointly or severally. No lease shall provide, nor be construed to provide, that any governmental unit shall be under any obligation to purchase such leased building.

History. Enact. Acts 1970, ch. 155, § 11.

107.440. Conveyance or lease of land by governmental unit to district.

Any governmental unit or units desiring to have buildings erected on land owned or to be acquired by it or them may convey such lands (whether then with or without improvements) to the district, or may lease such land to the district for a nominal rental for the same period of years that such governmental unit proposes to lease the particular building, or portion thereof, to be constructed wholly or in part thereon, and, in the event the land was leased, may grant an option to the district to purchase such land within six (6) months after the expiration of the lease on the building in the event such governmental unit or units shall not have exercised or shall not exercise an option to purchase such building within the terms of the contract of lease. Any such conveyance or lease of land by a governmental unit to the district shall be authorized by the governing body of such governmental unit by resolution or ordinance which shall be entered in the official records of said governing body. Such authorization may be given concurrently with the authorization by such governmental unit of a lease by it of the particular building, or portion thereof, to be constructed wholly or in part on said land. The deed, in the case of a conveyance of the land, or the lease, in the case of a lease thereof, shall be executed on behalf of the governmental unit by the officer or officers authorized by law to execute contracts on behalf of such unit and said lease shall be executed on behalf of the district by the chairman and secretary of the board.

History. Enact. Acts 1970, ch. 155, § 12.

107.450. Revenue bonds authorized.

The district is authorized to defray the cost of acquiring any real or personal property for the purposes contemplated by KRS 107.310 to 107.500 through the issuance of revenue bonds, and for that purpose the district shall have all the powers and duties that are granted to or imposed upon governmental units by law, including specifically the terms and provisions of KRS 58.010 to 58.140 .

History. Enact. Acts 1970, ch. 155, § 13.

107.460. Prerequisites to issuance of bonds.

The board, subject to the approval required by KRS Chapter 66, may sell and deliver its general obligation bonds not to exceed in principal amount any limitation provided in Section 158 of the Constitution, in the manner and at the times for public sale as it deems proper, provided that before the bonds may be issued, the board shall take the same actions required by KRS Chapter 66.

History. Enact. Acts 1970, ch. 155, § 14; 1984, ch. 111, § 58, effective July 13, 1984; 1996, ch. 274, § 64, effective July 15, 1996; 1996, ch. 280, § 24, effective July 15, 1996.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(7/15/96). This section was amended by 1996 Ky. Acts chs. 274 and 280. Where these Acts are not in conflict, they have been codified together. Where a conflict exists, Acts ch. 280, which was last enacted by the General Assembly, prevails under KRS 446.250 .

107.470. Power to borrow money — Pledge of taxes or anticipated income.

The district may borrow money from any source on its own credit in anticipation of revenue to be derived from taxes or other income, and for such purposes the district may pledge the taxes or other income anticipated, subject to constitutional limitations. The district may enter into contracts with governmental units for the initiation of projects deemed to benefit such units, or which will be leased to such units, and such units may appropriate or advance funds to the district for its expenses, including general expenses of operation related thereto.

History. Enact. Acts 1970, ch. 155, § 15.

107.480. Applicability of KRS 61.390.

In the issuance of either general obligation or revenue bonds by the district the provisions of KRS 61.390 shall apply.

History. Enact. Acts 1970, ch. 155, § 16.

107.490. Contract with county for administrative functions — Approval of expenditures.

In order to avoid duplication of functions within the area of the district, the district shall contract with the county for the performance of administrative functions, and all expenditures proposed by the district shall be submitted to the county judge/executive for approval, subject to confirmation by the fiscal court; provided, however, that when a project has been undertaken and bonds issued after initial approval by the fiscal court as required by KRS 107.370 , the board shall be required to continue any contribution which it has contracted to continue as provided in KRS 107.410 , to the extent of the income and revenue provided to the board.

History. Enact. Acts 1970, ch. 155, § 17; 1972, ch. 313, § 6; 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 20, § 6, effective January 2, 1978.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Validity of Act.

The provision of this section requiring submission of all proposed expenditures of the district to the county judge (now county judge/executive) for approval, subject to confirmation by the fiscal court, is valid as the district is an agency of the county and there is no subjection of one independent municipal corporation to the control of another. Lowery v. Jefferson, 458 S.W.2d 168, 1970 Ky. LEXIS 167 ( Ky. 1970 ).

107.500. Conveyance to federal government not limited.

Nothing herein shall be deemed to limit the conveyance of a project or any portion of a project to the federal government or any agency thereof in the manner required by federal statute.

History. Enact. Acts 1970, ch. 155, § 18.

Financing Wastewater Collection Projects

107.600. Kentucky wastewater revolving fund. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 13, § 6) was repealed by Acts 1982, ch. 388, § 7, effective July 15, 1982.

107.610. Uniformity of benefit assessments — Payment. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 13, § 7) was repealed by Acts 1982, ch. 388, § 7, effective July 15, 1982.

107.620. Return of lump sum improvement benefit assessments to owners of property not benefited if project not completed. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 13, § 8) was repealed by Acts 1982, ch. 388, § 7, effective July 15, 1982.

107.630. Sewer assessment hardship fund. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 13, § 9) was repealed by Acts 1986, ch. 331, § 63, effective July 15, 1986.

Water Privatization Projects

107.700. Legislative policy.

The General Assembly declares that the policy of this Commonwealth is to assure its citizens adequate public services, at reasonable cost, and that such services are essential to the maintenance and general welfare of the citizens of this Commonwealth and to the continued expansion of the Commonwealth’s economy, job market, and industrial base. However, the cost of constructing, owning, and operating capital facilities to meet the demand for those public services is becoming increasingly burdensome to cities, counties, urban-counties, and improvement districts and it is desirable that innovative financing mechanisms be made available to assist the communities of this Commonwealth in developing drinking water, water, and wastewater projects at reasonable cost. Private sector ownership and operation of capital facilities providing public services can result in cost savings to communities contracting for those public services. It is therefore in the best public interest of the Commonwealth and its citizens that cities, counties, urban-counties, and improvement districts be authorized to cause such services to be provided by private enterprise, and to contract with private owners or private owner/operators for providing the service to the public.

History. Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 456, § 1, effective July 15, 1986.

107.710. Definitions.

As used in KRS 107.720 to 107.760 , unless the context otherwise requires:

  1. “Agreement” means a short-term agreement or a long-term agreement;
  2. “Bonds” means industrial revenue bonds issued by a city, county or urban-county pursuant to KRS 103.200 et seq.;
  3. “Cost” means with respect to any privatization project or facility related thereto:
    1. All costs of designing, planning, acquiring, constructing, reconstructing, modifying, improving, maintaining, equipping, extending, furnishing and placing in service any privatization project, including architectural, planning, engineering, legal and fiscal advisors’ fees or costs and any costs incident to the acquisition of any necessary property, easement of right-of-way;
    2. Any costs incurred for preliminary planning to determine the economic or engineering feasibility of a proposed privatization project, including, without limitation, costs of economic investigations and studies, surveys, preparation of designs, plans, working drawings, specifications and inspection and supervision of the construction of any facility;
    3. All costs incident to the purchase, installation, or financing of equipment, machinery, and other personal property required by a privatization project;
    4. All costs incident to the authorization and issuance of bonds, including accountants’ fees, attorneys’ fees, financial advisors’ fees, underwriting fees (including bond discount) and other professional services and printing costs;
    5. All costs incident to the establishment and funding of appropriate reserve funds; and
    6. Interest estimated to accrue on any bonds issued to finance a privatization project for a reasonable time prior to construction, during construction and for a reasonable period of time after construction;
  4. “Drinking water project” means any work or facility necessary or desirable to provide water for human consumption and other domestic uses, including collection, treatment, storage, distribution facilities, and any related structures and facilities;
  5. “Facility” means any structure, building, machinery, system, land, water right, or other property necessary or desirable to provide the services contemplated by a privatization project, including, without limitation, all related and appurtenant easements and rights-of-way, improvements, utilities, landscaping, sidewalks, roads, curbs and gutters, and equipment and furnishings;
  6. “Governing authority” means the persons, board, body or entity in which the legislative powers of a political subdivision are vested;
  7. “Legislative body” means the board or body in which the general legislative powers of a city, county or urban-county are vested;
  8. “Long-term agreement” means an agreement or contract having a term of more than five (5) years and less than fifty (50) years;
  9. “Political subdivision” means the state or any city, county, urban-county, improvement district, water conservancy district, special district, special taxing district, drainage district, metropolitan water district, irrigation district, separate legal or administrative entity constituting a political subdivision under the laws of the state;
  10. “Private owner or private owner/operator” means a person or entity that is not a political subdivision and which owns or owns and operates a privatization project;
  11. “Privatization project” means all or part of any drinking water, water, or wastewater project which is owned or operated by a private owner or private owner/operator, and provides the related services to political subdivisions;
  12. “Short-term agreement” means any contract or agreement having a term of five (5) years or less;
  13. “Wastewater project” means sewage collection systems and treatment plants, including, without limitations, intercepting sewers, outfall sewers, force mains, pumping stations, instrumentation and control systems, and other appurtenances necessary or useful for the collection, removal, reduction, treatment, purification, disposal, and handling of liquid and solid waste, sewage and industrial waste and refuse;
  14. “Water project” means any work or facility necessary or desirable to conserve, develop, protect, or treat the waters of this state including, without limitation, any reservoir, diversion dam, irrigation dam and system, culinary water system, water work, water treatment facility, canal, ditch, artesian well, aqueduct, pipeline, conduit, drain, tunnel, and related structures and facilities; and
  15. “Waters of this state” means any stream, lake, pond, marsh, watercourse, waterway, well, spring, irrigation system, drainage system, or other body or accumulation of water, whether surface, underground, natural, artificial, public or private, or other water resource of the state which is contained within or flows in or through the state.

History. Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 456, § 2, effective July 15, 1986.

107.720. Privatization contracts — Notice — Hearing — Competitive bidding — Assignment of contract.

  1. Any political subdivision may enter into a privatization contract with a private owner or private owner/operator to accomplish the transfer of any political subdivision owned drinking water, water or wastewater project or the designing, construction, operation, maintenance, financing of cost or any combination thereof, of a drinking water, water or wastewater project pursuant to the provisions of KRS 107.720 to 107.760 .
  2. Prior to a political subdivision entering into a privatization contract pertaining to its drinking water, water or wastewater project, or any portion thereof, the governing authority shall cause notice of its intention to adopt an ordinance to accomplish such privatization to be published pursuant to KRS Chapter 424. The notice shall set forth a brief summary of the privatization contract provisions, and set a time and place for a public hearing to be conducted by the executive authority of the political subdivision. The notice shall be published each week for a period of two (2) weeks, the first publication being not less than thirty (30) days prior to the adoption of the ordinance approving the execution of the privatization contract. The hearing may be held in conjunction with any hearing on the question of issuing bonds to finance the cost of the privatization project, or on the question of adoption of the service agreement, or any other question. A copy of the proposed privatization contract shall be filed as a public record with the clerk of the political subdivision not less than thirty (30) days prior to the adoption of the aforesaid ordinance.
  3. Notwithstanding whether the political subdivision has adopted the provisions of KRS 45A.345 to 45A.460 , the privatization contract, the service agreement or any other purchase by the local government in connection with a privatization contract under KRS 107.720 to 107.760 may be made or awarded by competitive bidding, competitive negotiation, or negotiation.
  4. The privatization contract or the service agreement may be assigned by either party to secure the performance of any obligation in connection with the financing of construction or operation of a drinking water, water or wastewater project.

History. Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 456, § 3, effective July 15, 1986.

107.730. Service agreements — Notice — Hearing.

  1. In connection with a privatization contract, a political subdivision, if authorized by its governing body, may enter into one (1) or more service agreements with a private owner or private owner/operator pursuant to which the private owner or private owner/operator will provide one (1) or more services to or for the benefit of such political subdivisions. The service agreement shall provide for the purchase by the political subdivision of all or any part of the capacity, capability, or output of the facilities used to provide the applicable service, and the charges or rates for such services, and shall contain such other terms and conditions as the political subdivision and the private owner or private owner/operator may agree including, without limitation, a covenant by the political subdivision to maintain rates sufficient to pay debt service incurred in connection with the financing of construction of a drinking water, water or wastewater project. The service agreement, the privatization contract, the charges and rates for services, and private owner or private owner/operator shall not be subject to the jurisdiction of the Kentucky Public Service Commission or any successor regulatory agency unless and only to the extent that the private owner or private owner/operator sells any part of the services or output of the facility to a person or entity other than the political subdivision which is a party to the service agreement.
  2. Prior to the execution of a service agreement, the governing body of the political subdivision shall cause notice of its intention to adopt an ordinance to accomplish such service agreement to be published pursuant to KRS Chapter 424. The notice shall set forth a brief summary of the service agreement provisions, and set a time and place for a public hearing to be conducted by the executive authority of the local government. The notice shall be published each week for a period of two (2) weeks, the first publication being not less than thirty (30) days prior to the adoption of the ordinance approving the execution of the service agreement. The hearing may be held in conjunction with any hearing on the question of issuing bonds to finance the cost of the privatization project, or on the question of adoption of the service agreement, or any other question. A copy of the proposed service agreement shall be filed as a public record with the clerk of the political subdivision not less than thirty (30) days prior to its adoption.

History. Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 456, § 4, effective July 15, 1986.

107.740. Recall of ordinance creating privatization project.

  1. Any ordinance creating a privatization project pursuant to KRS 107.720 to 107.760 , which provides for the transfer of ownership of an existing publicly-owned facility to a private owner or private owner/operator, shall be subject to being recalled pursuant to the public question procedure set out in KRS 83A.120 , except that such recall procedure shall not apply to an expansion of an existing facility. Upon the receipt of a petition requesting recall, the ordinance shall be suspended from going into effect pending the result of the election. If a majority of the votes cast upon the question is in the negative the ordinance shall not go into effect. If a majority of the votes cast upon the question is in the affirmative, the ordinance shall go into effect in accordance with its terms.

History. Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 456, § 5, effective July 15, 1986.

