CHAPTER 600 Introductory Matters

600.010. Title and intent of KRS Chapters 600 to 645.

  1. KRS Chapters 600 to 645 shall be known as the Kentucky Unified Juvenile Code.
  2. KRS Chapters 600 to 645 shall be interpreted to effectuate the following express legislative purposes:
    1. The Commonwealth shall direct its efforts to promoting protection of children; to the strengthening and encouragement of family life for the protection and care of children; to strengthening and maintaining the biological family unit; to ensuring that policies and practices utilized are supported by data and research and are monitored or measured for their effectiveness in achieving the intended results; and to offering all available resources to any family in need of them;
    2. It also shall be declared to be the policy of this Commonwealth that:
      1. All efforts shall be directed toward providing each child a safe and nurturing home;
      2. Emphasis shall be placed on involving families in interventions developed for youth, providing families with access to services necessary to address issues within the family, and increasing accountability of the youth and families within the juvenile justice system;
      3. To the extent possible, out-of-home placement should only be utilized for youth who are high-risk or high-level offenders, and that low-risk, low-level offenders should be served through evidence-based programming in their community; and
      4. As the population in Department of Juvenile Justice facilities is reduced through increased use of community-based treatment, and if staffing ratios can be maintained at the levels required by accreditation bodies, reductions of the number of facilities should be considered;
    3. The court shall show that other less restrictive alternatives have been attempted or are not feasible in order to insure that children are not removed from families except when absolutely necessary;
    4. Any child brought before the court under KRS Chapters 600 to 645 shall have a right to treatment reasonably calculated, through the use of evidence-based programs when available, to bring about an improvement of his or her condition and, to the extent possible, have that treatment administered in the county of residence of the custodial parent or parents or in the nearest available county;
    5. KRS Chapter 635 shall be interpreted to promote the best interests of the child through providing treatment and sanctions to reduce recidivism and assist in making the child a productive citizen by involving the family, as appropriate, and by advancing the principles of personal responsibility, accountability, and reformation, while maintaining public safety, and seeking restitution and reparation;
    6. KRS Chapter 640 shall be interpreted to promote public safety and the concept that every child be held accountable for his or her conduct through the use of restitution, reparation, and sanctions, in an effort to rehabilitate delinquent youth; and
    7. It shall further be the policy of this Commonwealth to provide judicial procedures in which rights and interests of all parties, including the parents and victims, are recognized and all parties are assured prompt and fair hearings. Unless otherwise provided, such protections belong to the child individually and may not be waived by any other party.

History. Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 423, § 1, effective July 1, 1987; 1998, ch. 57, § 1, effective March 17, 1998; 2000, ch. 534, § 5, effective July 14, 2000; 2002, ch. 257, § 20, effective July 15, 2002; 2014, ch. 132, § 23, effective July 15, 2014.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

1986 Ky. Acts ch. 423, § 199 provides: “KRS 446.250 to 446.320 to the contrary notwithstanding, 1986 Ky. Acts ch. 423 shall prevail in the event of a conflict between 1986 Ky. Acts ch. 423 and other Acts passed by the 1986 regular session of the General Assembly.”

NOTES TO DECISIONS

  1. In General.
  2. Legislative Intent.
  3. Inferences About Another Child.
  4. Less Restrictive Alternatives.
  5. Jurisdiction.
1. In General.

Common law infancy defense does not apply to proceedings under the Kentucky Unified Juvenile Code. W.D.B. v. Commonwealth, 2006 Ky. App. LEXIS 346 (Ky. Ct. App.), sub. op., 2006 Ky. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1108 (Ky. Ct. App. Nov. 22, 2006), aff'd, 246 S.W.3d 448, 2007 Ky. LEXIS 241 ( Ky. 2007 ).

The Kentucky Unified Juvenile Code has extinguished the common law presumption that a child is without criminal capacity (the “infancy defense”), since a delinquency adjudication in juvenile court is not a criminal conviction under KRS 635.040 , and allowing the presumption would frustrate the clinical and rehabilitative purposes of the Code. W.D.B. v. Commonwealth, 246 S.W.3d 448, 2007 Ky. LEXIS 241 ( Ky. 2007 ).

2. Legislative Intent.

The intent of subsection (1) in giving the District Court the ability to review any information it may require regarding one of its orders is to safeguard the interests of the child, considering it welfare as being too precious a commodity to jeopardize by an incomplete or inadequate judicial review. Cabinet for Human Resources v. McDonald, 765 S.W.2d 581, 1988 Ky. App. LEXIS 175 (Ky. Ct. App. 1988).

In line with the legislature’s expression in this section of the public policy to strengthen families in order to protect and care for children, children have a common-law right of action for the loss of parental consortium. Giuliani v. Guiler, 951 S.W.2d 318, 1997 Ky. LEXIS 74 ( Ky. 1997 ).

Juvenile may voluntarily waive the preliminary hearing required under KRS 640.010(2) and KRS 635.020(2) before the juvenile’s case may be transferred to the circuit court as: (1) KRS 600.010(2)(e) signals the legislature’s intent to allow a juvenile to waive any of the rights set out in the Kentucky Unified Juvenile Code, (2) the preliminary hearing is a dispositional, rather than an adjudicatory hearing, (3) if a defendant can waive his constitutional right to a jury trial, there is no reason he cannot also waive his right to a preliminary hearing, and (4) the circuit court has general subject matter jurisdiction over juvenile felony matters. Humphrey v. Commonwealth, 153 S.W.3d 854, 2004 Ky. App. LEXIS 147 (Ky. Ct. App. 2004).

Since KRS 635.060(4), (5), restrict the dispositional option to a child 14 or older, and thus, any child under the age of 14 is not allowed to be placed in detention, the dispositional order imposing 15 days in detention for a 13-year-old juvenile was improper, despite the fact that the detention was probated. N.T.G. v. Commonwealth, 185 S.W.3d 218, 2006 Ky. App. LEXIS 51 (Ky. Ct. App. 2006).

Ky. Const., § 230 and KRS 41.110 , preventing the expenditure of the State’s money without the consent of the legislature, and KRS 453.010 and CR 54.04(1), restricting judgments for costs against the Commonwealth, did not prohibit the trial court’s order requiring the Cabinet for Health and Family Services to pay for counseling for a mother whose child was placed with the Cabinet; a purpose of the Unified Juvenile Code was to strengthen and maintain the biological family unit and to offer all available resources to a family in need of them, under KRS 600.010(2)(a). Cabinet for Health & Family Servs. v. Evans, 2006 Ky. App. LEXIS 52 (Ky. Ct. App.), sub. op., 2006 Ky. App. Unpub. LEXIS 831 (Ky. Ct. App. Feb. 17, 2006).

3. Inferences About Another Child.

The Commonwealth’s position that from evidence proving dependency, or abuse or neglect, of one child, the same condition may be inferred about another child who lives in the same household, ran against the grain of not only the Juvenile Code, but also the notion of constitutional due process of law and familial realities as well. J.H. v. Commonwealth, 767 S.W.2d 330, 1988 Ky. App. LEXIS 204 (Ky. Ct. App. 1988).

4. Less Restrictive Alternatives.

Where the lower court did not state that other less restrictive alternatives, such as probation, had been attempted or were not feasible in accordance with KRS 600.010(2)(c), a juvenile defendant’s commitment to the department of justice was erroneous. X.B. v. Commonwealth, 105 S.W.3d 459, 2003 Ky. App. LEXIS 81 (Ky. Ct. App. 2003).

In a juvenile proceeding in which the juvenile argued that the trial court erred because commitment was not the least restrictive alternative since an aunt was willing to take her and that the trial court should have made findings as to why commitment was the only option, the trial court’s failure to make written findings or state during the hearings what alternatives had been tried was not fatal to the commitment. The record was full of second chances, house confinement, foster care, and other alternatives that the Cabinet for Families and Children and the court tried in order to help the juvenile. K.F. v. Commonwealth, 274 S.W.3d 457, 2008 Ky. App. LEXIS 376 (Ky. Ct. App. 2008).

Commitment of the juvenile was necessary to protect him from physical injury, and to the extent less restrictive alternatives were available, they were considered by the family court and determined unfeasible, KRS 600.010(2)(c), 600.020(35). J.S. v. Commonwealth, 304 S.W.3d 67, 2009 Ky. App. LEXIS 216 (Ky. Ct. App. 2009).

Family court fully explored alternatives to commitment for defendant juvenile when it recognized that he had made progress in his foster home and that he had to be committed to the Kentucky Cabinet of Health and Family Services in order to remain there. At defendant’s arraignment, the Cabinet explained that it had attempted to involve the family in a diversion program, and the court had subsequently allowed defendant to live with his father and then a relative, both of which arrangements ended unsuccessfully. D.G. v. Commonwealth, 355 S.W.3d 476, 2011 Ky. App. LEXIS 228 (Ky. Ct. App. 2011).

5. Jurisdiction.

Juvenile court retained jurisdiction over an offender to enforce a restitution order entered by the juvenile court after the offender turned 18 because KRS 600.060 authorized the use of contempt powers to enforce the restitution order. Commonwealth v. S.K., 253 S.W.3d 486, 2008 Ky. LEXIS 6 ( Ky. 2008 ).

Cited:

Johnson v. Commonwealth, 967 S.W.2d 12, 1998 Ky. LEXIS 60 ( Ky. 1998 ); N.L. v. Commonwealth, 323 S.W.3d 732, 2009 Ky. App. LEXIS 136 (Ky. Ct. App. 2009).

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Bench & Bar.

Lovitt, Choosing Paramours Over Parenting: A Closer Look at the Relationship Between Parent and Non-Parent as a Factor in Termination of Parental Rights Cases, Vol. 74, No. 1, January 2010, Ky. Bench & Bar 19.

Kentucky Law Journal.

Notes, Gehle, Loss of Consortium: Kentucky Should No Longer Prohibit a Child’s Claim for Loss of Parental Consortium Due to the Negligent Act of a Third Party, 84 Ky. L.J. 173 (1995-96).

Note: Loss of Parental Consortium: Why Kentucky Should Re-Recognize the Claim Outside the Wrongful Death Context, 98 Ky. L.J. 919 (2009/2010).

Note: The Disregarding of the Rehabilitative Spirit of Juvenile Codes: Addressing Resentencing Hearings in Blended Sentencing Schemes, 99 Ky. L.J. 211 (2010/2011).

Northern Kentucky Law Review.

Notes, Greathouse v. Shreve and Shifflet v. Shifflet: Maintaining the Status Quo in Custody Disputes Between Parents and Third Party Contestants, 23 N. Ky. L. Rev. 451 (1996).

Heft & Niehaus, Britt v. Commonwealth: The Kentucky Supreme Court Deciphers Legislative Intent in Juvenile Firearms Cases, 26 N. Ky. L. Rev. 17 (1999).

Tapp and Tincher, Of Innocents and Offenders: A Survey of Children’s Law in Kentucky, 30 N. Ky. L. Rev. 131 (2003).

Schechter, An Introduction to Re-envisioning the Role of the Juvenile Court in the 21st Century, 34 N. Ky. L. Rev. 181 (2007).

Treatises

Petrilli, Kentucky Family Law, Juvenile Court, §§ 32.3, 32.5, 32.10, 32.12, 32.13, 32.14, 32.23, 32.24, 32.25, 32.29.

Petrilli, Kentucky Family Law, Termination of Parental Rights and Adoption, § 29.1.

600.020. Definitions for KRS Chapters 600 to 645.

As used in KRS Chapters 600 to 645, unless the context otherwise requires:

  1. “Abused or neglected child” means a child whose health or welfare is harmed or threatened with harm when:
    1. His or her parent, guardian, person in a position of authority or special trust, as defined in KRS 532.045 , or other person exercising custodial control or supervision of the child:
      1. Inflicts or allows to be inflicted upon the child physical or emotional injury as defined in this section by other than accidental means;
      2. Creates or allows to be created a risk of physical or emotional injury as defined in this section to the child by other than accidental means;
      3. Engages in a pattern of conduct that renders the parent incapable of caring for the immediate and ongoing needs of the child, including but not limited to parental incapacity due to a substance use disorder as defined in KRS 222.005 ;
      4. Continuously or repeatedly fails or refuses to provide essential parental care and protection for the child, considering the age of the child;
      5. Commits or allows to be committed an act of sexual abuse, sexual exploitation, or prostitution upon the child;
      6. Creates or allows to be created a risk that an act of sexual abuse, sexual exploitation, or prostitution will be committed upon the child;
      7. Abandons or exploits the child;
      8. Does not provide the child with adequate care, supervision, food, clothing, shelter, and education or medical care necessary for the child’s well-being. A parent or other person exercising custodial control or supervision of the child legitimately practicing the person’s religious beliefs shall not be considered a negligent parent solely because of failure to provide specified medical treatment for a child for that reason alone. This exception shall not preclude a court from ordering necessary medical services for a child;
      9. Fails to make sufficient progress toward identified goals as set forth in the court-approved case plan to allow for the safe return of the child to the parent that results in the child remaining committed to the cabinet and remaining in foster care for fifteen (15) cumulative months out of forty-eight (48) months; or
      10. Commits or allows female genital mutilation as defined in KRS 508.125 to be committed; or
    2. A person twenty-one (21) years of age or older commits or allows to be committed an act of sexual abuse, sexual exploitation, or prostitution upon a child less than sixteen (16) years of age;
  2. “Age or developmentally appropriate” has the same meaning as in 42 U.S.C. sec. 675(11) ;
  3. “Aggravated circumstances” means the existence of one (1) or more of the following conditions:
    1. The parent has not attempted or has not had contact with the child for a period of not less than ninety (90) days;
    2. The parent is incarcerated and will be unavailable to care for the child for a period of at least one (1) year from the date of the child’s entry into foster care and there is no appropriate relative placement available during this period of time;
    3. The parent has sexually abused the child and has refused available treatment;
    4. The parent has been found by the cabinet to have engaged in abuse of the child that required removal from the parent’s home two (2) or more times in the past two (2) years; or
    5. The parent has caused the child serious physical injury;
  4. “Beyond the control of parents” means a child who has repeatedly failed to follow the reasonable directives of his or her parents, legal guardian, or person exercising custodial control or supervision other than a state agency, which behavior results in danger to the child or others, and which behavior does not constitute behavior that would warrant the filing of a petition under KRS Chapter 645;
  5. “Beyond the control of school” means any child who has been found by the court to have repeatedly violated the lawful regulations for the government of the school as provided in KRS 158.150 , and as documented in writing by the school as a part of the school’s petition or as an attachment to the school’s petition. The petition or attachment shall describe the student’s behavior and all intervention strategies attempted by the school;
  6. “Boarding home” means a privately owned and operated home for the boarding and lodging of individuals which is approved by the Department of Juvenile Justice or the cabinet for the placement of children committed to the department or the cabinet;
  7. “Cabinet” means the Cabinet for Health and Family Services;
  8. “Certified juvenile facility staff” means individuals who meet the qualifications of, and who have completed a course of education and training in juvenile detention developed and approved by, the Department of Juvenile Justice after consultation with other appropriate state agencies;
  9. “Child” means any person who has not reached his or her eighteenth birthday, unless otherwise provided;
  10. “Child-caring facility” means any facility or group home other than a state facility, Department of Juvenile Justice contract facility or group home, or one certified by an appropriate agency as operated primarily for educational or medical purposes, providing residential care on a twenty-four (24) hour basis to children not related by blood, adoption, or marriage to the person maintaining the facility;
  11. “Child-placing agency” means any agency, other than a state agency, which supervises the placement of children in foster family homes or child-caring facilities or which places children for adoption;
  12. “Clinical treatment facility” means a facility with more than eight (8) beds designated by the Department of Juvenile Justice or the cabinet for the treatment of mentally ill children. The treatment program of such facilities shall be supervised by a qualified mental health professional;
  13. “Commitment” means an order of the court which places a child under the custodial control or supervision of the Cabinet for Health and Family Services, Department of Juvenile Justice, or another facility or agency until the child attains the age of eighteen (18) unless otherwise provided by law;
  14. “Community-based facility” means any nonsecure, homelike facility licensed, operated, or permitted to operate by the Department of Juvenile Justice or the cabinet, which is located within a reasonable proximity of the child’s family and home community, which affords the child the opportunity, if a Kentucky resident, to continue family and community contact;
  15. “Complaint” means a verified statement setting forth allegations in regard to the child which contain sufficient facts for the formulation of a subsequent petition;
  16. “Court” means the juvenile session of District Court unless a statute specifies the adult session of District Court or the Circuit Court;
  17. “Court-designated worker” means that organization or individual delegated by the Administrative Office of the Courts for the purposes of placing children in alternative placements prior to arraignment, conducting preliminary investigations, and formulating, entering into, and supervising diversion agreements and performing such other functions as authorized by law or court order;
  18. “Deadly weapon” has the same meaning as it does in KRS 500.080 ;
  19. “Department” means the Department for Community Based Services;
  20. “Dependent child” means any child, other than an abused or neglected child, who is under improper care, custody, control, or guardianship that is not due to an intentional act of the parent, guardian, or person exercising custodial control or supervision of the child;
  21. “Detention” means the safe and temporary custody of a juvenile who is accused of conduct subject to the jurisdiction of the court who requires a restricted or closely supervised environment for his or her own or the community’s protection;
  22. “Detention hearing” means a hearing held by a judge or trial commissioner within twenty-four (24) hours, exclusive of weekends and holidays, of the start of any period of detention prior to adjudication;
  23. “Diversion agreement” means a mechanism designed to hold a child accountable for his or her behavior and, if appropriate, securing services to serve the best interest of the child and to provide redress for that behavior without court action and without the creation of a formal court record;
  24. “Eligible youth” means a person who:
    1. Is or has been committed to the cabinet as dependent, neglected, or abused;
    2. Is eighteen (18) years of age to nineteen (19) years of age; and
    3. Is requesting to extend or reinstate his or her commitment to the cabinet in order to participate in state or federal educational programs or to establish independent living arrangements;
  25. “Emergency shelter” is a group home, private residence, foster home, or similar homelike facility which provides temporary or emergency care of children and adequate staff and services consistent with the needs of each child;
  26. “Emotional injury” means an injury to the mental or psychological capacity or emotional stability of a child as evidenced by a substantial and observable impairment in the child’s ability to function within a normal range of performance and behavior with due regard to his or her age, development, culture, and environment as testified to by a qualified mental health professional;
  27. “Evidence-based practices” means policies, procedures, programs, and practices proven by scientific research to reliably produce reductions in recidivism;
  28. “Fictive kin” means an individual who is not related by birth, adoption, or marriage to a child, but who has an emotionally significant relationship with the child;
  29. “Firearm” shall have the same meaning as in KRS 237.060 and 527.010 ;
  30. “Foster family home” means a private home in which children are placed for foster family care under supervision of the cabinet or a licensed child-placing agency;
  31. “Graduated sanction” means any of a continuum of accountability measures, programs, and sanctions, ranging from less restrictive to more restrictive in nature, that may include but are not limited to:
    1. Electronic monitoring;
    2. Drug and alcohol screening, testing, or monitoring;
    3. Day or evening reporting centers;
    4. Reporting requirements;
    5. Community service; and
    6. Rehabilitative interventions such as family counseling, substance abuse treatment, restorative justice programs, and behavioral or mental health treatment;
  32. “Habitual runaway” means any child who has been found by the court to have been absent from his or her place of lawful residence without the permission of his or her custodian for at least three (3) days during a one (1) year period;
  33. “Habitual truant” means any child who has been found by the court to have been reported as a truant as defined in KRS 159.150(1) two (2) or more times during a one (1) year period;
  34. “Hospital” means, except for purposes of KRS Chapter 645, a licensed private or public facility, health care facility, or part thereof, which is approved by the cabinet to treat children;
  35. “Independent living” means those activities necessary to assist a committed child to establish independent living arrangements;
  36. “Informal adjustment” means an agreement reached among the parties, with consultation, but not the consent, of the victim of the crime or other persons specified in KRS 610.070 if the victim chooses not to or is unable to participate, after a petition has been filed, which is approved by the court, that the best interest of the child would be served without formal adjudication and disposition;
  37. “Intentionally” means, with respect to a result or to conduct described by a statute which defines an offense, that the actor’s conscious objective is to cause that result or to engage in that conduct;
  38. “Least restrictive alternative” means, except for purposes of KRS Chapter 645, that the program developed on the child’s behalf is no more harsh, hazardous, or intrusive than necessary; or involves no restrictions on physical movements nor requirements for residential care except as reasonably necessary for the protection of the child from physical injury; or protection of the community, and is conducted at the suitable available facility closest to the child’s place of residence to allow for appropriate family engagement;
  39. “Motor vehicle offense” means any violation of the nonfelony provisions of KRS Chapters 186, 189, or 189A, KRS 177.300 , 304.39-110 , or 304.39-117 ;
  40. “Near fatality” means an injury that, as certified by a physician, places a child in serious or critical condition;
  41. “Needs of the child” means necessary food, clothing, health, shelter, and education;
  42. “Nonoffender” means a child alleged to be dependent, neglected, or abused and who has not been otherwise charged with a status or public offense;
  43. “Nonsecure facility” means a facility which provides its residents access to the surrounding community and which does not rely primarily on the use of physically restricting construction and hardware to restrict freedom;
  44. “Nonsecure setting” means a nonsecure facility or a residential home, including a child’s own home, where a child may be temporarily placed pending further court action. Children before the court in a county that is served by a state operated secure detention facility, who are in the detention custody of the Department of Juvenile Justice, and who are placed in a nonsecure alternative by the Department of Juvenile Justice, shall be supervised by the Department of Juvenile Justice;
  45. “Out-of-home placement” means a placement other than in the home of a parent, relative, or guardian, in a boarding home, clinical treatment facility, community-based facility, detention facility, emergency shelter, fictive kin home, foster family home, hospital, nonsecure facility, physically secure facility, residential treatment facility, or youth alternative center;
  46. “Parent” means the biological or adoptive mother or father of a child;
  47. “Person exercising custodial control or supervision” means a person or agency that has assumed the role and responsibility of a parent or guardian for the child, but that does not necessarily have legal custody of the child;
  48. “Petition” means a verified statement, setting forth allegations in regard to the child, which initiates formal court involvement in the child’s case;
  49. “Physical injury” means substantial physical pain or any impairment of physical condition;
  50. “Physically secure facility” means a facility that relies primarily on the use of construction and hardware such as locks, bars, and fences to restrict freedom;
  51. “Public offense action” means an action, excluding contempt, brought in the interest of a child who is accused of committing an offense under KRS Chapter 527 or a public offense which, if committed by an adult, would be a crime, whether the same is a felony, misdemeanor, or violation, other than an action alleging that a child sixteen (16) years of age or older has committed a motor vehicle offense;
  52. “Qualified mental health professional” means:
    1. A physician licensed under the laws of Kentucky to practice medicine or osteopathy, or a medical officer of the government of the United States while engaged in the performance of official duties;
    2. A psychiatrist licensed under the laws of Kentucky to practice medicine or osteopathy, or a medical officer of the government of the United States while engaged in the practice of official duties, and who is certified or eligible to apply for certification by the American Board of Psychiatry and Neurology, Inc.;
    3. A psychologist with the health service provider designation, a psychological practitioner, a certified psychologist, or a psychological associate licensed under the provisions of KRS Chapter 319;
    4. A licensed registered nurse with a master’s degree in psychiatric nursing from an accredited institution and two (2) years of clinical experience with mentally ill persons, or a licensed registered nurse with a bachelor’s degree in nursing from an accredited institution who is certified as a psychiatric and mental health nurse by the American Nurses Association and who has three (3) years of inpatient or outpatient clinical experience in psychiatric nursing and who is currently employed by a hospital or forensic psychiatric facility licensed by the Commonwealth or a psychiatric unit of a general hospital or a regional comprehensive care center;
    5. A licensed clinical social worker licensed under the provisions of KRS 335.100 , or a certified social worker licensed under the provisions of KRS 335.080 with three (3) years of inpatient or outpatient clinical experience in psychiatric social work and currently employed by a hospital or forensic psychiatric facility licensed by the Commonwealth or a psychiatric unit of a general hospital or a regional comprehensive care center;
    6. A marriage and family therapist licensed under the provisions of KRS 335.300 to 335.399 with three (3) years of inpatient or outpatient clinical experience in psychiatric mental health practice and currently employed by a hospital or forensic psychiatric facility licensed by the Commonwealth, a psychiatric unit of a general hospital, or a regional comprehensive care center;
    7. A professional counselor credentialed under the provisions of KRS 335.500 to 335.599 with three (3) years of inpatient or outpatient clinical experience in psychiatric mental health practice and currently employed by a hospital or forensic facility licensed by the Commonwealth, a psychiatric unit of a general hospital, or a regional comprehensive care center; or
    8. A physician assistant licensed under KRS 311.840 to 311.862 , who meets one (1) of the following requirements:
      1. Provides documentation that he or she has completed a psychiatric residency program for physician assistants;
      2. Has completed at least one thousand (1,000) hours of clinical experience under a supervising physician, as defined by KRS 311.840 , who is a psychiatrist and is certified or eligible for certification by the American Board of Psychiatry and Neurology, Inc.;
      3. Holds a master’s degree from a physician assistant program accredited by the Accreditation Review Commission on Education for the Physician Assistant or its predecessor or successor agencies, is practicing under a supervising physician as defined by KRS 311.840, and:
        1. Has two (2) years of clinical experience in the assessment, evaluation, and treatment of mental disorders; or
        2. Has been employed by a hospital or forensic psychiatric facility licensed by the Commonwealth or a psychiatric unit of a general hospital or a private agency or company engaged in the provision of mental health services or a regional community program for mental health and individuals with an intellectual disability for at least two (2) years; or
      4. Holds a bachelor’s degree, possesses a current physician assistant certificate issued by the board prior to July 15, 2002, is practicing under a supervising physician as defined by KRS 311.840, and:
        1. Has three (3) years of clinical experience in the assessment, evaluation, and treatment of mental disorders; or
        2. Has been employed by a hospital or forensic psychiatric facility licensed by the Commonwealth or a psychiatric unit of a general hospital or a private agency or company engaged in the provision of mental health services or a regional community program for mental health and individuals with an intellectual disability for at least three (3) years;
  53. “Reasonable and prudent parent standard” has the same meaning as in 42 U.S.C. sec. 675(10) ;
  54. “Residential treatment facility” means a facility or group home with more than eight (8) beds designated by the Department of Juvenile Justice or the cabinet for the treatment of children;
  55. “Retain in custody” means, after a child has been taken into custody, the continued holding of the child by a peace officer for a period of time not to exceed twelve (12) hours when authorized by the court or the court-designated worker for the purpose of making preliminary inquiries;
  56. “Risk and needs assessment” means an actuarial tool scientifically proven to identify specific factors and needs that are related to delinquent and noncriminal misconduct;
  57. “School personnel” means those certified persons under the supervision of the local public or private education agency;
  58. “Secretary” means the secretary of the Cabinet for Health and Family Services;
  59. “Secure juvenile detention facility” means any physically secure facility used for the secure detention of children other than any facility in which adult prisoners are confined;
  60. “Serious physical injury” means physical injury which creates a substantial risk of death or which causes serious and prolonged disfigurement, prolonged impairment of health, or prolonged loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ;
  61. “Sexual abuse” includes but is not necessarily limited to any contacts or interactions in which the parent, guardian, person in a position of authority or special trust, as defined in KRS 532.045 , or other person having custodial control or supervision of the child or responsibility for his or her welfare, uses or allows, permits, or encourages the use of the child for the purposes of the sexual stimulation of the perpetrator or another person;
  62. “Sexual exploitation” includes but is not limited to a situation in which a parent, guardian, person in a position of authority or special trust, as defined in KRS 532.045 , or other person having custodial control or supervision of a child or responsible for his or her welfare, allows, permits, or encourages the child to engage in an act which constitutes prostitution under Kentucky law; or a parent, guardian, person in a position of authority or special trust, as defined in KRS 532.045 , or other person having custodial control or supervision of a child or responsible for his or her welfare, allows, permits, or encourages the child to engage in an act of obscene or pornographic photographing, filming, or depicting of a child as provided for under Kentucky law;
  63. “Social service worker” means any employee of the cabinet or any private agency designated as such by the secretary of the cabinet or a social worker employed by a county or city who has been approved by the cabinet to provide, under its supervision, services to families and children;
  64. “Staff secure facility for residential treatment” means any setting which assures that all entrances and exits are under the exclusive control of the facility staff, and in which a child may reside for the purpose of receiving treatment;
    1. “Status offense action” is any action brought in the interest of a child who is accused of committing acts, which if committed by an adult, would not be a crime. Such behavior shall not be considered criminal or delinquent and such children shall be termed status offenders. Status offenses shall include: (65) (a) “Status offense action” is any action brought in the interest of a child who is accused of committing acts, which if committed by an adult, would not be a crime. Such behavior shall not be considered criminal or delinquent and such children shall be termed status offenders. Status offenses shall include:
      1. Beyond the control of school or beyond the control of parents;
      2. Habitual runaway;
      3. Habitual truant; and
      4. Alcohol offenses as provided in KRS 244.085 .
    2. Status offenses shall not include violations of state or local ordinances which may apply to children such as a violation of curfew;
  65. “Take into custody” means the procedure by which a peace officer or other authorized person initially assumes custody of a child. A child may be taken into custody for a period of time not to exceed two (2) hours;
  66. “Transitional living support” means all benefits to which an eligible youth is entitled upon being granted extended or reinstated commitment to the cabinet by the court;
  67. “Transition plan” means a plan that is personalized at the direction of the youth that:
    1. Includes specific options on housing, health insurance, education, local opportunities for mentors and continuing support services, and workforce supports and employment services; and
    2. Is as detailed as the youth may elect;
  68. “Valid court order” means a court order issued by a judge to a child alleged or found to be a status offender:
    1. Who was brought before the court and made subject to the order;
    2. Whose future conduct was regulated by the order;
    3. Who was given written and verbal warning of the consequences of the violation of the order at the time the order was issued and whose attorney or parent or legal guardian was also provided with a written notice of the consequences of violation of the order, which notification is reflected in the record of the court proceedings; and
    4. Who received, before the issuance of the order, the full due process rights guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States;
  69. “Violation” means any offense, other than a traffic infraction, for which a sentence of a fine only can be imposed;
  70. “Youth alternative center” means a nonsecure facility, approved by the Department of Juvenile Justice, for the detention of juveniles, both prior to adjudication and after adjudication, which meets the criteria specified in KRS 15A.320 ; and
  71. “Youthful offender” means any person regardless of age, transferred to Circuit Court under the provisions of KRS Chapter 635 or 640 and who is subsequently convicted in Circuit Court.

History. Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 423, § 2, effective July 1, 1987; 1988, ch. 350, § 1, effective April 10, 1988; 1994, ch. 30, § 4, effective July 15, 1994; 1994, ch. 368, § 2, effective July 15, 1994; 1994, ch. 498, § 15, effective July 15, 1994; 1996, ch. 358, § 9, effective in part July 1, 1997, and in part July 15, 1997; 1996, ch. 369, § 21, effective July 15, 1996; 1998, ch. 57, § 2, effective March 17, 1998; 1998, ch. 303, § 1, effective July 15, 1998; 1998, ch. 426, § 611, effective July 15, 1998; 1998, ch. 538, § 13, effective April 13, 1998; 2000, ch. 14, § 57, effective July 14, 2000; 2000, ch. 60, § 1, effective July 14, 2000; 2000, ch. 193, § 1, effective July 14, 2000; 2000, ch. 534, § 6, effective July 14, 2000; 2002, ch. 99, § 4, effective March 28, 2002; 2004, ch. 116, § 16, effective July 13, 2004; 2005, ch. 99, § 659, effective June 20, 2005; 2005, ch. 172, § 3, effective June 20, 2005; 2008, ch. 87, § 1, effective July 15, 2008; 2012, ch. 143, § 1, effective July 12, 2012; 2012, ch. 148, § 1, effective July 12, 2012; 2014, ch. 132, § 24, effective July 15, 2014; 2016 ch. 115, § 3, effective July 15, 2016; 2017 ch. 10, § 3, effective June 29, 2017; 2018 ch. 165, § 2, effective July 14, 2018; 2019 ch. 128, § 28, effective June 27, 2019; 2020 ch. 35, § 10, effective March 26, 2020; 2020 ch. 74, § 6, effective April 2, 2020.

Legislative Research Commission Notes.

(4/2/2020). This statute was amended by 2020 Ky. Acts chs. 35 and 74, which do not appear to be in conflict and have been codified together.

(7/12/2012). This statute was amended by 2012 Ky. Acts chs. 143 and 148, which do not appear to be in conflict and have been codified together.

(7/12/2012). Under the authority of KRS 7.136(1), the Reviser of Statutes has inserted paragraph designations into subsections (23) and (63) of this statute. The words in the text were not changed.

(7/15/98). This section was amended by 1998 Ky. Acts chs. 57, 303, 426, and 538. Where these Acts are not in conflict, they have been codified together. A conflict exists between ch. 538, which is nonrevisory and substantive in nature, and ch. 426, which is a revisory amendment to reflect an agency name change. In codification of this conflict, ch. 538 has been allowed to prevail. Cf. KRS 7.136(3).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

  1. In General.
  2. Separate Dispositions Required.
  3. Exclusion of Public and Press.
  4. Status Offenses.
  5. —Curfew Ordinances Excluded.
  6. Juvenile Court Authority.
  7. Least Restrictive Alternative.
  8. Qualified Mental Health Professional.
  9. Abused and Neglected Child.
  10. Informal Adjustment.
  11. Guilty Pleas.
  12. Valid Court Order.
  13. De facto custodian.
1. In General.

Language of this section does not include an element of intent. Commonwealth v. K.S., 585 S.W.3d 202, 2019 Ky. LEXIS 382 ( Ky. 2019 ).

2. Separate Dispositions Required.

It is statutorily forbidden for any one child to be adjudged both dependent and abused or neglected in the same disposition. J.H. v. Commonwealth, 767 S.W.2d 330, 1988 Ky. App. LEXIS 204 (Ky. Ct. App. 1988).

3. Exclusion of Public and Press.

Although this section provides that the Unified Juvenile Code applies to matters conducted in the juvenile session of district court, in light of KRS 610.070(3), KRS 610.340 , and Ky. Const., § 115, the public and press are to be excluded not only from all juvenile proceedings at the district court level, but from all appellate proceedings stemming therefrom. F.T.P. v. Courier-Journal, 774 S.W.2d 444, 1989 Ky. LEXIS 48 ( Ky. 1989 ).

4. Status Offenses.
5. —Curfew Ordinances Excluded.

The legislature expressly excluded curfew ordinances from the definition of status offenses. Covington v. Court of Justice, 784 S.W.2d 180, 1990 Ky. LEXIS 13 ( Ky. 1990 ).

The Administrative Office of the Courts (AOC) is not authorized to require its court designated workers to process juvenile curfew violators as public offenders under KRS 610.010(1)(a); therefore, respondent city was expressly prohibited from requiring its court designated workers to process juvenile curfew violators as status offenders under the definition in this section. Covington v. Court of Justice, 784 S.W.2d 180, 1990 Ky. LEXIS 13 ( Ky. 1990 ).

6. Juvenile Court Authority.

The juvenile court did not have the authority to sentence an eighteen (18) year-old defendant to confinement in a juvenile facility for a car theft committed prior to the defendant’s eighteenth birthday. Jefferson County Dep't for Human Services v. Carter, 795 S.W.2d 59, 1990 Ky. LEXIS 73 ( Ky. 1990 ).

Circuit court finding that a father neglected or abused his minor child because the father completed the case plan to the satisfaction of the Cabinet for Health and Family Services, there was no allegation that the father ever engaged in any neglectful act directed toward the child, merely that his substance abuse in the past put the newborn child at risk of physical harm, and even more troubling was the disparate treatment received by the mother—against whom the Cabinet moved to dismiss the allegations—in spite of the fact that she had placed the child in actual, physical harm by substance abuse while pregnant with the child. C.B. v. Cabinet for Health & Family Servs., 2018 Ky. App. LEXIS 54 (Ky. Ct. App.), sub. op., 2018 Ky. App. Unpub. LEXIS 279 (Ky. Ct. App. Jan. 26, 2018).

7. Least Restrictive Alternative.

In a juvenile proceeding in which the juvenile argued that the trial court erred because commitment was not the least restrictive alternative since an aunt was willing to take her and that the trial court should have made findings as to why commitment was the only option, the trial court’s failure to make written findings or state during the hearings what alternatives had been tried was not fatal to the commitment. The record was full of second chances, house confinement, foster care, and other alternatives that the Cabinet for Families and Children and the court tried in order to help the juvenile. K.F. v. Commonwealth, 274 S.W.3d 457, 2008 Ky. App. LEXIS 376 (Ky. Ct. App. 2008).

Commitment of the juvenile was necessary to protect him from physical injury, and to the extent less restrictive alternatives were available, they were considered by the family court and determined unfeasible, KRS 600.010(2)(c), 600.020(35). J.S. v. Commonwealth, 304 S.W.3d 67, 2009 Ky. App. LEXIS 216 (Ky. Ct. App. 2009).

8. Qualified Mental Health Professional.

1996 amendment to the definition of “qualified mental health professional” in KRS 600.020 merely modified the existing definition to include a licensed clinical social worker and did not indicate the General Assembly’s intention to qualify such a person as an expert for all purposes. R.C. v. Commonwealth, 101 S.W.3d 897, 2002 Ky. App. LEXIS 1401 (Ky. Ct. App. 2002).

9. Abused and Neglected Child.

Order terminating a father’s parental rights was affirmed where, inter alia, father had no contact with the child for several years, and provided no financial support for 31 months; while the father claimed he did not know where to send support payments, the parties’ agreement included the proper address. B.T.R. v. J.W., 148 S.W.3d 294, 2004 Ky. App. LEXIS 290 (Ky. Ct. App. 2004).

Evidence that the residences parents and children lived in were unsanitary and unsafe for human habitation, and that the older child had been sexually abused by his uncles and parents, was sufficient to establish that the children were abused and neglected as defined in KRS 600.020(1) and to support the family court’s termination order. Cabinet for Health and Family Servs. v. A.G.G., 190 S.W.3d 338, 2006 Ky. LEXIS 97 ( Ky. 2006 ).

Pre-trial order excluding evidence of sexual abuse on one of the child’s siblings that resulted in the removal of the siblings from the home was vacated as the disputed evidence was not barred under the doctrine of issue preclusion since the identity of the perpetrator was not established in a prior proceeding; the identity of the perpetrator was not material to the finding that the siblings were abused or neglected since KRS 600.020(1) required only a finding that a parent or guardian had created or allowed to be created a risk that the child would be the victim of sexual abuse or exploitation. Cabinet for Health & Family Servs. v. R.H., 199 S.W.3d 201, 2006 Ky. App. LEXIS 259 (Ky. Ct. App. 2006).

Because there was no substantial evidence to support a finding under either KRS 625.090(1)(a)1. or (a)2., and there was no allegation of criminal charges under KRS 625.090(1)(a)3., the family court erred in finding that a child was abused or neglected; thus, as there was no ground supporting termination, the family court abused its discretion in terminating a mother’s parental rights to her daughter. T.G. v. Commonwealth, 2007 Ky. App. LEXIS 158 (Ky. Ct. App.), sub. op., 2007 Ky. App. Unpub. LEXIS 816 (Ky. Ct. App. May 18, 2007), rev'd, 2008 Ky. Unpub. LEXIS 150 (Ky. Aug. 21, 2008).

Cabinet for Health and Family Services did not present substantial evidence that a parent’s children were abused and neglected as required under KRS 600.020(1). It was not shown that the children suffered any direct, emotional or physical injury from the parent, and the Cabinet witnesses testified that the parent was a nurturing parent and that the children were well-cared for by the parent. M.E.C. v. Commonwealth, 254 S.W.3d 846, 2008 Ky. App. LEXIS 158 (Ky. Ct. App. 2008).

To find that KRS 620.030 does not apply, there must be a finding that the act committed upon the child is not an act of sexual abuse. For purposes of KRS Chapter 600, the definition of a neglected or abused child is set forth at KRS 600.020 . If sexual abuse has occurred, then the mandatory reporting requirement in KRS 620.030 would have required the teacher to report this incident and such mandatory reporting would result in this being considered a ministerial rather than a discretionary act which would preclude the teacher from claiming qualified official immunity. Nelson v. Turner, 256 S.W.3d 37, 2008 Ky. App. LEXIS 177 (Ky. Ct. App. 2008).

Finding that the father abused only one of the four children did not preclude the court from ordering the father to refrain from contact with all four children because KRS 600.020(1) permitted such a finding where a risk of abuse existed and did not require actual abuse. Z.T. v. M.T., 258 S.W.3d 31, 2008 Ky. App. LEXIS 206 (Ky. Ct. App. 2008).

Family court properly found that a child was an abused or neglected child as defined in KRS 600.020(1) and terminated the parental rights of the child’s minor mother under KRS 625.090 without receiving expert testimony as to the mother’s parenting potential upon adulthood because § 625.090 (2)(e), (g) did not require proof that the minor parent would be unable to effectively parent the child when the parent reached the age of majority. Commonwealth v. T.N.H., 302 S.W.3d 658, 2010 Ky. LEXIS 5 ( Ky. 2010 ).

Finding that a child was abused or neglected under KRS 600.020 was not supported by substantial evidence because a family court failed to determine the truth or falsity of all the allegations in a complaint under KRS 620.100 , and it relied upon information outside the record that was neither raised as an allegation in the complaint nor presented as evidence during a hearing; also, a dependency, neglect, or abuse adjudication hearing was not the appropriate forum for rehashing custody issues. Even though judicial notice of a prior case involving the mother and father could have been taken, the family court’s consideration of the evidence it heard in the earlier action was improper; moreover, there was no notice or opportunity to be heard relating to the taking of judicial notice. S.R. v. J.N., 307 S.W.3d 631, 2010 Ky. App. LEXIS 62 (Ky. Ct. App. 2010).

Under the plain language of KRS 600.020(1), the definition of an abused child is limited to a scenario in which his or her parent, guardian, or other person exercising custodial control or supervision inflicted or committed abuse, allowed abuse to be inflicted or committed, or created or allowed to be created a risk of abuse. As a result, the mandatory reporting requirement of KRS 620.030(1) does not apply when a child inappropriately touches another child unless a parent, guardian, or other person exercising custodial control or supervision allows such inappropriate touching to be committed or creates or allows such a risk of abuse. Turner v. Nelson, 342 S.W.3d 866, 2011 Ky. LEXIS 96 ( Ky. 2011 ).

Evidence that was based on compounded inferences was insufficient to support a finding of a mother’s neglect of her children under KRS 600.020(1)(f); her failure to sign an “Aftercare Plan” to keep the father away from the children, without evidence that he posed a risk to them, was insufficient. K.H. v. Cabinet for Health & Family Servs., 358 S.W.3d 29, 2011 Ky. App. LEXIS 248 (Ky. Ct. App. 2011).

KRS 600.020(1)(a)(2) allowed a finding by a court of neglect or abuse where the risk of abuse existed, and in this termination case, the child tested positive for marijuana at birth and the parents admitted to using such before and during the pregnancy, such that there was sufficient evidence to remove the child from the home in order to ensure her safety. C.J.M. v. Cabinet for Health and Family Servs., 389 S.W.3d 155, 2012 Ky. App. LEXIS 301 (Ky. Ct. App. 2012).

Parents conceded that the child was neglected or abused since they did not contest such. C.J.M. v. Cabinet for Health and Family Servs., 389 S.W.3d 155, 2012 Ky. App. LEXIS 301 (Ky. Ct. App. 2012).

Trial court did not err by determining that the children were abused and/or neglected under KRS 600.020 , 625.090 because the parents admitted that their children were neglected as a result of their substance abuse issues and admitted that because of their lack of supervision of one child she was injured and sustained a bruise to her face. C.A.W. v. Cabinet for Health & Family Servs., 391 S.W.3d 400, 2013 Ky. App. LEXIS 24 (Ky. Ct. App. 2013).

Substantial evidence supported conclusion that son was abused or neglected under this section, including evidence that the father had not seen his son since his removal from his mother in June 2009, he refused to provide documentation that he had a steady job or was making child support payments, and he had a very limited understanding of his son’s psychological needs. Cabinet for Health and Family Servs. v. K.H., 423 S.W.3d 204, 2014 Ky. LEXIS 13 ( Ky. 2014 ).

Informal adjustment requiring a juvenile to live with the juvenile's father in another state was improper because the informal adjustment, (1) in effect, changed custody without a hearing on the father's propriety as a custodian, and (2) did not provide for the child's possible inability to live with the father. Q.M. v. Commonwealth, 459 S.W.3d 360, 2015 Ky. LEXIS 1613 ( Ky. 2015 ).

When a juvenile returned to Kentucky, contrary to an informal adjustment requiring the juvenile to live with the juvenile's father in another state, it was error to subject the juvenile to formal proceedings because once the child and other interested parties agreed to an informal process waiving constitutional safeguards, it was error to shift to a formal process, especially when there was a factual question as to whether the juvenile violated the informal adjustment's sole term. Q.M. v. Commonwealth, 459 S.W.3d 360, 2015 Ky. LEXIS 1613 ( Ky. 2015 ).

When a juvenile returned to Kentucky, contrary to an informal adjustment requiring the juvenile to live with the juvenile's father in another state, the juvenile's subsequent commitment to the Department of Juvenile Justice as a juvenile sexual offender erred because (1) it was error to subject the juvenile to formal proceedings, once an informal adjustment was agreed to, and (2) the juvenile's admission was defective. Q.M. v. Commonwealth, 459 S.W.3d 360, 2015 Ky. LEXIS 1613 ( Ky. 2015 ).

Termination of a mother's parental rights was appropriate because a child was found to be abused and neglected based on the infliction of an emotional injury; the child suffered from Reactive Attachment Disorder, and the mother's mental illness made it incapable for her to care for the child. Moreover, the mother inflicted emotional injury to the child, failed to provide adequate parental care and supervision, and failed to provide the essentials of life for the child's overall well-being; termination was in the best interest of the child, reunification efforts were made, and the child's welfare would have improved if termination was ordered. B.E.K. v. Cabinet for Health & Family Servs., 487 S.W.3d 457, 2016 Ky. App. LEXIS 40 (Ky. Ct. App. 2016).

Termination of a father's parental rights on the ground of abandonment was inappropriate because, although the father did not visit with and support the child after the child was placed in foster care, the failures by the Kentucky Cabinet for Health and Family Services denied the father an opportunity to maintain contact with the child and to work toward a court-approved case plan to regain custody. Furthermore, the oral parenting plan given to the father was so lacking in formality and detail that it did not constitute a plan. H.M.R. v. Cabinet, 521 S.W.3d 221, 2017 Ky. App. LEXIS 157 (Ky. Ct. App. 2017).

Circuit court erred in requiring that a father's contact with his two sons in the family home be supervised where joint stipulations showed only that he twice pled guilty to sex crimes more than a decade ago, was assessed a low risk sex offender and required to register for life, and completed only the first of three phases of sex offender treatment program, there was no evidence that he had done anything to harms his sons, the sparse record did not show a proclivity to harm them, the father and mother had cooperated with authorities, and during 18 months of scrutiny, nothing had happened. R.S. v. Cabinet for Health & Family Servs., 2017 Ky. App. LEXIS 562 (Ky. Ct. App. Sept. 29, 2017), rev'd, 570 S.W.3d 538, 2018 Ky. LEXIS 534 ( Ky. 2018 ).

For a parent to neglect a child, he or she must intend to do so, and dependency is different than neglect, because while dependency may occur in circumstances similar to neglect, it lacks the requisite intent on the part of the parent; a child who suffers harm as a result of a parent’s intentional acts is neglected or abused, and in contrast, a child is dependent if the harm results from a parent’s unintentional acts, or from a cause unrelated to parental culpability. K.S. v. Commonwealth, 2018 Ky. App. LEXIS 224 (Ky. Ct. App. Aug. 17, 2018), rev'd, 585 S.W.3d 202, 2019 Ky. LEXIS 382 ( Ky. 2019 ).

Abused or neglected child means a child whose health or welfare is harmed or threatened with harm and some would interpret “threatened with harm” as implicating a risk of neglect; although this interpretation may be sound in some cases, it does not obviate the necessity of intent for neglect or abuse. K.S. v. Commonwealth, 2018 Ky. App. LEXIS 224 (Ky. Ct. App. Aug. 17, 2018), rev'd, 585 S.W.3d 202, 2019 Ky. LEXIS 382 ( Ky. 2019 ).

Termination of the mother’s parental rights was improper because the evidence did not show that the child was neglected; while a doctor stated that the mother’s limited intellect gave rise to a risk of neglect, that is not the same as neglect but rather indicates a child is dependent. The mother never had custody of the child, never neglected the child, and complied with her case plan, and while she had developmental disabilities, that alone was insufficient to render her behavior as neglectful. K.S. v. Commonwealth, 2018 Ky. App. LEXIS 224 (Ky. Ct. App. Aug. 17, 2018), rev'd, 585 S.W.3d 202, 2019 Ky. LEXIS 382 ( Ky. 2019 ).

Neglect finding was proper because a father did not have to exercise control or supervision over the child, as “exercising custodial control or supervision” modified “other person.” Cabinet for Health & Family Servs. v. C.B., 556 S.W.3d 568, 2018 Ky. LEXIS 365 ( Ky. 2018 ).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion when it found children to be neglected and requiring in-home supervision because the father had a history of criminal convictions for sexually abusing his underage half-brother and failed to comply with conditions of probation; the dispositional order was not unreasonable because the father was convicted of sexually abusing an underage male family member, violated his probation, and was classified as a risk, albeit low, to reoffend. Cabinet for Health & Family Servs. v. R.S., 570 S.W.3d 538, 2018 Ky. LEXIS 534 ( Ky. 2018 ), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 242, 205 L. Ed. 2d 130, 2019 U.S. LEXIS 5735 (U.S. 2019).

Subsection (1)(a)(2) does not calibrate for the judiciary the tolerable degree of risk when considering a potential finding of neglect, and it is a matter for judicial discretion; if psychosexual assessment standards do not contain a category of “no risk” in evaluating an offender’s chances for reoffending, then a risk for reoffending necessarily exists, and that risk of reoffending surely must be taken into account considering the offender’s initial offenses and subsequent history. Cabinet for Health & Family Servs. v. R.S., 570 S.W.3d 538, 2018 Ky. LEXIS 534 ( Ky. 2018 ), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 242, 205 L. Ed. 2d 130, 2019 U.S. LEXIS 5735 (U.S. 2019).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that children were at risk because the father had prior criminal acts, committed against an underage family member, and he was unable to complete probation supervision successfully. Cabinet for Health & Family Servs. v. R.S., 570 S.W.3d 538, 2018 Ky. LEXIS 534 ( Ky. 2018 ), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 242, 205 L. Ed. 2d 130, 2019 U.S. LEXIS 5735 (U.S. 2019).

Nothing in the plain language of Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 600.020(1) or in judicial precedent requires a trial court to find that a parent intentionally abused or neglected her child. Cabinet for Health & Fam. Servs. v. P.W., 582 S.W.3d 887, 2019 Ky. LEXIS 481 ( Ky. 2019 ).

Court of Appeals of Kentucky held that for a parent to abuse or neglect a child under Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 600.020(1), she must intend to do so. This is requiring an intentional result, i.e., that the parent intend that the result of their actions be that the child is abused or neglected. The Supreme Court of Kentucky is explicitly overruling that holding today. Cabinet for Health & Fam. Servs. v. P.W., 582 S.W.3d 887, 2019 Ky. LEXIS 481 ( Ky. 2019 ).

Substantial evidence supported a neglect finding in the termination of parental rights where the mother knew the father’s history of violence, failed to take any action to protect the child, and she could have prevented the child’s injury if she had been honest about the domestic violence that was occurring, had accepted services to address the violence, or been able to apply the skills she learned through multiple case plans. Cabinet for Health & Fam. Servs. v. P.W., 582 S.W.3d 887, 2019 Ky. LEXIS 481 ( Ky. 2019 ).

While no evidence showed that a second child was subjected to physical abuse, the evidence of abuse and neglect as to the other child provided sufficient evidence of a risk of harm. Cabinet for Health & Fam. Servs. v. P.W., 582 S.W.3d 887, 2019 Ky. LEXIS 481 ( Ky. 2019 ).

Family court acted properly in determining that the Commonwealth could not establish a prima facie case for educational neglect where the child was only five years old when she was enrolled in kindergarten and incurred the absences which provided the basis for the temporary removal petition, pursuant to Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 158.030(2), her enrollment and attendance were optional, and there could be no educational neglect of a child for excessive absenteeism who was not required by law to attend school. Commonwealth v. H. K., 595 S.W.3d 498, 2019 Ky. App. LEXIS 218 (Ky. Ct. App. 2019).

Termination of the mother’s parental rights was proper because the child was neglected as she was born with amphetamines in her system that came from the mother’s use of amphetamines prescribed to her, but she did not inform her physician of her pregnancy; she continuously abused drugs over the two-year period after the child had been removed; she went from one abusive relationship to another and did not complete her protective parenting class; and she did not pay child support; because there was no reasonable expectation of improvement in the mother’s situation within a reasonable amount of time; and because the child had been in foster care for 15 of the most recent 22 months preceding the filing of the petition to terminate. 2019 Ky. App. LEXIS 223 .

Department for Community Based Services, Cabinet for Health and Family Services failed to prove its allegation of neglect by appellee by showing that it was more likely than not that appellee failed to provide a child adequate supervision necessary for the child’s well-being in the afterschool program as the only evidence presented by the Cabinet that the boys touched each other sexually was unreliable and inconsistent hearsay; and no witness testified that the touching was ever reported to appellee. Dep't for Cmty. Based Servs., Cabinet for Health & Family Servs. v. Baker, 2020 Ky. LEXIS 459 (Ky. Dec. 17, 2020).

10. Informal Adjustment.

In a proceeding in which a juvenile was charged with first degree sexual assault, under KRS 600.020(31), the trial court’s approval for the parties’ agreement for an informal adjustment was required, and as it was in the best position to make that assessment, its decision not to approve the agreement would not be reversed. W.D.B. v. Commonwealth, 2006 Ky. App. LEXIS 346 (Ky. Ct. App.), sub. op., 2006 Ky. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1108 (Ky. Ct. App. Nov. 22, 2006), aff'd, 246 S.W.3d 448, 2007 Ky. LEXIS 241 ( Ky. 2007 ).

11. Guilty Pleas.

Defendant juvenile was wrongly designated as a status offender after a family court found him in contempt because the court did not engage defendant in any sort of meaningful discussion concerning the consequences of his guilty plea, nor did it determine or assure whether he made it voluntarily. The court did not ask defendant about his state of mind or if anyone had pressured him to make the plea, it did not explain to defendant that he had the option of pleading not guilty and thus becoming entitled to a hearing, and it did not ascertain whether he was aware of the constitutional rights that he waived as a result of his admission. D.G. v. Commonwealth, 355 S.W.3d 476, 2011 Ky. App. LEXIS 228 (Ky. Ct. App. 2011).

12. Valid Court Order.

Standard School Attendance Order (SSAO) was a valid court order and therefore the trial court properly held the minor in contempt, because she received the full due process rights to which she was entitled at that stage of the proceedings. The SSAO was entered after the minor was initially brought into court for her arraignment on the beyond control of parent charge and entered a plea of not true, she was made subject to the SSAO, and it regulated her future conduct. B.H. v. Commonwealth, 2013 Ky. App. LEXIS 164 (Ky. Ct. App. Nov. 22, 2013), review denied, ordered not published, 2014 Ky. LEXIS 423 (Ky. Aug. 13, 2014).

13. De facto custodian.

Circuit court properly committed a father’s 31-month-old child to the Cabinet for Health and Family Services because there was an emergency where the father was arrested on drug charges and drugs and a handgun were seized from a child’s bedroom, the stepmother did not meet the requirements of a de facto custodian where it was not established that the POA the father purportedly executed made her the child’s legal guardian, the father’s three blood relatives were eliminated from consideration as either living with, or being, drug traffickers, and the least restrictive appropriate placement available was the foster mother with whom the child has spent the majority of his life. G. P. v. Cabinet for Health and Family Servs., 572 S.W.3d 484, 2019 Ky. App. LEXIS 34 (Ky. Ct. App. 2019).

Cited in:

Crum v. Cabinet for Human Resources, 928 S.W.2d 355, 1996 Ky. App. LEXIS 134 (Ky. Ct. App. 1996); Commonwealth v. G.C.W., 139 S.W.3d 172, 2004 Ky. App. LEXIS 215 (Ky. Ct. App. 2004); B.C. v. B.T., 182 S.W.3d 213, 2005 Ky. App. LEXIS 281 (Ky. Ct. App. 2005); Commonwealth v. S.K., 253 S.W.3d 486, 2008 Ky. LEXIS 6 ( Ky. 2008 ); Commonwealth v. C.L.H., 2015 Ky. App. LEXIS 17 (Feb. 13, 2015); Cabinet for Health & Family Servs. v. J.M.G., 2015 Ky. LEXIS 2013 (Dec. 17, 2015).

Opinions of Attorney General.

A married child under the age of 16 has a legal responsibility to attend school, but once a child marries, the parent or guardian no longer has a legal obligation to ensure that the child attends school; however, if the spouse of a minor who is under the age of 16 and who is an habitual truant, is found to be a person exercising custodial control or supervision as defined by this section, the spouse may be subject to penalties under the Juvenile Code. OAG 87-40 .

It is clear from the language of this section and KRS 610.010(1)(c) that a student under the age of 18 years who is failing to attend school in violation of KRS 159.010 is subject to a delinquency prosecution in accordance with the Juvenile Code. OAG 90-106 .

While the two definitions of “habitual truant” in KRS 159.150 and in this section cannot be reconciled in terms of their language, it may be possible to reconcile them in their application. KRS 159.140 gives Directors of Pupil Personnel authority to enforce compulsory attendance laws, including KRS 159.150 . Penalties are set forth under KRS 159.990 and are enforced by the District Court. Through exclusive jurisdiction over habitual truants the District Court has discretion in enforcement. The court may either rely on a Director of Pupil Personnel to initiate proceedings for violations of KRS 159.150, or the court may order a Director of Pupil Personnel to enforce this section, in which case the director would have authority to apply the definition found therein. OAG 91-79 .

A married female under 16 years of age is a “child” as defined in this section. OAG 93-37 .

This section controls over KRS 159.150 in ascertaining the number of days a child must have unexcused absences prior to being found habitually truant under the Unified Juvenile Code. OAG 93-37 .

A child who does not receive necessary medical care due to his parents’ religious belief may be considered an abused or neglected child; accordingly, the reporting requirements of KRS 620.030(1) and the investigation requirements of KRS 620.050(3) are mandatory and must be followed in cases involving the religious exemption contained in subsection (1) of this section. OAG 93-84 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Bench & Bar.

DiLoreto, Representing the Child Client When Intimate Partner Violence Surfaces, Vol. 67, No. 5, Sept. 2003, Ky. Bench & Bar 23.

Kentucky Law Journal.

Smith, Medical and Psychotherapy Privileges and Confidentiality: On Giving With One Hand and Removing With the Other, 75 Ky. L.J. 473 (1986-87).

Essays, “Are Kentucky’s Children ‘At Risk’ as a Result of J.H. v. Commonwealth?”, 86 Ky. L.J. 999 (1997-98).

Northern Kentucky Law Review.

Tapp and Tincher, Of Innocents and Offenders: A Survey of Children’s Law in Kentucky, 30 N. Ky. L. Rev. 131 (2003).

Treatises

Caldwell’s Kentucky Form Book, 5th Ed., Practice Context for Juvenile Code Proceedings, § 258.00.

Caldwell’s Kentucky Form Book, 5th Ed., Practice Context for Termination of Parental Rights and Adoption, § 266.00.

Petrilli, Kentucky Family Law, Juvenile Court, §§ 32.9, 32.14.

Petrilli, Kentucky Family Law, Minors, § 30.34.

Petrilli, Kentucky Family Law, Forms, Family Offenses, Form 4.6.

600.030. Restrictions on regulations.

The cabinet shall not issue administrative regulations to implement the provisions of this chapter unless the Juvenile Code specifically authorizes their issuance. Regulations, when issued, shall not exceed the bounds of the specific authorization provided in this chapter.

History. Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 423, § 3, effective July 1, 1987.

600.040. Division of responsibility between cabinet and Department of Juvenile Justice.

When KRS 605.090 , 605.100 , 605.110 , 605.115 , 610.110 , or any other section of this code refer jointly to the operation of a program or service by both the Department of Juvenile Justice and the Cabinet for Health and Family Services, the following divisions are intended:

  1. Facilities, programs, and services relating to juveniles under KRS Chapter 635 or 640, or under KRS Chapter 645 as relates to a child who is mentally ill and who also comes within the purview of KRS Chapter 635 or 640, shall be the responsibility of the Department of Juvenile Justice.
  2. Facilities, programs, and services relating to juveniles under other chapters of the code, including KRS Chapter 630, shall be the responsibility of the Cabinet for Health and Family Services.

History. Enact. Acts 1996, ch. 358, § 33, effective July 1, 1997; 1998, ch. 426, § 612, effective July 15, 1998; 2005, ch. 99, § 660, effective June 20, 2005.

600.050. Designation and documentation of commitment of children needing protection or needing extraordinary services.

  1. For the purposes of this section:
    1. A child is deemed to need extraordinary services if the child is mentally or emotionally ill or has symptoms of mental or emotional illness and requires medical attention, and the child’s parent, guardian, or other person exercising custodial control or supervision over the child is unable to provide for the required treatment, care, or supervision of the child, and:
      1. The inability is due primarily to the lack of financial means of the child’s parent, guardian, or other person exercising custodial control or supervision unless assistance has been offered and rejected;
      2. The child’s parent, guardian, or other person exercising custodial control or supervision has made a reasonable effort under the circumstances to meet the needs of the child;
      3. The inability is not due to a willful act of commission or act of omission by the child’s parent, guardian, or other person exercising custodial control or supervision; and
      4. Commitment is not opposed by the parent, guardian, or other person exercising custodial control or supervision; and
    2. A child is deemed to need protection if the court determines the child is a dependent, abused, or neglected child and the needs of the child do not meet the definition of a child in need of extraordinary services.
  2. For children committed under KRS 620.140 after July 15, 1998, the court shall designate in the court order of commitment and the cabinet shall document in the official case file records showing whether the commitment is due to the child needing protection or the child needing extraordinary services.

History. Enact. Acts 1998, ch. 398, § 2, effective July 15, 1998.

600.060. No diminishment of court’s inherent contempt power — Exception.

Notwithstanding any other provision of KRS Chapter 600 to 645, the inherent contempt power of the court shall not be diminished, except that an order of detention for a child found in contempt shall not exceed thirty (30) days.

History. Enact. Acts 2000, ch. 193, § 18, effective July 14, 2000; 2014, ch. 132, § 25, effective July 1, 2015.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Analysis

  1. Juvenile Proceedings.
  2. Contempt Sentence.
  3. Restitution Proceedings.
  4. Criminal Contempt.
1. Juvenile Proceedings.

Although a juvenile was only 15-years old, a District Court had authority under KRS 600.060 to sentence the juvenile to 60-days detention for criminal contempt. C.G. v. Commonwealth, 2003 Ky. App. LEXIS 57 (Ky. Ct. App.), sub. op., 2003 Ky. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1383 (Ky. Ct. App. Mar. 14, 2003), review denied, ordered not published, 2005 Ky. LEXIS 212 (Ky. Aug. 17, 2005).

Both of the family court’s contempt orders violated Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann § 600.060 as ordered the juvenile to be detained for more than 30 days. C.S. v. Commonwealth, 559 S.W.3d 857, 2018 Ky. App. LEXIS 203 (Ky. Ct. App. 2018).

2. Contempt Sentence.

KRS 635.060(4) provided that a juvenile offender who was older than age 14 but younger than age 16 could be confined for a period not to exceed 45 days but KRS 600.060 stated that notwithstanding any other provision of KRS Chs. 600 to 645, the inherent contempt power of the court was not diminished, so, because KRS 600.060 specifically addressed the juvenile court’s contempt powers, it controlled over the more general limitation on sentencing of public offenders contained in KRS 635.060(4), and a juvenile court was allowed to sentence a public offender to 60 days in detention for being in contempt of court. A.W. v. Commonwealth, 2003 Ky. App. LEXIS 91 (Ky. Ct. App. May 2, 2003), aff'd, 163 S.W.3d 4, 2005 Ky. LEXIS 88 ( Ky. 2005 ).

3. Restitution Proceedings.

Juvenile court retained jurisdiction over an offender to enforce a restitution order entered by the juvenile court after the offender turned 18 because KRS 600.060 authorized the use of contempt powers to enforce the restitution order. Commonwealth v. S.K., 253 S.W.3d 486, 2008 Ky. LEXIS 6 ( Ky. 2008 ).

4. Criminal Contempt.

Family court erred in imposing criminal contempt sanctions against the Kentucky Cabinet for Health and Family Services because the court held the Cabinet in contempt for having disregarded a procedural rule which the court itself acknowledged regularly disregarding and the court failed to find willful disobedience by a case worker in the failure to file a required report. Cabinet for Health & Family Servs. v. J.M.G., 475 S.W.3d 600, 2015 Ky. LEXIS 2013 ( Ky. 2015 ).

Notes to Unpublished Decisions

1. Contempt Sentence.

Unpublished decision: KRS 600.060 did not restrict a juvenile court’s imposition of contempt sanctions, for violations of conditions of probation, as the juvenile court had the inherent authority to impose the sanctions; further, KRS 635.060 did not act as a limitation on the length of sentence imposed under a contempt order. A.W. v. Commonwealth, 163 S.W.3d 4, 2005 Ky. LEXIS 88 ( Ky. 2005 ).

600.070. Release of educational records.

Pursuant to the authority granted to the Commonwealth under the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act, 20 U.S.C. sec. 1232 g, when a statute within KRS Chapters 600 to 645 refers to the release of educational records, the purpose of the release shall be limited to providing the juvenile justice system with the ability to effectively serve, prior to adjudication, the needs of the student whose records are sought. The authorities to which the data are released shall certify that any educational records obtained pursuant to a statute within KRS Chapters 600 to 645 shall only be released to persons authorized by statute and shall not be released to any other person without the written consent of the parent of the child.

History. Enact. Acts 2013, ch. 124, § 7, effective June 25, 2013; 2014, ch. 132, § 55, effective July 15, 2014.

CHAPTER 605 Administrative Matters

605.010. Court-designated workers required.

In each judicial district there shall be a court-designated worker or agency. The number of persons assigned as court-designated workers shall be determined by the Administrative Office of the Courts.

History. Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 423, § 4, effective July 1, 1987.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

Acts 1986, ch. 423, § 199 provides: “KRS 446.250 to 446.320 to the contrary notwithstanding, Acts 1986, ch. 423 shall prevail in the event of a conflict between Acts 1986, ch. 423 and other Acts passed by the 1986 regular session of the General Assembly.”

Research References and Practice Aids

Treatises

Petrilli, Kentucky Family Law, Juvenile Court, § 32.3.

Petrilli, Kentucky Family Law, Termination of Parental Rights and Adoption, § 29.1.

605.020. Supervision of court-designated workers.

  1. Standards for the employment of court-designated workers shall be set by the Administrative Office of the Courts.
  2. If the Administrative Office of the Courts contracts with a public agency for the provision of the court-designated worker or workers, the contract shall specify that it is for the services, in part or in whole, of named personnel of that agency and no others. Personnel of a public agency under contract to the Administrative Office of the Courts selected as court-designated workers shall be selected in the manner set forth in the contract by and between the public agency and the Administrative Office of the Courts; shall be under the control of the Administrative Office of the Courts and the court to which they are assigned; and shall be subject to the same powers, duties, and restrictions as are court-designated workers employed by the Administrative Office of the Courts.
  3. Court-designated workers, whether employed by the Administrative Office of the Courts or by a public agency under contract to the Administrative Office of the Courts, may be disciplined or removed from the position of court-designated worker in the manner specified in the:
    1. Personnel policies for employees of the Administrative Office of the Courts or the personnel policies of the contract agencies as approved by the Administrative Office of the Courts; and
    2. Contract by and between the public agency and the Administrative Office of the Courts.
  4. The Administrative Office of the Courts shall not contract with private corporations, persons, or agencies for the services of court-designated workers.

History. Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 423, § 5, effective July 1, 1987.

605.020. Supervision of court-designated workers.

  1. Standards for the employment of court-designated workers shall be set by the Administrative Office of the Courts.
  2. If the Administrative Office of the Courts contracts with a public agency for the provision of the court-designated worker or workers, the contract shall specify that it is for the services, in part or in whole, of named personnel of that agency and no others. Personnel of a public agency under contract to the Administrative Office of the Courts selected as court-designated workers shall be selected in the manner set forth in the contract by and between the public agency and the Administrative Office of the Courts; shall be under the control of the Administrative Office of the Courts and the court to which they are assigned; and shall be subject to the same powers, duties, and restrictions as are court-designated workers employed by the Administrative Office of the Courts.
  3. Court-designated workers, whether employed by the Administrative Office of the Courts or by a public agency under contract to the Administrative Office of the Courts, may be disciplined or removed from the position of court-designated worker in the manner specified in the:
    1. Personnel policies for employees of the Administrative Office of the Courts or the personnel policies of the contract agencies as approved by the Administrative Office of the Courts; and
    2. Contract by and between the public agency and the Administrative Office of the Courts.
  4. The Administrative Office of the Courts shall not contract with private corporations, persons, or agencies for the services of court-designated workers.
  5. The Administrative Office of the Courts shall provide training to all court-designated workers in:
    1. The administration of evidence-based screening instruments and, for some workers as appropriate, the administration of risk and needs assessments;
    2. Identification of appropriate services for children and families;
    3. Techniques for diversion agreement implementation and supervision;
    4. Identifying and understanding the issues that led to the filing of a complaint, which may include recognition of signs of trauma, disability, behavioral, mental health, or substance abuse issues, in order to determine appropriate referrals; and
    5. Juvenile justice research, best practices, and any other subject deemed appropriate and available.
    1. The Administrative Office of the Courts shall collect and track data, and provide an annual report to the oversight council created in KRS 15A.063 containing the following information: (6) (a) The Administrative Office of the Courts shall collect and track data, and provide an annual report to the oversight council created in KRS 15A.063 containing the following information:
      1. The number and type of complaints received by each court-designated worker;
      2. The outcome of each complaint, including whether a referral was made to the county attorney or the Department for Community Based Services;
      3. The number of children committed to the Department for Community Based Services pursuant to KRS Chapter 620 who were originally charged with status offenses under KRS Chapter 630 or whose cases were amended from status to dependency, neglect, and abuse; and
      4. Whether a child who successfully completed a diversion agreement was, within one (1) year following completion of the agreement, adjudicated a public offender or convicted in the adult court of a criminal offense.
    2. Personally identifiable information of the court-designated worker shall not be provided but shall be retained by the Administrative Office of the Courts to address the need for additional staff training or other appropriate action.
  6. The Administrative Office of the Courts shall develop a graduated response protocol, consisting of a continuum of responses from the least restrictive to the most restrictive, for court-designated workers to utilize in response to violations of the terms of a diversion agreement.
  7. The Administrative Office of the Courts shall collaborate with the Justice and Public Safety Cabinet and provide technical assistance to judicial districts in implementing the fiscal incentive program established in KRS 15A.062 .
  8. The Administrative Office of the Courts shall act as the fiscal agent to receive funds awarded pursuant to KRS 15A.062 .
  9. The Administrative Office of the Courts shall, by regulation, establish a form complaint to be used in filing all complaints with the court-designated worker. The form shall contain the requirements of KRS 610.020 , and if the complaint is filed by a school district, shall require that the director of pupil personnel state that he or she documented the home conditions of the student and the intervention strategies attempted, as required by KRS 159.140 , and that he or she attempted to conduct a conference with the child and a parent.

History. Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 423, § 5, effective July 1, 1987; 2014, ch. 132, § 27, effective July 1, 2015.

605.030. Duties of court-designated workers.

  1. A court-designated worker may:
    1. Receive complaints;
    2. Review complaints taken by peace officers;
    3. Investigate complaints except neglect, abuse, and dependency;
    4. Perform an initial screening for human trafficking as defined in KRS 529.010 for referral to the cabinet for investigation as a case of dependency, neglect, or abuse;
    5. Dispose of complaints limited to a total of three (3) status or nonfelony public offense complaints per child and, with written approval of the county attorney, one (1) felony complaint that does not involve the commission of a sexual offense or the use of a deadly weapon;
    6. Administer oaths;
    7. Issue summonses;
    8. Issue subpoenas;
    9. Make advisory dispositional recommendations and provide, within forty-eight (48) hours, exclusive of weekends and holidays, information concerning a child who has chosen to waive the investigation pursuant to KRS 610.100 ;
    10. Perform such duties as required by KRS Chapter 645;
    11. Administer evidence-based screenings and assessments to identify the risk and needs of a child and his or her family;
    12. Enter into diversion agreements, including referral to programs or service providers, providing case management and service coordination, assisting with barriers to completion, and monitoring progress;
    13. Impose graduated sanctions, from least restrictive to most restrictive, in response to violations of the terms of a diversion agreement;
    14. Gather information necessary to track and record outcomes of all diversion agreement recommendations and final diversion disposition;
    15. Collaborate and cooperate with the family accountability, intervention, and response team, director of pupil personnel as appropriate, and service providers to ensure all appropriate interventions are utilized;
    16. Report annually to his or her local public school districts and to the Administrative Office of the Courts an inventory of all programs and service providers within the judicial district they serve;
    17. Request from the schools a student’s education records pursuant to KRS 17.125 ; and
    18. Perform such other functions related to activities of children as may be authorized or directed by the court.
  2. Upon the filing of a petition which initiates a formal court action in the interest of the child, the court-designated worker’s involvement, with the exception of the activities defined in subsection (1)(i) of this section, shall cease.
  3. When a child is to be tried as an adult, the court-designated worker need not make dispositional recommendations.

History. Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 423, § 6, effective July 1, 1987; 1988, ch. 350, § 2, effective April 10, 1988; 1996, ch. 358, § 11, effective July 15, 1997; 2013, ch. 25, § 5, effective June 25, 2013; 2014, ch. 132, § 28, effective July 15, 2014.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(7/15/96). Under 1996 Ky. Acts ch. 358, sec. 67(1), the amendment of this statute by Section 11 of that Act becomes effective July 15, 1997.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Construction.

Court-designated worker was not required to impose graduated sanctions prior to terminating a juvenile's diversion where the language in Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 605.030(1)(m) used the word “may,” and nothing in the Juvenile Court Rules of Practice and Procedure provided a reason to interpret the term as compulsory. J.S. v. Commonwealth, 528 S.W.3d 349, 2017 Ky. App. LEXIS 530 (Ky. Ct. App. 2017).

Court-designated worker failed to carry out a mandatory duty to refer the matter to the Family Accountability, Intervention, and Response Team prior to referring the case for prosecution, and as a result, the juvenile was deprived of the benefit of any services available to assist him, and the trial court was deprived of subject matter jurisdiction. J.S. v. Commonwealth, 528 S.W.3d 349, 2017 Ky. App. LEXIS 530 (Ky. Ct. App. 2017).

Research References and Practice Aids

Treatises

Petrilli, Kentucky Family Law, Juvenile Court, §§ 32.5, 32.18.

605.035. Family accountability, intervention, and response teams — Purpose — Membership.

  1. There is hereby created in each judicial district a family accountability, intervention, and response team that shall develop enhanced case management plans and opportunities for services for children referred to the team. The family accountability, intervention, and response team shall consist of not more than fifteen (15) persons.
  2. The membership of the team shall include the following representatives as appointed by their agencies or organizations:
    1. A court-designated worker in that judicial circuit or district;
    2. One (1) or more members, one (1) of whom shall be a representative of the community mental health center, of the regional interagency council specified in KRS 200.509(1)(a) to (d) and (g), or corresponding members of the local interagency council if one exists;
    3. A representative from the cabinet knowledgeable about services available through the cabinet and authorized to facilitate access to services;
    4. A representative from the office of a county attorney within the judicial district;
    5. A representative from the Department of Public Advocacy;
    6. A representative from a local public school within the judicial district;
    7. A representative of law enforcement; and
    8. Other persons interested in juvenile justice issues, as identified by the family accountability, intervention, and response team, who are necessary for a complete representation of resources within each judicial circuit or district.
  3. A court-designated worker from within the judicial circuit or district shall lead the team and be responsible for convening and staffing the team.
  4. The team shall adopt a case management approach and process for reviewing:
    1. Referrals from the court-designated worker involving cases in which a child has failed to appear for a preliminary intake inquiry, declined to enter into a diversion agreement, or failed to complete the terms of the agreement; and
    2. Status offense cases if the court-designated worker, after reviewing the complaint, has determined that no further action is necessary.
  5. After reviewing the actions taken by the court-designated worker, including referrals made for the child and his or her family, efforts to address barriers to successful completion, and whether other appropriate services are available to address the needs of the child and his or her family, the team may:
    1. Refer the case back to the court-designated worker to take further action as recommended by the team; or
    2. Advise the court-designated worker to refer the case to the county attorney if the team has no further recommendations to offer.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 2014, ch. 132, § 26, effective July 15, 2014; 2017 ch. 167, § 18, effective June 29, 2017; 2018 ch. 120, § 7, effective July 14, 2018.

605.040. Prohibited activities.

A court-designated worker shall not:

  1. Issue arrest or search warrants;
  2. Supervise a child following his adjudication when the child is committed to the cabinet or placed on probation under the supervision of the cabinet or any other agency or individual;
  3. Perform any clerical work not directly related to required juvenile activities;
  4. Investigate child abuse, neglect, or dependency allegations but shall refer such actions to the cabinet; or
  5. Dispose of complaints, except as authorized by KRS 605.030 or 635.010 .

History. Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 423, § 7, effective July 1, 1987; 1988, ch. 350, § 3, effective April 10, 1988; 1996, ch. 358, § 12, effective July 15, 1997.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(7/15/96). Under 1996 Ky. Acts ch. 358, sec. 67(1), the amendment of this statute by Section 12 of that Act becomes effective July 15, 1997.

605.050. Appointment of chief probation officers and volunteer probation officers — Training.

  1. In counties containing a city of the first or second class, the county judge/executive may appoint a chief probation officer of the juvenile court and such number of assistant probation officers, professional and clerical personnel as may be authorized by the fiscal court. Such officers shall receive reasonable salaries to be fixed by the fiscal court, and shall be allowed their actual and necessary expenses incurred in the performance of their duties. The salaries and expenses shall be paid out of the county treasury. The officers shall serve at the pleasure of the county judge/executive but shall be subject to the direction and control of the judges of the District Court in the performance of their duties. The officers shall be peace officers who shall possess all the powers of peace officers in carrying out the purposes of KRS Chapters 600 to 645. A probation officer may take into custody any child that he has reasonable grounds to believe is in violation of conditions of his probation.
  2. In counties containing an urban-county government, the mayor shall appoint a chief probation officer of the juvenile session of the District Court and such number of assistant probation officers, professional and clerical personnel as are reasonably necessary for the operation of the juvenile session of the District Court. Such officers shall receive reasonable salaries to be fixed by the urban-county council, and shall be allowed their actual and necessary expenses incurred in the performance of their duties. The salaries and expenses shall be paid out of the urban-county treasury. The officers shall serve at the pleasure of the mayor but shall be subject to the direction and control of the judges of the District Court in the performance of their duties. The officers shall be peace officers who shall possess all the powers of peace officers in carrying out the purposes of KRS Chapters 600 to 645. A probation officer may take into custody any child that he has reasonable grounds to believe is in violation of conditions of his probation.
  3. In any county, the Chief District Judge may appoint or designate one (1) or more discreet persons of good moral character to serve as volunteer probation officers of the juvenile session. Such volunteer probation officers shall serve during the pleasure of the judge and without compensation, except that the fiscal court or the urban-county council, as appropriate, may authorize the payment of compensation and reasonable expenses out of the county or urban-county treasury of any such officers.
  4. Officers appointed pursuant to this section shall be trained in the administration of a validated risk and needs assessment.

History. Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 423, § 8, effective July 1, 1987; 1988, ch. 350, § 4, effective April 10, 1988; 1990, ch. 264, § 12, effective July 13, 1990; 2014, ch. 132, § 29, effective July 15, 2014.

Compiler’s Notes.

For this section as effective January 1, 2015, see the following section also numbered KRS 605.050 .

For this section as effective January 1, 2015, see the following section also numbered KRS 605.050

Research References and Practice Aids

Treatises

Petrilli, Kentucky Family Law, Juvenile Court, §§ 32.10, 32.13, 32.17.

605.050. Appointment of chief probation officers and volunteer probation officers — Training.

  1. In counties containing a city of the first class or a city with a population equal to or greater than twenty thousand (20,000) as of the most recent federal decennial census, the county judge/executive may appoint a chief probation officer of the juvenile court and such number of assistant probation officers, professional and clerical personnel as may be authorized by the fiscal court. Such officers shall receive reasonable salaries to be fixed by the fiscal court, and shall be allowed their actual and necessary expenses incurred in the performance of their duties. The salaries and expenses shall be paid out of the county treasury. The officers shall serve at the pleasure of the county judge/executive but shall be subject to the direction and control of the judges of the District Court in the performance of their duties. The officers shall be peace officers who shall possess all the powers of peace officers in carrying out the purposes of KRS Chapters 600 to 645. A probation officer may take into custody any child that he has reasonable grounds to believe is in violation of conditions of his probation.
  2. In counties containing an urban-county government, the mayor shall appoint a chief probation officer of the juvenile session of the District Court and such number of assistant probation officers, professional and clerical personnel as are reasonably necessary for the operation of the juvenile session of the District Court. Such officers shall receive reasonable salaries to be fixed by the urban-county council, and shall be allowed their actual and necessary expenses incurred in the performance of their duties. The salaries and expenses shall be paid out of the urban-county treasury. The officers shall serve at the pleasure of the mayor but shall be subject to the direction and control of the judges of the District Court in the performance of their duties. The officers shall be peace officers who shall possess all the powers of peace officers in carrying out the purposes of KRS Chapters 600 to 645. A probation officer may take into custody any child that he has reasonable grounds to believe is in violation of conditions of his probation.
  3. In any county, the Chief District Judge may appoint or designate one (1) or more discreet persons of good moral character to serve as volunteer probation officers of the juvenile session. Such volunteer probation officers shall serve during the pleasure of the judge and without compensation, except that the fiscal court or the urban-county council, as appropriate, may authorize the payment of compensation and reasonable expenses out of the county or urban-county treasury of any such officers.
  4. Officers appointed pursuant to this section shall be trained in the administration of a validated risk and needs assessment.

History. Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 423, § 8, effective July 1, 1987; 1988, ch. 350, § 4, effective April 10, 1988; 1990, ch. 264, § 12, effective July 13, 1990; 2014, ch. 132, § 29, effective July 15, 2014; 2014, ch. 92, § 310, effective January 1, 2015.

Compiler’s Notes.

For this section as effective until January 1, 2015, see the preceding section also numbered KRS 605.050 .

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(1/1/2015). This statute was amended by 2014 Ky. Acts chs. 92 and 132, which do not appear to be in conflict and have been codified together.

605.060. Duties of probation officers.

Probation officers appointed pursuant to KRS 605.050 shall:

  1. Except as otherwise provided in KRS Chapter 645, make investigations as provided in this chapter, including the administration of a validated risk and needs assessment;
  2. Be present in court to represent the interest of the child when the cases investigated by them are heard, furnish such information as may be required, including the results of a validated risk and needs assessment, advise the court as to the proper disposition of the case and take such charge of the child before and after the hearings as may be ordered;
  3. Visit and supervise children placed on probation and as far as practicable, aid and encourage such children, by friendly advice and admonition, to keep terms of their probation, and provide for their rehabilitation;
  4. Make such reports and records as may be required by the court;
  5. Supervise the transfer of children to and from homes or facilities as directed by the court; and
  6. Work in cooperation with the representatives of the cabinet.

History. Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 423, § 9, effective July 1, 1987; 1988, ch. 350, § 5, effective April 10, 1988; 2014, ch. 132, § 30, effective July 15, 2014.

Research References and Practice Aids

Treatises

Petrilli, Kentucky Family Law, Juvenile Court, §§ 32.3, 32.13.

605.070. Duties of court appointed special advocates. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 423, § 10, effective July 1, 1987) was repealed by Acts 1990, ch. 264, § 13, effective July 13, 1990.

605.080. Transportation of children.

  1. Any child ordered to be transported, by a committing or sentencing court, shall be transported by the sheriff or the jailer of that county. Any other law enforcement agency may enter into agreements with the court, sheriff, or jailer to transport juveniles.
  2. Any peace officer who conveys a child from the committing court or from the detention facility of the committing court to a residential treatment facility or other facility operated by the Department of Juvenile Justice or the cabinet shall be allowed an amount prescribed by regulation adopted by the Finance and Administration Cabinet calculated by the nearest traveled route, and shall be paid for all necessary expenses for feeding, lodging, and transporting the child. The officer shall make out a full account of all expenses so incurred by him and give the distance traveled. The account shall be verified by the officer upon oath before the District Court and certified by the circuit clerk to the Department of Juvenile Justice or the cabinet, as appropriate, for payment out of funds appropriated to the Department of Juvenile Justice or the cabinet for this purpose. The child’s presence shall be necessary at a postdispositional proceeding only as required by court order for good cause. Transportation shall be provided as in subsection (1) of this section and expenses for transportation of a child to a proceeding from a residential treatment facility or other facility operated by the Department of Juvenile Justice or the cabinet shall be paid out of the State Treasury.
  3. No child shall be transported to any residential treatment facility or other facility, pursuant to order of any court, unless accompanied by an attendant of the same gender, unless that child, when authorized in writing by the court, the Department of Juvenile Justice, or the cabinet, is transported by a parent, grandparent, or adult brother or sister.
  4. The agent of any residential treatment facility or other facility which receives a child transported to the facility shall report any violation of subsection (3) of this section to the Commonwealth’s attorney of the judicial circuit in which the facility is located.
  5. The Department of Juvenile Justice or the cabinet may transport or pay the necessary traveling expenses of children committed to it for care and treatment from their homes to the residential treatment facility or other facility or home to which they are committed, and the traveling expenses of such children from the facility or home to their homes when discharged or placed on supervised placement.

History. Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 423, § 11, effective July 1, 1987; 1988, ch. 350, § 6, effective April 10, 1988; 1996, ch. 358, § 13, effective July 1, 1997; 1998, ch. 272, § 1, effective July 15, 1998; 2000, ch. 534, § 7, effective July 14, 2000; 2002, ch. 257, § 8, effective July 15, 2002.

Research References and Practice Aids

Treatises

Petrilli, Kentucky Family Law, Juvenile Court, § 32.11.

605.090. Alternative treatment for committed children — Notice of inappropriate behavior of child — Procedures for removal of child committed as dependent, neglected, or abused — Reports — Written transfer summary — Placement of public offenders.

  1. Unless precluded by law, any child committed to the Department of Juvenile Justice or the cabinet may by the decision of the Department of Juvenile Justice or the cabinet or its designee, at any time during the period of his or her commitment, be:
    1. Upon fourteen (14) days’ prior written notice to the court, discharged from commitment. Written notice of discharge shall be given to the committing court and to any other parties as may be required by law;
    2. Placed in the home of the child’s parents, in the home of a relative, or a fictive kin, a suitable foster home, or boarding home, upon such conditions as the Department of Juvenile Justice or the cabinet may prescribe and subject to visitation and supervision by a social service worker or juvenile probation and parole officer.
      1. At the time a committed child is placed in the home of his or her parents by the Department of Juvenile Justice or the cabinet, the parents shall be informed in writing of the conditions of the placement and the criteria that will be used to determine whether removal is necessary.
      2. At the time a committed child is placed anywhere other than the home of the child’s parents, the cabinet or the Department of Juvenile Justice shall inform the foster home, the relative, the fictive kin, or the governing authority of any private facility or agency in which the child has been placed whether the minor placed is a juvenile sexual offender as defined in KRS 635.505(2) or of any inappropriate sexual acts or sexual behavior by the child specifically known to the cabinet or Department of Juvenile Justice, and any behaviors of the child specifically known to the cabinet or Department of Juvenile Justice that indicate a safety risk for the placement. Information received by any private facility or agency under this paragraph shall be disclosed immediately and directly to the individual or individuals who have physical custody of the child.
      3. If, after a placement is made, additional information is obtained by the cabinet or the Department of Juvenile Justice about inappropriate sexual behavior or other behavior of the committed child that may indicate a safety risk for the placement, the cabinet or the Department of Juvenile Justice shall as soon as practicable, but no later than seventy-two (72) hours after the additional information is received, inform the foster parent, relative, fictive kin, or private facility or agency. Additional information received by any private facility or agency shall be disclosed immediately and directly to the individual or individuals who have physical custody of the child.
      4. Information disclosed under this paragraph shall be limited to the acts or behaviors of the committed child and shall not constitute a violation of confidentiality under KRS Chapter 610 or 620. No foster parent, relative, fictive kin, or other person caring for a committed child shall divulge the information received under this paragraph to persons who do not have a legitimate interest or responsibility relating to the case. Nothing in this subparagraph shall prohibit the disclosure or sharing of information between a foster parent, relative, fictive kin, custodian, private facility, or governmental entity for the protection of any child. A violation of this subparagraph is a Class B misdemeanor;
    3. Placed in one (1) of the facilities or programs operated by the Department of Juvenile Justice or the cabinet, except that no child committed under the provisions of KRS 610.010(2)(a), (b), or (c) shall be placed in a facility operated by the Department of Juvenile Justice for children adjudicated as a public offender unless the cabinet and the department agree, and the court consents, that the placement is in the best interest of the child and that the placement does not exceed a group home level;
    4. Placed in a child-caring facility operated by a local governmental unit or by a private organization willing to receive the child, upon such conditions as the cabinet may prescribe;
    5. However, under no circumstances shall a child committed under KRS Chapter 620 be placed in a home, facility, or other shelter with a child who has been committed to the Department of Juvenile Justice for commission of a sex crime, as that term is defined in KRS 17.500 , unless the child committed for the commission of a sex crime is kept segregated from other children in the home, facility, or other shelter that have not been committed for the commission of a sex crime;
    6. Treated as provided in KRS Chapter 645;
    7. Following the transfer or placement of a child pursuant to paragraphs (b), (c), (d), (e), or (f) of this subsection, the Department of Juvenile Justice or the cabinet shall, within fourteen (14) days, excluding weekends and holidays, give written notice to the court of the transfer, the placement, and the reasons therefor.
  2. No child ten (10) years of age or under shall be placed in a facility operated by the Department of Juvenile Justice for children adjudicated as public offenders, except that a child charged with the commission of a capital offense or with an offense designated as a Class A or Class B felony may be detained in a state-operated detention facility when there is no available less restrictive alternative.
  3. If a child committed to the cabinet as dependent, neglected, or abused is placed in the home of the child’s parents, the child shall not be removed except in accordance with the following standards and procedures:
    1. If the social service worker believes that the committed child continues to be dependent, neglected, or abused, but immediate removal is unnecessary to protect the child from imminent death or serious physical injury, the casework situation and evidence shall be reviewed with his supervisor to determine whether to continue work with the family intact or to remove the child. There shall be documentation that the social service worker, prior to the court hearing, made an effort to contact the parents to inform them of the specific problems that could lead to removal so they have an opportunity to take corrective action. If the parents are unavailable or do not respond to attempts to communicate, the specific circumstances shall be documented;
    2. If it appears that the child’s health or welfare or physical, mental, or emotional condition is subjected to or threatened with real and substantial harm and there is not reasonably available an alternative less drastic than removal of the child from the home, the cabinet shall petition the District Court to review the commitment pursuant to KRS 610.120 in relation to the cabinet’s intention to remove the child from the parent’s home. The petition shall set forth the facts which constitute the need for removal of the child. The court shall serve notice of the petition and the time and place of the hearing on the parents; however, the social service worker shall also contact the parents to ensure that they received the notice and are aware of the right to be represented by counsel. If the parents’ whereabouts are unknown, notice may be mailed to the last known address of an adult who is a near relative. If the court fails to find that the child’s health or welfare or physical, mental, or emotional condition is subjected to or threatened with real and substantial harm, or recommends a less drastic alternative that is reasonably available, the child shall not be removed from the parents’ home;
    3. If a social service worker finds a committed, unattended child who is too young to take care of himself, the social service worker shall make reasonable efforts to arrange for an emergency caretaker in the child’s home until the parents return or fail to return within a reasonable time. If no in-home caretaker is available for the child, the social service worker shall request any appropriate law enforcement officer to take the child into protective custody. If, after a reasonable time, it appears the child has been abandoned, the cabinet shall petition the District Court to review the case; or
    4. If there exist reasonable grounds to believe that the child is in danger of imminent death or serious physical injury or is being sexually abused and that the parents are unable or unwilling to protect the child, the social service worker shall, with the assistance of a law enforcement officer, immediately remove the child prior to filing a petition for review. Within seventy-two (72) hours after the removal, the cabinet shall file a petition for review in District Court pursuant to KRS 610.120 with a request for an expeditious hearing. If the court fails to find that the child’s health or welfare or physical, mental, or emotional condition is subjected to or threatened with real and substantial harm, or recommends a less drastic alternative that is reasonably available, the child shall be returned to the parents’ home.
  4. The cabinet or the Department of Juvenile Justice, as appropriate, shall notify the juvenile court of the county of placement with the conditions of supervised placement of each child placed in that county from one (1) of the residential treatment facilities operated by the Department of Juvenile Justice or the cabinet. Notice of the conditions of such placement may be made available by the court to any law enforcement agency.
  5. The person in charge of any home to which a child is probated, and the governing authority of any private facility or agency to which a child is committed, shall make such reports to the court as the court may require, and such reports as the Department of Juvenile Justice or the cabinet may require in the performance of its functions under the law. The Department of Juvenile Justice or the cabinet shall have the power to make such visitations and inspections of the homes, facilities, and agencies in which children who have committed public offenses have been placed as it deems necessary to carry out its functions under the law.
  6. The Department of Juvenile Justice or the cabinet shall provide a written transfer summary to the person in charge of any foster home or any governing authority of any private facility or agency in which the Department of Juvenile Justice or the cabinet has placed a child. The written summary shall include, at a minimum, demographic information about the child, a narrative statement detailing the child’s prior placements, the length of time the child has been committed, a description of the services and assistance provided to the child or the child’s family since the most current case plan, a copy of the current case plan for the child and the child’s family, and a copy of the child’s medical and educational passport, if available, provided that no information shall be provided that violates any statutory confidentiality requirements. The transfer summary shall state whether the child placed is a juvenile sexual offender as defined in KRS 635.505(2), and include information required under subsection (1) of this section. The transfer summary shall be provided by the Department of Juvenile Justice if it is responsible for the child, or the cabinet if it is responsible for the child, within seven (7) days of the placement of the child with the person, agency, or facility providing care to the child.
  7. The Department of Juvenile Justice may assist the courts in placing children who have committed public offenses in boarding homes, and, under agreements with the individual courts, may assume responsibility for making such placements. Counties may pay or contribute towards the expenses of maintaining such children and, to the extent authorized by the fiscal court, the Department of Juvenile Justice may incur obligations chargeable to the county for such expenses.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 423, § 12, effective July 1, 1987; 1988, ch. 350, § 7, effective April 10, 1988; 1988, ch. 350, § 142, effective April 10, 1988; 1994, ch. 226, § 1, effective July 15, 1994; 1996, ch. 358, § 14, effective July 1, 1997; 1998, ch. 57, § 3, effective March 17, 1998; 1998, ch. 398, § 5, effective July 15, 1998; 1998, ch. 606, § 20, effective July 15, 1998; 2000, ch. 14, § 62, effective July 14, 2000; 2002, ch. 263, § 3, effective July 15, 2002; 2002, ch. 279, § 3, effective July 15, 2002; 2006, ch. 182, § 50, effective July 12, 2006; 2008, ch. 87, § 17, effective July 15, 2008; 2017 ch. 10, § 4, effective June 29, 2017.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Placement In Religious Facilities.

Plaintiffs established standing because they sufficiently demonstrated a link between the challenged legislative actions and the alleged constitutional violations, namely that the state’s statutory funding for neglected children in private childcare facilities knowingly and impermissibly funded a religious organization. Although a religiously inspired employee conduct rule was not sufficient to constitute discrimination on the basis of religion, it was relevant to an inquiry under the Establishment Clause. Pedreira v. Ky. Baptist Homes for Children, Inc., 579 F.3d 722, 2009 FED App. 0316P, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 19487 (6th Cir. Ky. 2009 ), cert. denied, 563 U.S. 935, 131 S. Ct. 2091, 179 L. Ed. 2d 889, 2011 U.S. LEXIS 3088 (U.S. 2011), cert. denied, 563 U.S. 935, 131 S. Ct. 2143, 179 L. Ed. 2d 889, 2011 U.S. LEXIS 2982 (U.S. 2011).

Research References and Practice Aids

Treatises

Petrilli, Kentucky Family Law, Juvenile Court, §§ 32.11, 32.24.

605.093. Day treatment programs of Department of Juvenile Justice.

By August 1, 2000, the Department of Juvenile Justice shall provide, based on available general fund appropriations, a day treatment program accessible to every school district in each judicial region of the state. The day treatment programs shall combine therapeutic and academic services.

History. Enact. Acts 1998, ch. 493, § 8, effective April 10, 1998.

605.095. Department of Juvenile Justice to operate postadjudication facilities and programs — Transfer of juveniles to Department of Corrections facilities.

  1. The Department of Juvenile Justice shall operate or contract for the operation of any postadjudication juvenile detention or treatment facility in which a juvenile is confined for a public offense or as a youthful offender.
  2. Not less than one (1) facility specified in subsection (1) of this section shall be a secure facility with a security level comparable to a medium-security adult facility.
  3. The Department of Juvenile Justice shall operate or contract for the operation of any postadjudication juvenile treatment, rehabilitation, probation, or parole programs, diversion or alternatives to secure detention programs, or other programs for juvenile offenders to which a juvenile committed as a public offender or sentenced as a youthful offender has been assigned.
  4. A juvenile detained in a department-operated postadjudication detention or treatment facility may be transferred to a Department of Corrections facility at any time as provided by KRS 640.070 or other specific statute.

History. Enact. Acts 1996, ch. 358, § 10, effective July 1, 1997; 2002, ch. 257, § 9, effective July 15, 2002.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(7/15/96). Under 1996 Ky. Acts ch. 358, sec. 67(3), this statute becomes effective July 1, 1997, in that it deals with functions of the Department of Juvenile Justice.

605.100. Care, treatment, and rehabilitation of committed children — Validated needs and risk assessment.

  1. The Department of Juvenile Justice or the cabinet shall arrange for a program of care, treatment, and rehabilitation of the children committed to it, which program shall be designed to provide for classification, segregation, and specialized treatment of children according to their respective problems, needs, and characteristics, as identified through a validated needs and risk assessment, and to provide a coordinated system of probation and parole services that includes a continuum of graduated sanctions.
  2. The Department of Juvenile Justice or the cabinet shall be responsible for the operation, management, and development of the existing state facilities for the custodial care and rehabilitation of children committed to the Department of Juvenile Justice or the cabinet under provisions of this chapter. The Department of Juvenile Justice or the cabinet shall further be responsible for the development of such facilities as are necessary to provide an adequate and modern program for the care, treatment, and rehabilitation of such children.
  3. The facilities and programs under the control of the Department of Juvenile Justice or the cabinet shall be designed and operated in such a manner as to rehabilitate, train, develop, and educate the children to become good citizens and useful members of society.
  4. Suitable programs of vocational education and training shall be carried on in the facilities and programs, with the view of preparing the children for future self-support.
  5. The children in each facility and program shall be employed so far as practicable in labor incident to the maintenance and operation of the facility and program, and in suitable industries conducted by the facilities and programs as a part of the vocational training program.
  6. The superintendent or managing officer of each facility may use, for the maintenance of the facility, the products of farms, dairies, and other departments and industries of the facility or may sell or exchange such products for the benefit of the facility.

History. Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 423, § 13, effective July 1, 1987; 1988, ch. 350, § 8, effective April 10, 1988; 1996, ch. 358, § 15, effective July 1, 1997; 1998, ch. 443, § 11, effective July 15, 1998; 2014, ch. 132, § 31, effective July 15, 2014.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Entitlement to Services.

Kentucky statutes gave foster children an entitlement to protective services of which they may not be deprived without due process of law. Meador v. Cabinet for Human Resources, 902 F.2d 474, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 7247 (6th Cir. Ky.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 867, 111 S. Ct. 182, 112 L. Ed. 2d 145, 1990 U.S. LEXIS 4783 (U.S. 1990).

Cited in:

"Tony" L. v. Childers, 71 F.3d 1182, 1995 FED App. 0369P, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 35928 (6th Cir. Ky. 1995 ); Johnson v. Commonwealth, 967 S.W.2d 12, 1998 Ky. LEXIS 60 ( Ky. 1998 ).

605.102. Caregiver of committed child to use reasonable and prudent parent standard for child’s participation in age or developmentally appropriate activities — Limitation of liability — Cabinet official’s immunity not abrogated or diminished.

  1. For the purposes of this section, “caregiver” has the same meaning as in 42 U.S.C. sec. 675(10) (B).
  2. In accordance with 42 U.S.C. sec. 671 , a caregiver shall use the reasonable and prudent parent standard to determine whether to allow a child in the custody of the cabinet to participate in an age or developmentally appropriate extracurricular, enrichment, or social activity.
  3. A caregiver shall not be liable as a result of the caregiver’s approval of the participation of a child who is in the custody of the cabinet in an age or developmentally appropriate activity, so long as the caregiver acts in accordance with the reasonable and prudent parent standard. No provision in any agreement between the cabinet and a caregiver shall diminish the standard of care as set forth by this statute.
  4. Nothing in this section is intended to abrogate or diminish the immunities of a cabinet official acting in the course and scope of the cabinet official’s employment or create a legal duty on the part of a cabinet official.
  5. The cabinet, in conjunction with the child’s caregiver, shall utilize the reasonable and prudent parent standard to:
    1. Verify that a child is in the custody of the cabinet and is age or developmentally appropriate to apply for an operator’s license, motorcycle operator’s license, intermediate license, or any instruction permit in accordance with KRS 186.450 or 186.470 ; or
    2. Request that a child’s operator’s license, motorcycle license, intermediate license, or any instruction permit be cancelled in accordance with KRS 186.470 .
  6. The cabinet shall promulgate an administrative regulation to implement subsection (5) of this section.

HISTORY: 2016 ch. 115, § 4, effective July 15, 2016; 2017 ch. 11, § 4, effective June 29, 2017.

Legislative Research Commission Notes.

(7/15/2016). 2016 Ky. Acts ch. 115, sec. 4 directed that a new section of KRS Chapter 600 be created for the text of this statute. The subject matter of KRS Chapter 600 relates to introductory matters of the Unified Juvenile Code, KRS Chapters 600 to 645. Since this statute specifically addresses the standard of judgment a caregiver of a committed child must exercise in allowing participation in age or developmentally appropriate activities, in codification the Reviser of Statutes created a new section of KRS Chapter 605, which addresses administrative matters pertaining to committed children, as a more appropriate statutory designation under the authority of KRS 7.136(1)(a).

605.110. Smoking cessation services, medical care, and educational programs for committed children — Kentucky Educational Collaborative for State Agency Children — Personnel — Financing.

    1. Any child committed to or in the custody of the cabinet or the Department of Juvenile Justice who is not placed in a location where smoking cessation services are provided may participate in smoking cessation services offered by local health departments or their contracted agents at no cost. (1) (a) Any child committed to or in the custody of the cabinet or the Department of Juvenile Justice who is not placed in a location where smoking cessation services are provided may participate in smoking cessation services offered by local health departments or their contracted agents at no cost.
    2. Unless provided otherwise, when any child committed to or in the custody of the Department of Juvenile Justice or the cabinet requires medical or surgical care or treatment, the Department of Juvenile Justice or the cabinet may provide the same or arrange for the furnishing thereof by other public or private agencies, and may give consent to the medical or surgical treatment. For this purpose, the services and facilities of local health officers and departments shall be made available, at a cost not to exceed the Medicaid reimbursement rate, to the Department of Juvenile Justice or the cabinet, and as far as practicable, any publicly owned hospital shall provide hospitalization without charge for any such child who is a resident of the political subdivision by which the hospital is owned or operated. This section does not authorize nor shall permission be granted for abortion or sterilization.
  1. Any child placed in a foster home by an agency duly authorized in KRS Chapter 620 to place a child in a foster home shall receive a complete medical, visual, and dental examination by a professional authorized by the Kentucky Revised Statutes to conduct such examinations. Arrangements for a child placed in a foster home to receive such examinations shall be made within two (2) weeks of his placement in a foster home and not less than every twelve (12) months thereafter.
  2. Children maintained in any of the facilities and programs operated or contracted by the Department of Juvenile Justice or the cabinet shall, so far as possible, receive a common school education.
    1. The Kentucky Educational Collaborative for State Agency Children shall be established to serve children in facilities and programs operated or contracted by the Department of Juvenile Justice or the Cabinet for Health and Family Services, residential, day treatment, clinical, and group home programs. All policies and procedures necessary to educate state agency children shall be approved by the Kentucky Board of Education. All duties, responsibilities, rights, and privileges specifically imposed on or granted to the local education administration units shall be imposed on or granted to the Department of Juvenile Justice or the Cabinet for Health and Family Services and contracted agencies with regard to educating agency children. Classrooms for the Kentucky Educational Collaborative for State Agency Children shall be within or near the facilities and programs operated or contracted by the Department of Juvenile Justice or the cabinet. The Kentucky Department of Education, the Department of Juvenile Justice, and the Cabinet for Health and Family Services, Department for Community Based Services, shall develop a biennial plan regarding the educational needs and provisions of educational programs, with emphasis on the coordination of all treatment services and funds available to provide for the education of state agency children. The biennial plan shall include strategies to assure that teacher preparation programs include content related to working with state agency children and that adequate professional development opportunities for better meeting the needs of these students are available for teachers and schools.
    2. Teachers and other staff shall be hired on contract through a local school district or if a local school district is not willing to participate, teachers may be hired by the Kentucky Educational Collaborative for State Agency Children or a contract may be entered into with a private provider of educational services. All certified educational staff hired by the Kentucky Educational Collaborative for State Agency Children shall be members of the Kentucky Teachers’ Retirement System.
    3. Beginning July 1, 1993, the Kentucky Education Collaborative for State Agency Children shall be financed through:
      1. The amount generated by state agency children under the Support Education Excellence in Kentucky program as provided in KRS 157.360 for the guaranteed base and adjustments for the number of at-risk students, exceptional students, and transportation costs;
      2. A per-pupil distribution of professional development funds with the collaborative serving as a consortium for state agency children;
      3. A per-pupil distribution of technology funds in accordance with the state education technology plan pursuant to KRS 156.670 and the formula for the distribution of funds to local school districts;
      4. A per-pupil distribution of textbook funds pursuant to KRS 157.100 and 157.190 ;
      5. The funding for school services for state agency children authorized by KRS 158.135 ; and
      6. Other grants and entitlements, including federal funds, identified in the implementation plan developed pursuant to paragraph (f) of this subsection for the education of Kentucky’s children.
    4. The commissioner of Juvenile Justice and the secretary of the Cabinet for Health and Family Services shall promulgate administrative regulations, pursuant to KRS Chapter 13A, with the assistance of the Kentucky Department of Education and upon recommendation of the Kentucky Board of Education regarding the governance, curriculum, and other topics necessary to educate state agency children. The regulations shall:
      1. Provide for the development and implementation of interagency agreements that:
        1. Define the financial responsibility of each state and local agency for providing services to state agency children;
        2. Establish procedures for resolving interagency disputes among agencies that are parties to the agreements; and
      2. Provide procedures for the implementation of the Kentucky statutes regarding school-based decision making, student outcomes, accountability, assessment, rewards and sanctions, technology, staff development, salaries, and the development of coordinated individual treatment, education, and transition plans to ensure compliance with present education and treatment laws and regulations specific to the needs of children in the programs of the Cabinet for Health and Family Services.
    5. When the placement of a state agency child is changed so that the state agency child must transfer from one school or educational facility to a different school or educational facility, the school or educational facility that the state agency child is leaving shall, within two (2) days of the state agency child leaving, prepare an educational passport for the child, which shall be delivered to the cabinet or the Department of Juvenile Justice. The cabinet or the Department of Juvenile Justice shall, within two (2) days of enrolling a state agency child in a new school or educational facility, present the educational passport to the receiving school or educational facility.
    6. The commissioner of Juvenile Justice and the secretary of the Cabinet for Health and Family Services and the commissioner of the state Department of Education shall initiate development of a plan for implementation of the Kentucky Educational Collaborative for State Agency Children.

History. Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 423, § 14, effective July 1, 1987; 1988, ch. 350, § 9, effective April 10, 1988; 1988, ch. 357, § 12, effective July 15, 1988; 1992, ch. 357, § 3, effective July 14, 1992; 1994, ch. 376, § 3, effective July 15, 1994; 1996, ch. 358, § 16, effective July 1, 1997; 1996, ch. 362, § 6, effective July 15, 1996; 1998, ch. 398, § 4, effective July 15, 1998; 1998, ch. 426, § 613, effective July 15, 1998; 1998, ch. 433, § 2, effective July 15, 1998; 1998, ch. 538, § 5, effective April 13, 1998; 1998, ch. 609, § 4, effective July 15, 1998; 2000, ch. 14, § 58, effective July 14, 2000; 2000, ch. 534, § 19, effective July 14, 2000; 2002, ch. 257, § 10, effective July 15, 2002; 2005, ch. 99, § 661, effective June 20, 2005; 2006, ch. 17, § 2, effective July 12, 2006.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Jurisdiction.

Trial court had jurisdiction to enter custody orders as to a child who was originally presented to a hospital in Kentucky with life-threatening injuries, and who was transferred to a hospital in Tennessee, by air lift on that same date; however, an order permitting the Cabinet to terminate life sustaining treatment for the child was improper because the best interests of the child were secondary to the overriding and paramount right of the mother to a due process adjudication of termination. Until those rights were formally adjudicated, the Cabinet was not permitted to terminate treatment. D.K. v. Commonwealth, 221 S.W.3d 382, 2007 Ky. App. LEXIS 93 (Ky. Ct. App. 2007).

605.115. Access to Medicaid funding for local school districts providing funding matches for services for eligible children with disabilities.

The commissioner of the Department of Juvenile Justice and the secretary of the Cabinet for Health and Family Services, with the cooperation of the Kentucky Board of Education and the commissioner of education, shall implement policies to assure that local school districts providing a funding match shall have direct access to Medicaid funding as Medicaid providers for the provision of health-related services to eligible children with disabilities under the age of twenty-one (21) years of age. They shall develop policies and procedures so the Department of Education can transfer the local school districts’ matching funds to the Department for Medicaid Services. They shall also review state and federal statutes and regulations to determine the eligibility of local school districts to receive Medicaid reimbursement for health-related services identified on a child’s individual education plan.

History. Enact. Acts 1994, ch. 376, § 1, effective July 15, 1994; 1996, ch. 358, § 17, effective July 1, 1997; 1996, ch. 362, § 6, effective July 15, 1996; 1998, ch. 426, § 614, effective July 15, 1998; 2005, ch. 99, § 662, effective June 20, 2005.

605.120. Payments to home where children are placed — Reimbursement system for foster parents — Pilot projects — Relative caregiver and fictive kin services — Administrative regulations — Decisions regarding haircuts and hairstyles.

  1. The cabinet is authorized to expend available funds to provide for the board, lodging, and care of children who would otherwise be placed in foster care or who are placed by the cabinet in a foster home or boarding home, or may arrange for payments or contributions by any local governmental unit, or public or private agency or organization, willing to make payments or contributions for such purpose. The cabinet may accept any gift, devise, or bequest made to it for its purposes.
  2. The cabinet shall establish a reimbursement system, within existing appropriation amounts, for foster parents that comes as close as possible to meeting the actual cost of caring for foster children. The cabinet shall consider providing additional reimbursement for foster parents who obtain additional training, and foster parents who have served for an extended period of time. In establishing a reimbursement system, the cabinet shall, to the extent possible within existing appropriation amounts, address the additional cost associated with providing care to children with exceptional needs.
  3. The cabinet shall review reimbursement rates paid to foster parents and shall issue a report upon request comparing the rates paid by Kentucky to the figures presented in the Expenditures on Children by Families Annual Report prepared by the United States Department of Agriculture and the rates paid to foster parents by other states. To the extent that funding is available, reimbursement rates paid to foster parents shall be increased on an annual basis to reflect cost of living increases.
  4. The cabinet is encouraged to develop pilot projects both within the state system and in collaboration with private child caring agencies to test alternative delivery systems and nontraditional funding mechanisms.
    1. The cabinet shall track and analyze data on relative and fictive kin caregiver placements. The data shall include but not be limited to: (5) (a) The cabinet shall track and analyze data on relative and fictive kin caregiver placements. The data shall include but not be limited to:
      1. Demographic data on relative and fictive kin caregivers and children in their care;
      2. Custodial options selected by the relative and fictive kin caregivers;
      3. Services provisioned to relative and fictive kin caregivers and children in their care; and
      4. Permanency benchmarks and outcomes for relative and fictive kin caregiver placements.
    2. By September 30, 2020, and upon request thereafter, the cabinet shall submit a report to the Governor, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the director of the Legislative Research Commission for distribution to the Child Welfare Oversight and Advisory Committee and the Interim Joint Committee on Health and Welfare and Family Services relating to the data tracking and analysis established in this subsection.
  5. Foster parents shall have the authority, unless the cabinet determines that the child’s religion, race, ethnicity, or national origin prevents it, to make decisions regarding haircuts and hairstyles for foster children who are in their care for thirty (30) days or more.

History. Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 423, § 15, effective July 1, 1987; 1988, ch. 350, § 10, effective April 10, 1988; 1998, ch. 398, § 8, effective July 15, 1998; 2000, ch. 306, § 1, effective July 14, 2000; 2001, ch. 13, § 1, effective June 21, 2001; 2018 ch. 159, § 14, effective July 14, 2018; 2019 ch. 73, § 3, effective June 27, 2019; 2020 ch. 36, § 43, effective July 15, 2020.

605.130. General duties of cabinet.

In addition to the other duties, functions, and responsibilities imposed by law, the cabinet, through its authorized representatives, shall have general supervision and management of all matters contained in KRS 620.150 and 620.170 and shall, wherever possible:

  1. Locate and plan for all children who are dependent, neglected, or abused;
  2. Cooperate with and assist the courts of the various counties;
  3. Assist Circuit Courts through services to children whenever requested by the court. The cabinet may charge a reasonable fee for such services to be taxed as costs by the court; and
  4. Perform such other services as may be deemed necessary for the protection of children.

History. Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 423, § 16, effective July 1, 1987; 1988, ch. 350, § 11, effective April 10, 1988; 2002, ch. 257, § 11, effective July 15, 2002.

Compiler’s Notes.

For this section as effective July 1, 2015, see the following section also numbered KRS 605.130 .

605.130. General duties of cabinet.

In addition to the other duties, functions, and responsibilities imposed by law, the cabinet, through its authorized representatives, shall have general supervision and management of all matters contained in KRS 620.150 and 620.170 and shall, wherever possible:

  1. Locate and plan for all children who are dependent, neglected, or abused;
  2. Cooperate with and assist the courts of the various counties;
  3. Assist Circuit Courts through services to children whenever requested by the court. The cabinet may charge a reasonable fee for such services to be taxed as costs by the court;
  4. Assess all referrals received from a court-designated worker, pursuant to direction from the family accountability, intervention, and response team, to determine whether a basis exists to file a dependency, neglect, or abuse petition;
  5. Track and report to the oversight council created in KRS 15A.063 the number of referrals received, the number of investigations made upon those referrals, and the number and type of petitions filed in response;
  6. Identify all youth who have status offense charges and are committed or probated to the cabinet and report the number of committed and probated youth to the oversight council created in KRS 15A.063 ; and
  7. Perform such other services as may be deemed necessary for the protection of children.

History. Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 423, § 16, effective July 1, 1987; 1988, ch. 350, § 11, effective April 10, 1988; 2002, ch. 257, § 11, effective July 15, 2002; 2014, ch. 132, § 32, effective July 1, 2015.

Compiler’s Notes.

For this section as effective until July 1, 2015, see the preceding section also numbered KRS 605.130 .

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(7/1/2015). In codification, the Reviser of Statutes has altered the numbering of subsections (4) to (7) of this statute from the way it appeared in 2014 Ky. Acts ch. 132, sec. 32, under the authority of KRS 7.136(1)(c).

605.140. Juvenile Court Advisory Board.

  1. The Chief District Judge may appoint a board of not less than six (6) nor more than ten (10) reputable inhabitants of the county to be called the Advisory Board of the Juvenile Court. The members of the board shall hold office during the pleasure of the judge and shall serve without compensation.
  2. The board shall visit at least once a year all facilities in the county receiving children under KRS Chapters 600 to 645. At least two (2) of the members of the board shall go together on the visits and shall make a report to the board. The board shall report to the court from time to time the condition of the children in the facilities and shall make an annual report to the court.
  3. The board shall advise and cooperate with the Chief District Judge upon all matters affecting the workings of KRS Chapters 600 to 645 and shall recommend to the court any needful measures for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of KRS Chapters 600 to 645. The appointment and utilization of such advisory boards by each District Judge is recommended by the General Assembly as a matter of policy.

History. Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 423, § 17, effective July 1, 1987; 1988, ch. 350, § 12, effective April 10, 1988.

Research References and Practice Aids

Treatises

Petrilli, Kentucky Family Law, Juvenile Court, § 32.10.

605.150. Authority to promulgate administrative regulations.

  1. The cabinet may promulgate administrative regulations to implement the provisions of this chapter.
  2. The Department of Juvenile Justice may promulgate administrative regulations to implement the provisions of this chapter.
  3. The cabinet and the department shall not promulgate administrative regulations under this chapter that conflict.

History. Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 423, § 18, effective July 1, 1987; 1998, ch. 443, § 12, effective July 15, 1998.

605.160. Provision of information to those caring for committed children — Show cause hearing.

  1. The cabinet, the Department of Juvenile Justice, and the Kentucky Department of Education shall provide information to the individuals and entities contracting with the cabinet and the Department of Juvenile Justice to provide services and care to children committed to the cabinet or the Department of Juvenile Justice necessary to provide adequate care and services to the committed children they are serving. The cabinet, the Department of Juvenile Justice, and the Kentucky Department of Education shall develop a process that will result in the provision and transfer of information as required by KRS 158.137 , 605.090 , 605.110 , 610.120 , 620.145 , and this section in a timely and efficient manner, including:
    1. Medical passport or history;
    2. Educational passport;
    3. Treatment history; and
    4. Current case plan.
  2. If the cabinet, the Department of Juvenile Justice, or a school or educational facility as defined in KRS 158.137 fails to provide necessary information within the time frames established by KRS 158.137 , 605.090 , 605.110 , 620.145 , and this section, the person, agency, or entity providing care or services to a child may petition the court having jurisdiction over the child to hold a hearing, at which time the court, if the request for hearing is granted, shall require the cabinet, the Department of Juvenile Justice, or the school or educational facility as defined in KRS 158.137 to show cause as to why it has not provided the necessary information in a timely manner.

If action by a court is necessary to obtain or release information that the cabinet or the Department of Juvenile Justice deems necessary for the provision of care or services to a committed child, then the cabinet or Department of Juvenile Justice, as the case may be, shall promptly petition the court for permission to receive or release the necessary information.

History. Enact. Acts 1998, ch. 398, § 3, effective July 15, 1998.

605.170. Reporting of assaults, threats, and menacing conduct against client or staff — Information system to track threats and violent incidents against staff — Safety liaisons.

  1. Each staff member of the department shall report to his or her supervisor any physical or verbal conduct of a client or an individual associated with a client that appears to be threatening or menacing, and any incident of assault, attempted assault, or physical contact that appears to be threatening to any staff member. Any use or threat of use of any type of weapon shall be reported. The supervisor shall report threat or incident information to the commissioner of the department or his or her designee. An employee who reports under this subsection shall be protected from reprisals pursuant to KRS 61.102 .
  2. The department shall establish and maintain an information system and track all reports of threats or incidents involving violence against department staff as required by subsection (1) of this section. The department shall provide, upon request, the number and type of reports received and any information available regarding civil or criminal action or changes to policies and procedures resulting from threats or incidents of violence upon staff.
  3. The department shall designate or establish a safety liaison position within its central office and in each regional office. The regional administrator may designate or establish a safety liaison position in each county office. The duties of the central office safety liaison shall include but not be limited to:
    1. Development and implementation of policies and procedures related to the prevention of violence in the office and in community settings;
    2. Screening and assessment of the level of threat for professional-client interactions;
    3. Facilitation of safety training and safety and first alert protocols with all law enforcement agencies that work with each county office. Existing multidisciplinary teams may be utilized in the development of local safety protocols; and
    4. Administration of a Web-based social worker safety site and a threat and violence incident database.

History. Enact. Acts 2007, ch. 140, § 3, effective April 5, 2007.

605.990. Penalties.

  1. Any person who intentionally violates any provision of this chapter, other than KRS 605.080(4), shall be guilty of a Class B misdemeanor.
  2. Any person who intentionally violates KRS 605.080(4), shall be guilty of a violation.

History. Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 423, § 19, effective July 1, 1987; 1988, ch. 350, § 13, effective April 10, 1988; 1998, ch. 272, § 3, effective July 15, 1998.

CHAPTER 610 Procedural Matters

610.010. District Court jurisdiction of juvenile matters.

  1. Unless otherwise exempted by KRS Chapters 600 to 645, the juvenile session of the District Court of each county shall have exclusive jurisdiction in proceedings concerning any child living or found within the county who has not reached his or her eighteenth birthday or of any person who at the time of committing a public offense was under the age of eighteen (18) years, who allegedly has committed a public offense prior to his or her eighteenth birthday, except a motor vehicle offense involving a child sixteen (16) years of age or older. A child sixteen (16) years of age or older taken into custody upon the allegation that the child has committed a motor vehicle offense shall be treated as an adult and shall have the same conditions of release applied to him or her as an adult. A child taken into custody upon the allegation that he or she has committed a motor vehicle offense who is not released under conditions of release applicable to adults shall be held, pending his or her appearance before the District Court, in a facility as defined in KRS 15A.067 . Children sixteen (16) years of age or older who are convicted of, or plead guilty to, a motor vehicle offense shall, if sentenced to a term of confinement, be placed in a facility for that period of confinement preceding their eighteenth birthday and an adult detention facility for that period of confinement subsequent to their eighteenth birthday. The term “motor vehicle offense” shall not be deemed to include the offense of stealing or converting a motor vehicle nor operating the same without the owner’s consent nor any offense which constitutes a felony;
  2. Unless otherwise exempted by KRS Chapters 600 to 645, the juvenile session of the District Court of each county or the family division of the Circuit Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction in proceedings concerning any child living or found within the county who has not reached his or her eighteenth birthday and who allegedly:
    1. Is beyond the control of the school or beyond the control of parents as defined in KRS 600.020 ;
    2. Is an habitual truant from school;
    3. Is an habitual runaway from his or her parent or other person exercising custodial control or supervision of the child;
    4. Is dependent, neglected, or abused;
    5. Has committed an alcohol offense in violation of KRS 244.085 ; or
    6. Is mentally ill.
  3. Actions brought under subsection (1) of this section shall be considered to be public offense actions.
  4. Actions brought under subsection (2)(a), (b), (c), and (e) of this section shall be considered to be status offense actions.
  5. Actions brought under subsection (2)(d) of this section shall be considered to be nonoffender actions.
  6. Actions brought under subsection (2)(f) of this section shall be considered to be mental health actions.
  7. Nothing in this chapter shall deprive other courts of the jurisdiction to determine the custody or guardianship of children upon writs of habeas corpus or to determine the custody or guardianship of children when such custody or guardianship is incidental to the determination of other causes pending in such other courts; nor shall anything in this chapter affect the jurisdiction of Circuit Courts over adoptions and proceedings for termination of parental rights.
  8. The court shall have no jurisdiction to make permanent awards of custody of a child except as provided by KRS 620.027 .
  9. If the court finds an emergency to exist affecting the welfare of a child, or if the child is eligible for the relative or fictive kin caregiver assistance as established in KRS 620.142 , it may make temporary orders for the child’s custody; however, if the case involves allegations of dependency, neglect, or abuse, no emergency removal or temporary custody orders shall be effective unless the provisions of KRS Chapter 620 are followed. Such orders shall be entirely without prejudice to the proceedings for permanent custody of the child and shall remain in effect until modified or set aside by the court. Upon the entry of a temporary or final judgment in the Circuit Court awarding custody of such child, all prior orders of the juvenile session of the District Court in conflict therewith shall be deemed canceled. This section shall not work to deprive the Circuit Court of jurisdiction over cases filed in Circuit Court.
  10. The court of each county wherein a public offense, as defined in subsection (1) of this section, is committed by a child who is a resident of another county of this state shall have concurrent jurisdiction over such child with the court of the county wherein the child resides or the court of the county where the child is found. Whichever court first acquires jurisdiction of such child may proceed to final disposition of the case, or in its discretion may make an order transferring the case to the court of the county of the child’s residence or the county wherein the offense was committed, as the case may be.
  11. Nothing in this chapter shall prevent the court from holding a child in contempt of court to enforce valid court orders previously issued by the court, subject to the requirements contained in KRS 610.265 and 630.080 .
  12. Except as provided in KRS 635.060(4), 630.120(5), or 635.090 , nothing in this chapter shall confer upon the District Court or the family division of the Circuit Court, as appropriate, jurisdiction over the actions of the Department of Juvenile Justice or the cabinet in the placement, care, or treatment of a child committed to the Department of Juvenile Justice or committed to or in the custody of the cabinet; or to require the department or the cabinet to perform, or to refrain from performing, any specific act in the placement, care, or treatment of any child committed to the department or committed to or in the custody of the cabinet.
  13. Unless precluded by KRS Chapter 635 or 640, in addition to informal adjustment, the court shall have the discretion to amend the petition to reflect jurisdiction pursuant to the proper chapter of the Kentucky Unified Juvenile Code.
  14. The court shall have continuing jurisdiction over a child pursuant to subsection (1) of this section, to review dispositional orders, and to conduct permanency hearings under 42 U.S.C. sec. 675(5) (c) until the child is placed for adoption, returned home to his or her parents with all the court imposed conditions terminated, completes a disposition pursuant to KRS 635.060 , or reaches the age of eighteen (18) years.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 2019, ch. 73, § 4, effective June 27, 2019; 2020 ch. 35, § 11, effective March 26, 2020.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Analysis

  1. Legislative Intent.
  2. Curfew Violation Not Status Offense.
  3. Juvenile Court Authority.
  4. Federal Jurisdiction.
  5. Appellate Jurisdiction.
  6. Circuit Court Jurisdiction.
  7. Removal From Home State.
  8. Guilty Pleas.
  9. Valid Court Order.
  10. Jurisdiction.
1. Legislative Intent.

The intent of this section in giving the District Court the ability to review any information it may require regarding one of its orders is to safeguard the interests of the child, considering its welfare as being too precious a commodity to jeopardize by an incomplete or inadequate judicial review. Cabinet for Human Resources v. McDonald, 765 S.W.2d 581, 1988 Ky. App. LEXIS 175 (Ky. Ct. App. 1988).

Because the Kentucky Legislature conferred sole and exclusive authority upon the Cabinet for Health and Family Services to determine the appropriate placement of a child committed to its care in KRS 610.010(11) (now (12)), pursuant to Ky. Const., §§ 27, 28, the trial court erred in restricting where the Cabinet could place two (2) children. Cabinet for Health & Family Servs. ex rel. A.W. v. Huddleston, 185 S.W.3d 222, 2006 Ky. App. LEXIS 47 (Ky. Ct. App. 2006).

2. Curfew Violation Not Status Offense.

The Administrative Office of the Courts (AOC) is not authorized to require its court designated workers to process juvenile curfew violators as public offenders under this section; therefore, respondent city was expressly prohibited from requiring its court designated workers to process juvenile curfew violators as status offenders under the definition in KRS 600.020 . Covington v. Court of Justice, 784 S.W.2d 180, 1990 Ky. LEXIS 13 ( Ky. 1990 ).

3. Juvenile Court Authority.

The juvenile court did not have the authority to sentence an eighteen (18) year-old defendant to confinement in a juvenile facility for a car theft committed prior to the defendant’s eighteenth birthday. Jefferson County Dep't for Human Services v. Carter, 795 S.W.2d 59, 1990 Ky. LEXIS 73 ( Ky. 1990 ).

Express statutory authority anticipated that a juvenile court had the power to hold a child in contempt as KRS 610.010(10) (now (11)) specifically provided that nothing in “this chapter” would prevent a District Court from holding a child in contempt of court to enforce valid court orders previously issued by the court, KRS 610.265(1), 610.265(5) (now (3)) and 635.055 each set out provisions for the detention of a juvenile who was charged with being in contempt of court, and KRS 635.083(1) gave a juvenile court continuing jurisdiction over a juvenile who was convicted or adjudged delinquent of three (3) or more offenses, this jurisdiction continued even after the service of incarceration or other court-ordered punishment in the form of conditional discharge, and violation of the terms and conditions of conditional discharge could be punished as contempt of court. A.W. v. Commonwealth, 2003 Ky. App. LEXIS 91 (Ky. Ct. App. May 2, 2003), aff'd, 163 S.W.3d 4, 2005 Ky. LEXIS 88 ( Ky. 2005 ).

Juvenile court had the authority to hold a public offender in contempt for violating the terms of her probation, but the court should refrain from using its contempt authority to punish violations of probation unless it found that other options were either inappropriate or unavailable. A.W. v. Commonwealth, 2003 Ky. App. LEXIS 91 (Ky. Ct. App. May 2, 2003), aff'd, 163 S.W.3d 4, 2005 Ky. LEXIS 88 ( Ky. 2005 ).

When a public offender was found in contempt for violating the terms of her probation, significant due process considerations came into play, and, while her counsel’s stipulation to a violation of probation was adequate to establish a violation, it could not serve as the basis for finding the offender guilty of contempt of court. A.W. v. Commonwealth, 2003 Ky. App. LEXIS 91 (Ky. Ct. App. May 2, 2003), aff'd, 163 S.W.3d 4, 2005 Ky. LEXIS 88 ( Ky. 2005 ).

KRS 610.010(11) (now (12)), restricting the trial court’s authority over the actions of the Cabinet concerning the placement, care, or treatment of a child committed to it, did not restrict the trial court’s authority to order the Cabinet to pay for drug abuse treatment for the mother because the mother’s treatment did not relate to the child’s treatment. Cabinet for Health & Family Servs. v. Evans, 2006 Ky. App. LEXIS 52 (Ky. Ct. App.), sub. op., 2006 Ky. App. Unpub. LEXIS 831 (Ky. Ct. App. Feb. 17, 2006).

Order modifying the amount of restitution that a juvenile was directed to pay was affirmed because KRS 610.010(13) (now (14)) granted the juvenile court continuing jurisdiction to review a previously entered restitution order. Further, the order was not untimely as CR 59.05 did not apply to the entry of the dispositional order. D.F. v. Commonwealth, 2006 Ky. App. LEXIS 81 (Ky. Ct. App.), sub. op., 2006 Ky. App. Unpub. LEXIS 499 (Ky. Ct. App. Mar. 17, 2006).

Since there was precedent and a clear statement in KRS 610.010(13) (now (14)) that as a general rule juvenile court jurisdiction did not extend to adults, a circuit court erred when it inferred such an extension with respect to outstanding restitution orders to former juveniles who had turned 18. Nothing in KRS 413.090 conveyed jurisdiction. S.K. v. Commonwealth, 2006 Ky. App. LEXIS 154 (Ky. Ct. App. May 26, 2006), rev'd, 253 S.W.3d 486, 2008 Ky. LEXIS 6 ( Ky. 2008 ).

As a general rule, KRS 610.010(13) (now (14)) limits juvenile court jurisdiction to minors. Neither the court’s contempt power nor the limitations period for an action on a judgment implies an exception to that rule for restitution obligors. S.K. v. Commonwealth, 2006 Ky. App. LEXIS 154 (Ky. Ct. App. May 26, 2006), rev'd, 253 S.W.3d 486, 2008 Ky. LEXIS 6 ( Ky. 2008 ).

4. Federal Jurisdiction.

Federal District Court and not state District Court had jurisdiction over juvenile for crimes committed on Fort Knox military reservation since by KRS 3.030 the Kentucky Legislature has expressly granted jurisdiction to federal courts for matters occurring on the premises of Fort Knox and such statute does not conflict with this section. United States v. Juvenile Male, 939 F.2d 321, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 15266 (6th Cir. Ky. 1991 ).

5. Appellate Jurisdiction.

Once a Circuit Court enters a judgment terminating parental rights to a child who was previously committed to the Cabinet for Human Resources, the District Court loses its jurisdiction to review the earlier commitment order. (Decided under prior law) Cabinet for Human Resources v. D.S., 746 S.W.2d 87, 1988 Ky. App. LEXIS 30 (Ky. Ct. App. 1988).

The Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction over and, therefore, properly dismissed a juvenile’s appeal from an order of an elected Circut Court judge sitting in Family Court which required the juvenile to cooperate in counseling, undergo a drug and alcohol screening, and to schedule a gynecological examination before the next hearing date; the juvenile should have taken her appeal to the Circuit Court pursuant to the Family Court rules of practice. T.A. v. Byer, 13 S.W.3d 629, 2000 Ky. LEXIS 27 ( Ky. 2000 ).

6. Circuit Court Jurisdiction.

Trial court had jurisdiction to enter custody orders as to a child who was originally presented to a hospital in Kentucky with life-threatening injuries, and who was transferred to a hospital in Tennessee by air lift on that same date; however, an order permitting the Cabinet to terminate life sustaining treatment for the child was improper because the best interests of the child were secondary to the overriding and paramount right of the mother to a due process adjudication of termination. Until those rights were formally adjudicated, the Cabinet was not permitted to terminate treatment. D.K. v. Commonwealth, 221 S.W.3d 382, 2007 Ky. App. LEXIS 93 (Ky. Ct. App. 2007).

Firearm enhanced drug offense is actually charged at the higher level regardless of the procedural circumstances. Therefore, a circuit court properly acquired jurisdiction in a juvenile case because transfer order was facially valid where a district court found probable cause that appellant committed the offense of drug trafficking with a firearm enhancement; moreover, the trial court made two sets of findings, one concerning mandatory findings and one about the discretionary factors. Jackson v. Commonwealth, 363 S.W.3d 11, 2012 Ky. LEXIS 25 ( Ky. 2012 ).

7. Removal From Home State.

The trial court abused its discretion in relieving the Cabinet for Human Resources of its responsibility, under an original order, to return the children to their home state of New York from where they had been removed from proper custody. (Decided under prior law) Waters v. Cabinet for Human Resources, 736 S.W.2d 365, 1987 Ky. App. LEXIS 565 (Ky. Ct. App. 1987).

8. Guilty Pleas.

Defendant juvenile was wrongly designated as a status offender after a family court found him in contempt because the court did not engage defendant in any sort of meaningful discussion concerning the consequences of his guilty plea, nor did it determine or assure whether he made it voluntarily. The court did not ask defendant about his state of mind or if anyone had pressured him to make the plea, it did not explain to defendant that he had the option of pleading not guilty and thus becoming entitled to a hearing, and it did not ascertain whether he was aware of the constitutional rights that he waived as a result of his admission. D.G. v. Commonwealth, 355 S.W.3d 476, 2011 Ky. App. LEXIS 228 (Ky. Ct. App. 2011).

Entry of a guilty plea did not preclude the consideration of whether a transfer order in a juvenile case was facially invalid, and a waiver rule did not apply to a facially insufficient transfer order. Jackson v. Commonwealth, 363 S.W.3d 11, 2012 Ky. LEXIS 25 ( Ky. 2012 ).

9. Valid Court Order.

Standard School Attendance Order (SSAO) was a valid court order and therefore the trial court properly held the minor in contempt, because she received the full due process rights to which she was entitled at that stage of the proceedings. The SSAO was entered after the minor was initially brought into court for her arraignment on the beyond control of parent charge and entered a plea of not true, she was made subject to the SSAO, and it regulated her future conduct. B.H. v. Commonwealth, 2013 Ky. App. LEXIS 164 (Ky. Ct. App. Nov. 22, 2013), review denied, ordered not published, 2014 Ky. LEXIS 423 (Ky. Aug. 13, 2014).

Court may only hold a child in contempt of court to enforce a valid court order previously issued by the court. Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 610.010(11). It is manifestly unjust to subject a juvenile to sanctions for contempt, especially confinement in a detention facility, when the status offense case against her was effectively terminated without the entry of a valid written order regulating her future conduct. C.S. v. Commonwealth, 559 S.W.3d 857, 2018 Ky. App. LEXIS 203 (Ky. Ct. App. 2018).

10. Jurisdiction.

District court lacked particular case jurisdiction when it ordered the Department for Community Based Services of the Kentucky Cabinet for Health and Family Services—which investigated and found no substantiation for a parent’s claims that the other abused their child—to open a case and further assess the family needs. T.C. v. M.E., 603 S.W.3d 663, 2020 Ky. App. LEXIS 54 (Ky. Ct. App. 2020).

Notes to Unpublished Decisions

1. Juvenile Court Authority.

Unpublished decision: Juvenile court’s imposition of contempt sanctions, because of a juvenile’s violations of conditions that were placed on her probation, did not violate KRS 610.010(10), as the contempt power existed for the purpose of compelling the juvenile to comply with the court’s orders and to enable the court to help the juvenile become a productive citizen. A.W. v. Commonwealth, 163 S.W.3d 4, 2005 Ky. LEXIS 88 ( Ky. 2005 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

It is clear from the language of KRS 600.020(24) and subdivision (1)(c) of this section that a student under the age of 18 years who is failing to attend school in violation of KRS 159.010 is subject to a delinquency prosecution in accordance with the Juvenile Code. OAG 90-106 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Bench & Bar.

Wiederstein, Guardianship for Disabled Persons: A Practical Guide, Vol. 70, No. 1, January 2006, Ky. Bench & Bar 18.

Kentucky Law Journal.

Graham, Implementing Custody Mediation in Family Court: Some Comments on the Jefferson County Family Court Experience, 81 Ky. L.J. 1107 (1992-93).

Northern Kentucky Law Review.

Tapp and Tincher, Of Innocents and Offenders: A Survey of Children’s Law in Kentucky, 30 N. Ky. L. Rev. 131 (2003).

Treatises

Caldwell’s Kentucky Form Book, 5th Ed., Practice Context for Juvenile Code Proceedings, § 258.00.

Petrilli, Kentucky Family Law, Custody of Children, § 26.8.

Petrilli, Kentucky Family Law, Juvenile Court, §§ 32.3, 32.4, 32.5, 32.14, 32.31.

Petrilli, Kentucky Family Law, Minors, § 30.18.

Petrilli, Kentucky Family Law, Support of Children (On Dissolution), § 27.13.

Petrilli, Kentucky Family Law, Termination of Parental Rights and Adoption, § 29.1.

Petrilli, Kentucky Family Law, Forms, Juvenile Court, Form 5.1, Form 5.3, Form 5.5.

610.012. Exclusive jurisdiction of District Court or family division of Circuit Court concerning temporary detention of suspected runaway.

  1. The District Court or the family division of the Circuit Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction of proceedings under this section.
  2. Proceedings to temporarily detain a child suspected of being a runaway by means of an emergency protective custody order, pending further appropriate court action, shall be initiated by filing a complaint with the court-designated worker.
  3. Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, a child who is suspected of being a runaway may be detained in a nonsecure facility for a period of time not to exceed seventy-two (72) hours, exclusive of weekends and holidays, or, if the court makes a finding on the record that no less restrictive alternative is available, in a secure juvenile detention facility for a period of time not to exceed twenty-four (24) hours, exclusive of weekends and holidays, pursuant to an ex parte emergency protective order pending a court hearing to determine whether to return the child to his or her custodian or give custody of the child to the cabinet.
  4. If, at the hearing held as provided for in subsection (3) of this section, the child is not released, the court shall issue an emergency custody order pursuant to KRS Chapter 620 and place the child with the cabinet and the cabinet shall file a dependency, neglect, or abuse action.
  5. All hearings subsequent to the issuance of an emergency custody order shall be in accordance with KRS Chapter 620.
  6. If the child is released, except to the cabinet pursuant to an emergency custody order, the court-designated worker shall initiate a status offense case.
  7. The provisions of this section shall not apply to a child coming under the purview of KRS Chapter 615.