107.750. Construction of KRS 107.720 to 107.760 — Issuance of bonds authorized.

  1. KRS 107.720 to 107.760 shall be construed liberally to effect its purposes and shall not be construed as a restriction or limitation upon any powers which any political subdivision, private owner or private owner/operator might otherwise have under any laws of the Commonwealth; and the provisions of KRS 107.720 to 107.760 are cumulative to any such powers. KRS 107.720 to 107.760 does and shall be construed to provide a complete, additional and alternative method for the doing of the things authorized thereby and shall be regarded as supplemental and additional to other laws.
  2. Any city, county or urban-county may issue negotiable revenue bonds pursuant to KRS 103.200 et seq. in order to finance the costs associated with a privatization project entered into pursuant to KRS 107.720 to 107.760 .
  3. Bonds issued pursuant to KRS 107.720 to 107.760 do not constitute a debt or liability of this Commonwealth or of any legislative body, or any other political subdivision of the Commonwealth. Those bonds do not constitute the loaning of the credit of the Commonwealth or of any legislative body, or of any other political subdivision of the Commonwealth.

History. Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 456, § 6, effective July 15, 1986.

107.760. Political subdivision’s ability to own or operate water facility not limited.

Nothing in KRS 107.720 to 107.750 shall be construed to limit a political subdivision’s ability to own, operate, maintain or finance the acquisition, construction, operation or maintenance of drinking water, water or wastewater treatment systems whether or not a privatization project comprises a portion of or is otherwise connected to any such system.

History. Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 456, § 7, effective July 15, 1986.

107.770. Short title.

KRS 107.700 to 107.760 may be cited as the “Kentucky Privatization Act.”

History. Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 456, § 8, effective July 15, 1986.

Penalties

107.990. Penalties.

  1. Any public official, public employee or person who solicits and/or accepts, directly or indirectly, by himself or in conjunction with another person, any money, gift, or other advantage, in exchange for the promise and/or receipt of employment, monetary gain, or other benefits, under the provision of this chapter shall be fined not less than five thousand dollars ($5,000) nor more than fifty thousand dollars ($50,000), or imprisoned for not less than two (2) years nor more than ten (10) years or both.
  2. Any person, committee, association, organization, or corporation who promises, offers, or gives money, gift, or other advantage to obtain or attempt to obtain benefits or the promise of benefits, financial or otherwise, under the provisions of this chapter shall be fined not less than five thousand dollars ($5,000) nor more than fifty thousand dollars ($50,000), or imprisoned for not less than two (2) years nor more than ten (10) years, or both.

History. Enact. Acts 1976 (Ex. Sess), ch. 13, § 29.

CHAPTER 108 Urban Services Districts — Ambulance Service Districts

108.010. Authority to create districts.

To serve the public interest and provide a means of meeting problems of local government in urban areas, there may be established and operated under the provisions of this chapter an urban services district. Such a district shall be a public body corporate and political subdivision, with power to adopt and use a corporate seal, sue and be sued, contract and be contracted with, and in other ways to function as a municipal corporation or a natural person within the purview of this chapter. In addition to the general grants of power of this chapter, such a district shall have the specific authority provided for in KRS Chapters 58, 66, 79 and 107. The district shall have the power of eminent domain and shall follow the procedures outlined in the Eminent Domain Act of Kentucky.

History. Enact. Acts 1960, ch. 150, § 1; 1976, ch. 140, § 61.

Compiler’s Notes.

The Eminent Domain Act of Kentucky is compiled as KRS 416.540 to 416.680 .

Opinions of Attorney General.

An ambulance district cannot utilize the county’s right to elect not to come under KRS Chapter 216B, since KRS 216B.020(2) does not apply where ambulance service is being carried on by an ambulance district created under this chapter since an ambulance district is a taxing district within Ky. Const., § 157 and as a particular entity of government it has a certain autonomy, being managed by a board of directors and primarily funded from the ad valorem tax levied. OAG 81-47 .

108.015. Compliance with KRS 65A.010 to 65A.090.

The board of directors shall comply with the provisions of KRS 65A.010 to 65A.090 .

History. Enact. Acts 2013, ch. 40, § 51, effective March 21, 2013.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(3/21/2013). This statute refers to “the board of directors,” although under KRS 108.030 the governing body of an urban services district is a council. The context in which this statute was enacted suggests that a reference to such a council, rather than to a board, was intended. The statute was created as part of a series of sections in a bill (Sections 47 to 53 of 2013 Ky. Acts ch. 40), each of which requires the governing body of a governmental entity to comply with the provisions of KRS 65A.010 to 65A.090 . It appears that a similar reference was intended to appear in this statute.

108.020. District’s powers.

  1. An urban services district through its council is empowered to:
    1. Provide for police and fire protection;
    2. Construct and maintain streets, sidewalks, alleys and other drives and walks;
    3. Provide library services;
    4. Provide for garbage and trash collection and disposal;
    5. Provide for street lighting and street cleaning;
    6. Acquire, maintain and operate parks and playgrounds;
    7. Provide sewer, drainage and treatment services and facilities;
    8. Collect fees for services performed and to levy assessments consistent with this chapter and in such amounts as the council shall deem necessary to carry out the functions of the district; and
    9. Provide other services and engage in other activities, either directly or by contract with a county, a city or other districts, which contracts shall set forth what services are to be provided and how they are to be financed.
  2. An urban services district is prohibited from providing sanitation service that is being provided in the same area by a sanitation district as of June 16, 1960.

History. Enact. Acts 1960, ch. 150, § 2, effective June 16, 1960.

Opinions of Attorney General.

An urban service district created under KRS Chapter 108 does not qualify as a taxing district within the meaning of Ky. Const., §§ 157, 158. OAG 68-248 .

108.030. Council and director.

  1. The governmental and corporate authority of an urban services district shall be vested in a district council, which shall be the legislative and policy-making body, and a district director, who shall be the chief executive officer and shall preside over meetings of the council. The director shall have no right of veto over actions of the council.
  2. The council shall be composed of five (5) members, to be elected for a term of four (4) years at the next general election following the creation of the district. At the expiration of their terms, vacancies shall be filled in accordance with the general election laws of the state. Members of the council shall be qualified voters of the district, and a member shall vacate his position by removal of his residence from the district. Vacancies on the council shall be filled by appointment by the Governor for the remainder of the term. Members shall serve until their successors are elected and qualified.
  3. The council shall establish departments, offices or agencies to carry out the functions and services of the district and prescribe their powers and duties. The council shall meet regularly at least once in each month, and special meetings may be called by the director or on the call of three (3) or more members of the council.
  4. The council may determine its own rules and order of business, and may adopt rules and regulations for the functioning of the district to supplement the provisions of this chapter. Each member of the council shall be paid a salary to be fixed by the council.

History. Enact. Acts 1960, ch. 150, § 3; 1964, ch. 113, § 1.

108.040. Director — Appointment — Powers and duties.

  1. The director shall be appointed by the council and shall serve at their pleasure; but the director shall not be removed unless he has received from the council a notice of intention to remove him and the reasons therefor and unless a public hearing has been held on the charges. The director shall, as the chief executive officer of the district, appoint and remove heads of departments of the district, with the approval of the council, appoint and remove other employees of the district, supervise their activities, and fix their compensation, subject to regulations adopted by the council. He shall receive the compensation fixed by the council. No residence qualification shall be required of the director. In the event of a vacancy in the office of the director, it shall be filled by appointment by the council.
  2. The council shall designate a qualified administrative officer of the district to assume the duties and authority of the director during periods of temporary absence or disability of the director.

History. Enact. Acts 1960, ch. 150, §§ 4, 7; 1964, ch. 113, § 2; 1968, ch. 152, § 90.

108.050. Procedure for establishment of district.

  1. An urban services district may be created in accordance with the procedures of KRS 65.810 .
  2. The Governor shall, immediately upon certification that the district has been established, appoint five (5) qualified persons as members of the council.

History. Enact. Acts 1960, ch. 150, §§ 5, 6; 1964, ch. 113, § 3; 1966, ch. 239, § 123; 1976 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 20, § 6, effective January 2, 1978; 1978, ch. 384, § 240, effective June 17, 1978; 1984, ch. 64, § 12, effective July 13, 1984.

Opinions of Attorney General.

Urban services districts may be established and financed only as set out in this section or other laws specifically applicable to such districts. OAG 76-33 .

108.060. Civil service for employees.

A civil service system for employees of the district may be established by the council in accordance with the plan outlined for cities of the first class or a consolidated local government under KRS 90.110 to 90.230 .

History. Enact. Acts 1960, ch. 150, § 8, effective June 16, 1960; 2002, ch. 346, § 159, effective July 15, 2002.

108.070. Addition of territory — Territory in two or more counties.

  1. The area of a city or of another district may be added to the area of an urban services district by an agreement between the district council and the legislative body of the city or governing board of another district. Territory in an unincorporated area may be added to the urban services district upon approval by the council and the county judge/executive when a petition signed by fifty-one percent (51%) of the registered voters of that territory is filed with the county judge/executive.
  2. An urban services district may include territory in two (2) or more counties. In the organization, conduct of elections, and expansion of such districts, the county judge/executive and the county clerk of each county shall perform the duties provided for by this chapter in relationship to the territory and voters of the district within that county.

History. Enact. Acts 1960, ch. 150, § 9, effective June 16, 1960; 1978, ch. 384, § 241, effective June 17, 1978.

108.073. Joinder of an unincorporated area to an existing ambulance service district. [Repealed and reenacted.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1982, ch. 231, § 4, effective July 15, 1982) was repealed and reenacted as KRS 108.175 by Acts 1984, ch. 111, § 59, effective July 13, 1984.

108.075. Change of name for expanded district.

If, in the event of expansion of the district, it becomes apparent that the existing name is inappropriate, then the board of the district may change its name at any regularly-called meeting, by an affirmative vote of two-thirds (2/3) majority of the total membership.

History. Enact. Acts 1982, ch. 231, § 7, effective July 15, 1982.

Ambulance Service Districts

108.080. Definitions for KRS 108.090 to 108.180.

As used in KRS 108.090 to 108.180 unless the context requires otherwise:

  1. “District” means emergency ambulance service district;
  2. “Board” means the board of directors of the emergency ambulance service district;
  3. “County” means the incorporated and unincorporated areas thereof;
  4. “City” means an incorporated city of any class.

History. Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 33, § 1; 1980, ch. 86, § 1, effective July 15, 1980; 1982, ch. 231, § 1, effective July 15, 1982.

Opinions of Attorney General.

Since the county’s granting a franchise for ambulance service and the city’s granting a franchise are two different exercises of power, the city’s letting of an ambulance service within that city (ambulances traveling over city streets) will in no way conflict with the fiscal court’s authority to grant an ambulance franchise relating to ambulance service within the unincorporated boundaries of the county, and involving ambulances traveling over roads in that area. OAG 82-601 .

An ambulance service may be carried on in the county under one of three methods: (1) ambulance service under a county franchise to private persons or a corporation under KRS 65.710 , provided such franchise is let under competitive bidding pursuant to Ky. Const., § 164; (2) ambulance service as a direct county operation under its police power as found in KRS 67.083(3)(t); and (3) ambulance service provided by an ambulance district as established under KRS 108.080 et seq. OAG 82-601 .

108.090. Legislative purpose.

For the purpose of enabling cities or counties, or parts thereof, to provide emergency ambulance service to assure public safety and welfare the General Assembly does hereby allow all of the territory coterminous with the boundaries of a city or county, or coterminous with the boundaries of two (2) or more cities or counties contiguous to each other, to be organized into an emergency ambulance service district for the purpose of financing and administering emergency ambulance service for the residents of the district, and further does hereby allow an unincorporated area within a county that is contiguous with the boundaries of an existing ambulance district within that county to become part of that ambulance service district.

History. Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 33, § 2; 1980, ch. 119, § 10, effective July 15, 1980; 1982, ch. 231, § 2, effective July 15, 1982.

Opinions of Attorney General.

A district board has the authority to acquire vehicles and equipment for ambulance service with district tax money, and the authority to directly administer an emergency ambulance service for residents of the district; however, under subsection (9) of KRS 108.140 , the ambulance service district has the option to contract with a private person or corporation for providing ambulance service to residents of the district. OAG 83-87 .

Where district had contracted with corporation for provision of ambulance services, the board of directors of the district could acquire directly the necessary ambulances and equipment to be used by the corporation under the contract, or it could simply permit the corporation to acquire the ambulances and equipment. If the board of the district chose to own such ambulances and equipment, it would have to acquire them for valuable consideration after advertising for bids pursuant to KRS 424.260 . OAG 83-87 .

The ambulance district is a political subdivision, i.e., a taxing district. OAG 83-470 .

The board of directors of an ambulance district is required to provide ambulance service only to the inhabitants or residents of the district since the district is designed to serve only the residents of that special taxing district. OAG 83-470 .

108.100. Creation of districts — Collection of taxes.

  1. A district may be created by the fiscal court as provided in KRS 65.182 . In the event that the citizens of a city seek to create a district the boundaries of which shall be coterminous with those of the city, or which lie wholly within the boundaries of said city such citizens shall petition the city legislative body and the city legislative body shall exercise all rights, powers and duties of the fiscal court as set forth in KRS 65.182 in determining whether to create the district.
  2. The special ad valorem tax that may be imposed for the maintenance and operation of the district, shall not exceed ten cents ($0.10) on each one hundred dollars ($100) of the assessed valuation of all property in the district.
  3. Upon the creation of a district by a fiscal court or city legislative body as provided in KRS 65.182 , the district shall be so established and shall constitute and be a taxing district within the meaning of Section 157 of the Constitution of Kentucky.
  4. If the ambulance district consists solely of a single city, the ad valorem tax, as authorized by KRS 108.100 to 108.180 , shall be collected in the same manner as are the other city ad valorem taxes, and turned over to the board of the ambulance service district. All other special ad valorem taxes authorized by KRS 108.080 to 108.180 shall be collected in the following manner:
    1. The property valuation administrator of the county shall note on the tax rolls the taxpayers and valuation of the property subject to such assessment;
    2. The county clerk shall compute the tax on the regular state and county tax bills;
    3. The special ad valorem tax shall be in addition to all other ad valorem taxes;
    4. The sheriff shall collect the tax, turn it over to the board of the ambulance district, and shall be entitled to a fee of four percent (4%) of the amount of the tax collected by him for such district and all other special ad valorem taxes authorized by KRS 108.080 to 108.180 shall be collected in the same manner as are other county and city ad valorem taxes in each county and city affected and shall be turned over to the board of directors as the governing body of the district. The special ad valorem tax shall be in addition to all other ad valorem taxes. The sheriff shall be entitled to a fee of one percent (1%) of the amount of the tax collected by him for all special ad valorem taxes except the tax for the ambulance district.

History. Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 33, § 3; 1978, ch. 384, § 242, effective June 17, 1978; 1980, ch. 86, § 3, effective July 15, 1980; 1980, ch. 119, § 9, effective July 15, 1980; 1982, ch. 231, § 3, effective July 15, 1982; 1982, ch. 360, § 34, effective July 15, 1982; 1984, ch. 100, § 10, effective July 13, 1984.

Opinions of Attorney General.

An ambulance district, created under this section, may levy a tax rate that does not exceed the rate voted on in creating the district without being subject to the special tax limitations of KRS 132.023 . OAG 81-99 .

An emergency ambulance service district created either by referendum under this section or by action of the fiscal court under KRS 108.105 would be a special taxing district under Ky. Const., § 157, since this section and KRS 108.105 must be read together under the doctrine of in pari materia; such an autonomous special taxing district, would not be included in the county’s ad valorem tax levy under KRS 68.245 . OAG 81-99 ; OAG 81-344 .

An ambulance service district is a special taxing district under subsection (3) of this section and Ky. Const., § 157, and, as such, the tax rate and debt limitations referred to in Ky. Const., § 157 relate to that district rather than the county in which it is located; thus, the sheriff rather than the county has the authority to collect the special ad valorem tax for the district. OAG 81-319 .

Although a county fiscal court could not utilize KRS 92.285 (repealed) to fund an ambulance service district, since that section only related to city or urban counties, an ambulance service district created under this section, et seq. may be funded by a special ambulance service district tax imposed pursuant to either this section or KRS 108.105 . OAG 81-332 .

A sheriff may not demand or receive a commission in excess of 1 percent for the collection of ambulance service district taxes since subsection (4) of this section, which provides for the 1 percent commission, governs as a specific statute over the general provisions of KRS 134.290 , which provide for higher commissions. OAG 81-376 .

The sheriff is responsible for mailing the tax bills for an ambulance service district tax since subsection (4) of this section requires that the collection of a district tax be made in conformity with the general tax collection scheme for state and county taxes, and subsection (4) of KRS 133.220 includes other levies among the state and county taxes which the sheriff must collect. OAG 81-376 .

The sheriff, who is responsible for collecting the ambulance service district tax under subsection (4) of KRS 133.220 as applied to the district tax through subsection (4) of this section, is also responsible for the costs of postage, envelopes, and clerical personnel necessary to prepare the envelopes and to accept payment of the tax but such expenses may be paid out the excess fees of the sheriff. OAG 81-376 .

A fiscal court may reasonably restrict its ambulance services to emergency situations only. OAG 82-239 .

In general, any county may, in the discretion of the fiscal court, establish a county emergency ambulance service by contracting for it and granting a franchise under Ky. Const., § 164, or may establish an emergency ambulance service district pursuant to KRS 108.100 et seq., or may establish a county emergency ambulance service directly operated by the county, but the fiscal court is not mandatorily required to provide emergency ambulance service under present statutes. OAG 82-239 .

All ambulance services must be licensed by the certificate of need licensure board unless they offer no health services. OAG 82-561 .

Since the phrase “next regular election,” appearing in subsection (1) of this section, refers to the November election of Ky. Const., § 148, where voters at November, 1982 election voted to abolish ambulance district and the tax to support it that was established in June, 1982, such question cannot again be placed on the ballot earlier than the regular election of November, 1983. OAG 82-636 .

The establishment of an ambulance service district embracing the city is entirely in the hands of the city council for determination. There is no statutory authority for submitting the question to the voters. OAG 85-11 .

108.105. Alternate method for creation of ambulance service district.

  1. It is the intent of this section to create an alternative means of creating an ambulance service district in any city or county of the Commonwealth which has not heretofore created the same.
  2. In all counties where a county or city-county ambulance service has not been established pursuant to KRS 108.080 to 108.180 , an ambulance service district may be created in accordance with the provisions of this section.
  3. The fiscal court or local legislative body may by ordinance create an ambulance service district and an ambulance service district tax in such amount as deemed sufficient, but not in excess of ten cents ($0.10) per one hundred dollars ($100) of full assessed valuation.
  4. The ambulance service district tax shall be collected in the same manner as provided in KRS 108.080 to 108.180 and shall be used solely for the maintenance and operation of the city, county, city-county, or district ambulance service.
  5. Other matters with regard to the operation and management of the ambulance service district shall be in accordance with the provisions of KRS 108.080 to 108.180 insofar as they do not conflict with the provisions of this section.
  6. Nothing in this section shall be construed as to abridge the rights of two (2) or more cities, counties or cities in those counties from establishing a joint ambulance service district as provided in KRS 108.080 to 108.180 .

History. Enact. Acts 1980, ch. 119, § 8, effective July 15, 1980.

Opinions of Attorney General.

Where district had contracted with corporation for provision of ambulance services, the board of directors of the district could acquire directly the necessary ambulances and equipment to be used by the corporation under the contract, or it could simply permit the corporation to acquire the ambulances and equipment. If the board of the district chose to own such ambulances and equipment, it would have to acquire them for valuable consideration after advertising for bids pursuant to KRS 424.260 . OAG 83-87 .

An emergency ambulance service district created either by referendum under KRS 108.100 or by action of the fiscal court under this section would be a special taxing district under Ky. Const., § 157, since KRS 108.100 and this section must be read together under the doctrine of in pari materia; such an autonomous special taxing district, would not be included in the county’s ad valorem tax levy under KRS 68.245 . OAG 81-99 ; OAG 81-344 .

Where an ambulance district is created pursuant to this section, the statutory tax rate limits of KRS 132.023 would apply to the special district, since no voted levy is involved. OAG 81-99 .

Although a county fiscal court could not utilize KRS 92.285 (repealed) to fund an ambulance service district, since that section only related to city or urban counties, an ambulance service district created under KRS 108.100 et seq. may be funded by a special ambulance service district tax imposed pursuant to either KRS 108.100 or this section. OAG 81-332 .

The board of directors of an ambulance service district may borrow money for district purposes if the total financial obligations of the particular year do not exceed the income and revenue available to the district for the particular year, including the district tax revenues derived under subsection (3) of this section. OAG 82-48 .

A district board has the authority to acquire vehicles and equipment for ambulance service with district tax money, and the authority to directly administer an emergency ambulance service for residents of the district; however, under KRS 108.140(9), the ambulance service district has the option to contract with a private person or corporation for providing ambulance service to residents of the district. OAG 83-87 .

KRS 108.105 to 108.180 are preemptive statutes and therefore an ambulance service district has no authority to incorporate itself under KRS Chapter 273; such an act would be beyond its clearly expressed powers. In addition, even if the district could incorporate under KRS Chapter 273 (which it cannot), it would be a vain thing, which the law does not require, in view of its corporate nature. OAG 83-172 .

The ambulance district is a political subdivision, i.e., a taxing district. OAG 83-470 .

The board of directors of an ambulance district is required to provide ambulance service only to the inhabitants or residents of the district since the district is designed to serve only the residents of that special taxing district. OAG 83-470 .

108.110. Board of directors — Appointment — Term of office — Vacancies — Quorum — Removal of board members.

  1. The affairs of the district shall be controlled and managed by a board of directors appointed by the county judge/executive with the approval of the fiscal court and city legislative bodies in the following manner:
    1. If the district consists of one (1) city, three (3) members shall be appointed to the board by the city legislative body;
    2. If the district consists of two (2) cities, the legislative body of the city having the greater portion of the population of the district shall appoint two (2) directors and the legislative body of the other city shall appoint the third director;
    3. If the district consists of more than two (2) cities, the legislative body of the city having the greatest portion of the population of the district shall appoint two (2) directors and the legislative body of the remaining cities comprising the district shall appoint one (1) director;
    4. If the district consists of one (1) county, three (3) or five (5) members shall be appointed to the board by the county judge/executive of the county;
    5. If the district consists of two (2) counties, the county judge/executive of the county having the greater portion of the population of the district shall appoint two (2) directors and the county judge/executive of the other county shall appoint the third director;
    6. If the district consists of more than two (2) counties, the county judge/executive of the county having the greatest portion of the population of the district shall appoint two (2) directors and the county judge/executive of the remaining counties comprising the district shall each appoint one (1) director;
    7. The legislative body of each city with a population equal to or greater than eight thousand (8,000), or if there is no such city, the city with the highest population located within each county in the district shall appoint one (1) additional director;
    8. If part of an ambulance district within a county consists of an unincorporated area, the county judge/executive, with the approval of the fiscal court, shall appoint no more than two (2) persons residing within the affected unincorporated area to the board of directors for a term of two (2) years.
  2. Each board member shall reside within the district and within the county or city of which he was appointed to represent.
  3. The board of directors shall be appointed within thirty (30) days after the establishment of the district. Directors shall be appointed for terms of two (2) years each, except that initially the appointing authority shall appoint a minority of the board members for one (1) year terms. Subsequent terms shall all be for two (2) years. Any vacancies shall be filled by the appointing authority for the unexpired term.
  4. A majority of the membership of the board shall constitute a quorum.
  5. A member of the board of directors may be removed from office as provided by KRS 65.007 .

History. Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 33, § 4; 1980, ch. 18, § 12, effective July 15, 1980; 1980, ch. 86, § 4, effective July 15, 1980; 1980, ch. 119, § 11, effective July 15, 1980; 1982, ch. 231, § 5, effective July 15, 1982; 2012, ch. 17, § 1, effective July 12, 2012; 2014, ch. 92, § 210, effective January 1, 2015.

Opinions of Attorney General.

Since the office of director of an emergency ambulance service district is neither a county nor city office, nothing in Ky. Const., § 165 nor in KRS 61.080 would prevent a city or county officer from lawfully serving on that board. OAG 79-607 .

KRS 108.105 to 108.180 are preemptive statutes and therefore an ambulance service district has no authority to incorporate itself under KRS Chapter 273; such an act would be beyond its clearly expressed powers. In addition, even if the district could incorporate under KRS Chapter 273 (which it cannot), it would be a vain thing, which the law does not require, in view of its corporate nature. OAG 83-172 .

Since subsection (1)(g) of this section uses the phrase “the city of the highest class located within each county in the district” as opposed to “the city of the highest class located within the county,” it appears to be referring to a multicounty district rather than a single county district, and thus a single county district may retain its three member board of directors and need not afford representation to the city or cities within the county unless a court of law renders a judgment to the contrary. OAG 90-41 .

108.115. Compliance with KRS 65A.010 to 65A.090.

The board of each district shall comply with the provisions of KRS 65A.010 to 65A.090 .

History. Enact. Acts 2013, ch. 40, § 52, effective March 21, 2013.

108.120. Oath and compensation of directors.

  1. Each director, before entering upon his official duties, shall take and subscribe to an oath that he will honestly, faithfully and impartially perform the duties of his office and that he will not be interested in any contract let for the purpose of effectuating any of the provisions of KRS 108.080 to 108.120 . The oath shall be filed with the records of the district.
  2. The members of the board shall not receive compensation for their services but shall be reimbursed for their actual expenses necessarily incurred in the performance of their duties upon sworn written statements accompanied by receipts for any expense in excess of four dollars ($4) submitted to and approved by the board.

History. Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 33, § 5; 1980, ch. 86, § 5, effective July 15, 1980.

108.130. Employment of attorney.

  1. The board may employ or retain a licensed attorney to advise them on all matters pertaining to their duties. The attorney shall attend all meetings of the board, except executive sessions when the board does not require his presence.
  2. The board may appropriate out of the funds of the district a salary or commission for the attorney appointed to represent the board.

History. Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 33, § 6.

108.140. Powers and duties of directors.

The board of directors shall provide ambulance service to inhabitants of the district and shall have the authority to:

  1. Purchase ambulance vehicles and all other necessary equipment and employ trained personnel which meet all federal and state requirements;
  2. Establish a civil service system for employees of the district in accordance with the plan outlined for cities of the first class under KRS 90.110 to 90.230 ;
  3. Adopt rules and regulations necessary to effectively and efficiently provide emergency ambulance service for the district;
  4. Employ person(s) to administer the daily operations of the emergency ambulance service;
  5. Compensate employees of the district at a rate determined by the board;
  6. Apply for and receive available funds from the state and federal government for the purpose of maintaining or improving the emergency ambulance service of the district;
  7. Acquire by bequest, gift, grant or purchase such real or personal property necessary to provide emergency ambulance service;
  8. In addition to the special ad valorem tax, establish an equitable system of service charges to be collected from persons receiving emergency ambulance service from the district. The rate of the service charge shall be fixed in such amounts as can be reasonably expected to yield revenues not in excess of the cost of operation and maintenance of the system and for an adequate depreciation fund;
  9. Contract with private persons, partnerships, or corporations for providing ambulance service to residents of the district as long as these services utilize vehicles, equipment and personnel which conform to all requirements of KRS 108.080 to 108.180 .

History. Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 33, § 7.

Opinions of Attorney General.

It was not necessary for corporation, which furnished ambulance service under contract with district, to be enfranchised by the county, since subsection (9) of this section permits an ambulance service district to contract with a corporation, inter alia, for providing ambulance services within the service district. OAG 83-87 .

A district board has the authority to acquire vehicles and equipment for ambulance service with district tax money, and the authority to directly administer an emergency ambulance service for residents of the district; however, under subsection (9) of this section, the ambulance service district has the option to contract with a private person or corporation for providing ambulance service to residents of the district. OAG 83-87 .

Where district had contracted with corporation for provision of ambulance services, the board of directors of the district could acquire directly the necessary ambulances and equipment to be used by the corporation under the contract, or it could simply permit the corporation to acquire the ambulances and equipment. If the board of the district chose to own such ambulances and equipment, it would have to acquire them for valuable consideration after advertising for bids pursuant to KRS 424.260 . OAG 83-87 .

Where, prior to creation of ambulance service district, nonprofit corporation was created to provide ambulance service for part of county and ambulances and equipment were purchased with state and federal grant money and title thereto vested in the corporation, the preexisting ambulances and equipment did not have to be sold and transferred to the district as a gift or for valuable consideration and the district could not even negotiate for the sale of the ambulances and equipment; under the facts given, the district had no authority to take over one of the ambulances and a part of the equipment owned by corporation. OAG 83-87 .