History. Enact. Acts 2014, ch. 132, § 34, effective July 1, 2015.

Notes to Decisions

1. Jurisdiction.

Noncompliance with pretrial procedures deprived the family court of subject matter jurisdiction, but the habitual runaway cases in which the child had been detained under an emergency protective order were an exception. Thus, noncompliance with Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 610.030(6) and 630.050 did not deprive the family court of subject matter jurisdiction because Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 610.012 was more specific and, therefore, controlled. C.C. v. Mehling, 2020 Ky. App. LEXIS 48 (Ky. Ct. App. Apr. 24, 2020).

Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 610.012(6) mandated that the petition in the instant case be filed, and as a result, the offer of diversion or referral was not required prior to instituting a status offense case in the family court. C.C. v. Mehling, 2020 Ky. App. LEXIS 48 (Ky. Ct. App. Apr. 24, 2020).

610.015. Procedure when child tried as an adult — Matters to be tried by Circuit Court — Release of records.

  1. A child who is charged with an offense which classifies him for trial as an adult in the Circuit Court or the adult session of the District Court shall, at the time the decision is made by the court to try the child as an adult, be subject to the arrest, post-arrest, and criminal procedures that apply to an adult, except for the place of confinement, as provided in the Kentucky Revised Statutes and the Rules of Criminal Procedure.
  2. The Circuit Court shall try all misdemeanor, violation, traffic offense, and status offense matters included in or which arise from the act or series of acts which result in the trial of a child as an adult in the Circuit Court.
  3. Records, limited to the records of the present case in which the child has been charged, relating to a child charged under this section shall not be made public until after the child has been indicted and arraigned on the offense for trial of the child as an adult. Release of the child’s treatment, medical, mental, or psychological records is prohibited unless presented as evidence in Circuit Court. Release of any records resulting from the child’s prior abuse and neglect under Title IV-E or Title IV-B of the Federal Social Security Act is also prohibited.
  4. This section shall not be construed as permitting the release of the child’s treatment, medical, mental, or psychological records unless those records are presented as evidence in open court. The release of information relative to the child’s eligibility for services under Title IV-E or IV-B of the Federal Social Security Act is prohibited.

History. Enact. Acts 1996, ch. 358, § 19, effective July 15, 1997.

Compiler’s Notes.

Titles IV-E and IV-B of the federal Social Security Act referred to in subsections (3) and (4) of this section may be found at42 USCS § 673 et seq. and 42 USCS § 621 et seq., respectively.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(7/15/96). Under 1996 Ky. Acts ch. 358, sec. 67(1), this statute becomes effective July 15, 1997.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

  1. Construction With Other Law.
  2. Applicability.
1. Construction With Other Law.

In the context of the conflicts in the wording of KRS 610.015(1) and KRS 640.010 , the appellate court believes the legislature intends that the criminal rules governing preliminary hearings should apply to preliminary transfer hearings in juvenile court; thus, KRS 610.342 is not a rule of discovery, RCr 3.07 controls, and a juvenile is not entitled to complete discovery until probable cause is established. Commonwealth v. DeWeese, 141 S.W.3d 372, 2003 Ky. App. LEXIS 267 (Ky. Ct. App. 2003).

2. Applicability.

Circuit court judge was ordered to provide members of the media with a copy of the recording of a criminal arraignment and to refrain from closing any future proceeding that was ordinarily open to the public and from sealing records because he failed to conduct a hearing and closed the arraignment without making specific finding or considering less restrictive measures; the judge’s reliance on the statutory protections closing hearings was error because they were not applicable. WPSD TV v. Jameson, 552 S.W.3d 93, 2018 Ky. App. LEXIS 178 (Ky. Ct. App. 2018).

610.020. Complaints.

Except as otherwise provided in KRS Chapters 600 to 645:

  1. The complaint and all subsequent court documents shall be entitled: “In the interest of  . . . . . , a child.” The complaint shall be verified and may be upon information and belief. It shall set forth plainly:
    1. The facts which bring the child within the purview of KRS Chapters 600 to 645;
    2. The name, age and residence of the child;
    3. The name and residence of each parent;
    4. If the child has a legal guardian or is in the custody of or under the supervision of an adult other than a parent, the name and residence of such person;
    5. If no parent, guardian or other such person is known or can be found, the name and residence of the nearest known adult relative of the child; and
    6. If the child is in the custody or control of a person other than the parent, guardian or nearest adult relative, the name and residence of such person.
  2. If any of the facts required to be stated in the complaint are not known by the complainant, it shall so state.

History. Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 423, § 21, effective July 1, 1987.

Research References and Practice Aids

Treatises

Petrilli, Kentucky Family Law, Juvenile Court, §§ 32.5, 32.18, 32.21, 32.23.

Petrilli, Kentucky Family Law, Forms, Juvenile Court, Form 5.1, Form 5.3.

610.030. Preliminary inquiry procedures.

Except as otherwise provided in KRS Chapters 600 to 645:

  1. If any person files a complaint alleging that a child, except a child alleged to be neglected, abused, dependent or mentally ill who is subject to the jurisdiction of the court, may be within the purview of KRS Chapters 600 to 645, the court-designated worker shall make a preliminary determination as to whether the complaint is complete. In any case where the court-designated worker finds that the complaint is incomplete, the court-designated worker shall return the complaint without delay to the person or agency originating the complaint or having knowledge of the facts, or to the appropriate law enforcement agency having investigative jurisdiction of the offense, and request additional information in order to complete the complaint. The complainant shall promptly furnish the additional information requested;
    1. Upon receipt of a complaint which appears to be complete and which alleges that a child has committed a public offense, the court-designated worker shall refer the complaint to the county attorney for review pursuant to KRS 635.010 . (2) (a) Upon receipt of a complaint which appears to be complete and which alleges that a child has committed a public offense, the court-designated worker shall refer the complaint to the county attorney for review pursuant to KRS 635.010 .
    2. If after review the county attorney elects to proceed, the court-designated worker shall conduct a preliminary intake inquiry to recommend whether the interests of the child or the public require that further action be taken or whether, in the interest of justice, the complaint can be resolved informally without the filing of a petition;
  2. Upon receipt of a complaint that appears to be complete and that alleges that the child has committed a status offense, the court-designated worker shall conduct a preliminary intake inquiry to determine whether the interests of the child or the public require that further action be taken;
  3. Prior to conducting a preliminary intake inquiry, the court-designated worker shall notify the child and the child’s parent, guardian, or other person exercising custodial control or supervision of the child in writing:
    1. Of their opportunity to be present at the preliminary intake inquiry;
    2. That they may have counsel present during the preliminary intake inquiry as well as the formal conference thereafter;
      1. That all information supplied by the child to a court-designated worker during any process prior to the filing of the petition shall be deemed confidential and shall not be subject to subpoena or to disclosure without the written consent of the child. (c) 1. That all information supplied by the child to a court-designated worker during any process prior to the filing of the petition shall be deemed confidential and shall not be subject to subpoena or to disclosure without the written consent of the child.
      2. Information may be shared between treatment providers, the court-designated worker, and the family accountability, intervention, and response team to enable the court-designated worker to facilitate services and facilitate compliance with the diversion agreement; and
    3. That the child has the right to deny the allegation and demand a formal court hearing;
  4. The preliminary intake inquiry shall include the administration of an evidence-based screening tool and, if appropriate and available, a validated risk and needs assessment, in order to identify whether the child and his or her family are in need of services and the level of intervention needed;
  5. Upon the completion of the preliminary intake inquiry, the court-designated worker may:
    1. If the complaint alleges a status offense, determine that no further action be taken subject to review by the family accountability, intervention, and response team;
    2. If the complaint alleges a public offense, refer the complaint to the county attorney;
    3. Refer a public offense complaint for informal adjustment; or
    4. Based upon the results of the preliminary intake inquiry, other information obtained, and a determination that the interests of the child and the public would be better served, and with the written approval of the county attorney for a public offense complaint, if necessary, conduct a formal conference and enter into a diversion agreement;
  6. Upon receiving written approval of the county attorney, if necessary, to divert a public offense complaint, and prior to conducting a formal conference, the court-designated worker shall advise in writing the complainant, the victim if any, and the law enforcement agency having investigative jurisdiction of the offense:
    1. Of the recommendation and the reasons therefor and that the complainant, victim, or law enforcement agency may submit within ten (10) days from receipt of such notice a complaint to the county attorney for special review; or
    2. In the case of a misdemeanor diverted pursuant to KRS 635.010(4), of the fact that the child was statutorily entitled to divert the case;
  7. A formal conference shall include the child and his or her parent, guardian, or other person exercising custodial control or supervision. The formal conference shall be used to:
    1. Present information obtained at the preliminary intake inquiry; and
    2. Develop a diversion agreement that shall require that the child regularly attend school, shall not exceed six (6) months in duration, and may include:
      1. Referral of the child, and family if appropriate, to a public or private entity or person for the provision of identified services to address the complaint or assessed needs;
      2. Referral of the child, and family if appropriate, to a community service program within the limitations provided under KRS 635.080(2);
      3. Restitution, limited to the actual pecuniary loss suffered by the victim, if the child has the means or ability to make restitution;
      4. Notification that the court-designated worker may apply graduated sanctions for failure to comply with the diversion agreement;
      5. Any other program or effort which reasonably benefits the community and the child; and
      6. A plan for monitoring the child’s progress and completion of the agreement;
    1. If a child successfully completes a diversion agreement, the underlying complaint shall be dismissed and further action related to that complaint shall be prohibited. (9) (a) If a child successfully completes a diversion agreement, the underlying complaint shall be dismissed and further action related to that complaint shall be prohibited.
    2. If a child fails to appear for a preliminary intake inquiry, declines to enter into a diversion agreement, or fails to complete a diversion agreement, then:
      1. For a public offense complaint, the matter shall be referred to the county attorney for formal court action and, if a petition is filed, the child may request that the court dismiss the complaint based upon his or her substantial compliance with the terms of diversion; and
      2. For a status offense complaint, the court-designated worker shall refer the matter to the family accountability, intervention, and response team for review and further action;
  8. If a complaint is referred to the court, the complaint and findings of the court-designated worker’s preliminary intake inquiry shall be submitted to the court for the court to determine whether process should issue; and
  9. At any stage in the proceedings described in this section, the court or the county attorney may review any decision of the court-designated worker. The court upon its own motion or upon written request of the county attorney may refer any complaint for a formal hearing.

History. Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 423, § 22, effective July 1, 1987; 1988, ch. 350, § 15, effective April 10, 1988; 2014, ch. 132, § 36, effective July 1, 2015.

Compiler’s Notes.

For this section as effective until July 1, 2015, see the preceding section also numbered KRS 610.030 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Treatises

Caldwell’s Kentucky Form Book, 5th Ed., Practice Context for Juvenile Code Proceedings, § 258.00.

Petrilli, Kentucky Family Law, Juvenile Court, § 32.21.

Petrilli, Kentucky Family Law, Forms, Juvenile Court, Form 5.1.

610.040. Issuance of summons and notice of petition.

  1. After a public or status offense petition has been filed and after such further investigation as the court may direct, unless the parties appear voluntarily, the court shall issue a summons briefly reciting the substance of the petition and requiring the person who has the custody or control of the child to appear personally and bring the child before the court at a time and place stated. If the person so summoned is other than a parent or guardian of the child, the parent or guardian or both shall also be notified of the pendency of the proceeding and of the time and place appointed. Summons may be issued requiring the appearance of any other person whose presence, in the opinion of the judge, is necessary.
  2. The summons and notice provided for in subsection (1) of this section shall be served personally by the delivery of a copy thereof to the person summoned, unless the judge is satisfied that personal service would be impracticable, in which event the judge may order service by mail addressed to the last known address. Service by mail shall be deemed to be effected upon mailing. Notice by mail shall be presumed sufficient if mailed at least forty-eight (48) hours before the time for appearance specified in the summons or notice.
  3. Unless otherwise provided, service of summons or notice may be made by any suitable person, other than an employee of the cabinet, under the direction of the court, and upon request of the court shall be made by any peace officer.
  4. Any person summoned who, without reasonable cause, fails to appear, may be proceeded against for contempt of court. In case the summons cannot be served, or the parties served fail to appear, or in any case when it appears to the judge that the service will be ineffectual, or that the welfare of the child requires that he be brought forthwith before the court, a warrant may be issued for the parent, guardian, person having custodial control or supervision of the child, or the child.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 423, § 23, effective July 1, 1987; 1988, ch. 350, § 16, effective April 10, 1988; 2018 ch. 159, § 15, effective July 14, 2018.

Research References and Practice Aids

Treatises

Caldwell’s Kentucky Form Book, 5th Ed., Practice Context for Juvenile Code Proceedings, § 258.00.

Petrilli, Kentucky Family Law, Juvenile Court, §§ 32.5, 32.16, 32.22.

Petrilli, Kentucky Family Law, Forms, Juvenile Court, Form 5.7.

610.050. Temporary change in custody.

If it appears to the court, by affidavit or by sworn testimony, that the child is a danger to himself or the community, or is in such condition or surroundings that his welfare is being harmed or threatened with harm to such a degree that his best interest requires that his custody be immediately changed by the court from the original custodian to another, the judge may sign an order giving temporary custody of the child to a suitable custodian consenting to temporary custody. However, if this case involves allegations of dependency, neglect, or abuse, no emergency removal or temporary custody orders shall be effective unless the provisions of KRS Chapter 620 are followed; and, if the case involves allegations of mental illness, the provisions of KRS Chapter 645 shall be followed. As a part of such order, the court may direct that the child shall be taken into custody by the peace officer serving the summons or by any other peace officer and placed as directed by the court. In any event, a copy of the temporary custody order shall be served on the parent, guardian or other person exercising custodial control or supervision of the child when the summons is served. The temporary custody order shall be effective until the case is heard on its merits or until modified by the court. As a result of such order, the child shall be placed in custody and care in a home or other suitable facility.

History. Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 423, § 24, effective July 1, 1987; 1988, ch. 350, § 17, effective April 10, 1988; 1998, ch. 538, § 6, effective April 13, 1998.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Temporary custody proper.

Minor’s argument that the trial court improperly placed her in the Cabinet’s custody based on her contempt was rejected because the court reserved the sanction for contempt and placed the minor in the Cabinet’s temporary custody in accord with this section. B.H. v. Commonwealth, 2013 Ky. App. LEXIS 164 (Ky. Ct. App. Nov. 22, 2013), review denied, ordered not published, 2014 Ky. LEXIS 423 (Ky. Aug. 13, 2014).

Opinions of Attorney General.

KRS 620.060 , 620.090 , 620.140 and this section in conjunction with KRS 620.130 combine to comply with 42 USCS 672(a)(1), which requires a judicial determination, prior to the removal of a child from the home, that continuation in the home is contrary to the best interests of the child. OAG 90-37 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Treatises

Caldwell’s Kentucky Form Book, 5th Ed., Practice Context for Juvenile Code Proceedings, § 258.00.

Petrilli, Kentucky Family Law, Forms, Juvenile Court, Form 5.7.

610.060. Duty of court upon formal proceeding — Right to attend proceeding — Payment for counsel.

  1. If the Circuit or District Court determines that a formal proceeding is required in the interest of the child or to determine the truth or falsity of the allegations against the child, a petition shall be required pursuant to KRS 610.020 , and the court shall, when the child is brought before the court:
    1. Explain to the child and his parents, guardian, or person exercising custodial control their respective rights to counsel and, if the child and his parents, guardian, or person exercising custodial control are unable to obtain counsel, shall appoint counsel for the child, as provided in subsection (2) of this section, and, unless specified to the contrary by other provisions of KRS Chapters 600 to 645, may appoint counsel for the parents, guardian, or person exercising custodial control;
    2. Explain the right against self-incrimination by saying that the child, parents, relative, guardian, or custodian may remain silent concerning the charges against the child, and that anything said may be used against the child;
    3. Unless limited by statute, explain the right to confront anyone who has accused the child and to cross-examine that person on the allegations made against the child;
    4. Advise the child and his parents, guardian, or person exercising custodial control of the right to appeal from a determination of the court; and
    5. Advise the child that these rights belong to him and may not be waived by his parents, guardian, or person exercising custodial control.
    1. No court shall accept a plea or admission or conduct an adjudication hearing involving a child accused of committing any felony offense, any offense under KRS Chapter 510, or any offense, including the violation of a valid court order, for which the court intends to impose detention or commitment as a disposition unless that child is represented by counsel. (2) (a) No court shall accept a plea or admission or conduct an adjudication hearing involving a child accused of committing any felony offense, any offense under KRS Chapter 510, or any offense, including the violation of a valid court order, for which the court intends to impose detention or commitment as a disposition unless that child is represented by counsel.
    2. For a child accused of committing any other offense, before a court permits the child to proceed beyond notification of the right to counsel required by paragraph (a) of subsection (1) of this subsection without representation, the court shall:
      1. Conduct a hearing about the child’s waiver of counsel; and
      2. Make specific findings of fact that the child knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waived his right to counsel.
  2. Unless otherwise exempted in KRS Chapters 600 to 645, a child and his parents or person exercising custodial control shall have a right to attend the hearing if such attendance will not unnecessarily delay the hearing.
  3. Subject to the provisions of KRS 31.125 , the court may order a parent to pay for counsel for the child if the court determines that the parent has the ability to pay for such counsel. The fact that a child is committed to a state agency shall not be cause for the court to order that agency to pay for counsel.
  4. Subject to Rule 43.09 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court shall permit the victim, the victim’s parents or legal guardian, or, if emancipated, the victim’s spouse, or the legal representative of any of these, to attend all proceedings under this section.
  5. An attempt shall be made to notify the persons specified in subsection (5) of this section of the time, date, and place of all proceedings under this section. Each District Court shall, by rule, establish the means of notification and the person or agency responsible for making the notifications. The failure of a victim or other person specified in subsection (5) of this section to receive notice shall not delay the proceedings in the case.

History. Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 423, § 25, effective July 1, 1987; 1988, ch. 350, § 18, effective April 10, 1988; Acts 1996, ch. 358, § 20, effective July 15, 1997; 1998, ch. 443, § 14, effective July 15, 1998; 2002, ch. 203, § 1, effective April 5, 2002; 2008, ch. 87, § 4, effective July 15, 2008.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

  1. Counsel.
  2. — Waiver.
  3. Due Process.
1. Counsel.
2. — Waiver.

Defendant’s waiver of counsel without first being appointed counsel was ineffectual and contrary to KRS 610.060(1); KRS 610.060(1)(a) mandates the trial court to initially appoint counsel and after the appointment and consultation with counsel, the child could waive the right to counsel under KRS610.060(1)(e). D.R. v. Commonwealth, 64 S.W.3d 292, 2001 Ky. App. LEXIS 1266 (Ky. Ct. App. 2001).

3. Due Process.

It was error for the family court to adjudicate the juvenile’s status as an habitual truant from school and to place the juvenile under the authority of the Department of Community Based Services when the juvenile was not present at the adjudication or the disposition hearing. Determinations in the juvenile’s absence violated his due process rights. B.J. v. Commonwealth, 2006 Ky. App. Unpub. LEXIS 111 (Ky. Ct. App. Dec. 8, 2006), rev'd, 241 S.W.3d 324, 2007 Ky. LEXIS 259 ( Ky. 2007 ).

Cited:

Commonwealth v. Halsell, 934 S.W.2d 552, 1996 Ky. LEXIS 119 ( Ky. 1996 ); A.C. v. Commonwealth, 314 S.W.3d 319, 2010 Ky. App. LEXIS 98 (Ky. Ct. App. 2010).

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Bench & Bar.

Wiederstein, Closed Courtrooms and the Public’s Right of Access, Vol. 67, No. 4, July 2003, Ky. Bench & Bar 15.

Treatises

Caldwell’s Kentucky Form Book, 5th Ed., Practice Context for Juvenile Code Proceedings, § 258.00.

Petrilli, Kentucky Family Law, Juvenile Court, §§ 32.5, 32.8, 32.21.

Petrilli, Kentucky Family Law, Forms, Juvenile Court, Form 5.3.

610.070. Hearings.

  1. All cases involving children brought before the court whose cases are under the jurisdiction of the court shall be granted a speedy hearing and shall be dealt with by the court without a jury.
  2. The hearings shall be conducted in a formal manner, unless specified to the contrary by other provisions of KRS Chapters 600 to 645.
  3. The general public shall be excluded and only the immediate families or guardians of the parties before the court, witnesses necessary for the prosecution and defense of the case, the probation worker with direct interest in the case, a representative from the Department of Juvenile Justice, the victim, his parent or legal guardian, or if emancipated, his spouse, or a legal representative of either, such persons admitted as the judge shall find have a direct interest in the case or in the work of the court, and such other persons as agreed to by the child and his attorney may be admitted to the hearing. A parent, legal guardian, or spouse if a witness shall be admitted to the hearing only during and after his testimony at the hearing, and witnesses shall be admitted to the hearing only for the duration of their testimony. The court may order the exclusion of a parent, legal guardian, or spouse, if it is shown to the satisfaction of the court that the parent, legal guardian, or spouse may physically disrupt the proceedings or may do violence to any participant therein. The mere presence of a parent, legal guardian, or spouse shall not be deemed to be a disruption of the proceedings merely because their presence may make the defendant uncomfortable; the court shall find a potential for actual physical disruption of the proceedings before an exclusion may be granted for this reason.
  4. The court may order the parents, guardians, or persons exercising custodial control over the child to be present at any hearing or other proceeding involving the child.

History. Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 423, § 26, effective July 1, 1987; 1988, ch. 350, § 19, effective April 10, 1988; 1994, ch. 407, § 1, effective July 15, 1994; 1996, ch. 358, § 21, effective July 15, 1997; 1998, ch. 443, § 15, effective July 15, 1998.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(7/15/94). In 1994 Ky. Acts ch. 407, sec. 1, the sentence beginning “A parent, legal guardian, or spouse if a witness” in subsection (3) of this statute had instead “of a witness”. The drafter advises and the context clearly establishes that “if” not “of” should appear here, and this correction has been made to remedy a manifest clerical or typographical error under KRS 7.136(1)(h).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

  1. Purpose.
  2. Exclusion of Public and Press.
1. Purpose.

The purpose of the shroud of secrecy and confidentiality mandated by KRS 610.340 and this section is to protect the juvenile, and clearly this purpose was uppermost in the minds of the General Assembly; it was intended that trials of juveniles not be publicized in the news media, as such publicity would possibly deprive the juvenile of a fair trial and, more particularly, would likely diminish his or her prospect for rehabilitation. F.T.P. v. Courier-Journal, 774 S.W.2d 444, 1989 Ky. LEXIS 48 ( Ky. 1989 ).

2. Exclusion of Public and Press.

It is the province of the legislature to open juvenile hearings to the public if they are to be opened. (Decided under prior law) Johnson v. Simpson, 433 S.W.2d 644, 1968 Ky. LEXIS 283 ( Ky. 1968 ).

A juvenile judge cannot open the hearings in juvenile cases to reporters only on the condition that they not publish the names of children unless the judge gives specific permission and then exclude reporters who violate these terms while allowing others to remain. (Decided under prior law) Johnson v. Simpson, 433 S.W.2d 644, 1968 Ky. LEXIS 283 ( Ky. 1968 ).

In the absence of any statutory provision, a juvenile judge may not condition a reporter’s presence at the trial of an adult for contributing to the delinquency of minors upon his agreement to not publish the names of the children involved unless the judge allows him to do so. (Decided under prior law) Johnson v. Simpson, 433 S.W.2d 644, 1968 Ky. LEXIS 283 ( Ky. 1968 ).

Although KRS 600.020(12) provides that the Unified Juvenile Code applies to matters conducted in the juvenile session of District Court, in light of subsection (3) of this section, KRS 610.340 , and Const., § 115, the public and press are to be excluded not only from all juvenile proceedings at the District Court level, but from all appellate proceedings stemming therefrom. F.T.P. v. Courier-Journal, 774 S.W.2d 444, 1989 Ky. LEXIS 48 ( Ky. 1989 ).

To exclude the press at the district level, but admit them at the appellate level would tend to nullify the original intent and purpose of the Legislature and the wholesome policy of the Uniform Juvenile Act. F.T.P. v. Courier-Journal, 774 S.W.2d 444, 1989 Ky. LEXIS 48 ( Ky. 1989 ).

Exclusion of the press from juvenile court proceedings under the Kentucky Uniform Juvenile Code, KRS 610.070 , did not violate a press association’s First Amendment right of access to the courts because (1) the right of access was not extended to juvenile proceedings, and (2) the presumption of openness did not apply to juvenile proceedings as they were historically closed to the public and public access to such proceedings would frustrate the purpose of the juvenile courts. Ky. Press Ass'n v. State, 355 F. Supp. 2d 853, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2514 (E.D. Ky. 2005 ).

Circuit court judge was ordered to provide members of the media with a copy of the recording of a criminal arraignment and to refrain from closing any future proceeding that was ordinarily open to the public and from sealing records because he failed to conduct a hearing and closed the arraignment without making specific finding or considering less restrictive measures; the judge’s reliance on the statutory protections closing hearings was error because they were not applicable. WPSD TV v. Jameson, 552 S.W.3d 93, 2018 Ky. App. LEXIS 178 (Ky. Ct. App. 2018).

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Bench & Bar.

Wiederstein, Closed Courtrooms and the Public’s Right of Access, Vol. 67, No. 4, July 2003, Ky. Bench & Bar 15.

Family Court: Proceedings for Dependency, Neglect and Abuse: The Role of the Family Court Judge and the Guardian ad Litem, Vol. 68, No. 6, Nov. 2004, Ky. Bench & Bar 21.

Treatises

Caldwell’s Kentucky Form Book, 5th Ed., Practice Context for Juvenile Code Proceedings, § 258.00.

Petrilli, Kentucky Family Law, Juvenile Court, §§ 32.5, 32.6, 32.8, 32.21, 32.23, 32.24; 1991 Supp., § 32.4.

610.072. Attendance of public at hearings in courts participating in pilot project authorized by KRS 21A.190.

  1. Any statute, administrative procedure, or court rule limiting or prohibiting public attendance at court proceedings conducted under KRS Chapter 620 or 625 shall not apply in a court which is participating in a pilot project authorized by KRS 21A.190 to the extent that the Chief Justice, and the presiding judge for a case specified in KRS 21A.190 , have authorized public attendance at the proceeding.
  2. The provisions of this section shall not permit attendance by the public at any court handling a case under KRS Chapter 620 or 625 which is not participating in the pilot project authorized by KRS 21A.190 , except as otherwise authorized by law.
  3. Unless authorized by law, the provisions of this section shall not permit attendance by the public in any court participating in the pilot project authorized by KRS 21A.190 which is not authorized by the Supreme Court to admit the public for any case or class of cases.
  4. The provisions of this section shall not permit attendance by the public at any case before a court participating in the pilot project authorized by KRS 21A.190 when the judge presiding over the case determines that the case shall be closed.

HISTORY: 2016 ch. 76, § 3, effective July 15, 2016.

610.080. Bifurcated hearings in juvenile proceedings.

Juvenile proceedings shall consist of two (2) distinct hearings, an adjudication and a disposition, which shall be held on separate days unless the child, after consultation with an attorney, waives the right to a formal predisposition investigation report and moves that the hearings be held the same day. However, if the disposition is to be commitment, the child’s waiver shall not be valid without the consent of the Department of Juvenile Justice or the cabinet.

  1. The adjudication shall determine the truth or falsity of the allegations in the petition and shall be made on the basis of an admission or confession of the child to the court or by the taking of evidence.
  2. Unless otherwise exempted, upon motion by any child brought before the court on a petition under KRS 610.010(1), or 610.010(2)(a), (b), or (c), the Rules of Criminal Procedure shall apply. All adjudications shall be supported by evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, unless specified to the contrary by other provisions of KRS Chapters 600 to 645. For actions under KRS 610.010(2)(d) the Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure shall apply.

History. Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 423, § 27, effective July 1, 1987; 1988, ch. 350, § 20, effective April 10, 1988; 1998, ch. 538, § 7, effective April 13, 1998; 2008, ch. 87, § 18, effective July 15, 2008.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

  1. Detention Hearing.
  2. Voluntariness of Plea.
  3. Waiver of Right.
1. Detention Hearing.

A detention hearing for juvenile at which juvenile admitted to the charged offenses, was not transformed from a determination of probable cause for detention into an acceptance of a guilty plea, since no inquiry was made of the veracity of the charges or admission, no inquiry was made to determine if the plea was voluntary, and no inquiry was made as to nature of the charges. Laswell v. Frey, 45 F.3d 1011, 1995 FED App. 0036P, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 1537 (6th Cir. Ky.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 874, 116 S. Ct. 199, 133 L. Ed. 2d 134, 1995 U.S. LEXIS 6246 (U.S. 1995).

Where a district court entered a contempt admission under KRS 610.080(1) without a plea colloquy pursuant to RCrP 8.08 and despite the fact that a juvenile did not admit to the contempt, the error was palpable under RCrP 10.26. C.G. v. Commonwealth, 2003 Ky. App. LEXIS 57 (Ky. Ct. App.), sub. op., 2003 Ky. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1383 (Ky. Ct. App. Mar. 14, 2003), review denied, ordered not published, 2005 Ky. LEXIS 212 (Ky. Aug. 17, 2005).

2. Voluntariness of Plea.

Although a District Court advised a juvenile of the juvenile’s constitutional rights at a detention hearing on one charge, it did not apprise the juvenile of the rights under Boykin and KRS 610.080(1) when the juvenile entered a plea to additional charges; consequently, because the juvenile’s plea was not voluntary, a Circuit Court committed reversible error in affirming the District Court’s ruling. J.D. v. Commonwealth, 211 S.W.3d 60, 2006 Ky. App. LEXIS 387 (Ky. Ct. App. 2006).

3. Waiver of Right.

In a juvenile proceeding in which the Commonwealth waived the separate KRS 610.080 hearings, the juvenile correctly argued that the statute unmistakably mandated that only a juvenile could waive separate hearings. K.F. v. Commonwealth, 274 S.W.3d 457, 2008 Ky. App. LEXIS 376 (Ky. Ct. App. 2008).

Cited:

D.F. v. Commonwealth, 2006 Ky. App. LEXIS 81 (Ky. Ct. App. 2006); Commonwealth v. S.K., 253 S.W.3d 486, 2008 Ky. LEXIS 6 ( Ky. 2008 ); L.H. v. Commonwealth, 2019 Ky. App. LEXIS 89 (Ky. Ct. App. May 17, 2019).

Opinions of Attorney General.

In order for the juvenile court to impose penalties for habitual truancy, the burden of proof required of the commonwealth is evidence beyond a reasonable doubt. OAG 87-40 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Northern Kentucky Law Review.

Tapp and Tincher, Of Innocents and Offenders: A Survey of Children’s Law in Kentucky, 30 N. Ky. L. Rev. 131 (2003).

Treatises

Caldwell’s Kentucky Form Book, 5th Ed., Practice Context for Juvenile Code Proceedings, § 258.00.

Petrilli, Kentucky Family Law, Juvenile Court, §§ 32.3, 32.5, 32.22, 32.23, 32.24.

Petrilli, Kentucky Family Law, Termination of Parental Rights and Adoption, § 29.1.

610.090. Prohibitions on use of evidence in subsequent proceedings.

Unless the child is proceeded against as an adult in accordance with the law governing crimes as provided in KRS Chapter 635 or 640, the disposition of any child under the provisions of KRS Chapters 600 to 645, or any evidence given in the case, shall not be lawful evidence against the child for any purpose, except in subsequent cases involving the same child under KRS Chapters 600 to 645.

History. Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 423, § 28, effective July 1, 1987; 1996, ch. 358, § 22, effective July 15, 1997.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(7/15/96). Under 1996 Ky. Acts ch. 358, sec. 67(1), the amendment of this statute by Section 22 of that Act becomes effective July 15, 1997.

Research References and Practice Aids

Treatises

Petrilli, Kentucky Family Law, Juvenile Court, § 32.26.

610.100. Investigation — Informal adjustment.

  1. Unless there is a suitable prior disposition investigation report or unless waived by the child who is represented by counsel, before making disposition of the case of a child brought before the court under the provisions of KRS Chapters 630 or 635, whether by complaint pursuant to KRS 610.020 , or by reason of having been taken into custody pursuant to KRS 610.190 , the judge shall cause an investigation to be made concerning the nature of the specific act complained of and any surrounding circumstances which suggest the future care and guidance which should be given the child. The investigation shall include an inquiry into the child’s age, habits, school record, general reputation, and everything that may pertain to his or her life, and character. The investigation shall also include an inquiry into the home conditions, life, and character of the person having custody of the child. The investigation shall also include an assessment of the parent or guardian’s ability to pay all or part of the cost of the child’s care and treatment should the child be ordered into a treatment program or placed on supervised probation. The result of the investigation, including the result of the validated risk and needs assessment, shall be reported in writing to the court and to counsel for the parties three (3) days prior to the child’s dispositional hearing and shall become a part of the record of the proceedings. The child may waive the three (3) day requirement. Objections by counsel at the dispositional hearing to portions of the dispositional report shall be noted in the record.
  2. The investigation shall be conducted by a suitable public or private agency. The cabinet and the Department of Juvenile Justice may furnish investigation services under agreements with the individual juvenile courts. For this purpose, any county judge/executive or chief executive officer of an urban-county government may enter into a contract on behalf of his or her county with the Department of Juvenile Justice or the cabinet for the furnishings of such services.

History. Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 423, § 29, effective July 1, 1987; 1988, ch. 350, § 21, effective April 10, 1988; 1996, ch. 358, § 23, effective in part July 1, 1997, and in part July 15, 1997; 1998, ch. 443, § 16, effective July 15, 1998; 2000, ch. 193, § 3, effective July 14, 2000; 2014, ch. 132, § 37, effective July 1, 2015.

Compiler’s Notes.

For this section as effective until July 1, 2015, see the preceding section also numbered KRS 610.100 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. No Appeal Available.

By its plain language, an informal adjustment was not a final or appealable order adjudicating all the rights of all the parties in an action or proceeding, and no appeal from an informal juvenile adjustment pursuant to KRS 610.100(3) was available. Commonwealth v. C.J., Commonwealth v. C.J., 156 S.W.3d 296, 2005 Ky. LEXIS 47 ( Ky. 2005 ).

610.105. Informal adjustment permissible at any time with notice to parties.

  1. Upon the court’s motion or the motion of any party, following notice to the county attorney, an informal adjustment may be made at any time during the proceedings and with the victim and with those persons specified in KRS 610.070 having prior notification of the motion.
  2. An informal adjustment does not require adjudication of the case. If an adjudication has occurred, the court shall dismiss the case following successful completion under subsection (3) of this section.
  3. If the court orders an informal adjustment, the order may include any of the following:
    1. Referral of the case to diversion, but, if the child does not successfully complete the terms of the diversion, the case shall not be dismissed as a result of the diversion but shall be returned to court; or
    2. Placement of the child on community supervision or monitoring by the court under the informal adjustment with additional conditions as determined appropriate by the court for a period not to exceed six (6) months.

History. Enact. Acts 2014, ch. 132, § 33, effective July 1, 2015.

610.110. Disposition of case.

  1. The disposition shall determine the action to be taken by the court on behalf of, and in the best interest of, the child under the provisions of KRS Chapter 630 or 635.
  2. At the disposition, all information helpful in making a proper disposition, including oral and written reports and the results of a validated risk and needs assessment, shall be received by the court in compliance with subsection (1) of this section and relied upon to the extent of their probative value, provided that the parties or their counsel shall be afforded an opportunity to examine and controvert the reports.
  3. The court shall, and the Department of Juvenile Justice may upon request, notify the law enforcement agency of the child’s city, county, or urban-county of residence as appropriate and the law enforcement agencies where any offense was committed of the disposition of each case and of each child committed by the court who is placed in a residential treatment facility by the Department of Juvenile Justice or the cabinet.
  4. If any court commits a child to the Department of Juvenile Justice or the cabinet, a child-caring facility, or child-placing agency, the court shall cause to be transmitted to the Department of Juvenile Justice or the cabinet, facility, or agency, as appropriate, a certified copy of the commitment order, together with a summary of the court’s information concerning the child. A certified copy of the court order shall be proof of the authority of the Department of Juvenile Justice or the cabinet, facility, or agency to hold the child. Such certified order shall be sufficient authority for any law enforcement officer to take into custody any person named therein and deliver him or her to such a place as shall be directed by the Department of Juvenile Justice or the cabinet, facility, or agency given custody of him or her in the order.
  5. In placing a child on probation in a home or boarding home, or in committing a child to a child-caring facility or child-placing agency, the court shall as far as practicable select a home, facility, or agency operated or governed by persons of a similar religious faith as the parents of the child.
  6. Upon motion of the child and agreement of the Department of Juvenile Justice or the cabinet, as appropriate, the court may authorize an extension of commitment up to age twenty-one (21) for the purpose of permitting the Department of Juvenile Justice or the cabinet, as appropriate, to assist the child in establishing independent living arrangements if a return to the child’s home is not in his or her best interest.

History. Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 423, § 30, effective July 1, 1987; 1988, ch. 350, § 22, effective April 10, 1988; 1996, ch. 358, § 24, effective July 1, 1997; 1998, ch. 606, § 21, effective July 15, 1998; 2014, ch. 132, § 38, effective July 15, 2014.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(7/15/96). Under 1996 Ky. Acts ch. 358, sec. 67(3), the amendment of this statute by Section 24 of that Act becomes effective July 1, 1997, in that it deals functions of the Department of Juvenile Justice.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Independent Expert Permitted In Sexual Offender Dispositional Hearing.

Trial court erred in denying appellant’s motion for a continuance of a juvenile sexual offender disposition hearing in order to retain an expert for an independent evaluation, because the practice of using an independent expert in a sexual offender dispositional hearing was permitted, and was consistent with the language of KRS 610.110(2); further, nothing within the language of KRS 635.510(3) prohibited a defendant from using an expert witness to challenge the conclusions of a juvenile sexual offender assessment. N.L. v. Commonwealth, 323 S.W.3d 732, 2009 Ky. App. LEXIS 136 (Ky. Ct. App. 2009).

Research References and Practice Aids

Treatises

Caldwell’s Kentucky Form Book, 5th Ed., Practice Context for Juvenile Code Proceedings, § 258.00.

Petrilli, Kentucky Family Law, Juvenile Court, §§ 32.12, 32.24, 32.26.

Petrilli, Kentucky Family Law, Termination of Parental Rights and Adoption, § 29.1.

610.115. Circumstances permitting court to order further detention of child in custody of Department of Juvenile Justice or cabinet. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Acts 1994, ch. 489, § 4, effective July 15, 1994; 1996, ch. 358, § 25, effective July 1, 1997) was repealed by Acts 1998, ch. 606, § 192, effective July 15, 1998.

610.120. Review, continuation, or termination of disposition orders.

  1. Except as otherwise provided by KRS Chapters 605 and 635, an order of commitment or an order of supervision or probation made by the court in the case of a child may be terminated at any time prior to expiration on the court’s own initiative or on motion by:
    1. A child who is affected by an order of juvenile session of District Court;
    2. The family, custodian, guardian, or legal representative of such a child;
    3. The Department of Juvenile Justice or the cabinet;
    4. The county attorney of the county in which the committing court presides; or
    5. Any other person having an interest in the welfare of the child.
  2. Grounds for such action may include but are not limited to allegations that there has been a substantial change of material circumstances, there exists new evidence affecting the disposition of the child, the child is no longer in need of commitment, probation, or placement, the child has not responded to or benefited from treatment or the child has not received adequate and proper treatment, the original proceedings were not conducted in the manner required by law or the public interest requires termination of the order. Upon review of the child’s case, the Department of Juvenile Justice, the cabinet, any agency, facility, or individual responsible for the supervision, care, or treatment of the child shall divulge and communicate such information regarding the child as the court may require.
  3. Except as otherwise provided by KRS Chapter 640 relating to youthful offenders, and KRS 610.110 , 620.140 , 635.060 , 635.090 , 635.515 , or 645.140 , relating to extending commitment beyond the age of eighteen (18), an order of commitment, temporary custody, or an order of supervision or probation made by the court in the case of a child shall be terminated when the child attains the age of eighteen (18) unless otherwise provided in law. At least fourteen (14) days prior to the termination of an order of commitment, the Department of Juvenile Justice or the cabinet shall prepare a summary of the information concerning the child and submit it with written notification to the committing court that a child’s commitment is due to expire.

History. Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 423, § 31, effective July 1, 1987; 1988, ch. 350, § 23, effective April 10, 1988; 1998, ch. 398, § 7, effective July 15, 1998; 1998, ch. 538, § 8, effective April 13, 1998; 2002, ch. 257, § 13, effective July 15, 2002; 2014, ch. 132, § 39, effective July 1, 2015.

Compiler’s Notes.

For this section as effective until July 1, 2015, see the preceding section also numbered KRS 610.120 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Relationship to Other Laws.

In order to determine whether Kentucky owed foster care maintenance payments under the Child Welfare Act for children who were placed with their aunt, it was necessary to decide whether the family court affirmatively discharged the children from state custody, as the Act required payments only when the children's placement and care were the state's responsibility; denial of benefits because the aunt was related to the children would violate federal law. D.O. v. Glisson, 847 F.3d 374, 2017 FED App. 0021P, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 1504 (6th Cir. Ky.), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 316, 199 L. Ed. 2d 233, 2017 U.S. LEXIS 6043 (U.S. 2017).

Cited:

Commonwealth v. Carneal, 274 S.W.3d 420, 2008 Ky. LEXIS 294 ( Ky. 2008 ).

Research References and Practice Aids

Treatises

Petrilli, Kentucky Family Law, Juvenile Court, §§ 32.23, 32.24.

610.125. Permanency hearing after custody given to Department of Juvenile Justice or cabinet.

  1. If a child has been removed from the home and placed in the custody of the Department of Juvenile Justice or the cabinet, a judge of the District Court shall conduct a permanency hearing no later than twelve (12) months after the date the child is considered to have entered foster care, and every twelve (12) months thereafter if custody and out-of-home placement continues, to determine the future status of the child. For purposes of this section, a child shall be considered to have entered foster care on the earlier of the date of the first judicial finding that the child has been subjected to child abuse or neglect or the date that is sixty (60) days after the date on which the child is removed from the home.
    1. If parental rights have not been terminated, whether the child should be returned to the parent;
    2. Whether the child should be placed for adoption;
    3. Whether the child should be placed with a permanent custodian; and
    4. Whether the cabinet has documented a compelling reason that it is in the best interest of the child who is age sixteen (16) or older to be placed in another planned permanent living arrangement other than those listed in this subsection. Prior to the approval of this permanency goal, the court shall:
      1. Ask the child about the desired permanency outcome; and
      2. Make a judicial determination explaining why, as of the date of the hearing, another planned permanent living arrangement is the best permanency goal for the child and provide compelling reasons why it continues to not be in the best interest of the child to return home, be placed for adoption, be placed with a legal guardian, or be placed with a fit and willing relative or fictive kin.
  2. If the cabinet or the Department of Juvenile Justice determines that reasonable efforts to reunify the child with the child’s parent will not be made, the cabinet or Department of Juvenile Justice shall file a case permanency plan as defined by KRS 620.230 or case progress report with the court that documents the reasons for not making reasonable efforts. The court shall hold a permanency hearing within thirty (30) days of the filing of the cabinet’s or Department of Juvenile Justice’s plan or report with the Court.
  3. The Department of Juvenile Justice or the cabinet shall inform the court not less than sixty (60) days prior to the expiration of the time in which the hearing shall be held and within the time established in subsection (1) of this section, and shall further inform the court of the name and address of the child’s foster parents, preadoptive parents, fictive kin, or relatives providing care to the child; court-appointed special advocate; and foster care review board member assigned to the case. For the hearing to be held pursuant to subsection (2) of this section, the names and addresses of the persons identified in this subsection shall be provided in the case permanency plan or case progress report to be filed with the court. The court shall set a time for the hearing and notify the child’s parent, foster parents, preadoptive parents, fictive kin, or relatives providing care to the child and who also shall have a right to be heard; court-appointed special advocate; foster care review board member assigned to the case; attorney for the child; attorney for the parent, if any; and the Department of Juvenile Justice or the cabinet.
  4. The Department of Juvenile Justice or the cabinet shall present evidence to the court concerning the care and progress of the child since the last permanency hearing, including the following:
    1. The length of time the child has been committed to the Department of Juvenile Justice or the cabinet;
    2. The number, location, and date for each placement during the total period of the child’s commitment;
    3. A description of the services and assistance provided to the parent or arranged by the Department of Juvenile Justice or the cabinet since the last case permanency plan or case progress report, and the results achieved;
    4. A description of the efforts and progress of the child’s parent since the last case permanency plan and case progress report, including the number and dates of parental visits and the extent, quality, and frequency of the parent’s communication with the child;
    5. The familial and institutional barriers to:
      1. Returning the child to the home;
      2. Ending the commitment of the child to the Department of Juvenile Justice or the cabinet; and
      3. Delivery of appropriate services needed by the child;
    6. Recommendations of services needed to make the transition from out-of-home care to independent living for children who have reached the age of fourteen (14) years;
    7. An evaluation of the child’s current placement and services provided to the child;
    8. Recommendations for necessary services required to terminate the commitment of the child to the cabinet, to return the child home, or to facilitate another permanent placement;
    9. Recommendations as to the permanency goal for the child; and
    10. For a child with another planned permanency arrangement as the child’s permanency goal:
      1. The intensive, ongoing efforts to return the child to the home or secure a placement with a fit and willing relative, legal guardian, fictive kin, or adoptive parent, including efforts that utilize search technology to find the biological family;
      2. The steps the agency is taking to ensure that the child’s foster family home or licensed child-caring facility is following the reasonable and prudent parent standard in accordance with 42 U.S.C. sec. 671 ; and
      3. The cabinet’s efforts to ensure the child has regular, ongoing opportunities to engage in age or developmentally appropriate activities, including consulting with the child in an age and developmentally appropriate manner about the opportunities of the child to participate in the activities.
    1. The child’s parent, foster parent, preadoptive parent, fictive kin, or relative providing care to the child shall have the right to be heard; and (5) (a) The child’s parent, foster parent, preadoptive parent, fictive kin, or relative providing care to the child shall have the right to be heard; and
    2. The attorney for the parent, attorney for the child, or court-appointed special advocate, if deemed appropriate by the court, may present any evidence relevant to the determination of a permanency goal for the child.
  5. Upon conclusion of the hearing the court shall make a written order determining the permanency plan for the child.
  6. If necessary, the case may be redocketed for further review of the progress toward the implementation of the permanency plan established at the permanency hearing.

The court shall address the following areas:

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1994, ch. 318, § 2, effective July 15, 1994; 1994, ch. 489, § 2, effective July 15, 1994; 1996, ch. 358, § 26, effective July 1, 1997; 1998, ch. 57, § 8, effective March 17, 1998; 1998, ch. 398, § 9, effective July 15, 1998; 2000, ch. 60, § 3, effective July 14, 2000; 2013, ch. 79, § 3, effective June 25, 2013; 2016 ch. 115, § 5, effective July 15, 2016; 2017 ch. 10, § 5, effective June 29, 2017.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Relationship to Other Laws.

In order to determine whether Kentucky owed foster care maintenance payments under the Child Welfare Act for children who were placed with their aunt, it was necessary to decide whether the family court affirmatively discharged the children from state custody, as the Act required payments only when the children's placement and care were the state's responsibility; denial of benefits because the aunt was related to the children would violate federal law. D.O. v. Glisson, 847 F.3d 374, 2017 FED App. 0021P, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 1504 (6th Cir. Ky.), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 316, 199 L. Ed. 2d 233, 2017 U.S. LEXIS 6043 (U.S. 2017).

Cited in:

Cabinet for Health & Family Servs. v. J.M.G., 2015 Ky. LEXIS 2013 (Dec. 17, 2015).

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Bench & Bar.

Family Court: Proceedings for Dependency, Neglect and Abuse: The Role of the Family Court Judge and the Guardian ad Litem, Vol. 68, No. 6, Nov. 2004, Ky. Bench & Bar 21.

Lovitt, Choosing Paramours Over Parenting: A Closer Look at the Relationship Between Parent and Non-Parent as a Factor in Termination of Parental Rights Cases, Vol. 74, No. 1, January 2010, Ky. Bench & Bar 19.

Treatises

Caldwell’s Kentucky Form Book, 5th Ed., Practice Context for Juvenile Code Proceedings, § 258.00.

610.127. Parental circumstances negating requirement for reasonable efforts to reunify child with family.

Reasonable efforts as defined in KRS 620.020 shall not be required to be made with respect to a parent of a child if a court of competent jurisdiction determines that the parent has:

  1. Subjected the child to aggravated circumstances as defined in KRS 600.020 ;
  2. Been convicted in a criminal proceeding of having caused or contributed to the death of another child of the parent;
  3. Committed a felony assault that resulted in serious bodily injury to the child or to another child of the parent;
  4. Had their parental rights to another child terminated involuntarily;
  5. Engaged in a pattern of conduct due to a substance use disorder as defined in KRS 222.005 for a period of not less than ninety (90) days that has rendered the parent incapable of caring for the immediate and ongoing needs of the child, and the parent has refused or failed to complete available treatment for alcohol or other drug abuse;
  6. Mental illness as defined in KRS 202A.011 or is an individual with an intellectual disability as defined in KRS 202B.010 or other developmental disability as defined in KRS 387.510 that places the child at substantial risk of physical or emotional injury even if the most appropriate and available services were provided to the parent for twelve (12) months;
  7. Sexually abused the child or is required to register on a sex offender registry under 42 U.S.C. sec. 16913 , the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248; or
  8. Other circumstances in existence that make continuation or implementation of reasonable efforts to preserve or reunify the family inconsistent with the best interests of the child and with the permanency plan for the child.

History. Enact. Acts 2000, ch. 60, § 4, effective July 14, 2000; 2002, ch. 87, § 3, effective July 15, 2002; 2004, ch. 116, § 17, effective July 13, 2004; 2012, ch. 146, § 138, effective July 12, 2012; 2013, ch. 79, § 4, effective June 25, 2013; 2019 ch. 128, § 29, effective June 27, 2019.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Reasonable Efforts.

Pursuant to KRS 610.127(7), reasonable efforts are not required as defined in KRS 620.020 when the court determines with respect to a parent that the parent has created circumstances that make continuation of reasonable efforts to reunify the family inconsistent with the best interests of the child and with the permanency plan for the child. C.J.M. v. Cabinet for Health and Family Servs., 389 S.W.3d 155, 2012 Ky. App. LEXIS 301 (Ky. Ct. App. 2012).

Father asked that reasonable efforts to reunite him with the child be stopped, the trial court granted this request under KRS 610.127 , and thereafter, the father did not try to work with the Cabinet of Health and Family Services again; he admitted to smoking marijuana and said he would continue doing so, he threatened staff members of the Cabinet, he refused to participate in any case plan, the Cabinet does not have the power to compel someone to accept reasonable efforts, and substantial evidence existed to support the finding that reasonable efforts were made but the father refused them. C.J.M. v. Cabinet for Health and Family Servs., 389 S.W.3d 155, 2012 Ky. App. LEXIS 301 (Ky. Ct. App. 2012).

Cited:

B.C. v. B.T., 182 S.W.3d 213, 2005 Ky. App. LEXIS 281 (Ky. Ct. App. 2005); Cabinet for Health & Family Servs. v. J.M.G., 2015 Ky. LEXIS 2013 (Dec. 17, 2015).

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Bench & Bar.

Family Court: Proceedings for Dependency, Neglect and Abuse: The Role of the Family Court Judge and the Guardian ad Litem, Vol. 68, No. 6, Nov. 2004, Ky. Bench & Bar 21.

610.130. Appeal from disposition order.

Unless otherwise exempted, an appeal to the Circuit Court may be taken as a matter of right from the juvenile session of the District Court from dispositional orders under KRS 610.110 . The appeal shall be taken in the manner provided in the Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the Circuit Court shall, in the best interest of the child, hear such cases expeditiously.

History. Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 423, § 32, effective July 1, 1987; 1988, ch. 350, § 24, effective April 10, 1988.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

D.F. v. Commonwealth, 2006 Ky. App. LEXIS 81 (Ky. Ct. App. 2006); B.J. v. Commonwealth, — S.W.3d —, 2006 Ky. App. LEXIS 359 (Ky. Ct. App. 2006).

Research References and Practice Aids

Treatises

Petrilli, Kentucky Family Law, Juvenile Court, §§ 32.5, 32.27.

610.140. Appeals in dependency cases. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 423, § 33, effective July 1, 1987) was repealed by Acts 1988, ch. 350, § 143, effective April 10, 1988.

610.150. Authority of Circuit Court.

Upon the entry of a dispositional order and an appeal being filed, all issues relating to detention, custody, or participation in court-ordered programs may be reviewed by the Circuit Court upon motion being filed by the child with notice to the county and Commonwealth’s attorney.

History. Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 423, § 34, effective July 1, 1987.

Research References and Practice Aids

Treatises

Petrilli, Kentucky Family Law, Juvenile Court, § 32.27.

610.160. Court-ordered participation in child’s treatment.

Upon recommendation of the Department of Juvenile Justice or the cabinet or upon its own initiative, the court may order any parent, guardian, or person exercising similar custodial control or supervision of a child referred to the court to cooperate and actively participate in such treatment or social service programs which might reasonably be expected to meet the goal of enhancing the best interests of the child and family unity. When it appears to the court that the parents have failed to cooperate and actively participate in said programs, the court may issue a summons for the parents of the child which shall require them to attend a hearing in which they may rebut any evidence which may allege that they have violated a court order. The court may exercise its powers of contempt in addition to any other remedy provided by law to compel obedience of the parents, guardian, or person exercising custodial control or supervision of the child to the court’s orders.

History. Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 423, § 35, effective July 1, 1987; 1996, ch. 358, § 27, effective July 15, 1997.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(7/15/96). Under 1996 Ky. Acts ch. 358, sec. 67(1), the amendment of this statute by Section 27 of that Act becomes effective July 15, 1997.

Opinions of Attorney General.

A married child under the age of 16 has a legal responsibility to attend school, but once a child marries, the parent or guardian no longer has a legal obligation to ensure that the child attends school; however, if the spouse of a minor who is under the age of 16 and who is an habitual truant, is found to be a person exercising custodial control or supervision as defined in subdivision (26) of KRS 600.020 , the spouse may be subject to penalties under the Juvenile Code. OAG 87-40 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Bench & Bar.

Family Court: Proceedings for Dependency, Neglect and Abuse: The Role of the Family Court Judge and the Guardian ad Litem, Vol. 68, No. 6, Nov. 2004, Ky. Bench & Bar 21.

Treatises

Petrilli, Kentucky Family Law, Juvenile Court, §§ 32.23, 32.24, 32.31.

610.170. Court-ordered child support.

If it appears from the investigation required in KRS 610.100 or otherwise that the parent or other person exercising custodial control or supervision of any child, or the estate of any child, who has been found to fall within the purview of KRS Chapters 600 to 645 and who has been left in his own home or in the home of a relative, placed on probation or placed in a foster home or boarding home, or in the care of a public or private facility or agency, or the Department of Juvenile Justice or the cabinet, is able to contribute to the support of the child, the court shall enter an order requiring the parent or estate to pay a reasonable sum for the support, maintenance, or education of the child. The order shall direct that the money be paid to the circuit clerk to be disbursed as ordered by the court or be paid to the person, facility, agency, or the Department of Juvenile Justice or cabinet to which the child was committed or probated. On application and on such notice as the court may direct, the court may make alterations in the requirement for contribution. The court may issue such orders necessary to compel payment of the sum due. The enforcement of a sentence imposed on a parent who fails to comply with the order of the court may be suspended at the discretion of the court, but the suspension may be revoked at the discretion of the court upon the failure of the parent to obey further orders of the court. This section shall not apply when the parent or other person exercising custodial control or supervision of the child was the victim of the child’s criminal conduct under KRS Chapters 635 or 640, or filed the complaint against the child under other provisions of the Unified Juvenile Code.

History. Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 423, § 36, effective July 1, 1987; 1988, ch. 350, § 25, effective April 10, 1988; 1996, ch. 358, § 28, effective July 15, 1997; 1998, ch. 443, § 17, effective July 15, 1998; 2000, ch. 534, § 8, effective July 14, 2000.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Change of Circumstances.

Because one (1) of the parties’ children had been placed with the Department of Juvenile Justice, the trial court erred in increasing the father’s child support obligation pursuant to KRS 403.213(1), the guidelines figure for the support of one (1) child; if the Department had obtained child support from the father pursuant to KRS 610.170 , his child support obligation to the mother should have been recalculated as split custody in accordance with KRS 403.212(6). Rodney P. v. Stacy B., 169 S.W.3d 834, 2005 Ky. LEXIS 245 ( Ky. 2005 ).

Research References and Practice Aids

Treatises

Petrilli, Kentucky Family Law, Juvenile Court, §§ 32.16, 32.24, 32.31.

610.180. Financial penalty when child found delinquent.

A parent or other person exercising custodial control or supervision of a child is charged with the control of such child and shall have the power to exercise parental control and authority over such child. In any case where a child is adjudicated a public offender and placed on probation, if the court finds at the hearing that the person having custody of such child has failed or neglected to subject him to reasonable parental control and authority, and that such failure or neglect is the proximate cause of the act or acts of the child upon which the adjudication is based, the court may require such parent to enter into a recognizance with sufficient surety, in an amount of not more than five hundred dollars ($500), conditioned upon the faithful discharge of the conditions of probation of such child. If the child thereafter commits a second act and is by reason thereof adjudicated a public offender, or violates the conditions of probation, and the court finds at the hearing that the failure or neglect of such parent to subject him to reasonable parental control and authority or to faithfully discharge the conditions of probation of such child on the part of such parent, is the proximate cause of the act of the child upon which such second finding is based, or upon which such child is found to have violated the conditions of his probation, the court may declare all or a part of the recognizance forfeited and the amount of such forfeited recognizance shall be applied in payment of any damages which may have been caused by such child, if there be such damages, otherwise, the proceeds therefrom, or part remaining after the payment of damages as aforesaid, shall be retained by the court to apply to any future damages resulting from the act or acts of said child before he reaches his eighteenth birthday, at which date the remaining proceeds shall be returned to the parent or guardian. The provisions of this section as it relates to failure or neglect of parents to subject a child to reasonable parental control and authority shall be in addition to and not in substitution for any other sections of KRS Chapters 600 to 645 relating to failure or neglect to exercise such parental control or authority. The provisions of this section shall not apply to foster parents.

History. Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 423, § 37, effective July 1, 1987; 1988, ch. 350, § 26, effective April 10, 1988.

Research References and Practice Aids

Treatises

Petrilli, Kentucky Family Law, Juvenile Court, §§ 32.24, 32.31.

Petrilli, Kentucky Family Law, Minors, § 30.16.

610.190. Arrest laws applicable to child taken into custody — Applicability of bail laws — Custody by person other than peace officer.

  1. The law relating to the persons by whom and the circumstances under which a person may be arrested for a public offense shall be applicable to children, but the taking of a child into custody under such law shall not be termed an arrest until the court has made the decision to try the child in Circuit or District Court as an adult. The law relating to bail shall not be applicable to children detained in accordance with this chapter unless the child is subject to being tried in Circuit or District Court as an adult.
  2. A peace officer may take a child into protective custody if the officer suspects the child to be a runaway. A child taken into protective custody under this subsection shall not be considered to have been arrested and may be held at the locations specified in KRS 610.220(1), after which the officer shall proceed with an initial investigation as provided for in KRS 610.200 .
  3. When a child is taken into custody by a person other than a peace officer, such person shall as soon as possible place the child in the custody of a peace officer.

History. Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 423, § 38, effective July 1, 1987; 1988, ch. 350, § 27, effective April 10, 1988; 1996, ch. 358, § 29, effective July 15, 1997; 2014, ch. 132, § 40, effective July 1, 2015.

Compiler’s Notes.

For this section as effective until July 1, 2015, see the preceding section also numbered KRS 610.190 .

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(7/15/96). Under 1996 Ky. Acts ch. 358, sec. 67(1), the amendment of this statute by Section 29 of that Act becomes effective July 15, 1997.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Rights of Minors.

The system of selective placement of juveniles in the county jail for dispositional and predispositional purposes, although for limited periods of time, constituted a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment in that it was treating, for punitive purposes, the juveniles as adults and yet not according them, for due process purposes, the rights accorded to adults. Baker v. Hamilton, 345 F. Supp. 345, 1972 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14032 (W.D. Ky. 1972 ).

A minor’s arrest for curfew violation where he was refused a telephone call to his parents when taken to jail by the arresting officer who refused to notify minor’s parents together with minor’s confinement with the general jail population without a probable cause hearing, constituted “cruel and unusual punishment” in violation of his rights under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.Cox v. Turley, 506 F.2d 1347, 1974 U.S. App. LEXIS 5935 (6th Cir. Ky. 1974 ).

Where officer taking two (2) juvenile brothers under the age of 14 to police substation from their home did not tell the brothers or their 16 year old sister of the specific charges of vandalism against them, the specific statute violated, their Miranda rights, did not remain at home for parents who were due to return soon, did not state the time and place of detention and offered no reason as to the necessity for keeping the children in custody, he violated the provisions of former law regarding arrest of children, since he neither immediately notified the parents of the details of the arrest nor immediately released them into the custody of the parents in the absence of circumstances necessitating secure custody, the statutory language of former law regarding arrest of children being mandatory rather than directory. Davidson v. Commonwealth, 613 S.W.2d 431, 1981 Ky. App. LEXIS 229 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981).

Research References and Practice Aids

Treatises

Petrilli, Kentucky Family Law, Juvenile Court, §§ 32.14, 32.17, 32.18, 32.20.

Petrilli, Kentucky Family Law, Forms, Juvenile Court, Form 5.3.

610.200. Duties of peace officer.

  1. When a peace officer has taken or received a child into custody on a charge of committing an offense, the officer shall immediately inform the child of his constitutional rights and afford him the protections required thereunder, notify the parent, or if the child is committed, the Department of Juvenile Justice or the cabinet, as appropriate, and if the parent is not available, then a relative, guardian, or person exercising custodial control or supervision of the child, that the child has been taken into custody, give an account of specific charges against the child, including the specific statute alleged to have been violated, and the reasons for taking the child into custody.
    1. When a peace officer has taken or received a child into protective custody on suspicion of being a runaway, the officer shall immediately notify: (2) (a) When a peace officer has taken or received a child into protective custody on suspicion of being a runaway, the officer shall immediately notify:
      1. The child’s parent, guardian, or person exercising custodial control or supervision of the child, if determined;
      2. The cabinet or Department of Juvenile Justice, if appropriate; and
      3. The court-designated worker.
    2. If the parent, guardian, or other person exercising custodial control or supervision is identified and notified, the peace officer may retain custody of the child for a reasonable period to allow the person notified the opportunity to arrive at the officer’s location and collect the child.
    3. If the parent, guardian, or other person exercising custodial control or supervision cannot be identified or located, the peace officer may retain custody of the child for a period of time not to exceed two (2) hours to continue his or her investigation.
    4. If, at the conclusion of the peace officer’s investigation, the parent, guardian, or person exercising custodial control or supervision of the child is identified and notified, the peace officer shall return the child to the custody of that person and shall file a status offense case with the court-designated worker.
    5. If, at the conclusion of the peace officer’s investigation, the parent, guardian, or person exercising custodial control or supervision of the child cannot be identified or located, or that person refuses to collect the child, the peace officer shall file a complaint pursuant to KRS 610.012 .
  2. Unless the child is subject to trial as an adult or unless the nature of the offense or other circumstances are such as to indicate the necessity of retaining the child in custody, the officer shall release the child to the custody of his parent or if the child is committed, the Department of Juvenile Justice or the cabinet, as appropriate; or if the parent is not available, then a relative, guardian, or person exercising custodial control or supervision or other responsible person or agency approved by the court upon the written promise, signed by such person or agency, to bring the child to the court at a stated time or at such time as the court may order. The written promise, accompanied by a written report by the officer, shall be submitted forthwith to the court or court-designated worker and shall detail the reasons for having taken custody of the child, the release of the child, the person to whom the child was released, and the reasons for the release.
    1. If the person fails to produce the child as agreed or upon notice from the Court as provided in subsection (3) of this section, a summons, warrant, or custody order may be issued for the apprehension of the person or of the child, or both. (4) (a) If the person fails to produce the child as agreed or upon notice from the Court as provided in subsection (3) of this section, a summons, warrant, or custody order may be issued for the apprehension of the person or of the child, or both.
    2. If the person notified to collect a suspected runaway pursuant to subsection (2)(a) of this section fails or refuses to collect the child, the peace officer shall notify the county attorney, who may file a charge of endangering the welfare of a minor, and the cabinet.
  3. The release of a child pursuant to this section shall not preclude a peace officer from proceeding with a complaint against a child or any other person.
  4. Unless the child is subject to trial as an adult, if the child is not released, the peace officer shall contact the court-designated worker who may:
    1. Release the child to his parents;
    2. Release the child to such other persons or organizations as are authorized by law;
    3. Release the child to either of the above subject to stated conditions; or
    4. Except as provided in subsection (7) of this section, authorize the peace officer to retain custody of the child for an additional period not to exceed twelve (12) hours during which the peace officer may transport the child to a secure juvenile detention facility or a nonsecure facility. If the child is retained in custody, the court-designated worker shall give notice to the child’s parents or person exercising custodial control or supervision of the fact that the child is being retained in custody.
    1. Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this subsection, no child ten (10) years of age or under shall be taken to or placed in a juvenile detention facility. (7) (a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this subsection, no child ten (10) years of age or under shall be taken to or placed in a juvenile detention facility.
    2. Any child ten (10) years of age or under who has been charged with the commission of a capital offense or with an offense designated as a Class A or Class B felony may be taken to or placed in a secure juvenile detention facility or youth alternative center when there is no available less restrictive alternative.

History. Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 423, § 39, effective July 1, 1987; 1988, ch. 350, § 28, effective April 10, 1988; 1996, ch. 358, § 30, effective July 15, 1997; 1998, ch. 443, § 18, effective July 15, 1998; 2002, ch. 263, § 4, effective July 15, 2002; 2014, ch. 132, § 41, effective July 1, 2015.

Compiler’s Notes.

For this section as effective until July 1, 2015, see the preceding section also numbered KRS 610.200 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Custodial Interrogation.

Analysis that requires compliance with the provisions of KRS 610.200 as an important variable in determining whether a juvenile’s confession was given voluntarily should also apply to violations of KRS 610.220 . Shepherd v. Commonwealth, 251 S.W.3d 309, 2008 Ky. LEXIS 30 ( Ky. 2008 ).

Technical violation of KRS 610.200 , which requires a police officer who takes a child into custody to notify the child’s parents, did not automatically make a 16-year old defendant’s statement inadmissible where there was every indication that his confession was given voluntarily and he did not raise the issue of voluntariness at trial. Shepherd v. Commonwealth, 251 S.W.3d 309, 2008 Ky. LEXIS 30 ( Ky. 2008 ).

Even though a detective failed to immediately notify the juvenile defendant’s mother of her son’s arrest and charges in violation of KRS 610.200(1), the fact remained that the police had made efforts to contact her and keep her apprised of the situation, and prior to defendant’s arrest, his mother already knew that defendant was a suspect in the murder, that his brother had been arrested and taken into custody, and that the police were in pursuit of defendant; thus, there was no basis to suppress defendant’s statements based upon a failure to notify his mother. Taylor v. Commonwealth, 276 S.W.3d 800, 2008 Ky. LEXIS 313 ( Ky. 2008 ), cert. denied, 558 U.S. 865, 130 S. Ct. 175, 175 L. Ed. 2d 110, 2009 U.S. LEXIS 5366 (U.S. 2009).

As there was no evidence of police coercion or of defendant’s unwillingness to cooperate, there was no reason to suppress his confession based upon a technical violation of KRS 610.200 . Taylor v. Commonwealth, 276 S.W.3d 800, 2008 Ky. LEXIS 313 ( Ky. 2008 ), cert. denied, 558 U.S. 865, 130 S. Ct. 175, 175 L. Ed. 2d 110, 2009 U.S. LEXIS 5366 (U.S. 2009).

Notes to Unpublished Decisions

1. Failure to inform parent.

Unpublished decision: Where the inmate was a juvenile when he committed a murder and the police technically violated KRS 610.200 when they failed to contact the inmate’s mother but then advised the inmate of his Miranda rights and began questioning him, the admission of the inmate’s police statement did not violate his due process rights because: (1) the police did everything in their power to comply with the statute, (2) the inmate was not harmed by any errors the police may have made, and (3) there was no indication that the inmate’s statement was involuntary. The district court’s denial of the inmate’s 28 U.S.C.S. § 2254 petition for a writ of habeas corpus was affirmed. Mayberry v. Motley, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 638 (6th Cir. Ky. Jan. 12, 2005).

Research References and Practice Aids

Treatises

Caldwell’s Kentucky Form Book, 5th Ed., Practice Context for Juvenile Code Proceedings, § 258.00.

Petrilli, Kentucky Family Law, Juvenile Court, §§ 32.5, 32.14, 32.17, 32.20, 32.21.

Petrilli, Kentucky Family Law, Forms, Juvenile Court, Form 5.3, Form 5.5, Form 5.6.

610.210. Peace officer may take child to court-approved custody center. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 423, § 40, effective July 1, 1987) was repealed by Acts 1988, ch. 350, § 143, effective April 10, 1988.

610.220. Permitted purposes for holding child in custody — Time limitation — Extension — Separation from adult prisoners — Prohibition against attaching child to stationary object.