This section authorizes the board of directors to employ an administrative aide in supervising or coordinating a contract for the provision of ambulance service by a private service, but only if such employment is actually necessary for the district to adequately administer the contract. OAG 83-87 .

KRS 65.710 provides for only cities and counties contracting for ambulance services; the statute, because of its express and literal language, cannot apply to an ambulance service district created under KRS Chapter 108. Clearly the statutes dealing with the ambulance service district envision the district’s furnishing ambulance services directly, or, as an option under subsection (9) of this section, the district’s contracting with private persons, partnerships or corporations for providing ambulance service to residents of the district. OAG 83-172 .

Ambulance district board’s action, prohibiting the district from transferring patients from the county hospital to other medical facilities unless the patients’ medical condition arose while within such county or the patients were residents of such county, went beyond the express and explicit powers of the board and constituted a violation of this section. OAG 83-470 .

The board of directors of an ambulance district is required to provide ambulance service only to the inhabitants or residents of the district since the district is designed to serve only the residents of that special taxing district. OAG 83-470 .

108.150. Minute book.

The board shall keep a minute book, appropriately bound and marked, in which the minutes of each meeting of the board shall be kept, together with all resolutions, regulations, tax levies, and other pertinent material. A copy of the contents of the minute book shall be kept on file in the office of the clerk of the county or city which has the greatest population of the district. The public shall have the right to inspect the book and its contents at all times.

History. Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 33, § 8; 1980, ch. 86, § 6, effective July 15, 1980.

Opinions of Attorney General.

The names of persons transported by a county ambulance service may be kept confidential as an exception to the open records law under subsection (1) (a) of KRS 61.878 . OAG 76-568 .

108.160. Dissolution of single city or county districts.

Single city or county districts may be dissolved in the following manner:

  1. Upon the filing of a certified petition of a number of registered voters equal to or greater than twenty-five percent (25%) of the average of the voters living in the taxing district and voting in the last four (4) general elections or upon the determination of the fiscal court or city legislative body that the abolishment of the district is in the best interest of the inhabitants of the county or city, the fiscal court or city legislative body (as appropriate) shall adopt a resolution submitting to the qualified voters of the county or city as to whether the district should be dissolved and the imposition of the special ad valorem tax discontinued. A certified copy of the resolution of the fiscal court or city legislative body (as appropriate) shall be filed with the county clerk not later than the second Tuesday in August prior to the next regular election and thereupon the clerk shall cause the question to be placed before the voters.
  2. The question shall be in substantially the following form: “Are you in favor of dissolving the emergency ambulance service district for (insert name of city or county) and discontinuing the special ad valorem tax that is imposed for the maintenance and operation of the district?”
  3. If a majority of those voting on the question favor dissolving the district and discontinuing the imposition of the special ad valorem tax the county clerk or the collector of city taxes shall remove the levy of the special ad valorem tax from the tax bills of the property owners of the district and the district shall be dissolved by order of the fiscal court or the city legislative body. If less than a majority of those voting on the question favor dissolving the district, the district shall be continued and no future vote may be taken on the question of dissolving the district until the next regular election four (4) years later.
  4. A resolution for the dissolution of the district shall not be considered to have any legal effect if contractual obligations assumed prior to the time of the passage of the resolution by the board have not been met.

History. Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 33, § 9; 1978, ch. 384, § 243, effective June 17, 1978; 1980, ch. 86, § 7, effective July 15, 1980; 1980, ch. 119, § 12, effective July 15, 1980; 1982, ch. 360, § 35, effective July 15, 1982; 1988, ch. 43, § 1, effective July 15, 1988; 1996, ch. 195, § 52, effective July 15, 1996.

Opinions of Attorney General.

Where an ambulance service district has borrowed money for district purposes, that indebtedness would prevent the question of the district’s dissolution from being placed on the ballot since subsection (4) of this section prevents dissolution from being effected so long as contractual obligations assumed prior to the passage of the dissolution resolution by the fiscal court have not been met. OAG 82-48 .

108.170. Dissolution of multicounty or multicity districts.

Multicounty or multicity districts may be dissolved when each member county or city follows procedures defined in KRS 108.160 .

History. Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 33, § 10; 1980, ch. 86, § 8, effective July 15, 1980; 1980, ch. 119, § 13, effective July 15, 1980.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

This section was amended by two 1980 acts which do not appear to be in conflict and have been compiled together.

108.175. Joinder of an unincorporated area to an existing ambulance service district.

  1. If the people in an unincorporated area desire to become part of an existing ambulance service district, a certified petition of a simple majority, or one hundred (100) or more qualified voters, whichever is less, within the unincorporated area, as set out in metes and bounds, within the county shall be filed with the fiscal court. The petition shall set out the metes and bounds of the unincorporated area desiring to become part of the existing ambulance district. The fiscal court shall adopt a resolution, submitting to the qualified voters within the unincorporated area, as set out in metes and bounds, the question as to whether they wish to become part of the existing emergency ambulance service district and impose a special ad valorem tax for the maintenance and operation of the district, not to exceed ten cents ($0.10) on each one hundred dollars ($100) of the assessed valuation of all property in the district. A certified copy of the resolution of the fiscal court shall be filed with the county court clerk at least sixty (60) days prior to the next regular election and, thereupon, the clerk shall cause the question to be placed on the ballot.
  2. The question shall be, substantially, the following form: “Are you in favor of becoming a part of the (insert name of the existing emergency ambulance service district) which shall have the authority to impose a special ad valorem tax of (insert exact amount) on each one hundred dollars ($100) worth of property assessed for local taxation in the district for the maintenance and operation of the (insert name) emergency ambulance service district?”
  3. If a majority of those voting on the question in the unincorporated area, as set out in metes and bounds, favor becoming part of the existing ambulance service district, then it shall be so established, and shall be part of the taxing district within the meaning of Section 157 of the Constitution of Kentucky. The cost of the election shall be paid by the fiscal court.

History. Enact. Acts 1982, ch. 231, § 4, effective July 15, 1982; repealed and reenact., Acts 1984, ch. 111, § 59, effective July 13, 1984.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section was formerly compiled as KRS 108.073 and was repealed and reenacted as this section by Acts 1984, ch. 111, § 59, effective July 13, 1984.

108.180. Withdrawal of membership by city, county or unincorporated area.

Any member city or county or unincorporated area of the district may withdraw its membership after following the procedures defined in subsections (1), (2), and (3) of KRS 108.160 . The district shall continue to function after such withdrawals, with its boundaries consisting of the remaining county or city or unincorporated area members. No city or county or unincorporated area may withdraw from any district unless it satisfies its part of all contractual obligations assumed by the district prior to the passage of its resolution to the satisfaction of the board.

History. Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 33, § 11; 1980, ch. 86, § 9, effective July 15, 1980; 1980, ch. 119, § 14, effective July 15, 1980; 1982, ch. 231, § 6, effective July 15, 1982.

CHAPTER 108A New Community Districts [Repealed]

108A.010. Purpose of chapter. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1970, ch. 219, § 2) was repealed by Acts 1984, ch. 4, § 3, effective July 15, 1986.

108A.020. Petition by nonprofit membership corporation — Requisites of corporation. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1970, ch. 219, § 3; 1974, ch. 278, § 1; 1978, ch. 384, § 244, effective July 17, 1978) was repealed by Acts 1984, ch. 4, § 3, effective July 15, 1986.

108A.030. Requisites of petition. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1970, ch. 219, § 4; 1974, ch. 278, § 1; 1978, ch. 384, § 245, effective July 17, 1978) was repealed by Acts 1984, ch. 4, § 3, effective July 15, 1986.

108A.040. Date to be set for hearing — Notice. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1970, ch. 219, § 5) was repealed by Acts 1984, ch. 4, § 3, effective July 15, 1986.

108A.050. Hearing — Order establishing district — Restriction when board of education objects to petition — Certification. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1970, ch. 219, § 6; 1978, ch. 384, § 246, effective June 17, 1978) was repealed by Acts 1984, ch. 4, § 3, effective July 15, 1986.

108A.060. Governor’s duty. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1970, ch. 219, § 7) was repealed by Acts 1984, ch. 4, § 3, effective July 15, 1986.

108A.070. Adoption of development criteria — Acquisition of real property bynegotiated purchase — Condemnation authorized. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1970, ch. 219, § 8; 1976, ch. 140, § 62) was repealed by Acts 1984, ch. 4, § 3, effective July 15, 1986.

108A.080. Condemnation proceedings. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1970, ch. 320, § 9) was repealed by Acts 1976, ch. 140, § 129. For present law see KRS 416.540 to 416.680 .

108A.090. Board of commissioners. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1970, ch. 219, § 10; 1980, ch. 18, § 13, effective July 15, 1980) was repealed by Acts 1984, ch. 4, § 3, effective July 15, 1986.

108A.100. Authority of board. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1970, ch. 219, § 11) was repealed by Acts 1984, ch. 4, § 3, effective July 15, 1986.

108A.110. Corporate powers. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1970, ch. 219, § 12) was repealed by Acts 1984, ch. 4, § 3, effective July 15, 1986.

108A.120. Procedure for addition of territory. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1970, ch. 219, § 13; 1978, ch. 384, § 247, effective June 17, 1978; 1980, ch. 188, § 98, effective July 15, 1980) was repealed by Acts 1984, ch. 4, § 3, effective July 15, 1986.

108A.130. Incorporation as a city. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1970, ch. 219, § 14) was repealed by Acts 1984, ch. 4, § 3, effective July 15, 1986.

CHAPTER 109 Local Solid Waste Management

109.010. Definitions. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 66, § 1; 1972 (1st Ex. Sess.), ch. 3, § 27; 1974, ch. 63, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1978, ch. 115, § 15, effective June 17, 1978.

109.011. Findings and declaration of purpose — Intent.

The General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Kentucky hereby finds, determines, and declares, as follows:

  1. That an ever-increasing volume of solid waste both within and outside the Commonwealth is being generated as a result of increasing economic and commercial activity, continuing technological progress, and changes in methods of manufacturing, packaging, and marketing of consumer products, which results in additional solid wastes discarded by the users of these products;
  2. That the continued economic and population growth of the Commonwealth has required increased industrial and commercial expansion and has made necessary the demolition of obsolete structures, the construction of new structures, the provision of highways and other avenues of transportation, and the construction and installation of public works which, together with pre-existing commercial, industrial, and agricultural operations, have resulted in the generation of further volumes of solid waste;
  3. That the handling of solid wastes has been primarily carried out through the dumping of wastes on open soil and in landfills, which in some cases are inimical to the public health, safety, and welfare;
  4. That by the enactment by the Congress of the United States of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (Public Law 94-580), as amended, the collection, sanitary disposal, and recovery of solid waste has been determined to be a matter of nationwide importance, recognizing that the management of solid waste should continue to be primarily the function of state, regional, and local agencies; and that pursuant to this federal law, the Commonwealth has taken and will take certain actions in respect to the planning and implementation of solid waste plans within the guidelines of time requirements set forth in this federal law;
  5. That as a result of the conditions described in the foregoing findings, problems of solid waste collection, management, and treatment, and resource recovery activities in connection therewith have become a matter of statewide concern necessitating action by the General Assembly to:
    1. Enable responsible planning and management agencies to be created to define solid waste management requirements, with all of the foregoing subject to regulation by the Energy and Environment Cabinet;
    2. Assist those units of government primarily responsible for the management of solid waste and the acquisition, financing and operation of facilities to dispose of solid waste to fulfill their functions in a responsible and proper manner with primary emphasis on the regionalization of these functions; and
    3. Reduce the amount of solid waste generated and disposed in Kentucky;
  6. That it is the intent of the General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Kentucky that the primary responsibility for adequate solid waste collection, management, treatment, disposal, and resource recovery shall rest with combinations of counties and waste management districts, subject to standards set by administrative regulations adopted by the Energy and Environment Cabinet. In those cities currently operating solid waste management systems, the city and county may assume joint responsibility of preparing a solid waste management plan. If it is in the best public interest to do so and with the mutual agreement of both the county and city, a county may delegate responsibility for adequate collection, management, treatment, disposal, or materials recovery to a city. This delegation of responsibility is contingent upon the approval of a solid waste management plan by the cabinet. The purpose of delegating responsibilities shall be to effectuate the safe and sanitary management, use, and handling of solid waste, the protection of the health, welfare, and safety of the citizens and inhabitants of the Commonwealth, and for making the most efficient use of all resources for the benefit of the citizens and inhabitants of the Commonwealth;
  7. That the General Assembly recognizes the generation of solid waste is inevitable, but much of it is unnecessary and should be discouraged. However, where solid waste does exist, it should be considered to the extent possible as a valuable resource, and be made use of wherever and whenever desirable and economically justifiable. Therefore, it shall be the policy of the Commonwealth to, above all things, encourage resource conservation and preservation of our natural resources before waste contributes in a needless fashion to the volumes of solid waste and litter produced by our society; but in dealing with existing solid waste, materials recovery from the solid waste stream is deemed to be the most environmentally sound alternative for handling waste;
  8. It is not the intent of this chapter to prohibit or discourage the participation of the private sector in any aspect of solid waste management. Moreover, it is preferable for solid waste management functions to be performed by the private sector when it is in the best interests of the public and conforms with the policies and provisions in this chapter;
  9. It is the intent of the General Assembly that counties and waste management districts cooperate to develop and implement the solid waste management plans mandated by KRS Chapter 224 and the administrative regulations adopted by the cabinet with the goal of regionalizing the management of solid waste;
  10. It is the intent of the General Assembly that waste requiring disposal in municipal solid waste disposal facilities be reduced and that solid waste be managed in an environmentally protective manner;
  11. Notwithstanding any provision of KRS Chapters 82, 83, and 94, it is the intent of the General Assembly that this chapter and KRS 67.083(3)(o) provide counties with authority to develop a solid waste management system for solid waste generated within the geographical boundaries of the county, consistent with the provisions of this chapter and KRS Chapter 224. It is further the intent of the General Assembly that cities be authorized to finance, own, and operate solid waste management systems with the consent of the county or by contract with the county, except that in the event a county fails to submit a solid waste management plan pursuant to KRS Chapter 224 cities may proceed to develop solid waste management systems consistent with administrative regulations adopted by the cabinet pursuant to KRS Chapter 224. Cities that develop solid waste management facilities pursuant to this section shall have all the powers and restrictions set forth for counties in KRS 109.041 , 109.056 , and 109.059 ; and
  12. It is the intent of the General Assembly that waste management districts which are formed and operated under this chapter shall comply with the standards set by administrative regulations adopted by the cabinet pursuant to KRS Chapter 224.

History. Enact. Acts 1978, ch. 115, § 1, effective June 17, 1978; 1982, ch. 74, § 1, effective July 15, 1982; 1984, ch. 111, § 60, effective July 13, 1984; 1984, ch. 398, § 1, effective July 13, 1984; 1991 (1st Ex. Sess.), ch. 12, § 29, effective February 26, 1991; 2002, ch. 342, § 13, effective July 15, 2002; 2010, ch. 24, § 89, effective July 15, 2010.

Compiler’s Notes.

The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, referred to in subsection (4) of this section, is compiled as 42 USCS § 6901 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Powers of Cities.

Under KRS 82.082 cities still have the power over collection of garbage within their limits, and KRS Chapter 109 does not permit a county to preempt the entire field of waste collection and disposal. Radcliff v. Hardin County, 607 S.W.2d 132, 1980 Ky. App. LEXIS 376 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980).

Because a City did not continue to contract for the collection of solid waste after the effective date of KRS 224.43-315 , the County had the exclusive authority to regulate the collection under KRS 67.083(3)(o), (7)(b), and 109.011 ; therefore, the trial court properly granted summary judgment to the County. City of Salyersville v. Magoffin County, 178 S.W.3d 539, 2005 Ky. App. LEXIS 242 (Ky. Ct. App. 2005).

2. Garbage Collection Franchises.

A county does not have the right to exercise an exclusive garbage collection franchise within the incorporated areas of cities. Radcliff v. Hardin County, 607 S.W.2d 132, 1980 Ky. App. LEXIS 376 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980).

Contract between the county fiscal court and private company for disposal of solid waste in a privately-owned landfill was a grant of a privilege or franchise granted in violation of the advertisement and public bidding requirements of Ky. Const. § 164. KRS Chapters 67, 224, and this chapter establish that the General Assembly has placed in the counties primary responsibility and authority for the exclusive management of solid waste. County fiscal court was exercising its governmental, rather than proprietary, function in contracting with a private company for the construction and operation of the proposed landfill. Solid waste disposal requires a franchise whether it is performed by private parties or on private property. Eastern Ky. Resources v. Arnett, 934 S.W.2d 270, 1996 Ky. LEXIS 118 ( Ky. 1996 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Jefferson County does have the authority to construct a solid waste recovery facility and to require solid waste haulers in this county to transport solid wastes to this plant. OAG 79-84 .

Jefferson County does have the authority to construct a solid waste recovery facility which will generate energy from the burning of solid waste; the county also has the authority to promulgate the necessary rules and regulations as long as they are consistent with the rules and regulations of the Department for Natural Resources and Environmental Protection (now Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Cabinet). OAG 79-84 .

A garbage disposal district organized and functioning pursuant to this section, et seq. is considered a public or governmental agency pursuant to the provisions of subsection (1)(b) of KRS 58.180 as it is exercising governmental functions; thus, it may form a nonprofit corporation in order to apply to the pollution abatement authority for the financing of a resource recovery incinerator. OAG 81-282 .

Where a county was operating under a contract with a private company for solid waste disposal, and the contract contained no reference to the county’s participation in sharing certain engineering costs attendant upon the operation of the landfill by the private entrepreneurs, the county’s sharing in such extra costs would be of a gratuitous nature, which would apparently be prohibited by Const., §§ 3 and 171. OAG 84-276 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Stephens, Commencing the Decade With Environmental Reform: The 1980 Kentucky General Assembly Implements the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 69 Ky. L.J. 227 (1980-81).

109.012. Definitions for chapter.

As used in this chapter, unless the context requires otherwise:

  1. “Board of directors” or “board” means the governing body of a solid waste management district;
  2. “City” means an existing city of any class;
  3. “County” means the governing body of a county, including urban-county governments;
  4. “Cabinet” means the Energy and Environment Cabinet;
  5. “Franchise” means a franchise, contract, right, authorization, or privilege granted by a local government for provision of solid waste management services;
  6. “Local government” means a city, county, urban-county government, charter county government, consolidated local government, or unified local government or a solid waste management district created pursuant to KRS Chapter 109;
  7. “Long-term contract” means a contract of sufficient duration to assure the viability of a resource recovery facility to the extent that such viability depends upon solid waste supply;
  8. “Recovered material” means those materials which have known current use, reuse, or recycling potential, which can be feasibly used, reused, or recycled, and which have been diverted or removed from the solid waste stream for sale, use, reuse, or recycling, whether or not requiring subsequent separation and processing, but does not include materials diverted or removed for purposes of energy recovery or combustion except refuse-derived fuel (RDF), which shall be credited as a recovered material in an amount equal to that percentage of the municipal solid waste received on a daily basis at the processing facility and processed into RDF; but not to exceed fifteen percent (15%) of the total amount of the municipal solid waste received at the processing facility on a daily basis;
  9. “Recovered material processing facility” means a facility engaged solely in the storage, processing, and resale or reuse of recovered material but does not mean a solid waste management facility if solid waste generated by a recovered material processing facility is managed pursuant to KRS Chapter 224 and administrative regulations adopted by the cabinet;
  10. “Person” means an individual, trust, firm, joint stock company, corporation (including a government corporation), partnership, association, federal agency, state agency, city, commission, political subdivision of the Commonwealth, or any interstate body;
  11. “Service company” means any person or entity duly authorized by an agency of the Commonwealth of Kentucky pursuant to the Kentucky Revised Statutes, or administrative regulations promulgated thereunder, for the provision of solid waste management services;
  12. “Solid waste” means any garbage, refuse, sludge, and other discarded material, including solid, liquid, semisolid, or contained gaseous material resulting from industrial, commercial, mining (excluding coal mining waste, coal mining by-products, refuse and overburden), agricultural operations, and from community activities, but does not include those materials including but not limited to sand, soil, rock, gravel, or bridge debris extracted as part of a public road construction project funded wholly or in part with state funds, recovered material, special wastes as designated by KRS 224.50-760 , solid or dissolved material in domestic sewage, manure, crops, crop residue, or a combination thereof which are placed on the soil for return to the soil as fertilizers or soil conditions, or solid or dissolved materials in irrigation return flows or industrial discharges which are point sources subject to permits under Section 402 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, as amended (86 Stat. 880), or source, special nuclear, or by-product material as defined by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 923).
    1. “Household solid waste” means solid waste, including garbage and trash generated by single and multiple family residences, hotels, motels, bunk houses, ranger stations, crew quarters, and recreational areas such as picnic areas, parks, and camp grounds;
    2. “Commercial solid waste” means all types of solid waste generated by stores, offices, restaurants, warehouses, and other service and nonmanufacturing activities, excluding household and industrial solid waste;
    3. “Industrial solid waste” means solid waste generated by manufacturing or industrial processes that is not a hazardous waste or a special waste as designated by KRS 224.50-760 , including but not limited to waste resulting from the following manufacturing processes: electric power generation; fertilizer or agricultural chemicals; food and related products or by-products; inorganic chemicals; iron and steel manufacturing; leather and leather products; nonferrous metals manufacturing/foundries; organic chemicals; plastics and resins manufacturing; pulp and paper industry; rubber and miscellaneous plastic products; stone, glass, clay, and concrete products; textile manufacturing; transportation equipment; and water treatment; and
    4. “Municipal solid waste” means household solid waste and commercial solid waste;
  13. “Solid waste management” or “solid waste management services” means the administration of solid waste activities: collection, storage, transportation, transfer, processing, treatment, and disposal, which shall be in accordance with a cabinet approved county or multicounty solid waste management plan of the cabinet. For the purposes of subsection (5) of this section and KRS 109.0417 , “solid waste management services” additionally includes collection, storage, transportation, transfer, processing, treatment, and disposal of special wastes, as designated by KRS 224.50-760 ,  and recovered material;
  14. “Solid waste management area” or “area” means any geographical area established or, designated by the cabinet in accordance with the provisions of KRS Chapter 224;
  15. “Solid waste management facility” means any facility for collection, storage, transportation, transfer, processing, treatment, or disposal of solid waste, whether such facility is associated with facilities generating such wastes or otherwise, but does not include a container located on property where solid waste is generated and which is used solely for the purpose of collection and temporary storage of that solid waste prior to off-site disposal, or a recovered material processing facility which is subject to regulation pursuant to the chapter for control of environmental impacts and to prevent any public nuisance; and
  16. “Waste management district” means any county or group of counties electing to form under the provisions of KRS 109.115 and operate in conformance with the provisions of this chapter and with Section 4006 of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, as amended (P.L. 94-580).

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1978, ch. 115, § 2, effective June 17, 1978; 1982, ch. 74, § 2, effective July 15, 1982; 1984, ch. 111, § 61, effective July 13, 1984; 1991 (1st Ex. Sess.), ch. 12, § 30, effective February 26, 1991; 2010, ch. 24, § 90, effective July 15, 2010; 2017 ch. 48, § 1, effective June 29, 2017.

Compiler’s Notes.

The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, referred to in subsection (13) is compiled as 42 USCS § 6901 et seq.

The Federal Water Pollution Control Act, referred to in subsection (9) of this section, is codified as 33 USCS § 1256. The definitions in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 also referred to in subsection (9) can be found in 42 USCS § 2014.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

Eastern Ky. Resources v. Arnett, 934 S.W.2d 270, 1996 Ky. LEXIS 118 ( Ky. 1996 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Jefferson County does have the authority to construct a solid waste recovery facility which will generate energy from the burning of solid waste; the county also has the authority to promulgate the necessary rules and regulations as long as they are consistent with the rules and regulations of the Department for Natural Resources and Environmental Protection (now the Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Cabinet). OAG 79-84 .

Three counties joining together pursuant to an interlocal agreement for the purpose of handling solid waste problems does not create a “special district” or a “waste management district” under this chapter. OAG 93-67 .

Definitions of solid waste contained in subsection (9) of this section and in regulations adopted by the board of directors of solid waste district which include “any garbage, refuse, sludge and other discarded material,” are broad enough to cover both those parts of solid waste which can be treated or recycled and those which cannot; therefore, the petroleum contaminated soils which were treated by corporation were solid wastes within the meaning of both the definition in KRS Chapter 109 and in the solid waste district regulations. OAG 94-43 .

109.015. Compliance with KRS 65A.010 to 65A.090.

Any board or authority shall comply with the provisions of KRS 65A.010 to 65A.090 .

History. Enact. Acts 2013, ch. 40, § 53, effective March 21, 2013.

109.020. Contracts between counties for management, collection, or disposal of solid waste. [Renumbered.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 66, § 3; 1978, ch. 115, § 9, effective June 17, 1978; 1982, ch. 74, § 3, effective July 15, 1982) is now compiled as KRS 109.082 .

109.021. Natural resources and environmental protection cabinet designated official planning and management agency. [Amended and reenacted.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1978, ch. 115, § 3, effective June 17, 1978) was amended and reenacted as KRS 224.886 by Acts 1982, ch. 74, § 22 and was later renumbered as KRS 224.43-310 by the Reviser of Statutes under authority of KRS 7.136 and 7.140 and confirmed by the Legislative Research Commission on July 10, 1991.

109.022. Rules and regulations — Approval of plans. [Amended and reenacted.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1978, ch. 115, § 4, effective June 17, 1978; 1980, ch. 279, § 1, effective July 15, 1980) was amended and reenacted as KRS 224.887 by Acts 1982, ch. 74, § 23 and was later renumbered as KRS 224.43-340 by the Reviser of Statutes under authority of KRS 7.136 and 7.140 and confirmed by the Legislative Research Commission on July 10, 1991.

109.030. Garbage disposal districts, establishment by fiscal court and cities. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 66, § 2) was repealed by Acts 1978, ch. 115, § 15, effective June 17, 1978.

109.031. What plan shall contain. [Amended and reenacted.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1978, ch. 115, § 5, effective June 17, 1978) was amended and reenacted as KRS 224.888 by Acts 1982, ch. 74, § 24 and was later renumbered as KRS 224.43-345 by the Reviser of Statutes under authority of KRS 7.136 and 7.140 and confirmed by the Legislative Research Commission on July 10, 1991.

109.040. Board of directors of garbage disposal district. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 66, § 4; 1974, ch. 21, § 1) was repealed by Acts 1978, ch. 115, § 15, effective June 17, 1978.