  1. Except as otherwise provided by statute, if an officer takes or receives a child into custody on an allegation of committing a public offense or into protective custody on being a suspected runaway, the child may be held at a police station, secure juvenile detention facility, youth alternative center, a nonsecure facility, or, as necessary, in a hospital or clinic for the following purposes:
    1. Identification and booking;
    2. Attempting to notify the parents or person exercising custodial control or supervision of the child, a relative, guardian, other responsible person, or the cabinet;
    3. Photographing;
    4. Fingerprinting;
    5. Physical examinations, including examinations for evidence;
    6. Evidence collection, including scientific tests;
    7. Records checks;
    8. Determining whether the child is subject to trial as an adult; and
    9. Other inquiries of a preliminary nature.
  2. A child may be held in custody pursuant to this section for a period of time not to exceed two (2) hours, unless an extension of time is granted. Permission for an extension of time may be granted by the court, trial commissioner, or court-designated worker pursuant to KRS 610.200 (6) (d) and the child may be retained in custody for up to an additional ten (10) hours at a facility of the type listed in subsection (1) of this section except for an intermittent holding facility for the period of retention.
  3. Any child held in custody pursuant to this section shall be sight and sound separated from any adult prisoners held in secure custody at the same location, and shall not be handcuffed to or otherwise securely attached to any stationary object.

History. Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 423, § 41, effective July 1, 1987; 1988, ch. 350, § 29, effective April 10, 1988; 1996, ch. 358, § 31, effective July 15, 1997; 2000, ch. 193, § 4, effective July 14, 2000; 2000, ch. 534, § 9, effective July 14, 2000; 2004, ch. 160, § 2, effective April 21, 2004; 2014, ch. 132, § 42, effective July 1, 2015.

Compiler’s Notes.

For this section as effective until July 1, 2015, see the preceding section also numbered KRS 610.220 .

NOTES TO DECISIONS

  1. Rights of Minors.
  2. Separation from Adults.
1. Rights of Minors.

A system of selective placement of juveniles in the county jail for dispositional and predispositional purposes, although for limited periods of time, constituted a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment in that it was treating, for punitive purposes, the juveniles as adults and yet not according them, for due process purposes, the rights accorded to adults. (Decided under prior law) Baker v. Hamilton, 345 F. Supp. 345, 1972 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14032 (W.D. Ky. 1972 ).

Trial courts should treat a violation of KRS 610.220 as an important factor in the overall determination of whether a juvenile defendant gave his statement voluntarily. Shepherd v. Commonwealth, 251 S.W.3d 309, 2008 Ky. LEXIS 30 ( Ky. 2008 ).

Sixteen-year old defendant’s claim that his police interview was coercive as a matter of law because he was held in custody longer than the statutory limit set forth in KRS 610.220(2) failed because defendant properly understood his Miranda rights, was not under the influence of any substance that would impair his judgment, and was not physically abused or coerced by the police; a possible technical violation of KRS 610.220(2) did not necessarily require the suppression of an otherwise voluntary statement. Shepherd v. Commonwealth, 251 S.W.3d 309, 2008 Ky. LEXIS 30 ( Ky. 2008 ).

Analysis that requires compliance with the provisions of KRS 610.200 as an important variable in determining whether a juvenile’s confession was given voluntarily should also apply to violations of KRS 610.220 . Shepherd v. Commonwealth, 251 S.W.3d 309, 2008 Ky. LEXIS 30 ( Ky. 2008 ).

As the police complied with KRS 610.220(2) in acquiring the necessary extensions to hold defendant in custody beyond the two-hour limit, the defendant answered the detective’s questions voluntarily, and there was no evidence of coercion, there were no grounds to suppress defendant’s taped statements. Taylor v. Commonwealth, 276 S.W.3d 800, 2008 Ky. LEXIS 313 ( Ky. 2008 ), cert. denied, 558 U.S. 865, 130 S. Ct. 175, 175 L. Ed. 2d 110, 2009 U.S. LEXIS 5366 (U.S. 2009).

2. Separation from Adults.

There was no legal authority for the detention of a thirteen (13) year-old child in any portion of a county jail that is not physically separated from sight and sound of all other portions of the jail. (Decided under prior law) Skeans v. Vanhoose, 512 S.W.2d 520, 1974 Ky. LEXIS 404 ( Ky. 1974 ).

Opinions of Attorney General.

This section statutorily authorizes the fingerprinting and photographing of juveniles taken or received into custody by an officer without the requirement of a court order. OAG 88-34 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Treatises

Petrilli, Kentucky Family Law, Juvenile Court, § 32.20.

610.230. Detaining children in jails. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 423, § 42, effective July 1, 1987) was repealed by Acts 1988, ch. 350, § 143, effective April 10, 1988.

610.240. Detention longer than specified time. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 423, § 43, effective July 1, 1987) was repealed by Acts 1988, ch. 350, § 143, effective April 10, 1988.

610.250. Conditional releases. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 423, § 44, effective July 1, 1987; 1988, ch. 350, § 30, effective April 10, 1988; 1996, ch. 358, § 32, effective July 15, 1997) was repealed by Acts 2002, ch. 193, § 19, effective July 14, 2000.

610.255. Peace officer may take child to court-approved center — Release of child without formal charges filed.

The peace officer may divert the child from the formal court process and take the child to a court-approved center offering voluntary services to children and release the child without formal charges being filed, if:

  1. The offense the child has allegedly committed under the provisions of KRS 610.010(1) is not a felony offense;
  2. The peace officer has received the permission of the parent or other responsible adult; and
  3. The peace officer has followed guidelines which the court has established for such release.

History. Enact. Acts 1988, ch. 350, § 31, effective April 10, 1988; 2008, ch. 87, § 19, effective July 15, 2008.

Research References and Practice Aids

Treatises

Petrilli, Kentucky Family Law, Juvenile Court, § 32.20.

610.260. Court options when detention exceeds specified time limits. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 423, § 45, effective July 1, 1987) was repealed by Acts 1988, ch. 350, § 143, effective April 10, 1988.

610.265. Detention of children in specified facilities — Time frame for holding detention hearing — Release of child required if hearing not held as specified.

  1. Any child who is alleged to be a status offender or who is accused of being in contempt of court on an underlying finding that the child is a status offender may be detained in a nonsecure facility or a secure juvenile detention facility for a period of time not to exceed twenty-four (24) hours, exclusive of weekends and holidays, pending a detention hearing. Any child who is accused of committing a public offense or of being in contempt of court on an underlying public offense may be detained in a secure juvenile detention facility or a nonsecure setting approved by the Department of Juvenile Justice for a period of time not to exceed forty-eight (48) hours, exclusive of weekends and holidays, pending a detention hearing.
  2. Within the period of detention described in subsection (1) of this section, exclusive of weekends and holidays, a detention hearing shall be held by the judge or trial commissioner of the court for the purpose of determining whether the child shall be further detained. At the hearing held pursuant to this subsection, the court shall consider the nature of the offense, the child’s background and history, and other information relevant to the child’s conduct or condition.
  3. If the court orders a child detained further, that detention shall be served as follows:
    1. If the child is charged with a capital offense, Class A felony, or Class B felony, detention shall occur in a secure juvenile detention facility pending the child’s next court appearance subject to the court’s review of the detention order prior to that court appearance;
    2. Except as provided in KRS 630.080(2), if it is alleged that the child is a status offender, the child may be detained in a secure juvenile detention facility for a period not to exceed twenty-four (24) hours after which detention shall occur in a nonsecure setting approved by the Department of Juvenile Justice pending the child’s next court appearance subject to the court’s review of the detention order prior to the next court appearance;
    3. If a status offender or a child alleged to be a status offender is charged with violating a valid court order, the child may be detained in a secure juvenile detention facility, or in a nonsecure setting approved by the Department of Juvenile Justice, for a period not to exceed forty-eight (48) hours, exclusive of weekends and holidays, pending the child’s next court appearance;
    4. Prior to ordering a status offender or alleged status offender who is subject to a valid court order securely detained because the child violated the valid court order, the court shall:
      1. Affirm that the requirements for a valid court order were met at the time the original order was issued;
      2. Make a determination during the adjudicatory hearing that the child violated the valid court order; and
      3. Within forty-eight (48) hours after the adjudicatory hearing on the violation of a valid court order by the child, exclusive of weekends and holidays, receive and review a written report prepared by an appropriate public agency that reviews the behavior of the child and the circumstances under which the child was brought before the court, determines the reasons for the child’s behavior, and determines whether all dispositions other than secure detention have been exhausted or are inappropriate. If a prior written report is included in the child’s file, that report shall not be used to satisfy this requirement. The child may be securely detained for a period not to exceed forty-eight (48) hours, exclusive of weekends and holidays, pending receipt and review of the report by the court. The hearing shall be conducted in accordance with the provisions of KRS 610.060 . The findings required by this subsection shall be included in any order issued by the court which results in the secure or nonsecure detention of a status offender; and
    5. If the child is charged with a public offense, or contempt on a public offense, and the county in which the case is before the court is served by a state operated secure detention facility under the statewide detention plan, the child shall be referred to the Department of Juvenile Justice for a security assessment and placement in an approved detention facility or program pending the child’s next court appearance.
  4. If, at the hearing conducted under subsection (2) of this section, the court conducts an adjudicatory hearing on the merits of a violation of a valid court order, that hearing shall conform to the requirements of KRS 630.080 .
  5. If the detention hearing is not held as provided in subsection (1) of this section, the child shall be released as provided in KRS 610.290 .
  6. If the child is not released, the court-designated worker shall notify the parent, person exercising custodial control or supervision, a relative, guardian, or other responsible adult, and the Department of Juvenile Justice or the cabinet, as appropriate.

History. Enact. Acts 1988, ch. 350, § 32, effective April 10, 1988; 1998, ch. 606, § 4, effective July 15, 1998; 2000, ch. 193, § 5, effective July 14, 2000; 2004, ch. 160, § 3, effective April 21, 2004; 2008, ch. 87, § 5, effective July 15, 2008; 2014, ch. 132, § 43, effective July 1, 2015.

Compiler’s Notes.

For this section as effective until July 1, 2015, see the preceding section also numbered KRS 610.265 .

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(7/15/2008). 2008 Ky. Acts ch. 87, sec. 5 amended KRS 610.265 . This amendment inserted the following phrase at the beginning of subsection (4) of this section: “If, at the hearing conducted under subsection (3) paragraph (c) of this section, ...”. It appears that this reference is not correct. Subsection (3)(c) of this section does not mention hearings. It appears that the reference should have been to subsection (2) of KRS 610.265 , which does deal with hearings. The Reviser of Statutes has made this change under the authority of KRS 7.136(1)(e).

NOTES TO DECISIONS

  1. Rights of Minors.
  2. Separation from Adults.
1. Rights of Minors.

A system of selective placement of juveniles in the county jail for dispositional and predispositional purposes, although for limited periods of time, constituted a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment in that it was treating, for punitive purposes, the juveniles as adults and yet not according them, for due process purposes, the rights accorded to adults. Baker v. Hamilton, 345 F. Supp. 345, 1972 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14032 (W.D. Ky. 1972 ) (decided under prior law).

Express statutory authority anticipated that a juvenile court had the power to hold a child in contempt as KRS 610.010(10) (now (11)) specifically provided that nothing in “this chapter” would prevent a District Court from holding a child in contempt of court to enforce valid court orders previously issued by the court, KRS 610.265(1), 610.265(5) (now (3)) and 635.055 each set out provisions for the detention of a juvenile who was charged with being in contempt of court, and KRS 635.083(1) gave a juvenile court continuing jurisdiction over a juvenile who was convicted or adjudged delinquent of three (3) or more offenses, this jurisdiction continued even after the service of incarceration or other court-ordered punishment in the form of conditional discharge, and violation of the terms and conditions of conditional discharge could be punished as contempt of court. A.W. v. Commonwealth, 2003 Ky. App. LEXIS 91 (Ky. Ct. App. May 2, 2003), aff'd, 163 S.W.3d 4, 2005 Ky. LEXIS 88 ( Ky. 2005 ).

2. Separation from Adults.

There is no legal authority for the detention of a thirteen (13) year-old child in any portion of a county jail that is not physically separated from sight and sound of all other portions of the jail. Skeans v. Vanhoose, 512 S.W.2d 520, 1974 Ky. LEXIS 404 ( Ky. 1974 ) (decided under prior law).

Cited:

C.G. v. Commonwealth, 2003 Ky. App. LEXIS 57 (Ky. Ct. App. 2003), review denied and ordered not published, 2005 Ky. LEXIS 212 ( Ky. 2005 ); A.C. v. Commonwealth, 314 S.W.3d 319, 2010 Ky. App. LEXIS 98 (Ky. Ct. App. 2010).

Research References and Practice Aids

Treatises

Caldwell’s Kentucky Form Book, 5th Ed., Practice Context for Juvenile Code Proceedings, § 258.00.

Petrilli, Kentucky Family Law, Juvenile Court, § 32.20.

610.266. Restriction on placement of nonoffender or curfew violator.

The following persons shall not be detained in a secure juvenile detention facility:

  1. A nonoffender; or
  2. Any child charged with a violation of a statute or local ordinance pertaining to curfew.

History. Enact. Acts 2008, ch. 87, § 2, effective July 15, 2008; 2014, ch. 132, § 44, effective July 1, 2015.

Compiler’s Notes.

For this section as effective until July 1, 2015, see the preceding section also numbered KRS 610.266 .

610.267. Youth alternative centers. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1994, ch. 368, § 1, effective July 15, 1994; 1998, ch. 443, § 19, effective July 15, 1998) was repealed by Acts 2000, ch. 534, § 20, effective July 14, 2000. For present law, see KRS 15A.320 .

610.270. Failure to release to parent or other adult. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 423, § 46, effective July 1, 1987) was repealed by Acts 1988, ch. 350, § 143, effective April 10, 1988.

610.280. Considerations for and findings from detention hearing.

  1. At the detention hearing held pursuant to KRS 610.265 , the court shall make separate findings as follows:
    1. If there is probable cause to believe that an offense has been committed and that the accused child committed that offense. Probable cause may be established in the same manner as in a preliminary hearing in cases involving adults accused of felonies. The child shall be afforded the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses. The Commonwealth shall bear the burden of proof, and if it should fail to establish probable cause, the child shall be released and the complaint or petition dismissed unless the court determines further detention is necessary to assure the appearance of the child in court on another pending case;
    2. In determining whether a child should be further detained, the court shall consider the seriousness of the alleged offense, the possibility that the child would commit an offense dangerous to himself or the community pending disposition of the alleged offense, the child’s prior record, if any, and whether there are other charges pending against the child.
  2. If, after completion of the detention hearing, the court is of the opinion that detention is necessary, the order shall state on the record the specific reasons for detention.

History. Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 423, § 47, effective July 1, 1987; 1988, ch. 350, § 33, effective April 10, 1988; 1994, ch. 489, § 5, effective July 15, 1994; 1998, ch. 606, § 5, effective July 15, 1998; 2000, ch. 193, § 6, effective July 14, 2000; 2002, ch. 257, § 14, effective July 15, 2002.

Research References and Practice Aids

Treatises

Petrilli, Kentucky Family Law, Juvenile Court, § 32.20.

Petrilli, Kentucky Family Law, Forms, Juvenile Court, Form 5.5.

610.290. Rights of juvenile.

  1. Unless a hearing is held within the time frame established by KRS 610.265 , and the necessity for detention properly established, the child shall be released to the custody of his parents, person exercising custodial control or supervision or other responsible adult pending further disposition of the case.
  2. The child shall have a right to counsel at his detention hearing determining his right to freedom pending the disposition of his case, and his parents, person exercising custodial control or supervision or other responsible adult shall have a right to attend the hearing if such attendance will not unnecessarily delay the hearing. Any person aggrieved by a proceeding under this subsection may proceed by habeas corpus to the Circuit Court.
  3. Whether the child is released before or after a hearing, or is detained as a result of such hearing, the child and his parents, person exercising custodial control or supervision or other responsible adult shall be given written notice of the time and place of the adjudicatory hearing concerning the child and an account of the specific charges against the child, including the specific statute alleged to have been violated. Such notice shall be given at least seventy-two (72) hours prior to the initial hearing on the case.

History. Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 423, § 48, effective July 1, 1987; 1988, ch. 350, § 34, effective April 10, 1988; 2000, ch. 193, § 7, effective July 14, 2000; 2004, ch. 160, § 4, effective April 21, 2004.

Research References and Practice Aids

Treatises

Petrilli, Kentucky Family Law, Juvenile Court, §§ 32.5, 32.20.

610.295. Detention costs — Assessment against parent after hearing — Payments when adjudication based on status offense or public offense — Payment schedule and discharge.

  1. Any statute to the contrary notwithstanding, detention costs shall not be assessed by a court against a parent unless the court has conducted a hearing and has determined:
    1. That the child has previously been adjudicated as a habitual truant under KRS Chapter 630, a public offender under KRS Chapter 635, or a youthful offender under KRS Chapter 640, and now stands adjudicated guilty of a subsequent habitual truancy or public offense, or is now being considered for transfer to the Circuit Court for trial as a youthful offender; and
    2. That the failure or neglect of the parent to properly supervise or control the child is a substantial contributing factor of the act or acts of the child upon which the proceeding is based; and
    3. That the parent has the financial ability to pay any fees ordered.
  2. Any orders for payment shall direct that payments be made to the fiscal court or legislative body of a consolidated local government, urban-county government, or charter government if detention is based upon adjudication related to a status offense and to the Department of Juvenile Justice if the adjudication is based upon a public offense or transfer as a youthful offender.
  3. The fiscal court or legislative body of a consolidated local government, urban-county government, or charter government or the Department of Juvenile Justice, as appropriate, shall establish a payment schedule for parents against whom detention costs have been assessed, and may discharge any remaining portion of the debt upon proof of substantial change in circumstances of the parent.
  4. The authority granted under subsection (3) of this section may be applied to all pre-existing court orders assessing detention costs in effect on July 15, 2002.

History. Enact. Acts 2002, ch. 263, § 5, effective July 15, 2002.

610.300. Evidence in public offense investigations.

  1. Physical evidence shall be obtained and utilized in the investigation of public offenses involving children in the same manner as it is obtained and utilized in the investigation of public offenses involving adults.
  2. Except for fingerprint records, all records and physical evidence so obtained shall be surrendered to the court upon motion for good cause shown. All records, including fingerprint records, shall be subject to expungement in the manner provided in KRS 431.076 for circumstances specified therein.
  3. The court shall, upon receipt of physical evidence, return any evidence which is not contraband and is not needed for further prosecution, to its lawful owner. The fingerprint cards created pursuant to KRS Chapters 600 to 645 shall be transferred pursuant to KRS 17.110 .

History. Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 423, § 49, effective July 1, 1987; 1988, ch. 350, § 35, effective April 10, 1988; 1998, ch. 606, § 31, effective July 15, 1998.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Photograph.

Where a photograph was taken of a juvenile defendant and admittedly not disposed of as required by former law regarding disposition of physical evidence in juvenile proceedings, the photograph was properly used as identification evidence in the subsequent unrelated armed robbery trial of the defendant as an adult, since the defendant was an adult when the photograph was used against him and thus he was not within the protective aegis of the statute, which is a deterrent to specific conduct of police authorities and is not constitutional in nature. (Decided under prior law) Commonwealth v. Gordon, 621 S.W.2d 27, 1981 Ky. LEXIS 269 ( Ky. 1981 ).

610.310. Medical treatment for child.

  1. When the mental or physical health of any child before the juvenile court requires it, the court may order the child to be placed in a public or private hospital or institution for examination, evaluation, treatment, or care by a health officer, comprehensive care center, children’s clinic, or any reputable physician or psychologist who will conduct the examination. The cabinet and the Department of Juvenile Justice may furnish services under agreements with the individual juvenile courts. For this purpose, any county judge/executive or chief executive officer of an urban-county or charter county government may enter into a contract on behalf of his or her county with the cabinet or the Department of Juvenile Justice for the furnishings of these services.
  2. The court may order or consent to necessary medical treatment, including surgical procedures, except for the purpose of abortion, electroshock therapy or psychosurgery as provided in KRS Chapter 645, or sterilization, after a hearing conducted to determine the necessity of such treatment or procedure. In making the order, the court may take into consideration the religious beliefs and practices of the child and his parents or guardian. Reasonable notice, taking into account any emergency circumstances, shall be provided to the parents, guardian or person exercising custodial control or supervision of the child to enable them to attend the hearing.

History. Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 423, § 50, effective July 1, 1987; 1988, ch. 350, § 36, effective April 10, 1988; 2000, ch. 534, § 10, effective July 14, 2000.

Opinions of Attorney General.

The language of subsection (2) of this section which permits a court to consider the religious beliefs of a child and his parents or guardian prior to ordering medical treatment for the child does not provide a lesser standard of protection for one group of children. OAG 94-34 .

610.320. Juvenile record and juvenile docket — Disclosure of information in court and police records concerning juvenile prohibited — Exceptions — Use of juvenile records in court.

  1. A special record book shall be kept by the court for all cases, to be known as the “juvenile record,” and the docket or calendar of such cases shall be called the “juvenile docket.”
  2. No probation officer, nor employee of a probation officer, shall, without the consent of the District Judge sitting in juvenile session, divulge or communicate to any persons other than the court, law enforcement, the Department of Juvenile Justice, an officer of the court interested in the case, a member of the advisory board of the court, or a representative of the cabinet, any information obtained pursuant to the discharge of his duties, nor shall any record of the action of the probation officer be made public except by leave of the District Judge; provided, that nothing in this subsection shall prohibit the probation officer from divulging or communicating such information to the court, to his colleagues or superiors in his own department, or to another probation officer having a direct interest in the record or social history of the child.
  3. All law enforcement and court records regarding children who have not reached their eighteenth birthday shall not be opened to scrutiny by the public, except that a separate public record shall be kept by the clerk of the court which shall be accessible to the public for court records, limited to the petition, order of the adjudication, and disposition in juvenile delinquency proceedings concerning a child who is fourteen (14) years of age or older at the time of the commission of the offense, and who is adjudicated a juvenile delinquent for the commission of an offense that would constitute a capital offense or a Class A, B, or C felony if the juvenile were an adult, or any offense involving a deadly weapon, or an offense wherein a deadly weapon is used or displayed.
  4. Release of the child’s treatment, medical, mental, or psychological records is prohibited unless presented as evidence in Circuit Court. Release of any records resulting from the child’s prior abuse and neglect under Title IV-E or Title IV-B of the Federal Social Security Act is also prohibited. Otherwise, the law enforcement records shall be made available to the child, family, guardian, or legal representative of the child involved. The records shall also be made available to the court, probation officers, prosecutors, the Department of Juvenile Justice, and law enforcement agencies or representatives of the cabinet. Records, limited to the child’s adjudication of delinquency, and disposition of a criminal activity covered by KRS 610.345 , shall also be made available to public or private elementary and secondary school administrative, transportation, and counseling personnel, and to any teacher to whose class the student has been assigned for instruction, subject to the provisions of KRS 610.340 and 610.345 .
  5. Subject to the Kentucky Rules of Evidence, juvenile court records of adjudications of guilt of a child for an offense which would be a felony if committed by an adult shall be admissible in court at any time the child is tried as an adult, or after the child becomes an adult, at any subsequent criminal trial relating to that same person. Juvenile court records made available pursuant to this section may be used for impeachment purposes during a criminal trial, and may be used during the sentencing phase of a criminal trial. However, the fact that a juvenile has been adjudicated delinquent of an offense which would be a felony if the child had been an adult shall not be used in finding the child to be a persistent felony offender based upon that adjudication.
  6. This section shall not relieve the probation officer or peace officer from divulging such facts as a witness in a trial or hearing involving any cases falling under KRS Chapters 600 to 645 or the production of juvenile records for use in the trial or proceedings.
  7. This section shall not prohibit release of information regarding juvenile proceedings in the District Court which do not reveal the identity of the child or its parents or guardians, or which relate to the child’s eligibility for services under Title IV-E or IV-B of the Federal Social Security Act. Release of the child’s treatment, medical, mental, or psychological records is prohibited unless presented as evidence in Circuit Court.

History. Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 423, § 51, effective July 1, 1987; 1988, ch. 350, § 37, effective April 10, 1988; 1996, ch. 358, § 36, effective July 1, 1996 and July 15, 1997; 1998, ch. 493, § 15, effective April 10, 1998; 1998, ch. 606, § 22, effective July 15, 1998; 2006, ch. 182, § 68, effective July 12, 2006.

Compiler’s Notes.

Titles IV-E and IV-B of the federal Social Security Act, referred to in (4) and (7), may be found as as 42 USCS § 670 et seq. and 42 USCS § 621 et seq., respectively.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Freedom of the Press.

Denial of access to juvenile court records under the Kentucky Uniform Juvenile Code, KRS 610.070 , did not violate a press association’s First Amendment right of access to the courts because (1) the right of access was not extended to juvenile proceedings, and (2) the presumption of openness did not apply to juvenile proceedings as they were historically closed to the public and public access to such proceedings would frustrate the purpose of the juvenile courts. Ky. Press Ass'n v. State, 355 F. Supp. 2d 853, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2514 (E.D. Ky. 2005 ).

Cited:

Howard v. Commonwealth, 318 S.W.3d 607, 2010 Ky. App. LEXIS 41 (Ky. Ct. App. 2010).

Commonwealth v. Deweese, 141 S.W.3d 372, 2003 Ky. App. LEXIS 267 (Ky. Ct. App. 2003).

Opinions of Attorney General.

The Kentucky State Police improperly relied on subsection (3) of this section, KRS 61.878(1)(a) and (k), and 620.050(4), in denying a request to inspect the files generated in the course of its investigation into a candidate for county sheriff who was charged with sodomy, sexual abuse and unlawful transaction with a minor. Although the privacy interests of the juveniles whose names appeared in those records were superior to the public’s interest in disclosure of their identities, that interest could be protected by redaction of the juveniles’ names and personally identifiable information. The candidate’s privacy interests, however, were outweighed by the public’s interest in assessing his fitness to serve as county sheriff, and the public’s interest in evaluating the performance of the Kentucky State Police in investigating the case. OAG 93-ORD-42.

Subsection (3) of this section, KRS 61.878(1)(k) and 620.050(4) are aimed at protecting juveniles, and not adults who are criminally prosecuted for victimizing juveniles. OAG 93-ORD-42.

A transcript of grand jury testimony is a record subject to the exclusive control of the judiciary. Therefore, a person seeking the release of grand jury testimony involving reference to a juvenile covered by this section, KRS 610.340 , or KRS 610.340 (6) must do so by motion to the court with control over the record. OAG 95-17 .

The protection provided by subsection (3) of this section, which is incorporated into the Open Records Act by operation of KRS 61.878(1)( l ), is not expressly, or by implication, limited to living juveniles nor does it exclude from its coverage situations where the juvenile has died; thus the Urban County Government properly denied a reporter’s request to inspect documents and records regarding the suicides of two juveniles. 95-ORD-7.

The deletion of juvenile law enforcement records, per subsection (3) of this section and KRS 61.878(1)( l ), from an existing database of arrest records is not equivalent to the production of a record in a specially tailored or nonstandardized format within the meaning of KRS 61.874(3), thus, the Division of Police is required to discharge this duty under KRS 61.878(4), provide the requested records, and bear the cost of redaction. OAG 95-ORD-82.

Subsection (3) prohibits disclosure of juvenile law enforcement records, but does not apply when the law enforcement records relate to a juvenile victim of crime; nevertheless, portions of those law enforcement records revealing the identity of the victim may be withheld under authority of KRS 61.878(1)(a) when, because of the nature and circumstances of the crime perpetrated against the juvenile, his privacy interests outweigh the public’s interest in disclosure. OAG 99-ORD-29.

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Bench & Bar.

Wiederstein, Closed Courtrooms and the Public’s Right of Access, Vol. 67, No. 4, July 2003, Ky. Bench & Bar 15.

610.330. Expungement of offenses and proceedings from juvenile court records.

    1. Any child who has been adjudicated as coming within the purview of KRS Chapter 630, 635, or 645, but not KRS Chapter 620 or 640, may petition the court for the expungement of offenses from his or her juvenile court record. He or she shall be informed of such right at the time of adjudication. (1) (a) Any child who has been adjudicated as coming within the purview of KRS Chapter 630, 635, or 645, but not KRS Chapter 620 or 640, may petition the court for the expungement of offenses from his or her juvenile court record. He or she shall be informed of such right at the time of adjudication.
    2. The court on its own motion, or on the motion of a probation officer of the court, a representative of the Department of Juvenile Justice or the cabinet, or any other interested person, may initiate expungement proceedings concerning the record of any child who has been under the jurisdiction of the court.
    3. Expungement shall not be granted if:
      1. There are any proceedings pending or being instituted against the child;
      2. The offense is a sex crime, as defined in KRS 17.500 ; or
      3. The offense would classify a person as a violent offender under KRS 439.3401 .
  1. A petition may seek the expungement from the juvenile court record of:
    1. Misdemeanors, violations, or status offenses;
    2. A single felony; or
    3. A series of felonies arising from a single incident.
  2. The petition shall be filed or the court order entered no sooner than two (2) years after the date of termination of the court’s jurisdiction over the person, or two (2) years after his or her unconditional release from commitment to the Department of Juvenile Justice or the Cabinet for Health and Family Services or a public or private agency, except that the two (2) year period may be waived if the court finds that such extraordinary circumstances exist with regard to the petitioner as to make the waiver advisable.
  3. Upon the filing of a petition or entering of a court order, the court shall set a date for a hearing and shall notify the county attorney and anyone else whom the court or the child, his or her parents, relatives, guardian, or custodian has reason to believe may have relevant information related to the expungement of the record.
  4. The court may order the adjudication vacated and all records expunged in the petitioner’s case in the custody of the court and any of these records in the custody of any other agency or official, including law enforcement and public or private elementary and secondary school records, unless at the hearing the county attorney establishes that the child or offense is ineligible for expungement under subsections (1) to (4) of this section
  5. Upon the entry of an order to expunge the records, the proceedings in the case shall be deemed never to have occurred and all index references shall be deleted and the person and court may properly reply that no record exists with respect to such person upon any inquiry in the matter. The person whose record is expunged shall not have to disclose the fact of the record or any matter relating thereto on an application for employment, credit, or other type of application.
  6. If a court dismisses a petition against a child or finds a child not delinquent in a juvenile proceeding, the court shall concurrently order the record of the proceeding expunged. The order expunging the proceedings shall not require any action by the child.
  7. Copies of the order shall be sent to each agency or official named therein.
  8. Inspection of the records included in the order may thereafter be permitted by the court only upon petition by the person who is the subject of such records, and only to those persons named in such petition.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 423, § 52, effective July 1, 1987; 1988, ch. 350, § 38, effective April 10, 1988; 1996, ch. 358, § 37, effective July 15, 1997; 1998, ch. 426, § 615, effective July 15, 1998; 1998, ch. 443, § 20, effective July 15, 1998; 2005, ch. 99, § 663, effective June 20, 2005; 2008, ch. 87, § 20, effective July 15, 2008; 2017 ch. 112, § 1, effective June 29, 2017.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

  1. Duty to Disclose.
  2. Freedom of the Press.
1. Duty to Disclose.

A thirty (30) day suspension from the practice of law, pending a favorable character and fitness review, was the proper penalty for attorney’s failure to disclose on his application for bar admission a prior conviction for endangering the welfare of a minor, where the conviction was sealed under former KRS 208.275(4) (now KRS 610.330(4)), and where attorney exercised diligence in attempting to ascertain his duty to report the conviction. Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Guidugli, 967 S.W.2d 587, 1998 Ky. LEXIS 52 ( Ky. 1998 ).

2. Freedom of the Press.

Expungement of juvenile court records under the Kentucky Uniform Juvenile Code, KRS 610.330 , did not violate a press association’s First Amendment right of access to the courts because (1) the right of access was not extended to juvenile proceedings, and (2) the presumption of openness did not apply to juvenile proceedings as they were historically closed to the public and public access to such proceedings would frustrate the purpose of the juvenile courts. Ky. Press Ass'n v. State, 355 F. Supp. 2d 853, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2514 (E.D. Ky. 2005 ).

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Bench & Bar.

Foellger, “Toughening” The Juvenile Code: Did We Or Didn’t We?, Vol. 60, No. 3, Summer 1996, Ky. Bench & Bar 43.

Wiederstein, Closed Courtrooms and the Public’s Right of Access, Vol. 67, No. 4, July 2003, Ky. Bench & Bar 15.

Treatises

Caldwell’s Kentucky Form Book, 5th Ed., Practice Context for Juvenile Code Proceedings, § 258.00.

Petrilli, Kentucky Family Law, Forms, Juvenile Court, Form 5.8.

610.340. Confidentiality of juvenile court records.

    1. Unless a specific provision of KRS Chapters 600 to 645 specifies otherwise, all juvenile court records of any nature generated pursuant to KRS Chapters 600 to 645 by any agency or instrumentality, public or private, shall be deemed to be confidential and shall not be disclosed except to the child, parent, victims, or other persons authorized to attend a juvenile court hearing pursuant to KRS 610.070 unless ordered by the court for good cause. (1) (a) Unless a specific provision of KRS Chapters 600 to 645 specifies otherwise, all juvenile court records of any nature generated pursuant to KRS Chapters 600 to 645 by any agency or instrumentality, public or private, shall be deemed to be confidential and shall not be disclosed except to the child, parent, victims, or other persons authorized to attend a juvenile court hearing pursuant to KRS 610.070 unless ordered by the court for good cause.
    2. Juvenile court records which contain information pertaining to arrests, petitions, adjudications, and dispositions of a child may be disclosed to victims or other persons authorized to attend a juvenile court hearing pursuant to KRS 610.070.
    3. Release of the child’s treatment, medical, mental, or psychological records is prohibited unless presented as evidence in Circuit Court. Any records resulting from the child’s prior abuse and neglect under Title IV-E or Title IV-B of the Federal Social Security Act shall not be disclosed to victims or other persons authorized to attend a juvenile court hearing pursuant to KRS 610.070.
    4. Victim access under this subsection to juvenile court records shall include access to records of adjudications that occurred prior to July 15, 1998.
  1. The provisions of this section shall not apply to public officers or employees engaged in the investigation of and in the prosecution of cases under KRS Chapters 600 to 645 or other portions of the Kentucky Revised Statutes. Any record obtained pursuant to this subsection shall be used for official use only, shall not be disclosed publicly, and shall be exempt from disclosure under the Open Records Act, KRS 61.870 to 61.884 .
  2. The provisions of this section shall not apply to any peace officer, as defined in KRS 446.010 , who is engaged in the investigation or prosecution of cases under KRS Chapters 600 to 645 or other portions of the Kentucky Revised Statutes. Any record obtained pursuant to this subsection shall be used for official use only, shall not be disclosed publicly, and shall be exempt from disclosure under the Open Records Act, KRS 61.870 to 61.884 .
  3. The provisions of this section shall not apply to employees of the Department of Juvenile Justice or cabinet or its designees responsible for any services under KRS Chapters 600 to 645 or to attorneys for parties involved in actions relating to KRS Chapters 600 to 645 or other prosecutions authorized by the Kentucky Revised Statutes.
  4. The provisions of this section shall not apply to records disclosed pursuant to KRS 610.320 or to public or private elementary and secondary school administrative, transportation, and counseling personnel, to any teacher or school employee with whom the student may come in contact, or to persons entitled to have juvenile records under KRS 610.345 , if the possession and use of the records is in compliance with the provisions of KRS 610.345 and this section.
  5. No person, including school personnel, shall disclose any confidential record or any information contained therein except as permitted by this section or other specific section of KRS Chapters 600 to 645, or except as permitted by specific order of the court.
  6. No person, including school personnel, authorized to obtain records pursuant to KRS Chapters 600 to 645 shall obtain or attempt to obtain confidential records to which he is not entitled or for purposes for which he is not permitted to obtain them pursuant to KRS Chapters 600 to 645.
  7. No person, including school personnel, not authorized to obtain records pursuant to KRS Chapters 600 to 645 shall obtain or attempt to obtain records which are made confidential pursuant to KRS Chapters 600 to 645 except upon proper motion to a court of competent jurisdiction.
  8. No person shall destroy or attempt to destroy any record required to be kept pursuant to KRS Chapters 600 to 645 unless the destruction is permitted pursuant to KRS Chapters 600 to 645 and is authorized by the court upon proper motion and good cause for the destruction being shown.
  9. As used in this section the term “KRS Chapters 600 to 645” includes any administrative regulations which are lawfully promulgated pursuant to KRS Chapters 600 to 645.
  10. Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit a crime victim from speaking publicly after the adjudication about his or her case on matters within his or her knowledge or on matters disclosed to the victim during any aspect of a juvenile court proceeding.

History. Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 423, § 53, effective July 1, 1987; 1996, ch. 358, § 38, effective July 1, 1996 and July 15, 1997; 1998, ch. 493, § 16, effective April 10, 1998; 1998, ch. 606, § 23, effective July 15, 1998; 2006, ch. 182, § 69, effective July 12, 2006; 2011, ch. 2, § 105, effective June 8, 2011; 2013, ch. 124, § 6, effective June 25, 2013.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(7/12/2006). This statute, as amended by 2006 Ky. Acts ch. 182, sec. 69, contained an internal reference in subsection (3) to “KRS 446.010 (24).” Under KRS 7.136(1)(e), this reference has been changed in codification to “KRS 446.010 (25)” by the Reviser of Statutes to reflect the insertion of a new subsection (24) in KRS 446.010 and the resulting renumbering of succeeding subsections in 2006 Ky. Acts ch. 149, sec. 237.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

  1. Purpose.
  2. Exclusion of Public and Press.
1. Purpose.

The purpose of the shroud of secrecy and confidentiality mandated by this section and KRS 610.070 is to protect the juvenile, and clearly this purpose was uppermost in the minds of the General Assembly; it was intended that trials of juveniles not be publicized in the news media, as such publicity would possibly deprive the juvenile of a fair trial and, more particularly, would likely diminish his or her prospect for rehabilitation. F.T.P. v. Courier-Journal, 774 S.W.2d 444, 1989 Ky. LEXIS 48 ( Ky. 1989 ).

2. Exclusion of Public and Press.

Although KRS 600.020(12) provides that the Unified Juvenile Code applies to matters conducted in the juvenile session of District Court, in light of KRS 610.070(3), this section, and Const., § 115, the public and press are to be excluded not only from all juvenile proceedings at the District Court level, but from all appellate proceedings stemming therefrom. F.T.P. v. Courier-Journal, 774 S.W.2d 444, 1989 Ky. LEXIS 48 ( Ky. 1989 ).

To exclude the press at the district level, but admit them at the appellate level would tend to nullify the original intent and purpose of the Legislature and the wholesome policy of the Uniform Juvenile Act. F.T.P. v. Courier-Journal, 774 S.W.2d 444, 1989 Ky. LEXIS 48 ( Ky. 1989 ).

Confidentiality of juvenile court records under the Kentucky Uniform Juvenile Code, KRS 610.340 did not violate a press association’s First Amendment right of access to the courts because (1) the right of access was not extended to juvenile proceedings, and (2) the presumption of openness did not apply to juvenile proceedings as they were historically closed to the public and public access to such proceedings would frustrate the purpose of the juvenile courts. Ky. Press Ass'n v. State, 355 F. Supp. 2d 853, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2514 (E.D. Ky. 2005 ).

Trial court did not err by denying defendant’s motion to allow a juvenile expert from his attorney’s office to review the juvenile court records of several of the victims because defendant provided no evidence that the dispositional information would be exculpatory, but merely only made vague references that what transpired in the juvenile cases would be part of his defense and would be exculpatory. Howard v. Commonwealth, 595 S.W.3d 462, 2020 Ky. LEXIS 11 ( Ky. 2020 ).

Cited:

G.F. v. Jaeger, 71 S.W.3d 96, 2000 Ky. App. LEXIS 56 (Ky. Ct. App. 2000); Manns v. Commonwealth, 80 S.W.3d 439, 2002 Ky. LEXIS 114 ( Ky. 2002 ); Commonwealth v. Deweese, 141 S.W.3d 372, 2003 Ky. App. LEXIS 267 (Ky. Ct. App. 2003).

Opinions of Attorney General.

A juvenile court’s orders appointing attorneys as specific juveniles’ guardians ad litem and orders authorizing their payment in specific cases are confidential juvenile court records and as such are excluded from public view, however, a public agency’s records that a specific attorney was paid a sum certain out of public funds for his or her service in a specific court as a guardian ad litem are not; if the agency’s records include the names of the juveniles involved, making release of such information an invasion of the juveniles’ privacy, those names may be removed from the records before allowing access to the records. OAG 90-62 .

Cabinet records of a disbursement to an individual for discharging the duty of guardian ad litem in juvenile court are not juvenile court records as envisioned by subsection (a) (now (1)) of this section; rather, they are public records of a public expenditure made by a public agency to a person in consideration of a public service which was performed under the auspices of the juvenile court. OAG 90-62 .

A transcript of grand jury testimony is a record subject to the exclusive control of the judiciary. Therefore, a person seeking the release of grand jury testimony involving reference to juvenile covered by KRS 610.320 or this section must do so by motion to the court with control over the record. OAG 95-17 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Bench & Bar.

Wiederstein, Closed Courtrooms and the Public’s Right of Access, Vol. 67, No. 4, July 2003, Ky. Bench & Bar 15.

Treatises

Petrilli, Kentucky Family Law, Juvenile Court, § 32.12; 1991 Supp., § 32.4.

610.342. Full access to all records relating to a child for that child’s attorney — Enforcement by court order.

  1. Any statute to the contrary notwithstanding, an attorney representing a child in any proceeding under KRS Chapters 600 to 645 or in any adult criminal proceeding shall have full access to all records, including juvenile records, held by law enforcement, courts, social work agencies, or any other record, public or private, relating to that child which the attorney believes is necessary to the representation of that child.
  2. All courts shall enforce the provisions of subsection (1) of this section through appropriate orders, upon request of an attorney representing a child in any proceeding specified in subsection (1) of this section.

History. Enact. Acts 1996, ch. 182, § 1, effective July 15, 1996.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Construction.

Only the Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure applicable to preliminary hearings apply in a juvenile transfer hearing pursuant to KRS 635.020(4), and as such RCr 3.07 controls, and the juvenile is not entitled to complete discovery until probable cause is established; furthermore, KRS 610.342 is not a rule of discovery, indeed if it were, the appellate court would be constrained to declare it an unconstitutional encroachment on the powers of the judiciary. Commonwealth v. DeWeese, 141 S.W.3d 372, 2003 Ky. App. LEXIS 267 (Ky. Ct. App. 2003).

610.345. School superintendent or principal to be notified when child found guilty or when petition is filed — Disclosure of records — Provision of offense history to school superintendent.

  1. When a child is adjudicated guilty of an offense which classifies him or her as a youthful offender, the judge in the court in which the matter was tried shall direct the clerk to notify the superintendent of the public school district in which the child is enrolled or the principal of any private elementary or secondary school which the child attends of the adjudication and the petition and disposition of the case. The name of the complainant shall be deleted. The court shall direct the appropriate prosecuting entity to give the school district or the school a statement of facts in the case. The superintendent shall notify the principal of the school in which the child is enrolled.
  2. When a child is adjudicated guilty of an offense which would classify him or her as a violent offender under KRS 439.3401 , or be a felony under KRS Chapter 218A, 508, 510, or 527 if committed by an adult, but which would not classify him or her as a youthful offender, the judge in the court in which the matter was tried shall direct the clerk to notify within five (5) days of the order the superintendent of the public school district in which the child is enrolled or the principal of any private elementary or secondary school which the child attends of the charge, the adjudication, and the disposition of the case. The name of the complainant shall be deleted. The court shall authorize the county attorney to give the school district or the school a statement of facts in the case. The superintendent shall notify the principal of the school in which the child is enrolled.
  3. When a petition is filed against a child, or a child is adjudicated guilty of an offense that would be a felony or misdemeanor if committed by an adult, and the misdemeanor involves a controlled substance or the possession, carrying, or use of a deadly weapon, or physical injury to another person, the judge in the court in which the matter is considered shall direct the clerk to notify the superintendent of the public school district in which the child is enrolled or the principal of any private elementary or secondary school that the child attends of the charge, the adjudication, and the disposition of the case. The notification shall be made within twenty-four (24) hours of the time when the petition is filed. The name of the complainant shall be deleted. The court shall authorize the county attorney to give the school district or the school a statement of the facts in the case, not to include the complainant’s name. If the petition is dismissed, all records of the incident or notification created in the school district or the school under this subsection shall be destroyed, and shall not be included in the child’s school records.
  4. Notice of adjudication to a district superintendent referenced in subsections (2) and (3) of this section shall be released by the superintendent to the principal. A principal of a public or private school receiving notice of adjudication shall release the information to employees of the school having responsibility for classroom instruction or counseling of the child and may release it to other school personnel as described in subsection (5) of this section, but the information shall otherwise be confidential and shall not be shared by school personnel with any other person or agency except as may otherwise be required by law. The notification in writing of the nature of the offense committed by the child and any probation requirements shall not become a part of the child’s student record.
  5. Records or information disclosed pursuant to this section shall be limited to records of that student’s criminal petition and the disposition thereof covered by this section, shall be subject to the provisions of KRS 610.320 and 610.340 , and shall not be disclosed to any other person, including school personnel, except to a district superintendent, public or private elementary and secondary school administrative, transportation, and counseling personnel, and to any teacher or school employee with whom the student may come in contact. This section shall not authorize the disclosure of any other juvenile record or information relating to the child.
  6. The Department of Juvenile Justice shall provide a child’s offense history information pursuant to this section to the superintendent of the local school district in which the child, who is committed to the department, is placed.
  7. Records or information received by the school pursuant to this section shall be kept in a locked file, when not in use, to be opened only on permission of the administrator.

History. Enact. Acts 1996, ch. 358, § 34, effective July 15, 1996; 1998, ch. 493, § 17, effective April 10, 1998; 1998, ch. 606, § 182, effective July 15, 1998; 2002, ch. 257, § 19, effective July 15, 2002; 2004, ch. 185, § 1, effective July 13, 2004; 2006, ch. 182, § 70, effective July 12, 2006.

610.350. Fees.

  1. In proceedings in the juvenile session of the District Court, no court fees shall be charged against, and no witness fees shall be allowed to, any party to a petition. No public officer shall be entitled to receive any fee from the service of process or for attendance in court in any such proceedings. All other persons acting under orders of the court may be paid for service of process and attendance as witnesses. The payments for fees provided by law for like services in civil cases in the Circuit Court are to be made out of the county treasury. The county or state may compensate any officer or person in the amount prescribed by law for the transportation of a child to a place where he will be detained or placed or the return of any child to the jurisdiction of the court, and funds for this purpose may be appropriated and paid by the fiscal court.
  2. For the purpose of paying salaries and expenses necessary to carry out the purposes of KRS Chapters 600 to 645, the fiscal court of any county, or urban-county council of an urban-county government, may levy taxes and make appropriations within constitutional limitations. The legislative body of any city also is authorized to appropriate funds to assist the county in carrying out the purposes of KRS Chapters 600 to 645, including providing facilities for custody and care of children coming within the purview of KRS Chapters 600 to 645.

History. Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 423, § 54, effective July 1, 1987; 1988, ch. 350, § 39, effective April 10, 1988.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Payment by Interested Party.

The attempt by a Circuit Court to provide that neither the District Court nor Circuit Court would hear cases or any orders therein involving dependency or custody of children until the petitioner agreed to pay the fees of and costs expended by the guardian ad litem was an effort by that court to do what the statutes and decisions of the Kentucky courts have prohibited and the Circuit Court judgment on that point would be reversed. (Decided under prior law) Department for Human Resources v. Nester, 585 S.W.2d 437, 1979 Ky. App. LEXIS 444 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).

Research References and Practice Aids

Treatises

Petrilli, Kentucky Family Law, Juvenile Court, §§ 32.8, 32.11.

610.360. Court costs.

  1. Court costs commensurate with those in District or Circuit Court, as appropriate, shall be charged by the juvenile session of District Court against juveniles who are informally adjusted or found delinquent because of status offenses or public offenses and by the Circuit Court against juveniles who are found to be youthful offenders.
  2. Where possible, court costs shall be assessed against the child, but they may be assessed against the child’s parent or legal guardian.
  3. Court costs shall not be assessed against a parent or guardian who is the complainant against the child or who has been the victim of the child’s acts.
  4. In the case of children who have been committed, court costs shall not be assessed against the Department of Juvenile Justice or the cabinet.
  5. The court may require juveniles to pay court costs on the installment plan or in any other manner provided for fines by KRS Chapter 534 or to engage in community labor at state minimum wage rates to pay off their court costs. Labor to pay court costs shall be in addition to community labor ordered for other purposes.

History. Enact. Acts 1996, ch. 358, § 35, effective July 15, 1997; 1998, ch. 443, § 21, effective July 15, 1998.

610.990. Penalty.

Any person who intentionally violates any of the provisions of this chapter shall be guilty of a Class B misdemeanor.

History. Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 423, § 55, effective July 1, 1987; 1988, ch. 350, § 40, effective April 10, 1988.

Research References and Practice Aids

Treatises

Petrilli, Kentucky Family Law, Juvenile Court, § 32.20.

Petrilli, Kentucky Family Law, Support of Children (On Dissolution), § 27.13.

CHAPTER 615 Interstate Compacts

Interstate Compact on Juveniles

615.010. Interstate Compact for Juveniles — Purpose — Definitions — Commission — Powers — Organization, rulemaking, enforcement — Enactment by states — Withdrawal.

ARTICLE I. PURPOSE.

The compacting states to this Interstate Compact recognize that each state is responsible for the proper supervision or return of juveniles, delinquents and status offenders who are on probation or parole and who have absconded, escaped or run away from supervision and control and in so doing have endangered their own safety and the safety of others. The compacting states also recognize that each state is responsible for the safe return of juveniles who have run away from home and in doing so have left their state of residence. The compacting states also recognize that Congress, by enacting the Crime Control Act, 4 U.S.C. sec. 112 (1965), has authorized and encouraged compacts for cooperative efforts and mutual assistance in the prevention of crime.

It is the purpose of this compact, through means of joint and cooperative action among the compacting states to:

  1. Ensure that the adjudicated juveniles and status offenders subject to this compact are provided adequate supervision and services in the receiving state as ordered by the adjudicating judge or parole authority in the sending state;
  2. Ensure that the public safety interests of the citizens, including the victims of juvenile offenders, in both the sending and receiving states are adequately protected;
  3. Return juveniles who have run away, absconded or escaped from supervision or control or have been accused of an offense to the state requesting their return;
  4. Make contracts for the cooperative institutionalization in public facilities in member states for delinquent youth needing special services;
  5. Provide for the effective tracking and supervision of juveniles;
  6. Equitably allocate the costs, benefits, and obligations of the compacting states;
  7. Establish procedures to manage the movement between states of juvenile offenders released to the community under the jurisdiction of courts, juvenile departments, or any other criminal or juvenile justice agency which has jurisdiction over juvenile offenders;
  8. Ensure immediate notice to jurisdictions where defined offenders are authorized to travel or to relocate across state lines;
  9. Establish procedures to resolve pending charges (detainers) against juvenile offenders prior to transfer or release to the community under the terms of this compact;
  10. Establish a system of uniform data collection on information pertaining to juveniles subject to this compact that allows access by authorized juvenile justice and criminal justice officials, and regular reporting of compact activities to heads of state executive, judicial, and legislative branches and juvenile and criminal justice administrators;
  11. Monitor compliance with rules governing interstate movement of juveniles and initiate interventions to address and correct noncompliance;
  12. Coordinate training and education regarding the regulation of interstate movement of juveniles for officials involved in such activity; and
  13. Coordinate the implementation and operation of the compact with the Interstate Compact for the Placement of Children, the Interstate Compact for Adult Offender Supervision and other compacts affecting juveniles, particularly in those cases where concurrent or overlapping supervision issues arise. It is the policy of the compacting states that the activities conducted by the Interstate Commission created herein are the formation of public policies and therefore are public business. Furthermore, the compacting states shall cooperate and observe their individual and collective duties and responsibilities for the prompt return and acceptance of juveniles subject to the provisions of this compact. The provisions of this compact shall be reasonably and liberally construed to accomplish the purposes and policies of the compact.

ARTICLE II. DEFINITIONS.

As used in this compact, unless the context clearly requires a different construction:

  1. “By-laws” means those by-laws established by the Interstate Commission for its governance, or for directing or controlling its actions or conduct.
  2. “Compact administrator” means the individual in each compacting state appointed pursuant to the terms of this compact, responsible for the administration and management of the state’s supervision and transfer of juveniles subject to the terms of this compact, the rules adopted by the Interstate Commission and policies adopted by the State Council under this compact.
  3. “Compacting state” means any state which has enacted the enabling legislation for this compact.
  4. “Commissioner” means the voting representative of each compacting state appointed pursuant to Article III of this compact.
  5. “Court” means any court having jurisdiction over delinquent, neglected, or dependent children.
  6. “Deputy compact administrator” means the individual, if any, in each compacting state appointed to act on behalf of a Compact Administrator pursuant to the terms of this compact responsible for the administration and management of the state’s supervision and transfer of juveniles subject to the terms of this compact.
  7. “Interstate Commission” means the Interstate Commission for Juveniles created by Article III of this compact.
  8. “Juvenile” means any person defined as a juvenile in any member state or by the rules of the Interstate Commission, including:
    1. Accused delinquent - a person charged with an offense that, if committed by an adult, would be a criminal offense;
    2. Adjudicated delinquent - a person found to have committed an offense that, if committed by an adult, would be a criminal offense;
    3. Accused status offender - a person charged with an offense that would not be a criminal offense if committed by an adult;
    4. Adjudicated status offender - a person found to have committed an offense that would not be a criminal offense if committed by an adult; and
    5. Non-offender - a person in need of supervision who has not been accused or adjudicated a status offender or delinquent.
  9. “Noncompacting state” means any state which has not enacted the enabling legislation for this compact.
  10. “Probation or Parole” means any kind of supervision or conditional release of juveniles authorized under the law of the compacting states.
  11. “Rule” means a written statement by the Interstate Commission promulgated pursuant to Article VI of this compact that is of general applicability, implements, interprets or prescribes a policy or provision of the compact, or an organizational, procedural, or practice requirement of the Commission, and has the force and effect of statutory law in a compacting state, and includes the amendment, repeal, or suspension of an existing rule.
  12. “State” means a state of the United States, the District of Columbia or its designee, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, and the Northern Marianas Islands.

ARTICLE III. INTERSTATE COMMISSION FOR JUVENILES.

  1. The compacting states hereby create the “Interstate Commission for Juveniles.” The commission shall be a body corporate and joint agency of the compacting states. The commission shall have all the responsibilities, powers and duties set forth herein, and such additional powers as may be conferred upon it by subsequent action of the respective legislatures of the compacting states in accordance with the terms of this compact.
  2. The Interstate Commission shall consist of commissioners appointed by the appropriate appointing authority in each state pursuant to the rules and requirements of each compacting state and in consultation with the State Council for Interstate Juvenile Supervision created hereunder. The commissioner shall be the compact administrator, deputy compact administrator or designee from that state who shall serve on the Interstate Commission in such capacity under or pursuant to the applicable law of the compacting state.
  3. In addition to the commissioners who are the voting representatives of each state, the Interstate Commission shall include individuals who are not commissioners, but who are members of interested organizations. Such noncommissioner members must include a member of the national organizations of governors, legislators, state chief justices, attorneys general, Interstate Compact for Adult Offender Supervision, Interstate Compact for the Placement of Children, juvenile justice and juvenile corrections officials, and crime victims. All noncommissioner members of the Interstate Commission shall be ex officio nonvoting members. The Interstate Commission may provide in its by-laws for such additional ex officio nonvoting members, including members of other national organizations, in such numbers as shall be determined by the commission.
  4. Each compacting state represented at any meeting of the commission is entitled to one (1) vote. A majority of the compacting states shall constitute a quorum for the transactions of business, unless a larger quorum is required by the by-laws of the Interstate Commission.
  5. The commission shall meet at least once each calendar year. The chairperson may call additional meetings and, upon the request of a simple majority of the compacting states, shall call additional meetings. Public notice shall be given of all meetings and meetings shall be open to the public.
  6. The Interstate Commission shall establish an executive committee, which shall include commission officers, members, and others as determined by the by-laws. The executive committee shall have the power to act on behalf of the Interstate Commission during periods when the Interstate Commission is not in session, with the exceptions of rulemaking and amendment to the compact. The executive committee shall oversee the day-to-day activities of the administration of the compact managed by an executive director and Interstate Commission staff; administer enforcement and compliance with the provisions of the compact, its by-laws, and rules; and perform such other duties as directed by the Interstate Commission or set forth in the by-laws.
  7. Each member of the Interstate Commission shall have the right and power to cast a vote to which that compacting state is entitled and to participate in the business and affairs of the Interstate Commission. A member shall vote in person and shall not delegate a vote to another compacting state. However, a commissioner, in consultation with the state council, shall appoint another authorized representative, in the absence of the commissioner from that state, to cast a vote on behalf of the compacting state at a specified meeting. The by-laws may provide for members’ participation in meetings by telephone or other means of telecommunication or electronic communication.
  8. The Interstate Commission’s by-laws shall establish conditions and procedures under which the Interstate Commission shall make its information and official records available to the public for inspection or copying. The Interstate Commission may exempt from disclosure any information or official records to the extent they would adversely affect personal privacy rights or proprietary interests.
  9. Public notice shall be given of all meetings and all meetings shall be open to the public, except as set forth in the rules or as otherwise provided in the compact. The Interstate Commission and any of its committees may close a meeting to the public where it determines by two-thirds (2/3) vote that an open meeting would be likely to:
    1. Relate solely to the Interstate Commission’s internal personnel practices and procedures;
    2. Disclose matters specifically exempted from disclosure by statute;
    3. Disclose trade secrets or commercial or financial information which is privileged or confidential;
    4. Involve accusing any person of a crime, or formally censuring any person;
    5. Disclose information of a personal nature where disclosure would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;
    6. Disclose investigative records compiled for law enforcement purposes;
    7. Disclose information contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports prepared by, or on behalf of or for the use of, the Interstate Commission with respect to a regulated person or entity for the purpose of regulation or supervision of such person or entity;
    8. Disclose information, the premature disclosure of which would significantly endanger the stability of a regulated person or entity; or
    9. Specifically relate to the Interstate Commission’s issuance of a subpoena, or its participation in a civil action or other legal proceeding.
  10. For every meeting closed pursuant to this provision, the Interstate Commission’s legal counsel shall publicly certify that, in the legal counsel’s opinion, the meeting may be closed to the public, and shall reference each relevant exemptive provision. The Interstate Commission shall keep minutes which shall fully and clearly describe all matters discussed in any meeting and shall provide a full and accurate summary of any actions taken, and the reasons therefore, including a description of each of the views expressed on any item and the record of any roll call vote (reflected in the vote of each member on the question). All documents considered in connection with any action shall be identified in such minutes.
  11. The Interstate Commission shall collect standardized data concerning the interstate movement of juveniles as directed through its rules which shall specify the data to be collected, the means of collection, and data exchange and reporting requirements. Such methods of data collection, exchange, and reporting shall insofar as is reasonably possible conform to up-to-date technology and coordinate its information functions with the appropriate repository of records.

ARTICLE IV. POWERS AND DUTIES OF THE INTERSTATE COMMISSION.

The commission shall have the following powers and duties:

  1. To provide for dispute resolution among compacting states.
  2. To promulgate rules to effect the purposes and obligations as enumerated in this compact, which shall have the force and effect of statutory law and shall be binding in the compacting states to the extent and in the manner provided in this compact.
  3. To oversee, supervise, and coordinate the interstate movement of juveniles subject to the terms of this compact and any by-laws adopted and rules promulgated by the Interstate Commission.
  4. To enforce compliance with the compact provisions, the rules promulgated by the Interstate Commission, and the by-laws, using all necessary and proper means, including but not limited to the use of judicial process.
  5. To establish and maintain offices which shall be located within one (1) or more of the compacting states.
  6. To purchase and maintain insurance and bonds.
  7. To borrow, accept, hire, or contract for services of personnel.
  8. To establish and appoint committees and hire staff which it deems necessary for the carrying out of its functions, including but not limited to an executive committee as required by Article III, which shall have the power to act on behalf of the Interstate Commission in carrying out its powers and duties hereunder.
  9. To elect or appoint such officers, attorneys, employees, agents, or consultants, and to fix their compensation, define their duties, and determine their qualifications; and to establish the Interstate Commission’s personnel policies and programs relating to, inter alia, conflicts of interest, rates of compensation, and qualifications of personnel.
  10. To accept any and all donations and grants of money, equipment, supplies, materials, and services, and to receive, utilize, and dispose of it.
  11. To lease, purchase, accept contributions or donations of, or otherwise to own, hold, improve, or use any property, real, personal, or mixed.
  12. To sell, convey, mortgage, pledge, lease, exchange, abandon, or otherwise dispose of any property, real, personal, or mixed.
  13. To establish a budget and make expenditures and levy dues as provided in Article VIII of this compact.
  14. To sue and be sued.
  15. To adopt a seal and by-laws governing the management and operation of the Interstate Commission.
  16. To perform such functions as may be necessary or appropriate to achieve the purposes of this compact.
  17. To report annually to the legislatures, governors, judiciary, and state councils of the compacting states concerning the activities of the Interstate Commission during the preceding year. Such reports shall also include any recommendations that may have been adopted by the Interstate Commission.
  18. To coordinate education, training, and public awareness regarding the interstate movement of juveniles for officials involved in such activity.
  19. To establish uniform standards of the reporting, collecting, and exchanging of data.
  20. The Interstate Commission shall maintain its corporate books and records in accordance with the by-laws.

ARTICLE V. ORGANIZATION AND OPERATION OF THE INTERSTATE COMMISSION.

Section A. By-laws

  1. The Interstate Commission shall, by a majority of the members present and voting, within twelve (12) months after the first Interstate Commission meeting, adopt by-laws to govern its conduct as may be necessary or appropriate to carry out the purposes of the compact, including but not limited to:
    1. Establishing the fiscal year of the Interstate Commission;
    2. Establishing an executive committee and such other committees as may be necessary;
    3. Provide for the establishment of committees governing any general or specific delegation of any authority or function of the Interstate Commission;
    4. Providing reasonable procedures for calling and conducting meetings of the Interstate Commission, and ensuring reasonable notice of each such meeting;
    5. Establishing the titles and responsibilities of the officers of the Interstate Commission;
    6. Providing a mechanism for concluding the operations of the Interstate Commission and the return of any surplus funds that may exist upon the termination of the compact after the payment or reserving of all of its debts and obligations;
    7. Providing “start-up” rules for initial administration of the compact; and
    8. Establishing standards and procedures for compliance and technical assistance in carrying out the compact.

Section B. Officers and Staff

  1. The Interstate Commission shall, by a majority of the members, elect annually from among its members a chairperson and a vice chairperson, each of whom shall have such authority and duties as may be specified in the by-laws. The chairperson or, in the chairperson’s absence or disability, the vice-chairperson shall preside at all meetings of the Interstate Commission. The officers so elected shall serve without compensation or remuneration from the Interstate Commission; provided that, subject to the availability of budgeted funds, the officers shall be reimbursed for any ordinary and necessary costs and expenses incurred by them in the performance of their duties and responsibilities as officers of the Interstate Commission.
  2. The Interstate Commission shall, through its executive committee, appoint or retain an executive director for such period, upon such terms and conditions and for compensation as the Interstate Commission may deem appropriate. The executive director shall serve as secretary to the Interstate Commission, but shall not be a member and shall hire and supervise such other staff as may be authorized by the Interstate Commission.

Section C. Qualified Immunity, Defense, and Indemnification

  1. The Commission’s executive director and employees shall be immune from suit and liability, either personally or in their official capacity, for any claim for damage to or loss of property or personal injury or other civil liability caused or arising out of or relating to any actual or alleged act, error, or omission that occurred, or that such person had a reasonable basis for believing occurred within the scope of Commission employment, duties, or responsibilities; provided, that any such person shall not be protected from suit or liability for any damage, loss, injury, or liability caused by the intentional or willful and wanton misconduct of any such person.
  2. The liability of any commissioner, or the employee or agent of a commissioner, acting within the scope of such person’s employment or duties for acts, errors, or omissions occurring within such person’s state may not exceed the limits of liability set forth under the Constitution and laws of that state for state officials, employees, and agents. Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to protect any such person from suit or liability for any damage, loss, injury, or liability caused by the intentional or willful and wanton misconduct of any such person.
  3. The Interstate Commission shall defend the executive director or the employees or representatives of the Interstate Commission and, subject to the approval of the Attorney General of the state represented by any commissioner of a compacting state, shall defend such commissioner or the commissioner’s representatives or employees in any civil action seeking to impose liability arising out of any actual or alleged act, error, or omission that occurred within the scope of Interstate Commission employment, duties, or responsibilities, or that the defendant had a reasonable basis for believing occurred within the scope of Interstate Commission employment, duties, or responsibilities, provided that the actual or alleged act, error, or omission did not result from intentional or willful and wanton misconduct on the part of such person.
  4. The Interstate Commission shall indemnify and hold the commissioner of a compacting state, or the commissioner’s representatives or employees, or the Interstate Commission’s representatives or employees, harmless in the amount of any settlement or judgment obtained against such persons arising out of any actual or alleged act, error, or omission that occurred within the scope of Interstate Commission employment, duties, or responsibilities, or that such persons had a reasonable basis for believing occurred within the scope of Interstate Commission employment, duties, or responsibilities, provided that the actual or alleged act, error, or omission did not result from intentional or willful and wanton misconduct on the part of such persons.

ARTICLE VI. RULEMAKING FUNCTIONS OF THE INTERSTATE COMMISSION.

  1. The Interstate Commission shall promulgate and publish rules in order to effectively and efficiently achieve the purposes of the compact.
  2. Rulemaking shall occur pursuant to the criteria set forth in this article and the by-laws and rules adopted pursuant thereto. Such rulemaking shall substantially conform to the principles of the “Model State Administrative Procedures Act,” 1981 Act, Uniform Laws Annotated, Vol. 15, p. 1 (2000), or such other administrative procedures act, as the Interstate Commission deems appropriate consistent with due process requirements under the Constitution of the United States, as now or hereafter interpreted by the United States Supreme Court. All rules and amendments shall become binding as of the date specified, as published with the final version of the rule as approved by the Interstate Commission.
  3. When promulgating a rule, the Interstate Commission shall, at a minimum:
    1. Publish the proposed rule’s entire text stating the reasons for that proposed rule;
    2. Allow and invite any and all persons to submit written data, facts, opinions, and arguments, which information shall be added to the record and be made publicly available;
    3. Provide an opportunity for an informal hearing if petitioned by ten (10) or more persons; and
    4. Promulgate a final rule and its effective date, if appropriate, based on input from state or local officials, or interested parties.
  4. Allow, not later than sixty (60) days after a rule is promulgated, any interested person to file a petition in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia or in the Federal District Court where the Interstate Commission’s principal office is located for judicial review of such rule. If the court finds that the Interstate Commission’s action is not supported by substantial evidence in the rulemaking record, the court shall hold the rule unlawful and set it aside. For purposes of this subsection, evidence is substantial if it would be considered substantial evidence under the Model State Administrative Procedures Act.
  5. If a majority of the legislatures of the compacting states rejects a rule, those states may, by enactment of a statute or resolution in the same manner used to adopt the compact, cause that such rule shall have no further force and effect in any compacting state.
  6. The existing rules governing the operation of the Interstate Compact on Juveniles superseded by this compact shall be null and void twelve (12) months after the first meeting of the Interstate Commission created hereunder.
  7. Upon determination by the Interstate Commission that a state-of-emergency exists, it may promulgate an emergency rule which shall become effective immediately upon adoption, provided that the usual rulemaking procedures provided hereunder shall be retroactively applied to said rule as soon as reasonably possible, but no later than ninety (90) days after the effective date of the emergency rule.

ARTICLE VII. OVERSIGHT, ENFORCEMENT, AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION BY THE INTERSTATE COMMISSION.

Section A. Oversight

  1. The Interstate Commission shall oversee the administration and operations of the interstate movement of juveniles subject to this compact in the compacting states and shall monitor such activities being administered in noncompacting states which may significantly affect compacting states.
  2. The courts and executive agencies in each compacting state shall enforce this compact and shall take all actions necessary and appropriate to effectuate the compact’s purposes and intent. The provisions of this compact and the rules promulgated hereunder shall be received by all the judges, public officers, commissions, and departments of the state government as evidence of the authorized statute and administrative rules. All courts shall take judicial notice of the compact and the rules. In any judicial or administrative proceeding in a compacting state pertaining to the subject matter of this compact which may affect the powers, responsibilities, or actions of the Interstate Commission, it shall be entitled to receive all service of process in any such proceeding, and shall have standing to intervene in the proceeding for all purposes.

Section B. Dispute Resolution

  1. The compacting states shall report to the Interstate Commission on all issues and activities necessary for the administration of the compact, as well as issues and activities pertaining to compliance with the provisions of the compact and its by-laws and rules.
  2. The Interstate Commission shall attempt, upon the request of a compacting state, to resolve any disputes or other issues which are subject to the compact and which may arise among compacting states and between compacting and noncompacting states. The commission shall promulgate a rule providing for both mediation and binding dispute resolution for disputes among the compacting states.
  3. The Interstate Commission, in the reasonable exercise of its discretion, shall enforce the provisions and rules of this compact using any or all means set forth in Article XI of this compact.

ARTICLE VIII. FINANCE.

  1. The Interstate Commission shall pay or provide for the payment of the reasonable expenses of its establishment, organization, and ongoing activities.
  2. The Interstate Commission shall levy on and collect an annual assessment from each compacting state to cover the costs of the internal operations and activities of the Interstate Commission and its staff, which must be in a total amount sufficient to cover the Interstate Commission’s annual budget as approved each year. The aggregate annual assessment amount shall be allocated based upon a formula to be determined by the Interstate Commission, taking into consideration the population of each compacting state and the volume of interstate movement of juveniles in each compacting state and shall promulgate a rule binding upon all compacting states which governs said assessment.
  3. The Interstate Commission shall not incur any obligations of any kind prior to securing the funds adequate to meet the same; nor shall the Interstate Commission pledge the credit of any of the compacting states, except by and with the authority of the compacting state.
  4. The Interstate Commission shall keep accurate accounts of all receipts and disbursements. The receipts and disbursements of the Interstate Commission shall be subject to the audit and accounting procedures established under its by-laws. However, all receipts and disbursements of funds handled by the Interstate Commission shall be audited yearly by a certified or licensed public accountant and the report of the audit shall be included in and become part of the annual report of the Interstate Commission.

ARTICLE IX. THE STATE COUNCIL.

Each member state shall create a State Council for Interstate Juvenile Supervision. While each state may determine the membership of its own state council, its membership shall include at least one (1) representative from:

  1. The legislative branch of government;
  2. The judicial branch of government;
  3. The executive branch of government;
  4. Victims groups;
  5. The Department of Public Advocacy;
  6. The Kentucky Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers;
  7. The County Attorneys Association;
  8. The Commonwealth’s Attorneys Association; and
  9. The compact administrator, deputy compact administrator, or designee.

Each compacting state retains the right to determine the qualifications of the compact administrator or deputy compact administrator. Each state council will advise and may exercise oversight and advocacy concerning that state’s participation in Interstate Commission activities and other duties as may be determined by that state, including but not limited to development of policy concerning operations and procedures of the compact within that state.

ARTICLE X. COMPACTING STATES, EFFECTIVE DATE AND AMENDMENT.

  1. Any state, the District of Columbia or its designee, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, and the Northern Marianas Islands as defined in Article II of this compact is eligible to become a compacting state.
  2. The compact shall become effective and binding upon legislative enactment of the compact into law by no less than thirty-five (35) of the states. The initial effective date shall be the later of July 1, 2006, or upon enactment into law by the thirty-fifth jurisdiction. Thereafter, it shall become effective and binding as to any other compacting state upon enactment of the compact into law by that state. The governors of nonmember states or their designees shall be invited to participate in the activities of the Interstate Commission on a nonvoting basis prior to adoption of the compact by all states and territories of the United States.
  3. The Interstate Commission may propose amendments to the compact for enactment by the compacting states. No amendment shall become effective and binding upon the Interstate Commission and the compacting states unless and until it is enacted into law by unanimous consent of the compacting states.

ARTICLE XI. WITHDRAWAL, DEFAULT, TERMINATION, AND JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT.

Section A. Withdrawal

  1. Once effective, the compact shall continue in force and remain binding upon each and every compacting state; provided that a compacting state may withdraw from the compact by specifically repealing the statute which enacted the compact into law.
  2. The effective date of withdrawal is the effective date of the repeal.
  3. The withdrawing state shall immediately notify the chairperson of the Interstate Commission in writing upon the introduction of legislation repealing this compact in the withdrawing state. The Interstate Commission shall notify the other compacting states of the withdrawing state’s intent to withdraw within sixty (60) days of its receipt thereof.
  4. The withdrawing state is responsible for all assessments, obligations, and liabilities incurred through the effective date of withdrawal, including any obligations, the performance of which extend beyond the effective date of withdrawal.
  5. Reinstatement following withdrawal of any compacting state shall occur upon the withdrawing state reenacting the compact, or upon such later date as determined by the Interstate Commission.

Section B. Technical Assistance, Fines, Suspension, Termination, and Default

  1. If the Interstate Commission determines that any compacting state has at any time defaulted in the performance of any of its obligations or responsibilities under this compact, or the by-laws or duly promulgated rules, the Interstate Commission may impose any or all of the following penalties:
    1. Remedial training and technical assistance as directed by the Interstate Commission;
    2. Alternative Dispute Resolution;
    3. Fines, fees, and costs in amounts as are deemed to be reasonable as fixed by the Interstate Commission; and
    4. Suspension or termination of membership in the compact, which shall be imposed only after all other reasonable means of securing compliance under the by-laws and rules have been exhausted and the Interstate Commission has therefore determined that the offending state is in default. Immediate notice of suspension shall be given by the Interstate Commission to the Governor, the Chief Justice or the Chief Judicial Officer of the state, the majority and minority leaders of the defaulting state’s legislature, and the state council. The grounds for default include, but are not limited to, failure of a compacting state to perform such obligations or responsibilities imposed upon it by this compact, the by-laws, or duly promulgated rules and any other grounds designated in commission by-laws and rules. The Interstate Commission shall immediately notify the defaulting state in writing of the penalty imposed by the Interstate Commission and of the default pending a cure of the default. The commission shall stipulate the conditions and the time period within which the defaulting state must cure its default. If the defaulting state fails to cure the default within the time period specified by the commission, the defaulting state shall be terminated from the compact upon an affirmative vote of a majority of the compacting states and all rights, privileges, and benefits conferred by this compact shall be terminated from the effective date of termination.
  2. Within sixty (60) days of the effective date of termination of a defaulting state, the commission shall notify the Governor, the Chief Justice or Chief Judicial Officer, the Majority and Minority Leaders of the defaulting state’s legislature, and the state council of such termination.
  3. The defaulting state is responsible for all assessments, obligations, and liabilities incurred through the effective date of termination, including any obligations, the performance of which extends beyond the effective date of termination.
  4. The Interstate Commission shall not bear any costs relating to the defaulting state unless otherwise mutually agreed upon in writing between the Interstate Commission and the defaulting state.
  5. Reinstatement following termination of any compacting state requires both a reenactment of the compact by the defaulting state and the approval of the Interstate Commission pursuant to the rules.

Section C. Judicial Enforcement

The Interstate Commission may, by majority vote of the members, initiate legal action in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia or, at the discretion of the Interstate Commission, in the federal district where the Interstate Commission has its offices, to enforce compliance with the provisions of the compact, its duly promulgated rules and by-laws, against any compacting state in default. In the event judicial enforcement is necessary the prevailing party shall be awarded all costs of such litigation including reasonable attorneys fees.

Section D. Dissolution of Compact

  1. The compact dissolves effective upon the date of the withdrawal or default of the compacting state, which reduces membership in the compact to one (1) compacting state.
  2. Upon the dissolution of this compact, the compact becomes null and void and shall be of no further force or effect, and the business and affairs of the Interstate Commission shall be concluded and any surplus funds shall be distributed in accordance with the by-laws.

ARTICLE XII. SEVERABILITY AND CONSTRUCTION.

  1. The provisions of this compact shall be severable, and if any phrase, clause, sentence, or provision is deemed unenforceable, the remaining provisions of the compact shall be enforceable.
  2. The provisions of this compact shall be liberally construed to effectuate its purposes.

ARTICLE XIII. BINDING EFFECT OF COMPACT AND OTHER LAWS.

Section A. Other Laws

  1. Nothing herein prevents the enforcement of any other law of a compacting state that is not inconsistent with this compact.
  2. All compacting states’ laws other than state Constitutions and other interstate compacts conflicting with this compact are superseded to the extent of the conflict.

Section B. Binding Effect of the Compact

  1. All lawful actions of the Interstate Commission, including all rules and by-laws promulgated by the Interstate Commission, are binding upon the compacting states.
  2. All agreements between the Interstate Commission and the compacting states are binding in accordance with their terms.
  3. Upon the request of a party to a conflict over meaning or interpretation of Interstate Commission actions, and upon a majority vote of the compacting states, the Interstate Commission may issue advisory opinions regarding such meaning or interpretation.
  4. In the event any provision of this compact exceeds the constitutional limits imposed on the legislature of any compacting state, the obligations, duties, powers, or jurisdiction sought to be conferred by such provision upon the Interstate Commission shall be ineffective and such obligations, duties, powers, or jurisdiction shall remain in the compacting state and shall be exercised by the agency thereof to which such obligations, duties, powers, or jurisdiction are delegated by law in effect at the time this compact becomes effective.

Legislative Research Commission Notes.

(8/26/2008). Under 2005 Ky. Acts ch. 118, sec. 3, this statute is repealed and reenacted “upon the legislative enactment of the compact into law by no less than thirty-five (35) states or upon July 1, 2006, whichever is later.” On August 26, 2008, Illinois became the thirty-fifth state to enact the revised compact. Therefore, the repeal, reenactment, and amendment of KRS 615.010 contained in 2005 Ky. Acts ch. 118, sec. 1, is effective August 26, 2008.

Acts 1986, ch. 423, § 199 read: “KRS 446.250 to 446.320 to the contrary notwithstanding, Acts 1986, ch. 423 shall prevail in the event of a conflict between Acts 1986, ch. 423 and other Acts passed by the 1986 regular session of the General Assembly.”

615.020. Duties of compact administrator. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 423, § 57, effective July 1, 1987) was repealed by Acts 2005, ch. 118, § 2, effective July 1, 2006, upon contingency not being met.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

Under 2005 Ky. Acts ch. 118, sec. 3, this statute is repealed “upon the legislative enactment of the compact into law by no less than thirty-five (35) states or upon July 1, 2006, whichever is later.”

Interstate Compact on Placement of Children

615.030. Interstate compact for the placement of children. [Effective upon contingency.]

History. Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 423, § 58, effective July 1, 1987; 1988, ch. 283, § 17, effective July 15, 1988; 2012, ch. 146, § 139, effective July 12, 2012; repealed and reenact., Acts 2013, ch. 79, § 5.

Compiler’s Notes.

For this section as effective until the contingency set forth in Acts 2013, ch. 79 is met, see the previous section also numbered KRS 615.030 .

The catchline for KRS § 615.030 appears here to reflect a change in its text.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(6/25/2013). This statute was repealed and reenacted in 2013 Ky. Acts ch. 79, sec. 5. Section 9 of that Act prescribed that this statute would take effect as provided in Article XIV of this statute, upon the legislative enactment of the compact into law by no fewer than 35 states. Section 10 of that Act prescribed that the Cabinet for Health and Family Services must notify the Reviser of Statutes when the 35th state has enacted the compact. That threshold has not yet been met.

Research References and Practice Aids

Treatises

Petrilli, Kentucky Family Law, Juvenile Court, § 32.32.

Petrilli, Kentucky Family Law, Termination of Parental Rights and Adoption, § 29.13.

615.040. Definitions — Financial responsibility — Placement in another state — Bond. [Effective until contingency is met.]

The following provisions apply to the compact described in KRS 615.030 :

  1. The following definitions apply to KRS 615.030 :
    1. As used in paragraph (a) of Article V of the interstate compact on the placement of children, the phrase “appropriate authority in the receiving state” with reference to this state shall mean the Cabinet for Health and Family Services.
    2. The “appropriate public authorities” as used in Article III of the interstate compact on the placement of children shall, with reference to this state, mean the Cabinet for Health and Family Services and said cabinet shall receive and act with reference to notices required by said Article III.
    3. As used in Article VII of the interstate compact on the placement of children, the term “executive head” means the Governor. The Governor is hereby authorized to appoint a compact administrator in accordance with the terms of said Article VII.
  2. Financial responsibility for any child placed pursuant to the provisions of the interstate compact on the placement of children:
    1. Shall be determined in accordance with the provisions of Article V thereof in the first instance. However, in the event of partial or complete default of performance thereunder, the provisions of KRS 405.020 shall apply.
    2. The officers and agencies of this state and its subdivisions having authority to place children are hereby empowered to enter into agreements with appropriate officers or agencies of or in another party state pursuant to paragraph (b) of Article V of the interstate compact on the placement of children. Any such agreement which contains a financial commitment or imposes a financial obligation on this state or subdivision or agency thereof shall not be binding unless it has the approval in writing of the secretary of the Finance and Administration Cabinet in the case of the state and of the chief local fiscal officer in the case of a subdivision of the state.
  3. Any court having jurisdiction to place delinquent children may place such a child in an institution of or in another state pursuant to Article VI of the interstate compact on the placement of children and shall retain jurisdiction as provided in Article V of KRS 615.030 thereof.
  4. No person or institution shall bring or send, or cause to be brought or sent, a dependent child into this state from another state for the purpose of placing him in a family home, either with or without indenture or for adoption, without first filing a ten thousand dollar ($10,000) bond with the county judge/executive of the county in which the child is to be placed.
  5. The bond shall be conditioned as follows:
    1. That they will not bring or send, or cause to be brought or sent, into this state any child that is incorrigible or of unsound mind or body or who has any contagious or incurable disease;
    2. That they will immediately, upon placing the child, report to the department the name and age of the child, and the name and residence of the person with whom he is placed;
    3. That if the child becomes a public charge before reaching his majority, they will, within thirty (30) days after receiving written notice of such fact from the department, remove the child from the state;
    4. That if the child is convicted of a crime or misdemeanor and is imprisoned, within five (5) years of the time of his arrival, they will remove the child from the state immediately upon his release;
    5. That they will place each dependent child by written contract with a person who will furnish the child a proper home, and will make the person receiving the child responsible for its proper care, education, and training;
    6. That they will properly supervise the care and training of the child, and visit each child at least once a year;
    7. That they will make such reports to the department as the department requires.
  6. The provisions of KRS 615.030 shall not apply to a parent, stepparent, grandparent, adult brother or sister, or adult uncle or aunt going to any other state or country and bringing a child into this state for the purpose of giving it a home in his own family, and may be waived by the department for any child brought into the state under the supervision of the division or licensed child-caring or child-placing institution or agency by written agreement with the responsible agency of the other state or country, or under special circumstances agreed to in writing by the cabinet and the persons wishing to import a child.
  7. The provisions of subsections (4) and (5) of this section shall not apply to placements made pursuant to the interstate compact on the placement of children.

History. Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 423, § 59, effective July 1, 1987; 1998, ch. 426, § 616, effective July 15, 1998; 2005, ch. 99, § 664, effective June 20, 2005.

Compiler’s Notes.

For this section as effective upon contingency, see the following section also numbered KRS 615.040 .

615.040. Definitions — Financial responsibility — Placement in another state — Bond. [Effective upon contingency.]

The following provisions apply to the compact described in KRS 615.030 :

  1. The following definitions apply to KRS 615.030 :
    1. As defined in subsection (18) of Article II of the interstate compact on the placement of children, the phrase “public child placing agency” with reference to this state shall mean the Cabinet for Health and Family Services.
    2. As used in Article VIII of the interstate compact on the placement of children, the term “executive head” means the Governor. The Governor is hereby authorized to appoint a compact administrator in accordance with the terms of said Article VIII.
  2. Financial responsibility for any child placed pursuant to the provisions of the interstate compact on the placement of children:
    1. Shall be determined in accordance with the provisions of Article VII thereof in the first instance. However, in the event of partial or complete default of performance thereunder, the provisions of KRS 405.020 shall apply.
    2. The officers and agencies of this state and its subdivisions having authority to place children are hereby empowered to enter into agreements with appropriate officers or agencies of or in another party state pursuant to subsection (5) of Article VII of the interstate compact on the placement of children. Any such agreement which contains a financial commitment or imposes a financial obligation on this state or subdivision or agency thereof shall not be binding unless it has the approval in writing of the secretary of the Finance and Administration Cabinet in the case of the state and of the chief local fiscal officer in the case of a subdivision of the state.
  3. Any court having jurisdiction to place delinquent children may place such a child in an institution of or in another state pursuant to Article IV of the interstate compact on the placement of children and shall retain jurisdiction as provided in Article IV of KRS 615.030 thereof.
  4. No person or institution shall bring or send, or cause to be brought or sent, a dependent child into this state from another state for the purpose of placing him in a family home, either with or without indenture or for adoption, without first filing a ten thousand dollar ($10,000) bond with the county judge/executive of the county in which the child is to be placed.
  5. The bond shall be conditioned as follows:
    1. That they will not bring or send, or cause to be brought or sent, into this state any child that is incorrigible or of unsound mind or body or who has any contagious or incurable disease;
    2. That they will immediately, upon placing the child, report to the department the name and age of the child, and the name and residence of the person with whom he is placed;
    3. That if the child becomes a public charge before reaching his majority, they will, within thirty (30) days after receiving written notice of such fact from the department, remove the child from the state;
    4. That if the child is convicted of a crime or misdemeanor and is imprisoned, within five (5) years of the time of his arrival, they will remove the child from the state immediately upon his release;
    5. That they will place each dependent child by written contract with a person who will furnish the child a proper home, and will make the person receiving the child responsible for its proper care, education, and training;
    6. That they will properly supervise the care and training of the child, and visit each child at least once a year;
    7. That they will make such reports to the department as the department requires.
  6. The provisions of KRS 615.030 shall not apply to a parent, stepparent, grandparent, adult brother or sister, or adult uncle or aunt going to any other state or country and bringing a child into this state for the purpose of giving it a home in his own family, and may be waived by the department for any child brought into the state under the supervision of the division or licensed child-caring or child-placing institution or agency by written agreement with the responsible agency of the other state or country, or under special circumstances agreed to in writing by the cabinet and the persons wishing to import a child.
  7. The provisions of subsections (4) and (5) of this section shall not apply to placements made pursuant to the interstate compact on the placement of children.

History. Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 423, § 59, effective July 1, 1987; 1998, ch. 426, § 616, effective July 15, 1998; 2005, ch. 99, § 664, effective June 20, 2005; 2013, ch. 79, § 6.

Compiler’s Notes.

For this section as effective until contingency is met , see the preceding section also numbered KRS 615.040 .

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(6/25/2013).This statute was amended in 2013 Ky. Acts ch. 79, sec. 6. Section 9 of that Act prescribed that the amendments to this statute would take effect as provided in KRS 615.030 , Article XIV, upon the legislative enactment of the compact into law by no fewer than 35 states. Section 10 of that Act prescribed that the Cabinet for Health and Family Services must notify the Reviser of Statutes when the 35th state has enacted the compact. That threshold has not yet been met.

615.050. Administrative regulations.

The cabinet may promulgate administrative regulations to implement the provisions of this chapter.

History. Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 423, § 60, effective July 1, 1987.

Penalties

615.990. Penalties.

  1. Any person who violates KRS 615.040(4) shall be imprisoned in the county jail not less than ten (10) nor more than sixty (60) days, or fined not less than twenty-five dollars ($25) nor more than two hundred dollars ($200), or both.
  2. Any person who upon thirty (30) days’ notice fails to remove a child from the state when required to do so under a bond as provided in KRS 615.040(5)(c) or (d) shall forfeit one thousand dollars ($1,000), to be recovered upon the bond by a suit in the name of the county in which the bond is filed.

History. Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 423, § 61, effective July 1, 1987.

CHAPTER 620 Dependency, Neglect, and Abuse

620.010. Legislative purpose.

In addition to the purposes set forth in KRS 600.010 , this chapter shall be interpreted to effectuate the following express legislative purposes regarding the treatment of dependent, neglected and abused children. Children have certain fundamental rights which must be protected and preserved, including but not limited to, the rights to adequate food, clothing and shelter; the right to be free from physical, sexual or emotional injury or exploitation; the right to develop physically, mentally, and emotionally to their potential; and the right to educational instruction and the right to a secure, stable family. It is further recognized that upon some occasions, in order to protect and preserve the rights and needs of children, it is necessary to remove a child from his or her parents.

History. Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 423, § 62, effective July 1, 1987.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

Acts 1986, ch. 423, § 199 read: “KRS 446.250 to 446.320 to the contrary notwithstanding, Acts 1986, ch. 423 shall prevail in the event of a conflict between Acts 1986, ch. 423 and other Acts passed by the 1986 regular session of the General Assembly.”

NOTES TO DECISIONS

  1. Affirmative duty.
  2. Abused and Neglected Child.
1. Affirmative duty.

This section creates an affirmative duty for the parent of a child to prevent such physical injury which would result in an assault on that child and this duty was clearly violated by defendant mother where evidence showed that the child’s injuries were not consistent with the history given by the defendant that the injuries were a result of a recent fall down the stairs and where many of the injuries were linear, they appeared to have resulted from the child being struck with a linear object, and did not appear accidental but were of an inflicted manner. Lane v. Commonwealth, 956 S.W.2d 874, 1997 Ky. LEXIS 68 ( Ky. 1997 ), modified, 1997 Ky. LEXIS 97 (Ky. Sept. 4, 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1123, 118 S. Ct. 1067, 140 L. Ed. 2d 127, 1998 U.S. LEXIS 1074 (U.S. 1998).

In view of the natural relationship between parent and guardian, this section creates an affirmative duty for parents and guardians to prevent physical injury, which results in an assault on a child. Lane v. Commonwealth, 956 S.W.2d 874, 1997 Ky. LEXIS 68 ( Ky. 1997 ), modified, 1997 Ky. LEXIS 97 (Ky. Sept. 4, 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1123, 118 S. Ct. 1067, 140 L. Ed. 2d 127, 1998 U.S. LEXIS 1074 (U.S. 1998).

This chapter has created an affirmative duty to prevent physical injury to children; prosecution for such conduct can fall either under the assault provisions of the statute or under the abuse provision of the statute. Lane v. Commonwealth, 956 S.W.2d 874, 1997 Ky. LEXIS 68 ( Ky. 1997 ), modified, 1997 Ky. LEXIS 97 (Ky. Sept. 4, 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1123, 118 S. Ct. 1067, 140 L. Ed. 2d 127, 1998 U.S. LEXIS 1074 (U.S. 1998).

This section creates an affirmative duty for the parent or guardian of a child to protect the child from abuse or assault; a parent or guardian who fails to fulfill that duty may be convicted of complicity to assault under the legal duty theory of § 502.020(1)(c). Lane v. Commonwealth, 1997 Ky. LEXIS 97 (Ky. Sept. 4, 1997).

2. Abused and Neglected Child.

Finding that a child was abused or neglected under KRS 600.020 was not supported by substantial evidence because a family court failed to determine the truth or falsity of all the allegations in a complaint under KRS 620.100 , and it relied upon information outside the record that was neither raised as an allegation in the complaint nor presented as evidence during a hearing; also, a dependency, neglect, or abuse adjudication hearing was not the appropriate forum for rehashing custody issues. Even though judicial notice of a prior case involving the mother and father could have been taken, the family court’s consideration of the evidence it heard in the earlier action was improper; moreover, there was no notice or opportunity to be heard relating to the taking of judicial notice. S.R. v. J.N., 307 S.W.3d 631, 2010 Ky. App. LEXIS 62 (Ky. Ct. App. 2010).

Cited:

“"Tony" L. v. Childers, 71 F.3d 1182, 1995 FED App. 0369P, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 35928 (6th Cir. Ky. 1995 ); London v. Collins, 242 S.W.3d 351, 2007 Ky. App. LEXIS 462 (Ky. Ct. App. 2007).

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Bench & Bar.

Family Court: Proceedings for Dependency, Neglect and Abuse: The Role of the Family Court Judge and the Guardian ad Litem, Vol. 68, No. 6, Nov. 2004, Ky. Bench & Bar 21.

Kentucky Law Journal.

Essays, “Are Kentucky’s Children ‘At Risk’ as a Result of J.H. v. Commonwealth?”, 86 Ky. L.J. 999 (1997-98).

May, Social Reform for Kentucky’s Judicial System: The Creation of Unified Family Courts, 92 Ky. L.J. 571 (2003).

Treatises

Petrilli, Kentucky Family Law, Juvenile Court, §§ 32.3, 32.14.

Petrilli, Kentucky Family Law, Termination of Parental Rights and Adoption, §§ 29.1, 29.13.

Petrilli, Kentucky Family Law, Forms, Juvenile Court, Form 5.7, Form 5.8.

620.020. Definitions for chapter.

The definitions in KRS Chapter 600 shall apply to this chapter. In addition, as used in this chapter, unless the context requires otherwise:

  1. “Case permanency plan” means a document identifying decisions made by the cabinet, for both the biological family and the child, concerning action which needs to be taken to assure that the child in foster care expeditiously obtains a permanent home;
  2. “Case progress report” means a written record of goals that have been achieved in the case of a child;
  3. “Case record” means a cabinet file of specific documents and a running record of activities pertaining to the child;
  4. “Children’s advocacy center” means an agency that advocates on behalf of children alleged to have been abused; that assists in the coordination of the investigation of child abuse by providing a location for forensic interviews and medical examinations, and by promoting the coordination of services for children alleged to have been abused; and that provides, directly or by formalized agreements, services that include, but are not limited to, forensic interviews, medical examinations, mental health and related support services, court advocacy, consultation, training, and staffing of multidisciplinary teams;
  5. “Foster care” means the provision of temporary twenty-four (24) hour care for a child for a planned period of time when the child is:
    1. Removed from his parents or person exercising custodial control or supervision and subsequently placed in the custody of the cabinet; and
    2. Placed in a foster home or private child-caring facility or child-placing agency but remains under the supervision of the cabinet;
  6. “Local citizen foster care review board” means a citizen board which provides periodic permanency reviews of children placed in the custody of the cabinet by a court order of temporary custody or commitment under this chapter;
  7. “Multidisciplinary teams” means local teams operating under protocols governing roles, responsibilities, and procedures developed by the Kentucky Multidisciplinary Commission on Child Sexual Abuse pursuant to KRS 431.600 ;
  8. “Pediatric abusive head trauma” means the various injuries or conditions that may result following the vigorous shaking, slamming, or impacting the head of an infant or young child. These injuries or conditions, also known as pediatric acquired abusive head trauma, have in the past been called “Shaken Baby Syndrome” or “Shaken Infant Syndrome.” Pediatric abusive head trauma injuries or conditions have included but are not limited to the following:
    1. Irreversible brain damage;
    2. Blindness;
    3. Retinal hemorrhage;
    4. Eye damage;
    5. Cerebral palsy;
    6. Hearing loss;
    7. Spinal cord injury;
    8. Paralysis;
    9. Seizures;
    10. Learning disability;
    11. Death;
    12. Central nervous system injury as evidenced by central nervous system hemorrhaging;
    13. Closed head injury;
    14. Rib fracture; and
    15. Subdural hematoma;
  9. “Permanence” means a relationship between a child and an adult which is intended to last a lifetime, providing commitment and continuity in the child’s relationships and a sense of belonging;
  10. “Position of authority” has the same meaning as in KRS 532.045 ;
  11. “Position of special trust” has the same meaning as in KRS 532.045 ;
  12. “Preventive services” means those services which are designed to help maintain and strengthen the family unit by preventing or eliminating the need for removal of children from the family;
  13. “Reasonable efforts” means the exercise of ordinary diligence and care by the department to utilize all preventive and reunification services available to the community in accordance with the state plan for Public Law 96-272 which are necessary to enable the child to safely live at home;
  14. “Reunification services” means remedial and preventive services which are designed to strengthen the family unit, to secure reunification of the family and child where appropriate, as quickly as practicable, and to prevent the future removal of the child from the family; and
  15. “State citizen foster care review board” means a board created by KRS 620.310 .

History. Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 423, § 63, effective July 1, 1987; 1988, ch. 258, § 1, effective July 15, 1988; 1988, ch. 350, § 41, effective April 10, 1988; 1992, ch. 434, § 1, effective July 14, 1992; 1996, ch. 18, § 4, effective July 15, 1996; 1996, ch. 301, § 1, effective July 15, 1996; 1998, ch. 278, § 1, effective July 15, 1998; 2000, ch. 144, § 4, effective July 14, 2000; 2002, ch. 87, § 1, effective July 15, 2002; 2010, ch. 171, § 16, effective July 15, 2010; 2019 ch. 33, § 8, effective June 27, 2019.

Compiler’s Notes.

Public Law 96-272, referred to in (10), may be found as various sections throughout Title 42 of the United States Code.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Reasonable Efforts.

There was no error in the judgment regarding reasonable efforts for the mother, for purposes of KRS 625.090(3), 620.020(11), given that the Cabinet of Health and Family Services offered the mother many services, but she ultimately stopped attending parenting classes, participating in drug tests and abstaining from drug and alcohol use, completing various assessments, and making planned visits with the child; there was substantial evidence that the Cabinet offered services to the mother and she failed to avail herself of those services. C.J.M. v. Cabinet for Health and Family Servs., 389 S.W.3d 155, 2012 Ky. App. LEXIS 301 (Ky. Ct. App. 2012).

Pursuant to KRS 610.127(7), reasonable efforts are not required as defined in KRS 620.020 when the court determines with respect to a parent that the parent has created circumstances that make continuation of reasonable efforts to reunify the family inconsistent with the best interests of the child and with the permanency plan for the child. C.J.M. v. Cabinet for Health and Family Servs., 389 S.W.3d 155, 2012 Ky. App. LEXIS 301 (Ky. Ct. App. 2012).

Trial court found that the Cabinet of Health and Family Services made reasonable efforts to reunite the parents with the child, and considering the neglect and parents’ lack of insight and lack of progress on their case plans, the trial court properly found that termination was in the child’s best interests. C.J.M. v. Cabinet for Health and Family Servs., 389 S.W.3d 155, 2012 Ky. App. LEXIS 301 (Ky. Ct. App. 2012).

Father asked that reasonable efforts to reunite him with the child be stopped, the trial court granted this request under KRS 610.127 , and thereafter, the father did not try to work with the Cabinet of Health and Family Services again; he admitted to smoking marijuana and said he would continue doing so, he threatened staff members of the Cabinet, he refused to participate in any case plan, the Cabinet does not have the power to compel someone to accept reasonable efforts, and substantial evidence existed to support the finding that reasonable efforts were made but the father refused them. C.J.M. v. Cabinet for Health and Family Servs., 389 S.W.3d 155, 2012 Ky. App. LEXIS 301 (Ky. Ct. App. 2012).

In a termination of parental rights case, the Cabinet for Health and Family Services (CHFS) made reasonable efforts to reunite the family because CHFS referred the father to an abusive parenting program recognized by Kentucky; the father failed to complete the abusive parenting class as he refused to admit abusing his daughter; although the father lived in Michigan, CHFS was not required to become familiar with services offered around the world in the event a parent chose to relocate to another state or country; no matter where the father moved, a qualifying program would require the same admission; and he did not take advantage of services offered and did not sufficiently progress toward completion of the treatment plan. K.M.E. v. Commonwealth, 565 S.W.3d 648, 2018 Ky. App. LEXIS 270 (Ky. Ct. App. 2018).

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Bench & Bar.

Family Court: Proceedings for Dependency, Neglect and Abuse: The Role of the Family Court Judge and the Guardian ad Litem, Vol. 68, No. 6, Nov. 2004, Ky. Bench & Bar 21.

620.023. Evidence to be considered in determining the best interest of a child.

  1. Evidence of the following circumstances if relevant shall be considered by the court in all proceedings conducted pursuant to KRS Chapter 620 in which the court is required to render decisions in the best interest of the child:
    1. Mental illness as defined in KRS 202A.011 or an intellectual disability as defined in KRS 202B.010 of the parent, as attested to by a qualified mental health professional, which renders the parent unable to care for the immediate and ongoing needs of the child;
    2. Acts of abuse or neglect as defined in KRS 600.020 toward any child;
    3. Substance use disorder, as defined in KRS 222.005 , that results in an incapacity by the parent or caretaker to provide essential care and protection for the child;
    4. A finding of domestic violence and abuse as defined in KRS 403.720 , whether or not committed in the presence of the child;
    5. Any other crime committed by a parent which results in the death or permanent physical or mental disability of a member of that parent’s family or household; and
    6. The existence of any guardianship or conservatorship of the parent pursuant to a determination of disability or partial disability as made under KRS 387.500 to 387.770 and 387.990 .
  2. In determining the best interest of the child, the court may consider the effectiveness of rehabilitative efforts made by the parent or caretaker intended to address circumstances in this section.

History. Enact. Acts 1998, ch. 57, § 7, effective March 17, 1998; 2004, ch. 116, § 18, effective July 13, 2004; 2012, ch. 146, § 140, effective July 12, 2012; 2019 ch. 128, § 30, effective June 27, 2019.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

  1. Applicability.
  2. Factors Considered.
1. Applicability.

The family court did not abuse its discretion in awarding custody to the child’s grandmother and aunt. The grandmother and aunt were already the child’s physical custodians after findings of abuse and neglect had caused removal of the child from the home, so they were de facto custodians and were on equal footing with the father; therefore, the best interest standards under KRS 403.270(2) and KRS 620.023 were the proper guidelines and were properly applied to grant the grandmother and aunt permanent custody. B.C. v. B.T., 182 S.W.3d 213, 2005 Ky. App. LEXIS 281 (Ky. Ct. App. 2005).

Substantial evidence supported neglect finding because (1) it was no error to consider a father’s prior termination of parental rights in which abuse or neglect had to be found, which was relevant, and whether substance abuse incapacitated the father had to be considered, and (2) the evidence showed the father’s drug use and the earlier proceeding caused and exacerbated the father’s legal problems involving children, and the father’s incorrect prescription use showed continued dependency and a fear of withdrawal. Cabinet for Health & Family Servs. v. C.B., 556 S.W.3d 568, 2018 Ky. LEXIS 365 ( Ky. 2018 ).

Court of Appeals erred in reversing a family court decision declining to conduct a Special Immigrant Juvenile (SIJ) hearing at the disposition phase of a dependency, neglect, and abuse case regarding an unaccompanied Guatemalan minor because, while the minor was a dependent child and entitled to the protection and care of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, the courts of Kentucky were not required to make additional findings related to SIJ classification unless they first determine that the evidence to be gleaned from such a supplemental hearing was relevant to the child’s best interests, and there were also grave concerns about the use of the juvenile process in the case to circumvent federal immigration law. Commonwealth v. N.B.D., 577 S.W.3d 73, 2019 Ky. LEXIS 209 ( Ky. 2019 ), cert. denied, 207 L. Ed. 2d 1096, 2020 U.S. LEXIS 3427 (U.S. 2020).

Court of Appeals erred in reversing a family court decision declining to conduct a Special Immigrant Juvenile (SIJ) hearing at the disposition phase of a dependency, neglect, and abuse case regarding an unaccompanied Guatemalan minor because, while the minor was a dependent child and entitled to the protection and care of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, the courts of Kentucky were not required to make additional findings related to SIJ classification unless they first determine that the evidence to be gleaned from such a supplemental hearing was relevant to the child’s best interests, and there were also grave concerns about the use of the juvenile process in the case to circumvent federal immigration law. Commonwealth v. N.B.D., 577 S.W.3d 73, 2019 Ky. LEXIS 209 ( Ky. 2019 ), cert. denied, 207 L. Ed. 2d 1096, 2020 U.S. LEXIS 3427 (U.S. 2020).

2. Factors Considered.

Paternal grandparents were properly awarded permanent custody of their grandson where a family court analyzed the factors under KRS 403.270 , 620.023 and determined that the award was in the child’s best interest because the grandparents provided the grandson with a stable and secure environment and had worked with the school and counselors to ensure he was receiving proper treatment; a mother had not sought return of the child since 2003, she failed to stop abuse she was aware of, she failed to obtain a court-ordered evaluation, she failed to seek counseling, and she threatened another child in her care. L.D. v. J.H., 350 S.W.3d 828, 2011 Ky. App. LEXIS 258 (Ky. Ct. App. 2011).

Family court properly denied the grandparents’ motion to be considered for placement of their grandchild because the family court properly used the statutory factors, its five-page order contained ample substantial evidence justifying its decision to deny the grandparents’ plea for placement, and, given the child’s age, traumatic past, and significant improvement in the foster home, it would not be in her best interest to be uprooted, again, to experiment with a relative placement with people with whom she had not bonded—or even knew, and the grandfather’s criminal history, domestic violence, and past parental concerns weighed heavily in favor of it not being in the child’s best interest to live with him. S.B. v. Cabinet for Health & Family Servs., 2020 Ky. App. LEXIS 50 (Ky. Ct. App. Apr. 17, 2020).

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Article: Promising Protection: 911 Call Records as Foundation for Family Violence Intervention, 102 Ky. L.J. 49 (2013).

620.025. Jurisdictional precedence.

A finding of jurisdiction under this chapter shall not necessarily preclude a finding of jurisdiction under KRS Chapters 625, 630, or 635; however, jurisdiction under this chapter shall take precedence. No child shall be released from the jurisdiction of the court under this chapter if concurrent complaints under KRS Chapters 630 or 635 are pending.

History. Enact. Acts 1988, ch. 350, § 42, effective April 10, 1988.

620.027. District Court’s concurrent jurisdiction for child custody and visitation in permanent placement cases.

The District Court has jurisdiction, concurrent with that of the Circuit Court, to determine matters of child custody and visitation in cases that come before the District Court where the need for a permanent placement and custody order is established as set forth in this chapter. The District Court, in making these determinations, shall utilize the provisions of KRS Chapter 403 relating to child custody and visitation. In any case where the child is actually residing with a grandparent in a stable relationship, the court may recognize the grandparent as having the same standing as a parent for evaluating what custody arrangements are in the best interest of the child.

History. Enact. Acts 1996, ch. 314, § 3, effective July 15, 1996; 2000, ch. 60, § 5, effective July 14, 2000.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

  1. Custody Decrees.
  2. Standing.
1. Custody Decrees.

In order for a custody order to be a “custody decree,” within the meaning of KRS Chapter 403, it must be based on the standards set out in KRS 403.270(2). A permanency order in a dependency action, under KRS Chapter 620, can and ordinarily should satisfy this requirement. London v. Collins, 242 S.W.3d 351, 2007 Ky. App. LEXIS 462 (Ky. Ct. App. 2007).

If a permanency order in a dependency action brought under Chapter 620 complies with KRS 403.270(2) and is based on the best interests of the child, it would qualify as a “custody decree” and the requirements of KRS 403.340 would have to be satisfied in order to amend it. Since the permanency order in question in this case was not a “custody decree” within the meaning of KRS Chapter 403, KRS 403.340 is inapplicable, and the Family Court was required to consider the petition for custody as if there had been no prior custody determination. London v. Collins, 242 S.W.3d 351, 2007 Ky. App. LEXIS 462 (Ky. Ct. App. 2007).

Trial court erred in finding that the cousin of the deceased mother was a de facto custodian pursuant to KRS 403.270 (1)(a) and that she should retain permanent custody; the proceeding was not a dependency proceeding as to the father, the father was not represented by counsel, and there was no evidence taken, let alone evidence required to make the findings necessary to support an award of custody pursuant to KRS 403.270 . London v. Collins, 242 S.W.3d 351, 2007 Ky. App. LEXIS 462 (Ky. Ct. App. 2007).

2. Standing.

Parental grandparents met the requirement for de facto custodians under KRS 403.270 because a grandson had resided with the grandparents for more than 6 months, and intended compliance with a permanency plan with a goal of returning the grandson to his mother did not equate to a legal proceeding under KRS 403.270 ; the mother had taken no legal action to regain custody of the grandson since his initial removal, and she had not complied with the permanency plan. Notwithstanding the mother’s argument, the grandparents had standing under KRS 620.027 because they provided a stable environment for the grandson; the grandson’s mental health issues were due to his diagnosis, not due to a problem with the grandparents. L.D. v. J.H., 350 S.W.3d 828, 2011 Ky. App. LEXIS 258 (Ky. Ct. App. 2011).

Cited:

B.C. v. B.T., 182 S.W.3d 213, 2005 Ky. App. LEXIS 281 (Ky. Ct. App. 2005).

620.029. Duties of cabinet relating to children who are victims of human trafficking.

  1. In order to provide the most effective treatment for children who are victims of human trafficking, as defined in KRS 529.010 , the cabinet shall:
    1. Investigate a report alleging a child is a victim of human trafficking pursuant to KRS 620.030(3);
    2. Provide or ensure the provision of appropriate treatment, housing, and services consistent with the status of the child as a victim of human trafficking; and
    3. Proceed in the case in accordance with applicable statutes governing cases involving dependency, neglect, or abuse regardless of whether the person believed to have caused the human trafficking of the child is a parent, guardian, or person exercising custodial control or supervision.
  2. In order to effectuate the requirements of this section, the cabinet shall:
    1. Consult with agencies serving victims of human trafficking to promulgate administrative regulations for the treatment of children who are reported to be victims of human trafficking as dependent, neglected, or abused children, including providing for appropriate screening, assessment, treatment, services, temporary and long-term placement of these children, training of staff, the designation of specific staff, and collaboration with service providers and law enforcement; and
    2. By November 1 of each year, beginning in 2013, submit to the Legislative Research Commission a comprehensive report detailing the number of reports the cabinet has received regarding child victims of human trafficking, the number of reports in which the cabinet has investigated and determined that a child is the victim of human trafficking, and the number of cases in which services were provided.

History. Enact. Acts 2013, ch. 25, § 1, effective June 25, 2013.

Legislative Research Commission Note.

(6/25/2013). This statute was created in Section 1 of 2013 Ky. Acts ch. 25. Section 28 of that Act states that “Sections 1 to 28 of this Act may be cited as the ‘Human Trafficking Victims Rights Act.’ ”

620.030. Duty to report dependency, neglect, abuse, human trafficking, or female genital mutilation — Husband-wife and professional-client/patient privileges not grounds for refusal to report — Exceptions — Penalties.

  1. Any person who knows or has reasonable cause to believe that a child is dependent, neglected, or abused shall immediately cause an oral or written report to be made to a local law enforcement agency or to the Department of Kentucky State Police, the cabinet or its designated representative, the Commonwealth’s attorney, or the county attorney by telephone or otherwise. Any supervisor who receives from an employee a report of suspected dependency, neglect, or abuse shall promptly make a report to the proper authorities for investigation. If the cabinet receives a report of abuse or neglect allegedly committed by a person other than a parent, guardian, fictive kin, person in a position of authority, person in a position of special trust, or person exercising custodial control or supervision, the cabinet shall refer the matter to the Commonwealth’s attorney or the county attorney and the local law enforcement agency or the Department of Kentucky State Police. Nothing in this section shall relieve individuals of their obligations to report.
  2. Any person, including but not limited to a physician, osteopathic physician, nurse, teacher, school personnel, social worker, coroner, medical examiner, child-caring personnel, resident, intern, chiropractor, dentist, optometrist, emergency medical technician, paramedic, health professional, mental health professional, peace officer, or any organization or agency for any of the above, who knows or has reasonable cause to believe that a child is dependent, neglected, or abused, regardless of whether the person believed to have caused the dependency, neglect, or abuse is a parent, guardian, fictive kin, person in a position of authority, person in a position of special trust, person exercising custodial control or supervision, or another person, or who has attended such child as a part of his or her professional duties shall, if requested, in addition to the report required in subsection (1) or (3) of this section, file with the local law enforcement agency or the Department of Kentucky State Police, the cabinet or its designated representative, the Commonwealth’s attorney, or county attorney within forty-eight (48) hours of the original report a written report containing:
    1. The names and addresses of the child and his or her parents or other persons exercising custodial control or supervision;
    2. The child’s age;
    3. The nature and extent of the child’s alleged dependency, neglect, or abuse, including any previous charges of dependency, neglect, or abuse, to this child or his or her siblings;
    4. The name and address of the person allegedly responsible for the abuse or neglect; and
    5. Any other information that the person making the report believes may be helpful in the furtherance of the purpose of this section.
  3. Any person who knows or has reasonable cause to believe that a child is a victim of human trafficking as defined in KRS 529.010 shall immediately cause an oral or written report to be made to a local law enforcement agency or the Department of Kentucky State Police; or the cabinet or its designated representative; or the Commonwealth’s attorney or the county attorney; by telephone or otherwise. This subsection shall apply regardless of whether the person believed to have caused the human trafficking of the child is a parent, guardian, fictive kin, person in a position of authority, person in a position of special trust, or person exercising custodial control or supervision.
  4. Any person who knows or has reasonable cause to believe that a child is a victim of female genital mutilation as defined in KRS 508.125 shall immediately cause an oral or written report to be made by telephone or otherwise to:
    1. A local law enforcement agency or the Department of Kentucky State Police;
    2. The cabinet or its designated representative; or
    3. The Commonwealth’s attorney or the county attorney. This subsection shall apply regardless of whether the person believed to have caused the female genital mutilation of the child is a parent, guardian, or person exercising custodial control or supervision.
  5. Neither the husband-wife nor any professional-client/patient privilege, except the attorney-client and clergy-penitent privilege, shall be a ground for refusing to report under this section or for excluding evidence regarding a dependent, neglected, or abused child or the cause thereof, in any judicial proceedings resulting from a report pursuant to this section. This subsection shall also apply in any criminal proceeding in District or Circuit Court regarding a dependent, neglected, or abused child.
  6. The cabinet upon request shall receive from any agency of the state or any other agency, institution, or facility providing services to the child or his or her family, such cooperation, assistance, and information as will enable the cabinet to fulfill its responsibilities under KRS 620.030 , 620.040 , and 620.050 .
  7. Nothing in this section shall limit the cabinet’s investigatory authority under KRS 620.050 or any other obligation imposed by law.
  8. Any person who intentionally violates the provisions of this section shall be guilty of a:
    1. Class B misdemeanor for the first offense;
    2. Class A misdemeanor for the second offense; and
    3. Class D felony for each subsequent offense.

History. Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 423, § 64, effective July 1, 1987; 1988, ch. 258, § 2, effective July 15, 1988; 1988, ch. 350, § 43, effective April 10, 1988; 2007, ch. 85, § 330, effective June 26, 2007; 2008, ch. 72, § 4, effective July 15, 2008; 2013, ch. 25, § 2, effective June 25, 2013; 2019 ch. 33, § 9, effective June 27, 2019; 2020 ch. 74, § 7, effective April 2, 2020.

Legislative Research Commission Notes.

The 1988 amendments to this section are effective April 10, 1988, except for the second sentence of subsection (1), which is effective July 15, 1988.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

  1. Duty of Trial Court.
  2. Immunity.
  3. —Intent.
  4. Affirmative Duty.
  5. Sufficiency of Report.
  6. Negligence per se.
  7. Summary Judgment.
1. Duty of Trial Court.

In cases involving alleged abuse of children, and where there is reason to believe such abuse has occurred, a trial court must take an active role in assuring that the child’s physical and emotional wellbeing have been protected and is required, under this section, to report suspected abuse or neglect where the proper authorities or investigating agency have not been notified. Fugate v. Fugate, 896 S.W.2d 621, 1995 Ky. App. LEXIS 78 (Ky. Ct. App. 1995).

Nothing exempts a trial judge, under this section, of the duty to report dependency, neglect or abuse. Fugate v. Fugate, 896 S.W.2d 621, 1995 Ky. App. LEXIS 78 (Ky. Ct. App. 1995).

2. Immunity.

Where a hospital employee allegedly made a false report to authorities that a newborn child’s meconium stool sample tested positive for drugs, which led to the child’s being placed in foster care, a doctor was immune from civil liability for the report under KRS 620.030(1) and KRS 620.050(1), because there was no allegation that she acted in bad faith. Garrison v. Leahy-Auer, 220 S.W.3d 693, 2006 Ky. App. LEXIS 151 (Ky. Ct. App. 2006).

To find that KRS 620.030 does not apply, there must be a finding that the act committed upon the child is not an act of sexual abuse. For purposes of KRS Chapter 600, the definition of a neglected or abused child is set forth at KRS 600.020 . If sexual abuse has occurred, then the mandatory reporting requirement in KRS 620.030 would have required the teacher to report this incident and such mandatory reporting would result in this being considered a ministerial rather than a discretionary act which would preclude the teacher from claiming qualified official immunity. Nelson v. Turner, 256 S.W.3d 37, 2008 Ky. App. LEXIS 177 (Ky. Ct. App. 2008).

Trial court did not err in granting a neighbor’s motion to dismiss an action filed by a mother and father alleging that their child was removed from their home based on a false report because the neighbor was entitled to immunity under KRS 620.030(1) when the mother and father failed to demonstrate that the neighbor acted in bad faith in reporting suspected child neglect; the neighbor reported the suspected neglect to her local law enforcement agency, and it did not matter that the police officer she spoke with was her son because he was a member of her local law enforcement agency. Morgan v. Bird, 289 S.W.3d 222, 2009 Ky. App. LEXIS 68 (Ky. Ct. App. 2009).

Reporter may be acting under KRS 620.030 to 620.050 in good faith if the reporter subjectively believed he or she was discharging the duty imposed by KRS 620.030 ; therefore, a reporter’s good faith belief that he or she is discharging the lawful duty to report under KRS 620.030, even if such a belief is ultimately determined to be erroneous, is all that is required under KRS 620.050 (1). As a result, several health care providers were immune from liability under KRS 620.050(1) because they acted in good faith under KRS 620.030 in making a report of a new mother’s suspected child abuse, even though a blood alcohol report was erroneous. Norton Hosps., Inc. v. Peyton, 381 S.W.3d 286, 2012 Ky. LEXIS 165 ( Ky. 2012 ).

Custody evaluator was immune for a report to the Cabinet for Health and Family Services of a father's gun possession because no bad faith or lack of a subjective belief that the evaluator discharged the evaluator's duty to report was shown. J.S. v. Berla, 456 S.W.3d 19, 2015 Ky. App. LEXIS 14 (Ky. Ct. App. 2015).

Because a doctor who treated a minor child prior to the child's death did not report suspected abuse of the child while in foster care to the proper authorities, the doctor was not entitled to statutory immunity from civil suit. A.A. v. Shutts, 516 S.W.3d 343, 2017 Ky. App. LEXIS 34 (Ky. Ct. App. 2017).

School officials were entitled to qualified immunity as to the student’s claims regarding their failure to report the teacher after becoming aware of his texting relationship with another student because this section’s reporting requirement involved a discretionary action when a school official was determining whether there was reasonable cause to believe that a child had been or was being abused. Ritchie v. Turner, 559 S.W.3d 822, 2018 Ky. LEXIS 434 ( Ky. 2018 ).

3. —Intent.

Because parents could not show doctor had bad intent when, after performing a series of tests on their baby including a CT scan showing a subarachnoid hemorrhage he noted was consistent with “Shaken Baby Syndrome,” he reported the baby’s injury to social services, the doctor was afforded the immunity granted by KRS 620.050 ; because doctor could not be held liable, neither could hospital. Hazlett v. Evans, 943 F. Supp. 785, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16769 (E.D. Ky. 1996 ).

In a report of child neglect to the Kentucky Cabinet of Health and Family Services' Department of Community Based Services based on a four-year-old student wandering away from a school, who was found approximately one-half mile away, the trial court did not err in dismissing appellant's claims against her employer alleging wrongful discharge, negligence and vicarious liability, and defamation as the record did not support any allegations that the employer's report of neglect was done in bad faith as appellant did not dispute that the child wandered away from the school while she was working; and, although appellant was ultimately exonerated from having committed neglect, an erroneous belief regarding neglect did not constitute bad faith. Collins v. KCEOC Cmty. Action P'ship, 455 S.W.3d 421, 2015 Ky. App. LEXIS 9 (Ky. Ct. App. 2015).

4. Affirmative Duty.

This chapter has created an affirmative duty to prevent physical injury to children; prosecution for such conduct can fall either under the assault provisions of the statute or under the abuse provision of the statute. Lane v. Commonwealth, 956 S.W.2d 874, 1997 Ky. LEXIS 68 ( Ky. 1997 ), modified, 1997 Ky. LEXIS 97 (Ky. Sept. 4, 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1123, 118 S. Ct. 1067, 140 L. Ed. 2d 127, 1998 U.S. LEXIS 1074 (U.S. 1998).

Under former KRS 199.335 , diocese had duty to take action when it discovered that a teacher in its employ was sexually abusing students; failure to do so was a violation of the aforementioned section, and constituted concealment and obstruction under KRS 413.090 , so as to toll the applicable statute of limitations for an action based on negligence on the part of the Diocese. Roman Catholic Diocese v. Secter, 966 S.W.2d 286, 1998 Ky. App. LEXIS 31 (Ky. Ct. App. 1998).

Trial court did not err in granting a police officer summary judgment in an action filed by a mother and father alleging that their child was removed from their home based on a false report because the officer properly followed the guidelines outlined in KRS 620.030 for reporting a claim of neglect to the Cabinet for Health and Family Services; in light of finding no bad faith by the officer, it followed that the claims against a city and its council members based on failure to properly supervise and/or train the officer were also properly dismissed. Morgan v. Bird, 289 S.W.3d 222, 2009 Ky. App. LEXIS 68 (Ky. Ct. App. 2009).

Under the plain language of KRS 600.020(1), the definition of an abused child is limited to a scenario in which his or her parent, guardian, or other person exercising custodial control or supervision inflicted or committed abuse, allowed abuse to be inflicted or committed, or created or allowed to be created a risk of abuse. As a result, the mandatory reporting requirement of KRS 620.030(1) does not apply when a child inappropriately touches another child unless a parent, guardian, or other person exercising custodial control or supervision allows such inappropriate touching to be committed or creates or allows such a risk of abuse. Turner v. Nelson, 342 S.W.3d 866, 2011 Ky. LEXIS 96 ( Ky. 2011 ).

In civil rights suit, defendants could not assert indemnity against plaintiff’s parents, based upon plaintiff’s claim of failing to report child abuse because, if defendants had knowledge of potential child abuse, failing to exercise their affirmative duty to report would preclude them from claiming they were passive tortfeasors. Compton v. City of Harrodsburg, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142306 (E.D. Ky. Oct. 2, 2013).

5. Sufficiency of Report.

A report by a teacher or counselor to his or her supervisor does not satisfy the statutory duty to report. Commonwealth v. Allen, 980 S.W.2d 278, 1998 Ky. LEXIS 148 ( Ky. 1998 ).

6. Negligence per se.

District court refused to grant the city’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s claim for failure to report child abuse, because the court was persuaded that a negligence per se claim could be brought under KRS 446.070 for a violation of KRS 620.030 for failure to report child abuse. Compton v. City of Harrodsburg, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68690 (E.D. Ky. May 10, 2013).

7. Summary Judgment.

Doctor who treated a minor child prior to the child's death was not entitled to an award of summary judgment on the issue of breach of duty for failing to report the possible abuse of the child because a jury could reasonably have concluded that the doctor should have been on heightened awareness to suspected abuse, thus triggering a duty to report the child's head injury, especially when the physical evidence and medical records left unanswered questions about the story given by the child's relative as to the child's injury. A.A. v. Shutts, 516 S.W.3d 343, 2017 Ky. App. LEXIS 34 (Ky. Ct. App. 2017).

Cited in:

Nave v. Feinberg, 539 S.W.3d 685, 2017 Ky. App. LEXIS 374 (Ky. Ct. App. 2017); Coursey v. Commonwealth, 593 S.W.3d 64, 2019 Ky. App. LEXIS 25 (Ky. Ct. App. 2019); T.C. v. M.E., 603 S.W.3d 663, 2020 Ky. App. LEXIS 54 (Ky. Ct. App. 2020); Dep't for Cmty. Based Servs., Cabinet for Health & Family Servs. v. Baker, 2020 Ky. LEXIS 459 (Ky. Dec. 17, 2020).

Opinions of Attorney General.

Although subsection (3) (now (4)) of this section provides that agencies providing services to children, such as schools, must cooperate with the Cabinet for Human Resources (CHR) and provide assistance and information, such interviews should be conducted in a manner that causes the least disruption to the students’ school schedule and the procedures vary if the allegations of student abuse are against school personnel. OAG 92-138 .

If the police desire to talk with a student who is a victim of a crime, then the school authorities should use their best judgment in determining whether the parents should be contacted. In the event that the officer is investigating allegations of dependency, neglect or abuse, the school should allow the interview to occur at school. The school should consult with the officer before the school officials inform the parents that an interview has taken place. OAG 92-138 .

School officials should use their discretion and confer with the police officer in deciding whether to be present when the court designated worker or the police questions a student. If the child is a victim of abuse, then the child should have input on choosing a trusted adult to sit in during the interview. OAG 92-138 .

Since the school is not required to notify the parents before the Cabinet for Human Resources talks with the students, the fact that the parents cannot be reached is immaterial. OAG 92-138 .

The school system is required pursuant to this section to permit social workers from the Cabinet for Human Resources (CHR) to come into the school and talk with students regarding investigations of dependency, neglect or abuse. OAG 92-138 .

Whether school personnel should be present when the social workers question the students is a decision that is best left to the discretion of the Cabinet for Human Resources’ social worker conducting the interview. OAG 92-138 .

A child who does not receive necessary medical care due to his parents’ religious belief may be considered an abused or neglected child; accordingly, the reporting requirements of subsection (1) of this section and the investigation requirements of KRS 620.050(3) are mandatory and must be followed in cases involving the religious exemption contained in KRS 600.020(1). OAG 93-84 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Bench & Bar.

Family Court: Proceedings for Dependency, Neglect and Abuse: The Role of the Family Court Judge and the Guardian ad Litem, Vol. 68, No. 6, Nov. 2004, Ky. Bench & Bar 21.

Davidson, Confession is Good for the Soul: Confidentiality, Privilege, and Clergy Liability Issues. Vol. 73, No. 1, January 2009, Ky. Bench & Bar 10.

Lovitt, Choosing Paramours Over Parenting: A Closer Look at the Relationship Between Parent and Non-Parent as a Factor in Termination of Parental Rights Cases, Vol. 74, No. 1, January 2010, Ky. Bench & Bar 19.

Kentucky Law Journal.

Smith, Medical and Psychotherapy Privileges and Confidentiality: On Giving With One Hand and Removing With the Other, 75 Ky. L.J. 473 (1986-87).

Graham, Implementing Custody Mediation in Family Court: Some Comments on the Jefferson County Family Court Experience, 81 Ky. L.J. 1107 (1992-93).

Paquin, The Development and Organization of Domestic Relations Mediation in a Multi-Function Mediation Center in Kentucky, 81 Ky. L.J. 1133 (1992-93).

Northern Kentucky Law Review.

Jones, Kentucky Tort Liability for Failure to Report Family Violence, 26 N. Ky. L. Rev. 43 (1999).

Note, Commonwealth v. Allen: An Eye-Opener for Kentucky’s Teachers, 27 N. Ky. L. Rev. 447 (2000).

Treatises

Caldwell’s Kentucky Form Book, 5th Ed., Practice Context for Juvenile Code Proceedings, § 258.00.

Petrilli, Kentucky Family Law, Actions, § 17.15.

Petrilli, Kentucky Family Law, Minors, § 30.34.

Petrilli, Kentucky Family Law, Personal Rights and Privileges Resulting from Marriage, § 12.11.

620.032. Annual report by cabinet detailing reports received regarding female genital mutilation.

By November 1 of each year, beginning in 2021, the Cabinet for Health and Family Services shall submit to the Legislative Research Commission a comprehensive report that does not identify individuals, detailing the number of reports the cabinet has received regarding female genital mutilation as defined in KRS 508.125 , the number of reports in which the cabinet has investigated and determined that a child is the victim of female genital mutilation, and the number of cases in which services were provided.

HISTORY: 2020 ch. 74, § 8, effective April 2, 2020.

620.040. Duties of prosecutor, police, and cabinet — Prohibition as to school personnel — Multidisciplinary teams.

    1. Upon receipt of a report alleging abuse or neglect by a parent, guardian, fictive kin, person in a position of authority, person in a position of special trust, or person exercising custodial control or supervision, pursuant to KRS 620.030(1) or (2), or a report alleging a child is a victim of human trafficking pursuant to KRS 620.030(3), the recipient of the report shall immediately notify the cabinet or its designated representative, the local law enforcement agency or the Department of Kentucky State Police, and the Commonwealth’s or county attorney of the receipt of the report unless they are the reporting source. (1) (a) Upon receipt of a report alleging abuse or neglect by a parent, guardian, fictive kin, person in a position of authority, person in a position of special trust, or person exercising custodial control or supervision, pursuant to KRS 620.030(1) or (2), or a report alleging a child is a victim of human trafficking pursuant to KRS 620.030(3), the recipient of the report shall immediately notify the cabinet or its designated representative, the local law enforcement agency or the Department of Kentucky State Police, and the Commonwealth’s or county attorney of the receipt of the report unless they are the reporting source.
    2. Based upon the allegation in the report, the cabinet shall immediately make an initial determination as to the risk of harm and immediate safety of the child. Based upon the level of risk determined, the cabinet shall investigate the allegation or accept the report for an assessment of family needs and, if appropriate, may provide or make referral to any community-based services necessary to reduce risk to the child and to provide family support. A report of sexual abuse or human trafficking of a child shall be considered high risk and shall not be referred to any other community agency.
    3. The cabinet shall, within seventy-two (72) hours, exclusive of weekends and holidays, make a written report to the Commonwealth’s or county attorney and the local enforcement agency or the Department of Kentucky State Police concerning the action that has been taken on the investigation.
    4. If the report alleges abuse or neglect by someone other than a parent, guardian, fictive kin, person in a position of authority, person in a position of special trust, or person exercising custodial control or supervision, or the human trafficking of a child, the cabinet shall immediately notify the Commonwealth’s or county attorney and the local law enforcement agency or the Department of Kentucky State Police.
    1. Upon receipt of a report alleging dependency pursuant to KRS 620.030(1) and (2), the recipient shall immediately notify the cabinet or its designated representative. (2) (a) Upon receipt of a report alleging dependency pursuant to KRS 620.030(1) and (2), the recipient shall immediately notify the cabinet or its designated representative.
    2. Based upon the allegation in the report, the cabinet shall immediately make an initial determination as to the risk of harm and immediate safety of the child. Based upon the level of risk, the cabinet shall investigate the allegation or accept the report for an assessment of family needs and, if appropriate, may provide or make referral to any community-based services necessary to reduce risk to the child and to provide family support. A report of sexual abuse or human trafficking of a child shall be considered high risk and shall not be referred to any other community agency.
    3. The cabinet need not notify the local law enforcement agency or the Department of Kentucky State Police or county attorney or Commonwealth’s attorney of reports made under this subsection unless the report involves the human trafficking of a child, in which case the notification shall be required.
  1. If the cabinet or its designated representative receives a report of abuse by a person other than a parent, guardian, fictive kin, person in a position of authority, person in a position of special trust, or other person exercising custodial control or supervision of a child, it shall immediately notify the local law enforcement agency or the Department of Kentucky State Police and the Commonwealth’s or county attorney of the receipt of the report and its contents, and they shall investigate the matter. The cabinet or its designated representative shall participate in an investigation of noncustodial physical abuse or neglect at the request of the local law enforcement agency or the Department of Kentucky State Police. The cabinet shall participate in all investigations of reported or suspected sexual abuse or human trafficking of a child.
  2. School personnel or other persons listed in KRS 620.030(2) do not have the authority to conduct internal investigations in lieu of the official investigations outlined in this section.
    1. If, after receiving the report, the law enforcement officer, the cabinet, or its designated representative cannot gain admission to the location of the child, a search warrant shall be requested from, and may be issued by, the judge to the appropriate law enforcement official upon probable cause that the child is dependent, neglected, or abused. If, pursuant to a search under a warrant, a child is discovered and appears to be in imminent danger, the child may be removed by the law enforcement officer. (5) (a) If, after receiving the report, the law enforcement officer, the cabinet, or its designated representative cannot gain admission to the location of the child, a search warrant shall be requested from, and may be issued by, the judge to the appropriate law enforcement official upon probable cause that the child is dependent, neglected, or abused. If, pursuant to a search under a warrant, a child is discovered and appears to be in imminent danger, the child may be removed by the law enforcement officer.
    2. If a child who is in a hospital or under the immediate care of a physician appears to be in imminent danger if he or she is returned to the persons having custody of him or her, the physician or hospital administrator may hold the child without court order, provided that a request is made to the court for an emergency custody order at the earliest practicable time, not to exceed seventy-two (72) hours.
    3. Any appropriate law enforcement officer may take a child into protective custody and may hold that child in protective custody without the consent of the parent or other person exercising custodial control or supervision if there exist reasonable grounds for the officer to believe that the child is in danger of imminent death or serious physical injury, is being sexually abused, or is a victim of human trafficking and that the parents or other person exercising custodial control or supervision are unable or unwilling to protect the child. The officer or the person to whom the officer entrusts the child shall, within twelve (12) hours of taking the child into protective custody, request the court to issue an emergency custody order.
    4. When a law enforcement officer, hospital administrator, or physician takes a child into custody without the consent of the parent or other person exercising custodial control or supervision, he or she shall provide written notice to the parent or other person stating the reasons for removal of the child. Failure of the parent or other person to receive notice shall not, by itself, be cause for civil or criminal liability.
  3. To the extent practicable and when in the best interest of a child alleged to have been abused, interviews with the child shall be conducted at a children’s advocacy center.
    1. One (1) or more multidisciplinary teams may be established in every county or group of contiguous counties. (7) (a) One (1) or more multidisciplinary teams may be established in every county or group of contiguous counties.
    2. Membership of the multidisciplinary team shall include but shall not be limited to social service workers employed by the Cabinet for Health and Family Services and law enforcement officers. Additional team members may include Commonwealth’s and county attorneys, children’s advocacy center staff, mental health professionals, medical professionals, victim advocates including advocates for victims of human trafficking, educators, and other related professionals, as deemed appropriate.
    3. The multidisciplinary team shall review child sexual abuse cases and child human trafficking cases involving commercial sexual activity referred by participating professionals, including those in which the alleged perpetrator does not have custodial control or supervision of the child or is not responsible for the child’s welfare. The purpose of the multidisciplinary team shall be to review investigations, assess service delivery, and to facilitate efficient and appropriate disposition of cases through the criminal justice system.
    4. The team shall hold regularly scheduled meetings if new reports of sexual abuse or child human trafficking cases involving commercial sexual activity are received or if active cases exist. At each meeting, each active case shall be presented and the agencies’ responses assessed.
    5. The multidisciplinary team shall provide an annual report to the public of nonidentifying case information to allow assessment of the processing and disposition of child sexual abuse cases and child human trafficking cases involving commercial sexual activity.
    6. Multidisciplinary team members and anyone invited by the multidisciplinary team to participate in a meeting shall not divulge case information, including information regarding the identity of the victim or source of the report. Team members and others attending meetings shall sign a confidentiality statement that is consistent with statutory prohibitions on disclosure of this information.
    7. The multidisciplinary team shall, pursuant to KRS 431.600 and 431.660 , develop a local protocol consistent with the model protocol issued by the Kentucky Multidisciplinary Commission on Child Sexual Abuse. The local team shall submit the protocol to the commission for review and approval.
    8. The multidisciplinary team review of a case may include information from reports generated by agencies, organizations, or individuals that are responsible for investigation, prosecution, or treatment in the case, KRS 610.320 to KRS 610.340 notwithstanding.
    9. To the extent practicable, multidisciplinary teams shall be staffed by the local children’s advocacy center.
  4. Nothing in this section shall limit the cabinet’s investigatory authority under KRS 620.050 or any other obligation imposed by law.

History. Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 423, § 65, effective July 1, 1987; 1988, ch. 258, § 3, effective July 15, 1988; 1988, ch. 350, § 44, effective April 10, 1988; 1990, ch. 39, § 1, effective July 13, 1990; 1992, ch. 434, § 2, effective July 14, 1992; 1994, ch. 217, § 1, effective July 15, 1994; 1996, ch. 18, § 5, effective July 15, 1996; 1998, ch. 426, § 617, effective July 15, 1998; 2000, ch. 14, § 63, effective July 14, 2000; 2000, ch. 144, § 6, effective July 14, 2000; 2000, ch. 164, § 1, effective July 14, 2000; 2005, ch. 99, § 665, effective June 20, 2005; 2007, ch. 85, § 331, effective June 26, 2007; 2013, ch. 25, § 3, effective June 25, 2013; 2019 ch. 33, § 10, effective June 27, 2019.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

  1. Due Process.
  2. Separation of powers.
1. Due Process.

Although this section and KRS 620.050 and 200.100 require the Cabinet for Human Resources to take action regarding abused, neglected and dependent children, these sections do not mandate any particular substantive result; they merely provide a plaintiff with an expectation that a certain procedure will be followed by the Cabinet, and this is not sufficient to give rise to a state-created due process liberty interest, which requires a plaintiff to have an expectation that a particular result will follow from a particular required action. “"Tony" L. v. Childers, 71 F.3d 1182, 1995 FED App. 0369P, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 35928 (6th Cir. Ky. 1995 ), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1212, 116 S. Ct. 1834, 134 L. Ed. 2d 938, 1996 U.S. LEXIS 3341 (U.S. 1996).

2. Separation of powers.

When a district court ordered the Department for Community Based Services of the Kentucky Cabinet for Health and Family Services—which investigated and found no substantiation for a parent’s claims that the other abused their child—to open a case and further assess the family needs, it violated the separation of powers doctrine. The district court usurped the Cabinet’s authority to the benefit of the complaining parent who presented nothing in the case except two unsworn petitions in two different emergency protective order cases. T.C. v. M.E., 603 S.W.3d 663, 2020 Ky. App. LEXIS 54 (Ky. Ct. App. 2020).

Cited in

Dep't for Cmty. Based Servs., Cabinet for Health & Family Servs. v. Baker, 2020 Ky. LEXIS 459 (Ky. Dec. 17, 2020).

Research References and Practice Aids

Treatises

Petrilli, Kentucky Family Law, Actions, § 17.15.

Petrilli, Kentucky Family Law, Juvenile Court, § 32.3.

Petrilli, Kentucky Family Law, Minors, § 30.34.

Petrilli, Kentucky Family Law, Termination of Parental Rights and Adoption, § 29.1.

620.045. Funding for regional children’s advocacy center.

  1. The secretaries of the Cabinet for Health and Family Services and the Justice and Public Safety Cabinet are authorized to make state grants and other fund allocations to assist nonprofit corporations in the establishment and operation of regional children’s advocacy centers.
  2. To be eligible for grants from any state government entity, a children’s advocacy center shall meet the statutory definition of a children’s advocacy center as provided in this chapter and shall operate consistent with administrative regulations promulgated by the Cabinet for Health and Family Services in accordance with KRS Chapter 13A.

History. Enact. Acts 2000, ch. 144, § 5, effective July 14, 2000; 2005, ch. 99, § 71, effective June 20, 2005; 2007, ch. 85, § 332, effective June 26, 2007.

620.050. Immunity for good-faith actions or reports — Investigations — Confidentiality of reports — Exceptions — Parent’s access to records — Sharing of information by children’s advocacy centers — Confidentiality of interview with child — Exceptions — Confidentiality of identifying information regarding reporting individual — Internal review and report — Waiver — Medical diagnostic procedures — Sharing information with relatives — Interaction among siblings who are not jointly placed.