109.041. County powers for solid waste management.

  1. In addition to all other powers enumerated in Chapter 67 and other sections of the Kentucky Revised Statutes, counties, acting by and through their fiscal courts, may own and hold the permit for, plan, initiate, acquire, construct, and maintain solid waste management facilities, enter into contracts or leases with private parties for the design, construction, or operation of a publicly-owned solid waste management facility, and adopt administrative regulations with respect thereto in accordance with this chapter. It is hereby determined and declared that in the implementation, acquisition, financing, and maintenance of solid waste management facilities, and in the enforcement of their use, counties will be performing state functions duly delegated to them for the public welfare. In such regard, the right of counties to condemn land necessary for the acquisition of solid waste management facilities pursuant to the Eminent Domain Act of Kentucky and to exercise the police power in respect thereto is confirmed. Any county may contract with third parties for the management by public or private means of solid waste within the county.
  2. No solid waste management facility shall be acquired and constructed until the construction thereof has been approved in writing by the cabinet. Planning for a solid waste management facility shall be conducted in accordance with the policy set forth in KRS 109.011(7) and KRS Chapter 224.
  3. No county or waste management district shall prohibit or otherwise restrict materials recovery by:
    1. Any materials recovery operation in existence in the county or district on the effective date of the mandatory program;
    2. Any person supplying material to materials recovery operations on the effective date of the mandatory program;
    3. Any new materials recovery operation that reclaims the same type of materials as materials recovery operations included in paragraph (a) of this subsection;
    4. Any new suppliers to materials recovery operations included in paragraphs (a) and (c) of this subsection;
    5. Any materials recovery operation for glass, plastic, or metal beverage containers, unless a commitment has been made by a local government or other political subdivision of the state, by ordinance or contract, to a solid waste project consistent with the provisions of this chapter, that is dependent upon the materials recovery of glass, plastic, or metal beverage containers to meet its financial obligations for said project, and such commitment has been made prior to the operation of any other such materials recovery facility in the county or district;
    6. Any other materials recovery operation within the county or district not included in paragraphs (a) through (e) of this subsection or the supply of materials to such operation unless it is established that such operation would jeopardize the ability of a local government or other political subdivision of the state to meet financial obligations incurred in the maintenance, operation, or amortization of capital acquisition costs for a solid waste management facility; or
    7. In a county containing a consolidated local government, any municipality located within the geographic area of the county or waste management district created to serve that county.
  4. Notwithstanding any other provision of the Kentucky Revised Statutes to the contrary, no county or waste management district shall regulate special wastes as defined in KRS 224.50-760 , other than sludge from water and waste water treatment facilities as it pertains to landfarming, or solid waste from agricultural or mining operations.
  5. Any county undertaking the planning, implementation, construction, installation, acquisition, and financing of a solid waste management facility pursuant to this chapter shall have the authority set forth in Chapter 58 of the Kentucky Revised Statutes concerning the financing of such solid waste management facility, including the authority to promulgate, enforce, and collect reasonable rates, rentals, and charges for the use of such solid waste management facility.
  6. Bonds authorized to be issued by any county pursuant to the authority of this chapter for the financing of solid waste management facilities may be sold at either private or public sale as may in the sound discretion of the county be in the best interests of the county.
  7. Any county undertaking solid waste management pursuant to the provisions of this chapter may contract with any person for the provision of solid waste management services. A county may contract with any city to provide solid waste management services or may delegate the responsibility for solid waste management within incorporated areas to a city when the city agrees to assume such responsibility. In connection with solid waste management, any county may enter into contracts with any person for any term of years.
  8. Counties are authorized to charge a reasonable fee to transporters for the handling of their waste at a solid waste management facility approved by the cabinet.
  9. Counties are authorized to sell or market materials and energy recovered from solid waste and to enter into long-term contracts guaranteeing supply to insure markets for the sale of recovered products.
  10. In carrying out the provisions of this chapter, counties shall be subject to standards set by regulations adopted by the cabinet on waste management pursuant to KRS Chapter 224.
  11. No county or waste management district shall prohibit long-term contracts by ordinance or other means.
  12. Counties are expressly authorized in addition to the powers enumerated in KRS Chapter 65 and this chapter to contract with one another in order to regionalize solid waste management to the maximum extent practicable.
  13. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a fiscal court may, by ordinance, create a solid waste district to exercise the powers of the county pursuant to this chapter, except that a district created for this purpose shall not levy or collect ad valorem property taxes.
  14. If a city within a county containing a consolidated local government is in conformity with the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. secs. 6901 et seq., and is in conformity with all state statutes and administrative regulations applicable to the collection, management, and treatment of solid waste and resource recovery therefrom, the consolidated local government or waste management district serving the county containing the consolidated local government shall not, directly or indirectly, hinder, delay, impair, prohibit, or impede any city or its contractors and agents from accessing, utilizing, and otherwise using any solid waste management facility for the disposal of solid waste. The consolidated local government or waste management district shall not charge a city within the county containing the consolidated local government, or the city’s contractors and agents, directly or indirectly, any fee that is based, directly or indirectly, on the composition of the solid waste stream of that city if the solid waste stream is in conformity with state and federal law for the use of the solid waste management facility receiving the waste.

History. Enact. Acts 1978, ch. 115, § 6, effective June 17, 1978; 1982, ch. 74, § 4, effective July 15, 1982; 1984, ch. 398, § 2, effective July 13, 1984; 1988, ch. 329, § 1, effective July 15, 1988; 1990, ch. 353, § 1, effective July 13, 1990; 1991 (1st Ex. Sess.), ch. 12, § 33, effective February 26, 1991; 2002, ch. 342, § 14, effective July 15, 2002; 2017 ch. 105, § 1, effective March 21, 2017.

Compiler’s Notes.

The Eminent Domain Act of Kentucky is compiled as KRS 416.540 to 416.680 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Franchise Required.

A ruling on the constitutionality of subsection (7) of this section was not needed to reach the decision made by the Court of Appeals that subsection (7) of this section was sua sponte unconstitutionally contradictory to the 20-year limitation on franchises of Ky. Const., § 164. Because the contract involved in the case did not exceed 20 years, a ruling on this question was not necessary. Eastern Ky. Resources v. Arnett, 934 S.W.2d 270, 1996 Ky. LEXIS 118 ( Ky. 1996 ).

Fiscal court had the responsibility for the management and disposal of solid waste within its jurisdiction under KRS 67.083(3), KRS 109.041(1), and KRS 224.40-315 (1), so the argument that its contract granting a solid waste company the right to expand its landfill did not grant a franchise because a franchise could not be granted for the sale of a commercial product that was not the product of a government, but was a business which was open to all, was without merit. BFI Waste Sys. of N. Am., Inc. v. Huntington Woods Neighborhood Ass'n, 134 S.W.3d 624, 2003 Ky. App. LEXIS 295 (Ky. Ct. App. 2003).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Jefferson County does have the authority to construct a solid waste recovery facility which will generate energy from the burning of solid waste; the county also has the authority to promulgate the necessary rules and regulations as long as they are consistent with the rules and regulations of the Department for Natural Resources and Environmental Protection (now the Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Cabinet). OAG 79-84 .

A fiscal court could engage in a five-year contract with a landfill operator at an agreed-to price for handling the county’s garbage solid waste, but with the express understanding that payments to the landfill operator will come only out of the receipts to the county in the form of garbage system user charges; the contract should by an express provision make it clear that the fiscal court is not obligated to fund out of its general funds, created by tax revenues, the landfill contract and the hauling of the garbage and solid waste from the transfer station in the county to the landfill; the contract could also provide that during the five-year period the fiscal court would covenant to maintain the specific user charges agreed on, and that all county garbage would be delivered to that landfill operator. OAG 80-455 .

“Regulate” in this section speaks to what is done with the wastes (i.e., handling, treatment, etc.) rather than to planning and zoning issues of where certain types of facilities might be located within a planning unit’s jurisdiction; while this section would prohibit the country from saying how special wastes may be handled, treated, etc., this section does not remove special waste disposal facilities from normal planning and zoning requirements. OAG 92-33 .

Three counties joining together pursuant to an interlocal agreement for the purpose of handling solid waste problems does not create a “special district” or a “waste management district” under this chapter. OAG 93-67 .

Properly created and constituted solid waste management districts are authorized to impose uniform participation on all waste-producing entities in the county without requiring additional action on the part of the fiscal court. The board of directors is free to choose those means which it considers necessary to fulfill its responsibilities, as long as the means chosen are consistent with the applicable statutes, regulations of the Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Cabinet, and any other regulations which may be applicable. OAG 94-35 .

The General Assembly has delegated to the counties, and through them, to such special districts as are created, broad authority to regulate all aspects of solid waste management and disposal and this authority may be exercised cooperatively by both a county and a special district. However, any regulation or ordinance must not be arbitrary and must also be consistent with state statutes and regulations upon the subject. OAG 94-43 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Cox, What May States Do About Out-of-State Waste in Light of Recent Supreme Court Decisions Applying the Dormant Commerce Clause? Kentucky As Case Study in the Waste Wars, 83 Ky. L.J. 551 (1994-95).

109.0415. Election on initial county solid waste management plan for counties without approved plan as of March 15, 1992.

  1. As to any county for which an initial county or area solid waste management plan was not approved by the cabinet as of March 15, 1992, a county solid waste management plan submitted to the cabinet shall not become effective if fifty-one percent (51%) of the registered voters eligible to vote in the last Presidential election sign and file a petition with the county clerk and the cabinet requesting submission of the plan to voter approval. The petition shall be filed within one hundred fifty (150) days of the fiscal court vote approving the plan.
  2. If the county clerk determines that the petition is in proper order, the clerk shall certify the petition to the fiscal court. The fiscal court shall direct that the question be placed before the voters at a special election held less than sixty (60) days from the certification of the petition. The fiscal court shall bear the costs of advertising and placing the question before the voters.
  3. The county clerk shall advertise the question as provided in KRS Chapter 424 and shall instruct the voters to vote “yes” or “no” on acceptance of the solid waste management plan. The results of the vote shall be certified to the fiscal court of the county and the cabinet. The cabinet shall not approve a county solid waste management plan if at least sixty (60) percent of those voting vote “no.”
  4. The provisions of this section shall not apply to any subsequent plan submitted by any county.

History. Enact. Acts 1992, ch. 160, § 1, effective April 1, 1992; 2002, ch. 342, § 11, effective July 15, 2002.

109.0417. Procedures for a local government’s change of solid waste management service providers or award of a new franchise for provision of solid waste management services.

    1. After June 29, 2017, a local government shall not: (1) (a) After June 29, 2017, a local government shall not:
      1. Commence solid waste management services that would have the effect of prohibiting a service company from continuing to provide services that it was providing prior to commencement of services by the local government; or
      2. Award a franchise for solid waste management services where no franchise exists;

        unless the local government complies with the requirements in this section.

    2. Paragraph (a) of this subsection shall not apply to:
      1. The renewal, according to its terms, or replacement, upon its expiration, of an existing franchise; or
      2. The expansion or extension of urban services related to residential waste management services for single-family or two (2) family dwelling units by an urban-county government pursuant to KRS Chapter 67A, so long as the urban-county government:
        1. Holds at least one (1) public hearing and provides written notice to all service companies registered within the urban-county government no later than ten (10) days prior to the scheduled public hearing; and
        2. Provides written notice to all service companies registered with the urban-county government no later than ten (10) days after:
          1. Receiving a petition to extend urban services;
          2. Mailing voting cards to proposed service recipients regarding the petition so long as the written notice contains the date that voting cards are to be returned by the recipient; and
          3. Making a final determination.
  1. Not less than one hundred eighty (180) days prior to making a final determination to take an action described in subsection (1)(a) of this section, a local government shall send written notification by certified mail to the local Kentucky address of all service companies providing solid waste management services within the solid waste management area where the action is proposed to occur that:
    1. Describes the proposed action in detail;
    2. Provides the date, time, and location of the public hearing required pursuant to subsection (3) of this section; and
    3. Designates a responsible official within the local government to be available to personally communicate with any service company regarding the particular details of and rationale for the proposed action, including but not limited to the economic and employment consequences of the proposed action.
  2. No sooner than forty-five (45) days but within one hundred eighty (180) days following the written notice required under subsection (2) of this section, the local government shall:
    1. Hold one (1) public hearing that is advertised to the public in accordance with KRS 424.130 for the purposes of:
      1. Describing the proposed action, including but not limited to the economic and employment consequences of the plan; and
      2. Accepting written comments from the public and service companies regarding the proposed action; and
    2. Accept additional verbal and written comments regarding the proposed action for no less than thirty (30) days following the public hearing described in paragraph (a) of this subsection.
  3. No later than sixty (60) days following the close of the public comment period described in subsection (3) of this section, the local government shall prepare a summary of all comments, and the local government’s response to each comment, received at the public hearings. The local government shall send, by certified mail, the summary and response to any service company that has submitted comments and make the summary and response to comments available to the public as an open record.
    1. If a local government makes a final determination to take an action described in subsection (1)(a) of this section, the effective time for the action shall be governed by this subsection. (5) (a) If a local government makes a final determination to take an action described in subsection (1)(a) of this section, the effective time for the action shall be governed by this subsection.
    2. For actions described in subsection (1)(a)1. of this section, the action shall take place no sooner than eighteen (18) months following the local government’s final determination.
    3. For actions described in subsection (1)(a)2. of this section, the franchise award shall be effective no sooner than twelve (12) months following the local government’s final determination.
    4. This subsection shall not apply to actions taken by a county or solid waste management district pursuant to KRS 109.059 .
  4. If a local government makes a final determination to take an action described in subsection (1)(a) of this section, the final determination shall be made no later than three hundred sixty-five (365) days from the date of the notice required pursuant to subsection (2) of this section.
  5. If a local government submits a bid or proposal to perform solid waste management services in competition with a service company, the local government shall incorporate in its bid or proposal all elements that are required of bids from service companies for the same services.
  6. For actions described in subsection (1)(a)1. of this section, nothing in this section shall be interpreted to preclude a local government and the service company or companies impacted by the action from entering into an agreement that provides alternative terms and conditions to govern the rights of a local government and a service company or companies, including but not limited to a complete waiver of the requirements of this section.
  7. This section shall not apply to actions taken by a local government:
    1. To the extent necessary to mitigate conditions caused by a service company that are reasonably determined to threaten the health or safety of the residents of the community, or a material breach of a contract with the local government, after the service company has been given written notice and the opportunity to cure the condition. If the contract with the local government provides for the remedy associated with a breach of the contract, the terms of the contract shall take precedence over this paragraph; or
    2. That would result in the service company’s loss of fifty (50) or fewer residential customers due to the action. A local government may only take one (1) action to which this paragraph applies every three (3) years.

HISTORY: 2017 ch. 48, § 2, effective June 29, 2017.

109.042. Enforcement representative — Regulations — Financing for program.

  1. A county or waste management district may employ an enforcement representative to ensure compliance with applicable administrative regulations of the cabinet relating to construction and operation of solid waste management facilities. The local government representative shall have the authority to inspect loads of solid waste and prevent any loads, which fail to comply with administrative regulations, from being disposed of at the solid waste management facility. The local government representative shall possess at least minimum qualifications required of representatives of the cabinet performing similar functions.
  2. The cabinet shall adopt administrative regulations for local government inspection of solid waste management facilities and enforcement procedures. The administrative regulations shall include but not be limited to, requiring local enforcement representatives to report violations of state solid waste management facilities laws and administrative regulations immediately to the cabinet and requiring the cabinet to respond to the report within forty-eight (48) hours of its receipt.
  3. A county or waste management district which elects to implement a local inspection and enforcement program for solid waste management facilities may finance the program from the license fees provided for in KRS 68.178 .

History. Enact. Acts 1988, ch. 45, § 2, effective July 15, 1988; 1991 (1st Ex. Sess.), ch. 12, § 31, effective February 26, 1991.

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Cox, What May States Do About Out-of-State Waste in Light of Recent Supreme Court Decisions Applying the Dormant Commerce Clause? Kentucky As Case Study in the Waste Wars, 83 Ky. L.J. 551 (1994-95).

109.050. Oath and bond of directors. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 66, § 5) was repealed by Acts 1978, ch. 115, § 15, effective June 17, 1978.

109.051. Cities, counties, and districts may join together for solid waste disposal. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1978, ch. 115, § 7, effective June 17, 1978) was repealed by Acts 1982, ch. 74, § 27, effective July 15, 1982.

109.056. Tax levy — Service charges.

  1. Any county or waste management district, if authorized by all the counties that comprise the district, may levy an annual tax, not to exceed ten cents ($0.10) on each one hundred dollars ($100) of assessed valuation of real property within the area subject to taxation for county purposes. The proceeds of such tax shall be used for solid waste management expenses of the area and for redemption of any bonds issued.
  2. The county or waste management district, if authorized by the counties that comprise the district, may in lieu of the tax provided in subsection (1) of this section or in addition thereto finance the maintenance, operation, and capital acquisition costs of the area by fees to be collected from all persons receiving services from the area. The charges shall be fixed in amounts as can be reasonably expected to yield revenues not in excess of the cost of operation and maintenance of the system and for an adequate depreciation fund and amortization of capital acquisition costs.
  3. The service charges authorized by subsections (1) and (2) of this section may be collected by the area directly or the area may enter into an agreement with other utilities either public or private to collect such charges.

History. Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 66, § 18; 1978, ch. 115, § 13, effective June 17, 1978; 1982, ch. 74, § 11, effective July 15, 1982; 1991 (1st Ex. Sess.), ch. 12, § 32, effective February 26, 1991.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section was formerly compiled as KRS 109.180 .

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(1988). A technical correction has been made in this section by the Reviser of Statutes pursuant to KRS 7.136 .

Opinions of Attorney General.

A fiscal court has no authority to specify in the order creating a garbage and disposal district the method or methods of financing that the district may use. OAG 70-9 .

The fiscal court, upon the creation of a garbage district, has no authority to restrict in any way the taxing authority of the district. OAG 70-9 .

Garbage district can levy an annual tax on the property within the district or impose a service charge for users, and board of directors could operate the system directly or contract and, while the fiscal court may establish such district and boundaries for it, the legislative bodies of incorporated cities within the county boundary would have to approve their being made a part of the district and the fiscal court would have no authority to specify the methods of financing the district may use. OAG 73-487 .

After a district board has by formal action made a tax levy under this section it should lodge a copy of the records of the board showing such tax levy with the county court clerk of each county of the district and it is then the responsibility of the county court clerk to include the district tax, in connection with the tax rolls, on the prescribed form. OAG 74-372 .

When a garbage district taxes it must tax all the citizens in every county in the district and cannot collect a tax in all counties of the district to fund a garbage collection system in only one county. OAG 74-372 .

An attempted restriction that a garbage district shall not be authorized to levy any tax for disposal is contrary to statute and unenforceable. OAG 74-372 .

A multi-county and city garbage district organized pursuant to KRS 109.030 (now repealed) was a separate taxing district and could levy an annual tax pursuant to this section to fund a rural, containerized garbage and refuse collection and transportation service by a simple vote of the majority of directors as authorized by KRS 446.050 . OAG 74-372 .

An ordinance passed by a fiscal court under KRS 67.083 requiring electric companies to collect the garbage district charge from those persons who use both electricity and the garbage district services would be illegal as such an ordinance would conflict with subsection (3) of this section providing for voluntary agreement. OAG 74-528 .

Where a garbage district has levied a tax and secured a loan from a bank in which one of its commissioners is a stockholder, the commissioner’s financial interest in the loan is too speculative to create a conflict of interest. OAG 75-100 .

If the board of directors of a garbage district establishes a tax under this section to finance the garbage district operation, then the tax would be included in county tax bills as a validly created special district tax. OAG 76-206 .

A fiscal court ordinance which attempts to enforce the collection of garbage and to establish certain rules relating to definitions of “garbage” and “residence” is illegal, since the affairs of a garbage district must be controlled and managed by the district board of directors. OAG 76-250 .

The board of directors of a garbage district has the power to levy the tax provided for in this section without any referendum. OAG 76-250 .

Since a utility gross receipts tax which is measured by the receipts from the sale of the gas would be an excise tax, the tax could not be levied by a fiscal court to finance a garbage collection and disposal system in the county. OAG 77-266 .

The property subject to the garbage district tax includes all lands and improvements thereon lying within the garbage district, but does not include tangible and intangible personal property. OAG 77-731 .

A garbage district (or a waste management district) organized and functioning pursuant to KRS Chapter 109 is a separate taxing district operating autonomously within its statutory sphere of authority; the county government, under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, is not liable for the tortious or negligent conduct of its officers and employees or for such conduct on the part of the garbage district’s officers and employees. OAG 83-4 .

Under subsection (3) of this section a solid waste management commission cannot place the past due solid waste charges on the property tax bills of persons who refuse to pay their garbage bills, identifying the charge as a garbage charge, and have the sheriff collect the past due charges when he makes his normal yearly property tax collection since KRS 134.140 provides in part that the sheriff is collector of all state, county and district taxes and this involves only taxes in the strict legal sense, not “charges” for a governmental service and since KRS 133.220 deals with the county clerk’s preparation of tax bills and makes no mention of governmental charges. OAG 83-253 .

109.059. Use of solid waste management facility — Exception.

Any county or waste management district may require the use of any solid waste management facility or other facility, meeting the standards of the department set by regulations issued pursuant to KRS Chapter 224 by all persons situated within the geographical boundaries thereof; such mandatory use of any solid waste management facility shall not be applicable to any city within the geographical boundaries of any such county or waste management district provided that:

  1. The city owns and operates a municipal solid waste management facility; and
  2. The solid waste management facility is not a sanitary landfill; and
  3. The solid waste management facility was in existence prior to June 17, 1978; and
  4. The solid waste management facility complies with the intent and purposes of KRS Chapters 109 and 224.

History. Enact. Acts 1978, ch. 113, § 14, effective June 17, 1978; 1982, ch. 74, § 13, effective July 15, 1982.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section was formerly compiled as KRS 109.250 .

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(1988). A technical correction has been made in this section by the Reviser of Statutes pursuant to KRS 7.136 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Garbage Collection Franchises.

A county does not have the right to exercise an exclusive garbage collection franchise within the incorporated areas of cities. Radcliff v. Hardin County, 607 S.W.2d 132, 1980 Ky. App. LEXIS 376 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980).

109.060. Directors, terms of office. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 66, § 6) was repealed by Acts 1978, ch. 115, § 15, effective June 17, 1978.

109.061. Single county as solid waste management area. [Renumbered.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1978, ch. 115, § 8, effective June 17, 1978) is now compiled as KRS 109.072 .

109.062. Use of collection system. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1982, ch. 74, § 14, effective July 15, 1982; 1984, ch. 111, § 62, effective July 13, 1984) was repealed by Acts 2002, ch. 342, § 18.

109.070. Plans of district — Operations. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 66, § 9) was repealed by Acts 1978, ch. 115, § 15, effective June 17, 1978.

109.071. Districts — Establishment — Powers — Directors. [Renumbered.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1978, ch. 115, § 10, effective June 17, 1978; 1982, ch. 74, § 5, effective July 15, 1982) is now compiled as KRS 109.115 .

109.072. Single county as solid waste management area.

Where it is consistent with the policy set forth in this chapter and approved by the department one (1) county may be designated as a solid waste management area.

History. Enact. Acts 1978, ch. 115, § 8, effective June 17, 1978.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section was formerly compiled as KRS 109.061 .

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(1982). A technical correction has been made in this section by the Reviser of Statutes pursuant to KRS 7.136 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Garbage Collection Franchises.

A county does not have the right to exercise an exclusive garbage collection franchise within the incorporated areas of cities. Radcliff v. Hardin County, 607 S.W.2d 132, 1980 Ky. App. LEXIS 376 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980).

109.080. Plans to be approved by state health department — Methods of disposal. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 66, § 10; 1974, ch. 63, § 2) was repealed by Acts 1978, ch. 115, § 15, effective June 17, 1978.

109.082. Contracts between counties for management, collection, or disposal of solid waste.

When two (2) or more counties join with each other in the management or solely in the collection or solely in the disposal of solid waste in accordance with the state solid waste management plan they may cause a contract to be prepared and executed which shall set forth:

  1. Whether and to what extent counties shall render services to the area and receive services from the area or from each other.
  2. Whether counties will contract with a private party or parties for the management of solid waste.
  3. The financial responsibilities and contributions of the respective counties in the joint undertaking.
  4. The extent to which the counties will furnish personnel and administrative services to the area.
  5. The terms of the contract or agreement: provided that such contract may be modified from time to time as conditions may warrant and provided one or more additional counties desiring to participate in the joint undertaking may be permitted to become parties to the contract.
  6. Such other provisions as may be necessary to execute a workable system for solid waste management or solely of collection or solely of disposal of solid waste.

History. Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 66, § 3; 1978, ch. 115, § 9, effective June 17, 1978; 1982, ch. 74, § 3, effective July 15, 1982.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section was formerly compiled as KRS 109.020 .

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(1988). A technical correction has been made in this section by the Reviser of Statutes pursuant to KRS 7.136 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Extent of County’s Authority.

A county does not have the right to exercise an exclusive garbage collection franchise within the incorporated areas of cities. Radcliff v. Hardin County, 607 S.W.2d 132, 1980 Ky. App. LEXIS 376 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Although the fiscal court can establish a direct county disposal system or garbage collection in the unincorporated area of the county, a city could enter into a joint venture with the county in those areas. OAG 71-449 .

A city may, by the approval of its legislative body, enter into a joint venture with a county in connection with that part of the county garbage collection and disposal system involving the incorporated area of the city and may exact a garbage collection charge from the city users although the residents of the city pay a county ad valorem tax out of which the county’s disposal site operation is partly funded. OAG 74-557 .

In the absence of an agreement with a city, a county cannot be made to locate trash collection boxes within the limits of the city. OAG 74-557 .

Except where a statute expressly authorizes, a county has no general obligations to expend tax funds within the limits of incorporated communities of the county. OAG 74-557 .

109.090. Collection and disposal before plans approved unlawful. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 66, § 12; 1974, ch. 63, § 3; 1978, ch. 384, § 248) was repealed by Acts 1978, ch. 115, § 15, effective June 17, 1978.

109.095. Discontinuance by petition of majority. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1974, ch. 63, § 4; 1978, ch. 384, § 248) was repealed by Acts 1978, ch. 115, § 15, effective June 17, 1978.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

KRS 109.095 was amended in the reviser’s bill, Acts 1978, ch. 384, HB 607, § 248; however, the repeal in Acts 1978, ch. 115, SB 301, § 15 prevails. See KRS 7.136(3).

109.100. Engineer and attorney for board — Personnel — Offices. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 66, § 8) was repealed by Acts 1978, ch. 115, § 15, effective June 17, 1978.

109.110. Duties of commissioner of environmental protection. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 66, § 11; 1972 (1st Ex. Sess.), ch. 3, § 28) was repealed by Acts 1974, ch. 63, § 5.

109.115. Districts — Establishment — Powers — Directors, appointment and removal — Board of directors in county not containing a consolidated local government — Board of directors in county containing a consolidated local government.

  1. A single county, or two (2) or more counties may create a waste management district in accordance with the procedures of KRS 65.182 . Waste management districts shall have all powers and authority set forth in KRS 109.041 .
  2. The waste management district shall be controlled and managed by a board of directors.
  3. The fiscal court in a county not containing a consolidated local government shall determine the composition of the board of directors in one (1) of the following ways:
    1. Appointment of the county judge/executive of every county, or portion of a county, within that district and the mayor of the most populous city in each county. Appointment of a third member from each county in the district so that representation on the board shall be in proportion to the urban-rural population distribution in the county. The county judge/executive and the mayor may delegate a representative to serve in their stead; or
    2. Appointment of members by the county judge/executive and confirmed by the respective fiscal court. In the case of multicounty districts, membership on the board shall be apportioned among the counties in ratio to their population with each county having at least one (1) member. The mayor of the most populous city in each county that is a participant in the waste management district shall be appointed a member. In no case shall the total membership of the board consist of fewer than three (3) persons. When a county has two (2) or more members on the board, members shall be selected from urban or rural areas in the same proportion as the urban-rural population distribution in the county, except that there shall be at least one (1) member each from a rural and from an urban area.
  4. In a county containing a consolidated local government, the mayor of the consolidated local government, with the approval of the legislative body of the consolidated local government, shall appoint the following seven (7) persons to constitute the board of directors:
    1. Three (3) residents, one (1) from each of the three (3) commissioner’s districts in the county and no two (2) members shall reside within the samestate Senate district;
    2. One (1) resident of the county who shall also reside within and represent the urban services district within the consolidated local government;
    3. One (1) resident of the county submitted by the organization representing the largest amount of cities within the county which does not have statewide membership;
    4. One (1) resident of the county who does not reside within a city or the urban services district in the county; and
    5. One (1) resident of the county submitted by the association representing the largest number of waste management entities operating within the county.
  5. A member of the board of directors may be removed from office pursuant to KRS 65.007 .
  6. Except for the initial board appointed pursuant to this section, each director shall serve a two (2) year term, and shall serve no more than three (3) consecutive terms. The initial board appointed pursuant to this section shall consist of three (3) directors appointed for one (1) year and four (4) directors appointed for two (2) years.

History. Enact. Acts 1978, ch. 115, § 10, effective June 17, 1978; 1982, ch. 74, § 5, effective July 15, 1982; 1984, ch. 100, § 11, effective July 13, 1984; 1992, ch. 20, § 1, effective July 14, 1992; 1996, ch. 136, § 3, effective July 15, 1996; 2017 ch. 105, § 2, effective March 21, 2017.

Compiler’s Notes.

This section was formerly compiled as KRS 109.071 .

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(3/21/2017). 2017 Ky. Acts ch. 105, sec. 6 provided that amendments made to this statute in Section 2 of that Act “shall be applied, on the effective date of this Act (March 21, 2017), to declare vacant the offices of current board members of a solid waste management district in a county containing a consolidated local government who were appointed under subsection (3) of (this statute) prior to its amendment in this Act. The mayor of the consolidated local government shall fill the vacant positions within 90 days of (March 21, 2017) in accordance with subsection (4) of (this statute); otherwise all appointment authority shall shift to the Governor.”

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Garbage Collection Franchises.