  1. Anyone acting upon reasonable cause in the making of a report or acting under KRS 620.030 to 620.050 in good faith shall have immunity from any liability, civil or criminal, that might otherwise be incurred or imposed. Any such participant shall have the same immunity with respect to participation in any judicial proceeding resulting from such report or action. However, any person who knowingly makes a false report and does so with malice shall be guilty of a Class A misdemeanor.
  2. Any employee or designated agent of a children’s advocacy center shall be immune from any civil liability arising from performance within the scope of the person’s duties as provided in KRS 620.030 to 620.050 . Any such person shall have the same immunity with respect to participation in any judicial proceeding. Nothing in this subsection shall limit liability for negligence. Upon the request of an employee or designated agent of a children’s advocacy center, the Attorney General shall provide for the defense of any civil action brought against the employee or designated agent as provided under KRS 12.211 to 12.215 .
  3. Neither the husband-wife nor any professional-client/patient privilege, except the attorney-client and clergy-penitent privilege, shall be a ground for refusing to report under this section or for excluding evidence regarding a dependent, neglected, or abused child or the cause thereof, in any judicial proceedings resulting from a report pursuant to this section. This subsection shall also apply in any criminal proceeding in District or Circuit Court regarding a dependent, neglected, or abused child.
  4. Upon receipt of a report of an abused, neglected, or dependent child pursuant to this chapter, the cabinet as the designated agency or its delegated representative shall initiate a prompt investigation or assessment of family needs, take necessary action, and shall offer protective services toward safeguarding the welfare of the child. The cabinet shall work toward preventing further dependency, neglect, or abuse of the child or any other child under the same care, and preserve and strengthen family life, where possible, by enhancing parental capacity for adequate child care.
  5. The report of suspected child abuse, neglect, or dependency and all information obtained by the cabinet or its delegated representative, as a result of an investigation or assessment made pursuant to this chapter, except for those records provided for in subsection (6) of this section, shall not be divulged to anyone except:
    1. Persons suspected of causing dependency, neglect, or abuse;
    2. The custodial parent or legal guardian of the child alleged to be dependent, neglected, or abused;
    3. Persons within the cabinet with a legitimate interest or responsibility related to the case;
    4. A licensed child-caring facility or child-placing agency evaluating placement for or serving a child who is believed to be the victim of an abuse, neglect, or dependency report;
    5. Other medical, psychological, educational, or social service agencies, child care administrators, corrections personnel, or law enforcement agencies, including the county attorney’s office, the coroner, and the local child fatality response team, that have a legitimate interest in the case;
    6. A noncustodial parent when the dependency, neglect, or abuse is substantiated;
    7. Members of multidisciplinary teams as defined by KRS 620.020 and which operate pursuant to KRS 431.600 ;
    8. Employees or designated agents of a children’s advocacy center;
    9. Those persons so authorized by court order; or
    10. The external child fatality and near fatality review panel established by KRS 620.055 .
    1. Files, reports, notes, photographs, records, electronic and other communications, and working papers used or developed by a children’s advocacy center in providing services under this chapter are confidential and shall not be disclosed except to the following persons: (6) (a) Files, reports, notes, photographs, records, electronic and other communications, and working papers used or developed by a children’s advocacy center in providing services under this chapter are confidential and shall not be disclosed except to the following persons:
      1. Staff employed by the cabinet, law enforcement officers, and Commonwealth’s and county attorneys who are directly involved in the investigation or prosecution of the case, including a cabinet investigation or assessment of child abuse, neglect, and dependency in accordance with this chapter;
      2. Medical and mental health professionals listed by name in a release of information signed by the guardian of the child, provided that the information shared is limited to that necessary to promote the physical or psychological health of the child or to treat the child for abuse-related symptoms;
      3. The court and those persons so authorized by a court order;
      4. The external child fatality and near fatality review panel established by KRS 620.055 ; and
      5. The parties to an administrative hearing conducted by the cabinet or its designee in accordance with KRS Chapter 13B in an appeal of a cabinet-substantiated finding of abuse or neglect. The children’s advocacy center may, in its sole discretion, provide testimony in lieu of files, reports, notes, photographs, records, electronic and other communications, and working papers used or developed by the center if the center determines that the release poses a threat to the safety or well-being of the child, or would be in the best interests of the child. Following the administrative hearing and any judicial review, the parties to the administrative hearing shall return all files, reports, notes, photographs, records, electronic and other communications, and working papers used or developed by the children’s advocacy center to the center.
    2. The provisions of this subsection shall not be construed as to contravene the Rules of Criminal Procedure relating to discovery.
  6. Nothing in this section shall prohibit a parent or guardian from accessing records for his or her child providing that the parent or guardian is not currently under investigation by a law enforcement agency or the cabinet relating to the abuse or neglect of a child.
  7. Nothing in this section shall prohibit employees or designated agents of a children’s advocacy center from disclosing information during a multidisciplinary team review of a child sexual abuse case as set forth under KRS 620.040 . Persons receiving this information shall sign a confidentiality statement consistent with statutory prohibitions on disclosure of this information.
  8. Employees or designated agents of a children’s advocacy center may confirm to another children’s advocacy center that a child has been seen for services. If an information release has been signed by the guardian of the child, a children’s advocacy center may disclose relevant information to another children’s advocacy center.
    1. An interview of a child recorded at a children’s advocacy center shall not be duplicated, except that the Commonwealth’s or county attorney prosecuting the case may: (10) (a) An interview of a child recorded at a children’s advocacy center shall not be duplicated, except that the Commonwealth’s or county attorney prosecuting the case may:
      1. Make and retain one (1) copy of the interview; and
      2. Make one (1) copy for the defendant’s or respondent’s counsel that the defendant’s or respondent’s counsel shall not duplicate.
    2. The defendant’s or respondent’s counsel shall file the copy with the court clerk at the close of the case.
    3. Unless objected to by the victim or victims, the court, on its own motion, or on motion of the attorney for the Commonwealth shall order all recorded interviews that are introduced into evidence or are in the possession of the children’s advocacy center, law enforcement, the prosecution, or the court to be sealed.
    4. The provisions of this subsection shall not be construed as to contravene the Rules of Criminal Procedure relating to discovery.
  9. Identifying information concerning the individual initiating the report under KRS 620.030 shall not be disclosed except:
    1. To law enforcement officials that have a legitimate interest in the case;
    2. To the agency designated by the cabinet to investigate or assess the report;
    3. To members of multidisciplinary teams as defined by KRS 620.020 that operated under KRS 431.600
    4. Under a court order, after the court has conducted an in camera review of the record of the state related to the report and has found reasonable cause to believe that the reporter knowingly made a false report; or
    5. The external child fatality and near fatality review panel established by KRS 620.055 .
    1. Information may be publicly disclosed by the cabinet in a case where child abuse or neglect has resulted in a child fatality or near fatality. (12) (a) Information may be publicly disclosed by the cabinet in a case where child abuse or neglect has resulted in a child fatality or near fatality.
    2. The cabinet shall conduct an internal review of any case where child abuse or neglect has resulted in a child fatality or near fatality and the cabinet had prior involvement with the child or family. The cabinet shall prepare a summary that includes an account of:
      1. The cabinet’s actions and any policy or personnel changes taken or to be taken, including the results of appeals, as a result of the findings from the internal review; and
      2. Any cooperation, assistance, or information from any agency of the state or any other agency, institution, or facility providing services to the child or family that were requested and received by the cabinet during the investigation of a child fatality or near fatality.
    3. The cabinet shall submit a report by September 1 of each year containing an analysis of all summaries of internal reviews occurring during the previous year and an analysis of historical trends to the Governor, the General Assembly, and the state child fatality review team created under KRS 211.684 .
  10. When an adult who is the subject of information made confidential by subsection (5) of this section publicly reveals or causes to be revealed any significant part of the confidential matter or information, the confidentiality afforded by subsection (5) of this section is presumed voluntarily waived, and confidential information and records about the person making or causing the public disclosure, not already disclosed but related to the information made public, may be disclosed if disclosure is in the best interest of the child or is necessary for the administration of the cabinet’s duties under this chapter.
  11. As a result of any report of suspected child abuse or neglect, photographs and X-rays or other appropriate medical diagnostic procedures may be taken or caused to be taken, without the consent of the parent or other person exercising custodial control or supervision of the child, as a part of the medical evaluation or investigation of these reports. These photographs and X-rays or results of other medical diagnostic procedures may be introduced into evidence in any subsequent judicial proceedings or an administrative hearing conducted by the cabinet or its designee in accordance with KRS Chapter 13B in an appeal of a cabinet-substantiated finding of child abuse or neglect. The person performing the diagnostic procedures or taking photographs or X-rays shall be immune from criminal or civil liability for having performed the act. Nothing herein shall limit liability for negligence.
  12. In accordance with 42 U.S.C. sec. 671 , the cabinet shall share information about a child in the custody of the cabinet with a relative or a parent of the child’s sibling for the purposes of:
    1. Evaluating or arranging a placement for the child;
    2. Arranging appropriate treatment services for the child; or
    3. Establishing visitation between the child and a relative, including a sibling of the child.
  13. In accordance with 42 U.S.C. sec. 671 , the cabinet shall, in the case of siblings removed from their home who are not jointly placed, provide for frequent visitation or other ongoing interaction between the siblings, unless the cabinet determines that frequent visitation or other ongoing interaction would be contrary to the safety or well-being of any of the siblings.

History. Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 423, § 66, effective July 1, 1987; 1988, ch. 350, § 45, effective April 10, 1988; 1996, ch. 18, § 6, effective July 15, 1996; 1996, ch. 347, § 7, effective July 15, 1996; 1998, ch. 57, § 19, effective March 17, 1998; 1998, ch. 303, § 2, effective July 15, 1998; 2000, ch. 144, § 7, effective July 14, 2000; 2000, ch. 164, § 2, effective July 14, 2000; 2002, ch. 87, § 2, effective July 15, 2002; 2004, ch. 169, § 1, effective July 13, 2004; 2013, ch. 39, § 2, effective June 25, 2013; 2016 ch. 115, § 6, effective July 15, 2016; 2018 ch. 159, § 19, effective July 14, 2018; 2019 ch. 3, § 1, effective June 27, 2019.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

  1. In General.
  2. Due Process.
  3. Intent.
  4. Marital Privilege.
  5. Immunity.

Cited:

1. In General.

A report by a teacher or counselor to his or her supervisor does not entitle him or her to immunity from prosecution since such a report is not a report within the meaning of KRS 620.030 . Commonwealth v. Allen, 980 S.W.2d 278, 1998 Ky. LEXIS 148 ( Ky. 1998 ).

Commonwealth of Kentucky, Cabinet for Health and Family Services’ (Cabinet) failure to disclose the requested records constituted a “willful” violation of the Open Records Act, KRS 61.871 ; the Cabinet failed to make particularized analysis and instead relied on an all-encompassing policy of nondisclosure despite the purpose of the Act and despite the acknowledged applicability of KRS 620.050(12)(a) under these circumstances, and the circuit court concluded that these denials were made in “bad faith.” Commonwealth v. Lexington H-L Servs., 382 S.W.3d 875, 2012 Ky. App. LEXIS 216 (Ky. Ct. App. 2012).

2. Due Process.

Although this section and KRS 620.040 and 200.100 require the Cabinet for Human Resources to take action regarding abused, neglected and dependent children, these sections do not mandate any particular substantive result; they merely provide a plaintiff with an expectation that a certain procedure will be followed by the Cabinet, and this is not sufficient to give rise to a state-created due process liberty interest, which requires a plaintiff to have an expectation that a particular result will follow from a particular required action. “ "Tony" L. v. Childers, 71 F.3d 1182, 1995 FED App. 0369P, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 35928 (6th Cir. Ky. 1995 ), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1212, 116 S. Ct. 1834, 134 L. Ed. 2d 938, 1996 U.S. LEXIS 3341 (U.S. 1996).

3. Intent.

Because parents could not show doctor had bad intent when, after performing a series of tests on their baby including a CT scan showing a subarachnoid hemorrhage he noted was consistent with “Shaken Baby Syndrome,” he reported the baby’s injury to social services, the doctor was afforded the immunity granted by KRS 620.050 ; because doctor could not be held liable, neither could hospital; motions to dismiss granted. Hazlett v. Evans, 943 F. Supp. 785, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16769 (E.D. Ky. 1996 ).

Where a hospital employee allegedly made a false report to authorities that a newborn child’s meconium stool sample tested positive for drugs, which led to the child’s being placed in foster care, a doctor was immune from civil liability for the report under KRS 620.030(1) and KRS 620.050(1), because there was no allegation that she acted in bad faith. Garrison v. Leahy-Auer, 220 S.W.3d 693, 2006 Ky. App. LEXIS 151 (Ky. Ct. App. 2006).

4. Marital Privilege.

The marital privilege, which courts construe strictly and narrowly, is inapplicable in a case regarding an abused, neglected, or dependent child; thus, neither a husband charged with third degree sodomy against a fourteen (14) year old girl, nor his wife, who reported the act to the police, could claim the marital privilege. This section does not conflict with Rule 504, nor does its application violate Rule 1102. Mullins v. Commonwealth, 956 S.W.2d 210, 1997 Ky. LEXIS 147 ( Ky. 1997 ).

Defendant was not allowed to invoke spousal privilege under Ky. R. Evid. 504 to prevent his ex-wife from testifying about a conversation they had while married where the charges involved the rape and sodomy of a teenage girl, and thus, marital privilege was abrogated under Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 620.050 . Kays v. Commonwealth, 505 S.W.3d 260, 2016 Ky. App. LEXIS 177 (Ky. Ct. App. 2016).

5. Immunity.

Custody evaluator was immune for a report to the Cabinet for Health and Family Services of a father's gun possession because no bad faith or lack of a subjective belief that the evaluator discharged the evaluator's duty to report was shown. J.S. v. Berla, 456 S.W.3d 19, 2015 Ky. App. LEXIS 14 (Ky. Ct. App. 2015).

Reporter may be acting under KRS 620.030 to 620.050 in good faith if the reporter subjectively believed he or she was discharging the duty imposed by KRS 620.030 ; therefore, a reporter’s good faith belief that he or she is discharging the lawful duty to report under KRS 620.030, even if such a belief is ultimately determined to be erroneous, is all that is required under KRS 620.050 (1). As a result, several health care providers were immune from liability under KRS 620.050(1) because they acted in good faith under KRS 620.030 in making a report of a new mother’s suspected child abuse, even though a blood alcohol report was erroneous. Norton Hosps., Inc. v. Peyton, 381 S.W.3d 286, 2012 Ky. LEXIS 165 ( Ky. 2012 ).

Relative who reported suspected abuse was entitled to immunity since she had reasonable cause to make the allegations. The relative reported that the mother and children were living with her father, who was suspected of abusing the mother as a child; moreover, the relative alleged that the mother had engaged in bizarre behavior and reported similar allegations made by the mother’s pastor. Leamon v. Phillips, 423 S.W.3d 759, 2014 Ky. App. LEXIS 8 (Ky. Ct. App. 2014).

In a report of child neglect to the Kentucky Cabinet of Health and Family Services' Department of Community Based Services based on a four-year-old student wandering away from a school, who was found approximately one-half mile away, the trial court did not err in dismissing appellant's claims against her employer alleging wrongful discharge, negligence and vicarious liability, and defamation as the record did not support any allegations that the employer's report of neglect was done in bad faith as appellant did not dispute that the child wandered away from the school while she was working; and, although appellant was ultimately exonerated from having committed neglect, an erroneous belief regarding neglect did not constitute bad faith. Collins v. KCEOC Cmty. Action P'ship, 455 S.W.3d 421, 2015 Ky. App. LEXIS 9 (Ky. Ct. App. 2015).

Because a doctor who treated a minor child prior to the child's death did not report suspected abuse of the child while in foster care to the proper authorities, the doctor was not entitled to statutory immunity from civil suit. A.A. v. Shutts, 516 S.W.3d 343, 2017 Ky. App. LEXIS 34 (Ky. Ct. App. 2017).

Cited:

Morgan v. Bird, 289 S.W.3d 222, 2009 Ky. App. LEXIS 68 (Ky. Ct. App. 2009).

Opinions of Attorney General.

This section requires schools to continue to allow the Cabinet for Human Resources (CHR) to interview children on school premises without consent of parents in the course of an abuse investigation if that is the course of action determined appropriate by the CHR. OAG 87-33 .

The Department for Social Services acted properly when it refused to make available for inspection to the alleged perpetrator of child abuse the names of informants and those portions of the statements of a judge and an informant wherein those parties set forth personal opinions, observations, and recommendations not related to the child abuse investigation and the findings resulting from that investigation. OAG 87-82 .

The public agency’s refusal to furnish records and documents to the requesting party relative to an investigation of an alleged instance of child abuse and neglect was supported by subdivision (1)(j) of KRS 61.878 and subsection (4) of this section. OAG 88-4 .

Cabinet for Human Resources acted consistently with the Open Records Laws to the extent that it withheld from inspection the names of informants which spawned its investigation pursuant to KRS 61.878(1)(a) and (j) and subdivision (4)(a) of this section, and to the extent that it denied inspection of the verbal complaint or oral allegations made by an individual to an employee of the cabinet. However, the cabinet acted inconsistently with the Open Records Law to the extent that it denied inspection of the written complaint which initially spawned the investigation, although, the names of informants contained within the written complaint may properly be withheld. OAG 91-33 .

Where person requesting documents regarding detention of student at a school and the report and findings of an investigation conducted by the Department for Social Services did not demonstrate that he fell under any of the statutorily recognized classifications of this section or KRS 61.878 or that his particular situation warranted the release of the requested material, his request was properly denied. OAG 91-93 .

Subsection (4) is applicable to information obtained as a result of a joint investigation by the Cabinet for Human Resources and the Kentucky State Police. OAG 91-173 .

This section clearly requires that the Cabinet for Human Resources and the Department for Social Services withhold from all persons information acquired as a result of an investigation conducted pursuant to this section, unless the requesting party can demonstrate that he or she satisfies one of the requirements set forth in subsection (4)(a) through (4)(f) of this section. Thus where, although the requesting party was currently involved in a custody dispute with his former wife, she was the custodial parent, and the allegations of abuse were not substantiated, the requesting party could not be said to have satisfied the requirements of subsection (4)(e) of this section and his open records request was properly denied. OAG 92-53 .

Subsection (4) of this section KRS 61.878(1)(k) and KRS 610.320(3) are aimed at protecting juveniles, and not adults who are criminally prosecuted for victimizing juveniles. OAG 93-ORD-42.

The Kentucky State Police improperly relied on subsection (4) of this section, KRS 61.878(1)(a) and (k), and KRS 610.320(3) in denying a request to inspect the files generated in the course of its investigation into a candidate for county sheriff who was charged with sodomy, sexual abuse and unlawful transaction with a minor. Although the privacy interests of the juveniles whose names appeared in those records were superior to the public’s interest in disclosure of their identities, that interest could be protected by redaction of the juveniles’ names and personally identifiable information. The candidate’s privacy interests, however, were outweighed by the public’s interest in assessing his fitness to serve as county sheriff, and the public’s interest in evaluating the performance of the Kentucky State Police in investigating the case. OAG 93-ORD-42.

Unless the Kentucky State Police is acting as the Cabinet for Human Resources’ designated representative in conducting a joint investigation into allegations of dependency, neglect, or abuse, as opposed to independently conducting an investigation into possible criminal charges against an adult, subsection (4) of this section does not operate to authorize nondisclosure of the records it compiles. OAG 93-ORD-42.

The Department of Social Services improperly denied the Kentucky Board of Nursing’s request for medical records referenced in a report prepared by the Department in the course of an investigation into suspected child abuse pursuant to subsection (4) of this section, which is incorporated into the Open Records Act by operation of subdivision (1)(k) of KRS 61.878 . OAG 93-ORD-132.

A child who does not receive necessary medical care due to his parents’ religious belief may considered an abused or neglected child; accordingly, the reporting requirements of KRS 620.030 (1) and the investigation requirements of subsection (3) of this section are mandatory and must be followed in cases involving the religious exemption contained in KRS 600.020 (1). OAG 93-84 .

Since the shroud of secrecy mandated by KRS 620.050(4) is “not intended to protect the identities of adults and employees of a public agency charged with violations of the criminal laws,” but is instead intended to protect the affected families, and in particular, the affected children, the Cabinet for Human Resources could not persuasively argue that it was bound by the confidentiality provision found at KRS 620.050(4) in witholding unsubstantiated complaints of abuse against its employees, and, at the same time, that it was free to release most, if not all, of the remaining records it compiled in its investigation of alleged employee misconduct. OAG 94-ORD-76 (overruling OAG 88-4 where inconsistent).

Cabinet for Health Service properly relied on KRS 61.872(6) and 61.878(1)(a), (k) and ( l ) and various confidentiality provisions found in both state ( KRS 209.140 , 210.235 , 214.420 , 214.625 and 620.050 ) and federal law, in denying request for inspection of all nursing facility licensure inspection reports for a two year period where the Cabinet sustained the burden of showing that such request was an unreasonable burden on the Cabinet in describing with specificity the actual volumes of records implicated by the request and where the exemptions to disclosure provided by the state and federal law were mandatory and the difficulty of separation of confidential from releasable information constituted an unreasonable burden. 97-ORD-88.

The Cabinet for Families and Children properly relied on KRS 61.878(1)(a), in addition to KRS 194B.060 and subsection (4) of this section, which are incorporated into the Open Records Act by operation of KRS 61.878(1)(l), in denying a request for a copy of the Children’s Protective Services Report relating to two (2) children identified in the request and their mother. OAG 99-ORD-197.

Although the requester has established that she has “relative placement” of at least one of her grandchildren, she has not established that she is the children’s custodial parent or legal guardian within the meaning of KRS 620.050(5)(b) or that she otherwise falls within one of the remaining statutorily recognized classifications. A letter prepared by a social worker does not invest her with the status of custodial parent or legal guardian. Nor has she produced a court order directing disclosure of the disputed records to her. Insofar as none of the criteria found in KRS 620.050(5) are satisfied, the requester is not entitled to receive a copy of those records pursuant to KRS 61.878(1)(l). OAG 03-ORD-70.

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Smith, Medical and Psychotherapy Privileges and Confidentiality: On Giving With One Hand and Removing With the Other, 75 Ky. L.J. 473 (1986-87).

Northern Kentucky Law Review.

Jones, Kentucky Tort Liability for Failure to Report Family Violence, 26 N. Ky. L. Rev. 43 (1999).

Note, Commonwealth v. Allen: An Eye-Opener for Kentucky’s Teachers, 27 N. Ky. L. Rev. 447 (2000).

Treatises

Petrilli, Kentucky Family Law, Minors, § 30.34.

Petrilli, Kentucky Family Law, Personal Rights Privilege Resulting from Marriage, § 12.11.

Petrilli, Kentucky Family Law, Support of the Family, § 16.16.

620.051. Background check of child abuse and neglect records — Fee — Central registry — Administrative regulations.

  1. The cabinet may charge a fee of ten dollars ($10) per background check of the cabinet’s child abuse and neglect records when those services are requested by a person for professional, trade, or commercial purposes or for personal use.
  2. The cabinet shall promulgate administrative regulations to establish the central registry and the process for a background check of the cabinet’s child abuse and neglect records.

HISTORY: 2018 ch. 159, § 18, effective July 14, 2018.

620.052. Provision of information to parent or legal guardian concerning community service programs for families in crisis when child protection investigation does not result in out-of-home placement of a child.

During a child protection investigation that does not result in an out-of-home placement due to abuse of a child, the Cabinet for Health and Family Services is authorized and encouraged to provide information to the parent or legal guardian about community service programs that provide support services for families in crisis, including organizations that operate programs authorized under KRS 403.352 and 403.353 . The Cabinet for Health and Family Services is authorized to exercise its discretion in recommending programs, organizations, and resources to the parent or legal guardian.

HISTORY: 2016 ch. 107, § 3, effective July 15, 2016.

Legislative Research Commission Notes.

(7/15/2016). 2016 Ky. Acts ch. 107, sec. 3 directed that a new section of KRS Chapter 403 be created for the text of this statute. The subject matter of KRS Chapter 403 relates to divorce and dissolution of marriage. Since this statute addresses an option for the Cabinet for Health and Family Services to follow at the conclusion of a child protection investigation that does not result in removing a child from the parent or legal guardian's home, in codification the Reviser of Statutes created a new section of KRS Chapter 620, which addresses child abuse and neglect investigations, as a more appropriate statutory designation under the authority of KRS 7.136(1)(a).

620.055. External child fatality and near fatality review panel — Creation — Members — Meetings — Duties — Responsibilities — Information required to be provided to members — Confidentiality — Destruction of information following conclusion of panel’s examination — Application of open records and open meetings law — Limitation of liability — Annual evaluation of panel’s work.

  1. An external child fatality and near fatality review panel is hereby created and established for the purpose of conducting comprehensive reviews of child fatalities and near fatalities, reported to the Cabinet for Health and Family Services, suspected to be a result of abuse or neglect. The panel shall be attached to the Justice and Public Safety Cabinet for staff and administrative purposes.
  2. The external child fatality and near fatality review panel shall be composed of the following five (5) ex officio nonvoting members and fifteen (15) voting members:
    1. The chairperson of the House Health and Welfare Committee of the Kentucky General Assembly, who shall be an ex officio nonvoting member;
    2. The chairperson of the Senate Health and Welfare Committee of the Kentucky General Assembly, who shall be an ex officio nonvoting member;
    3. The commissioner of the Department for Community Based Services, who shall be an ex officio nonvoting member;
    4. The commissioner of the Department for Public Health, who shall be an ex officio nonvoting member;
    5. A family court judge selected by the Chief Justice of the Kentucky Supreme Court, who shall be an ex officio nonvoting member;
    6. A pediatrician from the University of Kentucky’s Department of Pediatrics who is licensed and experienced in forensic medicine relating to child abuse and neglect to be selected by the Attorney General from a list of three (3) names provided by the dean of the University of Kentucky School of Medicine;
    7. A pediatrician from the University of Louisville’s Department of Pediatrics who is licensed and experienced in forensic medicine relating to child abuse and neglect to be selected by the Attorney General from a list of three (3) names provided by the dean of the University of Louisville School of Medicine;
    8. The state medical examiner or designee;
    9. A court-appointed special advocate (CASA) program director to be selected by the Attorney General from a list of three (3) names provided by the Kentucky CASA Association;
    10. A peace officer with experience investigating child abuse and neglect fatalities and near fatalities to be selected by the Attorney General from a list of three(3) names provided by the commissioner of the Kentucky State Police;
    11. A representative from Prevent Child Abuse Kentucky, Inc. to be selected by the Attorney General from a list of three (3) names provided by the president of the Prevent Child Abuse Kentucky, Inc. board of directors;
    12. A practicing local prosecutor to be selected by the Attorney General;
    13. The executive director of the Kentucky Domestic Violence Association or the executive director’s designee;
    14. The chairperson of the State Child Fatality Review Team established in accordance with KRS 211.684 or the chairperson’s designee;
    15. A practicing social work clinician to be selected by the Attorney General from a list of three (3) names provided by the Board of Social Work;
    16. A practicing addiction counselor to be selected by the Attorney General from a list of three (3) names provided by the Kentucky Association of Addiction Professionals;
    17. A representative from the family resource and youth service centers to be selected by the Attorney General from a list of three (3) names submitted by the Cabinet for Health and Family Services;
    18. A representative of a community mental health center to be selected by the Attorney General from a list of three (3) names provided by the Kentucky Association of Regional Mental Health and Mental Retardation Programs, Inc.;
    19. A member of a citizen foster care review board selected by the Chief Justice of the Kentucky Supreme Court; and
    20. An at-large representative who shall serve as chairperson to be selected by the Secretary of State.
    1. By August 1, 2013, the appointing authority or the appointing authorities, as the case may be, shall have appointed panel members. Initial terms of members, other than those serving ex officio, shall be staggered to provide continuity. Initial appointments shall be: five (5) members for terms of one (1) year, five (5) members for terms of two (2) years, and five (5) members for terms of three (3) years, these terms to expire, in each instance, on June 30 and thereafter until a successor is appointed and accepts appointment. (3) (a) By August 1, 2013, the appointing authority or the appointing authorities, as the case may be, shall have appointed panel members. Initial terms of members, other than those serving ex officio, shall be staggered to provide continuity. Initial appointments shall be: five (5) members for terms of one (1) year, five (5) members for terms of two (2) years, and five (5) members for terms of three (3) years, these terms to expire, in each instance, on June 30 and thereafter until a successor is appointed and accepts appointment.
    2. Upon the expiration of these initial staggered terms, successors shall be appointed by the respective appointing authorities, for terms of two (2) years, and until successors are appointed and accept their appointments. Members shall be eligible for reappointment. Vacancies in the membership of the panel shall be filled in the same manner as the original appointments.
    3. At any time, a panel member shall recuse himself or herself from the review of a case if the panel member believes he or she has a personal or private conflict of interest.
    4. If a voting panel member is absent from two (2) or more consecutive, regularly scheduled meetings, the member shall be considered to have resigned and shall be replaced with a new member in the same manner as the original appointment.
    5. If a voting panel member is proven to have violated subsection (13) of this section, the member shall be removed from the panel, and the member shall be replaced with a new member in the same manner as the original appointment.
  3. The panel shall meet at least quarterly and may meet upon the call of the chairperson of the panel.
  4. Members of the panel shall receive no compensation for their duties related to the panel, but may be reimbursed for expenses incurred in accordance with state guidelines and administrative regulations.
  5. Each panel member shall be provided copies of all information set out in this subsection, including but not limited to records and information, upon request, to be gathered, unredacted, and submitted to the panel within thirty (30) days by the Cabinet for Health and Family Services from the Department for Community Based Services or any agency, organization, or entity involved with a child subject to a fatality or near fatality:
    1. Cabinet for Health and Family Services records and documentation regarding the deceased or injured child and his or her caregivers, residents of the home, and persons supervising the child at the time of the incident that include all records and documentation set out in this paragraph:
      1. All prior and ongoing investigations, services, or contacts;
      2. Any and all records of services to the family provided by agencies or individuals contracted by the Cabinet for Health and Family Services; and
      3. All documentation of actions taken as a result of child fatality internal reviews conducted pursuant to KRS 620.050(12)(b);
    2. Licensing reports from the Cabinet for Health and Family Services, Office of Inspector General, if an incident occurred in a licensed facility;
    3. All available records regarding protective services provided out of state;
    4. All records of services provided by the Department for Juvenile Justice regarding the deceased or injured child and his or her caregivers, residents of the home, and persons involved with the child at the time of the incident;
    5. Autopsy reports;
    6. Emergency medical service, fire department, law enforcement, coroner, and other first responder reports, including but not limited to photos and interviews with family members and witnesses;
    7. Medical records regarding the deceased or injured child, including but not limited to all records and documentation set out in this paragraph:
      1. Primary care records, including progress notes; developmental milestones; growth charts that include head circumference; all laboratory and X-ray requests and results; and birth record that includes record of delivery type, complications, and initial physical exam of baby;
      2. In-home provider care notes about observations of the family, bonding, others in home, and concerns;
      3. Hospitalization and emergency department records;
      4. Dental records;
      5. Specialist records; and
      6. All photographs of injuries of the child that are available;
    8. Educational records of the deceased or injured child, or other children residing in the home where the incident occurred, including but not limited to the records and documents set out in this paragraph:
      1. Attendance records;
      2. Special education services;
      3. School-based health records; and
      4. Documentation of any interaction and services provided to the children and family.
    9. Head Start records or records from any other child care or early child care provider;
    10. Records of any Family, Circuit, or District Court involvement with the deceased or injured child and his or her caregivers, residents of the home and persons involved with the child at the time of the incident that include but are not limited to the juvenile and family court records and orders set out in this paragraph, pursuant to KRS Chapters 199, 403, 405, 406, and 600 to 645:
      1. Petitions;
      2. Court reports by the Department for Community Based Services, guardian ad litem, court-appointed special advocate, and the Citizen Foster Care Review Board;
      3. All orders of the court, including temporary, dispositional, or adjudicatory; and
      4. Documentation of annual or any other review by the court;
    11. Home visit records from the Department for Public Health or other services;
    12. All information on prior allegations of abuse or neglect and deaths of children of adults residing in the household;
    13. All law enforcement records and documentation regarding the deceased or injured child and his or her caregivers, residents of the home, and persons involved with the child at the time of the incident; and
    14. Mental health records regarding the deceased or injured child and his or her caregivers, residents of the home, and persons involved with the child at the time of the incident.
  6. The panel may seek the advice of experts, such as persons specializing in the fields of psychiatric and forensic medicine, nursing, psychology, social work, education, law enforcement, family law, or other related fields, if the facts of a case warrant additional expertise.
  7. The panel shall post updates after each meeting to the Web site of the Justice and Public Safety Cabinet regarding case reviews, findings, and recommendations.
  8. The panel chairperson, or other requested persons, shall report a summary of the panel’s discussions and proposed or actual recommendations to the Interim Joint Committee on Health and Welfare of the Kentucky General Assembly monthly or at the request of a committee co-chair. The goal of the committee shall be to ensure impartiality regarding the operations of the panel during its review process.
  9. The panel shall publish an annual report by December 1 of each year consisting of case reviews, findings, and recommendations for system and process improvements to help prevent child fatalities and near fatalities that are due to abuse and neglect. The report shall be submitted to the Governor, the secretary of the Cabinet for Health and Family Services, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, the Attorney General, and the director of the Legislative Research Commission for distribution to the Child Welfare Oversight and Advisory Committee established in KRS 6.943 and the Judiciary Committee.
  10. Information and record copies that are confidential under state or federal law and are provided to the external child fatality and near fatality review panel by the Cabinet for Health and Family Services, the Department for Community Based Services, or any agency, organization, or entity for review shall not become the information and records of the panel and shall not lose their confidentiality by virtue of the panel’s access to the information and records. The original information and records used to generate information and record copies provided to the panel in accordance with subsection (6) of this section shall be maintained by the appropriate agency in accordance with state and federal law and shall be subject to the Kentucky Open Records Act, KRS 61.870 to 61.884 . All open records requests shall be made to the appropriate agency, not to the external child fatality and near fatality review panel or any of the panel members. Information and record copies provided to the panel for review shall be exempt from the Kentucky Open Records Act, KRS 61.870 to 61.884 . At the conclusion of the panel’s examination, all copies of information and records provided to the panel involving an individual case shall be destroyed by the Justice and Public Safety Cabinet.
  11. Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the portions of the external child fatality and near fatality review panel meetings during which an individual child fatality or near fatality case is reviewed or discussed by panel members may be a closed session and subject to the provisions of KRS 61.815(1) and shall only occur following the conclusion of an open session. At the conclusion of the closed session, the panel shall immediately convene an open session and give a summary of what occurred during the closed session.
  12. Each member of the external child fatality and near fatality review panel, any person attending a closed panel session, and any person presenting information or records on an individual child fatality or near fatality shall not release information or records not available under the Kentucky Open Records Act, KRS 61.870 to 61.884 to the public.
  13. A member of the external child fatality and near fatality review panel shall not be prohibited from making a good faith report to any state or federal agency of any information or issue that the panel member believes should be reported or disclosed in an effort to facilitate effectiveness and transparency in Kentucky’s child protective services.
  14. A member of the external child fatality and near fatality review panel shall not be held liable for any civil damages or criminal penalties pursuant to KRS 620.990 as a result of any action taken or omitted in the performance of the member’s duties pursuant to this section and KRS 620.050 , except for violations of subsection (11), (12), or (13) of this section.
  15. Beginning in 2014 the Legislative Program Review and Investigations Committee of the Kentucky General Assembly shall conduct an annual evaluation of the external child fatality and near fatality review panel established pursuant to this section to monitor the operations, procedures, and recommendations of the panel and shall report its findings to the General Assembly.

The release of educational records shall be in compliance with the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act, 20 U.S.C. sec. 1232 g and its implementing regulations;

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 2013, ch. 39, § 1, effective June 25, 2013; 2018 ch. 159, § 55, effective July 14, 2018.

620.060. Emergency custody orders.

  1. The court for the county where the child ordinarily resides or will reside or the county where the child is present may issue an ex parte emergency custody order when it appears to the court that removal is in the best interest of the child and that there are reasonable grounds to believe, as supported by affidavit or by recorded sworn testimony, that one (1) or more of the following conditions exist and that the parents or other person exercising custodial control or supervision are unable or unwilling to protect the child:
    1. The child is in danger of imminent death or serious physical injury or is being sexually abused;
    2. The parent has repeatedly inflicted or allowed to be inflicted by other than accidental means physical injury or emotional injury. This condition shall not include reasonable and ordinary discipline recognized in the community where the child lives, as long as reasonable and ordinary discipline does not result in abuse or neglect as defined in KRS 600.020(1); or
    3. The child is in immediate danger due to the parent’s failure or refusal to provide for the safety or needs of the child.
  2. Custody may be placed with a relative taking into account the wishes of the custodial parent and child or any other appropriate person or agency including the cabinet.
  3. An emergency custody order shall be effective no longer than seventy-two (72) hours, exclusive of weekends and holidays, unless there is a temporary removal hearing with oral or other notice to the county attorney and the parent or other person exercising custodial control or supervision of the child, to determine if the child should be held for a longer period. The seventy-two (72) hour period also may be extended or delayed upon the waiver or request of the child’s parent or other person exercising custodial control or supervision.
  4. Any person authorized to serve process shall serve the parent or other person exercising custodial control or supervision with a copy of the emergency custody order. If such person cannot be found, the sheriff shall make a good faith effort to notify the nearest known relative, neighbor, or other person familiar with the child.
  5. Within seventy-two (72) hours of the taking of a child into custody without the consent of his parent or other person exercising custodial control or supervision, a petition shall be filed pursuant to this chapter.
  6. Nothing herein shall preclude the issuance of arrest warrants pursuant to the Rules of Criminal Procedure.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 423, § 67, effective July 1, 1987; 1988, ch. 350, § 46, effective April 10, 1988; 1998, ch. 57, § 4, effective March 17, 1998; 2018 ch. 159, § 20, effective July 14, 2018.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Statutory Requirements Not Met.

Status quo ex parte order granting the grandparents custody of the children was unenforceable where it appeared to be an emergency order for temporary custody, but the court's sparse findings did not meet the requirements of Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 620.060(1). Robison v. Theele, 461 S.W.3d 772, 2015 Ky. App. LEXIS 55 (Ky. Ct. App. 2015).

Circuit court properly committed a father’s 31-month-old child to the Cabinet for Health and Family Services because there was an emergency where the father was arrested on drug charges and drugs and a handgun were seized from a child’s bedroom, the stepmother did not meet the requirements of a de facto custodian where it was not established that the POA the father purportedly executed made her the child’s legal guardian, the father’s three blood relatives were eliminated from consideration as either living with, or being, drug traffickers, and the least restrictive appropriate placement available was the foster mother with whom the child has spent the majority of his life. G. P. v. Cabinet for Health and Family Servs., 572 S.W.3d 484, 2019 Ky. App. LEXIS 34 (Ky. Ct. App. 2019).

Cited:

Cole v. Thomas, 735 S.W.2d 333, 1987 Ky. App. LEXIS 541 (Ky. Ct. App. 1987); Cabinet for Health & Family Servs. v. J.M.G., 2015 Ky. LEXIS 2013 (Dec. 17, 2015).

Opinions of Attorney General.

KRS 620.090 , 620.140 and 610.050 , and this section in conjunction with KRS 620.130 combine to comply with 42 USCS 672(a)(1), which requires a judicial determination, prior to the removal of a child from the home, that continuation in the home is contrary to the best interests of the child. OAG 90-37 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Bench & Bar.

Family Court: Proceedings for Dependency, Neglect and Abuse: The Role of the Family Court Judge and the Guardian ad Litem, Vol. 68, No. 6, Nov. 2004, Ky. Bench & Bar 21.

Kentucky Law Journal.

Graham, Implementing Custody Mediation in Family Court: Some Comments on the Jefferson County Family Court Experience, 81 Ky. L.J. 1107 (1992-93).

Essays, “Are Kentucky’s Children ‘At Risk’ as a Result of J.H. v. Commonwealth?”, 86 Ky. L.J. 999 (1997-98).

Treatises

Caldwell’s Kentucky Form Book, 5th Ed., Practice Context for Juvenile Code Proceedings, § 258.00.

Petrilli, Kentucky Family Law, Juvenile Court, § 32.21.

620.070. Dependency, neglect, or abuse action — Service of petition and summons — Contents of summons.

  1. A dependency, neglect, or abuse action may be commenced by the filing of a petition by any interested person in the juvenile session of the District Court.
  2. After a petition has been filed, the clerk of the court shall issue, and the sheriff or other person authorized to serve process, except an employee of the Cabinet for Health and Family Services shall serve, a copy of the petition and a summons to the parent or other person exercising custodial control or supervision, unless their identity or location is unknown, in which case the petition and summons shall be served as directed by the court, which means may include service on the nearest known adult relative, service by mail to the last known address, or other service directed by the court and given in a manner reasonably calculated to give actual notice. Service may be by warning order if other means are not effective.
  3. The summons shall include an explanation of the importance of the petition and an explanation of the rights of the parent or other person exercising custodial control in any subsequent proceedings. The summons shall emphasize the importance of immediately contacting the court about legal representation and to be advised of the date, time, and place when the parent or other person exercising custodial control or supervision is to appear before the court. The summons shall include written notification that the case may be reviewed by a local citizen foster care review board and the report of the board review shall become part of the court record.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 423, § 68, effective July 1, 1987; 1988, ch. 350, § 47, effective April 10, 1988; 1992, ch. 412, § 5, effective July 14, 1992; 1996, ch. 301, § 2, effective July 15, 1996; 1998, ch. 278, § 2, effective July 15, 1998; 2018 ch. 159, § 21, effective July 14, 2018.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Compliance.

District judge erred to the point of manifest injustice by using an order denying an emergency protective order petition to initiate a removal case in the juvenile division of the judge’s own court because the court did not qualify as an interested party that was able to initiate a dependency, neglect, or abuse action. T.C. v. M.E., 603 S.W.3d 663, 2020 Ky. App. LEXIS 54 (Ky. Ct. App. 2020).

Cited:

Cole v. Thomas, 735 S.W.2d 333, 1987 Ky. App. LEXIS 541 (Ky. Ct. App. 1987); Cabinet for Health & Family Servs. v. J.M.G., 2015 Ky. LEXIS 2013 (Dec. 17, 2015).

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Graham, Implementing Custody Mediation in Family Court: Some Comments on the Jefferson County Family Court Experience, 81 Ky. L.J. 1107 (1992-93).

May, Social Reform for Kentucky’s Judicial System: The Creation of Unified Family Courts, 92 Ky. L.J. 571 (2003).

Treatises

Petrilli, Kentucky Family Law, Juvenile Court, §§ 32.22, 32.23.

Petrilli, Kentucky Family Law, Support of the Family, § 16.16.

Petrilli, Kentucky Family Law, Forms, Family Offenses, Form 4.6.

620.072. Unannounced home visits concerning abused or neglected child — Conditions requiring — Request for assistance in gaining access to child.

  1. If the cabinet’s initial determination as to the risk of harm to and immediate safety of an abused or neglected child as defined in KRS 600.020 requires an investigation pursuant to administrative regulations promulgated by the cabinet, including consideration of information on the nature and extent of a present danger or threat of danger to the child or cabinet staff, and if the investigation requires a visit to the residence or location where the reported abuse or neglect occurred, the cabinet shall make the visit unannounced, in addition to any other actions taken to protect the child.
  2. If the initial visit is necessary, after it is completed, the cabinet shall incorporate unannounced visits with any necessary scheduled visits until the welfare of the child has been safeguarded in accordance with administrative regulations promulgated by the cabinet.
  3. If there is reason to believe a child is in imminent danger, or if a parent or caretaker of a child refuses the cabinet entry to a child’s home or refuses to allow a child to be interviewed, the cabinet may request assistance:
    1. From law enforcement; or
    2. Through a request for a court order pursuant to KRS 620.040(5)(a).
  4. A school or a child-care provider shall provide the cabinet access to a child subject to an investigation without parental consent.

HISTORY: 2017 ch. 188, § 1, effective June 29, 2017.

Legislative Research Commission Notes.

(6/29/2017). 2017 Ky. Acts ch. 188, sec. 2 provided that this statute created in 2017 Ky. Acts ch. 188, sec. 1 may be cited as the Tucker Act.

620.080. Temporary removal hearing.

  1. Unless waived by the child and his parent or other person exercising custodial control or supervision, a temporary removal hearing shall be held:
    1. Within seventy-two (72) hours, excluding weekends and holidays, of the time when an emergency custody order is issued or when a child is taken into custody without the consent of his parent or other person exercising custodial control or supervision; and
    2. In cases commenced by the filing of a petition, within ten (10) days of the date of filing.
  2. At a temporary removal hearing, the court shall determine whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that the child would be dependent, neglected or abused if returned to or left in the custody of his parent or other person exercising custodial control or supervision even though it is not proved conclusively who has perpetrated the dependency, neglect or abuse. For good cause, the court may allow hearsay evidence. The Commonwealth shall bear the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence and if the Commonwealth should fail to establish same, the child shall be released to or retained in the custody of his parent or other person exercising custodial control or supervision.

History. Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 423, § 69, effective July 1, 1987; 1988, ch. 350, § 48, effective April 10, 1988.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

  1. Inferences About Another Child.
  2. Discovery.
1. Inferences About Another Child.

The Commonwealth’s position that from evidence proving dependency, or abuse or neglect, of one child, the same condition may be inferred about another child who lives in the same household, ran against the grain of not only the Juvenile Code, but also the notion of constitutional due process of law and familial realities as well. J.H. v. Commonwealth, 767 S.W.2d 330, 1988 Ky. App. LEXIS 204 (Ky. Ct. App. 1988).

2. Discovery.

Appellant mother was improperly denied access to discovery before her children were removed from her custody based on a finding of neglect. Pursuant to KRS 620.100(3), 610.080(2), a participant in a dependency, neglect, and abuse action is entitled to the benefit of the Civil Rules, including the discovery provisions, so long as there is no conflict with the Juvenile Code. C. C. v. Cabinet For Health & Family Servs., 330 S.W.3d 83, 2011 Ky. LEXIS 9 ( Ky. 2011 ).

Cited:

B.C. v. B.T., 182 S.W.3d 213, 2005 Ky. App. LEXIS 281 (Ky. Ct. App. 2005); Wolfe v. Wolfe, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Ky. App. LEXIS 35 (Ky. Ct. App. 2013); Cabinet for Health & Family Servs. v. J.M.G., 2015 Ky. LEXIS 2013 (Dec. 17, 2015); T.C. v. M.E., 603 S.W.3d 663, 2020 Ky. App. LEXIS 54 (Ky. Ct. App. 2020).

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Bench & Bar.

Family Court: Proceedings for Dependency, Neglect and Abuse: The Role of the Family Court Judge and the Guardian ad Litem, Vol. 68, No. 6, Nov. 2004, Ky. Bench & Bar 21.

Kentucky Law Journal.

Graham, Implementing Custody Mediation in Family Court: Some Comments on the Jefferson County Family Court Experience, 81 Ky. L.J. 1107 (1992-93).

Treatises

Caldwell’s Kentucky Form Book, 5th Ed., Practice Context for Juvenile Code Proceedings, § 258.00.

Caldwell’s Kentucky Form Book, 5th Ed., Juvenile Dependency, Neglect, or Abuse Petition, Form 258.01.

620.090. Temporary custody orders.

  1. If, after completion of the temporary removal hearing, the court finds there are reasonable grounds to believe the child is dependent, neglected or abused, the court shall issue an order for temporary removal and shall grant temporary custody to the cabinet or other appropriate person or agency. Preference shall be given to available and qualified relatives of the child considering the wishes of the parent or other person exercising custodial control or supervision, if known. The order shall state the specific reasons for removal and show that alternative less restrictive placements and services have been considered. The court may recommend a placement for the child.
  2. In placing a child under an order of temporary custody, the cabinet or its designee shall use the least restrictive appropriate placement available. Preference shall be given to available and qualified relatives of the child considering the wishes of the parent or other person exercising custodial control or supervision, if known. The child may also be placed in a facility or program operated or approved by the cabinet, including a foster home, or any other appropriate available placement. However, under no circumstance shall the child be placed in a home, facility, or other shelter with a child who has been committed to the Department of Juvenile Justice for commission of a sex crime as that term is defined in KRS 17.500 , unless the child committed for the commission of a sex crime is kept segregated from other children in the home, facility, or other shelter that have not been committed for the commission of a sex crime.
  3. If the court finds there are not reasonable grounds to believe the child is dependent, neglected or abused, or if no action is taken within seventy-two (72) hours, the emergency custody order shall be dissolved automatically and the cabinet or its designee shall return the child to the parent or other person exercising custodial control or supervision. A request for a continuance of the hearing by the parent or other person exercising custodial control or supervision shall constitute action precluding automatic dissolution of the emergency custody order.
  4. When the court issues a temporary order for the custody of a child, the court may order that, within two (2) weeks, arrangements be made for the child to receive a thorough medical, visual, and dental examination by a professional authorized by the Kentucky Revised Statutes to conduct such examinations. The costs of the examination shall be paid by the cabinet.
  5. The child shall remain in temporary custody with the cabinet for a period of time not to exceed forty-five (45) days from the date of the removal from his home. The court shall conduct the adjudicatory hearing and shall make a final disposition within forty-five (45) days of the removal of the child. The court may extend such time after making written findings establishing the need for the extension and after finding that the extension is in the child’s best interest.
  6. If custody is granted to a grandparent of the child pursuant to this section, the court shall consider granting reasonable visitation rights to any other grandparent of the child if the court determines the grandparent has a significant and viable relationship with the child as established in KRS 405.021(1)(c).

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 423, § 70, effective July 1, 1987; 1988, ch. 350, § 49, effective April 10, 1988; 2006, ch. 182, § 51, effective July 12, 2006; 2018 ch. 197, § 2, effective July 14, 2018.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

  1. Generally.
  2. Placement With Relatives.
  3. Least restrictive appropriate placement.
1. Generally.

Under 922 KAR 1:140 and KRS 620.090(2), as well as the policies and procedures of the Kentucky Cabinet for Families and Children, second cousins of an adoptive child were vested with a sufficient, cognizable legal interest in the child’s adoption proceeding, and their motion to intervene in the adoption proceeding should have been granted. Baker v. Webb, 127 S.W.3d 622, 2004 Ky. LEXIS 43 ( Ky. 2004 ).

2. Placement With Relatives.

Cabinet for Health and Family Services (Cabinet) did not violate Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 620.090 or 922 Ky. Admin. Regs. 1:140 because, after a mother's children were removed from the mother's custody, the Cabinet briefly placed the children with a maternal aunt in Georgia until the aunt did not comply with procedures required to approve a longer placement. J.L.C. v. Cabinet for Health & Family Servs., 539 S.W.3d 692, 2017 Ky. App. LEXIS 812 (Ky. Ct. App. 2017).

3. Least restrictive appropriate placement.

Circuit court properly committed a father’s 31-month-old child to the Cabinet for Health and Family Services because there was an emergency where the father was arrested on drug charges and drugs and a handgun were seized from a child’s bedroom, the stepmother did not meet the requirements of a de facto custodian where it was not established that the POA the father purportedly executed made her the child’s legal guardian, the father’s three blood relatives were eliminated from consideration as either living with, or being, drug traffickers, and the least restrictive appropriate placement available was the foster mother with whom the child has spent the majority of his life. G. P. v. Cabinet for Health and Family Servs., 572 S.W.3d 484, 2019 Ky. App. LEXIS 34 (Ky. Ct. App. 2019).

Cited:

Wolfe v. Wolfe, — S.W.3d —, 2013 Ky. App. LEXIS 35 (Ky. Ct. App. 2013); Cabinet for Health & Family Servs. v. J.M.G., 2015 Ky. LEXIS 2013 (Dec. 17, 2015).

Opinions of Attorney General.

KRS 620.060 , 620.140 , and 610.050 , and this section, in conjunction with KRS 620.130 combine to comply with 42 USCS 672(a)(1), which requires a judicial determination, prior to the removal of a child from the home that continuation in the home, is contrary to the best interests of the child. OAG 90-37 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Bench & Bar.

Family Court: Proceedings for Dependency, Neglect and Abuse: The Role of the Family Court Judge and the Guardian ad Litem, Vol. 68, No. 6, Nov. 2004, Ky. Bench & Bar 21.

Wiederstein, Firm Hearing and Trial Dates: A Partial Answer to Reducing Delay in the Courts, Vol. 70, No. 3, May 2006, Ky. Bench & Bar 18.

Kentucky Law Journal.

Graham, Implementing Custody Mediation in Family Court: Some Comments on the Jefferson County Family Court Experience, 81 Ky. L.J. 1107 (1992-93).

Treatises

Caldwell’s Kentucky Form Book, 5th Ed., Practice Context for Juvenile Code Proceedings, § 258.00.

Petrilli, Kentucky Family Law, Termination of Parental Rights and Adoption, § 29.1.

620.095. Restriction on placement of nonoffender.

A nonoffender, as defined in KRS 600.020 , shall not be placed in secure or nonsecure detention.

History. Enact. Acts 2008, ch. 87, § 6, effective July 15, 2008.

620.100. Appointment of separate counsel — Court-appointed special advocate volunteer — Full adjudicatory hearing — Notice of proceedings.

  1. If the court determines, as a result of a temporary removal hearing, that further proceedings are required, the court shall advise the child and his parent or other person exercising custodial control or supervision of their right to appointment of separate counsel:
    1. The court shall appoint counsel for the child to be paid for by the Finance and Administration Cabinet. Counsel shall document participation in training on the role of counsel that includes training in early childhood, child, and adolescent development. The clerk of the court shall arrange for service on all parties, including the local representative of the Cabinet for Health and Family Services, of the order appointing counsel. The fee to be fixed by the court shall not exceed five hundred dollars ($500); however, if the action has final disposition in the District Court, the fee shall not exceed two hundred fifty dollars ($250);
    2. The court shall appoint separate counsel for the parent who exercises custodial control or supervision if the parent is unable to afford counsel pursuant to KRS Chapter 31. The clerk of the court shall arrange for service on all parties, including the local representative of the Cabinet for Health and Family Services, of the order appointing counsel. The parent’s counsel shall be provided or paid for by the Finance and Administration Cabinet. The fee to be fixed by the court shall not exceed five hundred dollars ($500); however, if the action has final disposition in the District Court, the fee shall not exceed two hundred fifty dollars ($250);
    3. The court shall appoint separate counsel for a person claiming to be a de facto custodian, as defined in KRS 403.270 , if the person is unable to afford counsel pursuant to KRS Chapter 31. The clerk of the court shall arrange for service on all parties, including the local representative of the Cabinet for Health and Family Services, of the order appointing counsel. The person’s counsel shall be provided or paid for by the Finance and Administration Cabinet. The fee to be fixed by the court shall not exceed five hundred dollars ($500); however, if the action has final disposition in the District Court, the fee shall not exceed two hundred fifty dollars ($250);
    4. The court may, in the interest of justice, appoint separate counsel for a nonparent who exercises custodial control or supervision of the child, if the person is unable to afford counsel, pursuant to KRS Chapter 31. The clerk of the court shall arrange for service on all parties, including the local representative of the Cabinet for Health and Family Services, of the order appointing counsel. Counsel for the person shall be provided or paid for by the Finance and Administration Cabinet. The fee to be fixed by the court shall not exceed five hundred dollars ($500); however, if the action has final disposition in the District Court, the fee shall not exceed two hundred fifty dollars ($250); and
    5. The court may, in the interest of justice, appoint a court-appointed special advocate volunteer to represent the best interests of the child pursuant to KRS 620.500 to 620.550 . The clerk of the court shall arrange for service on all parties, including the local representative of the cabinet, of the order appointing the court-appointed special advocate volunteer.
  2. If the court determines that further proceedings are required, the court also shall advise the child and his parent or other person exercising custodial control or supervision that they have a right to not incriminate themselves, and a right to a full adjudicatory hearing at which they may confront and cross-examine all adverse witnesses, present evidence on their own behalf and to an appeal.
  3. The adjudication shall determine the truth or falsity of the allegations in the complaint. The burden of proof shall be upon the complainant, and a determination of dependency, neglect, and abuse shall be made by a preponderance of the evidence. The Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure shall apply.
  4. The disposition shall determine the action to be taken by the court on behalf of the child and his parent or other person exercising custodial control or supervision.
  5. Foster parents, preadoptive parents, or relatives providing care for the child shall receive notice of, and shall have a right to be heard in, any proceeding held with respect to the child. This subsection shall not be construed to require that a foster parent, preadoptive parent, or relative caring for the child be made a party to a proceeding solely on the basis of the notice and right to be heard.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 423, § 71, effective July 1, 1987; 1988, ch. 350, § 50, effective April 10, 1988; 1992, ch. 241, § 1, effective July 14, 1992; 1996, ch. 245, § 1, effective July 15, 1996; 1998, ch. 426, § 618, effective July 15, 1998; 2005, ch. 99, § 666, effective June 20, 2005; 2013, ch. 79, § 7, effective June 25, 2013; 2018 ch. 159, § 47, effective July 14, 2018.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

  1. Applicability.
  2. Inferences About Another Child.
  3. Effective Assistance of Counsel.
  4. Right to Counsel.
  5. Truth or Falsity of Allegations.
  6. Due process.
1. Applicability.

Because a father was unrepresented in the dependency action brought against the mother and it did not appear that he was ever advised of those rights, neither did it appear that any permanency plan was developed, either to “return” the child to the father or to terminate his parental rights, the trial court did not comply with KRS 620.100 . London v. Collins, 242 S.W.3d 351, 2007 Ky. App. LEXIS 462 (Ky. Ct. App. 2007).

2. Inferences About Another Child.

The Commonwealth’s position that from evidence proving dependency, or abuse or neglect, of one child, the same condition may be inferred about another child who lives in the same household, ran against the grain of not only the Juvenile Code, but also the notion of constitutional due process of law and familial realities as well. J.H. v. Commonwealth, 767 S.W.2d 330, 1988 Ky. App. LEXIS 204 (Ky. Ct. App. 1988).

3. Effective Assistance of Counsel.

In a dependency proceeding, the father’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on an alleged failure to more zealously pursue the father’s position that the pastor committed the alleged abuse and that other family members coaxed the child into making sexual allegations lacked merit, where there was no error committed by counsel or deficiencies in counsel’s performance which demanded that a deprivation of due process be found. Z.T. v. M.T., 258 S.W.3d 31, 2008 Ky. App. LEXIS 206 (Ky. Ct. App. 2008).

4. Right to Counsel.

Mother’s due process rights and rights under KRS 625.080(3) and KRS 620.100(1) were violated when a Family Court proceeded to take testimony from two (2) witnesses in a termination of parental rights trial even though the mother’s counsel could not get to court due to a snow storm. A.P. v. Commonwealth, 270 S.W.3d 418, 2008 Ky. App. LEXIS 319 (Ky. Ct. App. 2008).

Trial court was not required to appoint counsel to represent the biological father during the neglect proceedings against the biological mother, as he was not accused of neglecting the child or the subject of those proceedings. B.L. v. J.S., 434 S.W.3d 61, 2014 Ky. App. LEXIS 75 (Ky. Ct. App. 2014).

Family court terminating a mother's and father's parental rights to their minor child because they were denied effective assistance of counsel when the family court proceeded with the termination hearing after counsel requested that he be permitted to withdraw based on a conflict of interest where the perpetrator of the child abuse was unknown and the prejudice caused by that representation had to be presumed. T.W. v. Cabinet for Health & Family Servs., 484 S.W.3d 302, 2016 Ky. App. LEXIS 95 (Ky. Ct. App. 2016).

In a termination of parental rights action, this section did not entitle an indigent parent to state-funded expert assistance. Cabinet for Health & Family Servs. v. K.S., 2020 Ky. LEXIS 396 (Ky. Oct. 29, 2020).

5. Truth or Falsity of Allegations.

Finding that a child was abused or neglected under KRS 600.020 was not supported by substantial evidence because a family court failed to determine the truth or falsity of all the allegations in a complaint under KRS 620.100 , and it relied upon information outside the record that was neither raised as an allegation in the complaint nor presented as evidence during a hearing; also, a dependency, neglect, or abuse adjudication hearing was not the appropriate forum for rehashing custody issues. Even though judicial notice of a prior case involving the mother and father could have been taken, the family court’s consideration of the evidence it heard in the earlier action was improper; moreover, there was no notice or opportunity to be heard relating to the taking of judicial notice. S.R. v. J.N., 307 S.W.3d 631, 2010 Ky. App. LEXIS 62 (Ky. Ct. App. 2010).

Appellant mother was improperly denied access to discovery before her children were removed from her custody based on a finding of neglect. Pursuant to KRS 620.100(3), 610.080(2), a participant in a dependency, neglect, and abuse action is entitled to the benefit of the Civil Rules, including the discovery provisions, so long as there is no conflict with the Juvenile Code. C. C. v. Cabinet For Health & Family Servs., 330 S.W.3d 83, 2011 Ky. LEXIS 9 ( Ky. 2011 ).

Circuit court erred in requiring that a father's contact with his two sons in the family home be supervised where joint stipulations showed only that he twice pled guilty to sex crimes more than a decade ago, was assessed a low risk sex offender and required to register for life, and completed only the first of three phases of sex offender treatment program, there was no evidence that he had done anything to harms his sons, the sparse record did not show a proclivity to harm them, the father and mother had cooperated with authorities, and during 18 months of scrutiny, nothing had happened. R.S. v. Cabinet for Health & Family Servs., 2017 Ky. App. LEXIS 562 (Ky. Ct. App. Sept. 29, 2017), rev'd, 570 S.W.3d 538, 2018 Ky. LEXIS 534 ( Ky. 2018 ).

6. Due process.

District court violated a father’s due process rights in a pendency, neglect, and abuse proceeding because the court first decided the case in favor of the mother before the father presented anything, effectively and improperly shifting the burden of proof to the father to win back the father’s parental right by proving a negative, that the father did not abuse the father’s child. T.C. v. M.E., 603 S.W.3d 663, 2020 Ky. App. LEXIS 54 (Ky. Ct. App. 2020).

Cited in:

Cabinet for Health & Family Servs. v. J.M.G., 2015 Ky. LEXIS 2013 (Dec. 17, 2015).

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Bench & Bar.

Family Court: Proceedings for Dependency, Neglect and Abuse: The Role of the Family Court Judge and the Guardian ad Litem, Vol. 68, No. 6, Nov. 2004, Ky. Bench & Bar 21.

Kentucky Law Journal.

Graham, Implementing Custody Mediation in Family Court: Some Comments on the Jefferson County Family Court Experience, 81 Ky. L.J. 1107 (1992-93).

Treatises

Caldwell’s Kentucky Form Book, 5th Ed., Practice Context for Juvenile Code Proceedings, § 258.00.

Caldwell’s Kentucky Form Book, 5th Ed., Order for Attorney Fees, Form 258.03.

Caldwell’s Kentucky Form Book, 5th Ed., Financial Statement, Affidavit of Indigence, Request for Counsel and Order, Form 258.04.

620.110. Petition for immediate entitlement to custody.

Any person aggrieved by the issuance of a temporary removal order may file a petition in Circuit Court for immediate entitlement to custody and a hearing shall be expeditiously held according to the Rules of Civil Procedure. During the pendency of the petition for immediate entitlement the orders of the District Court shall remain in effect.

History. Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 423, § 72, effective July 1, 1987.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Petition Properly Denied.

Circuit court properly denied a father's petition for immediate entitlement to custody of his eight-year-old child, which followed a removal hearing after a fire claimed the lives of her mother and her brothers because the child's best interests were served by her maternal grandmother retaining custody where the father, who lived in South Carolina, admitted he had not seen the child in person in over two years, the child was close to the grandmother, was well-adapted and familiar with her school and other surroundings, the circuit court intended to ease the child into her new reality, and the legal balance between the father's rights and the protection of the child had to be struck in favor of the child. C.K. v. Cabinet for Health and Family Servs., 529 S.W.3d 786, 2017 Ky. App. LEXIS 150 (Ky. Ct. App. 2017).

Trial court erred in its restricted application of Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 620.110 where it misconstrued case law focused exclusively on parents to mean that only parents could invoke § 620.110 to seek relief from a temporary removal order. Notwithstanding that error, consideration of the appeal was severely hampered given the lack of a clear statement of preservation, as required by Ky. R. Civ. P. 76.12(4)(c)(v), there was no recording of the § 620.110 hearing, and the record had been certified without an avowal. The great aunt and uncle had not shown that they were aggrieved where the only connection the they alleged with the child was a blood connection, and that bare allegation, without proof of an actual connection between the child and the great aunt and uncle, was not enough to trigger relief. S.T. v. Cabinet for Health and Family Servs., 585 S.W.3d 769, 2019 Ky. App. LEXIS 165 (Ky. Ct. App. 2019).

620.120. Criminal charges tried separately.

In cases where criminal charges arising out of the same transaction or occurrence are filed against an adult alleged to be the perpetrator of child abuse or neglect, such charges shall be tried separately from the adjudicatory hearing held pursuant to this chapter.

History. Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 423, § 73, effective July 1, 1987.

Research References and Practice Aids

Treatises

Caldwell’s Kentucky Form Book, 5th Ed., Practice Context for Juvenile Code Proceedings, § 258.00.

620.125. Testimony in adjudication not admissible in criminal proceeding except for purposes of impeachment.

Testimony offered by an alleged responsible parent or person exercising custodial control or supervision in an adjudication of a petition under this chapter for dependency, abuse, or neglect shall not be admissible in any criminal proceeding for charges arising from the same transaction or occurrence except for the purposes of impeachment.

HISTORY: 2018 ch. 159, § 17, effective July 14, 2018.

620.130. Alternatives to removal from custody.

  1. In any proceeding under this chapter, when the court is petitioned to remove or continue the removal of a child from the custody of his parent or other person exercising custodial control or supervision, the court shall first consider whether the child may be reasonably protected against the alleged dependency, neglect or abuse, by alternatives less restrictive than removal. Such alternatives may include, but shall not be limited to, the provision of medical, educational, psychiatric, psychological, social work, counseling, day care, or homemaking services with monitoring wherever necessary by the cabinet or other appropriate agency. Where the court specifically finds that such alternatives are adequate to reasonably protect the child against the alleged dependency, neglect or abuse, the court shall not order the removal or continued removal of the child.
  2. If the court orders the removal or continues the removal of the child, services provided to the parent and the child shall be designed to promote the protection of the child and the return of the child safely to the child’s home as soon as possible. The cabinet shall develop a treatment plan for each child designed to meet the needs of the child. The cabinet may change the child’s placement or treatment plan as the cabinet may require. The cabinet shall notify the committing court of the change, in writing, within fourteen (14) days after the change has been implemented.

History. Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 423, § 74, effective July 1, 1987; 1998, ch. 57, § 5, effective March 17, 1998.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

  1. Treatment.
  2. Compliance.
1. Treatment.

The trial court was authorized to order the Cabinet for Health and Family Services to pay for substance abuse and mental health counseling recommended for the mother, which she could not pay for, since KRS 620.130(2) requires the provision of services designed to promote the protection of the child and the return of the child safely to the child’s home as soon as possible, and the Cabinet was responsible for providing services to facilitate this family reintegration. Cabinet for Health & Family Servs. v. Evans, 2006 Ky. App. LEXIS 52 (Ky. Ct. App.), sub. op., 2006 Ky. App. Unpub. LEXIS 831 (Ky. Ct. App. Feb. 17, 2006).

2. Compliance.

District judge erred to the point of manifest injustice by using an order denying an emergency protective order petition to initiate a removal case in the juvenile division of the judge’s own court because the court did not qualify as an interested party that was able to initiate a dependency, neglect, or abuse action. T.C. v. M.E., 603 S.W.3d 663, 2020 Ky. App. LEXIS 54 (Ky. Ct. App. 2020).

Cited in:

Cabinet for Health & Family Servs. v. J.M.G., 2015 Ky. LEXIS 2013 (Dec. 17, 2015).

Opinions of Attorney General.

KRS 620.060 , 620.090 , 620.140 and 610.050 in conjunction with this section combine to comply with 42 USCS 672(a)(1), which requires a judicial determination, prior to the removal of a child from the home, that continuation in the home is contrary to the best interests of the child. OAG 90-37 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Northern Kentucky Law Review.

Notes, Greathouse v. Shreve and Shifflet v. Shifflet: Maintaining the Status Quo in Custody Disputes Between Parents and Third Party Contestants, 23 N. Ky. L. Rev. 451 (1996).

620.140. Dispositional alternatives.

  1. In determining the disposition of all cases brought on behalf of dependent, neglected, or abused children, the juvenile session of the District Court, in the best interest of the child, shall have but shall not be limited to the following dispositional alternatives:
    1. Informal adjustment of the case;
    2. Protective orders, such as the following:
      1. Requiring the parent or any other person to abstain from any conduct abusing, neglecting, or making the child dependent;
      2. Placing the child in his or her own home under supervision of the cabinet or its designee with services as determined to be appropriate by the cabinet; and
      3. Orders authorized by KRS 403.715 to 403.785 and by KRS Chapter 456;
    3. Removal of the child to the custody of an adult relative, fictive kin, other person, or child-caring facility or child-placing agency, taking into consideration the wishes of the parent or other person exercising custodial control or supervision. Before any child is committed to the cabinet or placed out of his or her home under the supervision of the cabinet, the court shall determine that reasonable efforts have been made by the court or the cabinet to prevent or eliminate the need for removal and that continuation in the home would be contrary to the welfare of the child. If a child is to be placed with an adult relative or fictive kin the parent or other person exercising custodial control or supervision shall provide a list to the cabinet of possible persons to be considered;
    4. Commitment of the child to the custody of the cabinet for placement for an indeterminate period of time not to exceed his or her attainment of the age eighteen (18), unless the youth elects to extend his or her commitment beyond the age of eighteen (18) under paragraph (e) of this subsection. Beginning at least six (6) months prior to an eligible youth attaining the age of eighteen (18), the cabinet shall provide the eligible youth with education, encouragement, assistance, and support regarding the development of a transition plan, and inform the eligible youth of his or her right to extend commitment beyond the age of eighteen (18); or
    5. Extend or reinstate an eligible youth’s commitment up to the age of twenty-one (21) to receive transitional living support. The request shall be made by the youth prior to attaining nineteen (19) years of age. Upon receipt of the request and with the concurrence of the cabinet, the court may authorize commitment up to the age of twenty-one (21).
  2. An order of temporary custody to the cabinet shall not be considered as a permissible dispositional alternative.

History. Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 423, § 75, effective July 1, 1987; 1988, ch. 350, § 51, effective April 10, 1988; 1990, ch. 253, § 1, effective July 13, 1990; 2012, ch. 143, § 2, effective July 12, 2012; 2015 ch. 102, § 50, effective January 1, 2016; 2017 ch. 10, § 6, effective June 29, 2017; 2019 ch. 132, § 1, effective June 27, 2019.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

  1. Reinstatement of Commitment.
  2. Removal order.
  3. Estoppel.
1. Reinstatement of Commitment.

Because a trial court merely reinstated educational services that were suspended by the Cabinet’s procedure of issuing a letter of intent to release and the order of education stood until modified or vacated, there was no error in the order of the trial court reinstating a former dependent minor’s commitment to the Cabinet. Commonwealth v. C.M., 2008 Ky. App. LEXIS 66 (Ky. Ct. App. Mar. 14, 2008), review denied, ordered not published, 2008 Ky. LEXIS 172 (Ky. Aug. 13, 2008).

2. Removal order.

District court erred in entering a complete, no contact order of removal because the court entered a conclusory ruling, and in addition to there being no substantial evidence supporting any of the findings of fact—or the removal itself—in the adjudication order or the disposition order, the court failed to justify why this was the only result the court considered. Further, when the father’s counsel urged the consideration of at least some form of visitation, the court rejected it with no explanation. T.C. v. M.E., 603 S.W.3d 663, 2020 Ky. App. LEXIS 54 (Ky. Ct. App. 2020).

3. Estoppel.

Cabinet had an opportunity to raise timely any objections it had to an informal adjustment but failed to do so; in reliance upon the cabinet’s silence, both the court and the parties agreed to resolve the DNA petition amicably and the cabinet was estopped by silence from raising its belated objections. Commonwealth v. Marshall, 606 S.W.3d 99, 2020 Ky. App. LEXIS 79 (Ky. Ct. App. 2020).

Cited in:

Cabinet for Health & Family Servs. v. J.M.G., 2015 Ky. LEXIS 2013 (Dec. 17, 2015).

Opinions of Attorney General.

KRS 620.060 , 620.090 , 610.050 and this section in conjunction with KRS 620.130 combine to comply with 42 USCS 672(a)(1), which requires a judicial determination, prior to the removal of a child from the home, that continuation in the home is contrary to the best interests of the child. OAG 90-37 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Treatises

Caldwell’s Kentucky Form Book, 5th Ed., Practice Context for Juvenile Code Proceedings, § 258.00.

620.142. Custodial, permanency, and service options available to relative or fictive kin caregiver of an abused, neglected, or dependent child.

  1. The cabinet shall develop custodial, permanency, and service options, including but not limited to monetary supports, that shall be available to a relative or fictive kin caregiver in the instance that a child, who would otherwise be placed in another out-of-home placement, is placed with him or her due to a cabinet finding that the child is abused, neglected, or dependent, as determined by an assessment or investigation conducted in accordance with this chapter.
  2. The cabinet shall disclose to a prospective relative or fictive kin caregiver each of the options established in subsection (1) of this section prior to the child’s placement. The prospective relative or fictive kin caregiver shall select the option that best represents the level of care and support needed for the child while the child is receiving treatment and care in the placement with the relative or fictive kin caregiver.
  3. The custodial, permanency, and service options required by subsection (1) of this section shall reflect nationally recognized best practices.
  4. The cabinet shall maximize services available under federal and state law, including but not limited to Titles IV and XIX of the Social Security Act, to fulfill the requirements of this section.
  5. The cabinet shall promulgate administrative regulations in accordance with KRS Chapter 13A to implement this section.

HISTORY: 2019 ch. 73, § 1, effective June 27, 2019.

620.145. Cabinet’s assessment of child’s educational needs.

  1. Within sixty (60) days of the commitment date of a child due to abuse, neglect, or dependency, the Cabinet for Health and Family Services shall provide the court with jurisdiction an assessment of the child to determine:
    1. The child’s current and historical educational functioning;
    2. The child’s emotional and behavioral functioning; and
    3. The extent to which the child’s life experiences and circumstances of commitment have created a disabling condition requiring special educational programming or other services to provide the child an appropriate public education.
  2. Upon discerning of an emotional, behavioral, or other disabling condition with negative impact upon a child’s educational experience, the Cabinet for Health and Family Services as guardian of the child shall ensure that whatever services necessary are obtained to allow the child the benefit of a free, appropriate public education.
  3. Services required to allow the child a free, appropriate public education shall be limited to those required under Section 504 of Pub. L. 93-112, Pub. L. 94-142, or other federal statutes affecting children with emotional or behavioral disabilities.
  4. The Cabinet for Health and Family Services shall include activities undertaken to ensure a child committed to the Cabinet for Health and Family Services receives adequate public education in the six (6) month case progress report required by KRS 620.240 .
  5. Any child removed from his home due to abuse, neglect, or dependency and placed in the least restrictive appropriate placement available shall, for the purposes of acquiring an appropriate public education, be considered a resident of the school district where the placement occurs.
  6. The Cabinet for Health and Family Services shall provide a copy of the assessment required by subsection (1) of this section to the foster parent, or other agency or entity providing residential care to a committed child, within five (5) days of filing the assessment with the court.

History. Enact. Acts 1990, ch. 350, § 1, effective July 13, 1990; 1994, ch. 405, § 89, effective July 15, 1994; 1994, ch. 416, § 16, effective July 15, 1994; 1998, ch. 398, § 6, effective July 15, 1998; 1998, ch. 426, § 619, effective July 15, 1998; 2005, ch. 99, § 667, effective June 20, 2005.

620.146. Notice to be given to school personnel of persons authorized to contact or remove a child of whom the cabinet has custody from school grounds.

  1. If, as a result of dependency, neglect, or abuse, custody of a child is granted to the cabinet through an emergency, temporary, or permanent court order, the cabinet shall notify the principal or any assistant principal of the school in which the child is enrolled, and the school district’s director of pupil personnel, of the names of persons authorized to contact the child at school, in accordance with school visitation or communication policy, or remove the child from school grounds.
  2. The notification required by this section shall be provided by the Cabinet for Health and Family Services to the school:
    1. By written notice via electronic mail or facsimile on the day that a court order is entered and again on any day that a change is made with regard to persons authorized to contact or remove the child from school. The verbal notification shall occur on the next school day immediately following the day a court order is entered or a change is made if the court order or change occurs after the end of the current school day; and
    2. By electronic mail, facsimile, or hand delivery of a copy of the court order within ten (10) calendar days following the Cabinet for Health and Family Services’ receipt of the court order of a change of custody or change in contact or removal authority.
  3. The cabinet’s mandate to provide the information required by this section shall cease when the court order under which the cabinet acts is rescinded or otherwise expires.

HISTORY: 2017 ch. 159, § 1, effective June 29, 2017; 2018 ch. 159, § 44, effective July 14, 2018.

620.150. Visitation.

Following an order that a child shall be removed from his home, the cabinet shall establish such terms and conditions of visitation with the child after consultation with the parent or other person exercising custodial control or supervision of the child. If the parent or other person is dissatisfied with the visitation schedule, they may petition the court for review of the visitation schedule. The court, after reviewing all of the circumstances surrounding the case, may alter the visitation schedule if it finds the schedule set up by the cabinet has been arbitrary or unreasonable.

History. Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 423, § 76, effective July 1, 1987.

620.155. Appeals.

Any interested party aggrieved by a proceeding under KRS 610.010(2)(d) including the parent, child, guardian ad litem, the cabinet, and the county attorney may appeal from the juvenile court to the Circuit Court as a matter of right in the manner provided in the Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure. The Circuit Court may order that the child may be removed to a suitable place, pending the appeal, if it appears by affidavit or sworn testimony that the child would be in imminent danger if left with or returned to his or her parents, guardian, or other person party to the appeal.

History. Enact. Acts 1988, ch. 350, § 52, effective April 10, 1988; 1998, ch. 57, § 6, effective March 17, 1998; 2008, ch. 87, § 21, effective July 15, 2008.

Notes to Unpublished Decisions

1. Appeal.

Unpublished decision: Legislative intent that KRS 620.155 only applied to counties without a family court resolved any conflict between KRS 22A.020 and KRS 620.155 regarding whether a circuit court or the court of appeals had jurisdiction of an appeal from a family court order. Thorn v. Commonwealth, 181 S.W.3d 560, 2005 Ky. App. LEXIS 265 (Ky. Ct. App. 2005).

Cited in:

T.C. v. M.E., 603 S.W.3d 663, 2020 Ky. App. LEXIS 54 (Ky. Ct. App. 2020).

620.157. Appeal of cabinet’s determination that child should not be returned home. [Repealed]

HISTORY: 2018 ch. 159, § 43, effective July 14, 2018; repealed by 2020 ch. 36, § 44, effective July 15, 2020.

620.160. Motion to seal child’s record.

Upon attaining majority, a person who was the subject of an action under this chapter may make a motion for the sealing of records relating to a petition filed under this chapter. In its discretion, the court may order the record unsealed for good cause shown.

History. Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 423, § 77, effective July 1, 1987; 1988, ch. 350, § 53, effective April 10, 1988.

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Bench & Bar.

Wiederstein, Closed Courtrooms and the Public’s Right of Access, Vol. 67, No. 4, July 2003, Ky. Bench & Bar 15.

620.170. Voluntary commitments.

  1. The cabinet may accept custody of a child who is voluntarily committed to the cabinet by the child’s parent, guardian, or other person having legal custody. However, the cabinet shall refuse to accept any child on a voluntary commitment unless adequate facilities, funds, and resources are available to care for the child, and the secretary finds that commitment would be in the best interest of the child.
  2. As a condition of any voluntary commitment, the cabinet may enter into an agreement with the parent, guardian, or other person having legal custody of the child consenting to the commitment to pay an agreed sum for the care and treatment of the child. The sum shall be determined by the needs of the child and by the ability of the parent, guardian, or other person having legal custody or other person exercising custodial control or to pay.
  3. In the case of voluntary commitment, the cabinet may expend funds necessary to give the child all services available to any committed child including, but not limited to, diagnosis, treatment, foster care, day care, care and treatment in a facility, and necessary medical, psychological, and psychiatric care.
  4. Any person who has consented to a child’s voluntary commitment may request the release of the child in writing addressed to the cabinet. The cabinet shall within ten (10) days release the child, or, if in the opinion of the cabinet it would be in the best interest of the child to remain in the custody of the cabinet, a petition shall be filed in the court of the county of residence of the child as provided in KRS 620.030 to 620.050 .
  5. If, following a hearing on the matter, the court determines that the child can no longer benefit from those services offered by the cabinet or that the parent, guardian, or other person having legal custody of the child is capable of providing proper care, the child may be returned at once to the care of his parent, guardian, or other person having legal custody of the child or to another person mutually agreed upon.
  6. Any parent, guardian, or other person having legal custody of a child who has consented to the child’s voluntary commitment to the cabinet shall be entitled to participate in treatment planning for the child for the pendency of the commitment.

History. Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 423, § 78, effective July 1, 1987; 1988, ch. 350, § 54, effective April 10, 1988; 1996, ch. 22, § 1, effective July 15, 1996.

Research References and Practice Aids

Treatises

Caldwell’s Kentucky Form Book, 5th Ed., Practice Context for Juvenile Code Proceedings, § 258.00.

620.180. Administrative regulations.

  1. The cabinet may promulgate administrative regulations to implement the provisions of this chapter. The cabinet may also promulgate administrative regulations pursuant to the requirements of Public Law 96-272 as to the maximum number of children who at any time during a fiscal year, will remain in foster care after having been in such care for a period in excess of twenty-four (24) months, together with the steps to be taken to achieve such goal.
  2. The cabinet shall promulgate administrative regulations to provide the following:
    1. The method used to periodically review the status of children placed in foster family homes which shall include, but not be limited to, the following:
      1. Within ten (10) calendar days of the temporary removal hearing provided for in this chapter, a case conference shall be held on all children placed with the cabinet for the purpose of establishing a specific treatment plan which may include preventive and reunification services for the child and his parent or other person exercising custodial control or supervision. Additional case conferences and reviews shall be held as appropriate, but shall be held at least every six (6) months. The parent or other person exercising custodial control or supervision and his counsel, if any, shall have the right to be present at and participate in such conferences. The child; the child’s attorney, if any; the parent or other person exercising custodial control or supervision and his attorney of record, if any; and the county attorney shall be notified of, and may be present at and participate in such conferences;
      2. On-going case work and supportive services shall be provided as indicated to best meet the needs of the child as established by the review and planning process; and
      3. There may be procedures for providing for appropriate visitation between the parents and the child based on the needs of the child;
    2. The procedures for reporting to a committing court the status and plans for children committed to the cabinet as dependent, neglected or abused and placed in foster family homes;
    3. By January 1, 2019, the establishment and implementation of the processes, procedures, and requirements to ensure that children committed to the cabinet as dependent, neglected, or abused and placed in foster family homes are timely reunified with their biological family or identified for and placed in a new permanent home. These processes, procedures, and requirements shall include but not be limited to the following:
      1. A case review and recommendation submitted to the committing court related to whether the best interest of the child is reunification or termination of parental rights after the child has been committed to the cabinet a total of six (6) cumulative months;
      2. An additional case review and recommendation submitted to the committing court every three (3) cumulative months after the initial six (6) months if a child is still in the custody of the cabinet;
      3. A petition to the court of appropriate jurisdiction seeking the termination of parental rights and authority to place the child for adoption in accordance with this chapter and KRS Chapter 625 no later than after a child has been committed to the cabinet for a total of fifteen (15) cumulative months out of forty-eight (48) months; and
      4. A plan to ensure, no longer than thirty (30) working days after a court enters a judgment of termination of parental rights to a child that is committed to the cabinet, that the cabinet shall complete and submit to the court all necessary paperwork to facilitate the child’s permanency plan, including but not limited to the presentation summary and identification of an adoptive home if determined; and
    4. By October 1, 2019, the establishment and implementation of the processes, procedures, and requirements to ensure that children committed to the cabinet as dependent, neglected, or abused and placed in qualified residential treatment facilities are subject to case reviews within sixty (60) days of the start of each placement in accordance with 42 U.S.C. sec. 675 a(c)(2).

History. Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 423, § 79, effective July 1, 1987; 1988, ch. 350, § 55, effective April 10, 1988; 2018 ch. 159, § 22, effective July 14, 2018; 2019 ch. 33, § 11, effective June 27, 2019.

620.190. Citizen foster care review boards — Local citizen foster care review boards.

  1. There shall be established within each judicial district a citizen foster care review board to be appointed by the Chief District Judge or family court judge. The Chief District Judge or family court judge may authorize the creation of additional local citizen foster care review boards as needed.
  2. Each local citizen foster care review board shall consist of not less than three (3) members and shall be appointed according to the following guidelines:
    1. All members shall have an interest in foster care or child welfare;
    2. At least two (2) members of each local citizen foster care review board shall, as far as practicable, be chosen from among the following professions: law, medicine, psychology, social work, and education;
    3. Each local citizen foster care review board shall, as far as practicable, include a foster parent;
    4. All members of each local citizen foster care review board shall, as far as practicable, be representative of the socioeconomic, racial, and ethnic composition of the area served;
    5. Employees of the cabinet shall be prohibited from serving on the local citizen foster care review board;
    6. All appointed board members shall serve a term of three (3) years, except that if a vacancy occurs, a successor shall be appointed to serve the unexpired term. The term of each member shall expire on August 1 of the appropriate year. Members may be reappointed and shall continue to serve until a successor is appointed; and
    7. All members shall be certified prior to appointment by the state citizen foster care review board or its designee. For the purposes of this section, “certified” means acknowledgment of completion of initial training approved by the state citizen foster care review board.
  3. Local citizen foster care review board members may be removed for nonparticipation, failure to meet training requirements, or other cause as determined by the state citizen foster care review board in compliance with its constitution and bylaws.
  4. Each local citizen foster care review board shall annually elect a chairman and vice chairman to serve in the absence of the chairman.
  5. Each local citizen foster care review board shall meet, at a place designated by the Chief District Judge or family court judge, as often as is deemed necessary to carry out the duties of the board. The local citizen foster care review board shall meet no less than four (4) times annually.

History. Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 423, § 80, effective July 1, 1987; 1988, ch. 350, § 56, effective April 10, 1988; 1992, ch. 412, § 6, effective July 14, 1992; 1996, ch. 301, § 3, effective July 15, 1996; 1998, ch. 278, § 3, effective July 15, 1998.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited in:

Cabinet for Health & Family Servs. v. J.M.G., 2015 Ky. LEXIS 2013 (Dec. 17, 2015).

Opinions of Attorney General.

District judges may appoint members of foster care citizen review boards in the judge’s judicial district as provided in this section. OAG 94-5 .

620.200. Support services for local citizen foster care review boards.

  1. Secretarial and support services for each local citizen foster care review board may be provided by the District Court, or circuit clerk, or both, as ordered by the Chief District Judges or family court judges.
  2. Local citizen foster care review boards may receive state and federal funding to insure total or partial funding of the board’s activities.

History. Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 423, § 81, effective July 1, 1987; 1996, ch. 301, § 4, effective July 15, 1996; 1998, ch. 278, § 4, effective July 15, 1998.

620.210. Training of board members.

  1. Training shall be established, approved, and provided by the state citizen foster care review board and its staff as provided by KRS 620.320 .
  2. During the training session, each local citizen foster care review board member shall promise by oath given by the Chief District Judge or family court judge or a member of the court of justice to keep confidential the information reviewed by the board and its actions and recommendations in individual cases pursuant to the authority mandated to other officers of the court in KRS Chapter 522. Members of the local citizen foster care review boards shall be subject to the same penalties as officers of the court pursuant to KRS Chapter 522.

History. Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 423, § 82, effective July 1, 1987; 1988, ch. 350, § 57, effective April 10, 1988; 1996, ch. 301, § 5, effective July 15, 1996; 1998, ch. 278, § 5, effective July 15, 1998.

620.220. Information to Administrative Office of the Courts Citizen Foster Care Review Board Program.

  1. The clerk of the court shall forward to the Administrative Office of the Courts Citizen Foster Care Review Board Program a copy of each temporary custody order and commitment order or provide electronic notification in the manner prescribed by the Administrative Office of the Courts within fourteen (14) days of the date the order is issued.
  2. When a child is voluntarily committed to the cabinet, the cabinet shall forward a copy of the placement agreement to the Administrative Office of the Courts Citizen Foster Care Review Board Program within fourteen (14) days of the time the child is placed.

History. Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 423, § 83, effective July 1, 1987; 1988, ch. 350, § 58, effective April 10, 1988; 1996, ch. 301, § 6, effective July 15, 1996; 1998, ch. 278, § 6, effective July 15, 1998; 2008, ch. 187, § 1, effective July 15, 2008.

Research References and Practice Aids

2008-2010 Budget Reference.

See Judicial Branch Budget, 2008 Ky. Acts ch. 128, Pt. III, 15, at 616; and Judicial Branch Budget Memorandum, 2008 Ky. Acts ch. 190, at 1986 (Final Budget Memorandum, at X-29).

620.230. Case permanency plans.

  1. For each child placed in the custody of the cabinet by an order of commitment, the cabinet shall file a case permanency plan for the child with the court and send a copy to the Administrative Office of the Courts Citizen Foster Care Review Board Program as soon as the plan is prepared but no later than thirty (30) days after the effective date of the order. Notwithstanding the provisions of KRS 620.090(5), if a child remains in the temporary custody of the cabinet for longer than forty-five (45) days and if a request is submitted by the Administrative Office of the Courts Citizen Foster Care Review Board Program, the cabinet shall provide a copy of the case permanency plan for the child.
  2. The case permanency plan shall include, but need not be limited to:
    1. A concise statement of the reasons why the child is in the custody of the cabinet;
    2. A statement of the actions which have been taken with regard to the child to the date of the plan;
    3. A statement of the proposed actions which may be taken or are contemplated with regard to the child during the next six (6) months and during the entire duration of the time the child is in the custody of the cabinet;
    4. Contemplated placements for the child;
    5. If the child is placed outside the home, reasons why the child cannot be protected adequately in the home, the harms the child may suffer if left in the home, factors which may indicate when the child can be returned to the home, and efforts the cabinet or others are making to return the child to the home;
    6. If the child is placed outside the home, the steps that the cabinet will take to minimize the harm to the child as a result of the action, both at the time of removal and on a long-term basis;
    7. A description of the type of home, child-caring facility, child-placing agency or facility in which the child is to be placed or has been placed, and a statement why the placement is appropriate for the child, including but not limited to:
      1. Age;
      2. Educational needs;
      3. Medical needs;
      4. Emotional needs;
      5. Relationship with parents; and
      6. Number of children the home is authorized to care for and the number of children currently residing in the home;
    8. If the placement is outside the child’s original county of residence, documentation that no closer placement is appropriate or available, and the reasons why the placement made was chosen;
    9. A description of the services for the child and his family to be provided or arranged by the cabinet to facilitate the return of the child to his own home or to another permanent placement;
    10. A list of objectives and specific tasks, together with specific time frames for each task, for which the parents have agreed to assume responsibility, including a schedule of regular visits with the child;
    11. A projected schedule of time intervals by which each of the services, objectives, and tasks outlined in the case permanency plan should be accomplished and a schedule of time intervals which have already been accomplished or are in the process of accomplishment;
    12. If the child is to remain at home, a description of the potential harm which could befall the child and measures that are being taken to prevent or minimize such harm; and
    13. If the child is to remain at home, reasons why he cannot be placed in foster care or why such care is not needed.
  3. Under no circumstance shall a child be placed in a home, facility, or other shelter with a child who has been committed to the Department of Juvenile Justice for commission of a sex crime as defined in KRS 17.500 , unless the child committed for the commission of a sex crime is kept segregated from other children in the home, facility, or other shelter that have not been committed for the commission of a sex crime.

History. Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 423, § 84, effective July 1, 1987; 1988, ch. 350, § 59, effective April 10, 1988; 1996, ch. 301, § 7, effective July 15, 1996; 1998, ch. 278, § 7, effective July 15, 1998; 2006, ch. 182, § 52, effective July 12, 2006.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited in:

Cabinet for Health & Family Servs. v. J.M.G., 2015 Ky. LEXIS 2013 (Dec. 17, 2015).

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Bench & Bar.

Family Court: Proceedings for Dependency, Neglect and Abuse: The Role of the Family Court Judge and the Guardian ad Litem, Vol. 68, No. 6, Nov. 2004, Ky. Bench & Bar 21.

620.240. Case progress reports.

The cabinet shall file for each child a case progress report at least once every six (6) months with the court and the Administrative Office of the Courts Citizen Foster Care Review Board Program. The first case progress report after the child is placed in the custody of the cabinet by an order of temporary custody or commitment shall be mailed to the Administrative Office of the Courts Citizen Foster Care Review Board Program and subsequent case progress reports shall be provided to the local citizen foster care review board within the case file. The case progress report shall include but is not limited to:

  1. The length of time the child has been in the custody of the cabinet;
  2. The number, location, and date for each placement during the time the child has been in the custody of the cabinet;
  3. A description of the services and assistance provided or arranged by the cabinet to the parents since the last case permanency plan or case progress report, and results achieved;
  4. A description of the efforts and progress of the parents since the last case permanency plan and case progress report, including the number and dates of parental visits and the extent, quality, and frequency of the parents’ communication with the child;
  5. The barriers, familial and institutional, to returning the child home or releasing the child from the custody of the cabinet and services that are not currently available in the community;
  6. An evaluation of the child’s current placement and services provided to the child;
  7. Recommendations for necessary services required to release the child from the custody of the cabinet, to return the child home, or to facilitate another permanent placement;
  8. A timetable for the child’s return home or other permanent placement; and
  9. If return home is not recommended, a specific recommendation for a permanent placement, including termination of parental rights if appropriate. If continued foster care is recommended, an explanation as to why another permanent placement is not appropriate.

History. Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 423, § 85, effective July 1, 1987; 1988, ch. 350, § 60, effective April 10, 1988; 1996, ch. 301, § 8, effective July 15, 1996; 1998, ch. 278, § 8, effective July 15, 1998.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Sanction.

Family court erred in imposing criminal contempt sanctions against the Kentucky Cabinet for Health and Family Services because the court held the Cabinet in contempt for having disregarded a procedural rule which the court itself acknowledged regularly disregarding and the court failed to find willful disobedience by a case worker in the failure to file a required report. Cabinet for Health & Family Servs. v. J.M.G., 475 S.W.3d 600, 2015 Ky. LEXIS 2013 ( Ky. 2015 ).

620.250. Local citizen foster care review board’s access to records.

  1. Each local citizen foster care review board shall have access to all information and records of the cabinet pertinent to the parents or person exercising custodial control or supervision of the child assigned to the local board for review. Information and records shall include, but not be limited to, case permanency plans, case progress reports, and case records.
  2. Each local citizen foster care review board shall have access to all information and records of the court, the cabinet, and public and private child-caring facilities when pertinent to the child assigned to the local board for review. Information and records shall include, but not be limited to, case permanency plans, case progress reports, and case records.
  3. All requested information or records, or both, not already before the local citizen foster care review board at the time of the six (6) months review shall be submitted by the agency or organization in possession of the information or records, or both, no later than five (5) working days after the receipt of the request.
  4. If the local citizen foster care review board is denied access to any public or private information or records, or both, it may request the court to hold a hearing, at which time the court may require the agency or organization in whose possession the information or records, or both, are held to show cause as to the reasons why the information or records, or both, shall not be ordered surrendered pursuant to its authority.

History. Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 423, § 86, effective July 1, 1987; 1992, ch. 412, § 2, effective July 14, 1992; 1996, ch. 301, § 9, effective July 15, 1996; 1998, ch. 278, § 9, effective July 15, 1998.

620.260. Conflict of interest.

Local citizen foster care review board members who have a conflict of interest shall not participate in such review.

History. Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 423, § 87, effective July 1, 1987; 1996, ch. 301, § 10, effective July 15, 1996; 1998, ch. 278, § 10, effective July 15, 1998.

620.270. Scope of review of local citizen foster care review board — Regional forums.

  1. Subject to the provisions of KRS 620.230 , the local citizen foster care review board shall review the case of each child placed in the custody of the cabinet by an order of temporary custody or commitment by the court in the county or counties which the local board serves. The review shall occur at least once every six (6) months until the child is no longer in the custody of the cabinet or until an adoption proceeding becomes final.
  2. During each six (6) month review, the local citizen foster care review board shall review:
    1. The past, current, and future status of the child and his placement as shown through the case permanency plan, case record, case progress reports submitted by the cabinet, and other information as the board may require;
    2. The efforts or adjustment the parent has made in his circumstances, conduct, or conditions to make it in the child’s best interest to return him to his home within a reasonable period of time considering the age of the child;
    3. The efforts of the cabinet to locate and provide services to the biological parents of the child;
    4. The efforts of the cabinet and other agencies to facilitate the return of the child to the home or to find an alternative permanent placement if reunion with the parent or previous custodian is not feasible. The cabinet shall report to the board all factors which either favor or mitigate against any decision or alternative with regard to these matters; and
    5. Any problems, solutions, or alternatives which may be capable of exploration, or other matters with regard to the child as the cabinet or the board determine to be explored with regard to the best interests of the state or of the child.
  3. Upon completion of a training curriculum developed and provided jointly by the Administrative Office of the Courts and by the Department for Community Based Services and approved by the state review board in regard to child sexual abuse, the local citizen foster care review board may review, at the discretion of the board, a sample of all petitions filed in the District Court of the county served by the board alleging sexual abuse of any child, not to exceed two hundred (200) petitions per year statewide, in order to determine the adequacy of the investigation, and the appropriateness of findings, adjudication, and disposition of the court. The board shall have access to all records of the cabinet, medical professionals, and law enforcement agencies pertaining to these cases. The board shall provide the cabinet and the court a full report of the findings and recommendations concerning the review.
  4. Notice of the six (6) month interested party review and the right to attend and participate in the six (6) month interested party review shall be provided to the child’s parents, if parental rights have not been terminated or surrendered; the parent’s attorney; the guardian ad litem, the attorney for the child, or both; the foster parents; the prospective adoptive parent; the relative providing care for the child; and the child who is a party to the proceeding. The cabinet shall provide the Administrative Office of the Courts Citizen Foster Care Review Board with the names, addresses, and any other needed contact information in order to provide adequate, timely notice of the review to these persons.
  5. At least twice annually, the local citizen foster care review boards shall participate in regional community forums for members of the public to discuss areas of concern regarding the foster care system and to identify barriers to timely permanency, well-being and safety for children in out-of-home care. The boards shall report their findings to the State Citizen Foster Care Review Board in accordance with KRS 620.340 .

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 423, § 88, effective July 1, 1987; 1988, ch. 350, § 61, effective April 10, 1988; 1992, ch. 412, § 3, effective July 14, 1992; 1996, ch. 301, § 11, effective July 15, 1996; 1998, ch. 278, § 11, effective July 15, 1998; 2000, ch. 14, § 59, effective July 14, 2000; 2015 ch. 63, § 1, effective June 24, 2015; 2018 ch. 159, § 23, effective July 14, 2018.

620.280. Employees of cabinet and other agencies to appear at local board meetings.

Each local citizen foster care review board may request in writing employees of the cabinet or other agencies or organizations, on five (5) working days’ notice, to appear at local board meetings when necessary to determine the progress made in placing the child in a permanent home. Should an employee fail to appear at such a meeting, the local citizen foster care review board may request that the court hold a hearing at which time the court, if the request for the hearing is granted, shall require the employee to show cause as to why he should not be compelled to appear.

History. Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 423, § 89, effective July 1, 1987; 1996, ch. 301, § 12, effective July 15, 1996; 1998, ch. 278, § 12, effective July 15, 1998.

620.290. Board’s findings and recommendations — Report on children frequently moved.

The local citizen foster care review board shall submit to the court within fourteen (14) days of the six (6) month review its findings and recommendations. The findings and recommendations for each child under review shall include but need not be limited to:

  1. Whether there is a plan for permanence;
  2. Whether the plan is progressing;
  3. The appropriateness of the current placement or plan for permanence. If the local foster care review board determines that a current placement or plan for permanence is inappropriate, a notification shall be provided to the court, and the cabinet which shall summarize the position of the local foster care review board, the response of the cabinet, if any, to the concerns expressed by the local foster care review board, and any action proposed by the local foster care review board; and
  4. The number of moves that have occurred during the child’s placement into out-of-home care, including whether the child has moved three (3) or more times within a six (6) month period.

History. Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 423, § 90, effective July 1, 1987; 1996, ch. 301, § 13, effective July 15, 1996; 1998, ch. 278, § 13, effective July 15, 1998; 1998, ch. 398, § 10, effective July 15, 1998; 2018 ch. 159, § 24, effective July 14, 2018; 2019 ch. 132, § 2, effective June 27, 2019.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited in:

Cabinet for Health & Family Servs. v. J.M.G., 2015 Ky. LEXIS 2013 (Dec. 17, 2015).

620.300. Notice of completed reviews. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 423, § 91, effective July 1, 1987) was repealed by Acts 1992, ch. 412, § 7, effective July 14, 1992.

620.310. State Citizen Foster Care Review Board established.

  1. There is hereby established a State Citizen Foster Care Review Board. The State Citizen Foster Care Review Board shall consist of all chairmen of the local foster care review boards.
  2. The State Citizen Foster Care Review Board shall biennially elect a chairman and vice chairman to serve in the absence of the chairman.
  3. The State Citizen Foster Care Review Board shall meet at least annually, and more frequently upon the call of the chairman, or as the board shall determine.
  4. Members of the State Citizen Foster Care Review Board may only receive compensation for travel mileage cost and overnight lodging at a rate consistent with that provided to state employees as provided under the law of the Commonwealth.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 423, § 92, effective July 1, 1987; 1996, ch. 301, § 14, effective July 15, 1996; 1998, ch. 278, § 14, effective July 15, 1998; 2018 ch. 159, § 25, effective July 14, 2018.

620.320. Duties of State Citizen Foster Care Review Board.

The duties of the State Citizen Foster Care Review Board shall be to:

  1. Establish, approve, and provide training programs for local citizen foster care review board members;
  2. Review and coordinate the activities of local citizen foster care review boards;
  3. Establish reporting procedures to be followed by the local citizen foster care review boards and publish an annual written report compiling data reported by local foster care review boards which shall include statistics relating, at a minimum, to the following:
    1. Barriers to permanency identified in reviews;
    2. The number of children moved more than three (3) times within a six (6) month period;
    3. The average length of time in care;
    4. Local solutions reported to meet identified barriers; and
    5. The total number and frequency of reviews;
  4. Publish an annual written report on the effectiveness of such local citizen foster care review boards; and
  5. Evaluate and make annual recommendations to the Supreme Court, Governor, and the Child Welfare Oversight and Advisory Committee established in KRS 6.943 regarding:
    1. Laws of the Commonwealth;
    2. Practices, policies, and procedures within the Commonwealth affecting permanence for children in out-of-home placement and the investigation of allegations of abuse and neglect;
    3. The findings of the local citizen foster care review board community forums conducted pursuant to KRS 620.270 ; and
    4. The effectiveness or lack thereof and reasons therefor of local citizen foster care review of children in the custody of the cabinet in bringing about permanence for the Commonwealth’s children.

History. Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 423, § 93, effective July 1, 1987; 1992, ch. 412, § 4, effective July 14, 1992; 1996, ch. 301, § 15, effective July 15, 1996; 1998, ch. 278, § 15, effective July 15, 1998; 1998, ch. 398, § 11, effective July 15, 1998; 2018 ch. 159, § 56, effective July 14, 2018; 2019 ch. 132, § 3, effective June 27, 2019.

620.330. Support services for State Citizen Foster Care Review Board.

  1. Secretarial and support services for the State Citizen Foster Care Review Board may be provided by the Administrative Office of the Courts.
  2. The State Citizen Foster Care Review Board may receive state and federal funds to insure total or partial funding of the board’s activities.

History. Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 423, § 94, effective July 1, 1987; 1996, ch. 301, § 16, effective July 15, 1996; 1998, ch. 278, § 16, effective July 15, 1998.

620.340. Reports from local boards to state board.

Each local citizen foster care review board shall forward annually to the State Citizen Foster Care Review Board a report and any recommendations regarding:

  1. The policies and practices of the cabinet, the court, and other child-caring facilities and child-placing agencies which affect permanence for children in out-of-home placement; and
  2. The process of local citizen foster care review.

History. Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 423, § 95, effective July 1, 1987; 1996, ch. 301, § 17, effective July 15, 1996; 1998, ch. 278, § 17, effective July 15, 1998.

620.345. Study group on privatizing foster care services — Membership — Recommendations.

  1. As used in this section, unless the context otherwise requires;
    1. “Cabinet” means the Cabinet for Health and Family Services; and
    2. “Secretary” means the secretary of the Cabinet for Health and Family Services.
  2. The secretary shall designate a study group to make recommendations regarding the feasibility and implementation of the privatization of all foster care services in the Commonwealth.
  3. The study group shall be composed of the following members:
    1. The secretary;
    2. The commissioner for the Department for Community Based Services;
    3. The director of the Administrative Office of the Courts, or designee;
    4. The executive director of the Governor’s Office of Early Childhood, or designee;
    5. One (1) adult who was a former foster child in the Commonwealth;
    6. One (1) adult who is a current or former foster parent in the Commonwealth;
    7. Two (2) employees of a licensed child-placing agency;
    8. Two (2) employees of a licensed child-caring facility; and
    9. Any personnel within the Department for Community Based Services that the secretary deems necessary.
  4. In its deliberations, the study group shall include but not be limited to analysis of improved timeliness and likelihood of permanency such as reunification, adoption, or guardianship; fewer moves for children in foster care; reduced instances of reentry into care; and financial implications.
  5. The study group shall report its recommendations by July 1, 2019, to the Governor, the Interim Joint Committees on Appropriations and Revenue and Health and Welfare and Family Services, and the Child Welfare Oversight and Advisory Committee established in KRS 6.943 . The study group shall cease to operate after the delivery of the recommendations required by this subsection.

HISTORY: 2018 ch. 159, § 46, effective July 14, 2018.

620.350. Abandoned newborn infant — Emergency custody order — No investigation of abandonment — Placement in foster home — Inquiry to ensure that infant is not missing child — Involuntary termination of parental rights.

  1. As used in this section, “newborn infant” means an infant who is medically determined to be less than thirty (30) days old.
  2. Upon notice from any emergency medical services provider or hospital staff that a newborn infant has been abandoned at a hospital, the cabinet shall immediately seek an order for emergency custody of the infant.
    1. No child protective services investigation or assessment shall be initiated regarding the abandonment of an infant in accordance with KRS 405.075 . The provisions of this subsection shall not apply when indicators of child physical abuse or child neglect are present.
    2. Upon the infant’s release from the hospital, the cabinet shall place the child in a foster home approved by the cabinet to provide concurrent planning placement services. As used in this paragraph, “concurrent planning placement services” means the foster family shall work with the cabinet on reunification with the birth family, if known, and shall seek to adopt the infant if reunification cannot be accomplished.
  3. At the temporary removal hearing required by KRS 620.080 , if the court places temporary custody with the cabinet, the custody order shall remain in effect for a minimum of thirty (30) days.
  4. During the initial thirty (30) days of placement, the cabinet shall request assistance from law enforcement officials to investigate through the Missing Child Information Center established by KRS 17.450 and other national resources to ensure that the infant is not a missing child.
  5. As soon as practicable following the thirty (30) day placement period, the cabinet shall file a petition in Circuit Court seeking the involuntary termination of parental rights of the unknown parents and authority to place the child for adoption in accordance with KRS Chapter 625.
  6. If a claim of parental rights is made at any time prior to the court order issued under KRS 625.100 , the Circuit Court may hold the action for involuntary termination of parental rights in abeyance for a period of time not to exceed ninety (90) days and immediately remand the case to the District Court.
    1. If a case is remanded to District Court under this subsection, an adjudicatory hearing shall be conducted as required by KRS 620.100 within ten (10) days of the assertion of parental rights;
    2. The District Court may order genetic testing to establish maternity or paternity at the expense of the claimant;
    3. The cabinet shall conduct a child protective services investigation or assessment and home evaluation to develop recommendations for the District Court; and
    4. Further proceedings shall be conducted in accordance with KRS Chapter 620; however, a newborn infant who has been placed in accordance with KRS 405.075 shall not be found to be a neglected child based on that act alone.

History. Enact. Acts 2002, ch. 303, § 5, effective April 9, 2002; 2016 ch. 122, § 6, effective July 15, 2016.

Legislative Research Commission Notes.

(7/15/2002). In subsection (1) of this section, the words “means an infant” have been inserted by the Reviser of Statutes to correct a manifest clerical or typographical error in accordance with KRS 7.136 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Note: Remembering the Endangered “Child”: Limiting the Definition of “Safe Haven” and Looking Beyond the Safe Haven Law Framework, 98 Ky. L.J. 833 (2009/2010).

620.355. Information form for person who leaves infant — Media campaign.

  1. The cabinet shall make available standardized health, medical, and background information forms for use in gathering voluntary, nonidentifying information from a person who leaves an infant in accordance with KRS 405.075 and as required by KRS 216B.190 . The materials shall clearly state on each page that the information requested is designed to facilitate medical care for the infant. The material shall include information on family services, termination of parental rights, and adoption. The material shall also include:
    1. Information on the importance of medical and health information regarding the infant; and
    2. Written notification that failure to contact the Department for Community Based Services and assert a claim of parental rights within thirty (30) days of the receipt of the material shall result in the commencement of proceedings for involuntary termination of parental rights and placement of the child for adoption.
  2. Subject to available funding, the cabinet shall produce and distribute a media campaign to promote safe placement alternatives for newborn infants, the confidentiality offered to birth parents, and information regarding adoption procedures.

History. Enact. Acts 2002, ch. 303, § 6, effective April 9, 2002; 2016 ch. 122, § 7, effective July 15, 2016.

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Note: Remembering the Endangered “Child”: Limiting the Definition of “Safe Haven” and Looking Beyond the Safe Haven Law Framework, 98 Ky. L.J. 833 (2009/2010).

620.360. Rights and responsibilities of foster parents — Training of person investigating abuse or neglect in foster homes — Foster parent approval — Nonliability of cabinet.

  1. Persons who provide foster care services to children who have been committed to the custody of the state shall be considered a primary partner and member of a professional team caring for foster children. Foster parents shall have the following rights:
    1. To be treated with respect, consideration, and dignity;
    2. To fully understand the role of the cabinet and the role of other members of the child’s professional team;
    3. To receive information and training about foster parents’ rights, responsibilities, and access to local and statewide support groups, including but not limited to the Kentucky Foster/Adoptive Care Association, the Kentucky Foster and Adoptive Parent Network, and Adoption Support of Kentucky;
    4. To receive information and training to improve skills in the daily care and in meeting the special needs of foster children;
    5. To receive timely and adequate financial reimbursement for knowledgeable and quality care of a child in foster care within budgetary limitations;
    6. To maintain the foster family’s own routines and values while respecting the rights and confidentiality of each foster child placed in their home;
    7. To receive a period of respite from providing foster care, pursuant to cabinet policies;
    8. To receive, upon an open records request, a copy of all information contained in the cabinet’s records about the family’s foster home and the foster care services provided by the family consistent with KRS 605.160 ;
    9. To access cabinet support and assistance as necessary twenty-four (24) hours per day, seven (7) days per week;
    10. To receive, prior to a child being placed in the foster home pursuant to KRS 605.090 , information relating to the child’s behavior, family background, or health history that may jeopardize the health or safety of any member of the foster family’s household, including other foster children, and similar information that may affect the manner in which foster care services are provided, consistent with KRS 605.160 . In an emergency situation, the cabinet shall provide information as soon as it is available;
    11. To refuse placement of a child within the foster home and to request, with reasonable notice to the cabinet, the removal of a child from the foster home without fear of reprisal;
    12. To communicate, with an appropriate release of information consistent with KRS 605.160, with other professionals who work directly with the foster child, including but not limited to teachers, therapists, and health care practitioners and to notify the cabinet within twenty-four (24) hours of the communication;
    13. To assist the cabinet in the development of the child’s plan of care;
    14. To receive an explanatory notice from the cabinet, consistent with KRS 620.130 and when it is in the best interest of the child, when a foster child’s case plan has changed and, except in an immediate response to a child protective services investigation involving the foster home, an explanatory notice of termination or change in placement affecting the foster home within fourteen (14) days of the change or termination in placement;
    15. To have priority consideration for placement if a child who has previously been placed in the foster home reenters foster care, consistent with KRS 605.130 and 620.130 and to the extent it is in the best interest of the child;
    16. To have priority consideration for adoption if a foster child who has been placed in the foster home for a period of at least twelve (12) consecutive months becomes eligible for adoption consistent with KRS 605.130 and 620.130 and to the extent it is in the best interest of the child;
    17. To maintain contact with the foster child after the child leaves the foster home, unless the child, a biological parent, the cabinet when the cabinet retains custody of the child, or other foster or adoptive parent refuses such contact; and
    18. To receive notice of, have a right to attend, and have a right to be heard in, either verbally or in writing, any cabinet or court proceeding held with respect to the child. This paragraph shall not be construed to require that a foster parent caring for the child be made a party to a proceeding solely on the basis of the notice and rights to attend and be heard.
  2. The responsibilities of foster parents shall include but not be limited to the following:
    1. To maintain an orderly and clean home;
    2. To ensure that the child has adequate resources for personal hygiene and clothing;
    3. To provide recreational and spiritual opportunities for the child, in accordance with cabinet policies;
    4. To attend all school and case planning meetings involving a foster child placed in their home whenever possible, subject to KRS 620.130 and the confidentiality requirements of 42 U.S.C. sec. 671 ;
    5. To abide by cabinet policies relating to discipline of a foster child; and
    6. To support the involvement of a foster child’s biological family whenever possible and in accordance with cabinet policies.
  3. The cabinet shall provide specific training on investigations of alleged child abuse or neglect in a foster home to a person appointed by the Kentucky Foster/Adoptive Care Association. The training shall include the rights of a foster parent during an investigation. Training shall be consistent with 42 U.S.C. sec. 5106(a) .
  4. The cabinet shall promulgate administrative regulations to establish that foster parent approval shall be effective for a minimum of three (3) years before reevaluation is required.
  5. Nothing in this section shall be construed to establish monetary liability of or cause of action against the cabinet.

History. Enact. Acts 2006, ch. 45, § 1, effective July 12, 2006; 2018 ch. 159, § 45, effective July 14, 2018; 2019 ch. 132, § 4, effective June 27, 2019.

620.363. Rights of foster child.

A child who is placed in foster care shall be considered a primary partner and member of a professional team. A foster child, as the most integral part of the professional team, shall have the following rights to:

  1. Adequate food, clothing, and shelter;
  2. Freedom from physical, sexual, or emotional injury or exploitation;
  3. Develop physically, mentally, and emotionally to his or her potential;
  4. A safe, secure, and stable family;
  5. Individual educational needs being met;
  6. Remain in the same educational setting prior to removal, whenever possible;
  7. Placement in the least restrictive setting in close proximity to his or her home that meets his or her needs and serves his or her best interests to the extent that such placement is available;
  8. Information about the circumstances requiring his or her initial and continued placement;
  9. Receive notice of, attend, and be consulted in the development of case plans during periodic reviews;
  10. Receive notice of and participate in court hearings;
  11. Receive notice of and explanation for changes in placement or visitation agreements;
  12. Visit the family in the family home, receive visits from family and friends, and have telephone conversations with family members, when not contraindicated by the case plan or court order;
  13. Participate in extracurricular, social, cultural, and enrichment activities, including but not limited to sports, field trips, and overnights;
  14. Express opinions on issues concerning his or her care or treatment;
  15. Three (3) additional rights if he or she is age fourteen (14) years or older. These additional three (3) rights are the right to:
    1. Designate two (2) additional individuals to participate in case planning conferences or periodic reviews, who are not the foster parent or his or her worker, and who may advocate on his or her behalf. The cabinet, child caring facility, or child-placing agency may reject an individual with reasonable belief that the individual will not act appropriately on the child’s behalf;
    2. Receive a written description of the programs and services that will help prepare him or her for the transition from foster care to successful adulthood; and
    3. Receive a consumer report yearly until discharged from care and to receive assistance in interpreting and resolving any inaccuracies in the report, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. sec. 675(5) (I); and
  16. Receive, free of charge when he or she is eighteen (18) years or older and preparing to exit foster care by reason of attaining the age of eighteen (18) years old, the following:
    1. An official birth certificate;
    2. A Social Security card;
    3. Health insurance information;
    4. A copy of the child’s medical records; and
    5. A state-issued identification.

HISTORY: 2019 ch. 33, § 7, effective June 27, 2019.

620.365. Notification when child in foster care is to be moved or reunified with family.

  1. If the cabinet determines that a child, who is in the custody of the cabinet through an emergency, temporary, or permanent court order as a result of dependency, neglect, or abuse and is in foster care, should be moved from a current placement to a new placement or reunified with their family, the cabinet shall provide verbal and written notification to the foster parents and the child-caring facility or child-placing agency where the child is residing at least ten (10) calendar days prior to the new placement or reunification occurring.
  2. The cabinet’s mandate to provide the notification required by this section shall not be required if the cabinet determines the child is in imminent danger.

HISTORY: 2018 ch. 159, § 16, effective July 14, 2018.

Court-Appointed Special Advocates

620.500. Definitions for KRS 620.500 to 620.550.

As used in KRS 620.500 to 620.550 , unless the context otherwise requires:

  1. “Association” means the state Court-Appointed Special Advocate Association established in KRS 620.530 ;
  2. “Court” means family court or, if there is no family court in the county where the CASA program is located, then District Court;
  3. “Court-appointed special advocate case” and “CASA case” mean a child or group of siblings who are within the jurisdiction of the court as a result of abuse, neglect, or dependency proceedings and for whom the court has appointed and the program director has assigned a CASA volunteer;
  4. “Court-appointed special advocate program” and “CASA program” mean a program by which trained community volunteers are provided to the court for appointment to represent the best interests of children who have come into the court system as a result of dependency, abuse, or neglect;
  5. “Court-appointed special advocate volunteer” and “CASA volunteer” mean a person who completes training through and is supervised by a CASA program and appointed by a judge to represent the best interests of dependent, abused, and neglected children in court;
  6. “Local board” means the local board of directors appointed or selected in accordance with KRS 620.505 to govern local CASA programs;
  7. “Program director” means the director of each local CASA program selected in accordance with KRS 620.505 ;
  8. “State board” means the state board of directors elected in accordance with KRS 620.530 ; and
  9. “State director” means the director of the state association provided for in KRS 620.537 .

History. Enact. Acts 1990, ch. 264, § 1, effective July 13, 1990; 1996, ch. 245, § 2, effective July 15, 1996; 2004, ch. 138, § 1, effective July 13, 2004.

Opinions of Attorney General.

Court appointed special advocates may be appointed either by the District Court under the CASA projects authorized by KRS 620.500 through 620.550 or by the Circuit Court under the authorization of KRS 421.500(2). OAG 91-123 .

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Bench & Bar.

DiLoreto, KRS 26A.140 , Its Plain Meaning, Current and Potential Application to Assist Children in Court Proceedings. Vol. 73, No. 4, July 2009, Ky. Bench & Bar, 24.

620.505. Court-appointed special advocate program — Local board of directors — Program director — CASA volunteers.

  1. For the purpose of providing an independent, efficient, and thorough representation for children who enter the court system as a result of dependency, abuse, or neglect, there may be established a court-appointed special advocate program by the chief judge of family court or, if none, then by the Chief District Judge.
  2. Local CASA programs shall be governed by a local board of directors. For new CASA programs, the board shall initially be appointed by the chief judge of family court or, if none, then by the Chief District Judge. Members shall be selected by the existing board members thereafter. Each board shall include at least fifteen (15) members. Each board member shall have a demonstrated interest in child welfare issues and commitment to the purpose and role of the court-appointed special advocate volunteers. Cabinet employees shall not be eligible to serve as officers of the board. Members shall, as far as practicable, be representative of the racial and ethnic composition of the area served by the CASA program. The board shall:
    1. Determine major personnel, organization, fiscal, and program policies including, but not limited to, the following:
      1. Measures to be taken to safeguard the CASA program’s information relating to children, their families, and the CASA volunteers;
      2. The procedures for the recruitment, screening, training, and supervision of CASA volunteers; and
      3. The procedure for and circumstances warranting dismissal of a CASA volunteer from the CASA program;
    2. Determine overall plans and priorities for the CASA program, including provisions for evaluating progress against performance;
    3. Approve the program budget;
    4. Enforce compliance with all conditions of all grants contracts;
    5. Determine rules and procedures for the governing board;
    6. Select the officers and the executive committee, if any, of the governing board;
    7. Meet at least four (4) times each year;
    8. Submit an annual report to the association in the uniform manner required which shall include, but need not be limited to, the following information:
      1. Number of CASA volunteers in the program;
      2. Number of program staff;
      3. Number of children served;
      4. Number of volunteers receiving initial training;
      5. Number of and topics for in-service training;
      6. The type of source of the funds received and the amount received from each type of source during the previous fiscal year;
      7. The expenditures during the previous year; and
      8. Other information as deemed appropriate.
  3. Local CASA programs shall comply with the National CASA Association and Kentucky CASA Association Standards for Programs. Local programs shall ensure that CASA volunteers are adequately supervised by providing at least one (1) supervisory staff person for every thirty (30) CASA volunteers that have been appointed by the court and assigned by the program director. Each local CASA program shall be managed by a qualified director whose service may be voluntary or who may be paid a salary. The program director’s duties shall include:
    1. Administration of the CASA program as directed by the local and state boards;
    2. Recruitment, screening, training, and supervision of CASA volunteers and other program staff;
    3. Facilitation of the performance of the court-appointed special advocates’ duties; and
    4. Ensuring that the security measures established by the local and state boards for safeguarding the information relating to children, their families, and the CASA volunteers are maintained.
  4. CASA volunteers shall, as far as practicable, be representative of the socioeconomic, racial, and ethnic composition of the area served.
  5. CASA volunteers may be removed by the court for nonparticipation or other cause or by the program director pursuant to subsection (2) of this section.
  6. All written court-appointed special advocate reports submitted pursuant to KRS 620.525 shall become part of the cabinet’s record of the child.
  7. Employees of the cabinet shall not become volunteers or employees of the court-appointed special advocate program.
  8. Each CASA volunteer, program director, and other program staff shall take an oath, administered by a member of the Court of Justice, to keep confidential all information related to the appointed case except in conferring with or reports to the court, parties to the case, the cabinet, the Citizen Foster Care Review Board, others designated by the court, and as provided by law.
  9. CASA volunteers shall be appointed by the presiding judge to represent the best interest of the child, subject to judicial discretion, and only after confirmation from the program director that the CASA volunteer has been properly screened and trained.

History. Enact. Acts 1990, ch. 264, § 2, effective July 13, 1990; 1996, ch. 245, § 3, effective July 15, 1996; 1998, ch. 278, § 18, effective July 15, 1998; 2004, ch. 138, § 2, effective July 13, 2004.

Opinions of Attorney General.

Court Appointed Special Advocate (CASA) is not a “public agency” within the meaning of KRS 61.870(1), and is therefore not bound by the provisions of the Open Records Act. In addition, CASA officials and volunteers must keep confidential all information contained in records of the type requested except in conferring with or reports to the court pursuant to KRS 620.505(8), incorporated into the Open Records Act by virtue of KRS 61.878(1)(l). OAG 05-ORD-004.

620.510. Support services and funding for CASA programs.

  1. Secretarial and support services for each CASA program may be provided by the family court, the District Court, the circuit clerk, or a combination thereof, as ordered by the chief judge of family court or, if none, then by the Chief District Judge. The Administrative Office of the Courts may also provide secretarial and support services.
  2. CASA programs may receive private funds and local, state, and federal government funding to insure total or partial funding of program activities.

History. Enact. Acts 1990, ch. 264, § 3, effective July 13, 1990; 1996, ch. 245, § 4, effective July 15, 1996; 2004, ch. 138, § 3, effective July 13, 2004.

Opinions of Attorney General.

Court Appointed Special Advocate (CASA) is not a “public agency” within the meaning of KRS 61.870(1), and is therefore not bound by the provisions of the Open Records Act. In addition, CASA officials and volunteers must keep confidential all information contained in records of the type requested except in conferring with or reports to the court pursuant to KRS 620.505(8), incorporated into the Open Records Act by virtue of KRS 61.878(1)(l). OAG 05-ORD-004.

620.512. Kentucky CASA network fund — Creation and administration.

  1. The Kentucky CASA network fund is hereby created as a separate trust fund. The fund shall be administered by the Justice and Public Safety Cabinet.
  2. The fund shall receive amounts collected from the income tax checkoff established in KRS 141.449 , and any other proceeds from grants, contributions, appropriations, or other moneys made available for the purposes of the fund. Moneys in the fund shall be used to support CASA programs in Kentucky.
  3. Notwithstanding KRS 45.229 , fund amounts not expended at the close of a fiscal year shall not lapse but shall be carried forward to the next fiscal year.
  4. Any interest earned on moneys in the fund shall become a part of the trust fund and shall not lapse.
  5. Moneys in the fund are appropriated for the purposes set forth in this section and shall not be appropriated or transferred by the General Assembly for any other purposes.

HISTORY: 2018 ch. 62, § 2, effective July 14, 2018.

620.515. Minimum requirements for CASA volunteer — Training — Oath.

  1. A CASA volunteer shall meet the following minimum requirements:
    1. Be at least twenty-one (21) years of age;
    2. Be of good moral character;
    3. Complete a written application providing the names of at least three (3) references;
    4. Submit to a personal interview with program staff;
    5. Submit to a criminal record check; and
    6. Submit to a check of the child abuse and adult protection registry maintained by the cabinet.
  2. If found acceptable, then the applicant shall receive a minimum of thirty (30) hours of initial training and take an oath of confidentiality administered by a family court judge or, if none, then a District Judge.
  3. Training, both initial and in-service, of volunteers shall be provided by the program director or staff following standards adopted pursuant to KRS 620.535 .

History. Enact. Acts 1990, ch. 264, § 4, effective July 13, 1990; 1996, ch. 245, § 5, effective July 15, 1996; 2004, ch. 138, § 4, effective July 13, 2004.

620.520. Information available to program directors and CASA volunteers.

  1. The clerk of the court shall:
    1. Notify and provide a copy of all dependency, abuse, and neglect petitions to the program director, as soon as the court makes a referral to the program director for assignment of a CASA volunteer to the case;
    2. Provide a copy of all court orders issued pursuant to this section; and
    3. Notify the program director of all scheduled court hearings for cases to which a CASA volunteer has been assigned.
  2. Upon appointment by the court to represent a child, the CASA volunteer shall have access to all information and records pertaining to the child including, but not limited to, the records of the following entities: the cabinet; child-caring facilities operated or licensed by the cabinet; public and private schools; physical and mental health care providers; law enforcement agencies; and other entities deemed appropriate by the court.
  3. With court approval, the CASA volunteer may have access to information and records pertaining to the parents or persons exercising custodial control or supervision of the child assigned to the CASA volunteer, including information and records of the court, the cabinet, public and private child care facilities, private and public schools, and the medical and psychological records of the child assigned to the volunteer. The volunteer shall have access to the medical and psychological records of parents when the court determines that the information is essential to the welfare of the child and the court orders it.

History. Enact. Acts 1990, ch. 264, § 5, effective July 13, 1990; 1996, ch. 245, § 6, effective July 15, 1996; 2004, ch. 138, § 5, effective July 13, 2004.

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Bench & Bar.

Wiederstein, Closed Courtrooms and the Public’s Right of Access, Vol. 67, No. 4, July 2003, Ky. Bench & Bar 15.

620.525. Duties of CASA volunteers.

  1. CASA volunteers who have a conflict of interest in a case shall not be appointed to the case.
  2. The CASA volunteer shall:
    1. Attend all court hearings except that the CASA volunteer may be excused by the court or the program director if emergency circumstances arise;
    2. Submit a written report and recommendation to the judge for consideration in determining the best interest of the child at the dispositional hearing, dispositional review hearings, other hearings as requested by the court, and at least one (1) report every six (6) months for as long as the case is assigned to a CASA volunteer;
    3. Monitor the case by visiting the child as often as necessary to observe whether the child’s essential needs are being met and whether court orders are actually being carried out;
    4. Participate in any treatment planning conferences and reviews involving the child to assess whether reasonable efforts are being made to provide services to the child and family and determine the appropriateness and progress of the child’s permanent plan;
    5. Advocate a prompt, thorough review of the case if the child’s circumstances warrant the attention of the court;
    6. Interview parties involved in the case, including interviewing and observing the child;
    7. Maintain complete written records about the case;
    8. Report any incidents of child or adult abuse or neglect to the appropriate authorities and to the program director;
    9. Remain actively involved in the case until dismissed from the case by the program director or judge with competent jurisdiction, or when an adoption proceeding is finalized;
    10. Return all case-related materials including, but not limited to, written notes, court reports, and agency documents, to the program director upon the request of the program director; and
    11. Work with the cabinet representatives to advocate the best interest of the child.

History. Enact. Acts 1990, ch. 264, § 6, effective July 13, 1990; 1996, ch. 245, § 7, effective July 15, 1996.

620.530. Court-Appointed Special Advocate Association.

  1. A state Court-Appointed Special Advocate Association shall be established. All CASA volunteers, local board members, program directors, and staff shall be eligible for membership in the association. Other categories of membership may be created by the association.
  2. The association shall meet annually to elect a board of directors to manage the business of the association. The board shall, annually, elect a president, a vice president, a secretary, and a treasurer. The board shall meet at least four (4) times a year, and meetings may be held more frequently when called by the president of the board or by a majority of the board members.

History. Enact. Acts 1990, ch. 264, § 7, effective July 13, 1990; 1996, ch. 245, § 8, effective July 15, 1996.

620.535. Duties of association.

The association shall:

  1. Adopt and approve state standards for all CASA volunteers, program directors, and other staff, including, but not limited to, guidelines for training;
  2. Adopt and approve the uniform annual data reporting procedures for local programs pursuant to KRS 620.505(2)(h); and
  3. Evaluate and make recommendations by February 1 in odd-numbered years to the Supreme Court, the Governor, the Legislative Research Commission, and the cabinet regarding:
    1. Laws of the Commonwealth and practices, policies, and procedures within the Commonwealth affecting the welfare of children and families; and
    2. The effectiveness, or lack thereof, and the reasons therefor, of local CASA volunteers advocating for permanent placement for the children in the Commonwealth.

History. Enact. Acts 1990, ch. 264, § 8, effective July 13, 1990; 1996, ch. 245, § 9, effective July 15, 1996.

620.537. Director of association — Qualifications — Duties.

If the state board employs a full-time staff person to serve as the director of the association, then:

  1. The state director shall be a person who by a combination of education, professional qualification, training, and experience is qualified to perform the duties of this position. The state director shall be of good moral character with at least two (2) years of experience working in a position managing a human services program and who has received a:
    1. Master’s degree in social work, sociology, psychology, guidance and counseling, education, criminal justice, or other human service field; or
    2. Baccalaureate degree in social work, sociology, psychology, guidance and counseling, education, criminal justice, or other human service field with, in addition to the work experience required in this subsection, at least two (2) more years of experience working in the human services field.
  2. The duties of the state director shall be:
    1. To manage the state court-appointed special advocate office, including staff;
    2. To coordinate the activities of the association;
    3. To monitor the policies and practices of local CASA programs for compliance with state laws, National CASA Association Standards for Programs, and reporting requirements established by the state association; to assist local CASA programs in efforts to achieve compliance; and to report to the state association the status of compliance by local CASA programs;
    4. Upon request of local CASA programs, to provide technical assistance to local CASA programs;
    5. To provide technical assistance and support to chief judges of family courts, Chief District Judges, and others in development of new local CASA programs;
    6. To coordinate a statewide public awareness campaign for generating interest in developing new CASA programs, recruiting volunteers, and informing the public of the issues concerning child abuse and neglect; and
    7. Other duties as directed by the association.

History. Enact. Acts 1996, ch. 245, § 13, effective July 15, 1996; 2004, ch. 138, § 6, effective July 13, 2004.

620.540. Support services and funding for board.

  1. Secretarial and support services for the state board may be provided by the Administrative Office of the Courts.
  2. The association may receive private funds, and local, state, and federal government funds to financially assist existing local CASA programs, assist local efforts to start a CASA program, or other activities deemed appropriate by the association.

History. Enact. Acts 1990, ch. 264, § 9, effective July 13, 1990; 1996, ch. 245, § 10, effective July 15, 1996; 2004, ch. 138, § 7, effective July 13, 2004.

620.545. Reports from CASA programs.

Each CASA program shall forward annually to the association and cabinet a report, pursuant to KRS 620.535(2) and KRS 620.505(2)(h), and any recommendations regarding the policies and practices of the court, the cabinet, and child-care facilities and child-placement agencies affecting the children being represented by the CASA volunteers.

History. Enact. Acts 1990, ch. 264, § 10, effective July 13, 1990; 1996, ch. 245, § 11, effective July 15, 1996.

620.550. Notification of treatment planning conferences and reviews.

The cabinet shall notify the CASA volunteer, the CASA program, and the court when it schedules treatment planning conferences and reviews.

History. Enact. Acts 1990, ch. 264, § 11, effective July 13, 1990; 1996, ch. 245, § 12, effective July 15, 1996.

Penalty

620.990. Penalty.

  1. Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, any person intentionally violating the provisions of this chapter shall be guilty of a Class B misdemeanor.
  2. The use of information by public officers and by defense counsel for purposes of investigation and trial of cases or other proceedings under the provisions of KRS Chapters 600 to 645 or in any criminal prosecution or appeal shall not constitute a violation of this chapter.

History. Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 423, § 96, effective July 1, 1987; 1988, ch. 350, § 62, effective April 10, 1988; 2008, ch. 72, § 5, effective July 15, 2008.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited:

Hazlett v. Evans, 943 F. Supp. 785, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16769 (E.D. Ky. 1996 ).

Research References and Practice Aids

Treatises

Caldwell’s Kentucky Form Book, 5th Ed., Practice Context for Juvenile Code Proceedings, § 258.00.

Petrilli, Kentucky Family Law, Juvenile Court, §§ 32.3, 32.5.

Petrilli, Kentucky Family Law, Minors, § 30.34.

CHAPTER 625 Termination of Parental Rights

625.010. Definitions. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 423, § 97, effective July 1, 1987) was repealed by Acts 1988, ch. 350, § 143, effective April 10, 1988.

625.020. Circuit Court jurisdiction.

The Circuit Court shall have jurisdiction of proceedings under this chapter.

History. Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 423, § 98, effective July 1, 1987.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Abused And Neglected Child.

Termination of a mother’s and a father’s parental rights was supported by substantial evidence and was in their children’s best interests because there was ongoing domestic violence between the mother and the father and the parents and the children, the parents did little to resolve their drug and alcohol dependency, the parents continuously or repeatedly failed to provide or were incapable of providing essential food, clothing, shelter, medical care or education reasonably necessary and available for the children’s well-being and there was no reasonable expectation of significant improvement in the parents’ conduct in the immediately foreseeable future, one child was sexually abused by her parents and her uncles, another child was deemed a high suicide risk, and the parents failed to make sufficient progress toward identified goals as set forth in the court-approved case plan which would have allowed for the children’s safe return. C.R.G. v. Cabinet for Health & Fam. Servs., 297 S.W.3d 914, 2009 Ky. App. LEXIS 215 (Ky. Ct. App. 2009).

Research References and Practice Aids

Treatises

Petrilli, Kentucky Family Law, Termination of Parental Rights and Adoption, §§ 29.1, 29.12, 29.14.

Petrilli, Kentucky Family Law, Forms, Adoption and Termination of Parental Rights, Form 3.3, Form 3.4.

625.025. Extension of wardship to age twenty-one.

In the case of a child who has become a ward of the Cabinet for Health and Family Services as a result of a termination of parental rights judgment entered against the child’s parents, and who remains a ward of the cabinet upon attainment of his or her eighteenth birthday, the cabinet, in its discretion, upon request of the ward, may extend its wardship to age twenty-one (21) for the purpose of the child’s participating in state or federal educational programs or to assist the child in establishing independent living arrangements.

History. Enact. Acts 1998, ch. 57, § 17, effective March 17, 1998; 2005, ch. 99, § 668, effective June 20, 2005.

625.030. Putative father party to proceedings. [Repealed.]

Compiler’s Notes.

This section (Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 423, § 99, effective July 1, 1987) was repealed by Acts 1988, ch. 350, § 143, effective April 10, 1988.

Voluntary Termination

625.040. Petition.

  1. A petition for the voluntary termination of parental rights shall be entitled “In the interest of..., a child.” The petition may be filed by a parent or counsel when the appearance-waiver and consent-to-adopt forms are signed by the parent, counsel, and cabinet representative under the conditions described in KRS 625.041(3) and (4).
  2. The petition for the voluntary termination of parental rights shall be filed in the Circuit Court of the judicial circuit where the petitioner or child resides or in the Circuit Court in the county in which juvenile court actions, if any, concerning the child have commenced, and shall be verified and contain the following:
    1. Name and place of residence of each petitioner;
    2. Name, sex, date of birth, and place of residence of the child;
    3. Name and relationship of each petitioner to the child;
    4. A concise statement of the factual basis for the termination of parental rights;
    5. Name and address of the person or of the cabinet or authorized agency to which parental rights are sought to be transferred; and
    6. A statement that the person, cabinet, or authorized agency to whom custody is to be given has facilities available, is willing to receive the custody of the child, and the person, if not excepted by KRS 199.470(4), has applied for the written permission of the secretary or the secretary’s designee for the child’s placement. This provision shall not affect the right of a court to grant temporary custody under KRS 199.473 .
  3. No petition may be filed under this chapter prior to three (3) days after the birth of the child.
  4. Any petition filed pursuant to this section shall be fully adjudicated and a final judgment shall be entered by the court within six (6) months of the filing of the petition.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 423, § 100, effective July 1, 1987; 1988, ch. 350, § 63, effective April 10, 1988; 1994, ch. 242, § 14, effective July 15, 1994; 1998, ch. 57, § 11, effective March 17, 1998; 2018 ch. 159, § 38, effective July 14, 2018.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

  1. Best Interest of Child.
  2. Revocation of Voluntary Termination.
  3. Effect of Termination.
  4. Requirements.
1. Best Interest of Child.

A parent who has transferred possession and custody of his or her child to another has surrendered the primary right of custody and thereafter the court shall determine custody on the basis of the best interest of the child. (Decided under prior law) Van Wey v. Van Wey, 656 S.W.2d 731, 1983 Ky. LEXIS 300 ( Ky. 1983 ), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1066, 104 S. Ct. 1416, 79 L. Ed. 2d 742 (U.S. 1984).

The fact that the mother, who voluntarily, over a period of months, arranged to give up child for adoption, had understandable “reasons” to give up her child and “cause” to wish to regain her child did not obviate the burden on her to show that to return custody to her would be for the child’s best interest; the mother must bear this burden even in the absence of proof that she is unfit in the context of the standard established by the involuntary termination statute (abandonment, neglect or abuse). (Decided under prior law) Van Wey v. Van Wey, 656 S.W.2d 731, 1983 Ky. LEXIS 300 ( Ky. 1983 ), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1066, 104 S. Ct. 1416, 79 L. Ed. 2d 742 (U.S. 1984).

2. Revocation of Voluntary Termination.

Where mother’s petition to terminate parental rights was initially voluntary, but the mother later attempted to revoke her consent, the court had a responsibility to consider the overall welfare of the child in deciding whether or not to permit such revocation; “sufficient reason” to revoke means more than emotional distress at the time the petition for voluntary termination is filed. (Decided under prior law) Van Wey v. Van Wey, 656 S.W.2d 731, 1983 Ky. LEXIS 300 ( Ky. 1983 ), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1066, 104 S. Ct. 1416, 79 L. Ed. 2d 742 (U.S. 1984).

3. Effect of Termination.

Where natural father voluntarily terminated his parental rights to a daughter born out of wedlock, he had no legal relationship to the child and, therefore, no standing to challenge her adoption. (Decided under prior law) Hill v. Garner, 561 S.W.2d 106, 1977 Ky. App. LEXIS 891 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).

4. Requirements.

Family court erred in converting an involuntary termination action against a father into a voluntary termination action because he failed to comply with the statutory procedure for voluntarily terminating his parental rights by filing a verified petition with the court, the Cabinet for Health and Family Services did not sign the Appearance-Waiver and Consent forms, crucial information was absent from the record, and the Cabinet objected to the voluntary termination. D.L.B. v. Cabinet for Health & Family Servs., 418 S.W.3d 426, 2014 Ky. App. LEXIS 2 (Ky. Ct. App. 2014).

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Graham, Implementing Custody Mediation in Family Court: Some Comments on the Jefferson County Family Court Experience, 81 Ky. L.J. 1107 (1992-93).

Treatises

Caldwell’s Kentucky Form Book, 5th Ed., Practice Context for Termination of Parental Rights and Adoption, § 266.00.

Caldwell’s Kentucky Form Book, 5th Ed., Petition for Voluntary Termination of Parental Rights of Natural Mother, Form 266.02.

Petrilli, Kentucky Family Law, Termination of Parental Rights and Adoption, § 29.2.

Petrilli, Kentucky Family Law, Forms, Adoption and Termination of Parental Rights, Form 3.4, Form 3.6.

625.0405. Appointment of attorney to represent indigent parent for termination of rights for purpose of adoption — Expenses paid by prospective adoptive parents to be submitted to court — Penalty.

  1. A parent desiring the termination of his or her parental rights and a transfer of the parental rights to a person, persons, the cabinet, or a child-placing agency licensed by the cabinet for the purpose of adoption may prior to or upon the filing of the petition request the Circuit Court to appoint an attorney to represent the parent and provide legal representation in the termination action. If the court determines pursuant to KRS Chapter 31 that the requesting parent is indigent, the court shall appoint an attorney (within forty-eight (48) hours) to represent the indigent parent. The attorney for the indigent parent shall receive a fee to be fixed by the court, not to exceed five hundred dollars ($500) and assessed as costs, and the court may order the costs to be paid by the proposed adoptive parent, parents, or agency before the entry of a judgment of termination, except the attorney’s fee shall be paid by the Finance and Administration Cabinet if termination is not granted, or if custody of the child is placed with the cabinet.
    1. In every voluntary termination proceeding, the expenses paid, including but not limited to any fees for legal services, placement services, and expenses of the biological parent or parents, by the prospective adoptive parent for any purpose related to a termination of parental rights shall be submitted to the court, supported by an affidavit, setting forth in detail a listing of the expenses for the court’s approval or modification. (2) (a) In every voluntary termination proceeding, the expenses paid, including but not limited to any fees for legal services, placement services, and expenses of the biological parent or parents, by the prospective adoptive parent for any purpose related to a termination of parental rights shall be submitted to the court, supported by an affidavit, setting forth in detail a listing of the expenses for the court’s approval or modification.
    2. In the event the court modifies the expense request as it relates to legal fees and legal expenses only, the attorney for the prospective adoptive parents shall not have any claim against the prospective adoptive parents for the amount not approved.
  2. Any person who violates subsection (2) of this section shall be guilty of a Class A misdemeanor.

History. Enact. Acts 1994, ch. 242, § 18, effective July 15, 1994; 1998, ch. 57, § 9, effective March 17, 1998.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

1. Right to Counsel.

Circuit court erred in finding that it lacked authority to appoint counsel for a mother in a termination and adoption proceeding because she was entitled to counsel prior to termination of her parental rights parents had a statutory right to legal representation in involuntary termination actions and were statutorily authorized appointment of counsel to represent them in a voluntary termination action for purposes of adoption, the mother filed an affidavit of indigency and specifically requested appointment of counsel prior to the hearing, and under the circumstances, her delay in bringing the motion did not amount to a waiver. S.S. v. Commonwealth, 537 S.W.3d 834, 2017 Ky. App. LEXIS 548 (Ky. Ct. App. 2017).

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Bench & Bar.

Keller, Beware: Major Changes in Private Independent Adoptions, Vol. 42, No. 3, Summer 1996 Ky. Bench & B. 38.

625.0407. Attorney not to represent both biological and adoptive parents — Penalty.

  1. In a voluntary termination proceeding, an attorney shall not represent both the biological parents and the prospective adoptive parents.
  2. Any person who violates subsection (1) of this section shall be guilty of a Class A misdemeanor.

History. Enact. Acts 1994, ch. 242, § 19, effective July 15, 1994.

Research References and Practice Aids

Treatises

Caldwell’s Kentucky Form Book, 5th Ed., Petition for Voluntary Termination of Parental Rights of Natural Mother, Form 266.02.

625.041. Party to action — Guardian ad litem to be appointed.

  1. The parties to an action for voluntary termination of parental rights shall be the parent seeking termination, whose presence is not required if represented by counsel for the parent when an appearance-waiver and consent-to-adopt form is filed with the court, but the court shall appoint a guardian ad litem to represent the best interest of the child.
  2. The guardian ad litem shall be paid a fee to be fixed by the court, not to exceed five hundred dollars ($500), to be paid by the petitioner, except if the Cabinet for Health and Family Services receives custody of the child, the guardian ad litem shall be paid by the Finance and Administration Cabinet.
  3. The parent may sign an appearance-waiver and consent-to-adopt form when the parent chooses not to attend a voluntary termination of parental rights proceedings. This form, prescribed by the Administrative Office of the Courts, shall:
    1. Contain a statement of acknowledgment and agreement, regarding the appearance at the proceeding, signed by the parent, counsel for the parent, and the cabinet. If the parent is a minor, the form shall also be signed by the guardian of the minor parent;
    2. Contain the parent’s notarized signature;
    3. Contain any address to which the parent requests the final judgment be served.
  4. If a joint petition is filed, counsel shall be designated as attorney for both parties.

History. Enact. Acts 1988, ch. 350, § 64, effective April 10, 1988; 1998, ch. 57, § 12, effective March 17, 1998; 1998, ch. 426, § 620, effective July 15, 1998; 2005, ch. 99, § 669, effective June 20, 2005.

Research References and Practice Aids

Treatises

Caldwell’s Kentucky Form Book, 5th Ed., Practice Context for Termination of Parental Rights and Adoption, § 266.00.

Caldwell’s Kentucky Form Book, 5th Ed., Petition of Minor by Guardian to Voluntarily Terminate Parental Rights, Form 264.04.

Caldwell’s Kentucky Form Book, 5th Ed., Order for Fees in Termination of Parental Rights Case, Form 266.22.

Petrilli, Kentucky Family Law, Termination of Parental Rights and Adoption, § 29.2.

625.042. Conduct of hearings.

  1. Within three (3) days after a petition for the voluntary termination of parental rights is filed, the Circuit Court shall set a date for a hearing which shall not be more than thirty (30) calendar days after the petition is filed. In any case in which the child’s permanent custody is proposed to be transferred to an individual not excepted by KRS 199.470(4), a final order of termination shall be entered only if the proposed custodian has received the written approval of the secretary or the secretary’s designee for the child’s placement as required by KRS 199.473 . The secretary or the secretary’s designee shall provide written approval or disapproval, if required by this subsection, within thirty (30) days after the request is made.
  2. The Circuit Court shall require notice to be served upon the local representative of the cabinet in any case in which a statement from the cabinet of willingness to accept custody of the child has not been filed with the petition, or custody of the child is to be placed with an individual unless the placement has been approved by the cabinet. It shall not be necessary to serve notice upon the cabinet if custody of the child is to be placed with the cabinet or with a child-placing agency.
  3. Proceedings under this chapter shall be completed as soon as practicable but shall not exceed six (6) months. All hearings shall be held before the Circuit Court privately for the purpose of determining the facts.
  4. An official stenographic or mechanical record shall be made of the proceedings and retained for a period of five (5) years.
  5. The best interests of the child shall be considered paramount, including but not limited to matters relating to child support.
  6. At the time of the hearing, the Circuit Court, after full and complete inquiry, shall determine whether each petitioner is fully aware of the purpose of the proceedings and the consequences of the provisions of this chapter.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1988, ch. 350, § 65, effective April 10, 1988; 1994, ch. 242, § 15, effective July 15, 1994; 1998, ch. 57, § 10, effective March 17, 1998; 2018 ch. 159, § 39, effective July 14, 2018.

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Bench & Bar.

Wiederstein, Closed Courtrooms and the Public’s Right of Access, Vol. 67, No. 4, July 2003, Ky. Bench & Bar 15.

Treatises

Caldwell’s Kentucky Form Book, 5th Ed., Practice Context for Termination of Parental Rights and Adoption, § 266.00.

Caldwell’s Kentucky Form Book, 5th Ed., Report of Guardian ad Litem for Petitioner in Termination of Parental Rights--Petitioner Incarcerated, Form 266.14.

Petrilli, Kentucky Family Law, Termination of Parental Rights and Adoption, § 29.2.

625.043. Termination orders.

  1. If the Circuit Court determines that parental rights are to be voluntarily terminated in accordance with the provisions of this chapter, it shall make an order terminating all parental rights and obligations of the parent and releasing the child from all legal obligations to the parent and vesting care and custody of the child in the person, agency, or cabinet the court believes is best qualified to receive custody.
  2. Upon consent by the Cabinet for Health and Family Services, the child may be declared a ward of the state and custody vested in the cabinet or in any child-placing agency or child-caring facility licensed by the cabinet or in another person if all persons with parental rights to the child under the law have had their rights terminated voluntarily or involuntarily. If the other person is not excepted by KRS 199.470(4), a grant of permanent custody shall be made only if the proposed custodian has received the written approval of the secretary or the secretary’s designee for the child’s placement.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1988, ch. 350, § 66, effective April 10, 1988; 1994, ch. 242, § 16, effective July 15, 1994; 1998, ch. 426, § 621, effective July 15, 1998; 2005, ch. 99, § 670, effective June 20, 2005; 2018 ch. 159, § 40, effective July 14, 2018.

Research References and Practice Aids

Treatises

Caldwell’s Kentucky Form Book, 5th Ed., Order and Judgment Voluntarily (Mother) Termination of Parental Rights and Involuntary Termination (Absent Father) of Parental Rights, Form 266.19.

Caldwell’s Kentucky Form Book, 5th Ed., Practice Context for Termination of Parental Rights and Adoption, § 266.00.

Petrilli, Kentucky Family Law, Termination of Parental Rights and Adoption, § 29.2.

625.044. Child’s right to inherit following termination.

Following the entry of an order voluntarily terminating parental rights in a child, the child shall retain the right to inherit from his parent under the laws of descent and distribution until the child is adopted.

History. Enact. Acts 1988, ch. 350, § 67, effective April 10, 1988.

Research References and Practice Aids

Treatises

Caldwell’s Kentucky Form Book, 5th Ed., Practice Context for Termination of Parental Rights and Adoption, § 266.00.

Petrilli, Kentucky Family Law, Termination of Parental Rights and Adoption, § 29.2.

625.045. Confidentiality and sealing of files and records.

  1. Any order resulting from the voluntary termination of parental rights of any person under the provisions of this chapter, including the caption of the order, shall contain only the name of the child, without any reference to the names of the parents whose rights have been terminated. Such order shall be duly recorded in the order book of the Circuit Court and a certified copy of the order given to the petitioner and to the cabinet upon request. Such order may contain a statement of authority to place the child for adoption.
  2. The files and records of the Circuit Court, excluding the name or other identifying information of a prospective adoptive parent, during proceedings for voluntary termination of parental rights shall not be open to inspection by persons other than parties to such proceedings, their attorneys, and representatives of the cabinet, except under order of the court expressly permitting inspection. Upon the entry of the final order in the case, the clerk shall place all papers and records in the case in a suitable envelope which shall be sealed and shall not be open for inspection by any person other than representatives of the cabinet without a written order of the court or as authorized by the provisions of KRS Chapter 199.
  3. No person having charge of any voluntary termination records shall disclose the names of any parties appearing in such records or furnish any copy of any such records, except upon order of the court which entered the judgment of termination; however, facts necessary in order to secure a court order for a copy of the termination order to be used in an adoption proceeding may be disclosed. The clerk of the Circuit Court shall set up a separate docket and order book for termination cases and these files and records shall be kept locked.

History. Enact. Acts 1988, ch. 350, § 68, effective April 10, 1988.

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Bench & Bar.

Wiederstein, Closed Courtrooms and the Public’s Right of Access, Vol. 67, No. 4, July 2003, Ky. Bench & Bar 15.

Treatises

Caldwell’s Kentucky Form Book, 5th Ed., Practice Context for Termination of Parental Rights and Adoption, § 266.00.

Petrilli, Kentucky Family Law, Termination of Parental Rights and Adoption, § 29.2.

625.046. Effect of termination order.

Any order for the voluntary termination of parental rights shall be conclusive and binding on all parties.

History. Enact. Acts 1988, ch. 350, § 69, effective April 10, 1988.

Research References and Practice Aids

Treatises

Petrilli, Kentucky Family Law, Termination of Parental Rights and Adoption, § 29.2.

Petrilli, Kentucky Family Law, Forms, Adoption and Termination of Parental Rights, Form 3.5.

Involuntary Termination

625.050. Petition.

  1. A petition for involuntary termination of parental rights shall be entitled “In the interest of..., a child.”
  2. The petition shall be filed in the Circuit Court for any of the following counties:
    1. The county in which either parent resides or may be found;
    2. The county in which juvenile court actions, if any, concerning the child have commenced; or
    3. The county in which the child involved resides or is present.
  3. Proceedings for involuntary termination of parental rights may be initiated upon petition by the cabinet, any child-placing agency licensed by the cabinet, any county or Commonwealth’s attorney or parent.
  4. The petition for involuntary termination of parental rights shall be verified and contain the following:
    1. Name and mailing address of each petitioner;
    2. Name, sex, date of birth and place of residence of the child;
    3. Name and address of the living parents of the child;
    4. Name, date of death and cause of death, if known, of any deceased parent;
    5. Name and address of the putative father, if known by the petitioner, of the child if not the same person as the legal father;
    6. Name and address of the person, cabinet or agency having custody of the child;
    7. Name and identity of the person, cabinet or authorized agency to whom custody is sought to be transferred;
    8. Statement that the person, cabinet or agency to whom custody is to be given has facilities available and is willing to receive the custody of the child;
    9. All pertinent information concerning termination or disclaimers of parenthood or voluntary consent to termination;
    10. Information as to the legal status of the child and the court so adjudicating; and
    11. A concise statement of the factual basis for the termination of parental rights.
  5. No petition may be filed under this section prior to five (5) days after the birth of the child.
  6. No petition may be filed to terminate the parental rights of a woman solely because of her use of a nonprescribed controlled substance during pregnancy if she enrolls in and maintains substantial compliance with both a substance abuse treatment or recovery program and a regimen of prenatal care as recommended by her health care practitioner throughout the remaining term of her pregnancy. Upon certified completion of the treatment or recovery program, or six (6) months after giving birth during which time substantial compliance with a substance abuse treatment or recovery program has occurred, whichever is earlier, any records maintained by a court or by the cabinet relating to a positive test for a nonprescribed controlled substance shall be sealed by the court and may not be used in any future criminal prosecution or future petition to terminate the woman’s parental rights.
  7. Any petition filed pursuant to this section shall be fully adjudicated and a final judgment shall be entered by the court within six (6) months of the service of the petition on the parents.

HISTORY: Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 423, § 101, effective July 1, 1987; 1988, ch. 350, § 70, effective April 10, 1988; 2015 ch. 66, § 20, effective March 25, 2015; 2015 ch. 82, § 2, effective June 24, 2015; 2018 ch. 159, § 41, effective July 14, 2018.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

  1. Due Process.
  2. Requirements.
  3. Application.
1. Due Process.

Although the petitions for termination of parental rights were written in a bare bones manner and the allegations were couched in conclusory language, substantial justice was done in that the pleadings gave fair notice of what was taking place; therefore, procedural due process was not lacking. (Decided under prior law) V.S. v. Commonwealth, Cabinet for Human Resources, 706 S.W.2d 420, 1986 Ky. App. LEXIS 1069 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986).

Placement with relatives may be an option for consideration by the Cabinet for Human Resources but nothing more; once this section has been complied with and a review of the Cabinet’s program for the children is determined to be reasonable, then there can be no valid argument for want of due process in this regard. (Decided under prior law) V.S. v. Commonwealth, Cabinet for Human Resources, 706 S.W.2d 420, 1986 Ky. App. LEXIS 1069 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986).

2. Requirements.

There is no requirement in KRS 625.050(4)(a) that a petition for termination of parental rights contain the precise home address a child involved in an involuntary termination proceeding. The petition filed against the mother containing the mailing address of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, Cabinet for Health and Family Services and clearly stating that the child resided in a state approved home met the requirements of KRS 625.050(4)(a). T.N.H. v. J.L.H., 2007 Ky. App. LEXIS 325 (Ky. Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2007), rev'd, 302 S.W.3d 658, 2010 Ky. LEXIS 5 ( Ky. 2010 ).

Foster parents’ petition for termination of parental rights and adoption had to be dismissed because the foster parents were not statutorily authorized to seek termination of parental rights. S.B.P. v. R.L., 567 S.W.3d 142, 2018 Ky. App. LEXIS 303 (Ky. Ct. App. 2018).

3. Application.

Trial court incorrectly applied Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 625 to a step-mother’s amended petition because it was an adoption, and therefore, Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 199 governed the entirety of the amended petition seeking adoption. E.K. v. T.A., 572 S.W.3d 80, 2019 Ky. App. LEXIS 32 (Ky. Ct. App. 2019).

By its nature, adoption under Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 199 vitiates parental rights of biological parents. Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 199.520(2); when there is a dual petition involving an adoption and involuntary termination of parental rights, the adoption supersedes the termination because § 199 encompasses Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 625. E.K. v. T.A., 572 S.W.3d 80, 2019 Ky. App. LEXIS 32 (Ky. Ct. App. 2019).

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Law Journal.

Graham, Implementing Custody Mediation in Family Court: Some Comments on the Jefferson County Family Court Experience, 81 Ky. L.J. 1107 (1992-93).

Treatises

Caldwell’s Kentucky Form Book, 5th Ed., Practice Context for Termination of Parental Rights and Adoption, § 266.00.

Petrilli, Kentucky Family Law, Termination of Parental Rights and Adoption, §§ 29.3, 29.5.

Petrilli, Kentucky Family Law, Forms, Adoption and Termination of Parental Rights, Form 3.7.

625.060. Parties to action — Intervention of foster parent.

  1. In addition to the child, the following shall be the parties in an action for involuntary termination of parental rights:
    1. The petitioner;
    2. The cabinet, if not the petitioner; and
    3. The biological parents, if known and if their rights have not been previously terminated. It shall not be necessary to make the putative father a party if he is exempted by KRS 625.065 .
  2. Any party other than the child who is not the petitioner shall be a respondent.
  3. A foster parent of a child who is currently placed with the foster parent may intervene as a matter of right in any action for the involuntary termination of parental rights involving a child who is placed with the foster parent. Such intervention may be made anonymously or in the true name of the foster parent. If proceeding anonymously, the foster parent shall be identified by initials and shall receive service through his or her counsel or, if not represented by counsel, by providing a preferred mailing address to receive notices from the court and other parties.

History. Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 423, § 102, effective July 1, 1987; 1988, ch. 350, § 71, effective April 10, 1988; 1998, ch. 57, § 13, effective March 17, 1998; 2019 ch. 132, § 5, effective June 27, 2019; 2020 ch. 14, § 1, effective March 16, 2020.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

  1. Children.
  2. Standing to Bring Action.
1. Children.

Children are necessary parties to any appeal from an action terminating, or failing to terminate their parents’ parental rights. R.L.W. v. Cabinet for Human Resources, 756 S.W.2d 148, 1988 Ky. App. LEXIS 125 (Ky. Ct. App. 1988).

2. Standing to Bring Action.

Foster parents had no standing to bring an action to terminate the parental rights of natural mother since they were not among the persons or agencies having authority to file such action under former law regarding termination of parental rights. L.S.J. v. E.B., 672 S.W.2d 937, 1984 Ky. App. LEXIS 505 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984).

Research References and Practice Aids

Treatises

Petrilli, Kentucky Family Law, Termination of Parental Rights and Adoption, §§ 29.2, 29.4.

Petrilli, Kentucky Family Law, Forms, Adoption and Termination of Parental Rights, Form 3.7.

625.065. Putative father party to proceedings.

  1. The putative father of a child shall be made a party and brought before the circuit court in the same manner as any other party to an involuntary termination action if one (1) of the following conditions exists:
    1. He is known and voluntarily identified by the mother by affidavit;
    2. He has registered with the cabinet pursuant to KRS 199.503 as a putative father prior to the birth of the child, or if he did not have notice prior to the birth of the child, within twenty-one (21) days after the birth of the child;
    3. He has caused his name to be affixed to the birth certificate of the child;
    4. He has commenced a judicial proceeding claiming parental right;
    5. He has contributed financially to the support of the child, either by paying the medical or hospital bills associated with the birth of the child or financially contributing to the child’s support; or
    6. He has married the mother of the child or has lived openly or is living openly with the child or the person designated on the birth certificate as the biological mother of the child.
  2. Any person to whom none of the above conditions apply shall be deemed to have no parental rights to the child in question.

History. Enact. Acts 1988, ch. 350, § 72, effective April 10, 1988; 2018 ch. 159, § 34, effective July 14, 2018; 2019 ch. 33, § 5, effective June 27, 2019.

Research References and Practice Aids

Treatises

Caldwell’s Kentucky Form Book, 5th Ed., Practice Context for Termination of Parental Rights and Adoption, § 266.00.

Petrilli, Kentucky Family Law, Termination of Parental Rights and Adoption, § 29.4.

625.070. Service of process — Copy of petition to foster parent.

  1. In any action for involuntary termination of parental rights, service upon the parties shall be accomplished by personal service where possible or constructive service where personal service is not possible, pursuant to the Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
  2. No service shall be necessary if a disclaimer of paternity or a petition for voluntary termination of parental rights has been executed by a parent or alleged parent and filed in the record, or an order terminating parental rights has been entered by a Circuit Court of competent jurisdiction.
  3. Notwithstanding the provisions of the Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure, appointment of a guardian ad litem for a child in an action for termination of parental rights, and service of the petition upon the guardian ad litem shall be sufficient for personal jurisdiction over the child in the action.
  4. Within five (5) days of filing a petition for involuntary termination of parental rights, the petitioner shall send a courtesy copy of the petition to the foster parent, if the child is currently placed with a foster parent, by certified mail or hand delivery. Upon request of the court, the petitioner shall provide documentation of sending through either a copy of a signed mailing receipt or an affidavit verified by the foster parent. If the foster parent’s name and address are unknown to the petitioner, then the courtesy copy shall be served on the secretary of the Cabinet for Health and Family Services, who shall cause it to be delivered in any manner provided by the Rules of Civil Procedure to the foster parent.

History. Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 423, § 103, effective July 1, 1987; 1988, ch. 350, § 73, effective April 10, 1988; 1998, ch. 57, § 14, effective March 17, 1998; 2020 ch. 14, § 2, effective March 16, 2020.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

  1. Available Means.
  2. Parties Entitled to Notice.
1. Available Means.

Constructive service was the only means of notifying a mother that parental termination proceedings were being instigated against her when she had not been living at her residence for over a year and a half at the time of service, and her location was unknown. Dotson v. Rowe, 957 S.W.2d 269, 1997 Ky. App. LEXIS 72 (Ky. Ct. App. 1997).

2. Parties Entitled to Notice.

Where the State petitioned to involuntarily terminate parental rights, where the parents thereafter petitioned to voluntarily terminate their parental rights upon the condition that the child’s paternal grandparents be permitted to adopt him, and where the paternal grandparents moved to intervene, the trial court properly denied their motion because a proceeding for the termination of parental rights concerned the relationship between parent and child and not any other party; the grandparents simply had no cognizable rights to protect or enforce in a termination proceeding. Commonwealth v. L.J.P., 316 S.W.3d 871, 2010 Ky. LEXIS 120 ( Ky. 2010 ).

Research References and Practice Aids

Treatises

Caldwell’s Kentucky Form Book, 5th Ed., Motion for Appointment of Warning Order Attorney, Form 266.05.

Caldwell’s Kentucky Form Book, 5th Ed., Order Appointing Guardian ad Litem, Form 266.09.

Petrilli, Kentucky Family Law, Termination of Parental Rights and Adoption, § 29.4.

625.080. Conduct of hearings.

In any involuntary action for termination of parental rights:

  1. The Circuit Court shall conduct a private hearing. An official stenographic or mechanical record shall be made of the proceedings and retained for a period of five (5) years. The court shall make findings of fact and conclusions of law, which may be made on the record, to support its judgment;
  2. Any child to whom an involuntary action directly relates shall be made a party to the action and a guardian ad litem shall be appointed to represent the best interests of the child. The person appointed as a guardian ad litem shall be paid a fee not to exceed five hundred dollars ($500), to be paid by the Finance and Administration Cabinet when the cabinet is the proposed custodian. When the cabinet is not the proposed custodian, the court may order the cost to be paid by the proposed adoptive parent, parents, agency, or the petitioner. Upon motion of any party, the child may be permitted to be present during the proceedings and to testify if the court finds such to be in the best interests of the child. In its discretion, the Circuit Court may interview the child in private, but a record of the interview shall be made, which, in the discretion of the court, may be sealed to be used only by an appellate court;
  3. The parents have the right to legal representation in involuntary termination actions. The Circuit Court shall determine if the parent is indigent and, therefore, entitled to counsel pursuant to KRS Chapter 31. If the Circuit Court so finds, the Circuit Court shall inform the parent; and, upon request, if it appears reasonably necessary in the interest of justice, the Circuit Court shall appoint an attorney to represent the parent pursuant to KRS Chapter 31 to be provided or paid for by the Finance and Administration Cabinet a fee to be set by the court and not to exceed five hundred dollars ($500);
  4. If the parent is currently authorized to visit with the child, the court may continue to permit the parent to visit the child pending the final hearing unless it finds that visitation would not be in the best interest of the child.
  5. The hearing under this chapter shall be held within sixty (60) days of the motion by a party or the guardian ad litem for a trial date.

History. Enact. Acts 1988, ch. 423, § 104, effective July 1, 1987; 1988, ch. 350, § 74, effective April 10, 1988; 1998, ch. 57, § 15, effective March 17, 1998.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

  1. Necessary Parties.
  2. Interview With Children.
  3. Evidence.
  4. Right to Counsel.
  5. Children’s Testimony.
1. Necessary Parties.

Children are necessary parties to any appeal from an action terminating, or failing to terminate their parents’ parental rights. R.L.W. v. Cabinet for Human Resources, 756 S.W.2d 148, 1988 Ky. App. LEXIS 125 (Ky. Ct. App. 1988).

2. Interview With Children.

Although at the close of the trial the judge indicated his intention to interview the children in a termination of parental rights case, where there was absolutely no indication from the record that the interview actually occurred, it could not be determined that the court erred in failing to make a record of an interview which did not appear to have taken place. Crum v. Cabinet for Human Resources, 928 S.W.2d 355, 1996 Ky. App. LEXIS 134 (Ky. Ct. App. 1996).

3. Evidence.

G.E.Y. v. Cabinet for Human Resources, 701 S.W.2d 713, 1985 Ky. App. LEXIS 607 (Ky. App.), is no longer (if it ever was) authority for the proposition that hearsay exceptions do not apply in actions to terminate parental rights. Cabinet for Health and Family Servs. v. A.G.G., 190 S.W.3d 338, 2006 Ky. LEXIS 97 ( Ky. 2006 ).

In a parental rights termination case, the family court properly admitted testimony by a family therapist and a pediatrician about a child’s account of his sexual abuse at the hands of his parents and uncles. The testimony was admissible under KRE 803(4) as statements made for purposes of medical treatment or diagnosis, and the restriction on the use of hearsay evidence in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177, 2004 U.S. LEXIS 1838 (2004), did not apply to civil cases. Cabinet for Health and Family Servs. v. A.G.G., 190 S.W.3d 338, 2006 Ky. LEXIS 97 ( Ky. 2006 ).

4. Right to Counsel.

Because an indigent mother and father were not afforded counsel at a goal change hearing held before the District Court, as well as during other critical stages of the dependency action, an order terminating their parental rights was improper, as such detrimentally affected the termination proceeding before the Circuit Court when the court made an erroneous finding of fact that the child had been in foster care for 15 of the preceding 22 months. R.V. v. Commonwealth, 242 S.W.3d 669, 2007 Ky. App. LEXIS 298 (Ky. Ct. App. 2007).

Trial court erred in ordering the Cabinet for Health and Family Services to pay appellate costs and fees because KRS 625.080(3) limited the amount that could be awarded to $500, an amount exhausted at the trial level. T.N.H. v. J.L.H., 2007 Ky. App. LEXIS 325 (Ky. Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2007), rev'd, 302 S.W.3d 658, 2010 Ky. LEXIS 5 ( Ky. 2010 ).

In a dependency proceeding, the father’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on an alleged failure to more zealously pursue the father’s position that the pastor committed the alleged abuse and that other family members coaxed the child into making sexual allegations lacked merit, where there was no error committed by counsel or deficiencies in counsel’s performance which demanded that a deprivation of due process be found. Z.T. v. M.T., 258 S.W.3d 31, 2008 Ky. App. LEXIS 206 (Ky. Ct. App. 2008).

Mother’s due process rights and rights under KRS 625.080(3) and KRS 620.100(1) were violated when a Family Court proceeded to take testimony from two (2) witnesses in a termination of parental rights trial even though the mother’s counsel could not get to court due to a snow storm. A.P. v. Commonwealth, 270 S.W.3d 418, 2008 Ky. App. LEXIS 319 (Ky. Ct. App. 2008).

While counsel is to be appointed in dependency actions, no statutory or caselaw provisions indicates that counsel must be foisted on parties who decline representation. C.J.M. v. Cabinet for Health and Family Servs., 389 S.W.3d 155, 2012 Ky. App. LEXIS 301 (Ky. Ct. App. 2012).

Parents did not prove that their decision to be unrepresented took place at a critical stage of the underlying dependency case, and the court’s review supported the proposition that manifest injustice did not happen here; the parents chose to dismiss counsel during the dependency action, and when the case became a termination action, they were given counsel and accepted representation, such that no error occurred. C.J.M. v. Cabinet for Health and Family Servs., 389 S.W.3d 155, 2012 Ky. App. LEXIS 301 (Ky. Ct. App. 2012).

Family court terminating a mother's and father's parental rights to their minor child because they were denied effective assistance of counsel when the family court proceeded with the termination hearing after counsel requested that he be permitted to withdraw based on a conflict of interest where the perpetrator of the child abuse was unknown and the prejudice caused by that representation had to be presumed. T.W. v. Cabinet for Health & Family Servs., 484 S.W.3d 302, 2016 Ky. App. LEXIS 95 (Ky. Ct. App. 2016).

Circuit court erred in finding that it lacked authority to appoint counsel for a mother in a termination and adoption proceeding because she was entitled to counsel prior to termination of her parental rights parents had a statutory right to legal representation in involuntary termination actions and were statutorily authorized appointment of counsel to represent them in a voluntary termination action for purposes of adoption, the mother filed an affidavit of indigency and specifically requested appointment of counsel prior to the hearing, and under the circumstances, her delay in bringing the motion did not amount to a waiver. S.S. v. Commonwealth, 537 S.W.3d 834, 2017 Ky. App. LEXIS 548 (Ky. Ct. App. 2017).

5. Children’s Testimony.

Mother’s due process rights were not violated by the denial of her request that her children testify in a termination of parental rights proceeding as the ramifications of the children’s testimony was considered, and for purposes of KRS 625.080(2) it was not in their best interests to testify; the mother had had the opportunity to question the children during an in camera interview. J.M.R. v. Commonwealth, 239 S.W.3d 116, 2007 Ky. App. LEXIS 407 (Ky. Ct. App. 2007), overruled, Colvard v. Commonwealth, 309 S.W.3d 239, 2010 Ky. LEXIS 62 ( Ky. 2010 ).

Research References and Practice Aids

Kentucky Bench & Bar.

Wiederstein, Closed Courtrooms and the Public’s Right of Access, Vol. 67, No. 4, July 2003, Ky. Bench & Bar 15.

Treatises

Caldwell’s Kentucky Form Book, 5th Ed., Practice Context for Termination of Parental Rights and Adoption, § 266.00.

Caldwell’s Kentucky Form Book, 5th Ed., Order for Fees in Termination of Parental Rights Case, Form 266.22.

Caldwell’s Kentucky Form Book, 5th Ed., Report of Guardian ad Litem for Petitioner in Termination of Parental Rights--Petitioner Incarcerated, Form 266.14.

Caldwell’s Kentucky Form Book, 5th Ed., Motion for Fees, Form 266.20.

Petrilli, Kentucky Family Law, Termination of Parental Rights and Adoption, § 29.4.

Petrilli, Kentucky Family Law, Forms, Adoption and Termination of Parental Rights, Form 3.7.

625.090. Grounds for involuntary termination of parental rights.

  1. The Circuit Court may involuntarily terminate all parental rights of a parent of a named child, if the Circuit Court finds from the pleadings and by clear and convincing evidence that:
      1. The child has been adjudged to be an abused or neglected child, as defined in KRS 600.020(1), by a court of competent jurisdiction; (a) 1. The child has been adjudged to be an abused or neglected child, as defined in KRS 600.020(1), by a court of competent jurisdiction;
      2. The child is found to be an abused or neglected child, as defined in KRS 600.020(1), by the Circuit Court in this proceeding;
      3. The child is found to have been diagnosed with neonatal abstinence syndrome at the time of birth, unless his or her birth mother:
        1. Was prescribed and properly using medication for a legitimate medical condition as directed by a health care practitioner that may have led to the neonatal abstinence syndrome; or
        2. Is currently, or within ninety (90) days after the birth, enrolled in and maintaining substantial compliance with both a substance abuse treatment or recovery program and a regimen of prenatal care or postnatal care as recommended by her health care practitioner throughout the remaining term of her pregnancy or the appropriate time after her pregnancy; or
      4. The parent has been convicted of a criminal charge relating to the physical or sexual abuse or neglect of any child and that physical or sexual abuse, neglect, or emotional injury to the child named in the present termination action is likely to occur if the parental rights are not terminated;
    1. The Cabinet for Health and Family Services has filed a petition with the court pursuant to KRS 620.180 ; and
    2. Termination would be in the best interest of the child.
  2. No termination of parental rights shall be ordered unless the Circuit Court also finds by clear and convincing evidence the existence of one (1) or more of the following grounds:
    1. That the parent has abandoned the child for a period of not less than ninety (90) days;
    2. That the parent has inflicted or allowed to be inflicted upon the child, by other than accidental means, serious physical injury;
    3. That the parent has continuously or repeatedly inflicted or allowed to be inflicted upon the child, by other than accidental means, physical injury or emotional harm;
    4. That the parent has been convicted of a felony that involved the infliction of serious physical injury to any child;
    5. That the parent, for a period of not less than six (6) months, has continuously or repeatedly failed or refused to provide or has been substantially incapable of providing essential parental care and protection for the child and that there is no reasonable expectation of improvement in parental care and protection, considering the age of the child;
    6. That the parent has caused or allowed the child to be sexually abused or exploited;
    7. That the parent, for reasons other than poverty alone, has continuously or repeatedly failed to provide or is incapable of providing essential food, clothing, shelter, medical care, or education reasonably necessary and available for the child’s well-being and that there is no reasonable expectation of significant improvement in the parent’s conduct in the immediately foreseeable future, considering the age of the child;
    8. That:
      1. The parent’s parental rights to another child have been involuntarily terminated;
      2. The child named in the present termination action was born subsequent to or during the pendency of the previous termination; and
      3. The conditions or factors which were the basis for the previous termination finding have not been corrected;
    9. That the parent has been convicted in a criminal proceeding of having caused or contributed to the death of another child as a result of physical or sexual abuse or neglect;
    10. That the child has been in foster care under the responsibility of the cabinet for fifteen (15) cumulative months out of forty-eight (48) months preceding the filing of the petition to terminate parental rights; or
    11. That the child has been removed from the biological or legal parents more than two (2) times in a twenty-four (24) month period by the cabinet or a court.
  3. In determining the best interest of the child and the existence of a ground for termination, the Circuit Court shall consider the following factors:
    1. Mental illness as defined by KRS 202A.011(9), or an intellectual disability as defined by KRS 202B.010(9) of the parent as certified by a qualified mental health professional, which renders the parent consistently unable to care for the immediate and ongoing physical or psychological needs of the child for extended periods of time;
    2. Acts of abuse or neglect as defined in KRS 600.020(1) toward any child in the family;
    3. If the child has been placed with the cabinet, whether the cabinet has, prior to the filing of the petition made reasonable efforts as defined in KRS 620.020 to reunite the child with the parents unless one or more of the circumstances enumerated in KRS 610.127 for not requiring reasonable efforts have been substantiated in a written finding by the District Court;
    4. The efforts and adjustments the parent has made in his circumstances, conduct, or conditions to make it in the child’s best interest to return him to his home within a reasonable period of time, considering the age of the child;
    5. The physical, emotional, and mental health of the child and the prospects for the improvement of the child’s welfare if termination is ordered; and
    6. The payment or the failure to pay a reasonable portion of substitute physical care and maintenance if financially able to do so.
  4. If the child has been placed with the cabinet, the parent may present testimony concerning the reunification services offered by the cabinet and whether additional services would be likely to bring about lasting parental adjustment enabling a return of the child to the parent.
  5. If the parent proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the child will not continue to be an abused or neglected child as defined in KRS 600.020(1) if returned to the parent the court in its discretion may determine not to terminate parental rights.
  6. Upon the conclusion of proof and argument of counsel, the Circuit Court shall enter findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a decision as to each parent-respondent within thirty (30) days either:
    1. Terminating the right of the parent; or
    2. Dismissing the petition and stating whether the child shall be returned to the parent or shall remain in the custody of the state.

History. Enact. Acts 1986, ch. 423, § 105, effective July 1, 1987; 1988, ch. 350, § 75, effective April 10, 1988; 1994, ch. 242, § 17, effective July 15, 1994; 1998, ch. 57, § 16, effective March 17, 1998; 2000, ch. 60, § 6, effective July 14, 2000; 2012, ch. 146, § 141, effective July 12, 2012; 2018 ch. 159, § 26, effective July 14, 2018; 2019 ch. 132, § 6, effective June 27, 2019.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

  1. Court Authority Exceeded.
  2. Factors Considered by Court.
  3. Abuse and Neglect.
  4. Required Services.
  5. Standard of Review.
  6. Sufficiency of Evidence.
  7. Right to Counsel.
  8. Adoption.
  9. Procedure.
  10. Burden of Proof.
  11. Abandonment and Neglect.
  12. Poverty.
  13. Discretion of Court.

10. Best Interests.

Cited in:

1. Court Authority Exceeded.

The court exceeded its authority where, although it found sufficient evidence to terminate parental rights, it declined to do so provided that the parents comply with all the conditions detailed in the court’s order. Cabinet for Human Resources v. J.B.B., 772 S.W.2d 646, 1989 Ky. App. LEXIS 82 (Ky. Ct. App. 1989).

2. Factors Considered by Court.

Absence, voluntary or court-imposed, may be a factor to consider in determining whether the children have been neglected. (Decisions under prior law.) J.H. v. Cabinet for Human Resources, 704 S.W.2d 661, 1985 Ky. App. LEXIS 719 (Ky. Ct. App. 1985).

Where for reasons other than poverty alone, the incarcerated father continuously or repeatedly failed to provide or was incapable of providing essential food, clothing, shelter, medical care or education reasonably necessary and available for the children’s well-being and there was no reasonable expectation of significant improvement, and where the incarcerated parent never contributed to the economic well-being of the family when with them, the trial court was correct in involuntarily terminating his parental rights. Cabinet for Human Resources v. Rogeski, 909 S.W.2d 660, 1995 Ky. LEXIS 134 ( Ky. 1995 ).

The statute requires a finding (1) that the child, by clear and convincing evidence, is an abused or neglected child; (2) that the termination would be in the best interest of the child; and (3) that one or more of the factors set out in subsection (1)(a)-(f) (now (2)(a)-(c), (e) and (f)) of this section are present. R. C. R. v. Commonwealth, 988 S.W.2d 36, 1998 Ky. App. LEXIS 138 (Ky. Ct. App. 1998).

Evidence was sufficient to support termination of a mother’s parental rights where the mother had been incarcerated since the birth of the child at issue for reasons directly related to the abuse of an older child, social worker testified that parenting instructions provided did not carry over from one (1) visit to another, and a psychological associate testified that the mother’s history in prison included two (2) suicide attempts and self-mutilation. M.P.S. v. Cabinet for Human Resources ex rel. S.A.S., 979 S.W.2d 114, 1998 Ky. App. LEXIS 66 (Ky. Ct. App. 1998).

Before a circuit court may terminate a parent’s rights, it must find, by clear and convincing evidence: (1) that the child is an abused or neglected child, as defined by KRS 600.020(1); and (2) that termination would be in the child’s best interest. After that threshold is met, a court must find the existence of one of the numerous grounds recited in KRS 625.090(1), including abandonment, infliction of serious physical injury or emotional harm, sexual abuse, or neglect in providing access to basic survival needs, in order to terminate parental rights. Commonwealth v. G.C.W., 139 S.W.3d 172, 2004 Ky. App. LEXIS 215 (Ky. Ct. App. 2004).

Family court properly terminated the parental rights of a minor mother under KRS 625.090 without receiving expert testimony as to the mother’s parenting potential upon adulthood because § 625.090 (2)(e), (g) did not require proof that a minor parent would be unable to effectively parent a child when the parent reached the age of majority. Commonwealth v. T.N.H., 302 S.W.3d 658, 2010 Ky. LEXIS 5 ( Ky. 2010 ).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the child’s best interests would be served if the mother’s rights were terminated, given the evidence that (1) the mother did not have stable housing and was dependent on her boyfriend, (2) she did not pay any child support, (3) the child had special needs based on his drug addiction at birth, and (4) the child was in a foster home, and the child recognized the providers as his parents. D.J.D. v. Cabinet for Health & Family Servs., 350 S.W.3d 833, 2011 Ky. App. LEXIS 259 (Ky. Ct. App. 2011).

Regarding abandonment, neither parent saw the child for more than one year, neither parent worked on his or her case plan, both had child support arrearages, and there was substantial evidence supporting the trial court’s decision to terminate the parents’ rights, and this was not clearly erroneous. C.J.M. v. Cabinet for Health and Family Servs., 389 S.W.3d 155, 2012 Ky. App. LEXIS 301 (Ky. Ct. App. 2012).

Trial court found that the Cabinet of Health and Family Services made reasonable efforts to reunite the parents with the child, and considering the neglect and parents’ lack of insight and lack of progress on their case plans, the trial court properly found that termination was in the child’s best interests. C.J.M. v. Cabinet for Health and Family Servs., 389 S.W.3d 155, 2012 Ky. App. LEXIS 301 (Ky. Ct. App. 2012).

Trial court did not err by finding that at least on ground listed in KRS 625.090(2) existed because: (1) at the time of the termination of parental rights hearing the children had been in the custody and control of the Cabinet for Health and Family Services for over 24 months and for a period of not less than six months, and for reasons other than poverty alone; (2) the parents failed to provide essential parental care and protection for the children, including clothing, shelter, medical care, or education; (3) the parents had not had any contact with their children since September 2010; and (4) the parents did not complete all required substance abuse orders and recommendations, individual counseling services, or parenting classes. C.A.W. v. Cabinet for Health & Family Servs., 391 S.W.3d 400, 2013 Ky. App. LEXIS 24 (Ky. Ct. App. 2013).

Termination of parental rights was proper because the court found that the State had provided all reasonable services; there was ample testimony that both the mother and the children had been offered a number of services throughout the time the children were in foster care and that the services were fully utilized. C.H. v. Cabinet for Health & Family Servs., 399 S.W.3d 782, 2013 Ky. App. LEXIS 116 (Ky. Ct. App. 2013).

It appeared that the trial court relied only on the mother’s incarceration as a ground for termination, but that was just one factor to be considered. M.L.C. v. Cabinet, 411 S.W.3d 761, 2013 Ky. App. LEXIS 136 (Ky. Ct. App. 2013).

Termination of a mother's parental rights was appropriate because a child was found to be abused and neglected based on the infliction of an emotional injury; the child suffered from Reactive Attachment Disorder, and the mother's mental illness made it incapable for her to care for the child. Moreover, the mother inflicted emotional injury to the child, failed to provide adequate parental care and supervision, and failed to provide the essentials of life for the child's overall well-being; termination was in the best interest of the child, reunification efforts were made, and the child's welfare would have improved if termination was ordered. B.E.K. v. Cabinet for Health & Family Servs., 487 S.W.3d 457, 2016 Ky. App. LEXIS 40 (Ky. Ct. App. 2016).

Family court did not err in determining that the grounds in this section were present after a witness testified that in his professional opinion the mother’s disability was such that she was unlikely to improve to a degree that would permit her to give adequate care to the child and there were no services that would abate the concerns if the child were returned to the mother. Commonwealth v. K.S., 585 S.W.3d 202, 2019 Ky. LEXIS 382 ( Ky. 2019 ).

Termination of the mother’s parental rights was proper because the child was neglected as she was born with amphetamines in her system that came from the mother’s use of amphetamines prescribed to her, but she did not inform her physician of her pregnancy; she continuously abused drugs over the two-year period after the child had been removed; she went from one abusive relationship to another and did not complete her protective parenting class; and she did not pay child support; because there was no reasonable expectation of improvement in the mother’s situation within a reasonable amount of time; and because the child had been in foster care for 15 of the most recent 22 months preceding the filing of the petition to terminate. 2019 Ky. App. LEXIS 223 .

Trial court did not err when it admitted into evidence the files from the dependency, neglect, and abuse proceedings of the child and her three siblings because the trial court made independent findings regarding the child’s neglect based on the testimonial evidence produced at trial and did not simply rely on the dependency, neglect, and abuse adjudications; the abuse or neglect of other children in the family was relevant to the current termination proceedings; and the documents were admissible because they were not excluded by hearsay, and were self-authenticating public documents. 2019 Ky. App. LEXIS 223 .

Trial court’s written findings indicated that the father’s parental rights were not terminated solely due to his incarceration; while the offenses he was convicted of all took place before the child was born, it did not make the trial court’s decision erroneous in light of the father’s repeated criminal history, including at least two violent felonies, and the fact that he was likely to remain incarcerated and be unable to actively take care of the child for a substantial time in the future. A.R.D. v. Commonwealth, 606 S.W.3d 105, 2020 Ky. App. LEXIS 92 (Ky. Ct. App. 2020).

3. Abuse and Neglect.

Evidence showing that the defendants’ children lived in a filthy home, suffered from malnutrition, sores and impetigo and were frequently absent from school supported a judgment terminating parental rights. (Decisions under prior law.) Church v. Department for Human Resources, 555 S.W.2d 602, 1977 Ky. App. LEXIS 791 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).

Although incarceration for an isolated criminal offense may not constitute abandonment justifying termination of parental rights, incarceration is a factor to be considered, particularly so where father was incarcerated for the rape of the half-sister of the two (2) children involved. Cabinet for Human Resources v. Rogeski, 909 S.W.2d 660, 1995 Ky. LEXIS 134 ( Ky. 1995 ).

Although testimony consisting of children’s out-of-court statements regarding sexual abuse would be improper in a criminal case, in a termination of parental rights action statements were properly admitted as additional evidence of parental conduct. Crum v. Cabinet for Human Resources, 928 S.W.2d 355, 1996 Ky. App. LEXIS 134 (Ky. Ct. App. 1996).

Although a foster parent does not qualify as an expert witness competent to testify as to the existence of sexual abuse, question posed to foster parent as to whether she believed that the children had been sexually abused was not objectionable nor unfairly prejudicial in bench trial terminating parental rights of mother. Crum v. Cabinet for Human Resources, 928 S.W.2d 355, 1996 Ky. App. LEXIS 134 (Ky. Ct. App. 1996).

Trial court erred in failing to terminate a mother’s parental rights to her four children where, by clear and convincing evidence, the State demonstrated that the children were placed in foster care by the mother because she could not deal with their problems, she had no interaction with them for nearly a year and they were in foster care for over three years, the mother had exposed the children to sexual abuse and exploitation and refused to acknowledge the same, and she was unable and unwilling to care for their needs. Commonwealth v. G.C.W., 139 S.W.3d 172, 2004 Ky. App. LEXIS 215 (Ky. Ct. App. 2004).

Order terminating a father’s parental rights was affirmed where, inter alia, father had no contact with the child for several years, and provided no financial support for 31 months; while the father claimed he did not know where to send support payments, the parties’ agreement included the proper address. B.T.R. v. J.W., 148 S.W.3d 294, 2004 Ky. App. LEXIS 290 (Ky. Ct. App. 2004).

Evidence that the residences the parents and children lived in were unsanitary and unsafe for human habitation, and that the older child had been sexually abused by his uncles and parents, was sufficient to establish that the children were abused and neglected as defined in KRS 600.020(1) and to support the family court’s termination order. Cabinet for Health and Family Servs. v. A.G.G., 190 S.W.3d 338, 2006 Ky. LEXIS 97 ( Ky. 2006 ).

Because there was no substantial evidence to support a finding under either KRS 625.090(1)(a)1. or (a)2., and there was no allegation of criminal charges under subsection (1)(a)3., the family court erred in finding that a child was abused or neglected; thus, as there was no ground supporting termination, the family court abused its discretion in terminating a mother’s parental rights to her daughter. T.G. v. Commonwealth, 2007 Ky. App. LEXIS 158 (Ky. Ct. App.), sub. op., 2007 Ky. App. Unpub. LEXIS 816 (Ky. Ct. App. May 18, 2007), rev'd, 2008 Ky. Unpub. LEXIS 150 (Ky. Aug. 21, 2008).

Grant of petition for adoption without the consent of the biological father, who had undergone gender reassignment surgery, was, in effect, a proceeding to terminate the father’s parental rights based on abuse and neglect. The grant was proper because the evidence showed that the minor child suffered major depression, suicidal ideation, a decline in school performance, physical symptoms and withdrawn behavior, and the child testified the child felt abandoned. M.B. v. D.W., 236 S.W.3d 31, 2007 Ky. App. LEXIS 346 (Ky. Ct. App. 2007).

Termination of a mother’s parental rights was proper under KRS 625.090(2)(c) as the mother had abused her children or allowed them to be abused by a stepfather. J.M.R. v. Commonwealth, 239 S.W.3d 116, 2007 Ky. App. LEXIS 407 (Ky. Ct. App. 2007), overruled, Colvard v. Commonwealth, 309 S.W.3d 239, 2010 Ky. LEXIS 62 ( Ky. 2010 ).

Termination of a mother’s and a father’s parental rights was supported by substantial evidence and was in their children’s best interests because there was ongoing domestic violence between the mother and the father and the parents and the children, the parents did little to resolve their drug and alcohol dependency, the parents continuously or repeatedly failed to provide or were incapable of providing essential food, clothing, shelter, medical care or education reasonably necessary and available for the children’s well-being and there was no reasonable expectation of significant improvement in the parents’ conduct in the immediately foreseeable future, one child was sexually abused by her parents and her uncles, another child was deemed a high suicide risk, and the parents failed to make sufficient progress toward identified goals as set forth in the court-approved case plan which would have allowed for the children’s safe return. C.R.G. v. Cabinet for Health & Fam. Servs., 297 S.W.3d 914, 2009 Ky. App. LEXIS 215 (Ky. Ct. App. 2009).

Finding that mother stipulated to abusing the child based on prenatal drug use met the first prong of the test under KRS 625.090 . D.J.D. v. Cabinet for Health & Family Servs., 350 S.W.3d 833, 2011 Ky. App. LEXIS 259 (Ky. Ct. App. 2011).

Termination of parental rights was inappropriate pursuant to KRS 625.090(5) because the parents were loving, they had the potential to learn at least some appropriate parenting skills, and they had repeatedly demonstrated a willingness to learn and change their behavior at the request of Cabinet for Health and Family Services. D.G.R. v. Commonwealth, 364 S.W.3d 106, 2012 Ky. LEXIS 36 ( Ky. 2012 ).

KRS 600.020(1)(a)(2) allowed a finding by a court of neglect or abuse where the risk of abuse existed, and in this termination case, the child tested positive for marijuana at birth and the parents admitted to using such before and during the pregnancy, such that there was sufficient evidence to remove the child from the home in order to ensure her safety. C.J.M. v. Cabinet for Health and Family Servs., 389 S.W.3d 155, 2012 Ky. App. LEXIS 301 (Ky. Ct. App. 2012).

Parents conceded that the child was neglected or abused since they did not contest such. C.J.M. v. Cabinet for Health and Family Servs., 389 S.W.3d 155, 2012 Ky. App. LEXIS 301 (Ky. Ct. App. 2012).

Trial court did not err by determining that the children were abused and/or neglected under KRS 600.020 , 625.090 because the parents admitted that their children were neglected as a result of their substance abuse issues and admitted that because of their lack of supervision of one child she was injured and sustained a bruise to her face. C.A.W. v. Cabinet for Health & Family Servs., 391 S.W.3d 400, 2013 Ky. App. LEXIS 24 (Ky. Ct. App. 2013).

Language of this section clearly mandates that the trial court must find that each parent satisfies the three prongs found in the terminate the parental rights statute, including whether the child qualifies as an abused or neglected child. Cabinet for Health and Family Servs. v. K.H., 423 S.W.3d 204, 2014 Ky. LEXIS 13 ( Ky. 2014 ).

Substantial evidence supported conclusion that son was abused or neglected under this section, including evidence that the father had not seen his son since his removal from his mother in June 2009, he refused to provide documentation that he had a steady job or was making child support payments, and he had a very limited understanding of his son’s psychological needs. Cabinet for Health and Family Servs. v. K.H., 423 S.W.3d 204, 2014 Ky. LEXIS 13 ( Ky. 2014 ).

Termination of the mother’s parental rights was improper because the evidence did not show that the child was neglected; while a doctor stated that the mother’s limited intellect gave rise to a risk of neglect, that is not the same as neglect but rather indicates a child is dependent. The mother never had custody of the child, never neglected the child, and complied with her case plan, and while she had developmental disabilities, that alone was insufficient to render her behavior as neglectful. K.S. v. Commonwealth, 2018 Ky. App. LEXIS 224 (Ky. Ct. App. Aug. 17, 2018), rev'd, 585 S.W.3d 202, 2019 Ky. LEXIS 382 ( Ky. 2019 ).

4. Required Services.

The Cabinet for Human Resources (CHR) did not fail to provide services required by this section to a father whose children were removed: the CHR proposed a treatment plan providing for a five (5) day foster care conference, but the parents failed to take advantage of services offered; the CHR provided an alcohol treatment program, with which the father failed to cooperate; and the father was incarcerated between the time the children were removed and the hearing for termination. Prater v. Cabinet for Human Resources, 954 S.W.2d 954, 1997 Ky. LEXIS 121 ( Ky. 1997 ), superseded, 1997 Ky. LEXIS 122 (Ky. June 19, 1997).

Although the agency was not required to amend its permanency goal from reasonable efforts/reunification to termination/adoption prior to the filing the termination petition, because the agency failed to prove the requirements for termination in KRS 625.090 , the trial court properly dismissed its petition. Commonwealth v. C.V., 192 S.W.3d 703, 2006 Ky. App. LEXIS 148 (Ky. Ct. App. 2006).

Cabinet of Health and Family Services had an obligation to make reasonable efforts toward reunification as required by KRS 625.090(3). C.J.M. v. Cabinet for Health and Family Servs., 389 S.W.3d 155, 2012 Ky. App. LEXIS 301 (Ky. Ct. App. 2012).

There was no error in the judgment regarding reasonable efforts for the mother, for purposes of KRS 625.090(3), 620.020(11), given that the Cabinet of Health and Family Services offered the mother many services, but she ultimately stopped attending parenting classes, participating in drug tests and abstaining from drug and alcohol use, completing various assessments, and making planned visits with the child; there was substantial evidence that the Cabinet offered services to the mother and she failed to avail herself of those services. C.J.M. v. Cabinet for Health and Family Servs., 389 S.W.3d 155, 2012 Ky. App. LEXIS 301 (Ky. Ct. App. 2012).

5. Standard of Review.

Standards governing appellate review require an appellate court to accord considerable deference to the findings of a trial court in a termination of parental rights case. Its findings cannot be disturbed unless there is no substantial evidence in the record to support them. Commonwealth v. G.C.W., 139 S.W.3d 172, 2004 Ky. App. LEXIS 215 (Ky. Ct. App. 2004).

Since standard of review in termination of parental rights action was confined to the clearly erroneous standard in CR 52.01, the court applied that standard to custodians’ appeal of orders denying their adoption petitions. Substantial evidence supported the family court’s finding that involuntary termination of the children’s biological mother would not be in the children’s best interest, so the standard for involuntary termination under KRS 625.090 was not met. C.M.C. v. A.L.W., 180 S.W.3d 485, 2005 Ky. App. LEXIS 246 (Ky. Ct. App. 2005).

Although a mother alleged her child’s father had severely beaten her and had held her and the child hostage, that he failed to pay child support, and that he had abandoned the child for nearly two (2) years, since she presented no evidence to show that termination of the father’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest, the evidence did not compel a finding that the father’s parental rights should have been terminated, and the trial court’s denial of her termination petition was not clearly erroneous. K.R.L. v. P.A.C., 210 S.W.3d 183, 2006 Ky. App. LEXIS 349 (Ky. Ct. App. 2006).

Review of KRS 625.090(1)(a)1. does not reveal any indication that the legislature intended a finding under subsection (1)(a)1. to be a rebuttable presumption. T.G. v. Commonwealth, 2007 Ky. App. LEXIS 158 (Ky. Ct. App.), sub. op., 2007 Ky. App. Unpub. LEXIS 816 (Ky. Ct. App. May 18, 2007), rev'd, 2008 Ky. Unpub. LEXIS 150 (Ky. Aug. 21, 2008).

Because a Circuit Court may perform an independent review of the evidence submitted in the dependency action and make its own determination of abuse or neglect based upon the elevated standard of proof and either party would be permitted to offer proof to establish facts that led to the lower court’s finding of abuse, neglect or dependency, KRS 625.090(1)(a)1. is constitutional, so long as it is correctly applied. T.G. v. Commonwealth, 2007 Ky. App. LEXIS 158 (Ky. Ct. App.), sub. op., 2007 Ky. App. Unpub. LEXIS 816 (Ky. Ct. App. May 18, 2007), rev'd, 2008 Ky. Unpub. LEXIS 150 (Ky. Aug. 21, 2008).

6. Sufficiency of Evidence.

Trial court properly found that termination of a mother's parental rights was in the children's best interest because the trial court acted appropriately in taking judicial notice of its prior adjudication of neglect regarding the children and the record was replete with evidence regarding every statutory factor regarding termination and the children's best interests. M.A.B. v. Commonwealth, 456 S.W.3d 407, 2015 Ky. App. LEXIS 22 (Ky. Ct. App. 2015).

The evidence presented buy the Kentucky Cabinet for Family Services was insufficient to support the family court’s findings of medical and educational neglect of the children as the allegations of medical neglect centered on a special needs child and there was no evidence as to why the child missed doctors appointments, there was no evidence as to how much school the children had missed, and the fact that the oldest child was reading at a level far below his grade level did not, in and of itself, indicate parental neglect. V.S. v. Commonwealth, 194 S.W.3d 331, 2006 Ky. App. LEXIS 173 (Ky. Ct. App. 2006).

Kentucky Cabinet of Family Services position that mother’s parental rights to her three children should be terminated based, at least in part, because she was unable to provide a suitable home was not supported by the evidence presented at a termination hearing; the Cabinet did not adduce specific testimony as to how the home was unsuitable, a social service worker’s opinion’s on that issue were not supported by facts, and the Cabinet did not show that the allegedly substandard home was due to factors other than poverty alone, as was required by KRS 625.090(2)(g). V.S. v. Commonwealth, 194 S.W.3d 331, 2006 Ky. App. LEXIS 173 (Ky. Ct. App. 2006).

It was in a child’s best interest to terminate his mother’s parental rights under KRS 625.090 , as clear and convincing evidence established that she did not protect him from his abuser or provide him with a safe home, food, clothing, shelter, medical care, or education, and there was no expectation of significant improvement in her conduct. A.D.B. v. Commonwealth, 205 S.W.3d 255, 2006 Ky. App. LEXIS 400 (Ky. Ct. App. 2006).

Cabinet for Health and Family Services failed to meet its burden of establishing, by clear and convincing evidence, grounds for terminating the teenage mother’s parental rights; termination could not be based solely on the mother’s prior behavior without some objective assessment of the mother’s psychological and mental capacity to develop the required parenting abilities to effectively parent where age and emotional immaturity contributed to the mother’s lack of parenting skills. T.N.H. v. J.L.H., 2007 Ky. App. LEXIS 325 (Ky. Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2007), rev'd, 302 S.W.3d 658, 2010 Ky. LEXIS 5 ( Ky. 2010 ).

Substantial evidence supported the termination of a mother’s parental rights under KRS 625.090(2)(g) as there was clear and convincing evidence under CR 52.01 that the mother had failed to provide the necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical care, or education for her children since she had not paid any child support, and still resided in the stepfather’s house where the stepfather paid the bills. J.M.R. v. Commonwealth, 239 S.W.3d 116, 2007 Ky. App. LEXIS 407 (Ky. Ct. App. 2007), overruled, Colvard v. Commonwealth, 309 S.W.3d 239, 2010 Ky. LEXIS 62 ( Ky. 2010 ).

Judgment terminating a parent’s parental rights under KRS 625.090 was an abuse of discretion, as the Cabinet for Health and Family Services failed to meet its burden for establishing grounds for termination because all of its court testimony focused on past behavior without any significant evaluation of future parenting capacity. The goal from reunification to termination was changed after only eight months, during which time the parent was either incarcerated or hospitalized. M.E.C. v. Commonwealth, 254 S.W.3d 846, 2008 Ky. App. LEXIS 158 (Ky. Ct. App. 2008).

Circuit court erred in terminating a father’s parental rights based upon willful abandonment and allowing the child’s stepfather to adopt him because the record showed that the mother thwarted the father’s attempts to visit with his son, that the mother treated the father with hostility and resentment, that the mother and her new husband removed the child from Kentucky every Father’s Day, that the father asked his family members to keep in contact with his child and the mother admonished them to stay away from the child, and that the mother never informed the father about the child’s extracurricular activities. Despite the mother’s attempts to sever the parent-child relationship between father and son, however, the record also reflected that the father was current in his child support obligation and that he sent gifts to the boy. P.C.C. v. C.M.C., 297 S.W.3d 590, 2009 Ky. App. LEXIS 144 (Ky. Ct. App. 2009).

Court erred in failing to terminate a father’s parental rights because the child never had a relationship with the father, the father would not come forth as the child’s father or help remove him from an admittedly abusive home, and he was not capable of handling the child’s physical needs on a daily basis. Cabinet for Health & Family Servs. v. I.W., 338 S.W.3d 295, 2010 Ky. App. LEXIS 232 (Ky. Ct. App. 2010).

Trial court found, for purposes of KRS 625.090(2)(e), (g), that the mother repeatedly failed to provide care and protection for the child and there was no expectation of improvement, plus she failed to provide the child food and other care, for reasons other than just poverty, and the findings were supported by substantial evidence, for purposes of CR 52.01; in part, the mother had a long history of drug abuse, had no employment and was dependent on her boyfriend for her needs, the child suffered drug withdrawal, had developmental delays, and had bonded with his foster parents, the child was denied fundamental necessities by the mother based on her drug abuse and lack of a stable home, and although the mother’s four-month long sobriety was commendable, there was substantial evidence to support the trial court’s termination order. D.J.D. v. Cabinet for Health & Family Servs., 350 S.W.3d 833, 2011 Ky. App. LEXIS 259 (Ky. Ct. App. 2011).

Trial court did parrot the legal language required in the statute, but did not explain or cite to evidence supporting its decision concerning any of the facts, as reunification efforts were not detailed, and there was no support for the best interest finding; without clear evidence to support its findings, the trial court’s ruling amounted to an abuse of discretion. M.L.C. v. Cabinet, 411 S.W.3d 761, 2013 Ky. App. LEXIS 136 (Ky. Ct. App. 2013).

Circuit court order terminating the mother's parental rights to her daughter was affirmed where a case worker testified to at least three grounds for termination, Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 625.090(2)(e), (g) and (j), the mother did not refute the testimony, the mother had not done the work required of her to address her admitted substance abuse issues and grief, and the trial court had not abused its discretion in denying her motion for a continuance. W.L.C. v. Commonwealth, 484 S.W.3d 737, 2016 Ky. App. LEXIS 12 (Ky. Ct. App. 2016).

Trial court erred in terminating the father’s parental rights, as the father made requests for visitation, attended a substance abuse assessment and the recommended classes, had not touched alcohol for more than a year, had negative drug screens, had full-time employment, had housing, and could afford to hire someone to watch the children while he was at work, which prevented the Cabinet for Health and Family Services from establishing that there was no reasonable expectation for improvement. F.V. v. Commonwealth, 567 S.W.3d 597, 2018 Ky. App. LEXIS 315 (Ky. Ct. App. 2018).

Trial court did not err in denying a petition to terminate the mother’s parental rights, as substantial evidence supported the court’s findings that the daughters had a relationship with the mother, that the mother had demonstrated a creditable effort in her work towards sobriety, and that the mother would continue in her attempts to reunify with her children. Commonwealth v. J.M.A., 2020 Ky. App. LEXIS 126 (Ky. Ct. App. Dec. 4, 2020).

7. Right to Counsel.

Because an indigent mother and father were not afforded counsel at a goal change hearing held before the district court, as well as during other critical stages of the dependency action, an order terminating their parental rights was improper, as such detrimentally affected the termination proceeding before the circuit court when the court made an erroneous finding of fact that the child had been in foster care for 15 of the preceding 22 months. R.V. v. Commonwealth, 242 S.W.3d 669, 2007 Ky. App. LEXIS 298 (Ky. Ct. App. 2007).

8. Adoption.

Denial of a petition for the adoption of the child of a biological father who had not consented to the adoption was proper; there were no allegations set forth against the biological father which would have constituted a condition sufficient to terminate his parental rights as required by KRS 199.502 (1), and which were the same conditions set forth in KRS 625.090(2); the provisions of KRS ch. 625 were applicable only as permitted by KRS 199.500(4), and as specifically enumerated in KRS 199.502 . R.M. v. R.B., 281 S.W.3d 293, 2009 Ky. App. LEXIS 33 (Ky. Ct. App. 2009).

9. Procedure.

There was no error in a trial court’s procedure in conducting an evidentiary hearing on an adoption petition and essentially permitting the presentation of a case for the involuntary termination of the nonconsenting biological father’s parental rights under KRS ch. 625 because the substantial provisions of KRS 625.090(2) pertaining to the involuntary termination of parental rights were identical to KRS 199.502(1). R.M. v. R.B., 281 S.W.3d 293, 2009 Ky. App. LEXIS 33 (Ky. Ct. App. 2009).

Fact that an involuntary termination of parental rights action was pending did not prevent the parents from filing a petition for voluntary termination of parental rights, nor did it take away their right to consent to adoption of their child by the child’s paternal grandparents. The fact that they filed their petition before their parental rights were terminated made their voluntary petition timely. Commonwealth v. L.J.P., 316 S.W.3d 871, 2010 Ky. LEXIS 120 ( Ky. 2010 ).

Had the mother been present in person to testify, her testimony would have been the same, and thus the court found no error in the trial court’s denial of a continuance in this termination of parental rights case. M.L.C. v. Cabinet, 411 S.W.3d 761, 2013 Ky. App. LEXIS 136 (Ky. Ct. App. 2013).

Trial court erred in terminating a father's rights to his three minor children because the trial court, inter alia, did not make adequate findings regarding the best interest of the children, did not include any specific written facts to support its conclusion, did not consider whether the father could improve if provided with some level of support or offered the opportunity to complete a parenting plan, allowed the guardian ad litem to provide an evidentiary report, and relied on that report. M.L.W. v. Heart to Home Adoption Agency, 2016 Ky. App. LEXIS 96 (Ky. Ct. App. June 10, 2016), sub. op., 2017 Ky. App. Unpub. LEXIS 138 (Ky. Ct. App. Feb. 17, 2017).

While the trial court was attempting to provide a mother one last chance to “rebuild her life” before terminating her parental rights, the express statutory procedure did not permit the trial court to “defer” the matter beyond the statutory period where the terms “either” and “or,” combined with the lack of any other alternative outcome in the other parts of the statute, limited the trial court's options following trial and rendered the trial court's selection between these options mandatory. K.M.J. v. Cabinet for Health & Family Servs., 503 S.W.3d 193, 2016 Ky. App. LEXIS 183 (Ky. Ct. App. 2016).

Family court was not required to issue its interlocutory judgment within 30 days of the termination portion of the bifurcated hearing where Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 625.090(6) did not apply to actions brought under Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 199.502 . A.F. v. L.B., 572 S.W.3d 64, 2019 Ky. App. LEXIS 26 (Ky. Ct. App. 2019).

10. Burden of Proof.

Mother's parental rights were properly terminated because the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) was not triggered where the child was not in any way raised in an Indian home or environment and then removed, pursuant to the Existing Indian Family Doctrine; therefore, the beyond a reasonable doubt standard was not appropriate. Moreover, the mother was not prejudiced because the family court did not reach its decision by applying a lesser standard of proof than the clear and convincing standard applicable in non-ICWA cases. S.L.C.E. v. Cabinet for Health & Family Servs., 454 S.W.3d 305, 2014 Ky. App. LEXIS 191 (Ky. Ct. App. 2014).

10. Best Interests.

Trial court did not err by determining that termination of parental rights was in the children’s best interests under KRS 625.090(3) because the evidence showed that: (1) the parents’ psychological assessments showed that they could not raise their children without significant help; (2) the Cabinet for Health and Family Services made all reasonable efforts to reunite the children with their parents before filing the termination of parental rights action; (3) the parents did not comply with treatment services; and (4) the children formed a very strong bond with their foster parents; (5) the parents did not provide the children with financial assistance, food, clothing, shelter, medical, or educational care. C.A.W. v. Cabinet for Health & Family Servs., 391 S.W.3d 400, 2013 Ky. App. LEXIS 24 (Ky. Ct. App. 2013).

Termination of a mother’s parental rights was in the children’s best interests because the mother suffered from both mental and physical illness that impaired her ability to care for her children, the mother failed to pay child support despite being able to obtain gainful employment, and ther