A county does not have the right to exercise an exclusive garbage collection franchise within the incorporated areas of cities. Radcliff v. Hardin County, 607 S.W.2d 132, 1980 Ky. App. LEXIS 376 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Properly created and constituted solid waste management districts are authorized to impose uniform participation on all waste-producing entities in the county without requiring additional action on the part of the fiscal court. The board of directors is free to choose those means which it considers necessary to fulfill its responsibilities, as long as the means chosen are consistent with the applicable statutes, regulations of the Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Cabinet, and any other regulations which may be applicable. OAG 94-35 .

109.120. Rules and regulations of board — Different provisions for rulemaking in those counties containing a consolidated local government and those counties that do not.

  1. In counties not containing a consolidated local government, the board may adopt such rules and regulations as are necessary to carry out the purposes for which the waste management district was created and necessary for the adequate management of solid waste in a manner adequate to protect the public health and consistent with such rules and regulations as may be promulgated by the department.
  2. In counties containing a consolidated local government, all rules and regulations of the solid waste management district enacted from adoption of the most recent solid waste management plan prior to March 21, 2017, shall continue in full force and effect until the later of August 31, 2017, or the date on which a new solid waste management plan is approved by the department.
  3. In counties containing a consolidated local government, the board may adopt such rules and regulations as are necessary to carry out the purposes for which the waste management district was created and necessary for the adequate management of solid waste in a manner adequate to protect the public health and consistent with such rules and regulations as may be promulgated by the department. These rules and regulations shall not be enforceable within the boundaries of the city until approved by the legislative body of the city or, if outside of an incorporated municipality, the legislative body of the consolidated local government, where the rule or regulation is intended to apply. A city shall approve any rule or regulation if rejecting it would cause the city to be in violation of its approved solid waste management plan adopted in accordance with the provisions of KRS 224.43-340 and 224.43-345 .
  4. In counties containing a consolidated local government, a solid waste district shall be required to electronically make available on a Web site operated by the consolidated local government, all notices, meeting agendas, and meeting minutes.

History. Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 66, § 7; 1978, ch. 115, § 11, effective June 17, 1978; 1982, ch. 74, § 6, effective July 15, 1982; 2017 ch. 105, § 3, effective March 21, 2017.

Opinions of Attorney General.

Properly created and constituted solid waste management districts are authorized to impose uniform participation on all waste-producing entities in the county without requiring additional action on the part of the fiscal court. The board of directors is free to choose those means which it considers necessary to fulfill its responsibilities, as long as the means chosen are consistent with the applicable statutes, regulations of the Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Cabinet, and any other regulations which may be applicable. OAG 94-35 .

109.130. Contracts for service outside district. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 66, § 13) was repealed by Acts 1978, ch. 115, § 15, effective June 17, 1978.

109.140. Use of funds.

All funds derived from taxes, service charges, sales or other income resulting from the operation of a waste management district shall if collected or held by another person be paid to and expended by the district to carry out its duties, functions, and responsibilities.

History. Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 66, § 14; 1982, ch. 74, § 7, effective July 15, 1982.

109.150. Acquisition of property by waste management district.

The waste management district may acquire by bequest, gift, grant or purchase such real and personal property or any interest therein as may be necessary to accomplish its purposes. Title to all property acquired by the waste management district shall be vested solely in the name of the district. With the approval of the department the waste management district may apply for and receive funds available under federal legislation such as grants and loans for the purpose of improving solid waste management.

History. Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 66, § 15; 1978, ch. 115, § 12, effective June 17, 1978; 1982, ch. 74, § 8, effective July 15, 1982.

109.160. Condemnation of property.

The board may by resolution recite the need, order the condemnation on behalf of the waste management district of any real property or interest therein that in the opinion of the board is necessary for the proposed construction or use of a solid waste management facility. Proceedings for condemnation shall be conducted in the manner prescribed in the Eminent Domain Act of Kentucky.

History. Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 66, § 16; 1976, ch. 140, § 63; 1982, ch. 74, § 9, effective July 15, 1982.

Compiler’s Notes.

The Eminent Domain Act of Kentucky, referred to in this section, is compiled as KRS 416.540 to 416.670 .

109.170. Issuance of bonds.

For the purpose of acquiring, creating and maintaining collection systems and solid waste management facilities any waste management district may pursuant to the provisions of KRS Chapter 58 borrow money and issue negotiable revenue bonds.

History. Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 66, § 17; 1982, ch. 74, § 10, effective July 15, 1982.

Opinions of Attorney General.

Garbage district can levy an annual tax on the property within the district or impose a service charge for users, and board of directors could operate the system directly or contract and, while the fiscal court may establish such district and boundaries for it, the legislative bodies of incorporated cities within the county boundary would have to approve their being made a part of the district and the fiscal court would have no authority to specify the methods of financing the district may use. OAG 73-487 .

109.180. Financing — Taxes — Service charges. [Renumbered.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1966, ch. 66, § 18; 1978, ch. 115, § 13, effective June 17, 1978; 1982, ch. 74, § 11, effective July 15, 1982) is now compiled as KRS 109.056 .

109.190. Status of existing districts.

Garbage and refuse districts established pursuant to this chapter prior to June 17, 1978, whether de jure or de facto, unless the cabinet finds that such do not comply with the Federal Resource Conservation and Recovery Act as amended and with the state solid waste management plan, shall be deemed waste management districts and shall have all of the powers and duties of waste management districts as set forth in this chapter.

History. Enact. Acts 1978, ch. 115, § 14, effective June 17, 1978; 1982, ch. 74, § 12, effective July 15, 1982; 1986, ch. 331, § 23, effective July 15, 1986.

Opinions of Attorney General.

The repeal of certain statutory sections relating to garbage disposal districts in Acts 1978, Chapter 115, section 15, is inoperative as to those preexisting garbage disposal districts qualifying for a continuing status under this section; where a garbage disposal district qualifies under this section for a continued status, the old applicable law is operative and the garbage disposal district board under KRS 109.040 (repealed) has the exclusive authority to provide for the landfill site in that district, and the fiscal court has no authority to take any action concerning the landfill site. OAG 80-172 .

A garbage district (or a waste management district) organized and functioning pursuant to KRS Chapter 109 is a separate taxing district operating autonomously within its statutory sphere of authority; the county government, under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, is not liable for the tortious or negligent conduct of its officers and employees or for such conduct on the part of the garbage district’s officers and employees. OAG 83-4 .

109.250. Use of solid waste management facility — Exception. [Renumbered.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1978, ch. 113, § 14, effective June 17, 1978; 1982, ch. 74, § 13, effective July 15, 1982) is now compiled as KRS 109.059 .

109.260. City providing solid waste management services pending implementation of approved plan.

  1. No provision of this chapter shall preclude a city from providing solid waste management services pending implementation of the approved solid waste management plan submitted by a county or district pursuant to KRS 224.43-340 . Any county or waste management district that includes the provision of solid waste management services to a city in its approved solid waste management plan shall provide the city with written notice at least one (1) year prior to the date it intends to provide such service to the city.
  2. A city may be delegated the responsibility for providing solid waste management services by a county where it is mutually advantageous to do so, and both the city and county agree to the delegation of authority. Upon delegation of responsibility, a city acting by and through its legislative body may plan, initiate, acquire, construct and maintain solid waste management facilities and promulgate rules and regulations with respect thereto in accordance with this chapter.
  3. Any solid waste management plan submitted by a county or district pursuant to KRS 224.43-340 , that includes any city that has made a financial commitment for a solid waste management system, shall include provisions for insuring sufficient revenues to the city to retire the debt on said system in accordance with the financial obligations incurred by the city.

History. Enact. Acts 1982, ch. 74, § 15, effective July 15, 1982; 1984, ch. 398, § 3, effective July 13, 1984.

109.270. Establishment of district by citizen petition and election — Election on plan — Dissolution or modification of districts.

  1. When the citizens of a county desire to have such county establish a solid waste management plan and as of January 1, 1984, the fiscal court has failed to establish a plan, a number of citizens equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the votes cast in the county for the office receiving the greatest total vote at the last general election, shall file a petition in the county of their residence asking that a solid waste management plan be established.
  2. The petition shall be filed with the county judge/executive asking that the proposition of establishing a solid waste management plan for the county be submitted to the voters of the county at the next general election held in the county. Each voter signing the petition shall state his full name and address. Upon the filing of the petition with the county judge/executive he shall enter an order directing that the petition be published in full pursuant to KRS Chapter 424, and shall further enter an order with the county clerk not later than the second Tuesday in August preceding the general election to have placed before the voters at such election the question, “Are you in favor of having the county establish a solid waste management plan?” with proper spaces in which the voter may indicate a “Yes” or a “No” vote. If the majority of those voting on the proposition vote “Yes,” a solid waste management plan shall be developed. The vote shall be canvassed and returned by the board of election commissioners for the general election.
  3. The result of any election with respect to establishing a solid waste management plan shall be certified to the fiscal court of the county, and the fiscal court shall, if the result of the election is certified as in favor of the establishment of the plan, proceed to develop a solid waste management plan for the county.
  4. At the next general election held in the county following the vote of the people in favor of the establishment of a solid waste management plan, the county shall submit to the voters of the county the details of said plan, including the area to be served, the debt to be incurred, any fees or assessments to be levied or other financing proposals. At least thirty (30) days prior to said election the county judge/executive shall enter an order directing that the details of the solid waste management plan be published pursuant to KRS Chapter 424, and shall further enter an order not later than the second Tuesday in August preceding the general election directing the county clerk to have placed before the voters at such election the question, “Are you in favor of the implementation of the solid waste management plan proposed by the county?” with proper spaces in which the voter may indicate a “Yes” or a “No” vote. If the majority of those voting on the proposition vote “Yes,” the solid waste management plan shall be implemented. The vote shall be canvassed and returned by the board of election commissioners for the general election.
  5. The result of any election with respect to a solid waste management plan shall be certified to the fiscal court of the county, and the fiscal court shall, if the result of the election is certified as in favor of the plan, forthwith proceed to put the plan into effect. If the result of the election is against the implementation of that solid waste management plan, the county shall proceed to develop another plan to be submitted to the voters of the county at the next general election, following the procedure set forth in subsection (4) of this section.
  6. The result of any election with respect to establishing a waste management district shall be certified to the fiscal court of the counties composing the district to be established, and the fiscal court shall, if the result of the election is certified as in favor of the establishment of the district, forthwith proceed to declare the county or counties a district for the purposes of waste management, and shall proceed to put the district into effect in the same manner as they are authorized to do upon their own initiative.
  7. Waste management districts created under this section may be dissolved or modified pursuant to the provisions of KRS 65.166 to 65.176 .

History. Enact. Acts 1982, ch. 74, § 16, effective July 15, 1982; 1996, ch. 195, § 53, effective July 15, 1996.

109.280. Exercise of powers in urban-county governments.

  1. In urban-county governments powers delegated in this chapter to the county judge/executive shall be exercised by the official in whom the chief executive power is vested.
  2. In urban-county governments powers delegated in this chapter to the fiscal court shall be exercised by the body in which the chief legislative power is vested.

History. Enact. Acts 1982, ch. 74, § 17, effective July 15, 1982.

109.300. Purpose of KRS 109.310 to 109.320.

  1. It is the purpose of KRS 109.310 to 109.320 to further the intention of the General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Kentucky as expressed in KRS 109.011 that the primary responsibility for adequate solid waste collection, disposal and resource recovery rests with counties, and to assist local governments to carry out those responsibilities.
  2. The authority granted by KRS 109.310 to 109.320 shall be construed as being in addition to other power already given to counties. The purpose of this grant of authority shall be to increase the range of options from which counties may choose in order to meet local solid waste management needs.

History. Enact. Acts 1990, ch. 158, § 1, effective July 13, 1990.

109.310. Collection of solid waste pick-up fees — Combination with property tax bill — Notice — Waiver if owner of property is not the occupant — Assessment of fines or fees.

  1. A county or urban-county government may collect solid waste pick-up fees which are delinquent three (3) consecutive months or more by combining the delinquent fees with the property tax bill for the property where the solid waste pick-up is made. The fees shall be limited to a return on capital expenditures and to cover operational costs.
  2. The pick-up fee when combined with the property tax bill shall be clearly set out as the delinquent amount owed for solid waste pick-up services and shall in no way be represented as an assessment based on the value of the property.
  3. Sixty (60) days before a property tax bill which includes a delinquent solid waste pick-up fee is mailed, the county office responsible for solid waste pick-up billing shall give written notice to the owner of the property that the pick-up bill is delinquent and that, if left unpaid, the fee will be combined with the next property tax bill.
  4. A county or urban-county government may waive the solid waste pick-up fee for businesses which request a waiver. The request for a waiver shall include a certification that the solid waste generated by the business is disposed of properly and include a description of the disposal method and the property owner’s federal employer’s identification number.
  5. If the owner of the property is not the occupant of the property where the solid waste is picked up, the county or urban-county government shall waive the delinquent solid waste pick-up fee portion of the property tax bill if the owner of the property requests a waiver. In requesting the waiver, the owner shall certify he is not the occupant of the property and that the occupant will be notified that failure of the occupant to pay the solid waste pick-up fee will be considered a breach of the occupant’s lease making the occupant subject to eviction.
    1. Notwithstanding the provisions of subsections (1) to (5) of this section, or any other provision of law to the contrary, no fine or fee shall be assessed on a residential property owner or lien placed on the residential property,relating to the failure of an occupant of the residential property to enter into a contract for solid waste collection services, or failure to pay solid waste pick-up fees if: (6) (a) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsections (1) to (5) of this section, or any other provision of law to the contrary, no fine or fee shall be assessed on a residential property owner or lien placed on the residential property,relating to the failure of an occupant of the residential property to enter into a contract for solid waste collection services, or failure to pay solid waste pick-up fees if:
      1. The residential property owner does not occupy the residential property; and
      2. There is no valid agreement for the residential property owner to pay for or otherwise provide for solid waste collection services on behalf of the occupant.
    2. A fine or fee may be assessed against the occupant of the residential property or a lien may be placed on the property of the occupant when the occupant has failed to enter into a contract for solid waste collection services, or has failed to pay solid waste pick-up fees.

History. Enact. Acts 1990, ch. 158, § 2, effective July 13, 1990; 2017 ch. 105, § 5, effective March 21, 2017.

109.320. Exemption from pick-up fee. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1990, ch. 158, § 3, effective July 13, 1990) was repealed by Acts 2002, ch. 342, § 18.